BEYOND A CONTEST OF WILLS: A THEORY OF STATE SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN INSURGENT CONFLICTS

DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

Within a large and growing literature on insurgencies, scholars have engaged in fierce debate about the determinants of conflict outcomes. Having noted that material capability is a poor predictor of conflict outcomes, intense disagreement has arisen over why this is the case. Some argue that insurgencies are defeated through military and police means of punishment and prosecution. This is referred to as the combat model. Others argue that insurgencies are ultimately defeated through political means, and I refer to this as the social model. Why each of these two processes is thought to be more effective is rarely well explained or specified by their proponents.

Because each of these model yields different and competing expectations for the outcomes of insurgent conflicts, I evaluate their relative merits in this study. To evaluate these two competing schools of thought in the security studies literature, I present a conditional theory of insurgent outcomes that predicts when the combat and social models will be relevant. In order to do this, I approach insurgencies using scholarship from the study of terrorism, deriving three archetypical motivational logics of insurgency action: strategic, organizational, and extremist. From the scholarship on insurgencies, I also develop a typology of counterinsurgency strategies focusing on three broad but distinct strategic approaches: policing, accommodation, and reciprocal punishment. The
combination of a particular insurgent motivation with a particular counterinsurgent strategy will result in an increase or decrease in insurgent violence.

I hypothesize that this conditional model will better predict insurgent outcomes than either the combat model or the social model alone. However, even if it does not, its evaluation will still serve as a useful comparison of the relative merits of those two models. To test the model I code statements made by leaders of insurgencies to discern their motivations and compare these codings to the organizational dynamics and actions of the insurgency to arrive at a categorization of the group according to one of the dynamics I described. I also code statements and policies enacted by the government that make up its counterinsurgency strategy in order to arrive a coding of its strategic behavior. Based on the combination of these two codings, I predict either insurgent success or failure in that given time period. Then, I track insurgent incidents and insurgent-caused fatalities as a means of evaluating this prediction. I make predictions and evaluate their results in four case studies: The Chechen insurgency against Russia (1994-present), the PIRA insurgency against Great Britain (1969-1999), the LTTE insurgency against Sri Lanka (1976-present), and the Algerian insurgency against France (1954-1962).

I find that the conditional model of insurgent conflict correctly predicts the change in insurgent violence in nine of 14 strategic periods, representing 75 of the total 97 years under analysis. The social model correctly predicts 10 of the 14 strategic periods, representing 70 of the 97 years. The combat model correctly predicts four of the 14 strategic periods, representing 27 of the 97 years. Overall, I found that the conditional
performs as well as the social model in predicting insurgent conflict outcomes, and much better than the combat model. The results of this study indicate that scholars of insurgency and violence in general should give greater consideration to both the strategic choices of states and the motivations of the insurgents themselves.
Dedicated to my amazing wife, Stacy.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"As time went by our need to fight for the ideal increased to an unquestioning possession, riding with spur and rein over our doubts. Willy-nilly it became a faith. We had sold ourselves into its slavery, manacled ourselves together in its chain-gang, bowed ourselves to serve its holiness with all our good and ill content."1

The preceding quotation by T. E. Lawrence describes his common bond with his fellow insurgents in the Arabian Peninsula in his famous memoirs, Seven Pillars of Wisdom. Yet, what is so intriguing about this quote is that we can easily imagine a similar sentiment expressed, with varying degrees of eloquence, by any number of soldiers and combatants who have fought for the armies of nations or smaller insurgent movements.2 With men and often women deeply committed to their cause on both sides of the struggle, we would regularly expect that the better equipped, funded, and larger army would regularly carry the day. Yet, this does not seem to be the case.

Rather, it often seems that small insurgent groups, lacking parity in material capabilities by any number of measures, succeed in sustaining combat against much larger and better-equipped forces. In some cases, this continuation of violence has been sufficient to wring costly concessions from their opponents. Simply stated, why is it the

2 See also the excellent work by Lawrence, T. E. (1920). "The Evolution of a Revolt." Army Quarterly and Defence Journal.
case that materially weaker insurgent groups are often able to persist in their campaign of violence against states? Why do insurgent groups with even less military might than Lawrence’s Arabs perpetuate violence despite concerted efforts by their opponents (Keeley 1996)? This is certainly a puzzle for anyone concerned with the ability of states to reflect their power in terms of their military capabilities. It is the focus of this dissertation.

To understand why states sometimes succeed and other times fail to reduce insurgent violence, I first turn to the extant literature on insurgencies and neighboring fields of conflict. As I will demonstrate, there are several competing notions of what makes insurgent campaigns more or less likely to be successful. These competing notions range from recommendations to obliterate insurgents militarily to tactics for engaging and even granting significant concessions to insurgents (Henry 2007). I evaluate these competing notions by testing an explanatory model of insurgent conflict. My explanatory model proposes that states succeed or fail in their efforts to ameliorate insurgent violence because of an interaction between the type of counterinsurgent strategy that the state pursues and the motivational characteristics of the insurgent group represented in its leadership. I investigate this model with a set of structured case studies. Thus, even if the proposed model is disproved, the results of the study will still lend insight into the factors that make success or failure more likely in an insurgent campaign.

Roadmap to the Dissertation

While much of the study of international security has focused on war between states (Waltz 1959; Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1981), scholars also address a variety of violent
conflicts outside the realm of interstate war (Huntington 1962; Gurr 1970; Singer 1979; Geller 1998; Gurr 2000). These conflicts include civil war, ethnic conflict, guerilla insurgencies, and terrorism (Midlarsky 1992; Lake 1996; Lake 1998; Walter 1999; Laqueur 2001; Laqueur 2003; Harff 2004). Such is the predicament when the United Kingdom attempts to pacify the IRA, or when the United States seeks to quell insurgency within the nascent Iraqi state.

How states deal with violent, non-state actors like insurgents is an important subject for study within international relations for several reasons. First, by examining the full gamut of conflicts, we can get a better picture of the role of war and the use of violence by states and others in the international system. Second, we can better appreciate the extent of state capabilities to exert force and control within their territory. Furthermore, we can better understand how states perceive their choices in terms of ameliorating these threats. How do we study the full range of conflicts involving states? International relations scholarship has tended to focus on conflicts where states fight each other, and especially where great powers fight each other (Mearsheimer 2001). Yet, many scholars seek to extend international relations scholarship to questions outside of conflict between states. In that mold, this project seeks to address a particular type of conflict that has been little studied and less theorized.

Within the realm of international relations, material power is often assumed to be a major predictor of success in international conflicts. Yet, there are cases where weaker entities defeat stronger entities in wars and conflicts. Theories for why this might happen between states abound (Blainey 1988; Van Evera 1999; Arreguin-Toft 2001; Biddle
2004; Arreguin-Toft 2005). Yet, these theories often do not directly address the particular characteristics and challenges inherent in a state’s quest to end a violent insurgency. Surely, a state should predominantly prevail over a materially weaker non-state actor. Yet, this does not appear to be the case. Insurgencies are often difficult for states to put down and may even be observed to gain strength in the face of state coercion. Thus, there is a real puzzle and a gap in the literature in answering it. *That is, why do states sometimes succeed in reducing violent conflict against materially weaker insurgencies, and why do they sometimes fail?*

This study undertakes the task of developing a theory to address important aspects of these conflicts and why states succeed or fail to ameliorate them. I propose that the actions of states can be grouped into three general strategic conceptions. States select these strategies for a variety of reasons. In the first option, the state can try to police against actions of the groups, arrest members of the group through standard means of law, and seek to undermine the group through tactics that would also be employed by any other type of organized crime. In the second option, the state adds to the base strategy of the first option by attempting to raise the costs of the non-state actor’s violence by punishing them with strategy of reciprocal violence. In the third and final option, states can opt for a strategy of accommodation: attempting to integrate the group into a nonviolent realm of the political process. Various states may even be observed to attempt more than one of these strategies over the course of their interaction with a particular non-state group. These three state strategies represent approaches to counterinsurgency described in various bodies of literature.
Variance in state strategy does not alone explain the outcomes of insurgent conflicts. I also propose that insurgent groups can be grouped into three general conceptions of decision-making. The first conception is that groups strategically and instrumentally connect their actions to their stated goals. The second conception suggests that groups are motivated by internal dynamics and that these dynamics create a disjunction between groups’ stated goals and their actions. Finally, the third conception is that groups do not see a difference between their stated long-term goals and the short-term tactics they employ. Furthermore, violence is the dominant choice in their decision-making because it is central to their understanding of themselves. These three concepts reflect strategic, organizational, and extremist portraits of insurgent groups that have been painted in extant literature.

I propose that it is the interaction of the general strategy of the state and the general conception of the group’s decision-making that predicts success or failure in an insurgent conflict. That is, when a strategically oriented group is faced with a strategy of reciprocal violence, the group’s violence will be quelled more efficiently than if either of the other strategies is employed. This is additionally true when an organizationally oriented group is faced with an accommodationist strategy and when an extremist-oriented group is faced with a basic policing strategy.

For this study, I am selecting a group of conflicts that are representative of the universe of state-insurgent conflicts. It is appropriate to center the study on a careful consideration of a small set of cases, rather than on summary consideration of a large set of cases, because such an approach will allow me to better distinguish nuance and
process within the cases themselves and will allow me to better reject or find support for the theory.

Also for this study, I have developed explicit coding rules to interpret narrative accounts of conflicts and to code both the strategic choices of states and the decision-making characteristics of insurgent groups. I also code the goals of both the insurgent groups and the states. I am applying these coding rules to a selection of first-hand accounts, histories, secondary interviews, news articles, and press releases as well as academic treatments of the conflicts. I use these accounts to construct a narrative of the insurgent conflict as well as an evaluation of events that measures the intensity of the insurgency. I then examine whether states’ strategic choices and the motivation of groups’ decision-making accurately predicts the relative success or failure of the state in ameliorating violence from the group.

For the remainder of this chapter I frame this dissertation’s puzzle by reviewing several disparate literatures that deal with conflicts involving non-state entities. I first discuss the direct literature on insurgencies from a historical perspective. Then I offer a more brief discussion of the scholarship on civil wars, ethnic conflict, and terrorism as they inform our understanding of insurgencies. Then I make a case for a relationship between these disparate fields of study and argue that there is a place for theorization about insurgencies that takes account of the strategic choices of states and the motivational dynamics of insurgent organizations. Finally, I briefly discuss the plan of this study and its theoretical limits and constraints.
The Historical Development of Insurgency Scholarship

On December 15, 2006, for the first time in twenty years, the United States Army issued a newly updated manual for fighting a counterinsurgency campaign. This event has been anticipated, not merely for the potentially new doctrine that the manual contains, but because it is a hallmark of a renewed focus and interest in the causes and processes of insurgency and the best ways for a military to fight them. Not surprisingly, some of the recommendations within the new manual are quite distinct from traditional war fighting (2006). Yet, these recommendations did not emerge from a vacuum of theory. Rather, over a long period of time, scholars as well as leaders of insurgent and counterinsurgent campaigns have been concerned with what leads to their success and failure.

Of course, thinking about how insurgents fight or how to fight effectively against them is not new. As quoted above, British military officer T. E. Lawrence describes the mobilization of Arabs from 1916 to 1918 to fight against the Ottoman Empire, thereby limiting the effectiveness of that much larger army and allowing the British Army to succeed more quickly in the Middle East (Lawrence 1935). Just as Lawrence’s memoir gives numerous lessons for the effective prosecution of an insurgency, other classics have expounded upon the development of an effective insurgency campaign (Leighton 1962; 1963). Mao Zedong describes the principles that the Communists employed to seize power in China. His dictums and explanations still serve as a blueprint not only for future tacticians of insurgencies, but practitioners as well (Mao 1961). This can readily be seen, even across the political spectrum, in an examination of the guerilla warfare
manual promulgated in Nicaragua in the 1980s via the CIA (Tayacan 1985). In early works like Lawrence, the focus is on the internal organization and especially leadership of an insurgency campaign, as well as their tactics. Mao takes this tact several steps further with his consideration of the relationship between the insurgency and the local populace. However, both works, as well as most modern insurgency manuals are merely proscriptive; they do not explain why insurgent campaigns succeed or fail.

Whereas some of the works wisely considered foundational in insurgency scholarship are anecdotal and geared toward recommendations stemming from or toward a specific campaign, subsequent work has tended toward explaining insurgencies and introducing the concept of counterinsurgency. Drawing on observational experience in China, Greece, Southeast Asia, and Algeria, David Galula begins to seek commonalities across various insurgency campaigns (Galula 1964). Galula’s early work serves as a template for many successive efforts in the realm of insurgency scholarship in that he devotes the first half of his text to a description of the unifying and typifying characteristics of insurgencies. Then, armed with these generalizations, he devotes the second half to proscriptive measures designed to mount a successful counterinsurgency campaign. However, Galula’s early work is found wanting by many subsequent authors in that many of his recommendations focus on returning a region to stability after insurgent forces have been defeated. The actual process of defeating insurgent forces is often the crucial step in reducing violence and it is the puzzle of this study.

Other authors of the time seemed to consider guerillas and insurgents to be something akin to a naturally occurring characteristic of the international system.
Perhaps they could be manipulated by powerful states, but their origin and eventual
decline was not considered (Paret 1962). Of course, emerging as it did in the 1960s,
insurgency scholarship has a distinct Cold War orientation. Many early works do not
distinguish between Communist insurgencies and insurgency as a broader category of
analysis (Leighton 1962; Pustay 1965). One author who did manage to make this
distinction was the French military theorist, Roger Trinquier, who makes two critical
distinctions in his work that serve as both foundational assumptions for future work in
insurgencies and also provide links to the other literatures discussed in this chapter
(Trinquier 1964). First, Trinquier defines insurgency as a separate class of conflict from
other types of modern warfare and notes that a principle feature of insurgencies is the
employment of terrorism as a tactic of the insurgents. Trinquier notes that like modern
militaries, insurgents are trying to control the populace, but given their relatively weak
position, they cannot indirectly control the populace by occupying territory, and so they
must do it directly by influencing the population. This suggests that both an
understanding of terrorism as a tactic, as well as knowledge of groups who opt for
terrorism are important for analyzing insurgency. Additionally, Trinquier is important
for noting that many modern militaries (here his frame of reference is the French
experience in Algeria and Indochina) employ the wrong lessons in fighting insurgencies
(see also (Fall 1963)). However, by adopting a different set of strategic assumptions,
Trinquier believes that militaries can permanently undermine the tendencies toward
insurgency. This is important because it demonstrates thinking echoed so recently in the
new Army handbook on counterinsurgency: fighting against insurgents requires a
different set of strategic choices than fighting against a regular army. Yet, we will see that part of the puzzle of this study reveals that some insurgencies decrease in violence after military engagement has subsided and political engagement is developed.

Throughout the 1960s, while inroads were clearly being made to develop a social science around the concept of insurgency, much of the work remained historical and narrative in nature. While this work does not advance the theory building goals of this project, much of it is useful for providing cogent accounts of the prosecution of counterinsurgency campaigns (Clutterbuck 1966). However, a second strand of literature, with its roots in Trinquier and Galula, developed in the late 1960s and 1970s as the United States grappled with its involvement in Vietnam. This literature seems to take one of two primary tracks. The first follows the second half of Trinquier in attempting to promote counterinsurgent strategies. An exemplar of this work is the RAND publication, *Rebellion and Authority* (Leites 1970). The fact that RAND, as a quasi-governmental research group, turned its focus to insurgency at this time is suggestive of the perception of the increased policy importance of counterinsurgency. *Rebellion and Authority* is interesting in that it seeks to explain and provide proscriptions dealing with insurgency using systems theory. This text is important in that it draws a distinction between coercion, as applied between the state and the insurgent group, on the one hand, and a battle for the hearts and minds of the local populace on the other. Where the book fails is in its contention that these approaches are in some way exclusive. The puzzle for this study is to seek to understand what combination of military tactics and political tactics serve to ameliorate insurgent violence. The second track of this literature is focused on a
deeper and yet analytical understanding of the insurgents themselves. This is aptly demonstrated in Andrew Scott’s *Insurgency* (Scott 1970). At the same time, some scholars began to think about the application of psychology to explain insurgency, whereas to this point, insurgents had been assumed to be motivated by material ends (Ben Rafael 1979).

In the early 1980s, scholars attempted to draw lessons from the American experience in Vietnam, as well as other post-colonial rebellions and insurgencies around the world. Important in this literature is the effort of Bard O’Neill to not only provide an overarching theory of the behavior of insurgents, but also to use this framework to explain historical cases and then draw implications for counterinsurgency (O’Neill 1980), see also (Chaliand 1982). However, more generally the 1980s were a relatively dry time in scholarship on insurgency. This would change radically at the end of the Cold War. The early 1990s served as a time for many scholars to reflect on the Cold War experience. Out of this reflection came a number of interesting and useful historical and analytical works dealing with insurgency (Shafer 1988; Blaufarb 1989; McClintock 1992; Carruthers 1995). Also at this time, major powers turned their attention to various types of “new wars” and as a result, the scholarship on insurgency found new life (Metz 1995; Mockaitis 1995; Hamilton 1997). However, many times this literature delves specifically into how various states can position themselves to fight insurgency, real or hypothetical, rather than the broader theoretical contribution of trying to understand what fuels insurgencies and what determines the outcomes of the interactions of insurgency and counterinsurgent campaigns.
The events of 9/11 and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and especially Iraq have further complicated the literature on insurgency. In some ways, these events have been fruitful. The Bush administration’s decision to link the invasion of Iraq with the concomitant war on terror has been roundly criticized, but an incidental effect has been an increased consideration of the links between terrorism and insurgency (Kalyvas 2001; Hashim 2006; Byman and Pollack 2007). This is most clearly demonstrated in Bard O’Neill’s excellent introduction to insurgency (O'Neill 2005), see also (Gareau 2004; Bunker 2005). However, others have drawn back on the insurgency scholarship of the 1970s to seek a basis for scholarship today (Cassidy 2004; Joes 2004; Thomas 2004). Perhaps the most important work out of this substantial body of literature is John Nagl’s comparison of British and American counterinsurgency efforts (Nagl 2002). Nagl introduces the important idea that militaries learn and adapt over the course of counterinsurgent campaigns. Furthermore, Nagl argues that this process of learning leads states to adopt strategies that may be more or less successful relative to the insurgency they are facing. Nagl finds that organizational culture within the military is a critical component to determining the effectiveness of a counterinsurgency campaign. Others have attempted to seek out what insurgency scholarship may look like in a post-Cold War context where international terrorism has received a heightened level of attention in the United States due to the events of 9/11 (Howard 1992; Hammes 2004; Mackinlay 2005; Weinstein 2007).
The Study of Civil Wars

The scholarship of civil wars is extremely broad, and broadly reviewing it here would distract from the immediate project, which is the intersection of civil wars with insurgency. With that in mind, what does civil war scholarship have to teach us about insurgency? I find that the intersections are both interesting and useful for this project.

First, what is the relationship between a civil war and an insurgency? What can the study of civil wars teach us about the nature of insurgencies? Charles Tilly draws a distinction between a revolutionary situation and a revolutionary outcome (Tilly 1978; Tilly 1993; Tilly 2003; Tilly 2004). In the first case, a group challenges the incumbent by declaring some separate level of sovereignty. This group obtains a transfer of power if they are able to replace the incumbent, thus a revolutionary outcome is obtained. In the same way, insurgents lay claim to some sovereignty apart from the state. What seems clear is that sometimes insurgents are sometimes able to retain this claim in the face of pressure from the state, whereas other times they must submit to the sovereignty of the state. Therefore, some of the same factors that may lead to the continuation of civil war violence may also play a role in the continuation of insurgent violence. What are some of these factors?

Tilly argues that there are six steps in the process from insurgency to a revolutionary transfer of power. First, there are insurgents claiming sovereignty. Second, people choose to support the insurgency. Third, the government fails to suppress the insurgency. If this happens, the fourth step is for insurgents to gain armed strength to confront the government. Fifth, supporters of the government defect to the insurgency.
Finally, the government is overthrown and the insurgency supplants them (Kousis 2005). This theoretical process is important because it illustrates that many scholars of insurgency are interested only in the first three steps. That is, why do insurgencies emerge with some level of popular support, and why is the government successful or unsuccessful in suppressing them? This particular study is concerned with the second part of that question. Once an insurgency exists, why is a government successful or not in quelling the violence from it? Therefore, it is worth noting that the studies of insurgencies, including this dissertation, are necessarily more limited than the study of revolutions in general. The limitation is a temporal one and is governed by the fact that an insurgent group, by common accepted definition, is materially weaker than the state it is competing against. Therefore, the fifth and sixth steps that Tilly describes are beyond the scope of this study.

Other scholars of civil war, like Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, are more concerned with the systemic conditions under which civil war is likely to occur and persist (Elbadawi, Sambanis et al. 2000; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2001; Collier and Sambanis 2005; Doyle and Sambanis 2006), on the duration of civil war, see also (Fearon 2004). Collier and Sambanis apply a theory of civil war that argues from an economic perspective that civil wars are more likely caused by windows of opportunity (to gain rents from the prosecution of the civil war) than any particular grievance (Collier, Hoeffler et al. 2001). For an explanation of this theory, see (Collier, Hoeffler et al. 2001). In making this argument, Collier and Sambanis, in joint and separate works of scholarship, draw a sharp distinction between themselves and Ted Gurr, whose model of
grievance is a major way of explaining the emergence of ethnic conflict, described below. This line of work is important because it demonstrates that a large portion of the theoretical work on civil wars does not examine the decision-making of insurgents. Instead, it treats them as generic opportunity maximizing agents who select violent insurgency because of systemic conditions rather than particular grievances (Collier 2002).

It should be noted, however, that this is not the case for all scholars of civil war. Stathis Kalyvas has examined the individual and group level decision-making processes that lead to insurgency and civil war (Kalyvas 1999; Kalyvas 2001; Kalyvas 2006). He argues that there is a strong line of continuity of the origins of civil wars, and consequently, the emergence of insurgency. Kalyvas finds that civil wars emerge when groups hold collective grievances, exist in the penumbra of popular support (and compete over ownership of former and the latter), and generally perpetuate a controlled level of violence (rather than gratuitous violence for its own sake). In making this case, Kalyvas shows insurgencies to be strategically goal oriented and not arising merely out of systemic conditions. Kalyvas assumes that insurgents select violence and continue pursuing violence as the result of a cost-benefit calculation. As I demonstrate below, some scholars of both ethnic conflict and terrorism find that such an assumption is either limiting or misleading.
The Study of Ethnic Conflict

In the wake of the end of the Cold War, ethnic conflict has taken up a more important place in the minds of many scholars of international security. There is a wide spectrum of divergence in various scholars understanding the nature of ethnic conflict (Desch 1998). Within the field of international security, there are essentially two broad views of ethnic conflict, which are derived from the overarching field of nationalism. I will describe relevant research from the field of ethnic conflict and then argue that a failure to apply these findings has a detrimental effect on the conclusions of insurgency scholars.

One way to begin discussing ethnic conflict is to discuss its critics. These critics take issue with the idea that the small, virulent wars that have flourished in weak states of southeastern Europe, central Asia, and various sections of Africa have other causes. James Fearon and David Laitin argue that a trend towards insurgency is the main cause behind these conflicts (Fearon 2003). Ethnicity, while present, is a red herring in the explanation of civil war. In demonstrating this, he argues for a slow and gradual rise of insurgency since the end of colonialism, not a sudden break in the ethnic floodgates at the end of the Cold War. John Mueller joins Fearon and Laitin in criticizing ethnicity as an explanatory variable in conflict. Mueller’s article, “The Banality of Ethnic Warfare,” argues that ethnic difference is not nearly so important for explaining these so called ethnic conflicts (Mueller 2000). Mueller argues that armed bands of criminals comprise the heart of groups of ethnic agitators. These actors are impelled not by ethnicity, but by the desire to gain materially. The employment of an ethnic cover is to facilitate their
ability to behave rapaciously with less threat of sanction. Stephen Saideman, one of the contributors to Lake and Rothchild’s volume on ethnic conflict, argues that most of the post-Cold War conflicts are not driven by ethnic motives for secession, but instead by the rigors of democratization and economic upheaval (Lake 1998). These arguments are important because they suggest that ethnic conflict is not a wholly separate category from insurgency, but rather a type of conflict which to some extent overlaps with insurgent conflict.

In contrast to these scholars, a number of other researchers have assumed that ethnic conflict is driven by ethnic difference and they have sought theoretical and empirical insights into this area. From a theoretical development perspective, Van Evera offers a number of proposed factors that serve to explain the correlation between nationalism and war (Van Evera 1994; Van Evera 1998; Van Evera 1999). His hypotheses are organized into direct and indirect causes of conflict. The direct causes he hypothesizes include most importantly: the ability of an ethnicity without a state to credibly challenge for a state coupled with the desire to do so. He also notes that if this group is tied to a nation-state with the same national majority, likelihood of war is greater. His other proximate hypotheses include oppression and a vanishing window of opportunity to acquire a state. Van Evera’s remote hypotheses deal with preconditions for ethnic grievances, including oppression (which he lists in both categories), densely intermingled ethnic groups, and weak state control of borders.

Other scholars have considered various facets of ethnic conflict. Rothchild and Lake focus on fear as the driving factor in ethnic conflicts (Lake 1996). They argue that
ethnic fear is a natural part of everyday life for nearly everyone in a heterogeneous society and in some cases creates an acute security dilemma that leads to an outbreak of conflict. This fear can be ameliorated by the security guarantees of a strong state, but when the state weakens, individuals resort to trust in their ethnic group to provide security for them. Lake and Rothchild suggest that there are substantive steps states can make to control fear, including enfranchising the minority, sharing power, granting regional autonomy, etc. Other states can also provide security through real or promised intervention on the side of the ethnic group in fear. Besides this work, Kalyvas has written on the rational underlying logic of ethnic conflict. Kalyvas describes incidences where people were coerced to join ethnic conflict, and once joined, found it against their interests to leave (Kalyvas 1999; Kalyvas 2001; Kalyvas 2006).

Besides their own work, Lake and Rothchild have edited a volume on the problems of ethnic conflict (Lake 1998). This volume includes sections on both the nature of ethnic conflict and how to control it. Amongst those studying its nature, Will Moore and David Davis support Van Evera’s hypotheses that ethnic overlaps between states encourage conflict in the state where that ethnicity is the minority. This seems to mirror in some ways Walt’s Revolution and War, as it suggests that external states would see internal conflict as a sign of weakness (Walt 1996). Timur Kuran writes in the vein of the two level games literature (Putnam 1988). He argues that ethnic secessionists seek an international audience (probably for legitimacy, see (Krasner 1999)) and that states conflicting with these minorities seldom realize this important fact (Krasner 1999). Probably most interesting of Lake and Rothchild’s contributors is an offering by Fearon,
who in this instance accepts ethnic conflict. I contend that this is not at variance with his insurgency argument. Even using the concept of insurgency here, his argument still holds. He is probably adopting the ethnic semantics to fit with the tenor of the volume. Here he argues that ethnic conflict is a commitment problem because neither party can go to a third party to guarantee its commitments (Fearon 1998; Lake 1998).

There are several outcomes to draw from this work on ethnic conflict. First, such conflicts can escalate both vertically (in intensity) or horizontally (in the area or number of states effected). In addition, ethnic conflict is not unique. Furthermore, groups often manipulate ethnic conflict for political or base material gain. Finally, and importantly, ethnic conflict is conceived to be a strategic interaction between the ethnicity and other ethnic groups or the ethnicity and the state (Lake 1999).

The work in international security on ethnic conflict is interesting and important, but it would be better if it took stock of the two typically adopted positions of scholars of nationalism (Fearon 2000). The predominant intellectual position in the study of nationalism is the constructivist position. This position, represented by the works of Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm argues that ethnicity is not real (Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 1990). Rather, it is socially constructed. In contrast, the traditional position in the study of nationalism has been the primordialist position. This position is adopted by Anthony Smith and at the cultural level, Samuel Huntington in his clash of civilizations argument (Smith 1979; Huntington 1996; Huntington 1996). This position argues that ethnicity is an immutable fact of life and has existed throughout history. By contending with these two positions, the scholars of ethnic conflict should root their
hypotheses in one tradition or another, and use those results to speak to the primordialist and constructivist positions. For example, are the processes studies by Moore and Davis fueled by daily reproduction and intergroup relations, as constructivists and psychologists would respectively suggest, or is it the product of identifying traits in groups that cannot be separated, even over the distance of nation states? (Berger 1967; Wendt 1995; Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999; Hopf 2002; Brewer 2003)

I believe that the constructivist approach provides the best underlying explanation to ethnicity. Furthermore, this account allows us to understand that insurgencies can exist in a world where ethnicity is malleable identity. Here, Gurr’s model of ethnic rebellion is applicable. As Gregory Saxton summarizes aptly, “In short, Gurr’s model at its core posits that ethno-political rebellion is more likely to develop within those groups that have the strongest, most cohesive identities; the greatest extent of grievances supplying the incentive to organize; the most elaborate networks and leadership capabilities that give them the capacity to mobilize; and a set of external political factors furnishing the opportunities to mobilize against the state.” ((Saxton 2005) pg. 89).

Therefore, insurgency is not determined by ethnicity. Instead, ethnicity may play a role as a framing device to mobilize groups for insurgency. That said there is much to appreciate in Lake and Rothchild’s account of ethnic fear. Turning trust from a weak state to a strong ethnic group seems to have a great deal of face validity in individual decision-making. Additionally, this can help us understand Tilly’s framework in terms of a local populace lending support to an insurgency over a government. Such findings are borne out in the work of Kalyvas described above. The fact that Lake and Rothchild seek
to link this explanation to strategic interactions gives it greater theoretical traction as well.

Despite that, one of the important findings from the work on ethnic conflict is that not all choices for violence are based in rational calculation. Rather, violence often seems costly for individuals who pursue it nonetheless. Framing drawn on malleable ethnic definitions may be a sufficient cause for violence. If that were the case, we would expect that appeals to shifts in the rational calculus would not have the anticipated effect of ameliorating continued ethnic violence. In the same way, some insurgent violence does not ameliorate, even when that violence becomes much more costly. Some of the explanations for this deviation from the cost-benefit calculation are most fully developed in the study of terrorism, where this review now turns.

The Study of Terrorism

A common approach to studying conflicts is to look at their common characteristics (great power status, regional affiliation, ethnic grievances, etc.) This is the approach taken by many who study terrorism. Yet, the very idea of terrorism is politically loaded and is frequently manipulated to include or exclude various groups from the terrorist banner (Jenkins 2003). Even amongst scholars, there is by no means a consensus on what is and is not a terrorist act. For example, Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman have collected 109 distinguishably different definitions of terrorism from scholarly and governmental sources (Schmid 1988). Subsequent efforts by Schmid have yielded an even larger proliferation of definitions, with no progress toward greater agreement. Furthermore, Martha Crenshaw notes that there is a very wide range of
behavior available for consideration under most definitions of terrorism (Crenshaw 2000), see also (Stohl 1988). Some scholars of terrorism focus on a particular tactic, such as airline hijacking in the 1970s or suicide bombing in the modern context (Crenshaw 2007; Wade 2007). Additionally, there is a wide range of proposed reasons for that behavior (McAdam 1996; Stern 2003; Kydd 2006). The problems of this approach are also evident in the study of ethnic conflict. This term, which finds the state in the role of an aggressor, a defender, or even an involved third party, describes a perceived characteristic of the conflict itself. However, as discussed above, scholars have argued that ethnic distinctions are not always the most salient of the characteristics defining the conflict (Gurr 2000; Mueller 2000). Ethnicity may certainly play a role in the conflict, but when it is not the prime motivating factor in the conflict, the term is at best misleading. Yet, despite the politicization and disagreement over semantic issues, much interesting theoretic work and empirical work has been done in the study of terrorism.

Much of this work is historical. Alex Schmid has compiled several comprehensive histories of terrorism scholarship (Schmid and Graaf 1982; Schmid 1982; Schmid 1988; Schmid 2005; Schmid and Jongman 2005). Michael Stohl has also contributed to this work, as well as broadening the purview of most terrorist scholars to include state terrorism as a component of analysis (Stohl 1988; Stohl 1988). Walter Laqueur has composed several histories of terrorism, and his efforts have been echoed in numerous readers and anthologies (Schmid and Graaf 1982; Laqueur 2001; Tan 2002; Laqueur 2003; Whittaker 2003; Schmid and Jongman 2005; Hoffman 2006).
Though it will receive much greater treatment in the next chapter, a substantial portion of terrorist scholarship deals with state response to terrorism. These range from preparedness, to counterterrorism, to effectiveness of terrorism, to elements of coercive force applied abroad (Bell 1978; Livingstone 1982; Livingstone 1986; Trager 1986; Tucker 1988; Rubin 1990; Smith 1990; Alexander 2002; Nacos 2002; Hall 2003; Howitt 2003; Kayyem 2003; Cronin 2004; Schmid 2005; Abrahms 2006; Trager 2006; Bueno de Mesquita 2007; Powell 2007). I will discuss how these tactical choices comport to general state strategic choice in the puzzle chapter that follows this one.

Of course, a huge number of works on terrorism, scholarly and otherwise, delve into specific groups. This is also true of a smaller subset of insurgency literature (Bell 1976; Weinstein 2007). To the extent that they inform this study, I will treat that literature in subsequent chapters. However, influential recent examples of this type of work include efforts to understand modern groups like Al Qaeda and other terror networks (Gunaratna 2002; Kepel 2004; Sageman 2004). Finally, how are we to understand the people who undertake acts of terrorism? Psychologist and terrorism expert Jerrold Post writes, “Terrorism is not a homogenous phenomenon. There is a broad spectrum of terrorist groups and organizations, each of which has a different psychology, motivation, and decision-making structure.” ((Post 2004), pg. 123). It has become a subject of academic and governmental interest to profile and understand these different groups (Hudson 1999). Below I present the three main forms of terrorist motivation that are presented in academic scholarship and governmental analysis.
Terrorists as Strategic Actors

Many scholars of terrorism understand individuals and groups practicing tactics of terrorism to make decisions according to strategic calculations (Reich 1998; Bloom 2003; Pape 2003; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003; Bloom 2004; Meirowitz 2004; Bloom 2005; Neumann 2005; Trager 2006). It should be noted that this differs substantially from those who focus on the specific choices of strategy made by terrorist groups (Kydd 2002; Clark 2007). Insurgent groups may have an articulated ideology, but the motivation for such groups comes from their belief that violent tactics help them achieve specific goals that have a material basis (land, welfare, autonomy, etc.). Though he uses terminology similar to this study, Gregory Miller falls into this camp when he argues that the goals of terrorist groups make them more or less responsive to different coercive state strategies (Miller 2007).

The classic work in defining the strategic logic is Thomas Schelling’s *Arms and Influence* (Schelling 1966). Schelling writes, “It is a paradox of deterrence that in threatening to hurt somebody if he misbehaves, it need not make a critical difference how much it would hurt you too—if you can make him believe the threat” (italics in original, p. 36). This observation applies for the compellance that insurgent groups seek as well. According to the strategic logic, they understand that a successful display of commitment or resolve is the most efficient way to mitigate the superior power of their opponent in an insurgent conflict. In fact, resolve of the opponents is often viewed as the magic bullet that determines the outcome of the conflict, regardless of most other factors (Mack 1975).
I argue in the next chapter that this is a critical flaw in many works on terrorism and insurgency.

Often, insurgents display violence to two distinct, but related audiences. On the one hand, the actions taken by the insurgent group are a demonstration of commitment to the powerful state. On the other hand, they are also a demonstration of strength and commitment to the general populace of the state and other states relevant to the conflict. Depending on the tactics employed, the strategic goals of the insurgent group in relation to the populace may be to communicate their plight vis-à-vis the state, demonstrate the weakness of the state, recruit new active members, or even cause the populace to question the wisdom of prosecuting an ongoing conflict. As Martha Crenshaw writes in describing the strategic logic, “Efficacy is the primary standard by which terrorism is compared with other methods of achieving political goals” ((Reich 1998), pg. 8). In such cases, it is not necessary for the actions of the group to appear individually rational, but only for the overall goals of the group and the tactics they employ to reach them be seen as rationally linked (Pape 2003; Kuperman 2006).

*Terrorists as Organizationally Motivated Actors*

Some scholars of terrorism have argued that terrorists are frequently motivated by psychological elements of group dynamics and organizational motivations (Crenshaw 1981; Crenshaw 1983; Oots 1986; Crenshaw 2004). Insurgent groups may have an articulated ideology, but their motivation comes primarily from a desire to maintain group esteem and identity. The violent nature of the insurgent group is part of its identity. Therefore, the insurgent group has two sets of goals, which are only tangentially
related. The first set of goals frames the insurgent group’s ideology. The second set of goals focuses on the maintenance of the group’s identity. The group may articulate the first set of goals, but uses tactics that achieve the second set of goals. This is crucial for this study because it highlights the notion that a resort to violence does not always comport with a material cost-benefit calculation and therefore presents an alternative explanation to why violence persists in the face of a rising costs of its continuation.

This is quite a different approach to the psychology of terrorists or insurgent groups that would suggest that such individuals or collections of individuals suffer from psychological pathologies that lead them to embrace absolutist beliefs and violence, even indiscriminate violence, as a means of rectifying perceived injustices. This approach has been widely rebutted by investigations into the behavior of individual terrorists, where the vast majority were found to be incredibly normal in psychological profile (Reich 1998). Rather, there is something peculiar about the way that some insurgent groups are organized, managed, and developed that makes the propensity for terrorism greater. As Post writes, “…political terrorists are driven to commit acts of violence as a consequence of psychological forces, and that their special psycho-logic is constructed to rationalize acts they are psychologically compelled to commit. Individuals are drawn to commit acts of violence; their special logic, which is grounded in their psychology and reflected in their rhetoric, becomes the justification for their violent acts.” ((Post 2004), pg. 127-128).

The basis of this explanation is the effect that the desire to belong and associate in individuals has on the behavior of groups. Humans have habituated themselves to
community life and generally strive to associate themselves with certain groups for their benefit, both psychologically and materially. Individuals often make commitments to groups that are not instrumentally rational at the level of the individual. The more that an individual identifies with a particular group, the greater the likelihood that he or she will subvert his or her own needs for the needs of the group. Furthermore, individuals have been found to demonstrate bias against people outside of even the most arbitrary group, and they demonstrate favoritism for individuals within their own group (Messick 1996; Sedikides 2001; Brewer 2003).

Scholars have applied this psychological insight to the operation of terrorist organizations as well. Because terrorist or insurgent groups are often secretive or at least highly selective in their recruitment, they have the potential to develop a strong in-group bias amongst their members. Furthermore, individuals do not necessarily join such organizations out of a pure ideological motivation, but out of a desire to belong to a group and gain the material and psychological rewards provided by membership (Hoffman 2003). In an enclosed and secretive group, means of advancement within the group is dependent upon a greater and more significant demonstration of commitment to the group and its objectives. Thus, a group may turn to violence because violence allows individuals in the group to demonstrate greater commitment to the group than peaceful alternatives. The group undertakes violent tactics not because they directly meet the goals of the stated ideology of the insurgent group, but because they advance the internal interests of the group. As the group becomes more radical and violent, it also becomes more isolated from society and thus increases the identification of the group members.
with the group. While this seems especially true of smaller groups such as the Italian Red Brigades (Meade 1990), such a dynamic could even be present in larger insurgencies, given their compartmentalized nature (Gunaratna 2002; Galeotti 2005). Under these conditions, the stated ideology of the group becomes separated from the actual goals and tactics employed by the group. In fact, the ideology can be merely a pretext to continue in a series of violent acts that are mostly focused toward the internal dynamics of the group (Rapoport 2001).

_Terrorists as Extremist Actors_

Some scholars and many politicians treat insurgents carrying out terrorist tactics as individuals or groups who are committed to terrorism because of a particular religious or ideological conviction that is amplified by the individual’s extreme adherence to the conviction (Hacker 1976; Rapoport 1984; Hoffman 1993; Esposito 2002; Juergensmeyer 2003). Such scholars treat the insurgent as an extremist, unwilling to settle for compromises with opponents. The goals of the insurgent cannot be achieved through any type of compromise and as a result, compromise is not a desirable option for the insurgent. Michael Mazarr portrays the motivation of the Islamic extremist as a reaction against modernity and presumably the secular liberalism that accompanies it (Mazarr 2007). Thinking of this notion of extremism, Walter Laqueur writes, “Fanaticism per se is of course not new, but it has had a major rebirth – much to the surprise of those in Europe and America who believed that it was a thing of the past” (Laqueur 2003). This extremism, according to Laqueur, renders insurgents incapable of willingly abandoning their commitment to violent conflict. That is, for such extremists, violent conflict is an
end in itself, and not merely a means. This differentiates the extremist from the two other archetypical forms of terrorism described above.

Drawing on the religious aspect, Bruce Hoffman refers to this model as “holy terror” (Hoffman 1993). He writes, “For the religious terrorist, violence first and foremost is a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative” ((Hoffman 1993), pg. 2). Others, such as John Esposito, argue that terrorists are often fueled by radical interpretations of religious texts, rather than using radical interpretations as a justification for a predisposition towards violence (Esposito 2002; Selengut 2003). Either way, insurgent groups have an ideology that is the direct rationale and justification for their actions. The goals of the insurgent group are the direct realization of their ideology, generally lacking room for political compromise. In the same way, the tactics employed by the insurgent group are a direct attempt to realize the ideology and goals of the insurgent group, rather than a series of intermediate goals through which the group pursues its ideology. This is an important point of distinction between the extremist model and the strategic model. If an extremism motivated group destroys a religious building, it is the final goal and purpose of the group to destroy that building and possibly others like it. If a strategic group destroys the same religious building, they may be doing so for some broader purpose that is not tied intrinsically to the destruction of the building. Compromise is anathema to the insurgent group governed by extremist motivations. Violence is the only way or the only allowable way to realize the goals of the insurgent group stipulated by its ideology.
It is important to note, however, that to suggest that extremist motivated insurgencies are disinclined to comprise is not to suggest that they are undefeatable or that their violence continues in perpetuity. Rather, extremist groups, by definition, will be unwilling to abandon violence. However, unwilling is the critical phrase. Any group can be forced to abandon violence if its capabilities are sufficiently reduced. Furthermore, some extremists, though committed to violence, may sink below the level that their actions require special attentions (though they may persist) because their capabilities have been so impoverished.

**Dominant Models of Counterinsurgency Warfare**

The previous sections discussed the various ways that authors study insurgent groups, civil war, and terrorism and the various efforts focused on determining when insurgencies will arise. It also explored how the literature on insurgent conflicts fits into the larger literature on terrorism, civil war, and security studies in general. The question now to ask is how scholars have theoretically modeled insurgent conflicts themselves.

Most scholars of insurgencies fall into one of three camps in their treatment of how they understand insurgent conflicts. These camps are the idiographic or proscriptive models, implicit nomothetic models, and explicit nomothetic models. Each of these three camps offers a contribution to the literature, but as I argue below, it is the third camp where efforts are most scant, and where scholars could reap a great deal of benefit by studying insurgencies.

Many studies of insurgencies are either idiographic or proscriptive in nature. That is, either they discuss the nature of a single insurgency or they offer a set of
recommendations for dealing with current or future insurgencies. These two tasks are often intertwined. Allow me to offer a single, prototypical example. In his recent and well-written book, Ahmed Hashim describes the nature of Iraqi insurgents and the characteristics of the insurgency itself. He then offers prescriptions for American foreign policy in regards to successfully engaging the insurgents (Hashim 2006). Hashim is therefore able to convey a close understanding of the Iraqi insurgency. However, the proscriptions that he makes regarding what is likely to lead to the end of the Iraqi insurgency draws only from a reading of the immediate history of Iraq and an evaluation of successes and failures up to this point. As such, Hashim’s book can say little about other insurgencies because it is not clear which factors matter more or less in the Iraqi insurgency. Furthermore, Hashim does not present clear and testable implications that would demonstrate success or failure in the insurgent conflict.

While Hashim combines idiographic and prescriptive elements in his text, other authors rely only on an idiographic account. These accounts are the closest of all types to historical narratives. Literally, what happened in a particular insurgent conflict, and perhaps, who or what shaped the way it happened? There are many examples of this type of scholarship (Laqueur 1998), but Alf Heggoy’s treatment of the insurgent and counter-insurgent campaigns in Algeria is particularly useful and apt (Heggoy 1972). Heggoy’s text is really a history of the insurgent conflict in Algeria, and it does not purport to offer lessons on any other insurgencies, or even to draw general lessons about the Algerian case.
The second camp of scholarship on insurgent conflicts employs implicit nomothetic models. Here we find scholars who have some assumptions about what is likely to succeed and what is likely to fail in insurgent conflicts, but these models are not clearly specified and it is unclear what would constitute a refutation of the model. Authors writing in this context typically shape their arguments around one of two organizing assumptions. The first assumption is that states can drive insurgencies into the ground through the proper utilization of force and provision of security by state agencies. These studies essentially treat insurgencies with a military focus, both in the nature of the insurgency, and in the appropriate government responses. Insurgencies are a military problem, and their primary solution is a military one. With that in mind, I refer to studies of this nature as the “combat model.”

The second assumption, which runs counter to the first, is that states can only defeat insurgencies by removing the antecedent conditions that gave rise to the insurgency in the first place. These antecedent conditions include economic deprivation, ethnic repression, a supportive local populace, or even a particular ideology; depending on the variables the particular study deems to be important. Therefore, the second set of studies treat insurgencies with a social focus, and the violence that emanates from insurgencies is a symptom of a social problem. Obviously, the treatment for insurgent violence must be a social proscription. Removing the antecedent conditions for violence will remove the need for violence. Any direct attempts to remove the violence through more direct means will be incomplete at best, and may exacerbate the violence through increased repression, cleavages, etc. I will refer to these studies as the “social model.”
These two approaches predict that a different set of tactics by the state will be more or less successful in quelling insurgency. The combat model proscribes a sufficient projection of force by the state and the provision of security to the populace while eliminating active insurgents through police and military actions. David Galula argues for a form of this strategy when he argues for a series of steps beginning the destruction of active insurgents, then controlling the population, and concluding with the reestablishment of effective organs of the state in the rebellious region (Galula 1964). Roger Trinquier offers another view of this assumption (Trinquier 1964). He argues that counterinsurgent strategy should focus first on establishing complete control and security over significant towns and cities and then spread incrementally into more rural areas to eradicate the insurgent threat progressively. Other authors implicitly adopt this model by focusing exclusively on military tactics in counterinsurgencies (Beckett and Pimlott 1985; Beckett 1988; Klare and Kornbluh 1988).

The social model focuses on state efforts to remove political and societal support for the insurgents, often ignoring or shunting to the side actual interactions with active insurgents. This approach seeks to win the hearts and minds of the local populace, turning insurgents into persona non gratis in their own territory and furthermore giving them an opportunity to opt out of violence and rejoin the state proper (Kepel 2004). By focusing on the bases of support for political subversion and not insurgents themselves, Donald Hamilton reflects an adherence to this assumption (Hamilton 1997). He writes, “…the government’s focus should be on increasing the paucity for political demand by decreasing the subversive means of recruiting personnel and garnering attention from the
populace” ((Hamilton 1997) pg. 146). Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk are more explicit in their reliance on this assumption. They argue that large, state-sponsored economic development packages can suppress the recruitment of terrorists, or insurgents as the case may be (Cragin 2003; Sepp 2005). Another recent adherent to this assumption is John Mackinlay’s treatment of the current insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan (Mackinlay 2005). Mackinlay argues that the most important factors in determining state success in insurgent conflicts is unified international cooperation geared toward securing populations susceptible to insurgent subversion. Finally, the historian Ian F. W. Beckett identifies six major variables that determine the success or failure of a counterinsurgent campaign. Of the six, five are concurrent with the social model, and only one conditionally represents the combat model (Beckett 2001).

Before continuing, a brief word about the local populace is necessary. Many scholars understand the populace surrounding an insurgent conflict to be composed of neutral people, who support neither side of the conflict, and active and passive supporters of either the state or insurgent group (McAdam 1996; Kalyvas 1999; Kalyvas 2006). This creates a five-category continuum within the populace (see Figure 1.1 below). The left side of the continuum ranges from active supporters of the state (such as state police and military) to passive state supporters (like the cooperative general populace). In the middle of the continuum are neutral members of society (equally likely to cooperate with the state and insurgent group). On the right side of the continuum, passive supporters of the insurgency are more likely to support the aims, if not the actual activities of the insurgency, whereas active supporters contribute to the actual undertakings of the
insurgency by providing them direct assistance. Passive supporters do not directly aid the effort of either side, but generally favor one side and could become their active supporters if effectively mobilized. Most scholars of insurgencies tend to agree these groups are not static, but that various activities by the state and by the insurgents will sway neutral and partisan members of the populace in one direction or another (Siqueira 2006).

![Figure 1.1: Continuum of support for the state and insurgents](image)

This differentiation amongst members of the local populace is important for the following reasons. First, whether scholars adopt a social model or a combat model of insurgent conflict, they tend to assume that the local populace is implicitly affected by any counterinsurgent actions. This is more explicit under the social model, where scholars address the societal antecedents and preconditions leading to insurgency. However, even when a combat model is applied, scholars must account for the military impact, in both positive and negative ways, on the surrounding populace. Some scholars focus on providing security to the local populace, thereby depriving the insurgents of supporters. Others consider the local populace to be the unfortunate but likely victims of
the ongoing insurgent conflict. In these analyses, one of the normative goals of analysts is the mitigation of civilian casualties. Second, any acts undertaken by the state or the insurgent group usually have the local populace as their witnesses if not participants. This is important because the same tactics that reduce the immediate threat from actual insurgents may also increase sympathy for the insurgency, increase the effectiveness of recruiting and therefore enhance the insurgency overall. For the purposes of this study, I examine the impact of insurgent and counterinsurgent strategies in a society composed according to Figure 1.1 above. Therefore, any act by the state or the insurgent group affects at least a portion of populace, and we should be able to observe shifting allegiances within the affected populace. However, we should be able to safely assume that in cases of insurgency, the primary opponent for the state is the violent insurgency and the primary opponent for the insurgency is the state. For that reason, I focus this study on the interactions between the two toward each other. That is not to suggest that the surrounding populace is irrelevant, but that we can ascertain its role by examining the choices made by the state and the insurgency.

I will now return to the general approaches of the combat model and social model. While these two implicit models of insurgency each extend beyond an idiographic treatment of insurgent conflicts, it would be useful to engage these two divergent approaches to understanding insurgency. Just because winning hearts and minds may help to decrease the violence of some insurgent conflicts, it is not necessarily true for every conflict. Richard Clutterbuck describes the positive results of a social model in the British experience in Malaya while the same types of efforts failed during the American
experience in Vietnam (Clutterbuck 1966). This begs the question, why would the social model succeed at some times, and yet fail at others? The alternative understanding, the combat model, suffers from a similar historical record. Robert Cassidy describes American success in quelling insurgency in the Philippines using a combat model (Cassidy 2004). However, similar tactics were unsuccessful in quelling insurgency in the early stages of the Vietnam conflict or insurgent responses to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.

The final camp is the home for this particular study. That is, this study presents an explicit model of insurgent conflicts that purports to explain why states sometimes succeed and sometimes fail in the conflict. This is not the first study to undertake this challenge. However, even those studies that explicitly theorize their expectations for outcomes in insurgent conflicts still side with either the combat model or the social model of insurgent conflicts. As previously discussed, Gil Merom examines the role of internal support as a primary factor for why democracies lose small wars that material expectations suggest they would otherwise win (Merom 2003). Merom assumes that the state should be able to win the conflict and employs factors from the social model to explain why the state failed. Bard O’Neill has also taken steps to lay out a model that predicts insurgent success or failure in their conflict with a state. His primary variables are popular support, organization, cohesion, external support, the environment, and the role of the government (O’Neill 1980). In each case but the last, the insurgent group is the unit of analysis for determining the continuance or cessation of violence. However, it is difficult to measure convincingly many of these variables, and O’Neill does not
provide a metric for doing so or a set of expectations stemming from these variables. However, the tendencies of his indicators are clear. As popular support, complexity of organization, cohesion, and external support all increase for the insurgent group, the ability of the state to defeat the insurgent group decreases. The environment is a structural variable that tends to covary with the material strength of the state. That is, when the state is strong, terrain matters little. However, when the state is weaker, difficult terrain is an exacerbating factor for the state’s impotence. Finally, the role of the government refers to the type of strategy that the government may employ. O’Neill argues that the government strategy results from a decision-making process where the other five factors influence decision-makers’ understandings of the best way to undermine success for the insurgents (O’Neill 2005). Thus, O’Neill’s work sits comfortably within the social model of insurgent conflict that I have described in the preceding paragraphs.

Because the combat model of insurgency and the social model of insurgency offer competing understandings of what is likely to yield success and failure for states in insurgent conflicts, there is a clear intellectual puzzle that drives this project. I represent this set of competing explanations graphically in the table below (see Figure 1.2). Thus, there is an open question in the literature on insurgencies. Which of these two competing explanations of insurgent conflict is more accurate in determining the effectiveness of various state strategies? To address this question, this study will employ a test to evaluate their relative accuracy. Furthermore, because the historical record of each in explaining insurgency outcomes is mixed, there is the prospect that further refinement
beyond these two dominant explanations will also bear explanatory fruit. Therefore, the puzzle for this project is under what conditions both the combat model of insurgency and the social model of insurgency succeed in predicting insurgent outcomes. Toward this end, I develop a conditional model of insurgent conflict where predictions from the social model and predictions from the combat model both apply under specific circumstances. If the evidence I propose to use supports this model, it will suggest that both explanations are more accurate when bound by specific theoretical conditions. However, even if the evidence rejects the model, the study will still be able to make claims about the relative accuracy of the combat model and social model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Social Model Strategies Employed</th>
<th>Combat Model Strategies Employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Model Predictions</td>
<td>State Success</td>
<td>State Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Model Predictions</td>
<td>State Failure</td>
<td>State Success</td>
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Figure 1.2: Competing Extant Models of Insurgent Conflict

This study then has two additional benefits to recommend it. In the first place, though they offer competing interpretations of the evidence, there is scant work testing the relative accuracy of the combat model versus the social model. This study proposes to do that. Second, what the study of insurgencies needs is a model that predicts state success or failure that scholars can test on the substantial and previously established
historical record. That is, as discussed above, most of the scholarship on insurgencies is idiographic in the first or poorly specified in the second.

To review, the first camp makes no claims about modeling insurgent conflicts, except to make proscriptive statements post-hoc. The second camp offers two sets of expectations, both of which are lacking when compared to the historical record. Simply securing area controlled by insurgents and eliminating insurgents, as recommended by the combat model does not always work, as Merom and Andrew Mack separately demonstrate (Mack 1975). Furthermore, seeking to win hearts and minds or “draining the swamp,” as offered by the social model is also not always successful. Finally, the nomothetic and explicit models of insurgency offered thus far are either underspecified (as O’Neill illustrates) or ignore what I argue are two critical variables that I can measure with some degree of confidence: the strategy that the state employs and the organizational behavior of the insurgent group. Existing models of insurgent conflict either assume or proscribe that the state pursues single strategy against the insurgent group or they ignore variation in the behavior of groups, or both. By doing this, existing theories miss a parsimonious way to explain variation in state success or failure in insurgent conflicts. This model succeeds then if it is able to do so.

**Drawing Links from the Literature and the Puzzle In Brief**

The literature on small wars and insurgent conflicts has often noted that state strategies employed in some conflicts have not been as successful in other conflicts. Rather than classify conflicts based upon tactics (such as terrorism) or motivations (such as ethnic conflicts) insurgencies are classified based upon the power relationship between
the warring factions (O'Neill 1980; O'Neill 2005). This relationship can be described using the same terms whether one is discussing a war between great powers, or a minor intra-state insurgency. Thus, we can hold conflicts like those studied in terrorism literature and elsewhere according to the same logic that defines great power conflicts and interstate wars which are the focus of most international relations scholarship. A typology of insurgencies begins by bifurcating conflicts into situations where the relative power between the opposing powers is relatively symmetrical or asymmetrical. J. David Singer’s *Correlates of War* treats any conflict where the state has five times more power (or more) than the opponent as an asymmetric conflict (Singer 1979). It is important to note in using the term asymmetric, I am specifically referring to the power difference between the two actors. This term loses substantial meaning when it is applied to specific strategies, tactics, etc.

Therefore, the question to ask is, can the two actors compete in terms of relative power, or is one far stronger than the other is? According to Geoffrey Blainey, all conflicts are inherently asymmetrical, because for violence to occur at least one side of the conflict must incorrectly evaluate its capabilities. The type of asymmetry I am concerned with here differs in that it is blatantly obvious to the parties involved or casual observers that one side possesses preponderant capabilities. That is to say, it meets both the criteria of a material preponderance of power and the recognition of this power differential on the part of the conflicting parties (Blainey 1988). This dichotomy encompasses every type of conflict, whether interstate, non-state, or between a state and a non-state actor.
From this point, if we assume that one of the actors we wish to study is a state, we can further narrow our study by deciding on the type of opponent and their relationship to the state. Symmetrical contests between states have received a disproportionate amount of study in international security, followed by a growing literature regarding asymmetrical contests between states. In fact, the bulk of the literature on asymmetric conflict deals with how the military might prosecute “asymmetric wars.” This term means anything from unconventional methods of warfare (from human shields, to cyber warfare, to urban combat, to the use of weapons of mass destruction) to combating opponents that make use of these unconventional means (often but not always terrorist organizations, armed insurgencies, etc.). Loaded into the term is the notion that such things are notable because they are not practiced by the United States. Roger W. Barnett lists hostage taking, use of weapons of mass destruction, suicide attacks, human shields, computer attacks, booby traps, environmental destruction, and false representation as asymmetrical warfare “because the United States and its Western allies cannot or will not practice them” (Barnett 2003, pg. 18).

This leaves two realms to explore: symmetrical conflicts between a state and non-state actor, and asymmetrical conflicts between the two. I choose the latter because it seems that the former is receiving the full attention of scholars exploring the process of revolutions in failed and weak states (Gurr 1970; Gurr 2000). In these cases of asymmetric warfare, the state generally possesses predominant capabilities. One can imagine situations where this is not the case, such as NATO’s action against the Former Yugoslav Republic of Serbia. However, I am limiting my discussion to situations where
a state seeks to deal with a threat from a non-state actor where, based on an evaluation of material capabilities alone, we would expect the state to be successful. I will discuss this in terms of the operationalization of both power and success in the subsequent puzzle chapter.

Why focus on this subset of conflict? Two important reasons come immediately to mind. First, a number of the most important conflicts in the world since the end of the Cold War fit this set of criteria. The U.S. effort to quell the insurgency in Iraq, the Russian effort to control Chechnya, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are all examples of this type of conflict. If great power war is increasingly becoming obsolete then it makes sense to focus on the forms of violence still occurring (Mueller 1989; Fukuyama 1992; Mueller 1995; Mueller 2004). Second, despite the disparity of capabilities within this type of asymmetric conflict, the materially weak non-state actor often chooses to engage in conflict and even more to the point, is often successful in either defeating the state or forcing significant concessions from it (Arreguin-Toft 2001; Merom 2003). This puzzle invites scholars to introduce a number of other variables to the simple logic of power and capability.

I am not alone in seeking to understand this form of conflict (Leighton 1962; Scott 1970). A number of scholars have sought to address this form of asymmetric conflict and the puzzle that it presents. Gil Merom argues that in addition to realist considerations of balance of power and competing levels of resolve on the part of the state and the non-state actor, the regime type of the state plays a significant role in determining the success of the state (Merom 2003). Ivan Arreguin-Toft argues that an
interaction of the strategies employed by both actors shape the outcome of the conflict (Arreguin-Toft 2001; Arreguin-Toft 2005). Andrew Mack contends that weak non-state actors can drain the will of a materially stronger actor, and that such an act is just as effective as sapping their material capabilities to fight (Mack 1975). While these works form a good basis for the consideration of asymmetric conflicts, they neglect an important dynamic that this paper explores. Namely, the specific strategies employed by the state should have differing effects on the non-state actor depending on how that actor is presumed to be motivated. There are widely divergent assumptions made about the motivations of insurgent groups, and this paper will explore the implications of various state strategies on them.

**Plan of the Study**

This dissertation seeks to understand why state campaigns to ameliorate violence from an insurgent group sometimes succeed and sometimes fail. It subsequently contributes to the overall literature seeking to understand the processes and outcomes of conflicts between states and violent, non-state groups. It will be able to perform an evaluation of the competing understandings of insurgent conflict described above. This study extends the literature on insurgencies by taking account of how insurgent groups are motivated to pursue their goals. It seeks to provide greater understanding of the success and failure of both the state and the insurgent group, relative to their goals. Finally, the dissertation will serve as a plan to code and evaluate additional and future conflicts according to the hypotheses model generated herein.
The plan of this dissertation is as follows. In the next chapter, I describe in detail the model that I propose to evaluate in this dissertation. I specify my variables, derive hypotheses, discuss the methodology for conducting the study, and finally describe my case selection process. The next four chapters represent case studies of insurgent conflicts. Chapter Three details the Chechen insurgency against Russia from 1994 until 2006. Chapter Four investigates the British struggle to quell violence in Northern Ireland from 1968 until 1999. Chapter Five examines the conflict between the Sri Lankan Sinhalese government and the Tamil Tiger insurgents from 1983 until 1999. Chapter Six explores French efforts to quell Algerian uprising from 1954 until 1962. A final chapter compiles conclusions from the case studies and reflects back on the results of these conclusions for the proposed hypotheses and the model in general. It also discusses future avenues for research.
"Bombs and bullets are the physical weapons of the rural guerilla and equally of the urban terrorist, but the real lever for both is politics."³

**Introduction**

The first chapter performed several tasks. First, it reviewed relevant literature regarding the behavior of violent groups, how various authors have understood and studied violent non-state groups, and the ways states seek to combat violence from those groups. Second, it has argued that theory derived from scholarship on terrorism can be useful to develop ways of understanding insurgencies. This is especially helpful given that many treatments of insurgencies lag behind other realms of security studies in the application of testable theoretical models. Finally, it argued that these two disparate fields of study need to speak directly to each other, and that such a conversation is viable. This task: demonstrating a puzzle in the existing literature on insurgencies, proposing an answer to that puzzle, and describing how I will evaluate that proposed answer, is where I now turn.

In general, I address why states succeed or fail to subdue violence from a presently violent, non-state group. The extant literature on this question provides two competing, contradictory answers. I propose a model that makes the claims of both current competing models conditional, and when I evaluate my model, it should contribute to the debate between these competing understandings.

In brief, my conditional model examines the choices that states make to deal with the violence of non-state actors. However, merely focusing on states’ choices is not sufficient to explain why states sometimes succeed and other times fail to ameliorate violence. I also explore how violent, non-state groups are motivated. Below, I argue that the interaction between a state’s choices and the motivations of non-state groups impact success or failure in a state’s attempts to ameliorate violence.

The chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section, I begin by discussing the general questions that this study on insurgency seeks to answer. Then, I describe the competing models used to explain insurgent conflicts, either implicitly or explicitly, in the extant literature. I find that they propose contradictory answers to the general questions I seek to answer. After deducing that these models offer contradictory predictions, I argue that a model that makes the expectations of both conditional will be able to evaluate them both in a useful way. I then provide a concise summary of the explanatory model proposed in this chapter and the hypotheses I seek to test. In the second section, I describe and elucidate the general framework for a model of conflict between a state and non-state actor. I demonstrate how this model represents the interaction of state choices and group motivations. Then, I explore the specifics of these
components, first defining them, and then using them to derive implications for my model. In the third section of the chapter, I review hypotheses I will test in the study and specify how to operationalize and measure the variables in the study. Finally, I discuss the methodology for testing the conflict model I present, namely, a structured set of case studies. I then present the comparative cases I have selected for study, describing their applicability and appropriateness as good tests of the model I present. I conclude by returning to the puzzle with which I began. Using the case studies I describe below, I demonstrate the competing answers offered by two models of insurgent conflict in the extant literature. I then explain how my conditional model can usefully evaluate between the two of them.

**The Puzzle: Research Questions**

Why do states sometimes succeed and sometimes fail in their attempts to maintain a monopoly on organized violence within their borders? Why do non-state actors sometimes succeed in perpetuating extended campaigns of violence against a state, despite attempts by the state to prevent the violence from occurring and to punish those responsible for it? Why especially do these campaigns persist in states that are stable, robust, and in possession of extensive material capabilities? These are the key questions for this study of conflicts between states and non-state actors. To answer these questions, I first draw competing explanations from the extant literature. Then, to evaluate these explanations, I develop a model based on a typology of two critical characteristics of insurgent conflicts. First, how do states try to ameliorate the violence emanating from violent, non-state groups? That is to say, what strategies do states select to combat
insurgent groups? Second, what role do the motivational dynamics of the non-state group play in affecting the perpetuation or cessation of violence? Does a variance in goals and assumptions about achieving those goals affect which strategies employed by the state are likely to be effective in quelling non-state violence?

As described in the previous chapter, the literature on small wars and insurgent conflicts has often noted that state strategies employed in some conflicts have not been as successful in other conflicts. At the same time, the first chapter has argued about the problematic nature of relying on concepts like commitment or material power to explain this variance away. Therefore, this study attempts to explain the variance between success and failure in insurgent conflicts using the interaction of state strategies and group motivational dynamics. If evidence from the historical record supports the model, it suggests that the competing explanations in the extant literature are actually conditional. If the coding of historical record I offer in this project leads us to reject the model, the record should still lend support to one literature-based explanation or the other. This is the utility of and intellectual usefulness of this project.

The Model in Summary

In this study, I argue that a state’s success in ameliorating violence from a non-state actor finds its basis in the combined effect of strategic choices made by the state itself and the motivations of the violent group. Groups pursue violence for a variety of organizational reasons and the strategies that states employ will vary in their effectiveness depending on the reasons for violence in the first place. This approach differs from the existing models of insurgency above in that it analyzes both variation in
state strategy and variation in the behavior of insurgent groups. In the context of an insurgent conflict, I argue that examining these two variables predicts whether a state will succeed or fail in its attempts to quell an insurgency.

Below, I argue that states generally pursue one of three general strategies in their effort to maintain a monopoly of violence in their borders. First, states may select to merely police against the group with minimal direct attempts to dissuade them from further violence. That is to say, the state may treat an insurgency as merely a normal component of the crime within the state, and not a special political problem. Second, states can opt to punish organized violence with a strategy of reciprocal violence. Finally, states can choose to undermine the effectiveness of groups by seeking to accommodate some of their demands and providing alternatives to violence.

I further argue that groups vary in their relationship between the violence they pursue and the reasons why they pursue it. After all, groups opposed to the state frequently do not elect to pursue violence. Why then, do some groups elect violence as an option? In the extant literature, scholars employ three distinct and frequently competing explanations to explain this choice. I described these three alternative explanations of group violence in the prior chapter. First, a strategic account of non-state violence is proposed. Here groups seek to achieve their goals through the efficient bargaining process of offering violence as a means to coerce the state. Second, I offer an account centering on organizational dynamics. In this account, groups often resort to violence for internal reasons as well as their stated goals. Finally, I describe an extremist model of group behavior. In this model, groups seek the perpetuation of violence as an
end rather than a means. I argue that while any given group might contain a mixture of these motivations (see (Reich 1998)), each group can be classified within the three according to objective criteria.

The interaction of these three state strategies and models of group behavior provides a set of expectations about the likely success or failure of the state’s policy to prevent violence from the non-state group. A state’s policy is successful when violence from the group decreases in both frequency and intensity, both of which are concepts I discuss below. I represent the general relationship I predict graphically in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Strategy</th>
<th>Reciprocal Punishment (Hard Bargain)</th>
<th>Policing (No Bargain)</th>
<th>Accommodation (Soft Bargain)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic</strong></td>
<td>State Success</td>
<td>State Failure</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational</strong></td>
<td>State Failure</td>
<td>State Failure</td>
<td>State Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extremist</strong></td>
<td>State Failure</td>
<td>State Success</td>
<td>State Failure</td>
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Figure 2.1: Predictions of Proposed Model of Insurgent Conflict

This model of insurgent conflict differs from both of the traditional and competing understandings of insurgent conflict: the combat model and social model described above. Under the combat model, scholars predict success only when the state undertakes militarily focused solutions to insurgency, although not every militarily focused strategy would lead to success. Therefore, if state success is achieved using an
accommodationist strategy, this evidence contradicts the combat model of insurgency. In the same way, the social model of insurgency argues that pure military combat against insurgents is at best tangential and at worst detrimental to quelling insurgency. If that is the case, state success under a strategy of reciprocal punishment contradicts the social model. Therefore, this model makes both the combat model and the social model conditional, suggesting that each is applicable only under certain circumstances. It also hypothesizes that the decision set of most states includes a choice to avoid directly addressing the violence of the insurgency and rather to treat insurgent tactics as normal criminal behavior. I illustrate the respective predictions of the combat and social models below. These contrast competitively with each other and with the contingent model in Figure 2.3. The model in Figure 2.3 argues that both the combat model and the social model are partial explanations of insurgent conflict. What follows is a formal statement of the hypotheses generated by this model. I will use these hypotheses to evaluate the model in question.

The design of this model is such that even if we reject the model proposed here, we can still evaluate the two predominant explanations, the combat or the social model of insurgencies, relative to each other. The implications of this idea are clear. If the evidence I gather from this study shows that soft bargaining strategies are the only successes, it disconfirms my model and lends support to the extant social model. Conversely, if hard bargain and no bargain strategies yield the only incidences of state success, then my model is also disconfirmed and we find support for the combat model of counterinsurgencies. Finally, only if state success and failure is represented in the way
predicted in Figure 2.3 and stated formally in the hypotheses below can we conclude that the contingent model proposed herein receives support.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Strategy</th>
<th>Group Behavioral Model</th>
<th>Reciprocal Violence (Hard Bargain)</th>
<th>Policing (No Bargain)</th>
<th>Accommodation (Soft Bargain)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td></td>
<td>State Success</td>
<td>State Success</td>
<td>State Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td></td>
<td>State Success</td>
<td>State Success</td>
<td>State Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremist</td>
<td></td>
<td>State Success</td>
<td>State Success</td>
<td>State Failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.2: Predictions of Combat Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Strategy</th>
<th>Group Behavioral Model</th>
<th>Reciprocal Violence (Hard Bargain)</th>
<th>Policing (No Bargain)</th>
<th>Accommodation (Soft Bargain)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td></td>
<td>State Failure</td>
<td>State Failure</td>
<td>State Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td></td>
<td>State Failure</td>
<td>State Failure</td>
<td>State Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremist</td>
<td></td>
<td>State Failure</td>
<td>State Failure</td>
<td>State Success</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.3: Predictions of Social Model

Hypotheses

Drawing on the interaction between state strategy and group behavior briefly described above yields the following hypotheses.
1. The Strategic Logic
   
a. If the group is motivated according to a strategic logic, a state’s attempts to ameliorate violence will succeed with a strategy of reciprocal violence.

b. If the group is motivated according to a strategic logic, a state’s attempts to ameliorate violence will fail with a strategy of policing.

c. If the group is motivated according to a strategic logic, a state’s attempts to ameliorate violence will fail when accommodation is attempted.

2. The Organizational Logic
   
a. If the group is motivated according to an organizational logic, a state will be successful when accommodation is attempted.

b. If the group is motivated according to an organizational logic, a state will be unsuccessful with a strategy of reciprocal violence.

c. If the group is motivated according to an organizational logic, a state will be unsuccessful with a strategy of policing.

3. The Extremist Logic
   
a. If the group is motivated according to an extremist logic, a state will be successful with a policing strategy.

b. If the group is motivated according to an extremist logic, a state will be unsuccessful with a strategy of reciprocal violence.
c. If the group is motivated according to an extremist logic, a state will be unsuccessful when accommodation is attempted.

Variable Specifications

The Dependent Variable

The dependent variable for this project is the success or failure that a particular state strategy attains in ameliorating the violence perpetuated by a non-state group. This variable ranges from an exacerbation of non-state perpetrated violence to a complete cessation of violence, whatever the status of the perpetrating group. That is, states can eliminate violence equally effectively by making the group docile or by eradicating the group completely. This variable is agnostic with respect to the continued existence of the group. This reflects the idea that states frequently permit the continued existence of violence groups once they have been pacified. Rather, here I am concerned with whether that group continues to challenge the state’s monopoly violence through its own violent acts.

Any strategy that a state undertakes against a violent group seeks to ameliorate the violent tendencies of that group. To that end, any strategy seeks to do two things: decrease the frequency of violent actions by a group and decrease the intensity of any violent actions. When strategy does both of these things, it is successful. When it does neither, it is unsuccessful. When it does one and not the other, then the results are mixed and I measure them according to the extent that the strategy accomplishes each task.

In order to evaluate accurately whether a strategy is successful and to control for spurious explanations, I will attempt as much as possible to follow the specific responses
of the group to the strategies of the state in order to determine the general effect of the state’s tactics. Coding for case studies will come from such accounts as can be found in newspapers, statements by the non-state group, government speeches, and secondary sources. Specifically, the case studies will provide a narrative account of the implementation of the state’s strategy and the response of the group. I am attempting to determine whether a specific state strategy leads the group to alter the intensity and frequency of their violent actions.

The Independent Variable: The Strategy of the State

The first independent variable for this project is the type of strategy adopted by the state to deal with a violent non-state group. I explicate this strategic choice below as a form of bargain from the state to the violent group. This model conceives of the strategic choice variable as having three forms: policing, which represents the choice to offer no bargain to the insurgent group, reciprocal punishment, which represents a hard bargain from the state to the insurgent group, and finally accommodation, which represents a soft bargain offered to the violent non-state actor. Hard bargain simply means that the state is following a classic deterrent strategy to convince the group not to commit acts of violence. It promulgates a threat of retaliatory punishment if the group perpetuates acts of violence. To the extent that these threats are successful, the group refrains from further violence. When the group initiates violence in the face of such threats, the deterrent aspect of reciprocal violence fails and the state must decide to execute reciprocal violence against the insurgents and the things they value (such as their families, their homes, territory, etc.) (Schelling 1960; Morgan 1983; Lebow 1990).
In this way, the state employs violence to coerce the group to abandon violent behavior. If the group then abjures violence, the state is content to hold further violence in abeyance as an immediate deterrent.

In contrast, policing or *no bargain* assumes that the state cannot or prefers not to deter the violent group. Instead, it seeks to prevent or limit the ability of the group to carry out violent attacks. Furthermore, when the state perceives the opportunity to arrest members of the group or undermine their cohesiveness or capabilities, it does so. This is all generally within the same purview of the state that addresses normal criminality and disorganized violence within the functioning of the state. That is, the state would not appear to treat an insurgency or its acts any differently than individual criminals or non-politically motivated violence. This concept of policing corresponds to an idea of deterrence by denial rather than a bargain.

Finally, accommodation or *soft bargain* is a coercive strategy that rewards the insurgent group for abstaining from violent acts. The state may reward the group by granting it legitimacy, offering it a place in the government, acquiescing to some of its demands, or relinquishing certain powers or demands over the group in exchange for a cessation of violence. In a real way, the state may simply pay off the insurgent group to end their violent campaign. Commensurate with this approach, we may expect the state to employ a complementary strategy that provides non-violent alternatives to the group in order to undermine the insurgents’ proclivity toward violence. Undermining the group’s tendencies toward violence may include creating non-violent alternatives to the group, discrediting it, or co-opting influential members of the group.
There are two distinct sets of factors that distinguish amongst the three strategies states may pursue. The first set of factors is statements made by leaders of the state. If the state is attempting to coerce the group through reciprocal punishment or accommodation (as opposed to merely policing), that strategy should be frequently enunciated in public statements, policy briefings, interviews, and other forms of public engagement. Furthermore, if leaders offer a bargain to the violent group, their public statements will often deal with the specifics of the bargain. For example, do leaders offer amnesty for disarmament? If so, is this evidence of the soft bargain of accommodation? In contrast, do leaders promise only continued and extended punishment for violence? This evidence would support the hard bargain of reciprocal violence. I will evaluate these public statements for the presence of bargaining language according to rules discussed in the methodology section below.

The second sets of factors are the actual tactics of the state. Does a state actually offer alternatives to violence or seek to undermine the group through partial concession or co-optation? Is so, these tactics suggest that the state is following a soft bargain strategy of accommodation. On the other hand, does the state respond to the group only when the group has perpetuated an act of violence and only then with retaliatory punishment? If so, then this behavior supports the strategy of reciprocal violence associated with a hard bargain. Finally, if the state pursues tactics that simply seek to arrest and prosecute the group for its violent activities or repress its functioning, then this behavior supports the no bargain strategy associated with policing.
It is important to note here that in real world application, the tactics selected by a state may be classified under more than one of the three general state strategies I propose. This is not as much of a problem from the perspective of strategic choice, where state decision-makers make statements to the public (including insurgents) detailing their strategic choices and a type of bargain (or lack thereof) toward the violent group. It is, however, a problem in examining the actual tactics employed by the state, which must serve as a check on the statements made by decision-makers in order to determine whether their statements are real bargains and accurately represent their strategic choices or whether they are merely cheap talk. Toward that end, I propose that the three strategies I have described above can be thought of as stackable strategies, with each holding similar and differentiating components. For example, I suspect that for the state to be defined as such, it probably needs to be able to carry out policing functions within its borders most of the time (Krasner 1999). Therefore, even if a state is pursuing a strategy of reciprocal violence, it is not necessarily abandoning its policing function. The same could be said under circumstances of accommodation, where the state’s ongoing policing function is demonstrated when it makes special exceptions toward insurgents in order to offer amnesty.

Therefore, I first believe that policing is a constant part of any counterinsurgency strategy. The next question is whether a state adds to this strategy components of reciprocal violence, accommodation, or both. If the tactics are solely violent in nature, we can confidently conclude that state decision-makers are pursuing reciprocal violence, or a hard bargain. On the other hand, if the state is only offering rewards to end violence,
we can conclude that the decision-makers have selected a policy of accommodation or soft bargain. What if state decision-makers offer both of these types of tactics? Under these circumstances, I argue that the state generally employs violence to support the ends typified in the accommodationist offers that it is making toward the insurgent group. That is, the state is using violence to push the insurgent group toward accepting the accommodations that it is offering. Therefore, I believe it is appropriate to treat such circumstances as cases where the state is pursuing an accommodationist strategy or offering a soft bargain.

I code this independent variable for this study by answering two questions. *First, what do state decision-makers say about their strategic choices?* If they were offering a hard bargain of reciprocal violence or a soft bargain of accommodation, we would expect them to refer to this bargain explicitly or implicitly. They would do this through speeches, press releases, interviews, and other verbal and written articulations of state policy. Do decision-makers leading the state believe that they can bargain with the violent, non-state actor? If they deny this possibility, we would expect them to pursue a base policing strategy with a bargain toward the insurgent group. *Second, which available strategy do state decision-makers pursue to confront the group?* If a state does not attempt to punish or accommodate the group, it will default to a strategy of policing or no bargain. However, if the state attempts to succeed by deterring or coercing the group, it will select a strategy (of reciprocal punishment or accommodation) based on what I suspect are a myriad of factors. This study does not hypothesize why states select particular strategies, but the case studies do address the antecedent factors exogenous and
endogenous to the decision-making process that influence the leaders in question to select a particular strategy. I explore the distinctions between these various strategies below and rules for coding them are included in the testing section.

**Independent Variable: The Motivation of the Non-State Group**

Described above and elucidated below, the behavior of the non-state group and the motivations for it is the second independent variable for this study. As discussed in the preceding chapter, scholars usually point to one of three distinct models or logics that describe the motivation of violent groups. These logics come from the study of the motivations of terrorist groups as well as insurgencies, and there is considerable overlap of motivations within these two fields. While scholars frequently allow the caveat that a single group may contain members whose motivations vary, the behavior of the group itself corresponds to the motivations of the leadership of the organization. Thus, when I refer to the motivations of a group, I focus on the motivations of the leadership of that group. If the group acts in ways not associated with the motivations of the leader, this calls into question the validity of the leadership itself.

Within a group, we can observe one of three predominant sets of motivations, each with a connection to a predominant explanation within the extent literature. Do strategic calculations primarily fuel the motivations of the group? If not, what other motivations influence their decision-making? Are there organizational dynamics that drive the particular group’s violence? Alternatively, do extreme goals within the group propel it to opt for violence as an end rather than merely a means? Strategies adopted by the state will have divergent effects depending on the way that the group is motivated.
I code the insurgent group’s motivation as one of three archetypical models of motivation: strategic, organizational, and extremist. Specific coding rules for these models are available in the testing section. I apply these coding rules to specific group statements and interviews with current and former group members. I then couple these assessments with accounts of the groups in available press accounts and secondary analyses of the behavior and motivation of the group.

**Elucidating the Proposed Model**

Before delving into specific components of this model of violent conflict between states and non-state actors, let us briefly define several concepts critical to understanding the behavior of these actors in conflictual situations. In general theoretical terms, I understand that the state is best described as undertaking a decision-making process that produces a strategy vis-à-vis the non-state group. The goals held by decision-makers within the state may be simple, such as “stop violence” or they may be more complex. However, I generally assume we can explain these goals by examining the decision-making process of elite decision-makers. Consequently, leaders apply resources of the state toward achieving their goals.

When leaders undertake an effort to reduce or end violence from a non-state group, this effort can be broken into four general attribution categories: commitment, capacity, strategy, and luck. By commitment, I mean the extent to which leaders desire to achieve the goal. Some scholars use this problematic variable to explain away variance in predictions of the success or failure in insurgent conflicts. Furthermore, commitment varies amongst individual actors and perhaps with individuals over time.
One can easily imagine that a democratically elected leader initially highly committed to eradicating an insurgency may find her commitment waning as public opinion turns away from the effort. By capacity, I mean the ability of the state to perform any actions that it wishes to perform. A state’s capacity in relation to helicopters is low if it has none and high if it can undertake any mission it desires with helicopters. International relations theorists most frequently employ capacity in military terms in relation to the state and in societal support terms in relation to the insurgent group. Unfortunately, this variable is frequently under-theorized when applied (for an excellent counterexample, see Kalyvas, 2006). Strategy refers to the specific choices and ways that decision-makers select to attempt to achieve goals. This is the focus of this study and is a frequently ignored component of conflicts. Finally, luck serves as an unsatisfying but inescapable error term that reflects the idiosyncratic nature of wars and conflict.

Both decision-makers in the state and the violent group they face pursue their goals through a diverse and dynamic portfolio of commitment, capacity, strategy, and luck. Holding aside luck, which represents uncertainty and randomness endemic to conflict (Blainey 1988) and cannot be realistically theorized, I account for the other three facets of the attribution model. In general, the focus within non-state groups has frequently been on their strategy, while the focus within states has been on their capacity or (at the level of their domestic politics) their commitment (Merom 2003). I am broadening the analytical effort by taking seriously the strategies of the state and the behavioral responses of the violent, non-state group. As a result, it will be important......
within this study to adequately control for commitment and capacity as influences on the success or a failure of a state to ameliorate violence.

Therefore, this model attempts to control for the variable of commitment in the following ways. First, this model only seeks to explain cases where the level of commitment is at least high enough to lead both the state and the group into violent conflict. It is reasonable to believe that for either actor, violence is more costly than most other possible actions and a resort to violence is an indicator of a high level of commitment to the actor’s goals. If the actor was not highly committed, it might simply concede the point (even the point of nationalist secession) to the other actor. Therefore, for the cases to which this model applies, a large loss of commitment would be required to affect the behavior of either the state or the non-state group. This loss of motivation seems to be largely absent outside of failed states (which this study does not explore).

The second conceptual component is capacity. While states generally predominate in narrow, materialist conceptions of power, it is often the case that violent non-state groups marshal impressive resources under broader conceptions of power. Therefore, referring to these conflicts as insurgent conflicts relies on an explicitly materialist conception of power. Despite this caveat, it is still semantically useful to use the term insurgent to refer to conflicts of this type.

However, I argue that even in conflicts where the non-state group holds impressive capacities, several factors are true for the cases covered by this model. First, the state is not in immediate danger of a loss of sovereignty to the non-state group. That is, in the cases explained by this model, the non-state group does not hold either material
or societal capacity sufficient to overthrow the state and assume power. Second, if the non-state actors were as clearly visible to the state as the state is to the non-state actors, the state would have little trouble subduing the actors themselves. The case studies in this model reflect the various capacities of both the state and the non-state actor. Considering the various capacities employed by both actors will be necessary to reject a null hypothesis that a resort to power (broadly conceived) is the sole factor critical to explain insurgent conflicts.

The third component is strategy and is where I turn presently. While a great deal of focus has been on the strategy of the non-state group (especially terrorist strategies), it has been argued elsewhere that most strategic innovations by the non-state group do not alter the behavior of the state (Falkenrath 2001). On the other hand, I argue that the strategies of states are vitally important in affecting the behavior of a non-state group. Above I have typified each of my three general strategies as a type of bargain. Policing represents no bargain, Reciprocal punishment represents a hard bargain, and accommodation represents a soft bargain. I discuss the reasoning for this assertion below and describe how it interacts with the decision-making process present within each group.

Types of State Strategies: A Typology of Bargains

How should we go about analyzing strategies that a state adopts to ameliorate the threats from an organized, violent insurgent group? Many scholars have listed a variety of distinct and partially complementary tactics that states have employed. These strategies range from tactics of deterrence to law enforcement to enhanced civil defense to negotiation with the violent group (1999). Ivan Arreguin-Toft argues that states make
a choice between two general types of strategies in insurgent conflicts: direct attack and barbarism (Arreguin-Toft 2001). Most other scholars tend to focus on specific tactics, rather than general strategies. Like Arreguin-Toft, I agree that general formulations of state strategies are useful. However, I believe it is helpful to distinguish two critical choices that leaders of states must make when they develop a strategy to deal with an insurgent attack. Before discussing these choices, I must first distinguish a critical component of these choices: the concept of counterinsurgency as a bargain offered to the violent group by the state.

Generally, states, substate actors, and individuals may make bargains. A bargain occurs whenever something is offered for something else. This may occur even if one or both things are negations (i.e. “If you stop persecuting us, we will stop bombing you”). Bargains imply that the other party making the offer believes that the receiving party can make value calculations about its goals. Further, it implies that the offering party believes that the receiving party will understand the bargain as an offer of exchange affecting its pursuit of its goals. This effect can be positive (i.e. “If you stop your bombing campaign, we will grant you cultural sovereignty”) or negative (i.e. “If you do not stop your bombing campaign, we will occupy your villages and impose martial law”). A single bargain could encompass both positive and negative effects.

Specifically, when a state bargains with an insurgent group, it is attempting to change the behavior of that group by altering the value calculation of that group (Clark 2007). By rewarding desirable behavior and/or punishing undesirable behavior, the state is hoping to influence the insurgent group toward behavior that the state prefers.
It is important to note the role of a reference point for both the side offering the bargain and the side receiving the bargain. Specifically, the one side may not understand in the same way (or to the same degree) what is understood as a reward or as a punishment by the other side. If one side is attempting to provoke a violent reaction, then a threat of violent retaliation might be a desired and welcomed offer. In the case of a state’s interaction with an insurgent group, how the state understands the bargain (as a reward or a punishment) is important because it provides a check on the strategic choices made by the state (described below). How the insurgent group understands this bargain from its reference point is an important facet of explaining the effectiveness of the strategy. For example, a bargain offered by a state may not offer enough of a cost or benefit to the insurgent group to compel them to change their behavior. In a bargaining scenario where the state attempts to influence the behavior of the insurgent group, it is the burden of the state to understand not only what the insurgent group values, but also how much they value it relative to other values. Failing to meet either of these criteria leads to ineffective bargaining.

When a state offers a bargain to an insurgent group, it can be true or false and credible or incredible. That is, the state may be willing and able to carry out its end of the bargain, or it may be unwilling or unable. While it is certainly true that states are not always truthful (nor are they always duplicitous) when dealing with insurgent groups, the presence of a bargain indicates that the state believes that the insurgent group can be a bargaining partner and that the state makes tactical choices affected by that belief.
States make bargains toward insurgent groups that are either open or secretive. When states make bargains openly, they intend for third parties, including the domestic public, international governments, and international publics to understand these bargains and thus incur the binding and committing effects that such a public statement makes. When a bargain is made secretly, it is generally limited to a select set of individuals that include at least the insurgent group. For the purposes of coding and analysis, this raises a problem, because there is always the possibility that a secret bargain was in place that affected the behavior of the state and insurgent group in unexplained ways. However, this research project will focus on open, publicly stated bargains. It is clear that this analytical choice introduces a particular type of bias in the analysis, as I discuss below.

There is good reason to support this position. First, public bargains, especially by a state to an insurgent group, are publicly costly. This is because insurgent conflicts involve not only the state and insurgent forces, but also a public comprised of neutral and leaning citizens. Thus, a government unable to follow through on its bargains may lose supporters and embolden insurgents. Furthermore, a government able to execute bargains effectively appears stronger domestically and internationally. Unfortunately, a government may use secret bargains to mitigate some of the political costs of publicity, and to the extent that these bargains have remained secret, this analysis will not detect them. However, I believe (although I cannot test) that this behavior is generally unlikely. In the first place, the historical record of secret negotiations between a government and insurgents where the dialogue differed from public rhetoric is relatively sparse. While these types of interactions regularly take place between states, they appear much less
often between a state and an insurgent group. Second, a state attempting to undermine group cohesion or popular support for the group has little reason to do so in secret. The state stands more to gain by offering such bargains publicly.

Thus, a definition of a bargain for this project is as follows: *A state is offering a bargain to an insurgent group when it offers to punish or reward specific actions by the insurgent group, either ongoing or hypothetical, and that such punishment is contingent upon the commencement or cessation of those actions.*

For the purposes of operationalization, I have described below the two general types of bargains available to a state when dealing with an insurgent group. Below each, I offer a potential operational definition. Although the state may not word them as such, a bargain should be able to be worded as an if-then statement (“if you do this, then we will do that”). Within each of these general types is a range of bargains that might exist. First is a hard bargain.

The hard bargain of reciprocal violence from the state tells the insurgent group that violence perpetrated by the group will warrant commensurate or greater punishment. The hope of this bargain is not necessarily to eliminate the group, but to deter it from perpetrating violent acts. On the one hand, the state tells (or shows in a situation of repeated interaction) the insurgents that any violent actions will be punished through retribution upon the group and its interests. At the same time, if the insurgents resort to violence, the state attempts to compel them to abjure violence or face escalating costs in kind. A hard bargain must include the following components. First, it must include recognition by state decision-makers of the potential of violent actions or a perception of
current violent actions on the part of the insurgent group. Second, it must include a stated commitment to punish the insurgent group under conditions where the group pursues violence. Statements by decision-makers or their repeated behavior in the face of insurgent violence allow us to ascertain this commitment. Finally, there must be a consequential process linking the commencement of the punishment to the execution of violent actions by the insurgent group.

A soft bargain from the state may tell the insurgent group that any violent acts will warrant punishment, but more importantly, the state will reward abstention from violence with accommodations. An accommodation is something offered to the insurgent group that the state perceives it to desire. For conceptual clarity, this can be anything that the group desires (sovereignty, peace talks, release of prisoners, etc.). In cases of insurgent conflict, it is rarely the case that the strong actor refrains from any form of punishment and only offers rewards. At the very least, the state will continue to police against violence stemming from the insurgency while offering accommodations. More usually, the state will use broader violence associated with the hard bargain strategy described above to pressure the insurgents to accept the offered accommodations.

In a soft bargain of accommodation, the state offers not only the stick of punishment to ameliorate the threat of the insurgent group, but also the carrot of rewarding the group for a commitment to nonviolence. A soft bargain must include the following components. First, it must include recognition by state decision-makers of the potential for violent actions or a perception of current violent actions on the part of the insurgent group. This condition is no different from the hard bargain described above.
Second, the soft bargain must contain a commitment to reward the group or its members under certain conditions. For example, Saudi Arabia has recently drawn attention with media accounts of its extremely material rewarding and mild program towards detained insurgents (Henry 2007). The goal of this program is not to punish insurgents, but to show them that a life outside of the insurgency is more comfortable and rewarding than one within it.

Soft bargains will also usually contain a commitment to punish the group should it continue to pursue violence, whether or not it accepts the concessions the state is offering. However, it is possible to imagine (however, unlikely) a situation where the state offers only accommodations to the insurgent group. What conditions could the state require of insurgents? These could include abjuring violence, defecting from the group, turning into informants, disarming, etc. The rewards for such activity could include any of the accommodations discussed above. Finally, a soft bargain should include a consequential process linking the commencement of the punishment and rewards offered by the state to insurgent group behavior opposed and desired (respectively) by the state.

In this definition, the category of soft bargain is far more inclusive than that of hard bargain. However, the appellation of soft bargain does not necessarily mean that the state is taking a soft approach to the insurgent group. Recall that only the presence of a bargain is necessary. Drawing a logical distinction between hard and soft bargains does provide a useful benefit to the study. First, while the state may undertake a punishing strategy of reciprocal violence along with a soft bargain of accommodation, it is difficult to understand how a state would undertake an accomodationist strategy while only
offering reciprocal violence. Thus, this distinction provides a partial test of the state’s belief in the efficacy of bargaining. Second, this distinction provides an additional level of information about the nature of the bargains that states offer to insurgent groups. For example, do states begin with hard bargains and move to soft bargains over the course of the conflict? By making this distinction, we can say something about the nature of the bargains states offer without incurring classification struggles stemming from issues of a reference point.

Now, let us return to the choices that states make with respect to a violent, non-state group. The first critical choice a state must make is to decide whether the insurgent group can be a bargaining partner. That is, can the stronger actor impose costs and offer benefits to the insurgent group in order to dissuade the insurgent group from violent actions against the state or its interests? This is akin to the state making a judgment about the perceived rationality of the insurgent group. If state decision-makers express the view that the insurgent group is rational enough that it can dissuade the group through the imposition of costs or the provision of benefits, then it can be a bargaining partner. Conversely, if the decision-makers determine that for whatever reason it cannot offer benefits or impose costs that will dissuade the insurgent group, then they cannot be a bargaining partner. If state decision-makers decide that they cannot bargain with an insurgent group, then the likely recourse of the state is to defend against the violent actions of the insurgent group. I refer to this strategic option as policing or no bargain below. As I discuss below, a state may also intentionally adopt this strategy even in cases where an insurgent group can actually be a bargaining partner. However, if state
decision-makers perceive that they can bargain with the insurgent group and it is in their interest to do so, then they may use a variety of tools to coerce the insurgent group to give up its violent strategy of insurgency.

If state decision-makers argue that they can bargain with the insurgents, then the state can decide between three distinct strategic approaches. Below, I briefly describe these three strategies. It should be noted that I distinguish between strategy, which is the overall approach to dealing with the conflict, versus tactics, which are various policies or groups of policies employed in the service of a particular strategy. Some tactics are particular to one or two strategies (negotiations as a tactic would not be a part of a strategy that denies the ability of the insurgent group to bargain), but some tactics could serve any of the three strategies. Strategy is determined both through an examination of the portfolio of selected tactics, their timing in relation to actions of the insurgent group, and the intentions of the decision-makers leading the state.

The first strategy that state decision-makers may adopt is what I term policing or no bargain. Under this strategy, state decision-makers express the belief that they cannot bargain with the insurgents. Conversely, decision-makers may perceive that they could bargain with the insurgent group, but they opt not to do so. This may occur for a variety of reasons ranging from a desire not to negotiate with terrorists, to a belief that any bargaining with an insurgency may grant it legitimacy, to a belief that the threat posed by the insurgency is so minor, no overt threats or bargains need to be made. This last view is most commensurate with the approach that the insurgency is nothing more than criminality and should be treated as such. The strategy of policing reflects the behavior
of the state in situations described as “brute force” by Thomas Schelling (Schelling 1966). This strategy suggests that the tactics of the state tend to take a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, the state will focus much of its efforts on its ability to absorb or defend against any violence produced by the insurgent group. Since it cannot expect that any bargain or threat will produce a lessening of violence, it must prepare to bear the brunt of violence (Mueller 2005). On the other hand, the state will also look for opportunities to arrest or remove threats posed by insurgents if these opportunities present themselves. Therefore, we should see the state detaining and prosecuting insurgents themselves, as well as seeking to infiltrate and undertake surveillance of groups, as it would do against criminals of all sorts. The state adopts a strategy that does not attempt to bargain with or influence the insurgent group, so the only action the state would look to take would be actions to damage the group itself.

Numerous states have undertaken this type of strategic approach with an insurgent group in insurgent conflict. One particular illustrative example is the behavior of the Sinhalese government of Sri Lanka before and after the incursion of the Indian army against the Tamil Tigers (or LTTE) from 1985 until 1990. While the Tamil insurgency had been increasing in ferocity in Sri Lanka for more than a decade, the Indian army presented a completely different strategy from the Sinhalese policing of Tamil violence. The Indian army directly attempted to coerce the LTTE through a strategy of reciprocal violence and probably would have succeeded, had it been willing to pursue the fleeing rebels into the jungles beyond the Jaffna peninsula (Whittaker 2003). After 1990, with the withdrawal of the Indian army, the strategy for combating the LTTE changed again,
to an accommodationist approach seeking a cease-fire agreement. This learning and change in strategies is not unusual in the prosecution of insurgencies (Nagl 2002).

The second strategy that state decision-makers may adopt is to offer the insurgent group a hard bargain of reciprocal violence. The hard bargain from the state tells the insurgent group that any violence perpetrated by the group will incur commensurate or greater punishment. The hope of this bargain is not necessarily to eliminate the group, but to deter it from perpetrating further violent acts. Deterrence and compellance play the major role in this bargain (Schelling 1966; Trager 2006). On the one hand, state decision-makers argue (or show in a situation of repeated interaction) the insurgent group that any violent actions will be punished through retribution upon the insurgent group and its interests. At the same, if the insurgent group resorts to violence, the state attempts to compel the insurgent group to abjure violence or face escalating costs in kind (Morgan 1983). Compared to the strategy of no bargain, the strategy of hard bargain must contain a component of communication between state decision-makers and the insurgent group. Often, this communication takes the form of public rhetoric made by leaders and decision-makers of the state (Nacos 2002). Another frequently used method is some form of formal dialogue (whether negotiations or only channels of communication) between the government and the insurgent group itself. A critical component of deterrence is the ability to make the threat known to the opponent and that requirement is present in insurgent conflicts with non-states as well.

Again, the case of the LTTE insurgency is illustrative in the case of hard bargain. In the years preceding and following the Indian incursion into Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankan
government often followed the strategy of policing or offering no bargain. From 1983 to 1987, Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese government responded to Tamil attacks with policing by attempting to mitigate the effects of attacks and to detain the responsible insurgents. When the Indian army entered, it offered a new strategic component by threatening the Tigers with reciprocal violence. After the Indian army withdrew, the Sri Lankan government resumed their prior strategy for a brief time before integrating components of sovereignty offers that transitioned their approach into the third strategy I describe here (Beckett 2001).

The final strategy that state decision-makers may adopt in its attempt to ameliorate the threat of an insurgent group is what I term a soft bargain of accommodation. This is the second of two types of bargains that decision-makers can offer to the insurgent group. The soft bargain of accommodation from the state offers as a reward for abstention from violence in the form of various incentives (such as autonomy, amnesty, political voice, etc.). In cases of insurgent conflict, rarely does the strong actor refrain from any form of punishment and only offer rewards. In a soft bargain, state decision-makers usually offer not only the stick of punishment to ameliorate the threat of the insurgent group, but also the carrot of rewarding the group for a commitment to nonviolence. These two prongs of motivation are often coupled with attempts to undermine the insurgent group internally which is part of the policing base which characterizes all three strategies (Teague 2006). One need only look to the British moves to integrate Sinn Fein into the political process during the 1990s while at the same time continuing to punish the IRA for its violent tactics (O’Day 1995). The hope of such
a strategy is that it will be doubly effective in reducing the threat of an insurgent group. The strategy combines the provision of some concessions to reduce the grievances of the insurgent group while continuing to prosecute violence and undermining the group’s capabilities. The thought of such a strategy is that it makes a nonviolent approach that much more attractive.

Whatever strategy the state adopts, it should be noted that I assume that the eradication of the group is not the ultimate goal of the state’s strategy. Rather, the decision-makers for the state meet their goal if the group is no longer a violent threat. The state may decide that the best way to achieve this is through eradication, which is represented by the strategy of no bargain.

These two critical questions, whether decision-makers perceive that they can bargain with an insurgent group and what type of strategy the state should use, create a typology representative of the various strategies states undertake when facing insurgent conflicts with non-states. I illustrate these three strategies and the two choices that develop them graphically below.
Do State decision-makers believe they can bargain with the insurgent Group?

\[ \text{NO} \quad \text{YES} \]

\[ \text{No Bargain} \quad \text{Which strategy do the State decision-makers believe is most effective?} \]

\[ \text{No Bargain} \quad \text{Hard Bargain} \quad \text{Soft Bargain} \]

Figure 2.4: Decision-tree for the state leaders in an insurgent conflict

As discussed above, I will investigate but not theorize the factors that may lead a state to select a particular strategy to employ against an insurgent group. Where I will now turn my attention, however, is an investigation of the motivations of the violent non-state actor. While the overall strategy of the state is a major variable to consider in the determination of an insurgent conflict, I argue in the next section that an equally important variable is the motivation of the insurgent group. These motivations coupled with the particular strategies above will produce testable expectations regarding the likelihood of success for a state in an insurgent conflict.

*Types of Group Motivations*

How are groups of people motivated to be violent? Are they driven by the logic of strategic material gains, or by the logic of what is appropriate (March 1998)? Conversely, does a set of organizational motivations shape the decision-making of these groups? Groups that undertake violence against a state have long been understood to operate under a variety of logics, as discussed in the previous chapter. Scholars like
Martha Crenshaw and Jerrold Post have long argued that terrorist groups are driven towards violence by organizational dynamics within their respective groups (Crenshaw 1981; Crenshaw 1983; Crenshaw 1991; Reich 1998). Other scholars have examined the rational and strategic reasons that insurgents employ violence (Schmid 1988; Tan 2002; Stern 2003). Finally, some scholars have examined the characteristics of insurgents that typify them as extremist (Hoffman 1993; Esposito 2002; Hoffman 2003). Furthermore, few other types of organizations have had their motivations questioned so intensely as terrorist and insurgent groups. What motivates these groups? There are a number of ways to discuss and formulate typologies of the motivations of violent groups (Whittaker 2003). Some authors have focused on the ideology of the group (Hacker 1976; Frost 2005), others have analyzed structural factors influencing the decision-making environment of the group (Stern 2003), and still others have catalogued the tactics employed by the groups (Tan 2002). The goal here is to present one typology of the motivations of insurgent groups. While no typology captures every relevant characteristic of insurgent groups, this typology presents the promise of discernibly different reactions to the anti-insurgency strategies of the state. In this section, I describe each one of the three different behavioral logics that characterizes all insurgent groups.

In discussing the motivations of insurgent groups, I draw a distinction between the ideology, goals, and tactics of the group. The ideology of the group is the general set of broad beliefs and ontological foundations that form the basis of every group’s

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4 While terms such as fanatical, eschatological, millennial, and religious have all been used by scholars within this literature, I find that the term extremist is most useful because it avoids the pejorative connotation of irrationality present in “fanatical” and understands that the extreme goals may be correlated with, but do not require, religious commitments.
existence. For example, the IRA’s ideology may include the general political orientation of its members (especially leaders) as well as its ultimate aims, such as freedom from British rule. In contrast, the goals of a group are the immediate objectives that the group seeks to achieve. Goals are the physically attainable steps that the group will take in pursuit of its ideology or other benefits. For example, a goal of the current Chechen insurgency appears to be the incapacitation of local Russian military forces (Kramer 2005). Finally, the tactics of the group are the specific actions that the group performs in pursuit of its goals. The Chechen insurgency could undertake a variety of tactics to incapacitate the local Russian military forces, but thus far has relied primarily on ambushes and roadside bombings (Kramer 2005). I make this distinction because below I discuss three main ways that scholars have expected insurgencies, especially insurgencies utilizing terrorism, to be motivated. We can clearly understand the distinction between these three sets of motivations in the relationship between their ideology, goals, and tactics. I represent this relationship schematically at the end of a description of each.

The archetypical models of insurgent behavior presented here come primarily from the study of the motivations of terrorist and insurgent groups. However, they apply well to any violent, non-state group irrespective of the terrorist label. I argue that these groups are primarily fueled by strategic calculations (Reich 1998; Arreguin-Toft 2001; Art 2003; Pape 2003), by organizational dynamics that drive the particular group to violence (Crenshaw 2001), or by extremist goals that dictate violence as an end rather than a means (Reich 1998; Esposito 2002; Juergensmeyer 2003).
The Strategic Logic

As discussed in the previous chapter, many scholars of security studies understand terrorism to emerge from a strategic calculation (Posen 2001; Mackinlay 2002; Pape 2003; Stevenson 2004). Insurgent groups may have an articulated ideology, but the motivation for such groups comes from their belief that violent tactics help them achieve specific goals that have either a material basis such as land, or a perceptual basis, such as welfare, autonomy, or justice (Welch 1993). In the case of Stevenson, even religiously motivated groups that are typically thought to reject bargaining with their adversaries are assumed to participate in “tacit bargaining” and “coordination games” with their opponents. Stevenson explicitly adopts Thomas Schelling’s language and expectations in this approach (Stevenson 2004).

If that were the case, we would expect that the most successful strategies for dealing with terrorist insurgent groups would be strategies that punish groups for perpetuating violent activities. If insurgents were acting to achieve instrumental goals, we would expect the most successful policies of the state to attempt to deal with the group at the level of a strategic choice (Midlarsky 2000). That is, we would expect policies that would make insurgent strategies more costly or the perceived goals easier to achieve by other non-violent means. Crenshaw writes, “Each party, the government and the terrorist, wants to erode the other’s motivation to continue and tries to understand what the other values most” (Art 2003). Specifically, we would expect a reliance on policies of retaliation (Stohl 1988). Bargaining is a desirable policy for the state, since it
understands the insurgent group as essentially rational. The policies of the state would seek to increase the costs of pursuing violent activities while increasing the benefits of acceptable alternatives (Kahn 1960; Schelling 1960; Kahn 1965; Schelling 1966; Lebow 1990). Most policies would be essentially reactive (Mullins 1997). Crenshaw notes that positive inducements can be less likely, given the often zero-sum nature of these conflicts (Art 2003). Policies would include deterrent strategies like retaliatory strikes for terrorist attacks and compellance strategies to convince the insurgent group of increasing costs in the face of continued violence. In sum, the ideology of the group contains the goals of the insurgent group, and the goals of the insurgent group influence options for the tactics of the group.5

The Organizational Logic

Some scholars of terrorism have argued that terrorists are frequently motivated by psychological elements of group dynamics and organizational motivations (Crenshaw 1981; Crenshaw 1983; Oots 1986; Sageman 2004). Insurgent groups may have an articulated ideology, but their motivation comes primarily from a desire to maintain group esteem and identity (Brewer 2003). The violent nature of the insurgent group is part of its identity. Therefore, the insurgent group has two sets of goals, which are only tangentially related. The first set of goals frames the insurgent group’s ideology. The second set of goals focuses on the maintenance of the group’s identity. The group may articulate the first set of goals, but uses tactics that achieve the second set of goals.

5 By this terminology, I mean that the goals of a group (defined as the immediate physical objectives sought by the group) are constrained by the ideology of the group. Furthermore, the tactics that the group selects are a result of a rational attempt to efficiently achieve their selected goals and stem from that rational process.
If insurgents act because of the logic of their organizational structure, we would expect the most successful policies of the states to be focused on undermining that organization (Crenshaw 2001). That is, the state’s policies would not bargain directly with the insurgent group in relation to its goals and the costs of achieving them. Rather, the state’s policies would seek to alter the organization that opts to pursue violent strategies. Such an alteration would, if successful, produce an organization that either was operationally weakened, disbanded, or no longer was inclined to pursue terrorism (Crenshaw 1981). Decision-makers should implement policies designed to change the societal or organizational factors within a group that they believe lead to violence. As such, they would be divorced from any reaction to particular violent events in the midst of a long campaign against the insurgent group.

Policies would include societal avenues for advancement as an alternative to groups practicing terrorism and stiffer penalties for being part of an insurgent organization, even in a non-criminal capacity. Other policies would include offering amnesty or concessions to insurgent group defectors or using media or societal pressure to undermine the internal legitimacy of the group. Silencing the leadership of the organization, either politically or literally, is also a strategy designed to counter groups motivated by the organizational logic. As Jerrold Post writes, counter terrorism is best accomplished through “inhibit[ing] potential recruits from joining the group”, “produc[ing] tensions within the group,” “facilitating exit from the group,” and, “reduce[ing] external support for the group and its leader” (Post 2004). In sum, the ideology of the group constrains their stated goals, but goals pursued by the tactics of the
group are influenced by the insurgent group’s unstated motivations for internal identity preservation as well as their stated goals.

The Extremist Logic

Some scholars and many politicians seem to think of insurgents monolithically. They seem to understand that these violent actors carry out murder and mayhem because such violence is central and fundamental to their role and what they seek to accomplish. Many times, politicians and some scholars seem to link the violent tendencies of these individuals and groups to a particular religious conviction, individual psychological predilections, or criminal proclivity (Hacker 1976; Rapoport 1984; Hoffman 1993; Esposito 2002; Juergensmeyer 2003). In popular discourse, these groups are often referred to as fanatics, zealots, or extremists.6 Individuals who operate according to religious convictions or ideological commitments are often described as being incapable of compromise. However, this is certainly not always true. Many groups that draw upon religious inspiration or hold to strong ideological commitments compromise in the service of their goals. Aside from the ideological characteristics of individuals and groups, what, if anything, makes them extremist? If we cannot reasonably deduce significant differences between extremist groups and other types of violent, non-state actors, we should collapse the category. However, as I argue below, if extremist groups exist as a separate analytical category from other types of insurgent groups, they should display two specific characteristics.

6 In attempting to balance the competing needs of objective nomenclature in political analysis and conceptual clarity, I refer to these groups as extremist. The term is not as pejorative as fanatic or zealot, but retains necessary clarity.
For the strategic and organizationally motivated groups described above, a distinction can be made between the group’s stated, long-term goals and their proximate, short-term goals. A strategically motivated group may adopt short-term goals of violence against the state, knowing that violence can be abandoned if the long-term goal of secession is achieved. In this sense, violence is a means to a secessionist end. The same distinction is true of organizationally motivated groups, though as I discussed above, organizationally motivated groups have short-term goals that reflect their stated long-term goals as well as short-term goals focused on in-group dynamics. However, this distinction between short-term and long-term goals should not be apparent in an extremist group. The short-term goals of the insurgent group are the direct realization of their long-term goals. In the same way, the tactics employed by the extremist insurgent group are a direct attempt to realize their goals, both short and long-term, rather than a series of short-term goals through which the group seeks to advance its long-term goals. Thus, the first characteristic of extremist groups is a lack of analytical distinctiveness between the short and long-term goals of the group.

The idea that extremist groups see no distinction between their immediate, proximate goals and their long-term objectives represents the first critical characteristic of extremist groups, but it is also crucial for the second characteristic. The second characteristic that distinguishes extremist groups from others with similar long-term goals or motivations is the central role that violence plays for the group. Amongst the groups that seek to undertake actions that directly realize their long-term goals, those groups for whom violence is a central part of those goals are considered extremist. That is to say,
the group could not abandon violence in favor of an alternative course of action without fundamentally questioning the nature or convictions of the group. Violence is not something that extremist groups do; it is something that extremist groups are. Some genocide campaign participants, who see violence as a central component to (in their minds) the necessary task they perform are not only directly trying to realize their long-term goals through their actions, but they are doing so in a way that requires violence. They could not remain true to their convictions and understandings of themselves and not be violent (Stern 2003).

An example from the abortion debates is helpful in illustrating these two characteristics of extremist groups. Many Christian groups hold staunch anti-abortion positions. Some Christian groups seek to reduce abortion rates by emphasizing such alternative options as abstinence and adoption. Other Christian groups seek to lobby the government or support particular candidates to hold positions on abortion that they support. Still others employ horrific acts of violence against doctors, patients, and clinics. Some groups pursue proximate goals, which are distinct from their long-term goals. For example, helping elect a pro-life candidate does not directly reduce abortions, but as a short-term goal, it may contribute to that long-term goal. Such groups would not meet the first characteristic of extremism. Other groups may directly attempt to reduce the number of abortions, by either offering alternatives to abortion or publicizing them, but they do not opt for violence. In this case, the first characteristic may be met, but the second (the centrality of violence) is not. Only when both of these characteristics are met in guise of abortion clinic bombers do such actors meet the standard of extremism.
Misguided though they may be, abortion clinic bombers see their short-term actions as a direct achievement of their long-term goals (see interviews in (Stern 2003)). That is, they see their immediate actions as reducing the number of abortions occurring, which is their long-term goal, and violence is central to the accomplishment of this short-term goal.

Thus, I define extremist groups as groups that pursue violence because it is central to who they are and because it is a direct achievement of their ideology. This understanding makes extremist motivated groups distinct from strategically motivated groups who have simply not been persuaded to compromise yet.

Under the extremist logic, we would expect the policies of the state to be preventative. That is, the state will acknowledge insurgents as individuals and groups with whom it cannot bargain or even effectively undermine. Walter Laqueur writes, “The outlook [for negotiation with insurgents] is poor; there are no known cures for fanaticism and paranoia” (Laqueur 2003). Thus, the only alternative is to seek to prevent their actions as best as possible. Successful state policies would not seek to bargain or even communicate with groups or individuals perceived as terrorists. State policies would seek to make it difficult for insurgents to carry out their strategies, or at worst, mitigate the damage of those strategies. Policies would be a mix of reactive and proactive approaches. Passive policies (which would predominate) would include increased civil defense and greater surveillance of likely insurgent targets. Active policies would include terrorist profiling and restricting the freedoms of religious and political groups aligned or linked with insurgent group activities. In sum, the long-term goals of the group define the short-term goals of the insurgent group and prescribe tactics.

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In this model, the long-term goals of the group are so constraining that short-term goals and tactics set by the long-term goals are not causally distinct from each other.

These three models of the motivations that drive insurgent groups are by their very nature broad and do not contain the nuance of a model that might be derived by studying the functioning of a particular group. Rather, they are an attempt to describe the general behavior of a particular insurgent group or set of groups. With that in mind, one possible criticism of this typology is that we may observe different segments of an insurgent group to behave according to different logics or even that mixture of motivations might be present. For example, the leadership of a particular insurgency might behave very strategically (showing a willingness to bargain and compromise with the state), while the organizational model might better characterize the lower-level functionaries and the actual terrorist operatives might best be characterized by adherence to extremes goals for their motivation. To be sure, we may find in any organization a variety of motivations resident to varying degrees amongst individuals. Additionally, Jerrold Post, a scholar of terrorist motivations, has correctly pointed out that terrorists are procedurally rational, even as their choices might appear strategically irrational to outside observers (Reich 1998).

While I accept these points as valid, for analytical purposes, we can determine which archetypical logic of motivation best describes the behavior of the group. The logic driving the leadership of an insurgency should dominate other sources of motivation. If the leaders of a particular group are rationally strategic (and they have effective control over the insurgency), then the behavior of the group should be strategic,
regardless of the motivations of other members of the group. However, if organizational motivations drive the leadership of the group along with the rest of the group, then the organizational model should predominate. Finally, if the leaders of an insurgency exhibit tactics and goals which directly seek to realize their long-term goals conterminously with their short-term goals and emphasize the centrality of violence in their identities, then the group is broadly motivated by the extremist logic. In such a group, any individual self-interest within the organization will be secondary in their characterization of the group. This is because the leadership would eschew goals and tactics selected for the purpose of seeking intermediate goals or internally advancing within the organization.

The Analysis of State Strategies and Group Motivations

This chapter has thus far based its logic on two key features of insurgent conflicts: state strategies and group motivations. This section describes how these two features form a model of success in insurgent conflicts. After considering the interplay of strategy and motivation, a model of insurgent conflict between a state and an insurgent group is proposed. In the subsequent chapters, I test the model by an examination of four spatially and temporally variable insurgent conflicts.

When states confront an insurgent group that operates according to a strategic logic, I argue it is most effective for the state to present a hard bargain of reciprocal violence.\(^7\) If a state can deter a non-state group from violence with the threat of retaliation, it has prevented the conflict with only the costs of making and maintaining the threat. Additionally, if the group has already begun perpetrating violence, the prospect of

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\(^7\) By effective, I mean the two measures that I argue are most important to states and that I will use to evaluate the model: number of deaths caused by the insurgents and the frequency of insurgent violence.
continued violence in retaliation from the state can raise the costs of such a strategy high enough to compel the group to abandon it.

When an insurgent group is strategically motivated, it is more sensitive to the pains of increased costs than groups that are motivated by organizational dynamics or extremist goals. When this is the case, the most successful strategy for the state will be one that raises the costs of violent insurgency past the point that a strategically minded group will find it advantageous to pursue. Thus, the pairing of this strategy with this type of group will be more successful than an equivalent expenditure of resources by the state in another strategy.

It is not efficient for a state to make concessions associated with a soft bargain to the group when it is sufficient to impose costs on insurgents. In the first place, such concessions are often very expensive for the state (Art 2003). Second, such concessions will often prompt a strategically minded group to seek additional accommodations from the state and only escalate its current strategy. In fact, states should only offer concessions to insurgents when the costs of those concessions (and the concomitant costs of emboldening the insurgent group) are less than the costs of continued efforts at deterrence. This is not the case unless the insurgent group remains undeterred by the strategy of reciprocal punishment. In the same way, it will not be efficient to offer no bargain and merely police against the insurgent group. Employing this strategy, the state will waste an opportunity to convince the insurgent group that further violence is not in its interest and will instead continue to passively repress and apprehend members of the
group, which may only serve to produce more recruits for the insurgent group in the long term.

*When states confront an insurgent group that operates according to an organizational logic, I argue it is most effective to present a soft bargain of accommodation.* In groups that are motivated by psychological desires for group identification and belonging as well as organizational motivations toward escalating violence as a form of commitment, undermining that dynamic is the key way for the state to ameliorate violence. Thus, it is important to note that it is not sufficient for the state merely to offer a selection of threats and rewards to an organizationally motivated group. Rather, the state will most efficiently ameliorate violence from the group if the threats against the group and the rewards for the group focus on undermining the group’s internal dynamics (Rapoport 2001).

Whereas a strategically minded insurgent group pursues violent insurgency because it is a valuable choice for achieving their goals, an organizationally minded group pursues insurgency for internal reasons. The formation of the organization, not its goals, matters most for propelling its members toward violence. If this organization can be undermined, I argue that the group’s desire to pursue violence will be severely lessened. As I describe below, the broad strategy of accommodation contains the types of strategic elements that are best suited to undermine the internal group dynamics of the insurgent group and therefore it represents the most efficient method of ameliorating violence from this type of group.
Undermining the internal group cohesion of an organizational group can take a variety of interrelated forms. First, a state may seek to assassinate or otherwise incapacitate leaders within the group. This is consistent with the baseline policing inherent in each strategic approach. This could break up the group dynamic in such a way that the group will either disintegrate or deviate from a path of violence. However, it may also mobilize the group and make way for underlings to rise to leadership feeling the need for greater acts of violence to validate their position. Perhaps more effectively, the state could penalize new members of an organization while at the same time rewarding those who leave the organization or turn into informants. Both actions seek to pull people away from the group when they might still be influenced by material rewards and undermine the cohesion of the group by inciting suspicion. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the state can set up alternative sets of rewards and means of expression to rival the insurgent group. By creating nonviolent means to acquire the sense of belonging and material rewards that insurgent groups offer, the state delegitimizes the role that the insurgent group plays. State decision-makers can do this by creating a place for typical insurgent group members (such as a particular ethnic group, etc.) in the formal government or a quasi-governmental advocacy organization. They can also accomplish it by co-opting the leaders of an insurgent group into the government with the hope that they will lead their organization out of violent behavior. However, this may produce fracturing within the insurgent group, with violent and non-violent factions, as was the case in Northern Ireland (Cox 2000; McKittrick 2002; Newsinger 2002). Finally and most directly, the state may simply give the insurgent group part of what they want and
hope that such concessions will be sufficient to induce the group to abandon violence as part of its overall strategy.

If an organizationally motivated group were subject to only the policing strategy associated with no bargain, it would increase their insularity and thus the power of the group dynamic that exacerbates their resort to violence. Furthermore, such repression would probably make the benefits that the group provides more attractive and thus unintentionally assist in their recruitment. Equally pernicious would be a hard bargain of reciprocal punishment, because without the rewards to challenge those offered by the insurgent group to current and potential recruits, it would only enhance the recruitment and internal cohesion of the insurgent group. Limiting punishment to retaliation could only serve further to unify the group itself and would result in the failure of the state’s strategy.

When states confront an insurgent group that operates according to an extremist logic of motivation, I argue it is most effective to present no bargain and merely police against the activities of the group. In this case, contrary to the two described above, the policing strategy is merely the least of three evils. Groups that draw upon extremist ideologies often eschew negotiation at all or present demands that are so extreme that the state cannot comply and remain a state (Fowler 1995; Evans 1997; Krasner 1999). At the same time, these motivations make such groups difficult to deter because they perceive the actions they take as not merely a means to an end, but rather, an end in themselves. For the same reason they are difficult to compel to abjure violence once they have begun it. Thus, the appropriate strategy to ameliorate violence from an insurgent group driven
by extremist goals is to present it with no bargain. The best the state can do directly against the insurgent group is to protect against violent acts it seeks to perpetrate while seek to eradicate the membership of the group, should the opportunity present itself. While this seems rather grim, it is more efficient than repeated failures to bargain with the insurgent group. That is to say, any additional punishment dealt out through a strategy of reciprocal punishment will only add costs to the strategy of the state and will not have a great effect in dissuading the insurgent group. At the same time, accommodations might be accepted by the group, but they will not be sufficient to either undermine the group or satisfy it unless the state fully concedes to the wishes of the group.\textsuperscript{8} Indirect strategies of the state may focus on undermining the legitimacy of the group (through religious or other authorities) and marshaling public support against the group. Both tactics aid in isolating and destroying the violent group. With these expectations in mind, the following set of strategic responses would be most successful in light of the motivations of groups.

\textsuperscript{8} If a state ever gives an insurgent group everything that it is asking for, we must assume that the demands of the group were not of particular importance or cost to the state and that this does not represent the types of ongoing insurgent conflicts that I seek to explain with this model.
Figure 2.5: Strategies Hypothesized to Be More or Less Successful Against Variously Motivated Groups

This set of observations represents the core of the model of insurgent conflicts with non-state actors that I present. I have deliberately left the resolve of the insurgent group and the state out of this model, in part because it seems that such a variable can only be determined post hoc and partly because this variable overdetermines the outcome of the conflict. Ultimately, scholars frequently judge the winner of the conflict to possess the superior resolve (Sullivan 2007).

Methodology and Evidence

In the first chapter, I argued that research in terrorism and insurgencies has typically been either qualitative or quantitative, but rarely both. Large N studies have
typically focused on general facets of civil wars and the success or failure of the state or a secessionist movement, for example (Elbadawi 2002; Fearon 2004). In contrast, small N studies have either focused on a particular conflict over time (which is the predominant approach in the literature) or upon comparative set of cases (Beckett 2001; Joes 2004). I employ this approach in this study. John Gerring refers to approach as a comparative-historical research design because it possesses both temporal variation (within each case of insurgent conflict) and spatial variation (across a set of insurgent conflicts) (Gerring 2004). Gerring correctly notes that this research design makes sacrifices and yields particular advantages. A comparative-historical research design is more descriptive than a large N analysis, but less so than an analysis of a single case. At the same time, it is better suited to make causal attributions and delineate the breadth of those attributions than a single case study, but is less effective in that regard than a large N analysis. Because this study relies heavily on a careful and structured comparison of state decision-makers and insurgent groups, a large N analysis is not effective to evaluate the proposed theory. It is appropriate to center the study on a careful consideration of a small set of cases, rather than on summary consideration of a large set of cases, because such an approach will allow me to better distinguish nuance and process within the cases themselves and will better allow me to reject the hypotheses proposed above. At the same time, employing a comparative historical approach (rather than investigating a single case) yields a better evaluation of the accuracy and applicability of the theory. At the same time, I will limit the implications of this study to the types of cases I am investigating herein.
For this study, I am selecting a group of conflicts that are representative of the world of state-insurgent conflicts with the following caveats. First, I have generally selected states that are not in danger of losing their sovereignty to the insurgent group. There are a host of insurgency conflicts that lead to failed states and this study does not seek to explain them (Gurr 1970; Colaresi 2004). Rather, this study attempts to control for the material capacities of the state by ensuring the state is the materially stronger of the two actors in the conflict. The mere fact that the state is not always successful in conflicts such as these suggests that something beyond material power is influencing the outcome of the conflict.

Second, I am interested in cases of insurgency that provide temporal variation on the dependent variable. That is, I am interested in cases where the state exhibits periods of success and periods of failure. These cases are necessary to evaluate whether state strategies and group motivations covary with state success or failure in ways that I have hypothesized in the above paragraphs.

Finally, I am interested in cases that scholars consider paradigmatic cases of insurgent conflicts. Because insurgencies do not exist in a vacuum, and there is strong evidence of emulation in insurgent and counterinsurgent tactics, it makes sense to investigate insurgencies widely considered to be important or influential (Beckett 2001). This has not been the prime factor in case selection, but to the extent possible, I have tried to locate cases that also support this criterion.

For this study, I have developed explicit coding rules to interpret narrative accounts of conflicts and statements by insurgent leaders and to code both the strategic
choices of states and the decision-making characteristics of insurgent groups. I also
describe the goals of both the insurgent groups and the states. Coding rules are available
in the testing section of this study. I am applying these coding rules to a selection of
first-hand accounts, histories, secondary interviews, news articles, and press releases as
well as academic treatments of the conflicts. I then compare the interaction of states’
strategic choices and the conception of groups’ decision-making to the relative success or
failure of both the group and the state vis-à-vis their goals.

Testing the Proposed Model

In this project, the ability to test the model appropriately is critical. By evaluating
the model proposed above, we may conclude with confidence that the available evidence
supports the model, or rejects the hypotheses it generates. Additionally, even if we reject
the model, the test of the model allows the study to evaluate the relative accuracy of the
two predominant explanations of insurgent conflict in the extant literature, what I have
called the social and combat model. That is, if reciprocal violence or policing strategies
represent the only successes and all accommodationist strategies end in failures, we can
conclude that while my model is rejected, the study lends support to the combat model of
counterinsurgencies. Additionally, if accommodationist strategies lead to the only real
successes, this lends support to the idea that the social model of counterinsurgency is
more convincing (see the Figures 2.2 and 2.3 above). What that in mind, in this section I
discuss how I intend to test the hypotheses posed above. The first issue in this regard is
to discuss how I will code each of three critical variables: the counterinsurgent strategy of
a state, the motivational dynamics of an insurgent group, and the success or failure of a state to ameliorate violence. I will deal with each presently.

The success or failure of a state to ameliorate violence stemming from an insurgent is the dependent variable for this project. This variable ranges from an exacerbation of non-state perpetrated violence to a complete cessation of violence, whatever the status of the perpetrating group. In fact, this analysis is relatively agnostic with respect to the continued existence of the group. If the group ceases to exist or if it merely ceases a violent campaign, we may consider both as successes for the state. Any strategy that a state undertakes against a violent group seeks to ameliorate the violent tendencies of that group. To that end, any strategy seeks to do two things: decrease the frequency of violent actions by a group and decrease the intensity of any violent actions, both within a set time period. When strategy does both of these things, it is successful. When it does neither, it is unsuccessful. When it does one and not the other, then the results are mixed and we can measure them according to the extent that the state accomplishes each task. Therefore, the frequency of violent actions and the intensity of those violent actions serve as the dependent variable for this study. Clearly, a number of extraneous factors affect the frequency and intensity of violent actions by the group beside the strategy. Therefore, it will be important to control for these other factors in the analysis. The case studies will serve as a check in this regard.

As described above, I will measure intensity as the number of deaths caused by insurgent violence over a period of time. This is a change measure. That is, I am interested (as are decision-makers) in the relative increase or decrease in fatalities in an
insurgency, rather than global absolute numbers. I gather numerical data on fatalities from a variety of sources including some pre-existing data sets and evidence from historical records. Where I find data in dispute, I will first attempt to utilize the most credible data, and failing to be able to make such a judge, I will take the mean of various estimates. I measure frequency as the rate at which the insurgent group undertakes violent actions. In open war, the frequency is nearly continual. However, in many insurgencies, there is considerable time between insurgent actions. Therefore, it is appropriate to track not only intensity, but also frequency as a means to assess whether a state’s strategy is successfully ameliorating violence. To measure this component, I track incidents of insurgent actions over time. I am interested in both the frequency of insurgent actions as well as the intensity of them. In order to track these variables, I employ some quantitative data sets where they are available and derive figures from the historical record where they are not. I particularly employ published media accounts of events in conflicts to develop this timeline. However, data will also come from such accounts as can be found in statements by the non-state group, government speeches, and secondary sources.

The first independent variable for this study is the strategy selected by the state. As described above, I conceive of a state’s general strategic approaches as a typology of bargains. Therefore, the first task for identifying a state’s strategy is to determine whether a bargain is present or absent in the actions of the state. It is an assumption of this coding scheme that state decision-makers offer any bargain before or in conjunction with its accompanying strategy, as well as implicitly with the nature of the tactics.
employed. A bargain or threat and the accompanying tactics will determine the coding of the strategy of the state. Furthermore, a set of tactics without a preceding bargain or threat will also determine the strategy of the state. Therefore, I code bargains initially for their presence or absence.

_Coding Rules for the Presence of Bargains in Government Statements_

_Coding Procedures:_

1. The unit of analysis is a verbal or written statement by the state leader.
2. The basic coding unit is a directed phrase within the leader’s statements. A directed phrase is a sentiment, idea, request, or relationship that is specifically directed at an individual or group (referred to henceforth as the target).
3. Underline any phrases directed at the following individuals or groups: the insurgent group or any component of it.
4. For all phrases, label the phrase for willingness to compromise. Label the phrase with a _SB_ (for bargain), label the phrase _NSB_ (for no bargain), or leave the phrase unlabeled depending on the conditions below.
   a. If the phrase indicates an offer to negotiate or compromise with the target, label as _B_. Key words include: negotiate, bargain, compromise, flex, cooperate, trade, etc. Code if-then statements directed toward targets as _B_. Examples include, “We will happily give you limited autonomy if you will disarm,” “We are willing to work with you to achieve peace,” and “We will grant amnesty if you will turn yourselves in.”
b. If the phrase indicates a refusal to negotiate or compromise with the target, label as NB. Key words include a negation of the words in 7a. Note it is not sufficient to express resolution, but compromise or negotiation must be rejected. Examples include, “No discussion with this evil group is possible,” “We will never cease until we have achieved complete victory over this insurgency,” “We do not make deals with terrorists.”

c. If the phrase indicates neither of the above, do not label.

d. A coding of B must be present to code as a bargain.

I use government statements that directly address the non-state group and code these statements for the presence of bargains. I also employ secondary sources, which frequently lend insight in privately offered bargains and even the acknowledgement of bargains in the statements made by insurgent groups. If literature on a particular conflict contains an account of the state publicly or privately offering a bargain to an insurgent group, I code this as a bargain at that time for this conflict. If the conflict existed previously and this account appears to be a departure from previous policy, I code this as a new strategy. If this appears to be continuation of previous policy, I code the entire period as the same strategy. Of course, if the literature on a particular conflict contains no evidence of a state publicly or privately offering a bargain to an insurgent group and no implicit evidence from the tactics it employs, I code this as “no bargain” for this conflict. If a state explicitly states that it refuses to communicate or acknowledge the
group in any way and no evidence is available to the contrary, I code this from this point forward as “no bargain.” If the case was “bargain” previously, this marks a new strategy.

The second portion of this independent variable is the menu of tactics employed by the state. Combined with a particular bargain (or lack thereof), the roster of tactics a state is using will allow the study to code the type of strategy a state is using. In examining the tactics of a state, I am primarily looking to code whether the tactics over a given period are negative or positive. By negative, I mean the state uses the tactics to punish the group, its members, or the adjacent population. By positive, I mean tactics used to reward the group, its members, or the adjacent population.9 The KOSIMO dataset contains an extensive coding of both the positive and negative (as they are defined in this study) tactics that a state employs in a particular conflict. I will use the KOSIMO data as a starting point, and supplement it with data gained from news sources and secondary accounts. If the state offers a bargain to the insurgent group and its tactics are primarily (i.e. a majority of its tactics) positive, it is pursuing a soft bargain, accommodationist strategy. A bargain plus primarily negative tactics is a hard bargain or reciprocal violence. Finally, I code the lack of an available bargain as no bargain or the strategy of policing.

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9 In this study, like many others on terrorism and asymmetric conflict, I understand the populace relevant to an asymmetric conflict to be composed of active and passive supporters of either the strong or the weak power. Active supporters range from actual members (state police and military for the state; insurgents and terrorists for the violent group) to those that provide them direct assistance. Passive supporters do not directly aid the effort of either side, but generally favor one side and could become their active supporters if effectively mobilized. See McAdam, D., John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, Ed. (1996). *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
The second independent variable is the motivational dynamic of the insurgent group. As discussed above, there are three competing archetypical dynamics derived from the extant literature. This variable seeks to code accurately each group as having a dominant dynamic. As discussed above, this is not to suggest it is the only dynamic driving the group. However, it is influential because it is the most dominant. I assume that the dominant dynamic is the one that directly characterizes the decision-making leadership of the group (Moghaddam 2004; Lazarevska 2005). Furthermore, unless there is information to the contrary, I assume the motivational logic of the group is stable over time (Weinberg 1989).

The material I use to code the motivations of group is comprised of speeches and statements made by leaders of the group at the time, as well as concurrent actions taken by the group. Leaders’ speeches are sometimes delivered publicly, but more often, they are distributed in written form to various media outlets (Bobrow 1977). I will code these speeches for the presence of various criteria listed below. I also employ an examination of concurrent actions by the group to determine whether the actions of the group reflect statements made by leaders. Below, I list coding criteria specific to each of the three motivational dynamics I employ.
Rules for Coding Leaders’ Statements

Coding Procedures:

1. The unit of analysis is a verbal or written statement by an insurgent leader.

2. The basic coding unit is a directed phrase within the leader’s statements. A directed phrase is a sentiment, idea, request, or relationship that is specifically directed at an individual or group (referred to henceforth as the target).

3. Underline any phrases directed at the following individuals or groups: the leader himself, the leader’s own group (or any components thereof), the state (or any of its representatives) that the group is fighting against, including state government, military components or leaders, and police components or leaders.

4. Label all phrases directed at the leader himself, the leader’s own group, or any components of that group as I phrases (for insurgents).

5. Label all phrases directed at the state the group is fighting against, including state government, military components or leaders, and police components or leaders as S phrases (for state).

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6. For all *I phrases*, label the phrase as *GC* (for group cohesion) if **any** of the following elements are present. Otherwise, label the phrase *NGC* (indicating no presence of group cohesion).

   a. A **direct positive association for the insurgent group**. In other words, liking the group, deriving pleasure in belonging, a sense of community, the desire to be accepted or supported. Examples would include, “I am proud to be part of such a brave band of warriors,” “We fellow strugglers must rely upon each other,” and “I expect the continued allegiance of our committed freedom fighters.”

   b. A **negative reaction to a rift in the insurgent group**. In other words, a negative reaction includes expressing regret, dismay, anger, or a desire for reconciliation within the insurgent group. The rift may be expressed in the phrase or merely implied. Examples would include, “I certainly hope we can agree once again,” “All internal squabbling must cease so that we can pursue our greater goals,” and “I am saddened at the fracturing of our movement.”

   c. A **positive evaluation of the insurgent group in comparison to another**. This means that the phrase reflects superiority, righteousness, rectitude, strength, or wisdom within the insurgent group that is greater than what can be found in a comparison group. Examples would include, “We are the standard bearers for the nationalist movement,” “Our strength and
intelligence set us apart from other freedom fighters,” and “The
degenerate leaders of the government are bound to fail in the face of our
righteous cause.”

7. For all S phrases, label the phrase for the presence or absence of a goal. Label the
phrase with a G (for goal) if any of the following elements are present.
Otherwise, label the phrase NG (for no goal).

a. The phrase contains a reference to an item of value or a state of being that
the leader is trying to obtain from the target. These items or states of
being can refer to anything that the leader or the group are seeking and the
state as provider may be implied. Examples include land, sovereignty,
salvation, rights, money, tactical advantages, and victory.

b. The phrase contains a reference to tactics employed by the leader for the
purpose of obtaining an item of value or state of being from the target.
These tactics can be political or military in nature. Key words include
compel, coerce, demand, force, pressure, convince, persuade, achieve, etc.

8. For all S phrases, label the phrase for willingness to compromise. Label the
phrase with a B (for bargain), label the phrase NB (for no bargain), or leave the
phrase unlabeled depending on the conditions below.

a. If the phrase indicates a willingness to negotiate or compromise with the
target, label as B. Key words include: negotiate, bargain, compromise,
flex, cooperate, trade, etc. Code if-then statements directed toward targets as $B$. Code statements that explain insurgent actions with respect to a broader set of insurgent goals as $B$. Examples include, “We will happily give up bombing if the state will stop persecuting our people,” “We are willing to work with the state to gradually achieve sovereignty,” “We have undertaken this campaign to obtain the respect of our country’s leaders,” and “We believe that our desires are reasonable and we will work to achieve them.”

b. If the phrase indicates an unwillingness to negotiate or compromise with the target, label as $NB$. Key words include a negation of the words in 7a. Note it is not sufficient to express resolution, but compromise or negotiation must be rejected. Examples include, “No discussion with this corrupt regime is possible,” “We will never cease until we have achieved complete victory,” “We do not make deals.” Also, code statements that explain insurgent actions as ends to themselves rather than means to broader insurgent goals as $NB$. Examples include, “This attack demonstrates our might and righteousness” and “Our obedience in carrying out these actions is being rewarded.”

c. If the phrase indicates neither of the above, do not label.

9. For each unit of analysis, aggregate the above codings into the following format (see Figure 2.6 below):
10. Finding the percentage of $I/GC$ codings to be higher than $S/G$ is NECESSARY evidence for the organizational motivational logic affecting a leader.

11. Finding the percentage of $S/G$ codings to be higher than $I/GC$ is NECESSARY evidence for the strategic or extremist motivational logic.

12. Coupled with 11, finding the percentage of $S/B$ codings to be higher than $S/NB$ is SUFFICIENT evidence to code leader statements as Strategic.

13. Coupled with 11, finding the percentage of $S/NB$ codings to be higher than $S/B$ is SUFFICIENT evidence to code leader statements as Extremist.

14. For purposes of clarity, the archetype of the coding is as follows (see Figure 2.7 below):
Figure 2.7: Coding strength representing the strongest correspondence to specific group motivations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I/GC Codings</th>
<th>S/G Codings</th>
<th>S/B Codings</th>
<th>S/NB Codings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremist</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. Subsequent questions to be asked in the qualitative analysis of the case:

a. If the leaders’ statements are coded as Strategic, then:
   i. Actions taken by the group do not contradict statements by its leaders, if the leaders mention specific tactics.
   ii. Actions taken by a group seek to coerce the state.

b. If these criteria are met, this provides qualitative support for the coding above.

c. If the leader’s statements are coded as Organizational, then:
   iii. The group takes actions without implicit or explicit justification.
   iv. Actions taken by the group arise out of internal political competition, rather than a commitment to achieving any goals expressed by the leader.
   v. Concurrent actions of the insurgent group shows that actions taken by the group arise out of external political competition.
with other groups, rather than a commitment to achieving any goals related to the group’s leaders’ statements.

d. If these criteria are met, this provides qualitative support for the coding above.

e. If the leader’s statements are coded as Extremist, then:

vi. Actions taken by the group do not contradict statements by its leaders, if the leaders mention specific tactics.

vii. Actions taken by a group are undertaken for their own ends, rather than any broader, stated objective.

viii. The centrality of violence is fixed within the ideology of the group, rather than merely a facet of the group’s current behavior.

ix. The intensity, type of actions, and targets of actions do not contradict statements by leaders of the group.

f. If these criteria are met, this provides qualitative support for the coding above.

Case Selection and Description

Based upon my case selection criteria described in the methodology section above, the following cases will be used to test the relative merits of the social and combat models originating from the extant literature as well as the conditional model proposed herein.

The first case study examines the Chechen insurgency against Russia. I divide this insurgency into four periods: an active era of conflict from 1994 until 1996, an era of
peace negotiations leading to a peace agreement in 1996, an interregnum from 1996 until 1999, and a second period of insurgent activity from 1999 until the present. During periods of active conflict, the Russian government was ultimately able to suppress violence from Chechen insurgents. However, I argue that both the strategy of the Russian government and the motivational dynamics of the insurgency have changed in ways that explain this continued interaction. In the first era of conflict, the Russian government offered a hard bargain of reciprocal violence to an insurgency that was strategically motivated. This strategy succeeded due to both the motivations of Chechen insurgents and Russian military strategy. The Russian counterinsurgent strategy ultimately did ameliorate violence from the insurgency when they added accommodationist components in 1996, though this might have poisoned the counterinsurgent effort in the end. During the interregnum until 1999, the Chechen insurgency grew increasingly insular and extremist motivated. In the second period of conflict, the Chechen insurgency is extremist motivated and therefore embattled and ultimately suppressed by the no bargain strategy of policing employed by the hard-line Putin government.

The second case study explores the insurgent campaign of the Provisional Irish Republican Army against Great Britain and its agents. I subdivide this campaign into three time periods. In the first time period, from 1969 to 1977, the British government employed a strategy of accommodation to induce peace in Northern Ireland. This policy succeeded in ameliorating, but not ending the conflict. In 1977, Britain transitioned to a policing option which did not bear fruit in ending the conflict until the early 1990s when accommodationist tactics were increasingly added, culminating with the Good Friday
Accords. The rump policing strategy was a failure against the organizationally motivated PIRA. Beginning in 1993, Great Britain switched to a soft bargain accommodationist strategy, emphasizing tactics designed to undermine the effectiveness of the PIRA and provide nonviolent alternatives. This strategy ultimately proved successful in 1999. The ultimate success of this strategy was supported with the 2005 renunciation of violence by the PIRA.

The third case study chapter examines the Sri Lankan effort to quell insurgency from the Tamil Tigers. I subdivide this case into five time periods. In the first time period, from 1976 until 1985, Sri Lanka failed to quell a Tamil Tiger insurgency through a general strategy of policing. This chapter argues that the Tamil Tigers are best coded as a strategic group, suggesting that a no bargain strategy like policing will produce pernicious effects for the state. From 1985 until 1990, the Indian government’s intervention led to a campaign designed to pacify and conquer the Tamil Tigers through a strategy of reciprocal punishment. This strategy saw limited success during the time of its implementation, but also allowed the LTTE to increase their recruitment and capacity. Following the Indian military’s withdrawal, the Sri Lankan government attempted to offer concessions to the LTTE from 1990 until 1994, which proved unsuccessful given their growing power and strategic goals. From 1995 until 2001, Sri Lanka’s military strategy was gradually effective in pushing the strategically motivated Tamil Tigers toward the negotiating table. I argue that sadly, Sri Lanka made a crucial error in moving toward peace talks from 2001 until 2005 as the LTTE was beginning to moderate its strategic goals. This failure has continued as a result Sri Lanka’s transition to an
accommodationist strategy; primarily because the type of accommodations offered have only emboldened LTTE desires for secessionism. This is most aptly demonstrated in the frequently violated ceasefire concluded in 2002. Because of the Tigers’ strategic motivations, these accommodations were not sufficient to ameliorate violence and emboldened the Tigers within their strategic goals.

The final case study investigates the French counterinsurgency campaign against insurgents in Algeria. From 1954-1958 in the first of two periods, the French failed to achieve success against an extremist motivated FLN Algerian insurgency through a strategy of reciprocal violence. In the second period, from 1958 until 1962, France was not as successful and their practice of a strategy of accommodation was a failure against the Algerian insurgency. I show a schematic representation of these cases in Figure 2.9 below. However, remember that I constructed this model for two purposes. In the first instance, it is interested in evaluating to two dominant models of insurgent conflict prevalent in the extant literature. Toward that end, I offer a typology of how these models would predict success or failure for the cases I have selected in the above paragraphs. This typology appears in Figure 2.8 immediately below. Even if the evidence does not support the model I propose above and apply below in Figure 2.9, the same evidence should allow us to evaluate the relative accuracy of the combat model and social model as described in Figure 2.8.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Social Model Predictions</th>
<th>Combat Model Predictions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.8: Alternative Expectations: Combat Model and Social Model
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent State</th>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
CHAPTER 3

THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT VERSUS THE CHECHEN INSURGENCY

“There is no more important question in Russia than that of Chechnya. It is an open bleeding wound.”

Introduction

With the end of the Cold War came a significant time of national and nationalist birth throughout the former Soviet sphere of influence. In some cases, established states such as Poland and Romania formed new governments and drafted new constitutions. In other cases, movements and leaders created new political entities relatively peacefully, such as Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Other transitions were more perilous, including the independence of the Baltic states, the breakdown of order in former Yugoslavia, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself (Bennett 1995). This general fracturing and a sense of a window of opportunity for self-determination set the stage for a number of secessionist movements (Schulzinger 2002). The Kosovar Albanians’ attempt to secede from the Serb-controlled Former Republic of Yugoslavia is one such instance. The plight of Kosovo eventually became one of interstate conflict. The early secessionist movements within the region of Chechnya provide another

example, though in this case, the secessionist movement has primarily acted only with respect to the Russian government. It was this secessionist movement, coupled with the response of the Russian government, which set the stage for a protracted and ongoing insurgent conflict.

This chapter demonstrates that the insurgent conflict between Chechen insurgents and the Russian military exemplifies two distinct cases of eventual success in counterinsurgency, which are at least partly the result of appropriately matching Russia’s strategy to the motivations of the insurgent group. As a result, this chapter considers two distinct episodes in the history of the conflict, which is commensurate with its development. The first episode runs from the beginning of Russian intervention to curtail the Chechen separatist movement in 1994 and ends with the commencement of a three-year period of relative peace beginning in 1996, during which Chechnya obtained partial autonomy through the success of the insurgents. The second period begins with the 1999 invasion of Dagestan by Chechen rebels and continues until the present. In the first period, I will argue that the Russian military’s strategy of reciprocal violence, coupled with the strategic motivations of the Chechen insurgents eventually debilitated the Chechen insurgency and drove them to the negotiation table. While the Russian accommodations eventually produced a relative peace, this peace was short-lived, and we should not consider it a successful amelioration of violence. In the second period, I will argue that Russia’s policing strategy, coupled with an increasingly extremist set of motivations for the Chechen rebels has overcome initial failures to effectively quell the Chechen insurgency.
In the remainder of this section, I will briefly address some of the antecedent conditions that led to the beginning of the Chechen separatist movement. In the next section, I will describe the first conflict between Russia and Chechen insurgents. I will highlight the goals and ideology of the insurgents, the strategy and tactics employed by the Russian military, and the motivations that guided the decision-making of the insurgents. Finally, I will describe the process by which the Russian strategy was generally successful. In the subsequent section, I will repeat this process for the second round of conflict, describing why it appears to be succeeding.

Review of Theory

I propose that the actions of states can be grouped into three general strategic conceptions. These strategies may be selected for a variety of reasons. In the first option, the state can try to police against actions of the groups, arrest members of the group through standard means of law, and seek to undermine the group through tactics that would also be employed by any other type of organized crime. In the second option, the state adds to the base strategy of the first option by attempting to raise the costs of the non-state actor’s violence by punishing them with strategy of reciprocal violence. In the third and final option, states can opt for a strategy of accommodation; attempting to integrate the group into a nonviolent realm of the political process. Various states may even be observed to attempt more than one of these strategies over the course of their interaction with a particular non-state group. These three state strategies represent approaches to counterinsurgency described in extant literature.
Variance in state strategy does not alone explain the outcomes of insurgent conflicts. I also argue that insurgent groups can be grouped into three general conceptions of their decision-making. The first conception is that groups strategically and instrumentally connect their actions to their stated goals. The second conception suggests that groups are motivated by internal dynamics and that these dynamics create a disjunction between groups’ stated goals and their actions. Finally, the third conception is that groups do not see a difference between their stated goals and the actions they take. That is to say, their actions are always intended to be a direct achievement of their goals. These three concepts reflect strategic, organizational, and extremist portraits of insurgent groups that have been painted in extant literature (described in Chapter 1).

I argue that it is the interaction of the general strategy of the state and the general conception of the group’s decision-making that predicts success or failure in an insurgent conflict. That is, when a strategically oriented group is faced with a strategy of reciprocal violence, the group’s violence will be quelled more efficiently than if either of the other strategies is employed. This is additionally true when an organizationally oriented group is faced with an accommodationist strategy and when an extremist oriented group is faced with a basic policing strategy.

Evidence and Methodology

The Russian conflict against the nationalist separatist movement in Chechnya is an important case of modern insurgency. Though Russia spent much of the 1990s in significant economic decline, it was still able to field a large and well-equipped military. For this reason, its inability to quell a violent insurgency within its own territory presents
an interesting puzzle. It is also interesting to note that Russia has shifted its strategic approach to dealing with the Chechen insurgency. Because of Russia’s military significance and the continuing thorn in its side that Chechnya represents, many modern accounts of insurgency have treated Chechnya as a case that is critical to explaining modern insurgencies (Blank 2003; Boot 2003; Kramer 2005). However, the coverage that is given to the Chechen insurgency is often limited and frequently is portrayed from a lens colored by the U.S. led war on terror (Zoellick 2000; Miller 2004; Cimbala 2007; Kahl 2007). Therefore, examining the Chechen insurgency apart from a broader cultural or civilization-oriented conflict will help us understand the more immediate goals and relationships within this conflict. Finally, this insurgency is important given the immense disparity in the stakes that Russian leaders have placed in Chechnya with the level of success they have achieved in asserting control over Chechen territory. While Russia has been content in the wake of the end of the Cold War to allow numerous valuable territories to secede and seek autonomy, such a path has never been granted to Chechnya. For both material and perceptual reasons discussed below, Russia has been entirely unwilling to grant Chechen secessionist demands. Despite that, Russia has also been unable to eradicate the ongoing violence stemming from the Chechen nationalist separatist movement. The question, as always, is why a government with such high stakes (as are described below) has produced such mixed results in ameliorating violence from an insurgency.

For this case study, I employ explicit coding rules (developed in chapter 2) to interpret narrative accounts of conflicts and to code both the strategic choices of the
Russian leadership and the decision-making characteristics of the Chechen nationalist separatist movement. I also employ narrative accounts of the insurgency to capture the stakes and goals of both the Chechens and the Russian government. I am applying these coding rules to a selection of speeches, first-hand accounts, histories, secondary interviews, news articles, and press releases as well as academic treatments of the conflicts. I use these accounts to construct a narrative of the insurgent conflict as well as a measurement of the intensity of the insurgency’s violent activity. I then compare the interaction of states’ strategic choices and the conception of groups’ decision-making to the relative success or failure of both the group and the state vis-à-vis their goals.

Hypotheses in the Chechen Case

In this chapter, I apply the hypotheses described in general in Chapter 2 to the specific case of the Russian government’s struggle against the Tamil Tigers. As such, I will evaluate the following hypotheses:

1a. When the Chechen insurgency is coded as a \textit{strategically} motivated group; Russian tactics of \textbf{reciprocal violence will succeed} in reducing violence.

1b. When the Chechen insurgency is coded as a \textit{strategically} motivated group; Russian tactics of \textbf{policing will fail} in reducing violence.

1c. When the Chechen insurgency is coded as a \textit{strategically} motivated group; Russian tactics of \textbf{accommodation will fail} in reducing violence.

2a. When the Chechen insurgency is coded as an \textit{organizationally} motivated group; Russian tactics of \textbf{reciprocal violence will fail} in reducing violence.
2b. When the Chechen insurgency is coded as an organizationally motivated group; Russian tactics of policing will fail in reducing violence.

2c. When the Chechen insurgency is coded as an organizationally motivated group; Russian tactics of accommodation will succeed in reducing violence.

3a. When the Chechen insurgency is coded as an extremist motivated group; Russian tactics of reciprocal violence will fail in reducing violence.

3b. When the Chechen insurgency is coded as an extremist motivated group; Russian tactics of policing will succeed in reducing violence.

3c. When the Chechen insurgency is coded as an extremist motivated group; Russian tactics of accommodation will fail in reducing violence.

**Historical Background of the Conflict**

Chechnya is located in the southwestern part of Russia, in the middle of the Northern Caucasus. Chechnya itself is only about 6,000 square miles, or slightly larger than the state of Connecticut (Murphy 2004). It is landlocked, and ranges from relatively flat land in the north of the region to mountainous in the south, where is borders Georgia. As with many insurgent conflicts, this terrain has played a role in the perpetuation of violence. At the end of the Cold War, just more than a million people lived in the region, although huge displacement effects resulting from the conflict have severely depopulated the region. Compared to the rest of Russia, Chechnya remains a place where the indigenous people group (Chechens have been recognized themselves as such long before the current conflict) remains a majority (Knezys 1999). However, prior to the conflict, ethnic Russians represented a significant proportion of the populace. Chechens’
traditional social structure is an extended clan unit, built on patriarchal lines. There are approximately 150-170 of these clan units in Chechnya, with the most significant internal division being between the clans inhabiting the relatively flat north of Chechnya, and those in the more mountainous south (Galeotti 2005). Chechens are predominantly Muslim in their faith. The region is not wealthy and unemployment is high, although Chechnya is rich in natural resources and has a developed petroleum industry.

Various groups in the Northern Caucasus region (Cherkassians, Chechens, and Dagestanis) have had an antagonist relationship with Russia. Incursions from the north resulted in general Russian control by the eighteenth century. Chechens rejected this domination in the early nineteenth century by a revolt led by Imam Shamil, who established an imamate over the region. Russian military forces eventually put down the rebellion and they reconquered the region in the late 1850s. In fact, the Chechen capital of Groznyy was originally a Russian outpost built during this effort. This history is relevant because modern insurgents invoke the name of Imam Shamil as a model nationalist and insurgent who was capable of resiliency in the face the of Russians. Furthermore, as John Dunlop argues, the political culture of Chechnya was distinctly martial and therefore made Chechens open to violent tactics to secede from Russia (Dunlop 1998). Chechens were further alienated from the Russians to the north when, in response to a revolt during WWII, Joseph Stalin deported vast numbers of Chechens from the region. Most did not return until Nikita Khrushchev declared a general amnesty in 1957, following Stalin’s death (Kipp 2003).
The modern conflict in Chechnya began with the breakdown of the Cold War and commensurately, the former Soviet Union. By 1991, the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia had all asserted their independence. While the Russian government led by Boris Yeltsin was attempting to reorganize former parts of the Soviet Union under the Russian Federation, it was not clear that a number of the now autonomous republics would accept this. It was under this context that a November 27, 1990 meeting of the Chechen-Ingush Republic soviet dissolved their union and declared individual sovereignty from Russia and each other. A retired Soviet Air Force officer and Chechen nationalist, Dzhokhar Dudaev, was named President of Chechnya in a subsequent election unauthorized by Moscow (Kipp 2003). Shortly after his election, Dudaev again declared Chechnya to be an independent state from Russia. On November 7, 1991, Boris Yeltsin declared that the presidential election and declaration of independence in Chechnya were invalid (Knezys 1999). He went on to impose martial law in the region and order the arrest of Dudaev. To prosecute this order, he sent a small number of Russian troops (about 600) to the region, but angry crowds prevented this small force from even disembarking from their planes at the airport in Groznyy (Lieven 1998).

One of Dudaev’s first orders of business was the creation of the Chechen armed forces. This was a relatively peaceful time between the Chechen separatists and the Russian government. Much of this peace stems from the fact that Russia was facing a multitude of crises stemming from the end of the Soviet Union, and the secessionist movement in Chechnya was simply a low priority (Hopf 2002). Furthermore, the Chechens were still scrambling to fill the power vacuum left in the wake of the
declaration of independence. While Dudaev eventually consolidated political power, the Chechens first worry was not Russia, but competing sects with the region. Thus, during this time the Chechens were able to accumulate substantial military resources for such a small militia, mainly by absconding with materiel from Russian military depots (Kipp 2003).

For Russia, the impetus to take military action against Chechnya was both strategic to the region and part of the wider regional political environment that Moscow found itself in. In the North Caucasus, Chechnya was a geographically central region. To lose Chechnya completely would open the entire region to potential secession, or at the very least, create a very difficult border situation. At the same time, and perhaps more importantly, Russia had recently compromised with secessionists within Tartarstan by granting them partial autonomy. Prior to this, Dudaev had rejected offers of partial autonomy within Russia. Now that Yeltsin had granted that benefit to Tartarstan, he felt even less inclined to grant it to the more obstinate Chechens. Additionally, he worried that increasing autonomy would undermine Russia’s cohesiveness and exacerbate secessionism (Knezys 1999).

Thus, at the same time that Chechens remained resolute in their demands, Yeltsin’s incentives to compromise evaporated. Throughout 1992 and 1993, Yeltsin also consolidated power in Moscow, something which prevented him from acting decisively in 1991 (Trenin 2004). Primarily, Russian leaders did not take Chechen secession seriously in the early years of its assertion. Dimtri V. Trenin and Aleksy V. Malashenko of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Moscow write, “Moscow
politicians were generally amazed by the actions of the rebels and hoped that Dudaev would finally come to his senses and realize that claims of independence simply had no future” (Trenin 2004). It may have appeared to Yeltsin that military action in Chechnya would serve to silence secessionist movements there and nearby in the former Soviet sphere. Yeltsin was also able to draw on two other important justifications for military action in Chechnya. The first was a scapegoat of a criminal Chechen mafia which was supposedly behind the secessionist movement (Knezys 1999). This rationale has since been refuted, at least at the level of the leadership of the rebels and mafia (Galeotti 2005). The second was the violence resulting from low-level skirmishes between Dudaev’s supporters and opponents within Chechnya (Malashenko 2004; Tishkov 2004). These allowed Yeltsin to argue for intervention to stop further bloodshed.

**Motivations of the Insurgency**

Generally, the ideology of the Chechen insurgents, especially in the early years of their conflict with Russia (1994-1996), could be characterized as a nationalist ideology. While there were elements of that nationalist ideology that envisioned the incipient state as a second imamate like that of Imam Shamil, the general ideological motivation was a nationalist-secessionist one (Lapidus 1998). As a result, the goals of the insurgency were generally focused on preserving the secessionist steps taken by the nascent Chechen government and preventing Russian military forces from reasserting control over the region (Hughes 2007). Thus, the goals of the insurgency included the defense of the major cities and resources within the region, specifically Groznyy, the consolidation of
military power to defend the region, and a desire to be regarded as a serious opponent by Russian military forces and political leaders.

Early on in the conflict, the Chechen insurgents organized themselves and behaved like regularly trained army units. Chechens derived most of the resources available to them from materials left by the Soviets after the government’s army had generally left the region (Cimbala 2007). As a result, the Chechens were left with aircraft, artillery, tanks, and communication equipment (Knezys 1999; Kipp 2003). Most of this materiel was put to good use in the conflict with the Russian military, with the possible exception of the aircraft, which was underused due to a lack in trained Chechen pilots (Knezys 1999).

Dudaev’s forces effectively utilized this equipment, especially anti-tank grenade launchers, when they used an urban guerilla warfare approach to confront and defeat Russian and opposition fighters on November 26, 1994. This defeat served to do two things. First, it silenced Chechen opposition to Dudaev’s regime. Second, it led the Kremlin to believe that confronting the Chechen insurgency would have to be the primary responsibility of Russian forces and not surrogates. After Russian forces substantively invaded Chechnya and attempted to blockade Groznyy, the insurgents practiced highly coordinated hit and run techniques to compensate for their lack of superior force (Kipp 2003). These attacks made use of superior guerilla tactics in the urban environment in Groznyy, employing snipers to harass slower and more conspicuous Russian units on the ground. They also employed additional rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) to negate Russian armored units and render tanks not an
advantage, but a liability (Lieven 1998). This allowed the Chechen insurgents to decimate a much larger, but more disorganized and demoralized Russian force.

When Russia’s superior conventional forces appeared insurmountable to the insurgents, they surrendered the capital of Groznyy and continued to harass effectively the Russian forces from the southern, mountainous regions of Chechnya. During the middle of this conflict, Chechen fighters undertook a terrorist hostage mission in the Russian city of Budionovsk. Here, a small, covert group of insurgents led by Shamil Basaev attacked civilians and took a large city hospital and its entire staff hostage (Murphy 2004; Kramer 2005). The Russian government badly mishandled this hostage crisis, which was a major news event in Russia. Russians eventually allowed Basaev to return to Chechnya, and the event came to typify Moscow’s difficulty in solving the Chechen insurgency. At the same time, it emboldened Chechen insurgents, who continued their campaign against Russian soldiers in Chechnya despite an agreement stemming from the Budionovsk events to negotiate a peaceful settlement (Cassidy 2003).

I must note that this event was atypical of the tactics employed by the Chechen insurgents. In an interview dated from December 13, 1995, Dudaev specifically repudiated acts of terrorism saying, “I am a professional soldier and I am opposed to terrorist warfare” (Graff 1995).

In the first major insurgent conflict with Russia, Dudaev’s forces were highly organized and hierarchically commanded during major battles, while relying on communal kinship ties to prosecute the guerilla phases of the war (Knezys 1999; Galeotti 2005). During this time, groups associated with the insurgency were not insular and
perpetration of violence was not necessary to identify with the insurgency. Anatol Lieven argues that Chechen resistance was organized locally, but that local groups voluntarily submitted to commands from central authorities in the insurgency. Lieven quotes one local insurgent, “There are 20 of us here in my group from Vedeno, all relatives or friends. Each group chooses its own commander, or elder. We chose a man who was a sergeant in the Soviet army, because he obviously knows more about what to do…but of course we listen to the chief commanders…” (Lieven 1998). Lieven goes on to note that, “…‘Maskhadov [a Chechen insurgent leader] was able to create a more effective central command [over time]’” (Lieven 1998).

That Chechen insurgents turned to forms of terrorism as part of rational strategy of war fighting is clearly illustrated by Shamil Basaev’s explanation for the hostage operation he organized and led. Paul Murphy quotes him as saying “We could no longer fight [the Russians] normally. They were shelling our villages. They were destroying our houses with six ton bombs….We needed to show the people in Russia that this was very close to them too; we wanted them to see what blood looks like, and how it is when people are dying. We wanted them to understand it, to wake up” (Murphy 2004).

As the war went on, separatists resorted to large hostage takings, attempting to influence the Russian public and Russian leadership. In June 1995, rebels led by Shamil Basaev took more than 1,500 people hostage in southern Russia in what became known as the Budyonnovsk hospital hostage crisis. As a result of this attack, about 120 civilians died. The Budyonnovsk raid enforced a temporary stop in Russian military operations,
allowing the Chechens to regroup in the time of their greatest crisis and prepare for the national guerrilla campaign.

The entrance of foreign fighters into the insurgency against Russia raised the specter of a religiously motivated jihad from other regions, including outside Russia. By one estimate, up to 5,000 non-Chechens served as foreign volunteers in the insurgency. They mostly hailed from the surrounding Caucus nations and included Dagestanis, Georgians, Ingushes, and Azeris. The volunteers also included a number of ethnic Russians, notably citizens of Moscow. On March 6, 1996, a Cypriot passenger jet flying toward Germany was hijacked by Chechen sympathizers to publicize the Chechen cause as was a Turkish passenger ship carrying 200 Russian passengers on January 9, 1996.

The types of attacks that Chechen insurgents undertook from 1994 to 1996 represented a strategic logic. That is, they undertook tactics that maximized their benefits and minimized their losses. Therefore, early in the war, when the insurgents had relative military parity with the hybrid of Russian and Chechen opposition forces, they fought a generally conventional (and generally successful) battle for Groznyy. Later, when Russian military capabilities made a conventional war untenable for the insurgency, they opted for guerilla tactics that made use of the advantageous terrain. Finally, Chechen insurgents reverted to more traditional military organization once they pushed the Russian forces back. In 1996, when the Russians succeeded in killing Dudaev, insurgent leaders such as Shamil Basaev quickly committed themselves and those under their command to the Dudaev’s successor, Aslan Maskhadov (Smith 1998). I discuss this observation of Chechen tactics in relation to the internal group motivations below.
After the war, parliamentary and presidential elections took place in January 1997 in Chechnya and brought to power Aslan Maskhadov, chief of staff and prime minister in the Chechen coalition government, for a five-year term. Maskhadov sought to maintain Chechen sovereignty while pressing Moscow to help rebuild the republic, whose formal economy and infrastructure were virtually destroyed. Russia continued to send money for the rehabilitation of the republic; it also provided pensions and funds for schools and hospitals. Nearly half a million people (40% of Chechnya’s prewar population) have been internally displaced and live in refugee camps or overcrowded villages (Gannushkina 2006). The economy also massively receded. Russia sought to help stabilize Chechnya by stationing two essentially permanent brigades in the region. Maskhadov undertook efforts to rebuild the country and its devastated capital Groznyy by trading oil with countries such as the United Kingdom (Tishkov 2004).

In lieu of the devastated formal economy, numerous black market opportunities bloomed in Chechnya (Galeotti 2005). Kidnapping emerged as a principal source of income countrywide, procuring over $200 million during the three-year independence of the chaotic fledgling state. In 1998 alone, 176 people were kidnapped, according to official reports. Political violence and religious extremism, blamed on rising Wahhabism, was rife as well. In 1998, the authorities in Groznyy declared a state of emergency. Tensions led to the open clashes like the July 1998 confrontation in Gudermes between Chechen National Guard and Islamist militants.

In large part, the ideology and goals of the Chechen insurgency remained the same in the 1999-2005 period of conflict with Russia. That is, the Chechens generally
expressed goals motivated toward a secessionist, nationalist political movement. One difference in their ideology was a stronger commitment to an Islam-informed insurgency, with designs on establishing an Islamic state in the Caucasus with Chechnya as its core. This ideology was largely driven by leaders like Shamil Basaev and Khattab, an Arabic fighter who came to Chechnya in 1995 to fight the insurgency and grew in power and prominence over the next four years (Smith 1998; Kipp 2003; Murphy 2004). It is important to note however, that while both men at various times advocated a state with Islamic sharia law, they approached it with different religious understandings. Khattab subscribed to a very strict Wahhabist understanding of sharia and Islam, while Basaev’s Chechen rearing led him to a Sufism, and a softer conception of sharia (Tishkov 2004). Both of these approaches to the nationalist goals of Chechen separatists are at odds with those of Aslan Maskhadov, a main commander of the 1994-1996 war, Dudaev’s chief of staff, and his successor in the role of the Chechen presidency.

In August of 1999, forces led by Basaev and Khattab made an incursion into Dagestan to ignite an Islamic insurgency in the province. While the Russian government successfully suppressed this insurgency, the aftermath of the conflict produced a bombing campaign perpetrated by these forces throughout Russia, killing hundreds and wounding thousands (Baev 2004). The incursion into Dagestan and the subsequent bombing campaign coincided with the promotion of Vladimir Putin to the militarily important head of the Security Council, as well as Yeltsin’s self-appointed successor. The bombing campaign, unlike the first Chechen conflict, produced massive public support for retribution against Chechen insurgents. The Russian public specifically heralded Putin
for taking a tough line against the insurgency (Cimbala 2007). In early 2000, the Russian army, again expending extensive losses in life and material, captured the city of Groznyy in an attempt to crush the Chechen rebels. This assault, which was much better coordinated, eventually forced the insurgency to flee Groznyy and again take up the campaign from the hinterlands, especially in the south. Chechen insurgents have adopted many of the tactics that are familiar from the U.S. experience in Iraq: snipers, roadside IEDs, and kidnappings are the most common tactics within Chechnya. IEDs are especially pernicious, due to the fact that the insurgents retain a large stockpile of Russian mines (Kramer 2005). The Chechens have also been somewhat successful in downing Russian airplanes and helicopters with shoulder-launched missiles.

Outside of Chechnya, forces loyal to Basaev and Khattab have conducted spectacular and ruthless campaigns of hostage taking and bombing. These include the May 2002 bombing of the Dagestani city of Kaspiisk, the hostage-taking operation in a Moscow theater filled with nearly a thousand people, and particularly the September 2004 seizure of an elementary school in North Ossetia, with catastrophic results. The groups have also perpetrated campaigns of suicide bombing in Russia, notably being some of the first groups to use women in this role (Murphy 2004). Chechen insurgents also attempts to place radioactive material in a Moscow park, though no harm appears to have come of this act (Kayyem 2003). These attacks have generally led to increase in Russian resolve, with the public increasingly supporting Putin and unwilling to offer the insurgents any concessions. While insurgents ostensibly committed to Chechnya’s
independence took these actions, the net result has been to decrease the likelihood of independence for the province.

The organization of the 1999-2005 insurgency in Chechnya is markedly different from the 1994-1996 version. We can best describe this period of Chechen insurgency as highly diffuse and cellular (Hämmerli 2006). In contrast to the hierarchical insurgency of 1994-1996, this insurgency was less interested in undertaking tactics that achieve instrumental goals than it was in undertaking tactics that bolster group dynamics and perpetuate the insurgent groups themselves. Though Khattab was successfully killed by the Russian FSB on the 19th of March, 2002 (Murphy 2004), his organized remains highly insular and devoted to pursuing an Wahhabist vision for Chechnya. More significantly, Basaev remained active through the period until his death and both Russian opponents and Chechen supporters recognized him as the figurehead for the continuing insurgent campaign in Chechnya. Basaev claimed responsibility for the Beslan school attack. The casualties of this attack appear to have been exacerbated by the presence of armed locals who sought to assist government forces in storming the school and may have inadvertently increased the number of deaths (Boin 2005).

Between June 2000 and September 2004, Chechen insurgents added suicide attacks to their tactics. During this period, there have been 23 Chechen related suicide attacks in and outside Chechnya. The profiles of the Chechen suicide bombers have varied just as much as the circumstances surrounding the bombngs, most of which targeted military or government-related targets (Speckhard 2006).
Several comments need to be made with respect to the actions of the Chechen insurgency during this time. First, the Chechen rebels do not yet currently comprise a unified resistance, as they did from 1994-1996 (Kramer 2005). Rather, groups, such as they exist, are extremely diffuse, and tend to organize around charismatic leaders like Basaev. Second, these groups continue insurgent efforts despite requests by Chechen leaders to stop, suggesting that they obtain power and influence onto themselves through the campaigns. More to the point, these insurgent groups do not appear to be acting strategically, given that with each further insurgent action, especially bombings and hostage-takings, decreases the willingness of Russian leaders and their populace to compromise.

Having discussed general dynamics within the Chechen insurgency, I will now turn to an examination of important individual leaders. After discussing the important personal characteristics of these leaders, the impact of their leadership, and finally the motivational dynamics found in their speeches, I make an assessment for the motivational dynamics of the Chechen insurgency as a whole.

*Dzhokhar Dudaev*

Dzhokhar Dudaev was born in the early days of 1944 and as such, his formative years were those of the Stalinist exile of Chechens. Until his family and the rest of the exiled Chechens were allowed to return to Chechnya in 1957, Dudaev spent his early life in southern Kazakhstan. At the age of 18, Dudaev sought out a military career, first in helicopter school and then later in military school for aviation. In 1966 he was granted membership in the Communist Party (Dunlop 1998). Dudaev rose quickly through the
ranks of the Russian air force, eventually achieving the rank of major general. In 1986, Dudaev participated in Soviet air raids against mujahedeen forces in Afghanistan. Soviet intelligence appears to have made much of this episode, largely concluding that Dudaev was not an Islamist politically (Dunlop 1998). This is interesting, given that once Dudaev became president of the Chechen government, he practiced a much more observant Muslim faith.

Dudaev’s own views seem to be influenced by one of his last postings: Estonia. Dudaev served with a long-range bomber group based out of Estonia from 1987-1991. During this time, he witnessed the nationalist sentiment present in Estonia and he seemed to draw parallels to the Chechen plight. Several scholars have noted that Dudaev’s military service also facilitated his rise to power in Chechnya. Not only were his military credentials impressive, but his service took him away from Chechnya’s internal clan-based competition prior to the breakdown of the Soviet Union. As such, Dudaev was able to return to Chechnya as a uniting figure with lesser clan allegiances than most other potential political leaders (Dunlop 1998). Many scholars note Dudaev was able to subvert the intentions of other Chechen nationalist to manipulate him as a figurehead. Dudaev himself appears largely successful in capturing and directing the early years of the Chechen nationalist-separatist insurgency.

Coding Statements of Dzhokhar Dudaev

In order to evaluate Dudaev’s motivations for pursuing Chechen goals, a large set of speeches were coded according to the rules described in Chapter 2. These speeches were primarily drawn from a number of sources, including websites sympathetic to the
Chechen insurgency and interviews with media outlets and academics. Collecting these speeches for every available year of analysis yields a word count of over 2500. These speeches are intended for consumption by Dudaev’s colleagues as well as the Russian political leadership and even the broader international community. Therefore, I believe that they accurately capture his conception of the Chechen insurgency.

Using the coding rules described in Chapter 2, I have coded Dudaev’s speeches (as well as those of the other leaders described below) for references to his state opponent and for references to the Chechen insurgent movement. I have also coded references to the state for specific references to both willingness to bargain as well as a centrality of violence and Dudaev’s goals. I have coded references to the Chechen insurgency for emphases of group cohesion or a specific lack of group cohesion. Immediately below I provide representative examples of my coding followed by summary data on Dudaev’s codings.

Example 1

“From Moscow, the world has been given vague promises…”

I code this phrase as (S), because a reference is made to the state in the conflict.

Example 2

“We must reach an agreement to end the war.”

I code this phrase as (S/B), because Dudaev indicates a willingness to negotiate with Russia.
Example 3

“For peace to return, Russia must withdraw its troops and return to the bargaining table…”

I code this phrase as (S/B/G), because it reflects both a desire to negotiate and the goals of the Chechen insurgents toward Russia.

While the above examples are meant to be illustrative, I will now present summary conclusions on the motivational codings of Dudaev. Figure 3.1 displays the distribution of codings across all of Dudaev’s speeches. Across all of Dudaev’s speeches, the most predominant coding is to references to Russia without respect to Chechen negotiating propensity or their goals. This is interesting and fairly rare across the selection of leaders I have studied. Trailing behind this notation though are a significant minority of references made to Chechen goals (S/G) and a willingness to negotiate with the state (S/B). There are only minor references to group cohesion (I/GC) or even the insurgent movement in general. There are no references to the centrality of violence in Dudaev’s statements. Based on these trends and their consistency in Dudaev’s speeches over time, I am confident in coding the motivational dynamics of Dzhokhar Dudaev as generally strategic.
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Dzhokhar Dudaev’s Speech Codings

Shamil Basaev

No figure is more synonymous with the Chechen insurgency than Shamil Basaev is. Basaev himself was born in 1965 in the southern Chechen village of Dyshni-Vedeno. He completed secondary education and worked in relatively nondescript labor jobs in Chechnya nearly until he entered the insurgency. Though he held no military training, John Dunlop notes that Basaev displayed both an aptitude and a proclivity for military operations. In fact, his first military service was on behalf of Russia, in the 1993 Abkhazia battle against the Georgian military (Dunlop 1998). It is ironic that Basaev
would begin to use the military training he acquired from Russia against them a few short years later.

Basaev moved to Azerbaijan, where he aided Azerbaijani forces against Karabakhi-Armenian fighters in the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. He was said to having led a battalion-strength Chechen contingent. He later said he pulled his mujahedeen out of the conflict when the war seemed to be more for nationalism than for jihad (Speckhard 2006). During the conflict, Basaev was first introduced to the pan-Islamic revolutionary Amir Ibn al-Khattab. Other sources claim that after Abkhazia, Basaev moved to Chechnya and became a successful entrepreneur in the Chechen mafia, organizing train-car theft and drug dealing networks (Galeotti 2005).

With the outbreak of war, Basaev took an active role in the resistance, successfully commanding his Abkhaz Battalion. The unit inflicted major losses on Russian forces in the Battle of Groznyy, from December 1994 to February 1995. Basaev's men were among the last rebels to abandon the city. After capturing Groznyy, the momentum changed in favor of the Russian forces, and by April Chechen forces had been pushed into the mountains with most of their equipment destroyed. Basaev's battalion suffered many casualties, particularly during battles around Vedeno in May and their ranks sank to as low as 200 men (Murphy 2004). At this time, Basaev also suffered a personal tragedy. On June 3, 1995, during a Russian air strike on his hometown of Dyshne-Vedeno, two bombs landed on the home of Basaev's uncle, and six children, four women, and the uncle were killed. Basaev's wife and child were among the dead, as was his sister (Murphy 2004).
In an attempt to force a stop to the Russian advance, some Chechen forces resorted to a series of attacks directed against civilian targets outside the area that they claimed. Basaev led the most famous such attack, the Budyonovsk hospital hostage crisis in June 14, 1995, less than two weeks after he lost his family in the air raids. Basaev's large band seized the Budyonovsk hospital in southern Russia and the 1,600 people inside for a period of several days. At least 129 civilians died and 415 were wounded during the crisis as Russian special forces repeatedly attempted to free the hostages by force (Kipp 2003). Basaev and his fighters then returned back to Chechnya under cover of hostages. The media coverage surrounding the hostage taking and his safe retreat propelled the then mostly unknown Basaev into the international spotlight, and made him Chechnya's most famed national hero overnight. As a result of the raid, military actions on the territory of the Chechen republic largely stopped for several months.

By 1996, Basaev had been promoted to the rank of General and Commander of the Chechen Armed Forces. Basaev stepped down from his military position in December 1996 to run for president in Chechnya's second (and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria's first and only ever internationally monitored) presidential elections (Tishkov 2004). Basaev came in second place to Aslan Maskhadov, obtaining 23.5% of the votes. Allegedly, Basaev found the defeat very painful.

In early 1997 he was appointed vice-Prime Minister of Chechnya by Maskhadov. Maskhadov worked with Basaev until 1998, when Basaev established a network of military officers, who soon became rival warlords (Murphy 2004). As Chechnya
collapsed into chaos, Basaev's reputation began to plummet as he and others were accused of corruption and involvement in kidnapping; his alliance with Ibn al-Khattab also alienated many Chechens. By early 1998, Basaev emerged as the main political opponent of the Chechen president. Basaev called for the termination of talks with Russia and eventual sent a letter of resignation from the post of the Chechen Prime Minister in the summer of 1998 (Cimbala 2007).

In August 1999, Basaev and Khattab led a 1,400-strong army of Islamist fighters in unsuccessful attempt to aid Dagestani Wahhabists to take over the neighboring Republic of Dagestan and establish a new Chechen-Dagestan Islamic republic. By the end of the month, Russian forces had managed to repel the invasion, but admitted suffering more than 1,200 casualties (Trenin 2004).

During the rebel withdrawal from Grozny in January 2000 Basaev lost a foot after stepping on a land mine while leading his men through a minefield. Despite this injury, Basaev eluded Russian capture together with other rebels by hiding in forests and mountains. He welcomed assistance from foreign fighters from Afghanistan and other Islamic countries, encouraging them to join the Chechen cause (Hughes 2007). He also personally executed nine Russian OMON prisoners on April 4, 2000; the men were shot because the Russians had refused to swap them for Yuri Budanov, an arrested army officer accused of raping and killing an 18-year-old Chechen woman.

In September 2004, Basaev claimed responsibility for the Beslan school siege in which over 350 people, most of them children, were killed and hundreds more injured. Basaev himself did not participate in the seizure of the school, but claimed to have
organized and financed the attack. Basaev also claimed responsibility for the attacks against civilians during the previous week, in which a metro station in Moscow was bombed (killing 10 people), and two airliners were blown up by suicide bombers (killing 89 people) (Hughes 2007).

On August 23, 2005, Basaev rejoined the Chechen separatist government, taking the post of first deputy chair. Later this year Basaev claimed responsibility for a raid on Nalchik, the capital of the Russian republic of Kabardino-Balkaria. On July 10, 2006, Shamil Basaev was killed in the village of Ekazhevo, in Ingushetia, a republic bordering Chechnya (Hughes 2007). According to Chechen sources, Basaev was riding in one of the cars escorting a truck filled with explosives in preparation for an attack when the truck, hitting a pothole, exploded, killing Basaev and three other rebels. Russian officials state that this explosion was the result of the planned special operation.

Coding Statements of Shamil Basaev

In order to evaluate Shamil Basaev’s motivations for pursuing Chechen goals, a large set of speeches were coded according to the rules described in Chapter 2. These speeches were primarily drawn from a number of sources, including websites sympathetic to the Chechen insurgency and interviews with media outlets and academics. Collecting these speeches for every available year of analysis yields a word count of approximately 1765. These speeches are intended for consumption by Basaev’s colleagues as well as the Russian political leadership and even the broader international community. Therefore, I believe that they accurately capture his conception of the Chechen insurgency.
I will now present summary conclusions on the motivational codings of Shamil Basaev. Figure 3.2 displays the distribution of codings across all of Basaev’s speeches. Across all of Basaev’s speeches, the most predominant coding is (S/NB), or references to the centrality of violence in the Chechen movement. The second predominant coding is (S/G), or references to the goals of the insurgent group. Basaev never indicates that negotiating with the state is desirable, in reality or even hypothetically. He does both of these things consistently over time, as Figure 3.3 indicates. Based on these trends and their consistency, I am confident in coding the motivational dynamics of Shamil Basaev as generally extremist.

![Figure 3.2: Distribution of Shamil Basaev’s Speech Codings](image)

Figure 3.2: Distribution of Shamil Basaev’s Speech Codings
Figure 3.3: Distribution of Shamil Basaev’s Speech Components Over Selected Time

Abdul Halim Sadulayev

Abdul Sadulayev was born in the town of Argun on the plains of central Chechnya to the east of Groznyy. After growing up in Argun, he entered a local university to study philology, but ended his education with the eruption of hostilities in 1994 in which he fought against the Russians in a local Argun militia. Sadulayev began to study Islam under local Islamic theologians and from 1996 began what would become regular appearances on Chechen television speaking about Islam. He lectured across
Chechnya and led Argun's Muslim community, for a while as the town's imam.

Sadulayev made the hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, apparently the only time he is known to have left his homeland (Hughes 2007).

Sadulayev became the leader of the only jamaat in the city of Argun. Apart from their religious functions, most of the jamaats in Chechnya also represent military detachments, though there is no direct evidence to support that Sadulayev was directly involved in these activities as part of his role (Hughes 2007).

In 1999, Aslan Maskhadov appointed Sadulayev to a commission for constitutional sharia reform. Maskhadov offered Sadulayev the head of the Supreme Sharia Court of Chechnya, but Sadulayev turned down the offer. When the second Chechen insurgency started, Sadulayev returned to fighting, commanding the popular militia from Argun. Since 1999, Sadulayev has been one of Maskhadov's most loyal field commanders. In 2002, he was designated by Maskhadov to be his successor as president of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

Shortly following Maskhadov's death in 2005, the Chechen rebel council announced that Sadulayev had assumed Maskhadov's position, a move that was quickly endorsed by Shamil Basaev. After assuming power, Sadulayev called for expanding the Chechnya conflict into a broader secessionist movement for all Muslim-dominated adjoining regions of Chechnya. He further advocated the adoption of a constitution based on Islamic law, or sharia. Interestingly, he also condemned hostage taking, popular local way of raising money (Galeotti 2005).
Sadulayev had not only an ideological commitment to maintaining the conflict, but perhaps a personal one as well: Chechen insurgent sources claim that his wife was kidnapped in 2003 by Russian forces and killed by the FSB when attempts to buy her back failed (Speckhard 2006). He had worked to eliminate terrorist violence, publicly denounced the targeting of civilians, and urged Basaev and other warlords to direct attacks on military targets, including law enforcement officials, federal troops and local civil servants and their offices. He appeared to have convinced Basaev, who was enlisted in the formation of the Caucasian Front, which giving up on civilian targets would help spread the insurgency across the North Caucasus.

On 17 June 2006, Sadulayev was killed in a gun battle with the FSB and pro-Moscow militiamen in Argun. The next day, June 18, Sadulayev was succeeded as head of the Chechen resistance by the rebel vice-president and an active guerrilla commander, Doku Umarov.

**Coding Statements of Abdul Sadulayev**

In order to evaluate Abdul Sadulayev’s motivations for pursuing Chechen goals, a large set of speeches were coded according to the rules described in Chapter 2. These speeches were primarily drawn from a number of sources, including websites sympathetic to the Chechen insurgency and interviews with media outlets and academics. Collecting these speeches for every available year of analysis yields a word count of approximately 3500. These speeches are intended for consumption by Sadulayev’s colleagues as well as the Russian political leadership and even the broader international
community. Therefore, I believe that they accurately capture his conception of the
Chechen insurgency.

I will now present summary conclusions on the motivational codings of Abdul
Sadulayev. Figure 3.4 displays the distribution of codings across all of Sadulayev’s
speeches. Across all of Sadulayev’s speeches, the most predominant coding is (I/GC), or
referenced to the internal cohesion of the insurgent movement. Close behind this are a
significant number of references to (S/NB), or references to the centrality of violence in
the Chechen movement. Sadulayev also prominently emphasizes the goals of the
insurgent group. Sadulayev rarely indicates that negotiating with the state is desirable, in
reality or hypothetically. As Figure 3.5 indicates, the ordinal values of these codings are
quite consistent over the relevant time of analysis. Based on these trends and their
consistency, I am confident in coding the motivational dynamics of Abdul Sadulayev
as generally organizationally motivated, but with secondary tendencies toward
extremism.
Figure 3.4: Distribution of Abdul Sadulayev’s Speech Codings
Figure 3.5: Distribution of Abdul Sadulayev’s Speech Components Over Selected Time

Aslan Maskhadov

On September 21, 1951, Aslan Aliyevich Maskhadov was born in the Karaganda region of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), in the small village of Shakai, during the mass deportation of the Chechen people ordered in 1944 by Joseph Stalin. In 1957, his family returned to Chechnya (Dunlop 1998; Lieven 1998). Maskhadov joined the Soviet Army, trained in the neighboring Georgia, and graduated from the Tbilisi Artillery School in 1972. He graduated with honors from the Leningrad Kalinin Higher Artillery in 1981 and he was posted to Hungary with a self-propelled artillery regiment until 1986 and then from 1986 in the Baltic Military District. He served from 1990 as the
chief of staff of Soviet missile and artillery forces in Vilnius, capital of the Lithuanian SSR. Maskhadov retired from the Soviet Army in 1992 with the rank of a colonel and returned to his native land. He was at the head of civil defense between late 1992 and November 1993 (Lieven 1998).

After the fall of the Soviet Union, in the summer of 1993 Maskhadov took part in raids on anti-Dudaev opposition in the Urus-Martan, Nadterechny, and Gudermes districts. An unsuccessful anti-Dudaev mutiny in November 1993 resulted in his appointment as acting chief of staff and, in March 1994, as chief of staff (Smith 1998). He was the senior military figure on the Chechen side during the 1994-1996 Chechen insurgency and was widely seen as being instrumental to the Chechen victory over the Russian forces. During the battle of Groznyy, Maskhadov organized defense of the Presidential Palace in Groznyy as First Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Council (President Dudaev was the chairman) and chief of staff. In February 1995, Dudaev promoted Aslan to Divisional General. From June 1995, he took part in peace talks in Groznyy to resolve the Chechnya crisis (Knezys 1999). In August 1996, after Groznyy’s seizure by Chechen units he again held talks with Alexander Lebed and on 31 August 1996 the signing of the Khasav-Yurt Accord took place, a ceasefire agreement that marked the end of the first Chechen insurgency (Knezys 1999).

Following the ceasefire, Maskhadov was appointed Prime Minister of Ichkeria, while he also remained Chief of Staff and Defense Minister. Maskhadov nominated himself for President of Ichkeria for the 1997 free democratic presidential and parliamentary elections held in Chechnya under the OSCE, running primarily against
Shamil Basaev and Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev. The elections were conducted based on the Chechen constitution adopted in March 1992, according to which the Chechen Republic was an independent state. Representatives of more than 20 countries, as well as the United Nations and the OSCE, attended the elections as observers. Maskhadov won 60% of the votes and was congratulated by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who pledged to rebuild relations with Chechnya (Knezys 1999). Maskhadov remained commander-in-chief of the republican armed forces. On May 12, 1997, Maskhadov signed a peace treaty with Yeltsin at the Kremlin.

By the end of 1996, when Maskhadov assumed his office, nearly half a million people (40% of Chechnya’s prewar population) had been internally displaced and were living in refugee camps or overcrowded villages (Gannushkina 2006). The economy was destroyed. Two Russian brigades were stationed in Chechnya and did not leave. The warlords appeared to have no intention of disbanding their militias. Under such circumstances, Maskhadov's political fortunes began to wane. His political standing within Chechnya became increasingly insecure as he lost control to Basaev and other warlords. Just like in the years before the first Chechen insurgency under Dudaev, the years of Chechen independence were notorious for organized crime, including kidnapping, leading to several public executions of criminals (Tishkov 2004; Galeotti 2005). Maskhadov attempted with only limited success to curb the growth of Wahhabism and other fundamentalist Muslim groups supported by Basaev, producing a split in the Chechen separatist movement between Islamic fundamentalism and secular nationalists (Toft 2003).
In the summer of 1999, he condemned an attempt by Basaev and Khattab to spread war to neighboring Dagestan. This raid and a series of Russian apartment bombings were both blamed on Maskhadov’s Chechen leadership. On October 1, 1999, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin declared the authority of President Maskhadov and his parliament illegitimate (Cimbala 2007). Putin sent Russian forces into Chechnya and his promise of a quick and decisive victory propelled him to the Russian Presidency. Rapidly on the heel of this renewed conflict, Maskhadov outlined a peace plan offering a crackdown on renegade warlords; however, the offer was rejected by the Russian side. In response, President Maskhadov declared a return to violence to confront the approaching Russian army.

After the Chechen insurgents’ withdrawal from their devastated capital following another battle for the city, Maskhadov returned to life as a guerrilla leader, living in hiding as Russia’s second most wanted man after Basaev, with Russia placing a 10 million dollar bounty on his capture. He was seen as the political leader of the separatist forces during the war, but it is unclear what kind of a military role he played (Hughes 2007). Maskhadov offered his readiness for unconditional peace talks with Moscow several times in 2000 alone, continuing in the following years, but the Russian side seems to have ignored his appeals for the political solution.

Maskhadov advocated armed resistance to what he saw as a Russian occupation but condemned attacks on civilians. Maskhadov consistently denied responsibility for the increasingly brutal terrorist acts against Russian civilians by Basaev’s followers, continually issuing denunciations of such incidents through spokespersons abroad. He
described the rebels behind the Beslan school siege as “madmen” driven out of their senses by Russian acts of brutality (Speckhard 2006).

In early 2005, Maskhadov issued a special order to stop all military operations but these in self-defense, both inside and outside Chechnya, until the end of February as a gesture of good will, and again called for a negotiated end to the Chechen conflict (Hughes 2007). Maskhadov intimated that the separatists were no longer seeking independence, but only some form of internal autonomy. This surprise unilateral ceasefire was supported by Basaev but flatly rejected by the Russian and pro-Russian leaders who once again refused to negotiate. Maskhadov's order to cease temporarily the offensive actions was largely followed by the rebel movement.

On March 8, 2005, less than a month after Maskhadov announced the cease-fire, FSB head Nikolay Patrushev announced that special forces attached to the FSB had “today carried out an operation in the settlement of Tolstoy-Yurt, as a result of which the international jihadist and leader of armed groups Maskhadov was killed, and his closest comrades-in-arms detained” (Hughes 2007). He said the special operations unit had wanted to take Maskhadov alive for interrogation, but claim that they killed him accidentally with a grenade thrown into a bunker where Maskhadov was hiding. This account of Maskhadov’s death is the most predominant, though other accounts suggest that his death may have come at the hands of rival insurgents. Shortly following Maskhadov's death, the Chechen rebel council announced that Abdul Sadulayev had assumed the leadership.
Coding Statements of Aslan Maskhadov

In order to evaluate Aslan Maskhadov’s motivations for pursuing Chechen goals, a large set of speeches were coded according to the rules described in Chapter 2. These speeches were primarily drawn from a number of sources, including websites sympathetic to the Chechen insurgency and interviews with media outlets and academics. Collecting these speeches for every available year of analysis yields a word count of approximately 5200. These speeches are intended for consumption by Maskhadov’s colleagues as well as the Russian political leadership and even the broader international community. Therefore, I believe that they accurately capture his conception of the Chechen insurgency.

I will now present summary conclusions on the motivational codings of Aslan Maskhadov. Figure 3.6 displays the distribution of codings across all of Maskhadov’s speeches. Across all of Maskhadov’s speeches, the most predominant coding is (S/B), or a willingness to negotiate with the state, in this case, the Russian government. However, we find that the data shows a different story when we compare a speech by Maskhadov in 1999 from one shortly before his death in 2005. See Figure 3.7. In 1999, Maskhadov’s distribution of codings is fairly equitable, though the most predominant coding is toward in-group cohesion. At this time, Maskhadov would be coded as organizationally motivated. Yet, by 2005, the vast majority of Maskhadov’s coded statements express a desire to negotiate with the state. Thus, based on both the narrative of Maskhadov’s actions above and the coding of his statements over time, the most convincing coding of
Maskhadov’s motivational dynamics is a transition from an organizational motivation to a strategic motivation.

Figure 3.6: Distribution of Aslan Maskhadov’s Speech Codings
Conclusions about Motivations within the Chechen Insurgency

Based on the descriptions of the Chechen insurgency above and its leaders, I want to emphasize the following points about the changing nature of the Chechen violent, nationalist-separatist movement. First, the Chechen insurgent movement experienced three distinct periods in the part of its life cycle under analysis in this study. These three periods correspond to the two periods of overt violent insurgency against the Russian state (1994-1996 and 1999-present) and the somewhat more peaceful interregnum between these two periods. This is not simply a convenient heuristic typology for the
insurgency. Rather, I conclude that the insurgency itself was fundamentally shaped by the activity of conducting a violent campaign. As John Mueller explains,

“Confronted with a heavy-handed Russian invasion, the resistance was often dedicated and tenacious in a fight for national independence….Once victory had been achieved, however, the combatants quickly reverted to self-destructive banditry and hooliganism, much of it inflicted on the very people they had previously fought so valiantly to protect from the Russian forces” ((Mueller 2004), 108).

Furthermore, Mueller argues that these forces reverted to their discipline and dedication with the renewed conflict in 1999 (Mueller 2004). Thus, the very act of insurgency helped to structure the organization of the Chechen rebels. I conclude, based on the study above, that the Chechen insurgency displayed a higher degree of cohesion in both violent periods than in the much more lawless and crime-driven interregnum.

Across the three ages, we also observe a transition in the leadership of the Chechen insurgency. In the first period of violent conflict, Dzhokhar Dudaev was the primary and predominant leader of the Chechen insurgency. At this time, other leaders under analysis, such as Shamil Basaev and Aslan Maskhadov, were also important. However, Basaev and Maskhadov were highly responsive to Dudaev’s leadership throughout 1994-1996. It was not until Dudaev’s death removed him from power that Basaev began to assert himself independently from Dudaev’s appointed replacement, Maskhadov. At the end of the 1994-1996 insurrection, we see a rift begin to emerge between Basaev and Maskhadov. In the less violent interregnum, we see the organizational structure of the insurgency dissipate considerably. Therefore, those involved in the insurgency at this time are increasingly influenced by the less
compromising leaders, especially Basaev and to a much less extent, Khattab. Then, with the resumption of hostilities in 1999, the split between the institutionally oriented Maskhadov and the insurgency-oriented Basaev was reinvigorated. With the Russian government blaming Maskhadov’s leadership for attacks by Basaev and others, his rule was practically and then formally invalidated. As a result, he joined with Basaev, but this time subordinate to him in leadership. Around the same time, Abdul Sadulayev also joined the insurgency, representing a middle ground between Maskhadov and Basaev. Like Maskhadov, he was interested in working within the confines of Chechen governmental institutions. However, he was significantly more Islamist like Basaev, and received his endorsement to succeed Maskhadov upon his death.

This notion of Basaev’s Islamist views reflects the third major shift in the Chechen insurgency. Initially, the insurgency couched its rhetoric in nationalist-separatist language. This would hold throughout the reign of Dudaev. Yet, in the midst of the interregnum, the reduced Chechen insurgency would become increasingly Islamist, bolstered by foreign fighters described above. As a result, when violence renewed in 1999, it adopted a much-increased level of religious language in its rhetoric. This feature appears to hold true in past the death of Basaev, one its main proponents, in 2006.

Based on these observations, the coding of the Chechen insurgency’s leaders and the history provided above, I find that in the 1994-1996 period, the Chechen insurgency is best coded as strategic in its motivation. In the interregnum, this motivation transitioned as more strategically minded leaders left the actual insurgency and the group was distilled to its extreme elements, led by Shamil Basaev. This 1996-
1999 period finds the insurgency difficult to code, but transitional between strategic and extremist elements. Once violence resumed, these forces began to lead the growing insurgency, but the 1999-present insurgency is much better coded as extremist.

Strategies and Tactics of the State

Prior to the commencement of the conflict in 1994, the Russian government supported several attempts to overthrow Dzhokhar Dudaev’s separatist government. During this time, the Russian policy consisted of offering talks with the separatists while funding and in some cases supplying Dudaev’s Chechen opponents to overthrow the government (Kipp 2003; Trenin 2004). Yet, as Dudaev’s government consolidated power within Chechnya and Yeltsin consolidated power within Moscow, Russia abandoned these half-hearted efforts in favor of more direct measures that actually initiated the asymmetric conflict.

While it was generally only a temporary strategy, the first move that Russia made was to send advisors and supplies to the Chechen opponents of Dudaev. When it became clear that Dudaev and supporters had obtained the lion’s share of former Russian military equipment and organized themselves to a greater than previously imagined extent, this plan was augmented with additional tactics. Now, Russian units would support Chechen opposition fighters to bring down the Dudaev government. On November 26, 1994, these forces began an assault on Groznyy. When this semi-covert assault failed, Moscow recognized the need for a more direct military approach. At this time, Yeltsin made Russia’s general strategic approach apparent when he offered the Chechens a hard bargain in the form of a general attempt to crush the Chechen insurgency with the
**policy of reciprocal violence.** Paul Murphy, a former U.S. counterterrorism official working in region quotes a Russian official saying at the time that “All carrot dangling was useless” (Murphy 2004).

On December 11, 1994, Russian forces launched a three-pronged ground attack towards Groznyy. The main attack was temporarily halted by deputy commander of the Russian Ground Forces, Colonel-General Eduard Vorobyov, who then resigned in protest, citing his unwillingness to use military power against part the Russian state. Many in the Russian military and government opposed the war as well. Yeltsin's adviser on nationality affairs, Emil Pain, and Russia's Deputy Minister of Defense, Colonel-General Boris Gromov (esteemed commander of the Soviet-Afghan War), also resigned in protest of the invasion.

The Chechen Air Force was destroyed in the first few hours of the war. Nevertheless, Boris Yeltsin cabinet's expectations of a quick, overwhelming show of force, quickly followed by Chechen surrender, were horribly misguided, and Russia soon found itself in a quagmire. The morale of the troops was low from the beginning, for they were poorly prepared and did not understand why they were sent into battle. Some Russian units resisted the order to advance, and in some cases, the troops sabotaged their own equipment. In Ingushetia, civilian protesters stopped the western column and set 30 military vehicles on fire, while about 70 conscripts deserted their units. Advance of the western column was halted by the unexpected Chechen resistance at Dolinskoye. A group of 50 Russian paratroopers surrendered to the local militia, after being deployed by helicopters behind enemy lines and then abandoned.
The Russians believed that the elements driving the Chechen insurgency were intractably committed to their cause. If Chechens did not adopt a cease-fire, lay down arms, and release prisoners, the Russian military would enforce martial law in order to restore peace and security to the region. However, Yeltsin and the Kremlin repeated made offers to conduct peace talks and settlement negotiations with the Chechen rebels (Kipp 2003). However, these offers of negotiation did not promise any concessions to the Chechens that would be indicative of an accommodationist strategy. Russia eventually implemented a plan that they designed to ultimately surround and capture the city of Groznyy, thereby quashing the insurgency. During this time, Russia air forces were generally able to pressure the Chechens by bombing the Groznyy airport and other targets, though they lost helicopters to anti-aircraft weapons.

The initial attack ended with a major rout of the attacking forces and led to heavy Russian casualties and nearly a complete breakdown of morale. An estimated 1,000 to 2,000 federal soldiers died in the disastrous New Year's Eve assault. In one particular unit, numbering more than one thousand men, only about 230 survivors emerged from a two-day fight in the area of the Groznyy's central railway station. Several other Russian armored columns each lost hundreds of men during the first two days and nights of the siege.

Despite the early Chechen defeat of the New Year assault and many further casualties, Groznyy was eventually conquered by Russian forces amidst bitter urban warfare. On January 7, 1995, Russia's Major-General Viktor Vorobyov was killed by mortar fire, becoming the first on a long list of generals to be killed in Chechnya. On
January 19, despite heavy casualties, Russian forces seized the ruins of the presidential palace, which had been heavily contested for more than three weeks as Chechens finally abandoned their positions in the destroyed downtown area. The battle for the southern part of the city continued until the official end on March 6, 1995.

The poorly disciplined, ill supplied and badly led conscripts of the Russian army proved incapable of suppressing determined Chechen opposition, both in the Chechen capital and in the countryside. It took Russian forces over 15 months to capture Bamut, a small village southwest of the capital Groznyy, which fell on May 22, 1996. On March 6, 1996, between 1,500 and 2,000 Chechen fighters infiltrated Groznyy and launched a three-day surprise raid on the city, overrunning much of the city and capturing caches of weapons and ammunition. Also in March, the Chechens attacked Samashki, where hundreds of villagers were killed by indiscriminate Russian fire. A month later, on April 16, forces of Arab commander Ibn al-Khattab destroyed a large Russian armored column in an ambush near Shatoy, killing at least 53 soldiers. In another near Vedeno, at least 28 troops were killed.

These initial engagements led to an overall effort to blockade the city of Groznyy. After initially being rebuffed in their attempt to blockade the city, the Russians suffered heavy losses in setting up positions around Groznyy. They subsequently spread their military capabilities to numerous towns and cities within Chechnya. This allowed the Russians to continue to use artillery to bombard insurgent positions from a comparatively safe distance. Yet, this tactic was insufficient as the Chechen rebels largely deserted Groznyy and continued to fight the stationary Russian soldiers from mountainous
positions and rural encampments. On April 21, 1996, Yeltsin authorized an air strike against the known location of Dudaev, killing him. With Dudaev’s death, Yeltsin again offered the costly option of a ceasefire and negotiations, which the rebels accepted (Kipp 2003). Therefore, we observe a switch in the Russian strategy from **reciprocal violence** to **one of accommodation** with the advent of peace talks. Yeltsin officially declared victory in Groznyy on May 28, 1996, after a new temporary ceasefire was signed with the Chechen Acting President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev. While the political leaders were talking about the ceasefires and peace negotiations, military forces continued to conduct combat operations. On August 6, 1996, three days before Yeltsin was to be inaugurated for his second term as president, and when most of the Russian Army troops were moved south due to what was planned as their final offensive against remaining mountainous rebel strongholds, the Chechens launched another surprise attack on Groznyy.

During eight hours of talks, Lebed and Maskhadov drafted and signed the Khasav-Yurt Accord on August 31, 1996. It included technical aspects of demilitarization, the withdrawal of forces from Grozny, the withdrawal of all federal forces from Chechnya by December 31, 1996, and a stipulation that any agreement on the relations between the Chechen Republic Ichkeria and the Russian federal government need not be finalized until late 2001.

*The general strategy of the Russian government from 1999 until the present has been one of policing to the Chechens.* Vladimir Putin came to power promising to deal strongly with the Chechen insurgency. Whereas some of his electoral opponents promised another round of negotiations with the insurgents, Putin explicitly denied the
option of negotiation, countering that he would “wipe out the terrorists and bandits” (Kramer 2005). Putin has described his intentions in the current conflict with the Russian slang “mochit ’v sortire” which means “to wipe them out” (Starobin 2005). Russia’s military has generally adopted tactics that support Putin’s strategy of policing. Mark Kramer writes, “Since mid-2000, Russian forces in Chechnya have sought to rely on standard counterinsurgency operations aimed at maintaining control of urban areas, isolating and eliminating the guerillas, preventing suicide bombing attacks, restoring a semblance of normal life in major towns, bolstering the pro-Russian government, and consolidating the long-term military presence” (Kramer 2005).

The Chechen conflict entered a new phase on October 1, 1999, when Russia's new Prime Minister Vladimir Putin declared the authority of Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov and his parliament illegitimate. At this time, Vladimir Putin announced that Russian troops would initiate a land invasion but progress only as far as the Terek River, which cuts the northern third of Chechnya off from the rest of the republic. Putin's stated intention was to take control of Chechnya's northern plain and establish a cordon sanitaire against further Chechen aggression (Cimbala 2007). According to some accounts, Putin accelerated a plan for a major crackdown against Chechnya that had been drawn up months earlier.

The increased competence and commitment of the Russian military presence in Chechnya made it less likely that the Chechen insurgents could fight a conventional conflict as they did in 1994-1996. However, it also has not been successful in completely pacifying the region. The military lacks the capabilities to survey the area from the air.
effectively, due to Chechen anti-aircraft attacks. Perhaps more importantly, it is unable to track the insurgency on the ground, due to limited Russian patrols into the hinterlands because of IEDs and the general lack of language and cultural competency in the Russian military.

Russian President Vladimir Putin established direct rule of Chechnya in May 2000. The following month, Putin appointed Akhmad Kadyrov interim head of the pro-Moscow government. This development met with early approval in the rest of Russia, but the continued deaths of Russian troops dampened public enthusiasm (Hughes 2007). On March 23, 2003, a new Chechen constitution was passed in a controversial referendum that international observers described as deeply flawed. The 2003 Constitution granted the Chechen Republic a significant degree of autonomy, but still tied it firmly to Russia and Moscow's rule, and went into force on April 2, 2003 (Art 2007). The referendum was strongly supported by the Russian government but met with a harsh critical response from Chechen separatists. Since December 2005, Ramzan Kadyrov, leader of a pro-Moscow militia, had been functioning as Chechnya's de-facto ruler (Art 2007). Kadyrov, whose irregular forces are accused of carrying out numerous acts of violence, has become Chechnya's most powerful leader and on February 2007, with support from Putin, Ramzan Kadyrov replaced Alu Alkhanov as president.

**Evaluating the Outcome of State Counter-Insurgency Efforts**

In this study, we are primarily concerned with two measures associated with state counterinsurgency strategies on insurgent groups. First, how often does the insurgent group perpetrate acts of violence? Second, how deadly are the acts of violence
perpetrated by the violent group? I argue that when the death toll and number of incidents climbs, the state is unsuccessful in ameliorating insurgent violence with its current strategy. When the death toll and the frequency of incidents falls, this is a good indicator of a state’s progress in ameliorating violence stemming from an insurgency.

I will now review my findings with respect to the actual levels of violence in Chechnya and Russia from 1994 through 2005. In Figures 3.9 and 3.10 below, I present summary data on the actual levels of violence in Chechnya Russia that will be used to evaluate the fit of my conditional model of counterinsurgency. This data was obtained from the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism in conjunction with the RAND Corporation (mipt.org). This data is widely respected by academic sources and considered more objective than either Russian government or Chechen estimates. However, one caveat is order. The data from MIPT/RAND cover international events throughout the duration of the analysis. However, domestic events only receive coverage from 1997 forward to the present. As a result, domestic violence in the first Chechen of 1994-1996 is not covered. Therefore, I consult outside estimates of the casualty rates in the first Chechen war to supplement this data.

By Sergey Kovalev's estimates, about 27,000 civilians died in the first five weeks of fighting in 1994 (Hughes 2007). Dmitri Volkogonov, the late Russian historian and general, said the Russian military's bombardment of Groznyy killed around 35,000 civilians, including 5,000 children, and that the vast majority of those killed were ethnic Russians (Blank 1995). While military casualties are not known, the Russian side admitted to having lost nearly 2,000 killed or missing (Arbatov 2000).
Between January and June 1995, when the Russian forces conquered most of the republic in the conventional campaign, their losses in Chechnya were approximately 2,800 killed, 10,000 wounded, and over 500 missing or captured (Desch 2001). The dominant Russian strategy was to use heavy artillery and air strikes throughout the campaign, leading some Western and Chechen sources to call the air strikes deliberate terror bombing on the part of Russia. Ironically, because ethnic Chechens in Groznyy were able to seek refuge among their respective teips in the surrounding villages of the countryside, a high proportion of initial civilian casualties were inflicted against ethnic Russians who were unable to procure viable escape routes. The villages, however, were also targeted even from the early on; the Russian cluster bombs, for example, killed at least 55 civilians during the January 3, 1995 Shali cluster bomb attack (Miller 2004).

Figure 3.8 presents overall numbers of incidents perpetrated by the Chechen insurgency for each year. As can be seen, the pattern of incidents occurring in Russia is typified by a sharp increase of incidents in 1998 followed by a relative decline until 2001, when incidents began to climb steadily until finally leveling off in 2007. The incidents occurring in Chechnya remain relatively low in frequency until 2001, when they climb to a peak in 2004, before dropping off dramatically over the last few years until 2007. In Figure 3.9, I report summary data about the level of fatalities stemming from the Chechen insurgency. As discussed in the chapter, data on fatalities is difficult to obtain from Chechnya, but with that caveat, Figure 3.9 represents a reasonable index of fatalities. Fatalities spiked in Russia in 1999, 2002, and 2004, mostly as the result of the spectacular terrorist attacks undertaken on Russian soil by the Chechen insurgency in those years.
However, the Chechen fatalities are lower, but present a much smoother trend. Fatalities in Chechnya by the insurgency are quite low until 2002, when they spike up, before declining over the course of the remainder of the time period. How do these two measures trend in the time periods that correspond to the state strategies that I have coded? A summary table is present below in Figure 3.10.

Figure 3.8: Number of Incidents in Chechnya and Russia Perpetrated by Chechen Insurgents
Source: Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism/RAND (www.tkb.org; accessed 3/13/2008)
Figure 3.9: Number of Deaths Perpetrated by Insurgents in Chechnya and Russia
Source: Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism/RAND (www.tkb.org; accessed 3/13/2008)

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<tr>
<td>Observed Trend in Number of Incidents by Chechen Insurgents</td>
<td>Rising</td>
<td>Falling</td>
<td>Rising until 2005, then falling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observed Trend in Number of Deaths by Chechen Insurgents</td>
<td>Rising</td>
<td>Falling</td>
<td>Rising until 2004, then falling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Actual Trend in Violence</td>
<td>Increasing</td>
<td>Decreasing</td>
<td>Increasing</td>
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Figure 3.10: Observed Level of Violence in Chechnya
Conclusion


From the very beginning, Russian leaders and citizens came to view the effort to blockade and capture the city of Groznyy as a failure. In large part, this may have been due to the divergence between Russia’s actual military preparedness in 1994 and the Russian media and people’s perception of Russian military’s former capacity. By accepting heavy losses, the imposition of the superior Russian military force throughout the region of Chechnya was insufficient to overwhelm the Chechens’ conventional military force. The Chechens shifted tactical focus, and were continually emboldened by Kremlin entreaties to pursue settlement talks. The insurgents found these entreaties particularly gratifying, given that their own demands were relatively more absolute and definitively than other separatist movements in Russia at the time (Kempton 2002). Chechen insurgents’ hostage-taking operations in Russia, widely seen by the Russian and international media as terrorist in nature, exacerbated this situation. With the combination of domestic pressures of the approaching 1996 election and an apparent inability to quell the insurgency completely, Yeltsin and Russia were forced to grant significant autonomy to the Chechen separatists and move toward costly settlement talks.

It seems true that the results of negotiation probably undermined Boris Yeltsin’s tenure as President of Russia, due to the Russian public’s perception of Yeltsin’s failure (Hopf 1999). This is especially true because Yeltsin and his leadership team appeared to
harbor deep resentment toward Dudaev and other members of the Chechen insurgency (Dunlop 1998; Kempton 2002). It is important to note that this theory does not suggest that a state’s strategy against an insurgent group will be the best for domestic benefit, international appeal, etc. It is only the best insofar as it ameliorates the violence from the group. However, Russia was unable to ameliorate even the violence of this strategically motivated group until it had largely achieved concessions it was seeking. Furthermore, the concessions it granted were distasteful at in domestic politics and in Russia’s foreign policy as well.

Perceptions of Success of the Russian Strategy: 1999-Present

The success of current Russian attempts to ameliorate the violence caused by the Chechen insurgency is partially a result of prosecuting a policing strategy against groups that we can best describe through extremist motivations. The types of tactics undertaken under a strategy of policing are the most efficient use of a state’s resources when confronted with a group for whom violence is a central part of their belief system.

This helps us understand the initial upswing of violence from 1999-2004. As violence was renewed, the insurgency made use of Russian atrocities and Chechen retributions to foster recruitment, both at home and abroad (Murphy 2004). Actions undertaken by the Russian army served to benefit directly the insurgency in a nearly symbiotic relationship. Yuri Andrienko and Louise Shelley point out that the Russian military has personally gained from siphoning off oil from refineries it controls in the Chechen region. Furthermore, Russian soldiers benefited personally from looting Chechen villages, which enhances insurgent recruitment. Finally, there is some evidence
that Russian soldiers traded military equipment directly to insurgent fighters in exchange for drugs, primarily opiates from Afghanistan (Collier and Sambanis 2005). Journalist Anna Politkovskaia is even more direct. She writes, “Everyone has found a niche. The mercenaries at the checkpoints get bribes of ten to twenty rubles around the clock. The generals in Moscow and Khankala use their war budget for personal gain. Officers of the middle ranks collect ransom for temporary hostages and corpses. Junior officers get to go marauding during the purges. And as a team, (soldiers and some of the militants), they take part in illegal oil and weapon trade” (Politkovskaia 2003).

Truly, the types of objectives that the Russian military needed to master to effectively combat the Chechen insurgency were costly and time consuming. These included a major commitment toward language competency in troops and infiltration of insurgent groups, both for sowing dissention and eliminating charismatic leaders. With the passage of time, the Russian military has shown progress on both of these fronts, albeit more on the second than the first (Hughes 2007). Additionally, the Russian government would need to invest the time and political capital to provide alternative outlets to dissatisfied members of Chechen society. This means providing jobs and meaningful political outlets. However, it is difficult to imagine a high degree of motivation to do these things, so long as Putin and his government continue to reap massive political benefits from standing resolute against the Chechen insurgency.
Evaluating the Conditional Model in the Chechen Case

Because of coding the Chechen insurgency as a strategically motivated group and an extremist motivated group, I am able to evaluate hypotheses 1a-1c and 3a-3c (listed above under the second task), which are as follows:

1a. When the Chechen insurgency is coded as a strategically motivated group; Russian tactics of reciprocal violence will succeed in reducing violence.

1b. When the Chechen insurgency is coded as a strategically motivated group; Russian tactics of policing will fail in reducing violence.

1c. When the Chechen insurgency is coded as a strategically motivated group; Russian tactics of accommodation will fail in reducing violence.

3a. When the Chechen insurgency is coded as an extremist motivated group; Russian tactics of reciprocal violence will fail in reducing violence.

3b. When the Chechen insurgency is coded as an extremist motivated group; Russian tactics of policing will succeed in reducing violence.

3c. When the Chechen insurgency is coded as an extremist motivated group; Russian tactics of accommodation will fail in reducing violence.

Given the above findings regarding Russian counterinsurgency strategy and my coding of the motivational dynamics of the Chechen insurgency, my theory holds the following expectations for my hypotheses.
Figure 3.11: Table of Expectations of Counterinsurgent Outcomes Based on Conditional Model in the Chechen Case

What does the case of the Chechens’ nationalist separatist struggle against the Russian government mean for my contingent theory of counterinsurgency success?

Below is a chart revisiting the hypotheses that I evaluate and their outcomes. The notations for the applicable hypotheses refer to those described at the beginning of this chapter.
As can be seen above, from 1994-1996, the Russian strategy of reciprocal violence, though militarily costly, was able to ameliorate the violence stemming from the Russian insurgency. This is an interesting finding, because while Russians tended to view the 1994-1996 period as one of failure, this is really a perception of costs as well as normative questions about waging a counterinsurgency campaign in Chechnya. The strategy selected was successful in reducing the violence from the Chechen insurgency over the 1994-1996 period.

The conditional model is does not explain insurgent responses to the accommodationist turn that Russia took in 1996. According to the conditional model, we would expect strategically motivated insurgents to press their luck and seek more gains in the face of accommodations. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, this is a difficult year to code from the perspective of the Chechens’ motivational dynamics. With

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applicable Hypothesis</th>
<th>1a</th>
<th>1c</th>
<th>3b</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Tactics</td>
<td>Reciprocal Violence</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>Policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prediction of Contingent Model of Counterinsurgent Strategy</td>
<td>Success in Reducing Violence</td>
<td>Failure to Reduce Violence</td>
<td>Success to Reduce Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation Based on Dependent Variable</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Unsupported</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
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Figure 3.12: Evaluation of Conditional Model in the Chechen Case
Dudaev out of the picture, it is possible that the group is already well on its way to transitioning to an extremist motivated group. However, as I noted above, there were undertones of group cohesion on display at this time; perhaps this helps explain the transition. More likely, I think, is that the accommodations, which emerged in 1996, came in the context of Russia’s extremely costly crushing of the Chechen insurgency from 1994 to 1996. In this context, a strategic or even extremist oriented group might have opted for accommodations as way to save itself from utter defeat. Viewed in this light, Russia might have offered accommodations out of political necessity, but doing so may have allowed the Chechens to regroup and prolong their fight. **Finally, from 1996 until 2005, the conditional model correctly predicts that the policing model does ameliorate violence from an extremist motivated group.** There is mixed, but I believe, ultimately convincing evidence to believe that a policing strategy will ultimately be effective against the Chechen insurgency. Although violence spiked initially from 1999-2004, over the last several years, violence has dropped dramatically. I believe that early spikes in violence can be attributed to the interregnum of 1996-1999 where Russian forces were present in Chechen but highly inactive. This gave the insurgents time and freedom to develop fighting capacity. That fight capacity was no significantly affected in the early years of renewed conflict (1999-2003) because Russia’s policing efforts were poorly executed. I address this issue of poor policing in the conclusion chapter. However, once Russia developed more experience in policing in Chechnya and also began to apprehend or, more often, kill Chechen insurgent leaders, the level of violence has dropped precipitously. However, as I discuss in Chapter 2, a policing strategy may
not ultimately eradicate a group with extremist motivations, it will provide the state with the most efficient means of keeping violence low. For Russia under Putin, this seems to be the accepted trade-off.
CHAPTER 4

THE UNITED KINGDOM VERSUS THE PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY

“The Dirty War provides a model for how to dismantle a terrorist organization. The trick is to not mind killing, and to expect dying.”12

Introduction

Few conflicts have been as influential on the study of terrorism and political violence as the Troubles of Northern Ireland. This conflict has served to illustrate the emergence of violent non-state actors, like the nationalist Provos. The violence that preoccupied Northern Ireland for much of the last century did not begin or end with the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). However, the PIRA served as a predominant force in insurgent conflict for a substantial period of time, and it played a significant formative role in both the violent and pacific actors in the current Northern Ireland political climate. Furthermore, as the quote above suggests, the Troubles in Northern Ireland helped to shape British counterinsurgency policy for the last four decades and bears an enormous influence on other countries’ approaches to their own political and

military counterinsurgency questions. Because the PIRA has evolved so significantly in its interactions with the British government, it provides a robust case study for this study.

This chapter will help us evaluate questions described in the first and second chapters. These questions are central to the understanding of nationalist secessionist insurgencies. Northern Ireland has experienced periods of increased violence and periods of decreased violence perpetrated by the PIRA. What factors influence these rising and falling levels of violence? What factors influenced the continuance of violent interactions between the PIRA and the British government, despite the government’s attempts to suppress republican violence? Can a violent, non-state group like the PIRA be deterred? In the first two chapters, I described several models of counterinsurgent behavior that have been proffered within extant literature as superior for dealing with insurgencies (Galula 1964; Trinquier 1964; Hamilton 1997; Mackinlay 2002; Nagl 2002; Mackinlay 2005). The two most sharply distinguished models I term the combat model and the social model. I then proposed that while these models each feature cases of success and cases of failure\(^\text{13}\), a conditional model incorporating both of them allows us to hypothesize why they both might succeed and fail under certain circumstances. This chapter contributes to the project by evaluating this conditional model using evidence from British counterinsurgency efforts against the PIRA.

*Review of Theory*

I propose that the actions of states can be grouped into three general strategic conceptions. These strategies may be selected for a variety of reasons. In the first

\(^\text{13}\) That is, cases where the frequency of violent incidents and lethality of those attacks during the insurgent campaign decrease (success) or increase (failure).
option, the state can try to police against actions of the groups, arrest members of the group through standard means of law, and seek to undermine the group through tactics that would also be employed by any other type of organized crime. In the second option, the state adds to the base strategy of the first option by attempting raise the costs of the non-state actor’s violence by punishing them with strategy of reciprocal violence. In the third and final option, states can opt for a strategy of accommodation; attempting to integrate the group into a nonviolent realm of the political process. Various states may even be observed to attempt more than one of these strategies over the course of their interaction with a particular non-state group. These three state strategies represent approaches to counterinsurgency described in extant literature.

Variance in state strategy does not alone explain the outcomes of insurgent conflicts. I also argue that insurgent groups can be grouped into three general conceptions of their decision-making. The first conception is that groups strategically and instrumentally connect their actions to their stated goals. The second conception suggests that groups are motivated by internal dynamics and that these dynamics create a disjunction between groups’ stated goals and their actions. Finally, the third conception is that groups do not see a difference between their stated goals and the actions they take. That is to say, their actions are always intended to be a direct achievement of their goals. These three concepts reflect strategic, organizational, and extremist portraits of insurgent groups that have been painted in extant literature (described in Chapter 1).

I argue that it is the interaction of the general strategy of the state and the general conception of the group’s decision-making that predicts success or failure in an insurgent
conflict. That is, when a strategically oriented group is faced with a strategy of reciprocal violence, the group’s violence will be quelled more efficiently than if either of the other strategies is employed. This is additionally true when an organizationally oriented group is faced with an accommodationist strategy and when an extremist oriented group is faced with a basic policing strategy.

Evidence and Methodology

Few insurgencies have been as enduring, puzzling, and well documented as the Troubles. All three of these characteristics make the Provisional Irish Republican Army’s violent struggle against the British government and its agents in Northern Ireland an interesting case for analysis and a useful one for this study.

First, the Troubles have been an enduring aspect of Northern Irish, and consequently, British politics. While many authors trace the origins of Irish nationalism back several centuries, we can comfortably claim that modern Irish nationalism has exhibited consistently violent strains since the Anglo-Irish war of 1919-1921 (Lustick 1993; O’Brien 1999; Cox 2000; Coogan 2002). The settlement of this conflict created the political structure of Northern Ireland and set the stage for the Troubles, beginning in the inter-war period, but reemerging shortly after the end of World War II. The mere notion of an enduring violent conflict in Northern Ireland is compelling, given that many factors would predict a much shorter cycle of violence. The United Kingdom has been relatively economically virile, its economic policies are relatively liberal, the governments of the United Kingdom and Ireland are exceptionally stable, and Northern Ireland is situated in a part of the world that has experienced an unprecedented expansion of peace and even
integration over the past fifty years (Coulter 1999). Yet despite these trends, violence in Northern Ireland has endured. This chapter will explain this behavior.

Second, the Troubles are exceptionally well documented (McKittrick 2002; Hennessey 2005). This seems to have happened for several reasons. First, much of the interaction between the British government and the PIRA has occurred in full view of the public. Part of this tendency is the desire on both sides of the conflict to appeal to public constituencies from which they hope to draw an operational mandate. Also, both sides have long appeared to value public support for their objectives as part of their political goals (Hennessey 2001). This chapter will address why this appears to be the case. As important as a desire to be public with goals and negotiations, the Irish conflict has availed itself to the probing of journalists and other investigators (Urban 1993; McFerran 1997; Cox 2000; Farren and Mulvihill 2000). Because of the relatively small and developed geography of Northern Ireland as well as the accompanying technology present in Northern Ireland, the reporting and investigation of the Northern Ireland conflict have been particularly thick. This effort has been aided by competitive democracy within the British government, which has led to a greater transparency in British counterinsurgency strategy than in many counterinsurgency efforts worldwide. This will be important for this project, which traces the interactions between the PIRA and the British government.

Finally, this case of insurgent conflict is particularly puzzling. There are several related puzzles which will be addressed this project. First, though the British clearly placed a high preference on their ability to achieve stability in Northern Ireland and
sacrificed other policy preferences to pursue this goal, their results were decidedly mixed. That is, the stakes held by the state do not appear to predict accurately the outcome of the insurgent conflict. To put it another way, this case controls for a major alternative explanation of the outcomes of insurgent conflicts, material power. This case is especially useful, because not only does Great Britain have much more extensive material power to focus on the conflict, it also chose to employ a great deal of it (Newsinger 2002; Neumann 2003). Thus, Britain had more material power in general and more power in the field during the conflict. Despite that, its attempts to quell the insurgency yield decidedly mixed results. The question, as always, is why a government with such high stakes (as are described below) has produced such mixed results in ameliorating violence from an insurgency.

A second puzzle present in this conflict is the changing nature of British counterinsurgent strategy. Though there is extensive discussion of British counterinsurgency efforts in Northern Ireland, this case will help us understand that the British counterinsurgent strategies were not mere internally generated, but resulted from a complex set of factors, including domestic politics, military preferences, and reactions to the insurgent strategies employed against them (Dewar 1985; Cunningham 2001). The strategies of the British government then help us understand the changing levels of violence perpetrated by the PIRA.

For this case study, I employ explicit coding rules (developed in chapter 2) to interpret narrative accounts of conflicts and to code both the strategic choices of the United Kingdom and the decision-making characteristics of the PIRA. I also employ
narrative accounts of the insurgency to capture the stakes and goals of both the PIRA and the British government. I am applying these coding rules to a selection of speeches, first-hand accounts, histories, secondary interviews, news articles, and press releases as well as academic treatments of the conflicts. I use these accounts to construct a narrative of the insurgent conflict as well as a measurement of the intensity of the insurgency’s violent activity. I then compare the interaction of states’ strategic choices and the conception of groups’ decision-making to the relative success or failure of both the group and the state vis-à-vis their goals.

*Hypotheses in the Northern Ireland Case*

In this chapter, I apply the hypotheses described in general in Chapter 2 to the specific case of the British government’s struggle against the Tamil Tigers. As such, I will evaluate the following hypotheses:

1a. When the PIRA is coded as a strategically motivated group; British tactics of **reciprocal violence will succeed** in reducing violence.

1b. When the PIRA is coded as a strategically motivated group; British tactics of **policing will fail** in reducing violence.

1c. When the PIRA is coded as a strategically motivated group; British tactics of **accommodation will fail** in reducing violence.

2a. When the PIRA is coded as an organizationally motivated group; British tactics of **reciprocal violence will fail** in reducing violence.

2b. When the PIRA is coded as an organizationally motivated group; British tactics of **policing will fail** in reducing violence.
2c. When the PIRA is coded as an organizationally motivated group; British tactics of accommodation will succeed in reducing violence.

3a. When the PIRA is coded as an extremist motivated group; British tactics of reciprocal violence will fail in reducing violence.

3b. When the PIRA is coded as an extremist motivated group; British tactics of policing will succeed in reducing violence.

3c. When the PIRA is coded as an extremist motivated group; British tactics of accommodation will fail in reducing violence.

Historical Background of the Conflict

The active insurgency in Northern Ireland known as the Troubles emerged in 1968, when widespread rioting and public disorder broke out at several political marches. These marches were organized to protest disproportionate Protestant voting power and especially to seek an end to the Special Powers Act, which allowed for internment and other repressive measures (Coogan 2002).

Initially, Terence O'Neill, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, had been inclined toward pursuing political reform. However, he was opposed by many hard-line unionists, including William Craig and Ian Paisley, who accused him of being a sell-out (Kennedy-Pipe 1997; O'Donnell 2007). Once violence broke out at several marches, Protestant loyalists responded by attacking demonstrators with clubs. The Royal Ulster Constabulary, almost entirely Protestant, was widely accused of supporting the loyalists and of allowing the violence to occur (Bell 1987; Dunnigan 1995).
Much of the hostile loyalist reaction at this time was linked to the ability of loyalist leaders to provoke the fear within the Unionist populace that the IRA was not only behind the violence, but was also planning a renewed armed campaign. In fact, the IRA was moribund, had few weapons, fewer members, negligible support, and was increasingly committed to non-violent politics, out of necessity if not disposition (Bell 1987). This situation would change dramatically as violence worsened and the Provisional IRA emerged.

Communal disturbances worsened throughout 1969. The RUC was accused of failing to protect the marchers. Barricades were erected in nationalist areas of Derry and Belfast in the following months. This disorder culminated in the August 1969 Battle of the Bogside, a huge communal uprising in Derry between police and nationalists (Coogan 2002; Hennessey 2005). The riot started in a confrontation between Catholic residents of the Bogside, police, and members of the Apprentice Boys of Derry who were due to march past the Bogside along the city walls.

Rioting between police and loyalists on one side and Bogside residents on the other continued for two days before British troops were sent in to restore order (Mockaitis 1995). The battle sparked vicious sectarian rioting in Belfast, Newry, Strabane and elsewhere. The riots began with nationalist demonstrations in support of the Bogside residents and escalated when a grenade was thrown at a police station (Coogan 2002). The RUC responded by deploying three armored cars mounted with machine guns, killing a nine-year-old boy who was struck by a bullet as he lay in bed in his family's flat in a nationalist area of Belfast (Hennessey 2005). Loyalist crowds
attacked Catholic areas, burning down much of Bombay Street, Madrid Street and other Catholic streets.

Nationalists alleged that the Royal Ulster Constabulary had aided, or at least not acted against, loyalists in these riots. The IRA had been widely criticized by its supporters for failing to defend the Catholic community during the Belfast troubles of August 1969, when seven people had been killed, about 750 injured and 1,505 Catholic families had been forced out of their homes—almost five times the number of dispossessed Protestant households. One Catholic priest reported that his parishioners were contemptuously calling the IRA I Ran Away (Coogan 2002).

The government of Northern Ireland requested that the British government deploy the British Army in Northern Ireland to restore order, possibly in response to somewhat exaggerated media reports that the Irish government was considering military intervention to protect Catholic areas in Derry. Nationalists initially welcomed the Army, often giving the soldiers tea and sandwiches, as they did not trust the police to act in an unbiased manner, but relations soured due to heavy-handedness by the Army, who were soon considered to be biased in favor of the Unionists (White 1989).

*The Emergence of the PIRA*

The years 1970–1972 saw an explosion of political violence in Northern Ireland, peaking in 1972, when nearly 500 people lost their lives. There are several reasons why violence escalated in these years.

First, Unionists claim the main reason was the formation of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (Provisional IRA), a group formed when the IRA split into the
Provisional and Official factions (O'Brien 1999). While the older IRA had embraced non-violent civil agitation, the new Provisional IRA was determined to wage armed struggle against British rule in Northern Ireland. The new IRA was willing to take on a sectarian character as defenders of the Catholic community, rather than seeking working-class unity across both communities that had become the aim of the Officials. Unionists perceive this ongoing campaign as the main cause and sustaining element of the Troubles.

On the other hand, nationalists argued that the upsurge in violence was caused by the disappointment of the hopes engendered by the civil rights movement and the repression subsequently directed at their community. They point to a number of events in these years to support this opinion. One such incident was the Falls Curfew in July 1970, when 3,000 troops imposed a curfew on the nationalist Lower Falls area of Belfast, firing more than 1,500 rounds of ammunition in gun battles with the IRA and killing four people (Hennessey 2005). Another was the 1971 introduction of internment without trial. Out of over 350 initial detainees, not one was Protestant (Hennessey 2005). Moreover, due to poor intelligence, very few of those interned were actually republican activists, but some went on to become republicans because of their unfortunate experiences. Between 1971 and 1975, nearly 2000 people were detained, of which the vast majority were or became Republicans. There were widespread allegations from the nationalist community of abuse and even torture of detainees. Most emotionally of all, nationalists also point to the fatal shootings of 14 unarmed nationalist civil rights demonstrators by the British
Army in Derry in January 1972 on what became known as Bloody Sunday (Coogan 2002).

The Provisional IRA (or Provos, as they are often known), formed in early 1970, soon establishing itself as more aggressive and militant in its response to attacks on the nationalist community by loyalists and the police, gaining greater support in the nationalist ghettos in the early 1970s as defenders of those communities (Bell 1997; O'Brien 1999). By 1972, the Provisionals’ campaign was of such intensity that they had already killed more than 100 soldiers, wounded 500 more and carried out 1,300 bombings, mostly against commercial targets that they considered the artificial economy (Hennessey 2005). The bombing campaign killed many civilians, notably on Bloody Friday in July 1972, when 22 bombs were set off in the centre of Belfast (Moloney 2002). The Official IRA, who had never been fully committed to armed action, called off their campaign in June 1972 (Coogan 2002). The Provisionals, however, despite a temporary ceasefire in 1972 and talks with British officials, seemed determined to continue their campaign until the achievement of a united Ireland.

The loyalist paramilitaries, including the Ulster Volunteer Force and the recently founded Ulster Defence Association, responded to the mushrooming violence with a campaign of sectarian assassination of nationalists, whom some of them identified simply as Catholics (Dunn 1995). Some of these murders were particularly gruesome, as in the case of the Shankill Butchers, who beat and tortured their victims before killing them (Dunn 1995). The PIRA were also guilty of sectarian assassination. Another feature of
the political violence was the involuntary or forced displacement of both Catholics and Protestants from formerly mixed residential areas.

The UK government in London, perceiving that the Northern Ireland administration was incapable of containing the security situation, suspended the unionist-controlled Stormont Home Rule government in 1972 and introduced Direct Rule from London (Bric and Coakley 2004). Direct Rule was initially intended as a short-term measure, the medium-term strategy being to restore self-government to Northern Ireland on a basis that was acceptable to both unionists and nationalists. Agreement proved elusive, however, and the Troubles continued within a context of political deadlock.

In June 1973, following a referendum in March on the status of Northern Ireland, a new parliamentary body, the Northern Ireland Assembly, was established. In October of that year, mainstream nationalist and unionist parties, along with the British and Irish governments, negotiated the Sunningdale Agreement, which was intended to produce a political settlement within Northern Ireland, but with a so-called Irish dimension involving the Republic of Ireland (Farren and Mulvihill 2000). The agreement provided for power sharing between nationalists and unionists and a Council of Ireland designed to encourage cross-border co-operation.

Unionists, however, was split over Sunningdale, which was also opposed by the PIRA, whose goal remained nothing short of an end to Northern Ireland's existence as part of the United Kingdom (Bell 2000; Arena and Arrigo 2006). Many unionists opposed the concept of power sharing, arguing that it was not feasible to share power with those who sought the destruction of the state. Ultimately, however, the Sunningdale
Agreement was brought down by mass action on the part of loyalists (primarily the Ulster Defence Association, at that time over 20,000 strong) and Protestant workers, who formed the Ulster Workers' Council. They organized a general strike that stopped all business in Northern Ireland and cut off essential services such as water and electricity. Nationalists argue that the UK government did not do enough to break this strike and uphold the Sunningdale initiative (Coogan 2002). In the event, however, faced with such determined opposition, the pro-Sunningdale unionists resigned from the power-sharing government and the new regime collapsed.

The failure of Sunningdale led on to the examination in London of the option of a rapid British withdrawal by the new government of Harold Wilson. The violence continued through the rest of the 1970s. The Provisional IRA declared a ceasefire in 1975 but returned to violence in 1976 (Hennessey 2001). By this time, they had lost the hope that they had had in the early 1970s that they could force a rapid British withdrawal from Northern Ireland, and instead developed a strategy known as the Long War, which involved a less intense but more sustained campaign of violence that could continue indefinitely (Smith 1995). The Official IRA ceasefire of 1972, however, became permanent, and the Official movement eventually evolved into the Workers Party, which rejected violence completely. This study, as a result, is more concerned with the organizational dynamics and violent behaviors of the PIRA.

Successive British governments, having failed to achieve a political settlement, tried to normalize Northern Ireland. Aspects included the removal of internment without trial and the removal of political status for paramilitary prisoners (Cunningham 2001).
From 1976 onwards, paramilitaries were tried in juryless Diplock courts to avoid intimidation of jurors. On conviction, they were to be treated as ordinary criminals. Resistance to this policy among republican prisoners led to over 500 of them in the Maze prison initiating the blanket protest and the dirty protest. Their protests culminated in hunger strikes in 1980 and 1981, aimed at the restoration of political status.

In the 1981 Irish Hunger Strike, ten republican prisoners (seven from the Provisional IRA and three from the Irish National Liberation Army) starved themselves to death. The first hunger striker to die, Bobby Sands, was elected to Parliament (Cunningham 2001). The hunger strikes proved emotive events for the nationalist community, as over 100,000 people attended Sands' funeral mass.

From an Irish republican perspective, the significance of these events was to demonstrate a potential for political and electoral strategy. In the wake of the hunger strikes, Sinn Féin, the PIRA's political wing, began to contest elections for the first time in both Northern Ireland and the Republic (Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003). In 1986, Sinn Féin recognized the legitimacy of the Irish Dáil, which caused a small group of republicans to break away and form Republican Sinn Féin. From a unionist perspective, the hunger strikes appeared to show that the nationalist community supported terrorism and this perception deepened sectarian antagonism.

Paramilitary campaigns continued on both sides until the respective republican and loyalists ceasefires of 1994 (Coogan 2002). Fewer people were killed in the 1980s and 1990s than in the 1970s, but the duration and seemingly interminable nature of the political violence has left behind a very negative sociological legacy.
The PIRA's Long War was boosted by large donations of arms to them from Libya in 1986 (Urban 1993). Although they were now killing fewer soldiers and members of the security forces than in the 1970s, the PIRA's capacity for assassinations and bombings appeared boundless. Many of their operations were directed at local unionist targets such as off-duty police officers, part-time soldiers and Protestant civilians, such as those killed during the Remembrance Day massacre of 1987 (Hennessey 2005). The PIRA also targeted construction workers, cleaners and other workers, both Catholics and Protestants, who were employed at jobs at police stations and Army bases.

One particularly controversial aspect of the conflict has been allegations of collusion between the state security forces and loyalist paramilitaries. These criticisms have come from both traditionally from Irish nationalist or pro-Irish republican media and news outlets as well as political groups like Sinn Fein (Guelke 1994). In the mid-1970s, a Royal Ulster Constabulary anti-terrorist unit, the Special Patrol Group, was implicated in aiding and participating in a number of sectarian murders in the mid-Ulster area. Two SPG members were convicted in 1980 of a 1977 murder. They in turn implicated their immediate colleagues in at least 11 other killings and alleged that they were part of a wider conspiracy involving the RUC Special Branch, British military intelligence, and the UVF. The Special Patrol Group was stood down after the men's conviction. Additionally, elements within the Army and police have been shown to have leaked intelligence to loyalists from the late 1980s to target republican activists (Urban
In 1992, a British agent within the UDA revealed Army complicity in activities that included murder and importing arms.

Since the late 1980s, while the IRA continued its armed campaign, its political wing Sinn Féin, led since 1983 by Gerry Adams, sought a negotiated end to the conflict, although Adams knew that this would be a very long process. In the 1970s, he himself predicted that the war would last another 20 years (Coogan 2002). This was manifested in open talks with John Hume’s Social Democratic and Labour Party leader and secret talks with Government officials (Moloney 2002). Loyalists were also engaged in behind-the-scenes talks to end the violence, liaising with the British and Irish governments through Protestant clergy, in particular the Presbyterian Rev. Roy Magee and the Anglican Archbishop Robin Eames. After a prolonged period of political maneuvering in the background, the loyalist and republican paramilitaries declared ceasefires in 1994.

The year leading up to the ceasefires was a particularly tense one, marked by atrocities. The UDA and UVF increased their attacks against Catholics (for the first time killing more civilians than Republicans in a year in 1993). The IRA responded with the Shankill Road bombing in October 1993, which aimed to kill the UDA leadership, but in fact killed nine Protestant civilians (Coogan 2002). The UDA in turn retaliated with the Greysteel massacre and shootings at Castlerock, County Londonderry.

On June 16, 1994, just before the ceasefires, the Irish National Liberation Army killed three UVF members in a gun attack on the Shankill Road. In revenge, three days later, the UVF killed six civilians in a shooting at a pub in Loughinisland, County Down. The IRA, in the remaining month before its ceasefire, killed four senior loyalists, three
from the UDA and one from the UVF (Coogan 2002). There are various interpretations of the spike in violence before the ceasefires. One theory is that the loyalists feared the peace process represented an imminent sellout of the Union and ratcheted up their violence accordingly (Geraghty 2000). Another explanation is that the republicans were settling old scores before the end of their campaigns and wanted to enter the political process from a position of military strength rather than weakness (Hennessey 2001).

Eventually, in August 1994, the Provisional IRA declared a ceasefire. The loyalist paramilitaries reciprocated six weeks later. Although these ceasefires failed in the short run, they mark an effective end to large-scale political violence in the Troubles, as they paved the way for the final ceasefire. On 9 February 1996, less than two years after the declaration of the ceasefire, the IRA revoked it with the Docklands bombing in the Canary Wharf area of London, killing two people and causing £85 million in damage to the city's financial center (McKittrick 2002). Sinn Féin blamed the failure of the ceasefire on the UK government's refusal to begin all-party negotiations until the IRA decommissioned its weapons.

The attack was followed by several more, most notably the Manchester Bombing which destroyed a large area of the centre of the city on 15 June 1996. It was the largest bomb attack in Great Britain since World War II, and while the attack avoided many fatalities due to the rapid response of the emergency services to an earlier telephone warning made to a local television station, over 200 people were injured in the attack, many of them outside the established cordon. The damage caused by the blast was valued at £411 million (McKittrick 2002).
The IRA reinstated their ceasefire in July 1997 as negotiations for the document that would become known as the Good Friday Agreement were starting without Sinn Féin. In September of the same year, Sinn Féin signed The Mitchell Principles and was invited into the talks (Hennessey 2001).

The advent of negotiations produced rifts in the violent actors in the Troubles. The UVF was the first paramilitary grouping to split because of their ceasefire, spawning the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) in 1996. In addition, two hard-line splinter groups from the Provisional IRA, the Real IRA and the Continuity IRA, who rejected the Provisional ceasefire, continued a bombing campaign (Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003). In August 1998, a Real IRA bomb in Omagh killed 29 civilians. This bombing, the single worst of the entire Troubles, largely discredited dissident Republicans and their campaigns in the eyes of most nationalists. At present, they are now small and relatively non-influential groups. The INLA also declared a ceasefire after the Belfast Agreement was passed in 1998.

Since then, most paramilitary violence has been directed inwards, at their own communities and at other factions within their organizations. The UDA, for example, has come to blows with their fellow loyalists the UVF on two occasions since 2000, and has been torn apart repeatedly by internal feuding between Brigade commanders over power within the organization and the proceeds of organized crime. On the Republican side, the tendency for internecine violence has been less marked, but the Provisional IRA has been accused of killing at least one double agent and its members have also been accused of
intimidating and expelling Catholics, assaulting men and women, and, in the extreme cases, murder (Arena and Arrigo 2006).

A feature of Northern Irish politics since the Agreement has been the eclipse in electoral terms of the relatively moderate parties such as the Social Democratic and Labour Party and Ulster Unionist Party by more extreme parties—Sinn Féin and the DUP. Similarly, although political violence is greatly reduced, sectarian animosity has not disappeared and residential areas are more segregated between Catholic nationalists and Protestant unionists than ever. Because of this, progress towards restoring the power-sharing institutions has been slow and tortuous. Though the peace process is slow going, movements have formed which give those affected by the Troubles a voice in their communities. Recently, Gerry Adams and Ian Paisley have announced the formation of a power-sharing government, ending the five-year standoff. However, there are still worries about an eventual resumption of violence. Paul Wilkinson, a scholar of the Troubles, argued in 1999, “[T]here remain threats to the Good Friday Agreement. The most important is neglect of the key relationship between peace and security” (1999). Whether both Great Britain and the Northern Ireland government can guarantee security and therefore ensure peace to republicans and loyalists alike will drive the question of violence in coming years.

Motivations of the Insurgency

Few groups have had their internal organizations and motivations probed as extensively as the PIRA. Partially because of its longevity and because of its close relationship with a number of Western media sources, the PIRA presents a more open
view of its inner workings than the vast majority of insurgent groups. Despite that openness, it is still a challenge to discern the motivational drives of the PIRA. In this section, I will briefly outline the organizational character of the PIRA, before turning to the coding process by which I determine the motivation of the PIRA’s goals.

Charles Tilly correctly points out that unlike cases such as Colombia, Angola, or Sri Lanka (which follows in the next chapter), Northern Ireland does not contain a “professional full-time military force” to compete with the British military ((Tilly 2003), 117). One of the first hallmarks of the PIRA it is a volunteer and essentially part-time insurgent force. While a few members of the PIRA essentially devoted the vast majority of their time to insurgent activities, many, if not most of the PIRA’s membership held regular jobs. Additionally, most members (all those not currently on the run from British or RUC forces) remained in their local homes and communities. This fact is reflected in the organization of the PIRA, which is essentially based around the Catholic neighborhoods that PIRA members inhabited. Therefore, the first important point to make about PIRA organizational dynamics is the neighbor-networked organization of the insurgency.

The second point to emphasize about the PIRA insurgency is their historical position in the nationalist movement in Northern Ireland. As has become a hallmark in this and other nationalist insurgencies, violent insurgent movements are often born out of the pacifying trends of a broader group. In the case of Northern Ireland, the PIRA emerged out of a cohort of younger members of the Official Irish Republican Army dissatisfied with that organization’s renunciation of violence to obtain political
objectives. As such, we can conclude that the PIRA was not articulating a new goal, that of nationalist separation, but they were advocating a renewed commitment to the goal, primarily through their willingness to pursue violence (Bunker 2005). Additionally, the PIRA benefited from traditional lines of support for republican nationalist in Northern Ireland. Many members of the PIRA leadership, as well as rank-and-file members joined the PIRA because prior memberships within their immediate or extended families. PIRA recruiting used these familial links as its primary source of new members (Heiberg, O’Leary et al. 2007).

One of the core reasons that the Provisional IRA and provisional Sinn Féin were founded, in December 1969 and January 1970, respectively, was that people like Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, Dáithí Ó Conaill, and Billy McKee opposed participation in constitutional politics. When, at the December 1969 IRA convention and the January 1970 Sinn Féin Ard Fheis the delegates voted to participate in the Dublin (Leinster House), Belfast (Stormont) and London (Westminster) parliaments, the organizations split (Coogan 2002). Gerry Adams, who had joined the Republican Movement in the early 1960s, did join the PIRA until later in 1970.

This point leads to the third characteristic of the PIRA insurgency. The PIRA leadership has been enormously influential in shaping the activity of the organization throughout the length and breadth of the Troubles. Below I discuss the histories and political views of key PIRA leaders. I then code statements made by these leaders to understand their motivations toward insurgency. Following that, I describe how these individual leaders help explain the motivational dynamics of the PIRA over time.
Gerry Adams

Gerry Adams was born in west Belfast into a nationalist Catholic family steeped in a strong republican background. Adams's grandfather, also Gerry Adams, had been a member of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) during the Irish War of Independence. Two of Adams's uncles, Dominic and Patrick Adams, had been interned by the governments in Belfast and Dublin (Moloney 2002). Although it is reported that his uncle Dominic was a one-time IRA chief of staff, J. Bowyer Bell states that Dominic Adams was a senior figure in the IRA of the mid-1940s (Bell 1997). Gerry Sr. joined the IRA aged sixteen; in 1942, he participated in an IRA ambush on a Royal Ulster Constabulary patrol but was himself shot, arrested and sentenced to eight years imprisonment.

Following his primary schools, Adams became a bartender, but also was increasingly involved in the Irish republican movement, joining Sinn Féin in 1964, after being radicalized by the Divis Street riots during the general election campaign (Moloney 2002). In the late 1960s, a civil rights campaign developed in Northern Ireland. Adams was an active supporter and joined the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association in 1967. Instead of leading to change, the civil rights movement was met with protests from Loyalist counter-demonstrators, and Northern Irish government forces. This culminated in August 1969, when Northern Ireland cities like Belfast and Derry erupted in major
rioting and British troops were called in at the request of the Government of Northern Ireland.

Adams was active in Sinn Féin at this time. In August 1971, internment without trial was introduced in Northern Ireland under the Special Powers Act. Adams was interned in March 1972, on HMS Maidstone, but was released in June to take part in secret, but abortive talks in London. The IRA negotiated a short-lived truce with the British and an IRA delegation met with William Whitelaw (Dunnigan 1995). The delegation included Sean Mac Stiofáin (the PIRA Chief of Staff), Daithi O'Conaill, Seamus Twomey, Ivor Bell, Martin McGuinness and Gerry Adams (Farren and Mulvihill 2000). The IRA insisted Adams be included in the meeting and he was released from internment to participate. Following the failure of the talks he played a central role in planning the bomb blitz on Belfast known as Bloody Friday (Wichert 1999). He was re-arrested in July 1973 and interned at Long Kesh internment camp. After taking part in an IRA-organized escape attempt, he was sentenced to a period of imprisonment. During the Hunger Strikes of 1981, Adams played an important policy-making role, which saw the emergence of his party as a political force (O'Donnell 2007).

In 1983, Adams was elected president of Sinn Féin and became the first Sinn Féin MP elected to the British House of Commons since the 1950s. Following his election as MP for Belfast West the British government lifted a ban on him traveling to Britain. In line with Sinn Féin policy, he refused to sit in the House of Commons (Dunn 1995).

Adams has stated repeatedly that he has never been a member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA). However, noted scholars such as Ed Moloney, Richard
English, Peter Taylor and Mark Urban have all named Adams to be part of the IRA leadership since the 1970s (Moloney 2002). Adams appears to have risen to become the most senior figure in the IRA Northern Command on the basis of his absolute rejection of anything but military action, but this conflicts with the fact that during his time in prison Adams came to reassess his approach and became more political (Moloney 2002).

In Long Kesh in the mid-1970s, and writing under the pseudonym Brownie in Republican News, Adams called for increased political activity, especially at a local level, by Republicans (Santino 2001). The call resonated with younger Northern people, many of whom had been active in the Provisional IRA but had not necessarily been highly active in Sinn Féin. In 1977, Adams and Danny Morrison drafted the address of Jimmy Drumm at the Annual Wolfe Tone Commemoration at Bodenstown. The Address was viewed as watershed in that Drumm acknowledged that the war would be a long one and that success depended on political activity that would complement the PIRA’s armed campaign.

In 1983, that Ruairí Ó Brádaigh resigned as President of Sinn Féin and was succeeded by Gerry Adams. Republicans had long claimed that the only legitimate Irish state was the Irish Republic declared in the Proclamation of the Republic of 1916, which they considered to be still in existence. In their view, the legitimate government was the IRA Army Council, which had been vested with the authority of that Republic in 1938 by the last remaining anti-Treaty deputies of the Second Dáil. Adams continued to adhere to this claim of republican political legitimacy until quite recently, however in his 2005 speech to the Sinn Féin Ard Fheis he explicitly rejected it (O’Donnell 2007).
Adams’ leadership of Sinn Féin was supported by a Northern-based cadre that included people like Danny Morrison and Martin McGuinness. Adams and others, over time, pointed to Republican electoral successes in the early and mid-1980s, when hunger strikers Bobby Sands and Kieran Doherty were elected to the British House of Commons and Dáil Éireann respectively, and they advocated that Sinn Féin become increasingly political and base its influence on electoral politics rather than paramilitarism (Bric and Coakley 2004). The electoral effects of this strategy were shown later by the election of Adams and McGuinness to the House of Commons.

In popular consciousness in Britain, Adams is primarily remembered during the latter part of this period for the ban on the media broadcast of his voice. This ban was imposed by the then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1988, to deny the PIRA additional publicity after the BBC interviewed Martin McGuinness. The ban was lifted by Prime Minister John Major in 1994 (Bric and Coakley 2004).

Under Adams, Sinn Féin appeared to move away from being a political voice of the Provisional IRA to becoming a professionally organized political party in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. SDLP leader John Hume, MP, identified the possibility that a negotiated settlement might be possible and began secret talks with Adams in 1988 (Urban 1993). These discussions led to unofficial contacts with the British Northern Ireland Office under the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter Brooke, and with the government of the Republic under Charles Haughey although both governments maintained in public that they would not negotiate with terrorists (Cox 2000; Heiberg, O’Leary et al. 2007).
Gerry Adams insisted that the Belfast Agreement provided a mechanism to deliver a united Ireland by non-violent and constitutional means, much as Michael Collins had said of the Anglo-Irish Treaty nearly 80 years earlier. Adams remains the President of Sinn Féin, and was re-elected to the Northern Ireland Assembly on March 8, 2007, and on March 26, he met with DUP leader Ian Paisley face-to-face for the first time, and the two came to an agreement regarding the return of the power-sharing executive in Northern Ireland.

Coding Statements of Gerry Adams

In order to evaluate Adams’ motivations for pursuing PIRA goals, a large set of speeches were coded according to the rules described in Chapter 2. These speeches were primarily drawn from a number of sources, including the official Sinn Féin website. Collecting these speeches for every available year of analysis yields a word count of over 26,000. These speeches are intended for consumption by Adams’ PIRA colleagues as well as the broader Northern Ireland community. Therefore, I believe that they accurately capture Adams’ conception of PIRA motivations as he wants to represent them to his colleagues, the British, and the general Northern Ireland community.

Using the coding rules described in Chapter 2, I have coded Adams’ speeches (as well as those of the other leaders described below) for references to his state opponent and for references to the PIRA. I have also coded references to the state for specific references to both willingness to bargain as well as a centrality of violence and Adams’ goals. I have coded references to the PIRA for emphases of group cohesion or a specific
lack of group cohesion. Immediately below I provide representative examples of my coding followed by summary data on Adams’ codings.

Example 1

“For 25 years and longer, the British government misled the world about their involvement in Ireland” (1994).

I code this phrase (S) because Adams is referring to the government of Great Britain (S).

Example 2

“I call upon the British government to follow the example of the Dublin government and to restore to listeners and viewers of the British broadcasting services their rights to information, and to our electorate, its right to freedom of speech” (1994).

I code this phrase (S/G) because Adams is referencing a specific goal of the PIRA (G) with reference to what the state (S) must do; in this case, remove the coverage ban on Adams and his fellow leaders.

Example 3

“There cannot be peace without dialogue” (1994).

I code this phrase as (S/B), because Adams specific refers implicitly to the government of Great Britain (S) coupled with the desire to negotiate which is linked to peace (B).

Example 4

“Making peace is a very difficult business and we must persevere with our efforts, despite the British government’s stance” (1994).
I code this phrase as (I), because while Adams refers to his movement, he does not call for a more specific reference to unity or cohesion.

*Example 5*

“We have defended our own political and organisational integrity and cohesion…” (1994).

I code this phrase as (I/GC), because Adams makes specific reference to bolstering or commending the internal cohesion and unity of the PIRA.

While the above examples are meant to be illustrative, I will now present summary conclusions on the motivational codings of Gerry Adams. Figure 4.1 displays the distribution of codings across all of Adams’ speeches. Across all of Adams’ speeches, the most predominant coding is (S/G), or references to the goals of the insurgent group. This means that Adams is coded as most frequently referring to the state with respect to his and the PIRA’s goals.14 The second predominant coding is (I/GC). The (I/GC) coding indicates that a reference is made to the insurgent group in a way that emphasizes the desire and normative importance of cohesion and unity. This coding is only slightly more predominant than the (S/B) coding, which indicates a willingness or desire to negotiate with the state. Adams nearly never indicates that negotiating with the state is impossible or undesirable. Figure 4.2 shows the relative weight of each coding...

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14 Two points of coding clarification are relevant here. First, Adams and other PIRA leaders often address the (southern) Irish government in their speeches and interviews. However, because the insurgency was fought against Great Britain, I only code references to this state. Second, while Adams ostensibly referred to himself publicly as a leader within Sinn Fein, I adopt the general consensus amongst scholars of the Troubles and assume that Adams is also reflecting the policies and points of view of the PIRA, of which he was a known but unacknowledged member.
within each specific speech. This graph demonstrates the general ordinal consistency of Adams’ codings. That is, (S/G) is always the most dominant coding in Adams’ speeches. Likewise, (I/GC) is always the second most predominant coding in Adams’ speeches. This shows us that not only does Adams have a clear predominance toward expressing insurgent goals to the states, he has a secondary preference for emphasizing internal cohesion within his insurgent group. He does both of these things consistently over time.

**Based on these trends and their consistency, I am confident in coding the motivational dynamics of Gerry Adams as generally strategic, though with tendencies toward organizational motivation.** Though such data are not available for the other PIRA leaders within the study, it should be noted that the information derived from Adam’s speeches is supportive of similar conclusions drawn from the application of Margaret Hermann’s personality at a distance method (Mastors 2000).
Figure 4.1: Relative Distribution of Gerry Adams’ Speech Components
Seán Mac Stíofáin was born an only child as John Edward Drayton Stephenson in Leytonstone, London in 1928. Mac Stíofáin (who was baptized a Roman Catholic, despite the fact that neither of his parents was Catholic) attended Catholic schools, where he encountered pro-Sinn Féin Irish Catholic students. He left school in 1944 at the age of 16 and worked in the building trade before being conscripted into the RAF to do his national service in 1945 (Coogan 2002). He attained the rank of corporal. After leaving the RAF, he returned to London where he became increasingly involved with Irish...
organizations in Britain. He joined Sinn Féin in London and eventually in 1949 helped to organize a unit of the IRA (Bell 1997).

In 1953, Mac Stíofáin took part in an IRA arms raid on the Officers Training Corps School at Felstead in Essex. In that raid, the IRA netted over one hundred and eight rifles, ten Bren and eight Sten guns, two mortars and dummy mortar bombs. The British police seized the van carrying the stolen weapons some hours later and he was sentenced to eight years imprisonment (Bell 1997).

Upon parole in 1959, Mac Stíofáin went to the Republic of Ireland with his wife and young family and settled in Dublin, and later Navan, County Meath, and became known under the Irish version of his name. He remained active in the IRA and gave the Bodenstown oration in 1959. A staunch and lifelong devoted Catholic, he distrusted the left-wing political direction that some nationalists were bringing to the IRA. Appointed IRA Director of Intelligence in 1966, Mac Stíofáin was in a position to oppose this trend.

Mac Stíofáin was regarded as a rather dour personality who did not drink or smoke. He was described by a former colleague as “a very rigid kind of person. He is not a person who thinks a lot. A courageous person in the physical sense, but at the same time not a person who has an accurate feeling about the situation in Ireland” (Bell 2000; Geraghty 2000).

Nicknamed 'Mac the Knife', Mac Stíofáin was a dedicated physical force republican, who believed that violence was the only means to bring about an end to British rule in Northern Ireland. He described the aims of the Provisional IRA as moving from area defense to combined defense and retaliation and then a third phase of launching
an all-out offensive action against the British occupation system (Bell 1987). He also
gave a detailed account of his development of the tactic of the one shot sniper (Darby
1976). He has expressed remorse over innocent civilian casualties of IRA actions, but
not regret for his selection of tactics (Bell 2000).

On 7 July 1972, Mac Stíofáin led an IRA delegation to a secret meeting with
members of the British government, led by Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
William Whitelaw, at Cheyne Walk in London. This was the Chelsea home of
millionaire Tory minister, Paul Channon. Other IRA leaders in attendance were Dáithí Ó
Conaill, Martin McGuinness, Gerry Adams, Seamus Twomey and Ivor Bell. Very much
in charge, Mac Stíofáin spelled out the three basic demands of the Provisionals: (1) The
future of Ireland to be decided by the people of Ireland acting as a unit; (2) a British
government Declaration of Intent to withdraw from Ireland by January 1975 and (3) the
unconditional release of all political prisoners (McKittrick 2002). The British claimed
this was impossible owing to the commitment it had given to unionists. The talks ended
in failure.

Following the unsuccessful talks, Mac Stíofáin ordered an intensification of the
IRA campaign which peaked on July 21, 1972, or Bloody Friday, when the IRA
detonated 22 car bombs in less than two hours across Belfast, killing nine people and
injuring 130 (Hennessey 2005). Arrested and jailed, Mac Stíofáin embarked on a hunger
and thirst strike. His hunger strike led to tumultuous scenes in Dublin and protests
outside the Mater Hospital. After nearly two months, he was ordered off his protest by
the IRA Army Council. Following standard procedures, Mac Stíofáin lost his rank upon
arrest and he never again regained his influence within the IRA after his release in April 1973 (Moloney 2002). Mac Stíofáin died in early 2001 after a long illness at the age of 73.

Coding Statements of Sean Mac Stíofáin

Below I present summary conclusions on the motivational codings of Sean Mac Stíofáin. Figure 4.3 displays the distribution of codings across all of Mac Stíofáin’s speeches, which represent a word count of 2000. Across all of Mac Stíofáin’s speeches, the most predominant coding is (S/G), or references to the goals of the insurgent group. The second predominant coding is (I/GC). The (I/GC) coding indicates that a reference is made to the insurgent group in a way that emphasizes the desire and normative importance of cohesion and unity. Interestingly, these two codings are much more predominant in Mac Stíofáin’s speeches any other codings. In fact, half of the references coded for Mac Stíofáin are directed toward the insurgent group, and the majority of them emphasize group cohesion. Mac Stíofáin nearly never offers to negotiate with the British government. However, he also does not negate this possibility. This shows us that not only does Mac Stíofáin have a slight predominance toward expressing insurgent goals to the states, he is doing so in the presence of a secondary preference for emphasizing internal cohesion within his insurgent group. Based on these coding distributions, I am confident in coding the motivational dynamics of Sean Mac Stíofáin as generally organizational in motivation.
Figure 4.3: Relative Distribution of Seán Mac Stiófáin’s Speech Components

Ruairí Ó Brádaigh

Ruairí Ó Brádaigh (born Rory Brady) was born into a middle-class republican family in Longford that lived in a duplex home on Battery Road. His father, Matt Brady, was an IRA volunteer and was severely wounded in an encounter with the Royal Irish Constabulary, in 1919. His father died when he was ten, and was given a paramilitary funeral led by his former IRA colleagues. Ó Brádaigh was educated at St Mel's College, leaving in 1950, and University College Dublin, from where he graduated with a commerce degree and certification in the teaching of the Irish language, in 1954
(Moloney 2002). That year he took a job teaching Irish at Roscommon Vocational School, in Roscommon.

He joined Sinn Féin in 1950. While at university, in 1951, he joined the Irish Republican Army (Moloney 2002). While formally a teacher by profession, he was also a Training Officer for the IRA. In 1954, he was appointed to the Military Council of the IRA, a subcommittee set up by the IRA Army Council in 1950 to plan a military campaign against Royal Ulster Constabulary barracks in Northern Ireland.

On 13 August 1955, Ó Brádaigh was part of the ten-member IRA group in an arms raid on Hasbrouck Barracks, in Berkshire (Kennedy-Pipe 1997; Hennessey 2005). During the IRA Border Campaign, he served as second in command of the Teeling Column. On 30 December 1956, he partook in the Teeling Column attack on Royal Ulster Constabulary barracks in Derrylin, County Fermanagh. Ó Brádaigh and others were arrested across the border the day after the attack. Those arrested were tried and jailed for six months in Mountjoy Prison for failing to account for their activities (Moloney 2002).

Upon completing his prison sentence, he was immediately interned at the Curragh Military Prison, along with other republicans. On 27 September 1958, Ó Brádaigh escaped from the camp along with Dáithí Ó Conaill. That October, Ó Brádaigh became the IRA's Chief of Staff, a position he held until May 1959, when an IRA Convention elected Sean Cronin to the position and Ó Brádaigh became Cronin's adjutant general (O'Brien 1999). Ó Brádaigh was arrested in November 1959, refused to answer questions, and was jailed under the Offences Against the State Act in Mountjoy. He was released

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from Mountjoy in May 1960 and, after Cronin was arrested, he again became Chief of Staff. He began teaching again in autumn 1962, just after he was succeeded by Cathal Goulding in the position of Chief of Staff of the IRA. He remained an active member of Sinn Féin and was a member of the IRA Army Council throughout the decade.

In 1970, He was voted chair of the Caretaker Executive of Provisional Sinn Féin. That October, he formally became president of the party. He held this position until 1983. It is also likely that he served on the Army Council or the Executive of the Provisional Irish Republican Army until he was seriously injured in a car accident on January 1, 1984 (Bell 1997).

During December 1974, Ó Brádaigh participated in the Feakle talks between the IRA Army Council and Sinn Féin leadership and the leaders of the Protestant churches in Ireland. Although the meeting was raided and broken up by the Gardaí, the Protestant churchmen passed on proposals from the IRA leadership to the British government. These proposals called on the British government to declare a commitment to withdraw, the election of an all-Ireland assembly to draft a new constitution and an amnesty for political prisoners. The IRA subsequently called a total and complete ceasefire intended to last from December 22 to January 2, 1975 to allow the British government to respond to proposals (Cox 2000; Cunningham 2001). British government officials also held talks with Ó Brádaigh in his position as president of Sinn Féin from late December to January, 1975.

In the aftermath of the 1975 truce, Ó Brádaigh’s leadership came under severe criticism from a younger generation of activists from Northern Ireland, headed by Gerry
Adams, who became a vice-president of Sinn Féin in 1978. By the early 1980s, Ó Brádaigh’s position as president of Sinn Féin was openly under challenge.

Ó Brádaigh remains a vociferous opponent of the Good Friday Agreement, viewing it as a ploy to achieve Irish partition and entrench sectarian divisions in the north. He has condemned his erstwhile comrades in Provisional Sinn Féin and the Provisional IRA for decommissioning weapons while British troops remain in the country (Hennessey 2005).

Coding Statements of Ruairí Ó Brádaigh

*Example 1*

“Four times since 1922 [demilitarization and ceasefire] happened, all ended in failure and ended ultimately in the degradation and shame of collaborating with the British, of handing over our political prisoners to them and running counter to what they originally set out to do” (1986).

I code this phrase (S/NB) because Ó Brádaigh is arguing against any and every instance of abandoning violent insurgency, indicative of notion of the centrality of violence.

While the above example is meant to be illustrative, I will now present summary conclusions on the motivational codings of Ruairí Ó Brádaigh. Figure 4.4 displays the distribution of codings across all of Ó Brádaigh’s speeches, representing a total word count of over 4000 words. Across all of Ó Brádaigh’s speeches, the most predominant coding is (S/G), or references to the goals of the insurgent group. This means that Ó Brádaigh’s is coded as most frequently referring to the state with respect to his and the PIRA’s goals. This coding outweighs all other references combined. Ó Brádaigh displays minor tendencies toward internal group cohesion and commitment to the central
of violence for the insurgent group. This second tendency is unique amongst PIRA leadership and perhaps reflects Ó Brádaigh’s dissatisfaction with the peace process the PIRA has pursued. Supporting this, Ó Brádaigh nearly never indicates a desire or willingness to negotiate with the state. Figure 4.5 shows the relative weight of each coding within each specific speech. Important in this figure is the point that over time, references to PIRA goals and reference to group cohesion decline as recognition of the centrality of violence in the insurgent struggle climbs. Based on these trends, we might suspect that Ó Brádaigh is moving away from a strategic motivation to adopt one that also contains elements of extremism. This idea is supported by the idea that Ó Brádaigh never advocates negotiating with the British government. Therefore, based on his overall speech pattern, I code the motivational dynamics of Ruairí Ó Brádaigh as generally extremist.
Figure 4.4: Relative Distribution of Ruairí Ó Brádaigh’s Speech Components
Dáithí Ó Conaill

Dáithí Ó Conaill was born in Cork in 1938. After his vocational school education, he trained as a woodwork teacher in a college in County Wexford. He joined the Republican Movement at 17 years of age and took part in the IRA Border Campaign. He was arrested by the Garda Síochána and imprisoned in Mountjoy Prison for six months. Upon release, he was interned in the Curragh. On 27 September 1958 he escaped along with Ruairí Ó Brádaigh and went on the run (Moloney 2002).

With most of the IRA leadership under arrest or interned, Ó Conaill became IRA Director of Operations. In an altercation with the RUC and B Specials near Lough Neagh
in 1959, he was shot, badly injured, and later captured by the Royal Ulster Constabulary. Upon recovery, he received an eight-year sentence and remained in Belfast Jail until he was released unconditionally in September 1963.

During the late 1960s, Ó Conaill played little part in the activities of the IRA or Sinn Féin. With the outbreak of the Troubles in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s, Ó Conaill would become a prominent spokesperson for the Provisional IRA (O'Donnell 2007). He was active in the IRA through the 1960s, and IRA Chief of Staff Cathal Goulding appointed him the Commanding Officer of the Donegal unit prior to the IRA's Convention in December 1969. Ó Conaill was also a member of the IRA's Army Council after Goulding expanded that body at the IRA Convention late in 1968. In the fall of 1969, Ó Conaill, upset with the then IRA leadership, walked out of the unit convention and was suspended. In the 1960s, Ó Conaill was approached by elements from within the Irish government and the Fianna Fáil party with an offer to provide arms and training in Irish Army barracks or ranges.

Ó Conaill helped form the Provisional IRA after the 1969 IRA split, served on the first Provisional IRA Army Council, and was the Provisional IRA's Director of Publicity. In 1970, he traveled to New York and was instrumental in establishing Irish Northern Aid or NORAID, which raised funds for the Provisionals. In 1971, he traveled to Prague and purchased 4.5 tons of small arms from the Czechoslovakia state arms marketing company, Omnipol. The consignment was later seized in the Netherlands (Lee 1983).

Despite his belief in the armed campaign, Ó Conaill was not solely a militarist. He also played a leading role in the truce negotiations between the IRA and the British
conference in Derry, along with Seán Mac Stiofáin, Seamus Twomey and Martin
McGuinness, which announced an IRA cease-fire proposal, and gave William Whitelaw
forty-eight hours to make a decision (Bric and Coakley 2004).

On 20 June 1972, he represented the IRA along with Gerry Adams at secret talks
at the home of Colonel Sir Michael McCorkell, Ballyarnett, County Londonderry. After
the collapse of the IRA-British government contacts, Ó Conaill maintained informal
contacts with Sir John Hackett, who had been the commanding officer of British forces in
Northern Ireland. In September 1973, Hackett reported to Woodfield of the Northern
Ireland Office that Ó Conaill was “losing ground to younger and more impatient
operators. To arrest him and remove him from the scene would loosen restraint on those
and open the way for more irresponsible action” (Geraghty 2000).

In a 1974 interview, Ó Conaill claimed there would be an escalation of IRA
violence. Four days later, on 21 November, IRA detonated bombs in two pubs in
Birmingham, killing 21 civilians (Coogan 2002). Ó Conaill was commanding officer of
the IRA Southern Command for much of the early 1970s until his arrest, in July 1975.
Found guilty of IRA membership, and imprisoned in Portlaoise Prison, where in 1977 he
was one of 20 men who took part in a 47-day hunger strike in protest at conditions in the
jail.

Upon his release from prison, he was active in the National H-Block/Armagh
Committee. He was the director of elections in the June 1981 Irish general election in
which two prisoners were elected to Dáil Éireann. In 1983, along with Ruairí Ó
Brádaigh, he resigned from the position of vice-president of Sinn Féin in opposition to
the dropping of the Éire Nua policy. At the 1986 Sinn Féin Ard Fheis, he opposed the
decision to drop abstentionism to Leinster House. He joined in the walk out led by Ó
Brádaigh and was chair of Republican Sinn Féin from 1986 to 1987 and subsequently a
vice-president of the party. Shortly before his death, he wrote a document entitled
Towards a Peaceful Ireland, which offered a traditionalist republican solution to Irish
partition (Cox 2000).

**Coding Statements of Dáithí Ó Conaill**

Below I present summary conclusions on the motivational codings of Dáithí Ó
Conaill. Figure 4.6 displays the distribution of codings across all of Ó Conaill’s
speeches, which represent a word count of 700. This word count is quite low, but I
believe still robust enough to grant us insight into Ó Conaill. Across all of Ó Conaill’s
speeches, the most predominant coding is (S/G), or references to the goals of the
insurgent group. The second predominant coding is (S/B), or a willingness to negotiate
with the state. Interestingly, Ó Conaill never emphasizes group cohesion, nor does he
ever negate the notion of negotiations. **Based on these coding distributions, I am
confident in coding the motivational dynamics of Dáithí Ó Conaill as generally
strategic in motivation.**
Figure 4.6: Relative Distribution of Dáithí Ó Conaill’s Speech Components

*Martin McGuinness*

Martin McGuinness joined the Provisional IRA around 1970 at the age of 20, after the Troubles broke out. In November 2003, he confirmed to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry that he had been second-in-command of the Provisional IRA in Derry in 1972, at the time of Bloody Sunday at the age of 21, but he refused to divulge any information about other Provisional IRA members (Heiberg, O'Leary et al. 2007).

McGuinness negotiated alongside Gerry Adams with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Willie Whitelaw, in 1972. He was convicted by the Republic of Ireland's Special Criminal Court in 1973, after being caught with a car containing 250 lb
of explosives and nearly 5,000 rounds of ammunition. He refused to recognize the court, and was sentenced to six months imprisonment (Coogan 2002).

After his release, and another conviction in the Republic for IRA membership, he became increasingly prominent in Sinn Féin, the political wing of the IRA. He has been in contact with British intelligence since the 1980 hunger strike (Moloney 2002). He was elected to a short-lived assembly at Stormont in 1982, and was then banned from entering Great Britain under the Prevention of Terrorism Act.

He became Sinn Féin's chief negotiator in the time leading to the Belfast Agreement. He became MP for Mid Ulster in 1997, and after the Agreement was concluded, was returned as a member of the Assembly, and nominated by his party for a ministerial position in the power-sharing executive, where he became Minister for Education. He was re-elected to the Westminster Parliament in 2001, but along with the rest of his party has refused to take his seat there because of their abstentionist policy.

In May 2003, transcripts of telephone calls between McGuinness and British officials including Mo Mowlam, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair's Chief of Staff, were published (O'Donnell 2007). The tapes had been made by MI5 and the authors of the book were arrested under the Official Secrets Act. The conversations showed an easy and friendly relationship between McGuinness and the British.

**Coding Statements of Martin McGuinness**

Below I present summary conclusions on the motivational codings of Martin McGuinness. Figure 4.7 displays the distribution of codings across all of McGuinness’
speeches. Across all of McGuinness’ speeches, the most predominant coding is (S/B), which indicates a willingness or desire to negotiate with the state. Nearly as predominant is the (S/G) coding, which represents references to the goals of the insurgent group. This means that McGuinness is coded as most frequently referring to the state with respect to his and the PIRA’s goals as well as a willingness or desire to negotiate with the state over them. In a secondary way, the (I/GC) coding is important. The (I/GC) coding indicates that a reference is made to the insurgent group in a way that emphasizes the desire and normative importance of cohesion and unity. Figure 4.8 shows the relative weight of each coding within each specific speech. This graph demonstrates the general ordinal consistency of McGuinness’ codings. That is, (S/G) and (S/B) are always the most dominant codings in McGuinness’ speeches. This shows us that not only does McGuinness have a clear predominance toward expressing insurgent goals to the states, he has a secondary preference for emphasizing internal cohesion within his insurgent group. He does both of these things consistently over time. Based on these trends and their consistency, I am confident in coding the motivational dynamics of Martin McGuinness as generally strategic, though with tendencies toward organizational motivation.
Figure 4.7: Relative Distribution of Martin McGuinness’ Speech Components
Conclusions about the motivational dynamics of the PIRA

To evaluate the motivational dynamics of the PIRA accurately using the information above, we must take account of two important factors: time and leadership structure. Here I will briefly describe both of these characteristics before offering a final assessment of the motivational dynamics of the PIRA.

Andrew Garfield argues that the PIRA can best be described as having a three-generation leadership structure (Bunker 2005). Garfield argues that the first generation

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15 Though Garfield highlights three generations of PIRA leadership, he argues that the third generation has not yet emerged circa 2005 and therefore it does not bear on the analysis of this study. See Bunker, R. J., Ed. (2005). Networks, terrorism and global insurgency. London, Routledge.
of PIRA leadership is the early or founding leaders. He specifically notes that Ó Brádaigh, Mac Stíofáin, and Ó Conaill represent this first generation of leadership. These men had long been active fighters in the Republican cause, well before the advent of the PIRA. Garfield points out that as a group they were relatively mature and experienced in the insurgency. These men were able to command respect and organize the PIRA less because of their personal charisma than because of the credibility they had obtained through their prior actions. This history served as the basis upon which the PIRA was founded and was the capital by which the first waves of PIRA recruits were obtained (Bunker 2005). Scholars have noted that the first order of business for this initial generation of leadership was the solidification of the organization itself (O'Day 1995; Moloney 2002; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003). As such, and coupled with the individual studies above, I code this initial generation of leadership of the PIRA as organizationally motivated. It should be noted that while my analysis and extant literature generally support the organizational appellation, this is necessarily monolithic. For example, I note above that coding of Ó Brádaigh’s speeches reveals extremist tendencies. However, these tendencies emerged in speeches given after the initial formative period of the PIRA. Additionally, the actions and words of Ó Conaill suggest that he is individually strategically motivated. This mix of motivations suggests that as the PIRA was being formed, its motivations, even amongst its leaders, were varied. Therefore, while I am confident in coding the PIRA as organizationally motivated in this early generation, the coding is not as strong as it would be in the future.
The second generation of PIRA leadership is fundamentally captured in the personages of Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness. Garfield argues that these men did not form the PIRA, but joined it subsequently. As a result, their understanding of the organization and their place in it differed fundamentally from prior leaders (Bunker 2005). Garfield argues that because the PIRA was the first violent insurgent experience for men like Adams and McGuinness, they invested more in the organization than the founding leaders did. Whereas the founding leaders like Brádaigh, Mac Stíofáin, and Ó Conaill had seen the emergence and collapse of various Republican movements and were therefore circumspect about the prospects of the PIRA, Adams and McGuinness were true believers (Bunker 2005). Garfield argues that the strength of this leadership era was their ability to incorporate both the large majority who were motivated toward violence because of the organizational benefits they reaped from carrying it out with those who saw violence as a means to the republican end.

This notion of Adams and McGuinness incorporating both organizationally and strategically minded elements of their groups is highly supported by the analysis conducted above. Therefore, though there is sufficient evidence to code Adams and McGuinness as individually strategic, I find that the overall coding of the PIRA during this second generation of leadership is best represented as strongly organizationally motivated. Though Garfield applies strong demarcations to these generations (specifically 1969-1975 for the first generation, and 1978 to present for the
second generation), I find that the transition is gradual, suggesting the organizational motivation of the PIRA gradually increased over time.\(^{16}\)

**Strategies and Tactics of the State**

Through the process of coding counterinsurgency tactics employed by the British government, I find that their tactics divide this case into three time periods. In the first time period, from 1969 until 1977, Great Britain attempted to end the PIRA insurgency through a general strategy of accommodation. **This chapter finds that the PIRA are best coded as an organizationally motivated group**, suggesting that an accommodationist strategy will yield success for the state. From 1977 until 1993, the British government’s strategy for dealing with the PIRA is best understood as policing. We would expect that such as policy would be unsuccessful in quelling organizationally motivated insurgent violence. Finally, after 1993, the British strategy again reflects an accommodationist approach, which we would hypothesize would be successful in ameliorating insurgent violence.

Below I discuss the various counterinsurgency tactics undertaken by the Great Britain. I discuss how each of these periods can reasonably represent an overall counterinsurgency strategy against the PIRA. I do this by examining two key factors. First, is the state attempting to bargain or negotiate with the insurgent group? By drawing on governmental statements and scholarly narratives, I find that the British government regularly (though not always) attempted to negotiate with the PIRA. Just as

important, did the counterinsurgency tactics employed by the government seek to punish violence perpetrated by the group with additional hardship and violence, or did the government also grant rewards or concessions to the insurgent based on their willingness to abandon violence? As I discussed in Chapter 2, answering these two questions using the coding rules I have stipulated allows me to categorize the counterinsurgency strategy that the British government employs.

1969-1977: Negotiations and Reprisals

From its earliest experiences with the PIRA, the British government adopted an accommodationist strategy. As described above, the PIRA emerged out of communal riots of 1969. At the request of the Northern Ireland government, the British Army was sent into Northern Ireland to act as a peacekeeping force (Newsinger 2002). If this was all that was done by the British government, we might code this strategy as policing. However, from the very beginning, the Labour government of Harold Wilson attempted to implement political reforms that would find favor with the Catholic population in Northern Ireland. These reforms especially included truncating the Royal Ulster Constabulary, which was seen as particularly biased toward Protestants (Beckett 2001). In June of 1970, the Conservative government of Edward Heath replaced Wilson. Heath’s motivations were significantly different from Wilson’s motivations. Whereas Wilson had sought to utilize the Army in a peacekeeping role, Heath sought to gain political credibility by quickly restoring order in Northern Ireland. As such, while continuing the reforms begun by Wilson, Heath sought to crack down on Catholic unrest in Northern Ireland. John Newsinger explains, “This was not a routine military blunder
but had been given the go-ahead at Westminster level where the Conservative Heath government had just assumed office. The intention seems to have been to teach the Catholics a salutary lesson” ((Newsinger 2002), 243). Although the intention of this action was to continue to offer reforms to the general Catholic population with cracking down on criminals and malcontents, in practice the action gave a large boost to the nascent PIRA.

Over the next seven years, the British government would continue to be stuck in a particular policy rut. Having fought numerous counterinsurgency battles (with decidedly mixed results) in their external colonies, the British attempted to apply these lessons to Northern Ireland. However, what emerged is best expressed again by John Newsinger:

“What resulted was a security policy, vitiated by contradictory political initiatives, that was repressive enough to continue the alienation of the working-class Catholics but not repressive enough to actually defeat the Provisional IRA” ((Newsinger 2002), 244).

However, what Newsinger overlooks is that it was not the intention of the British government to attempt to defeat the PIRA via purely military measures. During this time, the Heath government, despite its outward bluster, conducted secret talks with the leaders of the PIRA, primarily via the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, William Whitelaw (O'Brien 1999; Moloney 2002; Neumann 2003). Thus, the British Army was assigned to respond to acts of violence (both republican and loyalist) while the government made offers of power sharing and political accommodation. This is the archetypical definition of an accommodationist strategy.

Unfortunately, some of the reprisals and tactics executed by the Army during this time served to undermine the strategy of accommodation. Significant was the initiation
of internment, which had the effect of publicizing the PIRA’s cause. This tactic may have been effective in some of Great Britain’s colonial counterinsurgency efforts, but in the densely populated Belfast and Derry, it served to draw recruits and public support to the PIRA banner. Just as destructive to the British cause was Bloody Sunday, where in January 1972, 42 unarmed demonstrators were shot by the Army, killing 14 (Coogan 2002). These tactics worked against attempts to draw the PIRA to the negotiating table. Each in its own way gave the PIRA incentives to abjure concessions offered by the British government for peace.

Yet, despite these initial tactical failures, the British accommodationist strategy began to bear fruit. The Sunningdale Agreement, though ultimately abortive, demonstrated to the PIRA and its potential supporters that the British government was willing to make sacrifices in the pursuit of peace. By dramatically increasing intelligence gathering activities and eliminating further missteps like Bloody Sunday, the British government was able to move the PIRA toward peace with both carrots and sticks. On 10 February 1975, the IRA Army Council, unanimously endorsed an open-ended cessation of IRA hostilities, which became known as the 1975 truce (Hennessey 2001).

It is reported in some accounts that the IRA leaders had mistakenly believed they had persuaded the British Government to withdraw from Ireland and the protracted negotiations between themselves and British officials were the preamble to a public declaration of intent to withdraw (Hamill 1985). In fact, as British government papers now show, the British entertained talks with the IRA in the hope that this would fragment the movement further, and scored several intelligence coups during the talks (Geraghty
2000; Moloney 2002; Teague 2006). It is argued by some that by the time the truce collapsed in late 1975 the Provisional IRA had been severely weakened. This bad faith embittered many in the republican movement, and another ceasefire was not to happen until 1994.

The fact that the British continued to offer an accommodationist strategy until 1977 did ultimately succeed in ameliorating violence by bringing the PIRA to the negotiating table, but it had other effects as well. John Mueller writes,

“Regimes have frequently allowed their participation in peace talks to be affected in important ways by terrorists. By stating that they will not negotiate as long as terrorist attacks continue, both the Israeli government and the British government (over Northern Ireland) effectively permitted individual terrorists to set their agendas—although, of course, if those governments didn’t want to negotiate anyway, the terrorist acts simply supplied a convenient excuse” ((Mueller 2004), 111).

In the case of Northern Ireland, an unwillingness to negotiate when with the PIRA in the face of active terrorist attacks actually sustained a level of violence. With the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979, the British government abandoned the policy of accommodation in exchange for a reversion to a base policing strategy (Dekmejian 2007). As Mueller suggests, whether this was a principled choice by the Thatcher government or whether it was a convenient excuse to not negotiate with the PIRA, the fact remains that the late 1970s signaled a clear shift in the British counterinsurgent strategy.

1977-1993: Policing and Rhetoric

With the relatively lower levels of PIRA violence achieved by 1975, the British government began a shift in their counterinsurgent policy that was formalized in 1977.

At this time, Great Britain abandoned its accommodationist strategy in favor of a
policing approach. This strategy, which became known as Ulsterization, was designed to more efficiently deal with a lower level of violence from the PIRA. Legislatively, the key policy was the passage of the 1978 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act (Cunningham 2001). However, because of the internal dynamics of the PIRA noted above, a policing strategy without accommodation would induce the PIRA to remain insular and consequently, violent.

In some ways, policing was at the root of governance problems in Northern Ireland. The Royal Ulster Constabulary, the police force in Northern Ireland, was since its inception, largely, though not totally, Protestant for a number of reasons. Catholics did not join in the numbers expected by the British when the force was first created. Some of those who did reported an unwelcoming working environment. Those Catholics who did join were also often targeted for assassination by republican paramilitaries, yet a number of Catholics did join the RUC (Bell 1987; Bew and Gillespie 1999).

The result was that critics of the unionist and loyalist communities portrayed the police force as a unionist police force. Sinn Féin produced posters in the 1990s that said of the RUC, 90% Protestant, 100% unionist and depicted an officer wearing an Orange sash (O'Brien 2000). Even more than the regular police force, this perception was widely held by nationalists about the B-Specials, a part time police force mobilized in times of emergency. The B-Specials were disbanded in 1970, but were replaced by the Ulster Defense Regiment, a locally recruited part-time unit of the British Army that was intended for security duties in Northern Ireland. While the UDR killed only eight people during the Troubles and often carried out security duties professionally and well, many of
its members were found to have been involved with loyalist paramilitary groups and in a number of killings of Catholics nationalists (Kennedy-Pipe 1997; O'Brien 2000; McKittrick 2002). For this reason, the nationalists also viewed the UDR as a partisan force. The UDR were disbanded in 1992 and incorporated into the regular Royal Irish Regiment (Addison 2002; Coogan 2002).

One of the major social problems created by the Troubles was the takeover of law enforcement in certain areas by either republican or loyalist paramilitaries, who punished local criminals with beatings, kneecappings and even murder. One of the principal aims of the peace process was to establish a publicly accountable police force that could be trusted to act as the sole enforcers of law and order.

In addition, republicans allege that the security forces operated a policy of "shoot-to-kill"—killing rather than arresting IRA suspects. The security forces denied this and point out that in incidents such as the killing of eight IRA men at Loughgall in 1987; the paramilitaries who were killed were heavily armed. Others argue that incidents such as the shooting of three unarmed IRA members in Gibraltar by the SAS ten months later confirmed suspicions among republicans, and in the British and Irish media, of a tacit British "shoot-to-kill" policy of suspected IRA members (Urban 1993; Geraghty 2000; Coogan 2002; Newsinger 2002).

1993-1999: Negotiations and the Undermining of the PIRA

Though the British had practiced a policy of policing since the late 1970s, by the early 1990s, the British government of Margaret Thatcher began to reconsider this approach. Confronted with both the specter of PIRA hunger strikes in the early 1980s as
well as an inability to completely eradicate PIRA violence with a policing strategy. **Great Britain transitioned to a strategy of accommodation.** This strategy stands in contrast to the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, which was rejected by republicans because it reaffirmed the place of Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom.

In 1993, the Major government began to engage in secret as well as public talks with key leaders in both the PIRA and Sinn Féin (Urban 1993; Moloney 2002). These talks would continue under the new Blair government as well. The PIRA declared a ceasefire in the autumn of 1994. The Major government had asked that the PIRA decommission all of their weapons before Sinn Féin be admitted to the talks, but the Labour government of Tony Blair let them in on the basis of the ceasefire. The talks led to the Belfast Agreement of April 10, 1998 (also known as the Good Friday Agreement), which set up an inclusive devolved government, and altered the claim to the whole island in Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution of Ireland. Sinn Fein has been nominally committed to constitutional politics since then, though the demand that the PIRA decommission all of its arms has led to repeated suspensions of the assembly. The PIRA started decommissioning arms after a deal was agreed restoring the suspended Northern Ireland Assembly.

Sinn Féin entered the negotiations that led to the Belfast Agreement in 1998, with a demand that the RUC be disbanded (Moloney 2002; O'Donnell 2007). A policing review, as part of the Agreement, resulted in some reforms of policing, including more rigorous accountability measures to increase the number of Catholic officers and the renaming of the RUC to the Police Service of Northern Ireland or PSNI.
Factions within the British Army and RUC are known to have cooperated with loyalists and the UDA through the British Army Intelligence group called the Force Research Unit. Since the late 1990s, some loyalists have confirmed that they received files and intelligence from security sources on Republican targets. In fact, one of the hallmarks of this period is that while the British government would publicly retaliate for insurgent attacks, the bulk of its policy followed two semi-secret tracks. On the one hand, the British government engaged in a long-term project designed to infiltrate the PIRA and undermine the internal cohesion in its cellular structure (Urban 1993; Bell 1997; Bell 2000; Geraghty 2000; Moloney 2002; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003; Arena and Arrigo 2006). On the other hand, Great Britain began to offer concessions to PIRA if it would come peacefully to the negotiating table (Cox 2000; Mastors 2000; Sylvan 2005; O'Donnell 2007). These tactics, and the overall British intent to undermine the PIRA lead me to code British strategy as accommodationalist toward the PIRA until the Good Friday agreement, where the PIRA appears, at least at present, to have abandoned violence as an insurgent strategy.

Evaluating the Outcome of State Counter-Insurgency Efforts

In this study, we are primarily concerned with two measures associated with state counterinsurgency strategies on insurgent groups. First, how often does the insurgent group perpetrate acts of violence? Second, how deadly are the acts of violence perpetrated by the violent group? I argue that when the death toll and number of incidents climbs, the state is unsuccessful in ameliorating insurgent violence with its
current strategy. When the death toll and the frequency of incidents falls, this is a good indicator of a state’s progress in ameliorating violence stemming from an insurgency.

For the figures below, I have drawn data from the TWEED database, which contains a comprehensive third party accounting of PIRA violence throughout the entire period of analysis as well as the CAIN archive of the Troubles, maintained by the University of Ulster. I find that these sources are superior to the also readily available RUC data, which, while corresponding closely to both sources, carries the stigma of being generated by one of the interested parties in the insurgent conflict. The TWEED and CAIN data provides general information on insurgent violence in Northern Ireland as well as specific accounting of violence perpetrated by the PIRA.

Allow me to review my hypotheses in light of the data that I have developed on my independent variables. First, I have found the predominant coding of the PIRA’s motivations to be organizational throughout the time period under consideration. I have made this determination based on coding the speeches of their most important leaders. Because of this coding, I am only able to evaluate hypotheses 2a-2c, which are as follows:

2a. When the PIRA is coded as an organizationally motivated group; British tactics of reciprocal violence will fail in reducing violence.

2b. When the PIRA is coded as an organizationally motivated group; British tactics of policing will fail in reducing violence.

2c. When the PIRA is coded as an organizationally motivated group; British tactics of accommodation will succeed in reducing violence.
Given the above findings regarding British counterinsurgency strategy and my coding of the motivational dynamics of the PIRA, my theory holds the following expectations for my hypotheses.

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<th>Applicable Hypothesis</th>
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<th>2b</th>
<th>2c</th>
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<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>Policing</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group Motivation</td>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td>Organizational</td>
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<tr>
<td>Theoretical Expectation of Counterinsurgent Strategy</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Success</td>
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Figure 4.9: Table of Expectations for British success and failure against the PIRA

I will now evaluate these hypotheses with respect to the actual levels of violence in Northern Ireland from 1969 through 2005. In Figures 4.10-4.13 below, I present summary data on the actual levels of violence in Northern Ireland that will be used to evaluate the relative performance of counterinsurgent strategies. Figures 4.10 and 4.11 present overall numbers of deaths and overall numbers of incidents perpetrated respectively in Northern Ireland. As can be seen from this graph, the number of deaths and the number of incidents spike early on in the analysis. Figures 4.12 and 4.13 chart the number of incidents perpetrated by the PIRA and the number of deaths caused by the PIRA per year. Please note that in counting deaths caused by the PIRA, I am not including the deaths of PIRA members themselves. How do these two measures trend in
the time periods that correspond to the state strategies that I have coded? A summary table is present below in Figure 4.14.

![Total Number of Fatalities in Northern Ireland By Year](chart.png)

**Figure 4.10: Total number of violent fatalities in Northern Ireland per year**

Source: CAIN (http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/security/security.htm; accessed 3/1/07)
Figure 4.11: Total Number of Insurgent Incidents in Northern Ireland per year
Source: CAIN (http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/security/security.htm; accessed 3/1/07)

Figure 4.12: Total number of Fatalities per year by PIRA
Source: TWEED
Figure 4.13: Total number of Incidents per year by PIRA
Source: TWEED
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<td>Coded State Tactics</td>
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<td>Policing</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
</tr>
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<td>Observed Trend in</td>
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<td>Increasing through 1979,</td>
<td>Decreasing to nearly zero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Incidents</td>
<td>in 1971-72, then</td>
<td>then decreasing and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by PIRA</td>
<td>Decreasing</td>
<td>leveling off from 1983-1993</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observed Trend in</td>
<td>Increasing and peaking</td>
<td>Increasing through 1979,</td>
<td>Decreasing to nearly zero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Deaths by</td>
<td>in 1971-72, then</td>
<td>then decreasing and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIRA</td>
<td>Decreasing</td>
<td>leveling off from 1983-1993</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Actual Trend</td>
<td>Violence Decreases</td>
<td>Initially decreasing, but</td>
<td>Decreasing to nearly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in PIRA Violence</td>
<td></td>
<td>sustained and stable</td>
<td>nothing: Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prediction of</td>
<td>Violence Decreases</td>
<td>Violence Increases</td>
<td>Violence Decreases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional Model of</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Counterinsurgent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.14: Summary of PIRA violence trends in Northern Ireland

First, from 1969 to 1977, the British government employed an overall strategy of accommodation to induce peace in Northern Ireland. This policy succeeded in ameliorating, but not ending the conflict. When the conflict was reduced to comparatively low levels in 1977, the British government transitioned to a policing strategy that exacerbated the conflict. The rump policing strategy of 1977-1993 was a failure against the organizationally motivated PIRA. By abandoning more overt forms of engagement and focusing on the PIRA as a policing issue, Great Britain allowed it to
perpetuate at consistent levels until the early 1990s. Beginning in 1993, Great Britain switched to an accomodationist strategy, emphasizing tactics designed to undermine the effectiveness of the PIRA and provide nonviolent alternatives. This strategy ultimately proved successful by 1999. The ultimate success of this strategy was supported with the 2005 renunciation of violence by the PIRA.

While violence initially spiked at the beginning of the case study, both the empirical assessment and the case study assessment support the idea that an accommodationist strategy was successful in quelling this violence. Violence remained relatively constant though in subsequent years because of a shift in strategy. However, violence finally abated with a return the Great Britain’s ordinal strategy. This account rejects the combat model of insurgent conflicts. It does not reject the social model, which remains an alternative explanation to the account offered here. This chapter was able to demonstrate that the coding of Great Britain’s strategy and the PIRA’s motivational dynamic correct predict levels of success in ameliorating insurgent violence.

Conclusion

What does the case of the PIRA nationalist separatist struggle against the British government mean for my contingent theory of counterinsurgency success? Below is Figure 4.15, revisiting the hypotheses that I evaluate and their outcomes. The notations for the applicable hypotheses refer to those described at the beginning of this chapter.
Applicable Hypothesis | 2c | 2b | 2c
---|---|---|---
State Tactics | Accommodation | Policing | Accommodation
Prediction of Contingent Model of Counterinsurgent Strategy | Success in Reducing Violence | Failure to Reduce Violence | Success in Reducing Violence
Evaluation Based on Dependent Variable | Supported | Mixed | Supported

Figure 4.15: Outcome of hypothesis evaluation in PIRA case

As can be seen from Figure 4.15 above, the theory accurately predicted the early success of an accommodationist strategy to ameliorate violence from the PIRA in Northern Ireland. From 1969-1977, violence at the hands of the PIRA was ultimately decreasing. I believe that the downward trend in violence, especially from 1972-1977 is explained by the accommodationist strategy of the British government undermining the group dynamics of the organizationally motivated PIRA. However, it should be noted that this success was not a smooth process. Rather, some of the most intense violence from the PIRA insurgency took place during this time. I believe that violence, which emerged out of the communal rioting that gave birth to the PIRA, would have initially been high regardless of the strategy employed by the state. It is a testament to the success of the accommodation strategy that violence was rapidly decreasing (and the PIRA was offering a ceasefire) at the end of this period. It is clear from both the case study above and the PIRA’s own violent trends that violence was decreasing and I predict it probably
would have continued to do so if the British government had maintained its accommodationist strategy.

Instead, the British government transitioned to a policing strategy in 1977, a move that was reinforced with the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979. This shift in strategy resulted in an initial upsurge of violence, but just as importantly, once policing and the process of Ulsterization was instantiated, was insufficient to ultimately eliminate the violence stemming from the PIRA insurgency (Abrahms 2006). We might justify the initial upswing in violence because of inefficient implementation of a policing strategy, but the fact that the policing strategy allowed the PIRA to persist and remain politically influential suggests that—based on the dependent variable in this study—the strategy was a failure. However, it should be noted that a stable level of violence at relatively low levels might have been sufficient to convince Thatcher and Major to adopt a hard-line policy toward the PIRA, even though the return to an accommodationist strategy ultimately paved the way for a complete renunciation of violence. They might have done this because of a high political tolerance for violence (which I address in the conclusion to this study), or for political benefits that they might have reaped for appearing tough against Republican terrorism.

The contingent theory also successfully predicted the amelioration of PIRA violence via the strategy of accommodation from 1993 through 2005. Once secret negotiations were begun under the waning days of the Major government and were coupled with both British infiltrators into the PIRA and offers of public negotiations in exchange of concessions, something important happened. The PIRA, formerly driven by
its own internal group dynamics, found the group increasingly insufficient as a driving force for a violent insurgency. With the heightened realization that a number of PIRA members might have been on the British dime as well as opportunities to leave the PIRA under less hard circumstances (i.e. avoiding both prison and the grave), membership of the PIRA was no longer as committed to violent insurgency, or even the PIRA, as they might once have been.

Based on these observations, allow me to reflect briefly on the questions driving this project. This account rejects the combat model of insurgent conflicts. That is, it finds that the periods where Great Britain devoted more time and energy to addressing the social and political conditions fueling the insurgency as more success in reducing violence. It supports the social model, which remains an alternative explanation to the account offered here. This chapter is able to demonstrate that the coding of Great Britain’s strategy and the PIRA’s motivational dynamic correct predict levels of success in ameliorating insurgent violence. Combined with the other cases in this study, we will be able to evaluate both theories.
CHAPTER 5

THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT VERSUS THE LTTE

“No one talks peace while waging war better than Sri Lanka’s government and the Tamil rebels.”17

Introduction

The epigraph above from the Economist encapsulates an intriguing puzzle. Since the early 1980s, the government of Sri Lanka has engaged in a vicious and ultimately inconclusive counterinsurgency campaign against a Tamil insurgency. This insurgency has been spearheaded by a group known in English as the Tamil Tigers or LTTE.18 Yet, this conflict has not been a simple escalation of violence over that period of time. Rather, the conflict has exhibited periods of marked escalation of violence, significant ceasefires, rounds of negotiations that overlap both, and periods of time where it appears that the government of Sri Lanka is close to winning a brutal victory over the Tamil Tigers. Yet, violence continues. What helps to explain these violent and complex interactions? In this chapter, I apply the model presented in Chapters 1 and two to the conflict as it has occurred between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE.

18 This acronym stands for “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.”
This chapter will help us evaluate questions described in the first and second chapters. These questions are central to the understanding of nationalist secessionist insurgencies. Sri Lanka has experienced periods of increased violence and periods of decreased violence against the materially weaker Tamil insurgency. What factors influence these rising and falling levels of violence? What factors have influenced the continuance of violent interactions between the Tamil Tigers and Sri Lankan government, despite the government’s often-costly efforts to the contrary? Can a violent, non-state group like the LTTE be deterred? In the first two chapters, I described several models of counterinsurgent behavior that have been proffered within extant literature as superior for dealing with insurgencies (Galula 1964; Trinquier 1964; Hamilton 1997; Mackinlay 2002; Nagl 2002; Mackinlay 2005). The two most sharply distinguished models I term the combat model and the social model. I then proposed that while these models each feature cases of success and cases of failure19, a conditional model incorporating both of them allows us to hypothesize why they both might succeed and fail under certain circumstances. This chapter contributes to the project by evaluating this conditional model using evidence from the Sri Lankan counterinsurgency efforts against the Tamil Tigers.

Review of Theory

I propose that the actions of states can be grouped into three general strategic conceptions. These strategies may be selected for a variety of reasons. In the first option, the state can try to police against actions of the groups, arrest members of the

19 That is, cases where the frequency of violent incidents and lethality of those attacks during the insurgent campaign decrease (success) or increase (failure).
group through standard means of law, and seek to undermine the group through tactics that would also be employed by any other type of organized crime. In the second option, the state adds to the base strategy of the first option by attempting to raise the costs of the non-state actor’s violence by punishing them with strategy of reciprocal violence. In the third and final option, states can opt for a strategy of accommodation, attempting to integrate the group into a nonviolent realm of the political process. Various states may even be observed to attempt more than one of these strategies over the course of their interaction with a particular non-state group. These three state strategies represent approaches to counterinsurgency described in extant literature.

Variance in state strategy does not alone explain the outcomes of insurgent conflicts. I also argue that insurgent groups can be categorized into three general conceptions of their motivations for decision-making. The first conception is that groups strategically and instrumentally connect their actions to their stated goals. The second conception suggests that groups are motivated by internal dynamics and that these dynamics create a disjunction between groups’ stated goals and their actions. Finally, the third conception is that groups do not see a difference between their stated goals and the actions they take. That is to say, their actions are intended to be a direct achievement of their goals. These three concepts reflect strategic, organizational, and extremist portraits of insurgent groups that have been painted in extant literature (described in Chapter 1).

I argue that it is the interaction of the general strategy of the state and the general conception of the group’s motivation for decision-making that predicts success or failure in an insurgent conflict. That is, when a strategically oriented group is faced with a
strategy of reciprocal violence, the group’s violence will be quelled more efficiently than if either of the other strategies is employed. This is additionally true when an organizationally oriented group is faced with an accommodationist strategy and when an extremist oriented group is presented with a basic policing strategy.

Evidence and Methodology

For this chapter, I am focusing on an insurgent conflict that is important for several reasons. First, its importance is reflected in the literature on insurgent conflict and terrorism (Bloom 2003; Pape 2003; Richardson 2005; Sislin 2006). Authors have used Sri Lanka’s struggle against the Tamil Tigers to explore issues of economic development (Samarasinghe and Coughlan 1991; Richardson 2005), ethnic conflict (Gurr 2000; Kalyvas 2006), and peace process negotiations (Raghavan 2007). Few conflicts receive greater international media attention than the Sri Lankan campaign against the LTTE. Yet, despite that coverage, our understanding of the Sri Lankan conflict is often limited. For example, well-known academic studies of the LTTE have focused on the group’s proclivity toward suicide bombing, while ignoring the fact that this is only one facet of a much broader conflict (Bloom 2003; Pape 2003).20

Second, the Sri Lankan struggle against the LTTE is particularly useful as a case to test the theory proposed in this study. The LTTE’s struggle as a nationalist secessionist movement has spanned three important periods: the Cold War, the post-Cold War, and the post-9/11 era. Additionally, the insurgency has been influenced by two significant external shocks. First, the Indian government engaged in an extended period

of interaction and intervention in Sri Lanka. Second, Sri Lanka suffered massive damage because of the 2004 tsunami that struck much of Southern and Southeast Asia. Both of these external shocks allow us to understand not only how an ongoing insurgency reacts to governmental counterinsurgency efforts, but also how it reacts to broader external forces. Finally, this case exhibits a marked differential in absolute material power compared to the other three cases in the study. While Russia, Great Britain, and France undoubtedly possess some of the most proficient militaries in the world, Sri Lanka’s military capabilities are much more limited. However, an important clarification is in order. Though Sri Lanka’s military is surely less capable than that of the countries mentioned above in absolute terms, this does not necessarily imply parity between the Sri Lankan military and the LTTE’s own military capabilities. In interstate terms, Sri Lanka’s military is quite adept. As an island about the size of Ireland, it has spent about as much on its military as Ireland has. Its economy is quite robust, unemployment is low, and it leads the southern Asia region in development indicators. Thus, we should expect the Sri Lankan military to be at least an order of magnitude more capable in military matters than the LTTE. Evidence bears this out as estimates of the Sri Lankan military and the LTTE suggest that the Sri Lankan army has at least a 10:1 military advantage (Gambetta 2005). The question, as always, is why a government with such high stakes (as are described below) has produced such mixed results in ameliorating violence from an insurgency.

For this case study, I employ explicit coding rules (developed in Chapter 2) to interpret narrative accounts of conflicts and to code both the strategic choices of Sri
Lanka and the motivated decision-making characteristics of the LTTE. I also employ narrative accounts of the insurgency to capture the stakes and goals of both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. I apply these coding rules to a selection of speeches, first-hand accounts, histories, secondary interviews, news articles, and press releases as well as academic treatments of the conflicts. I use these accounts to construct a narrative of the insurgent conflict as well as a measurement of the intensity of the insurgency’s violent activity. I then compare the interaction of states’ strategic choices and the conception of groups’ decision-making to the relative success or failure of both the group and the state vis-à-vis their goals. For the state, success is a reduction in the lethality of violent attacks from the insurgency as well as a reduction of the frequency of violent attacks from the group. For the group, success is the achievement of their stated goals, as well as the implicit goal of their own continued existence.

Hypotheses in the Sri Lankan Case

In this chapter, I apply the hypotheses described in general in Chapter 2 to the specific case of the Sri Lankan government’s struggle against the Tamil Tigers. As such, I will evaluate the following hypotheses:

1a. When the LTTE is coded as a strategically motivated group; Sri Lankan tactics of reciprocal violence will succeed in reducing violence.

1b. When the LTTE is coded as a strategically motivated group; Sri Lankan tactics of policing will fail in reducing violence.

1c. When the LTTE is coded as a strategically motivated group; Sri Lankan tactics of accommodation will fail in reducing violence.
2a. When the LTTE is coded as an organizationally motivated group; Sri Lankan tactics of reciprocal violence will fail in reducing violence.

2b. When the LTTE is coded as an organizationally motivated group; Sri Lankan tactics of policing will fail in reducing violence.

2c. When the LTTE is coded as an organizationally motivated group; Sri Lankan tactics of accommodation will succeed in reducing violence.

3a. When the LTTE is coded as an extremist motivated group; Sri Lankan tactics of reciprocal violence will fail in reducing violence.

3b. When the LTTE is coded as an extremist motivated group; Sri Lankan tactics of policing will succeed in reducing violence.

3c. When the LTTE is coded as an extremist motivated group; Sri Lankan tactics of accommodation will fail in reducing violence.

**Historical Background of the Conflict**

The inter-ethnic violence in Sri Lanka, which is currently waged between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), has existed in various forms for decades, but not centuries. In fact, much of Sri Lankan history portrays amicable relations between the two main ethnic groups, the majority Sinhalese and minority Tamils. In this section, I will discuss the origins of communal violence within Sri Lanka that has coalesced into the current LTTE insurgency against the government. I will address several key questions. First, what are the origins of communal violence in Sri Lanka? Second, how did that violence evolve to be represented by two main actors, the Sinhalese government and the Tamil LTTE? Third and finally, what are the stakes
that have led the government to continue to struggle against the LTTE, rather than simply
granting the LTTE its stated goals?

Sri Lanka is a small island country located off the southern tip of India. Population figures estimate that about twenty-one million people live on the island, which is a slightly larger landmass than the state of West Virginia. Ethnic diversity is a significant feature of the conflict. Approximately seventy-five percent of Sri Lankans are Sinhalese. The Sinhalese migrated to the island from the Indian mainland beginning around the 6th century. Sinhalese is the official state language of the Sri Lankan government. The Sinhalese are concentrated in the center and south of the island. The most significant minority ethnic group in Sri Lanka is the Tamils. Estimates of the Tamils range from 8.5-17% of the total population. This Tamil population is recognized on the island as two distinct groups. The Sri Lankan Tamils (also known as Jaffna Tamils and referred to subsequently in this chapter as simply Tamils) immigrated to the island approximately 1,500 years ago. They are most highly concentrated in the northern and eastern coastal regions of the island. The other Tamil group is known as Indian Tamils, because they were imported to the island by the British during their colonial presence from mainland India, which has its own sizable Tamil population (in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu). Indian Tamils are not significantly concentrated in any part of the island. There is also a small population of other minority groups, the largest of which is a small Sri Lankan Moorish population, representing not more than 7% of the total population. The Sri Lankan Moors are highly concentrated in areas proximate to Sri
Lankan Tamil areas. It is the Sri Lankan Tamils (and generally not the Indian Tamils) that have been the support base and recruiting population for the LTTE.

Though Tamils and Sinhalese have long lived in proximity to each other, violence has not characterized the vast majority of their history (Muni 1993). That said, it would be overly simplistic to believe that relations between Tamils and the Sinhalese were entirely pacific for hundreds of years. However, violence that emerged between the ethnic groups was extremely sporadic and rarely widespread (Wilson 1988; Little 1994; Richardson 2005). The catalyst for current conflict between the two groups was the insertion and removal of British colonial rule. Though the island, as a major trade port, had long been influenced by European powers (and experienced significant though not total Dutch control), the island was first brought under total colonial rule by the British East India company in 1796. However, Great Britain would not achieve total control of the island until 1815 (Whittaker 2003). It was under the British that the Tamil and Sinhalese regions of the island would be combined under a single administrative hierarchy.

The island of Sri Lanka (then known as Ceylon) attained independence from British rule in 1948, setting the stage for political competition between the Tamils and the Sinhalese. This urge toward political competition was fueled by both the British decision to consolidate administration of the entire island under a single government and the power vacuum induced by British exit from the island (Rudolph 2003). With the government of the entire island held in the hands of a Sinhalese majority, the Sinhalese undertook several early policy moves which were designed to correct for perceived
British favoritism towards the Tamils, due to their higher levels of education (Dekmejian 2007). Whether warranted or not, these policies, which sought to standardize civic life under Sinhalese culture, were deeply resented by the Tamil minorities of the north and the east (Ganguly and Macduff 2003). These policies included making Sinhalese the official language of Sri Lanka, favoritism within educational and bureaucratic institutions, and attempts to repatriate Sri Lankan-born Tamils to the Tamil-majority Indian state of Tamil Nadu (Whittaker 2003). The most significant of these political actions was the passage of the 1956 Sinhala Only Act, which declared Sinhala as the sole official language. This act touched off disorganized communal riots that resulted in the deaths of 150 people, most of whom appear to have been Tamils (Dekmejian 2007).

In reaction to these Sinhalese actions, Tamil political groups formed in the interest of Tamil rights (Bose 1994). It is important to note that these groups were by no means seeking to be violent in their initial incarnation. Rather, when several of these groups consolidated in 1972 to form the Tamil United Front (TUF, later renamed the Tamil United Liberation Front, or TULF), the primary purpose of the organization was to campaign via peaceful political means for equality in areas such as language, education, and religious freedom (Ganguly and Macduff 2003). However, by the mid-1970s, these groups grew increasingly frustrated with a lack of progress through peaceful political channels (Rudolph 2003). This frustration culminated in 1977, when the TULF participated in Sri Lankan general elections on a platform of creating an independent Tamil state (Manogaran 1994). The TULF won all the seats in Tamil areas during this election (Dekmejian 2007). However, the TULF political representatives were unable to
achieve any significant political reform in the Sinhalese majoritarian government, increasing frustration within the Tamil community (Heiberg, O'Leary et al. 2007). The fact that the Tamils were unable to lobby peacefully for political secession or autonomy is not surprising. The Tamil-dominated regions of Sri Lanka are critical as trading ports, especially with Sri Lanka, and it is difficult to imagine a Sinhalese government easily granting devolution to those areas.

The Emergence of the LTTE

Around the time of the TULF’s greatest victory as part of the peaceful political process, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were formed (Joshi 1996; Art 2007; Heiberg, O'Leary et al. 2007). The emergence of the LTTE was not seen as remarkable or unique during this time period. Rather, numerous parties and groups were emerging to work in concert or competition with the TULF (Ganguly and Macduff 2003). Many of these groups were dissatisfied with the lack of progress achieved by the TULF and opted for the use of violent tactics to agitate for a Tamil state. While more than thirty-five different groups can be observed during the late 1970s, they quickly merged into five dominant groups: the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Front (EPRLF), the People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS), and the Tamil New Tigers (TNT), which would be renamed within a year the LTTE (Muni 1993; Ganguly and Macduff 2003). All of these groups drew their rhetorical inspiration from

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21 The word eelam is one of several interpretations and disputed origins, but is generally used to refer to the Tamil notion of a sovereign homeland. Tamil Eelam is specifically the concept of an independent and sovereign Tamil nation-state.
Marxist revolutionary sources, but their stated goals reflected a desire for national separatism rather than any strong notions of a Marxist revolution.

Given the comparatively peaceful history of Tamil political protest, why did these groups, and the LTTE in particular, flourish? One contributing explanation is the presence of not only Tamil national separatism, but a significant and actively violent strain of Sinhalese nationalism (Whittaker 2003; Bouffard 2006; Raghavan 2007). The forces of Sinhalese nationalism entered into Sri Lankan politics with the transition to post-colonial independence, and actually impacted the government before the Tamil nationalist movement (Bose 1994). Prime Minister Bandaranaike, who was responsible for the 1956 Sinhala Only Act, was assassinated in 1959 by two Sinhalese monks who believed that he was not sufficiently pro-Sinhalese (Whittaker 2003). Thus, the Sinhalese government faced growing opposition on its right as well as a nationalist movement on its left. The Tamil agitation became the easier problem to respond to, because actions against the Tamils would help placate ultranationalist Sinhalese factions. Thus, the stakes for the Sri Lankan government include not only maintaining the territorial control of the entire island for economic and security viability, but also containing the effects of Sinhalese nationalism.

A second factor in the growth of the LTTE was its successful intra-communal campaign against its fellow militant organizations (Hellmann-Rajanayagam 1994). At the same time that Tamils were beginning to question the efficacy of peace political protest as a means to greater Tamil autonomy, the LTTE successfully presented itself as the militant alternative to the comparatively peaceful TULF. It was especially able to
distinguish itself from alternative groups with the successful assassination of the Sinhalese governor of Jaffna, Alfred Duraiappah (Alexander 2002). Furthermore, multiple sources cite the relative advantages of the LTTE in terms of organization (Joshi 1996; Mackinlay 2002; Ganguly and Macduff 2003; Whittaker 2003; Arena and Arrigo 2006). Thus, the LTTE was able to outflank many of its more pacific competitors by riding the wave of political polarization in Sri Lanka while subsuming both resources and members from its faltering competitor organizations. In addition to winning internecine competitions within insurgent groups, the LTTE was also able to undermine the peaceful political processes of the TULF, notably with the assassination of its leader, Appapillai Amirthalingham (Crenshaw 1997). The consequence of these actions was that by 1980, the LTTE had emerged as the preeminent militant Tamil organization operating in Sri Lanka. The LTTE has been able to retain that position through rigid leadership structures stemming from their central leadership and an ongoing adversarial relationship to alternative expressions of Tamil militancy. To put it another way, the LTTE has tried to ensure they are the only insurgent game in town, and that they adhere to strict internal discipline to retain that advantage. The LTTE has also supplemented its income (which comes from external contributions from diasporas, internal contributions from the Tamil community, and possibly extorted contributions as well) with clandestine smuggling operations of weapons and drugs (Peiris 2001).

The LTTE was able to consolidate its position as the main actor in Tamil struggles for nationalist separation in 1983, when communal riots touched off what many consider the formal beginning of the Tamil Tigers’ insurgency in Sri Lanka. John
Mueller argues that this communal violence was facilitated by poor and sometimes complicit policing, pushing more Tamils into traditional northern strongholds, and giving insurgents like the LTTE more clout within the Tamil community (Mueller 2004). In July 1983, the LTTE launched a deadly attack on the military in the north of the country, killing 13 soldiers. The government retaliated with riots in Colombo, the capital, and elsewhere. Between 400 and 3,000 Tamils were estimated to have been killed, and many more fled Sinhalese-majority areas (Muni 1993). These riots, though rising up out of a grassroots communal violence driven by Sinhalese vindictiveness over LTTE actions, occurred with the complicity of the government. Rather than attempting to curtail the violence, the Sri Lankan police forces refrained from acting and may have even encouraged the violent rioting (Muni 1993). This had the effect of supporting the cause of the LTTE, because LTTE was able to justify its existence as a violent advocate for Tamil rights in the face of Sinhalese violence. It is ironic though, that they were the catalyst for this violence.

During this time, the LTTE was able to derive significant support from abroad, especially from India and western countries with Tamil diasporas (Peiris 2001; Ganguly and Macduff 2003). Peace talks between the LTTE and the government began in Thimphu in 1985, but they soon failed because the government was unwilling to yield to any of the Tamil Tigers’ demands. The insurgency continued unabated. The regular entry into or proposal of peace talks between the government and the LTTE has become a hallmark of this insurgent conflict.
In 1987, government troops pushed the LTTE fighters to the northern city of Jaffna. This series of attacks from the government represented a response to increased LTTE militancy. In April 1987, the conflict exploded with heightened ferocity, as both the government forces and the LTTE fighters engaged each other in a series of bloody operations (Gambetta 2005). The Sri Lankan military launched an offensive, called “Operation Liberation,” beginning May 1987, that was designed to regain the territory in Jaffna peninsula from the LTTE's control (Muni 1993). This offensive marked the Sri Lankan military's first ever conventional military operations on Sri Lankan soil since independence. The military offensive was successful and LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran narrowly escaped from advancing troops. In July 1987, the LTTE carried out their first suicide attack: an operative of the Black Tigers (the special forces division of the LTTE) drove a small truck with explosives through the wall of a fortified Sri Lankan army camp, reportedly killing forty soldiers (Richardson 2005). Since then they have carried out over 170 suicide attacks, more than any other organization in the world, and the suicide attack has become a trademark of the LTTE and a characteristic of the insurgency (Bloom 2003; Hoffman 2004; Gambetta 2005).

One of the most significant time periods within the LTTE insurgency began in 1987, when at the request of the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE, the Indian government inserted peacekeeping forces into the island (Rupesinghe 1988; Carment, James et al. 2006). India became involved in the conflict for a number of reasons, including its leaders' desire to project India as the regional power in the area. Beginning in the 1980s, India provided arms, training, and monetary support to several Tamil
militant groups, including the LTTE (Manogaran 1994). India became more actively involved in the late 1980s, and on June 5, 1987 the Indian Air Force airdropped food parcels to the LTTE in Jaffna while the city was under siege by Sri Lankan forces (Richardson 2005). Negotiations were held between India and Sri Lanka, and the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord was signed on July 29, 1987, by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Jayewardene (Carment, James et al. 2006). Under this accord, the Sri Lankan government made a number of concessions to Tamil demands, which included greater autonomy to the Tamils and official status for the Tamil language (Muni 1993). India agreed to establish order in the north and east through a peacekeeping force, and to cease assisting Tamil insurgents. The LTTE, although initially reluctant, agreed to surrender their arms to the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF).

The Sri Lankan government, which was facing a Sinhalese nationalist uprising by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) in the south, called in the Indian military immediately after the agreement was signed. The Sri Lankan government pulled its troops south and fought the JVP rebellion as the IPKF took over control of most areas in the north of the country. While most Tamil militant groups laid down their weapons and agreed to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict, the LTTE refused to disarm its fighters (Dekmejian 2007). This may be because the LTTE grew to distrust the IPKF, or because they never trusted the disarmament in the first place, only negotiating to obtain concessions without making sacrifices in their tactics. Either way, there is no
authoritative account of the LTTE’s decision not to comply willingly with Indian disarmament.

The IPKF then tried to demobilize the LTTE by force and ended up in full-scale conflict against the Tamil Tigers. Simultaneously, nationalist sentiment led many Sinhalese to oppose the continued Indian presence in Sri Lanka (Bullion 1995). The led the Sri Lankan government to call for India to leave the island. The LTTE and IPKF continued to have frequent hostilities, and according to some accounts, the Sri Lankan government even armed the LTTE to facilitate the insurgency’s growing violent focus against the Indian forces (Muni 1993; Dekmejian 2007). Following Ghandi’s defeat in Indian parliamentary elections in December 1989, the new Prime Minister V. P. Singh ordered the withdrawal of the IPKF, and the last Indian ship left Sri Lanka in March 1990. The 32 month presence of the IPKF in Sri Lanka resulted in the death of 1100 Indian soldiers and over 5000 Sri Lankans and cost over 20 billion rupees for the Indian government (Carment, James et al. 2006). A year later, Ghandi himself would be assassinated by a female LTTE suicide bomber, completing the Indian alienation from the LTTE (Dekmejian 2007).

After Indian withdrawal from Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese government again became the major antagonist for LTTE militancy. The period immediately following Indian withdrawal was marked by abortive attempts by the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government to enter into peace negotiations. These negotiations were frequently scuttled by hard line forces within the Sri Lankan government, and general distrust within the LTTE (Dekmejian 2007). One such round of negotiations was destroyed by the LTTE’s
assassination of Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa, who was relatively moderate toward Tamil nationalist separatism (Dekmejian 2007). Premadasa was replaced by the significantly more hard line Chandrika Kumaratunga, who took power in 1994. Interspersed with these attempts at negotiations were military actions aimed at capturing the LTTE’s stronghold at Jaffna. This stronghold was ultimately captured in 1995, though the LTTE continued to effectively strike at government forces from the areas surrounding Jaffna (Ganguly and Macduff 2003). With Kumaratunga at the helm, violence escalated as the Sri Lankan government committed thousands of soldiers to the Tamil-held north and east, while the LTTE responded with one of the most extensive suicide bombing campaigns the world had yet seen (Bloom 2003; Hoffman 2004; Dekmejian 2007). Kumaratunga herself was wounded in a LTTE bombing attack on December 18, 1999.

By the year 2000, it seemed clear to international observers that even with the rededicated efforts of the Sri Lankan government, it would not be possible for violence to coerce the LTTE into capitulation. At this time, the government of Norway stepped into the conflict, offering to both sides its services as a mediator (Dekmejian 2007). While Norway was perceived as sufficiently impartial by both sides, there was initially little traction in these talks because Norway also lacked the coercive leverage necessary to force concessions from either side. This changed in 2001, when the LTTE appeared to have become concerned that the new U.S. war on terror would extend to support the Sri Lankan government against the LTTE (Bouffard 2006). LTTE leader Prabhakaran adopted a warmer approach to negotiation, and Kumaratunga suffered a defeat in
Parliament and was joined by the more moderate Prime Minister, Wickremesinghe.\textsuperscript{22} These two men would ultimately sign a Norway-moderated ceasefire (Bouffard 2006). However, these advances would be undermined by Sinhalese nationalism in the form of the JVP, whose protests in 2003 would again polarize the Tamil-Sinhalese dialogue and give President Kumaratunga cause to suspend the peace talks and Norway’s role as mediator (Dekmejian 2007). As John Mueller notes, even during this time of relative peace, the LTTE retained significant discipline over its organization, training, and recruitment, suggesting that while peace was superficially given a chance, violence was by no means abandoned (Mueller 2003).

The 2004-2005 time period would be characterized by political crisis within the Sri Lankan government, and an eventual return to hostilities with the LTTE. President Kumaratunga’s suspension of peace talks in 2003 was followed in 2004 by her decision to extend her tenure for two additional years. This produced considerable instability in the Sri Lankan government, though the constitutional crisis it engendered was shelved by the massive destruction caused by the December 26, 2004 tsunami that struck the island. The tsunami actually had a pacifying effect on interactions between the government and the LTTE, both of which made offers of rapprochement following the disaster (Dekmejian 2007). While this conciliatory mood produced a ceasefire mediated by Norway, it was ultimately short-lived. In late 2005, Mahinda Rajapakse replaced Kumaratunga, again with significant support from Sinhalese hardliners. By the summer of 2006, the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government were again engaged in fairly frequent

\textsuperscript{22} This marked the first time during the time period under consideration that the Parliament and the Presidency were held by two different parties.
tit-for-tat exchanges of violence, though the ceasefire had not officially been violated (Dekmejian 2007). This violence was some of the greatest that the country had seen since 2001.

**Motivations of the Insurgency**

The organization, characteristics, and goals of the LTTE have been described in a number of studies and accounts. Numerous sources have noted both the organizational capacity of the LTTE as well as its durability (Mackinlay 2002; Ganguly and Macduff 2003). In this section, I will briefly outline the organizational character of the LTTE, before turning to the coding process by which I determine the motivation of the LTTE’s goals.

Brendan O’Duffy characterizes the rise of the LTTE as “…a group of 30 poorly armed dissidents in 1983 into one of the world’s foremost paramilitary groups by 1991…” (Heiberg, O'Leary et al. 2007). According to O’Duffy, “the organizational structure of the LTTE is extremely hierarchical, with a Central Governing Committee, headed by ‘the leader’ Vellupillai Prabhakaran (b. 1954), overseeing both military and political branches” (Heiberg, O'Leary et al. 2007). This dichotomy of a political and military wing, both headed by Prabhakaran, is supported by other accounts of the LTTE (Joshi 1996). Within the military wing, the LTTE described lines of division between its special forces (Charles Anthony Regiment), suicide operatives (Black Tigers), maritime forces (Sea Tigers), as well as communications, munitions, intelligence, and support logistics (Mackinlay 2002; Heiberg, O'Leary et al. 2007).
Like many of the Tamil politico-militant groups that formed in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the LTTE espouses a Marxist rhetoric. However, the recitation of this rhetoric has waned over the years. While some accounts still classify the LTTE as a Maoist ethnonationalist group, the socialist nature of the LTTE is fairly unimportant in dictating policy or group goals (Manogaran 1994). Much more important is the ethnonationalist component of LTTE ideology. Michael Arena and Bruce Arrigo contend that the three identities critical to an LTTE member are Tamil, freedom fighter, and martyr (Arena and Arrigo 2006). It is important to note that the martyr identity is secular in nature; no afterlife reward awaits the LTTE member. Rather, duty in this life is the sole motivator. In addition, the notion of becoming a martyr is an eventual outcome, or a byproduct of being a successful Tamil freedom fighter. It is not a state to be sought on its own. Illustrative is the following description of LTTE recruits:

“In the 1990s, the trend toward youth has accelerated. Some members are as young as thirteen for fourteen years old. Many of these younger members are fanatical; they are issued a cyanide capsule on completion of their basic training with the LTTE, and they have been engaged in suicide bombing” (1999).

In LTTE literature and speeches, the idea of the cyanide capsule is much more heavily emphasized than suicide bombing missions. The implication is that the LTTE stress a willingness to die for the cause, but only in tactically specific circumstances do they employ the instrumental need to die for the cause.

Another important characteristic of LTTE organization is the ongoing struggle to maintain its place as the sole outlet for Tamil militancy. I have already detailed above the LTTE’s annexation and elimination of rival Tamil militant groups (Hellmann-Rajanayagam 1994). This process continued well after the establishment of the LTTE as
the preeminent insurgent threat to the Sri Lankan government. In recent years, this effort has focused on a splinter faction of the LTTE, led by Colonel Karuna Amman (Dekmejian 2007). Yet despite what the presence of this splinter faction might suggest, the LTTE has far outstripped most violent non-state actors in its ability to remain cohesive and not regularly splinter and factionalize. Part of this may be due to the LTTE’s hierarchical decision-making structure. It may also be because of the LTTE’s nationalist separatist goals. There is some evidence even in the splinter faction to support this, as Amman appears to have split from the group not over broad ideological goals, but over specific tactics and especially the (geographic) allocation of resources within the insurgency (Heiberg, O’Leary et al. 2007).

In determining the motivations of the goals of the LTTE, I focused specifically on two individuals, Velupillai Prabhakaran and Anton Balasingham, though Prabhakaran, as leader of the LTTE, receives the bulk of the attention and analysis. Balasingham is significant as the public face of the LTTE and its representative, especially abroad.

**Velupillai Prabhakaran**

Velupillai Prabhakaran was born in 1954 in the northern coastal town of Velvettithurai. The biographical data from his early years, including his socioeconomic status, is somewhat in dispute (Whittaker 2003; Hoffman 2004; Richardson 2005). In 1972, at the age of 18, Velupillai Prabhakaran founded an organization named Tamil New Tigers (TNT), which would later become the LTTE (Muni 1993). In 1975, after becoming heavily involved in the Tamil movement, he carried out his first political murder by assassinating the mayor of Jaffna, Alfred Duraiappah, shooting him at point
blank range while he was about to enter a Hindu temple. The assassination was in response to the 1974 Tamil conference incident, and Tamil radicals had blamed Alfred Duraiappah because he backed the then Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) implicated in the violence as well as for allegedly betraying the Tamil nationalist sentiments in the Jaffna peninsula (Dekmejian 2007).

Prabhakaran is a member of the relatively lower Karaiyar caste (Manogaran 1994). Religion is not a major factor in his philosophy or ideology. The LTTE as an organization does not cite any material or doctrine from holy or religious texts in any of its ideological documents or propaganda. Instead, it publicly appears to be rhetorically driven only by the idea of Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism. As such, it considers its goals only as the single-minded pursuit of an independent Tamil Eelam (Arena and Arrigo 2006).

There are not many insights into Prabhakaran's personal life, either from his interviews or from cited media sources, although it is widely known that he is married to Mathivathani Erambu. They have a daughter named Duwaraka, a son named Charles Anthony and another son named Balachandran. Prabhakaran named his son Charles Anthony, after one of his most trusted associates, Charles Lucas Anthony, who was killed in 1983 (Richardson 2005).

Prabhakaran has not expressed an all-encompassing systematic philosophy or ideology as such, but has declared his ideology to be driven by revolutionary socialism and the creation of an egalitarian society. He joined the Tamil nationalist movement in his youth and quickly established himself as a strong willed militant leader within the
LTTE. His rare interviews, his annual Tamil Eelam Heroes Day speeches, and the policies and actions of the LTTE can be taken as indicators of Prabhakaran’s philosophy and ideology. Prabhakaran’s source of inspiration and direction is Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism.

As for his own views toward violence, Prabhakaran has explicitly stated that he chose military means only after observing that nonviolent means have been ineffectual and obsolete. Velupillai Prabhakaran has been accused of building the LTTE around a personality cult. He is called "the great leader" and his picture is hung everywhere in rebel held areas. He has banned other religions, as well as alcohol and smoking. This is deeply ironic, given that the LTTE’s income is partially based on drug smuggling (Peiris 2001). He has claimed to be the sole representative of Tamil people, and has steeped the entire culture into one of self-sacrifice and martyrdom (Bloom 2003; Hoffman 2004).

Coding Statements of Velupillai Prabhakaran

In order to evaluate Prabhakaran’s motivations for pursuing LTTE goals, a large set of speeches were coded according to the rules described in Chapter 2. These speeches were primarily drawn from the official LTTE website (www.eelam.com). Prabhakaran delivers a yearly speech that is similar in tone and length to the American President’s State of the Union Address. Collecting these speeches for every year from 1984 through 2006, plus several extended interviews with Prabhakaran, yields a word count of over 42,000. Furthermore, these speeches provide extensive coverage over the entirety of the LTTE’s prominence in Sri Lankan politics. Finally, these speeches are intended for consumption by Prabhakaran’s LTTE members as well as the Sri Lankan government and
the international community. Therefore, I believe that they accurately capture Prabhakaran’s conception of LTTE motivations as he wants to represent them to all three audiences.

Using the coding rules described in Chapter 2, I have coded Prabhakaran’s speeches for references to his state opponent and for references to the LTTE. I have also coded references to the state for specific references to both a willingness to bargain and Prabhakaran’s goals. I have coded references to the LTTE for emphases of group cohesion or a specific lack of group cohesion. Immediately below I provide representative examples of my coding followed by summary data on Prabhakaran’s codings.

Example 1
“Our position is that political negotiations should be preceded by creating conditions for de-escalation, withdrawal of troops and normalcy” (1996).
I code this phrase as (S/B/G), because the implicit subject of the state is the government of Sri Lanka (S), and Prabhakaran indicates a willingness to negotiate (B), as well as specific goals (G), such as the withdrawal of troops.

Example 2
“If the government takes the initiative we will respond positively” (2000).
I code this phrase as (S/B), because Prabhakaran specific refers to the government of Sri Lanka (S) and makes a conditional promise to respond positively, which is evidence for a willingness to negotiate (B).
Example 3

“We are fighting this war against a state and its armed forces determined to subjugate our people through the force of arms” (2001).

I code this phrase (S) because Prabhakaran is referring to the government of Sri Lanka (S).

Example 4

“We are not terrorists. We are not mentally demented as to commit blind acts of violence impelled by racist and religious fanaticism” (2001).

I code this phrase (I) because Prabhakaran is referring to the LTTE, but there is no direct evidence for a coding of group cohesion.

Example 5

“[The idea that Prabhakaran is opposed to a united Tamil political movement] is only propaganda by other groups to undermine our movement” (1984).

I code this phrase (I/GC) because not only does Prabhakaran refer to the LTTE, but he specifically refutes an idea that he claims is meant to undermine the LTTE.

Example 6

“The uncompromising stance of Sinhala nationalism has left us with no other option but an independent state for the people of Tamil Eelam” (2006).

I code this phrase (S/NB) because Prabhakaran refers to his opposition, namely the Sri Lankan government (S), and specifically indicates that their position leaves him no other option. Therefore, negotiation is presently impossible (NB).
While the above examples are meant to be illustrative, I will now present summary data on the motivational codings of Velupillai Prabhakaran. Figure 5.1 displays the distribution of codings across all of Prabhakaran’s speeches. Across all of Prabhakaran speeches (amongst which there is a high degree of internal consistency), the most predominant coding is (S/G). The (S/G) coding indicates a reference is made to the state with respect to the goals of the insurgent group. This means that Prabhakaran is most frequently referring to the state, in this case Sri Lanka, with respect to his and the LTTE’s goals. The second predominant coding is (S/B). The (S/B) coding indicates that a reference is made to the state with the connotation of willingness or a desire to negotiate to change behavior based on state actions. This means that Prabhakaran is often referring to Sri Lanka while indicating implicitly or explicitly his willingness to negotiate with them. Note that this coding is much more predominant than the (S/NB) coding, which would indicate an unwillingness to negotiate with Sri Lanka. Finally, when Prabhakaran refers to the LTTE, he rarely does so in a way that would focus on the internal cohesion within the group. Prabhakaran makes approximately three references to the LTTE that do not discuss group cohesion for every one reference that does. Figure 5.2 shows the relative weight of each coding within each specific speech. This graph demonstrates the general ordinal consistency of Prabhakaran’s codings. That is, (S/G) is nearly always the most dominant coding in Prabhakaran’s speeches. Likewise, (S/B) is nearly always the second most predominant coding in Prabhakaran’s speeches. This shows us that not only does Prabhakaran have a clear predominance toward referencing the state and indicating a desire to negotiate, he does so consistently over time.
Figure 5.1: Distribution of Velupillai Prabhakaran's Speech Codings
Anton Balasingham was born in Batticaloa in 1938. His father was a Hindu and his mother a Roman Catholic. His father also hailed from the Eastern province where as his mother was a native Jaffna Tamil. After his graduation from school in Jaffna, he worked as a journalist in a Colombo newspaper and as a translator at the British High Commission in Colombo. Balasingham was married to Adele Ann Wilby in 1978. Adele, an Australian citizen and a nurse by professional training, became a prominent member of the women’s wing of the LTTE. In the past, Adele herself has been involved in the peace talks, as the secretary of the LTTE delegation (Richardson 2005). In April 2002, Anton Balasingham appeared alongside Prabhakaran in a rare press conference by the LTTE (Bouffard 2006).
From the Thimphu talks in 1985 to the first round of the Geneva talks held in 2006, Balasingham was the head of the LTTE delegation in all the peace negotiations with the government of Sri Lanka (Joshi 1996). However, he could not participate in an October round because of ill health, and in November 2006, Balasingham was diagnosed with cancer. He died shortly after and his funeral was held in north London (Liyanage 2006).

Balasingham has been credited as the only moderating force within an otherwise belligerent rebel group and the only man within the group that could criticize and influence the leader Velupillai Prabhakaran (Joshi 1996). Balasingham was known for his relentless attempts to bring the Tigers to the international negotiating arena. It was mainly due to his perseverance that the Tigers acquired a reputation as a progressive organization among certain liberals in the west (Richardson 2005).

Coding Statements of Anton Balasingham

The availability of published speeches by Anton Balasingham is significantly less than that of Prabhakaran. This is not a significant concern for this study, as Prabhakaran is widely understood (and I believe correctly) to be the dominant leader within the LTTE. Therefore, his motivations for LTTE goals should predominate within the group. However, it is useful to code available speeches for Balasingham because they should correspond to Prabhakaran’s codings if his views do indeed predominate within the LTTE.

Using the procedural coding rules described in Chapter 2, I have coded Balasingham’s speeches for references to his state opponent and for references to the
LTTE. I have also coded references to the state for specific references to both a willingness to bargain and Balasingham’s goals. I have coded references to the LTTE for emphasis of group cohesion or a specific lack of group cohesion. Immediately below I provide representative examples of my coding followed by summary data on Balasingham’s codings.

Example 1

"Chandrika offered to negotiate with mediation three times, but stated unacceptable conditions" (1999).

I code this phrase as (S/B) because Balasingham specifically refers to the Sri Lankan leader in a negotiation setting, and explains that her conditions are reasons negotiations did not proceed.

Example 2

“Sinhala troops must leave the Tamil homelands for peace to be possible” (1999).

I code this phrase as (S/G/B) because Balasingham indicates peace is possible (negotiate, B), if Sri Lankan troops (reference to the state, S) leave Tamil homelands (the goal, G).

Example 3

“They must leave or the LTTE will drive them out” (1999).

I code this phrase (S/G) because Balasingham is referencing a specific goal of the LTTE (G) with reference to what the state (S) must do; in this case, leave.
Example 4

“Our leadership is working very hard to bring back normalcy into your life, putting in the back burner all political considerations and interacting with the international community on a realistic basis” (2005).

I code this phrase as (I/GC), because Balasingham is specifically referring to the leadership of the LTTE (I), while at the same time referencing its actions in a positive way, which I code as enhancing group cohesion (GC).

While the above examples are meant to be illustrative, I will now present summary data on the motivational codings of Anton Balasingham. Figure 5.3 displays the distribution of codings across all of Balasingham’s speeches. Across Balasingham’s speeches, the most predominant coding is (S/B), meaning that Balasingham is most frequently referring to the state, in this case Sri Lanka, with respect to the LTTE’s willingness to negotiate. This is interesting, because it stands in contrast to the coding of Prabhakaran. Beyond the predominant coding, however, the picture for Balasingham is murkier. The second predominant coding is very close between (S/G) and (I/GC), meaning that Balasingham is about as often referring to Sri Lanka with reference to LTTE goals as he is addressing the LTTE in a way designed to enhance group cohesion. Importantly, though, Balasingham, like Prabhakaran, displays a low level of (S/NB) which would be indicative of an unwillingness to negotiate with Sri Lanka. As indicated in Figure 5.4, when (S/G) and (S/B) codings are predominant, we find that this is most indicative of leaders motivated according to the strategic logic. The only troubling
evidence is the high level of (I/GC) codings in Balasingham’s speeches, but given that his word count was much lower (1612 words), I am more confident in the Prabhakaran coding. Across both leaders, however, we have good evidence to conclude that the pursuit of their goals is motivated by their own internal strategic logic.

Figure 5.3: Relative Weight of Anton Balasingham’s Statements

Based on this analysis of statements of Prabhakaran and Balasingham, what can we conclude about the motivational characteristics of the LTTE as a group? Looking at merely the distribution of references in Balasingham and Prabhakaran’s speeches that
have been analyzed above, we find strong support that they match the strategic logic of motivation as described in Chapter Two. See Figure 5.4 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I/GC Codings</th>
<th>S/G Codings</th>
<th>S/B Codings</th>
<th>S/NB Codings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>--</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fanatic</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.4: Coding distribution representing the strongest correspondence to specific group motivations.

Importantly though, how can we reasonably trust that the sentiments of Prabhakaran and Balasingham accurately represent the LTTE as a group? I believe that we can draw this conclusion for at least two reasons. First, the organizational structure of the LTTE is described in multiple sources as being notably hierarchical. That is, dissent is not easily observable within the LTTE. This is what makes the splinter group led by Colonel Karuna Amman so noteworthy. Yet, even this splintering is not without outside influence. British authorities, who recently arrested Amman on weapons charges while he was in London, announced that his passport was forged with the assistance of the Sri Lankan government. The international activist group Human Rights Watch has also argued that Amman is extensively connected with the Sri Lankan government. Thus, we observe no natural splinter groups within the LTTE. Second, we observe a very strong organizational control of the LTTE through the personages of Prabhakaran and formerly through Balasingham. The LTTE is frequently described as having a two-wing structure: military and political. Within that realm, Prabhakaran exerts control over both wings, but
asserts primary control over the military wing. Balasingham was responsible for shaping the political messages of the LTTE, but only did this with the direction of Prabhakaran. Given the extent that Prabhakaran authoritatively controls the governance and strategy of the LTTE, we can reasonably conclude that our analysis of Prabhakaran’s words as a strategically motivated actor also applies to the LTTE in general.

Strategies and Tactics of the State

Through the process of coding counterinsurgency tactics employed by the Sri Lankan government, I find that their tactics divide this case into five time periods. In the first time period, from 1976 until 1987, Sri Lanka failed to quell a Tamil Tiger insurgency through a general strategy of policing. This chapter finds that the Tamil Tigers are best coded as a strategic group, suggesting that a no bargain strategy like policing will produce pernicious effects for the state. From 1987 until 1990, the Indian government’s intervention led to a campaign designed to pacify and conquer the Tamil Tigers through a strategy of reciprocal punishment. This strategy saw limited success during the time of its implementation, but also allowed the LTTE to increase dramatically their recruitment and capacity. Following the Indian military’s withdrawal, the Sri Lankan government attempted to offer concessions to the LTTE from 1990-1994, which offered mixed results, given their growing power and strategic goals. From 1995 until 2001, Sri Lanka’s military strategy was intermittently effective in pushing the strategically motivated Tamil Tigers toward the negotiating table. I argue that Sri Lanka may have made a crucial error in moving toward peace talks from 2001 until 2005 as the LTTE was beginning to moderate its strategic goals, possibly because of reactionary fear
following the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States. This failure has continued as a result of Sri Lanka’s transition to an accommodationist strategy; primarily because the type of accommodations offered have only emboldened LTTE desires for secessionism. This is most aptly demonstrated in the frequently violated ceasefire announced in 2002. Because of the Tigers’ strategic motivations, these accommodations were not sufficient to ameliorate violence and emboldened the Tigers within their strategic goals. This emboldening can most effectively be seen in the increasing violations of the 2002 ceasefire and an eventual return to large scale insurgency, which has led the Sri Lankan government to readopt a policy of reciprocal violence, which they appear to have maintained through 2007.

Below I discuss the various counterinsurgency tactics undertaken by the Sri Lankan state, at times with the help of the Indian military. I discuss how each of these periods can reasonably represent an overall counterinsurgency strategy against the Tamil Tigers. I do this by examining two key factors. First, is the state attempting to bargain or negotiate with the insurgent group? By drawing on governmental statements and scholarly narratives, I find that the Sri Lankan government regularly (though not always) attempted to negotiate with the LTTE. Just as important, did the counterinsurgency tactics employed by the government seek to punish violence perpetrated by the group with additional hardship and violence, or did the government also grant rewards or concessions to the insurgent based on their willingness to abandon violence? As I discussed in Chapter 2, answering these two questions using the coding rules I have stipulated allows me to broadly categorize the counterinsurgency strategy that the Sri
Lankan government employs. This is important as we examine how the goals of the LTTE affect the counterinsurgency strategy of Sri Lanka to either ameliorate or exacerbate the level of violence in the conflict.

1976-1985: From Policing to Intervention

In the early years of the conflict, the Sri Lankan government did not accord a particularly unique role to the LTTE compared to other Tamil political groups. Though Prabhakaran had attempted several assassinations in the years prior to 1976, he was unsuccessful in the execution of these fairly singular and disorganized attacks (Alexander 2002). In fact, he was so spectacularly unsuccessful that the attacks appear to have not been taken very seriously by Sri Lankan authorities. Prabhakaran would not be individually successful in doing anything more than exploding a bomb at a local government sponsored carnival until 1975, when he and two other men were finally successful in assassinating the moderate Tamil mayor of Jaffna, Alfred Duraiappah (Richardson 2005). It was after this violent act that Prabhakaran began to rise to greater prominence in the Tamil insurgency, which ultimately gave birth to the LTTE.

In fact, in the early years of this period, Sri Lankan counterinsurgency policy could not claim to be focused on any particular insurgent group or their leaders. Rather, the Sinhalese government understood that political groups such as the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), Tamil Student’s League (TSL), and the Tamil Youth League (TYL) represented more radical alternatives to the parliamentary-committed, yet nationalist Tamil United Front (TUF) (Joshi 1996). Thus, there is no evidence that the Sri Lankan government offered any bargains of any sort to violent insurgent groups.
existing in the early part of this eleven-year period. Rather, the evidence of governmental action indicates that violence stemming from these groups was treated as essentially individual criminal matters, and beyond the prevention or prosecution of violent acts, no additional punitive or preventative tactics were undertaken. That is, the violence was treated as if it stemmed from an individual, rather than as directed by an overarching group. For example, a major incident at this time was the apprehension of a TELO leader’s boat in 1973 that was loaded with explosives and munitions. Though this act suggested a marked escalation in the preparation and scale of potential violence, police forces and criminal courts were entirely responsible for the incident’s resolution. Sri Lankan prosecutors successfully extradited the TELO leader from India and he was ultimately sentenced to jail time (Joshi 1996).

In 1976, as described above, Prabhakaran founded the Tamil Tigers, or LTTE. At this time, the government still did not publicly identify any particular organization within the Tamil unrest. Mia Bloom, quoting K.M. de Silva, argues that the government understood Tamil violence in the 1970s as stemming from individual violence, rather than a larger or more organized violent agitation (Bloom 2003). This would begin to change in 1979, when “the government promulgated the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), which permitted the army and the police to hold prisoners incommunicado for up to 18 months without trial” (Bloom 2003). This act led to significant detention rates amongst Tamil youth, which the government intended to use to remove the most violent agitators from the local populace. Bloom argues that the policy had the opposite effect, escalating Tamil violence in general in the 1980s (Bloom 2003). Regardless of overall
levels of violence, the fact remains that clear evidence shows that even in the early 1980s, the Sri Lankan government would not extend itself beyond the policing strategy that it had adopted at the outbreak of Tamil unrest.

In 1981, the Sri Lankan government began holding informal talks with a Tamil nationalist political party, the TULF. This organization had been affiliated with Prabhakaran’s LTTE as late as 1978, but split from the LTTE over disagreements about the legitimacy of using the political process. As a result, the LTTE was not part of these talks. Regardless, talks broke down as general Tamil violence escalated in northern Sri Lanka throughout 1982 and into the early months of 1983.

In 1983, mass communal violence broke out in Tamil regions of Sri Lanka. At this time, the government took its first major steps of involvement in an attempt to quell the uprising. In October of 1983, the government dispatched 2000 army soldiers to the north to restore order and limit ethnically-based rioting (Muni 1993). However, it is important to note that at this time, the government was not attempting to communicate with or negotiate with any militant Tamil groups, much less the LTTE. As a consequence, we can continue to conclude that the government retained its policing strategy.

In early 1984, the Sri Lankan government of J.R. Jayewardene convened an all-party conference in Colombo to attempt to address the rising violence between Tamil and Sinhalese groups in the northern part of the island. This conference would run through nearly the entirety of 1984. During this time, with moderate Tamil groups engaged with discussions of devolution with the government, the LTTE was able to grow in numbers
and support. Yet, the government focused its attention on moderate and parliamentary groups within its conference and undertook no actions or statements toward the LTTE. This approach would change in 1985. **Yet, we can conclude that the strategy of the state in terms of the LTTE itself was policing for the above period.** This is largely due in the early years to ignorance of the LTTE, and in later years to a focus on moderate, parliamentary-oriented groups.

**1985-1990: Sri Lankan Escalation and Indian Intervention**

In 1985, several things happened which caused the Sri Lankan government of Jayewardene to reconsider its policing strategy with respect to the Tamil Tigers. First, the all-party conference that the government had entertained throughout 1984 failed to yield any results. While moderate parties had committed to negotiate with the government, this allowed radical groups like the LTTE to continue to gain support and to escalate the level of violence in the north. At the same time, the talks themselves had ultimately been inconclusive (O’Ballance 1989). The government had been unable to get the diffuse parties to agree on a devolution accord. Second, the LTTE engaged in several major acts of violence near the end of 1984. On November 30, the LTTE perpetrated massacres in two Sinhalese farming villages (Alexander 2002). Third, as described above, the internal power struggle amongst Tamils tips further in the militants’ favor when they successfully killed a number of Tamil political moderates to further hamper a diplomatic settlement (Rudolph 2003).

**Because of these actions, the Sri Lankan government fundamentally shifted its approach from one of policing to a strategy of reciprocal violence.** Several pieces
of evidence support this coding. First, the Sri Lankan government changed the application of its military’s tactics. Whereas in 1983 and 1984, the military had served in the capacity of auxiliary police forces in northern Sri Lanka, by 1985, they took on a prosecutorial role toward Tamil militants, including the increasingly prominent LTTE (Muni 1993). As Vernon Mendis describes this period, “the Sri Lankan government escalated its military operations against the LTTE, taking the stand that it would tackle ‘terrorism’ before trying to reach a political solution” (Alexander 2002). At the same time that the government escalated militarily, it also sought to bargain with the militant portions of the Tamil movement. In fact, by July of 1985, the Sri Lankan government had entered into direct talks with the Tamil Tigers, while at the same time escalating direct punishment against the LTTE. The coupling of direct communication, promising an end of violence for an exchange in kind, while at the same time continuing to apply that violence, is a hallmark of a state practicing a strategy of reciprocal violence.

This strategy of seeking negotiation while continuing to punish with violence continued throughout 1986 and into 1987. A major turning point of the conflict, described above, occurred in 1987, when India moved out of the role of mediator and into the role of a direct participant in the conflict. Supporting the Sri Lankan strategy of reciprocal violence, in late July of 1987, 6,000 Indian troops were sent to northern Sri Lankan to disarm and subdue the LTTE. While India was viewed as a more neutral player and therefore better equipped to pacify the LTTE, this task proved much more difficult than imagined and by November 1987, nearly 20,000 Indian troops occupied northern Sri Lanka (Bose 1994). At the height of Indian involvement, nearly 150,000
troops (including paramilitary supporters) were engaged against the LTTE (Alexander 2002). India’s military forces continued the strategy of reciprocal violence put in place by the Sri Lankan government (Bullion 1995). In this case, the negotiations are now two-fold. Talks continue, though more sporadically, between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. At the same time, local negotiations regarding the continuance or cessation of violence regularly occur between the Indian army and the LTTE. These interactions persist until Indian completes its pullout in 1990 (Rudolph 2003). Therefore, we can comfortably claim that while Indian entry into the conflict substantially changes the quantitative level of violence, it was not associated with a change in the qualitative selection of counterinsurgent strategy, which remained reciprocal violence throughout the period.

1990-1994: Proposed Peace

In the midst of Indian involvement in northern Sri Lanka, two important events occurred for the government of Sri Lanka. First, during this time, the government was forced to allow the Indian military force to take the lead role in combating the Tamil Tigers. The Sri Lankan government had a separate violent uprising from the Sinhalese nationalist group, the JVP, in the southern regions of the island. These so-called “protectors of Sinhala culture” served to make life extraordinarily difficult for Jayewardene and may have led to his defeat in the Presidential election of 1988 (Joshi 1996). Jayewardene was replaced by R. Premadasa of the UNP party. This Presidential election in 1988 was the second significant event, and ultimately paved the way for a
second shift in governmental counterinsurgent strategy. **This shift led Sri Lanka to practice an accommodationist counterinsurgency strategy over this time period.**

Unlike Jayewardene, Premadasa was not a party to the Indo-Lanka Accord that brought massive numbers of Indian army troops into Sri Lanka to fight the LTTE. One of his first priorities was the removal of those Indian troops from Sri Lankan soil as expeditiously as possible.

To facilitate this process, the Premadasa government began to engage in secret talks with members of the LTTE to co-opt them into the removal of Indian troops. These secret talks coincided with public peace talks between the Premadasa government and the Tamil Tigers. In the secret talks, the government offered the LTTE support, even up to money, weapons, and military camps, for their continued efforts to harass departing Indian soldiers (Muni 1993; Alexander 2002; Richardson 2005). In the public talks, the LTTE was offered a cease-fire, which it used to great advantage. During this time, as noted above, the LTTE emerged as the preeminent Tamil militant group, with no real rivals.

These offers of concessions would ultimately doom President Premadasa, as he would be killed by a Tamil Tiger suicide bomber on May 1, 1993. While Premadasa’s death certainly slowed and probably ultimately erased the hope of negotiations in 1993, they did not do so immediately. Both of Premadasa’s immediate successors, the former Prime Minister Dingiri Banda and the newly elected President Chandrika Kumaratunga sought to continue negotiations and peace talks with the LTTE. Kumaratunga continued to offer cease-fires to the LTTE in exchange for discussions of peace talks. Kumaratunga
even went so far as to make a major offer of autonomy to the Tamils through the LTTE, but this offer was rejected (Whittaker 2003). Pressure from Sinhalese nationalist hardliners would quickly push Kumaratunga away from this conciliatory position. Negotiations with the LTTE continued during this period, even while violence by the LTTE escalated in the face of a supposed cease-fire. This ceasefire was ultimately formally withdrawn by the LTTE in April of 1995.

1995-2001: State-led Violence

With the LTTE withdrawal from its cease-fire with the Sri Lankan government, the government elected to return to a campaign of reciprocal violence against the Tamil Tigers. By June of 1995, the government was issuing formal declarations that it would militarily defeat the LTTE, rather than continue to attempt to accommodate them (Alexander 2002; Bloom 2003). While the government escalated their military efforts against the LTTE (and dropped all offers of help and aid that came during the Indian presence in Sri Lanka), they also continued to bargain with the LTTE. Throughout this period, several abortive rounds of negotiations and numerous governmental statements indicated that Sri Lanka intended to continue punishing the Tigers for their acts of violence so long as the Tigers continued to commit them. This is coded as a strategy of reciprocal violence.

In 1995, the government undertook significant actions to undermine the strength that the LTTE had gained through the intervening years of neglect and support. The Sri Lankan government captured the LTTE’s main base in the Jaffna peninsula and a major urban base in Kilinochi a year later. The government also became increasingly
concerned about LTTE naval prowess at this time and blockaded arms connections that the LTTE had established with the Indian mainland.

Throughout 1996 and 1997, the Sri Lankan government continued to pressure and punish the LTTE for acts of violence, including attacks against military targets (such as the destruction of Sri Lankan naval vessels) and civilian targets (often by suicide bombings) (Bloom 2003). While continuing to attack Tiger positions, the Sri Lankan government also sought outside pressure on the LTTE, procuring diplomatic support from the United States, the United Kingdom, and India, amongst others (Richardson 2005). At the same time, Sri Lanka also sought international mediation. While this was proposed to the LTTE before, to no avail, desire for mediation was a unilateral action on the part of the government. However, when Norway was invited to serve as a mediator, the invitation was supported by Prabhakaran and LTTE in 2000. This still did not signal a change in strategy, because the government continued to attack and punish the LTTE with the expressed desire of dissuading them from future attacks. According to Teresita Schaffer, the director of the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in 1999, the Sri Lankan government specifically avoided three tactics that would be hallmarks of accommodation toward the LTTE. Schaffer argues that the Sri Lankan government undertook no serious efforts to sway Tamil citizens in hearts and minds campaign, to grant increased autonomy to the Tamils, or to conclude a serious peace settlement with the LTTE (1999). Therefore, I code the Sri Lankan government’s counterinsurgent strategy as reciprocal violence throughout this time period.
2001-2005: Peace Talks

Once again, several significant events occurred in close succession to pave the way for Sri Lanka to yet again switch its strategy from one of reciprocal violence to a counterinsurgency strategy focused on accommodation of the insurgent group. First, the LTTE undertook a major and internationally visible attack on July 24, 2001. Despite extensive security, LTTE units were able to infiltrate the Colombo airport and significantly damage numerous planes from Sri Lanka’s national carrier. While the number of casualties was low, the economic cost was huge, especially as Sri Lanka attempted to launch a tourism campaign (Alexander 2002; Heiberg, O'Leary et al. 2007). Thus, policy makers around the world were aware of the LTTE as September 11, 2001 dawned in the United States. Following the events of that day, international attention turned much more sternly onto groups that could easily be labeled terrorist. As a consequence, Mendis argues that the LTTE was cowed from further attacks, especially on a grand scale, for fear that reprisals would be swift and coalitional (Alexander 2002). Regardless, the strategy of the Sri Lankan government was to fully support the American-led war on terror, and to paint the LTTE with the same brush as Al Qaeda. Sri Lanka also sought Indian assistance again. In this case, the solution was not Indian intervention, but Indian pressure for LTTE supporters in its own country. In the wake of 9/11, India was more willing to comply with the proposal. Because of Indian pressure, strategic LTTE missteps, and worries over international reaction, Sri Lanka’s President Kumaratunga was able to sign a cease-fire agreement with the LTTE in early 2002.
As further evidence that the government had switched strategies to an **accommodationist approach**, the government spurned pressure from Sinhalese nationalist groups (including President Kumaratunga) to continue a military prosecution of the LTTE before engaging them in negotiations (Bush 2003; Richardson 2005; Heiberg, O'Leary et al. 2007). While the Sri Lankan government first offered negotiations, the LTTE was willing to enter into talks, though this did not yield an immediate peace. However, the next two and a half years were more generally characterized by the government of Sri Lankan negotiating and offering various concessions to the Tamil Tigers in exchange for the formal renunciation of hostilities, rather than attempting to compel them to abjure via military force. The government would often take the lead in attempting to restart negotiations when the Tigers suspended them, or moving to make additional concessions when negotiations stalled. Though talks officially stalled in mid-2003, the government continued to offer concessions of autonomy and amnesty to the LTTE until December 2004, when the tsunami struck Sri Lanka and changed life on the island irreparably.

2005 Postscript: A return to violence

Many activists and thinkers hoped that the tsunami would serve to propel the peace process in Sri Lanka forward. With both Sinhalese and Tamils needing and having a role to play in providing aid, perhaps this could be an opportunity for a natural tragedy to provide a solution to a political conflict (2006; 2006).

Sadly, that did not appear to be the case. Though the year following the tsunami saw the formal retention of the ceasefire, it was increasingly violated by both LTTE
attacks and Sri Lankan military reprisals. This cycle worsened with the Sri Lankan
election of 2005, which saw former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe elected as
President. It now appears that President Wickremasinghe intends to return to a policy of
reciprocal violence, as he has abandoned concessions to the LTTE while at the same time
resumed significant punitive military actions against them, including the seizure of land
that had been held by the Tigers since 2002. We might suppose that unless things
change, Sri Lanka is entering a new era of reciprocal violence with the LTTE.

Evaluating the Outcome of State Counter-Insurgency Efforts

In this study, we are primarily concerned with two measures associated with state
counterinsurgency strategies on insurgent groups. First, how often does the insurgent
group perpetrate acts of violence? Second, how deadly are the acts of violence
perpetrated by the violent group? I argue that when the death toll and number of
incidents climbs, the state is unsuccessful in ameliorating insurgent violence with its
current strategy. When the death toll and the frequency of incidents falls, this is a good
indicator of a state’s progress in ameliorating violence stemming from an insurgency.

In the case of Sri Lanka, there are several complicating factors. The first
complicating factor is the complex nature of the insurgency. This complexity takes
several forms. First, in the early years of the LTTE’s existence, other violent Tamil
groups serve as competitors to the LTTE. Some portion of violence perpetrated during
this time would logically stem from these groups. However, this problem is not
insurmountable. After all, in the early years of the LTTE’s existence, the overall level of
violence stemming from all Tamil militant groups is quite low (see Figure 5.5 below).
The time period where the LTTE had significant challengers within the Tamil militant community is the pre-1984 period. The post-1984 period marks the rise of interethnic violence after the communal riots of 1983. By this time, the LTTE had significantly consolidated authority within the Tamil community, as the above narrative describes. Somewhat more problematic is the intervention of Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) from 1987-1990. With the entry of a third party, measures of LTTE violence no longer capture just actions against the Sri Lankan government, but instead against a mixture of the Sri Lankan government and IPKF. However, I believe that this ultimately does not confound the analysis for two reasons. First, the goals of IPKF and the Sri Lankan government were the same insofar as they were both concerned with reducing the level of violence stemming from the LTTE. Second, the tactics employed by the Sri Lankan government and the IPKF display significant continuity, as described above. Therefore, any effect that the IPKF had on LTTE violence should be in the same direction as the tactics undertaken by the Sri Lankan government.

The second complicating factor is the availability of data on deaths and incidents of violence (Sislin 2006). For the figures below, I have drawn data from two sources. For the years 1976-1988, I have used the accounting of incidents and fatalities employed in John Richardson’s authoritative account of the Sri Lankan conflict with the LTTE, Paradise Poisoned (Richardson 2005). For the time period 1989-2006, I am able to use data from the Uppsala Conflict Database (2007). The value in these two measures is their ability to disaggregate LTTE sponsored incidents and LTTE caused fatalities from the more general universe of violent incidents and fatalities per year in Sri Lanka. That said,
I agree with Sislin and Pearson that reports of deaths often present accuracy problems, as do reports of incidents (Sislin 2006). However, I am reasonably confident in the objectivity of the two sources I am using. Furthermore, if they are biased in some way, we should be able to expect that their bias is relatively consistent, given their own internal coding rules (Richardson 2005; Högbladh 2007).

With the above caveats in mind, allow me to review my hypotheses in light of the data that I have developed on my independent variables. First, I have found the predominant coding of the LTTE’s motivations to be strategic throughout the time period under consideration. I have made this determination based on coding the speeches of their most important leaders. As a consequence of this coding, I am only able to evaluate hypotheses 1a-1c, which are as follows:

1a. When the LTTE is coded as a strategically motivated group; Sri Lankan tactics of reciprocal violence will succeed in reducing violence.

1b. When the LTTE is coded as a strategically motivated group; Sri Lankan tactics of policing will fail in reducing violence.

1c. When the LTTE is coded as a strategically motivated group; Sri Lankan tactics of accommodation will fail in reducing violence.

I have also coded the tactics employed by the Sri Lankan government. I have found that these tactics change over the time period considered. Given that the LTTE is strategically motivated over the entire time period I consider, my theory holds the following expectations for my hypotheses. These hypotheses are derived from the conditional model that I describe in Chapter 2.
I will now evaluate these hypotheses with respect to the actual levels of violence in Sri Lanka from 1976 through 2006. In Figures 5.6-5.8 below, I present summary data on the actual levels of violence in Sri Lanka that will be used to evaluate the relative performance of counterinsurgent strategies. Figure 5.6 presents overall numbers of deaths and overall numbers of incidents overlaid with numbers of deaths and incidents perpetrated specifically by the LTTE. As can be seen from this graph, the number of deaths attributed to the LTTE per year is dwarfed by the total number of deaths for many years in the study. This should not surprise us, given the narrative account above. The LTTE spent much of its early existence consolidating its position within the Tamil community as the sole source of the insurgency. However, there has been, especially in the 1980s, an enormous amount of intercommunal violence in Sri Lanka, both Tamil and Sinhalese, which is not attributable to any organization. It is also important to note that the total number of incidents is only available until 1988, but remains relatively low until the final year. We might suspect that the number of incidents climbed after 1988, as the
death toll rose precipitously, but as our focus is on the LTTE specifically, we can turn to Figures 5.7 and 5.8 for more specific and germane evidence. Figures 5.7 and 5.8 chart the number of incidents perpetrated by the LTTE and the number of deaths caused by the LTTE per year. Please note that in counting deaths caused by the LTTE, I am not including the deaths of LTTE members themselves, whether they are in combat, or more rarely, as the product of suicide bombings. These estimations are significantly more difficult to estimate confidently, and counting them would distort the variables of interest for the conditional model I propose. How do these two measures trend in the time periods that correspond to the state strategies that I have coded? A summary table is present below in Figure 5.9.

![Violence in Sri Lanka](image)

Figure 5.6: Overall Patterns of Violence and LTTE Patterns of Violence in Sri Lanka
Sources: Uppsala Conflict Database (http://www.pcr.uu.se/database; accessed 4/28/07) and (Richardson 2005).
Figure 5.7: Number of Incidents Perpetrated by LTTE
   Sources: Uppsala Conflict Database (http://www.pcr.uu.se/database; accessed 4/28/07) and (Richardson 2005).

Figure 5.8: Number of Fatalities Caused by LTTE
   Sources: Uppsala Conflict Database (http://www.pcr.uu.se/database; accessed 4/28/07) and (Richardson 2005).
Figure 5.9: Table of Observations on Dependent Variable in the LTTE case

Conclusion

What does the case of the LTTE’s nationalist separatist struggle against the Sri Lankan government mean for my contingent theory of counterinsurgency success?

Below is a chart revisiting the hypotheses that I evaluate and their outcomes. The notations for the applicable hypotheses refer to those described at the beginning of this chapter.

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There is the broader issue of a time lag effect, which I have argued earlier is likely to be minimal. However, a minimal time lag effect is not the same as a zero time lag effect. In cases like this, when more than half the time period under consideration ends on the same trend, I will adopt that trend in my evaluation, while noting that the evidence is not unequivocal.
Figure 5.10: Table of Expectations for Conditional Model in the LTTE case

As can be seen from Figure 5.10 above, the theory accurately predicted the nascent years of the LTTE from 1976 through 1985. Specifically, the theory suggests that the strategically motivated LTTE would not be successfully dissuaded from violence by the rump policing efforts of the Sri Lankan government. In fact, we might argue that initial Sri Lankan intransigence and oft-times complicity in violence toward the mobilization of Tamil militancy contributed to the rise of the LTTE. In fact, one area of necessary consideration is the efficiency of policing efforts that states employ in the face of communal violence. If the state is motivated to take sides, as appears to be the case during this time in Sri Lanka, we might expect that policing can be done poorly or well. Poorly executed or ham-fisted policing may actually create opportunities for increasing
violence, as was the case during this time in Sri Lanka (Abrahms 2006). I address this aspect of the execution of state strategy in detail in the concluding chapter.

The contingent theory also successfully predicted the amelioration of LTTE violence via the strategy of reciprocal violence from 1985 through 1990. That is, the policy of reciprocal violence carried out first by Sri Lankan government and then by the Indian Peace Keeping Force was successful in reducing the frequency and deadliness of attacks by the LTTE. This is remarkable, given that the presence of the IPKF increased the number of interactions between the LTTE and its opponents. It appears that IPKF might ultimately have been successful in completely dissuading the LTTE from violent militancy (or at least reducing their capacity to pursue it) had domestic politics and relations with the Sri Lankan government allowed them to continue their mission of Tamil disarmament.

Unfortunately, after 1990 the evidence does not conform to the conditional theory’s expectations. From 1990 through 1994, we observe an initial rise followed by a steady decline in LTTE incidents. We also observe an unsteady decline in LTTE deaths, meaning that while LTTE incidents did decline; those same incidents appear to have become somewhat more lethal. This evidence is not sufficient to support hypothesis 1c. We might hypothesize that this time period would comport with the theory more closely if we were able to understand a shift in LTTE strategy, which led them to adopt less frequent but more spectacular attacks. Why would the LTTE do this? I believe such a strategy may be derived as a response to the Sri Lankan government’s willingness to negotiate but not make any binding commitments. Less frequent but more spectacular
attacks might be tied into a strategy of attempting to goad the Sri Lankan government into more significant reactions. I address this potential avenue for future research in the concluding chapter.

From 1995 through 2001, there is a period in the middle of the strategy where deaths and violent incidents perpetrated by the LTTE do fall, as the theory would predict. However, this period is bordered by periods where violence is rising. Even if we accept the first period of rising violence (1995-1996) as a holdover from the prior strategy, this does not help explain the second period of rising violence (1999-2000). We might guess that the Sri Lankan government’s strategy of reciprocal violence was undermined by their own international efforts to secure third-party mediation, while at the same time making no efforts to offer concessions to the LTTE domestically. It is possible that the LTTE interpreted this set of behaviors as weakness on the part of the Sri Lankan government and continued to press their campaign of violence in the face of what would otherwise have been an effective strategy. At best, this time period presents only mixed evidence and does not support hypothesis 1a.

From 2001-2005, we observe a marked decline in the number of incidents and number of deaths caused by the LTTE. This evidence runs contrary to the expectations of the theory and does not support hypothesis 1c. We might hypothesize, based on the narrative and empirical evidence presented here, that the LTTE was willing to abjure violence on the promise of continued accommodations because it believed that it might either make real gains from the accommodations, or at the very least, bide time against the Sri Lankan government until it could resume its campaign of violent coercion.
One does wonder in this case why the Sri Lankan government would offer accommodations to an insurgency that appeared ready to negotiate. It is possible (and supported by the narrative constructed above) that the Sri Lankan government bargained without good faith, simply hoping to use the tactic of negotiations and promised (but never delivered) accommodations as a means of forestalling violence before conflict resumed. In this way, it allowed the Sri Lankan government to catch its breath in the conflict. It is also possible that the Al Qaeda attacks against the United States of September 11 gave the LTTE pause, but the Sri Lankan government did not perceive this, and continued to offer concessions that eventually re-emboldened the Tamil Tigers. I conclude, based on recent narrative accounts, that the effect of 9/11 in giving the LTTE pause in its violent tactics is more significant than was realized at the time. In some ways, the U.S. response to the attacks of 9/11 served as an external but still credible strategy of reciprocal violence that the LTTE took more seriously than the more immediate but duplicitous strategy of accommodation offered by the Sri Lankan government.

The last time period, 2005 to the present, is much more preliminary, but seems to represent a return to reciprocal violence for Sri Lanka and an increase in violence for the LTTE. To the extent that this is true, it runs contrary to the expectations of the theory. However, if the narrative account of the 2001-2005 period is correct, both sides now understand that period to be one of false accommodation, and therefore it may temporarily inoculate the LTTE against being responsive to a Sri Lankan strategy of reciprocal violence. The question would be whether violence would continue to escalate
against Sri Lanka, or whether it would level off and decline with a continued application of reciprocal violence.
CHAPTER 6

THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT VERSUS THE FLN

"Rebellions can be made by two percent active in a striking force and 98 percent passively sympathetic."\(^{24}\)

Introduction

T.E. Lawrence’s famous formula for rebellions above has never been tested empirically, though it remains evocative. Yet, if there is anything close to a test of this proscription, it might be found in the Algerian uprising and revolution against French colonial authority from 1954-1962. During this brief period of time, the Algerian nationalist-separatist movement grew from a minor and marginal insurgency to a broad-based movement, which ultimately was successful in changing French government policy toward Algeria and in securing Algerian independence. This chapter will address the development of this movement by tracking the insurgent efforts of the predominant Algerian insurgent organization, the FLN.\(^{25}\) How was the violence perpetuated by the FLN affected by the counterinsurgency strategies of the colonial French government? Did the strategy of the French government succeed, as some have suggested, in


\(^{25}\) The FLN is short for Front de Libération Nationale.
exacerbating the FLN’s proclivity for violence? Alternatively, did the French strategy successfully suppress violence from FLN? What helps to explain these violent and complex interactions? In this chapter, I apply the model presented in Chapters 1 and 2 to the conflict as it has occurred between the French government and the FLN.

This chapter will help us evaluate questions described in the first and second chapters. These questions are central to the understanding of nationalist secessionist insurgencies. In the brief history of Algerian independence, we can distinguish several distinct strategic approaches that the French employed in their counterinsurgency. Do these strategic choices help explain periods of increased violence and periods of decreased violence against the materially weaker Algerian insurgency? What factors, if any, influence rising and falling levels of violence? Could the French government have employed a more successful counterinsurgent strategy against a violent, non-state group like the FLN? In the first two chapters, I described several models of counterinsurgent behavior that have been proffered within scholarly literature as superior for dealing with insurgencies (Galula 1964; Trinquier 1964; Hamilton 1997; Mackinlay 2002; Nagl 2002; Mackinlay 2005). The two most sharply distinguished models are the combat model and the social model. I then proposed that while these models each feature cases of success and cases of failure\textsuperscript{26}, a conditional model incorporating both of them allows us to hypothesize why they both might succeed and fail under certain circumstances. This chapter contributes to the project by evaluating this conditional model using evidence from the French counterinsurgency efforts against the FLN.

\textsuperscript{26} That is, cases where the frequency of violent incidents and the lethality of those attacks during the insurgent campaign decrease (success for the state) or increase (failure for the state).
Review of Theory

I propose that the actions of states can be grouped into three general strategic conceptions. These strategies may be selected for a variety of reasons. In the first option, the state can try to police against actions of the groups, arrest members of the group through standard means of law, and seek to undermine the group through tactics that would also be employed by any other type of organized crime. In the second option, the state adds to the base strategy of the first option by attempting raise the costs of the non-state actor’s violence by punishing them with strategy of reciprocal violence. In the third and final option, states can opt for a strategy of accommodation; attempting to integrate the group into a nonviolent realm of the political process. Various states may even be observed to attempt more than one of these strategies over the course of their interaction with a particular non-state group. These three state strategies represent approaches to counterinsurgency described in extant literature.

Variance in state strategy does not alone explain the outcomes of insurgent conflicts. I also argue that insurgent groups can be grouped into three general conceptions of their decision-making. The first conception is that groups strategically and instrumentally connect their actions to their stated goals. The second conception suggests that groups are motivated by internal dynamics and that these dynamics create a disjunction between groups’ stated goals and their actions. Finally, the third conception is that groups do not see a difference between their stated goals and the actions they take. That is to say, their actions are always intended to be a direct achievement of their goals.
These three concepts reflect strategic, organizational, and extremist portraits of insurgent groups that have been painted in extant literature (described in Chapter 1).

I argue that it is the interaction of the general strategy of the state and the general conception of the group’s decision-making that predicts success or failure in an insurgent conflict. That is, when a strategically oriented group is faced with a strategy of reciprocal violence, the group’s violence will be quelled more efficiently than if either of the other strategies is employed. This is additionally true when an organizationally oriented group is faced with an accomodationist strategy and when an extremist oriented group is faced with a basic policing strategy.

*Evidence and Methodology*

This chapter focuses on one of the seminal cases of insurgent conflict. Consequently, studies of the Algerian uprising against the French government are important on two levels. First, some of the critical early studies of insurgency drew extensively from the French experience in Algeria (Leighton 1962; 1963; American University (Washington D.C.). Special Operations Research Office. 1963; Trinquier 1964; Heggoy 1972). This fascination has not abated with more current studies of insurgent conflict (Merom 2004; O'Neill 2005). Therefore, the inclusion of the Algerian case is important, if only because so much of the theoretical work dealing with insurgency has been applied to this case. Second, and more importantly, the history of the Algerian conflict has been read by political leaders and insurgency aspirants alike. Because of the early experience of French difficulties in quelling the insurgency in Algeria, other leaders have attempted to draw lessons from French experience, while
other insurgent movements have attempted to replicate the successes of the FLN (Khong 1992).

For the purposes of this study, French attempts to ameliorate violence stemming from the Algerian uprising make a useful case to study for several reasons. First, the French military clearly held a vast material advantage over the Algerian insurgents (Wall 2001; Gallagher 2002). Yet despite this material advantage, the French military was ultimately unsuccessful in retaining control of Algeria. We might then reasonably ask, “Did the French care all that much for Algeria?” The answer is an unequivocal yes, which leads to the second reason that this case is particularly attractive. Though Algeria was technically a colony, it held a particularly central place in the French political mind. Furthermore, by virtue of both French emigration to Algeria and the proximity of Algeria to France, some authors have argued that the French particularly valued their holdings in Algeria over other territories (Lustick 1993; Merom 2003; Merom 2004). Consequently, the stakes of losing control of Algeria were particularly high. Thus, it is an interesting puzzle to explain why France, with predominant material power and a clear desire to invest highly in the retention of Algeria, was unable to ameliorate violence that ultimately led to Algeria’s independence.

For this case study, I employ explicit coding rules (developed in chapter 2) to interpret narrative accounts of conflicts and to code both the strategic choices of France and the decision-making characteristics of the FLN. I also employ narrative accounts of the insurgency to capture the stakes and goals of both the FLN and the French government. I am applying these coding rules to a selection of histories, secondary
interviews, and news articles, as well as academic treatments of the conflicts. I use these accounts to construct a narrative of the insurgent conflict as well as a measurement of the intensity of the insurgency’s violent activity. I then compare the interaction of states’ strategic choices and the conception of groups’ decision-making to the relative success or failure of both the group and the state vis-à-vis their goals.

Compared to the other three cases in this study, this examination of the FLN’s nationalist-separatist insurgency against the French government differs in one important methodological respect. For the other three studies, I was able to obtain extensive bodies of verbatim English-language or single translator speeches from key leaders of the insurgencies. As a result, I was able to code these speeches both individually and collectively according to the rules above. Thus, the other three case studies offered summaries of data projecting the presence or absence of specific articulated components that signal their speaker’s motivations for insurgency. This is not the case for the FLN insurgency. Simply put the extensive bodies of collected or even diffuse speeches and interviews by key leaders of the FLN insurgency simply do not exist in an accessible or readily obtainable form.

Why is there a dearth of statements by leaders of the FLN? Were they simply more silent than leaders of other insurgencies? What factors explain this difference? Based on my analysis of the case, I conclude that several factors explain this divergence. First, one might suggest that there is a language issue. After all, the members of the FLN spoke either Arabic or French as their native tongue, so perhaps their statements and interviews never made their way into English. This appears to be possible, and even the
most likely explanation, initially. Such a notion is supported by the fact that I have been able to cull a number of brief quotes and anecdotes attributed to leaders of the FLN during the insurgency (mostly in the twenty to fifty word range). However, an examination of French language and Arabic language sources and bibliographies reveals a similar lack of comprehensive comments by the FLN. As for the source of these quotes, I have found that many sources seem to use the same quotes at a very high rate, suggesting that quotes from FLN leaders become totems passed from author to author as indicative of the leaders’ overall beliefs. While these quotes are fine for adding flavor to the narrative construction of the Algerian revolution, I would be deeply suspicious of basing my analysis on such a limited and selective pool of data.

If language barriers do not sufficient explain the lack of FLN statements, what does? I believe part of the answer has to do with coverage by the media. Unlike Northern Ireland, where a free and highly robust media found easy access to insurgents, Algeria in the late 1950s and early 1960s had less facility in obtaining interviews directly with men who were often hiding from prosecution by law enforcement (Jenkins 1982; McFerran 1997). However, a similar problem exists in Sri Lanka and Chechnya, yet insurgent groups in these areas have been able to communicate readily, even gregariously, with the outside world. I also conclude that technology has played a major role in these groups’ success. Both the Chechen insurgents and the Tamil Tigers have shown great facility with the internet and other forms of mass media. This is important for both, as fundraising is conducted abroad through such tools. This does not appear to be the case for the FLN in Algeria. Though the FLN was interested in making a case, it
was generally to the direct participants in the conflict, or though the café war, through French citizens. There is no observable campaign, violent or otherwise, towards broader international public opinion. A final issue of technology is recording and transcription technology. In the early years of the insurgency, leaders were rarely in places where their words could be recorded for posterity. Therefore, what we have of their statements comes primarily in two forms: small selections of statements remembered and later transcribed by first-hand witnesses, or recollections in the form of autobiographies and memoirs written much later (and for historical reflection). As I describe above, I am suspicious of using these sources of statements as I would be of using current speeches by Ahmed Ben Bella (of which there are many).

Despite this caveat, the analytical approach employed in this chapter is not substantially different from the other three. Statements and actions by the French government are as readily available as they are for Great Britain, Sri Lanka, and Russia. I still evaluate the words and actions of French leaders in determining the components of French counterinsurgent strategy against the FLN. With respect to the FLN, I still examine key leaders of the movement in an attempt to discern both their individual motivations for pursuing violent insurgency as well as the organizational form and dynamics of the FLN. I still apply the coding rules I have developed to the secondary accounts and analyses described above to ultimately arrive at a general motivational coding for the FLN. As such, I am still confident in the methodological procedures I have developed to represent accurately the motivational dynamics of the FLN, according the rules and theory laid out in Chapter 2.
Hypotheses in the Algerian Case

In this chapter, I apply the hypotheses described in general in Chapter 2 to the specific case of the French government’s struggle against the FLN. As such, I will evaluate the following hypotheses:

1a. When the FLN is coded as a strategically motivated group; French tactics of reciprocal violence will succeed in reducing violence.

1b. When the FLN is coded as a strategically motivated group; French tactics of policing will fail in reducing violence.

1c. When the FLN is coded as a strategically motivated group; French tactics of accommodation will fail in reducing violence.

2a. When the FLN is coded as an organizationally motivated group; French tactics of reciprocal violence will fail in reducing violence.

2b. When the FLN is coded as an organizationally motivated group; French tactics of policing will fail in reducing violence.

2c. When the FLN is coded as an organizationally motivated group; French tactics of accommodation will succeed in reducing violence.

3a. When the FLN is coded as an extremist motivated group; French tactics of reciprocal violence will fail in reducing violence.

3b. When the FLN is coded as an extremist motivated group; French tactics of policing will succeed in reducing violence.

3c. When the FLN is coded as an extremist motivated group; French tactics of accommodation will fail in reducing violence.
Historical Background of the Conflict

Martha Crenshaw argues that the stage was set in Algeria for a nationalist-separatist insurgency long before the generally recognized outbreak of hostilities in 1954. She writes, “The initiation of conflict was gradual, no abrupt, despite French perceptions of its unexpectedness. It began as a political process in the years after the First World War” (Crenshaw 1995). What did this political process look like? In order to understand the Algerian nationalist-separatist movement, we must begin with the process of French colonialism.

French colonial influence Algeria began in 1830 and deeply affected both the colonial power and the colony. For the Algerians, the French represented a ruling power which was both perceived as foreign and non-Muslim in addition to a usurper of both governmental control and land ownership (Horne 1978). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the entirety of the effects of colonialism on Algeria, but a few summary statements are appropriate. First, colonialism led to a dearth of traditional leadership. With most authority stemming from French colonial power or the pied-noirs, Europeans who settled in Algerian because of French governance, there was a void of indigenous Algerian leadership. Second, and related to the breakdown of traditional leadership, the colonial distinctions and related racial discrimination led to the emergence of new social classes in Algeria. This would ultimately become important as a relatively youth-driven nationalist movement could quickly rise to prominence in the post-war years. Finally, in the years of French domination, the struggles to survive, to co-exist, to gain equality, and to achieve independence shaped a large part of the Algerian national
identity. Thus, there was strong sentiment of nationalist impulse within the Algerian discourse prior to the emergence of the FLN (Entelis 1980; Bennoune 1988; Stora 2001).

At the same time that indigenous Algerians resented French domination, Algeria occupied a special place in the colonial landscape of the French mindset. Unlike other French colonies, Algeria was never designated as a distinct French colony. Rather, Algeria was appropriated into the metropolitan French state. Hence, from the French perspective, Algeria was a part of France, not merely one of its colonies (Smith 1974; Horne 1978; Merom 1999; Wall 2001). Ultimately, this perspective dramatically increased the stakes for the French in their attempts to retain an increasingly restive Algeria. To countenance the loss of Algeria was to consider the loss of a part of France itself, rather than the less emotionally significant loss of one of her colonial holdings.

The most direct progenitors of the Algerian nationalist movement emerged in the wake of the first World War (Horne 1978; Stora 2001). Some members of this movement were members of the few wealthy Muslim families that had managed to integrate themselves into the colonial system in the pre-war period and had with difficulty succeeded in obtaining for their children (primarily their sons) a French education. Many others came from the numerous Algerians who had served in the French army during World War I or had otherwise assisted with the war effort. While in France, they became aware of a standard of living higher than any they had known at home. This might be good evidence for the relative deprivation thesis that has been used to explain the origins of ethnic unrest (Gurr 1970; Gurr 2000).
Even with the growth of Algerian nationalism, the first calls for Algerian independence did not sound until the interwar period (Bennoune 1988; Lustick 1993). These calls came initially from socialist and communist student organizations. Interestingly, there were contemporaneous calls for Algerian autonomy and reform (though with less of a focus on independence) from Islamic movements of the time. For the present, these calls were ignored in France, as the pied-noir colonists had much more significant business and political ties in the French government. The colonists themselves were deeply opposed to either Algerian independence or even reforms which would elevate the indigenous Algerian population in terms of political rights or economic opportunities (Hutchinson 1978).

The effects of World War II were highly catalytic in the movement towards Algerian independence. In World War I, Algerian Muslims had quickly rallied to the side of France. This was initially true in World War II as well, though the quick defeat of France meant that this support would ultimately be less significant and disjunctive with the German-implemented Vichy. This internal divisiveness was worsened by the fact that the pied-noir colonists generally supported the Vichy and encouraged its oppressive laws against both Algerian Jews and Muslims alike (Smith 1974; Bennoune 1988). Though the indigenous Algerians would continue to support the Allied effort after the liberation of North Africa and France, they were dissatisfied that the Allies essentially tabled their political concerns until after the conclusion of the war.

After the war, De Gaulle responded to Algerian desires for greater political autonomy with limited political concessions. Still worried by the political influence of
the pied-noir colonists but finding their political social-conservatism distasteful, De Gaulle enacted citizenship for select categories of indigenous Algerians, particularly those with recent military service on the behalf of France. Yet, these moves did little to pacify an increasingly belligerent Algerian nationalist movement, which was internally debating the relatively merits of autonomous federation with France and complete independence. Violence broke out in 1945 with communal Muslim rioting around the area of Sétif, which caused approximately 100 casualties amongst the pied-noir colonists (Crenshaw 1995). French authorities responded with punitive actions, including the bombardment of villages and large-scale arrests. In addition, the colonists themselves retaliated with the formation of vigilante death squads. Crenshaw estimates that the casualties results from these retaliations range between fifteen and forty-five thousand Algerians (Crenshaw 1995). This incident would further serve to foster nationalist sentiment amongst Algerians into the next decade.

Around this time, the main leaders of the yet to be formed FLN began to emerge within the Algerian nationalist movement. Ferhat Abbas had long been at the forefront of Algerian nationalism, but at this point, he was joined by other nationalist leaders, including Ahmed Ben Bella, Houari Boumédienne, and Krim Belkacem. Abbas founded the UDMA, which called for a free, secular, and republican Algeria loosely federated with France (Horne 1978). Ben Bella, on the other hand, took over control of the OS (Organisation Speciale), a group created in 1947 to conduct terrorist operations when political protest through legal channels was suppressed by authorities. Eventually, Ben Bella would abandon this group to create a new underground action committee. The new
group, the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action hereafter referred to as the CRUA), was based in Cairo, where Ben Bella had fled in 1952. Known as the chefs historiques (historical chiefs), the group's nine original leaders: Ait Ahmed, Mohamed Boudiaf, Belkacem Krim, Rabah Bitat, Larbi Ben M'Hidi, Mourad Didouch, Moustafa Ben Boulaid, Mohamed Khider, and Ben Bella, were considered the leaders of the Algerian war for independence (Quandt 1969; Horne 1978; Hutchinson 1978).

Between March and October 1954, the CRUA organized a military network in Algeria comprising six military regions referred to as wilayat. The leaders of these regions and their followers became known as the "internals.” Ben Bella, Khider, and Ait Ahmed formed the External Delegation in Cairo (Quandt 1969). Encouraged by Egypt's President Nasser, their role was to gain foreign support for the rebellion and to acquire arms, supplies, and funds for the wilayat commanders (Lustick 1993). In October, the CRUA renamed itself the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale), which assumed responsibility for the political direction of the revolution. The National Liberation Army (Armée de Libération Nationale commonly abbreviated ALN), the FLN's military arm, was formed to conduct the war of independence within Algeria (Heggoy 1972; Kumamoto 1999; Gallagher 2002).

*The Outbreak of the Insurgency*

In the early morning hours of November 1, 1954, FLN guerrillas launched attacks in various parts of Algeria against military installations, police posts, warehouses, communications facilities, and public utilities. From Cairo, the FLN broadcast a
proclamation calling on Muslims in Algeria to join in a national struggle for the
"restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social, within the
framework of the principles of Islam" (Metz 1994). The French Minister of Interior,
future President François Mitterrand, responded sharply that "the only possible
negotiation is war" (Metz 1994). It was the reaction of Premier Pierre Mendès-France,
who only a few months before had completed the liquidation of France's empire in
Indochina, which set the tone of French policy for the next five years. On November 12,
he declared in the National Assembly, "One does not compromise when it comes to
defending the internal peace of the nation, the unity and integrity of the Republic. The
Algerian departments are part of the French Republic. They have been French for a long
time, and they are irrevocably French … between them and metropolitan France there can
be no conceivable secession" (Metz 1994).

The FLN uprising presented other nationalist groups with the question of whether
to adopt armed revolt as the main mode of action. During the first year of the insurgency,
Ferhat Abbas's UDMA and other groups maintained friendly neutrality toward the FLN.
In April 1956, Abbas flew to Cairo, where he formally joined the FLN (Horne 1978;
Entelis 1986). This action brought in many nationalists who had supported the UDMA in
the past.

Not every group easily aligned with the FLN. One of the most notable alternative
groups within the Algerian nationalist movement was the National Algerian Movement
(Mouvement National Algérien usually referred to as MNA), which advocated a policy of
violent revolution and total independence similar to that of the FLN (Hutchinson 1978).
The ALN, the military wing of the FLN, subsequently violently wiped out the MNA guerrilla operation. However, the MNA survived this attack by moving abroad and gaining the support of a majority of Algerian workers in France through the Union of Algerian Workers. The FLN responded by also establishing a strong organization in France to oppose the MNA. Merciless "café wars," resulting in nearly 5,000 deaths, were waged in France between the two rebel groups throughout the years of the war of independence. In fact, one enduring aspect of the Algerian insurgency was the fact that, like the Tamil Tiger’s struggle against the Sri Lankan government, the FLN had to contend against internecine threats to its authority in addition to opposition from the state (Hutchinson 1978).

On the political front, the FLN worked to coerce the Algerian masses to support the aims of the independence movement (Kalyvas 1999). Frantz Fanon, a psychiatrist from Martinique who became the FLN's leading political theorist, provided a sophisticated intellectual justification for the use of violence in achieving national liberation (Fanon 1965; Fanon 1980). As the FLN campaign spread through the countryside, many pied-noir colonists in the interior sold their holdings and sought refuge in Algiers, where they began to lobby for a more forceful counterinsurgent policy. At the same time, the pied-noirs began to take part of the counterinsurgency into their own hands. Vigilante units of colonists, whose unauthorized activities were conducted with the passive cooperation of police authorities, carried out punitive attacks against suspected FLN members within the indigenous community. The colonists demanded the proclamation of a state of emergency, the prohibition of all groups advocating secession

By 1955, effective political action groups representing the colonists succeeded in intimidating French officials sent to resolve the conflict. A major success in this regard was the cooptation of Jacques Soustelle, who went to Algeria as governor general in January 1955 determined to restore peace, but under pressure from the pied-noirs became more interested in suppressing the insurgency (Horne 1978).

One of the most critical events in the early years of war of independence was the killing of civilians by the FLN near the town of Philippeville in August of 1955. Before this operation, it was stated FLN policy to attack only military and government-related targets (Maran 1989; Stora 2001). As such, the killing by the FLN of 123 people, including women and children, shocked Soustelle into calling for more repressive measures against the rebels. The government claimed it killed 1,273 guerrillas in retaliation for the incident at Philippeville. In contrast, according to the FLN, 12,000 Muslims were killed in retaliatory attacks by the armed forces and police, as well as pied-noir gangs (Heggoy 1972). After Philippeville, most observers note the transition to all-out war in Algeria (Horne 1978; Entelis 1986; Alexander 2002).

Soustelle's successor, Governor General Robert Lacoste, favored stepping up French military operations and granted the army exceptional police powers to deal with the mounting terrorism (Metz 1994). At the same time, Lacoste proposed a new administrative structure that would give Algeria a degree of autonomy and a decentralized government. Although remaining an integral part of France, Algeria was to
be divided into five districts, each of which would have a territorial assembly elected from a single slate of candidates (Heggoy 1972). Colonist deputies were able to delay until 1958 passage of the measure by the National Assembly.

In late summer of 1956, the internal leadership of the FLN met to organize a formal policy-making body to synchronize the movement's political and military activities. The highest authority of the FLN was vested in the thirty-four-member National Council of the Algerian Revolution (Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne or CNRA), within which the five-person Committee of Coordination and Enforcement (Comité de Coordination et d'Exécution or CCE) formed the executive. The externals, including Ben Bella, knew the conference was taking place but were unable to attend because of French control over the borders of Algeria. To further reduce their immediate impact on the insurgency, Lacoste had the FLN external political leaders who were in Algeria at the time arrested and imprisoned for the duration of the war. This action caused the remaining rebel leaders to harden their stance (Heggoy 1972; Merom 1999; Merom 2003).

France took a more openly hostile view of President Nasser's material and political assistance to the FLN, which some French analysts believed was the most important element in sustaining continued rebel activity in Algeria. This may have partially contributed to France’s willingness to cooperate with the British in their ill-fated attempt to overthrow Nasser via the Suez Canal (Schulzinger 2002). During 1957, support for the FLN appeared to weaken as the breach between the internals and externals
widened (Hutchinson 1978). In response, the FLN expanded its direct leadership to include Abbas, as well as imprisoned leaders such as Ben Bella.

From its origins in 1954 as ragtag guerrillas numbering in the hundreds and armed with a motley assortment of hunting rifles and World War II-era light weapons, the ALN had evolved by 1957 into a disciplined fighting force of nearly 40,000. More than 30,000 were organized along conventional lines in external units that were stationed in Moroccan and Tunisian sanctuaries near the Algerian border, where they served primarily to divert some French military power from the main theaters of guerrilla activity to guard against infiltration. The brunt of the fighting was borne by the internals in the wilayat. Estimates of the numbers of internals range from 6,000 to more than 25,000, with thousands of part-time irregulars (Horne 1978; Stone 1997; Aussaresses 2002).

During 1956 and 1957, the ALN successfully applied hit-and-run tactics according to the classic canons of guerrilla warfare (Trinquier 1964). Specializing in ambushes and night raids and avoiding direct contact with superior French firepower, the internal forces targeted army patrols, military encampments, police posts, and pied-noir farms, mines, and factories, as well as transportation and communications facilities. Once an engagement was broken off, the guerrillas merged with the population in the countryside. Kidnapping was commonplace, as were the ritual murder and mutilation of captured French military, colonists of both genders and every age, suspected collaborators, and traitors (Kalyvas 1999; Kalyvas 2006).

Although successful in engendering an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty within Algeria, the revolutionaries' coercive tactics suggested that they had not as yet inspired
the bulk of the Muslim people to revolt against French colonial rule (Kalyvas 1999). Gradually, however, the FLN gained control in certain sectors of Algeria, including the Aurès, the Kabylie, and other mountainous areas around Constantine and south of Algiers and Oran (Heggoy 1972). In these places, the FLN established a simple administration that was able to collect taxes and food and to recruit volunteers. However, it was never able to hold large fixed positions.

To increase international and domestic French attention to their struggle, the FLN decided to bring the conflict to the cities and to call a nationwide general strike. The most notable manifestation of the new urban campaign was the Battle of Algiers, which began on September 30, 1956, when three women placed bombs at three sites including the downtown office of Air France (Entelis and Naylor 1992; Ciment 1997; Ruedy 2005). The FLN carried out an average of 800 shootings and bombings per month through the spring of 1957, resulting in many civilian casualties and inviting a crushing response from the authorities (Alexander 2002; Merom 2003). General Jacques Massu, who was instructed to use whatever methods were necessary to restore order in the city, frequently fought terrorism with acts of terrorism. Using paratroopers, he broke the strike and systematically destroyed the FLN infrastructure there. However, the publicity given the brutal methods used by the army to win the Battle of Algiers, including the widespread use of torture, cast doubt in France about its role in Algeria (Maran 1989; Merom 2003).

Despite complaints from the military command in Algiers, the French government was reluctant for many months to admit that the Algerian situation was out of control and that what was viewed officially as a pacification operation had developed into a major
By 1956, France had committed more than 400,000 troops to Algeria (Horne 1978).

Late in 1957, General Raoul Salan, commanding the French army in Algeria, instituted a system of quadrillage, dividing the country into sectors, each permanently garrisoned by troops responsible for suppressing rebel operations in their assigned territory (Heggoy 1972). Salan's methods sharply reduced the instances of FLN terrorism but tied down a large number of troops in static defense. Salan also constructed a heavily patrolled system of barriers to limit infiltration from Tunisia and Morocco. The best known of these was the Morice Line (named for the French defense minister, André Morice), which consisted of an electrified fence, barbed wire, and mines over a 320-kilometer stretch of the Tunisian border (Horne 1978; Aussaresses 2002).

The French military command ruthlessly applied the principle of collective responsibility to villages suspected of sheltering, supplying, or in any way cooperating with the guerrillas (Kalyvas 1999). Villages that could not be reached by mobile units were subject to aerial bombardment. The French also initiated a program of concentrating large segments of the rural population, including whole villages, in camps under military supervision to prevent them from aiding the rebels. In the three years (1957-60) during which the program was followed, more than 2 million Algerians were removed from their villages, mostly in the mountainous areas, and resettled in the plains. Living conditions in the camps were poor and many empty villages were devastated. These population transfers apparently had little strategic effect on the outcome of the war.
but the disruptive social and economic effects of this massive program continued to be felt a generation later (Entelis and Naylor 1992; Stone 1997; Stora 2001).

The French army shifted its tactics at the end of 1958 from dependence on quadrillage to the use of mobile forces deployed on massive search-and-destroy missions against FLN strongholds. Within the next year, Salan's successor, General Maurice Challe, appeared to have suppressed major rebel resistance (Horne 1978; Merom 2003). However, political developments had already overtaken the French army's successes.

*The Fifth Republic*

Europeans as well as many Muslims greeted de Gaulle's return to power as the breakthrough needed to end the hostilities. On his June 4 trip to Algeria, de Gaulle calculatedly made an ambiguous and broad emotional appeal to all the inhabitants, declaring "Je vous ai compris" (I have understood you) (Metz 1994). De Gaulle raised the hopes of colonists and the professional military, disaffected by the indecisiveness of previous governments, with his exclamation of "Vive Algérie française" (long live French Algeria) to cheering crowds in Mostaganem (Metz 1994). At the same time, he proposed economic, social, and political reforms to ameliorate the situation of the Muslims. Nonetheless, de Gaulle later admitted to having harbored deep pessimism about the outcome of the Algerian situation even then.

De Gaulle immediately appointed a committee to draft a new constitution for France's Fifth Republic, which would be declared early the next year, with which Algeria would be associated but of which it would not form an integral part. This was a significant departure for the French government. Muslims, including women, were
registered for the first time with Europeans on a common electoral roll to participate in a referendum to be held on the new constitution in September 1958 (Hutchinson 1978).

De Gaulle's initiative threatened the FLN with the prospect of losing the support of the growing numbers of Muslims who were tired of the war and had never been more than lukewarm in their commitment to a totally independent Algeria. In reaction, the FLN set up the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) headed by Abbas and based in Tunis. Before the referendum, Abbas lobbied for international support for the GPRA, which was quickly recognized by Morocco, Tunisia, and several other Arab countries, by a number of Asian and African states, and by the Soviet Union and other East European states (Entelis 1986).

In addition to political maneuvers, the FLN mounted a campaign of violence in Algeria to intimidate Muslims into boycotting the referendum. Despite threats of reprisal, however, 80 percent of the Muslim electorate turned out to vote in September, and of these 96 percent approved the constitution (Horne 1978). In early 1959, de Gaulle was elected President of the new Fifth Republic. He visited Constantine in October to announce a program to end the war and create an Algeria closely linked to France in which Europeans and Muslims would join as partners. De Gaulle's call on the rebel leaders to end hostilities and to participate in elections was met with adamant refusal (Metz 1994).

In 1958-59 the French army had won military control in Algeria and was the closest it would be to victory (Trinquier 1964; Heggoy 1972). During that period in France, however, opposition to the conflict was growing among many segments of the
population. Thousands of relatives of conscripts and reserve soldiers suffered loss and pain. Furthermore, revelations of torture and the indiscriminate brutality the army visited on the Muslim population prompted widespread revulsion (Maran 1989).

International pressure was also building on France to grant Algeria independence. Annually since 1955, the UN General Assembly had considered the Algerian question, and the FLN position was gaining support. France's seeming intransigence in settling a colonial war that tied down half the personnel of its armed forces was also a source of concern to its North American Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. In a September 1959 statement, de Gaulle dramatically reversed his stand and uttered the words "self-determination," which he envisioned as leading to majority rule in an Algeria formally associated with France. In Tunis, Abbas acknowledged that de Gaulle's statement might be accepted as a basis for settlement, but the French government refused to recognize the GPRA as the representative of Algeria's Muslim community.

Claiming that de Gaulle had betrayed them, the colonists, backed by units of the army, staged an insurrection in Algiers in January 1960 that won mass support in Europe. As the police and army stood by, rioting colons threw up barricades in the streets and seized government buildings (Entelis and Naylor 1992). In Paris, de Gaulle called on the army to remain loyal and rallied popular support for his Algeria policy in a televised address. Most of the army heeded his call, and in Algiers General Challe quickly defused the insurrection. However, the failure of the uprising did not deter the militant colonists. Highly organized and well-armed vigilante groups stepped up their terrorist activities, which were directed against both Muslims and pro-government Europeans, as the move
toward negotiated settlement of the war and self-determination gained momentum. To the FLN rebellion against France were added civil wars between extremists in the two communities and between the pied-noirs and the French government in Algeria (Horne 1978; Tlemcani 1986; Bennoune 1988).

In preparation for independence, the CNRA met in Tripoli in May 1962 to work out a plan for the FLN's transition from a liberation movement to a political party (Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003). Through this, deep personal and ideological divisions surfaced within the FLN as the war ended and the date for independence approached. Competition and confrontation among various factions not only deprived the FLN of a leadership that spoke with a single voice, but also almost resulted in full-scale civil war. According to historian John Ruedy, these factions, or "clans" did not embody "family or regional loyalties, as in the Arab East, because the generations-long detribalization of Algeria had been too thorough. Rather, they represented relationships based on school, wartime or other networking" (Ruedy 1994; Ruedy 2005).

Out of the internecine fighting within the insurgency, Boumédienne formed an alliance with Ben Bella, who together with Khider and Bitat announced the formation of the Political Bureau (Bureau Politique) as a rival government to the GPRA, which had installed itself in Algiers as the provisional government. Boumédienne and Ben Bella purged their political opponents from the single slate of candidates for the forthcoming National Assembly elections. However, underlying opposition to the Political Bureau and to the absence of alternative candidates was manifested in an 18 percent abstention rate nationwide that rose to 36 percent of the electorate in Algiers (Horne 1978).
The creation of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria was formally proclaimed at the opening session of the National Assembly on September 25, 1962. Abbas, a moderate unconnected with the Political Bureau, was elected president of the assembly by the delegates (Horne 1978). On the following day, after being named premier, Ben Bella formed a cabinet that was representative of the Political Bureau but that also included Boumédiene as defense minister as well as other members of the so-called Oujda Group, who had served under him with the external forces in Morocco (Hutchinson 1978). Ben Bella, Boumédiene, and Khider initially formed a triumvirate linking the leadership of the three power bases--the army, the party, and the government, respectively (Quandt 1969). However, Ben Bella's ambitions and authoritarian tendencies were to lead the triumvirate to unravel and provoke increasing discontent among Algerians, though such analysis is outside the scope of this chapter.

**Motivations of the Insurgency**

During the first half of the twentieth century, a series of initiatives by various indigenous leaderships sought first to secure meaningful political participation for the Muslim majority within the colonial system and later to negotiate autonomy, confederation, or independence. When these efforts proved fruitless, a group of radical young nationalists founded the Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action (CRUA or the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action), which began, in the spring or summer of 1952, to plan an insurrection (Bennoune 1988). Six CRUA members, together with three political exiles, are considered the main leaders of the Algerian revolution. The CRUA chiefs, led by Mohamed Boudiaf, included Moustafa Ben Boulaid, Mourad Didouche,
Belkacem Krim, Rabah Bitat, and Larbi Ben M'hidi. The external leaders were Hocine Ait Ahmed, Mohamed Khider, and Ahmed Ben Bella (Stora 2001; Wall 2001). I have subdivided investigations of these leaders accordingly below.

Estimates of the number of militants taking part in the initial insurrection range from nine hundred to about three thousand (Bennoune 1988; Stora 2001; Merom 2003; Merom 2004). It began with attacks on French installations in several parts of the country, but the most effective actions took place in the Aurès region of the southeast. During the ensuing winter, the French managed to contain the insurrection, limiting its manifestations to distant and inaccessible regions (Ruedy 2005). In August 1955, the leadership, concerned that neither the bulk of Algerians nor the European community were taking the insurrection seriously, decided to begin targeting European civilians in some twenty-six localities in the eastern part of the country. As many as 123 people were killed in what were called the Philippeville massacres. In outraged reaction, French forces responded by taking a far larger number of Muslim lives. These events served to polarize the two communities in such a way that a narrowly based insurrection became a nationwide revolution; thousands of men joined guerrilla units, while France rapidly built its own forces into the hundreds of thousands.

In its initial proclamation, on October 31, 1954, the CRUA had announced the creation of a National Liberation Front (FLN) to which it had invited Algerians of all political persuasions to rally. Because of the polarization following the events of August 1955, Algerian political classes across a broad ideological spectrum gradually closed down their independent operations and joined the FLN in revolution (Ruedy 2005).
In order to accommodate the dramatically broadened movement, the revolutionaries organized a clandestine congress in the Soumamm valley of the Kabylia during August and September 1956. One of the first decisions of the new executive was to initiate, at the end of September 1956, the urban warfare strategy that became known as the Battle of Algiers (Stone 1997). A very visible phase of the war that the French managed to win by the middle of 1957, the recourse to urban warfare brought the war home in a physical way to the majority of Colons, who were urban residents, and attracted the attention of metropolitan Frenchmen and the wider world for the first time to the Algerian situation.

Another result of the Battle of Algiers was that the severe French repression drove the top FLN leadership out of the country to Tunis (Stora 2001). This in turn generated problems in communications and orientation between the external leadership and the internal mujahedeen. These problems caused troublesome divisions within the movement that lasted throughout the war and beyond.

_The Externals_

**Hocine Ait Ahmed**

Hocine Ait Ahmed was born in 1919 in the town of Ain el-Hammam in Kabylia. He was one of the early leaders of the Organisation Spéciale (OS), a secret paramilitary structure created in 1947 for exploring the possibilities for revolutionary action. He is included among the nine "historic leaders" of the Algerian nationalists who in 1954 founded the FLN and began the eight-year war of independence against France (Aussaresses 2002). He fought as a rebel leader in his Kabylia mountains and with the
rebel high command abroad, in Egypt and Tunisia until he was captured by the French in October 1956 (with four other leaders, in a commercial airliner the French forced to land) (Entelis 1986; Tlemcani 1986; Stora 2001). He was imprisoned in France until the 1962 agreement on Algeria's independence.

After independence, he strongly opposed the ruling faction of Ben Bella and his associates (Entelis and Naylor 1992). Ben Bella, who ruthlessly suppressed all opposing factions, did not take similar action against him. Ben Bella made Ait Ahmed a member of the FLN, but the latter soon resigned and went underground. He was elected in 1963 to the National Assembly on the FLN list and returned from exile, but soon went underground again and started militant guerrilla action against Ben Bella's regime. He was captured in October 1962 and sentenced to death, but was pardoned by Ben Bella (Horne 1978; Horne 1984).

Ahmed Ben Bella

Ben Bella was born in 1918 in a small village in western Algeria during the height of the French colonial period to a Sufi Muslim family. He attended school in Tlemclen and was disturbed by the discrimination towards Muslims by his European teacher (Stora 2001). He failed his brevet exam, and subsequently dropped out of school.

Ben Bella entered military service in the French Army in 1936. While sources dispute whether Ben Bella was drafted or volunteered, it is clear that the Army was one of the few avenues of advancement for Algerian Muslims under colonial rule and voluntary enlistment was common (Reich 1990). In 1940, Ben Bella enlisted again and was awarded the Croix de Guerre. He was demobilized after the fall of France but joined
a regiment of Moroccan infantry with whom he saw service throughout the Italian campaign. Ben Bella was promoted to the rank of warrant officer and received the Medaille Militaire for bravery (Bennoune 1988). He refused to accept an officer's commission after learning of the harsh French repression that followed a Muslim rising in the small Algerian town of Setif in May 1945. This refusal is the first public statement of dissatisfaction towards the French-Algerian relationship by Ben Bella (Hutchinson 1978).

Following election as a municipal councilor, in 1947, Ben Bella became a founder member of an underground organization pledged to fight colonial rule, known as the Organisation Spéciale (OS). This was the immediate predecessor of the Front de Libération Nationale (Lustick 1993). Arrested in 1951 and sentenced to eight years imprisonment, Ben Bella escaped from Blida prison, making his way to Tunisia and then Egypt.

At the outbreak of the Algerian War in 1954, Ben Bella was based in Cairo where he had become one of the nine members of the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action, which headed the Front de Liberation Nationale. He was arrested in 1956, after the French intercepted his airplane brought him to France, where he was imprisoned until 1962. While in prison, he was elected a vice-premier of the Algerian provisional government. Ben Bella's first language was French, not Arabic (Horne 1978). He learned Arabic while in prison. While in Egypt, Ben Bella met the Egyptian president, Gamel Abdel Nasser. When Nasser brought Ben Bella to speak for the first time to an Egyptian audience, he broke into tears because he could not speak Arabic (Merle 1967).
It has been said that he refused to teach his own daughter French because he wanted her to learn Arabic first and not be in the same position he was.

After Algeria's independence was recognized, Ben Bella quickly became more popular, and thereby more powerful. In June 1962, he challenged the leadership of Premier Benyoucef Ben Khedda; this led to several disputes among his rivals in the FLN, which were quickly suppressed by Ben Bella's rapidly growing number of supporters, most notably within the armed forces (Alexander 2002). By September, Bella was in control of Algeria by all but name, and was elected as president in a one-sided election on 20 September, which was recognized by the United States on September 29 (Wall 2001). While Ben Bella would go on to have an extensive career in Algerian politics, it is his relationship with other insurgents prior to and during the independence period that is the focus of this chapter.

Mohamed Boudiaf

Mohamed Boudiaf was born in M'Sila, Algeria, to a family of former nobility, which had lost its standing and influence during colonial times. His education was cut short after primary school by poor health and his increasing activism in the nascent nationalist movement. Despite this nationalism, Boudiaf did serve with the French Army in World War II, achieving the rank of sergeant (1963). A member of the nationalist Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA) of Messali Hadj, he later joined the successor organization MTLD and its secret paramilitary wing, the Organisation Spéciale (OS) (Stora 2001). Boudiaf was responsible for organizing the OS network in the Sétif region,
storing arms, collecting funds and preparing guerrilla forces. He was sentenced in absentia to 10 years of prison by the French authorities, but avoided arrest (Smith 1974).

When Messali decided to dissolve the OS, his rivals combined with stalwarts of the guerrilla strategy to form the CRUA, a breakout committee designed to lay the groundwork for revolutionary war. Boudiaf was among them, after falling out with Messali, whom he accused of authoritarian tendencies (Quandt 1969). The CRUA - PPA/MTLD rivalry quickly spiraled towards violence, and would continue during the anti-French revolt until the PPA/MTLD (then reorganized as the Mouvement nationale algérien, MNA) was destroyed (Stora 2001). In July 1954, the CRUA-aligned Boudiaf survived an assassination attempt by his former comrades-in-arms, wounded and left for dead on an Algiers sidewalk.

The CRUA re-emerged as the FLN, which began a nation-wide armed insurrection. Boudiaf was by this time a main leader of the movement, and emerged as an important member of the exiled leadership working from Cairo and Algeria's neighboring countries. In 1956, he was captured along with Ahmed Ben Bella and several other FLN leaders in a controversial airplane hijacking by French forces, and imprisoned in France. While prisoner, he was symbolically elected minister in the FLN's government-in-exile, the GPRA, at its creation in 1958, and re-elected in 1960 and 1961. He was not released until immediately before the independence of Algeria in 1962, after a brutal eight-year war that had cost several hundred thousand lives (Hutchinson 1978).

On independence, internal conflict racked the FLN, which split into rival factions as French forces withdrew. A military-political alliance between Houari Boumedienne of
the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) and Ahmed Ben Bella, of the exiled leadership, brought down their rivals and set up a single-party state under Ben Bella's presidency.

The increasingly marginalized Boudiaf protested these developments, and founded a clandestine opposition party, the PRS, which briefly revolted against the FLN's single-party government. Boudiaf was forced into exile, and settled in neighboring Morocco. After Boumédiène’s coup d'état in 1965, Boumédiène remained in opposition, as he did under his successor, Chadli Bendjedid. His PRS group remained intermittently active in its opposition towards the government, but essentially, Boudiaf had ceased to be a force of any stature in Algerian politics early on after his exile (Metz 1994).

*The Internals*

**Belkacem Krim**

Belkacem Krim was born December 14, 1922 in Ait Yahia, Algeria. A corporal during World War II, he became an excellent sharpshooter. In 1946, he became a member of the Algerian nationalist party, PPA, and set up clandestine cells in two neighborhoods of Dra-El-Mizan, which had more than a hundred militants and sympathizers (Hutchinson 1978). After the arrest of a dozen fellow nationalists, Krim organized a strike in front of the office of the local government. In March 1947, accused of having killed a park ranger, he was summoned to court, but rather than risk imprisonment, he fled, armed with an old machine-gun, to join the insurgents in the mountains of Kabylie, under the alias of Si Rabah (Hutchinson 1978).
Krim was placed in charge of the PPA-MTLD for all the Kabylie and at the head of 22 militant leaders, which increased direct contact with militants and the people. In 1954, he commanded at least 500 active insurgents. At the end of April 1954, the chiefs of the OS and the MTLD realized it was time to act. Krim was in charge of the zone of Kabylie from the moment the revolution was launched on November 1, 1954 (Aussaresses 2002). He joined the Soummam Congress in 1956 and oversaw the FLN-ALN from 1958-1959 as vice-president of the GPRA and minister of the Armed Forces (Horne 1978).

After the Battle of Algiers (1956-57), Krim left Algeria and allied himself with Ben Tobbal and Boussouf against Abane Ramdane. He was minister of Foreign Affairs in 1960, of the Interior in 1961, and opened the negotiations with France that resulted in the Evian Accords. His interventions on behalf of the Accords were considered critical during the conference, and Krim believed that he had a responsibility to the world that was watching those negotiations. The French negotiators considered his presence ultimately important to the negotiation process (Lustick 1993; Merom 2004).

After independence, Krim fell out of favor with Ahmed Ben Bella's politics and removed himself from political life, dedicating himself to the jewelry business. He was found strangled to death in a hotel room in Frankfort, Germany in October 1970 (Stora 2001).
Moustafa Ben Boulaid

Moustafa Ben Boulaid was born in February 1917 in Arris in the Aurès mountain region of Algeria. He immigrated to France in 1937, saw the situation of Algerians there at first hand, and formed a union to defend their rights.

He served his mandatory military service with the Algerian 11th Regiment Riflemen, reaching the rank of Corporal, and was mobilized during World War II, when he saw combat, was awarded the Croix de Guerre and reached the rank of Adjutant. After the war, he went into business, operating a bus company, and became chair of the local group of traders, which enabled him to build up a network of contacts and relationships that he was to use later (Quandt 1969; Stora 2001).

In 1946, he joined the Algerian People's Party (PPA), stood in the elections to the Algeria Assembly in 1948, and was elected by a landslide victory. The French authorities however disallowed the results of the election and began to monitor him closely. The PPA was banned by the French authorities and he joined the MTLD, which replaced the PPA. He met with other nationalists, and demanded immediate action against colonialism.

He played an important role in the creation of Organisation Spéciale (OS), providing clandestine political education for young people and military training. He began to acquire weapons, purchasing them in Libya, and participated in harboring militants pursued by the authorities (Horne 1978; Wall 2001). Boulaid believed that the French could be beaten and that the time was right to begin the armed struggle for independence. He failed however, to persuade Messali el Hadj, the head of MTLF, and
other politicians except for Belkacem Krim, and he played an important role in establishing le Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action, (the Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action), the parent organization of the National Liberation Front (FLN). He was responsible for the area of Aurès (Wilaya 1), and then took part in the outbreak of the insurgency with troops in the Aurès under his command opening the Algerian war of independence with attacks on October 31 and November 1, 1954 (Bennoune 1988).

He had been wounded by the police in south Tunisia when attending a meeting in October to set the date of the uprising but was at the head of his troops, directing the insurgency, shortly thereafter. In January 1955, he set out on foot to Tripoli with his guide to buy weapons, only to be arrested on the Libyan-Tunisia border. He was tried by military court in Constantine in June 1955 and sentenced to death. However, he escaped from Constantine prison in November and resumed his guerrilla command. On March 22, 1956, he was killed by a booby-trapped field radio placed by French troops (Lustick 1993).

**Houari Boumédiène**

Boumédiène was born in 1927 near Héliopolis in the province of Guelma and educated at the Islamic Institute in Constantine. He joined National Liberation Front (FLN) in 1955, adopting Houari Boumédiène as his nom-de-guère (from Sidi Boumédiène, the name of the patron saint of the city of Tlemcen in western Algeria, where he served as an officer during the war, and Sidi El Houari, the patron saint of nearby Oran) (Tlemcni 1986). His decision to join the FLN was prompted by a call to
join the French army in 1952, a call that Boumédienne fled from, ultimately finding refuge in the FLN. He reached the rank of Colonel, then the highest rank in the FLN forces, and from 1960, he was chief of staff of the ALN, the FLN's military wing (Ottaway 1970).

Ellen Laipson describes Boumédienne as a quiet man whose shyness made him a poor public speaker (Reich 1990). His activities during the insurgency were primarily with the external army. During the insurgency, Boumédienne became known as a skilled recruiter. Boumédienne himself rose quickly within the General Staff of the FLN, assuming command in Tunisia by 1958, where his decisions to implement a low-cost, low-risk strategy may have led the French to overestimate their successes against the Algerian insurgents (Reich 1990).

After independence in 1962, he headed a powerful military faction within the government, and was made defense minister with the support of the Algerian leader Ahmed Ben Bella, whose ascent to power he had assisted as chief of staff (Entelis 1986). Some historians attribute the rise of Ben Bella more to the assistance of the competent and connected Boumédienne than the other way around (Reich 1990). However, Boumédienne over time grew increasingly distrustful of Ben Bella's erratic style of government and ideological Puritanism, and in June 1965, Boumédienne seized power in a bloodless coup. The country's constitution and political institutions were abolished, and he ruled through a Revolutionary Council of his own (mostly military) supporters. These were mainly drawn from his companions during the war years, when he was based around the Moroccan border town of Oujda, which caused analysts to speak of the
“Oujda group” (Metz 1994; Ruedy 2005). While Boumédienne would remain in power for thirteen years, this chapter is concerned with his role in the insurgency of the independence movement.

Ferhat Abbas

Ferhat Abbas was born in 1899 in a village south of Taher in the department of Jijel. Because his family hailed from a middle class background, Abbas was able to obtain a French education (Hutchinson 1978). After his education, Abbas served in the military for three years, primarily in the medical corps. After his military service, Abbas studied to become a pharmacist, though this educational period was more significant for the increasingly political roles that Abbas would play in Muslim student organizations.

Though Abbas has become strongly associated with the violent insurgency characterizing Algerian independence, much of his early activity was quite peaceful in nature (Reich 1990). Especially important in this is Abbas’ early writing, where he does not advocate for independence, but for political reforms to make indigenous Algerians full citizens in a union with France. Abbas was formerly an integrationist, not opposed to the French annexation, but advocating an Algeria where Algerians would have the same rights as Frenchmen. He became disillusioned with France when his hopes were not realized, and turned to nationalism, issuing the Manifesto of the Algerian People in 1943, and forming the nationalist party Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien in 1946 (Ruedy 2005).

Abbas, according to John Ruedy, was surprised by the violence that erupted in late 1954 (Reich 1990). Even at this time, Abbas did not join the violent insurgency, but
initially sought reconciliation. Disappointed by the failure of local French forces to respond to these entreaties, Abbas became more interested in the violent movement. He joined the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), in September 1955. His political standing in Algeria and reputation as a moderate nationalist, acceptable to the West, helped him become president of the provisional Algerian nationalist government-in-exile, the GPRA, from 1958 until 1961. He lost his place to Benyoucef Ben Khedda, which may have been a reason for his decision to join Ahmed Ben Bella's and Houari Boumédiène’s Tlemcen Group in opposition to the GPRA, which was subsequently dismantled (Tlemcani 1986). Abbas himself was sidelined from the Tlemcen group once Ben Bella began to consolidate power in 1962. This expulsion, which came in 1963, reflects the end of Abbas’ involvement with the Algerian independence movement in a leadership capacity.

Internal Politics of the FLN

The FLN has been described as a large and unwieldy organization, but this does not mean that specific attributed cannot be drawn out to give us insight into its motivations (Hughes 2007). First, what can we draw from the characteristics of the leadership? Examining the narrative accounts of both the internal and external leaders above, we find that they essentially all hail from lower middle to lower class socioeconomic backgrounds. While some of them received higher educations, there were no notable intellectuals amongst them. Furthermore, as is the case with many insurgencies, they were all generally young, from their mid-twenties to their mid-thirties. Importantly, several had received extensive training in the French military (including Ben
Bella, Krim, Bounedienne, Ben Boulaid, and Boudiaf) (1963). These characteristics suggest a cohesive group, if not in thought or decision-making, then certainly in life experiences.

A second important characteristic of the insurgent leaders were their ideological leanings. Though this insurgency was fueled on nationalist separatist goals, the leadership of the FLN espoused clear leftist political ideology (Stora 2001). Though many of the leaders of the FLN appear to have gleaned their knowledge of socialist ideology during their European experiences, upon returning to Algeria, they found that Europeans dominated leftist political parties and labor unions. Therefore, as the insurgency progressed, the leaders of the FLN continued to espouse socialist political ideology from two perspectives. The first perspective was recognition that the movement itself was inspired by socialist motivations. The leaders of the FLN appear to have believed that within the Algerian populace was a political astute and dissatisfied majority that only needed to be mobilized to affect an independence movement. The second perspective reflected a desire to replace the French colonial relationship with a socialist government. There is some internal dispute with the FLN leadership on the role that Algeria would have with France at this point. Some seemed to wish for a continued formal relationship, while others seemed to push for complete autonomy and internal sovereignty (Stora 2001). While some, like James Ciment, dispute that the majority of the FLN were in fact socialist in their ideology, a better interpretation is that while all exhibited socialist ideologies, some were more moderate in their willingness to compromise on those goals (Ciment 1997).
A third important characteristic of the insurgency was the Islamic nature of the insurgency. While Algerians in general were fairly devoted in their faith, multiple sources cite the FLN movement as attempting to utilize the Islamic faith of their potential recruits as motivation. This appeared to take the place through a two-stage framing of religious convictions. In the first stage, the FLN made their case for a violent, nationalist-separatist insurgency based on a religious calling. According to Benjamin Stora, “the promised pro-independence revolution still had certain characteristics of revolts based on millenarian hopes, or of riots for subsistence” ((Stora 2001), 66). In the reasoning of the leadership of the FLN, if Algerian could see an example of violent insurgency, they would rally behind such a movement in short order. In the second stage of this framing, members of the active insurgency were exhorted to refuse compromise because of their convictions (Alexander 2002). By this logic, insurgents were instructed that the violent insurgency was a fulfillment of religious duty and as such, could not be abandoned until full autonomy was achieved. This two-state framing holds whether or not the FLN leaders themselves were overwhelming devote, something which seems dubious in many of the leaders’ cases.

A fourth, and critical, characteristic of the FLN was its clearly demarcated internal and external structure. When the external leaders were detained abroad, the internal leaders made the decision to subdivide the leadership of the insurgency on a geographic basis, with joint agreement on major actions within the insurgency. These geographic areas are referred to as willayat, and the internal leaders of the insurgency each moved to take control of a single region. Organized this way, the effect was the
spread the FLN movement over the entire country of Algeria. Yet, it would be misleading to assume that insurgent activity was uniform across the country. Despite this distribution of leadership, insurgent activity was still clustered around particular towns and especially urban areas like Algiers. Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur argue,

“*But in a handful of cases the political parties leading the cause of national liberation relied heavily on terrorism, either in conjunction with mass protests or side-by-side with guerilla warfare. This was certainly the case in Algeria where the National Liberation Front discovered that the indiscriminate bombing of French civilians paid higher political dividends than the guerilla struggle in the remote reaches of the country*” ((Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003), 13).

In contrast to the internal organization of the insurgency, Ben Bella and Boudiaf more centrally controlled the external organization. Their purpose, directly and through their supporters, was to establish links with neighboring countries supportive of the insurgency, particularly Egypt and Libya (1963; Ambler 1966).

A fifth and final characteristic of the Algerian insurgency was a constant undercurrent of dissention amongst its leadership. Though these men shared a great deal in common, they also disagreed vociferously about the nature of the FLN insurgency. According to James Ciment, because the French had effectively isolated the external’s marshaled insurgent forces from the indigenous insurgency within Algeria, a rift formed between the two forces which would not be settled during the insurgency and would in fact set the table for political competition after France left Algeria (Ciment 1997). This internal competition within the FLN was more muted in the early years of the insurgency, primarily because besides facing the French state’s counterinsurgency efforts, the FLN also had to contend with rival nationalist organizations, like the more moderate MNA (Crenshaw 1995). Therefore, this competition placed the FLN in not only a violent
struggle to eliminate a more moderate alternative (that French leadership had threatened to negotiate with) but also to sway an uncommitted public vacillating between nationalist options.

Based on the overview of FLN organization, ideology, and internal politics, as well as that of their most influential leaders, **I code the FLN as an extremist motivated insurgent group.** I believe there is strong evidence to make this conclusion. Without recapitulating the entire preceding narrative, a few points bear emphasis. First, for the key leaders of the FLN, violence was central to the pursuit of their objectives. In fact, the defining feature that distinguished the FLN from both its predecessors and its rivals was the centrality of violence for the movement. This is a hallmark of the extremist motivation. Second, the FLN pursued the entirety of its goals as a single agenda. That is, the FLN never made concessions to the French government, even when those concessions might have helped them advance their goals. For example, FLN was content to hold out of talks with the French government when their choice of representatives (including Ben Bella) was rejected. Even though all evidence suggests the French were looking to offer significant sacrifices to the FLN, they wanted to see all their conditions met, or none at all.

Second, it seems clear that the organizational motivation is not appropriate for the FLN. Though the FLN’s leaders bore many superficial similarities, the movement was rife with internal fighting. Additionally, it does not appear that anyone within the leadership joined the FLN for personal gain as the primary motivation. In fact, there is a significant free-rider hurdle for the FLN to clear. It would have been easy to remain
outside the FLN and reap their benefits, rather than join at all. Therefore, it seems clear that FLN leadership was not motivated by organizational dynamics.

Finally, the FLN is not well described as a strategically motivated group. Though the group did seek (and ultimately obtain) specific goals, their pursuit of these goals was far from strategic. There is no historical record of the group offering to negotiate with the French government for anything less than the total realization of their goals. Though some sources describe elements within the FLN as being more moderate, this moderation seems to only extend to the extent of the relationship between France and Algeria post-independence. In addition, the use of violence as a tactic in the FLN’s insurgency does not match expectations of a strategic motivation. The FLN continued to pursue violent activities, even when those violent activities could have undermined gains being made from the French government, such as late in the insurgency (Hutchinson 1978; Crenshaw 1995).

**Strategies and Tactics of the State**

Despite the short spa of time that defines the Algerian war, we can observe a number of distinct strategic approaches taken by the French government in an attempt to ameliorate violence from Algerian separatists. There are two main sources of these changes in strategic approach. The first source is the shifting nature of the French government, both prior and into DeGaulle’s Fifth Republic. The second source is the decision-making of the French military on the ground in Algeria. Both of these sources were affected by their relationship with the pied-noirs within Algeria and with each other, in addition to their perceptions of the Algerian independence movement itself.
It is important to discuss religion and culture when analyzing the French Algerian War. Islamic traditions and principles guided the Algerian population while the colonialist and the French are Christians and predominantly Catholic. The French failed to design policy and programs that accounted for the Algerians’ Islamic beliefs. They tried to impose French culture, language, and Christianity during civil military operations. Religion and culture played an important part of the conflict.

From a French perspective, the war started on November 1, 1954. The FLN exploded dozens of bombs and ambushed government officials to signal a nation wide rebellion. They coordinated over seventy attacks across the country that ranged from destroying telegraphs poles and torching tobacco warehouses to raiding several police stations. The authorities assessed the damage at nearly 200 million francs. The attacks succeeded in terrorizing local officials and destroying infrastructure, and led to a general military and police response best characterized as reciprocal violence.

From the first day of the conflict, the FLN broadcasted its birth, agenda, and goals on Radio Cairo and scattered pamphlets throughout the country. The European settlers expressed outrage at the attacks and called for immediate action. The Algerian violence caught the French government by surprise. The French reaction combined with the settlers' suspicion, shock, and outrage began a cycle of increased acts of violence by both sides. The cycle created an atmosphere of recriminations, violence, and hatred.

First came the mass indiscriminate arrests of the suspects, most of them innocent but converted into ardent militants by the fact of their imprisonment; then the setting of
faces against liberal reforms designed to tackle the root of the trouble; followed, finally, when too late, by a new, progressive policy of liberalization (Lustick 1993).

The French government in Paris passed a series of resolutions that stated order must be restored and the guilty parties held accountable for their actions. The French public did not understand the hatred and humiliation felt by the Algerian Muslim population. The government and military could not lose part of France, especially in the aftermath of Indochina (Merom 2003; Merom 2004). Specifically, the French officer corps felt cheated and abandoned by the French government in Vietnam. To the French military, another defeat in Algeria represented a loss of world prestige and influence. Both sides prepared to win the struggle regardless of the cost. The French recognized the Algerian constabulary could not handle the persistent FLN attacks. Therefore, the French government deployed troops to Algeria. In late 1954, the first paratroop unit arrived in Algeria (Ambler 1966). Colonel Ducournau of the 25th Airborne Division began operations in the Aures area, known for its insurgent sympathy and activity. Colonel Ducournau saw action in Indochina and brought his knowledge of insurgency and counterinsurgency to Algeria. He set up his headquarters in the hills and lived with the civilian population (Stora 2001). The 25th Airborne Division stayed in the field and conducted mobile operations into the spring of 1955. He used local guides and interpreters to enable his troops to engage the FLN, though attempts were only made toward interdiction, not negotiation.

In February 1955, the French government replaced the incumbent governor-general of Algeria with Jacques Soustelle. Governor General Soustelle arrived in Algeria
determined to stem the violence. He fought with the French Resistance during World War II and was an experienced diplomat. He helped devise an anti-terrorist strategy based on integrating Algeria into France. Soustelle faced a difficult situation based on fundamental cultural differences. Soustelle recognized limited government capacity existed in rural Algeria. In response, Soustelle created the Section Administrative Specialists or SAS corps to integrate French influence in the rural areas. The SAS interacted with Muslims at the lowest level. The teams provided key governmental functions such as administration, teaching, health care, housing, and hospitals. The team leader was usually a captain or lieutenant with three to four non-commissioned officers. The SAS teams sought to improve the quality of life in the provinces. SAS teams worked with the local community to determine their needs and resourced specific projects designed to improve the standard of living (Alexander 2002). The education of young Muslim people received priority. They coordinated and oversaw many building projects. Hospitals and schools provided a needed service to the rural Muslim population. SAS teams, and their implementation, were directed toward the Algerian people. At the same time, attacks against the FLN continued. Therefore, the presence of SAS teams does not signal a shift to an accommodationist approach.

Despite this success, the SAS concept experienced several problems. First, the FLN targeted and killed many of the successful SAS units. Second, trained personnel were at a premium. The French military failed to train its soldier on the skills necessary for a successful SAS team. The French army did not possess the critical cultural awareness skills required to truly integrate French culture into Islamic society. The SAS
teams needed more coordination with Islamic leaders to develop a program to blend both societies into a united country. Furthermore, many SAS teams lacked leadership and cultural skills. In many circumstances, the SAS centers concentrated on intelligence collection. The Muslim population recognized the intelligence effort, which delegitimized the overall SAS effort to build institutional capacity and instill French culture (Smith 1974). Soustelle’s primary objective was to keep Algeria French, pacify the Muslims, and maintain the status quo.

In February 1956, the Mollet government in conjunction with the French military leadership developed the quadrillage system that helped pacify the frontier. The system divided Algeria into military zones of control. The system, in conjunction with the SAS teams, promoted French influence beyond the urban centers (Martin 1981; Tlemcani 1986). French troops garrisoned near strategic population centers assisted the local police with combating terrorism. In rural areas, they organized around villages and farms to create a local defensive network. They recruited local Muslim leaders to assist in resettlement operations, intelligence gathering, and police operations. General Raoul Salan implemented this system by late 1957 (Ottaway 1970). France also recruited and trained bands of loyal Muslim irregulars, known as harkis. Armed with shotguns and using guerrilla tactics similar to those of the ALN, the harkis, who eventually numbered about 150,000 volunteers, were an ideal instrument of counterinsurgency warfare.

Once a local commander secured his sector in the quadrillage strategy, his troops were available to higher commanders for large-scale operations. The veteran airborne troops acted as a rapid reaction force under the zone commander. The quadrillage system
required large numbers of troops and a sophisticated logistic system. Of the 400,000 French troops deployed to Algeria, less than ten percent actually fought, the remainder conducted stability and security duties such as protecting farms and critical infrastructure. Beginning in 1959, General Maurice Challe's large-scale military sweep operations coordinated with the quadrillage system sought to erase guerilla activity across Algeria.

In order to disrupt movement across the border and deny sanctuary to FLN fighters in Tunis, the French constructed a barrier between the two countries, called the Morice Line. The barrier consisted of two rows of electrified fencing and barbed wire, separated by minefields and strengthened by radar and blockhouses; it ran south from the coast some 200 miles into the Sahara desert. During the day, scouting planes flew overhead. At night, floodlights lit the line and tanks and armored cars patrolled the perimeter. A mobile force attacked detected breach points. In order to facilitate operations, the French resettled approximately 300,000 Algerians away from the border. The land blockade forced the FLN to wage a limited guerilla war with fragmented bands that lacked a sanctuary.

The aggressive French military pursuit of insurgents across the Morice Line cost the French in terms of diplomatic influence within the international community (Alexander 2002). Several incidents of bombing and excursions into Tunisian territory hurt the legitimacy of French efforts in Algeria. The best example was the French bombing of Sakiet, a Tunisian city on 8 February 1958. Prior to the bombing of the city, FLN infiltrators ambushed a French patrol and killed fifteen soldiers (Stone 1997). The day prior to the bombing of Sakiet, a French spotter plane was shot down by fire coming
from the city. The next day a squadron of French bombers attacked Sakiet and killed eighty Tunisian civilians at the central market. Tunisian officials immediately escorted foreign journalist to the site to photograph and report on the bombing. The Morice Line succeed by denying the insurgents use of their sanctuary in Tunis, but the barrier flamed international debate and turned international opinion against France.

By 1957, the French military began a systematic relocation effort of the Muslim population from insecure areas. Local commanders resettled civilians in response to local conditions. Local policies turned into national strategy. Commanders implemented the policy in phases. They identified those families and individuals to move based on military, economic, and social factors. Construction began on facilities and dwellings necessary to accommodate the incoming population. Education classes and propaganda messages promoted French culture. The French tried to impose their culture and values on the Islamic population. The French leadership thought resettlement succeeded by returning the Algerian countryside to its feudal past (Horne 1984). During the indoctrination process, French leaders conducted formal ceremonies handing power over to Muslim community leaders adding to the illusion of success.

The French resettled 300,000 people in the Blida region. They considered it a success and model to follow. They conducted the resettlement from villages and farms into compounds surrounded by barbed wire, watchtowers and guard posts (Alexander 2002). Rebel activity in the immediate area virtually ceased. The authorities in Blida received and money time to develop a well thought out plan. However, this event was a best-case scenario of the policy. Many resettlement operations were not properly resourced or
planned and consequently resulted in the separation of families, inadequate housing and limited economic opportunities for the resettled population. Therefore, the policy alienated many of the 2,000,000 people moved during the war. Many of these people would subsequently support, if not join, the FLN (Ambler 1966; Alexander 2002).

The resettlement operations separated the insurgent or guerilla from the population. However, implementation of the policy delegitimized the government's position. Resettlement increased the FLN recruiting efforts, angered the population, and destroyed the trust in government. Mismanagement and poorly conceived execution caused many civilians to seek out the FLN. The guerillas capitalized on government missteps and moved in to offer the disaffected group an alternative to French rule. The French did not consider the Islamic traditions, religion, and Algerian culture when implementing resettlement operations. Ultimately, the quadrillage system, in coordination with sweep operations and physical barriers, allowed the French army to fight the FLN to a draw by 1958.

The French army shifted its tactics at the end of 1958 from dependence on quadrillage to the use of mobile forces deployed on massive search-and-destroy missions against ALN strongholds. Within the next year, Salan's successor, General Maurice Challe, appeared to have suppressed major rebel resistance (Stora 2001; Ruedy 2005). However, political developments had already overtaken the French army's successes.

In May of 1958, General Charles de Gaulle ended the Fourth Republic of France and established the Fifth. General de Gaulle was convinced to assume the government based on a sufficient ability to exercise power in governing France. However, he was
recruited to assume the reigns of power based on the belief that he would exert the leadership and capacity necessary to end the conflict in Algeria and stave off a civil war at home in France (Stora 2001). Toward this end, General de Gaulle came to power under a new Constitution that substantially enhanced his Presidential power, including the exercise of nearly dictatorial power in cases of emergency. Once General de Gaulle came to power, the shift in strategy was clear in both substance and process. France would seek to disengage itself from Algeria. **The means by which France would do this was a strategy of accommodation.**

The policy shifts toward accommodation were immediately apparent. General de Gaulle abandoned previous rhetoric (including his own) about a perpetually French Algeria in favor of statements about the evolution of Algeria’s status in relation to France. Additionally, he pardoned FLN convicts in exchange for the release of French POWs (Stora 2001). He also dramatically announced, in September 1959, that he would offer self-determination to the Algerians. At the same time that General de Gaulle made these concessions, he also increased attacks and reprisals against the FLN. These attacks were enhanced by the French militaries nascent success in penetrating the communication structures of the FLN.

The first negotiations between France and the FLN would take place in late June 1960. While they produced no results, the negotiations at least succeeded in setting the table for more interactions. In January of 1961, General de Gaulle again and more forcefully articulated a French policy of decolonization toward Algeria. The result of this policy was an attempted was an attempted military coup against de Gaulle by military
leaders, including Generals Challe and Salan, who desperately wanted to retain Algeria under French control. When the coup failed to rally public support, the generals were removed from power, and the major resistance to French settlement with the FLN was the OAS, a secretive group of French military and pied-noirs who adopted violent insurgent tactics of their own in an attempt to scuttle settlement talks (Merom 1999).

Despite the violence of the OAS throughout 1961, the FLN began talks with the French government in March 1962, ultimately concluding with the Evian Accords. These accords paved the way for Algerian self-determination, while some economic and social concessions were granted by the FLN. In exchange, a ceasefire was agreed to between the two parties. Though the Evian Accords signal an end of the FLN’s insurgency against the French government, violence did not abate in Algeria immediately (Stora 2001). The OAS and pied-noir activists continued to undertake acts of violence in Algeria, and the FLN itself, spread thin as a result of the war and French counterinsurgency efforts, struggled to unite the country under its governance.

**Evaluating the Outcome of State Counter-Insurgency Efforts**

Given both the complex and changing nature of the Algerian insurgency and the changing strategic choices of the French government, when was the French government most and least successful in ameliorating insurgent violence from Algerian nationalist-separatists? This section will attempt to answer this question by examining the coding of both the motivational goals of the Algerian insurgency and the strategies of counterinsurgency employed by the French government. It then compares this
information to the relative levels of violence in Algeria to evaluate the hypotheses proposed at the beginning of this chapter.

With the above caveats in mind, allow me to review my hypotheses in light of the data that I have developed on my independent variables. First, I have found the predominant coding of the FLN’s motivations to be extremist throughout the time period under consideration. I have made this determination based on an analysis of their leadership and the group’s organization. As a consequence of this coding, I am only able to evaluate hypotheses 3a-3c, which are as follows:

3a. When the FLN is coded as an extremist motivated group; French tactics of reciprocal violence will fail in reducing violence.

3b. When the FLN is coded as an extremist motivated group; French tactics of policing will succeed in reducing violence.

3c. When the FLN is coded as an extremist motivated group; French tactics of accommodation will fail in reducing violence.

I have also coded the tactics employed by the French government. I have found that these tactics change over the periods considered. Given that the FLN is extremist motivated over the entire time period I consider, my theory holds the following expectations for my hypotheses. These hypotheses are derived from the conditional model that I describe in Chapter 2.
Evaluating Violence in Algeria

Measuring violence in Algeria is particularly difficult on the one hand, and yet incredibly easy on the other. Unlike the other conflicts detailed in this study, time series accountings of fatalities and violent incidents do not exist for the FLN insurgency in Algeria. In fact, the simplest of accountings, the number of dead, is highly disputed in Algeria. Stora argues that during the first two years of the conflict, the FLN killed about 6,000 Muslims and 1,000 Europeans (Stora 2001). According to different estimates, between 50,000 and 100,000 Muslim civilians were killed before the end of the war, and even more after the vengeful post-ceasefire bloodbath (when the harkis were largely killed by FLN partisans). Between 141,000 and 155,000 FLN and 16,000 other insurgents were either killed outright or declared missing, while many more died of wounds. Some sources indicate that it is possible that up to one million of Algerians were killed during the war (this is the official Algerian estimate, which is thought by scholars to be quite high) (Horne 1978; Horne 1984). Depending on source, the French

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applicable Hypothesis</th>
<th>3a</th>
<th>3c</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Tactics</td>
<td>Reciprocal Violence</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Motivation</td>
<td>Extremist</td>
<td>Extremist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical Expectation of Counterinsurgent Strategy</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6.1: Table of Expectations for Conditional Model in the Algerian case
Army should have lost between 17,456 and 25,000 dead (Horne 1978; Stora 2001). Also killed were 2,788 colons (other sources state as many as between 3,200 and 3,600) (Hutchinson 1978; Bennoune 1988; Merom 2003). Much worse for the latter, however, was the humiliating defeat and usually a ruinous exile.

Though the human cost of life is staggering, we simply do not have accurate numbers on the number of deaths or number of violence FLN incidents per year. However, the measurement of the level of violence in generalized form is in fact, quite easy to agree upon. All sources, including those favoring the French military and those more sympathetic to the FLN (as well as more objective accounts in-between) argue that violence from the FLN increased constantly in both incidence and lethality through 1954 until 1962, when peace between the French government and the FLN was only achieved by granting the FLN their stated objectives in exchange for ceasefire. Even though the military claimed victory over the FLN several times during the eight years of war, FLN violence continued to escalate unabated. In fact, FLN violence would rise even after the ceasefire, though such violence would be directed toward consolidating power in Algeria, not against the French government itself. Based on these observations, in Figure 6.2 below, I summarize the French counterinsurgency strategies and the trend in violence during the FLN’s insurgency.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observed Trend in Number of Incidents by FLN Insurgents</td>
<td>Rising</td>
<td>Rising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observed Trend in Number of Deaths by FLN Insurgents</td>
<td>Rising</td>
<td>Rising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Actual Trend in Violence</td>
<td>Increasing</td>
<td>Increasing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6.2: Observed Level of Violence in Algeria

**Conclusion**

What does the case of the FLN’s nationalist separatist struggle against the French government mean for my contingent theory of counterinsurgency success? Below is a chart revisiting the hypotheses that I evaluate and their outcomes. The notations for the applicable hypotheses refer to those described at the beginning of this chapter.
Figure 6.3: Table of Expectations for the Conditional Model in the Algerian Case

As can be seen from Figure 6.3 above, the theory accurately predicts FLN violence throughout the duration of the Algerian War for Independence. Specifically, the theory correctly predicts that the extremist motivated FLN would not be successfully dissuaded from violence by the reciprocal violence strategy of the French government. In fact, we see that violence grew dramatically during this time as French actions of reciprocal violence served to polarize the Algerian community and led them to increasingly support the goals represented by the FLN insurgency. As Walter Enders writes,

“Too strong a response can also have severe and harmful consequences. This was the case when French troops tried to crush the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) terrorists in Algeria in the late 1950s and early 1960s; French brutality turn the native Algerian Muslim community against the French and in favor of the terrorists” (Enders 2006).
Evaluating counterfactuals is as difficult in insurgency as it is everywhere else in international relations, but one wonders whether an efficient strategy of policing in Algeria might have put down the FLN without catalyzing the surrounding populace. This again calls into question the notion of effective versus ineffective execution of strategy, something I will address in the next chapter.

From 1958-1962, with the arrival of General de Gaulle, France shifts its policy from reciprocal violence to accommodation. Despite this dramatic shift in strategy, violence from the FLN continued until France completely capitulated to FLN goals. This is unusual compared to other cases under consideration in this study in one striking respect. Whereas other states adopted accommodation with the hope of placating the insurgents with partial concessions or undermining their resolve, the French government under de Gaulle quickly adopts a position of giving the FLN everything for which it had been striving. I do not think that this is a repudiation of the stakes that France saw in the loss of Algeria, but there is a role of the dramatic change in government France experienced which opened a window of opportunity for de Gaulle to make such a radical shift. I discuss this notion in the next chapter as well.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

“The phenomenon of the weak defeating the strong, though exceptional, is as old as war itself. Sparta finally beat Athens; Fredrick the Great always punched well above his weight; American rebels overturned British rule in the Thirteen Colonies; the Spanish guerilla bled Napoleon white; Jewish terrorists forced the British out of Palestine; Vietnamese Communists drove France and then the United States out of Indochina; and mujahideen handed the Soviet Union its own Vietnam in Afghanistan. Relative military power is a very imperfect predictor of war outcomes”27

Introduction

The quote by Jeffrey Record highlights some of the most well known cases of successful insurgency in the face of a much more military powerful opponent. In fact, one of the findings from the study of insurgencies that this project has confirmed is that military capability is not a particularly useful predictor of the outcomes of insurgent conflict (Moaz 1983; Moaz 1989). This finding, which has been born out in quantitative studies, is supported by the qualitative case studies of the preceding chapters.

Yet, this study has done more than note that weaker, less materially capable forces can prevail against stronger, materially and militarily more sophisticated adversaries. This study has attempted to explain the process within which insurgencies

are sometimes successful. Other times, counterinsurgent efforts are capable of reducing violence and claiming victory over insurgent forces. This study has presented a theory to explain the causal pathways to these two outcomes.

In general, in this study I have attempted address why states succeed or fail to subdue violence from a presently violent, insurgent group. The extant literature on this question provides two competing, contradictory answers. I have proposed a model that makes the claims of both current competing models conditional, and as I demonstrate below, this model contributes to the debate between these competing understandings.

In brief, my conditional model examines the strategic, counterinsurgent choices that states make to deal with the violence of non-state actors. However, merely focusing on the choices states make is not sufficient to explain why they sometimes succeed and other times fail to ameliorate violence. I also explore how violent, non-state groups are motivated. I have argued that it is the combination of a state’s strategic counterinsurgent choices and the motivations of insurgent groups that explains success or failure for a state in its attempts to ameliorate violence from the insurgent group.

In this chapter, I seek to accomplish several tasks. First, I review the model proposed by this study and applied in the four preceding case studies. I do this to provide both conceptual and theoretical clarity in the succeeding sections. Second, I reflect back on the puzzles that have driven this project. These theoretical puzzles and empirical questions drive this project and I will use this review in the third task. Third, I briefly review the results of counterinsurgency effort in these four case studies, compiling results from the four case studies into a set of unified results. Then, I evaluate my conditional
theory in general, reflecting on its relative ability to explain the four cases in the preceding chapters, including patterns that emerge out of its various successes and failures. It is in this section I will ultimately be able to evaluate the usefulness of the conditional model posed in the second chapter of this study. I also will return to the social and conflict models of counterinsurgency discussed in the first chapter and evaluate their usefulness relative to the conditional model I have proposed in this study.

Fourth, I return to the puzzles posed in the second section and discuss how this study affects those questions and debates within the literature. I reflect briefly back on the various literatures discussed in the first chapter which have informed this study, seeing what, if any, contribution this study can make them. Fifth, I discuss extensions of this study, including future avenues for research lessons, learned for both dealing insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, as well as their study. Here I will comment on methodological discoveries that have arisen as a result of this research, theoretical and empirical puzzles that can drive future research.

**Task 1: Review of Theory**

I have proposed that the actions of states can be grouped into three general strategic conceptions. These strategies may be selected by decision-makers for a variety of political reasons. In the first strategy, the state can try to police against actions of the groups, arrest members of the group through standard means of law, and seek to undermine the group through tactics that would also be employed against any other type of organized crime. In the second option, the state adds to the base strategy of the first option by attempting raise the costs of the non-state actor’s violence by punishing them
with strategy of reciprocal violence. In the third and final option, states can opt for a strategy of accommodation; attempting to integrate the group into a nonviolent realm of the political process. Various states may even be observed to attempt more than one of these strategies over the course of their interaction with a particular non-state group. These three state strategies represent approaches to counterinsurgency described in extant literature.

I also propose that variance in state strategy does not by itself explain the outcomes of insurgent conflicts. I present three general conceptions of decision-making that can be used to describe the motivational dynamics of insurgent groups. The first conception is that groups strategically and instrumentally connect their actions to their stated goals. The second conception suggests that groups are motivated by internal dynamics and that these dynamics create a disjunction between groups’ stated goals and their actions. Finally, the third conception is that groups do not see a difference between their stated goals and the actions they take. That is to say, their actions are always intended to be a direct achievement of their goals. These three concepts reflect strategic, organizational, and extremist portraits of insurgent groups that have been painted in extant literature (described in Chapter 1).

I argue that it is the interaction of the general strategy of the state and the general conception of the group’s decision-making that predicts success or failure in an insurgent conflict. That is, when a strategically oriented group is faced with a strategy of reciprocal violence, the group’s violence will be quelled more efficiently than if either of the other strategies is employed. This is additionally true when an organizationally oriented group
is faced with an accommodationist strategy and when an extremist oriented group is faced with a basic policing strategy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Strategy</th>
<th>Reciprocal Punishment (Hard Bargain)</th>
<th>Policing (No Bargain)</th>
<th>Accommodation (Soft Bargain)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic</strong></td>
<td>State Success</td>
<td>State Failure</td>
<td>State Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational</strong></td>
<td>State Failure</td>
<td>State Failure</td>
<td>State Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extremist</strong></td>
<td>State Failure</td>
<td>State Success</td>
<td>State Failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7.1: The conditional model of insurgent conflict

**Hypotheses**

Drawing on the interaction between state strategy and group behavior briefly described above yields the following hypotheses.

1. **The Strategic Logic**
   
   a. If the group is motivated according to a strategic logic, a state’s attempts to ameliorate violence will succeed with a strategy of reciprocal violence.
   
   b. If the group is motivated according to a strategic logic, a state’s attempts to ameliorate violence will fail with a strategy of policing.
   
   c. If the group is motivated according to a strategic logic, a state’s attempts to ameliorate violence will fail when accommodation is attempted.

2. **The Organizational Logic**
   
   a. If the group is motivated according to an organizational logic, a state will be successful when accommodation is attempted.
b. If the group is motivated according to an organizational logic, a state will be unsuccessful with a strategy of reciprocal violence.

c. If the group is motivated according to an organizational logic, a state will be unsuccessful with a strategy of policing.

3. The Extremist Logic

a. If the group is motivated according to an extremist logic, a state will be successful with a policing strategy.

b. If the group is motivated according to an extremist logic, a state will be unsuccessful with a strategy of reciprocal violence.

c. If the group is motivated according to an extremist logic, a state will be unsuccessful when accommodation is attempted.

Task 2: The Motivating Puzzles and Questions, Revisited

By far, the many task of this study has been to understand why states sometimes succeed and sometimes fail to quell insurgent violence. This question lingers not just for relatively material and institutionally weak states, but also states that are very capable in both respect. Numerous recent studies have attempted to answer this question (Merom 2003; Arreguin-Toft 2005; Miller 2007). How do states try to end insurgent violence? What strategies do these states employ, and how does the selection of strategy affect subsequent violence?

In Chapter 1, this study noted that the study of insurgency tends to fall into various camps that ultimately yield very different fruit. On the one hand, many scholars of insurgency have dedicated their work to the study of a single case of insurgent conflict.
In many cases, these authors seek to offer no theoretical base for their explanations of conflict outcomes; they are entirely inductive. There is nothing wrong with these works. In fact, this project has made use of a number of excellent historical narratives (Heggoy 1972; Muni 1993; Lieven 1998; Coogan 2002).

Amongst those authors who do approach the study of insurgency deductively, there is significant variance in how explicit they are in expressing the theory that drives their understanding of insurgency. However, as I argue in Chapter 1, there are essentially two starting positions in this theoretical scholarship. The first starting position is that states can defeat insurgencies through military force and provision of security. I refer to these studies as implicitly or explicitly expressing the “combat model.”

The second starting position is that states can defeat insurgencies by treating the antecedent conditions that created a permissive environment for the insurgency in the first place. Whether economic deprivation, ethnic repression, a supportive local populace, or even a particular ideology, removing the antecedent conditions for violence will remove the need for violence. I referred to these studies as implicitly or explicitly espousing the “social model.”

Therefore, one of the main puzzles to explaining state success and failure in insurgent conflict is adjudicating between these radically different sets of theoretical assumptions. The combat model argues that sufficient force from the state will dissuade insurgents, even if it does not succeed in destroying them entirely (Galula 1964; Trinquier 1964; Beckett and Pimlott 1985; Beckett 1988; Klare and Kornbluh 1988). The social model argues that any amount of military force will be insufficient if the state
cannot undermine the internal motivations of the insurgent group (Hamilton 1997; Beckett 2001; Cragin 2003; Kepel 2004; Mackinlay 2005; Sepp 2005). Based on a review of their expectations in Chapter, I present the predictions of the two models as follows in Figure 7.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Model Predictions</th>
<th>Combat Model Predictions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Success</td>
<td>State Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Failure</td>
<td>State Success</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7.2: Competing Extant Models of Insurgent Conflict

The combat and the social model present diametrically opposed predictions for state success and failure in insurgent conflicts. Yet, a quick review of insurgent conflicts and their results reveals that both approaches carry successes and failures in their records (Arreguin-Toft 2005). Why is this? This puzzle is the entry point for this study into the insurgency dialogue. Because the combat model of insurgency and the social model of insurgency offer competing understandings of what is likely to yield success and failure for states in insurgent conflicts, there is a clear intellectual puzzle that drives this project. Which of these two competing explanations of insurgent conflict is more accurate in determining the effectiveness of various state strategies? As I discuss in Chapter 1, this is not only an interesting question, and an important one from a scholarly perspective. Though they offer competing interpretations of the evidence, there is scant work testing the relative accuracy of the combat model versus the social model. This study does that.
Task 3: Evaluating the Proposed Theory

Below I briefly review the fit of my conditional model of success and failure in insurgent conflict in the four case studies discussed in the preceding four chapters. This review is not comprehensive; for that purpose, I recommend the preceding chapters. Instead, this section will review each of the cases with respect to the summary findings critical to the evaluation of the proposed conditional model. First, what is the trend in the counterinsurgent strategies selected by the state? This is one part of my independent variable. Second, how do I code the motivational dynamics of the insurgency at various points over the course of the insurgent conflict? I will make note of the overall coding of the motivational dynamics as well as briefly noting the intragroup distinctions that inform this coding. This is the second part of my independent variable and together with the first makes up the two critical components of my conditional model.

Third, what is the overall trend in violence in the insurgent conflict? This is my dependent variable, and I have operationalized it in two specific criteria. I track the number of fatalities over time in the insurgent conflict and I track the frequency of violent insurgent events over time during the conflict. I argue that when the death toll and number of incidents climbs, the state is unsuccessful in ameliorating insurgent violence with its current strategy. When the death toll and the frequency of incidents falls, this is a good indicator of a state’s progress in ameliorating violence stemming from an insurgency.
Fourth and finally, I use these findings to evaluate the predictions made in each case according to my conditional model. I will then use these results to help complete the main task in this chapter: evaluating the model as a whole.

*Findings from the Chechen Case*

As can be seen in Figure 7.3 below, from 1994-1996, the Russian strategy of reciprocal violence, though militarily costly, was able to ameliorate the violence stemming from the Russian insurgency. This finding supports the conditional model proposed by this study. However, the conditional model is does not explain insurgent responses to the accommodationist turn that Russia took in 1996. According to the conditional model, we would expect strategically motivated insurgents to press their luck and seek more gains in the face of accommodations. However, I argue that the accommodations of 1996 emerged out of Russia’s crushing of the Chechen insurgency from 1994 to 1996. As such, Chechen forces may have accepted accommodation simply as a means of self-preservation. Finally, from 1996 until present, the conditional model correctly predicts that the policing model does ameliorate violence from an extremist motivated group. Violence spiked initially from 1999-2004, but over the last several years it has dropped dramatically. I believe that early spikes in violence can be attributed to the interregnum of 1996-1999 where Russian forces were present in Chechen but highly inactive. This gave the insurgents time and freedom to develop fighting capacity. That fight capacity was no significantly affected in the early years of renewed conflict (1999-2003) because Russia’s policing efforts were poorly executed. I address this issue of poor policing below. However, once Russia developed more experience in policing in
Chechnya and also began to apprehend or, more often, kill Chechen insurgent leaders, the level of violence has dropped precipitously. However, as I discuss in Chapter 2, a policing strategy may not ultimately eradicate a group with extremist motivations, it will provide the state with the most efficient means of keeping violence low. For Russia under Putin, this seems to be the accepted trade-off.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applicable Hypothesis</th>
<th>1a</th>
<th>1c</th>
<th>3b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Tactics</td>
<td>Reciprocal Violence</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>Policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Motivation</td>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Extremist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prediction of Contingent Model of Counterinsurgent Strategy</td>
<td>Success in Reducing Violence</td>
<td>Failure to Reduce Violence</td>
<td>Success to Reduce Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation Based on Dependent Variable</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Unsupported</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7.3: Table of Expectations and Results from the Chechen case

*Findings from the Irish Case*

As can be seen in Figure 7.4 below, the conditional theory proposed in this study correctly predicted the success of an accommodationist strategy in reducing violence from the PIRA in Northern Ireland. For the 1969-1977 period, violence perpetrated by the PIRA ultimately decreased. I believe that the downward trend in violence, especially from 1972-1977 is explained by the accommodationist strategy of the British government.
which undermined the group dynamics of the organizationally motivated PIRA. I argue that it is clear from both the case study in Chapter 4 that violence was decreasing and I predict it would have continued to do so if the British government had maintained its accommodationist strategy. Instead, the British government transitioned to a policing strategy in 1977, which it maintained through 1993. This shift in strategy produced British counterinsurgent tactics, which though dedicated and increasingly sophisticated, were insufficient to eliminate the violence stemming from the PIRA insurgency, which continued at steady pace throughout the period. The British governments following 1977 might have done this because of a high political tolerance for violence, or for political benefits that they might have reaped for appearing tough against Republican terrorism. I address both of these possibilities below.

The contingent theory also successfully predicted the amelioration of PIRA violence via the strategy of accommodation from 1993 through 2005. The PIRA, driven by its own internal group dynamics, found the group increasingly insufficient as a driving force for a violent insurgency.
Figure 7.4: Table of Expectations and Results from the PIRA case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applicable Hypothesis</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>State Tactics</th>
<th>Group Motivation</th>
<th>Prediction of Contingent Model of Counterinsurgent Strategy</th>
<th>Evaluation Based on Dependent Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2c</td>
<td>1969-1977</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td>Success in Reducing Violence</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b</td>
<td>1977-1993</td>
<td>Policing</td>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td>Failure to Reduce Violence</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2c</td>
<td>1993-1999</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td>Success in Reducing Violence</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings from the Sri Lankan Case

Since the late 1970s, the Sri Lankan government has faced waves of violence stemming from its own internal ethnically Tamil minority. Violent actions taken by Tamil insurgents have come to be associated with a single insurgent organization, The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Here I summarize my findings regarding the Sri Lankan government’s violent interactions with the LTTE from 1976 until 2007.

As can be seen from Figure 7.5 below, the theory accurately predicted the early years of the LTTE from 1976-1985. Specifically, the theory suggests that the strategically motivated LTTE would not be successfully dissuaded from violence by the rump policing efforts of the Sri Lankan government. In fact, we might argue that initial Sri Lankan intransigence and oft-times complicity in violence toward the mobilization of
Tamil militancy contributed to the rise of the LTTE. If the state is motivated to take sides, as appears to be the case during this time in Sri Lanka, we might expect that policing can be done poorly or well. Poorly executed or ham-fisted policing may actually create opportunities for increasing violence, as was the case during this time in Sri Lanka (Abrahms 2006). I address this aspect of state strategy in greater detail below.

The contingent theory also successfully predicted the amelioration of LTTE violence via the strategy of reciprocal violence from 1985 through 1990. That is, the policy of reciprocal violence carried out first by Sri Lankan government and then by the Indian Peace Keeping Force was successful in reducing the frequency and deadliness of attacks by the LTTE.

Unfortunately, after 1990 the evidence does not conform to the conditional theory’s expectations. From 1990 through 1994, we observe a steady decline in LTTE violence. From 1995 through 2001, there is a period in the middle of the strategy where deaths and violent incidents perpetrated by the LTTE do fall, as the theory would predict. However, this period is bordered by periods where violence is rising. Even if we accept the first period of rising violence (1995-1996) as a holdover from the prior strategy, this does not help explain the second period of rising violence (1999-2000). At best, this time period presents only mixed evidence and does not support hypothesis 1a. From 2001-2005, we observe a marked decline in the number of incidents and number of deaths caused by the LTTE. This evidence runs contrary to the expectations of the theory and does not support hypothesis 1c. The last time period, 2005 to the present, is much more preliminary, but seems to represent a return to reciprocal violence for Sri Lanka and an
increase in violence for the LTTE. To the extent that this is true, it runs contrary to the expectations of the theory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applicable Hypothesis</th>
<th>1b</th>
<th>1a</th>
<th>1c</th>
<th>1a</th>
<th>1c</th>
<th>1a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Tactics</td>
<td>Pol.</td>
<td>R. V.</td>
<td>Acc.</td>
<td>R. V.</td>
<td>Acc.</td>
<td>R. V.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Motivations</td>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Strategic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prediction of Contingent Model of Counterinsurgent Strategy</td>
<td>Failure to Reduce Violence</td>
<td>Success in Reducing Violence</td>
<td>Failure to Reduce Violence</td>
<td>Success in Reducing Violence</td>
<td>Failure to Reduce Violence</td>
<td>Success in Reducing Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation Based on Dependent Variable</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Unsupported</td>
<td>Mixed Evidence</td>
<td>Unsupported</td>
<td>Unsupported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7.5: Table of Expectations and Results from the Sri Lankan case

Findings from the Algerian Case

As can be seen from Figure 7.6 below, the theory accurately predicts FLN violence throughout the duration of the Algerian War for Independence. Specifically, the theory correctly predicts that the extremist motivated FLN would not be successfully dissuaded from violence by the reciprocal violence strategy of the French government practiced from 1954-1958. In fact, we see that violence grew dramatically during this time as French actions of reciprocal violence served to polarize the Algerian community and led them to increasingly support the goals represented by the FLN insurgency.
From 1958-1962, with the arrival of General de Gaulle, France shifts its policy from reciprocal violence to accommodation. Despite this dramatic shift in strategy, violence from the FLN continued until France completely capitulated to FLN goals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applicable Hypothesis</th>
<th>3a</th>
<th>3c</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Tactics</td>
<td>Reciprocal Violence</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Motivations</td>
<td>Extremist</td>
<td>Extremist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prediction of Contingent Model of Counterinsurgent Strategy</td>
<td>Failure to Reduce Violence</td>
<td>Failure to Reduce Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation Based on Dependent Variable</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7.6: Table of Expectations and Results from the Algerian case

*Evaluating the Model Across the Cases*

Having briefly reviewed the proposed conditional model for the four case studies above, I now turn to an examination of the model across the four cases. The key results are presented below in several figures. First, in Figure 7.7, I present my original hypothesized predictions for insurgent conflict outcomes from Chapter 2. In short, this table reflects the predictions, based on derived hypotheses, of my model for the various stages of insurgent conflict in the four cases. When the conditional model’s predictions are supported by the analysis and the empirical evidence, I have bolded the entry. When
predictions are rejected by the analysis and the empirical evidence, I have italicized the entry.

As can be seen from Figure 7.7 below, the conditional model has correctly predicted insurgent violence in a number of periods in the case studies described above. In total, this study examines 14 time periods within the four case studies. Of these 14 time periods, the conditional model correctly predicts nine time periods correctly. Of the five time periods incorrectly predicted by the conditional model, twice the model predicted that insurgent violence would decline when it rose. The other three times, the model predicted that violence would increase when it actually declined. Looking at the model across the state’s choice of strategies, we can see that the model correctly predicted the outcome insurgent violence when the state selected policing as its strategy. Errors in the model occurred within the state strategies of reciprocal violence and accommodation.

Additionally, we note that the model performed better in some cases than in others. The model was most successful in predicting violence in the PIRA’s insurgency against Great Britain and in the Algerian FLN’s insurgency against France. In the Chechen insurgency against Russia, the model predicted the two longest periods of violence, though it incorrectly predicted the negotiation period between the two. As I discussed in Chapter 3, I believe this may be an artifact of my methodological procedures, a point I reflect further on below. The model was least effective in predicting the changing level of violence in the Sri Lankan case. Of the six time periods in that case, only two were correctly predicted. This is most troubling of the four cases. Several
possible explanations exist for such a result. Some authors would argue that the material power of the Sri Lankan government is significantly less than the other three states that comprise this analysis (Thomas 2004; O'Neill 2005; Sepp 2005). While this is true, as was discussed in Chapter 5, it seems clear that Sri Lankan had more than enough material capacity to launch any form of counterinsurgent strategy that it wished. More likely a contributing factor, I believe, were the frequently changing strategy of the Sri Lankan government. Because a change in governmental leadership frequently heralded a change in strategy toward the Tamil Tigers, I cannot help but wonder whether the Tigers generally ignored the character of the counterinsurgency mounted against them, knowing that additional changes would be forthcoming in the future. This behavior would comport with the strategic nature of the LTTE that was elucidated in the case study chapter.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent State</th>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sri Lanka vs. LTTE: 1985-1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France vs. Algeria: 1958-1962</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France vs. Algeria: 1954-1958</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7.7: Predictions of the Contingent Model Supported (bold) or Rejected (italics)

Figure 7.7 represents one way of reporting my findings in this study. I represent these results in a slightly different way in Figure 7.8. In the table below, I revisit the specific hypotheses derived from my conditional model in Chapter 2. I have listed these
hypotheses as the underlined predictions resulting from a specific combination of state strategy and group motivation. For example, when a state adopts a strategy of reciprocal punishment and the group’s motivation is fundamentally strategic, I predict the state will have success in reducing violence from the insurgent group, or Hypothesis 1a. Below each hypothesis, I list the relevant time periods that serve to evaluate that hypothesis. I have bolded time periods that support this hypothesis, and I italicized time periods that reject this hypothesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Strategy</th>
<th>Reciprocal Punishment (Hard Bargain)</th>
<th>Policing (No Bargain)</th>
<th>Accommodation (Soft Bargain)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic</strong></td>
<td>State Success (Hypo 1a)</td>
<td>State Failure (Hypo 1b)</td>
<td>State Failure (Hypo 1c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sri Lanka vs. LTTE 1985-1990</td>
<td>Sri Lanka vs. LTTE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational</strong></td>
<td>State Failure (Hypo 2a)</td>
<td>State Failure (Hypo 2b)</td>
<td>State Success (Hypo 2c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Great Britain vs. PIRA</td>
<td>Great Britain vs. PIRA 1969-1977 &amp; 1993-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1977-1993</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extremist</strong></td>
<td>State Failure (Hypo 3a)</td>
<td>State Success (Hypo 3b)</td>
<td>State Failure (Hypo 3c)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7.8: Evaluation of Hypotheses from Conditional Model
Several interesting points are reflected in Figure 7.8. First, any time the group has been coded as either organizational or extremist in its motivational dynamics, the predictions of the conditional model have been supported by the empirical evidence and analysis from the case studies. The only errors made by the conditional model occur when groups have been coded as strategic. This may help to explain the Russia anomaly of 1996. While Russia was negotiating a ceasefire and limited autonomy with the Chechen insurgents, it is possible the leadership of the insurgents was already transitioning to a different motivation, which may explain why the model incorrectly predicted a rapid resumption of violence. However, as I have discussed in Chapter 3 and elsewhere in this chapter, I believe that the Chechen’s response in 1996 had more to do with self-preservation following the 1994-1996 war than any intermediate shifts in their motivations.

A second important point is to note that not all of my hypotheses receive treatment in this study. While the case studies were selected for a variety of reasons discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, it was not possible to determine whether they would clearly cover every combination of state strategy and group motivation until the full analysis was done. While this analysis did cover the vast majority of combinations of state strategy and group motivations, I was unable to test hypothesis 2a. Specifically, I have no evidence to evaluate whether an organizationally motivated group confronted with a strategy of reciprocal punishment will lead to greater levels of insurgent violence, as the theory predicts (and as the social model predicts), or whether such a strategy will effective quell insurgent violence (as the combat model predicts). Any future additions to
this study will want to consider such a gap in the analysis. Having now reviewed the conditional model proposed in this study, I now turn to the puzzle that has driven this study: the disjunction between the social and combat models of insurgent conflict.

*The Social and Combat Models Revisited*

While the conditional model does a respectable job predicting violence in insurgent conflicts, how does it do relative to the combat and social models described above? Remember, the competing sets of explanations offered by the combat and the social models are the puzzle driving this project. The proposed model developed here makes the predictions of both the social model and the combat model conditional based on the selection of counterinsurgency strategies by the state and the motivational dynamics of the insurgent group. Ideally then, the conditional model would outperform both the social and the combat models. However, even if the model developed and evaluated here is less accurate than the social or the combat models, this study has still served as a useful contribution to the literature because it provides a comparative assessment of those two theories of insurgent conflict predominant in the literature (Scott 1970; Hammes 2004; Hammes 2005).

As summarized above and discussed in greater depth in the preceding chapters, the conditional model proposed here correctly explains nine of 14 time periods under investigation in the four case studies. How do the social and combat models perform over these same time periods? The results of their relative performance are listed in Figure 7.9. In Figure 7.9, I list the expectations of violence for both the social and combat models. As the two models would suggest, their predictions for insurgent
violence are diametrically opposed. Over the 14 time periods, the performance of the two models is quite marked. The social model correctly predicts 10 of the 14 time periods, while the combat model only predicts four of the 14 time periods. These results suggest that the social model is superior to understanding insurgent conflict relative to the combat model. That is, the application of state strategies according to the social model of counterinsurgency correctly predicts rising or falling violence in 10 of the 14 time periods depicted in this study. The social model is especially superior to the conditional model proposed in this study in the Sri Lankan case, where it successfully predicts the changing level of violence in five of the six time periods. In contrast, the conditional model proposed in this study correctly predicts only two of the six time periods, with one additional period present mixed evidence.

It is important to note that the time periods captured in the four case studies are not uniform. As such, another useful way to evaluate the combat and social models, as well as the proposed conditional model is to look at the number of correctly predicted years of insurgent conflict. Some time periods last as long as seventeen years, while others are a mere year in length. As a result, when we compare the three models by the number of years they correctly predict violence, the results lend greater support to the conditional model. In this interpretation, the conditional model performs best, correctly predicting 75 of a total 97 years under analysis. The social model also performs well, correctly predicting 70 of the 97 years across all cases. The combat model again produces the least inspiring results, only correctly predicting 27 of the 97 years. Based on these results, I conclude that the conditional model developed and evaluated in this
study is at least as good as the social model in predicting violent outcomes in cases of nationalist separatist insurgencies, and certainly far superior to the combat model. Figure 7.10 below is a summary table of the relative predictive performance of the three models. Even if we reject the value added by the conditional model proposed in this project, these results indicate there is a marked advantage to placing precedence on future examinations of the social model over that of the combat model of insurgent conflicts. This is discussed in greater detail below as I focus on the impact of this study for insurgency scholarship.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent</strong></td>
<td><strong>Social Model</strong></td>
<td><strong>Combat Model</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variable</strong></td>
<td>Predictions</td>
<td>Predictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Russia vs.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Russia vs.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Russia vs.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chechnya:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chechnya:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chechnya:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Great Britain vs.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Great Britain vs.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Great Britain vs.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PIRA:</strong></td>
<td><strong>PIRA:</strong></td>
<td><strong>PIRA:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sri Lanka vs.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sri Lanka vs.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sri Lanka vs.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LTTE:</strong></td>
<td><strong>LTTE:</strong></td>
<td><strong>LTTE:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>France vs.</strong></td>
<td><strong>France vs.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Algeria:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Algeria:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-1962</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7.9: Performance of Social and Combat Models (Supported in bold, Rejected in italics)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Time Periods Where the Model Correctly Predicted the Rise or Decline in Violence</th>
<th>Percent of Total Number of Time Periods (n = 14)</th>
<th>Number of Years Where the Model Correctly Predicted the Rise or Decline in Violence</th>
<th>Percent of Total Number of Years (n = 97)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Combat Model</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Social Model</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>71.5%</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Conditional Model</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7.10: Predictive Accuracy of the Competing Models of Counterinsurgency

**Task 4: Contributions to the Study of Insurgencies**

As discussed in the first chapter of this study, numerous scholars from a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches have performed useful work on the nature of insurgent conflicts. However, many of these scholars have not directly referred to actors in their work as insurgents. One of the hopes of this study is that scholars working in various fields will have more and more to say to each other as they knowing or unknowingly pursue a joint scholarship in the study of insurgency. Toward that end, this study began by introducing literature from the realms of insurgency, terrorism, civil war, and ethnic conflict. I would now like to briefly return to those literatures with two purposes in mind. First, I will evaluate how the results of this study impact the works that already exists in these fields. Second, I will suggest how this study might contribute
to their further integration and contribution to understanding violent, non-state actors (Thomas 2005).

**Insurgency**

In many ways, this study finds its closest kin in the study of insurgencies. I have already discussed above the most important contribution of this study: how it adjudicates between the social and combat models of insurgent conflict. What does this mean in the broader sense for the study of insurgencies? Often this literature delves specifically into how various states can position themselves to fight insurgency, real or hypothetical, rather than the broader theoretical contribution of trying to understand what fuels insurgencies and what determines the outcomes of the interactions of insurgency and counterinsurgent campaigns. Moving beyond this limitation, which was discussed in Chapter 1, there are several conclusions for the study of insurgency that can be drawn from this study.

First, as I discussed in Chapter 1, David Galula’s early and important work on counterinsurgency has been criticized for focusing too exclusively on the stabilization of society following the defeat of insurgents because he assumes the state’s military victory over the insurgents (Galula 1964). The emergence of the social model of counterinsurgency as superior to the combat model of counterinsurgency suggests that a bridge can be built between Galula and his critics (Ben Rafael 1979; Shafer 1988; Merom 2003; Mackinlay 2005). Galula falls well within the combat model of counterinsurgency in his discussions of post-insurgency stability. Yet, the social model can extend from the midst of insurgent conflict to the post-insurgency period. We have seen the social model
succeed in transitioning violent insurgents out of conflict and into a peaceful political realm. This was demonstrated to be the case in the British experience with the Provisional Irish Republican Army in Chapter 4. As the British employed tactics predicted to be successful by the social model, it paved the way for not only a reduction in violence, but also a transition to post-conflict stability via political integration, as Weinberg would suggest (Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2004). Therefore, Galula seems to be misguided in focusing solely on military means of providing stability, even in the post-insurgent conflict society.

The superiority of the social model in predicting insurgent outcomes also reflects on the second generation of counterinsurgency literature that grew out of pioneers like David Galula and Roger Trinquier (Trinquier 1964). The flaw in Leites’ Rebellion and Authority that draws a false dichotomy between a battle for hearts and minds in the populace and the struggle against insurgents themselves is emphasized by this finding (Leites 1970). Were the combat model to be superior in performance, it would be easier to suggest that states could divorce their counterinsurgent strategy from a hearts and minds campaign. In contrast, the social model is much more apt to integrate these two facets of counterinsurgency.

Third, this study has suggested that two rather obvious variables, the strategy of states and the motivations of insurgencies, can improve our predictions of the level of violence in insurgent conflicts. This further reinforces the notion that the study of insurgency should not be biased toward the activities of the state in the counterinsurgent relationship. Rather, scholars should continue to look at the organization of insurgencies
and the interaction between states and insurgent groups. The fact that this was not done in much of the counterinsurgent literature in the 1980s, where scholars tended to fall into the combat model of counterinsurgency (Beckett and Pimlott 1985; Beckett 1988; Klare and Kornbluh 1988). That the social model has been increasingly adopted in recent counterinsurgent work suggests that we are making progress in the field (Kalyvas 2001; Cragin 2003; Kalyvas 2006). To treat insurgencies monolithically or generically would be a major mistake, not merely from a tactical point of view, but also from an intellectual one. Following this study, I am reminded of the importance of works like John Nagl’s, who explained how the British and American militaries learned through counterinsurgent campaigns (Nagl 2002). I would like to propose that we could also learn from an examination of how the insurgencies themselves adapt and learn (if they do) over the course of their violent interactions with the state. In a sense, Nagl has captured on side of the learning environment, and perhaps this study has been a step toward addressing the other side, though clearly much more work needs to be done.

Fourth, as I discussed in Chapter 1, past and current scholars of insurgency tend to write in one of three camps, idiographic, implicitly nomothetic, and explicitly nomothetic. The idiographic scholarship offers proscriptive advice about (usually a single, specific) insurgency, but it does not make attempt to explain insurgent conflicts more generally. Much current work on conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan fall into this camp. This study, as I discussed in Chapter 1, has the least to say to these scholarly works, because the goals are so different. However, that this study has demonstrated that social conditions captured by both the social and the conditional model are critical to
predicting insurgent outcomes, and even idiographic studies of single insurgent campaigns, such as Alf Heggoy’s history of the Algerian insurgency or Ahmed Hashim’s case study of the insurgency in Iraq circa 2005 would be remiss if they do not consider these social conditions (Heggoy 1972; Hashim 2006).

In contrast, the study has much more to say to the nomothetic work on insurgent scholarship. First, toward those studies that only implicitly adopt a social or combat model understanding of insurgency; the implication is clear that this choice needs to be much more overt. For all of the nomothetic work on insurgency, the impact of this study is to suggest that we should reexamine cases that are based on the combat model, implicitly or explicitly. Robert Cassidy tells us that American forces were successful in the Philippines employing a combat model of counterinsurgency (Cassidy 2004). Yet, Cassidy’s analysis does not include an examination of elements of a social model strategy that may be present. Is it the case that the United States beat the odds in adopting an explicitly combat-based model? Alternatively, did that United States employ social model tactics that Cassidy’s analysis overlooks? Clearly, future studies of insurgent conflicts should evaluate the full gamut of tactics to answer this question.

Finally, this study supports work by scholars like Gil Merom and Bard O’Neill, who each in different ways emphasize the importance of social model factors in determining insurgent outcomes. This study supports the notion that these (often non-material) factors are critical in determining whether insurgent violence rises or declines (Merom 1999; Merom 2003; Merom 2004; O'Neill 2005).

_Terrorism_
All of the insurgent conflict examined here practice acts commonly understood as terrorism. Some, like the Algerians of the FLN, embraced the moniker of terrorist (Horne 1978; Hutchinson 1978; Horne 1984). Other groups attempted to justify themselves in the context of that term, either by applying it to their state opponent or by attempting to justify the ultimate morality of their actions (Woodworth 2001; Kepel 2004; Bloom 2005; O'Neill 2005). Yet, one of the easier conclusions from this study is that it would be an incredible oversimplification to label all of these violent, non-state actors as terrorists and treat them as a characteristically similar genus. This study has drawn from scholarship on terrorism that discusses alternative understandings of terrorist motivations. After using these alternative understandings of terrorist motivations as the building blocks to construct three different conceptions of the motivational dynamics of insurgent groups, I can now reflect back on what this study might contribute to scholarship on terrorism.

Drawing from this literature, many scholars of terrorism understand individuals and groups practicing tactics of terrorism to make decisions according to strategic calculations (Reich 1998; Bloom 2003; Pape 2003; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003; Bloom 2004; Meirowitz 2004; Bloom 2005; Neumann 2005; Trager 2006). Others have argued that group and organizational dynamics like self-esteem in intragroup competition fundamentally drive violent terrorist actions (Crenshaw 1981; Crenshaw 1983; Oots 1986; Messick 1996; Sedikides 2001; Brewer 2003; Crenshaw 2004). Finally, others understand terrorist actors as extremists, carrying violence because it is central to their understanding of who they are and what they are trying to accomplish, rather than an
instrumental means to another end (Hacker 1976; Rapoport 1984; Hoffman 1993; Esposito 2002; Juergensmeyer 2003).

This study contributes to these literatures by finding that terrorists do not fit easily into one category. This supports some scholars’ work and calls others into question. During the deductive stage of this project, it was an open question whether the insurgent groups in question would display a diversity of motivations, or whether they would all display similar motivations. For example, it would be easy to imagine that all the groups could have displayed only strategic motivations. Had this been the case, this study would have strongly supported work by Robert Pape, amongst others, who treat terrorists as fundamentally strategic (Pape 2003). Alternatively, it might have lent more support to scholars focused on intragroup dynamics as the predominant source of terrorist violence (Oots 1986; Messick 1996; Sedikides 2001; Post 2004). As it is, however, this study finds that insurgent groups practicing acts of terrorism often display a variety of motivations. These divergences in motivations are present even if we only examine the motivational dynamics of the leaders of insurgent groups. We might suppose that a diversity of motivations exist throughout the entirety of an insurgent organization. Therefore, this study supports but complicates work by Margaret Crenshaw, who argues that divergences might exist in the motivation amongst terrorist leaders, terrorist middle-management, and terrorist foot-soldiers (Crenshaw 1995; Rapoport 2001; Crenshaw 2004; Crenshaw 2007). What this study suggests is that even these subdivisions in a single organization are not necessarily homogenous. Therefore, this study exists at especially odds with prior scholarship that suggests all terrorists are extremists, or coldly
strategic, or even organizationally motivated (Oots 1986; Juergensmeyer 2003; Pape 2003; Crenshaw 2007).

Ultimately, what scholars from terrorism can draw from this study is affirmation of Martha Crenshaw and Jerrold Post’s argument that terrorist groups often display a mix of psychological and strategic characteristics (Reich 1998). To that argument, I would add that within that mix, certain characteristics could rise to the fore in certain leaders, and therefore, certain groups. As such, I would expect that different groups practicing acts of terrorism might do so for a variety of motivations, and that those motivations would change over time. This presents a more complex, but more accurate understanding of terrorism.

*Civil War*

Much of the burgeoning literature on civil wars has focused on the emergence of violence in civil wars, whether that emergence is explained as a process or through an analysis of the comparative weight of different causal factors (Tilly 1978; Tilly 1993; Tilly 2003; Tilly 2004; Elbadawi, Sambanis et al. 2000; Elbadawi, Sambanis et al. 2001; Collier and Sambanis 2005; Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Yet, surprisingly, much less recent scholarship has focused on the process of civil war once the conflict begins. To the extent that insurgencies can be thought of as a subset of civil wars, this study contributes to that literature by addressing this question. By explaining why a government can or cannot easily ameliorate violence from an insurgent group, this study could also help to explain civil war outcomes in some conflicts. This study specifically lends support to the process-based work of Stathis Kalyvas, which explains the process of
civil as an iterated interaction between the warring sides. Kalyvas’ focus on the group decision-making level as critical for the perpetuation of conflict is supported by the findings of this study. In contrast, this study suggests that structural conditions such as those used to explain civil war outbreak in work by Fearon and Laitin and civil war duration in work by Collier and Sambanis may not be sufficient to explain the life cycle of an insurgency (Fearon 2000; Sambanis 2001; Collier 2002; Fearon 2003; Fearon 2004; Collier and Sambanis 2005). Because this study has concluded that consideration of group motivation is critical to explaining insurgent outcomes, and because it has previously noted that these motivations may change over time, studies that look at static conditions to explain the emergence of violence will miss necessary nuance. Happily, others have begun to recognize this as well and have started to think about the civil war duration as part of a life cycle (Thomas 2004; Thomas 2005).

*Ethnic Conflict*

This study has examined four cases that could easily be termed ethnic conflict. The Chechens saw themselves as increasingly distinct from the Russians they fought against in the insurgency. First, this difference was primarily derived from tribal heritage, but it took on an increasingly religious aspect as the conflict proceeded. In contrast, the PIRA took great pains to explain itself as an Irish nationalist organization fighting against the British, rather than a Catholic one. The LTTE specifically carried itself as a leader within the Tamil community, even to the extent that it destroyed other Tamil organizations to consolidate that position. Finally, the FLN undertook a similar course to the LTTE and the PIRA in portraying itself as the best alternative for nationalist
Algerians while haphazardly adopting both Islamic and socialist beliefs into the organization.

All of these groups used symbols, tropes, and frames of ethnic groups in the midst of their violent insurgencies. What is the effect of this characteristic of insurgent conflict? This study has confirmed a substantial amount of work on ethnic conflict arguing that while ethnicity is not necessarily the source of conflict, it does serve as a useful frame for recruiting combatants or for defining the conflict in general (Anderson 1983; Mueller 2000; Mueller 2004). The use of an ethnic frame often facilitates insurgents’ ability to behave rapaciously with less threat of sanction. That said, this study calls into question treats of ethnicity that place it, whether socially constructed or primordial, at the center of the origins of insurgent violence (Jusdanis 2001).

Therefore, one contribution from this study to the scholarship on ethnic conflict is to demonstrate the importance of the sequencing of ethnicity and violence in insurgencies. In all four cases, nationalism was the primary motivation of the insurgency. However, in all four cases, ethnicity was used to draw members to the group and the motivate members once they had joined. Ethnicity did not necessarily bring the groups together in the first place. In the cases of the FLN and the PIRA, attempts were made to reach out beyond the ethnic group, if for no other reason than pacification. In the cases of the Chechen insurgents and the LTTE, the group was much more centered in a particular ethnicity. Despite that, both groups cooperated with other ethnic groups and even (in the case of the LTTE) with their primary ethnic opponents when it suited their interests. This suggest to me that ethnicity is not the primary factor in inducing conflict,
but is a primary factor in perpetuating conflict, both through grievance and recruitment (Gurr 1970; Gurr 2000).

**Task 5: Extensions of this Study**

This study has attempted to explain the success or failure of states to quell violence from nationalist separatist insurgencies. In the process of developing a theory of insurgent conflict and testing it against four case studies, I have observed several methodological and theoretical lessons that I believe are important for work that follows this study.

*Methodological Extensions*

This study attempted to do something that is rarely done in the field of insurgent conflict: study the motivational dynamics of insurgent leaders using their own words and the organization of their groups. It has also sought to evaluate the violence of insurgency using objective measures. I believe that this has been a valuable contribution methodologically to the scholarship on insurgencies, but it is not without challenges.

The first challenge in this study has been one of the availability of data on violence in insurgencies. In many cases of insurgency, data is either suspect because it has been primarily produced by one of the interested sides (as in Northern Ireland and Russia), because it is limited in its timeframe (as is the Uppsala Data, the MIPT data, or the TWEED data), or because it simply does not appear to exist in sufficiently detailed form (as is the case with the Algerian War for Independence).

This study has discovered that the data on more recent insurgencies is significantly more comprehensive than data on older insurgencies. For example, it was a
pleasant surprise to find relatively reliable and consistent data on the insurgency in Chechnya, despite both the Russian government and the Chechen insurgents desiring to obscure both the casualties they inflict and sustain. Yet at the same time, it was disappointing to ultimately not be able to locate usable, reliable data on yearly casualty rate in the Algerian War for Independence. In this conflict, it was difficult to find a reasonably reliable accounting of the total number of dead, much less the number of deaths per year. As discussed in Chapter 6, this ultimately did not affect the analysis, but more reliable figure would have been helpful. It also points to a broader methodological issue, that of extension. This project could serve as a useful starting point to study other insurgent conflicts, but there is likely to be a large variance on the availability of reliable, comprehensive, third-party data, a major problem in terrorism studies and other examinations of violent non-state actors (Mickolus 2002; Thomas 2004; Clauset 2007; Engene 2007; Sandler 2007). Unfortunately, there seems to be no easy answer to this problem other than encouraging the continued compilation of data. With that in mind, the closure of the Terrorism Knowledge Base and the dataset that it maintained is particularly troubling.

A second potential methodological extension associated with this study is the process by which leaders’ statements are coded. While I was satisfied in the three cases with the number of speeches, interviews, and statements I could obtain from insurgent leaders (again, Algeria being the data outlier), a useful project for the future could be the collection and maintenance of a database of statements by violent, non-state actors. Some collections do exist, but as of the writing of this study, no such publicly available
comprehensive collection exists. Published collections are either limited within a single conflict, or appear to be highly selective or even thematic (Jenkins 1982; Jenkins 2003). Such a collection presumably would not only aid scholars in their study of violent non-state actors, but also governments seeking to craft better counterterrorist and counterinsurgency policy (Laqueur 2004). Collecting these words in a similar format and a single location for facilitate another obvious next step for this study: a transition from human coding to machine coding of leaders’ statements (Hermann 1999).

**Theoretical Extensions**

I have addressed a significant number of theoretical applications above and I will not recapitulate those here. What would like to offer are several brief reflections on this study of insurgencies that can improve future versions of this study or additional projects that this study may inspire.

One area of necessary consideration is the efficiency of policing efforts that states employ in the face of communal violence. If the state is motivated to take sides, as appears to be the case during this time in Sri Lanka, we might expect that policing can be done poorly or well. This distinction is not part of the current analysis, but it should be. Though I believe, based on the results detailed above, that the theory proposed here offers an improvement over either the extant combat or social models, there is something lacking from the conceptualization of the strategies that states select. While I believe that the strategies I have describe present a useful and comprehensive typology, I note from this study that in several cases the strategy fails not just because it is the wrong strategy, but because it is the right strategy, poorly implemented.
As scholars of strategic choices by states, what should be done to address a question of good or bad policing, reciprocal violence, or accommodation? I believe that toward this end we can draw useful ideas from work on policy evaluation (Baldwin 2000). Ideally, we would be able to treat policy implementation as a variable that affects the strength of the original intent of the policy. However, there seems to be pitfall we would want to avoid. Just as some authors have reduced insurgent outcomes to simply whoever has the greater will, we would want to avoid claiming that insurgency or counterinsurgency campaigns were successful because they were better implemented, irrespective of any other factors. How this would be rectified is not immediately apparent, but a good start would be to code policies by states that were clearly (within a predetermined coding scheme) negligent or deliberating exacerbating was undermining whatever strategy they might otherwise be coded as in a conflict. For example, it seems clear that the Sri Lankan policing drove many Tamils into the arms of the emergent LTTE. It is difficult to code such activities as deliberate complicity in ethnic rioting as good policing. Therefore, we would want to note the presence of deliberate violence exacerbation in the Sri Lankan police, and factor such a notation into the analysis. Poor implement, however, need not be intentional, that seems to be merely the easiest to recognize.

A second theoretical extension is the necessity for an examination of the relationship between frequency of incidents and number of fatalities. In this study, those two factors were nearly always positively correlated. However, again in the case of the LTTE, we do observe at that a certain point, the LTTE scaled back the number of its
operations while increasing their lethality. In a much more subtle way, this may also have been case for the PIRA in Northern Ireland in the early 1980s. Why would this be the case? I believe such a strategy may be derived as a response to the Sri Lankan government’s willingness to negotiate but not make any binding commitments (as discussed in Chapter 5). Less frequent but more spectacular attacks might be tied into a strategy of attempting to goad the Sri Lankan government into more significant reactions. However, there is no direct evidence of goading strategy on the part of the LTTE. It does raise the broader question, however. What leads an insurgency to attempt numerous smaller incidents or fewer, larger scale incidents? I believe that this question should become part of the conversation about the diffusion, emulation, and adoption of insurgent tactics (Bloom 2005; Hoffman 2006). Why do groups adopt certain tactics, and what does this mean for the group itself? Integrating this question into the preceding analysis would allow us another avenue into the organizational dynamics of insurgent groups.

A third observation of insurgencies with potential for extension in future studies comes from the case of the Russian counterinsurgency against Chechnya. I conclude that, overall, each of the states under consideration would like to eliminate the violence insurgency they are facing. However, Putin has clearly derived domestic support for his hard-line stance against the Chechen insurgency. What would it look like if we encountered a leader who wanted to perpetuate an insurgency for the domestic or international political benefits they reaped as a result? I would like to be able to argue that such sentiments would be apparent from the comparison of their statements to their actions, but this remains an open question and one worthy of further exploration.
Ultimately, however, this might be a small problem, as most leaders are usually political damaged domestically by an ongoing insurgency; Putin’s case seems to be an outlier. Regardless, future projects may want to focus on state leaders (and possibly even insurgent leaders) as players in a two-level game environment (Putnam 1988; Fearon 2004; Bueno de Mesquita 2007; Clark 2007; Powell 2007). State leaders may want to quell the insurgency’s violence, but also reap domestic rewards, which in Putin’s case may lead to divergent goals. Insurgent leaders may want to push toward their individually held goals while at the same time feeling constrained by competing pressures from their own insurgency and the state.

A potentially broader issue for future study is the role of domestic sensitivity in the face of a violent insurgency. How sensitive is a particular government to the violence stemming from an insurgency? Are some governments more sensitive than others are? We observe that from 1977 until the early 1990s, the British government was content to apply policing tactics to the PIRA, despite a relatively constant level of violence from the insurgents. Does this means that British leaders believed firmly in the efficacy of their strategy, or were they simply relatively insensitive to violence? I think it is possible to measure how sensitive political leaders understand themselves to be to violence, but such as measure has not yet been applied in this study.

Final Thoughts

This entire study has sought to explain why sometimes the violence stemming from violent nationalist separatist insurgencies worsens, and why at other times it improves. I have refrained from directly offering policy recommendations as a
consequence of this study, though such recommendations are certainly possible. I will suffice with a single comment in this regard. If international relations scholarship is correct and war between major powers will become increasingly rare in coming decades, then over the next generation insurgencies will become even more important to all great powers in the system (Mueller 1989). As a result, they will find it critical to handle these insurgencies effectively. Currently, the scholarship on insurgencies and this study find that states very frequently do not address these conflict well and frequently waste wealth, political capital, liberties, and the lives of their citizens perhaps needlessly. I hope that I have not given the impression that I carry a status-quo bias; clearly, some successful insurgencies have benefited their constituents. However, I believe allowing violence to proliferate needlessly is a bad thing, and I hope that scholars and leaders alike will take more heed of the dangers of ongoing insurgent conflicts.


Jenkins, P. (2003). Images of terror: what we can and can't know about terrorism. New York, Aldine de Gruyter.


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