UNDERSTANDING NO-CONFIDENCE VOTES AGAINST ACADEMIC PRESIDENTS

THESIS

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
Master of Arts in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University

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The Ohio State University
2008

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ABSTRACT

Since 1989, over seventy faculties or faculty senates have voted no-confidence in their academic presidents. Although these votes are symbolic, as only an institution’s governing board can remove a president, they nonetheless bring paralysis to the campus community. What, then, are the sources of these votes of no-confidence?

Data suggest that most of these votes are held because faculty members believe that shared governance principles have been violated. This study examines this phenomenon at three institutions—Baylor University, Texas A&M University at Kingsville, and Goddard College—through case studies. This examination uses literature on university governance and organizational culture to explore shared governance, its sanctity in higher education, and how the notion of shared governance is rooted in academic culture. Because shared governance problems are indicative of organizational conflict, conflict management literature is used to help identify ways that these problems can be addressed.

By understanding the sources of no-confidence votes against presidents, colleges and universities can attempt to stop them from occurring. The practical benefits are profound; the campus community can heal and participants can truly fix institutional issues in a productive manner.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank my advisor, Dr. Tatiana Suspitsyna, for her prompt advice and help on this project. Her insight has helped me become a better writer and researcher.

Dr. Ada Demb provided similar assistance for which I am thankful. In particular, her advice about writing was quite beneficial.

I also wish to thank Matt Cordon from Baylor University and Kabba Colley from Goddard College for attempting to find pertinent archival data for this project.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vita</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapters</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction and Problem Statement</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 What a No-Confidence Vote Means</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Significance and Organization of Study</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Literature Review</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Defining Governance and Shared Governance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Academic Governance as Democracy</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Sharing Governance: Participants and Problems</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Organizational Culture: Problems with Participants’ Culture</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Understanding Conflict</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Design and Methodology</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Rationale for Using Case Study Method</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Data Sources and Collection</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Research Sites</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Validity</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 Limitations</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Findings</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Baylor University</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Analysis of the Baylor Case</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 Texas A&amp;M University and Kingsville (TAMUK)</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 Analysis of the TAMUK Case</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5 Goddard College</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6 Analysis of the Goddard Case</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7 Understanding the No-Confidence Votes</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Collaboration as Culture and Centrality of Decision-making for Case Studies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

In March 2005, the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University voted no-confidence in their president, Lawrence Summers. In the nearly four hundred year history of the university, never had a vote of no-confidence been held against the institution’s president. The vote was symbolic—only Harvard’s governing board could remove the president—and only a small portion of Harvard’s faculty members participated in the vote. Yet the repercussions of the vote were devastating. Not only did it make the issue of confidence in academic presidents salient, it also underscored the debilitating impact such votes can have on campuses (Fain, 2006; Tierney, 2007). President Summers ultimately resigned.

Since at least 1989, faculties at more than seventy colleges and universities have voted no-confidence in their academic presidents (See Appendix). These institutions range from small community colleges to large research universities. Even though the number of institutions that have held such votes are small compared to the entire population of colleges and universities in the United States, the impact at these institutions, like that at Harvard, is powerful. It is no wonder that Tierney (2007) deemed the no-confidence vote as a “nuclear option” because “the campus is usually consumed
for too long about the president’s fate . . . progress slows almost to a halt . . . the president’s troubles dominate public discussion” (para. 2).

**What a No-Confidence Vote Means**

The issue of no-confidence votes against academic presidents is an important feature of democracy in the academy. Primarily an instrument of parliamentary democracy, the motion of no-confidence is one of the most powerful and substantial legislative devices (Powell, 2004). If passed, it compels a government to resign or ask for the legislature to be dissolved, which then typically results in a general election. The motion of no-confidence has existed since at least the reign of George III, when his prime minister, Lord North, was challenged over his management of the American Revolutionary War (Randle, 1970; Reid, 1946). Indeed, governments from Britain, Canada, and other parliamentary nations have fallen since then due to successful no-confidence votes.

In higher education, though, votes of no-confidence by faculty are purely symbolic, as all authority is vested in the governing board of the institution. The result, though, is the same: support from a major constituency is lost. Furthermore, the campus becomes chaotic, tensions amongst constituents flare, and, as one disgruntled faculty member said about the vote at Harvard, it “[eats] up a lot of productive time” (Fogg, 2005, para. 7).

**Significance and Organization of Study**

The purpose of this study is to ascertain the sources of these successful votes of no-confidence at institutions of higher education. A preliminary review of data from
seventy-five institutions suggests that concerns about shared governance, with leadership style and financial management as byproducts of that issue, are the most prominent factors that compel faculties to hold votes of no-confidence (See Appendix). Hence, exploring the notion of shared governance and those involved within it is of crucial importance. A firm comprehension of the significance of shared governance will facilitate an understanding of the sources of no-confidence votes.

While an abundance of research exists on issues in university governance (Baldridge & Riley, 1977; Birnbaum, 1988; Brown, 2000; Tierney, 2004a), there are evidently no scholarly analyses of no-confidence votes against academic presidents. There are, however, numerous journalistic articles and investigations about occurrences of no-confidence votes. The Chronicle of Higher Education, Inside Higher Education, The New York Times, and other national media publications have examined these phenomena. Thus, this study attempts to convey new scholarly insights about no-confidence votes because, as noted previously, these votes essentially cause paralysis on campus communities. In addition to contributing to research, this analysis tries to consider practical solutions regarding no-confidence votes, such as using mediation or developing strong conflict-resolution skills amongst campus leaders. The goal is therefore to understand the practical implications of no-confidence votes at colleges and universities in the United States.

To meet this goal, I pose several questions. These questions arise from the literature on university governance, the literature on organizational culture, and statements and analyses made by actors at institutions where successful no-confidence
votes were held. What was the impetus, in the view of the faculty, to warrant such action against the president? How has the president rationalized his or her actions and behaviors? How, if at all, does the governing board, as the final authority, react? What do these constituents’ actions reflect about shared governance and its importance? What remedies might a university employ if a no-confidence vote looms? Not only do these questions reflect the concerns mentioned by many faculty members and administrators, they also underscore broader themes about no-confidence votes. Hence, by understanding these questions—and a fundamental comprehension of the sources of these votes—colleges and universities can develop a greater knowledge of the problems that generate successful votes of no-confidence.

This study is organized to provide the most comprehensive understanding of no-confidence votes. I share the important research questions first, thereby conveying the central questions and ideas that will guide this discussion. Then, I offer an extensive literature review of shared governance, wherein I posit that it is such a revered component of higher education that breaching it, or appearing to breach it, is extremely dangerous. Next, I explain my methodology, which uses case studies to examine no-confidence votes at various colleges and universities. Afterward, I introduce my three case study sites and explain the no-confidence votes that were held at those institutions. Subsequently, I examine each case study within the framework from my literature review. Such an analysis will permit a thorough understanding of the no-confidence votes at those institutions. Finally, based upon the results from the data analysis, I consider various practical solutions to help colleges and universities avert these situations.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Conceptualizing university governance is a critical component of this study. I contend that governance—particularly shared governance—is an inalienable element within the academy, rooted in collegial and democratic traditions of the academy, especially traditions that emerged following the Civil War and World War Two. This conceptualization encompasses institutions such as research universities or liberal arts colleges. Thus, violating or appearing to violate this sacrosanct relationship invites serious trouble, such as no-confidence votes. To illustrate this position, I define governance, then explore the notion of shared governance, and discuss the participants in it. A historical explanation of shared governance, including its theoretical origins from political science, is included to enhance its understanding. Further integrated is the idea that showing disrespect toward shared governance—a heavily cited cause of no-confidence votes—is very dangerous, particularly as it is a cultural component of academe. An organizational culture perspective is thus useful because it provides a framework for understanding the sanctity of shared governance. Finally, a brief overview of conflict in higher education is offered to understand an organizational perspective of
what culture is. This conceptualization enables the selected no-confidence votes to be understood better.

**Defining Governance and Shared Governance**

There are countless definitions of university governance. Some descriptions are abstract; others are concrete. Tierney and Lechuga (2004) define governance broadly, writing that governance “is the means to implementing ideas that either respond to problems or provide new strategies” (p. 1). Mortimer and Sathre (2007) believe that governance is an “art form” (p. xiii) because it is an extremely complex process to negotiate. Writing about democratic reforms at the City University of New York in the 1930s, Edel (1990) argues that governance is “the way in which designated people set [an institution’s] policies and they or other designated people carry them out, that is, ‘administer’ the institution” (p. 5).

Lee (1991) and Hirsch and Weber (2001) offer the most comprehensive definitions of governance. Lee (1991) states that governance is:

The way issues affecting the entire institution, or components thereof, are decided. [Her definition] included the structure, both informal and formal, of decision-making groups and the relationship between and among those groups and individuals. It included the process used to reach those decisions and the outcome of recommendations from governance groups to higher-level individuals and groups. (p. 42)

Hirsch and Weber (2001) provide a similar definition. They write, “Governance in a university [is] the formal and informal exercise of authority under laws, policies, and
rules that articulate the various rights and responsibilities of various actors, including rules by which they interact, so as to help the institution’s academic objectives” (Hirsch & Weber, 2001, p. viii).

Fusing all of these definitions together, governance, in essence, explains how university issues are decided, who decides them, and what happens as a result of such decisions. The most traditional form of governance in American higher education is shared governance (Burgan, 2004).

Just as it is difficult to define general governance, so, too, it is difficult to explain shared governance. Mortimer and Sathre (2007) contend that the idea of shared governance is very ambiguous, and it has multiple meanings to various constituents, despite strong support for shared governance throughout academe. But Duderstadt (2004) offers a lucid and significant definition of shared governance. “In theory, shared governance delegates academic decisions to the faculty and administrative decisions to the administration, leaving the governing board to focus on public policy and accountability” (Duderstadt, 2004, p. 140). Hirsch (2001) presents a similar assessment. “Ideally, shared governance in universities assigns specific rights and responsibilities to its three stakeholders i.e., provides for a separation of powers, and establishes a structure and process for stakeholders to interact in specific undertakings” (Hirsch, 2001, p. 147).

These definitions are rooted in the historic Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities (commonly called the “Joint Statement”) of the American Association of University Professors, the American Council on Education, and the Association of Governing Boards of Colleges and Universities (2006). This statement, implemented in
1967, delineated the roles and duties of faculty, the president, and the governing board in institutional governance. Accordingly, two principles emerged from this statement: (1) important areas of action involve at one time or another the initiating capacity and decision-making participation of all the institutional components, and (2) differences in the weight of each voice, from one point to the next, should be determined by reference to the responsibility of each component for the particular matter at hand, as developed hereinafter (American Association of University Professors [AAUP], 2006, p. 136). Therefore, the primary participants in shared governance—the faculty, the president, and the governing board—all have specific purposes in this construct.

**Academic Governance as Democracy**

To understand precisely why shared governance is so revered, a historical and political examination is necessary. Unlike their continental European counterparts, where national and centralized management is often the norm (Hirsch & Weber, 2001; Neave, 2001; van Ginkel, 2001), American colleges and universities enjoy shared governance because it is a distinctive product of American higher education (Lechuga, 2004). Indeed, Tierney (2004b) likens shared governance to higher education as “mom and apple pie” (p. 202) are to the United States. More importantly, shared governance, as an inherently American concept, contains fundamental ideas rooted in the United States’ democratic traditions.

Rosenzweig (as cited in Lyall, 2001) has compared shared governance with the system that emerged from the United States Constitution. The notion of shared governance that surfaced during the drafting of the United States Constitution is owed
mostly to James Madison. Madison (1982), writing the tenth Federalist Paper, argues that appropriate safeguards must be used to protect the populace from faction; or, more succinctly, the rights of all people must be protected from majority or minority tyranny. The primary safeguard is separating power amongst authorities (Sorenson, 1995). Edel (1990) compares these ideals with governance in the academy and notes how similar structures are used.

Indeed, the Madisonian ideal of sharing governance is evident throughout the post-colonial history of American higher education, especially following the Civil War. Before that, though, many institutions were governed by powerful governing boards, composed of civic and ecclesiastical leaders, and the president, often a minister, was a member of a typically very small faculty. Samuel Capen of the University of Buffalo noted in retrospect the irony that a democratic nation had produced a very undemocratic system of higher education (Crowley, 1994). After the Civil War, however, a surge in democratic values—and enrollment—and growing secularization impacted all aspects of higher education (Lucas, 2006). At this juncture, the power invested in the governing boards slowly transferred to the presidents, with faculty gaining additional governance roles as well. The president, however, held most authority, despite the development of faculty vis-à-vis the emergence of academic disciplines and departments, the notions of research and publishing, and the advent of autonomy (McCormick & Meiners, 1988). Indeed, this was the era of heroic, powerful presidents who were “giants on earth” (Shapiro, 1998, p.75).
Of course, as faculty began to assert their role on campuses, they began to regard presidents as authoritarian (Crowley, 1994). Crowley (1994) adds:

Faculty attention in the early twentieth century was more and more focused on the need for involvement and protection. The threatening and potentially alienating presence of presidential and trustee authority, a perceived business orientation, and growing bureaucratic control produced the inevitable response. (p. 61)

Furthermore, after several notorious incidents of president-faculty disputes, such as the Ross case at Stanford University, the “rights and responsibilities” (Tierney, 1997, p. 18) of faculty became salient. At this juncture in American higher education history, university presidents implemented democratic governance structures to enable participation (Crowley, 1994)

Thus, the system of shared governance began to grow. Edel (1990) adds that democratization amongst university constituents grew further before the Second World War, as Americans were very concerned about fascism permeating academe. From the 1950s, when the academy was impacted by the Red Scare, to the 1960s, when campus unrest became prominent, higher education institutions—as evident in the “Joint Statement”—established the idea of shared governance formally.

For decades, shared governance has been a fundamental component of the academy. Accordingly, the traditions of governing collectively have enabled faculty members, administrators, and governing boards, as a whole, to question, debate, and solve institutional matters. Thus, it is important to understand more fully the participants in shared governance and the issues which affect them. How, then, do they participate in
shared governance? How do the two interact with respect to shared governance? How does the governing board interact?

**Sharing Governance: Participants and Problems**

The “Joint Statement” articulates that three constituents within the academy are crucial to proper and effective institutional governance (AAUP, 2006). The president (administration), the faculty, and the governing board are these essential components. For what reasons are they so important? What roles and functions do they fulfill in the context of university governance? What are the problems the three parties encounter amongst them?

Faculty members are particularly crucial in shared governance matters. Hamilton (2004) posits that faculty members are important in governance because of the traditions of the professoriate, such as peer review and academic freedom, which stress consultation and autonomy, respectively. Hamilton (2004) argues strongly that:

> The most critical lesson for governing boards and administrators to learn is that the mission of higher education and of the academic profession is creating knowledge and teaching the discipline of dissent. The faculty’s areas of primary authority in shared governance and its claims for a consulting role on other decisions follow directly from this mission. (p. 97)

Mortimer and Sathre (2007) believe that faculty members are integral to governance because of their competence and knowledge of academic matters. Dimond (1991) states that faculty involvement in other, non-academic affairs, such as budgeting, is just as vital because ultimately those decisions impact academic programs. The “Joint Statement”
articulates a comparable belief, citing the importance of faculty consultation not only in academic issues, but broader institutional affairs as well (AAUP, 2006).

Likewise, the president also has a pivotal role in shared governance. Fincher (2003) believes that the president is eventually accountable for everything at his or her institution. Hence, he or she must address shared concerns effectively. Kerr and Glade (1986) contend that the president is a central figure in the shared governance process; for example, he or she facilitates concerns, shares ideas, or builds consensus. The “Joint Statement” states that the president, as the executive of the institution, must facilitate all views amongst all constituents (AAUP, 2006). The president’s role in shared governance is perhaps best exemplified by its comprehensiveness.

Meanwhile, the governing boards of institutions participate in shared governance rather importantly. Heilbron (1973) notes that a “trustee’s trust is to perpetuate our heritage for present and future generations” (p. 4) by serving an institution so that it can serve itself and others. This notion includes supporting good governance as a means to improve the various functions of higher education institutions. Indeed, Chait, Holland, and Taylor (1993, 1996) note that governing boards who respect and foster shared governance are considerably effective, and in turn, that effectiveness benefits their institutions.

Furthermore, as the final arbiter and final authority in all institutional matters, the governing board is a very powerful and vital entity (Taylor, 1987; Kerr & Glade, 1989). They must evaluate the president, settle internal disputes, and keep the image of the institution positive in the view of constituents, especially the government and the public.
In the context of shared governance, the governing board must delicately consider the concerns and complaints of other constituents—especially faculty—regarding issues of presidential leadership. This is a difficult task. Taylor (1987) argues that presidents and boards are “mutually depend[ent]” (p. iv) because each party relies on each other for institutional growth and success, and each party can also harm the other. In discussing trusteeship at private colleges, Wood (1985) notes that governing boards are often reticent when considering action against a president because of the awkwardness such an encounter would yield. Kerr and Glade (1989) add that governing boards remain loathe to question concerns about presidential actions because to do so would reflect poorly on the very board which hired the president. Finally, Taylor (1987) contends that during times of crisis, faculty and boards often clash over issues of authority and institutional goals. Such action surely emerges during times when faculty members are concerned about presidential leadership.

Within the confines of shared governance, problems undoubtedly emerge, particularly between the president and faculty. They interact together in ways that are important but sometimes antagonistic. For example, presidents believe the most difficult group with which to work is faculty (American Council on Education, 2007). Similarly, Carbone (1981) notes faculty members rarely give presidents their enthusiastic support. One reason for this disconnect might be, as Waugh (as cited in Birnbaum, 2003) suggests, that presidents must be more responsive to constituencies other than faculty because of the increasing managerial responsibilities of the academic presidency. Birnbaum (1992a) believes:
Faculty are obligated to judge whether the missions of creating and disseminating knowledge are being honored, whether a president is appropriately concerned with curriculum and student development, whether sufficient conditions for academic work are maintained, and whether the president operates in a manner consistent with a collegial community. (p. 58)

*Organizational Culture: Problems with Participants’ Culture*

Another explanation for tense faculty-president relations—or any tense relations in academe perhaps—rests in the organization’s culture. Since shared governance is so revered—and is widely practiced (Burgan, 2004)—I assume that shared governance is a part of university culture. Pettigrew (as cited in Masland, 1991) broadly defines organizational culture as “the amalgam of beliefs, ideology, language, ritual, and myth” (p. 118) in an organization. Tierney (1988) offers a more practical definition of organizational culture. In his view, organizational culture is “reflected in what is done, how it is done, and who is involved in doing it. It concerns decisions, actions, and communication both on an instrumental and symbolic level” (Tierney, 1988, p. 3). Using the latter definition, the idea of presidents and faculty having conflicts rooted in organizational culture is realistic, particularly if institutions have certain cultural roles, norms, and expectations of their presidents and faculty within the framework of shared governance. In other words, shared governance is a part of academic culture, and breaching shared governance means offending institutional culture. When coupled with the culture of participants in shared governance—faculty culture, for example—the risk of encountering governance problems is even greater.
Consider, for example, Bergquist’s (1992) claim that the collegial culture of universities—the dominant culture in American higher education—is partially embedded in the German research university model that permeated American higher education in the late nineteenth century. The German model espoused research and autonomy for faculty. As a result, a culture of independence and freedom was conceived as faculty began to assert these rights (Bergquist, 1992). Indeed, Fujita (as cited in Birnbaum, 1992b) found that faculty judge presidents based on the “[president’s] willingness to be influenced and the president's respect for the institution's culture” (p. 14). Birnbaum (1992b) additionally argues that “misread[ing] faculty culture” (p. 14) is a major reason presidencies fail. Tierney (1988) argues that organizational culture is first manifested to administrators only when they violate it, which often happens unknowingly. Hence, in the confines of shared governance, misreading participants’ cultures invites serious repercussions.

Furthermore, faculty view shared governance as an important feature of their institutions (Tierney & Minor, 2003). Yet, in practice, faculty members and administrators are often in conflict within shared governance. Del Favero (2003) notes:

Administrators are criticized by faculty as having a penchant for unilateral decisionmaking (sic) and for failure to consult faculty on matters affecting faculty work and the learning environment. Faculty are labeled by administrators as disinterested, uninvolved, and recalcitrant when it comes to collaborative institutional activity. (p. 1)
If the mindset of these two groups of participants is nearly always antagonistic, then one might argue that the participants’ cultures perpetuate these beliefs and perceptions continually. Holton and Phillips (1995) state that the cultures of faculty members and administrators are constantly in conflict. They write, “Faculty bemoan the lack of support by administrators, administrators wonder what faculty actually do” (Holton & Phillips, 1995, p. 43).

Finally, within the context of organizational culture, shared governance is not only a physical component of the academy, but also an institutionalized aspect of colleges and universities. It is such a widely practiced and very revered part of academic culture that it has become an inherent ceremonial component of academe. Two significant institutionalists in organizational theory, Meyer and Rowan (1977), note that institutionalized organizations must have ceremonial functions in order for stakeholders to view them as legitimate. In this instance, the university is an institutionalized organization. Furthermore, these ceremonial functions must be continuous. They state, “Organizations employ a host of mechanisms to dramatize the ritual commitments which their participants make to basic structural elements” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 358).

Shared governance, then, represents a symbolic commitment of the organization to institutional well-being. Organizations that foster such structures are thus more legitimate (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

Moreover, organizations “tend to be similar in structure—reflecting their common institutional origins—but may show much diversity in actual practice” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 357). Tierney (1988) concurs, noting that although organizations may appear
alike, they differ in practice based upon the “varying perceptions” (p. 3) participants in
the organization hold. In other words, shared governance might be seen as a common
mechanism in academe, but how it actually functions at different colleges and
universities is diverse, partly because organizational participants each have their own
perceptions of it. Tierney (1988) adds that these multiple viewpoints in part inhibit
administrators from truly understanding organizational culture—until crises develop,
however.

As a result of this dissonance, organizational participants might view each other’s
actions as illegitimate, and hence problems emerge. Meyer and Rowan (1977) state that
organizational legitimacy partly rests on the “confidence and good faith” of its members
and “. . . effectively absorbing uncertainty and maintaining confidence requires people to
assume that everyone is acting in good faith” (p. 357). If they are not acting in good faith,
or do not appear to be acting in good faith, then conflict emerges and the organization
appears to be dysfunctional.

Perhaps most problematic, though, is the idea that even though colleges and
universities expect these ceremonial functions—shared governance, in this example—to
respond to institutional needs, they cannot. “Technical activities and demands for
efficiency create conflicts and inconsistencies in an institutionalized organization’s
efforts to conform to the ceremonial rules of production” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p.
355). Essentially, then, this notion suggests that organizations must use ceremonial
structures even if they are inefficient because, ultimately, participants expect such
ceremonial entities to be used. This paradox is quite challenging.
Understanding Conflict

These scenarios discuss conflict amongst participants in shared governance. By “conflict” I refer to the structural problems in institutions, particularly the concerns about shared governance. I do not mean “conflict” in the sense of “a budget crisis” or “a personnel decision.” In many ways, those are just the symptoms of a larger problem within the organization. Hence, this analysis of conflict is concerned with fostering better shared governance.

Losey (as cited in Bess & Dee, 2008) defines conflict as “a condition that is perceived to need remediation in order to correct one or more misfits in the system” (p. 429). Higgerson (1998) states that “conflict exists whenever two or more people disagree about some decision or outcome” (p. 48). These definitions provide a general description of conflict. Yet, Coser (1956) offers another dimension of studying conflict—the concept of social conflict, or “a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power, and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals” (p. 8).

His definition is particularly provocative as it relates closely to the issues and themes revealed in the cases of this study. Although it is true that the more generic descriptions of conflict are applicable to these cases, Coser’s definition offers more insight into the events at the three case sites. For instance, faculty at the case sites all claimed, by virtue of their academic backgrounds, a certain status; they claimed some power in the institution; and, they also claimed some right to consider how resources
were used. Likewise, they aimed to remove their presidents for impeding upon those values and claims.

The provocative definition presented should not imply conflict is dangerous. In fact, many scholars argue that conflict is good and can result in positive changes in organizations (Bess & Dee, 2008; Coser, 1956; Holton, 1998). The cases in this study obviously demonstrate what happens when conflict does not result in positive outcomes.

Holton (1998) offers a thorough analysis of conflict in higher education. She argues that problems in academe have origins in ancient Greek and Roman institutions and have continued to the present day. She explains that ancient academies, such as those led by Pythagoras and Aristotle, had intra-faculty disputes about curriculum and teaching methods, as well as demands from external forces (Holton, 1995). These conflicts, among others, remain salient in modern times.

She notes that these conflicts involve “incompatible goals, scarce resources, and interference from others” (Holton, 1998, pp. 2-4). In essence, these conflicts—which impact relations between presidents and faculties—can cause confusion, ambiguity, and anger. Graff (1998) indicates that this conflict will remain in higher education forever, and constituents must seek ways to manage it. Sturnick (1998) concludes by offering an assessment of her experience working with an institution where a no-confidence vote against the president was recently held. In her example, she contends that long-standing conflict will continue to impact an institution unless it is addressed immediately—and, most importantly, she argues that governance processes must be employed, not ignored.
Thus, this perspective signifies the importance of understanding what conflict is, how it emerges, and how it can be managed in the context of shared governance.

Indeed, Weick’s (1995) concept of sensemaking—the ongoing process of making sense of uncertain occasions—can help clarify how people view problematic situations. In this instance, faculty and administrators view each others’ role in shared governance based upon these preexisting antagonistic mindsets. Harris (1994) and Weick (1995) claim that actors in organizations make sense of confusing events partially based upon the social setting of the organization. In essence, because faculty and administrators perpetuate hostility against each other, they often view problematic events—such as no-confidence votes—through lenses through which they were socialized and cultivated to see.

The system of shared governance is a fundamental component of higher education in the United States. Presidents and faculties have extensive roles and responsibilities in this framework. When a president, however, violates—or is perceived to violate—the central and revered tenets of shared governance, he or she is attracting conflict. Hence, faculty support is essential if an institution’s mechanisms of shared governance are to function properly. Without such support, academic presidents face various consequences including, but not limited to, votes of no-confidence. Thus, understanding governance, organizational culture, and conflict permits a better comprehension of votes of no-confidence at institutions of higher education.

Moreover, shared governance is vital to an institution because it enables proactive participation and debate. For example, the “Joint Statement” underscores the significance
of sharing responsibilities amongst constituents because such cooperation greatly improves the overall well-being of the institution (AAUP, 2006). Mortimer and Sathre (2007) stress the importance of shared governance by emphasizing that it might prevent “wicked problems” (p. 128) from emerging. Birnbaum (2004) adds that shared governance—through its intrinsic deliberative mechanisms—helps avoid rushed, irresponsible decision-making. Perhaps, then, that is why Tierney and Lechuga (2004) have called shared governance a “hallmark of higher education in the United States” (p. 1).

Shared governance is an important facet of academic culture. Explicitly, it enables participants to make important decisions collectively based upon their expertise. Implicitly, it is a vital structure of the organization, and those who are entrusted to implement shared governance are viewed more legitimately when they employ such practices. Ideally, shared governance permits joint decision-making in an effort to determine institutional goals and direction.
CHAPTER 3
DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Understanding votes of no-confidence against academic presidents requires a detailed qualitative approach. In this chapter, I explain the methods I used—and my reason for using them—to understand these phenomena. Then, I state how I collected data for this study and from which sources the data came. Thereafter, I describe the various research sites selected for the study. Finally, I conclude with a discussion about validity and limitations in this study.

Rationale for Using the Case Study Method

Case studies are used to understand why successful votes of no-confidence (or failed votes of confidence) occur at higher education institutions. Yin (2003) contends that a case study is the most suitable research approach “when ‘how or ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context” (p. 1). In particular, a multisite case study is employed because it enables “more compelling” (Merriam, 2001, p. 198) interpretations of the data. Furthermore, multisite studies are used because, as Stake (2000) writes, “[cases] may be similar or dissimilar, redundancy and variety each important. They are chosen because it is believed that understanding them will lead to
better understanding, perhaps better theorizing, about a still larger collection of cases” (p. 437).

By using Yin’s (2003) concept of literal replication—the idea that these cases will yield the same outcome—the multisite approach can enhance the analytic generalizability of the cases. Therefore, stronger analytic generalizability will augment the broader theoretical understanding of votes of no-confidence at higher education institutions. As noted previously, the data in this study suggest that faculty concerns about shared governance are the most salient reasons for holding a no-confidence vote against an academic president. Thus, the theoretical buttresses of this study emphasize shared governance, its meaning, its participants, and its importance; particularly, the triumvirate of the governing board, faculty, and administration (president) are examined because they form an “essential relationship” (Birnbaum, 2003, p. 3) collectively. The faculty and president are more closely examined, though, as the issue of no-confidence votes is ultimately an issue between these two constituents.

According to Yin (2003) and Stake (1995), case studies are best used when “how” or “why” questions are posed. Hence, I employ case studies to better understand the sources of successful votes of no-confidence at colleges and universities. Moreover, case studies provide specific, detailed accounts of situations; in this study, case studies will yield pertinent and thorough descriptions of no-confidence votes.

Data Sources and Collection

I began my study by seeking scholarly and journalistic articles, commentaries, and other records about no-confidence votes at colleges and universities. My primary
databases for research were the websites of *The Chronicle of Higher Education* and *Inside Higher Ed*. These two websites, popular and respected in the higher education community, contain exhaustive archives. The *Chronicle* has records accessible from 1989; *Inside Higher Ed* has data from 2005. I then searched these archives using terms such as “votes of no-confidence” or “no-confidence” in order to yield relevant records. I used those terms as well when seeking scholarly materials. For scholarly sources, I searched for printed publications and online resources such as *JSTOR* and *ERIC*.

At this juncture, I began to assemble each record into a table (See Appendix). I listed the institution’s name, its type (bachelor’s and/or advanced degree-granting, two year, or system, and if it was private or public), the source of the record and its date, and the rationale and additional notes regarding the successful vote of no-confidence. Seventy-five records were obtained using the process described above. Fifty-five are bachelor’s and/or advanced degree granting institutions, thirteen are two year institutions, and system-wide votes account for seven records.

Originally, I intended to use the institutional type variable to examine if the rationale for no-confidence votes differed amongst types of universities and colleges. As I began this exploration, though, the salient theme of shared governance emerged as a commonality in the data regarding no-confidence votes. Thus, my perspective shifted from seeking differences across institutional type to exploring the larger theme involving shared governance concerns. Hence, I chose to use a simplified typology when classifying institutions. By simplified typology, I mean a very generic description of the institution: bachelor’s and/or advanced-degree granting, two year, or system.
Additionally, I used simplified types because standardized classifications, such as those from the Carnegie Foundation, reflect data that may have changed since the date that a no-confidence vote was held. Instead of using these types as variables, I used them simply as descriptors. Then, when selecting case sites, I chose cases from each institutional type in order to provide a more representative view of the no-confidence phenomenon in higher education.

I also list the rationale that actors from each institution state for holding a no-confidence vote. From each article, analysis, or commentary, I either directly quote the rationale given by an actor involved in the vote, or I directly quote the reasoning that the record’s author provides. If no discernable quote exists, I offer a summary of the rationale based upon general statements in each record. Of the sixty-four records in which the rationale is clearly discernable, nearly all records reveal that faculty members had concerns about leadership (e.g. autocratic or dictatorial style), financial management (e.g. budget shortfalls, poor fundraising), or, most prominently, adherence to shared governance principles. Twenty-seven of those sixty-two records indicated problems with the institutions’ president and his or her lack of regard for shared governance.

Finally, I include notes regarding each record. Most of these notes indicate if a majority or plurality of persons voted no-confidence in the institution’s president. Knowing how many faculty members voted is an important criterion for case selection, because if a majority voted in favor of the vote of no-confidence, then the case becomes more legitimate. Additionally, I indicate if those voting were the entire faculty, a faculty government, or a faculty from a specific area, such as arts and sciences or law. Other
notes might indicate if the institution is now defunct, or if subsequent votes of no-confidence were held. The latter is a particularly useful detail as that might provide insight about recurring problems at a particular institution.

Another caveat to consider involves system-wide votes of no-confidence. Since I wanted to ensure that a majority of faculty members or faculty senates voted no-confidence in system-wide leaders, I had to eliminate three systems from potential case selection. Of the remaining four, one rationale was not given, and another rationale did not relate to shared governance. The final two records did indeed relate to shared governance, and could have been used as a case, but data was insufficient. Hence, I omitted systems from case consideration.

Another caveat involves two year institutions (community colleges). As the theme of shared governance became prominent in the data, I began to reconsider the appropriateness of including community college cases in this analysis. Community colleges do not have typical shared governance mechanisms, but rather more hierarchical and bureaucratic systems (Cohen & Brawer, 1996). As one community college president remarked, “With some notable exceptions, true collegial governance is relatively rare in community colleges. All too often, community college faculty are considered ‘employees’ and given only limited input into the design of educational programs and the selection of their colleagues” (Dempsey, 1992, sec. 2). Hence, I excluded them from analysis because most do not use shared governance.

Another warning to consider about these data is faculty unions. A search of the websites from which data were collected reveals that some college and university faculty
unions have held votes of no-confidence against their president, but such votes have occurred beyond the confines of traditional university governance structures. Mankato State University, Ferris State University, and Central Michigan University—the latter of which also had a separate vote of no-confidence by its faculty—are prominent examples of no-confidence votes held by unions. While the reasons that a union held a vote may be similar to those reasons of a faculty government, because not all institutions are represented by a faculty union, they were omitted. Unions are also primarily concerned with employment matters, not governance (Kemerer & Baldridge, 1981). This is another important reason for their exclusion.

After completing the table, I began to search for case sites using the institutional type descriptor. The process of identifying cases depended on the adequacy of data from those sites. Since I had discarded two year institutions and systems, and to try and encompass a more representative collection of institutions, I sought three bachelor’s and/or advanced-degree granting institutions. To further diversify those categories, I indicated—by searching all of these institutions’ websites for descriptions of their institutions—if an institution was a public university, a private university, or a private liberal arts college. I investigated the no-confidence votes at each institution in those categories. I conducted rigorous internet searches for journalistic records and other relevant data. Specifically, I searched The Chronicle of Higher Education, Inside Higher Ed, Google, and Lexis-Nexis Academic Search to find information on each record. In addition, I visited each institution’s website and searched for materials and documents.
relevant to each no-confidence vote. Once again, I used the search terms of “no-confidence” or “confidence” to obtain data.

After the sites were selected, I emailed various figures at each institution to ask for assistance in obtaining documents and other materials relevant to the no-confidence vote at those institutions. I visited my case sites’ websites and searched for names of provosts, faculty senate leaders, and media relations personnel. In some instances, I emailed persons who were mentioned in records that discussed no-confidence votes. I received a response from officials at Baylor and Goddard; however, they were not meaningful. Baylor officials wrote most of their documents were sealed because they were debated in executive session. A Goddard official wrote that the vote of no-confidence occurred before she arrived, but offered to make inquiries with others. None were received.

**Research Sites**

Hence, a bachelor’s and/or advanced-degree granting public university, a bachelor’s and/or advanced-degree granting private institution, and a private liberal arts college were analyzed. These cases were obtained using the method described previously. Specifically, the respective institutions are Texas A&M University at Kingsville in Kingsville, Texas, Baylor University in Waco, Texas, and Goddard College in Plainfield, Vermont. Two institutions are in Texas, and certain regional cultural aspects could have impacted these votes. Regardless, these sites were selected because they each represent a different segment of higher education in the United States. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, they were chosen because the majority of faculty members—either through
faculty government or direct faculty vote—voted no-confidence in their respective institutions’ presidents.

This is a particularly essential criterion. Majority support is an important, though not mandatory, component of legitimacy (Brighouse, 1998; Matheson, 1987; Spencer, 1970; Stillman, 1974). Thus, votes of no-confidence that did not receive majority support could be considered less legitimate in the view of the president and the governing board. Majority votes of no-confidence therefore remove ambiguity about the legitimacy of such votes.

Finally, these sites were chosen because articles and documents from the *Chronicle of Higher Education*, *Inside Higher Ed*, local media, and the institutions themselves explicitly stated that faculty concerns about shared governance, leadership style, or financial management led to the successful vote of no-confidence. These documents are therefore beneficial because of such clear articulations. Additionally, documents that corroborate other documents enhance evidence considerably (Yin, 2003).

**Validity**

Strong validity in qualitative research relies on actors’ various conceptions of reality and analyzing those conceptions with other actors’ views (Ambert, Adler, Adler, & Detzner, 1995). Specifically, the notion of using multiple sources to learn from and cross examine cases is known as triangulation (Glesne & Peshkin as cited in Stake, 2000; Lincoln & Guba as cited in Stake, 2000). These documents do indeed corroborate other documents, especially when trying to analyze specific statements and phrases that indicate why votes were held. Because these documents contain sources from the
journalistic record (newspaper articles or television reports) and university publications (text of board resolutions, presidential statements, or proceedings of faculty meetings) they incorporate from all constituencies, both official and unofficial. Stake (1995) stresses the importance of embracing sources with a variety of views, opinions, and rationales held by various actors. Accordingly, the overarching goal of the data collection is best summarized as a “sufficient presentation of evidence and careful consideration of alternative interpretations” (Yin, 2003, p. 110).

Moreover, I analyze these cases from a social constructivist perspective. I do believe that there is one definitive explanation about the occurrences of no-confidence votes; instead, multiple interpretations exist about these votes. I do not seek to generalize statistically; instead, I intend to adhere to Yin’s (2003) concept of analytic generalizability by building upon current knowledge and theories. I share Flyvbjerg’s (2006) belief that case studies are valid because they contribute to the greater knowledge. He explains his rationale by indicating that great researchers of the past—Galileo, Newton, Darwin, Freud—conducted research using carefully selected cases, not formal positivist models that are antithetical to case study research and validity (Flyvbjerg, 2006).

**Limitations**

This study does have limitations. First, the sources from which the data were obtained may have excluded articles about successful no-confidence votes at colleges and universities. In other words, some institutions may have held votes without a record of them in the databases accessed. Second, due to inherent design limitations, actors and
participants from the institutions under analysis cannot evaluate this study. Stake (1995) emphasizes the importance of enabling actors to review the situations in which they were involved; in this study, though, that is not possible. A final limitation is that it may not be possible to gauge if other factors besides the stated reasons may have affected the votes of no-confidence. While the actors involved may have explicitly said that a president lacked respect for shared governance and hence deserved a no-confidence vote, for example, there may have been other influences—perhaps personal or professional—that compelled faculty to hold such votes. Some actors at the selected sites do indeed suggest this occurs; however, not all actors at other sites have expressed this concern.
CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS

The following three cases reveal in greater detail the problems and complexities that compel no-confidence votes to be held at colleges and universities. For each case, a description of the institution, a discussion of the issues that led to a no-confidence vote, and an analysis of the case are offered. A summary of all of the cases is offered at the conclusion this section.

Baylor University

Baylor University is a private university in Waco, Texas. With an enrollment of nearly fifteen-thousand students, it is the largest Baptist-affiliated university in the world. In addition to offering a liberal arts undergraduate curriculum, Baylor offers graduate and professional programs and conducts research in many disciplines. Moreover, the institution prides itself on its Christian heritage, particularly its Baptist origins. This mixture of education and religion is best summarized in Baylor’s mission statement, in which the institution states that its objective is “to educate men and women for worldwide leadership and service by integrating academic excellence and Christian commitment within a caring community” (Baylor University, 2007, para. 1).
All legal and institutional authority is vested in the Baylor University Board of Regents. Thirty-one regents deliberate institutional issues and vote on pertinent matters. The president, as in most university governance systems, serves the Board of Regents and provides the daily executive administration of the university. Faculty members are represented through a Faculty Senate. This body consists of thirty-four faculty members from various departments and programs at the university. The Faculty Senate enables faculty members to contribute to administrative and curricular matters. The governance system at Baylor, then, is fairly typical in comparison with most other institutions’ governance structures.

These three constituents—the faculty, the president, and the governing board—all clashed during an intense period of strife and anger from September 2003 to December 2004. In particular, President Robert Sloan’s administration “produced a chilling work environment, a climate characterized by distrust, anxiety, intimidation, favoritism, as well as profound concern about the sanctity of academic freedom and professional standards” (Baylor University Faculty Senate, 2003, p. 1) according to the Faculty Senate, whose members claimed that President Sloan disregarded faculty input and faculty members’ role in institutional governance. The Faculty Senate’s concern ultimately concluded in a successful no-confidence vote in September 2003.

This issue of confidence in President Sloan culminated after several controversial events occurred in the Baylor community. One of Baylor’s star basketball players was murdered, and after his death, allegations of improprieties within the athletics department emerged. Despite the salience of that issue, the Faculty Senate denied that the athletics
problems were the catalyst for their question of confidence in President Sloan. Instead, they indicated the causes for the vote were the results of a survey which revealed considerable faculty angst against the president, as well as concern about the president’s strategic plan—deemed “Baylor 2012”—and that it was too costly and potentially detrimental to faculty autonomy and academic freedom, as it sought to strengthen the Christian mission of the university. Moreover, they argued that the president was combative and vindictive, and that such behavior had damaged his relations with the faculty. Kent Gilbreath (2004), a Baylor professor, noted that the president was somewhat aloof during this time, and thus unaware that his agenda severely upset many faculty members.

Not all faculty members agreed with the Faculty Senate’s perspective. Many faculty members supported the president and his agenda. Some deemed the Faculty Senate’s actions as unproductive; others argued that the president’s strategic plan was vital because it would make Baylor a top-tier institution. Rallies were held in support of the president. Organizations were created to raise funds in support of his agenda. Some supporters directly addressed the Faculty Senate’s concern about the president being vindictive by indicating that the Faculty Senate had indeed deliberated these measures freely and openly and without retribution.

The president, meanwhile, continued to plead for reconciliation and dialogue amongst university constituents. He recognized the challenges his plans posed, but he maintained his position that his agenda was appropriate for Baylor. Sloan stated, “Change is hard on all of us, but we have to be a university that's willing to be a distinctive voice
in higher education and one that maintains a Christian commitment” (Villarreal, 2003a, para. 17). He, too, noted that the charges of a fearful climate were unfounded, indicating the openness with which the Faculty Senate debated his performance.

After the vote of no-confidence was held, the Board of Regents convened and affirmed their support for the president. Four regents dissented, with one of the dissenters claiming that the president did not have the capacity to “heal the rift” (Villarreal, 2003b) within the institution. The chairman of the board expressed his continued support for President Sloan and vowed to defend the president throughout the conflict. Moreover, the board created several committees to investigate faculty concerns, such as hiring practices.

Ultimately, however, the relationship between the Faculty Senate and President Sloan never improved. Nearly a year after the first no-confidence vote, another vote was held in the Faculty Senate. It, too, was successful. In this vote, though, the Faculty Senate demanded an independent, third-party-administered referendum that would gauge the support of the entire faculty. In December 2004, this request was fulfilled, and nearly 85 percent of faculty members voted that they did not support President Sloan. Critics of the referendum argued that only half of the Baylor faculty participated, and that this result was thus not that meaningful. Regardless, the referendum evidently convinced President Sloan that his presidency was paralyzed. He resigned shortly thereafter.

**Analysis of the Baylor Case**

The problems at Baylor, especially between the president and Faculty Senate, are indicative of flaws within the conceptualization of shared governance. The framework presented earlier suggests that all parties must recognize the sanctity of shared
governance—vis-à-vis the collegial nature of universities, the roles and expectations of participants, and the culture of the organization and its participants—because it is vital for institutional prosperity.

According to the Faculty Senate, the president’s strategic plan was implemented and executed swiftly and without meaningful faculty contributions. The plan’s emphasis on evangelicalism—including preferences to hire Judeo-Christian faculty candidates—and tuition increases for various projects, combined with allegations of vindictive behavior, led to this rancorous relationship. Bergquist (1992) underscored the importance of fostering a collegial environment built upon collaboration and consultation. Yet, according to the Faculty Senate, President Sloan failed to engage faculty significantly, and even made personal and professional criticisms that maligned faculty members. Hence, when relationships dissolve into this level of hostility, the absence of collegiality is not surprising. But it is clearly damaging.

Curiously, President Sloan and the Faculty Senate debated each other in direct antithesis to the institution’s culture. Their bitter dialogue that led to the first no-confidence vote was not particularly expressive of the Christian culture at Baylor. Instead of conciliatory overtures, both sides frequently addressed their problems publically, sometimes even at large rallies. Here, again, anger and frustration prohibited the mechanisms of shared governance from being used effectively. Eventually, however, the president did state that he would meet with faculty leaders to address their concerns; however, these offers appeared to be fruitless as the Faculty Senate continued to deride
the president for ignoring them. Unfortunately, no data have been found which might explain why these gestures were not accepted.

Birnbaum (2003) noted that presidents are often overextended with respect to meeting the needs of various university constituents. Perhaps this partially explains why Faculty Senate members felt slighted by the president. His “Baylor 2012” plan was so comprehensive that he was forced to gauge all constituents, thus reducing time for faculty consultation. In essence, faculty members were not, in the president’s view, the prime constituents if this assertion is correct. Thus, the importance of faculty in shared governance is somewhat diminished.

Also of critical importance to this analysis is the understanding that this vote of no-confidence also occurred because problems between the president and Faculty Senate festered for too long and often went unnoticed. Gilbreath (2004), a Baylor faculty member opposed to President Sloan, noted in an essay, “We must understand and acknowledge these problems if we are to solve them and to not repeat them in the future. We cannot build a future for Baylor on a foundation of myth about the past” (Gilbreath, 2004, p. 2). Indeed, Mortimer and Sathre (2007) wrote that “wicked problems” emerge when shared governance procedures are not properly engaged. In this instance, such problems manifested themselves only as the prospect of a no-confidence vote emerged. The resentment between the president and the Faculty Senate climaxed at this juncture because these conflicts were not discussed through appropriate means—shared governance mechanisms. Instead, these problems were ignored.
Finally, the notions offered by Weick (1995) and Meyer and Rowan (1977) provide another organizational perspective regarding the problem at Baylor. Weick (1995) has stated that organizational members continuously make sense of confusing events partly because of how participants are socialized in the organization. Faculty members might perceive violations of shared governance based upon this social arrangement, even if their views are false. President Sloan did indeed express his commitment to faculty involvement in university matters, yet most of the faculty denied such overtures were made—even though other faculty members stated the president was being cooperative. The president’s faculty opponents, then, may have been socialized to view administrators as the “enemy” (Holton and Phillips, 1995, p. 44) and thus strive to undermine their work.

Meyer and Rowan (1977) claim that ceremonial functions are inefficient and, if violated, lead participants to view organizations and those who are entrusted to implement ceremonial functions as illegitimate. The situation at Baylor suggests that because President Sloan did not consult all faculty members regarding his reform plan, he lost legitimacy, even though to solicit such advice would be practically impossible. This paradox hurt the president greatly, as evinced by the vote of no-confidence.

The case at Baylor University underscores the importance of respecting shared governance and using appropriate procedures to ensure its successful implementation. Clearly, the Faculty Senate and president did not understand the magnitude of working within the confines of shared governance; that is, instead of embracing additional faculty input, the president, in the view of faculty, engaged his strategic plan while criticizing his
opponents. In turn, the faculty became upset, and the vote was held. The conflicts led to additional votes of no-confidence, as noted, as well as continued acrimony and paralysis.

**Texas A&M University at Kingsville**

Texas A&M University at Kingsville (TAMUK) is a public research university in Kingsville, Texas. Although one might believe the institution is merely a branch campus of the Texas A&M system, it is not. As such, TAMUK maintains a very independent and regional identity. Originally founded as a normal school, or state teachers’ school, it underwent considerable changes in academic scope and mission, ultimately joining the Texas A&M University System in 1989 in order to gain further funding and more opportunities for growth. Its mission statement reaffirms its commitment to serving South Texas while fostering and encouraging rigorous academic inquiry (TAMUK, 2007).

The university serves over six thousand students, of which nearly two-thirds are Hispanic. A traditional liberal arts program is offered for undergraduates. Vocational programs exist as well. The graduate program offers advanced degrees in a variety of disciplines, such as business and pharmacy. Several of the programs are designed to fulfill regional needs.

The Board of Regents of the Texas A&M University System serves as the legal and institutional authority for the system. Nine members, and one non-voting student member, serve in this capacity. A chancellor is selected by the Board of Regents to manage the daily activities of the system. Presidents of the various constituent institutions in the system report to the chancellor and Board of Regents. Thus, the President of TAMUK reports to the chancellor and Board of Regents simultaneously. Faculty
members at TAMUK have the opportunity to directly participate in university
governance through General Faculty meetings; however, most business is conducted via
an advisory body—the Faculty Senate—which consists of forty-four seats.

This arrangement for faculty participation in university governance is relatively
new at TAMUK. Indeed, the new governance structure is the direct result of the conflict
between the university president and Faculty Senate that led to a vote of no-confidence.
This conflict began in the spring of 2004.

The president of TAMUK, Rumaldo Juarez, wanted to change tenure and
promotions policies at the university. His opponents wanted tenure-track faculty
members to achieve a higher rank upon completing their fourth year at TAMUK, but
President Juarez believed that one’s credentials would not be sufficient enough to warrant
such a promotion, especially as the institution sought to increase its standards and
prestige (Rucker, 2004). President Juarez implemented his plan, noting that many faculty
members had participated in its development and supported the plan too.

Members of the Faculty Senate, however, disagreed. They argued that these
policies were implemented unilaterally and without the regard of the Faculty Senate.
Indeed, the no-confidence resolution that was ultimately drafted contained an amendment
in which the Senate expressed its “non-concurrence” about the “process by which [the
new policy] was arrived at” (Melendy, 2004, para. 8). Shared governance was
disregarded. In addition, senators noted that President Juarez denied tenure to several
faculty members despite support and encouragement from various departments.
Subsequently, the Faculty Senate issued a no-confidence resolution on September 7, 2004. Fifteen out of twenty-nine members voted in favor of the resolution.

The response to the no-confidence vote was varied. Members of the Faculty Senate claimed this was a victory against a problematic president. The president, meanwhile, indicated he had received considerable support from the Board of Regents, the Chancellor of the Texas A&M University System, and other faculty members at TAMUK. Moreover, a year after the vote, he claimed that the Faculty Senate was not representative of the entire faculty, as it was controlled by a close and very vocal group of malcontents who had led the body for many years.

Indeed, a year after the vote, President Juarez, citing a lack of cooperation from the Faculty Senate, suspended the body and ordered the creation of a new constitution for a new Faculty Senate. In his view, this was “an opportunity to have some new faculty players involved, those who [had not] been involved in all of [the] controversy” (Jaschik, 2005, para. 5). Faculty Senators and other faculty senates from institutions throughout Texas were outraged. This action prompted additional reflections about the relationship between President Juarez and the Faculty Senate, especially with respect to the no-confidence vote from the previous year.

The most blistering reflection came from the Chancellor of the Texas A&M University System. Bob McTeer, who became chancellor shortly after the no-confidence vote was held, addressed the Texas Council of Faculty Senates and discussed his view of the problems—both the initial vote of no-confidence and the suspension of the Faculty Senate. Dr. McTeer argued that he was strongly supportive of shared governance and
faculty members’ role in it. However, he indicated the situation at TAMUK did not reflect an ideal environment of shared governance due to the actions of the Faculty Senate. In his view, and that of the Board of Regents, the Faculty Senate was controlled by a cabal of cruel and uncooperative executive senators who were “abusing their tenure” (McTeer, 2005, para. 9). He stated that because of the way constituencies were arranged—certain colleges received more Senate seats than others—it was quite easy for the same people (and their supporters) to be continually elected, forming a type of bloc in the Senate. Hence, President Juarez’s suspension of the Faculty Senate was justified because he sought to increase representation and shared governance.

The suspension of the Faculty Senate remained intact. Several months later, a new constitution was drafted and implemented. Representation was increased and constituencies were evenly distributed in this new Faculty Senate. Dr. Juarez remained as president, but resigned in April 2008 to spend more time with his family and assume another role in the institution.

Curiously, the new TAMUK Faculty Senate website does not contain any resources or data from the previous incarnation of the Senate. All data appear to have been erased from the website.

**Analysis of the TAMUK Case**

Just as the situation at Baylor University revealed the importance of understanding shared governance, so, too does the case at TAMUK. President Juarez, in the Faculty Senate’s view, failed to collaborate effectively with the Faculty Senate. The plan to restructure tenure and promotions policies—areas of significant concern for
faculty—did not contain adequate Faculty Senate input. Once again, Bergquist’s (1992) notion that collaboration and mutual understanding are vital for institutional well-being is salient.

President Juarez and his supporters claimed that faculty members were actively engaged in the policy review. Indeed, most professors agreed with the changes, and some were vocal in their support of the changes. In a response to the Faculty Senate, Juarez (2004) noted that departments and colleges were actively involved in reviewing the procedures. However, Jaschik (2005) reported that as some faculty members began to question certain aspects of the policies, the president unilaterally implemented them.

Another aspect to consider about the TAMUK case is the idea that only a small group of vocal Faculty Senate leaders made these charges against the president. Indeed, the governing board and President Juarez noted that most of the criticisms of his plan came from the Senate executive leadership. Furthermore, the vote of no-confidence was thin—while a majority voted in favor of the resolution, 49% of the other senators present did not. Yet, despite the division over the president’s actions, the result nonetheless underscored how these votes negatively impact campus communities. Tierney’s (2007) description of the “nuclear option” is thus quite apt. Furthermore, it indicates how important it is to be collegial.

But what precisely does it mean to be collegial in this example? One of the paramount problems with the TAMUK case is that two sides are arguing two different versions of a common experience. The Faculty Senate members argue they were not consulted enough; the president argues that they were. Weick’s (1995) notion of
sensemaking suggests “people may not share meaning, they do share experience” (p. 188). In essence, then, President Juarez and the Faculty Senate both shared a common experience involving the tenure policies review. However, their meaning of the event differed greatly, as the case revealed. Collegiality in this instance is practically impossible to achieve because the two sides have internalized their meanings.

Beyond the topical breach of shared governance that was espoused by the Faculty Senate, there is also an underlying organizational problem. Like the situation at Baylor, the case at TAMUK reveals how a president made overtures toward disgruntled faculty members, yet those overtures were rejected or ridiculed. Interestingly, the previous TAMUK president had several altercations with a few key members of the Faculty Senate—the same members who clashed with President Juarez—and their badgering ultimately compelled him to leave TAMUK (McTeer, 2005).

Meyer and Rowan (1977) note that a major conflict “between categorical rules and efficiency is the inconsistency among institutionalized elements” (p. 356). For instance, this concept suggests that there is considerable ambiguity within shared governance. Participants in shared governance are thus unlikely to understand their roles and expectations—and their authority. That is, “Specific contexts highlight the inadequacies of the prescriptions of generalized myths, and inconsistent structural elements conflict over jurisdictional rights” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 356). Thus, Faculty Senate members, President Juarez, and perhaps even his predecessor, evidently did not have clearly delineated jurisdictions at TAMUK. This confusion partially led to the hostility that debilitated the institution.
Similarly, there appears to be a culture amongst specific Faculty Senate members which espoused faculty primacy in nearly all institutional matters. McTeer (2005) notes that these certain faculty members on the Senate often intimidated the university’s presidents in the interest of exerting and maintaining faculty power. Additionally, he notes, these faculty members were effectively trying to be co-presidents of the institution (McTeer, 2005). The faculty did not address these concerns; they only stated that the president implemented policies without their consent, despite the president suggesting otherwise.

The TAMUK case illustrates how shared governance mechanisms were ignored, or perceived to be ignored, and the consequences. President Juarez was adamant that faculty members were given ample time to participate in the tenure review process. A vocal group of Faculty Senate leaders claimed otherwise. Hence, the relationship between the two parties broke down, and the no-confidence vote occurred. Given the slight majority of support for the no-confidence vote, it would be interesting to explore the criticisms that this small majority did not represent the entire TAMUK faculty. If so, then, shared governance could actually be quite healthy. This different perspective could yield useful data about participants’ roles within the shared governance model.

**Goddard College**

Currently, Goddard College, in Plainfield, Vermont, primarily serves adult and low-residency (commuter or online) students. It offers a small undergraduate and graduate curriculum designed to serve students who cannot attend post-secondary classes
regularly. Goddard is particularly well-known for its progressive style of liberal arts education and its highly activist community.

Nearly seven-hundred students are enrolled at Goddard. In 1996, however, when a no-confidence vote occurred, Goddard enrolled only about residential 140 students. Another 300 enrolled but did not live on-campus. Fifty faculty members worked at the university, and a governing board of alumni, faculty, students, and civic leaders led the institution legally. The president of the institution, Richard Greene, reported to the governing board. This structural arrangement remains intact today.

Furthermore, Goddard is regarded for its highly participatory model of shared governance. For instance, Goddard faculty, administrators, and students decided issues collectively, even debating the choice of paint color for university buildings (Magner, 1996). Moreover, all constituents are included—with full voice and vote—on various committees and the governing board. Collaboration and consultation are highly valued.

The participatory and activist nature of the college was tested greatly in early 1996. The institution faced an enrollment shortfall at a time when questions about the vitality of progressive educational institutions became salient nationwide. The university had a low, six-figure endowment, and a projected deficit that would erase that endowment. Given these figures, how could Goddard compete against traditional liberal arts colleges or public universities? Drastic measures would have to be taken to keep the college afloat.

In the spring of 1996, Goddard’s president, Richard Greene, faced a no-confidence vote regarding his handling of this financial crisis. The enrollment decline
compelled the president to hire a consultant to advise him on enrollment management strategies and techniques. When these decisions were made without appropriate community consultation, the faculty voted 42-1 to express no-confidence in President Greene. In its resolution, the faculty said President Greene had “threatened the college’s financial stability and undermined its tradition of shared governance, unilaterally making decisions about faculty hiring and the curriculum” (*Chronicle of Higher Education*, 1996, para. 2).

The campus reacted swiftly. The governing board backed President Greene. His few faculty supporters did, too. According to the *Chronicle* (1996), the president’s supporters argued this was really an issue about who controls the university. His faculty and student critics—many of whom held protests and sit-ins against the president—continued to deride him for his perceived arrogance and uncooperativeness. One anonymous faculty member said, “People don’t work with Dick Greene, they work for Dick Greene” (Dillon, 1996, para. 36).

The president defended his actions. Citing a need to avoid a deficit, President Greene authorized the hiring of a consulting firm because they could provide insight into improving enrollment figures. Moreover, he said that the college’s “historic distrust of authority” (Magner, 1996, para. 6) impeded any decent efforts to avoid financial danger. In the president’s view, his actions were not only essential but required, and the reaction from faculty stemmed from the college’s activist and progressive culture. The president reaffirmed his argument about faculty criticisms by noting that since 1969, four out of eight presidents at Goddard received no-confidence votes.
Faculty members, however, disagreed. They accused President Greene of being autocratic and intimidating. Their attacks against him concerned practically every campus issue—from the enrollment crisis to the replacement of sidewalks (Magner, 1996). Faculty members viewed President Greene as an outsider from hierarchical establishments—he served in the military and led a Catholic college—who did not understand and value the progressive mission of Goddard. One university official, who was terminated by President Greene in an unrelated—though equally disparaged—effort to avoid a deficit, stated that faculty angst came not from the “clichéd strife” at Goddard; rather, the angst came from faculty members’ concerns about business-style management being imposed upon institutions that have historically rejected such styles of administration (Nobusawa, 1996, para. 2).

Another dimension of faculty members’ concerns involved tenure. Faculty members at Goddard were not awarded tenure at that time. As such, they began to ponder the unionization process during President Greene’s tenure. However, several critics of the president—who were also involved in the unionization movement—were terminated (Magner, 1996). The issues of tenure and unionization are not directly related to the no-confidence vote; however, they do provide more insight into how faculty members viewed President Greene—as an authoritarian, uncooperative leader unwilling to engage the Goddard community.

The hostility from the faculty members toward President Greene ultimately compelled the president to resign in August 1996. President Greene noted that enrollment
and endowment figures were greatly improved under his leadership (Haworth, 1996). However, the rancorous relationship between him and the faculty was beyond repair.

Analysis of the Goddard Case

The case at Goddard College once again revealed how important it is for all parties to understand shared governance structures at their institutions. President Greene, in the view of the faculty, did not understand Goddard’s participatory culture. The faculty, according to President Greene, were so entrenched in their progressive culture that they did not understand his policies for trying to save the college.

Once again, Weick’s (1995) notion of sensemaking is salient in this example. The Goddard faculty, socialized and immersed in the collective and activist culture of the college, viewed the president’s actions as antithetical to their traditions. The president, coming from military and Catholic college experiences, sought to take action on various initiatives, even if it meant offending faculty members. As such, each party made sense of these events according to their backgrounds, and thus these different meanings impaired productive dialogue.

Indeed, Tierney’s (1988) discussion of culture as “grounded in the shared assumptions of individuals participating in the organization” (p. 4) is useful in this example. He writes that these shared assumptions are “stories, specific language, norms, institutional ideology, and attitudes that emerge from organizational and individual behavior” (p. 4). At Goddard, then, President Greene did not appear—in the view of the faculty members—to recognize these shared assumptions. What seems to be salient, though, is that faculty members viewed President Greene as an embodiment of the
antithesis of Goddard College; he was a corporate, hierarchical figure in an environment where collective decision-making and participation was practiced.

The ideas of Meyer and Rowan (1977), too, provide insight into the case at Goddard. From an organizational perspective, the paradox seen at Baylor and TAMUK also applies to Goddard. At this institution, though, the paradox is much stronger. Since shared governance is such a highly valued structure in the college, yet very inefficient to practice, presidents do not and cannot appear legitimate. At an institution where choosing a paint color involves nearly all campus constituents, it is nearly impossible to gauge faculty members within the confines of shared governance without bringing the institution to a standstill.

The confusion and ambiguity about jurisdiction in these structures also emerges in the Goddard case. Meyer and Rowan (1977) indicate that uncertainty can ultimately lead to illegitimacy. Because Goddard had highly decentralized shared governance procedures, faculty thought they had significant input on matters which the president may have thought he or she actually did. Indeed, as noted earlier, President Greene said that what the larger issue actually involved was who had control of the college. The lack of clarity in this regard likely destabilized the president, as he was viewed as illegitimate.

The Goddard case underscores primarily how important understanding culture is to organizational prosperity. Tierney (1988) notes that as well. Without a comprehension or appreciation of organizational culture, particularly at a progressive college such as Goddard, organizational leaders will likely encounter hostility and resentment. Fully understanding shared governance mechanisms and procedures is also a salient theme.
from this case. For not using these structures properly—as the faculty claim—President Greene was embattled for a long time. He was also embattled because what was expected of him within shared governance, from an organizational viewpoint, was paradoxical and ineffective.

Understanding the No-Confidence Votes

Cultural misunderstanding and miscommunication, I contend, are the topical explanations of no-confidence votes against academic presidents. These two notions yield a more theoretical, underlying reason for such votes when examined in greater detail. The sources of no-confidence votes appear to be explicit and implicit breaches of shared governance. Explicitly, if a president does not attend a faculty meeting, or does not appear to consult every faculty member regarding an issue, he or she is likely to be viewed as violating the sacred expectations of shared governance—whatever those may be, since expectations are highly subjective. These topical transgressions on shared governance invite serious repercussions, as evident in the case sites.

Implicitly, organizational culture impacts the functions of shared governance, often unknowingly to academic presidents and, perhaps, to faculty members. As an institutionalized structure, shared governance is highly normative—individuals define it differently. Yet it is a ceremonial function of the organization—a sacred component of academic culture. Therefore organizational participants expect shared governance to provide some sort of collaborative dialogue amongst institutional actors in order to discuss organizational needs. Of course, this is quite inefficient; thus, if not practiced perfectly, those expected to implement shared governance in this manner are seen as
illegitimate. Hence, an implicit source of no-confidence votes is this organizational arrangement within academe.

Indeed, these cases reveal that shared governance as a concept is not necessarily the reason for a no-confidence vote, but instead it is the disregarding of the elements of shared governance which results in these votes of no-confidence. Affecting the elements of shared governance—including, but not limited to, curriculum, budgeting, or managing personnel matters (AAUP, 2006)—are cited in these cases as the causes of no-confidence votes. In essence, the issue is not merely violating shared governance; rather, the issue is that a precise mechanism of shared governance was not respected.

Consider this notion in the context of each institution’s culture. Baylor and TAMUK faculty members made advisory decisions on institutional matters espoused in the “Joint Statement,” such as curricular and personnel decisions. Goddard, however, made decisions not only on those matters, but also on choices of building color. The highly participatory culture at Goddard underscores how broadly and decentralized decision-making was at that institution. Baylor and TAMUK, by comparison, value collaboration, but make decisions more centrally and less comprehensively. Thus, one can conceptualize the culture of collaboration with the centrality of decision-making in these cases.
Collaboration as Culture and Centrality of Decision-making for Case Sites

This heuristic underscores the nuances of the sources of no-confidence votes. This phenomenon is not just a matter of “disregarding shared governance” in these institutions; instead, it is disregarding the elements of shared governance in institutions that leads to the votes of no-confidence, especially considering that these institutions value collaboration. The actual decisions that they ultimately consider, however, depends on each institution, as the centrality axis indicates. Hence, the conflict that emerges does not rest upon violating shared governance in general. Instead, the root of these conflicts—at these institutions—is the idea of showing respect for collaboration.

The cases at Baylor, TAMUK, and Goddard illustrate what happens when presidents violate or appear to violate shared governance mechanisms at these
institutions. The fighting that ensued during these affairs was detrimental to these institutions. Students, faculty, staff, and the governing board were collectively ensnared in these conflicts. Appropriate conflict management may have mitigated the problems that emerged from these conflicts. Deeper than that, though, is the idea that educating participants about organizational culture and organizational expectations is imperative if institutions are to be prosperous. Hence, understanding the sources of no-confidence votes requires a comprehensive knowledge of institutional governance and organizational culture.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

Two common themes emerge from the analyses of these institutions. First, the participants in shared governance—especially the president and faculty members—did not appear to understand the culture of the organizations or the culture of the specific participants in them. This is particularly true from the faculty perspective; in each instance, the faculty accused the president of not showing respect for the culture of shared governance. Furthermore, presidents were condemned for their seemingly autocratic or inattentive behavior. It is not surprising, then, that faculty members often viewed presidents in this manner; after all, most faculty tend to view administrators as having “[gone] over to the enemy” (Holton & Phillips, 1995, p. 44).

Additionally, the faculty members perceived these changes as radical and antithetical to the missions of their universities. And since these changes were so drastic, the mechanisms of shared governance appeared to be useless. Perhaps, then, this suggests shared governance can only be applicable incrementally. Otherwise, the principles of shared governance would have, in theory, developed a collective response that was acceptable to all parties. The concepts of Meyer and Rowan (1977) explain why, from the
organizational level, ceremonial functions of organizations are inefficient yet lead to organizational leaders being viewed as illegitimate.

In fact, the organizational paradox these authors present complements these sources of no-confidence votes. Meyer and Rowan (1977) state that institutionalized organizations must provide ceremonial products or risk being viewed as illegitimate, even though such ceremonial entities are inefficient. By imposing this paradox on organizations, presidents and faculty members cannot truly ascertain their roles, expectations, and jurisdictions in their colleges and universities. Consequently, conflict emerges and tensions flare within the elements of shared governance.

From the presidents’ perspectives, faculty members were not prepared to embrace changes that the presidents had deemed essential for institutional vitality. Presidents’ plans for curriculum changes, personnel decisions, and budgetary planning were, in the views of the presidents, important for growth. As unconventional as these plans were to faculty, the presidents seemed adamant that their approaches were appropriate. Angelo (as cited in Holton and Phillips, 1995) states that administrators are often detached from the faculty experience and thus “don’t understand why faculty are the way they are” (p. 44). Hence, the cultural divide between presidents and faculty might be explained by mere ignorance about each other’s roles in the academy.

Moreover, these cases underscored how important it is for participants to appreciate the broader organizational culture in institutions. Shared governance is a prominent fixture in American higher education and academic culture. The major associations that represent faculty, governing boards, and presidents have enshrined its
importance in a document that remains significant forty years after its inception. The case at Goddard, for example, is an excellent example of how important it is to respect organizational culture; Goddard has always valued participatory, collective decision-making. When someone appears to breach that tradition, problems explode on campus, as that case and the others have revealed.

The second theme that emerged from these cases involves miscommunication. In many ways, the situations at Baylor, TAMUK, and Goddard all revealed poor communication amongst the participants in shared governance. By “poor communication” I do not mean that documents were not shared in a timely manner or faculty members never answered phone calls from the president. Instead, I mean that each participant could not comprehend what the other participant wanted or meant. The faculty perceived the presidents as arrogant or uncooperative; the presidents countered that they have always been open and collaborative. This bickering is salient in the statements and rhetoric of the participants.

A lack of communication is one of the most salient complaints expressed in the academy (Coffman, 1995). “Fragmented information and statements out of context generate rumors at a ferocious pace . . . conflict sprouts like mushroom spores under these conditions” (Coffman, 1995, p. xviii). In the cases of the three institutions, the faculty would claim they were not consulted; the presidents would claim that the faculty members were. The presidents would offer evidence to support their claims; the faculty would refute it. This is indicative of poor communication (and perhaps political grandstanding, too) amongst the parties.
Further, the concept of sensemaking provides insight into miscommunication. Weick (1995) claims that the way we are socialized in organizations determines, in part, how we make sense of events. If faculty and administrators generally dislike each other, as del Favero (2003) has noted, and they therefore internalize this dislike, then perhaps they determine that some form of miscommunication has occurred regarding a major event, even if it has not. In other words, whether or not there is truly miscommunication is not the issue. The issue is faculty and presidents believe miscommunication has occurred because they were socialized to believe that—because it is the “other side” (Holton and Phillips, 1995, p. 8) being manipulative—and thus they make sense of these shocking events through that distorted lens.

Thus, when attempting to ascertain the sources of no-confidence votes, these two themes appear to be the chief causes—remembering, of course, that these conflicts are rooted in disregarding the precise elements of shared governance. Hence, the problems that these themes evince underscore the need for effective conflict management. If no-confidence votes are to be averted and shared governance and its mechanisms are to be given respect, then sound ideas about managing disputes ought to be implemented as quickly as possible by university officials. The three cases all indicate how fragile and hostile relationships can become when conflict emerges. By having a firm knowledge of conflict management practices, institutions can cultivate better shared governance practices—and learn to appreciate organizational culture—and ideally prevent no-confidence votes. What are some suggestions universities might employ to manage conflict better?
Conflict Management Ideas

There are many approaches to managing conflict. Some methods are basic, some are detailed, and some require simple, decent interpersonal skills. What they all share, though, is the idea that addressing conflict quickly and comprehensively is extremely important. In particular, these models can mitigate conflict that emerges in the elements of shared governance.

Douglas (1998) offers a model of conflict management for higher education that encourages discreetness. Participants should be able to speak freely and confidentially to an appointed person. Moreover, institutions should ignore the cost of such management. Essentially, this model prescribes a judicious and comprehensive analysis of campus conflicts. When addressing concerns about shared governance, then, this model would encourage faculty and the president to discuss their concerns, preferably to an external party, without fear of reprisal. Of course, this requires a willingness from each party to take this process seriously.

Holton (1998) offers a more simplistic model of conflict management for higher education. Her prescriptions are quite succinct: indentify the problem, identify solutions, and implement those solutions—all while communicating effectively (Holton, 1998). Indeed, Holton (1998) notes that without any meaningful communication, this process, as simple as it may appear, will not work. Again, considering that the conflict in this study is not what is in the curriculum, for example, but how what is in the curriculum got there initially. Applying this model to the issues of shared governance, then, the problem was that certain participants—the faculty, for instance—were not included in the process of
determining what would be in the curriculum. Holton (1998) prescribes various ways to not only identify solutions but implement them as well—participants need to be positive, share their interests, develop alternative solutions, and identify and consider criteria. An action plan can assist in the implementation of whatever solutions emerge.

Petrick (2007) explains a similar approach. The concept of a “visitation” is one approach to addressing conflict. He relates a case about a state university in New York. This university’s Faculty Senate had major disputes with the institution’s new president. These problems became so heated that a resolution of no-confidence was drafted. At this juncture, the state-wide system intervened, and a “visitation” occurred on the campus. Several faculty members from other state universities came to the campus and worked with Faculty Senators and the president. The “visitors” facilitated private discussions amongst faculty members and the president, and allowed the parties to talk openly with them so that they, as “visitors,” could make recommendations on how to improve relations on the campus.

Petrick (2007) notes that the president ultimately resigned to take another position in the university system, but he did state that cooperation between the faculty and the president did improve, even though the president’s resignation prevented the real impact of the “visitation” from being known.

Coffman (2005) offers ideas for conflict management that are particularly useful because, unlike the previous models, his approach considers the importance of culture in managing disputes. “These cultural variations across any institution, especially large ones, emphasize the importance of overarching guidelines and policies, as well as
understood practices, that let the total organization function as a whole cloth” (Coffman, 2005, p. 14). How does he implement culture with conflict management? His approach articulates fairness, negotiation, reasonableness, trust, and good interpersonal skills (Coffman, 2005). Essentially, he argues that being a good, decent person—whether a campus bus driver or president of the institution—will yield promising results. Indeed, this approach seems somewhat idealistic, but the holistic method it espouses is feasible, particularly because Coffman had used these practices as a faculty member and administrator.

Within the cases discussed earlier, this approach would suggest that the presidents and faculty need to respect and understand each other’s culture, especially the idea of collaboration as culture within the elements of shared governance—budgeting, curricular matters, etc. Moreover, they need to understand the culture because failing to do so will invariably create problems. Coffman (1995) notes that not understanding culture is like “pounding square pegs into round holes . . . [it] creates chronic pressure and friction—an ideal seed bed for future conflict” (p. 14). Accordingly, presidents and faculty members should attempt to engage each other fairly and productively in the mutual interest of institutional well-being.

These models provide potential frameworks to resolve the dangerous conflicts that often lead to votes of no-confidence. While they may seem mundane and basic, if properly used, they have the potential to thwart serious problems. Shared governance is such a sacred and cherished component of academe. To ensure shared governance’s
vitality, and the appreciation of organizational culture, it is certainly worth using conflict management models, regardless of any perceived simplicity of such models.

Limitations on Results

Earlier, limitations to this study were presented. The first limitation concerned the potential for other no-confidence votes to have occurred, but without the knowledge of the researcher. In other words, the databases through which I searched may have not reported on other records about no-confidence votes at institutions.

The second and third limitations discussed earlier are particularly appropriate with respect to the results. Those limitations stated that, because of the design of the study, actors involved in the cases could not review my research, and the limitations also expressed concern that other reasons may have compelled faculty members to hold votes of no-confidence. Stake (1995) noted how useful it is to have actors review a researcher’s analysis of a case in which the actors were involved.

Coupling this concern with the idea that faculty members may have held ulterior motives for holding no-confidence votes, I believe that a better method of collecting evidence is essential and would yield fruitful data. Both Stake (1995) and Yin (2003) state that interviews are one such way to gather comprehensive data about case phenomena.

I believe conducting interviews with parties involved in these cases would have provided more well-rounded data. The problem with viewing archival material and first-hand documents is that one does not get “the whole picture” of the event. Instead, one often finds highly rhetorical and politicized comments, namely from the president and the
impacted faculty members. How might other faculty members react, particularly if they are neutral in the matter and have formed an unbiased view of the phenomena? What other insights might presidents and faculty give in an interview setting, especially if the questions focused more on the roles of shared governance or organizational culture, their perceptions of them, and how they functioned with respect to the conflicts that led to no-confidence votes? The current analysis of using written records as data does provide a stable framework to understand the sources of no-confidence votes. However, conducting rigorous interviews and having actors review the data would make this framework richer and stronger.

Implications

There are several implications for practice. First, by understanding the sources of no-confidence votes, colleges and universities can develop ways to practice shared governance effectively. If institutions were made aware of the dangers of poor communication or enlighten newer members of the campus community about their culture, then they would be less likely, ideally, to avoid situations that would ultimately result in a no-confidence vote. It seems feasible to suggest that making community members aware of practices and beliefs will help them understand how to address problems and concerns in a way that reflects the traditions of the institution. This will require institutions to inform participants about how shared governance operates, who are involved in it, and how one suggests ideas using shared governance mechanisms. In many ways, this is a preemptive suggestion designed to inform participants upon their arrival about institutional operations.
Second, these findings suggest the campus community is paralyzed when votes of no-confidence occur. Tierney’s (2007) metaphor of the “nuclear option” remains salient. Campus communities cannot afford to have their institutions awash with controversy, negative publicity, and acrimony. Hence, it is important that colleges and universities take proactive measures to address any conflict or problem that emerges when shared governance seems threatened or ignored.

Finally, a major practical consideration is the finance involved if a vote of no-confidence leads to the resignation of a president. At Goddard, for example, the institution went through several presidents in a very short time. The cost of hiring a search firm, conducting the search, and then accommodating the new president is surely daunting. Moreover, productive work time is wasted as the campus becomes immersed in the controversy (Tierney, 2007). The financial ramifications are particularly important to consider at a time when higher education is desperate for funding. As a result, institutions ought to consider the ideas discussed earlier. The prevention of “wicked problems” (Mortimer & Sathre, 2007, p. 128) is vital for institutional growth.

The implications for research are twofold. First, any further research needs to incorporate interviews and member-checking in order to fully ascertain the events surrounding no-confidence votes. As stated previously, the reliance on written records provides considerable data, but to truly understand the sources of no-confidence votes, one must have the insight of participants. Without their insight, there is a risk of only having polemical statements and records from which to extract data. Interviews would enable more insight to emerge about the situations.
Second, these findings suggest additional research using organizational theory is needed to learn how and why participants act within the confines of shared governance. Are there ways to combat the paradox presented by Meyer and Rowan (1977)? Can presidents ever be efficient while implementing mandatory ceremonial functions? How might leaders attempt the daunting task of changing organizational culture in order to create a more hospitable and collaborative environment? Can they?

Actors from two of the case sites mentioned concerns about “control” and “power” as motives for faculty members holding no-confidence votes. Do faculty members vote no-confidence in their presidents in order to gain more power? Or do they vote no-confidence to assert faculty primacy? Coser (1956) notes that conflict emerges as parties clash over values and try to claim and secure resources and power. If faculty members vote no-confidence in their president because of explicit or implicit breaches of shared governance, then where do the ideas of “control” and “power” fit? Additional research could explore these questions.

These research questions underscore the need for a better understanding of organizational culture and governance, particularly when discussing shared governance. By exploring these questions and problems, researchers and practitioners can gain further insight into the no-confidence vote phenomenon. The problems that ensue from these votes might then be preventable, if various aspects of this phenomenon are examined.

Summary

No-confidence votes against academic presidents are a dangerous occurrence in higher education. These votes—and the prospects thereof—can lead to turmoil, rancor,
and institutional paralysis. On the surface, miscommunication and a lack of understanding participants’ and institutional culture are the salient themes that help explain why no-confidence votes happen. Underlying those notions, though, is the idea that the elements of shared governance, particularly the idea of collaboration as culture, are disregarded and thus cause these no-confidence votes to occur.

Understanding the cultural and organizational role of shared governance can help mitigate conflict that emerges. By specifically targeting conflicts within the elements of shared governance, colleges and universities are better poised to address problems in a positive, constructive manner. A willingness from all parties to consider the problems involved at their institutions is of paramount importance. With mutual support from faculty members, presidents, and governing boards, institutions can address issues affecting their goals and missions, especially those that involve faculty and president disputes which may result in a vote of no-confidence.
REFERENCES


71


# APPENDIX

Known Successful Votes of No-Confidence (1989-2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alvernia College</td>
<td>&quot;internal disputes&quot; such as academic freedom concerns; leadership concerns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American University</td>
<td>president's lavish spending; president &quot;isolated and detached&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Antioch University</td>
<td>for &quot;her dismissal of the college's president and reorganization of the college's fund raising operations — changes that the faculty said should have involved consultation with the faculty and did not&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baylor University</td>
<td>&quot;avalanche of faculty grievances&quot; and &quot;climate marked by fear&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bowie State University</td>
<td>&quot;behaving like a dictator&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California State University</td>
<td>suggesting system should be run like a business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carroll College of Wisconsin</td>
<td>proposed eliminating courses and majors from liberal arts education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carson-Newman College</td>
<td>&quot;for enrollment declines and faculty demotions&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Western Reserve University</td>
<td>&quot;for perceived fund-raising failures and for overseeing faulty budget projection&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Michigan University</td>
<td>&quot;handling of a budget shortfall&quot;; no shared governance or collegiality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Washington University</td>
<td>&quot;refused to work with proposed faculty union&quot;</td>
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<td>City Colleges of Chicago</td>
<td>did not &quot;rehire about 140 adjuncts and emeritus professors who had refused to cross the picket line&quot;</td>
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<td>Clark College</td>
<td>&quot;violating a commitment to shared governance&quot; and &quot;autocratic&quot; leadership</td>
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<td>Community College of Philadelphia</td>
<td>problems with &quot;management style, lack of support for student services, and financial problems&quot;</td>
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<td>Diablo Valley College</td>
<td>&quot;was not interested in shared governance&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eastern Illinois University</td>
<td>unfair hiring practices; mishandling sexual harassment case</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eastern Oregon University</td>
<td>&quot;dissatisfaction over budget cuts, low salaries, and other financial issues appears to underlie the faculty discontent&quot;</td>
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<td>El Paso Community College</td>
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<td>Elmira College</td>
<td>&quot;low salaries and growing class sizes&quot;; unilaterally investing in buildings over programs; &quot;defined scholarship too narrowly in the promotion and tenure process&quot;</td>
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<td>Gardner-Webb University</td>
<td>helped student-athlete change grade</td>
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<td>Glendale Community College</td>
<td>&quot;attempting to divert college money to a community project. It also criticizes her for poor communication skills and a divisive leadership style&quot;</td>
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<td>Glenville State College</td>
<td>Did not specify</td>
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<td>Goddard College</td>
<td>&quot;in a resolution, the faculty members complained that in his 20 months as president, Mr. Greene had threatened the college's financial stability and undermined its tradition of shared governance, unilaterally making decisions about faculty hiring and the curriculum,&quot;</td>
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<td>Golden Gate University</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harvard University</td>
<td>remarks about women; &quot;his aggressive and alienating leadership style&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopkinsville Community College</td>
<td>hired dean via external consultant, not by using typical search committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana State University</td>
<td>received a pay raise during financially difficult times; action deemed &quot;insensitive&quot;; &quot;haughty and unapproachable leadership style&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>James Madison University</td>
<td>&quot;Faculty leaders complained last week that they had again been cut out of decision making and that President Carrier had continued his autocratic style.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamar University</td>
<td>too much &quot;micromanagement&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lees College</td>
<td>Did not specify</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medaille College</td>
<td>&quot;repeatedly and deliberately alienated staff, students and faculty,&quot; made 'decisions unilaterally' and surrounded himself with new administrators who ‘shield him from contact with the rest of the Medaille community.’”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan Technological University</td>
<td>&quot;The senate voted no confidence . . . accusing [the president] of &quot;a failure of leadership&quot; and citing difficulties in areas including budgeting, finances, shared governance, and employee morale.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midland Lutheran</td>
<td>Did not specify</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miracosta College</td>
<td>inadequately responded to a &quot;palm tree scandal&quot; on campus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi University for Women</td>
<td>&quot;They complained that she micromanaged the university and didn't listen to anyone, and they were dismayed by the high turnover of senior and midlevel administrators&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi Valley State University</td>
<td>&quot;cited issues related to pay, respect for the chain of command, and lack of courtesy&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Vernon College</td>
<td>high turnover, inadequate fundraising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma State University</td>
<td>&quot;violating administrative and academic policies&quot;; reinstating athletes who had poor grades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olive-Harvey College (CC of Chicago)</td>
<td>denied tenure to faculty members; intimidating leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olivet College</td>
<td>Did not specify</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polytechnic University (NY)</td>
<td>&quot;failing to raise money for the institution and with inadequate leadership&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quincy College</td>
<td>president proposed faculty layoffs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute</td>
<td>&quot;authoritarian management style&quot; and &quot;the primary concern was the lack of faculty involvement in decisions&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island School of Design</td>
<td>&quot;stance on academic priorities...disproportionate growth in upper-level administration...a 'lack of transparency with respect to financial decisions,' and an 'increasingly adversarial relationship' between the college and the neighboring RISD Museum.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockland Community College (SUNY)</td>
<td>&quot;livid about an academic reorganization that their Board of Trustees recently adopted&quot; and &quot;the plan was crafted with little input from faculty members&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacramento State University</td>
<td>&quot;professors fault presidents for 'underfunding' the academic budget and making decisions without consulting them&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego State University</td>
<td>&quot;he called for the layoff of 147 tenured professors and the elimination of nine academic departments to help comply with state funding cuts. About 55 per cent of participating professors voted for his removal. Some accused Mr. Day of not consulting with them enough&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Santa Rosa Junior College</td>
<td>president conducted private investigation against critics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoreline Community College</td>
<td>&quot;preferential treatment given to administrators, poor communication between administrators and other people on the campus, and low employee morale&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sonoma State University</td>
<td>&quot;professors fault presidents for 'underfunding' the academic budget and making decisions without consulting them&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Louisiana Community College</td>
<td>&quot;created a 'climate of mistrust and diminished morale&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southwest Missouri State University</td>
<td>poor financial management (construction of arts center went over budget)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUNY at Plattsburgh</td>
<td>criticized for his management style and hiring practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUNY at Utica-Rome</td>
<td>&quot;micromanages university affairs and does not consult them on important decisions...is verbally abusive&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teikyo Westmar University</td>
<td>Did not specify</td>
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<tr>
<td>Texas A&amp;M at Kingsville</td>
<td>&quot;disregarded principles of shared governance and failed to provide effective leadership&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toccoa Falls College</td>
<td>&quot;The vote was prompted by reports . . . that the president . . . lacked the master's degree that was listed on his résumé when he first applied for the presidency in late 2000&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trenton State College</td>
<td>no shared governance, poor management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tusculum College</td>
<td>&quot;vote appears to be related to several changes in academic and administrative leadership at the over the past two years&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>Issue Details</td>
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<tr>
<td>U. of Houston at Clear Lake</td>
<td>suggested terminating tenured faculty member; peer-review and shared governance processes ignored</td>
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<tr>
<td>U. of Maine at Presque Isle</td>
<td>“had not communicated well with faculty members, students, or local civic groups”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. of Missouri at Kansas City</td>
<td>poor financial management, ignoring faculty</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Central Arkansas</td>
<td>“[Faculty] had lost our advisory role.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Cincinnati</td>
<td>“misplaced priorities, a loss of academic direction, mismanagement of university resources, and violations of agreed-upon shared-governance procedures.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Colorado</td>
<td>Did not specify</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Maine</td>
<td>“failing to consult with them on a plan to designate the six-year-old Education Network of Maine as the university's eighth institution”</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Massachusetts</td>
<td>“not giving [faculty] a voice in developing [a] restructuring proposal”</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of North Alabama</td>
<td>“abruptly fired the dean of student affairs” and president was not &quot;open, communicative, and [did not make] decisions in a participatory manner”</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Pittsburgh</td>
<td>“authoritarian management style”</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Southern Mississippi</td>
<td>“attempted to fire two professors who were suspicious of a vice president's credentials”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vermont State Colleges</td>
<td>“citing what they called his poor leadership and ‘lack of respect for shared governance’”</td>
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<td>Winthrop University</td>
<td>Did not specify</td>
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<td>York College (CUNY)</td>
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<td>Institution</td>
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<td>Bowie State University</td>
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<td>Goddard College</td>
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<td>Golden Gate University</td>
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<td>Harvard University</td>
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<td>Hopkinsville Community College</td>
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<td>Medaille College</td>
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<td>Mississippi University for Women</td>
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<td>Mississippi Valley State University</td>
<td><a href="http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/03/05/qt">http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/03/05/qt</a></td>
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