POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL DECAY IN INTERWAR GREECE

DISSERTATION

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By

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PREFACE

The initial wave of optimism about the prospects for sustained socio-economic and political development in the emerging nations has subsided, giving way to a more sober outlook and the need for a wide-ranging re-appraisal. In most of these countries, in spite of some early impressive gains in the social, economic and political sectors, the anticipated "take-off stage did not arrive or, if it did, it got bogged down and led to unforeseen consequences. Often hastily conceived and poorly executed, the process of modernization in these settings was typically accompanied by recurring patterns of social unrest, political instability, economic and bureaucratic stagnation and the rise of demagogic or sword-bearing "saviors" bent on some form of collectivism and the appeals of swift and authoritarian solutions.

Consequently, students of politics and society have begun to revise their earlier models and sharpen their tools in an attempt to broaden and deepen the perspective and thus arrive at a better understanding of the complex
dynamics of modernization. Yet some old assumptions and prejudices linger on, disension on how best to proceed is typical, and many of the key questions remain: what accounts for the failure to sustain initial patterns of growth and development in these settings? What are the factors responsible for what have been termed "breakdowns" of modernization, and how are these related? And what of the role of tradition in the process of social and political change? Are tradition and modernity to be viewed as essentially dichotomous variables, or may they coexist or complement each other? And if the two may be mutually reinforcing, when and how are they, and what are the implications for the broad process of transition from one to the other? Are there characteristic sets of problems confronting such societies, and do these appear in some order or sequence? Finally, what is the relationship between modernization and authoritarianism?

Perhaps one fruitful approach would be to broaden the perspective by shifting the focus to the first "batch" of latecomers to modernization, namely, those nations of Southern and Southeastern Europe which, after a long stay on the fringes of the great revolutionary currents sweep-
ing through nineteenth century Europe, invariably plunged into the mainstream of change and modernization, in a similar manner and with a similar set of responses to the challenges confronting them. Not only would this shift in focus provide an added—and much needed—historical dimension, it may also help narrow the conceptual gap between "developed" and "underdeveloped" polities by concentrating on the process of transition—its structure and dynamics.

This is a study of one such "early" latecomer to modernization—Greece as she emerged, after the struggle for independence and nationhood in the mid-1800's, into the twentieth century seeking unification, identity, and purpose amid the strains of war and powerful forces for change. The focus here is on the nature and direction of change, its locus, scope, and intensity. But close attention is given also to the more subtle and underlying forces for continuity. More precisely, the main emphasis will be directed on the interplay between the forces of change and continuity.

Though well aware of the obvious limitations for theory construction by way of a single case study, the
present inquiry is theoretically oriented; the aim is
to generalize and, on the basis of empirically-grounded--
but hopefully not parochial--observations, suggest some
testable hypotheses that may stimulate further inquiry.
The main purpose is not to propose yet another theory,
but to improve upon the existing body of theory. Thus
the central goal is modest enough: if this study succeeds
in raising and examining some of the right questions,
making some suggestive insights, and "grounding" some of
the loose conceptual wires it will have served its
purpose.
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INTRODUCTION

In August, 1936, after years of unstable and inefficient government and recurring economic crises in a society undergoing rapid change and modernization amid the scars and tensions of a long and bitter war, Greek parliamentary democracy gave way to the authoritarian dictatorship of General Metaxas. How and why did this come about? Was it just another coup or "palace revolution" so typical of the interwar period, or do its roots lie deeper in the rich subsoil of Greek social and political history? If the latter be the case, what is the relationship between modernization and authoritarianism? More importantly, what are the theoretical implications of such a relationship for the study of modernization and political development in general? These are some of the broad questions to be examined here. They help form the broad outlines of an inquiry into the exceedingly complex and variable process of socio-political change and modernization.

The purpose of this study is twofold: first, it is intended to provide a description and analysis of the
Greek polity during a most crucial but poorly-studied period in its evolution; second, and more importantly, by focusing on key aspects in the variance of that transition we may draw a clearer distinction between political change and political development as a special sort of change, and shed some light on an important but still largely unexplored category of "transitional" polity types as these traverse the different "moments" of modernization. Students of politics are in general agreement as to the main features of "modern" and--to a lesser extent--"traditional" polity types. But there is little consensus on the nature of the "transitional" type, and the numerous, often conflicting models are ample testimony of the long road ahead toward empirically-grounded theory. Hopefully, the present study will help reduce this discrepancy.

The main focus here is directed toward the possible theoretical significance and any suggestive insights that this case study might yield, not to a comprehensive description and analysis of the Greek political system. By drawing attention to certain key variables, it is hoped that the process of modernization and its political consequences will be put in better perspective. Of course,
the theory-yielding or theory-confirming potential of a single case study is extremely limited, as it can serve neither the basis for the validity or the refutation of a given generalization, or a set of these. Yet the potential theoretical significance remains: the single case study affords the possibility of intensive and close inquiry despite often very limited research resources, and the prospects for further refining existing hypotheses.

A study of modern Greece is a blessing in disguise; it is potentially very rewarding, but also elusive and even frustrating. First, one is immediately confronted with a serious lack of adequate materials. There are very few systematic works on the subject, and it is ironic that studies of Greece—a nation of so historic and "political" a people—are all but absent from the comparative politics literature. In the available literature,

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2Ibid.
with some noticeable exceptions, the works are of the narrow, narrative historical type, often polemical and, in terms of contemporary social science, largely inadequate. Most studies are highly descriptive, narrowly elitist and full of vague and unwarranted assumptions. For example, the theme that emerges for the interwar period is that of "the rise and fall" of parliamentary democracy, with little or no concern for careful analysis, accurate definitions or clear conceptualization of the main socio-economic and political forces and trends during this period.

This is a study of a country in which tradition and

3 Among the important works in Greek there are: Gregory Daphnis, Ἕλλας ἑταῖρος Ἐποίημα Πόλεμον ("Greece Between Two Wars"), two volumes, Athens, 1955; George Ventiris, Ἕλλας Του 1910-1920 ("Greece During 1910-1920"), Athens, 1931; Alexander Mazarakis, Ἀπομνημονεύματα ("Memoirs"), Athens, 1949; Xenophon Zolotas, Ἕλλας Εἰς Το Σταδίον Της Εκκλησιαστικής ("Greece at the Stage of Industrialization"), Athens, 1956; John Christides, ed., Ιωάννης Μεταξάς: Το Ημερολογίο Του ("John Metaxas: His Diary"), 4 Vols., Athens, 1962. Among the prominent works in foreign language there are: L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York, 1958); Jean Meynaud, Les Forces Politiques en Grece (Laussane 1965); D. Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and Its Impact Upon Greece (Paris 1962); Adam Papekasis, Socio-Cultural Barriers to the Economic Development of Greece (Berkeley, 1955; Nicholas Kalchas, Introduction to the Constitutional History of Modern Greece (New York, 1940; T. A. Coulombeis,
modernity ceaselessly intermingle, thus imparting a kaleidoscopic effect to the mosaic that is Greek politics. Subject to multiple and uneven currents of cultural evolution throughout its long and tortuous history, Greece lies at the crossroads between East and West, and while part of both, it cannot really be identified with either. She was the cradle of Western civilization, but spent several crucial centuries outside the pale or on the margins of that civilization. The struggle for national unification started relatively early and Greece was among the first nations of nineteenth century Europe to adopt representative institutions and many of the ways of the modernizing West. Yet those borrowed institutions and practices were out of phase with a traditional socio-economic infrastructure and subject to constant reinterpretation by a host of incoming elites. Thus according to one source, it took the Greeks well over a century (1770-1923) to achieve their full national and political unity. Moreover, those borrowed institu-


Dakin, p. 1.
tions have not been deeply rooted, as "Greek parliamentary politics seem to be concerned with matters either settled or ignored in contemporary Western political systems." It is not surprising, therefore, that as a result of such variable and discontinuous forces for change--forces subject to irregular and intermittent interaction with a heterogeneous reservoir of traditions revealing a remarkable resiliency and accommodative or absorptive capacity--there would develop in Greece a host of somewhat distinctive patterns of change and modernization. It is such subtlety and complexity that has baffled students of Greek politics and society, and thus makes careful study all the more necessary.

And the heritage of the past, too, seems as much a burden as a blessing. Modern Greece is the dubious heir to the glory of the classical heritage, the universalism of the Hellenistic period, and the despotism and mysticism of Byzantium and the feudal "Dark Ages" of four centuries under Ottoman rule. The elusive character of this strange fusion has assumed a variety of complex and contradictory forms that have left their imprint on the

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5Legg, p. 1.
nation's political life. Greeks have had to live with this complex juncture of Western and Eastern traits, thus embodying what Kazantzakis called "a double-born soul," 6 a strange but never permanent fusion between the Orient and the West. The inheritance of the classical era—the logic and temperance—is but a thin veneer that has been so often shattered by the forces of excess and intemperance.

In such a setting it becomes very difficult to mark boundaries, to draw clear distinctions—analytical tools that are indispensable to current political analysis. How does one overcome the sense of dualism, the ambivalence that pervades the tortuous course of Greek history and character? Change and continuity; a longing for a remote and partly mythical inheritance and an affinity for the "new" and the "modern" often pursued with a callous disregard for traditional values; parliamentarism and the personalist politics of clientelism, a powerful remnant of the past—all of these and other features have been inextricably woven into the web of Greek social and political life. It thus becomes apparent that such a heterogeneous and fluid scene cannot be readily studied in

terms of any one mode of analysis advanced thus far. Nevertheless, as this study seeks to make clear, some patterns and regularities are discernible, and by following an eclectic course through the literature a somewhat clear assessment can be made, and some conclusions reached. At least the transition process and related concepts such as "modernization," "political development," and political "breakdown" or decay may be better defined.

But what is this process of transition, and transition from what to what? Generally, we may say from one set of patterned relationships (e.g. "tradition") to another set (e.g. "modernity"), which suggests a bridge or continuum linking, through a series of successive phases, the two, presumably dichotomous, entities. But if, as is widely held, modernization is the bridge across the "Great Dichotomy" through which a society moves away from

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tradition towards modernity, a number of questions need to be raised and some vital distinctions made. First, is any and all movement across this path away from or antagonistic to tradition? Second, can we assume—as is implicit in the above view—such movement as being unilinear, uniform and irreversible? If so, how does one know when a polity exits from essentially traditional patterns and enters modern ones? Recent studies have shown that tradition and modernity, far from being always in opposition, are often complementary and mutually rein-

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8 The study of modernization has suffered from the persistent treatment of "Tradition" as a "catch-all" and "residual" category, involving anything and everything not included in the prevailing definition of "modernity." This, as Huntington notes, involves a serious "asymmetry" in definition: "... the modern ideal is set forth, and then everything... not modern is labeled 'traditional.'" See Huntington, "The Change to Change...," p. 414. For a standard version of the characteristics of modernity, see Dankwart Rustow and Robert Ward, eds., Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton, 1964), pp. 6 and 7.

forcing. The question is, what is the nature of such compatibility, and under what conditions does it no longer hold. Moreover, a clear distinction is needed between modernity and modernization. Some societies display numerous attributes of modernization (e.g., urbanization, high literacy rates, etc.) which may coexist with, but have little if any effect upon the tradition-bound features.\textsuperscript{10}

Thus the process of transition hardly involves merely a zero-sum relationship between tradition and modernity (e.g., a gain in one seen as necessarily a loss in the other). The question is not whether tradition and modernity exist in a dichotomous relationship, but when and under what conditions they may become antagonistic and incompatible. A polity featuring modernizing trends may in fact be adapting and expanding existing institutions and patterns of social and political structure, rather than undergoing structural innovation toward new patterns. The thrust of modernization and the staying power of tradition, therefore, interact and overlap during part of the transition process. The questions that are

\textsuperscript{10} Bendix, pp. 315 and 329.
of central concern here, are: at what point or phase in the transition process does such "overlapping" discontinue or become dysfunctional, and what are the new elements or variables that account for the discontinuities and antagonisms? This suggests that at some point in the transition process the very nature of change undergoes basic changes toward a new set of social patterns or regularities—a theme to be taken up shortly.

Seen in this context, the emergence of authoritarianism takes on a different, more meaningful perspective. When viewed according to the "theory" of modernization as a linear, irreversible progression leading toward some end state (e.g., industrialization, democracy, etc.), the appearance of an authoritarian regime may be consistently regarded as historically sui generis—an "accident" or "aberration" of the "normal" evolutionary process. But in a framework such as the one outlined above, which holds modernization to be non-uniform and reversible, authoritarianism may be seen as an integral part of the modernization process, causally related to the dynamics of

11 For a representative version of this theory, see Carl J. Friedrich and Zygmunt Bauman, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge, 1956).
transition and a polity's responses to these.

Some authors\textsuperscript{12} have argued that some authoritarian regimes may serve as "agents" of modernization, but these studies are limited to the experience of industrialized nations and the implications for transitional settings is not adequately explored. The prevailing view in the case of the latter is that authoritarianism tends to impede, retard or otherwise inhibit the modernization process, and it coincides with situations of stagnation and "breakdown" and attempts at "de-modernization.\textsuperscript{13} But the authoritarian phenomenon as such--while it may ultimately tend to reinforce and perpetuate the above conditions--must be distinguished from such processes. Instead, it needs to be viewed in its own terms, mainly as a \textit{response} to conditions of crisis and breakdown. And the performance of such regimes needs to be measured not merely in terms of the specific goals and values of the


modernizing socio-economic sectors, but also in terms of a society's larger requirements during periods of crisis.

Modernization and Social Balance

The process of modernization is highly complex and uneven. Different social sectors are differently affected as the thrust of social mobilization, urbanization and role-structure differentiation heightens the demands of some for more rights in terms of a more equal distribution and allocation of resources, while it bolsters and stimulates the traditional "world" of others. As new patterns of social interaction and struggle are being formed, old patterns are resurrected. Eventually this, to quote De Tocqueville, does not make for a situation in which "... the art of associating together" grows and develops in the same ratio in which "the equality of conditions is increased."14 In interwar Greece, as elsewhere in Europe, the latter phenomenon was very much in evidence during the late 'twenties and 'thirties, while the former remained in a state of "atrophy" and neglect. Driven by the impact

of the mass of refugees after 1923, the sudden wave of socio-economic and political change sweeping over Greece had a profound and far-reaching effect upon that nation's political process, reaching the very core of the underlying social structure and pitting the "old" against the "new" in an altogether different struggle for survival that put an end to a long period of accommodation and "coexistence" between tradition and modernity. In the ensuing confrontation Greece was abruptly thrust into a new era of development and hence of crisis and its aftermath.

The notion that sustained social modernization and political development requires that "the art of associating together" (or, generally, the process of social integration) and the equality of conditions (socio-economic, political, juridical, etc.) grow and develop "in the same ratio" suggests that some balance or equilibrium obtains in their interrelationships. To put this notion of balance more concretely: in a modernizing context, the tasks of socio-political integration and institutionalization must proceed in a similar rate along with the continuous increases in social mobilization and role-structure differentiation; otherwise the destabilizing
and potentially divisive effects of the latter will place severe strains on a polity's ability to meet current needs and utilize available resources.

To return to the central theme of this study—the process of transition from a tradition-bound polity to one that is modern—and secularly oriented—it may be argued that marked changes in overall social balance signal a specific act of the transition from one phase to another. Conversely, continuity of such balance would indicate activities and processes *within* a given phase. But how is such balance clearly identified? What variables can be singled out as representative of whether or not it is in effect?

Generally, the concept of "social balance" as used here may be defined as that state or condition that obtains between interacting parts of a social system, allowing for the *continuity in patterned relationships* over time among these parts, despite variable short-term disturbances generated by endogenous and/or exogenous forces. The main question is: how is social balance maintained, undermined and/or lost in a polity undergoing rapid change and modernization? Here a distinction is in order. To say that a state of balance is maintained and
thus periodically restored, does not entail restoration to some previous state of balance since, by definition, modernization ushers some new and irreversible social relationships thus suggesting a "shifting balance"—a moving equilibrium, if you will. Viewed as a dynamic phenomenon, social balance presupposes continuity in patterned not fixed relationships between different societal sectors. Thus the question of main interest here centers on how such a shifting balance is maintained or undermined and, if it cannot be restored by existing processes and resources, what is required in order to establish a new state of balance involving structurally new and fundamentally different social and political relationships. Briefly, we may say that if as a result of basic changes in social structure, existing patterned relationships—i.e., those involving authority, legitimacy and political socialization—are not integrated with the newly emerging patterns reflecting those changes, continuity is broken, the old "shifting" balance no longer obtains and a new state of balance is required to keep a polity as a going concern.

Consider, for example, the transition from subsistence to commercial agriculture. The rural-urban "balance"
shifts, changing rural stratification patterns emerge in response to changing urban needs and/or export requirements, and new dependency relationships between rural elites and peasants result mainly from elite attempts to forge new ties with—and thus expand their power base to—the rising urban sector.¹⁵ But these changes in class structure and social differentiation do not at first constitute a serious threat to existing moral-legal relationships between lord and peasant; the feudal ties binding the peasant to his "natural" superiors are not broken but extended through a host of intermediary social roles linking the countryside to the city. The social balance shifts, but it does so along pre-existing, institutionalized and legitimated channels. It is with basic changes in the social structure accompanying the rise of new non-elite demands and organizations that continuity is broken and a system is faced with a crisis situation requiring

¹⁵ For an excellent analysis of the socio-economic consequences of this transition, see James C. Scott, "The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds and Social Change in Rural Southeast Asia," The Journal of Asian Studies, XXXII, 1 (November 1972), pp. 5-37. For a general and more broadly historical account of such relationships, see Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston, 1966).
the creation of a new social balance.

Here the proposition will be advanced that some forms of authoritarian collectivist\(^{16}\) regimes are well suited for the task of forging a new social balance under certain conditions and—since a state of balance may be said to maximize the prospects for modernization and development—such regimes may serve as agents for long-term modernization. Generally, the conditions mentioned refer to (1) a certain sequential pattern of phases of "stages" of modernization characteristic of transitional polities; and (2) the emergence of an authoritarian regime at some key juncture of that sequence. For purposes of analysis, we may outline the phases of that sequence as follows:

1. The accommodative post-traditional\(^{17}\) phase

2. The uneven development phase

3. The crisis-breakdown phase

4. The collectivist phase

\(^{16}\)For lack of a better term, this compound term is used to stress not only the basic character but also the main goals of such regimes.

\(^{17}\)The term "post-traditional" seems appropriate as it lays emphasis on the continuity and adaptability of traditional structures. See S. N. Eisenstadt, "Post-Traditional Societies...," for further treatment.
5. The sustained modernization phase

The changing interwar Greek polity seems to have gone through this approximate sequence order, revealing, at key intervals such as in phases 2 and 3, significant structural changes that suggest developmental and uneven or disproportionate change patterns and that led eventually to a state of "breakdown" and the authoritarian aftermath. The bulk of this section is an attempt to conceptualize this sequence pattern in a framework of modernization, political development and decay. These matters are then elaborated in Chapters II, III, IV, and V.

It has been suggested that the historical role of authoritarianism in a transitional setting is closely related to the requirement of social balance. To frame this into a general hypothesis: authoritarianism may be viewed as having a constructive or positive role vis-a-vis modernization and political development in the long-run, if it can be shown that (a) conditions of imbalance as with the "uneven development" phase become societally intolerable under a given authority structure; and (b) that an authoritarian-collectivist regime contributes toward the establishment of a new state of balance involv-
ing the various antagonistic elements in this phase of rapid modernization.

Again, it needs to be pointed out that the emphasis is on creating a new social balance, not merely an attempt to restore the old. All too often the response of an authoritarian regime is—or after the assumption of power soon becomes—of the latter, essentially negative sort—a pure reaction to the forces of change and modernization, applying the coercive force of centralized power in order to deactivate and dismantle the main expressions of those forces, and do little else but seek a return to the status quo ante. To put it bluntly, any "two-bit" dictatorship can apply force to suspend the activities of party politics, trade unions and an uncensored press, while being devoid of any serious and systematic social program other than an ad hoc opportunist policy of how to stay in power. Seeking to establish a new social balance entails, by definition, the incorporation and utilization of the various modernizing and "developmental" forces into the new order. Of course, an authoritarian regime may, and often does, fall quite short of achieving a new social balance, though some significant contributions may be made.
It follows that a closer look at the heterogeneous origins and diverse character of such regimes,\textsuperscript{18} may reveal "progressive" components that will tell us a good deal more about the complex relationship between authoritarianism and modernization.

\textit{Modernization and Political Development: Distinctions, Dimensions and Definitions}

Political development is an elusive term. There is little agreement among students of politics as to what it is, or what it defines. Generally, the concept refers to fundamental changes in the nature of political institutions and usually entails the assumption of cumulative change and sustained structural complexity and "growth." But growth is a quantitative concept that suggests the extension of an established structure, whereas development implies a qualitative change, such as a "... change in functional capacity,"\textsuperscript{19} as for example, the ability to learn, adapt, or to coordinate resources to meet the demands

\textsuperscript{18}See Roland Sarti, "Fascist Modernization in Italy: Traditional or Revolutionary?" \textit{American Historical Review} (April 1970), pp. 1029-1045.

of a changing environment. This suggests a clear distinction between modernization—essentially a growth process—and political development. The former, then, involves additions to or extensions of existing structures, such as with the introduction of representative institutions in a post-traditional setting, increases in literacy, rise in per capita income, etc., while the latter entails basic structural changes permitting a polity to deal with the varied consequences of the multiple increments of growth processes.

The development process suggests a movement from a given state of a political system to another state. The direction of that movement is often conceived as leading to an end-state vaguely labelled "political modernity" and defined as the politics characteristic of Western nations. Employing the dichotomous Parsonian pattern variables, authors of this persuasion distinguish between "tradition" and "modernity" as polar entities, each with quite

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specific features and properties. But such dichotomous classification leaves much to be desired and leaves the transitional polity type in a vague and uncertain position. To begin with, there are significant differences between "traditional" or non-Western societies that need to be accounted for. Moreover, reliance on various indices of economic development as a basis for comparison and/or distinction distorts the fact that specific political or institutional arrangements are not always or typically associated with levels of economic development. Almond and Coleman attempt to close the conceptual gap by noting that all polities are in effect "mixed," but that is little help in establishing concrete patterns of "mix" over time, since their work is mainly a description of static systems not systems in process.

The transition process, then, implies movement over time along some "specified set of dimensions from one state


of these dimensions to another." 23 Such movement may vary in rate and intensity, and movement along one dimension may hinder or even preclude similar patterns along another. The dichotomous model implies a uniform and unidirectional development process and hence the vague and misleading notion of a steady and smooth transition to modern status. Clearly the task is to first disentangle the study of political change from pre-fabricated notions of political improvement, so that analysis can proceed without any a priori commitments to "... a formula which tells us which changes are good." 24

Avoiding the rigid classification and latent ethnocentric bias 25 of the dichotomous models, some recent formulations have moved closer to a more operational process model, one that seems more applicable to the Greek


25 For a critical review of this tendency, see Ali Mazrui, "From Social Darwinism to Current Theories of Modernization," World Politics, 21, I (October, 1968), pp. 69-83.
case. For example, Apter\textsuperscript{26} suggests two types of transitional systems: the "reconciliation" system involving pyramidal authority and consummatory values, along with goals and legitimacy defined by the principle of representation; and the "mobilization" system which involves hierarchical authority and consummatory values. Each level of development has an appropriate political system. Thus the mobilization type—more appropriate during the "middle" or "late" phases of modernization when maximum efficiency of coercive structures is needed—can mobilize the resources necessary for rapid socio-economic development, while withstanding the multiple pressures created by the dislocations inherent in such rapid and far-reaching change. One of Apter's important insights is very useful for our purposes, namely, that any attempt to graft a reconciliation system onto a preindustrial setting with low concensus or integration levels may result in "stagnation"—a situation that can be corrected only by a shift to the mobilization type, which alone can insure the vital need for a maximum increase in resources and

\textsuperscript{26} Apter, \textit{The Politics of Modernization}. 
the direction toward new loyalties and values.\(^{27}\)

Along similar lines, the "prismatic" society formulated by Riggs refers to a polity type that is intermediate between a traditional system in which functions are "fused" in a few structures, and a modern or "diffractions" society in which functions are widely distributed among many specialized structures.\(^{28}\) The objective is to present a type of system that has taken on many "modern" attributes, while retaining many aspects of traditionalism. Thus Riggs and Apter both suggest that sustained modernization is essentially characterized by increasing structural differentiation and functional specialization, and that periods of political "stagnation" tend to occur when government structures grow and expand more rapidly than do institutions of political control.

Both of these formulations are suggestive in terms of a broad frame of reference for the study of interwar Greek politics. Thus a variant of the reconciliation system type characterizes the Greek polity throughout most

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\(^{27}\) Ibid., p. 63.

\(^{28}\) Fred Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries* (Boston, 1964).
of this period, and in this form—in its own peculiar way—it was able for a time to accommodate growth and modernization within tolerable levels of system instability. It was only after the sudden imbalances and discontinuities ushered mainly by the refugee impact in the mid-twenties that Greece was gripped by a situation of multiple crisis and, subsequently, levels of instability and immobilism beyond acceptable limits of system tolerance or capacity. The results of crisis were a period of polity "breakdown" and the subsequent authoritarian response, which typologically corresponds to Apter's "stagnation" and the "mobilization" system, respectively.

Almond, too, views structural differentiation as a key aspect of the development process, but regards such change as a system's response to pressures or "challenges" from the environment. Now beyond the fact that his model is mainly of heuristic value since it is static and narrowly based on the Western "experience," it implies the questionable assumption that a political system can muster the necessary capability resources to meet oncoming chal-

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lenges, thus also precluding—all but theoretically—the possibility of polity breakdown, which the author dismisses as "historical accidents." Thus while admitting possible regressions, the rule is that

When one variable in a system changes in magnitude or in quality, the others are subjected to strains and are transformed; the system changes its patterns of performance or the unruly component is disciplined by regulator mechanisms.  

How a system changes its patterns of performance, how it is provided with "regulator" mechanisms, and how it actually deals with "regression" situations is not further treated.

Empirically, of course, authors of this persuasion are generally correct in suggesting that such indicators of modernization as social mobilization, increased literacy, urbanization, greater exposure to mass media, etc., will tend to correlate with attributes that make for a secularized, structurally differentiated and representative polity. But here again, such indicators are drawn from the experience of Western polities, and there is no

30 Ibid., p. 19.

explanation how transitional politics may be mobilized and transformed into Western-like libertarian patterns. Correlations and causal relationships are not the same. The former refers to static, cross-sectional phenomena, while the latter entail a dynamic and sequential process. As Sigelman points out, correlational analysis reveals basic patterns, but "...a pattern explains nothing; it is rather something to be explained." Studies of the correlates of democratic political development may be suggestive, but they tell us little of the actual processes of change in transitional politics. Summarizing his critique of many recent studies on this basic theme, Riggs argues that:

One finds continually references to criteria by which a politically developed system can be identified, but not any serious consideration of the stages by which...a traditional society, through whatever transitional stages, might have evolved in the past, or be expected to change in the future, in order to achieve

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the conditions prescribed as necessary for a developed polity.\textsuperscript{33}

Many authors have now come to accept the notion that political development is not a smooth or inevitable progression toward some predetermined goal, but instead merely one key dimension of social change. Thus Huntington\textsuperscript{34} suggests that development and decay are concurrent processes with no necessary end-state, and identifies development with institutionalization. Accordingly, social mobilization in the so-called "developing" states is associated with a lack of institutionalization (i.e., low levels of adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence) and hence reflects decay not development.\textsuperscript{35} Furthermore, sudden increases in education, political participation and economic development tend to correlate with institutional stagnation or decay. Thus he concludes that "most moderni-


\textsuperscript{34}Huntington, op. cit., p. 389.

\textsuperscript{35}Ibid., p. 391.
izing countries are buying social modernization at the price of political degeneration." The normal path to development through transitional patterns is quite unstable; modernity brings political stability but modernization does not.

Huntington's argument suggests that in order to achieve institutionalization, the thrust and direction of social mobilization needs to be inhibited and altered, respectively. But what leadership or regime could do this without also undermining a polity's potential for capability resources, and what are the conditions making it possible for such a regime to emerge? As with Apter, he leaves the question "How does it come about?" essentially unanswered, and, moreover, fails to elaborate on the concept of "decay."

The Role of Tradition and the Concept of Breakdown

A closer look at the viability and staying power of tradition in the process of modernization is long overdue. Most studies thus far approach tradition from the point of view of modern society—and then essentially in a

36 Ibid., p. 415.
"watered-down" form—and are not duly sensitive to the central place of traditional structures as regards the problems of identity and legitimacy, and to the role of tradition as a basis for social action and as an effective tool for some types of social mobilization. If the fact of the continuity of tradition in modernizing settings is to be better explained, and if its role in both the systemic viability and the frequent "breakdowns" of transitional polities is to be more adequately perceived, we need to know more about how tradition is involved in the process of change, what aspects are involved and the conditions under which traditional structures or traits are undermined or lose their functionality.

This need becomes clearly evident in the case of interwar Greece. Of course the data in this area thus far are still quite fragmentary and inconclusive, but as this study seeks to point out the main features of the role of tradition in the context of the "dialectic" between change and continuity are discernible. In Greece, tradi-

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tional structures mainly in the form of clientele networks of mutual obligation, played a central part in the variable response to incoming forces of social and political change. They were key ingredients in providing for the accommodative and absorptive capacity that made it possible for the Greek polity to meet the early challenge of modernization during what we've called the "accommodative post-traditional" phase. But it is one thing for traditional structures to adjust to change by selectively absorbing it; it is quite another to speak of the ability or capacity of a polity embedded in a traditional socio-cultural framework to innovate or transform that framework. This important distinction is vital for an understanding of events in Greece after the influx of the refugees. For with the refugee impact, the challenge of modernization, now more sudden and overwhelming, was no longer merely directed at affecting gradual and piecemeal change, change within the system that could be accommodated by minor adjustments—behavioral, institutional and normative-valuational—in and through those elements at the cultural "periphery" of the

\[38\] Ibid., p. 585.
society; rather, it was aimed at the very core of the
system--those principles of legitimacy, identity and con-
duct which make up what Redfield calls the "Great
Tradition." The results of the ensuing new level of con-
frontation were first a series of crises and, following a
period of impasse, polity breakdown and the authoritarian
aftermath.

The relationship between tradition and change is very
complex and differential, yet the two may for a time be
quite compatible. It is false and misleading to regard
the transition process as invariably a movement away from
tradition,\(^{39}\) and to view the latter as a residual category,
the norms, beliefs and patterns of which are incongenial
to modernity.\(^{40}\) Seen in this way, as Willner\(^{41}\) points out,
the traditional sector becomes "an amorphous, undifferen-
tiated mass; what we learn about it is mainly through
'negative inference.'" Thus a good deal is known about
the notion that they "are not like us," but far too little


\(^{40}\) Ibid., p. 31.

\(^{41}\) Willner, op. cit., p. 472.
it seems about what they are like, and then as seen mainly through models based on the Western experience.

To focus mainly on the differences between tradition and modernity obscures what they may share in common. What are the similarities in functional terms? What structures or groups may serve as "mediators" between the two? What is the polity type congenial in such "bridging" of gaps and discontinuities? It is when a marked failure in such mediation occurs that a condition of polity breakdown is likely.

According to Eisenstadt, ⁴² breakdown results when a polity is unable to adapt itself to changing demands, to absorb these in terms of policy-making, and to assure its own continuity in the face of such a challenge of new demands and organizations. Breakdowns tend to occur in societies where modernization has already made some significant advances. ⁴³ Hence the view that this phenomenon is a significant aspect of the dialectic between tradition and modernity. Moreover, as both Eisenstadt and Huntington emphasize, it is not primarily the discrepancy between the

⁴² Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns...," p. 346.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 355.
needs of a society and the polity's capacity that results in political breakdown, but perhaps more importantly, contradictions among the elites and within the political institutions themselves.

Such views are particularly relevant for the Greek case. Here a situation of breakdown became evident only after considerable and far-reaching socio-economic and political change took place. In addition, serious rifts between and among the elite groups were a prominent feature during the late 'twenties and early 'thirties—the period of the most significant patterns of change and development.

Transitional polities are confronted by a series of challenges or problems the sequence in which roughly correspond to the order proposed above for the different phases of modernization. Of course—and here the Greek case is typical—problems that typically emerge during certain periods are not necessarily resolved, and the resultant "problem overlapping" may have serious political consequences. But what about the rate in which such

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44 Huntington, op. cit., pp. 405-30.
problems emerge? Is polity stability undermined or even destroyed, as Nordlinger\textsuperscript{45} suggests, when problems emerge simultaneously or between brief time intervals? If this holds true for many nations, then Greece—as will be seen later—clearly represents a deviant case.

But that raises the question of how to conceptualize stability. Now there are different types and levels of stability, and a basic distinction is in order between overall system stability and that at the subsystem level. For example, some polities have demonstrated a remarkable capacity\textsuperscript{46} to maintain overall system stability, despite a rather high degree of instability at the subsystem level. Lijphart's model of the consociational polity type is intended to explain how stability is managed in fragmented Western systems that tend toward instability and immobilism,\textsuperscript{47} and—in contrast to Huntington's position that


\textsuperscript{46}See Michael Hudson's insightful article, "Democracy and Social Mobilization in Lebanese Politics," cited in Jackson and Stein, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 234-49.

\textsuperscript{47}Arend Lijphart, "A Typology of Political Systems," \textit{Comparative Political Studies} (April 1968), pp. 3-45; see also Legg, \textit{Politics in Modern Greece}, cited above.
inability is a typical measure of decay --some authors have noted a degree of functionality in some types of instability. Indeed it may be argued that in some cases a kind of "institutionalized instability" in key sub-system levels (e.g., party system, elite decision-making) may actually reinforce overall system stability. For example, instability among the political elites in Greece was a functional and expected consequence of the peculiar pattern of socio-cultural fragmentation and cleavage. Thus in this context, the onset of breakdown may be explained, not mainly in terms of excessive levels of instability, but because of a loss of functionality in key institutions.

Political development may be defined as that process through which a polity "...acquires the capacity to sustain...continuously new types of goals and demands and the creation of new types of organizations." The key ele-

48 Huntington, op. cit., p. 400.

49 Mazrui, op. cit., p. 80.

ments of that process may be said to involve the following interacting imperatives: "capacity," "equality," and "structural differentiation." Elaborating on this theme, a recent study\(^{51}\) views these elements as the underlying context or "ordering dimension" of development. It is along this dimension that the challenges confronting transitional polities (i.e., the problems of identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation and distribution) may be said to pass in varying sequence and frequency. Thus by linking a given sequence with successive states of this ordering dimension, it may be determined whether and at what point a polity undergoes developmental change.

This dimension—henceforth to be called the CED syndrome—makes possible a more concrete expression of the idea of "uneven development," clearly the central sequence phase of modernization in Greece as in other transitional polities. If we conceive of the unevenness in terms of imbalances or discrepancies between the interacting elements of the CED syndrome, and if these elements are in turn

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given a more concrete expression by being linked with specific events or socio-political processes (e.g., group demands for more participation and distribution vs. government capacity to meet such demands), then we may be able to move a step closer to an understanding of the relationship between political development, breakdown and authoritarianism.

The Staying Power of Tradition: Clientelism

The basis for an explanation of the adaptability and durability of the Greek polity during the post-traditional phase of modernization lies in the study of the clientele networks for mutual obligation. It is the web of vertically extending clientele structures that thoroughly penetrated the Greek system which helps explain stability in the midst of instability, a sort of social integration in the midst of division and fragmentation, and institutionalization in the midst of a transition to modernity.

Clientele structures—also called "non-corporate coalitions" or groups—may be defined as networks of

serially-linked and reversible\textsuperscript{53} sets of "personalized, affective, and reciprocal relationships between actors... commanding unequal resources and involving mutually beneficential transactions."\textsuperscript{54} Based on the premise of inequality of status and power, these asymmetrical clientelistic relationships may be found in most Mediterranean societies where "power is fragmented throughout the social order, and non-corporate coalitions flourish at every level."\textsuperscript{55} The study of political clientelism, therefore, seems especially relevant for a setting like the Greek, since it suggests an alternative means for integration in a polity characterized by fragmentation, low consensus, and insufficient coercive power to command widespread compliance. Expectations for mutual compliance provide a kind of social "adhesive" that is essential for a divided polity. Moreover, clientelism provides for basic legitimacy since

\textsuperscript{53}Thus one's patron may be another's client.


\textsuperscript{55}Schneider, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 339.

"it implies a normative commitment to certain instrumentalities and procedures for the achievement of goals and resolving conflicts."\textsuperscript{57} Thus clientele structures tend to be "functional" in terms of system-maintenance; since they serve as channels for achieving social interaction and mobility, they provide a sense of cohesiveness for the system as a whole.

Some authors have called attention to the adaptive capacity of clientelism. The norm of reciprocity, as Lemarchand and Legg\textsuperscript{58} point out, is inherently "malleable indeterminate," and hence adaptable to a variety of contexts. And the inherent instability in obligations that are always partial and conditional, may be turned into an adaptive advantage in the form of spontaneity and flexibility.\textsuperscript{59} In Greece during the early, gradual phase of social mobilization, new members could be added with relative ease to clientele networks (and existing members shift their commitments) to meet changing circumstances.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., p. 71.

\textsuperscript{58} Lemarchand and Legg, p. 156.

\textsuperscript{59} Schneider, p. 338.
But the durability of clientele networks is in large part contingent on the continuation of status and power asymmetries, and any process leading toward the equalization of status and economic opportunity—along with the concomitant legal-rational patterns of structural differentiation—would tend to undermine their coherence and functionality. Demands for equality and the differentiation of role-structures along more secular lines are not easily compatible with the particularistic and unequal basis that underlies the patron-client nexus.  

Furthermore, as Tarrow argues, clientelism resists the forms, goal-objectives and techniques of modern, mass-oriented party organization that seeks to articulate and implement broad policy and development goals.

In Greece, as the newly-mobilized groups after the refugee impact became aware of new interests and demands and the strength of organization; when they organized economically and politically to articulate such demands

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60 Lemarchand, p. 88.

61 Sidney Tarrow, "Political Dualism and Italian Communism," *APSR*, 61, 2 (March 1967), p. 44.
through channels other than the clientele structures, dis-
continuity and crisis resulted through the confrontation
between those who continued to move within the established
"circuits" of patronage, and those seeking other alterna-
tives.
CHAPTER I

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Problems of Independence and Diversity

The Greek state, born out of the ruins of the crumbling Ottoman structure and the revolutionary struggle for independence in the 1820's as the dubious heir to the twin heritage of Hellenism and the Byzantine past, was the product of two Greek "worlds" in the Ottoman Empire: the world of the cosmopolitan and westernized Phanariot\(^1\) intelligentsia with its vision of a new and powerful state along the Western model, and that of the illiterate, poverty-stricken but traditionally autonomous peasant in the Greek provinces. Each of these groups in its own way, and for different reasons, made a vital contribution to the struggle for independence and to the national awakening that precipitated the revolution. It was natural for the Phanariotes to assume the leadership of the struggle.

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\(^1\)The term depicts those from the Phanar or lighthouse district of Constantinople. The district was the center of Greek religious, commercial and intellectual life during much of the pre-revolutionary period.
Throughout the eighteenth century, many among their ranks formed an important part of the vast and decentralized Ottoman elite structure,² serving as ministers, advisers, and representatives of the Porte abroad.

But many of the Phanariotes conceived the revolution not as a means of achieving socio-economic reform, but essentially as an opportunity to dislodge the Ottomans from control and thus inherit the Empire intact. Thus, along with many of the primates³ who also enjoyed considerable power under the Ottomans, their position on the full implications of the revolution was ambivalent. In contrast, the land-hungry peasants, whose conditions under feudalism and the sipahis (province governors) worsened as the Empire weakened,⁴ came increasingly to support the revolution as a means of getting land. And the lower classes were supported by the growing numbers of merchants and intellectuals whose role as a rising middle class became increasingly important with the expansion of Greek

³ Ibid., p. 280.
⁴ Ibid., p. 273.
trade and commerce after the onset of the French Revolution.

Thus from the beginning the revolution meant different things to different people. It pitted the Byzantine tradition of the powerful church hierarchy and its supporters against the revived neo-classical tradition of the revolutionary leaders and the intellectuals, a revolutionary ideology imported from abroad against the less lofty demands of the peasant for land and security and, increasingly, one class against another in a setting of widening social and economic differentiation. In this way the new nation, for centuries on the fringes or outside the pale of the great intellectual and technological revolutions sweeping through Europe, was suddenly thrust into the great movements of the nineteenth century and was subject to the most diverse and multiple currents of social and cultural evolution. As many Greeks returned to the Hellas of glories past to forge the new nation armed with fresh ideas and doctrines from abroad, they were confronted with the strong opposition of traditional

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5 Ibid., p. 281.
oligarchs, on the one hand, and the largely inert and often hostile peasantry on the other.

Problems for the new nation loomed large, and a long period of internal dissension and struggle was imminent. The vital tasks of nation-building and unification were further compounded by the fact that the new state carved out of the lower Balkan peninsula (primarily for the purpose of meeting the imminent requirements of the European balance of power set in motion by the partition of the crumbling Ottoman Empire) did not coincide with the Greek nation. The house was being built to shelter only part of the family; the some 800,000 inhabitants in Greece in the 1830's represented only about one-fourth of all the Greeks living around the arc of the Aegean. Thus was reborn the desire to crown independence by expanding and incorporating the rest in a unified and powerful Greek nation.

From the beginning, therefore, there was the pursuit of two main and often contradictory objectives; one was the task of internal development--of providing for an adequate political and administrative structure that could undertake a program of social reform and economic develop-
ment; the other was the pursuit of the **Megali Idea** (Great Idea), the irredentist dream of uniting all the unredeemed Greeks under one nation-state.

By 1862, the imposition of an autocratic and centralized regime under Otto I failed its first test. 6 The combined force of the oligarchs, the military, the emerging middle sectors and the Powers which were disillusioned with the incompetence and "paper Constitution" of the regime, 7 forced Otto to abdicate. A new monarch, George I, was crowned in 1863, with the blessings of the Powers. A new, more democratic Constitution 8 was adopted by the National Assembly, calling for a unicameral Parliament elected by manhood suffrage and for limitations on royal authority. Some reforms 9 were initiated; education would be free and universal and the freedom of the Press was established.

Yet the major economic and political problems remained


unresolved, and despite the King’s policy of seeking stability through a “low profile” in internal factional matters, pressures for change were being intensified. With the notable exception of the series of the Trikoupis governments in the 1880’s, the new generation of leaders was not unlike the old, and none was able, for any length of time, to secure the confidence and support of large segments of the people. Reform and development were stymied by persistent administrative incompetence, corruption and unstable political rule, and the problems of land distribution and reform loomed ever larger, especially after the annexation of Thessaly in 1881.

Liberalism and Reform

The revolt of the Military League in Athens in 1909 is a major landmark in modern Greek history. After many years of semifeudal conditions—a legacy of Ottoman rule—it was the start of a new era ushering the rise of the middle classes, from whose ranks came a new set of leaders.

\(^{10}\) Ibid., p. 29.

\(^{11}\) Stavrianos, p. 297.

\(^{12}\) Ibid., p. 474.
that initiated widespread social change and reform. The young officers' revolt was sparked by the defeat in the Greco-Turkish war of 1897 (that resulted after years of frustration over the issue of the Greek irredenta),¹³ the national bankruptcy in 1893 and the imposition of foreign financial control in 1898.¹⁴ But in fact it was the direct outcome of widespread discontent with the conduct of politics at home and abroad, and the growing realization that the leadership lacked the foresight and a practical and realistic approach to the problems facing the country. There was a growing awareness, to quote one observer,

that the Greek state and society suffered from some deep ailment and that nothing in Greece functioned properly. They saw their political and administrative machinery a complete wreck . . . the public services lame and inefficient . . . the Church in a state of conservative inactivity. . . the educational system in a wretched condition, full of the scholastic spirit but incapable of preparing individuals to face life constructively and realistically . . . a University controlled by a handful of men who, in the name of ancient Greece and the shades of their forefathers, resisted. . . modern techniques in education. . . they saw

¹³ Ibid.
¹⁴ Ibid., p. 475.
the sciences shackled to routine parasitic work. . . the literature and art as purely personal and subjective, completely alien to the common people.\textsuperscript{15}

The man summoned to lead the "new politics" was Eleutherios Venizelos, a man of remarkable qualities whose fame as leader, statesman and administrator in the Cretan struggle for union with Greece had left a deep imprint upon the progressive-minded but inexperienced leaders of the Revoit Movement. Filling the political gap,\textsuperscript{16} Venizelos inspired confidence among Greeks of all classes, and was seen as the man who could bring unity, stability, social progress and, above all, the realization of the Megali Idea. But the price to pay would be high; internal reform and a policy of expansion were pursued at the expense of unity and stability. Reacting to the growing power of Venizelos, the old oligarchic elites—whose traditional power base was being threatened—found common cause in opposition and a new and entrenched ally in the Monarchy.\textsuperscript{17} It is around these two poles—the Venizelist


\textsuperscript{16} Stavrianos, p. 475.

\textsuperscript{17} George Ventiris, \textit{E. Hellas tou 1910-1920} ("Greece During 1910-1920"), Athens, 1931.
and the Royalist—-that the dualism characteristic of many facets of Greek life and society would reemerge, and that the two major political groupings or parties were formed thus forging the arena in which the struggle over the great issues of the interwar years was waged.

For Venizelos, the coming storm of war offered the opportunity to fully realize the dream of the Megali Idea, so long as Greece remained committed to the cause of her "natural" allies—-the Entente Powers. Epirus and Macedonia had been won during the victorious First Balkan Wars (1912-13), and added concessions—-the Smyrna District in Asia Minor, Thrace and the Dodecanese islands—resulting, in Venizelos' view, from the assured Allied victory over the Central Powers would complete the process of arriving ".... at the natural limits of the Greek nation." But this vision was directly opposed by King Constantine who, for personal and political reasons, decided for a policy of neutrality; he was convinced of

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18 Ibid., p. 19.

19 Ibid., p. 64. Translated from Greek.

20 Ibid., p. 21.
victory by German arms and the political priority of opposing Venizelos required such a policy.

The test came in 1915 as Serbia, threatened by attack by a combined German-Bulgarian army, called for the support of her Greek ally. Greece was morally and legally obliged to offer aid, but Constantine was intransigent, lest he appear to be reaching a rapprochement with the hated enemy of the Monarchist camp. But the real issue was constitutional. As the elected leader of his people who also commanded a majority in Parliament, did Venizelos, or did he not, have the mandate to pursue the policy of his government? Or were matters of "supreme national policy" as Constantine argued—and his supporters defended—"his sole responsibility before God?"21 Had Greece, as Venizelos is said to have lamented, reverted to the theory of the "divine right" of Kings?22 The constitutional monarchy was clearly in question. What began as a personal feud, quickly spread to the ranks of the military and had soon divided the Greek people themselves. As Ventiris put it, "Whatever unity existed was broken, never to be

21 Ibid., p. 24. Translated from Greek.

22 Ibid.
reconstituted again."\textsuperscript{23}

With the monarchy challenged, the alarmed Constantine moved even closer to his supporters, including a number of leading officers discredited by the 1909 Revolt.\textsuperscript{24} A symbiotic relationship developed between the two, as all interests converged on one common enemy—Venizelos and his followers among the military, in the Liberal Party, the intellectuals and many in the business community. Thus Constantine found himself as the leader of a new coalition and "... became in effect the leader of a political faction with his own political program."\textsuperscript{25}

Venizelos resigned in protest and Constantine immediately appointed the royalist Gounaris to form a government. Elections were called for December, 1915 and, with the Liberal Party abstaining, victory for the Populist-royalist forces was assured. The Entente promptly declared its opposition to the new Skouloudis government by invali-

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p. 9. Translated from Greek.

\textsuperscript{24} Gomme, p. 48.

\textsuperscript{25} Alexander Mazarakis, Apomnemoneumata ("Memories"), Athens, Ikaros, 1948, p. 147. Translated from Greek.
dating forthcoming loans, but the government responded by negotiating a series of loans from Germany that were not publicly disclosed. At this point the Allies intervened directly by ordering a partial blockade of major Greek ports and, citing rights under the "Protecting Power" clause of the Pact of 1830, ordered the landing of a sizable Allied force in the north at Salonika. But acting hastily the Allies went still further. In June, 1916, they demanded the dissolution of Parliament and the demobilization of the Greek army—an act that sent many proud and ambitious men to early retirement and, in many cases, into clandestine organizations thus swelling the ranks of anti-Venizelism, which awaited its hour of revenge.

On August 17, 1916, the insurrection of Salonika broke out in defiance of the King, thus signalling the final break with Athens by the Liberal-Venizelist forces, despite

26 Ibid., p. 170.


28 Ibid., p. 441.
several last minute attempts by Venizelos for reconciliation.\textsuperscript{29} Constantine contemptuously rejected such overtures and, after being forced to abdicate, began to reorganize his forces and plot for his return. With the Liberals back in power, the army was remobilized and the campaign resumed with rapid tempo and success. The Megali Idea, it seemed, had largely been achieved when the Treaty of Sevres in 1920 ceded Thrace and the Smyrna District\textsuperscript{30} to Greece. Yet the fruits of victory were not secure; still another drive was necessary against the forces of Kemal who, in defiance of the Sultan, did not recognize the Treaty of Sevres. With Allied acquiescence and even support, and under the guidance of Venizelos now at the height of his career, Greece prepared for battle once again.

\textsuperscript{29} Besides Venizelos, a number of leading public figures made a last-minute attempt to dissuade Constantine from pursuing the policy of neutrality. Perhaps the most eloquent appeal, a brilliant argument regarding the historic responsibility and role of the monarchy in Greek politics, came from the Ambassador to Rome, M. Coromilas. See David Lloyd George, \textit{Memoirs of the Peace Conference} (New Haven: Yale University Press, Vol. II, 1939), pp. 786-87.

\textsuperscript{30} Mazarakis, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 236.
But suddenly, near-triumph was turned into disaster; like Churchill in 1945, Venizelos lost in the fateful elections of November, 1920, and once again the royalist Gounaris assumed the Premiership amid promises to end the war and for an era of reconciliation.31 However, promises proved but empty words, and the return of Constantine was only a matter of time. A thorough purge of Liberals, particularly in the military, along with preparations for a "final" drive into Asia Minor got underway, even though now Greece, without allies, would have to do it alone.32 The royalist opposition would not be outdone by their hated opponent; they had to prove that they, not Venizelos, deserved the credit for the new and enlarged Greek nation. But events swiftly proved otherwise. After some initial victories the army, overextended, poorly led and without adequate supplies, began its long retreat home, taking along what remained of the helpless Greek population of Asia Minor.

An irredentist dream had come to a sudden and disas-

31 Ibid., p. 287.

32 Ibid., p. 285. Upon the return of Constantine, the Entente Allies made clear their intentions of withholding their support.
trous end. It was the end of an era; but it was also the beginning of a new one. 33 Greece looked inward as she had to somehow overcome the shock of humiliation and defeat and face the task of rebuilding the fragmented social and political fabric at home. Moreover, she was now confronted with the formidable task of absorbing and assimilating some one and a half million uprooted and embittered refugees forced upon her by the Laussane Treaty of 1923. 34 A century-old objective, the modus operandi of Greek external (and often internal) policy since statehood, was buried with the uprooting of Hellenism from Asia Minor. And in their new home the refugee masses would soon alter the spirit and priorities of Greek society. As one author put it: "Abandoning Saint Sophia, the two-headed eagle of Byzantium, wounded and bleeding, sought shelter in the ruins of the Parthenon." 35


34 Ibid., p. 5.

The Aftermath of Failure and Defeat: The "Uncrowned Democracy"

Among the few Army units that returned from Asia Minor intact, a self-proclaimed "Revolutionary Committee" headed by Colonels Plastiras and Gonatas demanded the dissolution of the government in Athens and a "general catharsis" of all those responsible for the disaster, and declared its intention to govern until things returned to normal and new elections could be held. But the Committee's task was awesome: it had to somehow save Western Thrace, restructure and remobilize the Army and, above all, unite a deeply-divided nation. That task required a truly national government that could place itself above hatred and faction, and not merely pursue the opposition to a discredited past. And this the Committee was unable to achieve; it lacked internal unity in terms of program and goals, and its position was soon undermined by those behind the scenes—in the military and elsewhere—that could influence its actions.

36 Daphnis, op. cit., p. 9.
37 Ibid., p. 10.
38 Ibid.
In an effort to appease the public and restore discipline in the military, the Committee brought to trial the six ministers held responsible for the debacle. Found guilty, these were hanged. This act sharpened divisions and precluded reconciliation between the Liberal and Populist-royalist forces—the Committee's stated goal. Royalists were in no mood to compromise and, paradoxically, some members of the Committee's "inner circle," headed by General Pangalos, began demanding the abolition of the monarchy and for the establishment of the "Uncrowned Democracy" or Republic. As elections were announced for December, 1923, the Pangalos group was gaining ground in its appeals for the Republic, while the Liberal party wanted the question settled by a plebiscite and the Populists decided to abstain.

Again the military were adversely affected. Cliques reappeared, and despite the Committee's attempts to keep ranks united, "... there was a growing feeling that the Revolution had gone astray." The disaffection erupted

39 Ibid., p. 111.

40 Ibid., p. 189.

41 Ibid., p. 112. Translated from Greek.
in the abortive "counterrevolution of October, 1923, which was exploited by the republicans as the work of royalists. It appears, however, that the abortive coup was a poorly planned attempt to prevent the return of the old politics and cliches. As Daphnis suggests, "not knowing exactly what they were after, the officers who led the coup attempt were, like many others, seeking for something new and better." Nevertheless, new converts were added to the republican camp, thus dividing the once powerful Liberal party. Actually, these were mostly officers who, after the Asia Minor disaster, lost patience with the mild liberalism of Venizelos and sought a more radical position.

        With the Populist and the Free Opinion party of General Metaxas abstaining, the Republicans could not defeat the Liberal party in the December 1923 elections, the results of which issued a clear call for the return of Venizelos. But the coming of the Republic was only a matter of time. After a number of attempts at reconciliation with the Populists that failed, Venizelos resigned.

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42 Ibid., p. 113. Translated from Greek.

43 Ibid., p. 152.
after only two months in office, and the Republican Papanastasiou became the new Premier pending new elections. Papanastasiou immediately reached agreement with the Populist leader Tsaldaris over the issue of general amnesty for all officers involved in the abortive coup of October, and both agreed to put an end to the hegemony of the military in politics. 44 The road to the uncrowned democracy was open; unanimously, the National Assembly declared Greece a Republic on March 1924, and a plebiscite held shortly after voted 70 per cent in favor of it. 45

However, the continuing political instability, along with the pressing problems of external policy, precluded early ratification of the new constitution. The Papanastasiou government was faced with a shattered economic structure, 46 the continuing interference of the military in politics, and the need to improve Greece's strained relations with Turkey and Yugoslavia. 47 It soon became clear

44 Ibid., p. 235.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid., p. 257.

47 W. Miller, Greece (New York, Scribner's, 1928), p. 75.
that the Republic was not firmly based. Papanastasiou resigned in early 1925, and was followed by a series of Republican prime ministers, none of whom could command a majority. Thus the first phase of the Republic—the "Republican experiment" as it has been aptly called—ended with the brief and tragicomic Pangalos dictatorship in 1926, a clear testimony to the fragile and precarious Greek political structure.

Coalition and the Return to Strong Party Rule

A new coalition or "mixed" Cabinet, the so-called "Ecumenical government" composed of members from both major parties and some from the emerging minor ones, was formed. This was perhaps a unique period in Greek politics in terms of results and relative stability. Some worthwhile policies were initiated and a degree of economic normalcy was achieved. Major loans were negotiated from the League of Nations and the United States, and the pressing external

48 P. M. Sifnaios, _Metaxas: To Prosopiko Tou Hemerologio_ ("Metaxas: His Personal Diary"), Athens, Ikaros, 1964, Vol. III.

49 E. S. Forster, _A Short History of Modern Greece_ (London, Methuen, 1941), p. 165.
problems received top priority. Yet the major issues of the settlement and rehabilitation of the refugees and the problem of the military remained outstanding, and after some twenty months in office the dissension within the government put an end to the new experiment, and Venizelos returned to assume power as the only one who could put together a strong and united party cabinet. Actually, the apparent stability of the ecumenical coalition was precarious from the start. The Populists' decision to participate was based on two key and unrealistic conditions: control of the purse strings, and of the ambitions of the new rising star in Royalist circles, General Metaxas—demands that resulted in protests and resignations of Republican members thus shattering the fragile coalition. Sifnaios captures the essence—and inherent weakness—of the ecumenical government in the following words:

50 Ibid., pp. 89-90.

51 A royalist career officer of considerable ability and stature, Metaxas and his Free Thought party, though of minor electoral strength, were distrusted and feared by the Tsaldaris Populists. As Secretary of the Interior in the "Ecumenical" coalition, Metaxas indicated his willingness to cooperate on matters vital for the country, but politically unpalatable to the Populist leadership. See Sifnaios, op. cit., pp. 496-504.
Locked in their laboratory they were struggling to establish, upon so many ruins, a new foundation. . . Yet outside the walls Venizelos was waiting, and inside—within the same government—anti-Venizelism was impatient. 52

Upon returning to power in 1928, Venizelos made clear his intentions to continue the same basic program as his predecessors and his willingness to seek a rapprochement with the Populists. 53 After Venizelos indicated his preference for the majoritarian electoral principle rather than proportional representation for the upcoming elections, Tsaldaris reached a secret agreement with him in favor of the majority system, 54 though the latter knew that this would mean a return of Venizelos to power. In this way the two major parties could square off in the elections thus forcing the loose factions and minor independent parties like the Free Opinion party of Metaxas to choose sides. Writing on the attitude of Tsaldaris, Vourous concludes:


In his insistence to preserve the long-range interests of the Populist party, even at very high cost. . . he /Tsaldaris/ took advantage of the new situation to gather under the party flag the anti-Venizelist forces, seeking to annihilate the other independent political groupings whose preservation fostered the dispersion of those forces. 55

The Venizelos administration (1928-32) finally concluded Friendship Agreements with Italy and Yugoslavia and entered into the historic Ankara Convention with Turkey in 1930. 56 The new emphasis was on stabilizing external relations so that the long over-due program of internal development could get underway. The government undertook programs of public works, bureaucratic reform, and did not hesitate to cross party lines in "... recruiting new faces and able men" 57—a policy that resulted in frequent Ministerial turnover, thus alienating a number of key Venizelists and providing ammunition to the populist opposition. 58

56 Stavrianos, op. cit., p. 666.
57 Daphnis, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 49. Translated from Greek.
58 Ibid., p. 13.
Once again the broad objectives of strong party government and rapprochement with the opposition were doomed; the Liberal ranks were broken, the "battle lines" between the two major parties were being redrawn, and the low military budget resulting from the emphasis on domestic priorities reintroduced criticism from and disaffection among the officer corps. But the heaviest blows to the last Venizelos government were the devastating effects of the Great Depression and the consequences of failing to settle and assimilate the refugees within Greek society. Venizelos did not fully perceive the implications of these factors nor the fundamental changes taking place in Greece during the late twenties and early 'thirties. He was, after all, the product of classic Liberalism and the rising middle sectors which, by the 1930's, "had arrived." "Having undergone the process of ossification," Stavrianos notes, Venizelos and Greek

59 Mazarakis, op. cit., p. 348.

60 Daphnis, op. cit., p. 94. In 1931, there were still some 30,000 homeless refugee families, and many others living under miserable conditions.
liberalism... viewed with alarm the agitation for reform bred by the Depression."  

Still less was the Populist party inclined or able to undertake a comprehensive program for social and political change; criticism of the Liberal government by the Populists was focused, as always, on the same narrow interests and contingencies, and Tsaldaris' decision to finally accept the Republican framework was a mere tactical move motivated by narrow party interests and the familiar policy of exploiting the difficulties of the party in power.

By early 1932, the Venizelos government had become quite unpopular and doubts grew as to its ability to win the elections set for September 1932. The apprehension in the Venizelist camp set in motion the resurgence of the Military League under Plastiras, which was brought to life again ostensibly for the purpose of "protecting" the Republic, but which in fact was determined to prevent the return of the monarchy. 63 After Venizelos and the Liberal

61 Stavrianos, p. 667.
62 Ibid., p. 668.
63 Forster, p. 180.
party lost the elections to the Populists, the League responded by hastily organizing two coup attempts in 1933 and in 1935, the failure of which finally terminated Venizelos' long career and swelled public sentiment for the Populist government—an event which the latter never expected or hoped for. Venizelos' belated and half-hearted attempt to create the one-party state was an utter failure and assured the resurgence of conservatism as a major force in Greek politics. Ironically, when in 1920 he could have succeeded (and, according to some of his key followers, should have tried), he dismissed the idea of dictatorship resolutely as unworkable and against his principles. Shocked and discredited, the architect and "master-builder" of modern Greece during the first quarter of the twentieth century left his country for the last time and died in Paris a short time later. When news of his

64 Daphnis, p. 351.
65 Ibid., p. 350. In a letter to his trusted lieutenant, General Plastiras, Venizelos revealed his belated intentions: Complete control of the military; removal of all royalist elements from it; and control of all security forces including local police units.
death arrived, a sudden remorse gripped the country as
Greeks, friend and foe alike, sensed the emptiness that
was created. As Daphnis eloquently concludes:

Few were those that perceived the real impli-
cations of Venizelos' death. . . . Dictator-
ships and periods of war are not the only
factors that suspend the unfolding of the
political life of nations. A remarkable per-
sonality can leave its imprint just as
effectively. And when it has not provided
for its succession, the void that its absence
creates is turned into an abyss.67

Reaction and Dictatorship:
The Rise of Metaxas

After the death of Venizelos events moved rapidly.
The monarchy was restored amid promises of full amnesty
for all those involved in the Republican-led coup attempts,
and new elections were set for January 1936. 68 But the
elections resulted in a deadlock and it was a new political
force, the Communist Party, that held the balance by win-
ing fifteen seats.69 The seriousness of the impasse was
evident as neither major party was willing to make serious

67 Daphnis, p. 411. Translated from Greek.
68 Forster, pp. 190-91.
69 Ibid., p. 193.
concessions for communist support. King George acted quickly and, without consulting party leaders, appointed General Metaxas as Premier pending restoration of normalcy and new elections. Parliament was dissolved for five months during which Metaxas would rule by decree so as to reassert authority, cope with the growing labor unrest, and control the activities and influence of the Communists.

But affairs rapidly deteriorated. Nationwide labor strikes broke out in the summer of 1936, communism loomed ever larger, and the whole system was nearly at a standstill. Clearly under Communist influence, tobacco workers in Salonika and Kavalla went on strike demanding more wages and greater political rights. The parties reacted to the new conditions by implicit support for Metaxas and patience . . . until the government finished job of bringing the country back to political stability

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70 Ibid., p. 194.
71 Daphnis, p. 422.
72 Ibid., p. 421.
73 Ibid., p. 424.
and normalcy." In other words, both major parties wanted, in effect, to have Metaxas as a sort of coordinator of their major differences. And when the crisis was over, they would then call on him to hand over the reins of power free of thorns.

But events proved otherwise. Threatened by quick dissolution and seizure of funds after enactment of the Compulsory Arbitration Act under Metaxas, the rival labor confederations coalesced and issued orders for a nationwide general strike on 5 August, 1936. Metaxas acted quickly. He persuaded the King to reject the option of compromise with the moderate and royalist elements of the parties, and to permit him to declare a state of emergency and suspend the Constitution. Thus was inaugurated the dictatorship of the "Fourth of August."

In initiating its program for "National Reconstruction," the new regime faced a difficult task. Unlike most other similarly authoritarian regimes established or emerging in Europe during this period, it had no organized

\[\text{\cite{Ibid., p. 418. Translated from Greek.}}\]

\[\text{\cite{Stavrianos, p. 671.}}\]
party, no official and coherent ideology; it faced considerable—if divided—opposition from the old party leaders, the business community, and the intellectuals, and mass support was negligible until the Italian invasion in late 1940. Nevertheless, in view of its brief history, the Metaxas regime achieved considerable progress in the areas of rural development, labor legislation, and a comprehensive public works program. The main emphasis was to be on the organization and "proper" socialization of youth and the social and economic development of the rural countryside. Peasant indebtedness was abolished, tax and subsidy legislation favorable to the rural areas was a top priority and, in 1937, the National Youth Organization (EON) was inaugurated, modeled after the German and Italian models. Metaxas was not opposed to rapid economic development and industrialization. But modernization and economic development were to continue without the usual political and social consequences; one peculiar feature of

76 Ibid., p. 675.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid., pp. 673-74.
the regime was its emphasis\textsuperscript{79} on promoting the development of both the urban and rural sectors, but each in its own way or \textit{separately}. Clearly implied in the regime's program for rural development was the notion that policy in this area be designed so as to keep the "virtues" and way of life of the rural countryside from being "infected" by the "undesirable" tendencies of the urban sector.\textsuperscript{80} Apparently, the policy of discouraging further rural exodus to the cities was aimed towards realizing this goal.

The ideological mainstay of the regime was vague, oriented to the past, and largely negative, that is, based on its critique of Greek parliamentarism. Metaxas quite simply argued that:

\begin{quote}
Borrowed Greek parliamentarism is an obstacle in meeting today's big problems... and another attempt at (parliamentary) compromise would reactivate the extreme factions and thus lead once again to division... there is no solution but to exit from parliamentarism and
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{80} In a radio speech to the nation on 4 August, 1936, Metaxas clearly stressed the need to be "protected" from the "Communist danger," and for the development of the rural areas. See \textit{ibid.}, pp. 225-27.
enter a state of a more stable, and a more lasting and powerful decision-making authority.\textsuperscript{81}

But the twin goals of unity and progress through the "Nation" and the heritage of "Hellenism," soon gave way before more pressing priorities. As the storm clouds reappeared over Europe, the Greek nation was again thrust into mobilization, war, and new sacrifice.

**Greece and the Refugees**

The above historical survey would be incomplete without a closer look at the profound impact of the Anatolian refugees after 1923. By capping this section with a review of this impact, the historical record of the vital interwar period will hopefully take on a better perspective.

The historical significance of the refugees, while generally acknowledged, has not been adequately studied. \textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{81} Metaxas' remarks in an interview with *Eleftheros Kosmos* ("Free World"), an Athens daily, on 4 January, 1934. Translated from Greek.

\textsuperscript{82} The term refers to all "Eastern" or Asia Minor Greeks.

\textsuperscript{83} There are some notable exceptions such as, C. B. Bödy, *Greece and the Greek Refugees* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1931); A. A. Pallis, *Greece's Anatolian Venture and After* (London: Methuen, 1937); and D. Pentzopoulos, *The
As a result, a number of hasty and questionable assumptions have been made regarding their impact (or lack of it) upon Greek society and politics. Thus the socio-economic effects have been often viewed as of secondary or indeterminate influence upon Greek development, and the political impact has received little attention as a force in its own right, and then primarily within the broad and inadequate framework of institutional and legal studies of the Greek policy. But perhaps the most conspicuous gap has been the failure to relate the various aspects of that impact and study its consequences. Thus, for example, it is a mistake to assume that due to partial success in economic and cultural assimilation, the refugees have become integrated into Greek society, or that their inability to muster a common and coherent voice in Greek politics established the refugees as a relatively minor force. In short, the tendency to view the refugee impact in a narrowly-defined scope and in its short-term significance that accounts for this near neglect of one of the most profound inputs in recent Greek history.


84 The political impact is adequately treated by Daphnis, Miller, and Pentzopoulos in the works cited above.
Coming on the aftermath of the disastrous final phase of the campaign into Asia Minor, the sudden and overwhelming influx of some 1.5 million people had profound and widespread consequences. Despite the immediate attention and much material aid and efforts of both the Greek government and the Refugee Settlement Commission (RSC), the sudden fait accompli of having to settle and rehabilitate the bewildered and disillusioned refugees—particularly the urban sectors—confronted Greece with a truly herculean task that seemed insurmountable. At first it appeared that the cynical prophecy of one official, namely, that once in their new home, the refugees "... would overthrow everything," was near the truth. There is little doubt that the combined effects of Greece's war-ravaged economy, the sharply-divided and perilous political situation in 1922, and the deeply-rooted and uncompromising sense of the refugee consciousness itself proved a major obstacle to early settlement and assimilation.

85 Pentzopoulos, p. 71.


87 Pentzopoulos, pp. 201-202.
In spite of such obstacles, however, the middle and late twenties witnessed a sizable—if spasmodic and only short-lived—boom in economic development, ushering a period of rapid and far-reaching social and political change, both of which were closely linked to the direct or indirect impact of the refugees. The boost to the economy, particularly in agriculture, was dramatic. Between 1924 and 1925, the production of wheat, corn, and cotton went up by 70, 45, and 25 percent, respectively, and the production of tobacco, the key exportable item, rose considerably. The total area of tobacco cultivation increased by 55 percent, and production figures rose from 25.3 million kilos in 1922 to 85.9 kilos in 1929. Production of tobacco brought in vital foreign exchange, and it was intensified, paying off handsomely. It was estimated that nearly half of the foreign exchange brought in between 1917-1927 (about 18 million pounds sterling) was earned from tobacco. Thus, in the decade following

88 Miller, pp. 284-85.
89 Pentzopoulos, p. 156. At least 50 percent of all those engaged in the production of tobacco were refugees.
90 Ibid., p. 157.
the Anatolian disaster (1923-1933) the national income from agriculture was doubled, and this was primarily due to the refugees. ⁹¹

Manufacturing and industry, too, underwent considerable development and the refugees, as consumers, laborers, and energetic entrepreneurs played a vital role in this upsurge. In 1917 there were 2,113 factories and 35,000 workers; between 1923 and 1930, 918 new factories were built and the number of industrial workers jumped to 429,831, ⁹² most of which were refugees. Thus the newcomers were a vital force in industrial development, and the most noteworthy advances occurred in areas where the refugees concentrated their talents and energy. Thus Pentzopoulos concludes that "... the most significant contribution to the industrial progress of Greece was made by the refugee entrepreneurs and producers." ⁹³ In this connection it should also be noted that the rapid growth

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⁹¹ Ibid., p. 159.
⁹² Ibid., p. 162.
⁹³ Ibid., p. 163.
of syndicalism in Greece during this period (its main effects to be considered at a later point) was closely linked to the energy and organizing potential of the refugee masses who were mainly responsible for the appearance of farm cooperatives and unionized activity throughout the country.

Some vital areas in which the refugee impact was almost solely responsible for expansion were the textile and carpet industries. Table below indicates the tremendous growth in this area. The newcomers also made a vital

<p>| TABLE 1 |</p>
<table>
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<th>EXPANSION OF THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY^a</th>
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<tr>
<td>Number of factories</td>
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<tr>
<td>Installations, looms, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of persons employed</td>
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<td>Production in millions of drachmas</td>
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^94 X. Zolotas, Με Ηη Ηελλας Εις Το Σταδιον Της Εκνημερωσεως ("Greece at the Stage of Industrialization"), Athens, Eleutheroudakis, 1926. The refugee factor was
contribution to the expansion of trade and commerce. Enterpreneurial refugees from such eastern trade centers as Smyrna, Constantinople, and Odessa had vast experience in foreign trade and utilized their numerous contacts abroad in the service of Greek commerce. As a result, the volume of trade between 1922 and 1930 nearly doubled as the number of ships visiting Greek ports rose from 17 thousand to over 39 thousand.95

Yet with all the important advances, the sudden economic growth patterns did not show a sustained trend upward. Compounded by the devastating effects of the Great Depression, the lack of an industrial-managerial infrastructure, inhibiting socio-cultural factors,96 and by the fact that sustained agricultural output was checked by the fragmentation of arable land resulting from intensive cultivation, the economic "miracle" was short-lived and, as we shall see, gave rise to more problems than it solved. And it was in the arena of social and political

primarily responsible for social legislation in such areas as wage and work-hour regulation, working conditions, female labor, and child-labor laws. See ibid., pp. 79-80.

95 Statistical Annual of Greece, cited in Pentzopoulos, p. 163.

96 Reference here is to the refugee consciousness and to the socio-cultural and linguistic traits.
change wrought by this brief period of development that these problems became manifest. Thus the refugee impact, for all its positive contributions, became also the epicenter of a host of far-reaching social, economic, and political dislocations, and early optimism regarding its long-term effects were premature.

One key factor in the undesirable consequences of this brief "Renaissance" was the uneven pattern of growth and development. The highly successful rural settlement of the refugees was in contrast to the much less successful urban settlement. Living conditions in the crowded cities were poor and work was uncertain. Moreover, the RSC spent only about one-fifth as much for urban settlement as it did for the rural, and in the over-crowded cities where families were often housed in warehouses, theatres, and churches, the newcomers confronted the suspicious and often resentful native population. As

97 One author described the refugee settlement as "one of the most important social achievements of our generation." See G. E. Mylonas, The Balkan States--An Introduction to Their History (St. Louis, Eden Publishing House, 1946), p. 123. And Miller, op. cit., pp. 282-90, compares the refugee impact to the Huguenot influence upon Britain's industrial development.

98 Pentzopoulos, p. 114.
Macartney puts it, "The peasants could be settled on waste or abandoned lands, but the urban refugees... had to compete for a livelihood with the pre-existing urban population of Greece." 99

The Political Impact

The refugee impact on Greek politics cannot be underestimated. Held together by the bonds of heritage, their traditions, and the consciousness of being a refugee--a state of mind that was reinforced by the dire conditions of their new existence--they spearheaded numerous changes in Greek society that became a determining factor in Greek politics, altering the whole political scene. The addition of about 300,000 adults to the electorate, a group liberal in outlook by heritage and circumstance, gave the liberal Republican forces a dominance for years to come. As the refugee newspaper Prosfygikos Kosmos noted in June, 1928,

It is an uncontestable fact that the refugee factor will play a significant role in the political life of the country... that it will give, by its compact block, the final

victory to one or the other side in the various political battles.\textsuperscript{100}

The newcomers' typically Greek keen interest in politics and public debate was coupled with a deep sense of concern and an urge to participate. Moreover, they felt the absence of a progressive spirit among the natives and regretted not having a greater influence upon the development of modern Greece.\textsuperscript{101} The general attitude was to do something about it now. They set upon organizing various local congresses and efforts were directed at adopting a unified and coherent attitude on the key issues of the day. But the refugees came not only to participate and contribute; they came also to "enlighten." In the words of one of their leaders:

> It was in some ways a mistake that old Greece . . . was the first to win its freedom, and that it was the weak and degenerate part of our people that was the first to receive the gift of independence and not we.\textsuperscript{102}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[100] Cited in Pentzopoulos, p. 176.
\item[101] Ibid., p. 175.
\end{footnotes}
Settlement of the refugees, jointly undertaken by the RSC and a number of Republican governments after 1923, appears to have been politically motivated. Over 60 per cent were settled in and around the large urban centers of Athens, Piraeus, and Salonika, the rest located in the rural—and mostly liberal—northeast. Hardly a trace were settled in the rural areas of central and southern Greece, traditional strongholds of populist-royalist supporters. The populist opposition protested vigorously against this "deliberate" gerrymandering but the liberals, and Venizelos in particular, defended such action on the grounds of ethnic homogeneity of the northeast and the industrialization in the urban centers.

As the consequences proved, the program for urban settlement was far from being a success. Homelessness, poverty, job insecurity, and social injustice burdened the refugees, and together proved a major source of social instability and unrest. The problems engendered by the poor and sometimes miserable conditions of the refugees required comprehensive programs of major social legislation which the Greek political world was not yet able to under-  

\footnote{103Pentzopoulos, p. 173.}
take with adequate success. And the political elites, their efforts consumed by the continuing factional strife and the backlog of problems accumulated over the past, did not perceive the full implications of the urban settlement. As Daphnis points out:

Venizelos did not fully perceive that the wretchedness of the refugees constituted the main threat against the society. ... that they formed a permanent source of social unrest.\textsuperscript{104}

There were efforts by the political elites--no doubt motivated by the potential voting power of the refugee masses--to appease the newcomers. The execution of the six ministers held responsible for the Asia Minor debacle in 1923 was largely in response to the outcry for revenge among the masses. Plastiras and the "Revolutionary Committee" resolved that public opinion, especially that of the refugees, demanded scapegoats\textsuperscript{105} for the disaster and would have to be appeased. More importantly, the refugee impact was centrally responsible for the abrogation of the Monarchy and the establishing of the Republic or "Uncrowned

\textsuperscript{104} Daphnis, pp. 96-97, Vol. II. Translated from Greek.

\textsuperscript{105} Miller, p. 72.
Democracy in 1924. Underlying the debate and movement that set up the Republic was the forceful presence and potential power of the refugees. As Papanastasiou, the Prime Minister during this critical period, acknowledged in 1934:

It is debatable whether the republican regime could have been established without the fanaticism of the refugee masses in favor of it.\textsuperscript{106}

But the rapprochement between the refugees and the Greek polity was brief and began to fall apart after 1930. The break with Venizelos and the Liberal party came after the expected compensations of refugee properties in Turkey were sacrificed for improved relations with that country in the Ankara Convention of 1930.\textsuperscript{107} In 1928, Prosfygi\k{e}s Kosmos attacked the political parties and, indirectly, the Greek political system for its neglect of refugee interests, rights, and the unjust under-representation of refugee deputies in parliament:

At the coming political elections, the refugee world will demand to elect its own representatives... not the ones

\textsuperscript{106} Cited in Pentzopoulos, p. 181.

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., p. 117.
imposed by the parties as has happened until now.108

And as early as July 1927, the same influential newspaper among the refugees vehemently attacked the inadequacy of social legislation and called for the abolition of the Ministry of Social Welfare.109

Having failed to create an independent political force within the framework of the Greek political system in pursuit of their goals and interests, many among the young refugees, particularly in the urban areas, turned to more radical ideas and solutions, and were recruited by the rising Communist Party of Greece (KKE).110 Suddenly becoming prominent in the internal polit. scene after the Asia Minor debacle,111 the KKE quickly adapted its orthodox position to fit the Greek reality. Thus the "struggle for power" against the "bourgeois-fascist


109 Ibid., 10 July 1927.

110 Pentzopoulou, p. 190.

republic" would bring forth "... a workers' and peasants' and refugees' government." Communist agitation among workers and refugees won many adherents among the disenchanted and the alienated masses and this was clearly reflected in the marked trend to the left after 1930.

112 Rizospastis ("The Radical"), 14 December, 1924, cited in ibid., p. 191.
CHAPTER II

THE INTERWAR GREEK POLITY, FIRST PHASE:
TRADITION AND ACCOMMODATION

The main theme that emerges throughout the above historical review is deep division and fragmentation of the political structure in interwar Greece, and the persistent instability that followed. Immediately, however, the important question is raised: How was this polity able to withstand such forces of division and dissensions without being subjected to civil war, social revolution, basic systemic transformation or permanent secession? Considering the degree of socio-cultural heterogeneity, factionalism, and the intensity of conflict it would seem remarkable that the Greek polity could weather such powerful centrifugal forces without undergoing basic structural change. Clearly, then, this polity is characterized by fragmentation and stability, and to account for that state of affairs is the purpose of the present section. Here an attempt will be made to describe and analyze those interrelated factors contributing to a rather peculiar sort of "unstable equilibrium"—however precarious—in the midst of division and instability.
The Consociational Polity

The interwar Greek polity represents a variant of what Lijphart\(^1\) calls a "consociational democracy," that is, a polity characterized by (1) sharp and well-defined sub-culture cleavages; (2) strong tendencies toward instability and immobilism; (3) a typical reliance on extra-parliamentary means and procedures; and (4) tacit agreement between competing elites to maintain the system as a viable concern. In such a setting where elite role is crucial, the extent to which elites will undertake "...deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing effects of socio-cultural fragmentation" will, according to Lijphart, depend in part on elite perceptions of external threats to the country, widespread approval of the principle of government by coalition or "elite cartel," and a relatively low total load on the elite decision-making apparatus.\(^2\) As a result of such "overarching cooperation" that transcends differing subcultures, a nation can achieve "a degree of


\(^2\)Ibid., p. 229.
political stability quite out of proportion to its social homogeneity." Of course, the extent to which a given consociational system will succeed will vary from one country to the next; besides the main factors noted above, there are other elements conducive to consociationalism—such as elite ability to accommodate the divergent interests of rival subcultures, their ability to articulate common "overarching" interests, etc.  

Cleavages along the lines of family, culture and language have long existed in Greek society, and even religion "...has not been the unifying force it was assumed to be." Traditionally strong family ties and a sense of insecurity bred by many years of servility, scarcity and war, have tended to reinforce an attitude of parochialism and distrust of others inherited from a tradition of quite

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4Lijphart, p. 227.


6Ibid., p. 32.
tolerant Ottoman rule and affected by austere demographic conditions. Furthermore, existing cleavages were further reinforced by the rather gradual and casual pace of national unification and social mobilization, and were also aggravated by the deep-seated division that gripped the country after 1915. The conflict over which language to use in the schools and in the civil service—the formal katharevousa (purist) or the demotic—a conflict that at times raged in the schools and in the literary world, has been a divisive political issue. Moreover, frequent usage of the purist language in the government, the bureaucracy and the Universities have hindered effective communication between the state and society (especially the peasantry) thus tending to sustain and widen the rural-urban and mass-elite gaps.

Such distinct cleavage patterns in a society with a consociational superstructure may be conducive to overall political stability. Distinct subcultures with divergent

7Ibid., p. 57.
9Ibid., p. 685.
10Lijphart, op. cit., p. 229.
interests and outlooks may "coexist" without being necessarily in direct conflict; it is when such differing subcultures are brought into close contact with each other that widespread social conflict is generated. 11 This seems to reflect the case of Greece. Intense rivalry and conflict was limited primarily to the elite representatives of different socio-economic groupings, and did not, until the refugee impact in the mid-twenties, significantly affect relations between rival subcultures at the mass or non-elite level. Political conflict and/or compromise at the mass level was largely limited to intra-group relations, and was conducted on behalf of the demands and interests of separate memberships or "publics." 12 In other words, political interests and demands were transmitted along personalized, vertical channels making up the complex networks of structured clientele relationships, 13 which penetrated every facet of social and public life. In this setting of mutual obligations, where


12 Legg, op. cit., p. 128.

13 Ibid., p. 82.
the role of the "patron" (often a Deputy) is to dispense with favors to a usually well-defined clientele in return for its voting or other form of support, the stability of the overall system is maintained so long as the traditional roles of meeting individual or clan-family demands remains the key emphasis. Politics in interwar Greece, then, was not primarily a 'world' of social legislation and policy-making as characterized by the Western democracies, but a one of "...micropolitics, personality and patronage"\textsuperscript{14} and, as one author would argue in another context, was "attuned mainly to incessant adjustment among primordial groups rather than general policy planning and execution."\textsuperscript{15}

To be sure, followers identified--often fanatically--with leaders on major issues and policies. Indeed, Greeks have always been intensely interested in politics, as conversations about matters political are among the favorite topics of daily discourse, albeit more in a spirit of criticism of others than in rational defense of policy

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., p. 167.

and issues. Clearly, as Miller succinctly points out, "...the art of composing Philippica did not die with Demosthenes."\(^{16}\) But the frequency of shifting loyalties and the unpredictable electoral behavior expressed during the interwar years, clearly indicate the superficial and narrow basis of political beliefs and orientations thus revealing their source in the interstices of personalized client-patron relationships. Thus social conflict during much of this period was not translated into class or associational group conflict, but "remained festering in the narrow interstices of personal relationships and ties."\(^{17}\)

**Instability and Immobilism**

It need hardly be stressed that the interwar Greek polity met the conditions of instability and immobilism set forth for the consociational polity type. The whole interwar period is inundated with short-lived governments, unstable coalitions, military coups and counter-coups and an atmosphere of uncertainty and tension as administrations

\(^{16}\)Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

swirled in and out of office like leaves on a windy day. Between 1847-1928, there were 47 different Prime Ministers (many having served several times) and 87 Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The average tenure for each administration was about one year. Under such circumstances immobilism was inevitable. Continuity of policy and the enactment of vital legislation (e.g., the land reform program, tenure for civil servants, amnesty for military personnel involved in the various coups, etc.) could have succeeded had the elites been oriented toward matters of actual social policy and broad legislation. But as they were concerned almost exclusively with increasing their individual political "resources"—by being preoccupied with matters relevant only to their secure following generally located in their districts—legislation dealing with vital and pressing matters was shelved rather than solved.

Perhaps the most obvious example of immobilism was the failure, between the founding of the Republic in 1924 and the last Venizelos administration (1928-32), to agree and act upon the new Constitution. Again and again this

18 Miller, op. cit., p. 141.

fundamental question was postponed as a result of petty inter- and intra-party rivalry. Both the Liberal party under Venizelos and the Populist under Tsaldaris violated the spirit and letter of the "uncrowned Democracy," and it took four years for the latter to accept the new regime in principle, fearing the loss of vital 'clients'. But even after the new Constitution was hastily ratified in 1929, it mattered little in terms of the real, substantive issues fought over; it mattered little what specific institutional arrangements prevailed—the real struggle was over how to maintain or improve one's position vis-a-vis one's supporters and clients in the game of "who gets what, when and how," to use Lasswell's phrase, and that meant maintaining the existing 'balance of power' and preventing the rise of anyone party or faction. Thus on the eve of the ill-fated Pangalos dictatorship in 1926, the main concern of the party leaders was not the real danger of the ominous role of the military in politics, but to make sure that existing power arrangements were not seriously disturbed. As

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20 Stavrianos, p. 663.
21 Daphnis, p. 54.
Sifnaios puts it:

Venizeleists and anti-Venizeleists could see the danger. But the former hesitated to abandon their base of power—which was necessary in order to form a broad coalition with which to confront Pangalos; the latter...did not dare to break from the shadow of Gounaris, from their irreconcilable position, lest they lose their customers; lest they appear to legitimize the politics of the Uncrowned Democracy. They were afraid more of Metaxas than of Pangalos. 22

This illustration of the tendency to seek to maintain a set of existing power arrangements by whatever means are available even at high cost is, according to Lijphart, 23 of the essence of a consociational polity. For the essential feature of such a polity,

is not so much any particular institutional arrangement as the deliberate...efforts by the elites to stabilize the system. 24

The tendency to manipulate or even ignore formal-legal institutional arrangements in order to gain a favorable position in the struggle between different

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22 Sifnaios, op. cit., p. 369. Translated from Greek. (Emphasis added.)


24 Ibid., p. 225.
factions is directly related to the extra-parliamentary level of Greek politics. This was the crucial level of political action, for it was here that the major disputes of the interwar period were waged. The direct, arbitrary and usually disruptive roles of the Monarchy and the military constitute a typical phenomenon of the period, as both were often eager to descend to the politics of clientelism and patronage and thus contribute to the perpetuation of these. Constitutional prohibitions mattered little as monarchs lavishly used (and abused) their royal prerogatives to dismiss, appoint or obstruct various governments even when based on a clear parliamentary majority (such as the Venizelos government of 1915-16\textsuperscript{25}) and to throw their lot with minority or extra-constitutional governments.\textsuperscript{26}

The Extraparliamentary Level

Before World War I, the monarchy and its wide dynastic connections was regarded as a trump card in

\textsuperscript{25} Ventiris, p. 24.

pursuit of Greek territorial claims, and its role was largely limited to foreign affairs. But with Constantine, the precedent for the direct involvement of the monarchy in domestic affairs was set. By siding with the deposed oligarchs and their military clients against Venizelos and the "spirit of 1909," however, Constantine did much more. His active opposition to and open contempt for the people's choice, set the stage for raising the fundamental "Constitutional Question" by undermining the principle of the constitutional monarchy, and helped launch the lingering political role of the military by promoting and directing systematic political indoctrination and anti-Venizelist propaganda among the ranks. Thus the hero of the First Balkan Wars, by immersing himself into the thick of internal Greek politics, became the new rallying point of anti-Venizelism and hence the pole of opposition attracting all those alarmed by the rise of Venizelos. But as Ventiris puts it, Constantine also set the stage for the spirit "of ignoring the fundamental bases of Greek politics, of the antithesis between the legal government

27 Ventiris, op. cit., p. 25.

28 Ibid., p. 60.
and those who really ruled...."

Through his partisan activities Constantine planted the seeds of organized political opposition in the form of the Royalist-Populist party. Indeed this party was born not in response to any positive program of socio-economic policy or reform, but in meeting the demands of the Greek polity for an opposition to the meteoric rise of the Liberal party and its able leader. The requirements for a "balance of power" in a normally operating consociational system are evident here. In disrepute and disarray ever since 1909, the oligarchic forces, in need of a new slogan and a new leader, rallied around the monarchy and found Constantine more than willing. After the historic dispute with Venizelos over Greece's role in the war and the latter's resignation, and on the eve of the October 1915 elections, the King made his intentions very clear. As one foreign diplomat, reporting a conversation he had with Constantine, said:

He will not allow the return of Venizelos to power until after the war...he has left the first and second Army groups in 'reliable old Greece' specifically for electoral purposes

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29 Ibid., p. 57. Translated from Greek.
that is to vote against the Liberal ticket... Constantine and his ministers are solely concerned with creating a party and the annihilation of Venizelism. 30

But Venizelos, too, was not above disregarding the Constitutional framework as his complicity in the Salonika insurrection indicated. He quietly acquiesced to the stationing of Entente troops in violation of Greek sovereignty in 1916, and though the secessionist movement was popular among the people in the North, "...a sense of real trust for laws was absent, and it was apparently a situation to be exploited for personal objectives."

The best example of the significance of the extra-parliamentary level in Greek politics is the military. In spite of the professionalism, extensive training and improved social status of the military after 1909, they became deeply involved in political strife and nearly every major political figure had his personal following in the Army. With the revolution of 1922 and the royalist-inspired counter-revolt in the following year, the military

30 Remarks by Russian Ambassador Demidov, quoted in ibid., p. 89. Translated from Greek.

was established as a major actor in the political struggle for power. Henceforth, politicians, before acting or deciding, wanted to know what the military would say or do.  

32 Thus deeply divided into Venizelists and anti-Venizelists—a dichotomy that lasted until well after World War II—the military groupings and cliques became in effect praetorian extensions of the various factions in the "balance of power" that was manipulated and precariously held together by the dominant Liberal and Populist parties.

But unlike the military in other "underdeveloped" societies (e.g., Kemal's Turkey, Nasser's Egypt, Ne Win's Burma), the Greek military did not have the makings of a "movement regime."  

33 Its role in social modernization was limited to efforts to establish its own coherence, professionalism and status in society, and thus does not fit the Janowitz model of a truly professional group that has "its members' kinship ties loosened and their sociometric...

32 Daphnis, op. cit., p. 159.

ties more rooted within the organization."\textsuperscript{34} Professionalism, to the extent that it was evident, coexisted along with factionalism and clientele relationships. Generals Metaxas and Plastiras, the model professional soldiers during this period, were no less deeply involved in factional politics.

Consensus and Stability at the Top

The Greek case seems more deviant with respect to Lijphart's final condition for a consociational polity, namely, common agreement or "overarching cooperation" between competing elites to maintain the system as a going concern. While the ecumenical government period (1926-28) illustrates repeated elite efforts to transcend specific subculture ties and constraints in order to achieve a coalition government by elite cartel,\textsuperscript{35} such efforts were short-lived and far from successful. Nevertheless, the key purpose of such coalitions--system stability--was to a large extent provided for in the Greek case by the "stabil-


\textsuperscript{35}Rolf Dahrendorf, \textit{Society and Democracy in Germany} (Garden City, 1967), cited in Lijphart, p. 225.
izing" actions of individual political leaders. Perhaps the best case of such elite tacit commitment to the larger system was the career of Venizelos himself. A classic-type liberal\textsuperscript{36} dedicated to the British model of parliamentarism, Venizelos, never in his long career—despite his bitter feud with Constantine—challenged the principle of the constitutional monarchy until the half-hearted coup attempts of 1933 and 1935 when it was too late; and even his indirect complicity in these abortive coups engineered by his trusted lieutenant General Plastiras, has not been clearly established. It is clear, however, that as the undisputed leader of the Liberal forces during the early "revolutionary" enthusiasm, he refused to abolish the Monarchy in 1911 and instead called for a reformist Constitution; in his bitter struggle with Constantine—even after the secessionist movement of Salonika in 1916-17—he publicly appealed for the latter to reconsider,\textsuperscript{37} and privately expressed confidence that the Monarchy would


\textsuperscript{37} Daphnis, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 207.
adjust itself to the new Greek reality emerging at the end of the long war. Venizelos did not wish to destroy the oligarchic power structure or the Monarchy; he wanted and sought for coexistence. Consider the remarks he made on the eve of his painful and critical decision to head the Salonika movement:

The new Greece (not the geographically, but the spiritually and ethically new) deserves to say to the old: before these complex and difficult times, move aside and make some room for the new Greece—the one which has the vigor to meet the new situation.  

Nor did Venizelos enthusiastically support the founding of the Republic in 1924. He accepted it pending the public will, but declined appeals by many of his closest friends and supporters to personally take its case to the people. In short, Venizelos was a reformer not a revolutionary; he was a product both of the past and the new spirit of modernization and reform—the chief expression of the accommodative post-traditional phase of Greek modernization—seeking to make his peace with the old

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38 Ibid., p. 214; see also Ventiros, op. cit., pp. 30-31.


40 Daphnis, op. cit., p. 190.
world of tradition and oligarchy which, however, ultimately "seduced" him and destroyed him. His efforts at coexistence eventually alienated many of his key aides and among the masses, until finally Venizelism, transformed into a more radical form of Republicanism, defied the old master and moved on without him.

The Liberal-Populist struggle for power in the period before the Republic was waged in a social and political context which--not yet having been deeply affected by the impact of rapid and far-reaching change--precluded or inhibited basic structural changes in that precarious balance of forces. In spite of bitter and intense conflict, the main actors on the scene, however different their perceptions and interests, operated within the same general framework and its familiar rules and for the same limited stakes and objectives available. Thus beneath the sound and fury of Greek political life during much of the interwar period, the elites were in fact involved in that process of "incessant adjustment" required to turn the centrifugal tendencies of socio-cultural fragmentation into an essential (if precarious) state of balance. The focus now shifts to the internal dynamics of such a state
of affairs in an attempt to unravel the social basis of the Greek consociational polity.

Clientelism

The basic unit in Greek social structure, indeed the common thread\textsuperscript{41} running through all forms of organized life was (and apparently still is) the clientele linkage vertically and hierarchically connecting individuals. Running through and connecting all levels of society, these clientele relationships constituted the expected and effective mode of operation for the vast majority of the peasantry and the urban-based elites, until the influx of the refugees (especially to the cities) which gave instant rise to a relatively large urban mass for which there were no such ties and, after being established for some, proved of little utility.

Bred by a long tradition of parochialism and local autonomy, these clientele structures were reinforced by the gradual pace of national unification and social mobilization, and their development corresponds to that of the pervasive socio-cultural fragmentation. It was these

\textsuperscript{41}Legg, p. 43.
cleavage patterns that shaped the loose coalitions of factions which, after 1909, crystallized into the Liberal and Populist-royalist parties. As in the case of Italy, loyalty and allegiance were granted to local ties and interests rather than national institutions, and the parties during this period were little more than the parliamentary expressions of factions led by liberal and populist notables, each with his own personal clientele in his home constituency.  

In his recent study of politics and Communism in Southern Italy, Tarrow defines clientele structures as shifting, informal, and vertical-independent ties that have no basis in concrete institutions and... which are antithetical to modern society's emphasis upon... horizontal solidarity and large-scale organization... thus also a lack of class formation and developed secondary organizations.  

As in the case of Italian clientelismo, primary, group-  

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like activities in Greece served the functions which in the West are generally associated with class and associational or secondary group organizations. In this setting of mutually reinforcing personalist activities, associations and clientele relationships, therefore, the expression of broad functional interests in political terms is very much inhibited, and access to those in authority can expand only through the extended vertical channels of clientele links. Of course in Greece, as elsewhere, hybrid forms of associational interest groups were introduced in the years following the revolution of 1909. But these economic and occupational "interests" did not seek to generally articulate the needs and demands of their members. Rather, they were more like "corporate" structures with regulatory functions and responsive mainly to—and represented well in—the various bureaus and ministries of the government. By the late twenties, these corporate groupings were well established in most government bureaus, such as the Greek Senate.45

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44 Legg, op. cit., p. 100.

Like so many other "modern" organizational forms borrowed from the West, these structures served only the interests of the few in the over-extended and poorly-managed Greek bureaucracy, and did not represent such otherwise well-known functions as interest aggregation and articulation on behalf of the broad masses—functions that were, however, handled separately by separate clientele group linkages. Thus many of the so-called "occupational" groups were associational only in name. Professionals such as doctors and lawyers were active organizers of associations, but mainly for the purpose of obtaining a form of secure, permanent patronage and increased political influence, not out of any sense of duty or professional ethics on behalf of social welfare and justice. Thus the prospects of increased patronage "resources" (and hence political influence) made it far more desirable to enter certain occupations rather than others. For example, a quite disproportionate number of prospective university students entered the fields of law and medicine, irrespective of the fact that far more trained and educated

46 Ibid.
47 Stavrianos, op. cit., p. 685.
personnel were needed in other areas of lesser "status."

The above case is characteristic of the disproportionate influence of such "interest" groups on overall government policy, not only in the field of education but also in the poorly-planned economic policy, particularly in agriculture. Nowhere is the case of imbalanced and fragmented interest articulation, resulting in unsystematic and incoherent legislation, more evident. Thus, in 1934, Sideres noted that "...our agricultural policy is again where it started."48 And Pepelasis, in his fine analysis of the socio-political effects on the Greek economy, concludes that:

Generally, Greek economic policy and legislation have been whimsical, fickle, self-contradictory, and unplanned.49

The extent and significance of clientele structures and relationships may be further illustrated by the nature and development of political parties. The major political parties were largely mere extensions of local and regional

48 Quoted in ibid., p. 682.

patron-client relationships, and the introduction of modern forms of structure and organization were mostly formalities or, as Sartori would have it in another context, "...mostly a facade covering loose and shifting coalitions of notables." The term "party" is to be used loosely, therefore, and it would be more appropriate to refer to these as factions or loose political groupings composed of "...cliques, clubs, and small groups of notables." What cohesiveness there was, was mostly based on men rather than principles. Since these factions were not held together by any concrete set of principles or rules of bureaucratic organization but by the ties of mutual obligation, particular groupings were not permanent or stable, and the tendency of 'party-hopping' from one to the other was strong and easily accomplished. The rule, as Meynaud points out, was that "...each performs, or is expected to perform, the services expected by the other."  


51 LaPalombara and Weiner, p. 5.

52 J. Meynaud, Oi Politikes Dynames Stin Hellada ("Political Forces in Greece"), Athens, 1965, p. 44.
Party discipline was hardly evident, since there were no party caucuses or party "whips" to induce members to tow the party line, namely, that of the top leaders. What discipline did exist was based on a personal, non-bureaucratic control structure, that is, the personal qualities of the leader. And when expected services were not performed over a period of time, unity tended to break down.

Reflecting the discontinuities of the party system, party structure did not reach the local level. Political functions here were performed by a variety of notables, teachers, priests, lawyers, or merchants, thus linking the locality to province and on to higher levels. Deputies' activities in their home districts were directed mainly to personal rather than party interests, and any efforts at party representation were discouraged by the fact that the leadership provided deputies with little information regarding party policy. Party and legislative committees were rare and in any case impractical.

53 Miller, op. cit., p. 99.
54 Legg, op. cit., p. 135.
55 Ibid.
Since policy positions were determined by the personal qualities of a leader rather than the merits of liabilities of a given issue, permanent and important committees were hardly useful, and served mainly an honorific function. And this key ingredient of personality persists.  

A recently conducted survey among a sample of 55 deputies asked these to list their preferences for qualifications to a ministerial office. A high percentage of these cited two broad categories: desirable personal characteristics and political backing.

**Political Recruitment**

Since the attractiveness of a "high" status occupation was due to the political connections and "resources" that would be assured thereby, a political position was among the most desirable, though, as we shall see, not widely available. Thus, between 1926 and 1946, over 10,000 different persons appeared as candidates in the fourteen parliamentary elections held during this period.  

56  
**Ibid.**, p. 137.

57  
On the basis of a table listing the parliamentary seats and candidates in the elections between 1926 and 1936, we found the mean ratio of candidates per seat (a total of 270 seats available on the average) to be 5:1. This discrepancy is further compounded by the persisting narrow base of political recruitment. As Legg points out, parties with a history of success have had very few places for new candidates, and the candidacy of those recruited has few changes of winning. Lack of success by newcomers has been particularly evident in the major parties and "...only once in the years 1963-63 did new entrants do better than the old."

The central place of the family in political socialization, along with the narrow base of political recruitment, on the one hand, and clientelism on the other, were (and continue to be) mutually reinforcing. In the period between 1833-1923, a dozen men each served as Prime Minister and in some Ministerial capacity six or more times.

58 Ibid., p. 137.
59 Ibid., p. 147.
60 Ibid., p. 148.
and in the case of eight of these, Cabinet posts were held by family members of each over a span covering three generations. Another study, reporting recent findings in an interview of 55 Greek Deputies, cites a rather high percentage of responses in terms of family influence in politics in comparison to other sources of interest, as shown in Table 2.

**TABLE 2**

**MAJOR SOURCES OF INTEREST IN POLITICS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Interest</th>
<th>Percentage Responding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family influence</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political or civic participation</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal predispositions</td>
<td>63.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic beliefs</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Only in terms of personal predispositions was the response higher than that for family influence, but that

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*Dakin, op. cit., pp. 283-303.*
only further reinforces the central role of clientelism, since personalism is one of its main ingredients.

The traditional pattern of deputy recruitment from political families continues to the present, and it is particularly marked in certain regions though very small in others. A recent study covering the results of two elections has found the varying percentages of elected deputies from political families shown in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>1958</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Athens-Piraeus</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peloponnesus</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thessaly</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crete</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>61.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrace</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

 TABLE 3a

DEPUTIES FROM POLITICAL FAMILIES


It should be noted that the highest percentages are of Deputies from area of "old" Greece, such as Thessaly and the Peloponnesus, where the influence of clientelistic structures remains predominant in politics and society. In contrast, percentages for relatively "new" regions such
as Macedonia and Thrace (annexed in 1912 and 1920, respectively) are considerably lower. These findings are significant for our purposes, for they broadly illustrate the profound socio-economic and political changes occurring after the refugee influx in 1923. Thus the markedly lower percentiles for Macedonia and Thrace are in part due to the fact that these regions account for some of the most extensive refugee settlement—a theme to be taken up in the next chapter. For a number of reasons—as will be shown later—a good many of the refugees would not and often could not enter into the traditional clientele relationships, and thus sought other means of organization and expression.

**Fragmentation and Stability**

In light of the above discussion on the internal dynamics of Greek politics and its societal base, the basic theme of stability and continuity in the midst of extensive fragmentation and short-term instability becomes clearer. The vertical and relatively independent clientele structures allowed for a continuous process between politics and society that tended to offset the discontinuities and centrifugal tendencies of such a "...discontinuous and
issueless political process." Thus, while shifting loyalties and coalitions and rapid government turnover resulted in short-term instability, this very same fragmentation and "polarized pluralism" provided the consociational polity in Greece with an adaptability and a resiliency that were complementary and indeed essential for overall system stability in the long run. In short, interwar Greek politics resembles the Lebanese case as reported by Hudson:

Thus, goals and interests are sought through particularistic rather than universalistic channels....The object of every player is to make small gains without upsetting the structural balance. As a result, the political situation seems to be changing constantly, yet very little really happens.  

So long as the pursuit of reciprocal favors via the clientele structures prevailed as the modus operandi of Greek politics, the process of "incessant adjustment" between elites could continue as each sought and waited his turn at the top.

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62 Legg, op. cit., p. 143.

63 Michael C. Hudson, "Democracy and Social Mobilization in Lebanese Politics," in Jackson and Stein, op. cit., p. 239.
decision-making load on the elites. Thus the Greek Deputy or Cabinet Minister, in office or out, seeking favors for his clientele in order to expand his patronage base, was little concerned with such burdensome issues as broad social and economic policy. Therefore, his responsibility to the "legislative process" largely coincided with his obligations to his various clients. This factor of narrow and limited responsibility, by minimizing the number and scope of possible "liabilities" facing the elites, tended also to encourage general elite support for the basic stability and perpetuation of the system. As in this system thoroughly permeated by the clientele networks, all elite actors (in the parliamentary or extra-parliamentary level) had the same potential access to similar levers of power through similar though separate channels, there existed the common basic interest to keep this edifice a going concern.

*Modernizing Traditionalism*

Interwar Greece was a society undergoing modernization. Starting in the 1860's, the introduction of Western political institutions, a market economy, the land reform program, and an improved transportation system brought
about gradual and piecemeal change, until the Revolution of 1909 seemed to be adding a new dynamism to the forces for change and reform. With the appearance of new leadership under Venizelos, new ideas, and a new sense of confidence and direction modernity seemed to provide the means with which Greece could rid herself of the shackles of an oligarchic and semi-feudal past, and turn to the pressing problems ushered by expansion and an enlarged population.

But change and reform were slow and often inconclusive. The "modern" Western institutions that were hastily grafted onto the more traditional structures soon proved superficial and tended to produce serious disruptions. Nevertheless, the process of modernization was here to stay, it was ongoing, and the task now was to make room for it in the existing social and political setting; indeed, the period between the two wars may be largely seen as a series of attempts to arrive at such a rapprochement.

In this way during this period, modernization was mostly accommodated within the consociational Greek polity and the results did not represent substantive differences from the past. The introduction of parliamentary institutions and procedures (e.g., political parties, mass suffrage, proportional representation, etc.) are not neces-
We have suggested that low-level contact and interaction between differing subcultures, reinforced by sharp cleavage patterns, is conducive to the basic stability of a consociational polity. This thesis—not limited to this polity type—is endorsed by Easton, Verba, and Deutsch. Thus Easton summarizes his views as follows:

The major hope of avoiding stress between heterogeneous socio-cultural units may lie in attempting to incorporate and manage rather than to eliminate the diversity of cultures.

Arguing along similar lines, Verba suggests that it is by bringing "...differing subcultures into contact with each other," that the management of conflict commensurate with minimal stability may become quite difficult. In the Greek case, not only did minimal subculture contact promote system stability, it also permitted for a relatively low

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sarily accompanied by—-or do they usually result in—the efficiency, or the rational, secular and ethical behavior patterns that in the West are generally associated with such institutions. Such borrowed political forms may satisfy the universal urge to be "modern" or, as Binder points out, may serve as yet another way of "...getting traditional things done." They do not necessarily determine or significantly influence the nature and course of political action, or the real makeup and expression of other related forms of behavior. As Riggs succinctly argues:

Clearly political parties, elections, and elected assemblies can be used to decorate a polity as well as to guide and control it... modernization (or emulative acculturation, if you prefer) has to do with the introduction of borrowed structures, both Western and neo-traditional, but not in the way in which they are used, or how they affect pre-existing structures.70


In Greece, during the accommodative post-traditional phase of modernization, political parties, the Monarchy, the military and the bureaucracy were used, as Legg points out, not as national or broadly socio-political institutions to which basic loyalties were granted, but for narrow and usually antagonistic parochial purposes. In this way through the expansion and extension of the clientele structures, the prospects for an efficient and responsible bureaucracy—its main role defined in terms of broadly-based social and economic criteria, resulted in a case of what may be called mere "bureaucratic hyper-trophy," an expanded status-conscious structure incorporating an ever larger number of idle personnel in over-staffed departments; political parties turned out to be overgrown cliques, clubs or loose coalitions of factions, and the focal point and final "clearing houses" for long chains of patron-client networks; and the institution of universal suffrage, rather than serving as the basis for the politicization of the masses, merely broadened the base and scope of the available political resources in the struggle for reciprocal favors between patrons and clients,

\footnote{Legg, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 83.}
and thus tending to inhibit the development of large-scale interest politics, \textsuperscript{72} and a responsible and efficient political machinery.

In such a clientele-oriented system where general interests were rarely, if ever, enunciated (until after the refugee impact) and the "processing" of demands by separate clientele networks was carried out on an individualist basis, there was no need—indeed, it was impractical—to disturb or restructure existing authority relationships, especially since these proved compatible with the early phase of superficial (or "decorative") modernization. After all, the satisfaction of individual or family demands is best achieved with minimal disruption of existing institutions and practices. It is the above considerations that help explain the paradox of system stability in the midst of intense conflict, stagnation and inefficiency, and recurring subsystem instability. The consequences of adhering to the ways of the past paraded in new dress were, as noted earlier, sharp internal division, political instability and immobilism, and above all elite inability to resolve the mounting problems facing a society in transi-

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 104.
The following passage from a sharp and brilliant indictment of Rumanian society and institutions during the interwar years is also characteristic of maladies and precariousness in Greek social and political life in this period.

Unfortunately our glorious urban institutions for all their liberal-democratic techniques, are pure falsehoods...we have introduced universal suffrage but with ballot stuffing; we have ruined rural households in order to increase credit institutions, but have not permitted free competition among these institutions...we have encouraged national industry, not for the benefit of the rural population...but for the benefit of politicians who are pensioners of this national industry; we have centralized the administration of the country, not in the hands of a trained bureaucracy but in the hands of the parties and their partisans; in a word, but at bottom we have persisted in the sycophantic habits of the past. In this way we have transformed political life into a hopeless turmoil.73

Yet while the key problems were not solved, they were generally "contained" or postponed. Postponement of pressing issues was typical, as with the case of the constitutional and amnesty questions. This, moreover, was expected in view of the rapid succession of governments, the accompanying turnover of bureaucratic personnel, and

73 Quoted in Stavrianos, op. cit., p. 613.
the policy discontinuity that resulted. The same held true for pressing social legislation, pending programs for economic development, electoral and administrative reform, etc. Since, however, the variety of positions on issues corresponded closely to the cleavage patterns of the fragmented Greek polity, solutions in terms of a broad societal level were rare indeed. In a setting of "issue-less politics" where the formulation and articulation of political issues is made almost exclusively in terms of a particular clientele network, problem-solving is bound to be partial and incomplete. Thus deputies whose party or faction is in power seek to resolve problems in terms solely of their clientele group with little or no regard for the wider societal implications (and, of course, extra-parliamentary support is always available if needed). If a deputy and his party are out of power, the options have been to abstain from the political process, resign in apathy and simply wait for his turn at the top, or strike a bargain with those in power. In any case, he does not expect very much.

In short, the solution of pressing social, economic, and political problems, and the formulation of issues, were closely related to the cleavage patterns reflecting
the numerous clientele networks. So long as the behavior patterns legitimized and routinized by the traditional order remained viable and largely unchallenged by other alternatives for access to social prestige and political power, the ability of the consociational polity in Greece to return to a state of stability (following repeated disruptions caused by the hopelessly bogged-down legislation, government instability, and the unpredictable interventions of a variety of extra-parliamentary forces) was assured. Indeed, the overall integrity and basic constitution of the system were not seriously challenged until, largely as a result of the refugee impact, there emerged basic change in the social structure, namely, in the clientele structures.

The above considerations challenge the thesis that with increased economic development, social mobilization, and socio-cultural communication, political integration and modernity, along western lines of development, can be adequately achieved. Instead, it is proposed here that the widely-held assumptions of successful national unification and social integration through the so-called process of "nation-building" as developed by Deutsch and
others is questionable and, in the case of interwar Greece, untenable. Indeed, the Greek case suggests considerable malintegration and extensive discontinuities in the process of socio-economic and political modernization.

And recent research tends to support this view. For example, Smelser points out that modernization tends to be divisive of established society and thus to further reinforce existing cleavage patterns, and this is particularly true in a society already badly fragmented. Also, Connor supports the view that increases in social mobilization and communication tend to increase cultural awareness and to exacerbate differences by making groups more aware of their differences with others. In the case of Greece, early modernization made possible a condition

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76 W. Connor, "Nation-Building or Destroying?" *World Politics*, XXIV, 3 (April, 1972), pp. 319-55.
of mutual reinforcement between the clientele structures and the divisive tendencies of introducing new structures and methods.

Under what conditions, then, will sustained change and modernization increase the prospects for assimilation and integration rather than tend to further division? And more precisely, as the Greek case suggests, how could this come about while providing for the vital functions of security and system stability? It should be emphasized that the Greek polity undergoing what we have termed "modernizing traditionalism" met those key requirements by virtue of its peculiar social structure. The effects of modernization were in a sense "compartmentalized," and intense social and political conflict was limited to "fester in the narrow interstices of personal relations," and thus within limits compatible with system stability.
CHAPTER III

THE INTERWAR GREEK POLITY—PHASE TWO:
THE REFUGEE IMPACT, CRISIS AND THE
THRESHOLD OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Few nations have experienced such a shock as that confronting Greece in the aftermath of the Anatolian disaster. Suddenly and without warning, Greece, quite unprepared, was faced with the task of absorbing all at once the triple shock of military and diplomatic humiliation, the shattering of the national myth of the Megali Idea, and the influx of one and a half million embittered and mostly penniless refugees—a shock that overwhelmed and very nearly destroyed the fabric of state and society. The multi-faceted refugee impact was the main thrust of that force which propelled the second, more dynamic wave of rapid and far-reaching change, thus confronting Greece with a most profound and critical challenge. It is as the epicenter of such new forces for change and modernization that the refugee impact assumes the cast of a meaningful and explanatory variable in the complex world of Greek politics.
Somehow, after the influx of refugees things were
different in Greece; events and changes were taking place
in a manner quite different than before. As one author,
noting the nature of the impact upon Greece, puts it:

One short clause in the Treaty of Laussane
brought a Near Eastern Ruritania into the
the headlong rout of twentieth-century
politics. ¹

A number of key changes in the Greek polity come immediate-
ly to mind: the rise of the Republic in 1924; the political
realignments and the emergence of multi-partyism; signifi-
cant—if only brief and spasmodic—steps toward economic
development and industrialization; sudden urbanization,
"proletarianization and the rise of syndicalism; the rise
of Communism as a major political force; and above all,
basic changes in the social structure and the subculture
cleavage patterns. All of the above are related—
directly or indirectly—to the refugee impact. And the
combined force of these and other factors brought Greece
to the "threshold" of political development, but also,
paradoxically, gave rise to other contending and often
antagonistic socio-political forces that led the Greek
polity to the brink of chaos and disintegration.

¹Riggs in Braibanti, op. cit., p. 236.
If, as this study maintains, the refugee impact represents a dimension of change and modernization that markedly differs from previous patterns; if as the main vehicle or "agent" of such change it ushered in the developmental process, then clearly some definitions and distinctions are in order.

The "Threshold" of Political Development

Generally, modernization may be considered as a type of "emulative acculturation in which cultural practices, institutional forms, and technologies are consciously borrowed or adapted from one society to another."\(^2\) Historically, such a complex and uneven process has demonstrated that technological change and institutional forms may be diffused or borrowed much more readily than their cultural-social concommitants. Thus early post-traditional modernization in Greece was accommodated to the basic framework of the consociational polity, but was not accompanied by critical changes in the social structure or in the basic political alignments and behavior patterns. However, when certain "historical discontinuities"--such as those ushered

\(^2\)Binder, op. cit., p. 16.
by the refugee impact--emerge, bringing new patterns of "regularities" in the social and political process, and when these involve changes in the socio-political structure as well as in terms of borrowed institutions and technologies, we may think of the new phase of modernization in terms of a "historical threshold" marking off the old patterns of regularities from the newly emerging ones. This type of modernity resulting from entering and/or crossing this threshold is seen here as indicative of a critical juncture in the transition from tradition to modernity and as qualitatively different from those patterns occurring before.

Our understanding of the fundamental distinction between political change and political development is closely related to this conception of modernity. Change occurring within the socio-political parameters of a given "era" and its characteristic "regularities" would refer to change as such while developmental change may be said to result from "...the political consequences of crossing (or

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3 Ibid., p. 12.

4 Ibid., p. 16.
entering) an historical threshold."⁵ But entering such a threshold in no way will assure the crossing of it; indeed this represents the period of maximum tension and stress confronting the ability of a polity to undergo change. Thus in one sense, we may view the moment of "episode" of entrance into the threshold as the critical test of a transitional polity to both regulate and maximize the modernization process, for the main significance of the threshold of political development lies in the fact that it presents a polity with both the opportunity of sustained modernization and development, and the most critical challenge or threat to its fundamental stability and basic constitution. It follows that a polity may, under certain conditions and costs, cross the threshold or—as is so often the case—get bogged down in a state of stagnation and "retarded" or "delayed" development and its consequences. The widely held view that contemporary Greece remains in the politically "underdeveloped" or "developing" category is a sharp reminder that in this case the threshold was not crossed but only entered into—triggering a series of developments that foreshadowed the demise of the con-

⁵ Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication.
sociational polity and the rise of authoritarianism in 1936.

The discontinuities or differentials of the modernization process may be studied by focusing on its characteristic traits as these develop over time. It is generally held, that in a society undergoing increased socio-economic and political complexity—defined here briefly as functional role specificity, and structural specialization and differentiation—these traits consist of: (1) economic development, defined here as the economic consequences of technological change; (2) greater social mobility between differing social strata with emphasis on urbanization; (3) the increasing significance of the middle sectors and the related rise of associational interest groups, along with loosened family and primary group ties; (4) increases in bureaucratization in terms of more rational and secular patterns of a state's organizational behavior; and (5) increased industrialization and its concomitants such as a large and mobile work force, centralized planning, flowing capital for investment, etc. The changes associated with these traits (or, better, with the efforts to attain these) generate numerous problems that confront a polity and its established order with varying degrees of scope
and intensity. Thus, as Deutsch points out, urbanization and social mobilization create problems of extending identification and transferring loyalties⁶ from the family and the primary group to the society and the state. Similarly, there are problems of increasing social awareness, namely, of socializing new members into the social and political order. Finally, economic development and bureaucratization generate problems concerning a more equitable distribution of available goods and services, greater expectations for increased levels in these, demands for more and more efficient programs of social (e.g., social welfare, justice, medical aid, etc.) and demands for achievement rather than status ascriptive norms governing social role performance.

The above problems may be grouped in the following widely-accepted classification scheme: the five-fold "problem areas"⁷ consisting of the problems of "identity," "legitimacy," "participation," "distribution" and "penetration." The extent to which a polity succeeds in resolving recurring problems in any or all of the problem


⁷Binder, op. cit., p. 53.
areas will, according to Binder,\(^8\) determine "the political path to modernity," or political development. Before expanding further along these lines, a closer look at the Greek case will help put this line of conceptualization in historical perspective.

**Crises of Modernization**

During the post-traditional phase, the consociational Greek polity handled such problems of modernity in its characteristic and peculiar way. Each of the problem areas was accommodated within the existing institutional framework based on the clientele system. Now if we may define a "crisis" as "...a stage in the solution of these problems that requires new patterns of institutionalization...involving more than the mere expansion of previous patterns of institutionalization," it becomes clear that Greece in this early phase did not undergo crises at all but only a repetitive series of challenges that were adapted (not to say resolved) in the existing order of things. Despite, then, the consequences in political

\(^8\)Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 303.

\(^9\)Hudson, *op. cit.*, p. 293.
instability and immobilism, these problems were by and large "routinized" as Greece, much as in the case of Lebanon, exhibited a peculiar capacity to "institutionalize" instability,¹⁰ as divisive conflict within the mosaic of conflicting loyalties and parochial interests (and "underwritten" as it were by the clientele system) was fully expected and common.

A crisis represents a situation whereby the fundamental institutional patterns in a polity are challenged and routine response proves inadequate. If the crisis is to be averted and the viability of the system assured, some innovative activity or capacity by the government (e.g., its ability to legislate and implement policy on the basis of a changing, more meaningful and more broadly-based conception of political participation) is necessary. In other words, as happened in Greece with the pressing needs for broad social policy and reform after rapid urbanization and social mobilization accompanying the refugee influx to the cities, some changes create pressures for entirely new kinds of participatory and distributive

¹⁰Verba, op. cit., pp. 303-305.
activities, for example, and the emergence of new conditions and new social groups affect a redefinition of a given problem area, as a problem is thus transformed into a crisis.\footnote{Legg, op. cit., p. 126.} In Greece before the refugees, a participation crisis was not provoked;\footnote{Ibid., p. 127.} the introduction of parliamentary institutions and mass suffrage and the gradual pressures for participation that were generated, were accommodated within the system largely by expanding (or by "overloading the circuits," as it were) of the clientele structures. But as the issue of participation became redefined by a large number of people who demanded not only a greater voice in politics, but also meaningful organizational and representational alternatives to those provided by clientelism, structural innovation became an imperative and, in its absence, a series of crises was inevitable.

And the same was also true for the problem areas of legitimacy and identity. So long as loyalty was granted to incumbents of political offices rather than institutions, the personalized and intimate relationships within clientele
structures served their purpose as the functional equivalents to other, more familiar integrative mechanisms. Thus there was no crisis of legitimacy since the traditional patron-client relationships upon which authority and obligation rested were functional and thus authoritative. Moreover, this notion of legitimacy was further reinforced by the fact that the prevailing elite conceptions of modernity were made to closely coincide with the values and needs of the existing social order—in short, there was a correspondence between elite views and the varied interests and demands of the populace. But the refugee impact ushered fresh new ideas about modernity and about the relationships of men to the state and to each other. In the past, such abstractions as the "state," or the "nation" remained just that and were hardly taken seriously in any consistent or systematic manner. Beyond the rhetoric of politicians, and in between the occasional brilliant flashes of nationalism as with the First Balkan Wars (1912-13) and the first phase of the Anatolian Campaign (1918-20), affairs at home moved along pretty much as they always had amid the hatreds, divisions and narrowly based interests of warring cliques and factions. But with the first stirrings of mass society and class-based
politics accompanying the influx of refugees, the force of nationalism and the idea of Hellenism--no less than the new doctrines of Communism, Socialism, etc.--emerged for yet another major reassessment.

The refugee impact ushered growing multiple pressures for widespread reform and the search for new societal goals. In this way economic criteria came to replace political institutions as the measure of modernity, and the existing political system lost legitimacy in the eyes of some Greeks.13

And underlying this search for identity and goals was the refugees' own predicament upon settling in their new home. For after a brief period of seeking to adjust "to the system," it became increasingly clear that many of the newcomers had decided to part company with their once-revered "redeemer," Venizelos, and with the mildly liberal policies of assimilation--policies that were in effect a call for coexistence with the old, and, for many of the refugees, discredited, ways of Greece. In short, a good many of the refugees were quickly disillusioned; what they expected or hoped for, and what they actually found, were two very different things. As Holden so eloquently put it:

13Pentzopoulos, op. cit., p. 172.
The refugees "came home" to a Greece that for them had never really existed. Their Greece had been an empire of the mind, a folk ideal compounded of grand historical and cultural associations.  

Indeed! Yet one key point that Holden and many others failed to mention is that many refugees took that "empire of the mind" quite seriously and were determined to do something about it. That some eventually turned to Communism or to other radical doctrines, is in one sense a sign of their ultimate frustration, after the hopes engendered by the early signs of change turned to a deep pessimism.

Rapid Social Mobilization and Development

Let us now consider some of the key indicators for modernity cited earlier in relation to the Greek case. First, inter-group mobility between the cities and the countryside prior to 1923 was negligible. Between 1928 and 1940, the urban population increased from 33 per cent of the total to only 33.7 per cent, and this slight increase was due primarily to the movement of some rural refugees

who decided to seek their fortune in the cities.\textsuperscript{15} To be sure, there was a good deal of movement between city and countryside, but in terms of effective urbanization it was quite deceptive. Indeed, as Fried\textsuperscript{16} points out, this apparent mobility served to keep the urban and rural components of kinship and clientele groups in close contact; it did not loosen the family ties or alter the "world view" of the peasant. The thousands of "origin associations found in all urban centers further illustrate this common practice of visiting, or temporarily residing in, the seats of power while keeping close touch with home base.\textsuperscript{17}

The processes of urbanization and social mobilization in Greece emerged suddenly and almost exclusively as a result of the refugee masses' influx to the cities. The large urban centers were in a sense "instantly" urbanized by a refugee population. In the Athens-Piracus area alone, over 240,000 newcomers were settled, often housed in ware-

\textsuperscript{15}Legg, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 110.

\textsuperscript{16}Pentzopoulos, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 173.

houses, theatres, and churches, and confronted with a suspicious and resentful native population with which they had to compete for a livelihood.\footnote{18} Table 4 below indicates the increase in urban population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population (census of 1920)</th>
<th>Population (1926)</th>
<th>Per cent of increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Athens-Piraeus</td>
<td>453,042</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salonika</td>
<td>174,390</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kavalla</td>
<td>22,939</td>
<td>52,000</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volos</td>
<td>30,046</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\footnote{\textsuperscript{a}} G. Daphnis, \textit{Greece Between Two Wars} (Athens, 1955), p. 84.

Thus the Greek state was suddenly confronted with the task of devising new policies and allocating new resources in the areas of housing, sanitation, social welfare, employment regulation, etc., policies that were not previously established, and in any case unnecessary in the context of the consociational system.

\footnote{18} \textit{Statistical Annual of Greece}, 1930, p. 75.
"Instant" urbanization and social mobilization in inter-war Greece gave rise to a relatively large, proletarian-like mass that was without the familiar clientele and not disposed to enter into these. This central fact stimulated the development of two related but antagonistic processes that proved vital for the formation and outcome of the second, more "advanced" phase of modernization: the first was the expansion in the variety and scope of governmental activity and policy-making; the second was the upsurge in the organizational activity in Greek society, particularly among the refugees in both the urban and rural areas.

First, the state was forced to initiate new programs for broad social legislation and reform to meet an emerging situation of potential crisis and social unrest. It is often overlooked that while the many skills and ingenuity of the newcomers gave a tremendous boost to the Greek economy, nearly one-fourth of the refugees were unskilled and uneducated, thus completely dependent on state relief and other public services. This important fact reflecting the dualism of the refugee impact is illustrated in Table 5.
TABLE 5

DISTRIBUTION OF REFUGEES ABOVE THE AGE OF 10 BY OCCUPATION (1928)\textsuperscript{a}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Categories</th>
<th>Number of Refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>242,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>114,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>38,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without Occupation</td>
<td>340,976</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a} G. Daphnis, \textit{Greece Between Two Wars} (Athens, 1955), p. 85.

Internal growth and development moved ahead during the last complete Venizelos administration (1928-32). Thus 1650 kms. of new paved roads were built, 3,167 new schools were constructed, and after an extensive program of public works, 2,750,000 hectares of new tillable land were made available.\textsuperscript{19} And during this period, despite a 20 percent increase in spending, the financial picture was temporarily improved due to the productivity of the newcomers and a series of loans from abroad. As a result, there was a

\textsuperscript{19} Pentzopoulos, p. 159. A stremma equals about one-fourth of an acre.
brief period of little or no unemployment (1929-30), and the budget showed a surplus until the period 1931-32 when there was a sharp deficit, reflecting the devastating effects of the depression years.\textsuperscript{20} Thus the growth period was brief and inconclusive and the results far from positive. Expectations were raised—on the basis of the government's good but limited performance—for sustained internal growth and reform which, however, was not forthcoming.

Urbanization and proletarianization usher the need for comprehensive programs of social legislation. The brief success of the Greek polity in meeting the new demands and aspirations was, in fact, counter-productive: it both demonstrated the relevance and utility of alternatives to the clientele system of interest articulation and socio-economic security, and, when success turned to failure after 1930, the refugees and all those directly or indirectly affected by their impact sought new and more radical courses for action.

\textsuperscript{20} Andreades, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 173.
But the contradictory results of progress combined with failure and disappointment are best illustrated in the changes in agriculture. As was noted earlier, the agricultural settlement of refugees was far more successful than the urban, and increases in production paralleled the new spirit of organization, particularly in the northeast where the rural refugees were most numerous. The results of intensive cultivation are shown in Table 6.

**TABLE 6**

**INCREASES IN TILLABLE LAND**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strammata</th>
<th>14 million</th>
<th>over 19 million</th>
<th>nearly 22 million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>(an all-time record)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


But the combination of intensive cultivation, the radical reform movement after the refugees and the high density of persons on the farms resulted in the fragmentation of arable land and, consequently in the long-run, in low productivity. Thus between 1917 and 1925, a total of 1,496
landed properties were expropriated\textsuperscript{21} and the total amount of tillable land affected by the radical reform programs in comparison to other European nations was as follows:\textsuperscript{22}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{l|c}
\hline
\textbf{Percent} & \\
\hline
Greece & 50 \\
Rumania & 19.7 \\
Poland & 6 \\
Czechoslovakia & 14.1 \\
Yugoslavia & 10 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

And Greece led all European nations in the number of farmers per producing square mile. These data are shown in Table 7.

\section*{TABLE 7}
\textbf{RURAL POPULATION DENSITY}\textsuperscript{a}  
\textit{(pre-1939 statistics)}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{l|c}
\hline
\textbf{No. of Persons} & \\
\hline
Greece & 407 \\
Rumania & 251 \\
Italy & 233 \\
Germany & 186 \\
Yugoslavia & 295 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{21}Pentzopoulos, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 159.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{22}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 160.
\end{flushright}
The extremely small holdings resulting from such fragmentation plus the need to pool resources in order to buy new farm equipment, forced cooperation and the need for organization among the rural population. The spirit of organization may be illustrated by the rapid growth of agricultural cooperatives and trade unions, structures resembling the Western-type of associational interest groups and thus a novelty for Greece. Between 1921 and 1925, about 1,350 agricultural associations were established. Table 8 below illustrates the situation in 1925 in Macedonia where these were most numerous.

**TABLE 8**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>No. of Societies</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191 local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>404 refugee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 mixed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Industrial development during this period shows a similar pattern of growth. During the decade of 1921-31 there was a six-fold increase in the value of industrial
production, a substantial increase in the value of exports, and a rapid expansion of the available workforce, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Workers in Thousands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>103,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>429,831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of refugees (1929)</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus the increase in 1929 was almost totally due to the workers among the refugees. Though not very successful in influencing the course of Greek politics until the early thirties, the trade unions did provide an important source of organizational power which helped set the stage for the challenge to the consociational system and the crises that followed.

The movement towards alternative types of socio-political organizations along impersonal and more secular lines also had a significant impact on the party system. The two major political parties, the Liberal and the

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23 Pentzopoulos, op. cit., p. 160.

24 Legg, op. cit., p. 114.

25 Diamant, op. cit., p. 96.
Populist, dominated the scene until about 1930. But after the effects of urbanization and social mobilization began to take clearly political undertones, the newly formed minor parties began to cater to the new uncommitted masses. Thus having found a new base of potential support, the old splinter groups like the Metaxas and Papanastassiou groupings turned into mass-oriented parties in defiance of the two major alignments and their leadership.

The appearance of the multi-party system \(^{26}\) undermined the consociational polity by challenging its basic function: minimal system stability. The old patterns of political fragmentation did not seriously threaten basic system stability because all groupings, large and small, sought to utilize the same channels of access to political power. Whatever the particular alignment at any one time, the different groupings still polarized around the two major poles, thus insuring the state of "polarized cohesion" discussed earlier. But when fragmentation emerges without clearly established patterns of orientation and communication, a system can no longer be assured of its

basic stabilizing function.

We have argued that the changes wrought by the multi-faceted refugee impact may be viewed in terms of the five-fold crises of political development. Routine response by the Greek polity, that is accommodation within the existing institutional framework, in meeting the increasing demands for new patterns of distribution and participation proved inadequate. Also, the failure to incorporate the urban and some rural masses into the clientele structures ushered the crises of identity and legitimacy which further aggrevated the overall crisis pattern and sequence.

Adaptation and Innovation

Closer study of the passing of a crisis or a set of these and the political consequences requires a clear conceptualization of the process of political development. According to Diamant, political development may be defined as the process through which a polity acquires "...the capacity to sustain continuously new types of goals and demands and the creation of new types of organizations." 27

But the capacity involved in political development is not merely the Parsonian "evolutionary universal" of adaptation or "the capacity to cope with broad ranges of environmental factors, through adjustment, or active control, or both,"²⁸ nor is it merely the system capability function referred to by Almond as "the criterion of political change,"²⁹ allowing a polity to respond efficiently and autonomously to a new range of problems. In short, it is not merely the ability of a system to survive by modifying its environment to meet its basic needs and goals, but also the innovative and "creative" capacity to increase its power potential in order to "...plan, implement, and manipulate new change,"³⁰ and thus itself undergo basic change to meet new needs and the creation of new goals.

Thus in spite of its ability to survive by adapting its environment, the Greek polity did not achieve the

²⁸ Coleman, op. cit., p. 79.

²⁹ Diamant, op. cit., p. 96.

innovative capacity through which, as Diamant would have it, it would be able "to command resources from, and power over, wide sphere and regions of the society."\textsuperscript{31} Rather it was a limited capacity geared to the narrow requirements of the consociational polity, not a broad societal capacity. Translating capacity into political power, there was little net increase in overall power, but merely a continuous redistribution of such resources between a relatively fixed number of rotating elites. The modernized machine was geared to provide for a better "lubrication" of the interacting parts, and to allow for some increase of those involved in the struggle for the same pool of power resources, but not to generate cumulative increases in new sources of power required for the realization of new social demands and goals. As Geertz eloquently puts it, the growth of a modern state superimposed on a traditional social context represents not merely the shifting or transfer of a fixed quantity of power between groups...but rather the creation of a new and more efficient machine for the production of power itself, and thus an increase in the

general political capacity of the society. This is a much more genuinely "revolutionary" phenomena than the mere redistribution, however radical, of power within a given system.\textsuperscript{32}

Modernity in Greece did not result in an integrative, creative, responsive as well as adaptive capacity, and hence into what Apter calls "the expansion of choice" which results from the varied proliferation of functional roles in a society.\textsuperscript{33} When after the profound refugee impact, new demands and organizations did emerge and goals and issues were redefined, the Greek polity, not having "invested" in future capacity but only in the ability to meet the power contingencies of the moment, found itself faced with a series of crises that it could not solve.

New demands for participation and distribution reflect the general imperative of equality, while the new organizational forms that emerge in response to these refer to another imperative, namely, structural differentiation. The


continuous interaction between these three imperatives—capacity, equality and differentiation—reflects the process of political development. These are said to constitute the developmental syndrome\textsuperscript{34} or the key interacting ingredients in the developmental process.\textsuperscript{35} It is along these three dimensions of the syndrome that the passing of a crisis may be linked, thus allowing us to examine the relationships that obtain between the various crises and the syndrome components and to study the political consequences. The extent to which such interactions by sustaining both new goals and demands (equality) and new types of organizations (differentiation), we may speak of increases in political development.

The three elements of the syndrome are typically incongruent. There is an inherent tendency for equality and capacity to vary in inverse relation to each other, and this discrepancy, as Riggs points out, becomes particularly acute during periods of the transition process.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{34} Coleman, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 74.

\textsuperscript{35} Pye, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 45-47.

The object, then, is to achieve a balance or an increase in both capacity and equality, and that requires continuous increases in differentiation. In the following section we shall examine the conditions under which these optimum considerations are likely to occur.
CHAPTER IV

A CONSOCIATIONAL POLITY UNDER STRESS:
CUMULATIVE CRISIS AND THE
PROCESS OF BREAKDOWN

By the late twenties, the main effects of rapid social
mobilization and uneven political development in Greece
were becoming increasingly evident. Sudden and relatively
extensive urbanization opened the door to needed manpower
and skills for economic development and was the main
stimulus for widespread politicization of the masses; but
it was also the source for social anomie, joblessness,
poverty, alienation, and the dissemination of radical ideas.
Due to the spirit and resourcefulness of the refugees, the
rural Northeast was socially and economically revitalized,
and the growing trade union and agricultural cooperative
activity added a new tempo and scope to the character of
Greek society. Yet the relative boom was short-lived. The
Greek polity was ill-prepared to meet the new wave of
demands, coordinate these with existing articulation and
bargaining patterns, and devise a realistic program of
social policy measures and priorities that was long overdue
in order to achieve a balanced and sustained development drive.

It needs to be pointed out, however, that it was not the mere widening of the "elite-mass" and "rural-urban" gaps which produced the crisis atmosphere.¹ Rather, it was the new sense of awareness of these by broad segments of the people and, more importantly, of the ineptness of (and hence responsibility of) established elites in closing the gaps. It is in this sense that the crisis situation that gripped Greece in the late twenties and thirties becomes meaningful. Crises arose precisely because continuing "growth" or the mere extension of an already established structure was no longer sufficient, and elite response to the new problem was inadequate. One key variable here, then, involves the failure in elite perception of and response to the new realities. Thus, as it turned out, the short-term gains in economic and political development ushered by the refugee impact were more than offset by the disruptive and dislocating effects of that uneven process.

¹Such gaps had long been regarded as a relatively permanent feature of Greek society (see Chapter 1).
The results may be seen as a case of "political lag": a situation that found the Greek polity trailing—in developmental terms—far behind a society in rapid flux, a society in which key sectors were undergoing rapid change and development.

To be sure, the old elites did narrowly perceive—and paid lip-service too—the new changes. Yet, as this study will propose, their failure lay not so much on too-little perception of reality, but on their ambivalence: they, by and large, courted the masses with the appropriate symbolism and rhetoric, but refused to make decisive moves to their ranks, lest the traditional sources of support become alienated. Indecisive at a time when foresight and action were badly needed in order to restructure priorities and new policy, many among the elite continued to be preoccupied with the factional politics of the past, regarding the newly mobilized masses as a new source of power to be manipulated rather than as a signal for effective change and reform. And the "disenfranchised"

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2For a recent study of political lag in Italy, see R. Zariski, *Italy: The Politics of Uneven Development* (Hinsdale, Ill., 1972).
urban masses, many of whom were without ties to the traditional clientele relationships, became increasingly dependent on the state and, for a brief time, placed their hopes on the new republican regime. Clearly, new policies were needed in such areas as housing, social security, sanitation and education. But while some efforts were made and much rhetoric was spent, the results were far from satisfactory. The new political and economic groupings that came to challenge the old leadership arose in response to this failure.

The political scene, too, had been altered. The emerging multi-partyism, resulting largely from the fragmentation of both the Liberal and Populist parties along more distinct ideological lines, ushered a series of unstable coalition governments and a new period of immobilism and crisis. And it was the newly formed mass-oriented and disciplined minor parties, not the old groupings, that set the pace and tone of the political struggle after 1924. But having only limited access to traditional sources of power and influence, these new parties appealed mainly to the urban and rural masses and thus became the protagonists in the new framework of shifting
coalitions and centrifugal tendencies characteristic of the republican period.

In short, the Greek political scene had entered a new phase of change and modernization, representing a break from modernizing traditionalism. But how are such discontinuities to be conceptualized in terms of political development and political decay? Clearly a direct or automatic relationship between the various forces of modernity and new levels of polity capacity, as implied in Deutsch's popular thesis, does not apply to the Greek case. Rather, the latter is an illustration that the "package" of modernization, while multiplying the demands for government services and thus generating the need for new levels of capacity, does not necessarily "...stimulate an increase in government capabilities, and a broadening of the elite,"—that is, not of the sort that is required to meet the new situation. Implicit in Deutsch's view is the notion of "capacity" as some uniform and undifferentiated element which increases in proportion to an expansion in government structures and functions and a

3 Deuscht, "Social Mobilization..."

4 Ibid., p. 493 (emphasis added).
broadening of the body politic. But the Greek case indicates a net decrease in polity capacity after some considerable advances in modernity were made, and that was due to a failure to achieve new levels in capacity (i.e., integrative, distributive, etc.)

The strains and discontinuities in the Greek consociational polity represent a case of breakdown or what may be termed "functional atrophy" in long-standing institutionalized structures. For example, the avoidance, bypassing, or otherwise lack of use of clientelistic linkages (resulting in gaps in these vertical structures) by the refugee or other newly mobilized groups in favor of the emerging mass-oriented, secular and impersonal associational groupings, reflected a case of such breakdown. Interest articulation and aggregation through such hastily arranged structures represented a sharp break with existing patterns of institutionalization. And since such changes in the social structure were not accompanied or followed by corresponding structural changes at the political elite level, the new set of demands arising from such changes—along with the need to coordinate these with existing ones—could not be adequately met.
advanced Western, politics), and lack of innovative capacity in transitional settings. Equally important is that dimension of capacity reflecting not so much a system's capability to deal with its "environment,"\(^7\) internal or external, but rather consensus or dissensus and contradictions at the intra- and inter-elite levels. For example, the divisions and cleavages arising within the top levels of both the Liberal and Populist parties after the founding of the Republic in 1924, will illustrate this important point. Along the same lines but in a different context, Gillis points out that

> It is not the dysfunctional relation between the needs of a society and the capacity of the state alone that produces this (breakdown) situation, but rather contradictions within the political institutions themselves.\(^8\)

For purposes of analysis, let us summarize some of the key interrelated traits or characteristics that seem to typify situations of breakdown:

\(^7\)For a representative view, see Almond, "Comparative Politics..."

(A) A marked and persistent decrease in polity capacity; this can be measured by such indicators as (1) loss or decline in adaptability or responsiveness to new demands; (2) loss of coherence and/or autonomy in major institutions.

(B) The process of "dysfunctional fusion": whereby previously reinforcing dualisms between traditional and modernizing roles and structures become increasingly non-reinforcing.

(C) Increase discrepancy between demands of different groups, i.e., between clientelistic interest articulation and that through impersonal associational groups; to some extent, clientelism becomes dysfunctional.

(D) Increased discrepancy in elite perceptions and behaviors; vulnerability to "egalitarian ethos," along with continued elite attachment to traditional sources of power.

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(E) Sudden increases in the scope or "load" carrying of elite responsibility; unsuccessful attempts at coalition government are more frequent.

This listing of traits is by no means exhaustive. Nor will it be argued that the Greek case of breakdown may be considered as a representative example of each of these features. Nevertheless, the case of interwar Greece suggests these traits to a greater or lesser degree, and thus may be useful in opening up further lines of inquiry. It should also be emphasized that these traits are closely interrelated and interdependent. Thus "dysfunctional fusion" is directly linked with a decline in the utility of clientele relationships, and that in turn affects an increase in elite "load-carrying" by denying governing elites the load-carrying support formerly provided by clientele structures, which, through a series of vertical linkages, served as intermediaries bringing elites in contact with different persons and groups at the local or regional level. In the Greek case, the decline in the

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10 Ibid.
intermediary or "broker" role of local notables such as lawyers, teachers and priests, a decline that corresponded to the rise of mass-oriented interest group activity in the rural cooperatives and the syndicalist movement, and to the local activities of the new minor parties, meant a definite increase in the load-carrying and conflict-resolving responsibilities of the governing elites.

The importance of the "broker" type functions in a society undergoing rapid social mobilization increases in direct relation to the expansion or increase in the scope of activities of the political structure at the center. More demands need to be met, and if a polity is to live up to the new set of expectations in terms of its ability to distribute the available goods and services and effectively penetrate the rural countryside, the active

11 See Lemarchand and Legg, "Political Clientelism..." for a discussion on "broker" functions.

12 The local, cell-creating activities of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) is a case in point. Thus in 1925, the Party paper, Rizospastis, proclaimed the policy of the Executive Committee in a lead article as follows: "The Party...without ceasing to be a party of the working class, must conquer the masses of peasants and refugees." See Pentzopoulos, The Balkin Exchange..., p. 191.

13 Lemarchand and Legg, op. cit., p. 162.
role of intermediary or broker structures is essential. In the Greek case, ironically, brokerage functions started to become dysfunctional precisely at a time they were most needed to provide the support necessary to deal with the disruptive and disintegrating tendencies of rapid change.

Before turning to an analysis of some aspects of breakdown in the Greek setting, it should be noted that a number of unresolved issues carried over from the past undermined the prospects for the smooth working of the republican regime from the start. First, the new regime lacked an appropriate constitutional base. Indeed, a Constitution was not ratified until nearly four years later, late in 1927. The Republic had been widely proclaimed by plebiscite and ratified by the National Assembly, but it was only nominally established; the bulk of the monarcho-populist forces did not accept it, many not even in principle. The fact that such leaders of the Right as Tsaldaris and Metaxas agreed to participate in various republican-led coalitions did not alter their fundamental hostility for the "Uncrowned Democracy"; many were in fact waiting for the right moment to resume their long-term goal: the restoration of the monarchy. Besides, working from within they were strategically
located to take advantage of the expected mistakes by
the increasingly dissonant and incoherent liberal-
democratic forces.

Then there was, of course, the long list of unresolved
problems that invariably emerged to haunt each incoming
administration after 1924. The pressing issue of refugee
rehabilitation and assimilation; the question of amnesty
for all those involved in the abortive counter-revolution
of 1923; the issues of sound economic policy and monetary
reform; the need for an effective public works program;
the important question of electoral reform--all of these
proved major obstacles to overall policy implementation
and effective leadership. All of these issues had been
"incubated" in the consociational framework of the past,
and elite views (and hence vested interests) regarding
these had been formed in that mold. Thus, in spite of
new orientations and changing attitudes in some of the
leaders, the habits of and links to the past persisted.
Nevertheless, these changes proved sufficient to divide
the leadership structure.

Such discrepancies can be seen also in the changing
character of political parties. With the possible ex-
caption of the Communist Party (KKE), most other minor
parties such as the Liberal Union led by Kafandaris, the Democratic Liberal Union led by Papanastasiou, and the Free Opinion Party led by Metaxas were in essence hybrid forms of the old Liberal and Populist groupings. They were still largely "personalist" in character, and despite changes in outlook toward more broadly-based and mass-oriented policy, they resisted alienating their traditional clientele following. It was this paradoxical and ambivalent elite posture—a tendency to identify with the forces for change and modernity while seeking to maintain existing sources of power—that was a major characteristic of the Greek political scene after 1924.

Serious troubles arose almost immediately. The first two Republican coalitions, the governments of Papanastasiou in 1924, and of Michalakopoulos in 1925, were confronted with a wave of demands for social and economic reforms and improved working conditions and wages from various worker and professional groups. Such demands were hardly expected, as it was widely assumed\(^{14}\) by the elites that

\(^{14}\) Daphnis, *Greece Between Two Wars...*, I, p. 270.
the expansion of political rights achieved under the Republic would be met with widespread satisfaction. But the elites failed to perceive that the new demands were of a different order and that the means for their expression (i.e., the trade union) was here to stay as a new form of socio-economic organization. Thus, refusing to acknowledge a list of demands submitted by striking civil servants, Michalakopoulous declared: "Such syndicalism is intolerable in the state for it constitutes anarchy." 15 Such attitudes may come into perspective when one considers the nature and scope of support given to the Republic by the majority of the old-line liberal-Venizelist forces. Actually, most liberals who followed Papanastasiou's lead in proclaiming the Republic, did so mainly because of their opposition to the Monarchy not because of any inclination or basic commitment to the basic socio-economic changes that republicanism might entail. Indeed, the Venizelist ranks were by and large opposed to any radical socio-economic modifications. 16

15 Ibid., p. 272. Translated from Greek.

16 Ibid., p. 248.
Thus—one is tempted to use Paretoian language—what is implied here is a case for the circulation of elites; having outlived its usefulness in serving the dominant elites, the Monarchy would now give way before the vigorous, more "modern" form—the uncrowned democracy. But while the new masses were now to be courted in terms of the powerful "myths" of democracy (i.e., equality, higher standard of living, social welfare policies, etc.) and by some recruitment into elite ranks, major societal changes that could upset the fundamental relationship between rulers and ruled were to be resisted. In effect, the masses were to be content with a mere change in masters.

This brief estimate of what the typical old liberal orientations and posture might have been, however oversimplified, is intended mainly to point out the extent of misperception by some of the governing elites regarding some major changes in Greek society and the realities that these ushered. Old conceptions of modernity in terms of borrowed political technologies and differentiation of the government structure were being challenged by views that saw modernity in terms of substantive social and economic reforms and more meaningful political participation. In short, many among the elites failed to realize
that the new republican regime was popularly regarded mainly as the necessary framework for the realization of more concrete socio-economic and political objectives.

As Daphnis aptly puts it:

Political liberties did not constitute the crux of workers' demands. Political democracy was being welcomed as a first major step toward the realization of social and economic reforms.\(^{17}\)

The articulation of interests through organized groupings that were increasingly class-oriented and associational in character exerted heavy pressures upon a system geared to handle demands on a personalized clientele group basis. Such new demands, then, constituted a major challenge to the republican regime to provide the required levels of capacity. That such capabilities were not forthcoming may be illustrated by the high incidence of workers' strikes throughout the twenties and thirties. Table 8 below summarizes the major cases of protest and other forms of disaffection during this period.

\(^{17}\)Ibid., p. 257. Translated from Greek.
As Table 9 clearly indicates, the new strains in government-labor relations were not limited to any one specific sector of the society or economy. The drive for economic reforms and social justice and equality affected the ranks of the bureaucracy no less than the increasingly "proletarianized" workers in the tobacco, manufacturing and construction industries. Indeed, the new sense of a commonality of interests among otherwise different groupings—as revealed by the willingness of man and varied groups to join in protest with others—suggests an emerging class character in the shifting sands of Greek society and politics. And this, moreover, illustrates the general pattern in the new secular-horizontal cleavage structures which cut across existing socio-cultural and occupational distinctions, and hence, also crisscrossing established stratification patterns and the corresponding vertical clientelistic linkages.

The cumulative crisis situation involving, to a different extent, all of the problem-areas discussed earlier, was directly related to the widening rift within the top
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Striking Groups</th>
<th>Related Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May, 1924</td>
<td>dockworkers, bakers; construction workers</td>
<td>confrontation with violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March, 1925</td>
<td>rail workers, civil servants; joined by dockworkers and electrical workers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March, 1927</td>
<td>civil servants</td>
<td>demonstrations, confrontations and violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June, 1928</td>
<td>nationwide strikes by tobacco workers; joined by bakers and dockworkers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May, 1936</td>
<td>nationwide strikes by tobacco workers; joined by all labor groups in Salonika</td>
<td>demonstrations, confrontation and violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May, 1936</td>
<td>nationwide strikes involving most workers' groups</td>
<td>confrontation with violence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{a}\) Tabulated on the basis of data in G. Daphnis, *Greece Between Two Wars* (Athens, 1955), Part I, Chapters IV and V.
ranks of the once-powerful Liberal party.\textsuperscript{18} Thus the outright refusal by the Michalakopoulos government in 1925 of the demands for better wages and pensions by civil servants, drew a series of sharp criticisms from the Liberal Democrats of Papanastasiou who labeled such policy as "reactionary" and "anti-labor."\textsuperscript{19} But the clearest indication of sharp divisions among the elites was the major feud between Venizelos and his former top lieutenant, Kafandaris, the leader of the new Liberal Union party. The feud, though clearly a power play by the old master who was seeking to re-assert his leadership and thus close Liberal ranks, was also prompted by other than strictly personal considerations. Actually, it became serious after Venizelos sharply attacked Kafandaris' policy program while the latter was Minister of Economics during the initial coalition—the "ecumenical" government of 1926-27.\textsuperscript{20} In general, the new intra-

\textsuperscript{18} The rift in Liberal ranks was in the making ever since Venizelos' refusal to openly support the Republic by campaigning for it, in 1923-24.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 270.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 372.
elite divisions were not typically based on the old familiar differences over such things as the allocation of party or individual favors, personality classes, questions of procedure, etc. Actually these divisions appear to have had important ideological overtones centered on basic differences over the nature of key issues and the formulation of social policy.21

While more serious and widespread among the liberal-democrats, serious divisions were also felt within the populist ranks. The "old guard" headed by Tsaldaris developed a mortal fear of the independent-minded Metaxas and his followers among the military. Metaxas had made his peace with the uncrowned democracy after general amnesty was granted to all those involved in past counterrevolutionary attempts and, more importantly, understood the changes taking place in Greek society and consequently "...had perceived the need to liberate policy-making from the quagmire of clientelism."22 For example, as a member of the ecumenical coalition in 1926-27 (Minister of Transportation), he sought to imple-

21 Ibid., p. 272.
22 Sifnaios, Metaxas, p. 496.
ment his policy of major and secondary road construction, a plan that would add 5,000 kilometers of new roads and improve the some 100,000 kilometers of existing and badly-kept road network. But opposition was fierce and not the least of it came from Tsaldaris and the populists. Support for Metaxas would make the Populist party appear as following the lead of the "agegade" Free Opinion party; and besides, Metaxas would get the credit for the success of such an undertaking. Under such terms, Tsaldaris resigned as Minister of State in August, 1927, in an attempt to undermine the work of the ecumenical government. 23

A good illustration of the nature and extent of elite division would be the party formations and results during the November 7, 1925 elections. The array of minor splinter parties and new parties and the widespread vote distribution is characteristic of this whole uncertain and uneasy period. These data are shown in Table 10.

23 Ibid., p. 504.
TABLE 10
PARTIES AND VOTING RESULTS OF
NOVEMBER, 1925 ELECTIONS^a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No. of Votes</th>
<th>Percent of Votes</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Union (Kafandaris)</td>
<td>303,140</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populist Party (Tsaldaris)</td>
<td>194,243</td>
<td>20.27</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Opinion (Metaxas)</td>
<td>151,044</td>
<td>15.76</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Union (Papanastasiou)</td>
<td>62,086</td>
<td>6.48</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party</td>
<td>41,982</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian Party</td>
<td>28,318</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents and Refugees Party</td>
<td>17,410</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Refugee Party</td>
<td>13,798</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Union Party</td>
<td>12,661</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^a Adapted from Daphnis, *Greece Between Two Wars* (Athens, 1955), I, pp. 348-49.
It is characteristic that this was the first election to be held by proportional representation. That was required in order to allow full expression to the wide variety of political views and preferences. It should also be noted that a relatively small but significant portion of the electorate was moving into voting patterns clearly along class lines not along traditional voting alignments, as indicated by the support given to the communist, refugee, and agrarian groupings. These three received about 10 percent of the vote, which may appear insignificant in view of the strength in the more traditional alignments. But it should be recognized that this figure represents only one portion of the class vote since an unspecified number of those who voted for the Liberal Union and Democratic Union tickets were refugees or radical democrats and thus were, to some extent, expressing class attitudes.

But if this was an indication of the assault upon the politics of clientelism from the Left, the attack from the Right—though less powerful—was no less significant.

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24 Both Papanastasiou and Kafandaris enjoyed widespread support among the urban refugees in the Athens and Salonika areas.
The unprecedented support given to Metaxas' Free Opinion party is a clear indication that the mounting attack on the ways of the past was not limited to the efforts of the liberal-democratic forces.

But in the final analysis, the party and voter alignments in the November, 1925 elections was one more piece of evidence of the basic elite discrepancy between those who, like Tsaldaris, clung firmly to the traditionalist past, and "modernizers" like Metaxas and Papanastasiou who sought new ways in shaping the new realities. And it was the ambivalence of those who like the latter appeared both as champions of the emerging forces and yet still as supporters of the forces of continuity and order that had serious consequences for the basic stability of the Greek polity and the integrity of existing institutions. Policies and reforms were enunciated that could not be fulfilled; hopes were raised for social and economic programs and benefits that could not be met. And the Greek polity, still considerably immersed in the web of tradition and clientelism, was hard put to cope with the resulting tensions and centrifugal forces.

It was noted earlier that the mere existence of intense political conflict and the discrepancy between
demands of different groups do not constitute sufficient conditions for the onset of breakdown. In varying degree, these features may be found in a number of different polities and the Greek case, as a variant of the transitional polity type, is no exception. Rather, what is significant here is that new, rapid patterns in social mobilization and differentiation usher a new framework, a different "marketplace" of ideas, goals and interests as it were, within which new identities are discovered, new loyalties are forged, and new paths for the realization of changing goals and interests are outlined. It is in this sort of framework that the significance of the new minor parties and socio-economic organizations in the Greek setting becomes meaningful. It is this framework that provides the indispensable condition for a situation of breakdown by generating what has been called the process of "dysfunctional fusion." In Greece, in other words, the urban and rural masses were suddenly thrust into a common framework of ideas and rules of action—that is, they were brought together in terms of being exposed to a common set of stimuli; but—and here lies the essential problem—such exposure to a common set of stimuli sets in motion the need for some stable or pre-
dictable pattern of orientation to these. Now, since elite action sets the pace and tone of the political process, the role of governing elites in meeting this need is vital; without some minimal elite consensus on (1) the meaning of modernity, and (2) the goals and priorities that such conceptions entail, there can be no development of stable and authoritative patterns of receptivity. In other words, there can be no development of a new (or modified) institutional base to take the place—and hence assume the legitimating and integrative functions of—the old, clientele-based institutional structure that is being increasingly undermined.

In short, the mobilized Greek masses became "available" for new patterns of socialization and behavior, but the base upon which to erect these was not yet available. The new structure was being built, yet the architects had still not agreed on the proper foundations. It is in this sense, implying a failure on the part of elites to provide for or otherwise perceive the need for such institutional foundations, that Eisenstadt views the

problem of breakdown essentially in terms of a lack of capacity for coordinating new sets of demands and as the absence of stable patterns of receptivity to a host of new stimuli. 26 In the Greek case, even those leaders, such as Papanastasiou, Kafandaris and Metaxas, who recognized the need for substantive structural and policy-making reforms, did not sufficiently extricate themselves from that "quagmire of clientelism." They did not fully appreciate the extent of interdependence among the new demands and the new direct role of the state in meeting them. Once again to cite Eisenstadt in a related context, the new values, demands and related activities required a higher level of coordination since they

were not, as in pre-modern regimes, kept in relatively segregated, even if interlocked, compartments, but were brought into relatively common frameworks of political process and decision-making.27

Seen in this way, the problem of political breakdown is essentially a problem of integration or the failure of the Greek republican polity to institutionalize a new set of behavior patterns, thus rendering these new ones as


27 Ibid., p. 351.
legitimate and stable or recurring. It was above all a crisis of integration as the elites failed to elicit, or mobilize the populace towards, a general consensus on and identity with the state and each other.\textsuperscript{28}

Conflicting views between different elite groups regarding conceptions of modernity and the attendant problems have been rather typical in many polities during the interwar years. The cases of pre-Fascist Italy and pre-Nazi Germany are well known, and in interwar Japan remnants of the old Meiji oligarchy tried, in the face of new issues and problems ushered by modernization and industrialization,\textsuperscript{29} and failed to uphold the traditional symbols of imperial loyalty and patriotism. In interwar Argentina, as Gerani points out, the different "solidarity symbols" used by elites to deal with the problems of rapid social mobilization and economic development, were


often unrelated to the real problems facing that society. 30

In the case of Argentina, such elite discrepancies are seen in part as a result of a tendency by some of the older middle-class elites to be "absorbed" by and hence defend the system which they once criticized. As middle-class interests and values become "established," such elites tend to regard the demands of newly-mobilized groups as a threat to their vested interests, and hence tend to weaken or "water-down" their commitment to further modernization. Germani argues this point in a way that would apply to the Greek case:

As new sectors of the population became ready for political participation, a different type of participation crisis appeared, in which the middle strata found themselves ambivalent and sometimes opposed to the recently mobilized portions of the lower strata. 31

This is essentially what happened to Venizelos after the Republic was established in 1924. The old revolutionary


of 1909 and 1915, became the main defender of established middle-class values and interests in the face of the new challenge from the newly-mobilized masses and their spokesmen, and in so doing drove the principal wedge into Liberal party ranks. Upon his return to active politics and just prior to his last full term in office, Venizelos made clear his new conception of modernity as the consolidation and defense of the existing social order. As he put it, the main objective would be to provide the strength and effectiveness in government necessary for that task:

> It is my duty to resume leadership of the party which constitutes the bulwark against the various constitutional dangers, the threat of dictatorship, and the social convulsions likely to result from a lack of power in government.\(^{32}\)

Winning a stunning victory in 1928, Venizelos read the results as a mandate for the constitution of a well-organized and powerful government. As the Liberals won 233 out of a possible 250 seats and 61 percent of the vote, 

he could write to his wife that "...in essence, the Greek people have made me a constitutional dictator."\(^{33}\) The policies he pursued clearly indicate that he took the "mandate" seriously. He sought a new rapprochement with the Populists and their acceptance of the regime so as to provide for succession in case his government fell; and in search for efficiency, he called on nearly one-fourth of all Liberal party deputies to take a ministerial post at one time or another. Yet his policies alienated many liberals and drove many of his former supporters—including many among the refugees—further to the left. The rift with some key liberal-democratic figures became wide open, as he was accused by Kafandaris and Papanastasiou of centralizing power, and after his economic policy was sharply criticized by his old aide, Zavitsianos.\(^{34}\)

Venizelos was a tragic historical figure. The man who, more than any other, put modern Greece on the map, helped her struggle for identity as a nation, and put her on the road to modernity and development, came, after

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\(^{34}\) *Daphnis,* *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 28.
1928, to unknowingly stifle her further development. Ironically, he sought a return to the old two-party system precisely at a time when the budding multi-partyism began yielding results in terms of a true party responsibility and organization; he sought to consolidate and establish the status quo on the basis of middle-class interests, perceptions and values, when what was most needed was a re-structuring of the basis of legitimacy and institutionalization in view of the relatively radical changes in socio-economic reality; and above all, while he correctly perceived the imperative for polity capacity, he mistakenly sought to find it in the clientele-bound interstices of the existing order.

In Greece, then, the development of the various processes of rapid and sweeping social mobilization were not accompanied or followed by adequate levels of integration, thus resulting in the breakdown of existing levels of political modernization. As noted earlier, the most significant development was a situation of a growing interdépendence, of an increasing awareness of common bonds and problems, and of a growing interaction between different groups and social strata in terms of their being drawn
together into new common frameworks. But there did not develop the proper integrative and regulatory mechanisms required to deal with the host of problems resulting from such new patterns of interaction and hence differentiation.

The various new groups, be they political parties, professional organizations, labor unions, or agricultural cooperatives, were not able to function very effectively because they operated under what one author calls "false premises," that is, some of the key pre-requisites for their effective functioning did not develop in the new Greek socio-political and cultural setting. In other words, the lack in what we have termed basic elite consensus, or a serious discrepancy in elite perceptions and ambivalence in their behavior set the stage for repeated crises and breakdown. Thus the prevailing elite tendency to persist in combining the best of the two "worlds" of modernity and tradition, and to do so on the basis of faulty conceptions of the nature and function of both, proved a failure. In effect, as the old clientelistic patterns (along with the corresponding norms, values and

\[35\] Eisenstadt, op. cit., p. 360.
symbols) were becoming dysfunctional, the new more secular and mass-oriented patterns failed to become functional enough.

In Greece of the 'twenties and 'thirties, the old "solidarity symbols" of Monarchy and irredentism in the form of the Megali Idea were in disrepute or discredited altogether. And both the disillusionment with old traditions and goals and the re-appraisal and innovations that followed, were not limited to the refugee masses and their spokesmen; a new generation of Greeks had grown up to witness the consequences of past mistakes, the dishonor of national defeat along with weak, unstable government, and the unfolding drama of refugee rehabilitation and assimilation. They, too, sought new answers to old and new questions; they, too, joined in the struggle for social and political reform, and in the successful movement to adopt the demotike or vernacular in the schools and in literature, thus forming as it were an "alliance" with the newcomers confronting the large and often hostile numbers of natives still bound to the traditional order.

36 Pentzopoulos, op. cit., p. 216.
In the final analysis, it is this dualism that lies at the heart of elite inability to strike new paths and provide the strength and foresight needed to forge adequate symbols of unity and progress.

It is in this context that the "historical meaning" of Metaxas' authoritarianism comes into perspective. For, as will be argued in the next section, however brief its duration, and however ad hoc and unsophisticated its program, his regime appears to have addressed itself to the relevant issues and questions, and to have laid the basis for some of the solutions. In this sense, the type of phenomenon that this regime represents or entails (and its place or role in the process of modernization and political development) cannot be assumed a priori, but rather deserves close scrutiny.
CHAPTER V

METAXAS' AUTHORITARIANISM IN PERSPECTIVE

The rise of General Metaxas and his fourth of August regime in 1936 was the direct outcome of crisis and breakdown and cannot be understood apart from these processes. It was no mere dictatorship in the narrow sense of the term, nor was it only or primarily a conservative or royalist reaction to the inefficiency and paralysis of parliamentary government. It was, of course, a Risorsimento, an attempt to "recapture" the spirit and greatness of the past, but it also represented a sharp break with it, both in terms of experimenting with new ideas and forms for the purpose of providing a continuity with the trends and forces of the times, and also in offering a new and in some ways radical interpretation of Greek history; for it was not so much to a historic, but to a glorified and mythical past that Metaxas appealed to in his attempt to lay the foundations of his regime. It should also be pointed out that Metaxas, despite a number of actions and techniques modelled after the Italian and
German dictatorships, was no mere imitator; in many ways his regime was quite typically Greek, native to the land and its people.

To broaden our perspective, it would be useful to view the Metaxas period in the context of the temper of the times. By the middle and late twenties, Liberalism was in disrepute and increasingly on the defensive throughout Europe. Failing to appreciate the changes wrought by the Great War and its aftermath, the established liberal elites were unprepared to meet the new challenges of Socialism and Communism which Liberalism, both in its triumph and subsequent failure, directly provoked. And this confrontation provoked also, if indirectly, the Fascist and authoritarian movements which emerged as their "antidote."

After the Great Depression and the apparent failure of laissez-faire capitalism, the liberal bourgeois forces had gone through the full circle of triumph, crisis and retreat. Ironically, in retreat the liberal elites (Giolitti in Italy, Venizelos in Greece) found themselves assuming the same conservative and even reactionary
postures and justifications which they had once ridiculed in the traditional oligarchic elites which they had displaced. Some thinkers on the Continent had forewarned of the incapacity of Liberalism to meet the new crisis and the "retreat" that would follow. In offering his new syndicalism, Sorel rejected reason and spoke of the role of "myths" in social action; Pareto scornfully rejected those "sentimental humanitarians" who lacked the will and character for effective leadership; and Burkhardt declared that the Liberal-democratic onslaught was heading for disaster and would be taken over by new "helmsmen," the Gewaltochen (men of power) who alone could provide the determination, vision, and decisive, if often brutal, action required for that difficult task.1 Generally, it is in this historic "tradition" of the new European men of power and action that Metaxas may be seen. Above all, Metaxas represents, in the Greek context, both the reaction and alternative to the idea that Liberalism, in the form of parliamentary democracy and economic lassiez-

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faire, w's the "new gospel" to be exported everywhere and that, once grafted on to a system that ill-receives it, it could work out its own contradictions.

This section is an attempt to explicate this posture and its implications. But prior to that analysis it would be useful to briefly recapitulate the Greek political setting on the eve of Metaxas' rise to power.

Metaxas came to power suddenly, almost by accident. Appointed by royal decree upon the death of Professor Demerdjis² on April 13, 1936, his appearance did not cause much alarm for anyone except the Communists who were alone in calling for immediate resistance and in predicting his future intentions. Thus the Assembly, by a vote of 241 to 16, gave Metaxas a vote of confidence to rule by decree for five months, until things returned to

²Professor Demertjis, it will be recalled, was the "compromise" Premier chosen to head a caretaker government during the impasse created by the January, 1936 elections. Actually, M. Sophoulis, the titular head of the Liberal Party after the death of Venizelos, having arrived at an "understanding" with the Communists in return for their support, was duly elected President of the Chamber and could thus form the new government. But after threats from the King and royalist officers to fight any government based on Communist support, Sophoulis turned to Demertjis. See Chapter I.
"normal." The elites were in effect calling on Metaxas to settle their differences, and, what's more, hand power back to them undiluted and "free of thorns." 3

Metaxas moved swiftly. He dissolved the militant trade unions and seized their funds; he arrested and deported key labor and Communist leaders; he enacted a Compulsory Arbitration Act forbidding strikes as illegal; and all along he was restructuring the military—by now almost totally composed of royalist elements—for its future role. In retaliation, the Communists closed ranks with other minor socialist and agrarian parties, and proceeded in affecting a rapprochement between the rival Unitary (communist) and General (reformist) Confederations of Labor. Numerous strikes and other disruptive activities were planned, some resulting in considerable violence 4 and the new labor "united front" prepared for a nationwide strike set for 5 August. But lacking support from the major political forces, this was hardly a res-


4 The General strike in Salonika on 9 May, 1936, took the lives of 30 workers and wounded 400 others.
pectable opposing coalition. Actually the elites, even after Metaxas openly declared the dictatorship on 4 August remained largely acquiescent and even supported the new regime. Not until the end of 1936 did the Liberal and Populist party leadership go on record opposing the dictatorship, and then it was too late; King George, to whom many leaders still looked for a solution to the crisis, had decided to tie the fate of the newly-restored Monarchy with the Metaxas regime.

Thus the political elites shunned any dynamic solutions and limited their opposition activities to "informing" the public and organizing public manifestos criticizing the regime. In any case, the few faint voices calling for active resistance were doomed from the start; neither the passive masses nor the military were moved. The bulk of the latter, lacking a strong leadership, dismissed any such actions, since another change in regime would likely return to active service many among the some 500 liberal-Venizelist officers dismissed after the abortive coup attempts of 1933 and 1935, and thus threaten the hard-won rightist composition of the armed forces. Moreover, the continued strong ties between the new regime and the military should not be overlooked; many of
Metaxas' key appointments were among the chief protagonists in the counter-revolution of 1923, the wellspring of conservative anti-Venizelist sentiment and support among the military.

But the major factor accounting for the lack of any effective opposition to Metaxas—indeed, what turned out to be a source of strength for him—lay within the top ranks of the political elites. First, there was a serious gap in leadership. The void created after the deaths of Venizelos and Tsaldaris was not filled. Whatever the shortcomings of these men, the new leadership of the Liberal and Populist parties, Sophoulis and Theotokis respectively, simply did not have the stature nor enjoy the support given to their former mentors. Consequently, those forces that could mount a serious threat to Metaxas lacked unity and coordination and, what's more, were now more than ever led by men without charisma or the will to act. In short, for the elites it was back to the old familiar game of "wait and see," along with the jockeying for position as usual. Everyone, it seems, hoped to gain something from the Metaxas experience: for the Populist-conservative and the liberal-Venizelist forces (both of
which had come to feel their positions of power and prestige undermined and threatened by the "rise of the masses"), the Metaxas regime represented a dynamic and efficient means of doing their "dirty work," namely, halt the surging tide of new demands and put an end to the socialist and communist instigators who, lurking behind and instructing the aimless masses, made trouble for everybody; the communists, on the other hand, in line with Marxist theory and as always obedient to directives from Moscow, waited for the "right moment" to strike, a moment that would correspond roughly to the "final phase" of the class struggle and hence to the final days of the bourgeois social order, but a moment which, of course, never came.

And all were proven wrong as Metaxas' intentions and plans disappointed everyone. They failed to perceive that Metaxas, in the final analysis, was his own man, that he did not really represent any one interest or party, but rather, conceived of his historical role as a "unifier" who came to do away with the divisions and ineptness of the past and the "ill-conceived" political structure on which these were based, and in its place
erect another "...upon a more sound ethical and material base."5

Due to its brief life span, the regime's program was not finalized. But the incomplete results (or achievements), when viewed against the backdrop of Greek realities, were relatively impressive. The long-neglected program for Social Security was passed and in part implemented; Collective Agreements with Labor and Industry were signed, and during the four-year period, 44,217 labor disputes were settled; a program of minimum work hours and wage rates was put into effect, along with two-week yearly vacations and overtime pay rates, thus affecting a "...substantial improvement for the lowest-paid unskilled laborers."6 Public health legislation was passed, health care centers for workers were established, and mothers were assured free medical care. Particular emphasis was put on rural development. Metaxas repeatedly lauded peasant virtues, and their important role in the society and nation. As with the trade unions, he consoli-

5Stavrianos, op. cit., p. 674.

6Ibid., p. 675.
idated all agricultural cooperatives into the National Union of Agricultural cooperatives in 1938, thus coordinating activities and centralizing the command structure. His pet project, the Hellenic Youth Organization (EON) was established in 1937, providing a variety of programs of activities for the youth, and an organizational alternative to previous forms of group activity.

An extensive public works program was established, strengthening defenses and providing for much-needed employment. Considerable attention was also given to a program of regional decentralization that was designed to minimize the descent to the cities by the rural population in pursuit of their various interests. Toward this end, more decision-making power was given to the regional monarchs (governors), and the staffing of their central and local offices was substantially augmented.

Metaxas' authoritarian regime defies easy classification, and it is just as well. Any attempt to do so on the basis of some abstract model would fall short of its goal and is likely to be very misleading. In many ways

7Ibid.
the regime was quite unlike any other during the interwar period. It lacked an organized and coherent party organization, and there were no serious attempts to establish one. There was no native intellectual tradition or body of ideology from which Metaxas could draw, and hence his reliance on re-interpreting the greatness of the past which would serve as a general guide. Metaxas relied on many of his former friends and lieutenants, but for all practical purposes he was the Fourth of August regime, its source of strength, inspiration and guidance. Perhaps the best way to approach the problem of understanding is to inquire into the man's thought regarding questions of social and political import, so as to assess his critique of the previous state of affairs and the new objectives and programs that were put forth.

Metaxas launched his regime with an address to the nation on 4 August in which he stressed the threat of communism and the corruption and ineptitude of the former system. 8

8 Drawn from a series of excerpts from Metaxas' key addresses made available to the author in the Summer of 1971, by the late Constantine Maniadakis, Under Secretary of Internal Security under Metaxas.
Communism made deep inroads into education, corrupting the staff and affecting our youth, thus seeking to lead astray into oblivion our beautiful traditions...it also made inroads into the civil service, seeking to develop there the attitude that the state is the common enemy of the citizen...mine is not a party government...it seeks the ethical and material betterment of the whole society.\(^9\)

But the speech that truly suggests the foundation of his main ideas and sets the tone for the policies to come, was delivered to the nation on 10 August, 1936:

You did not lose your freedoms...you gained your deliverance from the double yoke of communist tyranny and factional tyranny...Awaken and rise as a whole to restore the Fatherland, for all of us constitute one thing and the Nation is one...Oh, youth, you are not to blame for being led astray. Ignored, neglected after so much destruction of your ideals and dreams, you followed the charlatans and demagogues which led you to the abyss of despair and materialism...Rise Hellenic youth! There is no other reality for you but the fatherland, and only there you will find yourself. Only in the framework of your national destiny and heritage you will find yourself, and rediscover your ideals and dreams...Those foreign fabrications and insane romanticisms with which the impostors sought to lure you are poisonous lies. For understand, you cannot live but as a Hellene, and only within your race...you will rediscover the logos and destiny of your existence.\(^10\)

\(^9\)Ibid.

\(^{10}\)Ibid.
Metaxas was keenly aware of the sad state of national unity. The old symbols of unity had fallen or were in disrepute: the Megali Idea and its motto of irredentism; the Monarchy; and, lately, Liberalism—all of these had either been destroyed or had not sunk deep roots into Greek society and culture. This helps explain the emphasis on the need to "rediscover" the appropriate "unifying principle." But to immerse oneself into the past in order to rediscover the proper synthesis, one must first know and appreciate the problems and dilemmas of the present. Thus,

Retrospection, the examination of and inquiry into the past, has no other value but that which the needs of the present give it.11

Since the needs of the present issue in large part form the crises of the times, it was necessary to understand the nature of the problems by tracing their origins to those imported ideas and institutions that were alien to Greek character and culture. Thus Metaxas' emphasis in exposing "those foreign fabrications." Again and again he stresses this point, a central theme in his writing and

11 Ibid.
reflection of this period.

Let us get rid of those miserable teachings that tell you to be unethical and cowardly and to look beyond the nation for truth and inspiration. Let us all be devoted to the Hellenic whole.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}

Liberalism and parliamentary democracy were not in principle bad or inadequate. It was simply that these did not square with Greek reality at that juncture of its history. It is implicit in Metaxas' line of thought that a philosophy, a conception of the world and man's place in it, a \textit{Weltanschauung}, if you will, in order to be accepted by a people, must come to terms with the needs of such a people, the needs for understanding and action in a given historical setting. Thus, it is meaningless to speak of the "truth" or "falsity" of a philosophy without first reference to the conditions of its acceptability. And the basic conditions are those reflecting the fundamental human needs to understand, believe and act. The truth of a belief is known by the mind that holds it. Any belief or judgment about an object that takes as its point of reference some object outside the self, is false. This is what Metaxas had in mind when, writing in his \textit{Notebook}, he argues:

\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}
Let us say that the universe has limits. But which universe? Surely it is that which we are able to conceive. In other words, it is like saying that our judgment has limits. A tautology. 13

The belief in the primacy of personal beliefs and values is reaffirmed in the following distinction between Christianity and Communism:

Communism, in organizing the social revolution follows basically the path set by Christianity in its struggle against Rome. But with the major difference that the organization of Christianity was not "premeditated"; the Christians struggled according to their hearts and feelings, whereas the Communist struggle is "premeditated," the product of the logic of theoreticians. 14

This basic theme is again struck during a speech at the University of Athens in November, 1940:

If I did not follow dogmatic theories on matters of internal policy, I ask you to consider that politics is not a science... it is one form of the struggle of life...and in the face of that imperative, the imperative of Primum vivere deinde philosophare, every need for dogmatic theory recedes into the background. 15

In Metaxas' view, the responsibility for Greece's calamities during the interwar years--the Asia Minor

13 From the Notebook of Thoughts, 13 May, 1929.

14 Interview with Maniadakis.

15 Ibid.
catastrophe and the deep social divisions that followed, the failure of parliamentarism, the sad state of economic development—lay squarely in the attempt to graft an alien system onto a social and cultural base that was neither psychologically nor materially prepared to accept it. The imported edifice of the liberal-democratic state proved weak and artificial because it was hastily imposed upon the crumbling walls of the old system which it helped destroy. Thus Liberalism undermined and helped to destroy the existing traditions and values without providing for a viable alternative. Writing in 1929, Metaxas argues a point that reflects the crux of this matter:

Basically, there are two kinds of political actions: the first creates and establishes the new which, once established, dissolves the old: the second dissolves the old in order to create the new. Great men are those of the first kind of action; those associated with the second are small men.16

To become "established," therefore, a new social order had first to be accepted by the people on ethical terms. But how could this have been achieved when the old elites not only did not practice what they preached, but also

16 *Notebook of Thoughts*, 23 February, 1929.
undiminished whatever good and useful remained of the old, traditional value and belief systems by their erroneous ideas and contradictory behavior?

Men are not inspired by abstract ideas... ideas must be embodied by men so that others may be inspired... in Greece they have torn down all the "idols" so as to force the people to worship an abstract idea which they have named "democracy." Perhaps that is logically and theoretically correct. But it is contrary to human nature. And so the Greek people, having lost all their "idols," worship nothing.17

Parliamentarism, for all its lofty principles such as representation, individual freedom, equality, material well-being, etc., was little more than a mere facade (and a poor one at that) covering the true interests and actions of the old elites. What did parliamentarism represent but the interests of a political oligarchy, of a "new feudalism?" As it had need of parties, the ruling oligarchy created them promptly and artifically... and though nothing had divided the Greeks, we found ourselves divided in the cities and in the smallest village.18

17 Maniadakis interview.

18 Ibid.
Thus it became necessary to found a new, more powerful and just state, a state which, conceived on a new basis of the relationship between man and authority, would be guided and inspired by the rich and glorious heritage of the Greek Nation and thus capable of restoring those ideals and values buried under the onslaught of Liberalism. As parliamentary democracy proved unable to rise to the challenge, it became "...an obstacle in meeting today's great problems," and there was no solution but to "enter a state of a more lasting, more stable, and more powerful decision-making authority." 19 In short, Greek society needed above all a "moral topic" which the new state, the ethical state that embodied the principles of unity, cooperation and progress, alone could provide. The following statement drawn from Gentile's vision of the new state (lo stato nuovo), might well apply to Metaxas' conception:

A state which drew together into one spiritual unity the creative souls of its citizens:--not the drab state of the raison d'etat, but the state whose very nature was identical with the cultural expression for which men yearned. 20

19 Metaxas' interview with Eleftheros Kosmos (Free World), 4 January, 1934.

Man did not, as the Liberal tradition held, have "natural rights" that he could exercise at will against the state. That would be a contradiction in terms, since man found his true purpose and identity within the new national consciousness created and organized by the state. For it is not the nation which creates the state, but rather the state which "redisCOVERS" and thus recreates the nation and hence the sense of moral and spiritual unity. Did not the "mechanical unity" affected by the era of Liberalism—far from being translated into an organic whole—come apart at the seams with the first strong winds of crisis thus bringing in its dissolution and decay, a new set of prophets of the "new order," namely, socialism and communism and their chaotic and anarchic aftermath? The new state being erected by the Fourth of August regime was no mere judge or observer removed from the struggle of conflicting interests; it was an active mediator and arbiter between these, seeking to balance and resolve these conflicts in the interest of the whole. In a speech at Salonika in September, 1936, Metaxas outlined the role of the new state under construction:

Upon the ruins of the Liberal state and the allegedly "self-regulated" economics is being built an authority of regulation and coordina-
tion, a guide to the inevitably conflicting private and group interests. . . the productive potential of the individual has need of discipline and coordination so it is not lost in today's complex and in many ways contradictorily differentiated society. Thus the state must assert its active intervention so as to direct the national economy through the labyrinth of conflicting interests. . . only thus is it possible to secure the interests of the whole without the injustices and inequalities which are unacceptable to the character of modern man.21

But what of the freedom of the individual? Well, we are told, that is another deception perpetrated by Liberalism and the other doctrines that followed. Speaking to the Athens Newspapers Union, Metaxas asked:

Whom among you is free in the strict sense of the term? Who is free of the various forces and ways of society? You are in reality only relatively free when you voluntarily submit to higher authority and freer still when you believe in it. . . if then absolute liberty is a mirage, what is left? Nothing remains but to be arranged with others in a complete unity, to be organized. . . And one can only be organized by the state.22

Disciplined liberty! That is another recurring theme in Metaxas' thought. This was in many ways the "directing

21 Interview with Maniadakis.

22 Ibid.
thought" that made it possible to approach and be inspired by ". . . the ancient prototypes of our race. . . was it not the directing ideal of ancient Sparta?"23 And of the freedom achieved during the previous regimes? There was none, for a citizen was subject to the parties' power, and one could not get along without

. . . belonging to some party. The peasant had no freedom. He was subjected to the enslavement of the party representative, and his existence and fate were squarely in the politician's hands.24

On the basis of the above discussion, it is difficult to arrive, with such limited and one-sided resources, at a coherent and really meaningful statement of Metaxas' thought, and even more formidable to say, with any degree of certainty, to what extent the verbiage corresponds to reality, i.e., programs initiated, policies followed, etc. There were serious logical flaws in his arguments, and contradictions in his performance. Typical of many of its "cousins" in interwar Europe that moved along in an ad hoc and even opportunistic basis, the regime's performance was not programmed on some comprehensive "blue-

23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
print," but was built upon and corrected in terms of day-
to-day experiences. Hence a full assessment would be
presumptuous. Yet despite the incomplete record, and
beneath all the rhetoric and inconsistencies, it is none-
theless possible to detect some basic pattern and contin-
uity in Metaxas' program.

The central underlying theme that emerges throughout
that pattern is the quest for unity. According to one of
Metaxas' closest confidants—in a point that he stressed
time and time again—25—if the former had achieved nothing
else of lasting significance, he wanted to unify the
Greek people. But national unification, which had
proved so elusive in the past, required not merely
"energy" or power in the form of a new centralized and
powerful state machinery; it required also, and perhaps
more importantly, an adequate "psychological transmitter"—
a set of Sorelian "myths" if you will—in order that power
may flow so as to inspire men to action. For "... no
material force can long uphold a situation lacking an
ethical base."26

25 Ibid.
26 Notebook of Thoughts, 4 August, 1938.
Seen in this way, the Metaxas regime may be regarded as that force attempting to counterbalance the mobilized sectors of society and their effects. The policies of "de-mobilization (i.e., the attempts to re-channel the demands of those mobilized sectors), the program of administrative decentralization, and the youth movement may be seen as various aspects of the overall policy of restoring social equilibrium. The propagation of the "new myth," too, may be seen as another aspect in the pursuit of balance. Metaxas seemed to have followed the principle that one fights a myth with another myth; he was far too perceptive to expect that those "foreign fabrications" could be combated with repression alone.

It may be that this aspect of the regime, analogous to the role of the "balancer" in the balance of power international system, reflects the essential historic role of Metaxas as he conceived of it. The evidence presented here strongly suggests that this role fulfills the essential condition of a balancer, namely, that the latter is free of any permanent ties to any one group or interest, and has only one permanent interest: the

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equilibrium of the system. Metaxas was no instrument of any one class or special interest, and this is supported not only by his actions after he was in power but also by his earlier, highly independent performance during the period of parliamentarism.

Again the fact that the Metaxas regime was relatively short-lived (1936-40) and had to devote much of its energy during the last two years in preparation for yet another round of war and sacrifice, precludes any definitive statement on its full significance. Still, on the basis of the goals sought and its brief performance in seeking to realize these, we may draw a number of general and tentative conclusions.

The essential features of the Fourth of August regime took shape rather early as one main reflection of Greece's struggle to weather the storm of rapid socio-political modernization and its crisis aftermath. In his attempt to reconcile progressive with traditional forces into one harmonious whole under the aegis of the state for which he sought, above all else, to provide a sound ethical and material base, Metaxas was guided by the dual principle of "continuity and change." Herein lies
his modus operandi and the significance of his historical role: the ability to perceive and appreciate—perhaps more clearly and certainly more forcefully than any other leader of his time—the cardinal fact that the confrontation between the forces of modernity and tradition that threatened to dismember Greek society in the 'thirties, was radically unlike anything that took place in the past. Greece had entered a new stage in her historical development, and there was no going back to the ideas and ways of the discredited past. The forces unleashed by the new wave of change could not and should not be denied; rather, Metaxas' "What is to be done?" lay in harnessing those forces toward the fulfillment of a set of more or less specific national goals.

The sense of dualism running through the regime's program underscores Metaxas' role as an actor considerably independent of any one group, faction or ideological orientation. Thus he could focus on rural development and stress the basic significance of rural values in an attempt to arrest the "flight" to the cities, but at the same time channel public funds for his program of communication network and into the private sector for industrial
growth and capital accumulation; he rejected Socialism as an ideology, but enthusiastically supported numerous programs of social reform; he dismantled organized labor's leadership role as opponent to the state and big business, but also acted swiftly to implement and enforce important labor legislation; finally, he sought resolutely to destroy and discredit Communism and remove its influence from various organizations and above all the schools, but at the same time acted to implement many programs such as in social security, welfare and a policy of free education—programs which the Communists were pressing for all along. Communists "will never forgive me," he was fond of telling his friends and close associates, "for stealing their thunder." It was this sense of dualism which permitted Metaxas the vital flexibility and maneuverability needed in order to keep from being consistently associated with any one group or interest, and thus also escape the confinements of ideology.

Thus, paradoxically perhaps, one important by-product of the pursuit of social balance mainly in terms of "defusing" the dynamism of the urban sector and its political manifestations, and in effect the continued increasing interdependence between different sectors of the
society and economy. In other words, although social balance and overall stability were achieved largely at the expense of continued immediate gains in socio-economic mobility and structural differentiation, the long-term effects of such actions were far from "negative" or developmentally counterproductive, as the postwar period of development and political stability—the first such period of sustained growth and development in modern Greek history—clearly indicates. Stability through balance, the *sine qua non* of sustained but not lopsided social and political development—therein lies the significance of Metaxas’ historical role.
CONCLUSION

SOME THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
UNEVEN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

After a slow start, progress toward a theory of modernization and political development is being made. Concepts are being better defined, relationships are more clearly stated and better explained, and an interdisciplinary effort covering a wider range of phenomena is under way. One result of this renewed drive is the increasing number of empirical case studies attuned to the needs for both verification of the existing body of theory via testable hypotheses, and its refinement through efforts to account for diversity and contextual variation.

In the growing body of literature, one area that requires closer scrutiny is the study of the process of transition from tradition to modernity itself, and of the class of "transitional" polities which variously characterize that process. The present study of interwar Greece is an effort in that direction; it is an attempt to conceptualize that process of change--its rate, scope, intensity and the political consequences during its different
phases or "moments."

What are some of the lessons and implications--however tentative and incomplete--that can be drawn from the Greek case? In other words, in what ways does this study highlight, raise questions about, or add to our present state of knowledge of modernization and the development process? Again, there are no definitive answers proposed here. The fact that theory-building in this area is in its formative stage (and that the study of polity-types such as in interwar Greece is rather a "latecomer" to this comparative effort) precludes any general and conclusive statement. Nevertheless, some tentatively conclusive remarks and suggestions are in order.

The central theme of this study has been the process of change or transition from one set of structured socio-political regularities (tradition) to another (modernity); the focus centered on the key political consequences of (1) a polity's entering into what has been called the "threshold" of political development, and (2) the conditions for crossing that threshold; the main query has been the rise of the phenomenon of authoritarianism and its role in the modernization process. The main argument or thesis that emerges from this study of interwar Greece may be
summarized as follows: some polities—of which the consociational type is one—are, by virtue of a peculiar social structure, especially equipped to undergo some forms of change by absorbing and accommodating it within the framework of the ongoing value and authority systems, and to withstand—and even turn into an advantage vis-à-vis those systems—the destabilizing effects of such change or modernization. Yet for all the adaptiveness and resiliency that these polities display, such capacity to adapt is limited to modernization in the form of what Riggs aptly calls "emulative acculturation," or the superficial and decorative grafting of various institutional forms, techniques and practices onto the existing tradition-bound order without the concomitant value and attitudinal changes, and did not extend to modernization in the form of political development and its characteristic types of creative and innovative capacity that entail the ability to affect basic structural change of the system itself. Thus in interwar Greece, the growth of bureaucracy—facilitated by the personalized, hierarchic clientele and further reinforced by a consistently narrow base of elite recruitment—was status—not achievement-oriented; it was not accompanied by the development of the bureau-
ocratic "ethos" in the Weberian sense and its characteristic traits of efficiency, role responsibility and a sense of professionalism.

Until the impact of developmental change during the mid-twenties and early 'thirties spearheaded by the refugee influx, the Greek consociational system "worked" in its own peculiar way: it provided for the periodic "circulation" of elites, the cooptation of leading members of subelite groups and, above all, it provided for basic system stability despite the divisive and destabilizing tendencies of cultural and political fragmentation. But with changing cleavage patterns and a host of new demands and goals supported by new types of organizations, all of which are thrust upon the system by newly-mobilized social and political groupings, situations of crisis and possibly breakdown arise. In other words, the ensuing conflicts that are generated in this new phase of modernization—the phase of uneven development—between the state and the newly-mobilized groups cannot be readily negotiated along familiar clientele lines of transactions, because the new sets of goals and demands arising from these otherwise organized, differentiated, but non-integrated sectors entail new types of integrative and
distributive capacity that are simply not available to
the system. The results are serious imbalances and dis-
continuities since the clientele networks--the "guts" of
the consociational system and its system of communications--
become increasingly dysfunctional.

In this study we have viewed political development
as essentially the interaction among three key elements and
dimensions: capacity, equality and structural differenti-
ation. The three elements relate to each other in specific
ways. The relationship between capacity and equality is
essentially antagonistic; as the Greek case shows, growing
demands for social justice, economic well-being, welfare
and meaningful political participation stand in direct
opposition to the requirements for capacity, namely,
hierarchy, efficiency, capital accumulation, ability or
competence, etc. Differentiation, on the other hand,
stands in a special relation to both. Political develop-
ment implies that there appear in a polity a growing number
of specialized social roles and differentiated structures.
But the mere increase in terms of roles and structures--as
the post-traditional phase of modernization illustrates--
does not suffice for entering the threshold of development;
for it is essential that these structures enter into specific and patterned relationships to each other. In short, developmental differentiation suggests social and political integration, or increasing value consensus among a people and a sense of identity with the state--its role and claims. Now since such an integrative capacity has requirements that entail increases along both of the dimensions of capacity and equality (i.e., both types of demands must be relatively satisfied), it follows that sustained increases in developmental differentiation (viewed here as the sufficient condition for political development) require a corresponding balanced "growth" or increases in both levels of capacity and equality. On the basis of the above, therefore, it may be argued that the polity which is capable of positively employing and minimizing the inherent tensions or "contradictions" of the capacity-equality dualism, may be said to be providing, for the long-run at least, the conditions for sustained political development.

Now the term "balance" as used here suggests a relative concept involving two antagonistic and interdependent phenomena; increases in one presuppose decline in the other,
and vice versa. Thus in Greece during the late 'twenties when the forces for rapid and far-reaching change and development unleashed by the refugee impact were in full force, the sharp increases in the forces for equality (e.g., widespread syndicalist and political party activities, the growth of agricultural cooperatives, professional organizations, etc.) were accompanied or followed by an equally sharp decline in the general capacity of the state to meet the new wave of demands and accommodate the newly-differentiated levels of the new organizations. That, after all--along with the emergence of internal contradictions among the elites themselves--is what essentially explains the aftermath in terms of polity breakdown. It seems to follow that the establishment of balance or equilibrium in such a setting of increasingly uneven development requires the revitalization or "mobilization" of those value-identific elements making for integration--elements that did not develop, or remained "atrophied" in the onslaught of the other developing (and divisive) patterns--and that, in turn, requires the devitalization or "demo-
obilization" of the mobilized developing social sectors.
The need for integration in a fragmented polity rises in direct relation to cumulative increases in structural differentiation. When such a need becomes an imperative in order to prevent the disintegration of a social order as, for example, is possible under conditions of breakdown and the "dysfunctional fusion" that results when large bodies of people are brought into common frameworks of action without common views or purpose through rapid mobilization and urbanization, it may well be that the most likely political order by which such an imperative can be realized is one that undertakes to radically reconstruct a society's goals and purpose. Of course, most societies are not lacking in goals or purposes. But some are more fortunate than others in that they are not confronted with irreconcilable conflict between different goals that threaten to tear the social fabric apart. And that brings us once again to that basic requirement for a sense of societal balance.

We have argued that authoritarianism is both the product of, and a response to, the fundamental disequilibrria generated by the process of uneven development. It is an attempt, in some cases, to restore a social balance by demobilizing some of the mobilized sectors and their
effects, and by seeking to rechannel their dynamism within a proposed new framework or social order that entails a new relationship between state and society. In so doing, to the extent that such a regime succeeds, it may well make a contribution to the ongoing process of modernization and political development.

There are many paths to sustained modernization and political development. Some may be relatively smooth and troublefree, while others may entail many and varied obstacles and be quite circuitous; still others may involve the retracing of some vital steps which, for reasons that vary from one context to the next, were not well covered during the early phases of the journey. Collectivism as a generic phenomenon, is one important link in the sequence of phases in some transitions from tradition to modernity. It is essentially a response to certain overriding problems which, of course, may not be resolved. But if the characteristic problems of a given phase are not resolved, they are likely to return in time and in yet another form and confront a polity with a relapse of situations of crisis and the prospects of authoritarianism.
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