US MILITARY ADVISERS IN GREECE:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES MILITARY
ASSISTANCE AND COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
DURING THE GREEK CIVIL WAR

A Thesis
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This study examines the role U.S. military advisers played in the shaping of U.S. foreign policy in Greece during its civil war and its effects on U.S. military assistance programs. It discusses this role within the context of the national security policy announced in the Truman Doctrine in 1947. The prestige garnered from success in World War II and the growing tensions of the Cold War elevated the military to a more influential role in international affairs. With the implementation of a military assistance program for Greece and Turkey, the military became a formal partner in managing U.S. foreign policy. In documenting the increasing authority of the military assistance program in Greece, this study demonstrates that:

- U.S. military personnel shaped the U.S. government's view of the situation in Greece;
- U.S. military assistance in Greece surpassed the economic assistance program, increasing the military's power and authority in Greece;
- The U.S. military assistance program in Greece established a precedence for the establishment of other military assistance programs;
- The extension of operational advice to the Greek National Army by U.S. military advisers and U.S. sponsored military training programs contributed to the Greek victory;
- U.S. military advisers in Greece set the example for future U.S. counterinsurgency operations.
Ultimately, U.S. involvement in Greece established a pattern for increased military influence in U.S. foreign policy that would dominate the next forty-five years of foreign relations. It also served as the antecedent of the U.S. military's counterinsurgency doctrine and the mission of foreign internal defense.
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INTRODUCTION

On March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman announced a new era in United States foreign policy. Truman's speech before Congress, in which he outlined the principles of what would become known as the Truman Doctrine, suggested a transformation in the United States concept of national security. Acknowledging that global stability would promote national stability, the President announced that the United States would assume a more active role in world affairs. In the March 12 speech, Truman asked Congress to provide an aid program for Greece and Turkey in the amount of $400 million. The program provided economic assistance, military equipment, and both civilian and military technical advisors to help both Greece and Turkey defend against the threat of Communist expansion. Proclaimed as a means to allow the "free peoples" of the world to resist subjugation by armed minorities or by outside coercion, the Truman Doctrine inaugurated the policy of containment that became the foundation of Cold War national security policy.¹

In developing containment, the Truman administration established foreign policy objectives that emphasized a combination of political, economic, and military factors. Although political and economic influences were traditional aspects of foreign policy, the introduction of military considerations into the equation during

peacetime was something new. Prior to World War II, the peacetime role of the United States military focused primarily on domestic concerns such as personnel mobilizations and management, modernization, and budget allocation. The global effects of World War II elevated the military to unprecedented heights in shaping world events. In *Allies and Adversaries*, Mark Stoler attributes the rise of military influence in foreign policy to three main factors. First, the United States’ full-scale involvement in a global and total war meant that every foreign policy decision might have military implications, which in turn meant that foreign policy became a component of strategic planning. Second, the war was a coalition effort requiring diplomatic considerations in decision making and a detailed assessment of allies’ wartime and postwar strategies and policies. Third, as the military increased its role in diplomatic issues, the State Department’s influence dissipated.  

The complete defeat of the Axis powers and America’s sole possession of an atomic weapon seemingly promised a quick return of power to civilian control at the expense of the military. Yet, the emergence of the Soviet Union as a political, economic, and potential military threat deferred the reduction of military influence and, instead, the military occupied a position of notable importance as a foreign policy instrument during a time of peace. The cause and effect of this military influence is seldom addressed. The majority of literature on the early era of the Cold War primarily focuses on diplomatic studies and viewpoints. As of yet, there is little analysis on the use of the military in shaping the policies that would dominate the

next forty-five years of foreign relations. In order to bridge the gap between diplomatic and military influences, it is necessary to identify the first practical example of military involvement in foreign policy decisions. The United States aid program to Greece, introduced by the Truman Doctrine, serves as an excellent illustration of the increasing use of military assistance in foreign affairs and is the focus of this study. Primarily economic in design, the Greek aid program transformed into one dominated by military aid and military personnel. Based on intelligence provided by military sources, the Truman administration elevated the military assistance program over economic assistance and made the military defeat of the Communist insurgents its first priority. Reports from Greece emphasized that restoration of economic and political stability would only be possible after the military defeat of Communist insurgent forces.

The time frame examined covers the period from late 1946, when the events leading to the decision to extend foreign aid to Greece and Turkey occurred, to late 1949, when the Greek Civil War ended. The 1946 to 1949 period is significant to this study because there was a perceptible increase in military control of the Greek aid program. Aid to Turkey, although initiated as part of the same program, does not offer the same example of transition and development as the program in Greece. Whereas Greece contended with both internal and external challenges to its stability and survival, Turkey was primarily concerned with Soviet intimidation over access to the Dardanelles and lacked the urgency of an internal civil war.

In attempting to link the military and diplomatic aspects of the United States aid to Greece between 1946 and 1949, this study focuses on military sources. The
citations selected are principally those related to military input in foreign policy
decision-making in Washington D.C., military actions in Greece, and decisions made
by military personnel in Greece that shaped aspects of U.S. foreign policy.
Therefore, this study does not examine matters of economic aid or diplomatic
influence beyond the scope of their relationship to the military program. The analysis
is based chiefly on U.S. primary sources, such as The Foreign Relations of the United
States series and first person accounts of military advisors in Greece. In addition, a
wide array of secondary sources on the Greek Civil War and the beginnings of the
Cold War provide a framework for analysis.

In examining military influence in United States’ relations with Greece, five
issues need to be addressed. First, an analysis of the situation in Greece at the end of
World War II will help explain Greece’s need for assistance. Second, the role of
military assessments in shaping events leading to the Truman Doctrine will indicate
the reliance of State Department officials on such military assessments. Third, an
examination of the increasing sway of military opinion in foreign affairs will
demonstrate the increased participation of military advisers in influencing
government policy. Fourth, the escalation of military assistance at the expense of
economic assistance will show the predominance of the military effort in Greece.
Fifth, the increased authority and standing of the military assistance mission beyond
the realm of the U.S. Ambassador to Greece will demonstrate the military’s elevated
status within the arena of foreign policy and establish a precedent for future actions.
In the post-World War II era, the enhanced prestige of military leaders and the reliance on the military establishment to govern and administrate occupied nations, implement economic and social programs overseas, and occupy key positions within the Foreign Service establishment led to a more essential role of the military as participants in the diplomatic arena. The role of the military as a bureaucratic influence expanded tremendously after World War II and established a pattern of broadening prominence in future U.S. foreign policy. The distinction of American aid to Greece between 1947 and 1949 was that the vast majority of decision-makers in Greece were military personnel. The military officers implemented the decisions of foreign policy in Greece and it was those same military officers who reported on the conditions in Greece that led to those decisions. The tendency to consider foreign policy decisions from a military perspective was a contributing factor to many of the U.S. decisions in Greece in 1947. An understanding of the existing influence to State Department officials will help elucidate many of the later policy decisions in Greece.

Based on the apparent success of the military assistance program in Greece, the United States became deeply committed to the idea of military assistance as a foreign policy tool and would utilize it repeatedly in other third world nations. The military assistance program in Greece established a clear model for other military assistance programs and serves as an important foundation for later military assistance missions. The U.S. military experience in Greece also helped lay the groundwork for the development of formal counterinsurgency doctrine. Overall,

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United States actions in Greece suggest an increase in the use of military missions as a tool of foreign policy during the Truman era. U.S. policymakers seem to have found themselves increasingly influenced by military officers who were often unfamiliar with the political intricacies of foreign policy, resulting in an emphasis on more tangible, strategic details at the expense of intangible, long term political views.

The implementation of the military assistance program in Greece led to the establishment of two important trends, although only one was recognized at the time. The first, recognized trend was increased U.S. military involvement in matters of U.S. foreign affairs in support of national security policy. The second, less known trend was the beginning of increased U.S. military involvement in counterinsurgency operations in foreign countries. The second trend is a direct consequence of the first. Ultimately, U.S. involvement in Greece established a pattern for increased military influence in U.S. foreign policy that would dominate the next forty-five years of foreign relations. It also served as the antecedent of the U.S. military's counterinsurgency doctrine.
CHAPTER 1: THE GREEK CIVIL WAR IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The end of World War Two brought about significant changes in the political, economic, and social landscapes of Europe, Asia, and Africa. The elimination of an Axis threat altered the relationships of the three major Allied powers of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States, with each other as well as the post-imperial world of 1945. Internationally, the cooperation between the Communist-ruled Soviet Union and the democratic and capitalist nations of Great Britain and the United States began to fall apart as each sought to develop a protective sphere of influence using formerly occupied or allied nations. Within various developing nations, the unifying tendencies of anti-Axis sentiment were replaced with internal struggles to control post war state apparatus. These internal power struggles were soon caught up in the larger bipolar struggles of the United States and the Soviet Union.

As tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union increased, the strategically located nations of the Northern Tier or Near East became valuable commodities. The three key nations of the Northern Tier were Greece, Turkey, and Iran. Of the three, only the nations of Turkey and Iran were considered key components in post-war U.S. plans of defense and containment. Both were strategically placed along the southern border of the Soviet Union and both were directly threatened by a potentially aggressive Soviet Union. In both cases diplomatic pressure from the United States and the United Nations reinforced Turkish and
Iranian resistance to Soviet pressures. Although not bordering the Soviet Union, Greece was always considered the key to the Near East. Greece’s importance lay more in its strategic position as the sole remaining non-Communist controlled nation in the Balkans and the belief that the loss of Greece would jeopardize the position of Turkey, Iran, and Western control of the Mediterranean.

Acting under their expanded conception of national security, the Soviet Union and the United States each sought to serve as sponsor of important Middle and Near Eastern states. While the Soviet Union tended to be more hands-on in its association, the United States often sought to establish representative states within a region that would act with U.S. interests in mind. In turn, the United States would provide military and economic assistance on a level appropriate to a nation’s strategic value and amount of cooperation. As the post-war tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union intensified, the United States began to rely more heavily on military-oriented solutions for matters of foreign policy. This militarization of foreign policy became more dominant after the implementation of the Truman Doctrine with its aid package targeting Greece and Turkey and established a reliance on military assistance as a U.S. foreign policy tool.

Several works examine U.S. efforts in Greece after World War II. The more prominent ones focus on the diplomatic repercussions and precedence established by the Truman Doctrine and U.S. economic and military assistance. By the 1970s, the availability of the majority of American and British primary sources spurred an increase in works on the Greek Civil War and its possible role in initiating the Cold War. Given the political mood of the time, the majority of these works presented
revisionist views of U.S. efforts in Greece and were disapproving of the Truman Doctrine’s confrontational nature. Michael Amen’s American Foreign Policy in Greece, 1944-1949: Economic, Military and Institutional Aspects, Robert Frazier’s Anglo-American Relations with Greece: The Coming of the Cold War, 1942-47, and Lawrence Wittner’s American Intervention in Greece are all critical of American policy in Greece and tend to view the United States as the aggressor.

Amen’s study focuses on American institutional penetration into Greek military and political policy decisions from the establishment of the American Mission to Aid Greece (AMAG) in June 1947 to the end of the Greek Civil War in 1949. He argues that American actions in Greece can be explained by applying the concepts of neo-imperialism and colonialism to American methods. Amen states that the Truman Doctrine was “based on the Wilsonian vision of internationalizing American exceptionalism” and that the Doctrine “did not originate simply as a sudden response to particular crises occurring in early 1947.”¹ Instead, he views the Truman Doctrine as an inherited “presidential legacy of resorting to military force” to attain a postwar international democratic political system in keeping with Wilsonian international objectives.² These Wilsonian international objectives and military objectives became inseparably linked as American military personnel became the persons responsible for implementing U.S. foreign policy.

¹ Michael M. Amen, American Foreign Policy in Greece, 1944-1949: Economic, Military and Institutional Aspects. (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Ltd., 1978), 103.
² Ibid., 215.
Although conspiratorial in tone, Amen’s study presents detailed information on American economic programs. Controlled by AMAG and the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), Amen argues that these programs subverted Greek economic autonomy and permeated Greek economic policy in the areas of trade, shipping, taxation, currency, and budget adoption. Amen emphasizes the manipulation of economic programs to support American military domination of Greek-American relations.³ Amen contests the view that the Truman Doctrine initially emphasized economic aid and only reverted to military aid when it was realized financial stability and economic development could not occur until the guerrilla war ended.

Additionally, Amen is too quick to dismiss the culpability of the Greek Communist guerrillas in commencing hostilities. During the first two rounds of the Greek Civil War, the United States remained a disinterested observer. Only when the British government notified the United States of its intent to end aid to Greece did the United States become a reluctant, but active, participant in Greek affairs. The most intriguing aspect of Amen’s argument concerns the increasing role of American military personnel assisting in foreign policy decisions. According to Amen, over a period of time, American foreign policy decision-making power in Greece shifted away from State Department bureaucrats and into the hands of American military men in Greece. Essentially this shift “altered the basis of American foreign relations, heretofore guided by Wilson’s formulation of the American world mission, as the United States pursued military objectives not only in Greece but subsequently in other

³ Ibid., 220-221.
parts of the world." Clearly, Amen is attempting to establish links between U.S.
actions in Greece and later military interventions in other parts of the world,
specifically Vietnam. Although his claims of American neocolonialism in Greece are
unconvincing, Amen’s observation of increasing military input in foreign
policymaking seems to have some merit. However, Amen ignores the actions of U.S.
military advisors in Greece and makes no mention of the reasons for their expanding
influence. As this study will demonstrate, U.S. military advisors assigned to Greece
earned their credibility through their actions on the ground and their ability to gain the
confidence of the Greek army’s leadership. With the confidence of the Greek
military, the advisors’ credibility increased and their level of influence increased.

In *Anglo-American Relations with Greece*, Robert Frazier criticizes the
inability of Great Britain and the United States to reach a consensus regarding post-
war policy in Greece. Central to Frazier’s thesis is the idea that developments in
Greece were the prime factor in the cause of the Cold War. Frazier argues that the
State Department used the Greek crisis to promote the Truman Doctrine and proclaim
a new foreign policy based on anti-communism. In order to garner support for this
new policy, the White House depicted the situation in Greece as an ideological
crusade against the Soviet Union and its effort to dominate the world. Frazier firmly
believes that had the United States and Great Britain adopted a more unified stance in
their policy toward Greece “the Cold War might have developed in different ways, or
been avoided entirely.”

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5 Robert Frazier, *Anglo-American Relations with Greece: The Coming of the Cold War, 1942-1947*
(New York: St. Martin’s, 1991), i:81.
Frazier argues that Truman and his advisers focused too quickly on the ideological aspects of the issue. The Truman administration felt the only way to gain the support of the Republican controlled Congress for a large aid package to Greece was by framing it as an ideological crusade against the evils of communism and the Soviet Union. Frazier considers the emphasis on ideological differences in the Truman Doctrine to be the starting point of the Cold War. According to Frazier, the Truman Doctrine represented the first time differences between the East and West were framed in an ideological context instead of one based on the fear of Soviet expansionism. Frazier states that the “emphasis on ideology polarized the Cold War along inflexible lines and prevented...any productive negotiation between East and West.”

Unlike Amen, while Frazier blames the United States and Britain for starting the Cold War, he does not condemn their intentions in Greece. He is convinced that without British and American intervention in Greece, the Greek National Liberation Front (EAM) would have taken control of the country and converted it into a Soviet client state. Frazier does, however, condemn the U.S. and British methods. He firmly believes a unified and cooperative Anglo-American policy would have prevented the civil war in Greece, which in turn may have prevented the Cold War. Frazier’s argument is unrealistic and seemingly ignores the vast literature on the origins of the Cold War. He too easily dismisses other examples of U.S.-Soviet conflict, such as in Turkey over the Dardanelles and in Iran over northern Azerbaijan. In numerous places around the globe the Americans and Soviets had already taken

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6 Ibid., 159.
opposing sides. A redeeming aspect of Frazier’s study is that it demonstrates a clear lack of coordination between the United States and Great Britain concerning Greece. This lack of coordination continued to plague the U.S.-British relationship throughout the Greek Civil War and resulted in sharp differences of opinion between British and American military advisors.

Of the three studies mentioned, Lawrence Wittner’s *American Intervention in Greece* is the most complete. Wittner criticizes what he views as a U.S. obsession with possible Communist machinations behind every foreign nation’s domestic struggles. American policymakers made a deliberate choice to oppose all forms of radical nationalism and leftist-oriented movements to maintain the stability of the status quo. Opposition methods usually involved an excessive reliance on military oriented solutions that failed to address the long-term issues of regional interests. He expounds on the Truman administration’s support for pro-American regimes regardless of their nature. In the Cold War context, U.S. officials believed any disorder or instability in foreign governments would provide an opening for Soviet exploitation. Therefore, U.S. officials sought to minimize disorder or the threat of disorder at every opportunity.

Wittner acknowledges his revisionist slant, but he differs from Amen and Frazier in his view of American policymakers’ motivations. He finds no evidence of U.S. intentions to exploit Greece economically as Amen suggests. Wittner’s analysis also differs from Frazier’s argument of ideological differences being the prime motivator behind the Truman Doctrine and argues that American policymakers “genuinely feared the extension of Soviet power” and “viewed the Greek left as a
cat's-paw for masterminds in the Kremlin. Working from this premise, Wittner presents a fairly balanced account of the Greek Civil War, although his portrayal of the Greek Communist-guerrillas is romanticized at times.

In analyzing the military solution American policymakers applied to Greece, Wittner glosses over many of the details concerning U.S. military advisors. Wittner views U.S. military assistance in Greece in terms of its political and economic aspects. He disregards improvements in the effectiveness and aggressiveness of Greek forces associated with the impact of U.S. military advisors. Wittner cites increases in U.S. funding, which facilitated an increase in the size of the Greek National Army (GNA), and the total tonnage of equipment and ammunition as the most relevant aspects of U.S. military assistance. Accordingly, he minimizes the affect and contribution of military advisors in defeating the guerrillas and views changes in guerrilla tactics and a Communist realignment as the primary reasons behind the Communist guerrillas defeat.

In contrast to Wittner, Amen, and Frazier, historians Bruce Kuniholm and Howard Jones view U.S. actions in Greece as a natural consequence of U.S.-Soviet tensions. In The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East Kuniholm argues that Soviet actions in Iran and Turkey prompted U.S. action in the region. Essentially, Kuniholm views U.S. efforts in the Middle East as a continuation of the older clash between Great Britain and Russian in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The increasingly aggressive posture of the Soviet Union in relation to Turkey caused U.S. officials great distress. Taken in context with Soviet actions in Iran, several U.S.

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[Lawrence Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949, (New York: Columbia University]
State Department officials concluded that the events were part of an overall Soviet expansionist push. Soviet insistence on revisions in the Montreux Agreements governing the passage of ships through the Turkish Straits of the Black Sea and demands for territorial concessions alarmed U.S. and British analysts, who viewed these demands as the first step towards converting Turkey into a Soviet satellite state.  

Soviet actions and U.S. military planners' assessment of the strategic value of Turkey directed U.S. policymakers towards the extension of military assistance. The civil war in Greece and the British decision to minimize their presence in the two countries provided the perfect opportunity to link Greek and Turkish aid to an economic and military assistance package to "safeguard freedom by strengthening free peoples against Communist aggression and subversion."  

Kuniholm argues that the announcement of the Truman Doctrine suggested a transformation in the United States concept of national security. Acknowledging that global stability would promote national stability, the President announced that the United States would assume a more active role in world affairs. In the speech, Truman asked Congress to provide an aid program for Greece and Turkey in the amount of $400 million dollars. The program provided economic assistance, military equipment, and both civilian and military technical advisors to help both Greece and Turkey defend against the threat of Communist expansion. Proclaimed as a means to allow the free peoples of the

Press, 1982), xi.


9 Ibid., 412.
world to resist subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures, the Truman Doctrine inaugurated the policy of containment that became the foundation of Cold War strategy.

After presenting the starting point for U.S. military assistance to Greece and Turkey, Kuniholm is remarkably silent about it. The lack of any assessment on the role military assistance played after the implementation of the Truman Doctrine would seem to suggest Kuniholm did not consider it very relevant to Greek, Turkish or Iranian development.

In *A New Kind of War: America’s Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece*, Howard Jones views American actions towards Greece as the starting point for Soviet containment. Whether the Soviet Union had any designs on Greece is less important than the idea that the Truman administration believed it did and therefore took action deemed necessary to impede Soviet expansion. Jones emphasizes how events appeared to American leaders at the time and demonstrates how policymakers’ efforts evolved in response to the situation in Greece, rather than as part of an elaborate plan to dominate the Greek economy and political system. He views the Truman Doctrine as a success in Greece, but argues that many American policymakers drew the wrong lessons from achievements in Greece and mistakenly applied these lessons to decisions regarding Vietnam. The application of U.S. military influence was only one piece of the puzzle to the larger economic and stability problems facing Greece.
Jones examines the military aspects of U.S. assistance to Greece more closely than the previous works mentioned here, but still glosses over many of the details of military aid and the role of military advisors. Although he correctly identifies the importance of the "new kind of war" occurring in Greece, one based on elements of guerrilla warfare, he makes little reference to the U.S. military advisors' experience in dealing with guerrilla operations in a Peoples War. Jones is more interested in examining policy decisions, such as the debate over the proposal to commit U.S. combat troops to Greece and the decision to extend operational advice through U.S. military advisors to the Greek military.

The focus of Jones, Kuniholm, Wittner, Frazier, and Amen are on policy decisions and seem to disregard Greece's importance in helping to establish a formal program of military assistance that focused on counterinsurgency operations. Prior to Greece, U.S. Army involvement in counterinsurgency operations involved conventional efforts with a sizable U.S. military presence or threat of a large U.S. presence. The battles against Native Americans, operations in Cuba, the Philippines, and other military interventionist operations all involved ample military forces and rarely involved operating in an independent and sovereign nation. Greece represents one of the first instances where U.S. military personnel, in this case military advisors, were involved in counterinsurgency operations with combat forces not under direct American command and free of recent colonial association.

In a survey of U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine prior to World War II, Andrew J. Birtle notes the absence of any formal counterinsurgency policies and strategies. However, Birtle argues that the lack of written doctrine does not indicate
the absence of handed down knowledge of anti-guerrilla operations. Indeed, Birtle identifies "a strong continuity in the manner in which the U.S. Army performed counterinsurgency and overseas constabulary missions in the century that preceded the outbreak of World War II." He argues that the consistency of U.S. actions from one incident to the next indicate a pattern of unofficial U.S. military doctrine. Birtle attributes this continuity to a variety of factors, such as American social and military values and the idea that "similar situations tended to evoke similar responses." Despite differences of culture, terrain, and armament the principles of guerrilla warfare remain unchanged, just as the means to combat guerrilla actions tend to remain the same. Although Birtle's study focuses on counterinsurgency rather than military assistance, the work demonstrates the lack of formal U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine prior to U.S. involvement in Greece. U.S. military experiences in Greece went a long way towards correcting that deficiency.

Two other studies that briefly analyze U.S. military assistance to the Near East are Chester J. Pach's *Arming the Free World: The Origins of the United States Military Assistance Program, 1945-1950* and William H. Mott's *United States Military Assistance: An Empirical Perspective*. Pach focuses one chapter on U.S. efforts to secure the Northern Tier nations of Iran, Turkey, and Greece and the affects of the Truman Doctrine on each. Mott, on the other hand, examined the regional influence of American military assistance programs. Both works view post-war

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11 Ibid., 274.
military assistance as extensions of the World War Two Lend-Lease program and as a useful solution to dispose of the stockpile of weapons that the war's end had turned into surplus.

Both Pach and Mott designate the period between World War Two and the Korean War as the important, formative years of the U.S. military assistance program. During this period, the program grew from piecemeal regional programs, such as in Iran, Turkey, and Greece, into a "coordinated, worldwide effort" to contain Communist expansion. The two works also both emphasize how Turkey and Iran actively pursued U.S. assistance, due to anxiety over questionable Soviet actions in the Near East. Appeals from both Turkey and Iran for U.S. assistance were integral in the eventual development of a coordinated program of economic and military assistance to nations threatened with Communist control.

In regard to Turkey, in 1945 Soviet officials sought to include provisions in the renewal of the Russo-Turkish treaty of friendship that authorized joint fortification of the Black Sea straits, Soviet bases on Turkish soil, and the cession of other territories. Turkey emphatically refused all of the Soviet proposals and sought international assistance. In Iran, Soviet occupation forces, which in association with Great Britain had occupied Iran since 1941, showed no interest in departing from Iran after the end of the war. Additionally, Soviet occupation officials actively supported a Communist separatist movement in the northwest Iranian province of Azerbaijan.

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Initially, Truman regarded circumstances in Turkey and Iran to be a situation best left to bilateral negotiations between the countries involved. After a period of time, however, Truman and his advisors came to view Soviet efforts in the Middle East, specifically towards Turkey and Iran, as expansionist in nature. The events in Turkey and Iran shifted the Truman administration toward a firmer policy with the Soviet Union resulting in the hard-line with Communist actions in Greece that led to the Truman Doctrine. U.S. military strategists took a more active interest in the value of the Near East and by 1946 U.S. military planners completed a joint war plan that "pointed to the advantages of using the Caucasus Mountains-Black Sea region... as a corridor for a major offensive against the industrial heart of the Soviet Union."\textsuperscript{13}

In general, both Pach and Mott argue that the purpose of U.S. military assistance was to demonstrate American resolve in the Near East and raise the morale of nations seeking to resist communism. Pach focuses predominantly on the political use of military assistance as a psychological aid to increase foreign morale. Mott emphasizes the necessity to gain and keep influence and applies Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s argument that "U.S. foreign policy was permanently dominated by Americans' view of themselves in the role of redeemers, commissioned to save humanity."\textsuperscript{14} Yet, both works also minimize the early role of military assistance programs in developing policies of counterinsurgency.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 95.
One of the landmark events of U.S. involvement in Greece was the development of a formal military assistance program designed to deal with future incidences like Greece. The establishment of a formal military assistance program indicated that the United States, through the use of the U.S. military, would actively seek situations in which to impose military advisors as tools of American diplomacy. The use of guerrilla and subversive techniques by Communist groups to destabilize governments meant that military efforts became of vital importance to assist those governments threatened by destabilization, fearful of Soviet transgression, or deemed as important to U.S. strategic concerns. Accordingly, counterinsurgency doctrine would become an important component of U.S. military assistance programs.
CHAPTER 2: FOUNDATIONS OF CIVIL WAR

2.1. The Situation in Greece

Near the end of World War II, Greece was in turmoil. Although successful in defending Greece against Italian invaders in 1941, the Greek army was virtually destroyed by the Germans, who came to the aid of their Italian allies later that same year. For the next three years, with the exception of a small contingent fighting with the British, the Greek army ceased to exist. The devastating loss of junior enlisted soldiers and junior officers meant that after the war the Greek army would be deprived of important leadership and experienced veterans on which to base a professional standing army. This lack of experience would be the source of great harm to Greek efforts during its campaign against the Communist guerrillas between 1946 and 1949.¹

The defeat of the Greek army did not mean an end to the fighting in Greece. For the next three years Greek partisans waged a vicious guerrilla war against the German and Italian occupation forces. The partisan bands not only struggled against the Germans and Italians, but also against each other in an effort to control the balance of power and loyalty of the Greek people in the struggle for control of post-

war Greece. Although many guerrilla factions existed, the two main guerrilla forces were a Communist dominated group on one side and a more rightist organization representing the interests of the monarchists on the other.²

In response to the German invasion, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) used its pre-war experience in underground activities and formed the National Liberation Front (EAM), an innocuous and non-political sounding title that appealed to the patriotic and nationalist minded citizens of Greece, in September 1941. In theory, the EAM was a political coalition focused on the liberation of Greece. In reality, a triumvirate of Communist leaders dominated it. With its organizational structure firmly established in labor organizations, rural villages, and urban centers throughout Greece, the EAM formed the National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS) in early 1942.

The generic, non-political, public objectives of the EAM and ELAS attracted the majority of Greeks committed to resistance activities against the foreign occupiers. So, although the ELAS was ultimately directed by KKE, the Communists did not make up a majority of the rank and file within the resistance movement. Instead, ELAS represented the best opportunity for many Greeks to fight against the German and Italian invaders. Eventually the group grew to become the largest guerrilla force in Greece. Gathering assistance from any available source, namely the British at this time, the ELAS did the minimum necessary against the Germans and Italians to credibly present itself as a national fighting force in the eyes of the people. In fact, majority of ELAS operations were carried out against opposing guerrilla

bands established by other political factions. Eventually the EAM/ELAS eliminated or absorbed all other major resistance organizations in Greece with the exception of the National Republican Greek League (EDES).³

The other major guerrilla group able to field a substantial fighting force, the EDES, conducted guerrilla operations in the western mountains of Greece. Although a smaller organization, the EDES assisted a British Special Operations Executive (SOE) mission in November 1942 and were generally considered the most reliable of all the guerrilla organizations by the Allies. As a result of their high standing, the EDES received considerable aid from the Allied Military Mission in Greece, which contributed to the EDES’s ability to survive constant ELAS assaults during the war.⁴

The Allied Military Mission, especially its British members, became aware of the political goals and possible, unstated objectives of the ELAS and attempted to limit ELAS activities through the control of supply deliveries. The surrender of Italy in 1943 created an independent source of arms and ammunition for ELAS since it accepted the surrender of the majority of the Italian forces in Greece. The Communist-controlled forces quickly took advantage of their newfound freedom and attacked elements of the EDES. A bitter three-way struggle ensued pitting the ELAS, EDES, and German counterguerrilla forces against one another. The ELAS’s operations against the other Greek resistance groups are usually referred to as the First Round of the Greek Civil War.

⁴ Condit, Case Study, 159-166; A British team of 12 men parachuted into Greece in 1942 to sever the supply line to Rommel’s forces in North Africa. The force successfully sabotaged the Gorgopotamos
By mid-1944 the Allies were finally able to broker a cease-fire agreement between the various guerrilla elements, but ELAS actions fully alerted representatives of the Greek government-in-exile to the potential threat posed by ELAS attempts to control Greece. The Allied Military Mission to Greece, consisting of representatives from the British SOE and the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS), also had little reason to trust the ELAS. Since the first OSS units entered Greece in September 1943, ELAS worked hard at driving a wedge between OSS and SOE forces in hopes of playing the two organizations against one another. Although not completely successful, the effort did aggravate existing mutual suspicion between the two organizations and led to the OSS cultivating its own sources of information within Greece and its own contacts within the Greek government-in-exile. These contacts would play an important role in providing information to American military officers after the end of World War II.\(^5\)

When the German Army withdrew from Greece later that year the EAM/ELAS contingent tried to seize control of Greece with military action. British and Greek forces reacted quickly and were able to defeat the EAM/ELAS forces by mid-January 1945 in what is typically referred to as the Second Round of the Greek Civil War. The resulting bloodshed of the brief insurgency, especially in Athens, cast off the patriotic mask of the EAM/ELAS and revealed its true, Communist-dominated image to the Greek people. Support for the EAM/ELAS plummeted and the force

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demobilized, while the Communist leaders returned to their more subtle underground activities. Additionally, the bond between the British and Greek governments grew stronger as the Greek government moved farther to the right.6

One factor in the shift to the right of the Greek government was the restoration of King George II. Since his evacuation from Greece in 1941, the King had served as a figurehead for Greek support of the British war effort. The King and a small cabinet formed a government-in-exile based in Cairo, Egypt, but their legitimacy within Greece met with serious opposition. Prior to the war, King George II had accepted the formation of a pro-fascist and pro-German dictatorship under John Metaxas that seriously damaged his credibility and that of the royalists who supported him. After the Germans invaded Greece to rescue the defeated Italian invasion force, most Greeks seriously doubted whether the king would ever be able to return.

Within the British government three conflicting views were present regarding the king’s return. First, the British military wished to ensure the continued support of Greek resistance forces fighting German forces in Greece and tended to support the views of republican EDES and Communist EAM/ELAS guerrilla groups, who opposed the king’s unqualified return. Second, the British Foreign Office, fearing the possibility of civil war, preferred a plebiscite that would decide the matter of the King’s situation by popular vote prior to his return to Greece. Third, Prime Minister Winston Churchill stubbornly supported the restoration of the King and fought the Foreign Office’s attempts to promote the plebiscite. Ultimately, King George agreed to submit to the plebiscite prior to his return.

6 Condit, Case Study, 71-78.
By September 1946, the plebiscite result returned a majority in favor of the return of the King. Although the majority of the Greek population appeared anti-Communist and the national plebiscite approved the return of King George II, the economic hardship occurring throughout Greece made the time seem right for the Communists to act. Immediately thereafter, the EAM began the Third Round of the Greek Civil War. The Communist forces emerged from their mountain hideaways along the Yugoslavian and Albanian borders and once again tried to incite a popular insurgency against the Greek regime. The unstable situation in Greece, coupled with the increasing costs of waging an anti-guerrilla war while attempting to rebuild the Greek infrastructure placed an incredible strain on the British government. A crippled transportation system, an enormous displaced population, thousands of villages destroyed, and a national government barely able to conduct daily business drove many Greeks into the Communist camp.7

Additionally, Soviet pressure in Turkey and Iran seemed to indicate a planned Communist offensive focused on expansion in the Near East. In reality, the Soviets seem to have shown little interest in events in Greece. Howard Jones points out in *A New Kind of War* that a Soviet mission to Greece during World War II dismissed Greek Communist efforts to seize power and that Stalin fully recognized Greece as falling into the British sphere of interest. Also, Lawrence Wittner's findings in *American Intervention in Greece* show that U.S. intelligence sources intercepted numerous messages between the Soviets and the EAM movement in which the

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Soviets refused to support the EAM and, instead, encouraged them to work with the Greek national government. However, Greece’s Communist neighbors, Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, were more than happy to extend any aid they could to help destabilize the last remaining non-Communist state in the Balkans. From U.S. and British intelligence analysts’ perspective the notion that the Soviet Union was not directly involved in all Communist insurgencies seemed very unlikely and they informed their superiors accordingly.  

Britain, based on its long-standing relationship and interest in Greece, tried to assist the Greek government both financially and militarily. The British Military Mission to Greece helped recreate the Greek army and provided it with military supplies and equipment. However, many critics claim that British assistance did more harm than good by creating a mirror image of the British army in a nation too poor to maintain it. A preponderance of officers, auxiliary services, and vehicles contributed very little to the fighting quality of the Greek army. Furthermore, British failure to adjust the seniority system in the Greek army only “frustrate[d] competent young officers and perpetuate[d] a cadre of colonels and generals who have been taught by a series of political purges over a period of twenty-five years to avoid initiative and responsibility at all costs.” Also, the British were dealing with financial troubles of their own. As early as 1946, the United States recognized that Britain might not be able to continue supplying arms and equipment to Greece and

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8 Jones, *New Kind*, 4-6; Wittner, *Intervention*, 7-8, 27.
outlined a plan to funnel supplies to Greece through Great Britain. Eventually, financial difficulties, exacerbated by Britain's over-extension of military forces worldwide, led to Britain's decision to cut its aid to Greece. On February 21, 1947, the British embassy informed the U.S. State Department of its decision to end aid to Greece and Turkey by March 31, 1947.  

2.2. The Role of Military Assessments

The United States recognized the importance of Greece for both its strategic and political value. A 1946 memorandum on Greece acknowledged that Greece might be the deciding factor in the future orientation of the Near and Middle East. As the only Balkan country not controlled by the Communists, Greece formed "the sole obstacle to Soviet domination of the Eastern Mediterranean." Additionally, if Greece were to fall to Communist control, then incredible pressure would be placed on Turkey, possibly jeopardizing not only the entire Near and Middle East, but northern Africa as well. Strategically, the State Department also recognized the political value of Greece and believed that failure to defend Greece from Communist domination would encourage similar guerrilla movements by Communist elements in "middle of the road governments."

11 Jones, New Kind, 31-33.
Recognizing the implications of the end of British aid, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson outlined a series of recommendations to Secretary of State George Marshall to help sustain the Greek government after the British withdrawal. The recommendations focused primarily on political and economic reform sustained with U.S. financial aid, but also suggested that U.S. military equipment might be needed.14 A few days later, Marshall outlined to Truman his appraisal of the situation in Greece along with his recommendation that American assistance be provided, basing it heavily on information sent to him by three U.S. representatives in Greece. The three U.S. representatives were the U.S. Ambassador to Greece Lincoln MacVeagh, Mark Ethridge, head of the United Nation Security Council’s Investigation in Greece, and Paul A. Porter, head of the U.S. economic mission to Greece.15

MacVeagh, Ethridge, and Porter all seemed to have based their assessments on information provided by U.S. military personnel. Throughout much of 1946 and early 1947, members of the Embassy’s Military Attaché Office painted bleak pictures for their civilian supervisors concerning conditions in Greece. Reports as early as March 1946 concluded that ELAS was receiving Soviet financial and military assistance.16 The senior military attaché in Greece was Colonel Donald N. Wackwitz.

14 Ibid., 31. In “Lessons” of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy, Ernest R. May states that he believed Truman intended to provide military advisers all along and that his reaction was much too militant.
15 Memorandum by Secretary of State to President, Feb 27, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 5:61. In his autobiography Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, Dean Acheson refers to MacVeagh, Ethridge, and Porter as “our scouts in Greece.”
16 Memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel E.G. Edwards to Military Attaché, American Embassy, Greece, March 18, 1946; Greece 09.41-092, 1 Jan 46 to 31 Dec 48 (Greece, 1946-48); 900.1 Greece to 686 Greenland, 1946-1948 (Greece to Greenland, 1946-48); Army Intelligence Project Decimal File, 1946 to 1948 (Decimal File, 1946-48); Records of the Army Staff, Record Group 319 (RG 319); National Archives at College Park, MD (NACP).
Wackwitz, an officer in the Army Air Corps, was assigned to Greece on January 30, 1946 and was appointed as both the military attaché and military air attaché to Greece. He seems to have been a man not quite up to the job. Almost immediately he began submitting reports to his supervisors in Washington complaining how a shortage of personnel, limited office space, and limited equipment were all problems minimizing the effectiveness of his office. With an assigned staff of four officers and three enlisted personnel, complimented with seven officers and seven enlisted personnel attached as of November 15, 1946, Wackwitz's possessed the largest military attaché office in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{17} His complaints hardly seemed justified. Although Ambassador MacVeagh acknowledged Wackwitz's inadequacies as an attaché, he still praised Wackwitz's "cooperative spirit and his indefatigable devotion to duty."\textsuperscript{18} In a letter to the Pentagon concerning Wackwitz's performance, MacVeagh stated that "[n]either his education nor his aptitudes fit him especially for his present position. But he has shown himself very intense and faithful about his work."\textsuperscript{19}

For intelligence information, MacVeagh preferred to rely on Lieutenant Colonel Allen C. Miller, the assistant military attaché. Miller, an Infantry officer, had served as commander of the Apache Scouts in Fort Huachuca, AZ and as commander of 2nd Battalion, 513th Parachute Infantry Regiment during the 17th Airborne

\textsuperscript{17} Colonel Donald Wackwitz to Office of the Military Attaché, April 26, 1946; Greece, 1946-48; Greece to Greenland, 1946-48; Decimal File, 1946-48; RG 319; NACP. Captain John E. Van Sant, Assistant Personnel Officer to Office of the Military Attaché, November 15, 1946; Greece, 1946-48; Greece to Greenland, 1946-48; Decimal File, 1946-48; RG 319; NACP.

\textsuperscript{18} Letter from Lincoln MacVeagh, U.S. Ambassador to Greece to Colonel Carlisle Allen, G-2 War Department, January 2, 1947; Greece, 1946-48; Greece to Greenland, 1946-48; Decimal File, 1946-48; RG 319; NACP.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
Division's parachute drop over the Rhine River during the war. He proved very capable of gathering accurate information based on personal reconnaissance and established contacts among the Greek General Staff and the British Counter Intelligence Service. MacVeagh frequently credited Miller's efforts in gathering information on guerrilla forces along the northern frontier of Greece. MacVeagh praised Miller as a "serious, painstaking and reliable officer whose findings so far as they go I have no hesitation in endorsing." The ambassador regularly passed on Miller's assessments of the situation in northern Greece and adopted many of Miller's own opinions concerning Soviet support for the Communist-led guerrillas. MacVeagh's reports to the State Department and the Secretary of State reiterated Miller's views concerning the precarious condition of Greece and the presence of Soviet sponsored guerrilla training camps.

Mark Ethridge served as a second conduit of information for the State Department concerning conditions in Greece. Appointed as the head of a United Nations Security Council commission to investigate Greek allegations that Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia were aiding and providing refuge for guerrilla forces, Ethridge arrived in Greece in January 1947. After several months of investigation, the commission failed to uncover sufficient evidence of foreign-sponsored border violations into Greece. However, Ethridge and several other commission members, particularly the British, French, and Chinese members, believed Greece was teetering

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21 Wackwitz to Office of the Military Attaché, December 7, 1946; Greece, 1946-48; Greece to Greenland, 1946-48; Decimal File, 1946-48; RG 319; NACP.
on the brink of Communist subjugation. Like MacVeagh, Ethridge based his conclusions on many observations, but relied heavily on Miller's assessments and often reiterated Miller's observations directly to the Secretary of State. Ethridge quickly relayed his views to the State Department that "Greece may be about to fall" to Soviet-controlled forces and that "if Greece goes not only the Near East goes with it but also Italy and France."²⁴

Paul A. Porter served as the third source of information for State Department officials on Greece. Porter headed a U.S. economic mission to Greece trying to coordinate a limited program of economic assistance. Porter arrived in Greece in January 1947 and after several hundred interviews with Greek business and economic leaders became skeptical of the Greek government's ability to restore economic stability. Porter blamed the lack of Greek economic recovery after World War II on the psychological condition of the Greek people. In a letter to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Porter noted that the Greeks suffered from a general feeling of helplessness over their suffering during the war. Although he believed the Greek government was willing to accept American suggestions, he seriously doubted their ability to carry them out. Porter claimed that Greece is more a loose "hierarchy of individualistic politicians" rather than a government "in the Western concept" and identified Greece's main problems as being caused by its own incapable government.²⁵

²³ MacVeagh to Secretary of State, Oct 27, 1946, FRUS, 1946, 7:246-247; Witter, Intervention, 34.
²⁴ Jones, New Kind, 26; Ethridge to Secretary of State, Feb 21, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 5:24, 38.
Porter’s condemnation of the incompetence of the Greek government in dealing with domestic troubles may have curtailed U.S. intentions to extend economic assistance to Greece had MacVeagh and Ethridge not intervened. Prior to submitting a final report Porter was influenced by Ethridge, a close friend, and MacVeagh to consider the external pressure placed on the Greek political structure by the Soviet encroachment represented by guerilla activity in northern Greece. Together MacVeagh and Ethridge convinced Porter to recommend economic assistance. Although Porter’s report included stipulations that the Greek government institute several economic reforms, eventually, “Porter agreed with MacVeagh that the largest initial expenditure would be military in view of growing domestic violence encouraged from the outside.” 26 Again, many of Ethridge’s and MacVeagh’s views concerning the military situation and guerilla activities were shaped directly by Lieut. Col. Allen and members of the military attaché’s office. These views were indirectly extended to Porter’s assessment.

Back in Washington Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson edited a report prepared by Loy Henderson, director of Near Eastern and African Affairs for the State Department, titled “Crisis and Imminent Possibility of Collapse in Greece” for Secretary of State Marshall. The report was generated in reaction to the British revelation that they would be unable to continue economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey. Based on information from the reports of MacVeagh, Ethridge, and Porter, Acheson stated that Greece would be unable to maintain its independence since the Greek Communists and Soviet dominated governments of Albania,

Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria "are making every effort to prevent any improvement in Greek internal affairs." Acheson also warned Marshall that the "[a]reas under the control of guerrilla bands, who receive aid and encouragement from outside Greece, are increasing" and recommended the extension of economic and military aid to Greece. Six days later Marshall passed on Acheson's recommendations to President Truman. Marshall also outlined the situation in Greece using the warnings and reports of MacVeagh, Ethridge, and Porter, concluding that "[i]f Greece should dissolve into civil war it is altogether probable that it would emerge as a Communist state under Soviet control."  

In the specific example of MacVeagh, Etheridge, and Porter, all three depended on the intelligence assessments of members of the U.S. military attaché's office in Greece in forming their evaluations and recommendations to the secretary of state. In this way, military representatives in Greece exerted minor influence in foreign policy development by helping shape recommendations made to the secretary of state and ultimately the president. When taken as an isolated example, this influence is hardly significant, but when analyzed in light of events in Greece over the next three years their influence helped establish a trend of increasing reliance on military personnel for assessing Greek politics. Precedents began to be established in Greece, especially among MacVeagh and other U.S. embassy personnel, to be more attentive to military considerations. The presence of a military personality more forceful than Wackwitz and in a position of greater authority than Miller would make

28 Ibid., 29-31.
the most of that new attentiveness. Even after the initial aid program to Greece began in August 1947, MacVeagh realized that a “wider judgment based on estimate of military situation” may be required and that “a larger staff of military observers . . . under a superior officer of broader vision and higher authority than present Military Attaché would be useful.”

CHAPTER 3: MILITARIZATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

3.1. Military Assistance over Economic Assistance

Congress’s passage of Public Law 75, the Aid to Greece and Turkey Bill, on May 22, 1947 formalized the first step in implementing the Truman Doctrine’s goal of aiding Greece and Turkey. The main objective of the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG) was to stabilize the Greek economy to a point where there would be no adverse effect on Greek political stability and Greek military efforts to defeat the Communist insurgents. The U.S. Army Group Greece (USAGG) formed the military component of AMAG. The first officers of the military mission arrived in Greece on May 24, 1947. USAGG’s mission centered on furnishing the Greek military with supplies and equipment necessary to defeat the guerrilla forces and restore order and security to the country, which would then facilitate economic and political recovery. Beyond the immediate tasks of determining what supplies and equipment were needed and distributing them as they arrived, the U.S. personnel also had to instruct the Greek military forces in the equipment’s use and maintenance.¹

The economic portion of AMAG’s program focused on assisting the Greek population. Of the $300,000,000 in aid appropriated by Congress, approximately half was allocated for civilian reconstruction and rehabilitation. The aid program planned to repair transportation and communication facilities, improve electric and water
utilities, and assist in agricultural and disease prevention programs. However, guerrilla attacks against Greek civilians and the destruction of several villages created a huge refugee problem and produced economic and political chaos. Despite AMAG's best efforts, it soon became apparent that economic recovery could not occur until internal order was restored.²

Communist activities in 1947 severely damaged the Greek government's credibility and further aggravated the refugee and food shortage problems. Starting with the assassination of local officials, the Democratic People's Army (DAS) gradually increased the size of its operations. Attacks against small, isolated Gendarmerie posts escalated into raids on small villages and larger Gendarmerie detachments. Soon the Communist forces were attacking small Army posts along the northern frontier of Greece, until they had established well-defined and well-defended areas of operation. The guerrilla objectives were always the same. They drove the majority of villagers from their homes, stole food and livestock, and forcibly conscripted recruits.

The guerrilla assaults created a huge political demand in Greece for the Army to protect towns and public utilities, severely limiting offensive operations. The successful guerrilla strategy focused on civilians, the public services, lines of communication, transportation, commerce, industry, and agriculture, which were the very things U.S. economic aid was trying to rebuild. The Greek army's attempt at

offensive operations against the guerrillas failed miserably and identified the shortcomings of the nation’s military. The Greek government was struggling to survive and desperately needed more substantial military aid.³

The military aspects of the aid program to Greece quickly displaced the economic aid program. The military situation became so urgent that Eugene Clay, the chief economic adviser for AMAG, hastily transferred $9,000,000 from the economic fund into the military fund, based largely on the recommendation of Lieut. Col. Miller. The transferred funds, originally intended for agricultural programs, would now be devoted to increasing the Greek army by approximately ten thousand men and funding a three month extension of twenty thousand men already serving in the Greek army.⁴ Even the reluctant Porter admitted that “there can be no permanent solution...until the present military burden is reduced—until money and men are released for productive purposes.”⁵ Back in Washington, even the coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey, George C. McGhee, understood the need to re-prioritize aid efforts in Greece. He recalls that one day, “after the Greek guerrillas had blown up several of the bridges we had just built, that I quietly, without getting anyone’s approval outside of the department, sent the Treasury Department a check transferring $50,000,000 from the Greek economic program to the Defense Department to apply against defeating the guerrillas. No one ever complained or questioned.”⁶

⁴ Jones, New Kind, 95.
Upon his return from a routine visit to Greece, director of Near Eastern and African Affairs Loy Henderson warned Marshall that not enough attention was being paid to the internal military problems of Greece. After speaking with MacVeagh, Griswold, and American military leaders, Henderson realized "[t]here was no purpose in trying to build roads and help establish factories only to have them torn down or destroyed by the guerrillas." Marshall immediately discerned the danger and informed Dwight Griswold, the chief of AMAG, that the destruction of the guerrilla forces was the most important task at hand and their destruction took "precedence over any portions [of the] present program which do not directly support" anti-guerrilla operations.8

Truman also recognized the danger of the guerrilla situation in Greece and authorized the transfer of another $23,000,000 in aid funds from the economic to the military program. He advised Congress that the "military aspects of the aid program has encroached substantially upon the development of economic programs."9 The additional money supported the creation of a Greek National Defense Corps capable of defending villages and towns, freeing the Greek army to pursue the guerrilla forces.

Between 1947 and 1949 the military effort in Greece superseded the economic effort by a substantial margin. For example, from September 1947, when military aid began, to March 1949, the apogee of military assistance, military aid increased from

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$25 million to $270 million. Another example of the increased predominance of military over economic aid can be found in President Truman’s quarterly reports to Congress, drafted by the State Department. In his second report to Congress covering the period until December 1947, the military situation covered seven pages, while the economic situation required twenty-five pages. Less than eighteen months later, in his seventh report, fifteen pages were devoted toward the military situation, while the economic program could be covered in only one.\textsuperscript{10}

Additionally, in June 1948, the allocation of Marshall Plan funds to Greece resulted in the diversion of even more Truman Doctrine funds to the military assistance program. The formation of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), the agency created by Truman to administer the Marshall Plan, made the economic branch of AMAG obsolete. In order to avoid duplication of effort, the State Department and ECA agreed that the ECA “would handle economic matters through a special mission in Greece responsible to the ECA administrator.”\textsuperscript{11} The potential of additional funding through the Marshall Plan, intended for the Greek infrastructure, meant that more Truman Doctrine funds could be diverted from the AMAG economic program to the military program. The new funding source also reassured worried American officers that when the funds provided by the Truman Doctrine, scheduled to expire in June 1948, ended, an additional financial aid source might be available. Occasionally, even Marshall Plan funding became caught up in


\textsuperscript{11} Jones, New Kind, 172.
military programs, as one ECA official reported to Congress that "[w]e could not start a real economic development project until we had more security in Greece and that stage was not reached until 1950."\textsuperscript{12}

3.2. Increased Military Authority

Beyond the change in priorities between the economic and military aspects of AMAG, other examples of increasing military influence in foreign policy occurred in Greece. The deteriorating conditions in Greece during the summer of 1947 that prompted the shift in financial aid also affected the role of USAGG. Once again, based on the observations and recommendations of the military attaché Lieut. Col. Miller and USAGG commander Major General William L. Livesay, both Griswold and Ambassador MacVeagh recommended increases to the Greek armed forces and increased U.S. military participation in the Greek Civil War. The request for increased military participation did not refer to the deployment of U.S. fighting forces, but rather the extension of operational advice to the Greek military and an increased U.S. military presence to carry it out.\textsuperscript{13}

Upon its arrival in Greece, USAGG set about accomplishing its primary task of supplying the Greek military with U.S. equipment. Consisting of approximately forty military and twenty civilian personnel, USAGG compiled lists of Greek military equipment shortages, coordinated supply functions with British and Greek military supply personnel, and assessed the capabilities of pre-existing Greek logistical

\textsuperscript{12} Wittner, \textit{Intervention}, 188.
facilities. Necessary improvements in Greek port facilities, airfields, and road networks facilitated the receiving, stockpiling, and distribution of military equipment and complemented AMAG’s economic assistance program to improve the Greek infrastructure were quickly implemented.\textsuperscript{14}

Although the Greek armed forces possessed a variety of military equipment, primarily British, Italian, and German, it had little experience with U.S. military equipment. USAGG took on the additional responsibility of training Greek military personnel in the operation and maintenance of the American-provided equipment. By August 1947 American instructors, in coordination with their British counterparts from the British Military Mission (Greece), were in place at the three major Greek National Army (GNA) training centers. Using U.S. equipment, American instructors at the Signals Training Center in Haidari, the Technical Services Training Center in Athens, and the School of Military Engineering in Loutraki implemented a familiarization and training program for select Greek military students. Occasionally the U.S. instructors accompanied the Greek military students on their field exercises to ensure the troops were operating the equipment properly and provide any necessary technical assistance.\textsuperscript{15}

Within a matter of a few months, USAGG personnel became involved on a daily basis with the tactical, operational, strategic, and political aspects of the Greek Civil War. Once on the ground, the USAGG military officers realized the problem of

\textsuperscript{14} Selton, "Cradle," 48-49.
\textsuperscript{15} USAGG Monthly Historical Report, August 1947, 7 (August 1947); USAGG Monthly Historical Reports, August 1947 thru December 1947 (USAGG Monthly Historical Reports); Monthly Historical Reports, 1947 to History Maps 1950 (1947-1950); Joint United States Military Aid Group, Greece (JUSMAGG); Interservice Agencies, Record Group 334 (RG 334), National Archives at College Park,
developing the GNA into an effective fighting force required more than U.S.
equipment. By September 1947 occasional assistance in matters beyond its original
charter resulted in USAGG personnel not only providing supplies and training, but
also intelligence and planning to the Greek armed forces. In late October, at the
request of the AMAG Chief Dwight Griswold, a small plans and policy group was
added to the USAGG staff.\footnote{MD (NACP). October 1947, 7; USAGG Monthly Historical Reports; 1947-1950; JUSMAGG; RG 334; NACP.}

Livesay and the USAGG staff identified three main problems with the Greek
armed forces. First, the Greeks lacked the forces necessary to occupy multiple areas.
Second, the Greek military was plagued by political interference which pressured the
combat troops to defend certain politically valuable and sensitive areas. Third, the
combination of the first two problems resulted in a defensive mindset among Greek
Army officers. Livesay realized that the "earlier belief that military aid could be
limited to matters relating strictly to supply was no longer valid."\footnote{USAGG Monthly Historical Reports; 1947-1950; JUSMAGG; RG 334; NACP.} In September,
Livesay provided two recommendations to his superior at AMAG. First, he
recommended a permanent increase in the GNA. Second, "an urgent necessity for
extending the authority of the United States Army, Navy and Air Force in Greece to
include the full advisory functions provided for in Public Law 75."\footnote{MD (NACP). October 1947, 9-10; USAGG Monthly Historical Reports; 1947-1950; JUSMAGG; RG 334; NACP.} The Assistant
Military Attaché Lieut. Col. Miller, in contact with the USAGG staff, made a similar
recommendation to Ambassador MacVeagh. In turn, both MacVeagh and Griswold forwarded the endorsed recommendation to provide operational assistance to the Greek armed forces.

Although communication flowed between USAGG and the U.S. Embassy's Military Attaché office, communication between their two civilian supervisors was limited to say the least. MacVeagh, "a mild-mannered and highly sensitive man" disagreed with Griswold's open meddling in Greece's affairs and took offense to Griswold's use of AMAG's economic and military leverage to make demands on the Greeks.\textsuperscript{19} The two men's inability to work together created many difficulties for the White House and seems to have affected the State Department's level of confidence in both men. While both men advocated the extension of operational advice to the Greek military and an increased U.S. military presence, each felt that their own agency should control the process.

The recommendation to offer operational advice represented an important step toward escalating U.S. involvement in Greece and forced the State Department to make a momentous decision. In considering both MacVeagh's and Griswold's recommendations, the State Department dispatched an Army officer to Athens to "survey broad strategic and operational factors of present military situations."\textsuperscript{20} Accordingly, Major General Stephen Chamberlain, director of Army Intelligence, traveled to Greece in September 1947 with the complete confidence of the State Department to conduct his investigation. By soliciting the opinion of a senior military officer, instead of basing its decision on the recommendations of its

\textsuperscript{19} Jones, \textit{New Kind}, 72-73, 88.
representatives in Greece, the State Department indicated a growing reliance on the military in assisting with foreign policy decisions. A level of familiarization and confidence seemed to be growing. Additionally, the existence of two, separately controlled diplomatic missions in Greece placed Chamberlain in the position of referee and deciding which organization, either AMAG or the embassy, should control the mission.

In October of 1947, Chamberlain submitted his report to General Eisenhower, the Army Chief of Staff, recommending the extension of operational assistance to the Greek armed forces. He suggested the creation of a “U.S. Advisory and Planning Group under [the] Ambassador’s control but reporting to JCS to furnish high level military advice to the Greek Government and its armed forces.” Chamberlain’s recommendations were quickly approved and by December additional military personnel began arriving in Greece. Although the Chamberlain recommended the placement of the advisory group under the Ambassador’s control, a heated protest by Griswold, in which he threatened to resign, changed Marshall’s mind. The new organization would report to the Chief of AMAG, but Marshall stipulated in a telegram to the U.S. Embassy in Greece that “all military and naval assistance to Greece whether in form supplies or advice, should be handled by military and naval units AMAG unless high policy decisions involved in which case authority rests with Ambassador.” The placement of the new organization under AMAG went against the very reasoning behind Chamberlain’s suggestion of creating a new organization in

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20 Telegram from Lovett to Griswold, FRUS, 1947, 5:345.
the first place. Realizing it would be extremely difficult to remove USAGG from under Griswold's control, Chamberlain recommended the creation of a new mission placed under the control of the ambassador to avoid the lack of coordination and power struggle going on between MacVeagh and Griswold.23 Eventually MacVeagh would be removed and reassigned to the embassy in Lisbon, Portugal, while Griswold would resign, allowing the two competing diplomatic missions to be reunited under single office in July 1948, that of the new ambassador and chief of AMAG, Henry Grady.

The new organization was known as the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) and had a unique chain of command. The group had direct contact to the JCS and full authority in all military matters pertaining to Greece as long as it did not affect AMAG operations. The group was subordinate to AMAG in all non-military matters. Additionally, the senior Army officer was “designated as Chief of the entire Army, Navy, and Air group, at least for purposes of planning and operational advice.”24 This unusual organizational structure seemingly removed all civilian control of purely military matters in Greece. The commander of JUSMAPG controlled all military functions and decision-making in Greece and could appeal directly to the JCS for decisions and approval that were beyond his scope. [See Figure 1]. In terms of direct influence over military matters, the new AMAG chief had none. The problem of coordination between the Chief of AMAG and ambassador had been solved by combining the two offices under Grady in July 1948, but the introduction of the ECA in June 1948 meant AMAG's economic advisory role

disappeared. Without an economic advisory role and without any apparent
authorization to influence military matters concerning either JUSMAPG or USAGG,
Grady’s ability to influence events in Greece was significantly reduced.

Figure 1
Organization of AMAG—JUSMAPG—USAGG, March 1948

CHAPTER 4: THE FOUNDATION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE

4.1. JUSMAPG

The Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) was officially organized on December 31, 1947. As officers and enlisted men began to arrive, Livesay took on the increased responsibility of commanding both JUSMAPG and USAGG. Livesay had enjoyed a long and notable career. Enlisting as a private in 1915, he received his commission as a 2nd Lieutenant in the Infantry eighteen months later. The young Livesay participated in the Mexican border crisis and served in France during World War I. After the war, Livesay served as an instructor at the Infantry School in Fort Benning, GA and as the director of the Office of Chief of Infantry in Washington D.C. In 1943, now Major General Livesay became commander of the 91st Infantry Division and led his division in several campaigns in Italy in 1944 until the unit was deactivated in December 1945. At the time of his appointment as USAGG commander, Livesay was commanding Fort Jackson, SC.¹

JUSMAPG began by organizing and assigning U.S. military advisers to Greek army staffs and Greek divisions. The division detachment usually consisted of eight men who supervised training and provided operational advice. Although U.S.

¹ Jones, New Kind, 70.
military advisers were authorized to accompany the Greek divisions on operations, they were not allowed to participate in combat operations. Livesay outlined the immediate challenges for the new organization in an address to the newly arrived advisers. He forewarned the advisers that "we are diplomats" and as representatives of the American government their actions would reflect on the United States. Their mission, first and foremost, was to build up the prestige and aggressiveness of the Greek army. The advisers were to accomplish this by offering operational advice, but in a manner "that the individual Greek officer will think it was his idea in the first place." In this way, the Greek commanders would maintain the confidence necessary to continue commanding their unit. Occasionally, however, some reporters would notice that "Americans appear to be in charge of operations and there is not much disguising this fact, although everyone pretends it isn’t so."

Livesay also described the confusing nature of the advisers’ combat status. The advisers of JUSMAPG were not authorized to carry weapons. His advice was ambiguous, but it demonstrated the vague nature of the assignment. He told them:

> Your conduct, if you are caught in an operation, is more or less entirely up to you. The thing for you to do is to take cover. You are not armed and you take the best cover you can and see what you can but don’t get involved in combat. If you get ambushed without arms and take off down the road you will lose prestige among the Greeks so don’t give the Greeks the idea you are afraid when you take cover. You are not armed for your protection.

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3. Livesay’s address to American advisers to Greek Army, Jan. 16, 1948 (Livesay’s address, Jan. 16, 1948), 1-2; Greece; Livesay Papers; U.S. Army Military History Institute (USAMHI); Carlisle Military Barracks, PA (CMB).

4. Livesay’s address, Jan. 16, 1948, 2; Greece; Livesay Papers; USAMHI; CMB.


6. Livesay’s address, Jan. 16, 1948, 6-7; Greece; Livesay Papers; USAMHI; CMB. In a later interview, Van Fleet admitted that several of his advisers in Greece carried weapons and the he carried a
To Livesay’s credit, he realized the difficult role the advisers would be placed in during combat operations. The adviser had to cope with the competing criteria of setting an example for the Greek forces, maintaining his own legitimacy by demonstrating courage under fire, and remain unarmed to avoid the implication of active participation in combat operations. Livesay assured his advisers by conveying to them that “[i]f I were lying [sic] in a hole and there was a Greek rifle close to me and I knew a bandit was coming to shoot me, there is not much doubt what I would do. You can be judged in the same way.” Livesay established what is today considered the first rule of engagement for his advisers, the right to self-defense.

Tasked with advising the Greek National Army (GNA), the Royal Hellenic Navy (RHN), and the Royal Hellenic Air Force (RHAF), JUSMAPG was organized into three sections of Army, Navy, and Air. Each section was responsible for keeping Livesay informed on all pertinent matters and with managing the advisory teams assigned to their Greek counterparts. Four advisory groups were formed to assist the Greek General Staff with Personnel (G-1), Intelligence (G-2), Plans and Operations (G-3), and Logistics (G-4). Field advisory teams were assigned to the three Greek Army Corps and to the seven Army divisions. [See Figure 2].

The field advisory teams were tasked with maintaining operational awareness of their assigned areas and provide an objective evaluation of GNA operations to the JUSMAPG Director. U.S. field advisory teams’ assessments provided a more

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"personal .45." Oral History, Volume 2, 34, Mar. 3, 1974; James A. Van Fleet Papers; USAMHI; CMB.

7 Ibid.

8 Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group, JUSMAPG: Brief History 1 January 1948 to 31 August 1949 (Athens: Reports and Records Section, 1949), 1-3.
Figure 2
JUSMAPG Organization, 22 March 1948
accurate picture of the GNA’s performance than JUSMAPG was receiving through
the Greek General Staff. The teams also submitted recommendations to JUSMAPG
concerning changes in the organization and training of the Greek units and
evaluations of Greek commanders. An additional responsibility of the advisory teams
was to coordinate operations with the British Military Mission (BMM(G)) advisers.
Although an informal agreement existed between JUSMAPG and BMM(G), in which
JUSMAPG provided operational and logistical advice and BMM(G) provided
organizational and training advice, there was no formal arrangement. The lack of a
formalized agreement became an area of difficulty for the two missions as JUSMAPG
expanded its influence to training in mid-1948.

Livesay retained command of JUSMAPG for less than a month before he was
replaced by Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet. Although the JCS recommended
Livesay remain as director of JUSMAPG, Marshall concluded that “a more
impressive personality” was needed to lead the U.S. military program in Greece.
Marshall regarded Van Fleet as “one of the outstanding aggressive fighting corps
commanders of the campaign in Europe” and believed he was the right person to
instill the necessary aggressiveness in the Greek armed forces. Accordingly, Lieut.

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9 The Americans advisers developed a system of stamping the word “Henley” on all documents that
were meant for U.S. eyes only. Livesay’s address, Jan. 16, 1948, 7, Greece: Livesay Papers;
USAMHI; CMB.
10 Although the British government ended aid to Greece on March 31, 1947, they maintained a presence
11 Paul Brair suggests that Marshall relieved Livesay on the personal request of Greece’s Queen
Frederika, who felt a more aggressive officer was needed to defeat the Communist guerrillas. Paul F.
Brair, The Will to Win: The Life of General James A. Fleet (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2001), 156-157. Van Fleet was promoted immediately after acceptance of the mission in Greece and
received his third star on February 19, 1948.
12 Kenneth W. Condit, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National
Policy, Volume II, 1947-1949 (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazer, Inc, 1979), 41. In War in Peacetime,
J. Lawton Collins states he was the one to recommend Van Fleet to Marshall for the assignment in
Gen. James A. Van Fleet was appointed the new USAGG commander and the Director of JUSMAPG. Promoted to Lieutenant General soon after accepting the assignment, the combination of Van Fleet's aggressive personality and the developing tendency to defer more authority to military representatives in Greece, allowed Van Fleet to significantly increased U.S. military influence in U.S. foreign policy development in Greece.

4.2. Van Fleet arrives

Previously stationed in Frankfurt, Germany and receiving no advance notification of his consideration for the new position, Van Fleet received word to depart for Washington D.C. for a "special mission." He departed Germany on February 2, 1948 in a C-54, completely unaware of his fate. After several meetings with Marshall, Van Fleet was officially appointed as Chief of the USAGG and as the Director of JUSMAPG. Van Fleet attempted to prepare as best he could for his new assignment. In addition to the series of briefings he received in Washington, he received substantial advice from British and Greek sources during a stopover in London on his way to Athens. After returning briefly to Germany on February 16 to begin preparations to change duty stations, he departed for London the next day to meet with the British Chiefs of Staff and gain their perspective on the situation in Greece. After several years' commitment, the British government still felt it had a vested interest in Greek affairs, despite the announcement concerning its inability to

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continue Greek aid. While waiting to meet with the British Chiefs of Staff, Van Fleet attended a short one hour meeting with Mr. Melas, the Greek Ambassador to England. After receiving the Greek perspective and the whirlwind version of the American perspective from briefings in Washington, Van Fleet felt he was prepared for the British.\footnote{Commanding General's Journal, February 2-6, 1948, James A. Van Fleet Papers (Van Fleet Papers), box 45, folder 1, George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, Virginia (Marshall Library).}

The meeting had power play written all over it. The meeting’s attendees included Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham, the First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, LTG G.W.P. Templer, representing the Chief of Imperial General Staff, LTG Sir Leslie C. Hoytis Chief Staff Officer to the Minister of Defense, and was presided over by the Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, Chief of the Air Staff. By his side Van Fleet had Mr. G.A. Wallinger form the Foreign Office and Major W.M. Leffingwell, the USAGG liaison in London. The British definitely held numerical superiority and had assembled an informative and influential group with the purpose of convincing Van Fleet of their point of view. Lord Tedder led the discussion and conveyed the Chiefs of Staffs’ position that “the key to the solution of the Greek problem lay in the reorganization of the present system of command of the Greek armed forces, particularly the Greek army.\footnote{Commanding General’s Journal, February 17-19, 1948, Van Fleet Papers, box 49, folder 1, Marshall Library.}

Van Fleet had come to much the same conclusion after his meetings in Washington and both sides agreed that a unified chain of command was crucial to successful operations in 1948. Lord Tedder continued to add that “once the Greeks

\footnote{British Chiefs of Staff Committee minutes of Feb 18, 1948 meeting, Feb. 18, 1948, Correspondence, 17 FEB 48 to 20 FEB 48, Van Fleet Papers, box 49, folder 13, Marshall Library.}
had been persuaded to set up a military command free from political influence, the
next step would be to persuade them to evolve a satisfactory operational plan."16. For
the British, air power seemed to be the key to success in Greece. Templer, Tedder,
and Cunningham all emphasized the effectiveness of air operations against the
guerrillas in the past and urged Van Fleet to make it a priority. Van Fleet disagreed
with this strategy and believed it would be a mistake to use the RHAF on missions the
Greek army should perform. He told the British that "we would soon spoil [the
Greeks], it is the ground army that must take the offensive and close with the bandits,
killing or capturing them. We must stop scattering them or permitting them to escape
across the border."17 Van Fleet intended to operate against the guerrilla formations
using mobile ground forces capable operating in any terrain.

Although Van Fleet's meeting with the British Chiefs of Staff failed to
establish a close working relationship between the JUSMAPG and the BMM(G), it
does reveal Van Fleet's plan of attack for Greece. Without having set foot in the
country or speaking with any members of his new staff, he was certain of the steps
necessary to win in Greece. The outline of Van Fleet's approach in Greece was
revealed in the meeting's minutes of his discussion with the British Chiefs of Staff.
Van Fleet's strategy centered on the ideas that "the Greek army corps would have to
go out and fight," he would have to "prevent tactical direction of operations from
Athens" and other forms of political interference, JUSMAPG would "prevent the

16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
Greeks from using the lack of equipment as an alibi for lack of action,” persuade the GNA corps commanders “to resume offensive operations,” and prevent the guerrillas “escape across the border.”18

Van Fleet arrived in Greece on February 24, 1948 and immediately began implementing his plan of action. Van Fleet realized that his success in Greece depended on his ability to serve as “a combat soldier, a diplomat, and something of a politician as well.”19 Upon his arrival in Greece, Van Fleet exercised his political persona and became a non-voting member of the Supreme National Defense Council (SNDC) and was able to minimize political influence in Greek military affairs.20 He also convinced the Council to support his recommendation to make the chief of the Greek General Staff also the Commander of the Greek National Army, thereby establishing a unified chain of command. In the same meeting, Van Fleet recommended the retirement of ineffective Greek generals and the dismissal of several slow or incompetent commanders. In almost every instance his requests were immediately granted, indicating the extensive authority he held among the Greek leadership and their confidence in him.21

Van Fleet, the diplomat, established an effective working relationship with both the king and the prime minister. He also worked to establish a friendly relationship with the Greek press and Greek public.22 In a BBC radio report profiling Van Fleet, correspondent Kenneth Matthews described Van Fleet as hard-nosed, but a

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18 Ibid.
19 Braim, The Will to Win, 163.
"considerable diplomat." Van Fleet's greatest strength lay in never undermining his Greek counterparts. At every opportunity, when among the press or Greek public, he praised the fighting qualities of the Greek soldier and minimized the U.S. role.

Van Fleet's excellent working relationship with the Greeks did not extend to his American diplomatic counterparts. Van Fleet encountered difficulties with both AMAG Chief Griswold and Griswold's replacement, Ambassador Henry Grady. At one point the relationship between Grady and Van Fleet became so bad that Truman considered relieving Van Fleet. Fearing that he would have to choose between Van Fleet and Grady, Truman sent Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall to Greece to evaluate the situation. Since Grady was in Washington during the Secretary's visit, Van Fleet controlled all aspects of Royall's visit.

Van Fleet impressed Royall so much that upon Royall's return to Washington he told the President that "[e]verything's all right in Greece. Just leave Van Fleet alone, and -- ambassador or no ambassador---he'll win the war."24

Van Fleet's good relationship with the royal couple often became a point of contention between Grady and himself. For example, on the occasion of Marshall's visit to Greece in October 1948, Queen Frederika asked Van Fleet to arrange a private meeting with the secretary of state. Van Fleet did so, and upon the group's arrival at the Royal Palace, Marshall promptly dismissed Ambassador Grady and went in with Van Fleet to meet the King and Queen. Years later, Van Fleet could still recall the

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23 Transcript of BBC radio report, Mar. 9, 1948, Correspondence, Van Fleet Papers, box 49, folder 18, Marshall Library.
24 Wittner, Intervention, 247.
Ambassador’s face, puffed up, red, and an expression of fury. Once inside the palace, the Queen confided to Marshall that if “Van Fleet is allowed to continue his leadership, the Greek military will defeat the Communists.”

However, it was Van Fleet’s combat soldier qualities that had the most immediate impact upon the Greek struggle. Within a few weeks of his arrival, Van Fleet made a purposeful effort to visit Greek combat units in the field with General Dimitrious Yiadjis, the Greek chief of staff. The visits, in addition to meeting Van Fleet’s goal of “getting my fingers into the operations,” helped establish the legitimacy, prestige, and confidence of Yiadjis, and bolstered the morale and confidence of the GNA. During the visits Van Fleet and Yiadjis “continuously talked offensive spirit and made the commanders and troops feel that the size of the Army, its training, and its equipment were now adequate to eliminate the bandit forces in the interior of Greece.”

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27 Van Fleet to Wedemeyer, Mar. 31, 1948, Correspondence, Van Fleet to Wedemeyer, Van Fleet Papers, box 52, folder 19, Marshall Library.
In addition to building GNA morale through personal visits to the front, Van Fleet believed combat success would act as a confidence builder for both the Greek commanders and their men. Accordingly, he and the JUSMAPG staff submitted an operational plan to the Greek General Staff for a spring offensive that started small and gradually increased in size. Operations began with a series of small, local operations in all parts of Greece. By beginning the offensive with a string of preliminary operations, Van Fleet hoped to seize the initiative away from the guerrilla forces and provide good training opportunities for the GNA. Under the watchful eye of JUSMAPG’s military advisers, deficiencies in communication and coordination were identified and addressed prior to the major operations scheduled for April and May.28

As the GNA increased its confidence with easy victories over small groups of Communist-led guerrillas, American advisers planned the next phase of offensive operations. The guerrillas dominated the two mountain ranges that stretched from central Greece and extended north into Yugoslavia and Albania. They also controlled all the mountainous area immediately northeast of Salonika, Greece’s second largest city. [See Figure 4]. The American planners hoped to limit the guerrillas’ freedom of movement by seizing several of these mountainous areas and trapping the guerrilla units occupying them. In two separate multi-divisional operations, the GNA

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28 Ibid. Van Fleet to Wedemeyer, Mar. 3, 1948, Correspondence, Van Fleet to Wedemeyer, Van Fleet Papers, box 52, folder 19, Marshall Library.
Figure 4
Situation map of Greece, January 1948
cleared the Rouneli area in central Greece and several of the mountainous regions north of Salonika. Although the initial phases of the spring offensive produced great results, the GNA met stiff resistance in the Grammos Mountains. Operations took much longer than expected and, although Grammos was cleared, the majority of the guerrilla force escaped into Albania and soon reappeared in the Vitsi area to the northeast of Grammos.29

4.3. Problems Addressed

For Van Fleet, the culmination of the spring offensive was a huge disappointment. He identified many contributing factors for the operations failure. However, the principal reasons for the GNA failure had to do with problems of leadership, old-timers, insufficient forces, and poor training. Van Fleet and the JUSMAPG advisers immediately set about correcting these deficiencies.30

Leadership problems were addressed by relieving inefficient or incompetent commanders, promoting officers on merit and ability, and encouraging junior leadership. Using the assessments of JUSMAPG advisers assigned to the three Greek Army Corps and seven divisions, Van Fleet submitted the names of a corps commander, division commanders, and several other senior officers to be relieved to the SNDC. Additionally, with the help of AMAG, legislation was enacted by the Greek Parliament to permit the retirement of several senior lieutenant generals and

replace them with more effective leaders. JUSMAPG also initiated a program to improve the quality of the Greek NCO corps by endorsing inducements to pay, improving promotion opportunities, and encouraging greater initiative as junior leaders.\footnote{Memorandum for Chief, American Mission for Aid to Greece from Van Fleet, Dec. 21, 1948, Correspondence, Van Fleet Papers, box 49, folder 39, Marshall Library.}

The problems of insufficient and inefficient personnel were on-going problems in the GNA and had been a focus of JUSMAPG since its inception. By 1948, the bulk of the soldiers in the Greek army “were old, worn-out and ineffective.”\footnote{Ibid. Memorandum for Record, Jul. 23, 1948, Correspondence, Van Fleet Papers, box 49, folder 29, Marshall Library. Van Fleet to Colonel A.J. Regnier, Aug. 7, 1948, Correspondence, Van Fleet Papers, box 49, folder 30, Marshall Papers. Van Fleet to Wedemeyer, Mar. 31, 1948, Correspondence, Van Fleet to Wedemeyer, Van Fleet Papers, box 52, folder 19, Marshall Library.} JUSMAPG implemented a replacement program that incorporated the authorization to increase the size of the GNA for a period of six months, from May 1948 to October 1948. Through a series of call-ups, the GNA was able to increase its level of recruitment to facilitate the replacement of a number of the older soldiers. An unfortunate corollary of the increased recruitment was the shortening of the recruit training period to only eight weeks. Deemed too short a time for adequate training, the poorly trained recruits exacerbated an already notable deficiency in the GNA. The problem of insufficient troops had been addressed earlier in the year by the formation of the National Defense Corps (NDC). The NDC served as a home guard organization that served under the control of the army. Approximately ninety-six battalions were organized to provide local area defense and free the GNA for

\footnote{Memorandum for Chief, American Mission for Aid to Greece from Van Fleet, Dec. 21, 1948, Correspondence, Van Fleet Papers, box 49, folder 39, Marshall Library.}
offensive operations elsewhere. After Grammos, however, JUSMAPG realized more troops were needed to continue operational pressure on the guerrillas and maintain security in recently cleared areas. Accordingly, Van Fleet requested and received an authorization to increase the GNA permanent strength by 15,000 men. Although a welcome gain in strength, the force increase also added to the dilemma of creating an efficient, well-trained army.

The immediate challenge facing JUSMAPG was the implementation of an army wide training program without interfering with on-going combat operations. While an effective training program would increase the combat effectiveness of the Greek military, the increase in guerrilla operations would not permit the cessation of anti-guerrilla operations.

In August 1948 Van Fleet met with retired General Alexander Papagos, a notable military figure in Greece and potential replacement for General Yiadjis. The two men discussed the current military situation and possible remedies to problems that had been plaguing Greek effort’s against the Communist-led guerrillas. Several problems were discussed during the meeting concerning the Greek army’s lack of progress. In addition to leadership and organizational structure, the two men identified a lack of individual and small unit training at the soldier and junior officer levels as a major deficiency.

Papagos preferred to suggest technological based solutions that increased firepower and made up for individual training deficiencies. Papagos believed that

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33 After a period of time, the NDC battalions were absorbed by the Army and designated as Light Infantry Battalions. Murray, “The Anti-Bandit War,” 21.
improved direct fire weapons, more effective artillery, and additional bombers would lessen the reliance on infantry forces and compensate for insufficient combat training. However, Papagos did admit that better junior leaders, promoted according to performance rather than seniority, were essential to developing a more effective force. While agreeing with many of General Papagos' observations, Van Fleet believed the Greeks already had sufficient equipment to do the job and argued that a better-trained force and more aggressive leadership would solve the Greek military problems.

For Van Fleet better training became the new key to success in Greece. In keeping with Van Fleet's new priority, JUSMAPG established a training program at the Infantry School in Khalkis designed to enhance individual and small unit training. The program established a demonstration or training team for each Greek division and separate brigades. A total of ten in all, each training team worked with their assigned division and conducted a two-week rotational training program for each battalion in a division. One at a time, the battalions withdrew from the fighting fronts to conduct the training course and then return to relieve the next battalion in line.36

Van Fleet designed the training plan to address an observed deficiency in tactical training among the Greek forces. The ten training teams were drawn from Greek army units. Each training team consisted of sixty-two enlisted personnel, three "battle-trained" NCOs, and one "battle-trained" lieutenant divided into one rifle platoon, one mortar section, and one machine-gun section. A "combat trained" major

35 Memorandum for Record of conference between General Van Fleet and General Papagos, Aug 3, 1948, Correspondence, Van Fleet Papers, box 49, folder 30, Marshall Library.

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was assigned to supervise the instruction techniques of each unit. Additionally, both JUSMAPG and the BMM (G) furnished one officer each to assist and provide further tactical advice during the training and supervise each unit's performance. Each training team went through a month of intense training before reporting to their assigned division to begin instruction. Over the two-week training period for each battalion the instructional teams began with demonstrations of platoon operations and worked their way up through company operations to battalion exercises.  

In addition to the demonstration teams, Van Fleet established a Training Section in JUSMAPG on July 1, 1948. This section revised the school program of the Greek army and introduced U.S. methods and doctrines into GNA training. The section organized an advanced Infantry Training courses for Greek recruits, addressing problems associated with the short eight week basic training program, and teaching advanced weapons training and infantry tactics. The Training Section also established a ten-week division training program under the

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37 Van Fleet to Lieutenant General Viadis, Jul 21, 1948; 320.2 Strength, 1947-1948, Operational Directives to Strength, 1947-1950; JUSMAGG; RG 334; NACP.
direct supervision of American advisers. At every opportunity the American instructors and advisers emphasized the importance of coordination and the development of junior leaders, both considered areas of weakness within the GNA. 38

In general, Van Fleet held the individual Greek soldier in high regard. He considered "the Greek soldier to be a superb individual, tough, hard, determined and full of spirit, courage, and patriotism." 39 Despite these praises, Van Fleet recognized that the Greek Infantry was poorly trained and was disgusted by what he viewed as their lack of aggressiveness. In a personal letter to General Courtney H. Hodges, Van Fleet lamented the fact that the Greek army was indoctrinated with the idea that enemy pillboxes required air and artillery support before the infantry could advance. He viewed this attitude as nonsense and argued that "good Infantry and good small unit leadership, both of which are lacking in the Greek army, can overcome enemy bunkers just as easily with well-aimed fire and a few grenades." 40

From Van Fleet’s perspective, the Greek army had all the men and material it needed to do the job at hand. He told Hodges that the "Greek army has a great superiority over the guerrillas both as to numbers and weapons," but "the Army is young and has had no training other than basic training of a few weeks." 41 Van Fleet believed that a thorough training program would address this deficiency. The use of demonstration platoons and instructional teams at the division level was critical to

39 Van Fleet to Grady, Aug 28, 1948, Correspondence, Van Fleet Papers, box 49, folder 31, Marshall Library.
40 Van Fleet to Courtney H. Hodges, Aug 6, 1948, Correspondence, Van Fleet Papers, box 49, folder 30, Marshall Library.
enhancing a platoon's, company's, and battalion's ability to fire and maneuver against an enemy objective. Once these skills were developed the Greek soldier would "be developed into a real fighter."\textsuperscript{42}

With a more efficient training program, Van Fleet expected quick results in terms of operations against the guerrillas. He felt the improved Greek army could damage the main forces of the Communist-led guerrillas before the end of the 1948. American advisors emphasis on improved coordination between Greek infantry and artillery units reaped huge benefits. In a short period of time, junior officers gained valuable experience in leadership and were able to execute more efficient night operations and coordinated attacks. Van Fleet praised the growing aggressiveness and forceful leadership taking hold among the Greek military.\textsuperscript{43}

Through the combination of American advisors and the efforts of the training teams, the noted development in Greek leaders was a vast improvement over American assessments six months earlier. For example, in an operations report sent to JUSMAPG in February 1948, an American advisor sharply criticized a Greek battalion commander's performance. The advisor reported that the "Battalion Commander is more inclined to use mortar and artillery fire than he is to use troops to close with the enemy. One machine gun can stop a battalion. The Battalion Commander does not use darkness to obtain an objective or keep contact with the

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.; Van Fleet to Grady, Aug 28, 1948, Correspondence, Van Fleet Papers, box 49, folder 31, Marshall Library.
enemy.\textsuperscript{44} By November 1948, American advisers were seeing productive results from the training teams and an increase in Greek commanders' enthusiasm for training.\textsuperscript{45}

The GNA of 1948 bore little resemblance to the GNA at the end of the civil war. Major General Reuben Jenkins, the Assistant Director of JUSMAPG and the Chief of the Army section, credited the divisional training program with giving the GNA the added edge needed to defeat the Communist guerrillas. The Infantry units mastered the elements of marksmanship, how to employ its automatic weapons and mortars in supporting fires, and the importance of fire and maneuver. Better coordination between the Greek Infantry and Artillery units resulted in greater accuracy and the ability to mass fires quickly on a single target and then shift fires to another target with little delay. He credits the American system of training, consisting of the four-step process of explanation, demonstration, application, and testing, with creating a more professional, efficient, and lethal army.\textsuperscript{46}

Over the next year, JUSMAPG advisers continued to provide operational advice and training to the GNA. Although poor leader quality, lack of aggressiveness, and insufficient training remained areas of concern for Van Fleet and

\textsuperscript{44} Special Operations report on 619 Battalion, 73d Brigade sent to JUSMAPG CG, Athens, Feb 12, 1948; 319.1 Operations Reports XV Mountain Division (Grk) 1948; 1947-1950; JUSMAGG;RG 334; NACP.
\textsuperscript{45} Van Fleet to Colonel Temple C. Holland, Nov. 9, 1948, Correspondence, Van Fleet Papers, box 49, folder 37, Marshall Library.
\textsuperscript{46} Maj. Gen. Reuben Jenkins to Greek Army newspaper, enclosure (1) Questions and Answers, Van Fleet Papers, box 35, folder 26, Marshall Library. Jenkins cites the fact that GNA casualty rates in the 1949 Grammos-Vitsi campaign were thirty percent lower than the 1948 Grammos-Vitsi campaign as proof of the GNA's improvement, but fails to address possible changes in guerilla capabilities that may have also contributed to this decline.
JUSMAPG, the GNA was making huge gains as a professional fighting force. A combination of political and military factors, both within the Communist guerrillas and the GNA, contributed to the final defeat of the Communists.

A split in the Greek Communist leadership, combined with difficulties between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union since June 1948, resulted in the isolation of the Communist forces. Political and strategic differences between Nikos Zachariades, leader of the KKE, and Markos Vasiades, commander of the DAS, created a power struggle within the Greek Communist hierarchy. Zachariades' victory in this power struggle spelled disaster for the guerrilla movement. First, Zachariades' pro-Soviet stance alienated Yugoslavia, which had split from the Soviet-controlled Cominform in mid-1948, and served as the main resupply source for DAS forces. Second, Zachariades lacked an understanding of guerrilla operations and sought a decisive, conventional engagement with GNA forces.  

General Alexander Papagos, a heroic figure from World War II, became commander in chief of the Greek armed forces in January 1949. Papagos provided the aggressive spirit and level of cooperation Van Fleet had been searching for in a Greek commander. Papagos appointment as commander in chief, the apogee of American aid, and the culmination point of U.S. training efforts all intersected perfectly with Zachariades' decision to mount a major counteroffensive into northern Greece. The DAS suffered a punishing defeat. When the Communist forces tried to concentrate again in the Grammos-Vitsi area in August 1949, Papagos quickly moved his forces in position to launch a coordinated attack. The closing of the Yugoslavia

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47 Selton, "Communist Errors," 73-75.
border by Tito in July 1949 cut off the DAS from both supplies and reinforcements positioned in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. In a period of seventeen days, from August 10 to August 27, GNA forces overran both Grammos and Vitsi destroying a force of approximately 12,000 guerrillas. By combining extensive night operations, coordinated fire support, and a concentration of force, the GNA effectively ended the war.48

Van Fleet maintained an enormous level of influence in Greece during his time there. His control of both U.S. military operations and, to a lesser degree, Greek military operations illustrated the power he held over foreign policy development. His access to the SNDC, the prime minister, and the king and queen gave him enormous clout in Greece. Additionally, his authority as the senior U.S. military official in Greece and strong relationship with Marshall gave him instant credibility in the State Department, in Congress, and among the Joint Chiefs.49

Van Fleet’s most successful accomplishment in Greece was his ability to motivate and inspire the Greek military leadership and soldiers. As commander of JUSMAPG, Van Fleet improved the military training centers and created demonstration detachments that improved the quality of the Greek army. He also invigorated Greek commanders by fostering an offensive spirit in anti-guerrilla operations. Naturally, a wide array of other factors

contributed to the Greek army’s victory over the Communist guerrillas, but it was the contribution of U.S. military assistance that claimed victory and set a precedent for both containment of communism and expansion of military influence in foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid, 211-213.
CHAPTER 5: THE EXTENSION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE

5.1. The Insurgency Connection

After World War Two, the national security interests of the United States changed dramatically due to the political implications of the Cold War. The potential threat represented by Soviet conventional forces seemed to necessitate a strong military deterrent and an aggressive foreign policy of containment to provide the backbone of what would become forward collective defense. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson summarized the new national security perspective while addressing the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee:

Our security depends, first, on our own strength and, second, on the strength of our allies. We can no longer isolate ourselves from the rest of the world, or rely on our own arms alone. The Military Assistance Program is the only way in which we can start to make our allies strong enough, so that they can make a material contribution to our security as well as to their own.¹

At that time, U.S. security meant blocking the threat posed by an expansionist Soviet Union. As Harold Clem points out, the “continuing program of military assistance to other governments began when the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, which was designed to bolster the defenses of Western Europe, was launched immediately after

ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949.\textsuperscript{2} The creation of collective defense agreements, such as the multilateral North Atlantic Treaty covering Europe and the Rio Treaty covering South America fostered the extension of military assistance programs to any nation willing to participate in the containment of Soviet power, as long as it also advanced the security interests of the United States.\textsuperscript{3}

The combined strategies of collective defense and containment proved reasonably successful against overt Communist expansion, with the halting of North Korean expansion across the 38th parallel providing the obvious example. However, the threat of Communist-sponsored insurgencies proved more difficult to deal with. Douglas S. Blaufarb views Communist rural insurgencies as a product of Leninist Marxism that reached its peak under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung in China between 1927 and 1937. Mao’s strategy of waging a protracted people’s war culminated in his eventual victory in 1949 and what many Americans viewed as the “loss of China.”\textsuperscript{4} By 1950, some U.S. military officers began to view Communist insurgencies, with their intrinsic guerrilla operations, as a viable military threat. Postwar experience in China, Greece, and the Philippines seemed to provide enough information to permit the development of formal doctrine in countering guerrilla and insurgency operations.

\textsuperscript{3} The North Atlantic Treaty was signed April 4, 1949 and included the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Italy, and Portugal. The Rio Treaty, or Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, was signed in Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947 and included over twenty nations of North and South America. Both treaties were defensive in nature and recognized that an armed attack against one shall be considered an attack against all. Clem, \textit{Collective Defense}, 4-5.
5.2 The Doctrinal Trail

In *The Counterinsurgency Era*, Blaufarb argues that U.S. involvement in the Philippines during the Huk Rebellion represent the beginning of U.S. participation in counterinsurgency operations. Although Blaufarb acknowledges the U.S. experience in Greece as the first involvement, he believed the conflict “had little impact on the U.S.’s awareness of Communist rural insurgency as a special or serious new problem.”\(^5\) He further argues that U.S. success in countering the Huk insurgency “had considerable influence in later years as the United States became more concerned with and involved in counterinsurgency” and served as an example of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy of providing advice, technical assistance, economic aid, and military aid.\(^6\)

In elevating the Philippine example over Greece, Blaufarb completely disregards the establishment of formal counterguerrilla doctrine prior to the unfolding of events in the Philippines. Recognizing the possibility of a new trend in the conduct of counterguerrilla-oriented operations, the Infantry School in Fort Benning, Georgia produced the first draft of Field Manual (FM) 31-20 *Operations Against Guerrilla Forces* in May 1950.\(^7\) The manual’s purpose was to familiarize Army commanders with guerilla tactics and organization and provide feasible suggestions for combating hostile guerilla organizations. In the introduction to *Operations Against Guerrilla Forces*, several examples of U.S. experience with guerilla warfare are mentioned and are referred to for appropriate lessons. Specifically, the manual mentions Greece as

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\(^5\) Blaufarb, *Counterinsurgency*, 23.
\(^6\) Ibid., 40.
"a very recent and instructive example of guerrilla warfare."8 The advantages of the Communist guerrilla forces in Greece are listed as terrain, the weakened condition of the Greek army after the war, aid from pro-Communist, neighboring countries, and the helplessness of the Greek population to resist the armed guerillas. The survey on Greece concludes that there is "considerable doubt that Greece could have withstood the guerilla menace and survived as a democratic country if the United States had not poured many millions of dollars in military and economic aid into the country."9

The manual goes on to emphasize several of the lessons learned during the U.S. military's experience in Greece and other guerilla experiences. In developing a plan to combat guerrilla forces a developed doctrine must be realistic and "based on a detailed analysis of a country, the national characteristics, and the customs, beliefs, cares, hopes, and desires of the people."10 Additionally, the section on anti-guerilla operations stresses the interweaving of political, administrative, economic, and military concerns both during and prior to anti-guerilla operations. Close coordination of these aspects minimizes the likelihood of a mass uprising and can eliminate most of the guerilla support structure. In fact, the manual encourages the development of a friendly guerilla movement and points out that "one of the most effective ways to fight guerillas is to wage guerrilla warfare against them."11

7 The previous FM 31-20 was produced in December 1941 and entitled Basic Field Manual of Jungle Warfare. After official approval, the Department of the Army distributed the manual in February 1951.
9 Ibid., 11.
10 Ibid., 63.
11 Ibid.
In a later section on operations against guerrilla forces, the manual suggests three phases for destroying guerrilla forces. Encirclement, attack, and pursuit are the three recommended steps. As mentioned earlier, Andrew Birtle noted the existence of a "strong continuity in the manner in which the U.S. Army performed counterinsurgency and overseas constabulary missions" in the years prior to World War II and certainly this doctrinal example of an anti-guerrilla operation has its antecedents in past operations. However, the anti-guerrilla tactics recommended in the manual bear a strong resemblance to operations in conducted in Greece. Specifically, the suggested methods of attack after encirclement are virtually identical to Van Fleet's Peloponnesian Operation in December 1948 during the Greek Civil War. [See Figures 7 and 8]. Both advocate the encirclement of a guerrilla force and the establishment of fixed blocking positions along linear features, culminating with the gradual compression of the encirclement. Hence, the Army is seen as applying several of the lessons learned in Greece and incorporating them into a precise and specified doctrine to distribute to commanders and staffs in the field. This strongly suggests recognition of the likelihood of future guerrilla or insurgent struggles in the Cold War military environment.

5.3. The Greek Connection

U.S. involvement in Greece in 1947 established three trends in Cold War national security policy. First, Greece served as the first example of the strategy of containment. Second, the strategy of extending military and economic assistance to promote containment to another sovereign nation began in Greece. Third, the use of
Figure 7
Destruction of encircled guerrillas by hammer and anvil method. From FM 31-20, FEB 1951

Figure 8
Situational map of Peloponnesse Operation, December 1948
military advisers and the establishment of a military advisory group to promote containment began in Greece. Although some contend that U.S. military assistance to Greece was inconsequential in defeating the Communist guerrillas, it was seen as a victory and therefore served as the starting point for all military assistance programs for the next twenty-five years. Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson all used Greece as a model for American action in Vietnam. After the first agreement on aid to Greece and Turkey was concluded in 1947, the United States concluded forty-seven military assistance agreements by 1968. Every one of these military assistance agreements targeted the military threat posed by Communist expansion. Despite the precedent the Greck and Turkish aid program established as a weapon against communism, the real significance of the program was the realization that military assistance represented a valuable foreign policy tool.

A report by the Special Ad Hoc Committee to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in April 1947 recognized that only the United States and the Soviet Union were capable of providing military assistance in large quantities. The smaller nations could choose either the Soviet Union and its satellites or the United States, supplemented by Britain. The committee realized that:

[The source of acquisition by such countries of military equipment will have profound military and political implications. If, through inability to obtain the equipment and supplies from the United States, they turn to the Soviet Union or its satellites they will provide the Soviet Union with a political leverage potentially dangerous to U.S. security interests. The same leverage, possessed by the United States, could be made to serve the interests of international peace and security.

17 Kunitz, _The Origins of the Cold_, 420; May, 108.  
The committee recognized the legitimate need for nations to want properly trained and equipped military forces and that through promotion of standardization and military collaboration the U.S. would promote its own national security. The program would also assist national industry since the assisted nation would rely on the U.S. for "replacement, maintenance, service, and training in the use of U.S. types of equipment." Ultimately, the success of the Greek aid program validated the assessments made by the committee and further merged military, political, and economic interests.

Essentially, it would seem that the Greek aid program helped start a trend toward military assistance. Harold Clem states that "U.S. foreign assistance programs were launched with the Greek-Turkish Aid Program and the Marshall Plan" which led to a continuing program of military assistance to other governments under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. The United States abandoned its pre-World War Two isolationist policy for collective security. By using the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, the United States would maintain world peace by assisting free world governments defend themselves against Communist aggression.16

The Military Assistance Program (MAP) grew out of an extension of early military assistance programs to nations around the world, such as the Philippines, Iran, Greece, and Turkey. The success of U.S. military assistance in these countries in defeating Communist influence and retaining U.S. allies was recognized by the

15 FRUS, 1947, 1:726.
U.S. State Department. The program also served as a "vital and specific means of augmenting the collective military strength of free nations friendly to the United States." In addition to organizing all existing military assistance missions under a single, controlling authority, the program also intended to offer new aid to any friendly nations seeking assistance. Designed to complement and not compete with the European Recovery Plan/Program, MAP sought three main goals. First, enhance the security of the North Atlantic Pact and the countries of Western Europe. Second, allow the President to bring the military assistance programs into a closer working relationship with the other activities of U.S. foreign policy. Third, establish a consistent evaluative framework for granting foreign aid to requesting nations.

The development of MAP signaled a clear change in U.S. foreign policy. Basically, the program acknowledged the realization that "this nation cannot stand alone or hope to maintain its safety by limiting its defensive efforts to actions taken within its geographical boundaries." Also, the program emphasized that "vigorous, consecutive action in every phase of international affairs is the only possible answer to the problem of national security."

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16 Clem, *National Security Management*, 1, 13. Clem states that the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1951, plus the Mutual Security Act of 1954, are the basic legislation that shaped the character and administration of foreign assistance for a decade.
18 Ibid, 3.
19 Ibid, 4.
20 Ibid, 4.
5.4. Van Fleet’s Return

As he was leaving Greece, on his way back to the United States, Van Fleet seemed to recognize the implications of U.S. lessons learned in Greece as they applied to anti-guerrilla or counterinsurgency operations. In a letter to Ed Clark, a reporter with United Press Associations of America, Van Fleet conveyed several of his viewpoints on anti-guerrilla operations. He believed the Greek experience demonstrated the important role civilians played in suppressing a guerrilla insurrection. Without the support of the people, in terms of either supplies or intelligence, an insurgency will rapidly disintegrate. He also noted the valuable lessons learned “in the mobilization and organization of foreign armies, the standardization and employment of weapons, the overcoming of language barrier in combined operations and a confirming appreciation of terrain as it effects military operations. Obviously the knowledge and experience gained in Greece will be of great value in the event of guerrilla warfare elsewhere.”

Van Fleet was quick to point out, however, that terrain, climate, the mood of the civilian populace, and a host of other factors made each situation different. The careful study of guerrilla warfare, a constant emphasis on training, and the ability to adapt and stay flexible to any situation are the key elements to defeating an insurgency. In terms of combat skills, Van Fleet believed mobility, striking power, and the ability to operate at night were the principal factors behind the GNA’s

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21 Van Fleet to Ed Clark, Jul. 11, 1950, Correspondence, Van Fleet Papers, box 32, folder 66, Marshall Library.
eventual success. He stated that "constant and relentless pressure on the guerrillas was a great factor in their overall dispersion and destruction," and notes that “[w]hen the GNA took the field at night the tide of battle had definitely turned."\textsuperscript{22}

Interestingly enough, George C. McGhee and Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale came to many of the same conclusions eleven years later, in November 1961, when reporting on similarities between counter-guerrilla campaigns in Greece and the situation in South Vietnam. They recognized the importance of strong leadership by Van Fleet, who “in effect became commander of the GNA,” and “the interrelationship of military tactics and socio-economic reform in the conduct of successful counter-guerrilla operations.”\textsuperscript{23} McGhee and Lansdale viewed efforts designed to improve the Greek infrastructure and gain the support of the Greek populace as some of the most significant. Reconstruction of war damage, extension of economic assistance to villagers, and U.S. efforts to popularize the Greek government were all noted as contributing factors to the eventual Greek victory.\textsuperscript{24} Their interpretation of the lessons learned in Greece focused on ways to counter an insurgency effort rather than developing a means to attack it.

Meanwhile, in roughly the same time period, Van Fleet was making his own comparisons of past operations in Greece to operations in South Vietnam. In late 1961, a retired General Van Fleet was recalled to active duty for a second time. The first time had been under Eisenhower to serve as special envoy to the Far East in the mid-1950s and evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. Military Assistance Programs in the

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy from George C. McGhee, Nov. 21, 1961, Correspondence, Van Fleet Papers, box 103, folder 32, Marshall Library.

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region. Once again, Van Fleet's recall was by presidential request and involved several different issues related to the Kennedy administration's escalation of the Vietnam conflict. One of the issues involved the assessment of the U.S. Army Special Forces unit at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In a personal letter to General Van Fleet, the president emphasized his "great personal interest in this effort" and insisted that there was no one "better qualified" than the General was to make an effective appraisal.²⁵ The president's interest extended to the present and future development of the Special Forces mission, the training of instructors for guerrilla warfare, and the training of counter-guerrilla and counter-insurgency forces and specifically identified Van Fleet as the man with "the background and knowledge" to get the job done.²⁶

Van Fleet concluded his evaluation and submitted a report to Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr, Jr. on 1 December 1961. Van Fleet had several positive comments concerning the Special Forces. During Van Fleet's two-day inspection of the Special Forces and Fort Bragg's facilities, he concluded "the school is imperative to develop doctrine and tactics and general information world-wide on past, present, and future international communist guerrilla activities and countermeasures to meet them."²⁷ However, based upon a perspective gained in Greece, Van Fleet seemed to pass over Special Forces primary mission of creating guerilla forces and focus only

²⁴ ibid.
²⁶ ibid.
on the unit's potential as a counter-insurgent force. He stated that the Special Forces should be "a great asset to supply qualified men to various military assistant groups in friendly nations currently threatened." 28

After years of combat experience, Van Fleet had developed strong beliefs concerning the changing nature of warfare. Experience in Greece, Korea, and his extensive travels in the Far East and Middle East convinced Van Fleet that the conventional U.S. Army could not compete with Communist tactics of guerilla warfare. He believed the country must increase its combat potential by supporting national armies in countries friendly to the United States. Such a strategy would promote U.S. interests "without ruining our own economy." 29 Van Fleet was quick to point out, however, that "the will to fight of the native element" was the important ingredient and often unknown without a good working relationship and assessment by U.S. forces. 30

Following Van Fleet's initial inspections in November 1961 and the publication of his 1 December 1961 report, he was given an opportunity to revisit several of the army bases in February 1962 to assess any changes. In the case of Fort Bragg, Van Fleet visited the base over a seventy-two hour period between the 21st and 24th of February. 31 These visits resulted in a follow-up report to the Secretary of the Army in March both revising and emphasizing some of Van Fleet's earlier

30 Ibid.
31 Van Fleet to Buchanan, (no date), Van Fleet Papers, box 103, folder 33, Marshall Library.
observations. The section of the report dealing with the Army’s Special Warfare
Training Program and Special Forces themselves contained high praise for the units’
performance and mission. 32

During his February visit to Fort Bragg, Van Fleet observed various Special
Forces units, the Special Forces Replacement Training Unit, the Special Warfare
School, and the Military Assistance Training Advisor Course. Van Fleet liked what
he saw. In regards to the Special Warfare Center, Van Fleet stated that he had “never
observed a finer, more capable and dedicated group of officers and men in all of my
experience.”33 From the perspective of a soldier who fought across Europe as a
regimental, division, and then corps commander during World War Two, contributed
to the defeat of communist insurgents in Greece, and commanded the Eighth Army
during the Korean War, this seems high praise. Van Fleet included several other
recommendations in his report that highlighted the importance of Special Forces unit.
Additionally, he acknowledged that the placement of the Special Warfare Center
under the command of United States Continental Army Command (USCONARC),
instead of under the Third Army and Fort Bragg, indicated that the Center “is no
longer just a stepchild,” but an important component of the Army.34

In terms of addressing foreign policy concerns, Van Fleet stressed the
importance of cooperation between the State Department, intelligence agencies, and
Special Forces units in assessing likely areas of operations. By prioritizing the
potential operating environment and likelihood of commitment, capabilities could be

33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
focused on likely target nations and minimize a dispersed effort. Also, efforts to
target select individuals with “first-hand knowledge of counter-insurgency and area
orientation can make a vital contribution to the preparation of our forces for this
current war.” Specifically, Van Fleet recommended the development of a personnel
management program capable of directing personnel who already possessed critical
knowledge of an area deemed vital or potentially vital to the Special Forces, if not
willingly then under orders. From Van Fleet’s perspective, such a program could
only enhance U.S. military readiness.

While Van Fleet acknowledged the necessity to prepare for and win
either a nuclear war or a conventional war, he believed the modern battleground was
the underdeveloped and emerging states of the third world. As these nations struggle
to build their economies and strengthen their political and social institutions, they are
challenged by insurgent forces seeking to exploit their weaknesses. Van Fleet argued
that “the overt use of conventionally organized and trained Armed Forces of the
United States, operating in their primary role, cannot result in success in this type of
war except in rare and special instances.” The extension of counterguerrilla and
counterinsurgency assistance to countries threatened by Communism can only
enhance the United States’ position. In closing, Van Fleet observes that “based upon
my war experience in Greece and Korea, and since retiring, extensive on-the-spot
travel and inspections” that too much attention is focused on conventional and nuclear
war and too little effort on counterinsurgency type operations.

\[35\] Ibid.
\[36\] Ibid.
\[37\] Ibid.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

In many ways, the beginning of the Cold War represents a watershed in American foreign relations as military influences, military priorities, and military personalities occupied an extensive role in the development of U.S. foreign policymaking. The successful conclusion of World War II elevated the military to unimagined heights of importance and prestige. Military personnel occupied government positions of significant influence and found themselves frequently called upon to make an assessment or render an opinion on matters that were beyond the normal bounds of military concerns.

Increasingly, these assessments centered on the development of national security and global strategic concerns, paving the way for an enhanced military role in foreign affairs. The first example of increased military participation in foreign affairs was evident in the U.S. assistance program to Greece as outlined in the Truman Doctrine in 1947. The military, still flush with its success in World War II and encouraged by its performance in managing military governments in Western Europe, welcomed the opportunity of assuming an important role in a military assistance program for Greece and Turkey.

In the continuation of a trend started in World War II, the role of the military as a bureaucratic influence expanded tremendously after the war and established a pattern of broadening prominence in future U.S. foreign policy. The distinction of
American aid to Greece between 1947 and 1949 was that the vast majority of decision-makers in Greece were military personnel. The military officers implemented the decisions of foreign policy in Greece and it was those same military officers who reported on the conditions in Greece that led to those decisions.

The increasing reliance of MacVeagh and other U.S. diplomatic personnel on military assessments represented the beginning of a trend in Greece. As military considerations became more ingrained in diplomatic decisions, embassy officials deferred more and more to the subject-matter experts. Only the presence of a forceful military personality, with greater military authority than currently existed in Greece, was needed to complete the picture. Although he controlled the authority, the first Director of JUSMAPG, Livesay, did not possess the assertiveness of a Van Fleet. Van Fleet’s appointment to JUSMAPG and his ability to work well with the Greeks established the military as the voice of U.S. influence in Greece.

As JUSMAPG director, Van Fleet became involved on a daily basis with the tactical, operational, strategic, and political aspects of the Greek Civil War. Once on the ground, the problem of developing the GNA into an effective fighting force required an increasing level of military-oriented solutions. Although the military decision-makers and government policymakers probably didn’t realize it at the time, the decision to prioritize military assistance over economic assistance and extend operational advice to the GNA represented the first step to the military becoming a formal partner in making and executing foreign policy.

While working in Greece, Van Fleet maintained an enormous level of influence within both the government and military. His control of both U.S. military
operations and, to a lesser degree, Greek military operations illustrated the power he held over foreign policy development. Van Fleet’s unfriendly relationship with Ambassador Grady and Marshall’s frank preference of Van Fleet over Grady openly usurped the authority of ambassador and damaged Grady’s credibility and legitimacy with the Greek government. As far as the Greeks were concerned, they knew who was in control in Greece.

After the disappointing offensive operations of 1948, Van Fleet and the JUSMAPG advisers and trainers focused on improving the efficiency of the Greek armed forces. Improved military training centers, effective use of demonstration detachments, and an uncompromising emphasis on the benefits of continuous training improved the quality of the Greek army. Greek commanders not displaying sufficient levels of aggressiveness in combat operations were replaced almost immediately with officers who did. The revitalization of the Greek army through American efforts was the greatest factor in the Greek army’s victory over the Communist guerrillas. Although many other factors played a part in the ultimate victory, it was the contribution of U.S. military assistance that claimed victory and set a precedent for both containment of communism and expansion of military influence in foreign affairs.

From the success of military assistance in Greece, the United States acquired a new weapon to complement containment strategy. In many ways Greece served as a test case for the effectiveness of military assistance in Europe. Using JUSMAPG as a model, military assistance and advisory groups were liberally employed in any nation the U.S. government felt was threatened with communism and deemed important
enough to protect. As a result, the U.S. military would find itself involved more frequently in counterinsurgency operations. JUSMAPG’s operations in Greece served as an early learning point for the development of anti-guerrilla or counterinsurgency doctrine. The mounting occurrences of counterinsurgency operations led to the development of a force skilled in counterinsurgency operations. This decision led to the modification of the U.S. Army Special Forces’ primary mission of unconventional warfare to one centered on providing counterinsurgency expertise. Essentially, JUSMAPG served as the precursor to counterinsurgency operations.

The two trends of increased military involvement in foreign affairs and increased U.S. military involvement in counterinsurgency operations are a direct result of military assistance to Greece during its civil war. The Truman Doctrine, which authorized American aid to Greece and Turkey, ushered in, not only an era of containment, but an era of increasing military participation in national security policy and counterinsurgency operations. Ultimately, the Greek experience served as an example of a successful intervention against Communist expansion, but also promoted the belief that American military and economic resources could always ensure the success of counterguerrilla operations. It would take the hard lessons of Vietnam would disprove that theory.
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