RESERVE POLICY FOR THE NUCLEAR AGE

THE DEVELOPMENT OF POST-WAR AMERICAN RESERVE POLICY

1943-1955

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University

By

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1985

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation is the product of the aid and advice of many people, but two in particular deserve special mention. The first, Dr. Williamson Murray, introduced me to the field of military history while I was still an undergraduate and since then has continually enriched and deepened my understanding of this subject in a great variety of ways. The second individual is Dr. Allan R. Millett, my advisor at Ohio State. It was he who furnished me with a much needed grounding in American military history and who first suggested post-war reserve policy as a dissertation topic. Throughout my career at Ohio State, he has provided invaluable encouragement, guidance and constructive criticism. Together, he and Dr. Murray proved to be superb teachers, able counselors, and firm friends.

I must also thank a number of individuals outside of Ohio State. Chief among them is William J. Taylor, Jr. of the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, who took me in as a research assistant at the Center during the summers and who exposed me to the field of military manpower studies. To him, and to Dr. Harlan Ullman, also of CSIS, I owe many thanks for allowing me to
complete my dissertation while working at the Center.

In the course of research for this study, I overworked the staffs of several libraries and archives. Perhaps the busiest were Mr. Ed Reese and Mr. Dave Mahoney of the Modern Military Field Branch at the National Archives, who patiently and efficiently coped with my endless requests for documents. The staff of the Library of Congress Manuscript Division was similarly helpful, as was the staff of the Ohio State Library, especially the inter-library loan division.

Among the other libraries I visited was the Harry S. Truman Library in Independence Missouri, which kindly provided me with a research grant to work there. The staff, including Mr. Neil Johnson, Mr. Warren Ohrvall and Ms. Liz Safly, were all very helpful and accommodating. My stay there was extremely pleasant. I also must thank Mr Tom Brannigar of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, who efficiently shepherded me through the very large collection of documents at that facility. Finally, I wish to thank the United States Army Military History Institute for a research grant which enabled me to complete my research there. In particular, I must express my appreciation to Dr. Richard Sommers and Mr. Davis Keogh of the Institute's archives for their invaluable help and guidance.

Other individuals who assisted me, either directly or indirectly, include: Ms. Hanna Zeidlik and Mr. Carl Cocke
of the U.S. Army Center of Military History; Major Robert K. Griffith, USA; Major James T. Currie, USA; and Major John M. Kendall, whose own excellent study of Army mobilization policies after World War II represents a complement to this dissertation. I also must thank Mr. Mac McGlasson, formerly of the National Guard Association, as well Major General Bruce Palmer, NGUSA, for their comments on some of the issues raised in this study.

Finally, I would like to thank my parents, family and friends, both in Columbus and elsewhere, for their patience and support in the writing of this dissertation. Most of all, I owe a deep debt of gratitude to Miss Jamie Bell, to whom this dissertation is dedicated.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.............................................ii
VITA.........................................................................iv
INTRODUCTION......................................................1

Chapter

One. WARTIME PLANNING FOR POST-WAR ARMY RESERVE POLICY, 1943-1945.........................67

Two. THE ARMY RESERVE PROGRAM TAKES SHAPE, 1945-1947.................................................119

Three. NAVY AND AAF RESERVE PLANS, 1943-1947..........158

Four. RESERVE POLICY UNDER REVIEW, 1947-1949........202

Five. KOREA AND THE BEGINNINGS OF RESERVE POLICY REFORM, 1950-1951.........................255

Six. THE ARMED FORCES RESERVE ACT OF 1952........300

Seven. THE NEW LOOK AND RESERVE REFORM, 1953-1954....334

Eight. THE ARMED FORCES RESERVE ACT OF 1955........380

Nine. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION..............................404

BIBLIOGRAPHY......................................................414
INTRODUCTION

The decade following World War II witnessed a revolution in American military policy. For the first time in its history, the United States maintained large standing military forces, both at home and abroad, in support of a deliberately internationalist foreign policy. In addition, three traditionally distinct and separate military services, and a fourth new one, were brought together in a reorganized National Military Establishment. Nuclear weapons emerged as the centerpiece of America's military arsenal, and conscription became the cornerstone of the nation's military manpower policies. A less well known component of this revolution concerned the reserves. The raising, training, and organizing of adequate numbers of reserves had occupied American military planners since the revolution, but after 1945 this task assumed vastly different dimensions and character. Not only did the federal government seek to create a large, organized reserve force subject only to its control, it also sought to integrate state based reserves with the above force and the regular military establishment. Legislation providing for both of these goals had existed since 1920, but only now did the national leadership attempt
to create a coherent, unified reserve structure. It is worth examining this process in some detail, for it illustrates both traditional problems in American military policy, as well as new dilemmas posed by the existence of nuclear weapons. A fresh look at the evolution of post-war military reserve policy will provide a new perspective on the overall shift in American military policy since 1945 and perhaps yield practical insights to contemporary reserve policy makers.

Scholarly Views on Post-War Reserve Policy

Reserve policy in the post-war period has received relatively scant attention from historians and political scientists. On the surface, it is difficult to understand how an issue which was the focus of three major commission reports, three minor, and three major pieces of legislation in less than ten years could be so ignored. Part of the reason for this neglect stems from the importance of other events occurring at this time. Scholars of the post-war period have naturally concentrated on issues such as Defense Department reorganization, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the formation of NATO, Korea, and the development of nuclear strategy to the exclusion of reserve policy. Yet this is an incomplete explanation. A survey of some of the more prominent writings on post-war defense policy may provide a more satisfactory answer.
One of the first writers to examine the military and strategic requirements of the atomic age was Hanson Baldwin, military correspondent for the *New York Times*. In his book, *The Price of Power*, published in 1947, Baldwin concludes that any future war involving the United States will be a total conflict requiring a complete mobilization of the nation's resources. During wartime, Baldwin argues for the use of Selective Service to procure manpower and for an emphasis on readiness potential rather than mobilization potential. On these grounds, Baldwin opposes Universal Military Training (UMT) as a means for building up a trained reserve. He goes on to point out the inherent obstacles to any meaningful improvement in reserve forces readiness and urges a major reorganization and reorientation of America's reserve forces. Since none of these forces will be ready on mobilization day, he argues that only one-half of the reserve should be trained for overseas combat duty. The other portion should prepare for home defense duties. Starting from the same premise as such large reserve proponents as General George C. Marshall and John McAuley Palmer, Baldwin comes to an opposite conclusion: namely, that large, traditionally trained reserves in the atomic age are an expensive anachronism.

More recent and scholarly than *The Price of Power* is Samuel P. Huntington's *For the Common Defense*. In this work, Huntington surveys and analyzes the development of
American strategic programs in the period 1945-60. One would not expect much attention to reserve policy issues in such a work, and there is in fact little mention of this subject. Huntington does comment briefly on the Eisenhower Administration's attempt to expand reserve forces in the early 1950s, but it is clear that he regards this as a misguided policy: "The administration's support for a large and effective reserve program, on the other hand, stemmed less from the idea that it would be valuable in any future great mobilization, than from the belief that it would be a reasonably inexpensive way to replace the active duty manpower eliminated in the FY 1955 and FY 1956 budgets." Elsewhere, Huntington asserts that "the Eisenhower administration soon realized that large reserves contributed relatively little to the purposes of deterrence." Given the author's preference for the latter concept, one could argue that, like Baldwin, he too regards large reserve forces as unnecessary in the nuclear age.

Arthur Ekirch's survey of U.S. civil-military relations, The Civilian and The Military, presents a slightly different view. In describing the various post-World War II schemes for procurement of a large reserve force, Ekirch claims that the War Department's campaign for UMT in the period 1943-1945 was "Un-American, compulsory, totalitarian, and part of the preparation for war mentality and program." Less polemical in tone is Edward Kolodziej's
The Uncommon Defense and Congress 1945-1963. This work reviews Congress' role in refashioning American defense policy after World War II. Yet, in describing a period during which Congress was much concerned with reserve policy, Kolodziej mentions the subject only briefly. Even one of the standard texts in American military policy gives no more than a cursory account of the struggle to reform and refashion our military reserves in the years 1945-1955.

This brief survey suggests that scholarly indifference to post-World War II reserve policy does not stem solely from the appeal or significance of other contemporary developments in American military policy. Many writers clearly regard the drive to create a large federal reserve after the war as strategically purposeless and financially wasteful. In their view, the requirements of the atomic age necessitated large forces in being, not a huge reserve supplied by UMT. As Huntington has argued, only the political strength of the reserve lobbying organizations and the presence of supporters in Congress enabled the reserves to resist the strategically logical policy of size reductions and lowered mobilization priority in the late 1950s. The buildup and reform of reserves which occurred after World War II was thus the result of the lobbying skills of the National Guard Association and the Reserve Officers Association and political timidity in Congress. Large reserves represented a traditional, but outdated
element of American military policy at a time when that policy had to change radically. Given these assumptions, the manner in which many scholars have described reserve policy after World War II is not surprising.

It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that no one has closely examined post-war reserve policy. Several writers have in fact done so, although only a few of them are well established scholars. Examining the approach, focus, and conclusions of the more prominent analyses of reserve policy in this era will tell us more about overall scholarly attitudes toward this subject.

A substantial amount of work in this area has focused on the campaign for UMT in the immediate post-war years. John M. Swomley's Ph.D. dissertation, "A Study of the Universal Military Training Campaign 1944-52" examines the carefully coordinated effort by the War Department and President Truman to secure UMT. Swomley criticizes Army Chief of Staff Marshall for making all of the Army's post-war policies so dependent on the passage of a UMT bill. Thus, he argues, when Congress refused to pass such a measure in 1945, 1947, and 1948, the War Department had a ready made excuse for not building up the Organized Reserves as energetically as they should have. Conversely, Swomley also argues that the Army deliberately neglected the reserves so as to pressure Congress into passing a UMT bill. The author never explicitly states his views on
this issue, but his criticism of Marshall and the War 
Department implies opposition to UMT. Another study of 
this subject is Robert S. Ward's "The Movement for Universal 
Military Training in the United States 1942-1952." Ward 
concludes that despite the impressive strength and 
organization of the pro-UMT forces, their effort was doomed. 
He argues that the pressure of war business in 1945, the 
need to support a return to the draft, interservice rivalry, 
the cost of UMT, and skillful parliamentary maneuvering by 
UMT opponents combined to defeat the War Department and the 
President. But the real obstacle to UMT, in Ward's view, 
was that it simply was not a viable military manpower policy 
in the postwar era.

A more recent and focused work on UMT is Frank D. 
Cunningham's 1976 dissertation, "The Army and UMT 1942- 
1948." More detailed than the above two studies, this work 
is also less critical of both the War Department effort to 
secure UMT and UMT itself. Cunningham contends that the 
suspension of the pro-UMT campaign in the winter of 1945 
halted War Department efforts that were on the brink of 
success. By the time the Army resumed its UMT campaign in 
earnest two years later, memories of the war had faded and 
other issues dominated the political agenda. Cunningham 
argues that UMT was inherently a long run military 
preparedness program ill suited for meeting the military 
requirements of emergencies. Yet it was only during such
emergencies (such as the early part of the Korean War) that real public and congressional support for UMT existed. Cunningham admits, however, that, in the final analysis, UMT was of questionable military utility in the nuclear age.

One of the first scholarly works to deal specifically with the question of reserve policy was Charles Dale Story's 1959 dissertation, "The Formulation of Army Reserve Forces Policy... Its Setting Amidst Pressure Group Activity." Written from a political science perspective, this work describes the evolution of Army reserve policy in the years 1951-1955 in terms of the activities of various pressure groups--the Army, the NGA, the ROA, the President, and Congress. Story argues that the post-war Army was less concerned with building up the reserve than with enlarging its own position within the national defense establishment. To the extent that the Army did anything for the reserves, it did so because of pressure from Congress. In Story's view, the latter deserves the lion's share of the credit for what improvement took place in Army reserve policy. Less polemic in tone than Story's work is William S. Levantrosser's 1967 study, Congress and the Citizen Soldier. Levantrosser reviews Congress' handling of reserve policy as reflected in six major pieces of legislation from the period 1948-1965. Relying for the most part on interviews with congressional staffers and publicly available congressional documents, Levantrosser, like Story,
argues that Congress displayed "a primacy of interest in reserve affairs," and that it has exercised a dominant influence in reserve policy-making. This study accurately points out those areas of reserve policy-making where Congress has been dominant, but it errs in equating congressional action on a particular reserve issue with its solution. As we shall see below, the manner and conviction with which reserve legislation was implemented by the military had a significant impact on the development of reserve policy in this period.

James Gerhardt's The Draft and Public Policy offers a wider perspective than Levantrosser's work, but his conclusions with respect to the contribution of Congress to reserve policy are the same. Reviewing the formulation of U.S. military manpower policy from 1945-1970 from a congressional perspective, Gerhardt argues that the initiative for every major piece of reserve legislation from 1945 to 1955 came from Congress. Like Levantrosser, Gerhardt devotes much space to congressional actions on the draft, UMT, and reserve policy and almost none to executive branch plans, policies and programs in these areas. The result is an incomplete picture of the overall reserve policy process in the immediate post World War II decade.

One recent study which does something to redress the balance in writing on reserve policy is John Kendall's study, "An Inflexible Response: U.S. Army Manpower
Mobilization Policies, 1945-1957." After demonstrating the manifest flaws in Army mobilization plans from 1945-1950, Kendall offers a vivid portrait of the chaos and confusion which characterized the reserve mobilization for the Korean War. He then assesses the extent to which the Reserve Forces Acts of 1952 and 1955 eliminated the flaws in Army manpower mobilization policies. Kendall concludes that for much of the immediate post-World War II period, U.S. Army mobilization policies were not sufficiently flexible to handle limited war contingencies. As a result, the great potential resource of the Organized Reserves was largely wasted during the Korean War mobilization process.

Although this study is somewhat narrow in scope, and thus does not address some of the key issues in reserve policy planning, it does demonstrate the deleterious effects which Army reserve policies had on the nation's mobilization potential in 1945-1950.

In reviewing the scholarly literature on post-World War II reserve policy formulation, two points stand out. First, most of the work has focused on these elements of the process, such as the campaign for UMT or congressional activism, which were openly controversial or received significant press coverage at the time. The relative accessibility of sources on the UMT fight and congressional action in this area undoubtedly accounts for much of the emphasis on these topics in the literature. But many of
these writings display another characteristic, one which is related to the frequent reliance on congressional and newspaper sources. Most of the secondary works which have focused on reserve policy have implicitly or explicitly accepted a central assumption of the first group of writers discussed above: that large reserve forces and UMT were anachronisms in the atomic age. At the very least, they have limited their analysis in a way which restricts the number of key reserve issues they can discuss. The above accounts of reserve policy and UMT have focused on peripheral and administrative questions (such as the role of Congress in reserve policy making, the influence of lobbying groups and military influence on legislation) and have thus missed or ignored some central themes in American military reserve policy. To understand these themes adequately, one must examine the activities of the White House and Executive Branch in this field. None of the writers discussed above, except for Cunningham and Kendall, have done so. We can best begin the search for the substantive questions in post-World War II reserve policy by surveying first the Army's and then the Navy's attempts to develop adequate reserve forces from the turn of the century to World War II.

Army Reserve Policies 1898-1941

On the eve of the Spanish-American War in early 1898, the regular Army of the United States numbered some 27,000
officers and men. In theory, all able-bodied males ages 18-45 were liable for military service in time of war, but in practice, the organized militia, or National Guard, some 110,000 strong, constituted the regular Army's main reserve. Not surprisingly, the relationship between the two groups was strained. The regulars viewed the guard as a poorly trained and equipped mob of amateur soldiers led by incompetent political hacks. In return, the guard saw the Army as a collection of arrogant militarists. However, the real obstacles to the effective use of the National Guard as a reserve force stemmed from two other factors: the prohibition on the use of the guard outside the continental United States, and the difficulty of ensuring adequate federal control over the state-based militia. Regular Army concern over these issues was most eloquently and passionately voiced during the 1870s and 1880s by Major General Emory Upton, author of an extended treatise on the military policy of the United States. This work's central thesis was that all American wars (up to 1865) had been prolonged unnecessarily because of a lack of preparation caused by unfounded hostility to even a small regular Army, persistent use of raw militia, absence of an expansive organization, excessive state influence and other problems. Upton had no objection to the use of militia serving under federal control, but only to those forces serving under the authority of the states. As a remedy for
this disheartening situation, Upton sought, among other things, a large standing army which could be expanded in time of war by a pretrained reserve force under the control of the regular Army.

Upton's suicide in 1884 ended a brilliant military career, but his ideas on the evils of the state militias and the desirability of a federal reserve soon became gospel to a large part of the regular Army officer corps. Indeed, much of the intellectual impetus for the Army's search for a viable federal reserve from 1898 to 1945 came from Emory Upton. The likelihood that the United States would assume a larger political and military role in the world only added urgency to this search as the 19th century drew to a close.

The growing threat of a war with Spain in early 1898 offered Upton's disciples within the Army an opportunity to implement some of his ideas on the organization of military reserves. In March, the War Department persuaded Congressman John Hull (R., Iowa) to introduce a bill proposing to enlarge the regular Army to 104,000 men without relying on the National Guard. The Hull bill provided for the raising of regiments of national volunteers recruited in, but not controlled by the states. Despite broad administration support for the measure, the National Guard Association, working with its allies in Congress, defeated the Hull bill in early April. Then, after consultation with the NGA, Congress, and the War Department, President
McKinley proposed a new bill which provided for a volunteer supplement to the regular Army that would be recruited and officered by the states. In practice, this measure, which passed Congress in late April, allowed National Guardsmen to enlist as individuals. (They could not be sent overseas if they joined in their original guard units.) Late in May, 1898, McKinley succumbed to further pressure from the NGA and Congress and provided 75,000 more mobilization slots for the guard. The regular Army's first attempt to create a reserve force separate from the National Guard was thus defeated. The latter's political strength in Congress, and the fact that it existed as an organized reserve force, enabled it to claim that it was the army's front line reserve. But the regular Army's quest for a federal reserve had just begun.

The well known difficulties experienced by the War Department in mobilizing and planning for the war with Spain gave impetus to a nascent reform movement within the Army and War Department. In August 1899, a new Secretary of War, a New York lawyer named Elihu Root, took office. Influenced, but not captivated, by the writings of Emory Upton, Root became committed to a major program of army reforms which included an expanded regular Army, the creation of a general staff on the Prussian model, the establishment of a war college, and the formation of a federal volunteer reserve. The new Secretary of War,
however, was a political realist as well as a progressive reformer. Thus, while he managed to secure the first three items on the reformer's agenda, Root did not even attempt to gain congressional approval for a federal reserve bill. In fact, even as his military advisors planned for such a force, the Secretary of War was working with the NGA and Congress to secure passage of a new militia bill. This measure, known as the Dick Act, passed Congress in January 1903. In essence, it cleared up much of the confusion which surrounded the constitutional principle of the universal military obligation. The measure designated all the unorganized, able-bodied manpower of the states as the reserve militia and the National Guard as the organized militia. To build up the latter force as a reserve of the regular Army, the Dick act provided federal funds for equipment, arms, and drill pay for the National Guard. The measure also specified the number of annual drills and summer encampments required of a guard unit that wished to maintain its federal status (and its federal funds). Finally, the bill stipulated that after three months of federal service, a National Guard unit might volunteer as a unit for federal service. Thus, a time when many regular Army officers felt an even greater need for a large federal reserve (because of expanded U.S. military responsibilities in the Pacific and the Caribbean), Congress had strengthened and reconfirmed its federal reserve role the
state controlled force which so many of them viewed with contempt.

For a decade or so after the passage of the Dick Act, Army reserve policy progressed on a dual track. The NGA and its allies in Congress worked to increase federal support of the guard and remove legal limitations on its use as a federal reserve force while the regular Army continued to devise plans for a front line federal reserve. In 1908, Congress passed a series of amendments to the Dick Act to strengthen the reserve role of the National Guard. The first one removed the nine month limitation on the National Guard's allowed term of federal service. The second amendment lifted the constitutional prohibition against National Guard service overseas. The regular Army responded to this initiative by requesting a legal ruling on the constitutionality of these changes. In 1912, the U.S. Attorney General ruled that Congress had acted unconstitutionally in passing the 1908 amendment. However, just two years later, Congress passed another law allowing individual guardsmen to volunteer for federal service outside the United States and mandated that if three-quarters of a unit volunteered for such service, then the guard unit would have to be kept intact.

The Dick Act and subsequent legislation seriously undercut the efforts of the Army officers who sought to create a federal reserve force, but if anything, they
increased their efforts in this direction after 1903. Major
General William Carter, Root's military aide as Secretary of
War, publicly denigrated the reserve potential of the
National Guard and called for a body of national volunteers
to replace it. In 1910, the cause of those seeking a
federal reserve received a major boost when a vigorous
champion of this idea, Major General Leonard Wood, became
Army Chief of Staff. Wood was convinced that a large
national reserve force was an essential element of the
revitalized and expanded military structure America needed.
Unlike many of his fellow officers, however, Wood believed
that citizen soldiers, trained and organized in peacetime,
could from an adequate reserve. In addition, Wood conceded
some usefulness to the National Guard, even though he did
not emphasize the role of the citizen reserve force. Ever
the active thinker, the chief of Staff also proposed the
formation of a Regular Army Reserve, to be composed of
furloughed regular Army enlistees. In 1912, Secretary of
War Henry L. Stimson, a progressive in the Elihu Root mold,
incorporated some of Wood's ideas on reserve policy in a
supplement to his annual report to Congress. Aiding
Stimson in the preparation of this supplement was an
obscure General Staff officer, Captain John McAuley Palmer.
In their treatise, Palmer and Stimson rejected as too
expensive Upton's expansible army concept and proposed that
the regular Army be organized to fight immediately in case
of emergency. Backing up the active Army would be a 
Regular Army Reserve composed of furloughed Army enlistees. 
This force would provide fillers to raise the regular Army 
(always understrength in peacetime) to war strength 
30 immediately after mobilization.

Meanwhile, Leonard Wood continued his campaign for an 
improved federal reserve composed of citizen soldiers. 
However, the National Guard and its congressional allies 
continued to resist any scheme which would limit the reserve 
role of the guard. In 1912, Congress passed a law providing 
for a federal reserve force, but it also stipulated that it 
would be composed only of regular Army veterans furloughed 
into the reserve for four years after an initial three year 
hitch on active duty. The act also limited membership in 
the new force to unmarried men under the age of forty-five 
31 and provided no funds for equipment or training. While 
Congress finally had created what many Army officers had 
pressed for since the 1880s, it ensured that it would 
remain small and hence no threat to the primacy of the 
National Guard. Not surprisingly, recruiting for the 
Regular Army Reserve went as Congress had wanted; in two 
years, the measure provided only sixteen reservists to the 
new reserve. Still, the establishment in principle of the 
Regular Army reserve represented a partial victory for Wood 
and Stimson. Congress had recognized that a federal 
military reserve might be necessary for certain tasks, even
if they were unwilling to allow it to replace the state based National Guard.

Leonard Wood's term as Army Chief of Staff ended in 1914, and President Wilson, not wanting to keep the able Republican Wood in Washington for four more years, decided not to reappoint him to another term. Wood's departure from the capital, however, gave him greater freedom to publicize his ideas on reserve policy. In speech after speech, the former Chief of Staff argued that the nation's security was not assured without the creation of a mass federal reserve force composed of citizens given military training in peacetime. The recent outbreak of war in Europe added force to these arguments. With the cooperation and aid of prominent east coast Republicans, Wood decided to demonstrate his ideas in practice. In the summer of 1915, he opened the first of the Plattsburg Camps. These camps, located in upper New York State, provided basic military training for citizen volunteers. They constituted a real, if small scale, showpiece for the idea of Universal Military Training, which Wood argued was an essential element in any preparedness program. UMT would provide the manpower for the mass, citizen-based (federal) reserve the ex-Chief of Staff wanted. In late 1915, the recently formed National Association for UMT, whose members included Root and Stimson, began lobbying Congress for a UMT bill. An act providing for UMT was introduced in December 1915, but it
got nowhere. Wood's propagandizing efforts on behalf of UMT, however, were not in vain. Despite the relatively small size of his audience and the unpopularity of some of his ideas (such as conscription), President Wilson felt compelled to respond to Wood's challenge on the issue of military preparedness. Accordingly, in the summer of 1915, he asked Secretary of War Lindley Garrison to formulate a new national security program for submission to Congress.

Garrison's plan, released later that year under the title, Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States, called for radical changes in the nation's land force policy. The regular Army would more than double in size, from 100,000 to 230,000 men. Behind this would stand a federal reserve force of 400,000, to be raised in annual increments of 133,000. The National Guard would still receive federal support, but under this plan, it would be relegated to domestic policing and guard duties. The new federal reserve, or Continental Army, would constitute the nation's front line reserve. After some delay, President Wilson endorsed Garrison's scheme and sent it up to Congress for consideration. Preparedness groups applauded the plan and gave it strong support but, James Hay (D., Va.), the Chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, was less enthusiastic. He and the other southern states' rights advocates on the committee questioned the provision allotting a secondary reserve role to the National
Guard. In addition, they doubted the feasibility of recruiting so large a federal reserve force at a time when it was almost impossible to keep the guard up to strength. By early 1916, it was clear that Garrison's Continental Army plan was in deep trouble. That January, Hay and the Military Affairs Committee began formulating an alternative to the Secretary of War's scheme.

Hay's alternative plan, which he discussed with the President in late January, sought to strengthen the National Guard as a front line reserve by increasing federal responsibility for it. The federal government would equip, train, and pay the guard and have the right to qualify militia officers applying for federal commissions. In return, the states would ensure that federal training standards were being maintained, and guardsmen would swear an oath to respond in their units to federal calls for service anywhere. After listening to Hay's proposals, Wilson embarked on a nationwide speaking tour to test public sentiment on the preparedness issue. He discovered much enthusiasm for the general idea of military preparedness, but none at all for the Continental Army Plan. In early February, Hay formally informed the President that his Secretary of War's plan was unacceptable to Congress. He then introduced his own military reorganization bill. Garrison objected violently to these developments and, after some political maneuvering, decided to resign. Congress,
working closely with his successor, Newton D. Baker, approved Hay's plan in May. In addition to incorporating Hay's proposals with respect to the National Guard, this bill, which became known as the National Defense Act of 1916, provided for an increase in the regular Army to 175,000 and increased the authorized strength of the guard to 400,000. It also offered bounties to induce men to join the Regular Army Reserve, provided money to keep the Plattsburg camps going, and created the Reserve Officers Training Corps. The products of this program would form an Officers Reserve Corps while technical specialists could join a newly created Enlisted Reserve Corps. While the bill provided for new federal reserve components, it also strengthened the National Guard and confirmed it as the nation's front line reserve. But it did meet many of the objections of regular Army Officers who claimed that the guard's state ties reduced its reliability and flexibility as a reserve to the Army.

The National Defense Act of 1916 addressed many of the manpower problems that had plagued American military policy since the Civil War. Yet the passage of this measure did not deter Leonard Wood and his civilian supporters from continuing their quest for Universal Military Training. A UMT bill introduced by Senator George Chamberlain (D., Ore.) in late 1916 stimulated a vigorous debate in Congress, and similar measures were introduced early in 1917. Still, as
UMT proponents themselves acknowledged, most Americans did not understand the concept adequately. Preparedness advocates realized a comprehensive program of public education on UMT was needed before it could be adopted. In an effort to make the idea more attractive to the American public, UMT proponents increasingly emphasized the non-military as well as the military benefits of the program. Retired Army Lieutenant General Samuel Young, President of the National Association for UMT, testified before Congress that UMT was not merely valuable for the purposes of national defense, it would also increase industrial efficiency by solidifying recent immigrants into Americans and reduce the crime rate. In a speech delivered in 1918, Young argued that UMT would "make this country a united nation... and restore the physical stamina of our young people and ensure a high degree of physical, mental, and moral development among our young people for the future." Young's remarks reflect a typical progressive era concern with national unity, efficiency, and harmony, but these themes would reappear again and again in pro-UMT arguments even after the end of the progressive era. They also hinted at a fundamental dilemma for UMT advocates. On the one hand, it seemed that the only way to achieve UMT in the face of skeptical, anti-militarist public opinion was to emphasize its collateral civic benefits. Yet most UMT proponents, especially those
in the military, realized that military need constituted the only logical justification for such a far-reaching and compulsory program of training.

American entry into World War I in early April 1917 ended all serious discussion of UMT in Congress. Concern shifted to the problem of raising, training and supplying the mass army that would revive the allies' sinking fortunes in Europe. In May, Congress passed the Selective Service Act of 1917. This measure authorized the President to induct up to one million men into the armed forces, if he deemed it necessary. The term of service for both draftees and volunteers in the regular Army and National Guard was set at the duration of the emergency. The conscripted force would supplement a regular Army of 133,000 and a National Guard of 181,000. In addition, the Officers Reserve Corps provided 2000 men, the Enlisted Reserve Corps 10,000 specialists and the Regular Army Reserve 4,700 enlisted men.

By the end of the war, the Army of the United States (the wartime force which included the regular Army, National Guard, reservists and draftees) numbered some 3.7 million men. The majority of this force had been raised by conscription. In a departure from American military tradition, the country had raised the largest army in its history by compulsory means, an achievement which must have heartened those who sought to use similar methods to build
up a large citizen reserve.

Despite the diversion of the nation's attention to the war effort, the advocates of long-term preparedness measures continued their activities in 1917-1918. Young, Wood, and their citizen allies in the Military Training Camps Association spoke and lobbied extensively for UMT and other preparedness measures. Young also corresponded with Adjutant General Enoch Crowder, head of wartime Selective Service, in an attempt to convince him of the need for UMT. The sudden end of the war in November 1918 saw the pro-UMT forces well prepared to resume their fight in Congress. In July 1919, the MTCA persuaded Senator George Chamberlain and Congressman Julius Kahn to introduce parallel versions of the association's UMT bill in Congress. This measure proposed six months of military training for all able-bodied males followed by enrollment in a general reserve. Under this plan, the regular Army would be occupied mainly by planning for war and training UMT enlistees and reservists.

The MTCA and its allies, however, were not the only ones concerned with post-war military policy in 1918-1919. In December 1918, General Jack Pershing, commander of the AEF, asked the G-5 section of his general headquarters to prepare a statement on post-war military policy. A few weeks later, a first draft of the statement had been prepared. It called for a citizen-based federal reserve
based on seven months UMT. This force would supply the manpower needed for the initial expansion and subsequent reinforcement of the wartime army. At this point, in late December, General Pershing requested that John McAuley Palmer, now a colonel, represent him during the formulation of a new military policy at home. Upon arrival at Pershing's French Headquarters, Palmer reviewed the initial G-5 plan for a new military policy and made major changes. He reworked the plan so as to provide that the graduates of a UMT program would form not an unorganized pool of fillers and reinforcements, but a highly organized and trained citizen army, officered by civilian soldiers. He also increased the period of UMT from seven to twelve months and provided for a program of regular refresher training for UMT graduates. The Palmer alterations to the G-5 plan did not seem significant at the time, but in actuality they reflected the beginnings of a fundamental split in Army thinking about the organization and role of a federal reserve. The original G-5 draft, reflecting the Uptonian ideals of its authors, envisioned a UMT based reserve as the source of individual manpower for the expansion of the regular Army. Palmer's view, which was less widely held in the Army, called for a UMT based reserve composed of organized units capable of supplementing, but not merging into, the regular Army. This difference, still muted in late 1918, would soon emerge as one of the central issues.
in reserve policy.

Palmer reported for duty in Washington, D.C. as Pershing's emissary in late January 1919. But upon his arrival at the War Department, he quickly discovered that the Army Chief of Staff, Peyton C. March, had already prepared a plan embodying his own ideas about the future of the army. Moreover, his proposals bore a striking similarity to the original G-5 staff plan which Palmer had just radically altered. March proposed a large regular Army of 500,000, skeletonized to serve as the cadre for an army of five corps. To fill out this force in wartime, the Chief of Staff provided for a federal reserve formed by a system of UMT. The National Guard was relegated to the rank of a second line reserve, behind the regular Army and the new federal reserve. March's ideas, which were submitted in the form of a bill to Congress in February 1919, reflected the persistent influence of Upton, and to a lesser degree, Leonard Wood, on regular Army thinking on manpower questions. Not surprisingly, the army reorganization bill received a cool reception on Capitol Hill. The Military Affairs Committees of both houses held hearings on the measure throughout the spring and summer of 1919, but chances for its unamended passage looked slim.

Finally, after months of inconclusive action in Congress, John Auley Palmer stepped into the spotlight. Palmer had seen his own ideas for reorganizing the Army
vigorously rebuffed by the Chief of Staff in March, and he was searching for way to give his proposals a new hearing. His opportunity came in October 1919 in the form of an invitation from Senate Military Affairs Committee Chairman James Wadsworth (R., N.Y.) to testify on the War Department bill. Palmer readily agreed, and in three days of testimony, he delicately but firmly shredded March's reorganization plan. Charging that the Chief of Staff's ideas were not in harmony with the genius of American institutions, Palmer argued for a smaller regular Army backed by a large organized [my emphasis] citizen reserve. After Palmer's testimony, Wadsworth and the other members of the committee decided to reject the War Department bill and draft their own measure for the reorganization of the Army. The Chairman also requested that Colonel Palmer be detailed from the General Staff to assist his committee in preparing a new bill.

Wadsworth's alternate army bill was virtually completed by January 1920, but by this time, the National Guard Association had entered the fray. Determined to ensure the guard's premier reserve role in the post-war military establishment, the NGA threatened to withhold support for the bill's UMT provisions unless the guard was guaranteed a share of the UMT graduates to keep it up to strength. In addition, guard representatives were unwilling to submerge their identity in the proposed federal reserve force. The
prospect of a dual reserve, which was abhorrent to Wadsworth and Palmer, now seemed likely.

Because of the controversy surrounding the Treaty of Versailles, Wadsworth's bill, which provided for six months of UMT followed by three years in the guard or five in the federal reserve, did not reach the Senate floor until April 1920. At this point, election year political considerations worked to gut the bill of its compulsory military training provisions. In February, House Democrats voted to oppose UMT on principle, and Wadsworth soon discovered that a majority of senators, whatever their actual convictions, would oppose UMT also. Palmer then hastily rewrote the bill to provide for a voluntary military training program, which the upper house did accept on April 9. To add to the woes of Wadsworth and Palmer, the House version of their bill, which also passed in April, maintained the National Guard as the nation's first line reserve under the militia clauses of the constitution. This provision limited the Federal Government's control over it in peacetime. In addition, the House measure contained no provision for a federal reserve of any kind.

During the month of May, House and Senate conferees attempted to work up a compromise army bill, but agreement did not come easily. The Senate representatives sought to expand federal control over the guard by organizing it under the army clauses of the Constitution, but the House rejected
this proposal overwhelmingly. The lower house did seem ready to accept the idea of a federal reserve, as long as the National Guard remained preeminent. Finally, in late May, the conferees agreed on a new army bill, which became known as the National Defense Act (NDA) of 1920. This measure, signed by the President in early June, provided for a regular Army of 280,000 men, a force much smaller than that originally requested by March. Behind the active army stood an enlarged National Guard and the Organized Reserve Corps. The latter was composed of the Officers Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps. Manpower for these elements of the reserve would come from ROTC and an expanded network of Citizens Military Training Camps (CMTC). These provisions of the NDA of 1920 thus realized Palmer's dream of officering the federal reserve with citizen officers. Finally, the bill stipulated that all future National Guard and reserve policies would have to be formulated and approved by joint committees of reservists and regulars. Although the measure failed to provide for UMT and a single, federally controlled reserve, Palmer and Wadsworth had reason to be satisfied with the National Defense Act of 1920. In it they laid the foundations upon which a large, organized national reserve composed of citizen soldiers might be built.

A number of important themes emerge from this summary of the U.S. Army's initial attempts to formulate a coherent,
effective and politically acceptable reserve policy. First, the events of the years 1898-1920 illustrated the ability of the National Guard and its allies to secure and retain a significant federal military role. The guard not only defeated every attempt to relegate it to purely state-related duties, it also secured increased federal subsidies and guarantees of its federal reserve status. Second, military and civilian advocates of a federal reserve disagreed over the best way to create that force. Some believed that a reserve should be formed out of furloughed regular Army enlistees, while a larger number contended that the ideal federal reserve should consist of citizens trained under a system of UMT. Behind this dispute lay a long standing disagreement as to exactly how much training was required to make a good soldier and over the ideological merits of a citizen-soldier reserve force. Third, the same groups differed as to the organization and purpose of a federal reserve. Most regular Army officers preferred an unorganized pool of reserve officers and men which would provide fillers and replacements for an expanded regular Army. By contrast, certain other officers and many civilians pressed for a federal reserve organized in units which would train in peacetime. These units would deploy alongside the regular Army in wartime. Lastly, the process of reserve policy formulation in this period was dominated by Congress. On at least three occasions, it rejected out
of hand White House or War Department reserve policy proposals and passed its own instead. The National Defense Act of 1920, which was almost exclusively a Congressional creation, attempted to settle the first three issues above, but it failed to do so. They would recur whenever the nation addressed the problem of Army reserve policy again.

The wave of post-war disillusionment and isolationism which shattered Woodrow Wilson's hopes for a new era in American foreign policy also crippled the operation of the National Defense Act of 1920. Only a few months after its passage, Congress overrode Wilson's veto to reduce regular Army strength to 175,000. Yet this was only the first step in a series of budget cutting moves during the early 1920s; cost reduction pressures intensified after the Republicans took office in 1921. In 1925, for example, Congress appropriated enough money for an army of only 118,750 men. Army leaders responded by cutting regular units, closing corps area training centers, and sending the instructors back to active units. They also reduce training pay for the National Guard and cut equipment allowances for the Organized Reserves. As a result, the guard barely reached half of its authorized strength of 435,000, and the Organized Reserves, which consisted mostly of officers, could train only on a volunteer basis. Senator Wadsworth and a few like-minded members of Congress attempted to fight future cuts in Army appropriations, but the damage had
already been done. One glimmer of hope lay in the relative success of the ROTC program and the CMTCs. By 1928, over 127,000 students in 323 schools had enrolled in ROTC, and the CMTC, organized on the Plattsburg model, were attracting thousands of youths each summer for what can best be described as quasi-military training.

The election of an economy-minded Herbert Hoover as President in 1928 and the onset of the Great Depression in 1929-1930 signaled another round of cuts in the federal budget. As a result, the Army lost $65 million in appropriations for FY 1931 and a further $15 million for FY 1932. Not surprisingly, the National Guard, Organized Reserves, ROTC, and CMTC programs absorbed a disproportionate share of these reductions. Despite the cuts, the very existence of the Organized Reserves still aroused suspicion. In January 1930, Congressman Ross Collins (D., Miss.) felt compelled to denounce the Organized Reserve Corps and the Reserve Officer Association as evil forces for Army expansion and militarism. These complaints notwithstanding, by the early 1930s the morale and operational readiness of the regular Army and its reserves had reached a low point.

The reductions in Army appropriations and the reduced readiness of both the National Guard and Organized Reserves forced the regular Army to search for new ways to bring itself up to authorized strength in the event of an
emergency. The urgency of this problem can be gauged by the fact that the Army General Staff assigned it as a study problem to War College students for ten straight years (1928-1938). The answers provided by the best War College essays reveal much about regular Army thinking on reserve and mobilization policy. A typical paper of these years, written by Major Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1928, concluded that in the event of an emergency, the Army would need at least 75,000 men to bring itself up to full strength. Eisenhower argued that neither the National Guard nor the Enlisted Reserve Corps could supply the necessary trained men in time, but he acknowledged that it was unlikely that Congress would provide the needed 75,000 men in peacetime. The answer to this dilemma, Eisenhower asserted, lay in the reestablishment of the Regular Army Reserve, which had been abolished by the National Defense Act of 1920. He recommended that the War Department seek congressional approval to set all regular Army enlistments at two years on active duty, followed by three years in the reserves. Within a few years, this change would lead to the formation of a reliable, trained reserve force of some 100,000 men. Eisenhower's paper did not specify the organization of this new reserve, but his comments on its role as source of fillers suggested that it would be unorganized. Subsequent papers on this subject, including studies by Leslie J. McNair and Robert Eichelberger, came to similar
conclusions. But despite the apparent moderation of these proposals, Congress was not yet in the mood to provide for yet another reserve for the Army.

While a few regular Army officers struggled with the problem of finding enough manpower just to expand to authorized strength in an emergency, the NGA, without the cooperation of the War Department, successfully lobbied Congress for legislation to ensure that the guard would be federalized in units. In June 1933, Congress passed a bill creating a force known as the National Guard of the United States (NGUS) and designated it as a reserve component of the Army of the United States. It was composed of specially designated guard units and could be ordered into federal service whenever Congress had declared a national emergency. As far as possible NGUS units were to remain intact while in federal service. The War Department and the regular Army, pre-occupied by their own problems, did not fight the measure. Once again, the National Guard had demonstrated its political strength on matters affecting it directly.

As the guard strengthened its status as the army's front line reserve, the other reserve force, the Organized Reserve Corps, struggled just to stay alive. Its condition during the 1930s reflected both a shortage of funds and the National Guard's dominance of the reserve policy process. For most of the decade, the number of men
enrolled in the ORC hovered between 105,000 and 120,000, but of these figures, all but 4-5000 were officers. Furthermore, almost 90 percent of these men were company grade officers, many of whom were unassignable for lack of vacancies. Acute shortages of funds limited training time drastically, especially for field grade officers. This situation led some reserve officers to charge that the regular Army was seeking to reduce the Officers Reserve Corps to a mere unorganized pool of junior officers. The problems experienced by reserve officers, however, paled in comparison to the difficulties which confronted the Enlisted Reserve Corps. Lacking any real recruiting incentives, the ERC never numbered more than 5000 men at anytime in the inter-war period. In addition, virtually no paid training was available, and little equipment existed. The state of this force in the 1930s was such that one War College study declared that the present "enlisted reserve is of no value in providing an effective enlisted reserve and cannot be improved under existing laws." This judgement may have been a little harsh, but it does point to a very real problem in Army reserve policy. The NDA of 1920 had erected a framework for the development of large, organized federal reserves, but it had failed to ensure such a force would receive the necessary funds and personnel. Only large sums of money and a UMT program could guarantee the creation of viable ERC, but Congress
had failed to provide either during the interwar years.

Despite the continuing pressures for cuts in Army appropriations, Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur successfully beat back attempts to reduce personnel strengths in 1932 and 1933. Even more encouraging was MacArthur's successful attempt to bring Army mobilization plans closer to reality. A key part of this effort was the creation of moderately sized mobile readiness force to be deployed immediately in an emergency. The Chief of Staff could not convince Congress to provide the additional manpower for this force, but he did push through a plan whereby each regular Army officer was designated to fill a specific mobilization slot. MacArthur also developed an original proposal to enlarge the enlisted reserve. In 1935, he suggested that enrollees of the Civilian Conservation Corps, which the Army had a hand in running, be given the option of taking six months of military training after an initial six months in the CCC. After the training, the enrollee would join an auxiliary enlisted reserve. A bill embodying MacArthur's proposal was introduced into Congress, but several peace organizations opposed the measure, and it died quickly in a House committee.

MacArthur's successor as Chief of Staff in 1935, Malin Craig, continued his efforts to improve Army mobilization plans. Equally important, he sought and achieved sizeable increases in Army personnel strengths. By FY 1939, when
Craig stepped down as Chief of Staff, the Army numbered some 189,000 officers and men, its highest total in 17 years. In addition, Craig pushed vigorously for the reestablishment of the Regular Army Reserve. In his annual report for 1936, he proposed a uniform five year enlistment in the Army. The first two years would be spent on active duty, after which an enlistee would transfer into an unorganized Army Reserve for three years. Craig envisioned a total Army reserve of 150,000 trained men after five years. Secretary of War Henry Woodring supported the Chief of Staff's proposal in his own annual report for 1936. He also suggested significant increases in the National Guard and active Army as well. No immediate action on this issue was forthcoming until the General Staff had studied in further, but finally, on January 31, 1938, Senator Morris Sheppard (D., Texas) introduced in Congress a bill to reestablish a Regular Army Reserve. In March, President Roosevelt, in announcing plans to increase Army appropriations, gave his support to the measure. The bill encountered surprisingly little opposition, possibly because it required only $1.5 million in appropriations, and it became law in April. The measure provided funds for a token payment of twenty-five dollars per year for any unmarried Army veteran under forty-five who wished to join the reserve. By failing to change the regular Army term of enlistment so that all Army enlisted men would be furloughed into the reserve, Congress
kept the size and hence, the cost of this force down.
Still, it did authorize funds for a Regular Army Reserve of
75,000, to be raised over four years. The reestablishment
of this force promised to be helpful to an army struggling
to maintain its authorized strength. But this action came
at a time when events in Europe and the Pacific were
suggesting that the Army might need far more than 75,000
reservists to meet its future obligations.

Recruiting for the new reserve began amidst optimism,
but it soon ran into trouble. Age restrictions, the lack of
pay and benefits, and the prohibition against accepting
married men hampered recruiting for the force. During one
two-month period in early 1939, only 5,000 men signed up for
the Army Reserve. This drop in enlistments forced the
Army to eliminate the clause prohibiting the enlistment of
married men and organize a concerted recruiting campaign for
the reserve. These steps led to a dramatic increase in
enlistments; by the end of April 1939, 17,500 veterans had
signed up in the preceding two months. By all accounts,
the Army seemed satisfied with its new reserve. A War
College review of November 1939 concluded that despite some
recruiting problems, the quality of personnel in, and the
cost of the Regular Army Reserve was acceptable. This
review noted that other measures designed to increase the
size of this force, such as eliminating the requirement that
it be composed exclusively of Army enlistees or requiring
all regular Army enlistees to join the reserve after two years, were either opposed by the NGA or would harm recruiting for the active Army. Another War College study, also from late 1939, described the tasks the Regular Army Reserve would assume in any mobilization. If called to active duty, members of this force would be assigned as fillers for active Army units at home or overseas, act as cadres for other regular Army or AUS units, assume recruiting duties, and staff replacement centers in each Corps area. The recommendations of this War College study mirrored those made in an April G-3 General Staff study of the same subject. These reviews indicated that the active Army still viewed reserve policy from an Uptonian perspective. Its new reserve was to supply fillers for the regular Army, not provide organized, trained units to fight along side it.

The outbreak of war in Europe coincided almost exactly with the appointment of George C. Marshall as Army Chief of Staff. A close associate of John McAuley Palmer from World War I, Marshall shared many of the latter's ideas on the importance of an organized civilian reserve for the Army. The new Chief of Staff's immediate concerns, however, lay in building up the strength of the regular Army. Soon after taking office, he persuaded the President to increase the active Army to 227,000 men and the National Guard to 235,000. Roosevelt also authorized the expansion of the
officer corps through the recall of reserve officers to active duty. Beyond these steps, though, the administration did little in the manpower area to prepare the Army for war. Isolationism and antimilitary feeling still ran strong in many parts of the country, and Roosevelt was not yet prepared to challenge these forces directly.

Not until the disasters in France and the Low Countries in late spring of 1940 was the President ready to support more extreme measures for building up the Army. The most important of these was a draft bill. However, the impetus for conscription came not from FDR or the War Department, but from the Military Training Camps Association and its allies in Congress. In June, Roosevelt signalled his support for some sort of draft bill by appointing an outspoken supporter of conscription, Henry L. Stimson, as Secretary of War. That same month, Congressman James Wadsworth and Senator Edward Burke (D., Neb.) introduced bills providing for the first peacetime draft in the nation's history.

The growing public consensus for conscription did not, however, ensure easy passage for the Burke-Wadsworth bills. During committee hearings on these measures, representatives of the National Guard hinted that they would oppose them unless the guard received written guarantees of its place as the nation's front line reserve. John McAuley Palmer, who had been one of the original instigators of the conscription
bills, suggested that the House and Senate committees simply insert a declaration of policy in the text of the act stipulating that the National Guard was indeed the premier reserve force. Both committees readily accepted Palmer's suggestion and amended the bills accordingly. In early September, Congress passed the Burke-Wadsworth Act. The measure authorized the drafting of men aged 21 to 36 for one year but limited the employment of conscripted troops to the Western Hemisphere and American overseas possessions. The act also contained a clause requiring that every man drafted under it would have to serve in a reserve component of the land or naval forces for ten years after his active term of service had expired. Men who served in the National Guard for two years after active duty were exempted from further reserve service. This clause meant that the future reserve would in theory consist mainly of active duty veterans, a principle which Uptonian officers had insisted upon for years. But at the same time, Congress had guaranteed the National Guard's status as the front line reserve, an action which would complicate planning for the post-war Army reserve.

The passage of the Selective Service Act (which was accompanied by a callup of the guard and Organized Reserves), and the deteriorating military situation in Europe drew most Army planners' time and attention toward the buildup and organization of a large active Army.
Related problems of materiel procurement, personnel changes, and War Department reorganization overshadowed whatever concerns about reserve policy existed. And after December 7, 1941, the prosecution of the war and organizing the necessary mobilization absorbed all the War Department's time and energy. In March 1942, the latter suspended the operation of the Section Five Committees, which had formulated and reviewed all National Guard and reserve policies, for the duration. However, some officers, General Marshall among them, realized that the Army could not afford to neglect long range planning during wartime. Hence, in late December 1941, the Chief of Staff formerly requested the recall to active duty of his old friend, Brigadier General John McAuley Palmer, to act as his personal advisor. Palmer's initial assignment involved the mediation of a regular Army-guard dispute over the latter's place in the nation's military policy, but Marshall made it clear that he was also to act as consultant on the question of post-war military policy. Notwithstanding the pressing demands of the war, Marshall and Palmer realized that the Army would have to begin planning for peace long before the fighting ended.

**Naval Services Reserve Policy, 1890-1941**

The history of reserve policy in the Navy stands in contrast to that of the Army. Not only is it much shorter and simpler, but also less political and controversial. Yet
a comparison with land forces reserve policy is instructive, for it illustrates the character and dimensions of the critical issues in overall reserve policy formulation.

The U.S. Navy’s image as a political neutral meant that it never had to face intense ideological opposition to large standing forces. To be sure, congressional parsimony and the presence of a friendly Royal Navy ensured that the American Navy would remain small during the 19th century. But despite its modest size, the Navy always planned to go to war with the forces on hand. Any additional men needed during wartime could be procured from the civilian merchant marine. This fact limited the Navy’s need for a large reserve. In addition, there was no Navy equivalent of the National Guard for most of the 19th century, thus allowing Navy planners more flexibility and freedom of choice during any expansion. When Navy policy-makers did consider the question of reserves, their problem was both smaller and simpler than faced by their Army counterparts.

As the 19th century drew to a close, however, naval reserve policy became more complicated. During the late 1880s and 1890s, several states, mostly in the east, began to form naval equivalents of the National Guard. By 1891, these organizations had secured limited amounts of federal aid and had formed the Association of Naval Militias (ANM) to represent their interests in Washington. Throughout the 1890s and early 1900s, the ANM lobbied Congress for
legislation to confer federal status on the various naval militias. Their efforts bore fruit in early 1914 when the Congress passed the Naval Militia Act. This measure placed the Naval Militia under the control of the Navy Department, prescribed conditions for bringing it into federal service, provided drill pay for training, and stipulated that the Naval Militia would be called to the colors before any 87 volunteers. This act accomplished for the Naval Militia what the Dick Act and NDA of 1916 had done for the National Guard.

The regular Navy, meanwhile, had not been inactive in the face of the lobbying efforts by the Naval Militia. Late in 1914, the Navy Department formulated plans to set up a national naval reserve as a supplement to the state-based navies. Suspicion of the latter's reliability and sailing skills undoubtedly played a role in this initiative. By early 1915, the Navy had reworked its reserve plans into a bill providing for a federal naval reserve. This force would consist of enlisted men discharged from the Regular Navy. The bill also prescribed pay scales for individual reservists that varied with grade and experience. This measure, which passed the Congress easily in 1915, was amended the next year to provide for a naval officer reserve 88 and divided enlisted reservists into six classes. In less than a year, the Navy had created an organization which the Army had struggled for 20 years to obtain. In formulating
plans for a federal naval reserve, the Navy Department did have to make allowances for the existence of the Naval Militia, but unlike the Army, the Navy was not divided by arguments over the proper method of obtaining reservists. Without debate, it adopted the furlough method and retained it.

World War I put the Navy's two new reserve organization to a quick test. Both forces supplied a number of officers and men to the expanded wartime Navy, but most new arrivals came via volunteering or the draft. Moreover, by the middle of 1918, the Navy had grown dissatisfied with its dual reserve system. That summer, the Navy Department proposed legislation to abolish the Naval militia as a federal reserve. Surprisingly, officers of the ANM expressed little or no opposition during hearings on the bill. They may have recognized the real limits on their political influence (because of their small size) and decided that it would be unwise to challenge a regular military service during wartime. In any event, the bill became law in July, forcing the disbanding of most Naval Militia forces. Thereafter, only those militiamen who were also members of the national naval reserve could receive federal drill pay. Some naval militiamen, however, refused to accept the legitimacy of this measure. After the war, they successfully lobbied Congress for a law which kept the Naval Militia alive. This measure, which
was passed in June 1920, guaranteed the integrity of those Naval Militia units in the six states where it had survived. Nevertheless, the earlier breakup of the Naval Militia had permanently crippled the organization. In fact, if not in theory, the Naval Reserve constituted the regular Navy's front line reserve at the beginning of the 1920s.

The Naval Reserve, like its Army counterparts, did not escape the cuts imposed by a series of economy-minded Congresses in the early 1920s. In 1921, Congress reduced Naval Reserve appropriations from $12 million to $7 million. This cut forced the Navy Department to disenroll or transfer 25,000 reserve officers and suspend payments to 200,000 enlisted men. Despite these reductions, the Navy successfully reorganized and delineated specific authority in its Naval Reserve Division. It staffed this division with more reserve officers and streamlined reserve administration. As a result, morale in the Naval Reserve picked up noticeably in the mid-1920s. The problems caused by the 1921 cutbacks, however, convinced the Navy Department that new legislation was needed. By late 1924, a special board appointed to draft legislation had submitted its recommendations, the Naval Reserve Act of 1925, became law. It provided for more liberal promotion for reserve officers and made it easier to transfer enlisted men to the reserves. The act also obligated every regular Navy
enlistee to a four year stint in the reserves. Most important, it divided the Naval Reserve into three subunits: The Fleet Reserve, The Merchant Marine Reserve, and the Volunteer Naval Reserve. The first subunit, which would receive most of the training pay, was the most important. Its role was to provide trained units for shipboard service in wartime. The latter two forces were to supply individuals for such duties, either onshore or off, as the Navy might direct.

The passage of the NRA of 1925 contributed significantly to the overall improvement which the Naval Reserve underwent in the late 1920s. Congressional appropriations remained meager, but unlike the Army Organized Reserves, insufficient funds did notcripple the Naval Reserve. In 1926, further improvements in the reserve officer promotion system were made. In addition, the Navy established six NROTC units. In 1932, the Navy General Board approved mobilization plans which called for significant Naval Reserve participation in the event of war. The onset of the depression, however, had led to further reductions in Navy Department appropriations and proportionately higher cuts in Naval Reserve funds. These moves resulted in a rise of bad feeling between regular and reserve officers and frequent attacks on the Navy in Congress. Some reserve officers claimed that new legislation was necessary, but Congress was too busy with
other issues to respond to their demands.

Eventually, the bitterness between reserve and regular officers died down. In 1938, the two groups cooperated in the drafting of a new reserve bill which embodied several recommendations made by reserve officers to Congress in 1935. This measure provided for the appointment of a flag rank officer to head the Naval Reserve Division, a statutory Reserve Force Policy Board, and a revised reserve officer promotion system (the running mate system). It also called for systematic increases in reserve strength and more extensive training for the Merchant Marine and Volunteer Reserve. Finally, it reorganized the reserve into four groups: The Fleet Reserve, The Organized Reserves, The Merchant Marine Reserve, and the Volunteer Reserve. The new reserve bill, referred to as the Naval Reserve Act of 1938, passed Congress with relative ease. It provided the essential machinery for the expansion in the Naval Reserve which occurred in 1939-1940. Upon the outbreak of war in Europe, any Naval Reservist who so desired was ordered to active duty, and less than two years later, in May 1941, the entire reserve was called up.

One striking characteristic of the above summary of naval reserve policy, as compared with that of the Army, is its brevity. By 1938, Navy department planners had formulated a simple and relatively efficient reserve structure. The process of developing it, moreover, was
comparatively straightforward and noncontroversial. An important reason for the lack of sustained debate in the formulation of naval reserve policy was the absence of a large and politically influential Naval Militia. A few state based units still existed on the eve of World War II, but they commanded none of the funds or political influence of their Army counterparts. Naval reserve policy thus lacked the distinct dualism which had characterized Army reserve policy since at least 1920. This factor, however, does not account for all the differences between the two services' reserve systems up to World War II. Another key distinction concerns reserve procurement and organization. The Naval Reserve, with the exception of certain Volunteer Reserve units, was essentially a pool of furloughed officers and men from the regular Navy. The Army, of course, could not commit itself solely to one policy in this regard. Some Army officers sought to model their reserve organized into tactical units and procured by some form of UMT. Here again, Army reserve policy was characterized by a sense of dualism, if not schizophrenia. Finally, the Navy proved far more energetic than the Army in streamlining the administration of the reserves and in providing an effective reserve officer promotion system. At the beginning of World War II, the Army had no promotion policy for its reserve officers and had failed to secure inactive duty training pay for any of its reservists. Still, one should not be too
hard on the Army. If the Naval Reserve of 1941 was a more efficient organization than its army counterpart, part of the reason lies in the fact that the Navy did not need as large or as organized a reserve as the land forces. And of course, the Navy never had to provide a place in its mobilization plans for a reserve force over which they had less than total financial and jurisdictional control.

Reserve Policy 1943-1955: The Players and the Issues

Before discussing some of the key participants in the post-World War II reserve policy debate, it would be worthwhile to recall the environment in which this debate occurred. The 1945-55 period witnessed several significant changes in American military policy. Among them were the shift to a nuclear strategy, the maintenance of large standing forces abroad, and the reorganization of the nation's defense establishment. These events, combined with the formation of NATO and the rise of the Soviet threat, placed great pressures on reserve policy-makers. Another total war, requiring mass mobilization of reserves, seemed possible at a time when the Army and Navy's attention was focused on their active forces and overseas duties. Even more troubling was the Truman administration's decision to limit defense expenditures to no more than $13-15 billion per year until 1950. Given the expanded size and responsibilities of the post-war Army and Navy, and the emergence of an independent Air Force, this sum was
inadequate. The result was heightened inter-service rivalry and rigorous cost-cutting in programs which were not directly related to the services' post-war missions. All reserve programs, especially those of the Army, bore a disproportionate share of these cuts. The task of reserve policy-makers was not made any easier by the nation's precipitate demobilization and the public's desire to turn its back on all things military. Thus, at a time when the country expected larger and better organized reserves, it also limited the financial and moral resources allotted to their creation.

Any public policy issue of great significance involves many actors or groups of actors, but for whatever reason, the post-World War II reserve policy debate involved an unusually large number of bureaucratic and political "players".

The Congress

As the summary of Army and Navy Reserve policy to 1941 makes clear, Congress considered itself, with some justification, as the dominant influence in reserve policy formulation. Since the turn of the century it had acted as the locus of debate on almost every key reserve policy issue and had taken the initiative on all important reserve legislation. And after World War II, when the executive branch and military had dominated policy, Congress was eager
to reassert its primacy in this area of military policy. The presence of several former National Guard and Reserve officers in Congress only reinforced this urge. The House of Representatives, inherently more sensitive than the Senate to grass roots political issues, signalled its intention to decide military reserve policy by forming, in 1949, a special subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee to deal exclusively with reserve issues. This subcommittee would play a key role in the passage of major reserve legislation in 1951, 1952, and 1955.

The Presidency

As the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the President had a significant theoretical role to play in the formulation of reserve policy. Unfortunately, the complexity of reserve issues themselves and the number of other difficult problems during these years meant that Presidents Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower all supported the concept of large reserves in a general sense, and the first two explicitly committed themselves to UMT. Whenever the President wanted to emphasize reserve policy, as Truman did in 1945-47 and Eisenhower in 1954-55, he was a formidable adversary. At other times, however, he usually gave blanket approval to the recommendations of his staff or the military, and delegated much reserve policy-related work to subordinates. But because all major staff and congressional action on reserve policy had to cross his desk, the role of
the President in this area should not be belittled.

The Military Services

The real architect of reserve policy in the executive branch was the military. It alone possessed the staff, the expertise, and the experience for sustained and detailed planning for the reserves. Not surprisingly, attitudes towards the reserves and procedures for formulating reserve policy differed widely from service to service, but we will discuss these in detail below. Just as important as their policy, formulation role was the services' administrative function. As the sole full-time managers, organizers and trainers of the reserves, the military could, and did, undermine or contradict policies promulgated by Congress, the President, or even itself. The vast size and complexity of the various reserve organizations made it difficult for all but the most informed and determined Congressman or White House staffer to detect and correct any failure on the part of the military to carry out established reserve policy.

The Secretary of Defense

Of increasing importance after 1950 was the office of the Secretary of Defense. The creation in 1949 of the Civilian Components Policy Board and the appointment in 1950 of an Assistant Secretary of Defense to monitor manpower and reserve policy gave the civilian head of the military
establishment the tools to expand his influence in and control over the formulation of overall reserve policy. The Secretary of Defense's influence was greatest when the four services disagreed over the details of a common reserve policy, as they did frequently. He could then choose which reserve policy alternatives he preferred. Indeed, the gradual, but unmistakeable drift towards a uniform military reserve policy in the early 1950s reflected the Secretary's vastly increased power in this area.

Other Agencies

In addition to these four key "players", a number of other executive branch agencies played significant roles in the reserve policy debate. Among them was the Selective Service System (SSS), headed by Army Major General Lewis B. Hershey. This office's importance arises from the fact that it would have served as the central procurement, induction, and registration agency for any UMT program. The SSS, in fact, made extensive plans for its role in running a UMT program throughout the 1945-48 period. In addition, General Hershey was one of the key figures in the Eisenhower Administration debate on the feasibility of running a draft and a UMT program simultaneously. Another important agency was the Bureau of the Budget (BoB). In carrying out President Truman's policy of capping defense expenditures at a certain, constant level, the Bureau was responsible for many of the major cuts in reserve program
appropriations throughout the period 1945-1955. Its influence, moreover, did not end there, for the Bureau also involved itself in the substance of reserve policy decisions by refusing to fund specific reserve programs. In doing so, this agency frequently violated the spirit, if not the letter of congressionally mandated reserve policy. Another organization worth noting was the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), which reached the peak of its influence in 1953-54. Under a shrewd and aggressive head, Arthur S. Flemming, the ODM went from being one of many executive branch agencies concerned with mobilization for war to being the coordinator and supervisor of all of them. In addition, it played a major role in formulating the National Reserve Plan of 1954, perhaps matching, if not exceeding, the contribution of the Department of Defense. Its influence, though, on the subsequent deliberation on the National Reserve Plan was minimal.

Reserve policy formulation in these years also involved two powerful reserve lobbying groups, the National Guard Association (NGA) and the Reserve Officers Association (ROA). The NGA, founded in 1879, formed the vanguard of the National Guard in Washington political battles. Headed by a series of energetic, able, and intensely partisan leaders from 1920 on, this organization exercised a virtual veto power over reserve legislation until after World War II. The NGA also possessed an uncanny ability to sense when
vital policy decisions affecting its interests were being made in the War Department or White House and to influence decisions made on this level. Its Organized Reserve equivalent, the ROA, was founded in 1922, partially on the suggestion of some congressmen who told several reserve officers that they would do better on Capitol Hill if they spoke as an association. The ROA started slowly, but by the late 1940s, it counted almost 100,000 reserve officers as members. As the only major organization representing the hundreds of thousands of reserve officers who had served during World War II, the ROA's influence in Congress increased considerably after the war. On narrow, pay-related issues, such as reserve retirement benefits and inactive training pay, it wielded much power in Congress.

The evolution of post-war reserve policy can best be understood in terms of three distinct themes. The first relates to the non-military aspects of reserve service. After World War II, many politicians and some military officers hoped to use Universal Military Training and the reserve service which followed to inculcate the virtues of physical fitness, discipline, respect for authority, and patriotism in the nation's youth. In their view, reserve policy transcended traditional military imperatives to include social and educational concerns. This concept of reserve service originated during the progressive era, but
it received its widest articulation in the late 1940s. After the Korean war, the place of non-military factors in the reserve policy debate diminished, but they continued to play a role as late as 1955.

The second theme concerns the increasingly active efforts on the part of the American military and its political masters to adapt reserve policies based on the concepts of mass warfare and wartime mobilization to the demands of a deterrence/limited war strategy. The contradiction between existing reserve policy and post-war strategic realities was only dimly perceived before 1950, but after the Korean War, the gap between the two was acknowledged by most, though not all, policy makers. During the first half of the 1950s, both the Congress and the executive branch sought to narrow this gap, but their efforts met with only mixed success.

Lastly, it was clear that each of the four military services possessed distinct and different reserve policy needs. These needs related to the substance and structure of each service's mission, as well as to its view of the nature of future conflict. The services' differed over five specific issues:

--The method of procuring manpower for the reserves.
--The organization of the civilian components.
--The place of the National Guard in reserve policy.
--The size of the reserve as compared with the size of
the active forces.

--The experience level of the reserves.

Many of the disagreements over these questions were eventually settled, but the services continued to espouse different views on the structure and purposes of the reserves.

These three themes hold the key to a full understanding of this nation's attempts to fully organize and find a proper role for both federal and state controlled reserve forces. In addition, this understanding can not be attained by focusing solely on congressional activity in this area. Congress did play a large role in creating a large reserve in the years 1943-1955, but its influence has been exaggerated. This dissertation will thus emphasize the contribution of other actors in the formulation of post-war reserve policy. National military reserve policy was expressed and refined not merely through legislation, but also through military and executive branch plans, programs, and management styles. Indeed, it is by focusing on activity in this area that we can best explore the themes described above and arrive at a more complete and balanced perspective on one of the most complex problems in modern American military policy.
FOOTNOTES

INTRODUCTION


4. Ibid., pp. 275-81.


6. Ibid., pp. 435-36.


9. Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy, pp. 443-44.


12. Ibid., pp. 175-78.
13. A check on Swomley's background confirms this supposition. He was a prominent member of a group formed to oppose UMT. (Source: Swomley's vita in his dissertation).


15. Ibid., pp. 458-62.


18. Ibid., pp. 112-13.


22. Ibid., pp. 274-78.


25. Ibid., p. 127.


33. Weigley, History, pp. 343-44.


35. Weigley, History, p. 345.

36. Ibid., pp. 345-46.


41. Samuel B. Young, Address to the Annual Convention of the Commandery in Chief of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, October 9, 1918, Samuel B. Young Papers, USAMHI Archives.

42. For more on the passage of this legislation, see John W. Chambers, "Conscripting for Colossus" in Peter Karsten, ed., The Military in America (New York: The Free Press, 1980).

43. Weigley, History, p. 358.

44. Samuel B. Young to General Enoch Crowder, December 14, 1917, Samuel B. Young Papers, USAMHI Archives.

46. Ibid., pp. 403-04.

47. Ibid., pp. 404-06.

48. Ibid., p. 413.


50. Holley, Citizen Soldiers, pp. 416-17.

51. Ibid., pp. 438-49.


53. Holley, Citizen Soldiers, pp. 460-61.

54. Ibid., pp. 471-72.

55. The National Defense Act of 1920 contained many other significant provisions beyond those noted here. See Weigley, History, pp. 399-400.


59. By 1939, some 327, 586 men had enrolled in the CMTCs since 1920. New York Times, MARCH 19, 1939, sec. III, p. 5. For a good account of life at a typical CMTC in the interwar period, see Daniel Doyle, Doyle Papers, USAMHI Archives.


62. Major Dwight D. Eisenhower to the Asst. Commandant, Army War College, March 15, 1928, Army War College Collection, USAMHI Archives. See also Captain Leslie J. McNair, "Synopsis of Committee Report on Reserve

63. Mahon, History of the Militia, pp. 174-75.

64. For more on the Organized Reserve Corps in the interwar period, see Harry Vaughan, Oral History, Truman Library, Independence, Mo., p. 22.

65. Of 22, 175 reserve officers who received 15 day tours of active duty in 1936, only 1 was a general and 218 colonels. See Jim Dan Hill, The Minute Man in War and Peace (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole & Co., 1964), pp. 348-51.

66. Ibid., p. 352.


70. Ibid., pp. 415-16.


77. Captain Maxwell D. Taylor to the Asst. Commandant. Army War College, November 8, 1939, Army War College Collection, USAMHI Archives.

78. Captain Robert Bacon to the Asst. Commandant, Army War College, November 8, 1939, Army War College Collection, USAMHI Archives.


81. Ibid., pp. 604-05.


83. See Weigley, *History*, pp. 427-443 for a good summary of these efforts.


86. Harold T. Wieand, "The History of the Development of the Naval Reserves" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pittsburg, 1951) is somewhat dated, but it remains virtually the only scholarly source on this subject.

87. Ibid., p. 96.

88. Ibid., pp. 97-99.

89. Ibid., pp. 149-52.

90. Ibid., pp. 151-52.

91. Ibid., pp. 171-72.

92. Ibid., pp. 193-98.

93. Ibid., pp. 205-06.

94. Ibid., pp. 231-33.

95. Ibid., pp. 287-90.

96. These so-called units of the Fleet Naval Reserve were actually more administrative than tactical in nature.

97. Among them were Senator Strom Thurmond, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, and Congressmen Charles Fletcher and Francis Case. See *Reserve Officer* (July 1947), pp. 14-15.
98. See Chapter VI for more on the Bureau of the Budget activities in this area.

99. See Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics*, for more on the political activities of the NGA.


101. See Levantrosser, *Congress and the Citizen Soldier*, chp. 1 & 2 for a detailed account of the ROA in Congress.
CHAPTER ONE

WARTIME PLANNING FOR POST-WAR ARMY RESERVE POLICY, 1943-1945

Serious and detailed planning for the post-war Army reserve began over two years before the end of World War II. By the middle of 1943, the War Department had created a special staff division, whose sole purpose was to develop and circulate plans for all elements of the post-war Army. General guidelines for the planners were published in the summer of 1944, and by the middle of the next year, key policies for both the National Guard and Organized Reserves had been formulated. The Army was thus better prepared for the transition to peacetime than it had been in 1919-1920. Unfortunately, the fact that so much of its post-war planning occurred during the war prevented planners from taking changed post-war military and political conditions into account. Notwithstanding this problem, the reserve policy debate of 1943-1945 not only determined the Army's immediate post-war reserve structure, but also foreshadowed the problems and controversies which reserve planners had to confront in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
Initial Planning: Summer 1942 to Summer 1944

For several weeks after Pearl Harbor, Brigadier General John McAuley Palmer languished in his Library of Congress office. Long range planning inevitably had become subordinate to the demands of the war. But Palmer's initial experience in mediating differences between regulars and National Guardsmen in the early winter of 1942 had convinced him that the problem of planning the organization of the post-war Army required more attention than it was receiving. In June, Palmer finally managed to discuss the problem with General Marshall. The latter agreed that long range planning was being neglected, and in late July, he created a Post-War Planning Board on the General Staff and appointed Palmer as its secretary for reserve and National Guard forces. Other members of the board included the heads of G-1, G-3, the head of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) and the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs (ERRA).

Palmer quickly took advantage of his enhanced status, which gave him an office in the War Department and greater access to the Army staff. In early July, he informed Congressman James Wadsworth, Jr. (R., N.Y.), who was then preparing a UMT bill, that he would like to submit it to the Post-War Planning Board for study. After further correspondence with the New York Congressman, Palmer formally urged Marshall to push for the immediate passage of a UMT act. If the War Department waited until the end
of the war to submit such a measure, Palmer argued, it would risk encountering an anti-U.M.T. reaction similar to that which had occurred in 1919-1920.

Palmer proceeded to draw up a more detailed U.M.T. plan which provided that all trainees from the program would join a federal reserve organized under the army clause of the Constitution. And finally, in February of 1943, Congressman Wadsworth and Senator Chan Gurney (R., S.D.) introduced U.M.T. bills in Congress. The two measures differed slightly from Palmer's plan; they called for U.M.T. trainees to enter either the National Guard or the Organized Reserves, as provided for in the National Defense Act of 1920. Despite this difference, the idea in which Palmer placed so much faith was again under consideration.

The Wadsworth-Gurney bill excited little interest in a Congress preoccupied by the war, but it did prompt a violent reaction from the National Guard Association of the United States. A few days after Wadsworth introduced the measure, Major General Milton A. Reckford, a prominent member of the NGA, urged Palmer to suggest to Wadsworth that any consideration of U.M.T. be put off until after the war. In a subsequent letter, Reckford warned Palmer that he could "shoot it full of holes" and promised that the NGA would not forget about the bill if it ever came close to passage. The Guard's objections to the Wadsworth U.M.T. bill probably centered around the fact that, unlike the Draft Act of 1940,
it provided no special incentive for trainees to enter the Guard rather than the Organized Reserves after training. Fortunately for the guard, the bill never got close to passage. It died quietly in committee later in the year.

Despite the failure of UMT legislation in early 1943, post-war planning in the War Department continued. Late in March, Colonel Boyer of ERRA sent General Palmer a long memorandum on the post-war organization of the reserve and ROTC. This document assumed the enactment of UMT with a provision for a mandatory period of reserve service afterwards. It also envisioned the creation of a single Army reserve component, solely under federal control. As both this memorandum and Palmer's earlier studies indicate, those regular Army officers who were thinking about the post-war reserve were contemplating fundamental changes in the nation's reserve structure. Palmer especially sought to use the power and prestige the Army possessed during the war to achieve reserve policy goals unfulfilled since 1920.

Early in 1943, Palmer and certain members of General Marshall's staff realized that the long-range planning organization created in July 1942 was inadequate. After several more months of staff studies and inconclusive buck-passing, Marshall ordered the formation of a new staff division, the Special Planning Division (SPD). Located on the War Department Special Staff, the SPD was to focus solely on the major issues in post-war Army organization.
The most important of these included defense organization and UMT. Heading the new division was Brigadier General William F. Tompkins, an old friend of Palmer.

Immediately after the creation of SPD, Tompkins asked the latter to sit in on the division's deliberations as an informal advisor. Later in the fall, the SPD chief strengthened Palmer's position further by making him a full fledged member.

Palmer's close relationship with Tompkins brought immediate benefits. Shortly before the SPD began its work, its chief invited Palmer to present his views on the question of post-war Army organization to the newly assigned staff officers of the division. In his address, Palmer repeated his earlier proposals to create a unified Army reserve organization stocked with the graduates of a UMT program. This force would be organized under the Army clause but be recruited on a territorial basis. The latter provision would not only allow a more rapid rate of mobilization, it would also make the overall proposal more acceptable to Congress. Palmer's ideas provoked little opposition from the SPD staff, but they did draw criticism from Brigadier General Miller G. White, the G-1 on the Army General Staff. White found Palmer's proposal to organized the Army reserve on a territorial basis unacceptable.

Instead, he proposed that all UMT graduates be placed in an unorganized pool, an arrangement which would facilitate the
selective call-up of individual reservists with the needed technical skills. To Palmer, this scheme recalled the Uptonian-like plans of General March and Pershing's GHQ AEF Staff, but he did agree to meet with White to discuss his views. And after a more formal presentation by General White, Palmer conceded that his own ideas on the territorial organization of a UMT based reserve were out of date. Tompkins too was convinced that White's proposal had merit. In early August, he sent Marshall a draft of a statement on post-war reserve policy which embodied White's ideas on the subject. The SPD chief stated in his cover letter that the "National Guard under a system of UMT, disappears." All graduates of the program would enter a reserve pool, and organized reserve units, under this scheme, would not exist in peacetime. The Chief of Staff's reaction to this memorandum, however, was less than enthusiastic. Marshall disliked the planners' assumption of a large regular Army and said so directly. In addition, he promised to take up the issue of reserve organization in person.

General White's criticisms of Palmer's proposals for a territorially based reserve forced Palmer to confront the problem of finding a role for the National Guard in the post-war Army. In December 1943, he reviewed the suggestions of Major General Hugh Drum, a National Guard officer, to preserve the existing dual Army reserve
structure, but Palmer ultimately rejected them. He then attempted to work up his own scheme for the preservation of the National Guard as a federal reserve force, but concluded that it would be difficult to fit the Guard as traditionally organized into a single Army reserve structure. Palmer, however, at least confronted this question. Most SPD planners, following the line set forth in Tompkin's memorandum to Marshall, did not even admit that there was a problem in this area. One staffer did urge that the National Guard be brought into the planning process for UMT and a single reserve, but even he accepted the basic policy.

Another subject of dispute within the Army staff at this time concerned the creation of a large enlisted reserve force. In early January of 1944, a member of the G-1 division warned a colleague that the formation of a large enlisted reserve, with its attendant high costs, might threaten prospects for UMT. This officer proposed a reserve composed solely of officers commissioned under standards higher than those which presently existed. It is not clear whether he had an organized or unorganized enlisted reserve in mind (probably the former), but his other comments suggest that he was opposed to any type of peacetime enlisted reserve force. The profusion of ideas like these throughout the War Department indicates that Palmer's influence on reserve policy making was slipping
noticeably by the early winter of 1944. Plans which he had fought against in 1918-1920 were cropping up once again.

Notwithstanding growing differences over the form and organization of the post-war Army reserve, almost everyone on the War Department General Staff agreed on the importance of UMT. That cause received a needed boost in January 1944 when Congressman Andrew May (D., KY.) introduced a second UMT bill in Congress. This measure called for the induction of all able-bodied youth into the military for one year's training followed by periodic refresher courses. Unlike the Wadsworth-Gurney Act, it did not specify any particular form of post-war National Guard or reserve organization.

Tompkins, hoping to rally all UMT supporters, including the National Guard, around this bill, set up a meeting with the American Legion in Washington to discuss the issue. However, the NGA, and its newly chosen president, Major General Ellard Walsh, was not yet prepared to offer the War Department unconditional support for UMT. In February, Walsh, with the help of Palmer, set up a conference between SPD, the NGA, and the National Guard Bureau to discuss not only the issue of UMT but the larger question of the guard's place in the post-war Army.

The conference, which lasted for two days, February 28-29, commenced on an acrimonious note. Palmer began by restating his view that the post-war National Guard should be organized under the army clause of the Constitution, but
this proposal met with violent objections from guard representatives. Walsh claimed that the problem with organizing the guard was not lack of legal authority, but the failure on the part of the Army to exercise it fully. Struck by these arguments, Palmer promised to look into the matter.

The central topic at the conference, however, concerned the place of the guard in the post-war Army. Tompkins refused to give guard representatives a straight answer regarding present SPD plans on this point, and blunt words ensued. Correctly suspecting that the guard's federal reserve role was in danger, Walsh announced that the NGA would only support UMT in Congress if it received a guarantee that the guard would retain its role as the Army's front line reserve. Walsh left no doubt in the Army representatives' minds that the NGA would sabotage UMT on Capitol Hill if it did receive the assurance it wanted. With this warning, Palmer, Tompkins, and the rest of the SPD staff returned to the War Department to rethink their policies.

By the middle of March, it was apparent that the Army-National Guard meeting of late February had precipitated a radical shift in SPD thinking on post-war military policy. In a subsequent report to the Chief of Staff, Tompkins argued that the NGA would be able to block congressional action on UMT if it was not satisfied as to the guard's
post-war reserve role. In closing, the SPD chief recommended that his division try to revitalize the Army's reserve structure by using the National Guard as presently constituted [my emphasis]. During the next few weeks, the SPD revised the original draft of its "Outline of a Post-War Military Establishment" to retain the National Guard. However, when the revised paper was circulated to the other staff agencies for comment, it encountered substantial criticism. Their objections did not focus so much on the new guard policy as on the plans for UMT trainees. G-1, as it had done in 1943, argued that the products of any training program should be placed in unorganized pools, not units. Peacetime organization of a UMT produced reserve was both expensive and purposeless. General Palmer, commenting on these criticisms, urged the rejection of G-1's plan. Furthermore, he argued that UMT trainees should not be trained by the regular Army, as G-1 had proposed, but by reserve officers. G-1, though, refused to budge. In April, when Tompkins asked it to produce cost estimates for an organized Enlisted Reserve Corps, G-1 responded that the country would not accept the costs or the punitive measures needed to create such a force. Despite these objections, Palmer and the SPD went on with their plans for an Army reserve organized in units that included the National Guard.
While the SPD and the War Department General Staff debated the issue of the organization of the post-war Army, Congress became involved in this question. In late March, the House of Representatives established a select committee on post-war military policy and named Representative Clifton Woodrum (D., Va.) as its head. The select committee, which also included Congressmen Andrew May and James Wadsworth as members, began its work quickly. Woodrum scheduled the first hearings for late April and May and requested General Palmer to sit in as an advisor to the group. Since several Army representatives were scheduled to appear, the Army staff prepared a general policy statement for use before the Committee. This document stated in part that the post-war Army and Air Force would consist of the regular establishment, one-year UMT trainees, the active reserve, the inactive reserve, and the National Guard. The policy statement did not specify any particular mission for the latter force (since this was still undecided), but it did designate the active reserve as the source for fillers for overseas forces and cadre expansion, replacements for combat losses, and for potential NCO and officer candidates. The fact that the regular Army staff would circulate a public policy statement it knew contradicted the plans of the War Department's long-range planning agency indicates both the strength of its convictions on this issue and the lack of
authority possessed by SPD in planning matters. Palmer and Tompkins could not have been pleased with the content of this paper, but because of the other weighty issues discussed at the hearings (such as service unification) the two officers did not attempt to rebut it before the committee. Indeed, because of the approaching elections, the chairman, though sympathetic to UMT, decided to shelve the issue until 1945.

The first stages of the War Department's effort to formulate a coherent post-war reserve policy focused almost exclusively on questions of organization and personnel procurement. The National Guard forced the abandonment of the regular Army's plans to merge it into a single federal reserve component, and the Army staff itself skirmished over the organization issue. UMT, an idea with a long history, was resurrected as a means of providing manpower for the reserve. Long range planning in the War Department was off to an impressive start, especially when compared to 1919-1920, but two flaws in the planners' approach must be noted. First, little thought was given to building up a reserve by voluntary means alone, or even in combination with compulsion. Second, and more important, no War Department planner, Congressman, or National Guard officer, ever questioned the need for a large Army reserve in the post-war period. Given the history of Army reserve policy since the turn of the century and the difficulty of
anticipating post-war conditions during wartime, it is not surprising that this issue was not discussed at this time. But it would have to be confronted eventually.

The Planning Intensifies: Summer 1944 to Spring 1945

The period after the conclusion of the Woodrum Committee hearings saw major changes in the War Department's long-range planning organization. For some time Palmer had urged Tompkins to seek the reconstitution of the War Department Section Five committees on National Guard and Reserve policy. General Walsh had been clamoring for their reactivation also, and in early August, Tompkins agreed to request the reconstitution of the Committee on National Guard Policy. Two months later, he ordered the reactivation of the Committee on Reserve Policy and the joint National Guard-Reserve equivalent. Each of these committees consisted of equal numbers of guard or reserve officers and regular Army representatives. Under the supervision of SPD, they were to develop specific National Guard or reserve policies and circulate them to the general staff for comment and revision. The machinery for sustained and detailed policy formulation for the reserves was now in place. Moreover, the reestablishment of all three Section Five committees in their original form indicated that no fundamental changes in the Army's reserve structure (such as the abolition of the National Guard) would occur. Whatever innovations would emerge from the committees' deliberations,
the dual reserve system would remain.

Having helped improve the War Department's post-war planning organization, Palmer began work on a general statement of policy on the post-war Army. He was now convinced that the Army reserve should be organized into units, not pools. The general was less concerned as to whether the old National Guard or new Organized Reserves (or both) would constitute this organized reserve. Palmer was equally insistent on the need to promote reserve officers to field grade rank, a policy which many regulars opposed. After over a month's work, Palmer completed a memorandum embodying these ideas and forwarded it to General Marshall.

On August 25, the Chief of Staff directed the publication of Palmer's paper as an official statement of Army policy. This document, which was published as War Department Circular #347, discussed the various types of military organization from which America could choose, and concluded that a combination of a small regular Army and large citizen reserve best fitted the military needs and political traditions of the United States. Specifically, the circular assumed the enactment of UMT, which would provide manpower for a large, organized citizen reserve officered by civilian soldiers. This reserve would supply fully trained units to a regular professional army no larger than necessary to meet normal peacetime requirements. Marshall's decision to publish Palmer's paper without change
indicated his own strong belief in the type of system the latter had described, but it was far from clear just how strongly other elements in the War Department believed in them. This simple declaration of policy did not guarantee its implementation. The first step in this process was up to the Section Five Committees, which were about to begin their work.

The Committee on National Guard Policy, reconvened in late August. The key issue was the future status of the National Guard. The guard members on the committee still sought an explicit guarantee from the Army on the National Guard's post-war reserve role, and they succeeded in convincing the other members to address this issue first. In September, the committee proposed that the National Guard would again constitute an integral part of the Army's front line reserve. Its role would be to provide units for the expansion of the Army for service anywhere in the world. Both Marshall and Secretary of War Henry Stimson indicated preliminary approval of these ideas, but not all the War Department staff agreed. In mid-October, the Section Five Committee sought to draft a statement saying that the National Guard afforded the best means of providing a front line reserve, but one member refused to endorse such a statement. He argued that the strength of the National Guard should be determined not by M-day mobilization requirements, but by the needs of its state
mission. The federal government, in his view, should control the bulk of the Army's reserve components. The committee voted to draft the statement anyway, but the dissenting member's attitude toward the guard was not an isolated one.

Meanwhile, the Committee on Reserve Policy, which first met in October, began drafting a mission statement for the Organized Reserves, whose post-war reserve role was not yet clear. The chairman of this group, Brigadier General E.A. Evans, revealed some of the committee's ideas on this subject in a November memorandum to the Chief of Staff. In suggesting changes to an SPD paper on the post-war Army, Evans urged that insertion of a mission statement for the Organized Reserves. In his view, the Active Reserve (one part of the Organized Reserve Corps) would furnish units organized and trained in peacetime for deployment as part of a balanced force. It would also supply additional trained fillers for unit expansion. The Inactive Reserve would constitute a pool of individuals to be available as replacements for the Army of the United States (AUS). Two weeks later, Evans elaborated on his ideas for the organization and mission of the Organized Reserves. The Active Reserve of the ORC was to form one component of a balanced AUS of 4.5 million men. No ORC units would be larger than a division, and there would be three types of unit organization - full TO&E, full complement of officers
plus a cadre of enlisted men, and finally, units composed of
officers only. Active Reserve personnel not assigned to
units would constitute the reservoir of manpower needed for
expansion. Both Colonel Textor, second in command at SPD,
and General Palmer endorsed Evans' statement on the post-war
Organized Reserve Corps, and they recommended that Marshall
approve it as official Army policy. Before this could
occur, however, the regular staff divisions would have an
opportunity to review and critique the Section Five
Committee plan.

The General Staff reviewed the committee's statement
on the Organized Reserves in early December. Its response
was mixed. G-2 and G-4 posed no objections, but the
Personnel and Organization and Training sections (G-1 and
G-3), respectively, voiced strong criticism of the plan.
They argued that any UMT-fed reserve force should be
organized into "cadres" of replacements and fillers, not
organized units. The reserves should be organized into
tactical units after the outbreak of war, not before.
Both G-1 and G-3 refused to endorse the Section Five
Committee's plan unless these changes were made, but SPD
and the committee refused to budge. The deadlock over this
issue persisted until early January 1945. At that time,
General Marshall intervened and approved the original
Section Five Committee statement over the objections of the
dissenting staff divisions. The Palmerian concept of the
Army reserves had passed its first major obstacle on the road to full implementation.

Another issue of contention concerned the disposition of UMT trainees after their training had ended. In his various writings, Palmer had always assumed that UMT trainees would enter a federal reserve for a given period, but he never specified whether this assignment would be voluntary or compulsory. The official War Department statement on UMT, released in the early fall of 1944, declared that all UMT trainees would enter a general, non-training reserve for five to six years, but also offered them the option of joining the National Guard or Organized Reserve voluntarily. In early December, SPD issued a statement of policy on this subject which interpreted Palmer's use of the words "federal reserve" to mean the Organized Reserve. On seeing this statement, G-3 objected strongly, claiming that this policy would entail extensive record keeping and would make UMT trainees unavailable for the draft during their period of reserve service. It refused to concur in the SPD statement of policy if this particular provision were retained. Three months later G-3 repeated these same objections, this time to a similar clause in a UMT bill that Congressman Wadsworth was preparing. Although both the SPD statement of policy and Wadsworth retained the original enrollment clauses, G-3 views on this question remained unchanged. The real issue
in this dispute was the ultimate form of the Army's federal reserve force. G-3 and to a lesser extent, G-1, sought a large, unorganized pool of UMT trainees which they could employ in an Uptonian style mobilization. They did not want a large organized reserve, since this force would be a less flexible mobilization instrument, and they believed they could prevent the creation of a viable organized reserve by funneling UMT trainees away from it. On the other side, Palmer and the Section Five Committee saw UMT as the only source of manpower for their cherished organized reserve. Thus, even though Marshall had given his official approval to a mission statement which envisioned a federal reserve composed of units, the all-important question of what to do with UMT trainees remained unresolved. And as long as this was the case, the regular staff divisions could still sabotage the Section Five Committee's plans for an organized federal reserve.

As planning for the post-war reserve accelerated within the War Department during the fall and early winter of 1944, agencies and departments outside the military began to get involved in this process. Most of this outside activity concerned UMT and the effort to secure congressional approval for it. The immediate stimulus for the widening of interest in this issue was the submission of the joint Army-Navy plan for UMT to the Bureau of the Budget in early September. The head of the Bureau, Harold Smith,
immediately assigned several of his staff to conduct a
detailed study of the proposal with a view to determining
its suitability for the President's approval. Meanwhile,
Secretary of War Stimson began to assume a more active role
in the selling of UMT. In early November, he met with
several prominent labor leaders to discuss the subject. At
this meeting, Stimson argued that UMT provided the only
effective and democratic means of ensuring that the
military would have the trained manpower to fight future
wars. A few days later, at a cabinet meeting, the
President himself brought up the subject. Roosevelt was
thinking about endorsing some form of UMT and asked Stimson
for advice. The Secretary of War replied that the
President should support a bill which emphasized the
military aspects of UMT, a point labor leaders had made
during their meeting with Stimson. Roosevelt then
mentioned the possibility of sending Congress a message on
the subject, but Stimson urged him to reconsider, claiming
that too much publicity at this time might harm a UMT
bill's chances of passage. The Secretary of War may have
wanted to control the UMT campaign solely from the War
Department and was thus reluctant to let the President get
too involved in this issue. The Secretary's pleas,
however, were in vain. That same month, Roosevelt decided
to ignore Stimson's warnings and prepare a message on UMT
for submission to Congress in January.
At this point, in late December, Harold Smith reported to FDR on the results of his staff's review of the Army-Navy UMT proposal submitted in September. The Budget Director was less than enthusiastic about the plan. He argued that the military's UMT scheme, which called for one year's military training followed by six years service in a front line reserve failed to consider critical non-military aspects of the problem. It thus ran the risk of provoking a knee-jerk, anti-UMT reaction from educational and religious groups. Smith then pointed out those aspects of the scheme which could cause controversy. These included the length of the training, the age of induction, the content of the training, and the assumption that the nation needed the large reserves that UMT would produce. Smith asserted that the military's UMT plan would have to be recast before submission to Congress, and he recommended the creation of a Presidential committee to be composed of both civilian and military representatives to perform this task. He also believed that UMT would stand a better chance of passage if its specific features were formulated by a joint military-civilian group. Finally, Smith offered the services of the Budget Bureau in laying the ground work and providing staff support for the proposed committee. The Budget Director's sudden interest in UMT is perplexing, for his organization had little direct concern for or authority in military policy. The fact that the Bureau
opposed Wadsworth's first UMT bill in the spring of 1943, when the president was not interested in the idea, suggests that it viewed participation in a review of UMT only as a means of extending its influence in the military sphere.

Notwithstanding this criticism of the military's UMT plan, the War Department's campaign for the idea seemed to be going well as 1945 began. At this point, however, the demands of the war, which had previously exercised almost no influence over reserve policy planning, intervened. As a result of the unexpected reverses suffered in the Ardennes in December 1944, and a general shortage of ground combat troops, the War Department felt compelled to seek passage of a National Service Bill, which would provide for a draft of civilian as well as military manpower. On January 2, Stimson informed Roosevelt's aide Harry Hopkins, who was working on the President's speech on National Service and UMT, that the former measure was of more immediate importance. If any issue were to be postponed, it would have to be UMT. Hopkins agreed with Stimson's definition of priorities and promised to mention the matter to the President. Two days later, Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson echoed this line of argument to his staff and suggested that the Woodrum Committee hearings on UMT be postponed. Finally, on January 10, Congressman Wadsworth met with Stimson and Patterson and reluctantly agreed to postpone any action on UMT until they disposed of national
service. Unfortunately, all this activity on behalf of the National Service bill was in vain, for Congress rejected the measure in late March. Some writers have argued that the delay in action on UMT in the early winter of 1945 may have irretrievably set back the War Department's UMT campaign. They point out that by the time UMT hearings did take place in May and June, Roosevelt, who was just beginning to support the idea, had died. UMT proponents thus had to waste further time enlisting the support of the new President, Harry S. Truman. Moreover, by late spring, the inevitable post-war reaction against all things military had set in, thus dooming UMT in Congress. It is certain that the postponement of the Woodrum UMT hearings stripped the campaign of valuable momentum, but it is unlikely that Congress would have passed a measure so complex as UMT during the hectic days of the winter and spring of 1945. The postponement did ensure, however, that UMT would remain in suspense long after the war had ended. This uncertainty about UMT would have an enormous impact on post-war Army reserve policy.

Despite the temporary halt in the War Department's public efforts on behalf of UMT, the SPD and the Section Five Committees continued detailed planning for the post-war reserve throughout the winter and spring of 1945. In mid-January, after a clarification of staff procedures, the Committee on Reserve Policy submitted recommendations on
personnel procurement policies for the ORC. The committee's plan provided that officers were to come from three main sources: World War II veterans, ROTC units, and various Officer's Candidate School programs. Manpower for the Enlisted Reserve Corps would come almost exclusively from a UMT program. The committee viewed UMT as the sole source of enlisted men because it believed it was unlikely that World War II enlisted veterans would want to join the reserve in any great numbers. Later in the month, the committee submitted its plan for ORC training policies. In brief, these provided for both unit and individual training for members of the ORC, but they specified that wherever practicable, the training of the Active Reserve would be by units. In late January and early February, Tompkins circulated these two sets of recommendations to the other staff divisions for comment. Surprisingly, G-1 and G-3, as well as the other General Staff sections, approved them without debate. The SPD chief then forwarded the Section Five Committee plans to General Marshall, with the recommendation that they be approved as official statements of Army policy. In early March, the Chief of Staff followed SPD's suggestion and formally approved the committee's recommended policies.

The Section Five Committee on National Guard Policy, meanwhile, was also proceeding quickly with its work. In late January, Marshall formally approved a statement that
guaranteed that the Guard would continue to exist after the war and that it would constitute a front line reserve component organized and trained to furnish combat units for worldwide service. The committee also recommended that all National Guard units be maintained at 100 percent officer and 80 percent enlisted strength during peacetime. They also drafted policies covering officer and enlisted procurement (mostly voluntary with some UMT trainees), officer promotion, and the size of guard units. By the end of March, Marshall had approved all of the committee's recommendations.

After the formulation of the most important reserve policies, the planners turned their attention to some of the practical problems involved in creating a large reserve force. Early in the month, the Section Five Committee on Reserve Policy commissioned a poll of selected AUS officers and enlisted men to determine how many would volunteer for the Officers' and Enlisted Reserve Corps after the war. Its survey indicated that over 61 percent of all officers and 12 percent of all enlisted men would definitely join the Organized Reserves. Extrapolating from these findings, the committee predicted that 420,000 officers and at least 900,000 enlisted men would join the federal reserve component. These figures were encouraging, but viewed from a different perspective, they undercut the very foundation of the Army's post-war reserve policies. The
poll findings suggested that with a little work, voluntary methods could produce a reserve of over a million men. They thus cast substantial doubt on the Army's claim that UMT constituted the only means of building a large, trained reserve. By this time, however, UMT had become a virtual article of faith for most Army planners, and the idea of creating a reserve through voluntary methods alone was incomprehensible.

The defeat of the National Service Bill in late March permitted the removal of the War Department's self-imposed restraints on its efforts to secure UMT. The department's inter-divisional committee on UMT, which had been formed on Stimson's directive the previous December, stepped up its activities. It discussed ways to combat anti-UMT newspaper articles, supervised the publication of an Army-Navy brochure on the subject, and sponsored the writing of a book supporting UMT. The War Department's civilian heads also returned to the campaign. On April 4, Stimson met with Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal to discuss the subject. The latter expressed concern about the loss of momentum in the campaign and the buildup in the opposition to UMT, and he asked the Secretary of War whether he would be willing to fight for the program again. Stimson replied that he would be willing to work for UMT, but his choice of words suggest that his heart was not in it. Other UMT supporters, however, were as enthusiastic
as ever. James Wadsworth held several meetings with the leaders of the MTCA to coordinate strategy for the campaign and worked behind the scenes to lay the groundwork for the upcoming Woodrum Committee hearings. In early May, Chairman Woodrum announced that the long delayed session on UMT would begin on June 4. By this time, however, Roosevelt had died, an event which radically altered the political situation in the capital, especially with respect to UMT. No one was sure where his successor, Harry S. Truman, stood on the subject, and his arrival at the White House was certain to cause still more delay on the issue.

Despite these complications, much of the confusion and uncertainty surrounding post-war Army reserve organization had been cleared by by the spring of 1945. The National Guard had again reasserted its claim as the nation's front line reserve and had secured written guarantees concerning its mission and organization. At the same time, General Palmer and other supporters of an organized federal reserve had obtained the Chief of Staff's approval for policies providing for a UMT based Army reserve organized in units during peacetime. In addition, they had defeated various attempts to have graduates of UMT placed into a vast unorganized pool of individual reservists. But despite this progress, a number of problems remained. The most immediate of these concerned the fate of UMT. This program was no closer to realization in the spring of 1945 than it
had been the previous fall, yet it remained a central assumption of the Army reserve policies formulated in 1944-1945. Second, reserve planners could not be sure that their policies would be implemented even if UMT was instituted. Much of the Army staff remained dissatisfied with many elements of the officially approved reserve policies. The misgivings of these officers were not transitory; they reflected long held personal beliefs about the role of the Army reserve and the institutional self interest of certain staff divisions. Lastly, there was no discussion of the need for a large post-war Army reserve. Clearly, the existence of a long range planning structure for the reserves had not eliminated all problems in this area.

**Truman Arrives; Marshall Departs: Spring 1945 to Autumn 1945**

As noted above, President Roosevelt's death struck the pro-UMT forces particularly hard. After months of persistent and patient lobbying, they had finally convinced FDR to support UMT legislation early in 1945. All those efforts were now for naught, and UMT proponents had to begin again from scratch. The new President, moreover, remained something of a mystery. As an ex-Army Reserve and National Guard officer, Truman might be favorably disposed toward UMT, but no one could not take his support for the idea for granted. What ensued was a six week period in
which virtually all UMT proponents met with the new President to ascertain his real feelings on the subject. Barely a week after Truman took the oath of office, the Secretary of the Navy called to discuss the idea. The President told him that he supported the principle of the program but added that he wanted to study the matter further before giving final endorsement to any specific plan. In early May, General Marshall sent Truman a memorandum in which he outlined the broad structure of the post-war Army and underlined the vital importance of UMT to the civilian components. Admiral King arrived at the White House to discuss UMT on May 22, and he was followed on the 29th by the Secretary of War. At the latter meeting, Stimson told the President that FDR had just begun to support UMT before he died and suggested that he, Forrestal, King, and Marshall meet with Truman to discuss the future of UMT.

The results of this frenetic lobbying were mixed. At a press conference on June 1, Truman voiced unequivocal support for UMT, but he added that he had some views on it which did not agree with those of the military or the Congress. Three days later, at another press conference, the President was more specific. He reasserted his faith in UMT, but then proposed a totally new plan of military training. Instead of one full year of UMT as the military had proposed, Truman outlined a scheme in which every high
school graduate would take three months training every summer for four consecutive summers. The President also stressed the importance of providing technical training as a supplement to the trainee's military activities.

In late June, Truman expounded his views on UMT to Samuel Rosenman, his special counsel, and asked him to work them into a memorandum on the post-war Army and Navy. By the beginning of July, it was apparent that even though Truman favored UMT in general, he would not be bullied or cajoled into accepting the military's specific ideas on the subject. Indeed, the particular UMT scheme the President favored seemed calculated to distress the services. Truman was as much concerned about the social and educational benefits of UMT as he was about the military aspects, a position which had hampered past efforts to secure the program.

June also witnessed the opening of the Woodrum Committee hearings on UMT. Proponents hoped that these hearings would provide the prelude to serious congressional consideration of the program. General Palmer, who acted as the group's liaison with the War Department, attended virtually all committee sessions. In less than a month it heard testimony from more than one hundred witnesses, including Stimson, Forrestal, Marshall, King, and Eisenhower. Every one of the military witnesses agreed on the vital importance of UMT to the nation's military
structure. On June 19, the hearings concluded, and less
than three weeks later, the committee released its final
report. The result was highly favorable to the UMT
cause; the Woodrum Committee had concluded that the
nation's security depended on the existence of a small
regular Army supplemented by a trained reserve created by
some form of compulsory military training. Although six
out of the committee's 22 members refused to sign the final
report, Palmer and Marshall had reason to conclude from the
hearings that favorable congressional action on UMT was
closer than ever.

Roosevelt's death and the arrival of a President with
uncertain views on UMT had not affected the work of the
Section Five Committees in the War Department. By the end
of May, the Reserve Policy Committee had completed
deliberations on ORC administration policies, agreed on
qualifications for Reserve corps instructors, and begun an
age-in-grade study for reserve officers. Overshadowing
this progress, however, was a renewal of the December
dispute over the disposition of UMT trainees. On May 17,
Brigadier General Edward W. Smith, the head of ERRA wrote
to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Thomas
Handy, to discuss the continuing differences within the
General Staff over the question of the mandatory assignment
of UMT trainees to the Organized Reserve. In his
memorandum, Smith noted that he and General Evans supported
this policy while SPD, G-1 and G-3 opposed it. A week later, Tompkins, who was about to leave SPD, asked Evans to clarify his committee's position on this question. The SPD chief stressed that it was critical to settle it one way or another because the War Department would have to specify the disposition of UMT trainees before Congress would pass any UMT bill. The Section Five Committee, in response, stated that all training and service subsequent to UMT would be purely voluntary. But it also recommended that the Enlisted Reserve Corps be divided into two categories: one for those UMT trainees who had volunteered for more training, and one for those who had not. Individuals in category I would be assigned to drilling reserve units. Those UMT trainees in category II would have no peacetime obligation for reserve training or service, but they would be assigned to units for mobilization purposes.

General Staff reaction to the Section Five Committee's stand on this issue was hostile. The Operations and Plans Division (OPD), G-1, and G-3 all vigorously opposed the involuntary assignment of UMT trainees to units, claiming that it would create major administrative problems and present a false picture of the nation's reserve strength. These staff divisions undoubtedly saw this dispute as an opportunity to undercut the already approved reserve policies (especially those concerning mission and organization) which they had unsuccessfully opposed the
previous winter. If they managed to block the involuntary assignment of trainees to reserve units, then the Organized Reserves as a whole would be less able to supply large numbers of units on mobilization.

Despite the opposition of G-1, G-3, and OPD, the Section Five Committee refused to alter its position on this issue. Searching for a solution to the impasse, Tompkins suggested to Marshall that the War Department not assign UMT trainees to units in peacetime, but reserve the right to assign them voluntarily in an emergency. Responding for his chief, Handy rejected this suggestion and urged the approval of the original Section Five Committee recommendations. The debate, however, continued. G-3 eventually concurred with the committee's suggestions, but G-1 refused to follow suit. opposition.

At this point, in late August, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, who had been managing the War Department's UMT campaign, became involved in the debate. In a memorandum to Brigadier General Henry Hodes, Assistant Deputy Chief Staff, McCloy expressed concern that the committee's views on this question might suggest to some in Congress that UMT would involve military service as well as training. The Assistant Secretary of War preferred to wait until President Truman had expressed his views on UMT before any final War Department announcement regarding the assignment of trainees to units. Ten days later the head
of the department's Legislative Liaison Division wrote
McCloy to argue that the Section Five Committee proposals
did not deviate from the training only concept so important
to UMT. This officer conceded that it would be best to wait
for the President's UMT speech before publicly announcing
any policy. McCloy remained wary, though, and in early
September, he returned all the staff papers on this subject
with the suggestion that the committee reconsider its
position. The issue remained in abeyance throughout the
autumn, and by January 1946, it was clear that Congress was
not going to pass UMT legislation soon. Acknowledging that
the question was now moot, SPD placed all the material
relating to it in a suspense file and let the matter drop.
Notwithstanding the anti-climactic conclusion to this
controversy, the dispute between the Section Five Committee
and ERRA and the General Staff indicated real and
persistent differences within the War Department over
reserve policy. All participants desired a large reserve,
but Army planners disagreed on the degree of organization
and mission the reserve would have.

By mid-August, of course, the above debate had become
irrelevant to the immediate problem of creating a reserve.
Congress had not yet enacted UMT, and it would be fall
before it even addressed the issue. Meanwhile, the end of
hostilities in Europe and the Pacific meant that large
numbers of potential reservists were being discharged from
the Army. The World War II veteran constituted the only real source of trained manpower for the Organized Reserves for the foreseeable future. But beyond printing flyers encouraging all officer and enlisted veterans to join the reserves, the Army did little to encourage enlistment in the reserves. Planners had expected UMT to be in place by the end of the war and had made no detailed plans to procure men for the Enlisted Reserve Corps by voluntary means. After visiting several Army separation centers in late August, General Evans noted the problem of insufficient enlistment in the ERC and argued to General Smith that the problem lay in the lack of concrete information about the reserve. Smith was so alarmed at this situation that in early September, he recommended to the new head of SPD, Major General Raymond Porter, that the War Department transfer all separating enlisted men to a reserve component and not discharge them at all. Although the 1940 Draft Act contained the authority for such a move, Porter did not act on Smith's request.

Transferring every World War II enlisted veteran into the reserves lay beyond the administrative capabilities of an Army already burdened with major occupation duties. But the enlistment problems which Smith and Evans noted affected the future of the Organized Reserves. They constituted a grave yet only dimly perceived hurdle for reserve policy planners and greatly limited their future
policy options. The failure to plan for the failure of UMT meant that the Army was poorly prepared to make use of the only viable source of manpower for the Organized Reserves. But if it had attempted to encourage voluntary enlistment in the reserves, the Army would have undercut its case for UMT with Congress. And UMT remained on the War Department's legislative agenda in the fall of 1945. Reserve planners were thus trapped in the middle of a conflict between immediate needs and long range requirements.

Back in the White House, Presidential Counsel Samuel Rosenman spent June and July drafting Truman's statement on post-war military policy. Detailed to assist him was a young naval reserve officer from Missouri, Clark Clifford. The first version of the statement, completed at the end of June, provided for an Army organized reserve composed of UMT trainees and capable of furnishing both units and individuals for the expansion of the regular Army. The draft statement also outlined a UMT program in which the year's training was to be broken up into four approximately equal segments. After the initial four month training period, the trainee would have the option of continuing his training or joining the regular Army, ROTC, National Guard, or Organized Reserve. After circulating this version in the White House and interviewing some Army and Navy reserve planners, Clifford and Rosenman completed a second draft in
late July. There were no major changes from the first version, although the authors did specify that only the Organized Reserve, which was composed entirely of volunteers, would be organized in units. Rosenman and Clifford undoubtedly made this change to put the White House on record as being opposed to the involuntary assignment of UMT trainees to reserve units, a policy which these two politically astute individuals knew would cause trouble in Congress. The White House was thus unwittingly aligned with those forces in the War Department who opposed the above idea for quite different reasons. McCloy's subsequent unease about the Section Five Committee's support for this policy seems part of widespread civilian concern about anything which could soil the image of UMT on Capitol Hill.

While Rosenman and Clifford awaited comments on the second draft of the statement on post-war military policy, Truman announced to his staff that he would address Congress on UMT in late October. On August 22, George Elsey, Truman's administrative aide, asked Clifford to drop his work on the post-war policy statement and begin work on the President's speech. By the end of the month, Clifford had completed a first draft, but it was rejected as being too long and too specific. The speech went through four more revisions before Truman accepted it. Clifford's fifth and final version, completed in the middle of October, stressed
the importance of the military justification for UMT but also devoted much space to the moral, educational, and health dimensions of the program. In addition, the speech contained no reference to the four phase training program the President had favored. It simply suggested that able bodied males take a year of training, followed by service in the regular Army, National Guard, or Organized Reserves. Truman, who had been so insistent on the need to break up the year's training into four phases, now seemed less committed to the idea.

The President's uncertainty with respect to the specifics of his UMT plan was not accidental. It stemmed in large part from the objections posed to his four phase UMT plan by some of his cabinet and military advisors. On August 31, Truman had presented to his cabinet the memorandum on post-war military policy (which Clifford and Rosenman had prepared) which embodied the President's initial ideas on UMT. Most of the members present expressed general approval, but Secretary of the Navy Forrestal voiced doubts about the wisdom of breaking up the training period into so many short phases. At another cabinet meeting one week later, the latter restated his objections to the plan.

A few days later both Forrestal and Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson stated their objections to the four phase training program in writing. The misgivings of the
civilians heads of the military departments apparently influenced some of Truman's own staff as well. In early October, Rosenman told the President that he too believed that one uninterrupted year of military training was preferable to one broken up into four phases. Confronted with the opposition of one of his chief aides, as well as the doubts of some of his cabinet, Truman readily adopted Clifford's suggestion that in his speech, the President leave the precise form of UMT for Congress to decide.

On October 22, Truman appeared before Congress to formally request a military training program of one year's duration. He argued that such a program was essential to the proper development of a large citizen soldier reserve which would supply both units and individuals to the regular Army in an emergency. The President's speech received wide publicity in the newspapers and prompted an enthusiastic response from at least one Congressman, but the predominant reaction was indifference, if not hostility. With the war over, Congress was in no mood for further compulsory service, whatever its military justification. Even George Elsey, a member of the President's inner circle, saw little hope for UMT. One bright spot, however, was the fact that in November, the House Military Affairs Committee was scheduled to hold hearings on UMT prior to framing a bill to put before the full House. Still, prospects for quick congressional
approval for the program looked slim.

The Military Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives began hearings in the first week of November. But in contrast to the Woodrum Committee, which numbered many active UMT supporters as members, this body contained proportionately more Southern and rural representatives, who as a group were hostile to UMT. Despite this disadvantage, UMT proponents pressed their cause. Both service secretaries and military service chiefs appeared, and all gave it unqualified support, as did Representative Wadsworth. Despite the weight of administration and professional military opinion in support of UMT, the hearings also highlighted major differences within the military as to the program's ultimate purpose. One witness, a general officer on the War Department G-3 staff, testified that UMT would provide the manpower for a general reserve of trained individuals who would be drafted singly in an emergency and then organized into units. The fact that a prominent member of the General Staff made public statements which openly contradicted official Army reserve policy suggests the extent of opposition to that policy. In addition, the committee hearings afforded many anti-UMT groups a chance to air their views, which they did at length. Complicating the situation further was the American Legion's recent endorsement of a watered-down four month version of UMT. By the time the hearings
concluded in early December, the committee members had become so confused on the issue that they voted not to submit a UMT bill to the full House. UMT seemed dead for the foreseeable future.

November also marked the end of George C. Marshall's tenure as Army Chief of Staff and the arrival of his successor, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. As a protege of Marshall and a public supporter of UMT, the former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe appeared to be the ideal choice to ensure the full implementation of the Army Reserve policies formulated under Marshall.

In reality, Eisenhower was not the enthusiastic UMT advocate he appeared to be. In his "pro-UMT" letter to the Woodrum Committee the previous June, he had offered only general support for the principle of UMT. Significantly, Eisenhower did not once mention UMT in connection with the buildup of a large organized reserve. More revealing than this document is an exchange of letters between Marshall and Eisenhower two months before the latter took over as Chief of Staff. On September 20, Marshall wrote to his successor to relay his concern about the post-war Army plan the General Staff was going to use in an upcoming conference with the Navy. This scheme, which was authored by the General Staff, not Marshall's own office, envisioned a post-war Army of more than one million men. By contrast, the latter had wanted a much smaller force backed up by a
large, UMT-fed reserve. An Army of one million, Marshall argued, would require more money than Congress was willing to spend during peacetime and was strategically unnecessary. The Chief of Staff was also concerned that public presentation of this large army plan would impair Congress' confidence in the military and thus hamper the campaign for UMT. In addition, Marshall argued that the General Staff did not properly appreciate the potential of UMT or the severe budgetary limitations which Congress would impose on the military after the war. The Chief of Staff acknowledged that he was powerless to do anything about the situation since he was soon leaving this post, but he asked for Eisenhower's views on the subject. Marshall in effect was pleading for some reassurance from his successor that he would bring the General Staff into line and work for a smaller regular Army and UMT. He knew that military policy must not merely be declared, but must be implemented as well.

Eisenhower's response was superficially satisfying, but it also suggested future trouble for Marshall's policies. The incoming Chief of Staff reaffirmed his support for the ideas of defense unification and the principle of UMT, and echoed Marshall's views on the desired size of the post-war Army. He added, however, that he did not count temporary occupation forces in the 330,000 man force which Marshall had envisioned as the peacetime Army. More significantly,
Eisenhower stated that all UMT trainees should be turned over to the National Guard (voluntarily), and failed to mention the need for an organized federal reserve composed of UMT graduates. This statement, taken together with Eisenhower's letter to the Woodrum Committee, suggests that at the very least, the incoming Chief of Staff was only secondarily concerned with securing UMT and building up the civilian components. His main concern seemed to lie with the health of the active Army and its occupation duties. The arrival of a Chief of Staff with these priorities did not bode well for the full implementation of Marshall's reserve policies.

Conclusion

By the end of 1945, the Army had virtually completed the blueprints for both of its post-war reserve components, the National Guard and the Organized Reserve Corps. But before these plans could be translated into an effective working program, a number of hurdles would have to be overcome. The first of these was the failure to secure UMT, which placed Army reserve planners in a difficult situation. When the war ended suddenly in August 1945, UMT had not yet been enacted, and the Army had to man the Organized Reserve Corps with returning World War II veterans, all of whom joined voluntarily. The reserve policies which existed were based on the existence of UMT and hence ill suited to the character of the reserve being
built up. But UMT remained official Army policy, which limited the planners' ability to adjust reserve policies to the post-war environment.

Complicating the efforts to secure UMT was the fact that in 1944-45, this idea had once again become linked to broader non-military concerns about the state of nation's physical and moral health. President Truman himself had outlined a UMT plan which emphasized educational and social benefits as much as military imperatives. Army leaders correctly realized that national security constituted the only logical justification for such a program, but they were powerless to prevent a widening of the UMT debate.

Left unmentioned in the deliberations over reserve policy was the problem of implementation and administration. Not withstanding the failure to secure UMT, it was uncertain whether the manpower the reserves possessed would be organized and trained as the official policies directed; the staff agencies which had argued against forming reserve units in 1943-45, G-1 and G-3, were the very agencies responsible for implementing the post-war reserve policies. Also undiscussed was the size of the post-war Army reserve and the strategic rationale for this force. Planners assumed that any future war would be total and require the mobilization of a mass reserve. This assumption, though rarely articulated openly, would drive reserve planning and administration for much of the
immediate post-war period. Clearly, the task of the Army reserve planner had only just begun.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER ONE


9. Same to same, February 26, 1943, PP, LOC.


17. Ibid., p. 641.


20. Memo, Col. Richardson to Col. Halverson, January 18, 1944, SPD, RG 165, NARS.


23. "Notes on Conference with National Guard Representatives," February 28, 1944, SPD, RG 165, NARS.


26. Memo, Col. Richardson to Brig. Gen. William F. Tompkins, April 22, 1944, PP, LOC.


28. "Statement for use by War Department Representatives appearing before the House Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy," April 18, 1944, PP, LOC.


31. Same to same, September 30, 1944, SPD, RG 165, NARS.


33. War Department Circular # 347, reproduced in ibid., pp. 659-60.


35. "Record of Discussion at Meeting of Section Five Committee on Reserve and National Guard Affairs," October 18, 1944, PP, LOC.


37. Same to same, November 20, 1944, SPD, RG 165, NARS.


41. Memo, Col. Ponter to Brig. Gen. Tompkins, December 11, 1944, Files of the the Organization and Training Division (G-3), RG 165, NARS.

42. Memo, Col. Irvine to Special Planning Division, December 30, 1944, G-3, RG 165, NARS.

43. Henry L. Stimson, Diary, November 10, 1944, Papers of Henry L. Stimson, LOC.

44. Ibid.

45. "Summary of Meeting of War Department Inter-Divisional UMT Committee," December 16, 1944, SPD, RG 165, NARS.
46. Memo, Harold Smith to Franklin D. Roosevelt, December 1944, UMT File, Papers of George Elsey, TL.

47. Henry L. Stimson, Diary, May 10, 1943, Papers of Henry L. Stimson, LOC.


49. Henry L. Stimson, Diary, January 2, 1945, Papers of Henry L. Stimson, LOC.

50. Robert Patterson to Henry Stimson, January 4, 1945, Papers of Robert Patterson (PatP), LOC.

51. James Wadsworth, Diary, January 10, 1945, Papers of James Wadsworth, LOC.


53. These changes in staff procedures confirmed SPD's dominance of the post-war planning process. In addition they gave the special staff divisions, such as the National Guard Bureau and ERRA an equal voice in planning with the General Staff divisions (G-1, G-2, G-3, etc.). Memo, Brig. Gen. E.A. Evans to SPD, January 17, 1945, SPD, RG 165, NARS.


56. Memo, Brig. Gen. William F. Tompkins to Assistant Chiefs of Staff, January 24, 1945 and same to same, February 7, 1945, SPD, RG 165, NARS.

57. Memo, Col. Textor to Gen. George C. Marshall, March 5, 1945, SPD, RG 165, NARS.


59. Memo, Brig. Gen. E.A. Evans to SPD, April 7, 1945, SPD, RG 165, NARS.
60. Butressing this attitude was the Army's experience with the ERC during the inter-war period. In these years, voluntary recruiting produced an enlisted reserve of barely 5000 men. See Introduction, pp. 33-40.

61. Memo, "Meetings of the War Department Committee on UMT," February 17, 1945 and same, March 31, 1945, SPD, RG 165, NARS.

62. Henry L. Stimson, Diary, April 4, 1945, Papers of Henry L. Stimson, LOC.


65. Appointment Notes, May 22, 1945, Papers of Eban Ayers, TL.


67. Record of Press Conference, June 1, 1945, Papers of Eban Ayers, TL.

68. Record of Press Conference, June 4, 1945, Papers of Eban Ayers, TL.

69. Notes on UMT, August 24, 1945, Papers of George Elsey, TL.

70. James Wadsworth, Diary, July 5, 1945, Papers of James Wadsworth Papers, LOC.

71. Holley, Palmer, pp. 682-83.


75. Memo, Col. Holden to Gen. George C. Marshall, June 1, 1945, SPD, RG 165, NARS.
76. Memo, Col. Boyer to General Staff Representatives, June 6, 1945, SPD, RG 165, NARS.


78. War Department, "Summary of Policy Deliberations on Involuntary Assignment of UMT Trainees to Reserve Units," June 30, 1945, SPD, RG 165, NARS.

79. John J. McCloy to Brig. Gen. Henry Hodes, August 20, 1945, SPD, RG 165, NARS.

80. Gen. Milton Persons to John J. McCloy, August 31, 1945, SPD, RG 165, NARS.


82. War Department, Publicity Material for the Organized Reserve Corps, July 4, 1945, SPD, RG 165, NARS.


85. First Draft of Statement on Post-War Military Policy, September 26, 1945, Papers of Samuel I. Rosenman, TL.

86. Samuel I. Rosenman to Harry S. Truman, July 20, 1945. Papers of Samuel I. Rosenman, TL.


88. Notes on UMT, August 24, 1945, Papers of George Elsey Papers, TL.

89. Fifth Draft of Speech on UMT, October 16, 1945, UMT File, Papers of Clark Clifford, TL.

90. Holley implies that the SPD Division, in a special briefing paper on UMT sent to Truman, turned the President around on this issue. But the timing of this message (it was sent to the White House before the first cabinet meeting on UMT, when Truman still favored his original plan), suggests that it had less of an impact than cabinet and staff opposition.
91. Records of Cabinet Meeting, August 31, 1945, Papers of Thomas Connally, TL.

92. Records of Cabinet Meeting, September 7, 1945, Papers of Thomas Connally, TL.

93. James Forrestal to Harry S. Truman, September 17, 1945, Papers of Samuel I. Rosenman, TL; Robert Patterson to Harry S. Truman, September 21, 1945, Official File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, TL.

94. Samuel I. Rosenman to Harry S. Truman, October 9, 1945, Papers of George Elsey, TL.

95. Cong. Overton Brooks to Harry S. Truman, November 1, 1945, Official File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, TL.

96. Notes on UMT, September 4, 1945 and September 20, 1945, Papers of George Elsey, TL.


101. General Marshall envisioned a regular Army (including the Army Air Forces) of 330,000 men in addition to the National Guard, Organized Reserves and 630,000 UMT trainees. For more on the conflict between Marshall and the Army General Staff over the size of the post-war army, see Sherry, Preparing for the Next War, pp. 102-08.


CHAPTER TWO

THE ARMY RESERVE PROGRAM TAKES SHAPE,
1945-1947

Despite continuing uncertainty as to the fate of UMT and increasingly severe budgetary restrictions, Army administrators decided to implement their post-war reserve policies during the summer of 1946. Although certain aspects were amended even as they were being implemented, the essential elements of these policies (which were published in October 1945) remained unchanged. Complicating the task of reserve planners and administrators in the immediate post-war years were the fiscal and personnel requirements of an undermanned regular Army burdened with major overseas occupation duties. Concerned with meeting the immediate needs of the active forces, the War Department neglected both short and long-term reserve requirements. Reserve planners themselves had difficulty bringing long-term policies into synch with the realities of the reserve program in the field. Thus, although the trained manpower for the reserves existed, the Army would have trouble recruiting and organizing them into a coherent reserve force. As the post-war period began, it
was clear that the Army reserve program would have
difficulty living up to the expectations generated for it
during the war.

Retreat on UMT, Controversy over Reserve Units:
December 1945 to June 1946

Many Army officers, including General Palmer, who
remained as an advisor in the War Department, hoped that
1946 would see an revival of the drive for UMT. But they
were to be disappointed in this hope. Not only would both
the White House and War Department refuse to push for the
program in early 1946, they also began to question its
value to the Army and the nation. The first public hint of
the President's changed attitude toward UMT came in his
State of the Union address for 1946. In his speech, Truman
spoke at length about the manpower problems of the regular
services, but he failed to mention UMT. This omission
was intentional, for it reflected a conscious decision by
the White House to downplay the issue. Two weeks before
delivering the State of the Union speech, the President
told Budget Director Harold Smith that he [Truman] did not
really have military training in mind when he had advocated
the principle of compulsory training for the nation's
youth. Distressed at the number of men rejected by the
wartime draft because of physical disability, Truman viewed
UMT mainly as a means of improving the nation's physical
and moral health. But it was not the most pressing item
on the President's agenda, and Truman saw no reason to pursue the issue now.

The President's ambivalence on UMT was echoed by the civilian heads of the War Department. In late January, the new Under-Secretary of War, Kenneth Royall, discussed the department's future position on UMT in a memorandum to Robert Patterson, the new Secretary of War. Royall described the regular Army's current recruiting problems and argued that the extension of the draft act was the most important item on the Army's legislative agenda. Accordingly, he urged that the Department publicly announce that it was deferring consideration of UMT until the matter of extending the draft was resolved. Patterson, a long-time supporter of UMT, did not lose all faith in the idea, but he did not question either Royall's logic or his assumptions. As a result, efforts to secure UMT ceased.

More worrying to UMT advocates than these developments, however, was the fact that top military leaders were beginning to question the idea. In mid-December 1945, just after taking office, General Eisenhower attended a presentation of the SPD's revised report on the Army's post-war strength. In commenting on the report, the new Chief of Staff asserted that it would be more acceptable to him if it contained a provision for Universal Military Service, rather than for Universal Military Training. He admitted, though, that the former
was not politically possible. Eisenhower also asked the briefing officer whether the money to be spent on UMT (approximately $3 billion per year) might be better used to create a larger and better trained National Guard. The Chief of Staff's doubts about the continued high place of UMT in Army planning were evident.

Eisenhower's feelings toward UMT were revealed openly in an exchange of memoranda with General Palmer in the late winter of 1946. In January, the Chief of Staff informed Palmer that there was a real probability that the Army would not receive all the funds it needed in the future. He noted the high cost of UMT and asked Palmer's help in formulating alternative manpower procurement methods. The latter responded that it would be foolish to drop UMT now. He repeated an earlier recommendation to appoint a national civilian panel to study the issue and urged Eisenhower not to give up on UMT. Palmer did not discuss any alternative ways to build up the reserves. One month later, Eisenhower returned his original memorandum to Palmer with instructions that he should address the problem of building up an adequate reserve without UMT. The Chief of Staff also refused to act on the latter's recommendation for a UMT commission and concurred with an SPD suggestion that the War Department concentrate on the goal of service unification without distracting Congress with UMT proposals.

In mid-March, Palmer replied to his chief's note. Once
again, he claimed that he could make no useful
recommendations as to how modify War Department plans for
the post-war Army. If the large cuts Eisenhower mentioned
in his first note actually occurred, causing the failure of
UMT, then a voluntary program should be offered. Palmer
continued to insist, however, that UMT was essential to the
full implementation of the Army's reserve policies. The
old general's inability to rethink UMT reflected in
microcosm one key flaw in the original post-war reserve
policies: their rigid reliance on a single, untested means
of manpower procurement. After this exchange, Palmer
realized that his ideas on UMT and the reserves were not in
keeping with the new War Department line, and he knew that
he would have to continue the fight from outside the
department. Thus, in April, he requested to be relieved
from active duty, a request which the Chief of Staff
quickly granted. Palmer's departure from the War
Department confirmed that UMT was no longer a high priority
for the Army. Faced with a shortage of funds and manpower
deficiencies, the regular Army did not have the time nor
the inclination to emphasize reserve policy issues.

While top civilian and military officials debated the
fate of UMT and other reserve policies, the Organized
Reserve Corps continued to grow, albeit in an unbalanced
fashion. At the end of 1945, the ERC numbered some 113,600
men, although most of these soldiers were not assigned to
any unit. Officers, of course, continued to join the ORC at a much greater rate. One ERRA staff member reported that at one Army separation center, approximately 60 percent of the eligible officers joined the reserves, while only six to ten percent of the enlisted men did so. At another separation center, only two percent of the latter group joined up. By the end of March 1946, the Officers Reserve Corps numbered over 325,000, while its enlisted reserve equivalent contained less than 300,000 men. The actual composition of the Organized Reserve Corps threatened to make a mockery of the Army's unit organization plans for the reserves. A preliminary General Staff reserve troop basis plan, published in January, had envisioned a total of 766,000 reservists organized in units, 640,000 of whom would be placed in the most highly organized class of unit (Class A). But there were clearly too many officers and too few enlisted men to implement these plans properly. The distribution of personnel within the Organized Reserves mandated either a drastic revision of the reserve troop basis, or the recruitment of more enlisted men and fewer officers.

Another important issue at this time was the organization of combat units in the Organized Reserve Corps. In March, this problem became the subject of a major dispute involving the Army, the National Guard Association, and the White House. It began with the arrival of a letter
from the NGA at the War Department protesting the Army's plans to create Class A-2 (combat) units in the Organized Reserves. This message precipitated a major debate within the General Staff on the wisdom of these plans. The Legislative Liaison division and the SPD supported the guard's objections while G-3 opposed them. The matter remained unresolved until the Office of the Chief of Staff intervened and directed that reserve combat units would not be formed. However, a reserve officer on the General Staff saw this directive and reported it promptly to Harry Vaughan, the President's military aide and a Major General in the ORC. The latter told Truman about the problem and subsequently informed Eisenhower directly that "the President thinks that there is no use having a reserve without Class A-2 reserve units." Vaughan's letter forced the General Staff to review the entire subject again. After some debate, they agreed to recommend to Eisenhower that reserve combat units would be organized, but added that, due to expected budget restrictions, full readiness of those units was not to be expected. The General Staff also suggested establishing a training time differential in favor of the guard to compensate it for the lack of attractiveness of its state mission.

Faced with the unanimous advice of the General Staff, Eisenhower decided to reverse his initial decision on the organization of A-2 reserve units. In a letter to the
President, he acknowledged that this issue had caused some controversy but stated that he had authorized the creation of the reserve units in question. The fact that a subordinate actually signed this letter and the length of time required for a response (three weeks) suggests that the Chief of Staff decided to follow the President's "suggestion" to create the combat units only reluctantly. Moreover, it was unclear to what extent financial limitations and personnel shortages would affect the organization of these formations.

Less contentious, but perhaps as important as the decision to organize A-2 reserve units, were a series of organizational changes in the War Department's long-range planning structure during the winter and spring 1946. The reorganization began in February, when Major General Raymond Porter, the head of SPD, proposed to the Deputy Chief of Staff a reduction in status (from full-time to part-time) for all three Section Five Committees. Brigadier General E.A. Evans, head of the Reserve Policy Committee opposed this recommendation on the grounds that it would limit the time the committees would actually sit, thus reducing their input into the policy process. His objections, however, fell on deaf ears. At the end of March, Eisenhower approved Porter's recommendations.

As result of this action, one of the few organizations within the General Staff which consistently supported the
unit concept of the reserves was to meet only on the call of the Secretary of War. In the future, the committees' duties would be limited to commenting on reserve policies formulated by the regular General Staff divisions; they no longer had the authority to propose policies of their own. Also in late February, a General Staff representative informed ERRA, the other prominent supporter of the original reserve policies, that its primary peacetime function would be to promote and maintain understanding between the War Department, the regular Army, and the Organized Reserves. Under no circumstances should the ERRA undertake any detailed review or formulation of ORC plans and policies. The most important organizational change, however, occurred in May. In the middle of the month, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff Hodes ordered the early dissolution of the SPD. Responsibility for monitoring further action on or approving new policies for the Organized Reserves would rest with G-3. Henceforth, the staff agency which had been so hostile to the idea of a peacetime organized reserve would control reserve policy formulation and administration. Enhancing its future influence was the fact that its former equals in reserve policy making during the war, ERRA and the Section Five Committees, had been stripped of their policy making duties.

One of the most pressing issues which this new planning structure had to face was the question of inactive duty
training pay for the Organized Reserves. Both the National Guard and the Organized Naval Reserve were authorized to receive such pay, but the ORC enjoyed no such benefit. Army reserve planners quickly realized, however, that the creation of a viable organized reserve was impossible without some provision for training pay, especially since UMT remained in suspense. In April, ERRA began lobbying the regular staff divisions in support of the idea, which would require congressional authorization. ERRA proposed to pay reservists on the basis of completing a prescribed training programs, rather than for attendance at a given number of drills. Such a plan would maintain individual reserve readiness at a high level. Surprisingly, G-3 and the other regular staff divisions agreed to this scheme.

In June, a bill providing for inactive duty training pay for the Organized Reserves was introduced in Congress, but it died in committee. Both Congress and the President were determined to cut taxes and keep a lid on military spending, thus dooming the measure. In addition, the Bureau of the Budget refused to give its approval for the bill until the Army and the Navy had worked out uniform provisions for the authorization of inactive duty training pay. The summer also witnessed the defeat of a bill to provide non-disability retirement benefits for the Organized Reserves. Notwithstanding the defeat of this measure and the training pay bill, the fact that they
were introduced at all reflected the military's and Congress' realization that, for the time being, they would have to build up the Organized Reserve through voluntary means alone. In this effort, training pay and retirement benefits for the reserve were essential. The Army continued to assume enactment of a compulsory procurement program (UMT), but it was in fact laying the foundations for a voluntary reserve system.

Back in the War Department, Army officials were making final preparation for the implementation of the reserve policies published in October 1945. In late May, Secretary of War Patterson directed that responsibility for administering all reserve personnel in the field be assigned to the six continental Army commands. Early in June, G-1 distributed specific guidelines concerning the activation administration and staffing of reserve units. A few days later, the War Department formally directed each of the six Army area commanding generals to begin activating all authorized reserve units under their jurisdiction.

Initial plans called for equipping all "A" class units on a Class "B" and "C" basis until July 1, 1947, when it was expected that more money and equipment would become available. The decision to begin activating units in the summer of 1946 was encouraging, but the system of reserve administration the Army devised seemed calculated to cause problems. By leaving control of the process of unit
activation in the hands of the six local commanding generals, each of whom had varying degrees of interest in and commitment to the reserve program, the War Department virtually guaranteed uneven and inconsistent implementation of its reserve policies.

The initial post-war period in reserve policy witnessed the beginnings of a painful, but perhaps necessary adjustment of plans and assumptions relating to the civilian components. As was the case with other areas of Army policy, wartime reserve plans did not fit the realities of the post-war era. By late 1945, it was obvious that UMT would not be enacted soon, and that, in any case, it was necessary for the Army to concentrate on the extension of the draft. As a result, Eisenhower and the General Staff focused on other problems. Unfortunately, they took few concrete steps to make Army reserve policy less dependent on UMT. The War Department did realize the need for incentives for voluntary enlistment in the reserved, but neither the President nor the Congress provided any support for these measures. It was also clear that, under Eisenhower, the War Department intended to deemphasize those policies which provided for the creation of a large organized reserve. This move represented, in part, a recognition of post-war realities, although it also conformed well to many officers' traditional notions about reserve organization.
Activation of Units, Further Alterations to Reserve Policy:  
June 1946 to December 1946

The activation of reserve units in the field began on July 1st, 1946. The vast majority of units activated were of battalion size or smaller, and all were initially organized in "C" status (officers only). Naturally, the surplus of officers caused problems. Since only a small percentage could be assigned to units, something would have to be done for the rest. The Army's solution was to create what were called composite units. These formations, though not part of the reserve troop basis, provided an organizational and social focal point for surplus reserve officers of all branches. These units would bring member officers together for monthly meetings and lectures, thus maintaining the interest of the large number of reserve officers not assigned to units.

Shortages of funds and equipment caused problems everywhere, but most damaging to the unit activation process was the insufficient number of regular Army instructors assigned to the reserves. As late as the middle of September, the 7th Army commander reported that none of the authorized instructors to the units in his area had yet been assigned. By December, only 7 out of 28 had actually arrived. War Department officials acknowledged that the instructor shortage was creating real problems for the Organized Reserves (and the National Guard), but they added that no immediate improvement in the situation was likely.
By the end of the year, it was obvious that the Army had not been prepared to implement its reserve policies. The Organized Reserve Corps thus had a long way to go before it would be ready to fulfil its stated mission—the production of fully trained units and individuals.

Not all of the problems experienced during the activation of reserve units were attributable to poor Army planning or management. In particular, the increasingly large cuts in military appropriations, which caused many difficulties for reserve planners and administrators, were the product of decisions made elsewhere. In early August, for example, President Truman told the Secretary of War that because of higher than expected inflation and a large budget deficit, he would have to cut $1 billion from current Army outlays and keep future expenditures to around $8 billion total. As a result of these cuts, the War Department Budget Advisory Committee, which was detailed to prescribe reductions in specific programs, directed that all class "A" reserve units would henceforth train at the "B" unit level. Although this directive had no immediate practical effect, since no "A" units yet existed, it did not augur well for the future of the reserve program. In November, both the Secretary of War and Army Chief of Staff told ERRA, which was responsible for drafting the ORC budget, that estimates for the Organized Reserves for FY 1948 were not to exceed $150,000,000. Although the budget cuts affected all parts
of the Army, Truman's economizing struck the ORC particularly hard, coming just when it was struggling to organize.

Another problem for Army reserve planners at this time concerned the creation of ORC combat units, a subject which had supposedly been settled in April. The National Guard did not consider the subject closed, however. Many Guard officers still believed that class A-2 reserve units would compete with the National Guard for manpower. In June, Major General Milton Reckford, President of the Adjutant Generals Association refused to support the inactive duty training pay bill then pending in Congress because it provided pay for trainees in reserve combat units. In response, G-3 suggested that the War Department delay activation of all A-2 reserve units until July 1, 1948, thus giving the guard a head start in the recruitment of men for its own combat units. The other General Staff divisions quickly agreed, and the organization and training division included a directive to this effect in its July guidelines for the organization of ORC units. When Reckford and the National Guard demanded more explicit and permanent guarantees on this issue, the head of ERRA responded that there was no reason for major policy changes in this area, because ORC units could not then secure enough enlisted men or equipment to advance to "A" status. Guard representatives were not satisfied,
however; they continued to press the War Department on this issue, and in November, the Army agreed to modify the official War Department policies on the National Guard and Organized Reserves in accordance with the guard's demands. The new policies provided that the regular Army and the National Guard would constitute the M-day force to be mobilized on the outbreak of war. The ORC would provide that force with only those units which the other two components could not provide, and would be allowed to form "A" class combat units only if the National Guard proved unable to organize such units. Finally, the new policies stipulated that priority in funds and equipment would go to those units which made up the M-day force.

Although they had little immediate impact on the unit activation process, the revised policies would have serious consequences for the future. Not only did the revisions discourage the formation of reserve combat units, they also ensured that "B" and "C" class units would receive a minimum of training time and equipment. Moreover, since all of the existing reserve units were in these two classes, it seemed unlikely that any reserve unit could progress to "A" status in the near future. The result would be an Army reserve composed almost entirely of unorganized individuals, a concept which the War Department had supposedly rejected in 1943-1945.
If the events of the fall were disheartening to those who favored the unit concept, there was good news on another front—the rebirth of the UMT campaign. This development involved two separate occurrences: the revision of the War Department's plan for UMT and President Truman's decision to appoint a civilian commission to study the idea. Within the War Department, all public lobbying for UMT had ceased after the November 1945 hearings in the House on the subject. Patterson and Eisenhower had then focused their efforts on securing the extension of the Selective Service Act, which was due to expire at the end of March 1946. The Army justified its request for extension by arguing that without the draft, it would be 330,000 men short of its manpower goals by 1948. The issue of draft extension precipitated a lively congressional debate on the merits of compulsory manpower procurement measures, but at the end of June, Congress agreed to extend the Selective Service Act to March 31, 1947. Although the final version of the extension bill exempted 18 year olds and contained more liberal deferment provisions than the Army had wanted, Congress gave the latter essentially what it had asked for.

The decision to concentrate on getting the draft extended and to cease public lobbying for UMT had not, however, put a halt to all discussion of the idea within the War Department General Staff. By late March, the SPD had produced a new plan for UMT which closely resembled the
scheme the American Legion had proposed in November 1945. It provided for one year's training divided into two parts: an initial six months of basic military training followed by any one of a number of options for additional service or training. These included completing the last six months of UMT, entering a service academy, enlisting in the regular Army, National Guard, or Organized Reserves, or entering the ERC and taking ROTC or technical courses.

Because of the department's absorption in the draft issue, the new UMT plan elicited little official comment. But SPD and G-3 continued to plan for the implementation of UMT throughout the spring and summer. In late July, Secretary of War Patterson became convinced that it was now time to renew the drive for UMT. When he finally announced the War Department's new UMT plan in late September, it contained virtually all of the features of the scheme SPD had worked out in March--six months initial training to be followed by one of a series of options for additional training, service, or schooling. An additional step in the War Department's revived campaign for UMT was the formation of an experimental UMT unit at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Its purpose was to demonstrate to civilian and military skeptics that UMT could provide well-trained young men for the reserves while safeguarding the social, psychological and moral health of the trainees. The War Department now recognized that UMT would never be enacted
without substantial civilian support; its revised plan thus contained concessions to the civilian point of view on UMT.

The other element in the reborn UMT campaign, Truman's decision to create a civilian commission on UMT, also originated with the Secretary of War. Shortly after he had announced the War Department's revised UMT plan, Patterson urged Truman to appoint a civilian commission to assess the need for UMT and to make appropriate changes in the military's UMT plans. Late in October, the President agreed to do so, and on November 20, the White House formally issued invitations to the nine individuals chosen by Truman and Patterson to sit on the commission. They included Karl Compton, who was invited to be chairman, Joseph E. Davies, Harold Dodds, Truman Gibson, Jr., Daniel Polling, Anna Rosenberg, Samuel I. Rosenman, Edmund A. Walsh, and Charles Wilson. By late November, all eight had agreed to join the commission. When the names of these individuals were made public, some critics charged that Truman had stacked the commission with individuals predisposed toward UMT. There was some truth in this view, but it would not be accurate to describe the UMT commission as a rubber stamp for Truman's views on the subject. Shortly before Compton accepted the invitation to join the commission, he told the President that although he believed in the principle of UMT, he could not endorse it if it cost too much.
Truman publicly announced the creation of the Compton Commission shortly before Christmas. His introductory remarks to the group were brief, but highly revealing. In explaining the commission's task and his own ideas on the subject, Truman emphasized the moral and educational benefits of UMT and softpedaled the military dimension of the program. The President's concept of UMT was most clearly reflected in the group's formal title: The President's Commission on Universal Training (not Universal Military Training). In addition, there were limits to Truman's commitment to UMT. Just two days before announcing the creation of the commission, he told Budget Bureau representatives that he wanted UMT, but added that he would be willing to accept a limit on UMT expenditures for the next few years. The President was prepared to join the War Department in a second campaign for UMT, but the extent and character of his allegiance to the idea were different. He was not willing to fund it on a scale which would increase the budget deficit, and he preferred to emphasize the collateral civic and educational benefits of UMT rather than the central military one.

While the White House and the War Department geared up for a second attempt to secure UMT, the activation of reserve units continued at a steady, if slow, pace. At the end of the year, ERRA estimated that 656 reserve units had been activated since June. All but a fraction of this
number, though, consisted of officers only. The overall strength of the Organized Corps at this time had grown to 460,000 officers and 570,000 enlisted men. These numbers seemed impressive, but their significance was mitigated by the fact that over 90 percent of the officer total and close to 100 percent of the enlisted men were unassigned. Some reserve officers warned, moreover, that the Army would lose many of these men, especially in the enlisted ranks, if more reserve units were not activated and authorized. Placing more reservists in units would at least allow the War Department to secure their addresses and maintain interest in the program. Even more troubling than the number of unassigned reservists was the absence of any War Department plan to offer reserve unit training before FY 1948. The other Army reserve component, the National Guard, was, if anything, in worse shape at the end of the year. The Guard was authorized to receive federal drill pay, but the progress of unit reactivation and reorganization was slow. In December 1946, the National Guard numbered a mere 26,200 officers and men. The War Department's decision to give the guard priority in the formation of combat units might encourage future recruiting, but it had done nothing to improve its current condition.

Many of the problems confronting reserve planners, especially those in the area of funding, were not the fault
of the Army, but of Congress. That body had the opportunity in 1946 to pass legislation providing for inactive duty training pay and non-disability retirement for reservists, but neither of these measures came close to passage. More generally, it could have insisted on higher levels of funding for the ORC, but it did not. At a time when everyone seemed eager to cut taxes and reduce spending, congressional interest in the reserves, long a favored program, seemed non-existent.

Despite the above difficulties, it would have been premature to declare the Army's reserve policies a failure at the end of 1946. Many problems, such as the absence of UMT and spending limitations, lay beyond the control of the War Department. In addition, other flaws in army reserve policies became manifest only after implementation had begun. In particular, it was clear that it would be impossible to fully organize the ORC, notwithstanding the fact that many Army officers had long preferred the pool concept. The rebirth of the UMT campaign represented good news for proponents of the unit idea, but the administration's emphasis on non-military considerations was unsettling to many UMT advocates in the military. In any case, it had become increasingly clear that the critical challenge for Army reserve planners lay not in recruiting sufficient manpower, but in securing sufficient funds, organizing units, and defining a mission.
The Second Campaign for UMT: January 1947 to September 1947

Truman's special vision of UMT did not mean that his initial commitment to the idea was less enthusiastic than the military's. In his State of the Union speech for 1947, the President asserted that the development of a trained citizen reserve was vital to the nation's security and added that UMT constituted the best way to accomplish this goal. A short time later, the President asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to write a letter endorsing the principle of UMT to the Compton commission.

In January, the latter began work. One of its first actions was to request staff assistance from the Bureau of the Budget team which had prepared the original assessment of the first Army-Navy UMT plan in the fall of 1944. The Commission then began the laborious process of soliciting testimony from all groups and individuals, both pro and con, who had an interest in UMT. Army and Navy representatives testified at length, but they did not dominate the hearings. Other government agencies, such as the Bureau of the Budget and Office of Selective Service Records, and many private organizations offered their views as well. All told, over 200 people appeared before or consulted with the Commission.

In addition to working directly with the Compton Commission, the War Department undertook its own separate campaign for UMT. Much of this work involved narrowing the
gap between its own UMT plan and the schemes of other groups, such as the American Legion. In late January, War Department officials met with representatives of the Legion, the National Guard, the Reserve Officers Association, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars in an attempt to secure support for the Army's UMT plan. Unfortunately, the American Legion refused to endorse the latter's scheme. At the next meeting of the Army War Council, Patterson and his colleagues decided that the introduction of a bill embodying the War Department's UMT proposals would only confuse and divide UMT proponents on the Hill. The Legion had convinced one Congressman to introduce a measure containing their plan containing their plan for UMT, and the introduction of a similar but not identical bill could only hurt the cause of UMT. The renewal of the campaign for UMT, however, did not mean that all doubts about the program had eased. Eisenhower, for example, still wondered how UMT could ever be implemented given the limited manpower and tight budgets of the War Department. Even Patterson, a long-time supporter of UMT, expressed skepticism about the program's chances for passage in the current Congress. These doubts might have contributed to his subsequent decision not to submit an Army UMT bill to Congress. In any event, the War Department would have to wait until the release of the Compton Commission's report, expected in April, before making any further moves.
Meanwhile, the President had to make a decision on the further extension of the Selective Service Act. The measure was due to expire at the end of March, and most of his advisers counselled against renewal. Since the middle of 1946, voluntary enlistments in the Army had been higher than expected, and no inductions had in fact occurred since October. James Wadsworth, co-author of the Selective Service Act of 1940, told General Palmer in January that the present high rate of enlistments in the Army negated the need to extend the draft. Few people were thus surprised when, in late February, Truman announced that he would not seek extension of the draft. The President may have hoped that with the draft no longer in effect, the way would be cleared for UMT. This reasoning, however, worked both ways. One could also argue that if the nation was unwilling to accept compulsion for the procurement of men for the active Army, which was the nation's first line of defense, then it would hardly be willing to accept a similar measure for the buildup of the reserves, which were clearly not as important to the nation's security. In any event, the Selective Service and Training Act expired for good on March 31, 1947, forcing the Army to rely solely on volunteers for the first time in almost seven years.

The appointment of the Compton Commission and the expiration of the draft had little immediate impact on the operation of Army reserve policy, but the first half of 1947
did see a noticeable acceleration in the rate of reserve unit activation. In March, Brigadier General Edward S. Bres, head of ERRA, reported that 2500 out of 8364 authorized reserve units had been created since June 1946. In May, the figure stood at 3500 units, but only 65 of these were class "B" formations. Unfortunately, no one in the War Department could determine how many of the 1.1 million men in the ORC were actually enrolled in units. There was, however, some potential good news concerning recruitment in the ERC. In early April, G-3 proposed to extend the period during which returning veterans could join the enlisted reserve to December 31, 1947 and to allow non-prior service individuals to join the ERC beginning in the summer of 1947. G-3 justified the latter move as a means of aiding the expansion of class "A" reserve units. G-3's suggestions were referred to G-1 for further study, but no one on the General Staff seemed opposed to either proposal.

Despite these hopeful signs, outside criticism of the Army's handling of its reserve program increased significantly during the first part of 1947. The NGA continued to berate the War Department for its failure to supply the guard with sufficient equipment and its overall anti-guard bias, but these charges were hardly new. More unsettling was the volume and tone of the criticism from the ROA. Some reserve officers claimed that the regular Army
wanted to sabotage the Organized Reserves, and almost all complained about the poor management and inadequate funding for the unit activation program. These complaints were not new, but their volume was unsettling. Moreover, it was likely that Congress, the traditional ally of the reservist would soon respond to the reservists' protests.

This rising chorus of dissatisfaction with the Army reserve program may have precipitated a meeting of the Army's top leadership to discuss the future of the civilian components program. Attendees at this conference, which was held in the middle of May, included Eisenhower, Lt. Gen. Thomas Handy, Lt. Gen. J. Lawton Collins (soon to be Deputy Chief of Staff), Maj. Gen. Henry P. McClain, and the heads of all General Staff divisions. The conferees first discussed the continuing friction between the National Guard and the Organized Reserve Corps. General Walsh of the NGA had recently predicted an open break between the two civilian components, and the War Department was undecided what action, if any, it should take to prevent such a break. Eisenhower stated that the department should not get involved in this struggle at all, a rather curious comment considering that some War Department policies were partially responsible for the trouble.

Another topic of discussion concerned the future of the National Guard. General McClain, who was the War Department liaison with the Compton Commission, was concerned that the
group might ask him for an opinion on this question, and he was not sure how he should respond. Eisenhower declared that there was no possibility of altering the guard's dual status in the future, regardless of the military desirability of a change. Generals Hailsip and Hall, however, indicated that they did not consider this question settled. The meeting broke up without any agreement on major changes in reserve policy. Most officers, including Eisenhower, seemed willing to let some sort of Presidential Commission address some of the more pressing problems in reserve policy, but no one seemed eager to take the initiative on this proposal. Distracted by other pressing issues and divided on key questions, the Army leadership sought to postpone hard decisions on the future of the reserves.

While the War Department pondered its next move, the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training continued their work. In mid-April, regular Army representatives testified at length before the Commission. They first described the planned post-war military establishment—a regular Army of 875,000, a 723,000 man National Guard, and Organized Reserve Corps of 876,000. UMT was vital to this scheme, they argued, for it would provide the trained manpower to build up both civilian components. Without the program, the entire reserve troops basis would have to be revised drastically. The guard and ORC would
number only 350,000 and 375,000, respectively, and the latter would consist of just class "C" divisions. Only astronomically higher appropriations could fully compensate for the absence of UMT, the Army claimed, but more money was a virtual impossibility.

Virtually all other administration testimony was favorable to UMT, with one exception: the Bureau of the Budget. Appearing before the Commission in April, Budget Director James Webb indicated that there would probably be little "fat" in future budgets to provide funds for UMT. He added that those deciding on whether to adopt it would have to compare UMT's cost and effectiveness with those of other alternatives. Webb never denigrated the program openly, but it was clear that he had doubts about whether the nation could afford it. In late May, the Commission finally completed its work, and on the 29th, it issued its final report, entitled *A Program for National Security*.

The Commission report contained good news for UMT proponents. The group concluded that a compulsory and universal program of military training constituted an essential element in an integrated program of national security. Other elements of this program included a united and informed nation, a coordinated intelligence service, better scientific research and development, industrial mobilization, a striking Air Force, the regular Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, and unification of the armed
In describing the benefits of UT, the Commission noted the moral, physical and educational advantages, but it emphasized the military payoffs. Interestingly, the report did not state that UT would directly help the National Guard and ORC, but that it would provide "a pool of young, physically fit and trained reserves who could be mobilized if a future crisis arose." The Commission thus essentially accepted the traditional military justification for UT; it assumed, as did the Army, that future mobilizations would follow the pattern established in 1917 and 1940-42. Nowhere in the report is any doubt expressed that large reserve forces were essential to the nation's security.

A Program for National Security also outlined a specific plan of UT. The scheme the Commission recommended was a virtual carbon copy of the War Department's revised UMT plan. It provided for six months basic military training followed by four additional training, service or schooling options. Finally, the report suggested that a civilian committee, not the military, administer UT. A Program for National Security was a model commission report. It presented a clear and unequivocal recommendation defended by widely accepted generalities and few specifics. The report was short on detailed analysis of the issue of procurement of manpower for a large reserve, and it was calculated to appeal to the widest possible audience. As
an instrument in the political fight for UT, the report was ideal; as a searching examination of all the issues and alternatives in manpower procurement for the reserves, it was not.

The release of the Commission's report led to a flurry of White House and congressional activity. Truman approved the public release of *A Program for National Security* in early June, and he promptly sent copies of it to Congress with the request to consider UMT at an early date. Despite the lateness of the session and the large amount of other pressing business, the House Armed Services Committee agreed to hold hearings on the issue. After three weeks of work, the Committee voted to report a UMT bill introduced by Representative Harry Towe (R., N.J.). In essence, this measure provided for the type of UMT favored by the War Department and Compton Commission. Despite this favorable action, however, the Towe Bill's chances of passage before the summer recess were slight. Many Congressmen had indicated that they wanted to test public sentiment on this issue before voting on it. Congress thus adjourned in late July without acting on UMT.

Despite funding problems and a continuing shortage of instructors, the activation of ORC units continued at a steady pace during the spring and summer of 1947. The longer the process went on, however, the more obvious the
flaws in the Army's administrative arrangements for the reserves became. By the end of May, major disparities in the percentage of units activated from one Army area to another had become evident. In one area over 41 percent of authorized units had been activated, but in another, the figure was less than 19 percent. The decision to place control of all reservists in the hands of the local Army commander had resulted in an uneven pace of unit activation, a fact which did nothing to improve the Army's image in the eyes of reservists.

Events in the summer and fall also confirmed the debilitation of the War Department Section Five Committees on National Guard and Reserve Policy. The three committees had met once in late 1946, but only to provide rubber stamp approval for policies formulated elsewhere. Their 1947 experience was no more worthwhile. The Secretary of War summoned them for three days of brief debate and policy approvals and then dismissed them. Just after their session had ended, G-1 received a staff proposal to create a federalized state guard force and forwarded it to Plans and Operations. This division, with the concurrence of G-3, returned the proposal to G-1 with the comment that it should not be submitted to the Section Five Committees until a regular General Staff position on the question had been developed. The manner in which the regular staff divisions handled this proposal indicates the extent to
which the Section Five Committees had been excluded from the reserve policy process.

Conclusion

The acceptance of *A Program for National Security* by the President must have heartened Army reserve planners. After two years of delay and inaction, the administration finally seemed prepared to push for enactment of UMT. The commission's report, however, also underlined two major problems with Army reserve policy. The first related to UMT itself. Though the Compton Commission duly emphasized military considerations, it also discussed the non-military benefits of the program at length. This fact indicated that the terms of the UMT debate had shifted away from the military dimension to embrace social and educational aspects as well. The grounds for opposition to UMT were thus broadened. The second difficulty concerned the report's blithe acceptance of the necessity for a large Army reserve. This assumption had stood unchallenged as the central, if unmentioned, pillar of Army reserve planning since 1943, but it was far from clear that future wars and future reserve needs would duplicate the 1941-1945 experience. At this time, it would have been difficult to define precisely the shape of future conflict, yet the absence of any recognition by the Army that the post-war era might be different from the past, and that its reserve policies might have to be altered, was revealing. Army
reserve planners thus faced major conceptual problems, in addition to the substantial practical hurdles relating to the actual implementation of existing reserve policies. Unfortunately, no one in Washington, either in the executive branch or Congress, offered them any help.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER TWO

1. Harry S. Truman, State of the Union Address, January 18, 1946, Papers of Clark Clifford, TL.

2. Harold D. Smith, Diary, January 4, 1946, Papers of Harold D. Smith Papers, TL.

3. Kenneth Royall to Robert Patterson, January 26, 1946, PatP, LOC.

4. Robert Patterson to John Davis, March 6, 1946, PatP, LOC.

5. Memorandum on the Presentation of the Revised Report of the Committee on the Post-War Strength of the Military Establishment, December 12, 1945, SPD, RG 165, NARS.


10. War Department, Survey of the Enlisted Reserve Corps, December 31, 1945, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.


17. War Department, Summary of Conference on the Formation of Class A-2 Reserve Units, April 5, 1946, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.


21. Memo, Col. Parks to ERRA, February 18, 1946, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.


23. Memo, Col. Rathbone to G-1, April 17, 1946, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

24. Memo, Appleby to Robert Patterson, July 1, 1946, P&O, RG 165, NARS.

25. Memo, G-1 to all Commanding Generals, May 24, 1946, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

26. Memo, G-1 to all Commanding Generals, June 1946, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

27. War Department, News Release on Activation of Reserve Units, December 26, 1946, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

28. Memo, Gen. Hall to Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, December 5, 1946, ERRA; RG 165, NARS.

29. War Department, Initial Report of Status of ORC Organization and Units, September 16, 1946, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.
30. Memo, Col. Laskowski to ERRA, December 13, 1946, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

31. Memo, G-1 to ERRA, November 21, 1946, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

32. Harry S. Truman to Robert Patterson, August 1, 1946, OF, TL.


34. Memo, Maj. Gen. Hall to ERRA, July 23, 1946, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.


37. Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy, pp. 44-54 contains a good account of the congressional debate over the extension of the draft in 1946.


39. In late July, an assistant told Patterson that certain influential newspaper editors felt that there was a dormant spirit for UMT which "could and should be aroused." Unnamed Assistant to Robert Patterson, July 31, 1946, PatP, LOC.


41. Ibid., p. 60.

42. Robert Patterson to Harry S. Truman, October 1, 1946. President's Secretary File, Papers of Harry S. Truman (PSF), TL.

43. Zeigler to Harry S. Truman, January 1, 1947, OF, TL.

44. Karl Compton to Harry S. Truman, November 26, 1946, OF, TL.

45. Henceforth, I will use the terms "Compton Commission" and the "President's Commission on Universal Training" (PACUT) interchangeably.
46. Letter on UMT, undated, Papers of George Elsey, TL.

47. War Department, News Release on Activation of Reserve Units, December 26, 1946, ERRA Files, RG 165, NARS.

48. Memo, Col. Cook to Col. Rathbone, December 16, 1946, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

49. Memo, National Guard Bureau to Gen. L. Norstad, December 12, 1946, P&O, RG 165, NARS.

50. Harry S. Truman, State of the Union address, January 17, 1947, Speech File, George Elsey Papers, TL.

51. Combined Chiefs of Staff to Karl Compton, January 17, 1947, Records of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, NARS.

52. Memo, James Webb to Ohly, January 22, 1947, Director's Files, Records of the Bureau of the Budget, RG 51, NARS.


54. Minutes of Army War Council Meeting, March 6, 1947, PatP, LOC.


56. Ibid.


58. James Wadsworth, Diary, January 30, 1947, Papers of James Wadsworth, LOC.


61. Memo, G-3 to G-1, April 2, 1947, Records of the Personnel Division (G-1), RG 165, Washington National Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Maryland.

62. Memo, Klein to Robert Patterson, March 5, 1947, PatP, LOC.
63. See for example, the editorial "Through Lack of a Plan," Reserve Officer, June 1947, p. 3.

64. Col. G. Lincoln, Memorandum for the Record, May 14, 1947, P&O, RG 165, NARS.


68. Ibid., pp. 90-91.

69. Ibid., pp. 92-93.

70. Ibid., pp. 79-80.

71. Ibid., pp. 94-95.


74. War Department, Table of Number of Reserve Units Activated, May 29, 1947, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

75. Memorandum for the Record, October 10, 1947, P&O, RG 165, NARS.
CHAPTER THREE

NAVY AND AAF RESERVE PLANS,
1943-1947

The experience of the Navy and Army Air Force reserve programs during the 1943-47 period stands in sharp contrast to that of the Army civilian components. Reserve planners in the former two services faced many of the same post-war problems as their Army counterparts—greatly expanded duties, budget cuts, and an apathetic public, but the extent and character of the Navy and Air Force's dependence on their reserve forces differed. Post-war planners for the Navy and the Air Force tended to emphasize the importance of large standing forces to the nation's security, and thus they were less concerned about building up large, organized reserves. Moreover, although both the Navy and the Army Air Forces endorsed the principle of UMT during the war, they were more cautious than the Army in making it the foundation of their post-war manpower plans. Finally, the sea and air services wished to maintain their image as volunteer organizations; they were thus reluctant to commit themselves to compulsory manpower procurement measures. Strongly influencing and sometimes determining
the formulation of Navy and AAF reserve policies was the former's fight against service unification and the latter's drive to secure service autonomy. Navy and Air Force plans for UMT and the reserves were often pawns in a larger bureaucratic chess game, a condition which was less characteristic of Army reserve policy. To understand the evolution of American post-war reserve policy, it is essential to first examine how the Navy and the Air Force perceived and handled their reserve policy problems before 1947.

Wartime Navy Planning for UMT and the Reserves, 1943-1945

Navy post-war planning differed from the Army's in both manner and content. For much of the war, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, devoted most of his time and energy to his duties as Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (COMINCH) and neglected the long range planning responsibilities associated with the CNO post. Moreover, there was no Navy equivalent of the Army's John McAuley Palmer to act as elder statesman and gadfly on long-term policy issues. As a result, the Navy did not begin serious post-war planning until 1943. Even after this had begun, it remained a secondary priority until the end of the war.

The first sign of official Navy Department interest in post-war planning came in the late spring of 1943. In June, Vice Admiral Frederick Horn, the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations, asked a retired Navy Admiral, C.C. Bloch, to set down some general suggestions concerning the shape of the post-war Navy. A few weeks later, Bloch replied. His paper recommended the maintenance of a large Navy that would be equally divided between the Atlantic and Pacific. Bloch's recommendations assumed that 1) the United States would assume the task of maintaining the peace in certain troubled areas of the post-war world, and 2) some form of compulsory military training would be enacted from which, along with other sources, the Navy would annually 200,000 to 300,000 men. The latter assumption is striking, for it indicates that at least some naval officers viewed UMT as the foundation of post-war Navy manpower procurement policies. Bloch's memorandum, however, envisaged that UMT would provide trained manpower for the active Navy, not the Naval reserves.

Bloch's paper apparently stirred little debate within the Navy Department, for there is no record of any official consideration of them. No other post-war planning activities occurred at the Navy Department until late July 1943. At that time, then Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson informed the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, that the War Department was preparing to establish a Special Planning Division that would conduct post-war planning for the Army. Knox turned the letter containing this news over to Admiral Horne, who subsequently forwarded
it to King with the recommendation that the Navy create a similar post-war planning agency.

In late August, the CNO formally approved this recommendation and directed the formation of a Special Planning Section (SPS), to be located in the office of the CNO. To head this new planning group, King chose a retired Admiral, H.E. Yarnell. There is no indication as to how many officers were appointed to the SPS, but the fact that it was described as "section" rather than a "division" suggests that it probably was smaller than the War Department's SPD. In addition, King's decision to locate it within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, rather than give it semi-autonomous status like the SPD, limited the SPS's freedom of action and the number of other Navy Department agencies it could deal with. In any event, the day after the issuance of the CNO's directive, Horne instructed the new head of SPS to develop some specific suggestions as to the size and shape of the post-war Navy and as to any legislation which might be needed to support them. Implicit in Horne's instructions was the idea that the post-war Navy would be large and that it would have to be concerned with events worldwide in maintaining U.S. security.

Yarnell began work quickly, and by the middle of September, he had completed a first draft of his recommendations. One week later, the finished piece was
ready, and Yarnell then distributed a limited number of copies to agencies within the Navy Department. In brief, his paper assumed a generally peaceful post-war world, but it added that the U.S. and its allies would be responsible for keeping the peace world-wide. It also assumed that Congress would be willing to pay for a large active Navy and would enact some form of compulsory military training. Yarnell's plans did not contain any explicit reference to the Naval Reserves, but given his advocacy of a large regular Navy, it seems likely that he did not envision a large role for the former.

Yarnell's paper, which in places was vague and contradictory, excited little enthusiasm within the Navy Department. Accordingly, in late November, Admiral Horne decided to take over the task of post-war planning. On the 17th, he issued a completely new planning document, "Navy Basic Demobilization Plan #1", which essentially superceded Yarnell's paper. Horne's plan contained several important changes from Yarnell's. First, it assumed a much greater degree of post-war political instability and more U.S. political involvement in Europe. As a result, Horne envisioned a much larger peacetime Navy than Yarnell had. In addition, the "Basic Demobilization Plan #1" did not assume the enactment of UMT. Horne's refusal to assume UMT may have sprung from two sources: 1) concern that its high costs would reduce funds otherwise available for
traditional Navy purposes and 2) a desire to maintain the
Navy's image as a volunteer service. Like Yarnell, Horne
did stress the importance of constant readiness, and he did
not mention the reserves at all. His elimination of the
assumption of UMT did not necessarily mean that there would
be no post-war Naval Reserve at all, but he probably
envisioned it being built up by voluntary means alone.
Still, the emphasis on instant readiness and the provision
for a large regular Navy suggests that neither the size nor
the mission of the post-war naval reserve would be at all
similar to those of the Army's reserve forces.

Horne's plan prompted much criticism when it was
finally circulated within the Navy Department in December,
but none of it related to the elimination of the assumption
of UMT or the provision for a large post-war Navy. One
senses that while some naval officers would have liked to
have some form of compulsory military training after the
war, the vast majority were either indifferent or believed
that it was not worth the high cost. That winter saw
several revisions and further comments upon "Navy Basic
Demobilization Plan #1", but no one questioned the absence
of UMT. In mid-January, however, outside pressure forced
the Navy Department to confront this subject openly. On the
14th, a member of a Presidential committee on post-war
military problems warned Under Secretary of the Navy
James Forrestal that unless the Navy began to cooperate
with the Army on certain post-war planning issues, it might be ordered to do so.

Partly as a result of this pressure, the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BuPers) held a conference with the Army's SPD to discuss UMT in mid-March 1944. The outcome was a set of common principles to be applied in connection with a program of UMT. The first of these stated that UMT was essential to the nation's security. The Army and Navy also agreed that the training should last for one year, after which the trainee would go into a reserve component for 4-6 years. Of the 800,000 total trainees expected annually, the Army would receive approximately 560,000 and the Navy 240,000. Given the prevailing Navy attitude toward UMT, it may seem surprising that BuPers agreed to such a document. In reality, however, BuPers endorsement of this statement meant little as far as the overall Navy Department's position was concerned. In the first place, the agreement involved only one of many bureaus in the Department and did not commit the entire Navy to the principles contained therein. Second, the Navy Department leadership may have encouraged the agreement on UMT, a subject which was not vital to Navy interests, as a means of relieving the pressure to negotiate with the Army on the unification issue, which no one in the Navy was yet prepared to discuss. In any event, the Navy's agreement to the above set of principles did not mean that it was
prepared to allow UMT a more prominent place in its post-war plans.

Meanwhile, post-war planning within the Navy Department continued. On May 22, Horne forwarded the now complete "Navy Basic Demobilization Plan #1" to Forrestal, the new Secretary of the Navy. Less than three weeks later, Horne completed a new planning document, "Navy Basic Demobilization Plan #2" and distributed it to all Navy Department offices. The one major change from its predecessor concerned the size of the post-war Navy. Plan #1 had envisioned a peacetime Navy of some 825,000 officers and men costing $7 billion per year, but the second version reduced this to 550,000 officers and men and an annual budget of $3 billion. Like its predecessor, Plan #2 made no mention of UMT. During the summer and early fall, this document went through another cycle of revision and criticism. By October, it was virtually complete, but no one, including its author, showed much interest in it. By this time, it was apparent that the drive had gone out of the Navy's post-war planning efforts.

The impetus for a fresh start in post-war planning came from Admiral King, who had heretofore remained aloof from this task. On October 22, the CNO asked Admiral R.S. Edwards, his chief of staff, to supervise all long range planning within the Navy Department. Though Horne retained some influence in the planning process, he was no longer the
key player. One month after receiving his assignment, Admiral Edwards informed his planning staff, which was now located in the more important COMINCH office, that "Navy Basic Demobilization Plan #2" was inadequate and directed that they make a fresh start on post-war planning. By the beginning of 1945, Edwards' group had begun work on a completely new planning document.

The fall of 1944 also saw renewed action on the UMT front. In September, the Navy Department agreed to submit a joint Army-Navy proposal for UMT to the Bureau of the Budget. The impetus for this move, which was a preliminary step in the campaign for UMT, probably came from Forrestal, who was known to favor this idea. The Secretary of the Navy participated enthusiastically in subsequent administration efforts to publicize UMT. Later in the fall, he attended the November UMT meeting with Secretary of War Stimson and national labor leaders. At this gathering, Forrestal agreed with Stimson's assertion that Army-Navy collaboration on UMT was essential. The autumn of 1944 also witnessed the first explicit discussion of the Naval Reserves within the Navy Department. In October, Forrestal informed King that his office was planning to set up a board to study the future relationship between the regular Navy and the reserves. The former hoped that the findings of this group would be useful in encouraging young naval reserve officers to join the active Navy after the
war. This issue also cropped up at the third meeting of the Top Policy Group (TPG), a committee composed of the highest ranking civilian and military officials in the Navy Department. At this meeting, which took place in late November, some members of the TPG expressed concern that too many reserve officers were leaving the service after their tour of duty instead of staying in the Naval Reserve or transferring into the regular Navy. This discussion revealed much about the Navy's interest in its reserves. Most officers present viewed the wartime Naval Reserve mainly as a source of personnel for the post-war Navy. There was no discussion of future reserve policy per se. Clearly, the Navy's post-war planning concerns continued to focus on the active Navy, not the reserves.

The existence of a specific UMT plan endorsed by the Navy forced further discussion of this issue in the early winter of 1945. The most revealing debate on UMT took place at the 10th meeting of the TPG, which was held in mid-January. This gathering featured a presentation by Colonel Textor of the SPD on the Army's post-war plans. According to Textor, these plans envisioned an Army of 330,000 men which could be expanded in time for war to a 4.5 million man force. UMT, of course, was essential to these plans. When one officer asked Textor about the Army's plan in case UMT was not enacted, he replied that the Army had no such plan. In the ensuing discussion,
Admiral King noted that since trainees would be in training only, they would be of no immediate use to the regular Navy. A few minutes later, Admiral Edwards, the head of all post-war planning activities within the Navy, commented on the difficulty of planning, given the uncertainty of UMT. He argued that the new Navy post-war planning document should assume no UMT, but include an annex that outlined the changes required if it was enacted. The CNO disagreed strongly with this assertion, claiming that the needs of the post-war regular Navy and its size were totally independent [my italics] of UMT. After this exchange, the meeting concluded. Some Navy officers had clearly been surprised when Textor had stated that the Army possessed no plans which did not assume UMT, and as King's comments indicate, the Navy clearly intended to avoid this pitfall. Its post-war plans would not assume UMT.

After several months of relative inactivity, Admiral Edwards' office completed a new post-war planning document on March 2, 1945 and immediately forwarded it to King. The latter approved it the next day and ordered its distribution within the Navy Department. At the end of the month, Edwards sent King a revised draft of this scheme, which both the CNO and Secretary of the Navy approved a few days later. This document, together with an April letter on post-war policies from King to Forrestal, constituted the
most authoritative and comprehensive expression of the Navy's post-war plans. They included the following points:

1) a determination to fight hard for a large post-war Navy

2) a plan to keep all usable ships accumulated during the war and set the strength of the post-war Navy at 550,000 officers and men and the strength of the Marine Corps at 20 percent of this figure

3) minimum Navy commitment to be in the Western Atlantic and entire Pacific Oceans

4) continued indifference to Europe

5) no explicit reliance on UMT

Shortly after these plans were officially authorized and circulated, the Navy Department did show some willingness to cooperate with the Army in preparing UMT legislation, but it was clear that these activities were intended to placate Navy critics in Congress and the White House. They did not signal any substantive change in the Navy's attitude toward the idea. Underlying the Navy's post-war plans was the assumption that it would have to be prepared immediately to fight at the beginning of hostilities. Nowhere in these plans was there mention of a mobilization strategy, as was the case with the Army.

The above plans also said little about post-war Naval Reserve policy. To the extent that the Navy leadership addressed this problem at this time, it again focused on the issue of encouraging more wartime Naval Reserve officers to transfer to the regular Navy. Beyond this, there was no top-level discussion of future Navy
reserve policy. However, some general features of the Navy's plans in this area emerged during the course of the Truman administration's summer review of the military's post-war plans. In mid-July, Clark Clifford discussed future Navy Reserve policy with a member of the Bureau of Naval Personnel. The latter noted that in the event of UMT, the Naval Reserve would be organized as it had been before the war, although it would be much larger. He added that after finishing UMT training, the trainee could join the Organized Naval Reserve, but he did not say whether this would be mandatory or voluntary. In summarizing this conversation, Clifford noted that the only real difference between the future Naval Reserve and the old one was its size and the fact that the former could only be mobilized at the call of Congress. The White House's memorandum on Post-War Military Training, which Clifford drafted, provided for a Naval Reserve, composed of trained officers and men, who could be mobilized for the immediate manning of some ships and the later manning of others. The Marine Corps Reserve would be made up of officers and men specially trained in amphibious warfare. The memorandum also stipulated that the Naval Reserve would be composed of civilians with one years' UMT and officers and men who had chosen to take additional training. In addition, the Marine Corps Reserve would consist of some trainees and furloughed veterans organized into units that could be employed
immediately after mobilization. This document failed to specify whether trainees would be compelled to serve in the Naval or Marine Corps Reserve; it contained no provision for a Navy equivalent of the general reserve for the Army, which would provide a place for all Army trainees who had not volunteered for the regular Army, National Guard, or Organized Reserves after training. In its explicit reliance on UMT, this document represented a sharp divergence from Navy Department thinking, but since official BuPers plans for the Naval Reserve were only ten percent complete at this time, it is difficult to know how far apart the White House and the Navy were in this area. From Clifford's conversation with BuPers, it was clear that with or without UMT, the essential organization, if not the size, of the post-war Naval Reserve would be the same as that of its pre-war equivalent.

A more authoritative, if still incomplete, indication of the Navy's plans for its post-war reserve came during the House Naval Affairs Committee hearings on the size of the post-war Navy, which were held in September. In his testimony before the group, Admiral King described plans to divide the post-war Navy into three groups: the Active Fleet (30 percent of the total in ships), the Ready Reserve Fleet (10 percent of the total), and the Laid-up Reserve Fleet (60 percent of the total). The Active Fleet would be manned at 70 percent of wartime compliment, the Ready
Reserve Fleet at 20-30 percent, and the Laid-up Reserve would be manned only by a few preservation personnel. Neither King nor Admiral Louis Denfeld, Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, specified how the two reserve fleets would be manned in the event of war, but it seems likely that they envisioned some role for the Naval Reserve. However, as King and several other Navy witnesses virtually admitted, the decision to create a three part fleet stemmed not from a desire to provide a large role for the post-war Naval Reserve, but from a concern to retain as many ships as possible after the war. Moreover, at one point in the hearings, Admiral Denfeld stated that UMT was not relevant to the problem of raising and maintaining an active Navy of 500,000 plus men. Given the content of the Navy's post-war plans, this statement is hardly surprising, but Denfeld also failed to discuss the relationship of UMT to the buildup of the Naval Reserves.

As the fall wore on, some of the well camouflaged, but distinct, differences between the Army and Navy positions on UMT became evident. Early in October, Truman asked both Forrestal and Patterson to take joint responsibility for the preparation of UMT legislation. But later that month, an internal Navy Department memorandum stated that in the upcoming House hearings on UMT, "the Army should carry the ball on this issue." Early in November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to
the President the formation of a special Presidential committee to study the problem of post-war national security. Secretary of War Patterson opposed the creation of such a committee on the grounds that it might hinder or delay congressional consideration of service unification or UMT. Forrestal, on the other hand, dismissed Patterson's fears as exaggerated and urged Truman to accept the JCS proposal. Also, about a week later, Admiral Duffield reported to Forrestal that the Army's most recent UMT plan contained a new provision for the creation of one single UMT corps for all trainees. To Duffield, this change seemed to be an opening wedge for discussion of overall service unification, and he thus recommended that Forrestal refuse comment on it at the UMT hearings. Late in November, Forrestal and several other Navy witnesses appeared before the House Military Affairs Committee to testify on UMT. The Secretary of the Navy endorsed UMT enthusiastically, but he did so only in very general terms. Forrestal spoke of the need to be prepared for war by training the nation's young men in peacetime, but he did not explicitly link UMT to any specific Naval Reserve plan. Secretary of War Patterson, on the other hand, described precisely the size and shape of both the regular Army and reserve under a system of UMT. The differences in the testimony of the two men reflected more than just the relatively advanced state of the Army's reserve policy.
planning; they also underlined the divergence in the two
services' attitudes towards UMT and its relationship to
post-war reserve policy.

Wartime Navy planning for post-war reserve policy
stood in sharp contrast to the Army's activities in this
area. Although many Navy leaders explicitly favored the
principle of UMT and implicitly assumed the existence of a
large post-war Naval Reserve, neither item stood at the
center of the Navy's future plans. Those plans envisioned
a large post-war Navy recruited by voluntary means. UMT
was viewed by some as desirable in principle, but by late
1943, the Navy's long-range plans no longer assumed its
enactment. Planning for the naval reserve itself was
virtually non-existent during the war, although it picked
up during the summer and fall of 1945. There were
indications that the Navy contemplated a reconstitution of
the pre-war reserve structure, but the issues of size and
means of recruitment remained undecided as of late 1945.
In any case, the planners' emphasis on a large post-war
regular Navy and the lack of wartime attention to reserve
policy suggests that the Navy, unlike the Army, did not
regard its civilian component as a particularly crucial
element in its post-war establishment.
Wartime Planning for the Army Air Force Reserves

As in the Navy, wartime planning for the reserves and UMT in the Army Air Forces (AAF) reflected the dominance of non-reserve policy issues on the service's long range planning agenda. Moreover, the AAF's position on these other issues ensured that it would view the idea of UMT and large reserves with skepticism, if not outright hostility. The development of a distinct Air Force position on UMT and reserve policy was facilitated by the fact that long range planning for the AAF during the war remained separate from that of the Army Ground Forces. The most important AAF planning agency was the Post War Division of the Plans Section of the Air Staff. Headed by a brilliant, if partisan, Air Force officer, Brigadier General Lawrence F. Kuter, the Post War Division began its work in earnest in the summer of 1943. Kuter's initial plans contained two key elements: a provision for the establishment of an independent Air Force after the war and an emphasis on strategic bombardment doctrine. In their attitude on the desired size of the post-war Air Force, Kuter and the other AAF planners were Uptonians. They stressed the importance of a large standing Air Force capable of immediate mobilization in an emergency. Initially, they envisaged a million man Air Force Force organized into 105 Air groups. After consultation with Army ground force planners, Kuter and his staff reduced these numbers
somewhat, but the revised plan still called for a 430,000
man, 75 group post-war Air Force. When Army Chief of
Staff Marshall reviewed these plans in November 1944, he
was shocked by what he viewed was their apparent disregard
for political and financial realities. Accordingly, he
ordered SPD to come up with a new scheme. This version,
which Kuter and the Post-War Division had no hand in
drafting, provided for a post-war Air Force of 120,000
regulars and only 16 air groups. Supplementing this force
would be a group of 200,000 trainees provided by UMT. Not
surprisingly, the Air Staff refused to accept this plan
claiming that it would endanger the nation's security. By
the spring of 1945, War Department planning on the size of
the post-war Army and Air Force had become stalemated.

The initial AAF plans had said nothing about a post-
war Air Reserve, but their emphasis on a large standing Air
Force suggests that Kuter and his colleagues did not attach
much importance to the idea of a big reserve. The fact
that none of the post-war plans drafted by the Air Staff
assumed UMT, which would have provided such a reserve,
reinforces this impression. AAF planners were in fact
openly skeptical of UMT. As early as August 1943, some of
the members of the Post War Division openly doubted that
UMT, which provided only one year's training, could produce
men with sufficient technical skills to be of any use to
the Air Force. A few months later, Kuter stated that if
given the choice between UMT and a large standing Air Force, he would choose the latter. Thus, while many Navy and all Army planners accepted the principle of UMT, AAF planners openly questioned its value to the Air Force. In addition, Kuter and his staff in the Post War Division had developed plans for a post-war Air Force which provided no significant role for an Air Reserve.

Notwithstanding its lack of interest in reserve policy, the AAF did assign its own representatives to all three Section Five Committees on National Guard and Reserve policy in the fall of 1944. The Air Force officers on these committees attended the meetings regularly, but they rarely offered any substantive comments or criticisms. One important exception occurred in December, during the Army staff debate over the involuntary assignment of UMT trainees to reserve units. One AAF officer, in commenting on a proposal to force trainees into units, stated that the Air Force could not accept this policy and sided with the Army General Staff's G-3 section in opposing the idea. This officer's opposition probably sprung less from a distaste for an organized reserve than from a desire to use voluntary means to man the Air Force, either active or reserve. As the Section Five Committee deliberations proceeded through the fall and winter of 1944-45, it became obvious that there would be some sort of federal Air Force reserve after the war. Since the AAF remained officially
part of the Army, it was bound to follow all Army policies, including those relating to the reserves. Thus, in May 1945, the AAF officially informed the SPD and the Chief of Staff that the already approved Army Ground Forces reserve policies were considered workable for the Air Force. It did, however, claim that the AAF would have complete responsibility for training and administering the Air Reserve.

Another important result of the Section Five Committee deliberations in 1944-45 was the creation of an Air National Guard. Since February 1944, when the guard secured guarantees from the War Department that it would retain its front line reserve role after the war, observers both inside and outside of the War Department had assumed that an Air Force equivalent of the Army's National Guard would soon be established. In October 1944, the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff approved the first study on the role of a post-war National Guard. Although this document limited its mission to anti-aircraft and combat support duties, it did assume the creation of an Air National Guard. This assumption was confirmed in October 1945, with the publishing of the Approved War Department Policies Relating to the Post-War National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps. These policies committed the War Department to the establishment of both an Air National Guard and an Organized Air Reserve. The former was to be the primary
source of combat ready units to the regular Air Force in an emergency. While many AAF officers remained skeptical of the value of a state based air reserve force, the AAF did draft a plan to implement the approved policies in November. After some revision, the Commanding General of the AAF formally approved the civilian components plan that same month. By the end of 1945, the outline for the Air Forces's post-war reserve structure was complete. It would consist of an Air National Guard organized entirely in units and an Air Reserve composed of three classes of units and a pool of unassigned individuals.

If the AAF followed the Army's reserve policies on mission and organization, it did not do so in the area of manpower procurement. Long before the approved reserve policies were published, the AAF officially informed the War Department that it could not accept UMT as a substitute for large forces in being. This statement marked an escalation in the ongoing struggle between the AAF planners, who wanted a large active Air Force, and General Marshall, who continued to insist that the Army (including the AAF) should anticipate low post-war military budgets and thus plan for smaller regular forces. In Marshall's view, the enactment of UMT would compensate for the reductions in the regular Army and Air Force by providing large, immediately mobilizable reserves. But the AAF had long since concluded that UMT at best was only a supplement
to, not a replacement for, a large peacetime Air Force. Because of the AAF's high degree of organizational autonomy and General Marshall's impending departure, the issue of the size of the post-war Army and Air Force remained unsettled as the war ended. The AAF had committed itself to a specific set of post-war reserve policies, but it was unclear to what extent they would be implemented, especially given the service's open doubts about UMT.

Navy and AAF Reserve Programs Take Shape, 1945-1947

As 1946 began, the Navy's first personnel policy concern continued to be the procurement of commissioned personnel for the expanded post-war officer corps. The Navy's long range plans envisioned a corps of 40,000 to 50,000 officers, but the Naval Academy, heretofore the main source of career officers, could produce only about 1000 candidates per year. Since the other pre-war source, the NRCTC program, had not yet been reconstituted, the only immediately available group of potential officers for the peacetime Navy was the 300,000 or so officers who had received wartime reserve commissions. Rear Admiral William Fechteler, the Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel, was so concerned with this problem that he proposed to Forrestal that the Navy offer special inducements and bonuses to induce more men to transfer to the active Navy. Fechteler's worries, though, proved to be groundless. In mid-January, other sources reported that the
Navy had received transfer applications for 72 percent of the open officer slots in the regular Navy during the last four and a half months of 1945. At the forty-fifth meeting of the TPG late in January, the officer in charge of the transfer program informed the group that he expected over 34,000 applications by June 1946 for the 22,944 openings in the regular Navy officer corps. He added that most of the those applying for transfer possessed excellent service records and the skills the post-war Navy needed.

The main item on the agenda of the above meeting, however, concerned the organization and mission of the post-war Naval Reserve. BuPers activity in this area had accelerated during the fall of 1945, and by mid-winter, it had completed a set of concrete plans and policies for the Navy's reserves. Rear Admiral John E. Gingrich, a representative of the Bureau, presented the results of the previous four months' work to the TPG. BuPers' plans envisioned a Naval Reserve structure consisting of four components: The Ready or Organized Reserves, The Standby or Volunteer Reserves, The Merchant Marine Reserve, and The Honorary Reserve. The first element, the Ready Reserves, would receive regular training and would number approximately 25,000 officers and 175,000 men. This force would be designated to augment the crew complements on the active Navy's ships (from 70 percent to 100 percent wartime compliment) immediately and fill out the compliments on the
Ready Reserve Fleet (from 20-30 percent to 100 percent wartime compliment) in ten days. The Standby Reserve would consist of between 300,000 and 500,000 officers and men, mostly technical specialists, who would be called up and assigned wherever needed. The Honorary Reserve would be composed of all Naval Reservists who had reached the age of 50. Gingrich stressed that post World War II Naval Reserve would be integrated more closely with the regular Navy, thus eliminating some of "clubby" aura that had characterized the pre-war reserve. He also stated that an assistant for reserve affairs would be assigned to each commandant of a naval district but added that administration of the Naval Reserve would be centered in the Navy Department in Washington, specifically in the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Finally, Gingrich announced that the Navy would begin implementing these reserve plans, on a volunteer basis, as soon after April 1st as possible.

In comparing the Navy's planned reserve program with that of the Army, four differences stand out. First, although the Navy had committed itself to the principle of UMT on several occasions, it set out from the very beginning to build up a Navy Reserve by voluntary means alone. Notwithstanding the fact that the Army Organized Reserves were currently being recruited on a volunteer basis, all Army reserve policies continued to assume UMT.
The Navy's decision to forgo the latter led to another point of difference, which concerned the size of the two programs. The then current Army reserve plan envisioned a total reserve force of over 1.5 million men (National Guard plus Organized Reserves), as compared with the Navy's more modest 900,000. The disparity in the size of the planned organized reserve forces of the two services was even greater: 900,000 organized Army reservists versus 200,000 Naval reservists. A third difference related to organization. Even though the Ready Reserve of the Navy was to be organized into units for purposes of training, it would not be called up as a collection of tactical units. The members of both it and the Volunteer Naval Reserve would be mobilized as individuals. The Army, of course, had planned to organize its reserve mostly into tactical units, which would be called up as such. Lastly, the Navy Department planned to control and administer its reserve from one central location, while the Army had decentralized control among several General Staff divisions, six Army area commanders, and 48 state governors. From its inception, the Navy's post-war reserve policies were more compatible with the political and administrative realities of the time. More modest in scale, more realistic in the assumptions it was based on, and more efficient in administrative concept, the Navy's reserve program seemed less likely to encounter the difficulties which would
plague its Army counterpart.

One problem which no military reserve program could avoid in 1946 was a shortage of funds. Like the Army, the Navy as a whole had to endure frequent and deep cuts in its early post-war budgets. If anything, the Navy suffered more proportionately than the Army and AAF. One reason for this state of affairs was President Truman's palpable dislike for the Navy. When the President saw the military services' first post-war budget requests in December 1945, he specifically castigated the Navy for "its wasteful and unrealistic spending attitudes." In February 1946, Budget Director Harold Smith informed Truman that he had to choose between cutting the Navy down to 400,000 officers and men (significantly smaller than the planned 550,000) and 100,000 marines, or drastically upsetting the FY 1947 budget. Without hesitation, the President selected the former alternative. Later in the same meeting, he told the Budget Director to make further cuts if necessary. The total budget reductions for the year amounted to $2.4 billion out of an original request of $6.0 billion, a cut of over 40 percent. Secretary Forrestal protested these reductions immediately, but Truman held firm. These moves forced a $20 million reduction in Naval Reserve funds. The Department implemented it by limiting the number of NROTC enrollees, reducing the purchase of training equipment and cutting active duty training time for the Volunteer
Reserve. The President contemplated yet another cut in the Navy budget in the fall of 1946, but the new Budget Director, James Webb, convinced him not to do so by pointing out the harmful political implications of further reductions (which would have hit the Naval Reserve disproportionately hard). Despite this small victory, the prospects for increased funding for the Naval Reserve in the future looked dim. Just a few weeks later, the President directed Webb to keep FY 1948 defense expenditures below the original ceiling of $13.15 billion.

The cuts in Naval Reserve funding, coming as they did when the program was just beginning, had a particularly harmful impact, especially in the area of equipment procurement and training time. But despite the cuts, the enrollment of men into the Organized and Volunteer Naval Reserves began as planned. By the end of the year, the former had recruited some 40,000 men and activated 82 percent of its 285 authorized units. The Volunteer Reserve had attracted over 550,000 men, and more were coming in at a rapid rate. By August, the Navy Department had completed a detail plan of reserve administration which provided for the appointment of Special Assistants for Reserve Affairs in every bureau or office which had an interest in reserve affairs. Overall control of the program would remain in BuPers. In late November,
Secretary Forrestal approved disability retirement policies which gave Naval and Marine Corps Reservists the same benefits as their regular Navy counterparts.

Despite these tangible signs of improvement, dissatisfaction with the Naval Reserve was evident when the TPG met to discuss the program's progress in January 1947. At this meeting, Admiral Gingrich described some of the continuing problems encountered by the program. These included inadequate shore facilities, lack of sufficient supplies, and the poor condition of many ships in the reserve fleet. Most serious, however, was the persistence of a negative attitude on the part of many regular officers towards reservists and the reserve program. Gingrich called for a more positive regular Navy spirit towards the reserves and argued that the Navy had to decide now whether it wanted to keep the Naval Reserve program or abandon it. Secretary Forrestal agreed, saying that he would rather have no naval reserve than a sloppily run program. Echoing this view, Under Secretary John Sullivan urged a comprehensive review of the Naval Reserve program to determine its viability for the future. Most of the officers present felt that the reserve was worth investing more money in, especially since it constituted the only source of manpower to fill out the crew compliments of the regular and reserve fleets on short notice. By the conclusion of the meeting, a clear consensus in favor of retaining and upgrading the Navy's
reserve program had emerged. 1946 had not been an easy year for the Naval Reserve, but its prospects for the future seemed good.

Not surprisingly, the Navy Department ignored the subject of UMT for most of 1946. None of its post-war plans, including those for the reserves, depended on it, and thus there was no reason to push for UMT. The War Department's announcement of a new UMT plan in September, however, forced the Navy to address the issue again. In November, an aide asked Forrestal whether he had given any thought to the question of supporting the War Department's request for UMT in the upcoming Congress. Forrestal replied that he had not done so. Two days after this exchange, Rear Admiral D.C. Ramsay, the head of the Bureau of Aeronautics, told the Vice Chief of Naval Operations that although the Navy would not need the draft or UMT, it should support the Army's request for either measure in the next Congress. Meanwhile, other offices within the Department debated the merits of UMT and the wisdom of supporting the Army on this issue. One result of all this activity was the decision to publish in early 1947 a revised Navy and Marine Corps plan for UMT. The plan was a virtual carbon copy of the War Department's version; it provided for six months UMT followed by four to five additional training and service options. The decision to revise and publish the Navy's UMT plan at this time could
be interpreted as a form of support for the Army's UMT efforts, but the depth of the Navy's conviction on this issue was suspect. Just as the year ended, the Navy Department sent the President a list of the legislation it deemed essential for 1947. UMT was not on that list.

Although the Army Air Forces desired immediate autonomy, it remained an integral part of the Army at the beginning of 1946. The subsequent implementation of Air Force reserve policies thus proceeded in step with those of the Army Ground Forces. Mercifully, the AAF was not directly involved in the April dispute between the White House, the National Guard, and the War Department over the activation of Class A-2 reserve units. It did, however, find that dealing with two mutually jealous reserve components, the Air National Guard (ANG) and the Air Reserve (AR), was no easy matter. In January Eisenhower had directed the limited activation of ANG units, and a short time later, the NGB announced the AAF reserve plan to all states and territories. Activation of Air Reserve units, though, would not begin until the summer. Complicating the task of administering the ANG was the fact that administrative and financial control of this force was vested in the National Guard Bureau, which was staffed by Army officers unfamiliar with or unsympathetic to the Air Force reserve's special needs. Despite repeated efforts during the immediate post-war years to gain a greater
measure of administrative and financial control over the ANG, the Air Force did not obtain this control until 1950. The initial activation progress of the ANG, like that of its Army counterpart, was slow. Budget limitations, poor equipment and airfields, and a shortage of regular Army Air Force instructors all created major problems. One year after activation had begun, this force numbered just over 5000 officers and men and contained only 30 federally recognized flying squadrons.

The AAF's other reserve force, the Air Reserve, began to activate units in July 1946, along with the Army Organized Reserves. Like its Army counterpart, the Air Reserve suffered from insufficient funding, poor quality equipment, a lack of instructors and surplus of officers. At the end of August 1946, the Air Reserve numbered 194,300 officers and 157,400 enlisted men, but only a fraction of these men were enrolled in organized units. The fall and winter saw little improvement in the unit activation picture; at the end of March 1947, only 112 out 969 authorized units had been activated. And as was the case with the Army reserves, all of the newly established units consisted of officers only ("C" class). Just as the unit activation process was getting under way, the AAF submitted an updated plan for the organization of the Air Reserve. It proposed that this force would be organized in the same manner as the Army Organized Reserves--Active and Inactive
Reserve, three classes of reserve unit, and be assigned the same mission—the supply of organized units and trained individuals for the expansion of the regular Air Force in the event of war. The personnel for the Air Reserve would come from three sources: World War II veterans, APROTC recruits and voluntary enlistees. The revised plan made no mention of UMT produced personnel. Thus, although the basic structure of the Air Reserve would remain identical to that of the Army reserves, its personnel procurement policy differed significantly. UMT remained an official assumption of Army reserve policies, but the AAF had rejected it, both in theory and practice. The extent of its conversion to voluntarism as a means of building up the Air Reserve can be gauged by the fact that in June 1946 the AAF decided to accept enlistments from non-prior service personnel into the reserve, a policy which the Army did not adopt until late 1947. It is true that the ORC was currently being recruited on a volunteer basis, but the Army remained committed in principle to the idea of compulsory recruitment for the reserve. The Army and the Air Force were thus opposed on an essential element of reserve policy, and they would remain at odds over this question for more than a decade.

The Navy and AAF reserve programs suffered from much the same problems during their initial activation phases. Funding limitations, shortages of equipment, and an
indifferent attitude on the part of the respective regular establishments all combined to stunt the early growth of the Navy and AAF reserve components. Substantial differences existed also. The former had to cope only with one federal reserve force over which it had total control, while the AAF had to manage two distinct reserve programs, one of which was administered and funded by another agency. In addition, by late 1946, the Navy had decided to devote more time and money to its reserve program. The regular AAF, on the other hand, remained indifferent, if not hostile, to its civilian components. One essential question, however, the two services agreed: the desirability of building up their respective reserve programs by voluntary means alone. By early 1947, both the Navy and the AAF had concluded that they would not need UMT even if it were enacted, a position which put them in conflict with the Army. The decision to forgo UMT meant not only that the Navy and AAF reserves would be smaller than those of the Army, but also that the former's reserve programs were less tightly linked to the structure of their regular forces.

The Navy, the Air Force and the Compton Commission

Many UMT proponents viewed the creation of the Compton Commission and the rebirth of the UMT campaign as a opportunity for forging a new military consensus on compulsory military training. But in this hope, they were to be disappointed. If anything, the renewed activity
on UMT during the winter and spring of 1947 exacerbated rather than dampened the conflict between the four services over UMT and reserve policy. In January, for example, the War and Navy Departments sparred over the issue of benefits for ROTC and NROTC students. The former objected to higher benefits the Navy offered to NROTC students and sought to reduce the differential between these and benefits to ROTC students. The Navy, however, held firm, and the issue remained unsettled. Also that winter, some unnamed members of Patterson's staff complained privately to the Compton Commission that the Navy was just going through the motions with respect to UMT. They alleged that since the Navy felt that it could meet its manpower requirements without UMT, it was indifferent to its fate. These criticisms apparently disturbed one member of the commission so much that he asked the Secretary of the Navy personally for an explanation. There is no record in the Compton Commission documents of any response.

The well concealed but undeniable gulf between the Army and Navy positions on UMT became evident after the appearance of Admiral Chester Nimitz, the new CNO, before the Compton Commission in mid-April. When asked about the effect on the regular Navy and Naval Reserve of a failure to enact UMT, Nimitz replied that the present manpower requirements of both forces could be met without UMT, though he did concede that there might be some difficulty for the
reserves in the future without UMT. After the Commission had completed its hearings, Patterson and Forrestal clashed again, this time over the question of requiring all ROTC and NROTC candidates to take six months basic UMT before entering college. The former argued that this requirement was essential, but Forrestal disagreed. As in January, the two service secretaries could not settle their differences, and in early June, they both agreed that Congress would have to settle the question. The events of the winter and spring of 1947 illustrated the truism that military services will very often agree on vaguely defined principles (compulsory military training for able-bodied young men) but disagree strongly whenever the discussion focuses on specifics.

The extent of the AAF's participation in the Compton Commission hearings reflected their growing distaste for the idea of UMT. The AAF representatives who appeared before the group gave pro forma support to the principle of UMT, but the depth of that support can be gauged by the number of AAF officers designated to testify. Of the nearly 60 military officers who appeared before the Compton Commission, only five were from the AAF. By contrast, the Army sent 39 representatives to testify. One would expect some disparity, but the difference in the number of Army and Air Force officers who appeared before the group is striking. Shortly after the Commission completed its
work, General Ira Eaker, one of the AAF officers who had testified, mentioned UMT in a speech at the National War College. Eaker voiced general support for the idea, but, in a revealing choice of words, he described UMT as "a wise [but not essential] provision for national security."

Notwithstanding the Compton Commission's endorsement of UT, its hearings revealed that the military services were far from united on this issue. For the Army, it was an essential element of its post-war plans, both for the active forces and the reserves. But to the Navy and especially the Air Force, UMT was at best a convenient means of supplying trained men for the reserves, and at worst, an unnecessary and costly drain on funds better spent on the regular services.

A further indication of the Navy's attitude towards UMT was the fact that even as the Compton Commission hearings were proceeding, it was preparing to inject new life into its Volunteer Reserve program. In April, the Navy began a major new recruiting effort to enlist one million men into the Volunteer Naval Reserve. At a May meeting of the TPG, the officer in charge of this campaign reported that the manpower drive was going well and predicted that it would succeed by a large margin. After the presentation, the now retired Admiral King complimented the recruiting effort, but he also expressed concern that the decision to conduct this campaign might have been in
conflict with the Navy's official position of support for UMT. Needless to say, no other officer at the meeting echoed King's worries. By this time, moreover, the Navy Department's decision to devote more money and attention to its reserve program was showing results. Recruitment and organization for the Naval Reserves as a whole had improved markedly by the summer of 1947. In July the Naval Air Reserve reported that it had filled 99 percent of its authorized officers slots and recruited 89 percent of the needed enlisted personnel. Ironically, 1947 had witnessed more improvement in the Naval Reserve, which was less vital to the regular Navy, than in the Army's National Guard and Organized Reserves, which theoretically were indispensable to the ground force's post-war plans.

Conclusion

Despite significant differences in the policies and experiences of the Navy and AAF reserves in 1943-1947, similar pressures and concerns influenced the development of both programs. Post-war planning in the Navy and AAF proceeded on the assumption that large active forces-in-being would be required after the war. As a result, planners in these two services did not envision the huge organized reserve forces the Army was contemplating. This fact, combined with a desire to remain faithful to service traditions and obtain the most skilled reservists possible, steered Navy and AAF planners toward voluntarism and away
from compulsion. For the sake of the Army, both voiced public support for UMT, but in private, they remained committed to voluntary reserve recruitment.

Thus, on the eve of the most significant defense reorganization in the nation's history, each of the services had formulated its own conception of its reserve needs and had drafted policies best suited to meet those needs. As the policy deliberations of 1943-1947 make clear, each service's view of reserve policy was rooted not in transitory inter-service differences, but in traditional perceptions of roles and missions, as well as in judgments about the future of warfare.
FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER THREE


4. Ibid., pp. 15–16.

5. Ibid., p. 22.

6. Ibid., pp. 22–23.

7. Ibid., pp. 26–25.

8. Ibid., p. 69.

9. "Principles and Assumptions to be Applied by the Army and the Navy in connections with a program of Universal Military Training," April 1, 1944, UMT Files, Papers of Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, USAMHI.

10. Davis, Postwar Defense Policy, p. 94.

11. Ibid., pp. 97–98.

12. Ibid., pp. 103–05.


14. James Forrestal to Admiral Ernest J. King, October 22, 1944, Papers of James Forrestal (No Record Group), NARS.

15. Record of the Third Meeting, Navy Top Policy Group (TPG), November, 25, 1944, TPG File, Records of the Department of the Navy, RG 80, NARS.
16. Records of the Tenth Meeting, Navy TPG, January 10, 1945, TPG File, Records of the Department of the Navy, RG 80, NARS.


18. Ibid., p. 118.

19. Clark Clifford, Notes on talk with Captain Hillenkotter, July 19, 1945, UMT File, Papers of Clark Clifford, TL.

20. Clark Clifford, Notes on UMT draft, July 1945, UMT File, Papers of Clark Clifford, TL.


24. Ibid., pp. 1365-75.

25. Harry S. Truman to Robert Patterson, October 5, 1945; Harry S. Truman to James Forrestal, October 5, 1945, both PSF, Papers of Harry S. Truman, TL.

26. Memo, Under Secretary of Navy to Gates, October 30, 1945, Correspondence File, Papers of James Forrestal, NARS.

27. James Forrestal to Harry S. Truman, November 8, 1945, Records of the Secretary of the Navy/Chief of Naval Operations, RG 80, NARS.

28. Admiral Duffield to James Forrestal, November 12, 1945, Correspondence File, Papers of James Forrestal, NARS.

29. Statement by James Forrestal before the House Military Affairs Committee, November 26, 1945, Miscellaneous Records File, Papers of James Forrestal, NARS.


31. Ibid., pp. 85-87.
32. Ibid., pp. 72-74.


34. Smith, Air Force Plans, p. 87.

35. Memo, Col. Arnet to Col. Bradley, December 19, 1944, G-3, RG 165, NARS.


39. Ibid., p. 27.


41. As Marshall himself admitted in a letter to Eisenhower, the fact that he was soon to leave the War Department hampered his ability to bring dissenting elements of the Army General Staff and the Air Staff into line over this issue. See Chapter One, pp. 107-09.

42. Under Navy Regulations, the receiving of a wartime reserve commission did not obligate one to join any element of the Naval Reserve after the war.

43. Admiral Fechteler to James Forrestal, January 8, 1946, Papers of James Forrestal, NARS.

44. James Forrestal to Harry S. Truman, January 14, 1946, Papers of James Forrestal, NARS.

45. Records of the 45th Meeting, Navy TPG, January 25, 1946, TPG File, Records of the Department of the Navy, NARS.

46. Harold Smith, Diary, December 19, 1945, Papers of Harold Smith, TL.

47. Harold Smith, Diary, February 18, 1946, Papers of Harold Smith, TL.
48. The Army (which still included the AAF) suffered a smaller proportional cut, $2.5 billion from an original request of $9.6 billion.

49. James Forrestal to Harry S. Truman, August 21, 1946, Correspondence File, TPG File, Records of the Department of the Navy, RG 80, NARS.


51. James Webb, Notes on Conference with the President, October 21, 1946, Papers of James Webb, TL.

52. Records of the 62nd Meeting, Navy TPG, January 31, 1947, TPG Files, Records of the Department of the Navy, RG 80, NARS.

53. Memo, Smedberg to James Forrestal, August 14, 1946, Correspondence File, Records of the Secretary of the Navy/Chief of Naval Operations, RG 80, NARS.

54. Memo, Connor to James Forrestal, November 27, 1946, Papers of James Forrestal, NARS.

55. Ibid.

56. Memo, Connor to James Forrestal, November 4, 1946, Records of the Secretary of the Navy/Chief of Naval Operations, RG 80, NARS.

57. Memo, Admiral D.C. Ramsay to Vice Chief of Naval Operations, November 6, 1946, Correspondence File, Records of the Secretary of the Navy/Chief of Naval Operations, RG 80, NARS.

58. Memo, Connor to James Forrestal, November 7, 1946, Correspondence File, Records of the Secretary of the Navy/Chief of Naval Operations, RG 80, NARS.


60. James Forrestal to Harry S. Truman, December 13, 1946, Papers of George Elsey, TL.


62. Ibid., pp. 72-82.
63. Ibid., p. 49.

64. War Department, "Report of Progress in Establishing the Air Reserve," August 31, 1946, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.


66. War Department, "AAF Plan for the Post-War Air Reserve," July 12, 1946, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

67. Robert Patterson to James Forrestal, January 10, 1947, Correspondence File, Records of the Secretary of the Navy/Chief of Naval Operations, RG 80, NARS.

68. Transcript of Telephone Conversation between James Forrestal and Charles Wilson on UMT, February 20, 1947, Correspondence File, Records of the Secretary of the Navy/Chief of Naval Operations, RG 80, NARS.

69. Replies to questions posed by President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training (PACUT) to Admiral Chester Nimitz, April 14, 1947, UMT File, TL.

70. Robert Patterson to James Forrestal, May 14, 1947; James Forrestal to Robert Patterson, June 20, 1947, both Papers of James Forrestal, NARS.


73. Records of the 72nd Meeting, Navy TPG, May 19, 1947, TPG Files, Records of the Department of the Navy, RG 80, NARS.

74. As of the end of June 1947, the Organized Naval Reserve numbered almost 120,000 officers and men. The Volunteer Naval Reserve totaled over 370,000 men. Office of Selective Service Records, Statistic Sheet, June 1947, Papers of Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, USAMHI.

75. Records of the 76th Meeting, Navy TPG, July 9, 1947, TPG Files, Records of the Department of the Navy, RG 80, NARS.
CHAPTER FOUR
RESERVE POLICY UNDER REVIEW, 1947-1949

By the fall of 1947, two of the nation's three military reserve programs were in trouble. The rate of recruiting and unit activation in the AAF and Army reserves was lower than ever, and adequate equipment, facilities and unit instructors remained in short supply. Adding to the woes of reserve planners was the fact that these deficiencies were receiving an increased amount of public and congressional attention. Along with this development, international tension rose in 1947-49, leading to renewed demands for larger and more ready active military forces. Election year political considerations complicated the situation further. These pressures forced both the executive branch and Congress to address some of the weaknesses in the nation's reserve policies. The result was a flurry of governmental activity in the area of manpower policy and the initiation of several high level reviews of the nation's civilian component programs.
Reserve Policy Reviewed; UMT Proposed, But Not Enacted:  
Fall 1947 to Spring 1948

During the nine months from the establishment of the 
National Military Establishment (NME) to the passage of the 
Selective Service Act of 1948, executive branch activity in 
the area of military manpower policy proceeded on three 
levels. The first was at the White House, which prepared 
for one more attempt to secure UMT. The second level of 
activity took place in the NME, where a comprehensive 
review of all military reserve policies was initiated. The 
last was a Department of the Army restudy of its reserve 
program and the formulation of new reserve mobilization 
plans. All three efforts proceeded in isolation from each 
other, but the outcome of each, especially the UMT 
campaign, directly influenced the results of the other two. 

Congress' failure to act on the Tooke bill in the 
summer of 1947 had disappointed but not discouraged 
President Truman and the UMT supporters in his cabinet. As 
the second session of the 80th Congress began (September 
1947), Truman and James Forrestal, the newly appointed 
Secretary of Defense, made plans to revive the UMT campaign. 
Shortly after taking office, Forrestal invited the three 
military services to present their UMT plans to him as a 
prelude to formulating an NME position on the issue. When 
it became apparent that the Republican leadership of the 
House of Representatives was not going to allow the still
pending Towe Bill to reach the floor of that body. Forrestal decided in December to have his own staff redraft the measure for submission to the Senate, which was known to be more receptive to the idea. He also formed a committee to coordinate the drafting of an NME position on UMT with other executive branch agencies. In the White House, President Truman decided to repeat his 1947 request for UMT legislation in his State of the Union address for 1948. Truman also raised the subject of UMT at the first White House cabinet meeting held in 1948. At this meeting, both Secretary of State George Marshall and Forrestal argued fervently for the idea, claiming that it was vital to the nation's security. The Secretary of Defense suggested that to avoid confusion as to the administration's real position of UMT, the NME be given the sole responsibility for handling UMT legislation. Truman himself spoke favorably of the idea and announced his intention to submit legislation providing for both UMT and a draft as soon as possible.

The campaign for UMT and a return to conscription received a major boost in February from the news that Czechoslovakian communists had overthrown the lawfully elected government of that nation. The Czech coup precipitated a major administration review of the state of the nation's military posture and convinced many in Congress that concrete steps to improve America's military
readiness were now required. Truman's response to the Czech coup was a decision to seek immediate enactment of the draft and UMT, along with major increases in defense spending for FY 1949. In mid-March, the President appeared before a joint session of Congress to urge the passage of UMT, a temporary reenactment of the draft and the passage of the European Recovery Program. As a first step towards the first of these requests, Forrestal and Marshall convinced the Senate Armed Services Committee to begin hearings on UMT immediately after the President's appearance on Capitol Hill. Prospects for the enactment of UMT had never seemed brighter.

The relative speed and ease with which the Truman Administration persuaded Congress to consider UMT was encouraging, but doubts about the idea persisted, especially in the military. General Eisenhower, in his final report as Chief of Staff of the Army (submitted in February), noted the several previous failures to secure UMT and warned that it was not a panacea for all the nation's security problems. Eisenhower's misgivings on UMT were shared by his successor, General Omar Bradley. Early in March, the latter wrote to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to urge the immediate enactment of selective service. In this message, Bradley also affirmed his support for UMT as a long term preparedness measure, but added that this program would not compensate the Army immediately for the loss of personnel
needed for a UMT training base. Later in the month, the JCS did agree that, in view of the increasingly unstable political situation in Europe, the National Military Establishment should be strengthened by the immediate enactment of some form of conscription. The service chiefs did not exclude the possibility of also securing UMT, but they stressed that this program would only be useful in a long term perspective. The above JCS statement highlighted a major problem for UMT advocates: UMT was being considered with conscription, which promised a cheaper and more immediate solution to the nation's security problems. Given the choice between UMT and the draft, most congressmen and senators, and all of the service chiefs, would choose the latter.

The NME's actions in the manpower area at this time concerned reserve policy directly. Shortly after taking office, James Forrestal attended a briefing by the three services on their respective reserve and National Guard programs. What he heard convinced him that there was an immediate need for a comprehensive review of the nation's reserve policies. Accordingly, in early November, Forrestal announced the formation of an interservice committee to study the organization, training programs, and personnel policies of all military reserve programs. Headed by Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray, this group, also known as the Secretary of Defense's Committee
on Civilian Components, was to survey the reserves and
develop an integrated and uniform reserve program for the
nation. Gray, backed up by a directive from Forrestal
requesting the cooperation of the three service
secretaries, began work quickly. By early December, he had
established five subcommittees to study the missions and
roles, size and organizations, personnel, facilities, and
11 legislative needs of the reserves. The establishment of
the Gray Committee reflected both a growing awareness of
major problems in the civilian component programs,
especially in the Army, and Forrestal's desire to develop a
uniform set of reserve policies for all three services. He
may also have believed that a reform of the reserves from
above constituted an good way to initiate the process of
service unification.

It soon became evident, however, that the task before
the Gray Committee was not going to be an easy one. In
mid-January, Gray complained to Forrestal that the present
reserve programs of the three services were based on
individual service mobilization needs, not on one joint
mobilization plan. He also argued that the Committee could
not proceed any further without specific guidance from the
JCS as to the military's overall mobilization
12 requirements. The service chiefs did begin a joint
review of these needs but they did not complete a final
report until late in the year, long after the Gray
Committee had finished its work. Despite the failure to secure the information it needed, the Gray Committee decided to press on. During February and March 1948, it interviewed the heads of most of the major staff divisions of the three services and representatives of the NGA and ROA. All told, the Gray Committee met 65 times, heard from 89 witnesses, and received studies from over 200 organizations. At the beginning of April, the Gray Committee completed its investigation and turned to the task of drafting a report. On June 30, the committee submitted its recommendations to Forrestal, but contrary to expectations, the Secretary of Defense refused to make the report public at that time.

The Secretary of Defense's concern at the lack of progress in the nation's civilian components programs was mirrored in the Department of the Army. In the fall, it decided to initiate its own review of Army reserve policy. This review, which constituted the third level of reserve policy related activity in 1947-48, began in mid-November, with the formation of an Organized Reserve Corps Committee within the Army General Staff. Headed by the Director of Organization and Training, this committee consisted of three G-3, two G-1, two ERRA, and two Army Ground Forces officers. It was to survey all Department of the Army ORC policies with a view to recommending changes in these policies. The decision to initiate this review indicated
that the Army was aware that its civilian components had problems. However, the administrative arrangements made for this committee led one to question just how searching this reexamination of reserve policy would be. It was unlikely that a G-3 dominated and supervised committee would find fault with policies that G-3 had had a large hand in formulating and implementing since 1945.

The final report of this group, released late in January 1948, called for no major changes in Army reserve policies. It provided for an Army composed of the regular forces, the National Guard and the Organized Reserve Corps and the enactment of UMT and inactive duty training pay. It did not deny that there had been problems in the implementation of Army reserve policies since the end of the war, but it blamed these shortcomings on a lack of funds, a surplus of reserve officers, the enlistment of personnel with no previous training, and a lack of UMT—all of which lay beyond the control of the Department of the Army. The ORC Committee report did include several recommendations for change, but these were fairly modest. It urged the formulation of new ORC troop basis (to provide more slots for reserve officers), the development of a long range promotion policy for reserve officers, the elimination of unqualified reserve officers, and the recruitment of non-prior service personnel for all units of the ERC. The Committee had noted some of the
difficulties confronting the Army reserve program, but it had failed to address the critical flaws in Army reserve policy—the lack of sufficient numbers of regular Army instructors, the uncertain division of responsibility between the National Guard and ORC, and finally, the continued dependence on UMT.

The release of the above report failed to quiet the rising chorus of discontent with the reserve program on the Army staff. Not surprisingly, the loudest and most persistent criticisms came from the head of ERRA, Brigadier General Wendell Westover. Shortly after the completion of the ORC committee report, Westover circulated a memorandum which declared that all of the Army's ORC policies since 1945 had been a failure. The ERRA chief noted that out of the almost 7000 ORC units activated since 1946, only 60 were class "A" and that over 60 percent of the officers and 90 percent of the enlisted men in the ORC were unassigned or members of composite units. Westover claimed that a lack of funds, the absence of promotion policies for reserve officers, insufficient armory space and the priorities given the National Guard in combat unit formation, among other things, were responsible for the sorry state of the reserve program. In early April, he forwarded his own study of the ORC to the Chief of Staff and G-3. It repeated his earlier claims that the Army reserve program had been a failure and quoted the unit mission statement
for the ORC from the original 1945 policies. The report also suggested that ERRA be enlarged and relocated in the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff and that the Army undertake a comprehensive long range study of the reserve program.

As the Department of the Army pondered its next move, Congress took up UMT in earnest. On March 17, the day of Truman's speech to Congress, the Senate Armed Services Committee opened hearings on UMT. Secretary of State George Marshall, Secretary of Defense Forrestal and other administration witnesses all testified in glowing terms for the idea, but the impact of their testimony was diluted by the fact that they spoke only about UMT in general terms; as yet there was no specific UMT measure before Congress. During the last week of March, administration officials and congressional leaders worked furiously behind the scenes to frame an acceptable bill, but for the time being the two groups could only agree that if it came down to a choice between the draft and UMT, the former had to come first. Meanwhile, Forrestal produced more specific information as to the administration's plan for UMT. Speaking again before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Secretary of Defense estimated that a UMT program would cost some $860 million initially and perhaps as much as $4 billion annually after the first year. The former sum was in addition to the $3 billion supplemental budget request for
the military for FY 1949. After three years of operation, a UMT program could produce 850,000 trainees annually.

Forrestal's carefully prepared program of balanced force expansion supplemented by UMT was effectively shattered on March 25, when Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington testified before the Armed Services Committee. Symington, supported by the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Carl Spaatz, stated that the 55 air groups provided for in Forrestal's program were not enough; 70 groups was deemed the minimum to meet the needs of national security. The Air Force Secretary also asserted that UMT was no substitute for an enlarged Air Force. Forrestal tried to rebut Symington's testimony at a subsequent appearance before the House Armed Services Committee, but his efforts met with little success. That body had already passed a resolution favoring the 70 group Air Force, and during the hearings themselves, the ranking Democrat, Carl Vinson (D., Ga.), announced that he would support an amendment to the defense appropriations bill to provide an additional $900 million for aircraft construction.

On April 14, despite pro-UMT testimony by Army Chief of Staff Omar Bradley, the full House voted to add $822 million to the Air Force budget for FY 1949. Although both houses of Congress had yet to act formally on Truman's request for UMT, prospects for a UMT bill's passage looked increasingly dim.
The Army viewed UMT's growing troubles in Congress with a mixture of concern and resignation. Notwithstanding Bradley's support for UMT on Capitol Hill, many Army officers believed that it was now time for the Army to cease campaigning for this idea and reorient its manpower procurement plans and policies. The most cogent and forceful expression of this position came in two memoranda submitted to the Chief of Army Information in early April by Colonel S.L.A. Marshall, then serving with the Army staff in Washington. Marshall noted the prime position which UMT occupied in official Army doctrine and the importance of the idea to current reserve policies and strength estimates. He claimed, however, that "it was become daily more evident that this policy [UMT] will be unacceptable to Congress" and added that the Army now had to decide whether "it can afford to hold indefinitely to UMT as a matter of doctrine without depriving itself of the prospect for greater strength in being."

Marshall did urge the Army to continue the fight for UMT in the current Congress, but, he added, if it failed, the Army should cease all efforts to secure UMT. In concluding, Marshall spelled out two options in case of the failure of UMT: accepting a weaker substitute for UMT, such as the CMTC, or requesting greater strength in being, both active and reserve. In Marshall's view, the second of these two options was clearly more acceptable. He did
not indicate how the Army should recruit the additional manpower for this buildup, but he did make a persuasive case for the abandonment of UMT. It is difficult to determine the real impact of these two messages, but the fact that they were written at all indicates that some high ranking officers were beginning to question the Army's rigid dependence on UMT.

Further evidence of a shift in Army thinking about UMT and the reserves come from a P & O Division staff paper written in the spring of 1948. This document appears to have been written as a stimulus to further discussion, not as a formal staff proposal. In brief, the P & O draft outlined a system of conscription by which a certain number of men would be drafted for one year's service in the regular Army and then transferred to the National Guard or Class "A" ORC units for three years. Assuming that two-thirds of the annual draftee class of 300,000 men would go into these two reserve forces, the paper predicted that by 1952, the front-line Army reserves would number over 700,000 men. The study also recommended that two-year draftees serve for five years in the inactive reserve after their tour of active duty. At the end of the paper, the author (unknown) claimed that his proposals were in no way intended as a substitute for UMT; they were merely offered as a supplement to it. It was clear, however, that even under this system, UMT would be relegated to a secondary
role in providing the manpower for the Army's front-line reserves. As with Marshall's memoranda, it is difficult to tell what impact this document had, but it is clear from the subsequent development of Army reserve policy, that it represented an emerging body of Army thought on alternate methods to build up the reserves.

Whether coincidental or not, final congressional action on UMT and the draft conformed quite closely to the plan sketched out in the above staff paper. At the beginning of May, the Senate Armed Services Committee opened hearings on the administration's conscription proposals. During these sessions, UMT was barely mentioned. The House's earlier action on the supplemental Air Force appropriations amendment had by now convinced Forrestal to concentrate his efforts on securing the reenactment of the draft and to try for UMT later. In negotiations with Senate leaders, the Secretary of Defense thus agreed to changes in the draft bill which all but doomed UMT. The alterations included amendments stipulating that every person inducted under the new draft act would acquire a reserve obligation of five years, reducable to three if the inductee served in an organized reserve unit. Also accepted were provisions exempting veterans who joined an organized reserve unit from the draft, as well as 18-1/2 year olds who joined the National Guard. Another clause offered draft exemption to all current members of any training ORC unit, as long as
they remained with that unit. Finally, the bill allowed a limited number of 18 year olds to enlist for one year of active duty followed by four years of compulsory service in an organized reserve unit. Whether these provisions would provide the manpower and training incentives to turn the Army's (and Air Force's) reserve programs around was uncertain, but both the House and the Senate preferred to take this chance. Thus, despite substantial opposition in the House and a filibuster in the Senate, the Selective Service Act of 1948, with the above provisions intact, became law on June 24, 1948.

The period from September 1947 to June 1948 witnessed an unprecedented amount of government activity in the areas of manpower procurement and reserve policy. The results of this activity were mixed. Congress had rejected UMT, but had resurrected the draft and, in an important step for the future, linked it with provisions to induce reserve service. The outcome of the NME review of reserve policy was unknown, but it seemed certain to cause controversy. Lastly, the Department of the Army, perhaps in response to Congress' rejection of UMT, began to rethink its dependence on this idea. Unfortunately, no one on the Army staff attempted to relate the structure of the reserves to the nation's strategic needs, let alone question the necessity of large reserve forces and a mobilization strategy. Notwithstanding this omission, the Army had at least
admitted the need for a review of reserve policy. Henceforth, it would not debate the desirability of reserve policy reform, but simply the extent of that reform.

Presidential Politics and the Reserves: May to December 1948

The Department of the Army's review of its civilian components program entered a second phase in the late spring of 1948. The task of revising and restructuring the Army's reserve program to take account of changed expectations and unanticipated circumstances was a formidable task, but in one respect the job of reserve policy planning had been made slightly easier by the middle of the year. In March, Congress had passed a bill providing for inactive duty training pay for the Army and Air Force Reserves. President Truman had signed the measure into law immediately, thus giving the Army and the Air Force the means to attract reservists to unit training assignments.

Having secured inactive duty training pay for its reserves, the Army staff turned to the issue of the size of and the distribution of missions with its civilian components program. The fruit of their efforts was a new mobilization scheme known as the 18/25 division plan. Originally formulated in rough form by the G-3 division early in 1948, this plan contemplated significant changes in the original reserve troops basis of 27 National Guard divisions and 25 ORC class "B" divisions (and other
supporting units). Noting Congress' failure to enact UMT and provide sufficient funds for the reserve program, G-3 proposed significant reductions in the reserve troop basis and a more explicit mobilization plan. In essence, the 18/25 division plan provided for the creation of an Army M-day force, to be composed of regular Army and National Guard combat divisions and some ORC supporting units. No ORC combat divisions were to be included in the M-day force. Although many of the details remained to be worked out, G-3 circulated a first draft of the plan within the Army staff in March. Not surprisingly, ERRA objected to the scheme, claiming that it gave unwarranted priority to the National Guard in the formation of combat units for the M-day force. In early April, ERRA circulated its own paper on the future of the reserves which emphasized the unit mission of the ORC and provided for the formation of ORC combat divisions on an equal basis with the Guard.

By May, it was obvious that the Army's efforts to restructure its reserve program would not be accomplished without internal dissension.

The dispute between ERRA and G-3 over the provisions of the 18/25 division plan remained in suspension until early June. Only then did the latter respond to ERRA's April study of the ORC program. In its review of the study, the Organization and Training division claimed that the ORC existed not merely to supply units, but also to supply
fillers and replacements for the AUS as well. G-3 added that only part of the ORC would be needed immediately after mobilization. The rest of the force should be maintained as a pool of replacements for subsequent combat losses. It also claimed that because of the lack of UMT, the ORC could never recruit enough trained men to form legitimate class "A" combat divisions. Moreover, it was unlikely that Congress would appropriate enough funds to train all the troops needed to fill up these units.

Less than two weeks later, G-3 announced the beginning of a second restudy of the Army ORC program. The 18/25 division plan would form the basis of the restudy. Curiously, G-3 stated that the new reserve troop basis, like the old one, was based on the expectation of securing UMT. Under the new scheme, the ORC would supply only those class "A" units which neither the regular Army nor the Guard could supply. In addition, only those units which belonged to the M-day force were eligible to receive drill pay. Further details of the plan were released in the middle of June. In brief, it provided for the creation of an M-day force of 18 divisions (12 regular Army and 6 National Guard) by FY 1949 and a force of 25 divisions (12 active Army and 13 guard) by FY 1952. The ORC would supply a limited number of combat and service support units but no combat divisions. In all, the ORC would supply 510,000 men in T/O & E units, 210,000 in T/D units and 110,000 fillers.
G-3 also recommended that the strength of all non M-day ORC units be "controlled" so as to limit their eligibility for inactive duty training pay. The success of the 18/25 division plan depended on the Army's ability to funnel men and money to only those units which made up the M-day force. G-3 conceded that the recommended strength control measures might hurt the morale of the affected ORC formations, but urged the Chief of Staff to approve the plan nevertheless.

Just before the Army staff gave final approval to the policies supporting the 18/25 division plan, the Secretary of Defense released the long-awaited Gray Committee report, *Reserve Forces for National Security*. Yet the manner in which Forrestal handled its release raised doubts as to the administration's commitment to the report's recommendations. On August 6, the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued a statement that Forrestal had decided to delay release of the report, which had been scheduled for August 11. The Secretary of Defense, the statement continued, had decided to refer the report back to the Gray Committee for clarification of some of its recommendations. Three days later, however, Forrestal abruptly reversed himself and presented the report to the press personally. In explaining the confusion attending the release of the report, Forrestal claimed that originally he had wanted to refer the report back to the
Gray committee for further study because it had not yet been reviewed by the services and because some of its recommendations did not constitute administration policy. After he had issued the August 6 press release, Forrestal decided that more would be lost by further delay and decided to make the report public. In a brief, but revealing comment on the substance of the report, Forrestal stated that he found it extremely provocative and interesting, but added that the report did not represent a blueprint for administration action on reserve policy.

The reason for Forrestal's lack of enthusiasm for the report lay in its first recommendation: a call for the merging of the Army and Air National Guards with their respective federal reserve equivalent. Whatever its military merits, the idea of merging the guard with the ORC was but politically impossible. On several occasions since the turn of the century, most recently in 1943-1944, the National Guard had successfully rebuffed all attempts to abolish it or merge it with another reserve force. Complicating the situation further was the fact that 1948 was a Presidential election year, a time when the administration could least afford to offend the politically powerful National Guard. Predictably, reaction to the Gray Board report was mixed. The NGA and all but one state governor condemned the report in the strongest terms, and Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royal, who may have harbored
political ambitions, disassociated himself from it entirely. President Truman, who was involved in a stiff fight for reelection, refused public comment on the Gray proposals.

Military reaction, especially from the Army, was more favorable. One Department of the Army report described the Gray Committee's argument in favor of the federalization of the Guard as "objective and excellent." In October, General Westover reported that he concurred with 54 of the report's 90 recommendations, including the proposal to unite the guard and the ORC. In mid-November, the senior Army leadership met to discuss the report. All of the officers present, except Bradley, the Chief of Staff, thought federalization of the Guard was desirable. The latter did not disagree with this judgment, but warned that the fight to secure it might endanger other Army needs, such as the extension of the draft. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, endorsed the Gray Committee's recommendation calling for single reserve components in the Army and the Air Force. Notwithstanding the military's favorable reaction to the report, however, Forrestal and Truman realized that they could not afford to implement its recommendations in an election year. They thus decided to refer the federalization proposal to the services for further study and delay action on the other recommendations until 1949.
By mid-October, the pace of reserve policy reform had slowed. At this point, President Truman himself gave the reform cause a badly needed boost. On October 15, he issued an Executive Order (#10007) directing the Secretary of Defense and the three service secretaries to organize all authorized reserve component units and to establish vigorous, progressive programs of instruction for all elements of the reserves. In a letter to Forrestal which accompanied the order, the President suggested that he urge the service secretaries to assign a high ranking officer to head the reserve programs in each department. Truman also directed Forrestal to submit a report detailing each service's progress toward implementation of the Executive Order before the end of the year. The reasons for the issuance of this order were complex. Part of the reasoning behind this action was undoubtedly political, for Truman knew he could gain valuable political support from the increasingly powerful Reserve Officers Association by demonstrating his commitment to the unit concept favored by the vast majority of reserve officers. In addition, Truman's own background as a reserve officer and long standing concern with the reserves constituted an additional motive.

One should note, however, that Forrestal, the three service secretaries, and the three service chiefs all opposed this move and told the President so directly.
Apparently they were concerned that it would disrupt plans for enlargement of the regular services and adversely affect the ongoing organization of National Guard units. The fact that Truman chose to ignore the unanimous advice of his military advisors and issue the order suggests both the depth of his feeling on this issue and the precarious state of his reelection campaign. It is difficult to determine which motive predominated, although the military's opposition to the order does suggest that political considerations were uppermost in the President's mind.

Reaction to Truman's move was mixed. The ROA applauded the action, but newspaper opinion was less enthusiastic. Hanson Baldwin, the prominent military critic for the New York Times, commented that the order would have little practical effect without provision for more funds and the enactment of armory legislation for the reserves. He also noted that Truman had not proposed the merging of the National Guard and ORC, a step which, in Baldwin's mind, was essential if the country was to have a coherent and rational reserve policy. In the Department of the Army, Executive Order #10007 forced reserve planners to rethink some of the policy changes they had been contemplating, but its effect was not as great as the President had expected. In mid-November, the Section Five Committees met to discuss ways of implementing the
Executive Order. After some debate they agreed to recommend the appointment of an high ranking officer to head the Army's reserve program, the procurement of more regular Army instructors, the creation of 25 "B" class ORC divisions, more funds for reserve unit training and the elimination of all priorities for Guard units (except class "A" formations). After reviewing these recommendations, G-3 concurred with all but the proposal to train 25 class "B" ORC divisions and the suggestion to improve ORC unit training efforts. This division claimed that "measures to carry out such programs (for ORC unit training) have been initiated" and thus recommended no changes in present policies. Despite some objections from ERRA, G-3 forwarded the Section Five Committee resolutions and its own comments to the Secretary of the Army for use in preparing his report to Forrestal on the state of the Army reserve program. The limited nature of the Army staff's response to Truman's order indicates the former's unwillingness to initiate any changes in reserve policy that emphasized the unit concept. For appearances sake, the Army would have to make some previously unconsidered changes in its civilian components program, but these would be carefully limited so as not to interfere with the implementation of the 18/25 division plan.

In early December, the three service secretaries forwarded reports on their respective reserve programs
to the Secretary of Defense. John Sullivan, the Secretary of the Navy, reported that as of late 1948, the organization of the Naval Reserve was proceeding smoothly. At the time of the report, the Naval Reserve numbered some 1.02 million men, 184,000 of whom were engaged in inactive duty training (75 percent of the planned figure). Sullivan stated that in response to Truman's Executive Order, the Navy had stepped up unit training of reservists, increased the number of regular Navy officers and enlisted men assigned to the Naval Reserve and opened new reserve training centers. Finally, he listed a number of desirable actions which would further aid the Naval Reserve. These included allotment of more funds and the procurement of better equipment, but not the enactment of UMT. Sullivan's report was generally upbeat and confident, indicating the relative success which the Navy had had in organizing its reserves since World War II.

The report of Secretary of the Air Force, Symington was also positive, but it hinted at how far the Air Reserve had to go to match its Navy equivalent. As of the end of November 1948, the Air Reserve numbered 233,000 officers and 187,000 airmen. Of the combined total only 37,900 were participating in inactive duty training. Of the 354 Air Reserve units activated since 1946, only 15 were fully manned, class "A" formations. In describing the Air Force's response to Executive Order # 10007, Symington pointed out
that he had just appointed a three star general to serve as special assistant to the Chief of Staff for reserve affairs, and that funds for inactive duty training had been increased. In addition, he noted that Continental Air Command had just been relieved of planning duties, thus freeing it for reserve administration activities, and that the Adjutant General of the Air Force had sent a letter to all major commands urging greater emphasis on the reserves. In outlining steps needed to improve the Air Reserve, Symington emphasized the procurement of more training aids and facilities, obtaining more instructors and the merging of the Air Reserve and Air National Guard. Like Sullivan, he did not mention UMT. Although Symington dwelt at length on the Air Force's responses to Truman's order, they were in fact limited and modest in content. The Air Force's response to Executive Order # 10007, when viewed against the depressed state of the Air Reserve program, suggests that the improvement of its civilian components program was nowhere near the top of the its priorities at this time.

Secretary of the Army Royall's report to Forrestal faithfully adhered to the suggestions provided by the G-3 dominated Army staff in late November. He conceded that the figures for the ORC program--750,000 men total, 145,000 of whom were in units, and only 19,000 assigned to units in the 18 division Army--were troubling, but he stressed that the
Army was moving to correct many of the deficiencies. As proof, Royall pointed out that the Army had decided to appoint a major general as Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs, that priorities for training and equipping ORC units had been raised, that more regular Army personnel had been assigned to reserve units, and that more money and facilities would be provided to the ORC program. In explaining the many problems which the reserves had encountered since 1946, he blamed the failure to enact UMT, the lack of a reserve facilities bill, and insufficient appropriations. Only if these inadequacies were remedied soon could the Army fully implement its reserve policies. The thrust of Royall's report was that there were very few meaningful changes the Army itself could make; the future of its reserve program was in the hands of the Congress and the White House. In addition, the report indicated that notwithstanding Congress' recent refusal to enact UMT, the Army still viewed this idea as the foundation of its reserve policies. Needless to say, Royall's emphasis on the need for UMT also provided the Army with a convenient excuse should its reserve program fail to improve in the future.

After reviewing all three reports, Forrestal forwarded them to the President, along with his own comments on the military's reserve programs. The Secretary of Defense conceded that, with the possible exception of the Naval
Reserve, the nation's reserve forces were in poor shape. He blamed most of the problems on a shortage of instructors, poor facilities, and a lack of funds, but he claimed that the programs were improving. Forrestal did not recommend the merging of the Army National Guard and ORC, but he did urge the immediate unification of the Air Reserve and air National Guard. Echoing Royall's recommendations, he also pressed for the enactment of UMT, a joint reserve facilities bill, and a higher level of spending on the reserves. The lack of any original suggestions from the Secretary of Defense may have reflected his own confusion and uncertainty in the face of problems which turned out to be much more complex and controversial than he had expected. It may also have stemmed from sheer exhaustion on the part of Forrestal, for 1948 had been an extremely trying year for the nation's first Secretary of Defense. In any event, the lack of strong and informed leadership from the Secretary of Defense meant that the individual services would be free to pursue as much or as little reserve policy reform as they wished.

The issuance of Executive Order #10007 did not materially influence the Army staff's restudy of civilian component mobilization requirements and the related policy changes. Although Bradley had approved the G-3 suggested policy changes in mid-October, the 18/25 division
plan was not yet official Army policy. In early November, G-3 submitted a study of reserve mobilization requirements to the Chief of Staff. If argued that if the JCS accepted the Army's suggestions on this issue (then being considered by the JCS), then the Army staff should make a complete restudy of the civilian components program, based on active Army of 12 regular divisions, 18 Guard divisions, and 10 class "B" divisions. The addition of the 10 ORC formations constituted a slight retreat from G-3's earlier position, but it did not necessarily mean that ORC combat units would be included in the Army's striking force, which would be mobilized on the outbreak of war. More important, G-3 concluded that it was uneconomical to spend limited funds in peacetime to create a personnel mobilization base which could be created after the beginning of hostilities.

By now, other Army staff sections had become involved in the review of reserve policy. Early in December, the Plans and Operations Division conducted its own study of the reorientation of the Army reserve program and forwarded the results to the Deputy Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins. The study concluded that the original reserve troop basis was too large to fit the current mobilization needs of the Army. At present, 40 divisions (broken down as described above) constituted the largest force the Army could reasonably put in the field. P & O recommended that the authorized strength of the National Guard be reduced to
400,000 and that it organize 13 divisions at various levels of strength. It also urged that the ORC be limited to 485,000 men organized in 10 cadre divisions (and other supporting units) and 290,000 fillers. Most important, the study strongly implied that this new reserve program would not assume UMT.

In mid-December, the JCS completed their deliberations on Army mobilization requirements. They concluded that the Army should prepare to put in the field, a total of 40 combat divisions within the first year of a general mobilization. Having received the JCS guidance it had wanted, and additional staff support for a revision of reserve policies, the Army leadership now decided to initiate another review of its civilian components program. In mid-December, General Collins appointed a committee (membership not yet set) to study the reorientation of the Army's reserve structure. The committee would base its review on the above JCS guidance and assume a 400,000 man National Guard and and 800,000 man ORC organized to provide both units and fillers. Collins also designated the P & O division as the monitoring agency for the restudy. On December 20, G-3 circulated a first draft of a memorandum to serve as the basis of discussion for the committee. This draft proposed a reduction in the authorized strength of the Army civilian components from 1.6 million to 1.2 million men. It did not assume UMT as a means of
procurement for the reserves. The G-3 paper also outlined three possible plans for the reorganization of the National Guard and ORC. It was now clear that the Army was intent on a major restructuring of its reserve components, but the success of this effort remained in doubt.

Against the background of this activity, Congress had remained relatively silent on reserve policy in 1948. In late April and early May, Congressmen John Byrnes (R., Wisc.) and James Van Zandt (R., Pa.) had lambasted the Army and Air Force for the sorry state of their reserve programs, but beyond the passage of the inactive duty pay bill. Congress had done nothing of consequence in the area of reserve policy. Certain other congressmen and senators had spoken out against the Gray Board recommendations for merging the National Guard and ORC, but they had voiced no suggestions for improvements in reserve policy. In an election year, it seemed safer to avoid this sensitive issue together.

During the last half of 1948 the frenetic activity in the area of reserve policy which had marked the first part of the year continued. Significantly, this activity had turned reserve policy into a live public and political issue. Many reserve officers, particularly in the Army, welcomed the increased attention to their concerns, for only by publicizing the problems of the Army reserve program could they force the services to make meaningful
policy reforms. However, the events of 1948 had also demonstrated the difficulty of achieving major changes in the nation's reserve policies. The Gray Committee report had failed to provoke even a serious discussion of the problems inherent in the dual reserve structure of the Army. President Truman's Executive Order had boosted many Army reservists' hopes for real changes in reserve policies, but its impact had been modest. Although the Army seemed prepared to abandon its assumption of UMT and commit itself to a major review of its civilian components program, there were clear limits to the extent of acceptable reserve policy changes. It had conceded the need to reduce the planned size of its reserves, but only because of an inability to recruit sufficient personnel and a lack of funds, not because of a reevaluation of the need for large reserves in the nuclear age. Clearly, the process of reserve reform had only just begun.

The Byrnes Committee and the Ryder Restudy: January to November 1949

The year 1949 began just as the previous year had begun—with a new campaign for UMT. This effort, however, appeared to have even less chance of success than the 1948 campaign. The campaign commenced in early January with an announcement by the American Legion that it would renew the fight for UMT. Legion officials acknowledged that the President was reluctant to submit a UMT bill to Congress,
but they vowed to pressure him to do so. Yet Truman's attitude on UMT was not the real obstacle to enactment of UMT, for by this time, Congress had had enough of this issue. The high cost of UMT, the existence of the draft, and the program's huge size all stood against it. Even Carl Vinson, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and a longtime proponent of UMT, stated that he would not ask his committee to consider the idea in 1949, mainly for economic reasons. In any case, the relevance of UMT to military reserve policy was fast diminishing. The key reserve policy activity of 1949 was not the American Legion's attempt to revive UMT, but rather the Department of the Army's restudy of its civilian components program.

By mid-January, preparations for this effort were well under way. On the 7th, William Draper, the Under Secretary of the Army, informed the White House of the appointment of the committee to study the reorientation of Army reserve policy. Formally referred to as "The Secretary of the Army's Committee on Civilian Components," this group was to be headed by James F. Byrnes, former Senator from South Carolina, Supreme Court Justice and Secretary of State. Joining Byrnes on the committee were three other civilians, and three officers each from the regular Army, National Guard, and the Organized Reserves. Its task was to recommend a realistic reserve troop basis and propose new
methods of securing manpower for the reserves without relying on UMT. Given the fact that all previous studies of Army reserve policy had been conducted solely by the Army staff, with no publicity, one may wonder why the Army decided to assign the responsibility for reviewing its reserve program to a civilian-led committee operating in public. Several reasons suggest themselves. One may have been that the Army wanted to show President Truman and the nation as a whole that it was actively responding to Executive Order # 10007 and honestly attempting to upgrade its reserve program. A more important motive may have related to the expected results of the committee's deliberations. The Army staff, through the preparation of papers such as the one G-3 had drafted, had virtually dictated the Byrnes Committee findings in advance, and it was well aware of the negative reactive these findings might provoke. By making it appear that the changes in the Army reserve troop basis had been formulated by a civilian-led commission working ostensibly for the Secretary of the Army, the Army staff hoped to make the new policies more acceptable in the eyes of the general public and Congress.

On February 1, the Byrnes Committee opened its hearings, which consisted solely of five presentations from various divisions of the Army staff. The Organization and Training Divisions presented the first and longest briefing. In a revealing analysis of past reserve plans, G-3
representatives conceded that the civilian components structure developed in 1945 (700,000 National Guardsmen and 950,000 Organized Reservists) had been based not upon joint strategic requirements or upon logistical capabilities, but solely upon the idea of total mobilization. G-3 went on to argue that this reserve troop basis was far too large, and called for a drastic reduction in the overall size and number of units authorized for both reserve components. It then presented six alternate mobilization plans providing for the use of Guard and ORC units in varying combinations. G-3 recommended the scheme which gave the National Guard priority in organizing combat divisions and which provided for ORC divisions manned on a cadre basis only.

One noticeable gap in G-3's testimony was the absence of any real discussion of manpower procurement methods. It did not mention UMT or the draft explicitly, nor did it discuss any voluntary measures. Somewhat later in the hearings, the Personnel and Administration division did note the long term desirability of UMT as a means of supplying manpower to the reserves. In concluding its presentation, however, G-1 argued for the draft as a means funneling men to the civilian components, but it failed to supply any details.

The other noteworthy presentation was given by ERRA. This division openly criticized the Army staff's 40 division mobilization plan, claiming that it would destroy
the unit concept of the ORC. ERRA also complained about the unwarranted priority the scheme gave to the National Guard and asserted that it would require some sort of compulsion to procure sufficient men. In its stead, ERRA proposed a plan which assumed voluntary procurement means and which provided for an equal number of Guard and ORC divisions in the M-day force. Under the ERRA scheme, the ORC would supply 15 class "B" combat divisions, 156,000 fillers, 151,000 men for domestic mobilization duties, and 50,000 surplus officers. ERRA claimed that the needed manpower for this plan (500,000 enlisted men) could be procured through an intensified recruiting campaign and the granting of draft deferments to anyone serving in an ORC unit. ERRA admitted, however, that enlisted personnel in excess of this figure could only be secured through compulsion. Immediately after the ERRA presentation, the committee adjourned to draft a preliminary report.

On February 4, Byrnes forwarded the committee's interim report to the Secretary of the Army. In essence, it represented a compromise between the G-3 and ERRA mobilization plans. The report called for greater equality between the guard and the ORC, although it stated that some priority should still be accorded to the National Guard. The committee did, however, recommend that all ORC divisions be recalled as units during mobilization and urged the pooling of guard and ORC instructors, facilities
and equipment to get more use out of limited funds.

Five days later, Under Secretary Draper relayed the Army staff's comments to Byrnes. In brief, it had found the interim report totally unacceptable. The problem lay in the committee's recommendations as to the National Guard troop basis and the role of the ORC. Draper indicted that the Army staff wanted 13 Guard divisions organized at 75 percent strength, a limit of 450,000 on the overall strength of this component and the elimination of all ORC combat divisions from the mobilization plan. In addition, it found the committee's guidelines as to ORC strength highly unrealistic, considering the absence of UMT. Draper also told Byrnes that in view of the limited mobilization role of most ORC units, the committee should consider what role the personnel in these formations should play.

Finally, the Under Secretary requested Byrnes to reconvene his committee and revise its recommendations in consonance with the above "suggestions." The tone and content of Draper's letter to Byrnes indicates the Army's real view of the Committee—a rubber stamp for plans and policies which the Army staff had previously formulated.

In accordance with Draper's instructions, Byrnes duly reconvened the committee and directed the group to make major revisions in its interim recommendations. In mid-February, the committee submitted its final report. This document contained everything which the Army staff had
asked for. It recommended a reserve troop basis which included 13 Guard divisions manned at 75 percent strength, 12 additional Guard divisions organized at 4 percent strength, and set a ceiling of 475,000 for this force. The committee also recommended an ORC troop basis which provided for 25 class "B" service divisions with 200 percent officer strength. Henceforth, this component would be limited to 580,000 men. The purpose of overstocking ORC divisions with officers was to provide a source of well trained fillers during mobilization. Finally, the Byrnes report recommended extending the Selective Service Act to the reserves in order to provide an immediate source of manpower for the civilian components, but it also emphasized the long-term need for UMT.

The Byrnes Committee report met with mixed reactions upon its release. The New York Times was fairly positive, although it did claim erroneously that the report provided for significant increases in National Guard and ORC strength. The Times, a long-time supporter of UMT, also emphasized the committee's half-hearted endorsement of the idea. Within the Army staff, the response was also mixed. Not surprisingly, ERRA criticized the report harshly, claiming that it failed to provide for a balanced troop basis and that it did not live up to the spirit of President Truman's Executive Order on the reserves. G-1 expressed less contentious, but still substantial
objections to the report's vague statements on personnel procurement for the reserves. Despite these criticisms, the Section Five Committee approved the Byrnes Committee report in early March. Given the fact that the regular Army and National Guard representatives on this committee outnumbered ORC officers two to one, this action was a foregone conclusion. In the middle of the month, G-3 forwarded all Army staff comment on the report to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army with a recommendation for immediate approval of the document.

On April 12, both General Bradley and Secretary Royall gave their assent to the Byrnes Committee report. The report was then forwarded to the new Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, for final approval. Much to the Army's chagrin, however, this approval never came. In early May, the New York Times reported that Presidential advisor Harry Vaughan and Secretary of Defense Johnson had refused to accept the Byrnes Committee report, either in whole or in part. The reasons for this action were not specified, but it is likely that the provisions calling for major reductions in National Guard and ORC strength were the main culprits. In any case, it was clear that the Army would have to take a different tack if its efforts to reform its reserve program were to succeed.

One of the first steps the Army took in the wake of the rejection of the Byrnes Committee report was to reorganize
its reserve policymaking structure, which had proved cumbersome in past deliberations on reserve policy. In early April, the Army staff created a new interdivisional committee to monitor, expedite and coordinate the implementation of Army reserve policy. Referred to as the Reserve Components Coordinating Committee (RCCC), this group was headed by a representative of G-3 and included members of all General Staff divisions, but not ERRA or the NGB. This reorganization may have indeed been intended to streamline reserve policymaking within the Department of the Army, but it also represented a clear attempt by the General Staff to cut ERRA, the strongest opponent of the ORC pool concept, out of the policy process.

A brief review of the subjects discussed at one of the RCCC's early meetings supports this view. At the April 28 gathering, the committee discussed the future of the unit concept of the reserves. Major General Charles Ryder, the recently appointed Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs, dominated the discussion. Pointing to the difficulty many ORC units had experienced in organizing beyond cadre status, Ryder argued that the Army staff should now conduct a comprehensive survey of the ORC program to determine whether the unit concept was attainable. If it proved to be unrealistic, Ryder recommended that the Army abandon the idea completely and maintain the ORC as a pool of officers. General
Cunningham, the chairman of the RCCC, responded that now was not the time for such a review, but he did not rule one out for the future. Although General Ryder failed to secure approval for the restudy he wanted, the course of the discussion indicates that doubts about the efficacy of the reserve unit concept within the Army staff were as strong as ever.

Despite the refusal of the President and the Secretary of Defense to approve the Byrnes Committee report, the Army staff pursued its plans for streamlining the civilian components. In mid-April, it began a major consolidation and revision of ORC regulations and made additional changes in the official Army National Guard and ORC policies. The most important alteration concerned standards for reserve units, activation and progression. In late April, G-3 proposed that the existing scheme of classifying ORC units into A, B, and C levels be abolished. In its stead, it recommended a system by which reserve formations would be required to progress from cadre status through various intermediate stages to fully manned status at specified intervals or face deactivation. This plan would ensure that those ORC units which did exist would be better prepared to take the field, but it also meant that, given the current fiscal and personnel pressures on the reserve program, many reserve units would be disbanded. ERRA protested this proposal vigorously, but by late June, it
was forced to accept in principle the idea of forced unit progression.

June also witnessed a development which would have little immediate impact on Army reserve policy, but which would eventually transform the reserve policy formulation process. On the 14th, Secretary of Defense Johnson created by administrative action a Civilian Components Policy Board (CCPB) in the office of the Secretary of Defense. This committee would be chaired by a civilian, but it would also include a military executive officer and one under secretary, two National Guard, two reserve and one regular officer from each of the three service departments. The CCPB's task was to develop overall reserve policies and coordinate and maintain surveillance over the plans, policies, and programs of the civilian components of the armed forces. Much of the effectiveness of the CCPB would ultimately depend on how frequently it met and how closely the Secretary of Defense followed its advice, but by its creation, Johnson had provided himself the means, if he was so inclined, to standardize the reserve policies of the three services.

Back in the Department of the Army, the process of drafting the new ORC regulations was virtually complete by the end of June. But despite this progress, many Army staff officers, General Ryder among them, remained dissatisfied with the manner in which Army reserve policy
was being revised. Ryder believed that more vigorous and substantive action was required, and in early July, he again proposed a comprehensive restudy of the Army civilian components program. In a supporting memorandum, Ryder claimed that the reserve troop basis was too large for the number of reservists actually enrolled and urged the implementation of the concept of forced progression for ORC units. He also recommended the creation of a promotion system which favored members of troop basis (M-day) reserve units and the payment of individual reservists on an individual contract basis. In concluding his proposal, Ryder argued that the completion of this restudy and the implementation of the above recommendations would definitely determine "whether or not the idea of a federal reserve organized in units was capable of formation."

Ryder's memorandum was quickly routed to the Vice Chief of Staff's office, and on July 12, General Collins approved its recommendations. Like the Byrnes Committee review, Ryder's reserve restudy contemplated major reductions in both the overall size and in the number of units in the ORC troop basis. Unlike the former effort, however, this new reserve review was limited to General Staff divisions only. No civilians or special staff divisions (such as ERRA) would take part.

The Ryder Restudy occupied the four General Staff divisions for most of the summer, but by early September,
the review was essentially complete. On September 30, each of the participating divisions briefed the RCCC on the results of its individual review. The longest and most important presentation focused on the size, organization and personnel policies of the ORC. This report called for a reduction in ORC personnel to a level required to provide only supporting troops for the 25 division Army. This would mean cutting the number of authorized ORC units by 45 percent and limiting the overall strength of the force to 540,000 officers and men. 65 percent of the ORC would be in T/O&E units, 20 percent in T/D units and 15 percent in pools. In addition, this study called for the establishment of a single index of ORC unit organization (50 percent of T/O&E) and the institution of a forced unit progression system. On the issue of manpower procurement, the restudy noted the problems of maintaining adequate numbers of enlisted men in the ORC and the low numbers of men in organized units, but it proposed no significant changes in reserve manpower policy. It merely stated that with certain unspecified adjustments, the ORC could be kept properly manned by voluntary means.

The recommendations of the Ryder Restudy did provoke criticism, especially from ERRA, but plans to implement them went ahead smoothly. In late October, the RCCC discussed the finalization of the restudy's recommendations and prepared to present them to the Secretary of Defense and
the President. On November 8, the Section Five Committee considered and approved the Ryder Restudy and the policy changes that accompanied it. And on the 21st, General Collins gave his assent to the plan, despite the persistent objections of ERRA. At this point, the only remaining obstacles to implementation were the President and Secretary of Defense. Mindful of the fate of the Byrnes Committee report, the Army leadership decided to have the Chief of Staff present the Ryder Plan personally to Truman and Johnson, a task which had been left to the General Staff division chiefs in the spring. This precaution paid off, for in mid-January 1950, both the Secretary of Defense and the President approved the recommendations of the Ryder Restudy. The policies and plans which had been rejected in May 1949 were now ready for implementation.

Often forgotten in the tension and confusion of the Army staff debates over reserve policy was the actual state of the National Guard and the ORC. The former, aided by provisions of the Selective Service Act and Army policies granting it priority in forming combat units, had grown significantly since mid-1948. By the end of 1949, it numbered some 356,000 officers and men, all of whom belonged to organized units. The guard was still plagued by a shortage of enlisted men and regular Army instructors, but it had successfully reestablished itself as the Army’s front-line reserve force by the end of the decade. The
condition of the other reserve, the ORC, was much worse. From a high of 750,000 officers and men in late 1948, it had shrunk to less than 550,000 in December 1949. Even more troubling was the fact that only 120,000 men were enrolled in T/O&E units. The balance of the ORC were either in training units or unassigned. An ERC recruiting campaign, which had begun in early March, started off well, bringing in 100,000 men per month during the spring, but it tailed off considerably in the summer and fall. By December, the campaign was recruiting fewer men per month than left the ERC. In addition, the ORC continued to suffer from a shortage of instructors, poor equipment, a lack of armory space, and low morale. There were also problems in administering the inactive duty pay bill, a fact which hampered reserve unit training and caused additional resentment among reservists. At the beginning of 1950, the structure of the ORC more closely resembled G-3's pool concept than Palmer's unit idea. This situation had resulted partly from circumstances beyond the Army's control, but it was also the consequence of deliberate policy.

Conclusion

The period from the fall of 1947 to the winter of 1949 constituted a critical phase in the evolution of post-war Army reserve policy. In particular, two developments stand
out. Most obvious was the increased public and congressional attention focused on reserve policy in general and on Army reserve policy in particular. The fight over UMT and the draft, the Gray Board report, and the issuance of Executive Order 10007 had fixed the spotlight on the Army reserve program. Of all these developments, however, only the passage of the Selective Service Act of 1948, with its provisions to funnel draftees to the reserves would have a sustained impact on reserve policy. The second development was a change in the Department of the Army's attitude towards its reserve policies. By late 1947, the Army had conceded that its civilian components program was seriously out of step with post-war realities, and it began the painful process of review and reform. Especially noteworthy was the growing realization that it could no longer count on UMT to provide manpower for the reserves. Unfortunately, it failed to devote much thought to developing alternative procurement methods. The Army staff had also admitted that its reserve troop basis had had little relation with overall strategic requirements, but it failed to think through the problem of post-war reserve needs. On the eve of the Korean War, both the military and its civilian superiors recognized that the nation's reserve policies had problems, but neither had developed any satisfactory solutions.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER FOUR

1. Kenneth Royal to James Forrestal, September 4, 1947, Papers of James Forrestal, NARS.


4. James Wadsworth, Diary, January 7, 1948, Papers of James Wadsworth, LOC.


8. Memo, Gen. Omar Bradley to Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 11, 1948, Records of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), RG 218, NARS.


10. See note 1.


12. Memo, Gordon Gray to James Forrestal, January 19, 1948, CCS, RG 218, NARS.


249
14. Memo, Wilson to ERRA, November 17, 1948, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

15. Report of the Department of the Army Organized Reserve Corps Committee, January 1948, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.


17. ERRA, Study of the Reserve Program, April 4, 1948, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

18. Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy, p. 94.

19. James Wadsworth, Diary, March 24, 1948 and March 26, 1948, Papers of James Wadsworth, LOC.


21. Ibid., p. 100.

22. Ibid., p. 97-100.

23. Ibid., p. 105; See also Charles Gross, "UMT, A Study in American Ideology" (M.A. Thesis, Utah State University, 1973).

24. Memo, Col. S.L.A. Marshall to Chief, Army Information Division, April 9, 1948; Same to Same, April 13, 1948, both CCS, RG 218, NARS.

25. Plans and Operations Division, "Outline of a Plan to bring the Regular Army to authorized Strength and to Provide a Flow of Trained Personnel to the Reserves through the Use of a Selective Service System," Spring 1948, P&O, RG 165, NARS.


27. For a good description of the final Congressional debate on this measure, See Garhardt, The Draft and Public Policy, pp. 105-124.


29. ERRA, Presentation to the Gray Committee, March 19, 1948, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.
30. ERRA, Study of the ORC Program, April 5, 1948, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

31. Memo, Chief, Organization and Training Division to Chief, ERRA, June 8, 1948, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

32. Memo, Chief, Organization and Training Division to Chief, ERRA, June 17, 1948, RG 165, NARS.


34. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Press Release, August 6, 1948, CCS, RG 218, NARS.

35. Transcript of Press Conference, August 10, 1948, CCS, RG 218, NARS.


37. P&O Staff Report to General Wedemeyer, September 1, 1948, P&O, RG 165, NARS.

38. Brig. Gen. Wendell Westover, Memorandum for the Record, October 25, 1948, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

39. Col. George Butler, Memorandum for the Record, November 16, 1948, ERRA, RG 165, NARS. Interestingly, the only other group within the Department of the Army that disapproved of the Gray Committee Report was the Section Five Committee. See the Washington Post, December 12, 1948.

40. Memo, Joint Chiefs of Staff to James Forrestal, October 21, 1948, CCS, RG 218, NARS.

41. Presidential Executive Order # 10007, October 1948, G-1, RG 165, WNRC.

42. Memo, Harry S. Truman to James Forrestal, October 15, 1948, G-1, Rg 165, WNRC.

43. See Chapter Two, pp. 124-126.

44. James Forrestal to Harry S. Truman, October 6, 1948, OF, TL.

45. Same to same, October 15, 1948, OF, TL.

47. Memo, Smith to Kenneth Royall, November 13, 1948, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

48. Comments of G-3 Division on Resolution of Section Five Committee, November 24, 1948, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

49. John Sullivan to James Forrestal, December 1, 1948, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

50. Stuart Symington to James Forrestal, December 8, 1948, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

51. Kenneth Royall to James Forrestal, December 9, 1948, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

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CHAPTER FIVE
KOREA AND THE BEGINNING OF
RESERVE POLICY REFORM, 1950-1951

The Korean War represented a watershed in the history of post World War II reserve policy. The rapid and chaotic mobilization of the civilian components during the summer and fall of 1950 highlighted previously well known flaws in the nation's reserve policies and exposed several new ones as well. The resulting public protests and complaints forced both Congress and the executive branch to address these flaws and protect the rights of reservists. In the space of less than two years, the Department of Defense formulated two major pieces of reserve legislation, while the individual military departments completely recast their reserve programs. Subsequently, Congress enacted one of these measures and began consideration of the other. This activity resulted in a significantly changed Selective Service Act and a new approach to manpower procurement for the reserves. Although traditional reserve policy problems and attitudes persisted, a different set of concerns and priorities emerged after 1950.
The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1950 and the Outbreak of the Korean War: November 1949 - September 1950

Much of the reserve policy related activity which occurred in the Pentagon during the first half of 1950 concerned the implementation of the Army's new ORC program. On January 18, the new Secretary of the Army, Gordon Gray, publicly announced the details of the Army's revised reserve policies. In describing the new program, Gray stressed that it was cheaper and provided more promotion opportunities for junior officers than the old one. In addition, it would alleviate many of the equipment and armory shortages which had plagued the ORC program since its inception. Gray also noted the ORC unit reduction and forced progression provisions of the plan, but he did not emphasize then, for understandable reasons. Finally, he declared that given adequate levels of funding and recruiting, the new ORC would number 625,000 unit personnel and 230,000 fillers. Implementation of the plan was scheduled to begin on April 1st and be completed by the end of the year. Press reaction to the new program was generally favorable, although some newspapers misleadingly described it as a scheme for producing more reservists at less cost. The attitude of the reservists themselves was more restrained. Some members liked the new policies, but most reservists preferred to withhold their approval until they saw the plan in action.
As the date for the implementation of the new ORC program neared, an old nemesis of Army reserve planners, a shortage of enlisted men, resurfaced. During the eighteen month period from June 1948 to December 1949, the number of enlisted personnel in the Army Organized Reserves dropped from 465,000 to 272,000, a decline of over 40 percent. As of March 1, 1950, the Enlisted Reserve Corps numbered only 93,000 unit personnel, some 130,000 less than the Ryder Plan envisioned. The precipitous decline in the number of enlisted men in the ORC underlined the need for some fresh thinking about personnel procurement, but many members of the Army staff remained unaware of or indifferent to this problem. In mid-March, for example, G-1, supported by the Office of the Chief of Staff, circulated a proposal to raise the mental qualifications required for entry into the ERC to the same level as required for regular Army inductees. This idea, if enacted, would have deprived the Organized Reserves of enlisted men at the very time that it needed more of them. Pointing to this fact, TAG, G-3, and ERRA strongly opposed this recommendation and eventually forced its abandonment. But the fact that the proposal was circulated at all raises questions about the Army staff's perception of the needs of its reserve program. More encouraging was a directive from TAG, issued in late April, which requested each of the six Army area commanders to nominate the six most proficient reserve recruiters in his
area for the purpose of creating a special recruiting board for the ERC. TAG also organized two staff conferences, to be held in July and October, to discuss problems in ERC recruiting. Yet these moves, commendable as they were, amounted to no more than superficial attempts to solve a deep seated problem. Given the limited ORC budget, it was unlikely that the Army could ever recruit enough enlisted men by voluntary means alone. To be sure, UMT seemed out of the question, but there were other compulsory methods of raising men, such as a draft for the reserves or the furloughing of active service inductees into the civilian components. Yet there is no evidence that the Army staff discussed such options.

Notwithstanding the continued shortage of enlisted men in the ORC, the Army went ahead with the implementation of the Ryder plan. In early April, almost a hundred Army staff officers, armed with information charts and regulation manuals, traveled to each of the six Army areas to brief local officers on the new ORC program. By the middle of the month, all six CONUS armies had begun the transition to the new policies. All went smoothly until early May. At that time, a new player in reserve policy formulation asserted itself—the Bureau of the Budget (BoB). On May 10, this agency announced that it would withhold authorized funds for thirty, sixty, and ninety day tours of active duty for Army reservists. (In late April,
the Department of the Army had requested funding for these tours as a means of giving reserve officers needed experience in the regular Army.) The Bureau also imposed strict ceilings on the number of reserve personnel permitted to enroll in class "A" ORC units. The Army staff responded to these moves by sending a formal petition to the Budget Bureau asking it to reconsider its action. In addition, the G-3 division drafted a letter to the Chief of Staff which argued that the Bureau had exceeded its authority in dictating Army training programs and policies. The Army's pleas had some effect, for on June 8, the Bureau of the Budget agreed to permit conversion of 2000 fifteen day tour slots to an equivalent number (in total days) of thirty or sixty day tours of active duty for reservists. It refused, however, to remove the ceilings on the size of class "A" reserve formations. Late in July, the Bureau did allow a small increase in its ceiling figures, but it made no further concessions on the thirty-sixty-ninety day tour issue, despite continued pressure from the Department of the Army. Although the Bureau's actions hardly crippled to the new ORC plan, the manner and extent of this intervention in the implementation of Army reserve policies was disturbing. The BoB had exercised tight control of ORC expenditures ever since the war, but until now, it had been content to determine the general level of funding and leave the responsibility of allocating
money to specific reserve programs to the Army. By its actions in May, however, the Bureau indicated its intention to use its control of the purse to shape the details and determine the specific direction of reserve policy.

While the Department of the Army prepared for the implementation of its new reserve program and battled with the Bureau of the Budget, the Civilian Components Policy Board began drafting the first piece of comprehensive reserve legislation in the nation's history. This process had actually begun in October 1949, at the first meeting of the CCPB. At this gathering, some members of the board expressed concern about the lack of uniformity in reserve policies among the four services. Accordingly, at its second meeting, held on November 4th, the CCPB created a subcommittee to prepare legislation to equalize pay, benefits, training opportunities, and other policies among the various reserve programs. The subcommittee used as a model a measure the Navy Department had prepared in 1949 to update and streamline its reserve policies, referred to as the Roper Bill. This group began work immediately, but soon found that drafting one reserve bill which met all the requirements of the three services was no easy task. In mid-January 1950, at the fourth meeting of the CCPB, the subcommittee reported that its work was not yet complete and that it would not be able to finish it in time to submit the measure to Congress in 1950 unless drastic
steps were taken. Alarmed by this prospect, the CCPB voted
to take all possible measures to expedite preparation of
the bill, including an invitation to the Army and Air Force
reserve committees to consult with the CCPB subcommittee on

12 the legislation.

With the renewed backing of the board, the
subcommittee completed a rough outline of the proposed
Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1950 by February and circulated
copies to the military services for comment. In early
March, the CCPB reviewed both the draft outline of the bill
and the services' comments. It acknowledged that there
were several areas of significant differences over the
outline, but the CCPB nevertheless decided to appoint a
second subcommittee to complete a final draft of the

13 bill.

On March 21st, this subcommittee forwarded a complete
copy of the measure to the services for further comment.
As originally drafted, the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1950
constituted a step forward in the streamlining of military
reserve policies, but it did not provide for total
standardization of those policies. Most notably, it did
not establish uniform standards for reserve training time,
drill pay, pay and allowances, and organization. In
addition, the measure permitted the individual services
wide authority and broad discretion in the planning and
administration of their reserve programs. Finally, the
bill failed to address either the issues of personnel procurement or liability to recall.

By the time of the CCPB's next meeting in mid-April, it was obvious that the measure would have to be redrafted before submission to Congress. Service comment on the first version of the bill had been extensive and many points of differences between the three departments remained. Of all the services, the Air Force posed the strongest objections to the measure. Specifically, it criticized the bill's lack of uniformity of language and opposed the inclusion of even a few narrowly drafted provisions on reserve training, promotion, and retirement policies. In addition, the Air Force objected to the Army's attempts to include all laws relating to the civilian components in the measure, claiming that it (the Air Force) had not yet formulated a complete set of policies for its reserves. By contrast, the Army, Navy and Marine Corps were generally satisfied with the content of the draft. In any event, the Air Force's criticisms forced the CCPB subcommittee to revise the bill in late April. In early May, it submitted the new version to the services for comment, but again the Air Force opposed the measure. Exasperated by the services' inability to settle their differences, the executive committee of the CCPB decided to submit the revised measure and the comments of the services to the Secretary of Defense for final
resolution.

The actual task of reviewing the services' comments on the bill and recommending a solution to the impasse fell to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Marx Leva. After two months of consultation and deliberation, Leva forwarded his suggestions for resolving the services' differences to Secretary Johnson. On July 21, Johnson informed Leva that he had approved essentially all of his recommendations concerning the Armed Forces Reserve Act. In particular, he agreed with Leva that the bill should apply to all four services, that there should be uniformity of obligation for recall to active duty, that the organization of the reserves should be fixed by statute and that there should be a retired reserve for all services. In addition, the Secretary of Defense decided to grant the services the right to discharge reservists as necessary, to allow each to formulate its own reserve promotion policies and to give the services control over the formulation and implementation of reserve regulations. After Johnson's ruling, the bill was redrafted and submitted to the Bureau of the Budget for final consideration. In general, the Secretary of Defense had sided with the Army and the Navy in resolving differences over the bill, but he had made some concessions to the Air Force view that the individual services should formulate their own reserve policies. The CCPB and the Department of Defense (DoD) must have been
heartened by their success in drafting this measure, whatever its limitations, but by the time Secretary of Defense Johnson completed action on the bill, events in Northeast Asia had rendered it obsolete.

The Korean conflict caught the United States unprepared for war, both psychologically and materially. Conditioned to expect that the next war would be a total, all-out conflict in which mass armies or air power would dominate, the U.S. military and the public at large were not ready to fight or support a limited land war in Asia. Complicating the situation further was the fact that the United States, having just made a major political and military commitment to Western Europe, through the North Atlantic Treaty, could not concentrate solely on the new source of trouble in the Far East. Nevertheless, the Truman administration quickly decided to commit substantial U.S. forces to the defense of South Korea.

The service which would have to bear the brunt of this task, the Army, was the least prepared for war. The four Army divisions based in the Far East were manned at two-thirds of their authorized strength and had recently demobilized all of their medium tank battalions. Of the six divisions which composed the general reserve in the United States, only one, the 82nd airborne division, was combat ready. The remaining units were both undermanned and ill equipped. Yet in early July, General Douglas
MacArthur, commander of all U.S. and U.N. forces in the Far East, estimated that he would need a field army of four divisions, an airborne regimental combat team (RCT), three tank battalions, various artillery and combat support units and 30,000 fillers to restore the status quo ante. Given the desperate military situation on the Korean peninsula, the JCS had no choice but to strip the general reserve to meet MacArthur's needs. So great was the need for combat troops that even crucial mobilization base units were sent to Korea to buttress the allied line.

The dispatch of these forces helped stabilize the situation in Korea, but the Army now faced the task of rebuilding the depleted general reserve and providing fillers to build up understrength units and provide combat replacements. The draft, which the Congress had extended for another year in early July, could not supply trained men in time; the Army thus had to turn to the civilian components for manpower. To build up the general reserve, the JCS decided in mid-August to federalize four Army National Guard divisions. Unfortunately, due to manpower and equipment shortages, these units would not be ready for combat until the end of the year. To provide an immediate supply of trained individuals, the Army's most pressing requirement, it was decided to call up portions of the ORC, many of whose members were World War II veterans. An initial call for volunteers proved unsuccessful, and
in mid-August, the Army proceeded to notify 9,500 officers and 62,000 enlisted men that they would be recalled involuntarily by the end of October. A few days later, the Army decided to recall an additional 47,000 enlisted men, and in November, it added an additional 9,700 company grade officers to the recall quotas.

The recalled reservists played a critical role in filling out Army units, both in the U.S. and Korea, and in replacing the heavy combat losses of the summer and fall. The recall effort, however, was not without costs. The need for experienced men with certain critical skills (mostly in the combat arms) meant that World War II veterans were called in large numbers. Because of the need to keep existing ORC units intact, most of the men recalled came from the inactive and volunteer divisions of the ORC. Men in these categories had trained little since World War II and had believed that if the reserves were mobilized, they would be called up last, not first. The impact of the recall program on the lives of individual reservists was tragic, as the following case history suggests:

A youth of 18, just out of high school in 1942, volunteered for the Army. He fought in Europe, earned an officer's commission, and was mustered out four years later, in 1946. He then began his college training under the G.I. Bill of Rights. In June, 1950, at 26 he was graduated. He got a job, expecting to start his civilian career—late, since most college graduates get started at the age of 22. But he worked only a few months. Now, as an Inactive Reservist, he is being called back into the Army for at least 21 months of additional
service. When he gets out, he will be 28 and starting almost from scratch. (25)

From the perspective of the recalled reservists, the situation was made even more galling by the fact they were being called up while reservists belonging to units and college students exempt from the draft stayed at home. World War II veterans who had decided not to join the reserves in 1945 also enjoyed an exemption. A final problem with the Army's reserve mobilization effort stemmed from the use made of federalized National Guard units. Due to the fact that none of them were combat ready on mobilization, they were initially employed as training divisions for the large number of draftees now entering the Army. Needless to say, the guard leadership strongly objected to this policy and was not hesitant in saying so publicly.

The Army, of course, was not the only service which required trained replacements and fillers for use in Korea. The other three services were also forced to recall significant numbers of reservists during the summer and fall of 1950. The Navy, whose reserve needs ranked second only to those of the Army, brought up over 90,000 individual reservists, while the Air Force recalled 50,000 men, both in units and as individuals. The Marine Corps reserve, the most combat ready of the nation's civilian components, contributed almost all of its pre-war strength -- 16,000 unit members and 44,000 individuals -- by the end of
None of these three recall efforts were immune from problems, but because of their smaller scale, better organization, and fairer selection policies (proportionately more men from each of the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps reserve were called up), they exerted fewer hardships on those involved and thus provoked less public outcry than the Army's mobilization effort.

The chaotic and inequitable recall of Army reservists, especially those from the ORC, provoked a firestorm of public protest in the fall of 1950. Friends and relatives of affected reservists flooded Congress and the Pentagon with letters and telegrams of protest. In response to the growing public outrage over DoD mobilization policies, the new Secretary of Defense, George C. Marshall, who had succeeded Louis Johnson in September, directed the release of most categories of recalled reservists as soon as replacements became available. This move dampened the public furor for the time being, but it was now evident that major changes in the nation's reserve policies were needed.

One immediate consequence of the outbreak of the war and the chaotic mobilization that followed was the rebirth of the UMT campaign, which had languished since the spring of 1948. The daily horror stories of poorly trained inactive reservists being called up for service in Korea and the shoddy state of National Guard units lent weight to
the UMT cause. A program of UMT, its proponents claimed, would ensure that only non-veteran, trained reservists would be recalled in any future emergency. Spurred on by these arguments, several senators introduced a UMT bill in late July. A few weeks later, then Secretary of Defense Johnson urged the enactment of the measure, subject to the provison that it would not be initiated until the President would so direct. Notwithstanding Johnson's endorsement, it was clear that the Truman administration, preoccupied with the immediate demands of the war, was not prepared to enact UMT at this time. This view was confirmed on August 29, when the President urged the leaders of the House and Senate to suspend action on UMT until the next year. Truman claimed that because of the demands of the war on the regular forces, they did not possess the manpower to immediately implement UMT. All available training personnel were needed to train the large number of draftees then entering the military. Unwilling to refuse a Presidential request during time of war, congressional leaders agreed to shelve UMT for the time being. As in 1944 and 1948, the manpower requirements of a current military emergency had prevented consideration, if not the passage of, a UMT bill. This time, however, congressional support for the idea seemed more widespread than before, and it was likely that Congress would again consider it in 1951.
The Korean War and the hectic manpower mobilization which followed created both problems and opportunities for reserve planners. On the one hand, the demands of the conflict and the recall of individual reservists revealed heretofore unknown inadequacies and inequities in the nation's reserve policies. In particular, the events of the summer of 1950 underlined the absence of a coherent and uniform system for determining liability for recall and organizing reservists accordingly. As a result, many veteran but poorly prepared reservists were activated while reservists in units and non-veteran college students stayed at home. In addition, the existing distribution of units and individuals within the reserves was clearly not suited for a partial mobilization. Lastly, the Korean War threatened to undermine the Army's attempts to implement its new reserve program. Reserve policy planners could, however, find some potential benefits in the Korean War experience. First of all, the war had led to a dramatic upsurge in public and congressional support for UMT and the related concept of universal military service (UMS), thus increasing the possibility that the reserves would receive the manpower they needed. Second, the heightened interest in reserve policy could be used to secure other needed reforms such as the formulation of precise recall liability policies and officer promotion reforms. In any case, whatever the long-term policy consequences of the Korean
War mobilization, existing reserves program plans and assumptions were now obsolete.

**New DoD Plans for the Reserves, Passage of the UMTS Act: September 1950 - June 1951**

By the fall of 1950, the initial mobilization experience had begun to have an impact on the national defense establishment. The first change came on September 21, when Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson was forced to resign and was replaced by former Army Chief of Staff and Secretary of State George C. Marshall. The former's departure probably stemmed from his poor relations with the individual services (especially the Navy, which resented Johnson's cancellation of a supercarrier in 1949), but it was hastened by the U.S. military's evident lack of preparedness for Korea, a situation which arose in part from his zealous attempts to restrain defense spending in 1949-1950. In choosing Marshall to replace Johnson, Truman had selected a figure who commanded great respect and admiration within the government and who seemed uniquely qualified to revive the military's sagging fortunes in Korea. Not coincidentally, Marshall was also an enthusiastic advocate of UMT. The second noteworthy personnel change occurred in November, with the appointment of Anna Rosenberg as the nation's first Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower. A bright and capable administrator, Rosenberg was also a long-time supporter of
UMT, having been a member of the Compton Commission on Universal Training. She was not without her detractors, some of whom claimed that she had received the job merely because she was a woman and a UMT proponent, but her nomination was approved by the Senate by a wide margin in December 1950. Her arrival at the Pentagon, and the appointment of Marshall, signalled that a major reexamination of reserve policy was about to begin.

Even as the new Secretary of Defense and his assistant were moving into their offices, fresh thinking on reserve policy was taking place elsewhere in the Department of Defense. In late September, the Army staff discussed the problem of interesting the large number of selective servicemen now on active duty in the Army reserves. In mid-October, the RCCC and the Army General Staff circulated a plan to use the draft to provide trained manpower for the reserves. These agencies also debated the advisability of changing the present draft law to require fulfillment of a selective serviceman's reserve obligation in the Ready Reserve. All these ideas were incorporated in a study which Lt. Gen. Edward Brooks, Army G-1, forwarded to the Chief of Staff at the end of October. Brooks recommended that the term of service for draftees be extended to 30 months and that Congress require all draftees to serve in the reserves after their tour of active duty. He also advised against implementing UMT during the current
expansion of the active Army, although he did accept the necessity for some sort of UMT bill eventually.

The Army staff was not the only source of new thinking on reserve policy at this time. Also in October, Assistant Secretary of Defense Marx Leva forwarded to the White House a short paper on the future of military reserve policy. Leva argued that henceforth the nation should build up its reserves by requiring all draftees to enter the civilian components after their two year tour of active duty. Under this system, the reserves would grow in proportion with the regular forces (with a two year lag). Once the reserves had grown large enough, Leva suggested, then the active forces could safely be reduced, allowing the deferment of 18-19 year olds. After this had occurred, the military could then initiate UMT for all 18 year old males, who were currently being drafted. Leva outlined these ideas in greater detail for Under Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett in November, and Lovett then forwarded them to Marshall.

During the fall of 1950 the Army also began a general review of its reserve policies in light of the Korean War experience. On October 24, General J. Lawton Collins, the Chief of Staff, ordered the formation of an ad hoc committee to study new ways of organizing the civilian components. Specifically, the group was to recommend reserve policies which would allow for a limited, as well as total, mobilization of the reserves. The committee,
which consisted of representatives from the service secretary's office, the reserves, and the regular Army, first met in early November and worked steadily until the end of January. At its second meeting, the group agreed to use the official Department of the Army policies on the National Guard and ORC as the basis of its deliberations. It also decided that it would make recommendations on certain issues without seeking policy guidance from above.

Meanwhile, the recall of reservists continued. In early September, the Army began taking men from other elements of its reserves. These included some six year reservists (produced by the Selective Service Act of 1948) who had enrolled in organized reserve units. This action provoked protests from several members of the Army staff, who complained that the selective recall of unit reservists would make it more difficult for those formations which had lost personnel to the war to meet the new stiffer standards for unit certification. In an attempt to solve this problem, ERRA proposed in mid-September that the Army extend the time limit for attaining cadre strength for all affected ORC units. Subsequently, G-3 agreed to extend the deadline for all ORC units progressing to cadre strength by three months. Despite these problems, field reports on the progress of the new ORC program were encouraging. In early October, the First Army Area
reported that the implementation of the plan was 75 percent complete and that it would be able to meet the final implementation deadline of December 31, 1950 without difficulty. Other Army Area commanders reported that the absence of regular Army instructors and the loss of reserve personnel to Korea had slowed implementation of the new policies, but the dominant tone of these reports was also positive. As of the fall of 1950, the reserve callup had had little impact on the operation of the Army's reserve policy reforms. As long as the Army continued to activate only individual reservists, the Ryder plan was safe.

In the late fall, Marshall and Rosenberg began preparations for their own reserve policy review. Immediately after her appointment, Rosenberg sent a memorandum to Marshall describing the most important military manpower tasks confronting the Department of Defense. These included the reform of reserve policy, giving a greater role to the CCPB, resolving the differences between the military and civilian agencies' demands for manpower, and the development of a formula to dovetail Selective Service, UMT, and Universal Military Service. Rosenberg then began work on a comprehensive plan for military manpower procurement. After laboring through November and most of December, she and her staff completed an outline of a new draft measure, the Universal Military Training and Service (UMT & S) Act. In late
December, Rosenberg presented this outline to Marshall and other senior Defense Department officials. In brief, the new UMT and S Act imposed a military training or service obligation on every American male. It provided for the induction of 18 year olds for 27 months of service (or training) followed by a three to five year tour of duty with the reserves. In all, this measure envisioned a uniform military obligation, both active and reserve, of eight years. After describing the act, Rosenberg argued that its passage (which would greatly increase the number of men flowing into the reserves) made major reforms in the military's reserve programs necessary. The Assistant Secretary's plans provided not one but two methods for building up the reserves, UMT and a furlough of draftees, and thus offered a solution for one of the most vexing problems for the post-war reserves--a shortage of enlisted men. But as Rosenberg herself admitted, providing more manpower was not the sole answer to the reserves' problems. Issues such as organization, liability to recall, and ensuring training in units would also have to be addressed.

The UMT & S Act was introduced in Congress in early January. Almost immediately, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees began hearings on the measure. Both committees focused their attention on three elements of the administration's manpower proposals--the provisions for
longer draftee service and lowered age of induction, the term of reserve service and the size of active and reserve manpower pools, and the enactment of UMT. On the first of these issues, Congress forced significant but not crippling changes. After extensive testimony by Defense Department officials, both committees decided to reduce the term of active duty service for all draftees to 24 months, three less than the Pentagon had requested. More controversial than the term of service provision was DoD's plan to draft 18 year olds. In her appearance before the Senate Armed Service Committee, Anna Rosenberg argued that induction at 18 would cause less disruption in young men's lives and would allow a smoother transition to a UMT program. General Hershey and the service chiefs both stressed that this provision would reduce the need to draft fathers and also expand the safety margin for the manpower pool. The Senate Armed Services Committee and the upper house as a whole accepted these arguments, but the House of Representatives did not. It insisted on a minimum draft age of 18 and 1/2 years and successfully inserted this provision in the final draft of the bill. While the Congress refused to accept in its original form the provision that would have expanded the draft liable manpower pool and reduced the number of men the military could induct, it did make concessions to the DoD view on both of these issues.
Congress treated the second group of contested proposals, those relating to the length of active and reserve service overall, in a similar manner. The original version of the UMT and S Act gave the Department of Defense the authority to continue calling reservists to active duty, eliminate draft deferrals for National Guardsmen, and to establish a uniform eight year military obligation for all men entering military service. Although the House and Senate differed as to details, both quickly agreed to extend the Pentagon's authority to activate reservists and to set the active term of service for this class of personnel at twenty-four months. The two bodies waffled on the question of extending draft deferments to guardsmen and in essence agreed to continue exempting members of the National Guard enrolled in units as of February 1, 1951.

On the last issue, both the Senate and the House decided to impose an eight year military obligation (active and reserve) on any man entering the military, either volunteer or draftee. In addition, Congress stipulated that after two years of active duty service, all servicemen were obligated to serve in the reserves for six years. Unfortunately, it did not include a provision spelling out penalties for failure to serve in the reserves or specify the manner in which reserve service was to be performed.

Notwithstanding the latter omission, Congress had so far approved most of the provisions the Department of
Defense had requested. On the issue of UMT, however, it proved to be far less accommodating. Rosenberg's original plan had stipulated that when international conditions required that fewer young men be drafted, the President would be authorized to increase the basic training of those men inducted to six months and eliminate their active service requirement, thus leaving the draftee with only a reserve obligation. The Assistant Secretary had also included a provision for the creation of special UMT commission to advise the President on the details of the program. After reviewing these proposals, the Senate Armed Services Committee essentially left Rosenberg's plan intact. The House, though, revised her proposals drastically. First, it stipulated that UMT was not to be put into effect at the discretion of the President, but only after Congress had considered and approved a detailed UMT program. To formulate this program, the House created a body known as the National Security Training Commission (NSTC), which was to develop a UMT plan within six months after the UMT and S Act had been enacted. Finally, it stipulated that even after a UMT program was approved, it could not go into effect until the induction of all men under 19 years old had ceased. The net effect of these amendments was to give Congress another opportunity to review UMT before it could begin.
In the conference committee negotiations, the Senate conferees reluctantly accepted the House provisions on UMT. The conferees also agreed that the act was to last for four 50 years. Thus, while Congress had erected the machinery to begin planning for UMT, it retained veto power over the idea. On June 19, 1951, both the Senate and the House of Representatives approved the conference committee version of the UMT and S Act and sent it to the White House for Truman's signature, which came two days later. Congress' failure to enact UMT immediately caused the White House and Department of Defense some concern, but the final version of the measure did link procurement of personnel for the reserves with that for the regular forces and thus provided a guaranteed flow of trained manpower to the civilian components.

The UMT and S Act, as important as it was, did not address all the problems afflicting the nation's reserve system. Both Congress and the Pentagon realized that if the measure was to be effective, it would have to be accompanied by major changes in the reserve programs themselves. In early January 1951, Congressman Carl Vinson, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, told Anna Rosenberg that he wanted a new reserve program as the price for his support of UMT. In particular, Vinson wanted assurances that the flood of new reservists which would be produced by the UMT and S Act would be able to
join properly organized units. To consider the details of a new reserve program, Vinson had recently created a special subcommittee on reserve affairs, chaired by Representative Overton Brooks (D., La.). Vinson also hinted that if the Department of Defense did not formulate a new reserve bill, Brooks’ subcommittee would draft one itself. Rosenberg, who was also eager for reserve reform, quickly agreed to Vinson’s request. On January 19, she informed the service secretaries that she had asked the CCPB to formulate broad guidelines for the development of new reserve policies by the individual departments. After the CCPB guidelines had been approved, the services should revise their reserve policies accordingly.

The next day, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, John Floberg, sent Marshall a copy of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1950, which had remained in limbo since the summer of 1950. Floberg recommended that in view of Rosenberg’s plans for a complete revision of reserve policies, the bill should not be submitted to Congress at the time. Instead, he suggested that it be circulated in the services for comment and redrafted for later submission to Congress after the CCPB reserve policy guidelines had been approved.

Less than two weeks later, in response to pressure from Vinson and Brocks, Marshall announced that he would speed up consideration of the Armed Forces Reserve Act by
the Department of Defense. Accordingly, he requested prompt service department comment on the measure and on the advisability of sending it up to Capitol Hill in its present form. Neither the Army nor the Navy posed any strong objections to the bill, but they both noted that it did not take into account the new reserve guidelines then being formulated by the CCPB. They suggested that the measure not be submitted to Congress until it had been revised in accordance with the forthcoming CCPB guidelines and the pending UMT and S bill. The Air Force, by contrast, presented a detailed critique of the armed Forces Reserve Act and did not address the question of its suitability for review by Congress.

A few days later, on February 17, the CCPB completed a second draft of its proposed guidelines and forwarded it to the services and Assistant Secretary Rosenberg for comment. The most important CCPB proposal called for the division of all military reserves into three categories--ready, standby, and retired. The individual reservist's vulnerability to recall was determined by the component he was assigned to--the Ready Reservist being the the most liable to activation and the Retired Reservist the least. In addition, each of these components would be organized, trained and equipped according to the likelihood of its use. Surprisingly, all four services concurred with the proposed policies, although each suggested many technical
and stylistic changes. The most significant criticism came from the Navy, which expressed doubt that any adequate reserve training program could be supported by voluntary participation. Anna Rosenberg's reaction to the CCPB draft policies, however, was more critical. After reviewing the draft, she directed that the committee reconvene and revise the proposed guidelines. In compliance with Rosenberg's directive, the CCPB reconvened in late February. After more than a month's work, the CCPB completed a second draft of the reserve policy guidelines and sent it to Marshall's office for comment.

On April 6, Secretary of Defense Marshall formally approved the committee's recommendations and forwarded them to the three service departments, together with a request that they each submit a detailed outline of their individual reserve program (in accordance with the CCPB policies) to his office by April 11. The final draft of the CCPB reserve policies reflected much of the services' earlier criticism. It included a provision for the appointment of a reserve officer in each Chief of Staff's office, tightened up regulations to compel the obligated reservist to participate in unit training, guaranteed the integrity of reserve units during mobilization and allowed the reassignment of unit personnel once on active duty. Most important, the final version of the guidelines
retained the first draft's division of the reserves into ready, standby, and retired classes.

Although the individual services' own reserve policies were dependent on the general guidelines which the CCPB was developing, the military departments had begun reviewing their reserve programs before the CCPB commenced its work. In the Army, this effort was conducted almost solely by the Ad Hoc Committee on Army Reserve Policy, created by General Collins the previous October. After working through December and January, the Committee submitted an interim report to the Army Staff on February 7. It concluded that in light of the Korean experience, the Army should in the future avoid involuntary recalls of reservists and recommended that the active Army be enlarged so as to be able to meet the demands of another partial mobilization without the use of reservists. The report also argued that while federalization of the National Guard was desirable from a military point of view, it was politically impossible. More significantly, it stated that the present voluntary concept of a participation in reserve units must be changed to one of mandatory participation. An effective reserve program would require not only a system of compulsion to provide the manpower, it would also need a means of compelling those in the reserves to participate in reserve training. Such a program, the report continued, should provide for a pool of individuals to be used as
fillers and give the Secretary of the Army authority to provide preferential treatment for selected Ready Reserve units. This report directly reflected the impact of the Korean experience on the Army. The latter was now contemplating both the compulsory assignment of men to the reserves and compulsory participation by those men in reserve training, ideas which had been foreclosed before 1950.

The Army staff's reaction to the report was mixed. ERRA and the General Staff expressed general concurrence with its recommendations, but the NGB and the Comptroller, Lt. Gen. Raymond McClain, voiced strong criticisms. The former objected to the provisions which called for the organization of some guard units on a cadre basis and for cuts in National Guard training time, while the latter complained that the report had failed to adequately address the issue of the federalization of the guard. In forwarding the report to General Collins, Major General Maxwell Taylor, the head of G-3, noted these criticisms and suggested that the Army Planning Advisory Board consider them at its next meeting. Taylor also emphasized the report's recommendation for preferential treatment for selected Ready Reserve units and for the creation of a pool of fillers within the Army reserve.

On March 17th, at a meeting of the senior Army leadership, the committee's report was used as the basis of
discussion on the Army's position in the ongoing DoD review of reserve policy. The main topic at this meeting was the Army's future reserve mobilization needs. General Collins proposed an overall force of 54 divisions to be put in the field on M-Day. It was to be composed of 12 regular Army, 27 National Guard, and 8 ORC divisions, as well as 7 RCTs. Collins noted that the Army Organized Reserves would supply eight divisions to this force, but added that the ORC as a whole would be composed primarily of individuals. Two days later, Collins directed G-3 to prepare an outline of a new Army reserve program by March 26. This outline was to assume passage of the UMT and S Act and be based on the CCPB policies then being formulated and the February 7 report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Army Reserve Policy.

On March 29, G-3 presented the new reserve plan to General Collins. The final form of the scheme did not conform exactly to the suggestions made by the Chief of Staff on March 17, but in general, it reflected Collins' ideas on the subject. The plan envisioned that the National Guard would supply the majority of reserve units on M-day and that the ORC should provide some units, but mostly individuals. After further discussion and a few modifications, General Collins approved the new reserve plan on April 3. Taylor then forwarded copies of the scheme to all six Army Areas, with a message that implementation would begin in a few months. The addition
of this latter statement reflected the fact that, unlike in the past, the power to implement or block these policies no longer lay with the Army, but with the Department of Defense and Congress.

One week later, in response to Marshall's April 6 directive, the Assistant Secretary of the Army and the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force forwarded outlines of their service's reserve program to the Secretary of Defense. The most upbeat and confident report was, not surprisingly, that of Navy Secretary Francis P. Matthews. He stated outright that although it appeared that compulsion would be substituted for voluntarism in the area of manpower procurement (this report, like the others, assumed passage of the UMT and S Act in its original form), the basic policies of the Naval Reserve would remain unchanged. This force would continue to provide trained personnel to meet the needs of the active Navy in the event of a mobilization. Matthews also stressed that the Naval Reserve would continue to emphasize individual, not unit, training. As far as the future size of the Naval Reserve, the report predicted that with a yearly input from UMT of 160,000 men, the Organized Naval Reserve would number some 335,000 men by FY 1960. The other component of the Naval Reserve, the Volunteer Reserve would reach 878,000. In addition, Matthews' report envisioned that the Marine Corps Reserve, whose primary mission was the same as its Navy
equivalent, would number 230,000 men by the end of the 64 decade. Matthew's presentation suggested that despite the recall problems of 1950, the Navy was basically satisfied with its present reserve structure. The report also reflected the long standing Navy Department attitude towards UMT and the idea of compulsion—it would not lobby hard to secure UMT, but would always welcome the increased manpower it brought.

Even more revealing than Matthew's report was that of the Secretary of the Air Force, Thomas K. Finletter. His report argued that ideally, the Air Force Reserve should be increased to 1.6 million men by FY 1957, but it conceded that this figure was unattainable because of the huge cost involved (a total of $12.5 billion over six years). Finletter then described a more realistic plan, which provided for an Air Force Ready Reserve of 400,000 and a Standby Reserve of 140,000 by FY 1955. The primary mission of this force was to augment (provide fillers) the active Air Force during an emergency. His report went on to argue, however, that as long as the present state of world tension persisted, the U.S. Air Force had to be in a position to respond instantly in the event of a major war, and he claimed that the reserve force described above did not constitute a viable M-day force. Finletter concluded that as long as the nation required large M-day forces, the Department of Defense should not devote funds
for reserve programs which could be better spent building up the active military establishment. He did not state explicitly that the nation should do away with the reserves, but his report expressed clear doubts about the concept of large, organized reserves.

The report of Assistant Secretary of the Army Earl Johnson stands in contrast to that of Finletter. Johnson began by describing the new Army reserve program which Collins had approved less than two weeks before. This scheme provided for a three-tiered reserve—a Ready Reserve, a Standby Reserve, and a Retired Reserve. The most important of these components, the Ready Reserve, was in turn broken down into early ready and later ready sections. The first included nine National Guard divisions and supporting units, while the second consisted of twelve Guard and twelve ORC divisions and their support forces. With the passage of the UMT & S Act, the National Guard would grow to 370,000, and the ORC to 1.47 million men by FY 1955. A substantial portion of the ORC would be organized into pools in order to provide a source of fillers and combat replacements in the event of another Korea. Johnson's report also stressed the importance of ensuring that returning draftees and UMT trainees actually participate in reserve unit training. This presentation, in contrast to that of the Secretary of the Air Force, assumed that large, organized reserves were essential to
America's security and that they would continue to be important in the future. It also reflected the significant impact the Korean experience had had on Army thinking on reserve policy. The ORC plan for 1950-51, which had been formulated in 1949, had envisioned a small, compact reserve force manned exclusively by volunteers. The program which Johnson now described was significantly different. It provided for major increases in the size of the Army civilian components and for the use of compulsion as a means of reserve procurement.

After the release of the CCPB formulated reserve guidelines and the drafting of the individual services' reserve policies, the Department of Defense turned its attention to the Armed Forces Reserve Act, which had been virtually ignored since February. During the second week of April, Assistant Secretary of Defense Leva revised the act in accordance with the CCPB guidelines and circulated it among the services for comment. The only service to submit detailed comments was the Army, which argued that the bill would have to be reviewed again after the passage of the UMT & S Act. Leva and his staff then revised the bill again and forwarded a second draft to the military departments in mid-May. Within a week all four services had commented on the measure. Each voiced different criticisms of the bill, although the Air Force again posed the strongest objections. By this time (late May),
however, Assistant Secretary Rosenberg was being pressured by Congress to submit a reserve bill. She thus decided to convene a conference of the military departments, the CCPB, and her own staff in an attempt to settle all the remaining differences over the proposed Armed Forces Reserve Act. This meeting proved successful, and in late June, the Legislative Liaison Division of the Department of Defense drafted a final version of the measure and submitted it to the Bureau of the Budget for clearance. In response to DoD pressure, the latter agency quickly gave its assent, and on June 30, Congressman Brooks introduced the Armed Forces Reserve Act in the House. The measure was then referred to Brooks' own subcommittee, which had been holding hearings on reserve policy since January.

In June, the Defense Department also altered its reserve policy-making structure. The time and effort required to obtain agreement on the Armed Forces Reserve Act had convinced Marshall that he needed to expand his control over the military's reserve programs. Accordingly, on June 13, Marshall abolished the CCPB and replaced it with a new body, the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB). In structure and membership, the RFPB was identical to its predecessor, but its authority was enlarged. The RFPB would not only have the power to review, coordinate, and formulate all basic guidance for reserve policy, but it would also oversee the training policies, procurement
methods, facilities, budgets, and organization of the civilian components. Finally, Marshall directed that the civilian chairman of the committee was to act as his principal adviser on reserve policy. By defining the tasks of the RFPB so broadly, Marshall enhanced his own ability to manage the formulation and implementation of DoD reserve policies. He clearly wished to reduce the authority of the individual services in this area; the best way to accomplish this goal was to centralize control of reserve policy in his office. The success of this effort, however, depended on the Secretary of Defense's continuing interest in this subject and upon the intelligence and aggressiveness of the RFPB chairman.

By July, the locus of reserve policy activity had shifted to the Congress, which had begun consideration of the Armed Forces Reserve Act. At the same time, certain agencies within the executive branch continued to review reserve policy. One of these was the Bureau of the Budget, which released a report on the ORC program in late July. This report, which described the Army's Organized Reserve Corps as an expensive failure, recommended a series of measures to upgrade the program. These included giving every reservist an opportunity to resign (to weed out the slackers and malcontents), requiring a vigorous physical exam for every reservist, reducing the number of field grade officers, providing the means to absorb large numbers
of UMT trainees, and emphasizing the obligations of citizenship, rather than personal gain, in recruiting for the reserves. The significance of this report lies not so much in its harshly critical tone, but in the fact that through its release, the Bureau of the Budget had committed itself to a specific set of reserve policy reforms. Moreover, as its actions of May and June of 1950 indicated, the Bureau was willing to use its control of the military budget to support or undercut specific reserve programs and policies. The BoB realized that unchecked reserve growth meant spiraling costs, and it thus sought to increase its influence in the formulation and conduct of reserve policy.

Conclusion

By the middle of 1951, American reserve policy was in a state of flux. The three military departments had each formulated new reserve plans, a major piece of reserve legislation had passed Congress, and another measure was still pending. Significant changes in manpower procurement policies had been enacted, but the precise extent of these changes was not yet clear. In the midst of this confusion and uncertainty, however, two points stood out. First, whatever the fate of UMT, Congress had broadened the scope of compulsion in reserve policy. The shift away from voluntarism meant that the reserves would be much larger in the future than would have otherwise been the case. The implications for reserve budgets and mobilization plans was
profound. At the same time, it was apparent that Congress would attempt to limit the number of men on whom the most onerous reserve obligation would fall. Second, although the UMT & S Act was intended to furnish the manpower for a large reserve, the division of the reserve into three classes suggested that some planners were moving away from the assumption that the nation needed large, mobilizeable reserve forces. Still, radical reserve policy change was prevented by, among other things, the persistence of traditional service habits, attitudes and needs in this area. Reform was in the air, but its pace was bound to be slow and its extent uncertain.
FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER FIVE

1. Department of the Army, Press Release on New ORC Program, January 18, 1950, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.


5. Memo, G-1 to Army General Staff, March 17, 1950, G-1, RG 165, WNRC.

6. Memo, TAG to all Army Area Commanding Generals, April 27, 1950, G-1, RG 165, WNRC.

7. Colonel Ennis, Minutes of RCCC Meeting, May 18, 1950, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

8. Colonel Ennis, Minutes of RCCC Meeting, May 11, 1950, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

9. Colonel Ennis, Minutes of RCCC Meeting, June 8, 1950, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.


11. This measure was named after the head of the Navy board which formulated it earlier in 1949, Admiral J.W. Roper, Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel at this time. Minutes of the 3rd meeting of the CCPB, November 30-December 2, 1949, "Collection of Documents pertaining to the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1950", Library, USAMHI.


15. Department of the Air Force, Comments on draft of Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1950, April 1950, G-1 RG 165, WNRC.


17. Memo, G-1 to Col. Bendleton, May 1, 1950, G-1 RG 165, WNRC.

18. CCPB, Monthly Progress Report, June 1, 1950, ERRA RG 165, NARS.


24. Ibid., p. 183.


28. See, for example, the stories in Newsweek, October 30, 1950, pp. 27-28; U.S. News and World Report (USNWR), October 20, 1950, pp. 15-17; USNWR, October 6, 1950, p. 22; USNWR, November 17, 1950, pp. 18-19; and TIME, November 13, 1950, p. 23.
29. Louis Johnson to Millard Tydings, August 16, 1950, OF, TL.

30. Harry S. Truman to Carl Vinson, August 29, 1950, and
Harry S. Truman to Millard Tydings, August 29, 1950,
both OF, TL.

31. In August 1950, for example, the long delayed reserve
armories bill was finally enacted by Congress. See
U.S. Congress, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., August 31,
1950, Congressional Record, Vol. 95

32. Thomas J. Schneider, Oral History, pp. 87-89, TL;
Wilfred J. McNeil, Oral History, pp. 188-90, TL.

33. Col. Smith, Minutes of RCCC Meeting, September 25,
1950, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

34. Thomas J. Schneider, Oral History, TL, pp. 87-89;

35. Memo, Col. Brooks to Gen. J. Lawton Collins, October
31, 1950, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

36. Marx Leva to George Elsey, October 28, 1950, Papers
of George Elsey, TL.

37. Marx Leva to Robert Lovett, November 13, 1950, Papers
of George Elsey, TL.

38. Memo, Byers to Chief, G-3 Division, October 24, 1950,
ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

39. ERRA, Memorandum for the Record, November 8, 1950,
ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

40. Bodey, Minutes of RCCC Meeting, September 14, 19590,
ERRA, RG 165 NARS.

41. Memo, Col. Roberts to ERRA, October 9, 1950, ERRA,
RG 165, NARS.

42. Report on visits by Army staff to continental Army
Areas, October 1950, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

43. Anna Rosenberg to George C. Marshall, November 1950,
Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Office of the Assistant Secretary (Manpower,
Personnel, and Reserves) (OASD), Executive Office
Files (EOF), RG 330, NARS.
44. George C. Marshall to Service Secretaries, December 28, 1950, OASD, Chronological File (CF), RG 330, NARS.

45. This "safety margin" which General Hershey referred to in his testimony before Congress, was simply the pool of manpower available for immediate induction at any given time. See Gerhardt, The Draft And Public Policy, p. 151.


47. Ibid., pp. 161-64.

48. Ibid., pp. 165-69.

49. Memo, Col. Butler to Bruce, March 26, 1951, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

50. Anna Rosenberg to Service Secretaries, January 29, 1951, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

51. John Floberg to George C. Marshall, January 30, 1951, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

52. Marx Leva to Service Secretaries, February 10, 1951, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

53. Kimbal to George C. Marshall, February 13, 1951; Earl Johnson to Marx Leva, February 16, 1951, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

54. Memo, Air Force to Director, Office of Legislative Liaison, February 15, 1951, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

55. Memo, John Floberg to George C. Marshall, February 23, 1951, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

56. Memo, George C. Marshall to Service Secretaries, April 6, 1951, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

57. Department of Defense, "Approved DoD Policies Relating to the Reserve Components", April 6, 1951, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

58. Department of the Army, "Conclusions of Report on the Army Position with Reference to the Organization of the Civilian Components", February 7, 1951, ERRA RG 165, NARS.
59. Memo, ERRA to G-3, February 8, 1951; Memo, McClain to G-3, February 9, 1951, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.


61. Col. Winn, Memorandum for the Record, March 17, 1951, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.


63. Col. Duertly, Memorandum for the Record, March 29, 1951, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

64. Francis Matthews to George C. Marshall, April 16, 1951, OASD, Decimal Correspondence File (DCF), RG 330, NARS.

65. Thomas Finletter to George C. Marshall, April 10, 1951, OASD, DCF, RG 330, NARS.

66. Earl Johnson to George C. Marshall, April 10, 1951, OASD, DCF, RG 330, NARS.

67. Marx Leva to Reber, April 10, 1951, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

68. Earl Johnson to Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Liaison, April 25, 1951, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

69. Adams to Reber, May 16, 1951, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

70. Anna Rosenberg to Assistant Service Secretaries, June 11, 1951, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.


72. Department of Defense, Directive creating the Reserve Forces Policy Board, June 13, 1951, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

CHAPTER SIX

THE ARMED FORCES RESERVE ACT OF 1952

The last year and a half of Harry Truman's presidency witnessed the culmination of his administration's efforts to reform and reorganize the reserves. The central achievement was the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, which capped two and a half years of highly publicized and sometimes controversial government activity in the area of reserve policy. This measure, in combination with the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, solved many of the problems which had plagued the reserves since 1945 and which had been highlighted so vividly during the summer and fall of 1950. However, these two pieces of legislation, and the other reserve policy reforms of the 1950-52 period, failed to address all of the problems afflicting the nation's reserve programs. Notwithstanding the real legislative and administrative achievements of this period, by the end of 1952, there was some doubt as to how far the nation was willing to go in reforming its military reserve system.
Advance and Retreat in Reserve Policy: July 1951 to March 1952

The introduction of the Armed Forces Reserve Act in Congress signalled the start of a new phase in the effort to reform the nation's reserve policies. Until July 1952, Congress, not the White House or the Pentagon, would dominate this process. On July 2, Congressman Brooks announced that his subcommittee on reserve affairs would soon begin hearings on the Armed Forces Reserve Act and on other proposals to refashion the nation's reserve structure. A few days later, the subcommittee began its work, which would continue until early September.

Officials from the Department of Defense, the NGA, and the ROA were summoned to testify on the measure, which seemed destined to be amended in many crucial areas before final passage. Some of the most interesting testimony came from Edwin Burgess, former head (until June 1951) of the CCPB. In reviewing the history of the civilian components since 1945, Burgess noted that until 1950, the unit concept of the reserves had driven policy, at least in theory. He added, however, that the Korean War had exposed the inadequacies of this idea and argued that the reserves must also be organized to provide fillers for the quick expansion of the active forces, in addition to supplying pretrained units.

Another noteworthy feature of the initial House hearings on the Armed Forces Reserve Act was the severe
criticism of the Army voiced by representatives of the NGA and ROA. In particular, the former objected to the Army's failure to include provisions in the reserve bill which protected the Guard from undue federal control during mobilization and which guaranteed the integrity of all guard units when federalized. The NGA also opposed a clause in the act giving the RFPB a statutory charter. Apparently, it feared that this body would come to dominate the Army Section Five Committee (on which the guard was well represented) in the formulation of future reserve policies.

As the hearings progressed, it became apparent that the House subcommittee planned to amend the bill so as to limit the authority of the President to call up the Ready Reserve. When word of this proposed change reached the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs urged Marshall to oppose any attempts to limit the President's reserve recall powers. Nevertheless, in late August, the Brooks subcommittee voted overwhelmingly for an amendment that stipulated that Congress would first have to specify the size of a reserve recall before it could take place. In addition, the subcommittee revised the bill to require a congressional declaration of war or national emergency before the President could activate the Standby Reserve. It did retain the eight year military obligation provisions of the UMT & S Act, but added a clause allowing men who had served
on active duty for four years could transfer directly to the Standby Reserve after their tour of duty. This change was particularly damaging to the Navy and the Air Force since it ensured that these two services, because they required an initial four year tour of active duty for all enlistees, would have virtually no men obligated to Ready Reserve service. Other amendments included the equalizing pay and benefits among reserve components, placing the RFPB on a statutory basis (the NGA did not get its way here), increasing food and uniform allowances, and the appointment of individual assistant service secretaries for reserve affairs. The revised bill did, however, retain the key provision of the original DoD measure, the division of the reserves into ready, standby, and retired categories. On September 20, the full House Armed Services Committee approved the measure and the House of Representatives as a whole followed suit on October 15. The bill was then sent to the Senate, but because of the lateness of the session, the leaders of the upper house decided to defer consideration of the measure until the new year.

The opening of the House hearings on the Armed Forces Reserve Act did not lead to the complete cessation of all Department of Defense activity in this area. The RFPB subcommittee on reserve policy continued to work throughout the summer and early fall, considering further reforms and monitoring the progress of the individual services' reserve
programs. More significant, however, was the debate within the Department of the Army over the implementation of the new reserve policies. In early September, the Army staff supplied the six Army Area commanders with further details of these policies, the most important of which called for the elimination of nearly half the number of ORC divisions then authorized. This reorganization was to commence at the beginning of 1952. Finally, the Army staff cautioned all commanders not to give the new plan any publicity until the Department of the Army gave instructions to do so. Despite the nearness of the date for the implementation of the plan, however, it had not yet been approved in toto, and the Army staff itself remained deeply divided over the new policies. In the middle of September, Assistant Secretary of the Army Earl Johnson informed Secretary of the Army Frank Pace that the proposed reorganization had become the "subject of much controversy" and warned that even if the scheme were adopted, publicity would have to be handled carefully. The main sticking point was the planned reduction in the number of ORC divisions from twenty-five to thirteen, a move which the Chief of Staff himself had urged the previous March. Despite continued uneasiness about the plan, General Collins gave the go ahead for the reorganization of the ORC in mid-November. But this action failed to ease the doubts of his subordinates. One day after Collins had approved the plan, G-3 warned the Chief
of Staff that the public relations aspect of the new policies was extremely tricky, for opposition to them, both inside and outside of the Army, was growing. G-3 added that it might be necessary to retain all twenty-five ORC divisions for the time being in order to avoid a public outcry.

Such fears seemed justified by the amount of criticism the plan received from the Army staff after Collins had announced its approval. On November 20, ERRA protested the Chief of Staff's decision, claiming that the proposed reorganization would lower the morale of the reserves and soil the public image of the Army. One month later, the Section Five Committee on Reserve Policy unanimously adopted a resolution recommending the retention of all twenty-five ORC divisions. The opposition of these staff agencies further fueled the doubts of the G-3 division as to the wisdom of the ORC reductions, and on December 19, it urged Collins to defer the reorganization of the ORC until December 31, 1952, or until the impact on the reserve of the influx of 580,000 draftees (to occur during the last half of 1952) could be measured. One day later, the Chief of Staff reversed his earlier decision and directed the retention of the twenty-five existing ORC divisions. Collins added, however, that they all should be converted to infantry formations and that they were subject to individual recalls if needed. The significance of this
action lies not so much in the retention of twelve ORC divisions, but in the justification provided for the decision. Collins had followed G-3's advice not out of concern for the ORC or a desire to support the unit concept of the reserve, but because of a fear of adverse public reaction to the planned reduction. In deferring implementation of the plan, Collins did something which no Army Chief of Staff would have contemplated before 1950: he let the need to maintain a favorable public image override a demonstrable military necessity.

While the Army staff debated the wisdom of implementing its new reserve policies, the agency created by Congress to develop legislative recommendations on UMT, the National Security Training Commission, had been hard at work. After deliberating through the summer and early fall, the commission submitted its first report to Congress on October 28th. The NSTC recommended a six months program of UMT which would begin at age eighteen and be followed by seven and a half years of reserve service. The report outlined a program commencing with a class of 60,000 trainees per year and steadily increasing to 800,000 trainees annually. Of these trainees, the Army would take 50 percent, the Navy and Marine Corps 28 percent, and the Air Force 22 percent. The Commission estimated fixed initial costs for the program at $2 billion and annual recurring outlays at $2 billion. By the provisions of the
UMT & S Act of 1951, Congress had forty-five days from the start of the next session (to begin in January) to act on these recommendations. If it did not do so, the plan could not go into effect. Both the New York Times and the new Secretary of Defense, Robert Lovett, praised the commission's report, but there was no immediate reaction from Congress. Not until late November did Congressman Vinson announce that the House Armed Services Committee would hold hearings on UMT in January. This announcement was encouraging, but other congressional sources predicted a tough fight ahead for UMT.

Shortly before the new congressional session was to begin, the Armed Forces Policy Council met with Vinson and several other congressional leaders to work out the details of initiating UMT should Congress approve it. After reviewing several different plans, the two sides agreed on a scheme under which 60,000 17-19 year olds would volunteer for six months training on the condition that they accept 18 months reserve service afterwards. There was also a possibility that these reservists could be called to active duty if needed. Unfortunately, the two sides did not discuss the main obstacle to the full implementation of UMT: continued high draft calls for 19 year olds. Administration and congressional supporters of UMT may have hoped to enact this small scale program quickly, without raising this troublesome issue. No one in the Defense
Department was yet prepared to give a definite date for an end to high draft calls. On the eve of congressional hearings on UMT, the administration had developed a short term plan for implementing UMT, but had no long-range strategy for integrating it into the existing manpower procurement structure.

In early January 1952, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees commenced hearings on the NSTC report. Shortly afterwards, legislation embodying the December administration-congressional agreement on UMT was introduced in both houses of Congress. A long line of administration witnesses, including Lovett, Rosenberg, and General Hershey, testified in favor of these measures. Appearing before the House Armed Services Committee, the Secretary of Defense claimed that the primary purpose of UMT was to permit the "withering away of the draft" and suggested that in three years, it might be possible to halt conscription entirely, if UMT was enacted immediately. Assistant Secretary of Defense Rosenberg, however, was less sanguine about the prospects for an early end to the draft. At her appearance on Capitol Hill, Rosenberg told Congress that she could not and would not give a guarantee on how soon the Department of Defense could cease inductions and reduce the size of the active forces. Testimony such as this did nothing to enhance UMT's prospects with congressmen already uneasy about combining a
draft for the active forces with a draft for the reserves. By the end of January, it was obvious that UMT was in trouble. During February, both committees attached a series of crippling amendments to the UMT bills. In the House, congressmen concerned that the Department of Defense might recall UMT trainees to active service successfully inserted an amendment that prohibited the DoD from activating any of the initial class of UMT trainees. In the Senate, UMT opponents added a provision to require the Department of Defense to reduce the active forces by one man for every three reservists produced by UMT, once the program had graduated 300,000 trainees. Late in the month, one pro-UMT congressman informed the White House that although his own state delegation was behind the idea, it was unlikely that a UMT bill would pass without further major changes. On February 29, the House UMT bill finally reached the floor. In an effort to appease opponents of the measure, Vinson proposed an amendment which stipulated that UMT would not begin until all selective service inductions had ceased. The House accepted this amendment by an overwhelming margin, but this move did nothing to help the cause of UMT. On March 4, after a series of complicated parliamentary maneuvers, the House voted to recommit the bill to committee. The same day, Vinson announced that he would not seek further action on the measure. This decision led the Senate to suspend
action on its own UMT bill. UMT was dead.

Although the immediate cause of death lay in the shrewd parliamentary tactics of the UMT opposition, it was apparent long before the March vote that Congress was unwilling to enact UMT in the form proposed by the administration and NSTC. Many congressmen who had supported the principle of UMT in 1951 had changed their minds when confronted with the details of a practical program. Like so many other high minded proposals, the idea of requiring six months military training for every able bodied American male looked good in the abstract, but it lost much of its appeal when transformed into a concrete plan complete with specific numbers and costs. In addition, the fact that 1952 was an election year may have led some previously pro-UMT congressmen to take the politically expedient step of rejecting it.

Congress' refusal to enact UMT dealt a double blow to the reserves. First, it deprived the military of the means to procure large numbers of trained, but non-prior service men for the civilian components. Although the effect of Congress' action was mitigated somewhat by the fact that hundreds of thousands of draftees inducted in the early stages of the Korean War would soon be joining the civilian components, there was no certainty that draft calls would remain at a high enough level to provide sufficient numbers of men. In addition, reservists from this source had a
shorter Ready Reserve obligation than UMT trainees would have had. Second, Congress' rejection of UMT was accompanied by a refusal to enact measures which insured that the obligated reservist leaving active duty would actually join and train with an organized reserve unit. Thus, while the reserves would possess a large number of men on paper, none of these men would be forced to train in units. The actual contribution of hundreds of thousands of veteran reservists to the efficiency and readiness of the civilian components could not be guaranteed. The timing of Congress' action of UMT was also unfortunate, because it followed House passage of the Armed Forces Reserve Act, a measure which assumed the enactment of UMT. It was now up to the Senate to make the necessary adjustments to the measure, but given the importance of UMT to the reserves, it was doubtful that it could do so successfully.

In addition to the death of UMT, the month of March witnessed the climax of a series of long running battles between the Department of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget over reserve policy. As before, the dispute between the two agencies concerned the latter's use of its authority to allocate funds to support reserve policies the former opposed. On March 6, Rear Admiral McQuiston of the RFPB reported to Anna Rosenberg that the Bureau of the Budget was blocking a DoD sponsored bill to extend certain types of federal benefits to all members of the civilian
components. In 1951, Congress had mandated that such benefits for reservists and regulars be equalized, and McQuiston recommended that the Department of Defense oppose any effort by the Budget Bureau to reduce benefits to reservists.

The two departments also clashed over the issue of training pay for individual reservists. In mid-March, the Bureau of the Budget announced that it would allot no funds for individual inactive duty training during the current fiscal year. This move led Assistant Secretary of the Army Johnson to complain to the Chief of Staff that the BoB was hampering the Army's efforts to build up a pool of trained individual reinforcements. He urged Collins to seek the President's help in getting the Bureau of the Budget to cooperate with the Army on this issue. A few days later, G-3 circulated a memorandum which pointed out that for the fiscal years 1951 to 1953, the Budget Bureau had cut Army ORC and National Guard budget requests by an average of 40 percent for the former and 20 percent for the latter. The memo also argued that the past difficulty of obtaining BoB approval for certain reserve programs stemmed from a difference in concept between the two agencies as to the organization of the reserves. The Bureau of the Budget, G-3 contended, emphasized unit training and participation, while the Army was more interested in creating pools of trained individuals. The memorandum
concluded that as long as these differences persisted, the BoB would continue to use the budget process as a means of formulating reserve policy.

Perhaps the most vivid and revealing example of the manner in which the Budget Bureau controlled reserve policy was its handling of funds appropriated for reserve armory construction. The difficulties began in May 1951, when the Army requested release of $12.6 million out of a total of $16 million in funds appropriated for the construction of reserve armories. The BoB refused to release the money, claiming that the proposed buildings were to be used for individual reservist training. It stipulated that only programmed troop basis strength (i.e. unit strength) was considered a valid justification for armory construction. The Bureau also criticized specific features of the planned design of the armories and urged the Army to reduce the scale of its building program. After further negotiations, the BoB released $4 million of the total in October but continued to withhold the balance. In March 1952, after yet another round of negotiations, the Bureau transmitted the remaining $8.6 million in armory funds. At this time, however, it stipulated that the money could only be used to construct armories capable of accommodating a maximum of 400 men.
The Passage of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952
April to December 1952

Despite Congress' failure to enact UMT in March, Defense Department officials hoped that the Senate would consider the idea when it took up the Armed Forces Reserve Act. The prospect for a revival of UMT seemed slight, however, for the Senate appeared in no great hurry to consider this measure. Only after a direct appeal from Anna Rosenberg to Senator Richard Russell, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, did the latter begin consideration of the Armed Forces Reserve Act. Once the hearings on the bill began (in late May), it became obvious that the members of the committee were opposed to anything that hinted of UMT. In quick succession, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted down an NGA proposal to grant draft deferments to guardsmen enlisting after February 1, 1951 (men who had enlisted before this date were already draft deferred), and a New York National Guard suggestion for compulsory guard or ORC service for all draftees after their tour of active duty. The latter proposal was also opposed vigorously by the Navy, which argued that compulsion reduced the moral efficiency of the reserves. The committee also rejected amendments proposed by the Defense Department and General Hershey to funnel more trained men directly to Ready Reserve units. When the committee focused on the bill itself, it decided to abandon the ready, standby, and retired reserve classes provided
for in the House version and allow the Selective Service System or some other civilian agency control the recall of a majority of reservists. In this way, the government could better take into account family obligations, the length and nature of prior military service and the needs of the civilian economy in selecting which reservists would be activated. Due to DoD opposition, however, the committee included this idea only as a suggestion, not as an integral part of the bill. After a month of hearings, the Armed Services Committee approved the measure and sent it on to the full Senate, which passed it with few changes on June 27.

The final form of the Armed Forces Reserve Act was determined at a House-Senate conference in early July. The conferees agreed to retain the House bill's provision for a ready, standby, and retired reserve, as well as the guidelines for the recall of these categories. They retained the eight year military obligation, but they cut the total requirement for active and ready reserve service from six years to five. The conferees also gave the RFPB a permanent, statutory charter. Finally, they included restrictions of the President's power to call up the Ready Reserve and imposed a ceiling of 1.5 million men on this force. On July 9, 1952, both houses of Congress approved the conference report, and President Truman signed the Armed Forces Reserve Act into law the next day. For the
Defense Department, this measure, dubbed the "Magna Charter of the reserves" by its congressional proponents, was a mixed blessing. The act did codify and consolidate the myriad rules and regulations for the reserves and provide for a more orderly and equitable method of recalling reservists. But it also imposed an arbitrary upper limit on the size of the Ready Reserve and gave Congress an integral role in the recall process. Both of these provisions were bound to limit the President's flexibility in a military crisis. Most damaging of all, however, was the bill's failure to provide any practical means of compelling the obligated reservist to join and train with an organized reserve unit. The absence of such a provision threatened to render the idea of an eight year military obligation meaningless. The reserves would look impressive on paper, but possess little real readiness. In its emphasis on reordering the reserve recall system and its failure to address the problem noted above, the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 reflected the nature of the event that had given rise to it: the chaotic and inequitable reserve mobilization of 1950-51. No one had then been concerned with the failure of obligated reservists to train properly, and thus there was little public pressure on Congress to confront this problem squarely.
Reaction to the passage of the act was mixed. Hanson Baldwin, writing in the *New York Times*, applauded the bill's provisions for modernizing existing reserve regulations and equalizing benefits and training pay between and among the various reserve components. He added, however, that the measure could not revitalize the reserves by itself, for it assumed passage of UMT, which had been shelved by Congress in March. Baldwin also argued that the Armed Forces Reserve Act did nothing to settle the state reserve vs. federal reserve conflict, and he repeated his call for federalization of the National Guard. In addition, he noted that the bill lacked any provision to compel obligated reservists to train. Finally, he stated that although the act was a good first step towards the upgrading of the civilian components, Congress and the White House should not devote so much time and effort to the reserves. They should concentrate on building up the active forces, which, in Baldwin's mind, constituted the only viable military instrument in the nuclear age.

Little of Baldwin's criticism was new; he had opposed UMT and large reserves ever since the end of World War II. But this fact does not invalidate his observations on the deficiencies of the Armed Forces Reserve Act, especially its dependence on UMT and the absence of any means to ensure participation in reserve training.
The passage of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 precipitated much debate over reserve policy within the White House and the Department of Defense. One topic of discussion was the congressionally imposed restrictions on the President's recall authority. These restrictions distressed the Department of Defense and infuriated the President. Both believed that they represented a dangerous and unwarranted intrusion by Congress into a traditional area of executive authority. Accordingly, on August 2, Truman asked Lovett's office to draft legislation repealing the provisions of the Armed Forces Reserve Act that forced the President to consult Congress before calling out the Ready Reserve. Lovett forwarded this request to the services for comment. All three departments voiced approval of the action, especially the Army, which claimed that Congress could only impede a major reserve recall effort. In mid-September, the RFPB also expressed support for the President's suggestion. In addition, the board urged the Secretary of Defense to study the desirability of removing the congressionally imposed ceiling of 1.5 million for the Ready Reserve. (In mid-November, Lovett decided to seek postponement of the deadline for limiting the Ready Reserve to 1.5 million men). Despite this activity and the unanimity of Defense Department opinion on this issue, the Truman administration took no action on this issue. As a lame duck President,
Truman's influence on Capitol Hill was virtually nil, and it was unlikely that Congress would have agreed to lift these restrictions so soon after the passage of the Armed Forces Reserve Act.

More important than the discussions relating to restrictions on presidential authority was the debate within the Defense Department as to what means to adopt, if any, to force obligated reservists to train with organized reserve units. In early summer, the military services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense discussed the possibility of punishing reservists who failed to obey a recall order in the event of a partial mobilization. In mid-July, the Army, the service most affected by this problem, informed Anna Rosenberg that because of public relations considerations and the small number of reservists involved, it had decided not to invoke any penalty for failure to comply with a recall order for the time being. Later in the month, the new Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve affairs, Frederick Korth, informed Rosenberg that the Army would also not prosecute any obligated reservist who failed to engage in reserve unit training until the Department of Defense as a whole had established a uniform policy on this question. The Army was clearly reluctant to be the only service to penalize reservists for failing to train properly, although it was also clear that it would welcome greater authority to
require unit participation from its reservists.

In September, the Department of the Army attempted to clarify its position on this question. Early in the month, the Section Five Committee on National Guard and Reserve Policy urged the Secretary of the Army to seek legislation to assure active reserve participation by servicemen completing their tours of active duty. On September 6, Assistant Secretary Korth, responding to a Rosenberg query about the progress of the Army reserve under the Armed Forces Reserve Act, cited four problems with the measure: the absence of UMT, the restrictions placed upon the President's recall authority, the lack of sufficient funds, and the failure to provide any means to require participation by reservists in unit training programs.

Ten days later the RFPB recommended that the Secretary of Defense initiate a study of the problem of assuring active participation by obligated reservists in the proper training programs. Besides the need to establish a long range policy on this issue, there was also a question of what to do about the hundreds of thousands of men (draftees leaving active duty) who would soon be entering the reserves. In late September, Korth proposed a solution. For the time being, the military departments should be allowed to assign obligated reservists who had explicitly volunteered for unit training to the appropriate organized reserve unit (including the National Guard), with the
stipulation that no service employ involuntary assignment methods. Korth correctly perceived that the services, especially the Army, had to walk a fine line between being too heavy handed with their reservists and failing to secure any unit participation by obligated servicemen.

The Army staff was also careful not to move too quickly on this issue. On September 16, the Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs and representatives of G-1 briefed the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration, Lt. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, on current Army procedures for encouraging obligated reservists to join reserve units. These consisted of handing out information sheets on the reserve to separating servicemen and occasional talks by Army staff teams on the need to join a unit. There was no provision for punishment of any kind for failure to join a unit. Despite this omission, General Taylor accepted these procedures as adequate and designated G-1 as the staff agency to insure their proper implementation. During the fall, other divisions of the Army staff voiced their opinions on the problem of compelling reservists to join training units. ERRA expressed doubt as to the legality of requiring five year reservists (i.e. those produced by the Selective Service Act of 1948) to join reserve units. It also took note of the current plans to increase reserve unit participation by compulsory means, but expressed the hope that mandatory
assignment would not be necessary. Early in October, a G-3 staff member told G-1 that there was no sense in the Army instituting a mandatory assignment policy for reservists without first deciding on a legally enforceable and effective policy on this issue at the DoD level.

Finally, on October 13, G-1 recommended to the Secretary of the Army that the department withhold adoption of an official position on this question until the DoD study recommended by the RFPB was complete. These discussions indicated that no firm consensus on the question of enforcing reserve participation by obligated servicemen existed. Given this fact, the Army decided to play it safe and wait for firm DoD guidance.

In mid-November, Rosenberg announced to the RFPB and the services that she had decided not to establish an ad hoc committee in her office to investigate the problem of ensuring adequate reserve participation. Instead, she proposed to issue a directive leaving the decision to compel reserve participation to the service secretaries. She recommended, however, that a mandatory assignment policy not be implemented until experience showed that sufficient numbers of men for reserve units could not be obtained by voluntary methods. This decision stunned the RFPB and the services. At the next meeting of the Board, held on November 20-21, Army representatives argued forcefully that this problem required concerted and
immediate action by the four services. They also claimed that securing the means to ensure satisfactory participation by reservists was crucial to the future success of the entire reserve program. After some debate, the RFPB agreed to request Rosenberg to reconsider her decision not to establish a committee to study this issue and stated that if she did not reverse herself, then the RFPB would consider establishing its own committee on the problem of compelling reservists to serve in units. The decision of the normally docile RFPB to threaten to go over an Assistant Secretary of Defense's head suggests how strongly the services, particularly the Army, felt about this issue.

Because Rosenberg and the rest of the top civilian leadership of the Department of Defense were about to leave office, the question of mandatory assignment remained in suspense during the last months of 1952. Yet the manner in which Rosenberg, the Army, and the RFPB handled this issue suggests much about the place of compulsion in American military reserve policy. In early 1951, Rosenberg had sought and the services had welcomed legislation which obligated all young men (in theory) to eight years of active and reserve service. Despite the subsequent failure to enact UMT, the UMT & S Act did provide for compulsory reserve, as well as active, military service. Yet once this legislation was in place, both Rosenberg and the
services were extremely reluctant to adopt measures which would have made compulsory reserve service a reality. The more Rosenberg and the military departments considered the idea, the less appealing it looked, primarily because of public relations and economic considerations, but also because its full implementation might impair the effectiveness of the reserves. In any event, the position adopted by the Assistant Secretary of Defense and the services on this issue was remarkably close to that of Congress. Both DoD and Congress criticized each other's handling of the issue of compulsion, but neither was prepared in practice to use it to build up a large, organized reserve. The same could be said for the White House and the nation at large.

The issues of Presidential authority and the place of compulsion in reserve policy were not the only ones brought to a head by the passage of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952. The enactment of this measure also precipitated another dispute between the Department of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget over the latter's attempts to control reserve policy. On this occasion, the dispute focused on the services' right to negotiate contracts for active duty service with reserve officers, which had been provided for in the Armed Forces Reserve Act. The Bureau of the Budget, however, sought a voice in the negotiation of these contracts. Specifically, it sought to limit the length of
these agreements to two years, although Congress had explicitly provided for contracts of up to five years' duration. In late August, Assistant Secretary Rosenberg circulated a proposed DoD directive that incorporated the two year limit. In response, the services unanimously condemned the directive and urged action to induce the Bureau of the Budget to lift its restrictions. On the 17th, the RFPB also requested the Secretary of Defense to urge the BoB to allow active duty contracts with reservists for up to five years. None of these actions affected the position of the BoB, which by late September had received the backing of the Department of the Treasury.

At the end of September, however, other participants became involved in the dispute. During the summer, several representatives of the ROA had written Harry Vaughan at the White House to complain about the Budget Bureau's stand on the contract issue and to ask the President's assistance. Vaughan showed these letters to Truman, who then forwarded them to Frederick Lawton, Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The President also included a note expressing his own support for the reservists' point of view. Shortly thereafter, Lawton replied that members of the BoB were currently negotiating with the Department of Defense on this matter and that an agreement was expected shortly. But in fact, the Bureau continued to adhere to its original stand in the talks with Pentagon officials. By late
October, the negotiations were stalemated. At this point, Secretary of Defense Lovett intervened directly in the dispute. In a letter to Lawton on October 21, Lovett pointed out that all four services remained strongly opposed to the BoB imposed restrictions on the length of active duty contracts with reservists. He politely but firmly requested the Bureau to reconsider its position on this issue. The Secretary of Defense noted that a two year limit on these agreements made it difficult to get reservists to sign up for the program, thus leaving them vulnerable to further involuntary recalls. The military services, Lovett argued, should be free to determine the numbers, skills, and length of agreement needed of reservists without interference from other agencies.

Confronted with the opposition of both the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Bureau of the Budget broke off the talks with DoD and reassessed its position.

Two months later, on December 23, the BoB informed Lovett's office that it would allow negotiation of active duty contracts with reservists of up to five years' duration, provided that the services developed a system of controls on the number of reservists eligible for such agreements. The Department of Defense had gained its first clear cut victory in its long running dispute with the Budget Bureau over reserve policy, but it had required the intervention of both the President and the Secretary of
Defense to achieve it.

Despite the distractions produced by the debates over the place of compulsion in reserve policy and by the bitter disputes with the Bureau of the Budget, the services had managed to begin implementing the main provisions of the Armed Forces Reserve Act in the late summer and early fall of 1952. In early October, the three service secretaries reported to Lovett on the progress of this effort and their attempts to revitalize their reserve programs. Secretary Matthews of the Navy Department reported that all was well with the Navy and Marine Corps Reserves and noted that the passage of the Armed Forces Reserve Act had necessitated few policy changes and little reorganization in the Navy. The Air Force, on the other hand, acknowledged that it had some distance to go in organizing its reserve components, but pointed out that the recently approved Smith Committee report provided an excellent blueprint for the reorganization of the Air Force reserves. This report linked, for the first time since the war, reserve missions and personnel strengths with the Air Force's master war plan. Secretary of the Army Frank Pace's report was the least optimistic of the three. It pointed out that the entire Army reserve structure was being reviewed in light of the Armed Forces Reserve Act, but added that four major problems remained to be addressed. They included the lack of authority to require reserve participation in units, the
absence of UMT, the restrictions on the President's authority to call up the Ready Reserve, and the lack of adequate funding for the reserves. As the Truman years ended, it was clear that despite the substantial progress in reserve policy reform which had occurred since 1950, serious problems remained.

Conclusion

The Korean War experience and the legislation that followed profoundly altered the nature of the challenges facing reserve policy planners. For the time being, the problem which had plagued the reserves since 1946, a shortage of enlisted men, was solved. In addition, Congress and the Department of Defense had developed a more orderly and equitable system for the recall of reservists. These were positive steps, but a number of traditional difficulties persisted. The reserve programs of all four services continued to be underfunded and remained subject to an extraordinary degree of policy control by an outside agency that had its own ideas on reserve policy. In addition, the question of reserve organization still provoked sharp debate within the Army staff.

The most important new challenge for reserve policy planners, ensuring satisfactory reserve participation by obligated servicemen, was also the most fundamental, since it involved the question of compulsion. The Army realized that it needed to compel reservists to join organized
units, but it was all too aware of the negative consequences of this policy, both in terms of the Army's public image and the effectiveness of the reserves. As a result, the Army and the other three services relied exclusively on voluntary methods to man reserve units. Yet compulsion remained at the center of the reserve policy debate in the early 1950s, in part because it was intimately linked to the issues of the size and readiness of the reserve. One traditional assumption, the need for large reserves, and a new one, the requirement for an instantly ready reserve, necessitated compulsion, at least in theory. The Korean War mobilization had shifted the focus of the debate on this question from UMT to assigning reservists to units, but it had failed to settle it definitively. It was now up to Truman's successor to solve this problem.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER SIX


2. Statement of Edwin Burgess before the Brooks Subcommittee on Reserve Policy, August 1, 1951, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

3. National Guard Association comments on the Armed Forces Reserve Act, July 26, 1951, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.


5. Memo, Burnham to Butler, August 30, 1951, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

6. Memo, Fenn to Chairman, RFPB, October 18, 1951, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

7. Memo, Bergin to Army Area Commanding Generals, September 5, 1951, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

8. Memo, Edwin Johnson to Frank Pace, September 19, 1951, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.


11. Section V Committee Resolution on Proposed reserve Reorganization, December 14, 1951, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.


13. ERRA, Memorandum for the Record, December 20, 1951, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.


330
15. In September 1951, George C. Marshall resigned as Secretary of Defense, in accordance with his promise to President Truman to remain in that office for only one year. He was succeeded by Lovett, who had served as Under Secretary of Defense. This information was supplied to me by Dr. Forrest Pogue, during a conversation held in his Washington office in November 1983.


17. Memo, Rosenberg to Service Secretaries, December 22, 1951, Bureau of the Budget, Director's Files, RG 51, NARS.


21. Congressman Frank Boykin to Dawson, February 27, 1952, OF, TL.


25. Memo, McQuiston to Anna Rosenberg, March 20, 1952, OASD, CF, RG 330, NARS.


27. Memo, Decker to G-3, March 19, 1952, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.


31. Memo, Captain Walker to Anna Rosenberg, April 7, 1952, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.


33. Ibid., pp. 176-77.


35. Harry S. Truman to Robert Lovett, August 2, 1952, OF, TL.

36. Memo, Levings to Anna Rosenberg, August 25, 1952, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

37. Report of Actions taken at the 17th Meeting of the RFPB, September 17, 1952, ERRA, RG 165, NA; Foster to Service Secretaries, November 14, 1952, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

38. Memo, Frederick Korth to Anna Rosenberg, July 21, 1952, G-1, RG 165, WNRC.

39. Memo, Frederick Korth to Anna Rosenberg, July 28, 1952, G-1, RG 165, NARS.

40. Report on Section V Committee Meeting, September 405, 1952, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

41. Memo, Frederick Korth to Anna Rosenberg, September 6, 1952, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

42. RFPB, Report of Actions Taken at 17th Meeting of RFPB, September 17, 1952, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

43. Korth to Rosenberg, September 22, 1952, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

44. Colonel O'Brien, Memorandum for the Record, September 16, 1952, RG 165, NARS.

45. Memo, ERRA to G-1, September 30, 1952, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

46. Colonel Hill, G-3 Division to G-1, October 2, 1952, G-3, RG 165, NARS.

47. G-1 to Frank Pace, October 13, 1952, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

48. Kirby to RFPB, November 19, 1952, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.
49. RFPB, Actions Taken at the 19th Meeting of the RFPB, November 23, 1952, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

50. Compelling reserve service so soon after the involuntary recalls of the Korean War had obvious drawbacks from a public relations point of view. In addition, by placing so many men in training units, where they would be paid and require equipment, such a policy also possessed fiscal shortcomings. This step would in all likelihood lead to greatly increased reserve expenditures at a time when the nation was attempting to build up its active forces in Europe and elsewhere. In addition, many experts on reserve policy, especially in the Navy and the Air Force, believed that a small reserve composed of volunteers was much more effective and useful than a large force which had been manned by compulsion.

51. RFPB, Report of Actions Taken at the 17th Meeting of the RFPB, September 17, 1952, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

52. Harry S. Truman to Frederick Lawton, September 26, 1952, Bureau of the Budget, Director's Files, RG 51, NARS.

53. Robert Lovett to Frederick Lawton, October 21, 1952, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

54. Memo, Anna Rosenberg to Service Secretaries, December 23, 1952, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.


56. McQuiston to Anna Rosenberg, October 8, 1952, OASD, DCF, RG 330, NARS.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE NEW LOOK AND RESERVE REFORM, 1953-1954

If the Korean War represents one watershed in the history of American reserve policy, then the election of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President in 1952 represents another. The former Supreme Allied Commander and Army Chief of Staff brought with him to the White House a new set of assumptions and attitudes with respect to American defense policy. Translated into specific policies, these assumptions and attitudes would lead to significantly greater emphasis on the reserves and stimulate a wide ranging debate of the future of reserve policy. This debate resulted in the formulation of a new and ambitious program of reserve policy reform, the National Reserve Plan. It is worth analyzing the deliberations leading up to the National Reserve Plan, for they constitute a microcosm of the entire reserve policy debate since World War II. Four issues in particular stood out: the place of compulsion in reserve policy; the size of the reserves in relation to the size of the active forces; the question of the proper organization of the civilian components; and the personnel character (veteran vs. non-veteran) of the reserves. Although Congress would amend the National
Reserve Plan significantly before enacting it into law (treated in the next chapter), this scheme did establish the parameters and policy choices for subsequent generations of reserve planners and administrators.

**The New Look and the Reserve Policy:**
*January 1953 to January 1954*

Even before Dwight D. Eisenhower took the oath of office as President, it was apparent that he was planning major changes in American defense policy. In December 1952, while returning home from a trip to South Korea, the President-elect and his main prospective cabinet members, John Foster Dulles, Charles E. Wilson, and George M. 1 Humphrey, held a series of conferences on American national security policy for the 1950s. They were joined by a number of high ranking military officers, including Admiral Arthur Radford, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet and a candidate for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At these meetings, Eisenhower argued that defense policy should be based on the long haul concept, rather than on the idea of preparing for one critical year, which had formed the basis for the Truman administration's military policy. He also expressed concern that any of the rearmament programs then underway might bankrupt the civilian economy and turn the nation into a garrison state. The President-elect concluded that the country's security depended not only on the size and strength of her fighting
forces, but also on the vitality of the domestic economy. These ideas meshed neatly with those of Admiral Radford, who claimed that American military power was currently overextended and urged that this power be concentrated on or near the North American continent. Eisenhower's arguments also jibed with Dulles' assertion that communism could best be contained through the maintenance of massive retaliatory power rather than by fighting limited conventional wars in every corner of the globe. The December conferences did not produce any specific plan of military policy reform, but they did suggest that, under an Eisenhower administration, defense spending would be held in check and the money that was spent on defense would be concentrated less on maintaining the nation's conventional warfare capability than in the Truman years.

Once in the White House, Eisenhower sought an immediate reduction in defense appropriations. In early March, the National Security Council directed the Department of Defense to submit program revisions which would bring expenditures for FY 1954 down from the $45.4 billion proposed by the Truman administration to a more modest $41.2 billion. Not surprisingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed these reductions, claiming that they would reduce the rate of the ongoing military buildup and seriously endanger the nation's security. Convinced that the service chiefs would be of little help in limiting
defense expenditures, the top civilian officials at the
Pentagon decided to do the job themselves. The new
defense budget, which was completed in May, reduced
new appropriations from $41.2 billion to $36 billion and
cut planned expenditures from $45.4 billion to $43.2
billion. New obligations from the Air Force were cut by
$5 billion, those for the Navy by $1.7 billion, while
funds for the Army were actually increased by $1.5
billion. Despite protests from the Air Force and its
supporters in Congress, both houses eventually accepted the
reductions and even added $1 billion to the amount cut
from the Defense Department budget.

While Eisenhower's subordinates trimmed defense
spending, the President himself announced the shift in
philosophy behind his administration's defense policy. In
late April, Eisenhower publicly rejected the "year of
maximum danger" concept which had driven his predecessor's
policies and stressed the importance of preparing for the
long haul. Although the difference between this policy and
that of the Truman years was not as great as the President
made out at the time, it was to have a considerable impact
on the pattern of defense spending during the middle and
late 1950s. Military expenditures would now be kept fairly
constant, with none of the sudden shifts of the early part
of the decade. In addition, the elimination of the crisis
year concept deprived the services of the argument that a
given set of military requirements had to be on hand by a specific date, a fact which made it easier to avoid sudden changes in the defense budget. By early summer, the outline of the Administration's new approach to defense policy was clear: reduced but stable defense budgets and an emphasis on the long haul. However, the specific programs and force levels required by the new policy had not yet been decided upon.

For the first half of 1953, most of the White House's attention was focused on military policy as a whole, but it also had to deal with specific defense issues, one of which was UMT. As Eisenhower entered office, UMT idea clung stubbornly to life, primarily due to the efforts of the National Security Training Commission, which had continued to lobby for the idea. Less than a month after Eisenhower's election, the NSTC had asked the President-elect for a hearing to present its views on the subject. Eisenhower, who had said little about UMT during the campaign, agreed to the meeting, which took place on January 2, 1953. Representing the NSTC was Henry McClain, a former Army general who had worked with Compton Commission. In his talk with the President-elect, McClain urged Eisenhower to formulate a new UMT bill for immediate submission to Congress. The President, however, refused to commit himself.
The issue of UMT remained in suspense until late January 1953. At that time, several senators introduced their own UMT bill in Congress. This development caused concern in the White House. Bryce Harlow, Special Assistant to the President, pointed out to General Wilton Persons, Eisenhower's Deputy Assistant for Congressional Affairs, that this action could cause problems for the administration, which risked being caught behind Congress if it decided to act on the UMT bill. Three weeks later, the President himself told a news conference that he was having a commission study the problem, but he added that did not think that UMT and a draft could be operated simultaneously. Given the complexity and uncertain popularity of compulsory military training, Eisenhower was anxious to avoid committing himself on this issue, but he was handicapped by the fact that Congress controlled action on UMT.

Early in April, a new problem cropped up. At this time, the NSTC was composed of only two members out of a required five. Eisenhower would soon have to appoint three new members, including a chairman, or else the commission would lapse. But, as General Persons pointed out to Sherman Adams, the Assistant to the President, the appointment of new members might reactivate the UMT debate, which in turn might force the White House to adopt a firm position on the idea, something which it was
not yet prepared to do. Yet if Eisenhower failed to act, he would be indicating his opposition to UMT, even if indirectly.

By May, the situation had become even more difficult. The Senate Armed Services Committee, with the support of the NSTC and the Selective Service System, had requested a favorable report on the pending UMT bill. This move forced the Department of Defense to urge publicly that the measure not be enacted at this time, because it would interfere with the operation of the draft. The Pentagon was supported by Arthur Flemming, interim head of the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) and a rising star in the administration, but the White House remained silent.

The situation reached the crisis stage in mid-June. Although the Senate as a whole had failed to act on the UMT bill (presumably because of the Department of Defense's objections), the House was now refusing to allot additional funds for the NSTC unless the White House expressed unequivocal support for this body. On the 16th, Harlow told Persons that the Administration would have to take a position on UMT, for its attitude would be indicated in any case by its response to the NSTC's plea for funds. As a solution, Harlow suggested that the President appoint a chairman and two new members and request a modest appropriation for the coming fiscal year. At the same time, Eisenhower should announce that these actions were
premised on his desire to obtain a detailed report by the NSTC on the feasibility of operating a draft and UMT concurrently. Harlow successfully sold the President on this idea a few days later, and in late July, Eisenhower announced the appointment of Julius Ochs Adler, the general manager of the New York Times, to head the NSTC. He also directed the commission to study the problems of military manpower procurement and the feasibility of combining the draft and UMT. One week later, however, the President announced that he had also requested the Office of Defense Mobilization to submit a separate report on the availability of manpower to operate UMT and supply the needs of the active forces. Both the NSTC and the ODM were to submit their reports to the President by December 1, 1953.

Despite the seeming decisiveness of these actions, the White House had in fact managed to avoid taking a firm stand on UMT. By his appointment of Adler and two additional members to the NSTC, Eisenhower had merely indicated that he did not want to limit his options in formulating changes in existing manpower procurement policies. But by ordering the NSTC to undertake a study of these policies, the President managed to put off a definite decision on UMT. In doing so, he had the support of most of the civilian and military leadership at the Department of Defense, none of whom favored the immediate enactment of this idea.
The President's real attitude on UMT could be gauged from the fact that he had also requested the Office of Defense Mobilization to produce a second report on military manpower procurement. Its chief, Arthur Flemming, had sided with the Pentagon in May in opposing the passage of a UMT bill by Congress and was known to be a favorite of the President's. (His growing stature within the administration was indicated in mid-August, when Eisenhower issued an executive order increasing his authority and responsibilities as head of ODM. ) The President's gesture of support for the NSTC was thus somewhat deceiving. By appointing ODM to study the same issues as the NSTC, Eisenhower ensured that he would not be put in the position of having to accept the NSTC's recommendations, which would likely call for UMT, or reject them and thus do nothing at all about the problem. Moreover, it was probable that the ODM report would urge some other course of reserve reform than the enactment of UMT, thereby allowing Eisenhower the freedom of maneuver he desired.

While the White House formulated a new approach to defense policy and struggled to avoid a decision on UMT, the services proceeded with the implementation of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952. Not surprisingly, the most difficult part of this process concerned the enforcement of a reserve training obligation of servicemen leaving active duty. During the second week of January, the Office of the
Army Chief of Staff recommended to the incoming Secretary of the Army, Robert Stevens, that he approve the mandatory assignment of individuals who failed to participate in reserve training programs. Recognizing the sensitivity of this issue, the Office of the Chief of Staff also urged Stevens to consult with the other service secretaries before announcing the adoption of this policy. On January 19, the new Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower, James Mitchell, responded by requesting that the Army staff study this question further and modify the policy before implementing it. Mitchell stressed the importance of getting Army policy on this question correct and expressed skepticism as to the value of involuntary assignment in the reserves. Despite the civilian leadership's refusal to approve its recommendation, the Army staff continued to press for action on this subject. In early February, its efforts were rewarded. On the 7th, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower announced the formation of an ad hoc committee to study the problem of inadequate reserve participation by obligated servicemen and assigned the chairmanship of this group to the Department of the Army.

The appointment of this committee was an encouraging step, but it did nothing to assuage the continuing doubts of some Army staff officers as to the wisdom of involuntarily assigning reservists to training units. In
late March, the G-1 division discussed this issue in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff. G-1 noted that the Army had two options in dealing with the large number of eight year reservists who would soon be released from active duty— involuntary assignment or voluntary assignment. Citing the absence of an effective means of enforcing participation in unit training programs, G-1 argued that the Army had no choice but to adopt the latter policy. It also pointed out that an involuntary assignment policy would build up unwanted reserve units and drive up the Army reserve budget.

These arguments were echoed in the final report of the DoD ad hoc Committee on Mandatory Assignment of Reservists. This document, which was released in early April, concluded that it would be impractical to establish a uniform DoD policy on involuntary assignment because of the differing sizes and purposes of the services' reserves. The report also stated that the decision to invoke involuntary assignment should be the responsibility of the individual service secretary, but urged continued adherence to the principle of voluntary reserve participation for the time being.

This report was then forwarded to the services, all of which, including the Army, concurred in its findings.

The release of the ad hoc committee report did not end the Department of the Army debate over this issue. In late June, G-2 reported to the Chief of Staff that the G-3
division was preparing a plan to assign reservists involuntarily to units. G-3's scheme also called for the mandatory assignment of reservists to units which would be used merely as training formations to provide fillers for the active Army. The announcement of this plan provoked another strong response from Assistant Secretary Mitchell. On July 3, he sent a message to G-3 that argued that current Department of the Army policies for mandatory assignment appeared to be mere expedients to the demands of the moment. Mitchell also repeated his earlier doubts as to the wisdom of abandoning the "traditional volunteer concept of the reserves" and, citing the success of the individual oriented Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force reserve programs, questioned the present unit concept of the Army reserves. The Assistant Secretary added that if it was proven that a unit reserve program was needed, then only purely military requirements should determine the number of reserve formations to be organized. Mitchell concluded that there was a compelling need to reexamine the Army reserve program, a statement hardly calculated to appeal to a service which had completed two major reserve program reviews in the previous three years. One week later, in response to Mitchell's memorandum, G-1 asserted that the real problem with the Army reserves stemmed not from the unit concept but from the lack of participation by obligated servicemen in reserve unit training. G-1
concluded that if the DoD wanted Army reserve units manned at full strength without resorting to UMT, it would have to depart from the volunteer manning concept. It did add, however, that reserve units for mobilization purposes should be manned by volunteers. Mitchell's criticism of the mandatory assignment policy and the Army staff's response underlined both the growing importance attached to this question and the continued confusion and uncertainty within the Army as to the place of compulsion in reserve policy.

In the mid-summer of 1953, the true dimensions of the problem of inadequate reserve participation became evident. Figures released by the Department of the Army revealed that as of June 30, 1953, only 25 percent of all obligated officers and 3.8 percent of obligated enlisted men had enrolled in and were training with organized reserve units. These figures confirmed what many Army staff officers and reservists had been predicting since the early part of 1952: few obligated men would voluntarily participate in reserve training programs. The Pentagon's response to this news was somewhat haphazard. The Army Operations Office undertook a study to isolate the factors which caused this lack of participation, while the RFPB announced plans to form its own ad hoc committee on the involuntary assignment question. More noteworthy than these actions was the formulation of a new Army reserve
plan that was based entirely on individual training. The scheme, which originated in General Collins' office, retained the volunteer concept of manning the reserve, but emphasized the attainment of individual MOS proficiency, rather than unit readiness. Under this plan, the Army reserves' primary mission would be to furnish individual fillers to the active Army. The scheme was never seriously considered by the Army staff as a whole, but the fact that it was proposed at all indicates the concern with which the Army viewed the problem of insufficient reserve participation. Also, the plan's adoption of the volunteer manning concept suggests that more than a few Army officers believed that, whatever the immediate benefits of compulsory assignment, the latter policy was ill suited for the reserves.

By the fall, the Army had ceased all efforts to secure authority to assign reservists involuntarily to training units, and it now began exploring ways to stimulate voluntary participation. In late October, ERRA, which had been among the most vocal of Army staff agencies arguing for mandatory assignment in the spring, recommended to the Chief of Staff a series of steps to increase the attractiveness of reserve service. In a subsequent review of the Army Reserve program, ERRA proposed that an obligated reservist who had not joined either a National Guard or Army Reserve unit be assigned in a reinforcement
status to a reserve division near his home. The affected reservist would not be required to participate in any training. The farthest the Army would now go in the direction of mandatory assignment was to inaugurate in December a mobilization plan that involved the involuntary assignment of a limited number of six-year reservists to active Army units as mobilization assignees. The purpose of this program, however, was to stimulate voluntary participation by other reservists in National Guard and Army Reserve units. The development of this plan indicates that the Army was making some effort to encourage voluntary participation in reserve training programs, but its small size (applied only to six-year reservists) suggests that the Army viewed it more as an experiment than as a final solution to the problems of inadequate reserve participation.

Mandatory assignment was not the only reserve policy issue debated within the Pentagon during 1953. Less persistent, but just as contentious was the problem of training pay for members of the Standby Reserve. Since late 1952, the Department of Defense Comptroller had, as a matter of policy, refused to authorize funds for the payment of standby reservists in training, even though no legal prohibition of this practice existed. Naturally, the services opposed the Comptroller's restrictions, and in late March, they convinced the RFPB to recommend to the
Secretary of Defense that each service secretary be given the authority to allocate training funds between the Ready Reserve and the Standby Reserve as he saw fit. One week later, on April 7, the RFPB reported to John Hannah, the new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, that the Navy was trying to reclaim money cut by the Comptroller for payment of standby reservists, and pointed out that a policy decision on this question would now have to be made. Two weeks later, DoD Comptroller Llyle Garlock responded to the RFPB's statement on reserve training requirements. Not surprisingly, he repeated his opposition to the idea of paying standby reservists, claiming that it would be expensive and would increase the difficulty of recruiting for the Ready Reserve. Garlock added that an examination of the long range reserve programs of the services might be in order because of the difficulty of financing the larger programs expected in the future (due to the influx of servicemen released from active duty in 1953).

The RFPB responded to Garlock's memorandum in mid-May. The board claimed that a complete review of all reserve programs was impossible and pointed out that all three services were having difficulty getting both ready and standby reservists to train. Training pay for the latter group was thus essential. The RFPB also argued that the great expansion in the size of the reserves which Garlock
had described would not occur, with the result that fiscal requirements for future reserve training programs would not exceed FY 1954 levels. Finally, the board urged Hannah to recommend to the Secretary of Defense that service secretaries be allowed to distribute reserve training pay as they saw fit. Evidently, the RFPB's arguments were persuasive, for a few days later Hannah sent Secretary Wilson a memorandum recommending that he give the service secretaries full control of reserve training funds. On May 29, Wilson approved Hannah's recommendation. The victory of the military departments over the Comptroller's office was noteworthy, for it came at a time when civilian Department of Defense officials were engaged in a major cost-cutting effort. It also reflected the increasing emphasis both the services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense were placing on individual, rather than unit, reserve training, as well as an awareness that in the absence of compulsory methods, cash payment was the only simple way to achieve greater participation in reserve training programs.

As important as were the debates over mandatory assignment and allotment of reserve training funds, they paled in significance to the discussions that occurred in the White House during the last half of the year. By late summer, the Eisenhower administration was preparing for the full implementation of its new defense policies, some of
which would have a direct bearing on the reserves. The focus of these discussions was the FY 1955 defense budget and military force levels. The first phase of the process began in mid July, at a meeting at the White House between the President and the four general officers who would shortly become the new Joint Chiefs of Staff. They included Chairman Admiral Arthur Radford; Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Robert Carney; Army Chief of Staff Matthew B. Ridgway; and Air Force Chief of Staff General Nathan Twinning. At this meeting, the President directed the Joint Chiefs to make a complete survey of all the nation's military commitments and consider military policy changes not only in relation to foreign policy, but also in relation to the fiscal policy of the government. In addition to this long-range study, intended to plan force levels for FY 1957, the chiefs were told to recommend specific funding and manpower levels for the upcoming fiscal year, FY 1955. In early October, they forwarded their report on the latter subject to the NSC for review. In essence, it provided for no real reductions in the size of the military establishment for the coming year. The personnel ceiling for the combined services totaled 3.5 million men, slightly more than the current 3.36 million man level. Costs came to $41.5 billion in estimated expenditures and $34.5 billion in new obligations, essentially the same as those of the previous year. The
NSC's reaction to the JCS report was predictably cool, but it did not direct any immediate revision of the military's manpower or budget figures. For the time being, the services continued to plan on the basis of these numbers.

As the month of October wore on, however, those forces within the government which favored significant reductions in defense expenditures and manpower levels gained strength. At the same time, the President and two influential cabinet members, John Foster Dulles and George Humphrey, began to argue for a dramatic shift in the focus of American military strategy. They urged that in the future, the nation should rely more heavily on nuclear weapons, both for its own defense and for the containment of communism worldwide. The adoption of such a strategy, these men argued, would relieve the military establishment of the burden and the cost of having to fight limited conventional conflicts in distant regions of the world. By the end of the month, this view, which was also supported by the military economizers, was ascendant. Its dominance was underlined by the approval of an NSC staff paper on October 30 that allowed the military to plan for the use of both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons whenever militarily desirable. This paper explicitly ruled out the possibility of fighting any substantial wars by conventional means alone, thus reducing the military's need for large numbers of men and equipment.
The approval of the NSC paper had immediate implications for force level planning for FY 1955. In early November, Assistant Secretary of Defense Hannah suggested a ten percent cutback in the active duty manpower of the Army, Marine Corps, and the Navy for the upcoming fiscal year. One month later, Secretary Wilson formally directed the three services involved to make these reductions. Only the Air Force, which had an expanded role in the new strategy, was to increase in size. Army Chief of Staff Ridgway protested the manpower cuts vigorously, claiming that they would prevent the Army from carrying out all of its worldwide missions. Wilson, however, pointed to the Army's reduced need for conventional combat troops (a result of the new nuclear weapons oriented strategy) and claimed that planned improvements in the reserves would compensate for the active force reductions. When Ridgway took the issue up with the President, he encountered the same arguments. Confronted with the united stand of both Wilson and Eisenhower, Ridgway and the other affected service chiefs had no choice but to program lower force levels for FY 1955.

The personnel cutbacks were not as staggering as the Army Chief of Staff made out in his talks with Wilson and Eisenhower, but they were still significant. The Army was to be reduced from a force of 1.5 million men to 1.15 million, and the overall military establishment was to be
out from 3.45 million men to 3.2 million. As noted above, Air Force manpower levels were programmed to rise during the upcoming year. For the long term, the JCS agreed to reduce the Army to 1.0 million and the entire military to 2.8 million by FY 1957. Planned expenditures for the Army, Navy, and the Air Force for FY 1955 were $12 billion, 10.6 billion, and 16.2 billion, respectively. As was the case with manpower, the latter service was the only one to manage a funding increase from the previous year. In mid-December, President Eisenhower formally approved the revised manpower and budget figures, thus giving the "New Look" its first full expression. As secretary Wilson hinted in his conversations with General Ridgway, one element of the new policies was an increased reliance on reserve forces. Yet this policy would only make sense if the various reserve programs were significantly improved and enlarged, and it was to this task that Eisenhower now turned.

The announcement of the FY 1955 manpower and budget figures preceded by a matter of days the release of the first of two separate reports on manpower procurement for the reserves. On December 14, the NSTC submitted its report, entitled "20th Century Minuteman," to President Eisenhower. In essence, the commission argued that the nation's present reserve system was both inequitable and inadequate and urged a comprehensive revision of reserve
manpower procurement policies. Claiming that enough men were available to operate both the draft and a system of UMT (now referred to as National Security Training or NST), the NSTC recommended that all 18 year old men should enter a NST pool after registering with Selective Service and that NST trainees should form the basis of an organized, non-veteran reserve force. Finally, the commission urged that NST should be initiated on January 1, 1955, with an initial class of 100,000 youths to be increased yearly so as to take all young men not inducted into the active forces. After NST, trainees could join a reserve unit voluntarily or be placed in a ready reserve pool. After receiving the NSTC report, Eisenhower told the commission's chairman, Julius Adler, that he would wait for the release of the ODM manpower report before announcing the next step in his efforts to improve the reserves. The President was non-committal when asked by Adler to at least mention the subject of UMT in his 1954 State of the Union address. Highly conscious of UMT's potential for generating political controversy, Eisenhower refused to say or do anything that could jeopardize his reserve reform plans.

Reaction outside the White House to "20th Century Minuteman" was less restrained. General Lewis B. Hershey, who had furnished the NSTC with much technical information during its deliberation, endorsed the report enthusiastically. Hanson Baldwin, writing in the New
York Times, called the NSTC study the best yet on the subject, noting that it correctly pointed out many of the flaws in the current reserve system and that it made adjustments for the existence of the draft. He added, however, that the report failed to address all areas of inequity in the nation's manpower procurement system and argued that the study, if implemented, would result in the creation of large reserve forces at the expense of the regular military establishment. Baldwin concluded that if Congress had to choose between having a strong active force and a strong mobilization force, it should select the former. Congressional reaction to the commission's report was hostile. The Speaker of the House, Representative Joseph Martin (R., Mass.) and Representative Dewey Short (R., Mass.) argued that it would be impossible to operate both the draft and UMT simultaneously and predicted that a UMT bill modeled on the NSTC report would have little chance of passage.

The ODM report on military manpower policy, which was being drafted by a subcommittee headed by Lawrence Appley, President of the American Management Association, was to have been completed at the same time as the NSTC report, but it was not finally released until early January 1954. The Appley Report presented a much different view of the nation's manpower problems than the NSTC study. It conceded that the nation's reserve system needed
improvement, but argued that what was required first was an overall study, to be conducted by the National Security Council, of the nation's reserve mobilization requirements. The Department of Defense should use this study as the basis for a new reserve program, which would provide for the establishment of a service callable reserve and a selectively callable reserve. This new reserve plan, the report continued, should also give the Secretary of Defense the authority to induct men directly into the reserves. Finally, the Appley Committee recommended that, pending the completion of the NSC study as to the size and composition of the reserves, the White House should defer a decision on UMT. Along with the subcommittee's report, Flemming offered the President his services in coordinating service and OSD consideration of the Adler and Appley reports, with a view to submitting a reserve policy paper to the NSC by 49 April 1, 1954.

A few days later, the President accepted Flemming's offer to oversee the formulation of a new reserve plan, and he directed both Adler and the heads of all other involved government agencies to cooperate with the ODM Chief. Flemming now had the responsibility for supervising the formulation of a new plan for the reserves. And although Eisenhower thanked Julius Adler for his report, the fact that he had chosen Flemming and the NSTC head to coordinate the drafting of a new reserve plan suggests that the
President did not view UMT as the core of a future reserve system. Eisenhower had in fact come close to openly endorsing the Appley Committee report, a fact which irritated some NSTC members. But given the history of the President's attitude toward UMT, it was not surprising that he sided with the study which recommended against enactment of this idea.

At the end of his first year in office, the President had successfully begun preparations for the formulation of the last major element of his New Look defense policies—a new reserve program. Moreover, he had managed to initiate the process of reserve policy reform without creating the public controversies that had plagued previous efforts. By soliciting studies from both pro- and anti-UMT groups, Eisenhower appeared to be giving all interested parties a voice in the reform process. In reality, the President was eager to avoid reliance on UMT as a solution for the nation's reserve manpower problems, but he did not reject this idea outright. The relative absence of public and congressional discontent with Eisenhower's approach was encouraging, but it did little to solve immediate reserve policy problems. Most prominent of these was the failure of obligated reservists to join and train with reserve units. Another sign of trouble centered on the growing doubts on the part of both civilian and military officials about the unit concept of the reserves. Behind the debates
over compulsion, reserve organization, and training pay lay
the question of the reserves' ultimate purpose in the
nuclear age. The President and his advisors seemed to have
envisioned a greater future role for the civilian
components, but the precise character and dimensions of
that role remained unclear.

The Formulation of the National Reserve Plan:
January to December 1954

Arthur Flemming, flushed with his new responsibilities
and authority, began work on the new reserve plan
immediately. In late January, he established an ad hoc
task force on the problems of recalling members of the
selectively callable reserve to active duty. This group
included representatives from the Department of Defense,
the Department of Labor, and the Selective Service
System. At the same time, he requested the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower to prepare
fresh proposals for the complete reorganization of the
nation's reserve structure. In early February, Secretary
of Defense Wilson established a task force in his office to
develop these proposals. The group's specific task was to
determine the size and composition of an immediately
callable reserve in light of current and future security
requirements. The Secretary also requested the aid and
advice of both the services and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. One month later, the JCS forwarded to Wilson
their suggestions for reform of the reserve system. They concluded that all four services needed reserve forces composed of both units and individuals and recommended that each service be given the authority to modify as necessary the composition of its reserve. The chiefs also urged the establishment of a selectively callable reserve composed entirely of individuals possessing certain critical skills. Finally, they agreed with the ODM view that any decision on UMT should be deferred until the completion of the overall reserve reform plan.

Despite some differences within the military as to key elements of the new reserve plan, the DoD task force on mobilization requirements completed its report in mid-May and immediately submitted it to Arthur Flemming for review. It opened with a basic statement of reserve organization, which included the following principles: national security considerations would take precedence over all others, including that of equity; the reserve should be built around a substantial proportion of prior service personnel; and the influx of large numbers of relatively untrained individuals into the reserve would not satisfy the requirements of national security. The report then described the two main components of the new reserve structure, a service callable reserve containing both units and individuals, and a selectively callable reserve that would be composed almost entirely of individuals. The DoD
task force was unable to develop specific force requirements for the selectively callable reserve, but it did estimate minimum manpower levels for this force (approximately 760,000 officers and men). The report also called for the adoption of stricter provisions to enforce participation in reserve training and recommended that non-prior service personnel who volunteered for the reserves directly remain liable for induction. More significantly, it also argued that valid requirements for non-prior service personnel should be met both by voluntary enlistment of persons below draft age and by direct induction of draft age youths into the reserves. Finally, the report described the screening procedures to be used during the mobilization of the selectively callable reserves.

In many ways, the reserve structure outlined by the DoD task force resembled the existing one. The service and selectively callable reserves were essentially the ready and standby reserves by another name. Yet the proposed system differed from the old one in certain key areas. It envisioned a much larger reserve than the one which currently existed, and it placed greater emphasis on military and national security requirements than on considerations of equity. More important, it provided for the direct induction of non-prior service personnel into the reserves, a radical extension of the principle of
compulsion in reserve policy. The new scheme also deprived Congress of the authority to determine the pace and magnitude of a reserve mobilization. In sum, the DoD task force study envisioned major changes in the size and organization of the reserves, as well as new means of supplying them with manpower.

After circulating the study through other agencies for comment, Flemming set down his own criticisms of the DoD report and forwarded them to Robert Cutler, Eisenhower's NSC advisor, in early June. Flemming pointed out that the DoD reserve plan would place a long and demanding military obligation on an increasingly small percentage of men reaching military age and would result in a rise in the age of new inductees. It thus threatened the principle of universality of military service established by the UMT & S Act. He also noted that the task force study made no provision for the training of reservists for civil defense duties, a natural mission for the reserves in the nuclear age. In addition, Flemming argued that the huge reserve mobilization envisioned by the DoD plan, three million reservists in less than six months, would present insuperable administrative and logistical difficulties, and he pointed out that the report failed to list any positive incentives for voluntary participation in reserve training programs. The result, Flemming argued, was that the task force study seemed unduly to rely on compulsory methods to
build up the reserves. The ODM director's report was
couched in polite language, but in substance, it indicated
substantial dissatisfaction with the Department of Defense' plan for the revitalization of the reserves.

On June 17, the National Security Council considered
the Department of Defense plan to revitalize the reserves.
The meeting was of some significance, for it represented
the first occasion on which the NSC ever considered the
problem of reserve policy and mobilization requirements, a
fact which reflected the importance the Eisenhower
administration attached to this issue. After some debate,
the NSC decided to refer the DoD's reserve plan back to the
Pentagon for revision. In particular, the NSC directed the
reserve planners to give greater weight to considerations
of equity of service and to consider ways to enhance the
federal government's control over the National Guard.

In late July, Secretary Wilson forwarded to the NSC a
revised set of reserve program objectives and requirements.
These included specific provisions stressing the importance
of equity, keeping the age of inductees as low as
possible, and discharging World War II and Korean War
veterans who no longer wished to serve in the reserves.
The main impulse for the inclusion of these provisions
probably came from the President himself. The day after
the first NSC meeting on reserve policy, he had told
Assistant Secretary Hannah that, in the course of his
revision of the DoD plan, he should assume the participation of non-prior service personnel. Along with the above set of changes, Wilson outlined several ways to ensure federal control over the National Guard in a crisis. On July 30, the NSC considered Wilson's memorandum and accepted it as the basis for further revision of the task force plan.

The NSC's actions of this period reflected its desire to emphasize the principles of equity and universality of military service, even if they interfered with military considerations. It is noteworthy, however, that despite its concern for the non-military aspects of the reserve program, the NSC did not object to the original report's provision for a direct draft of the reserves. Nor did it urge consideration of the alternative method of supplying manpower to the reserves--UMT. In its search for a new reserve policy, the NSC seemed to be steering a middle course between the extremes of universal compulsion on the one hand, and pure voluntarism on the other.

The National Security Council was not the only critic of the Defense Department's new reserve proposals. In late June, the New York Times reported that the Navy Department had objected to a provision which provided that all personnel entering the reserves would be subject to the same mental and physical requirements, regardless of which reserve they enlisted in. In addition, the Navy, the
Marine Corps, and the Air Force all voiced misgivings about the effect which the extension of conscription to the reserves would have on voluntary enlistments in their own reserves. The Army, on the other hand, objected to the emphasis placed on procuring prior service personnel for the reserves. It also argued that any efforts to compel participation in unit training should be directed at non-prior service personnel, not veterans. Not only did the military as a whole dislike certain provisions of the DoD's reserve plan, they were divided among themselves as to the most objectionable aspects of the scheme.

While the National Security Council and the Department of Defense reviewed plans for overall reserve reform, Congress completed action on a narrower issue of reserve policy. In late July, the Senate Armed Services Committee concluded hearings on the Reserve Officer Personnel Act (ROPA), which had first been introduced in Congress in early 1953. This measure provided for mandatory and periodic consideration and selection of reserve officers for promotion. It had been drafted in response to the complaints of recalled reserve officers who claimed that they had been discriminated against in opportunities for promotion during the Korean War. Despite the Department of Defense' request to defer consideration of the bill until the presentation of the administration's comprehensive reserve program, the Senate passed the ROPA in early
August. Shortly thereafter, the President reluctantly signed the measure into law. This episode reveals the precise nature of Congress' contribution to reserve policy. In the areas of reserve pay, benefits and the like, its role was positive and substantial. In matters of organization, mission, and personnel procurement, however, Congress was less assertive.

On September 20, the Department of Defense submitted a revised report on reserve mobilization requirements to the NSC. In accordance with the NSC's July directive, it listed a total of five objectives relating to equity and the needs of the civilian economy, in addition to the original military ones. The report justified the inclusion of the former by arguing that a system of compulsory participation in reserve training would not be acceptable to the American people unless all qualified young men were required to serve in the active or reserve forces. The revised draft did retain the original organizational concept (service and selectively callable reserves), as well as the original strength figures. In a concession to the demands of equity, however, the report outlined measures to keep the size of the military manpower pool (e.g. those men not inducted for any form of service) as far below one million men as possible. These included the pre-release of active servicemen, reducing the Navy and Air Force term of enlistment from four years to two, and
forcing these two services to accept draftees. The report also stipulated that those service-callable reservists who failed to participate satisfactorily in a reserve training program would be liable to involuntary recall to active duty for a period of not more than one year and recommended that the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) should be applied to non-participating reservists. The most noteworthy feature of the revised study, though, was the absence of the provision calling for the direct induction of men into the reserves. Evidently, Navy and Air Force protests against this policy had forced its removal from the report. The other major change concerned the status of the National Guard. Included in the report was a provision creating a state militia not subject to federal service, but which would receive federal funds. This militia would perform the state-related missions that had been the responsibility of the National Guard. After reviewing the revised DoD study, the NSC decided to defer final consideration of the report pending further revision and comment. The NSC probably realized that some elements within the defense establishment still had doubts about the plan in its present form, and thus it decided to give the dissenting agencies a further hearing before making a final decision on the scheme.

The NSC's action proved sound, for opposition to the plan was still strong. On September 23, General Hershey
forwarded his comments on the revised draft to the council. Although he praised certain aspects of the proposed reserve program, Hershey argued that it provided for a much larger reserve buildup than the country could sustain economically, and he criticized the plan's reliance on prior service personnel. He also urged the elimination of the provision extending the UCMJ to the reserves, as well as the proposal to alter the status of the National Guard and create a state militia. The latter changes, Hershey argued, were irrelevant to the purpose of the program and would ensure its defeat in Congress. The NSTC was even more critical of the DoD report. It claimed that the size of the manpower pool provided for was inconsistent with the principle of universality of service and argued that the proposed service callable reserve was too large and expensive. The commission also complained about the plan's formulation process, asserting that it had not been given sufficient time or authority to contribute effectively to its development.

The military also voiced objections to the revised report. In early October, the JCS urged Wilson to direct the reserve policy task force to place less emphasis on the principle of equity in its future deliberations. The service chiefs also recommended that the NSC defer action on specifying a precise size for the reserve until the completion of the JCS midrange war plan. The number and
diversity of these criticisms suggested the complexity of the military, political, and economic issues involved in the making of reserve policy, but mere recognition of this fact did not make the job of selling the program any easier. By early October, it was clear that not only additional changes, but also strong political will on the part of the President and his top advisors would be required to gain acceptance of the plan.

After the second NSC review, the Defense Department task force again reworked its reserve plan. On October 27, Burgess presented the revised report to Secretary Wilson, Arthur Flemming, and Admiral Radford. After reviewing the history of the Department of Defense's reserve scheme, now referred to as the National Reserve Plan (NRP), Burgess conceded that some disagreements over the plan still existed, but he urged all interested parties to show flexibility and an understanding of opposing views. He then described the provisions of the plan itself, emphasizing that it would rely heavily on volunteers and a hard core of trained veterans. Burgess noted that it provided for forced participation of reservists, but only if absolutely necessary. In addition, the plan contained provisions to ensure adherence to the principle of universality of service. It also gave the Secretary of Defense the authority to induct men directly into the reserves (a provision which had been missing from the
second version of the plan), but made no mention of any change in the status of the National Guard. Finally, Burgess discussed the military's objections to the scheme. These included the Army's unhappiness with the Air Force's voluntary reserve procurement program, the Navy and the Air Force's worries about the effect on their voluntary enlistments of a direct draft into the reserves, and the Navy's opposition to enforced participation in reserve training programs. Burgess argued that these objections were insignificant compared to the extent of service agreement on the plan and recommended immediate acceptance of the NRP. The Assistant Secretary's briefing evidently allayed most of his listeners' doubts, for, on November 9, the Armed Forces Policy Council directed the services to prepare a new reserve training program in accordance with NSC document 5420/2 (the NRP) for presentation to the upcoming Congress. Six days later, the National Security Council approved the NRP in principle.

Although other agencies continued to press for their own plans of reserve reform, the National Reserve Plan now represented official administration policy. This fact was underlined in early December, when Eisenhower agreed to a buildup of the reserves to the figure (approximately three million) specified in the NRP. The buildup would commence on FY 1955 and be complete by FY 1960. One week later, the President explicitly linked the NRP to his plans for
further cutbacks in active force levels, especially in the Army. On December 15, he announced that henceforth, the nation would rely less on large active military forces and more on improved reserve components. In the next breath, the President revealed plans for a further 100,000 man reduction in active Army strength. Despite continued military dissatisfaction with the plan, the White House was now fully committed to the NRP as an integral component of the New Look. It was now up to Congress to pass judgment on the administration's reserve reforms.

Conclusion

The National Reserve Plan represented the most ambitious and comprehensive program of reserve reform formulated in the post-war period. In providing for a fourfold increase in the number of ready reservists and specifying measures to ensure satisfactory reserve training participation, the NRP aimed to create a truly viable reserve force. The plan's focus on reserve readiness represented a departure from the mobilization strategy which had driven reserve policy since the founding of the republic. Equally important, the NRP was the first program of reserve reform conciously integrated with the nation's overall defense policy. The Eisenhower administration championed an improved reserve structure as an inexpensive substitute for large active forces; the development of such
a structure would permit the active manpower reductions the New Look called for.

Some troubling questions remained, however. One source of concern related to the Eisenhower administration's motives for a reserve buildup. Given the President's past attitude toward the civilian components, and the timing of the NRP, it was clear that the main reason for Eisenhower's sudden enthusiasm for reserve reform stemmed from the fact that it could justify significant cutbacks in active force levels and ease the task of balancing the federal budget. Under the New Look, the reserve's importance was fiscal, not strategic. Another problem involved the persistent disagreements within the military as to the direction and pace of reserve reform. The depth of the disagreements and the fundamental nature of the disputed issues, such as compulsion, raised doubts as to how successful this or any other comprehensive plan of reserve reform could be.

Finally, although the National Reserve Plan did represent a step away from the traditional mobilization concept, it had not broken away from that idea completely. The provision for a large standby reserve, most of which would not be ready on M-day, indicated as much. The NRP constituted a significant achievement, but it had not settled all fundamental problems. It would thus be a mistake to represent the upcoming debate in Congress over the NRP as a conflict between a congressional view and an executive
branch view of reserve policy. The Capitol would merely serve as the forum for the continuation of a national debate as to the direction and character of military reserve policy.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER SEVEN

1. The incoming Secretaries of State, Defense, and the Treasury, respectively.


3. Ibid., p. 393.


5. Ibid., pp. 400-05.


7. Memo, Bryce Harlow to Milton Persons, January 1953, OF, CF, EL.


10. Memo, Milton Persons to Sherman Adams, April 1, 1953, OF, CF, EL.

11. Memo, Milton Persons to Sherman Adams, May 6, 1953, OF, CF, EL.


15. Ibid.


17. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Executive Order #10480, August 15, 1953, OF, AWF, EL.


22. Ad Hoc Committee on Mandatory Reserve Participation to Charles Wilson, April 8, 1953, OASD, DCF, RG 330, NARS.

23. The Army did, however, voice misgivings as to the legality of recalling non-participating reservists to active duty (as punishment for failure to participate). Admiral J.P. Womble to John Hannah, July 6, 1953, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.


28. Ibid.

29. Memo, Office of the Army Chief of Staff to G-3, July 29, 1953, G-3, RG 165, NARS.


31. ERRA, Review of the Army Reserve Program, Fall 1953, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.
32. Memo, Maj. Gen. Clyde Eddleman to James Mitchell, December 11, 1953, ERRA, RG 165, NARS. The program itself did not turn out to be much of a success. As of the end of May 1954, only 210 of the 11,000 men involved in the program had actually joined units and were participating in reserve training. Colonel Wing, Memorandum for the Record, June 4, 1954, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

33. Memo, Buford to Chairman, Office of Manpower Research, Office of Personnel Policy, Office of Manpower Utilization, March 31, 1953, OASD, DCF, RG 330, NARS.


35. Memo, Llyle Garlock to Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel, April 21, 1953, OASD, DCF, RG 330, NARS.


37. Memo, John Hannah to Charles Wilson, May 22, 1953, OASD, DCF, RG 330, NARS.

38. Memo, Charles Wilson to Service Secretaries, May 29, 1953, CCS, DCF, RG 218, NARS.

39. May also witnessed a brief but spirited dispute between the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense over the former's attempts to enlist non-prior service personnel directly into the reserves. The latter argued that this practice would allow the Air Force to stockpile select personnel in the reserves. The OSD prevailed for the moment. See Ralph Sollott to John Hannah, May 20, 1953, OASD, DCF, RG 330, NARS.


41. Ibid., pp. 423-429.

42. Ibid., pp. 432-37.

43. Ibid., 444-55.

45. White House Staff, Report on President's Meeting with Julius Adler, December 15, 1953, White House Office (WHO), Office of Staff Security (OSS), EL.


47. ______, December 21, 1953, p. 16.


52. Memo, Charles Wilson to Service Secretaries, February 3, CCS, RG 218, NARS.

53. Memo, The Joint Chiefs of Staff to Charles Wilson, March 5, 1954, CCS, RG 218, NARS.

54. Memo, The Joint Chiefs of Staff to Charles Wilson, April 9, 1954, CCS, RG 218, NARS; Memo, Arthur Flemming to Robert Cutler, May 24, 1954, WHO, NSC Series, EL.


56. Flemming pointed out that under the DoD proposal, only about 100,000 men would receive training for the reserves every year, this at a time when the overall Selective Service manpower pool was expected to rise to more than two million men by FY 1960. He also noted that the average size of the annual draft calls (under the DoD proposal) would continue to diminish, thus raising the age at which men were inducted, since inductees are called by age classes working from the top down.


59. Memo, Charles Wilson to Executive Secretary, NSC, July 24, 1954, WHO, NSC Series, EL.

60. This action was erroneously reported in the press as final NSC endorsement of the DoD reserve plan. See *New York Times*, July 30, 1954, p. 5.


62. Memo, Colonel Stahr to Colonel Snyder, July 30, 1954, ERRA, RG 165, NARS.

63. Memo, Hyde to Jones, July 23, 1954, OF, CF, EL.

64. During the summer of 1954, for example, Congress said little and did nothing about the real problems confronting the reserves: e.g. finding a mission in the nuclear age, getting men to train in units, procuring sufficient manpower, organization, etc.

65. This was the level at which the average age of induction began to rise, and hence was viewed as the maximum figure consistent with the demands of equity and universality of service (in the eyes of DoD planners).

66. James Lay, Note to the Executive Secretary of the NSC on Mobilization requirements, September 20, 1954, BHP, EL.

67. Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey to Executive Secretary of the NSC, September 23, 1954, Papers of Lewis B. Hersheys, USAMHI.

68. Julius Adler to D.D. Eisenhower, September 29, 1954, CCS, RG 218, NARS.

69. Memo, The Joint Chiefs of Staff to Charles Wilson, October 8, 1954, CCS, RG 218, NARS.

70. John Hannah resigned his position as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel in late July to take a position at Michigan State University. He was replaced by Carter Burgess. See *New York Times*, August 3, 1954, p. 9.


74. Memo, Rowden to Callahan, December 7, 1954, CCS, RG 218, NARS.

75. L. Arthur Minnich, Notes on Legislative Meeting, December 13, 1954, WHO, OSS, EL.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE ARMED FORCES RESERVE ACT
OF 1955

The true test of the Eisenhower administration's determination to revitalize the reserves came when the National Reserve Plan was presented to Congress. Since the end of World War II, this body had repeatedly demonstrated its independence on reserve policy issues, and it seemed no more prepared to follow the executive branch's lead in reserve policy now than it had in the past. Congress had been especially sensitive about compulsion, a prominent feature of Eisenhower's reform plans. Complicating the situation was the lack of broad administration support for the NRP. These factors ensured a continuation of the reserve policy debate which had occupied the administration since late 1953. Yet the final outcome of this debate, the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1955, solved most, if not all, of the problems that had plagued the reserves since the war. What followed was a more prosperous and less contentious era for the nation's civilian components.

The Passage of the Armed Forces Reserve Act: January to August 1955

President Eisenhower's commitment to reserve policy reform was underlined by his decision to appear personally
before Congress in mid-January 1955 to outline the National Reserve Plan and urge immediate passage of a bill embodying its provisions. As described by the President, the plan included the following salient features:

1) A continued military obligation of eight years for all enlistees and inductees.

2) Two new enlistment programs for the reserves—voluntary six-month training and nine and a half years service, and a two years active service plus six years reserve service, both for youths under eighteen and a half.

3) Authority to induct men to fill the quotas set for the above two enlistment programs.

4) A Ready Reserve, subject to the call of Congress for the duration of a war or national emergency, or by the President alone for up to twenty-four months.

5) A Standby Reserve, consisting of all other members of the reserve, subject to call only by the Congress, and then only after screening by the Selective Service System.

6) Screening from the Ready to the Standby Reserve to assure that the needs of the civilian economy and proper credit for prior combat service was given.

6) Compulsory assignment to drilling Ready Reserve units with penalties for failure to participate to include induction into active service or less than honorable discharge. (1)

In addition, Eisenhower proposed the creation of a purely state-based militia force to supplement the National Guard. Along with the National Reserve Plan, the President urged the extension of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 for four more years. The continuation of this measure was essential to the success of the NRP, for the latter assumed the continuing furloughing of men
from active duty into the reserves, something which only the UMT & S Act could provide. Three days after Eisenhower's speech on Capitol Hill, Congressman Overton Brooks introduced a bill contained the President's reserve reform proposals in the House.

Even as the President was urging congressional approval for the National Reserve Plan, however, signs of division within his administration cropped up again. In mid-January, in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff again asserted that the principle of national security had to take precedence over considerations of equity in the formulation of manpower policies. The chiefs did not criticize the NRP openly, but it was clear that they believed that it placed too great an emphasis on non-military needs. More disturbing than the JCS's vague doubts were the specific misgivings of senior Air Force officers. Their concerns continued to center on the proposed reserve enlistment programs for youths and the provision for reserve induction authority, which the Air Force believed would have a ruinous effect on its voluntary enlistments. Its persistent objections to the administration's reserve plan caused concern among senior Defense Department officials. In late January, Carter Burgess admitted in an internal departmental memorandum that "high ranking [Air Force] officers continue to have basic fears about the National Reserve Plan and
wish to have their position understood before being called on to testify [for the measure in Congress]." He went on to argue, though, that the Air Force's fears were groundless, pointing out that the increasing size of the manpower pool and the continuation of the draft would enable this service to recruit more than enough men in the future. In concluding, Burgess urged the Air Force to support the NRF openly and warned that if it did not, then it and the other military services might be saddled with a reserve program formulated by outsiders (such as those developed by the NSTC and the American Legion). The tone of concern evident in Burgess' memorandum suggests the extent of the administration's fears for its reserve reform program, as well as the scope of the Air Force's misgivings about the National Reserve Plan. And although this service never openly opposed the measure, its refusal to give its unqualified support could and did influence the proceedings on Capitol Hill.

The House subcommittee hearings on the National Reserve Plan only highlighted the lack of support for certain provisions of the scheme within the administration. In early February, Secretary Wilson, Admiral Radford and General Ridgeway appeared before Congressman Brooks' subcommittee to testify on the reserve reform bill. The first two endorsed the measure enthusiastically, but the Army Chief of Staff was less supportive. Arguing that the
state of the Army reserves continued to be unacceptable, Ridgway testified that he did not believe that any type of reserve reform could quickly improve reserve readiness (although he added that he did not oppose the NRP per se). Two weeks later, Arthur Adams, the Chairman of the RFPB, testified before the House Subcommittee. He applauded certain features of the NRP, such as the six months training program for youths under eighteen and a half, but he expressed opposition to the compulsory provisions of the plan, claiming that the military had not exhausted all possibilities of building up the reserves by voluntary means. A few days later, Arthur Flemming, the overall architect of the NRP, spoke in favor of the measure, but his testimony was followed by that of James Straubel, Executive Director of the Air Force Association, who was much less enthusiastic. Straubel expressed agreement with the objectives of the National Reserve Plan but argued that it would be unfortunate if this plan were used as an excuse for reducing the size of the regular Air Force. He also echoed the Department of the Air Force’s doubts about the six months training program and the use of the draft to procure men for the reserves. In concluding, Straubel recommended the enactment of the NRP based on voluntary enlistment rather than compulsory service. Straubel’s and Adams’ testimony indicated to a Congress suspicious of compulsion that despite the blanket endorsement of the NRP
by Wilson, Flemming and Radford, certain elements within
the administration remained dissatisfied with the
compulsory provisions of the plan.

In late March, the House subcommittee concluded its
hearings and began considering amendments. By the time it
had finished, the subcommittee had revised the NRP
extensively. It approved the provisions for a 2.9 million-
man Ready Reserve by FY 1960 and for the six months reserve
training program, but eliminated the clause giving the
Secretary of Defense the authority to draft men directly
into the reserves. Since the beginning of the session,
certain powerful congressmen had warned the administration
that the elimination of this provision was essential if the
overall plan were to pass the House. Wilson and Flemming
thus accepted this amendment without objection. The Brooks
subcommittee also reduced the time required for active and
Ready Reserve service to qualify for transfer to the
Standby Reserve and softened the penalties for failing to
participate satisfactorily in reserve training programs.
In addition, the subcommittee guaranteed that the National
Guard would receive men from the six months training
program or from active service, just as the other reserve
components did. Finally, it placed a ceiling of one
million men on the President's authority to call up the
Ready Reserve without congressional consent and made
transfer to the Standby Reserve after completion of the
Ready Reserve obligation mandatory. In general, Brooks' subcommittee had altered the administration's reserve bill in accordance with traditional congressional attitudes on compulsion and presidential recall authority, but it is important to remember that many executive branch agencies favored the above amendments as well.

In early April, Brooks forwarded the amended reserve bill to the full House Armed Services Committee, which adopted a favorable report late in the month. During the first week of May, debate on the measure began in the House of Representatives, with Congressman Brooks taking the lead in defending it against charges that the bill would provide an opening wedge for the enactment of UMT. Brooks was having the better of the argument when trouble from an unexpected source suddenly developed. On May 18, Representative Adam Clayton Powell (D., N.Y.) offered an amendment that would prohibit discrimination in the enlistment or transfer of six-month trainees to National Guard units in the South (which remained segregated). After a brief debate, the full House accepted Powell's amendment. This change did not affect the main features of the reserve bill, but it now made the measure objectionable to its key House sponsors, all of whom were Southern Democrats. In an attempt to save the bill, Representative Carl Vinson offered an amendment to delete all references to the National Guard in the measure, but this revision was
rejected. At this point, Vinson and Brooks essentially shelved the bill, thus placing the fate of the administration's reserve reform program in jeopardy.

The House of Representatives' refusal to take further action on the reserve bill placed the burden of reviving the measure on the White House, but the President seemed equal to the task. Just after the Powell Amendment had been accepted, he told a White House legislative meeting that he was determined to get Congress to act on his reserve plan or "there will be the damndest fight at this end of Pennsylvania Avenue you ever saw." Subsequent efforts to get the House of Representatives to move on the stalled bill proved unavailing, however, and in early June, Eisenhower decided to couple a public appeal on behalf of the reserve measure with private talks with Senate leaders.

On June 9, the President held a news conference to drum up public support for his reserve plan, and a few days later, he appealed directly to the public in a nationwide address, urging people to pressure their congressional representatives to take action on the reserve bill. At a subsequent legislative meeting, he promised to remind voters of the Democrats' "betrayal" if they failed to move on the above measure.

The White House's lobbying efforts on behalf of the reserve bill were rewarded on June 19, when Congressman Brooks introduced a new reserve measure in the House of
Representatives. The House Armed Services Committee then referred the bill to Brooks' subcommittee, which proceeded to restore most of the provisions of the original House bill. The subcommittee did, however, make several additional changes. These included the removal of all clauses relating to the National Guard, the deletion of the six months training program, and a reduction of the overall military obligation to six years, with certain exceptions. The full Armed Services Committee then approved the new reserve bill, after having first restored the provision for a six months training program for men under eighteen and a half. Congressman Powell tried to insert an anti-segregation amendment in this measure, but the committee voted it down. That same day, both houses of Congress overwhelmingly approved a bill extending the draft for four more years, thus ensuring that the reserves would receive sufficient trained manpower. On July 1, the House passed the second version of the reserve bill by a voice vote.

As the measure was taken up by the Senate, the White House held a series of legislative conferences with leaders of the upper house to ensure against a repeat of the troubles which had stalled the first reserve bill. At the first meeting, held on July 6, Senator Richard Russell (D., Ga.), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, objected to the inclusion of a provision forcing prior
service personnel into the Ready Reserve, claiming that it was unfair and unnecessary. In response, the President pointed out that the six months reserve training program would not provide enough men to the reserves and argued that the presence of a core of prior service personnel was essential to the health of the civilian components. Eisenhower did concede, though, that combat veterans might be excused from Ready Reserve service. One week later, at a second conference, the two men differed again, this time over the issue of compelling two-year servicemen to enter the reserve. Senator Russell contended that this policy was militaristic and unfair, but Eisenhower argued that it enabled the service to man their reserve programs with qualified personnel and urged its retention. The dispute between Russell and the President represented in microcosm a key theme of post-war reserve policy: conflict between consideration of equity and of military need. It was now up to the Senate to decide which of the two would predominate.

During the second week in July, the Senate took up the reserve bill. After a week of debate, the upper house passed its own version of the measure. In general, the Senate, had gone farther than the lower house had in diluting some of the measure's obligatory provisions. The House-Senate conference, however, resolved most of the differences between the two bills in favor of the House.
On the 25th, both chambers adopted the conference report and sent the measure to the White House for the President's signature. The final form of the bill, referred to as the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1955, contained the following key provisions:

1) The Ready Reserve was set at 2.9 million men, one million of which could be recalled by the president alone for twenty-four months. The Standby Reserve was to be recalled only with the express approval of the Congress.

2) The total military obligation, with certain exceptions, was set at six years. Transfer to the Standby Reserve was made obligatory after five years of combined active and Ready Reserve service. The penalty for unsatisfactory reserve training participation was set at recall to active duty for not more than 45 days per year.

3) Enlistment in the reserves for six years was permitted, with postponement of active duty service of two years for up to two years after initial enlistment.

4) A six months training program for men under eighteen and a half was provided for. After training these men would serve for seven and a half years in the reserves, with a draft exemption. Quota for this program was set at 250,000 annually.

5) Men under eighteen and a half were permitted to enlist in the National Guard while retaining draft deferment. (Provision to establish a state militia to supplement the Guard was eliminated from the bill).

6) Men who had entered active service prior to the enactment of the law were excused from Ready Reserve service, but retained an eight year military obligation. (21)

On August 9, President Eisenhower signed the Armed Forces Reserve Act into law. Although he expressed reservations about certain aspects of the measure, he declared himself satisfied with what had been achieved. The means and the
authority to upgrade and expand the nation's reserve forces were now in place. All that remained was implementation.

Reaction to the new reserve law was cautious, if not critical. Hanson Baldwin, who had earlier argued that the bill placed too much emphasis on the "militia concept" of military service, described the final version of the measure as "neither military fish nor civilian fowl." He pointed out that the bill provided for a UMT-like training program which Americans would not like, failed to ensure equity of military service, and would cost too much.

Reaction from within the administration was more positive, although some reservations persisted. In a memorandum to the President, Carter Burgess compared the final version of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1955 with the original administration proposals. He noted that in three of the five major reserve problem areas, the size and structure of the reserve, obligation to train, and the input of young men into the civilian components, the final bill met the Pentagon's requirements. Burgess added, however, that Congress had failed to require enlistees in the National Guard to take basic military training and that it did not grant authority to induct men directly into the reserves. He concluded somewhat ominously that since the measure did not ensure that the National Guard would meet federal training standards, it might be necessary to reevaluate the place of the Guard in the Army and Air Force's mobilization
Much of the reaction to the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1955, particularly that of Hanson Baldwin, revealed more about the individual's view of the reserves in general than it did about the strengths and weaknesses of the bill in particular. Both Baldwin's and Burgess' criticisms of the measure, however, were correct in one sense: the act did represent a compromise between the military and the civilian requirements for reserve policy.

The enactment of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1955 marked the end of long and often difficult period of reserve policy reform. Although the Eisenhower administration would later make some important administrative adjustments, the essential structure and size of a reserve system had now been established. The final form of the Armed Forces Reserve Act owed much to the actions of Congress, but it would be a mistake to claim, as some observers have, that reserve policy in the 1950s was the exclusive province of that body. For with one exception, the issue of presidential recall authority, all of the reserve policy problems and solutions discussed by Congress from January to July 1955 had been reviewed by the executive branch in 1953-54. In addressing the issues of compulsion, equity, the size and structure of the reserve, training obligations, and many others, Congress followed the path that administration reserve planners had first established. It is thus misleading to describe the Armed
Forces Reserve Act as a compromise between congressional and executive branch views on reserve policy. The "compromise" character of the final version of the bill was less an indication of the evenly matched strength of the two protagonists than of the inherently complex and eclectic nature of reserve policy. If the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1955 struck a balance between military needs and non-military imperatives, that was because it faithfully reflected the dual character of its subject—the American citizen soldier. Subject to the restraints of military life, but possessing the freedoms of the civilian world, the American military reservist represented the fusion of two disparate sets of values, and it is not surprising that reserve reform effort evolved in the manner it did.

Epilogue: Military Reserve Policy, 1955-1959

Before concluding, it might be helpful to review the initial experience of the reserves under the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1955, for their post-1955 fate indicates both the extent to which the above measure solved long standing reserve policy problems and the nature of the difficulties which persisted. Four days after the Armed Forces Reserve Act had been signed into law, the President gave the Army and the Marine Corps the go ahead to begin recruiting men for the six month reserve training
program. In spite of the quick start, early enrollment figures for the program, especially in the Army, were disappointingly low. As of the end of October 1955, the program had attracted only 1700 youths, far short of the 5000 man goal for its first three months of operation. Army spokesmen explained the slow start by pointing out that the six months training program had to compete for enlistments with other reserve programs, the regular Army, and the National Guard, all of which offered higher pay and benefits. The biggest obstacle to improved recruiting, however, stemmed from the fact that with low draft calls (less than 10,000 per month), young men felt under little pressure to take advantage of the draft deferment provisions offered by the six months training program. In any event, Army officials were temporarily at a loss as to what to do to improve enlistments.

When Congress reconvened in January 1956, the reserves remained a source of concern. Accordingly, it voted to investigate the problems encountered by the civilian components since the passage of the Armed Forces Reserve Act, particularly the flagging six months training program. At the same time, Congressman Brooks sought to remedy one obvious defect in the latter scheme, substandard pay, by introducing a bill to increase the pay of six month trainees to the level offered to National Guard enlistees ($ 78 per month). In mid-Feberuary, the House approved
this measure and sent it on to the Senate, which passed it in late March. A month later, President Eisenhower signed the bill into law. The pay increase did lead to a rise in Army enlistments for the six months program, but they remained far below the 95,000 man quota set the previous August. In August 1956, the Army announced that over 57,000 men had enlisted in the various reserve service programs since the passage of the Armed Forces Reserve Act. Of this figure, however, only 31,000 had signed up for the six months training option. The balance had enrolled in the combined active duty-reserve program (for two and four years, respectively) or in a special one year reserve service option for veterans. A more realistic assessment of the six months training scheme came from David Sarnoff, the new head of the NSTC, who stated that enlistments in this program were still lagging badly and that it would have to be doubled or tripled in size to meet the needs of national security. Sarnoff also hinted that fundamental changes in the program might be necessary if recruiting did not improve soon.

In mid-December 1956, the Department of Defense initiated major changes in reserve policy, but these concerned the reserves as a whole, not just the six months training program. On December 10, Assistant Secretary Carter Burgess announced that because of the need for better trained reserves and spiralling costs, DoD would
begin cutting back the size of the reserves and henceforth emphasize quality of personnel rather than quantity. He pointed out that because of the 1955 reserve law and the extension of the UMT & S Act, hundreds of thousands of former servicemen would continue to flow into the Ready Reserve, thus threatening to overburden the entire system. Burgess proposed specifically to train all obligated Ready Reservists for only one of the three years of their term of service and then assign them to non-training reserve formations. These changes were followed in January 1957 by news that the Army planned to require six months active duty training of all National Guard enlistees and expand the size of the manpower pool eligible for the six months training program (by raising the age limit). The announcement of the new Guard training requirements provoked a strong negative reaction from the NGA, which claimed that they might reduce enlistments in the National Guard. Eventually, thanks to the mediation of Congressman Brooks, the Army and the Guard agreed to a compromise. After January 1, 1958, all Guard enlistees were required to take six months basic training; before that date, however, new entrants under the age of eighteen and a half could satisfy the training requirement by taking basic training for only eleven weeks.

By contrast, the Army's decision to expand the upper age limit for the six months training program from eighteen
and a half to twenty-five encountered little opposition. In fact, it led to a drastic reversal of fortunes for this option. Recruiting for the program soared after the announcement of the age limit changes was made, and by early May, new enlistments for the program were averaging 18,000 per month, as compared to the previous year's rate of 1000 per month. The improvement in reserve recruiting was encouraging, but the drastic change in the rate of increase led some observers to wonder whether the Army was building too large a Ready Reserve. Not surprisingly, the unexpected volume of reserve enlistments placed a great strain on Army training facilities and on reserve budgets, and in mid-May, the Army suspended enlistments of the seventeen to eighteen and a half year old age group in the six months training program to allow the recruiting backlog to clear. At the same time, the Army reported that reserve training participation stood at an all time high, with 436,000 National Guardsmen and 264,000 Army reservists involved in official reserve training programs. The increase in the size and in the level of participation was accompanied by steep rises in federal spending on the civilian components. In FY 1958, the Department of Defense reserve budget, which had stood at $854 million in FY 1955, rose to $1.24 billion. From one point of view, the significant improvements in reserve recruiting which took place in early 1957 were
cause to celebrate, but many people now began to wonder whether the nation needed, or could afford, the large reserve forces which now existed.

One of those who was having doubts about the reserve buildup which had resulted from the Armed Forces Reserve Act and subsequent administrative changes was the President. In 1953-54, he had viewed the reserves as an inexpensive substitute for large standing forces, but the current escalation in reserve costs forced him to reconsider this view. In addition, in mid-1957, the economy plunged into a recession, and the federal budget deficit began to skyrocket. This situation, in Eisenhower's mind, mandated a reduction in defense spending. Accordingly, in the summer of 1957, the President directed the Defense Department to review current policies, specifically with the intention of finding ways to reduce spending on the civilian components. In January 1958, the Pentagon reported that the reserves were too large from both a fiscal and military point of view and proposed reducing the Army National Guard from 300,000 to 270,000. In addition, the Defense Department planned to eliminate ten Guard and Army Reserve divisions and reorganize the remaining units into Pentomic formations, which contained fewer men and more nuclear weapons. Congress, the NGA, and the ROA ultimately forced the Pentagon to cancel the planned cutbacks, but by this time,
the Army had begun imposing reserve training requirements selectively rather than universally on those men who had acquired ready reserve obligations. The era of unrestrained growth in the reserves was over.

By the late 1950s, the goals, requirements, and external conditions for military reserve policy had changed drastically. Thanks to the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 and subsequent adjustments, reserve planners were now assured of a supply of trained men. In addition, the facilities, equipment, and instructors for both the National Guard and federal reserve forces existed, as did an elaborate screening process for the recall of the civilian components. Henceforth, reserve planners and administrators would be more concerned with controlling the growth of the reserves and training fewer, not more, obligated Ready Reservists. In addition, some people now wanted to use the reserves as a means of giving more young men military service at a time of shrinking draft calls and an expanding manpower pool. Finally, certain members of the Eisenhower administration contemplated the conversion of units into civil defense and home guard formations.

The reserve policy challenges of the late 1950s and early 1960s were far less contentious and in character, and smaller in scope, than those of the 1945-55 period. In essence, they related more to the efficient management and use of an existing reserve structure, than the creation of
a structure from the ground up. The Berlin Mobilization, the Vietman War, and the transition to the All Volunteer Force presented major challenges to military reserve planners, but none of these developments involved fundamental reserve reform. To understand post-war American reserve policy, one must focus on the decade that ended with the signing of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1955.
FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER EIGHT


2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff to Charles Wilson, January 23, 1955, CCS, RG 218, NARS.


7. Gerhardt, *The Draft and Public Policy*, p. 198; A cabinet paper of April 1955 on the National Reserve Plan noted that after the elimination of the draft provision by the House that the essential provision of the plan remained intact—the President's authority to order the Ready reserve to active duty without the consent of Congress. Cabinet Paper on the National Reserve Plan, April 1955, AWF, Cabinet Series, EL.

8. The Committee did, however, increase the penalties for those six month trainees who failed to participate in the required training program. See note 9.


12. L. Arthur Minnich, Notes on Cabinet Meeting, May 17, BHP, EL.
13. Memo, Carter Burgess to Bryce Harlow, June 2, 1955, BHP, EL.


25. Levantrosser, Gerhardt and especially Story make this claim at several points in their respective studies of post-war reserve policy. See notes 17-20 for the introduction.


28. ________, November 9, 1956, p. 18.

29. ________, January 4, 1956, p. 11.

30. ________, February 10, 1956, p. 23; March 27, 1956, p. 13; April 24, 1956, p. 11.


34. ______, February 27, 1957, p. 1.

35. In addition to opening the six months training program to men aged eighteen and a half to twenty-five, the Department of the Army also shortened the post-training Ready Reserve obligation for men under eighteen and a half to four and one-half years. Men aged eighteen and a half to twenty five would incur a Ready Reserve obligation of five and one-half years. See Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy; pp. 208-09.


38. ______, January 17, 1957, p. 16


40. Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy, p. 209

41. From 1954 to 1961, draft calls for the Department of Defense fell from 265,000 per year to 60,000 per year. All but a few thousand of these went to the Army. During the same period, the number of men registered with the Selective Service System rose from 9.1 million to 13.9 million men. Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy, pp. 218, 228.

42. Late in 1959, the President told the Joint Chiefs of Staff "that the biggest mission of the reserves today is rehabilitation in case disaster should occur through nuclear war." L. Arthur Minnich, Memorandum of Conference with the President, November 18, 1959, WHO, OSS, EL.
CHAPTER NINE
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

For the historian, post World War II reserve policy remains an elusive subject. Overshadowed by contemporary developments in U.S. foreign and defense policy, it could easily be described as the forgotten problem in modern American defense policy. It would be foolish, however, to dismiss post-war reserve policy as unworthy of scholarly attention. This subject, and the related issue of Universal Military Training, absorbed much of the energy and time of military officers and civilian officials alike in the 1945-1955 period; it also sparked several prolonged and bitter bureaucratic and political disputes. On a deeper level, reserve policy was not only linked to larger shifts in post-war American defense policy, it also represents a unique source of insight into the specific problem of raising and organizing military forces. The key themes of post-war reserve policy reflect the dual importance of this subject. We will review each of these themes below, but it would be useful to first discuss two general factors which helped shape the course of post-war reserve reform.
The first relates to the funding of reserve programs. For the first five years of the post-war era, relatively little money was spent on defense in general and on the civilian components in particular. This situation stemmed in part from President Truman's decision to cap annual defense expenditures as well as active force levels. The funding limitations occurred, moreover, at a time when all three services were attempting to implement the most ambitious reserve plans in their history. Not surprisingly, the consequences were calamitous. Equipment, instructors, armory space, and training time for the reserves were all in short supply, driving away many potential reservists and demoralizing those who remained. For the Army reserve, which was attempting to organize on a unit basis, the spending limitations proved especially injurious. By 1950, it consisted of a few understrength organized units and a vast pool of dissatisfied individuals. After the outbreak of the Korean War and the passage of vital legislation, funding for the reserves increased, but a new source of trouble then emerged—the Bureau of the Budget. During the early 1950s, this agency intervened extensively in reserve affairs. It not only determined the general level of spending for the civilian components, but also allocated or withheld money for specific reserve programs. Reserve planners attempting to implement congressionally authorized reserve policies were
often frustrated by the Budget Bureau, which used its control over funds to support its own, sometimes diametrically opposed, reserve policies. This extralegal intervention did little to help, and much to hamper efforts to revitalize the reserves. Not until the mid-1950s, when the Eisenhower administration made an explicit commitment to building up the reserves, did adequate funding for these forces become available.

Related to the problem of money, but extending beyond it, was the existence of a wide gap between the men who made reserve policy in Washington, D.C. and the men who implemented it in the field. Initially, this problem plagued the military departments, especially the War Department. The Army officers who developed the unit oriented reserve policies in 1944-1945 were not the ones who would have to put them into effect, and after the war it soon became apparent that the latter group of officers held different ideas as to the size and extent of organization of the Army reserves. The fact that the financial realities of the day operated in favor of the ideas held by the implementing group made it more difficult, if not impossible, to put the original policies into effect. Subsequently, this condition affected Congress and other executive branch agencies. More than once, congressionally authorized or White House approved policies were improperly implemented or even blocked by the
military or by the Bureau of the Budget. This problem was far from unique to reserve policy, but coming at a time of initial policy development and reorganization, it proved especially injurious to the civilian components. At the root of this gap was the persistence of disagreement within the government as to what sort of reserve policy should be pursued. Congress, the White House, the Bureau of the Budget and the four military services each possessed its own stake in the reserves and thus advanced its own set of reserve policies. As a result, it was virtually impossible to formulate, let alone implement, a coherent, uniform reserve program. The National Reserve Plan and the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1955 represented progress towards this goal, but as the nature of the deliberations leading up to both measures indicated, the government was far from unified on reserve policy, even as late as 1955.

These two conditions greatly influenced the pace and extent of reserve policy reform, but they had little to do with its direction and dynamics. The latter can best be understood in terms of the three themes noted in the introduction: the clash between military and non-military considerations in reserve policy, inter-service differences over reserve policy, and the search for a reserve structure suited to the nuclear age. One can detect other trends and issues, but these three best define the limits and substance of the post-war reserve policy debate.
Of all the problems addressed by post-war reserve planners, perhaps the most complex and frustrating was the constant intrusion of non-military considerations in the formulation of reserve policy. In most cases, the practical effect of this intrusion was limited, but in others it was substantial. On at least two occasions, the UMT debate of 1944-48, and the formulation of the National Reserve Plan, non-military concerns played a major role. In both of these cases, the intrusion of extraneous factors confused the policy debate and contributed to the demise of two key policy initiatives: UMT and a reserves-only draft. Throughout the post-war period, reserve planners frequently found themselves trapped between fulfilling non-military ideals and meeting military needs. It should be noted, however, that although the proponents of broadly based reserve policies defeated some of the more "militaristic" reserve policy initiatives, they failed to secure any of their major positive goals. Despite the absence of UMT and a reserves-only draft, the reserve structure of the late 1950s was, if anything, more responsive to military requirements than ever before. This development was mainly the result of the Korean War, which had underlined the need for reserve policies more in tune with military realities. The tension between the military and non-military considerations continued, but the balance between the two had shifted in favor of the former.
Complicating the reserve problem further, especially at a time of defense unification and consolidation, was the fact that each of the four services possessed very different reserve needs and traditions. These differences encompassed five specific issues: size, organization, the role of state based reserves, training requirements, and the place of compulsion. The Army, which for better or worse, remained wedded to the concept of reserve mobilization and smaller standing forces, required a large, relatively organized reserve. This fact, and political considerations, forced the Army to allot a significant reserve role to the National Guard and push (albeit unenthusiastically) for compulsion to build up its other reserve component, the Army Reserve. The Navy, Marine Corps and to an even greater extent, the Air Force, believed in the importance of large standing forces and thus saw little need for large mobilizable reserves. The reserves these services did possess were relatively small, highly skilled, and recruited on a volunteer basis. They viewed compulsion as unnecessary, if not actively harmful, to the health of their reserve components. However, service differences over reserve policy were not mere manifestations of petty bickering or inter-service jealousies; they reflected traditional reserve practices, inherent service roles and missions, and differing visions of future conflict. Because of the fundamental nature of
these differences, one cannot fairly condemn the Reserve Forces Acts of 1952 and 1955 for failing to bridge them. Indeed, by implicitly conceding these differences instead of trying to eradicate them, these measures may have achieved a degree of success they otherwise would not have had.

Looming in the background of all post-war reserve policy debates and plans was the need to adjust the nation's reserve structure to the demands of limited war and nuclear deterrence. Though it was rarely expressed openly, the search for a more realistic reserve structure drove the development of post-war reserve policy. In this sense, reserve policy was directly linked with more general developments in American defense policy. Before the Korean War, few if any reserve planners even recognized a gap between policy and requirements. The shape of the post-war world and the nature of future conflict could not be determined precisely, and it seemed safer and politically more palatable to stick with traditional policies. The Korean War mobilization, however, highlighted the fundamental conceptual flaws of the old system, and in subsequent years many of these flaws were eliminated. However, as the Reserve Forces Acts of 1952 and 1955 indicated, old assumptions and traditional policies proved highly resistant to change, even in the face of evidence that they had become outmoded. But if these measures
accomplished nothing else, they did underscore the importance of the Ready Reserve and the policies needed to create and sustain such a force. In this respect, they represented a repudiation of the concept of reserve mobilization and a tacit acknowledgement of the military requirements of the nuclear age. Subsequent efforts to create a Ready Reserve for all the services have met with only mixed success, but this concept remains the foundation of current reserve policies. It constitutes perhaps the greatest legacy from this formative period of modern American reserve policy.

Before closing, a word should be said about the role of Congress in the development of post-war reserve policy. Our survey of this subject has indicated that this body played a highly important role in reserve policy formulation, particularly in the early 1950s. Yet it is also clear that Congress was only one of a number of key "players" in this area. Indeed, one could argue that Congress' real importance in relation to reserve policy stemmed more from the initiatives it rejected than the ones it enacted, e.g. UMT, methods to ensure proper reserve training, and a reserve draft. Congress' refusal to enact these proposals helped define the environment in which reserve policy evolved and foreclosed certain policy options, but that is all. Those areas in which Congress acted positively--reserve training pay, promotion policies,
and recall liability—were important, but not fundamental to the development of reserve policy. In sum, the participation of Congress was necessary for policy formulation, but was not sufficient in itself.

The importance of this study's focus on the executive branch has less to do with which actor deserves the most credit (or blame) for post-war reserve policy than with the broader perspective which follows from such an approach. It highlights, for instance, the two distinct, but related sets of problems that confronted post-war reserve planners: the traditional difficulties of raising and organizing reserve forces in the United States, and the imperative of creating a reserve structure suited to the needs of a new military era. The structure they created was not perfect. Fiscal constraints, bureaucratic infighting, political rigidity and a continued public suspicion of "militarism" imposed strict limits on how far or how fast reserve policy could develop after World War II. Indeed, given the number and diversity of the constituencies involved, and the far-reaching political, fiscal and strategic implications of radical reserve policy reform, one of the hidden virtues of the policies formulated in the post-war period may have been that they did not attempt a total break with past reserve structures and traditions. Fundamental change in American defense policy has always been a slowly paced, incremental process, and reserve policy was no exception.
On the other side, however, it was clear that the civilian components of the late 1950s were larger, better organized, trained and equipped than ever before and that they had progressed further in the decade or so after World War II than in any other comparable period in the nation's history. The need for further reserve reforms remained, but one should not belittle the accomplishments of the early post-war reserve reformers. Given the dimensions of the problem and the amount of resources allotted to it, the creation of the reserve structure of the late 1950s must rank as one of the great unrecognized achievements in modern American defense policy.
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