THE STAGES OF GENTRIFICATION AND NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION:
A CASE STUDY OF THE DENNISON PLACE AND VICTORIAN VILLAGE
NEIGHBORHOODS, THE NEAR NORTH SIDE COMMUNITY, COLUMBUS, OHIO

A Thesis
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree Master of City and Regional Planning

by

Wanda Brendette Coston, B.A.

The Ohio State University
1984

Approved by

Laurence J. Gerckens
Department of City and Regional Planning

Copyright © 1984
by Wanda Brendette Coston
All rights reserved.
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my late great-aunt Rosa Shipman. Aunt Rosa was a guiding force in my life. She instilled in me many of the morals and values that I live by, as well as the importance of "making something out of my life."

This thesis is also dedicated to my father, Bernard Coston, my mother, Margaret Coston, and my step-mother, Annie Coston, who together provided me with much needed love and support throughout my educational endeavor.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my advisors, Professor Laurence Gerckens, Dr. Milton Rosner and Dr. Henry Taylor, for their constructive criticism, editorial comments, and intellectual stimulation throughout the formulation and completion of this study. I am eternally grateful for their positive advice, guidance, patience, and understanding.

Special appreciation is extended to Dr. Gwendolyn Gilbert, who introduced me to the "gentrification" and "neighborhood revitalization" phenomena, and thus, motivated me to undertake this study; and to Dr. Raymond Mills for giving me confidence to pursue scientific inquiry into the phenomena.

During the execution of this study, several people assisted me in countless ways. I would especially like to thank Richard Archer, Donzella Edgerton, Thomas Fowlkes, James Hudson, James McGriff, Elvin Moore, Robert Moore, Valorie Perry, Martha Smith, and Hugo Valencia.

Special thanks is extended to all of my former colleagues at the City of Columbus Department of Development, and all the respondents of my surveys. Without their cooperation, this study would have been virtually impossible.

I am especially appreciative of financial support from The College of Social Work through the Merris Cornell Research Scholarship and the Edwin Sharpe Burdell Award.

iii
Finally, I thank God for giving me faith in myself to undertake such a challenge and strength to endure until the end.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Renewal</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentrification and Neighborhood Revitalization</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theories of Gentrification and Neighborhood Revitalization</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displacement</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE NEAR NORTH SIDE COMMUNITY</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Background of Study Area: Dennison Place</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Background of Study Area: Victorial Village</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. METHODS</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analytical Framework</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Study Areas</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Collection</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Limitations</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Analysis</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. START-UP PHASE THEORY</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dennison Place</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMC: Phase One</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victorian Village</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. BUY-IN PHASE THEORY</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dennison Place</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovative Grant Program</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displacement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMC's Displaced Tenants: Perceptions of Displacement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victorial Village</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VI. TAKE-OFF PHASE THEORY ........................................ 160

    Dennison Place .............................................. 160
    OMC: Phase Two
    Victorian Village .......................................... 172

VII. FILL-IN PHASE THEORY ........................................ 186

    Dennison Place .............................................. 186
    Innovative Grant Tenant Assistance Program
    Tenant Purchase Program
    Relocation Assistance Program
    Victorian Village .......................................... 201

VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS .............................. 211

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................... 226

APPENDICES ........................................................ 236

   A. Selected Demographic and Housing Characteristics
      Columbus, Ohio, Dennison Place and Victorian
      Village Neighborhoods ...................................... 237

   B. Survey Questionnaire – Dennison Place and
      Victorian Village Residents .............................. 255

   C. Open-Ended Questionnaire OMC Tenant Displacees .... 260

   D. OMC Real Estate Purchase Agreement and Bidding
      Rules ................................................................... 262

   E. Report on 1978 Development Activities: Olentangy
      Management Company ....................................... 266

   F. Godwin-Bohm-NBBJ, Columbus, Ohio, Progress Report-
      OMC Planning Activities .................................... 280

   G. Confidential Report on Strategy for Phase Two
      Development ...................................................... 283

   H. Comparison of Responses of Dennison Place and
      Victorian Village Residents Relative to the
      Gentrification and Neighborhood Revitalization
      Stage Model ...................................................... 292
# LIST OF FIGURES

Figure  
1. Near North Side Historic District ........................................... 41  
2. Goodale Slum Clearance Area Project ........................................... 45  
3. Adjusted Value of Sales in the Dennison Place Neighborhood – Deed Transfer Activity, 1956 to 1980 ........................................... 54  
4. Adjusted Value of Sales in the Renaissance Project Area – Deed Transfer Activity, 1956 to 1980 ........................................... 55  
5. Adjusted Value of Sales in the Victorian Village Neighborhood – Deed Transfer Activity, 1956 to 1980 ........................................... 61  
6. Analytical Framework of the Stages of Gentrification and Neighborhood Revitalization Model ........................................... 67  
7. Study Area in Detail ..................................................................... 69  
8. Phase One of Olentangy Management Company's Proposal for Restoration ........................................... 89  
9. Typical Advertisement of the Olentangy Management Company ........................................... 97  
10. Dennison Avenue Conservation Project Area .................................. 101  
11. Advertisement of the Victorian Village Society Fall Festival and Tour of Homes ........................................... 174  
12. Advertisement of Luxury Townhouses - "Charleston Place" ........................................... 177  
13. Typical Advertisement of Victorian Village .................................... 178  
14. Typical Advertisement of the Olentangy Management Company ........................................... 194  
15. Advertisement of Single Family Rental Homes - "Renaissance Village" ........................................... 198  
17. Mean Residential Property Tax in the Dennison Place Neighborhood, 1974 and 1983 ........................................... 202

19. Mean Residential Property Tax in the Victorian Village Neighborhood, 1974 and 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
LIST OF TABLES

Table
1. Innovative Grant Tenant Assistance Program: Renaissance Project Areas ........................................... 189
2. Innovative Grant Tenant Assistance Program by Family (Household) Size: Renaissance Project Areas ............. 190
3. Summary Comparison of Similarities and Differences Between Study Neighborhoods (Dennison Place and Victorian Village) and The National Urban Coalition Model of Gentrification and Neighborhood Revitalization ......................................................... 217
INTRODUCTION

The revival of the central city may yield healthy, socioeconomically diverse communities... help disperse low-income and minority households to suburban areas, where housing and employment opportunities exist... shoot up central city tax bases. Alternatively, the revival of the central city could merely shift to other parts of the city the intractable problems of poverty, unemployment, and inadequate housing through the wholesale dialocation of the old, the poor, and minority residents from one neighborhood to another.¹

Gentrification and neighborhood revitalization appear on the surface to be great American success stories. Successes, however, are not attained without conflict or victims. The dwellings that gentries and neighborhood revitalizers covet are often the homes of the urban poor and these neighborhoods are their lifelong communities. Gentrification and neighborhood revitalization are growing phenomena in many of America's central cities with populations of 50,000 or more, although they are more predominant in the large (over 100,000 population) central cities.² These two forms of land use conversion change the "rent topography" of an area because the same mechanisms used to alter the once stately and large single-family dwellings abandoned by the middle- and upper-classes as they fled the city for the suburbs, are again at work in reverse as property values rise, rents accelerate rapidly, and demand for single-family dwellings also rise.
The term "gentrification" is derived from a British term used to describe simultaneously a physical, social, and cultural process. What it describes is the physical renovation of dwellings which were previously in the privately rented sector in such a manner as to raise them up to the standards required by the new professional and upper middle-class owner occupying residents who bring with them a distinctive lifestyle and set of tastes. There does not appear to be a universally accepted definition of gentrification. Most authorities tend to agree that gentrification occurs when better-off citizens move into a neighborhood and displace the existing lower income residents. It is also commonly accepted that gentrification is a private phenomenon. Many authorities, however, believe that governmental actions can affect the gentrification process to a great degree.

Neighborhood revitalization, on the other hand, is a somewhat different phenomenon. The most salient feature of this process is that physical reinvestment is primarily accomplished by the long-term residents of the district who are of moderate income. Neighborhood revitalization by incumbent residents is commonly characterized by a strong neighborhood organization and a great proportion of home owners. The physical reinvestment that takes place reflects greater confidence in the future of the neighborhood on the part of current homeowners.

"Rent topography" describes the location and geographic space of different types of housing by income and price of housing. "Rent" also describes the value of land and how much the unit of land can generate. "Income differentials" in housing suggest that the urban environment is
stratified by class as it relates to housing by virtue of location and amenities that generate greater values.

Gentrification and neighborhood revitalization suggest a trust in the viability of American central cities as homes for Americans affluent enough to choose their place of residence and to build the environment to suit their needs. But these positive aspects have not occurred without the accompanying negative effects of displacement of the low-income inhabitants of the gentrification and revitalization zones and its corollary increase of rent for such housing in the urban area as a whole as a result of diminished supply.

One of the major attractions of central city housing has been economic. In the last several years, inflation of both housing values and money markets have been among the strongest elements in the processes of gentrification and neighborhood revitalization. (Central city housing is particularly susceptible to reuse by upper- and middle-income households because in the current market it is relatively inexpensive to purchase. Such housing is considered not only as a good purchase by affluent individuals who regard the acquisition as a money making investment, but also as "affordable housing" by those who might not otherwise have the opportunity to purchase a home.

In recent years, tastes in housing have changed substantially. Long viewed as worn out stock, central city housing has come to be favored by many prospective buyers for the quality and durability of its construction and for it's architectural value. With the skyrocketing
cost of new construction, older housing often offers more land, style, interior space, and individuality than is affordable in new housing. This is the type of housing that predominates in many of America's urban neighborhoods.

Inflation in costs, commonly associated with gentrification and neighborhood revitalization, is the primary mechanism which appears to stimulate displacement of low-income inhabitants. Inflation ensures that such areas will be affordable to only a narrowly defined income group, specifically affluent whites. The more affluent homebuyers instantly produce acceleration in house prices and rents that eventually prohibit market participation by the poor.

When gentrification and neighborhood revitalization activity begins, the renovators usually purchase housing at below market prices. However, as interest in the neighborhood heightens, reinvestment begins to force the price of housing higher. This is most pronounced in neighborhoods where physical improvement has caught the attention of local residents, speculators, and others who are determined to make windfall profits. The driving force behind most private market displacement is speculation. Speculation accelerates inflation, distorts housing investment priorities, diverts capital from needed construction, and displaces people who cannot afford to pay the skyrocketing rents and prices that give speculators their profits. Displacement of renters of low- or fixed-income is unavoidable under such circumstances since they will not be able to afford the increases in rent. In neighborhoods where the majority of residents are homeowners, speculation helps raise
prices out of the reach of moderate-income homeowners and often inflates property tax levels to the point where low- and fixed-income owners are forced to sell and get out.

The poorest groups in large central cities generally live in locations subject to the greatest speculative pressures for land use conversion. High-cost housing rehabilitation has taken place on land presently inhabited by low- and moderate-income households. The processes of land use change are structured through a market system that permits only individuals, groups, and organizations with access to financial and political resources to participate in the gentrification and neighborhood revitalization process. Unfortunately, for low-income inhabitants of central city neighborhoods, gentrification and neighborhood revitalization as a form of land use conversion have had a negative impact on the availability of decent low-cost housing throughout the city. This is the nature of the problem to be studied.
ENDNOTES


2Ibid., p. 148.

CHAPTER I

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

For the past several decades, urban centers throughout America have been in various stages of decline. This decline has been attributed to the widespread and continuous loss of upper- and middle-class households, the exodus of business and industry and the consequent loss of jobs, the decline of public institutions, and the growing loss of confidence in city neighborhoods as desirable places to live. As elements of the city moved out, sources of jobs disappeared and the tax base of the city was greatly reduced. For many better-off households, the suburban dream became a reality because of favorable mortgage terms offered by the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans Administration programs, quickening the exodus for the more affluent.

The upper- and middle-class, moving to the suburbs, left inner-city neighborhoods as ghettos for immigrants, minorities, lower-income whites, and the often poor elderly. City governments were reluctant to improve utilities, roads, schools, and other public services in declining neighborhoods. As neighborhoods continued to decline, vandalism, street crime, drug use, litter, and deteriorated buildings increased. Absentee landlords were also reluctant to renovate their properties and the maintenance of many properties was reduced to the bare minimum. In such neighborhoods, lending institutions were unwilling to make loans due
to the uncertain economic future of these areas, thereby discouraging those property owners who might otherwise have upgraded their property.6 The consequence of these actions was a large number of abandoned and deteriorated properties.

Urban Renewal

The revival of the central city became a national concern in American when the first federal program explicitly directed at urban redevelopment was passed by Congress--Title 1 of the Housing Act of 1949.7 As a result of this act, many federal programs advocated central city demolition as the best way to "save" the cities from urban blight.8

At the same time, through a variety of exclusionary techniques, suburban communities restricted entry to a relatively homogeneous class of acceptable neighbors. These practices included restrictive zoning or building codes . . . to discourage, and in some cases to prohibit, the construction of subsidized housing. . . . Augmented by outright racial discrimination . . . restrictions helped to open a broad rift between the central cities and its suburbs. The city . . . at the same time moved toward a predominantly low-income population.9

Most of urban renewal efforts failed socially and aesthetically.10 Once operational, local urban renewal authorities were frequently manipulated by powerful vested interests in the community, resulting in use of the program as a source of windfall profits for private developers and landowners.11 Urban renewal programs often demolished the housing of the poor and built new housing for the not so poor.12 Urban renewal often forced the relocation of the poor, disrupted families and neighborhoods, and increased the cost of relocation housing.13 At the same
time, the vast nationwide Interstate Highway program caused more disruption and displacement.\textsuperscript{14} Urban renewal and highway construction displaced millions of individuals.\textsuperscript{15} It has been stated that,

If we look at most of the eastern cities from the air, we would view a sight similar to the after effects of enemy bombing. During the 1950s and 1960s urban renewal solved the problem of blighted neighborhoods and deteriorated buildings by leveling them with bulldozers. Also ... along came the highway men cutting great swaths of goods and people. Finally, we have the absentee "slum landlord" who picked up the remaining cheap, deteriorating houses, asking and receiving exorbitant rents. ... It would be virtually impossible to erase many of the physical and emotional scars of the structural and social programs and other politically motivated developments that disrupted the lives of millions. Urban renewal, downtown freeways, and similar projects ... changed the character and face of thousands of neighborhoods. ...\textsuperscript{16}

**Gentrification and Neighborhood Revitalization**

In 1966, one year after its formation, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was authorized under the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act to assist cities in undertaking historic and architectural surveys.\textsuperscript{17} Beginning in the early 1970s, after years of suburban flight, many cities—particularly with historically architecturally significant neighborhoods—were beginning to experience "a renaissance."\textsuperscript{18} The designation of these neighborhoods as historic districts became an important preservation tool.\textsuperscript{19} A 1973 special report of the President's Council on Environmental Quality advocated a new focus on the role of the older, urban neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{20} In 1974 HUD developed a comprehensive block grant program to develop viable urban communities. The program included both conservation and preservation of the nation's housing stock. The Community Development Act required furthering the revitalization of the community, including "the
restoration and rehabilitation of stable neighborhoods to the maximum extent."21

"Deterioration gave way to restoration and preservation, and poverty gave way to affluence."22 Many people looked to historic preservation and the type of renewal it implied as a force in which the "salvation" of central cities rested.23 Attracting the affluent to these neighborhoods as permanent residents, it was believed, would not only arrest decay but, over time, would restore vitality and a dwindling tax base.24 Individuals and families already displaced by urban renewal, highways, or other projects now faced yet another disruption. Rather than producing a heterogeneous, multifaceted community, historic preservation seemed to be resulting in the displacement of one group of urban residents by another, and the replacement of one form of segregation by another.25 According to an article in the first issue of American Preservation,

The revival of urban neighborhoods in the U.S. is becoming a reality, yet some of the solutions are becoming part of the problem because the displacement of low-income groups continues as more affluent whites return to the inner-city to live. Although the dislocations of the 70s are not on the wholesale scale of the 50s and 60s, the problem is still one of the most vexing in the resurgence of the neighborhood preservation movement in this country. . . . The neighborhood renaissance is being pressed . . . by some very strange bedfellows. . . . In areas that become newly attractive, well to do purchasers will bid up purchase prices to levels where neither working class whites nor blacks can compete.26

It has been noted that social displacement is the insidious by-product of success in neighborhood preservation. Physical restoration drives out the original population. . . . There is little evidence of any lasting solution to the dilemma. . . .27
With the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, significant tax incentives were made available to owners of historic structures who wished to rehabilitate them. In the belief that rehabilitation and preservation of historic structures and neighborhoods was an important national goal, and that the achievement of this goal was largely dependent upon private funds, Congress decided that the then-existing tax advantages of demolishing historic structures and building replacement structures should be reduced and that incentives should be granted to those rehabilitating older buildings.

According to one observer,

The past decades have been the dark ages of American cities and during this time blacks were the keepers of many of our urban landmarks. Now that the renaissance has come (the sudden interest of the affluent and the government promoting neighborhood preservation), it is not the time for blacks to turn over the keys to the cities to those who ran off and left their heritage. . . . Many poor people now have what the affluent want, something old that can be something new and fine. . . .

There is increasing evidence across the country that a transformation of neighborhoods from lower to higher socioeconomic status characterizes gentrification. The term "gentrification" is derived from a British term which describes simultaneously a physical, social, and cultural process. It commonly involves the physical renovation of houses, many of which were previously in the privately rented sector, up to the standards required by new owner-occupying middle class residents who bring with them a distinctive lifestyle and set of tastes. Ruth Glass, commenting on London in 1963, noted:
One by one, many of the working class quarters of London have been invaded by the middle classes—upper and lower—shabby modest mews and cottages . . . have been taken over when their leases expired, and have become elegant, expensive residences. Larger Victorian houses, downgraded in an earlier or recent period—which are used as lodging houses or were otherwise in multiple occupation—have been upgraded once again. . . . Once this process of "gentrification" starts in a district it goes on rapidly until all or most of the original working class occupiers are displaced and the whole social character of the districts is changed.33

Ten years later Glass went even further, suggesting that London was being renewed at a rapid pace:

Inner London is not being "Americanized": it is not on the way to becoming a working class city, a "polarized" city, or a vast ghetto for a black proletariat. The real risk for inner London is that it may well be gentrified with a vengeance and be almost exclusively reserved for selected higher class strata.34

All authorities on the gentrification phenomenon appear to agree that gentrification occurs when better off citizens move into a neighborhood and that they often displace the original lower-income residents.35 There is no apparent disagreement about its central meaning, which is the replacement of a substantial number of a neighborhood's residents by newcomers who enjoy a higher income which they use to buy and renovate houses that were once attractive but have been neglected.36 Because of this private and municipal neglect, such houses are often available at bargain prices. Renovated, the houses thus acquired may give new owners more for their money than they could obtain in a suburb or outer-city neighborhood.37

It is also generally agreed that gentrification is a private phenomenon. Many authorities believe, however, that governmental actions can
influence the process to a great degree.\textsuperscript{38} Federal actions have provided the gentry's pioneering efforts with both symbolic and monetary rewards.\textsuperscript{39} President Carter's 1978 National Urban Policy declared that federal urban strategies "will be focused on supporting the back-to-the-city movement now beginning to appear in many cities."\textsuperscript{40} Expansion of Urban Homesteading and Section 312 loan programs were proposed toward this end.\textsuperscript{41} HUD Assistant Secretary Embry stated that "the Administration has been developing a package of programs designed to help middle-income people find housing in cities."\textsuperscript{42}

Expectations of great payoffs beneficial to government have tended to induce neighborhood gentrification. Local governments have viewed middle-class rehabilitation dollars as the means both to restore the city's deteriorated housing stock and to bolster its declining tax base. National officials have viewed with favor the confluence of gentrification patterns with the nation's broader policy objectives, such as reduction of the nation's energy consumption, urban conservation, more efficient use of existing capital infrastructure, and diminished urban dependence on federal aid.\textsuperscript{43}

A 1975 Urban Land Institute (ULI) survey found that 65\% of central cities with populations over 150,000 were experiencing private market housing rehabilitation in older deteriorated areas.\textsuperscript{44} The areas where rehabilitation was occurring were concentrated in areas which were of local or national historic significance and which had received some official designation as a historic district.\textsuperscript{45} Owner-occupants were
responsible for 75 percent of renovation activity, with the remainder split between speculative and investor renovations. Responses to this survey indicated that households were generally small, consisting of singles and young marrieds, with no or few children, with incomes in the middle- to upper-income range, and that these new occupants were working in white-collar professional and business occupations. There were some exceptions. A small percentage of the cities indicated that new households were primarily blue-collar families with incomes in the moderate- to middle-range. About ten percent indicated that the new occupants were a mix of blue- and white-collar families with a range of incomes from moderate to high.46

An update of the 1975 ULI national survey of central city reinvestment activity was conducted in 1979. The results of this survey indicated that renovation of older properties for middle- to upper-income occupancy had spread to even more cities. Renovation activity was reported in 86 percent of cities with over 150,000 residents, compared to 65 percent in 1975. Of the cities providing estimates of the number of structures where renovation activity was occurring or had occurred, the numbers were several times greater, the average being 1,200 units in 1979 as compared to 441 units on the average in 1975.47 The ULI survey tends to support the proposition that the demand for middle- to upper-income housing in certain areas of our central cities is growing in volume and becoming more common.48
Phillip Clay conducted a study in 1976 to find out what was going on in America's largest cities in terms of gentrification. He observed instances of gentrification in all regions of the country and in almost all of the 30 largest central cities.\textsuperscript{49} Clay reported gentrification in many smaller cities.\textsuperscript{50} Of the cities observed, there was no evidence of a circumstance where gentrification, once established, had been reversed.\textsuperscript{51} Mr. Clay identified two fundamentally different types of neighborhood reinvestment activity: "gentrification" and "neighborhood revitalization."\textsuperscript{52}

Gentrified neighborhoods are usually within, or close to, the Central Business District (CBD), they often have attractive topographical features and local historical significance, and are likely to be located near recent nonresidential upgrading.\textsuperscript{53} In such neighborhoods, rehabilitation is by outsiders of a higher socioeconomic status than that of the existing residents. These outsiders are generally young professionals, and primarily white. Developers and speculators are likely to be involved in these areas and the local government is often called upon to upgrade utilities and to round out private investment with various local or federal funds.\textsuperscript{54} The existing residents are usually the poor, the elderly and the transient. They are usually renters who are not able to protect their own interests, articulate their own interests, or articulate their needs.\textsuperscript{55}

A number of forces contributing to gentrification have been suggested that appear to be confirmed by Mr. Clay's study data.\textsuperscript{56}
According to Mr. Clay, gentrification has emerged as a result of significant trends that have occurred in recent years: interest on the part of young buyers in the center city, a growing number of households, direct and indirect encouragement from public agencies, housing stock available at low prices in attractive areas, local regulations that assist or reinforce middle class investment, a new spirit of self-actualization in young households that encourages them to reflect their lifestyle in the design of their residential environments, and the flexibility offered in older houses to reflect middle-class lifestyles.

Neighborhoods experiencing "neighborhood revitalizations" or "incumbent upgrading" are normally low- to moderate-income areas, in which there is a large percentage of homeownership. The houses are in good condition, while not architecturally distinct. The organization of a strong neighborhood group is frequently the first sign of neighborhood revitalization. Renovation is usually undertaken by existing residents with only minimal interest from potential new residents. The new households that are attracted to a revitalized neighborhood are generally of the same socioeconomic status as the existing residents. In the beginning, improvements are generalized and scattered. While there is little or no conflict between old and new residents, conflicts often arise between the neighborhood groups and local government. The neighborhood residents are more concerned with the viability of the neighborhood than with distinctive design features and numerous efforts are made by local neighborhood organizations to funnel public resources
into the neighborhood. However, until the city sees a turn-around in the area, local reinvestment dollars are show to arrive. In the past, such "revitalized" neighborhoods were not deteriorated to the point of being designated as HUD clearance target areas, yet streets and other public services were on the decline.

An article in *American Preservation* confirmed Clay's findings. In "Neighborhood Conservation: Lessons from Three Cities," Phyllis Myers and Gordon Binder indicate there are two different waves of preservation efforts. The first is privately financed and occurs in neighborhoods that have some attraction (architecture, scenic, or location) for affluent residents. The second wave is dependent upon public investment, occurs in places less attractive to either private money or the affluent, and relies on an investment strategy that has been developed from the onset to offer protection to existing residents, and to upgrade the overall physical character of the area. Indications are that, at least in the first round, gentrification will involve a "creaming" of the best neighborhoods which implies a focus on those neighborhoods with noteworthy characteristics popular among the gentry.

Bruce London has described the gentrification process as a "reinvasion" process. Reinvasion "implies that upper status groups are replacing lower status groups in inner city areas, and in so doing, they are reclaiming the territory that they once held." As they purchase and renovate old "Victorians" and "brownstones," they are reinvading space that was once theirs (by income class) and had been since utilized
by other social classes. Reinvasions are of two types: (1) those which result in changes in land-use and (2) those which result in changes in population composition.

The overwhelming consensus among authorities is that the parents of gentrification are the children of the postwar baby boom, who entered the housing market at a time when the volume of new construction was low and the price of suburban housing was very high. The revival of inner-city neighborhoods is the result of macrotrends in housing market economics and in demographic and lifestyle changes. Newcomers tend to be relatively affluent professionals between the ages of 25 and 44, who live in childless households. In many of the nation's older cities, the influx of affluent newcomers is producing a significant change in both the condition and character of declining residential areas.

A systematic study of national statistics executed by Franklin James in 1977 revealed conclusive evidence of heightened renovation in central cities. His findings were based on changes in housing values, in homeownership rates, and in home improvement expenditures by central city residents. Gregory Lipton measured inner city revival in terms of the socioeconomic status of census tracts. The extent of renovation activity in a city was indicated by the number of tracts within two miles of the CBD in which the average income and/or educational level was above that for the entire Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA). Among the twenty largest metropolitan areas, three (New York, Washington, and Boston) showed definite improvement.
Neighborhoods which have some intrinsic attractiveness—based on their proximity to downtown or other major focal points of activity, or the inherent value of the housing stock no matter how deteriorated—are prime candidates for renovation.\textsuperscript{76} The National Urban Coalition's survey (1978) of 44 central cities found widespread evidence of housing renovation, regardless of city size or geographic location.\textsuperscript{77} Among the 30 largest central cities, evidence of renovation activity was observed in more than 100 neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{78}

\textbf{Theories of Gentrification and Neighborhood Revitalization}

Most authorities agree with The National Urban Coalition's study that gentrification and neighborhood revitalization, particularly the former, is carried out in the following stages:

1. The initial phase is the "\textit{Start-Up Phase.}" Persons involved are referred to as "pioneers." The restoration work is that of an owner investor who is attracted to the neighborhood by the architectural features of the structure purchased and its low cost. The "pioneer" is not put off by the neighborhood as long as he is not threatened personally, and often is attracted by its diversity. The rate and scale of reinvestment is small and focuses on structures readily converted to single family homes that have been abandoned or are offered for sale by the owner. The changes in the neighborhood are not readily apparent and residents may not be conscious that an incipient change is underway. Since the initial "pioneers" purchase structures that have been abandoned or have been put on the market, there is little eviction or involuntary displacement of current residents. Impact on the demographic
characteristics of the neighborhood is minimal and there is no curtailment of in-migration by persons having the prevailing socioeconomic characteristics.

(2) The second phase is the "Buy-In Phase" and the persons involved are referred to as the "early settlers." These "early settlers" pay a bit more than the "pioneers" did for comparable property but, although still aware of the negative factors in the neighborhood, they are confident of the future of the area. The "early settlers" look for stability in their neighbors. They are not concerned that the neighbors are quite unlike themselves. During this phase, rehabilitation, which is spreading and increasing in intensity, gains public notice. Displacement of tenants begins to attain significant proportions.

(3) The third phase is termed the "Take-Off Phase." Confidence in the neighborhood has now been established. People coming in at this stage feel a need for more security and status than the "pioneers" and "early settlers." They demand improved public services and disapprove "inauthentic" restorations. They are willing to pay substantially higher prices than their predecessors and may contract the desired rehabilitation rather than do it themselves. Speculative rehabilitation increases significantly in this phase and it becomes clear that the process will proceed until the neighborhood is totally rehabilitated. Speculators and would-be buyers seek out owners, both absentee and resident, to make offers of purchase. Resident owners, although still perhaps not fully aware of the eventual value of their property, often sell to realize what appears to be substantial capital gains. A number
of the departing owners may have wished to leave the neighborhood for years without having been able to sell for enough to afford to purchase elsewhere.

(4) The last and final phase, the "Fill-In Phase", sees the completion of the process. Property values and taxes rise dramatically. Long-term owners, who are financially able, join in the rehabilitation, while those who cannot pay the rising taxes and the increased repair and maintenance costs arising from stricter code enforcement are forced out. Not too gradually the remaining unimproved properties are rehabilitated. Homeowner displacement, which began in the "take-off" phase, peaks and then drops as total displacement of the former homeowners is completed.79

Neil Smith has also proposed a theory of gentrification. According to Smith, the process of gentrification cannot be adequately explained by the gentrifier's actions alone; the role of builders, developers, landlords, tenants, government agencies, mortgage lenders and real estate agents must also be considered. A theory of gentrification must take into account the role of producers as well as consumers and, in doing so, it would seem that the needs of production, particularly the need to earn profits is more of a driving force behind gentrification than consumer preference. Although consumer preference and demand for gentrified housing is of secondary importance in initiating the actual process, and in explaining why gentrification has occurred, it is of primary importance in determining the final form and character of revitalized areas. The "urban renaissance" has been stimulated more by
economic than cultural forces. In the decision to rehabilitate a structure one consumer preference tends to take precedent—the preference for profit or sound financial investment, thus few people would consider rehabilitation if a financial loss were anticipated. 80

Gentrification is almost always preceded by "filtering," although the process need not occur entirely for gentrification to follow. The objective mechanism underlying filtering is the depreciation and devaluation of capital invested in inner-city neighborhoods. This depreciation produces the objective economic conditions that make capital revaluation (gentrification) a rational market response, therefore, creating a rent gap. The rent gap is the difference between the amount that can be capitalized under the land's "highest and best use" (potential ground rent level), and the actual reduction from the surplus value created over and above cost-price by the producers on the site (ground rent capitalized) under the present land use. In filtering, the rent gap is produced primarily by capital depreciation and also by urban development and expansion. A "valley" was identified by Hoyt in his observation of land values in Chicago, indicating the location of sections where buildings were mostly over forty years old and where the residents ranked lowest in rent-paying ability. This valley can now be primarily explained as the rent gap. 81 Only when this gap becomes apparent, can redevelopment be expected since if the present use succeeded in capitalizing all or most of the ground rent, little economic benefit could be derived from redevelopment. As filtering and neighborhood decline continue, the rent gap widens. 82
Gentrification takes place when the rent gap is wide enough that developers can purchase shells cheaply, can pay interest on mortgage and construction loans and then can sell the end product for a sale price that provides a satisfactory return for the developer. Once the rent gap is wide enough, gentrification may be initiated in a neighborhood by many different actors in the land and housing market. With private market gentrification, one or more financial institutions will soon reverse its "redlining" policy and actively target a neighborhood as a potential market for loans. Mortgage capital is a prerequisite because mortgage capital must be borrowed by willing consumers exercising some preference or another. This mortgage capital must be borrowed by willing consumers exercising some preference, but these preferences are not prerequisites since they may be socially created. Both financial institutions and professional developers have acted as the collective initiative behind gentrification. However, an exception to this predominance of collective action occurs in neighborhoods adjacent to already gentrified areas. Where this is the case, individual gentrifiers may be very important in initiating rehabilitation.

Three kinds of developers typically operate in recycling neighborhoods:

(a) professional developers who purchase property, redevelop it, and resell for profit;

(b) occupier developers who buy and redevelop property and inhabit it after completion; and
(c) landlord developers who rent it to tenants after rehabilitation.

The developer's return on investment comes as part of the completed property's sale price; for the landlord developer it also comes in the form of house rent. The fragmented structure of property ownership in inner-city neighborhoods makes the occupier developer, who is generally an inefficient operator in the construction industry, into a suitable vehicle for recycling devalued neighborhoods. This theory also suggests that as these areas are recycled, other areas offering lower but still substantial return will be sought after by developers.84

Studies have shown that 70 percent of city homebuyers are already city residents, two-thirds of them previous renters.85 An additional 13 percent are moving from other central cities or from non-metropolitan areas. Dennis Gale's findings from Washington, D.C., also suggest that much neighborhood reinvestment is a result of movement from neighborhood to neighborhood within the inner city.86 The fact that in-migrants are city dwellers rather than suburbanites returning to the city does not alter the immediate impact on the neighborhoods into which they move.87

Displacement

Historically, inner city housing has filtered down to lower-income groups as it is vacated voluntarily by higher-income households moving on to better housing. Everyone gained. But now in some areas, older housing which previously filtered down to lower-income households has begun to percolate back up to higher income households. Unlike filtering (downward income movement), such percolation leads to displacement--forced movement by lower income households often to less
desirable or more expensive but not more desirable dwellings. Grier and Grier concluded that:

Displacement occurs when any household is forced to move from its residence by conditions which affect the dwelling or its immediate surroundings, and which:

1. are beyond the household's reasonable ability to control or prevent;
2. occur despite the household's having met all previously-imposed conditions of occupancy; and
3. make continued occupancy by that household impossible, hazardous or unaffordable.9

Chester Hartman described displacement as a political process, having to do with operant values and powers in the society. According to Hartman, displacement results when one group of potential users of a piece of property has the motivation and the power to force others out of that property. This normally occurs when the former desires to put property to what planners and economists term "higher and better use"—usually for profit maximization.90 Displacement in this country began with colonization and settlement. Native Americans were displaced from their land and placed on reservations.91 The poor have similarly been forced out of one potentially valuable neighborhood after another as it suits the interests of planners and speculators according to Lang. Up until the present, these displaced poor have been able to find alternative accommodations within the core slum areas.92

Gentrification and neighborhood revitalization have created many problems. Long time residents of low and/or fixed income find their property taxes or rent payments increasing with land values.93 Low
income inhabitants are forced from their neighborhoods into less desirable ones or into new ghettos outside the city altogether. "The phenomenon of increased housing costs following relocation is characteristic of virtually all the rehousing efforts reviewed."94 It is not unusual for 80 to 85 percent of those displaced to experience a rent increase often of substantial proportions, particularly in relation to the household's ability to pay.95

Walter Alessio, executive vice president of the Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation stated that, "one new affluent white family can displace as many as four or five low-income families."96 Ronald Rysiaik, Director of Community Development of Milwaukee, Wisconsin stated that, "there is a possibility that in 40 years the poor will be pushed outside the central cities entirely and only the wealthy will remain."97 The people with the least amount of choices are being victimized by a phenomenon which is beneficial only to the affluent.98 Hordes of affluent whites are converging on low-income neighborhoods to reclaim "the prime land" in the central areas of many of the nation's oldest cities.99

The positive effects of gentrification and neighborhood revitalization—increased security, increased local prestige, and physical improvements—accrue to all groups except the existing low-income residents.100 Economic pressures on the land tend to raise weekly rents to higher rates and in many instances result in the loss of tenancy for the household since the landlord wishes to refurbish his
property either for rental at higher rates or for sale at a higher price. Clearly, such effects constitute a direct and substantial economic cost to the low-income inhabitant.101

The necessity for a household to move out of a neighborhood in search of low cost housing imposes a direct social cost on that family. Old friendships, kinships, and secondary relationships (with storekeepers and the like) are all broken. Many times it is difficult, if not impossible, to restructure such social patterns in a new and seemingly hostile neighborhood where one feels like a stranger.102 This is particularly true for the elderly who currently form a disproportionately high percentage of the residents in low-income urban areas.

Evidence for the existence of displacement and related problems has emerged despite the fact that there has never been a definitive study of displacement and definitional problems exist that are not sufficiently operational for authoritative research.103 A study conducted by the National Urban Coalition in 1978 suggested that in more than two-thirds of the neighborhoods that have experienced substantial middle- and upper-income resettlement, displacement of low-income inhabitants was also encountered.104 Data collected for the survey confirmed that displacement was apparent in four out of five neighborhoods undergoing reinvestment activity.105

While there are cases of forceable and mass evictions, these are not necessary for displacement, nor does displacement have to occur in a short period of time. Most advanced stage displacements have taken
place over a period of years, with little local recognition of what was occurring. 106

The most dramatic evidence of displacement occurs when real estate speculators begin acquiring rental properties in areas they believe will become attractive to middle- and upper-income households. Such speculative activity leads to the rapid turnover of recently obtained properties. A 1978 study of property transactions in Washington, D.C. documented that 20 percent of the properties sold over a two-year period were sold more than once during this period of time. Of these multiple sales, the great majority occurred within ten months of each other. One of the most important findings of the National Urban Coalition was that speculative rehabilitation greatly accelerates the pace of the rehabilitation cycle. When speculative buying occurs, housing values increase 100–300 percent for both unrehabilitated and renovated properties. 107

The first to be affected by such rampant speculative activities are resident renters. Although actual renovation may not take place until a considerable time in the future, developers and speculators have no incentive to retain current tenants, even on a temporary basis. It has been suggested that this occurs for several reasons: present rents are too low to cover operating and maintenance costs; the existence of housing code violations creates the possibility of legal action or rent strikes; and it is easier to dispose of the property to a higher income group if it is vacant and poverty is not in evidence. 108
As reinvestment proceeds, owner-occupants are likely to be affected. Two mechanisms are likely to operate. First, presented with what seems like good offers, owners may sell too eagerly and too quickly, believing that the neighborhood is still in decline. By not realizing the true value of their property, homeowners may find it difficult to purchase housing other than in areas similar to their old neighborhood. Secondly, as the neighborhood becomes more attractive to middle- and upper-income households, increases in property values will correspondingly drive up tax assessments. This may force out owner-occupants whose income cannot meet the rising costs.109

Phillip Clay observed that in locations where neighborhood reinvestment by low- to moderate-income households was taking place only 25 percent of the reinvestment activity was by developers, in contrast to more than 40 percent by developers in gentrification neighborhoods.110

Several groups are likely to be affected by displacement including low- and moderate-income renters, low income homeowners, the elderly, minority families, and transient households (including "skid row" population). Low- and moderate-income renters face a tight housing market, high rents, and/or relocation to undesirable areas when they are forced out of housing for no reason other than the effects of reinvestment. In tight housing markets low- to moderate-income households are frequently forced to make serious sacrifices in their already marginal standard of living.111
The elderly have the same problems as other low-income renters and, perhaps, additional problems associated with physical hardship and psychological loss or trauma.\textsuperscript{112} Their commonly fixed income allows them even fewer choices than working households.\textsuperscript{113} In addition, relocation can be a problem for the elderly if the only available neighborhoods are some distance from transportation, health facilities, and other support services.\textsuperscript{114}

Minority families have additional problems associated with racial discrimination, since available neighborhoods include some where they may feel alienated or where aspects of the racially segmented market may limit their access.\textsuperscript{115}

Single persons and members of a transient population face many difficulties. Revitalization of downtown areas often includes the removal or change in use of residential hotels, rooming houses and other means of shelter that they have relied on. Many times this population has already experienced displacement due to urban renewal and other similar projects.\textsuperscript{116}

Low-income homeowners are affected by increased housing costs induced by code enforcement and increased taxes, and suffer psychological displacement as familiar services, institutions, and shops are lost and a new ambiance prevades the neighborhoods. Difficulties are compounded if the household includes a large number of children or if the family receives public assistance.\textsuperscript{117}
Numerous studies have identified these populations as being particularly vulnerable to the processes of gentrification in particular, and to neighborhood revitalization.

Much displacement that takes place cannot be traced directly to governmental actions. While national urban policy has voiced a commitment to meeting the needs of distressed people and to securing the cooperation of existing residents in developing strategies to reverse decline, it concurrently seeks to support private sector reinvestment in the urban core. The problems of displacement of the urban poor, the severity of this activity, and its social costs have been downplayed. Typically, displacees go into worse housing situations, often at higher rents. Sometimes, they go into no homes at all--simply into the streets. Although statistics are flawed by a severe undercount, it is clear that at least 500,000 households (or about 1.4 million people) are being displaced in America each year. Displacement is a national problem and a powerful issue. It is tied indirectly with many other aspects of what is wrong with our housing market system. A former Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce, Lawrence Houstoun, expressed the current dilemma well:

To treat the needs of the affluent and the poor simultaneously requires a difficult and delicate balance and more sensitive information systems than most cites have yet adopted.

**Major Research Questions**

The major research question is "Were the stages of gentrification and neighborhood revitalization that have occurred in the Dennison Place and Victorian Village neighborhoods of Columbus, Ohio different from the
stages commonly observed in neighborhoods undergoing gentrification and neighborhood revitalization as explicated by the National Urban Coalition?"

Sub-Questions

(1) Were the following characteristics of the "Start-Up Phase" observed in the Dennison Place and Victorian Village neighborhoods?

a. owner-investor involved in restoration work
b. pioneer attracted by architectural features
c. pioneer attracted by the low [purchase] price
d. pioneer not put off by the [poor] neighborhood [environment] as long as he/she is not personally threatened
e. pioneer often attracted by [neighborhood] diversity
f. small scale reinvestment focuses on buildings readily converted to single family homes
g. changes in the neighborhood are not readily apparent
h. little eviction or involuntary displacement
i. no curtailment of in-migration of newcomers
j. existing residents not aware of incipient change.

(2) Were the following characteristics of the "Buy-In Phase" observed in the Dennison Place and Victorian Village neighborhoods?

a. early settlers pay more than pioneers for comparable property
b. early settlers are aware of negative factors in the neighborhood but are confident of the future of the area
c. early settlers look for stability in their neighbors but are not concerned [about differences]
d. restoration/rehabilitation is spreading and increasing in intensity, and gains public notice
e. displacement of tenants begins to attain significant proportions.

(3) Were the following characteristics of the "Take-Off Phase" observed in the Dennison Place and Victorian Village neighborhoods?

a. confidence in the neighborhood has been established
b. newcomers often feel a need for more security and status than pioneers and early settlers
c. newcomers demand improved public services
d. newcomers disparage "inauthentic" restoration
e. newcomers willing to pay substantial higher prices than their
predecessors and many contract restoration/rehabilitation work rather than do it themselves
f. speculative rehabilitations increase and proceed until entire neighborhood is totally rehabilitated
g. speculators seek out private owners, both absentee and resident, and make offers of purchase
h. residents, perhaps not fully aware of eventual value of their property, sell out for what appears to be substantial capital gains
i. many departing homeowners had wanted to leave for years without having been able to sell at a price [adequate] enough to purchase elsewhere.

(4) Were the following characteristics of the "Fill-In Phase"
observed in the Dennison Place and Victorian Village neighborhoods?

a. property values and taxes rise dramatically
b. long-term owners, financially able, join in the restoration/rehabilitation activity
c. long-term owners who cannot pay rising [property] taxes are forced out
d. long-term owners who cannot afford repair and maintenance costs arising from stricter code enforcement are forced out
e. remaining unimproved properties are restored/rehabilitated
f. homeowner displacement peaks and then [declines] as displacement of former homeowners is completed.
ENDNOTES


4Klimoski, p. 4.

5Ibid.

6Ibid, p. 5.


8Klimoski, p. 5.


10Klimoski, p. 5.


13Klimoski, p. 5.

14Ibid.


19. Ibid.


23. Ibid., p. 178.

24. Ibid., p. 182.

25. Ibid., p. 183.


29. Ibid., p. 7.


33. Ibid., p. 470.

34. Ibid.


37 Ibid.

38 Lang, p. 6.


40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Auger, p. 516.

43 Ibid., p. 519.


46 Ibid., p. 10.

47 Ibid., p. 11.

48 Ibid., p. 12.

49 Clay, *Neighborhood Renewal*, p. 16.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid., p. 17.

52 Ibid., p. 15.

53 Ibid., p. 21.

54 Ibid., p. 15.

55 Ibid., pp. 32-33.

56 Ibid., p. 15.

57 Ibid., pp. 33-34.

58 Ibid., p. 21.

68 Ibid., p. 6.

69 Klimoski, p. 12.

70 Bruce London, "Gentrification as Urban Reinvasion: Some Preliminary Definitional and Theoretical Considerations," in Laska, Shirley and Spain, Daphne (eds.), *Back to the City*, p. 80.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid., p. 79.


74 Ibid., p. 482.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.


78 Ibid.


Redlining is a practice engaged in by lending institutions that refuse mortgage money in certain neighborhoods or areas based on the neighborhoods or area being lower income and declining, but often also based on racial characteristics.


Lang, p. 32.


Ibid.

Ibid.


Ronald Kysiak, quoted in David Alpern, "A City Revival?" Newsweek, 15 January, 1979, p. 32.


104 The National Urban Coalition, Displacement, p. 4.
105 Ibid.
106 Clay, Neighborhood Renewal, p. 32.
108 The National Urban Coalition, "Displacement," p. 3.
110 Ibid.
111 Clay, Neighborhood Renewal, p. 49.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid., p. 33.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Lang, p. 31.
119 Auger, p. 521.
120 Ibid., p. 520.
CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE NEAR NORTH SIDE COMMUNITY

Columbus was founded as a new town and state capital in 1812 with a plan by Joel Wright.\(^1\) For the first four decades, the Near North Side community experienced little growth and travel was confined to the Olentangy River corridor. In 1823, the first internal roadway, the Columbus-Worthington Pike was opened for service. This dirt roadway (now High Street) was improved in 1850 and renamed the Columbus Worthington Plank Turnpike. This improved turnpike helped to provide a link between industries developing in Columbus and Worthington. Development activity along the road began to increase due to the access it provided to farm areas and vacant lands in the Near North Side area.\(^2\) (See Figure 1.)

Development in the Near North Side was stimulated early in the 1850's when Lincoln Goodale deeded forty acres of land for Goodale Park to the City of Columbus. During this time the park was located at the northern boundary of the City. The amenity the park provided, and the ease with which residents could travel from the area to the Central Business District contributed to rapid construction in the community. In 1853, the introduction of the horse-drawn streetcar along High Street attracted many wealthy Columbus families to construct elegant and stately Victorian homes around the park and adjacent areas. The Near
Figure 1. NEAR NORTH SIDE HISTORIC DISTRICT

SOURCE: City of Columbus Department of Development, Division of Planning and Economic Development.
North Side Community became one of the first exclusive suburbs in the City of Columbus. In the late 1850's several of the larger landowners began to subdivide their property. In 1859 vacant lots in the Dennison Avenue, High Street and West Third Avenue areas were sold for as much as $4,000. Annexation to the City began in the Near North Side in 1862 which included the section bounded by Dennison Avenue, Fifth Avenue, Sixth Street and Goodale Street.3

Toward the latter half of the 19th century, industrial and manufacturing companies began to develop in the Near North Side. The majority of industrial uses were located adjacent to the Penn Central Railroad track on the eastern fringe of the community. This manufacturing district was annexed to the City in 1885.4

Another group of industries developed north of Goodale Street along the Olentangy River up to Third Avenue. A working class community began to develop around these industrial districts which provided close proximity for the employees because there was no alternative but to walk to work. The old "Flytown" where Thurber Village now stands was the working class community associated with the industries along the Olentangy River. Annexation of the area was completed by 1871.5

To attract potential buyers to the area, landowners often furnished sewers, sidewalks and other infrastructure improvements before placing the property on the real estate market. A demand for expanded streetcar service was created by the increased population and the commerce in the community, and as a result electric streetcar service was extended to High Street, Goodale, and Neil Avenues, and to The Ohio State University.
area during the 1890s. In the late 1880s a land boom occurred in the community. In 1886 a street improvement law required roads to be paved in the area at the expense of the abutting property owners. This requirement was often expanded to unimportant and sparsely populated streets of the new "suburbs". To accommodate population increases, bridges were constructed over the Olentangy River, water mains were built and firehouses and schools were constructed.6

The vast majority of development of the Near North Side Community was completed by the early 1900's with a large proportion of the homes being constructed before 1925. The Near North Side Community eventually became comprised of seven neighborhoods: Dennison Place, Harrison West, Italian Village, Victorian Village, N.E.C.K.O., Unity and Weinland Park.

Before 1925, housing demand in the area began to decline which is attributed in large part to the increased mobility created by the automobile. As more streets were constructed and completed in Columbus, residential location was no longer restricted to the streetcar lines. The period after World War II saw many families and households of lesser means moving into the community. Many stately and elegant homes were converted to duplex and multiple-family dwelling units. Also contributing to this conversion was the expanded student enrollment of The Ohio State University, which from 1920 to 1948 increased from 3,000 students to 28,000 students and by 1960 had increased to 40,000 students.7

In 1950, local government officials and staff began planning the first urban renewal project ever undertaken in the City of Columbus,
Ohio. This urban renewal project became known as the "Goodale Slum Clearance Project." The project was targeted to "Flytown", the early working class neighborhood within the Near North Side Community. Local government officials and staff considered it to be "the worst slum area" in the City of Columbus. The project area boundaries included Buttles and First Avenues to the north, Goodale Avenue to the south, Neil Avenue to the east and Michigan Avenue to the west. The "bulldozer approach" used in the area destroyed homes and displaced residents from the community. The only structures remaining after this massive clearance was the First Avenue and Olentangy schools. After the area had been cleared, a major development corporation headed by John Galbreath purchased the land and redeveloped the area in accordance with the slum clearance plan.8 (See Figure 2.)

Around this same time, Battelle Memorial Institute began acquiring properties in the community for the proposed future expansion of its facilities. These properties under the Institute's control were later to become some of the most blighted properties in the community as well as in the City.9

Soon after the completion of the Goodale Slum Clearance Project, local government officials announced plans for another major urban renewal related project in the Near North Side Community which became known as the Dennison Avenue Conservation Project. The project, which lasted for eleven years (1965-1976), was perhaps considered to be one of the most successful urban renewal programs administered anywhere in the United States. Despite the fact that the project did not eradicate the
Figure 2. GOODALE SLUM CLEARANCE AREA PROJECT

declining state of the Near North Side as a whole, it did create a renewed interest in the area by private investors, specifically in an area which was later to become known as Victorian Village.\textsuperscript{10}

By 1975, local government officials were convinced of the reinvestment potential of the community and proposed that Victorian Village, Harrison West and Italian Village neighborhoods share a portion of the $9,000,000 of Columbus' First Year Community Development Act (CDA) funds for housing rehabilitation grants, low-interest loans, and capital improvements that had been provided to Columbus by HUD. During the subsequent years as private reinvestment in the area heightened, other neighborhoods within the Near North Side were allocated CDA funds to assist residents with housing rehabilitation and to provide capital improvements.\textsuperscript{11}

In 1976, the Battelle Memorial Institute, after closely watching the positive trends in the surrounding area and weighing alternatives, and motivated by a court order requiring divestiture of neighborhood properties, established the Olentangy Management Company (OMC), an independent subsidiary, to manage the largest private rehabilitation effort ever undertaken in America. As a consequence of this massive project, revitalization fever inflicted the community, particularly the Victorian Village and Dennison Place neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{12}

In 1978, in response to a Federal Register notice issued by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Department of Development submitted a $2,003,100 Innovative Grant
Proposal which was to be used in the OMC revitalization area to: support a public/private/partnership for revitalization; minimize displacement and gentrification; and provide for necessary capital improvements. The Innovative grant Program was to reflect a new partnership between the local government, private enterprise, and neighborhood organizations.

Also in 1978, the City of Columbus applied to HUD to have a large proportion of the Near North Side Community designated as a Neighborhood Strategy Area (NSA). The NSA program, launched by HUD in 1977, was designed to provide local governments with direct access to Section 8 housing funds, and to enable local governments to more closely coordinate the delivery of housing and community development service. According to the application submitted by the City to HUD requesting the designation of a large segment of the Near North Side as a NSA program area, funds were to be used to promote neighborhood revitalization, housing rehabilitation and stability by concentrating HUD redevelopment funds in designated areas. During the ensuing years over $4,000,000 would be spent in the NSA for capital improvements, community development, housing rehabilitation assistance, and relocation assistance resulting from displacement.13

In mid-January of 1979 a major portion of the Near North Side was declared a historic district, making it a candidate for inclusion to the National Register for Historic Places. The Near North Side historical area extended from Goodale Park on the south to Eleventh Avenue on the north. The western boundary zig zags from Neil Avenue on the south to
west of Perry Street on the north; the eastern boundary is the first
alley west of North High Street. Subsequently, in 1980, the United
States Department of the Interior declared the Victorian Village neigh-
borhood to be a National Historic area. Victorian Village as an
historic district represented homogeneity in the design, materials and
scale of structures throughout the area.14

Ultimately, by the beginning decade of the 1980s, several neigh-
brhoods within the Near North Side Community were on their way to
becoming some of Columbus' residential architectural showcases, specifi-
cally, Victorian Village, OMC Phase One and Phase Two project areas,
Dennison Place, which became the showplace of the neighborhood, and, to
a limited extent, Italian Village. The City of Columbus' Department of
Development (hereinafter referred to as "the Department of Development")
also recognized that Victorian Village and Dennison Place should be
monitored neighborhoods due to the fact that massive displacement had
occurred, particularly in the OMC Phase One and Phase Two project
areas. Thus, these neighborhoods were considered speculative revitali-
ization areas that had progressed through the gentrification and neigh-
brhood revitalization process to a degree that potential buyers
perceived these neighborhoods to be areas in which excellent housing
investments could be realized. The primary objective for monitoring
these neighborhoods was to ensure that the adverse impacts of gentrifi-
cation and neighborhood revitalization on lower-income households would
be mitigated as much as possible.15
Today, a majority of the Near North Side's housing stock continues to be preserved, rehabilitated, restored, and reconstructed to their original grandeur. In addition, despite downswings in the national and local housing markets, created primarily by increased interest rates, confidence in the future of the area by private investors to attract middle- and upper-middle-income households is apparent throughout the community as is evidenced by current construction of townhouses and condominium conversions. Finally, in an effort to retain the low- and moderate-income households and to ensure the continued revitalization and stabilization of the community, the Harrison West neighborhood and a portion of Victorian Village have been included in the City of Columbus Ninth Year Community Development Block Grant budget. These funds will provide eligible homeowners with housing rehabilitation grants and low-interest loans, and also provide for additional capital improvements in these areas.

A survey to identify buildings in the North High Street commercial strip that are eligible for nomination to the National Register of Historic Places has recently been proposed to Columbus City Council. The listing of a building in the National Register would entitle the owner(s) to a 25 percent tax credit if the owner(s) renovates the property according to guidelines established by the United States Department of Interior. It is hoped that this will motivate property owners to become involved in the restoration/rehabilitation activities in the area, and thereby, enhance the character and appearance of North High Street and the businesses within this strip.16
Historical Background of Study Area: Dennison Place

The Dennison Place neighborhood, which was formerly called the "Fifth-to-King" neighborhood, is located approximately one mile north of the CBD. The neighborhood's boundaries are: King Avenue on the north; West Fifth Avenue on the south; North High Street on the east; and the Olentangy River on the west.

The development of Dennison Place began during the late 1880s when Civil War Governor William Dennison subdivided the farm given to him by his father-in-law William Neil who owned most of the area today known as the City's Near North Side Community. The subdivision of the farm became known as the Dennison Park Addition, which today is known unofficially as the Circle Neighborhood as it was laid out on a grand scale with circular parks at street intersections. Large two and three story homes in the Circle Neighborhood, of brick and stone, reflected the late Victorian architectural styles and tastes with pitched hip and gable roofs, dormers, turrets, stained and leaded glass, and elaborate porches and carriage houses. During the years of the neighborhood's zenith many prominent Columbus citizens resided there.

Also noteworthy in discussing the prestige and character of the Circle Neighborhood is the fact that it was predicted that with renewed interest in the Near North Side by more affluent households, these households would reside in "certain pockets" of the community where the finest housing stock and most attractive amenities were located. One of these pockets, most observers agreed, would be the Circle Neighborhood. It was later included in OMC's Phase One project area.
Some of these homes, when placed on the housing market restored to their original grandeur, sold for as much as $120,000.21

The remaining housing stock, while not constructed on the grand scale of the Circle Neighborhood, is primarily two-story houses of brick construction with several features of the architectural styles of the Victorian architectural era. These houses were constructed primarily by the middle class. The majority of the housing stock (58 percent) in Dennison Place was built before 1899, with an additional 40 percent constructed between 1900 and 1919.22

By the First World War, middle- and upper-class households began to leave the neighborhood as the mobility afforded by the automobile and its transportation networks permitted these households to reside in residential suburbs farther away from the urban core. Subsequently, several of the younger faculty members of The Ohio State University began moving into the neighborhood.23

In 1929, Battelle Memorial Institute, a nonprofit charitable trust devoted to research, established its corporate headquarters on a ten-acre site in the western section of the Dennison Park Addition. The incentive for the establishment of the Institute in the neighborhood was Gordon Battelle. In 1923, when Gordon Battelle died, he left a major portion of his estate for the establishment of a Battelle Memorial Institute, "which was to become a scientific research organization in Columbus, Ohio."24 Item Twenty-one of his will contained the clause that provided for the establishment of the new Institute which read as follows:
All the residue of my estate . . . , I give for the foundation of a 'Battelle Memorial Institute', to be established . . . for the purpose of education in connection with and the encouragement of creative and research work and the making of discoveries and inventions in connection with the metallurgy of coal, iron, steel, zinc and their allied industries. . . .25

The clause also provided for a Board of Trustees who, shall:

. . . undertake and assist in the discovery of such new experiments and processes and license or dispose of the same in such manner and upon such terms as may seem advisable for the continuance and advancement of said 'Battelle Memorial Institute' and the purposes for which it was founded.26

Two years later, in 1925, Gordon Battelle's mother, Annie Norton Battelle, died and bequeathed $2,172,000 (most of her estate) to the Institute her son had created. With this bequest, the total amount available for the establishment of the new institute was more than 3.5 million dollars. On March 27, 1925 the five member Board of Trustees, founded Battelle Memorial Institute as a nonprofit corporation. As the years progressed, the Institute continued to grow as the world's largest independent research organization.27

Beginning in the decade of the 1940s, the socioeconomic status of many of Dennison Place's residents began to decline with the influx of new residents from rural Ohio and Appalachia. As a result, many of the housing units became increasingly renter-occupied, despite the fact that in 1940 homeownership in the Circle Neighborhood was still predominant, with more than 50 percent of the houses owner-occupied and considered to be in good structural condition.28 The gradual acquisition of properties by Battelle (which was now a rapidly growing institution) for the future expansion of its facilities, also contributed to the decline of the neighborhood. The Institute intended to eventually raze all the
properties and felt that there wasn't any point in investing money in maintaining the houses, renting them "as is" for whatever the real estate market would bring. Thus, under the Institute's benign neglect, this area became a major reservoir of low-income rental housing.

By 1956, Dennison Place still had a healthy housing market and was relatively competitive within the City's real estate market but, like other areas of the City, the neighborhood experienced a decline in real (adjusted for inflation) property values through the 50s, 60s and early 70s. In 1960, deed transfer activity was at its lowest point and in 1973, real property values reached an all-time low. Although significant, the decline in real property values, never reached the level of many other inner-city areas. Since this time, real property values have generally increased to a point where the 1980 real property average is substantially the same as in the early 60s. (See Figure 3.)

Beginning in 1973, real property values began to accelerate, but this increase leveled off in 1976 and the neighborhood has since undergone both increases and decreases in absolute and real property values. The fluctuation has been attributed to several factors, prime among which was increase in the investment activity of Battelle's subsidiary, OMC. Once OMC divesture activities became apparent, deed transfer activity in the "Renaissance" project area accelerated, reaching its highest levels in 1978 and 1979 (see Figure 4).

The overall decline in the real estate market may explain the decline in real property values in Dennison Place during 1977 and
Figure 3. ADJUSTED VALUE OF SALES IN THE DENNISON PLACE NEIGHBORHOOD – DEED TRANSFER ACTIVITY, 1956 TO 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Transactions</th>
<th>Transactions per 100 structures</th>
<th>Yearly Average Value (3 yr. av.)</th>
<th>Adjusted Value (1956 constant $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9.31</td>
<td>12,859</td>
<td>13,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>12,765</td>
<td>12,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>11,988</td>
<td>12,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8.82</td>
<td>11,519</td>
<td>11,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>11,085</td>
<td>10,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>12,444</td>
<td>9,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8.82</td>
<td>14,259</td>
<td>9,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8.82</td>
<td>14,825</td>
<td>8,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13.24</td>
<td>15,844</td>
<td>7,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6.86</td>
<td>17,970</td>
<td>7,367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>20,738</td>
<td>7,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6.86</td>
<td>23,275</td>
<td>8,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10.78</td>
<td>23,482</td>
<td>8,663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14.71</td>
<td>28,198</td>
<td>8,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15.20</td>
<td>30,645</td>
<td>8,754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10.78</td>
<td><em>34,776</em></td>
<td>8,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td><em>34,776</em></td>
<td>9,293*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*2 year average

### Figure 4. ADJUSTED VALUE OF SALES IN THE RENAISSANCE PROJECT AREA - DEED TRANSFER ACTIVITY, 1956 TO 1980.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Transactions</th>
<th>Transactions per 100 structures</th>
<th>Yearly Average Value (3 yr. av.)</th>
<th>Adjusted Value (1956 constant $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>14,278</td>
<td>14,905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>13,378</td>
<td>13,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>13,314</td>
<td>12,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>13,250</td>
<td>12,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>13,611</td>
<td>11,663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>11,958</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>19,661</td>
<td>11,078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>21,490</td>
<td>10,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>24,166</td>
<td>11,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>23,050</td>
<td>9,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>21,372</td>
<td>8,547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>24,363</td>
<td>9,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>29,685</td>
<td>10,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>36,410</td>
<td>11,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>46,236</td>
<td>12,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>51,508 *</td>
<td>13,765 *</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*2 year average

**SOURCE:** City of Columbus Department of Development, "Neighborhood Change," 1982.
1979. Yet, private investment by banks in the neighborhood accounted for the largest investment in any Columbus neighborhood designated as a Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funded area. Finally, increased deed transfer activity in Dennison Place between 1976 and 1979 would appear to indicate that the decline was only a market fluctuation, rather than an indication of any long term disinvestment. (The low number of transfers in 1980 is attributed to overall reduction in real estate market activity.)

An equally important factor that has contributed to the general increase in real property values in the Dennison Place neighborhood was the City's commitment of $1,414,745 in CDBG funds from 1978 to 1983 for a number of housing rehabilitation grants and low-interest loans. Finally, in an attempt to attract more affluent household to help stabilize the neighborhood, in July of 1979, the Columbus City Council approved a zoning that "downzoned" Dennison Place by limiting new construction of dwellings to a maximum of two units. The reason for the downzoning was to reduce conversions which added units to houses.

**Historical Background of Study Area: Victorian Village**

The area presently known as Victorian Village is a predominantly residential neighborhood within the Near North Side Community. Victorian Village encompasses approximately 36 square blocks whose boundaries include: West Fifth Avenue to the north; Goodale Avenue to the south; High Street to the east; and Neil Avenue and the east side of Harrison Avenue to the west. The village's southern boundary (Goodale Avenue) is approximately one-half mile from the City of Columbus Central
Business District (CBD), while its northern boundary (West Fifth Avenue) is approximately one-half mile from The Ohio State University.

The impetus to the development of the area during the latter part of the 19th Century were the landscaping of Goodale Park, a 40 acre tract of land donated to the City of Columbus by Doctor Lincoln Goodale in 1851; the construction of The White Cross Hospital adjacent to Goodale Park on Park Street; and the expansion of the street railroad line along Neil Avenue from Goodale Avenue to the Ohio Agricultural and Mechanical College (presently The Ohio State University). 34 Subsequently, this development stimulated many of Columbus' affluent, and upwardly mobile families who had previously moved east to Broad Street and Bryden Road, to begin settling in the north area. 35 During this period, many elegant and stately Victorian homes were constructed. The most prominent homes were constructed around Goodale Park and along Neil Avenue. 36 These structures were primarily two- and one-half and three stories in height with steeply pitched hip and gable roofs, dormers, ornamental cresting, corbelled chimneys, highly decorated porches, windows of leaded and stained glasses in a variety of shapes and sizes, and carriage houses located in the back of the lots. 37 These features were characteristic of the Eastlake, Italianate, Romanesque and Queen Anne architectural styles of the Victorian Era in America. 38 By the turn of the century, these two areas, Goodale Park and Neil Avenue, were considered to be among the most fashionable in Columbus. Subsequent additions to the housing stock in the area were constructed on a smaller scale, but highlighted features adopted from the earlier architectural styles. Some apartment buildings and rowhouses were also
constructed in the area to accommodate the increasing university population.39

From the beginning, the area constituted a community of diverse income, occupation and educational groups, and a variety of lifestyles. Doctors, judges, lawyers, craftsmen, and merchants to name a few, built homes in the area and this social mixture was reflected in the variety of architecture and housing quality that still exist.40

Another hospital, "Doctors Hospital" was later established in the community. The hospital was originally a mansion. Prior to the hospital's establishment, the land was part of a land grant as signed in 1802 to Joseph R. Stau which extended from First Avenue to Fifth Avenue. Today, "Doctors North Hospital" is an integral part of the neighborhood. Commercial development was generally located along North High Street, and manufacturing activities were limited to the southwestern portion of the neighborhood.41

By 1920, the area now known as Victorian Village was completely developed. It has been noted that also around this time, the neighborhood began to experience a gradual decline. With the advent of the automobile and the creation of new suburbs further to the north and northwest of the City, many of the successful businesses and affluent residents moved out of the neighborhood to the suburbs. Influx of rural Appalachians, many of low income, and increased enrollment at The Ohio State University caused owner-occupancy to decline. Despite these factors the neighborhood was relatively stable throughout the decade of the 1920s.42
By 1940, a great proportion of the housing stock had been converted to two-family and four family rental units and rooming houses. Landlords were primarily absentee, being either speculators or people who had inherited the old homestead from their parents and were renting them out, since the demand for housing in the neighborhood was primarily by households of a lower socioeconomic status. By the end of 1940, 78 percent of the properties in the village was renter-occupied. By 1960, 82.9 percent of the housing units in the neighborhood were renter-occupied. As this trend continued, maintenance and upkeep declined to zero. It was maintained that the income from a rental property was either too low or a tenant was too destructive to justify a property's maintenance and upkeep. This attitude contributed to the neighborhood's decline. The local government also contributed to the decline in the neighborhood: streets and alleys were not maintained; street lighting became inadequate and outdated; and city services such as sanitation, health inspections and code enforcement were sadly neglected. As a consequence, the neighborhood became even more heavily populated with rural Appalachians, transients and university students, seeking affordable rental housing.

During the 1950's real property values in the Victorian Village neighborhood were beginning to decline. In 1966 deed transfer activity declined to its lowest point. During this low point, the average yearly value (based on a three year average) for a single-family home was $9,473, and the adjusted value (base on 1956 constant dollars) was $7,018. However, by the early 1970's the overall decline in the neighborhood had been arrested and thus, the potential economic attractiveness
and appeal of the neighborhood began to be realized. Between 1966 and 1975 the yearly average value (based on a three year average) had appreciated to $18,818. By 1976 both property values and deed transfer activity had accelerated significantly, factors attributed to the gentrification and neighborhood revitalization processes that were taking place in the Village.47

It should be noted that actual property values were increasing, but when converted to 1956 constant dollars (which was based on the average sale price of a single-family home in Franklin County in 1956, which was $14,512) were shown to be less than the actual average increase, indicating that real property values in Victorian Village were declining.48 (See Figure 5.)

Utilizing urban renewal funds, the City undertook an intensive code enforcement program of restrictive "conservation standards," rather than minimal housing code standards. From 1975 to 1978, Community Development Act funds and Section 312 and Section 235 loans were administered through a housing rehabilitation program which contributed to arresting the decline in the neighborhood.49

Today, a portion of the Victorian Village neighborhood has been included in the City of Columbus Ninth Year Community Development Block Grant funds for housing rehabilitation grants and low-interest loans, and Capital Improvement Program funds have been allocated to upgrade existing facilities and services (i.e., street lighting, fire station renovation, etc.).
Figure 5. ADJUSTED VALUE OF SALES IN THE VICTORIAN VILLAGE NEIGHBORHOOD – DEED TRANSFER ACTIVITY, 1956 TO 1980.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Transactions</th>
<th>Transactions per 100 structures</th>
<th>Yearly Average Value (3 yr. av.)</th>
<th>Adjusted Value (1956 constant $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>6.05</td>
<td>11,105</td>
<td>11,321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>10,981</td>
<td>10,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>10,691</td>
<td>10,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>7.38</td>
<td>10,657</td>
<td>9,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>10,639</td>
<td>9,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>5.23</td>
<td>9,473</td>
<td>9,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>9,473</td>
<td>7,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>7.28</td>
<td>14,159</td>
<td>7,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>7.28</td>
<td>14,960</td>
<td>7,621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>8.20</td>
<td>16,250</td>
<td>7,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>8.10</td>
<td>17,385</td>
<td>7,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>7.28</td>
<td>16,818</td>
<td>7,526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10.25</td>
<td>21,805</td>
<td>8,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>10.05</td>
<td>25,122</td>
<td>8,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>9.95</td>
<td>32,470</td>
<td>10,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>9.64</td>
<td>35,882</td>
<td>10,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>6.15</td>
<td>39,151</td>
<td>10,462</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*2 year average

ENDNOTES


3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Interview with Mr. Robert Applegate, City of Columbus Department of Development, Division of Community Development, Columbus, Ohio, 12 March 1984.


10 Interview with Mr. Robert Applegate.


13 City of Columbus Department of Development, "Neighborhood Strategy Area," Columbus, Ohio, 1978. (Typewritten.)


15 City of Columbus Department of Development, "Neighborhood Investment Strategy," Columbus, Ohio, 1981. (Typewritten.)

16 "History May Hide on High Street," *OSU Lantern*, 13 July 1984, p. 3.
17 Romin Koebel, "Toward Planned Neighborhood Revitalization: The Experience of the Near North Side, Columbus, Ohio, Man-Environment Systems 10 (September, 1980):263.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.


25 Ibid.

26 Ibid., p. 13.


29 Ibid.

30 City of Columbus, Department of Development, "Neighborhood Change," Columbus, Ohio, 1982, p. 40.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., p. 38.

33 "Celebrating Ten Years of Publication for You," The Neighborhood Busybody: Dennison Place Newsletter, 20 March 1984, p. 3.

34 Victorian Village Area Commission, "Guidelines for Rehabilitation," Columbus, Ohio, 1981. (Typewritten.)


36 Victorian Village Area Commission, "Guidelines."

38Ibid.


40Victorian Village Area Commission, "Guidelines."

41Alton Thompson, "Inner City Differentiation," pp. 100, 102.

42Ibid., p. 102.


44Alton Thompson, "Inner City Differentiation," p. 106.

45"Dennison Project," p. 5.

46Ibid.

47City of Columbus, Department of Development, "Neighborhood Change," Columbus, Ohio, 1982, p. 50.

48Ibid.

49Interview with Robert Applegate.
CHAPTER III

METHODS

Design

The case study approach was utilized to provide answers to the major research question: "Were the stages of gentrification and neighborhood revitalization that have occurred in the Dennison Place and Victorian Village neighborhoods in Columbus, Ohio different from the stages commonly observed in neighborhoods undergoing gentrification and neighborhood revitalization as explicated by the National Urban Coalition?"

The rationale for the selection of the case study approach was its flexibility and open-ended characteristics that lend themselves to examining the behavior of organizations or structures of neighborhoods and communities in describing the complex interrelationships among the constituent parts involved in the stages of gentrification and neighborhood revitalization. Therefore, taking into account the complex and unique events in the study areas in question, the case study was regarded as well suited to these neighborhoods which have experienced gentrification and neighborhood revitalization. As Rolf Goetz has pointed out, "the nature and extent of neighborhood changes (which constitute the stages of gentrification and neighborhood revitalization) currently underway are best revealed by an actual case in which the
basic neighborhood trend, disinvestment, has been transformed into potential displacement. . . ."2

**Analytical Framework**

Consistent with the major and minor research questions, the analytical framework was taken directly from the component parts of the stages of gentrification and neighborhood revitalization model developed by The National Urban Coalition as illustrated in Figure 6.

**The Study Areas**

Two neighborhoods within the Near North Side Community, Columbus, Ohio, Dennison Place and Victorian Village, were the focus of this study. The two neighborhoods were selected because they both contain a large proportion of elegant and stately homes constructed in the Victorian architectural style in addition to sharing similar histories in their development and decline. Both Dennison Place and Victorian Village experienced their most rapid development by 1899 with 58.3 percent and 52.6 percent of the housing stock, respectively, having been constructed by 1899. Between 1900 and 1919, an additional 40.0 percent of the housing stock was constructed in Dennison Place. In Victorian Village, during this same time period, 41.0 percent of the housing stock was constructed. Thus, by 1919, 98.3 of the housing stock had been constructed in Dennison Place and 92.6 percent had been constructed in Victorian Village. By the 1920s, both neighborhoods began to experience a gradual state of decline as a consequence of the exodus of middle and upper income households to the newly developing suburbs and an influx of low- and moderate-income households. Selected demographic and housing
**Figure 6. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STAGES OF GENTRIFICATION AND NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION MODEL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Start-Up Phase</th>
<th>Buy-In Phase</th>
<th>Take-Off Phase</th>
<th>Fill-In Phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>restoration work by owner-investor</td>
<td>early settlers pay more for comparable housing</td>
<td>confidence in the neighborhood established</td>
<td>property values and taxes rise dramatically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attracted by architectural features</td>
<td>aware of negative factors</td>
<td>newcomers feel need for security and status</td>
<td>long-term homeowners join in restoration/rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attracted by neighborhood diversity</td>
<td>confident in the future of the area</td>
<td>newcomers demand improved public services</td>
<td>long-term homeowners forced out due to rising property taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not put off by poor neighborhood environment as long as not personally threatened</td>
<td>look for stability in their neighbors</td>
<td>newcomers pay substantial higher prices for housing</td>
<td>long-term homeowners forced out due to stricter code enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>small scale reinvestment</td>
<td>not concerned neighbors are unlike themselves</td>
<td>speculative rehabilitation increases</td>
<td>remaining unimproved properties restored/rehabilitated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>housing converted to single-family homes</td>
<td>restoration/rehabilitation spreads and intensifies</td>
<td>long-term homeowners sell out</td>
<td>homeowner displacement peaks and then declines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>changes not readily apparent</td>
<td>gains public notice</td>
<td>departing homeowners have wanted to leave for years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>existing residents not aware of incipient change</td>
<td>tenant displacement attains significant proportions</td>
<td>newcomers disapprove &quot;inauthentic&quot; restoration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>little eviction or involuntary displacement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

characteristics of both study areas are included in Appendix A: Selected Demographics.

In recent years, many of the housing units in both neighborhoods have been restored/rehabilitated to their original grandeur. Both neighborhoods appear to have progressed through various stages of gentrification and neighborhood revitalization. The impetus for this progress would appear to have federal dollars allocated by the local government to neighborhood programs and Battelle's divestiture of its property holdings in the area which induced private investment. As a consequence of gentrification and neighborhood revitalization in the Dennison Place and Victorian Village neighborhoods, these two neighborhoods have experienced a great change in land rent topography that forced a large number of low-and moderate-income residents out of the area. The geographic boundaries of the study areas are shown in detail in Figure 7.

Data Collection

Information from Dennison Place and Victorian Village residents (primarily "pioneers" and "early settlers"), and former OMC tenants who were displaced, but managed to remain or return to the area, once the issue of residential displacement had been resolved, provided pertinent information to answer the research questions. Secondary statistical data was obtained from the following sources: "The OMC Market Demand Summary, 1977;" "Neighborhood Development Plan and Implementation Program Summary: Olentangy Management Company;" "The 1978 OMC Tenant Survey;" "The Report on 1978 Development Activities: Olentangy
Figure 7. STUDY AREA IN DETAIL

SOURCE: City of Columbus Department of Development, Division of Planning and Economic Development.
Management Company;" "The City of Columbus Department of Development Innovative Grant Program;" "The Innovative Grant Relocation Plan;" "The Innovative Grant Relocation Report;" "The Victorian Village Society's Planning Committee Survey;" The City of Columbus Department of Development's Columbus Development Strategy: Neighborhood Change (1956-1980 deed transfer analysis); The Annual Real Estate Report, Columbus Board of Realtors Multiple Listing Service Records; and "The 1974 and 1983 Franklin County Real Estate Tax Record for Residential Properties."

Census tract data for the City of Columbus from 1940 to 1980 was also utilized to trace the evolutionary changes that have occurred in the Dennison Place and Victorian Village neighborhoods. The census tract data for these neighborhoods has been compared with that for the City of Columbus as a whole to observe differences and similarities in demographic and housing characteristics for each decennial period.

Secondary data was employed to obtain quantitative data concerning the chain of events that took place relative to the stages of gentrification and neighborhood revitalization in the Dennison Place and Victorian Village neighborhoods.

To supplement these data, information was obtained from The Columbus Dispatch; The Columbus Citizen Journal; The Columbus Monthly Magazine; The Ohio Magazine; The Columbus Free Press; The Wall Street Journal; The Department of Development's Innovative Grant Application Summary: Near North/University Neighborhood Revitalization Program Report; and The Neighborhood Strategy Area Report; The Village Vibe Newsletter For and About Victorian Villagers; The Dennison Place.
Neighborhood Busybody Newsletter; and The Near North News. In addition, the Near North/University Information Profile: Community Planning Area 13; and "Toward Planned Neighborhood Revitalization: The Experience of the Near North Side, Columbus, Ohio," by Romin Koebel were utilized to trace the development of the Near North Side Community and its neighborhood.

Interviews

To help answer the research questions it was important to obtain the perceptions of neighborhood residents relative to the stages of gentrification and revitalization of these neighborhoods. Sixty-eight (N=68) respondents were interviewed in a telephone survey method.

Telephone surveys in recent years have gained general acceptance as a legitimate method of obtaining quantifiable and reliable data. The method has also gained acceptance because today an overwhelming majority of households have telephones, helping to reduce the sampling bias. The telephone survey results in a higher response rate than the personal interview. This may be attributed to the fact that people are quite skeptical about opening their doors to strangers but are willing to talk to strangers over the phone. Due to the brevity of the questionnaire, the author's tight time schedule, and limited resources, it was the most practical survey method to employ.

Some of the weaknesses of the telephone survey method must be pointed out. Telephone interviews may result in what is referred to as the "broken off" interview, that is the respondent will terminate the
interview before it is completed. The fact that this did not occur may be attributed to the brevity of the questionnaire, the structuring of the questions, and the fact that the majority of the residents were interested in the study. Telephone interviews may also produce less information, but the structure of these questions was fairly simple and not too personal. Thus, the respondents contacted were quite cooperative, although a few were reluctant to talk in the initial contact. This may be attributed to a disinclination on the part of some to talk to a stranger over the telephone. After taking a few moments to explain the survey's purpose and the importance of their cooperation, the majority consented. Only three people refused to cooperate. A weakness of this method, however, is that the interviewer cannot describe the respondent's physical characteristics or their environment. Since the author was familiar with the community, having lived in the surrounding area for three years and having used the census tract data extensively, this weakness was greatly reduced.

Taking the aforementioned into consideration, (28) respondents from the Dennison Place neighborhood; (28) respondents from the Victorian Village neighborhood; and (12) former OMC displacees were interviewed. The Dennison Place and Victorian Village residents were selected from lists of names and telephone numbers kept in the Department of Development's Division of Planning files on the OMC Phase One and Phase Two Project Area, 1977 to 1980; the Victorian Village Society, 1975 to 1977; and the Victorian Village Neighborhood 1978-1982. The respondents interviewed in these two neighborhoods were randomly selected from these
lists. A list of names and telephone numbers of former OMC tenants was not obtainable from either the City of Columbus Department of Development Relocation Office or from the Godman Guild Settlement House (a social service agency within the Near North Side Community). Since this was the case, the author utilized many newspaper articles that mentioned various neighborhood resident activists, the majority of whom were OMC tenants faced with potential displacement. A former social worker at Godman Guild was also contacted for assistance. From the names gathered, the Columbus City Directory and the Ohio Bell Telephone Directory were used in an effort to locate telephone numbers and current addresses.

The surveys were conducted during March and April of 1984. Each telephone contact was limited to fifteen to twenty minutes, which was sufficient time for the questionnaire to be completed. The questionnaire used to conduct the survey of the 56 respondents was developed from selected characteristics (variables) used in The National Urban Coalition's stages of gentrification and neighborhood revitalization model. The respondents were also asked about selected demographic characteristics. (See Appendix B: Survey Questionnaire - Dennison Place and Victorian Village Residents.)

The respondents who had been displaced (N=12) were asked a different set of questions. These questions were designed to obtain information concerning their personal experiences with displacement, and thus were open-end questions. The questions asked these respondents also included in Appendix C: Open-ended Questionnaire - OMC Tenant
Major Limitations

A major limitation of this study was that the author was unable to identify or locate persons displaced from the Victorian Village neighborhood, although several attempts were made. Of the 25 names and telephone numbers gathered of former OMC tenants, a little more than one-half (N=13) had relocated to unknown addresses, making it impossible to locate or interview them. Only one former OMC-displaced tenant refused to be interviewed. Documented statistics on the numbers and names of households who were actually displaced were unobtainable, and thus, presented some bias in the selection of persons interviewed. Another major limitation of this study was that data and information was not obtainable from the National Urban Coalition to quantify the timing of each stage. Therefore, a trend analysis was not possible.

Data Analysis

The data analysis technique employed in this study was content analysis of the secondary data sources and frequency distributions of responses expressed in percentages.
ENDNOTES


CHAPTER IV

START-UP PHASE THEORY

Dennison Place

By the beginning of 1970, the Battelle Memorial Institute had entered its fifth decade as a research corporation. The Institute has been described as riding a high wave of institutional prosperity during this time.¹ However, one year prior to this, a litigation had begun concerning the intent and meaning of Gordon Battelle's will. A lawsuit filed by the Attorney General of the State of Ohio and the Prosecuting Attorney of Franklin County, alleged that the Battelle Memorial Institute was not operating in accordance with the will of Gordon Battelle. The will states that:

... whenever at the end of any calendar year the income from the business of said 'Battelle Memorial Institute' shall result in a profit of over twenty percent of the principal of this legacy that said Board of Trustees shall distribute, in the name of said 'Battelle Memorial Institute' the amount of such earnings to such charitable institutions, needy enterprises or persons and in such manner and amounts as in their judgment will do the greatest good for humanity. ...²

Both the Attorney General and Prosecuting Attorney contended that interpretation of the will under contemporary standards would require a more sizable distribution of the Institute's income than was then being donated to charities not under its control.³

A compromise settlement with the United States Internal Revenue Service to end the Institute's exempt status from the payment of federal
income taxes had also raised serious questions about the operation and status of the Battelle Memorial Institute. The conditions of the settlement demanded a payment of $47,000,000 of Battelle's funds in compensation of taxes for the years 1968 through 1973, dismissing all of the corporation's past liability for federal income taxes. In addition, the Institute was subject to tax on its income for 1974 and the years thereafter. However, extraction of the exempt status, did not influence the Institute's position as a charitable, nonprofit trust under the laws of Ohio.³

The agreement of the lawsuit was made final with the entry of a declaratory decree and judgment in May of 1975, demanding a total dispersal of $80,000,000 in funds, property, and securities in adjustment of all prior liability to charity. In fulfilling the settlement, the Institute established two autonomous charitable organizations—the Battelle Commons Company for Community Urban Redevelopment and the Battelle Memorial Institute Foundation.⁴

According to one source, the Battelle Commons Company for Community Urban Redevelopment had been planned prior to the court agreement. The intended purpose of the organization was to help construct the Ohio Center, a multi-purpose civic center which included convention and meeting facilities, transportation-related facilities, a hotel, and a shopping mall. Under the settlement Battelle's share of the cost totalled 36.5 million dollars.⁵

The Battelle Memorial Institute Foundation, whose primary purpose was to distribute funds to charities under the administration of a Board
of representatives of various Columbus charitable and educational organizations, received $21,000,000. The settlement also required Battelle to transfer 7.5 million dollars to the Academy for Contemporary Problems, and to provide for the autonomous operation of the Academy. The agreement took into consideration prior expenditures by the Institute, including approximately $9,000,000 to the Energy Program and $7,000,000 to several charities. A formula based on the Institute's net income from investments and research contracts, with a minimum distribution beginning in 1978 of $100,000 a year, would determine future contributions. A total sum of $127,000,000 was required to satisfy the terms of these settlements. The Institute was also required to divest itself of its surplus land holdings in nearby neighborhoods.

Through the years, the Institute had acquired many of the properties surrounding its corporate headquarters. In all, the corporation had acquired 340 parcels with more than 600 dwelling units, including approximately 150 vacant properties. It was alleged by Battelle that the parcels acquired were needed for the future expansion of its facilities. While clearance for expansion was pending, the structures in their possession were rented to enclaves of Appalachians, college students, working and unemployed people, and subsistence elderly, who were paying low rents (ranging from $80 to $110 a month). During this time, Battelle allowed the properties to further deteriorate, and in turn, some long-term homeowners in the area became caught up in a cycle of neighborhood decay and deterioration.
In October 1976, the Olentangy Management Company (OMC), an independent for profit subsidiary, was established by the Institute in order to divest its holdings in the area. Rather than disposing of the deteriorating structures at a short run profit, however, the corporation decided to engage in an ambitious program of gradual and comprehensive planned neighborhood rehabilitation. The Institute desired for its corporate headquarters, a better entry image, an improvement of access patterns and a setting in a viable neighborhood, while adequate space for future expansion would be maintained. The long term effects of the program would be to promote appreciation of property values, and in doing so, the Institute intended to recoup its original investment of approximately $5,000,000. As one author stated, "Although Battelle was organized on a nonprofit basis, there was every intention of running it as a not for loss institution as well."  

The Olentangy Management Company (OMC) was considered the vehicle that could effectively address the problems of the neighborhood and work with the neighborhood organizations to upgrade the area. OMC was charged with the responsibility of the Institute's properties in the neighborhood, in an area bounded by Eighth Avenue to the north, Third Avenue to the south, Neil Avenue to the east, and Olentangy River to the west. Over the years, Battelle had purchased 60 percent of the property from Third Avenue to Fifth Avenue; 50 percent from Fifth Avenue to King Avenue; and 30 percent of the property from King Avenue to Eighth Avenue. In sum, the Institute's property holdings covered 100 acres within the area. The housing stock under OMC management ranged from 2 and 3-story
brick structures to small wooden frame units which had been constructed in the Victorian architectural style. 11

The Institute's chief executive, Sherwood Fawcett stated that,

... Olentangy Management Company will provide more direct involvement with the properties on a day-to-day basis and make it possible to work more closely with residents of the neighborhood. The new company is intended to give stronger continuity and focus to management policies affecting the area ... it is time to have an organization that can devote all of its time and effort to the properties, and the Olentangy Management Company will do just that. 12

It was also claimed that as a result of changes in research opportunities, Battelle no longer intended to use all the property, and several years ago decided to reevaluate the future of its property holdings. 13 The new company's president, Barry Humphries asserted that, ... we have concentrated our efforts in two areas:

1. to improve our property management system; and
2. to establish overall direction for our properties in the neighborhood. 14

The latter objective had been adopted as a result of the employment of Naramore, Bain, Brady, and Johanson (NBBJ), a Seattle, Washington based architectural and planning firm who was to work with OMC and neighborhood interests to inventory the existing neighborhood conditions and propose economic, physical, and social strategies that would upgrade the Institute's properties while maintaining the overall character of the neighborhood. In keeping with these objectives, OMC had contacted several neighborhood organizations in the area. The data gathered from the inventory were supposed to be the partial results of several meetings that the firm had conducted with representatives of the
neighborhood organizations, and was to be presented at OMC's first official public planning session with representatives of the various organizations. According to OMC's president, "the policy of the corporation is to continue to involve these groups in our planning and work with them on common areas of concern." In keeping with the stated policy, the purpose of the planning session was to verify the accuracy of the company's planning information through knowledgeable representatives and to correct any misconceptions very early in the planning process.

In addition to making the announcement about the planning session, Humphries announced the extent of OMC's commitment to carrying out a planned approach. While the planning program was still in the development stage, OMC announced its intent to demolish four structures.

The corporation approaches the demolition of any of its structures cautiously, as the result is a loss of revenue. Demolition is only approved after condemnation orders are issued by the City and our evaluation indicates that a unit has reached a state of physical obsolescence that makes it uneconomical to rehabilitate.

OMC received a request from the Near North Housing Task Force that OMC make the structures available for homesteading to low-income families in the neighborhood. Humphries' emphatic position on the request was:

Regardless of the economic considerations or merits of a homesteading program, Olentangy Management Company cannot dispose of its properties on a piecemeal basis until we have completed our master planning for all of our properties. If our planning program is successful, we hope to be in a position to resolve ... the future of our properties by mid-summer of 1977.

The data presented at the first planning session was not very impressive to the area residents or to city planners who were familiar
with the area (most of the demographic data were based on the 1970 Census); very little information, in fact, had been generated. As a consequence, Humphries agreed to involve neighborhood residents and organizations in developing alternatives for properties under OMC's management. May 1, 1977 was the deadline agreed upon for input by the neighborhood organizations. It was proclaimed that, "The community participation structure relies heavily on each neighborhood organization for contributions . . . and are extremely important to construct alternatives for consideration." Six areas were identified at the session as part of the study area in question:

1. Battelle Campus
2. King Avenue to The Ohio State University (O.S.U.)
3. Circle Area
4. Neil Avenue Corridor
5. Third Avenue to Fifth Avenue
6. Riverview (Perry Street to the Olentangy River).

What is important to this entire scenario is that prior to the first planning session, NBBJ had conducted a three month (January 1977-March 1977) market demand survey. It was alleged that the market analysis for the proposed area was to recognize area trends and identify unique demands within the study area, "While area-wide trends provide the context for all development activities, unique study area demands provide a developer with a market over which he can exert maximum control." Approximately 3,000 surveys were distributed to employees at the three major institutions in the study area: Battelle, O.S.U. and Doctors Hospital North. Among the survey respondents were:
According to the market demand summary, the overwhelming demand identified was for rehabilitated residential structures and this demand exceeded the supply by a factor of two. There was also a substantial demand for both garden apartments and townhouses. Although the demand for units included all income groups, and estimates had included the housing needs of the low-income and student population, it seems ironic that the housing needs of existing residents in the neighborhood, many of whom were low-income and students, were not estimated.

In response to the results of the market demand summary, the Godman Guild Settlement House concluded that

Battelle has always indicated a desire to "improve the quality of the neighborhood"—especially the area Battelle owns. Although it is the ultimate goal . . . to accomplish "neighborhood improvement on a scale not previously possible", Battelle has never indicated that it shared that basic goal of neighborhood improvement for the present neighborhood residents—the people who first started working toward that goal. In preparing its market and research studies . . . Battelle left out a large and important group of individuals who will be dramatically affected—the present residents . . . many of which have lived in the neighborhood since Battelle first started owning rental property, more than a decade ago. As the plan is proposed, it will almost certainly intensify and compound the problem of urban displacement as the price paid for working to live in a better neighborhood.
Although the Guild had forcefully expressed serious concerns for the potential displacement of many of the existing residents once OMC began implementing the neighborhood improvement program, when the OMC "Neighborhood Development Plan and Implementation Program" was released to the public in August 1977 it did not acknowledge minimizing displacement as one of its four basic objectives. Rather the objectives were to:

- Create viable neighborhood units within the study area
- Provide adequate expansion area for Battelle with improved access and entry image
- Involve the citizens in the planning process
- Participate with the City of Columbus and other government agencies to implement programs supportive or revitalization of the neighborhood.26

To directly respond to the objectives and the market analysis of the management company, the "Neighborhood Development Plan and Implementation Program" outlined the plan and program to be developed in two phases. The boundaries for Phase One of the proposed project area was King Avenue and The Ohio State University to the north, Third Avenue to the south, and Neil Avenue to the east, the western boundary north of Fifth Avenue was Perry Street and south of Fifth Avenue the boundary zigzagged between Pennsylvania and Michigan Avenues. The Phase One redevelopment area encompassed approximately 50 acres and included the management company's best housing stock. The projected completion of Phase One was to take seven to ten years.27
OMC Phase One

King Avenue/The Ohio State University

In this area, 30 percent of the property was under the management of OMC. The decision to include this area in Phase One rather than Phase Two, as previously proposed, was due to the fact that at the time The Ohio State University was assessing the future expansion of its medical facility, and as a result, properties between the University and Ninth Avenue were divested without renovation.29

Battelle Expansion

This portion of the project was intended to provide for future expansion, to reasonably merge property, and to enhance access and entry to the Institute and the neighborhood. Primarily, the area would be a visitor entrance to the Institute and a buffer between the Institute and the neighborhood. To satisfy this, a boulevard linking King Avenue to Fifth Avenue was recommended between Battelle and the Circle Park area. The boulevard was to include a landscaped pedestrian/bike system and a median with turning lanes lined with trees. The visitor entrance to the corporation would also be attractively landscaped.30

Circle Park/Neil Avenue

The visual impact of these properties was quite significant in this area next to the Institute's headquarters. The concentration of Battelle controlled land here was substantial. Therefore, to capitalize on the plan for the properties in this area renovation was targeted to exterior and energy oriented rehabilitation. After renovation, these properties would be placed on the real estate market, emphasizing
single-family homeownership. The relocation of fourteen to sixteen structures to vacant lots was also proposed because these structures were in the Institute's proposed expansion area and the boulevard right-of-way. The entire Circle Park/Neil Avenue area was to be rezoned to a lower density, supporting single-family development and was to be incorporated in a historic district to retain the quality and unique character of the area.31

Improvements in the circulation/parking system were also proposed. Such improvements would include:

- Entry to the neighborhood from the recommended boulevard linking King Avenue to Fifth Avenue and Neil Avenue.

- Access to the neighborhood on Pennsylvania and Michigan Avenues from Fifth Avenue and King Avenue was to be closed to deter through traffic.

- Existing alleys would be upgraded to provide fences, garbage enclosures, landscaping, lighting and parking.32

Finally, other improvements proposed in this area included:

- Four mini-parks in the closed portions of Pennsylvania and Michigan Avenues would provide additional park/open space in this area.

- Bus shelters would be installed.

- Landscaping of the Circle Parks at the center of street intersections would be undertaken.33

In the first year, a demonstration project on Seventh Avenue was to be carried out to indicate the potential of the area for restoration as well as to demonstrate the manner in which alley and park improvements could be integrated into the area.34
Harrison Avenue/Pennsylvania Avenue

The properties under the Institute's control in this area would receive exterior and energy related renovations. Through limited relocation of existing residential structures and the construction of duplexes, townhouses and single-family units, vacant lots were to be infilled. Property sales in this area also emphasized homeownership, as well as providing existing tenants the opportunity to purchase. The expansion of the historic district was to also include Harrison and Pennsylvania Avenues. To discourage through traffic and alleviate conflict at the intersection of Fifth Avenue and Harrison Avenue, a cul-de-sac was recommended. A centrally located neighborhood park on Fourth Avenue between Pennsylvania and Michigan Avenues was proposed for development. To upgrade the visual impact of Third Avenue, the improvement of Third Avenue was recommended. Finally, to indicate the area potential for revitalization, infill housing and street upgrading, a demonstration project between Fourth and Fifth Avenues, Harrison and Neil Avenues was delineated in the Master Plan.35

The OMC strategy was to exemplify what might be accomplished with older homes and to demonstrate to local lending institutions the desirability of the area for mortgage loans. OMC did not have plans to become directly involved in mortgage financing. Two prominent homes, one at 356 West Seventh Avenue, and the other at 397 West Seventh Avenue were to be totally restored to their original grandeur. To accomplish the task, Damon Baker and Robert Gease, two highly respected Columbus, Ohio developers and craftsmen were selected to completely restore the structures. It was assumed that once restored, these models would command
between $75,000 and $100,000. However, when the latter model home was
sold, in September of 1978, the purchase price as $120,000. In addi-
tion, OMC announced that their plan included restoring two homes to
appeal to the middle-income, and restoring two homes to accommodate
low- to moderate-income households. The two homes that were to be
restored for low- to moderate-income owners were never restored by OMC.
(See Figure 8.)

The Master Plan outlined renovating only the exteriors of the
structures. The theory of exterior renovation was based on the assump-
tion that purchasers would be able to do most of the interior renovation
through "sweat equity" to reduce the price of the property once it was
placed on the real estate market. The external renovations included
sandblasting and tuck-pointing brick or stone exteriors, replacing the
deteriorated wood of frame structures, replacing roofs if necessary,
installing new gutters, repairing and/or reconstructing porches,
painting, landscaping, and fencing. Other work to be done was complete
insulation, including stormdoors and windows. According to the manage-
ment company's president, Barry Humphries:

Doing only the exteriors will keep the prices down. People can
put 'sweat equity' (their own labor) into the interiors to save
money. This plan should enable many of the low- to moderate-
income residents to remain. Residential rehabilita-
tion projects throughout the country have forced out the poor as
property values climb and the well-to-do move in. We want a real
mix (of people). The real challenge is to maintain some low- to
moderate-income residents. We hope to get national publicity
from this. OMC signed a contract with a consulting firm
whose job it is to search out federal grants to make the project
big. Federal money will be sought to enable low-income residents
to obtain mortgages as well as for necessary capital improvements
such as street lighting, wider alleys, parks, and other
amenities.
Figure 8. PHASE ONE OF OLENTANGY MANAGEMENT COMPANY'S PROPOSAL FOR RESTORATION

SOURCE: City of Columbus Department of Development, "Innovative Grant Summary."
Exterior renovation for large homes was estimated to cost between $10,000 and $12,000, and between $5,000 and $8,000 for more modest structures. A total of $12,000,000 was committed by Battelle for such restoration/rehabilitation efforts. OMC's chief spokesman (Humphries) contended that, "existing tenants would be given the first opportunity to purchase, and public bidding would follow at the appraised value."

The estimated price that better houses would command on the market ranged from $30,000 to $60,000, and the more modest units between $15,000 to $25,000.

A survey conducted in the area by a city and regional planning class at The Ohio State University in 1978, revealed that 39.6 percent of the existing residents had earned annual income of less than $5,000. Another survey conducted by the Godman Guild, concluded that 62.5 percent of the existing tenants had annual earned incomes of less than $4,000 per year. Although there was some doubts as to which survey was more representative of the present population, there was not any doubt that many tenants were already spending a large proportion of their income for housing. Therefore, the ability of existing tenants to reap benefit from the massive revitalization project would be limited because many households were unable to meet the minimum conventional financing requirements of a 20 percent downpayment and monthly mortgage payments of $125.00 to $220.28 on loan principals ranging from $16,000 to $28,000, as well as the additional expense of the required interior renovations. OMC's president asserted:

Profit making is a consideration at OMC and we reserve the right to make a profit. A balanced company ledger is essential and residents should not look to the golden egg of Battelle for tons
of money to be dumped there. I'm not the city and I'm not the public housing authority. I have to keep in mind the overall economic condition of my company. My number one objective is to improve the neighborhood.\textsuperscript{40}

OMC's plan included selling most of the houses itself—avoiding the standard seven percent real estate sales commission. Since this was the case, virtually none of the properties were listed with the local real estate multiple listing service during the time of their sale. OMC assumed that by keeping both sales and rent "in house", Battelle's tarnished image in the neighborhood would be changed. OMC declared that the properties would be sold at prices approximating fair market value.\textsuperscript{41}

In October 1977, the renovation of 22 structures was begun and renovation of 64 more units was planned for 1978. It was anticipated that the renovated structures would be placed on the housing market between May and October of 1978. In addition, OMC claimed that most residents would not be affected by the renovation program for some time because renovation activity would be undertaken on 20 to 25 properties at a time and thus it would take a great deal of time to complete the entire redevelopment plan.\textsuperscript{42} Renovation activity was to begin in two areas: Seventh Avenue in the area of the circles, and on Neil and Harrison Avenues between Fourth Avenue and Fifth Avenue; the areas that had the greatest potential to attract more affluent households.

However, the management company also contended,

\ldots to establish housing for as many income levels as possible in our first year of operations. \ldots the sale of land and buildings to John Sandefar local Section 8 builder for 26 units of rent subsidy (low-income) housing in the Harrison West area was the first step. This low-income housing combined with four
houses proposed to be donated to the Near North Housing Task Force, brings the total low income housing that OMC has made possible to 30 units. In attempts to appeal to other segments, 11 houses are being sold to builders for interior and exterior rehabilitation which will then be resold for homeownership.43

The four properties donated to the housing task force were for the purpose of helping to establish a nonprofit housing corporation whose primary purpose was to provide many of the low and moderate income tenants homeownership and Section 8 rental opportunities. However, prior to this "generous" donation, OMC had rejected the task forces proposal of managing 200 of the management company's rental units, claiming the task force lacked experience. Also rejected was the idea of donating 10 properties which would be rehabilitated through conventional financing, and the capital generated from the sale of the rehabilitated properties to be used to purchase more homes in the area. According to Kenneth Molli, co-coordinator of the task force, "one of the houses donated to us located north of Fifth Avenue was in such awful condition we turned it down."44 Molli also stated that, "for the corporation to be effective, we would have to own 100 units to retain low and moderate income households."45

In March and April of 1978 six properties were sold to two private developers and a State Representative. Three potential single-family structures were sold to developer Damon Baker: 361-363 West Seventh Avenue for $12,500; 347 West Seventh Avenue for $15,500, and 379 West Seventh Avenue for $16,300. One single-family unit and a six unit apartment house were sold to developer Robert Gease: 390 West Seventh Avenue for $10,900 and 1371-1375 Michigan Avenue for $10,700. These
sales were defended by OMC as part of the company's redevelopment plan. However, area tenants claimed the sale of the properties to developers was a "direct violation of trust." The tenants also acknowledged that they were aware that two multiple units would be sold to developers, but the selling of the properties to Baker and Gease was "the frosting on the cake." One of the current tenants at 379 West Seventh Avenue, had been interested in purchasing the property that had been sold to Baker, raising doubt as to OMC's sincerity of its original statement that it would offer existing tenants the first opportunity to purchase.

Dawn Petersein, general manager of OMC alleged, "these homes were not part of the five to ten percent that will be offered to the present tenants." The management company's response to the residents' accusations were:

Under OMC policy all tenants are given an opportunity to purchase their present dwelling where possible. This tenant and other eligible tenants who are not afforded the opportunity to purchase, will go on a priority list . . . to buy a different OMC property that has been turned down by its current occupant.

To reinforce the management company's defense of its selling of the properties, it was pointed out that a previous letter to the residents concerning tenants being given the first option to purchase, contained a paragraph which stated, "the company's policy to give current residents the first opportunity to purchase should not be considered binding and could be subject to change." What was also very frustrating to the tenants in the sale of the properties to the developers was that the properties were sold unrenovated. However, when the residents had requested the right to purchase properties in their present condition,
intending to do the exterior renovation themselves to avoid the additional costs at the time of initial purchase, OMC turned down the request, stating that this would disrupt the project plans. In an attempt to justify OMC's reasons for selling these properties to the developers, it was contended that the properties required exterior and interior restoration and once restored the developers would place them on the market for owner occupancy. The sale of these properties by the developers, it was held, would induce confidence in the area by local lending institutions as well as attract more affluent households to the area.

The sale of the property to Ohio Representative Michael Stinziano was also defended as part of OMC's overall Master Plan. After renting the property for less than two months at $275.00 per month, the property was sold to "current renter" Stinziano in May of 1978.

By this time some area residents were also criticizing the City's public officials and Department of Development staff members for not taking appropriate steps to assist residents who wanted to remain in the neighborhoods and for not doing anything to mitigate the adverse effects of the displacement which were taking place. They criticized the City for not yet developing a sound, workable program to prevent even the most avoidable displacement created by OMC's Master Plan, and for allocating Community Developments funds for such capital improvements as street and alley improvements of primary benefit to Battelle. These tended to be valid criticisms, particularly since the ultimate beneficiaries of Community Development Block Grant funds should be low-and
moderate-income persons according to the terms of original enactment. The City was required by federal regulation to develop a displacement program when Community Development funds were to be used to supplement such a project as OMC's "Neighborhood Development Plan and Implementation Program" which would cause direct or indirect displacement or other hardships to low- and moderate-income persons. By providing capital improvement funds in the OMC project area it would appear that the City was contributing to the problems confronting many of the neighborhood residents.

In May of 1978, OMC christened its massive revitalization project "Renaissance" which was a name and a marketing concept created to arouse a yearning for the classic tree-lined residential neighborhood with its elegant and stately brick houses with wide porches and arched windows, strong wood staircases and Sunday dinner dining rooms.

Also, during the month of May, the management company released its real estate purchase agreement and bidding rules (see Appendix D). Some neighborhood residents were concerned that an aristocratic name such as "Renaissance" would dramatically increase property values and rents, thereby forcing them out. Other neighborhood residents were equally concerned and suspicious about the real estate purchase agreement and bidding rules. Neither guaranteed that eligible tenants would be provided the first opportunity to purchase an OMC property, nor were eligible tenants aware of what the final asking price of a home would be in the bidding rule. These were legitimate concerns.
On June 1, 1978 the Olentangy Management Company conducted a preview showing of model homes in the Phase One project areas ("Renaissance"). (See Figure 9.) As a result, when OMC's model homes were sold, they commanded prices as high as $120,000. In addition, given the size of the houses in the Phase One area and spiraling interest rates, the selling prices of the properties in this area were between $65,000 and $100,000. Since this was the case, it would be ludicrous to think any of the properties in Phase One were targeting to attract OMC's low- and moderate-income tenants as homebuyers.

During the years 1977 and 1979, the period in which the City's planner for the Near North Side, Ronald Rybak, kept a comprehensive account of the properties sold while the Phase One residential restoration/rehabilitation activities were in progress it was indicated that of 90 properties sold, 61.1 percent (55 properties) were sold to non-residents of the area, 14.4 percent (13 properties) were sold to developers, and only 24.4 (22 properties) throughout the entire Near North Side were sold to OMC tenants. The properties sold included both single-family and multi-family dwelling units.

**Victorian Village**

In 1965, there was a renewed interest in the Near North Side community by the local government. An urban renewal project was launched by the City of Columbus which became known as the Dennison Avenue Conservation Project. The project was aimed at halting the decline of the community. It encompassed Fifth Avenue to the north, First Avenue to the south, High Street to the east and Neil Avenue to the west.
Figure 9. TYPICAL ADVERTISEMENT OF THE OLENTANGY MANAGEMENT COMPANY

Olentangy Management Company requests your presence on Thursday, June 1, 1978, from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. to enjoy wines and cheeses and to participate in a preview showing of model properties in Renaissance, a planned restoration community.

Enclosed please find a parking guide and directions to the location of the preview party:

R.S.V.P. regrets only, 421-7450

According to a City staff person of the project,

The neighborhood was seedy and rundown, and highly transient. At any time of the day or night you'd see people loading up trucks, tying things on top of cars. Code enforcement was practically nonexistent.\textsuperscript{55}

The primary objectives of the project were to enforce housing codes, acquire land, raze substandard structures and construct new ones, provide low-income housing rehabilitation grants and low-interest loans, make capital improvements and landscape the neighborhood.\textsuperscript{56}

A majority of the project funds were used to acquire land and raze structures which were not salvageable or which impeded the expansion of the neighborhood's primary land users Doctors North Hospital and Everett Junior High School, and to allow for the construction of the Thompson Recreation Center. Other structures were demolished to provide for the realignment of Starr Avenue. Many properties were acquired by the City when owners refused to bring their properties up to housing code standards, thus, opting to sell them cheaply. During the course of the project, the City acquired and demolished 178 structures which were predominantly renter-occupied.\textsuperscript{57}

Residents who were forced to move from a dwelling unit which was scheduled for demolition were offered relocation assistance. Displaced residents were given an allowance of $50 per room for moving expenses.\textsuperscript{58}

There are no available statistics to substantiate the amount of displacement that occurred. One might safely assume, however, that demolition of 178 structures had a significant impact on many of the neighborhood residents, especially tenants, since the majority of the housing units were renter-occupied and the vacancy rate had been zero.
Federal funds, in the form of Section 312 loans and Section 115 grants, were available to low-income owner-occupants for rehabilitation and property maintenance. The loans and grants enabled homeowners to upgrade properties above housing code requirements, which contributed to the aesthetics of the project area. According to one local government staff member, approximately 450 dwelling units were rehabilitated through the provision of grants and loans, or a combination of both. During the project years, housing rehabilitation grants and loans totalled $800,000.59

Other project improvements included street and alley resurfacing, sidewalk improvements, street lights and sewer upgrading, and an extensive landscaping (450 trees were planted) program. According to one observer of the project,

One of the most readily apparent exterior changes the Dennison project has wrought is the tree planting. Any bureaucracy that brings flowering trees to a poor neighborhood has to be on the right track. Improved sewers are great; but it is the little amenities like this that can transform a mundane urban rehabilitation program.60

Garry Kane, a staff member of the project, remarked:

... the most important service that the project offered to the community, and the reason for its impact, was simply that its workers became a part of the community and acted as advocates. After years of neglect, someone was going to insist that the city do its job. The neighborhood began to develop a sense of pride and a realization of its power and this was worth more than any of the dollars that had been spent.61

It has been noted that prior to the implementation of the project, the Near North Side Neighborhood Association, which had hardly ever attracted more than six or seven people to a meeting, began attracting
crowds of over 100. In addition, it is noteworthy to mention that the community had not played an active role in getting funds for the project and the neighborhood organizations that later were instrumental in applying pressure for government funding in the community were quite inactive.62

The Dennison Avenue Conservation Project was phase out in 1976. The net project cost for eleven years of implementation totalled $4,800,000. To some observers, the Dennison Avenue Conservation Project was among the most successful projects ever attempted in Columbus to motivate private investment because in 1978. The neighborhood experienced $4,115,800 in gross sales, in 115 private transactions, nearly equalling the public expenditure that had been made to implement the project.63 (See Figure 10.)
Figure 10. DENNISON AVENUE CONSERVATION PROJECT AREA

LAND ACQUISITION PLAN

1  BLOCK NUMBER
 parcels number

LAND TO BE ACQUIRED
ACQUIRED FOR CLEARSANCE & REDEVELOPMENT
ACQUIRED FOR PUBLIC FACILITIES

SOURCE: City of Columbus Urban Renewal Commission, October 1960.
ENDNOTES


3Boehm and Groner, p. 86.

4Ibid.

5Ibid.

6Ibid.

7Ibid.

8Romin Koebel, "Toward Planned Neighborhood Revitalization: The Experience of the Near North Side," Columbus, OH.

9"Residents to Fight Battelle's Subsidiary," Columbus Dispatch, 4 September 1977, p. 2.

10Boehm and Groner, p. 95.


13Barry Humphries to N. Jack Huddle, 10 March 1977, Barry Humphries Papers, Olentangy Management Company, Columbus, Ohio.

14Ibid.

15Ibid.

16Ibid.

17Ibid.
18Ibid.


20Ibid.

21Olentangy Management Company, "Market Demand Survey Summary," Columbus, Ohio, 1977. (Typedwitten.)

22Ibid.

23Ibid.


27Olentangy Management Company, "Neighborhood Development Plan."

28Ibid.

29Ibid.

30Ibid.

31Ibid.

32Ibid.

33Ibid.

34Ibid.

35"Housing Plan to Include Poor?" Columbus Dispatch, 16 February 1978, sec. B-3.

36Ibid.

37"Residents to Fight Battelle's Subsidiary," Columbus Dispatch, 4 September 1977, p. 3.

38"Housing Plan to Include Poor?", B-3.


Ibid.

Interview with Mr. Kenneth Molli, Columbus, Ohio, 19 April 1984.

"Housing Plan to Include Poor?", Sec. B-4.


Ibid.

Ibid.


"Legislator Buying Battelle Rehabilitation Area Home," *Columbus Citizen Journal*, 14 April 1978, p. 3.

Julie Straub to N. Jack Huddle, 21 April 1978, Julie Straub Papers, Columbus, Ohio.


"Olentangy Management Company's List of Property Sales," 15 October 1979. (Typewritten.)


Interview with Mr. Robert Applegate, City of Columbus Department of Development, Division of Community Development, Columbus, Ohio, 12 March 1984.

"Dennison Project," p. 5.

Ibid., p. 16.


62. Ibid.

63. Jeff Long to Wanda Coston, 20 March 1984, Jeff Long Papers, Columbus, Ohio.
CHAPTER V

BUY-IN PHASE THEORY

Dennison Place

Innovative Grant Program

During his Administration, President Carter announced a new comprehensive national urban policy. The new policy was declared to be a new partnership among all levels of government (federal, state, and local), private enterprise and neighborhood organizations. It was hoped that the new partnership would stimulate neighborhood involvement in community development and neighborhood revitalization. Thus, the City of Columbus' "Innovative Grant" application submitted to HUD was supposed to reflect a new partnership between the local government, private enterprise, and the neighborhood organizations in the area undergoing revitalization.

In January 1978, the Department of Development submitted a $2,003,100 Innovative Grant Proposal which was to advance the state of the community development art in the areas of urban reinvestment and promotion of neighborhood diversity and vitality by deconcentration of economic groups of persons. Many aspects of the proposal submitted to HUD were, in fact, part of OMC's Master Plan for the revitalization of the area. The proposal's stated purpose was:

To support an effective public/private partnership for the revitalization of the Near North/University Neighborhood and to
reduce tenant displacement and gentrification.\textsuperscript{1} (Emphasis by the author.)

The components of the proposal that supported the revitalization program being executed by OMC were:

1. A tenant assistance program which was to reduce impending dislocation of existing tenants and gentrification through rehabilitation grants, home maintenance support, housing removal/rehabilitation, and relocation assistance and services.
2. An infrastructure improvements plan which would provide the City with the capability to furnish basic capital improvements and neighborhood amenities.\textsuperscript{2}

The only public hearing concerning the components of the grant proposal was held two days before the deadline for submitting it to HUD, although federal grants require at least two public hearings prior to being submitted. Both area residents and Columbus City Council members criticized N. Jack Huddle, Director of the City of Columbus' Department of Development for not scheduling the required public hearings, providing ample time to discuss the subject matter of the proposal. Director Huddle's explanations for the lack of public hearings were that only recently had the Department received accurate deadline information and that neighborhood organizations had been working with OMC on the Master Plan since last spring (March 1977).\textsuperscript{3} These were not satisfactory explanations according to his critics.

At the hearing, several aspects of the proposed program were questioned by the residents. According to one resident, "the net effect of the program will be to reduce the amount of low-income housing in Columbus which is already scarce."\textsuperscript{4} Council member Jerry Hammond, one of
the two council members, the other council member being Pam Conrad, conducting the hearing noted that:

Low income neighborhoods which are neglected quickly become blighted and that efforts should be made to stabilize such neighborhoods. Without Battelle's involvement and commitment to retain some low-income residents, everyone could lose. You are faced with 100 percent displacement of poor people. It happened in German Village and could happen here. A commitment to create a neighborhood with residents of diverse incomes is therefore attractive.5

Council members Hammond and Conrad both agreed that," the project offered a 'unique opportunity' to combine massive private investment with public involvement, to try to turn a neighborhood around... although some displacement is unavoidable."6 They both pledged efforts to minimize displacement.

Neighborhood residents were particularly concerned that $594,200 was included in the proposal budget for the construction of a proposed Battelle Boulevard (Perry Street relocation). Others questioned how helpful the $700,000 included in the budget for a Tenant Assistance Program would be in assisting OMC tenants to become homeowners. One very important concern of both residents and council members was how binding the proposal was, and if approved, would citizen participation clarify and redefine the many questionable components of the proposal. Council members Conrad and Hammond assured area residents that citizen participation would be an essential element in the implementation of the "Innovative Grant Program." After delays, the proposal was approved by Council on January 26, 1978.7

In March of 1978, Columbus Mayor Tom Moody led a delegation of city and state officials, Olentangy Management company representatives, and
neighborhood organization spokespersons to Washington, D.C. to lobby in favor of the "Innovative Grant Program." The delegation acknowledged that without the grant program it would be difficult to prevent displacement due to OMC revitalization of the area.\textsuperscript{8} The group's lobbying effort was also to show support for the Tenant Assistance Program. Some members of the delegation, particularly the neighborhood spokespersons, still opposed the proposed boulevard. During the ensuing months, OMC president Humphries stated that, "in order to achieve the social and economic objectives of this planning, close cooperation between the private and public sector is essential."\textsuperscript{9} Humphries also remarked,

Getting the grant is vital to the current rehabilitation plan and maintaining low-income residents. Another $3,000,000 or so in city capital improvements is also mandatory. . . . Otherwise, there may be no Phase Two . . . (of the OMC program).\textsuperscript{10}

In June 1978, Ohio's United States Senators John Glenn and Howard Metzenbaum announced that the City of Columbus, Ohio had been awarded $2,003,200 out of a national total of $5,000,000 to implement the "Innovative Grant Program." The City of Columbus and Portland, Oregon were the only two cities awarded the innovative grant from the 92 applications received by HUD.\textsuperscript{11} Sources close to the application process credited Mayor Moody and Councilman Hammond with impressing upon federal officials that Columbus could put the monies to good use.\textsuperscript{12}

Certain segments of the Innovative Grant's program were considered critical to alleviate displacement of OMC tenants. One-half of the programs budget was to directly or indirectly help residents, with $700,000 apportioned to interior rehabilitation which otherwise could
not be afforded. Two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000) were allocated to transfer structures from existing locations to vacant lots and to rehabilitate them.\textsuperscript{13}

According to sources in Senator Metzenbaum's office $50,000 would assist tenants with relocation costs, and $17,000 was to be used to establish a relocation assistance office. Four hundred thirteen thousand dollars ($413,000) were designated for a home maintenance support program, including a mobile tool library.\textsuperscript{14}

The other half of the program's budget was strongly opposed by many of the Near North Side community residents. The opposition was targeted to the capital improvements sector of the program. This section included $594,200 allocated to construct the boulevard, and two hundred thirty-three thousand dollars ($233,000) appropriated to improve Third Avenue. Finally, $178,000 was allotted to develop a park on the Michigan Avenue Elementary School site at Fourth Avenue.\textsuperscript{15}

Upon the announcement of the grant, one tenant resident expressed that:

His group is pleased the grant will mitigate adverse effects of displacement, but . . . objects to the boulevard and park capital improvements proposal. . . . Harrison West and the Fifth to King Association changed initial opposition . . . after being informed the capital improvements section would be omitted.\textsuperscript{16}

However, they were soon to find out that the capital improvements section had not been omitted. To reinforce the positive components of the Innovative Grant Program, city officials pointed out, "... the federal grant will permit many low and moderate income OMC tenants to get
mortgages with just 10 percent down payments. But would OMC tenants actually be the beneficiaries of the opportunity when it had already been revealed in the various surveys conducted that many of the existing tenants had annual incomes of less than $4,000 to $5,000 and when, in fact, the first short-term and long-term tenant-homebuyers had purchased their homes for $45,000 and $50,000, respectively? The latter home had rented for $112.00 a month since 1970 and had only recently rented for $160.00 per month prior to the purchase.

Soon after the $2,003,100 innovative grant had been approved by HUD, the Washington, D.C. based National Center For Urban Ethnic Affairs analyzed the Columbus innovative grant proposal, OMC's Master Plan and OMC's Tenant Survey results. Prior to that, the Center had examined HUD's Innovative Grant Program as a source for potential strategies to minimize displacement caused by reinvestment. As a result of the Center's analysis, its Director of Neighborhood Revitalization Strategies reported,

What we found were striking contradictions between the purpose of the Innovative Grant Program (to minimize displacement) and the potential impact of the Columbus proposal. The community residents reinforced our analysis that the Columbus program would not minimize displacement in any true sense. . . . they clearly articulated the fact that the benefits . . . would be awarded primarily to prospective homebuyers . . . the costs of the program would fall disproportionately on the incumbent tenants who would be displaced. The community residents were also able to identify numerous irregularities in the public participation process, . . . there is currently a severe lack of citizen input in the implementation phase of the program. We have seen cases where reinvestment has occurred without compromising the socioeconomic diversity of the community . . . this could be achieved under a more sensitive program in the case of the Battelle site.
This analysis prompted HUD to re-examine the "Innovative Grant" proposal submitted by the City. Gloria Snider, Administrator of the City's Division of Community Development, and her assistant, Stephen McClary, stated,

They're (HUD) telling us now (the grant) is clearly in jeopardy. . . . four department staffers will go door-to-door in the project neighborhood, collect new data on incomes, family size, desire to purchase homes they are renting from OMC and potential displacement. . . . the information will be compiled within two weeks . . . we think the city can respond satisfactorily to HUD, but we are not certain.\textsuperscript{20}

OMC's response to HUD's action on the grant was to state that

If Columbus fails, OMC will re-evaluate the program. . . . Losing the federal money could cripple capital improvements necessary to creating a viable neighborhood. . . . With annual turnover at 46 percent the area already is highly transient making displacement hard to define. . . . turnover also makes it an ideal choice for rehabilitation with minimal real displacement. Of the first 39 properties subject to OMC's rehabilitation and offered for sale 17, or 44 percent, have been purchased by tenants, which . . . is "excellent." The number is rising because . . . the early sales were multi-family units not likely to be purchased by renters.\textsuperscript{21}

Despite the National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs' avowed interest in working with neighborhood organizations, HUD, and OMC to produce a program without the destabilizing effects which were inevitable under the original program, the neighborhood organizations were still in favor of the grant, although they openly opposed the capital improvements components. One neighborhood spokesperson stated,

We did a lot of work on these grants when the city first got it. . . . The neighborhood was excited, and if we don't get it and the tenants' assistance, a lot of long-term renters won't be able to buy their houses.\textsuperscript{22}

It is somewhat ironic that the powerless neighborhood groups did not accept the National Urban Center for Ethnic Affairs' offer of
assistance when in fact at two public hearings (July 16, 1978 and July 26, 1978) on the proposed "Innovative Grant Program" the majority had vigorously voiced opposition to construction of the boulevard and the development of the park due to the displacement that would result and had recommended alternatives which were totally rejected by OMC.23 An OMC representative stated, "if residents are opposed to the park . . . we don't have to build one at all."24 The National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs proposed that the $594,200 allocated for the construction of the boulevard be used instead to encourage lower-income people to purchase homes, and suggested that the amount and timing of the money allocated for the Tenant Assistance Program was not responsive to the housing needs of the incumbent tenants, and that the outcome of the program as it stands would be massive displacement. Critics of NCFEA maintain that the protest jeopardized the federal grant and threatened the overall success of the project and the ability of OMC tenants to become home buyers.25

Major flaws in the grant proposal prompted HUD to forestall releasing funds until these flaws were corrected. In addition, there was the unresolved controversy concerning the proposed designation of the Near North Side as an historic district. The proposed boulevard would have a negative impact on structures eligible for inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places. In awarding the City of Columbus the two million dollar federal grant, HUD had stipulated that one of the conditions for receiving the grant was resolution of the proposed National Register of Historic Places nomination for the area.26
By January 1979, the $2,003,100 federal innovative grant to the City of Columbus to support a public/private partnership to revitalize the Near North Side area was clearly in jeopardy. HUD officials maintained that the primary purpose of the grant had been to demonstrate innovative ways to assist low- and moderate-income residents avoid displacement in areas undergoing rehabilitation. The Columbus proposal had to be restructured to achieve that purpose. HUD originally approved the grant because the City estimated that it would be able to offer interior rehabilitation assistance to between 125 and 150 households over a two-year period. However, a City survey revealed that only 48 households in the OMC redevelopment area would be eligible for a rehabilitation grant through the tenant assistance program of Columbus' "Innovative Grant Program." HUD officials charged, "even if all 48 families applied, the demand for the grants would not warrant spending the $700,000 budgeted for them. . . ."27

It was announced that by March of 1979 the City would have a procedural outline to HUD officials explaining the actions which would be taken to handle tenant displacement.28 OMC's president Humphries acknowledged HUD's demand for restructuring the Columbus "plan" by informing the City that OMC would amend some of its policies to assist in the displacement battle, but admonished that the tenant assistance program must be in effect before May 1, 1979, when spring sales were to begin. The amended OMC policies included,

- Allowing all tenants of OMC properties to be given a chance to purchase an OMC home if the tenant of that home cannot afford it or decides not to buy it. Previously, the home would go on the open market if its tenant did not exercise his option to buy.
- Establishing a special office for tenant assistance and government relations. This office will help insure that tenants receive help from private and public sources.

- Extending from 30 to 60 days the period during which tenants who cannot buy a home must move to obtain a one month rent rebate.

- Giving priority in its exterior rehabilitation schedule to those homes which have tenants who are willing and able to buy them. The old schedule could leave a tenant waiting for years for renovation of the home he or she wants to buy.\(^\text{29}\)

In spite of these amendments to OMC's policies, members of the displacement subcommittee felt that the problem of tenant displacement would not be resolved unless tenant assistance was provided in Phase II of OMC's neighborhood development plan. Rand Howard, HUD's Columbus area community planning and development representative, had previously expressed a similar sentiment on the displacement issue, since this area offered much cheaper housing than Phase One and could provide more opportunities for tenant purchase. According to Howard, "the ultimate success of the program may hinge on some interface with Phase Two."\(^\text{30}\) The Department of Development project coordinator also agreed that this might resolve the issue of displacement. OMC's president retorted that plans for Phase Two would not be complete for another six to eight months and the Institute was undecided about getting involved in residential rehabilitation in this phase.\(^\text{31}\) Possible alternatives for Phase Two were construction of apartments and condominiums, commercial development, and expansion of the Institute's facilities. It was speculated that if the Institute opted not to become involved in residential rehabilitation and chose instead any of the other proposed alternatives, up to 80 percent of the housing might be razed.\(^\text{32}\) However, the attitude of the Olentangy Management Company was that as a private developer, it was
doing all it could and more than it was required to do without going bankrupt.\textsuperscript{33}

At this period of impasse concerning both the tenant displacement and historic district designation controversies, HUD officials continued to thwart Columbus' "Innovative Grant Program" by refusing to release the more than $2,000,000 allocation. In addition, as these issues remained unresolved, people were becoming more vocal. One such person was Ohio State Senator Michael Schwarzwald (a member of the displacement subcommittee) whose 16th District encompassed the area in question. Schwarzwald charged that OMC was insensitive to and guilty of tenant displacement, and threatened to oppose plans to use grant money to finance capital improvements unless all the tenant assistance funds were used.\textsuperscript{34}

In an attempt to resolve the historic district designation controversy and spur HUD to release the "innovative grant funds", OMC's project area was declared a historic district on January 17, 1979, making it a candidate for addition to the National Register of Historic Places. The historic district designation was to serve as a planning tool or guide for the proposed project. This would have a definite impact on the proposed boulevard construction. In addition, if the Near North Side was placed on the National Register of Historic Places, residents in the area would qualify for grants-in-aid, tax incentive programs, and various rehabilitation programs.\textsuperscript{35}

At a public hearing on February 14, 1979, the City of Columbus Department of Development announced that in order for residents to be
eligible for the interior rehabilitation loans residents must have resided in the Near North Side OMC project area since October 18, 1978. The Department disclosed its recommendations for the "Innovative Grant Program." Under the proposed program, eligible tenants could obtain up to $7,500 to support them in becoming home buyers. Included in the recommendation was a penalty for persons who purchased homes and sold them before the end of four years: a person whose home was rehabilitated with the aid of federal dollars would have to repay 75 percent of the grant if sold at the end of the first year; 50 percent if sold at the end of the second year, and 25 percent if sold at the end of the third year.36

Persons residing in the area who would be displaced either voluntarily or involuntarily would receive assistance in relocation. It was proposed by the Department that a "relocation technician" be assigned to assist tenants facing displacement. The technician would explain what assistance could be anticipated, and help households to find alternative housing. Also outlined in the Department's recommendations was that $117,200 be transferred from the rehabilitation program to the relocation program.37 The Department defended this recommendation by stating, "The Department had expected . . . more homes in the area would be available for moderate-income families. With fewer homes available more families will need relocation help."38

On February 26, 1979, the Department of Development unveiled the revised "Innovative Grant Program" relocation and rehabilitation components. The revised plan presented to the Columbus City Council was
unanimously approved. The $747,000 originally appropriated for rehabilitative grants, home maintenance, and relocation assistance in Phase One was now to include Phase Two, which contained more and cheaper housing units and, therefore, would provide more home purchase opportunities for low- and moderate-income households. The compromise also included the cancellation of plans to transfer $117,200 from the rehabilitation grant budget to relocation assistance because the original purpose of the grant was to assist low-income residents to remain in the neighborhood, and not facilitate their transition out of it. Efforts would be undertaken by the Department to locate persons already displaced from the project area and to offer them relocation payments. Relocation payments would range from $125 to $200 for households that had previously occupied unfurnished units and $30 per room for furnished units.39

In spite of the revision, there was still uncertainty concerning how soon the program would be implemented because of the historic district designation. Before federal money could be used in the designated historic district "adverse impact" proceedings had to be conducted. This was a potential threat to proceeding with the revised plan because of the highly controversial proposed capital improvements plans that would cause demolition of properties and evacuation displacement. However, the City and HUD agreed that not until six months after the tenant assistance program was in effect could any capital improvements be implemented. The compromise did not appease some residents who planned to continue protesting the capital improvements, despite a warning that such actions would prolong the release of the "innovative
grant" funds and possibly induce OMC to withdraw their participation in the "Innovative Grant Program."40

Anyone cognizant of the components of the "Innovative Grant Program" knew that since Battelle would be the chief benefactor of the program both directly and indirectly, it was highly improbable that OMC, Battelle's subsidiary, would withdraw their participation. It appeared this was possibly a scare tactic used on the opposing faction.

When the plan was to be presented to City Council, residents intended to urge Council members to adopt October 1, 1977 as the eligibility date for persons desiring assistance in rehabilitating homes. Residents wanted this cutoff date because they felt the proposed October 18, 1978 cutoff date might thwart the intent of the program which was to protect persons who had been residing in the area. According to the co-chairman, James Bowman, of the citizens advisory committee, "we're afraid people would move into the area because they would have been promised federal grants."41 The committee also recommended that Council adopt a provision that would prevent speculators from capitalizing on the rehabilitation grants.42

It is quite perplexing that the proposed capital improvements plans, particularly the boulevard, causing displacement. There did not appear to be any recognizable effort by the City to assess the real impact of the capital improvements, positive or negative on the community, and what they should comprise in order to lessen the adverse impacts and invigorate neighborhood integrity. It does not appear that any effort had been made to identify the concerns and objectives of all
those involved in the process and to ascertain whether or not the capital improvements plan could be implemented with due regard for those concerns and objectives. There was no apparent consideration given to the fact that tenants in the "Innovative Grant Program" area would be negatively affected by the capital improvements plan, and there was no apparent awareness of, or concern for, the fact that building the boulevard with grant funds would create that displacement that grant funds were intended to alleviate!

In April of 1979, the National Advisory Council on Historic Preservation informed the City it would not approve the proposal to use federal money to construct the boulevard. In a letter to the Department of Development's director, N. Jack Huddle, the Advisory Council maintained that city officials had given too much consideration to Battelle in deciding how to use the "innovative grant." The council's deputy director asserted,

We must object when the wishes of a private institution assume a preeminent place in the decision-making process. . . . The Council supports the purpose of the "Innovative Grant" . . . however, in our opinion, these goals are attainable without the construction of the proposed boulevard and the resultant adverse effects on the Near North/University district. . . . The Council feels that the extent of the potential adverse effect of the relocation has not been fully considered by the City. . . .

. . . the expansion needs of Battelle Memorial Institute have played an excessive role in the City's adoption of the Perry Street relocation . . . such prejudicial discussion of alternatives is inappropriate, given the City's responsibility. The Council's decision was accepted by the City as well as OMC as detrimental to the outcome of the "innovative grant." Director Huddle argued,
It appears impossible to carry out the "innovative grant" as originally planned. . . . We've always felt that capital improvements were an integral part of the master plan for revitalization of this area. . . . The city could appeal the decision to other federal officials but . . . it is unlikely because the appeal process would take two years. We think this (federal) action will result in more disruption than would result otherwise. . . .

Director Huddle appeared to be implying that the council's decision might prompt OMC to withdraw from the program.

OMC considered the decision regrettable and stated that it would possibly threaten some if not all of the $2,000,000 federal grant. OMC contended it would not longer agree to delay any of its rehabilitation efforts to ease displacement problems. The company's president adamantly stated,

Since 1977, the company has agreed to spend an extra $1.22 million to $1.86 million to accommodate public demands that were associated with participating in the "innovative grant" planning process. . . . The federal decision will force the company "to abandon" any additional costly, new programs . . . OMC will be aggressively pursuing its private redevelopment and sales program. . . .

Given the fact that the City had dragged its feet in resolving the controversial issue, and since this was postponing the distribution of the grant, it would appear that tenants were obviously in danger of being displaced. Another important fact is that the Advisory Council did not reject all components of the capital improvements plan. What it rejected was the proposed boulevard which necessitated the relocation or demolition of 20 structures in an area declared a historic district. OMC's threat as a result of the Council's decision was only a means of applying pressure to get what they wanted. HUD officials had not yet indicated that Columbus had lost the grant. The Council's position was
that given the adverse impact that the project would have on the
historic structures as well as the environment, and given the City's
responsibility to the community at large, it was urgent that this com-
ponent of the proposal be reassessed if this was to be a model project.

When May 1, 1979 approached, the date OMC had given the City to
have a tenant assistance program in effect if tenants were to par-
ticipate in the company's spring house sales, the City had not yet
reached a compromise on using the $594,200 budgeted for capital improve-
ments. Some Department of Development staff members did not accept the
National Advisory's Council on Historic Preservation decision grace-
fully, Community Development Administrator Gloria Snider argued,

I'm not at all optimistic that we can salvage anything of this
program. . . . We were hoping this could be a nice public-private
partnership but the private partner has had his incentive for
participating taken away. If this is a demonstration of the
incentive we provide private enterprise, then we've really bombed
out. They (HUD) approved this program as submitted, and now
they're talking about things that were never included in the ini-
tial program.48

Although the City had committed to work with OMC in rehabilitating the
area, and were encouraging further rehabilitation in the area, this
appeared to be at the expense of the many low-income residents facing
displacement. As a public institution, the local government agency had
a social responsibility to monitor the impact of the program on the
individuals involved and affected. The expectation of great payoffs
appeared to be an inducement behind the City's participation in the
revitalization project. The successful execution of rehabilitation
activities would restore the deteriorating housing stock in the are and
bolster the City tax base. As rehabilitation progressed, it was assured
that property values and rents would increase, as more and more higher income groups were attracted to the area.

HUD Assistant Secretary Robert Embry informed the Department of Development that, unless properties were made available to tenants by OMC at a fair price, it would be difficult to make the HUD money work as it was intended. The grant would be seriously in question if the City was not able to still obtain a positive working relationship with OMC. Thus, if changes were not made in the original grant application, the funds could not be effectively used and would be reapportioned elsewhere. The City had failed to follow up the grant application. The Department of Development maintained that HUD and the National Advisory Council on Historic Preservation were to blame.

Despite the fact that tenants had requested that the tenant assistance program be implemented immediately to meet the OMC May 1 deadline, the deadline was not met. The City had postponed action on the National Advisory Council's recommendation relative to the proposed boulevard and instead had requested that HUD intervene with the National Advisory Council in order to reverse the decision against the boulevard.

During most of the summer months of 1979, the "innovative grant" dispute continued. However, during the latter part of the summer, the City of Columbus announced that it expected to begin awarding tenant assistance grants immediately. According to HUD officials, the City of Columbus would receive $1.4 million of the grant. However, $560,000 would be withheld pending settlement of the proposed boulevard dispute.
Neighborhood residents would be eligible to receive grant of up to $7,500 to rehabilitate the interiors of homes purchased from OMC. Tenants who could not afford to purchase homes would be eligible for relocation payments. In order to make the Tenant Assistance Program more feasible, Section 8 income requirements were increased to the Section 235 level, and in recognizing the need to increase tenant assistance, money was diverted from the proposed boulevard and Fourth Avenue park projects budget and added to the Tenant Assistance Program. The additional money for tenant assistance reflected the increasingly important role the Near North Housing Corporation had assumed in fighting displacement. Some neighborhood residents opposed diverting money from the proposed Fourth Avenue park budget to accommodate the City and OMC in keeping their commitment to tenant-buyers, but a firm commitment was established that in the long run, the 2.5 acre park proposed in the original "innovative grant" proposal would be developed. The historic area boundaries were re-established, with OMC scaling down the proposed boulevard project, agreeing to preserve eight houses in the project area, and to relocate them to vacant lots. OMC agreed to submit development plans for review to the historic preservation groups. Subsequently, in November of 1979, HUD released the first "innovative grant" funds--for tenant assistance only.

During the delays in implementing the tenant assistance portion of the grant, OMC had been aggressively pursuing its "Neighborhood Development Plan and Implementation Program": increasing the purchase price of houses, increasing rents, and evicting undesirable tenants.
Area tenants were still concerned that there were not enough of the original tenants in the area to receive this rehabilitation grant money; that a viable housing program had yet to be established; and that residents who had already been displaced should be entitled to the $400 relocation payment. HUD continued to refuse to release the capital improvements funds OMC wanted until the City could assure that there would be a satisfactory number of tenant-buyers.  

The controversy continued on into 1980, until HUD communicated to the City that a resolution must be reached by March 12, 1980 or the City would lose the grant funds. This prompted the City to consider withdrawing from the "Innovative Grant Program" altogether, but HUD also communicated that the City's capability to administer the program would be considered in Washington to ascertain whether or not the City of Columbus was capable of administering a proposed $12,000,000 Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) for Capital Square South, a major redevelopment project in the downtown area. This placed intense pressure on the City to meet the HUD deadline, and solve the tenant purchase problem.  

The major incentive to resolving the controversial issues surrounding the "Innovative Grant" proposal was initiated by Council member Hammond who met with representatives of the City, OMC, and the Near North Housing Corporation. On March 12, 1980, the deadline date for reaching a resolution, representatives of the factions signed a "Memorandum Agreement." Important components of the agreement included:
1. Olentangy Management Company agreed to sell 79 houses "as-is" to the City and the Near North Housing Corporation for a tenant-purchase sweat-equity program. Thirty-one (31) of these properties were to be purchased by the Near North Housing Corporation and 48 properties were to be purchased by the City of Columbus.

2. The selling prices of the 79 properties were to be determined and frozen at September 1980 market prices.

3. "Innovative grant" interior rehabilitation grants were increased from $7,500 to $10,000, and could be used as a downpayment, rather than solely for interior rehabilitation.

4. The City was to provide Community Employment Training Act (CETA) employees, and $415,600 of three percent interest loans from Section 312 rehabilitation loans would be provided for rehabilitation costs and overhead expenses of the housing corporation.

5. The "innovative grant" boundaries were expanded to provide a broader range of eligible persons the opportunity of receiving a grant.

6. Both the City and Olentangy Management Company were to engage in greater efforts to assist in identifying relocation housing resources and provide essential relocation services and assistance to displaced households.

7. The City made a firm commitment to the proposed boulevard project by agreeing to resolve environmental issues with the National Advisory Council and the Ohio Historic Preservation Office; to assist in the identification and relocation of three additional structures form the proposed right-of-way; and to use if necessary, the City's power of eminent domain.57

In retrospect, the issues were resolved in this "Memorandum of Agreement" among the City, OMC, and Near North Housing Corporation, and approved by HUD in April of 1980. Whereas the Carter Administration's comprehensive urban policy was declared to be a "new partnership" among all levels of government (federal, state, and local), private enterprise and the neighborhood citizens having an equal role in the decision-making process, yet not one neighborhood organization representative signed the "Memorandum of Agreement" or were involved in the discussions which finally established it. Although many of the resolutions in the
agreement were previous requests made by neighborhood residents they were not the direct result of resident input in the final agreement. Instead, the resolutions were reached because of HUD's threat to the City to meet the original tenant-purchase objective (125 to 150 eligible tenant-buyers) established by the City and OMC or they would terminate the project. HUD had to insist that this objective be accomplished in order to justify using federal funds to subsidize OMC's Master Plan for the area which had already resulted in the displacement of many residents. HUD was compelled to alter the eligibility requirements to have an adequate number of tenant buyers. In the beginning, only OMC tenants residing in the Phase One project area were eligible for tenant assistance, but due to the fact that many tenants had already been displaced and could not now be located, or opted not to return to the neighborhood for various reasons, the eligibility boundary was expanded to include OMC's Phase Two project area where more affordable housing existed. As the implementation of the "Innovative Grant Program" progressed, in order to have the necessary number of tenant-buyers to satisfy HUD's demand, eligibility was extended to any low- and moderate-income household residing elsewhere in the entire Near North Side. As it turned out, most of the original OMC tenants, the people the program was originally intended to assist, were not the benefactors of the City's rehabilitation grants.

Displacement

In July of 1977, the Godman Guild Settlement House, the community's local social service agency, responded to OMC's proposed "Neighborhood Development Plan and Implementation Program." Prior to this time, the
Guild's executive director and various staff members had actively represented the neighborhood's interests at the planning sessions sponsored by OMC. The Guild's response to OMC's Master Plan for the area centered on the issue of residential displacement, specifically with regard to residents who occupied the rental units under OMC's management. The Guild felt that ensuring and maintaining socioeconomic diversity in the Near North Side could not be taken for granted. According to the community's social service agency,

The past has demonstrated that as rehabilitation and improvements make both houses and neighborhoods better places to live, market prices go up, speculation in the real estate market increases—driving prices, rents, property values and taxes higher, with the final effect of displacing those elderly, low-, moderate- and fixed-income residents . . . from a neighborhood they can no longer afford to live in. . . . The goal of stabilizing diversity and providing housing opportunities for lower income groups is a difficult task. But Battelle has a unique opportunity consistent with its founding chapter, to meet this contemporary challenge. . . . It remains for Battelle, to employ its technical, financial and human resources in partnership with the City and neighborhood organizations in implementing the proposals and programs necessary to meet this challenge.58

However, when OMC presented its "Neighborhood Development and Implementation Program" to neighborhood organizations representatives the proceeding month, it did not contain any statement relating to OMC efforts to minimize residential displacement while actively pursuing rehabilitation and neighborhood improvement, which had previously been mentioned in the preliminary draft of the proposed neighborhood development program. The management company's chief spokesperson (Barry Humphries) had earlier expressed that the company was not the City or a public housing authority and, since this was his sentiment, it is understandable why there was no statement by OMC relative to minimizing
the adverse impact of massive displacement in the proposed program and implementation plan for the area. One OMC tenant claimed, "that the real aims of Battelle is to drive low-income families from the area and to develop the neighborhoods into a white-collar or high-income area." 59 This primarily characterizes the gentrification and neighborhood revitalization processes of most inner-city areas. Critics of the plan also maintained that Battelle's sudden interest in improving the area surrounding its corporate headquarters would be at the expense of individuals with the least options for affordable housing—the poor.

The issue of residential displacement was not publicly discussed by OMC until several months later. In the first OMC Newsletter in December of 1977, an article contained vague statements concerning the potential of residential displacement caused by the rehabilitation activities being undertaken in the Phase One project area. The article stated,

OMC will be carrying this program over the next seven to ten years, taking 20-25 properties at a time. In most cases the resident of each property will have the first opportunity to purchase at market value after exterior renovation is completed. ... In the meantime, most residents will not be affected by the renovation program for some time as the rehabilitation will take a great deal of time. 60

It would appear that anyone who interpreted these statements as a commitment from OMC to retain low-income residents in the area would be quite naive. OMC tended to be simply downplaying the negative impacts the restoration/rehabilitation program would have on the lower-income households in the area.

During the ensuing months and years, the issues of displacement began to receive the attention of the residents, public, and various
goverment (local, state, and federal) officials. At the public hearing concerning the City's "innovative grant" application to HUD, some OMC tenants complained to the City Council that, "many residents would not even be able to afford low cost mortgages."61 Such a complaint by the tenants was considered valid, since earlier surveys conducted in the area had documented that many of the residents had annual incomes less than $4,000 to $5,000 which would indicate many of them were destitute.

However, at a meeting of the "Downtown Action Committee," Barry Humphries briefly addressed the potential for displacement in the Phase One project area. He asserted,

Phase One development is projected to occur over a seven to ten year period which will tend to minimize problems of upheaval and displacement of residents and give the opportunity for the public sector to respond to human need brought about by the redevelopment. . . . the public sector will be encouraged to develop low interest loan programs for low- and moderate- income residents.62

In March of 1978, two Near North Side areas were approved by the Columbus City Council for Fourth Year Community Development Act (CDA) funding. The neighborhoods approved were the eastern half of the Fifth to King (Dennison Place) neighborhood which was in the immediate vicinity of OMC's Phase One project and the southern half of Italian Village. However, Harrison West residents, a neighborhood also in the Near North Side Community and an area that contained a portion of Battelle controlled properties, had attempted unsuccessfully to negotiate with the Columbus Department of Development and City Council to include their neighborhood in the Fourth Year Community Development funding program. The neighborhood residents had argued that CDA funding
was necessary for Harrison West residents to take advantage of the unique opportunities which existed in the OMC project area and to prevent displacement. They were denied.

The Battelle Area Tenant Organization (BATO) an organization which was formed in October, 1977, about the same time OMC began its redevelopment activities for Phase One, confronted OMC's general manager David Armbrust with questions relating to the drastic rent increases imposed on some OMC tenants. The members of BATO felt that the rent increases, which ranged from $40 to $80 for units which had previously rented from $80 to $110 per month, would only exacerbate the problems of displacement already confronting many tenants. Armbrust conceded, "rents are going up, but so is operation, renovation and repair costs, taxes, and insurance, I don't believe that increased rents are preventing people from staying in the neighborhoods." It was obvious that OMC tenants would definitely share the costs of the revitalization of the neighborhood.

As the Department of Development and government officials, OMC, and OMC tenants anxiously awaited HUD's decision on the "innovative grant" application, OMC announced that displacement problems created by its "Neighborhood Development Plan and Implementation Program" were "manageable", because only a small segment of tenants will have to relocate each year, and also many of the rehabilitated properties would most likely be purchased by existing tenants. According to the company, the gradual redevelopment and exterior renovations over the next five to seven years would provide adequate time and preparation for relocation
assistance, and for tenants with the real potential to become home buyers.67

In addition, "manageable" was based on the "OMC Tenant Survey" findings conducted during March and April of 1978, which included 442 tenants and/or households in 527 out of a total of 634 OMC rental units.68 Thirty-one (31) percent, or 137 tenants, had expressed an interest in purchasing the property in which they lived; 68 percent were not interested in purchasing the property they lived in. This did not necessarily indicate they were not interested in purchasing another OMC property.69 Of the 68 percent who were not interested in purchasing the property where they lived, 60 percent, or 181 tenants, wanted help in finding another. This is 55 more tenants than the 126 tenants, or 28.5 percent, which had been reported by OMC as wanting assistance in finding replacement housing and was considered by OMC to represent those tenants who would be a problem.70 Barry Humphries asserted, "... vacancies will take care of them until the last phases of the rehabilitation. We will rehabilitate 64 properties in 1978, ... but we have 65 vacancies to handle relocation."71 However, the summary report revealed that 69 percent, or 305 tenants of the 442 surveyed, had no plans to move in 1978.72 The survey summary also revealed the following findings:

The high number of single households (67 percent or 296 households), a major concentration of University students (25 percent or 111 households), and the highly transient nature of OMC's tenant population (54 percent or 239 households have lived in the neighborhood five years or less), coupled with the extremely high turnover rate that OMC properties have experienced in the past five years (currently 47 percent on an annualized basis) lead to the conclusion that relocation-displacement should not prove to be a major factor affecting renovation plans. One potential relocation displacement concern is the nine percent or 41 elderly tenants on fixed income. OMC will be counseling these elderly
tenants as their units are rehabilitated over the next five to seven years and intends to work closely with public agencies to overcome any problems that might arise.73

OMC had not responded to the elderly homeowners potential for displacement, particularly the elderly homeowners in the Vermont Place area, since many of them were being pressured by OMC to sell their property in order for Battelle to accomplish the proposed expansion of its corporate headquarters.74

The OMC survey results did not satisfy everyone, nor were they interpreted the same. As one OMC tenant pointed out,

...the survey's finding that 46 percent of the area's residents have lived here five or more years shows a lot of people are staying...the fact that 43 percent...moved here because of relatives or friends shows a close-knit neighborhood, but they will be displaced...because OMC is converting low-income housing to high-income without replacing it somewhere else in the neighborhood.75

It would appear that the data and information obtained from the survey had been manipulated to obscure the potential adverse impact that OMC's revitalization program would have on many of OMC's tenants.

The approval of Columbus' "innovative grant" application by HUD appeared to have relieved some of the tension surrounding the issue of residential displacement. Approximately one-half of the more than $2,000,000 federal grant would directly or indirectly assist neighborhood residents. The grant was considered the first positive measure that had been taken to prevent massive displacement from the neighborhood. The community's social service agency (Godman Guild) reacted to HUD's approval of the City's "innovative grant" application by expressing what the agency considered major concerns. The concerns
included the following:

1. Adequate citizen participation in working out the details of the "Innovative Grant Program's" implementation must be assured and clearly defined.

2. The "innovative grant" must include Phase Two in order to be effective in avoiding displacement.

3. The tenant assistance portion of the grant must be implemented first and as quickly as possible, since displacement is occurring everyday.76

Although these concerns were valid, in order for them to be addressed, cooperation would be necessary between the Columbus City Council and Department of Development staff members, OMC area tenants and HUD. The optimism and enthusiasm shared by all parties involved in the "Innovative Grant Program" was very short-lived because HUD informed the City that the "innovative" grant allocation would be withheld pending new information on tenant displacement. As mentioned earlier, HUD's decision to delay the more than $2,000,000 federal grant was prompted by the National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs' concern that if the proposed "Innovative Grant Program" was implemented as originally submitted, there would be a dramatic transition in the neighborhood, where low- and moderate-income tenants would be replaced by middle- and upper-middle-income homeowners, and the end result would be massive displacement.77 Unless the City could provide the information that HUD had requested, the $2,003,110 "worth of hope" for the private/public partnership would be jeopardized.78

The circumstances surrounding HUD's decision to forestall the allocation to the City of Columbus were further exacerbated by OMC aggressively initiating efforts to displace undesirable tenants from the
neighborhood and by the City precipitously enforcing the City's revised housing code policy in the area. Through the years the City had allowed Battelle to rent the substandard housing under its control. However, City housing inspectors were now being urged to inspect the deteriorating housing stock in the area, both inside and outside, to protect the safety of the occupants. Property owners (landlords and owner-occupants) with housing code violations were given 30 days to bring the property up to housing code standards. In cases where housing was severely deteriorated and occupied, orders were written for occupants to vacate immediately. Some tenants had previously expressed to City Council that "it is better to live in substandard housing than no housing." According to Charlotte Pryor, a staff person in the City's Relocation Office, there was no decent, safe, and sanitary housing in the Columbus area renting for under $100 except in the Near North Side.

At a time when vacancies in government subsidized housing were almost nonexistent, and when many of the Near North Side formerly low-cost rental housing units were being restored/rehabilitated and sold at high prices and for homeownership, the City government had begun strict housing code enforcement making it inevitable that more affordable housing would vanish from the market place. Despite these circumstances, code enforcement officials charged they had to treat all neighborhoods within the City equally. According to one source, code enforcement officials did not consider it their responsibility to alleviate the problems of residential displacement.
By September of 1978, the City of Columbus Department of Development was forced by various pressure groups to recognize the "increased pressures of lower income residential displacement in various neighborhoods within the City as gentrification and neighborhood revitalization was becoming more imminent. To address the issue of displacement the City of Columbus Department of Development created the "Columbus Displacement: Plan of Action," a policy guide for the City of Columbus. The purpose of this plan was twofold:

1. To recommend a set of policies to guide public actions which might positively impact the displacement issues; and

2. To coordinate a variety of programs in order to effectively utilize existing and potential resources that might alleviate displacement of lower-income households.82

However, it was maintained that the degree to which the City could respond to the problems of residential displacement were virtually limited by the available public resources when compared to the estimated needs of lower-income displaces.83 To address the problems of residential displacement the plan proposed a strategy to be undertaken in two phases:

1. Preventive Phase: this phase identified the steps that the City would take to prevent lower income displacement within revitalizing area, i.e., rehabilitated rental housing opportunities, Urban Homesteading, Section 8, etc.

2. Remedial Phase: this phase provided guidance when the first phase had not prevented displacement or when displacement was the only alternative, i.e., benefits from the Uniform Relocation Act.84

The strategy's overall goal was to prevent the involuntary displacement of lower income residents in neighborhoods that appeared to have the potential of imminent gentrification and neighborhood revitalization. The plan recommended steps to be taken to help low-income households
retain their homes in areas experiencing property value increases created by gentrification and neighborhood revitalization. As far as some social service providers were concerned, the plan was needed to alleviate the encroachment of low-income households who were being displaced from the Near North Side community on other neighborhoods not experiencing gentrification and neighborhood revitalization and property value increases.

In order to quantify displacement in the Near North Side, a survey was administered in the OMC project area. The OMC project area had been identified as a first priority for activities oriented to minimize displacement due to the divestiture activities of Battelle Memorial Institute, the existence of the Victorian Village Area Commission, and the proposed designation of the area as a historic district, and the recent movement of white middle- and upper-income households (particularly young professionals) into the area that typify the gentrification process.

By the end of 1978, the Olentangy Management Company had developed a report entitled "Report on 1978 Development Activities: Olentangy Company," to summarize the impact of OMC's rehabilitation program to-date on its original housing stock in the area. The issue of displacement was discussed in the report by the following statements,

Relocation and displacement have received major attention from OMC in the formulation of the Company's development policies. The company recognized early . . . that public funding would be required if these issues were to be successfully resolved. OMC's support for the Innovative Grant was in part due to its concern that tenant assistance be given adequate public support . . . . OMC intends to cooperate as fully as possible with the City of Columbus Family Relocation Office to fulfill its objectives.
However, one neighborhood resident had previously contended that OMC had estimated that only about 20 percent of the existing residents would be able to remain in the area. 87

According to the report, to help offset displacement, the management company had already implemented several major policy directives designed to accomplish this objective which included the following:

- Programmed a relatively long (seven year) redevelopment period designed to effect a gradual redevelopment of the neighborhood thereby, reducing the magnitude of relocation and providing time for current residents of OMC and public agencies to seek governmental assistance.

- Sold housing and land to John Sandefur for Section 8 rent subsidy housing which has resulted in 26 units of rent subsidized housing which can be available for tenant relocation. We have completed negotiations for four additional Section 8 units and we are exploring the possibility for additional new construction of Section 8 units with Sandefur.

- Agreed to donate four structures ($53,000 approximate value) to the Near North Housing Corporation as seed capital for their program to rehabilitate housing for low- and moderate-income households, and

- Tailored OMC's market strategy to reduce displacement by renovating only the exteriors of properties, thereby reducing the costs to tenants and allowing sweat equity for interior renovation. 88

The report further stated, that OMC had designed a Tenant Purchase Program that allowed existing tenants the first opportunity to purchase their rental units when possible at the average of two certified appraisals. According to OMC, this policy had resulted in tenants purchasing housing at prices 23 percent less than what similar properties sold on the open market in public bids. The report also stated the company had established policies for tenants who chose not to purchase: tenants in good standing, nondelinquent rent, etc., would be reimbursed.
one month's rent to assist them with relocation expenses. However, according to one OMC tenant, while she was waiting for the home she had purchased from the Near North Housing Corporation to be completed, she had to pay both the rent to OMC and the mortgage payment on the home she had purchased, and when she finally moved out of the OMC property, she was not reimbursed one month's rent to assist her with relocation expenses. In addition, it was pointed out that the management company had made every attempt to assist tenants in relocating by placing them in one of OMC's vacant rental units or referring them to the appropriate Section 8 projects or public agencies for special assistance. OMC contended that sufficient vacant units (60) were available for relocation throughout 1978 and sufficient OMC rental units would be available for relocation in 1979.

Finally, the report stated that in 1978 38 tenants had been displaced from the Phase One project area while 358 or 67.9 percent of tenant move-outs had occurred in the 527 OMC rental units and since this was the case, relocation had not and should not prove to be an unmanageable element. Of the 38 tenants displaced only 11 received monetary relocation assistance from OMC, and data relative to the number of tenants not receiving assistance after being offered assistance, but who "skipped" or remained but did not pay rent, was missing in the report. Of the 170 properties included in the Phase One project area, 90 properties had been affected by OMC's redevelopment activities, and of these 90 properties 56 had been sold, but only 19 (34 percent) had been purchased by existing OMC tenants. However, OMC asserted that this was an excellent tenant retention rate for a program which had been entirely
accomplished by private efforts\textsuperscript{92} See Appendix E: Report On 1978 Development Activities: Olentangy Management Company.

In January of 1979, critics of OMC's Master Plan publicly charged that the management company was driving out the low- and moderate-income residents as quickly as possible.\textsuperscript{93} OMC had previously claimed that 56 tenants had been given an opportunity to purchase their property, but that only 19 tenants had exercised this option. However, some tenants charged that this was not true.\textsuperscript{94} In a letter of appeal to Mayor Tom Moody, Godman Guild's executive director, Randal Morrison, complained that, "tenants have been systematically asked to leave . . . and the potential for conversion of the remaining low- and moderate-income tenants to homeowners is virtually nonexistent."\textsuperscript{95} According to Morrison, if the intended purpose of helping tenants was to be salvaged, then the "Innovative Grant Program" should include OMC's Phase Two area.\textsuperscript{96} However, Barry Humphries maintained that,

\ldots complaints about OMC's operations come primarily from a few people who would not qualify to become homeowners. We're pleased with the tenant retention. \ldots Of 170 homes originally owned by OMC in Phase One, 105 are still owned and could be used in a tenant purchase program. \ldots \ldots the City must determine priority needs of tenants in the area . . . we are willing to cooperate in any way we can to modify our program.\textsuperscript{97}

Thus, OMC was either a hard-hearted landlord that forced poor people out into the street or the salvation of the Near North Side, depending on whom one asked.

As time progressed and the federal grant from HUD continued to be delayed, OMC also continued to be accused of forcing low-income households out of the neighborhood. Barry Humphries asserted,
There's a lot of talk about what's happening to the people up here, but the fact is we're the only ones who are spending a dime to turn this neighborhood around. . . . Renaissance is forcing some people out of their homes, . . . but the area . . . historically has been a transient one anyway. . . . the local social service agencies should be helping those who cannot find affordable housing elsewhere. 98

Humphries statements were attacked by many critics. According to Wendy Schweiger, "OMC made a public commitment to work to avoid displacement. . . ." 99 Council member Pam Conrad's reaction was,

When you see the kind of people Barry has on his staff, none of them have any experience working with low-income people. I can see where they would have trouble relating to the poor. 100

Finally, Ohio State Senator Michael Schwarwalder argued,

They're not helping people relocate, and I sat in a meeting and heard them say they would . . . . . . OMC is at least guilty of insensitivity. . . . I don't disagree that OMC is trying to do some things to alleviate displacement, but I do disagree that they're doing all they can. . . . Humphries has agreed to take steps to improve OMC's dealings with poor tenants as well as offer no more houses for sale until May, 1979, when the grant should be available. 101

Nine days (January 24, 1979) after it was announced that OMC had agreed not to offer anymore properties for sale until May, 1979, a home (327 West Fourth Avenue) was purchased by persons who did not reside in the Near North Side community, and subsequently, 18 other properties were sold to persons from outside of the area. During this time, only two properties (402 West Seventh Avenue and 1484 Belmont Avenue) were sold to OMC tenants. It seems almost impossible that only two of OMC's tenant could afford to purchase a home, despite the fact that sales were supposed to be frozen until May. It could be assumed from these actions that OMC was not actually committed to retaining many of its existing tenants. 102
As if tenant displacement was not already an unresolved issue in OMC's "Neighborhood Development Plan and Implementation Program," the management company was now applying pressure to long-term homeowners of Vermont Place to sell their properties. This appeared ridiculous, given the fact that OMC was established by the Institute in order to divest its property holdings in the area. One homeowner's entire family had grown up in the neighborhood; two homeowners had lived in the area 60 years and 50 years respectively; and another family had lived in the neighborhood for 25 years. One family who owned two properties on Vermont Place had in 1978 invested $3,000 in improvements to the home they occupied. OMC's president Barry Humphries had previously said: Since the Institute did not own 40 percent of the properties, those it did not manage would be rehabilitated by property owners once they saw the massive revitalization project OMC was undertaking. For years the homeowners on Vermont Place had struggled with the deteriorating properties and vacant lots under the Institute's control and now, rather than being allowed to willingly participate in the revitalization activities occurring in the area, they were instead being harrassed by OMC's representatives to sell their homes.

One OMC tenant who had been displaced during the early stage of Phase One and was relocated by OMC to one of the company's vacant units on Vermont Place was again confronted with displacement. According to the tenant, she had moved into this other OMC unit because OMC had offered her an opportunity to purchase the Vermont Place property when it went up for sale in a few years. She was encouraged to rent the Vermont Place property rather than purchase it right away, because it
would provide her more time to save for a downpayment. However, she was later told that the property would never be sold because Vermont Place was in the proposed Battelle expansion area, and would eventually be demolished. This tenant never became an OMC tenant-buyer, but rather became the first homeowner in the Near North Housing Corporation's homeownership program. The property (1153 Pennsylvania Avenue) that she purchased from the housing corporation was one of the four properties donated by the Institute in 1977.

The controversy surrounding the future of the Vermont Place properties was unresolved, for more than one year. The homeowners who had in the beginning withstood the pressures to sell their properties finally relented. Although the property owners were the victims of voluntary displacement, for many it was a traumatic experience. A former long-term resident of the Vermont Place area and retiree of Battelle maintained that the Institute began pressuring them to sell their property during the mid 1960's and then rent the same property from them (Battelle). Over the years the Institute would periodically contact the homeowner about selling. Finally, in 1979 the homeowner was forced to sell out to OMC because the houses which used to surround her property were now parking lots and traffic in the area was increasing. However, the homeowner stated "it was a traumatic experience to leave the home I had lived in for more than 40 years, but I had held out as long as it was practical." The homeowner negotiated a deal with OMC that paid for two homes in Upper Arlington, attorney fees, and moving expenses. But other homeowners in the Vermont Place area were not as fortunate as this
homeowner because many had bowed to OMC's pressures and accepted what they considered to be a substantial profit due to the present deterioration of the area. It should be noted that over the years Battelle had acquired the majority of the properties employing either tactic of convincing homeowners to sell their property and then rent the same property back from them (Battelle) or the tactic of offering a price for the home which to the homeowner appeared to be a substantial capital gain, since the area was continuing to decline.107

By February of 1979 the Department of Development had completed a survey to quantify the number of households that had been displaced or would be displaced by the private/public partnership revitalization activities. The number of households that had been displaced and would be displaced by private revitalization as well as government action included: 38 households that had previously been displaced by private revitalization; 82 households that would in the future be displaced by private revitalization, and 22 households that would in the future be displaced by government action. A total of 142 households would thus receive assistance either under the Uniform Relocation Act of 1970 (displacement due to governmental action) or the Optional Payment Plan which had been developed by the City of Columbus (displacement due to OMC's revitalization project).108

Despite the department's proposal to provide relocation assistance and payments through the "Innovation Grant Program," the federal funds were not released because of the unresolved capital improvements plan
controversy, specifically the proposed boulevard construction.

Tenant displacement was further exacerbated throughout the remainder of 1979. Although OMC had stated that the company would make every effort to assist tenants in relocation by placing them in one of the company's vacant units, some tenants found themselves displaced from the community entirely. And housing was demolished which could have been donated to the Near North Housing Corporation.

The rent on some units were increased as many as three times from 1977 to 1979. Some tenants who had requested to sign a one year lease to protect them against eviction were denied their request. Many residents were served eviction notices because they were no longer the "kind of people" the management company wanted in their rental properties. Some OMC tenants were voluntarily displaced from the neighborhood after observing what was happening to other tenants. They did not wish to experience what their neighbors had experienced. Feeling defeated, some tenants resigned themselves to moving when OMC would sell the houses they occupied to someone else, although they had expressed an interest in purchasing it and could afford it. Other residents believed that rather than encouraging them to become homeowners, there was a deliberate effort to make purchasing difficult. Finally, in some cases, tenants believed that because they had publicly opposed many of the plans OMC proposed to revitalize the area, the management company retaliated by evicting them.

In April 1980, when the funds for the "Innovative Grant Program" were finally released by HUD, time and inflation had significantly
impacted the original intent of reducing residential displacement caused by OMC's "Neighborhood Development Plan and Implementation Program."

Although some OMC tenants had withstood the rent increases pressures and harassment, evictions, and other tactics employed to force them out of the area, it was estimated that as many as 500 households had already been displaced. Some former OMC tenants took advantage of the opportunity to return to the area to become homeowners, but these were the households who had the potential for upward mobility, such as those households composed of medical, postgraduate, graduate, and law students.

For some OMC tenants, the battle against displacement was not yet over. Three months later, in July of 1980, after the City had begun implementing the tenant assistance portion of the "Innovative Grant Program" about 35 persons received notices to vacate their units by August 31, 1980. These people were asked to vacate 25 units located in an area bounded by Fourth, Fifth and Michigan Avenues, and the first alley east of Pennsylvania Avenue which was the area that had been proposed for commercial development in the Phase Two project area.

Although the rezoning of the 5.6 acres of commercial development was finally disapproved by the Columbus City Council in January of 1982, this did not prevent the displacement of residents occupying the units from the area in question, or the eventual demolition of the structures.

While the management company's rental units did experience an extremely high turnover rate, this could have been attributed to tenant fear and a sense of helplessness relative to the massive revitalization
activities being undertaken by OMC, creating voluntary displacement. Displacement was further exacerbated by the demolition of many houses that could have been made available to low-and moderate-income households. Due to the delay in implementing the "Innovative Grant Program," a considerable amount of displacement had already taken place. Consequently, the opportunity for many tenants to find replacement housing elsewhere in the neighborhood, as was optimistically projected by Battelle, was not realized. According to one source, as of January of 1981, approximately 750 residents had been displaced from the OMC Phase One and Phase Two areas.117

**OMC’s Displaced Tenants: Perceptions of Displacement**

To find out more about the personal experiences of displacement that occurred during implementation of OMC's "Renaissance Project," an attempt was made to locate tenants who had been displaced. It is quite noteworthy that of the displaced households that were located, all but one relocated to what was considered to be OMC's Phase Two project area.

It was difficult to locate households that had been displaced from the OMC Phase One and Phase Two project areas. Of the 25 displaced household names obtained, only 12 interviews could be arranged. Of these 12, 11 were former OMC tenants and one was a former homeowner in the Vermont Place area. Twelve of the other 13 households had moved again from the neighborhood they had relocated to, and no one knew their present place of residence. An interesting finding was that of the 11 former OMC tenants interviewed, all were given the opportunity to either remain in the neighborhood or return to the neighborhood, either through
the City's housing program \((N=1)\); OMC \((N=1)\); the Near North Housing Corporation \((N=8)\); or the private market \((N=1)\). The displacement of these tenants occurred from 1979 to 1981. Nine of the former tenants are now homeowners. Two households who were able to return to the neighborhood in 1982 as Section 8 tenants. In addition, many of the displacees who either remained or returned were households who complemented the neighborhood character that OMC was attempting to create through its "Renaissance Project": upwardly mobile, middle-income, professional, semi-professional, with few or no children, and stable.

Two households had lived in the area all of their lives; three households had moved in as renters in 1952, 1962, and 1969, respectively, and each had lived in the same house for years prior to being displaced. The remaining households had moved into the neighborhood between 1971 and 1976. All of the eleven households were displaced by OMC through eviction notice. They maintained that other households they knew to be displaced were forced to move either through eviction, demolition, harassment or rent increase, or voluntarily left out of fear or a sense of helplessness after attempting to negotiate with OMC to remain. They also maintained that the first households to be displaced were large families and the poor. Large families were the first to be displaced because many of these households occupied housing contained in the OMC Phase One project area. The poor were generally displaced as a consequence of the rent increases imposed upon them.

OMC had previously reported that the area was highly transient, yet some of these households had lived in the area for more than ten years
and 46 percent had lived there for 5 years or more, a finding reported in OMC's tenant survey but not emphasized by the management company. The displacees also pointed out that many of the former residents, including themselves, had moved to the neighborhood to be close to family and friends, considered the area to be a socially close-knit one. It has also been revealed in "OMC's Tenant Survey" that 43 percent of the tenants moved to the neighborhood to be near friends or relatives.

It was unanimously agreed by the former tenants that the major factor which governed their choice of replacement housing was their incomes. They overwhelmingly agreed that without the Tenant Assistance Program of the "innovative grant" to help tenants to become homeowners in the neighborhood and the Section 8 relocation units provided for low-income tenants through the Near North Housing Corporation, the 127 families who managed to either remain or return to the neighborhood would not have been able to do so.

When commenting on who actually benefitted from the OMC "Renaissance Project," most agreed that it was those tenants who stayed the longest and fought the hardest to retain some of the original neighborhood character and others who were "smart" enough "to move into the neighborhood once they realized the changes occurring in the neighborhood." Most would also agree that the psychological and sociological trauma experienced in displacement was an expensive price to pay to make the neighborhood a nicer place to live.
**Victorian Village**

Although the Dennison conservation project did not stop the overall decline of the Near North Side, it did have a positive spillover effect on a segment of the community that contained a large proportion of Victorian structures. Many eyes began to turn toward the potential for restoring/rehabilitating the once-elegant and stately Victorian homes to their original grandeur. In late 1973 this area was named "Victorian Village." It is generally accepted that the prime catalyst for renewed interest in this area was the Dennison Avenue Conservation Project.

Amid much skepticism from the investment community, some people began referring to the neighborhood with enthusiasm similar to that directed toward German Village, the largest privately financed inner-city residential restoration/rehabilitation project in America. The redevelopment potential of Victorian Village attracted several white middle- and upper-middle-income households, especially young professionals. The process of privately financed historic restoration/rehabilitation was begun in the neighborhood by new and old residents alike. One "pioneer" in the neighborhood asserted,

Victorian Village is going to take off and happen much faster than German Village because people have seen what's happened there, . . . I think it's going to work as a residential area downtown. 118

Another "pioneer" shared a similar sentiment, "located between the Convention Center and the University, this area can't go anywhere but up. . . ." 119

For some long-term residents, the influx of the middle- and upper-middle income households virtually assured that the once elegant
Victorian homes would be reconverted from tenements back to single family homes. One resident who was optimistic about the presence of the newcomers remarked, "Young people are converting units back into single family homes, and they're getting houses they couldn't possibly build in the suburbs. It's a real joy to see them coming in." Some local government staff members were equally optimistic that the presence of new residents would have a positive impact on the neighborhood's housing stock. According to one City staff member who had been involved in the Dennison Avenue Conservation Project:

It used to be that people would buy a single here, and the first thing they wanted to do was chop it up into a two-unit or a four-unit; now we're getting people moving in where their thought is to restore it to its original single family capacity, to live in it. Battelle Memorial Institute, the owner of 34 houses and eight vacant lots in the Village, also responded to the restoration/rehabilitation activities taking place. Clyde Tipton, vice-president for communications for the Institute, stated,

If the Victorian Village thrust is to go upward . . . we're not going to want to be the sore thumb that's got a couple of real uglies. . . . we'd like ours to be at least as good as the average of the neighborhood.

Others were convinced that once owner-occupancy had eliminated the phenomena of absentee landlords all the problems of the neighborhood would disappear. But this, of course, would displace many of the poor. Gerald Howard, the Victorian Village Society president, remarked, "one thing we're not trying to do is run out the low-income families." It was maintained that many of the newcomers liked the neighborhood's diversity and were not interested in pushing out the poor
and the best long-range goals for the neighborhood did not include bulldozing the poor into some other part of the City.124 Still others maintained that they did not have any objection to welfare and low-income families, as long as they maintained control over their children and maintained their property.125 Most people were confident that problems arising between the new residents and the low-income residents could be overcome and that the Village could be a positive example to other inner-city neighborhoods. Everyone appeared to be committed to making this unique neighborhood a success, particularly the recently established Victorian Village Area Commission and the Victorian Village Society.
ENDNOTES

1 City of Columbus, Department of Development, Innovative Grant Application Summary: Near North/University Neighborhood Revitalization Program (Columbus, Ohio: Department of Development, January 1978), p. 1.

2 Ibid.


5 Ibid.

6 "City Council Approves," pp. 1, 4.

7 Ibid.


9 City of Columbus Downtown Action Committee Minutes of Downtown Action Committee, meeting of March 1978 (Typewritten).

10 Ibid.


13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.


21 Ibid.


24 Ibid.

25 "North Side Grant Threatened," Columbus Dispatch, 10 August 1978, p. 3.

26 "Grant to Help Near North Side Hits Snag," Columbus Dispatch, 14 January 1979, p. 2.

27 Ibid.

28 "HUD May Conceal Two Million Dollar Grant If City Can't Handle Displacement," Columbus Dispatch, 24 January 1979, front page.

29 Ibid.

30 "Grant to Help," p. 2.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.


34 Ibid.

35 "Renaissance Area's Historic Tag May Spur Aid," Columbus Dispatch, 18 January 1979, p. 2.


37 Ibid.

40Ibid.


42Ibid.


44Ibid.

45Ibid.

46Ibid.

47Ibid.


49Ibid.

50"Battelle Tenants Seeking Release of HUD Funds," OSU Lantern, 4 May 1979, p. 3.


52Ibid.

53Ibid.

54Ibid.

55Ibid., p. 135.

56Ibid., p. 136.

57Ibid., p. 180.

58"Near North Side Community Council Meeting, 26 July 1977, "Guild Response to Proposed Battelle Master Plan."

59"Residents To Fight Battelle Subsidiary," Columbus Dispatch, 4 September 1977, p. 3.


62 City of Columbus Downtown Action Committee, Minutes of Meeting of the Downtown Action Committee, meeting of 1 March 1978. (Typewritten.)


65 Ibid., p. 6.


67 Ibid., p. 4.


69 Ibid., p. 3.

70 Ibid., p. 14.


73 Ibid., p. 4.

74 Interview with Mrs. Myrtle Banas, Columbus, Ohio, 4 April 1984.

75 "Residents Dispute OMC Survey on Housing Project," Columbus Citizen Journal, 10 May 1978.


Ibid.

City of Columbus Department of Development, "Columbus Displacement: Plan of Action," Columbus, Ohio, September 1978. (Typewritten.)

Ibid., p. 1.

Ibid., p. 2.

Ibid., p. 3.


Interview with Mrs. Mary Allman, Columbus, Ohio, 21 April 1984.


Ibid., p. 5.

Ibid., p. 4.

"Grant to Help Near North Side Hits Snag," p. 2.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.
101 Ibid.

102 "Olentangy Management Company's List of Property Sales," 15 October 1979. (Typewritten.)


104 Ibid.

105 Ibid.

106 Ibid.

107 Interview with Mrs. Myrtle Banas.

108 City of Columbus Department of Development, "Innovative Grant: General Relocation Plan," Columbus, Ohio, 13 February 1979. (Typewritten.)


111 Interview with Mrs. Nancy Yates, Columbus, Ohio, 27 April 1984.

112 Interview with Mrs. Penny Nichols, Columbus, Ohio, 9 March 1984.


114 Interview with Mrs. Penny Nichols.

115 Interview with Dr. Norman Rose, Columbus, Ohio, 21 April 1984.

116 "Renters Say They'll Force Eviction Move," Columbus Dispatch, 22 July 1980.


119 Ibid.

120 Ibid., p. 20.

121 Ibid., p. 23.
122 Ibid., p. 27.
123 Ibid., p. 25.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
CHAPTER VI

TAKE-OFF PHASE THEORY

Dennison Place

OMC: Phase Two

In order to accommodate those activities that could not be fully predetermined and for which market demand was some time in the distant future, OMC's "Neighborhood Development Plan and Implementation Program Summary" delineated the proposed activities for this phase quite vaguely. The execution of Phase Two was contingent upon the success of Phase One. This area did not contain many of the once-elegant and stately Victorian homes which were a major incentive for upper-middle and upper-income groups to reside in inner-city neighborhoods. The Phase Two project area comprised approximately 50 acres. The boundaries of this area are Fifth Avenue, Pennsylvania Avenue, Michigan Avenue and the Olentangy River. The projected activities for this phase included:

- Expansion of Battelle south of Fifth Avenue;
- Rehabilitation and sale of existing structures;
- Infill with townhouses and apartments;
- Provision of commercial development according to market demand;
- Determination of improvement to King Avenue, Fifth Avenue and internal streets;
- Construction of a bike/pedestrian system along the Olentangy River; and
- Code enforcement and maintenance programs in the area.

In March of 1979, OMC's president, Barry Humphries, communicated to city and state officials, to the Director the Department of Development and his staff members, and to the neighborhood and community leadership, that OMC was about to begin detailed planning of the Phase Two project area. Humphries stated,

To assist us in our planning and to insure that community concerns are voiced, we are establishing a neighborhood planning task force. The task force will consist of the neighborhood and community leadership. . . . The primary role of this group will be to react to and have input into the plans being prepared by OMC and their consultations, Godwin-Bohm-NBBJ. . . .

A series of six task force meetings was scheduled, beginning in April and ending in September. Included in these meetings were two public meetings to be held in June and September. Marsha Moorehead, a life-long resident and one of the first OMC tenant-buyers, who had recently been employed by OMC as Director of Tenant Assistance and Government Liaison, was to serve as moderator for the task force meetings.

On April 2, 1979 the first task force meeting was held. It was decided by the task force that an area survey would be conducted, but the group could not reach consensus as to what areas should be included. The purpose of the survey was threefold:

1. To determine demands and needs for residential units;
2. To profile area residents; and
3. To provide information on other community needs, i.e., commercial, other services, etc.
Various concerns were expressed by the group, such as

1. The issue of the City's role in the task force and if that role would be formalized;

2. The relationship of the task force to the innovative grant advisory committee;

3. The long and short-term plans for the north side of Vermont Place;

4. The boundaries/size of Phase Two;

5. The historic district potential and conflicts in the proposed expansion area;

6. Avoiding over emphasis of the historic district designation this could have a negative effect on opportunities for low- and moderate-income housing;

7. The conservation of low- and moderate-income housing;

8. The belief that building proposals of John Sandefur, the Section 8 builder, should be mapped out;

9. The decline of neighborhood diversity;

10. Low-income housing being retained, but not necessarily for current tenants;

11. The impact of reassessment of taxes on low- and moderate income homeowners;

12. How much housing should be retained, and how much in-fill housing should be constructed; and

13. Agreement that a low-income ghetto was not desirable.4

The consensus of the task force was that the group needed to know what OMC's proposed plans for Phase Two actually involved; what were the absolute givens and what remained to be worked out.

Two days later (April 6, 1979), Barry Humphries responded to the group's request for the specific plans for Phase Two by summarizing the following considerations of OMC for the project area:
- The company has no preferred land use for the area but any proposed future land use must stand the test of producing a healthy and viable neighborhood that will not be subjected to blighting influences. Proposals for high concentrations of subsidized low-income units would not be considered. As national experience has shown, such projects tend to segregate the poor and deteriorate rapidly.

- The company would like to fully explore the opportunity for neighborhood shopping facilities in Phase Two. Past experience has demonstrated that neighborhood shopping is extremely important to revitalization efforts and the lack of competition and shopping convenience in the Near North Side is an important problem for many area residents.

- All proposals for Phase Two that will not make good business sense, will not be pursued.

- The company will be very cautious about any proposal requiring new federal funds or state historic clearance in Phase Two. Past experience has adequately demonstrated the difficulties and long-time delays associated with each process.

- The Battelle parking areas are non-negotiable and are not included in the Phase Two planning assignment. These areas are required for immediate parking and will be developed in 1979.5

At the next scheduled meeting, Humphries reviewed for the task force his positions as summarized in the previously state OMC considerations for Phase Two. It was expressed to the task force that there were not any preconceived ideas concerning OMC's development in the Phase Two project area. Humphries further commented that, "OMC will have little interest in additional federal programs that bring with them delays and hassles similar to those we've experienced to date."6

According to the management company's chief spokesperson, his position would remain flexible and consideration would be given to any alternative that was economically viable.7

The role of the consulting firm of Godwin-Bohm-NBBJ was to organize ideas put forth by the task force. Those ideas which were economically
viable in the Phase Two planning process would be given thorough consideration. Of urgent concern to the task force was assurance that potential rehabilitation activities in Phase Two would be undertaken to keep homes affordable for those of low- and moderate-income. Another major concern of the group was that the survey be expanded to include a more representative sample.

In June, after some revisions and additions to questions, the confidential survey was distributed to residents from West Eight Avenue on the north, West Third Avenue on the south, Neil Avenue on the east, and the Olentangy River on the west, along with a cover letter explaining the survey's purpose. This cover letter stated:

The Olentangy Management Company has begun planning for what we have called Phase Two. . . . To assist us in our planning and to ensure that community concerns are voiced, we have established a neighborhood planning task force consisting of neighborhood and community leadership. The . . . survey has been designed to help the task force and OMC identify what area residents are interested in . . . it will be helpful for us to know some information of a personal nature. For that reason, the survey is anonymous—no record of name or address will be kept. Your answers will . . . help show us such things as how many senior citizens are living in the area, how many homes in a certain price range would be needed to satisfy the needs of the families living in the area, etc.8

The persons administering the survey were given a list of the task force members and it was suggested that if people appeared skeptical about the purpose and validity of the survey, a little 'name dropping' might help.9

Approximately two months (August 1979) after the survey was administered, the results were presented to the task force. Out of 400 surveys delivered, approximately 90 percent, or 360 persons, had been responded to. The task force overwhelmingly agreed that the results
were descriptive rather than predictive and, therefore, reached the following conclusions:10

1. The data was too extensive to absorb in and of itself;

2. The task force needed to review proposed plans for Phase Two against the survey result to determine feasibility and offer suggestions; and

3. The proposed August 30th public meeting to discuss the findings of the survey would be premature in that it would raise questions that could not be answered without a plan.11

Ultimately, the survey generated four major concerns of the group:

1. The survey should be conducted in the First and Third Avenues area as soon as possible because it was immediately south of Phase Two and would be affected by what happened in Phase Two.

2. The north side of Vermont Place should be included in the Phase Two planning process.

3. The eligibility for tenant assistance under the "Innovative Grant Program" should be extended to the Phase Two area, as many residents were having to leave due to increasing housing costs.

4. The amount of time the planning process for Phase Two was demanding seemed excessive.12

These concerns tended to be valid, and deserved a response from OMC since the group was aware of OMC's earlier position in relation to these issues. The most immediate potential impact Phase Two would have on current residents was massive displacement.

OMC had previously requested that the north side of Vermont Place be rezoned to meet the future demand for parking for Battelle employees. This had been tabled by City Council to prevent OMC from razing needed housing in the area. OMC had also previously refused to allow the City
to include Phase Two in the "Innovative Grant Program", citing this would not be considered until the planning process had been completed by OMC. OMC contended that the recommendations from the planning consultants for Phase Two were not expected for several months. The management company maintained that activities undertaken in Phase Two would not have an adverse affect on the area south of Third Avenue.\textsuperscript{13}

OMC formally responded to three of the task force concerns in a status report to the group. The report stated:

- The north side of Vermont Place was being studied by Battelle as agreed with City Council. A decision had not been reached to include the area in Phase Two planning.

- The administering of a survey in the First and Third Avenues area was not necessary or feasible, since OMC had acquired the information needed from the survey conducted north of Third Avenue, therefore, they (OMC) would not extend it south of Third Avenue.

- The inclusion of Phase Two in the "Innovative Grant Program" was pending the outcome of the City's considerations, and, therefore, (OMC) was reserving the right not to comment until later.\textsuperscript{14}

These did not appear to be satisfactory explanations given the facts that (1) the delay in HUD's release of the "Innovative Grant" funds centered around OMC's proposed activities for the area, and (2) that it had already been determined that unless Phase Two was included in the area eligible for "Innovative Grant" tenant assistance always there would not be enough eligible tenants to justify awarding the federal grant to the City of Columbus. Clearly, OMC's anticipation of eco-nomic return was taking precedence over considerations of the best interests of the neighborhood and its residents.
By mid-September, the task force was still involved in the Phase Two planning process and were to remain involved for some months to come. In the meantime, the Godwin-Bohm-NBBJ firm had developed a rehabilitation estimate methodology to determine the amount of work needed to rehabilitate many of the structures in the Phase Two project area. The strategy behind this was to arrive at a justification for the demolition of houses and the construction of new in-fill housing. The results of the estimate ranged from $17,000 to $22,000 for two-family and four-family units.\textsuperscript{15} It was pointed out in this estimate that: (1) the rehabilitation cost for two-family frame structures often exceeded the costs of new construction; (2) there would be little market demand for only exterior rehabilitated housing in this project area; (3) the cost estimates were for basics, not "frills"; and (4) a large number of structures were obsolete and, therefore, should be demolished to make way for new construction.\textsuperscript{16} The results of the survey, according to NBBJ, could only be modified if the Near North Housing Corporation could determine those structures it might be able to rehabilitate and what charm/character might be worth retaining in otherwise undesirable structures.\textsuperscript{17} The question was then posed to the Task Force, "If you can build a better house for the same cost that you can rehabilitate, what would you do?" This was a vague question, since it had not been clearly explained what replacement would be made on the vacant lots of demolished structures.

The task force agreed that, in order to maintain diversity in the area, a minimum of 30 percent of low- and moderate-income housing units
should be maintained. This would include Sections 8, 202, and 235 subsidized housing.

The consensus of the task force was that commercial development was desirable, provided it was not addressed as a top priority in the planning process. The group decided that the first priority was to determine which properties would be sold to the housing corporation. It was agreed that meeting housing demands and commercial development must occur simultaneously. In addition, the task force believed it was imperative for a market study to be conducted prior to approval of any commercial development.

In mid-November, Godwin-Bohm-NBBJ provided the Director for Tenant Assistance and Government Liaison, (Marsha Moorehead, the moderator of the task force meetings) with a progress report of OMC planning activities. The progress report was based on a complete physical analysis of the Phase Two project area. From the consulting firm's analysis, various spatial needs were identified to be fulfilled in the project area. The report contained four parts: Spatial Needs; Market Study for Retail Center; Infill Housing Design; and Potential Next Steps. See Appendix F: Godwin-Bohm-NBBJ, Columbus, Ohio, Progress Report-OMC Planning Activities. The firm concluded,

... we are prepared to create a "plan" for the Phase Two Planning Area. By its very nature, we must caution that any "plan" cannot be a static instrument given the dynamics ... in that area. We remain fully cognizant of the major issues that have paralleled the entire Phase Two Planning Activities and it remains our goal to balance the many objectives and factors in that area in any single "plan" that may be produced.
During subsequent months, the task force formalized its position statement on Phase Two development at the request of Marsha Moorehead. Despite the fact that the position statement contained valid concerns and priorities relating to Phase Two development, it appeared that it did not have a direct impact on the preliminary Phase Two plan. Whether or not it was a coincidence, the task force's position statement coincided with the stipulations HUD communicated to the City in order for the "innovative grant" funds to be released. The task force position statement lacked, however, convincing credibility with OMC because the task force had developed the position statement without such pertinent data and information as:

1. The number of existing OMC properties in the Phase Two area;
2. The number of households in the area;
3. The number of houses to be sold in order for OMC to accomplish its goals; and
4. The number and types of activities, funds, and programs that might be administered which would have a positive impact on the area.21

In January of 1980, the highlights of the preliminary Phase Two plan and a report on the City's status of negotiations with HUD to implement the "Innovative Grant Program" were presented to the task force. Three principal components were identified: the rehabilitation pool for implementing the "Innovative Grant Program", infill housing, and commercial development. The preliminary plan emphasized the following components:

1. The City and the Near North Housing Corporation would choose 77 out of 90 OMC structures for rehabilitation. Some of the properties were located on Vermont Place, which was outlined in the plan to be retained as residential.
2. Infill housing would be constructed which would consist of three basic single-family units ranging in price from $44,000 to $77,000.

3. Proposed commercial development would encompass 5.2 acres bounded on the north by West Fifth Avenue, on the south by West First Avenue, on the east by Harrison Avenue, and on the west by the Olentangy River. No street closing or rerouting would be necessary.\textsuperscript{22}

It was emphasized to the group that only three to five percent of the current total housing units would be lost.\textsuperscript{23} This would take into account the housing stock to be retained, infill housing on vacant lots, housing to be razed for commercial development and new units to be constructed in conjunction with the commercial development.\textsuperscript{24}

The plan was presented to the group without all of the facts. For example, although the planning activities would result in just a three to five percent loss of the existing housing stock in the project area, the absolute number of units and the number of people displaced were not specified. The proposed commercial development alone would require the demolition of 47 housing units! The plan obviously had the potential of being detrimental to the interests of many residents of the area, particularly OMC's low-income tenants.

The Department of Development's report on the status of negotiations for implementing the "Innovative Grant Program" highlighted the following:

1. The City had begun to inspect houses in the rehabilitation pool to determine how to establish tenant purchases.

2. OMC had committed an overall reduction in the sale price of housing units to the Near North Housing Corporation and its tenant-purchase program. The $195,000 to 200,000 reduction
below appraisal prices would be made rather than the commitment of equal dollar value of land for a park.

3. The City and OMC had viewed the appraisal process to develop a method acceptable to both of them.

4. The tenant purchase program and capital improvements component of the "Innovative Grant Program" would be effective immediately.

5. The City was exploring other options to expand the dollar commitment to the area.

6. HUD had agreed to base eligibility for rehabilitation grants on Section 235 housing eligibility requirements, rather than on Section 8 eligibility requirements.25

To anyone aware of OMC's commitment to HUD and to the City to retain many of its low- and moderate-income tenants as homebuyers, it would be obvious that if OMC actually intended to honor this commitment, it would have to do this in the Phase Two project area. Since this area contained a majority of housing stock of modest quality, this housing stock was the only hope for those households who had fought to remain in the neighborhood and the only hope for those households who had reluctantly moved out of the neighborhood but still desired to return to the neighborhood.

In order for the City to demonstrate to HUD that they were committed to minimizing displacement, as well as to ensure that the allocation of funds for the proposed boulevard would be released, the OMC Phase Two project area plan provided the only vehicle.

In addition to establishing confidence in the future of the area, the task force participation in Phase Two development had also satisfied the Carter Administration's National Urban Policy objective of
establishing a "new partnership" between the government, private enterprise, and neighborhood groups. This was held to be necessary for release of "innovative grant" funds for Battelle's boulevard and other infrastructure costs.

The Near North Side Community would be a diverse community, but the neighborhoods of which it was comprised would still be, in the most part, socioeconomically segregated.

**Victorian Village**

Victorian Village Area Commission was created by the Columbus City Council in 1973. The Commission was empowered by City Council:

(a) To study the problem and determine the needs of the City in furthering the purpose of restoring and preserving the area of the City known as Victorian Village.

(b) to determine what legislation, if any, was necessary to preserve, restore, and develop the Victorian Village area and to recommend such legislation to City Council.

(c) To provide for regular and special meetings to accomplish the purposes of paragraphs (a) and (b).26

The Commission was also granted architectural review powers. These architectural review powers gave the Commission the authority to determine if proposed construction, reconstruction, or alteration of the exterior of structures would be appropriate to the historical and architectural character and preservation of the area.

In 1975 the Near North Side Neighborhood Association was renamed the "Victorian Village Society." The primary objectives established by the Society included: the following:
1. To promote a spirit of neighborliness among residents of, businesses, and organizations within the Victorian Village area.

2. To promote the restoration, preservation and maintenance of the historical district known as Victorian Village.

3. To provide a representative voice to the Near North Side Neighborhood Council, to promote the general welfare of the Near North Side area and to express the interests of Victorian Village within the Council.

4. To promote the upgrading of businesses and professions in the area and encourage the development of new businesses in the area in keeping with the purposes of the Society.

5. To study the social and civic needs of Victorian Village and to promote a program designed to strengthen the general welfare and unity of the area.

The Society began the active role of reporting to the Near North Side community and to the local government the concerns of the Village's residents and the activities being undertaken, especially restoration/rehabilitation activities.

The Society wished to emphasize a feeling of neighborhood unity and community involvement to mitigate the skepticism others had about the neighborhood. In an effort to promote the Victorian image and gain support from the residents, the media, and the City, the first annual "Victorian Village Fall Festival and Tour of Homes" was initiated by the Society in September 1975. (See Figure 11.)

In 1975, the Department of Development submitted a proposal to the National Endowment For the Arts, a Washington, D.C. based federal agency, for a $40,000 conservation grant for the Village. The grant was to be matched by the Department using Community Development Act (CDA) funds. The conservation grant was to be used for the development of
Figure 11. ADVERTISEMENT OF THE VICTORIAN VILLAGE SOCIETY FALL FESTIVAL AND TOUR OF HOMES

Victorian Village

A Place of the Past
A Place of the Future

Victorian Village is located on the near north side of Columbus. Many of our city's wealthiest residents lived in this neighborhood around the turn of the century in the grandest of homes. Victorian Village residents are proud of their neighborhood's past and proud of their work that is returning it to an enriching community it once was.

On September 10, from 10 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., we invite you into our community to tour our homes. The Festival will feature arts and crafts, antiques and music. Tickets $3.00. Information: 299-9642

SOURCE: Columbus Monthly, September 1975.
plans that focused on the conservation of older, historic neighborhoods. The proposal's stated purpose was to assist the Victorian Village Area Commission in accomplishing its objectives by providing a conservation and restoration plan.28

The majority of the Victorian Village Area Commission and Victorian Village Society members supported the proposal. But some neighborhood residents opposed it, on the grounds that the proposed $40,000 CDA matching funds should be used instead to provide rehabilitation grants and low interest loans for the neighborhood's low- and moderate-income property owners. In March of 1976, Bill Lacy, the Director of Architecture and Environmental Arts for the National Endowment for the Arts, informed the Department of Development's director Jack Huddle that the City's grant application had not been approved.29

The launching of OMC's multi-million dollar revitalization program, local government's capital improvement funds, CDA grants, and white collar interest in urban living helped to increase investor confidence in Victorian Village. Many investors began referring to the neighborhood as a "sure thing" and were eager to become involved in its rejuvenation. George Eckelberry, vice president in charge of residential loans for Buckeye Federal Savings and Loan Association, asserted,

We think Victorian Village is here to stay. . . . We're going to see enormous changes including rehabilitation and new construction. In Victorian Village, Buckeye Federal made $2.1 million in residential loans and that figure will easily be topped in 1978. . . . Those older homes appeal to a lot of people. . . . With the closeness of downtown . . . the charm and the trees . . . the eye appeal those properties have . . . we've just seen the beginning.30
The new construction that George Eckelberry had alluded to was exemplified by the construction of 24 single-family luxury townhouses on Price Avenue. Referred to as "Charleston Place," the leading forces behind this new development were developer Fred Morrison and architect Robert Busser. The luxury townhouses were a part of a development scheme to attract the white collar workforce of the CBD to the area. Morrison stated,

... the luxury of being able to live in a Dublin, Westerville, Newark or Lancaster and commute to the central city in the future won't be there. You'll see people who work downtown needing to acquire housing some place in the central core. ...  

Morrison also cited rising energy and transportation costs as reasons for an increasing white collar interest in urban living. These reasons were reaffirmed by newcomers to the neighborhood as well as by authorities on restoration/rehabilitation, preservation activities and the processes of gentrification and neighborhood revitalization that were taking place in inner-city neighborhoods.  

Because of the fact that both public and private sector reinvestment would increase the prestige of the neighborhood for potential home-buyers, the net effect of these intensified efforts would be the generation of more nonresidential speculation and encouragement of more gentrification with its consequent displacement of existing low-income residents.  

In March of 1978, the Victorian Village Planning and Zoning Committee recommended that a substantial portion of Victorian Village be rezoned to prohibit future high density residential or commercial development in an area bounded by West Fifth Avenue to the north,
Figure 12. ADVERTISEMENT OF LUXURY TOWNHOUSES - "CHARLESTON PLACE"

A twentieth century version of the eighteenth century brick townhouses of Charleston, Georgetown, and Philadelphia is being brought to Columbus for the first time. These new low-maintenance, gas heated, energy-conserving houses are designed for people who share a concern for the future, but enjoy the warmth of the past... brass hardware... Brazilian Mahogany woodwork... and a variety of floor plans to choose from at a reasonable price.

Drive into your own garage... walk through your own private garden... into the elegance and convenience of your home at CHARLESTON PLACE. Located in Victorian Village, CHARLESTON PLACE is just five minutes from downtown, Ohio State University and seven medical centers, with shopping and recreational facilities nearby.

Call: 299-5901
Charleston Realty

Figure 13. TYPICAL ADVERTISEMENT OF VICTORIAN VILLAGE

VICTORIAN VILLAGE REALTY

Larry Schwartzmenberger
291-0227

Jean Young
876-7922

Whether you are looking, buying, or selling, in Victorian Village, we can help.
By keeping our ear to the ground, we know what’s on the market, or will be, in addition to our listings.
Work with the specialists who know the unusual characteristics & whimsies of Victorian architecture.
Let us show you what the Village has to offer.

41 West Third Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43201

SOURCE: The Second Annual Victorian Village Fall Festival and Tour of Homes, September 1976.
Goodale Avenue to the south, High Street to the east, and Harrison Avenue to the west, and area which totaled 19 square blocks. The remainder of the Village had been rezoned in 1973 and 1974 for low density residential under the Dennison Avenue Conservation Project. The proposed rezoning would allow up to a four unit apartment complex and also more accurately reflect the existing land use in the neighborhood. 33 The objectives of the Committee's "R-4 Reorganization Plan" were:

1. To reorder zoning priorities within the affected area;
2. To control the growth of the area in a manner consistent with the aims and objectives of Victorian Village; and
3. To provide a zoning plan within which the existing structures can be renovated or rehabilitated to their "highest" and "best" use. 34

It was the opinion of both the committee and the Department of Development staff members that this plan would permit an orderly development of the neighborhood, and yet, be flexible enough to allow the development of a wide variety of housing. It was also agreed that the Victorian Village Area Commission would act as a regulatory body to govern the interpretation and application of the reorganization plan.

A few property owners opposed having their properties included in the rezoning. According to one property owner the southern edge of Victorian Village was prime land for future commercial development since the anticipated completion of The Ohio Center and the completed Nationwide Plaza would most stimulate interest in his property in the future. 35 Despite this opposition, in July of 1978, the Columbus City Council unanimously approved the rezoning with the understanding that
property owners could apply for variances if the rezoning impeded the future development of their properties. An advocate of residential restoration and a supporter of the rezoning praised the Council's decision with the following remarks:

... rezoning will safeguard massive investments being made by homeowners... it should speed the transformation of the area from one scheduled for slum clearance to one noted for its elegance and charm.36

Although some authorities have argued that more affluent households are attracted to living in the inner-city because they seek neighborhood diversity, in the case of Victorian Village this could be seriously questioned. Sandefur Builders had invested $6,000,000 in the construction and rehabilitation of Section 8 housing for low-income households in the Near North Side Community, none of which had yet been constructed or rehabilitated in Victorian Village, and intended to invest $3,000,000 more in the area.37 The implied intent of the rezoning is clearly to discourage the development of Section 8 housing in Victorian Village. The rezoning suggested that socioeconomic homogeneity was strongly desired and it appeared that both the public and private sectors were acting to achieve this end.

In an attempt to show support for OMC's "Neighborhood Development Plan and Implementation Program," an editorial in the Village Vibe: A Newsletter For and About Victorian Villagers (a newspaper published by members of the Victorian Village Society) stated,

The "Village Vibe" wishes to express gratitude to OMC for improving the visual and physical landscape of Victorian Village. ... OMC's decision to revitalize instead of remove structures is to be commended and their plans to carry out revitalization
should be a blueprint for other areas of the country to follow in similar situations.\textsuperscript{40}

It was also pointed out that since the announcement of Battelle's plans to divest itself of its property holdings in the area, OMC had been concerned about the problems of displacement and had cooperated with the City, and neighborhood organization representatives to draft the "Innovative Grant" proposal. According to the article, $997,000 had been appropriated for the tenant assistance portion of the "Innovative Grant Program" which would encourage prospective property owners to retain existing tenants, assist tenants in securing replacement rental housing within the project area, or assist tenants in securing suitable housing within an area of their choice; and monetary assistance would be given to those "deciding" to move.\textsuperscript{41} In addition, the article made reference to "OMC's Tenant Survey" conclusions that only 48 percent of the tenants wanted to rent another unit in the neighborhood, while totally omitting the fact that 69 percent of OMC's tenants had no plans whatsoever to move in 1978. The article misrepresented the goals and objectives of the tenant assistance section of the "Innovative Grant Program" and narrowly interpreted the findings of the OMC Tenant Survey. Although the intent of the editorial had been to objectively present OMC's revitalization plans, which the editor believed had been subjectively presented in several articles in the \textit{Near North News} (a newspaper published by the Godman Guild Settlement House), it would appear that this editorial had done the same.

By 1979, the average price of a single family home in Victorian Village ($44,428) was almost four times more than in 1969 when the
average price of comparable housing was $10,836; and gross sales for
property totaled $5,064,807 compared to $563,500 in 1969.35 This would
certainly imply that confidence in the Village had been clearly
established.
ENDNOTES

1 Olentangy Management Company, "Neighborhood Development Plan and Implementation Program Summary," Columbus, Ohio, 1977. (Typewritten.)

2 Barry Humphries to Ron Rybak, 26 March 1979, Barry Humphries Papers, Olentangy Management Company, Columbus, Ohio.

3 Olentangy Management Company, Minutes of Phase Two Planning Task Force, meeting of 2 April 1979. (Typewritten.)

4 Ibid.

5 Barry Humphries, Memorandum on OMC Phase Two Policy Consideration, 6 April 1979, Humphries Papers, File, "... Policy Consideration," Olentangy Management Company, Columbus, Ohio.

6 Olentangy Management Company, Minutes of Phase Two Planning Task Force, meeting of 23 April 1979. (Typewritten.)

7 Ibid.

8 Marsha Moorehead to Neighborhood Residents, 12 June 1979, Moorehead Papers, Olentangy Management Company, Columbus, Ohio.

9 Marsha Moorehead, Memorandum on Residential Confidential Survey, 13 June 1979, Moorehead Papers, File, "... Survey," Olentangy Management Company, Columbus, Ohio.

10 Olentangy Management Company, Minutes of Phase Two Planning Task Force, meeting of 7 August 1979. (Typewritten.)

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.


15 Godwin-Bohm-NBBJ Consulting Firm, "Rehab Estimate Methodology," Columbus, Ohio, 1979. (Typewritten.)

183
16 Olentangy Management Company, Minutes of Phase Two Planning Task Force, meeting of 2 October 1979. (Typewritten.)

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.


21 Olentangy Management Company, Minutes of Phase Two Planning Task Force, meeting of 12 December 1979. (Typewritten.)

22 Olentangy Management Company, Minutes of Phase Two Planning Task Force, meeting of 24 January 1980. (Typewritten.)

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Columbus, Ohio, "Chapter 3315," Columbus City Codes (1959), sec. 3315.02.


28 N. Jack Huddle to National Endowment for the Arts, 3 November 1975, N. Jack Huddle Papers, City of Columbus Department of Development, Columbus, Ohio.

29 Bill Lacy to N. Jack Huddle, 2 March 1976, Bill Lacy Papers, National Endowment for the Arts, Washington, D.C.


31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.


40Ibid.

41Jeff Long to Wanda Coston, 20 March 1984, Jeff Long Paper, Columbus, Ohio.
CHAPTER VII

FILL-IN PHASE THEORY

Dennison Place

**Innovative Grant Tenant Assistance Program**

When the tenant assistance funds of the "Innovative Grant Program" were finally released by HUD, the City officials announced that 120 eligible moderate-income households would be able to purchase homes between 1980 and 1984 from either the Near North Housing Corporation, OMC, or the City's housing program.¹ The relocation assistance component of the Tenant Assistance Program would provide displaced households with up to $400 to help them to relocate.² Some households could receive additional relocation payments provided by the Relocation Act of 1970, if displacement was the result of governmental action such as the construction of the proposed boulevard.³ In addition, households displaced west of Perry Street were eligible for up to $1200 from a special fund established by OMC to assist these households to relocate.⁴

In order to maximize eligibility, to assist as many households as possible, and thus meet HUD's interests the project boundaries were extended to Hudson Street on the north, First Avenue at the south, North Fifth Street at the east and Perry Street at the west.⁵ The extended boundaries enabled non-residents, many of whom had never resided in the OMC Phase One or Phase Two project areas to benefit from the Tenent
Assistance Program. It would also provide former OMC tenants with "after the fact" relocation payments.\textsuperscript{6} It was explained that non-residents should benefit from the program because it was difficult to locate many former tenants, while other former tenants chose not to return to the neighborhood for various reasons.\textsuperscript{7} Many former tenants did not take advantage of the "after the fact" relocation payments because of the complicated "bureaucratic red tape" (application forms, procedures, etc.) involved in receiving the payments.\textsuperscript{8}

In a vain attempt to achieve the program's objectives of minimizing displacement and to provide tenants the opportunity to become homeowners, objectives substantially precluded by OMC's actions, housing rehabilitation grants were increased from $5,000 to $10,000, with the added provision that such grants could now be used for downpayments. The downpayment, in turn, would be very low or not required, and loan interest rates would be as low as four percent. Homebuyers would be eligible for low interest loans if the house cost more than $10,000 to rehabilitate. To meet the program's objectives, the rehabilitation grants had to be combined with other federal programs. Between 1978 and 1980 only eight tenants who had become OMC tenant-buyers qualified for rehabilitation grants. Some of these earlier tenants were now given housing rehabilitation grants in 1980.\textsuperscript{9}

Tenant Purchase Program

The Near North Housing Corporation provided 62 houses for homeownership with no downpayment required. These houses would be rehabilitated by the housing corporation, with some "sweat equity" by the
homeowner, and the houses would be sold at no profit. The housing corporation would also offer relocation units for low-income tenants by rehabilitating 27 two-family units. The individuals who purchased these houses would rent the other half of the unit to eligible Section 8 households.\textsuperscript{10}

OMC would offer 48 households the opportunity to purchase homes which had not been externally renovated; with little or no downpayment required. Homebuyers would have three years to rehabilitate their houses. Funds had been allocated for that purpose. Eligible households who wanted to purchase a home could do so if the home was a part of the "rehabilitation pool", otherwise, these households might have to displace another household in the neighborhood. The housing corporation would also be faced with the same dilemma.\textsuperscript{11} The City's housing program for moderate income first-time homebuyers included 52 homes. Rehabilitation grants, conventional loans, three percent low-interest loans and Section 235 loans, were available to assist with downpayments.\textsuperscript{12}

Relocation Assistance Program

The City of Columbus Relocation Office provided 157 families, 74 individuals, and 1 commercial establishment with relocation assistance through the "Innovative Grant Program." (See Tables 1 and 2). Of the 157 families and 74 individuals receiving relocation assistance, 64 families and 34 individuals remained in the north area, but this did not necessarily indicate that they remained in the OMC's revitalization areas. Of 52 houses sold by the housing corporation, 30 were purchased by former OMC tenants. Eighty-six percent (86\%) of the Section 8
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assistance Rendered to</th>
<th>Number Receiving Assistance</th>
<th>Purchased Housing</th>
<th>Rental Housing</th>
<th>Section 8 Rental Units</th>
<th>Total Assisted Who Remained in the North Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Families</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals (one person household units)</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Establishment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

INNOVATIVE GRANT TENANT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
BY FAMILY (HOUSEHOLD SIZE): RENAISSANCE PROJECT AREA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family (Household Size)</th>
<th>Number Assisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 persons</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 persons</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 persons</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 persons</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 persons</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 persons</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 or more persons</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

tenants in the double units sold were original residents of the neighborhood. Ninety-three (93) families and 40 individuals who were displaced from the Phase One and Phase Two project areas were relocated in the following areas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Out of the city</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South end of Columbus</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West side of Columbus</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East side of Columbus</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far north end of Columbus and northeast of Columbus</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

133 Total Households

The individuals and families receiving relocation assistance were placed in rental and Section 8 units, while a small proportion became homeowners. Rental housing included private rentals managed by private owners or management companies. Section 8 housing included rental housing that was rented after a household had received a "Section 8 Housing Certificate." The certificate made them eligible for subsidized rent enabling the family or individual to pay only 25 percent of their annual income for rent, while the federal government subsidized the remainder of the total rent payment. The Section 8 housing program was administered by the Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority during the implementation of the "Innovative Grant Program," and certificates were reserved to provide replacement housing for displacees who were eligible to receive the certificates. For those households who became homeowners, it was determined through pre-screening information provided to the relocation technician if a household could reasonably manage a mortgage payment. The income potential of the household was used by the lending institution to determine loan eligibility. However, not all
persons who were eligible for mortgage loans desired to become
homeowners. According to a staff person in the City's Relocation
Office, some tenants had not been mobile for years prior to being
displaced and therefore, had "lost a sense of progress." 14

The major problems of assisting tenants was the money available for
moving expenses and the availability of decent, safe and sanitary
housing particularly for large families. Other problems encountered
were:

(1) trying to convince a two-family household to separate and
establish their own household;

(2) explaining to households who refused to move that they did
not have any alternative;

(3) assisting households that had problems other than
displacement; these households were referred to the
appropriate agencies for help;

(4) accommodating the one commercial establishment in a satis-
factory location; and

(5) some households who would have been eligible for relocation
assistance, left the neighborhood without seeking any
assistance because of the fact that replacement housing had
to be decent, safe and sanitary housing, and thus felt they
could not afford to rent standard housing. 15

Despite the problems, 99 percent of the tenants were cooperative.
This cooperation might be attributed to the fact that for some tenants,
this was not the first time they had to succumb to the pressure of being
forced from a neighborhood. Some tenants had experienced the psycholo-
gical and sociological trauma from German Village, the first inner-city
neighborhood in Columbus to initiate the processes of gentrification and
neighborhood revitalization. 16
In the mid-1980, OMC's "Renaissance Project" was receiving enthusiastic and positive media attention. The project was considered a huge success because it was assumed that the market for restored inner-city housing was "red hot." In an article in the Ohio Magazine, these sentiments were expressed:

In Columbus, the sales pitch is positively inspired. They (OMC) aren't merely selling you a house but "a statement about your lifestyle." The (Renaissance) ads promise a unique opportunity to live in a classic old home with stained glass windows on a tree-lined street . . . your chance to capture that elusive alternative lifestyle you've been dreaming about. . . . The "Renaissance Project" engineered and executed by the Olentangy Management Company (OMC) . . . is a classic of American ingenuity, a case of turning a sow's ear into a silk purse . . . one of the most intriguing in recent urban history. (See Figure 14.)

The Olentangy Management Company was also enthusiastic about the progress and success of one of the largest and the most ambitious residential restoration projects ever implemented by a private sponsor. The difference between the $14,000,000 appraised values of the houses sold and the actual selling price was only $17,000.

During 1980, Barry Humphries resigned as OMC president, and made an arrangement with Battelle to become a consultant to the corporation. Humphries' consultant firm was called "Renaissance Group Incorporated". In July of 1980, Barry Humphries announced that three single-family homes would be constructed on vacant lots within the OMC planning area (Phase Two area). It was estimated that the homes would sell for between $59,000 and $69,000 with several available options. It was also speculated that up to 49 single-family infill dwelling units might be
Figure 14. TYPICAL ADVERTISEMENT OF THE OLENTANGY MANAGEMENT COMPANY

When you move to Renaissance, you're not just buying a home, you're making a commitment about your lifestyle. Renaissance is a residential restoration community located just north of Ohio State University and west of Neil Avenue. This unique opportunity to live in a classic old home with stained glass windows on a tree-lined street is your chance to capture that elusive alternative lifestyle you've been dreaming about. Each one of these magnificent old homes has received extensive exterior energy-saving renovations that include: roof replacement or restoration, brick cleaning and tuck pointing; complete exterior carpentry work; painting; insulation; storm windows and doors; and landscaping and fencing. The diverse housing stock in the Renaissance community offers something for everyone. There are imaginative restorations by Olentangy Management Company for those who desire a home that's ready to move into, and there are homes for the meticulous do-it-yourselfers who will remodel their interior to reflect and enhance their lives.

See what Renaissance has to offer you. For more information call 421-7450.

A RESIDENTIAL RESTORATION DEVELOPMENT
BY OLENTANGY MANAGEMENT COMPANY.
1265 NEIL AVENUE, COLUMBUS, OHIO 43201

developed on some of the vacant lots under the management company's control. Barry Humphries also formed "Renaissance Realty" to sell infill housing and property in the Near North Side Community.

Although it now appeared that Battelle and OMC were getting the positive recognition that Barry Humphries felt they deserved, a confidential report prepared by Urban Dynamics Incorporated, a Cleveland-based consulting firm was commissioned by Battelle to optimize the circumstance. Urban dynamics had been contracted by OMC in 1978 to advise the management company about a strategy for Phase Two and the balance of Phase One development and revitalization. Included in the strategy report were some very shrewd suggestions and negative statements about retaining low-income families. One suggestion specifically states, "Under no circumstances should low-income housing be allowed as it will defeat market upgrading." Another suggestion was to use the Michigan Avenue School area for elderly/handicapped housing which would do the following:

1. Build support for the OMC program by elderly persons;
2. Complete the buffer zones;
3. Provide an exciting "conceptual approach to elderly housing . . . and provide opportunities for "PR" [public relations] at minimal cost;
4. Provide a relief to pressure on the City on the sale of public land for low-income use;
5. Provide Battelle an opportunity as a low income, non-profit sponsor to insulate itself from charges of ignoring lower-income individuals;
6. Help to erode OMC's "high income image;"
7. Erode further, the radical opposition; and
8. Create the elderly as neighbors which should not be objectionable to higher-income families in the "Renaissance" areas.25

All though the suggested strategies of the firm were publicly flatly denied by OMC, the suggestions did have some striking similarities to the strategies that OMC had executed to implement its Master Plan for Phase One and Phase Two (see Appendix G: Confidential Report on Strategy for Phase Two Development).

By 1981, Battelle Memorial Institute and its subsidiary, OMC had gained national recognition for "developing a fashionable upper-middle class neighborhood in the middle of a slum."26 The Wall Street Journal reported that OMC, like other inner-city developers, had adopted some of the market tactics that suburban developers had used for years to attract homebuyers, such as giving its development a theme and an appealing name which would attract more affluent households.27 Another tactic which had been employed by OMC was referred to as its "loss leader" concept.28 The "loss leader" concept implied that OMC would lose money on some homes, but, in reality the purchase of these houses would increase the property values in the surrounding area and would create a market for other properties.29 It was contended that "if you're going to have a 'loss leader', this is the kind to have."30 To accomplish the 'loss leader' concept, the highest priority had been placed on refurbishing the larger, elegant and stately homes of Battelle's property holdings in the area. Several of these houses had been renovated lavishly with such amenities as custom-designed stained glass windows, hand painted tiles, split level bathrooms with sunken
tubs, and gold-plated fixtures, and priced as high as $182,000.31

Also in 1981, the management company announced,

The [restoration] project, known as "Renaissance" will be completed in 18 months [February 1983] four years ahead of schedule . . . the largest privately financed [restoration] in the country. . . .32

In early 1982, at a Victorian Village Society meeting, the organization which had unanimously supported OMC's Master Plan, an OMC spokesperson announced that the area previously designated for commercial development plans would now be used for the construction of the 96 condominium units was allowed under the existing zoning (ARLSD-Apartments Residential Low Density). The possibility of a park on the site, an often voiced hope of opponents, now appeared highly improbable.33

In August of 1983, the construction of 63 townhouse units, instead of the previously planned condominium units, was begun. The construction of the townhouses (which were to be for-rent only) was executed by MI Homes and IM Development Company. The two and three bedroom townhouses would be built to attract a certain clientele—professionals. (See Figure 15.) As of July 2, 1984, 53 units had been completed and 50 were occupied. The remaining units are expected to be completed in August of 1984. Rents range from $495 to $540 per month depending on the interior style of the townhouse. Also included with the units constructed on Pennsylvania and Michigan Avenues is an optional garage which can be rented for an additional $20.00 per month. According to the manager of the "Renaissance Village" townhouses, all of the renters
Figure 15. ADVERTISEMENT OF SINGLE FAMILY RENTAL HOMES - "RENAISSANCE VILLAGE"

Exciting... REVITALIZED NEIGHBORHOOD!

RENAISSANCE VILLAGE

Single Family Rental Homes
Live in the classically designed, unique neighborhood setting of Victorian Village. It's the perfect location for living in style: close to downtown excitement, events and shopping, plus easy access to expressways. Renaissance Village is centrally located to wherever you work or play. (only 5 minutes from Downtown and OSU).

Discover these newly constructed, beautiful 2 & 3 bedroom townhouses and 2 bedroom ranch homes with spacious interiors and quality features usually reserved only for home buyers. Enjoy the benefits of single unit construction, superior energy features, finished family rooms, basements, cozy fireplaces, and quality appliances. Garages are also available.

MODELS ARE OPEN
SUNDAY-THURSDAY 12:00-7:00
CLOSED FRIDAY
SATURDAY 12:00-5:00
Phone 299-4100
436-8900

are "strictly" professionals who are either employed in the CBD, the neighboring hospital (Doctors North and University), or the Battelle Memorial Institute. MI Homes is also in the process of constructing single-family infill housing on several of the vacant lots in the Harrison West neighborhood. It has been estimated that the average sale price of these houses will be $75,000 with an estimated monthly mortgage payment of $670.

Restoration and conversion is also evident in other areas of Dennison Place. Robert Gease, a developer who had purchased several properties during OMC's Phase One project, and an associate are in the process of completely restoring the exterior and partially restoring the interiors (leaving the remaining interior restoration work to be completed by the purchasers) of a formerly seven-unit rowhouse which will be converted to a six-unit condominium. The condominiums will be two and three bedroom units and are being restored to attract more young professionals to the neighborhood. The units selling price will range from $39,500 to $49,500, with optional bank financing. This project, which began in October of 1983 and is expected to be completed in the autumn of 1984, is named "Hunter Place." The units were placed on the housing market in July of 1984.

By 1982 the average sale price of a single family home listed with the Columbus Board of Realtors Multiple Listing Service was more than $90,000. (See Figure 16.) In 1983, the mean residential property tax for a single family home in Dennison Place was approximately $550 more
Figure 16. MEAN SALE PRICE OF A SINGLE FAMILY HOME IN THE DENNISON PLACE NEIGHBORHOOD, 1976 TO 1982

SOURCE: Franklin County Personal Property Division District 010 Real Estate Taxes, 1974 and 1983.
than double that for the same type of housing in 1974. (See Figure 17.) This indicates that property values and taxes have increased dramatically and also indicates that with regard to land values and taxes the expected stages of gentrification and neighborhood revitalization have taken place in the neighborhood. \textsuperscript{38}

\textbf{Victorian Village}

By 1980, Victorian Village Society members had begun advocating the revitalization of the commercial strip along High Street from Fifth Avenue to Goodale Avenue, the area most directly affecting Victorian Village. \textsuperscript{39} One Society member advocate stated,

In order to convince bankers and businesses to invest money for revitalization of the business district . . . we must convince them that there is a strong and increasing demand for goods and services. We must patronize the . . . businesses . . . in the area surrounding us. . . . After a little exploration, I've found clothing stores, antique shops, pharmacies, dry cleaners, printers, and groceries in and around the Village that not only cater to my tastes, but often give the kind of personalized service not offered in suburbia. Save gasoline and put your money where your home is: SHOP IN THE VICTORIAN VILLAGE AREA. \textsuperscript{40}

The impetus for the Society's support of revitalization of the commercial strip was in part due to their past involvement in the "High Street Commercial Revitalization Study" that had been initiated by the Department of Development, and the fact that they (the Society) had never advocated any more neighborhood commerce than what already existed. Thus, the proposed commercial development included in OMC's Phase Two planning activities did not gain unanimous support from the group and in June of 1980, a resolution was passed by the Society opposing commercial development by OMC. \textsuperscript{41}
Figure 17. MEAN RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY TAX IN THE DENNISON PLACE NEIGHBORHOOD, 1974 AND 1983

MEAN RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY TAX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1983</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>500 +</td>
<td>*****</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400 +</td>
<td>*****</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300 +</td>
<td>*****</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 +</td>
<td>*****</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 +</td>
<td>*****</td>
<td>*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1980, decline in deed transfer activity and decline in the average sale transaction value were apparent in Victorian Village. Despite these declines, real property values were continuing to accelerate which indicated that the neighborhood was still a viable real estate market with the potential to attract future investors. The Victorian Village Society's Planning and Zoning committee's survey of all properties (1013 single-family and multi-family dwelling units, and 92 commercial buildings) located within the Village's boundaries revealed that approximately 43 percent, or 475 properties were in various stages of exterior restoration and more than 50 percent of all properties were in good condition. The average price of a single-family dwelling unit in Victorian Village had skyrocketed from $10,000 in 1969 to $60,000 in 1980, which was attributed to a spillover effect from OMC's Phase One and Phase Two revitalization projects.

By 1981, Victorian Village was on its way to becoming one of Columbus' residential architectural showcases. This opinion was reinforced by one Village resident who remarked,

This community has gone with new people who had a vision and a love of old homes. . . .
. . . people in the neighborhood have an "old house disease," and are paying substantial sums of money to turn their dilapidated homes into elegant showcases. What we've done is turned a lot of old houses into a lot of new homes. . . .

The area is now described as a congenial middle class community comprised of a wide spectrum of professional people and blue collar workers which seems to support an earlier assumption that socioeconomic homeogeneity was strongly desired here.
From these statements concerning the present character of the neighborhood it would appear that displacement had taken place in the area, despite the fact that statistics are not available to document to the degree to which it has occurred. According to one resident, displacement had been a gradual process, but that it accelerated during OMC's Renaissance Project.  

By 1982, the average sale price of a single family home in Victorian Village listed with the Columbus Board of Realtors Multiple Listing Service was $65,000. (See Figure 18). Gross sales for all residential property was $2,780,600, which included only 46 property transactions for the year.  

In 1983, the Victorian Village Society's Planning Committee Survey revealed that since 1977 the neighborhood had experienced a significant increase in the number of single-family dwelling units and that the major reason for this increase was due to the conversion of multi-family units to single-family units. In 1983, approximately 48 percent of the housing stock was single-family units as opposed to 41 percent in 1977. The construction of single-family homes and condominiums contributed to this increase. The survey's results also revealed that visible restoration had been observed in over 61 percent of the properties, compared to the 1977 survey which revealed that approximately 24 percent of the properties were observed to have undergone visible restoration. The survey's findings also indicated that from 1980 to 1983, important changes which had a significant and positive impact on the neighborhood included the construction of 31 new condominiums; three new single-family
Figure 18. MEAN SALE PRICE OF A SINGLE FAMILY HOME IN THE VICTORIAN VILLAGE NEIGHBORHOOD, 1976 TO 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEAN SALE PRICE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10000+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|

SOURCE: Franklin County Personal Property Division District 010 Real Estate Taxes, 1974 AND 1983.
homes, and the conversion of eight properties to condominiums.48

In 1983, the average residential property tax in Victorian Village for a single-family unit was $450, compared to approximately $250 in 1974 for the same type of unit. (See Figure 19). With regard to property value and taxes, it would appear that the expected stages of gentrification and neighborhood revitalization have taken place in Victorian Village, especially since the annual real estate tax rate for Franklin County has only increased a small percentage point, from 1983 $48.30 per $1,000 valuation in 1974 to $48.33 per $1,000 valuation in 1983, during this nine-year period.49
Figure 19. MEAN RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY TAX IN THE VICTORIAN VILLAGE NEIGHBORHOOD, 1974 AND 1983

MEAN RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY TAX

450 +

400 +

350 +

300 +

250 +

200 +

150 +

100 +

50 +

1974 1983

ENDNOTES


2Ibid.

3Ibid.


5Charlotte Pryor to Wanda Coston, 14 March 1984, Charlotte Pryor Papers, City of Columbus Department of Development, Relocation Office, Columbus, Ohio.


8Ibid.


10Ibid.

11Ibid.

12Interview with Pat Grady, City of Columbus Department of Development, Division of Community Development, 9 February 1984.

13City of Columbus Department of Development, "Innovative Grant Report," Columbus, Ohio, 1984. (Typewritten.)

14Interview with Mrs. Anita Boyd, City of Columbus Department of Development, Relocation Office, 17 April 1984.

15Ibid.

16Ibid.


18Ibid.

19Ibid.


24"Confidential Report on Strategy for Phase Two Development," Urban Dynamics, Cleveland, Ohio, 3 August 1978. (Typewritten.)

25Ibid.


27Ibid.

28Ibid.

29Ibid.

30Ibid.

31Ibid.


34Interview with Terri Moon, Renaissance Village, Columbus, Ohio, 2 July 1984.


36Interview with Robert Gease, Columbus, Ohio, 9 July 1984.


City of Columbus Department of Development, "Neighborhood Change," Columbus, Ohio, 1982, p. 50.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Interview with Mrs. Barbara Covert, Columbus, Ohio, 13 March 1984.

Columbus Board of Realtors, "Multiple Listing Service, 1976-1982," Columbus, Ohio, 10 April 1984. (Typewritten.)

Victorian Village Society Planning Committee, "A Study in Neighborhood Restoration," Columbus, Ohio, 1983. (Typewritten.)

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Responses of Dennison Place and Victorian Village Residents Relative to the Gentrification and Neighborhood Revitalization Stage Model

In an attempt to obtain data from neighborhood residents concerning the stages of gentrification and neighborhood revitalization, and to answer thesis subquestions, fifty-six (56) telephone surveys were conducted. The majority of the respondents would be considered "pioneers" or "early settlers" if gentrification and neighborhood revitalization had taken place in the context of the stages commonly observed (see Appendix H: Comparison of Responses).

Both the local government and Battelle expected to attract middle- and upper middle-income households to the neighborhoods and deliberately made plans to stimulate such reinvestment. Survey results clearly show that the respondents, primarily new residents, were motivated to reside in the neighborhood by considerations predicted by the model developed by the National Urban Coalition.

Of the 56 respondents, 83.9 percent (N=48) learned about the restoration/rehabilitation activities taking place in these neighborhoods through personal observation. Fourteen and three tenths percent (14.3%) (N=8) and 1.8 percent (N=1), respectively, heard about the
restoration/rehabilitation activities from either the media or a local realtor. A large number of the respondents, 67.9 percent (N=38), were attracted to the neighborhoods because of the architectural features of the housing stock; 42.9 percent (N=24) were attracted because the neighborhoods provided affordable housing; while less than one-third, 30.4 percent (N=17) were attracted because of the diversity in the neighborhood.

A significant number of respondents, 82.1 percent (N=46), had purchased their homes at a low cost relative to comparable housing in the suburbs, 8.9 percent (N=5) considered the cost of their homes to be about the same as comparable housing in the suburbs, while only 1.8 percent (N=1) considered the cost of their home to be higher than comparable suburban housing.

Ninety four and six tenths (94.6%) (N=53) responded that their homes had to be restored after purchase while only 5.4 percent (N=3) stated that they had been restored prior to purchase. The responses were evenly split 21.4 percent (N=12) each, for those persons who had personally done all the restoration work, and those who had contracted all of the restoration. Of those persons responding, 57.2 percent (N=32), had done some of the restoration themselves and had contracted for some of the work.

With regard to the scale of reinvestment observed in the neighborhood: 58.9 percent (N=33) considered the scale of reinvestment to be high; 39.3 percent (N=22) considered it to be moderate; and 1.8 percent
(N=1) considered the scale of reinvestment to be small. Almost all of the respondents, 92.9 percent (N=52), responded that reinvestment had been focused on housing that is readily convertible to single-family housing; while only 3.6 percent (N=2) responded that it had focused on a mixture of housing types (single-family, duplex, multi-family, rowhouses, etc.); and another 3.6 percent (N=2) did not know whether reinvestment had been focused on housing readily convertible to single family or not.

Only 10.7 percent (N=6) of the respondents' homes were purchased from private homeowners; 32.1 percent (N=18) were purchased from a local realtor; and 56.1 percent (N=32) were purchased from other sources either the Olentangy Management Company, the City's housing program, the Near North Housing Corporation or directly from private developers.

Twenty-five percent of the respondents (N=14) considered crime, especially property crime, to be a negative factor in the areas; 17.9 percent (N=10) indicated that public services (poor quality of schools, inadequate street lights, etc.) were negative factors; and 19.6 percent (N=11) of the respondents considered unrenovated properties to be negative factors. Ten and seven tenths percent (N=6) indicated that traffic was a negative factor; and 17.9 percent (N=10) indicated there were not any negative factors in the neighborhood.

Virtually all of the respondents, 96.4 percent (N=54), indicated that they were confident about the future of the area. The remaining respondents, 3.6 percent (N=2), were either uncertain of the future of
the area or were not confident about the area's future. In addition, 94.6 percent (N=53) indicated that they looked for stability in their neighbors but are not concerned that they are unlike themselves; while only 5.3 percent (N=3) stated they were concerned that their neighbors were unlike them. A significant number of the respondents, 89.3 percent (N=50), had never felt personally threatened by living in a diverse neighborhood, while 10.7 percent (N=6) had initially felt personally threatened by the diversity of the neighborhood.

Of the respondents interviewed, 89.3 percent (N=50) indicated that in their perception a significant proportion of the former tenants had been displaced from the neighborhoods. 5.3 percent (N=3) stated that many of the existing tenants had not been forced out of the neighborhoods; while another 5.3 percent (N=3) did not know if any of the existing tenants had been displaced.

Forty-six and four tenths percent (46.4%) (N=26) responded that in their perception many of the long-term homeowners had not sold out or been forced out of the neighborhoods as a result of stricter code enforcement policies and rising property taxes. However, 35.7 percent (N=20) indicated that they believed that many long-term homeowners had, in fact, sold out or had been forced out by these influences and 17.9 percent (N=10) did not know if this had occurred or not.

Eighty and four tenths percent (80.4%) (N=45) of the respondents considered code enforcement to be strict in the neighborhoods; 14.3 percent (N=8) stated that they did not consider code enforcement to be
strict; and 5.3 percent (N=3) indicated that they did not know if code enforcement was strict in the neighborhoods or not.

Of these persons responding, 78.5 percent (N=44) indicated that a large and moderate proportion of speculative restoration/rehabilitation had occurred, 12.5 percent (N=7) stated that the extent of speculative rehabilitation had been small, and 8.9 percent (N=5) did not know the extent of speculative rehabilitation.

The overwhelming majority of the responses, 94.6 percent (N=53), indicated that both property values and taxes increased dramatically in the neighborhoods. Only 1.8 percent (N=1) and 3.6 percent (N=2), respectively, stated that property values and taxes had not increased dramatically or that they did not know if they had nor not.

Of those persons responding, 80.4 percent (N=45) believed that once the neighborhood gained public notice, government intervention helped accelerate restoration/rehabilitation activities, which became more intense; 7.1 percent (N=4) of the respondents did not believe government intervention had helped; and 12.5 percent (N=7) of the respondents did not know.

Eighty-five and seven tenths percent (85.7%) (N=48) believed that once the neighborhood gained public notice, media attention helped to accelerate restoration/rehabilitation activities accelerate; 10.7 percent (N=6) stated that the media did not help to accelerate restoration/rehabilitation activities; while 3.6 percent (N=2) of those persons responding did not know.
Virtually all of the respondents, 98.2 percent (N=55) indicated that since the neighborhoods have undergone some positive change they have noticed long-term homeowners joining in the restoration/rehabilitation activities. Only 1.8 percent (N=1) responded they had not noticed long-term homeowners joining in the restoration/rehabilitation activities.

Respondents' ratings with regard to public services provided in their neighborhoods, may be summarized as follows: 8.9 percent (N=5) rated them as "excellent;" 25.0 percent (N=14) rated them as "good;" 32.1 percent rated them as "adequate;" 21.4 percent (N=12) rated them as "fair;" and 12.5 percent (N=7) rated them as "poor."

In combination with respondents' ratings of their respective neighborhoods and other data sources, a comprehensive overview of similarities and differences between them (the study neighborhoods) and the gentrification and neighborhood revitalization model explicated by the National Urban Coalition supports conclusions and implications drawn from the four phases or stages (see Table 3).

Although the stages of gentrification and neighborhood revitalization were different in Dennison Place and Victorian Village than predicted through use of the model supported by the National Urban Coalition, some characteristics were the same. The complex interactions between community residents, government, and private sector have strongly influenced what has taken place in both neighborhoods. Of the characteristics observed in the "Start-Up Phase" of the Coalition's
Table 3

SUMMARY COMPARISON OF SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STUDY NEIGHBORHOODS (DENNISON PLACE AND VICTORIAN VILLAGE) AND THE NATIONAL URBAN COALITION MODEL OF GENTRIFICATION AND NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The National Urban Coalition's Observed Characteristics</th>
<th>Were Characteristics Observed In Dennison Place?</th>
<th>Were Characteristics Observed In Victorian Village?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(1) "Start-Up Phase"

a. initial restoration primarily done by owner-investor ("pioneer")
   No

b. pioneers were primarily attracted by architectural features
   No

c. pioneers were attracted by the low [purchase] price
   No

d. pioneers were not put off by the [poor] neighborhood [environment] as long as he/she was not personally threatened
   No

e. pioneers were often attracted by [neighborhood] diversity
   No

f. small scale reinvestment was focused on buildings readily converted to single family homes
   No

g. changes in the neighborhood were not readily apparent
   No

h. little eviction or involuntary displacement
   Yes
Table 3  
(continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The National Urban Coalition's Observed Characteristics</th>
<th>Were Characteristics Observed In Dennison Place?</th>
<th>Were Characteristics Observed In Victorian Village?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. no curtailment of immigration of newcomers</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. existing residents were not aware of incipient change</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) "Buy-In Phase"

a. early settlers paid more than pioneers for comparable property | Yes | Yes |

b. early settlers were aware of negative factors in the neighborhood but were confident of the future of the area | Yes | Yes |

c. early settlers looked for stability in their neighbors but were not concerned [about differences] | Yes | Yes |

d. restoration/rehabilitation was spreading and increasing in intensity, and gained public notice | Yes | Yes |

e. displacement of tenants began to attain significant proportions | Yes | Not Available |

(3) "Take-Off Phase"

a. confidence in the neighborhood had been established | Yes | Yes |

b. newcomers often felt a need for more security and status | Not Available | Yes |
Table 3
(continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The National Urban Coalition's Observed Characteristics</th>
<th>Were Characteristics Observed In Dennison Place?</th>
<th>Were Characteristics Observed In Victorian Village?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>c. newcomers demand improved public services</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. newcomers disparage &quot;inauthentic&quot; restoration</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. newcomers were willing to pay substantial higher prices than their predecessors and many contracted restoration/rehabilitation work, rather than do it themselves</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. speculative rehabilitations increased and proceeded until entire neighborhood was totally rehabilitated</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. speculators sought out private owners, both absentee and resident, and made offers of purchase</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. residents, perhaps not fully aware of eventual value of their property, sold out for what appeared to be substantial capital gains</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. many departing homeowners had wanted to leave for years without having been able to sell at a price [adequate] to purchase elsewhere</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) "Fill-In Phase"

a. property values and taxes rose dramatically                  | Yes                                             | Yes                                              |
Table 3  
(continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The National Urban Coalition's Observed Characteristics</th>
<th>Were Characteristics Observed In Dennison Place?</th>
<th>Were Characteristics Observed In Victorian Village?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b. long-term owners financially able, joined in the restoration/rehabilitation activity</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. long-term owners who could not pay reissuing [property] taxes were forced out</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. long-term owners who could not afford repair and maintenance costs arising from stricter code enforcement were forced out</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. not too gradually remaining unimproved properties are restored/rehabilitated</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. homeowner displacement peaked and then [declined] as displacement of former homeowners was completed</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
model none of the characteristics observed in the Dennison Place and Victorian Village neighborhoods fit. This can be attributed to the fact that in Dennison Place, restoration/rehabilitation was initiated by OMC, and in Victorian Village, it was initiated by the local government as opposed to owner-investors ("pioneers").

All of the notable characteristics of the "Buy-In Phase" were observed in the study neighborhoods with the exception of characteristic 2e of Table 3—displacement of tenants began to attain significant proportions. In the case of Victorian Village, data was not available to compare this characteristic.

In the "Take-Off Phase", the most notable characteristic which fit the model in both Dennison Place and Victorian Village was that confidence in the neighborhood had been established. In Victorian Village, newcomers disparaged "inauthentic" restoration through the formation of the Victorian Village Area Commission. None of the remaining characteristics of this phase were observed in either study neighborhood.

In the "Fill-In Phase", of the six characteristics noted in the Coalition's model, characteristic 4a of Table 3—property values and taxes rose dramatically—was observed in both study neighborhoods. Data regarding characteristics in this phase (Table 3(4) b, c, and d) was not available. Therefore, conclusions regarding the comparisons could not be drawn. Comparison of the remaining characteristics (Table 3(4) e and f) revealed clear difference. Unlike the model, in neither of the study neighborhoods had remaining unimproved properties been restored/rehabilitated nor had homeowner displacement peaked and then declined.
The fact that the stages of gentrification and neighborhood revitalization which have taken place in the Dennison Place and Victorian Village neighborhoods were found to be different from the stages of gentrification and neighborhood revitalization proposed by the National Urban Coalition may be attributed to the following factors:

1. The largest land holder in the Dennison Place neighborhood was a private corporation which through its established subsidiary, the Olentangy Management Company initiated the largest and the most ambitious restoration/rehabilitation project ever executed by a private sponsor in America.

2. The market strategies employed by OMC to divest Battelle of its property holdings, as well as to attract middle and upper middle income households were uncommon to other areas.

3. The City's commitment to the restoration/rehabilitation of both neighborhoods reduced perceived private reinvestment risks to a minimum.

4. The "Innovative Grant Program" which was implemented to support and maintain an effective public/private partnership, was unusual.

5. The eleven year (1965 to 1976) commitment by the City to the Dennison Avenue Conservation Project undoubtedly influenced the outcome.

6. Strict "conservation standards" were enforced in the Dennison Avenue Project area, as opposed to minimal housing code enforcement.

7. The Victorian Village Area Commission and the Victorian Village Society, have both been instrumental in overseeing and ensuring the rehabilitation activity in addition to reflecting local neighborhood commitment.

8. Formation of the University Area Commission and the Dennison Place Neighborhood Organization helped initiate private efforts in the restoration/rehabilitation activity and local neighborhood commitment.

9. The City of Columbus committed Community Development Block Grant funds (CDBG) to provide low-interest housing rehabilitation loans and grants and expended CDBG and Capital Improvement Funds for neighborhood Improvements (street lighting upgrading, street and alley resurfacing, etc.).
10. Designation of the Dennison Place neighborhood, the OMC Phase One and Phase Two project areas, and a portion of the Victorian Village neighborhood as a Neighborhood Strategy Area permitted the City to capitalize on the public, private and/or neighborhood commitments to restoring/rehabilitating and maintaining the neighborhood's housing stock, and/or upgrading of the neighborhood environment.

11. Both neighborhoods are in close proximity to major employment centers: the CBD, Battelle Memorial Institute, The Ohio State University, University Hospital and Doctors North Hospital. This has been a major attraction to residence in these neighborhoods.

12. Both neighborhoods were included in the National Register of Historic Places, in addition to local historic district designation.

Would the stages have followed the typical pattern if owner-occupants had been the prime investors in these two neighborhoods rather than newcomers?

Planning and Policy Implications

It is evident that the stages of gentrification and neighborhood revitalization that took place in the Dennison Place and Victorian Village neighborhoods were different from the stages commonly observed elsewhere. The complex interactions between the neighborhood residents, the local government and the private sector clearly indicate that policies and plans should not be formulated or implemented, unless they take into account the economic, psychological, sociological and consequences on vulnerable groups. Private-sector programs, together with federal, state (historic preservation), and local government programs, promoted gentrification and neighborhood revitalization here and thus all must share the responsibility for shortcomings as well as the glory of success.
The Dennison Place and Victorian Village neighborhoods experience were unique. The scale of private investment was massive, and government intervention was great. The general thrust of the "Innovative Grant Program" had the effect of directly and indirectly benefitting OMC and newcomers to these neighborhoods rather than the resident population it was intended to assist.

Lack of neighborhood power, especially for OMC tenants, created dynamic conflict and tended to cause residents to lose confidence in their ability to control neighborhood change. However, in the case of Victorian Village residents, the neighborhood's power through the Victorian Village Area Commission and the Village's Society have afforded them some control in neighborhood change. The "Innovative Grant Program" in a sense, had the effect of safeguarding the Village residents' substantial investments, both long term residents and newcomers.

Plans and policies formulated to arrest the decline of inner-city neighborhoods and attract reinvestment by more affluent households require an interdisciplinary approach involving individuals who are sensitive to the needs of vulnerable groups, especially the poor. The skills and knowledge of urban planners, social workers, health professionals, lawyers, economists, policy analysts and sociologists, to name a few, must be used to ensure that plans are formulated to effectively and positively direct clear decisions and strategies in the processes of gentrification and neighborhood revitalization. An interdisciplinary approach should help to better understand the stages
of gentrification and neighborhood revitalization and their insidious by-product, displacement. Such understanding should then provide positive input, expressed under common values and consensus, in terms of the quality of life, fairness, and justice for vulnerable groups. This approach is needed in order to adequately document the magnitude and negative effects of displacement because documentation is critical to understanding the full nature of the problem.

It is hoped that this study has revealed the urgent need for formulating plans and policies that will have the least stressful consequences on those populations most directly affected and alert sensitive policy-makers to the manners in which well-phrased statements of humanistic objectives have been subverted in the quest for the fulfillment of self-interest. In the Near North Side, the price of community "upgrading" was paid for with massive displacement of those least capable of protecting their own interests. Who pays the price of gentrified "improvement" and with what justice? When such displacement is encouraged, assisted, and promoted by private institutions, local government, and a federal program all loudly proclaiming their intent to minimize such adverse effects, what confidence can citizens have in the future policy statements of institutions they must look to for leadership and justice?
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alman, Mary. Columbus, Ohio. Interview, 21 April 1984.


Applegate, Robert. City of Columbus Department of Development, Division of Community Development, Columbus, Ohio. Interview, 12 March 1984.


Banas, Myrtle. Columbus, Ohio. Interview, 4 April 1984.


"Battelle May Not Get Federal Aid For Area Clean-Up." Columbus Citizen Journal, 8 August 1978, p. 2.


"Battelle and the Sandblasters." Columbus Monthly, September 1977, p. 16.


Boyd, Anita. City of Columbus Department of Development, Relocation Office, Columbus, Ohio. Interview, 17 April 1984.

"Celebrating Ten Years of Publication for You." The Neighborhood Busybody: Dennison Place Newsletter, 20 March 1984, p. 3.

"City Giving Up Hope on Development Grant." Columbus Citizen-Journal, 1 May 1979, p. 2.

City of Columbus Department of Development. "Columbus Displacement: Plan of Action." Columbus, Ohio, September 1978. (Typewritten.)


———. "Innovative Grant: General Relocation Plan." Columbus, Ohio, 13 February 1979. (Typewritten.)

———. "Innovative Grant Report." Columbus, Ohio, 1984. (Typewritten.)


———. "Neighborhood Change." Columbus, Ohio, 1982. (Typewritten.)

———. "Neighborhood Investment Strategy." Columbus, Ohio, 1981. (Typewritten.)

———. "Neighborhood Strategy Area." Columbus, Ohio, 1978. (Typewritten.)

City of Columbus Downtown Action Committee. Minutes of Meeting of the Downtown Action Committee, 1 March 1978. (Typewritten.)


Columbus, Ohio. "Chapter 3315." Columbus City Codes (1959), sec. 3315.02.

"Compromise Reached on Development." Columbus Dispatch, 27 February 1979, p. 2.

"Confidential Report on Strategy for Phase Two Development." Urban Dynamics, Cleveland, Ohio, 3 August 1978. (Typewritten.)


Covert, Barbara. Columbus, Ohio. Interview, 13 March 1984.


"Dennison Avenue Project." The Village Vibe: Newsletter For and About Victorian Villagers, February 1980, pp. 5-6.


Franklin County Personal Property Division. "District 101 Real Estate Taxes, 1974 and 1983." Columbus, Ohio.


________. "Rehab Estimate Methodology." Columbus, Ohio, 1979. (Typewritten.)


Grady, Pa. City of Columbus Department of Development, Division of Community Development, Columbus, Ohio. Interview, 9 February 1984.

"Grant to Help Near North Side Hits Snag." Columbus Dispatch, 14 January 1979, p. 2.


"Hidden History May Hide on High Street." OSU Lantern, 13 July 1984.


"Homes Currently Being Rehabilitated." OMC Newsletter, No. 2, 1978, pp. 1, 4,

"Housing Plan to Include Poor?" Columbus Dispatch, 16 February 1978, sec. B-3
"HUD May Cancel Two Million Dollar Grant If City Can't Handle Displacement." Columbus Dispatch, 24 January 1979, front page.


"Interior/Exterior Renovation Underway." OMC Newsletter, p. 4.


"Legislator Buying Rehabilitation Area Home." Columbus Citizen-Journal, 14 April 1978, p. 3.


Letter. N. Jack Huddle to National Endowment for the Arts, 3 November 1975, N. Jack Huddle Papers, City of Columbus Department of Development, Columbus, Ohio.

Letter. Barry Humphries to N. Jack Huddle, 10 March 1977, Barry Humphries Papers, Olentangy Management Company, Columbus, Ohio.

Letter. Barry Humphries to Ron Rybak, 26 March 1979, Barry Humphries Papers, Olentangy Management Company, Columbus, Ohio.


Letter. Jeff Long to Wanda Coston, 20 March 1984, Jeff Long Papers, Columbus, Ohio.
Letter. Marsha Moorehead to Neighborhood Residents, 12 June 1979, Marsha Moorehead Papers, Olantangy Management Company, Columbus, Ohio.

Letter. Charlotte Pryor to Wanda Coston, 14 March 1984, City of Columbus Department of Development, Relocation Office, Columbus, Ohio.

Letter. Julie Straub to N. Jack Huddle, 21 April 1978, Julie Straub Papers, Columbus, Ohio.


Memorandum. Barry Humphries on OMC Phase Two Policy Considerations, 6 April 1979, Barry Humphries Papers, File, "... Policy Consideration," Olantangy Management Company, Columbus, Ohio.


Molli, Kenneth. Columbus, Ohio. Interview, 19 April 1984.


"Olentangy Management Company's List of Property Sales." 15 October 1979. (Typewritten.)

Olentangy Management Company. "Market Demand Survey Summary." Columbus, Ohio. (Typewritten.)

________. Minutes of Meeting of Phase Two Planning Task Force, 2 April 1979. (Typewritten.)

________. Minutes of Meeting of Phase Two Planning Task Force, 23 April 1979. (Typewritten.)

________. Minutes of Meeting of Phase Two Planning Task Force, 7 August 1979. (Typewritten.)

________. Minutes of Meeting of Phase Two Planning Task Force, 2 October 1979. (Typewritten.)

________. Minutes of Meeting of Phase Two Planning Task Force, 12 December 1979. (Typewritten.)

________. Minutes of Meeting of Phase Two Planning Task Force, 24 January 1980. (Typewritten.)

________. "Neighborhood Development Plan and Implementation Program Summary." Columbus, Ohio, 1977. (Typewritten.)

________. "Survey of OMC Tenants Summary." Columbus, Ohio. March/April 1978. (Typewritten.)


"'Renaissance' Area's Historic Tag May Spur Aid." *Columbus Dispatch*, 18 January, 1979, p. 2.


"Renters Say They'll Force Eviction." *Columbus Dispatch*, 22 July 1980, p. 2.


"Residents Protest Street Plans."

"Residents To Fight Battelle's Subsidiary." *Columbus Dispatch*, 4 September 1977, p. 3.


"Tenants Claim Breach of Trust After Homes Sold by Battelle." OSU Lantern, 24 April 1978, p. 3.


"U.S. Council Nixes Idea For Area Renovation." Columbus Dispatch, 28 April 1979, p. 2.


———. Bureau of the Census. 1980 Census of Population and Housing: Census Tracts, Columbus, Ohio.

Victorian Village Area Commission. "Guidelines for Rehabilitation." Columbus, Ohio, 1981. (Typewritten.)


The Victorian Village Society, Inc., "Constitution." Art. III.


APPENDIX A

Selected Demographic and Housing Characteristics: Columbus, Ohio, Dennison Place, and Victorian Village Neighborhoods

A1: Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

A2: Population Characteristics for the City of Columbus, Dennison Place and Victorian Village: 1940–1980

A3: Selected Age Categories of the City of Columbus, Dennison Place and Victorian Village: 1940–1980

A4: Years of School Completed: Persons 25 Years Old and Over For the City of Columbus, Dennison Place and Victorian Village: 1940–1980

A5: Household Characteristics of the City of Columbus, Dennison Place and Victorian Village: 1940–1980

A6: Median Income of all Households in the City of Columbus, Dennison Place and Victorian Village Neighborhoods: 1940–1980

A7: Housing Characteristics for the City of Columbus, Dennison Place and Victorian Village: 1940–1980

A8: Percent of Housing Units Constructed in Dennison Place 1899 or Before to 1939

A9: Percent of Housing Units Constructed in Victorian Village 1899 or Before to 1939

237
Table A1

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Categories</th>
<th>Dennison Place</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Victorian Village</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 years - 29 years</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 years - 34 years</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 years - 39 years</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 years - 44 years</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 44 years</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Race                            |                |            |                   |            |
| Black                           | 1              | 3.5        | 2                 | 7.1        |
| White                           | 25             | 89.3       | 26                | 92.9       |
| Other races                     | 2              | 7.1        | -                 | -          |

| Sex                             |                |            |                   |            |
| Male                            | 17             | 60.7       | 14                | 50.0       |
| Female                          | 11             | 39.3       | 14                | 50.0       |

| Marital Status                  |                |            |                   |            |
| Married                         | 20             | 71.5       | 12                | 42.9       |
| Single                          | 8              | 28.5       | 16                | 57.1       |

| Family Status                   |                |            |                   |            |
| Households with children        | 10             | 35.7       | 11                | 39.3       |
| Household w/o children          | 18             | 64.3       | 17                | 60.7       |

| Occupational Level              |                |            |                   |            |
| Professional                    | 16             | 57.1       | 18                | 64.3       |
| Semi-professional               | 2              | 7.1        | 8                 | 28.6       |
| Self-employed                   | 4              | 14.3       | 0                 | 0.0        |
| Non-professional                | 3              | 10.7       | 1                 | 3.5        |
| Retired                         | 3              | 10.7       | 1                 | 3.5        |
Table A1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Origin</th>
<th>Dennison Place</th>
<th>Victorian Village</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=28</td>
<td>N=28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small city</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-size city</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large city</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural area</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburbs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Householder Moved</th>
<th>Dennison Place</th>
<th>Victorian Village</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Into the Neighborhood</td>
<td>N=28</td>
<td>N=28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 1950</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1954</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-1959</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1964</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-1969</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1974</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1979</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1984</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Previous Place of Residence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsewhere in the city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsewhere in the neighborhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsewhere in the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another city in Ohio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing Tenure</th>
<th>Dennison Place</th>
<th>Victorian Village</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Owner-occupied</td>
<td>N=28</td>
<td>N=28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renter-occupied</td>
<td>N=0</td>
<td>N=0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Households That Live Near Workplace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table A2

**Population Characteristics for the City of Columbus, Dennison Place and Victorian Village; 1940-1980**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Characteristics and Years</th>
<th>City of Columbus</th>
<th>Census Tracts</th>
<th>18.0a</th>
<th>18.1b</th>
<th>18.2c</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>21</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1940</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>306,087</td>
<td>8,747</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>7,158</td>
<td>3,636</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White population</td>
<td>270,183</td>
<td>8,702</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>7,124</td>
<td>3,614</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent white population</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black population</td>
<td>35,765</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent black population</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other races</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent other races</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **1950**                            |                  |              |       |       |       |    |    |
|                                     |                  |              |       |       |       |    |    |
| Total population                    | 375,901          | 11,752       | ...   | ...   | 7,470 | 3,925 |     |
| White population                    | 328,770          | 11,680       | ...   | ...   | 7,368 | 3,907 |     |
| Percent white population            | 87.5             | 99.4         | ...   | ...   | 98.6  | 99.5  |     |
| Black population                    | 46,692           | 33           | ...   | ...   | 101   | 7    |     |
| Percent black population            | 12.4             | .3           | ...   | ...   | 1.4   | .2   |     |
| Other races                         | 439              | 39           | ...   | ...   | 1     | 11   |     |
| Percent other races                 | .1               | .3           | ...   | ...   | .01   | .3   |     |

| **1960**                            |                  |              |       |       |       |    |    |
|                                     |                  |              |       |       |       |    |    |
| Total population                    | 471,316          | ...          | 5,202 | 5,164 | 7,526 | 3,379 |     |
| White population                    | 393,011          | ...          | 5,042 | 5,095 | 6,753 | 3,328 |     |
| Percent white population            | 83.4             | ...          | 96.9  | 98.7  | 89.7  | 98.5  |     |
| Black population                    | 77,140           | ...          | 32    | 60    | 767   | 43   |     |
| Percent black population            | 16.6             | ...          | .6    | 1.1   | 10.2  | 1.3  |     |
| Other races                         | 1,165            | ...          | 128   | 9     | 6     | 8    |     |
| Percent other races                 | .2               | ...          | 2.5   | .2    | .1    | .2   |     |
Table A2
(continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Characteristics and Years</th>
<th>City of Columbus</th>
<th>Census Tracts</th>
<th>18.0&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>18.1&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>18.2&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>21</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>539,677</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>4,059</td>
<td>4,148</td>
<td>5,979</td>
<td>2,343</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White population</td>
<td>437,255</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>3,830</td>
<td>4,022</td>
<td>5,250</td>
<td>2,316</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent white population</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black population</td>
<td>99,627</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent black population</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other races</td>
<td>2,795</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent other races</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>564,916</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>3,639</td>
<td>2,979</td>
<td>3,870</td>
<td>1,706</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White population</td>
<td>430,633</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>3,296</td>
<td>2,728</td>
<td>3,442</td>
<td>1,607</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent white population</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>94.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black population</td>
<td>124,880</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent black population</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other races</td>
<td>9,403</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent other races</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>During 1940 and 1950 Census Tract 18.0 encompassed 18.10 and 18.20.
<sup>b</sup>In 1960 Census Tract 18.0 was divided into Census Tract 18.10.
<sup>c</sup>In 1960 Census Tract 18.0 was divided into Census Tract 18.20.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years and Selected Age Categories</th>
<th>City of Columbus</th>
<th>Dennison Place and Victorian Village Census Tracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18.0&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total all ages</td>
<td>306,087</td>
<td>8,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 years to 34 years</td>
<td>53,932</td>
<td>1,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent 25–34 years</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 years to 44 years</td>
<td>47,136</td>
<td>1,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent 35–44 years</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 years and over</td>
<td>91,642</td>
<td>3,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent 45 and over</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1950**

| Total all ages                   | 375,901         | 11,752            | ...             | ...             | 7,470  | 3,925  |
| 25 years to 34 years             | 67,700          | 2,625             | ...             | ...             | 1,427  | 776    |
| Percent 25–34 years              | 18.1            | 22.3              | ...             | ...             | 19.1   | 19.8   |
| 35 years to 44 years             | 79,333          | 1,192             | ...             | ...             | 951    | 537    |
| Percent 35–44 years              | 21.1            | 10.1              | ...             | ...             | 12.7   | 13.7   |
| 45 years and over                | 11,234          | 3,079             | ...             | ...             | 2,044  | 1,336  |
| Percent 45 and over              | 29.9            | 26.2              | ...             | ...             | 27.4   | 34.0   |

**1960**

<p>| Total all ages                   | 471,316         | ...               | 5,202           | 5,164           | 7,526  | 3,379  |
| 25 years to 34 years             | 70,100          | ...               | 1,051           | 837            | 1,118  | 501    |
| Percent 25–34 years              | 14.8            | ...               | 20.2            | 16.2           | 14.9   | 14.8   |
| 35 years to 44 years             | 59,862          | ...               | 342             | 519            | 805    | 363    |
| Percent 35–44 years              | 12.8            | ...               | 6.6             | 10.1           | 10.7   | 10.7   |
| 45 years and over                | 137,858         | ...               | 1,054           | 1,459           | 1,877  | 1,118  |
| Percent 45 and over              | 29.2            | ...               | 20.3            | 28.3           | 24.9   | 33.1   |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years and Selected Age Categories</th>
<th>City of Columbus</th>
<th>Dennison Place and Victorian Village Census Tracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.0a</td>
<td>18.1b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total all ages</td>
<td>539,677</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 years to 34 years</td>
<td>74,978</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent 25–34 years</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 years to 44 years</td>
<td>57,043</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent 35–44 years</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 years and over</td>
<td>141,405</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent 45 and over</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1980</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total all ages</td>
<td>546,916</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 years to 34 years</td>
<td>110,522</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent 25–34 years</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 years to 44 years</td>
<td>54,621</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent 35–44 years</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 years and over</td>
<td>146,208</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent 45 and over</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aDuring 1940 and 1950 Census Tract 18.0 encompassed 18.10 and 18.20.

bIn 1960 Census Tract 18.0 was divided into Census Tract 18.10.

cIn 1960 Census Tract 18.0 was divided into Census Tract 18.20.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of School Completed and Years</th>
<th>City of Columbus</th>
<th>Census Tracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total persons 25 years and over</td>
<td>192,710</td>
<td>5,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>40,894</td>
<td>1,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3 years</td>
<td>11,797</td>
<td>663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 or more</td>
<td>11,870</td>
<td>895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent high school graduate</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total persons 25 years and over</td>
<td>225,785</td>
<td>6,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>51,630</td>
<td>1,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3 years</td>
<td>24,870</td>
<td>1,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 or more</td>
<td>18,115</td>
<td>1,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent high school graduate</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total persons 25 years and over</td>
<td>258,004</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>68,966</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3 years</td>
<td>23,486</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 or more</td>
<td>21,712</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of School Completed</td>
<td>City of Columbus</td>
<td>Dennison Place and Victorian Village Census Tracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent high school graduate</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1970

| | Total persons 25 years and over | 273,482 | ... | 1,204 | 1,921 | 2,746 | 1,350 |
| High school: | 93,140 | ... | 217 | 435 | 530 | 347 |
| 4 years | 27,669 | ... | 210 | 147 | 91 | 37 |
| College: 1-3 years | 31,174 | ... | 453 | 274 | 120 | 69 |
| 4 or more | Percent high school graduate | 55.5 | ... | 73.1 | 44.6 | 27.0 | 33.6 |

1980

| | Total persons 25 years and over | 311,572 | ... | 861 | 1,576 | 2,091 | 1,158 |
| High school: | 109,118 | ... | 72 | 344 | 334 | 286 |
| 4 years | 47,564 | ... | 203 | 213 | 229 | 134 |
| College: 1-3 years | 57,939 | ... | 535 | 466 | 441 | 223 |
| 4 or more | Percent high school graduate | 68.9 | ... | 94.1 | 66.2 | 48.0 | 55.0 |

<sup>a</sup>During 1940 and 1950 Census Tract 18.0 encompassed 18.10 and 18.20.  
<sup>b</sup>In 1960 Census Tract 18.0 was divided into Census Tract 18.10.  
<sup>c</sup>In 1960 Census Tract 18.0 was divided into Census Tract 18.20.

Table A5

HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CITY OF COLUMBUS, DENNISON PLACE AND VICTORIAN VILLAGE: 1940-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years and Household Characteristics</th>
<th>City of Columbus</th>
<th>Dennison Place and Victorian Village Census Tracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.0 18.1 18.2 20 21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1940

| Populations in Households | 347,908 |
| Population Per Household  | 3.17    |

1950

| Populations in Households | 447,778 |
| Population Per Household  | 3.14    |

1960

| Populations in Households | 511,542 |
| Population Per Household  | 2.96    |

1970

| Populations in Households | 541,318 |
| Householder Living Alone  | 64,467  |
| Percent Living Alone      | 11.9    |
| Population Per Household  | 2.49    |

1980
aDuring 1940 and 1950 Census Tract 18.0 encompassed 18.10 and 18.20.
bIn 1960 Census Tract 18.0 was divided into Census Tract 18.10.
cIn 1960 Census Tract 18.0 was divided into Census Tract 18.20.

Table A5

MEDIAN INCOME OF ALL HOUSEHOLDS IN THE CITY OF COLUMBUS,
DENNISON PLACE AND VICTORIAN VILLAGE NEIGHBORHOODS: 1940-1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years and Median Income of All Households</th>
<th>Dennison Place and Victorian Village Census Tracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>City of Columbus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Households</td>
<td>132,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income</td>
<td>$3,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Households</td>
<td>153,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income</td>
<td>$4,789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Households</td>
<td>206,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income</td>
<td>$6,818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Households</td>
<td>217,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income</td>
<td>$14,834</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^During 1940 and 1950 Census Tract 18.0 encompassed 18.10 and 18.20.
^In 1960 Census Tract 18.0 was divided into Census Tract 18.10.
^In 1960 Census Tract 18.0 was divided into Census Tract 18.20.

### Table A6

**HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE CITY OF COLUMBUS, DENNISON PLACE AND VICTORIAN VILLAGE, 1940-1980**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing Characteristics and Years</th>
<th>City of Columbus</th>
<th>Dennison Place and Victorian Village Census Tracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1940</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total dwelling units</td>
<td>86,752</td>
<td>2,955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One unit plus mobile homes</td>
<td>48,922</td>
<td>1,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent one unit plus mobile home</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two or more units</td>
<td>37,830</td>
<td>1,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent two or more units</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>60.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All occupied units</td>
<td>83,597</td>
<td>2,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner-occupied units</td>
<td>30,950</td>
<td>814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent owner-occupied units</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median value</td>
<td>$4,178</td>
<td>$5,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renter-occupied units</td>
<td>52,647</td>
<td>1,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent renter-occupied units</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>70.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median rent</td>
<td>$28.27</td>
<td>$28.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacant for rent or sale</td>
<td>2,906</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent vacant for rent or sale</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **1950**                         |       |       |       |      |      |
| Total dwelling units             | 111,721 | 3,609 |   ... |   ... |  2,416 |  1,436 |
| One unit plus mobile homes       | 57,898  | 955   |   ... |   ... |   931  |   215  |
| Percent one unit plus mobile home| 51.8   | 26.5  |   ... |   ... |  38.5  |  15.0  |
| Two or more units                | 53,823  | 2,654 |   ... |   ... |  1,485 |  1,221 |
| Percent two or more units        | 48.2   | 75.3  |   ... |   ... |  61.5  |  85.0  |
| All occupied units               | 110,048 | 3,550 |   ... |   ... |  2,379 |  1,406 |
| Owner-occupied units             | 51,995  | 910   |   ... |   ... |   748  |   178  |
Table A6  
(continued)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing Characteristics and Years</th>
<th>City of Columbus</th>
<th>Census Tracts</th>
<th>18.0</th>
<th>18.1</th>
<th>18.2</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>21</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent owner-occupied units</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median value</td>
<td>$8,599</td>
<td>$9,297</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>$5,947</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renter-occupied units</td>
<td>58,053</td>
<td>2,640</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1,631</td>
<td>1,228</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent renter-occupied units</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median rent</td>
<td>$37.31</td>
<td>$43.50</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>$35.08</td>
<td>$38.77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacant for rent or sale</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent vacant for rent or sale</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1960

| Total dwelling units            | 151,974         | ...          | 2,548 | 2,230 | 2,397 | 1,422 |
| One unit plus mobile homes      | 103,559         | ...          | 510   | 681   | 1,327 | 258  |
| Percent one unit plus mobile home | 68.1          | ...          | 20.0  | 30.5  | 55.4  | 18.1 |
| Two or more units               | 48,405          | ...          | 20.38 | 1,549 | 1,070 | 1,164 |
| Percent two or more units       | 31.8            | ...          | 80.0  | 69.5  | 44.6  | 81.9 |
| All occupied units              | 142,378         | ...          | 2,348 | 2,014 | 2,209 | 1,274 |
| Owner-occupied units            | 73,553          | ...          | 349   | 387   | 584   | 132  |
| Percent owner-occupied units    | 51.7            | ...          | 14.9  | 19.2  | 26.4  | 10.4 |
| Median value                    | $13,000         | ...          | $15,100 | $10,900 | $8,600 | $12,200 |
| Renter-occupied units           | 68,825          | ...          | 1,999 | 1,627 | 1,625 | 1,142 |
| Percent renter-occupied units   | 48.3            | ...          | 85.1  | 80.8  | 73.6  | 89.6 |
| Median rent                     | $68.00          | ...          | $66.00 | $66.00 | $63.00 | $62.00 |
| Vacant for rent or sale         | 6,563           | ...          | 180   | 207   | 138   | 130  |
| Percent vacant for rent or sale | 4.3             | ...          | 7.1   | 9.3   | 5.8   | 9.1  |
### Table A6 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing Characteristics and Years</th>
<th>City of Columbus</th>
<th>Dennison Place and Victorian Village Census Tracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1970</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total dwelling units</td>
<td>182,402</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One unit plus mobile homes</td>
<td>107,049</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent one unit plus mobile home</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two or more units</td>
<td>75,308</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent two or more units</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All occupied units</td>
<td>173,056</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner-occupied units</td>
<td>88,684</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent owner-occupied units</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median value</td>
<td>$17,000</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renter-occupied units</td>
<td>84,791</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent renter-occupied units</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median rent</td>
<td>$ 87.00</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacant for rent or sale</td>
<td>9,312</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent vacant for rent or sale</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1980</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total dwelling units</td>
<td>236,549</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One unit plus mobile homes</td>
<td>132,065</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent one unit plus mobile home</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two or more units</td>
<td>104,484</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent two or more units</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All occupied units</td>
<td>217,135</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner-occupied units</td>
<td>105,965</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent owner-occupied units</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median value</td>
<td>$41,300</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renter-occupied units</td>
<td>111,170</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A6  
(continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing Characteristics and Years</th>
<th>Dennison Place and Victorian Village Census Tracts</th>
<th>City of Columbus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent renter-occupied units</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median rent</td>
<td>$171.00</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacant for rent or sale</td>
<td>19,434</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent vacant for rent or sale</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boarded up dwelling units</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent boarded up dwelling units</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a During 1940 and 1950 Census Tract 18.0 encompassed 18.10 and 18.20.
b In 1960 Census Tract 18.0 was divided into Census Tract 18.10.
c In 1960 Census Tract 18.0 was divided into Census Tract 18.20.

## Table A7

PERCENT OF HOUSING UNITS CONSTRUCTED IN DENNISON PLACE
1899 OR BEFORE TO 1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years Housing Units Constructed</th>
<th>Percent of Housing Units Constructed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing Units Constructed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899 or Before</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900 to 1919</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920 to 1929</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930 to 1939</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Alton Thompson, "Inner City Differentiation" A Stage Structure of Change Analysis of Columbus Symbolic Neighborhoods," p. 90.
Table A8

PERCENT OF HOUSING UNITS CONSTRUCTED IN VICTORIAN VILLAGE
1899 OR BEFORE TO 1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years Housing Units Constructed</th>
<th>Percent of Housing Units Constructed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing Units Constructed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899 or Before</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900 to 1919</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920 to 1929</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930 to 1939</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX B

Survey Questionnaire - Dennison Place and Victorian Village Residents
1. What age category are you?
   - 1 25 years-29 years  - 4 40 years-44 years
   - 2 30 years-34 years  - 5 Over 44 years
   - 3 35 years-39 years

2. What sex are you?
   - 1 Male
   - 2 Female

3. What race are you?
   - 1 Black
   - 2 White
   - 3 Other

4. What is your marital status?
   - 1 Married
   - 2 Single

5. Are there children living in your household?
   - 1 Yes
   - 2 No

6. What is your occupational level?
   - 1 Professional  - 4 Non-Professional
   - 2 Semi-Professional  - 5 Retired
   - 3 Self-Employed

7. Where are you originally from?
   - 1 Small city  - 4 Rural area
   - 2 Mid-size city  - 5 Suburbs
   - 3 Large city

8. What year did you move into the neighborhood?
   - 1 Before 1950  - 5 1965-1969
   - 3 1955-1959  - 7 1975-1979
9. Where did you previously live?
   - 1 Elsewhere in the city
   - 2 Elsewhere in the surrounding area
   - 3 Elsewhere in the neighborhood
   - 4 Suburbs
   - 5 Another city in Ohio
   - 6 Another state

10. How did you hear about the neighborhood?

11. Why were you attracted to the neighborhood?

12. Was your home purchased at a relatively low cost as compared to suburban housing?
   - 1 Yes
   - 2 No
   - 3 Comparable
   - 4 Do not know

13. Who was your home purchased from?

14. Did your home have to be restored?
   - 1 Yes
   - 2 No

15. Did you personally do the work yourself, was it contracted out or both?
   - 1 Yes
   - 2 No
   - 3 Both

16. Is your home near your work place?
   - 1 Yes
   - 2 No

17. Have you ever felt personally threatened by living in a socio-economic diverse neighborhood?
   - 1 Yes
   - 2 No

18. What would you consider to be negative factors in your neighborhoods?

19. What has been the scale of reinvestment in your neighborhood?
   - 1 Small
   - 2 Moderate
   - 3 High
20. Has reinvestment focused on housing that is readily converted to single family housing?
   - 1 Yes
   - 2 No
   - 3 Mixture of housing
   - 4 Do not know

21. Once the neighborhood gained public notice, did government intervention help the rehabilitation activity accelerate and become more intense in the neighborhood?
   - 1 Yes
   - 2 No
   - 3 Do not know

22. Once the neighborhood gained public notice, did media attention help the rehabilitation activity accelerate and become more intense in the neighborhood?
   - 1 Yes
   - 2 No
   - 3 Do not know

23. What has been the extent of speculative rehabilitation in the neighborhood?
   - 1 Large proportion
   - 2 Moderate proportion
   - 3 Small proportion
   - 4 Do not know

24. Have the existing long-term homeowners sold out or been forced out of the neighborhood as a result of stricter code enforcement rising property values and taxes?
   - 1 Yes
   - 2 No
   - 3 Normal turnover
   - 4 Do not know

25. Since the neighborhood has undergone some positive change, have you noticed long-term homeowners joining in the rehabilitative activity?
   - 1 Yes
   - 2 No
   - 3 Do not know

26. Have the existing tenants been forced out of the neighborhood either voluntarily or involuntarily?
   - 1 Yes
   - 2 No
   - 3 Do no know
27. Has property values increased dramatically?
   - 1 Yes
   - 2 No
   - 3 Do not know

28. Has property taxes increased dramatically?
   - 1 Yes
   - 2 No
   - 3 Do not know

29. How do you rate the public services provided in your neighborhood?
   - 1 Excellent
   - 2 Good
   - 3 Fair
   - 4 Poor-adequate

30. Is code enforcement strict in your neighborhood?
   - 1 Yes
   - 2 No
   - 3 Do not know

31. Do you look for stability in your neighbors?
   - 1 Yes
   - 2 No
   - 3 Somewhat
   - 4 Do not know

32. Do you have confidence in the future of the overall area?
   - 1 Yes
   - 2 No
   - 3 Uncertain
APPENDIX C

Open-Ended Questionnaire - OMC Tenant Displaced
OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONNAIRE - OMG TENANT DISPLACED:

1. Who benefits from gentrification and neighborhood revitalization?
2. How does displacement take place?
3. Who are the first to leave the neighborhood once gentrification and neighborhood revitalization begin?
4. What are the effects of different housing types and different tenancy on the number of people displaced from the neighborhoods being rehabilitated?
5. What factors govern displaced individuals choices for replacement housing?
6. What is the impact of the government, historic preservation, private investors upon the displaced low- and moderate-income residents?
7. Where do displaced individuals move?
8. Where renters have the first right of return, do they exercise this right?
9. When government grants are provided, do the original residents benefit from this assistance?
10. What are the psychological and sociological impacts of being displaced?
APPENDIX D

OMC Real Estate Purchase Agreement and Bidding Rules
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AGREEMENT AND BID

The undersigned Buyer hereby agrees to buy and the undersigned Seller agrees to sell, for the consideration and upon the terms hereinafter set forth, the real estate and appurtenances thereto located in Franklin County, Ohio and known as:

1. ON THE FOLLOWING TERMS (e.g. price, financing contingency if any, etc.): For a purchase price of $____________, payable in cash at Closing. Purchase contingent on Buyer obtaining conventional financing within fourteen (14) days after acceptance. Buyer will notify Seller upon obtaining financing.

2. POSSESSION: At Closing, subject to rights of existing tenants, if any.

3. EVIDENCE OF TITLE: (a) For each parcel of real estate to be conveyed, Seller shall furnish and pay for, at Seller’s expense, either:

   (i) An abstract of title extended to within ten days prior to closing and certified in accordance with the Standards of The Columbus Bar Association; or

   (ii) An owner’s closing title insurance commitment, with a copy of the applicable section of the recorded subdivision plat, certified to within ten days prior to closing and, after the closing, an owner’s title insurance policy in the amount of the total purchase price.

(b) Said abstract or said commitment shall show in Seller and the policy shall insure in Buyer a good and marketable title in fee simple free and clear of all liens and encumbrances except: (1) those created by or assumed by Buyer; (2) those specifically set forth in this contract; (3) zoning ordinances; (4) legal highways; and (5) restrictions, conditions and utility easements of record created or reserved as a part of a general plan in and for the subdivision or unit in which said property is located, provided the same do not unreasonably interfere with Buyer’s intended use which is: Residential.

(c) If title insurers are furnished. Seller shall pay the full costs and expenses in connection therewith except that Buyer shall pay any additional costs or premiums incurred in connection with mortgage insurance issued for the protection of Buyer’s lender. If Buyer desires a survey, Buyer shall pay the cost thereof.

(d) If the title to all or part of the real estate to be conveyed is defective or unmarketable, or if any part of the real estate is subject to liens, encumbrances, easements, conditions or restrictions other than those excepted in this contract, or in the event of any encumbrances, Seller shall have a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty (30) days, after written notice thereof, within which to remedy or remove any such defect, lien, encumbrance, easement, condition, restriction or encumbrance, or obtain title insurance against the same.

(e) Merchandisement shall be determined in accordance with the Standards of Title Examination adopted by the Ohio State Bar Association.

4. TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS: As of the date of closing, Seller shall pay or credit on the purchase price all delinquent taxes, together with penalties and interest thereon, and all special assessments that are to be paid on date of closing, both current and reassessed and whether due or to become due. Seller shall pay or credit on the purchase price all unpaid and estate taxes due not yet due for years prior to the closing and a portion of such taxes for the year of closing prorated through the date of closing. The pro rata of delinquent taxes shall be based on a 365 day year and on the most recently available tax rate and valuation. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is the intention of the parties in making the tax pro-rata to allow to Buyer a credit as close to amount as possible to the amount which Buyer will be required to remit to the County Treasurer for the period of time through the date of closing, and to thence, the parties shall make a good faith effort to give effect to any applicable tax refunds, homestead exemption, recently recorded mortgage, change in valuation and other ascertainable factors even if such factors have not been officially certified by either the Treasurer or the Auditor. The amounts so computed and adjusted shall be final.

Excess as hereinafter set forth. Seller warrants that all assessments now a lien are shown on the Treasurer's duplicate and that no improvements (line or area) have been installed by public authority the cost of which is to be assessed against said premises in the future, and Seller further warrants that he has not been notified of possible future improvements by public authority, any part of the cost of which would or might be assessed against the real estate, except the following: None.

5. PEST REPORT: Prior to the closing, Seller shall furnish and deliver to Buyer a report of a licensed exterminator stating whether or not there is evidence of infestation of the premises by termites or other wood destroying pests or evidence of structural damage thereby. If said report reveals evidence of such infestation or structural damage thereto, either (a) all infestation shall be removed and all structural damage shall be repaired by Seller at Seller's expense or (b) alternatively, if the other party elects to rescind and terminate this agreement, except that Seller may elect or erred and terminate if Buyer waives the alternative requirement that Seller remove infestation and repair damage.

6. DEED: Seller shall convey to Buyer a merchantable title in fee simple in the real estate by transferable and recordable general warranty deed, with release of dower, if any, or slander of title, as appropriate. Free and clear of all liens and encumbrances except those (excepted in paragraph 3) hereto, taxes not to be paid by Seller and the following: None.

7. FIXTURES AND EQUIPMENT: The consideration shall include all fixtures including but not limited to water softeners, electric garbage disposals, inside washers, electricity refrigerators, on-off water faucets, kitchen range, ovens, dishwasher, washer and dryer, television, radio, stereo equipment, built-in bookcases, built-in kitchen appliances, television aerials, meters, furnaces, kitchen furniture, etc., kitchen, central air conditioning equipment, fireplace hearers, heating apparatus, in-ground air conditioners, baths, kitchen range, ovens, fireplace screens and fenders not included, gas, electric, bathroom and vanity fixtures, built-in equipment, attached or affixed fixtures, attached sink, toilet appurtenances, window sheers, curtain rods and poles, venetian blinds, carpeting, shutters, blinds, plants and trees, and awnings. By screens, auxiliary doors and windows, and porch blinds belong to Seller and pertaining to the premises, whether now or on the premises or in storage, and the following chairs and equipment: None.

8. RENTALS, INTEREST, INSURANCE PREMIUMS, WATER, SEWER AND STREET CLEANSING BILLS: The following adjustments shall be made on the basis of a 365 day year, or calendar month as appropriate, as of the date of closing: (a) rentals (b) interest on any mortgage indebtedness by Buyer (c) insurance policies if Buyer so elects. Seller shall pay, through the date of possession, all accrued water, sewer, street cleansing and any other charges that are or may become a lien against the premises.

9. DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY: Risk of loss to the real estate and appurtenances from fire or other casualty shall be borne by Buyer, subject to the closing, provided that if the said property is substantially damaged or destroyed by fire or other casualty prior to the closing of the transaction, Buyer may at Seller's option, with the understanding in which the Seller is entitled to all insurance money, if any, payable to Seller under any and all policies of insurance covering the property so damaged or destroyed, or to elect to rescind the contract in which event all parties hereto shall be released from all liability hereunder and the deposit, if any, paid by Buyer to Seller shall be forthwith returned. If Buyer elects to rescind the contract, he shall notify Seller in writing within ten (10) days after Buyer has written notice of such damage or destruction. Failure by Buyer to rescind within ten (10) days shall constitute Buyer's election to proceed with the transaction.

The premises and all fixtures shall be conveyed in the same physical condition existing on the date of this conveyance, ordinary wear and tear excepted, and Buyer shall have reasonable access to the premises prior to the closing for purposes of inspection.
10. DURATION OF OFFER: This offer shall be open for acceptance for seven (7) days from the date made by Buyer.

11. CLOSING: This contract shall be performed and this transaction shall be closed within 30 days after acceptance hereof, unless the parties hereto agree in writing to an extension thereof; and the closing shall be held at such time and place in Franklin County, Ohio as Buyer shall designate.

12. DEPOSIT: Buyer has deposited with Seller the sum of $1,000.00, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, which the parties agree shall be held in trust and applied on the purchase price when the transaction is closed; or if Seller fails or refuses to perform Seller's part of this contract, the deposit shall be returned to Buyer; or if Buyer fails or refuses to perform Buyer's part of this contract, the deposit shall be retained by Seller. Such retention or return of the deposit shall not in any way prejudice the rights of either party to any remedy for such failure or refusal.

13. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES: Seller hereby makes the following representations and warranties for the purpose of inducing Buyer to purchase the real estate: Seller has not been notified within the period of two years immediately preceding the date hereof of contemplated improvements to the real estate by public authority, the costs of which are to be assessed against the real estate in the future; no unpaid for improvements which might form the basis of a mechanics' lien will have been made to the real estate within the sixty days immediately preceding the date of delivery of the deed; Seller has no knowledge of any off-record or undisclosed legal or equitable interest in the real estate owned or claimed by any other persons, firm or corporation. Seller, except during minority, has never been and is not now under any legal disability; all former spouses, if any, of Seller are deceased or any prior mortgages have been legally terminated by divorce; the rights of tenants or other possessory interests in the real estate, if any, have been fully disclosed to Buyer; the only encumbrances upon the title to the real estate are those set forth in Item (5) and the liens of real estate taxes not yet to be paid by Seller pursuant to this contract; the improvements on the real estate, so far as known to Seller, are located within the boundaries of the real estate, and Seller, with respect to said improvements, has no knowledge of hidden structural defects, infestation or damage by termites or other destructive insects or vermin, or uncompleted or with orders of civil authority having jurisdiction, so far as known to Seller, all utility service lines serving the real estate are located either within the boundaries of the real estate or within lands dedicated to public use or within recorded easements for the same; and, if Seller is a partnership or corporation, its officials consummating this transaction are properly authorized to do so, and said partnership or corporation, as well as said officials and the signatory hereto, shall be bound by these presents. Seller covenants that the foregoing representations and warranties shall remain true as of the date of closing of the purchase and sale of the real estate, that the same shall survive the closing and none of the same shall be merged with the title conveyed to Buyer, and, if requested by Buyer, Seller shall deliver to Buyer at closing an affidavit reaffirming such representations and warranties; provided, however, Buyer's failure to request such affidavit shall not adversely affect the making and giving of these representations and warranties, their survival of the closing, or any rights or causes of action which Buyer might have as a result of any representation or warranty being false.

14. GENERAL PROVISIONS: Except as set forth in paragraph (13) hereof, Buyer has examined all property involved in and making this offer is relying solely upon such examination with reference to the condition, character and size of the land and improvements and fixtures, if any. This contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of Ohio. This contract is not assignable by either party without the written consent of all other parties hereto. Any assignment permissible shall not relieve the assignor from his obligation to perform in accordance with the terms hereof. All warranties, representations and covenants herein contained shall survive the closing, and if the terms of Seller's deed and of this contract are inconsistent, the provisions of this contract shall control.

15. SPECIAL AGREEMENTS: None

WARNING: WHEN SIGNED BY BOTH PARTIES, THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A BINDING CONTRACT. DO NOT SIGN IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS.

Signed by Buyer this day of 19

Buyer's Attorney

Address Phone

Dead to Buyer(s)

Signed by Seller this day of 19

OLENTANGY MANAGEMENT COMPANY

Seller's Attorney

Harry L. Bennett, Esq. 424-6611

By: Barry K. Humphreys, President

Address 1205 Neil Avenue Phone 421-7450

Columbus, Ohio 43201
BIDDING RULES

1. All bids will be on OMC form B-1000 supplied by Olentangy Management Company without exception.

2. All bids will be submitted to Olentangy Management Company lock boxes in their offices located at 1265 Neil Avenue, Columbus, Ohio, before the specific bidding deadline in order to be eligible for the sale determination. All bids will be submitted in triplicate. Bids must be submitted during normal working hours (8:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m.).

3. The only information to be entered on the bid form by the bidder should be the price (item 1); and on the bottom of the form the date, signature of buyer(s), address, phone number, and buyer's attorney if applicable.

4. All bids must be accompanied by a $1,000 check drawn on a Columbus, Ohio bank. All unsuccessful bidders will have their checks returned promptly.

5. All bidders must register with Olentangy Management Company before depositing their bid in the lock box in order to receive a registration time and number.

6. All bids will be required to be submitted in a sealed plain white legal size envelope upon which the address of the structure being bid upon is typed or clearly printed.

7. All bids will be deposited into a lock box accessible only by a representative of Deloitte Haskins & Sells, Certified Public Accountants, who will open all bids to determine the highest bidder.

8. Olentangy Management Company may reject any bid form altered other than by entering the bid price.

9. The independent judge's rulings as to price are final and binding on both parties.

10. In the event of a tie in total dollars bid between two or more bidders, the bid which has been registered earliest will be declared the high bidder.

11. In the event the high bidder does not fulfill his contract, except for buyer obtaining conventional financing within 14 days after acceptance, the deposit of $1,000 will be forfeited to Olentangy Management Company and the property will be readvertised.

12. Olentangy Management Company reserves the right to reject all bids if there are no bids that equal or exceed the minimum price as established by OMC.

JA/ds
5/15/78
APPENDIX E

Report on 1978 Development Activities: Olentangy Management Company
REPORT ON 1978 DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES
OLENTANGY MANAGEMENT COMPANY
December 31, 1978

Olentangy Management Company (OMC) has had a highly successful two years. Since the company was formed in 1976, a twelve month development planning program has been completed with citizen participation and construction began in October of 1977. In 1978 the company affected ninety of its 170 structures in Phase I. Of these ninety houses, fifty-six have been sold and thirty-four are currently in some state of development.
These ninety structures had 120 tenants at the time they were converted to development property.

Relocation and displacement have received major attention from OMC in the formulation of the company's development policies. The company recognized early in its program that public funding would be required if these issues were to be successfully resolved. OMC's support for the Innovative Grant was in part due to its concern that tenant assistance be given adequate public support. Now that the Innovative Grant has been awarded, OMC intends to cooperate as fully as possible with the Family Relocation Office of the City of Columbus to fulfill its objectives. A major OMC role will be to provide data on changes in tenant status to the appropriate City representatives for action. This information role will require substantial OMC staff time, but the company is prepared to assume this responsibility to help ensure the success of the tenant assistance portion of the Innovative Grant.

In addition, the company has already implemented several major policy directives designed to help offset displacement including the following:

* Programmed a relatively long (seven year) redevelopment period designed to effect a gradual redevelopment of the neighborhood thereby reducing the magnitude of relocation and providing time for current residents of OMC and public agencies to seek governmental assistance.
- Sold housing and land to John Sandefur for Section 8 rent supplement housing which has resulted in twenty-six units of rent subsidized housing which can be available for relocation. Currently completed negotiations for four additional Section 8 units and exploring the possibility for additional new construction of Section 8 units with Sandefur.

- Agreed to donate four structures ($53,000 approximate value) to the Near Northside Housing Corporation as seed capital for their effort to rehabilitate housing for low and moderate income families. Two structures now under rehabilitation.

- Tailored marketing strategy to reduce displacement whereby the company rehabilitates only the exteriors of properties, thereby reducing costs to tenants and allowing sweat equity in interior rehabilitation.

In addition to these programs, OMC has designed a Tenant Purchase Program that allows current tenants the first opportunity to purchase their dwellings where possible at the average of two certified appraisals. A complete tenant purchase policy is enclosed for general information. This policy has resulted in tenants purchasing property at prices twenty-three percent below what like properties sold for on the open market in public bids in 1978. This represents a significant savings to tenants and has significantly contributed to high ratios of tenant purchases. In total, thirty-nine (39) homes received exterior renovation and were sold in 1978 under the OMC exterior program. Tenants purchased forty-six percent of the exterior renovations completed and sold in 1978 for a total of eighteen structures. This is excellent tenant retention for such a program and was achieved solely through private efforts.

The company also has established policies for tenants who choose not to purchase: tenants in good standing, non-delinquent rent, etc., receive the last months rent back to help with relocation expenses. The company also makes every effort to aid tenants in relocation through placing them in one of OMC's vacant units (currently sixty-five units vacant for relocation) or referring them to appropriate Section 8 projects or public agencies for specialized aid.
In addition, OMC prepared a comprehensive survey of all its tenants in 1978 to determine the extent of potential relocation problems and solutions. In total, forty-eight percent or 211 tenants indicated they would like to continue renting or living in the neighborhood and only 126 of these tenants would like help in finding another rental unit. These 126 tenants represent 26.5 percent of current residents and are a manageable number to work with effectively over the next five to seven years. In five years, this would approximate twenty-five relocations annually and OMC expects to maintain adequate vacant units to handle this volume until the latter years of the development program. Adequate vacant units (sixty) were available for relocation throughout 1978 and adequate vacant OMC units will be available for relocation in 1979.

The high number of single households (sixty-eight percent), major concentrations of University students (twenty-five percent), and the highly transient nature of OMC's tenant population (fifty-four percent have lived in the neighborhood five years or less) are expected to further minimize relocation and displacement.

These factors coupled with the extremely high turnover rate that OMC properties have experienced in the past five years (sixty-eight percent for 1978) lead to the conclusion that relocation has not and should not prove to be an unmanageable element but public funds from sources such as the Innovative Grant are needed.

**ANALYSIS OF 1978 ACTIVITY**

OMC was involved in two primary areas of activity in 1978: Property Management and Property Development. The following data are intended to highlight activity in these areas for the past year. Development has been broken down into three sub areas that include: total housing activity; housing sold under all programs; and the tenant sales program of houses actually sold in 1978.
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT

OMC has its own property management and maintenance staff. The highly transient nature of the residents contributes to an extremely high maintenance cost.

- Rental units as of December 31, 1978 527
- Tenant move-outs in 1978 358
- Percentage tenant turnover in 1978 67.9%

DEVELOPMENT

Data are presented for three areas to reflect all activity of the company which affects numerous programs including model development, outside development for interior rehabilitation, and the tenant exterior rehabilitation program.

Total Housing Activity

This section is intended to reflect the current status of all housing affected by OMC to-date whether it has been sold, is in construction, or served as a model in 1978. Many of these properties were not intended to be in the Tenant Sales Program as they were used as models or designated for other markets in the interior rehabilitation program. The purpose of all OMC marketing efforts has been to design housing programs that would appeal to a cross-section of income levels. The following data reflect the status of all housing programs.

Since the inception of its development program, the Olentangy Management Company has affected ninety of its 170 structures in the Innovative Grant area (Phase I). Of these ninety houses, fifty-six have been sold and thirty-four are currently in some state of development. These ninety structures had 210 tenants at the time they were converted to development property.
* Number of OMC properties in Grant area 170
* Number of properties affected by development (as of December 31, 1978 sold or in construction) 90
* Statistics on 90 properties affected by development (sold or in construction):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structures</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vacant Sales</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sold - tenants unaffected</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displacements</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carry-overs - unsold</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be offered</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Displacement From All Housing Activity In 1978

Number of OMC houses with displaced households (28% of 90 houses in development) 25
Number of OMC rebate notices sent (rental refund to aid in relocation) 23
Other persons displaced
  Before program 7
  Developer purchases with tenants 8
  Total affected tenants 38
Number of tenants receiving monetary relocation assistance from OMC 11
Number of tenants not receiving assistance after offer but skipped or not paying rent totaling $2,195.00.
  Deadline for moving passed 6
  Still in residence 6
  Total OMC Rebate Notices 23
HOUSING SOLD IN 1978

OMC has designed a tenant purchase program that allows tenants the first opportunity to purchase their house where possible. Under this program fifty-six persons have been given an opportunity to purchase their house and nineteen (34%) have exercised their options. The following table summarizes results under this program:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Houses</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacant Houses</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied houses in development</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Models and others not offered</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available for tenant purchase</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houses to be offered in 1979</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houses offered in 1978</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During 1978 fifty-six houses have been sold by OMC. Nineteen of these houses have been sold to tenants while eighteen others have been sold with tenants remaining in residence. Of the remaining nineteen, five were vacant resulting in fourteen houses where displacement took place. In addition, a program of interior renovation on houses previously offered to the tenants and the public and the 1979 models resulted in additional displacement of eleven houses. These twenty-five houses represent twenty-eight percent of the total houses involved in the OMC program this past year. The residents in eighteen of these houses were offered relocation assistance by OMC and residents in nine received payments. Four houses were vacated prior to the relocation assistance program and three structures were sold to the developer with residents in occupancy.

- Total Sales to date
  - Tenants: 19
  - Others: 37
Statistics on fifty-six sales in 1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structures</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sold to tenants</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sold with tenants remaining</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displacements</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exterior Renovated Houses Included in Tenant Sales Program and Sold in 1978

These data reflect only the housing that was actually sold in 1978 under the Tenant Sales Program.

* Exterior Renovated houses included in Tenant Sales Program and sold in 1978
  - Tenants 18
  - Others 27

* Percentages of tenant purchases in exterior program (eighteen tenant buyers; thirty-nine structures) 46%
OMC TENANT PURCHASE PROGRAM/PROCEDURES
AND OMC RELOCATION PROGRAM

OMC has designed a program for tenants to purchase their structures as rehabilitation takes place over the next seven years. The program and procedures are tailored so that most tenants of OMC will have the first opportunity to purchase. OMC residents can participate in the Tenant Purchase Program or may elect to purchase dwellings in the public sales program through sealed bids.

The OMC Tenant Purchase Program will give most tenants a special opportunity to purchase their residence at the average of two certified appraisals following rehabilitation. There is no undertaking to make any dwelling available under the Tenant Purchase Program; this program does not create any legal rights in any tenant or otherwise. Any tenant afforded an opportunity to purchase under this program, but not electing to, will forfeit his or her opportunity to purchase under the program.

SINGLE TENANT RESIDENCES

Dwellings occupied by one tenant will, where practical, be made available to the tenant in the dwelling at the time the dwelling becomes available. The tenant will be given an opportunity to reserve the residence for purchase, pending exterior renovation and the results of two certified appraisals.

Any tenant who desires to purchase the residence but is not given the opportunity to elect to purchase may elect in writing to be placed in the Alternate Program.

MULTI-TENANT RESIDENCES

Dwellings occupied by more than one tenant will, where practical, be made available to the tenants at the time the dwelling becomes available on a priority basis. First priority will be given to the tenant having the longest tenancy, second priority to the second longest, and so on. In the event length of tenancy cannot be determined, priorities will be determined by lot. Once any tenant has made his or her deposit to reserve the residence, all lower priority tenants will be notified; lower priority tenants will not be eligible to participate further in the Tenant Purchase Program.
If a multi-tenant residence is not made available under the Tenant Purchase Program, existing tenants may, on a like priority basis, elect in writing to be placed in the Alternate Program. Only one tenant from each multi-tenant residence will be eligible; eligibility will be determined in the same manner as for purchase priority.

ALTERNATE PROGRAM

Under the Alternate Program, names of eligible tenants would be placed on a waiting list. Thereafter, as dwellings become available (the existing tenant does not exercise the opportunity to purchase under the program), they will be made available to tenants in the Alternate Program on a basis of order on the waiting list. Tenants in the Alternate Program will have one opportunity to purchase a dwelling, as that dwelling is offered. There is no assurance as to which dwelling will be offered, or to whether the dwelling will be single or multi-tenant. Any tenant not electing when a dwelling is made available will forfeit his or her opportunity to purchase under the Alternate Program.

TERMINATION OF OR CHANGES IN PROGRAM

The Tenant Purchase Program may be terminated or altered at any time by OMC, without notice (except as to tenants who have made deposits, whose rights will continue).

PROCEDURES FOR SINGLE FAMILY STRUCTURES

1. If a single tenant dwelling is available for sale, the tenant will be notified when the dwelling is qualified under the Program.
2. If the tenant is interested in purchasing, he or she will have seven (7) days in which to confirm that interest in writing.
3. If a tenant indicates an interest in writing, the tenant will have fourteen (14) calendar days in which to make a $500 deposit to reserve the dwelling.
4. After the deposit is made and rehabilitation substantially completed on the dwelling, OMC will obtain two certified appraisals at its expense.

5. After the appraisals are in, the tenant will be provided with a contract to purchase at an average of the two certified appraisals. The contract will be in standard form as provided by OMC.

6. Copies of the appraisals will be sent with the contract to purchase.

7. After delivery of the contract, the tenant will have seven (7) days in which to execute the contract and twenty-three (23) additional days in which to obtain financing.

8. If the tenant signs the purchase contract and gets financing, the $500 deposited under the Tenant Purchase Program, plus any interest earned thereon, will become earnest money under the purchase contract.

9. If the tenant does not sign the contract or is not able to get financing, the $500, plus any interest earned thereon, will be refunded.

10. In the event that, prior to the closing, any residence is destroyed or damaged to an extent that OMC determines that it is not economic to repair, the tenant would lose his or her opportunity to purchase.

11. Only "tenants" of OMC are eligible; the individual must be a "tenant" under §5321.01(A) of the Ohio Revised Code.

12. Determination of "availability", "unavailability", or other questions will be at the sole and exclusive discretion of OMC.

13. Tenants in the Alternate Program are responsible for maintaining current addresses and phone numbers with OMC. Failure to do so will result in forfeiture of position in the Tenant Purchase Program.

PROCEDURES FOR MULTI-FAMILY STRUCTURES

1. In available multi-tenant dwellings, all tenants are to be notified when the dwelling qualifies under the Program.

2. Tenants interested in purchasing will have seven (7) days in which to confirm that interest in writing.

3. After tenant indications are in, those expressing interest will be prioritized based on:
   (i) length of tenancy, or
   (ii) lot, if length of tenancy is undeterminable or equal.
4. Determinations of priority will be in OMC's sole and exclusive judgment.

5. Interested tenants will be notified of their priority position.

6. The tenant with the first priority has fourteen (14) calendar days in which to deposit $500; all others will, upon expiration of the prior deposit period, have three (3) business days after they receive notice to make the deposit.

7. Once a deposit is made, all lower priority tenants will be notified; lower eligibility tenants will not be eligible to participate further in the Tenant Purchase Program.

8. After the deposit is made and rehabilitation is substantially completed on the dwelling, OMC will obtain two certified appraisals at its expense.

9. After the appraisals are in, the tenant will be provided with a contract to purchase at an average of the two certified appraisals. The contract will be in standard form as provided by OMC.

10. Copies of the appraisals will be sent with the contract to purchase.

11. After delivery of the contract, the tenant will have seven (7) days in which to execute the contract and twenty-three (23) additional days in which to obtain financing.

12. If the tenant signs the purchase contract and gets financing, the $500 deposited under the Tenant Purchase Program, plus any interest earned thereon, will become the earnest money under the purchase contract.

13. If the tenant does not sign the contract or is not able to get financing, the $500, plus any interest earned thereon, will be refunded.

14. In the event that, prior to the closing, any residence is destroyed or damaged to an extent that OMC determines that it is not economic to repair, the tenant would lose his or her opportunity to purchase.

15. Only "tenants" of OMC are eligible; the individual must be a "tenant" under § 5321.01(A) of the Ohio Revised Code.

16. Determination of "availability", "unavailability", or other questions will be at the sole and exclusive discretion of OMC.

17. Tenants in the Alternate Program are responsible for maintaining current addresses and phone numbers with OMC. Failure to do so will result in forfeiture of position in the Tenant Purchase Program.
OMC RELOCATION PROGRAM WHEN RELOCATION IS REQUIRED

When an OMC tenant is the occupant of a renovated single family residence and is not interested in purchasing, OMC will request that the resident vacate the property prior to sale. Tenants of rehabilitated OMC multi-family structures will in most cases be able to remain in their units when the building is sold.

Although OMC reviews each case involving relocation on an individual basis, the general relocation procedures are as follows:

1. If it is determined that a tenant must vacate a unit that is being rehabilitated, the resident will be given at least forty-five days notice.

2. A resident who is notified to vacate a rehabilitated structure will receive a refund of any prepaid rent and rent for the last thirty days of occupancy after the keys are turned in to the OMC office. This refund is intended to help residents with relocation expenses.

3. Residents will be offered priority to rent other vacant OMC rental units.

4. The security deposits will be refunded in accordance with the Ohio Revised Code.

5. OMC will work with relocated residents and the City of Columbus Relocation Service, if their services are required.

KEY INGREDIENTS AND CONCLUSIONS

The neighborhood development plan that is now underway has moved rapidly since its initiation in October of 1976. Neighborhood groups have been extensively involved in the planning process and OMC is beginning to make major commitments of private capital. This commitment will ultimately involve $12 million and losses are expected to exceed $1 million.

If the program is to be successful and result in a true mixed neighborhood, it must have the cooperation and financial support of the City of Columbus and various State and Federal agencies. Only an effective public
and private partnership can hope to resolve the many complicated issues faced in an inner-city neighborhood revitalization effort.

The program also requires the support of all interested groups in the neighborhood and City. The opportunity exists to achieve a true mixed neighborhood comprised of various income levels and interests. OMC is committed as one party to turn the opportunity into reality.
APPENDIX F

Godwin-Bohm-NBBJ, Columbus, Ohio, Progress Report-OMC
Planning Activities
PROGRESS REPORT - OMC PLANNING ACTIVITIES

TO: Marsha Morehead
FROM: GB/NBBJ
DATE: November 19, 1979

I. Based upon a complete physical analysis of the Phase II Planning Area, we have begun to identify the following spatial needs that will occur in the Phase II Planning Area. These needs include:

A. Areas for infill and rehabilitation with acknowledgment of needing to meet a range of housing needs.

B. Areas of contiguous new construction

C. Areas for NMH rehab-housing with or without OMC joint participation program.

D. Neighborhood park possibilities

E. Neighborhood retail center possibilities

In addition to these needs, we are beginning to detail infrastructure responsibilities, both public and private that need to occur to improve the quality of the neighborhood. These items include but are not limited to street and alley improvements, utility upgrading, "streetscape" improvements which would include special design concepts in terms of landscaping, possible lighting, and other such specialized features.

II. MARKET STUDY FOR RETAIL CENTER:

We hope to receive the Market Study information at the end of November or early December; preliminary indications as we suspected tend to suggest that a neighborhood retail center accessible from 5th Avenue is feasible.

III. INFILL HOUSING DESIGN:

Several design concepts have been or are in the process of being worked up and discussed with OMC in concert with several major local builders. Despite somewhat severe cost pressures on both single-unit and multiple-unit construction, we are attempting to make such designs as cost effective and cost conscious as possible given the range of housing needs in the Phase II planning area. As has been discussed previously, without subsidy, it will be difficult to reach the low end of the housing market in the neighborhood with new construction.
IV. POTENTIAL NEXT STEPS:

It is our proposal that prior to our being in attendance at any future Phase II Task Force meeting, that we first have and can provide "Hard" proposals to review. For the next Task Force meeting, we would hope to review the following:

A. A review of the total status of the planning analysis of the Phase II Area as it relates to the alternative allocation of uses for the Phase II Area.

B. A review of proposed alternatives on how to approach the location, layout and design for a neighborhood center.

C. Review the possibilities of integrating a neighborhood park into the overall Phase II Plan, attempting to balance the issues of park location, user needs for such a park, and location/demolition.

D. Solidify the Phase II Task Force thinking as to overall direction for the area and what the key issues are given this direction.

E. Determination of next steps beyond this Task Force Meeting as it would include additional neighborhood commission meetings and eventual zoning as required.

SUMMARY:

It is our feeling that now that all the data is "in", with the exception of the marketing information yet to be received, we are prepared to create a "plan" for the Phase II Planning Area. By its very nature, we must caution that any "plan" cannot be a static instrument given the neighborhood dynamics happening in that area. We remain fully cognizant of the major issues that have paralleled the entire Phase II Planning activities and it remains our goal to balance the many objectives and many factors involved in that area in any single "plan" that may be produced.

The above is for your information.

Very truly yours,

[Signature]

Lawrence E. Helman

LEH: pkj
APPENDIX G

Confidential Report on Strategy for Phase Two Development
CONFIDENTIAL REPORT ON STRATEGY
FOR PHASE 2 DEVELOPMENT

NEIGHBORHOOD STUDY AREA
OLENTANGY MANAGEMENT COMPANY

AUGUST 3, 1978
PHASE 1:

Year one demonstration projects, models and sales, altogether known as "Renaissance" have accomplished the following positive goals:

1. The program has demonstrated that OMC has the capacity to move a program aggressively.

2. The program has demonstrated OMC's organizational ability in marketing; its creativity in accomplishment; and its ability to do what it states it will do.

3. The program, through its innovative bidding procedure, has increased the real estate market values of property in the area considerably above expectations. This is going to create a higher economic return than envisioned.

4. The program has cemented relationships with certain neighborhood groups whose aims of improvement of environment, neighborhood and quality of residents coincide with the results of OMC's current efforts.

5. The program has caused the beginnings of response to improved market conditions by other owners who are beginning to fix their properties, thus contributing to further economic improvement of neighborhood values. As improvement accelerates, so should market price.

Year one programs may have had certain negative effects in the Phase 2 neighborhood of Harrison West, in that the neighborhood people can see the effects of improvement as pricing them, eventually, out of the area. To the extent that this is true, OMC is going to have to develop a carefully orchestrated strategy to achieve its future objectives.

Two steps taken by OMC may have temporarily calmed latent neighborhood hostility. This has been OMC's setting aside a block and selling units to be rehabilitated for Section 8 housing. This move is a brilliant political stroke for the short run. However, it may cause problems in the future if it sets a trend towards institutionalizing a poverty neighborhood. The other step was selling units to tenants at appraisal, rather than high bid, price. This has to have helped to create good will, as the tenant purchasing has seen immediate economic appreciation.

The second year program of OMC will be harder than the first year. However, the "Renaissance" program which started from areas of neighborhood strength should continue to move westward as quickly as possible from this strength. All units should be done, block by block, not in scattered shots, and where possible, both sides of street frontage, since this will continue to increase sales prices due to total environmental look.

The most difficult area for "Renaissance" will be the Pennsylvania Avenue frontages between Fifth and Third avenue, since the future of the Phase 2 development is not clear at this time, and existing housing in the Phase 2 Area is of a type and character entirely different than Phase 1 housing. Also, the extremes of poverty are to be found in this Phase 2 Area, which, of course, makes relatively high priced "Renaissance" housing more difficult to market.
Property owned north of King Avenue, with the exception of the possibility of "Renaissance" treatment along King Avenue, abutting Battelle, to be done for the purpose of "protection", the environment of Battelle should not be sold until after King Avenue properties are "Renaissanced" in that area and along the south side of King area.

The exterior of improvement of property along King and subsequent bid-sale should help to drive the market price of property north of King upward to OMC's economic advantage, if the current bid trends continue to produce results as have been so far demonstrated.

Demolition of housing or housing to be moved as in-fill housing to other areas for the new boulevard should be initiated quickly from King Avenue to Fifth in order to clearly demark the Circle Area Rehabilitation Area to all concerned. This will further stimulate other private owners to improve their property east of the Boulevard and cause them to "breathe a collective sigh of relief" that the road right-of-way is defined exactly. This action should be accelerated when the City gives its official sanction to the road here. Also, this will enable owned property for the Boulevard to be acquired at a slightly lower cost than if the full circle area rehabilitation program were completed.

The issue of Vermont Place's inclusion or exclusion as a historic area will be critical to the Boulevard. If included, it will create another "Arch" issue. If excluded, it will still create problems, but not as difficult as if it were in a historical area. OMC should consider the following actions:

1. Take every political step necessary to exclude Vermont Place from the line to be drawn as an historical area. OMC and Battelle should pull out all stops to achieve this goal.

2. Get as quick as possible a determination of the exact right-of-way of the Boulevard from Fifth to Third.

3. If necessary, move Vermont Avenue houses deemed "historical" as in-fill housing, treating them as "Renaissance" property, rather than moving housing north of Fifth to King as previously discussed, if lots are in short supply. Stress to the historical interests that this is not an unreasonable alternative, since the housing is similar to the area proposed for the in-fills and will at least fill gaps with historically relevant housing.

4. For other owners of housing on the Vermont crescent, offer to purchase their houses, move then, rehabilitate the exteriors and resell then the house at appraised value. This will do the following:

   a) Owner will get market value in cash.
   b) Owner will be able to buy back the home, with exterior improvements in an area of other rehabilitated units thus improving his environment and value. In this way, the cost of the move is discounted, the owner, based on bid prices, buys back an improved home at a price cheaper than bid prices of homes in the area to which he moved. Thus, the owner can be shown the economic benefit.
   c) While OMC absorbs moving cost, it does recapture its other in-
vestment. This may be preferable to a protracted and bitter struggle. Whatever it does, OMC should make an offer the owner cannot logically refuse so that the Vermont issue, at least, does not have homeowner opposition.

Previously, it was mentioned that Phase 1 "Renaissance" was moving westward. For the westerly edge of "Renaissance", south of Fifth to be successful as an economic enterprise, a buffer between Phase 2 existing housing and Phase 1 "Renaissance" must be created, otherwise the condition of those housing units in Phase 2 will depress sales prices. The plan calls for townhouses and a park as a buffer. A small commercial area is also indicated between Fifth, the new Boulevard, the park area and proposed townhouses. OMC should make every effort to expedite the development of the park area as a concurrent Phase 1 development prior to the "Renaissancing", and in-filling on the west side of Pennsylvania.

As a further device to create a continuing positive image, while housing stock for the Boulevard and park are being demolished, excepting those units moved, OMC should expedite part of Phase 2, and enter immediately into planning and development of the proposed townhouse housing above the park, between the rear lot line of the Pennsylvania houses and in-fill, east of the proposed commercial center and south of Fifth. This should do the following:

1. Provide a stabilizing influence on Pennsylvania Avenue Renaissance, and
2. As with the in-fill program, help to disarm opponents about housing demolition, since new housing is planned as well as in-fill moved housing.

Likewise, OMC should negotiate the purchase of the vacant city land, south of the school for housing development concurrently with the housing north of the park. Since this is public land, there is going to be real pressure for low-income housing here. It would be my suggestion that this location would be reasonable for housing for the elderly under Section 202, Section 8 or other federally funded housing programs. Battelle should clearly be identified as sponsor for the public relations to be gained here. This, then, is a further balancing of the opposition to housing demolition in the areas of the Boulevard and the park. Under no circumstances should family low-income housing be allowed as it will defeat market upgrading and the program of "Renaissancing" around Pennsylvania Avenue. It is possible to consider small garden type apartments, duplex townhouses or even quadriplex type housing. High-rise would not be in keeping with the scale. The design should be such that each elderly apartment unit has a small piece of ground in which OMC can sponsor, as part of the development, the ability of each elderly unit to have its own garden. OMC can provide a "Garden Club" environment for the elderly.

This, in my judgement does the following:

1. Builds support of elderly persons for the program;
2. Completes the "buffer zone";
3. Provides an exciting "conceptual" approach to elderly housing by keeping units close to the ground and providing opportunities for "PR" at little cost;
4. Provides a relief to pressure on the City on the sale of public land for low-income use;
5. Provides Battelle an opportunity as a low-income, non-profit sponsor to insulate itself from charges of ignoring lower income individuals;
6. Helps to erode OMC's "high-income" image;
7. Erodes further, the radical opposition; and
8. Creates the elderly as neighbors which should not be objectionable to higher income families in the "Renaissance" areas.

The above suggestions, then, totally should be considered Phase 1, rather than part Phase 1 and part Phase 2.

Phase 2

When the battle of Vermont Place is won, the Battelle primary expansion area is basically won.

Remaining in Phase 1 are the following:

Completion of street changes (Harrison cut-off, south of Fifth), (Michigan and Pennsylvania cut-offs at Fifth and King). These developments, while important to help create a more cohesive neighborhood are not essentially high priority items and could be completed during Phase 2. In fact, there might be some benefit in putting those improvements out to bid as part of the Boulevard.

1. Neighborhood support of these changes would be tied in a little bit with the more controversial Boulevard, and
2. Some economic savings might be achieved while equipment is in the neighborhood.

Remaining in Phase 2 are:

1. Commercial area.
2. Apartment area (west of proposed housing for elderly).
3. Battelle primary expansion area.
4. Secondary expansion area.

Before discussing each of these areas, it is important to determine whether rehabilitation efforts would be worthwhile for the wood frame, smaller type housing in a high state of deterioration. In most cases, an exterior improvement program would not be sufficient, since interior conditions of many of the units are deplorable and sales would be very doubtful. To this end, it is recommended that OMC satisfy itself that this is true by estimating the cost of a total rehabilitation; in 3 to 6 units. Then it is recommended further to have re-use appraisals made on these units without revealing your cost estimates of improvements to the appraiser. However, the appraiser should be informed that a total rehabilitation job will be done. Then the independent determination of market value by the appraiser without being influenced by your cost estimates should be compared to the total cost estimates. In my judgement, the cost of improvement together with book value of the existing housing will be such that a sales price based on those factors would drive the rent or price paid above market potential or value.

In short, I believe that the appraised sales potential will not provide sufficient justification or margin on cost and efforts expended.
In order to avoid further neighborhood struggles, OMC should not raise rents across the board, but should selectively increase rents in those units in rehabilitation areas which in the property manager's judgment the market can absorb. This would eliminate most of Phase 2 wooden frame structures from further rent increases.

For the Battelle primary expansion area, once Vermont Place is resolved, demolition of properties should be done piece-meal in accordance with the above recommendation. Those units to be purchased can be purchased either when they are surrounded by vacant land or preferably, after the Vermont area has been absorbed. The timing here is dependent on Battelle's need.

When the Third Avenue and Boulevard connecting link is determined, it will be appropriate in Phase 2 to announce construction of new housing construction on any remaining land left over after the Section 8 rehabilitation area is completed, if there is room. This housing which would be adjacent to Section 8 and housing for the elderly, as suggested, could be additional Section 8 or preferably a slightly higher income program under FHA or could be used for in-fill housing under Section 8. Whatever is the determination, one point should be made: AVOID LARGE FAMILY HOUSING FOR LOWER INCOME FAMILIES. Small unit types (one and two bedroom) should be planned. The presence of low-income large families will cause a continued neighborhood problem, especially since it is apt to be the children rather than the adults who cause many neighborhood problems.

Again, creativity is suggested. For example, housing here could be specially designed for handicapped persons. The advantages are:

1. Again Battelle-OMC can gain good PR sponsoring housing for a group which will not adversely affect the neighborhood, but will provide a real need for certain types of lower-income people.
2. The housing would be near hospitals, a selling point.
3. OMC can demonstrate its concern and creativity, while further segmenting the lower income, radical population. In short, it is hard to be against handicapped persons. Further, it may be possible with both the elderly group and the handicapped group to seek federal funds for specialized demonstration programs relating the Ohio State Medical School and the above mentioned groups. OMC could act as a positive force here.

Finally, in my judgement, the commercial area should be carefully studied and not developed until all factors of housing east of the Boulevard are in process. In order to be successful, the commercial area requires not only a larger market area, but a sizeable walk-in trade from the immediate surrounding area, and equally important, a new road system, as envisioned by the plan, in place.

I have not, at this time involved myself with Phase 2, possible secondary expansion area, although I feel that with river frontage this area would be a good location for higher income apartment, condominiums, or townhouses. This decision can wait for Battelle to determine if it needs the space. In any event, what is there is not worth keeping, but at this time it seems unnecessary to take any specific actions. However, as OMC units become vacated, tear them down so that the remainder of private units are gradually isolated.
The next question to be explored is that of what to do about current management of these types of units. The last rent increase also increased the number of vacant units since in some cases, even at $85-$95.00 per month, the physical conditions were such that no one would pay a $10.00 a month increase and hence, vacated the units. Simultaneously, in a number of these circumstances, City of Columbus housing inspectors have inspected these properties and wrote up orders requiring extensive and expensive work to be done. OMC's property manager, not having a maintenance budget sufficient to accomplish these orders, and not being able to justify them economically, has boarded up the units pending further OMC decision.

The following determinations need to be made on these buildings to make a practical recommendation on what further steps to take:

1. What is the remaining rental occupancy life of the building?
2. Does the remaining life make practical a pay back of improvement or maintenance funds invested to improve the buildings for rental occupancy?
3. What will the rent level have to be in order to pay back on the new investment?
4. Will this rental level be marketable, surrounded as it is by lower income occupancy?

In my judgment, the economic rent levels due to costs and time remaining for a viable building life is not feasible in the Phase 2 area. First of all, first-class rehabilitation of wood-frame structures is very expensive in ratio to resultant value, unless of course there is a real historic building. Secondly, rehabilitation of the structures, even if feasible economically, will drive rental and/or sales price beyond the reach of existing tenants. Thirdly, if the units were subsidized, OMC would be building a permanent poverty pocket on Battelle's southern boundary. Accordingly, I would recommend, after the above suggested study of costs and appraised value, that OMC tear down each boarded-up structure. This will accomplish the following:

1. Eliminate potential liability,
2. Eliminate constant building inspection and potential harassment,
3. Begin to set the stage for further new development,
4. Begin to break up the low-income neighborhood,
5. Avoid having to fix-up units and move-in lower-income tenants, only to have to displace them again as the city inspectors get more detailed in future inspections, and
6. Avoid future relocation commitments when development begins.

OMC can expect certain objections to demolition here. However, these demolitions will occur without occupants having to be displaced, and further, it is unlikely that new occupants will move in on an "as is" basis. To overcome these objections, OMC should be prepared, with its prior study material, to document and discuss with the objects the economic infeasibility of improvement for an existing level of tenancy based on the actual city orders. Further, OMC should stress the liability problems of vacant, boarded-up buildings. Finally, OMC should stress the Section 8 housing now being developed and its proposals for housing for the elderly.

In short, excepting for Vermont Avenue, piece-meal demolition on the economic basis as suggested of Phase 2 will be a less abrasive political problem, than massive demolition at one time to meet plan objectives.
In Summary:

Phase 2 is best accomplished by constantly keeping the neighborhood off balance through constructive development of non-family, lower-income housing in areas as suggested; by keeping a balance of new housing and demolition so that there is not too much of an imbalance, and by continued demolition of vacant units.

To this end, then, part of Phase 2 should be considered Phase 1, as outlined.
APPENDIX H

Comparison of Responses of Dennison Place and Victorian Village Residents Relative to the Gentrification and Neighborhood Revitalization Stage Model
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question/Response Categories</th>
<th>Dennison Place</th>
<th>Victorian Village</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why were you attracted to the neighborhood?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- architectural features</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- low cost [affordable]</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- neighborhood diversity</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was your home purchased at a relative low cost as compared to suburban housing?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- yes</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- no</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- comparable</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- do not know</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who was your home purchased from?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- realtor</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- private homeowner</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- city housing program</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- housing corporation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- other</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did your home have to be restored?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- yes</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>89.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- no</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did you personally do the work or was it contracted out or both?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- no</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- both</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question/Response Categories</td>
<td>Dennison Place</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you ever felt personally threatened by living in a socioeconomic diverse neighborhood?</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>88.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do you consider to be negative factors of the neighborhood?</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crime</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public services</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unrenovated properties</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>traffic</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What has been the scale of reinvestment in your neighborhood?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>small</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has reinvestment focused on housing that is readily converted to single-family housing?</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>92.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mixture of housing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>once the neighborhood gained public notice, did government intervention help the restoration/rehabilitation activity accelerate and become more intense?</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>88.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>do not know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question/Response Categories</td>
<td>Dennison Place</td>
<td>Victorian Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once the neighborhood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gained public notice, did</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>media attention help</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the restoration/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rehabilitation activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accelerate and become</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more intense?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- yes</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>82.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- no</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- do not know</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What has been the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extent of speculative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rehabilitation?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- large proportion</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- moderate proportion</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- small proportion</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- do not know</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have the existing home-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>owners sold or forced</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>out of the neighborhood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as a result of strict code</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enforcement and rising</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>property values and taxes?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- yes</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- no</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- do not know</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- normal turnover</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since the area has</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undergone some positive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>change, have you</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>noticed long-term</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>homeowens, doing in the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>restoration/rehabilitation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>activity?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- yes</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- no</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- do not know</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question/Response Categories</td>
<td>Dennison Place</td>
<td>Victorian Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have the existing tenants been forced out of the neighborhood either voluntarily or involuntarily?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- yes</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>89.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- no</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- do not know</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has property values and taxes increased dramatically?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- yes</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>96.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- no</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- do not know</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- somewhat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do you rate public services provided in your neighborhood?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- excellent</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- good</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- fair</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- poor</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- adequate</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is code enforcement strict in your neighborhood?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- yes</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- no</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- do not know</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you look for stability form your neighbors?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- yes</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- no</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- somewhat</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- do not know</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question/Response Categories</td>
<td>Dennison Place</td>
<td>Victorian Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you have confidence in the future of the area?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- yes</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- no</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- uncertain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>