EARLY COLLEGE MILITARY TRAINING
AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF R.O.T.C.

A Thesis
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by
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PREFACE

In the autumn of 1969 I returned to my alma mater, the Ohio State University, this time to obtain a Master of Arts degree in Education. As an Army Major on active duty, detailed upon my request to this university, I was deeply troubled to find a very hostile and negative attitude towards the military in general and towards ROTC on campus in particular. I discussed this subject with Professor Doctor Robert B. Sutton, my adviser, and decided to make a preliminary inquiry into the topic of the origins of college military training.

To my surprise I discovered that the most important legislation in the area of college military training, the passage of the ROTC provisions of the National Defense Act of 1916, originated on this campus. Four Ohio State men were instrumental in getting these laws passed. The knowledge of these facts compelled me to pursue the topic further. I decided to examine the historical materials basically from three positions -- first, from the viewpoint of a historian; second, as an educator; and third, from the perspective of a professional army officer.

I should like to explicate my biases in the very beginning: I am for a strong national defense establishment, for a healthy balance between the Regular Army and the Reserves,
but unquestionably for ultimate civilian control of all United States military forces. I further believe that the development of military training on civilian campuses was neither an accident of history nor a sinister attempt to militarize peaceful college students, but part of a viable and valid answer of a democratic society to the question of how to best provide for its national defense.

My hope is that a better understanding of the process by which colleges and universities became involved in the training of military leaders will contribute to a healthier atmosphere towards ROTC on campus. The coming of the "All Volunteer Army" will make the influx of officers from the civilian institutions more important than ever. These graduates are necessary to help the Army to remain an open organization, dedicated not only to the preservation of our country and our form of government, but also our freedoms.

This investigation was possible because the United States Army provided the funds and the time, but the Army neither suggested the topic, nor approved the thesis. I received valuable assistance and helpful critique from my adviser, Professor Sutton, and from Professor Ross L. Mooney. I was also helped in many ways by Professor Emeritus James E. Pollard and by the Ohio State University Archivist William Vollmer. Editorial assistance has been provided by Mar Sue Birtler. My wife Edith has had to put up with much inconvenience, has done all the typing, and has encouraged me.
continuously -- much credit goes to her. Needless to say, none of the people who assisted me carry any responsibility for what I have written. I am responsible.

The Ohio State University  
Columbus, Ohio  
August, 1971

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I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to trace the founding of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) from early college military training to the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916. This act included in Sections 40 through 53 the ROTC legislation, which has endured, even though with many changes, until today. For most of the thesis I will take the Ohio State University as a case study. Just as Columbus, Ohio is used by many commercial organizations as a test market for new products because it is "typical USA," so Ohio State is a "typical" Land-Grant institution.

The major currents in public and student opinion for or against military training are reflected in the history of this university. The historical documents contained within the archives of Ohio State mirror these attitudes from the fever-pitch of support during times of national crisis to the apathy, rejection, and confrontation in times of peace or unpopular war.

Using the Ohio State University as the case study also provides the documents necessary to the understand-
ing of the formulation and passage of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps legislation -- certainly the most significant development in the history of military education in civilian institutions. This documentation consists of personal letters, official correspondence, and publications of the day, concerning four Ohio State men -- William Oxley Thompson, President of the University; Edward Orton, Jr., Dean of the College of Engineering; Ralph E. Mershon, an Ohio State graduate (1890) and prominent engineer of his day; and Captain George L. Converse, Professor of Military Science and Tactics, a retired army officer.¹

These four men, each in their own ways, were mostly responsible for the passage of ROTC legislation. In this effort they were aided by the War Department, the General Staff, other educators, some Congressmen, and the sentiment of the day. My interpretation, which gives most of the credit to the four men mentioned above, is contrary to most previous accounts.² Lyons

¹Three of these men went on active Army duty, and attained the following military rank during or after WW I: Orton became a Brigadier General, Converse a Colonel, and Mershon a Lieutenant Colonel.

²A notable exception is Professor Emeritus James E. Pollard, in Military Training in the Land-Grant Colleges and Universities, the Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, 1964.
and Masland, in their book, *Education and Military Leadership, A Study of the ROTC*, wrote, "The Reserve Officers Training Corps program that was presented to the Congress by the War Department and incorporated in the National Defense Act of 1916 was, therefore, essentially the program developed by the General Staff."³ Part of my thesis, then, is devoted to the task of showing that Lyons and Masland were incorrect in their assessment, and that educators and the college associations played a significant role in the creation of ROTC.

The body of the thesis will be made up basically of two parts: first, a history and description of military training as it was conducted prior to ROTC. From its start in 1873, the Ohio State University will serve as the example, the case study. In the second part, I will show the growth of the ROTC ideas, the "Ohio Plan," and the legislative battles which led to its enactment.

I will show, then, that ROTC was not forced upon the colleges under the pressure of the WW I preparedness movement, and that this program originated in their midst, was shaped with their assistance, and became legislation (at least in part) because of pressure which they

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asserted upon Congress. I shall show the important parts which President Thompson, Dean Orton, Captain Converse, and Mr. Mershon played.
II. COLLEGE MILITARY TRAINING PRIOR TO R.O.T.C.

1. How and Why Civilian Educational Institutions Got Involved with Military Training

The first recorded military training on a college campus seems to have taken place at the University of Georgia. The laws of this state in 1807 required all male citizens (except ministers) between the ages of 18 and 45 to assemble at least five times a year for a military muster; four of these were company drills. Because this age bracket included university students, they attended such drills regularly on campus.¹ But the purpose of this drill was not designed to train officers, nor did it include theoretical instruction as it came later to do.

The first civilian institution organized in 1819, for the purpose of training officers, was "The American Literary, Scientific and Military Academy," at Norwich, Vermont. It was founded by Captain Alden Partridge

¹Pollard, op.cit., p. 3.
a former Superintendent of West Point, and offered "professional training to future officers of the militia." In spite of this limited intent, many graduates of Norwich University, as it was known after 1834, became Regular Army officers. The 1834 charter required that its board of trustees provide both theoretical and practical instruction to its students. Lyons and Masland call Norwich University the "spiritual grandfather of all the ROTC programs that followed," but Norwich was really a military college, even though not supported by the War Department.

Before the beginning of the Civil War, several more military colleges were established, most notably the Virginia Military Institute in 1839 and the Citadel (Charleston, S.C.) in 1842. These institutions, as well as other military colleges and academies, sprung up mostly in the South, leading to an imbalance of trained officers between the two parts of the country. This situation, at least in part, led to the inclusion of military training in the Morrill Act of 1862.

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2 Lyons and Masland, op.cit., p. 29.


4 Lyons and Masland, op.cit., p. 28.
An earlier version of this legislation, which had been vetoed by President Buchanan in 1857, had not included any such provisions. When Justin S. Morrill, Representative from Vermont, introduced his second bill in 1861, which was unchanged except for the inclusion noted above, the Committee on Public Lands reported unfavorably on the bill. Senator Wade of Ohio introduced a companion bill in the Senate, which was passed in June, 1862. After an involved legislative battle the Land-Grant Act was finally agreed to and signed into law by President Lincoln on July 2, 1862.

This act, known as either the Morrill Act or the Land-Grant Act, provided in Section 4 for each state tracts of public land or scrip in lieu thereof. The proceeds from the sale of land or scrip were to be used for

...the endowment, support, and maintenance of at least one college where the leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies, and including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts, in such manner as the legislaturess of the states may respectively prescribe....

The two underlined portions of Section 4 were to lead to many difficulties and misunderstandings in the following years, because the basic legislation was not specific enough. Such questions as "Should military training be mandatory?" or "Who should be required to take this training?" or "What support is the War Department supposed to provide?" could not be answered from the Morrill Act of 1862. Subsequent legislation provided partial answers,
but it was not until the passage of the ROTC legislation that relationships were clearly drawn and responsibilities fixed.

We do not know why the bill was not more explicit, because Representative Morrill had certainly more to say on this subject. While advocating his measure on the floor of the House, he placed considerable emphasis on the military feature. Morrill said:

Something of military instruction has been incorporated in the bill in consequence of the new conviction of its necessity forced upon the attention of the loyal States by the history of the past year. A total unpreparedness presents too many temptations, even to a foe otherwise weak. The national school at West Point may suffice for the Regular Army in ordinary years of peace, but it is wholly inadequate when a large army is to be suddenly put into service. If we ever expect to reduce the Army to its old dimensions and again rely on the volunteer system for defense, each State must have the means within itself to organize and officer its own force ... doubtless many valuable lives would have been saved in the progress of this plague-spotted rebellion had we not so long assumed that military discipline was also spontaneous. If ever again our legions are summoned to the field, let us show that we are not wholly unprepared. These colleges founded in every State will ... to some extent guard against the sheer ignorance of all military art....

There should have been important lessons for the future in this speech -- lessons on preparedness, on the weakness of a pure volunteer system, and on the tremendous toll in lives caused by poorly trained officers. Because these lessons were not included in the legislation they were soon lost, and at the beginning of the next major war, the First

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5Quoted in: Reeves, op.cit., pp. 80-81.
World War, the United States was almost as unprepared as before. Representative Morrill had also mentioned that college graduates with a background in military training should be made officers in the militia, but because the law itself did not require this, some states did, and some did not.

In most cases, then, the military instruction given to college students was soon forgotten, and neither the Regular Army nor the militias benefited greatly from this act in terms of available officers. The fact that thousands were no longer "ignorant of military art" could still not easily be transformed into actual military power.

Soon after the passage of the Land-Grant Act, states started to apply, colleges were endowed, and military training started to become a part of college curriculums. Initially drill and lectures were conducted by professors who had military experience in the Civil War. This training, however, was neither extensive nor thorough. A great improvement in this situation was made when Congress enacted legislation which allowed the War Department to detail Regular Army officers as professors of military science and tactics. This legislation, passed in 1866, limited the number of officers for such duty to twenty at any one time, and also required that colleges requesting these officers be able "to educate at one time not less than 150 male students."6

With the assignment of professionally trained men, college military instruction started to become more efficient, but not uniform. Because the basic law was not specific enough, and neither Congress nor the War Department clarified the situation, the military programs of the Land-Grant colleges differed widely. Nevertheless, military training was a fact of life on most Land-Grant college campuses by the time the Ohio State University was founded in 1870.

2. Problems and Issues of a College Military Department, Taking the Ohio State University as an Example

a. The Beginning of a Military Program

The Ohio Agricultural and Mechanical College (later The Ohio State University) was founded in 1870 under the Land-Grant Act of 1862. One of the requirements, as stated earlier, was that the College would have to offer military training. Therefore, on January 6, 1871, long before the opening of classes, the Board of Trustees decided that there would be a Professor of Military Tactics on the faculty. Two years later the Trustees asked the War Department for "an officer of the United States Army as a teacher or professor of tactics...."7 In a later meeting it was resolved

7Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Ohio Agricultural and Mechanical College, for the year 1873, p. 62. Hereafter simply designated as Annual Report, and the year for which the report was made.
that this officer should also give instruction in mathematics and/or civil engineering.\textsuperscript{8}

In the following month a steady correspondence developed between Joseph Sullivant, Secretary of the Board of Trustees, and one Lieutenant Luigi Lomia, an Army officer who had heard about the vacancy and applied for the position of Professor of Military Science. A graduate of West Point, he also offered to teach mathematics or modern languages if required. He asked for "a slight compensation," because he would otherwise lose the quarters and fuel normally furnished by the government. In subsequent letters Mr. Sullivant and Lieutenant Lomia finally agreed on a compensation of $1,000 annually, even though the Lieutenant had initially asked for $1,500.\textsuperscript{9}

Lieutenant Lomia was eminently qualified to teach at the college level. At a time when many professors had only a bachelors degree, he had received both B.S. and M.S. degrees from the College of the City of New York, in addition to his degree in civil engineering from the Military Academy at West Point. He had also taught French and Spanish at the

\textsuperscript{8}Ibid., p. 70.

\textsuperscript{9}Letters from Luigi Lomia, 1st Lieutenant, 5th Artillery, to Joseph Sullivant (Secretary of the Board of Trustees, O.A. & M.C.), originals in the O.S.U. Archives, Sullivant Papers, RG 1/D.
Academy for two years. Lieutenant Lomia advised Mr. Sullivan on how to go about applying for his detail; Lomia himself wrote personal letters to the Secretary of War -- all to no avail. The War Department would not release him for three more years because his unit was short of officers.  

Thus, when the Ohio Agricultural and Mechanical College (O.A. & M.C.) opened its doors to students in the fall of 1873, no Professor of Military Science and Tactics was assigned, and no military training was conducted. In the next year, 1874, this situation changed when Robert W. McFarland, Professor of Mathematics and Civil Engineering, initiated military instruction. In the autumn of this year he called the students together and informed them of the necessity for military training as required by the Morrill Act. This military training consisted of an occasional drill without uniforms or arms, and lectures in tactics by Professor McFarland, who had been a Lieutenant Colonel of the 86th Ohio Volunteer Infantry. The subjects of these lectures were mostly obtained from his Civil War experiences, "which inclined his hearers more to peace than to war."  

The Faculty censured a group of students "who absented

\[10\] Ibid.

themselves from recitations on Friday October 11, 1874 for the purpose of taking part in a military drill on the Fairground doing this without leave on notice.\textsuperscript{12} The necessity for action by the Faculty shows that there was an interest in drill, even before a Military Department was established. Other than what has been indicated above, we know very little about the military program of the O.A.\&M.C. in the first two years of its existence.

The unorganized period of military training came to an end in autumn, 1876, when Lieutenant Lomia was finally released by the War Department and assigned as Professor of Military Science and Tactics. Immediately upon his arrival Lieutenant Lomia started to make a plan for the organization of this department and presented it to the Faculty for approval. A lengthy discussion developed on whether or not drill should be compulsory for all able male students (unless they were conscientious objectors). Professor of Zoology Albert H. Tuttle made a motion to this effect, but it was tabled.\textsuperscript{13} The reason for Professor Tuttle's motion to make drill compulsory had been that he thought the Morrill Act required this.

At the next meeting of the faculty Professor of Political Economy and Civil Polity, William Colvin, making use

\textsuperscript{12}Faculty Minutes of the O.A.\&M.C., Vol. I, pp. 37-38, located in the O.S.U. Archives.

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., pp. 99-100.
of the language of the Morrill Act, "offered a preamble and resolution making obligatory the study of all agricultural and mechanical branches,"\textsuperscript{14} because these were also stipulated as mandatory in the basic law. At this point in the meeting Joseph Sullivant, the Secretary of the Board of Trustees, informed the Faculty that the Trustees had already decided at a previous meeting to make drill "obligatory." Thus, the only remaining course of action for the Faculty was to resolve that no further action on their part was necessary.\textsuperscript{15}

Other military matters which were discussed and decided were the frequency and time for drill, officers' discipline, the proposed uniform, and who should decide on exemptions from drill. The latter authority was given to the President of the college, and the matter of uniforms was left to the President and Lieutenant Lomia to decide.

The cadet uniform, as proposed by the Professor of Military Science and Tactics and later approved by the Faculty, consisted of "double breasted sack coat of indigo blue color, pantaloons \textit{[trousers]} of the same material and a forage cap of the 'chasseur' patterns -- the letters O.A.&M.C. on a scroll in front of the cap."\textsuperscript{16} Both coat

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., p. 101.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., pp. 101-102.

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., p. 106.
and trousers had scarlet braiding. Thus, this first uniform was patterned after the one worn by the artillery branch of the Regular Army, with a few touches of West Point thrown in. The wearing of this cadet uniform for drill became mandatory, and students had to purchase them at their own expense for about $23.\(^{17}\)

In this very first year of the existence of the Military Department of the Ohio Agricultural and Mechanical College, nearly all male students (about 100) participated in drill. But by the end of this school year several faculty members had already attempted to reduce the number of eligible students by proposing that members of the senior class be exempted from drill. Action on this proposal was postponed until the next term.

The heavy involvement of the Military Department with college life can also be shown by its participation in the Commencement Program of 1877. Listed were these military activities:

**Tuesday, June 19, 1877**

3:30 P.M.: Music by the band
4:00 P.M.: Military Exercises:
   a. Formation of the Battalion
   b. Review of Governor Young
   c. Battalion Drill
   d. Dress Parade...\(^{18}\)

From the very beginning, then, many military activities were to permeate life on campus, and cadet social organizations and activities became popular.

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\(^{17}\)Ibid., p. 106-107.
\(^{18}\)Ibid., P. 125.
The War Department was only lukewarm towards college military training in the 1870's. Professors of Military Science and Tactics (PMS&T) received little or no support and no guidance on what to teach. The colleges had to furnish whatever physical facilities and clerical assistance the PMS&T needed. About the only real contribution of the Federal Government was the issuance of arms and equipment required for drill. In 1877 the Board of Trustees had asked the State of Ohio for "arms and equipment to aid in prosecution of the study of military tactics ... the State disapproved, but the Secretary of War furnished such." 19

By the end of school year 1877, the Department of Military Science and Tactics was firmly established on campus. Most precedents and customs which had been introduced by this time were to remain in effect for many years to come. The beginning was over; maintenance and improvements of military training would be the issue from now on.

b. Problems in the Maintenance of a Military Department

On May 1, 1878, the General Assembly of the State of Ohio passed an act which reorganized the College and gave it a new name, The Ohio State University. This act also

19 Annual Report, O.A.&M.C., 1877, p. 130.
changed the Board of Trustees, and required of them to pro-
vide

for the teaching of such branches of learning as are
related to agriculture and the mechanic arts, mines,
and mine engineering, and military tactics....20

It further stipulated that

no student will be required to study military tactics
or take part in military drill, or provide any military
or particular uniform, except those who elect to study
military tactics.21

This law brought about a definite change in the status
of military training, plunging the Military Department into
its first real crisis. In order to prevent the collapse
of this department, the Faculty decided that President Orton
should urge the students to "adhere to the drill for the
remainder of the term ...."22 The available records do not
indicate what the response from the students was; but in the
beginning of the next school year, attendance at drill had
dropped considerably.

In his annual report of the Military Department for
calendar year 1878, Lieutenant Lomia remarked: "The law of
optional drill has given me eighty-two members, which is
about fifty per cent of the male students in attendance at
the University."23 Percentage-wise this was quite a

20James E. Pollard, History of the Ohio State Univer-
sity: The Story of Its First Seventy-Five Years, 1873-1948,
(Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University Press, 1952), p.40.

21Ibid.

22Faculty Minutes of the Ohio State University, Vol.I, p.160.
decrease, and so it was Lieutenant Lomia's belief that "the State law making the drill optional is much to be deplored...I earnestly hope that military training may again become obligatory upon all the students as formerly."²⁴

In spite of reduced attendance at all military courses of instruction, Lieutenant Lomia expressed satisfaction with the progress students were making. The cadet battalion was organized into two companies. New students were being instructed in squad and company drills, while old students exercised in artillery drill, target practice, and guard mount. For the rest of the year 1878, Lomia planned to conduct skirmish and battalion drills, bayonet exercise, and ceremonies. In addition to drill, thirty-one students also attended theoretical instruction in such subjects as Army Regulations, Field Engineering, Military History and Law, and the Science of Artillery.²⁵ Thus, Lieutenant Lomia ran an efficient Military Department, based on a well thought-out curriculum -- he provided much more than physical exercise and discipline for the students.

In the following year military training at the Ohio State University came close to extinction, for the battalion had dwindled down to thirty-eight cadets (about

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 26-27.
fifteen per cent of male students), and only twelve attended theoretical instruction. Lieutenant Lomia again campaigned for making drill mandatory. Now he was joined in this effort by President Edward Orton, who wrote in the annual report to the Governor that the law making drill voluntary

reminds the drill to an inconspicuous and unimportant place in college life. Human nature being what it is, it is certain that no body of college students will submit for any great length of time to the peremptory exactions of efficient military training unless they are obliged to do so. When obliged to submit, the great majority find no hardship in it, and drill, in such circumstances, becomes fairly popular...it seems to me that good faith [in reference to the Morrill Act] requires that the subject shall be put upon the only footing on which it can achieve success, viz., as compulsory on the whole body of male students for at least a portion of their college course.\textsuperscript{26}

President Orton's plea did not bring immediate results, however, and drill continued on an optional basis.

The stringent rules concerning military training, which had been adopted by the Board of Trustees to assist the Military Department, did not have the anticipated positive results either. The Trustees had ordered the Faculty to give an "academic value" to the Military Department and place it in one of the schools of the University. The Trustees further resolved "that the faculty will provide a duty, instead of drill for those who do not engage in it during the hour set apart for military instruction."\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{26}Annual Report of the Ohio State University, 1872, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{27}Hooper, op.cit., p. 131.
The Board also agreed with the faculty regulation which specified that a student be expelled from the University upon receiving eight reports for breach of military discipline in any one term.

The Faculty discussed the above mentioned regulations and did give academic credit to the Military Department, but it did not "provide a duty" for those who did not elect drill. Instead, it ordered students not to interfere with or disturb the drill, and "not to loiter on the grounds in the presence of the companies."\(^28\) This, it seems is not "providing a duty."

In March of 1880 a group of students seems also to have gotten involved in the struggle to make drill compulsory again. The *Faculty Minutes* show that the President and Faculty were unhappy with students about this "interference on their part with legislation relating to the affairs of the institution..."\(^29\) At the next meeting of the Faculty, the President announced "that he had spoken to the students relative to the impropriety of their course in the matter of petition for compulsory drill..."\(^30\)

Finally, in April 1880, the Legislature repealed the law making military drill optional, leaving the authority

\(^{28}\) *Faculty Minutes of the Ohio State University, Vol. I*, p. 166.

\(^{29}\) Ibid., p. 234.

\(^{30}\) Ibid.
to the Board of Trustees. Lieutenant Lomia presented a resolution to the Faculty which called for reinstatement of compulsory drill for all male students, except juniors and seniors, and for presentation of this resolution to the Board of Trustees. An amendment was offered which limited the required drill to two years, and exempted "those whose parents or guardians shall object on conscientious grounds." 31

Lieutenant Lomia's motion as amended was passed "with but one dissenting voice" and forwarded by the President to the Trustees with a recommendation that if this resolution met with their approval, it should be implemented as soon as possible. The Board of Trustees acted on June 17, 1880 to restore compulsory military training, and this status remained basically unchanged for over eighty years. The Trustees also gave the President authority to excuse students "upon reasonable grounds." 32

At the beginning of the next college-year, 144 students participated in military drill. Thirty students were excused by the President for physical disabilities, conscientious scruples on the part of parents, or financial inability to pay for the uniforms. Lieutenant Lomia could

31 Ibid., pp. 240-241.

32 Annual Report of the Ohio State University, 1880, p. 10.
announce proudly, "With the restoration of the compulsory feature to the drill, things, I am happy to say, fare much better in the military department."^{33}

In this same annual report, Lieutenant Lomia told about an increased interest in college military training by the War Department, manifested by a new requirement for PMS&T's to submit quarterly reports to the Adjutant General of the Army "concerning the number and discipline of their respective cadet organizations." Reports were also to be made on the progress of the Military Department, faculty interest in drill, and on outstanding student officers, who might become candidates for commission in the Regular Army.^{34}

Lieutenant Lomia also included the thinly veiled threat that, since more colleges had applied for officers than the War Department was allowed to assign by law, the U.S. Government could "at any time withdraw the services of an officer from a college, where there may be a lack of co-operation with the Military Department on the part of college authorities."^{35}

With the close of college-year 1881, Lieutenant Lomia's detail as Professor of Military Science and Tactics expired. The Ohio State University had been fortunate to have for its first PMS&T such a zealous officer who had the respect of the

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^{33}Ibid., p. 27.

^{34}Ibid., p. 28.

^{35}Ibid.
Board of Trustees, the faculty, and the students. From the very beginning Lieutenant Lomia had been granted full faculty status and privileges. His acceptance by the faculty as an equal was certainly enhanced by the fact that he was a well-educated, tactful man, and by the fact that he shared in the teaching load as Adjunct Professor of Mathematics and Elocution. The monthly salary of $60, paid to him by the University, in addition to his army pay, can certainly be termed a bargain for the University.

In today's terminology one could also say that Lieutenant Lomia was a good public relations man. He initiated many activities which connected the University to the State of Ohio. Cadet units participated admirably in many official parades, inaugurations, and public ceremonies off campus. Governors and legislators were also invited to the campus on occasion of military prize drills, cadet parades, and other occasions. At a time when the University was little known, even in its own state, this public relations activity was of considerable help to Ohio State.

Even before Lieutenant Lomia's tour of duty had ended, a "considerable number of officers, with honorable records and strong credentials made application to the Board that their names be forwarded to the Secretary of War for appointment."36 The Board of Trustees finally

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36 Annual Report of the Ohio State University, 1881, p. 10.
selected First Lieutenant George Ruhlen, 17th Infantry, because they "were assured of a firm and manly, but quiet and unobtrusive management of this somewhat difficult office." The Trustees did not explain what the "difficulty" of this office was.

In the meantime the Presidency of the University had changed. President Edward Orton had resigned, and Walter Quincy Scott was elected his successor. President Scott was also favorably disposed towards military training. Regarding drill, he said in his annual report:

To require the able-bodied students to spend during the first two years, three quarters of an hour at noon in these admirable exercises, is in many ways a great gain to their manliness and to their scholastic training. In the natural growth of the organization of the University this military training will combine with the discipline of classes to produce an *esprit du corps* /sic/ in every way desirable, both for good government and for highest education.  

Lieutenant Ruhlen, the new Professor of Military Science and Tactics, must have agreed with the President's view of military training. In his annual report, the new PMS&T recognized that the object of college military instruction was not "so much" to make soldiers of college students as it was to "train these young men in habits of obedience to fixed rules, of neatness of personal appearance, quickness of perception and promptness in execution of orders." The

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37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., p. 17.
39 Ibid., p. 40.
drill was also to serve as physical exercise. Lieutenant Ruhlen then went on to explain that he had set up his courses in such a way that he could accomplish the above-mentioned objectives. This attitude of having military training for educational ends seemingly changed the nature of this training. More emphasis was placed on drill and less on theoretical instruction.

Several reasons probably contributed to this attitude. The War Department was, to say the least, only lukewarm towards this whole program, and did not support its officers on campuses in any visible form. Furthermore, graduates of Ohio State who had taken as much as four years of military training were not being utilized by the U.S. Army or by the militia. Thus, the military training which students had received was largely wasted and not exploited for military ends. It is understandable, then, why Lieutenant Ruhlen saw his mission only as contributing towards educational ends. Not surprisingly, President Walter Q. Scott praised this "most excellent feature of our University system" in the next annual report, and declared that in his judgment "no equal portion of time devoted to other work in any department of the University produces larger and better results than the drill, in all that relates to the education of the citizen."\(^4\)

\(^4\) Annual Report of the Ohio State University, 1882, p. 22.
Since the beginning of drill it had been a problem to conduct these exercises during bad weather. When only a few students drilled, the basement of the college building (now University Hall) could be used, but as enrollment and participation increased, this became an unsatisfactory solution. Lieutenant Lomia was the first PMS&T to ask for a drill hall, and Lieutenant Ruhlen repeated the request. President Walter Q. Scott supported his effort. "As to the drill hall," he said, "the need has become well-nigh imperative...."41 This clamor for a building for the Military Department continued for many years and was supported by all Professors of Military Science, by several Presidents, and by the Board of Trustees. Finally, in 1897 contracts were let for an armory, drill hall, and gymnasium, and in 1898 the building was completed.

President Walter Q. Scott also supported the Military Department in many other ways. When the cadet battalion was in need of new national and battalion flags, he held a public lecture, "which resulted in securing means for purchasing, at a cost of two hundred and sixty dollars," these flags.42 The President and the Faculty also aided Lieutenant Ruhlen in keeping military discipline. A University student, after having refused to attend military drill, wrote to President Scott that he had no intention

41 Ibid., p. 27.
42 Ibid., p. 45.
of submitting "to the compulsory regulation of Military Drill." The Faculty, after hearing this from the President, decided "that he be immediately dismissed from the University."$^{43}$

This action by the Faculty was reversed after the student wrote an apology "acknowledging his error in the course he had taken; that he was ashamed and sorry for all he had done, and prayed the Faculty to permit him to return."$^{44}$ The Faculty accepted the apology and voted to reinstate him, but only at the beginning of the next term, which was actually the next college-year. Two other students, who were regular members of the cadet battalion, were also dismissed because they failed to participate in a Decoration Day parade as ordered by the Faculty. Only after suitable apologies were made to the Faculty, and in one instance also public pressure applied, were they readmitted in the next year. Thus, punishment was swift and severe for students who violated military discipline on campus.

The next President of Ohio State, William Henry Scott (no relation to W.Q. Scott), was also an ardent supporter of military science and drill. In his first annual report he appealed to the Board of Trustees for more stringent rules relative to excusing students from drill for physical

$^{43}$Faculty Minutes of the Ohio State University, Vol. I, p. 340.

$^{44}$Ibid., pp. 341-342.
reasons, because "the present system ... admits of grave abuse...."\textsuperscript{45} It seems that in this year, 1883, twenty per cent of the eligible students were excused for physical disabilities. Lieutenant Ruhlen surmised that either the physical condition of students was alarming, or physicians who signed their names to the disability certificates were careless or had "an easy conscience."\textsuperscript{46} The Board of Trustees seemed to have agreed with the latter explanation, because they made a new rule which required students to be examined by a physician appointed by the Secretary of the Board of Trustees. This new rule brought about an immediate decrease in the number of absentees.

The cadet band was regarded as part of the Military Department, but there were always difficulties in maintaining it. Since the War Department neither issued band instruments nor paid for them, money for this purpose had to be provided by the Board of Trustees. The Military Department had as its first musical organization a drum corps with twelve members. This organization was disbanded in early 1879, when Edward Orton, Junior, son of the first president of the University, formed the first military band. Three band members owned their instruments; "the others were supplied with second-hand instruments purchased with a fund

\textsuperscript{45}Annual Report of the Ohio State University, 1883, pp. 21 and 49.  
\textsuperscript{46}Ibid.
voted by the trustees." By the end of the college-year the band had sixteen members.\(^{47}\)

The band played at several occasions in the next few years. However, disciplinary problems and an absence of financial support from the Board of Trustees combined to bring the band almost to extinction. At the beginning of college-year 1884-85, instruments were in such bad shape that the band could not be formed. Lieutenant Blocksom, the new Professor of Military Science and Tactics, called attention to this fact in his annual report for 1884, and suggested that a sufficient amount be appropriated in order to have the instruments repaired. He stated that "a good many members of the college are desirous of forming a band. A band will do much to inspire enthusiasm in the battalion, besides doing good in other respects."\(^{48}\)

In November, 1884 a petition from the students of the University was sent to the Board of Trustees, asking that a sum of $300 be appropriated to be used for the purpose of buying new instruments. The students had gotten estimates on the repair, "but this was found to be more than the instruments were worth, and even if repaired the set would be incomplete and of a very poor grade...."\(^{49}\)

\(^{47}\)Hooper, op.cit., p. 200.

\(^{48}\)Annual Report of the Ohio State University, 1884, p. 44.

\(^{49}\)Petition from the Students to the Board of Trustees, William Henry Scott Papers, RG 3/c, original in O.S.U. Archives.
This petition was signed by 157 cadets, the whole battalion. It was also endorsed by Lieutenant Blocksom, who offered to accept responsibility for the instruments, and by the Faculty, "under the condition that the band shall be placed under the immediate authority of the commandant of the battalion." The seventeen faculty members, including President W.H. Scott, also signed the petition. It is unclear from the available records if the Board of Trustees acted on this petition right away. The band is mentioned again two years later, when Lieutenant Blocksom stated, "The members of the battalion are now engaged in organizing a band, which, if successful, will greatly promote its interests and be a pleasing feature of the University." The cadets were able to constitute a band by November 11, 1886.

During the next few years the Board of Trustees authorized minor expenditures for the cadet band. For example, in 1888 a total of $14.50 is listed in the treasurer's report as having been paid out for sheet music, band stands, and instrument repair. The published "Roster of the Battalion" for 1890-91, which listed all commissioned and noncommissioned officers, showed four band positions: Band Leader (Cadet Second Lieutenant), Drum-Major (Sergeant), and two Principal Musicians.

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50 Ibid.
51 Annual Report of the Ohio State University, 1886, p. 51.
52 Annual Report of the Ohio State University, 1890, "Catalogue" for 1890-1891, p. 25.
It seems that most band members were volunteers who had completed their obligatory two years of drill. Thus, when the Board of Trustees lessened their support of the band, its players could threaten to quit. In a letter to the new Professor of Military Science and Tactics, Lieutenant Wilson, dated October 17, 1895, the Band Leader did just this. He wrote that out of the forty pieces in the band, only three were furnished by the University, that although some belonged to students, the missing pieces should be provided. The band members requested $250 for eight new instruments and $250 yearly salary for a band instructor. If these demands were not met, the students said, "they could no longer give the organization their support."\(^{53}\)

Two days later the Band Leader reported that "unless some decisive action is taken beforehand, on Monday, October 21, the organization will be disbanded... those who are due in drill will be compelled to report to you for assignment in the battalion."\(^{54}\) Either these threats or Lieutenant Wilson's persuasion must have helped to change the mind of the Trustees, because they appropriated $235.65 for "band instruments and instruction,"\(^{55}\) and the band could continue.

\(^{53}\) Letter from Cadet First Lieutenant George W. Bope to the PMS&T, original in O.S.U. Archives, Canfield Papers, RG 35/A-7.

\(^{54}\) Ibid., dated October 21, 1895.

\(^{55}\) Annual Report of the Ohio State University, 1896, p. 12.
With professional instruction the band improved steadily and grew in size, until by 1914-15 it had about 64 members. Mr. Bruder, the professional musician in charge of the band for many years, said about it: "We had an excellent military band capable of performing any of the many military ceremonies upon call. During the fall and spring we were out on the field every drill day -- weather permitting."56 Military control of the band became much easier, when only first- and second-year man were accepted, because these were required to attend drill anyhow. It is undoubtedly true, however, that although the cadet band presented problems to each Professor of Military Science, it also inspired esprit de corps in all cadets.

In addition to problems with the cadet band, Professors of Military Science were also constantly faced with an erosion of their authority. Part of the problem can be directly attributed to the constant turn-over of officers. Whereas most professors remained at Ohio State for many years -- often until they retired -- professors of Military Science were normally limited to three year tours. Most of the erosion of authority occurred when a new army officer arrived and before he was able to establish himself. Often it took the PMS&T his whole tour to regain the ground lost.

56Quoted in: A History of the Bands of the Ohio State University, compiled by George S. Bonn (Columbus, Ohio: ETA Chapter of KKPsi, 1936), p. 19.
For years the Faculty of the Ohio State University tried to reduce the number of students liable for drill and military classroom instruction. From the remaining records it is evident that the Faculty did this not out of malice or opposition to military training, but because time was needed for other subjects. Time in Land-Grant colleges was much more limited than in those institutions patterned after the German universities. Classes were much smaller and practical exercises and laboratory work took much time -- students were occupied the whole day long. Therefore, it was very difficult to arrange schedules in such a way as to allow all students to take part in drill at the same time every day.

Two specific examples of the problems involved in the change-over from one PMS&T to the succeeding officer will be cited. The first example occurred in 1884, when Lieutenant Blocksom succeeded Lieutenant Ruhlen. Before his departure Lieutenant Ruhlen had agreed to a change of sophomore drill for the following year. This change called for sophomores to participate in artillery drill during the fall term. During the winter term these students were to be exempted from military training, but in the spring term sophomores were to act as instructors and leaders for freshman cadets.

As it happened, Lieutenant Blocksom, the new PMS&T, was unable to adhere to this program, because other faculty
members would not cooperate. At each hour not enough sophomores were available to man one gun for artillery drill, because the scheduled recitations interfered. This problem continued to exist, in spite of the fact that the Board of Trustees' rules required sophomores to drill. Lieutenant Blocksom recommended in the annual report for 1886 that since the faculty had "been utterly unable, after much consideration, to arrange hours of study so as to permit sophomores to drill," the appropriate regulation either be enforced or changed by the Board of Trustees.

The Trustees decided to enforce the rule, and the Faculty managed to rearrange studies to allow sophomores to drill again. President William H. Scott said that it had been accomplished "at the sacrifice of other important interests," that sophomores were now excluded from several electives otherwise open to them, and that extra work was imposed "where the amount was already large, not to say excessive." Even though the Faculty and the President had generally displayed a favorable attitude towards military training, it had taken Lieutenant Blocksom almost three years to regain the territory lost when he first arrived.

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57 Annual Report of the Ohio State University, 1884, p. 44.
58 Annual Report of the Ohio State University, 1886, p. 51.
59 Annual Report of the Ohio State University, 1887, p. 41.
A similar example of the loss of authority of a new PMS&T occurred in 1895 upon arrival of Lieutenant Martin. His predecessor, Lieutenant Wilson, had finally achieved a goal of all previous professors of Military Science, namely, to make attendance at theoretical military instruction classes in the winter term mandatory for all cadets. In May, 1895 the Faculty had agreed to Professor Wilson's motion that all sophomores be required to attend a course on the Art of War, and all freshmen be compelled to attend lectures in Tactics. Both of these courses had been on the University calendar for a long time, but they had generally been electives, or required of officers in the battalion only.\(^60\)

It seems that the Faculty took advantage of Lieutenant Martin's newness, because at a meeting in which he was not present they rescinded their previous approval of theoretical military instruction. The Faculty Minutes tells the whole story very concisely:

> It was moved and seconded that all courses of study be amended so as to require Tactics (1st year) and Art of War (2nd year) only of commissioned and non-commissioned officers. The rules being on motion suspended, the motion was adopted.\(^61\)

Thus, for all practical purposes theoretical instruction was again relegated to an elective status. Neither

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\(^{60}\) *Faculty Minutes of the Ohio State University*, Vol. III, pp. 106 and 111.

Lieutenant Martin nor the following Professors of Military Science were able to change this for many years.

It should be mentioned in this connection that the War Department did not provide any help for Lieutenant Martin in this controversy either, because it did not abide by the Army Regulation under which professors of Military Science were ordered to operate. This regulation (General Orders, No. 15), published in 1890 and agreed to by the Land-Grant colleges, specified that both practical and theoretical instruction should be given. The regulation was quite explicit:

Theoretical instruction shall be by recitations and lectures personally conducted and given by the professor of military science and tactics, and shall include, as far as practicable, a systematic and progressive course in the following subjects: The drill regulations of the U.S. Army, the preparation of the usual reports and returns pertaining to a company, the organization and administration of the U.S. Army, and the elementary principles governing the art of war.62

Neither the provisions for military training in the Morrill Act of 1862 nor subsequent legislation had laid down mandatory guidelines for the colleges, and so General Order No. 15 could not be enforced. It was published "for the information and guidance of all concerned," and contained the information for how military training should

be conducted.

In 1895 the new President of the Ohio State University, James H. Canfield, asked the War Department if current regulations "intended" classroom instruction for the whole battalion, or only for commissioned and non-commissioned officers. The Assistant Adjutant General replied, "I have the honor to inform you that it is a matter which rests exclusively within the discretion of collegiate authorities."\(^{63}\) Actually, this was an incorrect answer, because even if the regulation could not "require" classroom instruction, it was "intended." Nevertheless, this letter strengthened that side of the faculty which was in favor of mandatory drill only. Lieutenant Martin had lost the issue.

By 1897 the Ohio State University had for the first time more than 1000 students. The Military Department was well established, and 285 students participated in drill during the fall term. The number of drill hours had been reduced to three hours per week. The majority of the students who had completed their two years of mandatory drill were no longer "ignorant" of military science, but neither were they qualified to become officers in the Regular Army or in the National Guard.

The exceptions to this statement were, of course, those students who continued in the Military Department beyond the

\(^{63}\) Letter from the War Department to the President of Ohio State University, dated October 3, 1895, original in the O.S.U. Archives, Canfield Papers, RG 35/A-7.
required two years. These students were selected as officers for the battalion, because they had displayed the proficiency and desire required of leaders. The knowledge which cadet officers had gained as a result of theoretical military studies in Tactics and Art of War, as well as the experience of commanding and leading the cadets, qualified these students for officer commissions in either the Regular Army or in the National Guard.

But neither the Federal Government nor the State of Ohio fully recognized this potential source of officers in a formal way. All attempts by the University to achieve closer cooperation between its Military Department and the Ohio National Guard failed. One of the many bills which President Canfield had introduced in the State Legislature was also sent to the Adjutant General of Ohio for consideration. This was a "bill providing for the organization of the University Battalion." 64

The Adjutant General deleted those sections of the proposed bill which provided for the issuance of military stores from the Guard to the cadets. He also changed a section on cadet training camps to read "as to provide for the payment of your encampment expenses, out of any funds appropriated

64 Letter from the Adjutant General's Department of the State of Ohio to President Canfield, dated January 24, 1896, original in O.S.U. Archives, Canfield Papers, RG 35/A.
by the Legislature for that purpose, under the charge of the University.\textsuperscript{65} The State Adjutant General closed his letter by saying that National Guard facilities and funds were insufficient to be diverted for cadet training, but that he would help to secure legislation which would not be detrimental to the Ohio National Guard.\textsuperscript{66}

Even though the Ohio State University could not achieve closer cooperation with the National Guard, many other Land-Grant colleges had accomplished this -- chiefly by providing officers for the militia. A report read before the Section on College Work of the A.A.A.C. & E.S. in 1893 stated that during the recent "miner's" war in Tennessee "nearly all of the commissioned officers in the State militia, many of whose companies were organized for the occasion, were the graduates of Tennessee University."\textsuperscript{67} This example shows that Ohio State was not "typical" in this respect, because other states had recognized the value of college military training by giving officer commissions to graduates.

Thus, at least at the Ohio State University, there were few reasons for the students to do more than what was required in military training. Incentives were mainly of the

\textsuperscript{65}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{66}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{67}\textit{Proceedings, A.A.A.C. & E.S., 1893}, p. 29.
honorary kind -- such as the prestige of being a cadet officer, medals and swords for prize-drills, and "the empty honor of enrollment in the Army Register." Tangible rewards were college credit for military courses and Regular Army commissions for a few students. For example, in 1891 the Faculty received a petition from a student, Edward Sigerfoos, who wanted to become an officer in the U.S. Army and resolved "that the Faculty recommend Mr. Sigerfoos to the President of the United States for appointment as a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Army, and that his record in the battalion be transmitted with the recommendation." Regular Army commissions were offered so infrequently, though, that they could not really be considered an incentive for college students. That the Military Department was able to accomplish anything at all in these first twenty years must largely be attributed to the compulsory feature for freshmen and sophomores, to the enthusiasm for military training of juniors and seniors, and to the untiring efforts of many successive army officers detailed to the University. Thus, when the Spanish-American War was about to break out in 1898, many citizens of Ohio had received at least a minimum of military training from the Ohio State University.

69 Faculty Minutes of the Ohio State University, Vol.II, p. 369.
c. Military Training and the War against Spain

The Spanish-American War, which was declared by Congress on April 20, 1898, disrupted many educational activities at Ohio State, particularly military training. Two days before the declaration of war, the Columbus Board of Trade had requested that the University cadets be permitted to participate in a public demonstration on April 19, 1898, for the departure of the 17th Regiment, U.S. Infantry from Columbus, "pursuant to orders of the Secretary of War in view of a probable war with Spain."\(^{70}\) The Faculty granted this request, but stipulated that students could participate only after 4:00 P.M.

This decision must have caused an uproar from the cadets, because they seem to have complained to the State Legislature. As a result of this the Senate passed a resolution criticizing the Faculty for not releasing the students earlier, even though the cadets had expressed a unanimous desire to assist in the farewell. The Senate further requested "the faculty of said University to grant such request of the cadets; to have leave of absence 3 P.M. today, and ... a copy of these resolutions be forthwith sent to the president of the University."\(^{71}\)

\(^{70}\)Faculty Minutes of the Ohio State University, Vol. III, p. 214.

\(^{71}\)Senate Resolution No. 80, copy in Faculty Council Committee Reports, 1898, located in the O.S.U. Archives, Canfield Papers, RG 35/A-7.
President Canfield denied that the students had placed a request before the Faculty and rejected an insinuation by some senators that the Faculty was less than patriotic by stating, "I beg leave to assure you and your colleagues that no body of gentlemen in Ohio is more deeply, enthusiastically and wisely patriotic than the faculty of the State university."72 President Canfield may have tried to disprove the senators' accusation when he had the Cuban flag raised over the armory building -- only to earn "severe criticism on the part of many of his associates in the faculty."73

Patriotism and fervor for the war were running high throughout the nation, and so it is not surprising that many students and graduates volunteered for different units of the Ohio National Guard. President Canfield estimated that in the Fourth Ohio alone, there were nearly two hundred ex-students and graduates, and more than one third of Battery H consisted of Ohio State men. Former students also received some volunteer commissions in other National Guard units all over Ohio.74

Since the war broke out in the beginning of the spring term, many students interrupted their studies. Before their


73Cope, op. cit., p. 264.

74Annual Report of the Ohio State University, 1898, p. 31.
units were even called to duty, 33 students petitioned the Faculty for a clarification of credit. On April 22, the Faculty adopted a resolution which excused seniors from all remaining graduation requirements and assured them that they would be recommended for graduation with their class, if they responded to the call. Other students were promised that the Faculty would do everything possible to insure them full credit for the term's work if called to duty. Probably because the war had just been declared, or to prevent a mass exodus of students, the Faculty decided not to publicize this resolution and not to give it to the press.\footnote{Faculty Minutes of the Ohio State University, Vol. III, p. 215.}

Three days later the Professor of Military Science and Tactics, Lieutenant Martin, presented a plan for the organization of a University Volunteer Reserve Corps to the Faculty. Authority was given to President Canfield to "grant such use of the armory and of the equipment thereof as shall best advance the interests of such organization."\footnote{Ibid.} Lieutenant Martin was hardly able to start forming his first unit when he was ordered to report for duty to his regiment, which had already moved to Pensacola, Florida for deployment to Cuba. Lieutenant Martin was not replaced by the War Department during this crisis, because the Army was critically short of officers. The Armed Services had been neglected by
Congress for too long.

For the remainder of the spring term President Canfield took over the work in the Military Department personally. The volunteer company which Lieutenant Martin had started was continued by two cadet captains, Ford and Haigler. This "Captain" Ford later became an officer in the Regular Army and rose to the rank of Lieutenant General. The Ohio State volunteer companies (a second company was organized later) were soon dissolved though, when it became apparent that the chance was small for students to receive volunteer commissions.??

Under the stern discipline of President Canfield, and aided by the sentiment of the time, the Military Department closed the college-year 1898 in good shape, even though reduced in numbers. In the annual report President Canfield discussed the effect of the war:

This year the gap made in our ranks was wider than usual because of the large number which responded to the call of their country and their state, enlisting for the war with Spain. While we regretted to have them leave, and while we felt almost the anxiety of parents as these dear boys went to the front, we could but feel that is was proper that this ready and hearty and generous response should be made by the graduates and students of an institution which is endowed and largely supported by the general government; in which for years at the expense of the general government, young men have received special and efficient instruction in military science. It has been impossible to secure a full

roster of those whose names are thus honorably connect-
ed with this great national movement in behalf of hu-
manity and advancing civilization, but we know that the
number is very large... All over the state, the men who
have been within these walls responded with alacrity,
and furnished some of the most intelligent and efficient
soldiers that the state has ever known... The University
rejoices in the men who thus honor their Alma Mater in
honoring the nation, the state and themselves. May they
be safely returned to the equally useful and equally
honorable duties of that which in this country is falsely
called private life -- for there can be no private life
in a free republic: every man is born an officer of the
state, and is responsible for law and order and peace
and prosperity for all, through all.78

This rather lofty writing has been quoted at such length not
because it tells a story, but because it expresses the mood
of the country and time exceedingly well.

How much Ohio State men actually contributed to the vic-
tory is hard to determine, but it seems that only one student
was a casualty of the war. The Land-Grant colleges as a whole
furnished 1096 commissioned officers for this war, who repre-
tented about six per cent of those students who had received
adequate military training in the previous ten years.79

Soon after the peace treaty with Spain was signed,
President Canfield wrote to the War Department about the
return of Lieutenant Martin. The Lantern reported that the
Commandant would return on October 15, 1898, and the Cata-
logue for 1898-1899 still listed Lieutenant Martin as Pro-
fessor of Military Science and Tactics, but there is no

78Annual Report of the Ohio State University, 1898,
p. 31.

79Quoted in: Reeves, op.cit., p. 89.
available evidence to show that he actually returned to Ohio State. Instead, the War Department seems to have detailed at least two officers for temporary duty to the University.

On March 8, 1899, the *Lantern* wrote, "At last the Battalion has a Commandant." It was Captain James B. Jackson from the 7th Regiment, U.S. Infantry. This officer had participated in the campaign for Santiago and possessed "war experience." 80 He seems to have stayed only a very short time, and was replaced sometime in May, 1899 by Lieutenant Herbert White, 6th U.S. Cavalry, who is listed in the annual report as "temporarily in charge." 81 On October 1, 1899, Major James M. Burns, the first retired officer to be detailed by the War Department, was permanently assigned as FMS&T, but he too stayed for only one year. The continuous change of professors of Military Science in the wake of the Spanish-American War was indicative of the absence of planning by the War Department, as well as the shortage of officers.

The United States was not militarily ready when the war was declared. The lesson of the danger of military unpreparedness was not learned, however, since victory came quickly.

80 *The Ohio State Lantern*, March 8, 1899, p. 3.
and easily -- not so much because of the military strength of the United States, but more because of the weakness of Spain. The Land-Grant colleges had provided "intelligent" soldiers, but it seems that the basic deficiency or lack of trained and available officers in times of national emergency had still not been corrected, because the system was not set up properly.

There was a definite need for men with ideas and foresight to make the system work better for the training of officers for national emergencies. The basic idea of accomplishing this on civilian college campuses was sound, but many improvements were required. The Ohio State University was indeed fortunate to start the twentieth century with fresh and imaginative leadership. Improvements in the Military Department were initiated by the new Professor of Military Science and Tactics, Captain George L. Converse, a retired Army officer, who arrived in 1900. These local improvements were later carried to the national level by three more Ohio State men -- culminating in the passage of the ROTC legislation in 1916.

d. The Evolutionary Change of Military Training Under Captain Converse

The period between the end of the Spanish-American War and the First World War was one of rapid growth for most Land-Grant institutions. The number of students at the Ohio State University grew from 1149 in 1899, to 3829 in 1914.
Correspondingly, the number of cadets in military training increased from 343 to 1375. The provisions for military training in national legislation became totally inadequate during this interval. Although one professor of Military Science had been quite capable of giving satisfactory instruction in Military Science to three or four hundred students, this could not be expected with a load of over one thousand cadets. From this viewpoint alone, a change in legislation was justified. Clearly, the PMS&T needed additional help.

Edward Eddy in his book on Land-Grant colleges mentions that during this period between 1900 and 1914, "little change was evident in military instruction...;" that "conditions remained poor both academically and in the degree of support by the War Department...;" and that the colleges "admitted defeat, letting it [military tactics] ride along as an auxiliary but not particularly respectable part of the institution."\(^{32}\) This generalization, however, did not apply to military training at the Ohio State University. Here, under the aggressive leadership of Captain George L. Converse, military drill was transformed into Military Science.

Captain Converse arrived in the fall of 1899 to take over his duties as Professor of Military Science and Tactics.

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\(^{32}\)Eddy, op.cit., p. 123.
His responsibilities included the supervision of drill for four hundred students throughout the year, and the holding of lectures in Tactics for sixty cadets during the winter term; but the PMS&T no longer had additional teaching duties. Captain Converse added two new theoretical courses in 1902, The "Art of War" and "Customs of the Service." The latter, consisting of lectures and recitations, was given twice a week in the second term and required the attendance of the whole battalion. 83

Since Captain Converse was a retired officer, his tenure at Ohio State was not limited to three or four years, as had been the case with Regular Army officers. As a matter of fact, he held the position continuously for eighteen years, until 1918. The success of the Military Department must at least in part be attributed to this extraordinary circumstance.

Captain Converse did not attend many faculty meetings. A partial reason for his irregular attendance may have been that drill was for years scheduled at the same time. Nevertheless he was always present when military matters were discussed -- he had a good information system.

The Military Department operated smoothly for the next few years. Only minor skirmishes were reported about the "encroachments from various quarters on the hour for military

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drill,"\textsuperscript{84} but these seem to have been resolved with strong support from President William Oxley Thompson. In the autumn of 1905 President Thompson urged the Faculty to give consideration to a change in status of cadet service and gymnasium work. He suggested "giving a time-valuation" to these subjects, because they were required but still had no valuation in units, and that this fact caused students and faculty members to regard these subjects with indifference.\textsuperscript{85}

The Committee on Rules took up President Thompson's suggestion and conferred with Captain Converse and the Director of Physical Education on the matter. The committee came to the conclusion that credit valuation should only be discussed "in conjunction with other needed reforms," and referred the matter back to the Faculty with a recommendation that a new committee of seven be selected and that it should include the Commandant and the Director of Physical Education, "with instructions to consider the whole status of military drill and physical education, and make recommendations looking to the strengthening of this work."\textsuperscript{86}

The select committee was formed, and included Captain Converse and Edward Orton, Jr., Professor of Ceramic Engineering. Meetings of this committee were held on six

\textsuperscript{84}Faculty Minutes of the Ohio State University, Vol. VI, p. 67.

\textsuperscript{85}Faculty Minutes of the Ohio State University, Vol. VIII, p. 143.

\textsuperscript{86}Ibid., p. 8.
different occasions. By May 2, 1906 a report was made to the Faculty which included a thorough review of all applicable laws, regulations, and rules pertaining to both military training and physical education. The committee had even investigated how these matters were handled at Cornell University, Purdue University, and the Universities of West Virginia, Missouri, Minnesota, Iowa, and Illinois. 87

After several amendments had been added, the select committee presented a new rule, which included a "Military and Gymnasium Code." This Code specified that the PMS&T was also the Commandant of Cadets and that a Military and Gymnasium Board should be formed with the PMS&T as ex-officio chairman. Furthermore, the Code established who should be required to drill and what academic credit students would receive for this work, established a system of demerits to insure discipline, regulated cadet appointments and promotions, enumerated military prizes which cadets could win, and gave the Commandant authority to detail cadets to the band. 88

The report concluded with nine recommendations, such as: "that the Board of Trustees be respectfully invited to make such provision as is possible to meet the War Department's

87 Ibid., p. 93.
88 Ibid., pp. 95-96.
specific requirement of target practice ... by equipping a shooting gallery in the Gymnasium building." The committee also endorsed the "principle of remuneration of commissioned officers of the Regiment and volunteer members of the band as recommended by the President." The following yearly salaries were established:

1. Lieutenant Colonel of the Cadet Corps $100
2. Majors of the Cadet Corps, each $75
3. All other cadet commissioned officers, each $30
4. Volunteer band members, each $30.89

The Military and Gymnasium Code included several important innovations, which ten years later were incorporated into ROTC legislation: compulsory cadet membership for freshmen and sophomores and voluntary participation of qualified juniors and seniors as commissioned officers with pay. The cadet officers certainly earned their small salaries, because in addition to being responsible for drill in the fall and spring, they also had to hold recitations in Tactics in the winter.90

Since the Regiment had grown to over one thousand cadets, indoor drill became impossible in the crowded Gymnasium, and Captain Converse started to capaign for a new drill hall.

89 Ibid., p. 98.
90 Annual Report of the Ohio State University, 1907, p. 45.
In the meantime cadet service during the winter months was entirely devoted to theoretical instruction. Besides the recitations in Tactics already mentioned, Captain Converse held weekly lectures on military customs in the chapel for all cadets. In the annual report the Commandant admitted that "the work done in recitations is not uniform in the different companies," but that the term's work demonstrated that it was possible to have each man "fairly well" instructed in tactics, and that "the rapid improvement of the regiment in the spring term field work ... could be attributed to this theoretical instruction."91

Another feature of military training in 1907 was rifle practice in the new shooting gallery, located in the basement of the Armory. Initially it was difficult to obtain enough ammunition from the War Department, but the University seems to have supplemented this. Captain Converse's aim was not to train students as marksmen, but to give each cadet a "working knowledge of service guns."92

Military training continued on a strong foundation at Ohio State. Captain Converse had the support of much of the Faculty, the President, and the Board of Trustees. In his annual "Communication to the University Faculty" in October, 1907, President Thompson chided some faculty members for

91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
encouraging petitions for excuse from military service, which in turn led to an encouragement of the sentiment that this service was not of "special importance." The President continued:

If it is true that the work of any department in the University lacks in character or dignity or importance, it would seem proper to bring that matter up for discussion in the several college faculties rather than to encourage unfavorable sentiment by an official attitude interpreted as indifference towards University requirements. This communication is intended for members of the instructional force only, and not for miscellaneous or general distribution.93

If there was opposition to military training from faculty members, it was clandestine, and not even President Thompson's communication brought it to the surface -- at least the Faculty Minutes do not contain any discussions about the "character or dignity" of military training. On the other hand, the absence of substantive discussions on this subject could well have been grounded in the knowledge of its sheer futility, considering the attitudes of the President and the Board of Trustees.

A good example of this difference in outlook between the Board and the Faculty occurred in 1910. The Faculty passed a change in the rules in order to exempt all students in courses of less than four years duration from more than one year of drill.94 This change, however, was not approved by the Board of Trustees and did not become effective.

93 Faculty Minutes of the Ohio State University, Vol. X, pp. 28-29.

94 Faculty Minutes of the Ohio State University, Vol. XII, p. 200.
In the following three years only minor changes took place in the growing Military Department. For the first time in many years, the Professor of Military Science and Tactics received a supplementary salary from the University again ($450 per year). Captain Converse also had his own clerk and two part-time stenographers. By 1914, the University also paid for two Armormers and for an Assistant to the Commandant (salary $1,500). The University budget for the Military Department had grown to $5,262.31.

The assistant had been added, because even the supervision of the regiment by one man became impossible. Captain Converse stated in his annual report for 1913 that the regiment had increased so much in size that it was "manifestly impossible for the Commandant of Cadets to give much personal instruction to so large a body of men," and that he was "compelled to rely almost entirely upon student officers...." There were forty-eight sections in theoretical instruction given by student officers, he explained, and if he visited three during the military hour, it would require sixteen days to get around.95 Captain Converse suggested that the Board of Trustees should try to obtain an assistant from the War Department, but when this could not be done without expense, the University decided to pay the

95Annual Report of the Ohio State University, 1913, p. 64.
annual salary of $1,500 out of its own budget.

In the spring of 1913, the Ohio State University cadets were called upon to render assistance in a public emergency. The severest flood in memory had devastated large parts of Ohio, including Columbus. Four hundred and fifty members of the regiment participated in relief work and guard duty, alongside the Ohio National Guard. Captain Converse wrote: "They [the cadets] were on duty in twenty-four hour tours and endured the usual hardships that are incident to a soldier's duty."\textsuperscript{96}

President W. O. Thompson also commended the cadets for the help in the emergency. The students, he said, "showed in a high degree the results of discipline and the habit of obedience. Communications from the officers in charge bear testimony to the high character of this service."\textsuperscript{97} This cooperation between the cadets and the National Guard prompted Captain Converse to suggest

\ldots that some attention be given to a plan, whereby the corps of cadets of this institution may be made available as a source of supply for officers of the Ohio National Guard. There are many advantages that could accrue to this University from both the State and the United States without consuming additional time of the student, or holding him to any other requirement than the present, and at the same time it would strengthen the Military Department of this University decidedly.\textsuperscript{98}

\textsuperscript{96}Ibid., p. 65.
\textsuperscript{97}Ibid., p. 7.
\textsuperscript{98}Ibid., p. 65.
The suggestion made by Captain Converse was important, because it foreshadowed a significant feature of later ROTC legislation. The idea that students with completed college military training should find some utilization as militia officers had failed in Ohio before, but it was to succeed within a few years on the national level.

3. Military Training Prior to ROTC
   Some Conclusions

By 1913, then, military drill at Ohio State had evolved into Military Science. Physical exercise, obedience, and discipline were still considered important objectives of military training on campus, but theoretical instruction for all cadets, and command and teaching experience for juniors and seniors had changed the output of this training. The problem was that a graduate with all this good training had nowhere to go. Neither the Regular Army nor the National Guard offered commissions to a sizeable number of these college graduates — it was like receiving job-training for a non-existent occupation.

The fact that the Ohio State University could reach such a high level of effective military training was mostly due to the leadership of Captain Converse and the support of President Thompson. In this case again, just as in the previous thirty-seven years, the excellence of the Military Department depended to a high degree on the efforts of
individual men -- officers of the U.S. Army and university presidents. Professors of Military Science received little assistance from the War Department, little or no guidance on what to teach, and lukewarm to red-hot support from students and faculty, depending on the mood of the time.

Ohio State had been fortunate to count among its successive Professors of Military Science only excellent officers. Many Land-Grant institutions had not been so lucky; weak officers had caused weak military departments. This unevenness in the quality of college military departments was a constant worry to the War Department, but it had done little to improve the situation. Nevertheless, by 1912 some hopeful signs started to appear -- the War Department started at least to think about the products of these Land-Grant colleges.

The focus of this thesis now shifts from the telephoto-view of Ohio State to the wide-angle-view at the national level. Improvement of the whole system of military education in civilian institutions was only possible if continuity of programs could be assured through more effective national legislation. Times had changed -- the United States was now a world power with a tremendous military potential, but very little actual military power. The leading nations of the world all had large standing armies and well-trained and
equipped reserve forces.

As the War Department was to discover soon, it was important for the United States to possess at least adequate military reserves. Here, the greatest problem was how to insure a supply of trained and educated reserve officers. It is fortunate that Congress decided to choose the civilian colleges with military training as the main source of reserve officers. Nowhere in the world was such a large and well-educated manpower pool available at so low a cost to the government. The college associations, led by the Ohio State University, were instrumental in convincing the Congress of this fact, and in their efforts the colleges were supported by the War Department. The process of development of ROTC, from the inception of the ideas, through the framing of the legislation, to the passage of the National Defense Act in 1916, will be the subject of the next chapter. Even though the focus will be on the national level, Ohio State men continue to play a crucial role in these developments.
III. THE R.O.T.C. MOVEMENT AND LEGISLATION

1. The Germination of the ROTC Idea

a. Early Plans of the War Department

By 1912 military training at Land-Grant colleges could look back on a fifty year history. In spite of continuous expenditures in money and manpower, very few positive effects could be shown. An "awareness of military matters" which could not be translated into actual military power was of very little use if the United States should ever become involved in a major war with a first-class power. The vagueness of the Morrill Act, which did not provide for any specific utilization of college graduates with military training, would have to be changed. New legislation was needed.

The first impetus for change came from the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, and the Chief of Staff, Major General Leonard Wood, in the form of a Report on the "Organization of the Land Forces of the United States."¹ This was a plan for mobilization which gave prominence to the importance of reserve forces and included a section on reserve officers. In this report it was recognized that a lack of provisions for reserve officers was "one of the greatest defects in our military system."² The proposal was made to utilize

² Ibid., p.99.
the young men graduating with some military training as reserve lieutenants in the Regular Army, to provide opportunities for these young officers to train with "regular organizations at camps of instruction or maneuvers,"3 and to commission those qualified for a limited number of years.

This plan, however, did not mention any improvements of college military training, nor did it provide any monetary inducements to participating students. Instead, the plan suggested that receiving a reserve commission "would be appreciated as an honor by the best type of young men and that it would be no more than a proper reward to them for giving part of their college training to preparation for military service in war."4 The goals of the plan were indeed modest. It was anticipated that not more than 300 reserve officers could be placed on active duty at one time, and then only to replace regular officers absent on detached service.

Following the report was a proposed bill which would have enacted the provisions of the report into law. The bill, which was presented to the Senate in 1913 and became S.2518, would have set up the machinery for the raising of volunteer forces in time of war. Included in Section 7 was a statement that gave preference in the appointment of officers for volunteer forces from the Regular Army, the

3Ibid.
4Ibid.
National Guard, and those "who have been graduated from educational institutions in which military instruction is compulsory." This comprehensive emergency plan did not find much support in the country at this time, particularly since the danger of war was not yet imminent. Nevertheless, the influence of the mobilization plan on future thinking cannot be denied. The idea that Land-Grant colleges could be used as a source of reserve officers was established.

In the following summer of 1913 the War Department started a campaign to educate the public. In cooperation with a group of college presidents, two Student Camps were established, one at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania and one at Monterey, California. They were attended for six weeks by 264 students, who did not receive any pay and were not reimbursed for their travel expenses. Thus, poor students could not participate, and at least in the first year, the impact of the camps on military training was minimal. What did the War Department get out of these camps? According to the Secretary of War, "The benefit of these camps to the Nation is that they foster a spirit, without which a nation soon loses its virility and falls into decay." In addition, participation in the camps would help educated citizens to form correct opinions on

5Ibid., p. 130.

military topics."

The "spirit" mentioned above seems to have materialized, because in the following years these summer camps were greatly expanded. More college students attended, and Senior Camps were also added for businessmen. This so-called Plattsmouth movement grew rapidly, and by 1916 over 16,000 men participated. In these early years the summer camps did nothing to increase the number of reserve officers, but the summer camp idea did become a feature of later ROTC legislation -- another precedent had been established.

The Secretary of War's Annual Report of 1913 contained few new ideas on reserve officers. In the discussion about an Army reserve, officers were not mentioned at all. The reserve consisted of eight enlisted men, and no officers.\(^8\) General Wood, in the "Report of the Chief of Staff," did, however, suggest that four hundred graduates of Land-Grant colleges be chosen as provisional second lieutenants, and that these should train with the Regular Army for one year.\(^9\) Thus, by the fall of 1913, the General Staff had proposed some of the basic ideas for reserve officers training, but it was not until the meetings of the college associations that serious progress was made.


\(^8\)Ibid., pp. 21-23.

\(^9\)Ibid., pp. 151-152.
b. The College Association Meetings and the Addresses by President Hodges, Dean Orton, General Wood, and Captain Schindel in 1913

Significant steps for the improvement of military training at civilian institutions were taken at the November meetings of the Association of American Agricultural Colleges and Experiment Stations (A.A.A.C. & E.S., later known as the Land Grant College Association) and the National Association of State Universities (N.A.S.U.). The Ohio State University was an active member of both associations, and in 1913 President Thompson was a member of one of the standing committees of the N.A.S.U., and Chairman of the Executive Committee of the A.A.A.C. & E.S. It was in this latter role that he influenced the improvement of college military training.

The first association to meet that year was the N.A.S.U. on November 10-11, 1913. President Thomas E. Hodges of West Virginia University presented an address on "The Relationship of the Department of Military Instruction to the War Department."¹⁰ He criticized both the colleges and the War Department for not fulfilling their obligations in this matter and encouraged the colleges to "willingly" cooperate with the War Department. Such military training, he explained "has proved of physical and moral benefit to our students

and...has had a marked effect for good in the discipline of the university."\(^{11}\)

Hodges then implored the government to give more direct aid to the military work and suggested that (1) officers detailed to the colleges should have at least the rank of captain; (2) universities should have some say in the selection process; (3) there should be "some sort of bureau in the War Department with which the college authorities could be in constant communications;"\(^{12}\) (4) the War Department should prescribe and furnish uniforms; (5) the War Department should organize and operate free summer camps; and (6) students should have a chance to be commissioned, if qualified. President Hodges concluded his remarks by saying, "I am not sure that these suggestions are of much practical value, but I offer them for what they are worth in the hope that they may at least call out helpful suggestions from others."\(^{13}\)

Army Chief of Staff, General Wood, followed as a speaker. He praised the paper and said, "Personally I can endorse everything you have said. Your suggestions are very much on the line we are trying to establish."\(^{14}\) In response to some of the suggestions, General Wood explained that he could not

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\(^{11}\)Ibid., p.57. 
\(^{12}\)Ibid., p.59. 
\(^{13}\)Ibid., p.61. 
\(^{14}\)Ibid., p.62. 

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now ask Congress for financial support for encampments; that colleges could buy uniforms at cost; that not enough qualified officers were available as instructors; and that 500 provisional lieutenants could be appointed each year and would receive full pay. This, he said, "would be the cheapest way in the world to get a good officer." After one year with the Regular Army these officers would be available for the reserve, and this would soon lead to an accumulation of reserve officers.\footnote{Ibid., pp.62-70.} Thus, even though General Wood basically agreed with the suggestions made by President Hodges of West Virginia, it seems that he thought it was not the time to seek immediate implementation. The discussion which followed the speech of General Wood did have one specific result, however: the legislative committee of the N.A.S.U. was empowered to investigate and push legislation proposed by President James of the University of Illinois. This bill was designed to set up a definite rank structure for Professors of Military Science, based on the size of cadet regiments. For example, a regiment with more than 1200 college men would have a full colonel assigned by the Secretary of War.\footnote{Ibid., pp.70-74.} Aside from this proposed bill, the N.A.S.U. took no other actions in the area of military training at its meeting.

The most significant event of 1913 in the change of
status of campus military training occurred three days later at the meeting of the Association of American Agricultural Colleges and Experiment Stations, also held in Washington, D.C. The Dean of the College of Engineering of the Ohio State University, Edward Orton, Jr., read a paper entitled "The Status of the Military Department in the Land-Grant Colleges." Dean Orton, in this address, first undertook a comprehensive review of the origins and current situation of college military training. He then criticized the colleges and the War Department, and lastly he proposed a far-ranging plan to correct the inadequacies.17

The paper was presented to a joint session of the Section on College Work and Administration, and of the Engineering Association of the Land-Grant Colleges. Since the address was originally prepared for the latter group, it had special references for engineers. Dean Orton started by discussing the provision of the Morrill Act of 1862, especially the words "and including military tactics." Orton felt that these words left Land-Grant colleges no choice in this matter, that military training was required and not optional. He then recognized the wide variety of interpretations of this provision. Some colleges enforced military discipline and living conditions similar to West Point; others offered as little as three hours of military work a week for one year, but most colleges had a military program somewhere between

these two extremes. Dean Orton was opposed to this situation and said, "I think that it is improper that institutions which receive the same bounty should requite this bounty in such very different measure." He criticized the colleges for having "the wrong mental attitude" towards military instruction and for "failing seriously to take hold of and make effective use of one of the very best tools in their whole educational kit." Orton then went on to explain the educational advantages of college military training, namely the disciplinary value:

Military drill supplies a conception of authority, and respect for authority, which nothing else does or can furnish. It is needed more now than half a century ago, and will be needed increasingly as time goes on. How many of the young men that come before you in your administrative capacity for advice or reproof give evidence of being reared in a well ordered and well disciplined home? ...With our colleges full of young men of such undisciplined antecedents, and the proportion of such growing instead of decreasing, the need of a discipline, fundamental, vigorous and absolutely impartial, is apparent. No greater kindness can be shown an undisciplined spoiled boy, whose mother is too weak and whose father is too busy to control him, than to put him under military control...

Obedience does not come from precept or from intellectual conviction solely, or even chiefly; it comes from the knowledge of power and authority; and while intellectual conviction should always be used to its limit in securing obedience, there must always be the shadow of the big stick in the background, whether one deals with savages, or boys, or college professors. That is why a good military department

18Ibid., pp.172-173.
19Ibid., p.173.
20Ibid.
in any college is invaluable. It is the one branch of college work where authority visibly rests upon its actual source of power.21

Dean Orton also discussed the advantage of military drill for physical fitness, especially for those students who would not otherwise get enough exercise: "An hour of brisk marching in the open air, with head up, shoulders square, and with every sense alert, under the inspiring influence of mass actions, team work and military music, is a grand finish for the day of a college student..."22 If the drill did nothing else than provide physical exercise for a student, it still would be "worthwhile ten times over...."23

The third educational value of military training Orton mentioned was the "intellectual benefit" derived especially from the concentration required during drill and the constructive ability required for the handling of troops. Next, Orton discussed the "development of character." In his view, all engineers looked forward to controlling others, but they could do this only after they had learned to obey and to take orders from others. Orton saw drill as the laboratory of leadership, where students could be given increasing responsibility and coached on their faults. He believed that "a young man who cannot develop leadership

21Ibid., pp.173-174.
22Ibid., p.174.
23Ibid.
in a military organization is a young man whose attributes as an engineer need investigation."24

Student officers would also learn how to "read character" by having to select men for office. The high standard of personal honor required of officers would be another factor to help build their characters. Lastly, Orton talked about the "technical training of engineering value," which military training imparted. He equated many aspects of military life to engineering work. Such tasks as the transportation of supplies, the bridging of streams, the mapping of the country, and the making of roads, guns, and weapons were really "the application of the methods of engineering to the art of warfare." Engineering was, therefore, "the backbone in the instruction given in every military school in the world."25

Dean Orton then covered what the colleges could do to make the military work more effective: (1) the college should strongly support military discipline; (2) it "should acknowledge the educational value of military training as equal of any other subject in academic weighting" and award proper academic credit; (3) the faculty should observe military courtesy; (4) the college should grant sufficient time for the subject; and (5) the college should provide an

24Ibid., pp.174-175.

25Until very recently, all West Point Military Academy graduates received degrees in civil engineering.
"adequate" teaching force.\textsuperscript{26}

On this last point Orton said, "No college in the land would expect one professor of mathematics to teach a thousand students ... yet that is exactly what all of the colleges are doing with their military departments." He then proposed a rule "that no officer should ever be required to take charge of more than four hundred men." Orton suggested that the law limiting the number of officers be changed, but that the colleges should take it upon themselves in the meantime to hire retired officers and pay them out of college funds.\textsuperscript{27}

The next thesis Dean Orton brought up was that the needs of the country and the needs of the colleges were identical. It would also be in the interest of the War Department to strengthen the military work in the Land-Grant colleges. Up to this time the country had not really gotten its money's worth, for the millions spent had not helped to increase the military preparedness of the United States. The situation could only be corrected with the assistance and cooperation of the War Department with the colleges.\textsuperscript{28}

Dean Orton then discussed the military preparedness of the United States in more detail, especially with a view towards officer procurement. He deplored the lack of an efficient reserve, but pointed out that officering such a

\textsuperscript{26}Proceedings, A.A.A.C. & E.S., 1913, pp.176-177.
\textsuperscript{27}Ibid., pp.177-178.
\textsuperscript{28}Ibid., pp.178-179.
reserve was "the real problem, and the one in which the schools can assist in the solution." Other sources of reserve officers considered by Orton were the militia reserve and the veteran reserve, but both were found wanting. The West Point Military Academy and private military schools could hardly keep up with the needs of the small Regular Army, "and would, therefore, not be able to make much of a showing in providing officers for a reserve or a volunteer army."\textsuperscript{29}

Orton considered two of the more recent proposals for the training of reserve officers: first, the McKellar proposition for a military academy in each state fashioned after West Point\textsuperscript{30} and secondly, the Army student camps, but rejected these plans as either too costly or too limited in extent.

The last source of reserve officers which Dean Orton considered in his speech was the Land-Grant colleges. He mentioned that the Government was spending annually the sum of $2,400,000, which "goes to a large group of land-grant colleges which are required to teach military science as a condition of their existence. They are doing so in such a perfunctory and spiritless way that the War Department can see little practical return, so far as military preparedness is concerned."\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{29}Ibid., p.179.

\textsuperscript{30}See p.103 for more details on McKellar Plan.

\textsuperscript{31}Proceedings, A.A.A.C. & E.S., 1912, p. 180.
Out of all the before-mentioned considerations, two facts stood out clearly, Orton said. First, it was the duty of the Government to make the "present machinery" work, and not to embark on new expensive ventures, like the McKellar bill; second, that the Land-Grant colleges should take their part of the obligation seriously, and "to make some actual military output of a quality which the Government can recognize and use." By cooperation between the colleges and the War Department and with a "few simple changes" the whole system could be made to work successfully.  

However, the changes which Orton suggested were really not very simple. He proposed, in the first place, legislation which would standardize military training in all Land-Grant colleges by establishing exact minimum standards to include (a) two years of compulsory military drill; with (b) not less than three hours of work per week; (c) strict discipline, "with insubordination punishable by suspension from college;" and (d) a minimum curriculum which included at least a one-week camp per year, and specified drill and class room instruction.  

His second proposal was to pass an act which would require the War Department to frequently inspect college military work to enforce standards (colleges below standards

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32 Ibid., p.181.
33 Ibid.
would be penalized). Orton's third proposal was to change legislation limiting the number of detailed officers, and instead, to assign one officer per four hundred students. The fourth and fifth proposals called for legislation which would require each Land-Grant college to which two or more army officers were detailed to offer a four-year course in military engineering, and the Secretary of War to appoint these graduates as second lieutenants for one year. After one year at full pay and allowances, their appointments could either become permanent (Regular Army), or these officers could retain their commissions as officers of the reserve, but return to civilian life.  

The sixth and last suggestion Orton made in this speech was to encourage individual states to pass laws which would connect the college cadet regiments with the state National Guard in the same manner as West Point was related to the Regular Army. This would make more officers and military equipment available for instruction, and thus make the implementation of this whole plan more economically feasible. In the conclusion of his speech, Dean Orton called for the establishment of a committee on military education to study the subject, to canvass the opinions of the individual Land-Grant colleges, to confer with the War Department, and to prepare legislation for submission to Congress and the state legislatures.

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34 Ibid., pp. 181-182.

35 Ibid., p. 182.
Dean Orton’s six proposals were to influence the future of military training in civilian institutions greatly. Three years later, many of his ideas were incorporated into ROTC legislation, but in 1913 the time was not right yet—the First World War had not begun and national preparedness was no public issue. Nevertheless, those who had heard the speech were quite impressed. The college section immediately appointed a committee which took up Dean Orton’s suggestions and reported them to the Association as a whole. President Thompson of the Ohio State University urged the delegates during the following short discussion that the Association should secure legislative action during the coming winter, while Congress was in session, for “to delay this matter a year may be unfortunate.”

At the next morning-session President Thompson, as Chairman of the Executive Committee, offered the following resolution concerning Dean Orton’s speech for adoption by the A.A.A.C. & E.S.:

Voted, that the report of the special committee of the college section touching military instruction be printed and mailed to each college president for his judgment as to the proposals; that the report be made a special order for the next meeting of the Association; and that the executive committee, or a special committee if the Association so desires, present at that time a digest of the replies received with recommendations for action.

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36 Ibid., pp.115-116.

37 Ibid., p.143.

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This recommendation was approved, and the executive committee, under Chairman Thompson, took up the task of implementing the proposals of Dean Orton. Thus, the Land-Grant College Association had gone on record as favoring improvements in college military training long before national preparedness became fashionable.

Following the speech of Dean Orton was an address by General Wood, who had also responded to President Hodges' address to the N.A.S.U. a few days earlier. Wood called Orton's remarks "one of the most encouraging signs of our military situation," and said the paper "presents a most intelligent grasp of the situation with which we are confronted." General Wood agreed with most of the proposals made. He analyzed the military situation, criticized the unpreparedness of the United States, and stated that the 450,000-man reserve required in a modern war would need at least 15,000 or 16,000 officers.38

General Wood agreed with Orton that the additional officers should come from the colleges, but thought of it in a more limited way. He wanted to limit the annual input to five hundred officers. This amounted to only ten percent of the graduating seniors under military instruction. General Wood then went on to list the advantages accruing to those who would be appointed provisional second lieutenants for one year. He said that they would receive $2,200 to

38Ibid., pp.183-184.
$2,400 a year and could probably save at least $800 of this. He foresaw no need to pay cadets while they were in college; instead, he thought that if a sizeable number received commissions, this "would tend to popularize military instruction in these colleges and schools." 39

General Wood repeatedly emphasized that he was not advocating militarism, but military preparedness which would prevent war. He encouraged the members of the Association to support Dean Orton's proposals and assured them the assistance of the War Department in their effort. He concluded his speech by saying, "If we are well prepared, war will not be thrust upon us, and if it is thrust upon us, we will be able to make it short and carry it through with a minimum of loss, because our officers and men will know how to perform their duties efficiently." 40

The last speaker on the subject of military training at this meeting was Captain S.J. Bayard Schindel of the U.S. Army War College Division. Captain Schindel first pointed out that the college inspection board had found much variation in the training and that frequently no field training facilities were made available by the institutions. "Field training proper," he said, was what "the War Department was most interested in," rather than drill. 41

39 Ibid., p. 184.
40 Ibid., p. 185.
41 Ibid., p. 186.
Captain Schindel then went on to praise Dean Orton's idea of a military engineering curriculum, in that "these subjects must be considered the real basis of military education so far as scientific attainments go; hence I consider his suggestions most pertinent." He hoped that through cooperation between the War Department and the colleges, cadet training could be improved in such a way that Land-Grant college graduates would "possess the same attainments, so far as military training is concerned, as do graduates of the best military schools." 

Captain Schindel was so sympathetic to Dean Orton's ideas that he continued to assist the Land-Grant colleges in their efforts to obtain effective legislation.

By November, 1913 then, many of the ideas which were later incorporated in the ROTC legislation had germinated. Two Ohio State men, Dean Orton and President Thompson, had been responsible for bringing the subject up for public discussion and suggested speedy action, and in this effort they also received the support of the War Department.

c. The Orton-Paper Questionnaires of 1913 and 1914, and the Military Engineering Curriculum

As had been mentioned earlier, the Land-Grant College Association had decided to print and distribute the speeches of Dean Orton, General Wood, and Captain Schindel. Responses from college presidents were to be solicited, compiled,

\[42\] Ibid.
and presented at the next meeting of the Association. President Thompson, as Chairman of the Executive Committee, did not even wait for the printing of the addresses, but proceeded to take immediate action on the proposals.

Only four days after the Washington meeting, President Thompson sent out a circular letter and accompanying questionnaire to the "Presidents of Colleges of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts." This letter asked the presidents "for their opinion of these resolutions." Thompson further stated, "It was hoped that the opinions and comments of the several presidents would aid the Executive Committee in preparing the report."\(^4\)

The attached questionnaire followed the wording of the six Orton proposals exactly. The results of this first inquiry were, however, to prove disappointing.

President Thompson sent out fifty to sixty questionnaires, but only twenty-six presidents replied. Of these, about two thirds agreed with most of Dean Orton's proposals. The questions which most college presidents approved were concerned with increasing the number of army officers detailed to the colleges, and with the provision to appoint military engineering course graduates as second lieutenants for one year. There was most disagreement on the proposals dealing with a one week camp per year and on the frequent

\(^4\)Letter from President Thompson to the Presidents of Colleges of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts, dated November 18, 1913, copy in the O.S.J. Archives, Thompson Papers, RG 3/e.
inspections from the War Department with power to suspend federal funds. Of all the replies, six were generally opposed to any improvement of military training. 44

At the next convention of the A.A.A.C. & E.S., which was held in Washington, D.C. in November, 1914, President Thompson was supposed to present the results of the questionnaire. Instead he explained that "the replies do not seem to the Executive committee to be sufficient in number to warrant definite action at this time, nor does it seem wise at this time to present a digest of the replies." Thompson then suggested that a second attempt be made to secure answers from all Land-Grant colleges, that a report should be made at the next convention, and that the committee should suggest definite legislation for increasing the efficiency of military instruction. This resolution was approved. 45

Immediately after the convention President Thompson sent out a second circular letter to those college presidents who had not yet replied. Again the same Orton questionnaire was attached. In this letter Thompson said, "It will be a great favor and aid the Executive Committee in discovering the state of mind in the Association if you will have the


kindness to report as promptly as may be convenient.

In the following two months most college presidents replied, but President Thompson seems to have taken no action. The data received apparently were not compiled, for there are no records of such actions in the O.S.U. Archives and no figures were presented at the next Association meeting.

In early August, 1915 the acting Secretary of War, Henry Breckenridge, sent a letter to President Thompson (in his capacity as chairman of the Executive Committee) asking for his cooperation in getting a section on military matters established at the upcoming Association meeting. Such a measure, the Secretary of War said, would grant simple justice for the military department, offer the head of that department an opportunity to present its needs and improve cooperation and team work necessary for the well being and success of the institution... it seems to me that by admitting the military department to an equal share in the discussions which take place at these conventions, we will have gone far towards establishing a strong bond of sympathy necessary to promote an era of good will and cooperation between the land-grant colleges and the War Department.

The Land-Grant College Association met for its annual convention at Berkeley, California on August 11-13, 1915, but neither President Thompson nor Dean Orton attended. The report of the Executive Committee, prepared by President

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46 Letter from President Thompson to the Presidents of Colleges of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts, dated November 16, 1914, copy in the O.S.U. Archives, Thompson Papers, RG 3/e.

47 Letter from the acting Secretary of War, Henry Breckenridge to President Thompson, dated August 9, 1915, original in O.S.U. Archives, Thompson Papers, RG 3/e.
Thompson, was read by the acting chairman, H. S. Waters of Kansas. This initial report contained no mention of the Orton questionnaire, and it did not convey the suggestion of the Secretary of War to establish a section on military matters. 48

In the final report of the Executive Committee, military training was mentioned briefly as one of the matters for which the committee had responsibility and should have suggested definite legislation. It was admitted that the "Committee has not been able thus far effectively to prosecute these matters and desires to be advised by this convention whether or not it should pursue them further," and that it "recommends that the action of the last convention touching these matters be reaffirmed." This recommendation was adopted by the convention, seemingly without any discussion. 49

Thus, even though the Land-Grant colleges had first proposed improvements in military training in 1913, two years later still no definite legislation had been passed by Congress. Obviously the Executive Committee had not succeeded in carrying out its mandate.

In January, 1915, the Engineering Department of the Ohio State University, under the leadership of Dean Orton,

49 Ibid., p. 152.
completed the work on a new military engineering course -- a four-year plan of study. Included in this curriculum were 28 semester-hours of military training, drill, and theoretical instruction, as well as two five-week "student encampments." The graduates of this program were to spend a fifth year in the service of the government with the rank and pay of a second lieutenant. At the close of this year, they would retire as part of a Reserve Corps. 50

Dean Orton's military engineering course, then, had been put into definite form -- part of the so-called "Ohio Plan" was finished. But making a plan and getting it enacted into law are two different things, as President Thompson was to find out soon. In early 1915 he had tried to bring the just finished military engineering curriculum to the attention of Congress. Copies of the proposed curriculum were sent to Senator S. D. Fess and to Honorable Clement Brumbaugh, member of the House of Representatives. The accompanying letter, which President Thompson sent to these two Congressmen, explained the purpose of the curriculum and also stated, "It is the opinion of a good many military men that these land-grant colleges would by this means furnish a very admirable reserve force with splendidly trained and equipped men." President Thompson requested that "this proposal be brought to the attention of some member of the Committee on

Military Affairs." He also offered to appear before hearings on the merits of the proposal.\footnote{51}{Letter from President Thompson to Senator S. D. Fess and Representative Brumbaugh, dated January 14, 1915, copies in O.S.U. Archives, Thompson Papers, RG 3/e.}

Representative Brumbaugh tried several times to get Chairman Hay to agree to a meeting, but with no result. He finally wrote a letter to Hay and enclosed President Thompson's letter and curriculum proposal. Chairman Hay replied and said he would be glad to hold a hearing, but that at this "late day in the session this bill could not be passed even if it were reported." Representative Brumbaugh was quite surprised by this reply, and asked President Thompson what he should do in the matter.\footnote{52}{Letters from Representative Brumbaugh to President Thompson, dated February 3 and 5, 1915, with Enclosure, originals in O.S.U. Archives, Thompson Papers, RG 3/e.}

President Thompson answered that it was probably so close to March 4, "that we might as well hang up our fiddle and quit for this Session of Congress." He came to the conclusion that the situation in Washington was "not bright for any legislation of this sort" and that Chairman Hay seemed to have made up his mind. Thompson then added, "I hesitate to spend time and money in advocating a public cause when I am sure the time is too short in which to accomplish results." He ended the letter by promising to take this issue up again at the next session of Congress, and promised that he would also make some effort to reach Chairman Hay in person at
that time.  

The first attempt to get the "Ohio Plan" enacted had failed, but for unknown reasons President Thompson did not present the finished military engineering curriculum to either the Secretary of War or to the Association meetings at their August, 1915 convention. Dean Orton must have been disturbed that President Thompson had not succeeded in getting his plan anywhere, because on October 13, 1915, he wrote a chiding letter to his superior. He started the letter by telling President Thompson of the volumes of mail he had received in connection with his 1913 address, and he even included samples of this mail. He then stated,

I have been disappointed that so little has been accomplished thru the Land-Grant College Association itself in this matter. They are the logical ones to act, and yet after two years, I cannot see that any real headway has been made, in spite of the fact that strong support for the movement has been in sight in the Association all the time since the paper was read. I think that the failure to make progress has been due to the reference of this matter to the executive Committee, of which you are the Chairman. I do not think this Executive Committee has any very real interest or vital conviction in the matter...  

Dean Orton then suggested that this matter be referred to a special committee.

On such a special committee there would be no trouble at all to secure the cooperation of President Schurman [Cornell University], President James [University of Illinois], and a half dozen others of the most active Land-Grant College Presidents and such a committee would get action. The War Department, Congress and the Country are all floundering.

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around in a sea of suggestions, without any clear plan, and I fear without doing very much good, on this question of military preparedness...

The Government is spending on the Military Departments of the Land-Grant Colleges large sums of money, and is getting the minimum of return for it. Just a little more expenditure, and the change of a few laws, will make this inefficient mechanism a hundred fold more directly useful to the Government, and at the same time add to the effectiveness of education in the colleges themselves.

Are you still Chairman of the Executive Committee? If so can I induce you to take some active steps to have this committee either give consideration to the matter, or put it into the hands of a committee that will.54

Orton ended this letter "With kindest personal regards, I remain yours very truly," signed, "Edward Orton, Jr."

This letter is quite significant, because it shows that President Thompson was not very active in this issue, at least between February and October, 1915. His earlier enthusiasm seems to have waned at the beginning of the preparedness movement. The exact reasons for this cannot be found in the available documents, but it is possible that it had something to do with his activity in the peace movement, which will be discussed later. However, it is certain that starting in the latter part of October, President Thompson again became very active in the issue of officer training. Whether it was Orton's letter or whether he changed his mind on his own, we do not know. From this time on until the ROTC

54 Letter from Dean Edward Orton, Jr. to Dr. W. O. Thompson, dated October 13, 1915, original in the O.S.U. Archives, Thompson Papers, RG 3/e.
legislation was passed, he spent a tremendous amount of time, energy, and effort on securing this goal.

When President Thompson replied to Dean Orton's letter, he did not answer any of the allegations made. Instead, he wrote about the military engineering curriculum and about an upcoming meeting of the Executive Committee with the Secretary of War, which was to take place in Washington on November 22. In October, then, the military engineering curriculum was delivered to the Secretary of War by President Thompson himself. The Secretary promised at that time that he would support this plan, but that he first wanted the General Staff to review it.

This review turned out quite differently than expected. In an answer, probably prepared by the War College Division of the General Staff, Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison rejected the military engineering plan as being too narrow and restrictive in its approach. He said that too many college students would be excluded from obtaining a commission and that the needs of the Continental Army and the Reserve could not be met in this fashion. Garrison further wrote, "For these reasons, I am convinced that your plan, although excellent, is not sufficiently comprehensive for present day conditions."55

55Letter from Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison to President Thompson (WCD 9089-7), dated November 15, 1915, original in O.S.U. Archives, Thompson Papers, RG 3/e.
The Secretary of War proposed a plan in which a "standard military course" should be laid down for each institution by the War Department. This course should be required of all students who are members of the Reserve Officers Training Corps, but that these students could choose whatever course of study they elected -- not necessarily engineering. The military engineering course, the Secretary suggested, could instead be better used for training Regular Army officers, because in the future many vacancies would have to be filled. This course would be supplementary only, and would not take the place of training the majority of students to be reserve officers.56

In a way, the rejection of the military engineering curriculum by the War Department seems to have been due to a misunderstanding. Dean Orton had never suggested that this was the solution to the problem. In his original speech of 1913, he had proposed this curriculum as part of an over-all plan, which was much more comprehensive, and included all students of Land-Grant colleges. President Thompson also had a much wider view on military training, even though he backed the military engineering curriculum as a feature which could be easily implemented and made a reality.

Dean Orton's 1913 speech, the questionnaires of 1913 and 1914, and the military engineering curriculum had, up to mid-November, 1915, still not led to any definite legislation. But the attention of educators and military men had

56Ibid.
been kept focused on using civilian college military training as a source for Army officers, especially for the Reserves. President Thompson, Dean Orton, and other educators had kept this idea alive -- they had planted the seeds for what was soon to grow into the ROTC legislation.

2. The Emerging "Ohio Plan" and Competing Legislation

a. The Drafting of the ROTC Legislation

The ROTC legislation, commonly called the "Ohio Plan," seemingly originated on the campus of the Ohio State University. Two versions of this legislation were introduced in the Senate, both by Senator Atlee Pomerene of Ohio. There is no primary documentation on the first Pomerene Bill in the O.S.U. Archives, while there is much information available on the second bill.

Secondary evidence on the first ROTC bill, introduced on December 17, 1915 (S. 2709), is available, however, from several sources. President Thompson tells in November, 1916:

This bill had been drawn by Professor Orton in collaboration with Major [then Captain] George L. Converse of Ohio State University. It provided for a Reserve Officers' Training Corps for summer camps and included the main features of the statute now in force.57

The authors of the first Pomerene Bill, then, were Dean Orton and Captain Converse, but there is no exact information available on when they first started working on

the draft, what influenced them, or when the bill was finalized and forwarded to Senator Pomerene.

From the available evidence some facts can be deduced, however. First, the bill must have been completed before November 23, 1915, because on this date the joint meeting of the War Department, the Land-Grant College Association, and the National Association of State Universities had agreed on a bill which later became the second Pomerene Bill (to be discussed later). Since President Thompson attended this meeting, it seems certain that he would have induced Orton and Converse to modify their draft bill according to the conference results. The draft of S. 2709, then, must already have been dispatched before November 23, 1915.

Second, much influence for the first Pomerene Bill must have come from the War College Division of the General Staff, because many of its provisions were contained in a discussion of ROTC in a War College paper.\textsuperscript{58} It is uncertain, however, if this paper was available to Orton and Converse. Another possibility is that the authors corresponded with or talked to the War Department. Captain Converse, in an address delivered in 1930, said in this connection that

"General [a later title] Orton made a trip to Washington and interviewed the War Department at length on the subject." 59 Thus, the War Department probably had considerable influence on this first Pomerene Bill, even though its authors were Dean Orton and Captain Converse of Ohio State University.

Probably the clearest evidence of Orton's authorship of the first Pomerene Bill was the provision which made military drill obligatory in the Land-Grant colleges. 60 All through this period he had advocated that compulsion in military training was necessary and good -- for the country, for the colleges, and for the students. In this idea Orton was supported by Mr. Ralph E. Mershon, a noted civil engineer of his day and an Ohio State graduate, whose interest in college military training made him one of the chief supporters of the "Ohio Plan," a role which we shall return to later.

Mr. Mershon testified in this matter before a House Committee in 1916 and said he was "in favor of compulsion in that particular case, and at any rate I do not think there can be any harm in making a boy do some things at a regular

59 George L. Converse, Colonel (Ret.), "A Short History of the ROTC and Probable Effects in Event of War," (an address prepared for the Columbus, Ohio Chapter of the Torch Club, on May 15, 1930), copy in the O.S.U. Mershon Memorabilia Room, Mershon Papers, Box 23, p.2.

time, whether he wants to do them or not."\(^61\) The compulsory feature of the first Pomerene Bill proved to be the most controversial of its provisions and soon led to the introduction of the second bill on this subject by Senator Pomerene on January 25, 1916.

The second Pomerene Bill (S. 3546), also known as the Pomerene-Gard Bill, was the result of several conferences between the interested parties in Washington, D.C. President Thompson (as Chairman of the A.A.A.C. & E.S.) had originally requested the first conference from Secretary of War Garrison, and they had agreed to November 22 as the date. To this conference other parties were invited: the War College Division of the General Staff, the Executive Committee of the N.A.S.U., and representatives of the Association of Military Academies.

Probably the best account of this series of conferences is contained in a pamphlet published by the N.A.S.U. in February, 1916.\(^62\) The pamphlet started with the resolutions which the N.A.S.U. had adopted at its 1915 convention, which directed its Executive Committee "to keep in touch with those having such proposed legislation in charge, with a view to

\(^61\)Ibid., quotation from Hearings before Committee on Military Affairs, H.R., 64th Congress, 1st Session, p.13.

securing its passage..."63 President Thompson and his committee and the Executive Committee of the N.A.S.U. agreed to meet in joint session before going to the War Department in order to agree on a common policy.

At the outset of the meeting, a letter from President Strong of the N.A.S.U. was read which expressed his opposition to the improvement of the military position of the United States in any way, shape or form. He said, among other things:

As leaders in the intellectual and moral life of our country it seems to me that universities, of all institutions in our national life, must stand against militarism and a resort to force; that they should be the last to be moved by considerations of fear and hatred; that they should be the first to point the way to some other method than war, such as an international court, for the settlement of international difficulties.64

Those present at this meeting "gave respectful attention to the letter," but continued to follow the instructions of their Association, and proceeded in accordance with these. After a lengthy discussion, the following resolution was passed:

Moved and carried that it be the decision of the Executive Committee of the National Association of State Universities to cooperate with the Executive Committee of the Association of American Agricultural Colleges and Experiment Stations in promoting the passage of such a bill as may be unitedly approved for the utilization of Military Departments now existing in Land-Grant Colleges and State Universities or

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that may hereafter be established at other State Universities. 65

The joint committee then went to the War Department for the conference, where they were joined by Secretary of War Garrison, Chief of Staff General Scott, and Captain Schindel. The Secretary of War told the educators that he was "heartily interested in a scheme for better utilization of the colleges of the country for military training." 66 He then presented a memorandum which was an extract from the brochure on Reserve Officers from the General Staff. This was followed by a measure, also proposed by the General Staff, entitled "A Bill to Establish a Reserve Officers Training Corps."

The joint committee then asked to have a chance to examine the proposed bill alone, and adjourned to the New Willard Hotel. At an evening meeting the War Department plan was analyzed, discussed, and certain conclusions were reached. A special subcommittee made up of Presidents Thompson, Futrall, Duniway, and Benton was chosen to put these conclusions into suggestions for change.

Of the eleven sections of the War Department bill, the subcommittee accepted four unchanged and proposed amendments to seven. Some of these amendments were minor, others major. The colleges still wanted a specific ratio

65 Ibid., pp.4-5.
66 Ibid., p.5.
of students to officers specified, i.e., one officer for each four hundred students or major fractions thereof. The colleges were also opposed to having courses "prescribed" by the Secretary of War -- they wanted "approved," instead, and also insisted that the prescribed minimum of military instruction be no more than three hours per week. The joint college committee also proposed that third and fourth year students be paid $100 a year; receive free uniforms and equipment; attend one six-week summer camp, with the expenses paid by the Government; and be commissioned upon graduation "as second lieutenants for training and duty at regular pay for one year."

On the next day, again in conference with the War Department, the differences of opinion were discussed. The General Staff members could not see why students should receive $100 per year, and had to be persuaded that patriotic motives alone were not sufficient inducement for the many college students who were dependent on their own resources. The Army officers feared that this provision of the bill might lead to its defeat, and instead proposed to pay students "subsistence" (at that time about $8.00 per month).

At the conclusion of the conference the members of the General Staff promised to prepare a new bill, incorporating

67 Ibid., pp. 6-10.
68 Ibid., p. 10.
the changes agreed to. Presidents Thompson and Benton were appointed to a special committee to meet with a delegation from the Military Academies and to attend a new conference on December 2 and 4. Attempts were also to be renewed to see the Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs at that time.

The second meeting in Washington was attended by Presidents Thompson and Benton, the Secretary of War, and Captain Schindel. The proposed bill was revised, and the Secretary of War gave assurances that this bill would receive his full support. An important failure of this second meeting was that the association representatives were not able to see chairman Hay and thus, passage of their proposed legislation was far from being certain. Not even the support of the War Department could change this.

Upon his return from Washington, President Thompson continued his correspondence concerning college military training. He received several letters protesting the first Pomerene Bill (which Dean Orton and Captain Converse had drawn up) and also letters proposing different schemes for training reserve officers. For example, one such proposal was to reduce college work to three and one-half years and provide six months of concentrated military training, à la West Point. President Thompson answered this letter by writing that he was already committed to the ROTC Bill as agreed to
by the Land-Grant colleges. 69

During January, trouble for the ROTC idea was brewing in Washington. Captain Schindel of the War College Division warned President Thompson with a telegram: "You should appear military committee as soon as practicable reference Training Corps -- representatives military colleges appeared today -- have wired Benton." 70 President Thompson went to Washington on the following day and participated in several conferences. He wrote that the ROTC Bill was "somewhat amended and put into shape that I think will be agreeable to all parties concerned." Senator Pomerene introduced the bill (S. 3946) on Tuesday, January 25, as a substitute for his first bill.

While in Washington, President Thompson also arranged for the introduction of the ROTC Bill in the House of Representives by Representative Warren Gard of Ohio, the mailing of printed copies of S. 3946 to all interested supporters of the idea, and for a hearing before the House Committee, promised by Mr. Hay at a future (but unspecified) date. After President Thompson had asked for and received written approval of S. 3946 from the new acting Secretary of War Henry

69 Letters between President Thompson and Chancellor Samuel Avery (University of Nebraska), dated December 15, 1915, and January 14, 1916, O.S.U. Archives, Thompson Papers, RG 3/e.

70 Telegram from Captain Schindel to President Thompson, dated January 21, 1916, original in O.S.U. Archives, Thompson Papers, RG 3/e.
Breckenridge,\textsuperscript{71} he prompted Representative Gard to introduce the ROTC Bill in the House of Representatives on February 4, 1916.

Thus, President Thompson, with the support of the War College, had finally succeeded in getting the ROTC legislation introduced in Congress. What now follows is the campaign for public support. From the introduction of a bill to its passage there is normally a long delay. An ROTC Bill as such was never passed, but the features of this bill were incorporated into the National Defense Act of 1916. This was only possible after the campaign for public support had succeeded.

b. The Campaign for Public Support of ROTC Legislation

The work of Dr. Thompson with the A.A.A.C. & E.S. and the N.A.S.U. for support in the drafting of the ROTC legislation is one phase of the public support campaign which has already been mentioned. President Thompson continued to work through the college association channels during the ensuing legislative battle. He did this by sending out circulars to university presidents on what bills they should help to defeat, and when and where they should pressure their Congressmen to support ROTC legislation.

A second campaign for public support also had its center at Ohio State, but was directed at a different group -- towards the engineers of this country. The mastermind of this campaign was Mr. Ralph E. Mershon, and he was helped in these efforts by Captain Converse and Dean Orton. From early 1915 on, Mershon had started agitation for an Engineer Officers' Reserve Corps, and in connection with this, seems to have gotten involved with the Military Engineering curriculum already mentioned.

It also seems that Mershon helped Captain Converse and Dean Orton in the drafting of the first Pomerene Bill, but no direct evidence on this is available. There is, however, considerable proof of Mr. Mershon's work in behalf of ROTC legislation. Sometime in late 1915, Mr. Mershon had asked Captain Converse to prepare answers for a questionnaire on the provisions for and issues surrounding college military training. Mershon had planned to send the completed questionnaire, together with a letter asking for support, to engineers and their professional organizations throughout the United States.

By January, 1916, the two men were working out individual compromises to different questions. Mr. Mershon wanted more specific answers to such questions as, "Do all institutions involved have shooting galleries?" or, "What
is the exact student enrollment under military training?" 72
Mershon also told in this letter about "getting in touch
with several organizations with reference to their actively
getting behind the legislation we have in mind." 73
The organizations referred to were again mostly profes-
sional engineering associations.

In providing the answers for the questionnaire, Captain
Converse was also assisted by Dean Orton and by officers
of the War College Division of the General Staff. Dean Orton
was particularly critical of the length of the question-
naire, suggesting nobody would give it adequate consideration
unless it was shortened. He was also in favor of more con-
servative estimates on answers projecting future enroll-
ment in advanced ROTC classes. 74

The completed questionnaire which was finally agreed
upon and signed by Captain Converse on February 11, 1916,
was appended to a letter from Mr. Mershon to the engineers
of the country in which he explained the provisions of the
proposed ROTC legislation. Mershon concluded his circular
with these words:

72 Letter from Mr. Mershon to Captain Converse, dated
January 11, 1916, copy in O.S.U. Archives, Thompson Papers,
RG 3/e.

73 Ibid.

74 Letter from Dean Edward Orton, Jr., to Mr. Ralph D.
Mershon, dated February 4, 1916, original in the Mershon
Memorabilia Room at the Ohio State University, Mershon
Papers, Box 23.
It is hoped that all those interested in the matter of preparedness, and in the educational and disciplinary advantages which will accrue to the country from a large proportion of the young men in our colleges and schools receiving a certain amount of military training, will rally to the support of the plan contemplated by the proposed legislation. For the benefit of such, and others who may desire information covering this subject, a questionnaire has been prepared and submitted to the Commandant in one of the largest of the educational institutions, who has prepared answers to the questions.75

The scope of Mr. Mershon's public support campaign was quite impressive. He proposed to get 40,000 copies of the circular (including the questionnaire) printed and to send 30,000 of these information packets to engineers all over the country, "together with a letter requesting that they get after their Congressmen."76 Mershon also sent a copy to every Senator and Representative in Congress. Extra copies of the information packet were also made available to Captain Converse, Dean Orton, and President Thompson. The financial records of Mr. Mershon show that this campaign in behalf of RRTC legislation in

75Ralph D. Mershon, "Proposed Legislation for Increasing the Scope of Military Training in Civil Educational Institutions with Special Reference to Turning out Men Capable of Acting as Officers in Time of War," dated February, 1916, copy in the Mershon Memorabilia Room at the Ohio State University, Mershon Papers, Box 23.

1916 cost him almost $900.77

The campaigns for public support continued from February through April 1916. The strong leadership exerted by the four Ohio State men helped to generate sufficient sentiment in favor of ROTC legislation to keep it active in Congress, and also assisted in the defeat of all competing bills, particularly the "Cadet Company Plan" of Chairman Hay and the McKellar Bill for a "West Point" in every state. Both bills, if enacted, would have spelled doom for any improvements of college military training and would have been much more expensive. Thus, Mershon, Thompson, Converse, and Orton performed a valuable service for the country and the colleges when they rallied public support for ROTC legislation and helped to defeat competing legislation.

c. Competing Legislation and Ideas for Reserve Officers' Training

Even though the nation and Congress had finally been convinced that some method of training and acquiring reserve officers was necessary, agreement on how to accomplish this goal was still far from being reached. These differences in opinion existed not only in Congress, but also within the college community. However, since the ROTC legislation

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77 Financial Statement entitled: "Expense of Military Training Campaigns," copy in Mershon Memorabilia Room at the Ohio State University, Mershon Papers, Box 25.
had already been introduced, the greatest threat to ROTC came from within the Senate and the House of Representatives in the form of competing bills.

The McKellar Plan, which was introduced first, basically provided for the establishment and maintenance of a military training school in each state and in the District of Columbia, financed annually by appropriations from the federal government ($80,000) and each state ($40,000). Out of this yearly income of $120,000 per institution, each state had to guarantee a minimum attendance of 300 students; provide free housing, food, and academic education "of not less than three or more than four years course, fashioned as nearly as may be after the course of study at West Point." In addition, vocational training courses could be added "to, or in lieu of, a portion of the training given at West Point."78

States were required, according to the proposed McKellar Bill, to set aside or build suitable classroom buildings, messhalls, and drill grounds. The United States was to furnish officers for the teaching of military subjects, as well as arms, ammunition, equipment, and uniforms. Each military school was to have its own three-man governing board

78Circular from William O. Thompson, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the A.A.A.C. & E.S. to Presidents and Deans of Agricultural Colleges, dated February 29, 1916, copy in O.S.U. Archives, Thompson Papers, RG 3/e.
consisting of the Secretary of War, an officer of the Army, and "a civilian of high character and attainments to be appointed by the President." The said board was to have full authority to negotiate with the states and power to "make and enforce all needful rules and regulations governing the admission of students, their discipline," and curriculum and graduation requirements. 79

In his effort to defeat this competing legislation, President Thompson distributed a circular in which he described the McKellar Bill to the administrators of other agricultural colleges and listed his objections, the first of which was its high cost. Dean Orton estimated that the annual cost of maintaining these forty-nine schools would be at least 4.42 million dollars to the federal government alone. President Thompson thought that the $400 per student cost was much too low, since the cost of maintaining one West Point cadet was $1,500 annually. Therefore, the McKellar Bill would be even more expensive than estimated.

But Thompson was also opposed for other reasons:

(1) It is a bad piece of educational machinery.
(2) It puts a financial burden upon the state...
(3) This bill is an effort by law to direct and control entrance requirements, standards of education, as well as requirements for degrees.
(4) This board of three, having such general and ample authority would, in case the state legislature undertook to use the existing agricultural colleges as the institution for such

79 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
purposes, be often in conflict with the local board of trustees in matters of administration. 80

At the end of the circular, President Thompson told about the problems of securing hearings on the ROTC bills in Congress and of the danger that the McKellar Bill would pass as part of the general Army Bill which would be discussed in Congress within ten days. Addressees were to write their opinions on this matter to President Thompson, who also suggested "the propriety of an immediate message to the delegation from your state," in opposition to the McKellar Bill. The circular was reproduced in 160 copies, and 136 were sent out. President Thompson received letters supporting his stand from over 20 college and university presidents from as many different states. 81

Letters and telegrams of protest against the McKellar Bill were also sent directly to Congressmen by President Thompson, Dean Orton, and Mr. Mershon. In a letter Mershon expressed his misgivings about the McKellar Bill: "It seems to me, about as good an example of half-baked, illy [Sig] considered legislation as anything I have seen for some time." 82 Since the War Department also disapproved of this

80 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
81 Ibid., p. 4. See also Military Bills 1916-1918, Thompson Papers, RG 3/e.
82 Letter from Mr. Mershon to President Thompson, dated March 4, 1916, original in O.S.U. Archives, Thompson Papers, RG 3/e.
bill, it became possible to defeat it in Congress, thus removing one obstacle in the way of passage of ROTC legislation.

The second major obstacle in getting the ROTC Bill through Congress was the Cadet Company Plan introduced by Chairman Hay of the House Military Affairs Committee. The danger here was not so much a good alternate plan, but the powerful position of its author. The Cadet Company Plan provided for the organization of 3000 young men into thirty cadet companies. Each cadet company was to be attached to an organization of the Regular Army and after one year's training these cadets were to be commissioned as reserve officers. It was estimated that the cost of obtaining reserve officers in this manner was about $1,500 per cadet, almost twice as much as the probable cost of a reserve officer trained through ROTC.

The drafters of the ROTC legislation objected to this plan mainly because it neglected the existing military training at Land-Grant colleges and called for a completely new set-up. Dean Orton went even further in his critique of the Cadet Company Plan, stating that it was "inherently objectionable in itself." The Hay Bill would also make it very easy for "undesireables to be put into the Regular Army as officers through the medium of the Hay 'Cadet Companies.'" This would "point out a back-door route into the Regular Army, which politicians are certainly shrewd enough to see
and utilize. As shall be seen later, Mr. Hay's bill was eliminated through personal negotiations and pressure. ROTC legislation, in the form of the Gard Bill, could proceed only after the Cadet Company plan was dropped by Mr. Hay.

Additional threats to the ROTC plan came from within the college community. The advocates of training camps proposed that military training be divided into two phases -- theoretical instruction given in the colleges, and practical instruction (including drill) to be provided in annual summer camps. President Thompson was also opposed to this idea, because it weakened what he considered an important part of campus military training. Nevertheless, for those colleges not required by the Morrill Act to give military instruction, participation in the ROTC program was made easier by not insisting on compulsory ROTC for all students.

The backers of the "Ohio Plan" finally succeeded in defeating all competing legislation and ideas. This goal was achieved partially through the public support campaign already mentioned, and partially through effective lobbying in Congress.

3. The ROTC Legislation Battle in Congress

By February 4, 1916, the ROTC Bill was introduced in both houses of Congress in almost identical form. In the

Senate the bill had been introduced by Senator Atlee Pomerene of Ohio (S. 3946), and in the House by Representative Warren Gard, also of Ohio (H.R. 10845). President Thompson had chosen these two men carefully -- Pomerene and Gard both had ample experience in Congress and they were both tactful politicians.

The next major hurdle for the ROTC legislation was to find committee approval. President Thompson had recognized early that the chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, Mr. Hay of Virginia, was the greatest stumbling block in winning approval for his bill. All earlier attempts to get a hearing had failed, but President Thompson persisted, because Hay had given Thompson a verbal approval for a future hearing.

On February 9, he wrote again to Chairman Hay, asking for a hearing before his Committee. Thompson wrote, "I shall be greatly obliged if you can fix the date." Chairman Hay answered that he remembered talking with Thompson about a "bill to be presented looking toward the establishment of a Reserve Officers Training Corps," but he did not offer a specific date. Instead Hay wrote, "When that bill is taken up for action I shall be very glad to have you come before the committee."84

84 Letters between President Thompson and Senator James Hay, Chairman, Committee on Military Affairs, dated February 9 and 11, 1916, copies in O.S.U. Archives, Thompson Papers, RG 3/5e.

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The noncommittal reply from Chairman Hay is all the more difficult to understand, because only a few days earlier the whole ROTC Bill had been explained to the Military Affairs Committee by Mr. Mershon, who was actually there on another matter. Mershon was present with a Joint National Committee from the engineering societies advocating a National Engineer Reserve Corps, but he received permission from the Chairman to digress from the subject at hand. Mershon then discussed the two Pomerene Bills (for ROTC), pointing out that he was more in favor of the first bill, because it contained the compulsory feature which was missing in the second bill.

Mershon said to Mr. Hay's committee that he favored the military training in the Pomerene Bill not only for its value to preparedness, but even more so for its educational and disciplinary value. Mershon tells about this hearing:

In fact I went after the thing hot and heavy, and because I had been thinking about the matter for so long, and because I was in such deadly earnest, I apparently succeeded in 'getting across' the ideas I was striving to convey. At any rate, the Committee seemed to be very much interested, and asked me a great many questions... I tell you Captain Converse all this in order to clearly convey to you the fact that the impression had as to the result of this hearing was distinctly in favor of the Pomerene Bill, or legislation along the lines of it.85

During this hearing Mr. Mershon also had an exchange with Mr. Hay about the deletion of the compulsory feature

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85Letter from Mr. Mershon to Captain Converse, dated February 10, 1916, original in O.S.U. Archives, Thompson Papers, RG 3/e.
from the Pomerene Bill. It seemed to Mershon that Mr. Hay was "himself inclined toward the compulsory feature in connection with land-grant colleges."\(^{86}\) Chairman Hay, then, was familiar with the ROTC Bill when he wrote his noncommittal letter to President Thompson.

Near panic seems to have hit the proponents of the ROTC legislation when President Thompson received a telegram from Captain Schindel of the War College Division, which reported that the "McKellar bill [was a] likely substitute for the Cadet Company Plan in House Committee preparedness bill." Schindel mentioned that the Gard Bill had not reached the Committee which had already voted, and urged President Thompson to take immediate action.\(^{87}\) This telegram touched off a flurry of activity -- the public support campaign against the McKellar Bill, and a series of telegrams and letters to members of Congress.

President Thompson and Mr. Mershon both sent letters of protest to Chairman Hay against the McKellar Bill, and again requested a hearing "before anything definite is done on this measure."\(^{88}\) It seems that President Thompson did not receive an answer, but Mershon did. Mr. Hay wrote

\(^{86}\)Ibid.

\(^{87}\)Telegram from Captain Schindel to President Thompson, dated February 19, 1916, original in O.S.U. Archives, Thompson Papers, RG 3/e.

\(^{88}\)Letter from President Thompson to Chairman Hay, dated February 19, 1916, copy in O.S.U. Archives, Thompson Papers, RG 3/e.
to Mershon that there "was not much interest in the Committee for the [McKellar] Bill and should it come up in the House it would be altogether possible to substitute for it the Gard Bill," but this would not be for some time. Hay then wrote that he had examined the Gard Bill to see if it could be included in the general preparedness bill, but found that he "could not make it fit in very well" and that the Gard Bill also had much opposition in the Committee. 89

When President Thompson found out about this positive attitude of Mr. Hay, he seems to have been quite surprised and wondered in a letter to Mershon "whether it would be well to prime Mr. Gard with the attitude of Mr. Hay toward the substitution of the Gard bill for the McKellar bill," but Thompson was not sure if Mr. Gard "might be able to manage the thing diplomatically..." 90 His fears were unfounded, because only four days later Representative Gard wrote to President Thompson that he had a plan to get his bill inserted as a substitute for Section 18 (Mr. Hay's Cadet Company Plan) in the Army bill. 91

89 President Thompson's copy of a letter from Mr. Mershon to Captain Schindel, dated March 1, 1916, in O.S.U. Archives, Thompson Papers, RG 3/e.

90 Letter from President Thompson to Mr. Mershon, dated March 6, 1916, copy in O.S.U. Archives, Thompson Papers, RG 3/e.

91 Letter from Representative Gard to President Thompson, dated March 10, 1916, copy in O.S.U. Archives, Thompson Papers, RG 3/e.
It seems that Gard got his idea from similar action in the Senate, where Senator Pomerene had succeeded in getting the ROTC Bill included in the Chamberlain Bill (S. 4840), as Sections 44-57. Gard wrote, "I am very hopeful that we may have this [ROTC Bill] incorporated in the Military Bill on the floor of the House and if we do, there is but little doubt in my mind but what it will be ratified in the Senate and become a permanent law." He also asked President Thompson to come to Washington on March 18, when the bill would come up for consideration.92

In the meantime President Thompson had written to all members of the Ohio delegation in the House and to Senators Harding and Pomerene, urging them all to support the Gard Bill instead of the McKellar Bill. Thompson included with these letters copies of the Mershon-Converse packet. The majority of the Ohio Representatives responded to this letter and assured Thompson that they would support Mr. Gard.

President Thompson also wrote a letter to all Presidents and Deans of Agriculture Colleges and Presidents of State Universities, bringing them up to date on the status of the ROTC Bill. In this letter he still expected opposition from Mr. Hay. Thompson also told of his plan to go to Washington in support of the bill and asked all addressees

92Ibid.
to urge their Congressional delegations "to follow the leadership of Mr. Gard... The one thing important, as it appears at present, is that Congress shall support Mr. Gard in his efforts to include the measure the colleges advocate." 93

Even though the colleges were "advocating" the ROTC legislation, they still did not agree with one provision of the law, namely, the requirement to give military training five hours a week for four years. It was even feared that this provision could lead to the defeat of the bill. To prevent this, Dean Orton sent a letter to Senator Pomerene in which he proposed to decrease the requirement for military training to three hours per week in the first two years, but leave the third and fourth year at five hours a week. 94

Dean Orton had consulted with Captain Converse on this matter, and they also recommended that the bill should contain a provision for making ROTC graduates eligible to become officers in the Militia and National Guard. Orton concluded his letter:

I hope you will excuse my presumption in writing so strongly concerning these matters, but I have done so much work and been so persistently active in improving the status of the military work in


94 Letter from Dean Orton to Senator Pomerene, dated March 10, 1916, copy in the O.S.U. Archives, Thompson Papers, RG 3/e.
the Land-Grant colleges, that at this critical moment I cannot bear to see the system made ineffective especially without the intent to do so. 95

Dean Orton included in this letter the specific amendments suggested and told where they would fit into the original bill. The proposed amendment changing the hours required for military training was later adopted and became part of the final bill. The second proposed amendment, to make ROTC graduates eligible for commissions in the Militia, was not incorporated into law.

It was also Dean Orton who finally discovered a way to approach Chairman Hay of the House Military Affairs Committee. Hay's approval for including the Card Bill in the Military Bill (H.R. 12766) was essential, if the ROTC provisions were to be safe in the Conference Committee. Orton remembered an acquaintance in Virginia, for whom it seems he had done several favors in an earlier legislative battle for the establishment of the U.S. Bureau of Mines. This man, Mr. W. E. Carson, was President of the National Lime Manufacturers Association and also happened to be a good friend and neighbor of Chairman Hay. 96

On March 13, 1916, Dean Orton wrote to Mr. Carson a long and forceful letter, asking for his support for ROTC legislation. Orton explained that President Thompson, Captain Converse, and Mr. Mershon would be in Washington in

95 Ibid.

behalf of this bill. Dean Orton then told about his objections to Mr. Hay’s Cadet Company Plan and to the McKellar Bill, and spelled out the more important features of the ROTC Bill. Orton further wrote:

We want Mr. Hay to consent to the substitution of the Gard Bill provisions, in place of his own clause. He has studied the Gard Bill and himself admits he sees a good many things in it… he tried to find a way to incorporate its provisions into his bill, but could not do it very easily, and hence let it go as the Bill now stands. This indicates that he is not at least highly antagonistic… we think that if he [Hay] could be reached by the right man, that he might be persuaded… 97

Orton then recounted the completed action in the Senate, where the proponents had succeeded in getting the Pomerene Bill included in the Chamberlain Bill, and suggested that if the same thing could be done in the House, the ROTC provisions would stand. Orton then went on:

I hope you will go to Washington and confer with these gentlemen [Thompson, Mershon, and Converse]… let them put you fully as to the details and reasons and then that you will serve your country by going to see Mr. Hay and getting a strangle hold around his neck with that powerful right arm of yours and keeping it there until you make him see reason. You can do it if any one in the United States can. 98

Orton then pointed out that he did not expect Mr. Carson to do anything, unless he was convinced it was right.

The three Ohio State men who met Carson, and Dean Orton’s

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97 Letter from Dean Orton to Mr. W. E. Carson, dated March 13, 1916, op.cit.

98 Ibid.
letter seem to have succeeded, because Mr. Carson introduced President Thompson, Mr. Mershon, and Captain Converse to Mr. Hay the next day. The interview with Chairman Hay went surprisingly well. As Captain Converse tells later, Hay even suggested to the Ohio State men that when the Defense Act would come up for consideration in the Committee of the Whole House the next day and the section relating to reserve officers was reached, Representative Gard should move to substitute the "Ohio Plan" for Section 18 (the Cadet Company Plan). Everything went as planned, because when the critical moment occurred, "Mr. Hay arose and accepted the substitution... the 'Ohio Plan' for reserve officers was thus incorporated in the Defense Act of 1916...."$99$

Thus, Mr. Carson's interference had succeeded. President Thompson wrote him a letter thanking for the support: "I am under great obligation to you for your presence and kind introduction to Mr. Hay."$100$ President Thompson also wrote a letter of thanks to Representative Warren Gard, closing his letter with these words: "I certainly am under obligation to you personally for your extreme kindness to me, and I am officially under obligation for the service you have rendered

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$99$Converse, "A Short History of the R.O.T.C...." op.cit., p. 3.

$100$Letter from President Thompson to Mr. W. E. Carson, dated March 29, 1916, copy in O.S.U. Archives, Thompson Papers, RG 3/e.
to the institution."  

Even though both House and Senate versions of the Military- or Defense- Bill now contained the provisions for a Reserve Officers' Training Corps, there was no time to rest for the proponents of ROTC. All through April 1916, attempts were made by various groups to water down the provisions of the proposed law. President Thompson, Mr. Mershon, and Captain Converse spent considerable time and effort in holding amendments to a minimum, though they had to arrange for some changes in the Senate version of the bill, because texts were not identical with the House bill.

At the end of April, President Thompson went to Washington again, this time to insure the passage of the ROTC provisions in the Senate-House Conference Committee. In the night of April 25 to 26 Thompson wrote a memorandum in long-hand in which he analyzed, rewrote, and corrected the House and Senate versions on the ROTC legislation so the texts would be identical. With two minor exceptions, the final bill was exactly like President Thompson's rewrite. He submitted this memorandum "for the Committee of the War College, the Land-Grant Colleges and the State Universities...."  

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Thus, it was President Thompson of the Ohio State University who worked out the final compromise of the ROTC legislation.

By May 20, the House had agreed to the conference report, and this was followed shortly thereafter by the Senate as well. On June 3, 1916, the Military Bill, now renamed the National Defense Act, was signed into law by the President of the United States Woodrow Wilson. Sections 40 through 53 contained the provisions for a Reserve Officers' Training Corps — incorporating basically the ideas of the "Ohio Plan." The tireless efforts of President Thompson, Dean Orton, Mr. Mershon, and Captain Converse, as well as many other educators, Congressmen, and Army officers had not been in vain — the majority of the nation's reserve officers from now on were to be ROTC graduates.

4. The National Defense Act of 1916

The National Defense Act of June, 1916 finally remedied the most glaring weaknesses in the defense establishment of the United States. Among other things this law provided for an Officers' Reserve Corps, the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, and for Training Camps. As has already been mentioned, the ROTC provisions were contained in Sections 40 through 53 of the law.¹⁰³


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Section 40 of the National Defense Act authorized the President of the United States to establish and maintain a Reserve Officers' Training Corps in civilian educational institutions. This Corps was to consist of a Junior Division in schools below college level and of a Senior Division in college level institutions with at least four years of study required for a degree. The act specifically mentioned for this latter group the State universities and the Land-Grant colleges.

Sections 41 and 42 allowed the President to establish one or more units of the ROTC upon application of a State or other educational institution where an officer of the Army had been assigned as Professor of Military Science and which maintained at least one hundred students under military instruction. With the exception of Land-Grant colleges, the institutions could offer military training for two years on either a voluntary or compulsory basis.

Section 43 authorized the Secretary of War to "prescribe" both theoretical and practical courses in military training. Colleges had to agree to give military training for three hours a week in the first two years, and five hours in the third and fourth year. Section 44 limited membership in ROTC to U.S. citizens who were physically fit and over fourteen years old.

Sections 45 and 46 gave the President the authority to detail Army officers and non-commissioned officers to civilian educational institutions, while Section 47 allowed
the Secretary of War to issue arms, equipment, uniforms, and other military items to ROTC units. Section 48 provided for summer camps and for paying students in attendance and travel thereto.

Section 49 specified under what conditions the President could appoint ROTC graduates to the Reserve Officers' Corps. The law initially limited the total number of appointees to fifty thousand officers. Section 50 set the conditions under which third and fourth year ROTC cadets could participate. Students had to be volunteers, had to be selected by the president of the institution and by its Professor of Military Science, and had to agree in advance to complete their obligation of five hours of weekly training and attendance at summer camp. Under these conditions cadets were to be paid "commutation of subsistence," amounting to about $9 a month.

Sections 51 and 52 stipulated that ROTC graduates and those who had completed similar training at an earlier time could be appointed as temporary second lieutenants in the Regular Army in time of peace for a period of six months. Upon expiration of this service, such officers would revert back to reserve officer status. The last section, number 53, provided for the call to active duty of such reserve officers in times of national emergency and directed the Adjutant General of the Army to obtain, compile, and keep records on all ROTC graduates.
The National Defense Act of 1916, then, included all important provisions of the "Ohio Plan" and would rectify most of the deficiencies found in college military training in 1913, when Dean Orton first brought up the subject. The Federal Government had done what Orton had suggested: it had improved the existing military training at civilian educational institutions and provided for a utilization of the product of this training by taking all ROTC graduates into the Reserve Officers' Corps.

The end of the time period covered by the thesis has been reached. The plan was to trace the development of college military training from its beginning to the passage of the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916. To leave the story here, however, would in a way indicate a "happy end" for the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, but this was not yet the case.

Before ROTC could ever become established on college campuses and the provisions of the law could be transformed into actuality, the First World War began for the United States. The war interrupted even those measures which had already been implemented. The Reserve Officers' Training Corps became more or less defunct and was replaced by the Student Army Training Corps, a war-time measure designed to produce officers more quickly than was possible through ROTC.
It was not until 1920 that the Reserve Officers' Training Corps was effectively reestablished as part of a new National Defense Act. It is important to point out, though, that the basic ideas of the "Ohio Plan" and of the first ROTC bill were continued in the National Defense Act of 1920 and in subsequent ROTC legislation.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

During the period covered by the thesis we have traced the growth and development of college military training on civilian campuses from its infancy to manhood. The number of students participating rose from just a few hundred to over 25,000. This phenomenal increase paralleled the spectacular growth of public higher education in the same time span. Almost all college military training was offered in public institutions such as Land-Grant colleges and state universities.

Through the years two milestones in college military education stand out: the passage of the Morrill Act of 1862 and the passage of ROTC legislation in 1916. Some may say that these two events were just accidents of history, but my contention is that men of intelligence, foresight, and courage put their hands on the spokes of the wheel at the right time and in the right place.

This is particularly true in the development of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps. Men from Ohio State were able to lead in the forefront of the improvement of college military training because they had first solved that part of the problem which they could control at home. After all, on-campus military training under the ROTC law was set up almost identically to the way the Ohio State University had
operated its Military Department since 1907. For example, Ohio State offered both practical and theoretical training, gave college credit to this work, and divided its program into two distinct phases. Phase I was compulsory for freshmen and sophomores; Phase II was voluntary for juniors and seniors. In Phase II cadets were selected as officers and also received some pay. Ohio State had also established exact lines of responsibility, and through the Military and Gymnasium Code set up appropriate rules for the conduct of military matters. President Thompson, Dean Orton, and Captain Converse had all been intimately involved in this process on campus.

There were, however, three basic problems beyond their reach which required national legislation: (1) a more appropriate student-to-teacher ratio in military subjects, i.e. one Army officer for each 400 students; (2) more pay for cadet officers while on campus and while attending summer training camps; and (3) an appropriate utilization of graduating cadet officers by the War Department.

The "Ohio Plan," then, was a comprehensive measure incorporating the improvements in military training which had already been made at Ohio State, as well as the improvements required at the national level. Undoubtedly it would have been much more difficult to get the "Ohio Plan" enacted, had it not been for the fervor and pro-military sentiment generated by the pre-World War I preparedness.
movement. President Thompson seemed to have sensed this, because he waited for almost two years before he took definite action. Obviously his timing was correct.

During the late twenties and early thirties many accusations were heaped upon the proponents of ROTC legislation, not the least of which blamed everything on the fever-pitch of war hysteria in WW I. Documentary evidence in this thesis, however, shows that the basic ideas and beginnings of the ROTC Bill go back to 1912 and 1913 -- a time when the world seemed to be in eternal peace.

Certainly by 1916, questions of national security must have had some influence on ROTC proponents, but time and time again they had already pointed out the educational advantages of the "Ohio Plan." Thus, their primary interest was to improve one aspect of public higher education, and not national preparedness. Nevertheless it should also be pointed out that the members of the War College Division of the General Staff who participated in the development of ROTC plans were not willing to accept any other plan for the training of reserve officers which would have omitted the established colleges. "We are after college men,"¹ these Army officers insisted. Thus, it is no surprise that the college associations and the Army officers could cooperate so well in bringing about the necessary legislation.

¹Letter from Captain B. Schindel to President Thompson, dated January 14, 1916, original in O.S.U. Archives, Thompson Papers, RG 3/e.
for the Reserve Officers' Training Corps.

Before concluding this thesis it seems important to pay particular tribute to four Ohio State men, namely President Thompson, Dean Orton, Mr. Marshon, and Captain Converse. Some might consider it presumptuous to call President Thompson and Captain Converse "Ohio State men," because neither one graduated from this University. Nevertheless, Ohio State can claim Converse as an alumnus, for in 1874, prior to his appointment to West Point, he attended the O.A. & M.C. for one term. Both Thompson and Converse spent very productive and important parts of their lives at the Ohio State University -- they were intimately connected with it, and during their work on the ROTC legislation they represented the University.

This four-man team was ideally suited by nature, education, and position to bring this legislation to a successful conclusion. President Thompson, due to his position as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Land-Grant College Association, carried a lot more weight in all negotiations than the average college president. As past President of the A.A.A.C. & E.S. in 1903 and of the N.A.S.U. in 1911, he was well known in educational circles throughout the country.² By virtue of his experience then, President

²James E. Pollard, William Oxley Thompson, (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, 1955), pp. 163-165.
Thompson could lead the team in pushing a piece of legislation through Congress, negotiating with many different groups, and finding a compromise in a seemingly divided meeting. Thus, he was eminently qualified to be the "chief negotiator" of the team.

Still, it appears that President Thompson, an ordained Presbyterian minister, underwent what may be called a crisis of conscience, possibly because of his involvement in the peace movement.

Prior to World War I, Thompson was State Committee Chairman of the League to Enforce Peace, whose National Honorary Chairman was former President William Howard Taft of Ohio. The country was deeply divided during this period, and the whole presidential campaign of 1916 revolved around the issue of U.S. involvement. Many influential educators of the time were pacifists or at least against any participation in the "European War." These men were also opposed to the preparedness movement, because it might lead to war.

President Thompson's wide-ranging correspondence in the years 1914 and 1915 indicate a genuine neutrality. In letters written to the German University League and to Mr. Gilbert Parker in London, he expressed his wish for peace and his opposition to militarism and United States involvement in the war. In a letter written on September 20, 1915, to Mr. Frank J. Howell, who had inquired about the sentiment for war at Ohio State, President Thompson insisted that the
students and faculty had remained neutral and had not discussed the war, following the wishes of President Woodrow Wilson. Thompson closed the letter with "Personally I am very much in favor of peace and I am very much opposed to large expenditure for war purposes...".\(^3\)

However, during late September and early October, 1915, President Thompson seems to have reached a climax in the crisis of conscience between his desire for peace and his commitment to improve college military training. He seemingly changed his mind during the month of October, because he again became active in improving college military training. A letter written in November to an officer of the American Defense Society seems to show a change in attitude: "I am a thorough going believer in peace and I am willing to go to war to enforce it by insisting upon an international judiciary with a sufficient police force to keep the children quiet."\(^4\) Between September and November, a difference in attitude is apparent. It was no longer "peace at any price." In the following months and years President Thompson became an ardent supporter of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps idea -- his crisis of conscience had been resolved.

\(^3\)Letter from President Thompson to Mr. J. Frank Howell, dated September 20, 1915, copy in the O.S.U. Archives, Thompson Papers, RG 3/e.

\(^4\)Letter from President Thompson to Mr. J. F. Hubbard of the American Defense Society in New York City, dated November 17, 1915, copy in the O.S.U. Archives, Thompson Papers, RG 3/e.
and he could again be the "chief negotiator" for this cause.

Dean Edward Orton, Jr. was a true Ohio State man. Son of the first President of the University, he entered the Preparatory Department in 1877 at the age of fourteen, transferring to the Collegiate Department in 1881. As a student he participated in military training under the first PMS&T, Lieutenant Lomia, and founded the first military band on campus. After his graduation in 1884, Orton embarked on a career as an Engineer of Mines, but worked mostly in the clay industry of Ohio. Noting glaring deficiencies in the technical and scientific knowledge in this field, he started to campaign for a department of ceramics at Ohio State, drew up a bill to this effect, and was able to get it enacted in 1894. 5

The drive and determination which had helped Orton to found a new field of knowledge (i.e. Ceramic Engineering), also made it possible for him to attack the deficient college military training program, propose improvements, and get them translated into law. Dean Orton had also gathered some experience in improving military education, because he was part of the Faculty Committee which reorganized the Military Department at Ohio State.

5The Engineering Experiment Station, Edward Orton, Jr., A Memorial (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, 1932), pp. 3-6.
On the team to bring about the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, Orton qualified as the "idea man" and chief spokesman. After all, it was Dean Orton's speech in 1913, before the A.A.A.C. & F.S., which marked the official beginning of the "Ohio Plan" and of what was later called the ROTC Movement. President Thompson, while speaking at Orton's funeral about the activities leading to the National Defense Act said,

It is fair to say that notwithstanding the advice from the other three members \[\text{Thompson, Mershon, and Converse}\] Edward Orton is more responsible than any other one person for the present National Defense Act. 6

Ralph D. Mershon was also a true Ohio Stater. He attended the University from 1886 to 1890 and, like Orton, also participated in military training on campus. He continued as a student officer in the battalion voluntarily in his junior year -- without credit and without pay. In a letter to his mother, Mershon wrote,

We have a large battalion this year; about 250 men. I stand a very good chance of being promoted to a first lieutenancy in a few days.... I am glad Rose is coming up, but I wish when you folks come you would all come at once. Often a fellow gets a little behind with 20 hrs. work and five hours drill, it is no fun to catch up.... 7

Mershon, then, like other student officers before and after him, had given up part of his free time to continue his

6 Ibid., p. 55.

7 Letter from R.D. Mershon to his mother, dated October 7, 1888, original located in the O.S.U. Mershon Memorabilia Room, Mershon Papers, Box # 2.
military training.

After his graduation, Mershon continued his connection with the Ohio State University through the Alumni Association, whose President he became in 1911. Mr. Mershon actively assisted the University, provided continuous support in various matters, and corresponded for years with President Thompson. In 1915 Mershon got involved in the campaign to establish a Reserve Corps of Engineers and in the attempts to improve college military training. As a well known consulting engineer, President of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers, and member of other professional engineering societies, Mershon had access to an influential group of citizens. He exploited this potential during the campaign for public support of ROTC legislation.

Ralph E. Mershon was always ready to back up his beliefs with time, energy, and money. He did so in the campaign for public support and in helping the Military Department of the University. For example, when Captain Converse badly needed help in 1916, Mershon (as well as Dean Orton) made a gift of $300 for the purpose of paying the salary of a Student Assistant in Military Science.¹ Mershon was also willing and able to go anywhere when his presence in support of ROTC was required. On the team of the ROTC proponents, then,

¹Annual Report of the Ohio State University, 1916, p. 79.
Mershon was the public relations man and financier, but he also contributed ideas and assisted in the negotiations.

The last team member to be mentioned is George L. Converse. A member of an old Columbus family, Converse attended the Military Academy at West Point and became a professional Army officer. Soon after his graduation, Converse lost an eye in Indian fighting, but this seems not to have impaired his vision much. As Professor of Military Science and Tactics at Ohio State from 1900 to 1918, he was a keen observer. Dr. Pollard tells about it: "When it came to spotting a cadet out of step, or with the wrong kind of shoes or soiled collar, he could see more and farther than most men with normal vision."  

Because of his personality and long tenure, Converse was able to gain much influence on the University campus. He had the fullhearted support of the President and of the Board of Trustees, and this enabled him to build one of the most efficient Military Departments in the country. In 1916, when the War Department was about to assign a new Major as PMS&T, President Thompson and the Trustees fought a valiant battle with the War Department to keep Captain Converse from being superseded. They succeeded in this effort and finally managed to have him promoted to the rank of Major. During WW I, Converse was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and

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finally, in 1918, to Colonel.

On the ROTC team Converse was the military expert. He seems to have had considerable influence on the other three men. But he was not much of a writer and therefore he probably gets slighted in every historical account. Converse seems to have contributed many ideas and also assisted the negotiations through his liaison work with the Army War College Division of the General Staff.

Thus, the team pushing for the adoption of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps was well balanced — its members were thinkers, talkers, writers, and doers. Their combined efforts brought about that part of the National Defense Act of 1916 which created the ROTC. The team had helped to improve the military posture of the United States in times of national emergencies beyond their expectations, for during WW II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War, ROTC furnished by far the largest contingent of officers.

If we switch to an All-Volunteer Army during the 1970's, the importance of ROTC will no doubt increase rather than decrease. The influx of ROTC graduates, whether as career officers or as short-term reserve officers, can provide the United States Army with new blood and prevent in-breeding. These liberally educated young men with a variety of racial, economic, and cultural backgrounds will be essential, if the U.S. Army is to remain an open organization dedicated to the preservation of the nation and of our freedoms.
APPENDIX

Provisions for a Reserve Officers' Training Corps

Extract from the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916

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SEC. 40. The Reserve Officers' Training Corps. The President is hereby authorized to establish and maintain in civil educational institutions a Reserve Officers' Training Corps, which shall consist of a senior division organized at universities and colleges requiring four years of collegiate study for a degree, including State universities and those State institutions that are required to provide instruction in military tactics under the provisions of the Act of Congress of July second, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, donating lands for the establishment of colleges where the leading object shall be practical instruction in agriculture and the mechanic arts, including military tactics, and a junior division organized at all other public or private educational institutions, except that units of the senior division may be organized at those essentially military schools which do not confer an academic degree but which, as a result of the annual inspection of such institutions by the War Department, are specially designated by the Secretary of War as qualified for units of the senior division, and each division shall consist of units of the several arms or corps in such number and of such strength as the President may prescribe.

SEC. 41. The President may, upon the application of any State institution described in section forty of this Act, establish and maintain at such institution one or more units of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps: Provided, That no such unit shall be established or maintained at any such institution until an officer of the Army shall have been detailed as professor of military science and tactics, nor until such institution shall maintain under military instruction at least one hundred physically fit male students.

SEC. 42. The President may, upon the application of any established educational institution in the United States other than a State institution described in section forty of this Act, the authorities of which agree to establish and maintain a two years' elective or compulsory course of military training as a minimum for its physically fit male students, which course when entered upon by any student shall, as regards such student, be a prerequisite for graduation, establish and
maintain at such institution one or more units of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps: Provided, That no such unit shall be established or maintained at any such institution until an officer of the Army shall have been detailed as professor of military science and tactics, nor until such institution shall maintain under military instruction at least one hundred physically fit male students.

SEC. 43. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to prescribe standard courses of theoretical and practical military training for units of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, and no unit of the senior division shall be organized or maintained at any educational institution the authorities of which fail or neglect to adopt into their curriculum the prescribed courses of military training for the senior division or to devote at least an average of three hours per week per academic year to such military training; and no unit of the junior division shall be organized or maintained at any educational institution the authorities of which fail or neglect to adopt into their curriculum the prescribed courses of military training for the junior division, or to devote at least an average of three hours per week per academic year to such military training.

SEC. 44. Eligibility to membership in the Reserve Officers' Training Corps shall be limited to students of institutions in which units of such corps may be established who are citizens of the United States, who are not less than fourteen years of age, and whose bodily condition indicates that they are physically fit to perform military duty, or will be so upon arrival at military age.

SEC. 45. The President is hereby authorized to detail such numbers of officers of the Army, either active or retired, not above the grade of colonel, as may be necessary, for duty as professors and assistant professors of military science and tactics at institutions where one or more units of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps are maintained, but the total number of active officers so detailed at educational institutions shall not exceed three hundred, and no active officer shall be so detailed who has not had five years' commissioned service in the Army. In time of peace retired officers shall not be detailed under the provisions of this section without their consent. Retired officers below the grade of lieutenant colonel so detailed shall receive the full pay and allowances of their grade, and retired officers above the grade of major so detailed shall receive the same pay and allowances as a retired major would receive under a like detail. No detail of officers on the active list of the
Regular Army under the provisions of this section shall extend for more than four years.

SEC. 46. The President is hereby authorized to detail for duty at institutions where one or more units of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps are maintained such number of enlisted men, either active or retired or of the Regular Army Reserve, as he may deem necessary, but the number of active noncommissioned officers so detailed shall not exceed five hundred, and all active noncommissioned officers so detailed shall be additional in their respective grades to those otherwise authorized for the Army. Retired enlisted men or members of the Regular Army Reserve shall not be detailed under the provisions of this section without their consent. While so detailed they shall receive active pay and allowances.

SEC. 47. The Secretary of War, under such regulations as he may prescribe, is hereby authorized to issue to institutions at which one or more units of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps are maintained such public animals, arms, uniforms, equipment, and means of transportation as he may deem necessary, and to forage at the expense of the United States public animals so issued. He shall require from each institution to which property of the United States is issued a bond in the value of the property issued for the care and safekeeping thereof, and for its return when required.

SEC. 48. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to maintain camps for the further practical instruction of the members of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, no such camps to be maintained for a period longer than six weeks in any one year, except in time of actual or threatened hostilities, to transport members of such corps to and from such camps at the expense of the United States so far as appropriations will permit; to subsist them at the expense of the United States while traveling to and from such camps and while remaining therein so far as appropriations will permit; to use the Regular Army, such other military forces as Congress from time to time authorizes, and such Government property as he may deem necessary for the military training of the members of such corps while in attendance at such camps; to prescribe regulations for the government of such corps; and to authorize, in his discretion, the formation of company units thereof into battalion and regimental units.

SEC. 49. The President alone, under such regulations as he may prescribe, is hereby authorized to appoint in the Officers' Reserve Corps any graduate of the senior division of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps who shall have satisfactorily completed the further training provided for in
section fifty of this Act, or any graduate of the junior division who shall have satisfactorily completed the courses of military training prescribed for the senior division and the further training provided for in section fifty of this Act, and shall have participated in such practical instruction subsequent to graduation as the Secretary of War shall prescribe, who shall have arrived at the age of twenty-one years and who shall agree, under oath in writing, to serve the United States in the capacity of a reserve officer of the Army during a period of at least ten years from the date of his appointment as such reserve officer, unless sooner discharged by proper authority; but the total number of reserve officers so appointed shall not exceed fifty thousand: Provided, That any graduate qualified under the provisions of this section undergoing a postgraduate course at any institution shall not be eligible for appointment as a reserve officer while undergoing such postgraduate course, but his ultimate eligibility upon completion of such postgraduate course for such appointment shall not be affected because of his having undergone such postgraduate course.

SEC. 50. When any member of the senior division of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps has completed two academic years of service in that division, and has been selected for further training by the president of the institution and by its professor of military science and tactics, and has agreed in writing to continue in the Reserve Officers' Training Corps for the remainder of his course in the institution, devoting five hours per week to the military training prescribed by the Secretary of War, and has agreed in writing to pursue the courses in camp training prescribed by the Secretary of War, he may be furnished, at the expense of the United States, with commutation of subsistence at such rate, not exceeding the cost of the garrison ration prescribed for the Army, as may be fixed by the Secretary of War, during the remainder of his service in the Reserve Officers' Training Corps.

SEC. 51. Any physically fit male citizen of the United States, between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-seven years, who shall have graduated prior to the date of this Act from any educational institution at which an officer of the Army was detailed as professor of military science and tactics, and who, while a student at such institution, completed courses of military training under the direction of such professor of military science and tactics substantially equivalent to those prescribed pursuant to this Act for the senior division, shall, after satisfactorily completing such additional practical military training as the Secretary of War shall prescribe, be eligible for appointment to the Officers' Reserve Corps and as a temporary additional second lieutenant in accordance with the terms of this Act.
SEC. 52. The President alone is hereby authorized to appoint and commission as a temporary second lieutenant of the Regular Army in time of peace for purposes of instruction, for a period not exceeding six months, with the allowances now provided by law for that grade, but with pay at the rate of $100 per month, any reserve officer appointed pursuant to sections forty-nine and fifty-one of this Act and to attach him to a unit of the Regular Army for duty and training during the period covered by his appointment as such temporary second lieutenant, and upon the expiration of such service with the Regular Army such officer shall revert to his status as a reserve officer.

SEC. 53. No reserve officer or temporary second lieutenant appointed pursuant to this Act shall be entitled to retirement or to retired pay and shall be eligible for pension only for disability incurred in line of duty in active service or while serving with the Regular Army pursuant to the provisions of this Act: Provided, That in time of war the President may order reserve officers appointed under the provisions of this Act to active duty with any of the military forces of the United States in any grades not below that of second lieutenant, and while on such active duty they shall be subject to the Rules and Articles of War: And provided further, That The Adjutant General of the Army shall, under the direction and supervision of the Secretary of War, obtain, compile, and keep continually up to date all obtainable information as to the names, ages, addresses, occupations, and qualifications for appointment as commissioned officers of the Army, in time of war or other emergency, of men of suitable ages who, by reason of having received military training in civilian educational institutions or elsewhere, may be regarded as qualified and available for appointment as such commissioned officers.

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