THE LOGISTICS OF POWER:
TOKUGAWA RESPONSE TO THE SHIMABARA REBELLION
AND POWER PROJECTION IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY JAPAN

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
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By

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ABSTRACT

How would America react if today’s top news story told us that over three million U.S. soldiers, sailors, and marines, sent to southern Florida to quiet a regional rebellion against Federal authority, executed nearly 650,000 of their fellow countrymen in a single day? Violence of this scale and severity seems almost beyond our comprehension. However, a scenario of exactly these hideous proportions played out in southwestern Japan almost four centuries years ago.

After a generation of peace in Japan, in 1637 peasants on Kyushu Island in southern Japan, distraught over horrible treatment at the hands of cruel lords, killed the local magistrate and took control of their village. The rebellion soon spread as peasants in village after village rose up against the taxation and collection methods that left them destitute, starving, and subject to routine torture. Christianity, introduced a century earlier by Portuguese Jesuits, re-emerged as a rallying ideology for the peasants whose numbers swelled to over 30,000. Within just a few weeks the Tokugawa Shogun, the central authority in early modern Japan, assembled and deployed an army of perhaps 150,000 soldiers to Kyushu (750 miles from the capital in present-day Tokyo) to confront the rebel peasants who took refuge in an abandoned castle. After a three-month siege, the castle fell to the central government army, and a general slaughter followed as almost 30,000 Japanese peasants were beheaded, burnt, or drowned.
This dissertation examines the mechanics of how the Tokugawa were able to project military and political authority by fielding one of the largest, and potentially forceful, armies in the early modern world to confront and massacre their own subjects. It details the military, political, and economic apparatus used by the Tokugawa to mobilize, equip, and deploy an army greater than any European state could have at that time. This study will argue that the ability to maintain tremendous logistical ability, even during prolonged periods without war, underpinned the Tokugawa ability to project power, and thereby impose their authority on Japan for over two centuries.
For Nancy and Yasuko
This dissertation would not have been possible without the assistance, guidance, and encouragement of many people. First, I would like to thank Professor Edward I-te Chen for instilling in me a love of Asian history and encouraging me to pursue graduate education.

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Any mistakes or errors contained herein are entirely my own.
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CONVENTIONS

Dates

Dates are converted to Gregorian equivalents according to Nojima Jûsaburo, *Nihon reki seireki gappi shotaihyo*. (Tokyo: Nichi gai asoshieetsu, 1987)

Proper Nouns

For continuity and ease of reading, the names of military leaders (*daimyô*, their relatives, and vassals and Tokugawa liege vassals) are given as family name followed by adult given name. Where several adult given names were used, the most common is given preference. Romanization of given names follows Nichigai Associates, eds, *Nihonshi jinmei yomikata jiten* [Guide to Reading of First Names from Ancient Times down to the Edo Era] (Tokyo: Nichigai Associates, 1999).

The names of authors given in the text will follow Western order (given name followed by surname) unless the referenced work is in the Japanese language in which case Japanese order will be followed (surname then given name).

Early Modern Japanese Terminology & Concepts

Because one goal of this dissertation is to make early modern Japanese military history accessible to military historians without a background in Japanese history, many terms and features relating to early modern Japan will receive explanation that may seem unnecessary to historians of Japan.
Prologue

How would America react if today’s top news story told us that:

“Today workers smothered the last bonfires used to dispose of nearly 650,000 Floridians who rebelled against local, state, and federal authority last winter. The series of man-made and natural events that led some citizens of the Sunshine State to rebellion seem staggering in hindsight. Following a three-week-long winter frost that destroyed the year’s entire citrus and melon crop, spring rains flooded not only farms, thus ruining the spring strawberry, banana, and broccoli harvests, but also flooded homes up and down both coasts. Then the worst summer drought since the 1930s devastated the peanut, rice, berry, and watermelon crops. Finally, Mother Nature left tens of thousand of Floridians homeless when hurricane Irene destroyed homes, businesses, and roads along Florida’s normally prosperous and fashionable Gold Coast. Miami and surrounding areas were hardest hit.

Politicians exacerbated the already skyrocketing unemployment and inflation rates caused by the natural calamities of previous months by raising existing income and sales taxes, and creating new and insidious taxes. Suddenly, mostly homeless, jobless southern Florida residents faced new inflated prices on everything from gasoline to food and hotel rates to car, boat, and motorcycle taxes under the guise of ‘vice’ and ‘use’ taxes.

Hobbled by the overwhelming financial burden created by natural catastrophe and political malfeasance, beleaguered Floridians flocked to the call-to-arms from local militia groups. Once thought of as cultish weekend warriors and backwards racists, private militias promised citizens what the state and federal government could not: self-reliance, weapons, support, and sense of belonging. Not only did the rosters of local militias suddenly swell exponentially, they combined to create regional militias. Eventually, the regional militias joined to form the “Florida Freedom Movement,” with a membership of over half a million. Though most FFM members were not fundamentalist Christians, they used evangelical Christianity as symbolically cohesive ideology for the movement, even if in name only.

Armed to the teeth, angry, and motivated by fundamentalist righteousness, FFM members were enraged by sweeping new taxes conceived by the city comptroller and issued by the mayor. The execution of a FFM leader on murder charges that appeared fabricated by the state police pushed members beyond the breaking point. The militia began seizing state property and goods. Soon violence broke out all across the state as militia members fought with police and the Florida National Guard. Law enforcement was out numbered and losing to the militia, whose numbers grew as they made their way across the state to Miami, leaving havoc and ruin in their wake. The militia mob occupied Dolphin Stadium and began stocking it with supplies.
In December, the President suspended the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 and called on the National Guards of all 48 continental states, including the remainder of Florida's Guard, and Department of Defense forces to converge on Florida and put down the rebellion. Within weeks, over three million guardsmen, supported by every branch of the military, arrived in Florida and began attacking the FFM's stadium stronghold. After three months of fierce fighting, the FFM capitulated to the combined Federal-State forces. In an effort to prevent similar rebellions elsewhere, the President ordered that no quarter be given to FFM members; the Federal forces were ordered to kill every single man, woman, and child who fought with, or supported, the FFM. By April 1", Federal forces had killed in battle or systematically executed nearly 650,000 of their fellow countrymen.

The death toll was so high that tremendous fires were the only available method of disposing of the rebel corpses before disease could take hold in and around Miami. Today police found the Miami comptroller dead in his office – the victim of suicide. He may have only just escaped the execution by Presidential order suffered by Miami’s mayor earlier this week. While the skies of Miami are still black with the final remains of American citizens, the two men who left them destitute and disenfranchised through economic and political ineptitude have faced the same ultimate punishment as the people they were charged with administering. Americans, and their politicians, everywhere – some just as desperate as those in Miami – have taken note of how this administration deals with insurrection.” (USA Today, April 15, 2001, page A1)

Violence of this scale and severity seems almost beyond our comprehension. However, a scenario of exactly these proportions played out in southwestern Japan almost four centuries years ago…
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Legend of Shimabara

Lord Matsudaira, senior member of the Tokugawa Council of Elders, looked on from a raised platform as a young peasant mother tearfully examined a parade of severed human heads. Among them she identified the head of her emaciated son. Thus, the events of past months concluded for the mother of Amakusa Shirō, figurehead of the Shimabara Rebellion. This grisly scene played out against a backdrop of human bonfires and mass executions by decapitation and drowning as Tokugawa forces eliminated most of Shimabara’s Christian rebels following the 1638 siege of Hara Castle.

In the autumn of 1637, peasants on the Shimabara Peninsula in southwest Japan (750 miles from modern Tokyo) rebelled in the face of economic despair, religious oppression, and exploitation at the hands of local lords. Within days, the rebellion spread until more than 30,000 peasants were embroiled in the only large-scale challenge to the central authority of the Tokugawa Shogunate since its consolidation in 1615. Although the Tokugawa war machine had been unused for over twenty years, within two weeks the Shogunal government had been informed and developed a strategy to deal with the
rebellion. In less than a month the Tokugawa amassed one of the largest siege armies in the early modern world – nearly 150,000 troops strong – to confront the rebels. The Tokugawa managed to keep their massive army in the field for the next three months; and when the rebels finally broke from hunger and exhaustion, the Tokugawa massacred nearly all of them.

Following the slaughter of the Shimabara rebels, Tokugawa authority did not face another significant military threat for almost 250 years. The Tokugawa display of power in response to the Shimabara rebellion helped to ensure their authority was not challenged again until internal decay and foreign pressure (naiyū-gaikan) finally brought about their downfall in the late nineteenth century. Simply put, by projecting power through immense violence committed on its own subjects, the Tokugawa state inaugurated one of the longest periods of state peace in human history.

**Surrounded by Pen and Ink**

The Shimabara Rebellion is one of the best-documented uprisings of the mid-17th century. Not only do copious records describing the rebellion and siege remain, the range of sources describing the events of 1637-1638 includes a full complement of firsthand perspectives save one – the rebels themselves. The testimony of Japanese and foreign witnesses, official accounts, normative descriptions of the siege warfare, and literary narratives burgeoned from the events at Hara Castle. The impact of these varying accounts is evident from the nearly four centuries they have been reproduced, reconstructed, and disseminated. For four hundred years, descriptions of Shimabara have
endured in Japanese and Western historical and literary collections. The rebellion and siege were not only well documented, the legacy of those witnesses, participants, and onlookers who recorded what they saw, or in some cases heard, endured generations, changes of governments, world wars, and modernization.

A variety of Japanese documented and then distributed what they witnessed. Within months of the slaughter, popular chapbooks of the rebellion and siege began circulating throughout Japan. Most relied on the standard accounts of bakufu (shogunal government) and daimyô officials actually at the siege and incorporated their misunderstandings and biases. William Elliot Griffis, a professor of culture at a preparatory university in Fukui Han from 1872 until 1927, obtained a copy of one such work, the Shimabara Kassen, originally published in 1640.¹ He put his own cover with notes on it, and donated it before his death the following year to the Cornell University Library.² The furigana (phonetic gloss) to the right of the text indicates that this was a story intended for non-scholars of the day – in other words, for a more popular consumption. (See Figure 1.1)

The daimyô and their troops also recorded the events on the Shimabara Peninsula in the form of descriptive maps that spread across the country. Examples survive in the collections of domain documents from as far north as modern Sendai, throughout Honshu, Kyushu, and of course the city of Shimabara. (See Figure 1.2) As with the pamphlets, entrepreneurs recreated maps drawn at the scene and then distributed them for the masses, again with glosses for easy reading.³

² Shimabara Kassen, 1640 (Cornell University Libraries: Kroch Library Rare & Manuscripts; Asia Rare).
³ Dozens of these maps from around Japan are available in Kanô Collection of Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan. See also: “Hizen no kuni Shimabara Harajô ikki zûsho.” Document 37.9, Shimabara City Library
Figure 1.1: Detail of “Shimabara Kassen” table of contents.  
(Cornell University Libraries: Kroch Library Rare & Manuscripts; Asia Rare.)
Figure 1.2: “Hizen no kuni Shimabara Harajô ikki zusho.”
(Document 37.9, Shimabara City Library Archives.)
To date, thousands of pages of primary and secondary manuscript material (many redundant) regarding the Shimabara Rebellion and siege of Hara have been transcribed and published in Japanese. Some of them are very reliable transcriptions of primary documents: communiqués, orders, reports, receipts, etc. Some are the official and standard accounts like the *Shimabara Kassen*, which was eventually used to supply details about the rebellion and siege for the *Tokugawa Jikki* (*True Record of the Tokugawa*). Others, like the three-volume *Harajyō kiji* is 385 pages of material on the siege alone pieced together from over eighty-four other sources, some primary some secondary (although lacking citations or annotations it is of little historical use without corroboration). The *Harajyō kiji*, published in 1927 does, however, demonstrate the interest the siege maintained in popular and scholarly circles throughout the early modern, and into the modern, eras. Archivists have done tremendous work compiling a record of the events at Shimabara in 1637-8, but little has been done to organize or classify these materials. Although all of these works provide a reliable outline of their subject, their “facts” must be used judiciously.

This dissertation relies heavily on two such works: *Shimabara Hantō Shi* [History of the Shimabara Peninsula] and *Genshiryō de tsudzuru Amakusa Shimabara no Ran* [Primary Documents Spelling Out the Amakusa-Shimabara Rebellion]. These

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anthologies, compiled in 1956 and 1996 respectively, contain transcriptions of the hundreds of known documents relating to the rebellion and siege. They include Tokugawa government and military correspondence, *daimyō* orders and letters, merchant receipts, and even translations of better-known Dutch sources. In all, they encompass thousands of pages of (sometimes overlapping) documents. For reasons described above, use of these documents necessarily requires caution, and whenever possible corroboration by multiple sources. Surprisingly, although this wealth of material is well known, it has been rarely used, “hiding in plain sight” waiting for discerning use in describing the dramatic events of the late 1630s.

The only new significant document related to the rebellion is a hundred-page manuscript titled “*Gō shûjinchû gōdaidokoro nikki*” [On Campaign Kitchen Chronicle] found among piles of other documents in the out building of a former samurai family home outside Fukuoka City in Fukuoka Prefecture. Because of a desire to sell the document to the highest bidder, the family has restricted access to it within Japan. However, they felt that limited use in this thesis would not harm their chances of high domestic bids and I was therefore allowed to photograph the entire record.

Foreign accounts of the rebellion and siege range from eyewitness declarations by participants, to third-hand recollections, to heavily prejudiced background describing the persecution of Christians often credited with inciting the rebellion. Thanks to Nicholas Koeckebacker [a.k.a. Couckebacker] two sets of Dutch documents pertaining to the rebellion and siege exist – each uncensored by Japanese officials. First, letters from Koeckebacker at the Dutch Factory in Hirado to Antonio van Diemen, Governor General
at Batavia, provide a regular account of the rebellion and siege. Second, the “diary” kept by Koeckebacker while head of the Dutch Factory also provides almost daily accounts of local events – fortunate because of the close proximity of Hirado to Shimabara. Together, Koeckebacker’s letters and diary provide an unusually clear picture of his perspective of the rebellion and participation in the siege – the latter often credited with securing Dutch relations with the ever-suspicious Shogun Iemitsu.

The French traveler Jean Baptiste Tavenier took his account of the siege, the last of his main writings about Asia, back to Europe and published it in both French and English in the late 1600s. While at a Dutch trading post on the Ganges in 1648, Tavenier heard and recorded the account of the rebellion and siege from a Dutch merchant who had been in Kyushu ten years earlier. His informant claimed to have heard the “bloody story” from rebels who escaped the Tokugawa slaughter and hid in the surrounding mountains. Tavenier defends the veracity of his third-hand account by citing the merchant’s inability to hold back tears as he concluded describing the “massacre so horrid.” Another account of the rebellion and siege appeared in a letter from the Portuguese sea captain Duarte Correa in the form of a letter was published in 1643. Finally, Manual de Faria y Sousa,

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9 Tavenier, A Collection of Several Relations & Treatise, 10-12.
10 Duarte Correa, Relaçam do alevatamento de Ximabara, e du seu notavel cerco, e de varias mortes Portuguezes po la Fé (Lisbon, 1643). See also the English language translation, Guilherme João Carlos Henriques trans., An account of the rising at Ximabara, and of the notable siege thereof: and the deaths of various of our Portuguese fellow-countrymen for the faith (Alemquer: Campeão & Ca.: 1901).
a court historian to King John IV of Portugal, also wrote about the Tokugawa persecution from second-hand sources. His works, originally written in Spanish and translated into Portuguese in 1666 and English in 1695, drew together, and quoted, Jesuit letters that ascribed the rebellion mainly to the persecution of Japanese Christians and Jesuits in Japan.\footnote{Manual de Faria y Sousa, \textit{The Portuguese Asia: or the History of the Discovery and Conquest of India by the Portuguese}, Part III (C. Brome: London, 1695) 318-19. Although Faria y Sousa died in 1649, the Portuguese edition of this chronicle was not published until 1666.}

\textit{A Lasting Impression}

Between Dutch, English, French, Portuguese and Spanish sources, the history of the Christians in Kyushu, the Shimabara Rebellion, and the siege of Hara Castle appear to be the most heavily chronicled events of 17th-century Japanese history found in Western annals; but the interest proved short-lived. In Japan, by contrast, it endured. Reinforcing the books and maps circulating around Japan, in 1838 the Kuroda Daimyou of Fukuoka commissioned a \textit{byobu} (folding screen) in gold commemorating the 200th anniversary of Tokugawa military grandeur at the siege (See Figures 6.1 & 6.2 in Chapter 6 below). Noticeably the screens do not depict the rebellion, or its causes, but the glory of Tokugawa response alone.

Even the foreigners who flooded Japan following the Meiji restoration, returned home to Europe and American with reports of Shimabara. The Reverend Henry Stout, who taught biblical studies from his home in Nagasaki, toured the ruins of Hara Castle in 1879, took notes and etchings, and published them in Great Britain and the United States.
Figure 1.3: Selected locations mentioned in the text
that same year. Reverend Stout transcribed a glorious homage to the fallen Itakura Shigemasa, designed in 1681 by his descendants, but not erected or inscribed until 1791 with the help of local clergy. No doubt somewhat more weathered than when Reverend Stout first saw it, the monument still stands today.

In 1883, A. J. C. Geerts published Nicholaes Koeckebacker’s correspondence about the siege in the original Dutch with loose English translations in the *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*. Dr. Ludwig Riess, a German professor of history in Japan for fifteen years, presented the rebellion and siege to modern Germany in *Der Aufstand von Shimabara* in 1891. Seven years later, M. Steichen published his version of the Shimabara saga, *L’Insurrection de Shimabara*, in Tokyo. Riess and Steichen both used, or were more likely directed to by their Japanese hosts, official sources like *Shimabara Kassen* and *Arima no ki* to construct their own accounts of the rebellion and siege. Therefore, within decades of the Meiji restoration, the story of Shimabara reached Europe and America in Dutch, English, French, and German. More than two and a half centuries had not dispelled interest in the tragic story of the rebellion and siege.

In the twentieth-century, the Japanese continued documenting the rebellion with a tourist-oriented book published by the “Unzen Information Bureau [near modern Shimabara province].” Interestingly, the title, *An Epic of Christianity in Shimabara*, the

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13 Stout, “Inscriptions at Shimabara and Amakusa,” 188.


dramatic presentation of the content, and the fact that it was published in English in 1928, all point toward enticing Western Christians to the events that occurred at Shimabara for the benefit of local tourism. The rebellion’s mystique even garnered a historical novel, *Shimabara*, in 1986 – fiction based very loosely on the events of 1637-8. Today the Shimabara rebellion lives on in academic circles through brief references in almost every survey of early modern Japan, in English or Japanese.

In 1996, a commission of archeologists, historians, and local archivists (many lay volunteers), participated in a partial excavation of Hara Castle and published their archeological findings in the “proceedings” of the conference that followed. In 1998, residents of Shimabara Peninsula gathered in Arima near the site of old Hara Castle to participate in a symposium honoring the victims of the slaughter that occurred there 360 years earlier.

The modern tourist trade has even taken advantage of the enduring Shimabara myth. Restaurant menus, five-kilometer races, and summer festivals all celebrate the legend of Shimabara. Building on the archives related to the rebellion held at the Shimabara public library and the rebuilt Shimabara Castle that is now a museum, the city of Arima has built and continues to fund both a “Hara Castle Cultural Center” and a series of excavations of Hara Castle and the surrounding battlefield. The Center has even produced a hardbound

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17 *An Epic of Christianity in Shimabara* (Unzen Information Bureau, 1928).
comic book extolling the virtues of the rebel figurehead Amakusa Shirô and reminding Shimabara youngsters of the tragedy that took place in their homeland.\(^{20}\)

It is clear that a mythology surrounding the religious aspects of the rebels’ cause and the Tokugawa fear of that foreign ideology have endured in various literary and other forms for over four centuries. Casual treatment of the rebellion and siege has even led to assumptions and observations that are at best misleading and at worst simply incorrect. In *The Book of the Samurai: The Warrior Class of Japan* Stephen Turnbull states that “In reality the Shimabara Rebellion was a severe embarrassment to the Tokugawa rulers … Although ultimately successful, the campaign was a portent for the decline in samurai fighting skills.”\(^{21}\) This is an interesting, and sweeping, observation, but unfortunately it does not entirely fit the facts. It is, along with the myth about the importance of Christianity in the rebellion and siege, a generally held but largely unexamined belief about Shimabara. Dr. Turnbull is only partially correct. Although the rebellion did encompass the sum of Tokugawa, and daimyô, fears, it did not prove an embarrassment (except possibly for the fallen General Itakura Shigemasa – see Chapter 2 below). The rebellion was also not a complete failure for the rebels: survivors on the peninsula, and peasants transplanted to the area after the siege, benefited from elimination of some of the factors that caused the rebellion in the first place.


\(^{21}\) Stephen Turnbull, *The Book of the Samurai: The Warrior Class of Japan* (London: PRC Publishing, Ltd., 1982) 123. Sadly, Dr. Turnbull, who advertises himself as “…the leading authority outside Japan on the samurai.”, does not tell us which documents or scholarship lead him to these conclusions. In fact, his bibliography lists thirty-six works, thirty-two in English (including four that are his own) and four in Japanese.
Despite nearly 400 years of excavations, compilations of historical documents, accounts compiled from around the world, comic books, and other popular remembrances of the Shimabara Rebellion and siege, surprisingly little critical analysis has been undertaken on Shimabara as one of the most important military events of the early 17th century. The events at Shimabara are mentioned in almost every study of early modern Japan, Western or Japanese, but these glosses are largely limited to mention of the religious aspects of the rebellion and the Tokugawa response. In 1960, the Japanese scholar Okada Akio described the brutal end of the Shimabara Rebellion in his biography of its symbolic leader titled *Amakusa Tokisada* (a.k.a. Amakusa Shirô). Okada’s monograph chronicles the rebellion from inception through the sacking of Hara Castle from the perspective of Amakusa. Its principal difference from Ebisawa Arimichi’s 1967 monograph is the rendering of Amakusa Tokisada’s name in the title as *Amakusa Shirô.*

Ebisawa’s account of the rebellion, part of the *Nihon no Bushô* (Japanese Generals) series, also focuses on Amakusa’s role in the rebellion as a “Christian General.” Both of these works provide a general treatment of the topic, concentrating particularly on the significance of Christianity. Neither seriously engages the body of post-war scholarship on the power of the early modern state.

The 1980’s and 90’s witnessed a renewed interest in the history of the Tokugawa period (1600-1868) in the Japanese media and popular press. In the same vein as NHK’s (Japan Broadcasting) documentaries of Hideyoshi’s career and the legend of Japan’s early modern rogue warrior-savant Miyamoto Musashi, popular history pocketbooks engage Japanese commuters with tales of the feudal era. Two of these popular histories

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published in the 1980’s, *Shimabara no Ran* by Irimoto Masao and *Shimabara Kassenki* by Shimura Kunihiro, make the rebellion accessible to the non-academic community.\(^{23}\) Although they provide accurate descriptions of the rebellion, neither work is scholarly and neither forms part of an ongoing historical dialogue.

Three other studies provide the bulk of English language scholarship concerning the Shimabara Rebellion. C.R. Boxer’s classic 1951 study of Christianity in the early modern period *The Christian Century in Japan: 1549-1650* relies mostly on Portuguese primary sources for a brief depiction of the rebellion as it relates to the persecution of Christianity and the eventual “closing” of Japan in 1639.\(^{24}\) Similarly, Jurgis Elisonas’ monograph *Deus Destroyed: The Image of Christianity in Early Modern Japan*, published in 1973, examines the Shimabara Rebellion as one element in the suppression of Christianity and expulsion of foreigners in the early modern period.\(^{25}\) Elisonas’ study draws on an impressive array of Japanese, Portuguese, Dutch, and English sources. Elisonas also provides valuable translations of Japanese and Portuguese primary materials related to Christianity in Tokugawa Japan in an extensive appendix. A third study, Ivan Morris’ 1975 *The Nobility of Failure: Tragic Heroes in the History of Japan* includes a chapter that relies almost entirely on secondary scholarship to create a colorful narrative of the rebellion’s failed hero, Amakusa Shirō.\(^{26}\)

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Scholarship concerning the Shimabara Rebellion revolves around two themes, both of which focus particular attention on its religious dimension. First, the influence of foreign ideology, namely Catholicism brought to late 16th and early 17th century Japan by Portuguese missionaries, is credited with creating the impetus and character of the peasant unrest at Shimabara. More important is the overwhelming consensus that the Tokugawa bakufu reacted primarily to the Christian nature of the rebellion and the inherent threat of foreign ideology to Tokugawa control. Further, it appears that bakufu fear of foreign influence as manifested in the Shimabara rebellion hastened the closing of Japan in 1639, a critical element in our current understanding of the Tokugawa baku-han state.

There are, however, crucial but largely unexplored dimensions to the Shimabara Rebellion. This single event contravened fifty years of Toyotomi and Tokugawa socio-political controls, only one of which was the prohibition on Christianity. Regardless of their motivation, or Christian cohesion, the Shimabara rebels perforated Tokugawa order, prompting the lone use of large-scale military force by the Tokugawa in the 240 years from the fall of Osaka Castle until the arrival of United States Commodore Matthew C. Perry in 1853 and the subsequent Meiji restoration. Despite these facts, no studies, whether in English or Japanese, have approached the Rebellion or siege as a military event.
Strategy, Tactics, and Logistics

Early Western definitions of logistics stem from the naval ‘quartermasters’ responsible for overseeing the storage of supplies in the ship’s hold. On land, the quartermaster’s supply duties became the earliest logistical work, defined by an early Puritan writer as, “A quarter~master, who goeth before hand to prepare quarters for soldierns.”27 The early modern Japanese equivalent to logistics, heitangaku (兵站学) also describes the quartermasters’ work, or, the science of military ‘stops’ [for lodging and re-supply]. In the Western tradition, several modern English language sources credit the French with development of logistics as an independent military activity. Nation and Athenæum tells us that, “Strategy is the art of handling troops in the theatre of war; tactics that of handling them on the field of battle… The French have a third process, which they call logistics, the art of moving and quartering troops, i.e., quartermaster-general's work.”28 In 1947, The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research of Great Britain also attributed modern logistics as employed by the U.S. to the French: “The Americans use the word ‘logistics’ to describe the technique of packing stores... It is derived from the French ‘maître du logie’ [master of quarters].”29

27 William Gouge, A learned commentary on the whole Epistle to the Hebrewes (London: 1655, 1866).
In his pioneering study of logistics, *Supplying War*, Martin van Creveld offers a somewhat narrow, though traditional, definition of logistics as “…the practical art of moving armies and keeping them supplied.”³⁰ Van Creveld’s definition is closer to a description of what early modern quartermasters did than the modern concept of military logistics. As John Lynn points out, van Creveld’s definition leaves out several important elements.³¹ First, van Creveld ignores naval logistics entirely, preferring to focus exclusively on the supply of land warfare. Second, van Creveld leaves little room for examination of financing or raising troops; topics that are crucial to other scholars’ approaches to logistics.

John F. Guilmartin provides a broader, more realistic, definition of logistics as “…the procurement, marshalling, and deployment of resources [for war]”³² Guilmartin includes the finance, mobilization, and naval logistics absent from van Creveld’s definition. However, three more areas of military logistics should be considered. The services that troops in the field require, such as medical and spiritual support (not all of them involving tangible assets), are military necessities, and therefore should fall under the rubric of logistics. So too, should command and control structures that administer the “procurement, marshalling, and deployment of resources.” Finally, we might also consider construction of physical facilities, earthworks, and their maintenance to be a separate but vital branch of logistics. In a 1947 U.S. Marine Corps study, Admiral Henry


Eccles defined logistics more broadly as, “...the provision of the physical means by which power is exercised by organized forces. In military terms, it is the creation and sustained support of combat forces and weapons. Its objective is maximum sustained combat effectiveness.”

Combining services, command and control, and construction with Guilmartin’s definition of logistics and Eccles’ stress on objectives, we might arrive at the following definition: logistics is the procurement, marshalling, command, maintenance, and deployment of resources and services for sustained combat effectiveness. With this definition in mind I explore logistics in this study.

We must note, however, that applying this definition of logistics to the study of early modern Japan’s military is artificial and therefore will not always provide complete parity between definition and reality. The 17th-century Japanese soldier, sailor, and general alike viewed what has been defined here as ‘logistics’ as an inherent part of all military endeavors – not a separate arena of military activity. Today logistics is not a distinct topic of study among Japanese scholars of pre-modern military history, and thus a curious reader will not find Japanese counterparts to Van Creveld or Lynn’s works on the subject. Despite voluminous writing on pre-modern military topics, logistics is not among them. The closest native modern Japanese word to logistics, hokyū keitō (補給系統), or supply system, does not incorporate all the elements of logistics as described above. In fact, the only Japanese word that corresponds to the modern Western military meaning of logistics is the Japanese phonetic equivalent: rojisutikkusu (ロジスティックス). Therefore, in

this study, logistics is a concept somewhat separated in time, culture, and language from the subject to which it is being applied – the siege of Hara Castle in 1637-8.

**Why Study Logistics?**

Even if we know what logistics is, why should we study it? Certainly, as Edward N. Luttwak points out, bean counting can be far less exiting than battle narrative or strategic analysis. On the other hand, maybe not. There are several very important reasons why logistics not only should be studied, but also provides a fascinating forum for understanding military and state history. First, logistics transcends each level of military activity. Again, Guilmartin’s words are instructive: “It is axiomatic – or should be – that logistics cannot be meaningfully addressed in isolation, but must be evaluated as a component of the greater strategic equation.” Eccles concurred: “In all war situations, the actions and decisions of command, whatever the level, are based upon a blend of strategical, logistical, and tactical considerations.” Indeed, state policies and the strategies and tactics designed to carry them out must always conform to the logistical reality, or what Rhoads Murphey calls the “immutable context.” Murphey goes on to note that “…the supply of armies in the field (especially when they stayed in the field over the winter months…) was still the Achilles heel of all pre-modern armies…”

36 Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*, 16.
Likewise Allan Millett and Williamson Murray, commenting on military effectiveness in the twentieth century, observe that:

“It is not uncommon for a tactical system to require greater support than a military organization can actually provide. … A related problem is the tendency to underestimate demands that a tactical system may place on troops … The result of such errors is usually the inability to maintain combat operations at the tempo required by the tactical system. Therefore, military organizations that exhibit this problem would be considered less tactically effective than those whose tactical systems or support capabilities were more realistic.”

Further, the acquisition of logistical resources is often a primary objective of state policy. The connection between logistics and military action on the tactical level is also inseparable. Without troops, their guns, and munitions there are no operations or tactics. Logistics does not take place in a vacuum. Logistics also traverses the intersection of the military, state, and society. Because the state and military necessarily draw upon the resources of the society for logistical purposes, more brutally in the early modern period, the study of logistics sheds light on the relationship between, and character of, a particular state and its society.

In addition to the ubiquitous nature of logistics in the military and society, it is also the most controllable element of military affairs. Few other areas of military planning and preparation have as deep an impact on success or failure as logistics. As we shall see in the course of this thesis, while no complex human activity is predetermined, historical examples abound of battles won or lost primarily by logisticians, months and years before the fighting began. The ability of humans to control logistics more than any other area of military endeavor, is another reason for us to study it. First, because so much less of

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logistics is left to accident, or Clauswitzian “chance,” due to the ability to make flexible preparations, the lens of logistics gives us a better opportunity to study the causes, effects, and processes of military events without as many interruptions from unexpected events. Further, because it is controllable to a greater degree, and because it is complex, logistics necessitates detailed written records, which often gives the historian greater access to the subject. 39

Beyond the presence and impact of logistics on military affairs, it also makes for fascinating narrative. To read the mechanics of how Ottoman horsemen prepared for war, or how the interaction of logistics and tactics led to modern technological marvels, is, I would argue, simply interesting. 40 Logistics also provides a narrative that most of us can readily understand. Few people resemble Philip II or Hideyoshi – but most can relate to the scribe, the armorer, and the porter. We can see and understand their role in the events of the day better than we might that of their rulers. In this sense, there is a third dimension to the significance of logistics for military history; logistics covers the spectrum of history from above, as well as from below.

Given the importance of logistics in general, why should we concentrate on the early modern period? Because, as John Lynn points out, the military, political and technological developments that define the early modern state also related mutually with logistics. 41 In addition, the growth of armies, expansion of state bureaucracies, and


40 Here we also see the interaction of logistics with technology.

41 Lynn, *Feeding Mars*, 103.
increase in naval exploration all influenced, and were influenced by, logistics. Therefore, it is in the early modern period that we see the first logistical revolution.

In Europe, the development of navies between 1500 and 1800 played a particularly significant role in the development of states. Navies developed hand-in-hand with enlarging bureaucratic and administrative structures. The expense of navies involved new interest groups such as investors and manufactures in the articulation of state policy. Navies also influenced the outcome of Continental military affairs through naval war in the Atlantic and overseas. Navies especially played a role in the power of territorially smaller states by leveling the military and economic playing field. The wealth derived from Asian and American possessions fueled Imperial Spain’s quest for Continental domination at the same time it allowed the Dutch and Portuguese to defy her. Finally, navies created the first state-level arms race by forcing European states to compete against each other or be left behind, spurring innovation and exploration that significantly benefited the Atlantic states.

Logistics, Power Projection, and Shimabara

Using manuscript, primary, and secondary documents, this dissertation will examine the Shimabara Rebellion and the siege of Hara Castle as military events. Within the context of the third Shogun Iemitsu’s campaign to consolidate Tokugawa central (kôgi) authority, it will examine in detail the Tokugawa military action at Shimabara and compare it with the Military Revolution underway elsewhere in the early modern world.

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42 Glete, Navies and Nations.
This study will also examine the Tokugawa political motivations, beyond the suppression of subversive Christian ideology, and conclude that the siege of Hara was used as an opportunity for the Tokugawa to project real as well as symbolic authority to the nation.

First, I will examine the peasant rebellion on the Shimabara Peninsula in 1637 and siege of those rebels in Hara Castle by the forces of the central authority, culminating in the peasants’ massacre in 1638. This is not as simple as it sounds because, although the Shimabara Rebellion is addressed in virtually every study of early seventeenth-century Japan as one of the most significant events of that period, only one aspect of the rebellion or siege has received adequate study or analysis: the religious dimension.

The peasants around Shimabara rebelled, like peasants elsewhere in the mid-17th century, primarily because of economic hardship. Famine in southwestern Japan in the late 1630s combined with vigorous, and irresponsible, tax collection by local authorities to create widespread, unbearable, poverty. The cruel collection methods used by local authorities exacerbated the peasants’ plight until armed rebellion seemed to them the only alternative. Only after the rebellion began did religion come into play as a ready-made cohesive ideology.

Likewise, suppression of Christianity was not the main reason for Tokugawa response to the rebellion. The rebels had, in fact, contravened almost every policy created by the Tokugawa to maintain order in the state, and their authority over it, since establishing their regime in 1600. The prohibition on Christianity was but one of many Tokugawa policies the rebels challenged. That may be why the heavy-handed Tokugawa response to the rebellion aimed primarily at demonstrating that flouting Tokugawa authority would meet with severe punishment.
These are not the only problems to a proper understanding of the rebellion and siege. In the past three and a half centuries, a wall of misconception and myth has built up around both. For example, look up the Shimabara Rebellion in any scholarship on Japanese history and you will find that the Tokugawa murdered every peasant rebel, to the last man, save one rebel traitor who garnered Tokugawa favor. This study demonstrates that this is simply not true: although thousands did perish, solid evidence, from both Japanese and Western witnesses to the siege, suggests that a significant number of the rebels escaped, and thus survived the massacre at Hara Castle in 1638.

After clarifying the facts surrounding the central event, this dissertation will consider how the seventeenth-century Japanese state maintained authority, and why this display of state force inaugurated two centuries of remarkable internal peace in Japan. Following the victory of their forces at the Battle of Sekigahara in 1600, the Tokugawa began establishing a regime that maintained authority over Japan for almost three centuries. How did the Tokugawa establish and maintain a state with one of the longest records of peace in human history?

Tokugawa Japan was in many respects a military state: especially in the seventeenth century political and social hierarchy, economic organization, and many cultural dimensions of early modern Japan revolved around the military class and their institutions. But, how do we study a military state at rest? The lack of large-scale organized violence in early modern Japan has thus far thwarted attempts by military historians at doing just that. We cannot, for example, look at how effective their military was in comparison with rival nations. The conventional methods for evaluating a military state, strategy, tactics, weapon technology, successes and failures, do us no good.
It is also difficult to estimate how well a peacetime state was able to maintain its military prowess.

Scholars used to view the Tokugawa regime as absolutist, retaining direct control over the human and natural resources of early modern Japan, but more recent scholarship has convincingly challenged this notion by showing that regional authorities (daimyô, or feudal lords) maintained a great deal of autonomy from the Tokugawa within their own domains. Some have even claimed that the Tokugawa were at times ineffectual figureheads who wielded only symbolic authority as head of a “flamboyant” government with little real power. How can we evaluate these competing claims about the actual authority of a peacetime military state?

Military logistics offers a new and reliable means of evaluating Tokugawa ability to project authority. Logistics is a window on military effectiveness in peacetime and in war alike. No matter how skilled or fierce an army’s soldiers may be, no matter how well trained or organized, if they cannot be gathered, deployed to the front, and then supplied with the necessary food, equipment, and services, they will almost certainly be ineffective. In the 1630s Cardinal Richelieu, chief minister of France, observed that, “One finds in the history books that many more armies perished through lack of food and lack of order than through enemy action.” His Asian contemporaries could have said

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the same. Further, to be effective in war, logistical ability must be prepared in advance of confrontation – in other words maintained in peacetime. Logistics, then, is a lens through which we can evaluate the actual prowess of the peacetime Tokugawa military state.

Within two weeks of the 1637 rebellion of peasants on Shimabara peninsula, the Tokugawa began to field 150,000 troops, an army far beyond the capacity of any European nation at the time. The Tokugawa were also able to keep that army in the field for three months, waging a war of starvation, until the peasants in Hara Castle weakened from hunger and could resist no more. The Tokugawa could not have succeeded so swiftly in a large-scale military action like the siege of Hara Castle without the use of a well-maintained pre-existing logistical system. How, then, after a nearly a generation of peace since 1616, could the Tokugawa perform such a logistical feat; and, what does that success tell us about Tokugawa authority? The remainder of this dissertation will answer those questions.

This study is divided into three parts. Part I, in addition to describing the military and historical setting for the study will examine the events that interrupted Tokugawa peace in 1637 and led to the siege to Hara Castle (Chapter 2). Part II will explore the various components of the Tokugawa logistical system, investigating the communication and transportation infrastructure that allowed the Tokugawa to manage such a huge army (Chapter 3); the Tokugawa mobilization and deployment mechanisms (Chapter 4); and the methods of supply and finance that allowed the Tokugawa to maintain their large army in field (Chapter 5). Part III will clarify how Hara Castle was finally taken by the Tokugawa (Chapter 6) and conclude by looking at the implications of these logistical
feats for Tokugawa power projection in the seventeenth century (Chapter 7) and the
global context for understanding the Tokugawa military in the mid-1600s (Chapter 8).

This study will demonstrate that the Tokugawa did retain significant, if largely
unused, military potential in the early seventeenth-century by maintaining a potent
logistical system in peacetime. In the case of the Shimabara Rebellion, this logistical
potential translated directly into the ability to project physical and symbolic power
through military action.

To sum up, this dissertation will demonstrate that 17th-century Japan was not simply
a “flamboyant” state with only symbolic authority. It did, in fact, maintain military
potential that could have rivaled any European state. Given that the Tokugawa
assembled and fielded an army of 150,000 troops, kept that army in the field for three
months, and then slaughtered tens of thousands of peasants, there is little wonder that
“contentious events” in Japan thereafter dwindled.46 Tokugawa power projection
displayed at Shimabara should also be considered among the efforts by the third Shogun
Iemitsu to consolidate authority in the person of the Shogun – his campaign to strengthen
kōgi, or central Tokugawa authority. Perhaps in part because the Tokugawa were able to
display their authority so swiftly and powerfully in 1638, Japan remained a largely
peaceful state for the next two and one half centuries.

Finally, this investigation introduces a powerful new means of measuring state
power and military potential in the early modern period. Although a great deal of
scholarship has been devoted to pre- and post-Tokugawa military developments, work

46 White, Ikki.
done on military history in between is sparse.\textsuperscript{47} Unfortunately, most studies to date on the
Tokugawa military are limited to exploring of the individual tactics and philosophy of the
samurai. As Mary Elizabeth Berry argued in her Presidential Address to the Association
for Asian Studies in 2005, there is need for new scholarship that takes a rational approach
to the study of war in Japan which has often been limited to romantic notions of battle
and samurai – particularly in the West.\textsuperscript{48} By examining logistics we may begin to
understand the interplay of military potential and the state during more than two hundred
years of peaceful Tokugawa rule.

\textsuperscript{47} For a review of recent pre-Tokugawa military history see Martin Collcutt, “The ‘Emergence of the
(Jun., 1996): 151-164. For \textit{bakumatsu} (end of bakufu) military history see, for example, Mark Ravina, \textit{The

\textsuperscript{48} Mary Elizabeth Berry, “Presidential Address – Samurai Trouble: Thoughts on War and Loyalty,” \textit{The
CHAPTER 2

ONE SINGLE DEATH

Early modern Japan experienced a total of four years of warfare in the seventeenth century.¹ That is a significant contrast to modern Europe, which saw only four years of peace in the 1600s. In addition, Europe in this period experienced uprisings, rebellions, and revolts of every scale and in almost every locale. The first half of the seventeenth century saw several drawn-out, multinational wars. The Thirty Years War (1618-1648) involved Spain, the Dutch Republic, France, the Swiss, Poland, and the German states. The later part of Spain’s Eighty Year War with the Dutch (1621-48) pulled in, at various times, France, Denmark, England, and Switzerland. The later seventeenth century also witnessed three Dutch-Anglo wars, French-Spanish conflict, and numerous disputes over transoceanic possessions.

Rebellion also affected every major European power. The English Revolution raged from 1642 to 1660. Revolt in the Fronde consumed France in the 1648 to 1653. The Spanish Habsburgs experienced revolt in both Catalonia and Portugal from 1640, at the same time they were fighting the Dutch. However, not all rebellion was as grand or prolonged as these. For example, Provence in the south of France experienced 375

¹ 1600, 1615/16, 1638; by the Japanese lunar calendar, fighting in the Shimabara Rebellion occurred almost entirely in the New Year of 1638.
distinct rebellions and uprisings from 1596 to 1715. That is an average of more than three rebellions each year for more than a century. Ubiquitous ‘crisis’ was not, however, limited to Europe. The Ming Chinese experienced political and popular unrest in the seventeenth century, as did the Indian Empire under Aurangzeb.

Contemporary observers were well aware of the times they lived in. In 1643 the count-duke of Olivares, formerly chief minister of Spain, provided one of many commentaries on the general unrest of the seventeenth century in the Nicandro, written by his librarian:

> Sometimes Providence condemns the world with universal and evident calamities, whose causes we cannot know. This seems to be one of the epochs in which every nation is turned upside down, leading some great minds to suspect that we are approaching the end of the world. We have seen all the north in commotion and rebellion, its rivers running with blood, its populous provinces deserted; England, Ireland and Scotland aflame with Civil War; the Ottoman Sultan dragged through the streets of Constantinople; the Turks, after fighting the Persians, at war with each other. China invaded by the Tartars, Ethiopia by the Turks, and the Indian kings who live scattered through the region between the Ganges and the Indus raging with rivalry. What area does not suffer, if not from war, then from earthquakes, plague and famine? How is Olivares to blame because the world suffers from these misfortunes?

It appears that contemporary Europeans were well aware of the ‘crisis’ that was all around them. The one area they all overlooked was Japan. Nevertheless, even with only

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2 Parker and Smith, eds. The General crisis, Introduction.

3 In the introduction to Parker and Smith eds. The General Crisis of the 17th Century, Parker lists nearly a dozen poignant quotes from contemporaries about a self evident ‘crisis’ in 17th-century Europe.

4 See J. H. Elliott and J. de la Peña, eds., Memoriales y cartas del conde-duque de Olivares, II (Madrid, 1981), 275. The Nicandro o antidoto contra las calumnias que la ignorancia y envidia ha esparcido por deslucir y manchar las heróicas y inmortales acciones del conde-duque de Olivares después de su retiro, appeared in Madrid in May 1643 and was probably written during the previous four months, under Olivares’s inspiration, by his librarian (ibid., 227). The Inquisition almost immediately banned it. I thank Geoffrey Parker for drawing this text to my attention and for providing a translation.
four years of warfare to show for the seventeenth century, the only popular uprising of national severity in the entire early modern period there occurred in 1637-38.

Causes of Rebellion

Just as in Europe, in the early 17\textsuperscript{th} century Japan’s peasants too suffered from harsh weather, natural calamity, crop failure, social and political restriction, and financial hardship. Between 1590 and 1640, 198 rebellions occurred across Japan.\footnote{Herbert Bix, \textit{Peasant Protest in Japan, 1590-1884} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986) xxi.} During the 1630s and 40s, small peasant rebellions dotted Japan.\footnote{Endô Motoo, \textit{Kinsei Seikatsuushi Nempyô} (Tokyo: Yuzankaku, 1982) 49-68 passim.} These rebellions were brought on by a combination of famine, extreme weather, zealous spending by the Tokugawa and \textit{daimyô}, and disadvantageous inter-Asian silver trade.\footnote{William S. Atwell, “Some Observations of the ‘Seventeenth-Century Crisis’ in China and Japan,” in \textit{Journal of Asian Studies}, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Feb., 1986): 223-237.} Natural causes of the famines included disease in livestock, floods, cool summers, and infestations.\footnote{Yamamoto Hirofumi, \textit{Kan’ei jidai} (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kôbunkan, 1989) 197-8.} Although the \textit{kan’ei} era famine (\textit{kikin}) was underway by the time of rebellion in Shimabara, famines did not affect the whole country until 1641-42. However, in the years immediately preceding the rebellion, Kyushu experienced floods and disease that reduced the area of land under cultivation and the animal power for farming.\footnote{Yamamoto, \textit{Kan’ei jidai}, 199.} Though the rebellion was over by the time the famine peaked on a national scale, the area was nonetheless affected by those same climatic factors that eventually left 500,000 dead of starvation in most parts of Japan.
To compound the effect of famine on the area, the daimyô of Shimabara, Matsukura Katsuie, over-burdened the productive capacity of the peasantry for years by building the luxurious Shimabara Castle, and with his expensive displays of wealth during mandatory trips to Edo. Matsukura’s fiscal irresponsibility and brutal collection methods tragically exacerbated the effects of the famines, leaving the region’s population so strained that in 1637 rebellion became their only perceived option.

On 11 December 1637, the peasants of Arima Village in southern Shimabara, outraged over the torture of a villager’s daughter, murdered the local magistrate.10 Gathering supporters and supplies the following day, the mob of angry villagers, joined by former samurai retainers of the Arima family – the former lords of the region – attacked the Matsukura garrison at Shimabara Castle. Although unable to take the Castle, the villagers were able to pin the Matsukura forces inside and burn the castle town surrounding it. Free from threat by the forces trapped inside the castle, the growing number of rebels then turned their attention toward local villages, gathering supporters and punishing those who would not join them.11 From Shimabara, the peasants’ armed outrage spread to nearby Amakusa Island. A young farmer named Masuda Shirô, who, at age sixteen, claimed to be the reincarnation of Christ, led the peasants of Shimabara and Amakusa. Shirô became the spiritual leader and symbol of the rebellion. He eventually took the name of the island of his birth; Amakusa Shirô.

10 Hayashi Senkichi ed., Shimabara hantôshi II, (Nagasaki: Nagasaki Ken Minamitakakigun Shi kyôiku kai, 1956) 5. Note that Ivan Morris places the rebellion beginning several days later on 17 December 1637, see Morris The Nobility of Failure, 153. No source is given.
11 Hayashi, Shimabara hantôshi II, 5.
By mid-January 1638, the rebels learned that the bakufu had ordered their Lord Matsukura to leave Edo and return to Shimabara with a punitive force to quell the rebellion. En route to Shimabara, the troops of the daimyō Nabeshima, also of Kyushu, joined Matsukura. The villagers and samurai headed for the abandoned Hara Castle, their only available refuge. In preparation for the coming siege the rebels “carried the entirety of rice from [surrounding] villages back to the old [Hara] castle. In addition, about five thousand koku of rice was taken from Lord Nagamon’s [Matsukura Katsuie] storehouse at Kutchinotsu.” On 17 January, Amakusa Shirō escaped Amakusa Island and joined the Shimabara rebels at the castle. In the next several days, the Shimabara rebels were situated within the castle walls. The castle inhabitants then began to reconstitute the castle defenses, culminating in the raising of Shirō’s famed Christian flag on 22 January. The following day 2,700 peasants and samurai who survived skirmishes with the daimyō Terazawa’s garrisons on Amakusa arrived by boat to join the Shimabara rebels in Hara Castle. By 23 January the fortress was sealed and the rebels prepared for a siege.

The total number of castle defenders is a matter of some debate. Estimates range from 20,000 to 60,000 rebels. Likewise, estimates of the number of samurai among their number vary anywhere from forty to two hundred. The generally accepted figure of 37,000 rebels (20,000 men / 17,000 women and children) is difficult to accept. This figure, which is found throughout early modern and modern sources, appears to originate

12 “Yamada Uemon no suke kosho utsushi” in Hayashi, Shimabara hantōshi II, 190.
13 Hayashi, Shimabara hantōshi II, 190. One koku approximates 180 liters.
14 Hayashi, Shimabara hantōshi II, 190.
15 These estimates include men, women, children, peasant and samurai alike.
from an account of the rebellion recorded by a jailed Jesuit who overheard Japanese criminals recount the tale. The various primary accounts, as well as the capacity of Hara Castle, suggest rebel numbers at a total closer to 25,000.\textsuperscript{16} It should be noted however, that during the siege the bakufu forces estimated the rebel population to be in excess of 50,000 people.\textsuperscript{17}

Supplies of food and water are of primary concern in siege warfare. Fortunately for the rebels, Hara Castle afforded them a fresh-water well within the compound.\textsuperscript{18} Food supplies however, were initially limited to what was stored in the castle before 23 January. The amount of wood that could be used for cooking fuel and weapons was also limited to the amount of firewood stored within the castle and that taken from trees growing within the compounds. Although there is no extant record of the exact amount of wood stored before the siege, no indications in primary accounts suggest that wood supply, or lack thereof, was an important factor.

The castle arsenal is another matter of speculation. It is clear from accounts of the siege that the rebels possessed shoulder arms, bow and arrow, spears, and swords. The quality and quantity of these weapons is somewhat less clear. One account written in 1729 (by an unknown author related to the Matsukura family) records the castle’s arsenal as follows: 1480 matchlocks (of various calibers), 100 bows, 500 long swords, and 300

\textsuperscript{16} “Shimabara ikki matsukura ki” in Hayashi, Shimabara hantôshi II, 157: 23,888 total peasants (12,336 men / 11,552 women); “Hayashi shizaemon oboegaki” in Hayashi, Shimabara hantôshi, 63: 24,842 total peasants (12,943 men / 11,899 women). These totals are not presumed, as was the early modern Japanese tradition, to include children under 15 or the elderly over 59.

\textsuperscript{17} Tokyo Daigaku Hensanjyo, Dai nihon kinsei shiryô: Hosokawake shiryô. vol. 12 (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 1990), 167.

\textsuperscript{18} “Haranojin onko rokuzen” in Hayashi, Shimabara hantôshi, 246.
pikes.\(^{19}\) A report by a Matsukura retainer one month after conclusion of the siege confirms these figures.\(^{20}\) However, two other independent sources place the number of shoulder arms in rebel hands closer to five hundred.\(^{21}\)

The interior of Hara Castle consisted of four compounds. A main citadel, inner compound and outer compounds were arranged in concentric circles, with an additional Amakusa compound that faced Amakusa Island. The castle’s outer wall stood thirty two meters tall at an angle almost perpendicular to the ground as would be expected of Muromachi period castle construction.\(^{22}\) Defensive walls each in turn protected the inner compounds and main citadel. The castle did not however, possess a defensive moat. The castle’s single most important defensive feature was unapproachable sides above cliffs that dropped to the Pacific Ocean. With much of three sides butted against cliffs, Hara Castle left but one side, the north wall, of 1.2 kilometers exposed.\(^{23}\) At its widest point, the castle measured some 255 meters across.\(^{24}\) Although the castle was an irregular shape, by adding the area of each compound and the citadel, the area of the castle totals

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\(^{19}\) “Shimabara ikki Matsukura ki” in SHS II, 157.

\(^{20}\) “Shimabara ikki kachu zengo niccho oboe” in Hayashi, Shimabara hantôshi II, 123.

\(^{21}\) “Yamada saemon no suke kosho utsushi” in Hayashi, Shimabara hantôshi II, 191.; 500 matchlocks; “Hizen no kuni arima takakigun ikki rojo no kokugoku nikki” in Hayashi, Shimabara hantôshi II, 399: 530 matchlocks.

\(^{22}\) “Haranojin onko rokuzen” in Hayashi, Shimabara hantôshi II, 246-247.

\(^{23}\) “Haranojin onko rokuzen” in Hayashi, Shimabara hantôshi II, 246-247.

\(^{24}\) “Haranojin onko rokuzen” in Hayashi, Shimabara hantôshi II, 246-247. Note that Fujino Tamotsu estimates the castle dimensions to be 700 by 300 meters; see Fujino Tamotsu. Saga han no sôgô kenkyû: Han sei no seiritsu to kôzô. (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kôbunkan, 1981), 436.
However, the inner compound and main citadel each consisted of multiple stories adding to the usable area within the castle.

The castle’s physical dimensions provide insights into the circumstances of rebel entrenchment. First, if we consider for now the 12,000 men of fighting age (15-59) among the rebels, ten men could be devoted to the defense of each meter of the 1.2 kilometer wall facing into the peninsula. This is does not suggest that the rebel defenses, or the troops attacking the castle, were uniformly distributed. Rather, a man/meter ratio indicates the minimum distribution of rebel manpower. Likewise an estimated 1480 firearms, if evenly distributed, amounts to 1.2 matchlocks for each meter of exposed castle wall. Add the other weapons available to the rebels and we can discern that rebels possessing matchlocks, swords, bows, lances, and those dedicated to repelling escalade by dropping stones adequately manned the north wall.

Elements of Rebellion

The Christian heritage of the Shimabara certainly augmented the rebel call to arms and helped sustain them throughout the siege. More importantly, the Christian nature of the rebels and rebellion was one of the motivating factors of the bakufu’s response. However, if we look beyond the Christian elements of the rebellion, several other factors appear to have significantly influenced both the rebels and the bakufu.

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25 “Haranojin onko rokuzen” in Hayashi, Shimabara hantōshiki II, 246-247. Breakdown of the castle area is: Amakusa compound 23,650.5 m²; main citadel 34,184.0 m²; inner compound 93,674.7 m²; outer compound 87,447.4 m². This total is exclusive of second and third stories and of the citadel’s keep (or tenshu).
Five of the factors critical to the Shimabara rebels’ ability to challenge Tokugawa authority had long since been recognized as threats, and outlawed as such by the *bakufu*: Christianity, cruelty, a coalition force, weapons, and a castle. It was this combination of factors, the sum of Tokugawa fears, not the spectre of foreign influence embodied by Christianity alone, that caused the Tokugawa to react politically and militarily.

A combination of factors and opportunities, in addition to Christianity, were present in Shimabara in 1637, without any one of which the rebellion most likely would not have developed as it did. First, the immediate motivating factors to rebel were cruel and oppressive treatment at the hands of their local lords intensified by crop failures. As George Elison states, “The peasants of Shimabara and Amakusa were goaded beyond the breaking point by extortions and famines.”26 Nicholaes Koeckebacker in Hirado, just 75 miles from Shimabara during the rebellion and siege, agreed:

“[The Lord of Shimabara]… imposed moreover upon [rustic samurai] and other farmers more taxes, and forced them to raise such a quantity of rice as was impossible for them to do. Those who could not pay the fixed taxes … not only received burns, but some were burned to death … This revengeful tyrant, not content with his cruelty, ordered women to be suspended quite naked by the legs, and caused them to be scoffed at in various other ways.

The people endured this ill treatment of the said prince as long as he was present amongst them, but as his son the present lord, who resides in Yedo [Edo], feels also inclined to follow in the foot-steps of his father, and forces the farmers to pay far more in taxes than they are able to do, in such a manner that they languish from hunger, taking only some roots and vegetables for nourishment, the people resolved not to bear any longer the vexations, and to die one single death instead of the many slow deaths to which they were subjected.”27

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27 Nicholaes Koeckebacker to A. van Diemen, Governor General at Batavia, from the Dutch Factory at Hirado, January 18, 1638, in A. J. C. Geerts, “The Arima Rebellion and the Conduct of Koekebacker,” *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, XI (1883): 57-59; For a particularly vivid and horrible account of the torture of unrepentant Japanese Christians see Manual de Faria y Sousa, *The Portuguese Asia: or the
Though Christianity influenced the Shimabara region for more than fifty years, it was economic deprivation and social oppression that made the peasants rebel. In addition several other non-Christian factors allowed the peasants to militarily challenge the Tokugawa. The first of these was the coalition of samurai and peasant. The leadership and experience of even a few hundred trained military men provided the peasant army with tactical skill it would not have possessed otherwise. Further, without the numbers of peasants involved, a handful of samurai, no matter how skilled, could not have challenged the Tokugawa. The peasant numbers were necessary to defend the vast castle wall.

Prohibition of samurai leading weapon-wielding peasants began even before Tokugawa rule. In 1588 the second of Japan’s three unifiers, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, issued what Mary Elizabeth Berry credits as the signal of early modern Japan’s political settlement: the *katana gari*, or “sword hunt,” edict.28 The sword hunts were designed to strip the peasantry of all weapons. This was the first in what are called the “class separation” edicts. By denying peasants weapons, Hideyoshi was at the same time limiting the resources for popular rebellion and forcing a choice between life as a farmer, and life as a soldier. Three years later Hideyoshi issued another edict stratifying and freezing Japan’s social order; the *heinô bunri*, or “separation of peasant and farmer” edict.29 This class edict not only defined the farmer and the soldier but also forbade one

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29 Berry, *Hideyoshi*, 106.
to become the other. A samurai could no longer give up the sword for the hoe, nor could
the farmer earn a sword and a surname. The classes were separated. The Tokugawa
ikkoku ichijyô rei (one castle per province order), refined this policy by forcing the
daimyô to centralize their administration in one castle per domain, thereby drawing the
samurai away from the countryside. Hence the classes were also segregated. However,
despite these three regulations, almost fifty years later armed peasants and rustic samurai
united in defiance of Tokugawa law. As Philip Brown argues, not all central Tokugawa
directives were adopted completely or uniformly throughout Japan.30 Certainly the
number of men who had once been samurai among the peasant rebels suggests that the
Tokugawa edicts aimed at preventing just this sort of collusion were not entirely
effective.

The next factor was the combination of firearms and a stronghold. When the bakufu
dispatched Itakura Shigemasa to Shimabara, they were expecting either guerilla or open
field engagement from the rebels of the sort that harassed Shimabara Castle. In either
case, Itakura’s troops would probably have proven sufficient. However, by the time
Itakura arrived, the rebels were firmly in place within Hara Castle. Still, despite the
advantage of being in the castle, without the rebel gunfire that repulsed all three of his
assaults on the castle and ultimately cost his life, Itakura’s army would have stood a
better chance at dislodging the rebels.

Each of the factors which contributed either to the rebellion, or to the rebels’ success,
represent a breach of one or more social or political controls implemented by early

30 Philip Brown, *Central Authority and Local Autonomy in the Formation of Early Modern Japan*
modern Japan’s hegemons. As numerous authors have noted, the Tokugawa recognized Christianity as a dangerous influence on the peasantry and banned it as such long before the Shimabara rebels took up arms. From 1614, the Tokugawa vigorously strove to expel Christians and Christianity from Japan.\textsuperscript{31} Despite Tokugawa effort, however, the Shimabara region of Kyushu remained Christian and eventually contributed to the cohesion of the rebels.

From the outset of their rule, the Tokugawa recognized the danger of unnecessarily burdening or persecuting the peasantry. The Tokugawa proscribed the very practices engaged in by Matsukura and Terazawa decades earlier. The \textit{Buke shohatto}, or ‘Laws for Military Households’, was first formally issued following the fall of Osaka Castle in 1615. Among other regulations it forbade \textit{daimyō} to act irresponsibly toward the peasants under their care in order to avoid planting the seeds of peasant unrest – i.e. they were warned of the need for benevolent rule.\textsuperscript{32} In the same year, the \textit{bakufu} issued the \textit{ikkoku ichijyō rei}, or ‘one castle per province’ order, which limited \textit{daimyō} to one fortified stronghold each.\textsuperscript{33} In addition the \textit{buke shohatto} required that any construction in, or modifications of, the \textit{daimyō}’s one castle first be approved by the \textit{bakufu}. Emerging victoriously from Japan’s longest period of civil war, the Tokugawa were well aware of the military advantages of castles. They attempted to deprive \textit{daimyō}, and other would-be challengers like the Shimabara rebels, of that advantage.


The Local Setting

Hara Castle, built during the Muromachi period (1392-1573) as the Arima family headquarters, stretched across a cliff on the southern tip of Shimabara Peninsula.34 (see Images 2.1 – 2.3) The Arima survived the sengoku (era of warring states 1474-1598) period as daimyô family of the Shimabara han (feudal domain) in Hizen province. By exposing his father’s plot to defraud the shogun, Arima Naozumi rose to power as head of the Arima family in 1612 and was rewarded with his father’s fief.35 A third generation Christian (baptized as Miguel), Naozumi ruled Arima for two years before being transferred to a fief in Hyuga Province in central Japan because of his failure to curb local Christian growth.36

Soon after the daimyô Matsukura Shigemasa replaced the Arima family in Hara Castle in 1618, he abandoned the old fortress in favor of Shimabara Castle approximately fifteen miles to the north.37 Before taking over Shimabara han, Shigemasa had been daimyô of Futami, which was a reward granted

37 “*Hayashi shizaiemon oboegaki*” in Hayashi, *Shimabara hantôshi II*, 63. When possible measurements and geographical directions will be taken from primary accounts. In this case, six ri is converted to 23.58 kilometers.
Figure 2.1: LandSat Photo of Kyushu
(Courtesy of Matsumoto Masao,
Director of the Hara Castle Cultural Center)
Figure 2.2: LandSat Photo of Shimabara Peninsula
(Courtesy of Matsumoto Masao, Director of the Hara Castle Cultural Center)
Figure 2.3: Aerial Photo of Hara Castle with castle wall demarcation. Adapted from Sasahara Kazuo. Dōran Harajō shi: Manga de miru Shimabara no ran. (Nagasaki, Minami Arimachō: Minami Arimachō, 1990).
in 1578 for his loyalty to Toyotomi Hideyoshi. Shigemasa, renowned for his service to the Tokugawa at the Battle of Sekigahara, ruled as lord of Shimabara han until succeeded by his son Katsuie in 1634. Unlike Shimabara’s previous lords, the Matsukura were neither scrupulous nor Christian. To the contrary, Lord Matsukura was unsympathetic and cruel to the largely Christian population left behind by the Arima. Nor was Terazawa Katataka, daimyô of the Amakusa Islands twenty-six miles south of the Shimabara Peninsula, a sympathetic figure. From Karatsu Castle, Terazawa ruled the Christian population of Amakusa as harshly as Matsukura did Shimabara.

The period of Christian influence, primarily through the missions of the Society of Jesus, in early modern Japan was both brief and vigorous. From the arrival of Saint Francis Xavier in 1549 in Southwest Japan through the series of edicts between 1639 and 1650 that closed the nation to outside influence, the Jesuit Order enjoyed a number of successes proselytizing Japanese. Historiographically speaking, the brief influence of Christianity in pre-modern Japan has been of interest to Western scholars since the opening of Japan during the Meiji period. Although virtually every study of late sengoku and early Tokugawa Japan touches on Christianity, Papinot, Murdoch, Sansom, Boxer, Reischauer, and Elison in particular devoted a great deal of attention to questions of how successful the Jesuits were in Japan, what effect their works had on contemporary politics and culture, and what if any lasting effect their efforts had.

40 “Hayashi shizaemon oboegaki” in Hayashi, *Shimabara hantōshi II*, 63.
41 Nakajima ed., *Nihon rekishi daijiten*, vol. 7, 93.
42 Elison, *Deus Destroyed*, 14.
Counter-Reformation evangelicalism in Japan differed in that the missions were largely Spanish and Portuguese Jesuits who represented Rome in a more doctrinally pure effort to create an indigenous churches than missions elsewhere that were part and parcel of larger military, political, and economic efforts. Hideyoshi largely ignored the Christians except where their efforts intersected with his campaigns in Kyushu and Korea.\footnote{Berry, \textit{Hideyoshi}, 89-93, passim.} Beginning around 1600 under Ieyasu, the first Tokugawa shogun, the Jesuits enjoyed nearly a decade to do their work unmolested by national authority. However, under his son and heir Hidetada, the \textit{bakufu} began targeting \textit{daimyô} who had converted and the Jesuits and their native sectarians, known collectively as \textit{bateren}, for suppression.\footnote{Elisonas, “Christianity and the Daimyo,” \textit{Cambridge History of Early Modern Japan}, 365-6.} Especially in Kyushu, and in Arima province in particular, conversion to Christianity had been successful – up to and including baptism of the Arima \textit{daimyô}. Hidetada, followed by his son Iemitsu, viewed the influence of Christianity by local authorities with more suspicion and began combating Christianity by both refuting Jesuit doctrine and transplanting regional leaders.

It was not until the Shimabara Rebellion, however, that Iemitsu fully realized how potent foreign ideology could be among the populace. Following its suppression, he turned his attention to outlawing Christian practice not just among regional elites that influenced the people, but among townspeople and villagers as well.\footnote{Ohashi Yukihiro, “New Perspective on the Early Tokugawa Persecution,” John Breen and Mark Williams, eds., \textit{Japan and Christianity: Impacts and Responses} (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996) 66.} This effort at ridding Japan of Christian influence culminated in the \textit{sakoku} and \textit{shûmon aratame} edicts.
of 1639 and 1640 respectively. The sakoku edicts closed Japan to foreign intercourse, except under specific shogunal direction, and the shûmon aratame edict required each and every Japanese to declare in writing his or her allegiance to the Shintô and Buddhist religions. By forcing a declaration of non-Christian faith, Iemitsu ended the open practice of Christianity and pushed the remaining few Christians underground where they became known as kakure kirishitan (hidden Christians). By choking off the external and internal inroads of Christian influence, Iemitsu brought Japan’s “Christian Century” to a close.

The National Setting

Behind the local setting for the rebellion and siege loomed the Tokugawa Shogun’s political-military campaign for national authority. In the 1620’s, Iemitsu embarked on an aggressive campaign to secure Tokugawa supremacy through the projection of public authority, or kôgi. Upon investiture as shogun in 1623 Iemitsu began to rebuild the shogunal headquarters, Edo Castle, by drawing upon the resources of the daimyô. In 1634, Iemitsu marched through the Imperial city of Kyoto with a force of over 300,000 troops as a symbolic demonstration of Tokugawa supremacy to the nation. One year later Iemitsu tightened control over the daimyô by re-issuing an expanded version of the

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49 Bolitho, The han, 198.
buke shohatto. In 1636 he completed construction of a grand mausoleum honoring the posthumously deified first shogun, Tokugawa Ieyasu, to inaugurate his mausoleum, Iemitsu traveled to his grandfather’s grave in Nikkô (north of Tokyo) with a flamboyant procession of daimyō and retainers, again displaying his right to rule as head of the Tokugawa house. That same year he persuaded Korean envoys to extend their visit to Edo to Ieyasu’s mausoleum.50 The grandure of the Nikkô mausoleum, and its significance for shogunal prestige, is evident from the construction costs. At “an estimated one-seventh of the treasury” Iemitsu inherited from his father, Nikkô was the most expensive Japanese construction project of the early 17th century.51

It was during this period that Shogun Iemitsu liberally exercised one of the most powerful bakufu prerogatives: transfer and attainder of daimyō domains. Beginning with Ieyasu, the Tokugawa Shogun used the confiscation, redistribution, and forfeiture of land holdings to control the daimyō. Iemitsu used this Shogunal privilege with more fervor than even his father or grandfather had: during his reign, he confiscated lands from forty-six daimyō – more than any other shogun.52 The ability to trim, redistribute, or even revoke entirely the land holdings of Tokugawa vassals to the degree practiced in early 17th-century Japan was unique to the early modern era. No other ruler of the day wielded similar control over the nobles who helped make up the structure that kept the ruler in

power. Iemitsu in particular used transfer and attainder to control the daimyō and as one more method of consolidating power in the person of the Shogun.

Shogunal authority was further buttressed by the system of alternate attendance conceived by Ieyasu and begun under Shogun Hidetada. Sankin kōtai, or ‘alternating attendance,’ required the daimyō to journey from their domain at regular intervals and pay homage to the Shogun in Edo. Under the system, the daimyō were further required to maintain residences not only in their home province, but also in the capital. Most daimyō maintained two Edo mansions, or yashiki, and some many more. Daimyō yashiki in Edo numbered more than 600 and occupied over one-half the land in the capital city. Mansions in Edo were necessary because sankin kōtai required that each daimyō to periodically travel to the capital and reside in their yashiki for a fixed duration and leave their wives there perpetually. The interval of travel and duration of stay in the capital for each daimyō were determined by the daimyō’s relationship to the shogun, the distance of travel, and their economic capacity. Although the system was not legislated until 1635, it was in practice prior to Ieyasu’s death in 1616. It is important to note that most daimyō traveled with a large retinue of their best and most loyal samurai.

54 Tsukahira, Feudal control, 28, 36.
**Initial Response**

Iemitsu’s innovations played a key role in precipitating the revolt of Shimabara. First, the transfer of the hereditary Arima lords in favor of a new master severed traditional ties and removed experienced eyes. Second, the *sankin kôtai* system removed the lords of Shimabara and Amakusa at a crucial time. Their subjects chose to revolt at a moment when both their lords had gone to Edo, over 700 miles away, knowing that this gave them a few weeks to organize resistance before their lords could return. Matsukura could not do so until 14 January 1638. By then the sum of Tokugawa fears had materialized. A coalition force of peasants and samurai had taken up arms in the face of malevolent local lords. Before Tokugawa forces could reach Shimabara and suppress the beginnings of peasant rebellion, the peasants armed themselves and occupied a defensive position in an abandoned castle. Although cramped within the castle walls the rebels had fresh water, a supply of food, weapons, and enough manpower to effectively defend the castle’s one exposed wall. They also boasted a powerful ideology to justify their cause – Christianity – and their own Messiah – Amakusa Shirô.

Records of when the Tokugawa *bakufu* became aware of the rebellion at Shimabara are sketchy. Using Portuguese sources, C. R. Boxer states in *The Christian Century in Japan* that the *bakufu* first became aware of the events on Shimabara Peninsula on 17
Overall Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1600</td>
<td>Tokugawa Ieyasu victorious at Sekigahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1603</td>
<td>Ieyasu appointed Shogun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1605</td>
<td>Ieyasu retires in favor of Hidetada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1614-15</td>
<td>Osaka Winter and Summer Siege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1616</td>
<td>1st buke shohatto issued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1623</td>
<td>Hidetada retires in favor of Iemitsu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1632</td>
<td>Hidetada dies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1634</td>
<td>2nd buke shohatto issued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1637-8</td>
<td>Shimabara Rebellion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1639</td>
<td>Sakoku (closed country) edict issued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1640</td>
<td>Shûmon aratame edict issued</td>
</tr>
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</table>

1637-1638 Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 1637</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Villagers murder local magistrate and begin rebellion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Rebels attach Shimabara Castle and burn surrounding town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Rioting and gunfire heard in nearby Higo province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Dutch at Hirado informed of rebellion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Osaka Magistrates informed of rebellion – send word to Edo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Bakufu notified in Edo / Kysuhu and southern Honshu daimyô make preparations for mass travel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1638</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Matsudaira and Toda ordered to siege from Edo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Matsukura returns to Arima from Edo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Amakusa Shirô leaves Amakusa for Arima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Rebels secure Hara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Itakura’s first assault on Hara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1638</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Itakura’s second assault on Hara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Itakura’s third and final assault on Hara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Matsudaira and Toda arrive Arima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Dutch arrive by ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1638</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Dutch asked to withdraw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1638</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Final assault on Hara Castle begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Bakufu forces take Hara Castle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1: Selected Timeline
December, less than a week after the uprising began. Ivan Morris, relying on modern Japanese studies of the rebellion, cites the same date. An account of the rebellion and siege left by the magistrate of Shimabara City’s Arima District (who was subsequently commended for meritorious service in the attack on the castle) states that Hosokawa Tadatoshi, the lord of neighboring Higo Province, learned of the rebellion by reports of “great fires” and “the sound of gun shots” on the evening of 13 December as the rebels rioted. The Dutch Factory at Hirado became aware of the rebellion in the “county of Arima” on 17 December. The Tokugawa Jikki (True Records of the Tokugawa) reports that the bakufu was made aware of the rebellion on 25 December by a bakufu inspector in Higo placed within the Hosokawa government. The Tokugawa Jikki then indicates that the bakufu council issued several orders. First, it ordered Itakura Shigemasa, assisted by Ishigaya Sadakiyo, to lead an expeditionary force to suppress the unrest at Shimabara. Next, it ordered Matsukura Katsuie, daimyô of Shimabara, to return “hurriedly” to his fief. The Arima District magistrate confirms the dispatch of Itakura, Ishigaya, and Matsukura from Edo on 25 December 1637. Finally, the remaining daimyô of Hizen province, Nabeshima Katsunari and Terazawa Takakata were ordered to

55 Boxer, 379.
56 Morris, 153.
57 “Betto mokuzaemon oboegaki” in Hayashi, Shimabara hantôshi II, 87.
59 Kuroita Katsumi ed., Tokugawa Jikki. vol. 40 of Shintei zoho kokushi taikei. (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kôbun kan, 1964), 72. Details of the account of the rebellion and siege in the Tokugawa Jikki were taken from the Shimabara Kassen, an official Tokugawa record created just after the siege ended. N.b. that the Tokugawa Jikki was compiled toward the end of the early modern period from primary as well as secondary sources.
60 “Betto mokuzaemon oboegaki” in Hayashi, Shimabara hantôshi II, 87.
prepare their troops to aid Itakura. Shigemasa was a personal assistant to Tokugawa Ieyasu, and from 1603, acted as negotiator during the Winter and Summer Sieges of Osaka Castle in 1614-15, and traveled with the second two shoguns on all pilgrimages to Nikkô and marches to Kyoto.\(^{61}\) He presented a truce to Toyotomi Hideyori’s faction during the siege of Osaka Castle in 1615.\(^{62}\) After destroying the defenses of Osaka Castle, Ieyasu promptly broke the truce and sacked the castle. By taking Hideyori’s oath, Itakura played an instrumental role in sealing the fate of the Toyotomi line. Trusted by the Shogun, and with considerable military experience, Shigemasa was charged with directing *daïmyô* troops to quell the rebellion in Shimabara. Ishigaya Sadakiyo, a shogunate censor (intelligence agent), accompanied Shigemasa as a junior partner in managing the siege.\(^{63}\)

It was over a month after the rebellion began before *bakufu* forces reached the Shimabara Peninsula. The Shimabara *daïmyô* Matsukura arrived on the peninsula on 14 January.\(^{64}\) By 22 January the *baku-gun* (*baku*(fu)-army) comprised of Matsukura, Itakura, Ishigaya, and Nabeshima’s forces, formed on the peninsula and on the evening of 29 January the *bakugun* pushed to within four miles of the castle, where they slept for the night.\(^{65}\) Early the following day the *bakugun* closed the gap to the castle and attempted to storm the walls, but were repulsed, with heavy casualties, by rebel gunfire.\(^{66}\)

Throughout the afternoon and evening of the twelfth, the rebels and *bakufu* forces traded


\(^{62}\) Nakajima ed., *Nihon rekishi daijiten*, vol. 1, 328.

\(^{63}\) *Kokushi daijiten*, v1, 503.

\(^{64}\) “*Betto mokuzaemon oboegaki*” in Hayashi, *Shimabara hantôshi II*, 88.

\(^{65}\) “*Hayashi shizaemon oboegaki*” in Hayashi, *Shimabara hantôshi II*, 54.

\(^{66}\) “*Betto mokuzaemon oboegaki*” in Hayashi, *Shimabara hantôshi II*, 89.
gunfire to no avail but to expend gunpowder and ammunition. During the next several
days the *bakufu* forces were joined by the *daimyôs* Tachibana and Arima (the previous
*daimyô* of Shimabara).

As the refreshed *bakufu* forces prepared for a second attack, harassing gunfire from
within the castle continued. At approximately 1000 hours on the morning of 3 February
the *bakugun* assaulted the castle for a second time.\(^{67}\) Again the escalade was repelled,
again with heavy loss to the *bakugun* troops. The *Tokugawa Jikki* records that nearly
4,500 *bakufu* troops were killed or injured in the attack on the third.

Before Itakura failed a second time, the *bakufu* dispatched the *rôjû* (senior *bakufu*
elder) Matsudaira Nobutsuna at the head of a coalition of *daimyô* troops to take over
where Itakura had failed. However, in an attempt to grab the glory before Matsudaira
could arrive at Shimabara, Itakura launched a third assault. Mid-morning on 14 February
(new years day by the Japanese calendar), Itakura’s forces attempted yet again to storm
the castle. Morale was lost when the troops led by Arima Toyouji crumbled under rebel
gunfire.\(^{68}\) In a last heroic effort to spur the *bakufu* forces to victory, Itakura himself
charged the castle wall and was struck in the head by a bullet and killed. With the death
of Itakura, the assault collapsed. By the early afternoon the fighting had ceased except
for sporadic gunfire. Although the third assault was a brief encounter, *bakufu* forces
again suffered heavy casualties. When the gunfire finally stopped, sixty-two *bakufu*
troops lay dead and some 3,210 were wounded.

\(^{67}\) *Betto mokuzaemon oboegaki*\(^*\) in Hayashi, *Shimabara hantôshi II*, 89.

\(^{68}\) *Betto mokuzaemon oboegaki*\(^*\) in Hayashi, *Shimabara hantôshi II*, 89.
Itakura Shigemasa led the *bakugun* coalition army on three failed assaults on the rebel position in Hara Castle in just twenty days with casualties that approached 10,000 men. Less than a month after taking refuge in the castle, the peasant and samurai rebels repeatedly bested the forces of the Tokugawa *bakufu*.

**Conclusion**

From the moment the rebels sealed themselves into Hara Castle, they were doomed. If not routed by *bakufu* forces, the rebels would eventually run out of necessary provisions. The *bakufu* army could not likely have taken the castle early in the first month of 1638 as evidenced by the heavy casualties suffered two months after the rebels were weakened by starvation and isolation. Nor could the peasants escape the castle and elude the 50,000 troops of Itakura’s army. It was a standoff: a standoff that only the *bakufu* could win. Why then, were nearly 150,000 troops eventually devoted to the siege? That number of troops approximates the armies on both sides of the battle at Sekigahara from which the Tokugawa emerged as rulers of Japan in 1600. Why so many? Because Itakura’s failures transformed the siege of the castle into a display of national authority by the Tokugawa. Itakura made it necessary for the Tokugawa to make a show of force where such force should not have been necessary. It was necessary because it was exactly the projection of authority upon which Tokugawa hegemony was predicated. The *bakufu* needed not the capacity to take the castle, but merely to appear to have that capacity. The significance of the siege of Hara Castle surpasses the lone
Christian dimension, by further enlightening our understanding of early modern national authority and social control.

In 1637, natural calamity, oppressive rule, and religious restriction led the otherwise peaceful peasants of Shimabara Peninsula and Amakusa Island to rebel against not only local authorities, but against the fabric of Tokugawa national control in the midst of the Shogun Iemitsu’s drive to make the Tokugawa the symbol of national authority. Before the third assault on the rebel threat failed, the Shogun ordered the mobilization of one of the largest field armies in the early modern world to ensure control of the damage inflicted on Tokugawa authority not only by the rebels but also by their own general, Itakura.
CHAPTER 3

COMMUNICATION and TRANSPORTATION

Even before news of the rebellion could reach the bakufu in Edo, the Tokugawa military machine was generating a response to the rebellion in Shimabara. Just ten days after the rebellion, in addition to relaying the news to Edo, the Tokugawa representatives in Osaka began preparations for troop movements in western Honshu and Kyushu. It then took only four more days for relay runners to reach Edo where the decision to send Matsukura, daimyô of Shimabara, along with Itakura Shigemasa and Isagaya Sadakiyo to prosecute the siege was taken. In addition, daimyô from three regional domains (Saga, Kurume, and Yanagawa) were ordered to prepare to assist in the siege.

Although we do not have a transcript of the debate in Edo Castle, we can presume that the Shogun and bakufu elders had certain information in order to take these decisions, and to do so with such speed. For instance, we may assume that they knew the location and geography of Shimabara and Arima; what resources could be deployed there; and how long it would take to do so. Extensive Toyotomi and Tokugawa era
cadastral surveys, along with maps maintained by the Shogun would have provided the necessary information to construct a strategy to deal with the Shimabara rebels.\(^1\) Significantly, Koeckebacker mentions that Japanese officials provided him with maps of Arima and Amakusa so he could better understand the situation.\(^2\) These were no small feats in the early modern world, but the Tokugawa infrastructure handled them admirably.

We can also assume that details of the rebellion’s escalation and progress continued to reach Edo, making the *bakufu* quickly aware that the rebellion in Shimabara was no minor regional event. Even before Itakura arrived in Shimabara the Generals Matsudaira and Toda were dispatched from Edo and other *daimyô* were ordered to provide troops to support for the siege. Even the French traveler Tavernier noted in his account that:

> “The Emperour [Shogun] not believing that the [rebel] Army was so numerous, sent against them at first not above 25 or 30000 Men, under Command of the youngest of the two Lords of *Ximo*, that liv’d at Court. But those Troops were no sooner upon their March, but he rais’d new Forces, and sent another Army after them consisting of 40000 Men”\(^3\)

Maintaining and mobilizing a force the size of the *bakugun* arrayed in front of Hara Castle is one logistical obstacle, but managing the communications and transportation for a long siege is another entirely. How, for example, did the Tokugawa communications infrastructure facilitate news of the rebellion reaching Edo – 750 miles away – in just two

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weeks? Moreover, how could military assets in Kyushu be mobilized even sooner than that? Finally, how could nearly 150,000 troops of the Shogun’s army, along with their armor, horses, and support personnel (some serving dual roles as soldiers) be transported to the remote edge of Shimabara Peninsula.

This chapter will examine the transportation and communication infrastructure of Japan, as it developed under the first three Tokugawa Shoguns, that enabled the Tokugawa army to react to swiftly to the threat in Shimabara. Next, examination of the political and economic systems that maintained that infrastructure in peacetime will demonstrate why it worked so efficiently in war, and would have been just as effective anywhere else on the Japanese Islands. Finally, this chapter will look at how the transportation and communication system of early modern Japan operated in actual wartime practice in response to the rebellion in Shimabara.

*Time and Distance*

In his study of the Mediterranean World in the age of Spain’s Philip II, Fernand Braudel highlighted the importance of physical space and the limitation it placed on states and armies of the day: “To understand the importance of distance is to see in a new light the problems of governing an empire in the sixteenth century.”4 Braudel goes on to demonstrate that we cannot count transportation and communication among the advancements of early modern Europe. “…the essential point to remember is that …

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[goods], boats, and people traveled as fast, or as slowly, in the days of the Avignon Popes or to Venice during the first half of the fifteenth century, as they did in the age of Louis XIV.5 This was not true of early modern Japan. The Tokugawa improved transportation and communication rapidly in the first few decades of the seventeenth century. The system developed by the first three Shoguns remained essentially unchanged, other than growth and frequency of use, until the Meiji Period. Their success lies first in the size and contiguity of their empire: the Japanese Archipelago. Distance was not nearly the enemy to the Tokugawa that it was to Philip II and his peers. Second, the Tokugawa political distribution of land assured that no part of the contiguous empire was out of their reach. Finally, they initiated the development of a transportation infrastructure that subsequently grew because of Tokugawa political policies and was maintained through a combination of corvée labor and private business. When rebellion arose in Shimabara in 1637, the transportation and communication systems of Tokugawa Japan had already reached maturity.

Most daimyō “divisions” of the bakugun started their journeys from different locations and therefore traveled separately. In some cases they did not have a great distance to travel. Hosokawa Tadatoshi, the daimyō of Kumamoto domain in Kyushu, for example, was close to the scene and had to move his troops less than 100 miles. In all, the Tokugawa ordered deployment of twelve large forces from domains in Kyushu, thereby expediting the arrival of an army in Arima. Ogasawara Tadazane, with a domain in northernmost Kyushu, was not quite so near, but still close enough to deploy quickly to

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the siege. Therefore, the most immediate answer to the logistical transportation question was the proximity of some *daimyô* armies to Shimabara.

Although we do not find *daimyô* from northeastern Honshu or southern Hokkaido with troops at the siege, few were as close as Hosokawa and Ogasawara. In total, thirteen *daimyô* not from Kyushu or southwestern Honshu traveled to Arima to besiege Hara Castle. Without the advantage of close proximity, how did they manage the logistics of military transportation?

*Development of the Infrastructure*

The Tokugawa claimed strategic areas of the Japanese Islands as part of their own territory, the *gôryô*. Ieyasu included in the *gôryô* Nagasaki, one of the most heavily used ports of the day, Osaka (the economic capital), Matsumae *han* in southern Hokkaido (the buffer between ‘civilized’ Japan and the *Ainu* ‘barbarians’ in Hokkaido), and the lands of shrines and temples across the nation. The Tokugawa also considered the major highways of Japan, discussed below, as *bakufu*, and therefore Tokugawa, property. The Tokugawa did not stop at claiming lands across Japan as their own; they also placed inspectors (censors) and spies in every *han*. In each of the 66 historical provinces of Japan, which should not be confused with the political boundaries of the *han*, a Tokugawa censor resided and made regular reports of local activity to the Tokugawa. In addition, in most *han* clandestine Tokugawa agents within the domains, and sometimes within the governments, reported malfeasance or treachery to the Tokugawa.
The geo-political design of Japan by the Tokugawa Shoguns is important for our discussion of transportation and communication for several reasons. First, by engineering the distribution of daimyô and domains, the Tokugawa ensured that daimyô of all classifications were spread across the three main islands and the southern tip of Hokkaido. Had rebellion occurred elsewhere, the Tokugawa could have ordered forces near that scene into action with equal (if not greater) ease, once again defeating the obstacle of covering distance first by using assets close to the scene. Second, Tokugawa administrative leadership was not limited to one locus of power in Edo. In a crisis, representatives charged with protecting Tokugawa interests were in place across the nation and available to respond, from the southwestern tip of Kyushu (Nagasaki) to the northernmost frontier (Matsumae). Finally, the Tokugawa did not rely solely on the daimyô, whose interests often conflicted with the Tokugawa, for reports of rebellion, conspiracy, or crisis – both official and clandestine Tokugawa agents dotted the entire nation. Because of these factors, had rebellion broken out anywhere else in their realm, the Tokugawa were assured of speedy and, hopefully, reliable information; daimyô to call upon for assistance; and an area of Tokugawa land and officials nearby to manage the crisis until the central government in Edo could take control.

Between the 1580s and 1637, the Toyotomi and Tokugawa developed a network of major “highways” crisscrossing Japan, referred to in general as the Gôkaidô (or, ‘five highways’). By the time of the rebellion on Shimabara, the Tokugawa had over 280 post stations across Honshu, each one equipped with fresh horses, porters, inns, and supplies. The network also provided for pontoon bridges, where regular bridges washed away with
seasonal rains, and boats for coastal transport and island crossing. The Tokugawa mandated and regulated both the Gôkaidô and the post stations. Although their couriers, emissaries, officials, and the daimyô on the alternate attendance could use the resources of the Gôkaidô at no expense, merchants and private individuals had to pay for the privilege, thereby making the post stations, porters, and inns a semi-privatized, and somewhat self-supporting industry. In addition, sekishô, or checkpoints, along the Gôkaidô allowed the Tokugawa to control the movement of citizens by checking travel documents and maintaining order on the roads.

Immediately after his victory at Sekigahara in 1600, Tokugawa Ieyasu began cementing the logistic infrastructure developed during the Sengoku period by structuring what would become the early modern post station network. Of the “five highways” (Gôkaidô) in central and eastern Japan, he selected some and granted them official sanction, and added more in 1603. These recognized post stations were charged by the Tokugawa with handling official transportation of the Tokugawa and the daimyô. Each station could draw on the surrounding agrarian population to provide laborers to serve as porters as well as for packhorses.

In addition to giving bakufu sanction to existing post stations, with an eye toward efficiency, other stations were eliminated, and some even created, in order to produce a more or less regular spacing of stations at intervals of five miles throughout the Gôkaidô.

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8 Vaporis suggests that Ieyasu foresaw the necessity for a transportation infrastructure to assault Osaka Castle in 1614 though he gives no evidence for it – I find this unlikely in 1601.

Fifty-seven stations punctuated the Tōkaidō – the road between Edo and Kyoto – alone. The Tokugawa added seven stations to create a connector between the Tōkaidō and Osaka following the defeat of Toyotomi Hideyori and the fall of Osaka Castle, thus assuring Tokugawa access to this important political and economic region.

However, when the Gōkaidō network was used for official travel, the bakufu instructed post stations to garner the necessary porters and horses from a specified number of surrounding villages. This service to the post stations came in two forms: kuniyaku, or provincial corvée service, and sukegô, village assistance. At the behest of the Shogun, the rōjū (senior bakufu counselors) legitimated the sukegô system when they decreed in 1616 that shukueki (post stations) could hire horses (and later men) from neighboring villages in times of shortage to fulfill their official transportation duties along Japan’s major highways. The Tokugawa also standardized transportation between post stations by setting weight limits for porters (42 pounds) and horses (330 pounds).

An important element of the Gōkaidō network was the tsugi hikyaku, or “flying feet,” relay runners who delivered official messages. The runners, always traveling in pairs, passed messages from one station to the next. One carried a document or other small parcel in a box, and the other carried a lantern in case they should be slowed by  

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11 Kodama Kota, Nihonshi soran IV: Kinsei I (Tokyo: Shinjinbutsu oraisha, 1984) 433-5. Vaporis has the number at 53 stations; See Vaporis. Breaking Barriers, 32. We may attribute this discrepancy to counting up the number of stations at different times during the Tokugawa era.


nightfall.\textsuperscript{14} The Tokugawa considered the entire \textit{Gôkaidô} network as family, and thus government, property, so post stations always gave their “flying feet” priority, and other travelers gave them the right of way. The “flying feet” could move communiqués over lands as fast as any other communication system of the time because of the \textit{Gôkaidô} network.

The increased burden imposed on post stations by \textit{sankin kôtai} travel was immediately apparent: in 1634, two years after issuing the revised \textit{buke shohatto}, a seven article decree was issued by the \textit{ômetsuke} (great censors) detailing the duty of villages surrounding the post stations to provide necessary men and horses for official travel.\textsuperscript{15} The decree also enjoined post stations to work in harmony with the assisting villages in procuring men and horses. This signalled the beginning of the \textit{sukegô} (assisting village) form of semi-corvée logistical support. Ideally the post stations were maintained by the profits of private transportation while standing ready to provide the free official transport.

Overland travel was not the only method of communications developed during the early Tokugawa era. Although Hideyoshi’s large navy constructed for the failed assaults on Korea had long since disbanded, a healthy seagoing transportation system developed in much the same way as the \textit{Gôkaidô}. Fishermen and cargo boats made consistent use of regular sea lanes surrounding each of Japan’s three main islands. Just as the roads of the \textit{Gôkaidô} were dotted with post stations offering food, water, fresh horses and lodging, so docks providing these same services (except, of course, for horses) sprung up at landing

\textsuperscript{14} Vaporis. \textit{Breaking Barriers}, 19.

points along early modern Japanese sea routes. Not only did these routes circumnavigate the Japanese islands, the boats that used them also provided transportation between islands and transport inland into bays and rivers. In combination, the land, sea, and river crossing routes established in the first few decades of the seventeenth century provided the basis for one of the most reliable and comprehensive transportation systems in the early modern world.

When the need for military communication and troop movement became necessary in the winter of 1637-38, an entire infrastructure was ready and waiting for them. Tokugawa and daimyō troops could move swiftly to their destination at Hara because of the well-maintained roads, porters, horses, and supplies of the Gōkaidō. Communication was possible because of the tsugi hikyaku and water transport systems were already in place. However, to maintain the Gōkaidō entirely from Tokugawa funds would have bankrupted the bakufu. It was the peacetime paying customers of the Gōkaidō and the labor of the kuniyaku and sukegō systems that made the incredibly efficient Tokugawa response to the Shimabara rebellion possible.

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16 See Kota ed., Nihonshi soran IV, for maps of established early modern Japanese sea routes and landings.
Peacetime Use and Maintenance

The roots of provincial corvée service (kuniyaku) system can be traced to the policies of the second of Japan’s “Three Heroes”, Toyotomi Hideyoshi.\(^\text{17}\) Kuniyaku indicates service or labor (yaku) levied at the provincial level (kuni or koku).\(^\text{18}\) Whereas the sukegô system levied a labor tax by village with regard to the village’s proximity to the post station and the village's kokudaka, kuniyaku was temporarily levied against the peasants or craftsmen of an entire province at a per-oku ratio, without regard to specific distances from the work site. Kuniyaku was at times levied as a tax of resources and at times one of cash. The first significant use of kuniyaku in the Edo period was by the first shogun Ieyasu to provide armorers and steel in support of his sieges of Osaka castle (1614-1615).\(^\text{19}\) Iemitsu used large-scale kuniyaku to supply craftsmen for the re-construction of Edo castle, in addition to support at the Hara siege. As the 17th century progressed, kuniyaku was most commonly used for one of two purposes; to provide labor and resources for construction projects undertaken by the bakufu, and later as a cash tax to defray the costs of transportation labor. The construction supported by kuniyaku labor was commonly repair of waterways and surrounding earthworks, or maintenance of the

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\(^{17}\) Takagi Shosaku. “Bakuhan shoki no mibun to kuniyaku”, Rekishigaku kenkyu, (Annual Special Edition 1976): 88 - 96 passim, points out that although large scale labor taxes similar to kuniyaku were issued by Oda Nobunaga, the kuniyaku of Tokugawa Japan was based on both the mibun and kokudaka systems, initiated by Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s land surveys and sword hunts and characteristic of early modern Japan, suggesting post-Hideyoshi’s reign as a the point of origin.

\(^{18}\) I do not agree with Herman Ooms interpretation of kuniyaku as "national" corvée, but rather as "provincial" service based on "kuni" as the geographic unit against which this levy was accessed in the Tokugawa period. See Herman Ooms. Tokugawa Village Practice: Class, Status, Power, Law. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996) 93, 117.

\(^{19}\) Takagi Shosaku. “Bakuhan shoki no mibun to kuniyaku,” 92.
shogunal hunting grounds in the Kantō. The second typical form of kuniyaku was used to pay for the transportation of emissaries from Korea or Ryūkyū (Okinawa) traveling to Edo. Although this form of kuniyaku may also have started out as corvée labor, kuniyaku used to support the travel of foreign emissaries peasants was increasingly paid in cash rather than in labor as the Tokugawa period progressed.

The Tokugawa placed particular importance on peacetime maintenance of the roads and post stations – not only to keep official traffic moving, but also so that they would be ready in time of war. This fact is highlighted by the measures taken by the Tokugawa over the next century to maintain the peacetime system. Increased traffic, both private and public, due to the burdens of the sankin kōtai processions and the growing commercial and tourist trade of the late 1600's rendered the post stations increasingly understaffed by the porters and horses necessary to either turn a profit or provide official services. To alleviate this problem the circumference area of villages around the post stations from which sukegô, assisting village, men and horses could be requested increased throughout the seventeenth century.\(^{20}\) The Gōkaidō was kept in good use and repair by both official and unofficial travel.

\textit{Wartime Operation}

By the time of the rebellion in Shimabara, the communication infrastructure of Japan was so refined and well maintained that the bakufu officials in Osaka were comfortable predicting, almost to the day, the time messages would take to reach their destinations.

“The Warning of Edo and Osaka:

On the afternoon of December 21 [1637] an urgent letter relating news of the insurrection in Shimabara arrived at Osaka Castle by messenger boat from Shikoku. … The Castle Warden, Abe Masatsugu, Lord of Bichû, called together the Castle Guard,…the [Osaka] City Magistrate,…and the [City] Boat Magistrate at his house to discuss how Edo should be informed of the events of December 9, 10, and 11 [1637]…Well, as the night turned into day, a warning letter was sent off to the Edo government. The Lord of Bichû noted that the distance between Edo and Osaka was 325 miles, and the roundtrip by relay couriers would take 10 days. Then, discussion [in Edo] would take at least one day [making the return time] 11 days. When a response was finally received, it would take at least 10 days for it to make the 878 mile trip overseas to Shikoku, and if the favorable westerly winds were not as they are now, it would take 14 to 15 days to arrive, for a total of just under 30 days [for a response from Edo to reach the Shogun’s agents near the scene]. It is important [to remember] above all else that in the meantime, the insurrection may have progressed, and that before it could grow bigger it must be quelled.”21

The Osaka “Shû” (Tokugawa representatives in Osaka listed above) predicted the time it would take for orders from the bakufu to arrive in Kyushu and were mindful of the impact that delay could have on the news they had just received from Shimabara. Through a combination of tsugi hikyaku and relay boats, they estimated that the news of rebellion would take just thirty days to travel over 1200 miles and deliver Tokugawa directives on the scene in Shimabara. The confidence of the Osaka Shû emphasizes just how well used and maintained the communication infrastructure of early modern Japan was in 1637.

The travel of Matsudaira and Toda, the two “Generals” sent from Edo by the Shogun to relieve Itakura provide an excellent opportunity to examine how military forces moved

to the siege in particular, and in early modern Japan in general. The early modern post station system, mature by the early 1630s, provided the resting points, fresh horses, porters, and river crossing that allowed the Matsudaira/Toda force to reach Hara in just one month. Their journey divides neatly into three legs: the Edo to Osaka trip along the Tôkaidô, by boat from Osaka to Kyushu, and the final stretch by land and sea to Arima.

Matsudaira Nobutsuna and Toda Ujikane received orders from the Shogunate to travel to Arima and take charge of the siege. Nobutsuna came from rather humble beginnings with an original stipend of three assistants’ salaries in 1604, to full daimyô status in 1627 through work as a shogunal administrator, finally rising to Senior Counselor (rōjû) status in 1633. He was one of the architects of the Military Service system, the Alternate Attendance system, and the series of Seclusion (sakoku) Edicts. Toda, daimyô of Ôgaki Domain, had performed bravely on behalf of the Tokugawa at the Battle of Sekigahara. Within five days they rounded up their troops and servants in Edo, prepared their luggage, and departed for Kyushu. Over the next thirty days the Generals’ retinue, including some 4,500 troops, maintained an impressive pace. They traversed some 735 miles, farther than the 680-mile Spanish Road (the route of the Spanish army from Italy to the Netherlands), over land and sea in just twenty-eight travel-days. Although one of the smaller armies to participate in the Hara siege, the

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22 Vaporis, Breaking Barriers, 19.
24 Kokushi daijiten, v13, 138; and Ueda Masaaki et al., Kôdansha Nihon jinmei daijiten (Tokyo: Kôdansha, 2001) v5, 663.
26 Parker, The Military Revolution, p. 76.
Matsudaira and Toda troops were the largest contingent to travel so far. How could they have been able to keep up a pace of over twenty-five miles per day for a month in the depth of winter, and still be ready for war?

Long before the Generals Matsudaira and Toda left Edo for Shimabara, preparations were underway in Honshu and Kyushu to speed communication about the rebellion. On Christmas Eve 1637 the karō (elders) of eight daimyō in Kyushu and southwestern Honshu issued a circular to their domains to enhance the existing transportation infrastructure and facilitate the Bungō metsuke (the bakufu censor in Bungō Province) warning Edo of the developments in Shimabara. Apparently, in addition to the messages sent by tsugi hikyaku, the rebellion concerned the Bungō metsuke sufficiently to warrant a personal trip to Osaka and then Edo:

“Regarding the Christian rebellion in Shimabara.

Because the Bungō Metsuke is sending warning to Edo, make sure his travel on relay boats is not slowed.

1. Make sure relay landings are lit [with lanterns].
2. Keep two boats in place and ready for use.
3. Provide as many rowers as there are oars on the boat.
4. If the weather is poor, provide for overland travel.
5. In addition to overland travel, if the weather becomes better, be prepared to continue [by boat] from the next landing.

Until the conclusion of the rebellion in Shimabara, do not be negligent about the above orders.”

On January 17, Hosokawa Tadamichi, daimyō of Kumamoto domain, anticipated increased transportation requirements and reinforced the kuniyaku system in his domain in response to the rebellion with a circular that read:

“Regarding the tenka [bakufu] army: The messengers circulating this letter from place to place are acting on the behalf of the kōgi [Shogun]. They are not to be lax in their duty, nor interfered with. Because the Generals are descending from Edo, keep the roads within your area well maintained. The labor needed for this is to be considered provincial service (kuniyaku) and should be performed diligently…”

Just five days after Hosokawa ordered the peasants of his domain to prepare for movement of the Tokugawa army, the bakufu ordered the Hosokawa daimyō to do the same. On January 22, Tokugawa representatives ordered Hosokawa [Tadamichi] to provide boats at Kokura for the Generals arriving from Edo, who were still twenty days away from reaching that point in their journey.

“When the Generals are crossing to Kyushu, Hosokawa must transfer all his ships, without exception, from Tsuruzaki in Bungō to Kokura. This is on the order of the Generals. The number of ships you send will be recorded and sent to Edo. Be diligent in this matter.”

While preparations were underway in Honshu and Kyushu to reinforce the existing communication and transportation system by calling upon the peasants and daimyō of Japan to “serve” the Tokugawa, the Generals’ combined army headed southwest from Edo on the Tōkaidō along the eastern coast of Japan, or Eastern Sea-Way. The Tōkaidō,

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28 Hondo shi, ed. Genshiryō, 461. This circular (furitsugijyō) appears again two days later in another area of the Hosokawa domain, see Hondo shi, ed. Genshiryō, 474. Here the term kuniyaku may imply both the meaning understood by Herman Ooms (service to the nation), and the meaning I argue as standard in this dissertation, that is provincial service.

29 Hondo shi ed. Genshiryō, 492.

30 “Shimabara Amakusa nikki” in Amakusa sōdō, 268-70.
which developed during the late Sengoku Period, connected the pre-Tokugawa capital, Kyoto, with the Tokugawa created center of early modern Japan, Edo. Following the coast line, the Tōkaidō led them farther southwest for approximately 250 miles before turning inland toward Kyoto from Shono. Rather than continuing to Kyoto, the procession turned again to the southwest toward Osaka, the mercantile and travel hub of central Japan, at Fushimi. The 325-mile trip from Edo to Osaka, with a rather large force in tow, took just thirteen days.

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Table 3.1: The Generals’ Route to Shimabara

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 17</td>
<td>Shinagawa</td>
<td>February 2</td>
<td>Kawaguchi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 18</td>
<td>Ōiso</td>
<td>February 3</td>
<td>Muro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 19</td>
<td>Hakone</td>
<td>February 4</td>
<td>Ushimado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 20</td>
<td>Sakakibara</td>
<td>February 5</td>
<td>Shimotsui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 21</td>
<td>Okabe</td>
<td>February 6</td>
<td>Tomo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 22</td>
<td>Fukroï</td>
<td>February 7</td>
<td>Tadakai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 23</td>
<td>Shirosuga</td>
<td>February 8</td>
<td>Kamagawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 24</td>
<td>Okazaki</td>
<td>February 9</td>
<td>Jonoseki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 25</td>
<td>Atsuta</td>
<td>February 10</td>
<td>Shimonoseki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 26</td>
<td>Shono</td>
<td>February 11</td>
<td>Kokura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 27</td>
<td>Mizuguchi</td>
<td>February 12</td>
<td>Kokura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 28</td>
<td>Fushimi</td>
<td>February 13</td>
<td>Iizuka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 29</td>
<td>Fushimi</td>
<td>February 14</td>
<td>Harada</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 30</td>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>February 15</td>
<td>Terai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 31</td>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>February 16</td>
<td>Shimabara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1</td>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>February 17</td>
<td>Arima</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
During their passage from Edo to Osaka, Matsudaira and Toda stopped each night at Tōkaidō post stations. Over the twelve-day trip they rested at eleven of the stations. Although the farthest distance they traveled in one day was just over thirty-seven miles (between Okazaki and Atsuta), the next day snowfall slowed their progress to just sixteen miles (Atsuta to Shono).\textsuperscript{32} In total, they averaged twenty-five miles per day on the 325-mile route from Edo to Osaka.

After two days in Osaka, both re-supplying and meeting with the Tokugawa officials there, the Generals’ army boarded nine boats and on 1 February continued their journey through the Akashi Strait on along the Inland Sea separating Shikoku Island and the main island Honshu, making daily stops at relay stations, over almost 300 miles, before arriving at Shimonoseki ten days and 293 miles later. From Shimonoseki, they crossed the Strait to Kyushu and arrived at Kokura, a gateway city. Rough seas not only delayed their departure from Kokura, it forced the Generals’ army to abandon a sea route to Arima around the west coast of Kyushu. Instead they adopted an overland passage south to the Shimabara Peninsula and then on to Arima and Hara Castle, arriving on 17 February 1638. Ironically, this final delay gave Itakura his last chance to take the castle by assault before his superiors arrived, ending in his death, along with hundreds of his men.

\textit{Conclusion}

\textsuperscript{32} “Shimabara Amakusa nikki” in \textit{Amakusa sōdō}, 268-70.
“Be Prepared.”
– The Boy Scout Motto

The same transportation infrastructure that carried information throughout Japan also made the timely movement of large armies possible. At the center of the Tokugawa transportation system the Gôkaidô spread from Shimonoseki in the southwestern tip to Nikkô in the north of Honshu. Comprised of five major highways and their tributaries, the Gôkaidô provided the basis for orderly movement of information, goods, and people around Honshu and to the major crossing points to Japan’s other three main islands. Mature and fully functional by the 1630s, the Gôkaidô provided all the necessities for armies on the march. The Gôkaidô was dotted with hundreds of post-stations (shukueki) for changing horses and porters, inns and merchants for rest and replenishment, river crossings of various types, and guard stations (sekishô) to regulate traffic. Regular shipping lanes that encompassed the entire coastline of Japan, especially from Edo southwest around and between Shikoku and Kyushu enhanced the capacity of the Gôkaidô. Bulk goods, including horses and sometimes troops, could be moved efficiently by boat along the coastline of Japan either separately or in concert with travel along the Gôkaidô. Large armies, even ones approaching 100,000 troops and stretching dozens of miles from head to tail, could find all the horses, food, supplies, assistance, and shelter they needed to keep going along the transportation routes of early modern Japan. In 1637 this meant that the rebels of Shimabara had precious little time to barricade themselves in Hara Castle before the Tokugawa could move an overwhelming army in place to confront them.
While it is true that the Tokugawa held one advantage that few early modern states could claim – control of their entire, and most importantly contiguous, lands – this was not the only factor that sped information and armies hundreds of miles across the Japanese Islands by land and sea in response to the Shimabara Rebellion. Long before the rebels of Shimabara and Amakusa braced themselves for siege in old Hara Castle, all the elements of the Tokugawa transportation and communication system necessary to deliver an army to face them were in place.

The Tokugawa placed intelligence operatives and administrators, clandestine or otherwise, throughout the nation. They received a steady stream of intelligence that peered into the activities of all social classes and activities in the form of regular reports and, when warranted, covert messages. Even if the absentee administrators of Matsukura’s domain had not been so ill prepared deal with riotous peasants that they were forced to send dozens of dispatches to nearby domains pleading for rescue, it would not have been long before the Tokugawa learned of the rebellion from their own sources. In addition to spies and censors, the Tokugawa relied on daimyō to report disturbance or misbehavior in neighboring domains. The buke shohatto instructed daimyō to report any suspicious activity in surrounding lands, and to refuse safe haven to people from other domains. This provision of the buke shohatto ideally provided the Tokugawa with intelligence of possible threats to their authority and limited the hiding places of those who would break the Tokugawa social or political order.

No matter where the information about Shimabara came from, it had to reach Edo in time for the Tokugawa to make effective decisions about how to handle the rebellion. Fortunately, the official tsugi hikyaku messenger system provided a ready-made system
for moving information around the country. In addition, those messengers could use the extensive land and sea transportations routes that reached all corners of Japan to move their precious cargo to Edo, and carry instructions back.

Another factor that allowed the Tokugawa to react promptly to events in Japan worked hand-in-hand with the swift messengers and transportation infrastructure of the nation: the lands and officials of the gôryô, or Tokugawa, and thereby bakufu, lands. The Tokugawa claimed lands throughout Japan that were militarily, politically, or economically strategic. These areas were then overseen by bakufu officials, creating, in effect, proxy centers of Tokugawa rule. In the case of the Shimabara Rebellion, this alternative allowed the authorities in Osaka to take immediate action against the Shimabara rebels even as runners were speeding the news of rebellion to Edo. Because the Osaka officials intervened in the growing problem in Shimabara at the same time they sent for instructions from Edo, daimyô near Shimabara domain did not have to wait the time it took for information and orders to make the round trip from Kyushu to Edo and back before taking action. By creating surrogate centers of their authority in strategic areas around the country, the Tokugawa prevented provincial problems such as rebellion from escalating beyond redress before the Tokugawa could learn of and react to the event. In 1637, the Tokugawa network of spies, informants, runners, roadways, and regional authorities worked in concert to inform the bakufu of the Shimabara rebellion and allowed the Tokugawa to respond swiftly before the uprising could spread even further.

Establishment of the Tokugawa transportation infrastructure, however, was not enough to ensure that the Shogun Iemitsu could project Tokugawa authority in 1637-38.
The maintenance of that infrastructure over nearly four decades was crucial to the Tokugawa ability to project authority at long distances on moment’s notice. It was beyond the reach of Tokugawa wealth to create and sustain a military transportation and communication infrastructure strictly from family and bakufu funds. Instead, public and private activity buttressed the transportation infrastructure the Tokugawa eventually relied upon in 1637.

We can now draw comparisons between the methods of sustaining the Tokugawa transportation infrastructure and maintaining a standing army that was mobilized into the largest field army in the world. First, devolution in the form of paying consumers kept the roads and boats of the Tokugawa highways, boats, and launches in operation. Reminiscent of gun’yaku (see Chapter 4 below), this devolution afforded the Tokugawa a peacetime transportation system without the entire expense of maintaining it. Second, merchants of all descriptions that developed along the paths heavily used by both peasantry and officials ensured that the needs of travelers, whether peasants or troops on their way to Hara, could rest and re-supply with themselves with food, fresh horses, other goods, and even entertainment. Without these privatized merchants, Tokugawa troops on the path to war would have had only what they could carry with them, or supply from the rear, to sustain them during their movement. Second, as with the rice allowances provided to peacetime officials and wartime troops, the transportation network was underpinned, albeit to a lesser degree, by government subsidy. Funds for road oversight and maintenance were provided directly out of Tokugawa coffers and indirectly through Tokugawa-induced processions and pilgrimages. As with mobilization discussed in the
next chapter, devolution, privatization, and government subsidy sustained in peacetime what was necessary for war.
CHAPTER 4

MOBILIZATION and DEPLOYMENT

As noted in Chapter 1, John F. Guilmartin includes in his definition of logistics the finance and mobilization elements absent from Martin van Creveld’s definition. This chapter will explore exactly those two aspects of logistics: the mobilization and financing of troops, in early modern Japan. The Tokugawa siege of Hara Castle was the only military action of national scale between the Osaka Campaigns of 1614-15 and the 1860s. Various estimates put the Tokugawa army at Hara between 100,000 and 200,000 troops strong. What was the actual size of the siege army and how, after a generation of peace following the Osaka Campaigns, were the Tokugawa able to mobilize a force that large?

Until the Prussian Canton system of the 18th century, and the French levée en masse of the early 19th century, European armies relied primarily on three methods for mobilizing armies: volunteers, foreign troops, and forced conscription. Those either escaping poverty or the law, or searching for financial gain would volunteer to serve in the forces of early modern Europe’s monarchs.¹ A variety of non-volunteer methods also

existed: troops could be raised by hiring entire units of foreign armies, impressing the troops of enemies taken in combat, or through forced conscription of foreign and domestic civilians. Early modern states and the contractors, or independent military ‘captains’, upon whom they imposed mobilization, used each of these schemes. The ‘captain system’ involved an individual contractor with a patent from the crown to raise and arm a prescribed number of troops. The captains were essentially proto-entrepreneurs who raised and commanded troops for profit. The European methods for troop mobilization differed over region, and especially time, as they developed during the almost constant war of the 16th and 17th centuries.

In 1638, after a generation of peace, the Tokugawa raised a siege army larger than any European state at the time could have done, to put down a peasant rebellion in southwestern Japan. However, the large army raised in 1638 does not compare to the claims of contemporary Westerners concerning Japanese mobilization potential in that period. Several 17th-century European observers noted the military prowess of the Japanese:

“The Revenue which is divided amongst the Kings and governing Lords [daimyô] amounts to 18,400,000 Coquyns [koku]; according to which account, each of them must, proportionably, entertain a select company of Souldiers, always in readiness for the [Shogun’s] service; so that he who hath a thousand Coquyns yearly, must bring into the field, whenever he is commanded, twenty Foot Soldiers & two Horse-men. The number therefore of Souldiers, which the [Shogun] hath continually in service, entertained by the aforesaid Kings and Lords, amount to three hundred sixty eight thousand Foot, and thirty six thousand Horse. Besides these his Majesty hath one hundred thousand Foot, and twenty thousand

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Horse... Most of the Lords...do ordinarily keep double the number of Souldiers...then they are obliged to by their tax.”

Writing in 1636, François Caron, who would replace Koeckebacker as head of the Dutch Factory at Hirado, thus estimated that after twenty years of peace, the Tokugawa shogun could raise at least half a million troops, including nearly 60,000 knights, from a total population of twelve million. He went on to write that the actual total of troops at the shogun’s disposal was likely twice that number. Gathering and feeding an army of nearly one million troops would have been an impossible logistical feat in the early modern world. At the turn of the 16th century, the Hapsburgs had only 150,000 troops in pay to defend their global empire, while the Ottomans deployed over 100,000 troops for a single siege. Caron’s claim becomes even more fantastic if we consider that European states with even greater populations, such as France with a population of sixteen million, could not raise such vast forces. Even a century later, European nations could not boast armies nearly the size that Caron described. In 1740, European field armies were estimated to number 72,000 in Prussia, 80-100,000 in Austria, 130,000 in Russia, and in

3 Francis Caron and Joost Shorten [sic], A true Description of the Mighty Kingdoms of Japan and Siam (London: Samuel Brown, 1663) 35-36. Originally published in Dutch in 1636. Also see similar claims, presumably taken from Caron, in John Albert de Mandelslo (a.k.a. Johann Albrecht von Mendelslo), The Voyages & Travels of J. Albert Mandelslo into the East-Indies. Begun in the year M.DC.XXXXVIII. and finish’d in M.DC.XXL., Part II (London, 1662) 186; Bernhardus Varenium (a.k.a. Bernhard Varen, Bernhardi Varenii, Bernhardio Varenio), Descriptio Regni Iaponiae cum quibusdam affinis materiae (Amsterdam, 1649) 124.

4 Conrad Totman, Early Modern Japan (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993) 140. Totman notes that earlier estimates of the Japanese population in 1600 at 18 million are likely exaggerated and agrees with Hayami Akira’s corrected 12 million in 1600.

5 Parker, The Military Revolution, 45.


the seventeenth century 150,000 in France.\(^8\) Caron’s amazing claim provides a starting point for several questions about military mobilization in early modern Japan:

1. What system did the Tokugawa have in place for mobilizing such vast numbers of troops?
2. How did that system work in actual practice, at the Siege of Hara Castle in 1638?
3. How was mobilization capacity maintained during the generation of peace prior to Shimabara?
4. What can we make of Caron’s claim that the Tokugawa could raise one million troops in the mid-seventeenth century?

Japanese scholarship on military service focuses on either the minutia of the participants (type of pikes they carried, banner insignia etc.)\(^9\), or the larger implications of what the military edicts implied about Tokugawa political relations with the daimyô.\(^10\) Each emphasis is useful, but leaves a gap concerning how the edicts actually operated.

Even less has been written on military service in English. Although John Whitney Hall and Harold Bolitho drew the outlines of the military service edicts in their contributions to *The Cambridge History of Early Modern Japan: Volume 4 Early Modern Japan*, the details of the military service system and how it worked are more elusive.\(^11\).

In his overview of the pre-modern Japanese military, *The Samurai Sourcebook*, Stephen


Turnbull sheds some light on the early modern military service edicts. However, Turnbull’s few comments on the subject rely primarily on the work of noted military historian Yoshiko Sasama, whose explanation of military service is somewhat misleading. Sasama suggests that the 1649 military service edict was the first, and was issued in response to the need for a mobilization mechanism demonstrated by Tokugawa response to the Shimabara Rebellion. The existence of military service edicts clearly contradict Sasama’s explanation.

Background

In 1600, Tokugawa Ieyasu emerged from the Battle of Sekigahara as the most powerful of 260-odd warlords in the recently unified Japan. Following his victory, Ieyasu began implementing a series of political policies designed to cement Tokugawa authority while reining in the power of the other feudal lords, or daimyô. In 1603 Ieyasu forced the Emperor of Japan, long since a figurehead, to appoint him shogun. In theory, the Emperor was entrusting Ieyasu and his kin to safeguard the nation as the Emperor’s proxy; in reality, Ieyasu had legitimized his de facto status as the most powerful man in early modern Japan.

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14 For example, see: Sasama Yoshihiko, Zusetsu Nihon budô jiten (Tokyo: Kashiwa shobô, 1982) 280 (under gun no hensei); and Zusetsu Nihon senji sahô jiten (Tokyo: Kashiwa shobô, 2000) 44.
Rather than attempting to destroy all the other loci of power in Japan, Ieyasu classified the other feudal barons by their income and previous loyalty to him. Ieyasu’s predecessor, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, implemented nationwide cadastral surveys to assess the agricultural productivity of the land under his unified control. These surveys relied on the *kokudaka* system for accounting. A *koku*, or Japanese bushel, became the standard unit of measure for rice.\(^{16}\) The putative number of *koku* of rice, or *taka*, that a given area of land could produce annually was known as the *kokudaka*, or *koku* value, of that land. Ieyasu used the *kokudaka* measuring system to classify and control not only the *daimyō*, but the peasants of early modern Japan as well. The Tokugawa installed a floor on *daimyō* status at 10,000 *koku*. Following Sekigahara, military leaders with collective lands valued less than this amount were not considered *daimyō*, and were either subsumed by a *daimyō*’s clan or the Tokugawa, or their lands were increased to *daimyō* standing.

**Military Service**

In 1615, following the defeat of Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s heir, Hideyori - the last rival to Tokugawa authority – at the Summer Siege of Osaka Castle, the second Tokugawa Shogun, Hidetada, codified a set of rules governing military life. The *Buke shohatto*, or Various Laws for Military Houses, instructed the *daimyō*, their retainers, and Tokugawa

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\(^{15}\) For corroboration, see Fujino, Takagi, Asao etc. Sasama is picked up by many “lay” military historians as the authority, and he is probably the absolute authority on minutia (weapon specifications, uniforms etc.) but his explanation of *gun’yaku* (military service) is consistently off the mark.

\(^{16}\) One *koku* of rice (a dry measure) is equivalent to 180.39 liters, 5.12 U.S. bushels or approximately 47.62 U.S. gallons.
family liege vassals (family retainers including hatamoto (bannermen) and gokenin (housemen), under direct Tokugawa control) on proper military and political conduct. They included bans on harboring fugitives, inter-daimyō family marriage, and luxurious spending.

The following year, Hidetada issued the first Tokugawa gun’yaku, or “military service,” edict. Issued two months after his father’s death, the Military Service Edict specified the number of troops required of Tokugawa liege vassals with land valued between 500 and 5000 koku and the lowest daimyō level of 10,000 koku. (See Table 4.1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Value (in koku)</th>
<th>Knights</th>
<th>Arquebus</th>
<th>Archers</th>
<th>Pikemen</th>
<th>Banner-men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3000</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>15</td>
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</tr>
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<td>4000</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4.1: 1616 Military Service Edict Requirements*¹⁷

The 1616 Edict stood until his son, the third Shogun Iemitsu, assumed full power in 1632. He immediately overhauled the Tokugawa edicts relating to the military relationship between the Shogun, his direct liege vassals, and the *daimyô*. Among edicts including the re-issued Laws for Military Houses (*buke shohatto*, originally issued in 1615), Iemitsu expanded and reissued the Military Service Edict in two parts in 1633 (See Tables 4.2 and 4.3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Value</th>
<th>Total Troops</th>
<th>Foot Soldiers</th>
<th>Bows</th>
<th>Pikes</th>
<th>Horse Handler</th>
<th>Arquebus</th>
<th>Box Carriers</th>
<th>Armor Carriers</th>
<th>Shoe Carriers</th>
<th>Porters</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
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<td>400</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>600</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>•</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>700</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 (+1)</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4.2: 1633 Military Service Edict (200-900 koku)*

Issued on 26 March 1633, these two expanded edicts detailed the military service required of every Tokugawa liege vassal with a land grant between 200 and 9000 *koku*, and *daimyô* with domains worth an annual 10,000-100,000 *koku*. In Table 4.2, the requirements for liege vassals with stipends or land valued between 200-900 *koku* are

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extremely detailed. The total number of troops required of them is followed by the exact composition of those troops. Included are the samurai (indicating foot soldiers armed with the traditional two swords), pikemen, archers, arquebusiers, and support personnel such as porters, armorers, and horse handlers. Again we see a distribution of troops that emphasizes first foot soldiers, then pikemen and arquebusiers. This is also true of the regulations for daimyô possessing between 1,000 and 2,000 koku, except that the number of samurai is not specified.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Value</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Knights</th>
<th>Arquebus</th>
<th>Bows</th>
<th>Pikes</th>
<th>Banners</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>25-27</td>
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Table 4.3: 1633 Military Service Edict (1000-100,000 koku)^19

Table 4.3 Continued

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However, beyond 2000 koku, the number and composition of troops changes dramatically. From 2000 to 100,000 koku the relative number of knights and arquebusiers increases steadily. At 100,000 koku, not only have the number of knights
overtaken pikemen, but arquebusiers also outnumber pikemen by three to one. (See Figure 4.1)

![Graph showing troop types as a percentage of the total](image)

**Figure 4.1: Troop Types as a Percentage of the Total**

Looking at the requirements for 2,000 to 100,000-koku-value stipend and land, it is difficult to get a sense of the relative burden of these obligations on the *daimyō* and vassals because they are not a straight percentage of land value. Although foot soldiers and support personnel are not specified, by combining the specified troops (knights, arquebusiers, archers, pikemen, and bannermen) and reducing each level’s requirement to a per 100 *koku* value, comparison of the relative burdens can be drawn. For example, a vassal with an annual income of 6,000 *koku* was responsible for thirty-two specified
troops, which produces a 0.53 troops per 100 koku of land value percentage. This does not include foot soldiers armed with swords only or other personnel and is not intended therefore as an absolute statement of the military burden. However, it does allow comparison with the burden of say a 50,000-koku daimyô who was responsible for 0.68 specified troops per 100 koku. It is important to remember that this is not a ratio – which would indicate a portion of the total number of troops – but rather a percentage of troops to land value.

The military service edicts concerned the relationship between the shogun and his vassals, whether they were daimyô with independent lands, or lesser Tokugawa liege vassals. They do not, however, concern the distribution of military service or burden within the daimyô’s domain. Although the Tokugawa edicts were used as a standard by which daimyô administered military service within the domain, the relationship between a daimyô and his liege vassals was independent of the daimyô -Tokugawa relationship. In the instance of military service, as with other policies and administrative apparatus, the daimyô domain operated much like a bakufu writ small.

Takagi Shosaku questions how Tokugawa imposed military obligations were distributed within the daimyô domains. Were the daimyô responsible for the gross obligation required by the edicts, or did the edicts dictate service requirements for the daimyô as well as his vassals individually? For example, if a 10,000 koku daimyô gives administration of half of his lands to two sons (at 2,500 koku each), would the domain as a whole then be responsible for military service equal to the 5,000 koku requirement plus

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20 Takagi Shôsaku, Nihon kinsei kokka shi no kenkyû (Tokyo: Iwanami Shôten, 1990) chapters XI and XII.
twice the 2,500 koku requirement (Plan A)? Or, was the domain still responsible for the requirement set for a 10,000-koku daimyô (Plan B)?

The fact that the military service requirements, especially in the revised and expanded 1633 edicts, are not a fixed ratio of land value bears out Takagi Shôsaku’s conclusion that they were overall requirements of the domain. If it were a straight percentage, it would make no difference how the burden was distributed among the daimyô’s vassals: the total would be consistent. However, because the ratio of troop requirement is not fixed, and in fact increases with land holding value, the distribution within the domain would effect the overall requirement. Because the requirements are relatively less for smaller landholders and greater for larger landholders, the daimyô could have manipulated their total service by arrangement of land holding within the domain. Returning to our 10,000-koku daimyô, his gross burden (Plan B) would have been seventy-two troops (plus foot soldiers). However, under Plan A, if his possession were split equally with four vassals (five at 2,000 koku each) the gross burden would only be forty troops (8 troops each x 5). It would be counterintuitive to propose that the military service system was liable to the manipulations of the daimyô to such a drastic degree. Not only would such orchestration of the military burden reduce the gross number of troops, as we can see from Figure 4.1 it would have changed the composition of those troops because the balance of knights, arquebusiers, pikemen, and archers inverts as land value changes.

Further, the composition of troops changes as land value increases. Relatively more archers and pikemen were asked of vassals with smaller land grants, and relatively more knights and arquebusiers were asked of those with lands of greater value. Mounted troops and those with shoulder arms both required significant financial investments.
Although, as John F. Guilmartin points out, archery required a lifetime of dedication while a peasant could be made into a arquebusier in days, someone had to pay for the arquebus, shot, and powder.\textsuperscript{21} When maintained in larger quantities, with standard barrels, shot, and powder, arquebuses may have been less expensive per unit. Similarly, the incredible expense of maintaining the mounts of knights, including feed, equipment, and the handlers to care for the horses in peace and wartime, was likely more efficient with a larger stable. In combat, large forces of knights and arquebusiers who had been trained together, led by familiar superiors, would have the advantage over a group of smaller forces brought together only in combat. So the different composition of military contingents from fiefs of different size produced a balanced overall force.

\textit{Rice Allowances}

Another component of military service under the Tokugawa involved rice subsidies. Although in theory the reciprocal relationship between the Tokugawa landed-vassals (including \textit{daimyô} and lesser liege vassals) was of a feudal nature, in actual practice it contained more contractual elements.\textsuperscript{22} Theoretically, the \textit{daimyô} pledged to maintain and deliver troops for use by the Tokugawa in wartime, and in return the \textit{daimyô} were granted lands (or lands held were sanctioned after the fact) which they administered independent of the Tokugawa and from which they drew an income. However, in practice, rice allowances were added to the \textit{daimyô}’s column of the balance sheet.


Building on a tradition begun by Toyotomi Hideyoshi in the late Sengoku period the Tokugawa issued campaign-specific salaries to the troops of daimyō and liege vassals called to service for the shogun. For example, during the last conflicts between Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s successor and the new Tokugawa regime at Osaka Castle in the winter of 1614 and summer of 1615 (know as the Winter and Summer Sieges) the Tokugawa paid a salary to their own, and the daimyō’s troops, at the sieges. Called fuchimai (rice allowance), the troops who assisted the Tokugawa received an allotment of rice (or its cash equivalent) for the duration of the campaign at a set rate per day. Each daimyō and liege vassal was allotted a number of allowances in relation to the value of their land in rice. For the Osaka campaigns, the number of allowances was set at three per one hundred koku of land. For example, a daimyō with a land grant producing an estimated 20,000 koku of rice (or its equivalent) annually was entitled to draw salaries for up to 600 troops. Therefore, while theoretically it was the daimyō’s burden to maintain and provide troops to the Tokugawa in return for their land grant, in practice the Tokugawa also provided some financial compensation to offset the burden on daimyō for specific campaigns.

Along with the revised Military Service Edicts of 1633, the Tokugawa standardized rice allowances for daimyō participating in the numerous shogunal processions. Between Ieyasu’s death in 1616 and the Hara siege in 1638, the Shoguns Hidetada and Iemitsu made more than a dozen pilgrimages to Ieyasu’s grave in Nikkō. They also marched on Kyoto in a display of shogunal power fourteen times in those

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23 Rice allowances (fuchimai) were originally (and continued to be) granted to military men serving as administrators to compensate them for their staff. For example, an administrator overseeing 50,000 koku
years. On each of these processions, *daimyō* and their retainers accompanied the shoguns. Theoretically acting in their duty as shogunal guard, the *daimyō* really served the dual functions of helping to display shogunal grandeur as part of these large processions, while also showing their personal loyalty to the shogun.\(^{24}\) To offset the cost of these journeys on the *daimyō*, the shogunate issued allotments of rice for *daimyō* troops. In 1633 the Shogunate standardized the rice allowances for non-combat duty such as the processions and pilgrimages. Similar to the military service requirements, the rice allowances were assigned as a function of each *daimyō*’s land value, but not at a fixed ratio. Table 4.4 shows the 1633 rice allowance schedule for pilgrimages and processions, and what those allotments translate to at the per 100 *kokyu* ratio.

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<th>% Ratio</th>
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<th>Salaried Troops</th>
<th>% Ratio</th>
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*Table 4.4: 1633 Rice Allotment Schedule*\(^{25}\)

\(^{25}\) Naitō, *Tokugawa jūgodai shi*, v2, 52-54.
Table 4.4 Continued

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Note that subsidy from the Tokugawa steadily decreases as land value increases until it levels off at 1.5 allotments for every one hundred *koku* of rice from 3,000 through 100,000 *koku*. This indicates that the Tokugawa were much more sensitive to the burden.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Land Value</th>
<th>Specified Troops (Knights, Guns, Bow, Pikes, Banner)</th>
<th>Per 100 Koku Ratio</th>
<th>Standard Salary (pilgrimages &amp; processions)</th>
<th>% of Specified Troops</th>
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<td>300%</td>
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<td>75</td>
<td>313%</td>
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<td>0.75</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>200%</td>
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</table>

*Table 4.5: Comparison of Relative Military Service and Rice Allowances*
that military service placed on vassals with land grants producing smaller incomes than with subsidizing those with larger incomes.

Several questions about the Military Service Edicts and rice allowances issued by the Shogunate remain. First, do the levels of military service represent absolute statements of burden on the military class? In other words, did the Tokugawa assume that a daimyō with a land grant of 30,000 koku would provide exactly 30 knights, 80 arquebusiers, 30 archers, 70 pikemen, and 5 bannermen? Second, how should we understand the significant discrepancy between the military service burdens and salary allotments issued during times of service? Table 4.5 compares both the military service burden and standard salaries at that same per 100 koku ratio.

Why are the standard salary allotments consistently greater, by as much as 425%, than the required number of troops? Also, why, as shown in Figure 4.2, does the burden trend rise while the salary trend drops so that a 2000 koku liege vassal would receive salaries for more than four times the number of required troops while a 30,000 koku daimyō would receive salaries for just over twice his required troops?
It is also unclear how the value of allowances were calculated, or how and when they were paid. These questions can be answered by examining how the military service and rice allowances operated in time of war.

**The Composite Army at Hara**

Before examining the composite Shogun-daimyô army (bakugun) arrayed in front of Hara Castle in 1638 for clues to how the military service and rice allowance systems worked, we must reach an understanding of that army’s composition. First, the army’s size, which has been variously estimated in both primary sources and secondary scholarship between 100,000 and 200,000 troops strong, must be established. Then, a
qualitative look at the structure of the composite army in terms of age, military experience, and relative use of various kinds of troops and weapons will provide a basis for comparing actual practice to the standard of the military service and rice allowance edicts.

The Tokugawa called *daimyō* armies to service in two phases. The first group, ordered to Shimabara in December 1637, consisted of units from four *daimyō* domains. Matsukura Katsuie, *daimyō* of Shimabara domain, was ordered to return from Edo and assist in the suppression of the rebellion of his own subjects. In addition, Nabeshima Katsushige, *daimyō* of Saga, Arima Toyouji, *daimyō* of Kurume, and Tachibana Muneshige, *daimyō* of Yanagawa, mobilized troops and arrived outside Hara Castle in late January. Itakura Shigemasa, *daimyō* of Fukautsu Domain, led this first round of *daimyō* troops.

The second phase of mobilization followed the several unsuccessful attacks on the Castle in late January and early February. The second wave of *daimyō* armies included troops from eight additional domains. Even before General Itakura’s death in action on February 14, 1638, the Shogunate dispatched two more generals to overtake direction of the siege: Matsudaira Nobutsuna and Toda Ujikane. (See Table 4.6)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Arrival Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Matsukura</td>
<td>9 January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishigaya</td>
<td>19 January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabeshima</td>
<td>20 January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Itakura</td>
<td>22 January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arima</td>
<td>27 January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tachibana</td>
<td>28 January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsudaira</td>
<td>17 February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toda</td>
<td>17 February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terazawa</td>
<td>20 February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuroda</td>
<td>28 February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosokawa</td>
<td>11 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arima</td>
<td>11 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogasawara</td>
<td>31 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogasawara</td>
<td>31 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizuno</td>
<td>7 April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsudaira</td>
<td>10 April</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4.6: Arrival Dates*[^26]

The most complete picture of the total number of troops deployed to assault Hara Castle is provided by a Mitsui family document from Kumamoto. (See Table 4.7) This accounting, taken after the Castle had fallen, groups each *daimyō* with his sons and gives total troop strength. The figure given, roughly 120,000 troops, is also the most

[^26]: *Genshiryō, 970-7*, (For Itakura Shigemasa and Shigenori see “Shimabara iki Matsukura ki” in *Shimabara hantō shi*, 137). Note that these arrival dates indicate the when the first troops from each domain arrived but not necessarily the *daimyō* himself. For example, the sons of Kuroda Tadayuki, Kuroda Nagaoki and Takamasa, arrived on 28 February while Tadayuki himself didn’t arrive until 11 March; see *Genshiryō*, 811 and “*Kuroda ke shutsu ninzu narabini teoi uchishi kiki oboe*” in *Shimabara hantō shi*, 263-6.
commonly cited in secondary histories from the early modern period.\textsuperscript{27} Although this is the most reliable single accounting of troop strength, and an excellent starting point for examining the composition of the shogunate’s composite army, there are several problems that prevent a direct reading of the figures in it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arima</td>
<td>Kurume</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arima</td>
<td>Nobeoka</td>
<td>2,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosokawa</td>
<td>Kumamoto</td>
<td>28,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuroda</td>
<td>Fukuoka</td>
<td>20,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsudaira</td>
<td>Osh</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsudaira</td>
<td>Ryuo</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsukura</td>
<td>Shimabara</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizuno</td>
<td>Fukuyama</td>
<td>4,800</td>
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<td>Nabeshima</td>
<td>Saga</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Ogasawara</td>
<td>Nakatsu</td>
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<td>Ogasawara</td>
<td>Kokura</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tachibana</td>
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<td>4,860</td>
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<td>Terazawa</td>
<td>Karatsu</td>
<td>4,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toda</td>
<td>Ogaki</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified Casualties</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>120,264</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.7: Daimyô Troops Deployed to Hara Castle\textsuperscript{28}

Most obviously, the first two generals dispatched from Edo, Itakura and Ishigaya, along with Itakura’s son, Shigemori, are missing from this accounting. Presumably this

\textsuperscript{27} E.g. “Shimabara ikki Matsukura ki” in Shimabara hantô shi, 143.

\textsuperscript{28} “Arima go jinchu yosete shotaisho sashidashi oboe” in Arima Ikken, Genshiryô, 970-7; Note that in this transcription Toda Ujikane (戸田氏鉄) is printed as Toda Ujitsugu (戸田氏経).
is because it was taken as a part of an accounting of rice allowances, for which Itakura (already dead) and Ishigaya (relieved of duty) were not considered. An edited record of the siege compiled by an Arima liege vassal from Kurume Domain indicates that Itakura (and his son) and Ishigaya provided 979 and 106 troops, respectively, for the siege.\(^{29}\) Also excluded from this total are the 8,600 troops led by the Kagoshima Elder, Shimazu Hisamoto, who sailed from Kagoshima domain and guarded the eastern side of the castle from the sea. The total number of daimyō troops missing from this accounting was then 9,685.

A question about exactly which troops were being reported also hinders reliance on the un-amended totals in Table 4.7. The total given for Nabeshima Katsushige reveals the most drastic reporting difference. Although a detailed description of army composition reveals that Nabeshima and his two sons led a significantly larger number of troops to the siege, they only reported an approximation of the number of rice allowances they would receive (approximately 14,000) to the Shogunate.\(^{30}\) The Nabeshima records are unusual for another reason. We find that in some accounts of the total troops led under Nabeshima Katsushige, laborers are included with fighting men. In his study of the effect of military service on the development of Saga Domain, Fujino Tamotsu looks at the Nabeshima deployment to Hara.\(^{31}\) Using figures from a history of Katsushige’s

\(^{29}\) “Hara jin onko rokuzen” in Shimabara hantō shi, 242. Although this document does list total troops for other the daimyō, it is an edited work, which in comparison with other sources seems unreliable with regard to daimyō troop strength.

\(^{30}\) “Arima no eki” in Shimabara hantō shi, pp. 285 and 298.

\(^{31}\) Fujino Tamotsu, “Sakoku taisei to gun’yaku” in Saga han sogo kenkyū – hansei no seiritsu to kōzō (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1981). The figures Fujino cites do not correspond to the data he presents: a direct reading of his source gives 29,300 troops and 2,800 laborers, but he does not explain this discrepancy.
tenure as daimyô, Fujino arrives at a total deployment for the Nabeshima totaling 34,000. However, as Fujino points out, roughly 8,000 of that total represent laborers, mostly peasants, brought to construct the army’s camp and siege works.32

Two other documents support, and expand on, Fujino’s observation. The Record of Arima (Arima kiroku) and Arima Service (Arima no eki), both left by Nabeshima liege vassals, confirm that nearly 8,000 laborers were included in the inflated total. However, these two documents conflict with Fujino’s evidence concerning the total number, including laborers, brought to the siege. Both documents clearly state that Nabeshima troops and laborers brought to Hara totaled 25,303, of which 4300 were laborers, leaving a total of 21,003 soldiers.33 However, the Arima Record goes on to explain that this total, as reported to the General, did not include casualties, which bring the total to 30,293: 22,303 troops and 7,990 laborers. Even this reduced figure is significantly out of proportion to the Nabeshima requirement based on the military service obligation. Fujino and Fujimoto Masayuki both make the reasonable assertion that the overwhelming Nabeshima response to the Tokugawa call to arms represents a display of loyalty to make up for opposing the Tokugawa at Sekigahara.34

Returning to the Military Service Edicts, the requirements for daimyô and liege vassals with over 2000 koku of land value did not include foot soldiers who were not armed with bow, pike, or banner, though those troops were certainly necessary elements of each army. Of question here is whether the totals above include or exclude those

---

32 Fujino, Saga han sogo kenkyû, 440.
33 “Arima kiroku” and “Arima no eki” in Shimabara hantô shi, 298 and 313 respectively.
miscellaneous troops. The term *zappyo* (雑兵), which literally means “miscellaneous troops” generally refers to “lower ranking foot soldiers”. We find that, in actual practice, the meaning of *zappyō* was not standard in the early modern period and may lead us to compare apples with oranges. There is supportive evidence to suggest that in some of the totals above miscellaneous troops are included while they are excluded in others. Comparison of the Hosokawa and Matsukura totals makes this distinction clear. A record left by a Hosokawa liege vassal tells us that the 28,600 troops (listed above), “is comprehensive, including miscellaneous troops and ship hands.” Likewise we find that the total for the General Matsudaira Nobutsuna and his son includes some 1,300 miscellaneous troops. To the contrary, when miscellaneous troops are included, Matsukura Katsuie’s total jumps from 1,500 to 4,865.

Another omission from the account in Table 4.9 (total troops) is the troops of minor Shogunal envoys and administrators dispatched to Hara. We can add the following administrators’ troops to the totals above. (See Table 4.8)

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36 “Arima ki” in *Genshiryō*, 991; and “Hizen no kuni Arima senki” in *Shimabara hantō shi*, 211.

37 “Amakusa Shimabara nikki” in *Shimabara Amakusa gunkishū*, 269.

38 “Shimabara ikki Matsukura ki” in *Shimabara hantō shi*, 145-50; and *Shimabara Amakusa gunkishū*, 252-58.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baba Toshishige</td>
<td>Censor</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayashi Katsumasa</td>
<td>Shogunal Guard</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inoue Masashige</td>
<td>Great Censor</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanematsu Masanao</td>
<td>Censor</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makino Noriatsu</td>
<td>Censor</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsudaira Yukitaka</td>
<td>Courier</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motogawa Shouemon</td>
<td>Courier</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakakibara Motonao</td>
<td>Nagasaki Commissioner</td>
<td>603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1,757</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4.8: Shogunal Administrators and Representatives Deployed to Hara*39

With the individual *daimyō* and Tokugawa representative troop totals in hand we can now consider the total mobilization and deployment of fighting men to the Shimabara Peninsula in 1637-8. Table 4.9 below lists these figures as argued above and arrives at a total exceeding 140,000 actual troops rallied to the Tokugawa cause in front of Hara Castle.

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39 “Hara jin onko rokuzen” in *Shimabara hantō shi*, 242-3. Note that although Matsudaira Nobutsuna, Toda Ujikane, Itakura Shigemasa, and Ishigaya Sadakiyo were sent as Shogunal envoys, each were *daimyō* assigned that duty and as such are included with the *daimyō* rather than administrators.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Total Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arima Naozumi</td>
<td>Nobeoka</td>
<td>Daimyō</td>
<td>2,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arima Toyouji</td>
<td>Kurume</td>
<td>Daimyō</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baba Toshishige</td>
<td>(Tokugawa)</td>
<td>Censor</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayashi Katumasas</td>
<td>(Tokugawa)</td>
<td>Shogunal Guard</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosokawa Tadatoshi</td>
<td>Kumamoto</td>
<td>Daimyō</td>
<td>28,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inoue Masashige</td>
<td>(Tokugawa)</td>
<td>Great Censor</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishigaya Sadakiyo</td>
<td>(Tokugawa)</td>
<td>General/Censor</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Itakura Shigemasa</td>
<td>Fukutsu</td>
<td>General/Daimyō</td>
<td>979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanematsu Masanao</td>
<td>(Tokugawa)</td>
<td>Censor</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuroda Tadayuki</td>
<td>Fukuoka</td>
<td>Daimyō</td>
<td>20,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makino Noriatsu</td>
<td>(Tokugawa)</td>
<td>Censor</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsudaira Nobutsuna</td>
<td>Oshi</td>
<td>General/Daimyō</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsudaira Shigenao</td>
<td>Ryuo</td>
<td>Daimyō</td>
<td>1,200</td>
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<td>Matsudaira Yukitaka</td>
<td>(Tokugawa)</td>
<td>Courier</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsukura Katsueie</td>
<td>Shimabara</td>
<td>Daimyō</td>
<td>4,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizuno Katsumari</td>
<td>Fukuyama</td>
<td>Daimyō</td>
<td>4,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motogawa Shouemon</td>
<td>(Tokugawa)</td>
<td>Courier</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabeshima Katsushige</td>
<td>Saga</td>
<td>Daimyō</td>
<td>22,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogasawara Tadazane</td>
<td>Kokura</td>
<td>Daimyō</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogasawara Nagatsugu</td>
<td>Nakatsu</td>
<td>Daimyō</td>
<td>3,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakakibara Motonao</td>
<td>(Tokugawa)</td>
<td>Nagasaki Comm.</td>
<td>603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shimazu Hisamoto</td>
<td>Kagoshima</td>
<td>Elder</td>
<td>8,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tachibana Tadashige</td>
<td>Yanagawa</td>
<td>Daimyō</td>
<td>4,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terazawa Katataka</td>
<td>Karatsu</td>
<td>Daimyō</td>
<td>4,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toda Ujikane</td>
<td>Ogaki</td>
<td>General/Daimyō</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unidentified Casualties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>143,074</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4.9 Total Troops Dispatched Hara Castle in 1638*
However, this total comes with several caveats. First, in several instances, most notably Matsudaira Nobutsuna, totals are given as minimums, e.g. “1529 troops plus…” It is likely that this total is somewhat of an undercount. Second, military forces that were not deployed to the siege were nonetheless mobilized and employed because of the rebellion. Thus troops were used to guard nearby Shimabara Castle against further attack; the intendants in Nagasaki and Hirado were ordered to guard against potential uprising by disgruntled peasants; and surrounding daimyô domains dispersed troops to discourage their peasants from following the Shimabara and Amakusa example. A Dutch observer noted that in nearby Omura domain the daimyô disarmed the peasantry of arquebus and preemptively arrested all Christians. Finally, laborers, who will be discussed in the following chapter, may have served in the dual roles of workers and reserve line infantry. The figures noted above about Nabeshima forces indicate that three times as many “laborers” (3690) as actual troops (1300) became casualties by late February 1638. It is far easier to envision laborers being killed or wounded as they dug sap trenches approaching the castle, or carrying bamboo shields ahead of troops, than it is to imagine an overwhelming number of campfire, latrine, or packhorse incident fatalities. In addition, we must consider the rônin (masterless samurai, or guns-for-hire), present at the siege. Many were unemployed as a result of a generation of peace combined with Tokugawa political policies. For example, Matsukura Katsuie’s forces included some

40 “Amakusa Shimabara nikki” in Shimabara Amakusa Gunkishû, p. 269.
41 Nicholaes Koeckebacker to A. van Diemen, Governor General at Batavia, from the Dutch Factory at Hirado, 24 January 1638, in A. J. C. Geerts, “The Arima Rebellion and the Conduct of Koekebacker,” Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, XI (1883): 67. n.b. The prevalence of firearms and rustic samurai with swords even after Hideyoshi’s sword hunts and separation edicts adds fire to Philip Brown’s argument that few bakufu policies were uniformly or universally adopted.
42 “Arima kiroku” and “Arima no eki” in Shimabara hantô shi, 298 and 313 respectively.
117 rônin employed for the duration of the siege. How many rônin the daimyô employed is not evident from the record, but the rônin certainly swelled the ranks of the Tokugawa composite army. So did the representatives from around thirty domains who traveled to Shimabara as either a symbol of their families’ support for the siege or simply to gain personal battlefield experience, and by extension, prestige.

Although the sheer size of the Tokugawa composite army at Hara, approaching 150,000 troops strong or more, speaks volumes about their logistical mobilization capacity, the military effectiveness of that army are also important. Three methods will be used to evaluate the quality of the Tokugawa composite army. First, the balance of different types of troops actually present will be compared with the military service obligations. Second, the political composition of the army will be assessed by examining the relationship of the daimyô (and by extension, the domains) to the Tokugawa Shogunate. Finally, the experience of the daimyô and their senior vassals provides a sense of the leadership capacity of the army.

Detailed records of army composition exist for two of the daimyô armies dispatched to Hara: Matsudaira Nobutsuna and Matsukura Katsuie (daimyô of Shimabara domain) – both fudai daimyô. Table 4.10 compares the composition of Nobutsuna and Katsuie’s forces to their obligation under the military service edicts.

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43 “Shimabara ikki Matsukura ki” in Shimabara Amakusa gunki shû, 258, and Shimabara hantô shi, 150.

44 Genshiryô, 1095.

45 Detailed troop distribution records also exist for Nabeshima Katsuhige’s army, but his total force is so far out of proportion to his military obligation that comparison of his forces with the military service edicts would be fruitless, other than to note that his, as all the daimyô forces, exceeded the gross military service obligation imposed by the bakufu.
Table 4.10: Comparison of Actual versus Codified Military Service

In each “actual” column the troops of that type brought to the siege by these two daimyô are listed with what percent that number is of the total troops in parenthesis. The “edict” columns represent how many troops of each type the Military Service Edicts prescribed for a daimyô of that level, with the percent of the total, also noted parenthetically below. Looking at the numbers of troops, we find that Nobutsuna met or exceeded his obligation in all categories save archers. Katsuie exceeded his obligations except in the number of bannermen. He also incorporated more than twice the number of arquebusiers than mandated by the Military Service Edicts. The most significant overage was the mounted troops in Katsuie’s force, which exceeded the required number by more than an order of magnitude. This should not be entirely surprising, however, bearing in mind that Katsuie was the daimyô of Shimabara domain and that consequently his forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Daimyô</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Edict</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Edict</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Edict</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Edict</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Edict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Matsudaira Nobutsuna⁴⁶</td>
<td>52 (23%)</td>
<td>30 (14%)</td>
<td>80 (35%)</td>
<td>80 (37%)</td>
<td>20 (9%)</td>
<td>30 (14%)</td>
<td>70 (31%)</td>
<td>70 (33%)</td>
<td>5 (2%)</td>
<td>5 (2%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>30,000 koku</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsukura Katsuie⁴⁷</td>
<td>481 (53%)</td>
<td>40 (15%)</td>
<td>278 (31%)</td>
<td>120 (45%)</td>
<td>40 (4%)</td>
<td>30 (11%)</td>
<td>107 (12%)</td>
<td>70 (26%)</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
<td>8 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,000 koku</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁴⁶ “Amakusa Shimabara nikki” in Shimabara Amakusa gunki shû, 269. Note that for Matsudaira Nobutsuna and Terutsuna, these figures represent minimums because in their muster list, each category is followed by “plus.”

⁴⁷ “Shimabara ikki Matsukura ki” in Shimabara Amakusa gunki shû, 252-258, and Shimabara hantô shi, 145-150.
were the closest to Hara Castle. Therefore, bringing more horses to the siege would have been logistically easier for Katsuie in terms of distance and supply than for any other daimyô. Even so, we see that Nobutsuna, whose domain was just north of Edo, brought almost seventy-five percent more mounted troops than required.

The exceptions above notwithstanding, the make-up of both Nobutsuna and Katsuie’s forces loosely resemble the balance of troops indicated by the Military Service Edicts. Every daimyô deployed to the siege exceeded their gross military service obligation, and these figures indicate that except for an emphasis on mounted troops and arquebusiers, the composite army likely reflected the balance of forces prescribed in the Military Services Edicts.

As for the supernumeraries in the example above, Nobutsuna’s force included over 1,300 foot soldiers, or nearly six times the number of specified troops listed above. Foot soldiers outnumber the specified troops by four to one in Katsuie’s army (3,917:909). It is clear from these examples, as well as the total troops brought by the other daimyô, that although the Military Service Edicts did not specify foot soldiers, they were a crucial element of each daimyô’s force.

But who led this composite force of nearly 150,000 troops, and what was the political relationship between those leaders and the Tokugawa? Looking at the sixteen daimyô dispatched to Hara, almost two thirds (10 of 16) were fudai daimyô. They were the founders of their domains who fought on the side of Tokugawa Ieyasu at the Battle of Sekigahara in 1600. The remaining six did not side with Ieyasu and were hence

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48 By total troops, I mean the aggregate of these five types, as opposed to the gross total which would include foot soldiers and miscellaneous troops.
classified as *tôzama daimyô*. They were not, however, excluded from any of the obligations imposed on the *daimyô* like the Alternate Attendance System, adherence to the Various Laws for Military Houses, or, in this case, the Military Service Edicts.

It is important to note that although two thirds of the domains called to serve at Hara were of *fudai* status, the majority of the composite army was not. The six *tôzama* domains (Kurume, Kumamoto, Fukuoka, Saga, Yanagawa, and Kagoshima) supplied approximately 95,000 of the troops, making this army overwhelmingly of *tôzama* domain soldiers. There are two immediate explanations for this. First, the prevalence of *tôzama* domains in the Kyushu and western Honshu areas made it more practical to mobilize them than the *fudai* domains of middle and eastern Honshu. Secondly, most of the largest *daimyô* domains were of the *tôzama* status, which was especially true of the Kyushu *daimyô*.

The Kyushu *tôzama daimyô* also boasted the greater collective military experience of the leaders at the Hara siege. Older *tôzama daimyô* like Arima Toyouji, age 69, Hosokawa Tadatoshi, age 52, and Nabeshima Katsunari, age 58 had fought in the battles and sieges that unified Japan in the late *sengoku* and early *Tokugawa* years and were founders of their domains. Only a few *fudai daimyô*, notably Mizuno Katsunari (at age 74, the oldest *daimyô* at the siege), remained from the days of the shogunate’s founding. However, the collective military and political background of these *daimyô* conceals the fact that, for most of the siege, it was their sons, and the sons of their former peers, who led the armies. With the exception of Matsukura Katsuie and Matsudaira Nobutsuna, the heir-apparent sons of the *daimyô* preceded them to, and directed, the siege until their
fathers arrived, often months later. The sons and nephews of these *daimyô* were at least one generation removed from the warfare that forged the Tokugawa order. They had little if no firsthand experience in battle. However, they all had experience in organizing and leading troops in service to the Tokugawa during Shogunal processions and especially en route to attendance in Edo.

To sum up, the composite army assembled by the Tokugawa in 1637-8 was mixed both tactically and politically, and led by *daimyô* and their sons with a mix of first and second hand military experience. Tactical distribution of different types of troops in the 150,000-man army was modeled on the Military Service edicts, save for foot soldiers that were present and necessary, although not specified. Politically, the composite army included both *fudai* and *tôzama* domains from all three of the main Japanese island at that time (Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu). Next we will examine how the Tokugawa used rice allowance system to subsidize this huge, diverse, force.

*Subsidizing War*

It is important to highlight that none of the orders for deployment that the Tokugawa issued made specific reference to the Military Service Edicts. In fact the term military service (*gun’yaku*) was not used. Instead, the Tokugawa simply ordered the *daimyô* to mobilize (*shutsudô*) and deploy (*shuhei*) to the Shimabara Peninsula. However, on 13 March 1638, well after most of the *daimyô* armies had been deployed, the Tokugawa issued a very specific order concerning rice allowances for the siege. An entry from the

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49 See *Genshiryô*, 811.
13 March [Shimabara]

The Shogunal envoys Miyagi Kazuura and Ishikawa Takanari arrived at Noon. Because the troops of various domains have been in camp for quite a while and have worked hard, a rice allowance for 100,690 troops will be granted. This is based on 400 persons per 10,000 koku of rice. The rice should be transported now from surrounding provinces. Compensation will be made later in Osaka silver.

- 21,600 troops, Hosokawa Tadatoshi
- 4,780 troops, Tachibana Muneshige
- 1,600 troops, Matsukura Katsuie
- 8,400 troops, Arima Toyouji
- 14,280 troops, Nabeshima Katsusige
- 4,928 troops, Terazawa Katataka
- 20,800 troops, Kuroda Tadayuki
- 2,120 troops, Arima Naozumi
- 6,000 troops, Ogasawara Tadazane
- 3,200 troops, Ogasawara Nagatsugu
- 1,480 troops, Matsudaira Shigenao
- 4,800 troops, Mizuno Katsunari
- 1,500 troops, Matsudaira Nobutsuna

This large allotment is because Nobutsuna is the shogunal envoy and also has Inoue Masashige and his son, Nakanobo Choheie, Suzuki Saburokuro, Nose Shirouemon, and Yamanaka Keiheie in his camp.

- 4,000 troops, Toda Ujikane
- 480 troops, Itakura Shigenori
- 651 troops, miscellaneous

Total: 100,619 troops

According to this document, the envoys Miyagi and Ishikawa arrived from Edo with news from the Shogun that because of the length and burden of military service at the siege, daimyō troops would receive a generous rice allowance. Although fatigue and
discouragement played a part in the failure of the 14 February assault on Hara, that failure did not cause the Shogunate to issue a rice allowance. In fact, Miyagi and Ishikawa received their orders and departed Edo on 18 February: long before news of Itakura’s final unsuccessful assault, just four days earlier could have reached Edo. It is more likely that the Shogunate anticipated, after learning of the extent of the rebellion and the initial failure of the Itakura-led army to breach the Castle, that a longer starvation siege lay ahead. It would not have been prudent to attempt to starve out the rebels without providing support for the siege army.

Terutsuna is careful to explain why his father Nobutsuna, at that time a *daimyō* of 35,000 *koku*, received a rice allowance for 1500 troops rather than for 1400 troops as dictated by the 400 per 10,000 *koku* ratio. First, Nobutsuna was the trusted General dispatched from Edo to take charge of the siege, a duty with important implications for Tokugawa authority, and may have been compensated in that spirit. Second, Terutsuna tells us, six Shogunal administrators including an intelligence agent, a courier, and comptrollers, were stationed in the General’s camp and so he was given extra allowances to support those administrators and their staffs.

The rice allowance was not a call to arms, nor a guideline to *daimyō* on how many troops they should commit to the siege. Its arrival in Shimabara on 13 March preceded only four, smaller, *daimyō* units who were already mobilizing or en route. (See Figure 4.8 above). Rather, the rice allowance appears to be estimation by the shogunate of how

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50 *Genshiryō*, 811.; *Amakasu Shimabara Gunki shū*, 269.
51 *Genshiryō*, 1100 and 1116.
much support was necessary to keep the army in the field and subsidize the burden placed on *daimyô* by their troops.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Land Value</th>
<th>Rice Allowance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arima</td>
<td>Kurume</td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>8,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arima</td>
<td>Nobeoka</td>
<td>53,000</td>
<td>2,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosokawa</td>
<td>Kumamoto</td>
<td>540,000</td>
<td>21,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuroda</td>
<td>Fukuoka</td>
<td>523,000</td>
<td>20,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsudaira</td>
<td>Oshi</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsudaira</td>
<td>Ryu</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>1,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsukura</td>
<td>Shimabara</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizuno</td>
<td>Fukuyama</td>
<td>101,000</td>
<td>4,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabeshima</td>
<td>Saga</td>
<td>357,000</td>
<td>14,280</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ogasawara</td>
<td>Nakatsu</td>
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<td>Ogura</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tachibana</td>
<td>Yanagawa</td>
<td>119,600</td>
<td>4,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terazawa</td>
<td>Karatsu</td>
<td>123,000</td>
<td>4,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toda</td>
<td>Ogaki</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,468,600</strong></td>
<td><strong>98,744</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4.11: Troop Rice Allowances*

The rice allowance order recorded by Terutsuna included an estimate of the total calculated by the Shogunate midway through the siege. A record from the Matsui family

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52 “Arima go jinchi yosete shotaisho sashisashi oboe” in Arima Ikken; Genshiryô, 970-7. Document held in the Kumamoto University Archives.
gives us an accounting of the total rice allowances granted by the Shogunate after the fall of Hara Castle. (See Table 4.11)

This post-siege accounting amounts to fewer total allowances for daimyô troops by 1,875, or less than two percent. The original order differs significantly in three areas: 1) an over estimate of Mizuno Katsunari’s number of allowances by 760; 2) inclusion of 480 allowances for Itakura Shigenori (son of the late General Itakura); and 3) an additional 651 allowances for ten miscellaneous “lower status” administrators. Those differences notwithstanding, the number of troops granted rice allowances by the Shogunate hovers around the 100,000 mark, and represents a total land value of the daimyô concerned approach 2.5 million koku.

Although Matsudaira Terutsuna’s diary entry provides the ratio at which the Shogunate would subsidize each daimyô’s army, 400 allowances per 10,000 koku of land, it does not reveal what that meant to individual soldiers during the siege – or what financial burden it placed on the Shogunate. A record of the rice allowance for the Hosokawa family provides details about how the allowance was calculated and paid:

The shogunal envoys [Matsudaira and Toda] have instructed us to draw up a statement of account for our number of rice allowances. This is the statement made out by [Matsui Okinaga]53 and Ariyoshi Hidetaka:

Rice Allowance Receipt

Total: 7,452 koku at the Kyoto Standard (applicable land grant of 540,000 koku at four rice allowances per 100 koku).

Equivalent Silver: 372 kan 600 momme Precisely, 50 momme per koku

53 Also known as Nagaoka Sado no kami.
The above is for service at Arima in Hizen Province for sixty-nine days from 14 February through 23 April.

This is based on an allowance of 0.005 koku (0.18 liters) per diem.

Hosokawa has received payment from the Shogunate.

From: (the administration of Hosokawa Tadatoshi)
    Matsui Okinaga
    Ariyoshi Hidetaka

To: Nose Shirouemon
    Yamanaka Keiheie

With a land grant of potential yield totaling 540,000 koku per year, at the four allowances per 100 koku ratio, the Hosokawa were entitled to draw allowances for 21,600 of their 28,600 troops at the siege of Hara. Although those troops were in service before the rice allowance order, their service is figured from the death of the previous general, Itakura Shigemasa (on 14 February), through their return home on 23 April. Sixty-nine days of service for 21,600 troops equals 1,490,400 man-days of troop service. When the per diem of 0.005 koku of rice is applied, the total rice issued for the troops by the Hosokawa equals 7,452 koku (at the Kyoto Standard “masu”, a rice measuring box). The receipt notes this was repaid to the Hosokawa, by the Shogunate, in equivalent silver. One kan, or one thousand momme, equaled 8.25 lbs. At 0.05 kan (50 momme) per koku, the Tokugawa paid the Hosokawa 372.6 kan (or roughly 3074 lbs) of silver for their service at Hara.55

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\{540,000 \text{ koku} \times 0.04 \text{ troops/koku} = 21,600 \text{ troops}\}
\]

54 “Hizen no kuni Arima senki” in Shimabara hantō shi, 210. Note that a nominally different transcription of this document is available in Genshiryō, 993. Matsui and Ishigawa were karō (elders) of the Hosokawa domain. (for kan’ei period tsukin see Ono Takeo, Edo bukka jiten (Tokyo: Tenbōsha, 1979) 78-80). Nose and Yamanaka were comptrollers dispatched by the Shogunate.

55 This is significantly higher than the 35.30 momme standard price of rice from just three years earlier. See Ono, Edo bukka jiten, 451. (part of showing how the famine and siege caused rice prices to increase: See Sachiko Matsushita, Zusetsu Edo ryōri jiten (Tokyo; Kashiwa Shobō, 1996) 397.)
21,600 troops x 69 days = 1,490,400 man-days
1,490,400 man-days x 0.005 koku per day = 7,452 koku
7452 koku x 0.05 kan/koku = 372.6 kan
372.6 kan x 8.25 kan/lb. = 3073.95 lbs.

Based on the Hosokawa family calculations and what we know of the total rice allotments for all of the daimyô at Hara, we can project what the total subsidy from the Shogunate to their composite army might have been. The total land grant value of the fourteen daimyô was 2,468,600 koku, which at the four allotments per 100-koku ratio granted them 98,744 allotments. Using an average of sixty days of service, the subsidy reaches 5,924,640 person-days. Multiplied by 0.005 koku per diem, the subsidy equals 29,623.20 koku of rice, which at 50 momme per koku totals (1,481,160 momme) 1,481.16 kan, or 12,220 lbs. of silver.

Although an approximation, the total subsidy calculated above illuminates the burden for the Tokugawa of assembling a 150,000-man army for three months. The equivalent of 30,000 koku of rice paid to the daimyô following the Hara siege represents

56 Although some daimyô (notably Ogasawara) arrived later than 14 February, most daimyô’s troops, if not the daimyô themselves were there by then, and returned home around 15 April following the post-siege cleanup.
57 Please note that the 29,623.20 koku of rice here cannot be compared with, for instance, the land grant of a 30,000 koku daimyô. The figure here represents an actual amount of rice used as currency whereas a 30,000 koku daimyô held lands estimated to produce that much per year. The daimyô’s lands may have produce more or less, but he would only reap a portion of that produce after the farmers have kept their share, his retainers have collected their allotment, and administrative expenses met.
approximately 4.3% of Tokugawa income from taxation of house lands.\(^{58}\) This is relatively small proportion of the Tokugawa budget when compared to what European states spent on relatively smaller (albeit more active) armies. Eighty-five percent of Peter the Great’s annual budget was devoted to paying for the military.\(^{59}\) Likewise, Louis XIV was spending three quarter of his budget on the military, while military financing consumed a shocking 90% of the mid-17\(^{th}\) century English Republic’s revenues and 77% of the contemporary Ottoman budget.\(^{60}\) Few modern states, despite nuclear stockpiling, standing armies, and “star wars”, spend the amount of capital on the military that early modern European states did for the salaries and supplies of armies and navies. In comparison, the Tokugawa expenditure is minimal. Granted, to a certain extent this is a comparison of apples to oranges because these European nations were, as Parker writes, almost perpetually at war. However, the comparison is not wholly inappropriate because the Tokugawa did have a standing army at their disposal, even if it was seldom used, and that ability must be considered in the comparison of what it cost states to maintain a useable force.

In addition to rice allowances for their troops, the generals sent to direct the siege were personally compensated at the outset. The *Tokugawa Jikki* tells us that Matsudaira Nobutsuna and Toda Ujikane did not depart Edo before collecting payment from the

\(^{58}\) Conrad Totman, *Politics in the Tokugawa Bakufu*, 77. Totman notes that the income of 700,000 *koku* per year established by Ieyasu was preserved under his successor Hidetada and Iemitsu.


Tokugawa. Each was awarded gold coins called ryô (50 for Nobutsuna and 100 for Ujikane) as well as fresh horses to augment their own stables.\textsuperscript{61}

Although the total outlay in cash from the Shogunate was in an absolute sense quite large, the benefit for individual troops was likely a pittance at best. The 0.005 koku allotment credited to each soldier per day amounts to roughly a quart of a U.S. dry measure rice per day. This could not have been the soldiers’ only means of sustenance. Whether that rice was eaten by the individual, used to barter with the merchants that gathered around the campsites, or spent out of a general fund, it certainly would not have been enough to feed each soldier each day. There is no indication that the rice was given out to the soldiers individually at any point during the siege. If it were distributed to the soldiers rather than used in a general fund, how was it decided who got the rice and who did not – how, for instance, would the Hosokawa have determined which 7,000 of their 28,600 troops would not receive subsidy? Further, the administrative nightmare of passing out small quantities of rice to nearly 100,000 troops, at whatever interval (e.g. by the day, week, or month), would have consumed a great deal of each army’s time. The role the rice granted by the Tokugawa played in the daily lives of the soldiers will be examined more closely in Chapter 5.

\textit{Conclusion}

In theory, the military service edicts formed one of the cornerstones of Tokugawa hegemony in early modern Japan. At the head of a decentralized state, the Tokugawa

\textsuperscript{61} Tokugawa jikki, v 77 (13 January and 16 January 1638).
relied on the spirit of the edicts for military service from the daimyô in time of war. In the winter and spring of 1638, the military service edicts supported by rice allowances did, in fact, provide the Tokugawa with a potent national army. Composed of upwards of 150,000 fighting men, more than any European state at the time could muster, the Tokugawa army at Hara was also tactically balanced and competently led. The daimyô and vassal contingents represented self-contained forces that, when combined under the generalship of shogunate administrators, became a viable national army. However, the operation of the military service obligations was not quite as straightforward as the theory. It is clear from how this mobilization system was applied, that the military service edicts were somewhat less than literal mandates from the Shogunate.

The most obvious discrepancy between the theory and practice of the military service edicts was rice allotments. Daimyô and vassal mobilization was not simply repayment of a feudal debt. The Tokugawa consistently subsidized military mobilization in both peace and wartime. The standard rice allotments compensated daimyô during peacetime processions and pilgrimages, while siege-specific allotments supported troops during both the Osaka and Hara sieges. Even specific commanders such as Matsudaira and Toda were granted extra compensation for their roles in directing the siege.

In the edicts, especially from 1633, the military service obligations for lesser liege vassals of the Tokugawa were more carefully delineated. For vassals with lands valued between 200 and 900 koku, the specific composition of not only fighting troops, but also support personnel is specified (Table 4.2 above). Similarly, for land value from 1,000 to 1,900 koku, the edict lists the total number of troops including foot soldiers. However, from land value of 2000 koku and above, only the five core types of troops (mounted,
arquebusiers, archers, pikemen, and bannermen) are specified. We also note that the relative burden on vassals and daimyô increases as land value increases (e.g. from 0.40 troops per hundred koku at 2000 koku to 0.75 troops per one hundred koku at 100,000 koku). These features of the military service requirement, more specific and less burdensome expectations of lesser vassals may be a factor of economy. As in any large-scale endeavor, there is a financial moment of inertia that once overcome results in a per unit cost reduction. It is entirely likely that the unit cost of maintaining the eight specified troops for a vassal of 2000 koku was greater than the per unit cost of a 100,000 koku daimyô’s 750 specified troops.

The Tokugawa appear to have been cognizant of this financial inertia when setting the standard rice allowance rates. The 1633 rice allowances drop from over four times the number of specified troops at 2000 koku to just twice the specified troops at 100,000 koku.

But why do the military service edicts omit specifying support personnel at levels over 900 koku, and miscellaneous foot soldiers over 1,900 koku? Perhaps while lesser vassals may have been tempted by the burdens of service, or lack of experience, to forego crucial support personnel and troops, there may have been an expectation that if larger vassals met the obligation of specified troops they would have to, by default, included support personnel and foot soldiers. This assumption is born out by sources in three ways. First, the standard rice allowances, even for larger daimyô, provided allowances for over 200% of the specified troops, implying that the Tokugawa expected there to be at least that many foot soldiers in the daimyô armies. Second the siege-specific rice allowance at Hara provided significantly more allowance allotments than the standard.
For example, even 100,000-‐*koku daimyō* with a higher relative burden, received allowance for more than five times the number of specified troops. Finally, we see from the Hara example that not only did most vassals and *daimyō* exceed their military service requirements; most exceeded the inflated siege-‐specific rice allowances. Looking specifically at Matsudaira Nobutsuna and Matsukura Katsuie, foot soldiers made up 85% and 80% of their respective forces.

Although during the Military Revolution in Europe logistical need contributed to the growth of ever more complex bureaucratic and administrative structures, the opposite is true of early modern Japan. Bureaucracy driven by a necessity for political control of unified Japan supported logistical, in this case mobilization, ability. The military service and rice allowance systems that provided the Tokugawa with such a large army in 1638 were able to operate because of bureaucratic policies initiated under the Toyotomi and Tokugawa regimes. The separation of classes edict (*heinô bunri*), first issued by Hideyoshi and later enforced by the Tokugawa, assured a standing peer group of military men ready for the call to service. Unlike earlier Japanese armies, when the call to Hara came in January of 1638, no troops were pulled off the farms or dropped their hoes in favor of swords. Military men, commonly referred to as samurai, from the lowest foot soldier to upper ranking liege vassals were forbidden to adopt or maintain agricultural or trade occupations. Hence, they were preserved as a reserve of mobilization strength.

62 “Amakusa Shimabara nikki” in *Shimabara Amakusa gunki shû*, 269.
63 “Shimabara ikki Matsukura ki” in *Shimabara Amakusa gunki shû*, 252-258, and *Shimabara hantô shi*, 145-150.
without the ties or limitations of farm life. Further, the Tokugawa policy of restricting each domain to a single castle or stronghold (ikkoku ichijō rei) concentrated this fighting population in the new towns that developed around castles across the country. Not only was the military reserve unencumbered by ties to the land, they were clustered in groups around the nation.

In light of our understanding of how mobilization worked, Francis Caron’s claims about Japan’s military potential deserve a closer look. Caron based his claim of Japanese mobilization potential on two factors: 1) That the total yearly produce of daimyō held land was 18.4 million koku, and 2) A service ratio of twenty foot soldiers and two knights for every thousand koku. The first factor is correct; the aggregate daimyō land holding in the mid seventeenth century was roughly this figure. The service ratio he cites, as we have seen, does not exhaust the Tokugawa potential for mobilization. If we combine Caron’s “twenty Foot Soldiers & two Horse-men” it reduces to 2.2 troops per one hundred koku of land value. At Hara, the ratio of mobilization achieved was nearly twice that at over 4 troops per one hundred koku. But Caron is way ahead of us, as he notes at the end of this passage, that most daimyō could and did maintain, “double the number of Souldiers…then they are obliged to by their tax.” If we double Caron’s original estimate, we can estimate that the daimyō could have mobilized 736,000 foot soldiers and 72,000 knights. Including his figures for Tokugawa-family troops, the total force Caron estimates could have been mobilized by Japan in the seventeenth century climbs to 836,000 soldiers and 92,000 knights – nearly one million troops. The example of Hara

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64 Of course this very effect of the separation of classes led to difficulties later in the Tokugawa period because of the lack of employment for many military men.
suggests that this seemingly fantastic estimate was, at least on paper, plausible. In that event, the Japanese likely had one of the highest relative mobilization potentials of the 17th-century world. To what extent the Tokugawa logistical system could, or could not, have maintained such a force in the field will be discussed below. Regardless, 17th-century Japan could boast a huge mobilization potential for the early modern world.
CHAPTER 5

“FEEDING MARS”

With the enormous composite army in place in front of Hara Castle, the Tokugawa faced the challenge of feeding and supporting it. This would not have been a simple task at any point during the Tokugawa reign. In 1637-38, however, the logistical problems of supply and support were intensified by the blight of natural and human disaster that threatened Japan in general and the Shimabara Peninsula in specific. The region surrounding Hara Castle certainly could not support the needs of the Shogun’s army – so how would the troops be fed, gunpowder replenished, ditches dug, and cannons repaired? Two answers to these questions will be examined below. First, similar to the systematic methods employed by the Tokugawa to raise, mobilize, and transport the troops to Hara Castle, a combination of elements – devolution, privatization, and siege specific taxes and labor – fed and supported the army. Second, foodstuffs, supplies, and personnel necessary to keep the Tokugawa war machine operating were, almost without exception, imported from beyond the Shimabara Peninsula – even from as far away as the great Tokugawa storehouses in Osaka. Shifting the logistical burden elsewhere (usually downward) and supply from the rear, were the keys to Tokugawa ability to keep one of
the largest siege army in the early modern world working during a bleak Japanese winter of 1637-8.

Shelter

A look at how the composite army was housed gives and indication of how heavily the siege taxed the Tokugawa logistical support system. Did the domains provide shelter for their troops? How were the armies housed in the winter months of 1638? The accommodations for the two generals who took over the siege in mid February are particularly revealing. Matsudaira Nobutsuna and his son, as well as Toda Ujikane and his two sons, arrived in front of Hara Castle on February 17, 1638 with a total of 5,500 troops. Incredibly, within just two days of their arrival, laborers erected for them a camp of sixty-three tents, divided into 336 separate rooms, covering over 66,000 square feet. Those tents represent more than enough square footage to cover an entire NCAA football field, including both end zones.¹

Quarters for the two generals, and the three sons they brought with them, were constructed first, and indicate that austerity had its limits for early modern Japanese commanders, as well as the impressive reach of the Tokugawa logistical system. Matsudaira and Toda’s housing totaled sixteen tents ranging in size from twenty-two to 325 square feet each.² This included their personal quarters, staff quarters and offices, storage, and stables; all told covering almost 17,000 square feet. Their baths and latrines were set up separately. The floors of the generals’ tents were covered with over 13,000

¹ 57,600 square feet.
square feet of straw mats (*tatami*) and various other floor coverings brought from Edo.³

The remaining 49,000 square feet of tent was given over to the troops who accompanied

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Folding Screens</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Grills</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tables</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Tongs</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beds</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Cutting Boards</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blankets</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Place Settings</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand washing Basins</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mortar and Pestle</td>
<td>15 sets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot Water Tubs</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Colanders</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco &amp; Pipes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Shell Inlay Ladles</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large stone lanterns</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Wooden Ladles</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portable stone lanterns</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Rice Platters</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candles</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Rice Spatulas</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wooden lamps</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Suidenshi</td>
<td>25 packages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanterns</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Water Buckets</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stone lanterns</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Large Dipper</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor Stands</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Small Dipper</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writing &amp; Paper sets</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Hot Water Baths</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea boxes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Washtubs</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea pots</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Tubs</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal Pots</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Hand tubs</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pine Chop Sticks</td>
<td>2500 sets</td>
<td>Water Buckets</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cedar Chop Sticks</td>
<td>5000 sets</td>
<td>Small Tubs</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron Pot</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Horse Washing Tub</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pans</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Water Buckets</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pots (large/small)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Straw mats</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquor Warmers</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Burner Coasters</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warmer Pots</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Torches</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portable Stoves</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Armor stands</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1: Equipment for Generals Matsudaira and Toda⁴

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³ Including: *shiba mushiro, usuberi, shibugami, ozashiki kakoikoza.*
the generals to Shimabara, when not on the front lines. The camp was also protected on the side facing Hara by a 2,700-foot bamboo fence. Beyond the roomy tents and ground coverings, the generals’ quarters had an impressive array of comforts from home.

As illustrated by the inventory above, Tokugawa military logisticians attended to every facet of the generals’ comfort. All of their military, culinary, hygienic, leisure, and equestrian needs were well provided for by the materials assembled in their camp. Understandably, not all of the troops at the siege enjoyed the generous space and comfort of the higher-ranking Generals’ quarters. It was certainly crowded in front of Hara Castle. Nicholaes Koekecaker tells us that 7,000 troops from Kagoshima had to stay on their boats for want of space among the Tokugawa army’s tents:

“The Lord of Higo has proceeded with his troops to Arima and has joined the others: it is also said that more than 7,000 soldiers from Satsuma are laying (with their vessels) on the coast, as there is not sufficient lodging for them on shore.”

The hills and valley facing Hara Castle became increasingly crowded as the siege progressed and more troops moved in to face the rebels.

**Labor**

Of course, troops of the composite army were not the only people gathered by the Tokugawa at Hara. In addition to the 150,000-man army, the siege required support personnel of various descriptions. Laborers, porters, servants, tradesmen, and merchants supported the composite army throughout the siege. The Tokugawa arranged this

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4 These figures are for five people: Matsudaira, Toda, and their three sons.

5 A. J. C. Geerts, “The Arima Rebellion and the Conduct of Koekebacker,” *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, XI (1883) 83, letter dated February 17, 1638. Geerts’ translation of figures from these
massive population of support personnel through a combination of corvée duty, hired labor, and free enterprise.

We know that numerous servants assisted the daimyô and higher-ranking Tokugawa officials at the siege. For example, the Tokugawa administrators Makino Noriatsu, Hayashi Katsumasa, and Matsudaira Yūkitaka were each allotted fifty servants for the duration of the siege.⁶ The Hosokawa provided these personnel, from the population of Kumamoto, as a form of service to the Tokugawa. However, it is not possible to extrapolate from these examples the total number of servants in the army camp. Servants may also have played more than one role; working as servants, porters, and laborers at different times throughout the siege.

Support personnel, of whichever description, do not appear to have been immune from dangerous duty. As noted in the previous chapter, the Nabeshima augmented their large army of over 22,000 troops with nearly 8,000 support personnel.⁷ Significantly, some 3,600 of those personnel became casualties during the siege. In contrast, only about a third as many soldiers, 1,200, joined the casualty rolls. Laborers came under fire while sapping – digging trenches leading to the castle – erecting towers and fences, and moving ammunition and provisions to the troops at the front. The 45% casualty rate among Nabeshima laborers suggests that working as a laborer during a siege of this scale was an extremely hazardous profession.

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⁶ “Go kachû buntsû no uchi nukigaki” in Genshiryô, p. 444.
⁷ “Arima kiroku” and “Arima no eki” in Shimabara Hantô Shi, 298 and 313 respectively.
Manpower for construction and general duty used in camp by the daimyō armies appears to have been a combination of corvée and paid labor. An order circulated by the Hosokawa in Kumamoto domain sets out the amount of corvée that Hosokawa retainers involved in the siege could request:

“Concerning the military class with laborers at Shimabara; Up to two persons for every one hundred koku of land value is considered provincial service. Beyond that, pay each person at the rate of five koku per annum prorated for the number of days served.”

Under the provincial service system, townspeople and villagers were required to provide labor, sometime paid, more often corvée, for official projects. In addition to supporting travel to the siege, provincial service provided a pool of laborers for siege construction and in-camp labor.

The Hosokawa order reveals several insights into how labor was procured and paid for. First, this order is an after-the-fact reconciliation of how much service the population of Kumamoto Domain “owed” the Hosokawa. If a Hosokawa retainer with, for example, 1,000 koku of land value had engaged thirty peasants to serve as labor during the siege, the Hosokawa would not have compensated twenty of those peasants. Neither, however, would these peasants have borne the expense of their travel or board during the service period personally. Under the provincial service system, villages collectively supported their own members who served the “public good” with corvée labor through wages, tools, and food, and at times a stipend.

Not only were laborers procured under the corvée provincial service policy supported by their towns and villages; the villagers and townspeople also paid for the military

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8 Genshiryō, 1076-7.
personnel who supervised them. An Arima accounting of labor costs indicates that 336 “townspeople” (machikata) employed at the siege over a seventy-five day period provided over twenty-six koku of rice to support the troops (usually archers) and administrators who oversaw their work.9

One duty of laborers in camp was to erect housing for the troops. Construction of the generals’ camp, including the tents for their troops as well as fences, provides a detailed look at how labor was used during the siege. Included in the generals’ procession were 750 “workers” (who likely accompanied them from Edo and served as porters during the trip). Although the record is not specific about their origins, we may presume many to have been agricultural laborers, along with carpenters and other craftsmen experienced in construction. To obtain most of the building materials for the tents that would house the troops, the labors went to a bamboo grove and wooded area about two and a half miles from the campsite. There, working in shifts, they cut, bundled and hand carried over 50,000 wood and bamboo polls (averaging seven to nine feet long) and nearly a thousand bundles of thin bamboo.10 For eighteen hours, forty-seven of the workers cut and bundled the wood and bamboo, while 300 hundred others carried it in six loads back to the campsite. Fifty people remained at the campsite braiding rope out of straw. While the supplies came in, and the rope was made, the remaining 353 workers began construction, and within those hours constructed over 14,500 square feet of tent.

Once all the supplies were on site, all of the 750 workers applied themselves to the construction of the tents. In the next eight hours, they erected the remaining 17,500

9 “Hara jin onko rokuzen” in Shimabara Hantō Shi, 250.
10 “Ôkawauchi kiroku” in Genshiryō, 644-5.
square feet of tent before turning their attention to the bamboo fence that protected the side of the camp facing Hara Castle and wrapped around the sides. They completed the 2,700-foot fence in just two and one half-hours. The workers were given four meal breaks of thirty minutes throughout the construction process, which took just over thirty hours.

In total, the workers constructed 32,000 square feet of tent in just twenty-eight and a half working-hours at an average of 1,123 square feet of tent an hour. First, the construction laborers were working in a relatively safe environment: the generals’ camp was nestled in the hills facing Hara Castle, well outside of arquebus range, or Dutch cannon range from the sea for that matter.\(^\text{11}\) Second, they were able to gather the construction materials from the surrounding area rather than import them from afar. These two factors, combined with the large number of workers and hurried work schedule, explain how the large camp was erected in such a short time.

To supplement the laborers and other miscellaneous workers at the siege, the Tokugawa also ordered the daimyô to hire craftsmen, as needed from Nagasaki.\(^\text{12}\) The order is careful to insist that these tradesmen were to be paid for their service, as opposed to co-opting it as corvée. Included in the labor force who built the generals’ camp were skilled craftsmen.\(^\text{13}\) Other daimyô too hired craftsmen to build and maintain housing, siege works, and repair weapons. Arima Tadayori’s unit of the Arima army, for example, hired carpenters, metal smiths, and millers to support siege related construction and

\(^{11}\) This is in reference to an issue that will be addressed in the next chapter: the Dutch firing at the castle from the sea, over shot and hit some of the daimyô camps. Even if that were true, the Matsudaira and Toda camp was too far removed for that to be a risk.

\(^{12}\) Genshiryô, 811.
maintenance. For the majority of their time at the siege, Tadayori employed twenty-four carpenters, seven metal smiths, two millers, and two metal smiths who specialized in repair of arquebus.  

As we would expect, workers of various descriptions serving a number of important functions supported the composite army at Hara. Servants attending to the needs of daimyô, Tokugawa administrators, and higher ranking military men. Laborers, who performed functions ranging from construction to front-line support, aided each of the daimyô units. Tradesmen were also brought in to handle technical tasks like building structures in camp as well as siege towers, and to repair cannon and arquebus. The work of support personnel was procured through a combination of corvée duty to the Tokugawa and paid contract labor.  

Although the type and function of support personnel is clear, for several reasons, the evidence at hand does not lend itself to projecting the total number of support personnel at the siege. Above all, the evidence presented here cannot be construed as representative enough to make claims about total numbers – contrary to the troop number calculations in Chapter 4. Second, it is clear from the record that many of the support personnel played multiple roles in supporting the siege, for example, that of porter then construction worker. This fact prevents separation of personnel types with regard to the total population. Third, as the allotment of servants to Tokugawa administrators indicates, military men of varied status engaged different numbers of servants. Finally, because few workers brought from surrounding domains were at the siege for the duration (rather,  

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13 “Ôkawauchi kiroku” in Genshiryô, 644-5.  
14 “Hara jin onko rokuzen” in Shimabara Hantô Shi, 250-1.
working in shifts so as not to overburden the village or town) it would be difficult to separate man-days from total personnel.

Despite the above qualifications, a very rough estimate of the support personnel at Hara may still be attempted using a per-\textit{koku} calculation. As noted above, the Hosokawa allowed their retainers at least two, and possibly more, personnel for every one hundred \textit{koku} of land they possessed. If we look at the Nabeshima figures, we find that for a total domain value of 357,000 \textit{koku}, 8,000 personnel of various descriptions supported their army. This works out to 2.2 workers per one hundred \textit{koku}. If, based on these figures, we can assume that the entirety of the army was supported between two and three personnel for every one-hundred \textit{koku} of land, then the total of support personnel would approach 50,000 to 75,000 personnel of various types. Support of this magnitude would bring the total of people arrayed in front of Hara Castle in the winter and spring of 1638 to well over 200,000.

\textit{Supply}

The final category of support personnel that should be added to the figures above is the merchants gathered at Hara. Mobilizing an army, housing its troops, and providing necessary support personnel are significant tasks, but if that army is not fed, it will not remain viable in the field. The Roman military scholar, Vegetius, writing in the fifth century AD, reminds us that:

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“…when one reads the examples of Xerxes, Darius, Mithridates and other kings who armed countless populations, it is clearly apparent that over-large armies have been overcome more by their own size then the bravery
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of the enemy… For armies are more often destroyed by starvation than battle, and hunger is more savage than the sword.”\(^{15}\)

Sun Tzu agrees, warning:

“Now if the estimates made in the temple before hostilities indicate victory it is because calculations show one’s strength to be superior to that of his enemy; if they indicate defeat, it is because calculations show that one is inferior. With many calculations, one can win; with few one cannot. How much less chance of victory has one who makes none at all!”\(^{16}\)

The Tokugawa shogunate was also aware of the dangers to their army described by Vegetius and Sun Tzu. In a letter to the newly installed generals at the siege on 18 February, the Tokugawa Senior Counselors cautioned that, “because it is such a great [large] army, make sure it is not restricted by lack of provisions or supplies.”\(^{17}\)

But the Tokugawa were able to keep one of the largest early modern armies in the field for the better part of three months. What did the troops eat? Where did the provisions come from? And, how close to the limitations of their provisioning potential did the Tokugawa army come? In other words, how “savage” was hunger for the siege army at Hara?

The main staple of the army’s diet consisted of rice and soybeans. Both commodities were common in all parts of Japan, stored well, and provided the troops with little deviation from their peacetime diets. These two, especially rice, topped all of the extant inventory lists from the siege armies. Nutrient rich goods that also preserved well and were common to most of Japan augmented their meals. Supplementary foods included


\(^{17}\) “Ôkawauchi ke kiroku” in Genshiryô, 667.
bean paste, dried fish, rice cakes, pickles, and cooking condiments like soy sauce, vinegar, oil, and salt. Curiously, considering the pressures of supplying food to a large army, alcohol in significant quantities rounded out the list of supplies procured by the *daimyô* units.

A diary of the mess hall from the Kuroda domain’s contingent at the siege provides insight into the diet of troops at the siege.18 (See Figure 5.1) Higher-ranking Kuroda troops were fed from a communal mess hall, as opposed to the foot soldiers who cooked and ate alone or in small groups. The Kuroda upper echelon ate four meals per day beginning at 5 to 6 AM and concluding around 10 PM. The evening meals were always accompanied by rice wine. Their meals consisted mainly of fresh fish sold to the Kuroda by local fisherman, and rice purchased from merchants. The Kuroda no doubt benefited from economies of scale by feeding their higher ranks through a communal mess hall. The costs of the ingredients for each meal was studiously recorded and reported to the Kuroda administration.

18 “*Gô jinchu gôdaidokoro nikki*” Managi family archives, Fukuoka City, Fukuoka Japan.
Figure 5.1: “Gô shûjinchu gôdaidokoro nikki”
Managi family archives, Fukuoka City, Fukuoka Japan.
Returning to the example of the second set of generals, it is astounding how well Matsudaira and Toda, who arrived on site in mid-February appear to have eaten. Table 5.2 details the foodstuffs in the camp of Matsudaira, Toda, and their three sons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White Rice</td>
<td>30 <em>koku</em></td>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>25 sacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bean Cakes</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Ducks</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soybeans</td>
<td>20 bushels</td>
<td>Chickens</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bean Paste</td>
<td>25 tubs</td>
<td>Dried Bonito</td>
<td>500 tubes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pickles</td>
<td>5 tubs</td>
<td>Yellowtail</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sake (rice wine)</td>
<td>25 barrels</td>
<td>Radish</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soy sauce</td>
<td>5 barrel</td>
<td>Beef</td>
<td>150 packages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinegar</td>
<td>5 barrel</td>
<td>Charcoal</td>
<td>50 sacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooking Oil</td>
<td>5 barrel</td>
<td>Firewood</td>
<td>500 bundles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5.2: The Generals’ Food Supplies*¹⁹

In keeping with the generals’ in-camp comfort we see that in addition to the basics of rice, rice cakes, and soybeans, they brought a great deal of rice wine. They also enjoyed the luxuries of fresh poultry, beef, and fish. Likewise, the Arima army from Kurume Domain had forty barrels of rice wine (totaling 370 gallons), as well as the staples and cooking oils used by the generals.²⁰

¹⁹ “Go koya no oboe” in *Genshiryō*, 649. Unfortunately, because the size of barrels, tubs, crates etc was not standard in this period, where the size of these containers is not defined in the records, approximations cannot be attempted.

²⁰ “Hara jin onko rokuzen” in *Shimabara Hantô Shi*, 249.
This discussion above gives us a picture of what the Tokugawa army ate, but not where they procured it. With the exception of fish from the ocean surrounding the peninsula as indicated by the Kuroda ‘mess’ diary, there is no suggestion in the record that any other significant foodstuffs were procured locally. To the contrary, copious documents detail the shipment of supplies from the home domains of the daimyō at the siege. The Hosokawa repeatedly shipped rice and soybeans to the front. The Hosokawa sent 1,800 koku of rice and bushels of soybeans (the distribution is not specified) to their army on 19 January 1638.\textsuperscript{21} The domain elders in Kumamoto informed their counterparts at the front on 24 January that an additional 680 koku of rice and 320 bushels of soybeans had been sent from home for their support.\textsuperscript{22} Just five days later, on 29 January, they sent another 360 koku of rice and 280 bushels of soybeans.\textsuperscript{23} In just ten days, the Hosokawa sent from their home area nearly 3,500 bushels of rice and soybeans to their army at the front. Clearly, the Hosokawa did not expect their troops to fend for themselves in the field.

A division of the Arima army led by the daimyō’s son, Arima Tadayori, also shipped in food and supplies from their home domain. They received from Kurume approximately 370 gallons of wine, 57 gallons of vinegar, 343 gallons of bean paste, 29 gallons of soy sauce, 12 packages of rice cakes, 14 baskets of carp, and 4 crates of chicken.\textsuperscript{24} However, the Arima did not keep all of these supplies for themselves. The great majority was sold to other daimyō and to Tokugawa representatives at the siege.

\textsuperscript{21} “Go kachû buntsû no uchi nukigaki” in Genshiryō, 545.
\textsuperscript{22} “Go kachû buntsû no uchi nukigaki” in Genshiryō, 509.
\textsuperscript{23} “Go kachû buntsû no uchi nukigaki” in Genshiryō, 545.
\textsuperscript{24} “Hara jin onko rokuzen” in Shimabara Hantô Shi, 249.
Daimyô like Itakura Shigemasa, who traveled to the Hara from his home province in Fukautsu, purchased goods from the Arima stock.25 Similarly, Tokugawa shogunal administrators dispatched from Edo like Ishigaya Sadakiyo (general and censor), Baba Toshishige (censor), Makino Noriatsu (censor), and Matsudaira Yukitaka (courier) bought food and drink from the supplies brought from Kurume by the Arima. These purchases confirm that because these daimyô and representatives came from significant distances to the siege, it was more efficient to buy foodstuffs on site than haul it from home.

Domains like the Hosokawa and Arima also provided rice for the armies of the generals at the siege. An Arima record of expense in camp reveals that the Arima, Hosokawa, Nabeshima, and Matsukura (all regional daimyô) shared the expense of purchasing 2,200 koku of rice for the Matsudaira and Toda troops.26 Hosokawa Tadatoshi, daimyô of Kumamoto, ordered his retainers on 6 February to ship 300 koku of rice, 200 koku of rice bran, 50 bushels of soybeans, and 500 bundles of straw for use by the generals Matsudaira and Toda who were expected to arrive in a week’s time.27

But where did the daimyô get rice and other foods from within their domains? There were two sources: storehouses and the peasant population. Each daimyô maintained rice reserves within their domain and in storehouses in Osaka. In times of need, such as famine, fiscal crisis, or war, the daimyô could draw on either reserve to provide rice. Several documents (discussed below) indicate that internal domain rice reserves were tapped to send provisions to the front in Arima. The other source, the peasantry, is

26 “Hara jin onko rokuzen” in Shimabara Hantô Shi, 249-50.
highlighted by a Hosokawa order circulated among the village headmen of a county (not specified) in Kumamoto orders nine villages to present a total of 920 koku of rice to support the Hosokawa army.

Merchants who gathered at Hara to keep the troops supplied provided another source of food for the armies. In almost every map of the siege, merchant tents (machiya) appear along each side of the composite armies’ campsites. However, it appears that the sutlers, unregulated as they were, gave the daimyō reason for concern. A Hosokawa document warns the domain elders about unscrupulous vendors by citing previous purchases of shoes and straw sandals that turned out to be “too small, and hence of no use.” They are further cautioned that, “…great care should be used in deciding which merchants you patronize.” Non-food supplies were also purchased by troops while in camp. Arima Tadayori’s unit of the Arima army purchased camp goods such as lanterns, hoes, sickles, wood splitters, and candles from merchants at the siege. They also bought raw goods like oil and iron for repairing arquebus; cotton and paper for cannon wadding; and tarps and straw mats for the roof and floor of tents.

Not only did the methods of procuring provisions all rely on extra-Shimabara sources, Tokugawa communiqués repeatedly acknowledged that local supply was unlikely, and instructed the daimyō to seek food and goods elsewhere. Nicholaes Koekebacker claims that in anticipation of importing food, the Tokugawa issued the following warning:

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27 “Go kachû buntsû no uchi nukigaki” in Genshiryō, 593.
28 “Go kachû buntsû no uchi nukigaki” in Genshiryō, 563.
29 “Go kachû buntsû no uchi nukigaki” in Genshiryō, 563.
30 “Hara jin onko rokuzen” in Shimabara Hantô Shi, 251-2.
…we were informed by the Regents [of Hirado] that a notification had been issued to the whole population to the effect that the government godowns of rice would be closed during the rebellion in Arima and Amakusa, no rice being delivered to anybody but in extreme necessity. We were instructed to buy any rice we wanted from other places.”

On 7 March, the Tokugawa issued a general warning to the composite army that, “…if there are not enough provisions in Kyushu, gather them from surrounding areas.”

Even the Tokugawa order to provide rice allowances to the troops issued on 13 March (discussed in Chapter 4) stated that, “The rice [allowance] should be transported now from surrounding provinces.”

However, as the siege progressed, even importing food for the army became difficult. An 8 March Tokugawa communiqué sternly ordered the generals Matsudaira and Toda to bring rice in from Kyushu, Shikoku, and Chugoku (the central region of Japan’s main island Honshu) immediately, followed by the offer of support from Osaka, “…if there is not enough rice in those areas, we will send rice from Osaka [bakufu storehouses].”

Nearer the end of the siege, the situation became even worse. A letter on 1 April 1638 from a Tokugawa administrator stationed in Matsudaira Nobutsuna’s camp to the Osaka “group” (the Kyoto Deputy, Osaka Castle Guard, and Osaka City Magistrate), spells out the plight of the army after months in camp: “…rice is trading here at 56 to 57 momme per koku. But even at that price there isn’t a koku to buy. The situation is becoming


32 “Shimabara jin obeogaki” in Genshiryô, 779-80.

33 Genshiryô, 811; Amakusa Shimabara gunkishû, 269; see also Zoku Gunsho Ruijû Kanseikai eds, Zokuzoku gunki ruijû, (Tokyo: Zoku Gunsho Ruijû Kanseikai, 1978).

34 “Goshi shiryokan monjo” in Genshiryô, 784.
progressively worse. None of the people coming here have rice to sell.”35 It was probably fortunate for the Tokugawa that the castle fell just two weeks later.

The supply methods discussed above all involve importing food; what about the most obvious source of supply, Shimabara? Other than fishing, none of the sources make reference to supply from the peninsula upon which Hara castle, and the siege army, sat. Why not?

Put simply, there were no reserves of foodstuff to be had on the peninsula. Four major causes of the dearth on Shimabara confronted the huge Tokugawa army. First, Shimabara Domain could not have supported a large force under the best of conditions. This is true not only of the army on the Peninsula, but of large forces anywhere in the early modern world. As John Lynn has written,

In fact, the larger field armies of the second half of the seventeenth century required such great quantities of flour and bread [or, in this case rice] that this supply could only come up from the rear, brought by convoy from grain stores maintained by the government or munitionnaires. … Stores of food gathered in magazines and shipped forward by convoy were consequently a fixture of seventeenth-century warfare.36

The same was true for the Tokugawa. The total produce of rice of the Shimabara domain at the time did not exceed 40,000 koku annually.37 It is hard to image that in the best of times an area that routinely produced such a relatively small amount of rice could have single-handedly supported 150,000 troops (let alone an additional support personnel) for which the Tokugawa alone distributed the equivalent of 30,000 koku – three-quarters of the peninsula’s annual yield. But 1637 and 1638 were not the best of

35 “Shimabara Nikki” in Genshiryō, 900.
36 John Lynn, Feeding Mars, 140.
times. The *kan’ei* era ‘famine’ (*kikin*) of the late 1630s and early 1640s inflamed by the reckless policies of the *daimyô* Matsukura further diminished the peninsula’s capacity to support the huge *bakugun* army. If there was not enough rice to feed a national army in Shimabara under optimum circumstances, there was not a chance by the time famine and Matsukura fanaticism finished with the region.

The final factor that deprived the Tokugawa army of local supply was the rebel army itself. When peasants abandoned their homes as the rebellion spread through the domain, they took what food they could with them. Further, as the rebel force consolidated and headed for Hara Castle, they cleaned out what little strategic reserves the Matsukura had and took it with them. In preparation for the coming siege the rebels “carried the entirety of rice from [surrounding] villages back to the old [Hara] castle. In addition, about five thousand *koku* of rice was taken from [Matsukura Katsuie’s] storehouse at Kuchinotsu.”

It is not difficult to see how a relatively unproductive region, ravaged first by agricultural catastrophe, then by excessive taxation, and finally swept clean by starving peasants in the throws of rebellion was not able to provide one of the largest armies in the early modern world with the food necessary for a prolonged siege.

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38 “*Yamada saemon no suke kosho utushi*” in *Shimabara Hantô Shi*, 190.
Dry rice was not only a foodstuff, but also the basis for the Tokugawa agrarian economy, so it is not always clear whether rice quantities intended to support the troops and support personnel were used as a currency, a food staple, or both. However, as noted in the Chapter 4 above, it is unlikely that small amounts of rice were distributed directly to individual troops or workers because of the time such an endeavor would entail. Whether we understand rice allowances as payments of currency, used to purchase food or supplies, or foodstuffs proper, and regardless of whether that “payment” was made to individuals or used in a pool to provide sustenance for troops and workers, a look at the amounts of rice allotted to different actors in the siege gives an idea of what level of rice supply was necessary for the large army.

The “payments” (as qualified above) allotted to three different types of personnel at the siege are as follows. Returning to the discussion in Chapter 4, a portion of the troops at the siege were subsidized with five ご of rice (0.005 koku) or approximately 1.9 U.S. dry measure pints. The Zôhyô monogatari (Handbook for Miscellaneous Soldiers, or Rabble), written by the son of General Matsudaira some years after the siege, suggests that six ご, about 2.2 pints, of rice per day is adequate for one soldier’s maintenance.

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39 Calculations in this section are based on the following: 1000 ご = 1 koku, 1 koku = 180.39 liters, 1 liter = 2.113 U.S. dry measure pints.

40 Asano Nagatake and Higuchi Hideo eds., Zukan Zôhyô monogatari (Tokyo: Jinkutsu Ôraisha, 1967) 78.
The Tokugawa subsidy thus came close to the daily provision recommended by the *Zôhyô monogatari*.

However, as proposed earlier, it is not likely that the subsidy represented a full day’s sustenance. First, bean paste and fish, as described in the mess inventories noted above supplemented their meals. Second, ‘payment’ made to other troops, from their own domains, is in excess of six gô. A group of 932 arquebusiers from Arima Domain, an elite group compared to foot soldiers, who served at the siege for periods from four to forty-four days were each ‘paid’ at exactly 7.5 gô, or an equivalent of 2.9 pints, of rice each day.⁴¹ For those arquebusiers, the Tokugawa subsidy of five gô represented about two-thirds of their daily rice allowance. The Arima also paid their craftsmen. Nineteen carpenters, two millers, and seven metal smiths were paid at the rate of fifteen gô, almost six pints, of rice a day.⁴² Others, specifically five carpenters and two armormers, received a third of their colleagues’ pay at five gô a day each. Based on the Hosokawa order to their own retainers, we also know that workers brought to the siege exceeding the two per one-hundred *koku* level of corvée service were to be paid, “at the rate of five *koku* per annum prorated for the number of days served.”⁴³ Dividing five *koku* by 354, the number of days in the 1638 Japanese calendar (*kan’ei* 15), gives a per day stipend of 0.014 *koku*, or just over fourteen gô, per day. This is rather close to the pay of craftsmen at 15 gô. Both of these pay scales are roughly twice that of the stipend allotted to troops at the siege. The larger payments to craftsmen were stipends whereas the smaller daily allotments to troops were provided to augment their regular stipends.

⁴¹ “Hara jin onko rokuzen” in *Shimabara hantô shi*, 249-50.
⁴² “Hara jin onko rokuzen” in *Shimabara hantô shi*, 250.
To sum up, personnel, including troops and workers, corvée and hired, subsidized and not, received between five and fifteen gô of rice each day. Although these figures are not precise enough to calculate the exact total of rice consumed in one way or another at the siege, by looking at the upper limits we can determine whether the Tokugawa and dai myô concerned possessed at least that much rice in 1638. Using the high-end figures of at least 225,000 persons at the siege, and at least ninety days of service, multiplied by 15 gô of rice, we might estimate that entire rice allotments, used as either payment or food, for the siege approached 303,750 *koku* of rice. Remember that this figure is proposed as the likely outside limit, the highest possible, as a means of determining whether even this exaggerated estimate could have been feasible. In the 1630s, the annual rice production in Japan exceeded 18 million *koku*. So 300,000 *koku* to support the siege represented less than two percent of that annual produce; well within the agricultural means early modern Japan. Likewise, if we only look at the dai myô involved and the Tokugawa, we find that 300,000 *koku* is less than 10% of their 3.2 million *koku* of annual income. Again, this highest possible estimation of the siege cost seems to have been entirely reasonable. We must keep in mind that the Tokugawa did not want to create unrest elsewhere by overburdening peasants to pay for the siege at Hara. It seems from the percentage of rice used to support the siege, that this was entirely possible.

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43 Genshiryô, 1076-7.
Conclusion

The Tokugawa were able to keep their huge composite army at Hara fed, supplied, and supported through a combination of strategies. Direct bakufu contributions, various methods of supply devolution, and corvée and hired labor all contributed to the sustenance of an overwhelming concentration of troops and support personnel during a time of dearth throughout Japan. But even the complex Tokugawa supply organization was stretched almost to the limit by the sheer size and duration of the campaign against Hara Castle.

Local resources of the Shimabara Peninsula certainly could not have supported the Tokugawa composite army. To feed their troops the Tokugawa relied heavily on what Van Creveld would call supply from the rear. Raw materials like foodstuffs of all descriptions, weapons, and ammunition were brought from beyond the scene of the army’s camp. These materials were also procured through supply devolution. The bakufu put the onus on daimyô to provide much of the supplies necessary to prosecute the siege, who in turn relied on either shipments from home or purchases from merchants who gathered at the site. These practices are very similar to early modern Western European and Ottoman methods for tackling the obstacle of feeding large armies away from home.

The machiya, or merchants, that gathered around the composite army at Hara are reminiscent of the Ottoman ordu bazaar, a traveling market of settlers, craftsmen, and prostitutes that followed Turkish armies on campaign. This brand of supply devolution
took the administrative impetus off the *daimyô* units and allowed free enterprise to benefit both the army and the merchants who supplied it.

The *machiya* did, however, rely on a local supply of fish along the Peninsula’s coast to keep the army in stock. The Kuroda mess hall diary records daily purchases of fish that could not have been supplied any other way from merchants. An order from the *Rôjû* Matsudaira following the siege (discussed in Chapter 6 below) indicates that one item other than fresh fish that was supplied locally rather than from the rear: combustible materials. The order forbids deforestation following the siege. As described by the assembly of the Generals’ camp, wood, reed, and bamboo from the surrounding area was used for cooking and the construction of vast fences and towers used to prosecute the siege. As one of only ten post-siege orders from the Tokugawa representative, the concern for preserving wood and bamboo growth indicates that over three months of tent building, fire making, lining the walls of sapping trenches, and erecting wooden towers to approach Hara Castle took a significant toll on the natural resources of the Peninsula. These two products however, fish and wood, appear to be the only goods obtained locally in large amounts.

In addition to devolution and limited local supply, the *daimyô* and *bakufu* units also relied heavily on peacetime rice reserves to finance and feed the composite army. The Tokugawa directly or indirectly tapped the storehouse in individual domains and even the great Osaka warehouses for rice and other goods. As described above, we find shipment after shipment of rice, as food or payment, and other foods from *daimyô* domains and Osaka.
Without the *machiya* and supply from home reserves, the composite army would either have had to create a standing supply structure and maintain it in times of peace, or accept limited ability to stay in the field away from home supplies. The *machiya* and peacetime stores made it possible through devolution for the composite army to be supplied in wartime without overburdening the either the *bakufu* or the *daimyô* in peacetime. Similarly, by requiring the *daimyô* to feed their own troops, the bakufu maintained an affordable logistical reserve in peacetime that could be deployed on a moments notice without fear of the starving troops that Vegetius and Sun Tzu feared.

Food supply was not the only commodity for which the Tokugawa relied on a combination of devolution and contractual procurement. *Kuniyaku* provided corvée, and semi-corvée labor at the siege in combination with hired workers and craftsmen from surrounding areas. As with the mobilization and transportation of the Tokugawa field army, we find several elements working in concert to feed and supply that army en camp. The Tokugawa relied on political and economic devolution of these burdens, privatization, and imposition on the peasant class to feed the troops, provide the workers, and keep a very costly siege underway for more than three months in the winter of 1638.

However, two facts indicate that the Tokugawa supply system may have been reaching the limit of its capacity for feeding the vast army and paying for the necessary support personnel. Increasing demands for foodstuffs, and supply from incrementally greater distances, point to the fact that foods reserves in the region neared exhaustion. The behavior of sutlers on site also indicated the increasing difficulty of procuring food. By May 1638 the other side of the free enterprise coin began to materialize – merchants were, probably by necessity and opportunity, inflating the price of rice causing officials
on the scene to plead for even more relief from home. How do we reconcile this problem with the fact that the rice, whether as food or payment, was well within the Tokugawa and daimyô budgets?

In short, the Tokugawa were faced with a very delicate balancing act. After several years of natural disaster in Japan, rebellion was breaking out all over the country. Certainly no revolt or uprising reached the scale or notoriety of the Shimabara Rebellion, but the kan’ei famine (kikin) was in full swing and on its way to Shimabara. Laying siege to the rebels at Hara to make an example of what would happen to anyone who opposed state authority was a costly choice – doing it with one of the largest field armies in the early modern world even more so. However, it would have been counterintuitive for the Tokugawa to risk inflaming the entire region just to make an example of the Shimabara rebels. Therefore, although on paper the Tokugawa and daimyô should have been able to pay for their enormous army, in reality there were certain limits to how much could be squeezed from the peasantry and to how far they would dip into the nation’s various rice reserves.
CHAPTER 6

THE FALL OF HARA AND BEYOND

The previous three chapters have explored the logistics of how the Tokugawa shared news about the rebellion and transported their army to the scene, how the troops were mobilized and deployed, and how the army was sustained during the siege. This chapter will examine how the siege concluded and what effects its aftermath had regionally and nationally.

The Siege

Itakura Shigemasa failed three times in his rush to assault Hara Castle and defeat the rebels, thereby claiming personal glory before the Shogun’s appointed generals Matsudaira and Toda could arrive. Within days of Itakura’s third – and fatal – attempt to end the siege, the generals took over and began imposing Tokugawa will. When the rôjû Matsudaira Nobutsuna arrived at the siege line on 17 February, he began deploying the troops he brought with him in front of the exposed north castle wall.1 As a senior member of the bakufu’s council of elders, Matsudaira’s arrival signaled the seriousness

1 “Betto mokuzaemon oboegaki” in Hayashi, Shimabara hantôshi II, 90.
with which the *bakufu* now regarded the rebel challenge. Matsudaira was joined most notably by the great *daimyô* Hosokawa Tadatoshi (of Higo Province) and Toda Ujikane (of Minô Province). In the wake of Itakura’s defeat, Matsudaira did not order another assault on the castle, but rather that the troops begin preparations to wait the rebels out. This was not, as C. R. Boxer has suggested, a decision made solely by the “notoriously foxy” Matsudaira.\(^2\) The failure of Itakura to take the castle was an embarrassment to the Tokugawa *bakufu*. Shogun Iemitsu, Matsudaira’s only mortal superior, ordered him rather, to find a solution that would not risk further failure by the *bakugun*. A messenger brought word to Matsudaira from Edo reinforcing his prime directive to the generals: “[Shogun] Iemitsu has ordered that suppression [of the rebellion] must take place without injury to the troops.”\(^3\) Koeckebacker concurs, noting that, “…His Majesty [the Shogun] has ordered the subjugation of the rebels to be conducted in such a manner that little or no loss should occur among the imperial troops.”\(^4\) The order was clear, and Matsudaira embarked on a new strategy to deal with rebels in Hara Castle.

With the rebels pressed within the castle, Matsudaira and his generals knew that supplies would eventually run out. Although the rebels did not have a renewable source of provisions, the *bakugun* did, and could withstand a stalemate. To give some perspective to the resources of the *bakufu*’s forces, Matsudaira, Hosokawa and Toda

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\(^2\) Boxer, 381.


alone personally held between them lands that annually produced over 670,000 koku.\(^5\) As discussed in Chapter 5, it was reasonable to think that the bakufu army could afford to wait the rebels out, and this was the strategy that Matsudaira followed.

Matsudaira did not, however, passively wait for the rebels to capitulate from hunger. In the following weeks, his forces employed several alternative strategies to a frontal assault on the castle. First, they relied heavily on the Dutch merchants at Hirado and Nagasaki. Despite reluctance to become involved in Japanese internal affairs – let alone aid an attack on fellow Christians – the Dutch supported the siege with ships, cannon, powder, and expert advise on siege works. Tavernier accused the Dutch of playing traitor to the Christians inside Hara Castle simply to maintain economic relations with Japan, and he was probably right.\(^6\) That being said, the Dutch did not throw themselves completely behind the siege. When requested to send both Dutch ships from Hirado to Shimabara, Koeckebacker ordered Francois Caron to leave Hirado with one ship (the Petten), anchor it out of sight, and avoid being seen around Nagasaki.\(^7\)

On 24 February, the Dutch ship De Rijp (or de Ryp) arrived off the coast of Shimabara,\(^8\) and after unloading their most uniform five-pound cannon and gunners,

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circled around behind Hara Castle. With landed cannon in front and seaborne cannon to the rear, they bombarded the castle. In the encounter, three Dutch sailors lost their lives; one was shot down from a ship’s mast killing another he landed on, and one when a landed cannon exploded. The Dutch cannon fire also created a danger to Tokugawa troops. While firing at the citadel, the Dutch often overshot the castle walls causing their cannon balls to land amid the besiegers. The Dutch also fired from the ship at the homes of the rebellious farmers. Despite firing 426 cannonballs over two weeks from twenty guns, both from the sea and ashore, Koeckebacker lamented the ineffectiveness of gunpowder weapons on a fortress as solid as Hara. Not only were the five-pound field guns useless again a fortress like Hara, he even claimed that larger guns would not have been any more effective. Likely due to a combination of ineffectiveness, “friendly fire”, and the taunting by the rebels of samurai in need of foreign assistance, Matsudaira asked the Dutch to withdraw by 12 March. Despite uncertainty concerning the damage the artillery inflicted on the castle, it is clear that Dutch assistance did not play a decisive role in resolving the siege.

The bakugun also employed psychological tactics. Yabumi, arrows with letters attached, were fired into the castle. The bakufu letters advised the rebels to consider carefully their actions and offered amnesty to those who surrendered; offers we shall see

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9 C. R. Boxer, “Notes on Early European Military Influence in Japan (1543-1853),” *Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 8, (Second series, 1931): 76. Please note that this article contains a typographical error placing the Shimabara Rebellion in 1627.

10 Morris, *The Nobility of Failure*, 167; Boxer Notes, 76.


that the Tokugawa would not honor.\textsuperscript{13} The \textit{bakufu} leaders also used the family of Amakusa Shirô, his mother (baptismal name Martha) and sister (Regina), in an attempt to persuade the young leader to lay down his arms and lead his followers out of the castle.\textsuperscript{14} These tactics did not, however, weaken rebel resolve in any discernible manner. The \textit{bakufu} had to rely on other tactics to continue softening up the rebels. One of the more aggressive tactics employed during the interim weeks was a sapping project undertaken by the Hosokawa troops. They dug a broad ditch perpendicular to the east end of the north wall.\textsuperscript{15} Upon reaching the castle, the Hosokawa troops chiseled a hole in the castle wall in which ten \textit{koku} (1800 liters) of gunpowder was packed and detonated.\textsuperscript{16} It is likely that the inferior Japanese gunpowder mixture reacted more like flash powder than an explosive, and again, as with the Dutch cannon, the \textit{bakufu}’s tactics proved indecisive: the explosion did not significantly damage the castle wall. In any event, Matsudaira was careful, despite the eagerness of \textit{daimyô} troops for action, not to recreate the ill-advised escalades of Itakura. Even Koeckebacker noted how slowly and carefully the \textit{bakugun} siege lines advanced.

By mid March 1638, although the \textit{bakufu}’s alternative tactics had proven ineffective in routing the rebels from the castle, according to the account of Yamada Uemonnosuke, a rebel samurai turned traitor who provides the lone reliable account of the siege from inside the castle, the rebels’ food and gunpowder had run low.\textsuperscript{17} Just as significant, the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Hayashi, \textit{Shimabara hantôshi II}, 7.
\item Morris, \textit{The Nobility of Failure}, 168-9.
\item “Harajin onko rokuzen” in Hayashi, \textit{Shimabara hantôshi II}, 247.
\item Hosokawake shiryô, vol. 12, 175.
\item “Yamada Uemonnosuke kosho utsushi” in Hayashi, \textit{Shimabara hantôshi II}, 191.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
records of the Hosokawa troops state that the bakufu forces were aware of this fact by 14 March.\textsuperscript{18} Bakufu patience was bearing fruit. Without food or powder, it appeared to the bakufu army that it was only a matter of time before the castle could be stormed, without casualty, in accordance with Iemitsu’s wishes. It would be another month, however, before the bakufu troops were committed to action.

On the evening of 4 April, a group of starving rebels attempted a sortie from the castle to steal food and supplies from the bakufu encampments. That evening, Tachibana Tadashige spotted the burning wicks of forty to fifty rebel matchlocks as the rebels tried to sneak between his encampment and that of Matsukura Katsuie thirty-six yards to the west. In the ensuing skirmish, several hundred rebels were killed and scores more captured. Upon examining the bodies of fallen rebels, the besiegers noticed that the castle inhabitants were starving: “And when the stomachs of the dead enemy were cut open, it was discovered that they had been eating seaweed, treeleaves, unripe barley, and suchlike. Not one was there whose stomach had rice in it.”\textsuperscript{19} Within a week, Matsudaira launched a full-scale assault on the castle.

The fighting began early in the evening on 11 April by accident when a signal fire was mistakenly lit and daimyô troops rushed to action. Fighting continued through the night as the bakugun twice assaulted the castle as depicted in a folding screen series commissioned by the Kuroda daimyô of Fukuoka in the 1830s. (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2) By the morning of the twelfth, the bakufu forces had breached the castle defenses all the

\textsuperscript{18} Hosokawake shiryo, vol. 12, 167.

Figure 6.1: Scene from the final assault on Hara Castle
(Kuwata Tadachika, ed. *Sengoku kassen e Byôbu shûsei*. Vol 5
*Shimabara no Ranzu, Sengoku no Senzû* (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1988)
Figure 6.1: Detail of the final assault on Hara Castle
(Kuwata Tadachika, ed. Sengoku kassen e Byōbu shūsei. Vol 5 Shimabara no Ranzu, Sengoku no Senzū (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1988)
way through to the main citadel. Upon entering the castle, bakufu forces found 23,000 rebels, only 13,000 of them ambulatory. However, despite the weakened condition and reduced numbers, the defenders managed to inflict extremely heavy losses on the besiegers in the final encounter: 7,841 bakufu troops suffered injury, and 1206 troops died. These losses raised the bakufu’s total casualties for the siege of Hara Castle to over 20,000, or a 13% casualty rate among the 150,000 total troops involved.  

**Escapees**

Almost every author referring to the conclusion of the Shimabara Rebellion in English and Japanese scholarship drives home the cruelty and finality of the Tokugawa response by pointing out that every survivor of the siege, save the infamous turncoat Yamada, were executed following the fall of the castle. However, Western and Japanese sources, as well as an analytical review of the facts, dispel the notion that none of the rebels survived the siege. Koeckebacker, in his description of the siege in letters to the Dutch mission at Batavia, refers repeatedly to peasants who escaped the castle and the Tokugawa wrath. Tavernier claimed that he heard his account of the rebellion and siege

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20 “Harajin onko rokuzen” in Hayashi, Shimabara hantōshi II, 245.  
21 “Harajin onko rokuzen” in Hayashi, Shimabara hantōshi II, 243.  
from a merchant who had dealings with rebels who escaped to Nagasaki and undertook commerce instead of returning to farming.\textsuperscript{23}

Japanese sources also provide evidence that not all the rebels perished after the Tokugawa stormed the castle. Repeated accounts of rebels caught and executed by daimyô troops during attempted escapes from the castle establish that rebels were leaving the castle during the siege. There are almost as many citations of rebel raiding parties that were interdicted by government troops. However, Japanese sources are silent about escapees or raiding rebels eluding Tokugawa troops and fleeing to the countryside or nearby islands. There are, perhaps, two reasons for this. First, if the escapees were well known enough to be documented, they surely would have been pursued and resulted in one more story of those killed while trying to escape or forage from government camp supplies. Second, had the Tokugawa or daimyô been aware of escapees, it would have been contradictory to the power projection efforts of the bakufu to document those success stories.

Finally, a fresh look at the physical circumstances strongly suggests that it would be impossible to account for every rebel and thus claim that they had all been executed. In addition to the four main citadels, underground tunnels and passageways that would have facilitated concealment and escape crisscrossed the castle. The sheer size of the area and numbers of people involved also make it unlikely that the Tokugawa could account for every person. A combined group approaching 200,000 – 250,000 rebels, troops, and retainers in and around a castle the size of several football fields strung together, and the

\textsuperscript{23} Jean Baptiste Tavernier, \textit{A Collection of Several Relations & Treatise Singular and Curious of Jean Baptista Tavernier, Baron of Aubonne. Not Printed among his first Six Voyages} (London, 1680) 18.
composite army campsites in the surrounding countryside, would make it almost impossible for Tokugawa tacticians to control exactly without modern helicopters, thermal imaging, night vision, and satellite surveillance. However, the image that the troops were able to hound every survivor was essential to the Tokugawa campaign to project power.

**Restoring Order**

In the aftermath of the siege, the bakufu took several immediate and decisive steps to address the origin of the peasant unrest and the opportunity for resistance. First and foremost, the majority of 23,000 rebels were systematically executed by the sword, drowning, and by fire. Ivan Morris provides a vivid account of the bloodlust of bakufu troops in his study of the rebellion’s leader, Amakusa Shirō. Koeckebacker adds, in detail, how the heads of the rebel leaders were displayed on poles in Nagasaki and several thousand more corpses floated in the surrounding waters.

Following the massacre of those rebels who could not escape Tokugawa brutality, General Matsudaira turned his attention toward the local daimyô whose policies originally created a rebellious atmosphere in and around the Shimabara Peninsula. Matsukura Katsuie, the daimyô of Shimabara, whose cruel and careless rule the

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24 Morris, *The Nobility of Failure*, 172-175.

Tokugawa cited as a major reason for the peasant rebellion, was stripped of his domain and remanded to the custody of the Mori family at Misakutsuyama.\(^{26}\) The Mori daimyô supervised the beheading of Matsukura in August 1638. Terazawa Katataka, the ruler of Amakusa, shared responsibility with Matsukura and was also stripped of his fief. Terazawa, however, lived in seclusion for another ten years before committing suicide. After exterminating the rebels and removing a primary source of their grievances, the bakufu then demolished the source of the rebels’ power. Shortly after the siege ended, Matsudaira ordered Hara Castle, the resource that had ultimately allowed a group of peasants to challenge bakufu authority, to be destroyed.\(^{27}\) The inner walls of Hara Castle’s main and secondary citadels were toppled and buried on the spot in large pits. The troops then destroyed and buried within the castle all remaining wood and stone structures, furniture, and ovens. As a symbolic “destruction” of another cause of the rebellion, grave markers in a nearby Christian cemetery were used to build steps leading to a small Buddhist temple – thereby allowing the faithful to symbolically walk on Christ along their path to honor state-approved Buddhism.\(^{28}\)

The next, and possible most significant, action taken by the bakufu was a ten-article edict issued to the remaining populations of Shimabara, Amakusa, and the surrounding countryside. The edict was formally issued in the name of the rōjū Matsudaira Nobutsuna just over a month after the final assault on the castle. The ten articles of the edict are summarized as follows:

\(^{26}\) Nakajima ed., Nihon rekishi daijiten, vol. 8, 664.


Regulations

Item 1. Buddhist priests, Shinto priests, townspeople, and farmers alike must return to living peaceably as in previous times.

Item 2. Since a large number of peasants joined the rebel army, vast tracts of land have been abandoned. Those [peasants from other parts of Japan] who wish to take responsibility for farming that land may, in turn, do so.

Item 3. It is forbidden to harbor peasants who have absconded from neighboring villages.

Item 4. The balances of outstanding tax debts are discharged.

Item 5. The debt of those whose tax was collected in labor, and other outstanding labor obligations, are absolved.

Item 6. Henceforth Christianity is strictly prohibited. Relationship or communication with Christians as well as secret prayer is likewise forbidden.

Item 7. Reckless deforestation is prohibited.

Item 8. Foreclosure and riotous behavior in the market place are prohibited.

Item 9. The buying and selling of persons is prohibited.

Item 10. Giving shelter or assistance to masterless samurai (ronin) is absolutely forbidden.

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The majority of these ten articles concern peasant welfare. Peasant debt under Matsukura’s rule is absolved in articles four and five. The practice of slavery, which was commonly forced upon peasants who could not pay their tax debts, is outlawed by article nine. Article eight prohibits the duplicitous methods used by merchants to squeeze higher profits out of an already burdened peasantry. Several articles address regional stability. Articles three and ten forbid harboring peasants or samurai who have

absconded from their land or masters in an effort to prevent agitators and the displaced from gathering in the region. To prevent the stockpiling of military provisions and allow the forestry around Hara to regenerate after the Tokugawa troops cut down vast tracts of trees and bamboo for tents, fences, and battle towers, article seven forbids unnecessary forestry. The deficiency in peasant labor created by the rebellion is recognized in article two. By inviting peasants from outside the region to settle vacant land, this article served two purposes. First, new residents would ensure that the land abandoned by the rebels would not lay fallow, thereby feeding the population and supporting the domain. The chances of a fall in production of rice, and subsequently in tax payments, were reduced. Second, transplantation of an extra-local population diluted memory of the rebellion’s causes and consequences. Curiously, though the effects of articles two and three indirectly impact the religious make-up of the region, in only one of the ten articles do we find the issue of religion addressed directly: article six clearly prohibits Christianity.

The fate of Amakusa domain was left to Suzuki Shigenari, who had distinguished himself in besieging the rebels in Hara Castle. Suzuki was charged with correcting the economic sources of rebellion in Amakusa, transplanting a new population to the group of islands, and curtailing Christianity in favor of native Buddhism. For the latter task he enlisted his brother, Shôsan. However, when the bakufu refused to grant Shigenari’s request to lighten the tax burden in Amakusa he committed suicide in protest – an act for which he was deified among the people of Amakusa.30

Historical scholarship, especially in English, focuses on the Christian dimension of the Shimabara Rebellion. The Christian heritage of the region is routinely credited for inspiring the rebel call to arms and sustaining them throughout the siege. More importantly, the Christian nature of the rebels and rebellion is cited as the major motivating factor in the bakufu’s response. If we look beyond the Christian elements of the rebellion, several other factors significantly influenced both the rebels and the bakufu. However, the rebellion at Shimabara was not an “unmitigated failure” as some scholars conclude despite the rebels’ defeat.31 Had rebel intention been to secure freedom of religious choice, Shimabara might be considered a wash. However, Christian influence on the rebellion was a cohesive factor, not a goal. Through Matsudaira’s edict, the bakufu simultaneously secured the social order while relieving the peasantry of the burdens instrumental to inspiring the rebellion. Despite the tragic loss of life, regional and bakufu interests were served by the outcome of the rebellion; those of Martha, Shirô, and the other rebels slaughtered were not.

The effects of Shimabara were not only felt regionally. The rebellion and siege played a large part in the Shogun Iemitsu’s sakoku, or ‘closed country’, policy. Following Shimabara, through a series edicts, Iemitsu cut off trade with the Portuguese whose missionaries he blamed for inspiring the rebels with Christianity. By 1639 the shogun banished Portuguese merchants from Japan. The Dutch were then limited to conducting trade at the man-made island Deshima, and the Chinese to another larger island in Nagasaki Bay. The conduct of both the Dutch and Chinese were carefully supervised to ensure that their foreign ideology and contact would not continue to

31Morris, The Nobility of Failure, 175.
influence domestic Japanese affairs. These two results of the rebellion and siege – the exclusion of foreigners from Japan and the suppression of a large-scale military threat – remained virtually unchanged for the next two and a half centuries. Tokugawa Japan would not face the challenges of opposing foreigners, or war, until the \textit{bakumatsu} period in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century.
CHAPTER 7

POWER PROJECTION AND LOGISTICS

In the introduction to this dissertation I proposed to examine three basic questions about the Tokugawa response to the Shimabara rebellion: 1) What happened? 2) How was it accomplished? and 3) Why did the Tokugawa respond in the way they did?

How?

When the Tokugawa destroyed the last of their Toyotomi rivals at the Summer Siege of Osaka Castle in 1615, Japan’s warrior class had been jockeying for control of the nation for more than one hundred years and were well prepared for war. However, by the time of the siege of Hara Castle, Japan had experienced more than two decades of peace.¹ How, then, were the Tokugawa able to raise a force that would rival any Western European state, almost immediately deploy them 750 miles away from the capital, and keep them in the field for more than three months?

From Roman times to the present, the necessity of logistical preparedness for larger forces has haunted Western scholars of military science. Early modern Japan was no different; logistic preparation supported military capacity that in turn allowed the Tokugawa to project authority. The Tokugawa retained significant, if largely unused,

¹ In his transcription of the Zōhyō Monogatari Higuchi Hideo puts the space between 1616 and 1638 at seventeen years. See Higuchi Hideo, ed. Zukan Zōhyō Monogatari (Tokyo: Jinbutsu Ōraisha, 1967) 169.
military potential throughout the 17th century by maintaining a potent logistical system even in peacetime. In response to the Shimabara Rebellion, this logistical potential translated directly into the ability to project physical and symbolic power through military action. Three systemic factors contributed to Tokugawa ability to maintain large-scale logistical potential during their largely peaceful reign. First, policies and rituals undertaken by the second, and especially third, shoguns mimicked the logistical rigors of war in peacetime. Second, often unintended consequences of the ever-sprawling Tokugawa and daimyô administrative bureaucracy created a physical and human infrastructure capable of supporting large scale military logistics. Finally, as with all military organizations, the Tokugawa maintained a readily accessible logistical ability by partially privatizing essential elements of the system.

*Mimicking War*

Tokugawa policies mimicked many important elements of war in peacetime; thereby maintaining the logistical experience and infrastructure eventually mobilized in 1637. In other words, the military class received continuous practice. Because of policies that recreated the experience of war, the Tokugawa logistical machine did not rust.

Exercises such as processions to Kyoto and pilgrimages to Nikkô gave the daimyô occasions to travel with their troops in military fashion. Between 1600 and 1637, the shogun, followed by as many as 300,000 daimyô troops, made fourteen processions to Kyoto as a show of force to the then powerless Emperor of Japan.

Similarly, the shoguns made pilgrimages, again with the daimyô and their troops in tow, to the gravesites of the first Tokugawa Shogun, Ieyasu. His son and grandson,
Shoguns Hidetada and Iemitsu, made a total of eleven pilgrimages to his mausoleum, first at Ise Shrine. From 1636 to 1665 another six shogunal pilgrimages were made to the grand shrine built for Ieyasu by his grandson at Nikkō.²

These occasions had a profound impact on Tokugawa military logistics. Each gave the daimyō, and the Tokugawa, practical experience with some of the logistical challenges they would face in war. Not only did the daimyō have to gather and organize their troops for each event, they needed to arrange the necessary supplies and support personnel to maintain their large forces on the march. Also, because of the constant high-volume traffic created by these Tokugawa policies, what would become Japan’s transportation infrastructure developed. Inns, post stations, porters, and packhorses all appeared on the routes the daimyō took.

Alternate attendance (sankin kōtaï) was another practice that maintained logistical readiness in peacetime Japan by imitating war. Under this practice, the Tokugawa required the 260 odd regional lords, or daimyō, to travel yearly, on an alternating schedule, to the Tokugawa capital in Edo to pay homage to the Shogun. The daimyō stayed in Edo an average of six months on each visit. As the daimyō traveled to Edo for their attendance, they did so with ever-expanding retinues of their own troops.³ The journey to Edo became a matter of pride for the daimyō who tried to out-do each other in the size and extravagance of their alternate attendance processions.⁴

We should note that each of these policies mimicking war waned as the 17th century progressed. So to did the personal authority of the Tokugawa shoguns, and to a lesser extent the bakufu. In the 1720s, the eighth shogun Yoshimune embarked on a campaign to reinvigorate shogunal kôgi authority. The main thrust of his efforts revolved around resurrecting exactly these policies – procession, pilgrimage, and attendance – to return his office as Tokugawa shogun to the pinnacle of personal and public authority in Japan.

Administrative Necessity

A series of Tokugawa policies aimed at retaining control over both the daimyô and the population in general held the, often unintended, consequence of preparing the nation for war. Whereas in early modern Europe ever-increasing logistical needs brought about by constant warfare forced the administrative expansion of European governments, in 17th-century Japan the process was reversed. The maintenance and expansion of a logistical system founded during the sengoku period was partially a byproduct of the growing Tokugawa peacetime administration aimed at maintenance of political, social, and economic control of Japan. Therefore, although during the Military Revolution in Europe logistical need contributed to the growth of ever more complex bureaucratic and administrative structures, the opposite is true of early modern Japan. Bureaucracy driven by a necessity for political control of unified Japan supported logistical ability.

The alternate attendance (sankin kôtaî) policy straddled two of the factors, mimicking war and bureaucratic necessity, that allowed the Tokugawa to maintain tremendous peacetime logistical prowess. Aside from imitating war, this largely political and
economic policy may seem, at first glance, to have little to do with military logistics. However, experience with the alternate attendance system gave the daimyô important experience as absentee rulers of their regional domains. While on attendance in the capital, each daimyô relied on their retainers to administer their domains. By 1637, leaving their domains to besiege Hara Castle did not pose a threat of disorder at home for the daimyô. Years of attendance in Edo had forced the daimyô to establish apparatus to administer the domains in their absence. So, the Tokugawa could freely call on the daimyô to leave their domains, with large contingents of troops, without fear that the political or social order would break down in those daimyô domains. Here, a policy aimed primarily at political control greatly facilitated Tokugawa logistical preparation.

The military service and rice allowance systems that provided the Tokugawa with such a large army in 1638 were able to operate because of bureaucratic policies initiated under the Toyotomi and Tokugawa regimes. The separation of classes edict (heinô bunri), first issued by Hideyoshi and later enforced by the Tokugawa, assured a standing peer group of military men ready for the call to service. Unlike earlier Japanese armies, when the call to Hara came in January 1638, no troops were pulled off the farm or forced to drop their hoes in favor of swords. Military men from the lowest foot soldier to upper ranking liege vassals were forbidden to adopt or maintain agricultural or trade occupations. Hence, they were preserved as a reserve of mobilization strength without the ties or limitations of farm life. Further, the Tokugawa policy of restricting each domain to a single castle or stronghold (ikkoku ichijô rei) concentrated this fighting

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5 Of course this very effect of the separation of classes led to difficulties later in the Tokugawa period because of the lack of employment for many military men.
population in the towns that developed around castles across the country. In 1637, not only was the Tokugawa military reserve unencumbered by ties to the land, they were clustered in groups around the nation and ready for deployment without fear of uprising at home, or difficult passage ahead.

\textit{Privatization}

The third factor systemic to Tokugawa rule that underpinned logistical ability is, and was, common to all states with large military forces. It appears that no state can maintain all the logistical support necessary for large-scale military action, ready at a moment’s notice, without some form of privatization. Whether privatization (or as Geoffrey Parker calls it: devolution) is partially sponsored by the state or completely independent and opportunistic, it is logistically necessary for speedy and sustained response to military threats. In the case of the Tokugawa siege of Hara, three forms of privatization played important roles in getting \textit{bakugun} troops to Shimabara and keeping them there: \textit{gun’yaku}, the Gôkaidô network, and corvée labor.

The Tokugawa \textit{gun’yaku} system kept a standing pool of military force ready for action at little expense to the ruling Tokugawa family. The \textit{daimyô} maintained troops the Tokugawa could call on, and even within the \textit{bakufu} structure the expense of maintaining soldiers of all descriptions devolved in a feudal fashion downward through land grant and bonds of allegiance. The \textit{gun’yaku} system also regulated the type and number of forces each \textit{daimyô} or Tokugawa liege vassal should maintain, thereby ensuring that the proper troop composition was always at hand.
As discussed in Chapter 3, between the late 1500s and 1637, a network of major “highways,” referred to in general as the Gôkaidô, crisscrossing Japan developed. By the time of the rebellion on Shimabara, the Tokugawa had over 280 post station to rely on with fresh horses, porters, inns, and supplies. The network also provided for pontoon bridges where regular bridges washed away with seasonal rains and boats for island crossing. The Tokugawa mandated and regulated both the Gôkaidô and the post stations. Tokugawa couriers, emissaries, officials, and the daimyô on alternate attendance, could use the resources of the Gôkaidô at no expense. Merchants and private individuals, however, had to pay for the privilege of using the highway network, thereby making the post stations, porters, and inns a semi-privatized, and self-supporting industry.6

However, when the Gôkaidô network was used for official travel, the post stations were instructed by the bakufu to garner the necessary porters, horses (either in kind or in payment) from a specified number of surrounding villages. This service to the post stations came in two forms: kuniyaku, or provincial corvée service, and sukegô, village assistance. When the need for military communication and troop movement became necessary in the winter of 1637, an entire infrastructure was ready and waiting for them. The “flying feet” (tsugi hikyaku) could move communiqués farther and faster than most communication systems of the time because of the Gôkaidô network. Tokugawa and daimyô troops could move swiftly to their destination at Hara because of the well-maintained roads, porters, horses, and supplies of the Gôkaidô. To maintain the Gôkaidô entirely from Tokugawa funds would have bankrupted the bakufu. It was the peacetime

6Vaporis, Breaking Barriers, 20.
paying customers of the Gôkaidô and the labor of the kuniyaku and sukegô systems that made the incredibly efficient Tokugawa response to the Shimabara rebellion possible.

The roots of provincial corvée service (kuniyaku) system can be traced to the policies of the second of Japan’s “Three Heroes”, Toyotomi Hideyoshi. Kuniyaku indicates service or labor (yaku) levied at the provincial level (kuni or koku). Whereas the sukego system levied a labor tax by village with respect to the village’s proximity to the post station and the village's kokudaka, kuniyaku was temporarily levied against the peasants or craftsmen of an entire province at a per-koku ratio, without regard to specific distances from the work site. Kuniyaku was at times levied as a tax of resources and at times one of cash. The first significant use of kuniyaku in the Edo period was by the first shogun Ieyasu to provide armorer and steel in support of his sieges of Osaka castle (1615-1616). Iemitsu used kuniyaku to supply craftsmen for the re-construction of Edo castle, in addition to support at the Hara siege. As the 17th century progressed, kuniyaku was most commonly used for one of two purposes; to provide labor and resources for construction projects undertaken by the bakufu, and later as a cash tax to defray the costs of transportation labor. The construction supported by kuniyaku labor was commonly riparian or irrigative repair, or maintenance of the shogunal hunting grounds in the Kantô.

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7 Takagi Shosaku. “Bakuhan shoki no mibun to kuniyaku”, Rekishigaku kenkyu, (Annual Special Edition, 1976): 88 - 96 passim, points out that although large scale labor taxes similar to kuniyaku were issued by Oda Nobunaga, the kuniyaku of Tokugawa Japan was based on both the mibun and kokudaka systems, initiated by Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s land surveys and sword hunts and characteristic of early modern Japan, suggesting post-Hideyoshi’s reign as a the point of origin.

8 I do not concur with Prof. Herman Ooms interpretation of kuniyaku as "national" corvée, but rather as "provincial" service based on the "kuni" as the geographic unit of against which this levy was accessed. See Herman Ooms. Tokugawa Village Practice: Class, Status, Power, Law. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996) 93, 117.

9 Takagi Shosaku. “Bakuhan shoki no mibun to kuniyaku”, 92.
The second typical form of *kuniyaku* was used to pay for the transportation of emissaries from Korea or Ryûkyû (Okinawa) travelling to Edo. Although this form of *kuniyaku* may also have started out as corvée labor, *kuniyaku* used to support the travel of foreign emissaries was generally peasants increasingly paid in cash rather than in labor as the Tokugawa period progressed.

**WHY?**

*The Sum of All Fears*

Now we come to the question of why the Tokugawa deployed such an enormous force, at great expense, and saw to the deaths of tens of thousands of peasants. The Tokugawa objective at Hara was not simply to put down a rebellion or to curtail Christianity. Although the Tokugawa did take immediate steps to restore political and economic order following the siege, the Tokugawa, and the *daimyô*, reacted to a wholesale affront to their control of Japan by powerfully, and definitively, projecting physical power against those peasants who had threatened the Tokugawa order.

Historical scholarship to date, especially in English, focuses on the Christian dimension of the Shimabara Rebellion. The Christian heritage of the region is routinely credited for inspiring the rebel call to arms and sustaining them throughout the siege. More importantly, the Christian nature of the rebels and rebellion is cited as the major motivating factor in the *bakufu*’s response. However, if we look beyond the Christian elements of the rebellion, several other factors appear to have significantly influenced both the rebels and the *bakufu*. 

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A combination of factors and opportunities, in addition to Christianity, were present in Shimabara in 1637, without any one of which the rebellion most likely would not have developed as it did. First, the immediate motivating factor to rebel was cruel and oppressive treatment at the hands of their local lords. As George Elison states, “The peasants of Shimabara and Amakusa were goaded beyond the breaking point by extortions and famines.”\(^\text{10}\) Though the peasants of the Shimabara region were influenced by Christianity for more than fifty years, it was in the face of economic deprivation and social oppression that the peasants rebelled. In addition to non-Christian motivation to rebel, several non-Christian factors allowed the peasants to militarily challenge the bakufu so successfully. The first of these was the coalition of samurai and peasant. The leadership and experience of even a few hundred former military men provided the peasant army with tactical skill it would not have possessed otherwise. Further, without the numbers of peasants involved, a handful of samurai, no matter how skilled, could not have challenged the bakufu. The peasant numbers were necessary to defend the vast walls of Hara Castle.

The next factor was the combination of firearms and a stronghold. When the bakufu dispatched Itakura Shigemasa to Shimabara at the head perhaps 40,000 to 50,000 troops, the bakufu was expecting guerilla or open field engagement from the rebels. In either case Itakura’s troops would have probably proven sufficient. However, by the time Itakura arrived the rebels were firmly in place within Hara Castle. Still, despite the advantage of being in the castle, without the rebel gunfire that helped repulse all three of

his unwise assaults on the castle, and ultimately cost his life, Itakura’s army would have stood a better chance at dislodging the rebels.

Each of the factors that contributed either to the rebellion, or to the rebels’ success represents a breach of one or more social or political controls implemented by early modern Japan’s hegemons. As numerous authors have noted, the Tokugawa recognized Christianity as a dangerous influence on the peasantry and banned it as such long before the Shimabara rebels took up arms. From 1614, the Tokugawa vigorously strove to expel Christians and Christianity from Japan. Despite Tokugawa effort, however, much of Kyushu remained Christian (mostly in secret) or at least were familiar with Christianity which eventually contributed to the cohesion of the rebels.

From the outset of their rule, the Tokugawa recognized the danger of unnecessarily burdening or persecuting the peasantry. The Tokugawa legislated against the very practices engaged in by the daimyôs Matsukura and Terazawa. Among the other regulations in the buke shohatto, daimyô were forbidden to act irresponsibly toward the peasants of their domains in order to avoid planting the seeds of peasant unrest. Emerging victoriously from Japan’s longest period of civil war, the Tokugawa were well aware of the military advantages of castles. Through the ikoku ichiyô rei, or “one castle per province” order, which limited daimyô to one fortified stronghold in each domain, they attempted to deprive daimyô, and other would-be challengers like the Shimabara rebels, of that advantage.

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Prohibition of samurai leading weapon-wielding peasants began even before Tokugawa rule. In 1588 the second of Japan’s three unifiers, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, issued what Mary Elizabeth Berry credits as the signal of early modern Japan’s political settlement: the *katana gari*, or Sword Hunt, edict.\(^{13}\) The sword hunts were designed to strip the peasantry of all weapons. This was the first in what are called the “class separation” edicts. By denying peasants weapons, Hideyoshi was at the same time limiting the resources for popular rebellion and forcing a choice between life as a farmer, and life as a soldier. Three years later Hideyoshi issued another edict stratifying and freezing Japan’s social order.\(^{14}\) This class edict not only defined the farmer and the soldier, but forbade one to become the other. A samurai could no longer give up the sword for the hoe, nor could the farmer earn a sword and a surname. The social classes were stratified and frozen. The Tokugawa *ikkoku ichijyo rei*, refined this policy by forcing the *daimyō* to centralize their administration in one castle town, thereby drawing the samurai away from the countryside. However, despite fifty years of Toyotomi and Tokugawa edicts and policies aimed at maintaining civil order, in 1637-8 oppressed, but armed, peasants and rustic samurai united in a formidable castle under the banner Christianity to defy Tokugawa authority.

To summarize, the Tokugawa had long since recognized five of the factors critical to the Shimabara rebels’ ability to challenge central and local authority as threats, and outlawed them: 1) Christianity, 2) cruelty, 3) class mixing, 4) armed peasants, and 5) a defendable castle. It was this combination of factors, the sum of Tokugawa fears, not the


\(^{14}\)Berry, *Hideyoshi*, 106.
lone specter of foreign influence embodied by Christianity alone, that the Tokugawa reacted to politically and militarily. A continuum of Tokugawa social and political controls were breached, and the bakufu reacted.

**Power Projection**

Starting in the 1620’s the third Tokugawa shogun Iemitsu embarked on an aggressive campaign to secure Tokugawa supremacy through the projection of public authority, or こうい. It was amidst all Iemitsu’s efforts to project real and symbolic Tokugawa authority at a national level that the rebels of Shimabara and Amakusa seized Hara Castle. Although the rebellion was not super-regional, the challenge to Tokugawa authority embodied by the siege at Hara Castle was a national matter.

Despite the preventative measures undertaken by the 無二 Matsudaira following the fall of Hara to restore order to the region, the Tokugawa strategy at Hara was not simply to put down the rebellion or stamp out Christianity. Rather, at Hara Castle the Tokugawa pursued a massive campaign of power projection through a carefully orchestrated strategy of annihilation.

In *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz discusses war of “annihilation” in which destruction of the enemy’s main force is the objective of military action, as opposed to the strategy of “attrition.” In a war of attrition the objective is to out-maneuver and out-fight your opponent to deprive them of enough of their human and natural resources to force negotiation on favorable terms – total destruction of the enemy forces is not the objective.

The Tokugawa did not seek to restore the pre-rebellion status quo by armed force, or merely the capitulation of the rebels. Obviously, because the Shimabara rebels
represented a large portion of the local population, if the rebel army were totally
destroyed, return to pre-rebellion conditions was impossible. In fact, that was the case –
the rebels were nearly annihilated, thus precluding us from describing the Tokugawa
objective at siege of Hara as a “war of attrition.” Although we might call the Tokugawa
tactic after Matsudaira arrived at the siege – starvation – a tactic of attrition, the massacre
of almost all the rebels indicates that the Tokugawa political and military strategy was
one of annihilation.

This distinction between attrition and annihilation is important for our understanding
of Tokugawa response to the Shimabara Rebellion because it clarifies the real Tokugawa
objective. The Tokugawa did not send a force of approaching 150,000 troops to Kyushu
simply to get rebellious peasants under control. The Tokugawa assembled that power
projecting force expressly to send a message: defiance of Tokugawa, and by extension
daimyô, authority would not be tolerated. (the post-siege fate of Matsukura and
Terazawa also extended the message to the daimyô themselves). If the Tokugawa had
simply wanted to put down the rebellion, or stamp out Christianity, a smaller force and
different strategy would have been more effective. I base these observations on the
following factors.

The generals sent by the Tokugawa to prosecute the siege (Matsudaira and Toda)
where given specific instruction to execute every man, woman, and child involved in the
rebellion. This was not a policy that developed over time, or an ad hoc escalation of
violence following the final assault on the castle. The Shogun issued those instructions
before the generals left Edo for Kyushu. Further, all of the daimyô and their troops were
reminded of this objective after the fall of the castle. By ordering their troops to wipe out
all the rebels, the Tokugawa clearly indicated their preference for annihilation over attrition. Given that the Tokugawa objective from the very start was to eradicate the rebel peasants, either they thought this was the only way to force capitulation on their terms, which I find unlikely, or, the Tokugawa wanted to use the opportunity of the peasant rebellion to send a message to the rest of Japan by forcefully, and brutally, projecting their power.

The Tokugawa repeatedly issued orders during the siege forbidding the generals to assault the castle indiscriminately (as Itakura had) in order to prevent casualties in the composite army.\(^\text{15}\) At a ratio of five to one the Tokugawa were not likely in danger of falling victim to the rebels if they suffered casualties. Although in early modern Japan a ratio of even ten-to-one was usually necessary to take a castle, this was not the usual case. Fujino Tamotsu blames Itakura’s failures to defeat the rebels on the fact that his force was nearly the same size as the rebels’\(^\text{16}\). However, more than three quarters of Hara Castle faced the sea and therefore did not need to be guarded, reducing the length of circumvallation lines, and therefore the number of troops necessary.\(^\text{17}\) There was also no relief army on its way to rescue the rebels, so no outward looking circumvallation line or force around the *bakugun* position was necessary. The Tokugawa force consisted of professional soldiers whereas the rebels were mostly peasants, including many woman.

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\(^{15}\) Koeckebacker notes that the *bakufu* was concerned about pursuing the siege without injury to their own troops; see, Nicholas Koeckebacker to A. van Diemen, Governor General at Batavia, from the Dutch Factory at Hirado, January 24, 1638, in A. J. C. Geerts, “The Arima Rebellion and the Conduct of Koekebacker,” *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, XI (1883).


and children. The Tokugawa had superior firepower, supply, and services. Had Itakura simply waited, he could have starved out the peasants.\(^{18}\) Rather than tactical insurance against succumbing to the rebel force, this order fits the power projection/annihilation paradigm. The Tokugawa clearly did not want to include with the message they sent to the nation the notion that their troops were vulnerable to mere peasants when attacking the castle.

Two independent Western accounts of the siege state that upon the arrival of Matsudaira and Toda, a representative from the rebel camp went to the siege army and offered surrender, on any terms – including rejection of Christianity and execution the rebellion leaders – if the Tokugawa would spare the other rebels’ lives.

Tavernier tells us that:

> “…before the Engagement, the youngest of the Christian Brothers advis’d his other Brother to send to the General of the Emperour’s [Shogun’s] Army … and beseech him to intercede for them to the Emperour, and to assure him, that they were ready to lay down their Arms, and throw themselves at his Feet, and to justify their Innocency. To this purpose a Letter was fram’d and sent to the General, but the Messenger that carry’d it was nail’d to a Cross in sight of the whole Army of the Christians, and at the same time the Enemy came on with great fury to assail them.”\(^{19}\)

Koeckebacker concurs:

> “I was also informed that the people in Arima and Amakusa have notified that they would be willing to submit and to suffer death as a punishment for their crime, if His Majesty [the Shogun] should send some officer to command them to do so.”\(^{20}\)

\(^{18}\) He could have – but not before the Generals from Edo arrived and stole his glory.


If the rebels were willing to surrender to an order from the Shogun, even at the price of certain death, why were the siege and massacre necessary? Not only did the Tokugawa reject the rebel offer to surrender, they crucified the messenger.

Curiously, no Japanese sources confirm these Western accounts of rebel offers to surrender. The rebel offer of surrender raises two issues: a) Why the Tokugawa rejected terms that would seem to fit the objectives of any strategy of attrition; and b) Why we do not find this offer in Japanese accounts of the siege? First, rejection of the peasant offer clearly indicates that the Tokugawa objective was not only to “restore order” or to get the rebels under control. If those were Tokugawa objectives, then just the Tokugawa show of force would have accomplished them and they could have accepted rebel surrender. Second, if Japanese sources highlighted the rebel eagerness to surrender it would portray the rebels as weak, thereby tarnishing the invulnerable image of the Tokugawa army.

Under a strategy of attrition, the slaughter of the rebel peasants would not have been necessary. By the time the Tokugawa forces overran the castle, the rebels were weakened from malnutrition and had exhausted their supplies, very few remaining rebels were even ambulatory, and all were emmatiated – in other words, they posed little tactical threat to the Tokugawa army. Why, then, was their massacre necessary? It was necessary as the essential element of Tokugawa power projection. What message would the Tokugawa have sent to the rest of the country if, after the expense and effort of besieging the rebels with a huge army, they had negotiated a surrender or simply let the peasants capitulate to Tokugawa authority? Maybe that would have shown Tokugawa
benevolence. But displaying benevolent rule was not the Shogun Iemitsu's objective, displaying power was.

Western and Japanese sources suggest that a number of peasants did escape the post-siege massacre even though most early modern accounts and conventional scholarship tell us otherwise. Why do conventional accounts and scholarship on the siege tell us that every peasant was rounded up and murdered except for one traitor when other sources suggest this was not the case? Widespread belief that some peasants did escape Tokugawa wrath would have diminished the effect of projecting power. In this regard, both early modern chroniclers and modern historians seem to have acted as unwitting conspirators to the image of Tokugawa power projection.

Post-siege policy included the execution of one daimyô whose policies caused the rebellion and the confinement and the forced suicide of the other. Following the siege, they could very well have reinstalled those daimyô but did not. The removal of the daimyô whose policies the Tokugawa partially blamed for causing the rebellion served to expand their power projection message beyond the peasant population to include the daimyô themselves – maintain order in your own domain or suffer the consequences. Installing new daimyô in Shimabara and Amakusa helped to restore order to the region for the remaining peasants and extra-regional transplants. These measures served the dual goals of projecting power and restoring order.

Taken together, the evidence described above indicates that the Tokugawa overall strategy was not only to “restore order” but to project shogunal authority through annihilation of the Shimabara rebels. Further, this was not on-the-spot policy decision or one that developed over time. The Tokugawa intended, from the very start, to annihilate
the rebels. The Tokugawa goal was not simply to “put down” the rebellion nor to “stamp out” Christianity as some accounts would have us believe. Although both ending the rebellion and discouraging Christianity were collateral, and foreseeable, consequences of Tokugawa power projection, they clearly did not supercede it as the Tokugawa main objective.

Conventional history often marvels at daimyô obedience to Tokugawa policy in the siege of Hara, some even claiming that enthusiastic participation by the daimyô as repayment for past offenses was their main motivation. However, daimyô interests coincided with the Tokugawa’s in two important ways. First, the daimyô that participated in the siege, and, for that matter, all daimyô, rode the coattails of Tokugawa power projection. There is no way to disentangle the message that opposition to Tokugawa authority would not be tolerated from the message that neither would opposition to daimyô authority. Second, many of the daimyô with troops at the siege were from Kyushu, and hence as a practical matter were helping to end civil unrest in their own backyard that could have spread to their domains as well.

To sum up, although the Tokugawa did “restore order” following the siege, quelling the rebellion and suppressing Christianity were not the main objectives of the campaign. Rather, they intentionally created the image of overwhelming physical power by annihilating the rebels and in doing so displayed Tokugawa authority to the rest of the country, top to bottom.
CHAPTER 8

THE GLOBAL CONTEXT

This dissertation has explored how after a generation of peace the Tokugawa were able to assemble, move, and supply one of the largest field armies in the early modern world. Through a feudal-style devolution of military labor commitment found in the baku-han relationship and specified by the gun’yaku requirements the Tokugawa could summon daimyo troops to supply the bulk of a military force. Further, Tokugawa political and social policies laid the groundwork for mobilizing, transporting and supplying that force. All told, under the Shogun Iemitsu’s rule, a vast military potential lay dormant under an otherwise peaceful society and with it the ability to project shogunal authority at very short notice within early 17th-century Japan. Could other major military powers of the early modern world accomplished these same tasks?

Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire also maintained a logistical infrastructure supported partially by systemically privatized businesses. The Ottoman Sultans had a highly developed and rational approach to military mobilization. The bulk of the Ottoman military was composed of quasi-feudal landholders called timariots who provided military service to
the Sultan in return for land grants. Much like the daimyō, writ small, because the timariots were responsible for their own training, equipment, and other related expenses, they were not a drain on the Sultan’s treasury.¹ In this way, the contractor of Western Europe might be compared to timar holder in a military-economic sense, even if they were radically different in political makeup. The Ottomans used treasury funds from a flexible combination of trade revenues and military surtaxes, called bedel-I nüzul, to fund both the Sultan’s standing army (the kapa kulu) and specific troop deployments.² However, forced contributions in kind from Ottoman civilians, were not a part of the Ottoman finance system, because of the Ottoman emphasis on protection of the civilian economy: “…taxpayers [civilians] in Ottoman society were excluded from, but at the same time also protected from demands for their labor in military related tasks.”³ In fact, the Ottoman method of supply was actually a boon to economies in the vicinity of combat. The Ottoman system also allowed for the possibility of price surges due to poor harvest or natural calamity in their system. Because the Ottoman forces were, during the early modern period, primarily used offensively, the Sultan could plan the deployment of troops and thus prepare logistically in advance.

The Ottoman state depended heavily on control of waterways for transportation as well as defense. Within Ottoman territory, troops used the menzil hane, an extensive network of roads, river crossings, stocked magazines, and rest stops, to maneuver. Ottoman continental transport also relied on a network of rivers, especially the Danube,

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for transport. In *Ottoman Warfare: 1500 – 1700*, Rhoads Murphey argues that the *menzil hane* network was far more advanced than Western European corridors such as the Spanish Road.⁴ The Sultans depended more on cooperation with the population for transportation (and supply) than on compulsion – akin to the Tokugawa.⁵ Ottoman Sultans also gained an efficient edge over European transportation by standardizing pack loads, distances, and measurements for use in military transportation, as did the Tokugawa.⁶

Instead of attempting to provide troops with all the supplies on the march or in the field, prior to a campaign the Sultan would issue advance pay, in addition to yearly food and clothing allowances, to all of his *Janissary* troops, then ordered craftsmen and sutlers to gather.⁷ Rather than using corvée labor, the Ottomans used tax-exempt, registered guilds of specialists for infrastructure maintenance and security patrol in the absence of regular troops.⁸ The troops could then purchase all the equipment and clothing necessary, feast before the march, and head off to the front fully supplied and fat. As noted earlier, not only did this system prevent the military from parasitically burdening society; it was actually a windfall for the local economy. Similar to the *machiya* assembled with the Tokugawa army at Hara, the gathering of suppliers, called *ordu bazar* (the ‘horde bazaar’), then traveled with the troops and continued to provide all the goods and services they needed on campaign. Although *timar* holders were responsible for their own

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⁴ Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*, 98.
⁵ Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*, 83.
⁶ Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*, 75.
⁷ Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*, Chapter 4, passim.
⁸ Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*, 79.
finances, once on the march the *ordu bazar* was there to supply them. In addition to the travelling *ordu bazar*, the Ottomans transported goods (especially grain) to the front and used magazines to supply troops. When it was necessary to derive victuals from the surrounding communities, Ottoman troops inevitable paid, or at least negotiated, for what they took. The Janissaries also formed a communal mess on campaign to save money, time, and effort through economy of scale. The sultans further hedged against shortage during campaign season by stockpiling grains, setting aside sheep, and forbidding export of grain in times of shortage.\(^9\)

**Mughal India**

The organization and behavior of Mughal military and political apparatus were designed to incorporate, and occupy, the military and fiscal resources of India and its hinterlands. These objectives were met primarily in two ways. First, an inclusive military and political hierarchy subverted allegiances based on religion, class, region, and ethnicity in favor of loyalty to the Mughal Emperor. Second, by keeping the Court almost perpetually on the move and thus engaging the military class and their resources, Mughal Emperors prevented establishment of regional powers. Both of these characteristics, an all-inclusive hierarchy and constant travel, influenced military logistics under Mughal rule.

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\(^9\) Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*, 87. It is also interesting to note that as practicing Muslims, at least in theory, the Ottoman troops should not have been drinking alcohol and thus avoided the tremendous expense of transporting wine and beer that European armies consumed in great quantities. Guilmartin makes clear in *Feeding Mars* that alcohol, despite its volume, was a staple shipboard. Likewise, the Japanese did not eat beef and therefore did not need to supply it, on the hoof or otherwise, but, as shown in Chapter 5, drank plenty of alcohol at the front.
Military organization in Mughal India hinged on *Mansabs*, an intricate and flexible system of military honors awarded by Mughal emperors to indicate the position of a warrior and his troops in the larger imperial army. Following imperial evaluation, a *mansab* could be granted to Indian gentry (*zamindar*), as well as a continuum of warrior chiefs spanning nomadic *mawas* bands to landed Rajputs. In addition to blurring the line between nomadic bands and landed gentry, the *mansab* title superceded religious and parochial affiliations. Hindus and Muslims were both ranked under the same system – further erasing distinctions other than *mansabdari* appointments – as were Afgans, Turks, Iranians, and Indians. *Mansabdars* also served dual military and administrative roles within the Imperial system. Underpinned primarily by the *mansabdari* system, Mughal rule was what Jos Gommans calls a “gravitational force” that kept a variety of conflicting elements together.

In addition to the *mansabs* and their retainers, the Mughal emperors maintained household troops numbering between 100,000 and 200,000 strong. We may compare Mughal Imperial troops to the Ottoman *kappa kulu* and Tokugawa *hatamoto* and *gokenin*. In all three cases we can draw a distinction between house troops directly under central authority and regional warlords awarded proxy authority. All told, the paper manpower available to Mughal emperors could have reached nearly 400,000 horse and over four million foot.

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Besides providing a ranking within the imperial hierarchy, a *mansab* came with funding to raise and support troops. Similar to the Japanese *kokudaka* system and the Ottoman *timar* land grants, the Emperor assigned each *mansab* an assessed land value based on the *iqta* system. *Iqta* grants were flexible and fluid, preventing *mansabs* from establishing dominance in a particular area. Here we see a similarity with Iemitsu’s rule: the attainder and redistribution of land grants as a means of exercising authority over the *daimyô*. The downside to preventing *mansab* localization was *mansab* mistreatment of peasants and a consequent increase in peasant revolts.

The Mughal Court was a mobile capital that spent much of the year on the move. Gommans estimates the Mughal “action radius” was within 1200 km of Delhi and that the Court spent as much as nine months of the year traveling within that area. As in Japan, constant travel created and maintained major roadways and passages – the difference being that in Japan the *daimyô* went to the capital, while in India the Court toured the Empire. In addition, the constant travel of the Mughal Court accomplished the same logistical preparedness as the Tokugawa practices that mimicked war.

With as many as 60,000 horse, 100,000 foot, 50,000 camels, 3,000 elephants and various support personnel, the Mughal traveling court was moving city with perhaps 500,000 people and a thirty-mile radius. Although the Court traveled at around 10 km per day, the Emperor and some contingent of his troopers could separate from the main body and move quickly to engage a revolt or simply go on a hunting expedition. Post-

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runners, of course, could travel significantly faster at 125 km per day. However, possibly more than any other factor, the power of draft animals supporting the mobile court underlay Mughal power because without it the court could not tour the realm as it did.

As with Ottoman and Japanese troop deployments, the Mughal Court while in the field was supplied through a combination of magazines (*thanas*), foraging, local merchants, and most importantly bankers and sutlers that followed the Imperial caravan. This is a common theme in the early modern world – it seems that no large military contingent could subsist for long on march or at a siege without supply from merchants and the local population.

In his study of Mughal warfare Gommans argues that the principal elements of the European Military Revolution, and by extension the logistical implications, do not apply to 16th and 17th Century India. He contends that while the gunpowder technology of Europe was available to Mughal rulers, the primarily cavalry tactics of Mughal field battle, and limited use during sieges, made it irrelevant (except when used defensively).\(^\text{16}\) Especially in south India the Mughal viewed gunpowder weapons as a double-edged sword that could both promote Mughal interests and facilitate regional authority.\(^\text{17}\) Likewise, the Mughal emperors did not encourage the widespread use of forts, nor did they adopt *trace italienne*-style fortifications despite seeing European examples along India’s coastline. In fact, the Mughal rulers discouraged regional authorities from building fortifications in an attempt to limit their ability to create regional power bases.

\(^{\text{16}}\) Gommans, *Mughal Warfare*, 152.

\(^{\text{17}}\) Gommans, *Mughal Warfare*, 134.
Here we see a parallel with Tokugawa Japan and the *ikkoku ichijyô rei* under which *daimyô* were permitted only one castle in their domain for the very same reason: so that regional power would not outgrow the ability of central authority to overtake it. Finally, Gommans asserts that heavier European ship-of-the-line, armed broadside, that developed during the European military revolution were not necessary for the land-based Mughal who could manage India’s deltas and inland waterways with smaller and lighter junk-style galleys.

By incorporating a broad spectrum of regional and nomadic leaders, despite religion, ethnicity, or area of origin, in the larger *mansabdari* system, Mughal rulers prevented the building of regional power bases that could threaten the Empire. The roots of provincial authority were also undercut by Mughal policies such as discouraging the building of fortifications and hesitance to adopt large-scale gunpowder weaponry. Finally, the almost continuous travel of the Mughal Court occupied the military resources of the *mansabs* while imitating the logistical needs of war, thereby keeping the Mughal military in good practice – especially at keeping the army supplied and on the move.

*European Powers*

We find similar examples of privatized, and commandeered logistical infrastructure in early modern Europe. The first European method of mobilization was volunteers. Those either escaping poverty or the law, or searching for financial gain would volunteer to serve in the forces of early modern Europe’s monarchs.\(^\text{18}\) There was also a variety of

non-volunteer methods for obtaining men of arms. Troops could be raised by hiring entire units of foreign armies, impressing the troops of enemies taken in combat, or through forced conscription of foreign and domestic civilians. Each of these schemes was used by early modern states and the contractors upon whom they imposed mobilization. The ‘captain system’ involved an individual contractor with a patent from the crown to raise and arm a prescribed number of troops. Though they often received payment for this responsibility, sometimes their reward was noble rank; leaving the payment of troops to them and thus offsetting the cost of war for the state as in the Japanese case of gun’yaku. Foreign troops played and important role in European armies. As much as 50% of the troops in the Spanish ‘Army of Flanders’ were foreign-born recruits from no less than six different countries.

In The Army of Flanders Geoffrey Parker points out that although early modern Europe had post-stations, couriers, and healthy land and sea based trade, that infrastructure was inadequate to support the movement of troops, goods, and communications on the scale of early modern armies. Parker argues that the magnitude of military transport and communication necessitated the development of dedicated land and sea ‘corridors’ such as the 650 mile Spanish Road (the route of the Spanish army to the Netherlands). The Spanish Road suggests another problem facing European armies composed of troops from a variety of foreign states: how to bring together and deploy to

22 Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 42.
23 Parker, The Military Revolution, 76.
the theatre of combat troops from all over Western Europe.\textsuperscript{24} Parker points out that military corridors not only allowed for the movement of great numbers of people and goods, they allowed early modern logisticians and commanders to plan ahead, store supplies in magazines, negotiate with surrounding villages and towns, and draw maps of the route – all advantages to the transportation of troops.\textsuperscript{25} However, pre-determined corridors also limited route choices while affording enemies the opportunity to forecast troop movements. Corridors were further vulnerable to the whim of polities – many of which were, at times, outside of Spanish control – through which they passed.\textsuperscript{26}

Early modern European troops, as was the case across the early modern world, arrived at their destination in one or more of three ways: by foot, horse, or by sea (or all three). Supplies, on the other hand, were pulled and carried by porters, horses, and carts, or floated to the front. The \textit{étapes} system was the most organized European system for delivery of supplies to troops. The \textit{étapes} system allowed the pace of troops to be increased by controlling the distance between rest and resupply points: the more spread out they were, the faster the troops moved to get there. However, transport of either troops or supplies by sea was particularly difficult for the Spanish because of England’s Mahanian command of the Atlantic and the Channel and Ottoman intervention in the Mediterranean. The Dutch Sea Beggars made matters even worse for the Spanish by controlling the majority of Dutch seaports. In fact, seaports were the Dutch lifelines for access to trade, foreign aid, and troops. The Italians and French too could rely on the sea

\textsuperscript{24} Parker, \textit{The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road}, 41.
\textsuperscript{25} Parker, \textit{The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road}, 42-43.
\textsuperscript{26} Parker, \textit{The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road}, 49.
for transportation of troops and supplies. A final hindrance to western European, specifically Spanish, transportation was the reliance on sending payments in credit slips rather than specie to pay troops and buy supplies. Although credit slips were less expensive and safer to transport than specie, Philip II’s repeated bankruptcies made his use of credit increasingly difficult.27

European states fed their armies in one of three ways, whether on the march, in garrison, or at the front. Magazines for supply stationed along military corridors were an effective way to supply troops on the march, but as with the Ottoman menzil hane system, it was not long before battle or destination led troops away from predetermined routes and their magazines. Parker terms another method of supplying troops, the contractor system, one of ‘military devolution.’28 The use of contractors at fixed prices was cheap, and relatively easy for the state, but contractors could not afford to maintain the reserves of weapons, artillery, or food that large number of troops would need immediately in the case of unexpected hostilities.29 Parker also demonstrates that supply through plunder was terribly inefficient.30 However, brandschatzung (fire money), or threatening to burn down a village to coerce provisions and monies from the inhabitants was a more organized and productive form of forced contribution.31 In his critique of van Creveld’s thesis on logistics, John Lynn casts doubt on whether early modern armies

27 Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road*, 49.
28 Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road*, 84.
29 Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road*, 84; Parker, *The Military Revolution*, 67..
really abandoned ‘organic’ supply from the rear and lived entirely off the land through foraging, raids, and coercion, as van Creveld asserts.32

The most organized European method for supply was the étapes system. Army representatives would inform villages ahead of the army’s route, or near the front, of how many troops they would need to supply with specific amounts of food, clothing, quarter, and aid. If the army did not pay cash for the goods and services (on the spot payment was probably rare) the villagers were issued receipts which they could then apply to back or future taxes.33 Because villagers were reimbursed and it took advantage of advanced planning, étapes bore a strong resemblance to the Ottoman ordu bazaar and Japanese machiya.

Early Modern Logistics in Perspective

The Japanese, Ottoman, and Mughal methods of troop mobilization differed significantly from those of Western Europe. By creating a class of well organized landowning warriors responsible for furnishing troops, the Japanese, Ottomans, and Mughals formed a pool of human military might that could be drawn upon with consistency. They did not have to go to extraordinary lengths to provide troops for specific deployments as did the Europeans, because their troops were already in escrow. Further, while European nations were having difficulty maintaining forces due to attrition from mutiny, desertion, casualty, and mobility within the ranks, the Ottoman and

33 Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road*, 81.
Japanese could rely on a their standing groups of warriors.\(^{34}\) Just as important, and unlike the largely untrained European recruit, Japanese and Ottoman troops were trained warriors, either born into warrior families and cultures (in the case of timar holders, daimyô troops, and gokenin) or specially selected and trained (the Janissaries).\(^{35}\) For the Japanese, this also meant an army nearing total literacy. For example, the Tokugawa were able to dispatch troops immediately to Hara in December of 1637, without delays caused by the volunteer, conscription, or contractor methods of Europe. Further, most of the Japanese troops could read their orders and regulations. On site, members of different daimyô contingents were able to work together because they all spoke the same language, looked ‘racially’ similar, and shared a common culture - unlike the composite European forces. Each daimyô’s force also arrived as an independent corps, containing of all the elements of Japanese armies including military specialties, support staff, and equipment. This meant that each ‘daimyô corps’ was pre-organized and that relationships and hierarchy between troops and with commanders was well established and based on bonds of loyalty and service. The Japanese troop mobilization and composition likely translates into significant military advantages when compared with the Europe system of mobilization.

Maintaining a working transportation system in peacetime has also challenged large military states over time. The Tokugawa and Mughals held the advantage of a transportation infrastructure that was entirely within their domestic domain. Unless civil war broke out, the Tokugawa had little to fear from sabotage, ambush, or interdiction of

\(^{34}\)Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*, 56 – 60.

\(^{35}\)Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*, 43-44.
supplies. Further, it was maintained financially by increasing private traffic that subsidized the Gôkaidô and kept it ready for military use. The Ottoman state too had the luxury of the *menzil hane* that was primarily used for offensive campaigns and therefore could be maintained and prepared with supply in advance. Because they were fragmented, early modern European states like Spain, however, did not always have the luxury of either a transportation infrastructure entirely within their control, or pre-planned offensive maneuvers. Instead, western European states depended more on the military corridors, which were susceptible to intelligence ambush, denial of access, poor maintenance, and interdiction. European states also relied more on sea transport than the Tokugawa who purposefully sought to guard their boarders and closely regulate sea travel.

*Kuniyaku* labor and the *machiya* that supported the Tokugawa siege of Hara bear a strong resemblance to the guilds of craftsmen and *ordu bazaar* of the Ottoman Sultans. Although *kuniyaku* was often paid labor and sometimes semi-corvée, the Turkish guilds were a regulated and paid professionals that supported the military. The European *étapes* system was also semi-privatized, by default: sometime credit slips were paid, sometimes not. *Brandschätzung*, however, was entirely forced contribution – different than the Japanese or Ottoman systems of supply, by necessity. Again, the European armies did not always have the luxury of forward preparation or control of the surrounding territory.

The Modern United States

The U.S. logistical reserve clearly indicates that the hurdles states face in maintaining a large-scale logistical system permanently ready for war but fiscally manageable in
peacetime have not changed in more than two millennia: from Darius in the 5th century BC, to the 17th century, through September 11, 2001. Even the United States, possibly the last world “superpower” with an enormous military and defense budget cannot maintain the logistical infrastructure to meet any and all possible threats without the use of devolution and privatization. Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing U.S. response to invade first Afghanistan and then Iraq, the U.S. military logistical system was suddenly taxed at home and abroad. In addition to the movement of supplies, troops, and humanitarian goods to Afghanistan, planes, helicopters, ships, and personnel were busy State-side aiding in the recovery from 9/11 and prevention of another attack. As the U.S. sent more troops to Afghanistan for what has become a protracted ground war, logistics was key, and efficiency a premium.

A little over a month after the 9/11 attack, the Marine Corps began preparations to send 2,400 Marines to Afghanistan. In order to get them there, Marine Corps Brig. Gen. Douglas O'Dell Jr. was considering “…a contract with Federal Express.” rather than “…slow-moving ships…” to move heavy equipment, because the military cargo planes were reaching their limits.36 Akin to the contractor system of early modern Europe and the kuniyaku system of Tokugawa Japan, this example is only semi-privatized. The Marine Corps was considering a contract with FedEx as opposed to simply commandeering their planes. We should keep in mind, however, that the U.S. government already has the agreements to use civilian aircraft – including FedEx planes.37

36 Tony Perry, “Marines To Add 2,400 For War On Terrorism,” Los Angeles Times (October 18, 2001).
37 A point of interest: the founder of Federal Express is a former Marine.
The U.S. Department of Defense maintains relationships with civilian airlines and pilots, and merchant marine vessels and their crews. As part of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) the D.O.D. has at its disposal over 650 specific civilian aircraft maintained by thirty-five private carriers. The D.O.D. compensates these carriers, and ensures their cooperation, by guaranteeing them business (flying troops to new locations or on leave, moving cargo, etc.) that in 1999 amounted to $345 million. The D.O.D. also maintains the Merchant Marine Reserve (MMR), which gives the military immediate access to almost 80 ships of six types, and crews of Merchant Marines on each ship. The modern U.S., therefore, in addition to having one of the largest standing armies in the world, maintains a reserve of skilled pilots and marines – apart from the National Guards of the individual states.

Like the Ottoman and Japanese standardization of their reserves (guilds, porters, horses), the D.O.D. also standardizes and regulates its logistical reserve. The CRAF program standardizes carrier contracts in several ways. First, carriers must maintain long range or short range, or both, aircraft in their “fleets.” Each carrier is assigned to cover one or more spheres of operation such as the international, domestic, or Alaskan. Carriers also maintain specific aircraft for specific purposes including aero-medical evacuation, troop transport, and cargo carriers – and modify the aircraft accordingly. The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations goes into detail about the content of CRAF.

38 “USAF Civil Reserve Air Fleet Fact Sheet” (available on line at: www.af.mil.news.facsheets/Civil_Reserve_Air_Fleet.html.)

39 Department of the Navy, “MMIRRG Information Brief: Strategic Sealift.”

40 “USAF Civil Reserve Air Fleet Fact Sheet.”
contracts,\textsuperscript{41} and about the modification, maintainance, and inspection of CRAF aircraft.\textsuperscript{42} Not only does the U.S. Code standardize air and sea transport; it also ensures the availability of satellite intelligence and communications functions. The development and use of global positioning satellites and their ground stations are maintained during peacetime so they are available during war.\textsuperscript{43}

MMR ships are designated and maintained as vehicle transports, container ships, tankers, crane ships, heavy lifters, or troop carriers. MMR ships must also meet certain capability and safety criteria like range, sustained speed, offload capability, and damage control systems.\textsuperscript{44} The Merchant Marines are strictly regulated and must periodically pass examinations and maintain criteria spelled out by the U.S. Navy.\textsuperscript{45} In total, beyond strictly government property, the United States has at its disposal aircraft, ships, personnel, and satellites that are affordable in peacetime but ready for war. It appears that almost four centuries since the events at Shimabara have not changed the need for privatization of some military assets in order to maintain the ability of a large state to project authority.

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Returning to the scenario described in the prologue, the image of the United States government exercising central authority through mass violence on American citizens gives better a perspective of the Tokugawa ability to project power. If over a half a

\textsuperscript{41} U.S. Code of Federal Regulations: Title 10; Subtitle D; Part IV; Chapter 931; Sections 9511-9514.
\textsuperscript{42} U.S. Code of Federal Regulations: Title 32; Chapter VII; Part 831; Sections 831.1-831.4.
\textsuperscript{43} U.S. Code of Federal Regulations: Title 10; Subtitle A; Part IV; Chapter 136; Section 2881.
\textsuperscript{44} Department of the Navy, \textit{“MMIRRG Information Brief: Strategic Sealift.”}
\textsuperscript{45} Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, \textit{“Merchant Marine Reserve, U.S. Naval Reserve Program,”} (Department of the Navy, OPNAV 1534.1B, June 1992).
million Americans lost their lives to their own military forces, it would send a powerful message to the rest of the nation that rebellion would not be tolerated. It is difficult to image that such a massive use of domestic violence could be possible. However, the Tokugawa response to rebellion on Shimabara Peninsula in 1637-8 displayed just that level of severity to the entire nation. From the lowliest peasant to the largest daimyô, the siege of Hara Castle and its aftermath made clear the resolve of the Tokugawa bakufu, and especially Shogun Iemitsu, to maintain authority in mid-17th century Japan.
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