THE GEOGRAPHY OF EXCLUSION:
RACE AND SUBURBANIZATION
IN POSTWAR PHILADELPHIA

A Thesis
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Master of Arts in the
Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By
William Benjamin Piggot, B.A.

*****

The Ohio State University
2002

Master’s Examination Committee:
Dr. Steven Conn, Adviser
Dr. David Steigerwald
Dr. Eugene McCann

Approved by

Adviser
Department of History
ABSTRACT

In recent years, American historians have been more closely examining the existence of racism in northern and western states during the 1940s and 1950s. Evidence scholars like Thomas Sugrue, Arnold Hirsch and David Freund have presented suggests that nowhere was racial antipathy more intense than in the housing market. In cities like Chicago (Hirsch) and Detroit (Sugrue and Freund), whites often resorted to violence to prevent the “infiltration” of blacks into previously all-white neighborhoods. My research continues along the intellectual path pioneered by such historians, as I look at the process of residential segregation in the Philadelphia metropolitan area. However, rather than looking simply at neighborhoods that fiercely resisted racial integration, my study also focuses on attempts at interracial living. I focus on two suburban communities, Concord Park and Levittown, that are located just outside Philadelphia in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. Concord Park was one of the first attempts at privately developed interracial housing. Levittown, while a site of violent resistance to racial integration, also included a large number of citizens who were in favor of having black neighbors. These two examples help to prove that their was a good deal of sentiment in favor residential integration amongst Philadelphia’s white population. Yet despite their best intentions, deeply entrenched forms of institutionalized racism - particularly in the real estate business - ultimately made the postwar Philadelphia metropolitan area’s geography a heavily racialized one.
Dedicated to my parents, Patrick and Deborah Piggot
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, I would like to thank my fellow grad students in Room 239 for keeping my days interesting and my mind alive.

Of the Ohio State University history faculty members, I am indebted in particular to Stephanie Shaw and David Steigerwald, who provided me with important criticism and suggestions for revision.

Also, from the Ohio State University geography department, I would like to thank Eugene McCann, who opened my eyes to new ways of conceptualizing urban history.

Of course, without the guidance of Steven Conn over the past several years, I would not have reached the point I have today as successfully as I have done. He has been not just a mentor, but also a friend. Although I have chafed at some of his advice and criticism from time to time, Steve knew what he was doing when he offered. Thank you so much for your guidance.

Finally, my greatest debt is to my parents, Patrick and Deborah Piggot, who have offered me important moral, emotional, psychological and (let's not forget) financial support for all of my 25 years. Without their guidance, I would not be where I am today. Thank you - you don't know how much I appreciate what you have given me.
VITA

August 9, 1976...............................Born - London, England, the United Kingdom

June, 1999.................................B.A. Cultural Studies and History, McGill University

September 2000 - present...........Graduate Teaching Associate, the Ohio State University

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Modern United States History
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vita</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Post World War II Philadelphia Area</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levittown and Integration</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concord Park</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical Basis for Racial Exclusion</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denouement - Philadelphia’s Racial Geography Hardens</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figures</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**LIST OF FIGURES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Non White Households, 1950: In Residential Areas of Philadelphia By Census Tracts</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Crowding, 1950: In Residential Areas of Philadelphia By Census Tracts</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Dwelling Units Dilapidated or Lacking Private Bath: In Residential Areas of Philadelphia By Census Tract</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The Proportion of Blacks in Philadelphia Neighborhoods, 1940, 1960, and 1980</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Race and Owner Occupancy, Citywide and Selected Areas, 1940-1980</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Proportion of Migrants to the Philadelphia Region Choosing a Suburban Location, 1955-1980; and City-Suburban Mobility of Philadelphia Region by Race, 1955-1980</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

September 15, 2000 would have been a sad day for Morris Milgram had he lived to see it. On that day, Warren and Betsy Swartzbeck - the last original white residents of Milgram's pioneering Concord Park development in Trevose, Pennsylvania - moved out of the home into which they had first moved in 1954. Morris Milgram's Concord Park was one of the first of its kind in the United States - a suburban development dedicated to achieving true black/white integration. During its early years, Concord Park proved all of its doubters who claimed whites and blacks could never live together successfully wrong. For many of its early residents - Warren and Betsy Swartzbeck included - Concord Park was not simply a nice place to live, but a grand experiment. Concord Park's interracial character was made all the more significant as it stood just eight miles from the most famous of America's postwar suburban developments, the all-white Levittown. In terms of size and design, the houses at Concord Park and Levittown were virtually identical: the only major difference between the two was their racial composition. So in 1957, when a stone-throwing mob threatened Levittown's first black family (Bill and Daisy Myers and their children), Concord Park sent a biracial contingent to guard the Myers's house. Additionally, some of Concord Park's residents pooled their money to run a half page advertisement in a local paper, announcing: "To our neighbors in Levittown: we are an interracial community situated only eight miles away...Nearly half of our 139 families are Negro...Our children play happily together. Yet we live in homes much like yours....".

However, Concord Park’s halecyon days would not last. Morris Milgram found it increasingly difficult to maintain the development’s interracial character. Simply put, when the original residents began to move out, there were many more blacks than whites waiting to buy their homes. Into the 1960s, Concord Park remained one of the very few places where blacks could find new housing in the Philadelphia suburbs: conversely, whites could choose from a plethora of new developments. As Swartzbeck recalls, Milgram “kept a map of all the houses on his wall...(he) used pins, red and blue, to represent whites and blacks...Wherever there might be a liberal who might have friend who might be interested in integrated housing”, Milgram would try to search him or her out. Yet by 1968, when Congress passed the Fair Housing Act, the law of supply and demand had had its way: Concord Park was predominantly black. Today, 95% of its residents are African American.²

Still, if only for a few years, Concord Park proved that not only could whites and blacks live together in harmony, but they could do so in brand new suburban housing without property values depreciating. Levittown, Pennsylvania seems to provide quite a different lesson. As is widely known, William Levitt’s now famous (or infamous) suburban developments³ were hostile to the idea of integration. Levitt himself claimed to be free of prejudice: rather, he did not think it was his job as a businessman to function as a social engineer. As he famously stated, “We can solve a housing problem, or we can try to solve a racial problem. But we cannot combine the two.”⁴ Whether or not Levitt himself had a problem with racial integration, there is no doubt some of the homeowners...

² Ibid.
³ All three of his 1950s developments were initially known as “Levittown”. The original development of Long Island as well the one referred to here in Bucks County, Pennsylvania today remain as they were originally named. Levitt’s third development in Burlington County, New Jersey is today known as “Willingboro”.
in his developments did. Nowhere was this more evident than in Bucks County, Pennsylvania’s Levittown, where the first black family to move in - the Myers - were met with what can be described as massive resistance. Mobs formed in front of the Myers’ new residence, numerous threatening phone calls were made to both the Myers and those sympathetic to them, bricks were thrown through the Myers’s windows, crosses were burned on the Myers’s and sympathetic neighbor’s lawns, a Ku Klux Klan recruiting drive attracted close to one hundred members.⁵

The Myers’s example only seems to further confirm Levitt’s claim about the incompatibility of racial integration and 1950s suburbia. However, there were many Levittown residents who were firm supporters of the Myers and were outraged by the actions of their fellow neighbors. Their support would be crucial in enabling the second black family to move into the Levittown - the Mosbys, in 1958 - to do so without incident. Still, Levittown’s black population remained very small: in 1997, only 1.5% of Levittown’s residents were African American.⁶

Although Concord Park (and to a much lesser extent, Levittown) demonstrate there was some integration in Philadelphia’s post World War II suburbanization process, the fact remains that blacks were largely shut out of this building explosion. As builders like William Levitt geographically “Fordized” the “American dream” of homeownership on farmland surrounding the city, African Americans were left to fight over Philadelphia’s decaying core. “Fordism”, pioneered in Henry Ford’s automobile plants during the 1910s and 1920s, was a mode of organizing industrial production which advocated paying workers high enough wages to enable them to buy the very goods they were producing.

Although "Fordism" as an idea originated in the early part of the 20th century, only after World War II did it become adopted as a basis for the "corporatist" advanced industrial economies of Western Europe and North America.

The implications of Levitt's "Fordization" of the American building industry should not be underestimated. To a certain degree, the postwar housing model so quintessentially exemplified by Levittown demonstrated the ability of the American corporatist system to create a classless society without class warfare. The Fordist democratization of home ownership - facilitated by New Deal policies - seemed to many the perfect counter argument to Soviet Cold War claims that the American capitalist system's inherent inequalities meant it could not adequately provide for a bulk of its citizens. What need was there for a worker's revolution if the very system supposedly oppressing its workers could provide the kind of amenities a Communist society was promising the working class (American or otherwise) as the payoff for overcoming its capitalist oppressors? Yet, as the Myers's experience in Levittown makes so abundantly clear, this dream of suburban home ownership remained difficult - if not impossible - for a significant minority of Americans.

But why was it that America's supposedly egalitarian creed was able to accommodate its (white) "bus drivers, music teachers and boilermakers" but not its black doctors, lawyers and nurses? After all, African Americans were not prevented from buying cars when they became affordable - there are no stories about whites fiercely resisting African American ownership of Model Ts during the 1920s and 1930s. What exactly was it that made the suburban homestead different? This brief comparison of

---


society. From the venerated yeoman farmer of Thomas Jefferson's agrarian idyll to the demands of newly emancipated slaves for "forty acres and a mule", ownership of private property in the form of land has been a crucial marker of success throughout America's history, in a way that the ownership of other items - be they horses, cars, televisions, etc. - have not been. This is not to say that status has not accrued to those who have been able to acquire the best and the most cars or horses or televisions: rather, it is to say that ownership of land strikes closest to the heart of what the "American dream" really means. Thus, when black people tried to purchase homes in America's rapidly expanding suburban landscape during the 1950s, the latent (and not so latent) racism of many white suburbanites manifested itself in ways not triggered by more abstract civil rights issues. As John McDermott and Dennis Clark recognized in 1955, "Men reflect their true values, ideas and attitudes most directly in the intimate primary realm of living that surrounds the home. Discriminatory barriers in housing are strong because they are probably the last citadel for those basic attitudes of racial antipathy which, we must admit, still exist in the minds of the majority of white people."

By comparing the examples of Concord Park and Levittown, I hope to explain more clearly why African Americans were generally excluded from the widespread democratization of private property (vis a vis suburban home ownership) that occurred in the years immediately following World War II. There have been excellent studies focusing just on racial conflict and the changing racial composition of previously white majority

communities. Likewise, there have been excellent studies examining the process of racial exclusion and suburban development. Yet, while there have been a wealth of studies devoted to processes of racial conflict and racial exclusion, there have been very few studies that deal with attempts at **interracial** development and cooperation. Therefore, I believe a study comparing two suburban developments in the Philadelphia area - one interracial, one a site of resistance to racial integration - can provide valuable insight into the development patterns of an exemplary American (rustbelt) metropolitan area during the immediate post-World War II era. As the national civil rights movement steadily gained momentum through the 1950s and into the 1960s, reaching a crescendo with the passage of the 1964 and 1965 Civil Rights Acts, the racial geography of the Philadelphia area was becoming more segregated. Although Concord Park and Levittown had differing racial philosophies, both of their histories demonstrate how racism in the Philadelphia area real estate market put crippling restraints on any effort hoping to achieve residential integration in Philadelphia’s suburbs. In the end, Concord Park and Levittown’s examples

---


12 Although it is this kind of study’s numbers are very few, several important sources do exist. Original Concord Park residents George and Eunice Grier authored the valuable primary account *Privately Developed Interracial Housing*, published in 1960 (Eunice and George Grier: *Privately Developed Interracial Housing*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1960.). Much more recently, Guian A. McKee’s July 2001 article from *The Journal of Urban History*, “Liberal Ends Through Illiberal Means: Race, Urban Renewal, and Community in the Eastwick Section of Philadelphia, 1949-1990” suggests some very interesting new directions.
prove that the pro-integration sentiment of many individual Philadelphians was not enough to overcome the racist assumptions deeply imbedded in property development, real estate and government institutions. While African Americans were achieving important, yet for most northern whites, abstract gains in areas like voting rights, their ability to overcome segregated living patterns decreased.
The Post World War II Philadelphia Area

As many scholars have noted, the World War II years were ones of tremendous upheaval within the United States. Massive population shifts occurred as Americans moved throughout the country in search of newly-created wartime job opportunities. The Philadelphia area was certainly a recipient of some of these wartime migrants, particularly northward-bound African Americans. Indeed, Philadelphia’s African American population increased by 50% between 1940 and 1950, while its white population increased only 0.8%. This rapid in-migration caused Philadelphia’s population to reach its highest ever mark in the 1950 census, at 2,071,605 residents. Not surprisingly, a lack of suitable housing became a major problem. According to a report issued by the Philadelphia Housing Association in 1948, this shortage was caused by several factors. There had been inadequate construction since the building boom of the twenties. Much of the building that had occurred in the twenties had been too expensive for most potential buyers. Additionally, the effects of the Great Depression put an end to the construction of any kind of housing during the 1930s for all intents and purposes. Compounding these developments was a virtual standstill in housing production after war mobilization began in 1940. Together, these factors contributed to a situation in which, by 1946, 17% of all residential units (90,000 units) in Philadelphia were substandard, 65,000 families were living “doubled up” (two families living in space intended for one) and the vacancy rate in which dwellings were for sale or rent was between .5% and 1%.

13 Ibid., pg. 4.
The need for the construction of new housing was clear. But where would the construction take place? In fact, much undeveloped land remained within Philadelphia’s municipal boundaries. The section known as Northeast Philadelphia, which constituted over one-quarter of the city’s area, was still largely rural at the end of World War II. The seven contiguous suburban counties also offered obvious space for development. Thus, ultimately, it would not be a question of too little space that would determine the fate of Philadelphia’s postwar development. Rather, it would be a question of who would be allowed to occupy which spaces.

From the year 1946 to the year 1953, approximately 140,000 new homes were constructed in the Philadelphia metropolitan area. Of this number, only 1,044, or less than 1%, were available for purchase by African Americans. Perhaps there is no statistic of greater importance when discussing housing, integration and civil rights in immediate postwar Philadelphia than this one. This extremely circumscribed housing market for African Americans would lay a solid foundation upon which the segregated metropolis of the second half of the 20th century was built. Because of underlying racism in Philadelphia’s real estate and financial communities, buttressed by the pernicious effects of federally-sponsored “redlining” policies, African Americans were denied the freedom to purchase homes in neighborhoods of their choosing. Ultimately, this created a Philadelphia where a large majority of the area’s African American residents became more or less confined to several inner city ghettos, while a large portion of the city’s white population fled to the suburban periphery.

As has been documented elsewhere, governmental institutions played a key role in the creation of residential segregation. Indeed, the term “redlining” comes from the

HOLC's (Home Owners Loan Corporation) rating system, in which an area colored red was considered the most risky kind of area for investment and development.\textsuperscript{17} Neighborhoods with substantial black populations were invariably colored "red": even areas with small black populations were usually rated fourth grade ("red") or "hazardous" for investment. The standards used by the HOLC to evaluate the soundness of various areas for real estate development were then adopted by the FHA (the Federal Housing Authority). Because the Federal Housing Authority had the power to insure mortgages on private homes, its adoption of the HOLC's color-coded residential rating system had an enormous effect, as private institutions adopted the federal government's neighborhood evaluation standards. As Kenneth Jackson states, "its policies supported the income and racial segregation of suburbia. For perhaps the first time, the federal government embraced the discriminatory attitudes of the marketplace. Previously, prejudices were personalized and individualized; (the) FHA exhorted segregation and enshrined it as public policy."\textsuperscript{18}

Both the FHA and later, the Veteran's Administration (the VA, set up by the a provision in the GI Bill), provided guaranteed federal insurance to private mortgage and lending companies for long-term mortgages with little or no down payment. In the case of Levittown, a buyer only needed to make a down payment on 5% of the house's total value (no down payment if the buyer was a veteran); the rest was to be paid in monthly installments mortgaged over 30 years. This policy was particularly significant considering

\textsuperscript{17} Zones colored green were those deemed most worthy of investment, those colored blue were those deemed second most worthy, those deemed yellow third most worthy, those zoned red, fourth.

\textsuperscript{18} Jackson, \textit{Crabgrass Frontiers}, 195-218.
that prior to the institution of FHA mortgage guarantees in 1934, the American homebuyer had to make an average down payment on 32% of the house’s estimated value.19

However, the new FHA and the VA financing mechanisms came with strings attached, meaning not every potential housing development received financial backing. One of the most important conditions was placed on a particular area’s racial composition. For example, the Federal Housing Authority’s 1938 underwriting manual states the following: “Satisfaction, contentment, and comfort result from association with persons of similar social attributes. Families enjoy social relationships with other families whose education, abilities, mode of living, and racial characteristics are similar to their own.” The 1938 manual goes on to claim that

The Valuator should realize that the need for protection from adverse influences is greater in an undeveloped or partially developed area than in any other type of neighborhood. Generally, a high rating should be given only where adequate and properly enforced zoning regulations exist or where effective restrictive covenants are recorded against the entire tract, since these provide the surest protection against undesirable encroachment and inharmonious use. To be most effective, deed restrictions should be imposed upon all land in the immediate environment of the subject location.

In other words, the 1938 FHA manual asserts that as a general rule, people prefer to live in homogeneous communities (social, racial and otherwise). This is even more so in land “undeveloped or partially developed”. As such, the developer should do everything in his power to prevent “undesirable encroachment”. Clearly, these guidelines applied to the kind of previously undeveloped land - in Northeast Philadelphia and the contiguous suburban counties - being built upon immediately after World War II.20

Because of such building guidelines, African American home buyers were forced to

buy housing stock in the city's older neighborhoods (often houses sold by second and third generation immigrants moving to the suburbs and Northeast Philadelphia) housing which inevitably offered fewer modern amenities, was more cramped and more prone to physical deterioration (see figures 1, 2 and 3). As a result, many of these increasingly black neighborhoods appeared to outsiders to be "going downhill". Rather than attribute increasing blight to some of the factors listed above, many people instead saw deterioration as a result of the increasing presence of African Americans. This perception worked to reinforce stereotypes that served as the rationale for the very policies (such as "redlining") condemning Philadelphia's African Americans to substandard housing in the first place. Thus, the immediate post-war years saw the vicious cycle of racial discrimination become further entrenched. While whites had full access to the wide range of housing choices created by the post-war building boom, African Americans were generally condemned to live in some of the cities oldest and most crowded sections.

Clearly, then, the large scale growth occurring in Philadelphia's suburban counties after World War II and the ability of African Americans to access this housing were crucial to the fate of the area's racial dynamics. According to the 1950 census, the black population in the Philadelphia metropolitan area increased from 336,843 in 1940 to 484,644 in 1950, or by 43.9%. Of this population increase, 85% of it occurred within Philadelphia County. Obviously, the black population was growing at a disproportionately high rate in the city.

Yet despite the rather meager growth of the African American population in the suburban counties during the 1940s, significant black populations did exist in this seven county area, albeit in housing that predated the postwar housing boom. For example, Chester County had an African American population of 9.1%, Delaware County a
population of 6.2%, Burlington County, New Jersey a population of 6.3%, Camden County, New Jersey a population of 6.6%. These population concentrations dated back to the 19th century and were located in small manufacturing and railroad junction towns, located by rivers, canals or railroad lines. Typical of these towns were Coatesville, Downingtown and West Chester in Chester County; Norristown, Jenkintown, Ambler and Pottstown in Montgomery County; Bristol, Doylestown, Morrisville and Newtown in Bucks County; and Media, Paoli, Broomall and Chester in Delaware County. In between these small population centers lay a rural landscape, comprised of small dairy, corn, tobacco, fruit and vegetable farms. The seven counties ringing Philadelphia retained this rural/small town manufacturing geography until 1945, when real estate developers like William Levitt saw tremendous opportunity in the “unused” countryside. This geographical background is important to keep in mind, as it emphasizes that the massive wave of suburbanization sweeping across the country after World War II did not simply effect urban America, but rural and small town America as well. More importantly for the present study, the racially exclusive character of postwar suburbanization not only restricted blacks to inner cities, but also to the small manufacturing and railroad towns - many themselves experiencing economic decline - dotting the rural periphery of cities like Philadelphia.

Bucks County (the county containing both Concord Park and Levittown) provides an excellent example of this phenomenon. As the report points out, over half of the black households (54.1%) were located in four municipalities: Bensalem, Bristol Borough, Bristol Township and Falls Township. In these four municipalities, the black population rose as a percentage during the 1940s from 1.9% to 3.4%. In the rest of the county, the African American population dropped from 1.2% to 0.8%. In fact, 18 of
Bucks County’s 54 municipalities reported no black residents at all. This phenomenon of intra-county segregation is further demonstrated by the example of Chester County, with its considerably higher (9.1%) African American population. Like Bucks County, over half (58%) of Chester County’s African American population could be found in six municipalities, Coatesville, Kennett Square, South Coatesville, West Chester, Tredyffrin Township and Valley Township. In these six municipalities, the African American population rose from 19.3% to 20.1%; in the county’s 67 other municipalities, it declined from 6.6% to 5.2%.\textsuperscript{21} Simply put, racial segregation was not just a matter of city versus suburb, but a phenomena occurring within the suburban counties themselves in the 1950s as a result of post-war suburbanization.

These statistics are interesting not just because they emphasize the increasingly segregated nature of the Philadelphia metropolitan area during the post-World War II era. They also bring into question simplistic - but fairly pervasive - notions of the Northern racial landscape’s history: that the African American presence in Northern society has, at least historically speaking, been exclusively in cities. The above statistics tend to suggest otherwise. At least in the Philadelphia area, significant numbers of blacks have lived in communities of substantial size outside the city limits for many years. The phenomena of a “chocolate” city ringed by “vanilla” suburbs is a comparatively recent one. It was a product of postwar housing “Fordism”. This is not to say that segregation did not exist in the pre-war Northern city: rather, it is to observe that segregation became more prevalent as a result of postwar real estate practices.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 37-38.
Levittown and Integration

Levittown, Pennsylvania was archtypical of the kinds of newly developed residential communities growing up in and around Philadelphia during the immediate postwar years. Backed by the largesse of federal programs like the FHA and the Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 1944 (commonly known as the "GI Bill"), "the Levitt house (became) the reduction of the American Dream to an affordable reality." After the success of William Levitt's initial prefabricated suburban development on Long Island, Levitt decided to apply his community-building formula in Lower Bucks County. He decided on his Pennsylvania project's location largely because of the United States Steel Corporation's decision in 1950 to construct the $400 million Fairless Works on 3,800 acres of land in nearby Morrisville, PA. Planning of the Bucks County development began in 1951: by 1953, the first of 16,000 houses had owners.

Right from the beginning, it became clear that the "race question" would be one that Levittown, Pennsylvania could not avoid. On December 8, 1951 - the first day for the sale of Levittown, PA homes - a white visitor told the information clerk at the model home (the site where home sales took place) about a black friend who was interested in buying a home in the new development. Curtly, the clerk responded that Levittown was to be "a white community." Later that same day, a young black veteran from Trenton, New Jersey came to the site and was given a blank home owner's application and was told to return the following Monday. When he did so, he was informed that he was barred

23 Ibid., 23.
told to return the following Monday. When he did so, he was informed that he was barred from purchasing a home because of his color and that he had only been given an application in the first place to “avoid embarrassment”. 24

A year and a half later - on February 25, 1953 - the first citizen delegation from Bucks County met with William Levitt to discuss housing discrimination in Levittown. The group was an adhoc organization of Bucks County residents concerned about civil rights issues, led by local luminaries Pearl Buck and James Michener. In the meeting, Levitt defended himself by claiming he was only following the dictates of the home-buying market. “People are terribly prejudiced in Pennsylvania, just like anywhere else,” Levitt claimed, “they are not ready for Negro neighbors.” Levitt went on to challenge the delegation to name a single large community planned on an interracial basis. For Levitt, the major problem was economic. Was it possible for the citizen’s delegation to guarantee his firm protection against financial loss if he opened up his sales policy? Nevertheless, Levitt tried to claim he had no racial prejudice himself. He assured the delegation that “when the whites get ready for Negro neighbors, I’ll be among the first to open up my sales policy.” 25

Over the next several years, various groups attempted to use different means to enable the racial integration of Levittown. The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) was one the groups most involved. The AFSC sponsored a number of potential African American “pioneers” offering them moral, legal and financial support. Additionally, the AFSC attempted to buy property in Levittown, which they would then turn around and (try to) sell to African American families. Neither of these tactics met with success. The NAACP was another organization heavily involved in trying to break

24 Ibid., 23.
25 Ibid., pg. 24.
Levittown’s color line. Most importantly, the NAACP filed a lawsuit attempting to open up Levitt’s sales practices. On January 13, 1955, the NAACP charged the firm of Levitt and Sons “with using the federal government’s program of mortgage insurance and at the same time refusing to sell to Negroes.” Furthermore, the lawsuit demanded “an injunction restraining the developers of Levittown, Pa. from discriminating against a person because of race or color in the sales of homes as long as the developers continued to use the federal government’s aid.”

The NAACP’s case was based on the 1948 Supreme Court ruling in *Shelley vs. Kraemer*, which outlawed the enforcement of racial restrictive covenants. Despite the presence of Thurgood Marshall - fresh off his stunning 1954 victory against “separate, but equal” education facilities in *Brown vs. the Topeka, Kansas Board of Education* - as the NAACP’s chief council, the US District Court sided with Levitt. In the opinion of Chief District Judge William H. Kirkpatrick, “neither the FHA nor the VA has been charged by Congress with the duty of preventing discrimination in the sales of housing project properties...what the plaintiffs are saying in effect is that these agencies ought to be charged with that duty. That is something which only can be done by Congress.”

Thus, by the summer of 1957, Levittown, Pennsylvania remained an all-white community of 55,000. However, this was to change on August 13 of that year when Bill and Daisy Myers became the first African Americans to move in to a house in the community. Bill Myers had served in World War II as a staff sergeant in Europe. After Bill married Daisy in 1950, the couple moved north from Virginia to Pennsylvania.

---

because Bill did not like the South. Initially, the couple settled in York, Pennsylvania, a town about a hundred miles west of Philadelphia. The couple had two children while living there, but by 1954 Bill decided employment prospects in York were too limited, so the Myers family moved to the Philadelphia area. The family settled in Bloomsdale Gardens, a mostly black neighborhood in Bristol Township near Levittown. Bill, who had attended Hampton Institute in Virginia, got a job as a refrigeration systems troubleshooter with C.V. Hill and Co. in Trenton, NJ.  

Significantly, Bill and Daisy joined an informal discussion group of the Human Relations Council (HRC), an organization that worked closely with the NAACP, the AFSC and the Urban League to help break down discriminatory housing patterns in the Philadelphia area. At one of the HRC discussions attended by the Myers, it was brought to their attention that there was a house available in Levittown. Lew Wechsler - a member of the HRC and a Levittowner - suggested that the Myers buy the property as it had been unoccupied for two years. The house’s previous occupant, Irving Mandel, was a friend of Wechsler’s and was sympathetic to the goals of the civil rights movement. Perhaps most importantly, he was desperate to sell the house as it had been on the market for two years. After inspecting the property, Bill Myers decided the house was “just what Daisy...and I wanted”, and the deal was cinched. The Myers were set to break Levittown’s color line.

On August 13, the Myers moved in to their new home. Shortly thereafter, a crowd of hostile neighbors began to form across the street. By 8:30 PM, the Myers returned to their old house in Bloomsdale Gardens, supposedly because a hot water heater in the house was broken and would not be fixed until the weekend. Even after the

29 Mullaney, “40 Years Ago, Racial Chaos Swept a Bucks Town”.
30 Ibid.
Myers left, the mob remained outside their property. Around midnight, some 200 people were still gathered around the Myers’s new house. Stones began to fly, breaking picture windows. By this time, the police arrived, dispersing the crowd. However, by the following morning, a large crowd had reassembled. Meanwhile, approximately 600 residents met in the parking lot of the Veterans of Foreign Wars Billington Post and formed the 10-member Levittown Betterment Committee to force the Myers’s to leave.\(^{32}\)

Around the same time, twenty state troopers under the command of Major William Ruch moved in to restore order. Additional Bucks County police officers barricaded the roads leading into the Dogwood Hollow section of Levittown - in which the Myers’s new home was located - to prevent outsiders from further irritating the tense situation. Nevertheless, police checking license plates found people coming in from places as far a field as Philadelphia, Upper Darby, PA and Camden, NJ.\(^{33}\) Mobs continued to gather through the weekend. Scuffles broke out between police and protesters. Tensions finally boiled over on Monday August 20, when a member of the mob threw a rock that hit Bristol Township Sergeant Thomas Stewart in the head, knocking him unconscious. In response, police charged into the mob, nightsticks swinging. Several dozen protesters were arrested. As a result of this confrontation, the mob’s intensity subsided substantially. By August 26, the state police were confident enough that calm had been restored to withdraw for good.\(^{34}\)

Despite a sense of superficial calm produced by the police’s dispersal of the mob, resistance to the Myers’s presence remained extremely high. On August 20 - as police fought with teenagers in front of the Myers’s home - an unidentified Republican candidate for Bucks County Attorney General offered the Myers $15,000 to vacate their

\(^{32}\) Mullane. "40 Years Ago, Racial Chaos Swept a Bucks Town".


\(^{34}\) Mullane. "40 Years Ago".
new home. Levittowners willing to speak on the record expressed similar sentiments. "I don't have any objections to colored people," claimed George Bessam, a worker at nearby Fairless Works, "but I don't think they ought to live in white neighborhoods. A lot of people moved into Levittown from Philadelphia and other places for just one reason", Mr. Bessam went on to state, "to get away from colored people". Likewise, Mrs. Robert Gross, a waitress at a nightclub in New Jersey, stated that she "(didn't) want Negroes living in my neighborhood, and I don't want my children going to school with Negroes.” Champney Benauer, a salesman, concurred with both Bessam and Gross: "I don't know how I feel about this thing, but you couldn't print what I would have to say. Just say that I'm against it and I don't like it."\textsuperscript{36}

Yet despite the expression of such sentiment, many in Levittown were supportive of the Myers. Civic groups like the Citizens’ Committee for Levittown headed by Rev. Ray Harwick of Levittown’s Evangelical and Reformed Church of the Reformation were formed to provide the Myers’s firm support in the face of hostility. The committee was an ecumenical organization, including Lew Wechsler, who was Jewish. Perhaps unsurprisingly, such sympathetic Levittown residents also received a good deal of harassment. Early on September 6, Wechsler was awakened by another neighbor Barney Bell, who informed Wechsler of a five foot high cross burning on his front lawn. This was one of several cross burnings that occurred in Levittown during the late summer and early fall of 1957.\textsuperscript{37} Other forms of harassment continued to plague the Wechslers and Myers throughout the fall. A smoke bomb was thrown between the two family’s houses. A member of the Levittown Betterment Committee would continually walk his dog past the

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{37} J.D. Mullane. "Bucks Community Reflects the South in the '50s". 	extit{Bucks County Intelligencer}. August 18, 1997.
Myers's house, calling out "Here, Nigger", as if this were the dog's name. Perhaps most dramatically, a group of (white) people occupied an empty house behind the Myers's residence on September 22. By day, the group blasted songs with clear racial connotations like "Old Man River" and "Old Black Joe" over and over, in attempt to intimidate the Myers. By night, the new "residents" directed a powerful floodlight towards the Myers and Wechsler residences, making it difficult for the two families to sleep. When Lew Wechsler took several pictures of the "members" of this "Confederate Clubhouse", he awoke on the morning of September 25 to find "KKK" scrawled in large red letters across the side of his house.\(^{38}\)

Yet despite ongoing harassment, circumstances began to turn in the Myers's favor. On October 23, Pennsylvania Attorney General Thomas McBride presented evidence that led Bucks County Judge Edwin Satterthwaite to issue a temporary injunction preventing seven conspirators (members of the Levittown Betterment Committee) from harassing the Myers. Throughout October and November, Sargeant Adrian McCarr of the Pennsylvania State Police continued to gather evidence that would eventually lead to indictments on December 9 against the "Levittown seven". Two of the conspirators were given two years probation, while the other five were ordered to stop their harassment or face jail time. After these verdicts, overt hostilities against the Myers's and those friendly to them ceased. The Myers would continue to live at their Levittown residence until June 1961, when they decided to return to Bill's hometown of York, PA. As Daisy recalled in 1997, the reason for their decision to move was that Bill had become homesick: she brings no evidence to bear that would suggest racially-motivated harassment prompted their move.\(^{39}\)

\(^{38}\) Ibid.

Still, the Myers’s ability to remain in Levittown was more than a product of their own wherewithal. Just as a good deal of passive sympathy was needed for the racial harassment instigated by the Levittown Betterment Committee to occur, there needed to be a considerable amount support (passive or active) for the Myers to feel comfortable in their decision to remain in Levittown. This fact is highlighted by examples from other communities, which suggest that continued harassment and intimidation could be successful in forcing an African American family to leave a previously all-white neighborhood. Clearly, Levittown’s residents did not present the kind of “united front” that was often necessary to fully resist racial integration. Indeed, the very person - Lew Wechsler - who suggested the Myers move to Levittown in the first place himself lived in the community. Additionally, groups - like Reverend Ray Harwick’s Citizens Committee for Levittown - formed after the Myers moved in to offer them support. Further evidence is provided by the convocation of 200 Levittown residents at a “Leaders Conference” on February 15, 1958, which declared most of the community had been “ashamed” by the events of the previous summer and that this sense of shame was accompanied by a desire to “make amends”.

Probably as a result of the existence of sentiment like this, the second black family to move to Levittown - the Mosbys, who moved in on June 25, 1958 - experienced none of the harassment encountered by the Myers less than a year earlier. The ease with which the Mosbys were able to move into the Levittown community seemed to suggest some kind of important milestone had been reached, that racial “prejudice” and opposition to integrated living were gradually being pushed aside by the force of America’s democratic

---

40 For specific examples of this phenomenon, see Thomas J. Sugrue. The Origins of the Urban Crisis, in particular Chapter 9, “United Communities Are Impregnable”: Violence and the Color Line”.

creed. Yet by 1997, Levittown still had a statistically insignificant percentage of African American residents (1.5%).\textsuperscript{42} Indeed, as early as 1958 Thelma Bobbitt claimed in her report for the American Friends Service Committee that she felt it "extremely unlikely...that any sizable number of Negro families will move in to Levittown in the foreseeable future."\textsuperscript{43}

However, as the evidence that scholars like Thomas Sugrue and David Freund have presented from Detroit and Arnold Hirsch has presented from Chicago suggests, the fact that \textit{any} blacks were successfully able to integrate a previously all-white community should not be seen as insignificant. The lessons of the ability of a few black families to successfully move to Levittown suggests that with several specific elements in place, at least a modicum of integration into a previously all-white community could occur. First, both the Myers and the Mosbys received considerable amounts of support from outside organizations, specifically the American Friends Service Committee. Second, as has already been mentioned, there were a large number of people sympathetic or supportive to the cause of integrated housing. Finally, the power of the state was brought to bear on the side of the black families, whether through police protection or through court cases. Together, these forces worked together to enable a successful integration process. The simultaneous existence of such pro-integration forces alongside people like those who terrorized the Myers meant that a kind of informal compromise was reached in which integration of a token variety was allowed to occur, but that no more than a statistically insignificant amount of African Americans (see the census data from 1990 above) would be allowed to move into Levittown. Ultimately, such a compromise might have eased the

conscience of some of the Philadelphia area's more socially conscious white residents, but it did little to provide the region's growing African American population living options outside of Philadelphia's municipal limits.
Concord Park

If there was one person in the Philadelphia area who possessed the characteristics needed to make Concord Park a reality, that person was Morris Milgram. Morris Milgram was a former civil rights fighter and trade unionist who inherited his father-in-law’s real estate company in 1947. Yet even after becoming the head of Smelo-Milgram, Inc., Milgram remained very active in organizations advocating social justice. He served on the Board of Fellowship House, Fellowship Fund, and the Philadelphia branch of Americans for Democratic Action. Additionally, he was active member of Philadelphia’s branch of the NAACP and the Board of the National Council for a Permanent Fair Employment Practice Commission. All of this experience made Milgram a very unique figure in the real estate business. Milgram’s background and real passion was that of a social activist; he had entered the industry almost by happenstance. Accordingly, unlike the vast majority of builders and speculators, Milgram was willing to sacrifice profit margins to achieve a social goal. Still, during the first five years of his stewardship of the company, Milgram built houses exclusively for whites. However, by 1952 Milgram decided he would build no more houses unless they could be sold to “all people.” This decision set Milgram off on a long and difficult journey that ultimately would end happily in the construction and successful integration of Concord Park.

Described as “blunt and fiercely intense,” Milgram would need these qualities to

---

44 Ibid., 3.
persevere in his quest to receive financial backing for his “experiment” in interracial living.⁴⁷ First of all, Milgram needed to accumulate the capital needed to purchase a piece of land and then to finance the construction of housing upon it. Initially, Milgram went to a nameless large mortgage service with which he had worked in the past to finance all-white developments. At first, this mortgage service expressed some interest in financing Milgram’s proposal, but they demanded he find extensive evidence proving that a sizeable and reliable black population existed for the kind of housing he was proposing. Milgram devoted considerable effort to producing such evidence. He even went so far as to pre-sell twelve houses - seven to whites and five to blacks - to prove the commercial viability of his venture. Nevertheless, after nine months of work, the nameless mortgage company flatly refused financing for Milgram’s development in December 1952.⁴⁸

“Disillusioned but not crushed,” Milgram persevered.⁴⁹ He approached almost every other mortgage financing agency in the Philadelphia area, only to be met with universal rejection. Next, he tried tapping several wealthy individuals known to have “progressive” views, again with no luck. Finally, Milgram settled on the idea of setting up his own equity fund to accumulate enough venture capital to finance the development of what would become Concord Park, independent of major financial institutions. This equity fund was financed by a nationwide stock subscription drive, which collected $14,000 by May 1953.⁵⁰ Although the $14,000 Milgram’s stock drive collected was far short of the amount his venture ultimately would need, it had also attracted the interest of distinguished Bucks County businessmen George Otto. Milgram’s introduction to George Otto would prove to be his venture’s turning point.

⁴⁸ Grier, George and Eunice. “Concord Park: A Pioneer Attempt at Privately-Built Sales Housing for Interracial Occupancy”. pg. 4.
⁴⁹ Ibid. pg. 4.
⁵⁰ Ibid. pgs. 4-5.
George Otto would bring to the project much needed business connections and acumen. Otto was a Quaker from nearby Morrisville, Pennsylvania who was intrigued by Milgram’s idealism, largely because of his religious beliefs and institutional associations. Otto was chairman of the Friends Social Order Committee, treasurer of the Friends General Conference, vice president of Bucks County Community Chest and past president of Newtown Rotary Club. In particular, the Quaker organizations of which Otto was a member had seriously been weighing whether they were being faithful to their heritage of a commitment to racial justice.\textsuperscript{51} With his Quaker beliefs providing the impetus, Otto decided to bring his financial expertise to bear. He quickly decided that Milgram’s equity fund approach was inadequate and unwieldy, and accordingly, he worked to reorganize its financial details. Under Otto’s direction, Milgram’s equity fund was transformed into a stock corporation - with Otto as president and Milgram as vice president - limited just to the Concord Park project. Additionally, Otto’s presence brought with it many Quaker business associates, who invested substantially in the Concord Park corporation. By April 1954, the full $150,000 in stock options had been subscribed.\textsuperscript{52}

 Shortly thereafter, Otto and Milgram were able to secure the purchase of land where the Concord Park project would be built. The fifty-acre site was located in Trevose, Bucks County, at the intersection of Old Lincoln Highway and Pennsylvania State Route 132. The site was chosen because of its proximity to major transportation routes and to “phenomenal industrial development”, most notably the new US Steel plant in Fairless Hills. It was adjacent to a Pennsylvania Turnpike interchange under

\textsuperscript{51} Untitled Document issued by Concord Park Homes, Inc., November 15, 1954.
\textsuperscript{52} Eunice and George Grier. “Concord Park: A Pioneer Attempt at Privately-Built Sales Housing for Interracial Occupancy”, 5.
construction, half a mile from Trevose train station and on a PTC Bus Route that would connect commuters to Philadelphia’s elevated railroad. A sample house was quickly built, and by August 1954, active selling of the development began.

Still, the problem of mortgage financing remained unsolved. Again, Milgram made the rounds of area mortgage and banking institutions, this time in both Philadelphia and New York. Like before, he was universally rejected. Then, Milgram turned to institutions like labor unions and religious organizations not usually involved in the real estate business, but oriented towards “progressive” causes. These sources also refused him. “In all,” write the Griers, “over two score financial institutions turned him down over the course of a year and a half.” Finally, after considerable effort, Bowery Savings Bank of New York agreed to finance the development’s first thirty mortgages. After Bowery firmly committed to Concord Park, two previously reluctant Philadelphia area financial institutions - Peoples National Bank of Langhorne and Central Penn National Bank of Philadelphia - decided to firmly commit, providing the balance of necessary financial support.

After the financial situation had been sorted, Milgram then faced the problem of attracting both white and black buyers. This process would be a very difficult one. For one, there were disagreements amongst Concord Park’s various backers and staff members about exactly what goals the development should be working towards. These differences generally divided themselves into two camps. On the one hand, there were those who

---

55 Ibid., 5-6
56 "Summary of Remarks by Morris Milgram" National Urban League Conference in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, September 8, 1955
57 Paul Blanshard. “County’s New Concord Homes Project May Dispel Fancied Fears About Mixed Housing”
coalesced around Morris Milgram and believed that Concord Park’s primary goal was to serve as an example to the rest of the country - proving that integrated housing in the suburbs could be successful. On the other hand, there were those - chief among them Concord Park Homes’s president George Otto - who believed the development’s primary function was not as a social “experiment”, but simply to provide good housing to a group of people (Philadelphia’s black population) who desperately needed it. This conflict manifested itself at a July 1, 1954 meeting held at the Sylvania Hotel in Philadelphia. Milgram opened the proceedings by declaring that “for the first 30 houses (sold)...there should not be more than 4 or 5 Negroes among the residents. Later on the, the proportion could (be) increased to not more than 20 per cent.”58 In response, the conference report notes that “George Otto expressed very strong opposition to much of what Milgram had suggested” and “…in effect forbade him to guarantee any occupancy ratio.”59 Eventually, those in attendance reached a fairly vague agreement that “for a period of 60 or 90 days a genuine effort should be made to secure the kind of occupancy ratio that will lead to stability and integration.”60 However, no specific measures were suggested to help Concord Park achieve these goals.

Shortly after the sales process began, it became fairly clear to all involved that there were many more blacks interested in purchasing than there were whites. This was surprising to many observers at the time, even those with “progressive” views. However, an objective analysis of data available at the time clearly indicates a frustrated black demand for new suburban housing. Statistics in Milgram’s initial proposal to create an equity fund bear this out. Milgram’s proposal cited the Philadelphia Veteran’s Administration claim that an income of $3,000 a year was adequate to finance the

59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
mortgage of a small home valued at $9,000. According to this standard, Milgram
presented 1950 census data demonstrating that approximately 30,800 non-whites (which,
at this time, was a population that was almost entirely composed of African Americans)
in Philadelphia had the necessary income levels to finance the mortgage at this value.
Admittedly, the census data Milgram presents also shows that a large part of this 30,800
made little more than $3,000 annually: 11,500 non-whites with an annual income between
$3,000 and $3,499, 6,468 non-whites with an annual income between $3,500 and $3,999.
(Still, one must also note that over 13,000 non-white families made more than $4,000 and
over 5,000 made more than $5,000 annually).\textsuperscript{61} Nevertheless, according to the
Philadelphia VA guidelines, over 30,000 non-whites in the Philadelphia area would have
been able to afford William Levitt’s standard “Rancher” model, which was valued at
$8,490 in 1953.\textsuperscript{62} Considering only 45 of the new private homes built between 1946 and
1953 in the Philadelphia area (none of them located in Bucks County) were available to be
purchased by African Americans, the excitement guaranteed by the commencement of
the sales process at Concord Park should not have been unexpected.\textsuperscript{63}

The disproportionately large number of interested black buyers (disproportionate
in relationship to white interest) presented Milgram and Otto with an interesting
dilemma. By the winter of 1954/1955, with just over half of the development’s units sold,
60 of the sales had been made to blacks and only 12 to whites, with several of the white
sales reported as “shaky”.\textsuperscript{64} This left Milgram and Otto to make some tough decisions.
Although Milgram had been in favor of some kind of sales quota from the outset, he

\textsuperscript{61} "Proposal for Organization of Community Developers, Inc." Smel-Milgram, Inc.. May 11, 1953, 2.
\textsuperscript{62} "First of New ‘Budget’ Homes Goes on Display at Levittown". The Philadelphia Bulletin. May 30,
1953.
\textsuperscript{63} Untitled Document. Concord Park Homes, Inc.. November 15, 1954.
\textsuperscript{64} George and Eunice Grier. "Concord Park: A Pioneer Attempt at Privately-Built Sales Housing for
Interracial Occupancy", 7.
desired a quota that reflected the ratio of white to black residents in the Philadelphia metropolitan area as a whole, which was 87 to 13 in 1950. Accordingly, Milgram suggested a ratio of residency at Concord Park of 80% white and 20% black. George Otto, on the other hand, had opposed a sales quota from the start as fundamentally antidemocratic and antithetical to what he saw as being Concord Park’s primary purpose, which was to provide housing to an oppressed minority and turn a profit in the process. However, even Otto realized by early 1955 that the present trajectory of sales complicated Concord Park’s future. As a result, a consensus was reached in which no more than a half of the development’s final homeowners would be black. Thus, “illiberal means” would be used to achieve “liberal ends”.

However, the Concord Park Corporation’s decision to implement a sales quota was only as a reaction to the fundamentally illiberal structures that controlled the supposedly private marketplace within which developers like William Levitt and Morris Milgram operated. To put it more precisely, the decision to exclude blacks from most suburban development was not simply a matter of personal “prejudice”: the federal government had set up its very generous system of mortgage guarantees in such a way to encourage this exclusion. Likewise, Milgram and Otto found it necessary to employ their own microscopic version of the federal government’s “illiberal” market controls to fight the very effects these the government’s “illiberal” policies were having in the first place.

Obviously, this newly instituted sales policy necessitated a shift in the way Concord Park’s homes had been pitched up until that point. Special incentives were offered to salesmen for signing up white prospects and a new salesmen was hired whose

---

sole duty was to focus on potential white buyers. Still, one must point out that the Concord Park corporation had directed all of its paid publicity at the white market up until this point, with only 12 white sales to show for their efforts. Over $4,000 had already been spent on advertising in local newspapers; over 20,000 pieces of direct mail, stressing Concord Park's interracial policy, had been sent to members of various "liberal" organizations. Yet, despite the emphasis of Concord Park's publicity campaign, prospective black buyers flocked to view the development's model house and decided to become buyers at a rate five times higher than whites did. Word-of-mouth alone was enough to attract large black interest. In the words of the Griers, "word-of-mouth publicity...may be impossible to curb under those conditions when control is most needed - when the product meets a strong unfilled need." As a result, the unfortunate upshot of the social milieu in which Concord Park was born meant that many qualified black buyers had to be turned away to ensure the development's interracial character.

Because "illiberal means" were implemented, Milgram's original vision ultimately did become a reality. Concord Park's developers eventually settled on a 55%/45% white to black ownership ratio, ensuring the venture would achieve real integration. Significantly, this integration was not simply a numeric abstraction. For example, in 1957 the Institute for Urban Studies of the University of Pennsylvania conducted interviews with more than 90% of Concord Park's white residents. Of the residents interviewed, 75% expressed "unqualified approval" of their neighbors, while another 11% expressed "general approval" with "some qualifications". Only one person was specifically mentioned by name as disliked, and this person was white. In fact, two of the white families interviewed stated that their black neighbors were generally superior to Concord

---

68 George and Eunice Grier. Privately Developed Interracial Housing. 67.
Park's whites. Other respondents remarked more generally about the overall neighborly feel of the development. "People who don't even know you, wave because you live here, too" stated one resident. "I wonder if this is true in all-white developments?" Another resident's comments shed light on the widely held perception that blacks could not properly maintain private property. "There was one family here that didn't hang curtains for the longest time; it passed through my head that that must be a colored family, but you know it was white. People think Negroes don't keep their places up as well, but they're wrong." 69

The evidence produced in the 1957 survey is borne out by the recollections of Concord Park's original residents 43 years later. In 2000, original black resident Joyce Hadley described Concord Park's racial harmony as real. She recalled her family's relationship with Werner Knaack, a German man brought to the United States by a Quaker charity. "He used to come over and stand on our kitchen table playing accordion", remembered Hadley. "We'd all sing along. We'd eat purple cabbage and the puffed pastries and the bad-smelling cheese...That was the point of Concord Park. You learned to be tolerant. You absorbed each person individually." In a similar vein, Warren Swartzbeck recalls the early days as "our dream...our little effort to heal the nation." White and black children played together. Their mothers and fathers socialized as equals, forming various social groups, both political and non-political in nature. They shopped together and even boycotted together, protesting Woolworth's racist lunch-counter policy. 70

Of course - as has been noted several times already - Concord Park was not able to remain a racial "utopia". However, "white flight" from the development was not something that occurred in short order or because of white resident's dislike for their

---

69 Ibid., 197-198.
black neighbors. In fact, the first of the original occupants to move out - a black family - sold their home to a white family. The next two families to move out were both white: one of them sold to another white family, the other to a black family. A large reason for Concord Park’s initial ability to continue to attract white buyers were the near-herculean efforts of Morris Milgram. Milgram searched tirelessly for potential white buyers, but he also continued to apply a quota system to maintain racial balance. As the Griers comment in their 1960 study, Milgram employed a technique which had (has) been used by other developments to prevent their housing from becoming interracial. As the Griers describe, “At the time of settlement, both Negro and white buyers (were) presented with a resale agreement in which the buyer agrees to give the builder first option to buy back his house in the event he wishes to resell.” Such a procedure had been used by all-white developments to prevent individual home owners from selling to African Americans, so as to maintain their racial homogeneity. In the case of Concord Park, this covenant of sorts was used to prevent new black buyers (or at least an excess of new black buyers) in order to maintain racial heterogeneity.

Nevertheless, deeply entrenched institutional forms of racism would be more powerful than Morris Milgram’s best efforts. In retrospect, Milgram’s “defeat” seems inevitable. Simply put, there were many more new houses available in Philadelphia’s suburbs for white purchase than there were for black purchase. Accordingly, Milgram’s efforts were as effective as the proverbial finger blocking up the leaking dam. His efforts had success as a short term stop gap, but they were unable to address the underlying structural factors at the root of the problem. Davis McEntire describes several of these structural problems in Race and Residence, published in 1960. Most important to the current discussion, McEntire observes the following:
The general rule is that developments for nonwhite occupancy must be located within or adjacent to areas where nonwhites are already living, or if elsewhere, in areas that are not wanted for white residential development...the available sites are usually of poor quality for residential development because of intrinsic features, presence of blighting influences, remote location, or other drawbacks.\(^7\)

Additionally, for many white Americans of the time, an interracial development meant a “Negro” development. For example, the Griers point out, “For many persons...the concept of a new community which is voluntarily inhabited by both Negroes and whites may be difficult to grasp”. Accordingly, the Griers observe that Concord Park was generally referred to by whites living in the general vicinity as “that colored development”.\(^2\)

The implications of this perception were (and still are) large. Again, the example of Concord Park is instructive. According to Davis McEntire, the Concord Park corporation was allowed to choose the site they did because, at the time, the area remained spatially isolated. After the project’s initial success, Milgram attempted to expand Concord Park by buying adjacent farmland. At first, the land’s owner was willing to sell, but backed off after pressure was applied by local businessmen who were concerned that if Concord Park became physically larger, prospective developers and investors would be scared off by the proximity of a “Negro” enclave. Many in the area were not thrilled with Concord Park’s presence in the first place. They had become resigned to its existence, but were willing to do anything in their power to prevent its “encroachment” on still valuable land.\(^3\)

Thus, as the farmland surrounding cities like Philadelphia began to fill up with suburban development in the immediate post-war years, it became increasingly difficult for the small number of committed idealists like Morris Milgram to find space to build


\(^{2}\) Eunice and George Grier. *Privately Developed Interracial Housing*. 209, 213.

their housing "experiments". The developer committed to building open occupancy housing was left with several kinds of spaces upon which he or she could build, none of which were likely to result in a truly interracial community. The developer could choose land that was either in or adjacent to all-black areas, land that was adjacent to undesirable features like garbage dumps or smoke belching factories, or land that was very remote from any other new development. In the case of land in or near all-black areas - because this land was most likely located in built-up areas characterized by older, decaying housing and infrastructure - developers would have trouble attracting white residents, no matter how "liberal", as the white buyer had many other options in more spacious and modern locales. This also would be the case for land near undesirable physical features. In the case of land that was remote from other development, the developer would have trouble attracting any buyers. Such land was almost certainly located far from business and industrial centers (and thus the majority of jobs in a given metropolitan area) and also from convenient transportation routes. Furthermore, potential black buyers, who were generally willing to move to any development where they could purchase new, affordable housing, would be discouraged from purchasing a house in such a remote locale because such a purchase would isolate them from important African American social centers. To put it more precisely, a white person considering a new housing location would take for granted that social facilities and institutions would be freely available; a black person, on the other hand, would probably have to travel long distances from a remote housing development to established African American social centers, which typically would be in central cities.

36
The Theoretical Basis of Racial Exclusion

But why was maintaining an essentially all-white community so important for so many of Philadelphia’s suburbanites? Robert Fishman’s description of what suburbia came to represent - in what he terms the “Anglo-American” tradition - provides a useful window through which to view the racial dynamics of 1950s suburban expansion in the United States. Fishman traces the idea of suburban living back to late 18th century London, when London’s bourgeois elite sought to find bucolic refuge from an increasingly grimy and impoverished industrial city. Central to this bourgeois elite’s motivation for moving away from the city center was was the ability to exclude that which they deemed undesirable, typically the industrial working class. As Fishman claims, “the impetus for suburbanization had contained a large element of class fear, the desire to isolate oneself and one’s family from the turbulent lower orders of the urban core.”

Unlike the spatial arrangements of the preindustrial class hierarchy - in which the various classes lived cheek by jowl - the nouveau riche bourgeois elite were less able to assert what they felt was their class privilege. As a result, they felt the need to separate themselves physically from the “lower orders” in a way their aristocratic forebears had found unnecessary.

Stuart Blumin makes similar observations about American cities in his 1989 book, *The Emergence of the Middle Class: Social Experience in the American City, 1760-1900.* Blumin describes how the populations of America’s cities gradually sorted themselves out into two distinct parts during the middle part of the 19th century: those who worked

\[\text{Footnote: Fishman, Robert.} \text{Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia, Basic Books: New York,} 1987, \text{pg. 82.}\]
with their hands and those who did not. Significantly, this growing class distinction was largely predicated on cultural traits and assumptions, not on income disparity. Because the income levels of manual and nonmanual workers were relatively similar, the ability of increasingly self-conscious and self-identified "white collar", nonmanual workers to differentiate themselves from those who toiled with their hands was muted. As Blumin notes, "In the public mingling of classes on the streets and in the markets and stores of Philadelphia's neighborhoods, the 'plain dark democracy of broadcloth' asserted itself, to the detriment of both the old culture of rank and the emerging system of class distinctions." One of the major ways nonmanual workers tried to assert a sense of class privilege was by moving to the outskirts of what then constituted the city. Initially, only the wealthiest city dwellers were able and had the desire to relocate themselves on the urban periphery. However, after the Civil War less well-off members of the "nonmanual class" increasingly followed the example of the city's most wealthy citizens. Thus, "By the end of the century the attractive detached suburban house, set within a homogeneous neighborhood of commuting businessmen, professionals, officials, and senior clerical workers, had become one of the principal molders of middle class life, and one of its most powerful symbols."

Nevertheless, into the 20th century, the suburban homestead remained out of reach for many urban Americans. The cost of land as well as transportation limitations prevented a more widespread exodus from central cities. However, with the mass availability of automobiles as well as innovative mortgage and money lending policies instigated by the American federal government during Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal,

---

the dream of owning one's own suburban homestead increasingly became a reality for a
large segment of American society, particularly after World War II. However, as the
evidence presented so far indicates, the mass exodus to the bucolic refuge of suburbia after
1945 almost entirely excluded African Americans. Rather than applying the exclusionary
parameters of class, as suburbanites had done in earlier periods, Philadelphia's (and
America's) post World War II suburbanites used race as the exclusionary parameter
through which they at least partially defined what it meant to have purchased a plot of
land in the suburbs.

Of course, hierarchical racial ideologies did not suddenly emerge in the minds of
white Americans for the first time during the 1950s. Negative and oppressive ideology
has inscribed the position of the black or African "race" since American society's 17th
century formation.76 What made the post World War II situation unique was that never
before had America's non-Southern white population lived in such close proximity to so
many African Americans. The decades of the 1940s and 1950s witnessed the culminating
of the half-century long African American "Great Migration" from the states of the Old
Confederacy to those of the Northeast, Midwest and Far West. Some statistics are
indicative of the kinds of demographic shifts that occurred. In 1910, 90% of African
Americans resided in the states of the Old Confederacy; by 1940, the number was down
to 77%. By 1970, when the Great Migration had run its course, only half of the African

76 Some of the more notable works about racial ideology in American history include: George M.
Frederickson. The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American Character and
Winthrop Jordan. While Over Black: American Attitudes Towards the Negro, 1550-1912. Chapel
American population remained in the Southeast. In total, six and a half million African Americans migrated out of the South to Northern and Western destinations; of this number, fully five million migrated after 1940.  

As recent African American migrants began crowding into the inner cities of Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Cleveland and Los Angeles, fears about declining property values, rising crime rates and racial miscegenation caused these and other cities’ white residents to flee to the suburban fringe. Whether or not the white population’s assessment of the impact the black migration would have on their old neighborhoods was correct or not, many of the new suburbanites were determined to exclude African American “infiltration” from their new communities. Just as the 19th century bourgeoisie fled Manchester and London to exclusive pastoral retreats, so too did many American whites with the means to do so in the mid 20th century.

---

Denouement - Philadelphia's Racial Geography Hardens

Retrospectively, the failure of Philadelphia's developers, real estate agents and white suburbanites to make strides towards a more integrated metropolitan area during the fifteen years following the end of World War II is brought into bold relief by several important events that occurred during the first half of the 1960s. The first of these events occurred in 1963 when, like in Levittown six years earlier, Sara (a nurse at Pennsylvania Hospital) and Horace Baker (a laboratory technician) were met with massive resistance when they tried to become the first black family to move into the Delaware County suburb of Folcroft. Indeed, the reaction greeting the Bakers was significantly more virulent than the one that greeted the Myers.

The part of Folcroft the Bakers moved into was predominantly blue-collar, consisting of row housing built shortly after the war, primarily accommodating people who were moving from South, West and Southwest Philadelphia. According to the 1970 census, at $10,920, the median family income in Folcroft was slightly lower than the median of $11,822 for Delaware County as a whole. Additionally - and critically for the Bakers - the community did not have any leadership elements strongly in favor of integration. In this sense, Folcroft more closely resembled some of America's more famous sites of blue collar white backlash than it did Levittown, where a meaningful portion of the community organized in support of integration. Significantly, Folcroft's next appearance in the media spotlight occurred in late 1979, when presidential candidate Ronald Reagan made a "whistle stop" in the town to bolster his credentials with "middle
America, the hard-working, overtaxed, middle class." Clearly, Reagan believed his brand of conservative politics, with its calls for "local control", "law and order" and the cutting of aid for "welfare queens" would appeal to a town of voters who less than twenty years earlier had driven a black family from their community.

The Bakers purchased the house through the American Friends Service Committee, who themselves had purchased the house from the Veteran's Administration after the previous owner had defaulted on their mortgage payments. On Thursday, August 29, 1963, the Bakers twice attempted to move from West Philadelphia into their new home at 2002 Heather Road in the Delmar Village section of Folcroft. Twice, they were driven away by a jeering mob. Finally, the Bakers were able to enter their new home at 4 PM on the following day to chants of "2, 4, 6, 8, we don't want to integrate!" By Friday nightfall, a crowd of 1500 people milled outside the Baker's home. All the windows in the front of the house were broken by bottles, rocks, and sticks; homemade firecrackers exploded against the side of the house. At 10 PM, state troopers in riot gear attempted to disperse the mob, but were themselves driven back. The state trooper's inability to disperse the mob was perhaps not all that surprising, considering two local policemen had been spotted earlier in the day blocking workers from connecting the Baker's gas, water and electricity. However by Saturday, a semblance of calm had been restored after state troopers barricaded four roads leading into Delmar Village and a temporary ban on the sale of alcoholic beverages was placed on Folcroft and neighboring Darby and Glenolden Townships."

At least initially, the Bakers were determined to stay. "We are here to stay",


Horace stated, "No intimidation, no threat, no nothing will make me move."

Nevertheless, regular incidents of harassment continued to plague the Bakers for months. By late November, these incidents had taken their toll on Horace. On the morning of November 24, Horace was found wandering dazed and spattered with mud on Island Road in the Eastwick section of Philadelphia, after having vanished without a word the night before. Horace had suffered a nervous breakdown, and was admitted for a five week stay at Haverford State Hospital, a mental health institute. At this time, NAACP tri-state secretary Philip Savage revealed Horace had been under psychiatric surveillance since suffering a previous nervous breakdown on August 30, the night the Bakers first moved into their Folcroft home.  

Things did not improve for the Bakers after Horace's second nervous breakdown. Incidents of harrassment continued through the summer of 1964, when the Bakers had paint splashed on their car and a chopped-up snake left on their door step. The Bakers were frequently verbally abused, with neighbors continuing to call them "nigger", particularly neighborhood children. Horace was forced to take a new job after he was fired from his job at Radio Condenser Corporation in Camden, New Jersey because of his five week stay in Haverford State Hospital in late 1963. By early 1966, the Baker's will was finally broken. Citing continuing harassment, the Bakers put their house up for sale. Horace claimed he wanted to "get out of the neighborhood as soon as possible", while Sara claimed concern for their children motivated their move: "We have noticed changes in our daughter (Terri Lynn, five years old). I think our continued emotional strain has effected her."  

---

Unlike Levittown six years prior, the racist mobs had their way in Folcroft: their continued harassment had the desired effect, forcing the “offending” black family to move away. Furthermore, the Folcroft situation received considerably more local media attention than Levittown had. Unlike Levittown, Folcroft was the lead story for several days in two of the cities major papers, *The Philadelphia Inquirer* and the *Philadelphia Bulletin*. Six years earlier, the Myers move to Levittown had been covered by the city’s major papers, but only received banner headline attention in the city’s African American twice weekly, *The Philadelphia Tribune*. Indeed, the *Philadelphia Bulletin* dedicated its entire editorial page to reader responses to the events occurring in Folcroft on September 10, something that had not even done by *The Tribune* six years earlier. Why the increased media attention?\(^2\)

Undoubtedly, the increasing prominence of the national civil rights movement had changed the moral playing field upon which events like the Baker’s move to Folcroft played in the Philadelphia area’s public sphere. In fact, the racial violence at Folcroft occurred *two days* after Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech, a moment many later observers have recognized as a symbolic high point of the civil rights movement. Clearly, the significance of this jarring juxtaposition of events was not lost of the editors of *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, who were quick to strongly condemn the events of Folcroft in their lead editorial on Saturday August 31. However, more revelatory than the official editorial response was the “voice of the people”. As was mentioned above, the *Philadelphia Bulletin* dedicated their entire editorial page on September 10 to reader responses. Of the responses printed, 26 were in favor of the actions taken by Folcroft’s

---

white residents; 24 condemned them. Even if the letters printed did not accurately reflect
general public opinion, the amount of letters in favor of the white mobs indicate a large
degree of support for white neighborhood “defence.”

The pro-mob letters are significant not simply because they indicate large amounts
of racist sentiment in the Philadelphia area, though. They also indicate the degree to which
the institutionalized racism of America’s building and real estate practices had cemented
the link in many people’s minds between the achievement of the post-World War II
“American dream” - private property ownership in the suburbs - with racial exclusion.
Specific reader responses are instructive. For example, Mrs. Ellen McRawle wrote:
“Everyone should enjoy basic civil rights but no one should infringe on the rights of
others - our private rights to be able to live in an area free from other races.” Likewise, an
unnamed “Liberty Fighter” from Folcroft wrote: “Many people say we give the United
States a bad reputation. Well I believe we are fighting for liberty.” To Mrs. E. B. and
Mrs. J. McD., also from Folcroft, claimed it was the Bakers who should shoulder the
blame: “The Bakers stated ‘their dream had come true when they found this home’. Is
their dream such that they went to our police department to ask for an escort into their
new home? They knew then that people would not welcome them, but to them only their
dreams counted, not the dreams of the rest of the community.” W.H.C. posed his (?)
letter as a question: “Why, in a democracy, can the desires of one family outweigh those
of a hundred families? Why do some of these Negroes so dislike their own kind that they
refuse to live amongst them?”

What is fascinating about these responses is the way the ideas of democracy and
liberty - so central to American identity - are used to defend the “right” to exclude African

---

Americans. These letters get to the very heart of the dilemma faced by people like Morris Milgram. Many white people’s conceptions of themselves as American *citizens* was most clearly and proudly expressed - by 1963 - through their ownership of a well-kept suburban home in a neighborhood of well-kept suburban homes. Unfortunately for Milgram and like-minded reformers, real estate and property development businesses (assisted at least initially by government policy) had institutionalized an idea of the “well-kept neighborhood” as being free of racial minorities, most specifically African Americans. Whether or not these institutions imposed this idea from above or acted in response to the buying public’s “concerns”, by 1963, the die had been cast. The ground rules in the home buying market had been place for a long enough time to ensure residential segregation, a residential segregation many white homeowners began to see as the natural order of things, so much so that many whites were willing to fight violently to maintain their “natural right” to a racially homogenous community.

As African American movement to the burgeoning suburbs was being severely restricted, Philadelphia’s black population remained in several gradually expanding “ghettos”. The most notorious of these areas, “the jungle” of Lower North Philadelphia, would explode in three days of rioting during August 1964. The riot was sparked at 9:35 PM on the evening of Friday, August 28 - almost a year to the day of the Bakers’ move to Folcroft - when two policemen attempted to forcibly arrest Mrs. Odessa Bradford after she refused to move a car that was blocking the intersection of 22nd Street and Columbia Avenue. As police officer John Hoffer attempted to do so, a man by the name of James Mettles emerged from a crowd that had gathered and attacked Hoffer. By the time Mettles and Bradford had been brought under control and were being taken away by the police, bricks and bottles were raining down from nearby rooftops on to the police
officers who had responded to officer Robert Wells’s (John Hoffer’s partner) call for backup. Quickly a rumor spread through the neighborhood that a white police officer had beaten and shot to death a pregnant black woman. By midnight, six hundred police officers descended on Lower North Philadelphia to try to stem the rioting and looting, but it quickly became clear they would not be able to control the enraged mobs. As the night progressed several community leaders, including popular Disc Jockey Georgie Woods, Chester NAACP leader Stanley Branche and (by 3:45 AM) Philadelphia NAACP leader Cecil Moore tried to calm the situation, but to no avail. Only by 9 AM did the crowds begin to thin. Rioting and looting recommenced on Saturday night, despite an invocation by Mayor James Tate of a curfew subjecting anyone to arrest who did not stay indoors and the presence of 1,800 police officers.  

By Sunday evening, the rioting finally began to die down. However, the previous two nights had taken their toll on the area. The statistics Matthew Countryman cites are instructive. Of 170 businesses within a five block radius of where Odessa Bradford was initially arrested, only 54 survived the weekend undamaged. The businesses that were attacked were almost entirely white-owned. 52 of the 54 were clearly identifiable as black-owned, while the other two had Chinese proprietors. In addition to damage done to property, two people were killed (both black residents), 339 people were injured (100 cops and 239 black residents) and 308 people were arrested.  

Of course, the rioting was not simply the result of this incident: it was the product of years of racism, both personal and institutional in nature. Most relevant to the present study, the rioting was quite literally a desperate and futile attempt to physically remove the shackles of segregated living space after years of trying to do so.

---


Ibid., 309.
unsuccessfully through institutional channels. But rather than redressing the legitimate
grievances much of Philadelphia’s African American population had about the
discriminatory nature of the housing market, it had the tragic effect of reinforcing the kind
of beliefs like those held by the residents of Folcroft. As David Bartelt and Ira Goldstein
state: “The public rhetoric after the riot was expressed in a variety of contexts (for
instance, crime, safety, insurance, education, and so forth) but with a simple bottom line:
if you are white, get out of the city if you can.” Bartlet and Goldstein are correct to note
the powerful symbolic quality the 1964 riot had on the consciousness of white
Philadelphians. However, they misinterpret the riots as being a turning point in how
whites conceptualized race and residence in the city and its suburbs. Rather than a turning
point, the riots served as a capstone to a process of residential segregation which had been
greatly accelerated by the character of the post-1945 suburban building boom. The
information in Figures 4, 5 and 6 bear out this assertion: no significant change in the
demographic trajectory of white flight and black ghetto consolidation occurred as a result
of the 1964 riot. Indeed, as the Concord Park and Levittown stories show, Philadelphia
area residents had already learned the “rules of the game”: the 1964 riots only served to
confirm what they already knew.87

Retrospectively, the 1964 riot seems to prove that America’s postwar corporatist
system, of which supposedly “democratized” private housing was a crucial part, was
fatally flawed. As the riot made physically clear, a system predicated on the almost
complete exclusion of a large segment of the population from large parts of the
metropolitan landscape could not remain stable. Thus, the difficulties faced by both

---
Figure 1

NON WHITE HOUSEHOLDS, 1950

IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS OF PHILADELPHIA

BY CENSUS TRACTS

SOURCE: U.S. CENSUS, 1950

PERCENT OF ALL DWELLING UNITS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0% - 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1% - 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10% - 20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20% - 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50% - 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PREPARED FOR THE PHILADELPHIA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS BY THE PHILADELPHIA HOUSING ASSOCIATION JUNE 1953
CROWDING, 1950

IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS OF PHILADELPHIA

BY CENSUS TRACTS

SOURCE: U.S. CENSUS, 1950

MORE THAN ONE PERSON PER ROOM

- 0% - 5%
- 5% - 10%
- 10% - 15%
- 15% - 20%
- 20% - 100%

SCALE 1 MILE

PREPARED FOR THE PHILADELPHIA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS BY THE PHILADELPHIA HOUSING ASSOCIATION JUNE 1953
Figure 3

DWELLING UNITS DILAPIDATED OR LACKING PRIVATE BATH, 1950

IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS OF PHILADELPHIA

BY CENSUS TRACTS

PERCENT OF ALL DWELLING UNITS

- 0% - 5%
- 5% - 10%
- 10% - 20%
- 20% - 40%
- 40% - 100%

SOURCE: U.S. CENSUS, 1950
PREPARED FOR THE PHILADELPHIA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS BY THE PHILADELPHIA HOUSING ASSOCIATION JUNE 1953
Figure 4

- Race and owner occupancy, citywide and in selected areas, 1940–1980

Figure 5


Table 3.5  Proportion of migrants to the Philadelphia region choosing a suburban location, 1955–1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>76.9%</td>
<td>77.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>80.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.6  City-suburban mobility of residential population of Philadelphia region by race, 1955–1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See Table 3.5.
Bibliography

Archival Sources

Temple University Urban Archives

City of Philadelphia Municipal Archives

The Free Library of Philadelphia - Periodical Collection

Levittown, New York Public Library

Bucks County, Pennsylvania Historical Society (Doylestown, PA)

Secondary Sources


Federal Housing Administration. *United States Federal Housing Administration


