THE HISTORICAL CRITERIA OF PIERRE BAYLE:
A DISCUSSION OF HIS STANDARDS FOR THE WRITING OF HISTORY
AS EXPRESSED IN THE HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL DICTIONARY

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PREFACE

A NOTE ON THE PRIMARY SOURCES

Bayle published two editions of the *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, the first in 1697 and a greatly expanded one in 1702. He also left, after his death, a considerable number of manuscripts for publication in a supplement to the *Dictionnaire*. His design, however, was never carried out, and an entirely new edition was published at Rotterdam in 1720 containing the new articles. Since Bayle was no longer living and thus unable to supervise the publication, numerous errors appeared in the text. In 1730 yet another printing of the *Dictionnaire* was undertaken at Amsterdam, this edition being collated with both the 1697 and 1702 publications, the latter being Bayle's own copy.¹

The 1734 English translation done by Pierre Des Maizeaux is based on the 1730 Amsterdam printing. His biography of Bayle, also translated

¹Pierre Bayle, *The Dictionary Historical and Critical of Mr. Peter Bayle*. The Second Edition, Carefully collated with the several Editions of the Original; in which many are restored and the whole greatly augmented, particularly with a Translation of the Quotations from eminent Writers in various Languages. To which is prefixed *The Life Of The Author*, Revised, Corrected, and Enlarged, by Mr. Des Maizeaux, Fellow of the Royal Society (London, 1784), I, iii.
from the French, is included in the English edition. Much of the biographical material was drawn from a diary which is "an historical and chronological journal of his life ... [the] Calendarium Carlananum." A manuscript of this autobiographical compendium of Bayle's life exists today in the Bibliothèque Nationale, but it is not in his handwriting. Whether Des Maizeaux had an original copy is not known. There is one other English edition of the Dictionnaire extant. This is a 1710 translation done from the original second edition of 1702. Numerous errors and many omissions unfortunately render this work almost useless as a primary source. Since 1734 no editions of Bayle's greatest work have been translated into English. Many publications, which are only copies of Bayle's format have been undertaken, but these only approximate the original.

2Ibid., ii.

INTRODUCTION

The seventeenth century was an era of philosophic system-building par excellence. Not since the Hellenic Age had such an interest in the world and its place in the cosmos been evidenced. Descartes, Spinoza, Hobbes, Leibnitz, and Locke are recognized instantly for their philosophic genius. And they are by no means the only men of this time who have left their mark in the realm of ideas. Yet, not all of the intellectual activities of this period were in the area of technical philosophy. Biblical and literary criticism, polemical writings stemming from the ongoing religious disputes, a renewed interest in history, and an awakening interest in natural science were also part of the intellectual milieu.

One man in particular stands out because of his erudition—Pierre Bayle. Schooled in philosophy, theology, and history, he attacked every facet of his world that represented an excess. Superstition, intolerance, dogma, even rationality—whatever had been extended beyond reasonable bounds was subject to the scathing criticism of his pen. He combined elements of skepticism and the dialectical method of the scholastics, as well as Cartesian thinking in a rigorous analytical method, that made his a premiere critic of the age. For a man of letters, whose sole occupation was the world of books and ideas, his life was beset with inordinate controversy, and this same debate has
accompanied his thought to the present day. The issues of his faith, his scepticism, his use of "reason" are even now the subject of lively debate among scholars. However, one area of his thinking which has not received much attention is his view of history. The Dictionnaire historique et critique was not the first such compendium, but the standards of historical scholarship which Bayle established in this work stand as a monument in the development of the discipline of history. In this study the historical criteria which Bayle has set forth will be assessed in terms of the total corpus of his thought and evaluated in terms of his treatment of historical material within the Dictionnaire.
CHAPTER I

BIOGRAPHY

Carla, a small town in the county of Foix, is the birthplace of Pierre Bayle. A region with a long tradition of political independence, it was also a stronghold of Protestant sentiments. All but isolated in the foothills of the Pyrénées, Carla escaped the destruction of the religious wars and prospered. By the mid-seventeenth century it was a commercial center of the region as well as a stronghold of the French Reformed Church. Bayle's family had lived near Carla for at least two generations preceding Pierre's birth, his grandfather Isaac having been a laborer in the textile trade. Jean Bayle, Pierre's father, who had been a minister since 1637, married Jeanne de Bruguière in 1643. Even though Jeanne Bayle was a member of the local nobility, the family was poor, owing largely to the policies of the French government which made the economic position of a Calvinist minister somewhat precarious.

Into this setting, then, Pierre was born November 18, 1647. An older brother, Jacob, was three years his senior and nine years later,

5 Ibid., 9.
6 Bayle, Dictionary, I, iii. As noted in the first citation the author of Bayle's earliest biography is Pierre Des Maizeaux. Subsequent citations from this source will appear as Des Maizeaux, "Life," Dictionary, I.
in 1656 he would have a younger brother Joseph.7 Pierre, like his brothers, was educated at home, although Elisabeth Labrousse, his most recent biographer, asserts that he learned the rudiments of reading and writing in a Calvinist elementary school.8 In his youth Bayle exhibited a gifted intellect in the form of an excellent memory and an eagerness to learn. His father possessed a small personal library,9 in which he read avidly. He learned Latin as a child and began the study of Greek by the age of thirteen.10

In February 1667 he was sent to the Protestant academy at Puylarens for further study, but his intense pursuit of learning caused his already frail constitution to fail in September of that same year.11 From then until November 1668 when he returned to Puylarens, Bayle was forced to rest in an effort to regain his health. During

7Labrousse, Bayle, p. 10.

8Ibid., 19.

9Ibid.

10During his stay at Geneva he learned Italian by attending religious services in that language and there are indications that he also read Spanish. Although he never learned English, Dutch, Hebrew, or any German dialect, the five languages in which he could work were a significant aid in his research.

11Des Maizeaux, "Life," Dictionary, I, iii. See also: Howard Robinson, Bayle the Sceptic (New York, 1931), p. 241. Robinson asserts that Bayle's malady was hereditary--both his mother and maternal grandmother had died from a similar lung ailment. Bayle's health would break again from overwork in 1687, and he was ill for at least six months prior to his death.
this period he visited an uncle at Saverdun, but finding a library in
the home of a local minister, he returned to his studies. This com-
ounded his illness and his recuperation was severely hindered.\textsuperscript{12}
Once he returned to the academy, however, he rapidly made up his work
and was soon fully prepared for higher learning.

Bayle entered the University of Toulouse on February 19, 1669.\textsuperscript{13}
This was a Jesuit school, but such an occurrence was not uncommon at
this time. The Jesuits were renowned as good teachers and it was the
only readily accessible institution of higher education for him to
attend.\textsuperscript{14} Only one month after his arrival Bayle became a Catholic
convert,\textsuperscript{15} and his family was both shocked and grieved. The Bishop of
Rieux underwrote a portion of the young convert's expenses after his
father had stopped all financial support.\textsuperscript{16} For seventeen months
Bayle remained a Catholic. But he began to entertain doubts concerning
Roman theology, and on August 21, 1670 he abjured Catholicism and


\textsuperscript{13}\textit{Ibid.}, iv.

\textsuperscript{14}G. P. Gooch, \textit{French Profiles: Prophets and Pioneers} (London,

\textsuperscript{15}Des Maizeaux, "Life," \textit{Dictionary}, I, iv. Much discussion has
taken place concerning Bayle's motivation for this decision. The
consensus of opinion holds that it derived from purely academic con-
siderations--Bayle had been harboring doubts concerning Calvinist
theology--and that clever arguments presented by his teachers per-
suaded him to change religions.

\textsuperscript{16}\textit{Ibid.}
returned to the Reformed Church. He thereby became a relaps (i.e. one who has been converted to Catholicism and then reverts to a Protestant faith) and was subject to severe punishment under French law. Consequently, he left for Geneva the same day and arrived there on September 2, 1670.

He continued his studies at a Calvinist academy, emphasizing Cartesian philosophy, which he learned from a professor Chouet. To support himself, Bayle accepted tutorial positions—one in November 1670 and another in May 1672—which hindered his academic work. Nevertheless, he completed his courses and left for Rouen in May 1674, becoming a preceptor there as well. Less than one year later he departed from Rouen to go to Paris so that he could partake of a more stimulating intellectual environment. At this time he changed his name to Bôle to avoid detection as a relapsed Catholic. His situation, again as a private tutor, proved unsatisfactory to Bayle, and in August of 1675 he travelled to the Protestant academy at Sedan where

17 Ibid., vii.

18 Ibid., vii-viii.


21 Ibid.

22 Ibid., xi.
he entered into competition for the professorship of philosophy. He bested three other applicants in a disputation on "Time" and was awarded the job.

His stay at Sedan marked the beginning of his literary career. Bayle's teaching responsibilities were numerous, and as a result his early works are short essays, generally dealing with various philosophical topics. The appearance of the comet in 1680 was to inspire his first lengthy and well known work. Initially he submitted his treatise to the editor of the Mercure Gallant for publication but was refused. He then decided to publish the work independently, but the academy at Sedan was closed by a royal edict in 1681. Bayle considered emigrating to England; however, a former student intervened with Hadrian van Paets, a Counsellor of Rotterdam, on Bayle's behalf and secured the post of philosophy and history teacher for him at a newly formed academy, the Ecole Illustre.

Pierre Bayle, then resident of the Low Countries, began anew his teaching occupation in December of 1681. His lectures and tutoring were reduced to seven hours a week, and the publications which were to make him a center of controversy soon appeared. In 1682 he

\[23\] Ibid., xiv.
\[24\] Ibid.

\[25\] Ibid. Not only Bayle, but Pierre Jurieu, a colleague from Sedan, were given teaching positions at the new school. In fact, the Ecole Illustre was founded by the city officials of Rotterdam, at the urging of van Paets, for the benefit of French Calvinist émigrés.

\[26\] Ibid., xv.

\[27\] Robinson, Sceptic, p. 36.
published *Lettre à M.L.A.D.C., docteur de Sorbonne: ou il est prouvé par plusieurs raisons tirées de la philosophie et de la théologie que les comètes ne sont point le présage d'aucun malheur. Avec plusieurs réflexions morales et politiques et plusieurs observations historiques et la réfutation de quelques erreurs populaires.* In this work he attacked superstition and discussed morality as distinct from religious dogma.

Shortly hereafter Bayle printed a reply to the Jesuit historian Père Maimbourg who had written a partisan history of Calvinism. Bayle's work appeared in July of 1682 under the title of *Critique générale de l'Histoire du Calvinisme du P. Maimbourg.* A second edition was printed in August and a revised edition was published in November of the same year. Pierre Jurieu's sister-in-law attempted to arrange a marriage for Bayle at this time but he refused, stating that marriage was incompatible with the life of letters.

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28 The second edition, published also in 1682, is more commonly known by the title of the *Pensées diverses, écrites à un docteur de Sorbonne, à l'occasion de la comète qui parut au mois de Decembre 1680.* Further references to this work will be abbreviated to *Pensées diverses.*

29 At this time the Low Countries were known for tolerance, which was extended not only to religion but to ideas as well. Had Bayle gone anywhere else it is doubtful if much of his work would have been printed.

30 *Des Maizeaux, "Life," Dictionary, I, xvi.* Further reference to this work will be abbreviated to *Critique générale.*

31 *Ibid., xvii.*

32 *Ibid., xviii.* See also: Robinson, *Sceptic,* p. 30. Robinson asserts that Bayle also maintained a low opinion of women's conduct. The genesis of this sentiment can only be guessed, for Bayle had a very warm relationship with his mother—as expressed in his correspondence. For further material see: J. L. Gerig and G. L. van Roosbroeck, "Unpublished Letters of Pierre Bayle," *Romantic Review,* XXII (July - September, 1931). Not only this, but he was most disconsolate when his mother died.
Slightly more than one year later Pierre Bayle inaugurated a publication that was to leave an indelible mark on the world of letters. The *Nouvelles de la république des lettres*, which first appeared in May 1684, was a literary journal that not only carried book reviews but was also a forum for ideas in which the thought of the Great Arnauld, Boyle, Leibnitz, Locke, and Malebranche, among others, appeared and was commented upon by Bayle. The monthly appearance of this periodical was all the more amazing because the editor and primary contributor was Bayle alone. He continued in this task until 1687 when his health broke for a second time and he was forced to give up the task of its publication.

The year 1685 was a time of sorrow for Bayle. His father died in March, and his brother, imprisoned after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, also expired due to the mistreatment he received at the hands of his captors. Bayle was not only saddened but also infuriated at French political intervention into the religious sphere. In March 1686 he published *Ce que c'est que la France toute catholique sous le règne de Louis-le-Grand*, which was a condemnation of Louis' policies as well as a plea for toleration. Then in October 1686 Bayle brought out his great work on toleration: the *Commentaire philosophique sur ces paroles des Jesus-Christ: Contrains les d'entrer; oh l'on prouve par plusieurs raisons démonstratives qu'il n'y a rien de plus abominable que de faire*

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34 Further references to this work will be abbreviated to *France toute catholique*.

des conversions par la contrainte, et où l'on réfute tous les sophismes des convertisseurs à contrainte et l'apologie que St. Augustin a faite des persécutions.\textsuperscript{36} In numerous arguments Bayle refuted all grounds for religious intolerance, defending the rights of the erring conscience. The burden of these writings and the responsibilities of his monthly journal caused the breakdown of his health in 1687, but even with his illness Bayle published a supplement to the Commentaire philosophique\textsuperscript{37} in 1688.\textsuperscript{38} In addition to the problem of his poor health, the ideas that he had expressed in the Commentaire philosophique had aroused the opposition of his colleague, Pierre Jurieu. Jurieu, a professor of theology at the Ecole Illustre, was the religious and political spokesman for the Huguenot refugees in the Low Countries. As a strictly orthodox Calvinist he took exception to Bayle's arguments for religious toleration and proceeded to mount a literary attack on Bayle. The latter, because of his poor health and Jurieu's animosity, tried to secure a teaching position in Prussia, but he was unsuccessful and remained in Rotterdam.\textsuperscript{39}

The attacks levied by Pierre Jurieu on Bayle intensified in 1690 when the latter's name was connected with a pamphlet: the Avis important

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{36}This work like almost all his others bore a fictitious authorship, since Bayle feared, even in Rotterdam, persecution for his views, if not from the civil authorities, then from the Walloon Consistory.
\item \textsuperscript{37}This abbreviation will be used in further references to this work.
\item \textsuperscript{38}Robinson, Sceptic, p. 312.
\item \textsuperscript{39}Des Maizeaux, "Life," Dictionary, xxxix.
\end{itemize}
aux réfugiés aux leur prochain retour en France. Donné pour étrennes à l'un d'eux en 1690, which was a libelous attack on Jurieu's grandiose designs and predictions concerning the French Calvinists' impending return to and domination of their homeland.\textsuperscript{40} During the next three years both Bayle and Jurieu carried on a heated debate in print, each issuing one pamphlet after another to refute his opponent's latest charge. Finally, after much political maneuvering, Jurieu had Bayle removed from his professorship in October 1693.\textsuperscript{41} This represented the loss of a small income to Bayle but little else. He began to toil in earnest on his \textit{Dictionnaire}, which would be his greatest work.

\textsuperscript{40}The author of this pamphlet has never been definitely established.

\textsuperscript{41}Robinson, \textit{Sceptic}, p. 127. This author suggests that Bayle was the victim of political unrest attendant to the War of the League of Augsburg as much as to Jurieu's intrigue. Also a consideration is the disfavor in which Bayle was now held by William of Orange. Jurieu was the \textit{provocateur}, but King William issued the edict which cost Bayle his job, although the latter was never aware of this action. See: Leo Courtines, \textit{Bayle's Relations with England and the English} (New York, 1938), pp. 103-107.
In 1692 he had published a Projet et fragments d’un dictionnaire critique.42 His original intent was to correct the errors in other dictionnaires, especially that of Louis Moréri, whose work was first published in 1674. Bayle's design as expressed in the Projet was not well received and he altered his plans. The result was a two-volume work published in 169743 with the title Dictionnaire historique et critique. A monument to scholarship, the work was primarily biographical—the majority of persons listed coming from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In between the factual articles Bayle dispersed a virtual mountain of notes in which he covered every topic that he had ever discussed: toleration, atheism, the problem of evil, and Pyrrhonism to

42 One article alludes to the genesis of the Dictionnaire as emanating from as early as 1672. Lief Nedergaard, "La genèse du Dictionnaire historique et critique de Pierre Bayle," Orbis Litterarum, XIII (1958), 210-211. Nedergaard, referring to a biographical compendium written by Bayle in Geneva, asserts that "Les dix première pages sont consacrées à des apercus généalogiques de différente nature, tableaux suppliées par des commentaires: la premier page étant en blanc le premier tableau commence à la page 3: De la Famille des Asmoneens (suite page 2); puis, à la page 5, De la famille d'Herodes, suivie à la page 7 du tableau de la Famille de Boubon; finalement à la page 9, on lit De la maison de Foix (Extrait des notes sur la vie du Chau). "Baynard: ..." Referring to a second volume of similar material in the Royal Library of Copenhagen the author states: "Comme l'autre volume, Abrege des vies illustres des Plutarque, qui selon sa légende a été commencé le lundi 4, juillet 1672, celle ci de deux ans plus recente, semble avoir été achetée pour enregistrements d'apercus historiques." Nedergaard does not develop this thesis very fully or carefully, but he does make the assertion that Bayle had a project like the Dictionnaire in mind as early as 1672.

43 The 1697 date is cited in all works save one—Elisabeth Labrousse, Bayle, p. 245. Here she states that the Dictionnaire was placed on sale October 24, 1696.
name a few. No sooner had the first edition appeared than Bayle began
to work on a second, but not before he had to defend his work before the
Walloon Consistory, which was the governing body of the French Reformed
Church in exile. Jurieu, whose opposition to Bayle had become increas-
ingly vehement, took exception to the "atheistic beliefs" that the latter
had expressed in the Dictionnaire and persuaded the church authorities to
call Bayle before them for an interrogation. They insisted that Bayle
alter his article on "David" and the "Manicheans," as well as clarifying
his views on Pyrrhonism. The second edition was subsequently printed in
1702 with the objectionable articles intact, but with several "clarifica-
tions" to satisfy the Consistory.44 Another round of debate ensued
between Bayle and Jurieu, especially over the article "David."45 Bayle
was to publish one remaining work beginning in 170446: Reponse aux
Questions d'un Provincial, a work in which Bayle deals with a variety of
topics. This project and the continuing debate with Jurieu, who was
joined by two other writers, Jean Le Clerc and Isaac Jacquelot, in his
criticism of the Dictionnaire, occupied the last days of the now ailing
Bayle, who had been ill for six months prior to his death with what

44In the meantime he had published an addition to the Pensees
diverses in 1684 and a third edition of the same work in 1699.

45Bayle had considerably altered this article, but this printer had
inserted both the original and the modified versions into the 1702
edition. Jurieu's opposition had grown to a hatred of Bayle, and he used
any pretext to attack him.

46This work appeared in segments from 1704-1707, the last portion
being printed after his death.
Dex Maizeaux terms "a hereditary distemper." ⁴⁷ A true man of letters to his last breath, Bayle barely finished one final reply to his opponents before his death on December 28, 1706. ⁴⁸ In order to assess Bayle's position in the realm of ideas we must examine his thought, and it is to this segment of his life that we now turn our attention.

⁴⁷ Des Maizeaux, "Life," Dictionary, I, cxiv. See also: Robinson, Sceptic, p. 241. This author states that Bayle refused medical assistance during the last two years of his life because he was aware of the hereditary nature of his illness.

CHAPTER II

BAYLE'S SKEPTICISM AND HIS VIEWS ON TOLERATION

Bayle has been commonly thought of as a skeptic. This view was accepted by the philosophes, especially Voltaire, who were to use his Dictionnaire as both a source book and a model for the various "encyclopedias" of the eighteenth century. Until a few years ago this assessment has been the only interpretation of Bayle. However, as Craig Brush, a recent writer, has indicated, one must define skepticism in precise terms to apply it to Bayle with any validity. Currently there are two other views of Bayle. Richard Popkin argues that he is a fideist, while Elisabeth Labrousse sees Bayle as neither a skeptic, nor a fideist, but rather as a critic whose thinking is too varied to be given

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49 Craig B. Brush, Montaigne and Bayle: Variations on the Theme of Skepticism (The Hague, 1966).

50 Richard Popkin defines this term as follows in The History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Descartes (New York, 1964), p. xiv. "Fideism covers a group of possible views extending from (1) that of blind faith, which denies to reason any capacity whatsoever to reach the truth, or to make it plausible, and which bases all certitude on a complete and unquestioning adherence to some revealed or accepted truths, to (2) that of making faith prior to reason. This latter view denies to reason any complete and absolute certitude of the truth prior to the acceptance of some proposition or propositions by faith, ..., even though reason may play some relative or probable role in the search for, or explanation of truth." Popkin is the primary advocate of this view. He would classify Bayle as an adherent of the second option listed above.
a label. The diversity of topics covered by Bayle as well as his role as "a pragmatic critic rather than a metaphysical philosopher" has contributed to this great disparity of interpretations concerning his thought.

Another area of Bayle's writing which has been recognized as a major contribution to the history of ideas is that of toleration. Bayle advocated a latitude of tolerance that was considered radical, and even dangerous, by religious partisans. His initial call for religious toleration was aimed at the Catholics, but his ideas were so inclusive that his own churchmen denounced him. Although there is some debate concerning the sources and inspiration of his thinking on this matter, there is little disagreement over the substance of his ideas, except the exact limits of religious freedom that he would grant to atheists. This chapter will, therefore, be a discussion of the varying interpretations of Bayle's thinking in the areas of skepticism and toleration.

If one considers his intellectual tendencies and his education it becomes apparent that he could easily formulate a skeptical outlook on

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53 In the seventeenth century the definition of atheism was much broader than we construe it today. If one did not follow closely the dogma advocated by his particular sect he was open to the accusation of being an atheist. Juriéu saw Bayle's call for tolerance an atheistic act.
life. He possessed, above all, an inquiring mind: "the only things that counted in life for Bayle were things intellectual. Reading, writing, discussing that was what life meant to him."55 Also, "he had a mind that was analytical, thoughtfully critical, impartial, objective, and fearless, a type of mind for which skeptical thought would apt to have appeal and interest."56 His education served to reinforce these qualities. He was of course well grounded in the doctrines of Calvinism by his parents, but his own reading and the multitude of sectarian debates within the Reformed Church produced an intellectual crisis which resulted in his conversion to Catholicism while at Toulouse. During his stay with the Jesuits he received a thorough training in Scholastic philosophy which was illustrated by the teachings of Roderigo Arriaga whose technique was to expose the weaknesses of every rational attempt to make sense of human experience, and thus, demonstrate the inherent contradictions produced by reason.57 Bayle's ever-inquiring mind led

54 I will make a distinction here between skepticism as a school of philosophy and as a cast of mind which tends to doubt. See: Brush, Montaigne and Bayle, p. 5. He discusses the historical schools of skeptical thinking: Pyrrhonism, which advocates a total suspension of judgment, and Academic skepticism which is based upon the psychological ability of a person to clearly perceive truth.


56 Ruth E. Cowdrick, The Early Reading of Pierre Bayle: Its Relation to his Intellectual Development up to the Beginning of Publication of the Nouvelles de la république des lettres (Scottsdale, Pa., 1939), p. 78

him to doubt in turn the doctrines of the Roman Church, especially that of Transubstantiation, and he again became a Calvinist. At Geneva he studied Cartesian philosophy, to which he was very much attracted, and Calvinist theology under Louis Tronchin, who espoused a rational approach to religious doctrine. As Bayle completed his formal education at Geneva it is apparent that his thinking had undergone a series of metamorphoses, which certainly were significant in shaping his method as well as the views he later expressed.

Howard Robinson, who has written the only biography of Bayle in English, adheres to the skeptical interpretation of his thought. He sees Bayle's double conversion as "a sort of first act of scepticism" and later asserts that "Bayle was certainly a decided sceptic, . . . ," and that "he saw little, if any personal value in those positive religious beliefs so dear to the great majority." It is this view of Bayle which Voltaire had popularized, but it is based on an uncritical assessment of skepticism. Nowhere does Robinson define whether he is using the term in a strictly philosophical or in a more general sense, and this results in an incomplete discussion of the issue.

58 This article of faith represents one of the major differences between Calvinist and Catholic theology, the latter insisting upon the real presence of Christ in the bread while the Reformers argued that He was present only in a spiritual capacity.
59 Rex, Essays, pp. 129-137.
60 Howard Robinson, Bayle the Sceptic (New York, 1931).
61 Robinson, Skeptic, p. 11
62 Ibid., 243.
In the most recent monograph published on this topic Craig Brush discusses Bayle’s outlook in this manner:

But the most incisive reduction of Cartesian philosophy to skepticism was to be accomplished by a Protestant in Holland, who early in life became an adherent of the new thought. Pierre Bayle believed Descartes' *cogito* could silence Pyrrhonists; he preferred the dualist physics of the French philosopher to the empiricist theories of Gassendi or Locke; he agreed that self-evidence, however defective it might be, was the only possible rational criterion of truth; and at the same time, he provided Pyrrhonism with the strongest expression it had known since Montaigne.63

Brush has a more positive outlook on Bayle’s thought while still considering him a skeptic. He views Bayle as a thinker who not only used the skeptical method but gave it a new philosophical meaning. He also acknowledges that the variety of philosophies to which Bayle was exposed exerted a profound effect on his thinking.64 Brush also argues that Bayle’s adherence to Cartesianism was a direct result of his religious conversions. He states that "Cartesian philosophy, then, to the young Bayle seems to be quite compatible with the Protestant cause. He hopes that with its help a rational philosophy could explain even such a mystery as the Eucharist."65

Turning to purely philosophical matters Brush notes that Bayle employs logic to test certain concepts

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64 Brush notes in *Montaigne and Bayle*, p. 205, that these varied interests are expressed in the course of philosophy that Bayle taught at Sedan. The first year was entirely devoted to logic while the second year was divided "into sections on logic, ethics, general physics, particular physics (astronomy, weather, the cause of fountains, along with other miscellanea), and metaphysics."

65 *Tbid.*, 200-201.
such as extension and motion, while at the same time he bases rational knowledge on "the Cartesian principle that the one sure standard of truth is the evidence of a clear and distinct idea." In essence Bayle is subscribing to the cogito as a legitimate first principle, but he also finds "that some self-evident propositions are incomprensible." Brush asserts, then, that "Bayle... concludes that philosophy's task is to prove that something is so, not how it is so." Thus this author sees Bayle's early thinking as a mixture of Cartesianism and skepticism which interact to produce philosophical certitude.

Where religious toleration is concerned Brush finds that Bayle began to fuse certain psychological elements into his thought. He argues that Bayle found that "it is not reason, but instinct, passion and habit that motivate men. What we call reason is usually nothing more than the rationalization of our emotional needs." Yet, in his works on toleration he was "appealing to the principles of rationality... to find arguments against forceful methods of conversion that are convincing to

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66 Ibid., 206.
67 Ibid., 207.
68 Brush in Montaigne and Bayle, p. 207, finds Bayle's thought ambivalent at this point. He states that for Bayle "philosophical truth is not the only truth; for revelation gives men truths every bit as certain as philosophy's propositions." Furthermore, he argues Bayle is not only operating on a double standard but he would also limit the efficacy of faith in matters of revealed truths. He states that "logic produces a certitude and clarity [for Bayle] while faith will confer varying degrees of certitude depending on its source."
69 Ibid., 225.
all men regardless of religious affiliation."\textsuperscript{70} Brush argues that "Bayle founds his lessons of tolerance on the only truly \textit{religious} grounds possible, the sanctity of conscience,"\textsuperscript{71} and that he "uses skepticism to argue for the right of erring conscience . . . the truly clinching argument for the rights of the erring conscience must be that the truth cannot be surely recognized."\textsuperscript{72}

As Bayle's thought matured he exhibited an increasing tendency toward skepticism, because he found that the "self-evident propositions" of Descartes were not all clear and distinct in their meaning. But, Brush states "only when criticizing Cartesian theories or mathematics is Bayle directly attacking the concept of \textit{evidence}. To no other philosophy would he grant that its principles were self-evident,"\textsuperscript{73} and that "the major part of the case against \textit{evidence} is a survey of the failures of philosophy to account for the complexities of reality."\textsuperscript{74} This aspect of Bayle's skepticism the author concludes "approaches complete Academic skepticism in regard to reason. He preaches the Academics' \textit{akatalepsia}, or the incomprehensibility of thing."\textsuperscript{75} Furthermore Brush argues:

\textcolor{red}{... two things he [Bayle] constantly taught. First that each kind of truth has its own standards ... . Secondly, one must not forget that every field is filled

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{70}Ibid., 242.
\item \textsuperscript{71}Ibid., 243.
\item \textsuperscript{72}Ibid., 244.
\item \textsuperscript{73}Ibid., 280.
\item \textsuperscript{74}Ibid., 269.
\item \textsuperscript{75}Ibid., 282.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
with insoluble uncertainties. All in all, the truth is a complicated thing; there are many avenues that lead toward it; but do not all obtain it, and the wisest procedure is to avoid dogmatism.76

Bayle's skepticism represents much more, however, that a negative avoidance of dogma or a reinterpretation of the ancients. Brush asserts that Bayle contributes a positive aspect to skeptical thinking by relying on a criteria of probabilities which is augmented by the data provided by experience.77 According to Brush there are three types of certitude. The first emanates from self-evident propositions even when they are not completely clear and distinct. If they are in any way incomprehensible the certitude of each is based on a probability which is contingent to the degree of accord between reason and experience. In the second class there are physical certitudes which are also ranked according to the agreement between reason and experience. Into this group Bayle places historical matters. And finally there is moral certitude which includes

76Ibid., 302-303.

77Ibid., 300-301. Brush phrases his argument in the following manner: "Bayle's answer would seem to be that one must first determine which arguments are appropriate to prove a point, then evaluate them with the utmost caution and awareness of their consequences. When all evidence leads to one conclusion, it is virtually a certitude. When the great majority is on one side, one may accept that side as probable, provided that one's persuasion is subject to change. In philosophy, reason's destructive force is so great that Bayle would seem to believe that one is always forced to choose the lesser of two improbabilities. Note that his most frequent argument is that things become incomprehensible beyond a certain point. The fault lies in part with reason, but in part with the nature of things. This leaves open the possibility that some things are relatively clear. Bayle himself uses various techniques to weaken the position of absolute skepticism. In philosophy itself, the cogito is stronger than any Pyrrhonist arguments."
religious faith and ethics. The highest order of certainty here emanates from Scripture.\footnote{Ibid., 301-302.} In summary Brush argues that:

Bayle always maintained that it would be inaccurate to conclude that the human judgment should remain suspended until it could be persuaded with absolute certainty of the truth of the matter. With very few exceptions every proposition was subject to some doubt; reason's function, then, was to expose those doubts systematically with the utmost clarity and opt for the theory that seemed to come closest to accounting for the facts, both the facts of nature and the facts of revelation. Philosophically, his position is at the borderline between rationalism and skepticism; \ldots \! \ldots \! \ldots In my opinion his significance in the context of his time lies in his reduction of Cartesian dogmatism to a radical distrust of abstract reasoning and his consequent emphasis on the solidity of historical facts, among which are revealed history.\footnote{Ibid., 319-320. It is Brush's emphasis on Bayle's historical foundations which make this a most appealing interpretation. No other commentator on Bayle, except Elisabeth Labrousse, take into account Bayle's historical method, which is an integral part of his approach and must be considered in any interpretation of his thought.}
"Because he strove to be objective, because his remarks are often maddeningly noncommittal, because he buried his opinions under mountainous scholastic dialectics that frequently obscured the general outline and movement of his thought . . . Bayle has been interpreted in a multitude of ways by commentators."80 This salient observation by Professor Brush is indeed at the heart of the variance of opinion concerning Bayle's thought.

Another interpretation, supported primarily by Richard Popkin, considers Pierre Bayle as a representative of fideist thought. Popkin has presented his thinking in a series of articles dating from 1951.81 As Professor Popkin views the issue, Bayle replaced reason as a guide and measure of truth with faith as a new guide and Revelation as a new measure.82 This view as it has been expressed is drawn from many different areas of Bayle's writings. Popkin asserts that Bayle advocated a complete Pyrrhonism, which would totally annihilate reason's role in the search for truth:

80 Ibid., 320.

81 Richard H. Popkin, "Berkeley and Pyrrhonism," Review of Metaphysics, V (December, 1951). In this article Popkin argued that Bayle was indeed a skeptic. He asserted that Bayle "apparently intended to offer a new version of Pyrrhonian skepticism developed from the arguments of the seventeenth century rationalists." p. 230 and "Bayle like his later follower, Hume, had turned the enterprise of modern philosophy into a new Pyrrhonism . . . ." p. 246. In all later articles he has viewed Bayle as a fideist, and I am assuming that his represents his current view.

Bayle's aim was to undo the very effort to find rationality in the universe, partly by using the methods of the previous skeptics, partly by unleashing the attacks of Sextus Empiricus on metaphysics, mathematics, ethics, . . . , as well as on epistemology, against all theories new or old, and partly by incorporating other critical techniques into the skeptic's arsenal, Bayle's efforts were to provide the high road to complete Pyrrhonism, undermining completely the brave new world of seventeenth century metaphysics, and leaving man, in spite of his claims to the contrary, afloat in a sink of uncertainty and error. 83

Furthermore, "the countless attacks on various philosophical theories were preliminary to the grand onslaught on any rational theory of religious knowledge . . . " 84 In essence, Bayle advanced two claims:

"(1) that by principles of philosophy one is led to doubt everything and (2) that the futile search within philosophy for certitude by the 'natural light' leads one to conclude that it is necessary to turn to the supernatural light." 85

This same view is supported by two other authors. Harry M. Bracken, a student of Popkin's, argues along much the same line that Bayle was attempting "to ground the elevation of faith over reason on a metaphysical axiom, which has mathematical, not merely moral certainty." 86


85Ibid. Popkin is inconsistent in his arguments here. He has asserted elsewhere that Bayle wished to reject reason, and accept faith and Revelation while at the same time advancing rational arguments to support fideism. See also: "Pierre Bayle's Place in Seventeenth Century Skepticism," by this same author.

E. D. James advocates a variant view of Bayle's fideism. He asserts that Bayle is not a skeptic about knowledge in general but rather limits his skepticism to theological matters, by trying to show that "an absolute, subjective conviction of the truth of Revelation is given an objective rational justification by the morally certain demonstrations of the inspiration of the Scriptures." In other concerns "Bayle is a probabilist in relation to all knowledge that is not revealed." These three commentators then see Bayle as a fideist, giving faith at least a primacy over reason.

Elisabeth Labrousse has another approach to Bayle's thinking. She refuses to classify Bayle's writing under any single heading. She finds both skeptic and fideist as oversimplified terms to describe Bayle, stressing that his thinking was derived from numerous sources and applied to a vast array of topics in a variety of ways.

De ces éléments si variés qu'il accueille également, Bayle n'élabora aucune synthèse systématique: et cependant, ils ne demeurent pas isolés il flottants dans son esprit; seulement la fusion qui s'y opère n'est pas le résultat d'une construction intellectuelle c'est avant tout dans la personnalité de Bayle qu'il faut chercher les facteurs qui associent ces attitudes spirituelles si différentes en une unité moins doctrinale que psychologique.

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88 Ibid., 314.

89 Ibid., 315.

90 Ibid., 316. Again there is inconsistency in this argument. The author never really explains how Bayle's limited skepticism operates, or how it leads to fideism.

91 Labrousse, Bayle: heterodoxie, pp. x-xi.
There is thus no dominant aspect of Bayle's thought, in her interpretation. He must, instead, be dealt with from a much broader intellectual base.

As Brush has suggested, Bayle's own style, along with the scope and sheer volume of his work, make any and all assessments of Bayle as a complete skeptic probable at best. The philosophes saw what they wished to see in Bayle and used his thinking to their advantage. From the standpoint of his historical method it is erroneous to place Bayle into any skeptical school of philosophy. The arguments supporting a fideist interpretation may have merit, but as they are presently stated, they lack consistency. Brush makes an excellent case for a modified skepticism, in the best balanced and most consistent interpretation of Bayle, and Labrousse also makes many valuable observations, especially concerning Bayle's views on history. However, the same problem which faced Bayle now confronts his commentators, namely, what is the truth, in this case about the man who made this very same question the raison d'être of his life.

Another facet of Bayle's thought is the question of religious toleration. Walter Rex, also a recent writer on Bayle, finds that his "concern was with civil religious tolerance, i.e., the right of all religions, both heretical and orthodox, to remain separate and distinct from one another within the secular framework of the state." Bayle's own experience seemed sufficient to stir these beliefs to life. He was forced to leave France while a student to avoid civil persecution as a relaps. Then after he returned to his homeland under an assumed name and undertook a teaching

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career at Sedan, he again became an emigré when the state ordered the academy closed in one of a series of moves which preceded the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. Finally, his elder brother was imprisoned because of the Revocation and subsequently died as a result of ill-treatment, again by government authorities. Even in Rotterdam, where there was an almost total civil toleration of religious matters, Junieu appealed to the secular authorities on numerous occasions in an effort to suppress Bayle's publications. Junieu was successful here to the extent that Bayle lost his teaching position. One can see that Pierre Bayle was a victim of intolerance for the greater portion of his adult life.

He wrote three treatises which have a bearing on toleration. His Pensées diverses, which first appeared in 1682, did not deal directly with this problem, but in it he advanced arguments which he would use in later works to support his theories. Aside from a general attack on superstition, Bayle made a case for the separation of morality from religion, relying heavily on historical examples to prove his point. It is in this work that he made his first assertions concerning atheists, arguing that they could be as moral in their actions as the most "religious" man. In 1686, after the death of his brother he wrote a bitter denunciation of intolerance. He was so outraged that his France toute catholique is the only major work where Bayle put aside his scholarly detachment and engaged in a vitriolic attack on his adversaries. He attacked the policies of the French government toward the Huguenot minority, especially the use of

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93 The question of how far Bayle really would go in the toleration of atheist is also still a matter of debate, as well as just exactly what he meant by the use of the term.
violence in forcing conversions. Later that same year he published the
*Commentaire philosophique* which was a monumental work in the development
of the idea of toleration. Drawing from every possible resource at his
command, Bayle argued for the rights of the erring conscience in all
matters. He insisted that intolerance could lead only to hypocrisy and
thence to irreligion. As noted earlier, Brush has pointed out that Bayle
tried to show that no one dogma could be the repository of truth. From
this tenet Bayle asserted that the only legitimate means of effecting
religious conversion was persuasion, and nothing more. He attempted to
refute the literal interpretation of the Scripture, "compel them to come
in," as articulated by St. Augustine, by showing that it was contrary to
reason to make a man violate his conscience. The Catholics were the
direct object of his attacks but he made it very plain that intolerance
among Protestant sects was just as great an evil. To him the individual
conscience was a paramount concern; it must be allowed to make judgments
on all matters, especially those of religion, free from all restraint. 94

The sources of Bayle's thinking on toleration, aside from his own
experience, are also a matter of some debate. Here again the standard
interpretation is to find the intellectual grounds for his toleration in
skepticism, for a skeptic can exercise no preference in matters of dogma
either for himself or anyone else. A recent reinterpretation of Bayle on
this matter has been offered by Walter Rex who views Bayle's toleration

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94 Rex points out that there is a recorded exception to Bayle's prac-
tice of tolerance. While under the influence of Jurieu at Sedan, Bayle
joined the effort to suppress the aberrant Calvinist sect advocated by
Pajon. *Essays*, pp. 142-144.
as emanating directly from the concerns of Calvinist theology. He argues that "it is this orthodox Calvinism, unstifled by the past, continually seeking to remain alive to the conflicts of its time, that dominates the early work of Pierre Bayle." He asserts that Bayle is attacking idolatry and superstition in the Pensées diverses to make "certain that the identification of pagan and Catholic is firmly established in the reader's mind." In essence:

Bayle's reason for making the attack is not merely a theological disagreement with Catholic doctrine but political: Bayle strikes at the heart of the authority of the Catholic Church because it was in the name of this authority that the Church persecuted the Calvinists.

Bayle's arguments in both the Pensées diverses and the Commentaire philosophique, according to Rex, are drawn from the Eucharistic debates of the Calvinists. Thus, for this writer, Bayle was operating within a strictly orthodox framework, which was grounded in a sincere Calvinist belief, in his call for tolerance. Regardless of their inspiration, the ideas of toleration advocated by Bayle were to be used repeatedly by the Enlightenment thinkers, and moreover, they were the most far-reaching expressions on the topic that had appeared.

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96 Ibid., xiii.

97 Ibid., 46.

98 Ibid., 35.

99 Ibid., 173.
Whatever his contributions, either to sceptical thinking or to the cause of toleration, Bayle's most enduring influence has been in the discipline of history. His observations are a touchstone in the development of modern historical method, and his thoughts on historiography represent a completely positive point of view. For Bayle history was an affirmation of knowledge and thus an area of certainty in an otherwise uncertain world. However, he also saw the untruths propagated by bad history and he was determined to correct errors of fact as well as method. We will now consider the place of history in Bayle's thought.
CHAPTER III

THE PLACE OF HISTORY IN BAYLE'S THought

The *Dictionnaire historique et critique* was Bayle's greatest achievement. It contains not only a summation of his thought but also an articulation of his historical criteria, the latter representing his most enduring contribution to the world of letters. But more than this, the *Dictionnaire* exhibits on every page the standards of scholarship which Bayle was advocating.

The essential value of Bayle's conception of history is that he did not lay down this requirement in the abstract, but that he illustrated it to the last detail in actual practice. Never before had criticism of tradition been carried out with such severity and such inexorable ardor and exactness. Bayle is indefatigable in revealing the gaps, obscurities and contradictions of history. In this process his real genius manifests itself.¹⁰⁰

The value of history had always been apparent to Bayle. In his arguments for toleration, especially in the *Commentaire philosophique*, he employed a multitude of historical examples, and in the *Critique générale* he scored Pere Maimbourg for his partisan history of Calvinism. To Bayle history was both a tool in the search for Truth, and a truth in itself, which was capable of a high degree of certitude.¹⁰¹

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¹⁰¹"Truth" is here taken to mean knowledge.
in this manner, history had to be constructed as an internally consistent and systematic discipline that could discern the certainty of historical facts. This was Bayle's endeavor in the Dictionnaire: to establish critical standards by which one could judge the past. Ernst Cassirer observes:

It is he [Bayle] who carries out the 'Copernican revolution' in the realm of historical science. For he no longer bases history on some dogmatically given objective content which he finds in the Bible or in the doctrine of the Church; he returns rather to the subjective origins and conditions of this truth. The criticism of historical sources, which was at first his sole purpose, expands until it finally becomes a sort of 'Critique of Historical Reason'.

That Bayle appreciated the demands of objective history is most evident in the Dictionnaire. He states that:

History, generally speaking, is the most difficult composure that an author can undertake, or one of the most difficult. It requires a great judgment, a good confidence, perfect probity, many excellent materials, and the art of placing them in good order, and above all things, the power of resisting the instincts of a religious zeal, which prompts one to cry down what he thinks to be false, and to adorn and embellish what he thinks to be true.

Because of his own experience, the problem of religious bias is a paramount concern but his quest for impartiality goes far beyond the difficulty presented by sectarian writers.

In the article "Usson (rem.F)" he established a credo that is applicable to historians in any age.

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102 Cassirer, *Enlightenment*, p. 207.

All that are acquainted with the laws of History will agree, that every Historian, who designs faithfully to discharge his function, ought entirely to dispossess himself of the spirit of flattery and calumny, and put on as much as possible, such a Stoical temper, as is out of the reach of any disturbance from passion. Insensible to everything else, he ought only to be concerned for the interest of truth, to which his duty obliges him to sacrifice the resentment of an injury, the remembrance of a favor, and even the love of his country. He ought to forget that he was born in a certain country, that he was bred in the communion of a certain church, that he is indebted for the making of his fortune to such and such persons; and that such or such persons are his relations or friends.  

This commentary on historical scholarship is commonplace advice to the present day, but what does it mean for Bayle? Is his program merely a series of random observations or does it represent a coherent philosophy of history? Elisabeth Labrousse is the only writer who has asserted that Bayle did in fact view history from such a unitary position. Others argue simply that Bayle's historical interests are derived from his skepticism.

In the view of Elisabeth Labrousse, Bayle applies a modified Cartesian doctrine to history.

Ainsi Bayle transposé librement la méthode cartésienne: réduite à la première règle, coupée de ses prolongements métaphysiques et interprétée sur le plan psychologique elle est susceptible de s'étendre à l'histoire.

Therefore, the 'methodical doubt' of Descartes is the starting point for Bayle, not in the sense of reducing all existence back to the cogito but

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104 Bayle, Dictionary, V, 531.


106 Ibid., 57.
rather of applying rigorous tests to the evidence of history as it is presented. She states that "Bayle ... s'étend le vaste champ des vérités de fait, où le dernier mot appartient à l'expérience ou au document qui en porte le témoignage."\(^{107}\)

From this foundation Bayle then works to an historical certitude founded on a probability calculus which is based on available documentation of all types.\(^{108}\) Yet Elisabeth Labrousse finds that Bayle's historical thinking follows an even more definite guideline. Bayle, in effect, sees a basic stability in human history, all changes being essentially superficial,\(^{109}\) and this stability emanates from some type of regulating providence, which compensates for any radical alterations of the human condition and at the same time is the author of "miraculous events."\(^{110}\) Labrousse claims that "c'est un fait que Bayle invoque souvent et volontiers la Providence ... pour rendre compte des facteurs d'ordre et d'équilibre qu'il croit voir dans l'histoire humaine."\(^{111}\) She goes on to say that "les vicissitudes historiques de grande ampleur revelent a posteriori les intentions de la Providence."\(^{112}\) What Bayle

\(^{107}\) Ibid., 55.
\(^{108}\) Ibid., 65-67.
\(^{109}\) Ibid., 459.
\(^{110}\) Ibid., 462.
\(^{111}\) Ibid., 465.
\(^{112}\) Ibid., 466.
is dealing with according to Elisabeth Labrousse are "second causes," which represent the appropriate concern of the historian. She argues that for Bayle "la tâche majeure de l'historien reste avant tout l'établissement des faits et leur chronologie; ses ambitions explications doivent demeurer incidentes et modestes."  

She then sums up Bayle's historical philosophy by asserting that:  

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... le déroulement de l'histoire humaine n'est pas, pour Bayle, coupé de toute référence à la transcendance ... par une sorte de prolongement de l'occasionnalisme malébranchien.
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Elisabeth Labrousse thus places a definite limit on the sphere in which Bayle's critical observations can be applied. Those who view Bayle as a skeptical historian, however, do not define his criticism in such a narrow manner.

The term historical Pyrrhonism is used by Bayle on at least three occasions. In the *Critique générale* when he discusses the varying accounts given by religious historians he said "je veux être Pyrrhonien; je n'affirme ni l'un, ni l'autre" which is the essence of Pyrrhonist philosophy. Referring to false evidence Bayle asserted:

"And when a man finds himself deceived by a representation of pretended public Monuments, he can no longer tell what to trust to: he cannot tell whether Medals, inscriptions, and


\[115\] *Ibid*.

such like Monuments are more sincere than a mercenary Historian kept in annual Pay; and this is a confirmation of Historical Pyrrhonism.\textsuperscript{117}

Lastly, in a more obscure reference to the difficulties attendant to the gathering of information on "the siege of important places"\textsuperscript{118} he again invoked a call to Pyrrhonism. Taking Bayle on his word Popkin asserts that "the Dictionnaire is a summa in the medieval sense, a summation and synthesis of the intellectual revolution of the seventeenth century—a Summa Pyrrhonica."\textsuperscript{119}

To call Bayle a "Skeptic" here, however, is to overlook his eclecticism in matters of thought. A true Pyrrhonist would not have undertaken such a monumental work, since the entire Dictionnaire is an affirmation and not a negation of historical knowledge. Bayle certainly applied a skeptical outlook to the historian's task, but as Labrousse has indicated he is proceeding along a path of Cartesian doubt. He states in the article "Goulu (rem. F)"

\begin{quote}
We should in matters of fact, follow the advice, which Descartes gives with respect to philosophical speculations, examine everything afresh without any regard to what others have written concerning it. . . .\textsuperscript{120}
\end{quote}

Bayle's own words are echoed by those of P.J.S. Whitmore who finds that "Bayle's work is a monument to the practical application in the realm of

\textsuperscript{117}Bayle, "Botero (rem. C)," \textit{Dictionary}, II, 100.

\textsuperscript{118}Ibid., III, 719.


\textsuperscript{120}Bayle, \textit{Dictionary}, III, 204.
historical knowledge, . . . of the principles of Descartes' method . . . ."\(^{121}\) In essence Bayle "had developed a reluctance to accept written statements indiscriminately, and an impatience with established ideas when they could not stand the light of independent investigation."\(^{122}\) This reluctance is indicative:

. . . of the critical method of the scientific investigator who suspends judgment until factual evidence, thoroughly tested, validates a conclusion which is considered sure only so long as new factual evidence cannot be brought against it. Such a method is historical criticism, not historical Pyrrhonism.\(^{123}\) Far from being a skeptic Bayle finds as much certainty in history as in other branches of knowledge or more.\(^{124}\)

Therefore, as in all other considerations of Bayle's thought, no one element is dominant. He looked at history through a skeptical glass but, instead of denying it, Bayle affirmed its validity by rigorously criticizing the entire spectrum of historical scholarship. In order to see how Bayle constructed his methodology we must first examine, individually, both the historical and critical aspects of the *Dictionnaire*.

It is essentially a biographical dictionary with attention given to a few other topics (primarily geographical). Bayle wished to avoid duplicating the work of other writers, and, as a result, a majority of


\(^{122}\) Cowdrick, *Early Reading*, p. 65.


the entries deal with contemporaneous figures. As such its narrative historical scope is limited. Furthermore, the manner in which Bayle chose his subjects lacks any consistent pattern; notable absences include both Descartes and Montaigne, two writers whose works had exerted a profound influence on Bayle. Nevertheless, he illustrated his approach to history by a thorough documentation of his source material and by his critical commentary on each article. It is here that the real historical value of the Dictionnaire is found.

Paul Hazard asserts in a recent work that "the critical part [of the Dictionnaire] demolishes the historical," but such an assessment is unfair to Bayle, for his intention was to develop a systematic critique of history and he deliberately used the footnotes of the Dictionnaire to develop his critical formula. George Havens, another twentieth century writer, describes the analytical aspects of the work in this manner:

It is critical in that the author takes nothing on trust. He confronts authorities one with another, exposes their contradictions and discrepancies, estimates their relative value, and often suspends conclusions where a final judgment would be doubtful or theologically dangerous.

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125 J. H. Brumfitt notes that "a tendency to concentrate on the biographical in historical writing is characteristic of much late-seventeenth century historiography." Brumfitt, Voltaire Historian. (London, 1958), p. 10. There was yet another impetus for this approach. Ruth Cowdrick observes in Early Reading, p. 54, that "his correspondence indicates that he was interested in biography, and not alone in the lives of men who guided the course of history, but also in the chronicles of those who played a much humbler part in the shaping of events."


Craig Brush also makes an important distinction between the modes of expression used by Bayle to present his material.

In the Dictionnaire he was scrupulously careful to advance nothing without indicating his source. Only the critical commentary was his and that he would defend relentlessly, not because it was his, but because it was the result of an objective reasoned analysis that he felt was irrefutable. 128

Thus, the really significant contribution of the Dictionnaire is to be found in the commentary. It represents for Elisabeth Labrousse the expression of Bayle’s real talent, in determining the true from the false.

Auprement dit, pour Bayle la critique est une discipline proprement scientifique--savante, dans son vocabulaire--parce que l’érudit, quelque sagacité individuelle qu’il mette en œuvre pour les [faits] découvrir, se borne à proposer des hypothèses le bien-fondé ne découle que de leur aptitude à concilier entre eux les différents documents et qui sont donc indépendantes de la personnalité du chercheur. 129

He is trying to remove all influences which lead to a distortion of fact--and concomitantly history.

In the Dictionnaire Bayle enunciated clearly how one must approach the writing of history. He catalogued the errors of historians both ancient and modern, and set down explicit dictums to guide the historian in his task. Not that good history had not been written before, because it had. Nor was Bayle the first to write on historical method. What makes his contribution significant, however, is the thoroughness with which he approached the problem. He confronted the entire spectrum of previous scholarship and by exposing the many errors of the past he


129 Labrousse, Bayle, p. 236.
tried to show what to avoid in the writing of accurate historical accounts. He went even further and spelled out a series of maxims by which the relative merit of any history could be judged. These accomplishments represent the historical criteria of Pierre Bayle.
CHAPTER IV

THE HISTORICAL CRITERIA OF PIERRE BAYLE

Bayle had read the ancient historians and discovered a great many errors of both fact and method in their writings. He corrected the erroneous data as it became pertinent in the Dictionnaire and made random observations on their weaknesses. Directing his attention to what he saw as a lack of detail, Bayle stated:

The Ancient Historians so accustomed themselves to relate Things only in the Gross that they afford but little Light into some of the minute Particulars.130

In the article "Cappadocia (rem. K)" he attacked a different aspect of this problem.

There is so little Chronology in most of the Greek and Latin Historians, that ancient History stands in need of being new modelled. I dare venture to say, that, had we at this Day all those Assistanices with which they abounded [presumably documentary source materials], we should write much better Histories than those they have left us.131

Bayle also questions their reliability on this same topic in "Fabricus (rem. D)".132

The ancients, like historians of any era, misused their sources.

131 Ibid., II, 309.
132 Ibid., III, 2.
I am of Opinion that all the ancient Historians have taken the same liberty with regard to old Memoirs, which they consulted. They have tacked Supplements to them; and not finding the Facts unfolded and embellished to their Fancy, they have stretched and dressed them up as they pleased; and this is what at present we receive for history. As will be shown, the falsification of source material is absolutely a cardinal sin in Bayle's eyes. He returns to this theme again on numerous occasions.

Bayle sums up his view of the ancients with an admonition to the reader of such histories.

Shall we conclude . . . , that ancient history is so dark, that we know not generally what side to take amongst those who deny, and those who affirm the same thing? And that the yes and the no seeming to be equally authorized in matters, wherein it was the easiest thing in the world to know the truth, we may well doubt of the less notable events which the historians have mentioned? [sic] shall we, I say, infer such conclusions. I should rather advise the reader to make use of these observations to fortify his judgment against the custom of reading without attention, and of believing without examination.

Along with his general criticism of the anomalous accounts provided by the earliest historians, Bayle's inherent skeptical approach is manifested in this statement. One must again be aware, however, that he is not denying the possibility of certainty, but rather he is cautioning against an uncritical acceptance of what is passed off as history.

We should note that in "Cappadocia," cited above, Bayle recognized a general improvement in historical scholarship from antiquity to modern

133 The article "the" is frequently omitted in phrases such as this.
times, but as he pointed out, the end result was often equally as bad when the works of the modern historians were considered.\textsuperscript{136} His objections to contemporary historians follow much the same pattern as his critique of the earlier ages. Even though the sources are near at hand "do we not see that the best historians confound facts which are near their own time...\textsuperscript{137} A further problem faced in writing recent history is that:

\begin{quote}
... a man exposeth himself to an unlucky alternative, who writes the history of monarchs lately dead. He must either dissemble the truth, or provoke persons who are most to be feared. The first of these inconveniences shocks an historian's honor and conscience, the other offends against his prudence. It is best therefore to say nothing.\textsuperscript{138}
\end{quote}

Bayle then generalizes this objection in the following statement:

\begin{quote}
The Inconveniences I have mentioned are more particular to be apprehended in writing a History of our own Times; for, in proportion as the facts are of more distant Dates, the Readers become less intractable; but, as to those lately passed, they will hear no Reason.\textsuperscript{139}
\end{quote}

One of the reasons that he was wary of modern history was the partisan writing which accompanied the sectarian debates, that he had witnessed throughout his life. His strongest statements were those that dealt with bias. He states:

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{136} Bayle deals only with the ancient and the modern historians. He remarks on Medieval history only once in the Dictionary, "Otho (rem. D)," IV, 424, stating: "for the history of that middle age is so perplexed, and has passed through so many bad hands, that we meet with authorities pro and con, and for a thousand sorts of variations."

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., "Mopsus (rem. E)," IV, 254.

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., "Haillan (rem. E)," III, 334.

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., "Capriata (rem. C)," II, 311.
\end{quote}
I observe that truth being the soul of history, it is an essential thing for an historical composition to be free from lies; so that though it should have all other perfections, it will not be a History, but a meer [sic] fable and romance, if it wants truth.140

Bayle made it abundantly clear in this same article that lying can consist of omission as well as commission.141 He demanded always a thorough rendering of any historical account: "whereas an entire History of his Life requires, that he should be represented, not only with his Virtues, but his Vices too."142 In a later article he defended at length the right of an historian to discuss the crimes of history in order to give a complete rendering of the human experience.143

He realized too, that impartiality is a goal that few historians can attain. In "Capriata (rem.C)" he asserts that to give a completely fair account" requires a Man without Passions, or a Sage of the Stoics, a Man who can never be met with, and exists only in Idea."144 Consequently:

An Historian can never stand too much upon his guard; and it is almost impossible for him to be altogether free from prejudices. There are some forms of government, and some moral and political maxims which he likes or dislikes. This moves him to favor one party rather than another, even when he writes the History of an ancient nation or a remote country.145

140 Ibid., "Remond (rem. D)," IV, 863.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid., "Basta (rem. B)," I, 674.
143 Ibid., "Suetonius (rem. E)," V, 265. If Bayle can be accused of any bias it would be that of pessimism. He dwells on the sins, vices, and errors of mankind.
144 Ibid., II, 310.
145 Ibid., "Remond (rem. D)," IV, 862.
Bayle goes on to list some of the sources of bias. There are those who write because of personal jealousies, or to further some partisan cause.

Every age can furnish us with examples of authors who had never thought of writing histories, if personal resentments . . ., had not been their motive.\textsuperscript{146} or—if we knew of what party this author was . . . whether he had anything to hope for, or to fear, we might know how to judge [him].\textsuperscript{147}

One must also be aware of histories written by the servants of important figures.

Let us learn from hence not to trust histories written by domestics, that have received great favors. They suppress what is injurious to the memory of their masters.\textsuperscript{148}

Lastly we must be aware of those who write in defense of a religious interest.

How can one trust an Historiographer, who out of zeal for his religion, acts continually the Part of an Apologist, or of an Accuser, and who, properly speaking, turns an History into a Book of Controversy of a new Method.\textsuperscript{149}

\textsuperscript{146} \textit{Ibid.}, "Timeus (rem. L)," V, 362.

\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Ibid.}, "Alpiade (rem. B)," I, 233.

\textsuperscript{148} \textit{Ibid.}, "Geldenhaur (rem. K)," III, 148.

\textsuperscript{149} \textit{Ibid.}, "Brenzius (rem. B)," II, 131. Bayle is guilty of partisanship in this case. In "Macon (rem. C)," IV, 18, he asserts that rulers ought to read the histories of the religious wars daily to learn the horrible consequences of intolerance. He is even more biased in "Remond (rem. D)," IV, 862, where he discusses the writing of Reformation history. He states that "because they were Heathens, and might have been neutrals between the several sects of Christianity; so that they would have related without any prejudice or partiality, what was to be praised or blamed in the conduct of the Papists, Lutherans and Calvinists. But I do not know whether they might have kept an exact neutrality; for Popery being more agreeable to Paganism than the Protestant religion they might have been prepossessed against Luther and Calvin."
In each case he offered numerous examples to show how history had been misused to suit a particular purpose.

Perhaps his most valuable observations are those which concern the use of evidence. He asks "how many facts are there ... which pass from age to age, and from generation to generation, no body discovering their falsehood." 150 One of the difficulties which Bayle describes is the reliance on oral tradition. He finds that legend is a most untrustworthy method of affirming past events. 151 He states that "if we who are authors would always be so prudent as to distrust our memory, [and adhere to written records], our writings would be more accurate." 152 Once untruths are fixed in the minds of men they are not only perpetuated but also very hard to eradicate. Bayle observes that "at the end of three or four generations there is no possibility almost of finding out the grounds of uncertain and vulgar reports, which no author thought worth their while to adopt." 153 Thus, the historian must record all evidence, and he must do so first hand if at all possible.

Bayle saw the absolute necessity of referring to original sources and he emphasized this repeatedly in the Dictionnaire. Commenting on Moreti he says: "this should teach us to have recourse to the Originals, and not to stop at modern Authors who mention only such Circumstances of

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150 Bayle, "Logea (rem. F)," Dictionary, III, 856.
152 Ibid., "Urgulanilla (rem. A)," V, 516.
153 Ibid., "Paul II (rem. D)," IV, 511.
a Fact as they have present Occasion for."\textsuperscript{154} Moreover, accurate accounts by eye-witnesses to the fact are the best primary sources,\textsuperscript{155} and "in historical matters those who abound with exact quotations, do extremely [sic] abridge the way of instruction."\textsuperscript{156} Again Bayle supports his contentions by innumerable illustrations in both the text and the notes of the \textit{Dictionnaire}. Summarizing his standards for the propitious use of sources Bayle states:

... justice requires that an author who publishes the most secret transactions of a monarch's palace, and relates a thousand infamous crimes committed in its most dark recesses with an uncommon assurance, I say justice obliges such a writer to inform us how he came to the knowledge of these events; he ought to produce and name his authorities; he must either have original letters or authentic copies; in a word, he must have good proofs for what he advances.\textsuperscript{157}

He also makes some penetrating observations on the errors which result from poor translations and misquoting. On the former Bayle admonishes "those who Translate [that] they should avoid equivocal Expressions, and all that may hinder the Reader from entertaining the Ideas best suited to the Nature of each subject."\textsuperscript{158} It may be noted here that Bayle is not only calling for an elimination of confusing translations, but he is also requesting that the exact sense of the passage be

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\textsuperscript{154}\textit{Ibid.}, "Anaxagoras (rem. K)," I, 308.
\textsuperscript{155}\textit{Ibid.}, "Navarre (rem. H)," IV, 337.
\textsuperscript{156}\textit{Ibid.}, "Marillac (rem. A)," IV, 147.
\textsuperscript{157}\textit{Ibid.}, "Vergerius (rem. K)," V, 459.
\textsuperscript{158}\textit{Ibid.}, "Arsinoe (rem. C)," I, 510.
rendered. In other words, one must translate more than words. Where quotations are concerned Bayle has this to say:

I grant that an Historian may be allowed to represent persons according to what they think, altho' they do not openly express their sentiments: but this requires two conditions; one is that it should be evident, or at least very probable, that they think such a thing; the second that the Historian should give notice, that those sentiments have not been actually expressed in words, but have however been sufficiently made appear.  

He also sees that numerous mistakes result from "the Liberty some take of paraphrasing Authors whom they make use of." Therefore, even when one has access to the original sources he must be aware of other difficulties which bar the way to an accurate rendering of history.

Two random observations conclude Bayle's discussion of source material. Indicating the problem of sources which are in dispute he offers the following example:

I mean the number of Places, which contend for the honor of producing famous Persons. They take Advantage of the uncertainty of Fact and, hoping never to be effectually disproved, They vainly and without any grounds, report, that They are born in such and such a Place . . . I think an Historian is obliged to make all possible inquiry to satisfy his Readers in This Point;  

Finally, Bayle discusses a problem which may seem quaint to the modern reader, but which was a serious issue in the seventeenth century—deathbed testimony. After comparing two opposing accounts of the last words of the Duke of Guise, Bayle concludes that "most things that are told

159 Ibid., "Musurus (rem. D)," IV, 294.
161 Ibid., "Aurelianus (rem. A)," I, 570.
of them [the dying] may be called into question, because they are only
grounded upon the testimony of suspected persons."162 The question of
sources, their validation and use, does not originate with Bayle; how-
ever, his expression of coherent guidelines to govern the establishment
of historical fact is a benchmark in the development of the discipline.

In the seventeenth century history was still an integral part of
general literature. It was used, as indicated earlier, primarily as a
weapon in sectarian debate (e.g. Mainbourg and Bossuet and their polemi-
cal writings against the Protestants). Consequently there was little
respect given to history as an autonomous study of the past. Bayle in-
dicates his awareness of this situation in this statement:

... so few men can write a good history. The [y]
who are able to overcome all prejudices, and reject all
the tricks of art, could not appear altogether impartial
without exposing themselves to the indignation of the
people; ... they would be looked upon as false brethren,
prevaticators, and perfidious men.163

Bayle therefore endeavors to draw a distinction between history and
literature. Commenting in "Psammithicus (rem. B)," he states:

It is a pity Herodotus, whose relations are so
charming, did not live in another age, or was not sensi-
ble to the difference between History and Poetry. In
the latter, things must not be unfolded without a mir-
acle; the reader must be struck with admiration at any
rate; but Historical events ought to be attended with
simplicity; and if a judicious reader does not find it in
an Historian, he may well believe that the author had in-
serted wonderful fictions in the room of it.164

162Ibid., "Guise (rem. F)," III, 289.

163Ibid., "Remond (rem. D)," IV, 862.

164Ibid., IV, 790.
In "Bruschius (rem. D)," Bayle develops at length the differences between critical history and satire. The latter springs from uncontrolled passion, while history asserts only opprobriums which are justified by a reasoned analysis of facts.

He was also concerned with the writing of history. His recommendation for style is straightforward: "An exact historian always chooses his words with so much care; that he does not leave his readers to guess . . . ." He also counselled care in matters of spelling, for "faults are like Sparks of Fire; That, which is at first but an alteration of a Letter, becomes sometimes a Complication or Heap of monstrous Falsities." Finally, he maintains that a perspective must be established in the emphasis given to an historical topic:

... what difference there is between the author of an History of the Empire, and the author of a History of the Emperors. The former ought to touch but lightly on the private actions of a prince; he ought to say but little of kings, except when they have an influence on the general affairs of the state; But those, who write a history of the person of a monarch, ought chiefly to dwell on his private actions.

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165 Ibid., II, 160-161.
166 Ibid., "Micraelius (rem. D)," IV, 211.
167 Ibid., "Benjamin Basnage (rem. C)," I, 671.
168 Ibid., "Suetonius (rem. E)," V, 265. Associated with this is Bayle's concern, expressed in "Haillan (rem. E)," III, 334, that the historian should not treat periods already covered by other writers unless (1) new information becomes available, (2) the new work represents a consolidation of facts, or (3) the "taste of the readers requires a new language, and a new turn." (III, 335). Bayle is apparently referring to the demand for the translation of histories from Old French to New French in three.
These reflections, in essence, are Bayle's criteria. Nearly all are still applicable as viable standards today.

Before concluding this discussion on history as Bayle saw it, there are two other associated matters to discuss. The first is Biblical criticism. Probably the most famous article in the Dictionnaire is "David" where Bayle takes one of the most revered figures of the Old Testament and catalogues his human weaknesses in a scathing attack on immoral conduct. Bayle however makes no definitive statement concerning his approach to the Bible. Therefore, his real intent is open to interpretation. J. H. Brumfitt advances the traditional view that:

It is Bayle who, in the article "David" in the Dictionnaire, first makes the distinction between the historical and the dogmatic content of the Bible, and claims the historian's right to criticize the former.169

This interpretation has been challenged by Walter Rex in a recent work.170 He argues that Bayle is attacking Jurieu in a cleverly disguised satire on the latter's political pretensions,171 by repudiating the union of secular and religious elements in the control of the civil government.172

The other problem is that of the "miraculous" in history. As we have seen Elisabeth Labrousse asserts that Bayle accounted for this in a philosophy of history which embraced "occasional causes"; Bayle,


171 Jurieu envisioned a coalition with William III to invade France and establish a Calvinist State after deposing Louis XIV and securing his realm under Protestant control.

172 Rex, Essays, pp. 251-253.
however, does not address himself to this matter frequently in the Dictionnaire. He discusses it peripherally in "Maldonat (rem. C)" but he is not really clear on the role that he would assign to the supernatural. One interpretation which places this question in the perspective of Bayle's general scheme is put forth by Horatio Smith:

Bayle states that it may become the historian's duty to give an account of certain prodigies or miracles which are generally reputed to have accompanied some event. If the best historic monuments attest the authenticity of such a marvel, the new historian must record it faithfully. Although this describes how Bayle might treat such matters historically, it does not account for his earlier writings on miracles, especially in the Pensées diverses and its continuations. This like so many other questions attendant to Bayle's thinking remains moot indeed.

Although the Dictionnaire is limited as an historical narrative of a particular period, its scope is much wider in the sense that it gives Bayle freedom to ramble through the entire realm of what men have recorded as history. In this process he could illustrate the good and the bad, the useful and the useless. He compared the accounts of all available historians on any given fact and based the relative truth of each event on an assessment of probability. Where there was complete agreement the assurance of certitude was without doubt; where there was disagreement one must reserve his judgment or in true skeptical fashion suspend his conclusion. He was most affected by partisan history.

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173 Bayle, Dictionary, IV, 78.

because it was an immediate concern of the age. Consequently much of his commentary was directed to this problem. Yet, for all of his concern with error, his contribution to history is of a positive nature. He tried always to show what to do by illustrating what not to do. To assess Bayle's real value in making history a discipline we must ask how well did he succeed in his task.
CONCLUSION

"My Design was to compose a Dictionary of Errors" states Bayle in the Preface to the first edition of the Dictionnaire historique et critique. As we have seen the end result went far beyond his original intention. What of Bayle as an historian? Do his works reflect the standards which he has established, and where does he stand in comparison with modern writers?

Smith assesses Bayle in this fashion:

History is a matter of facts for him, a chronicle of the things done by men in their various political relations. He insists, to be sure, upon investigation into causes; with any superficial list of dates and happenings he is not content. But in the last analysis, history is still such a list, although lengthened and completed and with the inter-relations of the various facts to some extent established. Bayle has no notion of going still further, of getting at the ideas which lie back of the various groups of facts; it does not occur to him to treat history in a broader way, to treat of the meaning of religious, philosophical, literary, and humanitarian ideas in their relation to history.176

As noted earlier there are some elements of bias discernible in Bayle (e.g. Religious quarrels, the predominance of evil, and a dismal

175 Pierre Bayle, An Historical and Critical Dictionary by Monsieur Bayle. Translated into English, with many Additions and Corrections, made by the Author himself, that are not in the French Editions (London, 1710). Quote is taken from the preface which is not paginated.

176 Smith, Literary Criticism, p. 120.
view of the influence of women in history). When viewed in perspective these shortcomings may be considered:

a forcibly documented indictment of human pettiness and irrationality and at the same time a tireless conviction that objective, industrious search can illuminate at least some areas of human ignorance, in part by establishing diverse truths of fact, in part by demolishing false theories.

He favors the cause of the Reformers but he also does not hesitate to criticize his co-religionists when they are in error. His only narrative work "An Historical Discourse on the Life of Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden" was never finished. The two completed chapters, which his English translator published in an appendix to the 1734 edition of the Dictionnaire, lack the thorough documentation that appear in his other works. Smith's view, cited above, is valid here for the work is no more than a straightforward rendering of the pertinent political-military events. Yet we really cannot judge his historical acumen on the basis of a manuscript that was never really prepared for publication. As for analysis, one need only consult the footnotes to almost any article in the Dictionnaire to see Bayle discussing the motivations of men's actions.

The succeeding century used Bayle liberally as a primary source of fact and method alike. Diderot found in the Dictionnaire a format for the Encyclopédie; Voltaire, although he was critical of Bayle's style, found his skeptical approach to history congenial, and Bayle's work was a "best seller," copies of it being sought for years after his death.

177 For a discussion of Bayle's views on women see: Howard Robinson, Bayle the Sceptic (New York, 1931), p. 187.

178 Brush, Montaigne and Bayle, p. 303.
Nor was his reputation confined to European intellectuals, for his works were found in the American colonies as well.

Like Voltaire, Bayle was so prolific a writer that one can extract almost anything from his work. Voltaire admired his approach to history, but at the same time emphasized that portion of Bayle's thought which could be construed as irreligious. Such has been the unfortunate fate of Bayle. His eclectic tendency of choosing from among various doctrines what he saw most useful or valuable has not been appreciated by those who have followed. Critics, both favorable and not, have seized upon one facet or other of Bayle's thinking and asserted it as a one dimensional view of him. In essence they have violated one of his primary doctrines -- one must have a complete knowledge of something before he can formulate even intelligent opinions. But, then, few men have been as dedicated as Bayle to a life of scholarship. His every activity from the time he could read until his death was occupied by the world of ideas.

Bayle's critical-analytical approach anticipates the modern; yet he was very much a part of his century in his preoccupation with religious questions. Paul Hazard's thesis applies appropriately to Bayle. Bayle's major works emanate from the period which Hazard sees as an intellectual crisis for Europe. The late seventeenth century, according to Hazard, was a time of precarious balance between the sacred and the secular, a balance which would shortly swing to the latter, and Bayle's writings reflected this crisis of conscience.

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Regardless of Bayle's religious concerns, it was he alone, via the later philosophers, who elevated history to the level of a respectable discipline. They borrowed extensively from him, sometimes neglecting to apply his critical approach. Nevertheless, they recognized his historical genius. His contributions are accepted today as commonplace standards that are intrinsic to the writing of good history. Who would attempt to write about the past without going to the primary sources or without comparing variant texts? What careful historian would not make every effort to eliminate bias from his accounts of the past? We obviously do not question such criteria. But it is not so obvious that Bayle discussed each of these concerns, coalescing them into a definitive program to guide the historian. We must never forget that modern historical scholarship began with Bayle. He was a summation of all the historical writing that had preceded him and a critical foundation upon which all succeeding history, worthy of the title, has been written.
APPENDIX

The following is a listing of the articles in Bayle's Dictionary

where references to historical scholarship may be found.

Abimelich (C)        Guicciardini (B)
Agis (L)             Guise (F)
Alpiade (B)          Haillan (E)
Anaxagoras (K)       Horatius (A)
Antinoe (B)          Landau (C)
Archelaus (K)        Loges (F)
Arisinoe (C)         Macon (D)
Aurelianus (A)       Maldonat (G)
Basnage (C)          Mariana (D)
Basta (B)            Marillac (A)
Botero (C)           Micrelius (D)
Brenzius (B)         Mopsus (E)
Bruschius (D)        Musurus (D)
Camden (K)           Navarre (H)
Cappadocia (K)       Otho (D)
Capriata (C) (D)     Paul II (D)
Cataldus (B) (C)     Philistus (B)
Concini (G)          Psammithicus (B)
Conon (A)            Remond (D)
Demetrius (A)        Suetonius (E)
Fabricus (D)         Timeus (L)
Geldenhaur (K)       Vergerius (K)
Goulu (F)            Urgulanilla (A)
Guevara (D)          Usson (F)
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The Dictionary Historical and Critical of Mr. Peter Bayle. The Second Edition, Carefully collated with the several Editions of the Original; in which many are restored and the whole greatly augmented, particularly with a Translation of the Quotations from eminent Writers in various Languages. To which is prefixed The Life Of The Author, Revised, Corrected, and Enlarged, by Mr. Des Maizeaux, Fellow of the Royal Society. London: Printed for J. J. and P. Knapton; D. Midwinter; J. Brotheron; Al Betlesworth; and C. Hitch; J. Hazard; J. Tonson; W. Innys; and R. Manby; J. Osborne and T. Longman; T. Woodward; B. Motte; W. Hinchliff; J. Walthoe jun. E. Symon; T. Cox; A. Ward. D. Browne; S. Birt; W. Bickerton; T. Astley; S. Austin; L. Gilliver; H. Lintot; H. Whirtridge; R. Willode. 1734.

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SECONDARY ACCOUNTS:

BOOKS


**ARTICLES**


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