THE DEMOCRACY OF COLUMBUS, OHIO
DURING THE CIVIL WAR

A Thesis

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts

by

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The Ohio State University
1973

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CHAPTER I

THE DEMOCRACY OF COLUMBUS, OHIO

A missed train connection caused Senator Stephen A. Douglas unexpectedly to spend the night of April 22, 1861, in Columbus, Ohio. Fort Sumter had been fired upon just one week before and the Civil War, which Douglas and most other Americans had hoped to prevent, was beginning. All across the North, and particularly throughout his home region, the Northwest, Douglas' followers in the Democratic Party anxiously awaited their leader's advice and example. News of the Senator's arrival in Columbus spread quickly through the city and by midnight a large crowd had collected outside his hotel. Despite the late hour, the Senator came, half dressed, to the window of his room and spoke to the gathering. Douglas repeated the same theme he had been using since the night of the Sumter attack, when he had hurried to the White House to confer with President Lincoln. The Union must be preserved and secession defeated, Douglas emphatically declared. All other questions had to be put aside and the administration supported until the time when national unity was restored. "Partyism" must be suspended, or as he later more succintly stated it: "There can be no Neutrals in this war -- only patriots and traitors."¹ Douglas' remarks were greeted not with cheers but with a solemn and determined "Amen," and the Columbus crowd then slowly dispersed into the night.²

The example of Douglas is representative of the political dilemma that faced the Democratic party with the coming of the Civil War. In

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the presidential election campaign of 1860 and in the secession crisis, Douglas like most Northern Democrats, had advocated mutual concession as the needed solution for sectional grievances. However with the Confederate firing on Fort Sumter, all old political positions seemed meaningless. The authority of the Federal government had been attacked and the vast majority of Northerners of all parties rallied behind the Administration in supporting military action against the rebellion. The South, by resorting to arms to destroy the Union, had made most Northerners realize that they needed to put aside all partisan disputes and deal first with the common problem of defeating secession.

Douglas, in this spirit, undertook his campaign to gather Democratic support for war measures, but he was tragically felled by typhoid fever only six months after speaking in Columbus.3

The wartime activity of the Northern Democratic Party after the loss of Douglas' leadership has already been the subject of much historical scrutiny. As Richard O. Curry has pointed out, most historians until recent years have accepted and repeated the same highly critical judgments made by the Republicans on the conduct of their Democratic opponents.4 The Democrats, or the "Copperheads" as their political enemies preferred to call them, were long charged with sympathy for Southern independence, obstruction of the Northern war effort, treasonous aid and comfort to the enemy, and conspiracy to seize power in the Northwest and form an independent confederacy. Only since the mid-1950's has the critique of this Copperhead stereotype gathered force. The much feared conspiracies were shown to have been for the most part

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products of the bitter partisanship and war hysteria in the North. Democratic political activities were shown not to be motivated by obstructionism or treason but by a variety of economic, social, and ideological factors. Also intensive regional studies and carefully researched biographies revealed wide disagreements on war related issues within Democratic ranks. Similarly, analysis of voting returns and Congressional and state legislative records showed Democratic infighting to the point of one faction frequently voting with the Republicans.

An examination of one area, Columbus, Ohio with its particularly active Democratic leadership and its record of hotly contested elections, will therefore contribute to the needed study of Democratic politics during the Civil War. The location, ethnic composition, political history, and high calibre of political press and leadership in the city make it a good source for the study of wartime politics and the behavior of the Democratic Party. Studies such as this will greatly further our knowledge of local politics during the war. A thorough local political record will enable the most accurate possible analysis of the causes for the opposition by a wide segment of the Northern public to the Lincoln Administration’s conduct of the war.

Columbus, Ohio, in 1861, was a slow-growing state capital with attractive homes and shaded streets. The city’s original settlers were of English and Scotch-Irish descent. They had relocated in central Ohio from principally Pennsylvania and Virginia in the first quarter of the Nineteenth Century. The city grew rapidly in the 1830’s and 1840’s.
as a result of a heavy inflow of German and Irish immigrants. In the 1850's, however, Columbus' total population increased only from 17,882 to 18,554. The frontier growth of that part of Ohio had obviously passed. 6

Columbus was located in Franklin County along the banks of the upper Scioto River. Its immediate surroundings were among the most agriculturally productive in the state. The prosperity of the district's farmers was greatly facilitated by the county's excellent transportation resources. The Ohio Canal passed through the southern portion of the county and Columbus was connected to it by a feeder. Five railroads linked the city to important markets in the East and South. However aside from a few small-scale manufacturing establishments and some state health and penal institutions, the city's economy was essentially tied to agriculture. 7

A very important element in Columbus society was the large population of German immigrants. Settling in the southern portion of the city, in an area still referred to as "German Village," these immigrants from chiefly the Rhineland came to number about one-third of Columbus' 1860 population. The German community was soon among the most prosperous in the city. Several of Columbus' German-Americans became very important in local business and politics. A financially successful German language newspaper, Der Westbote, was founded in 1843 by Jacob Rhinhard and Friedrich Fieser. These editors recorded that even though the German-Americans of Columbus retained many of their traditional customs, they nevertheless found themselves well tolerated by the older
citizens. For reasons that will be discussed later, most of the Germans were staunch Democrats. The predominantly German Fifth Ward had been presented an award flag in 1859 by the Democratic State Central Committee in recognition of its large majorities for the party.

The rest of the city had a much more erratic voting record. Never in its history had Columbus elected a Democratic mayor though it gave considerable majorities to Democratic Presidential candidates James Buchanan in 1856 and Stephen Douglas in 1860. The state-wide Democratic ticket had always done well in Columbus but United States Congressman Samuel S. Cox had never carried his native city despite large-majorities in the rest of the County. In 1860, one of the city's newspapers had endorsed the Southern Democratic candidate, John C. Breckinridge, but his November vote was miniscule compared to that of Douglas and Lincoln.

Along with voting returns, the highly partisan city newspapers were a most revealing gauge of Columbus' political behavior. Since Columbus was the capital city, its leading papers had the reputation of representing official state party views. The leading Republican paper, the Ohio State Journal, was owned in 1861 by Henry D. Cooke, whose brother, Jay, was soon to be known as "the Financier of the Civil War." The editorial staff, including the later popular novelist, William Dean Howells, held the paper to a strong anti-slavery position. The Columbus Gazette was a former Whig, former Temperance, former Free Soil paper, which in 1861 advertised itself as a "non-political, family" journal. The Gazette's editor, John Greiner, however, had important
connections in Republican circles. Perhaps the most interesting Columbus paper was the Capital City Fact. Although its owner and editor, John Geary, was an Irish Catholic immigrant, he had supported Ohio's Know-Nothing Party. In 1860, Geary endorsed Breckinridge. After the Kentuckian's extremely poor Columbus showing, the Fact lost most of its influence among city Democrats.

Three other city papers were even more informative gauges of local Democratic activity. The already mentioned Der Westbote was consistently Democratic and had endorsed Douglas in 1860. Der Westbote insisted that it favored gradual emancipation but opposed abolitionist organizations whose political agitation threatened the Union. The ability and party influence of the paper's chief editor, Jacob Reinhard, had been acknowledged by his Democratic nomination for Ohio Secretary of State in 1859. The oldest paper in Columbus was the Ohio Statesman owned in 1861 by Thomas Miller, former Franklin County Sheriff, and by George W. Manypenny, long one of the State's leading Democrats. Manypenny, the editor, had in past years been an outspoken "Young American," a successful candidate for the State Board of Public Works, and the United States Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Under Manypenny, the Statesman had actively opposed the Lecompton Constitution that permitted slavery in the Kansas Territory on the grounds that it had been ratified in a fraudulent election. The Buchanan Administration, under heavy Southern influence, decided to force party approval of the Lecompton Constitution and removed Miller of the Statesman from his patronage job as city postmaster. The divisions in Ohio Democratic
ranks over Lecompton were deep, and the *Statesman* praised the party's 1860 Presidential nomination of Douglas, an anti-Lecompton man, as a well deserved rebuke to pro-Administration Democrats. The third Columbus Democratic paper, the *Crisis*, was a weekly begun only in January 1861. It was the singlehanded product of Samuel Medary, nicknamed "the Old Wheelhorse" in recognition of his career as a Democratic editor since the days of Jackson. A Democratic power for three decades, Medary had edited the *Ohio Statesman* for almost twenty years before being appointed Territorial Governor first of Minnesota, then Kansas. Medary, well rewarded with patronage by the Buchanan Administration, had been among the minority of Ohio Democrats favoring the Lecompton Constitution. In 1860, some of this faction had campaigned for Breckinridge in Ohio, but Medary had avoided participating in this unpopular enterprise by being away in Kansas. In the first issue of the *Crisis*, Medary promised to concentrate "on the perils of our Republic, showing the causes of their existence, their progress and final tendency, if not arrested BY THE UPRISING OF THE PEOPLE, in whose hand they now are." With a circulation soon reaching 20,000, the *Crisis* became one of the most influential newspapers in the Northwest.

Besides its newspaper editors, Columbus had no shortage of other influential Democratic leaders. Representing his home city and several surrounding central Ohio counties in the United States Congress was the three-term Democratic veteran Samuel S. "Sunset" Cox. Only thirty-eight years old when re-elected in 1860, Cox had a well-earned reputation as an able and witty speechmaker and as an energetic representative of the
local interests of his constituents. Cox was devoted to Douglas and followed the Illinoisan in initially opposing the Lecompton Constitution. In the end, Cox partially avoided bad will with the Buchanan Administration by supporting the English Compromise on the issue which resubmitted the Constitution to Kansas voters and added some inducements for approval. This talent for appeasement, moderation, and political survival was to be of great aid to Cox in the coming disputes over the war.19 Another Columbus Democrat whose career was on the rise was Allen G. Thurman, nephew of former Senator William "Foghorn" Allen. A former Congressman, Thurman in the 1850's had been a prosperous lawyer and won a high place in Democratic inner circles as the caretaker of his semi-retired uncle's still large political interests.20

On a slightly lower level of influence in the party was Cox's one-time law partner, George L. Converse. Ambitious and outspoken, Converse was elected to the lower house of the State Assembly in 1859 and quickly became one of his party's floor leaders.21 Converse's colleague in the Ohio House, Otto Dresel, was another prominent Columbus Democrat. An authentic "1848er," Dresel had sought refuge in the United States after the failure of the revolutions in Germany. A favorite of his fellow Germans in the city, Dresel soon became a successful lawyer and a power in local Democratic politics.22 Aside from the top party leaders were scores of city officeholders and committeemen who occasionally gained public note. From state to ward and township level, the Democrats made all their nominations at conventions. The proceedings of these meetings reported in the local press provide clues to the sentiments of the party

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at large. From top leader to rank and file, the Columbus Democracy
during the Civil War was active and vocal and left a record of great
value to today's historians.


5. Ibid., p. 29.


9. Official Franklin County election abstracts were usually published in the Columbus *Daily Ohio Statesman* about a week after the elections: The *Annual Report of the Secretary of State of Ohio for 1876* (Columbus, Ohio, 1876) also recounts Civil War period elections on a county-wide basis.


14. Wittke, p. 149; Samuel S. Cox to Isaac Toucey, April 21, 1857, Ohio Historical Center, Archives, Cox Letter Files.

16 Charles S. Medary to Samuel Medary, July 17, 1860, Ohio Historical Center, Archives, Medary Family Letter Files.

17 The Columbus Crisis, January 31, 1861, hereafter cited as Crisis.


20 John Soloman Hare, Allen G. Thurman: A Political Study, an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1933, pp. 1-118.

21 A Centennial Biographical History of the City of Columbus and Franklin County, Ohio (Chicago, 1901), p. 172.

22 D.O.S., February 12, 13, 1863; Crisis, February 25, 1963; The Columbus Capital City Fact, March 26, 1863 hereafter cited as C.C.F.
CHAPTER II

THE UNION PARTY CHALLENGE

The importance of the year 1861 in setting the future course of the Democratic Party cannot be underestimated. Most discussions of the Democratic Party during the Civil War have concentrated on the later years of the war when a spirit of "defeatism" in the North threatened to bring into power a Democratic faction that had despaired of war ever restoring the Union.¹ Because of the emphasis on these later events, the importance of the political struggle in the first years of the war has usually been overlooked. In fact, in 1861, the Democrats were forced to face the fundamental question of justifying the continued existence of their party. Fort Sumter had generated high patriotic emotions, and all but a few Northerners soon came to accept the necessity of a war to restore the Union.² Men of all parties considered it their duty to volunteer for the army and to vote for heavy war expenditures. A widely heard opinion was that continued political disputing in the North would only serve to encourage those in rebellion. Soon after Sumter, important newspapers and politicians of all parties were calling for the replacement of all old party organizations with one "Union" party that would include all men who supported vigorous action in putting down secession. The choice the Democrats had to make in 1861 was whether to fuse with the "Union" organization and risk domination by their old political opponents, or to run against the new party with its patriotic platforms and bipartisan tickets and risk calamitous
repudiation by the voters. The process of the Democrats' choice, the reasons behind it, and, of course, the ultimate results are the story of the 1861 political contest.

Samuel Medary's selection of the name, The Crisis, for his new newspaper, was an accurate reflection of the troubled state of the Northern mind in January 1861. In the four months between the secession of South Carolina and the attack on Fort Sumter, a great debate took place over how the Federal government should meet this challenge to its authority. In Columbus, as elsewhere, this debate was highly revealing of the fundamental principles both major parties held about the nature of the Union and the power of the central government. When this debate was ended by the first guns of war, these party principles would carry over and help explain why partisan activity continued through the war.

The Republican Party had for the last few years derided the Southern threats of secession as mere bluff. When South Carolina seceded, the Republicans were without a policy to deal with disunion. Columbus' Ohio State Journal, under Henry Cooke, declared itself in favor of voluntary dissolution of the Union and even suggested a plan to implement it peacefully. The Republican paper stated the Union existed only by consent and that the Constitution had "let states into the Confederacy, but they had no obligation to remain there, nor was there power to coerce them in case they wished to withdraw." Within two weeks, the Journal sensed it was at variance with most of the nation's Republican press and retreated to the position that "to be
released, a state would have to submit the proposal to the other states, which would have to give it their approval." After this, the Journal balanced its repugnance for the South and slavery with an equally strong desire to avoid disputes within Republican ranks until Lincoln could come into office and give the party a position to rally around.

Columbus' Democrats were not content to wait for Lincoln's inauguration to deal with secession. Many penny's Ohio Statesman considered South Carolina's secession an act "of revolution and rebellion, if not treason," but blamed Northern "abolitionist fanatics" as well as Southern "fire-eaters" for having brought it about. Medary of the Crisis presided over the city's annual Jackson Day Dinner and gave a speech criticizing Republican anti-slavery attitudes. The Franklin County "Democracy," as they commonly referred to themselves also turned out in large numbers to attend a special Democratic State Convention on January 23 in Columbus. That gathering was billed as a reconciliatory meeting of all Democratic factions, and a large number of former Breckinridge supporters arrived as delegates. Hugh J. Jewett of Muskingum County was elected president of the convention, and Columbus editor Medary was chosen for the resolutions committee. Franklin County Judge R. H. Warden, Allen G. Thurman, and Medary all made well received speeches. The resolutions passed at the convention stressed "devotion to the Union, allegiance to the Constitution, [and] obedience to the laws." The Democrats further recommended the convening of a national convention for the purpose of amending the Constitution to resolve sectional quarrels. Thurman presented a controversial resolution,
considered too pro-Southern by many delegates, that "when the people of the North shall have fulfilled their duties to the Constitution and the South -- then, and not until then, will it be proper for them to take into consideration the question of the right and propriety of coercion." The Ohio Democrats had come out strongly against secession but also insisted that compromise, not coercion, was the preferable course of action.

Of course, the influence of Columbus' Democrats on the national government's policy toward secession was not great. In Washington, Cox cooperated with Douglas in rallying Democratic support for compromise proposals, but the Republican majority in Congress was determined to stall action until Lincoln's inauguration. In an attempt to provoke Congress into action, Democrats all across the North sponsored well attended public rallies that endorsed the compromise proposals of Kentucky Senator John Crittenden and demanded a national convention for amending the Constitution. Such a rally was held in Columbus' City Hall on January 29, and was presided over by Mathias Martin, a writer for the Statesman. Few Republicans were in attendance to hear Medary and Thurman give pro-compromise speeches, a circumstance which the Capital City Fact, which also supported compromise, to blame the "Statesman clique" for mismanagement. Resolutions were passed endorsing the Crittenden Compromise and warning "that a civil war, under whatever specious name it might be urged, whether 'the enforcement of the laws,' or the 'defense of Southern rights,' would under the existing circumstances destroy the last hope of preserving the authority of the
Republic."\textsuperscript{11} The Democratic press took a position identical with that of the public rally. The newspapers too endorsed compromise and doubted the value of coercion in preserving the Union. Medary, in his \textit{Crisis}, expressed the same views of a loosely constructed Union and of a Federal government with highly restricted powers that President Buchanan held. To both men, secession and coercion were "alleged rights."\textsuperscript{12} Repeatedly, Medary blamed Republican agitation of the slavery issue for having made the South feel the need to secede. Medary believed the Republican 1860 Chicago platform expressed inflexible anti-slavery principles. He charged the Republicans now clung to these principles and opposed compromise because "it would save the Union but not the Republican Party, and as both cannot be saved they prefer their party and its platform to the country and its constitution."\textsuperscript{13} Manypenny's \textit{Ohio Statesman} was equally denunciatory of the Republicans, especially of those like the \textit{Journal} editors who had seriously discussed allowing the South to secede, just to be rid of the slavery problem. Such proposals, Manypenny felt, proved "that the Republican leaders intended to aid the extreme men of the South, in the overthrow and permanent destruction of the Federal Union...."\textsuperscript{14} Manypenny placed his faith in the compromise movement, for "there is some hope that an immediate intervention and strong expression of the popular will may stay the march of the revolutionary spirit in the South, and compel concessions from the fanatical sectionalists of the North."\textsuperscript{15} The third Democratic paper in Columbus, the \textit{Capital City Fact}, fully endorsed the non-coercive policy of
President Buchanan. Editor Geary denied the right of secession but saw no harm in letting the South "suppose" it was out of the Union. Soon enough they would discover "secession is but a farce" and would then cooperate in arranging a "satisfactory compromise."\(^{16}\)

In March, the Lincoln Administration took office, but avoided committing itself to either compromise or coercion and instead adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward developments in the South. In April, the Democratic Party demonstrated signs of substantial recovery from its 1860 debacle by good showings in the local elections held across the North. In Columbus, the Democrats captured City Hall for the first time in their history by electing Wray Thomas mayor. The Republican Journal, now completely opposed to secession, conceded the defeat was due to many Republicans having become disappointed with the Administration's failure to set a firm policy toward secession. The Ohio Statesman applauded its party's victory and responded to the Journal by saying: "As to any definite policy of the Administration, either foreign or domestic, the man is exceedingly green who expects anything of that sort from 'honest OLD ABE LINCOLN, the Rail Splitter.'\(^{17}\)

But with or without a policy, the North would soon be caught up in the events of Fort Sumter. Little had happened in the four months since Lincoln's election to lessen partisan feelings. If anything, the debate over the best policy to cope with secession had magnified partisanship. The Republicans had won the 1860 election fairly and denied any obligation to make the results more palatable to the South. Their party leaders argued that concessions would only strengthen the hand of

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Southern secessionists. Having opposed the further extension of slavery in the territories for years, few Republicans were prepared to abandon that doctrine after successfully electing a President upon it. Other Republicans worried that any alteration in party principle might damage their victorious coalition. The Democrats, in contrast, had endorsed compromise because they felt "the Union was formed in concession and compromise...." While denying the right of secession, the Democrats looked upon a maximum of state autonomy as a basic constitutional principle inherited from the party's founders, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. They preferred using compromise to restore the Union because they feared that employing the Federal government's coercive powers would risk military depopulation and the loss of individual rights. The Republicans, or at least the abolitionists among them, were bitterly warned by the Columbus Democratic press not to allow their prejudice against slavery to stand in the way of possible compromises that could save the Union.

The echoes of Sumter's guns reached Columbus by telegraph on Friday, April 12. The Republicans, in the next morning's Journal, editorialized: "In the view of war we cannot rejoice! But in view of the struggle which is to terminate in the triumph of liberty, and the unquestioned supremacy of order forever after, we hail this first battle of the new war of freedom." The Democrats much more mournfully received the news of Sumter. The Statesman felt that Republican stalling on compromise had finally provoked the South. Reflecting on the Journal's editorial, the Democratic paper complained: "Being a war
in which 'liberty' is to triumph, of course slavery is to be overthrown. It is the first battle of the 'irrepressible conflict,' and in that sense has all its gratifying significance among the fanatical Republicans of the country." Medary's Crisis condemned Republicans like Ohio's Governor William Dennison, who tried to put all the blame for the war on the South. Medary continued to express hope for compromise.  

The Ohio State Journal was indignant over these Democratic remarks, calling them "malignant drivel." In comparison, the Journal applauded the former Breckinridge paper, the Capital City Fact, which after Sumter had declared: "It is now too late to inquire who or what caused the war. It is, or ought to be, sufficient to know that war exists, and by the act of a band of rebels and traitors." The Journal demanded the other Democratic papers openly declare their support of the war or be held under suspicion of sympathy with treason. The Statesman replied that afternoon: "We may say in brief to our contemporary, that we are for the Constitution, the Union, the execution of the laws, and for every measure tending to restore harmony and fraternity among the people of the United States. Can the Journal say as much?" The Crisis replied that it opposed disunionists, North and South. Medary expressed a hope that since the war had already begun, it would be speedy and used for neither government 'consolidation' nor abolition. Because these two Democratic papers balked at giving an unqualified endorsement to a war they felt could and should have been prevented, the Journal seldom left an issue go by without stating some suspicions of disloyalty or treason in its Columbus competitors.

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However, in the next few months, there was little that could be criticized in the Democratic support for the war. For instance, many Columbus Democrats turned out at a public meeting at Armory Hall on April 18, and supported resolutions calling for enlistments and a vigorous prosecution of the war. Democratic Congressman Cox and Statesman editor Manypenny both followed Douglas' example and made well received addresses to army volunteers. The Statesman declared its support for a limited war, not for "the extermination of slavery or any moral or political institution which individual states are permitted, by the National Constitution, to establish and maintain," but for the sole aim of putting down "rebellion against the constitutional authority of the government." Both the Statesman and the Crisis were critical of Governor William Dennison for what they considered extralegal actions and for bad administration of the war preparations. The treason charges, however, continued, with the Journal stating that attacks on Dennison and Lincoln greatly encouraged the rebels. The Statesman and Crisis countered that statements by "irrepressibles" like the Journal had served to unite Southerners by confirming their fears of an abolitionist war.

Early in the summer, voters in Columbus began to give some attention to the coming fall elections. The first calls had been made soon after Sumter for the abandonment of all old political parties and for their replacement with a "Union" party including all men who supported the war against secession. Through the newspaper exchange lists of the day, these calls were reprinted and widely discussed in Columbus.
Democratic Ohio Assemblyman Converse as early as March wrote his close friend Congressman Cox, that: "Our policy should be to keep up our party organization and maintain our political integrity." The city's Democratic papers attacked the Union Party movement on several grounds. The Republicans were charged with hypocrisy for proclaiming an end to all party distinction while at the same time removing hundreds of loyal Democratic officeholders for partisan reasons. Both the Dennison and Lincoln Administrations were considered too inept and guilty of favoritism in war contracting and appointments ever to gain endorsements from fairminded Democrats. And finally, Medary and Manypenney both charged that Republicans, after having brought about the war by their antislavery agitation, now wanted to hide their past sins in a Union Party and "thus escape a proper responsibility and accountability for their wicked and reprehensible conduct." To these editors, the only real Union Party was the Democracy. They loudly applauded when the Democratic State Central Committee issued a call for a convention to nominate candidates for the October election.

The Democrats' first moves toward independent party action were a precipitate for Ohio's Union Party movement. G. Volney Dorsey, a recent Democratic candidate for State Auditor, wrote a public letter calling for a Union convention to "nominate good conservative men from the ranks of both political parties." The Ohio State Journal under editor Henry Cooke had refused to endorse the Union Party movement. After Cooke sold his share in the paper to Issac Allen of Cincinnati in June, the Journal at last gave "unionism" a degree of support.
Capital City Fact, the former Breckinridge paper, completed its political transformation to a Unionist organ by denouncing Democrats who wanted to run a "partisan organization" as "nothing less than traitors, and worse than Southern Rebels." The Republican State Committee on July 25 topped off the Unionist movement by resolving not to hold a State convention but to request the Democratic State Committee to join in calling a bi-partisan meeting to nominate candidates.

The reply of the Columbus Democratic press to the Union Party appeal was quick and sarcastic. The Statesman printed the Republican Committee's call as an obituary announcing the death of that party. The Franklin County Democrats, in an August 3rd meeting, rejected a proposal for a Union convention, and instead chose delegates for the coming Democratic convention. State Representative Otto Dresel and Der Westbote editor Jacob Reinhard were among those selected. A feud between Medary and Manypenny over local issues and financial dealings resulted in neither being sent to avoid offending the other. Medary's advice to Democrats who wanted a Union Party was to go to the Democratic Convention and "nominate a good State ticket and we think the Republicans will show their good sense by supporting it. This is the way to have one party and if they are sincere in their desire we shall see them give it an unanimous vote."

The Democratic State Convention opened in Columbus on several high notes. The city's Democrats had recently carried the election for Justice of the Peace by a 350-vote majority. Also, the highly respected John Crittenden, in Columbus the day before the convention, had
addressed the arriving delegates and commended their patriotism. The convention was well attended, with county delegations made up of both former Breckinridge and Douglas Democrats as well as a good number of Constitutional Unionists from the 1860 campaign. Hugh J. Jewett, a leading Democrat of Muskingum County, was nominated for Governor, and John Scott Harrison, a prominent former Know-Nothing, was nominated for Lieutenant Governor. There was a great similarity between the party's platform and the positions already taken by Columbus' Democratic press. The war was blamed on "misguided sectionalism engendered by fanatical agitators, North as well as South." The Democrats declared the aim of the war to be not the "overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of the States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution." Corruption was denounced, army volunteers applauded, and sectional compromise, undertaken by a National Convention, re-endorsed. Finally, the platform branded Lincoln's suspension of the habeas corpus unconstitutional. All three of Columbus' Democratic editors, Medary, Manypenny, and Reinhard, were named to the party's State Executive Committee, charged with handling quick-breaking political events until the full central committee could meet. The Ohio Democracy was ready for a vigorous campaign, and Columbus Democrats were to play a leading role in it.

The Democratic press and now the party organization had committed itself to opposing the Union Party movement. It was left to the organizers of the new Union Party to go over the heads of the Democratic leaders and invite the Democracy's rank and file to join in supporting
the Administration and renouncing partisanship. On August 13, the Ohio
State Journal printed a call, eventually signed by over a hundred
leading men of the state, inviting:

All loyal citizens of Ohio who are in favor of the mainten-
ance of the government and of the vigorous and continued
prosecution of the war now carried on for the suppression
of the rebellion against the government, to meet and appoint
delegates to a Union Convention to be held at the City of
Columbus on Thursday, the 5th of September next.

The signers, while mostly Republicans, included several Constitutional
Unionists and Democrats from both the Douglas and Breckinridge factions.
Significantly missing were many of the most outspoken, antislavery
Republicans like Joshua Giddings and Benjamin Wade. 46

Columbus put on its flags and bunting to greet the Union Party.
Franklin County sent a delegation including not only Republican stal-
warts like ex-Congressman Samuel Galloway, but also former Douglas
Democrat and Ohio Statesman editor, James H. Smith, and Breckinridge
Democrat Thomas Sparrow. 47 Thomas Ewing, a prominent old-line Whig,
was chosen president of the Convention. Of the seven places on the
state-wide ticket, three went to the Republicans, one to the Constitu-
tional Unionists, and three to the Democrats, including the nomination
of David Tod of Mahoning County for Governor. The extremely brief
platform was identical to that of the Democrats in resolutions endors-
ing a war solely to restore the Union and not to interfere with slavery.
To the anger of many highly partisan or highly antislavery Republicans,
the Convention refused to endorse the actions of the Dennison administra-
tion and re-nominated Josiah Scott for the State Supreme Court in spite
of his decision upholding the Fugitive Slave Law. 48 The opinion of most
historians is that, at least in 1861, the Union Party was a sincere, conservative movement, spurred only by the intention of giving united support to the Lincoln Administration in putting down the rebellion.\textsuperscript{49}

The Columbus press of both parties was surprised at how successful the Union Party Convention had been. The Republican \textit{Journal} declared that the Democratic Party had been reduced to only "'The Knights of the Golden Circle,' composed of the Breckinridge Democrats and such dupes as can be induced to join them."\textsuperscript{50} The Democratic \textit{Statesman} admitted that "The people of the State have before them two tickets composed of Union men, loyal to the Constitution and the faithful enforcement of the laws...."\textsuperscript{51}

In the month between the Union Party Convention and the October election, the rank-and-file Democrats were left to make the ultimate choice between their older party and the new "no-party" party. Both parties campaigned on platforms pledging loyalty to the national government's efforts to suppress the rebellion. While the Democrats tried to raise additional issues, concern over the war remained preeminent with the voters. Also, as of this time, there was no evidence of significant anti-war feelings among the Columbus Democrats in either their press or the activities of their usually responsive party leaders. The choice of traditionally Democratic voters between their old party and the new Union Party must therefore have been made on the basis of which party they felt best able to administer the state and local war efforts to the commonly agreed upon ends. How much this choice was influenced by long established partisan prejudices and how much by an expanding awareness.

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of the implications of civil war can only be determined by looking at
the short but vigorous Columbus election campaign.

The Union Party in 1861 put on a determined but unexciting campaign
following Nineteenth Century standards.\textsuperscript{52} The Columbus Union Party had
done little organizing beyond choosing delegates to the party's state
convention. It was not until September 16th that a convention met to
choose nominees for the local offices to be filled in the October
election. Former Republican Congressman Samuel Galloway was elected
the convention's chairman, but influential Democrats like John Groom,
Joseph Geiger, Thomas Sparrow, and Judges Josiah Warden and W. R.
Rankin also participated. The \textit{Capital City Fact} was once more endorsed
as the official party organ, despite its pro-Breckinridge antecedents.
A motion requesting that the convention interrogate the recently nomin-
ated Democratic ticket and support them if they proved loyal to the war
effort was hotly debated and finally rejected as having been intention-
ally disruptive. The convention then proceeded to nominate Warden for
State Senator, Rankin for one of the two State Representative seats,
and split the rest of the ticket in half between Democrats and Republi-
cans. Sparrow, however, was rejected in his quest for the auditorship
nomination, probably because he had alienated too many voters, Republi-
cans and Douglas Democrats, by running for Congress in 1860 as a pro-
Breckinridge Democrat. The only resolution adopted was to endorse the
platform of the Union Party's state convention.\textsuperscript{53}

The Union Party raised few issues in the campaign. The Union can-
didate for Governor, Tod, refused to debate Jewett, his Democratic opponent;

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but he did in many speeches condemn as folly the Democratic platform's continued hope for reunion through the compromises of a national Constitutional convention. The party's central thrust was that continued partisanship and criticism of the state and national administration only encouraged the South. Trying to encourage Democratic bolting, Judge Warden advised his fellow Democrats: "If you would preserve Democracy, you must preserve it as an unquestionably loyal sentiment, embodied in an evidently loyal party." The traditionally Republican Journal was considerably harsher of the Democrats. Its editor, Issac Allen, repeated the old charges of the questionable loyalty of the Democratic editors, Medary and Manypenny. Allen warned: "The hour has come when the Democrats of our country will be called upon to denounce these intriguing leaders, or to renounce the title of loyalty to the government." Stories were continually printed about a secret pro-Confederate order, the Knights of the Golden Circle, that purportedly directed the Northern Democratic leaders in treasonable paths. The Journal came close to branding all criticism of the Lincoln Administration's war management as treasonous.

The Democratic campaign was considerably more vigorous. Franklin County Democrats, in a convention chaired by Medary of the Crisis, nominated a straight Democratic ticket. The city's Democratic press developed a number of issues. Both the Crisis and the Statesman denounced Tod as a renegade and untrustworthy opportunist. Benjamin Stanton, the Union candidate for Lieutenant Governor, was labelled an "irrepressible" and one-time "peaceable disunionist." The mobbing of
two Ohio Democratic newspapers during the campaign was heavily criticized, as were Lincoln's suspension of the habeas corpus and his disregard for the Supreme Court's decision in the *ex parte Merryman* case.\(^{59}\) A late arising issue concerned General John C. Fremont's proclamation confiscating the slaves of all those in rebellion in Missouri. Lincoln quickly revoked Fremont's action but not before the Democrats had the chance to criticize the proclamation and the many Republicans, now Unionists, who had endorsed it. The Columbus Democrats also took this opportunity to revive old arguments against emancipation as a war aim and to state the threat of freed Blacks to Northern labor.\(^{60}\)

Manypenny in the *Statesman* took the lead in answering the criticisms of partisanship during wartime, by stating:

> In a free government like ours, where the citizens must necessarily combine in order to advance such measures of governmental policy and reform as they deem necessary, patriotism and devotions to the country's best interests can, in general, only be manifested through the medium of party organizations.... We are satisfied.... The Utopian scheme of a no-party organization, betrays either great cowardice or a lack of common sense.\(^{51}\)

The Republican strategy was not too difficult for Manypenny to understand -- destroy Northern Democracy by equating it with disloyalty and thereby destroy the last barrier to a war fought for abolition at the risk of defeat and permanent disunion.\(^{62}\) It was the Abolitionists, so strong in Unionist ranks, who really had to be watched for disloyalty, said Manypenny, because: "They do not care a straw for the Union; so that they can but set the Negroes free, this is the Alpha and Omega of their war."\(^{63}\) As the Democrats assessed the situation, it was not their continued partisan existence that worked against the goal of restoring
the Union but rather the pro-abolition sentiment of many of the Unionists.

The campaign went through its last week with some strong electioneering and a few surprises. The weekly Columbus Gazette broke from its non-partisan role by denouncing the Democracy as being "bankrupt in character" and "an aid to rebellion." Senator Andrew Johnson of Tennessee spoke to a Union campaign rally at the State Capitol three days before the election, but delivered a rambling speech that neither party found much to their liking. The Democrats staged a massive election-night rally, beginning with smaller rallies in the northern First Ward and the southern, German, Fifth Ward and then converging by two torchlight parades before the State House steps, where Columbus Congressman Cox gave a well-received pro-war and pro-Democratic address. The next morning, election day, the Journal sprang upon its readers the sensational story of the arrest in northern Ohio of a Knight of the Golden Circle "commander" and his sworn testimony "that there are NINE HUNDRED of them in Columbus!!" The immediately following exhortation to the voter was: "Arise, friends, and crush this villainous conspiracy against our country." The Journal had held back the story for several days until it was too late for the Democratic press to respond before the people had gone to the polls. By the maneuver, the Republicans had maximized the issue of partisanship and disloyalty and thus were confident of a great Unionist triumph.

It took over a week before the final election results were known. The entire Union ticket had been elected with Tod's statewide majority
of 55,223 for Governor being four times that of Dennison's in 1859. Sixty-six Unionists, including thirty-two former Democrats, were elected to the Ohio House of Representatives, compared to only twenty-four Democrats running on their own party's ticket. Of the thirty-four members elected to the State Senate, there were five Unionists of Democratic antecedents and twenty-one of Republican antecedents, compared to only eight Democrats.

In Columbus and Franklin County the results were significantly different. In the County, the Democratic state ticket won by an average majority of 700 votes, somewhat less than its 900-to-1000 averages of the past four elections. In the races for legislative seats and county offices, the Democrats triumphed in every contest with a near normal majority of 1041. The Democrats running as Unionists ran no better, and in most cases worse, than their Republican coalition partners. Judge Rankin running for one of the two State Representative seats received almost 200 votes less than his former-Republican ticket mate. In Columbus, too, the story was a Democratic victory but with a diminished majority. In fact, the Democrats had carried only one of the five wards, the predominantly German Fifth Ward. But, as had been the case in all the elections since the mid-fifties, the Democratic Fifth Ward's majority offset a Republican majority in the rest of the city.

However there were some signs that the Union Party appeal had been heard by some Democrats. Only rarely had the old Republicans carried all of the four northernmost wards. Also the Union majority in each of these wards this year was significantly larger than a Republican ticket
had ever managed. Usually the Republicans obtained about a 100 to 150 majority in the first four wards, but this was always overwhelmed by a Democratic majority of 400 to 550 in the Fifth Ward. In 1861, the more broadly based Union Party had carried the northern four wards by an unprecedented 460 votes, but the unyielding Democratic loyalty of the Germans reversed this to a city-wide 70-vote Democratic victory. The Columbus Union Party had come close but failed to defeat Democracy in its Capital stronghold.

Why had the large majority of the Democratic voters of Columbus chosen to stay with their old party and refused to join the new party which pledged to subordinate all other domestic matters to the task of supporting the Federal government and crushing the rebellion? Some historians have contended that the persistence of Democratic partisanship was due to strong anti-war sentiments held by many Democrats since the inception of the conflict. However, while some Democrats did, very early, come to oppose the war, it is incorrect to conclude that these men represented the bulk of the party. As has been shown, the Democrats of Columbus had condemned secession and came to endorse a war for the limited, and what they considered strictly Constitutional, goal of putting down the rebellion. Democrats had volunteered in numbers at least as great as the Republicans and their representatives had willingly voted for the necessary war expenditures. At the same time, however, they still hoped for some national compromise. As Hugh Jewett their candidate for Governor explained, they would not negotiate with rebels in arms, but rather with the large majority of the Southern people who
had been misled into secession. Democratic opposition to the war in 1861 was exaggerated out of all proportions by Republican editors and was never widespread enough to account for the Democratic decision to continue partisan opposition.

Some historians, most notably Frank Klement, have contended that economic depression and Midwestern sectionalism were responsible for the defeatism and opposition to the war, commonly referred to as the Copperhead movement. While Klement has pointed out the economic problems afflicting the Northwest in 1861, he does not attempt to explain the political events of that year as being greatly shaped by them. While few statistics are available, Columbus in fact seems to have prospered during the war years as a result of the great number of contracts won to outfit and supply the large Northern army. The city manufactured cannon balls, caissons, battery wagons, forges, and particularly cloth items from wool produced in the surrounding counties. The large number of new manufacturing firms begun in Columbus during the war ended the stagnancy the city had fallen into in the 1850's.

Why then did the Democrats of Columbus, and of the North, refuse to submerge themselves in the Union Party movement? One element explaining Democratic behavior in Columbus, and in many other areas, was the large number of German and other recent immigrants affiliated with the Democratic Party. Paul Kleppner in his study of Midwestern politics between 1850 and 1900 has concluded that German Catholic and Lutheran immigrants, as well as many other immigrants, were the product of traditional culture with a passive religious orientation emphasizing strict belief in formal
doctrines. These Germans, and other ethnic groups, therefore disapproved of the "pietistic" strain in native Protestantism that emphasized "moral reformism," such as prohibition and abolition. Kleppner concludes that the "pietistic" leadership of the Republican Party alienated the large majority of the immigrants and drove them into strict Democratic partyanship. While Kleppner's interpretation is still a subject of debate among historians, the political behavior of Columbus' Germans certainly seems to support his contentions. 73

Approximately half of Columbus' Democrats were not Germans, however. Why then did the large majority of these voters reject the Union Party call? The basic reason, as stressed in party newspapers and platforms, was that the Democrats balked at endorsing or giving unqualified support to administrations controlled by a party they had come to thoroughly distrust. The large majority of Columbus Democrats still held the Republicans partially responsible for the war as a result of their years of agitation of the slavery question and, more particularly, their blocking of the compromise attempts in the midst of the secession crisis. Columbus Democrats opposed secession and supported the war, but they wanted men of their own party to lead it. Despite Unionist protestations to the contrary, the Democrats still felt that the "irrepressibles" or radicals among the Republicans were working to turn the war into an abolitionist crusade. Only in their own party, they felt, could they hope to give effective opposition to these dangerous aspirations that would surely prolong the war, if not make it unwinnable. While many Democrats defected to the Unionist ranks, a sizable hard core kept the
party alive and provided a base for ultimate political recovery.

The Democrats of Columbus had no reason to be discouraged by the results of their 1861 campaign. The "sworn testimony" on the Knights of the Golden Circle was completely discredited when investigated. In Ohio such charges were never again taken as seriously as elsewhere in the North.74 Despite some defections among prominent leaders and the rank and file, the party in the city and county remained well organized and, at this time, reasonably united. Medary of the Crisis, whose influence in state Democratic circles was rising rapidly, believed that if the campaign had been as well conducted throughout the state as it was in Columbus' and if the Democrats had "gone into the field early, taken time to canvass each county thoroughly, and marched upon our political opponents with solid and well organized ranks, we would have held busy if not handsomely defeated them."75 In Columbus the 1861 Union Party campaign had come nowhere near destroying the Democratic Party, and in fact left them eager to battle again for power on the issues surrounding the war.

2 One exception consistently criticizing the necessity of the war from its initiation was Clement L. Vallandigham, whose best biography is Frank L. Klement, The Limits of Dissent: Clement L. Vallandigham (Lexington, Kentucky, 1970).


4 The Columbus Ohio State Journal, November 13, 1860, hereafter cited as O.S.J.

5 O.S.J., November 28, 1860.

6 D.O.S., January 2, 1861.

7 George L. Converse to Samuel Cox, January 9, 1861, Ohio Historical Center, Archives, Cox Letter File, D.O.S., January 7,9, 1861.


9 D.O.S., January 24, 1861.


11 The Columbus Capital City Fact, January 25,29, 1861, hereafter cited as C.C.F.


13 Crisis, January 31, 1861.

14 D.O.S., February 1, 1861.
15 Ibid., January 5, 1861.
16 C.C.F., January 23, 1861.
17 O.S.J., April 2, 1861; D.O.S., April 2, 1861.
18 Potter, pp. 243-262.
19 D.O.S., February 11, 1861.
21 D.O.S., April 11, 1861.
22 O.S.J., April 13, 1861.
23 D.O.S., April 13, 1861.
24 Crisis, April 18, 25, May 2, 1861.
25 O.S.J., April 16, 1861.
26 C.C.F., April 16, 1861.
27 D.O.S., April 16, 1861.
28 Crisis, May 2, June 20, 1861.
29 D.O.S., O.S.J., and Gazette all April 18, 1861.
30 D.O.S., April 27, 28, 1861.
31 Ibid., May 9, 1861.
33 O.S.J., May 6, 1861; D.O.S., May 5, 8, 1861; Crisis, May 30, 1861.
34 George L. Converse to Samuel Cox, March 5, 1861, Ohio Historical Center, Archives, Cox Letter Files.
35 D.O.S., May 6, 14, 22, 1861.
36 Ibid., June 23, 1861.
37 Klement, Vallandigham, p. 70; D.O.S., June 11, 1861.
38 D.O.S., July 11, 1861.
39 D.S.J., July 17, 1861; Gazette, June 28, 1861.

40 C.C.F., July 6, 26, 1861.

41 D.O.S., July 27, 1861.

42 Crisis, August 8, 1861; D.O.S., August 13, 1861.

43 Crisis, July 25, 1861.


45 Smith, Republican Party, pp. 14-15; D.O.S., August 8, 1861; O.S.J., August 8, 1861; John Scott Harrison declined the nomination of the Democrats and was replaced by John C. Marshall, another ex-Whig, Roseboom, Civil War Era, p. 390.

46 D.S.J., August 13, 1861 and several days thereafter with additional names being added.

47 D.O.S. and O.S.J. both September 6, 1861; Roseboom, Civil War Era, pp. 392-393.

48 Proceedings of the Great Union Convention of Ohio (Columbus, Ohio, 1861).

49 Roseboom, Civil War Era, p. 395.

50 O.S.J., September 6, 1861.

51 D.O.S., September 6, 1861.

52 Roseboom, Civil War Era, p. 393.

53 D.O.S., September 17, 24, 1861; O.S.J., September 1, 16, 1861; Gazette, September 20, 1861.

54 O.S.J., October 1, 1861.

55 Ibid., September 20, 1861.


57 Crisis, September 12, 1861.
58 Ibid., September 26, 1861; D.O.S., August 14, 22, September 26, 1861.


60 D.O.S., September 17, October 3, 1861; Crisis, September 26, 1861.

61 D.O.S., September 12, 1861.


63 Ibid., October 3, 1861.

64 Gazette, October 4, 1861.

65 D.O.S., October 5, 1861; O.S.J., October 5, 1861.

66 O.S.J., October 8, 1861.

67 Porter, pp. 90-91; Roseboom, pp. 393-394.

68 D.O.S., October 13, 1861.

69 Porter, Ohio Politics, and Henry C. Hubbart, The Old Middle West (New York, 1936) both state this interpretation.

70 D.O.S., September 13, 1861.

71 Frank L. Klement, "Economic Aspects of Middle Western Copperheadism," The Historian, XIV (Autumn, 1951), p. 35.

72 Francis Weisenburger, Columbus During the Civil War (Columbus, Ohio, 1963), p. 17.


74 Klement, Copperheads, pp. 139-142; Thomas H. Smith, pp. 23-26.

75 Crisis, October 9, 1861.
CHAPTER III

A YEAR OF RECOVERY

If the Democrats had salvaged a narrow victory in Columbus, the 1861 election in Ohio as a whole had been a resounding endorsement of the Union Party and its fundamental principle of uncritical support for the Administrations' conduct of the war. However as another year of war dawned and there were few signs of a quick, or even an eventual, Northern victory, the Unionist consensus came under great strain from many directions. Even before the Battle of Shiloh had sent a profound shock wave across the entire Northwest, voices were heard from certain Unionists and from their Democratic opponents demanding major shifts in war policy. Particularly from former Republicans, now Unionists, were heard demands for legislative assaults on the hated Southern slavery and for new taxes and higher tariffs to enable the North to press the war with more determination and might. In 1862, as the Lincoln Administration yielded to this pressure, dissent mounted from the Democratic and other conservative opposition, and in consequence Northern politics heated up rapidly. ¹ By the fall of the year, the shift in Northern war policies became a major subject of partisan debate. The unpopularity of many of the new policies gave the Democrats an opportunity to challenge the Unionist party's direction of the war effort by sweeping the fall election. In 1862, in Columbus and the entire North, the Democracy went on the offensive and caused many sleepless nights for all their opponents from local editors to White House occupants.
Back in Ohio it was widely hoped that the inauguration of Unionist
Governor David Tod would herald the beginning of a moderate and popular
administration of the war effort. Unfortunately the considerable
changes being made in war policy had a great disrupting effect on the
fragile coalition of former Democrats and former Republicans in Ohio's
Union Party's legislative majority. The party's factions argued fre-
quently over the proper policy toward slavery. In particular, the
desire of the strong antislavery Senator Benjamin Wade to be chosen for
another term so fractured party ranks that the legislature postponed its
selection until the next year. Regular Democrats, like Columbus
Assemblyman Otto Dresel, severely tested their opponent's party unity
by offering resolutions condemning abolition measures and instead endors-
ing the Crittenden resolutions' limited war goals. By avoiding heavy
involvement in this Union Party infighting, Governor Tod got the quarrel-
ing Assembly to pass most of his program retrenching normal state
expenditures in order to help pay for the heavy war expenses. At the
same time, the Democrats tried to make political capital by urging
legislation prohibiting the immigration of freed Blacks into the state
and permitting the absentee soldiers to vote in the fall election. The
height of political partisanship was reached when the Unionist majority
gerrymandered the state's nineteen Congressional districts in the hope
of capturing at least sixteen. Special targets for retirement were
Ohio's two best known Democratic incumbents, Clement Vallandigham of
Dayton and Cox of Columbus. On the executive level, Governor Tod was
successful in directing the resources of the State into the war effort,
but he found army recruiting to be a worsening problem.  

Columbus' politics were from the first caught up in the growing partisan debate. In January the old Breckinridge—now Unionist—paper, the Capital City Fact, broke the lull that had followed the fall election by predicting: "We cannot save the Union by force of arms without forever crippling, if not externally destroying the institution of slavery." The Democrats immediately attacked the Fact and the abolition legislation being proposed in Washington. The Democratic Ohio Statesman argued that what was actually being abolished was the Constitution, and bitterly professed that "The Worst enemies of Human Freedom are those who would for the sake of liberating by force and violence a few Negro slaves, destroy the only truly free Republic on earth, and put in jeopardy the freedom of twenty-eight millions of white citizens." Even the long established Republican Ohio State Journal said it stood only for the 1860 Chicago Platform and would not support any act of emancipation because "The feeling of the South...would by such an act become universally embittered, and intensified in its hostility to a degree of such utter ferocity, that would render the war against rebellion a sanguinary combat through indefinite years." Both Democratic papers applauded these sentiments. Medary of the weekly Crisis, estranged from the Statesman owners, Manypenny and Thomas Miller, on account of business and political rivalries, even pronounced the Journal the best daily in town for Democratic readers.  

This moment of bi-partisan agreement was short-lived. By spring, the Journal, while still hesitating to endorse the most militant
antislavery programs, began to support such moderate measures as abolition in the territories and the District of Columbia.\textsuperscript{12} The city-wide spring elections were highly partisan with the *Journal* denouncing the "Anti-Union Democratic ticket" and the *Crisis* cursing the "fusion free-Negro party." Both Unionist journals tried to connect the Columbus Democrats with "sympathizers for the Southern rebellion," such as "[Clement] Vallandigham, Davis & Co."\textsuperscript{12} Branding their opponents' sympathy with abolition as the true enemy of reunion, the Democrats once again defended their own loyalty. *Statesman* writer Amos Layman, in a highly partisan rebuttal to Republican charges, proclaimed that, "The party, or parties, who...set themselves in opposition to the Democratic Party, are necessarily, by that very antagonism placed in a position of hostility to the Constitution and the Union it established, and are more or less anti-Government, anti-Union and revolutionary.\textsuperscript{13} Since both parties had run in the local election on approximately the same issues as in the previous fall, the returns increasing the Democratic city-wide majority from 70 to nearly 500 were quite a shock to Unionists and a pleasure to Democrats. The shift of city voters demonstrated that either the Union Party's unquestioning support for Washington policy was losing some appeal or Democratic criticism of abolition proposals and other war measures was gaining in popularity. Events of the next few months kept the political atmosphere acrimonious. In late April, the state legislature disclosed the new apportionment bill which moved Franklin County from a safely Democratic congressional district to one shared with three highly Republican
 counties. Worried about how this would handicap Cox's re-election chances, Franklin County Representatives George Converse and Otto Dresel had futilely opposed the measure. While also worried, the Statesman retained faith that "the people are honest and will put their seal of condemnation upon this act of a tyrannical majority" come election day.¹⁴ The city's usually untroubled ethnic relations were upset when the German community reacted indignantly to a Journal campaign against public drinking places open on Sunday. Columbus' Der Westbote bitterly complained: "The brandy which, notwithstanding the Sunday law, is imbibed by the 'gentlemen' behind locked doors, is better adapted to its [the Journal's] taste. But beer and tobacco smoking are German habits; and evidently the Journal does not like the Germans."¹⁵ The Columbus Germans also felt that their own Otto Dresel was being unfairly singled out for Republican criticism, and many politicians were accused of old Know-Nothing party connections.¹⁶ The unauthorized proclamation by Union General David Hunter declaring emancipation for all the slaves in his military department provoked a rehashing of the abolition question until Lincoln suspended the document.¹⁷

Perhaps of most significance in light of events yet to come was the growing feud between the city's Democratic editors. While this quarrel had obscure origins in the highly disputed sale of the state's canal system to a private group including Statesman owners Manypenny and Thomas Miller, the papers soon developed clear differences of opinion on the conduct of the war. By 1862, the Crisis' Medary, who had long hesitated to give any endorsement to a coercive war, and who wrote

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glowingly of Vallandigham's activities, was printing editorials suggestively querying,

What is the use of fighting, spending millions upon millions daily, bringing sorrow to every doorway, and debts of uncalculable amounts upon ourselves and posterity, if they only get us further into difficulties, and further from a settlement of our troubles? If all this is to be only for the Negro, what is to be the fate of the white man? \(^{18}\)

Medary's defeatism and constant criticism of any and all war measures worried Manypenny because of the anti-war reputation the *Crisis* was gaining for the whole Democratic Party. *Statesman*'s editorial writer Amos Layman tried to discredit the much-better-known party journalist by pointing out that Medary's "constant effort has seemed to be to find fault with Democrats, and to take such extreme measures, and to show such a leaning toward JEFF DAVIS & C., as to damage the Democratic cause." \(^{19}\) The *Statesman* labored hard to hold the Democratic Party to a position of supporting a war against secession while not endorsing any impractical, and probably unconstitutional, abolition plans.

As had been the custom in recent years, both parties started their 1862 campaign at large state-wide conventions held in Columbus. The Unionists held theirs on August 21st in Naughten Hall. The conservative wing was in control, and out-maneuvered the pro-abolition faction. \(^{20}\) The Franklin County delegation included former Democrats General Joseph Geiger and Columbus *Fact* co-editor, R. H. Geary, both of whom served on important committees. The Convention passed resolutions endorsing the conduct of both the Tod and Lincoln Administrations. The party's 1861 state platform was re-endorsed, despite the fact that its wording was identical to the Crittenden resolution, now repudiated by Republicans.
in Congress and the State Legislature. For the relatively minor state offices up for election, a conservative ticket headed by former Democrat William Kennon and including staunch Republican Chauncey Olds of Columbus was nominated. The highly partisan Democratic press of Columbus was even willing to concede that the Unionist ticket was qualified, but the Statesman noted: "The few delegates to this convention who used to profess Democracy in years gone by, are either officeholders or office seekers. The Democratic people, who were lured into this fusion organization last year, are where they belong—in the Democratic Party—and will vote the Democratic ticket." This surge of Democratic confidence had begun at their own state convention held a month earlier. Columbus Democrats had played leading roles at this convention and, after some quarreling, both Medary and Manypenny had been sent as delegates. Manypenny was prominent as the acknowledged floor leader of the "War Democrat" faction. This group lobbied for a platform which pledged Democratic nominees elected to office to subordinate all other issues to the twin goals of defeating the rebellion and restoring the Union. The "War Democrats" had to labor against the atmosphere of the convention, emotionalized by news of the midnight arrest by armed soldiers of outspoken Democratic war critic, John Kees; editor of the Circleville Watchman. In the end, control of the gathering fell into the hands of "Peace" men like Medary, fellow Columbus delegate Allen Thurman, and Dayton Congressman Clement Vallandigham, who had arrived in the city with 200 devoted followers and "shouters." Medary was chosen presiding officer, and he, Thurman,
Vallandigham, and Rufus Ranney of Cleveland drew up the platform during the luncheon recess. Vallandigham's biographer recounts that Medary and Ranney argued loudly over war issues and Medary even criticized Vallandigham for failing to vote against all military bills and army appropriations. Medary desired planks demanding that the Union Army be withdrawn from the South and an armistice arranged; however the final compromise platform draft managed to skirt the divisive issues and merely criticize the policies of the Republicans. Specific planks opposed plans of confiscation and emancipation as unconstitutional and as sure to prolong the war. Particularly noted was the likelihood of large numbers of emancipated slaves coming to Ohio "to compete with and underwork the white laborers of the State, and to constitute in various ways, an almost or quite unbearable nuisance, if suffered to remain among us." In general, the Republicans were blamed with causing the war and failing to bring it to a quick end. As on the platform, a compromise spirit ruled the party nominations and "War Democrat" Ranney was named to head the ticket. All factions seemed pleased with the convention's results. By comparison the Unionist gathering was "a dead, terrible failure" according to Medary, who predicted a great Democratic victory in October.

Probably generating much more voter interest than the election for the minor state-wide officers were the races for the United States Congressional seats. The Unionist-dominated General Assembly had gone a long way to ensure the defeat of Columbus' Democratic Representative Samuel Cox by re-districting his home county of Franklin into a new
district including predominately Republican Madison, Green and Clarke Counties. Also in the new district was an incumbent Republican Congressman, Samuel Shellabarger, who had regularly supported all administration war measures and voted in favor of abolition legislation. Shellabarger had reason to be confident of re-election, for the three Republican counties had given the Unionists a 2,900 margin in 1861, compared to the 700-vote Democratic majority in Franklin. But Cox was not one to be underestimated. Only thirty-eight years old and a three-term veteran, Cox was already acknowledged as one of the leading Democrats in the House. While maintaining hopes for a compromise settlement with the South even after the fighting began, Cox had spoken out in favor of the war and supported most military appropriations. At the same time, Cox was a leader in opposing revenue measures like the tariff which he felt were more intended to benefit Eastern capitalists at the expense of Westerners than to aid the war effort. Confiscation and abolition were unwise and un-constitutional to Cox who denounced the Republicans for working "to free the Negro, regardless of Constitutional limitations and consequences." In the spring of 1862, when Vallandigham had tried to get all Western Democratic Congressmen to endorse a public address supporting the "Peace Democratic" position, Cox had led a counter group of Democrats into a caucus with border state Constitutional Unionists, including the esteemed John Crittenden. This meeting produced eight public resolutions opposing both secession and abolition, condemning confiscation, and calling for a vigorous prosecution of the war to accomplish the goals of the Crittenden's 1861
resolution. This was to be Cox's platform, and he returned to Columbus at the end of July to begin waging a vigorous campaign in every portion of his district.

The campaign of 1862 was going to be very much a campaign on the issues. For instance, the Democrats were able to take an early and popular stand against "arbitrary" arrests being made by military authorities all across the North. Those arrested, almost always Democrats, were accused of "treasonable utterances" or of counseling young men to resist the draft. They were tried in military not civilian courts. Particularly arousing to Franklin County citizens were the arrests of two nearby Ohioans, John Kees of Circleville and Dr. Edson B. Olds of Lancaster, who had once represented the old Columbus district in Congress. While the extreme peace statements of both of these men had been censured by even many fellow Democrats, the irregular manner of their seizure and seemingly political nature of the charges made the arrests unpopular across party lines. Originally these arrests were made under orders of Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, but President Lincoln showed his approval by issuing a proclamation in late September suspending the writ of habeas corpus in all cases involving "disloyal" acts. The Democratic press of Columbus condemned the arrests and the Administration for making dictatorial threats to civil liberties and for attempting to muzzle the political opposition. Sensing a popular issue, Democratic stump speakers and editorial writers repeatedly condemned the Republicans as "the party of Bastiles and prisons--of conviction without trial--of punishment without guilt."
The economy was another important issue, with the Midwest in a depression which the Democrats blamed on the various war taxes, currency adjustments, and high tariff provisions. The new tariff as a "great fiscal tyranny" forcing the West to pay a subsidy to "the ironmasters of Pennsylvania and the cotton millionaires of New England." In Columbus, this evidence of Midwestern sectionalism on economic issues appeared often in 1862, and not from Democrats alone. While the Republican Journal mildly complained of the East getting the lion's share of manufacturing contracts, the Democratic Statesman condemned the entire Federal economic policy, declaring that: "The old Federalists of New England, allied with the Abolitionists and capitalists, are straining every nerve so to shape the financial policy of the Government, as to make the Great West tributary to the East." The sagging economy, along with the bloody stalemate in the war, helped to make the autumn of 1862 a time of gloom and pessimism in the Midwest. Every new casualty list and rising price added to the discontent with Union Party leadership and aided the Democrats.

As the war entered its second year, a great need developed for soldiers to re-fill and expand Union Army ranks. When volunteering failed to meet this need, conscription proved necessary. However with the political disagreements on the goals and even the necessity of the war, the draft could not help but become a major issue in the campaign. All across Ohio, Union Party papers charged that the Democrats were not volunteering so that they could stay home and win the elections while their opponents were absent risking their lives to save the Union.
The best Democratic reply was to point to the behavior of their leaders. For example, Rufus Ranney, heading that year's ticket, interrupted his campaign, at Governor Tod's request, to make a series of speeches encouraging volunteering. In Columbus, Democrats like former Senator Allen and last year's candidate for Governor, Hugh Jewett, along with Congressman Cox shared platforms with Unionists and urged men of all parties to enlist. The draft set for August 4th by President Lincoln was, however, highly unpopular with some other Democrats, especially Medary of the Crisis, who felt the $300 commutation unfairly allowed the rich to escape service. The total impact of conscription on the election in Columbus was probably lessened when a bi-partisan recruiting campaign met the county's quota by mid-September and thereby avoided the draft for that year.

The most important issue in Ohio in 1862 was the abolition issue. In Columbus, this issue, more than any other, drew the dissident factions of the Democratic Party together to oppose the Unionists. Local Democrats excoriated Congressional legislation passed in the 1862 session abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia, prohibiting that institution in all Federal territories, offering to give financial aid to any state willing to undertake a program of compensated emancipation, and authorizing the confiscation of the property and slaves of all Confederate military officers and officeholders. The Democratic papers stressed the threat of Black economic competition and highlighted articles on that summer's race riots in Toledo and Cincinnati both of which resulted from the use of Black strike-breakers. Even the considerable
number of Columbus Blacks volunteering for the army, brought only Democratic complaints of how this degraded the status of white soldiers. 43 But it was the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, issued by Lincoln on September 22nd, that brought the issue to a boil. Medary, a confirmed racist, remarked in the Crisis that, "We have at last hit upon the lowest round of our national existence," and reminded Midwesterners that he had long claimed that abolition was the real Republican war goal. 44 Many penny in the Ohio Statesman echoed Medary's sentiments by writing, "God only knows what we are now to expect as a Nation," and declaring that the only salvation lay in electing a conservative Democratic Congress. 45 Candidate Cox was the most outspoken on the issue, especially on the prospect of a great immigration into Ohio of cheap Black labor. In one speech, after mentioning the threat of any type of abolition to immigrant labor, he turned to the potential plight of the veterans and said: "Our soldiers, when they return, 100,000 strong, to their Ohio homes, will find these Negroes, or the best of them, filling their places, felling timber, ploughing ground, gathering crops, etc. How their martial laurels will brighten when they discover the result of their services." 46 The imminent prospect of emancipation united all Democrats, regardless of opinion on the war, and provided them with a most popular issue to take to the voters.

By the end of summer, both party organizations in Columbus were in high gear for a vigorous campaign. In late August, the county Democrats met in a city hall convention presided over by Thomas Arnold, a leading local "War Democrat" and heavy contributor of funds for enlistment
bounties. A ticket for county offices was chosen, and resolutions were passed endorsing the Democratic State platform and the re-election of Cox. The county Unionists met a week later in an equally business-like convention but ran into considerable embarrassment when their candidate for Infirmary Director endorsed Cox "as a model Congressman," and consequently had to be replaced. Cox and Shellabarger energetically stumped their district, with Shellabarger questioning Cox's loyalty and Cox replying with his record of supporting war appropriations and making recruiting speeches. In a move to strengthen German support for Cox, the Ohio Statesman reprinted Shellabarger statements favoring the Maine prohibition law and the excise tax on whiskey.

In the last weeks, the campaign grew increasingly vicious. The Unionist papers in the city, the Journal and the Fact, filled their columns with articles hinting at treasonous Democratic plots and appealing to the patriotism of the voters to unite behind the Administration in putting down the rebellion. The Journal labelled Cox "the artful dodger" for claiming to support the war but failing to vote for many war taxes and for measures such as confiscation to punish the leaders of the rebellion. Shellabarger made frequent charges of a conspiracy existing among Northwestern Democrats to annex the region to the Confederacy and eschewed the emancipation issue. The Republican press buzzed over the fact that Shellabarger had gone to Cincinnati to join the volunteer "Squirrel Hunters" to defend the city against a threatened Confederate raid while Cox stayed home campaigning.

The Democratic press' rebuttal was to repeat their 1861 theme that

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the Republicans had been responsible for the war. Now, after the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, they added the charge that the Union Party had proved itself nothing more than an abolitionist front. Medary warned: "Every candidate for Congress in Ohio, nominated by the so-called Unionist Party, is a Republican of the radical school, and endorses the ultra and destructive legislation of Congress at its last session." The Statesman cautioned: "Allow the radicals to again hold the power in Congress and the country is lost." Cox's campaign was considerably aided by two letters of endorsement printed in the Democratic press from his highly respected colleague, John Crittenden of Kentucky. Even the non-partisan city press praised Cox for obtaining the construction of a Federal arsenal in Columbus.

Right down to the last election rally, Democratic stumpers like Dresel, Converse, and Cox defended their party's loyalty and stressed the issues of emancipation, arbitrary arrests, and the economic exploitation of the West.

It took several days to count the ballots, but when the totals were telegraphed into the State Capital, Democrats realized they had scored a victory. The final tallies gave Judge Ranney a 7,000 vote state majority with the rest of the party's ticket averaging a 5,500 vote victory. It was the first Democratic statewide election success since the formation of the Republican Party coalition in 1855. Fourteen of the nineteen Congressional races had been carried by the Democrats, with the only major consolation for the Unionists being the gerrymandered defeat of Vallandigham.

In Columbus and Franklin County, it was a Democratic landslide.
Every Democratic candidate on the ballot was elected. Cox's 1600 vote margin in Franklin County had given him a 272 majority in his district, and re-election despite the gerrymander. In the city, Cox defeated Shellabarger by over 800 votes and ran more than 50 votes ahead of the rest of the ticket. Columbus' overall returns were revealing. The Germans in the Fifth Ward increased their 1861 Democratic majority by over a hundred votes, but the other wards' results were even more significant. While traditionally Republican by small margins, the Northern four wards had in 1861 gone Unionist by an unprecedented 460 votes. However this year, the swing had reversed itself with the Democrats, for the first time in several years, obtaining a majority in the non-German portions of the city. Columbus' average Democratic victory margin had increased from a slim 70 to almost 700 votes. 60

The results elated the Democrats and dismayed the Republicans, who claimed that both fraud and the absence of Unionist voters in the Army cost them the election. 61 The Democratic Statesman had a different opinion: "The result of the election of the inst. is not a mere partisan success--it is a great popular demonstration. It is a Democratic victory, but it is also a Conservative, a Constitutional and a Union triumph." 62 This was an accurate assessment, for the great switch of city voters cannot be explained merely as the return to the ranks of Democrats who had the year before defected to the Unionists.

The Democratic campaign had obviously won over some Ohioans who had seldom voted for their party. The financial measures for the war passed by the Rebpulicans in Congress, especially the protective tariff, were
unpopular among many Midwesterners irregardless of party. The arbitrary imprisonment of leading Democrats was widely considered a violation of constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties. Emancipation seemed likely to flood the North with cheap Black labor and to prolong Southern resistance. The military stalemate and economic depression all weighed against administration supporters. But perhaps most influential of all was the position of the Democratic candidates. Ranney, Cox, and the local nominees were all "War Democrats" who pledged to defeat the rebellion but also promised to reunite the nation with the least possible disruption of the pre-war status quo. "Peace Democrats" like Medary had not given up their views but had gone along with the rest of the party in emphasizing other issues than that of war or peace. This conservative position of the party not only encouraged the return of Democratic defectors from the Unionists but offered a tolerable home to independent minded Republicans who wished to register a protest to one or more administration policies.

Unfortunately the "Peace" faction of the Democrats read quite more into the election outcome. This group interpreted the defeat of the Unionists in power as a clear indication of waning support for the war. As a result, this group re-doubled its efforts and managed to capture control of the party before the next election. Loss of the control of the Ohio Democracy by "War Democrats" like Cox and Manypenny to "Peace Democrats" like Medary, Allen Thurman, and Vallandigham would result in a greatly changed political scene in Columbus and the State during the next year of the war.


6 Trestler, *David Tod*, pp. 133-137.

7 *C.C.F.*, January 10, 1862.

8 *D.O.S.*, January 12, February 1, 1862; *Crisis*, March 19, 1862.

9 *O.S.J.*, February 12, 1862, also January 30, 1862.

10 *Crisis*, March 12, 1862; *D.O.S.*, February 2, 1862.

11 *O.S.J.*, February 14, March 17, 1862.

12 *Ibid.*, April 7, 1862; *C.C.F.*, April 5, 1862.

13 *D.O.S.*, May 23, 1862.

14 George L. Converse to Samuel Cox, February 28, 1862, Ohio Historical Center, Archives, Cox Letter Files.

15 *O.S.J.*, June 6, 1862.

16 *Crisis*, June 11, 1862.

17 *D.O.S.*, May 18, 1862; *O.S.J.*, May 21, 1862; *C.C.F.*, 17, 21, 1862.

18 *Crisis*, April 23, 1862.

19 *D.O.S.*, June 20, 1862.

20 Ulrich, p. 17.
22. D.O.S., August 21, 1862.
24. Ibid., pp. 99-100.
26. Proceedings of the Democratic State Convention Held at Columbus, Ohio, July 4, 1862, Ohio Historical Center, Archives, Medary Family File.
27. Crisis, August 27, 1862.
30. Samuel S. Cox, Eight Years in Congress From 1857 to 1865 (New York, 1865), pp. 236-258.
32. Joseph Gaston to Samuel Cox, February 18, 1862, Ohio Historical Center, Archives, Cox Letter Files.
34. Crisis, September 24, 1862; D.O.S., August 14, 1862; Crisis, May 28, 1862.
35. Frank L. Klement, "Economic Aspects of Middle Western Copperheadism," The Historian, XIV (Autumn, 1951), pp. 29-34, 37.
36. Ibid., p. 38.
37. D.O.S., June 10, 1862.
38. C.C.F., August 27, 1862.
39. Ulrich, p. 32; D.O.S., July 16, August 1, 3, 1862; Crisis, September 10, 1862.
40 Ulrich, p. 34; *Crisis*, July 30, 1862.

41 Osman G. Hooper, *History of the City of Columbus, Ohio* (Columbus, Ohio, 1920), p. 48.


43 *C.C.F.*, September 13, 1862; *D.O.S.*, July 12, 1862.

44 *Crisis*, September 24, 1862.

45 *D.O.S.*, September 24, 1862.

46 Cox, *Eight Years*, p. 256.

47 *D.O.S.*, August 24, 31, September 10, 1862.

48 *Ibid.*, September 10, 12, 1862; *O.S.J.*, September 1, 1862; *Gazette*, September 5, 1862.


50 *D.O.S.*, September 10, 1862.

51 *O.S.J.*, October 14, 1862; *C.C.F.*, October 2, 1862.

52 *O.S.J.*, September 25, 1862.

53 *D.O.S.*, October 5, 1862.

54 *O.S.J.*, September 12, 1862.

55 *Crisis*, October 1, 1862.

56 *D.O.S.*, October 14, 1862.

57 *Gazette*, October 17, 1862; *D.O.S.*, October 10, 11, 1862.

58 *D.O.S.*, October 14, 1862.

59 Roseboom, p. 402.

60 *D.O.S.*, October 22, 1862.

61 *O.S.J.* and *C.C.F.* both October 16, 1862.

62 *D.O.S.*, October 18, 1862.

CHAPTER IV

DAYS OF VIOLENCE

On March 6, 1863, Samuel Medary returned home by train from a business trip to Cincinnati. A large and sympathetic crowd of fellow Columbus Democrats was waiting to greet him at the station. This reception immediately convinced Medary that the unsettling news he had received that morning had not been exaggerated. Escorting him by his friends, Medary immediately proceeded to the office of his newspaper, the Crisis, where he found his type smashed, files looted, and furniture destroyed. The next day, a large number of townsfolk gathered at the courthouse square to attend a "Law and Order Meeting." By then, most of the local Democrats had learned by rumor or local newspaper account that the Crisis office had been sacked two nights before by a mob of armed soldiers and, some claimed, local Unionists. At the rally, all the important city Democratic figures competed in declaring such outrages to be "the natural consequence of that fatal disregard of the Constitution and laws which has marked the course of our Administration, Federal and State, since the war began." Over the next few weeks Medary from his repaired office and Manypenny in his Statesman promised Unionist papers retribution in kind if any further attacks occurred on Democrats. The Unionists of the city felt themselves unjustly accused, and were worried by the Democratic belligerence. The actual culprits, soldiers of the Second Ohio Cavalry Regiment, soon departed Columbus unapprehended, but left behind a city full of highly inflamed political
passions. From that time on, both parties feared that the complete political triumph of the other would lead to the destruction of civil liberties and even to violence. 2

The anxiety and bitterness resulting from the Crisis sacking were representative of the rising temperature of Ohio politics after the 1862 election. Following the Democratic victory in the fall of that year, the "Peace" faction of the party began a strenuous effort to gain control of their organization, hoping to lead it to victory on a platform of opposition to the war. The Union Party, holding both the Federal and State reins of power, had no intention of permitting this to happen. From a mixture of very patriotic and very partisan motives, the Unionists redoubled the use of all manner of political weapons—from accusations of Democratic disloyalty, to mob intimidation, to the arrest of their most prominent opponents. 3 Caught in the middle of this violent quarrel was the "War Democratic" faction. This group struggled to preserve the party's popular position of support of a war for the sole aim of restoring the Union. It would not be an easy struggle in the face of both interparty pressures for peace and opposition blanket charges of treason. Columbus and Ohio politics in 1863 were very much a three-way contest and in many ways were a practice field for many of the issues in the next year's contest for the Presidency. 4

Some of the earliest guns in the Peace Democrats' battle to take over their party were fired in Columbus. Only a month after the 1862 election, Medary in the Crisis began to warn of the certainty of foreign
intervention if the war continued. This "Peace" editor advocated that both sides suspend troop movements and arrange an "amicable settlement" before some European coalition forced a "disgraceful peace" upon them. Later, Medary stated that the Emancipation Proclamation had voided the terms of Democratic military enlistments by converting the war into a fight for abolition and suggested Democrats cease fighting in a "Party War." Manyenny's Statesman rushed to defend the War Democratic position from this onslaught. It declared:

> The opposition to the Administration is not an opposition to the war, when conducted for the restoration of the Union, and the enforcement of the Constitution and the Laws; but to the war policy which it has adopted, and the inevitable results of a persistence in that policy.

When the Crisis joined the Indiana and Illinois Democrats in recommending that a "Convention of All the States" be held to arrange a peace, the Statesman dissented by declaring the plan "impractical" as long as the majority of Northern legislatures were controlled by Republicans. The Crisis went as far as to charge War Democratic leaders with a vested political and commercial interest in the continuance of the war. The Statesman's most powerful rebuttal to the Peace "extremists" was to warn that their views, if adopted by the party, would drive off the support of non-Democratic conservatives whose votes had proved "absolutely indispensable" for victory.

In a paradoxical way, the Peace Democratic movement in Ohio got its greatest boost from the 1862 re-election defeat of its leading figure, Congressman Clement Vallandigham of Dayton. Clearly the victim of gerrymandering, Vallandigham capitalized on the resulting sympathy to
build momentum for a gubernatorial campaign in 1863.\textsuperscript{11} Believing, as did most fellow Peace Democrats, that his party's success in 1862 was an indication of swelling opposition to the war, Vallandigham in Congress began to outline a clear pro-peace program. Before his term ended, the Dayton lame duck declared himself in favor of an armistice, "an informal, practical recognition" of the Confederacy and a restoration of free commerce and communication. If all of this was carried out, Vallandigham sincerely believed that reunion would someday come about when "passions have time to cool and reason resume sway."\textsuperscript{12} The Crisis and Peace papers across the nation immediately endorsed Vallandigham's position, and several Ohio Democratic county rallies resolved to work to nominate him for Governor.\textsuperscript{13} Even Cox, who repudiated Vallandigham's plan, was impressed by his opponent's political strength and advised the Statesman to remain neutral on the Daytonian's candidacy.\textsuperscript{14} Cox hoped he and New York's conservative Democratic Governor, Horatio Seymour, had succeeded in getting Vallandigham and other Peace Democrats to "modify their views" at a party strategy meeting in Albany.\textsuperscript{15} The test would come when the prospective candidate returned to his state.

The political climate in Ohio in early 1863 was not very congenial for politicians of "modified views." Besides the struggle between "Vallandighammers" and War Democrats, backing 1861 candidate Hugh Jewett for the party's gubernatorial nomination, the atmosphere between parties was sulphurous. In January, the Columbus Democrats arranged a gala reception for Dr. Edson B. Olds, the recently released political
prisoner from Fort Lafayette in New York and newly elected Ohio Assemblyman. Columbus State Assemblyman George Converse hosted the welcome, and used the platform to denounce "King Abraham I" and any further use of Democratic volunteers in an abolition war. The mood of most speakers at the city's annual Jackson Day Dinner was so violently anti-war, that one worried Democrat wrote warning Cox that the "combustible element...must be controlled or it will raise the very devil with us." The previously described attack on the Columbus Democratic press came at the end of a Unionist paper campaign denouncing the Crisis and Statesman as "disloyal sheets" and as giving "aid and comfort to those who have armed themselves against the Union's defenders." Medary never ceased to blame the opposition papers and speechmakers for inciting the mob. Campaigning on Republican disregard for civil liberties, the Columbus Democrats had successfully elected their entire ticket in the spring election. However they had also witnessed their opponents organize a "Union League" that condemned persons "disaffected" with the war and swore vigilance against the "traitors at home."

In state-wide events, Columbus Assemblyman Otto Dresel was so vigorous in attacking arbitrary arrests and the Emancipation Proclamation, though not the war itself, that the Unionist majority in the legislature censured him "as a promoter of sedition and disunion."

Also, since the 1862 election, a few armed Democrats had resisted the draft in an overblown incident in Noble County and a Dayton Democratic editor was murdered in a political quarrel. By the time of
Vallandigham's return from Washington, the political mood of the state closely approximated a tinderbox.

A combustible spark hit the state in the form of news that Vallandigham had been seized by military authorities. The officer responsible for the arrest was Union General Ambrose E. Burnside, recently displaced from the Army of the Potomac to rear-line duty in the Department of the Ohio. In April, Burnside had issued his General Order No. 38, stating that the military would arrest, try, and exile into the Confederacy all in "the habit of declaring sympathy for the enemy." That spring Vallandigham had arrived home from Congress and vigorously began stumpmg the state. The Daytonian still worried that War Democrats like Jewett might manage to withhold the nomination from him. Vallandigham's most recent biographer has concluded that the Daytonian, by the end of April, had decided that his only sure way to clinch the nomination "was to get himself arrested and ride the public reaction into office." After failing to offend Burnside sufficiently in a Columbus rally organized by Medary, Vallandigham succeeded a few days later, at Mount Vernon, Ohio, by ridiculing and defying the General's Order N. 38. Arrested at 2:00 a.m. on May 4th, the Daytonian was speedily convicted by a court martial, despite legal aid from Cox and former Democratic Senator George E. Pugh. On May 25th, Vallandigham was sent through Confederate lines where he quickly booked passage by blockade runner to Canada.

By the time Vallandigham docked, he had become the Democratic nominee for Governor. However to the very end, many "war" Democrats had
been reluctant to give the exile his hard-earned prize. In Columbus and across the state much of this die-hard opposition sprang from pragmatism as well as principle. The retiring State Senator representing the capital city's district wrote Cox that Vallandigham's "nomination...would ruin us in Ohio next fall. The time may come when the people are prepared for just such a man, but I think not now." When Jewett despaired of defeating Vallandigham, Manypenny and Cox vainly beseeched General George McClellan to seek the nomination and head off a likely defeat in November under the Peace banner. In the city's politics, Medary had endorsed Vallandigham early and helped circulate a petition demanding the Daytonian's release and condemning his "arbitrary arrest, illegal trial, and inhuman imprisonment." When the county Democrats met in convention to choose delegates to the state gathering, the peace men led by Medary and Converse controlled all the rural townships and five of the city's nine newly redrawn and expanded wards. The "War" Democrats attempted to get some representation on the slate chosen for the state convention but failed. Despite pleas from Cox and Dresel, many of the German-American delegates walked out of the meeting when it proceeded to instruct the delegation to vote for Vallandigham and men of his views.

The June 11th State Democratic Convention attracted so many delegates and spectators that it had to be held outdoors on the statehouse lawn. The sentiment of the delegates and the spectators was so strongly pro-Vallandigham that opposition to his nomination dwindled away. The "War" men bowed to the feeling of the majority, and only
eleven votes were cast against the exile's nomination for Governor. Vallandigham's defense attorney, George E. Pugh, made such a rousing acceptance speech for his client that he was awarded with the nomination for Lieutenant Governor. The rest of the ticket were Peace Democrats, and the platform, drawn up chiefly by Columbus' Allen Thurman, condemned Vallandigham's arrest and vaguely endorsed pro-Peace plans. As a final gesture, a committee was formed to call on Lincoln to demand Vallandigham's freedom. The peace men had won handily and were eager to begin the campaign. 31

The Unionists did not have an easy time getting up a candidate against Vallandigham. Incumbent David Tod was replaced after a close convention vote by another former Democrat, John Brough. Tod in the past two years had inevitably alienated some voters, while Brough was highly regarded for his past efficiency as State Auditor and his recent pro-Unionist speeches. The convention's choice was for the candidate who could roll up the greatest possible majority against Vallandigham and the Peace position. The platform was exceedingly moderate and made no mention of emancipation. 32 Of Columbus' press, the Capital City Fact had been pro-Tod and the Journal neutral, but both papers came out strongly for the nominee. In addition, a campaign paper, The Union League, added to the Unionists' broadsides against "Vallandighamism." 33

In comparison, the Columbus' Democratic campaign got off to a faltering start. The Unionists were even predicting the Democratic factions could never unite behind a candidate nominated "pursuant to the orders issued from their 'Confederates' in Dixie." 34 Medary was
probably aware that Democratic unity had to be carefully restored. His first editorial after the convention supported Vallandigham but made no mention of the war. Instead the *Crisis* stressed the opportunity for Ohioans to "vindicate themselves and constitutional government" by electing this victim of tyrannical action. The *Statesman* decided it could accept the Vallandigham candidacy as a referendum on civil liberties and not as an endorsement of the exile's views on the war.

In that spirit, Manypenny's editor, Amos Layman, wrote:

> All who are for a depotism should vote against Mr. Vallandigham—all in favor of free speech, a free press, trial by jury, *habeas corpus* and all the safeguards of liberty which our fathers transmitted and handed down to us should vote for Mr. Vallandigham.36

For two weeks after the convention, however, the German language *Der Westbote* refused to endorse Vallandigham. Only the influence of Cox and other Vallandigham backers—by default—finally brought the last Democratic paper in the city into line.37 A Columbus Democracy Club, organized by Medary and Thurman, was eventually successful in drawing many War Democrats and even a few Unionist dropouts, like Judge William Rankin, into the Vallandigham campaign.38

The Columbus Unionists in the four months to election day took a cue from their State Convention and concentrated on attacking the opposition rather than defending their party's past performance. Events of that summer worked greatly to the Unionists' favor. Another outbreak of armed draft resistance, this time in Holmes County, Ohio, was blamed on the Democrats.39 The great draft riot in New York City in July and Governor Seymour's handling of it received a great deal of unfavorable
coverage in Columbus' Unionist press.40 Perhaps to counteract some of the racial prejudice being aroused by Democratic orators, Unionist papers lauded two recruiting meetings held by Columbus' Blacks.41 The great Northern victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg were celebrated by bonfires, band concerts, and patriotic speeches which many Unionist stumpers used to partisan advantage.42 Confederate General John Morgan's raid into the State in late July led the Capital City Fact to charge that:

Vallandigham, and his party, concocted with the Rebels that Lee was to invade Pennsylvania, Morgan to Indiana and Ohio --the Vallandigham and [Fernando] Wood party [to] create a diversion by a riot in New York... Beauregard [to] move on Washington, and by this combined movement overwhelm the Government.

Charges like the Fact's were typical of the year's disloyalty attacks made upon the Democrats. Brough stumped the state demanding the defeat of "a convicted traitor." When Democrat Pugh promised that 50,000 armed freedman would escort Vallandigham from Canada to his inauguration, Brough responded, at a Columbus rally, that such an act would cause a civil war in Ohio.44 The Journal and Fact tried to outdo each other in condemning Vallandigham. The Journal was sure the Daytonian was "a Disunionist from the very outset of the rebellion down to the present hour."45 The Fact proclaimed Vallandigham's election as "paramount to the loss of Ohio to the Union."46 The Journal tied together Copperhead and Confederate hopes, announcing: "The rebels hang their hopes of ultimate success on Vallandigham's election; Vallandigham hangs his hopes of election in the success of the rebel arms."47

The city's Republican papers also extended the disloyalty charge to
local Democrats. The Fact demanded Cox's arrest for "treasonable shouting" and warned "that the Vallandighammers of Columbus and vicinity are armed and arming to the teeth" probably to raise "the standard of rebellion." The Fact was sold in September to equally strident Unionists, who in their first issue damned "Sammedary, the Great Apostle of Vallandigham" and warned that a Democratic victory would encourage the rebels. The Journal was positive the Crisis was "sustained by funds supplied by leading secessionists of the South" and just as certain of the authenticity of a letter reputedly from Vallandigham to a Southern Colonel encouraging more Confederate attacks on the North. The city's Union League went as far as to recommend boycotting the places of business of enthusiastic "Vallandighammers."

Even in the face of these indiscriminate charges of disloyalty, or perhaps because of them, the Democratic factions in Columbus had difficulties in waging a united election effort. Medary's Crisis began the campaign by stressing the popular theme of Republican abuses of civil liberties and repeated it frequently until election day. However after a clandestine visit with Vallandigham in Canada, Medary returned his emphasis to the familiar arguments for peace. Once again, the voters were reminded that not slavery but antislavery agitation had caused the war. Because of their insistence on abolition, the Republicans were charged with a policy that "precludes all hopes of peace" and that amounted to "perpetual war." When Unionists insisted that Vallandigham's victory would encourage the South, Medary retorted that it would only encourage those Southerners who still desired reunion on the
historic Democratic position of mutual sectional compromise. Further war, especially for abolition, the Crisis felt, would only strengthen Southerners like Jefferson Davis, determined to fight to the last for Southern independence.56 Vallandigham's election and a pro-peace policy were essential, for "War, war successful even to subjugation, riots over the grave of the Constitution, and amid the bones and ashes of the Union!"57

At the same time, the Statesman also stayed close to its original principles. While some War Democrats like Ranney and Jewett chose to sit out the campaign, others like Manypenny and Cox had decided to elect Vallandigham "as the most efficient way to vindicate personal liberty and constitutional rights."58 The Statesman found it most comfortable to remain silent on Medary's and Vallandigham's peace views and instead concentrate its attack on Republican policies. In particular, suggestions by the Unionist Fact, that a reconstructed Union could only be based on abolition and an end to the "pernicious doctrine of State sovereignty," provoked Manypenny's pen.59 While denying any affection for slavery, the Statesman declared that the total abolition required by the Emancipation Proclamation forced Southerners to surrender "all rights of person and property acquired under the Constitution and laws of any State, or of the United States."60 The war which had been properly begun for "the express, sole and avowed purpose of restoring the Union with all rights...unimpaired" was being perverted into an abolition raid "under the flimsy pretext that slavery is the cause of the rebellion, and that there can be no permanent peace until the
State institution is destroyed..."61 Worse than that to Many-penny, the Unionists appeared ready to prolong the war not just for the sake of abolition but to keep hold of their offices and "'shoddy' contracts."62 While never endorsing the peace position, the Statesman made it clear that the country could not bear much further Republican control of the war effort.

Despite being less able than in 1862 to cover up their disagreements over the war, the Democrats did manage to unite on many issues. Besides the important theme of threatened civil liberties, Democratic campaigners seldom failed to condemn abolition as a threat to the white man's society. Medary denounced the "horrible crimes" daily committed by Black soldiers and defined abolitionists as "those who would be as willing to have a black wife as a white one--and a little more."63 Many-penny decried the fate of the White soldier forced to fight and die so that more Blacks could be "turned loose upon society to beg, plunder, and steal their living...."64 Besides the racial appeal, the draft was once more widely criticized. Many-penny doubted that conscription would be carried out fairly and warned that, despite Governor Tod's protestations, drafting would begin soon after the election.65 Medary's disapproval of the draft was so great that he even felt the rioters against it in New York City were justified.66 The Crisis still declared that the war was being fought to benefit New England's economy, but general Midwestern prosperity undermined much of the issue's appeal.67 The Ohio Legislature that year permitted absentee soldier voting, and many Democrats worried that the officers would pressure their men to vote for
Brough. For those that still cared greatly about partisan loyalty, Brough was condemned as an unprincipled opportunist.

In addition, not all events before election day worked to the disfavor of the Democrats. The papers of the Democracy eagerly reprinted the great amount of Republican criticism of Governor Tod's handling of the Morgan raid. The arrest of one of the Journal's editors for defrauding the government while an Army quartermaster in Cincinnati gave the Democrats a chance to question who should define "loyal" conduct. An American flag, inscribed "The Union and the Constitution--Vallandigham and Pugh," unexpectedly gained the Democrats a great deal of political capital. Mounted across the street from the Statehouse on the grocery of Adam Nieswender, an outspoken Peace Democrat, the flag was twice the victim of attacks by outraged Union soldiers. The Unionists were put in the awkward position of criticizing the soldiers for violating civil liberties, and the Democrats staged protest rallies, recalling the Crisis' mobbing and the Vallandigham arrest and predicting nobody's rights would be safe if Brough was elected. At the end of August, a large Democratic rally south of the city was the scene of fighting between two hundred soldiers from nearby Camp Chase and the partisan picknickers. The highly politicized press disagreed on how the violence started, but apparently some remark by Cox on Vallandigham caused the soldiers to rush the platform. Auditor Mathias Martin had already summoned three wagonloads of armed Democrats from the city, and everyone deemed it fortunate that neither side had opened fire. The Unionist Fact made no apologies: "No loyal person need ever fear violence from
soldiers, but traitors may expect to receive the treatment they
deserve." 73 The Statesman used this ill-tempered remark and the event
itself as further proof of Republican disregard for civil liberties. 74

By the end of the campaign, both sides thought they saw clear signs
of a popular shift to their standards. The return of Judge Rankin,
Colonel John Groom, and S. W. Andrews, all previously leading Unionists,
to the Democrats was considered the most visible part of a major politi-
cal trend by the Statesman. 75 The election of Democrats to a majority
of the county militia offices was also believed significant. 76 The
Unionists built high expectations of their own from the September meet-
ing in Columbus of two hundred dissident pro-War Democrats. This group
announced they could not bring themselves to vote for Vallandigham.
Nevertheless they did not nominate a candidate of their own or officially
endorse Brough. Both the Crisis and the Statesman condemned the gather-
ing and its intentions. The Statesman demonstrated great fear of a loss
of some War Democratic votes to the ticket and strongly denounced the
affair as "playing into the hands of the Abolitionists." Thomas Sparrow
and H. T. Chittenden, both of Columbus, played leading roles in the
movement, but the Statesman reminded Democrats that these two had
supported the Unionists in 1861 and 1862 and were little better than
"Abolitionists in disguise." 77 At the end of the campaign, even Many-
penny and Medary emerged from their editorial offices to join the local
stumpers and big-name guest speakers of both parties in trying to draw
every possible voter to the poll for their respective tickets.

The turn-out proved to be the largest in the history of the State to
that time. Vallandigham polled more votes than the successful Ranney of the year before, but Brough had received 288,374 ballots to give him an unprecedented 100,882 majority. The strongly Unionist soldier vote had given Brough about 40% of his majority, but Vallandigham had lost by more than 61,000 in the home vote. In fact, the Democratic ticket had carried only eighteen out of the state's eighty-eight counties. 78

One of these few Democratic counties was Franklin. In fact it had given Vallandigham his largest majority in any county. But the Daytonian's victory margin was only 720 compared to Ranney's 2,050 in 1862 and 150 behind this year's local ticket's majority. A thousand more votes had been cast than in 1862, with the Democrats having lost about 100 and the Unionists gaining 1,100. In Columbus, Vallandigham carried only four wards, including the German-American Fifth and Sixth by almost 600 votes and the new, heavily Irish-Catholic Ninth by 150. The more prosperous center wards were strongly pro-Brough, and Vallandigham's Columbus margin was only 268. The "ethnic" wards in Columbus remained almost as strongly Democratic as before, but the rest of the city had joined the state-wide swing to the Unionists. 79

The results of this election deserve considerable scrutiny. The sharp reversal of Democratic fortunes from 1862 must be explained. The Columbus and Ohio Democracy had emphasized most of the same issues as in the previous campaign--the draft, Republican violations of civil liberties, and the emancipation and freedman questions. However, this year, other factors had modified or competed with those issues' importance. Prosperity in the Midwest dampened Democratic economic arguments.
The Union victories at Vicksburg and Gettysburg, while probably not seen as a turning point in the conflict, at least lessened Northern pessimism and war weariness. These victories significantly contributed to a Unionist trend in the 1863 fall elections all across the North. The promises of civil war in the State if Vallandigham was inaugurated kept many peace-loving voters, who had seen enough violence that year, away from the Democratic standard. Perhaps most important to the outcome were the "Peace" views of Vallandigham. The drop in the Democratic vote in Franklin County and Columbus, if not in the whole State, indicate a probable loss of many "War" Democrats and other conservatives. These voters in 1862 had been repelled by emancipation and arbitrary arrests, but now were more offended by a candidate who seemed willing to abandon military efforts toward reunion just when they were becoming successful. They may not have believed Republican charges that Vallandigham did not desire reunion, but they doubted that the peaceful means he advocated, whether urged from the governor's chair or tried by the Federal Government, could succeed. With the shift of large numbers of these voters to the Unionists, the Democrats were left with primarily the "Peace" men, strongest in most isolated, conservative, and traditionally Democratic rural counties, the ethnic vote in the cities and some agricultural counties, and the party loyalists among the "War" Democrats, including Manypenny and Cox, who desired to recapture the party's reins of power. With the Peace candidate's disastrous defeat, no one could predict that the following year would be a peaceful one within Columbus or Ohio Democratic ranks.

2 Eugene H. Roseboom, "The Mobbing of the Crisis," Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly, LIX (April, 1950); Crisis, March 11,18, 1863; O.S.J., March 6, 7, 1863; Gazette, March 13, 1863; D.O.S., March 7,8, 1863; C.C.F., March 6, 1863.


5 Crisis, November 12, 1863.

6 Ibid., December 3, 1863.

7 D.O.S., February 13, 1863.

8 Ibid., February 11,19, 1863.

9 Crisis, April 15, 1863.

10 D.O.S., April 19, 1863.


12 Klement, Copperheads, pp. 116-118.

13 Crisis, January 21, 1863.

14 Amos Layman to Samuel Cox, January 25, 1863, Ohio Historical Center, Archives, Cox Letter Files; Klement, Vallandigham, p. 127.


16 D.O.S., O.S.J., C.C.F., all January 6, 1863; Gazette, January 9, 1863.

17 John McGuffey to Samuel Cox, January 10, 1863, Ohio Historical Center, Archives, Cox Letter Files; Gazette, January 16, 1863; John Solomon Hare, Allen G. Thurman: A Political Study, an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1933, 127-219.

18 O.S.J., February 27, 1863; C.C.F., February 19, 1863.
19. Crisis, March 18, 1863.


22. O.S.J., March 20, 1863; Crisis, April 1, 1863; Klement, Vallandigham, p. 114.


24. Klement, Vallandigham, p. 150.


27. Augustus Perrill to Samuel Cox, February 8, 1863, Ohio Historical Center, Archives, Cox Letter Files.


30. D.O.S., June 7, 1863; C.C.F., June 6, 1863; Crisis, June 3, 10, 1863.


32. Roseboom, Civil War Era, p. 418.

33. Gazette, June 19, 1863; C.C.F., June 15, 17, 1863; O.S.J., June 16, August 27, 1863.

34. O.S.J., June 11, 12, 1863; C.C.F., June 17, 1863.

35. Crisis, June 17, 1863.

37 O.S.J., June 20, 1863; C.C.F., June 25, 1863.
38 D.O.S., June 25, July 11, 1863.
39 O.S.J., June 25, 1863.
40 C.C.F., July, 1863; O.S.J., August 8, 1863.
41 C.C.F., June 22, July 9, 1863.
42 C.C.F. and D.O.S., July 8, 1863; John Sherman to J. J. Janney, July 6, 1863, Archives, The Ohio Historical Center, Janney Family Letter File.
43 C.C.F., July 25, 1863.
45 O.S.J., September 8, 1863.
46 C.C.F., August 1, September 16, 1863.
47 O.S.J., September 14,26, 1863.
48 C.C.F., September 19, 1863.
49 The Columbus Daily Express, October 5,6, 1863, hereafter cited as C.D.E.
50 O.S.J., October 5,10, 1863.
51 Klement, Vallandigham, p. 235; D.O.S., July 28, 1863.
52 Crisis, June 24, August 12,19, September 16, October 7, 1863.
53 Crisis, July 29, 1863; Klement, Vallandigham, pp. 244, 246-247.
54 Crisis, September 23, 1863.
55 Ibid., August 26, 1863.
56 Crisis, September 16,30, 1863.
57 Ibid., September 30, 1863.
58 D.O.S., June 23, August 22, September 16, 1863.
59 C.C.F., August 5,11, September 15, 1863.

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60. D.O.S., August 8, 1863.
61. Ibid., July 1, 15, October 8, 1863.
62. Ibid., August 15, September 29, 1863.
63. Crisis, August 19, September 9, 1863.
64. D.O.S., October 11, 1863.
65. Ibid., July 21, September 4, 1863.
66. Crisis, July 22, 1863.
67. Ibid., August 5, 1863.
68. Ibid., September 23, 1863.
70. Ibid., July 18, 1863.
71. Gazette, July 31, 1863; Crisis, September 9, 1863; O.S.J., September 14, 1863.
72. Gazette, August 8, 1863; D.O.S., August 5, September 10, 1863; O.S.J., August 5, 8, 1863; C.C.F., August 5, September 10, 1863; Samuel Galloway to J. J. Janney, August 6, 1863, Archives, The Ohio Historical Center, Janney Family Letter File.
73. C.C.F., August 27, 1863.
74. D.O.S., August 27, 29, 1863.
75. D.O.S., June 24, July 11, 23, August 27, October 6, 1863; Naragon, Ohio Campaign of 1863, p. 45.
76. Gazette, August 14, 1863; D.O.S., August 19, 1863.
77. Gazette, September 18, 25, 1863; D.O.S., September 23, 24, 1863.
78. Roseboom, Civil War Era, p. 421.
CHAPTER V

IN THE MIDST OF VICTORY

The night after the election, the Columbus Unionists took to the streets to celebrate the crushing defeat of Vallandigham. A massive crowd packed Capitol Square at a "jollification meeting" featuring congratulatory addresses from Governor Tod and local notables. Following the speeches and a fireworks display, the crowd broke up into torchlight parades that marched and cheered in the streets until 2 A.M. The next morning, the city's Republican papers announced that "the cause of the Union had most grandly and gloriously triumphed over the wild schemes of disunion and revolution, which reckless and unprincipled demagogues sought to involve the State."

1 The returns from the counties composing Cox's Congressional district were so overwhelmingly pro-Brough, that the opposition press demanded he resign instead of persisting in "misrepresenting" his constituents. 2 When the great size of Brough's majority was fully comprehended, many Unionists even predicted that the Democracy would never dare field another ticket in the State. 3

At the same time as their opponents were predicting their demise, the Democrats were preparing for the most serious round of intra-party feuding yet. Medary's Crisis touched it off. Reviewing the election outcome, Medary cited Vallandigham's record number of Democratic votes and blamed his defeat on fraud, illegal voters, and the stuffing of the ballot boxes by the Union Leagues. Most of all, Medary was glad the party had run a candidate of Peace principles, for even in defeat, the
Democrats "stand before the world, proud in character--strong in political virtue--brave in consciousness of right--and stand ready for any emergency when and where character and patriotism are required." War Democrats like Cox, Medary felt, should not be trusted in positions of party leadership but rather leaders should be "pure unmixed statesman" of Peace views.5

Medary's remarks brought an immediate reply from the city's War Democratic paper, the Statesman. The Statesman's owner, George Manypenny, at first limited his attack to Medary, whose outspoken Peace opinions, he charged, had lost the ticket several hundred votes in Franklin County alone.6 Medary was reminded that Vallandigham had been nominated because of his arrest and in spite, not because, of his pro-Peace position. Manypenny now considered the nomination "an impulse" and "a mistake" and declared: "Had not Vallandigham's record embarrassed us; had he stood simply on his arrest and banishment, a very different campaign and...result would have been attained." The lesson of the election was "that the majority of the people want war still" and the Democracy must heed their directions.7

This was just the first round of an intense struggle between the "Peace" and "War" factions of the Democracy for control of the Columbus party organization. It was also a small part of a similar contest going on all across the State and the nation which would endure as long as the war continued. In the political battling between Medary's followers and the supporters of Manypenny and Cox in Columbus can be seen the issues that shaped the entire Democratic party's course in the last year of the war.

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Since it was months before either party would begin serious preparations for the upcoming Presidential election, the Columbus Democratic factions could concentrate their worst attacks on each other. Medary tried to identify all his opponents with the renegade "War Democratic" organization that had last October bolted the Democrats and were still hopeful of creating a third party.\(^8\) The Statesman denied the charge by condemning the bolters as "strengthening the hands of the Abolitionists" and presented a pro-war platform to unite all Democrats.\(^9\) Medary immediately pronounced that "the platform of the Statesman is all the most intense Lincoln man could ask, and we do not see why any man could ask more of his devoted friends."\(^{10}\) The pro-war platform was a trap set for Medary, as Manypenny the next day revealed the document to have been composed of sentences taken from speeches of Vallandigham and John C. Calhoun. The Statesman owner hoped he had proved the pettiness and desire for personal power of "Peace" men like Medary and called for party unity.\(^{11}\) Manypenny outlined his vision of the future mission of the Democratic party: "If the rebellion is ever to be put down and the Constitution and Union preserved, with our concord and peace, it must be done by the Democratic Party." The goal of the Democracy must be to unite all conservative men in an endeavor "to wrest the Administration of the Government from the hands of the destructive radicals."\(^{12}\)

Medary and the Peace Democrats were not so easily put down. The "Peace" men organized themselves into "the Jefferson Club of Franklin County" and arranged a series of public addresses during the winter to persuade local Democrats to their point of view.\(^{13}\) Jackson's Day in
Columbus was celebrated by three separate gatherings. G. Volney Dorsey, a Democrat turned Unionist, spoke to a predominately Republican crowd at the Capitol. The "War Democratic" bolters held a convention attended by only sixteen delegates and soon ceased to be a credible political force. The Peace Democrats sponsored a dinner at the Neil House, where Medary, newly elected State Senator George Converse, and other local notables made well received anti-war toasts. A Vallandigham Fund was founded at the "Peace" men's dinner to defray the expenses of the exile and his family. In the course of the year, Columbus and Ohio Democrats raised nearly $20,000 in the drive. 14

The pro-War Democrats in Columbus received a severe blow when Many-penny announced he was selling the Statesman and retiring to private business. The paper's new ownership was never made public. Amos Layman, long-time editorial writer for the paper, became the official editor. 15 While not repudiating its established reputation as an organ of the War Democracy, the new Statesman tried to stress the common ground on which all Democrats agreed, Layman wrote:

Now it seems plain that both of parties are sincerely laboring to accomplish a common end, viz: the restoration of the Union on the principles of the Constitution of 1789: one believing that this most desirable object can alone be brought about by war, while the other, equally patriotic, sincerely believes that war is only making reunion more and more impossible; while both readily agree that reunion upon either plan cannot be effected until a more patriotic Administration is placed in power than the imbecile and corrupt one now ruling. 16

Therefore the Statesman's pre-eminent goal was to get all Democrats, regardless of opinion on the war, to unite to defeat Lincoln's re-election in the fall.
The choice of a Presidential candidate, however, was not likely to be easy grounds for party unity. The selection process began at a county party meeting to choose representatives to a State convention for naming four at-large state delegates to the national Democratic convention. The War Democrats had labored hard to control the county convention, but the Peace faction had a clear majority. While Layman was elected the gathering's secretary, editor Jacob Reinhard of the German language Der Westbote failed after vigorous efforts to get a single pro-war man named to Franklin County's delegation to the State Convention.17

The Democratic State Convention of 1864 was the most bitterly contested political gathering of the war years. The War men intentionally arrived early at Naughton Hall and organized the meeting by choosing a pro-War president and Layman as secretary before the Peace faction assembled. The factions managed to choose a ticket for the minor state offices due for election that fall by dividing the nominations. While some Peace men tried to hold out for a platform endorsing an armistice and a withdrawal of Union troops from the South, most accepted an ambiguous compromise plank demanding "the immediate inauguration of peaceable means to obtain an honorable settlement and the restoration of the Union under the Constitution."18 The contest for national convention delegates saw little such compromise. Two War men and a Peace man received enough votes to be chosen on the first ballot, with War Democrat Rufus Ranney, Vallandigham, and Medary trailing in that order. The Franklin County delegation removed Medary's name in favor of Vallandigham, but Ranney defeated the Peace faction's idol by 216½ votes to 211½. Charges
of fraud in tallying the votes were hurled at the convention president and at Layman; particularly by Columbus delegates. Somehow a brawl on the floor was prevented and the convention adjourned, but Medary and Peace Democrats felt they had been badly cheated.\textsuperscript{19}

The results of the State convention further estranged Columbus' Democratic factions. Two days after the convention, Layman continued the War Democrats' initiative by endorsing for President General George B. McClellan, a favorite of Eastern pro-war Democrats.\textsuperscript{20} A still angry Medary reacted by repeating his opposition to the war and remarking he would:

> be sorry to see the Democratic Party...forced on to a war platform. It will be their inevitable ruin and destroy the last hope of the country—all of which centered on the Democratic Party, as opposed to this war.\textsuperscript{21}

Medary further announced he would do nothing to participate in electing any War Democrat to office.

This belligerent mood of the Peace Democrats extended into local politics. Before the city's spring election, many "Peace" men bolted the local Democratic convention when a resolution to nominate only anti-war candidates was defeated. This group retreated to the Crisis office. There they nominated their own ticket which Medary's paper printed and endorsed. The bulk of the convention reorganized and put forward the regular ticket.\textsuperscript{22} The Statesman backed the correctly nominated ticket and cautioned city Democrats that "no mere personal preferences or differences on questions of policy should be allowed to divide" the party.\textsuperscript{23} The results of the election gave the regular Democrats better than 1800 votes, to 1400 for the Unionists, and little more than 100 for
the Democratic bolters. Even the Crisis was forced to admit that most Peace Democrats had refused to bolt the regularly nominated ticket.

While the local Unionist press applauded all the turmoil in Democratic ranks, their own party did not escape internal problems. As early as the preceding fall, Columbus' ex-Congressman Samuel Galloway had been encouraging Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase, a long time Ohio antislavery leader, to challenge Lincoln's renomination. This movement took form in February when a group of Congressional radicals published "the Pomeroy Circular" declaring Lincoln re-election impossible and undesirable and recommending Chase in his place. However, when the Ohio Unionist legislative caucus voted to support the incumbent, a disappointed Chase withdrew his name from consideration for the nomination. Columbus' Unionist newspapers which had been unanimously pro-Lincoln, applauded Chase for withdrawing. Throughout the summer, John C. Fremont campaigned as a Radical Republican alternative to Lincoln. In Columbus, however, he received more publicity from the city's Democratic then Unionist press until he withdrew in late September. Well before the elections for Congress and state offices in October and the Presidency in November, Unionists ranks had closed and their party fires concentrated on the Democrats.

The case of the Democrats was considerably different. Events occurring all across the nation added to local Democratic difficulties. Democrat Alexander Long, Congressman from Cincinnati, in an April House speech dropped a bomb on party ranks. Going beyond even Vallandigham's position, Long advocated an immediate end of the war and recognition of
Southern independence. Cox spoke up quickly to announce that Long spoke only for himself and that the Democratic Party definitely did not share his views. 30 The *Statesman* praised Cox's rebuttal and predicted that Long's views "will be repudiated by the entire mass of the Democratic Party." 31 The *Crisis* immediately took issue with Cox's and the *Statesman* 's claims that most Democrats would not support Long, and the two quarreled over the episode for months. 32

In late May, Medary was arrested by United States Marshals for participating in an undisclosed conspiracy. Although he was only held overnight and the case was never brought to trial, Medary became another "martyr" to the Peace forces. In the midst of the campaign, Medary made reference to his arrest: "It [was] just the thing for the tools of the Lincoln Despotism to use to injure our paper, and that is all they care about!" 33 This event, coupled with the unmolested return of Vallandigham from exile, greatly encouraged the Peace Democracy.

While Cox and Eastern War Democrats, like New York financier August Belmont, were gaining momentum in their quest to capture the party's Presidential nomination for George McClellan, Peace men manuvered to block them. In Ohio, each Congressional district was to hold a convention to pick two delegates to the national convention, and Peace forces tried to capture all of them. In the four county district including Columbus, the result satisfied neither party faction. At a convention closely divided between "War" and "Peace" men, Cox was chosen national delegate on the first ballot. Medary finished second, but the presiding officer, a Peace Democrat, ruled that the editor also had a
majority. A highly disputed voice vote supported this ruling and confirmed Medary's selection. The disappointed pro-War faction, led by Columbus Assemblyman Otto Dresel, gained some satisfaction in defeating a resolution endorsing Alexander Long's views. 34

When the national convention was postponed from July 4th to late August, both Democratic factions in Columbus approved. Each hoped to use the extra time for backroom maneuvering and for mustering popular support. 35 Cox was the leader of Western pro-McClellan forces and, despite the prospect of a difficult re-election campaign of his own, spent most of his time promoting the General. Despite encouraging letters advising him to "stand by the War," Cox knew local Democrats were deeply divided. 36 In July, Cox held a Columbus rally aimed at "giving McClellan life," and Layman's Statesman approvingly reported that Cox "stood where he always stood, in favor of a firm military position, with but one view, to make peace and restore the Union." 37 Besides the Statesman, the Der Westbote and leading city Democrats like County Auditor Mathias Martin and German-American Assemblyman Otto Dresel lined up with Cox to work for McClellan. 38

Local Peace Democrats were by no means subdued. Sponsoring a rally on the same day as Cox's but in a different part of the county, State Senator George Converse, Assemblyman John G. Edwards, and the spring bolter Adam Neiswender spoke to an enthusiastic crowd. The draft had finally become necessary in Franklin County that May, and the Peace Democrats found opposition to it to be their most popular issue. 39 The Peace meeting adopted resolutions condemning conscription, favoring the
nomination of a Peace Democrat, and demanding "in the name of Justice and Humanity...that peace measures be adopted as the only hope of a much oppressed people."

More Peace and anti-draft meetings were held in the county in August. Medary supplemented the drive by editorials blasting Cox's pro-War views and pronouncing McClellan an unacceptable candidate for the nomination.

When Republicans adopted abolition as an essential precondition for peace, a Democratic rally just south of the city resolved "We cannot and will not support a war for any such purpose."

A final, massive all day Peace rally was held in front of the Courthouse in Columbus a week before the National Convention.

Auditor Martin's effort to get the crowd to resolve to support whoever was eventually nominated was poorly received. Medary, the main speaker, vociferously attacked the draft and the administration. Before he had finished, however, Medary collapsed on the platform, and Converse had to lead the meeting in adopting resolutions stating:

that the Union cannot be maintained by force of arms; that the present war is therefore useless and barbarous; that this meeting is in favor of peace; and that it looks to the Chicago convention as the last refuge of constitutional liberty and demands from the convention a peace candidate and a peace platform.

Medary's illness kept him away from the National Convention, but Cox and Thurman were present from Columbus. The pre-convention work of Cox and August Belmont had been so successful that McClellan won on the first ballot. Cox had been the War Democrats' floor leader. His seconding speech for McClellan was widely praised. Thurman who had originally supported Horatio Seymour, finally sided with the McClellan men. Peace Democratic Congressman George Pendleton of Cincinnati
received the nomination for Vice President. This development plus the adoption of Vallandigham's resolution calling the war a failure and urging a peaceful restoration of the Union, won over most Peace Democrats. A handful including Alexander Long, however, left the convention disgruntled. 44

The nomination of McClellan was not easily accepted by many Columbus Democrats. The elated Statesman announced "Chicago has done its duty" and cautioned Peace Democrats:

It would be a crime against humanity and posterity if Democrats do not...cast a solid and united vote against Lincoln, the tyrant, the knave, and the indecent joker, and who assumes dictatorial power over a free people. 45

An outraged but seriously ill Medary advised Peace men to "keep your ranks closed, preserve your organization, stand fast and faithfully by your principles" until McClellan made his position clear in a letter of acceptance. 46 McClellan's letter of acceptance rejecting the peace-at-any-price platform immediately ended any last hopes of the Peace Democrats. Vallandigham cancelled most of his planned pro-McClellan speaking tour. Alexander Long led a Western Peace Democratic bolt but effectively killed the movement by declining its Presidential nomination. Medary felt McClellan's letter meant "another four years' war" regardless of who won. 47 The Crisis refused to support either McClellan or Cox on account of their pro-war views. When Medary was forced to abandon the paper's editorship to his son, the Crisis leaned toward the defeat of Lincoln as necessary for national "self-preservation," but a favorable word was never printed about McClellan or Cox. 48 The loss of Medary's leadership, coupled with the lack of an alternative to McClellan, left
the Peace Democrats little choice but to support the regular ticket.

Despite these initial dissensions, the Columbus Democracy managed to wage a vigorous campaign. Many of its issues had been developed during nearly three-and-a-half years of political contests revolving around the war. Racism was a tested Democratic issue, and the Statesman and the Crisis frequently pointed out instances of Black misbehavior in order to question the wisdom of emancipation. Republican abuses of Civil Liberties were mentioned but not as frequently as in previous years, for with the exception of Medary's arrests, there had been no flagrant examples in Ohio in 1864. The Statesman emphasized the military's frequent inference with Border State elections and warned that if Lincoln was re-elected "four years from now there will be no such thing as popular suffrage." The Crisis used the old economic and sectional argument that New England hoped to prolong the war so as to maintain its control of the economy. Opposition to conscription was popular with all the Democrats, and the Statesman predicted: "If Lincoln be re-elected, another draft will soon follow, and then another, and still another." Lincoln's refusal to permit further exchanges of prisoners was characterized as "heartless and wicked."

Locally the conviction of Journal owner Francis Hurtt for embezzlement as an Army quartermaster was pointed to by the Democrats as more proof of the corruption in the Republican administration. Also locally, the Statesman hoped to convince Catholic voters that some Journal remarks proved that the abolitionist "fanatics" were "prepared to excite and promote a war of sects, creeds and religions as soon as
the present war is over...." The thousands of men of the State Nation-
al Guard, called up for one hundred days duty during the summer by
Governor John Brough, were urged to "avenge their wrongs." As always, the most important issue concerned the conduct of the
war. The Statesman tried to present the position of McClellan and of
Cox so as to unite all Democrats despite opposition by the Crisis. Once
more the Republicans were blamed for causing the war, for converting it
into a "fanatic" abolition crusade, and for being unable to bring it to
an end. Lincoln's unalterable pre-condition of the total abolition
of slavery was condemned as preventing the Southern states' submission
and return to the Union; put McClellan in the White House, pledged to
sectional compromise and conciliation, and the military pressure of
Union armies would bring about negotiation and reunion almost immediately.
The Statesman warned, if "Lincoln should be re-elected, [even] the fall
of Richmond will not end the rebellion, because it will not compel the
abandonment of slavery by the South which is the only ground upon which
Lincoln will negotiate with the Southern States." "Peace and Union"
was the McClellan platform. In the opinion of these Democrats the war
had already been won, for the South now appeared willing to return to
the Union as long as abolition was not required of them.

The Unionist campaign strove to meet most of the issues put forth
by the Democrats. The draft and mobilization of the National Guard was
upheld as fair and necessary to hasten the defeat of the South. Charges of anti-Catholicism were denied, and abolition was defended as
necessary for the war effort and not harmful to the North. The Union
press praised Lincoln as being much more capable of the duties of the Presidency than McClellan.62

Once more a large case was assembled to prove Democratic treason. Unionists declared that Alexander Long's proposal to recognize Southern independence was representative of every Democrat's "frank opinion."63 Copperheads were accused of regarding each Northern victory with "unmitigated bitterness."64 Unionists charged that the Democrats wanted a prisoner exchange only "to relieve the rebel army by sending back their captured men...."65 The Order of American Knights, a "Secret Disloyal League," was exposed over the summer and charged with the same type of treasonable intentions as the Knights of the Golden Circle had been.66 Locally, Medary's arrest was pointed to and the Crisis accused of having been "established with Southern money to advocate the Southern cause in the North...."67 The Journal charged Columbus Peace Democratic Assemblyman John G. Edwards with hiding a Southerner engaged in smuggling Ohio cattle to the Confederates.68 The county Union convention went so far as to resolve that "Our political enemies at home today are of infinitely greater danger to the country than the enemy in the field."69

Their party papers declared that the Unionists stood behind "a 'peace policy'--a peace won by crushing rebellion instead of crawling to it."70 The Republicans argued that too much had been sacrificed to give up the fighting when victory was so near. McClellan would only trade away what had been won by Grant and Sherman. Negotiation before the rebels had been defeated would mean "submission to the terms they may choose to dictate" and would be "nothing short of an utter abandonment

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of the Government and a beseeching appeal to insurgents to take the
government in hand and make of it what seemeth to their good."71 Events
like the fall of Atlanta were offered as evidence that Republican policy
would soon be successful in restoring the Union.

The October election in Columbus centered primarily on the Congress-
sional race. That race was a re-run of the 1862 contest with Cox run-
ing against former Congressman Samuel Shellabarger of London, Ohio.
Cox brought back a prominent record from Congress. The majority of his
Democratic colleagues had given him their vote for Speaker of the House,
and he had functioned as an informal minority leader. As in the previous
Congress, Cox had mainly opposed Eastern-sponsored economic measures,
acts of confiscation aimed against the South, and measures like the
Freedman's Bureau Act supplementing emancipation. Cox had also opposed
reconstruction measures like the Wade-Davis Bill and called for a return
to the "Old Union."72 Shellabarger in contrast stumped the district
praising the Administration and its conduct of the war. The Unionist
candidate made several personal attacks on the loyalty of Cox and on
McClellan.73 Even the Journal conceded Cox had well attended to his
constituents' local interests, but condemned him for opposing "every act
of the Administration for the prosecution of the war made by his
Southern friends...."74 The Statesman countered that Cox was the
soldier's friend and that his record deserved the support of all con-
servative men regardless of party.75 Cox spent $2,000 of his own money
in the campaign, distributed free campaign literature supplied by
Belmont, and got contributions of almost $600 from Eastern friends who
wrote that they were "sure there is no one in the Country who has done more for the good cause than yourself."

While an ill and dying Medary refused to endorse Cox, the *Statesman, Der Westbote*, Assemblyman Dresel, Thurman, and many others stumped Columbus and the district for the incumbent. To the end Cox counted on Franklin County to reverse the expected Unionist majority in the rest of the district.

The morning after the election the *Journal* proclaimed the results: "Today Cox is dead in the political pit, sure enough--deader than a killed copperhead after sunset."

Cox had carried the city by 550 and the county, even after the soldier vote had been counted, by 950 votes. Cox had run ahead of the State ticket and 250 city votes better than Vallandigham in 1863. In the district as a whole, however, while cutting Vallandigham's deficit by 2,000 votes, Cox still lost by almost 3,200 votes.

While the *Statesman* complained of frauds in the soldier voting, Cox had gone under in a Unionist tide that had elected seventeen of nineteen Ohio Congressmen and given the State ticket a 54,000 vote majority.

The Republicans now felt confident of Lincoln's carrying Ohio in November. Never despairing, the *Statesman* pointed to the decreased Unionist majority compared to 1863 and promised "another month will work wonders" if hard campaigning continued for McClellan. However both Cox and Dresel were more realistic and left Ohio to make speeches in the more hopeful states of New York and Pennsylvania. Thurman managed a few more speeches in the county, and the *Statesman* editorially remained optimistic, but McClellan was defeated in Ohio by 60,000 votes. Columbus and the county, faithfully Democratic, gave the General majorities of
about 100 less than Cox's.\textsuperscript{82}

It is difficult to compare the 1864 elections with previous ones because of the city's boundary expansions since 1862. While Cox had done much better than Vallandigham, his city majority had dropped by 250 and his county majority by 900 on the home vote compared to his 1862 totals. A swing from Unionists to Democrats was visible in McClellan's totals. The predominately German Fifth and Sixth Wards had given Cox and McClellan eighty-five and eight-four percent of their vote compared to only seventy-eight for Vallandigham. Only two of the city wards, including the highly Irish Ninth Ward, had voted more heavily in favor of Vallandigham than the 1864 candidates. Vallandigham had carried no wards not commonly considered highly ethnic in voters, while McClellan and Cox had carried two and had done better in two of the three others.\textsuperscript{83}

These results show a definite Democratic recovery in Columbus from 1863's slim majorities for Vallandigham. In the city and the county, the War Democratic candidates had proven themselves able to bring in higher majorities of all but the Irish voters than the 1863 Peace Democratic candidate. The War Democratic position of keeping up the military effort while at all times being willing to negotiate reunion without the forfeit of Southern political rights or slavery had an appeal to moderates. It undoubtedly accounted for the return of many independent Democrats and other conservatives who had supported the War Democratic candidates in 1862 but now voted for Unionists rather than for Peace men like Vallandigham. However compared to 1862, the War Democratic candidates did not have the benefit of an anti-Administration atmosphere
created by arbitrary arrests, economic depression, and the recent publica-
tion of the Emancipation Proclamation. Even if the War Democrats'
popular 1862 issues had not lost any appeal, the ability of the Unionists
to point to a war nearly won aided the pro-Administration campaign
incalculably. The unwillingness to risk new leadership in a war finally
approaching victory kept many war-supporting conservatives of all
parties from again supporting War Democrats. This attitude held the
party's totals well below 1862 levels. In a traditionally Republican
district and state this meant the defeat of Cox and McClellan.

Even with Lincoln re-elected and the Republicans in safe control of
Washington and Ohio, the closing months of the war brought little peace
to Columbus politics. The Republican Journal looked at the results and
announced "now let us have quiet!" Democrats were warned either to
cease "throwing obstacles in the way of the government" or "pick up
their duds and move their boots" out of the county or to the
Confederacy. The Democrats had no intention of moving or ceasing their
political activity. When Otto Dresel resigned in December, another
Democrat was easily elected to his Assembly seat. The city's Demo-
cratic papers kept up their denunciations of each other, but actually
came to support closely similar positions. Both opposed the 13th Amend-
ment abolishing slavery, though the Crisis lashed lame-duck Cox for pro-
nouncing the measure constitutional if impractical. Both papers also
endorsed negotiations to bring about re-union. As late as March, the
Statesman still felt the Confederates would fight on even if Richmond
fell unless the North abandoned abolition as a war aim. As late as
the April 5th city elections, Columbus Democrats were still campaigning on the draft and negotiating a re-union as well as on new issues like opposing prohibition and Black suffrage. When the war finally ended, the city Democrats were indignant at being banned by "malignant" Republicans from the arrangement committees and platforms of the official victory celebration. When news of Lincoln's murder reached Columbus, the *Journal* even charged:

> The assassination is distinctly traceable to the teaching of [the Democratic] Party, and it behooves all honest men who are disinclined to share in such grave responsibility to separate from the association of those who are to a greater or lesser degree answerable for the act aimed, as well at the life of the nation, as at that of the President.

Although the war had officially come to an end, the Democracy of Columbus had been served notice that their local opponents were not done fighting against them.
1. O.S.J., October 15, 1863.
2. Ibid., October 19, 1863; C.D.E., October 15, 1863.
4. Crisis, October 21, 28, November 25, 1863.
5. Ibid., October 28, 1863.
7. Ibid., October 30, November 4, 1863.
10. Crisis, December 9, 1863.
11. D.O.S., December 9, 12, 1863.
12. Ibid., December 15, 1863.
13. Crisis, December 16, 1863.
15. D.O.S., January 17, 1864; Crisis, January 20, 1864.

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22. D.O.S., March 27, 1864; O.S.J., March 28, 1864; C.D.E., March 28, April 1, 1864; Gazette, April 1, 1864; Crisis, March 30, 1864. 
24. Gazette, April 8, 1864; D.O.S., April 5, 6, 1864; C.D.E., April 5, 1864; O.S.J., April 5, 1864. 
25. Crisis, May 4, 1864. 
27. Ibid., pp. 6-9; Eugene H. Roseboom, The Civil War Era, Vol. IV, History of the State of Ohio, ed. Carl Wittke (Columbus, Ohio, 1944), pp. 429-430. 
28. O.S.J., March 15, 1864; C.D.E., January 29, February 24, March 11, 1864; D.O.S., March 5, 1864. 
29. O.S.J., March 3, June 7, August 12, September 23, 1864; C.D.E., May 31, June 1, 3, 1864; D.O.S., June 3, July 16, 1864. 
30. David Lindsey, "Sunset Cox": Irrepressible Democrat (Detroit, Michigan, 1959), pp. 82-83. 
31. D.O.S., April 15, 1864. 
32. Crisis, May 11, 1864. 
33. Ibid., June 13, 1864. 
34. Gazette, June 17, 1864; Crisis, June 8, 15, 22, 1864; D.O.S., June 14, 1864. 
35. D.O.S., June 25, 1864; Crisis, June 29, 1864. 
36. Durbin Ward to Samuel Cox, August 2, 1864, and C.M. Gould to Samuel Cox, October 15, 1863, Ohio Historical Center, Archives, Cox Letter File. 
37. Lindsey, "Sunset Cox", p. 84; D.O.S., July 25, 1864. 
39. Francis P. Weisenburger, Columbus During the Civil War (Columbus, Ohio, 1963), p. 21.
Crisis, July 27, 1864; D.O.S., July 26, 1864; O.S.J., July 26, 1864; Gazette, July 29, 1864.

D.O.S., August 11, 1864; Gazette, August 2, 1864; Crisis, July 27, August 10, 1864; Yager, Campaign of 1864, pp. 16-17.

Gazette, August 12, 1864; D.O.S., August 11, 1864.

Gazette, August 26, 1864; D.O.S., August 24, 1864; O.S.J., August 24, 1864.


D.O.S., September 1, 1864.

Crisis, September 7, 1864.

Ibid., September 14, 1864; Roseboom, Civil War Era, pp. 433-434.


D.O.S., March 16, 31, July 11, August 20, 1864; Crisis, June 22, 1864.

D.O.S., January 3, February 16, July 12, October 6, 25, November 3, 1864; Crisis, January 19, 20, February 3, 1864; Yager, Campaign of 1864, p. 25.

Crisis, February 17, 1864.

D.O.S., May 4, October 20, November 3, 8, 1864; Crisis, June 13, 1864.

D.O.S., October 25, 26, 27, 1864.

D.O.S., June 22, July 13, 1864; Crisis, July 2, November 11, 1864.

D.O.S., October 13, 28, 1864.

Crisis, October 5, 1864; D.O.S., April 27, August 30; Roseboom, Civil War Era, p. 428.

D.O.S., November 29, December 11, 1863, January 27, 28, February 18, May 16, June 22, July 23, August 1, 11, September 27, October 6, 1864.

D.O.S., September 30, 1864.

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59 *Ibid.*, September 27, 39, October 20, 1864.

60 *O.S.J.*, February 2, April 29, May 4, July 9, 1864; *C.D.E.*, April 26, 1864.

61 *Gazette*, April 1, 1864; *C.D.E.*, December 19, 1863, January 30, February 10, 1864; *O.S.J.*, May 12, October 29, 1864.


63 *C.D.E.*, April 12, 1864; *O.S.J.*, April 14, 1864.

64 *O.S.J.*, September 15, 1864.


67 *C.D.E.*, May 17, 20, 1864; *O.S.J.*, May 21, 1864.

68 *O.S.J.*, April 23, 1864.


71 *C.D.E.*, April 18, May 12, 1864; *O.S.J.*, July 16, September 1, November 1, 1864.


73 *D.O.S.*, September 30, October 3, 1864; *O.S.J.*, September 29, 1864; *Gazette*, October 7, 1864.

74 *O.S.J.*, October 8, 11, 1864.

75 *D.O.S.*, September 30, October 7, 1864.

76 Lindsey, "Sunset Cox", p. 86; August Belmont to Samuel Cox, September 23, 1864; S.R.M. Barlow to Samuel Cox, October 7, 1864, The Ohio Historical Center, Archives, Cox Letter File.

77 *D.O.S.*, October 11, 1864.

78 *O.S.J.*, October 12, 1864.

79 *D.O.S.*, October 13, November 24, 1864.
80. Lindsey, "Sunset Cox", p. 87; Wells, Cox During the Ohio Phase, p. 105; Roseboom, The Civil War Era, p. 435.


82. Ibid., November 3, 8,30, 1864; Lindsey, "Sunset Cox", p. 87.


84. O.S.J., November 10, 1864.


86. D.O.S., January 16, February 2, 1865; O.S.J., January 21, February 4, 1865; Crisis, January 25, February 8, 1865.

87. D.O.S., March 1, 1865.

88. Ibid., March 20,23, April 5, 1865; Gazette, March 24, April 7, 1865; Crisis, April 5, 1865.

89. O.S.J., April 11,15, 1865; D.O.S., April 12,14,15, 1865.

90. O.S.J., April 18,20, 1865.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In Columbus and most of the North, the charge of Democratic disloyalty during the war did not end with the Confederate surrender. These post-war accusations, part of the "bloody shirt" appeal of many Republican campaigners, long helped to cloud interpretations of Democratic activity during the Civil War. The nationalism and high regard for Lincoln felt by the first American historians of the Civil War prompted them to accept Republican charges against the Northern Democrats. But an examination of the four years of political activities of the Columbus Democracy during the war makes most of the "Copperhead" stereotypes seem ill-fitting.

First of all, despite mountains of innuendoes and veiled charges by the city's Unionists, not one Columbus Democrat was ever brought to trial on any charge of treasonable activity. The arrest of Medary, the only "arbitrary arrest" in Franklin County, never led to an indictment. If any secret organizations of Democrats existed, the Republicans were never able to point to a single disloyal action undertaken by them. While a considerable portion of the Columbus Democracy came to oppose the war, there is no evidence that they committed any acts to disrupt it.

Another fact evident from looking at their public record is that it is impossible to define a single Democratic position on the war. Contrary to Republican charges, not all Columbus Democrats were "Peace" men, and there is no evidence that any of the party publicly endorsed
permanent disunion. Medary of the Crisis had very early opposed coercion to bring about reunion, but not until 1863 did the official city and county Democratic organizations endorse this viewpoint. At the same time, other Democrats including Congressman Cox, the Statesman, and leading German-Americans tried to hold their party to a position of supporting a war undertaken for the limited goal of reunion and nothing more. This group maintained control of the city party organization until 1863 and after that still won many intra-party victories through shrewd maneuvering. The largest Democratic successes were obtained in Columbus with pro-War candidates and platforms.

This study also reveals that the great intra-party struggles between Peace and War Democrats did not greatly damage the Democracy in Columbus' wartime elections. Despite disagreements on whether to use military means, both Democratic factions agreed that sectional compromise and retention of Southern rights and slaves was the only feasible basis for reunion. Both factions believed Republican abolitionism had caused the war and then had strengthened and prolonged Southern resistance. And finally, despite protests from some extreme "Peace" men like Medary, the 1864 vote showed that almost all Democrats considered any candidate of their party better able than the Republicans to bring the war to an end.

Several other factors are apparent from examining Columbus' wartime Democrats. The city's German- and Irish-American citizens overwhelmingly cast their votes for the Democratic candidates in these years. Their political behavior supports the previously discussed interpretations of Paul Kleppner. The German and Irish immigrants in Columbus were
products of traditional cultures with passive religious orientations emphasizing strict belief in formal doctrines. These groups were offended by the "moral reformism" stressed by American Protestantism, particularly by its political products, prohibition and abolition.² The Irish, in addition, worried that emancipation posed the threat of economic competition from freed Black labor. Of the two groups, the Germans seemed to have been more enthusiastic about supporting "War" rather than "Peace" Democratic candidates, perhaps because of the pro-War position of the city's German language newspaper, the Der Westbote. The election returns also reveal that despite the great rivalry between Democratic Party factions, the large majority of Democrats supported whatever candidate won the regular nomination.

Perhaps the most important finding from studying Columbus politics during the Civil War is the strength and vitality of the War Democratic faction. The war supporters among the Democrats have too long been considered to have decamped to the Unionist Party or to have been unprincipled political professionals aware of the unpopularity of "Peace" views. While Columbus War Democratic leaders may have fit under that last definition, in this Ohio city there appears to have been broadly based support for the pro-War position among Democrats. This support for a war for reunion was carefully disassociated from Republican programs for emancipation and re-organization of the Southern states. The popular appeal in Columbus of the War Democratic policy was repeatedly demonstrated in the War Democrat's ability to control most local party nominations and to win larger majorities for their candidates in city races.

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than the "Peace" men in city races. The War Democrat's experience in manipulating the anti-Black and pro-sectional conciliation sentiment of their constituents, plus their loyal war record, made them invaluable leaders in rebutting the Republican "bloody shirt" campaigns. The Columbus Democracy emerged from the trial of the Civil War well prepared to fight the next round of political wars.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

The most valuable sources for the study of Columbus during the Civil War are the files of the city newspapers for those years. The weekly Gazette has the reputation for the least bias, while the Daily Ohio Statesman (Democratic) and the Ohio State Journal (Republican) provide the most thorough account of city political events. The Capital City Fact is an excellent source for the views of a political outsider. The Daily Express, which was the successor of the Fact, gives a much more orthodox Unionist view. Der Westbote (Democratic), in German, if utilized can be an invaluable tool for the study of the important German-American community in Columbus. The weekly Crisis (Democratic) reprints freely from newspapers from all parts of the nation and is therefore an extremely helpful research lead.

Some campaign documents and a very few manuscript sources exist that deal with Columbus in the Civil War period. The Proceedings of the Democratic State Convention (Dayton, Ohio, 1862) and the Proceedings of the Great Union Convention of Ohio (Cleveland, Ohio, 1861) cover the political gatherings with more detail than the newspaper accounts. Only a few letters of Columbus Democrats Samuel Medary and Allen G. Thurman are available from the Civil War years. Republican J. J. Janney of Columbus, has left a number of letters dealing with city politics during the wartime period. The best manuscript source is the extensive collection of correspondence of Columbus Democratic Congressman Samuel S. Cox. While in Washington, a considerable number of Columbus Democrats regularly
reported to Cox on city and state political conditions. Cox wrote two books, *Eight Years in Congress, 1857 to 1865* (New York, 1865) and *Three Decades of Federal Legislation, 1855-1885*, in which he discusses his Civil War career. However these works deal primarily with national rather than local politics. These primary sources are all available at the Ohio Historical Center, Columbus, Ohio.

William Martin's *History of Franklin County* (Columbus, 1858) and C. S. William's *Columbus Directory* (Columbus, 1861-1865) are good sources for Columbus' history, business, and leading citizens. The William's Brother's *History of Franklin and Pickaway Counties* (n.p., 1880) is close enough to the Civil War period to give life histories of many leading war-time figures. Osman C. Hooper's *History of the City of Columbus* (Columbus, Ohio, 1920) relates much information about the city's activities during the Civil War. The *Annual Report of the Secretary of State of Ohio* contains election returns and other important statistics about Civil War Columbus and Franklin County. Joseph P. Smith's *History of the Republican Party of Ohio* (Chicago, 1898) is valuable as a collection of the platforms of both parties' state conventions.

There are several biographies available on Columbus' Democrats. David Lindsey's *"Sunset" Cox: Irrepressible Democrat* (Lexington, Kentucky, 1959) is an excellent biography of the Congressman and stresses his pro-war leadership. Edward S. Wells' 1935 Ohio State University Master's Thesis, *The Political Career of Samuel Sullivan Cox During the Ohio Phase* is detailed and balanced between Cox's Ohio and Washington activities. A 1933 Ohio State Doctoral dissertation, John S. Hare's

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War (Columbus, 1963) is helpful particularly for its bibliography. The
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West (New York, 1936), but the work misreads the motivation of the
Democrats during the early years of the war by stressing pro-Southern
sympathies.

Richard O. Curry in "The Union As It Was: A Critique of Recent
Interpretations of the Copperheads," Civil War History, XIII (March,
1967) is the only historiographic essay on the Democratic party during
the Civil War. The major interpretations are Wood Gray's The Hidden
Civil War (New York, 1942) which summarizes the long-held belief that
some Northwestern Democrats were conspiring to aid the Southern cause
and Frank L. Klement's The Copperheads in the Middle West (Chicago, 1960)
and The Limits of Dissent: Clement Vallandigham (Lexington, Kentucky,
1970) which dismiss the charges of Southern sympathy and instead stress
the economic motives for Democratic wartime discontent. Paul Kleppner's
The Cross of Culture (New York, 1970) is important for emphasizing the
importance of ethnic and religions affiliations in political behavior.

The Ohio State University has produced a considerable number of
Master's Theses and Doctoral dissertations dealing with various areas of
Ohio politics during the Civil War. Besides those already mentioned,
the dissertations of Delmer J. Trester, The Political Career of David Tod,
1950, and John L. Stipp, Economic and Political Aspects of Western
Copperheadism, 1944, are highly informative. Stipp was one of the first
to examine economic factors motivating the Copperheads. Three Master's
Theses: William J.Ulrich, Ohio in the Election of 1862, 1948;