“perplexity is the beginning of knowledge…”

Kahlil Gibran
A Tear and A Smile (1950)
STYLIN’! SAMBA JOY VERSUS STRUCTURAL PRECISION
THE SOCCER CASE STUDIES OF BRAZIL AND GERMANY

Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
The Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

Susan P. Milby, M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
2006

Dissertation Committee:

Professor Melvin Adelman, Adviser

Professor William J. Morgan

Professor Sarah Fields

Approved by

Adviser
College of Education Graduate Program
ABSTRACT

Soccer playing style has not been addressed in detail in the academic literature, as playing style has often been dismissed as the aesthetic element of the game. Brief mention of playing style is considered when discussing national identity and gender. Through a literature research methodology and detailed study of game situations, this dissertation addresses a definitive definition of playing style and details the cultural elements that influence it. A case study analysis of German and Brazilian soccer exemplifies how cultural elements shape, influence, and intersect with playing style.

Eight signature elements of playing style are determined: tactics, technique, body image, concept of soccer, values, tradition, ecological and a miscellaneous category. Each of these elements is then extrapolated for Germany and Brazil, setting up a comparative binary. Literature analysis further reinforces this contrasting comparison.

Both history of the country and the sport history of the country are necessary determinants when considering style, as style must be historically situated when being discussed in order to avoid stereotypification. Historic time lines of significant German and Brazilian style changes are determined and interpreted. This allows for the introduction of cultural elements and their historical situating.
Culture elements that shape soccer style include the history of the country, the history of soccer within the country, national habitus and national identity, and the impact of colonialism. Other cultural elements that influence soccer style and are thus examined include the interpretation of class and politics, race, gender, globalization trends, and religion. An examination of significant individual that have impacted on the sport is included, as well as analysis of training philosophies and unique features. Each of these cultural elements are determined to influence and shape soccer playing style on a national basis.
Dedicated to my parents and my sons:
  John and Esther Pavelka
  Andrew Milby
  Robert Milby
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank my adviser, Dr. Melvin Adelman, for his infinite patience with both myself and my subject matter. His encouragement and dedication, as well as his loving guidance, were much appreciated. His arguments were intellectually stimulating, and his corrections were illuminating. His guidance throughout my many years of this educational journey was a shining path for me to follow. Without him, my journey would never have started.

I thank Dr. Jay Martin of Ohio Wesleyan University for the use of much material (books and films) as well as his insights. His observations and time were very much appreciated.

I wish to thank my son, Andrew Milby, for his technological assistance.

And lastly, I wish to thank my parents, John and Esther Pavelka, for their unwavering support and confidence.
VITA

May 1, 1956 …………………………………………………..Born – Columbus, Ohio

August 1977 ………………………………………………B.S. Therapeutic Recreation
Georgetown College

December 1995 ………………………………………….. Teaching Certificate:
Physical Education
The Ohio State University

June 2001 ………………………………………………….M.A. Cultural Studies in
Education
The Ohio State University

1996 to present …………………………………………… physical education and
health teacher
Dublin City Schools
Dublin, Ohio

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Education
Emphasis: Sport History
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abstract</th>
<th>ii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vita</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapters

1. Introduction ...................................................... 1
2. Defining Style and its Components .................. 21
3. Defining Brazilian and German Style: Case Study Analysis ............. 62
4. A Short History of Brazil and How it Pertains to Soccer ............ 120
5. A Short History of Germany and How it Pertains to Soccer ........... 139
6. The Sport History of Brazil ................................. 170
7. The Sport History of Germany ............................... 234
8. Historic Time Line of Style: Brazil and Germany .................... 289
9. National Habitus, National Identity and Soccer ..................... 308
10. Brazil: National Habitus Codes, National Identity and Soccer .......... 325
11. German National Habitus Codes, National Identity and Soccer .......... 350
12. Colonialism and Soccer Style ............................... 381
13. Class, Politics and Sport .................................. 400
14. Germany: Class, Politics and Soccer .......................... 409
15. Brazil: Class, Politics and Soccer .......................... 429
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Soccer playing style captures the imagination of every soccer fan in the world, but defining and analyzing style has been problematic due not only to the depth of the question but also because of the necessity of situating the problematic historically and culturally. This study examines soccer style, and specifically, the intersection of national team playing style with culture and with history. It will look at what elements in the culture shape or influence individual national style, and I will describe in detail my theory that soccer style is shaped by some very specific cultural elements, such as national identity, conceptions of gender, race, and other cultural interpretations, as well as the history and sport history of the country. In the process, it will be necessary to detail a definition of style, and define how “style” is played out in reference to my two case studies, Germany and Brazil. I came to this study from two converging areas, my own background with soccer and my academic background…

“What is wrong with you? I knew we shouldn’t let a girl on this team. Why don’t you just go back to being the athletic trainer? GET YOUR WEIGHT ON YOUR TOES WHEN YOU’RE DEFENDING SOMEONE!!!” My introduction to the wonderful world of male competitive soccer at the collegiate level was less than inspiring. Yes, I
had legitimately made the team, but in the process had bumped a male contender out of a varsity spot. Not a great situation in which to start my new athletic career, nonetheless, one that exhilarated me. Right up until the moment that the Iranian center forward slide tackled me into an ignominious heap to emphasize that not only should women not be playing soccer with men, but appearing on the field in soccer shorts was a direct affront to his sensibilities. However, through the first month of endless running, conditioning drills, scrapes, bruises (all from my own teammates) and sore muscles, I gloried in the game. I loved this game with its intricacies, strategies, balletic and elegant flow of play combined with hard-nosed tackles, dirt, and lots of blood, mainly mine. I was never a superstar, but got into a few games as a substitute and played hard. I fell in love with the game, and that endearing feeling has never wavered.

Ten years later I stood on the touchline watching my five year old son play what was supposed to be the same game. Not a chance! Between the coach yelling “Just kick the ball!” and the other parents cheering wildly at what looked like a rugby scrum in the middle of the field, I stood in open-mouthed amazement. The next season I began coaching as an assistant, wanting to bring my love of the game as well as a little bit of skill to these children. Love of the game is never a problem with little boys…. Skill however, often is. Thus began a coaching career that spanned several decades. I took coaching courses, attended lectures, watched every game available on television, read books and worked my way up the ranks, along with my two boys. We did recreational soccer, travel team soccer, and Olympic Development soccer. As the boys entered high
school, I decided it probably wasn’t in their best interest to have “Mom” coach them anymore, and so pursued my own coaching career. I worked my way up the ranks through the local high school girls’ program, but missed coaching boys tremendously. When I was offered the varsity boys’ position at a local private school, I was ecstatic and ready to make my mark on the world. I just hadn’t realized that I was now coaching against my own son’s team, which added a bit of spice to family life.

Meanwhile, I had returned to school and obtained a teaching certificate in physical education for K-12. Of all the courses required, I felt drawn most to the course in sport history. That course introduced me to “real academia” and certainly challenged my mental capacity in ways that the other courses did not. I enjoyed research and writing, and being able to explore concepts and ideas, connections and relationships. When the kindly professor encouraged me to continue in sport history with a master’s degree I was encouraged but equally noncommittal. Teaching full time, coaching, raising two boys on my own…somehow further education seemed an unlikely option. However, I kept mulling it over and almost yearned to be back exploring sport history, but finances were a real stumbling block. Eventually, through a variety of grants, scholarships, scrimping and scraping, and a whole lot of hope, I returned to the Ohio State University to start my professional career in academia. I have never looked back, and never regretted for an instant my return to school. Graduate classes were challenging and stimulating, but allowed me to explore a variety of areas that were enticing. My
master’s thesis was on Cherokee sport, which had me moldering away in archives on
the reservation.¹ But it was so interesting!

Eventually the time came to choose a dissertation topic, and I turned to the sport that
had always had my primary allegiance: soccer. But what aspect of the world of soccer
called out for exploring, for detailed work and conceptualization, for the untangling of
the many threads that would be required for work at this level? I had been comfortable
teaching technique, but style and strategy was what I thoroughly enjoyed coaching. I
couldn’t possibly offer strategic plans to the great coaches of the game, but I could
delve much further into the cultural implications of what created style, and more
specifically, what created style at the national team level. Thus began the journey…

Style has been casually mentioned by a number of authors, but seldom has it been
analyzed and dissected in the academic realm. Eduardo Archetti has written on
Argentinian style, linking style to national identity and masculinity.² The connection of
nationalism, national identity and style is a fairly common theme, as demonstrated by
Alan Bairner.³ Richard Giulianotti said it quite distinctly: “academics have contributed

master’s thesis at the Ohio State University, 2001.
² See a variety of works by Archetti, including: Eduardo P. Archetti, “Masculinity and Football: The
Formation of National Identity in Argentina,” Games Without Frontiers: Football, Identity and
Modernity ed. by R. Giulianotti and J. Williams (London: Arena, 1994), 225-243; Eduardo P. Archetti,
“Playing Styles and Masculine Virtues in Argentine Football,” Machos, Mistresses, Madonnas ed. by
Melhuus and Stolen (London: Verso, 1996), 34-55; Eduardo P. Archetti, “Nationalism, Football and
³ Alan Bairner, Sport, Nationalism, and Globalization: European and North American Perspectives
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001.)
relatively little to our understanding of football’s playing styles and techniques.\textsuperscript{4}

Giulianotti has written in some depth on playing style, particularly in \textit{Football: A Sociology of the Global Game}, but his analysis of style is more of a broad sweep rather than an in-depth consideration of its connections with culture.\textsuperscript{5} Playing style, then, was an area ripe for exploration, with all its related overtones of nationalism, history, and ideology. In order to narrow the sense of research to manageable proportions, I choose two quite contrasting styles represented by the German and the Brazilian national team. Both styles had personal significance for me, but when Brazil and Germany ended up in the 2002 World Cup finals, I realized my choice had been destined. Much of my coaching training had been in the Germanic style, thanks to the influence of Dr. Jay Martin at Ohio Wesleyan University. He was an obvious admirer of the German style of play, had watched it closely for many years, researched the style, and then invariably taught elements of it in his coaching courses. My attraction to the Brazilian style of play had been lifelong, spurred along, no doubt, by my admiration for Pelé. However, when I acquired Brazilian nieces and nephews through marriage, I became even more entranced. The boys, in particular, became my sounding board for detailed discussions on Brazilian soccer. My two sons whole-heartedly adopted the Brazilian team as their own, and many supper-table discussions were about “futebol.”

This study examines, in detail, the nuances that shape Brazilian and German soccer style. Influencing cultural factors, how they interact with and upon each other and their

\textsuperscript{5} Ibid., 127-145.
significance will be explored in terms of their contribution to shaping a national soccer style, with an emphasis upon a cultural and critical interpretation. Playing style is a cultural interpretation of the game, and while the culture certainly helps contour the playing style, in a variety of ways the playing style also serves to reflect back upon the culture in a multidirectional flow. Power vectors move in both directions: from culture to style, and style to culture. Delineation of the variety of factors is best approached by a questioning attitude. Why? How? What is the significance?

The factors that I have identified as significantly influencing national team soccer style provide a broad range of intersections between culture and the sport of soccer. Some factors carry more weight than others in shaping style, but all the factors contribute in some way to the creating and cementing of a national team style. The factors to be explored include the following: the history of the country, national habitus and national identity, colonialism, the sporting history, class and politics, race, construction of gender, aspects of globalization, significant individuals, the influence of training regimes by cultural considerations, religion, and unique features of each country that impact on playing style. Most factors I have identified as significant will be explored in three parts with a chapter devoted to each part. The three parts will allow a thorough explanation of the factor, why it is significant in playing style, and what current academic research provides in terms of analysis. The other two parts will apply an analysis of that specific factor to the case study nations, Germany and Brazil. It is extremely important to acknowledge that the game of soccer is historically and
culturally situated, and the factors that tend to make each country unique also influence what makes their soccer unique. Soccer style is never cemented only in a stereotype, as it changes and flows over time. Discussing a particular style means situating it historically and acknowledging the changes that do occur. However, an overall perception of the stereotype can be analyzed in those terms. It is a stereotype, but one in which individual countries accept and even promote.

The first factor that I have identified as significant is the individual history of each country, which will be covered in chapters four and five. While the history of a country may not specifically be termed a cultural intersection with soccer style, a country’s history has a direct influence on the development of unique playing styles. Particularly since the rise of nationalism in the late 1700’s, aspects of the sport history of the country, including access to the game, contoured the development of playing style. The concept of nationalism, itself, has made a tremendous impact on the need and desire of each country to personalize and individualize their playing style.6 Even the route a country takes to nationalism appears to contribute significantly to playing style. The process whereby Brazil and Germany reached nation-state status has had an influence on how each country interprets the game, and thus the formation of a distinct style. For Brazil, colonization and the resulting latifunda economic development which eventually supported England’s industrialization and Portugal’s stability must be explored, as well as its single source economy. The variety of governmental styles, from king to

---

6 See, for example, Alan Bairner, *Sport, Nationalism, and Globalization* and Eduardo Archetti, “Nationalism, Football and Polo.
dictatorship, has certainly shaped the history and identity of Brazil, and thus indirectly contributed to the formation of soccer style.  

Brazil’s heavy investment in slavery and its late abolishment of the institution has been very important in the development of culture, and thus the style of soccer played. 

Brazil’s vast size and the urbanization which brought the majority of the population flocking to coastal cities leaving huge sections of undeveloped country has had an impact on how and why futebol has developed. 

For Germany, its late development to nation-state has always had a lasting effect on historical development. The continual debate on how to establish national boundaries via the integration of numerous princedoms, whether it be language based and include vast portions of Europe, or a more localized setting, has influenced German historical policy. The contributions of Prussia and Bismarck must be acknowledged and interpreted in terms of development of the game and its cultural situation. The rise and influence of the Nazi period, as well as post-World War II Germany, are significant factors in how style developed in Germany. 

That Germany was a colonizer, and Brazil was a colony seems to be a significant item that must be addressed in terms of its

---

9 Alex Bellos, *Futebol: Soccer the Brazilian Way* (New York: Bloomsbury USA, 2002).
soccer style. Along with nationalism, national identity will play a highly important role in defining playing style, and will be covered in chapters nine, ten, and eleven. How each country views itself has a direct influence on the formulation of soccer style. Brazilians and Germans define their own style in unique ways that differ from the rest of the world and lead to highly stylized and contrasting ways of playing soccer. Dissecting and analyzing national identity will be essential, and the path that I have chosen to take in that analysis is based on Norbert Elias’ conceptualization of national habitus. Each country values different aspects in soccer, and each country’s national habitus has contributed greatly to the development of style. Media studies have contributed to a discussion of national habitus and playing style in terms of self definition, as has the concept of “willful nostalgia.” In Germany, the concept of “other” has always playing a defining role in terms of national identity and playing style. Elias identifies such significant factors as student dueling societies, the influence of late nationalization, the glorification of power and strength by the society, and the engrained concepts of obedience, duty, and

12 Both Mann, *History of Germany* and Burns, *A History of Brazil* provide significant discussion on colonization and effects of colonialism.
13 Norbert Elias, *The Germans*. Further development and discussion of the national habitus theory will be undertaken in chapter 5.
methodical work in self identity. To tease out significant factors of Brazilian national identity that shape soccer playing style means analyzing the media and government design of using three cultural components to identify the country to the rest of the world: soccer, samba, and carnival. That the Brazilian population accepted these designations of their national identity influenced the development of style. Brazil’s self comparison to other countries (Britain, France, and the United States) has provided a variety of cultural and economic models. Roberto DaMatta’s theory on the interpretation of the “Brazilian Dilemma”, particularly conceptualizations of inside/outside the home and the “Do you know who you are talking to?” syndrome are key interpretations of Brazilian national habitus, and will be thoroughly explored.

Chapters six and seven will deal with the history of sport within each country, and its connections with playing style. The process of soccer development in Brazil and Germany has molded playing style. The values of sport, and specifically soccer, displayed by the country, and how sport was valued in comparison to other institutions will play out in terms of development of style. The impact of professionalization upon the game, the way the game was being played, and by whom it was being played all require critical analysis. There are unique power vectors within the soccer culture of

---

15 Elias, The Germans. Elias’ entire book deals with the development of German national habitus in the 19th and 20th century, not only in terms of what shaped the country’s national identity, but how and why.
16 Roberto DaMatta, Carnivals, Rogues, and Heroes: An Interpretation of the Brazilian Dilemma (Notre Dame, IN.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991).
17 Ibid.
18 For information on Brazilian soccer history, several sources are available. See: Bellos, Futebol and Tony Mason, Passion of the People? Football in South America (London: Verso, 1994) as good starting
each nation that contributes to soccer development. Each country perceives, understands, and values sport, particularly soccer, differently. Given that soccer is the premiere sport in both Germany and Brazil, it will be necessary to explore how soccer achieved that status and why other sports did not. Historically, other sports have competed for preeminence related to national identity, such as turnen in Germany. Why Germany initially accepted and embraced turnen and rejected soccer has contributed to the development of style.  

19 Germany’s late professionalization of soccer compared to other European countries needs to be explored.  

In Brazil, the initial control of the game was by the elites, as it was in many countries, but the game was eventually subverted and overtaken by the working class in terms of players, not management. The involvement of the masses was a significant issue in the development of playing style, particularly with the rapid acceptance and glorification of the game.  

21 Compared to other Latin American countries, Brazil was late in professionalizing the sport and the resulting brown professionalization contributed to style.  

22 Why did Brazil achieve world class status in this particular sport? What political policies controlled soccer’s points. For German soccer history, a comprehensive overview can be obtained from Ulrich Hesse-Lichtenberger, *Tor! The Story of German Football* (London: WSC Books, Ltd., 2002).

19 Hesse-Lichtenberger, *Tor!*, addresses this question in detail.


development in Brazil and have impacted on playing style?\textsuperscript{23} The 1958 or 1970 “Dream Team” and its tremendous success is often what Brazilians identify as their own unique style. Why?\textsuperscript{24} Of prime importance is analysis of Janet Lever’s theory that soccer has served as the “opium of the people” in Brazil, and thus served as a national unifying mechanism.\textsuperscript{25} Analysis of other theories regarding the nationalistic fervor with which Brazilians accept and embrace the game need to be studied, along with the concept that soccer served as a point of resistance for Brazilians at different times in history.\textsuperscript{26} Given its vast geographical size, the development and wide-spread acceptance in all parts of the country rather than just the urban centers of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, needs to be explored for style development.\textsuperscript{27}

In terms of analysis, it will be important to address both class and political overtones when discussing soccer style, and these will be the topics for chapters thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen. Class structure appears to contribute to the development of a unique style, but the significance of who controls the hegemony of the game within a particular country has also affected style, particularly in terms of whether the masses or the elite hold structural control. Who participates in the game as players, and who attends the game? A country’s political system and the style of government have shaped how the game is represented and played. Both the Brazilian and German national soccer teams

\textsuperscript{23} For a good analysis of Havelange and his impact, see John Sugden and Alan Tomlinson, \textit{FIFA and the Contest for World Football} (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).
\textsuperscript{25} Lever, \textit{Soccer Madness}.
\textsuperscript{26} See Bellos, \textit{Futebol}, particularly chapter fifteen on Socrates.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
have been used by their government for political means at different points in history.\textsuperscript{28}

In Germany, implications that political considerations influenced national team selection must be explored. In Brazil, initial players of the game were only the elites. It is obvious that this has not been true for many years, but the majority of the national team players coming from the favelas have changed, and that change must be explored. The dictators that ruled the country in the last half of the twentieth century used the game to promote agendas, and politicians have used club directorship as springboards into political careers.\textsuperscript{29} How this touched the game in Brazil needs to be considered.

Another identified strand is the subject of race, which in both country’s history appears to be a dominant strand. How race shapes soccer style will be examined in chapters sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen. There appear to be racial paradigms that contribute to playing style. If so, these influences must be teased out without resorting to stereotypical notions of race. The way each country accepts/rejects/redefines these features will have an impact on soccer style. In short, the way racial influences are interpreted both by the players and their audience is significant, and has changed over time. The question to be asked is why race is such a dominant strand in the conceptualization of playing style. Given Germany’s self definition as always in opposition to the “other”, it appears this has influenced racial composition of the


\textsuperscript{29} Bellos, \textit{Futebol} provides good information on politicians and clubs.
national team. A new racism is being exhibited in Germany, particularly in terms of fan composition and hooliganism so it will be important to determine who the new “other” is being defined as in German society. Historically, Germany tends to always have an “other”, and that concept seems to have influenced the game of soccer. The way soccer clubs reacted to the rising Nazism prior to World War II will be important, as well.

Race has always been a defining factor in Brazilian analysis of soccer, given its significance in the culture. It will be necessary to determine how Afro-Brazilians initially entered, and later co-opted the game from the elites. The Brazilian racial theory, the planned “whitening of the country” by miscegenation, will be examined in terms of soccer style. Soccer as a site of resistance, or acceptance, for Afro-Brazilians will need to be analyzed, as well as how the Afro-Brazilian altered the development of style. Brazil theoretically combines race and class designations, so can Brazilian style truly be defined as being shaped by racial characteristics?

Chapters twenty-one and twenty-two will examine the most influential players and coaches in each country, and whether individuals have altered playing style in a permanent or temporary way. Did Pelé or Garrincha mold national playing style by their mere presence on the team; or rather did they offer a more global influence on the game of soccer? What was the influence of Beckenbauer in Germany?

Chapters twenty-three, twenty-four and twenty-five will examine globalization trends and the development of a national style of play. It will be necessary to examine some of
the more prominent theories of sporting globalization in light of determining how increasing global trends intrude on the development of style. It would be pointless to ascertain that global trends have not impacted on style, particular in light of increasing mobility of players at the top levels. But how has altered style? Many theorize that globalization has led to a more homogenous style of play, and others theorize the trend has been resisted in several ways. It will be necessary to examine how globalization affects player transfers for both Brazil and Germany, has changed player development, and whether the majority of the national team players play within or outside the country. Brazil and Germany show a sharp contrast within this category, in that the majority of Brazilians on the national team play have their contracts held by European clubs, whereas the majority of the German national team players play within the Bundesliga. Why this has occurred, and how it has shaped national team style must be analyzed. At one point in history, Brazil made a concentrated effort to Europeanize their style of play. How the population reacted to the strategic change and whether it was a lasting or not is significant. The impact of the cosmopolitanism of the Bundesliga needs to dissected to determine if cosmopolitanism has shifted national team style.

The military has certainly shaped soccer style within Germany, and chapter twenty-nine will examine the military influence along with that of Bayern Munich. Determining how the social composition and cultural situating of the military in Germany influenced the style will be interesting; particularly in light of media
interpretations that Germany has developed a playing style that is often termed militaristic by other countries. Bayern Munich has dominated the Bundesliga for several decades, so a determination of their impact on the national team playing style is necessary.

In Brazil, samba, carnival, creolization, and capoeira have been influential in defining soccer style, and these aspects will be examined in chapter thirty. The style of dance exhibited by a country appears to influence the style of soccer play, so analyzing this concept for Brazil will be interesting, as well as determining if other culturally unique practices impact upon the game. In Brazil, the concept of individualism has always been a significant criticism of the Brazilian style of play. How and why this occurred may provide some answers regarding style. Germany, in contrast, has situated the team concept of play as of hierarchal importance. Is the difference strategic, or culturally situated? In Brazil, as in Britain, the soccer lottery has enormous cultural implications, and the lottery will need to be scrutinized to determine whether it has an impact on style of play.

Each country’s training regimen may impinge on soccer style, and these will be examined in chapters twenty-seven and twenty-eight. Determining if playing style reflects the type of training used for the national team, or whether the training has been a reflection of the style of play will be important. Given their contrasting styles, Brazil and Germany differ in terms of teaching technique, increasing physical endurance, diet,
and whether they used concentration. In Brazil, the use of early technocratic intervention is important, as is the concept of concentration and player’s reactions to it. Analysis of whether Germany and Brazil have accepted, contested, or compromised on training regimens historically is significant.

Religion has played a role in development of national style and will be considered in chapter twenty-six. Brazil’s national team recognizes religion as playing a role in the outcome of their games. Germany is the birthplace of the Reformation, with a strong emphasis on Lutheranism, but religion seems to have had little influence on playing style in that country. Brazil demonstrates a unique blend of Catholicism and Candomble (African religion), and this unique blend has intersected the game, and style, in a variety of ways. Soccer does not appear to be a strictly secular concern in Brazil, but the intertwining of religion and the game are important considerations.

Masculinity, as a culturally constructed concept, has had some significant impact on playing style and will be examined in chapters nineteen and twenty. Specifically, masculine construction in a nationalistic setting has shaped soccer, but determining what soccer, and national playing style, contributes to the definition of masculinity in either country must be considered. The concept of masculinity embedded in the game of soccer influenced player’s life styles on and off the field, but determining if Brazil

---

31 Voeks, *Sacred Leaves of Candomble*, is a nice resource on Afro-Brazilian religion. Bellos, in *Futebol*, devotes a chapter (“Frogs and Miracles”) to the intersections of religion and soccer in Brazil.
and Germany define masculinity in the same way will need to be examined, as well as how that contours playing style.\textsuperscript{32}

It is fairly clear that a wide variety of factors shape national playing style. These influences have been identified as national history, sporting history, national identity or habitus, class, politics, race, specific individuals, globalization trends, training regimens, religion, and construction of sexual identity. It is the goal of this dissertation to establish how each of these factors contributes to the formation of national playing style in Germany and Brazil. Germany and Brazil both have such distinctive and unique styles that it will be fascinating to determine how these factors have contributed to the formulation of style from a cultural perspective.

The methodology employed will be a combination of means. Foremost is an extensive literature search, and an analysis of available and current readings on soccer. A variety of authors have been influential in formulating my theories regarding style of play. Richard Giulianotti has contributed enormously in situating stylist interpretations historically.\textsuperscript{33} Janet Lever’s work on Brazil, although now somewhat dated, has contributed tremendous understanding, along with Alex Bellos’ new work, Robert Levine’s historical approach, and Roberto DaMatta’s wonderful works.\textsuperscript{34} Lincoln

\textsuperscript{32} Archetti’s wonderful work on masculinity and soccer in Argentina (Archetti, \textit{Masculinities: Football, Polo and Tango in Argentina}) will provide a blueprint for exploration in this area.

\textsuperscript{33} Particularly Giulianotti’s \textit{Football: A Sociology of the Global Game}.

\textsuperscript{34} Lever, \textit{Soccer Madness}; Bellos, \textit{Futebol}; Robert Levine, “Sport and Society: The Case of Brazilian Futebol,” \textit{Luso-Brazilian Review}, 17 (Summer 1980): 233-252. For DaMatta’s works, see \textit{Carnivals, Rogues and Heroes} as well as Roberto DaMatta, “Soccer: Opium for the People or Drama of Social
Allison has contributed in terms of sport and politics, and Joseph Arbena on Latin American sport. Eduardo Archetti presents a more anthropological approach to defining national identity, but Alan Bairner’s work on sport and nationalism has been an important influence, balanced by Joseph Maguire’s work on sport and globalization trends. Colonialism and sport diffusion theories by J. A. Mangan and Allen Guttman have been significant. Liz Crolley and David Hand’s media studies have provided much insight into an analysis of stereotyping of style. Exploring Germany and German soccer have led to readings by Norbert Elias, Udo Merkel, Christiane Eisenberg, and Siegfried Gehrmann. For pure joy while reading, as well as thoughtful and insightful observations, no one can match Eduardo Galeano.

---

Injustice?” Social Change in Contemporary Brazil ed. by Geert Banck and Kees Koonings (Amsterdam: CEDLA, 1988), 125-133.


38 Crolley and Hand, Football, Europe and the Press.


Secondly, I have relied strongly on my own observations as a coach and a soccer fan, watching literally thousands of hours of games and films. Experience does, at times, lend expertise, as does a fascination with the subject material. Historic tapes and live games were watched and analyzed for not only German and Brazilian national teams, but also Bundesliga and Brasilera games on a regular basis over a period of years. Notes were taken during conversations with other coaches over specific games, statistics kept and analyzed, and playing patterns traced on the field. I even went so far as to experiment with coaching in a particular national style at different times: “Okay boys, how would Brazil play this ball? Can you imitate that? What would Pelé be looking for under these circumstances?” Despite my superior coaching, none of my players ever came close to looking like Pelé on the field. My coaching courses and licensure courses provided me with the skills to analyze what I was seeing and form conclusions. The combination of extensive literature research, coaching experience, and film analysis have allowed me to specifically delineate my theory that national soccer playing style is directly shaped and influenced by the history and culture of each individual country.
CHAPTER 2
DEFINING STYLE AND ITS COMPONENTS

To discuss what influences the shaping of a national team’s soccer style, it is first necessary to define exactly what style is, what elements comprise it, and why those items are significant, before establishing a case comparison between Germany and Brazil. In this chapter I will examine, in order, a broad definition of style, explore some critical and cultural theorists’ beliefs on style, and examine the analysis of sport historian and sport sociologists’ writings on soccer style. Finally, I conclude with my working analysis of soccer playing style- that playing style is indicated by eight specific signatures: tactics, technique, body image, concept of soccer, values, tradition, ecological, and miscellaneous. Each signature of style will be analyzed as I attempt to reveal why each signature contributes to defining style. The qualifications for the invention of descriptive categories, or component signatures, of style can be academically verified, as a variety of authors cite different bits and pieces of my overall definition of style as being inherently significant. However, no academician has concentrated work on style to the point of precisely defining what constitutes style, nor done an in-depth study of what influences or contributes to the formation of a particular playing style. It is important to emphasize that this chapter is a process-oriented means
of defining style, but is not, yet, the means whereby what influences the formation of style is analyzed.

*Webster’s New World Dictionary* provides eleven definitions for style, but only four of those definitions are applicable to playing style. “(1) specific or characteristic manner of expression, execution, construction, or design, in any art, period, work, employment, etc.; (2.) distinction, excellence, originality, and character in any form of artistic or literary express; (3.) the way in which anything is made or done; manner; and (4.) distinction and elegance of manner and bearing.”¹ Of particular emphasis with regard to soccer are the terms distinction, excellence, originality, and the phrase ‘the way in which anything is done’. However, a dictionary definition certainly doesn’t provide discussion on how style is embedded within a culture, nor how it comes to be defined by a culture.

A variety of authors provide insight regarding a broad definition of style. Pierre Bourdieu offers some insight stating that style is a class grouping that defines works of the same universe and those that are complementary to it. He further ascertains that style presupposes differences that are implicit or explicit, that the work (in this case soccer) appears as a concrete individuality, but is also defined and redefined continuously.² He states:

> If the evolution of a style…does not appear either as the

autonomous development of an essence which is unique and always identical with itself, or as a continuous creation of unpredictable novelty, but as a progression which excludes neither leaps forward nor turnings back, it is because the creator’s habitus as a system of schemes constantly guides choices which, though not deliberate, are none the less systematic and, without being arranged and organized expressly in relation to a final goal, are none the less bearers of a kind of finality which will be revealed only post festum.  

His discussion is particularly pertinent when tracing a soccer national playing style. It is constantly changing and adapting to both inside and outside influences, and is never static and set, although stereotypical thoughts regarding style are frequent. When discussing style it is important to emphasize the historicity of the moment: this is Brazilian style at this specific point in time. Although my desire is to avoid stereotypical analysis, some broad considerations and conclusions can be drawn when looking at a national playing style over a long period of time. Certain specific style signatures tend to regularly reappear. Leaps forward and turnings back, particularly in terms of willful nostalgia, are evident when examining style over an extended period of time, as shall be further examined later in this chapter. The ultimate outcome of soccer style, for a nation, is the perfection of that style combined with the ultimate success on the field. The system of schemes that Bourdieu mentions would be style signatures, or specific elements that each nation emphasizes when discussing style. This stylistic signature is what I analyze and categorize in my definition of style, that there exist eight categories of signatures that define soccer playing style for a nation.

---

3 Ibid., 229.
Stuart Hall presents a discussion regarding style as a form of subculture identity that is useful. “What makes a style is the activity of stylization- the active organization of object with activities and outlooks, which produce an organized group-identity…a distinctive way of ‘being-in-the-world.’” Hall takes the subject of style beyond the merely surface dimension or aesthetic window-dressing and actually makes style the significant subject, with an emphasis on the body becoming cultural capital. In other words, style is not merely how something is done but rather the category that identifies who one is. Hall mentions the proliferation of styles as mirroring a wider process of cultural diversity and differentiation, but that style is also used as a signifier as to who an individual is within the broader society. Brazil and Germany both use style in defining their place in the soccer world. In relating Dick Hebdige’s work on style, Hall emphasizes that when “reading the style,” Hebdige places emphasis on style itself, and not style as an indication of class position. Style, then, goes beyond being merely an aesthetic or surface notion that indicates cultural rank. Style becomes a signifier of subcultures, providing identification with a culture. Hebdige’s work on subcultures and styles opens the door to reading style as a resistance to hegemony: “However, the challenge to hegemony which subcultures represent is not issued directly by them.

---

Rather it is expressed obliquely, in style…at the level of signs.” 7 The relevance to soccer is indirect. “The soccer culture” is certainly a subculture of the greater society of any nation, although Brazil may have grounds for resisting this notion. The idea of style as a form of resistance of hegemony is significant, and will certainly play out in nuances of race with regard to Brazil, as will be demonstrated. The level of signs, or signifiers, would be those distinct elements that define each country’s playing style.

Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer tend to view style in more structuralist terms, believing that it is now merely a caricature as culture moves from an artisan based society to an industrial one. However, they do allow a path into the vision of style as an aesthetic conceptualization that does represent class. “In the culture industry the notion of genuine style is seen to be the aesthetic equivalent of domination. Style considered as mere aesthetic regularity is a romantic dream of the past.” 8 Richard Grueneau takes a more neo-Gramscian approach, even as he self critiques neo-Gramscians for not having been concerned enough with “the precise ways in which particular sporting structures and beliefs materialize a logic of social distinction in various sport styles and practices and in their accompanying constitution of the body.” 9 Style is intimately related with each country’s conceptions of the body, and how that body should be displayed and celebrated.

---

7 Hebdige, *Subculture*, 17.
Moving from a general discussion of style to one specific to soccer, Richard Giulianotti provides linkage between the cultural dimension of sporting practice and soccer style. He asserts “…the game’s valued characteristics tells us something fundamental about the culture in which it is performed…football in any setting provides us with a kind of cultural map, a metaphorical representation, which enhances our understanding of that society.”\(^{10}\) He further explains that soccer is not dependent on the greater society, but instead is influenced by and in turn influences the broader social context.\(^{11}\) This exchange is significant when examining soccer style. A cultural exchange is always occurring as a national team adopts some factors of style represented by other teams, rejects some factors, and adapts others to suit its own self image. Allen Guttmann labels this process as appropriation, and discusses it in terms of cultural imperialism and national identity. Given the acknowledged British beginnings of the game of soccer, Guttmann states: “…soccer has been taken and remoulded in the style and the culture of the recipient; soccer has been appropriated and remade in these ways…”\(^{12}\) Giulianotti pinpoints the exchange as frequently occurring early in the historical development of each country’s game, whereby the host country copied and creolized the playing style of visiting teams.\(^{13}\) The concept of creolization becomes relevant. A soccer team, particularly at the national level, does not just copy the successful style of another team, but instead may borrow elements that were successful against them, or may incorporate

---

\(^{11}\) Ibid., p. xv.  
\(^{13}\) Giulianotti, *Football*, 9.
specific elements which would tend to enhance their own game. Each national team is still working within its own vision of what its style both represents and reflects. While this explains how style can be transferred and appropriated, it does not answer the question pending: what is style? How is it defined in soccer terms?

A variety of academicians regard style strictly in aesthetic terms. “Football is the most beautiful of the arts because it is an art” says Eric Cantona in his Eric the King video.14 David Inglis and John Hughson argue that even in pre-post-modern terms, soccer has always been fundamentally aesthetic and that the ‘essence’ of the game is an aesthetic one. “While the aim is to score a goal, the means whereby play towards that end is achieved is to a degree dependent on stylistic (aesthetic) grounds.” 15 Armstrong and Giulianotti acknowledge aesthetic codes of traditional and modernizing forces that shape national playing styles, and suggest that many countries end up with a hybridized or creolized style of play.16 I argue that while soccer style does have an aesthetic component, it is also comprised of much more, including such essentials as tactics and techniques, values embedded within the game that reflect a particular culture, body images idealized by the culture, ecological variations, and other signatures.

Richard Giulianotti, in *Football: A Sociology of the Global Game*, furthers the discussion of style and aesthetics. He delineates between two sociological perspectives when regarding style: the aesthetic perspective which portrays that soccer generates its own mixture of actions, styles and productive creativity; and the functional perspective that views soccer culture as reproductive of wider social relations. Stating the obvious, I envision soccer style from a functional perspective, but rather than seeing it as solely reproducing a wider cultural view, I examine the intersections of culture with style, and how those intersections produce aesthetic and other components. Returning to situating style historically, Giulianotti acknowledges that even the aesthetic dimension of soccer is not ahistorically given, but derives meaning from the wider socio-historical context. Style needs to be historically situated to avoid stereotyping. The two views can be resolved by the recognition that while soccer serves as a subculture of a larger society, it both receives from the wider society implications for the development of style, as well as reflects back to the wider society perceptions about itself, which can in turn lead to change. Soccer style reflects values that are already inherent in the society, as well as impacting how those values are regarded. Each culture generates its own meanings that are distinctive understandings of style, involving tactics and aesthetics.17

Eduardo Archetti has written extensively on the conceptualization and development of Argentinean soccer style, and in the process, has contributed to the conversation defining style. Much of his work on style connects the notion of style to national identity. In discussing style with a variety of soccer fans, Juancho, an Argentine fan

brings tradition into the discussion. Juancho told Archetti that: “A tradition in football is related to certain aesthetics and to criteria for defining a correct style.”¹⁸ Style, then, becomes a tradition within each country. C.L. Menotti, coach of the Argentinian national team, stated: “…it was modeled since the origins of our nationality with passion, with sacrifice…In our past, our way of playing was intimately related to our sentiments…This made possible the survival of a line, of a style…Football must also be measured with aesthetic criteria.”¹⁹ Archetti views soccer as both a ritual and as a space of symbolic construction. The space for symbolic construction generally occurs within the realm of the concept that defines style, for it allows individual and group construction of masculinity, national identity, and a variety of other identities. Archetti deduces that national style is not dependent only on victories or ethnic identity, but rather something more abstract which was a style, a way of doing, a way of playing, or in connection with great players. In essence, style was more than the aesthetic side of the game, but certainly included aesthetics.²⁰

While there can be no denying the relationship of style and notions of a national, imagined identity, many authors relate all issues of style to a form of nationalism, whereas others attribute other factors such as race or class. It is useful to survey a variety of academic opinions from authors discussing style, generally in passing

reference to some other aspect of soccer, but nonetheless, worthwhile in rounding out the discussion on playing style. Simon Kuper acknowledges the conversation on soccer style generally includes metaphors from either art or war. Alan Bairner, looking strictly at the relationship between soccer and nationalism, regards style as playing in a unique way or a certain fashion. Stephen Wagg contends that national soccer cultures adapt and bend, which in turn points back to the flexible status of playing style. Liz Crolley and David Hand relate style to collective identity which permits more than a sense of belonging to be recorded and classified, but allows that identity to be verbalized or recounted. They also recognized Archetti’s concept of ‘essentialist identity,’ defined as the ideal displayed by typical national style of play which is represented by mythical teams and model players. Through the process of representation, a stock of values, events and meanings then form the symbolic capital that defines the essence on national character.

João Nuno Coelho also perceives playing style as collective identity that is cultural tradition as well as being unique and essential, and representational. Janet Lever notes that the love of a sport (soccer) leads to respect for athletes and distinctive national styles of play. She notes that:

Although the Latins and the Europeans come together to play the same game under the same rules, cultural variation leads to

---

pronounced differences in playing style. The World Cup is more than a competition between separate nations; it is a place to contest different interpretations of a game and to observe the symbolic manifestations of cultural clash. Style, to Lever, represents not only notions of national identity, but exhibits representational value on a global basis for national systems of politics, economics, cultural values, and way of life. The game of soccer and how it is played (the style), then becomes symbolic of national identity, and world competitions become more than just soccer games. The teams, represented by contrasting styles, declare victory by more than just a win, but rather by a domination of their style, representing their way of life, on a global basis.

In fact, several authors not only view style as a cultural clash, but also as being defined mainly by its opposition to the “other,” which means other countries when discussing national playing styles. Style is not just “Brazilian” or “German”, but becomes “Brazilian-not-German.” Style provides a measure of contrast to other cultures and other peoples. Pablo Alabarces and Maria Graciela Rodriguez, further defining Archett’s definition, believed that the couplet “we” (the nation) vs. “they” (the others) found its expression in playing style, and noted that it was often better narrated than lived but always yielded great capacity for the production of social meanings. Albarces and Rodriguez mean that style is not always as clearly defined on the playing field as it appears when discussing it, but regardless; style intersects with culture in a

variety of ways and produces meaning within the culture. Style reveals the culture to outside observers, the “other.” Pierre Lanfranchi and Matthew Taylor further clarify the situation: “Yet these national playing styles did not emerge organically: they developed in relation to one another, becoming influenced by, or defined against, an international ‘other.’”25 As Lanfranchi and Taylor note, frequently that “other” was the English, who introduced the game into many countries. Perhaps the most poetic discussion of style, defined by his own elegant writing style, is Eduardo Galeano’s, the Uruguyan scholar on soccer:

The more the technocrats program it down to the smallest detail, the more the powerful manipulate it, soccer continues to be the art of the unforeseeable…An astonishing void: official history ignores soccer. Contemporary history text fails to mention it, even in passing, in countries where it has been and continues to be a primordial symbol of collective identity. I play therefore I am: a style of play is a way of being that reveals the unique profile of each community and affirms its right to be different. Tell me how you play and I’ll tell you who you are. For many years soccer has been played in different styles, expressions of the personality of each people, and the preservation of that diversity is more necessary today than ever before.26

As previously mentioned, to avoid stereotypical notions of style, style must be situated both historically and culturally. It is now time to place the discussion of playing style in historical perspective. When did national playing styles begin to formulate, and when did they emerge representational of more than just a specific team? As already noted, Giulianotti claimed that touring teams (mainly British) became a model for many developing national teams, and styles were copied and creolized. Tony Mason provides

no date, but mentions that Europeans and Latin Americans had quickly developed their own styles after being captivated by the British game. Gary Armstrong and Richard Giulianotti place the timing as before World War I when countries began to be considered synonymous with particular playing styles. For many countries, the first two decades of the twentieth century became the marking post for the beginnings of development of a national playing style.

Eduardo Archetti provides some fascinating detail about the Argentinian game, and dates its development of playing style to the 1920’s.

For Argentinian football the foundation myth, the emergence of a style of its own, different from other ways of playing, is in a way located in the 1920’s and is associated with the following aspects: the cult of ‘dribbling’, the appearance of the ‘pairs’ in a team…fundamentally the winger and the insider, the development of stunts…and the crystallization of a style defined as elegant, skillful, cheeky and lively.

Lanfranchi and Taylor assert that national styles started simultaneously with international competitions, particularly along with the 1908 and 1912 Olympics. But they believe that these styles were only consolidated during the interwar period and were well developed by the 1940’s in Europe and South America. João Nuno Coelho dates the emergence of national playing style in the 1930’s with the historical era of the nationalization of the masses, obviously connecting playing style intimately with

---


29 Lanfranchi and Taylor, *Moving With the Ball*, 201.
national identity. Lanfranchi and Taylor’s effort to connect playing style with the rise of international competition sets the date earlier, and they make a stronger argument. Professionalization of the game occurred at different times in different countries. Since the Olympics were amateur competitions, it is likely that the emergence of playing style did occur within the first two decades of the twentieth century. Although professionalization emerged much earlier in England, many of the touring teams were amateur teams. However, it does seem likely given England’s siring of the game that their style was developed earlier than other countries, and that other countries often developed their own style in contrast to England’s in order to differentiate their unique culture.

Richard Giulianotti provides the most comprehensive interpretation and delineation of the emergence of playing styles. The value of his study and categorization is directly related to my study in terms of history. My investigation into the respective Brazilian and German styles and how they were influenced by intersections with their culture, situated historically, provides both support as well as some critique of Giulianotti’s assessment. My interpretation is the particularization of his, extending historically further into the reaches of history. Giulianotti’s theory begins in 1880 in Britain with the rise of the professionalization of the game. Prior to that time, the British middle class dominated and controlled the game, bringing the amateur values with it. The entrepreneurial values of risk and individual attack predisposed the game to an aesthetic display of flamboyant dribblers. As the game professionalized and the working class

---

30 Coelho, “‘On the Border,’ 160.
gained ascendancy in players and fans, victories became more important than artistry. The game became more rationalized and scientific, with the results of becoming a passing game. Along with other influences of industrialization, division of labor was more thoroughly and concisely introduced, with players having specific assigned positions on the field and specialized tasks to perform. The traditional “kick and rush” game gave way to the passing game over a period of years, and probably was influenced by the influx of Scottish working class players. This traditional period established the tactical and aesthetic virtues of teamwork, increased technical skills, and an emphasis on winning the game.\textsuperscript{31}

Giulianotti dates the traditional period as roughly lasting until immediately after World War I. He notes that during the traditional period national playing styles were formulated, which occurs shortly after the diffusion of the game via the British Empire. During the traditional period, rules became solidified and codified, national associations began to form, and although the elite still controlled the game, the working class challenged their hegemony. What was not challenged was that the British held the right to define and legitimize the game. English remained the international language of soccer. Stadiums began to be built, but these stadiums enforced the segregation of social classes and allowed increased revenues into the sport. While British soccer was already professionalized, most other countries maintained loyalty to the Empire’s amateur philosophy. Coaching remained undeveloped, as did most tactical dimensions of the game, and the emphasis continued to remain on attack. The players during this

\textsuperscript{31} Giulianotti, \textit{Football}, 129-30.
time period were often considered local heroes, but renowned international players began to receive recognition and along with it, commercial endorsements primarily associated with health and fitness. England maintained its emphasis on the kick and rush game, but gradually came under the influence of the Scottish passing game with its allowance for smaller, less muscular players.\textsuperscript{32}

Giulianotti dates the early modernity period from the early 1920’s to the end of World War II. After World War I, the gap between attacking aesthetics and pragmatic defense widened, and in attempt to make the game more attractive to the paying audience the offside rule was changed in 1925. Previously, three defenders had to be between the ball and the goal, and this was reduced to two. The new offside rule allowed tactical and stylistic diversity to flourish. The W-M system came into existence, dropping a midfielder back into the defense to provide a stopper, or pivot-position, and designating two other midfielders as defense. Attackers no longer attacked in massive numbers, as positions became more refined, complex, and Fordist. The inventor of the W-M system, Arsenal coach Herbert Chapman, equated Fordism with football by seeking to use industrial techniques that sped up production of goods to also equate on the soccer pitch with speeding up production of goals. As a result, the counter-attack began to be developed in the game. As the W-M system swept across Europe, countries started to introduce cultural differences along with scientific approaches. Italy developed the catenaccio style of play, featuring the science of defense. Soccer became the working class sport on a global basis, with a decidedly male emphasis. The rise of Latin

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 129-30, 166-67, 135.
American soccer and its associations with nationalism became apparent. Vast stadiums are built in this nationalistic fervor, and radio made soccer available to millions. Top players become national figures enjoying higher than average wages, but lacking any long-term security or freedom of choice. England’s hegemony of the game began to be challenged as national playing styles further developed.33

Giulianotti’s intermediate modernity period of soccer basically constitutes the post-war years of 1945-1960. England continued to decline in dominance on a global basis as tactical and aesthetic innovations came from the outside. The 1950’s saw the introduction of the “Swiss Bolt” defensive scheme, with two central defenders (one being a libero) and two attacking full-backs. In Italy, catenaccio further developed the position of libero, or sweeper, to play behind the established defense to prevent an attack from fully developing. Catenaccio was rooted in ultra-professionalism with an emphasis on discipline, concentration, regimental training, planning, and establishing an astute possession game. Continental departmentalization of soccer bureaucracy was established and reinforced during this period on a global basis, although earlier confederations existed. The rise of television introduces the globalization of top players as international heroes with drawing power for the game. The “high-modern” period is established with Brazil’s dominance by a 4-2-4 system which features soccer’s aesthetic commitment to attack during the modern age. The 1958 Brazilian World Cup team is

33 Ibid., 130-31, 135, 167.
still considered as the prime example of the purest and most pleasing form of soccer, featuring attack, pragmatic defense, and creativity on the field.\textsuperscript{34}

Giulianotti’s late modernity period runs from the early 1960’s to the late 1980’s. Soccer becomes further influenced by the consumer culture and youth culture, along with a rise in commodification of players, clubs, and tournaments. Top international players become celebrities, and secure financial security as their freedom increases. Soccer becomes a business run by chief executives, and revenue rises with sponsorship and advertising overtaking gate money as the main income for teams. Global competitions, like the World Cup, become the extreme test of a nation for status within the soccer world. Styles and tactics became fads, and changed increasingly frequently. England’s 1966 World Cup team introduced the 4-3-3 formation, or the “Wingless Wonders” system which placed emphasis on hard-working and multi-talented midfielders, and less on talented, individualistic forwards. Catenaccio style became cemented in Italy, Holland played a 3-4-3, and English clubs emulated Brazil’s 4-4-2. Safety and functionality became the key words in style, and scientific methods dominated team preparation. England was returning to its “long ball” game, as data analysis proved that 90\% of the goals came from fewer than five passes during the attack. Brazil spent a large fortune in 1966 on scientific preparation for the World Cup which included a four month training camp with two hundred medical staff, athletic trainers, and psychologists on board. South American countries began building massive stadia, England and Northern Europe build rectangular stadia, and southern Europe adds

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 167, 131-32.
multifunctional stadia with running tracks. Fan cultures and hooliganism began to appear in England, and the ultras in Italy, and concomitantly, fanzines flourished and attached a political element to the game. The Dutch club, Ajax, introduced “total football” to the world, which returned an emphasis to attacking, fluid soccer. This style required players to be multi-talented and extremely skilled, technical virtuosos, as they rotated through positions on the field during the flow of play. Constant movement and positional realignment required increasing physicality as well as tactical vision and intelligence. By the mid 1980’s, teams began changing defensive alignments, proceeding to a flat back four, or zonal style of defensive play. The 4-4-2 still predominated in England, with outside fullbacks becoming more attacking, replacing former winger positions. The late 1980’s saw the development of the zona style in Italy, with a flat back four and a dominant pressing midfield. Repetition of techniques and tactics became the byword in the development of this style, and players appeared almost like robots at times.35

The post-modern era of soccer, as proposed by Giulianotti, occurred in the early 1990’s. The defensive negativity of the 1990 World Cup influenced FIFA to encourage a more attacking and flowing game to bring in new markets in the Far East and North America. Referees were told to punish the “professional” foul more severely, as the tackle from behind was increasingly used to halt attacks. Coaches began to deconstruct the highly Fordist 4-4-2 system on a match by match basis, changing style to best confound their opponent. Some coaches added a third center back as a libero, encouraging fullbacks to

---

35 Ibid., 168, 132-34.
fully enter the attack in a 3-5-2 formation. Italy introduced the mezzopunta position, which is an offensive midfielder with technical ball skills that links the midfield and the attack, leading to a 3-4-1-2 formation which is confusing for defenders to mark. Post-modern coaches are now reflecting skepticism of scientification of the game, realizing that soccer results can rarely be predicted and destined. Flank players have become exceedingly important, with their increasing speediness. As the middle class has assumed hegemony over culture, soccer continues to be commodified, particularly in light of television’s increasing influence on the game. In the Far East, soccer has become a symbol of advanced modernity, and in the West, a symbol of leisure time for the middle class. Latin America looks to the privatization of clubs as business ventures, and European clubs are increasingly joint stock ventures.36

As demonstrated, playing styles are not fixed, concrete notions for any country. However, Giulianotti ignored two important facets that were predominant throughout the evolution of playing styles, and have become even more significant in the post-modern era of globalization. The two facets include Eric Hobsbawm’s theory of invented tradition37 and the concept of willful nostalgia as espoused by Roland Robertson and further explained by Joseph Maguire.38 The significance of these frameworks become glaringly apparent as the components of style are explored for

---

Brazil and Germany. Since Brazil, in particular, exhibits dimensions of both theories in its evolution of style over the past century, a short synopsis of each is appropriate before delving into the components of style.

Hobsbawm defines invented traditions as those that appear to be old, but are quite frequently not only fairly new in origin, but also contrived traditions. He states:

“Invented tradition” is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past.\(^{39}\)

Hobsbawm notes that there appear to be three types of invented tradition since the industrial revolution: 1.) those promoting social cohesion of real or imagined communities of peoples, 2.) those legitimizing authority or institutions, and 3.) those promoting beliefs, value systems, conventions of behavior and socialization. Old traditions tend to be specific and binding, but invented traditions, while more vague, influence very specific practices. Hobsbawm does connect the rise of invented tradition with the corresponding rise of nationalism.\(^{40}\)

Robertson’s theory of willful nostalgia, and interpreted in a sporting light by Joseph Maguire, is in reality a small part of his theory on the processes and phases of globalization. The use of Maguire puts the theory into a sport perspective, which more

\(^{40}\) Ibid., 9-11, 14.
readily allows a transfer of ideas and their application to discussions of playing style.

The concept of willful nostalgia is associated with Robertson’s four phase of globalization, and accentuated during the fifth phase which began with the late 1960’s. During the fourth phase, hegemonic control of sport lay with the West, but it was never complete, and willful nostalgia was one form of resistance against that hegemony.

Willful nostalgia can be defined as “national angst, malaise, and a longing for some mythical golden age and what might be termed ‘homefulness.’” Maguire notes that the acceleration of globalization tendencies has also increased the tendencies in some cultures toward the construction and representation of nostalgia. Pertaining to playing style, as will be demonstrated, Brazil has periodically, but more frequently since 1990, exhibited notions of willful nostalgia with calls for returning to Brazil’s “unique” and “traditional” style. Given the constant evolution of playing style for any country, particularly in light of global flows increasing pace and substance, willful nostalgia becomes a form of resistance within playing style considerations.

I claim that seven components, or signatures of style, interplay and weave together to comprise a team’s style. The importance of identifying these signatures is the defining of style, specifically, before undertaking the task of determining what influences that style. These signatures consist of the following: 1.) Tactics that are unique or specific to that team, or tactics that tend to be associated primarily with the team; 2.) Body image and how it is represented both within the culture as well as on the playing field.

---

42 Ibid., 408, 410, 415. See also Maguire, Global Sport, 180.
(i.e., does there appear to be a stereotypical or representational body type associated with the individual team?); 3.) Unique or identifying techniques in how the team plays the game, such as emphasis on particular skill sets; 4.) A team’s concept of soccer, such as: is it viewed as a game or a sport, what does the national philosophy of soccer appear to be, and how does that contribute to the shaping of the game? 5.) Values that are associated with how the team plays, and values that the team holds significant; 6.) What is the tradition (invented or not) of the art of play for a team, as exemplified by subjective terms associated with the team; and 7.) Ecological impact: how does climate or geography influence the style of play? In addition, a miscellaneous category has been created to answer questions not easily suited to other categories.

The first signature of style to be discussed is the area of tactics within the game of soccer. Roberto DaMatta lists tactics as one of the components of the game that is associated with the activity of soccer. Lanfranchi and Taylor acknowledge that “…the articulation of specifically ‘national’ styles often cut across the strictly technical differences in the way in which players lined up on the pitch and the tactics they employed.” Lanfranchi further explores the stereotypical assignment of playing positions (a tactical maneuver) based on nationalities, in the club system. Yugoslavs were thought to be ideal goalkeepers, Africans and South Americans made ideal wing players, strikers should be South American or Yugoslav, the best midfield artists were Austrian or Hungarian, tireless runners should be Dutch, and reliable and strong defenders were German. While these notions are stereotypical, they often seemed to be

43 Lanfranchi and Taylor, Moving With the Ball, 200.
based on playing styles which emphasize different values in different countries.

Giulianotti links tactics and aesthetic viewpoints together when discussing how nations go through the process of changing their playing style.44 The category of tactics includes far more than playing formations. It contains the type of defense a team might use, tactical innovations associated with a specific team, how it chooses to move the ball down the field, the type of attack that is instituted, the use of space and off the ball plays. This signature involves such areas as descriptive terms that are associated with a particular style, including surprise and predictability, possession, and the type of pressure a team would use on the ball. Tactics are frequently considered to be the domain of the coaching staff based on their philosophy of the game, or at times, considerations for a specific opponent. They are the planned and taught scheme of how the game is played, although in reality, from a coaching perspective, they must be totally incorporated into the flow of the game to be effective. Tactics involve “forcing” the other team to play the way that is most comfortable and efficient for your team, one that leads to success in the outcome. Tactics are one signature of style.

Another signature of style is body image, and how that concept is translated into the game of soccer. One source attributes playing style directly to physiological differences in people between different regions of the world which lead to adaptation of a style which suits the characteristics of local players. Sergio Leite Lopes, Latin American anthropologist, attributes different playing styles as arising from distinctive body

movements that are established in different cultures. Giulianotti acknowledges that
different nations construct particular attributes of body build for particular playing
positions, which in turn leads to players trying to alter their body type to expectations.
He also asserts that body culture and social environment are closely related when
examining aspects of style. Giulianotti and Armstrong emphasize concepts of the body
in defining style, crediting “anthropological diversity of cultural meanings and body
styles” in how the game is understood. In *Masculinities*, Archetti clarifies the situation
by stating: “These styles, in turn, are based on ethnic differences conceptualized as
differences in character and in the form through which feelings and bodily movements
are expressed.” 45 Or to put it more plainly, each ethnic group uses an interpretation of
the body and its movements to define their identity. Archetti also notes that certainly
bodily practices are involved in the formation of national identity. One example he
presents is the importance of individualism in Argentinian soccer as opposed to a team
concept in English soccer. DaMatta emphasizes that in the United States and England,
the domain of sport has very much to do with control of the body, which is not reflected
in other cultures. He also adds that in Brazilian soccer a player must exhibit the
capacity to use the body to provoke confusion and fascination. 46

Styles and Masculine Virtues in Argentine Football,” *Machos, Mistresses, Madonnas* ed. by Marit
46 Expertfootball.com (June 7, 2004): 1; Sergio Leite Lopes, “All Together!” *UNESCO Courier* (April
1999): 34; Gianluca, *Football*, 111, 128; Giulianotti and Armstrong, “Introduction”, 27; Eduardo
Archetti, “The Meaning of Sport in Anthropology: A View from Latin America,” *European Review of
127.
So, cultural conceptions of body image play a role in defining style of play. Bodily images will be constructed through body types that are prevalent or dominant on a national team, but also how the team defines itself in bodily terms. In playing style, does a team favor strong, tall, muscular, physical players, or depend upon smaller, quicker players to express its style of play? What about attributes of speed, agility and flexibility? How “tough” are the players, or are they considered injury prone? Also considered will be concepts of whether bodily attributes are “natural” and innate, or whether they are considered aspects of training. Use of specific body parts when playing the game become significant cultural signifiers, for despite non-soccer enthusiast’s impression, soccer is not just a game of the feet.

Technique can also be a signature of playing style, although few authors comment on it. Lanfranchi and Taylor make passing reference to technical differences based on national style. Included in this category would be delineation of such details as finishing the strike, emphasis on specific skill sets such as heading or dribbling, the exploration of concepts of power, efficiency, skill, first touch on the ball, and “skill tricks” pertinent to a particular team. This category tends to emphasize how the individuals on the team directly play the ball, and whether a collective assessment of those individual techniques can be made. There are national differences in how a team technically touches the ball and what skill sets are emphasized that would contribute to the definition of style, and these will be explored during an analysis of the case study countries of Brazil and Germany.

47 Lanfranchi and Taylor, Moving With the Ball, 200.
Each team’s concept of soccer is also a signature of playing style at the national level.

Garry Jenkins quotes Pier Paolo Pasolini in his book *The Beautiful Team*:

| There are two types of football, prose and poetry. European teams are prose, tough, premeditated, systematic, collective. Latin American ones are poetry, ductile, spontaneous, individual, erotic. |

This is a somewhat stereotypical analysis, but one that has been firmly cemented in the minds of soccer fans around the world - that is the fiery, passionate Latin versus the cool and rational European, and passes beyond mere discussion of soccer style. Roberto DaMatta furthers the conception of soccer into terms of whether a team regards the contest as a game or a sport, and points out the significant differences in how it is regarded. Teams that regard soccer as a game also infuse the dimension of “game of chance” associated with gambling, whereby the outcome of the game is not only attributed to tactics, technical skills and psychological determination, but also depends on uncontrollable and unforeseen forces of destiny and fortune. Teams that view soccer as a game must not only play against their opponents, but also against destiny which must be changed in order to win. Teams that view soccer as a sport stress competition, technique, strength, with luck being much less situated as a controlling factor of the game. These views are culturally constructed; tying in with the premise that style is influenced and shaped by cultural nuances. Included in this category will be national coaching philosophy. National coaching philosophy involves how the style at a

---

49 DaMatta, “Soccer”, 127.
particular point in time permeates all levels of soccer within the national system, and
whether the style is considered representational of the wider population or whether it is
representational of a portion of the population. This category will also look at
stereotypical images of how the game is construed by each country as well as how it is
viewed by other countries: is it boring or exciting, is it considered in war terms, or more
celebratory terms? Is the game revered and adored, or is it one of many sporting events
in which the country participates? Media discourse provides some interesting analysis
of this signature.

The next signature to be considered is what specific values are related in the game of
soccer, and how those values contribute to the making of a national style. Lanfranchi
and Taylor assert that national playing styles say something about the nature of a
culture, what they are like, and how they want to be represented. Crolley and Hand
contend that “…playing styles are seen as unique and essential to the nation concerned,
as well as representing values that are deemed important in that nation. Notions are
widespread, then, of English fighting spirit and virility, French flair and style…”50
Sugden and Tomlinson perceive soccer as a form of popular theatre which is open to the
expression of distinct sets of ideologies and values as represented by individual nations.
Those ideologies and values have a tendency to transcend the intrinsic meaning of the
game, making the game more than just a competition between two teams, but also a
means of displaying cultural values to the world.51 The values that a culture attach to

50 Crolley and Hand, Football, Europe and the Press, 9.
51 Lanfranchi and Taylor, Moving With the Ball, 192; Sugden and Tomlinson, FIFA and the Contest, 4.
their national team and how it plays the game, or playing style, then reflect back onto, and impact, the culture. Joseph Arbena, citing G. Smith states it succinctly:

As Smith (1986) demonstrates, at first the game appears to be the same, but as it is played out in its specific contest, the game proves to have characteristics and meaning for its local participants far different from those anticipated by the outside player or observer. It could even be argued that the application of the term “national” to styles of soccer and other sports reflects the persistence of older, perhaps traditional, cultural values and forms that, to some, are inconsistent with the aspirations of the dominant culture.52

Arbena is relating that soccer playing style can serves as a means of resistance to hegemonic values, and by reflecting different values back onto and into the culture, perhaps may provide a vehicle for change within the culture. For example, the Brazilian player, Socrates, as a social activist, led a movement in 1982 that was strictly political, but played out in terms of soccer as well as politics.53 Archetti provides an even more insistent voice that soccer style of play is directly related to the expression of cultural values, and that in turn reveals essentialist identity, or how an individual defines himself as a member of a specific nation. One of Archetti’s informants noted that “different football styles convey information concerning ‘our beliefs about how we see what the world is like.’”54 Archetti claims that playing style reveals sentiments as well as provides a means of moral choices regarding producing and reproducing identities.55

53 This concept will be further explored in chapter thirteen. See: Bellos, Futebol, 357-372.
This historical process that creates values and meanings, he terms the essentialist perspective. Crolley and Hand provide a nice synopsis of this theory:

Essentialist national identity is the ideal displayed by a ‘typical’ style of play and represented by ‘mythical teams’ and ‘model players.’ Key values that appeal to a nation’s sense of collective belonging are exemplified by ‘great’ teams, ‘great’ heroes and the ‘great’ games of the past in which they played. A process of representation ensues that creates a stock of values, events and meanings that form the symbolic capital lying at the heart of definitions of the ‘essence’ of national character. Generally, the essentialist desire is to preserve the ‘essence’ of national identity as expressed through football, which is why apparent changes of tactics or styles of play can meet with fierce resistance. If key values are being sacrificed, a sense of decay is felt along with a loss of self-identity. Changes can be accepted but only if key values are maintained.  

It will be important, then, to ascertain what key values each country represents via their playing style on the pitch. Values to be explored include such items as mental strength, self-belief, teamwork, control, discipline or the lack there-of, artistry, guile or trickery, and a sense of emotional display. These words are often emotion laden terms and very often can be stereotypical statements about a country’s style of play reinforced by media reports. However, by comparing media representations with each country’s internal media reports, and comparing and contrasting them with academic interpretations, I believe that a broader perspective than mere stereotypes can be obtained. It is well understood that the display of values is intimately connected with national identity or national habitus, however, this connection will be explored in depth.

in a later chapter. Again, the impetus at this point is a definitional determination as to what playing style is, and how Germany and Brazil exhibit playing style.

The next category to be examined will be the art or the tradition of play, invented or otherwise, in defining style. Allen Guttmann clarifies tradition of playing style in light of cultural imperialism, and in doing so, comments directly on Brazil and Germany:

> Despite its British origins, soccer has been adopted around the world. The rules of the game are international, but the associated rituals are often the product of native culture. The folklore of Brazilian soccer is unlike that of the German game; watching Santos of Sao Paolo is not the same as a visit to the terraces of Schalke 04.57

This folklore of the game, as Guttmann terms it, is a tradition of playing style. A variety of authors note the importance of tradition in defining playing style. Giulianotti points out that a culture or a community is brought up to value one or two traditional playing styles. Lever indicates that sport roots people not only to a particular place, but to the past. Lanfranchi and Taylor acknowledge that a new coach must invariable work in the shadow of past tradition, which often involves an engagement with playing style. They further state that playing style, while a stereotypical image, is vested in tradition that the community gives to itself.58 Brazilians believe their particular style of soccer is rooted in tradition, unchanging, and reflective of their culture, despite significant ongoing changes over the years. The community defines the tradition, whether it is

---


58 Giulianotti, Football, 137; Lever, Soccer Madness, 12; Lanfranchi and Taylor, Moving with the Ball, 191.
invented or not. Archetti speaks of a national tradition of playing style (with particular reference to Argentina), but asserts that a great player can transcend a traditional style, much as Maradona did went he played in Europe. Transcending a traditional national style may be the impetus to the alteration of that style, resulting in a new tradition being established. Beckenbauer is an excellent example of this, as he transformed both German soccer and world soccer with his altered role of the sweeper.

When viewing the category of tradition of play, the process involves dealing with subjective, emotion laden terms such as creativity and a tradition of bullying or violence within the playing style. An emphasis on teamwork or individualism will prove to be key components, as will the overall success of the team in terms of winning. References to German “machine” analogies as well as their designation for being a “tournament team” abound. With Brazil, references to dance and magic are common. When extrapolating art of play and traditions of playing style, the historicity of the moment must be acknowledged. Discussion of playing tradition does not always include a specific date, although often the “tradition” being referred to is an invented one that is rooted in the playing style of a great national team, usually one that has won the World Cup. For example, with Brazil, the “traditional” style of play is often associated with the 1958 or 1970 World Cup winning teams when the legendary Pelé was playing, or sometimes, the 1982 World Cup team when Dr. Socrates was playing. The success of a team is invariably linked with the establishment of an invented tradition.

---

The last specific signature of playing style to be examined is environmental. Climate and geography can be instrumental in contributing to the national playing style of a country. Jose Goncalves, former Brazilian professional soccer player, current coach and author of *The Principles of Brazilian Soccer*, insists that a variety of factors, including climate, shape national playing styles. Archetti also places importance on the contribution of environmental factors to playing style: “…the transformative element of style was explicitly related to the environment, to the products and characteristics of a given territory…air, landscape, contact with natives, food and drink.” Given the contrasting climate of Germany and Brazil, ascertaining the impact of environmental conditions on the national playing style will be necessary.

Before turning to an analysis of German and Brazilian playing style, it is important to address some key critiques of naming or attempting to delineate a soccer style, namely stereotyping and mythologizing of playing style, the homogenization theory of playing style, and the designation of broad categories of playing style. Christian Bromberger takes a definite stance on the subject of stereotypes related to playing style, and insists that playing style, particularly on a local basis, is a stereotyped image, vested in tradition, that a community gives itself and reproduces for others. Commenting on national playing styles, Bromberger asserts that national style does not always

---

correspond to the reality of the game, but rather to stereotypical images that are embedded in time, and again, that a nation attributes to itself and wishes to display to other nations. Nicola Porro and Pippo Russo offer a credible theory regarding playing style and stereotypes: that they are part of a circular pattern whereby a player’s on field behavior is influenced by, and in turn then confirms, stereotypes regarding style of play. However, at times, stereotypes are reversed, when teams do not play in the expected image. They mention the Italy vs. Germany 1996 game where stereotypes, traditions, and national style were turned upside down, which resulted in a stunning breaking of the cycle, at least temporarily when Italy played an aggressive, attacking match and Germany a defensive one. They also mention that television has become a powerful medium for either reinforcing or weakening stereotypical images of soccer teams.

Given the establishment of stereotypes, how does one avoid them when discussing national playing style? It becomes apparent that stereotypes are part of the process, and must be acknowledged as such. However, several factors are important to note in the process. First, stereotypes correspond greatly with the invented traditions established in playing style. These invented traditions are mediated internally within a country, so examining what the country has to say about itself, along with what other countries and media reports represent, allows for a slightly clearer picture. Elias’ theory on national

---


habitus, or how a country constructs a historic self identity, helps to reduce a
stereotypical view of playing style. Secondly, situating the invented traditions within a
specific historic time period establishes some specificity, avoiding stereotypes.
However, when viewing the vast scope of historical tradition of playing style over a
period of many years, a certain acceptance of stereotyping becomes inevitable simply
because a discussion of the overall view of style cannot be situated to a specific point in
time. It is a stereotype and must be regarded as such, despite efforts to mediate its use.

When defining style, it is valuable at this point to acknowledge the critiques of those
that believe national playing styles no longer exist, particularly in light of recent
globalization patterns. While this subject is discussed at length in chapter twenty-four,
it cannot be ignored when defining style. Hugh Dauncey and Geoff Hare acknowledge
that one of the myths mediated through soccer relates to national playing style. Tony
Mason suggests that if national playing style is really a myth, it is interesting that many
still cling to the belief. Mason also asserts that by 1994, a soccer dichotomy of styles no
longer exists, and that all national teams now play in a similar fashion due to the
homogenizational impact of globalism. However, he notes that if the homogenization
theory is true, the loss of playing style will result in a loss of vitality and
attractiveness. 63 Eduardo Galeano attributes loss of playing style to commodification
and technocracy:

Obedience, speed, strength and none of those fancy

63 Hugh Dauncey and Geoff Hare, “World Cup France ’98,” International Review for the Sociology of
Sport, 35 (2000): 336; Tony Mason, Passion of the People? Football in South America (London: Verso,
1995), 129, 156-57.
turns: this is the mold into which globalization pours the game. Soccer gets mass-produced, and it comes out colder than a freezer and as merciless as a meat-grinder. It’s a soccer for robots. Such boredom supposedly means progress, but historian Arnold Toynbee had already seen enough of that when he wrote, “Civilizations in decline are consistently characterized by a tendency toward standardization and uniformity.”

However, the loss of a unique playing style is not a given, and it could be strongly argued that it is becoming more accentuated as time goes on. Redhead notes that during the 1990 World Cup, separate national identities continued to manifest themselves, despite protests that in terms of playing style, ‘we are all Europeans now,’ and that difference and spontaneity were being squeezed out of the playing styles on a global basis. Perhaps he was referring to the Europeanization of the Brazilian team with an emphasis on defense rather than their traditional artistic attacking style, but a style that still contained elements of the traditional Brazil. He also asserts that this is by no means certain. Porro and Russo claim that “national styles…still find expression on the pitch and form a model for interpreting sporting contests which remains valid.”

Donald Kirkendall, W. Wesley Dowd, and Tony DiCicco cite Yamanaka’s research that documents cultural differences in patterns of play between British, European, South American and African teams, such as frequency of possession change, direct play, and the way teams shoot and score. Archetti is perhaps the most outspoken proponent that

---

64 Galeano, *Soccer in Sun and Shadow*, 224.
66 Porro and Russo, “The Production of Media Epic”, 156.
national playing styles still exist, particularly when discussing Argentinean style. He makes his point by quoting Menotti, a successful Argentine coach:

> An authentic national football (style) exists...Once I heard somebody say that ‘there is no national football because football is universal.’ I would say that man is universal, but that the best way to reach universality in any activity is ‘to paint one’s own village.’

It is my position that national playing styles still exist, and that while globalization has impacted playing styles, in some cases willful nostalgia is also becoming accentuated as a resistance to global flows. This willful nostalgia, in turn, often leads a country back to its invented traditions regarding playing style. Variety among national team playing styles is alive and well.

So what are these playing styles? Does every country exhibit a unique style, or are there groupings of stylistic play that can be counted? While most authors acknowledge individual style per nation, and in some cases, a variety of styles within a nation, there are regional groupings of style that can be acknowledged and described. First, a look at national and intra-national style is appropriate, to establish the thesis that most countries exhibit a particular and unique playing style. Germany and Brazil will not be addressed at this time, since the contention of this chapter is that they exhibit a unique and specific playing style. Mason notes that Columbian players played a different style of soccer that was unfamiliar to the British in 1950, and that not only was their training more advanced, but the style showed a greater variety with more emphasis on practice with the ball. Jeremy MacClancy contrasts the Basque style of play with a more traditional

---

Spanish one, leading to intra-national variation. The Basque style was epitomized by fieriness and long passes, and presented a quick, strong, hard, physical appearance that was very direct and simplistic. The style of strength combined with speed and total physical and mental commitment exemplified the male attributes of force and determination. Catalonians were thought to play a more technical, cold game and Andalusians a more reckless one. Brent DiCrescenzo calls the U. S. style an “anti-style,” and asserts that it is an undefined amalgamation of styles that borrow South American art and European tactics. Archetti speaks in detail of the Argentinian style: emphasizing creolization, short passes on the ground, precision, slower than the British style, an emphasis on creative dribbling, individualistic, lacking tactical sense, agile and attractive.69

An examination of how various authors regionally group playing styles is interesting. Garry Jenkins categorizes three distinct styles since 1966, as defined by Brazilian soccer analysts, and considers them “philosophies” of play rather than direct styles because they are such broad categories. They are futebol-forca, exemplified by Germany and England, and described as a power game, futebol de resultados, exemplified by Italy which is a win-at-all-costs style, and futebol-arte, exemplified by the Brazilians in 1958.70 Goncalves asserts that there are four different styles:

---


70 Jenkins, The Beautiful Team, 35.
Brazilian, England, Dutch and German. He accordingly describes and diagrams each style in great detail, but a short synopsis would be: the English style to play directly out of the defense with as few passes as possible to reach the attacking third and target players, the Dutch team attacks down the flank with short passes, showing strong technical skills, and the Brazilian and German styles will be examined in great depth later in this paper. Simon Kuper delineates four main categories of styles as of 1994. The long ball game which is primarily British, total football, a Dutch invention, happy-go-lucky style associated with Brazil and South Africa, and catenaccio, the defensive oriented style played by Italy. Two authors insist that there are at least six different styles, but are not in agreement on how to categorize or designate the styles. Expertfootball.com, a coaching website, offers six categories that include British, Italian, Latin, Northern, Continental, and Central American. The British style is defined as long passing, physical, crossing for head balls, and the attack built quickly. Italian, or catenaccio style, is skillful, cunning and cautious, playing a very defensive oriented game and then punishing the opposing team with quick counter-attacks. The Latin style is exhibited by Spain, Portugal, Brazil and Argentina, and features spontaneity, individual based attacks with free-flowing play. The Northern style is demonstrated by Germany and Norway and consists of rigid but forceful and predictable attack playing straight at the opponent, with a defensive shape that is always preserved, and attacks being built from the back. The Continental style, demonstrated by Belgium, Holland, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria, is a hybrid style combining Latin and

---

72 Kuper, *Football Against the Enemy*, 76.
Northern approaches. It consists of creative play with a sense of methodical ball movement, with attacks very composed and linear, and yet creative. It is considered the most universal style. The Central American style, exemplified by Mexico, exhibits crafty and excessive dribbling, short passing on the ground, and slow and predictable ball movement featuring individual skills. Steve Redhead designates six premier stylists in international play: Britain, France, Italy, Brazil, Argentina, and the ‘emerging’ nations, but offers no description of these styles. Clearly, future research will need to be focused on “third world” or emerging nation styles, such as African and Asian styles, particularly with the emergence of Japan and Korea during the 2002 World Cup.

A synthesis of these writings clearly indicates that on an international basis, a variety of playing styles exist. While each nation tends to adapt a particular style to its own unique image, there do exist some regionally and nationally based templates that national teams tend to emulate. The British style of long ball, kick and rush, hard tackling and physical game certainly is a distinct style, as is Italian catenaccio based on cautious defense and lightning counter attack. The Latin American style based on dribbling and individual flair certainly exists, although the interpretation of this style varies dramatically from country to country. Brazil and Argentina both exhibit these elements, yet hardly play in the same style. Not mentioned by any of the authors is the total football style exhibited by Holland and Germany during the 1970’s, which was a

unique invention based on earlier traditions of players rotating among positions during the flow of play. Again, situating style of play historically is necessary due to the ever-changing evolution and fluidity of a nation’s style. Broad categorizations can be made, but to be totally accurate, they must be made and dated. The delineation of seven specific signatures of style, does however, allow the comparison and contrast of individual national teams. Using these specific seven signatures as the definition of style, it is now time to analyze the case study countries of Brazil and Germany.
CHAPTER 3
DEFINING BRAZILIAN AND GERMAN STYLE: CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

In this chapter I present a detailed analysis in a compare and contrast situation of Brazilian and German national team playing style, based on the seven signatures presented earlier: tactics, body image, technique, concepts of soccer, values, art of play and invented tradition, and ecological considerations. As the analysis develops, note the binaries that result from the comparison. Germany and Brazil, as well as exhibiting unique national styles, also present a contrast of opposites, which will become clear as the analysis proceeds.

The first signature of style to be examined is tactics. Germany is often described with an emphasis on their defense, particularly when they used an attacking libero. Other tactical designations for Germany include predictability, and an attack frequently described in war-like terms reminiscent of World War II. Regarding defense, as Liz Crolley and David Hand note, the British and the German press portray the traditional German game as being based on defense, and trying to destroy the creativity shown by the opposing team. The German national coach in 1934, Nerz, asserted that the team should build from the rear and base the game on a solid defense. Franz Beckenbauer, coaching the 1986 national team, commented that the team had little other than
proverbial German virtues, when he described as a fighting spirit and solid defending. The 2002 national team, World Cup runner-ups, was described as having the best defense of the tournament. Others comment on the fact that a definite shape is always preserved defensively, and that it is nearly impossible to counter attack against the German team.\(^1\)

The “traditional” style of defense for German involves a libero, or sweeper. While a libero position is not unique, Germany revolutionized the position by bringing the libero, the furthest back defender, into the attack, particularly when Beckenbauer played the position during the 1970’s. Prior to this period, the libero stayed rooted in the defense. Goncalves states: “In 1974…the world was not prepared to see the most impressive tactical development in soccer during this World Cup. The Germans used the libero (Beckenbauer) coming from the back to attack.”\(^2\) Other national teams emulated the new concept, beginning a trend that emphasized defenders leaving the defensive third of the field and attacking forward when given the opportunity. Brian Glanville rhapsodizes about the new concept:

> But the new football made the libero, or sweeper, no longer a defensive figure; he was a man who used his deep role as a kind of a springboard or, if you wish, a secluded lair whence he could foray upfield. If any one player invented the new role of the new sweeper, it was unquestionably Franz Beckenbauer…How wonderfully it worked in the 1972

---


63
Nations Cup. Giactinto Faccetti of Inter had inspired Beckenbauer with his attacking full-back play. If a full-back could do it, thought Beckenbauer, then why not a central defender? So the attacking sweeper was born.3

In 2000, the German coach, Rudi Voeller, abandoned the traditional attacking libero that Germany had made its own system for years, and instead instituted a flat back three formation that still depended on wing-backs, but no longer a sweeper as a central defender.4 Giulianotti notes that the German defender, the libero, was also considered a close marking position, meaning the libero had responsibility for marking either the center forward or the offensive midfielder during the flow of play.5

Tactically, the attack portion of the German style of play is frequently described in militaristic terms. Even in 2002, Mike Cockerill described Germany as “persevering with the Luftwaffe tactics that served them well so far.” During the early 1930’s, the Austrian Hans Pesser spoke with contempt of German soccer, saying that they played according to army regulations. Blain and O’Donnell noted that during 1990, the Germans were militaristic and “blasted or steamrollered” their opponents out of existence. In 1996, the French press described the German ‘Blitzkrieg’, making reference to World War II in what would be a recurring theme.6

---

4Hess-Lichtenberger, *Tor!*, 340.
The German style of attack is also often described as a direct attack, going right at the opponent’s goal through the center of the field. Nicola Porro and Pippo Russo describe a German attack as tenacious and sustaining. Another source indicates that German teams play straight at their opponent with high crosses or direct passing, with attacks built from the back, or describes Europeans as masters of the direct, pragmatic attack. Goncalves indicates that Germans like to attack down the center, maintaining possession with short passing options and the dribble, then look to the flank in the attacking half. Germans look to play directly, which eliminates the time for the opponent’s defense to regroup.7 Eduardo Galeano describes a goal in the 1966 World Cup by Franz Beckenbauer in his usual lyrical terms:

Uwe Seeler launched the attack along with Franz Beckenbauer, the two of them like Sancho Panza and Don Quijote, fired onto the field by an invisible trigger, back and forth, yours and mine. Once the entire Swiss defense was left useless as a deaf ear, Beckenbauer faced the goalie, Elsener, who leapt to his left. Beckenbauer pivoted at full tilt, shot to the right and it went in…Bucking the trend towards a soccer of sheer Panzer-style strength, he proved that elegance can be more powerful than a tank and delicacy more penetrating than a howitzer.8

In contrast with Galeano’s description, several authors mention unattractive scoring as a German characteristic. Glanville notes that the goals Germany scored in the 1986 World Cup final against Argentina were curiously sloppy. Crolley and Hand, in their

media studies, note that *El País*, the Spanish newspaper, called German goals unattractive ones. But despite the criticism, some positive notions of other authors are indicated. Goncalves mentions that perfection of individual and group tactics are characteristic of the German national team. Archetti comments that, particularly during the 1970’s when Germany was playing “total football,” the soccer world was dominated by ideas of the superiority of elaborate tactical systems, as played by the Dutch and German teams. What never seem to be in doubt when discussing the German national team is that they will score, whether it is aesthetically pleasing or not.⁹

Perhaps one of the key notions of German tactics is connected with the idea of predictability. Although Hesse-Lichtenberger asserts very vehemently that the notion that Germany plays a predictable and consistent game is a total myth, many other authors would just as strongly disagree. In the 1982 World Cup, Glanville calls them “unadventurous.” Expertfootball.com considers the German attack as forceful and predictable, but rigid. A French coach in 1998 commented that the German game is quite simple, if a little inflexible. The Spanish press in 1996 considered the Germans as unchanging, boring and monotonous. Udo Merkel states: “…particularly in the second half of this century Germany’s achievements on the international soccer scene have

---

been less of a surprise, but rather very predictable. Their soccer has been solid and
effective, if hardly ever spectacular or magnificent.”

The last German tactical characteristic to be examined is the notion of strong
goalkeeping. In the 1982 World Cup, Glanville insists that Schumacher (the German
goalkeeper) rivaled Dassaev as the best goalkeeper of the Cup. But Schumacher’s
expertise is equaled by his strength and somewhat brutal play:

Out of the goal raced the burly Schumacher. Battison beat
him to the ball, but Schumacher thundered into him, brutally
smashing him to the ground with the blow of a forearm, and
callously leaving him, minus two teeth, so badly hurt that
there were fears he would die…

Grant Wahl, writing for Sport’s Illustrated commented that during the 2002 World Cup,
only the dominance of Oliver Kahn, the “impossible Teutonic” goalkeeper, kept the
German team from being eliminated during the quarterfinal game against the U.S.
Kahn was voted German footballer of the year in 2000, as well as best European
goalkeeper. In 2002, he was named the Most Valuable Player of the World Cup.

To summarize the characteristics of German tactical style, the following phrases can be
used: strong defense, WWII attacking metaphors, direct attack leading to unattractive

---

10 Hess-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 15; Glanville, Story of the World Cup, 261; Expertfootball.com: 2; Roland
Gransart as quoted by Crolley and Hand, Football, Europe and the Press, 97; El Pais as quoted by Liz
Crolley, David Hand and Ralf Jeutter, “Playing the Identity Card: Stereotypes in European Football,”
Soccer and Society, 1 (Summer 2000): 116; Udo Merkel, “Germany and the World Cup: Solid, Reliable,
Often Undramatic- But Successful,” Hosts and Champions ed. by John Sugden and Alan Tomlinson

11 Glanville, Story of the World Cup, 256-7.

goals, predictable, and strong goalkeeping. Brazil presents a very contrasting picture in terms of their tactical signature. Probably the most often mentioned characteristic of Brazilian tactical play is their emphasis of always being on the attack. South American teams have often been described as “offensive juggernauts” with an “emphasis on attack,” but Brazil, in particular, is often singled out for their all-out tactical offensive style of play. Tony Mason notes: “Above all, it is a football based on attack…” John Humphrey calls it “all-out attack” whereas Glanville, describing the 1970 World Cup team, calls it “panache, elegance and enterprise which raised new hope for attacking football.” John Williams described it as “attacking power.”

Simon Kuper and Jose Goncalves provide some more detailed information regarding Brazil’s attacking style. Kuper, in an interview with Carlos Alberto Parreira, 1994 World Cup Brazilian coach, asked about a more attacking game. Parreira replied that “these are our roots. We want to go back to our roots…attacking football.” Goncalves adds that Brazil’s primary objective in the game is scoring goals, with creative offensive attacking by increasing the number of attackers in the box and increasing the pace of the attack. Brazil accomplishes this objective by changing the point of attack, constantly

---


switching the ball early away from pressure.\textsuperscript{15} David Winner, with tongue slightly in cheek, states: “Until the nineties, the Brazilian attitude always was: “You score three goals. We’ll score six.”\textsuperscript{16}

The concept that Brazilian teams play no defense is rooted in invented tradition, and as such will be explored later. However, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that Brazil does play defense, and play it well, although they are seldom credited with its toughness. Chris Taylor comments on their defensive acumen:

Brazil are certainly a good team going forward, but to imply they care nothing for defense is ridiculous. In the 1994 World Cup Brazil had the best defensive record in the tournament…Even the great 1970 side, legendary for not caring how many they conceded as long as they scored more, was not as profligate at the back as is widely assumed. Of the top four teams in the tournament, they let in fewer goals than West Germany and Italy- the ‘disciplined’ Europeans- and only another South American side, Uruguay, had a better defense.\textsuperscript{17}

Archetti acknowledges that the 1958 World Cup winning team had the combination of ability with speed and tactical discipline in the defense. Carlos Parreira notes that part of the Brazilian roots includes zonal defending with a flat back four system, with which Goncalves would agree. Winner would contend that Brazil only added defense in the

\textsuperscript{15} Goncalves, The Principles of Brazilian Soccer, v, 3-5, 242, 262.  
\textsuperscript{16} Winner, Brilliant Orange, 223.  
1990’s because they were tired of losing, and goes further, saying that now Brazil merely “boots the ball away” and plays a catenaccio version of the game. 18

One of the most notable descriptions of the Brazilian tactical game is reference with a descriptive term relating to flair or flashiness in their style of play. Goncalves and Williams describe it as flair, as does Lever. Litke describes the style of play as stylish, while Alex Bellos describes it as flamboyant and exciting. Giulianotti, describing the Rio style of play, also uses the term flamboyant. Robert Levine comments on its excitement and Lincoln Allison on its brilliance. João Filho notes the flashy surface effects.19

A further characteristic of Brazilian tactics is their emphasis on innovative play and improvisation, often done through the development of new tactics. Chris Taylor notes that Brazil has long been at the forefront of tactical innovations. Giulianotti discusses two great innovations that came from Brazil on dead ball strikes, the curving shot or banana kick developed by Didi during the 1950’s, and the double banana kick developed by Zico in the late 1970’s. Lever acknowledges the strong emphasis on

---

improvisation with all Latin American teams. The poet, Mario Chamrie, also emphasizes improvisation with the ball as being a trait of Brazilian style. Betty Milan describes the improvisational style of Brazilian soccer as deriving from a means of overcoming poverty, insisting that the Brazilian player has been “schooled in invention. If we have no money, then we’ll make a tambourine out of an old tin can.”20 I further contend that the concept of innovation may well be connected with poverty, but also as a means of demonstrating individualism and self acclaim in a culture that frequently does not see the impoverished. Innovation, then, becomes a means of establishing oneself in a world where one is often overlooked. Connected with improvisation (making something new) is the element of surprise, or unexpectedness, which is often used to describe Brazilian tactics. T. Bar-On describes it as spontaneity and unpredictability. Maurice Del Burgo discusses the element of surprise, “right under the noses of their opponents” as a way of displaying picardia, which is getting away with the unthinkable and doing the impossible. He calls it the myth of spontaneity, and relates that it is always articulated in opposition of authority, with defiance encoded in the elements of style of the way the game is played. The Brazilian scholar, Gilberto Freyre, in 1945 describing the Brazilian style as composed of several elements, one of which was surprise and all related to the celebration of the mixing of races that had occurred in Brazil. Surprise, then, became almost a racial characteristic displayed in soccer. Galeano further emphasizes the Brazilian characteristic of surprise: “He learns

the tricks of every trade and he becomes an expert in the art of pretending, surprising, breaking through where least expected…”  

One of the most significant characteristics of Brazilian playing style tactics is the emphasis on the short pass within the game. Whereas the English team is often noted for their long ball style of play, and most other teams mix long and short passes, Brazil has long been noted for their short, rapid, and pinpoint passing game to advance the ball forward. Mason states that it is a game played based on the rapid exchange of short passes, with passing more like a caress than a kick. Goncalves also emphasizes the short passing game whereby Brazil uses short passes to switch the ball away from pressure as well as using short passes to build the attack from the defense. The short passes are primarily kept on the ground, rather than in the air, which is distinctive. Kirkendall, Dowd and DiCiccio mention that Brazil rates low in comparison with other teams on long, forward passes. Winner also notes the emphasis on short passes, and Bryan McCann speaks of the rapid ball movement in limited space, always going forward, as a stylist emphasis of the late 1950’s. Grant Ramsay adds the slogan that “possession is prized” in Brazil, which leads to a short passing, controlled style of play. My conjecture is that the short passing game was thoroughly developed in the favelas on the

---


hillside, where space was at a premium, but large numbers played the game. A player needed to learn to control the ball in small areas to maintain possession, which in turn led to a short passing style of play.

To sum up the tactical signature of Brazilian playing style, the phrases attacking, flair, innovation/improvisation/surprise and short passing comprise a fairly descriptive determination. The binaries become glaringly apparent when contrasted with the German descriptive terms: A strong defense for Germany versus an attacking offense for Brazil, a direct attack with World War II terms for Germany in contrast to short passing on the ground for Brazil, predictability for Germany versus innovation/improvisation/surprise as well as flair for Brazil, a strong goalkeeper for Germany, and no mention of goalkeeping for Brazil. While binaries allude to a very structuralistic interpretation, they do allow for a vision of contrast between the two national teams which highlights the complete opposition of playing style. This contrast will be further emphasized as other signatures of style are examined.

The next signature of style to be examined is body image. For Germany, body image related to playing style can be summed up by two terms: strength and fitness. Strength is related to a variety of adjectives used to describe the players as a team; adjectives such as strong, powerful, muscular, solid, hard, and big. In the British press, the
The stereotype of Germany is one of strength, in the French press it is termed physical and mental strength, sheer energy and power.\textsuperscript{23} The \textit{Libèration} states:

\begin{quote}
“Germany won Euro 96 with its usual weapons, force, power and mental strength…The typical German player at Euro 2000 is big, strong, willing (but) this image also explains the feeling of heaviness and the lack of agility that weighs down the German’s boots. Cultivating only nerves of steel and muscles of iron…seems to have reached its natural limits.”\textsuperscript{24}
\end{quote}

The article further concludes that the German emphasis on strength leaves its teams lacking, as athleticism is not enough to win the international game.\textsuperscript{25} \textit{La Monde} describes the German team as “tons of muscles”, and against the Czech team during Euro ’96, they “flexed their muscles” and caught the “physically inferior” Czechs in a deadly “German pincer grip.”\textsuperscript{26} Former Austrian player, Hans Press, during the early 1930’s noted the German team played “strength-through-kicking” football. Udo Merkel also acknowledges German physical strength, and considers it a typical German virtue. Porro and Russo state that the German game is traditionally described as a style based on physical strength, with which Lever would agree. Page considers brute strength and physical conditioning as German characteristics of style, and Winner acknowledges the “hardness” of German players as well as their physically power. The Spanish press calls the German team “muscular” and refers to their “physical strength.”\textsuperscript{27}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{23} Crolley, Hand and Jeutter, “Playing the Identity Card”: 111, 119; Crolley and Hand, \textit{Football, Europe and the Press}, 89.
\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Libèration} (June 20, 2000) cited by Crolley and Hand, \textit{Football, Europe and the Press}, 98.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 98-99.
\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Le Mond} (June 18, 1996) as cited by Crolley and Hand, \textit{Football, Europe and the Press}, 93.
\textsuperscript{27} Hans Pesser as cited by Hesse-Lichtenberger, \textit{Tor!}, 89; Merkel, “Germany and the World Cup”, 109; Page, “Soccer Madness”, 45; Porro and Russo, “Production of a Media Epic”, 158; Lever, \textit{Soccer Madness}, 43; Winner, \textit{Brillian Orange}, 144, 103; Crolley and Hand, \textit{Football, Europe and the Press}, 152.
\end{flushright}
Brian Glanville offers a variety of amusing descriptions of German teams at a number of points in history, frequently emphasizing their strength. In describing the German 1934 World Cup team, he commented that “They (the Czechs) frolicked around the muscular…Germans like Lilliputians round a Gulliver.” The ’54 German World Cup team is termed muscular, and the ’62 team had a “sheer, forbidding muscul arity.” Although Glanville is prone to stereotyping, by situating these Germans teams historically, it is easier to conclude that physicality is not just a stereotype, but rather a recurring characteristic of German teams.

In terms of fitness, not only physical conditioning, but a physical style of play is often mentioned. French newspaper articles often mention that German teams are very physical, and Glanville notes that the ’82 team was overly physical, whereas the ’54 team had muscles and stamina. Page comments that physical conditioning is a German characteristic, while Hesse-Lichtenberger called fitness a German virtue. He also calls the ’78 World Cup team the “almost-superhumans that were reduced to mere mortals.” Kuper notes that while Dutch players were individuals, German players were so physically alike that they could barely be told apart if they weren’t wearing numbers.

The tradition of strength and physical fitness is so traditional and engrained, that during Euro 2000, a German sporting magazine lamented the seemingly untraditional physicality of their team by displaying a cover picture of Zinedane Zidane (French superstar) with the caption “This is a footballer.” Next to it, a picture of a bratwurst in

---

the German soccer uniform was captioned “This is a German international.” It is clear that the Germans, themselves, regard a physical style of play as a national team characteristic.

The German body, then, can be described as strong (in terms of power and muscularity) and physically fit. The Brazilians offer a far more intricate concept of the body, and is often described in terms of grace, dexterity, flexibility, agility, the use of all body parts to control the ball, and the inference that all Brazilian physical abilities are natural and innate, as opposed to rigidly trained and disciplined German bodies. These are clear, racial stereotypes, but ones which the two teams appear to accept and valorize internally. In terms of grace, Mason refers to “grace under pressure” and mentions Chamrie’s contention that soccer has to be graceful to be good. Goncalves mentions a grace that seems natural, while Bellos notes that Brazilians play a graceful style of soccer.

Flexibility, agility, and dexterity are all adjectives that could be used to describe a fluidness of body movement. DaMatta notes Brazilian soccer is a game associated with dexterity, and Giulianotti acknowledges it as finesse. Humphrey would describe the Brazilian game as being based on agility, whereas a Brazilian analyst described it as “fluid, entertaining…and acrobatic.” Matthew Shirts explains that the 1930’s saw the

---

rise of a new type of Brazilian player that was acrobatic and elastic, as soccer was beginning a mass spectator sport. This also happens to correspond with the period of professionalization, when Brazilian soccer was moving from an elite sport to a mass sport, and Afro-Brazilians were becoming more involved. It must be acknowledged that there are certain racial overtones connected with the emphasis on body movement. Redhead mentions fluidity, Jenkins talks of flexibility and athleticism, and Del Burgo of elasticity.31

Emphasis on using all parts of the body to control the body, and the importance of the body are reiterated over and over in the literature. Taylor notes that South Americans bring every part of their body into use when controlling the ball, and Brazilian coach, Parreira explains that “you cannot put Brazilians into a straight-jacket.” DaMattia calls Brazilian soccer jogo de cintura, or a “waist-game”. Galeano asserts that the most beautiful soccer in the world, Brazilian soccer, is made up of “hip feints, undulations of the torso, and legs in flight.” He even emphasizes that in Brazil, disabilities can be turned into assets on the soccer field. For example, he mentions that Pelé had flat feet, Socrates had the body of a heron with long, bony legs and small feet that tired easily, Garrincha’s misshapen legs are well known but were an advantage in his dribbling, Romario was short and chubby, and Leonidas was small, which allowed him to slip by

huge fullbacks. To use the lower half of the body in a cunning way is considered a Brazilian trait. Bellos explains why the Brazilians put so much emphasis on bodily movement; by saying they are a very body conscious culture. He notes that to call someone *vaidoso*, or vain, is actually a compliment in Brazil, since it is considered a social obligation to be beautiful.32

The last aspect of Brazilian physicality to explore is the concept that Brazilian athleticism is a natural, not trained, trait. Of course, this idea also has racial overtones, but seems to exceed even beyond the issue of race. Bellos calls it a “flamboyant, thrilling and graceful style that has set an unattainable benchmark for the rest of the world.” The inference is that the style is unattainable unless the player is Brazilian. In the Spanish newspaper, *Liga*, soccer is mentioned as “coming naturally to Brazilians” and “Ronaldo’s goal was down to his natural ability, part of his character.” Mason calls it “a joyful game…which owes little to coaching or schools of excellence.” Goncalves talks of a natural grace and rhythm, and Bar-On speaks of instinctive movement. Ramsay claims that fitness is taken for granted in Brazil, as everyone is expected to complete the whole game.33 Jenkins offers a scientific explanation for the natural athlete:

> For the Europeans, the ‘athleticism and flexibility’ of the Brazilians became the subject of serious, and at times,

---


To sum up, Brazilian physicality emphasizes graceful movement, fluidity, the use of the entire body, and reference to natural or innate ability. Again, the binaries provide an interesting dichotomy with German images of physicality. Contrast strength with fluidity. Contrast power with grace. Contrast physical fitness with innate, natural ability. Add the Brazilian use of all body parts to control the ball, and the opposition in the binaries becomes quite apparent.

The next signature to be examined is technique, or what skill sets each team emphasizes within their individual playing style. Technique is the “how to” part of the game and it will be demonstrated that the German and the Brazilian team accentuate very different components of the game. German technique can be summed up with three comprehensive phrases: power in movement, efficiency, and an emphasis on heading and tackling. The concept of power in movement contains such notions as constant movement, speed, hard running, power, and energy. Roland Gransart commented in *Libération* that one of the main components of the German game is constant movement. The French press also mentions energy and sheer speed, and Merkel comments that German soccer seems to go on running. The German press notes a fast game as a German virtue, with which Expertfootball.com would agree, while David Winner calls the German team “hard running.” During the 1930’s, under Coach Nerz, the German

---

34 Jenkins, *The Beautiful Team*, 10.
national team began to thoroughly develop the emphasis on a hard running style of play. Hesse-Lichentenberger notes that questions were beginning to be asked about the team. Questions included: “Was Germany’s power football stifling grace?” and “Was the German style producing runners instead of artists?” While the questions concerned the public, the coach turned a deaf ear to them.35

Other examples of relating German soccer to power abound. Blain, Boyle, and O’Donnell comment that there is a tendency to equate German soccer with power. The English Daily Mirror, during Euro ’96 noted that the Germans displayed “brute force.” Juan Carlos Lorenzo, former Argentine World Cup coach, asserted that Germany understood that “art” could be destroyed with physical power, and that the German team demonstrated just that during the ’54 World Cup finals.36

The concept of efficiency reverberates throughout the literature, and always in regard to Germany, with emphasis on efficiency of technique and organization on the field. Prior to World War II, after Germany annexed Austria, the German national team for the 1934 World Cup was comprised of players from both countries. However, the playing styles of the two countries were totally incompatible and the team did not play well.

Merkel commented that the Austrians played intuitively and individually, whereas the Germans played as “drilled workers.” The French, in press reports, mention German efficiency, and call them “maddeningly efficient and disciplined.” The British press has constructed a stereotype of German soccer that focuses on three concepts, one of which is efficiency. Crolley and Hand offer an explanation for the focus:

…just as apparent as the data studied, is the stereotype of German efficiency which, partially at least, derives from widely-held appreciations of the post-war economic miracle. West German reconstruction after the Second World War was swift and impressive, resulting in the economy becoming the third strongest in the world and something of a model of economic efficiency for her European partners. Popular European perceptions of Germany reinforce this point.38

Interestingly, German self image also reflects an emphasis on efficiency. G. Gebauer has noted that since the late 1970’s, one of the dominant values in Germany has been technical efficiency. Merkel describes German soccer as solid and effective, but hardly ever spectacular or magnificent. Blain and O’Donnell writing about collective identity during Italia ’90 and Wimbledon ’91 note that German players were considered efficient by the press. *Sports Illustrated* reporter, Grant Wahl, writing about World Cup 2002, commented that “the Mannschaft had plowed through its half of the draw with mistake-free efficiency.”39

---

37 Merkel, “Germany and the World Cup,” 104; Crolley, Hand, and Jeutter, “Obsession and Identity in Match Reports”, 175.
38 Crolley and Hand, *Football, Europe and the Press*, 49.
Brian Glanville provides an historic overview via his history of the World Cup. The ’34 World Cup team Glanville calls well-organized, and the ’54 team earned the accolades as “sweepingly effective and splendidly incisive,” and the ’86 team was noted as “grindingly efficient as ever.” The concept of organization goes along with efficiency, as German teams have the reputation of being well organized in their style of play. The British newspaper, *The Times*, said that Germany was a role model for order, and “not rampant, just tidy and efficient.” *Le Monde* calls it “this fine Germanic order”, and the Spanish press also emphasizes order and efficiency, while Hesse-Lichtenberger lists organization as one of the German proverbial virtues.40

The German technical emphasis on heading and tackling can also be connected with their physicality in their style of play. As Brian McBride has amply demonstrated time and time again, heading can be a rough and dangerous business. So, too, can tackling, as tackling is usually associated with a tough rather than a finesse style of play.

Miroslav Klose, forward for the Germans during the 2002 World Cup scored five goals during the tournament with his head. Galeano describes Uwe Seeler as “a bull when he headed the ball.” The ’54 World Cup Germany vs. Austria game demonstrated the German aerial power, as 4 of their 6 goals were scored by heading. Perhaps it is just

their towering size, or perhaps their fitness and physicality, but Germany has an invented tradition of being extremely powerful in the air.41

Germany also has a tradition of being a hard tackling team, and is often (unfairly?) stereotyped as vicious with their tackling technique. Crolley and Hand categorize Germany’s dominant values as “fight and tackle, work and run.” In the 1962 World Cup game against Switzerland, Glanville says: “…Szymaniak’s brutal tackle broke a leg of the Swiss forward” and in the 1966 semi final game against Russia: “A powerful tackle by Schnellinger robbed Chislenko, and hurt him in the process.” Hesse-Lichtenberger, quoting Buffy Ettmayer, about the late 1980’s, notes: “The players of today…even their calves are calloused, because they are tackling all the time.” He further relates that in 1979, Duisburg’s Paul Steiner broke Heinz Flohe’s leg as if it were “made of glass.” Kuper adds that in the 1988 game against the Dutch, the “Germans came out for the second half with a new tactic: kicking Dutchmen.” The English Mirror editorial, railing against the Germans, said: “It is evil things we shall be fighting against- the brute force, the high tackle…” Not only is Germany considered to emphasize the technical aspects of tackling, but is considered to emphasize extreme force behind the tackle.42

In direct contrast with the German style, the Brazilian technique emphasizes skillful and technically precise ball play, an excellent first touch on the ball, emphasis on the dribble

41 Cockerill, “Unfinished Business”:2; Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, 119; Glanville, Story of the World Cup, 79.
42 Crolley and Hand, Football, Europe and the Press, 51; Glanville, Story of the World Cup, 120, 150; Hesse-Lichtenberger quoting Buffy Ettmayer, Tor!, 258; Kuper, Football Against the Enemy, 8; Mirror (June 24, 1996) cited by Garland and Rowe, Racism and Anti-Racism, 157.
and speed. Crolley and Hand note that the Spanish press consistently stereotypes Brazilian players as skillful and displaying technical excellence. Mason calls the Brazilians “maestros with the ball” displaying “an individual ball control of an almost magical kind.” Glanville calls the ’50 World Cup team “technically superb” and after the 1970 win, one analyst called them “immensely skilled.” Sergio Leite Lopes suggests the very style of Brazilian football implied skill, and Williams insists Brazil combines “technique, attacking power and flair.” Gerson, a former Brazilian player of commented that the Brazilian style “was eighty percent technique and 20 percent physical condition. We knew how to play; they (Europeans) knew how to run.” As Galeano comments, “In soccer, skill is much more important than shape…” Jeff Tipping, commenting on the U-19 Women’s World Cup in 2002, noted: “Brazil certainly provided the widest and most eye-catching of the technical skills, with their play very similar to that of the Brazilian men.” It would appear that technical emphasis is not a gender specific trait in Brazilian soccer.43

While technical emphasis and skill are rather vague terms, Brazil is certainly noted for the specific skills of their first touch on the ball and their dribbling prowess. El País, discussing a Brazilian player notes “he has good control and first touch, it is fast and effective.” A Faroese player says it is good to have Brazilians on his club team because

“they have a better first touch and technique.” Graham Ramsay poetically explains why:

“To Brazilians the ball has a soul and special spirit.” Goncalves provides a little more technical explanation, that it is quickness in their touch, and the ability to move quickly from situation to situation, normally in first touch, comes from cultural influences and training. He calls the Brazilian ability of first touch the trademark of Brazilian soccer, with keepers and defenders playing two touch (fast and very safe), midfielders playing one and two touch (faster and very safe), and forwards playing one touch (very fast, not so safe.) 44

Another very distinguishable aspect of Brazilian technique is the emphasis on the dribble, a trait that is considered to be a Latin American trait. Expertfootball.com defines the Latin American style as creative dribblers. “The game in Latin America emphasizes maneuvering and dribbling rather than the ‘scientific values’ (especially latterly) upheld by the European style” says Del Burgo. 45 Although Kuper asserts the Brazilian dribbler is gone from the game, he quotes Professor Muniz Sodre on why the dribbler was so prominent in Brazilian soccer:

Let me draw you a picture. If you go to a favela, you will see a woman—there is no man in the house— who takes care of her five or six boys. The smartest of these boys, who can flee from police if he needs to, who can put up a fight, is a good football player. He can dribble past life’s difficulties. He can provide food for his mother. 46

45 Expertfootball.com/coaching/styles: 2; Del Burgo, “Don’t Stop the Carnival”, 65.
46 Professor Muniz Sodre cited by Kuper, Football Against the Enemy, 197-98, 204.
Again, the stereotype of Brazilian dribbling is connected with the favelas and poverty, as are many of the Brazilian stylist traits. Mason asserts that Brazilians play football based on the fast dribble, and Bellos insists the essence of Brazilian style is dribbles and flicks that are preferred over physical challenges or long-distance passes. Jenkins quotes Tomas Mazzoni: “The Englishman considers a player that dribbles three times successively a nuisance; the Brazilians consider him a virtuoso.”

The last aspect of Brazilian technique to be considered is speed. Gilberto Freyre, in 1945, listed “swiftness” as one of the unique Brazilian qualities that made their soccer game different than others. Goncalves asserts that to play fast, build the attack quickly, Brazilians must have great foot speed. In 1963, Aimore Moreira noted that “Brazilians can change, move, and improvise, within a fraction of a second.” Archetti comments that the ’58 World Cup team combined ability with speed. Even Alix Sharkey, commenting on the composition of the teams in Sega’s “Virtua Striker” arcade soccer video game noted that “the Brazilians are undoubtedly the best team, faster and more fluent on the ball than any other.” Even in virtual reality, the Brazilians embody the concept of speed.

Brazilian technique, then, can be summed up with the phrases skillful and technical, emphasis on first touch and dribbling, and demonstrating speed. Again, set up the

---

binaries with the German team, and they are quite revealing. Contrast Germany’s power in movement with Brazil’s speed. Contrast an emphasis on heading and tackling with an emphasis on first touch and dribbling. The only binary that doesn’t completely show an opposition is the concept of efficiency versus skillful and technical. However, German efficiency is very rarely considered artistic, whereas Brazilian emphasis on the technical and skillful aspects of the game generally is described in more aesthetic terms. Again, the contrast in the construction of playing styles through the category of “technique” holds true.

The next category to be analyzed is the country’s “conception of soccer.” While this term is spectacularly vague, it would include such items as whether soccer is viewed as a game or a sport, how other countries conceptualize the team’s playing style (i.e., in what terminology do they describe it), whether there is a national philosophy of the game, and what principles underlie that philosophy. For Germany, this category can be identified with the terms boring but rational, aggressive (particularly rife with warfare terms), successful, and regarded as a sport. The whole concept of whether soccer is regarded as a game or a sport becomes significant when comparing Germany and Brazil. Roberto DaMatta points out that how a country views soccer in terms of “game” or “sport” places a different emphasis on how the culture constructs the way soccer functions within that society. For example, Brazil associates soccer with “game”, particularly with the idea that soccer is a game of chance (jogo de azar.) This concept of game of chance is then closely allied with the term “gamble”, which in Germany is
not considered an aspect of the game of soccer at all. The German concept of soccer is
sport, which stresses competition, technique, and strength. In Brazil, the idea of soccer
as a game also implies luck in the outcome. In Germany, the concept of sport involves
much more emphasis on control of the body and control of individuals to form a
collective (emphasis on teamwork), while in Brazil, the soccer team must not only play
against their opponent, but also against destiny, which must be changed or corrected in
order for them to win.\(^{49}\)

Germany regards soccer as a sport, and thus constructs its meaning in terms of
modernity as rational and scientific. Unfortunately, this also leads Germany’s style of
play to be often called boring, repressed, and rational. In the 2002 World Cup,
Cockerill stated that “Germany bored their way to the final.” Glanville called the ’34
team “uninspired.” The Guinness Record of World Soccer called German soccer
“unspectacular,” and the *Daily Mirror* speaks of the “Teutonic tedium of their tactics.”
*El País*, in 1996, said: “This time at Wembley. Germans, the same as ever…Boring,
monotonous. In short, Germany.” Another Spanish newspaper, *ABC*, states: “Germany
wins by boring.” Even Galeano, when speaking of the ’90 World Cup, in which
Germany beat Argentina 1-0, stated: “This championship, boring soccer without
audacity or beauty…” However, it is important to determine how Germany views its
own soccer, and not just allow the stereotypes from other countries to dominant the
view. *Suddeutsche Zeitung* describes German striker, Oliver Bierhoff, as “emotionally

\(^{49}\) DaMatta, “Soccer: Opium for the People?”, 127. See also: Mason, *Passion of the People?*, 124, for
further discussion of DaMatta’s theory on cultural constructions of game vs. sport.
repressed, rational, unspontaneous…” confirming the stereotype of boring, and yet another article refers to the Germans as dull and unimaginative. Crolley and Hand note that print media discourse on soccer reflects the dominant values of the time, and that in Germany during the 1990’s, there is no space for vision or experimentation. Germany, then, is quite self-critical and would most likely agree with the standing stereotype that they play boring soccer.  

The determination that Germany is an aggressive team, consistently, appears over and over in the literature. Terminology such as determination, intimidation, and fear inspiring appear, and frequently the mention of aggression for Germany is associated with warfare terms, specifically in relationship to World War II. Crolley, Hand, and Jeutter note that references to warfare are made more extensively in media discourse about Germany than about any other team. The Times uses phrases such as “the mighty Germany” that makes “sorties” and “forays”, they “lead the battle on two fronts”, and “prepare an ambush for their opponents.” They “march on” and “ensure their defense is a hostile zone.” Even when Germany loses, the British press presents them in military terms: “the Germans could muster no rearguard action.” When the British press foregoes military terminology, it still emphasizes German aggression: “Dissatisfied with their play in the first half, they simply increased the aggression rather than attempt a

\[50\] Cockerill, “Unfinished Business”; 2; Glanville, Story of the World Cup, 29; Guinness Record of World Soccer as cited by Merkel, “Germany and the World Cup”, 98; Daily Mirror (June 24, 1996) as cited by Garland and Rowe, Race and Anti-Race, 157; El País (June 28, 1996) as cited by Crolley, Hand and Jeutter, “Playing the Identity Card”; 116; ABC (June 26, 1998) as cited by Crolley and Hand, Football, Europe and the Press, 153; Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, 181; Süddeutsche Zeitung (July 2, 1996) and (June 21, 1996) as cited by Crolley and Hand, Football, Europe and the Press, 51.
change of style.” Maguire, Poulton, and Passamai present other examples in the British press. *The Guardian* notes: “We are in for two days of unashamed Hun-bashing. The spirit of the Blitz and El Alumni will be invoked…Spitfires will once more do battle with Messerschmitts…” *The Guardian* also labeled the German Coach, Berti Vogts, as “General Vogts”, and *The Daily Mirror* announced that “Football War is now Declared!” 51

Germany’s image as aggressive fares little better in other countries. The Spanish press also presents an unattractive image of German style. *ABC* comments that when “Vogts got serious his troops stepped into motion and began to dominate.” The French, *La Monde*, also used military imagery: “nothing stopped their march…when the time came to make their kill, they did not hesitate, relishing their role as assassins” and: “the old warriors” who came back from being a goal down like an “armored division on the move.” Crolly and Hand add: “Newspaper articles about German football teams will, then…be based typically upon a series of premises: the Germans will be physical, intimidating and aggressive; they will inspire fear and will be almost impossible to beat.” Blain and O’Donnell also found that media discourse during Italia 90 relating to Germany was militaristic, aggressive, and the Germans either blasted or steamrolled their opponents out of existence. The Italian *Gazzetta dello Sport* describes the

Germany vs. Holland game as “the metaphor of the war.” The Spanish newspaper *As Color* describes German player, Matthaus, as “the resurgence of the German Luftwaffe” with “legs like machine guns.”

However, in contrast, the German nation rarely refers to itself in military terms. *Spiegel* recognizes that the team is known internationally as the “Teutonic panzer.” Crolley and Hand note that the use of military metaphors is totally absent in Germany, because self-glorification and militarism are still taboo in public discourse, whereas irony that undermines pride is acceptable. Other literature, though, would reinforce the view of German aggressiveness. Blain, Boyle, and O’Donnell comment that “killer instinct” is supposedly a German characteristic. Even former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, states: “…there is no doubt that the German team plans its games in the same way as the Army officers of that country…” Glanville calls the ’54 team “more than mere destroyers,” and Hesse-Lichtenberger cites a comment that “German football, this brute animal, deserved to be drowned in its own urine.”

While terms such as boring and rational or aggressive are not construed in a flattering light, one concept of soccer regarding Germany cannot be denied, and that is that the German team is highly successful. The German conception of soccer not only regards

---

soccer as a rational sport, but one in which success on the field is valued and a worthy
goal for which to strive. Gary Lineker, former England captain, made the statement that
football consists of twenty two people running after a ball and Germany winning at the end. While this may no longer always be valid, it is a concept that appears to be
universal. According to Jan Mulder, Dutch national player, it is the Dutch nature to lose
to Germany as the Germans are accustomed to winning. The Dutch also consider that
Germany plays to win at all costs and by any means necessary. Even in 1931, when
questions became common regarding German playing style and the coaching ability of
Nerz, Hesse-Lichtenberger notes that what counted was not the debate between power
and flair, but the final results. Further commenting about the bad name that German
soccer received during the 1980’s, he comments that the main problem was “while
nobody at home liked what they saw, there was no arguing with the naked results,” and
“Obviously, for this West German squad winning was the only thing that counted, and
everything else- sportsmanship, conduct, reputation, expectation of fans- was nonsense
from a forgotten era.” Roland Gransart, former French player speaks of the German
desire to win: “…their attitude, never give up, derives from the deep-seated belief that
they cannot possibly lose.” El Pais called Germany “a winning machine,” and said they
were “obsessed with winning.” They also commented that “The Germans can play
awful football, be inferior on the pitch, roam about aimlessly, employ the tactic of
floating long balls, but it doesn’t matter. They will always be among the favorites in
any international tournament,” and “The German side won because of the power of their
history.” The newspaper also said: “The Germans win because everyone is used to
losing to them.” *ABC* would agree: “There is nothing new about the Germans. They win because they have to win. It is written in the history of the World Cup.”

However, an examination of history shows that the facts are not always born out of media discourse. Germany does not always win, and at present, had such a terrible Euro 2004 that the international squad appears to be in disarray.

The German concept of soccer can be summed up with phrases regarding its conception as a sport, it is boring but rational, it is aggressive (which is often expressed in military terms outside of Germany) but also highly successful. The Brazilian concept of soccer is in direct opposition in regards to the sport/game binary, as to Brazilians it is very clearly established as a game with a large element of luck and destiny involved in the outcome. However, Brazil does have more of a determined national philosophy of how the game should be reproduced and recreated than Germany does, and Brazil, like Germany, is highly successful. Germany has a history of common characteristics exemplified in their playing style, but also appear to be more open to change within that style. For example, the total football of the late 1970’s, and the attacking libero with Beckenbauer were stylistic changes determined by the coaching staff and the type of player available. However, Germany appears to have remained true to certain concepts throughout any changes: direct attack, aerial and physical power, and efficiency, are all concepts that have remained fairly consistent historically. While it will be

---

demonstrated that Brazil has also experimented with stylistic changes throughout its history, the involvement of the entire culture in establishing the Brazilian concept of soccer differs from Germany. In Germany, it has always been a coaching determination, whereas in Brazil, while the coaches contribute, the culture also has a strong voice in the determination of style. Leite Lopes contributes:

But if this style is now already socially invented and legitimized, it will reproduce itself among all kinds of athletes with their diverse social origins…The style is reproduced and re-created in the less common sandlots in urban working-class neighborhoods; and in the growing numbers of social programs in slums and poor parts of the great cities.55

As John Humphrey points out: “Football proclaims the value of popular characteristics and virtues, and it is as deeply rooted in popular culture as samba and carnival. This was not always the case. Football had to be captured by the people and fashioned in their image.” Or as Page puts it: “For them (Brazilians), soccer was not just a game; it was the embodiment of their Brazilianess…” This process of invented tradition, associating soccer, samba and carnival as the Brazilian national identity will be further explored in a later chapter. However, it is important to note that Brazilian soccer playing style is culturally constructed, in a much more defined fashion than it is in Germany. While Germany embraces the sport of soccer, it does not use soccer to define its nationhood and people. Germany depends more on economics and social policy to define itself as a nation, whereas Brazil uses soccer. Lincoln Allison emphasizes this point: “…the Brazilian national team represents not merely the progress of Brazil as a society, but also the flair and style of Brazil.” Not only does the culture embrace the establishment

of a distinctly Brazilian style of play, but this is reinforced by the national coaching staff. “Brazilian soccer is a National philosophy. Every player of any age at any level will play with the same concept technically and tactically.”

The other conception of soccer within Brazil is the emphasis on success. As Murray points out, “…Brazil’s soccer teams created a style of play that no other teams could match.” Humphrey notes that “Brazil is the team most people around the world associate with the World Cup…it has also been a team which has won, and sometimes lost, in style.” In fact, Brazil is the only five time winner of the World Cup: 1958, 1962, 1970, 1994, and 2002. The first runner-up is Germany, winning the cup in 1954, 1974, and 1990. Zizinho, former Brazilian international, makes the point clearly: “In Brazil, being vice-champion is rubbish. It’s better to lose before the final. Losing hurts too much.” Goncalves explains why Brazil is so successful: “Brazil has been very successful playing against every country in the world because they have the ability to always force the opposite team to play their style…turning the opposition’s mistakes into goals.”

Brazil and Germany obviously have very different conceptions of soccer. In Brazil, it is a game, with a large element of luck involved. In Germany, soccer is a sport which

emphasizes a rational (although often boring) approach and a great deal of aggressive play, often described in terms of warfare by other countries. However, both countries have the emphasis on success within their programs, and a reputation for success on an international basis. Brazil’s style and thus their conception of soccer are more culturally constructed, in terms of the society participating in defining how the game is played to be representational of the country. Germany allows the coaching staff to define the style, without participation from either the masses or the players.

The next signature of style to be discussed is values, or what each country holds dear in terms of how they want their soccer to be portrayed to the rest of the world. For Germany, these can be described as mental strength (which would include confidence, self-belief, and arrogance), discipline, hard work, and teamwork. Crolley and Hand comment that “The universal practice of football is ‘indigenised’ with the effect that certain playing styles are seen as unique… as well as representing values that are deemed important in that nation. Notions are widespread, then…of German mental strength and efficiency.” The media discourse on German mental strength is well documented. The French press speaks of “dogged determination” and “mental strength…nerves of steel.” Le Monde discusses the “typically German quality of self-belief” and “determination.” The English press further adds to the stereotype. The Times commenting on why Germany won Euro ’96 offered the reasoning that it was their “belief, bordering on arrogant self-assertion that binds them again and again” and also described Klinsmann (a German national team player) as having “toughness of
attitude” and a “battler’s mentality.” The Spanish press comments on the “sangfroid” that Germany exhibits, but also calls an apparent lack of self-confidence during the ’98 World Cup “surprising”. 58

Glanville offers a comment regarding German mental strength by saying the ’86 World Cup team is considered “resilient as ever.” Winner, quotes Wim van Hanegem, a Dutch player who refused to attend a banquet for the Germans after they won the ’74 World Cup: “The Germans are good players but arrogant.” Speaking during Italia ’90, a German commented that “This is the real German arrogance you’re seeing and I feel deeply ashamed.” Hesse-Lichtenberger names self-belief as one of the proverbial virtues that had carried Germany through crises in the past, but laments that the German teams of the 1980’s displayed more than self-belief. German author, Ludger Schulze, in his book on the history of the German national team comments that “it was arrogance taken to new extremes” and author Dietrich Schulze-Marmeling says that “the image of the ugly German came back to life.” 59

However, Hesse-Lichtenberger would out and out deny that German teams displayed arrogance prior to the “bad boy teams” of the 1980’s. He states:

58 Crolley and Hand, Football, Europe and the Press, 9; Libération (July 1, 1998) and (June 20, 2000) as cited by Crolley and Hand, Football, Europe and the Press, 98; Le Monde (June 28, 1996) and (June 18, 1996) as cited by Crolley, Hand, and Jeutter, “Playing the Identity Card”: 119-120; The Times (July 2, 1996) and (June 20, 1996) as cited by Crolley, Hand, and Jeutter, “Playing the Identity Card”: 112; El País (June 27, 1996) and (June 25, 1998) as cited by Crolley and Hand, Football, Europe and the Press, 151, 153.

59 Glanville, Story of the World Cup, 295; Wim van Hanegem as cited by Winner, Brilliant Orange, 99; Blain, Boyle, O’Donnell, Sport and National Identity, 68; Ludger Schulze and Dietrich Schulze-Marmeling as cited by Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 314.
One of the most baffling accusations leveled against German national teams is that of arrogance. While Germans do tend to think of certain sides as sometimes leaning toward an arrogant attitude— the Dutch, for instance, or the Brazilians— we would never allow one of our teams even the slightest air of complacency. Arrogance is the beginning of the end, every German football fan has internalized that, and it is the one thing that can never be excused.\footnote{Hesse-Lichtenberger, \textit{Tor!}, 151.}

He also points out that in 1954 a real fear existed of sounding chauvinistic and arrogant a decade after the war. The southern German newspaper, \textit{Suddeutsche Zeitung} wrote after the win, “But let’s become sober again: the game is over, and it was just a game.” Hesse-Lichtenberger interestingly comments that Germans can organize a party, but they can’t have one because the feelings of guilt over the two world wars are never far away. He surmises that anything that could possibly be interpreted as arrogance, whether it be pride, patriotism or joy over a win, is unacceptable.\footnote{Ibid., 164-65.} Perhaps his comments held true for 1954, but the abundance of media discourse from the 1990’s would appear to deny his assertions. Whether it is a carry-over from the “bad boy” teams of the 1980’s, or a more historical evaluation, the German team is recognized for their mental strength, whether it is termed confidence, self-belief, or arrogance.

The next German value that reflects in the German playing style is discipline. Litke calls the 2002 presence in the World Cup final as “the reward for the traditional virtues of discipline and hard work.” Porro and Russo notes that Italians view German soccer as possessing organizational ability and discipline. Glanville quotes Hrubesch a former German player as saying the ’82 team needed an “iron hand by the coach.” Blain and
O’Donnell mention that during Italia ’90 the Germans were regarded as a highly disciplined soccer team, and the English paper, *The Times* remarks in 1996 that “the traditional German qualities of discipline and organization remain in evidence.” Outright amazement is noted later by *The Times* when “their indisciplined performance betrayed their history.” *Libération* remarks that the German team displays discipline and “German players follow orders to the letter.” *ABC* comments that Germany displays “highly disciplined football,” and *El Pais* acknowledge that the German “trainer has put together a compact group where discipline prevails along with a few drops of creativity.” The German press, itself, notes that the German style of play is characterized by “German virtues, namely discipline, a fighting attitude and a fast game.” Hesse-Lichtenberger comments that Germans are not supposed to add flourishes to their game, and presents a telling example of German coaching discipline.

Apparently in 1931, the German national coach, Nerz, threw a player off the team for eating an orange on a railway station platform after the game, which had been a loss to Czechoslovakia. Hesse-Lichtenberger adds “the first but not the last time a German national coach would demonstrate disciplinarian dogma during a World Cup.” Suffice to say, discipline is a value displayed by German soccer style of play.  

---

Another value demonstrated in German playing style is the emphasis on teamwork. Archetti notes that the total football of the 1970’s, as demonstrated by the Dutch and German teams, was in particular based on an integrated team approach, while Merkel adds the notion that the '94 team displayed particular team spirit. Crolley, Hand, and Jeutter assert that the German team has to be represented as having no stars, that the entire team is the star. *The Times* emphasizes this point when it says “the team drew on its collective resolve” and *Libération* adds “German players…always work as a team.” Stiehler and Marr list the ability to perform well as a team as a German virtue. Recent national team coach, Vogts, would heartily agree, as he constantly repeats the phrase “There are no stars; the team is the star.”

The last German value to be examined is the value of hard work and industriousness. Gebauer, as noted by Crolley and Hand, offers an explanation for the emphasis on hard work as a German value displayed in soccer. Gebauer believes that the dominant values in Germany since the late 1970’s have been technical efficiency, hard work, and success; and because of this emphasis, the soccer team is often used by politicians and the press as a means of communicating and reinforcing these values. The German national team, then, is regarded as almost a brand name that advertises German capacity for high quality achievement, much like Mercedes or Porsche. The French press notes this achievement, and comments of German soccer “rigor” and “practicality” are not

---

uncommon. Blain and O’Donnell mention the German soccer image involves the notion of “hard working”, and as previously mentioned, Litke also entitles them “hard working,” while the Italians portray the German team as “industrious.”

While Germany displays the values of mental strength, discipline, teamwork, and hard work through their soccer style, Brazil exhibits quite a different set of values through their game. Brazilian values include an emphasis on artistry, and in conjunction with that a marked sense of exhibition, a clear cut appreciation of joy within the game, and an emphasis on individualism. Artistry is probably the most frequent comment on the style of soccer demonstrated by Brazil. Expertfootball.com calls the Brazilian style “creative and free-flowing”, and T. Bar-On states it is synonymous with fantasy, color, and carnival. Alexander Wolff, sportswriter, compares Brazil to UNLV, saying they are “as concerned with stylin’ as…scoring,” noting the priority that Brazil places on its artistry. Shirts describes the style as “elegance”, Humphrey discusses the style as “artistry”, as does Giulianotti, who notes, “Brazil showed that artistry could win. Beauty could be effective.” Page calls Brazilian soccer a sport “elevated to an art form” and DaMatta declared it more artistic than soccer that existed in Europe. Goncalves mentions that Brazilians are creative by nature, and demonstrate creative flair constantly in their game. Williams contrasts Brazil’s “expansive style” with “dull, methodical English play”, while Professor Sodre comments that “Brazilian football is not only a

---

sport, it’s a kind of stage play, a theatrical movement.”65 Again, note the inference that to Brazilians, soccer is something other than sport.

Other authors cite the artistry of Brazilian soccer. Mason calls it “football as art” and notes that in both Brazil and Argentina, winning is not enough, but must be done with style and panache. Winner makes the important observation that the soccer is called “o jogo bonito” in Brazil, which translates “the beautiful game.” Taylor acknowledges that Brazilians refer to their style as “futebol arte” or “artistic football” as opposed to other styles exemplified by European teams. Galeano, perhaps, says it best: “…this foreign sport became Brazilian, fertilized by the creative energies of the people discovering it. And thus was born the most beautiful soccer in the world…” Later, he adds: “The British press commented: ‘Such beautiful soccer ought to be outlawed.’”66

Hand in hand with the artistry that the Brazilian team values, is also a sense of exhibition as part of that artistry. Winner was disappointed at current Brazilian style in 2000, commenting: “…they play…only to show off. A personal beauty is of course also valid.” Poet Mario Chamrie states that “even if the goal is the real aim of the

---

66 Mason, Passion of the People?, 102, 129; Winner, Brilliant Orange, 151; Taylor, The Beautiful Game, 95; Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, 31, 135.
game, it means less to us than the show.” João Filho believes that Brazilian exhibition jeopardizes competition, and Washington Rodrigues acknowledges “we think that football has to be a show” but now Brazil is becoming much more results oriented. I theorize that two facts explain why exhibition is such a prominent part of the Brazilian game: the situating of the game within the favelas and the economic status of players rising to superstar fame. Soccer provides faces to “one of the crowd” in a cultural where being poor, racially mixed, and lacking educational opportunity is the norm. Soccer played stylishly, and well, allows one to stand out and receive the ultimate admiration from a culture immersed in the game. Exhibition is tightly linked to the concept of individualism, as will be shown.

One of the strongest values that Brazilians hold dear and use to sell their brand of soccer to the world is the sense of joy found within their game. Mason describes it as “a joyful game,” and Goncalves describes Brazilian style as “simple and enjoyable because it is fun.” In discussing Brazil’s 1994 World Cup victory, he notes:

> the style was simply a manifestation of the player’s pure delight at finding themselves on the soccer field again. The seriousness of the World Cup did not seem to weight heavily on the Brazilians; they laughed and rejoiced all the way to the championship. They were having fun.

Leite Lopes calls “having fun” one of the very characteristics of Brazilian style, and Shirts calls it the “happy style.” Page notes the Brazilian game has a “sense of

---

67 Winner, Brilliant Orange, 57; Chamrie as cited by Mason, Passion of the People?, 123; Filho and Rodrigues as cited by Taylor, The Beautiful Game, 95, 118.
68 Mason, Passion of the People?, ix; Goncalves, Principles of Brazilian Soccer, v.
overwhelming joy shared by players and spectators alike” and cites an analyst that called the game “soccer with a smile.” Lever adds that Brazilians term their game “alegre”, meaning both happy and showy, whereas McCann comments that “futebol alegre” became the signature Brazilian style from the mid-1950’s through the mid-1970’s, and set the tone for international play until “total football” entered the picture. McCann reveals that “futebol alegre” was more than a tactic for former Brazilian coach, Saldanha. It was an extension of his philosophy as a national team coach.69

The concept of individualism is, in many ways, bound up with the invented tradition of the malandro, which will be discussed in the next category. However, the emphasis on individual play within Brazilian soccer is a cultural value. Describing the play, Bellos says: “Its essence is a game in which prodigious individual skills outshine team tactics…” and Lever notes that this trait applies to most South American teams. Page comments that soccer became a consummate mechanism for both individual and collective self-expression, but the emphasis on individual effort meant success in international competitions depended heavily on the genius of the superstars on the team. Some Brazilian coaches argued that an overly disciplined approach to the game could kill off the idiosyncratic genius that was the basis of the Brazilian game. Even as early as the first World Cup in 1930, Glanville asserts the Brazilian team were individually more clever, but collectively inferior to the Yugoslavian team. Humphrey calls it “individual flair” and Allison “brilliance and individualism.” Mason refers to it as “a

joyful game of individual self-expression”, and cites Freyre’s suggestion that it was the “brilliance of individual spontaneity” that made the Brazilian game unique. Coach Carlos Parreira remarks that the individualism is apparent, but has to be addressed at the national level: “I didn’t have to teach our players how to play soccer, but I did have to help them develop as a unit. That is not easy for Brazilian players because they are all such individuals.” Crolley and Hand note that even the foreign press considers the Brazilian game to feature individual emphasis. ABC comments: “Brazil saved themselves from defeat thanks again to certain individual performances.” Winner says “In South America the individual players, as human beings, are much more important than the overall system.” 70

Several authors give some explanation for this cultural emphasis on individualism within soccer. Mason ties in conceptions of democracy (during the dictatorships, Brazilians’ only areas for realizing democratic values were soccer, samba and carnival) with notions of poverty, whereby a poor Brazilian could “triumph in football meritocracy.” 71 Roberto DaMatta further clarifies:

...in the institutionalized and ‘structured’ spheres of Brazilian society, the dominant and explicit mode of relationship is ‘hierarchization’ by means of networks’ personal relations. In this plane, everything has its place and individual variations are impossible. In areas such as soccer, carnival, and umbanda, individual variations are

70 Bellos, Futebol, 33; Lever, Soccer Madness, 42; Page, “Soccer Madness,” 37, 45-6; Glanville, Story of the World Cup, 19; Humphrey, “No Holding Brazil,” 128; Allison, “Association Football,” 220; Freyre as cited by Mason, Passion of the People?, ix, 122; Parriera as cited by Goncalves, Principles of Brazilian Soccer, 3: ABC (July 4, 1998) as cited by Crolley and Hand, Football, Europe and the Press, 142; Winner, Brilliant Orange, 61.

71 Mason, Passion of the People?, 156.
possible and consequently individualism and ‘hot-dogging’ are the dominant ideologies. 72

Thus soccer provides an arena within highly structured Brazilian society where one is given the chance to stand out as an individual when other areas are closed off. Guilianotti also would add that even the innovations represented by Brazilian dead ball strikes (banana kick and double banana kick) reflect the deep cultural emphasis on individual skill and public display that is uniquely Brazilian. 73 Without going into great depth at this point, the cultural emphasis on individualism as a value within Brazilian soccer is directly related to issues of a highly structured society that reflects currents of politics, religion, colonialism, and economics. Soccer opens an area for individual display and exhibition that other areas of the culture do not provide.

Again, the binaries set up by comparing German and Brazilian values in soccer are revealing. Germany values teamwork, whereas Brazil values individualism. Germany values mental strength and Brazil values the expression of joy while playing the game. Germany values hard work, and Brazil values exhibitionism. Germany values discipline and Brazil values artistic expression. The dichotomy between the two playing styles becomes even more apparent when examining the signature of art of play, or the invented traditions associated with playing style in both countries. For Germany, two basic concepts are associated with the style of play, and those are the lack of imagination which is usually represented by allusions to machinery, and the idea that

72 Roberto DaMatta as cited by Shirts, “Socrates, Corinthians,” 102.
73 Giulianotti, Football: A Sociology, 137-38.
Germany is a “tournament team”, or one that builds momentum and power throughout a tournament regardless of how good they actually are.

The idea that German teams lack creativity and imagination is a well documented concept, and yet one that has become an invented tradition, although not necessarily by Germany, even though Germany appears to be accepting of this designation. The association of machinery with the German style of play is common, probably relating to their emphasis on teamwork, efficiency and power. Many coaches would decry the analysis that German teams lack creativity, and insist that the efficiency of the German team masks the creativity that they exhibit, simply because it becomes expected and commonplace.

Wolff compares the German team to the Duke or Carolina basketball team, stating that they “draw confidence from its tradition and system.” Crolley and Hand remark that “…all too readily the Germans are portrayed by their own press as well as that in Great Britain as reverting to their traditional ways, which is playing defensively and trying to destroy whatever is creative in the opposition’s game.” Glanville gives a historical overview, starting with the ’34 World Cup team which “began the game most cautiously, both inside-forwards, rather than just one, lying deep…”, to the ’54 team that “were a great deal more than mere destroyers, a mincing machine for other people’s talent” to the ’86 team which “played a dourly cautious game.” Several authors comment that Germany plays an “ugly style” or one that is “not attractive.” Merkel calls
German soccer “solid and effective, if hardly ever spectacular of magnificent.” Hesse-Lichtenberger calls the German style of the 1980’s “numbing”, and reports that even the GDR football teams were made up of “automatons.”

The association of the German style of play with machinery is prevalent throughout media discourse. Crolley and Hand list a variety of examples. The British press uses the imagery of machinery, particularly automotive machinery, linking the modern German economy with soccer. Two German players were described as “a couple of midfield motorcycles who take the shortest line between them…and the goal” and then describe the team “typically looks as if it was manufactured in a factory by Porsche.” Another time, “…as we know, heat or no heat, the German machine grinds on inexorably.”

The French press also presents imageries of machinery when describing the German team. Libération described a player, Eilts, in the mechanical terms as the “pressure regulator” moving around the field to adjust balance. Germany is referred to as “a machine” which is “on track”, or “running on diesel.” When substitutions are made, it is “to get the machine back on course.” Another time, “as predicted, the powerful cars are still in the race. Among the leaders, the German saloon is advancing toward the chequered flag with its usual reliability after having negotiated…the Mexican corner.”

---

74 Wolff, “It Should Be A Kick”:78; Crolley and Hand, Football, Europe and the Press, 51; Glanville, Story of the World Cup, 29, 79, 292; Winner, Brilliant Orange, 144; Expertfootball.com, 2; Merkel, “Germany and the World Cup,” 94; Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 258, 279.

75 The Times (June 17, 1996) and (June 30, 1996) as cited by Crolley and Hand, Football, Europe and the Press, 49-50. See also: Crolley, Hand, Jeutter, “Playing the Identity Card,” 112.
Liberation also calls Germany “a sort of steamroller, combining physical power with dogged determination”, but the French press also denotes some respect for Germany as “a model nation”, an image that is not always displayed with other nation’s press reports.  

The Spanish press also presents the same machine-like view of Germany. ABC states that “Then the Teutonic machine began to work.” “The German piston is vulgar but mechanical,” as well as “Without lifting a finger Germany threw coal on the machine and moved…(There is) something dangerous in the way they roam about, a mechanical rhythm, cold as ice and steel.” Another paper announced: “Germany is a winning machine. And when they don’t win, they are a losing machine. But they are always a machine.” El Pais calls the German team “a machine which has been programmed to win by asphyxia”. Even the German press refers to the “fundamentally German recipe…of pressurizing.” Archetti refers to the total football style of the German and Dutch teams of the 1970’s as “integrated, machine-like teams,” and Wahl called the 2002 World Cup team “soccer playing robots.”  

Along with the invented tradition of associating German style with machinery and lack of creativity is the tradition that the German team is a “tournament team.” Stiehler and

---

76 Libération (June 19, 1996), (June 29, 1998), (June 26, 1998), (July 1, 1998), (June 21, 1996) as cited by Crolley and Hand, Football, Europe and the Press, 97-98.  
78 Archetti, Masculinities, 187; Wahl, “Seize the Day”; 39.
Marr comment that there is a high correspondence of the image of the German team as being a team famous for the ability to raise their game on the big occasions. They note that the narrative of the German team being a tournament team has become embedded in the explanation for victories and defeats over a number of years, and is actually a myth that grew out of many championship games. They state:

A ‘tournament team’ demonstrates improving results from game to game and can compensate for the loss of players. In difficult situations, a tournament team possesses the ‘luck of the hard-working’. This story is simultaneously the ‘German virtues’- fighting strength, discipline, the ability to perform well as a team- with which the team asserts itself against football ‘artists’.79

Hesse-Lichtenberger makes the point that when German teams don’t start off strongly in a tournament, it is considered traditional, as their reputation for being a tournament team is to build strength throughout the tournament: “West Germany started the World Cup in traditional fashion by making things hard for themselves.”80

In contrast, the Brazilian soccer team is rich in invented tradition from the conceptualization of the malandro, to the connections of soccer and dance, to recurring references to magic, to images of being undisciplined. The idea of the malandro spirit epitomized in Brazilian soccer was “created” in the 1933 by Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre. Freyre published the book, *The Masters and the Slaves*, which advocated a new racial theory, an area in which Brazil had consistently struggled. Freyre believed that the integration of races present in Brazil should be seen as a

79 Stiehler and Marr, “Attribution of Failure”: 149, 159.
80 Hesse-Lichtenberger, *Tor!*, 176.
strength, rather than the weakness in which it had always been viewed. Miscegenation had produced a culture with varied layers of race, and Brazilian society had a difficult time not only in self-acceptance, but also world acceptance, of these layers. Freyre, although considered racist in today’s world view, at the time presented the novel sensation that Brazil’s unique blend of races provided an “Apollonian rationality and Dionysian malevolence.” It created a pro-mulatto view of national identity, making a negative into a positive. Freyre suggested that playfulness and mischievousness were national characteristics brought about by the miscegenation, leading to the character of the malandro. The malandro was a mulatto impish character, and soccer was his game. He would take an orderly, gentlemanly British game and turn it into a “dance of irrational surprises.” In 1938, Freyre wrote of the malandro spirit in Brazilian soccer:

> Our style of playing football contrasts with the Europeans because of a combination of qualities of surprise, malice, astuteness and agility, and at the same time brilliance and individual spontaneity…the touch of dance and subversiveness that marks the Brazilian style…seem to show psychologists and sociologists in a very interesting way the roguery and flamboyance of the mulatto that today is in every true affirmation of what is Brazilian.81

Sports journalists accepted the theory and propagated it, and over time, it became an invented tradition that the spirit of the malandro must exist in Brazilian soccer. The malandro is a mythological figure that demonstrates indefatigability, the art of fooling fortune and authority, and is a streetwise trickster, according to Giulianotti. The malandro is poor, generally considering as coming out of the favelas, and displays artfulness and trickery on the field. Christian Bromberger notes that the Brazilian style

---

81 Bellos, *Futebol*, 35-36.
of play which emphasizes the art of dodging illustrates a golden rule of the Brazilian culture: “how to work your way out of trouble with stylish dissimulation.” DaMatta further describes the Brazilian malandro style as “Futebol in Brazil is a waist-game (jogo de cintura) a kind of malice and swindling, which you don’t find in any other football. It is the art of dodging.” Galeano explains it further:

> Misery trains him for soccer or for crime. From the moment of birth, that child is forced to turn his disadvantage into a weapon, and before long he learns to dribble around the rules of order which deny him a place. He learns the tricks of every trade and he becomes an expert in the art of pretending, surprising, breaking through where least expected, and throwing off an enemy with a hip feint or some other tune from the rascal’s songbook.

Along with the spirit of the malandro, the connection between dance and soccer has long been emphasized. The invented tradition of connecting soccer with samba and carnival can be traced to journalist Mario Filho, honored by having the Maracanã stadium named after him. Filho was a sports journalist for *O Globo*, and then in 1931 founded the first sport daily, *O Mundo Esportivo*. What Filho did that was unique was to move the paper into the favelas, support samba schools and offer large prizes for carnival competitions. He encouraged soccer fans to dress up to show support for their teams, advocated the professionalization of soccer, and integrated soccer, samba and carnival as representative of Brazilian national identity. In 1934, back at *O Globo*, Filho launched a competition between the fans of Flamengo and Fluminense, encouraging the

---


83 Galeano, *Soccer in Sun and Shadow*, 44.
fans to bring drums, fireworks, colored streamers and instruments to the game. He coined the competition “Fla-Flu”, a name which still stands for the largest rivalry in Brazilian soccer. Filho became quite a revered character in Brazil, and quite influential not only for his sports writing but as an author of *O Negro no Futebol Brasileiro*, or *The Black Man in Brazilian Football*. Filho campaigned long and hard for the construction of the Maracanã stadium, but it is his connection of soccer and samba that is significant at this point.\(^{84}\)

The invented tradition of connecting Brazilian soccer with dance is noted by many authors. Lever calls Brazilian soccer rhythmic and balletic, Goncalves says Brazilian players “dance down the field”, and Archetti asserts “Brazilians are known for performing the ballet they are used to.” Giulianotti states that “the Latin American game sits within an ensemble of other popular cultural practices, most notably national dance. Brazil’s carioca rhythm is an extension of samba music.” Mason compares Brazilian soccer to ballet, and Levine adds that it was universally recognized “ballet-like elegance.” Taylor mentions that “samba”, “samba stars” and “samba skills” are common in journalistic descriptions of Brazilian soccer, but believes there is a grain of truth in the notion. He cites a Brazilian sociologist as saying: “A country that has samba, capoeira (a dance-like Brazilian martial art), frevo (a lively Samba style) and chorinho (a slower Samba style) has to play a different kind of football.” Kuper delves further into the connection between capoeira and soccer, citing Professor Sodre, stating that capoeira is a body philosophy that is a dance and a sport, just as Brazilian soccer

---

is. As can be seen, dance isn’t just a descriptive term of how Brazilians play the game, but is the essence of how Brazilians translate the gentlemanly game of soccer on the field. While the connections between soccer and samba (and carnival) are directly traced to Mario Filho, the invented tradition of soccer samba has been cemented in the Brazilian psyche.

The use of the term “magical” to describe Brazilian soccer is also common. While its connections with Afro-Brazilian religion cannot be denied, the invented tradition that Brazilian soccer is somehow connected to magic has been historically emphasized. Mason refers to “an individual ball control of an almost magical kind,” and T. Bar-On describes it as “magic (traces of the divine?).” Lincoln Allison comments that, “The Brazilian way represents to them (Brazilian fans) almost a kind of magic which symbolizes their national culture.” John Williams cites a British fan who says: “…when it looked like it wasn’t going anywhere they would just do a bit of magic…” Edilberto Coutinho calls Brazilian soccer “sheer black magic” connecting race and religion in one metaphor. Page makes the connection with the Brazilian concept of chance within the game: “…Brazilians…a faith in magic (exemplified by the conviction that in the relationship between the human body and the soccer ball, anything was possible)…”

---

The concept that Brazil is an undisciplined team and plays on an emotional roller-coaster leading to panic on the field, is also well established. Speaking of the ’58 World Cup winners, Glanville comments that George Raynor cheerfully forecast that “if the Brazilians went a goal down they would ‘panic all over the show.’ They did go an early goal down; and stayed serene.” Page notes that in his opinion, after 1970, “the lack of discipline inherent in the Brazilian approach to the game made adjustments to opposing countertactics difficult.” Coaches argued that an overly disciplined approach could kill off the idiosyncratic genius in the Brazilian game. The Corinthian Democracy movement in 1982 advocated that soccer players control their own bodies, and desired to interpret soccer as enjoyment, not discipline. Blain, Boyle, and O’Donnell acknowledge that Latins from Brazil to Italy are frequently accused of lack of “character”, which is interpreted to mean “grit.” They mention that Latins are often presented as unstable and unable to cope with the stresses of soccer, particularly when losing. *El País* calls the Brazilian team “undisciplined and frivolous”, and *ABC* calls Brazilian play “hot…whimsical…laid back.” Even as early as 1912, Scottish League forward Archie McLean who moved to São Paulo commented on the lack of discipline exhibited by Brazilian players while he was coaching: “There were great players there but they were terribly undisciplined. Their antics would not have been tolerated in Scotland. During a game a couple of players tried to find out who could kick the ball the highest. I soon put a stop to that sort of thing.”

Even Galeano provides a story about Brazilian lack of discipline that is often characterized in Brazilian soccer. The story is about Nilton Santos, and occurs during the 1958 World Cup game with Austria. Brazil is leading 1-0 when the “incident” occurs.

At the beginning of the second half, the key to the Brazilian defense, Nilton Santos...abandoned the rearguard, passed the center line, eluded a pair of opposing players and kept going. The Brazilian coach, Vicente Feola, was also running but on the other side of the touchline. Sweating buckets he screamed: “Go back! Go back!”

Nilton, unflappable, continued his race toward the enemy area. A fat and desperate Feola clutched his head but Nilton refused to pass the ball to any of the forwards. He made the play entirely on his own and it culminated in a tremendous goal.

Then a happy Feola commented, “Did you see that? Didn’t I tell you? This one really knows!”

The lack of discipline thus becomes a valued trait at times within the Brazilian game.

To sum up, the invented traditions and art of play exhibited by Brazilian soccer revolve around four concepts: the use of the malandro to symbolize mischievous, dodging style of play, frequent allusions to dance and to magic, and the idea that Brazilian players and teams are undisciplined. Some binaries do set up with the German team within this category. The German lack of creativity as evinced by machinery illustrations contrasts nicely with Brazilian allusions to dance, and even to magic. The efficient “machinery” also sets up a contrast with the Brazilian concept of the malandro. The invented

---

tradition that Germany is a tournament team and that Brazil is an undisciplined team only sets up a binary by greatly stretching, perhaps beyond acceptable limits.

The next signature of style to be examined is ecological. For Germany, there is little mention in the literature as to how climate or weather may affect their style of play. Expertfootball.com classifies Germany as one of the northern European teams in terms of style, and Litke notes that Europeans play a direct, pragmatic game that is necessary in cold, wet northern climates. A colder climate would certainly enable a quicker pace in the game with much running with less chance of heat exhaustion. A cold, wet pitch would lend itself to the development of a style that emphasizes more slide tackling and more balls played in the air to avoid a skidding of the ball on wet grass. A great many more authors comment on Brazilian climate and how it is has impacted playing style. Goncalves acknowledges that climate has shaped and influenced the different schools of playing style, but doesn’t develop the theme further by saying how or what influence it has. Lever, as well as Giulianotti, delineates regional styles in terms of Brazil. Giulianotti attributes part of the regional variations to geo-climatic conditions across a vast country, and the rest to economic and social conditions. Litke comments that “o jogo bonito”, the beautiful game, is played in the sunshine. Blain, Boyle, and O’Donnell mention the “heat” of the Latin character, but the comment acknowledges the stereotypical notion of South Americans, and not the climate, although connotations of the two are symbolic. Galeano notes that soccer was “tropicalized” in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo by the appropriation of the game by the poor, and then describes the style
in quite lyrical terms, but does not say precisely how the climate influenced the development. Page discusses the attempted “Europeanization” of the Brazilian game in the late 1970’s, and comments that “Yet at the same time it was obvious that certain aspects of the European style, such as long passes and constant running, were ill-suited to a tropical climate.” The constant heat of the lower Brazilian coastal cities, even in wintertime, seems to have been a contributing reason why Brazilians did emphasize a slightly slower pace of game with sudden, lightning attacks, and a plethora of short passes to move the ball up the field. Quick, short passes reduce the amount of running necessary in a game as compared to a long ball, which would necessitate at least one person to make a long run to receive it. Levine points out that Brazilian literary and intellectual figures endorsed soccer as a natural adaptation to the environment, particularly Freyre who saw Brazil as a tropical hybrid of European technology infused with Amerindian and African psychic forces, all revealed through soccer. Mason also emphasizes that soccer was appropriated because it was modern and European, but also mentions that the mastery of the bouncing ball, the one-touch short pass, and the dribble were South American emphases. It can be surmised that the development of some of these skills were directly related to climate. Brazil did not have lush, green fields (like Britain) in the favelas. Young boys learned to play on sandy beaches, or uncleared grounds and small spaces on the hillside in the favelas. Small spaces will lead to a short and rapid passing game in order to keep possession of the ball. Uncleared or rocky

89 Litke, “World Cup: It All Started with a Skull,” 1; Expertfootball.com, 2; Goncalves, Principles of Brazilian Soccer, 5; Lever, Soccer Madness, xii; Giulianotti, Football: A Sociology, 141; Blain, Boyle, O’Donnell, Sport and National Identity, 9; Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, 31; Page, “Soccer Madness,” 46; Levine, “Sport and Society”: 239; Mason, Passion of the People?, 155.
ground means the ball takes surprising bounces and must be controlled in the air with a variety of body parts. Sandy beaches as the soccer pitch prohibit long passes on the ground as the ball would die in the process. Climate and geography certainly must have had an impact on the development of style for Brazil.

The conclusion regarding style is that the definition of style is more than just the aesthetic component of the game. Seven signatures of style have been discussed regarding each team. They are tactics, body image, technique, concept of soccer, values, invented traditions, and ecological. Yet an overview of each team’s style can be determined, stereotypical it is true, but with defining elements that seem to transcend specific points in time. For German, the recognition of efficiency, physicality, power, organization, strong at tackling, aerial play and goal keeping, strong defense, and often described in militaristic and machinistic terminology. For Brazil, it is artistry, the spirit of the malandro, individuality, exhibition, and quick passing on the ground that would best describe the traditional conceptualization of the team. Now that the elements, or signatures of style have been identified and examined, it is important to trace what made the style the way it is, what influenced and shaped it so that Germany and Brazil play the same game, but in entirely different ways.
CHAPTER 4

A SHORT HISTORY OF BRAZIL AND HOW IT PERTAINS TO SOCCER

Historical implications and their impact upon soccer, particularly playing styles, are closely intertwined with cultural interpretations of the sport. It is valuable then, to review the history of each country and determine what historical implications impact on soccer. Three pertinent implications for the game of soccer are apparent when reviewing Brazilian history: the emphasis on the latifunda system and its influence on a monoculture system; that Brazil has had very few periods of democratic self-rule moving from colonialism to late nationalism through a series of dictatorships and military rule; and the implications of the massive importation of slaves to reinforce the monocultural system.

A fleet of Portuguese ships commanded by Pedro Alvares Cabral discovered Brazil in 1500 when they were blown off course. Ostensibly the land was named Brazil for the reddish cinderwood tree, *pau brasa*, however, some scholars contend that the land was named for Hy-Brazil, the mythological isle of the blessed. The land was populated by Amerindians, although numbers are unknown, and the Catholic missionaries accompanying the early expeditions vacillated over whether the natives had souls or not. Until 1549, the church played a very minor role in the settlement of Brazil, mainly
concentrating on the establishment from 1503 onwards of trading posts for traffic in the lucrative brazilwood, which the new European textile industry coveted for the red dye. When the French began forays to Brazil, Portugal realized they could not control a 3000 mile coastline, and after diplomacy and coastal patrolling failed, they decided to colonize. The monarchy sent Martim Afonso de Sousa, in 1532, to establish the first colony. He also established the pattern of land distribution which was to influence Brazil for centuries.¹

The good coastal land was quickly divided into huge sugar plantations, and the latifunda system was established, with the monoculture system also being established; only now it was sugar rather than brazilwood. The population was sparse, and labor needed. The Amerindian population proved inadequate due to temperament, the importation of European illness, and inadequate numbers. In 1538, Brazil started importing slave labor from Africa. In 1549 six Jesuits arrived to work with the Amerindians, and gathered thousands of Guarani into fortified settlements known as reductions. The reductions were often raided for slaves, and the Jesuits were accused of setting up a state within the state, and were thus expelled by the Portuguese crown in 1759, but other Catholic missions remained. Also in 1549, King João III of Portugal established a centralized government in Brazil. During the 1500’s, Brazil was established as a colony of Portugal, the government was centralized, Catholicism was the official religion,

Amerindians were impounded, and Wave I of the slave labor was imported. The land-labor pattern was thoroughly established, and the monoculture focus was on sugar.²

The early 1600’s focused on the establishment of sugar as the economic foundation for Brazil, but that changed toward the end of the century. Convents were forbidden as women were greatly needed to increase the country, and the boom/bust periods that came to signify the Brazilian economy provided incentive for manumission of slavery during the bust periods. These two conditions, scarcity of women and Africans and mulattos comprising the majority of the population provided the basis for the miscegenation of the population. By the end of the seventeenth century, the sugar economy of the northeast declined but in 1695 gold was discovered in Minas Gerais, leading to the second boom/bust cycle. A new demand for slavery was founded, and the second wave of slave importations began. An economic shift occurred from the northeast to the center south, as mining was established as the new monoculture. The Portuguese population increased through immigration due to the gold rush, but never approached the numbers of the Afro-Brazilian population. The monarchy in Portugal began to rely on the importation of Brazilian gold to hold together their economy, and much of the gold underpinned the industrialization of the British economy.³

---

In 1727, coffee was introduced into Brazil, which started the next cycle of monoculture economic emphasis and latifunda expansion. By 1770, the area around Rio de Janeiro and the state of Minas Gerais was heavily planted in coffee, leading in the 1800’s to another shift southward of economic power. In 1741, the King of Portugal ordered that all runaway slaves were to be branded. In 1759 the Jesuits were expelled from the country, accused of setting up a “state within a state.” In 1792 a small band of prominent citizens formed a conspiracy to plot for independence from Portugal, refusing to pay Portuguese taxes and demanding the right to build factories and universities. They were betrayed and arrested, but demonstrated the ability to protest against colonial rule, which was a rare occurrence in Brazil.4

By the nineteenth century, Brazil was well established with the coffee boom, becoming the world’s leading exporter of the product. Again, another wave of importation of slaves became necessary. The numbers imported were the most massive yet, leading to slaves comprising the majority of the population in Brazil. In 1808 attempting to escape from Napoleon’s advance through the Iberian Peninsula, the entire Portuguese court of King João VI, about 15,000 people, fled to Brazil. Brazil was now the center of the Portuguese Empire, rather than a distant colony. The Royal family remained in Brazil until 1832, but the King returned to Portugal in 1821, returning Brazil to colony status. The regent, the King’s son, Pedro, realized it was better to support the movement for independence rather than oppose it, so in 1822 Brazil became independent, ruled by their own monarchy. The monarchy was to last another sixty

4 Burns, A History, 134-5; Skidmore, Black into White, 43; Rocha, Brazil, 6, 8-9.
seven years. By 1850 the first faint glimmerings of industrialization was realized in Brazil, with the creation of factories and steamship companies. From 1850 onward, Britain rather than Portugal dominated commerce within Brazil, but France shaped intellectual and cultural life. Slave trade was abolished in 1850, mainly due to the British blockade of Brazilian ports to enforce the ban, but an acute labor shortage resulted, as coffee production continued to increase. Slaves continued to be smuggled into the country despite the official policy was that no further slaves were to be imported, with the passage of the Queiroz Law. From 1865 to 1870, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay went to war against Paraguay, with Amerindians and slaves making up the bulk of the Brazilian military. However, a new national institution arose due to the war, and that was the military. After peace returned in 1870, restless army officers turned their attention to politics and became the leaders in promoting the elimination of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic. By 1870, money tied up in the slave trade had been freed, allowing greater economic expansion. The labor problem was still a huge issue, and Brazil welcomed European immigration which began to increase. From 1870 onwards, the United States replaced Britain as the dominant trade partner with Brazil, and has remained in that position ever since.  

In 1871 Brazil passed the Law of the Free Womb, which determined that all children born to slaves were born free. By 1873, Italians passed the Portuguese in immigration numbers for Brazil, and mass urban migration began. German colonies were established in southern Brazil. Intellectuals began speaking out against the monarchy and against slavery. In 1885 the Saraiva-Cotegipe law was passed, freeing all slaves over the age of sixty-five but not until 1888, with the passage of the Golden Law, did Brazil officially eliminated slavery, the last country in the Americas to do so. Brazil had imported over 3.5 million slaves during its history, far more than any other country in the world. The response by the culture to the elimination of slavery was a greater emphasis on personal hygiene and fashion, and the discontinuation of a free land policy. In 1889, Emperor Pedro II was dethroned, and Brazil became a republic with the link between church and state cut. The period from 1889-1930 was termed the Old Republic and became a period of great social change.\textsuperscript{6} Implications from the nineteenth century include such notions as the shaping and influencing of the country by outside interests, mainly Britain and the United States from an economic and trade standpoint, and France from a cultural and intellectual one. Also of importance was the realization that the majority of people in the country were now black or of mixed race blood. Elite still controlled the government throughout the century, and illiterates who comprised most of the population were prohibited from voting.

The turn of the century saw Brazil enter another boom/bust period and monoculture emphasis with the rise of rubber production, made necessary with the rapid production of the automobile. The rubber boom lasted until 1912, when Malaya began to dominate the market with cheaper prices. In 1924, an army officer named Prestes led a rebellion of 1500 men for three years, marching throughout Brazil and occupying towns, demanding social and economic reforms. As a rebellion, it had little impact, but the significance of a dissatisfied military became important in the near future. Also in 1924, the modernists led an intellectual attack on the cult of the past, as espoused by the traditionalists. The traditionalists emphasized the regional influences throughout Brazil, such as the gaucho identity in Rio Grande do Sol. Ruben Olivens states that Brazil is a “country made up of natural regions onto which social regions were mapped” and further that in Brazil “what is national is first of all regional.” The modernists were concerned with the formation of a national identity for Brazil, and wanted to emphasize national culture over regional culture. In 1930, a revolution led by the military brought Getulio Vargas into power, and the junta installed him as chief of state. He rewarded the tenentes with power and positions in the government, dissolved Congress, removed governors of states, and strengthened the federal government. The populace widely supported Vargas even though he took power rather than being voted into office, as he instituted a lower voting age, extended the vote to working women, guaranteed the secret ballot, and wrote and implemented a new constitution which provided broader powers to the federal government. In 1937, Vargas instituted a coup d’etat, taking full control of the government, canceling elections and the implementation of the new
constitution. He formed a secret police force and took political prisoners. Vargas called the new government the New State, and made a number of social changes while in control. Through the Ministry of Labor he encouraged the formation of unions, maternal benefits and childcare, literacy campaigns, a minimum wage, and health and safety standards. Furthering the encouragement of nationalism, he decreed all educational classes be taught in Portuguese, Brazilian history presented in all schools, and there be only national flags, anthems and coats of arms, not regional ones. Under pressure from the country, Vargas decreed that presidential elections would take place in 1945. Concerned that Vargas was about to stage another coup, the military again intervened and staged their own coup prior to elections, but did allow elections to proceed as scheduled.7

In 1934, Gilberto Freyre published his work, The Master and the Slaves, which promoted the concept that one of Brazil’s main strengths was its mixed racial composition. Freyre postulated that the racial miscegenation within Brazil was a peaceful process leading to a racial democracy, and not a problem as perceived by Brazilians in the past. Brazilian society and government embraced Freyre’s well publicized, and it very quickly became an invented tradition. Vargas, in the tradition of Hitler and Mussolini, has often been labeled a fascist, and he maintained relations with the Axis powers until 1942 when American pressure that Brazil allowed Allied air bases to be built on the northeast coast led to German submarine attacks on Brazilian

merchant ships. Brazil then entered the war on the side of the Allies, the only Latin American country to send troops to fight in Europe. In 1946, under pressure, a new constitution was enacted. In 1950, Vargas won the open elections and assumed the presidency, but seemed unable to cope with changing situations in Brazil. An eminent coup in 1954 led Vargas to take his own life before he could be deposed.8

The Populist Phase extended from 1945-1964 in Brazil and was encased in another Brazilian “return to tradition” period with a common theme of the negative foreign influence on the country and the culture by outsiders. Manufacturing was now 20% of the GNP, urbanization well established if not rampant, and the question of national identity again arose. Juscelino Kubitschek was elected president in 1955 and is remembered for two main achievements: he moved the capital of Brazil to the interior, and built the first road link to the Amazon. Brasilia, the new capital, was to be the symbol of the unification of all Brazilian states. Kubitschek also built highways to connect all the states, over 11,000 miles of new roadway. Quadros succeeded Kubitschek in 1961, and he supported Fidel Castro, campaigned against bikinis and horseracing, and decorated Che Guevara. As inflation accelerated and rumors of coups flew around Brazil, Quadros resigned after eight months in office and was succeeded by his vice-president Goulart. During Goulart’s three year term, Brazil became polarized

between those who wanted radical reform and those who perceived reform as being communist inspired.⁹

In 1964, another coup occurred backed by the United States, leading to more than twenty years of military dictatorship. The generals took turns serving four year terms as president, and stifled unions, banned strikes, reduced wages and imposed censorship. Over 20,000 Brazilians were imprisoned during the dictatorship, and many “disappeared.” During some of the darkest years of the dictatorship, from 1969-1973, Brazil underwent its “economic miracle.” The GDP rose 12% a year, the Trans Amazon highway was started, and Brazil was recognized as an emerging world power. However, when the generals left power in 1985, they also left a huge debt for Brazil. The 1979 oil crisis and dramatically rising U.S. interest rates led to an ever increasing foreign debt. By 1982, Brazil was bankrupt, and had to apply to the International Monetary Fund for an austerity package. When the military left power, inflation was beginning to spiral upward and the country was in recession. Newly elected President Sarney introduced the Cruzado Plan which froze prices and wages, as well as changed the currency. Brazil entered into a ten year cycle of rising inflation, change of finance minister, wage and price freeze, new currency, brief pause, and then starting all over again.¹⁰

Although the dictatorship ended in 1985, Brazilians did not regain the right to direct elections until 1989 when they elected the playboy president, Fernando Collor. Collor confiscated all savings for eighteen months which plunged the country into recession. Accused of corruption by his own brother, he resigned before he could be impeached in 1992. His vice-president, Itamar Franco, succeeded Collor. By May 1994 inflation had reached nearly 50% a month, until finance minister Cardoso introduced the Real plan which stabilized the economy and led to Cardoso’s election in 1994. In 1995 the GNP was the eighth largest in the world. Cardoso was re-elected in 1998, the same year Brazil’s economy again unraveled and the country was forced to devalue its currency by 35%. Long time presidential candidate and union leader, Lula Da Silva, was elected in 2002. While inflation is declining, unemployment continues to grow leading to an escalating crime rate under Lula’s neo-liberal government, yet by most reports he is well loved by the populace. In 2002, the average income in Brazil was $6500 per year, and unemployment in São Paulo was twenty percent.

As Oliven points out in *Tradition Matters*, there are several recurrent themes in Brazilian history: union versus federation, nation versus region, unity versus diversity, national versus foreign, popular versus erudite, and tradition versus modernity. Brazil appears to reach a consensus on one of the issues, only to have it reappear and debated

---

all over several years later. Roberto DaMatta contends that Brazil is neither modern nor traditional, and often moves toward a middle ground of mediation and ambiguity which becomes a site for the conflict of values and the encompassment of the modern by the traditional. This perspective is also reflected in soccer playing style, as Brazil revolves between an emphasis on modernization (formulated as Europeanization with an emphasis on defense, structure, and teamwork) and an emphasis on returning to a more traditional Brazilian style emphasizing creativity and individualism. When Brazil plays a more “modernistic” style, even if they win, fans are not happy. Eventually the pendulum swings, and the style returns to a more traditional style. However, Brazil must always win, or the country laments loudly. DaMatta’s middle ground of mediation and ambiguity which becomes a middle ground for conflict of values is strongly represented within the soccer world.12

DaMatta provides much insight into Brazilian culture, and much of his cultural insights are readily transferable to the Brazilian soccer culture. In a comparison of Brazil and the United States, DaMatta notes that Americans describe themselves as “separate but equal” whereas Brazilians would say they were “different but united.” The difference in the phraseology reflects the Brazilian rule of a hierarchal and relational universe that is Brazil. In the U.S., the market economy where everything can be bought, sold and exchanged is grounded on the notion of the individual being dominant. In Brazil, the emphasis is political-cultural or “symbolic”, or a more traditional emphasis in which the

whole prevails over the individuals. In Brazil, then, the individual is a modern notion superimposed on a system of personal relations (hierarchal in style). In Protestantism, the body and soul developed an egalitarian union due to the work ethic. In Catholicism, as in Brazil, the soul continues to be superior to the body, and the person then is more important than the individual. Or as DaMatta explains: “In the Protestant, capitalist system, the body accompanies the soul, money follows work, and the individual makes the world and its rules. But in the Brazilian system, the body is less than the soul, money is separated from work, and persons hold sway.” In Brazil, individualism is rejected for a variety of reasons, but mainly because it fosters personal independence at the cost of social relationships and it also poses obstacles for the “bending” of the law in the Brazilian hierarchal system of relationships.13

Why has Brazilian soccer style become synonymous with individualism in a society that tends to reject individualism in favor of hierarchal relationships? Soccer represents one of the few areas where culture can be contested and resisted, as one of the middle grounds of contested values between modernity and traditionalism. Soccer provides a space for the display of individuality that is not acceptable in the culture on a normal basis, and along with Carnival, allows an inversion to occur. So the culture that values relational hierarchy above individualism also allows a style of soccer play that is based on creative individualism, seemingly in contradiction to cultural norms. In Brazil, individualism is often a synonym for egotism, which is perceived as highly negative. However, on the soccer field, this negative view is inverted, and individualism is highly

13 DaMatta, Carnival, Rogues and Heroes, 4, 6, 181, 133.
prized and applauded. It is because soccer is a site of resistance or contestation of the social norm, because it provides a “vent” in a hierarchal society, that not only can individualism be celebrated, but other forms of cultural resistance can also be framed. Perhaps one of the main areas of contestation on the soccer field is the celebration of the poor, Afro-Brazilian players that come from the favelas to make their fortune as international stars. Although this is the exception, clearly, rather than the rule, it does allow individuals to achieve financial success in a system that on the whole, does not allow poor blacks to succeed.14

DaMatta asserts that there are three vertices in Brazil: the state, the church, and the people. But even more important is the emphasis on the dichotomy of the street versus the home. To Brazilians, the home emphasizes a space of control, harmony, calm, rigid hierarchy, and structured space. It is strongly representative of rigid personal and kinship relationships that control much of Brazilian society. Who one knows or how they are related to one remains a defining element of the culture. The street represents unpredictability, accidents, passions, individual choice and the malandro. The street versus the home emphasis seems to be a controlling factor in Brazilian culture, and soccer most emphatically would be identified as an activity of the street. Not only do children literally grow up playing soccer in the street, but the space, the public space of soccer represents all those items that reflect the street: the game in unpredictable and involves an element of luck to win, accidents and passions are emphasized, individuality is prized and the malandro spirit is a defining character of Brazilian soccer.

14 DaMatta, *Carnivals, Rogues and Heroes*, 182.
style. The Brazilian conceptualization of the street, symbolic of soccer, also provides a site of resistance, inversion, and contestation.\(^{15}\)

The concept of hierarchy within Brazilian culture is an important one. The government, no matter whether it is a dictatorship or democratically elected, is perceived not only as a class instrument but also as a separate domain with its own laws and resources. Hierarchal relationships control much of the culture in Brazil, which from the Marxist viewpoint makes Brazil a definite product of colonialism whereby wealthy landowners supported a central and despotic Portuguese state leading to the latifunda system. As noted, the monocultural, latifunda system of one crop emphasis has gone through cycles of sugar, coffee, rubber, and now, soccer players. As shall be explored later, Brazil exports more soccer players than any other country, and the selling of players is how the soccer clubs survive in uncertain financial times. Soccer players are now the monocultural emphasis for a Brazilian latifunda system.\(^{16}\)

The fact that Brazil was a colony for many years, then under a monarchy, came late (comparatively) to nationalization, was ruled under dictatorships for much of the twentieth century, is a significant factor in the shaping of a culture that does not honor individual achievement. Brazil has had little opportunity to experience direct self-rule, and the hierarchization inherent in the society often limits that concept even further. For example, Brazil has always had laws limiting the vote to the literate, which in

\(^{15}\) Ibid., 43, 64.
\(^{16}\) Ibid., 10; Hess, “Introduction,” 4; Bellos, Futebol, 339-40.
Brazil can be a real issue. Four million Brazilian children are not in school, and 3.5 million children work. The official literacy rate is 81%, but up to 60% can do little more than write their own name. When early professionalization occurred in soccer, illiteracy was an issue used to prevent the game from escaping elite control, as shall be explored later. Given that Brazilians had few opportunities to select their style of government, and when they did, many of the poor were disenfranchised from the process, leads to the conclusion that supports DaMatta’s concept of hierarchization of the culture. In fact, DaMatta notes that in some ways it is paradoxical that Brazilians will never organize to demand rights, but will organize for fun, such as Carnival and soccer. These areas, again, allow the space for individual expression that is not apparent in the rest of the culture. It is reasonable to assume that that is one of the reasons that both Carnival and soccer are extremely popular, and prized as essences of the Brazilian character.17

The third implication from Brazilian history that plays out in terms of soccer is the racial composition of the country. While only 350,000 indigenous Amerindians remain in Brazil, representing 216 or more tribes and 180 languages, the Amerindian remains at the bottom of the social ladder. Well before soccer was officially imported from Britain, the Pareci Indians played a game with a rubber ball made from the sap of the mangaba tree, indicating some indigent games related to soccor occurred spontaneously in the country. Two teams faced each other and bounced the ball back and forth using

17 Rocha, Brazil, 26, 68; Sergio Koreisha, “Brazil in a Nutshell,” (http://www.uoregon.edu/~sergiok), 3; DaMatta, Carnivals, Rogues, and Heroes, 47.
only their heads, foreshadowing some stylistic emphases in Brazilian soccer. In 1913, Theodore Roosevelt journeyed through the Amazon, and also witnessed the game being played by the Pareci, and he christened it “headball.” While not many Amerindians have made the national squad in Brazil, a few have, and their contribution has often been an emphasis on their ability to run for long periods of time. In fact, physical tests have indicated that the Brazilian Amerindian has a cardio rate that is 10% more efficient than the other players on the team.18

While the Amerindian makes up a small portion of Brazil’s diverse population, Brazil has more than one hundred racial categories in their census. With a population of 175 million, Brazil boasts the second largest population in the western hemisphere. Over half of the population is considered mixed racially, with designations varying from cafuso (black and Indian) to mameluco (white and Indian) to mulatto and mestizo. The 1980 census in Brazil reported 53% of the population as white, 22% mulatto, 12% mestizo, 11% African, and 1% Japanese. Other sources indicate 54% white, 39% brown, and 6% black. Regardless of the figures used, Brazilians present a highly diversified culture, and the intermarriage of black, Indian, and European have shaped a unique culture that Brazil struggled with early in its history, until Freyre presented his theory on miscegenation as being a Brazilian strength. More than three-quarters of Brazilians live in an urban setting, and Brazil has significant “colonies” of Europeans which have played an important role in influencing culture. For example, there are currently 27 million persons that represent their heritage as being Portuguese, Spanish

18 Bellos, Futebol, 1, 77, 80, 85, 87.
or Italian, nine million that claim German blood, two million Japanese and nine million
Lebanese. As Geert Banck states, Brazil is truly a creole society. This racial mix has
been highly influential in the history of soccer, particularly as Afro-Brazilians and
mulattos began to co-opt the game early in its history.19

The conclusion to this chapter is that Brazilian history has shaped and influenced the
style of Brazilian soccer, particularly in regard to three implications. The first
implication is the latifunda system, or plantation system, with its emphasis on
monocultural production. Throughout Brazilian history, this monocultural emphasis
has led to boom/bust periods in cycles as the single export changed from brazilwood to
sugar to gold to coffee to rubber and now to soccer players. To support the latifunda
system, three massive waves of slavery imports from Africa occurred, which not only
shaped Brazilian culture, economy and national identity, but also were extremely
influential in the development of soccer playing style. That miscegenation of the
culture occurred led to a highly intermixed, categorized population with implications
that were far-reaching in terms of self-identity. The third implication is the
hierarchization of the culture, and the direct implications for lack of self-government
that occurred in conjunction with the hierarchization. Brazil’s colonial period,
monarchy period, and several periods of dictatorship have permitted the average citizen

---

19 “Brazilian Culture,” (http://iml.jou.ufl.edu/projects/Fall02/Schmitt/BRcultMain.html), 2; Muello,
“Leftist Likely to lead Brazil,” 1; Hess, “Introduction,” 1; Patrice Jones, “Who’s Black? In Brazil, New
Racial Preferences Set Off Debate,” Chicago Tribune (November 1, 2003); Chappell, “Sport in Latin
America,” 161; Oliven, Tradition Matters, 83; Lamartine DaCosta, “Epilogue: Hegemony,
Emancipation and Mythology,” Sport in Latin American Society: Past and Present ed. by J.A. Mangan
and Lamartine DaCosta (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 182; Geert A. Banck, “Mass Consumption and
Urban Contest in Brazil: Some Reflections on Lifestyle and Class,” Bulletin of Latin American Research,
few chances to participate in self-choice. Along with the hierarchization of the culture is the emphasis on the concept of the personal relationship and kinship ties that rule the society, far beyond the traditional class conceptualization that also occurs. Soccer playing style becomes an important open area of contestation for the population, and along with Carnival, provides a space for the celebration of individuality as well as the Afro-Brazilian. Soccer is generally perceived as an escape route from poverty. Soccer also serves as an open area for democracy, as it is one of the few areas in Brazilian society where individuals are judged strictly on merit, and not on relationships. The history of Brazil has had tremendous implications, although often nuanced, in the shaping of the style of soccer that Brazil plays.
CHAPTER 5
A SHORT HISTORY OF GERMANY AND HOW IT PERTAINS TO SOCCER

Germany, both as a region and a population, has a much longer documented history than Brazil, given the Eurocentric bias toward historical interpretation and documentation. However, similar to Brazil, Germany was relatively late in coming to the establishment of a nation-state, in terms of comparison to the rest of Europe. Five pertinent implications for the development of soccer, and thus soccer style, stem from an analysis of German history. These implications are less straight-forward than the ones identified with Brazil, and are more nuanced in terms of how they relate to the development of soccer within the nation-state of Germany. Germany, as always in terms of historicity, is a complicated amalgamation of parts. The five pertinent implications are the extremes in ideas versus reality represented in Germany that led to late nationalization, the geographical situating of German between east and west and concurrent with that the development of the concept of other, the historical implications of a weak middle class, the long history of decline in terms of size of the nation, and the influence of Prussia. These five historical implications all impacted on the development of soccer, and its playing style, within Germany.
The history of Germany stretches back to approximately 500,000 B.C.\(^1\), but the earliest significant documentation was written in A.D. 98 by the Roman historian, Tacticus. Tacticus’ treatise on Germania hypothesized that early German tribes were soon subdued by the Romans and incorporated into the Roman Empire. The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest in 9 A.D. halted Roman expansion, and liberated most of German tribes from Roman domination.\(^2\) Julius Caesar, writing in 51 B.C. in Book VI of *De Bello Gallico*, notes that Germans differ widely from the Gauls, and spend their entire life in hunting and war. From the earliest times, Germany has been culturally constructed in the warrior image.\(^3\) Tacticus provides a more in-depth and cultural picture of German tribes, describing their national war songs (valorizing Hercules), physical characteristics (huge frames fit only for physical exertion), military concepts (driven straight forward), government (kings by birth, generals by merit), youth training (arms presented as symbol of adulthood), warlike ardor (a reproach to return from battle if the chief is killed), dress, food, sport, slavery, and a delineation of each of the main tribes.\(^4\)

The material for heroic German epics, featuring the downfall of the Roman Empire in 410 when the German tribe, the Visigoths, sacked Rome, was provided by the time

\(^1\) http://timelines.ws/countries/Germ_To_1820.HTML, citing the *San Francisco Examiner and Chronicle* (September 26, 1999), T9.


\(^3\) Julius Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book VI (accessed from “Medieval Sourcebook” http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/51caesar-germans.html.)

period of 100-500 A.D.\textsuperscript{5} Charlemagne and the Carolingian dynasty ruled from 752-911, and his reign later became known as the First Reich as he united Roman, Christian and Germanic populations, and was crowned emperor by the pope in 800. With the expiration of the Carolingian line, the East Frankish kingdom elected a German to serve as their king (Conrad I), which many historians consider the beginning of a true German history. Other historians consider the Saxon king, Otto I, who invaded Italy and was crowned Holy Roman Emperor in 962 as the first true German king. Otto’s coronation is considered the beginning of the Holy Roman Empire, an institution that lasted until 1806, and contributed immensely to the delay of unification and nationalization of Germany.\textsuperscript{6}

Through the Saxton dynasty (919 to 1024) and the Salian dynasty (1024-1125), German persecution of Jews began to occur, concurrent with the Crusades. In 1096, German crusaders massacred the Jews of Worms before embarking on the First Crusade.\textsuperscript{7} The Hohenstaufen dynasty (1138-1254) established the monarchy as a major European power. The Great Interregnum lasted from 1256-1273 during which anarchy reigned, no emperor ruled, and a variety of German princes vied for advantage, which further increased fragmentation in Germany. The Knights of the Teutonic Order, a society of soldier-monks, extended the concept of German colonization in the east, and established


\textsuperscript{7} “Timeline Germany to 1820,” citing Scope Systems, Today in History, Internet (May 18, 2002).
German as the dominant culture and language in the region that would become Prussia.\(^8\)

The Habsburg dynasty ruled on and off from 1273 until the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806. In 1280, German merchants formed the Hanseatic League to facilitate trade. Continued persecution of Jews was apparent as the Jewish population was blamed for the ravages of the Black Death, or bubonic plague, which swept Europe.\(^9\)

In 1517, Martin Luther nailed his Ninety-five theses to the door of the Wittenberg Palace All Saint’s Church, signaling the start of the Protestant Reformation. Luther’s theses spread rapidly throughout Germany as he advocated for a German national church separate from Rome. Rome and the Holy Roman Empire banned Luther, who sought sanctuary among the German princes. In 1525, a revolt that started in Switzerland and spread to Germany, led to the Great Peasant War, whereby the peasants revolted against the princes amidst Protestants revolting against the Catholics. The peasants demanded an end to feudal services and oppression by the landed gentry, but the revolt was eventually crushed by the ruling class and the Holy Roman Empire. Despite the crushing of the rebellion, by 1545 most of northern Germany and large parts of southern Germany were Protestant.\(^10\)

---


The significance of the Protestant Reformation starting in Germany cannot be overemphasized, as its impact on subsequent historical occurrences in the nation is important. The Reformation effectively split the country in half, not only along religious lines but also political and class lines. As Golo Mann points out, not only did the Reformation split Germany apart, it did not do so elsewhere. The Empire, as a Catholic Empire, was pitted against the German princes, who benefited from the confusion that ensued. The elite classes, in conjunction with their power embedded in the Empire, tended to remain Catholic, whereas the masses, newly exposed to a religious text that emphasized “human equality and justice and is hostile to the rich”, in Mann’s words, fostered social unrest. The old Empire, mainly in the south and west remained Catholic, whereas the provinces, mainly Prussia, Pomerania and Brandenburg became Protestant. As Prussia rose in power, later, its Protestant influence also became even more pronounced within Germany.11

The late 1500’s saw another spike in incidences of a German drive to eliminate the “other” in their society. In 1597, Germany threw out English salesmen in what they termed “a noble experiment.”12 In 1618, the Thirty Years’ War broke out in Bohemia, but eventually spread to all of Europe, and ended up devastating Germany and reducing the size and power of its empire. Although devastating the country, the Thirty Years’ War did lead to a reduction of German particularism, drawing together some of the German princes. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 ended the war and effectively

destroyed the Holy Roman Empire, but also left Germany a scene of desolation and
disorder, wasted by fire, bloodshed, and the plague. The war was followed by a period
of decline due to the lack of laborers to reconstruct. During the last half of the 1600’s,
within the boundaries of Germany today, there were 234 independent countries, 51 free
cities and some 1500 knightly manors governed by their lords. Again, examples of
German anti-Semitism are demonstrated, as in the 1699 expelling of Jews from
Lubeck.13

The period from 1700-1786 is significant in the decline of the Holy Roman Empire and
the rise of Prussia. In 1700, Samuel Pufendorf writing in the History of the Principal
Kingdoms notes that the popes had long robbed the German kings of most of their
ruling power. King Frederick William I, ruling from 1713-1740, instigated the rise of
Prussia via the creation of an efficient army and related bureaucracy. Count von
Seckendorf, the Austrian ambassador to Berlin during the period noted that “nowhere in
the world one can see troops comparable with the Prussians…”14 Representative of the
rise of Prussia was the historical treatise “On War” written by Karl von Clausewitz,
which has remained a primer for military historians.15 During the Enlightenment
(roughly the 1700’s), Germans began to focus on the concept of national spirit,

---

13 “History of Germany,” 1; “East Germany: The Reformation and the Thirty Years’ War,” 2; “Timeline
Germany to 1820,” citing: Charles Van Doren, History of Knowledge, 90, San Francisco Chronicle (May
17, 1996), A-14, Scope Systems, and Today in History (March 4, 2002.)
14 Samuel Pufendorf, An Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe
(London: Thomas Newborough and Martha Gilliflower, 1700), 303; Count von Seckendorf, “On
Frederick William I,” The Foundations of Germany translated by J. Ellis Barker (New York: E.P. Dutton
and Co., 1916), 11. Both are cited by “Modern History Sourcebook”
(http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/hre-prussia.html).
15 “Modern History Sourcebook” (August 11, 2004); “Timeline Germany to 1820,” citing Webster's
volkgeist, and national folklore, volkstum, rather than merely denominations and borders of the country.16

During the Napoleonic period, Germany generally remained passive until the German war against France from 1792-1807. Napoleon’s main impact was the organization of the Confederation of the Rhine, mainly to limit the power and growth of Prussia. The Confederation collapsed when Napoleon was defeated in the battle of Leipzig by the coalition of Russia, Prussia, Britain, and Austria. France did not want Germany to establish as a nation-state, and Napoleon regarded Prussia as much more dangerous than the southern German states. The growth of the German Romantics during this period came to be representational of a thinking of escaping to the past and looking to a German fatherland that never really existed. The rise of Friedrich Jahn and his militant Teutonic gymnastics represented the rise in a nationalism based on a looking to the past for glory. Also representative of the time period is Hegel; the German philosopher of history that saw the self in an alien world and believed that might gives right.17

The Congress of Vienna in 1815, trying to restore the balance of power in Europe, stipulated the creation of the German Confederation which united several hundred small states into thirty-eight larger ones, with Prussia and Austria vying for primacy. In 1815,


the main occupation of Germany was still agricultural, with a patriarchal society and three class divisions: nobility, middle class and the masses. As Mann states: “The Germans were a loyal people who clung to traditions; how loyal almost defies description.” During the Metternich Era, Prussia and Austria remained united through the German Confederation. From 1830 onward, Prussia became more nationalistic and talk arose of expelling Austria from the Confederation. Along with rising nationalism, the growth of the Burschenschaften, or the student associations spread from northern and central Germany southward. The student associations were Christian and nationalistic, favoring a united “fatherland” and against foreign influence, particularly French and Jewish. They also took an enthusiasm for physical fitness from Jahnian principles, glorifying the past. By 1818, Prussia was forcing smaller German states into an economic union, and the establishment of the Zollverein in 1834 as a customs union, as well as the growth of the railroad system, further solidified trade and led to the German participation in the Industrial Revolution. As Prussia grew in power, German nationalism also increased, particularly during the Crisis of 1840 when France began to contest for the Rhine. The Rhine became the symbol of Franco-German enmity, later called the “hereditary enmity.” During the 1840’s, Marx and Engels began to make their voices heard in Germany. Anti-Semitism continued to grow, particularly among the French, German and Austrian middle classes.18

The March Revolution of 1848 began with a demand for a German Reich and the reorganization of the German Confederation. Eventually the Austrian, Metternich, resigned from office, and liberal philosophy held sway as “freedom” was granted to both Prussia and the German states, or freedom as defined by traditional authority. Formation of political parties began, but loyalty to the state continued to be stronger than the enthusiasm for a united Germany. The concepts of *grosseutsch* (greater German) and *kleindeutsch* (little German) came into vogue during 1848, signifying talk of unifying Germany with or without the inclusion of Austria. Eventually Germany reacted to Austria by deciding to implement *kleindeutsch* with Prussian leadership. Prussia invaded southern Germany, but an Austrian-Russian alliance finally forced Prussia to restore the original German Confederation. Many historians believe that early attempt of German unification in 1848 failed due to the opposition of Britain, Russia and France, who feared the power of a unified Germany.¹⁹

During the 1850’s Germany leapt into industrialization, and from 1840 to 1860, 50,000 individuals immigrated into the Ruhr region. Prussia continued to dominate the smaller principalities of Germany, but as Golo Mann maintains, Prussia itself was a dynasty and not a nation, whereas German states did not serve a nation. Italy united into a nation-state in 1861, but Germany and Prussia were still debating over the concepts of *grosseutsch* and *kleindeutsch*. By the middle of the century, often stemming initially from Social Darwinism, racial theories were flooding Europe and transgressing into outright racism. The German middle class began to perceive the growing labor class as

a threat, and the concept of a master race directed against the political interest of the masses attained great importance.  

In 1862, Bismarck became chancellor of Prussia, and set out to unify Germany with or without Austria. German unity, long dreamed about by the middle class, was achieved completely without their cooperation. The German Reich was proclaimed by princes and generals, and the middle class and masses followed along with little say in the matter. By 1866 Prussia was at war with Austria over control of the German Confederation. Prussia eventually absorbed some of the northern German states, and formed the rest into the North German Confederation in 1867. Engels remarked that “The main disadvantage, and it is a very big one, is the inevitable swamping of Germany by the Prussian spirit.” In 1871 Prussia unified the federal states into a nation-state, the German Reich, and in the process lost their own identity as a country but still maintained power through the Kaiser, who also happened to be the King of Prussia. After 1871, the middle class adopted aristocratic models, further weakening middle class influence. However, the victory by Prussia over France was hammered into young German boys leading to ideals of manhood associated with warrior-like attributes. German aggressiveness became codified as a stereotype, based on the

machine-like, disciplined army of Prussia, and the stereotype has been little changed the past 150 years.  

During the 1870’s, the German population rate decreased, and there were many concerns over the poor physical condition of the people, while the Russian population soared. The depression of 1873 led to a condemnation of liberalism within Germany, and along with it, an increasingly virulent racism could be easily identified. The Congress of Vienna had awarded the Ruhr region to Prussia, and from 1870-1900 masses of immigrants flowed into the area to work in the coal mining industries. 800,000 individuals came to live in coal villages with no urban core. The era of the big banks controlling industry as well as the House of Krupps establishing themselves as the armaments industry, all occurred within this time period. The Junkers, the landed Prussian landowners may have lagged behind the new industrialists economically, but they still controlled the power within Prussia via the government and the army. They prevented the middle class from assuming any authority, and the middle class was weak enough to be satisfied with economic advantages. Technically, Prussia was only about two thirds of the German Reich, but in terms of power they were dominant, and they controlled all aspects of religion and education within the Reich. As the Christian Socialist Party continued to grow in strength, their commitment to anti-Semitism also strengthened. It was during the 1870’s that Richard Wagner came into prominence with...
his epic operas saturated with elements from the glorious German past. In 1888, Freidrich Nietzsche was openly critical of Wagner, as well as Christianity, anti-Semitism, and all religion. However, it was also Nietzsche that promulgated the concept of the superman, which would later in history become a driving force.22

The Wilhemian Era lasted from 1888-1914, when William II was Kaiser of Germany. Norbert Elias notes that it was during this period that the middle class finally made peace with the aristocracy, and the middle class code which had been anti-aristocratic now swung the other way. About 90% of the German university students now came from the affluent middle class, and the student-corps, the _satisfaktionsfähig _Gesellschaft, forced the youth of the country into a set of rules encompassing the whole of their social life. The military continued to be highly honored, and had a higher social status than wealthy merchants. Rather than the court society playing an integrating role, it was the military and the student corps that played a centralizing position. The Kaiser viewed himself as the German emperor, although his role was certainly new and ahistorical. The Social Democrat Party soon became Germany’s largest political party. By the 1890’s, Germany had leapt into colonialism, taking possession of Cameroon, Togoland, Rwanda, and Western Samoa. In conjunction with colonialism, the pan-German movement became more prominent, and it had a very imperialistic and racist bent. The government believed that in order for Germany to become a world power they would first have to secure and dominate Europe since they were a land-locked

nation in the middle of the continent. Germany became increasingly isolated from the rest of the world, and boastfully announced that they could do without anyone else. The pan-Germans were in a desperate search for identity in a world that wanted to ignore them. Austria became Germany’s only ally, while Prussia continued to control Germany. Prussian honor continued to increase, but morality decreased as ideals were viewed as weaknesses, but Germany was becoming a power on the world stage. It was a power bid made by the nobility and the military, and the middle class was largely excluded from participation. In 1913, an imperial edict was announced basing nationality on bloodlines rather than birthplace, and laid the base for German citizenship law. The law merely established more firmly the concept of “other” in the German mind.23

It is not pertinent to play out all the details of World War I within the context of this paper; however, it does become important to note the pan-Germans and eventually the masses of the German public eventually identified Britain as their main enemy. After Germany’s defeat in the war, they were to live under two basic laws: the Treaty of Versailles which governed their relationships with their former enemies, and the Weimar Constitution which governed Germany from within. Germany regarded the Treaty of Versailles as unjust and overly stringent, as one eighth of its territory, all of its colonies, and a substantial part of its coal were taken from them. Germany was to bear the blame, and the restitution, for the war. Along with the burden of reparation,

inflation was rampant within Germany, further adding to the financial woes of the country. The Weimar Constitution did not break up Prussia, but the president was to be elected by the whole country. Germany again oscillated between centralization and regionalism, a repeated occurrence throughout their modern history. The army began to be rebuilt, but Germany continued to feel that there was a universal conspiracy against them and any possibility of recovery. The majority of the population began to look back toward the “glorious past” while regarding the present with resentment. The middle class began to regard the labor class as opponents, while the younger generation foresaw little hope for their future. The National Socialist Party remained a lunatic fringe group until the world economic crash of 1929, when it began to rise in power mainly due to its propaganda campaign. Mann itemizes a variety of reasons that led to the rise of the Nazi movement: a weak Republic and the belief that the Weimar state was merely an institution, the League of Nations that was controlled by the French, pan-German dreams, anti-Semitism that had permeated the society, and a generally hatred of the world and the power it controlled over Germany. Elias would add that the weak control of the military and the police by the government was highly significant. The Weimar Republic ended in 1933 when Hitler was appointed Chancellor, and by 1945 the world was once again at war with Germany who was now allied with Italy and Japan.24

---

The Potsdam Agreement after World War II created many changes in the landscape of Europe. Germany was reduced by one fourth, Poland received several German provinces, the victors took over administration of Germany, all German speaking persons were forced back to Germany (about 12 million in all), Germany was essentially portioned in two, and Prussia was dissolved because it was perceived to have born the main guilt for German historical errors. The election of Adenauer in 1949, and his presidency through 1963 demonstrated the coming of the middle class to power for the first time in German history. In 1961 the Berlin Wall was build, fully sealing off East Germany from West until reunification in 1990.²⁵

Germany went through an “economic miracle” after World War II, building its economy back to one of the most prosperous in the world. However, recent changes have been significant and carry implications for concern. From 1995 to 2002, Germany had the worst economy in Europe, and the economic and political crises in Europe has created serious problems. In the European Union, Britain and France frequently oppose German proposals for a federalized Europe, in part out of fear of German domination. German schools are faltering, and the German social welfare system is unsustainable. Yet Germans are averse to change, despite the tremendous economic drain created by reunification and the present welfare system. In 1999 the law was reformed that restricted German nationality based purely on German blood, but a rising right wing, anti-immigrant nationalism is also occurring. German immigrants are still segregated economically, socially and legally, and are discouraged from attaining citizenship. By

the end of the 1990’s, Germany had 7.5 million foreign born residents, and was facing an immigration crisis. Political parties are becoming increasingly vocal about forced assimilation and anti-immigration policies. As economic concerns became apparent, German support for EU institutions declined.⁹⁶

So how have the five pertinent implications from German history shaped both the concept of soccer and the subsequent development of a playing style in German soccer? The first implication is the oscillation between extremes that played out in German history as ideal versus reality and led to late nationalism for the country. The concept of Empire has contrasted mightily with the reality of countless small territorial states within Germany. Empire, be it the Holy Roman Empire, or an extended colonial empire as perceived during the Wilhelminian times, or a European empire as perceived by Hitler, has contrasted with the reality of a nation-state coming very late to nationalism, and in fact, the reality versus ideal was one of the significant reasons for that tardiness.⁹⁷ Golo Mann states:

> The memory of the Empire delayed and impeded the development of the modern nation-state; in the end it contributed to its establishment and deformed it. Much of the nation’s combination of political superiority and inferiority complexes stemmed originally from that memory.⁹⁸

Elias also notes that it was during medieval times that Germany did not keep pace with the state-formation process that other nations were progressing through, mainly due to

---

⁹⁷ Mann, History of Germany, 4.
⁹⁸ Mann, History of Germany, 8.
the weak formation of the Holy Roman Empire and the counterbalance that regional princes supplied. Empire versus regionalism was one extreme, but there were other extremes within German history that tended to contribute to late nationalism. The German people tended to indulge in an orgy of self-destruction, such as the Thirty Years War that devastated the region, and then the pendulum would swing upward, and the German people would reach high, spiritual heights, such as the Reformation. Political extremes, from disinterest to frenetic activity occurred throughout German history. Economic swings are particularly noted, from the inception of industrialization to collapsed economies after both World Wars, to the “economic miracle” of recovery during the 1950’s and ‘60’s, to the current economic stagnation of the early twenty-first century. The concept of aggression, in particular, demonstrates the oscillations that Germany has gone through historically in terms of extremes. Immense hatred toward others leading to war, to complete chaos and collapse, to economic recovery and return to status are all cyclic periods in German history. At times Germany demonstrates a very cosmopolitan attitude, receptive of foreign ideas. In fact, the Bundesliga (the German soccer league) is considered, both by data and narrative, to be the most cosmopolitan of all the major soccer leagues in the world. Yet, at other times, Germany withdraws into a hyper-nationalism, rejecting anything and everything foreign.

Germans swing between philosophical and hard-nosed practicality.29

As will be explored in more detail during the chapter on national identity, the coming
to nationalism at a relatively late time period compared to the rest of Europe has had a
negative impact on how Germans perceive themselves. The relationship of this fact to
soccer is indirect, but could subtly explain the tremendous emphasis and will that
Germans put into their national soccer team and the tremendous emphasis on winning.
Winning further supports the German national identity as a nation that matters, that is
influential and powerful within the world system. Germany always appears as trying to
“make their name” and reinforce their status in the world of soccer, and late nationalism
indirectly spurs this process. The oscillating extremes are less apparent in German
soccer, although the 2004 Euro Championship should be a point of reflection. The team
that was runner up in the 2002 World Cup performed dismally, crashing and burning, at
Euro 2004. The national coach resigned, two designated replacements turned down the
position, and Germany is in a panic over their team, which is scheduled to be the host
nation at World Cup 2006.\(^{30}\) However, unless the unforeseen occurs, it is not predicted
that German playing style will change substantially. One of the hallmarks of German
style is consistency in approach, that “machine-like” quality that is so often identified
with German soccer.

The next pertinent implication from German history is the geographical location of
Germany and how that has contributed to their conception of the “other.” Germany has
no natural boundaries, and is situated between Latin and Slavic cultures, both of which
have influenced Germany. The Latin culture has often been considered “more

civilized” than Germany, whereas the Slavic has frequently been termed less so.

Germany’s central position in Europe has always been threatening in terms of power vectors and control. The development of a concept of “other” has often stemmed from the uneasiness that the German population feel due to their location.31 Elias puts it more succinctly:

The process of state-formation among the Germans was deeply influenced by their position as middle bloc in the figuration of these three blocs of peoples. The Latinized and Slavonic groups time and again felt threatened by the populous German state. Time and again, the representatives of the nascent German state felt threatened from different sides at the same time. 32

The German people’s constant feeling of threat translated into a conception of the “other” that was also threatening. The emphasis on German bloodlines as necessary for citizenship, only recently repealed, is one indication of how Germans reacted to others in their society. Recent concerns over immigration policy and indications of rising right wing reactions to immigration are further indications that German national feelings have not been resolved in this age of globalization. Certainly the long and documented anti-Semitism (since the early Middle Ages) demonstrated by the German people are indicative of a long-seated feeling of alienation toward the “other” in their society. And it goes without saying that Hitler’s visions of racial purity demonstrate this unease taken to the impossible extreme. But other instances are also available. Germany’s “hereditary enmity” with France was identified as early as 1840, and Germans have often demonstrated a love-hate relationship with France historically. At various times

31 Mann, History of Germany Since 1789, 4-6.
in history, England was designated the “evil other” by Germans, as in 1597 when the “noble experiment” to throw English salesmen out of the country occurred. Early soccer in Germany struggled due to its association with the English, and was often rejected as “that English game.” The impact of a vision of “other” has played out in soccer style to a certain extent, also. It wasn’t until 2001 that a black appeared on the German national team, Ghanaian immigrant, Gerald Asamoah.

The 2002 World Cup national team featured only three players that played outside of Germany (two in England, one in France), whereas the majority of the Brazilian team play outside their country. When a number of national team players play their club season outside the country, they are exposed to different styles and different levels of play, which in turn influences the national team upon their return. As athletic migration increases on a global basis, national teams all have to adjust to a more cosmopolitan style. However, Germany appears to differ in that aspect. By drawing national team players mainly from their own national league, the Bundesliga, German style is less impacted by variety and exposure to other styles of play. Yes, the Bundesliga is a cosmopolitan league, but the German national team is not reflective of that in comparison to most other national teams. German national teams always have a German coach, whereas many developing soccer nations go outside their country to recruit a top level coach to help increase development of the team. (The United States hired Bora Multinovich, Carlos Parreira of Brazil has coached the Kuwaiti national

33 Ulrich Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!: The Story of German Football (London: WSC Books, 2002), 26, 32.
34 Kim, “Germany’s Soccer Team Scores a Multiracial First,” 1.
team, and the Greek national team is currently coached by the German, Otto Rehhagel.)

Even as Germany struggled to find someone to take the national team coaching job after their dismal loss in Euro ’04, they only turned to German coaches, finally convincing former player, Jurgen Klinnsmann to accept the job.

The third pertinent implication regarding German history is the tradition of a weak middle class, particularly in comparison to other European nations. Especially during the period of the Enlightenment, when other nation’s middle classes were developing and participating in restructuring society, the German middle class was weak. As Mann states:

> The German Enlightenment did not have its roots in any particular class. The cause of this is to be found more in the character of the middle class with its deep respect for authority and in the egotistical sense of self-preservation of the patriciate than in economic backwardness.36

Germany’s histories of style of rule, from the Holy Roman Empire, to small princedoms, to the Wilhemian era, are all indicative of rule from above. When aristocratic power was shared out, it was shared mainly with the military, which was not regarded as a middle class institution but one connected with the landed gentry. The deep respect for authority had become engrained in the national psyche for centuries. The monarchy in Germany assured that the top groups of urban merchants remained people of second rank, inferior to princes and court society, and generally to provincial aristocracy. The German nobility legitimized their claims to nobility by unbroken lines of descent that were untainted by middle class values or bloodlines. Elias points out

two streams of middle class politics were recognizable during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, and their main emphasis was the unification of Germany. It was
significant, then, that their plans failed. As Elias states, “The victory of the German
armies over France (in 1870) was at the same time a victory of the German nobility over
the German middle class.”37 Mann would agree, noting “What for half a century had
been the dream of the middle classes was now achieved without, and at times in spite of
the middle classes.”38 Elias further notes that prior to 1914, the middle class adopted
the lifestyle and norms of the military nobility as their own, leading to the capitulation
of the middle class to the aristocracy. As the middle class appropriated aristocratic
models of behavior, boundaries of behavior were often blurred and misunderstand by
the middle class. This in turn led to acceptance of boundless use of power and violence,
power that was more constrained within a military atmosphere. In the civil service and
the military, ancestry predetermined social ranking. One of the significant factors of
late nationalization for Germany is that bourgeois wealth also developed relatively late,
and with established emphasis on bloodlines, middle class power developed much later
than in other countries. Even the traditional image of the nation appeared outside the
boundaries of existence for most Germans as they viewed it as something external to
themselves, formed by those in control.39

The implications of a weak middle class in Germany had an indirect effect on the
development of soccer, and hence style, within the country. In the early years of soccer

38 Mann, History of Germany Since 1789, 172.
development, during the British imperialistic exportation of the game, soccer was not considered an acceptable middle class German sport, mainly because it was considered English. The Turner gymnastic movement, in particular, took a firm stand against soccer as being an “imported British game” that was not acceptable to German sensibilities as it emphasized competition, violent and uncontrolled movements, and did not have the patriotic implications that Jahnian gymnastics did. Regionally, working class soccer developed in specific areas, particularly the Ruhr area as Siegfried Gehrmann has delineated, but the middle class had little involvement after originally starting the clubs. After World War I, the Ruhr area clubs were clearly working class. Early soccer did develop in a school setting in some areas, but other areas, like western Germany, forbade students to participate in soccer games. Some of the earlier club settings were elite establishments associated mainly with gymnastics, but soccer always had a second tier designation compared to gymnastics. Christiane Eisenberg points out that sport played a disintegrative role in middle class formation in Germany. The military also had a hand in the development of soccer, but as has been established, the military institution came from the elite of the society. Udo Merkel has demonstrated the early connections of soccer in Germany with nationalistic and militaristic ideas. The implications of a weak middle class led to their having little, or minor influence on the development of the sport in Germany, initially.40

The fourth pertinent implication for soccer deriving from German history is the history of decline in size of the area of Germany, which in turn led to a weak self national identity. Germany moved from early German tribes controlling vast amounts of area, to the Holy Roman Empire, to the conglomeration of small principalities of German princes, to reduced size after each World War. Elias mentions that during the High Middle Ages, the German Reich had stretched far to the east with colonization and expansion, but had steadily undergone a process of increasing fragmentation since that time. German history, despite its many ups and downs, was a history of increasing decline.

Whether it was a question of the end of the Hohenstaufens or the Hohenzollerns of finally of the end of Hitler and his regime, the result every time was a weaker or smaller Germany.

The concept of German particularism, as other nations gradually developed toward a national unity, came about from the lack of centralized power within the Empire. German particularism set a pattern for Germany, indistinct no doubt, but a historical pattern that can vaguely be discerned as Germany became smaller and smaller. The reunification of East and West Germany in 1990, greeted with optimism and celebration, did increase the land size of Germany, halting the decline that had been in process for eons. However, the reunification was the greatest contributor to the plunge in economic security that had been enjoyed by West Germany, and led to much of their

---


42 Ibid., 344.
current financial crisis. The history of declining size of Germany has led to the shaping of a national identity that feels loss of power and size can be somehow mitigated by strength in sporting venues, to a certain degree. The concept of German national identity will be further explored in a later chapter, but the essence here is that decreasing size and power of a nation have indirect implications on the shaping of sport within that nation. German national soccer teams seem to feel they must “prove” something to the rest of the world on a constant basis. Combined with the fifth implication, the significance of Prussia on German history, it becomes more clear how German soccer teams have been branded with a warrior, machine-like stereotype, which has had an impact on the development of style of play.43

The fifth significant implication from German history is the influence of Prussia on the rest of Germany, and how Prussia has shaped and contributed to the playing style demonstrated by the German national team. While Mann would certainly disagree that Prussia has had a significant impact on Germany, a strong argument could very easily be made that they had, and that Prussia’s impact has also been a significant contributor to the shaping of a German soccer style. Mann argues that Prussia is not a cardinal factor in German history primarily because it only existed for one hundred and fifty years, and was eventually absorbed by Germany as many of the smaller principalities also were. Mann also argues that since Prussia has disappeared, it will soon be forgotten as it did not exist for the German nation nor the good of its subjects, and that

in reality, Prussia was not a Junker state. There was no Prussian ethnic group, and Mann maintains that the Prussian army existed merely to serve the state.\textsuperscript{44}

However, this argument can be refuted in several areas. For one, the longevity of a nation is not necessarily a measure of its influence, and the existence of Prussia and the impact that it had on both Germany and Europe, despite its short length of existence, is indisputable. Yes, Prussia existed not for Germany, but for itself. Yes, Prussia was not an ethnic group (although at one point far back in history a Prussian tribe did exist.) Mann’s argument that Prussia was not a Junker nation because other nations existed that also had the Junker system of nobility does not negate the fact that Prussia was influenced to a certain extent by their system of nobility. Elias notes that the Junkers loyalty was always to the land, and not to the Empire. What is important to delineate is that the Prussian national identity, or habitus, has had a large influence both on Germany and also on how the rest of the world perceives the stereotype of Germany, particularly in military terms. Prussia dominated Germany economically during the important transition of the Industrial Revolution, in part due to the Junker customs union, the Zollverein, that promoted trade between German states. Bismarck, the Prussian chancellor, and his policy of “iron and blood”, was instrumental in the unification of Germany, and the unification of Germany under Prussian rule was important in promoting the influence of Prussian characteristics upon the nation.\textsuperscript{45} After

\textsuperscript{44} Mann, \textit{History of Germany Since 1789}, 13-15.
the unification, Prussian behavioral elements became cemented in German national
character. Elias notes that:

Aristocratic German, especially Prussian, patterns of behavior and feeling also underwent bourgeoisification, and became elements in the German national character. Such traits had already penetrated wide sectors of the population before the establishment of the empire, but the very pronounced tendency of the German aristocracy to distance themselves from the middle classes made it difficult if not impossible for patterns of behavior and feeling to be transported from one stratum to another. Only with the unification of the empire and with the increasing incorporation of middle-class groups into the lower ranks of the court-aristocratic establishment, through titles and honors, for example, did fewer obstacles come to stand in the way of the flow of aristocratic patterns into middle-class circles and their transformation into national patterns.46

Elias further mentions that in the Prussian code of values, cultural achievements and morality ranked much lower than questions of honor, and that the deeply-rooted Prussian-German conscience formation also made it difficult to oppose authority.47 On the soccer field, honor and the will to win, still appear to rank higher in German esteem than “playing a beautiful style of game.” How the style of play appears does not matter as much as winning.

Merkel calls Prussia the “largest and economically the most important” state within the unified nation of Germany, and emphasizes how the Prussian military tradition has actually been embedded within German soccer from its earliest days. He notes that the use of militaristic expressions and metaphors to describe the game was initiated as a means of impressing the ruling elite which valorized the military. Soccer was compared

47 Ibid., 114, 415.
to war, and the army and the navy introduced soccer into their training regimens soon after the formation of the German Football Association. The DBF (German Football Association) glorified the Wilhelmine Empire (which was virtually the Prussian Empire) and clearly revealed a deep commitment to the “political and social positions of the past.” Bismarck had promoted the traditional colors of Prussian black and white with the Hanseatic red as emblematic of the Wilhelmine Empire, and those same colors were used several times by the DBF, even though the Weimar Republic was represented by black, red and gold.48 John Hoberman asserts that even as early as 1871, Germans were characterized as having the “iron discipline of the Prussian soldier that transformed the disciplined warriors of Germany into animated machines”, and that this Prussian stereotype of the Germans has assumed various forms since its codification in the 1870’s. Previous mention of German soccer style, particularly when described by the foreign press, still emphasizes the militaristic and machine analogies as being symptomatic of the German style of play.49 Hoberman also relates that:

An examination of the German press confirms the existence of a stable set of images applied by Germans to themselves that conform to the Prussian stereotype…: hard work (Fleiss), discipline, steady morale in combat (ausgeglichene Kampfmoral), initiative (Einsatz), will power, toughness and tenacity (Hartnäckigkeit, Verbissenheit), the will to victory.50

Prussia has definitely left a legacy within German soccer, and has had tremendous influence on the development of the style of play. In fact, the descriptive terminology

50 Ibid., 82-3.
used to delineate the German style of play is almost exactly a codification of the
description of Prussian military might.

In conclusion, the five pertinent and significant implications from German history have
had an impact on the development of soccer and soccer style within the country of
Germany. Germany’s late nationalization compared to other European countries,
heavily influenced by the pendulum like extremes between ideology and reality ( as
evidenced by the Reformation), concepts of nationalism vying with cosmopolitanism
that are still apparent in Germany today, and the self-destructive/rebuilding cycle
demonstrated in German history, all played out in terms of soccer, but played out very
often in an indirect manner. Late nationalization influenced a feeling on the soccer field
of needing to achieve to prove worth. Cycles of extremes are apparent when viewing
German soccer history, and very blatant when comparing the World Cup 2002 runner
up status to the abysmal showing of Germany in Euro 2004.

Germany’s geographical location which influenced their concept of “other” is still
apparent, and plays out in terms of cosmopolitanism within the Bundesliga but rarely
within the national team. German hooligan fans exhibit this dichotomy with increasing
concerns regarding violence toward the “other.” The national soccer team is still not
thoroughly integrated, and nationalistic fervor regarding the team still considers other
groups and countries as a negative “other.” While the impact on style has been to
maintain a certain degree of “German purity”, it would also be appropriate to surmise
that in the long run, this may turn into a negative aspect as the team has less internal exposure to other playing styles, unlike the majority of national teams.

The conceptualization of a weak middle class combined with the concept of “other” has led to much of the influence emanating from the elite and the military to the national team. Soccer did not truly become popularized in Germany until it moved to the masses after World War I. However, the masses have had little control of the soccer hierarchy. While the lower classes have had an impact on style of play at different times in German soccer history (specifically the Schalke teams and their whirling top), the determination of style has often been defined by the elite coaching ranks in opposition to the masses. This concept will be further explored in the chapter on German soccer history, but suffice to say, a weak middle class has led to a weak impact on determination of style.

The long history of decline in size of the country, and then reunification, is another nuanced impact on soccer style. The feeling of loss is strongly embedded in the German psyche and has perhaps led to a more militaristic approach on the soccer field to overcome that loss. Reunification with East Germany has not led to the anticipated superiority of German soccer, and the economic ramifications of reunification have been significant. While these are indirect influences on soccer, and soccer style, they can be teased out in terms of impact.
The influence of Prussia, and the Prussian national character, is almost overly apparent in soccer style, to the point that the influence has been caricatured by the European press. Most of the defining conceptualizations of German soccer style, such as efficiency, military connotations, machine-like, physicality, and war terminology all can be related to traits exemplified by Prussia. That Prussia no longer exists is beside the point, as their influence on German character has been deeply instilled, and this influence also plays out very directly in terms of soccer style when discussing the national team. German history, with all its extremes and ups and downs, has had an impact on the development of soccer style within the country.
CHAPTER 6
THE SPORT HISTORY OF BRAZIL

It is important to trace the sport history of a country, particularly its soccer history, before tracing the development of soccer style. This chapter will concentrate on how soccer was disseminated to Brazil, how it developed through particular stages, how professionalization and club development occurred in Brazil, as well as how the national team progressed historically through World Cup competitions. While the concentration of this sporting history is soccer, it must be acknowledged that other sporting histories were also occurring and developing, yet none of them rivaled the popularity that soccer obtained within Brazil. There truly can be little debate that soccer rules as the king of sport in Brazil, although its hegemony is slowly being challenged by a variety of sports in recent years. However, none of them, yet, challenges soccer’s superiority.

Around 1824, a wave of German immigrants arrived in southern Brazil, lured by allocations of land from the imperial government trying to increase the number of Europeans in the country. By 1850 the German community had established turnen clubs as a means of preserving their ethnic identity and promoting the pan-German movement. Turnen clubs featured gymnastics and organized physical exercise in the
traditional German manner, but also served as a socialization means for the
communities.\(^1\) Lamartine DaCosta and Plinio Labriola set the date of the establishment
of turnen at 1867 in Porte Alegro, and noted the emphasis in the clubs of Friedrich
Jahn’s doctrine of body discipline, group sociability and military preparation.\(^2\)

Concurrent with this time period, other very British sports were being established in the
country, and engaged in by the elite population, particularly in the city of Rio de
Janeiro. Horse racing had been introduced as an amusement by the British around
1810, the first official regatta was held in 1846, and the first yacht club was founded in
1851. Betting on horse racing and other events began to appear around the middle of
the century, and grew in popularity by the end of the century. By 1885, Rio had a
variety of sporting facilities that featured two skating rinks, an athletic and cycling
arena, swimming pools, gymnastic clubs, billiard halls, as well as boating regattas and
horse racing, which continued to flourish.\(^3\) J.A. Mangan notes that British sport was
willingly embraced by Latin America and quickly assimilated as it was considered
superior and desirable.\(^4\) He surmises that Britain displaced Spain and Portugal in South
America by means of selling industrial products and controlling the commercial
networks, and since the British considered games as part of the imperial civilizing

\(^1\) Leomar Tesche and Artur Blasio Rambo, “Constructing the Fatherland: German Turnen in Southern
Brazil,” *The European Sports History Review: Europe, Sport, World: Shaping Global Societies* ed. by
\(^2\) Lamartine P. DaCosta and Plinio Labriola, “Bodies from Brazil: Fascist Aesthetics in a South American
\(^3\) Victor De Melo and J.A. Mangan, “A Web of the Wealthy: Modern Sport in the Nineteenth-Century
process, their games arrived along with their products. While the games were generally enthusiastically welcomed by the elite, they were also controlled and disseminated by the elite.\(^5\) Lamartine DaCosta cites a primary source study by Victor Melo that concludes horseracing and rowing in Rio between 1849 and 1903 was a recreation of the European world in Brazil, mainly for the socially elite, and was not necessarily a hegemonic strategy.\(^6\) By the late 1800’s, cycling became the craze in Brazil as it did in many other countries, not only as a means of identifying with Europe, but also due to cycling’s connection with fitness, precision timing, distance, and commercialization.\(^7\)

Soccer’s beginnings in Brazil date to the second half of the nineteenth century, but its initial inception has been highly mythologized as an invented tradition. The mythology involves Charles Miller, and his supposed introduction of the game to Brazil in 1894. Numerous sources indicate that soccer was being played in Brazil long before 1894, but still credit Miller with bringing the game to Brazil. Tony Mason acknowledges that soccer was probably brought to Brazil by British sailors in the 1860’s and 1870’s, and notes that there are stories of a priest introducing the game in São Paulo in the 1870’s, and members of the São Railroad Company playing it in 1882. However, he credits Charles Miller with its introduction to Brazil.\(^8\) Richard Giulianotti notes that soccer arrived in Brazil through trade connections in 1864, brought by British sailors, but then

\(^7\) Robert Chappell, “Sport in Latin America from Past to Present: A European Perspective,” *Sport in Latin American Society*, 167.
goes on to acknowledge Charles Miller as one of the early proponents of the game.\textsuperscript{9} José Leite Lopes asserts that the game was first played by English sailors and members of English firms, but does not provide a date. However, he does go on to detail Charles Miller’s involvement during the early years.\textsuperscript{10} Joseph Page acknowledges that British sailors were the first to play soccer in Brazil, but also credits Charles Miller with bringing the game to the country.\textsuperscript{11} Lincoln Allison places the inception of soccer in São Paulo in 1864 by British sailors, but credits Charles Miller with its expansion a generation later.\textsuperscript{12} Other sources that indicate the game was brought to Brazil by British sailors, but also crediting Charles Miller, include Robert Levine (dating the arrival in 1864), Janet Lever (dating the arrival in 1884 to Rio de Janeiro), Lever in another article (1864), Chris Taylor placing the arrival in Rio and São Paulo in the late 1800’s, and Garry Jenkins, who places the arrival in Rio in 1874 by British and Dutch sailors.\textsuperscript{13} Jenkins also notes that according to some sources, the first games were played by workers on the Leopoldina Railway in 1875, and had been organized by a Scotsman named Mr. John.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{14} Jenkins, \textit{The Beautiful Team}, 141.
Several other authors mention a variety of origins of the game in Brazil. Martyn Bowden proposes that Brazilian soccer piggy-backed into Brazil in the 1880’s via cricket in São Paulo, and by means of sailing and cricket in Rio de Janeiro. Alex Bellos, while greatly detailing Charles Miller and his involvement, also acknowledges that other sources indicate that between 1850 and 1900, soccer was brought to Brazil by British and Dutch sailors. He mentions the 1875-76 games at the Leopoldina Railroad started by a Mr. John, as well as a Mr. Hugh teaching the game to employees of the São Paulo Railway in 1882. All of these esteemed sources, while indicating soccer probably arrived previous to Charles Miller in 1894, still tend to mythologize and acknowledge his role as the “father of Brazilian soccer.”

The invented tradition of Charles Miller is well documented. Charles Miller was born in Brazil from immigrant parents, who sent him back to British board school to obtain his education in Southampton. Bellos says that Charles Miller’s father, John, was a Scottish rail engineer who was putting down track to link Santos to the inland coffee plantations of São Paulo state. Allen Guttmann states that John Miller was English, along with Jan Rocha, Levine, Taylor, Mason, and Page. However, there is some disagreement over the heritage of Miller’s parents with Leite Lopes and Bill Murray.

16 Alex Bellos, Futebol: Soccer the Brazilian Way (New York: Bloomsbury, 2002), 1.
insisting that Charles’ mother was Brazilian and his father was English. Janet Lever insists that Miller’s father was the British born consul in São Paulo.

The tale of Charles Miller has been further mythologized by the story of his arrival back to Brazil on the docks of São Paulo. Lacey assures his readers that Miller dribbled from one end of the deck to the other on the ship returning him to Brazil. Jenkins states that he arrived on the docks with an extra rucksack containing regulation leather balls and boots; Lever says he had official balls and the rule book, Leite Lopes that he had two leather balls and a complete soccer kit in his baggage, and Bellos that he walked off the ship with a soccer ball in either hand. Even Miller’s own soccer playing history is shrouded in controversy. Bellos states that he was a promising left winger for St. Mary’s, a forerunner to Southampton FC, Lever comments he played first division soccer in Southampton, but Mason insists that Miller played for Bannister Court School in Southampton, but did not play for Southampton St. Mary’s. It is apparent that the story of Charles Miller and his connections to early Brazilian soccer have taken on a fairy tale aspect in the annals of soccer history. What does seem fairly certain is that Miller, observing that there was no organized soccer in Brazil, and having played the game in Britain, set out to correct the situation. In 1895 in São Paulo, Miller collected a group of young Englishmen from the local Gas Company, the London and Brazilian

---

19 Lever, Soccer Madness, 40.
20 Lacey, “Charles Miller,” 1; Jenkins, The Beautiful Team, 141; Lever, Soccer Madness, 40; Leite Lopes, “Success and Contradictions,” 55.
21 Bellos, Futebol, 27; Lever, Soccer Madness, 40; Mason, Passion of the People?, 9.
Bank, and the São Paulo Railway and played the first official game. Miller then convinced the São Paulo Athletic Club, formed in 1888 for cricket by a group of Englishmen, to add soccer to their list of physical activities, and games were organized on a semi-regular basis.22

The invented tradition of Charles Miller being the founding father of Brazilian soccer is well embedded, even within Brazilian culture.23 However, given the variety of sources that acknowledge soccer was played in Brazil before the arrival of Charles Miller, it seems fairly apparent that the mythological version is in error. Only one source has taken a stand that the notoriety of Miller is misplaced, and that is Lamartine DaCosta, professor at the University Gama Filho in Rio de Janeiro. DaCosta notes that soccer was introduced in Brazil two decades before Miller by the Jesuits, and was also played as early as 1893 at Episcopalian schools located in Juiz de Fora.24 What Miller did do, was popularize the game with the middle class elites, mainly of British origin, who resided in Brazil. In fact, early soccer was described as “the funny English game” that would never catch on since it was more suitable for well-nourished Anglo-Saxons than the less athletic Brazilians.25 The dissemination of soccer in Brazil followed the pattern that it did in many other countries: British players played the game among themselves, then the indigenous elites entered the game and assimilated it as a means of displaying

25 Rocha, *In Focus Brazil*, 66.
modernity during the early phases of capitalism, and then the indigenous masses co-opted the game as their own.\textsuperscript{26} Lever would acknowledge this pattern, noting that early games were played by English managers and Germans, who formed their own teams, then later Brazilian elites who had traveled in Europe and learned the game, generally students.\textsuperscript{27}

Eduardo Archetti has pointed out that while the British were present at the birth of the game in Brazil, other European immigrants were important in the early stages.\textsuperscript{28} Maurice Del Burgo notes that the first clubs throughout the continent were generally exclusively for migrants.\textsuperscript{29} As early as 1899, some of the original teams formed in São Paulo, represented the local German and Italian communities. From 1850-1900, over three hundred German sports clubs had been established in Rio Grand do Sul, and while mainly focusing on turnen, many of them also offered soccer.\textsuperscript{30} One of the significant Germans that impacted on Brazilian soccer was Hans Nobiling, who arrived from Hamburg in 1897. In Hamburg he had belonged to the Germania Club, so he started the São Paulo Germania Club that same year, featuring soccer. Mason notes that he didn’t found the club, but did persuade a gymnastics club to add soccer, and by 1899 his club

\begin{footnotes}
\item[26] For further discussion of this theory, see: Allison, “Association Football,” 218.
\item[27] Lever, “Soccer As A Brazilian Way of Life,” 140.
\item[28] Eduardo Archetti citing Mason, \textit{Masculinities: Football, Polo and Tango in Argentina} (Oxford: Berg, 1999), 75.
\end{footnotes}
team was playing a local college team.\textsuperscript{31} Oscar Cox, returning to Brazil from Lausanne, where he had played soccer in secondary school, was instrumental in setting up a Brazilian soccer team in Rio around 1900. He established a Brazilian team through the Rio Cricket Athletic Association (which had been founded by his father), and later (1902) helped found Fluminense Football Club, which was the first club solely devoted to soccer in Brazil.\textsuperscript{32}

The first club for Brazilians was established at Mackenzie College in São Paulo, but students had been playing kick-about there since 1895-96. Another soccer legend is associated with Mackenzie College: that a teacher returned from the United States with a basketball which the students promptly began using as a soccerball. The college founded the Associação Atlética and a soccer club by 1898, with a field marked out on the college recreation grounds. It is likely that the students at the college from the port of Santos were among the players. Murray notes that although the team was mainly composed of Brazilians, the college itself was English-speaking, which would reinforce the theory that soccer tended to be played among the immigrant populations first, and then spread to the Brazilian elite. Mackenzie College would be an apt example of the spread of the game to the indigenous elite, and as Ilan Rachum points out, a means for the elite to confirm their links to European culture.\textsuperscript{33}

Once soccer permeated the Brazilian elite, its growth was rapid, particularly via means of the established athletic clubs. Brazilian sporting clubs, as are many European related clubs, established not only for athletics but for socialization. In some ways they are comparable to the country clubs established within the United States. However, as will be shown, the clubs established strictly for soccer in Brazil underwent some vast changes in their early years. During this time period of the late 1800’s, sporting clubs were either elite establishments allowing the British and elite Brazilians to intermix, or they were established by ethnic groups seeking to preserve their identity. Private Brazilian clubs that sponsored soccer included the São Paulo Athletic Club (1888), Sport Club Internacional and Sport Club Germânia (1899) and Club Atlética (1900).34 By 1896, journalists were writing about soccer in their newspapers, generally with some questioning, but also growing enthusiasm. Strictly British terminology and tactics were being used in the Brazilian game of soccer during the late 1800’s. The game was still controlled and participated in by the elite.35 Robert Levine, Brazilian historian, describes the period from 1894-1904 as the time when private urban clubs of the foreign born adopted soccer. The time period from 1905-1933 was designated the amateur phase, when soccer increased in popularity and there was increasing pressure to subsidize athletes.36

34 Costa-Lima, “Inter-relations,” 1; Mason, Passion of the People?, 10-11.
35 Bellos, Futebol, 28.
The first decade of the twentieth century demonstrates the growth of popularity of the game via further establishment of club teams, increased attendance, the formation of leagues, and the beginning movement of the game out from the elite and into the urban working class. Bellos states that Brazil’s first club focused exclusively around soccer was formed in 1900 by a German colony in Rio Grande, near the Uruguayan border. A São Paulo shop, Casa Fuchs, began importing playing equipment from Europe, and three soccer teams had been established in the Rio urban area.37 By 1901, a league had been formed in São Paulo, and Charles Miller and Antonio Casimaro da Costa had founded the São Paulo championship. Meanwhile, Oscar Cox was establishing soccer in Rio de Janeiro and by December 1901 had established a league there comprised of AC São Paulo, FC Germania, Mackenzie College and CA Paulistano. The first time a Brazilian team beat a team composed of British players was in 1901, as was the first Rio-São game. Oscar Cox of Rio and Rene Vanorden of São organized the first matches, which both ended in ties. The games were a well established social occasion, with the two teams dining together afterward at the Rotisserie Sport restaurant, offering toasts to not only the President of Brazil but also to King Edward VII.38

In 1902, Oscar Cox founded Fluminense FC, which was to become the famous Brazilian club regarded as the club of the elites, as an offshoot of the British populated Rio Cricket and Athletic Association. Fluminense avoided signing Afro-Brazilian

---


38 Brazilian Embassy in London, “History of Football,” 1; Lever, Soccer Madness, 56; Murray, The World’s Game, 35; Bellos, Futebol, 28-29; Mason, Passion of the People?, 11-12.
players until the 1950’s, and even when Afro-Brazilians or working class players were signed, they were generally excluded from the club’s social activities. But, soccer was beginning to spread out from the urban areas to the rural villages, attendance was increasing at games (2-3,000) and sixty to seventy soccer teams had been formed. It was still an elitist game, with post-game celebrations involving the singing of English songs and toasts to the British monarch.39 A league had been formed in Rio, and a São team composed of mostly British players beat a visiting South African team, composed mostly of British players. 40

The Rio league added three new clubs in 1904: América, Botafogo and Bangu. Botafogo was founded by students at the Alfredo Gomez College, but it was Bangu that foretold the future of soccer in Brazil. Bangu was located in a suburb of the North Zone of Rio, in a more industrial atmosphere than the elitist urban clubs. It was started by the manager of the Companhia Progresso Industrial do Brasil, a textile firm, and shortly after being formed allowed the factory workers to participate in the game, even two Brazilians. Bangu’s first line-up included two Brazilians, five Englishmen, three Italians and two Portuguese. Factory workers were invited to watch the games, and there was no preferred seating in the stadium. Newspapers were detailing games fairly often, but still in very British terminology. However, crowd participation and behavior were much

40 Bellos, Futebol, 29; Guttmann, Games and Empires, 62.
less refined and more blatantly enthusiastic, which newspapers decried. What was particularly significant about Bangu was the admittance of the working class into the formerly elitist game of soccer. Leite Lopes comments that the directors of the Bangu factory quickly realized that adopting soccer as a pedagogical and disciplinary technique, much as English boarding schools had done, created a disciplined body for working class youth, to the benefit of the factory. A disciplined body demonstrated company loyalty, was less likely to create disturbances such as calls for unionization, and allowed the venting off of extra energy in a team oriented atmosphere. The team orientation, obviously, fell right in line with production goals. Working class citizens were assumed to have less discipline in their lives and “needed to be taught it.” Organized sport provided an ideal opportunity to do that.

By 1905, a Rio league was established with plans to play for a championship. Soccer had expanded to Minas Gerais and Bahia states, and the gradual decline of strictly English teams slowly began. Soccer games featuring competition between Rio and São Paulo increased, and the first public acknowledgment by a politician occurred when President Rodrigues Alves attended a game in Rio. In 1906, the President of Brazil offered a cup for competition between state teams, the earliest attempt at a national

---


43 Lever, Soccer Madness, 56; Murray, The World’s Game, 35; Rachum, “Futebol”:184, 195; Mason, Passion of the People?, 61.
The first true international game was played in 1908 against Argentina, with the game resulting in a 2-2 tie. The attendance was the largest ever seen to that point in the country. Following Bangu’s example, other factory teams were being formed, notably América Fabril, the forerunner of the Sport Club Pau Grande. It was established in a rural village some ninety kilometers from Rio. The elite amateurs from the big, urban clubs still dominated competition as they had more time and resources available for training, as well as input from foreign trainers and players. Factory worker/players still had to subordinate their playing to their jobs, even though they were generally on light work schedules. The age of professionalization had yet to arrive in Brazil.

The remainder of the decade foreshadowed further popularization of the game in Brazil. Soccer began embryonic connections with the cultural context of urban life, including carnival, Afro-Brazilian religion, music and Catholicism. Although there was growing participation by the working class, both in playing and attendance, the elites still controlled the game and its resources. Part of the reason was financial, as balls and

---

46 Bellos, *Futebol*, 1, 37.
boots were being imported from England, and grass fields were considered a luxury. Newspaper coverage increased, and seating at games reemphasized the class structure prevalent in the society. However, as the game spread, so did the innovativeness of the Brazilian people, using stocking balls on sand fields for kickabouts. Soccer had already surpassed rowing and horse racing in popularity, and Rio had more soccer pitches than anywhere in South America. Touring elite teams began to make stops in Rio and São Paulo, which further increased the popularity of the game as Brazilians were able to view highly skilled and organized teams playing. The amateur/elite Corinthian tour that visited Brazil in 1910 at the invitation of Fluminense (and again in 1913 and 1914) held particular significance. The touring team played three games against Rio teams and three against São Paulo teams with attendance comprised of the elite and the working class. The Brazilian president appeared to watch the Corinthians play, and the tour led to the formation of a new Brazilian club called the Corinthians. The Brazilian Corinthians were comprised of middle and lower class players (some Italian dockworkers were recruited) who played a rougher style of game. The new Corinthians provided a challenge to the socially elite, as they won regularly on the field, but the team was eventually expelled from the league for supposedly offering *bicho*, or cash bonuses, to their players. A debate regarding professionalization of players began

---

to emerge, but merely in whispers at this point.\footnote{Levine, “Sport and Society,” 235; Cesar Gordon and Ronaldo Helal, “The Crisis of Brazilian Football: Perspectives for the Twenty-First Century,” Sport in Latin American Society: Past and Present ed. by J.A. Mangan and Lamartine DaCosta (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 143.} Soccer was gaining popularity with the working class, and the demise of “fashionable ladies” in the stands began to be noticed, as the Brazilian class structure reacted to the appropriation of the game by the less elite. The Afro-Brazilian population started to become involved, forming their own teams in São Paulo prior to 1914.\footnote{Giulianotti, Football: A Sociology, 153; Mason, Passion of the People?, 52.}

The second decade of the century is frequently designated the heyday of amateurism in Brazil, featuring growing attendance and intermixing of soccer with popular culture, often influenced by a growing immigrant population. Soccer began to move into the middle class populations, new celebrations were created for victories, and the torcida (or soccer club fan) began to exert influence.\footnote{Rachum, “Futebol”: 186; Page, “Soccer Madness,” 36.} In 1911, after winning the Rio championship, the entire Fluminense team resigned membership in a dispute with the club. The team affiliated with the Flamengo Rowing Club across town, which did not have a soccer club at the time, but agreed to let the Fluminense players join. Thus was the start of the famous Fla-Flu soccer rivalry which still captivates Brazilians to this day.\footnote{Bellos, Futebol, 386; Taylor, The Beautiful Game, 87. The early teams from both clubs were primarily comprised of students, with Flamengo playing with mainly medical students and Fluminense with wealthier university students. See: Leite Lopes, “Success and Contradictions,” 56-57.} The first Fla-Flu meeting occurred in 1912, with Flu winning three to two. Galeano notes that the game was a very elitist affair, with decorated boxes, straw hats being thrown on the field after each goal, and violent fainting spells among the fans.\footnote{Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, 32.}
The year of 1912 saw other significant events in Brazilian soccer. The Santos team, which later Pelé would immortalize, was formed in 1912. The Argentine Football Association played against both Rio and São teams, winning the majority of their games, and Brazilians were already beginning to receive criticism for being “undisciplined players.”

By 1913, Brazilian teams were able to compete on a more even level with touring teams from Britain, even defeating the Corinthians during their tour, in front of crowds of 6-10,000. Coverage of a single match took an entire newspaper page, and full time soccer journalists were being employed. Soccer truly had become the national sport of Brazil. In 1914, mainly due to World War I involvement, the British influence began to decrease in Brazil. The Brazilian Sport Confederation had been established (and levied a 5% tax on the gross receipts of any sporting event so that soccer now supported all other sports) to select the national team, and Brazilian authorities were so pleased that the same team was encouraged to accept an invitation to the General Roca Cup in Argentine. The Brazilian national team then beat Argentina 1-0. Of particular emphasis for this national team was the surprising dominance and rise to national stardom of Arthur Friedenreich, nicknamed O Pé de Ouro (“foot of gold.”). (Bellos notes the rise of nicknames, a constant of Brazilian soccer, at this time.) Freidenreich

57 Mason, “Some Englishmen and Scotsmen Abroad,” 71; Mason, Passion of the People?, 13, 28; Bellos, Futebol, 35.
was a coffee-colored, green-eyed son of a German-Brazilian merchant and an Afro-Brazilian mother. Due to his social standing, Freidenreich was upset when chosen to play with black players in a black versus white game, and generally was accepted by the elite because of his family ties. Over the length of his career, 1912-1937, Friedenreich scored 1329 goals, the most in the history of the game. Lever notes that it was during this time period that the country started to become unified, not through trade unions, but rather soccer clubs.

By 1915, some players were receiving under the table payments, generally in the form of bicho, or bonuses. The Rio and the São Paulo leagues expanded the number of teams involved, and the three stage transition (British to local elite to working class) was complete. Galeano details that Rio Sports described soccer as “playing an agony,” due to the participation of working class players. In addition to the dominant urban leagues, there were also now five provincial leagues across the country.

Not only was the working class participating in the game, but Afro-Brazilians were beginning to make an impact. Perhaps the most famous story (which may be an invented tradition or not) occurred in 1916, and was immortalized by Mario Filho during the 1930’s. It involved a player named Carlos Alberto, a mulatto player who had

---

61 Lever, Soccer Madness, 56.
many friends among the university students playing for Fluminense. Being called up to the team, Alberto was supposedly observed in the dressing room prior to the game spreading rice powder on his face to lighten his complexion. Fluminense is still taunted with cries of pó de arroz, or rice powder, during games. 64

Due to the European involvement with World War I, obtaining soccer equipment became problematic. Brazil increased their domestic production of equipment, mainly due to the limit on imports, which further increases participation of the masses as well as spurring domestic industrialization. 65 Going hand in hand with the rising capitalistic participation of the country, some Rio and São Paulo clubs began charging an entry fee in 1917. Perhaps most significant during this year was the start of Brown Professionalism, which ran roughly from 1917 to 1933. Brown Professionalism, or the under the table payment of players, started with the concept of bicho and light work schedules for players in the factory settings. It evolved much further, with players being provided housing and food on club property, fictitious jobs, and per game salaries, all totally deniable, of course. The amateur ethos that permeated upper class society, certainly influenced by the British, saw rising professionalism as an assault on a class basis. 66 This ethos was also an assault on race, since in Brazil, race is negotiated through class. Until 1918, Afro-Brazilians (black Brazilians, not those classified as

65 Daflon and Ballvè, “The Beautiful Game?”: 24.
mulatto or other combinations of black, Indio or white) were banned by the Federação Brasileira de Sports from participating in any team sports. 67

In 1919, Brazil won their first “legitimate” South American championship in Rio de Janeiro. Some teams traveled for over two months to participate. The President congratulated the national team for their 1-0 win over Uruguay, with the winning goal scored by Arthur Freidenreich. Freidenreich’s muddy soccer boot was paraded through Rio to be displayed in the window of a jewelry store, and Galeano declares that at this point Freidenreich founded the Brazilian style of playing soccer. 68 1919 also saw the game of soccer spread to the last Brazilian state without a league, Acre. 69

The decade of the 1920’s reflected the negotiation that was ongoing within soccer regarding the incorporation of multi-racial teams and lower class citizens. Archetti notes that this was the decade of poor whites, mestizos, and blacks becoming fully involved in soccer as players, and Murray would agree, noting that the strength of the game was now coming from the poor and the black. 70 Rachum analyzes that political stirrings and cultural upheavals were occurring in Brazil that enabled soccer to radically change and allow the inclusion of lower economic classes and blacks. 71

---

67 Taylor, *The Beautiful Game*, 82.
71 Rachum, “Futebol”: 187.
In 1921, Brazil traveled to Argentina for the South American championship; however, President Pessoa orders that only white players may be named to the national team, which meant Freidenreich could not be named to the team. Later in the year, América signed the black sailor, Manteiga (or “Butter” as he was called for his slick passes), and nine of his teammates resigned in protest. Manteiga later defected from the team in Bahia state. Integration of soccer did not come easily in Brazil. By 1922, the modernists were strongly supporting and encouraging the growth of soccer due to its popular roots, during a period when Brazil was seeking to establish their own traditional roots. One of the emphases at this time was the glamorization of the Indio-Brazilian, so the Indo-Brazilian team from Pareci was invited to travel to Rio to play Fluminense in some exhibition games.

1923 was a significant year in Brazilian soccer. The first night game, in Brazil, was played by the lights of parked city trams. The race and class issue became extremely significant when Vasco recruited working class players, and was promoted to the first division with three black players, two mulattos and eight lower class whites. Vasco, the Portuguese working class club, broke the championship hegemony in Rio by winning the Carioca. To say there was an outcry would be an understatement. Vasco recruited from the less well-to-do suburbs and did not offer club membership to their players, did offer their players bicho, and confined them to club housing prior to games. Not only

---

72 Taylor, *The Beautiful Game*, 81; Mason, *Passion of the People?*, 49.
74 Rachum, “Futebol”: 189; Bellos, *Futebol*, 78.
were they assaulting class and race barriers that had been implicit in the game from its early years, but they were mounting an attack on the sacred ethos of amateurism with *amadorismo marrom*, or professionalism in disguise. Of course, the other more elitist teams hollered in pure protest. The original pressure for Vasco to drop out of the league had been ignored, so after Vasco won the championship, the other teams broke away to form their own amateur league, AMEA, in 1924, supported by the coffee aristocracy. Vasco was not invited to join, allegedly as they had no stadium of their own in which to play. The Portuguese colony immediately set out to organize and fund the construction of the city’s largest stadium. Meanwhile, the new league set out rules to ban any player who did not have a job outside of soccer, and also banned certain occupations which were considered too low class or open to taking bribes. These occupations included stevedores, soldiers, waiters, taxi drivers and barbers. The new league also instituted a literacy test by mandating that players entering the field had to be able to sign their name and fill out and enrollment form answering questions such as parent’s names, place of birth, location of schooling, and field of work. Vasco and São Cristóvão sent their players to a literacy crash course and instituted elementary tutoring sessions. Vasco was allowed to rejoin the league in 1925, as long as the AMEA card sanctions were met, and these sanctions lasted until 1929.

---


In 1925, FC Paulistano became the first Brazilian team to tour Europe, mainly playing against teams in France, Switzerland and Portugal. Two journalists accompanied the team to report on the progress of the strictly amateur team. Eleven of the players held college degrees, and the country of Brazil used their image to actively promote the image of Brazil that they wanted portrayed in Europe, even if one mulatto did participate in the tour. The President of the country congratulated the team upon their return, further sanctifying the game in the eyes of the Brazilians.78

By the late 1920’s, several trends become apparent, as soccer continues to grow in popularity. In 1927, Vasco opens their new, large stadium to celebrate the Rio/São final, with the Brazilian President in attendance. The crowds were estimated at 50,000, and after giving the President an ovation lasting for some time, the game began. All went well until twelve minutes left in the game when the referee awarded the Rio team a penalty kick for an infraction. At a 1-1 tie, the Paulista team refused to continue. The President attempted to intervene (one trend that would continue for many years in Brazilian soccer) but was ignored, and the Rio team was awarded the game.79

In the same year, a black versus white soccer match was organized in São Paulo to celebrate Abolition Day, with the black team winning by two points. The annual game continued for several years.80 By 1928, Carnival was being heavily promoted and

79 Mason, Passion of the People?, 62, 107; Rachum, “Futebol”: 196.
80 Mason, Passion of the People?, 52.
participation was rising, along with the embryonic connections between soccer, samba and Carnival. The same year also saw an unsuccessful campaign for professionalism in the game, but despite being defeated by the amateur elites, the issue was not to go away, particularly in light of the fact that European clubs began to raid players in Argentina and Uruguay that had turned professional.81 Brazil could not be far behind. The first stadium built with lights purposefully for night games opened.82

By the early 1930’s, Italian and other European clubs were heavily recruiting South American players, especially those of Italian heritage. The Italian colony in São Paulo was under barrage, but it was the loss of Fausto who was recruited to Barcelona, that raised a real outcry. He returned to Vasco in 1933 as the Europeans were not interested in Afro-Brazilian players, who soon became known as great local players but non-exportable. Of course, since Brazil had yet to professionalize, European transfers involved no transfer fees, making them good deals for the European teams. In 1931, alone, Brazil lost thirty nine players to Europe, and further numbers to Argentina and Uruguay.83 The decade also featured the importation of coaches from Europe to the Brazilian clubs. Many of the coaches tried to impose the W-M formation on the

---

Brazilian style, but with varied degrees of success. Brazilians throughout the country began to think that their playing style was the best in the world.\textsuperscript{84}

Brazil was invited to participate in the first World Cup in 1930, but did not progress beyond the first round. Glanville states that the “game was in anarchy” due to the admission of Afro-Brazilians to the game, a statement that can surely be challenged. He notes that the team was “individually clever but collectively inferior.”\textsuperscript{85} The national team did not fare any better in the ’34 World Cup, traveling 8000 miles for a single game, but the Brazilian team did feature the first black man to appear in the World Cup, Leônidas da Silva, the “Black Diamond.”\textsuperscript{86}

Rio de Janeiro gained its first daily sport newspaper, \textit{Mundo Esportivo}, in 1931 in time to coincide with the state soccer championship. Mario Filho promoted full-fledged samba parades during Carnival, as well as the intersections of Carnival, samba and soccer. This triad was quickly accepted, and became an invented tradition that the government used to promote Brazilian national identity. Filho also actively promoted professionalism within soccer, and forged the initial connections between soccer and the favelas, the mountainside slum tenements of Rio.\textsuperscript{87}


\textsuperscript{85} Brian Glanville, \textit{The Story of the World Cup} (London: Faber and Faber, 1993), 17, 19.


\textsuperscript{87} Bellos, \textit{Futebol}, 122-123; Murray, \textit{The World’s Game}, 50.
The watershed year of 1933 was when Brazil finally allowed professionalization of soccer players, at the same time, further democratizing the game. There was strong resistance offered by the middle class and elite along class/race lines. Compared to other South American countries, particularly Argentina and Uruguay, Brazil was late in coming to professionalization mainly due to their unique class and racial system. The deciding issue in terms of allowing professionalization was the luring away of top players by other countries. What spurred the final actualization of paying players was the public announcement in 1932 by the president of América that he was already paying players, and Bangu and Vasco publicly announced their support of the trend.

The elitist walls were crumbling. On January 12, 1933, Rio established Brazil’s first professional league. São Paulo followed suit in March. However, the battle was not over for professionalization. Rio de Janeiro continued to operate two leagues, one professional and one amateur through 1936 and survived by splitting the revenue, and it was only the CBD’s recognition of the professional league in 1937, in a bid to keep power within FIFA, that foretold the decline of the amateur league. In 1933 the states of Minas Gerais and Paraná also went professional, and Espirito Santo followed in 1934.

The elite and middle class that controlled the soccer clubs may have had professionalization forced upon them, but they did not willing become compliant, and found other means to maintain class and racial barriers. From 1933-1941, Fluminense

---

89 Mason, Passion of the People?, 51.
90 Mason, Passion of the People?, 53-55.
separated soccer from the rest of their club, and other clubs followed suit. Many of the 
clubs did turn professional, but paid athletes were voted to be excluded from club social 
functions or membership rules were amended to include two categories, paid players 
and members. 91

As professionalization ensued, crowd attendance increased but the level of behavior of 
the crowds became an issue. Afro-Brazilians were often taunted, although mulatto 
players were generally accepted. From the early 1930’s, the percentage of Afro-
Brazilians present in soccer was greater than their presence in the general population. 
The professionalization of the game permitted the lower echelons of society to find jobs 
that did not require a formal education, thus allowing soccer to provide a means of 
social mobility with ties to national identity. 92

Three significant trends were in play during this time period that promoted the growth 
of Brazilian soccer, and the examination of these trends is important. First, the growth 
of communication systems increased the numbers of persons able to indirectly 
participate in the game. Newspaper coverage became important, but even more 
significant was the growth of radio and the opportunity it provided for citizens to “be” 
at the game from a distance. The rural interior of Brazil particularly benefited from the

91 Mason, Passion of the People?, 54; Levine, “Sport and Society”: 235; Taylor, The Beautiful Game, 
84.
92 Levine, “Sport and Society”: 238; Rachum, “Futebol”: 193; Gordon and Helal, “The Crisis of Brazilian 
Football,” 143.
radio, spurring many semi-professional players, or itinerant players, into the game.\textsuperscript{93} The second significant trend was President Vargas’ political use of the game after he took power in a coup in 1930, to promote an agenda of national identity. Vargas particularly emphasized the role of sport and actively promoted sport (with much government involvement). In fact, according to Rachum, Vargas gained much of his support in his revolution from the masses via soccer. Vargas’ “New State” highlighted the passing of the “Old Republic”, and soccer was certainly a means to promote his agenda of moving from an economy based on coffee to an economy based on industrialism. By 1938, Vargas had his government subsidizing the national team, and actively promoting journalists to cover every detail about them.\textsuperscript{94} The third significant trend was the involvement of the press and particularly the intellectuals of the country in reshaping the culture and using soccer to promote it. Mario Filho, the newspaper journalist, was actively promoting the union of soccer, samba and carnival, and increasing attendance while he did it. But his tri-union was, perhaps, merely a foreshadowing of cultural trends within the country that was answered by the 1933 publication of \textit{Masters and Slaves} by Gilberto Freyre. Freyre theorized that Brazilian racial miscegenation was harmonious rather than confrontational, was a positive aspect of Brazilian society, and combined with Vargas’ nationalistic fervor, was used to promote Brazil as a unique and valued culture, rather than the backward culture that the taint of miscegenation had incurred in the past, particularly when viewed by European

\textsuperscript{93} Rachum, “Futebol”: 190; Levine, “Sport and Society”: 238.
countries. Freyre championed the mischievous and playful nature of the Brazilian malandro, who was also mulatto, and by 1938 was connecting the malandro spirit to soccer. By modern views, Freyre would undoubtedly be considered a racist, but his positivism was lauded and immediately accepted in Brazil even though it was a challenge to white hegemony. Lamartine DaCosta and Plinio Labriola present an interesting article that combines the two trends of Vargas’ involvement and the “re-invention” of the Brazilian racial mixture as a form of manipulation by the fascist government. As a true fascist, Vargas idolized the “beautiful body” (thus some of the connection with soccer), but Brazilian fascism tended to be founded in local tradition, unlike European fascism. Soccer merely became a means of seizing the local tradition as a means of promoting the ideology.

The 1938 World Cup demonstrated the consolidation of the Brazilian national style by lower class males. Brazil was the only CONMEBOL team to travel to France for the World Cup, and the team featured two Afro-Brazilian stars, Leônidas da Silva and Domingos da Guia. The captain of the team, however, was white, an amateur, and a physician. Brazil finished third in the tournament, amid some controversial coaching decisions. The coach dropped Leônidas from the roster in the semi-final, claiming he wanted to keep him fresh for the final, although allegations of racial prejudice abounded. No Afro-Brazilians played in the semi-final game against Italy. Glanville

reports that Brazil played “exquisite football” during the tournament. Galeano provides the most interesting tidbits of information about the 1938 World Cup, and how the international press viewed the Brazilian team. He notes that the La Gazzetta dello Sport exalted the Italian victory over Brazil as a victory of intelligence over the brute force of “the Negroes.” And yet, the international press chose Leônidas and da Guia as two of the best players of the tournament, with Leônidas scoring one goal against Poland barefoot, after losing his shoe in the mud of the penalty area. Despite finishing in third, the Brazilians had made an impact on the international scene with their style of play and individually artistic players.

During the 1940’s, the nation of Brazil increased promotion of soccer as a means of establishing national identity and unification of the country. A population shift within the country, urbanization, increased the exposure of the game and encouraged localized identity within large population centers. Soccer became a cohesive force, particularly for Brazilians who were moving to the cities in droves. In 1940, 69% of the country lived in rural areas, but that statistic was to rapidly change as Vargas’ policies encouraged industrialization of the mono-culture. Soccer players were now predominantly from the lower class (approximately 75%), and the lower classes embraced fandom of their teams. In 1941, the club network was linked to the federal

---

98 Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, 70.
government as part of Vargas’ centralization program, when the CND (Conselho Nacional de Desportos) was created. The CND’s mission was to serve the government’s political interests and serve in an executive capacity over all sport functioning within the country, which was mainly soccer.100

As the fans connected with local teams as a means of establishing local identity, and at the public urgings of Mario Filho, celebrations and a Carnival atmosphere increased at games. Teams were being saluted with rockets, firework displays were initiated, and the first samba band appeared at Flamengo in Rio.101 Radio continued to increase fan involvement, and the original yell of “Gooooooool!” (symbolic of Latino fans around the world to present day) was initiated by Ary Barrosa in 1942. Soccer superstitions became prevalent among teams, particularly Botafogo, often related to the Candomble religious beliefs of the fans. The fans were increasingly multiracial, and the players were increasingly Afro-Brazilian. Mario Filho commented at the time that nostalgia in the 1940’s meant a return of the game to the white, elite population. That was not to happen in Brazil.102

The publication in 1945 of Gilberto Freyre’s book, New World in the Tropics, directly addressed the race question in Brazilian soccer. Freyre posited that the dance like

---

100 Lever, Soccer Madness, 56; Gordon and Helal, “The Crisis of Brazilian Football,” 145; Mason, Passion of the People?, 63.
101 Bellos, Futebol, 126-127; Mason, Passion of the People?, 100; Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, 81; Giulianotti, Football: A Sociology, 59.
102 Bellos, Futebol, 240; Taylor, The Beautiful Game, 93, 117.
rhythms that Brazilians bring to their soccer style is the direct result of African blood. In 1947, *O Negro no futebol brasileiro* was written by Mario Filho, detailing the early history of the game in Brazil and the contribution of Afro-Brazilians. The continued involvement of the government in soccer played out in a variety of ways. Several items are worth noting in this chronological historical overview: by 1945, all soccer coaches were to be graduates of Brazilian physical education institutions, soccer was viewed as a national industry, and the government wanted to open up clubs to more middle class participation to increase intracity cohesion. Of course, these policies were to benefit the federal government. Political interference in soccer continued in Brazil. It was an accepted way of life.

Brazil had been awarded the 1950 World Cup, and by 1948 construction had begun on the Maracanã Stadium in Rio, soon to be the soccer showcase of the world. Brazil was predicted to win this World Cup, not only because it was on home territory, but because the team had shown such promise at the last staged World Cup in 1938. However, it lost in a heart-breaking final game to Uruguay, and has since been called the ultimate tragedy for Brazil. It is difficult to put into words how important this game has become in historical terms to Brazilians, nor is it easy to explain how a single

---

104 Costa-Lima, “Inter-relations”: 1.
107 Mason, *Passion of the People?*, 63.
109 Rachum, “Futebol”: 190.
soccer game has shaped the national psyche for decades. Every author that has written
on Brazilian soccer recounts this particular game and it lives on in the minds of
Brazilian fans to the present day, constantly being analyzed and re-analyzed with blame
being laid at different doorsteps. Ultimately, as often occurs in Brazil, it became a
racial issue.

The build-up to the final game was tremendous in Brazil. Despite the non-participation
of several important soccer nations (Germany was still banned, and Argentina refused
to attend), it is likely that the two finalists would still have been Brazil and Uruguay.
The Rio Carnival parade theme had been the World Cup, and the Brazilian team players
had been in residence for several months at a special training camp with cooks, doctors
and priests, a swimming pool, and a house furnished with gifts from Rio. The coach,
Flavio Costa, was earning 1000 pounds a month. Over 500,000 victory t-shirts had been
pre-sold. The radio played “Brazil must win” over and over. The final was to be played
in the Maracanã, with over 200,000 in attendance. The mayor of Rio opened the game
with an oration over 254 loudspeakers, addressing the Brazilians and guests with “You
Brazilians, whom I consider victors of the tournament…in less than a few hours will be
acclaimed champions…you are so superior.” A twenty one gun salute to the team’s
entrance onto the field, as 5,000 pigeons were released. Even FIFA president, Jules
Rimet, had prepared a speech congratulating Brazil as the winner of the trophy.110
When the final whistle blew, Uruguay was ahead 2-1, and won the prized World Cup.

110 Murray, The World’s Game, 89-91; Mason, Passion of the People?, 79-8; Glanville, The Story of the
World Cup, 45-55; Mason, Passion of the People?, 125; Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, 87.
The aftermath was a tragedy, no doubt. Bellos notes that “A football result has possibly never had such a strong and enduring impact on the emotional life of a nation.”  

Nelson Rodrigues said, “Everywhere has its irremediable national catastrophe, something like a Hiroshima. Our catastrophe, our Hiroshima, was the defeat by Uruguay in 1950.” Roberto DaMatta called the 1950 game “the greatest tragedy in contemporary Brazilian history, because it happened collectively and brought a united vision of the loss of a historic opportunity. Because it happened at the beginning of a decade in which Brazil was looking to assert itself as a nation with a great future.” Books have been written about the game, such as Paulo Perdigão’s *Anatomy of a Defeat*, and the *Jornal dos Sports* said “I saw a nation defeated- more than that- one without hope.” Even the colors the Brazilian team wore for the game (white shirts) were never worn again. Several suicides occurred after the game, and subsequent World Cup wins were always regarded as penance for the 1950 loss. The fans leaving the stadium were described as a “battalion of the living dead”, and many vowed never to set foot in the stadium again.

---

111 Bellos, *Futebol*, 44.
113 Roberto DaMatta as quoted by Bellos, *Futebol*, 45.
114 José Lins do Rego in *Jornal dos Sports* quoted by Bellos, *Futebol*, 55.
115 Bellos, *Futebol*, 64; Mason, *Passion of the People?*, 78.
A variety of reasons were posed to explain the loss.\(^{117}\) However, the most prominent and widely held view was that the loss was directly a result of the racial composition of the team. Allison reports that the 1950 World Cup team was comprised of 80% of the players being from the lower class, and in Brazil, race and class are often synonymous.\(^{118}\) Barbosa, the Afro-Brazilian goalkeeper, perhaps suffered most of the blame. Immediately after the game he was summoned to the secret police headquarters and grilled over whether he was a Communist. Even years later, Barbosa was regarded with the stigma of the loss. In 1993 he went to visit the national team training camp as the team prepared for the World Cup, and was not allowed to enter for fear he would bring bad luck.\(^{119}\) Bigode, a defender, was denied his sponsorship money, and Juvenal, another defender, would not leave his home for weeks. As Page notes, the loss not only brought out self-doubt, but also lingering racism that lurked beneath the Brazilian inferiority complex.\(^{120}\) Freyre’s theories held only superficial sway in Brazilian hearts; they did not completely penetrate the class/race subject into full acceptance. As Social-Darwinism was accepted by the Brazilian elites, the loss of the game was blamed on racial inadequacies: the inherent instability supposedly present in decision making by black players.\(^{121}\) DaMatta notes that the defeat in a soccer game was signified by the

\(^{117}\) Humphrey, “No Holding Brazil,” 130; Humphrey, “Brazil and the World Cup,” 67; Page, “Soccer Madness,” 40; Glanville, *Story of the World Cup*, 52.


\(^{119}\) Bellos, *Futebol*, 56.

\(^{120}\) Page, “Soccer Madness,” 34-35.

\(^{121}\) Leite Lopes, “Success and Contradicitions,” 70.
culture as a metaphor for a defeat of the culture that often regarded itself as racially impure. The game itself provided a framework which encompassed the society.\textsuperscript{122}

Much of the decade of the 1950’s reflected a Brazil trying to deal with the World Cup loss of 1950, and the eventual celebration of the Brazilian style of play. It was during the 1950’s that Brazil indigenized the game: all spellings and terminology were no longer in English, so “football” became “futebol.” The paternalism within the game continued, particularly with the concept of \textit{come e dorme}, whereby a beginning player lived on the club premises while he attempted to make the team. Clubs often educated, dressed, fed, attended medical and dental needs, and coached their players. Coaches lacked authority and were subject to the whims of the club directors, who often obtained the positions as a springboard into political life. Soccer salaries remained low, and players were watched to see that they did not participate in macumba rituals or excessive drinking, practices believed to be harmful to the lower classes. Pensions for players were inadequate, and disability insurance did not exist. Fluminense finally began signing Afro-Brazilian players in the 1950’s.\textsuperscript{123} From the 1950’s to the late 1970’s, Brazilian match attendance was the highest in the world.\textsuperscript{124}

The 1954 World Cup team, under Coach Zeze Moreira, pursued the goal of playing a more collective game, sacrificing individual skill and flamboyance for a team concept.

\textsuperscript{122} Roberto DaMatta, “Soccer: Opium for the People or Drama of Social Justice?” \textit{Social Change in Contemporary Brazil} ed. by Geert Banck and Kees Koonings (Amsterdam: CEDLA, 1988), 128-129.
\textsuperscript{123} Rachum, “Futebol”: 183, 191; Levine, “Sport and Society”: 240-241; Murray, \textit{The World’s Game}, 34.
\textsuperscript{124} Mason, \textit{Passion of the People}?, 100.
But the team suffered from internal tensions, mainly due to the usual Rio-São rivalries. In the quarter-finals, Brazil met Hungary, and the resulting match has often been called the Battle of Berne, with the blame laid at Brazil’s door. Three players were sent off during a rough match, with Hungary winning 4-2. It was the aftermath of the game that resulted in real havoc. Supposedly, a Brazilian player was struck in the face with a bottle by a Hungarian player, resulting in the Brazilian team invading the Hungarian dressing room where bottles and soccer cleats were used as weapons. The Brazilian team featured the outstanding players Didí (who “invented” the banana kick) and Indio, the first indigenous Indian-Brazilian.  

Preparations for the 1958 World Cup team consumed the country, and players expected to be named to the team were watched in detail. Brazil’s approach to this World Cup was termed “scientific”, and indeed, it was on the cutting edge of sport technology. Doctors scrutinized the players, dental work was arranged (dentists found 470 teeth with problems and extracted 32), a famous masseuse, Américo, was hired, and a psychologist was added to the staff. Dr. Hilton Gosling, in charge of the medical team, spent a month in Sweden finding the best headquarters for the team. Due to the lower classes that many of the players came from, medical needs were a priority. Many of the players had parasites or worms, several were anemic, and one player had syphilis. Bad gallbladders and chronic digestive problems were noted. Players were kept in

125 Mason, Passion of the People?, 82; Giulianotti, Football: A Sociology, 138; Glanville, Story of the World Cup, 73-74.  
126 Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, 67.  
127 Mason, Passion of the People?, 84; Taylor, The Beautiful Game, 96.
“concentration” or isolation, and not even allowed to receive letters.\textsuperscript{128} Named to the team was Didí, a seventeen year old named Pelé, and Garrincha, a player with malformed legs. Didí almost did not make the team, despite his renown for his falling leaf kicks. He was considered too old and not willing to try hard, as well as having married a white woman.\textsuperscript{129}

The aspect of adding a psychologist to the training staff was based on the belief that Brazilian players displayed a tempermental weakness, and this aspect was often discussed in racial terms. The team was considered to have been undisciplined in the ’38 and ’54 World Cup, and the ’52 Olympic team dissolved into tears when they were defeated by Germany.\textsuperscript{130} The findings of the psychologist appear amusing to this day. The psychologist, João Carvalhaes (described as an amiable eclectic from São, grey-sweatered and often unshaven), did not believe in haranguing the players in groups, nor did he believe in talking to the players individually as this often made the problem bigger. Rather, he believed in getting the players to draw pictures of a man, and the more intelligent players would draw sophisticated renderings, and the more instinctive players would draw stick figures. He recommended that Pelé should not be selected as he was “obviously infantile. He lacks the necessary fighting spirit. He is too young to feel aggressions and react in an adequate fashion. Beyond this he does not have the

\textsuperscript{128} Mason, Passion of the People?, 84.
\textsuperscript{129} Page, “Soccer Madness,” 41; Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, 103; Glanville, The Story of the World Cup, 92.
\textsuperscript{130} Murray, The World’s Game, 99.
Garrincha scored a 38 out of a possible 123, which qualified him, maybe, to drive a bus, but not play on the national squad. His aggression level was determined to be zero, and his intelligence below-average, and he was too undisciplined. There was also concern that the two players were too dark, as the Brazilian officials seemed to want to make the team as white as possible for the world stage. Fortunately, the coach did not follow the psychologist’s advice.

Brazil utilized the 4-2-4 system during the World Cup, with an aesthetic emphasis on the attack. Despite the acclaim for the creation of this system, Giulianotti notes that Brazil adopted this system from Paraguay. Pelé and Garrincha finally appeared in the third game, beating Russia 2-0. Garrincha was included at the request of his teammates, but displayed his outstanding skill and remained on the roster the rest of the tournament. In the semi-final against France, Pelé scored a hat-trick, and the team advanced on a 5-2 win. Brazil met Sweden, the home team, in the finals, and with Pelé scoring two more, beat Sweden 5 to 2.

The World Cup victory was affirmation for the Brazilian that their values (artistic soccer with individual flair) had triumphed over European values of teamwork and

---

134 Glanville, *Story of the World Cup*, 92-105.
The victorious team awarded the ball to their biggest fan, the Afro-Brazilian masseur, Américo. It was the first time a country playing outside its own continent won a World Cup. Brazilians began a huge celebration in the streets, as the final was broadcast live on radio all over Brazil. The inauguration of the new capital of Brazil, Brasilia, was to take place the next day, and President Kubitschek connected the two events to his political advantage. As the team arrived home in Rio, millions were on the street to celebrate their arrival, with carnival bands and fireworks, singing and dancing. The next day the entire event was repeated in São Paulo. When Pelé returned home to Bauru, local dignitaries presented him with a car, his first, and symbolic of his material success. The following year, Pelé’s team, Santos, undertook a European tour to raise money. It was the first of many to capitalize on the name of Pelé.

The decade of the 1960’s brought further success for Brazilian soccer. Club membership soared (in part due to success of the national team) and a huge middle class membership was finally achieved. Brazil pioneered initiatives for “Sport for All” during this time period, focusing on groups from the lower income classes, long before the European movement began. The urban population now outnumbered the rural population, and along with the growing numbers came the usual assortment of urban ills. “Sport for All” programs attempted to address some of these via the means of

---

135 Humphrey, “No Holding Brazil,” 129-130.
136 Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, 101-102.
137 Mason, Passion of the People?, 86.
138 Ibid., 88.
139 Rachum, “Futebol”: 191.
sport, which typically means some variation of soccer. However, despite “Sport for All”, during the 1960’s, women were forbidden by law from playing soccer.

During the early years of Brazilian soccer (from the 1920’s until 1950), Brazil often tried to use Argentina as the model for development, stylistic issues, and organization. But Post World War II indications are that Brazilians began to construct Argentina as their “other”, particularly within the soccer world. The role reversed during the 1960’s, as Argentina was attempting to emulate Brazilian style as it had been so successful. Argentina bought several defenders from Brazil so that the Argentinean teams could learn four man zonal defending from the experts.

By 1960, 6,000 Brazilians were considered professional soccer players, and Italy offered one million dollars for Pelé. The Brazilian Congress went into emergency session, eventually declaring Pelé was a non-exportable national treasure. It may be an invented tradition, but the president of Santos, Athie Coury, was warned that if Pelé left the club, Coury would not stand for re-election as deputy for the state of São Paulo, and his life would be endangered. Pelé continued to play for his club team, Santos, and they

---

141 Bellos, Futebol, 269.
won the World Club Championship in 1961 and 1962. By 1963, Pelé was the world’s highest paid sportsman.143

The 1962 World Cup was held in Chile, and Brazil dominated the tournament, proving once again to the world that beautiful style could be successful. Pelé was now a twenty one year old veteran, but “tore a thigh muscle” during one of the early round games and was lost for the rest of the tournament. This tournament was Garrincha’s, and at age thirty two, he displayed “luminous virtuosity” according to Glanville. The Chilean El Mercurio newspaper wanted to know “what planet is Garrincha from?” During the semi-final game against Chile, Garrincha was ejected, but Brazilian Prime Minister, Tancredo Neves, immediately sent an urgent telegram to FIFA president, Stanley Rous, pleading that the infraction be overlooked. Garrincha played in the next game, which was the final. Again, Brazil prepared for the tournament “scientifically” by holding training camp at altitude to simulate the Chilean atmosphere, and taking carbon impressions of feet to have boots specially made.144 The final game, against Czechoslovakia, was the first World Cup final broadcast live internationally. Brazil won 3-1.145

The mid 1960’s saw the military dictators assume control of Brazil via a coup (due to fears of communism), and with their governmental control came many elements of

143 Mason, Passion of the People?, 100, 56, 75; Jenkins, The Beautiful Team, 149, 181; Lever, Soccer Madness, 141.
144 Glanville, The Story of the World Cup, 111-112, 121, 125; Taylor, The Beautiful Game, 97; Galeano citing El Mercurio, Soccer in Sun and Shadow,115; Murray, The World’s Game, 103.
145 Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, 116.
soccer control. Social rights began to disappear, along with the paternalistic company
towns that had fostered soccer in its early years. Some upward shift occurred in the
groups playing soccer, with more participation by middle class players. The dictators
demonstrated much political involvement in the game of soccer, particularly if one of
the dictators felt he needed to associate himself with popular interests of the masses.
The Brazilian generals actually used soccer as an arm of their domestic policy. 146
Under the military regime, an orgy of stadium building began, which in itself was an
interesting phenomena, as Brazil already had built some of the largest stadiums in the
world. By 1970, stadiums holding over 100,000 persons had been, or were being built,
in Belo Horizonte, Pôrto Alegre, Salvador, Maceio, Curitiba, Belém and Fortaleza.
Rachum compares the stadium building to Roman governments pandering to the masses
with chariot races and gladiator fights, an apt analogy. 147

By the mid 1960’s the two best teams in the world were the Brazilian national team and
Santos. João Havelange was president of the Brazilian Sports Federation, and had
adopted a condescending and paternalistic attitude toward soccer players, seeing them
as children with few rights. Fluminense finally began admitting non-whites as social
members as well as hiring Afro-Brazilians to play on the team. Expectations began to
rise for the 1966 World Cup, and hopes abounded that Brazil would become the first
country to win the cup three times. 148

146 Leite Lopes, “Success and Contradictions,” 76; Lever, Soccer Madness, 60; Murray, The World’s
Game, 103.
147 Rachum, “Futebol”: 198-199.
The 1966 World Cup took place in England, and Brazil was coached by Vicente Feola. Preparations for this world cup were disorganized, as Feola was unable to make a decision regarding who should be named to the team. He eventually chose eight players over the age of thirty for his starting eleven. They washed out in the first round of play despite spending 300,000 pounds on scientific preparation, holding a four month training camp, and hiring 200 medical staff. Pelé was injured in the third game by a vicious foul, and vowed to never play in a World Cup game again. Once again, the goalkeeper was blamed. Brazil has a historical tendency to blame goalkeepers for losses, and poor Manga had to leave the country and play in Uruguay after the World Cup. The aftermath of the early exit from the Cup was tremendous in Brazil. Flags were flown at half mast and clouds of black carbon paper were thrown out of office windows. People wept in the street, and coffins and gallows were carried along main avenues. Black ribbons were posted on doors, people had nervous breakdowns and some committed suicide. Players and coaches were burned in effigy.

1969 proved to be a significant year for Brazilian soccer. Pelé scored his 1000th goal (on a penalty kick), and the sports lottery was created by the Department of Finance to raise revenue for projects, and, to help unify the country. The thirteen games featured in the weekly lottery must represent all regions of the country, forcing people to follow

games across the country and learn the geography of the country. The government benefits tremendously from the lottery (in 1977 it took in more than $376 million) and uses the money mainly for social welfare concerns and the construction of public athletic facilities. The success of the sport lottery led to a change in the structure of Brazilian soccer. The government encouraged the Confederation of Brazilian Sports to establish a national championship which would enable the lottery to run the year around, thus bringing in more revenue. In return for extending the season (more than doubling it, in fact) the Ministry of Education and Culture offered enough money to subsidize the air transportation needed to conduct a national championship as well as financing the preparations for the national team.\footnote{Gordon and Helal, “The Crisis of Brazilian Football,” 147-148; Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, 131; Janet Lever, “Sport in a Fractured Society: Brazil Under Military Rule,” Sport and Society in Latin America: Diffusion, Dependency, and the Rise of Mass Culture ed. by Joseph L. Arbena (Westport, CN.: Greenwood Press, 1988), 91-92; Lever, Soccer Madness, 64; Mason, Passion of the People?, 65.}

By this time, Pelé was a revered international figure, loved and admired around the world. Two incidences in 1969 demonstrate his adoration by world wide fans. In Columbia, Santos was playing a Columbian club team, and the opponents had keyed in on Pelé and his black co-strikers by kicking at them and hurling racial insults. One of the Brazilian strikers had retaliated, and Pelé, outraged, argued with the official and ended up being sent off for dissent. He was in the dressing room removing his cleats when another referee ran in and asked that he return to the field at once. The stadium had been filled with smoke, armed policemen ringed the field, and flaming cushions had been thrown onto the turf by the Columbians. The original official was escorted out of
the stadium, and Pelé played the rest of the game. Also in 1969, the warring factions of a civil war in Nigeria agreed to a twenty-four-hour peace hiatus so that the people could watch Pelé play for the touring Santos. Pelé had the power to stop a war.\footnote{Jenkins, The Beautiful Team, 182; Murray, The World’s Game, 122.}

Of course, by 1969 preparations were under way for the next World Cup. The dictator that took over the reigns of power that year, Médici (1969-1974) not only became intimately involved with soccer, but more than any other dictator, used soccer for his political means. The tune composed to inspire the national team in the 1970 World Cup (“Pra Frente, Brasil” or “Forward Brazil”) became the theme song of his government, and he tried to influence the selection of the national team. Many persons suspect that Médici also organized the firing of the national team coach (Saldanha) because of his communist sympathies. Other persons believe that Saldanha was fired for refusing to alter the training regimen so that the national team players could lunch with Médici. One thing Médici did understand was the emerging power of television, and regularly used it to promote his agenda, particularly when it involved soccer players.\footnote{Mason, Passion of the People?, 64; Page, “Soccer Madness,” 44; Jenkins, The Beautiful Team, 19, 21; Simon Kuper, Football Against the Enemy (London: Phoenix, 2002), 179.}

The 1970 World Cup in Mexico City occurred at a time that the Brazilian dictators designated the “economic miracle.” Growth was up, inflation was down, and coffee was no longer the largest export. Some of the Brazilian intellectuals wanted the national
team to do poorly in the World Cup to prevent their exploitation by the dictators.\textsuperscript{154}

The preparation of the national team was underwritten by João Havelange, who was then President of the Brazilian Sports Confederation, and lasted at least three months. Coach Saldanha had been replaced with Coach Zagalo, and in turn he was replaced by Coutinho, supposedly by Havelange. Coutinho was a firm believer in fitness, and patterned much of the training after the NASA program. He garrisoned the players in a castle for training, but eventually became the coach in name only as the “three cobras” (Gérson, Pelé and Carlos Alberto) took over the team and began making most strategic decisions, and even negotiating salaries with Havelange. By the time Brazil arrived at their training site, they had entirely seduced the Mexican population with small flags, pennants, good will and affection. Winning the locals hearts would pay off in the long run during the tournament. Brazil sailed through the first round, beating defending champions England, 1-0. The Mexican population certainly helped, keeping up a clamor and din outside the hotel where the English team was staying throughout the entire night before the game. The Rio paper, \textit{Jornal dos Sportes}, credited the victory over England to Jesus: “Whenever the ball flew towards our goal and a score seemed inevitable, Jesus reached his foot out of the clouds and cleared the ball.” The final was against Italy, a historic meeting of catenaccio and Brazilian attacking elegance was settled with Brazil winning 4-1. The semi-final win against Uruguay was particularly

sweet, and viewed as a national revenge for 1950, and was also translated as a win for the culture in terms of their unusual racial mixture.\textsuperscript{155}

The military regime quickly stepped into the celebrations to take credit for the team, and identified the victory with national development. Each player was awarded an $18,500 bonus from the government and the CBD. The players were flown from Mexico City straight to Brasilia to be greeted by Medicí, and then to Rio for a carnival parade. The regime used the occasion of the World Cup to lease telecommunication space from satellites that provided the first linkage between northern and southern Brazil. Pelé was convinced to appear in a television commercial for the regime.\textsuperscript{156}

In the early 1970’s more players began to go overseas to play, either in Europe or the United States. Santos began to be criticized as the Harlem Globetrotters of soccer for their frequent money-raising world tours, to the extent that sometimes they arrived at a destination and refused to play unless paid more. The Brazilian club league was to change formats almost annually hereafter, and it wasn’t until 1978 that clubs from all twenty-two states were actually involved. Much criticism has been leveled at João Havelange for his involvement in the setting up of a national tournament, since clubs now had to travel all over the country, big teams played small teams, travel expenses


were tremendous, and attendance went down as there were so many games with many featuring non-competitive teams.\textsuperscript{157} Although remaining mainly apolitical at this time, in 1972 Pelé declared that, in Brazil, there was no dictatorship. Despite his somewhat unobservant comment, he was still admired in Brazil. A 1973 Brazilian survey by Janet Lever notes that in a photo recognition test of twelve pictures, only one person in two hundred could not name Pelé, whereas twelve could not name President Medicí. By this time, Pelé was the second most recognized “brand” name in Europe.\textsuperscript{158}

The government continued to use soccer throughout the history of the military regimes. While it was announcing a 16\% increase in average wage in 1973 (raising the minimum monthly income to $51.23), it also announced that 15,000 free tickets would be given away for the annual Fla-Flu game. Ticket prices were regulated at the Maracanã to ensure that even the poor could attend. Standing room cost 35 cents, and the upper deck bleacher section was $1.75. Of course, price controls were not in effect for seats for the middle and upper classes, so they could adjust to inflation.\textsuperscript{159}

The 1974 World Cup, held in West Germany, was fast approaching. For this tournament, Brazil tried to Europeanize their game by adding toughness, discipline and tactical order, but unfortunately with little success. Havelange was no longer running

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
  \item[158] Levine, “Sport and Society”: 244; Lever, \textit{Soccer Madness}, 122; Bellos, \textit{Futebol}, 112.
  \item[159] Lever, \textit{Soccer Madness}, 61-2.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Brazilian soccer, having departed to be the new president of FIFA, but the new Brazilian soccer head was Heleno Nuñes, a retired admiral and leader of the government party (ARENA) in the state of Rio. The European style that Brazil was attempting to emulate was encouraged by the military regime (as military advisers had been appointed to the soccer bureaucracy), although the population did not much care for it. Six million was spent on preparations. Perhaps more significantly, Pelé was not selected for the team. In “Pelé Speaks,” an article in the Brazil Reader, Pelé contends that the military regime consistently pressured him to play, even having the president’s daughter call him up and plead for the cause. Pelé states that his refusal to play was his way of protesting the barbarities of the dictatorship. The team lost the third place game to Poland, 1-0, and the team returned in disgrace.160

During 1974 the fan culture in Brazil made a dramatic change to a more youthful, aggressive and partisan fan. This transformation began at Corinthians in São Paulo with the organization of Gaviões da Fiel, a new fan club that provided fans with an opportunity for an organized public gathering during the military regime rule. The new fan organizations rapidly spread to all the major clubs in Brazil, providing an opportunity for political action in a sanctioned atmosphere. They also provided an increase in hooliganism at the games.161 In 1975 Pelé came out of retirement to sign

161 Giulianotti, Football: A Sociology, 59; Bellos, Futebol, 142.
with the New York Cosmos for a significant sum of money,\textsuperscript{162} and the Brazilian National Congress passed a law which institutionalized unitary voting in soccer confederations. This law made the system a powerful tool in political bargaining and also allowed the leagues from the interior to control the federations. Now, soccer was involved in personal politics. More tournaments were required to allow the smaller clubs to participate.\textsuperscript{163}

The 1978 World Cup was to take place in neighboring Argentina, and Coach Coutinho vowed to increase the team’s endurance. He was an advocate of polyvalence, which he maintained was another way of saying “total football” as played by the Germans and the Dutch so successfully.\textsuperscript{164} Nunes, as president of the CBD, interfered with and influenced selection of the national team, as well as turning all the preliminary matches into political rallies.\textsuperscript{165} Brazil did not do well in the first round of the tournament, and as Glanville put it, actually blundered into the second round. Brazilian fans burned Coutinho in effigy, and the press criticized him severely. Brazil played better in the second round. Meanwhile, Argentina advanced to the final on goal differential, and having played the last game, Argentina knew ahead of time exactly how much they must beat Peru by to advance. Brazil accused Argentina of bribing Peru, and there is some foundation for the belief. Peru received 35,000 tons of grain and the Argentinean

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{162} In fact, there is some controversy regarding how much the Cosmos paid Pelé. Murray, \textit{The World’s Game}, 121 says it is $4 million dollars, and Mason, \textit{Passion of the People?}, 92 states that it was $7 million.
\item \textsuperscript{163} Gordon and Helal, “The Crisis of Brazilian Football,” 148-149.
\item \textsuperscript{164} Glanville, \textit{Story of the World Cup}, 215; José Thadeu Goncalves in cooperation with Professor Julio Mazzei, \textit{The Principles of Brazilian Soccer} (Spring City, PA.: Reedswain, Inc., 1998), 160.
\item \textsuperscript{165} Lever, \textit{Soccer Madness}, 62.
\end{itemize}
bank unfroze a credit account for Peru. Later, some admitted the deal was on, arranged through Argentina’s FIFA representative. Brazil ended up beating Italy in the third place match. They played in the European style, but were not European enough.¹⁶⁶

In 1979 the National Sport Council authorized the creation of the CBF, the Brazilian Football Confederation, to operate soccer autonomously, and separate it completely from amateur sport. The CBF would receive a share of the gate at international games; receive all broadcast monies, and some lottery profits. The 5% tax that all clubs paid on their gate money was abolished, and a full time national team coach was appointed. As inflation soared and recession deepened, as modernists and traditionalists argued over what Brazilian style should be, the fan base began to decrease while 94 clubs competed for a championship. Billboards were now featured on the fields to bring in revenue, and players were starting to be sold just to make money. In fact, a large number of players were sold to various Japanese clubs as their started up their own professional league.¹⁶⁷

By the early 1980’s, fan violence was increasing rapidly, and fan clubs were being formally banned from stadiums. Fan violence began to become a public issue. By 1980, Brazil had eight of the nine largest stadiums in the world, all with the “moat” design to protect the players from the fans. Agents, and not clubs, now owned players, whose average salary was $48,000 a year. The first soccer trade union was established in


In 1982, Havelange, now the president of FIFA made it known that he would only support the Brazilian World Cup bid if his son-in-law, Ricardo Teixeira, was elected president of the CBF. This was the World Cup of Sócrates, and was to be a return to the beautiful and traditional playing style for Brazil, or as Kuper puts it, “the Brazilian style fleetingly reappeared.” According to the video, *Golé!,* Brazil “oozed sunshine and confidence” encouraged by their “fanatical and adoring circus.” They were “driven on by drums” and were “favorites and champion of all world football.”

The coach of the team was Tele Santana, and he was committed to Brazilian attacking soccer and lyrical midfield play. The fans kept up their “voo-doo drumming” as Brazil coasted through the first round beating Russia, Scotland and New Zealand. Factories and banks closed in Brazil for the games, and there were wild celebrations in the streets afterward. Brazil then beat Argentina but fell to Italy in the second round. Brazil acted differently after their World Cup loss, at least differently than they normally do when being knocked out of the tournament. This time, the country felt that the national team restored their pride, playing in the correct style for Brazil. They considered the

---

170 Kuper, *Football Against the Enemy*, 197; Bellos, *Futebol*, 357.
171 *Golé!* The Official Film of the 1982 World Cup directed by Tom Clegg (Soccer Learning Systems).
poor defense was not really a defect, but the right style to play if one was a Brazilian.\footnote{Humphrey, “No Holding Brazil,” 136.}

The lack of acrimony by the public for the national team was unusual, but a significant point. Brazilians value their style of play, and when it is changed from the traditional style (as defined by the 1958, 1962 and 1970 teams) because of attempts to Europeanize it, the public is not happy. They could demonstrate pride even in losing during 1982, because Brazil had played as Brazilians should.

But 1982 was not unique just because of the national team. Another movement was under way in the country, spurred by the wonderful player, Sócrates at the Corinthians club. It is commonly entitled “Corinthian Democracy” and was in fact a political movement, tied to soccer, against the military regime. It started as a political movement by players at Corinthians to alter the management and labor relations within the club. It evolved to not only a battle for control of the club and its presidency, but also aligned with political movements being softly acknowledged within the country. The clubs had maintained their oligarchal system of control to that point, and Sócrates took a stand that if the present system was maintained, he would resign from soccer. Corinthian Democracy emphasized the players’ right to control their own bodies and personal lives with concerns about decreasing “concentration” (the Brazilian practice of confining players for several days before games), bringing beer and cigarettes into the locker room, and maintaining their own private lives. By 1984, Corinthian Democracy had made a political impact, and at a rally for free elections, Sócrates pledged that if the
proposed free election amendment passed, he would refuse a million dollar offer to play in Italy. Unfortunately, it did not pass, and Sócrates did go to Italy.  

By 1982 the sport lottery was running strong in Brazil, and the amount of money being poured into it was staggering. 92% of the adults in Rio bet on the sport lottery at least once a month, and 63% bet on it weekly. Despite the huge amounts of money involved, or perhaps even because of it, the early signs of a growing corruption in the sport were becoming more apparent. Certain teams were favored because of their social status, while others were suffering from a bias against their social inferiority. There was a massive exodus of players to Europe and Japan. Uniforms were now featuring publicity as another means to raise money for clubs.

The 1986 World Cup, again played in Mexico, had Brazil favored to win, but it was not a memorable Cup for Brazil. There were disagreements in training camp with Tele Santana, the coach. Brazil squeaked through the first round, and the second round putting them through to the quarter-finals, where they lost in a shoot-out to France. It

---

175 Lever, *Soccer Madness*, 80.
was a heart-breaking finish for a team that had highlighted the beauty of a Sócrates “strolling around the field in a samba rhythm.”

The decade of the ‘90’s exhibited more symptoms of the crisis in Brazilian soccer. In 1990, the former national team player, Zico, was appointed the National Secretary of Sports, a newly created role. Zico’s Law (Law 8,672) was not passed until 1993, but ended the transfer law, professionalized administrators, reduced the role of the State in soccer, and encouraged the development of clubs as profitable ventures.

Acknowledging problems within Brazilian soccer was indicative of the trend of the time: altering “traditional” Brazilian cultural practices by the modernists to make Brazil competitive with the rest of the world, not only in terms of business but also in soccer. The 1990 World Cup team displayed the struggle that was ongoing. According to Kuper, the modernists took control of Brazilian soccer again, and appointed the sternest coach ever seen in Brazilian team history, Sebastiao Lazaroni. Lazaroni noted that “The national team must become less playful” and set out to ensure that this occurred. Giulianotti called the 1990 Brazilian style of play a “post-Fordist system” whereas Glanville sums up that Brazilians were once again trying to be European, and betrayed Brazilian soccer.

\[178 \text{Glanville, } \textit{Story of the World Cup,}\] 282, 287, 298-99.

\[179 \text{Mason, } \textit{Passion of the People?},\] 136; Gordon and Helal, “The Crisis of Brazilian Football,” 151.

\[180 \text{Kuper, } \textit{Football Against the Enemy},\] 203.

\[181 \text{Giulianotti, } \textit{Football: A Sociology,}\] 134; Glanville, \textit{The Story of the World Cup,} 307, 314.
The 1990 World Cup took place in Italy. Brazil had added a libero to their game, or a sweeper style fullback in the European model, which became a point of contention within the team. The training camp at Asti was in havoc. When game time arrived, the team looked as if it were playing for free kicks and not trying to score from the flow of play. Brazil did advance and play Argentina in the knock-out second round.\footnote{Glanville, \textit{Story of the World Cup}, 307, 311.} As has been noted earlier, Argentina and Brazil had at various times in their history emulated the style and organizational qualities of each other, which in turn led to an intense rivalry for the title of “soccer king of the continent.” The second round game reflected the intensity of their rivalry. Maradona scored the winning goal of the game amidst a flurry of accusations. Lazaroni insisted the problem was that Brazil no longer produced great strikers. But perhaps the strangest incident of the game was the accusation by Branco, the Brazilian left defender, that the Argentina bench had given him a drugged bottle of Gatorade. The English press jumped on the story with the \textit{Daily Star} headlines reading “NOBBLED! Argies doped me says Brazilian ace Branco!” Many believed the accusations to be true.\footnote{Glanville, \textit{Story of the World Cup}, 320; Daily Star (June 27, 1990) cited by Neil Blain, Raymond Boyle and Hugh O’Donnell, \textit{Sport and National Identity in the European Media} (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993), 62; Kuper, \textit{Football Against the Enemy}, 203; Galeano, \textit{Soccer in Sun and Shadow}, 177; Pablo Alabarces, Ramiro Coelho and Juan Sanguinetti, “Treacheries and Traditions in Argentinian Football Styles: The Story of Estudiantes de La Plata,” \textit{Fear and Loathing in World Football} ed. by Gary Armstrong and Richard Giulianotti (Oxford: Berg, 2001), 249.}\footnote{Page, “Soccer Madness,” 47.} The aftermath of the game was not pretty, but a traditional Brazilian reaction, nonetheless. Unhappy fans met the returning players at the Rio airport and pelted them with coins.\footnote{Page, “Soccer Madness,” 47.} \textit{Izvestija} furthered the theme of Brazilian unhappiness and cultural results with these comments from an article:

\begin{quote}
Suffice it to say that on those days when there are matches in
\end{quote}
which the national team is taking part the number of heart attacks doubles…And while Maradona joyously waved the green-yellow strip of his defeated Brazilian opponents above his head, fourteen criminals managed to escape from the grounds of a prison also in São Paulo, taking advantage of the inconsolable grief of the guards. No one was particularly surprised: its football…

Fiona Miller and Steve Redhead surmise that too many national players playing abroad led to the result of the Brazilian team in the 1990’s which was a “sameness and negativity of play.” Lazaroni became the public enemy of all Brazil, as the nation demanded the return to the traditional style of play. He could not return home, and took a job at Fiorentina, while Pelé was quoted as saying “Pelé is a sad old man.”

It must be agreed that Miller and Redhead have a valid point, and that style of play was not the only problem that Brazil needed to address. By 1991, thirteen Brazilians were playing in the top Italian league. Culturally, who was playing the game in Brazil also indicated some changes. A 1991 survey in São Paulo indicated that the majority of the soccer players were white, middle class, and educated. Brazil started to make an effort to recruit more working class, urban players back into the game.

As Brazil began to prepare for the 1994 World Cup, President Franco forayed into soccer (certainly not an unknown situation in Brazil) and went on television to beg the

---

185 Izvestija (June 26, 1990) cited by Blain, Boyle and O’Donnell, Sport and National Identity, 70.
187 Kuper, Football Against the Enemy, 203.
coach to pick Ronaldo for the team. 189 The United States hosted the 1994 World Cup, and Carlos Parreira was named as coach of the Brazilian team. Parreira had an interesting dilemma facing him, which was how to modernize the Brazilian game without destroying their traditional style of play. Page contends that Parreira successfully melded the Brazilian and European styles of play, and T. Bar-On agrees that he combined samba with the northern European game. Kuper insists that the style was a return to the traditional, but modernized. My own opinion would most likely parallel Galeano’s: that the team played an efficient game that was stingy on poetry making people nostalgic for the old days, and noting that eight of the starting players now played in Europe.190 Parreira, himself, would insist that he was merely returning the players to the basics of Brazilian soccer. However, he also commented that “We will play in the way today’s football demands. Magic and dreams are finished in football. We have to combine technique and efficiency.”191

The discourse on Brazilian soccer was abundant at the time. Sports writer Richard Williams noted Brazil was carrying a burden for her country, the “burden of beautiful noise” because Brazil was slowly emerging from a period of domestic turmoil, chaotic and corrupt organization, emigrating stars and decreasing crowds. Former Republic of


Ireland player, Eamon Dunphy, declared Brazil was at the head of a crusade to save football from the dark sources, which included cynicism, brutality, and their own coach, saying “Parreira is the problem Brazil must overcome.”192 What Parreira managed to do was present the modern as traditional, but many Brazilians did not buy it. In the opening round, Brazil won two and tied one game. The team was accused of playing too defensively, but Parreira countered with: “It is not true that Brazil now plays the European way…the flat four, zonal marking…is all Brazilian.”193 Schools, factories and shopping centers closed for games, and the Brazilian carnival atmosphere took over. Brazil won their semi-final game against Sweden 3-0 and advanced to the final against Italy. Italy played their normal defensive game, but Brazil did not press the attack. The game was decided on penalty kicks, and Brazil won when Roberto Baggio shot the fifth penalty over the crossbar.194 Brazil had won their fourth World Cup, but it was not a happy nation that greeted the return of the players. The federal government awarded each player $150,000 for the victory, but the Brazilian fans were not happy.195 As Wagg points out, Brazil works as a paradigm in which certain events allow only certain explanations. The narrative of Brazilian soccer is interwoven with dualisms: spontaneity versus contrivance, art versus business, Latin passion versus European repression, the masses against the powerful, and good versus evil. The visible reality of the style of play of the team did not match the established myth, and so a human failing

194 Mason, Passion of the People?, 147-150; Murray, The World’s Game, 176.
had to account for it. The blame was laid on the coach, who always claimed that the style he taught was the traditional Brazilian style.\textsuperscript{196} What becomes so very interesting in this paradigm is the obvious construction of the battle between modernists and traditionalists. It is interesting to note that although Brazil also won the 2002 World Cup, Carlos Parreira has been announced as the coach for the 2006 team.

Preparations were under way for the 1998 World Cup, hosted by France. Pelé’s push as Minister of Sport, to change soccer was again met with resistance, and Havelange threatened to ban Brazil from the 1998 World Cup if Pelés’ bill passed in Congress. (How Havelange would ban Brazil was never mentioned.) Coach Zagalo had been named the Brazilian national team coach, and he prepared the team to use a traditional 4-4-2 style of play. Named to the team were the highest paid players in the world at that point, Denilson and Ronaldo.\textsuperscript{197} The team made it to the finals, playing France for the championship game, but the team was a sad travesty of its former self, despite being stacked with international stars. Brazil lost 3-0 to a French team that utterly dominated the game. It was reported that men cried in the streets over the Brazilian loss, but this time, much of the blame was placed not on the coach, but on Nike.\textsuperscript{198} Galeano describes how and why Nike was involved:

At fourteen, Ronaldo was a poor mulatto from the slums of Rio de Janeiro, with rabbit teeth and the legs of a great striker, who couldn’t play for Flamengo because he didn’t have the bus fare. At twenty-two, he was making a thousand dollars an hour, even

\textsuperscript{196} Wagg, “The Business of America,” 189.
\textsuperscript{198} Bellos, \textit{Futebol}, 318.
when he was asleep. Overwhelmed by his own popularity and the pressure of money, obliged to always shine and always win, Ronaldo suffered a nervous breakdown with violent convulsions hours before the ’98 Cup was decided. They say Nike forced him to take the field in the final against France. He played, but he didn’t. And he couldn’t demonstrate the virtues of Nike’s new line of boots, the R-9, being marketed on his feet.  

According to Galeano, Brazil sold its soul to modern soccer, particularly Nike.  

But Brazilian soccer had further problems, more than just addressed in the Senate Inquiries. In 2000, the national league tournament was postponed, then cancelled, and then started with 116 teams rather than 22. The playing schedule was announced ten days late. The number of games and tournaments have increased to the extent that players are now “in season” nearly year round, leading to an increase in injuries. Giulianotti notes that Brazil has replicated its tradition of feudal servitude and slave trading through its soccer system. Players can be signed to professional contracts as young as age twelve, but when they do sign, they must give up their passé, or labor market pass, to the club, which means they cannot engage in labor bargaining or determine any transfer rights. The club retains their passé until age thirty when they automatically become free agents. Players who challenge the system are shunned by clubs and the national team. Those players that become injured have their passé returned and receive no benefits: they are discarded.  

199 Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, 214.  
200 Downie, “Brazil Drops Ball in Soccer”: 7; Giulianotti, Football: A Sociology, 102, 113; Goncalves, Principles of Brazilian Soccer, 87.
Currently, the upper middle class elites still dominate and control the game of soccer in Brazil. What is changing is that fewer players are now coming out of the favelas and turning professional, mainly because the inequalities of poverty such as malnutrition and teenage substance abuse make them not fit enough to play a game that is rapidly increasing in the desire for strength and pace. However, Galeano states that soccer is not much different than in the past, as a recent survey indicates that two out of three professional Brazilian players have never finished primary school.\footnote{Giulianotti, \textit{Football: A Sociology}, 147, 164; Richard Giulianotti and Gerry P.T. Finn, “Epilogue: Old Visions, Old Issues- New Horizons, New Openings? Change, Continuity and other Contradictions in World Football,” \textit{Football Culture: Local Contests, Global Visions} ed. by Richard Giulianotti and Gerry P.T. Finn (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 261; Galeano, \textit{Soccer in Sun and Shadow}, 217.}

As has been demonstrated, Brazilian soccer has gone through many of the typical eras that other nations have when adopting a foreign sport, particularly a sport spread by the British Empire during its days of dominance. Initially, the game is introduced and played by foreign residents in the country, and in Brazil that was the German immigrant population and the British residents. Later it spreads to the indigent elite, who participate in the game in an effort to emulate the host country. The elite reinforce the image of amateurism as a means of separating themselves from the masses and retaining full control of the game. Eventually the game is co-opted by the indigent masses, and generally a short time later is professionalized. After professionalization there appears a period whereby the game is spread fairly rapidly throughout the country, and along with modernization becomes bureaucratized, organized, and somewhat commodified. It will be interesting to see how Brazil shapes soccer during the
postmodern era, and whether they will be able to address the inherent corruption that is thoroughly ingrained in the soccer system at this point. They have taken the first steps with the Inquiries and the adoption of Pelé’s Law which allows clubs to become businesses, but whether they can root out parts that have become the cultural norm still remains to be seen.
CHAPTER 7
THE SPORT HISTORY OF GERMANY

While the sporting history of Germany stretches back hundreds of years, soccer was very slowly accepted within Germany for a variety of reasons. This chapter explores the history of sport, particularly soccer, during the modern and post-modern periods of German history. Germany’s acceptance of soccer, and its subsequent rise to popularity, was never a guaranteed proposition.

The acceptance of soccer in Germany was a slow process compared to other countries, but once soccer permeated the working class its acceptance was rapid, leading to soccer’s rise as a mass sporting and the dominant sport in the country. Germany followed rather traditional patterns in the acceptance of the game, but lagged behind other countries in its acceptance and development of the sport. Several trends can be established for this lag: the dominance of turnen gymnastics and their historical connections with nationalistic identity as well as their hegemonic dominance of sport in the country, the anti-foreigner bias (formation of concept of “other”) dominant in the country which tarred all British games, the lack of a historical folk game of football, and a weak middle class, in terms of influencing cultural innovations, which initially resisted the introduction of the sport.
The rise of gymnastics and their ties to nationhood began to be established in Germany in the early 1800’s.¹ A short historical reminder is needed at this point to preface the introduction of turnen into German society. In 1806 Napoleon beat the Prussian army which directly led to reforms in the military. As a result, concerns over the physical fitness of youth were raised, and consequently, schools added a physical education program based on Guts Muths conceptions of gymnastics. In 1793, Guts Muths had the liberal ideology of wanting the middle class to have access to what the aristocracy had in terms of leisure and physical conditioning, and hence developed a program of gymnastics to meet that need.²

Friedrich Ludwig Jahn began using the term turnen to refer to a unique form of gymnastics emphasizing the cultural origins and ties to nationalism. Setting up his own turnplatz near Berlin in 1811, Jahn moved gymnastics out of the gym and into the woods and fields, providing a variety of daring apparatus on which to perform his gymnastic exercises, and adding hiking and swimming. His students were taught to idolize the Middle Ages, and hate the French. Jahn’s political views disturbed the Prussian autocratic rulers, and in 1819 he was arrested and turnen was outlawed. In 1842 the ban on turnen was lifted, and turnen was liberalized to a certain extent. Jahn made no secret of the fact that he hated “Junker, Juden, und Pfaffen” (“gentry, Jews

and priests”), and saw modern sport and gymnastics as being diametrically opposed. Jahn’s goal was to produce the perfect German, which led to nationalistic and anti-
foreign feelings permeating the turnen movement. By 1848, the most radical of the turnen supporters fled to America, and the movement began a move to a more conservative and nationalistic ideology. In Jahn’s view, gymnastics promoted unity, particularly German unity, whereas sport was decadent with too much English influence, an elitist flavor with an emphasis on individualism. Jahn did not emphasize formal gymnastics, rejected discipline and drill as a means of exercise, and particularly opposed team gymnastics. Jahn’s stated purpose was to keep young people physically fit for the coming struggle for the “Fatherland,” particularly in preparation for Napoleon. Women were not accepted in turnen. By 1860 the Deutsche Turnerschaft was established with ardent nationalistic supporters of the German Empire, emerging after the defeat of Napoleon III in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71.³

Throughout the 1800’s, turnen dominated the sporting life of Germany as clubs devoted to gymnastics also developed into social clubs with nationalistic leanings and political influences. The establishment of the German Empire in 1871 provided a further

impetus for the popularity of turnen. Udo Merkel contends that unification of the
Empire occurred with significant contributions by Turnbewegung which spearheaded a
national unity campaign through gymnastic clubs. The middle class was largely
excluded from nation building and the turnen were politically powerful with their
gymnastic clubs affiliated with political festivals on a regular basis. Turnen became a
key element in “German-ness” when the state appropriated gymnastics via the
educational system. 4 At the time of the establishment of the Wilhelmine Empire, there
was a general concern across Germany over a decreasing population that was patently
unhealthy, and an increasing Russian population poised on the far reaches of the
German Empire. Turnen represented the main means of achieving physical strength
coupled with beauty and moral strength. 5

Concurrent with the turnen movement in Germany was the rise in the student dueling
corps. Student dueling corps had long been connected to education institutions and
functioned somewhat along the same vein as college fraternities do in the United States,
serving as a social organization which provides contacts for designated sectors of
society. In Germany, they were primarily related to those sectors of society that would
enter public service, and served to maintain the existing social order. Prior to 1870, the
student corps emphasized an obligation to duel which then led to the autonomy of the
individual conscience being limited. From 1871 onwards, the dueling rituals changed

5 J.A. Mangan, “Prologue: Legacies,” Shaping the Superman: Fascist Body as Political Icon Aryan
Fascism ed. by J.A. Mangan (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 5; Eduardo Archetti, Masculinities: Football,
Polo and the Tango in Argentina (Oxford: Berg, 1999), xvii.
and began to emphasize single combat, formalized ritual violence with an emphasis on face wounds, and the deeming of weakness as being contemptible. As Norbert Elias points out, the significance of the student dueling societies contributed to a peculiar formation of national habitus. The connection to soccer may seem remote, but the involvement of the students with dueling and dueling’s social connotations, surely slowed the acceptance of soccer within Germany to a certain extent.6

It appears that soccer was introduced into Germany around 1860, probably by English students bringing that game that would later split into soccer and rugby.7 Pfister, Fasting, Scraton and Vázquez maintain that English residents of Germany played the game which led to German youth being introduced to soccer.8 Eisenberg proposes that soccer was introduced in the 1870’s and 1880’s by English settlers, tourists and students.9 Konrad Koch is credited with officially introducing the game into Germany in 1874, and most sources acknowledge him as the founder of German soccer, however, some discrepancies do appear in the accounts and give rise to questions regarding an invented tradition. Merkel acknowledges Koch as introducing soccer, and Dunning, Maguire and Pearton add that Koch was a mere eighteen years old at the time.10

---

7 Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 25.
10 Udo Merkel, “Germany and the World Cup: Solid, Reliable, Often Undramatic—but Successful,” Hosts and Champions: Soccer Cultures, National Identities and the USA World Cup ed. by John Sugden
Murray acknowledges that Koch introduced the game in 1874 as a physical education teacher at his school, the Braunschweiger Martino-Katharineum-Gymnasium, after spending a year in England.11 Guttmann advocates that Koch, as an eighteen year old student, introduced the game at the school, whereas Eisenberg advocates that Koch founded the first soccer club at the school as a teacher in 1874.12 Tony Mason advocates that after a stay in England, Koch introduced the game into recreational afternoons at his school.13 Hesse-Lichtenberger, acknowledging information from German football historian Hans Dieter Baroth, insists that in 1874 at a grammar school in Braunschweig, Konrad Koch and August Hermann, two teachers at the school, introduce the game to a group of students. According to Hesse-Lichtenberger, the teachers barely knew the rules, and had ordered the ball from England simply to try it out. It was the first introduction of the game in Germany that had no English involvement.14

By 1875, Koch and his pupils had formed a student association to play the game, and in 1876 played a game against another school in Göttingen. By 1879 a few teachers were ordering students to go out and play soccer to reduce boisterous outbursts in the

---

12 Guttmann, *Games and Empires*, 47; Eisenberg, “Football in Germany,” 215.
14 Hesse-Lichtenberger, *Tor!* , 25.
However, not all schools embraced the new sport. Most of the grammar schools were reluctant to allow their pupils to play soccer, and often banned soccer from afternoon physical activity sessions and forbade students from joining sports clubs. Soccer was forced into sports clubs and out of the educational environment, in direct opposition to its development in Britain and other countries. The whole area of “sport” was problematic for German society at the time, and with schools totally invested in turnen philosophy, sport developed outside in club settings.

The first soccer club for adults was established in 1878 in Hannover, although Hesse-Lichtenberger insists that FC of Hannover played more of a rugby style game rather than soccer. The club was met with fierce resistance by the local Turnen clubs, which symbolized how many of the early soccer clubs were accepted. The Turnen opposition was based on a variety of reasons, all having to do with the ideology of turnen, itself. They asserted that there was no spiritual, patriotic, or nationalistic foundation to soccer and that it lacked an ideological basis, which turnen offered. The opposition also featured elements of Anglophobia, particularly when sport emphasized competition and record keeping. The German educational system objected to soccer on the grounds that it offered cultural diversity at a time when Germany had little interest in international sport. A leading advocate of turnen, Karl Planck, denounced soccer in a written publication, saying it reduced men to the level of apes, and made reference to the

---

15 Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 25-26; Guttmann, Games and Empires, 47; Merkel, “The Hidden Social and Political History,” 169.
17 Eisenberg, “The Middle Class and Competition,” 276-77.
“English sickness,” comparing soccer to rickets. Another publication by Otto Heinrich Jäfer compares kicking the ball to ‘kicking a vicious cur.’

From about 1875 to the 1920’s, soccer was mainly a white collar game in Germany, following similar patterns in other countries. It tended to concentrate in middle sized cities with institutes with technical sectors and was played by young adult males, whose main orientation was socialization via physical activity. A variety of reasons have been proposed as to why the game was not willingly accepted in Germany and did not quickly become the mass sporting event that it assumed in many other countries. There is little doubt that the resistance offered by turnen slowed down the progress of “sport” in Germany as it posed a threat to the hegemonic dominance of gymnastics.

Along with the threat to their dominance, nationalistic fervor in the new Empire contributed to a rising tide of anti-foreign feeling. And soccer was one of those “English games” that was being imported into the country along with rugby and tennis. Prussian ideals of discipline, in particular, looked with disfavor on soccer as it appeared disorganized and wild. Militaristic, disciplined and controlled gymnastics were much more to their liking, particularly since they were of German origin. Eisenberg offers a well thought-out summary as to why the middle class was not more accepting of sport.

---

22 Hobsbawm, “Mass Producing Traditions,” 300.
23 Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 26.
The middle and lower classes in Germany at the time had little time for leisure, and little money to spend on it. Soccer uniforms, shoes, even balls had to be imported and were fairly costly items. Along with the influence of *turnen*, the German intelligentsia rejected sport, equating that mind and muscle were not compatible, and the great German tradition of *kulture* was based on a creative mind. German education, itself, tended to differ from the English. Whereas in England, the education system offered a liberal arts style of learning, in Germany, the educational system focused on a more specialized, technical education. Therefore, school boy sports were not as accepted in Germany. German athletics tended to emphasize unity and not competition, so the English notion of modern sport, based on competition, was an alien notion. Eisenberg’s concept is that sport was disintegrating to the middle class in Germany. There was no familiar history of folk football, so to German workers, the game was totally unfamiliar. There was no corresponding movement to civilize games, as there was in England, as Germany was merely disseminating the games. And there was no sub-culture of middle class youth as little school loyalty existed below the college level. Merkel would agree with this summation.24

During the 1880’s, soccer continued to slowly make inroads into German leisure time activities, and slowly began to develop as a sport. In 1880, Bremen and Hamburg organized soccer clubs for adults, although neither club survived for long. These towns were more open to English sport as the citizens were in close contact with English

24 Eisenberg, “The Middle Class and Competition,” 265-273; Eisenberg, “Football in Germany,” 207; Merkel, “Germany and the World Cup,” 94-95.
merchants that played and followed the game.\textsuperscript{25} In 1881, Hannover added a club, and by 1885, Berlin was adding several clubs, mainly due to George Leux. The first soccer clubs in Berlin and the surrounding towns were met with fierce opposition from the physical education teachers, who, steeped in \textit{turner} tradition, felt that the games were crude and dangerous, and didn’t hesitate to say so. What is interesting is that many of the early clubs were associated with \textit{turnen}, in that they were officially \textit{turnervein} organizations that also offered soccer. During the 1880’s, women’s participation in \textit{turnen} was increasing and was more socially accepted as the Social Darwinism grew with the philosophy that strong women led to strong offspring. Soccer was becoming viewed as a further means to produce stronger children, which may have eased its acceptance into some of the \textit{turnervein} societies. English schools within Germany also were impetuses to the spread of the game.\textsuperscript{26}

Around 1885, Meister (champions) medals became popular with soccer players and other athletic event participants. In part, these medals reflected the term “Meister” or master that was represented in trade guilds. Prior to the standardization of rules and leagues, the cost of these medals and who would pay for them were major points in negotiating games with opponents. Until the turn of the century, meister medals, the openness of the games (meaning that it was considered modern and therefore attractive), and emphasized individualism (there was little concept of team play or strategy) offered an attractive alternative to the solidarity represented by \textit{turnen}.

\textsuperscript{25} Guttmann, \textit{Games and Empires}, 48; Hesse-Lichtenberger, \textit{Tor!}, 26.
Women were allowed to be soccer club members, although they did not play the game. Players often joined clubs for one game and then moved to another club for the next game.\textsuperscript{27}

In 1886, Neuwied on the Rhine claims to have staged the first international match that was reported in German, with a school playing a local gymnastics club. In 1887, the first club devoted solely to soccer originated in Hamburg, and the trend began to spread to other northern coastal ports. Concurrently, around 8\% of the German students were now involved in dueling corps for social recognition, and increasing right wing nationalism was beginning to permeate the middle class. By 1888, FC Germania Berlin was established, which is the oldest club still in existence. From 1888 to about 1909, Berlin became the center of German soccer, with clubs forced into using military grounds for pitches. The local \textit{turnen} societies had priority on parks and community grounds.\textsuperscript{28}

1890 saw the uniting of the British and German clubs in the city of Berlin when Georg Leux established the \textit{Bund Deutscher Fussballspieler}, and a city championship was begun in 1892.\textsuperscript{29} 1892 also saw the formation of Hertha Berlin, FC Dresden and FC Britannia, the latter two being totally run by Germans. Braunschweig established the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{27} Eisenberg, “Football in Germany,” 210-211.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Guttmann, \textit{Games and Empires}, 48; Hesse-Lichtenberger, \textit{Tor!}, 33.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
first soccer club for adult males in 1895, while Hamburg began league play in 1894.\(^{30}\) The pattern of growth from school and middle class clubs led to a beginning soccer mania, which saw clubs begin to be organized in the industrialized regions. Part of the reasoning for the spread was the trading regulation amendment in 1891 that mandated no Sunday work for offices and shops, but which did not affect factory work. Players were mainly white collar workers, mostly single with an adequate income (soccer kits could cost up to half of a player’s weekly wages), and the sport became a piece of theatre to replace the student corps from which the workers were denied admission. In fact, soccer clubs often emulated student dueling corps by adopting similar names, wearing caps, and promoting drinking gatherings.\(^{31}\)

While soccer was growing in Germany, fierce opposition still existed during the 1890’s and beyond. This decade saw the publication of English FA soccer rules into German, which was indispensable in making the game have “German-ness” during the rising anti-English rhetoric of the period.\(^{32}\) *Turnen* continued to object to all English sports, and during the 1890’s began a trend toward an even more conservative bent, represented by Albert Spies. Spies’ style of gymnastics features indoor, closed military drill, and the ideology turned from a liberal-national mode to a militaristic mode. Modern sport was considered a dangerous alien import that would destroy the economic and political hegemony of the German people, while sport’s pride and egotism would

\(^{32}\) Pfister, Fasting, Scraton and Vásquez, “Women and Football,” 7, 12; Eisenberg, “Football in Germany,” 208.
destroy the national community. Gymnastic clubs began to focus on elaborate rituals and ceremonies. Leipzig soccer players were required to attend gymnastic drills in order to continue playing their game, and were treated as lepers within their own club.33

Despite the strenuous objections, the game began to grow, perhaps in part due to the fact that Germany did not accept rugby and cricket, thus allowing room for the game of soccer to develop. Sports journals began to be established. The first clubs were started in the industrialized Ruhr region, although they were still mainly of bourgeois origins. In 1898, Bar Kochba, the first Jewish gymnastics club was founded in Berlin, and by 1899 the first Polish gymnasiums were started in the Ruhr region.34 The movement of soccer into the industrialized regions did not signify that the game had moved into the working classes yet. The elites of German society were accepting the game because it was held outdoors, because it was considered modern, and because it allowed them to use sport as social exclusion. The working class tended to be put off of modern sport due to its accompanying social life that emulated the student dueling corps. But, as productivity and industrialization increased, more and more people were being exposed to English sport, particularly soccer.35 Guttmann theorizes that part of the reason the

working class was late in accepting soccer was due to the initial resistance of the 
*Arbeiter-Turn-Bewegung*, which was the socialist gymnastic federation established in 
1893 in opposition to the *Deutsche Turnerschaft*. The socialist’s workers movement 
were opposed to competitive sport because it smacked of capitalism and seemed to have 
little ideology.\(^{36}\)

By the end of the decade, German soccer was beginning to have some international 
exposure. In 1899, the first English soccer team visited Germany, despite protests. It 
was an FA tour composed of both amateur and professional, and was made possible by 
a German individual sponsoring the tour. Earlier, in 1896, the Duisburg team had 
traveled to England for four games. In 1898, Walter Bensemann took a German all-star 
team to Paris to play both French and English teams, but this was not considered the 
first official international game as there was no official German state organization 
sponsoring it, at least yet. Progress was being made towards that goal. In 1897, the 
Karsruhe region formed the first soccer association (Southern German Football 
Association) which encompassed six towns. In 1899, Preussen Berlin FC became the 
first club with their own grounds.\(^{37}\)

Around the turn of the century, the game of soccer was still an end to itself. German 
teams still stressed individualism, but the concept was being disrupted due to the 
beatings they received for semi-official English teams. A new team spirit entered the

---

\(^{36}\) Guttmann, *Games and Empires*, 49.

game, strengthened by military language and connections to the military, which after all, was supplying many of the playing fields. The team captain was often called the Kaiser, but coaches were still not in evidence. Referees officiated games in lounge suits and hats, but had little authority. Soccer began to split from *turnen* all around the country, which further contributed to the problem of finding playing space. Teams played in cow and sheep pastures, rubbish dumps, and even in cemeteries.38

Finally, in 1900, the *Deutscher Fussball Bund* (DFB), or German Football Association, was formed in Leipzig after several earlier failed attempts. Walther Bensemann initiated the proceedings, and Ferdinand Hueppe was elected president. Gustav and Fred Manning were implicitly involved, and founded the club, Bayern Munich in the same year. An official set of rules were published a few months later, including “no player is allowed to lie down to rest” during a game. The DFB was founded with the involvement of 86 clubs, and their intent was to establish common rules and prove that soccer was a patriotic movement which supported German nationalism while remaining apolitical. They initiated this by making frequent references to the “Fatherland” and the emperor, and tried to prove that soccer had been a German folk game from the Middle Ages. The use of English terms was criticized, so the translation of soccer terminology into German was highly encouraged, and was instrumental in Konrad Koch’s drawing up a German translation of soccer expressions by 1902. Merkel maintains that the DFB has

---

always been closely allied to the German power elites, national-socialists and the military from its inception. 39

In 1901, Borussia Dortmund was established as a social program within the Trinity parish, and by 1909 it was an independent organization. In 1904, Schalke 04 was begun by neighborhood youths, and they were amalgamated with Schalke Turnverein 1877 in order to affiliate with the DFB. The organization of these two clubs was significant because they were largely comprised of working class (mainly mining) players, and often were of Polish extraction. Of the Schalke 04 players, 35 of the 44 members from 1904-1913 were miners, workers or artisans. Soccer was starting to infiltrate the masses, but it was a slow process. 40

A German representative team traveled to England in 1901 and was beaten 12-0 in Tottenham. 1903 features several countries meeting to form an international soccer association, which included Belgium, France, Germany, Holland and Spain. The organization, FIFA, was officially founded in 1904, and the DFB joined via telegram despite anti-international feelings in Germany. While there was now a national German soccer association, the DFB lacked control, as regional association continued to control the organization. There was no national coach, and even national squad selections were


problematic. Rigid amateurism was the rule of the day. In 1903, the DFB sponsored the first national German championship, which was riddled with scandals and hoaxes. The championship game was delayed for half an hour due to a damaged soccer ball, and a false telegram was sent to Karlsruhe while their opponents were in Leipzig, and thus the DFB declared Prague the winners of the championship. In 1904, the championship was cancelled completely due to disorganization, but the DFB had 200 clubs with 10,000 members.\textsuperscript{41}

The championship returned in 1905, and was further plagued with organizational problems, an apathetic public and suspicious authorities. However, the Kaiser’s son, the Crown Prince, attended the final which led to an increased military interest in the game, particularly by the army and the navy. By 1906, FIFA was requiring the DFB to adopt English FA rules for the game, and the military continued to take an interest in the development of soccer, determining that the game could benefit military preparedness and physical conditioning. Army grounds were still frequent locations for game fields, and militaristic terms confirming patriotism continued to creep into soccer language. By 1908 a knock-out cup had been established in Berlin and the Crown Prince Cup was established in 1909 for amateur teams (which was all the soccer teams in Germany.) A national team had been formed and played the first official

international game against Switzerland in 1908. The national team suffered three
defeats in that year… they were not very good.42

By 1910, the military was allowing more and more of their grounds to be used for
soccer, and turnen still regarded the sport as a competitor. Soccer began to advance to
national interest right before World War I due to the interest and involvement of the
military, and the military lifted its ban on the game. Players were encouraged to
develop a calm, cold-blooded, clear headed, superior attitude which was considered
necessary for the ideal soldier, along with increased stamina. Training began to feature
army pack marches and shooting. Games at this point were generally friendlies within a
town, championships were rare, and leagues had not been established nation-wide. The
working class still showed little interest in the game. In 1911, the DFB and a white
collar union joined the paramilitary Jungdeutschlandbund, which officially aligned
soccer with the military. In 1912, the DFB stated in their annual report that soccer was
to improve the nation’s health and military might, but the Bavarian Minister of Culture
still issued a ban on high school soccer, which lasted until 1913. By 1914, the
membership of the DFB rivaled the National Choral Society Association, but still could
not match the Gymnastics Associations, which featured three times more members than
soccer. The GDF now had 2200 clubs as members.43

42 Hesse-Lichtenberger, *Tor!,* 44, 64, 67, 85; Eisenberg, “Football in Germany,” 206; Merkel, “The
Hidden Social and Political History,” 174.
43 Eisenberg, “Football in Germany,” 205-206, 208, 213-214; Pfister, Fasting, Scraton and Vázquez,
Continent,” 106; Murray, *The World’s Game,* 26; Hubert Dwertmann and Bero Rigauer, “Football
Hooliganism in Germany: A Developmental Sociological Study,” *Fighting Fans* ed. by Eric Dunning,
The outbreak of World War I impacted most clubs by the loss of players to the cause. Soccer had always had patriotic undertones, and this trend continued throughout World War I. Hesse-Lichtenberger offers some disagreement in this area, contending that local patriotism was most important in Germany, and that the national team at that time was considered something of a joke, and the national championship had been in tatters since the beginning. Three national training coaches had been appointed in 1914, but only one took his job due to the war, and he had little influence on national team selection and mainly served as a roving coach. But soccer did continue throughout the war. Games were frequently held between German barracks, and club play continued. Many clubs changed their names when Germany entered the war, particularly those clubs with English names. Britannia Hamburg immediately changed to FC Blücher. The Ruhleben POW camp in Berlin featured 4000 British POWs playing soccer, organized into leagues, and often appearing before 1000 German fans. Several sources mention a Christmas Day game of 1914 played in No Man’s Land in Flanders between German and English soldiers. While Merkel considers this story a modern fable or invented tradition, Eduardo Galeano cites an interview with Bertie Felstead prior to his death in 2002 and mentions he was the sole survivor of the Christmas Day game between British and German soldiers, but also cites the date as 1915. The July 1,
1916 British assault in Picardy supposedly started with a soccer kick launched by Captain Neville across the trenches. His regiment followed and the English won the battle, although Captain Neville was killed.46

Post war soccer foreshadowed some massive changes. The 1918 Treaty of Versailles reduced the German military, so physical education in and out of school became a substitute for former military training, and many of the physical education teachers were militarists. There began a movement of commercial and social involvement in soccer, and worker sponsored clubs began to increase. Workers had two options, either to join middle class clubs or form their own clubs. The middle class ideology still tended to emphasize individualism and hero worship in the soccer game, and most of the working mass felt more comfortable with a philosophy featuring teamwork. Industrialists supported the formation of clubs, particularly those emphasizing teamwork which might benefit production. By 1919 the eight hour work day had become law, which also increased the ranks of blue collar soccer players. Labor officials and leftist intellectuals were often critical of the game, believing that it distracted workers from the coming class struggle and served as the “opium of the masses.” By 1919, Germany featured 150,000 players, but the international game lay dormant.47

The most important trend during the decade of the 1920’s was the growing involvement and dominance of the working class into the game of soccer. The game began to flourish among the working class, and fan attendance increased correspondingly. Giulianotti designates this period as the early modernization period in German soccer which lasted until approximately 1950. Several theories are available for this rise in working class interest, and all of them probably contributed to the trend. Until 1918 the worker sport movement had been severely suppressed by the state, which has been generally attributed to a rising immigrant population (particularly in the industrial belt) and the growing differentiation of society. Also contributing to the increase was the institution of the eight hour work day (allowing more leisure time available to watch and participate), the Weimar Republic’s new constitution which allowed working class organizations more freedom and independence as well as allowing the formation of them, the concerns of the middle class at the influx of working class members into their clubs and social organizations, and the support of the state in soccer.  

As working class involvement in soccer began to rise, the example of Schalke 04 is revealing. In the early 1920’s, the Deutsche Turnerschaft in Schalke insisted on the separation of gymnastics and sport, which led to the soccer club separating from the Turnerschaft in 1923-4. They reformed in 1924 as the Schalke 04 soccer club, but were not recognized as a formal club by the municipal authorities. From 1923-1934, 91 of

the 122 members were from the working class. They rose from the fourth division of German soccer in 1920 to the first division in 1926. The members of Schalke 04 were from the German-Polish region of Prussia, and were industrial workers. Both reasons were significant for alienation in Germany.49

As soccer became a mass spectator sport in Germany, there arose a need for stadia, and a building craze ensued, but generally using pre-World War I plans. The stadiums exhibited an overall continental enthusiasm for Olympic influences, which led to running tracks for athletics around most of the fields. Stadiums were generally part of a multi-sport complex, oval shaped and open. Most had one main viewing stand and three open terraces. The stadiums reflected the rising popularity along with the German craze for six day races and mass sporting events.50 As mass spectator events increased, so too did media coverage. The championship final in 1927 was the first live match carried in entirety on the radio.51 Mass consumerism began to appear, and not surprisingly, Adidas offered their first running shoes available with spikes to soccer players.52

Given the social constraints that had been inherent in the German population for over a century, the mass involvement of the working class in what had formerly been a middle

51 Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 56.
52 Ibid., 139.
class sport led to some concerns. Consequently, amateurism became a pre-eminent area of controversy and class struggle. Amateurism held a quasi-religious status almost the equivalent of cult status in Germany. Every form of professionalism could be regarded as the decadent Zeitgeist, the American life style which featured greed, egoism and materialism. As gate prices increased for attendance, amateurism became more of an issue. The DFB denounced professionalism, and declared soccer would not become as it was in England. Amateurism had become a full-blown ideology just at a time when DFB membership doubled due to an influx of ex-military worker members. The DFB would not even allow the national team to play countries that had professional leagues, which further limited post-war competition, as now Austria and Hungary were ruled out as opponents. During the Weimar Republic, the DFB continued to be ruled by a small group of middle class men who saw the rise of the working class as a threat. In 1923 the West German Football Association passed legislation called “The New Way” which suspended promotion and relegation for two years. Their verbalized defense of “The New Way” was to decrease growing fan violence, but the reality was to preserve the upper middle class hegemony of soccer. The legislation basically froze working class clubs at their current divisional level, just at a time when they were starting to make dramatic gains in moving up through the divisions. The ban was eventually lifted in 1925 after a tremendous outcry from the public.53

Meanwhile, the post-war situation impacted on all German sporting fields. In 1920, the British teams within FIFA displayed the Versailles mentality and refused to play any of the countries that had been their opponents in World War I, which included Germany, Austria and Hungary. When FIFA lifted the ban after Switzerland supported the reinstatement of the three international teams, the entire British association resigned from FIFA. The first World Cup, held in Uruguay in 1920 did not feature any German soccer, but not because of any ban instituted by FIFA. Rather, the German DFB voted not to send a team to Uruguay because professionals were taking part in the tournament. The DFB was headed by Linnemann, and he did name Otto Nerv as national team coach in 1926. Nerv valued discipline, strategy and conditioning, and had a fixation with the English playing style, particularly the W-M.54

From 1925-1945, Germany showed an increasing militarization of soccer, much as it had prior to World War I. According to Merkel, the DFB did not change its military and ideological positions during the Weimar Republic, but continued to display a deepening identity with the Wilhelmine era, and in fact used the Wilhelmine flag at times. The militarization of soccer deepened significantly during the next decade.55

The decade of the 1930’s merely intensified trends that were apparent during the 1920’s. Amateurism versus professionalism continued to be problematic, soccer

---

continued to increasingly become political and militarized, and as a result, became a propaganda tool for Nazism. Women’s soccer was being played in Frankfurt in 1930, but was disbanded in 1931 due to pressure from the middle class. It would not appear again in Germany until 1970. Spectators continued to increase attendance at soccer games. In 1930, England lifted its ban on German soccer and sent a professional team to play in Germany, resulting in a 3-3 tie. Germany once again declined to participate in the 1930 World Cup.\footnote{Pfister, Fasting, Scraton and Vázquez, “Women and Football,” 12-13; John Hargreaves, “The State and Sport: Programmed and Non-Programmed Intervention in Contemporary Britain,” \emph{The Politics of Sport} ed. by Lincoln Allison (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), 248; Dwertman and Rigauer, “Football Hooliganism in Germany,” 78; Brian Glanville, \emph{The Story of the World Cup}, rev. ed. (London: Faber and Faber, 1993), 16; Hesse-Lichtenberger, \emph{Tor!}, 73, 92.}

One of the first scandals to hit the DFB occurred in 1930 when the DFB banned Schalke 04 for professionalism. The Ruhr team of miners was playing a significant role in German soccer at the time, and was dominating in the sport due to their teamwork. The chronic depression in the decentralized urban area had led to high unemployment in the region, which allowed midweek league games in the Ruhr. The make-up of the local association rose from 70% to 90% working class members, and shamateurism with under the table payments was almost a necessity for survival. The West German Football Association declared fourteen of the Schalke players were professionals and suspended them (although some accounts note that only eight players were suspended) and fined the team 1,000 DM. A huge public outcry arose, and eventually the association relented and reaccepted Schalke 04 for the 1931 season. Because the association backed down, a rift occurred between the regional associations in the DFB,
which further hindered movement toward professionalism. When the national team was beaten by Austria 6-0 in 1931, talk again turned to professionalism, but was defeated by three principles holding sway at the time: the *turnen* emphasis on the ethical elite, the Football Association’s continued curtailment of the working class, and the dominance throughout Germany of de Coubertin’s Olympic amateurism ethic. In 1932 the DFB was about to give in to the demands of professionalism when the Nazis seized power and abolished professionalism in all sports.⁵⁷

The Nazi government established a German Reich Committee for Physical Exercises, led by Hans von Tscharmer und Osten, which was to oversee all German sport. All sport was to be reorganized into 16 districts, and the twin goals of sport were now to display the racial superiority of the German people and to assist with the military preparations for the coming war. For soccer specifically, all working-class, social-democrat and communist soccer clubs were eliminated. In 1933, the DFB announced in *Kicker* magazine that all Jews and Marxists were no longer acceptable in leadership positions in soccer clubs, and that all Jews were to be expelled from sport clubs. Hitler outlawed the banned professional league that was being planned by the DFB.⁵⁸

---


In 1934, youth soccer began to affiliate with the Hitler Youth, and added hiking, marching and shooting to their soccer training. By 1936, all youth soccer was part of the Hitler Youth. In 1935, the Nazis eliminated all religious sporting clubs and dissolved all Jewish teams completely. The DFB continued to exist, but with new rules. The DFB’s main function was to represent Germany in FIFA, and all other tasks were relegated to the Special Office of Football. Felix Linnemann, the DFB president, was a member of the Nazi party, and the leaders of the 16 sporting districts soon joined the party also. The DFB continued to show full support for the Nazi regime. The Nazis established the German Football Association Cup in 1935. Meanwhile, Schalke 04 continued their incredible dominance in German soccer. Schalke was considered a worker’s club without ideology, and did not resist the Nazi philosophy so were allowed to continue to remain in existence, and because of their dominance, actually received Nazi support. From 1934-1942, Schalke 04 won the championship six times. The extent of Nazi interference appears to be requiring several players to change clubs during the season.\(^59\)

The national team continued in existence during this time period. Nerz, as coach, continued his infatuation with the English style of play, and thoroughly disliked the Schalke style despite their dominance in the German league. Germany made their first appearance at the World Cup in 1934, mainly for the propaganda value it afforded. They were deemed the best amateur team participating, and the German media ensured

that the German public knew that amateurs were able to successfully compete against
the professional teams of the rest of the world. Germany went thoroughly prepared for
the event, and advanced to the semi-final round against Czechoslovakia, eventually
losing 3-1 after weak finishing and cautious play. They beat Austria in a plodding 2-1
victory to capture third place in the tournament.\textsuperscript{60}

The next big sporting event was the 1936 “Hitler” Olympics. Hitler gave his elite
athletes special privileges in hopes of demonstrating the German superiority, but the
elite athletes were never mentioned as role models as they were deemed inferior to
soldiers in that regard. The Nazi philosophy linked hardness and achievement, while
the fascist philosophy linked muscularity with force. The ’36 Olympics was actually
the start of the era of the sport spectacle. The future head of FIFA, Havelange of Brazil,
was present at the ’36 Olympics and was overly impressed with being feted and dined
by the Nazi regime. Adidas had a hand in these Olympics, with their brand name
appearing on all the shoes. In terms of soccer, it was less than a success for Germany.
Whereas Hitler considered the Olympics a triumph, he was not satisfied with the soccer
performance. Norway eliminated Germany in the second round of the competition
when Nerz decides to play young talent in the early rounds and save his more
experienced players for later. (It led to his eventual replacement as coach with Sepp
Herberger.) Hitler, who was not a big soccer fan anyway, stormed out of the stadium

\textsuperscript{60}Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 89, 92; Merkel, “Germany and the World Cup,” 103, 110; Glanville, Story
of the World Cup, 26-29.
when Germany went down 2-0 to Norway. Soccer, by this defeat, lost the Nazi goodwill right in front of Hitler and Goebbels.61

The 1938 World Cup was fast approaching, and the three dominant supervisors of the national team, Linnemann, Nerz, and Herberger all had joined the Nazi party, or the NSDAP. By this point, Germany had annexed Austria. Since Austria now was the 17th sport district and professional soccer had been eliminated there, the prevailing thought was that Germany had the opportunity to create a dream team for the World Cup. Viennese soccer had exhibited a magical style prior to this period, and was much emulated throughout Europe with their fluid passing game and intertwined team work. Although the coaching staff had some reservations about combining the two teams, orders had come “from above” that the team was to feature 6 members of one country and five members of the other in the starting eleven. The combination led to chaos on the field, with Herberger having little authority to change the situation. Not only did the two styles not mesh (Germany at that point was already playing methodical, almost plodding strength soccer) but the players did not get along. Austrian players, not surprisingly, were resentful of the whole situation, both soccer-wise and political. The Germans continued to play like “drilled workers” and the Austrians were individual and

---

intuitive. Or as Merkel puts it, it was like trying to combine the Vienna Waltz with a military march. The team was eliminated in the first round with a loss to Switzerland.62

In November of 1940, Schalke 04 visited Vienna to play some games. The Austrians displayed their displeasure with all things German by destroying the team bus. The continued involvement of the Nazi party in sport led to the de-civilizing of sport within Germany. Club and national team players were threatened with being sent to the Russian front if they did not perform well. In 1941 the German champions played the Austrian team, Rapid Vienna, and lost. The German star was sent off to the war. Soccer became a matter of state. In 1942 the “match of death” was played in the Ukraine. A Luftwaffe team challenged Dynamo Kiev to a match, and warned them ahead of time that they had best lose the game. Galeano notes that Kiev was unable to resist the temptation of dignity, and thus beat the Luftwaffe 5-3. Murray claims that all but three of the Kiev players were executed, while Galeano insists that all eleven starters were shot in their soccer jerseys on the edge of a cliff. Throughout the war, club soccer continued its play, and in consequence, continued to serve as the “opium of the masses” during the hard times. The national team continued to play until 1942, then cancelled any games left scheduled. By 1942, military teams began to play in the German league.63 The 1942 and 1946 World Cups were cancelled.

63 Dwertman and Rigauer, “Football Hooliganism in Germany,” 78; Murray, The World’s Game, 74-76; Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, 35; Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 112, 117, 120.
Shortly after the war, soccer became an area where idealism could be expressed in Germany. In 1946, the DFB resumed activity. In the American Zone of Germany, the Southern German Football Association had reformed in 1945 with the American’s blessings, and league play resumed later that year despite equipment problems. By 1947, nationwide soccer had resumed in Germany. The issue of professionalism would rear its head quickly. In 1948, German players were considered under contract. They were employees, but not professionals, as there was a salary cap of 320 DM and all players had to hold a regular job in order to play. Illegal payments become the norm. A transfer fee cap of 15,000 DM was in place, which was very low compared to the rest of Europe. More and more top German players began to accept contracts in Italy, which alarmed the DFB. Players that played in Italy were no longer accepted for the national team, which further hindered progress. In 1949, FIFA lifted its ban on Germany and international competitions partially.64

By 1950, Germany was readmitted to FIFA, thanks to the intervention of Dr. Gustav Manning, a doctor in New York who had helped to found the club, Bayern Munich, but relocated to America. Although Germany was readmitted to FIFA, they were not allowed to participate in the 1950 World Cup. The IOC recognized Germany in 1950, allowing Olympic participation, and offered provisional recognition to the GDR in 1955. Sepp Herberger was formally appointed the national team soccer coach in

The 1950’s was the decade of the *wirtschaftswunder*, or the “economic miracle” when Germany not only recovered from the war (at least economically) but progressed at a tremendous rate. It was also the decade that started out with many soccer fights in peasant villages that gradually decreased until the 1970’s. Soccer and the economy were giving Germany something to be proud about again.66

The 1954 World Cup was titled “The Miracle of Berne” by the Germans. Herberger, as coach, made meticulous preparations. He sent spies to other teams’ camps so that he could plan strategy accordingly, and used the unusual arrangements of this particular World Cup to his advantage. For the first round game against Hungary, he fielded a reserve team. Even though the German team lost 8-3, they managed to advance by beating Turkey 4-1 and winning a playoff spot by beating Turkey again, 7-2. Many claimed that the early loss to Hungary was deliberate, both to confuse the Hungarian team by changing strategies (should they meet in a later round) as well as to put Germany through in a weaker bracket. In the second round, Germany beat Yugoslavia with pure strength, determination and stamina. The semi-final game against Austria was predicted to be an easy win for Austria, however they ended up losing 6-1 in a major upset. That put Germany into the finals with Hungary, perhaps something that Herberger had planned all along. Adi Dassler of Adidas sat on the bench for the final, preparing player’s shoes with the first removable studs ever used. Germany defeated

---

Hungary 3-2, and many noted that the art Hungary demonstrated was destroyed by the physical power of Germany. Rumors began to fly immediately that Germany had drugged its athletes, and one player commented that the German dressing room smelled like a field of poppies. Two months later, several players came down with jaundice, and the doping rumors flourished once again. The first World Cup championship for Germany had incredible social and national significance as it led to international recognition and increased national identity for a country still feeling the guilt of World War II. In fact, the winning players were strongly encouraged to quickly “become sober again” so that they did not exhibit excessive pride.67

During the mid 1950’s, the German lotto game began to rival the soccer pools, which led to decreasing money in soccer. Television began to become popular, and the number of fans in attendance at league games decreased. A two tiered system was developing in Germany, with the richer clubs increasing their competitiveness because they had money available to purchase players (or so it seemed) and the poorer clubs playing poorly. A national coaching network was established to both teach and credential coaches in Germany, and continues to be admired on a global basis today. In 1955, playing with a weak national team, Germany lost some international games. Compared to the rest of Europe, Germany was weakening because there was no national league of professional players. The better players were leaving the country for well

---

paying positions in other countries, and with the German policy set, were no longer welcome on the national team. The club situation was also in crisis. As money violations began to be revealed, it was demonstrated that particularly, the larger clubs were immensely in debt and could be considered in danger of folding.\textsuperscript{68}

The 1958 World Cup was not a fairy tale story as the ’54 Cup had been. Germany advanced to the second round to defeat Yugoslavia 1-0. The semi-final game against Sweden was marred by much controversy, starting out with a debate over the number of seats available for Germany. The ensuing game has been termed “scandalous” as Germany lost one player to severe injury and had another sent off. Even with only nine men on the field, Germany beat Sweden 3-1 in an extremely rough game. The animosity generated by the game lasted for years, and Sweden refused to play Germany for five years. The win advanced Germany into the third place game, which they lost to France 6-3. The late 1950’s marked the end of central European dominance and the rise of Germany and Italy.\textsuperscript{69}

From 1960 onward, German league played was being dominated by the pan-national team of Bayern Munich, and the country was preparing for the 1962 World Cup. Germany had tactical expertise and hardness, and yet for the first time ever, failed to advance beyond the quarterfinals. During the first round game against Italy, both teams

played catenaccio which led to a 0-0 tank battle. Germany then beat Switzerland 2-1 and Chile 2-0. The quarterfinal round had Germany meeting Yugoslavia, and again Germany played catenaccio: tight, cautious and many long passes. They lost 1-0.\textsuperscript{70}

The repercussions within Germany were immediate. The DFB, realizing Germany had been a disgrace, immediately set to rectify the situation, and their solution was to professionalize (finally) and form the Bundesliga, a professional league. The proposal to start the Bundesliga passed by a 2/3 majority, and five leagues (due to post-war partitioning) with 74 clubs were to be reduced to 16 first division teams. The 16 clubs were chosen based on athletic, financial and technical criteria. The league was scheduled to start in 1963. Although supposedly “professionalizing” German soccer, there were still limitations and salary caps. From a salary of around $100 month, players now could receive up to 1200 DM a month. A transfer bonus (or handgelter) of 10,000 DM limit was set, and a 50,000 DM transfer fee cap was set. Previously, national team players received nothing for international games, and now they would receive a set payment per game. When the Bundesliga began play in 1963, attendance soared from 3.4 million fans to over 6 million by the end of the season, and increased to 7 million in the 1964-65 season. Five foreigners were allowed per team, but over 42% of the players came from the junior clubs of each team. Although attendance increased dramatically, coolness developed between the professional players and fans. This coolness was not only due to the increased salary the players were now earning, but also

to the fact that players were rarely “locals” as they had once been. Before
professionalization, fans knew the players because they were raised in the area, played
in the area and then retired in the area. This all changed dramatically as teams
bargained for the expertise of the professional player. Soccer not only became a
consumer item, but it was also becoming a circus act as it turned into a mass spectator
sport.\footnote{Gehrmann, “Keeping Up with Europe,” 146-47, 151-154; Udo Merkel, Kurt Sombert, and Walter
Tokarski, “Football, Racism and Xenophobia in Germany: 50 Years Later-Here We Go Again,” \textit{Racism
and Xenophobia in European Football} ed. by Udo Merkel and Walter Tokarski (Aachen: Meyer and
Meyer, 1996), 153; Murray, \textit{The World’s Game}, 116; Merkel, “Germany and the World Cup,” 99; Hesse-
Lichtenberger, \textit{Tor!}, 183-186.}

The 1966 World Club, being played in England, rolled around, featuring the appearance
of Franz Beckenbauer, who Galeano states was just beginning his career and “already
playing with hat, gloves and cane.”\footnote{Galeano, \textit{Soccer in Sun and Shadow}, 122.} The semi-final match against Russia was termed a
“sour match’ with Germany losing two players and finishing the game with nine men on
the field. Beckenbauer was living up to his nickname of “The Kaiser” displaying a
powerful elegance on the field. Germany won 2-1 to advance to the championship
against England. England had never lost to Germany, but Germany elected to play
catenaccio, and had Beckenbauer policing Bobby Charlton on the field. The game went
to extra time, and though England won 4-2, a controversial call by the linesmen
increased the weariness the Germans were experiencing. England held the World
Championship.\footnote{Glanville, \textit{The Story of the World Cup}, 141-142, 149-155; Galeano, \textit{Soccer in Sun and Shadow}, 122.}
The 1970 World Cup featured the Germans placing third with a 1-0 win over Uruguay. Germany continued to play slow and cautious games in the catenaccio style, eking out an overtime win against England in the process. Beckenbauer continued to control the midfield, and actually played the semi-final game with his arm strapped to his side. Big changes were in store for the German team in the near future.

By 1972, the DFB lifted salary caps, handgelder caps and transfer fee caps from the Bundesliga. The average yearly income for a player jumped to 60-70,000 DM with the top stars earning from 180,000 to 240,000 DM. The income was still not sufficient to stop the drain to the rest of Europe but it did provide a check against the flood. The majority of the players were now coming from the working class, and the increased income provided a means of social mobility.

Two significant events occurred in 1972. The Olympics were held in Germany which was important to the IOC for two reasons: it took the world games to the spot where Nazism had flourished and been defeated, and it showed the world that Germany had risen from the ashes. The tragedy that occurred at the games, with the PLO taking Israeli athletes hostage, the Germans storming the compound, and all being killed was to have further impact on the 1974 World Cup. The second significant event of the year

74 Glanville, *The Story of the World Cup*, 166, 177-181.
was the winning of the European Championship by Germany, which foretold the strength and dominance of the team in the future.  

The 1974 World Cup, to be held in Germany, became an important symbol to Germany to establish a reputation of law and order after the ’72 Olympics. It was often called the “World Cup of Uniforms” as police and special security swarmed the country. As the new consumer culture flourished in Europe, the ’74 World Cup featured the cojoining of world soccer and “Big Business.” Recently elected FIFA president, Havelange, turned to his old friend, Adi Dessler of Adidas to implement this union of business and soccer. The German team players received 10,000 DM for wearing particular boots, and the DFB made $65 million off of the tournament. World soccer, at the time, was being dominated by “total football,” the style best played and represented by Germany and Holland. Glanville describes the style as “dynamic catenaccio”, but in fact it represented the philosophy of the total player. Each player on the field had to be able to move into any other position successfully during the flow of the game. The style wrested soccer supremacy from South America.

The German camp was a high security prison, and controversy seemed to be the byword. Schön was the coach, and five days before the first game he announced to the German delegation that he was sending home all 22 of the team players or he would be

---

76 Houlihan, *Sport and International Politics*, 1-2; Hesse-Lichtenberger, *Tor!*, 235.
leaving, himself. “Malente Night,” as it was later called, came to a show-down. The
players were demanding 100,000 DM to play in the tournament; after they heard what
other World Cup teams were being paid. The DFB was offering 30,000 DM.
Beckenbauer spent the night negotiating on the phone with the DFB president, and they
finally agreed on 70,000 DM. The crisis was averted, but Beckenbauer was now truly
regarded as the “Kaiser.” In the first round, Germany beat Australia and Chile, and then
faced a game that held great emotional turmoil for the Germans, as it was against the
GDR. Guns and helicopters circled the stadium while the two teams played, and
Germany lost to the GDR 1-0. Schön was heavily criticized and nearly had a
breakdown. Beckenbauer truly stepped in and settled everyone down at this point.
Germany had stuttered and labored in the early rounds, often being booed by their own
fans. The second round featured Germany beating Yugoslavia, Sweden and Poland to
advance to the finals against the other dominant “total football” team in the world,
Holland. It was the strongest continental grudge match that existed, as Holland had not
forgotten World War II. The show-down was to feature the two top players in the
world: Johann Cruyff of Holland and Franz Beckenbauer of Germany. Berti Voigts was
assigned the job of marking Cruyff, and the stadium was truly viewed as a battlefield.
Both teams were integrated, machine-like teams, but Beckenbauer was able to intensify
the performance of his teammates to the point that it surpassed his own ability, as well
as display his prowess as a moving sweeper. Germany won the match 2-1, setting in
place a grudge between the two teams that still is evident.79

79 Glanville, *Story of the World Cup*, 190-191, 199, 203-205; Dwertmann and Rigauer, “Football
Hooliganism in Germany,” 80; Archetti, *Masculinities*, 188; Giulianotti, *Football: A Sociology*, 13; David
Beckenbauer continued to play for his Bundesliga club, Bayern Munich, and from 1974-1976 they dominated the European championships. In 1977, along with other great players (Pelé for one), Beckenbauer agreed to transfer to the New York Cosmos. Germany was upset. The DFB put an informal ban on all transfers abroad until after the 1978 World Cup.80

The much awaited 1978 World Cup in Argentina was a great disaster for the German national team. During the first round the assistant coaches were highly critical of the coach, and the players expressed constant dissatisfaction with the strategic changes that were being made by Schön as well as the dull life of the training camp. The team was visited by the Nazi war hero, Colonel Hans-Ulrich Rudel who had been banned from any political meetings in Bavaria. The quarterfinal game against Austria was considered scandalous, with the Germans playing like “dead dogs.” Austria won 3-2, and Germany did not advance any further in the World Cup.81

As fan violence and hooliganism increased throughout Europe in the 1980’s, Germany tended to show a particularly virulent form of hooliganism associated with racism and neo-Nazism. From 1931-1982, Germany topped the list of fan incidents with seventeen

---

major incidents. 1982 saw the displacement of the violence to outside the stadium as fan projects to decrease violence came into vogue. The 1981 Bremen club fan project was held up as an ideal. By the 1985-86 season, fan attendance was decreasing due to the threat of violence.82

The 1982 World Cup was perhaps one of the lowest points for the German national team, at least in terms of world perception. Germany started with a loss to Algeria, 2-1, but followed with a win over Chile and a win over Austria, 1-0. The Austria game was somewhat of a farce. Both teams knew that if Germany won 1-0, they would both advance to the next round eliminating Algeria. The play reflected the certainty of the final score from the outset, and the game has often been termed scandalous. German tabloids ran headlines shouting “Shame on you!” German player, Lothar Matthäus commented after the game that “We have gone through. That’s all that counts.” German fans gathered in front of the team hotel to protest, and the German national team threw water balloons at their own fans. Meanwhile, the coach was being criticized by his own players, a perennial occurrence from the German national team.83 The second round featured a German win over England and Spain, putting Germany through to the semi-finals against France. The low-light of the game against France was the well documented and horrible foul by the German goalkeeper, Harald Schumacher.

---


against the attacking French star, Battiston. Both players were going for the ball, but Schumacher made a sudden shift that drove his hipbone into Battiston’s face, knocking him unconscious. As Hesse-Lichtenberger recounts, “…winning was the only thing that counted, and everything else- sportsmanship, conduct, reputation, expectation of fans- was nonsense from a forgotten era.”

Germany exhibited a widening rift between the national team and the country, which Hesse-Lichtenberger insists contributed to the German attitude of favoring the local club team over the national team. The final game featured Germany and Italy. The Germans played a “mean spirited, overly physical” and “unadventurous” game, leading to a rumble in the German locker room at halftime, with individual players threatening to hit each other. Italy eventually won the game 3-1, and as Glanville notes, it would have been sad for the game of soccer if Germany had won.

Clearly, Germany needed to make some changes within its own national system, as the world body was echoing with condemnation against the national team. Of interest is that the 1982-1990 German national teams operated under the philosophy of “jus soli,” that the nation was founded on a community of common blood. Even now there are rigid conceptions of belonging within Germany, enhanced by the increased immigration of “foreigners.” (A Berlin Council Study in 1985, indicated a three fold rise in Turkish sports clubs in Berlin.) In 1984, Franz Beckenbauer was announced as the new coach of

84 Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 313-314; Glanville, Story of the World Cup, 257; Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, 159.
85 Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 314-315; Giulianotti, Football: A Sociology, 13.
86 Glanville, Story of the World Cup, 261-263.
the national team, or rather, the team supervisor. Beckenbauer did not have the necessary coaching credentials to actually “coach” the German team. It was hoped and believed that Beckenbauer would be able to bring pride and credibility to the downward spiral that was plaguing both the national team and its image.87

The 1986 World Cup featured squabbles in the German coach (per the norm) even with Beckenbauer coaching. While they played a dour and cautious style, they were grindingly efficient and Schumacher was playing brilliantly in the goal. The backup goalkeeper was sent home after calling Beckenbauer a “clown.” In the quarter finals beat Mexico on penalty kicks, then proceeded to beat France in the semi-finals. That set up a final match between Argentina (with Maradona) and Germany. Germany set Lothar Matthäus to mark Maradona, which denied the German team his creativity in the midfield. Germany packed the defenders in front of their goal, but was unable to deny Argentina, and lost 3-2.88 Besides playing a cautious and defense oriented style throughout the tournament, the other legacy that the German national team acquired was allegations of massive drug use. Apparently there were innumerable injections, pills (steroids, stimulants, and sleeping pills) as well as a mysterious mineral water that


88 Glanville, Story of the World Cup, 272, 292-296; Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 319.
led to diarrhea for the team. In 1987, Schumacher noted in his book that the ’86 World Cup featured “too many drugs and not enough women” for the national team.89

After the World Cup, the domestic league featured a wide-spread building program to upgrade grounds and stadiums in Germany in order to host international competitions. Safety, comfort, and control of the fans were being emphasized as hooliganism problems still continued. Italy again began luring top German players to their league, and Bayern Munich started the trend that would continue in Germany for many years. They developed their own youth players to a consistent quality and then would sell them to Italy for money to run the club. It was a pattern that began to be repeated by top club teams through the world.90

1988 featured one of the most famous grudge matches occurring on the international stage: Germany versus Holland in the semi-finals of the European championships. Holland featured loud and consistent anti-German taunting, and Germany responded with racist taunting about the Dutch team. It was said that the German team could only be told apart by the numbers on their backs, and the game was billed as the Wehrmacht versus the Resistance. The Dutch beat Germany 2-1, and in Holland, celebrations included throwing bicycles into the air in memory of when Nazi Germany confiscated Dutch bicycles during the war. Germany offered no congratulations after the match, which infuriated the Dutch, and a Dutch player responded by using a German jersey as

89 Schumacher quoted by Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, 172-173.
90 Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 272; Giulianotti, Football: A Sociology, 68.
toilet paper. The next year a Dutch banner compared Lothar Matthäus to Hitler.

Matches between the two national teams have continued to be contentious to this day.91

The reunification of Germany in 1990 had little impact on the national team. Most GDR elite sport has been dismantled in the first six months. Of the GDR soccer teams, only two teams were integrated into the Bundesliga, and most other teams were on the point of folding. It was devastating to GDR soccer. Fan violence increased at the lower levels of soccer connected to the massive immigration from the former GDR to West Germany. The hooligan discourse began to revolve around reunification and immigration. There was some increased support for the national team and it reflected opposing German identities: a neckermanner or football tourist or a hard core fan.92

The 1990 World Cup started out with German fans “marauding” across Italy. Franz Beckenbauer was still the coach, and each German national team player was to receive $80,000 for playing. Half of the team was playing in leagues outside of Germany, which invariably creates a training problem for the manager. The second round featured the grudge match of Holland versus Germany, and was a typical match-up. Rudi Voeller and Frank Rijkaard were red-carded early in the match, supposedly when

91 Winner, Brilliant Orange 108, 111; Simon Kuper, Football Against the Enemy (London: Phoenix, 1996), 4-6, 8-10.
Voeller insulted a Dutch player and he retaliated by spitting on Voeller. Jurgen Klinsmann played his finest game of his life for Germany and Germany advanced on a 2-1 score. Dutch and German fan violence broke out on the common border of their countries after the game. The German team did not improve throughout this tournament, which was unusual, as their reputation for being a tournament team was being challenged. The final was between Argentina and Germany, and featured Adidas symbols not only on the ball but all the clothing being worn. The final game was both sad and somewhat crude. Germany won 1-0 on what Galeano called an “invisible foul and the wise coaching of Beckenbauer.” He termed it “boring soccer without audacity or beauty,” but the Germans, once again, won the World Cup championship.

Beckenbauer immediately resigned as national team coach.

The 1992-93 Bundesliga season was significant for several reasons. First, it featured the return of German players from the Italian league. By 1993, there were 5.5 million registered soccer players in Germany. The Ruhr club teams raised their budgets as they now had three sources of income: admission gate, sponsors and television. The private SAT 1 cable system bought the Bundesliga rights for five years, allowing an influx of cash flow for the teams. Many business terms began to be featured in the German soccer press, and a messianic vocabulary was apparent when discussing leadership figures in the soccer arena. While the Ruhr teams remained largely “pure German”

clubs, other Bundesliga teams were increasing the number of foreign players from three to five, and by 1993, 15% of the players were non-German across the league, and only 10% of the players were from junior clubs within the team. In 1992, the top clubs in both Germany and Italy devoted a day to protest racism within soccer. German clubs featured fans shouting “My friend is a foreigner,” in a battle against Neo-Nazi hooliganism and racism in the stadiums.94

Berti Vogts was the new national team coach for the 1994 World Cup. The players’ uniforms now featured the Mercedes Benz star alongside the federal eagle, an attribute to the increasing involvement of big business in German soccer. The national team appearances at the ’94 and ’98 World Cups exhibited bad football and appalling behavior by the German players. In 1994, a German player was sent home in the middle of the tournament after giving the finger to the German fans who cheered his substitution. Germany was beaten by Bulgaria in the quarter-finals.95 The same year saw the Bundesliga attendance double as television money began to spread the talent more evenly throughout the league.96

An analysis of the German press in the mid-1990’s suggested that the press was writing “as if” soccer was not part of serious intellectual discourse. This is a fairly true pattern

in Germany. Although representative intellectuals did offer some discourse on soccer (such as Rigauer, Merkel, Gehrmann and Eisenberg to name but a few), the German culture still seemed to hold the philosophy that sport was not a serious cultural undertaking. Compared to Britain, where intellectual discourse on soccer has been plentiful, or Brazil where popular discourse is leading to more intellectual consideration, Germany tends to treat the subject lightly, as though it is beneath the dignity of the German culture to really consider an English game as serious.97

The 1996 European championship not only featured a Berti Vogts team displaying more team spirit, but also increasing German hooliganism, an international press battle, and the obvious intrusion into soccer of European Union politics. Although there has, as been noted, almost an unspoken prohibition in the German press for too much enthusiasm for the national team, the same cannot possible be said about England. Prior to the England versus Germany game, the English press went rampant with military allegories about Germany and commentary that amplified typical stereotypes of Germans and German soccer. The German press ignored the military allusions, and focused instead on their strength which was the political agenda and Germany’s dominance in the EU. The war press of England was almost accepted with resignation by Germany, but the German press did note that “war is not the continuation of politics, soccer is…” Tensions of a larger scale between the two countries over Italy’s admission into the EU were more than evident, and the German public was not in favor of their admission. The day before the Italian-German match, Franz Beckenbauer

warned players not to miss the opportunity to foil a dangerous opponent’s bid for victory. The England versus Germany game turned out to be an anti-match, with the BBC focusing on the fans, anthems, and just about anything rather than the game, which England lost. Germany won the European championship, providing great hopes for the next World Cup.98

Prior to the 1998 World Cup several significant items occurred within German soccer. In 1997, Germany ruled that broadcasting rights belonged to the individual club within the Bundesliga, leading to a free for all over rights. By 1999, the top seven German clubs agreed to share their television revenue with other teams because another imbalance was starting to appear in the league. In 1998 the DFB ruled that clubs could depart from the traditional structure, which led to joint stock ventures for many clubs. Bayern Munich and Borussia Dortmund voted to change their clubs to share-holding companies rather than the former mutual ownership. Beckenbauer publicly stated that Manchester United was the model for soccer business for Bayern Munich. Television was now the greatest source of income, and ISL/Kirch bid 1.45 billion pounds for the 2002 and 2006 World Cup rights. The agreement allows the German company to auction off television rights for the World Cup, but does allow FIFA a veto vote. Top earners in the Bundesliga were now receiving 2 million pounds per season, with the lowest end earners receiving 25,000 pounds. The Bayern Munich coach accused the star

players of greed and said they were turning their backs on heroes. By 1999, German clubs featured the highest percentage of non-nationals in soccer clubs in the European Union, at 40.6% of the Bundesliga players now being non-Germans. The majority of the foreign players were Croatians, Poles, and Hungarians.99

The 1998 World Cup was hosted by France, and the German team certainly did not show to their finest. Germany was eliminated by Croatia in the quarter-finals. Coach Rudi Vogts claimed that the red card issued to German player, Christian Wörns, hinted that the referee had acted on orders “sent from above” because Germany had been too successful in the past. The German tabloid, Bild, responded with the headlines “Stop Whining!” Not only was Germany considered the most ludicrous team in the tournament, but their typical methodical, cautious and calculating play was considered old-fashioned and contributing to their defeat. German fans contributed to the image of the “bad German.” They rampaged at Lens and nearly beat a policeman to death. German soccer experts called for a compete overhaul of the system, saying German soccer was the worst and lacked creativity. They cited the preponderance of foreigners

in the Bundesliga as a reason, as well as decreased youth participation and bad management displayed by the DFB.100

Unfortunately, the trend continued in 1999. The German national team lost to the US twice in “friendly” matches. The coach, Ribbeck, was forced to resign and Rudi Voeller was appointed the coach for a one year period. The DFB also published their edition of the history of the past 100 years of German football. Interestingly enough, no sport historians were featured in the writing of the publication.101 The Bundesliga was now the most cosmopolitan league in Europe, with five FIFA federations and 17 World Cup nations represented among the players. The DFB began requiring that each Bundesliga team must play two U-23 Germans on the team to aid in the development of German youth for the national team. The DFB was also one of the world’s largest national sporting organizations, featuring 6.3 million members and 27,000 clubs.102

In 2001, Germany lost to England (5-1) in a World Cup qualifier. The Frankfurter Allgemeine daily newspaper, half-jokingly, commented that Germany seemed to be losing two symbols of post-war strength at the same time: the D-mark was being

---

replaced by the Euro and the national soccer team was no longer invincible. Hopes for the 2002 World Cup were at an all time low. Most of the Bundesliga clubs were now public limited clubs, and Bayern Munich, alone, featured 90,000 members. Players were still not allowed to be members of clubs.

The 2002 World Cup, played in South Korea and Japan, displayed a German team that went back to the “good old bad days” of sacrificing style for efficiency. Ollie Kahn, the German goalkeeper, inspired terror in other teams with his physicality and efficiency in the goal. He was frequently referred to as the “son of Ghengis.” Although advancing to the finals against Brazil, Germany stuttered along the way, and was compared to a machine struggling to get out of second gear. As usual, the German team was composed of players that played in the Bundesliga, with only three players playing outside the league, two in England and one in France. Compared to a Brazilian team where the majority of the players play their league ball outside of the country, Germany remains fixated in its thinking regarding bloodlines and national identity. The German team lost in the finals to Brazil, 2-0, mainly on a mistake by the tournament MVP, Oliver Kahn.

104 Sam Cage, “Can This Bayer Unit Meet its Goals?” Chemical Week, 164 (2002): 8; Wilkesmann and Blutner, “Going Public,” 24-25, 30.
The year 2004 has exposed further problems within the German national and domestic soccer system. While three of the Bundesliga clubs featured in the world’s top twenty richest teams, other teams struggled. Bayern Munich featured revenues of $187.1 million dollars to rank fifth, Borussia Dortmund was twelve with $142.6 million and Schalke 04 was fourteen with $136.4 million. The naming of Germany as the host of the 2006 World Cup has involved some underhand politics. Germany apparently made a political deal with England to back their bid for the World Cup, with UEFA’s agreement. England nearly went back on the deal, and a great deal of political maneuvering occurred before the UEFA agreement was finalized. Franz Beckenbauer was named the chairman of the organizing committee for the World Cup. In 2005, a referee scandal arose in Germany, involving referees betting on games they officiated, and then possibly influencing the outcome of the games. The issue remains unresolved, although the referee has been convicted.106

Euro ’04, the European Championships, were a definite low point for the German team, pointing out to the world the apparent disarray that German soccer was experiencing. Germany was the only team to start the tournament with three defenders, and quickly switched to four as they realized they could not contain the offense of their opponents. The German fans called the team a “national disgrace” after the loss to Czechoslovakia.

(its B team, at that) that eliminated it from the tournament. The Bild tabloid headlined “We’re Out! We’re the Laughing Stock of Europe!” National team coach, Rudi Voeller, immediately announced his resignation and Bayern Munich coach, Ottmar Hitzfeld emerged as the clear favorite to take over the team. In Hamburg, 150 furious fans rampaged while police arrested 23. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder announced at a press conference that it was “paramount to create a national team capable of competing at the highest level” in preparation for World Cup 2006. Kicker magazine noted that the defeat was no surprise and was an omen of things to come. They stated that the German national team had been in stagnation for the past ten years. Despite having Beckenbauer’s blessing, Hitzfeld turned down the coaching job, as did Otto Rehhagel, who led Greece into the semi-finals of Euro ’04,107 and Germany finally turned to a former player who had been an outspoken critic of the national team, Jürgen Klinsmann, who agreed to accept the job.108

In contrast to other countries, German sport history demonstrates a slow and somewhat late acceptance of what was initially defined as an English game. While the game gradually gained acceptance with the middle class, the opposition by the turnen and the masses slowed down the acceptance of the game in Germany. It was not until after World War I that the masses in the country became thoroughly involved in the sport,

which led in a short time to soccer become a mass spectator sport. The elite and upper middle class in the country have always controlled the sport, and continue to do so today. It was this control, along with other historical implications, that slowed the professionalization of the game in Germany. Germany was one of the last countries to professionalize soccer, and merely did agree to professionalize when the loss of top players became unbearable.

Although demonstrating a proud dominance on an international basis, German soccer exhibits many of the corruption problems that plague other countries. The acceptance of a soccer discourse among the intellectuals is a necessary component in bringing to light and correcting some of these problems. Germany still seems to harbor the feeling that soccer is ultimately beneath its dignity in terms of intellectual pursuit. The lack of a spotlight on the DFB and its dealings has allowed the corruption to go undetected, whereas in Brazil, the corruption within the system is blatant and almost culturally accepted. Whether Germany can continue to dominate in international competitions is dependent upon their willingness to become flexible and open to change. The historical emphasis on bloodlines and the alien “other” in German society has permeated national team selections, and Germany must address this problem in the long run. Whereas most national teams have become more and more cosmopolitan, Germany continues to harbor almost a retro-look when it comes to German international players. What Germany does have going for it, is the willingness and determination to be successful on the international stage and that may be its saving grace.
CHAPTER 8
HISTORIC TIME LINE OF STYLE: BRAZIL AND GERMANY

Given that the concept of style is constantly changing, mutating, and adapting, it becomes extremely important to historically situate these changes and what influenced them. This chapter examines a detailed timeline for stylistic changes exhibited by both Germany and Brazil. It notes what changes occurred as the game developed, and what influences were played out in each country. It explains how different styles evolved in different regions of the country that influenced the national team style, as well as how stylistic changes occurred in each country. Disruptions to the stereotypical style exhibited by both Germany and Brazil did occur, and frequently are indicative of global trends that were occurring in soccer. However, stylistic innovations also occurred within each country that were influential on the global scale. Tracking and tracing these stylistic changes, historically, is an important element in situating a discussion regarding what influences style.

In Germany, around the turn of the century, when soccer struggled for survival due to the gymnastics influence, play was very much influenced by the English amateur notion. The style tended to be very individualistic with little team loyalty or spirit. Gillmeister notes that it was during the 1890’s that the word “combination,” meaning
interpassing among teammates, came into existence in Germany, around the time that passing was introduced into the English kick and rush game. In 1898, a Preussen Berlin player, after studying English professionals for a year, urged his team to begin trapping the ball rather than sending it constantly down the field in high arcs. During the early years, as clubs were being formed, the English style of play and English coaches heavily influenced the southern part of Germany. In 1911, SpVgg Fürth adopted the “Scottish passing game” under the direction of William Townley. Southern German clubs emphasized a slow, considered style of play, stringing together passes and trying to pull the defense out of position to create openings for small forwards.¹

Pierre Lanfranchi would disagree, concluding that up until the militarization of soccer in the 1930’s, Germany had no autonomous style. Perhaps autonomous is the key word in the phrase, because regional variations cropped up all over Germany. Hesse-Lichtenberger emphasizes over and over that regionalism and club loyalty is more important to Germans, and has been, than the national team. While this point is highly debatable, regional influences did vary in playing style. Southern clubs, mainly Nüremberg and Fürth favored a slick, technical passing game influenced by southern Europe and Austria. Northern clubs, particularly Hamburg, favored an English style game. Eastern clubs, such as Dresden, borrowed from the Hungarian influence of delicate beauty. Western clubs, notably Schalke 04, displayed a work ethic that didn’t

emphasize a particular style as much as it emphasized hard play in its early days. By 1925, Hertha Berlin was combining the technically proficient southern style with the northern “Hussar” style.²

In 1925, Germany appointed its first national team coach, Otto Nerz. Nerz valued conditioning, discipline and strategy, all based on an English style of play. He embraced the new WM system and struggled over the course of many years to convince German players to use it. Nerz not only valued the English style of play, but a scientific approach to playing. By 1926, when the offside rule was changed, northern clubs were mainly playing a style that was either termed “English” or “Flying Hussar,” which was based on a fast pace and direct play, with a lot of high crosses being flighted in for wingers to finish in front of the goal. In 1929, Berlin clubs were in the process of cementing the “Vienna,” “Danubian School” or “Austrian” style of play which emphasized technique, control and ball skills, and a tactical and systematic approach to the game. Nerz still preferred the English style of play.³

The German team played its first game against England in 1930, and France the following year. Nerz began to come under heavy criticism for his “results oriented”, direct style of play which only allowed artistic players to run in straight lines. While a public debate opened up regarding artistry’s importance in the game, Nerz ignored all

³ Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 56-57; Pierre Lanfranchi and Matthew Taylor, Moving with the Ball: The Migration of Professional Footballers (Oxford: Berg, 2001), 193.
discussions and continued to focus on results. During the 1930 season, Hertha Berlin became the first German club to adopt the WM system, and won a title in the process. Perhaps influenced by the hiring of an Austrian coach in 1927, Schalke 04 produced the beautiful “Schalke top” or “spinning top” style in the early 1930’s, and continued to use it successfully, winning seven German championships between 1934 and 1958. The “Schalke top” style featured short, quick passes on the ground, which were dictated not by the man with the ball, but rather by the player running into open space. However successful the style was, national coach Nerz did not like Schalke or their style of play. Nerz still favored fast, physical and direct soccer, and for the 1934 World Cup, intended to build from the rear based on a solid defense, although he did add the modern invention of the stopper to the defense.⁴

After the German team lost in the 1936 Olympics, and Hitler was humiliated by the loss, Nerz gradually turned over the reigns of the national team to Herberger. Herberger changed the style of the national team, converting them to a subdued version of the “Schalke top” which emphasized more of a Scottish passing game and less of the English direct game. Nerz was the individual responsible for the formation of the Breslau-Elf, one of the most famous national teams in German history. Germany finally cemented a style of play which was a cross between the southern Danubian style and the “flying Hussar” style of the north. The foundation was not athleticism, but technique and exquisite passing combinations. The formation was not a classic WM, as

⁴ Siegfried Gehrmann, “Football and Identity in the Ruhr: The Case of Schalke 04,” Game Without Frontiers, 194; Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 74, 58, 95.
players were not fixed at position spots, but had more freedom to move. The center forward played deep, not as a target. Journalist Gerd Kramer commented that “The robot style people liked to pin on Germany sank into the realm of legend. Artistic football triumphed.” Unfortunately, it didn’t last long. 1938 saw Germany trying to blend the Austrian team and the German team into one, as Germany had annexed Austria. As Murray points out, it is not feasible to blend two contrasting styles, and the players were not willing to forego their own team style.  

International sporting competitions were eventually cancelled in Germany in 1943, while the national championship struggled on through the war years. Germany finally returned to international play in late 1950 with Herberger as coach again. As Germany prepared for the 1954 World Cup, Herberger set out to define the German mentality and style of play, which led to the “Miracle of Berne” and a World Cup championship. The semi-final game against Austria featured four of the six German goals from set pieces, probably solidifying the notion that Germany was an efficient team that liked to have strong skills in the air. Glanville reports that in 1962, Germany was playing catenaccio with a sweeper, but with very little variation of pace. In the 1966 World Cup, Germany played a flexible version of the catenaccio style again, but was not committed to merely a defensive game this time. Also in 1966, the German club, Gladbach, began building a style based around counter-attacks, using three forwards. Bayern Munich, with the formidable Beckenbauer playing out of the back, played a more possession oriented

---

style, building their attack from the rear. Beckenbauer’s attacks from the libero position would eventually have a great influence on shaping the style of the national team.⁶

“Total football”, as played by the Dutch and German national teams, came to the forefront in the 1970’s. The World Cup of 1974 featured “total football”, which Glanville describes as dynamic catenaccio. Murray describes “total football” as every player on the field being able to play in every position. It emphasized teamwork, technique, intelligence, as well as heightened vision from the players, and took the game beyond the limits of the brash physicality that many European teams had been playing. Winner comments that early in the ’74 World Cup, Germany “stuttered and labored,” but true to the invented tradition of being a tournament team, they beat Holland in the final. Two teams featuring “total football” dominated the rest of the world. Meanwhile, in the German Bundesliga, by 1975 Monchengladbach exhibited a style of play that emphasized beauty of goals, risk taking, and a declining emphasis on results. However, Bayern Munich continued to pave the way for the future, beginning to feature what would later become technocratic football, with an emphasis on calculation and rationality.⁷

By the 1982 World Cup, Glanville declared that “total football” was dead, although the memory still remained, and by 1986, declared the game had gone backwards since the

---

⁶ Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 119, 128, 158, 209; Brian Glanville, The Story of the World Cup, rev. ed. (London: Faber and Faber, 1993), 118, 152.
exhilarating days of “total football.” Soccer has a tendency to operate on trends, with the dominant teams setting the trend of innovative changes and other national teams following the lead in an attempt to remain competitive. “Total football” was a beautiful way to play, but required a depth of talent that was not readily available for most teams, and was not sustainable for even the best teams. The 1980’s was the decade of the German technocratic game. Glanville comments that the 1986 team was “so packed with defenders were they, you had the impression that even the man with the bucket and sponge must be a center-back in drag.” During the 1980’s, Bayern Munich continued to dominate in the Bundesliga, fully delivering the technocratic, boring style they had been accused of in the 1970’s. The club became known as the “striker’s graveyard” because all the forwards failed to score on a consistent basis. During the 1980’s and the 1990’s, two clubs dominated in the Bundesliga, and one of the two clubs was always Bayern Munich.8

The ’94 and ’98 German World Cup teams, coached by Berti Vogts, featured appalling German behavior and bad soccer. Hesse-Lichtenberger noted that by the ’98 World Cup, Germany had been left behind as other nations pulled ahead and improved, and Germany seemed content to keep playing as they always had. Particularly critical of the sweeper system, Hesse-Lichtenberger comments that Germany’s continued emphasis on it (even from the club teams of small children up through the national team), did not take into account that a technically gifted, fearless, and good in the air player had to man the position, as well as provide leadership. Beckenbauer had been such a player,

but Germany had no one with which to replace him. Rather than changing the formation and style, they continued with an out of date system. Vogts finally promised to abolish the sweeper system in 1998, but only stayed with a flat back four system for a total of forty-five minutes during the cup. Hesse-Lichtenberger attributes the continued use of the sweeper to two reasons: it had been successful in the past and Germans were notorious for not wanting to alter habits, and secondly, the flat back three and flat back four systems called for independent thinking players, and Germans always wanted a leader/father figure in the back. Stiehler and Marr comment that in 1998, it was the team’s old fashioned style that led to defeat. They believed that Germany was out of date and lacked creativity.⁹

The situation has not changed significantly in the new millennium. Germany finished second to Brazil in World Cup 2002, playing directly, and scoring frequently on set pieces and balls in the air. They still maintained their father figure/leadership from the back, only this time it was Ollie Kahn in the goalkeeper’s position. Stuart Roach, in an article for the BBC commented that “For Germany, it is a case of back to the good old bad old days, when they were winning games by sacrificing style for ruthless efficiency.” Euro 2004 was an extreme disappointment for Germany, when the team was knocked out after the first round of games. Germany did feature a flat back three, but when it was unsuccessful, switched to a flat back four like the remainder of the teams in the tournament. Unfortunately, that was not successful either. It will certainly

be interesting to see if Jürgen Klinsmann manages to change their playing style before the 2006 World Cup. Success, rather than artistry, has figured predominantly in German soccer circles, and Klinsmann must demonstrate success on the field.10

As has Germany, Brazil changed its style over the history of the game. What is an interesting point in regards to Brazilian style is that it developed in direct opposition to the English style which emphasized the gentlemanly player and amateurism. Del Burgo makes this point about Latin American soccer in general, and Archetti makes the same point with regard to Argentina. Bowden goes further, indicating that two distinctive poles of soccer developed in South America, Argentinean and Brazilian, as the two countries took different routes of development in their game. Goncalves provides four specific traits of Brazilian play that sets them apart from other countries: the ball is played on the ground permanently except in specified and defined situations, the emphasis is on triangle passes, the number of touches on the ball is minimized, and reception of the ball is always facing the opposite side of where the ball was played. These technical emphases have been a significant aspect in shaping and defining Brazilian soccer style.11

---

In the early years of Brazilian soccer, during what Mason terms the “elite period,” roughly between 1894 and 1914, it was unclear if the Brazilians ever played a gentlemanly and controlled game, although it is possible, given that most games were social occasions. By 1914, Afro-Brazilians were playing, and the style of games immediately began to change. In 1919, Americo R. Netto wrote an article he called the “Brazilian Innovation,” in which he noted several distinct differences between the British and the Brazilian game. Brazilian players would shoot the ball from any distance, as opposed to British forwards that wanted to be directly in front of the goal. British players would advance as a line, whereas Brazilians would only advance one or two players, and Brazilians demonstrated more speed.12

Little is known about the style of the 1920’s, as the game still held amateur status, and while followed greatly on a local basis, Brazil did not yet compete in any internationals. Leite Lopes states that Brazil used Argentinean soccer as its model from 1920-1950. Perhaps it used their program and development as a model, but Brazil’s style appeared to be its own from early in its history. From 1930 onward, players playing in other countries (generally Argentina and Uruguay) did contribute to a flexible style that began shaping into a national style. In the 1930 World Cup, Glanville terms Brazil as “individually clever but collectively inferior.” Humphrey comments that it was after soccer developed a massive following in Brazil that the Brazilians firmly established their own style. During the 1930’s, European coaches tried to impose the WM

formation in the belief that the Brazilian style of play could not possibly compete with a European style. Shirts believes that the professionalization of soccer in 1933 changed the style of play and altered the overall aesthetic of the game in the process, leading to a more carnivalesque atmosphere both on the field and in the stands.\footnote{13}

By the 1930’s, the style of happy and artistic soccer was clearly being established. In 1938 that Gilberto Freyre wrote that Brazilian style contrasted with the European style due to surprise, malice, astuteness, agility, and individual brilliance. Sport journalists rapidly endorsed his view that there was a unique Brazilian style. Lanfranchi and Taylor comment that references to a Brazilian style become common after the 1938 World Cup.\footnote{14} Galeano, discussing Artur Friedenreich, the first Brazilian star, said:

> The green-eyed mulatto founded the Brazilian style of play. He, or the devil who got into him through the sole of his foot, broke all the rules in the English manuals: Friedenreich brought to the solemn stadium of the whites the irreverence of brown boys who entertained themselves fighting over a rag ball in the slums. Thus was born a style open to fantasy, one which prefers pleasure to results. From Friedenreich onward, there have been no right angles in Brazilian soccer, just as there were none in the mountains of Rio de Janeiro or the buildings of Oscar Niemeyer.\footnote{15}

\footnote{14} Gilberto Freyre as cited by Bellos, Futebol, 13, 36-37; Lanfranchi and Taylor, Moving With the Ball, 201.
\footnote{15} Eduardo Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 2003), 42.
By the 1950 World Cup, Glanville noticed that “Brazil now played the football of the future, an almost surrealistic game, tactically unexceptional but technically superb, in which the ball players of genius, while abrogating none of their own right to virtuosity and spectacle, found an exhilarating modus vivendi.”\textsuperscript{16} However, the loss by Brazil in the finals was viewed by the country as a tragedy from which they never recovered. Zizinho, a former player, explains that it was because of the WM system, which the players had never used on the national team until the final four games of the 1950 Cup. He felt that Brazil beat every team that also used the WM, but Uruguay did not, and that made the difference. The 1954 World Cup team, Glanville calls abundantly gifted but tempestuous. Brazil was still not comfortable using the three back system, and would eventually abandon it before the 1958 World Cup. At the ’58 Cup, Brazil adopted a 4-2-4 system which Glanville says “If you had the extraordinary talent at your command that the Brazilians had, it was a marvelous system. If not, it would present as many difficulties as it solved, especially in midfield.” Brazil won their first World Cup in 1958, and saw it as the affirmation of Brazilian values over European ones, as well as the superiority of their style over European style. Giulianotti notes that the 4-2-4 system symbolized the survival of the aesthetic commitment to attack and goal scoring during the modern era, and most fans and soccer analysts regard it as the purest and most pleasing form of soccer throughout the world. Goncalves remarks that during the

\textsuperscript{16} Glanville, \textit{The Story of the World Cup}, 53.
'58 and ’62 World Cup, Brazil did not concentrate too much on tactics, as the brilliance of the individual players carried them through.17

In 1966, Brazil adopted a 4-3-3 system that proved to be ineffective against organized man to man marking or physically strong teams like Germany. After the defeat in 1966, many analysts considered the Brazilian style of soccer to be outdated compared to the new European “power soccer.” However, the 1970 World Cup changed that tune, as Brazil won brilliantly, proving that artistic, attacking soccer could beat catenaccio. Galeano comments that during 1970, “Brazil played a soccer worthy of her people’s yearning for celebration and craving for beauty.” Brazil played a 4-4-2 and a 4-3-3 formation during the tournament, and played so well that many have compared the style to a form of soccer jazz, “Improvised and extemporized to some secret, shared rhythm.” The team displayed tactical awareness, organization, and a through preparation as well as playing the game with art. Individual play was celebrated, but within a team concept, as players dared to be innovative with passing and shooting.18

But that all changed in 1974. The coach of the team openly proclaimed that he wanted to play a European style by not conceding goals, not allowing the other team to play, and only attacking when certain. The team played poorly; very defensive, disorganized,

almost fearing to attack. Jenkins called it a “pragmatic European style” and said they were a shadow of their former selves. Merkel comments that their efforts to incorporate discipline, toughness, and tactical order led to a loss of their magical brilliance.

Giulianotti noted that Brazil switched from *futebol arte* to *futebol forca* as they attempted to play a more European style. The ’78 national team was even worse, as an army officer with a physical education background was appointed coach, and tried to further Europeanize the team. Claudio Coutinho, the coach, was supposed to “modernize” the Brazilian team, just as the military was “modernizing” the Brazilian economy. Coutinho emphasized discipline and obedience which killed improvisation; he emphasized teamwork over individualism, physical force over artistic play, and used technocratic jargon. He also called dribbling “a waste of time and proof our our weakness.” Glanville notes that Coutinho was accused of trying to impose the concept of “polyvalence” on the team, or an early version of total football, but that by 1978 his approach turned almost entirely to fitness and European “hardness.” However, one source is not critical of Coutinho and called him “one of the best tactical coaches of all time.” Goncalves admired Coutinho and the style he tried to implement, and added that he developed the 4-4-2 system tactically and that his concept of the counter-attack by the fullbacks, as well as constant circulation in the midfield, was a tremendous step in the development of a Brazilian soccer philosophy. Goncalves also says that Coutinho “totally changed the mentality of the country and established the new Brazilian system and a very effective game philosophy.” Many would disagree, and lament that the Brazilian style was destroyed.19

19 Goncalves, *Principles of Brazilian Soccer*, 160-163; Glanville, *The Story of the World Cup*, 215;
During the 1980’s, Arbena argues that soccer throughout Latin America was in trouble due to a ponderous style of play that featured defense and declining scoring as Latin American teams began to emulate the technocratic trend that was occurring globally. However, according to Taylor, Brazil, under coach Tele Santana, presented a return to the best traditions of *futebol arte*. While Brazil displayed marvelous technical skill, with soccer becoming a show once again, they were not successful and were not results oriented. The late 1970’s and the 1980’s were dominated by a different style, as represented by Argentina and Italy, with Germany always present near the top. In the 1990 World Cup, Brazil again tried to be more European than the Europeans. The addition of a libero did not solve their defensive problems, although their technical skill remained high. Brazil appeared to be playing to score from free kicks (much like Germany) rather than from the flow of play. The Brazilian populace was outraged, and wanted the libero replaced with another midfielder. In 1992 the Brazilian national team visited England, and made the conscious decision to reject the “Europeanization” of their soccer and to revert to their original style. In 1993, during Cup qualifying, the coach (Parreira) tried initially to subordinate the players to the system, but the policy soon changed as the team did not play well during qualification.20


The 1994 World Cup revealed a real division on how the Brazilian style was to be interpreted. A variety of authors present diametrically opposing views on the style of play, but what cannot be questioned is that Brazil was successful, winning the World Cup. Jenkins adamantly believes that Brazil did not play “real Brazilian soccer.” Nor did Galeano:

> When Brazil won its fourth World Cup, only a few of the celebrating journalists managed to hide their nostalgia for the marvels of days past. The team of Romario and Bebeto played an efficient game, but it was stingy on poetry: much less Brazilian…several commentators pointed to the style of play imposed by the coach, successful but lacking in magic: Brazil sold its soul to modern soccer.\(^2\)

Parreira was held up for much criticism during the Cup, despite the team’s success. The \textit{Independent on Sunday} newspaper noted: “…the evidence of the last two World Cup finals suggest that international football is a brutal, worldly business no longer hospitable to football played the Brazilian way.” And further, in an interview with Pelé, the headlines read: “Parreira was Pelé’s reference point. Parreira is the problem Brazil must overcome.” Brazilian supporters at the airport said, “Parreira bad. Parreira too much \textit{retranca}. Too much defensive.” When a BBC reporter congratulated Parreira on the early wins in the Cup, Parreira told him that he had not heard that from the Brazilian media. The BBC later criticized the team for faking injuries, having goals of doubtful legitimacy, and doubtful tactics. Parreira defended himself by saying that Brazil does

\(^2\) Jenkins, \textit{The Beautiful Team}, 76; Galeano, \textit{Soccer in Sun and Shadow}, 207.
not play the European way. For example, he points out, “the flat four, zonal marking…is all Brazilian.” The German press called the Brazilians “disappointingly European, dominated by ‘Nordic cool.’”

But not everyone was critical of the Brazilian style in 1994. Mason noted that Brazil’s strength was a strong defense, something that many had criticized Brazil about for decades. However, Mason quotes Parreira: “We will play in the way today’s football demands. Magic and dreams are finished…We have to combine technique and efficiency.” Goncalves notes that the 4-4-2 system with outside penetration became an attractive style to the rest of the world, with 70% of the goals being scored inside the 18 yard box. Page comments that in 1994, Brazil melded the soccer styles of both Brazil and Europe with a disciplined defense behind two brilliant goal scorers. McCann calls it a very different style from the futebol alegre of the past, but Parreira assures everyone that “we’re playing the traditional Brazilian way, 4-4-2, which is the way they’ve played since they were kids.” Independent on Sunday called their style “explosive acceleration, a rapid exchange of passes which leaves opponents for dead, victims of the sublime combination of pace and technique associated with the Brazilian team of legend.” Arbena contends that the ’94 team played a “more open, improvised, fluid-more Brazilian- style of play,” while Bar-On views the team as exhibiting a blend of elements that contributed to their victory: “…they combined the old flair and flow of

---

elegant, magical and entertaining 'samba' football…with the more rigorous, tactical, and physical elements of the contemporary Northern European game.”

In the 1998 World Cup, France handily defeated Brazil in the final game. After the contest, Bellos commented that men were crying, not just for the defeat but for the manner of the defeat. “Brazil had not even put up a fight,” he noted. Much controversy still surrounds the ’98 Cup in Brazil. Galeano further adds that “Brazil and Argentina gave it a lot less than their best, handcuffed by strategies that were rather chary in joy and fantasy.” But the 2002 World Cup was a turn-around, again, for Brazil in their 2-0 defeat of Germany. Wahl announced that “the Brazil mystique is back,” and Ronaldo announced that “The nightmare is over.” Bellos notes that “Defeating the Germans will be a triumph of flair over efficiency, of passion over rationality, of the third world over the first. The triumph will show that Brazil is a contender, not just in football, but the modern world.” Galeano claims that “…Brazil remembered it was Brazil. The team finally let go and played like Brazilians, slipping out of the cage of efficient mediocrity…and Brazil, at last, turned into a fiesta.” Whether Brazil continues in the “old” way of playing in the next World Cup will be an interesting dilemma.


Stylistic changes have now been traced for the past one hundred years for both the Brazilian and German teams. They indicate quite clearly that style is constantly in a state of flux, influenced both by the internal culture of the country and well as outside influences. Yet an overview of each team’s style can be determined, stereotypical, it is true, but with defining elements that seem to transcend historical points in time. Now that the style has been defined, it is important to trace what made the style the way it is, what influenced and shaped it so that Germany and Brazil play the same game, but in entirely different ways.
This chapter explores the intersections of soccer and soccer style with popular culture, or more specifically what from each country’s culture has helped shape, mediate, and influence how it plays soccer. Of the cultural implications identified, the most frequently mentioned implication in the literature is that of national identity. The focus here will therefore center on the concept of national identity and national habitus, and their connections to sport and specifically soccer. Although many authors do not differentiate between these two terms, I feel that the differentiation plays out in terms of clarity when examining soccer. Both terms contribute to the shaping of a national playing style, as will be demonstrated, but national habitus (or national character) is a more deeply embedded concept, and in turn, shapes and influences national identity.

Pierre Bourdieu coined the term, “national habitus,” and constructed it as an alternative to subjectivism and structuralism. He defined habitus as “durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures…principles which generate and organize practices and representations.” Habitus is a practical sense which becomes second nature after a long practice of inculcation, but it is not necessarily static, rigid, or unchangeable. It is a past that
perpetuates itself into the future. Bourdieu further defines habitus as a system of dispositions and the internalizing of signs and sanctions.

While Bourdieu invented and defined the term, Norbert Elias clarifies and expands on the theory in a way that makes it far more understandable. Elias defines habitus as “second nature of embodied social learning that overcomes the old notion of ‘national character’ as something fixed and static.” It acknowledges and allows that habitus changes over time, but is heavily influenced by past history (centuries past, often) and becomes sedimented into individual members. Elias notes that “the fortunes of a nation become crystallized in institutions which are responsible for ensuring…that the society acquires the same characteristics and possess the same national habitus.” He cites a common language as one example of an institution that cements individuals into a nation, but explores far deeper than the mere surface sign of common language. Because the present habitus of a country is influenced by the past, a common past, a nation then unites in what Elias terms a “we-layer,” which is an expression of national habitus.

Joseph Maguire explains how habitus can shape and influence national identity.

There is no standardized, immutable, genetically inherited national character. Yet the habitus codes, embodied feelings

---

2 Bourdieu, *Field of Cultural Production*, 71, 133.
and discursive practices of the individuals who constitute a nation play a powerful role both in the foundation of cultural relations and in the construction and maintenance of national identities. National cultures can be said to provide one of the main sources of self-identity.5

Habitus codes, then, lead to the formation of a semi-fluid national character, which in turn shapes national identity. The national character is a layer of social habitus that is embedded deeply in the individual and leads to the notion of “we”, or what constitutes us as a group. When confronted with the “other”, this “we” layer becomes more hardened and in turn reinforces the concept of the definition of “we.” The compare/contrast value of the “other” cements the “we” notion more firmly.6 Maguire also notes that E. J. Hobsbawm’s concept of invented traditions and Benedict Anderson’s concept of imagined communities do not totally answer questions regarding a deeply sedimented national character or habitus codes (as they answer but a piece of the puzzle), but do contribute to a further understanding of national identity.7

National habitus codes which lead to the formation of a national character are flexible, but also are so deeply embedded that change is generally slow. Sport, in particular, seems to be an arena where these habitus codes are displayed, and especially how they are played. International sport features a sphere whereby “we” can always be contrasted with the “other”. As Maguire points out, the “sleeping memories” that are inherent in national habitus codes tend to focus and harden around common symbols

6 Ibid., 186-87.
such as national teams. International sport reawakens these sleeping memories that are
remains a sphere where habitus and identity testing and formation are conducted, and
specific sports are often seen to embody all the qualities of national character.\footnote{Ibid., 205.} As
Maguire states: “Sport being inherently competitive and based on a hierarchal valuing
of worth, binds people to the invented traditions and habitus codes associated with the
nation.”\footnote{Ibid., 205.} The media help reinforce myths of national character and collective identity
via sport, but an interesting phenomenon often occurs. As habitus codes shape a
nation’s “we” image, the media often not only reinforces them, but reinforces the story
the nation tells itself about itself, further cementing what may have been an invented
tradition.\footnote{Liz Crolley, David Hand and Ralf Jeutter, “Playing the Identity Card: Stereotypes in European

So, habitus codes influence and shape what is perceived as national character. National
caracter is exhibited on the playing field, usually defined in terms of playing style.
Soccer, being a global sport with its apex of international competition, is an arena where
the concept of national character is frequently displayed. Archetti has done extensive
work into the formation of national character and national identity with regards to
Argentina. Regarding soccer styles, he notes “These styles…are based on ethnic
differences conceptualized as differences in character and in the form through which
feelings and bodily movements are expressed.”12 He notes that Argentina created a
powerful imagery around soccer which produced a collective memory referring to a
beautiful soccer style. Archetti helps bridge the gap between deeply embedded habitus
codes and national identity by his references to collective memories leading to the
formation of national character.13

The concept of national identity is more commonly mentioned in the literature.
National identity is shaped not only by habitus codes but also by invented traditions,
imagined communities, and the collective “we” image. National identity is not only
how we as a nation see ourselves, but also involves how other nations see us. National
identity is the arena of stereotypes, portrayed by the “other” as well as portrayed by the
“we.” Stereotypes help affirm group membership and category classification, and their
vitality and influence in the formation of national identity merely increase the sense of
common belonging. Stereotypes lead to a common ground, and too often, an
international stereotype and a domestic stereotype differ little in reality. While national
identity is not fixed and can alter over time, stereotypification resists any changes, while
autotypification (self stereotypes) reinforces the stereotypes. While stereotypes fail to
acknowledge the complexity of national identity, the media reports deal mainly with
stereotypes that fit preconceived notions of national identity.14

---

Several theories provide an answer to the issue of stereotypes, and the means of exclusively relying on them when discussing national identity and its relationship to playing style. First, as previously mentioned, Elias’ theory of habitus codes and national habitus as being embodied social learning that is capable of change over time throws over the notion that national character is fixed and static, and helps avoid the stereotyping of national identity. Archetti’s theory of essentialist identity also helps overcome the notion of stereotypes, and is directly related to soccer playing style. Archetti defines essentialist identity as the ideal displayed by the typical style by the mythical team with model players. This in turn leads to the key values of the nation’s collective belonging being exemplified in the essence of national character, which in turn leads to the formation of national identity. The essentialist identity is the essence of national identity displayed via soccer. Changes in style are acceptable only if the key values remain consistent. Archetti also proposes the relativist identity, which is a style that is constructed in opposition to others. His example is that Argentina style of play was constructed in direct opposition to the English style to show “we are not English soccer players.” Archetti uses the symbolic capital of self definition, a looking back at the past. He also emphasizes the importance of the narrative of history and myth when style is constructed by a country.  


William J. Morgan also presents a persuasive argument about stereotypes. He notes that an overly robust conception of national identity leads to the belief that nations are monolithic, and that self-confirming emulation can lead to national identity, but variations in playing style are not stereotypes but rather genuine and alternative expressions of moral and cultural meanings. The fact that stylistic innovations do convey cultural differences is indicative that stereotypes are not the main mode of portraying soccer style. Rather, Morgan looks at the language used, and asserts that national self-assertion helps define social or moral terms of a nation’s collective lives, which stands in opposition to stereotypes. The narrative framework that a nation uses to tell about itself is accepted by the population and an attempt is made to live up to it, thus avoiding stereotypes.16

Now that the issue of stereotypes has been addressed, let us return to the discussion of national identity. Crolly and Hand note that the principal elements of a national identity remain consistent from country to country, as well as being consistent within the country. The media reinforces the myth of national character, but the realities of national identity are rooted in political and economic realities. Oliven would note that national identity is linked to the groups that have power and thus become guardians of the collective memory, thus restricting the memory to the group that carries the

---

tradition. But national memory is more generic and is linked to the ideology of the
country. For this reason, folklore often serves the cause of national identity, which has
a renewed importance at the end of the 20th century. Tomlinson points out that national
identity is not at the forefront of the everyday lived experience, but is mobilized as
nationalism when confronted with the “other.” Giulianotti further clarifies that the
powerful socially construction traditions to protect their interests and cement myths of a
national identity, but in the post-modern era immigration and ethnic divisions are
undermining a single national identity. There is a multiplicity of national identities
within a nation, and they are not static or mononuclear, but constantly open to change.
However, power vectors point to which national identity is the predominant one for a
nation. Hobsbawm would argue that national identity does not exclude or dominate
other identities, but always combines with them causing changes and shifts.17

National identity appears to be positioned between the past and the present for a nation.
It is the national-we identity often shaped by invented tradition, and these invention of
political traditions by institutions are used as means to express social cohesion and
structure social relations. But the reality of national identity must represent more than
just the imagined community. National identity sets symbolic boundaries for identities
in a dynamic way that defines us always against the “other,” while remaining fluid. It

17 Crolley and Hand, Football, Europe and the Press, 161; Tomlinson cited by John Sugden and Alan
Tomlinson, FIFA and the Contest for World Football: Who Rules the Peoples Game? (Cambridge: Polity
1999), xiv, 32; Ruben Oliven, Tradition Matters: Modern Gaúcho Identity in Brazil (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996), xiv, 8, 12; E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780:
becomes a symbolic element in the process of cultural production and exchange, but embraces the history of myths and is often resistant to material influence. Because it is fluid and constantly reconstituted by the nation, it goes beyond stereotypes, which are the result of paralysis of national identity. But national identity does lag behind change, which is why it places itself between the past and the present. Maguire points out that underpinning the construction and representation of national identity is a sense of nostalgia that is engendered, represented and embodied. This shift from the lived and everyday “collective memory” to a national memory, which is virtual and ideological, is made by the nation, with intellectuals building the discourse of national identity, and the media disseminating it.18

Several scholars reject the whole notion of national identity. Billig does so on the grounds that national identity no longer exists as it must compete with multiple identities, and they are dominant. Cohen rejects the concept of national identity but based on the belief that national identity is fixed, and reasons that there are no fixed national characteristics. He bases his belief on three claims: that there is no genetic

blueprint for a nation, that national traits are contingent, and that national identity fails
to recognize identities based on gender or ethnicity. While his objections hold some
merit, most scholars deny the notion that national identity is fixed, but rather a fluid
discourse. However, it cannot be denied that national identity is genderized and to
some extent ethnic based. But given that national identity is a fluid notion, although
admittedly lagging behind the present in terms of definition, Cohen’s and Billig’s
arguments must be rejected for the present, but bear re-examination in the future.¹⁹

The connections between national identity and sport are well defined in the literature.
National identity is fixed as a key element of sport, and sporting federations seek to
preserve that element to increase sporting spectacles. Maguire points out that not only
are sport and national identity intertwined, but that peripheral countries can use sport to
solidify international and national identity and thus enhance their international
recognition. Bale also links sport and national identity, and Hargreaves asserts that the
increased popularity of sport has led to sport being directly linked to national identity,
and that sport more than any other national popular culture symbolizes a national way
of life. The linkage of sport and national identity provides sport an entrance into the
consumer culture. Sport reinforces national identity and an imagined community, and
plays an important role in identity formation along with the media. Jarvie points out
that sport is a unique mechanism for national feelings that state the case for the nation
itself. Hobsbawm notes that an imagined community of millions is more real as a team

¹⁹ Billig (1995) and Cohen (1995) theories as presented by Jon Garland and Michael Rowe, *Racism and
Anti-Racism in Football* (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), 14, 113, 139.
of eleven on the field. Bairner insists that sport provides an opportunity for expression of national solidarity and proof of a nation’s existence, and will continue to play a role in the consolidation of national identities. Sport has been defined as a vehicle to construct individual, group and national identities for an imagined community/nation, and plays the role of defining the characteristics of nationhood. National prestige is played out in sport, with a nation investing their reputations in the identity of their national teams. Sport has been identified as playing an important role in nation building and the consolidation of a nation by fostering national identity. National sport takes different forms (styles) and provides insight into the character of the nation.20

The European Commission has recognized that sport is a vital component of national identity. Major sport festivals, such as the Olympics and the Soccer World Cup, also help solidify national identity by contrasting the “we” versus “the other” in competitions. Houlihan notes that the use of sport to proclaim national distinction was a British invention. By World War II, soccer internationals were clearly arenas for

displaying national identity, and nations utilized the tournament as a vehicle for social reproduction of the nation. This leads to one of the central paradoxes of FIFA, as Sugden and Tomlinson point out. FIFA represented international and supranational ideals by providing a platform for the displaying of national identity through the World Cup tournament. The inherent paradox is that a global organization promoting a global approach to sport with ideals extending beyond the nation, also increases nationalistic fervor. Sport provides a nation with common symbols and a collective identity, bringing together diverse classes, religions, and ethnicities to bear national traits and values, and thus become representative of a national character. Sport, then, becomes a most important setting to display symbols and discourses of a national identity, and particularly as television broadcasts of sporting events increased. Houlihan notes that athletes are seen as personifying certain characteristics of a nation, and that “A key element in the development of a sense of national identity is the capacity to define oneself in terms of the world… clearly, sport is an important element in this process.”21

In *Sport Worlds: A Sociological Perspective*, Maguire, Jarvie, Mansfield and Bradley list seven arguments for the relationship between sport, nationalism and culture. They provide an encapsulated view of what a variety of authors have been saying.

- Sport is inherently conservative and helps to consolidate official or centre nationalism, patriotism and racism.
- Sport has some inherent property that makes it a possible instrument of national unity and integration.
- Sport provides a safety valve or outlet of emotional energy for frustrated peoples or nations.
- Sport has contributed to unique political struggles, some of which have been closely connected to nationalistic policies and popular nationalist struggles.
- Sport is often involved in the process of nationalism as a natural reaction to dependency and uneven development.
- Sport contributes to a quest for identity, whether it be through nostalgia, mythology, invented traditions, flags, anthems and ceremonies or on a local or national scale.
- Sport helps reinforce national consciousness and cultural nationalism.22

Although the majority of authors find a connection between sport and national identity, there are several who do not, or at least do not see sport as playing a cohesive role in the formation of national identity. Klaus Heinemann acknowledges that sport is supposed to contribute to the formation of national identity and the consolidation of the nation, but express doubt whether it really possesses integrating powers. Finn and Giulianotti leave the question open, stating that there is no simple and direct relationship between soccer and national identity as sport can also serve the role of displaying conflict and differences. Bairner agrees, noting that sport is not wholly successful in uniting an entire nation or nationality as the national identity is often contested by sub-groups. I

---

share the perspective that sport can serve in both roles; however, the dominant voice still will establish national identity with which the majority of the population agrees, and sport does appear to play a role in this establishment, particularly when it is represented in contrast to other nations. Arbena is perhaps the strongest voice against equating sport with national identity, and even he hedges a bit. Arbena states “But that sport has contributed significantly and uniquely to the construction of national identity and cohesiveness…seems questionable in the long term context.” Despite reservations about the long term effect, and despite acknowledging that national identity is frequently a contested realm, it still seems clear that sport is internationally recognized as contributing to the formation of national identity (while never being solely responsible for it) and international tournaments which place nation against nation merely strengthens this relationship.23

Now that sport has been identified with national identity, an examination of the literature is needed to specify the sport of soccer and its relationship. Soccer as one of the purely international sports is in a unique position to display national identity. As many countries place soccer in a culturally central location, the game is identified as increasing national identity. Soccer itself is a legitimizing identity in many cultures, and that legitimization helps maintain the national identity. A national identity is a cultural product, not something innate as are habitus codes, but soccer is increasingly

appropriated to convey the concept of a national identity in that it is indexical, or showcases the beliefs, opinion, and customs of the culture. Soccer tends to shape and cement a national identity, but this is not true in all countries. Newer football nations, such as Australia and the United States, do not use the game to cement national belonging, as the game is not a pre-eminent sporting event there, but in most nations soccer is unequal in increasing national pride and unity. Sugden, Tomlinson and Darby insist that soccer is the most potent symbol for national identity in Africa. Soccer “reads” the narrative of national identity, whereas other sports do not. As the most popular sport in the world, soccer has a means of increasing national identity in internal and external forms. National soccer teams display more emotional resonance than league teams because of the relationship to national identity. Gaélan states that a national soccer uniform is the clearest symbol of collective identity available, and Del Burgo notes that soccer is a means of imagining a notion of unity within national consciousness. By the late 1800’s in Britain, soccer identity was noted as a repository of the national virtue. Currently, all the elements of national identity, ranging from competitions to national federations, are in opposition to regionalistic and supranational organization such as the European Union. Most of the opposition to the Bosman ruling has been based on the defense of national identity.²⁴

The main element of soccer that allows it to be used as a means of national identity is soccer style. Archetti, quoting one of his informers, noted that “football…represents the nation, a way of performing… that is different from others.” National teams provide a resonant symbol of national virtues which are reflected in playing style, leading to a “display” of national identity. Style is an exhibit of national characteristics, real and imaged, which are producing and reproducing identities as moral choices. A national tradition is “invented” through the identification in opposition to internal differences and resistant to outside differences to display national style. Archetti notes that Argentina has little national feelings except through soccer as it allows an arena for the “demonstration of what we are.” Soccer style is the process whereby a nation takes the sport and remolds it in the image of the recipient to display national identity. Archetti acknowledges that national identity interpreted through soccer style is open to arbitration, but also cements a feeling of national belonging at the same time. Style is imagined in the same way that national identity is imagined in that it is a cultural definition and not just a sporting definition. Style is more than just how the game is played, but rather a reflection on how a nation wants to be viewed. National style is what we show others, and that tells something about the nature of the people within the country. It is the local way of “doing” soccer. There is an opposition that is constantly
battling when defining soccer style and national identity, and that is the fight between modernity and traditionalism. Bromberger notes that national playing style does not always correlate to reality, but rather to stereotypes embedded in time that a nation gives itself for others to see. Porro and Russo identify a circular mechanism whereby a soccer player’s behavior is influenced by stereotypes of national identity, and in turn confirms the nation’s style of play. This circular mechanism, in my opinion, is more reflective of the battle between modernity and traditionalism than it is of mere stereotypical images. As has been amply demonstrated, soccer style does change over time, and often quite rapidly, in response to cultural situations.25

The connection of sport, and most particularly soccer playing style, with national identity seems clear. Given that national identity is more the surface element which also includes invented traditions, mythologies, and nostalgia, it will be necessary to examine habitus codes for Germany and Brazil to determine if those habitus codes influence or intersect in some way with the defined style. It is my contention that they do. Adding spice to the examination is Oliven’s comment: “For Brazil and Germany the problematic of national identity is a central question.”26


CHAPTER 10

BRAZIL: NATIONAL HABITUS CODES, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND SOCCER

This chapter explores national habitus codes and the concept of national identity within Brazil, and how both of them intersect with the idea of soccer style. Habitus codes, being deeply embedded, must be teased out and then related to soccer. I rely heavily on the work of two Brazilian sociologists: Roberto DaMatta and Oliven Ruben. The concept of national identity in Brazil is one that is closely associated with the process of modernization of the country. It is intimately entwined with soccer, and particularly soccer style, as a means of displaying to the world what makes Brazil a unique nation and demonstrates unique Brazilian values.

One of the most deeply embedded habitus codes in Brazil is the acceptance of hierarchy, which permeates social relations, culture, politics, and economics. DaMatta situates Brazil halfway between a fully hierarchal system such as India’s caste system and a fully capitalistic society operating on equality. The hierarchal system in Brazil ranges beyond mere class or race designations, but allows gradations and nuances for minute differences.27 The hierarchal tone permeates all of society. A Brazilian would not say “separate but equal” as an American might, but rather “different but united.”

27 Roberto DaMatta, *Carnivals, Rogues, and Heroes: An Interpretation of the Brazilian Dilemma* (Notre Dame, IN.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 196.
which DaMatta designates as the golden rule of a hierarchal and relational society.\textsuperscript{28}

The essence of a hierarchal system is embedded in Brazilian history, from the early days of colonization by Portugal to the great waves of slavery importation. The latifunda system reinforced the notion of hierarchy, as did the relatively late independence of the country. This hierarchal code acknowledges authority as its head, and Brazil is a deeply authoritarian society, apparent since colonial times. In a survey published in \textit{Economist} in 1996, 44\% of Brazilians stated they would put their trust in an authoritarian government and displayed indifference to democratic rule.\textsuperscript{29} Lever also notes the military regimes of the late 20\textsuperscript{th} century were all authoritarian, and sports are largely controlled by dictatorial sports organizations.\textsuperscript{30}

This hierarchal belief, deeply embedded, leads to a system of “places” for every individual, and the place is largely socially ordained. Whereas in North America, class and race are heavily equated with the political and economic domain, this does not hold true in Brazil. In Brazil, the opposite occurs, as everyone always knows “their place” and attempts to be in their “proper place.” DaMatta notes that “The principle of hierarchy is always present, because the deepest social fear in Brazil is the fear of ‘being out of place,’ especially when this displacement implies trying to pass as something other than what one really is.”\textsuperscript{31} This hierarchal acceptance leads to the

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{31} DaMatta, \textit{Carnivals, Rogues, and Heroes}, 130.
imposing of specialized roles played out in particular contexts, rather than general identities associated with a set of universal laws which typifies citizenship. Hierarchy also allows for the concept of revenge, and considers it a just form of political and social reciprocity.\textsuperscript{32}

Closely associated with a hierarchal habitus code is the concept that DaMatta calls “Do you know who you are talking to?” Implicit in this realm of personal relationships is always the concept of racism, but not a segregational racism. Rather, it is a racism of morals and class, and is never legal. The concept of “do you know who you are talking to?” involves some type of conflict, whereby the stronger role in society asserts authority over a weaker role, confirming social identity in both cases. In Brazil, the codes of personal relationships are structural parts of the society, and not something that will be changed by modernization. In fact, \textit{jeitinho}, the art of bending rules, is an acceptable practice in Brazil. The Brazilian adage, “For enemies, the law; for friends, everything” emphasizes the social and structural form of relationships whereby personal relationships encompass the law. DaMatta emphasizes that although Brazilian “personalism” can be used to subvert hierarchy, overall, it ends up reproducing it.\textsuperscript{33}

One prominent result of a hierarchal system is the weakening of the middle class. In fact, in Brazil, \textit{classe media}, or the middle class, has very negative political

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 152, 233.  
\textsuperscript{33} DaMatta, \textit{Carnivals, Rogues, and Heroes}, 10, 154, 162-63, 187, 196; David J. Hess and Roberto DaMatta, “Introduction,” \textit{The Brazilian Puzzle: Culture on the Borderlands of the Western World} ed. by David Hess and Roberto DaMatta (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 13; Roberto DaMatta, “For an Anthropology of the Brazilian Tradition or ‘A Virtude está no Meio,’” \textit{The Brazilian Puzzle}, 277.
connotations attached to it. As early as 1961, Fanon itemized the beaches of Rio, little Brazilian girls, half-breed thirteen year olds, and Copacabana port as stigmas of the deprivation of the Brazilian middle class. Others note that the bourgeoisie has been unable to impose hegemonic penetration in Brazilian society, thus also leading to a weaker middle class.34

Another concept of the hierarchization of Brazilian society is the delineation of house and street as separate spheres of activity with incompatible identities, even to this day. The street and the home serve as moral universes and social domains in Brazil rather than purely physical or geographical spaces. The street is associated with unpredictable events, accidents, passions, novelty, action, deceit, and roguery associated with the malandro. It is also associated with individual choice, or at least the possibility of choice. The home is associated with control, kinship and patronage relationships, harmony, and calm. It is much more hierarchized. Although this sets up a binary dichotomy, things in Brazil are rarely so black and white. Instead, they always tend to function in gradations, so that the porch becomes an intermediary space. Social roles and actions belong to one or the other setting, with reprimands and beatings belonging to the privacy of the home, and political conflict belonging to the domain of the streets.35

35 DaMatta, Carnivals, Rogues, and Heroes, 63-69; Hess and DaMatta, “Introduction,” 13; DaMatta, “For an Anthropology,” 287.
Another habitus code that is related to hierarchy is the rejection of individualism. Brazil rejects individualism for two major reasons: individualism would foster personal independence at the expense of social relationships, and individualism poses obstacles to the bending of legal codes and the impersonal norms of public life rather than the favoring of a friend or relative. Brazil differentiates between individual and personhood. An individual has choices, but a person has moral dilemmas. An individual is equal and parallel to others; a person is complementary to others. An individual has an individual consciousness; a person has relational and collective consciousness. In Brazilian personhood, the totality always takes precedence. And in Brazil, the notion of individualism is a modern notion superimposed on a powerful system of personal relationships that are hierarchal. DaMatta notes that in Catholic systems of religion, as in Brazil, that the soul continues to be superior to the body which leads to the concept of personhood over the individual. Brazilians consider individualism as a synonym for egotism, which is perceived as highly negative. In Brazil, there is less emphasis on comparison and individual achievement. A defined position in a hierarchy, one that is governed by relationships, leads to a less emphasized individual position within that hierarchy.

Now that it has been established that an acceptance of hierarchal relationships is a deeply embedded habitus code of Brazilian society, it is necessary to establish the link

36 DaMatta, *Carnivals, Rogues, and Heroes*, 133, 177, 181-182.
with soccer and soccer style. It is no secret that the soccer organization in Brazil is extremely hierarchal and paternalistic. “Do you know who you are talking to?” certainly has implications within the soccer organization, but it is less clear how this concept relates on the soccer field. The concept of a weak middle class also appears to have fewer implications on the field than in the soccer organizations. However, both of these concepts indirectly have impacted on playing style. Historically, one incident stands out that reflects the concept of “do you know who you are talking to?” During the 1970 World Cup, the three cobras (Carlos Alberto, Gérson and Pelé) not only took over the public relations duties from the coach but negotiated contracts for the team and assumed part of the coaching duties of the younger players. 38 Whereas the coach would normally have the authoritarian role on a soccer team, the three cobras were able to assert themselves into the hierarchy by their public image of greatness, giving them more power to assert in the situation. The three cobras were able to indirectly say, “Do you know who you are talking to?” to the coach as well as the soccer organization. In terms of the implications of a weak middle class, the Brazilian national team has historically been comprised of players from the lower classes. The conceptualization of “favela football” has been the conceptualization of Brazilian style, and has been demonstrated by Garrincha, Pelé, Romario, and Ronaldo. However, this vision of Brazilian style may be contested, as more middle class children penetrate the soccer system in recent times.

The street versus home concept, and the concept of the rejection of individualization are intertwined, but both directly influence soccer style in Brazil. Soccer, being of the street and not the home, allows for a space for individualism to not only be accepted but to flourish. The role of soccer becomes privileged because the “personalized social world of the home and the impersonal universe of the street are combined in a public ritual.”\(^{39}\) The impersonal rules imposed in soccer, as opposed to the personal relationship rules imposed in the culture, allow for the expression of individualism. Soccer allows the possibility of experiencing freedom and equality in a hierarchal society, and serves as a separate space, along with Carnival and umbanda, for this expression. Soccer allows for a greater exposure of personal merit and a challenge to authority. In fact, individualism becomes the dominant ideology in Brazilian soccer, and this is certainly reflected in the playing style.\(^{40}\) Soccer becomes a site of individual self-expression, allowing the player to escape from the fate of class or race and construct their own identities in a hierarchal society. It also, because of the permanency of the laws of the game, allows for individual expression through performance and merit, whereas a relationship dominated culture does not give this democracy. By playing alone but representing millions, the soccer star often enters into the discourse of nationalism. However, he remains an individual with individual skills that are adored by the public. Bellos comments that Brazilian players exhibit a national trait of showing off in public, but this image is too simplistic. Brazilian soccer flair associated

\(^{39}\) DaMatta cited by Archetti, “The Meaning of Sport in Anthropology,” 94.

with individualism does require a public performance, but it is one of the few public arenas in which individual exhibition is deemed acceptable.\footnote{Joseph A. Page, “Soccer Madness: Futebol in Brazil,” Sport in Latin America and the Caribbean ed. by Joseph Arbena and Dabid LaFrance (Wilmington, DE.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2002), 37; Eduardo Archetti, Masculinities: Football, Polo and the Tango in Argentina (Oxford: Berg, 1999), 191; Roberto DaMatta, “Soccer: Opium for the People or Drama of Social Justice?” Social Change in Contemporary Brazil ed. by Geert Banck and Kees Koonings (Amsterdam: CEDLA, 1988), 131; Tony Mason, Passion of the People? Football in South America (London: Verso, 1995), 123; Del Burgo, “Don’t Stop the Carnival,” 69; Alex Bellos, Futebol: The Brazilian Way of Life (New York: Bloomsbury, 2002), 34.}

Another habitus code present in Brazil is ritualism. The sphere of rituals reflects what a society wants to posit as its eternal ideals, and in turn becomes a site for the understanding of ideology and values that the society wants to exhibit as expression of their collective national being. The ritual not only reproduces values, but also creates and constructs them. Whereas all cultures display rituals, the interpretation of the rituals is within the realm of the habitus code of the nation. The Brazilian social world ritualizes itself through the use of religious processions, military parades, Carnival, and to a certain extent, soccer. National rituals, and corresponding national holidays, help “construct and crystallize an encompassing national identity” as DaMatta puts it. The fact that Brazil ritualizes religion, the military, and spectacle events such as Carnival and soccer reveals that the values each represents reflect what Brazil wants to present to the world: religious belief, authority (as represented by the military) and celebratory spectacles that allow the individual an arena of display, resistance, and inversion. The spectacle of Carnival will be discussed in a later chapter, but the spectacle of soccer that celebrates individuality, flair, and art is significant in a hierarchal society. In Brazilian soccer, not just the players celebrate, but the fans also. This may be a key area of future
research in that the soccer atmosphere provides that “other space” that is not inherent in the everyday life of the culture. Brazilians overcome conceptions of class, race (to a certain extent) and politics during soccer tournaments to become members of the team or the nation.42

The next habitus code identified is the conception of mixture. Brazilians reflect multiple identities within their national identity, and it is deeply ingrained. This mixture goes beyond just the issue of race, which permeates class conceptions in the country. Rather, it includes a multitude of areas and issues, and extends as a contrast to the melting pot theory of the United States. Brazil in not homogenous in any way, shape or form, and the idea of multiplicities is settled deeply. Brazil’s heritage is a cultural blend with diverse regionalism, racially diverse, and culturally diverse. Few things are either/or in Brazil. This sense of flexibility reflects the ability to “bend the rules” that is so inherent in Brazilian culture. For example, Brazilian religion blends Catholicism and the mediating spirits of umbanda (African spiritualism) into a blend that reflects and accepts both religions. So, in Brazil, one can be both a Catholic and a practitioner of Candomble (Brazilian spiritualism), one can be both a millionaire and a socialist, or a populist and an aristocrat.43 Benedict Anderson termed Brazil a creole state, and Geert Banck further clarifies by noting that a creole state reflects a mixture but does not harness the mixture in class perspective. Ruben Oliven notes that not only

42 DaMatta, Carnivals, Rogues, and Heroes, 15, 17, 26, 27, 53, 120.
does Brazil reflect a mixture, but it has extended this flexibility out to questions of nationhood. This is demonstrated by questions that are recurrent in Brazilian history that are never permanently solved, such as union versus federation, nation versus region, unity versus diversity, national versus foreign, and most importantly, traditional versus modern. Brazilian culture has become devalued at different points in history when the elites and intellectuals exchange models from European to North American. At other points, they pendulum swings back to an emphasis on Brazil being itself and unique. Questions over the racial mixture have long occupied the country. Soccer plays into this habitus codes by intersecting with this mixture in several ways. First, as has been demonstrated, the push-pull of tradition versus modernity has been reflected in the playing style of the country, sometimes reflecting one notion and sometimes the other. The push-pull of modern and tradition has been named: DaMatta calls it the “Brazilian Dilemma,” Hess calls it the “Brazilian Puzzle”, and many Brazilians simply call it “The Brazilian Reality.” Soccer also enters the picture in the sense that it has been used and promoted as a unifier in the country. Lever bases her entire theory on the premise that while soccer also promotes cleavages, it serves as a unifying mechanism in Brazil, drawing together remote regions. After the traumatic 1950 World Cup loss, Brazil reportedly turned back to soccer to reunify the country.44

The elevation of the malandro in Brazilian culture is a significant habitus code. The malandro is a folk figure displaying a street-smart cheekiness that can dodge his way out of all trouble. The malandro figure is so admired in Brazilian culture that it has become a reflection of a deeply ingrained conception that this artful dodger represents what is truly Brazilian. The malandro is the individual that fools fortune itself, and works his way out of trouble by dodging anything that is thrown at him. DaMatta tells us that the malandro and the caxias (the tough, authoritarian figure) are equally admired in Brazil, relating back to the hierarchal structure that is so embedded in the culture. The malandro occupies a place between order and disorder in the culture, and does not fit into the hierarchy that is so predominant. DaMatta also indicates that the malandro exhibits traits that have always been used to define the Brazilian way of being, to the point that a hero is never portrayed as the common man.45 Gilberto Freyre’s 1938 work celebrating Brazil’s racial mixture championed playfulness and mischievous as national characteristics, and used soccer playing style to demonstrate his theory, saying the malandro took the orderly British game and turned it into a “dance of irrational surprises.”46 Del Burgo identifies Pelé as a malandro, a working class, resourceful confidence trickster who can dribble his way out of trouble.47 But there is no doubt that the clearest representative of the malandro spirit was Garrincha, the most beloved Brazilian soccer player. Garrincha epitomized everything that was malandro, and starred on the 1958 national team. John Humphrey clarifies:

46 Freyre as cited by Bellos, *Futebol*, 36.
47 Del Burgo, “Don’t Stop the Carnival,” 65.
While everyone could admire his football, Brazilians saw in his play the affirmation of Brazilian values over European, and also popular values over those of the elite. For many people in Brazil there was no better sight that a six-foot, blond, superbly-coached and tactically-trained European defender on a rigid calorie-controlled diet being made to look like a fool by the devastating artistry of an undernourished, anarchic black winger with two twisted legs who would never have got past the medical exam in European soccer. In class terms, Garrincha was the semi-literate who could get by on his wits and cunning, able to put one over on the rich and the more powerful (or perhaps the police.) His football and his style had a quality which today might be called ‘street-wise.’ He was one of the boys: clever, artful and cunning.48

Another habitus code of the Brazilians is a deeply held belief that luck and fate tend to shape one’s life. This habitus code is reflected in the tremendous popularity of the animal lottery game and the football pools, which are not only immensely popular in Brazil but significant in terms of the economy. Carnival, soccer, and jôgo do bicho (the animal game) remain constants in a Brazilian culture that is continually changing. In Brazil, nobody believes that he can get by on mere work alone, rather, that it takes a stroke of luck or someone willing to offer a favor or bending of the rules, in order to be successful. Luck invariably plays a role in success, particularly in a hierarchal culture. In Brazil, sport is considered a game which requires tactics and technical skill, but also depends on fortune and destiny. After soccer games, commentaries in Brazil refer not

only to the team playing against an opponent, but also against destiny which must be changed or overcome in order to win the game.49

Connected to this belief in destiny, fate and luck is another habitus code which reflects a deeply held sense of failure. Much of this sense of failure is connected to racial beliefs held by Brazilians; that despite Freyre’s theories, the racial miscegenation in the Brazilian culture has led to an inferior group of people. This feeling of failure and inferiority is linked to the internalization of racial stereotypes, and these stereotypes were considered “natural.” During the 1950’s, Brazil’s self image continued to reflect serious reservations about their racial composition leading to doubts as to whether an undeveloped, tropical nation could ever successfully compete with Europe or North America. Brazil’s self comparison, particularly to the United States, caused them to consider themselves failures and ask why they did not have political stability, civil liberties, and economic success when they had such a large country. Tostão, former soccer player, says: “Brazil has always been a country that didn’t succeed…It is that thing of an inferiority complex.”50 Brazilians describe themselves as a “luckless people, a nation deprived of the great joys of victory, always pursued by bad luck, by the meanness of destiny,” and as having a stray dog complex which demonstrates the “inferiority with which the Brazilian positions himself, voluntarily, in front of the rest

49 DaMatta, *Carnivals, Rogues, and Heroes*, 91, 229; DaMatta, “Soccer: Opium for the People,” 127; DaMatta, “For an Anthropology of the Brazilian Tradition,” 273; Humphrey, “Brazil and the World Cup,” 68-69.
of the world.” 51 Costa-Lima hypothesizes that a major mistrust of self has played a large role in Brazilian behavior. 52 This sense of failure is dramatically reflected in soccer, and appears to have been initially exposed after the loss in the final of the 1950 World Cup, held in Brazil. This World Cup was to be Brazil’s showcase of their modern country to the world, and indeed, Brazil was overwhelmingly predicted to win the final against Uruguay. The loss was a national tragedy, and led to a sense of failure as a nation. Flávio Costa, the coach, surmised that the loss was such a huge tragedy precisely because Brazil, as a young country, had never suffered any tragedies, and indeed, had never been at war with any of its neighbors. 53 DaMatta believes that the soccer loss not only was the biggest tragedy in Brazilian history, but impacted the collectivity of the country causing a shared awareness of a loss of historical opportunity. Brazilians bitterly asked what good were plans and projects for the country if destiny never smiled upon them. Soccer in Brazil has been used to explain a supposed national weakness of character of the masses. Even the story of Garrincha has been exemplified as a national as well as personal tragedy, exhibiting unfulfilled Brazilian promise and wasted potential. 54 During the 1930’s, Brazilians held a strong belief in the inferiority of Brazilian soccer compared to Argentina and Europe. At that point of soccer development, the belief was not so out of line, but by 1950, Brazilians began to hope but with a hope tinged with a feeling of fate. In 1954, the head of the Brazilian

51 Bellos, Futebol, 55.
53 Costa as cited by Bellos, Futebol, 57, 45.
delegation to the World Cup was João Filho, and he said: “The Brazilian players lacked what is lacking for the Brazilian people in general...The ills are deeper...They go back to genetics itself.”

As late as 1994, Brazilians were still connecting a sense of failure about their country and football. “Brazilians are born to suffer. The country is no good but we still support it. Because when Brazil are playing I forget about our problems.”

While this sense of failure appears to permeate how the nation feels about itself, it would be difficult to construct a valid argument that it has affected soccer style in Brazil, other than the obvious connections with the belief in luck and fate. Brazilians don’t play as though they feel a sense of failure before they start the game.

The last habitus code to be examined is the deep sense of the body in Brazil. Symbolic of a bodily emphasis as well as a historic issue of illiteracy within the country, Brazil exhibits a strong preference for oral communication. The written word is rarely trusted. Soccer player’s nicknames reflect this oral culture. But an awareness and emphasis on the body goes much deeper than just a preference for oral communication. Brazilians are very body conscious, believing it is a social obligation to be beautiful. DaMatta connects part of this to a codification related to hierarchization: Brazilian’s dress and concern for appearance, particularly in public, serves to put a social label on the body to

---

counteract anonymity. Del Burgo asserts that the body becomes a challenge to authority, particularly in soccer and Carnival, where it becomes wild and untamable.\textsuperscript{57}

At the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the Brazilian elite adopted the classical Greek model of bodily identity. However, the Greek emphasis did not extend to intellectual pursuits but rather centered exclusively on bodily terms and training of the body. The well-proportioned body of the rower was considered the masculine ideal. As soccer replaced rowing in the status of most popular sport, the ideal bodily form was threatened along with the position of elitist sport, contributing to the closing of ranks and the attempt to keep the masses separate from the sport.\textsuperscript{58} Brazilians strongly assert the politics of the body, and this was even more apparent during the fascist reign of Vargas. The principles of fascism, emphasizing a beautiful and healthy body and aesthetic eugenics provided a consensus within Brazilian culture mainly because it had its foundation in local tradition and was not a reproduction of European initiative.\textsuperscript{59}

Sport and dance, particularly sport that featured the lower limbs such as soccer and capoeira was highly celebrated in a body sensitive society. Capoeira is an indigenous Brazilian martial art and dance mixture which features the dancer wearing knives on his heels with which he attempts to dance around and cut his opponent. Capoeira is a body philosophy that applauds the tricking of the opponent, and features much of the characteristics of the malandro within it. It is both a dance and a sport, much as soccer

\textsuperscript{57} Hess and DaMatta, “Introduction,” 19; Bellos, Futebol, 3, 226, 229; DaMatta, Carnivals, Rogues, and Heroes, 89; Del Burgo, “Don’t Stop the Carnival,” 66.
\textsuperscript{58} Costa-Lima, “Inter-relations,” 2.
is in Brazil. Archetti acknowledges that bodily exporting performances in sport and
dance in Brazil are of historical importance in the construction of identity.60

Soccer in particular is a Brazilian celebration of the body. The use of the term samba-
football, connecting soccer with dance, is part of the Brazilian self identity. The
Brazilian style of soccer resembles both samba and capoeira, and as in both, soccer uses
the body to provoke confusion and fascinate the public. According to Leite Lopes,
Brazilian soccer style employs largely subconscious bodily techniques and habitus to
shape the style that proclaims Brazil. The way Brazilians play soccer is a celebration of
the body and a performance to showcase it. The Tsunami Relief game of 2005 makes
my case in point. Recall Ronaldinho’s three step-overs with a heel flick, all performed
with a huge smile on his face. It would be entirely out of character for a German player
to perform such an outrageous stunt on the soccer field, but for a Brazilian, it was
widely accepted and applauded. Habitus codes go to the core of what it means to be a
Brazilian or German or any nationality. Even the Brazilian word for soccer fan is
endowed with physicality. The word is torcedor, or fan, and literally translated means
to bend or twist, both very physical actions. The Brazilian celebration of the body
seems to be in direct opposition to Catholic belief in the superiority of the soul over the
body; however, I would surmise that this celebration of the body, always in public so
“of the streets” provides an outlet for the rigid hierarchism displayed elsewhere.

60 Bellos, Futebol, 97; Simon Kuper, Football Against the Enemy (London: Phoenix, 1996), 198;
Although deeply ingrained, this habitus code operates in the spheres that both soccer and Carnival do, as a space apart.\(^6^1\)

Given the seven interconnected habitus codes that have been identified (hierarchy with its rejection of individualism and a street versus home separation, ritualism, mixture of identities, the malandro, the preponderance of a belief in luck or fate, an ingrained sense of failure, and an emphasis on the body) it is time to examine the Brazilian national identity and how soccer intersects with it. The search for national identity in Brazil has gone on for over a hundred years, and has been problematic for the country. As early as the mid 1800’s, Latin Americans began to search for a national identity. Oliven relates that in 1924, during the second modernization phase, there was an increase in emphasis on national culture as the intellectuals wanted a national identity and not a regional one. (Of interest, Oliven equated the same problem to Germany.) The term *Brasilidade* was born which was to represent Brazilian national identity. Over the years, Brazilian discussion continued to revolve around the question of identity. Oliven asserts that Brazilian national identity is first of all regional.\(^6^2\)

By the 1930’s, the main national intellectual concern was a search for Brazilian identity. Thinking in terms of the national was considered a modernistic project due to the introduction of the foreign, and was not a revival or invention of tradition. It can be

clearly seen that soccer would fall into this area, as it was brought to Brazil by the British and was not an indigenous game. However, given that identity is a mixture, or multiple identities in Brazil, and given the history and the size of the country, national identity was difficult to forge. Brazil, since it became an independent country, has always been a mixture of races, religions and cultures. Unifying the country and presenting a cohesive national identity to the world became a preoccupation of intellectuals and politicians.63

Brazil turned to the popular culture, and what DaMatta terms secondary sources, to establish national identity. During the 1930’s, Carnival was used in an illiterate society to spread national consciousness. In 1934, Filho linked soccer and carnival together exhibiting the trinity that was to represent national identity: soccer, samba and Carnival. They were to be used to mobilize the nation and establish Brazil to the world by showcasing their popular characteristics and the virtues of Brazil. The exultation of black culture also found a space in the national identity debate, as did religion. Lever establishes the trinity of soccer, samba and spiritualism as Brazilian national identity, while Shirts asserts soccer, carnival and religion, but also adds popular music, and delineates Brazilian religion as both Afro-Brazilian and Catholicism. The basing of national identity on soccer, samba and carnival (or characteristics of the masses) became a project of the State allowing a shift from collective memory to national

memory. DaMatta theorizes that soccer, samba and carnival serve better as national identity than do rockets and wars, answering critics’ complaints that Brazil should have loftier ideals for national identity than popular culture. The establishment of national identity is an ongoing process for all countries, and Brazil continues to search, particularly after the 1950 World Cup. Alabarces and Rodríguez believe that the triad promoted as national identity are now in the process of being replaced by new global products. They itemize symbolic luxury goods, publicity and Formula One racing as representative of a forming national identity for Brazil.64

Few countries in the world used soccer and soccer style as part of their national identity, and none so successfully as Brazil. No other country has been branded by a single sport as has Brazil.65 In a three year experiment with middle school students in the United States, during a lesson on stereotyping and national identity, over 95% of the students identified Brazil with soccer.66 A 1970 survey cited by Janet Lever indicated 90% of Brazilians identified soccer with the Brazilian nation. Several Latin American countries


65 Bellos, Futebol, 2.

66 This study was conducted by the author while teaching seventh grade students in the United States a lesson on stereotyping and national identities. Students were given large sheets of paper with a country’s name written on the top, and asked to write on the paper whatever they knew about the country. The 95% results relating to Brazil held consistent over the four semesters, with different groups of students. The only other recorded results relating to Brazil revolved around poverty or the Amazon. The lessons were conducted from 2003-2005.
tied soccer to their national identity and the foremost expression of their country’s
culture, Argentina for example. But in Brazil, soccer was highly prized as part of their
national identity. It was not just a game to Brazilians; it was the embodiment of their
Brazilianess. Soccer was central to Brazilian self image, and Brazilians saw the
national team as a reflection of their national identity and its values. Brazil has long
been called “the nation in football boots,” but it was through its soccer style that Brazil
sought to reveal national characteristics, real or imagined, and national values, such as
Brazilian flair.67

In Brazil, as in much of Latin America, soccer has become entwined with the concept of
citizenship through the element of national identity. The national team is considered
public property. The concept of national identity displayed via soccer and combined
with citizenship and spectatorship often supplants history in that soccer rather than
historical nationhood can confer citizenship.68 The connections between soccer and
national identity were established early. Bellos declares soccer was the strongest

Rule,” *Sport and Society in Latin America* ed. by Joseph Arbe (Westport, CN.: Greenweeod Press,
Conspiracies: Maradona, the CIA, and Popular Critique,” *Sport in Latin America and the Caribbean* ed.
by Joseph Arbe and David LaFrance (Wilmington, DE.: Scholarly Resources, 2002), 51; Taylor, *The
Beautiful Game*, 17; Jenkins, *The Beautiful Team*, 251; Mike Cronin, “‘When the World Soccer Cup is
Played on Roller Skates’: The Attempt to Make Gaelic Games International: The Meath-Australia
Matches of 1967-68,” *Sporting Nationalisms: Identity, Ethnicity, Immigration and Assimilation* ed. by
Mike Cronin and David Mayall (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 171; Wagg, “The Business of America,”
186; Humphrey, “Brazil and the World Cup,” 66; Del Burgo, “Don’t Stop the Carnival,” 57; Mason,
*Passion of the People?,* 91; Cesar Gordon and Ronaldo Helal, “The Crisis of Brazilian Football:
Perspectives for the Twenty-First Century,” *Sport in Latin American Society: Past and Present* ed. by
Football, Politics, Culture, and Social Transformation in Latin America,” *Sociological Research Online*, 2
68 Del Burgo, “Don’t Stop the Carnival,” 61-63, 70; Bellos, *Futebol*, 68; Lever, “Sport in a Fractured
symbol of national identity in Brazil within decades of 1894. Mason states that Brazil established the link between soccer and national patriotic celebrations in 1922, and by 1925 began promoting itself abroad through soccer. By 1930, the President began promoting soccer as part of national identity, and clearly by the mid 1930’s, soccer was the most potent symbol of Brazilian nationhood. Soccer arrived at an opportune moment as modernization and urbanization were occurring, and as intellectuals began searching for symbols of national identity.  

Soccer not only became of source of collective pride for Brazil, but also the most powerful force of national consciousness and authentic Brazilian nationalism. Betty Milan states: “Football reflects the nationality, it mirrors the nation. Without football, we Brazilians do not exist.” Soccer in Brazil provides a space that cuts across class, race, and ethnicity, leading to a male oriented national pride that increases cultural power. Lever’s theory, that soccer increased Brazilian nationalism by taking a popular cultural sport and turning it into a national self image was a process of using primordial identities to build political unity and allegiance to the modern civil state. Soccer, not samba or coffee, put Brazil on the modern map and symbolized national identity.


unity and progress. Soccer unified the country particularly when a national league was created and a soccer lottery was established. People in remote areas of the country became enthusiastic about following all the teams because the lottery system was based on predicting the winners in a given amount of games. Soccer increased cleavages and unity at the same time, allowing Brazil to build a nation from within and gain legitimacy and respect from without.72 Others have put it more succinctly. Sócrates, the Brazilian soccer star, called soccer Brazil’s greatest identity and its greatest ambassador. Aldo Rebelo, one of the most popular Latin American Communists, stated that nothing was more representative of Brazil than soccer. Ronaldo Helal, sociology professor at Rio de Janeiro University notes that: “What makes Brazil a star in the world is soccer. So there’s a feeling if we can’t win at soccer we can’t do anything right.”73

DaMatta, emphasizing the hierarchal status of power within the country, believes that soccer allows a “horizontalization of power” because it allows the masses to watch and address Brazil directly. Through soccer, the masses are able to claim the nationalistic symbol of Brazil and allow them to live a concrete experience of national unity.74 Bar-On explores the concept that Brazilian soccer and national identity are based on collective “virgin” symbols not stained by a colonial past or military dictatorship. In

---

74 DaMatta, “Soccer: Opium for the People,” 129.
this sense, he believes soccer has become a national symbol of enduring loyalty in the face of capitalist, global economic and cultural homogenization. Soccer, then, serves as a unifying symbol to provide cohesion in a multi-ethnic society during globalization processes.75

Astor takes Brazilian soccer beyond symbolic and into the economic realm. In 1994, after a World Cup championship, hyperinflation ended in a matter of months. After a disastrous loss in the finals of the 1998 World Cup, Brazil was forced to devalue its currency by 35%.76 Given that national identity correlating to soccer can be influenced by the success of the national team, a relationship to the country’s economic status does not seem to be implausible, at least in Brazil. For Brazil, soccer is the national identity. The national team has always been a symbolic representative of the progress of Brazil as a country. Soccer, and soccer style, was intended to “carve a place among the nations”, which was one of the reasons that Maracaná Stadium was built to be the largest in the modern world. It is also why corruption within soccer is so vilified, and yet common, in Brazil. The debacle with the Nike contract violated the Brazilian national identity, at least in the eyes of Brazil. It is also why the body of Garrincha was held in state in the Maracaná, so that the memory of the player (who had died in poverty and alcoholism) could be reclaimed by Brazil qua nation of soccer.77

As has been demonstrated, Brazilian national habitus codes have not only shaped Brazilian character, they have also impacted upon Brazilian playing style. Brazilian national identity has used soccer to promote what it considers unique about Brazil, and Brazil has defined itself both internally and externally with soccer. This has promoted the reproduction of the Brazilian playing style over a historic period of time, and given it legitimacy as national identity. Soccer is the Brazilian national identity, although this may be subject to change. Kuper sums it up by saying that when debating soccer, Brazilians are also debating the kind of country that Brazil should be. They feel their values and identity are being played out on the soccer field for the world to see and judge their nation’s progress.\textsuperscript{78} That is why soccer is so important in Brazil, because it mirrors the soul of Brazil to the world.

\textsuperscript{78} Kuper, \textit{Football Against the Enemy}, 203.
CHAPTER 11
GERMAN NATIONAL HABITUS CODES, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND SOCCER

This chapter explores some of the national habitus codes of Germany, German national identity, and their intersection with soccer and soccer playing style. I will rely heavily on Norbert Elias’ interpretation of German national habitus codes, particularly from his book entitled *The Germans: Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Given that habitus codes are subject to change, (Elias noted some changes in habitus during the Hitler era79) it is important to note that they do influence national character. National identity is a more surface affect, and may be both accepted and challenged by the national population. German soccer playing style is often presented in a stereotype, particularly by the press in other countries. Autotypification also seems apparent when the Germans discuss their own playing style, so it was my goal to dig deeper and look at some of the habitus codes that Elias delineated to see if the stereotypical image is a true one. In many instances, the stereotypical image of the German national team and their playing style does seem to be influenced by national habitus codes.

Elias notes four peculiarities in state formation of German as a nation that leads to some of the German habitus codes. These four are important. The first is Germany’s geographical location in the middle of Europe, surrounded on the west by Latin speaking nations and on the east by Slav speaking nations. The geographical location has influenced Germany’s long-standing and deeply embedded sense of the “other.” Secondly is Germany’s belief that they live in the shadow of a greater past. Germany was late (compared to other European nations) in coming to statehood, and Elias theorizes that part of their tardiness was due to the German character. This structural weakness in unification led to the idolization of the military, war, and ultimately violence. Thirdly, there were frequent breaks and discontinuities in the state formation. It was not unified all at once, and when unity did occur, it was the result of military machinations. This led to a dependence and a favoring of discipline as well as an emphasis on unbroken lines of descent of the people for citizenship. Fourthly, Germany had a historically weak middle class that was cut off from political and military activity, leading to class conflict. The ascension of the middle class to having access to power involved an adoption by the middle class of military models and norms as their own, which in turn led to a boundless use of power and violence. As can be seen, there is often overlap of influences on the formation of particular habitus codes.

The first habitus code to be examined is the concept of “other” that has played out historically over and over in Germany. In Germany, the upper class has always been

\[80\] Ibid., pp. 2, 4, 6-8, 12-13, 15.
more loyal to the land than to the ruler. In all likelihood, this reflects the geographical situation whereby many small kingdoms and duchies were inhibited by larger, nearby states. Their survival depended on a collectivity, which was highly valuable and sacrosanct, but it was not statehood or nationhood. When Germany finally was unified into a single nation, the rise of nationalism and a collective “we” equaled a self love. Germany’s development was not comparable to Britain’s, for example. The British united the concepts of individualism and nationalism, but Germany did not see these concepts as compatible. This melding into a “we” unit brought conflict to the surface, not with older generations or tradition (as in Britain) but rather a conflict developed against the “other” both within and outside their culture. As nationalism increased in the nineteenth century, so did the concept of “other” or “non-German.” Until the unification of the country, there existed little “we” image, particularly from the 15th century until the 19th century. The “we” image that Germany created was an ideal, and held all the capacity of being idealistic. From the beginning, a discrepancy existed between the state and the “Volk” or people of the country. For one, a gap existed between the ideal and the national identity. Secondly, the issue of pan-German, or German speaking descendents that had populated much area of western Europe, was problematic. After unification and nationhood, the pan-German discussion continued, but the “we” versus “other” concept became more cemented into the definition of nationhood. Germany began to define itself against its enemies.

---

81 Ibid., 53.
Germans also began to identity who could and who could not be defined as being German. Until around 1848, the Jewish populations in the German areas were defined as being of the religion of Judaism, but after the rise of Social Darwinism, the Jewish population was defined as a different race from the Germans. Historically, the Jewish population had suffered mistreatment at various times in Germany, but from 1848 onwards, the Jewish population began to be viewed as the “other.” The rising German empire of 1864 and the wars accompanying it also gave further impetus to a minority problem within what was to become Germany. The new Kaiserreich was multi-ethnic, but the minorities were suppressed. During the 1870’s, writings by von Treitschke proclaimed that history was determined by the struggle of races, and along with the beliefs of the Social Darwinists, the concept of “other” within Germany was further solidified. This “we” collectivity versus the “other” was a key factor in the Nazi rise to power, as the Nazi reign emphasized “other” as threatening and less pure. Hitler’s definition of the German race actually included more membership for the society, rather than limiting membership to the nobility and the middle class. The “we” image of Germany suffered greatly after the defeat during World War II, but it was soccer that helped heal it, particularly the 1954 World Cup victory.

Germany still has a tendency to define the “other” as threatening and alien, even in current history. This struggle is reflected in the large number of terms used to describe non-German residents in Germany. Once again, racism is rearing its head in Germany, spurred by the concept of “other” that is deeply embedded in habitus codes. In 1988, racist chanting was prominently exhibited by Germans during the Germany versus Holland soccer game, as Holland’s team featured several black stars. Soccer often provides a venue for the expression of such feelings, whereas other public spaces would inhibit such a display. When reunification of East and West Germany occurred, two distinct national identities had developed with no common values or traditions. These two identities had to be merged despite different historical and ethical patterns, and this merger has led to an increase in conceptualizing the “other” in the culture. 1990 saw increased racial attacks and neo-fascist attacks on the disabled. By 1991, a ten fold increase in racist attacks was occurring, as the national identity of Germany as a whole was reconfiguring. By 1992 the Germans were calling upon Germany to protect its national identity, and fears of being under attack from the “mongrel” races were becoming more public as the populations of Turkish and Slavic migrants increased. 1992 also marked an anti-Roma campaign, in fear that they would undermine ethnic purity. A movement began to emerge that advocated cultural separatism. This movement was not imperialistic, but accepted the permeability of national borders by calling for a cultural separatism whereby each culture had a right to a homeland and a national identity. Currently, this movement is still in the minority in Germany, but has been gaining strength. Fire bombings against the Turkish enclaves in Germany
occurred in 1993, and Merkel noted that racist, xenophobic and violent confrontations were rising most significantly in Germany in 1996. Many Germans favor a substitute identity as a European rather than as a German, and the push for European integration has led to an enthusiasm for the European Union in Germany.84

There has been a re-emergence of ethnic separation in sport since reunification.85 Turkish teams play separately from “German” teams within German cities. The concept of “other” within the country has long permeated the national team, with few minorities ever being rostered to the squad. During the 1998 World Cup, great interest was shown in Germany for the multi-ethnic team that won (France), although the interest did not seem to shape German playing selections.86 But it is on the playing field, against other nations, that the concept of “other” really begins to be played out. Given that international tournaments, like the World Cup, do foster an attitude of “we” versus the “other,” for some reason German teams are singled out as particularly exhibiting that attitude. Hoberman notes that German sporting nationalism suffused with racial folklore has flourished since the time of Hitler, and remains important to Germans.87 Others have noted that international matches, particularly against

85 Blecking, “Sport and the Integration of Minorities,” 32.
neighboring countries, provide a forum for German display of patriotic and nationalistic ideologies that reflect a far right wing racism.88

Elias notes that the “shadow of a greater past” also shapes German habitus codes. The elite in German society have long seen their ideal self image in the past, particularly regarding Germany as a world power. Germans yearn for a restoration of the old world, tracing back to the middle ages when the German Reich ruled central Europe, prior to its fragmentation. What is significant, in the eyes of the Germans, is that their nation has suffered a history of decline from that point, becoming smaller and smaller. The former German Empire has led to many myths and legends supporting the belief that it truly was an Empire, and monuments have been erected to cement the tradition. It was during the late 18th century and then the Wilhelmine era, that Romanticism and invented tradition built the cultural identity of an empire, mainly to link German and Prussian history together. The new German Reich of 1870 saw itself in the tradition of the medieval empire with a yearning for the spectacular. National thought began to focus more on romantic beliefs in the Volkstum (national folklore) and Volksgeist (national spirit) as a unification method, drawing together all the German principalities with Prussia. Germans had long seen themselves as legitimate heirs to classical Greece and not decadent Rome, but over time the identification shifted to Sparta.89 Even the press

88 Udo Merkel, Kurt Sombert and Walter Tokarski, “Football, Racism and Xenophobia in German: 50 Years Later- Here We Go Again?,” Racism and Xenophobia, 159.
from other countries occasionally make mention of a greater past for Germany. The Italian newspaper, *Gazzetta dello Sport*, reporting on a soccer match from World Cup 1990 said: “The Germans shout…a powerful, dull, hollow sound…bears the hereditary imprint of the roar which a thousand years ago brought fear to the hearts of Drusus and the legions…”90

Related to this feeling of a greater past and a less great present due to downsizing (although it is arguable that with reunification of the two Germanys that this habitus code is undergoing change at the present time), is a negative self image. The Germans hold that the combination of heroism and the Fatherland ultimately lead to defeat and perhaps death. The “we-image” of Germany certainly contains guilt over the Nazi control during World War II, and the atrocities committed in the name of Germany.91 This negative self image is particularly reflected at the level of national identity, which will be demonstrated.

Another habitus code identified by Elias is the warrior code or the valorization of the military within Germany, prior to World War II. Military victories in the 19th century over Austria, France and Denmark led to a glorification of strength and power, and accorded pre-eminence to the military. The eventual unification of the country in 1871 was achieved by the military (which Hobsbawm points out was an invented tradition in

---

itself), although it had long been a middle class dream which had remained unachieved. This unification further increased the prestige of the military, and the middle class changed from an anti-court bias to a pro-military bias (given that the military was usually considered among the elites in Germany.) From 1871 onward, models of behavior from the military were adopted by the middle class, and had a major influence on national character. The military valued physical strength, skill and readiness to do battle, and these values had deep roots in Germany, leading to a national attitude of no compromises, and contempt for weakness and bargaining. As Elias notes, the combination of the warrior code and nationalistic creed led to the acceptance of absolutes without questioning. This in turn led to the subordination of moral or humanistic values to national values. Young officers and students accepted, and wanted, to achieve political goals by military force. Thewelcit traces the German soldier psychology back to the Enlightenment, but the masses of the population did not adopt this warrior code and embed it deeply in their habitus codes until after the middle of the nineteenth century.92

Sport has long been associated with the military in Germany, from the nationalistic turnen movement to the Nazi use of sport to promote their fascism on an international basis. Dwertmann and Rigauer acknowledge that the introduction and development of soccer during the Wilhelmine era was reflected in the use of military language in the game as well as the organization of army pack marches for soccer clubs prior to 1914.

The early use of military terms in German soccer was a deliberate effort by soccer clubs (and the DFB) to confirm patriotism (particularly in light of the negative reception by the turnen movement) as well as an effort to confirm and reflect the status and prestige of the military in the country. From its earliest days, the DFB has been closely aligned with nationalistic and militaristic organizations in Germany, and the German press often refers to the national team as the “Teutonic Panzer.” Nicknames for German players frequently reflect a military leaning: “Der Bomber” for Gerd Muller, and “Der Kaiser” for Franz Beckenbauer. During the 1990 World Cup, military metaphors were commonly used to describe the German team, and a Soviet newspaper even went so far as to publish a cartoon featuring Lothar Matthäus in a tank. The German press in 1996 further equated soccer with war: “The Prussian general and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz was wrong. War is not the continuation of politics; football is.” German soccer style frequently exhibits the habitus code of valorization of the military. Precision and power are frequent synonyms for the German national team playing style, along with the related concepts of violence and discipline.

---


The habitus codes associated with discipline are directly related to the military, and relates to the concept of leadership. Due to the late integration of the nation under one government, the military and the student associations played an integrating role. The student associations, in particular, were of interest to Elias as institutions promulgating habitus codes within the culture. Student associations featured externally controlled discipline as well as the warrior code of honor which in turn led to private dueling to establish that code of honor. These outside controls by others developed students into displaying self restraints that require external support, and thus the autonomy of the individual conscience was limited. Initially, the honor code was reinforced and restrained by the nobility, but over time this changed. As the influence of the nobility waned and the influence of the military increased, few institutionalized restraints existed for the students. Until 1918, the Germans were always ruled from above which led to a failure to develop self control. Unification occurred under autocratic rule, and the middle class had to obtain their dream of unification at the hands of autocratic rulers via the military. The initial “we” image of Germany displayed an autocratic central power. The unification of the nation led to a standardization of the code of honor in the student fraternities. Germans wanted a strong leader with external control.95

Germany had suddenly changed from a weak and lowly conglomeration of states into a nation with power and showing increased nationalistic tendencies. “Iron” became a key word during the Wilhelmine era, establishing a long tradition of authoritarian rule and eventually a police state. The absolutist rule until 1918 led to subordination of the

masses and authoritarian government and authoritarian families. The change to a parliamentary government, during the Weimar period, (after their defeat during World War I), led to a more authoritarian government. Elias emphasized that during times of national crisis, Germans shed the burden of thinking for themselves. He noted that spurts back and forth in development of the nation, along with late unification, played a role in a weakened self restraint system in Germany. This fragile self esteem meant that national pride was taken very seriously, and the combination of discipline and obedience led to the concept of self sacrifice for the country, with unquestioning obedience even unto death. With an emphasis on discipline, there could be no compromise to the ideal. The iron discipline of the Prussian soldier eventually turned the disciplined warriors of Germany into machines. The stereotype of the disciplined and machine-like soldier has existed since the 1870’s, and continues to play out in a variety of ways today, particularly in the area of soccer and soccer style.96

Initially, the Prussian ideals of discipline and order caused a disdain for early soccer. It was too much a new game, with English roots, at that. But organization within the soccer clubs of Germany was undertaken with gusto, and organization on the field during play has long been emphasized. German discipline in training, and discipline during the game is a hallmark of German national teams. Porro and Russo surveyed Europeans on specifics of style, and it was no surprise that German soccer style was labeled industrious, organized and disciplined. Hoberman noted that Germans apply the

---

stereotype to themselves and believe that they display Prussian hard work, discipline, steady morale during combat, will power, toughness and tenacity. Former Bayer Leverkusen coach, Christoph Daum, employed some unique strategies to instill discipline, teamwork, and tenacity in his team. For discipline, he had players run across broken glass; for teamwork they were handed spoons, to symbolize all eating from the same bowl; for tenacity, strikers were lectured on how to sell vacuum cleaners (try and try again). For further discipline, he made his team train in the middle of the night.97

The German habitus code of discipline is so deeply ingrained that it even affects celebrations in soccer. After the 1954 World Cup victory, Hesse-Lichtenberger noted that “decency and discipline won the upper hand” quickly, as the Süddeutsche Zeitung, the largest southern German newspaper, wrote only days after the victory, “Let us become sober again: the game is over…” After the 1974 World Cup victory, goalkeeper Sepp Maier observed that “Germans can organize a World Cup perfectly and crush even the strongest opponent through unflagging discipline…but we don’t have the faintest idea about holding a party.”98

Another habitus code with connections to the military and discipline is the concept of power and strength leading to violence. Elias theorized that breaks in national stability led to increased violence in the culture, and Dwertmann and Rigauer insist that an

98 Süddeutsche Zeitung as cited by Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 165, 248.
orientation toward the practice of violence had become anchored in German society. Elias delineates the dueling student associations as socially sanctioned modes of violence that became a shared ritual leading to cohesion in the society. The Prussian notion of formalized violence led to pleasure in violence and a situation whereby the bully gained the respect of the culture. From 1871 onward, dueling became more violent and began to emphasize bloody wounds to the face rather than the former code of honor. A dynamic of coarsening took place whereby violence was accentuated and formalized, weakness was considered contemptible causing lashing out harder against the weak, and the capacity to sympathize was absent. Weakness led to being expelled from the group, with salt rubbed into the wounds. Compromise was considered in a negative light, and it became a German condition to fight until the end. Germans began to conclude that war and violence could be good. The code of behavior emphasizing no concessions to weakness led to the belief that everything was an absolute. Aggression became conditioned in a crisis, and the use of violence was weakly hedged by norms and conventions.99

Although the student dueling associations may have increased the level and acceptance of violence in the mid nineteenth century, Germans had long been reputed to embrace violence. Tacticus described the furoreutonicus, and the concept had been accepted as a racial trait since early in the 1800’s. The concept that politics rested on unbridled force also played out in increased violence and tension between the classes in Germany

and Italy, probably due to their late nationalization, according to Elias. A high value was placed on physical force after the defeat in World War I. The Nazi movement emphasized kraft, or strength, as a key word, and worshipped vigor, power and strength, and detested weakness. The hardness at the core of the SS ideal of manhood emphasized imperviousness to human emotion. Muscularity became a metaphor for force, dominance and control, and war was believed to shape masculinity into something that was hard, ruthless, and aggressive.100

Power and a certain sense of usually restrained violence also play out on the soccer field. One of the identifying traits attributed to German soccer style is physical power and strength while playing. Whereas Brazil likes to demonstrate a degree of deviousness and the malandro spirit, Germans prefer to attack straight toward the goal with power. The famous incident from the 1982 World Cup game where the German goalkeeper forcibly struck a French player while going for a ball, is often used as an example of German soccer violence. Every analysis given seems to indicate that the foul that took the player out of the game, unconscious, could have been avoided. According to Hesse-Lichtenberger, the real problem was that the goalkeeper had added a darker dimension to the credo that winning the game was all that counted. The goalkeeper had accepted the possibility of severely wounding the French player and

regarded this as a professional attitude.\textsuperscript{101} While this incident is notably the most famous and often cited incident, it is by no means the single cause for labeling the German team as powerful and sometimes violent. In 1974, \textit{Der Stern}, a German magazine called the stadium a battlefield, and suggested that “professional football has become a theatre of war.”\textsuperscript{102} The late 1980’s the German players were described as: “Even their calves are calloused, because they are tackling all the time,” and “Indeed, things were often as rough on the field as they were in the stands.”\textsuperscript{103} By 1984, the French newspaper, \textit{Libération}, commented that “German football, this brute animal, deserved to be drowned in its own urine.”\textsuperscript{104} The 1998 World Cup featured German players being sent off for blatant and vicious tackles.\textsuperscript{105}

Another habitus code that is closely related to “we” images and the designation of the “other” is the German emphasis on descent. It wasn’t until 1999 that Germany changed the laws that stated German citizenship was based on blood. Since the time of Bismarck, Germans have conceived of themselves in ethnic terms, with race being a potent element in German national identity. Many Germans still see themselves this way. This ethnic conception of identity tends to reject cultural diversity, and the “horsebreeder’s perspective” has been widespread in Germany, particularly since the introduction of Social Darwinism. Ancestry determined social rank, and class and

\textsuperscript{101} Hesse-Lichtenberger, \textit{Tor!}, 313-314.
\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Der Stern} (1974) as cited by Dwertmann and Rigauer, “Football Hooliganism in Germany,” 80.
\textsuperscript{103} Hesse-Lichtenberger, \textit{Tor!}, 258.
\textsuperscript{104} \textit{Libération} cited by Hesse-Lichtenberger, \textit{Tor!}, 317.
\textsuperscript{105} Hesse-Lichtenberger, \textit{Tor!}, 324; Simon Kuper, \textit{Football Against the Enemy} (London: Phoenix, 1996), 13.
descent equaled legal privilege. Germany has always seemed to be more concerned with genetic endowment than other nations, and the Nazi philosophy merely emphasized that during their reign of terror. Germans have a fairly rigid sense of belonging, and this community is deemed to be a community of blood. Nationalism and citizenship was not entered into by choice, but determined by history and nature, with historically determined entities based on ancestry. It led to Germany being regarded as a closed community, and the emphasis on *kulternation*, or a nation of fate bound by blood ties, influenced history. Knischewski and Krüger both agree that there was not a common literature, religion, or culture to bind the country together, so bloodlines became the qualifying factor in citizenship. The percentage of those of Jewish descent and of the handicapped remains low in population figures compared to other countries.¹⁰⁶ A big issue in Germany today is the immigration issue. Germans still tend to segregate immigrants economically, socially and legally. In a poll run by the German daily, *Handelsblatt*, 54% of the respondents felt that immigrants were not interested in assimilating, and 43% thought that foreigners were more disposed to be violent that Germans. The Christian Democrat party is currently attacking the 1999 reforms on citizenship, because of the immigration issue.¹⁰⁷


The emphasis on descent does affect soccer and soccer style. Selection of athletic talent, even at a young age, still is often done on anthropometric measurement. Bromberger notes that the German national teams of 1982, 1986 and 1990 were quasi-perfect illustrations of a nation founded on a community of blood. As has been previously noted, often the German players are described as being interchangeable except for their numbers, and it certainly is significant that the national team had no blacks on the team until about two years ago. German players also tend to be physically larger and more athletic than players from other nations, hence the stereotype regarding their strength and musculature. While it may be stretching the theory a bit, it could be argued that conformity of body type, such as demonstrated by the German team, influences style in that it shapes a more limited repertoire of responses on the soccer field, or allows for more responses. Given the advantage of large players that are athletic, it is no surprise that German players tend to be characterized as being dominant in the air. This was particularly noticeable in the 2002 World Cup game against a Middle Eastern team, when Germany scored the majority of their numerous goals off of headers.

Another habitus code that Elias explores is the acceptance of hierarchy in German culture. From early nationhood, the ownership of the means of production determined the social status of the German individual, and from the time of the Kaiser, hierarchy was the determining factor in the society. Top civil servants and the military were of

---

much higher rank than rich merchants, and the bourgeois developed fairly late in German history. The masses of German society viewed the state and government as external to themselves. After 1871, the middle class began to merge with the upper class, to the extent that they began to adopt some of the upper class codes and model them. Previously, the middle class codes had emphasized equality and humanity with a heightened sense of “culture,” but after unification of the country, the Prussian warrior code and the military model became the norm. The middle class had lacked freedom due to their lack of access to the political environment, and the area of culture allowed them an escape from hierarchy. National military victory weakened the middle class which led to the hegemony of the nobility. The warrior code emphasizing honor became more valued than a cultural or moral code. The student associations also reflected this hierarchization. As nationalist associations accepted more middle class students, dueling increased. Within the organizations there were precise rules of superiority and subordination, and the culture demanded submission to this code of hierarchization with punishment the consequence of failure to submit. In German society, some people were always more equal than others.109

The relationship to soccer and soccer style of this hierarchization of society is in the concept that a leader figure, or a Messiah figure, must lead the German team to victory. Crolley, Hand and Jeutter note how this phenomenon plays out in the German press, saying that Germans seemingly cannot get rid of their obsession with leader figures.

German soccer players are not just considered geniuses on the field or cultural icons, but are equipped with more power. At times, this leader position is imbued with religious overtones of a messiah: “…media disciples gathered in feverish expectation in order to give birth to the new Messiah out of their sweaty, steaming midst.” Hesse-Lichtenberger addresses the whole concept of the “sweeper system” as being problematic for the Germans as well as symbolic of the focus on a leader position. The sweeper, or directing defensive player playing closest to the goal, is so entrenched in German soccer that it permeates down to the lowest levels of children. The sweeper can be a very effective defensive scheme, particularly when the sweeper is the leader of the team. Franz Beckenbauer exemplified the sweeper as the leader. The main problem with the system is that it takes an outstanding player, physically strong with excellent leadership abilities and heightened tactical awareness to play the position. Not only are those players rare, but the system is somewhat outdated, as most national teams tend to play a modified version of a zonal defense. A sweeper can lead a zonal defense, but an attacking sweeper, such as Beckenbauer, who can move forward and open up the midfield as well as organize the defense, is an exceptional player. Germany has toyed with a flat back four zonal defense, but as Hesse-Lichtenberger points out, Germans are notoriously averse to altering habits, and the newer flat back systems do not depend on a father figure as designated sweeper. In Germany, the sweeper position exists as the messianic leader of the team, further reinforcing conceptualization of hierarchy.

111 Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 326-328.
 Appearing somewhat oppositional to the leadership emphasis is the habitus code that emphasizes teamwork over individuality. The comment that German soccer players can barely be told apart except for their numbers relates not only to physical appearance, but to the efficient teamwork that is the hallmark of German national teams. In fact, German soccer success is generally attributed to their teamwork. The shaping of this philosophy, that the individual has no importance in himself, was directly related to the concept of a super race, and not a superman. It was promulgated through physical education programs throughout the country, particularly in the pre-World War II era. But the idea of no individualism in sport can be discerned early on in the turnen movement, and was featured as part of the turnen critique against sport itself. Turnen emphasized shared cultural strengths, and sport, particularly foreign sport such as soccer, did not represent that philosophy in the eyes of the turnen movement. The only individuality that was emphasized and permitted was individual self sacrifice for the collective supremacy. In 1996, national team coach Bert Vogts remarked after a victory over England, “My star is the team.” Even the GDR, with its separate history and national identity, featured team play with no stars on the team, leading them to play almost as automatons. The German team is frequently referred to in the press as a team without stars, and however critical this may sound, there is a beauty in teamwork in soccer, and Germany epitomizes this concept on a global basis. Hence the many allusions to machine-like German teams.¹¹²

¹¹² Kuper, Football Against the Enemy, 9; Udo Merkel, “Germany and the World Cup: Solid, Reliable, Often Undramatic-But Successful,” Hosts and Champions: Soccer Cultures, National Identities and the
The last habitus code to be examined is a somewhat nebulous grouping of codes related to formality, ritual and perfectionism that are deeply embedded in the German character. From historic fixed courtship rituals (symbolic of hierarchy) to a heightening of rituality during the Wilhelmine era with an increased emphasis on manners, etiquette and increased ceremonial occasions, reflect a deep sense of formality. In the student dueling associations, this rigid formalization was reflected in control during the duel, not only control of the opponent but also a ritualization of the duel. As the code of honor came to replace the moral code in German society in the 1800’s, Germans became even more ostentatious which also resulted in a “wildness” being exhibited when Germans did let go in relaxation. Even German merriment eventually became ritualized. As Hesse-Lichtenberger has commented, Germans do not care for change. However, there is a yearning for perfection that is forever present in the German psyche. This drive for perfection has been translated into a drive for success, regardless of the means.113

The drive for success, or a results oriented philosophy, is readily reflected in German soccer style. The debate in 1931 over whether German power was stifling beauty in the game, and whether physicality was undoing artistic achievement on the field, was

---

quickly stifled by the coach. What counted for the team was results, and a performance based on success took priority. Chancellor Kohl reemphasized this belief when he congratulated Coach Berti Vogts in 1996 by saying, “It’s not important how one wins but that one wins,” further reflecting that success is what matters.\footnote{Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 74; Liz Crolley and David Hand, \textit{Football, Europe and the Press} (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 51.} Crolley, Hand and Jeutter note that this achievement based attitude has become German autotypification. The Dutch consider the German style of play as ugly and beneath contempt, because it considers a win at all cost and by any means necessary as shameful and indecent.\footnote{Crolley, Hand, and Jeutter, “Playing the Identity Card,” 123; Winner, \textit{Brilliant Orange}, 144.} Given the global model of achievement based elite sport, perhaps the real debate lends itself more to a discussion on the spirit of the game. Whereas the Germans reflect a modern, liberal capitalistic system insisting that success is the penultimate achievement, the Brazilians seem to vacillate back and forth between achievement oriented and a focus on art, or how the game is played.

Hesse-Lichtenberger offers a balanced perspective listing German character traits: gregariousness, suspiciousness, an us versus them mentality, organizing, and a longing for belonging. He particularly references this description to soccer clubs, and presents the view that belonging to a club satisfies a German need for being a member of a community. Merkel notes that typical German virtues displayed via German soccer style exhibit skill, team spirit, determination and physical strength, whereas Crolley and Hand delineate the dominant values in German soccer as fight and tackle, work and run.
Gebauer lists the dominant values displayed in Germany since the late 1970’s as technical efficiency, hard work and success above all else.\textsuperscript{116}

At the level of national identity, a more surface level, many of the habitus codes are reflected. It must be acknowledged that invented traditions, imagined communities, and other cultural interpretations, as well as stereotypification and autotypification, tend to play out at the level of national identity. Elias noted a gap between the national ideal and national identity that has always been present in German culture. Historically, several factors seem to dominate German national identity. Mangan believes that the birth of national stereotypes was based on Greek models that were perfected through the nineteenth century and flowered during World War I. These nationalistic stereotypes were based on a national consensus. Germany, due to late nationalization, lacked a historic identity which influenced a weak national identity. In 1870, the German national identity remained weak and undeveloped. Turnen played an important source in the development of national identity within Germany. Turnen provided a national political unity, an emphasis on common cultural roots, and a physicality (gymnastics) unique to the German tradition. The rise of Nazism in the twentieth century based national identity on the exclusion of the other, a concept that had been inherent in Germany for eons. The post World War II national identity has displayed a guilt that is never far from the surface, and as has been demonstrated in the soccer press throughout Europe, not forgotten by other countries. National identity was problematic after

\textsuperscript{116} Hesse-Lichtenberger, \textit{Tor!}, 23; Merkel, “Germany and the World Cup,” 109; Crolley and Hand, \textit{Football, Europe and the Press}, 51; Gebauer as cited by Crolley and Hand, \textit{Football, Europe and the Press}, 97.
Hitler’s fall, and Germany pursued a defensive posture different from the rest to Europe. The post World War II national identity exhibited low national pride, pessimism and restraint toward national symbols, a need for security and an identification with economic success and economic strength. Crises during the 1970’s and 1980’s threatened German substitute national identities, formulated since World War II, and Germans began to search for new national identities. Waves of nostalgia swept through Germany, including a Hitler wave. The increased use of national symbols and a rehabilitation of German history began to occur. The 1990 reunification of Germany again provoked a crisis in national identity, with calls for a redefinition of what being German meant. While the German soccer press tended to display a lack of interest in historical or war references, instead focusing on political references, Germany began to focus on economic and soccer success as means of national identity, with the goal of becoming the dominant force in the European Union.  

Whereas the German national soccer team has long been the focus of nationalistic sentiment, the association of soccer with German national identity has been a post World War II construction. While Germany has not been as aggressive as Brazil in using soccer to establish national identity, there has been use of the game in connections with national identity. Many persons in Germany felt that soccer success could help

---

assuage a sense of uncertainty and loss after the loss of an empire. From the initial rejection of foreign sport in 1870, by 1950 Germany began using soccer as an environment in which to express national values and idealism that had been corrupted by Nazism. Values that Germany wanted to display to the world as their new national identity were prominently displayed in soccer at the time, and conveniently disguised within the culture. These values included unselfishness, cooperation, and service to the nation, and they supported the idealistic streak that had always been present in Germany. The transformation of the machine-like Germans from World War II into a mythical German athlete was clearly associated with producing a new national identity, and sport play a favored role. Athletes became symbolic of national performance, especially in the rivalry between East and West Germany. Elite athletes saw their funding grow, establishing them as signs of a robust German nation. Soccer was being used to display “German-ness,” and Germans accepted this role as there was a high identity level with the game.¹¹⁸

Germany has long been a one sport country, marking a similarity with Brazil. But what differs is that the sport has changed in Germany from turnen gymnastics to soccer. Tennis made a brief surge in popularity with Boris Becker, and the discourse surrounding tennis varied little from that of soccer. But the popularity of the sport was

temporary, compared to the enduring identification with soccer. Soccer has held the most central place in German culture, with hundreds of thousands playing the game and millions watching the game as fans. Whereas the roots of nationalism have surrounded soccer in Germany since its inception, soccer is seen as the most German of all games and the embodiment of the German soul and character. The origins of the myth that soccer actually originated in Germany was an invented tradition fabricated to boost the early popularity of the game. Germans feel their national pride rests on the game and their success in it on an international basis. Germany could safely display their patriotism for their country in the soccer arena, which they could not do in other areas. Soccer also served to facilitate the citizen’s identity with the nation, much as it did in Brazil. In 1988, the chairman of the Scientific Council of the German Sports Association emphatically spoke out: “We must invest in sport because it facilitates the citizen’s identification with the state.”

The World Cup victory of 1954 by Germany cemented the meshing of soccer and national identity. Germany proclaimed that through soccer they were reborn: “We are somebody again!” Hesse-Lichtenberger comments that the World Cup victory was the true founding of the Berne Republic, as the victory made all Germans feel a part of the nation. The national team represented the “perfect Germany” to the rest of the world. The victory enabled Germany to promote a national identity built on success, and

established the recovery of the nation after World War II to the rest of the world. The country that once objected to soccer now used it as emblematic of national pride and thus national identity. The national team gave Germany a “safe” way to be proud of their country again.120

Of all European countries, the greatest convergence of national identity in soccer is exhibited by Germany. As Crolley, Hand and Jeutter demonstrate, the press from France, England, and Spain are all in agreement about the German national team and what characteristics of style it displays that denote national identity: aggressive strength, dull efficiency, and arrogant self belief.121 The German press differs little, with a major exception. The German press is often self critical of the team, but a war vocabulary is never used to describe the team, while it is a prominent feature in the press of other nations when describing German soccer. At times, there almost seems an unspoken prohibition in the German press to show enthusiasm for the national team, as if such enthusiasm could lead to accusations of self boasting. German soccer stars are often represented as projective figures who serve national conceit and German self-hatred at the same time. But the German press does serve as a unifying factor behind the national team, using phrases such as “All Germany leapt from its seat… All of Germany is on its feet in the living room.”122 This orientation of Germany and its national team provides

an interesting academic side note. Christiane Eisenberg thoroughly promotes the thesis that Germany relates primarily to its national team, and national identity of the country provides part of the reason for this. On the other hand, Ulrich Hesse-Lichtenberger would thoroughly disagree, arguing that German soccer is more oriented toward a local basis, with much of the fan emotional investment leveled at local city teams.\textsuperscript{123} I would have to agree more with Eisenberg, in that Germany has connected notions of soccer and national identity, as well as exhibited long term nationalistic connections with the DBF. Whereas local and regional support of soccer is high in Germany, as in Brazil, the national team provides some cohesion and a unitary locus of focus, particularly during major tournaments. Merkel further points out that in the cosmopolitan atmosphere of the Bundesliga, anonymity and distant admiration are more common today, as players are seldom from the local area. He states that the current form of fan-team relationship is conducive to a soccer culture expressing national affiliation and identity.\textsuperscript{124}

Particularly after reunification, the post-modern Germany is once again struggling with national identity. The support for the national team often reflects some of these opposing senses of national identity, and in German fashion, has named two differing groups of fans. The hard core fans appear to have their German identity rooted in social or moral integration, and thus maintain support for the national team regardless of the results. The \textit{neckermanner} group of fans is more emblematic of soccer tourists, and has

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{123} Hesse-Lichtenberger, \textit{Tor!}, 50. Hesse-Lichtenberger states Eisenberg’s theory and disputes it.
\textsuperscript{124} Merkel, “Germany and the World Cup,” 103.
\end{footnotesize}
a tendency to back the team when it is successful, but terminate identification with the
team when it is not.\textsuperscript{125} The next World Cup which is being hosted by Germany may
heavily influence whether Germans continue to use soccer as part of their national
identity. If the German team is successful, it would seem likely that soccer and
economic success will continue to be promoted on an international basis as representing
what Germany wants to exhibit to the world as being German.

As has been demonstrated, at the level of national identity, Germany has heavily
invested in soccer. Both foreign press and domestic press appear to agree that part of
the German national identity is reflected through soccer, and that soccer represents an
arena where German values are displayed to represent national character. At the level
of national habitus codes, many of those codes have intersected and shaped German
playing style. Examples of these would include discipline, reverence for the military
model, an acceptance for violence, emphasis on bloodlines, team unity as opposed to
individualism, a yearning for a greater past along with a yearning for perfection and
organization, and a significant delineation of the “other.” That the German soccer style
is frequently described as efficient, disciplined, physically powerful, machine-like in its
precision, and war-like reflects these deeply embedded habitus codes. Given that
habitus codes are consensually accepted by a nation and promulgated through
institutions and accepted as common-sensical notions, it would seem likely that they
would have a great influence on the soccer style that a nation develops. However, since
habitus codes are not concrete and are responsive to historical changes, it will be

interesting to watch how new conceptions of German-ness are developed since
reunification, and whether they influence a traditional German style of play. Perhaps
most interesting will be how Germany addresses the immigration issue, and whether the
German national team will, itself, be responsive to those influences.
CHAPTER 12

COLONIALISM AND SOCCER STYLE

The impact of colonialism on soccer style is a nuanced situation, and given that Germany and Brazil were at opposite ends of the spectrum regarding colonialism, it would be expected that its impact would be quite different. I explored the impact of colonialism (and imperialism) on sport, and then directly on soccer. I also examined how these issues specifically related to both Brazil and Germany. My theory is that Brazilian style was not directly affected by Portugal except in the area of player emigration. Rather, Brazilian style was more influenced by the system of colonization in terms of slave importation, the latifunda system, and a hierarchal culture. These aspects of colonization did have an impact on how soccer style developed within Brazil. Germany’s attempts to colonize, how they went about it, and more particularly where they went about it, shaped the soccer system within the country, and in only a few instances impacted on playing style. Immigration may hold some impetus for impacting German style in the future, but currently, it has had little effect. Germany has influenced other country’s playing style in an indirect manner by its organized coaching system.
Allen Guttmann presents three models of ludic diffusion: cultural imperialism, cultural hegemony and cultural emulation, and all three theories are useful in explaining the movement of sport in various cultures.\(^1\) Guttmann concludes that when viewing the English promulgation of sport throughout the world during the modernization period, that cultural imperialism is not the best description, but rather, cultural hegemony would be a more accurate finding.\(^2\) He defines modern sport as being diffused by the British, but also points out that the colonized cultures were not the only cultures to abandon their traditional physical culture during this time period.\(^3\) Tony Mason notes that some authors do call the spread of modern sport cultural imperialism, and believe that it was designed to maintain the dependence of the colonial state.\(^4\) When viewing our two case study nations, this theory seems unlikely, as neither nation was colonized by the British, and yet both have become soccer world powers. Sport, in itself, rarely wins territory or changes religion or ideology, but rather it supports the concept of the imagined community.\(^5\)

John Bale and Joseph Maguire explore four theories of ludic diffusion, and how foreign sport was adopted and ultimately adapted in various situations. The modernization theory has been used by Gruneau, Guttmann, Adelman and Lanfranchi, dealing with

---

\(^3\) Ibid., pp. 2, 9.
how traditional cultures reach modernity. The imperialism and neo-imperialism theory focuses on capitalistic expansion and the need for new markets, which allows western cultures to ensure control over world trade. Mangan and Arbena have both used aspects of this theory to explain specific cases of ludic diffusion. The dependency theory focuses on how multinationals operate actively to underdevelop the third world, but offers a somewhat limited view as to how specific nations seem to have overcome this obstacle. This theory is predominant when examining sport and Latin America, and has been used by Arbena and Jarvie. The last theory is the world system theory, which is associated with the work of Wallerstein basing diffusion on core, peripheral and semi-peripheral nations. The dependency theory focuses on industrial nations enriching themselves at the expense of periphery nations, maintaining this dependency by the legacy of colonialism. While Bale and Maguire were mainly interested in exploring sport labor migration patterns, these theories also have applicability to the spread of modern sport. While neither Brazil nor Germany was colonized by Britain, Britain brought soccer to both of them.

Britain’s role in the diffusion of sport, particularly in the case of Brazil, was related to economic concerns. In Brazil’s case, the diffusion of European sport to Latin America was mainly a one way process. The sport was imported and played by the elites as it was deemed desirable to emulate Europe. After acceptance by the elites, the sport then permeated the rest of the culture. During the period of the Industrial Revolution, which

---

coincided with much of the diffusion of modern sport, Britain replaced Spain and Portugal as the driving force in South America, based on control of commercial networks and interests. In Latin America, there was no moral or ideological impetus behind the infusion of sport, as the emphasis was on economic development, and the believing it would be the unifying process for the world. But of course, the economic control that Britain wielded perpetuated a domination that had been inherent in colonialism. Colonialism, whether political or economic, reconstructed and transformed culture. The English middle class role was prominent, because the nation that exercised economic power also exercised a cultural power. Imported sport adopted by the elites of the country created a further cultural dependence on Europe. As Arbena and LaFrance have pointed out, most popular sport in Latin America have little connection with traditional or colonial society, per se, but an argument can be made that they are representative of a type of neo-colonialism.7

Ludic diffusion and cultural mingling generally represented a two way situation, dependent upon the form of colonization that had been historically represented. In Latin America, this process tended to be assimilation and adaptation, or take the sport and while not changing its basic rules, make it fit the country. Sport did not usually

become a mechanism for reinforcing colonialism in Latin America, but it did reinforce a type of cultural and economic colonialism. As Stuart Hall points out, in the third world, traces of colonialism have not been erased. In the post-colonial period, sport played the role of allowing expression that did not challenge stability, and fostered national identity by being subsumed into a larger loyalty to the nation. For newly independent countries, sport represented either insecurity or an increasing maturation of the country, depending on the success of the country. Sport was used to differentiate the new country from the mother country. Fanon felt that games, and not modern sport, should be used to develop former colonies. Part of his reasoning rested on the assumption that newly independent states could not afford the time or money to develop achievement based sport prominent in a capitalistic society.8

Much has recently been written on sport labor migration patterns, and there is an element of neocolonialism present in the patterns. Sepp Blatter, president of FIFA, accused rich European teams of “conducting themselves increasingly as neocolonialists who don’t give a damn about heritage and culture, but engage in social and economic rape by robbing the developing world of its best players.”9 While the practice of robbing poorer nations of its better players is not new, the practice is certainly

---


becoming more prevalent, and not just at the club level. Countries have always found ways around the citizenship rules for national team players from third world countries, particularly those countries that were former colonies.

The history of soccer is intimately connected with colonial doctrine. While soccer may have been a colonial importation of the British to Latin American countries, it was met with little resistance. Soccer was unique in that it was part of British imperialism in non-British colonized countries, such as Brazil and Germany, and was more an indication of economic imperialism than a political one. When sport is imported by the dominant economy, it becomes more difficult to challenge the hegemony of that country, in this case Britain. Countries that were receivers of British soccer, such as Brazil and Germany, did not challenge the authority of the game, although Germany did initially resist the game due to its “Englishness.” Rather, they reshaped the game in their own image, not by changing rules or basic principles of play, but by altering the style with which they played the game. The interpretation of style then could challenge the hegemony, offer a resistance, and build national identity at the same time.\(^{10}\)

In some nations, soccer became an arena for political contest between the colonized and colonizers. Some colonizers used soccer as a form of social control to increase the cohesion of the population. Particularly in Africa, soccer was introduced and featured as

a form of colonial exploitation and cultural imperialism, but also offered a forum for resistance. Zimbabwe, formerly Rhodesia, would exemplify a nation where soccer was used as social control and resistance to colonialism. As Maguire points out, indigenous groups can choose to be active in what they receive from colonizers. In much of Latin America, soccer was used as an anti-colonial force to establish a nation’s own identity. Eduardo Galeano insists that the diffusion of soccer was the result of an imperialist trick to keep people tricked and in a state of infancy, but this has been frequently subverted to serve their own needs.11

A close examination of Germany and colonial doctrine, and its connections to soccer leads to some interesting conclusions. First, Germany initially resisted the game of soccer because it was English and introduced during a period of time when the national identity was being formulated and Germanness was being defined. This national identity, given its newly formed nationhood, was very resistant to any forms of cultural imperialism, imagined or perceived. The German turnen movement figured prominently in the formation of national identity, and it was particularly virulent in its opposition to English sport. The “greater German state,” or the imagined community of all German speaking peoples was an invented tradition that turnen reinforced, thus

slowing down sporting imperialism. Turnen had originally developed as a preparation for war of liberation against Napoleon, but quickly assumed a role as the pollen of German imperialism. Despite resistance by the turnen organizations, competitive sport and modern athleticism began to permeate Germany from Britain during the 1870’s.¹²

Second, Germany had a long history of imperialism, but what is significant about German imperialism and colonization, is that it was not all directed overseas. From the eleventh to the eighteenth century, Germans had settled in communities all over eastern and southeastern Europe, as well as forming small colonies in North and South America. These waves of conquest, migration and colonization resulted in small colonies of Germans that generally considered themselves German, maintaining the language and culture of their homeland. Pan-Germanism suggested an affinity with nationalism, even though Germany had not become a modern nation at that point.¹³

As Germany was proclaiming nationhood in the 1870’s, Heinrich von Treitschke, a member of the Reichstag, was avidly promoting a German imperialism based on racial characteristics. He claimed that it was the role of Germans to subjugate inferior races as


part of their world-destiny, and encouraged the expansion eastward of the German nation. His particular goal was the conquering of the Slavic nations to establish a German reserve as the initial step toward Germany dominating the globe. Von Treitschke was but one proponent of a trend in motion during these years, and that was that national and racial superiority was intertwined with colonial expansionism. With the growth of the German navy came expansion overseas. In 1898, Germany acquired a lease on Kiao-chow on the Chinese coast, and attempted to occupy the Philippines. They were thwarted by the United States in the Philippines, but were successful in buying the Caroline and Mariana Islands. In 1899 Germany acquired the Samoan Islands. Germany was also acquiring territory in Africa as well as establishing the Baghdad Railroad, which ran from Berlin to Baghdad. In Africa, the German colonies which were comprised of small colonial bureaucracies were protected by military contingents. The overseas colonies ended up costing more than they brought in, but individual German companies profited handsomely. The Pan-German Union was established, a consortium of tradespeople and scholars, that advocated rivaling the British Empire in colonial expansion on all continents.\(^{14}\)

Around the turn of the century, racial hygiene and eugenics began to figure more and more prominently into German expansion and imperialism, particularly regarding Czechoslovakia. Domination of Europe was required to ensure world power, as

Germany had limited access to the sea. In 1911, after a “second Moroccan crisis” with France, Germany received the Congo. During World War I, Germany aspired to take the Balkans and Asia Minor as part of their imperialist conquest, as well as dominate the rest of Europe. Germany differs from other colonial nations because from 1871 onward, Germany wanted hegemonic and physical control of Europe. The idea was antiquated before it was born, as the diminishing British Empire could illustrate. After World War I, the League of Nations confiscated Germany’s colonies, but German dreams of dominating Europe did not diminish, and in fact, continued to flourish secretly.15

Germany’s imperialist expansion throughout Europe during the World War II era is well documented, but its imperialistic expansion to the east was particular significant, as Hitler planned to take Austria, Bohemia, all Slavic countries, the Danube region and Russia. Fanon notes that the Nazi’s goal was to turn all of Europe into a German colony. Hitler’s conquest of Austria brings us back to sport. The 1938 World Cup featured a German team, half of which was comprised of Austrians, under Hitler’s orders. The team should have been wildly successful, and Hitler and company were banking on large propaganda bonuses from them. However, the two styles did not mesh well (not to mention that the Austrians really did not want to play under the German flag) and the team had a dismal showing. The Dutch resentment for occupation during

World War II now plays out on the soccer field, and is vented in a very public manner.\textsuperscript{16} German colonization notions, particularly regarding Europe, shape and flavor much of the sporting media rhetoric by the rest of Europe.

Soccer, post-World War II, has played a prominent role within Germany of assuaging the loss of an empire. Success at soccer on an international basis has permitted Germany a semblance of pride in their country again, particularly with the World Cup championship of 1954. But the specter of German imperialism still resounds throughout Europe. The French press printed an article on German-Czech diplomatic relations on the sporting page next to an article on German football. The placement of the articles, according to Crolley, Hand, and Jeutter, equates the German economic imperialism of the 1990’s and the superiority of the German soccer team with the German invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1939.\textsuperscript{17}

The third significant conclusion regarding Germany and colonialism/imperialism more directly relates to soccer and to the neo-colonial period of modern day. Although the Bundesliga is considered the most cosmopolitan of all soccer leagues, the German style of play along with German coaching techniques serve as export products for Germany.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\end{thebibliography}
A prominent pipeline exists in soccer for German players playing in Turkey, and Germany is considered a donor country when considering sporting migration patterns. German coaches, or trainers, employ their craft abroad for the respect of Germany and German soccer. Henning Eichberg points out that the enthusiasm of German coaches abroad are not directed toward the cultural gains of the people they are coaching, but rather to reflect German superiority via a sporting neo-colonialism. Dettmar Cramer, a top German coach in the early 1970’s, is considered the “Father of American Soccer Coaching Education” by the National Soccer Coaches Association of America. German coaches are particularly prominent in third world African nations, and I would surmise that part of the reason they are prominent in Africa is a racial stereotype that African players need more discipline to be successful. And who other than a German coach is able to provide that discipline and organization?18

An examination of Brazil and colonial doctrine leads to some vastly different conclusions, which are not unexpected given Brazil’s history. Although Brazil was a colony of Portugal, soccer did not arrive in Brazil until late in the Empire period. The British held more sway in shaping soccer initially as soccer was a British import. During the Brazilian Empire, the country was a cultural construct, joining colonizers and the colonized. In fact, German turnen probably arrived in Brazil prior to soccer, as the Imperial government of Brazil promoted German immigration, and turnen is

documented as being in Brazil as early as 1867. The Brazilians initially accepted the British game, whereas the Germans rejected it. Brazil used foreign sport to construct the national. Foreign sport was rapidly accepted, particularly British sport, as it represented modernization; hence the legend of Charles Miller as being the father of Brazilian soccer. Brazil was particularly accepting of soccer, horse racing and rowing, typical British sports, as these foreign imports helped impose social control and discipline. The elite of Brazilian society were the first Brazilians to accept British sport, and these sports served to re-create the British world for the elite. The very earliest teams were largely comprised of immigrants, generally English, Italian or German. German and Italian groups used sport to confirm their ethnicity in Brazil. From these immigrant groups and colonials, modern sport spread to the Brazilian elites, and finally to the masses.\(^{19}\)

Looking further back into history, Brazil was a colony established by Portugal in 1530, and it would be easy to assume that Portugal was the country to most shape Brazilian soccer as part of its colonial legacy. However, this would be a misconception. Portugal


393
indirectly had a hand in shaping Brazilian soccer and soccer style because Portugal shaped Brazilian culture, but it was the British that brought the sport to Brazil and more thoroughly influenced its early development. However, Portugal did influence Brazilian soccer in more nuanced ways. This is the second significant point regarding Brazil, colonialism and soccer, and that is how Portugal indirectly shaped and contributed to Brazilian soccer playing style. For example, by 1549, elderly and diseased Portuguese were being advised to visit Brazil for their health. The colonization of Brazil by some of these individuals brought disease to the Brazilian jungles and coastline. By seventy years of colonization, 95% of the indigenous population was extinguished through disease. This had two significant effects on how the style of soccer was to later develop: there would be little contribution initially from the native Indio-Brazilian population to the style of the game, and the lack of a work force from the native population contributed to the importation of African slaves, which would vastly influence the style of play.20

Given the devastation of the native population and the need for a work force for the colonial latifunda (plantation) system that was rapidly developing, Portugal began importing the first African slaves around 1530-1550. The latifunda system itself has had an influence on Brazilian soccer. The system in Brazil has always been based on a monoculture, with latifundias across the country raising and exporting only one crop. Although historically the crop was changed from sugar, to coffee, and then to rubber, it

still remained a one crop, monocultural system. This has been true with the sport of soccer, also. Other sports now compete with soccer in Brazil, but after the initial acceptance of the game by the masses, soccer was, without a doubt, the main sport of Brazil. The number of African slaves imported to Brazil to work the latifunda system outnumbers the importation of slaves to any other country, including the United States. It wasn’t until 1888 that slavery was completely abolished, after soccer had made its appearance in the country. In 1890, Brazil declared itself a republic after the emperor was dethroned, and the African population began its earliest stages of appropriating the game of soccer. The contribution of race to soccer was significant in Brazil, and was a tangible reminder of colonialism.21

Other significant influences from Portugal permeate the game. The hierarchal system of the culture as established by Portugal had an immense influence on soccer style, as soccer was viewed as an arena apart from the system which allowed individualism to flourish in a much regimented society. Brazilian soccer club presidents are often referred to as coronel, or colonel, signifying a local political chieftain, which is a direct legacy from the colonial plantation owners. A gato, or cat, is a soccer player with an altered birth certificate which allows him to be sold overseas at a greater price, much as

slaves were sold. Brazil and Portugal are the only countries to use first names and nicknames for players. Portugal tends to use them less than Brazil due to the more traditional, formalized culture, but both countries feature this unique system. The earliest stadiums built in Brazil in the Rio and São Paulo areas were designed in the colonial manner, and most have now been converted to training grounds for some of the larger clubs. Perhaps one of the most significant impacts of Portuguese colonialism on Brazilian soccer was the concept of the latifunda system and its monoculture. Brazil’s history of one crop emphasis is still being played out, only now the one crop is soccer players. The export of soccer players has been a staple product for Brazil for seventy odd years. Some of Brazil’s political heritage can also be linked to colonialism, in that Fanon claims that a direct link existed between colonialism and the fascist dictators that ran Brazil in the twentieth century. Some of these Brazilian dictators had a very direct impact on soccer, not so much on style, but rather on how soccer was used as an opiate for the country as well as a signifier of national identity.22

Although Brazil was “discovered” and colonized by Portugal, by the Empire period Brazil was looking to other countries for cultural guidance, and the British were particularly regarded with prominence due to their financial status during Industrialization. Although the written and spoken language of Brazil is Portuguese, soccer terms were commonly in English until the 1950’s when Portuguese terms came

into vogue. The Portuguese community in Brazil is a close knit community of merchants and shopkeepers that are often featured as the butt of Brazilian jokes as indicative of a longstanding prejudice against Portuguese immigrants. The early formation of soccer clubs in Brazil reflects many of these post-colonial ethnic groups. Fluminense represented the elite English group which featured English mannerisms, and Vasco represented the Portuguese. Vasco became prominent early in Brazilian soccer history (1923) by hiring lower class, ethnic players which led to an increased derision being exhibited toward the Portuguese community and their soccer club.23

The colonial legacy of a monocultural exportation system deserves to be further explored with regard to soccer. Brazilian soccer players are highly regarded on the international market, and the majority of the top-ranked players are sold abroad so that teams have a cash infusion to keep afloat. During the 1990’s, a veritable pipeline existed from Brazil to Japan, as the J League began operations. The early part of the twentieth century saw colonists being encouraged to relocate to Portugal to demonstrate the power of colonial links, and inevitably, top soccer players were recruited to Portugal where a common language made adaptation somewhat easier. Portugal automatically allowed Brazilian players to assume dual citizenship until restrictions in 1990 limited the practice. Thirty seven percent of the Brazilian soccer players play outside their

country at some point in their career, and fifty percent of the movement of players to
UEFA (the European federation) is from South America. The drain to Japan and
Europe further weakens the Brazilian league, to the extent that the famed Santos club
can no longer hold onto international players due to the European financial muscle. In
1999, Brazil posted 650 international transfers, and by 2000, transfers were made to 66
different countries with a total of 5,000 Brazilians playing overseas. Brazilian players
are the new neo-colonial products. With the emigration and exportation of top players,
the national team, at times, struggles to maintain a consistent style.  

In Latin America sport has always reflected colonialism as modern sport was mainly
imported by the British. However, as the sport was adapted by the masses, the
meanings attached to the sport, and the style in which the sport was played was changed
to suit the local culture. Soccer, particularly, was reflective of this process as each
country “made” the sport their own. The construction of nationhood and masculinity via
sport was due to foreign cultural practices. Latin American countries used foreign sport
to define their own cultural practices. Eduardo Archetti, in particular, explores the
concept of creolization, or the appropriation of a practice which had been exclusively
association with the identity of a given group, such as the British and soccer.  

---

24 No author noted, “The Boys from Brazil,” *Economist*, 337 (October 28, 1995): 105; Lanfranchi and
Taylor, *Moving With the Ball*, 168; Bill Murray, *The World’s Game: A History of Soccer* (Urbana, IL:
University of Illinois Press, 1996), 104; Joseph Maguire and Robert Pearton, “Global Sport and the
Migration Patterns of France ’98 World Cup Finals Players: Some Preliminary Observations,” *Soccer and
Sports Process*, 118-119; Eduardo P. Archetti, *Masculinities: Football, Polo and the Tango in Argentina*
(Oxford: Berg, 1999), 42; Cesar Gordon and Ronaldo Helal, “The Crisis of Brazilian Football:
In conclusion, the legacy of colonialism has impacted in different ways on the countries of Brazil and Germany. The cultural imperialism of modern sport, particularly British soccer was initially rejected in Germany, but welcomed with open arms in Brazil. Portugal, Brazil’s colonizer, has shaped and influenced soccer and soccer style in nuanced ways, through its cultural implications, whereas Britain has had more impact upon the game itself. Germany, being a colonizer and a member of the powerful UEFA organization, has exported players and more particularly coaching staff and philosophies around the world, but most particularly to African nations. Brazil’s exports of players are more financially based, rather than philosophical. The cash flow from the selling of Brazilian players keeps the soccer clubs running at home, and the monocultural system instigated by colonialism is alive and currently being represented by soccer. The German history of imperialism in Europe has had more of an impact on their soccer system than their actual colonial exploitation overseas, as the after-effects still reverberate within the European press whenever Germany plays. The German stereotype of a conquering nation, particularly on the soccer field, becomes almost a self-fulfilling prophecy shaping German playing style. Colonialism has had an impact on both countries in regards to playing style, but it is an oft-overlooked factor when exploring the concept of style.

CHAPTER 13
CLASS, POLITICS AND SPORT

This chapter explores the connections between class, politics, and sport, with a particular emphasis on soccer. Sport, and particularly soccer, seems to follow a well established pattern of establishment from country to country with soccer first being introduced and adopted by the elite of the society, and then gradually being co-opted and transformed into a sport for the masses. Sports follow a particular class based route to being embedded in the culture. Politics certainly plays a role in how quickly and how deeply the game advances to the masses. However, sport is also shaped and influenced by politics. This chapter extrapolates the relationship between sport and class, soccer and class, and soccer and politics.

Bourdieu and Gruneau both emphasize that sport may become an object of struggle between social classes as well as between sectors of the dominant class. Sport is used by the elite to establish hegemony and help secure their elitist status, but sport also can cause discord as the cultural domain of sport generally remains a highly contested area. Sport, then, not only reproduces class divisions but other divisions as well, such as gender, religious or political divisions. Janet Lever views sport as contributing to the
national integration of class, a ritual type of solidarity, while also increasing schisms between groups. In her view, sport serves as both integrating and disintegrating.¹

Gruneau distinguishes further how class has impacted on sport. He notes that the dominant class selectively uses traditions and institutions to create a sense of predisposed continuity in sport to help cement their hegemony. While the past hundred years has demonstrated an increased popularity and increased democracy of sport, the elite of a culture still control and shape the institutions and meanings of sport. Sport may no longer be considered a privilege, but a right of the average citizen. However, the broad rules and social relations of a capitalistic society still have a significant impact on the sporting resources of that society. Whereas the concept of amateurism so heavily emphasized globally during the late 1800’s and early 1900’s was a conscious strategy of exclusion from sport, today, the exclusion most likely exists in access to the resources and the power realms of sport. Small groups with power still determine what rules, where and when sports are played, and to a certain degree, who has access to power. Lamartine DaCosta would argue that in Latin America, sport development has been a reaction against poverty and social constraints. But I argue that while access to the game is widespread for all social classes, access to the power structures of sport is not.²

Looking specifically at soccer provides further fuel for my point. Global soccer is ultimately controlled both culturally and by the organization of FIFA. FIFA determines the rules, the eligibility, sets up the world contests, and acts as the governing body of the sport. FIFA is, in Sugden and Tomlinson’s words, a “power base for a small group of white, male elites.”

Besides FIFA, political patronage of the sport is negotiated by powerful elites, creating a scenario whereby soccer dramatizes the relationship between classes. Tony Mason notes that “Football may aid the rule of the rich but it does not by itself eliminate social conflict.” Archetti proclaims that soccer ruptures hierarchies, and to a certain extent, this has played out in Brazil, but it has not played out in the culture. Rather, Brazilian soccer is regarded as a “place apart” where equality and individualism can be applauded, but strictly on the field. The “business” of soccer is still strictly hierarchal, and tends to sustain social divisions. Globally, soccer serves as an arena for reproducing, producing and contesting social hierarchies.

Historically, the issue of class and soccer has predominated since the very earliest days. Dating back to folk football in Britain, where the landowners organized games and acted as patrons and the villagers and townsmen played the game, class has played an

---

integral role in the sport. During the 1800’s when soccer moved out of the schoolboy stage, soccer became more of an object of class struggle. The amateurism argument was used worldwide to reduce working class participation and cement the colonial elite in a variety of cultures. Eduardo Galeano comments that the diffusion of soccer was a result of “an imperialist maneuver to keep the oppressed in a state of infancy” but it is frequently subverted.6

Soccer had broad appeal to the poor, the illiterate and the masses of the working class as it had little expense involved and could serve as a venue to settle problems. Allen Guttmann delineates the “S curve” of soccer on the European continent: from elite to the middle class to the masses. This process served as a global model for the diffusion of the sport. In South American, the first clubs were immigrant and elite clubs. Soccer then moved to the middle class, and then with much opposition, to the urban poor. Dramatic tensions of opposites came to the forefront as the game diffused from the leisured class to the poor. As soccer became a working class game on a global basis, Latin America began to anchor their national identity in the working class rather than the patrician families as “old Europe” had done. As noted previously, while this opened up the game, control of the resources of the game continued to exist with the elites.7

An intense study of the intersection of sport and politics would be well beyond the
scope of this paper, however, acknowledgement must be made that sport and politics
are intertwined. Sport is not politically neutral, and sport and government generally
feature a symbiotic relationship. Sport and politics are connected through several
strands: sport can be divisive and act as an agent of social disorder and sport creates
politically usable resources. Sport also serves as an important instrument of foreign
policy and international prestige as it demonstrates the virtue of the country’s political
system. Sport tends to act as an extension of the state, and not strictly a reflection of it.
Bourdieu would insist that sport becomes a political objective and politics infects sport,
and MacClancy would clarify that sport cannot be understood without reference to
relations of power. MacAloon would note that a categorical opposition between politics
and sport is a western European and North American notion, with which I would
certainly concur. In Latin America, the boundary lines between sport and politics are so
blurred that they appear almost nonexistent at times.8

8 Lincoln Allison, “Sport and Politics,” The Politics of Sport ed. by Lincoln Allison (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1986), 3, 13-16; Lever, Soccer Madness, 59; Trevor Taylor, “Sport and
International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect,” The Politics of Sport, 41; Geoffrey Caldwell,
174; Bourdieu, “Sport and Social Class,” 829; T. Bar-On, “The Ambiguities of Football, Politics, Culture,
and Social Transformation in Latin America,” Sociological Research Online, 2
(http://www.socresonline.org.uk): 2; MacClancy, “Sport, Identity and Ethnicity,” 5; Matthias Marschik,
“Mitropa: Representations of ‘Central Europe’ in Football,” International Review for the Sociology of
Sport, 36 (2001): 8; John J. MacAloon, “The Turn of Two Centuries: Sport and the Politics of
Intercultural Relations,” Sport...The Third Millennium ed. by Fernand Landry, Marc Landry and
Several theories abound regarding sport’s relationship with politics. Maguire, Jarvie, Mansfield and Bradley note seven distinct themes connecting sport and nationalism, and among them are the safety valve outlet, and the contribution of sport to political struggles. The “Bread and Circuses” theory of sport implies the political nature of sport; that sport is used to distract the masses from other concerns. Another theory connecting politics and sport is that sport is used to foist dubious claims upon the masses, such as Hitler’s propaganda use of the 1936 Berlin Olympics, or the boycotting of the Moscow and Los Angeles Olympics as aspects of the cold war. Sport, as an aspect of popular culture, is often featured as the site for contestation between high and low culture, which in turn becomes a political as well as class-based struggle. Bairner reaffirms this by noting that modern sport is political because it reflects and exacerbates social divisions. Even the language is often interchangeable, as politics uses sporting symbolism, and sport uses political symbolism. Sport also becomes the site of political struggles at times, as the 1972 Munich Olympics brought to the foreground the armed struggle between the PLO and Israel.9

Given the global popularity of soccer, it is no surprise that the sport and politics intersect on a regular basis. Soccer is considered quasi-political, and the intensely

---

political nature of international matches means that soccer becomes an outright political forum at times. The discourse on the intersections of soccer and politics differ radically. Galeano simplifies the theories into rightist and leftist views. The conservative view would state that soccer-worship is the religion that the masses deserve as they are incapable of higher thought process. The leftist theorists denigrate soccer as it immobilizes the masses and derails revolution. Giulianotti further clarifies by categorizing several intellectuals into functionalist and non-functionalist categories. The functionalists believe that power relations are easily reproduced which leads to a political status quo, and soccer serves as an “opiate” or a safety valve within the system. Lever and Rachum are cited as examples of functionalists, particularly in regard to their work on Brazil. Mason and Evanson are listed as non-functionalists, believing that soccer can lead to democracy. Giulianotti offers three critiques of the functionalists theory: that soccer can allow the masses to protest against the elites, the considering soccer an opiate is the equivalent of intellectual disdain for sport and thus disdain for the masses, and that in a complex society there are many masters.10

The intersection of soccer and politics becomes even more specific and more theorized. Jeffrey Tobin does a short summary of intellectual views of soccer and politics which is helpful. Marx would view soccer, like religion, as an opium of the people, and others

would agree that soccer either distracts people from weightier matters or trains them for submission in fascist and capitalistic systems. Galeano notes that soccer and fatherland are always connected, and politicians and dictators exploit the masses by using the game, but that soccer also serves as a site for opposition. The 1978 World Cup in Argentina and its exploitation by the dictators is certainly an apt example of governmental use/abuse of the game. While a government’s use of soccer is oftentimes easy to discern, the domain of cultural politics in which soccer often operates is more shadowy. Politics is more than mere government. Politics and business are often intertwined in the soccer world, and soccer does not just exist as the extension of the state. As Kuper would say, “soccer affects politics,” but it affects it and is affected by it in a multitude of areas. Armstrong and Giulianotti note that soccer is oftentimes an arena for political contest between the colonizers and the colonized, which adds another dimension of the political process into the game.\(^{11}\)

A significant group of authors would deny that soccer is an opium nor an arena for rebellion. While Del Burgo hedges and opines that to watch the World Cup is a political act in itself, and that World Cup stadiums feature an area where soccer and politics become blurred, others would disagree. Tony Mason believes that soccer is not an opiate, as does Eduardo Archetti. Archetti and Christian Bromberger view soccer as

an open space, neither opiate nor site of rebellion. Bromberger, in particular, views soccer as a metaphor for democratic-meritocratic conceptions of society, and an open arena for interpretation. Bourdieu takes a somewhat different approach, noting the break between players and spectators in modern society is the most harmful political effect of soccer as a mass spectacle.\textsuperscript{12}

While I do not view the intersection of soccer and politics as only an opiate, there is evidence, particularly from South America that it has been used and abused in that manner. Hence to say, while I do view soccer as an open area for a multitude of interpretations, politics and soccer do impact upon each other in significant ways. The 1970 war between El Salvador and Honduras began as a dispute over a soccer game, and as feelings exploded, the war on the field bled into the political arena, and El Salvador shut down diplomatic channels with Honduras. From the 1936 Berlin Olympics, when Hitler used sport as a major propaganda tool, to the fascist dictators of the 1970’s in Brazil, soccer has been used as a political tool as well as a site of resistance and an open arena for the formulation of politics.\textsuperscript{13}


\textsuperscript{13} Janet Lever, “Soccer as a Brazilian Way of Life,” \textit{Games, Sport and Power ed. by Gregory P. Stone (New Brunswick, NJ.: Transaction Books of Rutgers University, 1972), 139; Sugden and Tomlinson, \textit{FIFA and the Contest for World Football}, 5, 25, 32, 38. For a fascinating breakdown and analysis of the political maneuvering within FIFA, particularly with the rise of João Havelange, see Sugden and Tomlinson’s book, \textit{FIFA and the Contest for World Football}. 408
Both class and politics have had a significant impact on the dissemination of soccer to the German public over the course of their history. The typical pattern of diffusion of soccer, which is to the elites and gradually moving downward to the masses, differs in Germany as compared to the rest of the world. Why Germany presents a differing pattern of introduction of the game, and whether that difference has had an impact on the game needs to be thoroughly explored. The impact of class is more nuanced and subtle, and at times needs to be approached from almost a regional perspective. How politics has intersected and impacted upon soccer is more apparent. Politics has impacted tremendously upon soccer, and all sport, in Germany from Hitler’s blatant use of the 1936 Olympics as a propaganda tool (yes, soccer was present there) to the impact of hooliganism in the 1990’s. The goal for this chapter is to explore both topics and their relationship to soccer, as well as to determine how both class and politics have shaped soccer, and soccer style, in Germany.

Germany’s nationhood, reached in 1871, occurred roughly a decade or two before the introduction of soccer. Initially, the German middle class was cut off from both politics and the military in the new nation, and the masses saw the German state as external to
themselves. The middle class persons chose one of two paths to participate in the new nation. Either they aligned with the military and the aristocracy, or they withdrew into culture. The majority of the middle class tended to adopt the military models and norms as their own, gradually altering what had been a code of morals to the more aristocratic/military based code of honor. The new German Reich was very definitely divided by class lines, and these class divisions were based on birth. Boundaries between classes, particularly between the middle class and the aristocracy were much stricter than in other countries. In fact, Hesse-Lichtenberger notes that Germany showed signs of class warfare up until the country became united for World War I.¹

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the middle class was not as accepting of sport as the British. Of course, the turnen gymnastics had much to do with the initial rejection of all British sport, considering sport to be an elitist activity focusing on winning and losing. Sociability tended to be established by law and custom, not by competition. Social organizations celebrated unity and not competition as competition was regarded as divisive and isolating. But the middle class also had less time and less money available for leisure, as well as an antithesis to anything international, particularly British. The soccer pioneers in Germany were young, unmarried males, generally of the middle class, and well off school boys. The first soccer clubs and even the German soccer league (DFB) were founded by middle class participants. Some of

the German upper class accepted soccer because it was British, a novelty, and was considered healthy and efficient. Sport, for them, was used to as a means of exclusivity, much as it had for the elite in other countries. Left wing intellectuals tended to criticize soccer, when they spoke of it at all, as being a mass movement. But the majority of the participants were clearly middle class.²

Around the turn of the century eugenics became more pronounced in Germany as fear of the rising population growth of the lower classes and the declining birth rates of the middle and upper classes became more apparent. The middle class attraction to the aristocracy began to weaken as urbanization and industrialization grew even more prominent. A few working class soccer players began to participate, but a rift between the middle class and the working class that occurred around 1890, tended to prohibit involvement. The working class generally feared soccer, and all sport, as an opiate to the worker’s movement. Besides, there was a distinct lack of time and money for any leisure activity until after World War I. Although soccer and the power elites aligned early, part of the impetus was due to a widespread fear of the political left and its relationship to the worker movement. The middle class was not educated in liberal arts in the German educational system; therefore a gap existed between what was deemed

culture and the intelligentsia. Due to this, sport developed outside of the public school systems. Acceptance of sport in the British fashion meant a blurring of long established class boundaries, and Germany was uncomfortable with that change. There was no German middle class movement to civilize games, as there was in Britain, but there was an urge to disseminate them to other middle class citizens. As the German working class refused interest in the new sporting movement, and there was no middle class youth subculture via the schools, the game developed in social clubs populated by middle class, unmarried, well salaried persons. As middle class status often occupied an uncertain stratum in the German hierarchy, German soccer contributed to the rise of the modern middle class in that country, although at times it played a disintegrating role. The rise of soccer was often accompanied by class conflict, but remained firmly in the hands of the middle class until after World War I.³

After World War I there was a breakthrough in soccer for the lower classes, partly due to the 1919 mandated eight hour working day which led to increased attendance at games for the working class. Soccer was the first area of working class leisure activity that exceeded the labor organizations’ ability to meet the social needs of its population. Germany began to emulate the transformation that had earlier occurred in Britain, in that soccer began to have mass appeal for the working class. By the 1920’s, the number

of working class clubs was increasing as were the number of working class fans and players as the masses sought a more communal relationship in what had become a very differentiated society. The working class joined middle class soccer clubs and formed their own clubs, while the middle class assumed the role of club patrons. The middle class had influenced soccer playing style with their values, which included an emphasis on individual stars and individual play. That influence gradually waned as the working class influence became more pronounced. The working class emphasis contributed to the development of team play and an emphasis on team style, thus further highlighting the ideological differences between the classes.4

The transition of soccer from a middle class game to a working class game was not without struggle, and in many ways paralleled the same transition in which Britain had undergone many years prior. The DBF was run by a small group of middle class men who wanted to safeguard their power. The rise of working class participation in the game was viewed as a threat, and the DBF responded much as other controlling organizations have responded to the same problem, and that was by emphasizing amateurism and attempt to limit access to working class clubs. In 1923, the DBF introduced a policy named “The New Way,” which suspended promotion and relegation within the leagues for two years. The policy was promoted publicly as a way to halt the

increasing tide of violence on the field as competitiveness between the teams increased. In reality, it was a means of limiting working class clubs from reaching the upper levels of play, and stemming the increasing talk of professionalism. The amateur ethic was definitely a middle class value embedded by years of exposure to the turnen gymnastics philosophy and a desire to keep the middle class as the ethically elite. The curtailing of the masses was a necessary means, and amateurism was the method used to promote it. The elite of the society also would promote amateurism due to its connections to Olympicism, which was seen as a modern, and thus acceptable, philosophy. The DFB effectively worked the system to bar working class clubs from the game, and amateurism became an ideology which permeated the German leagues for many years. Professionalism was deemed materialistic and a decadent form of alienation and the German league began to increase the number of rules and punishments associated with it.  

Soccer was a middle class game until the 1930’s, and the middle class hegemony over the game was solely a German trait. In the rest of the world, the elites diffused the game, but German control of soccer rested in the hands of the middle class, and the lower middle class, at that. The game was played and controlled by clerks and engineers, with soccer clubs being modeled on the famous student fraternity organizations. Their hegemony was challenged by the rise of the working class clubs,

particularly in the Ruhr region. Although soccer was considered a “white collar game”, by the late 1800’s clubs were being established in the coal mining regions, but they were mainly controlled by the bourgeois. A few of the clubs were strictly working class player clubs, such as Westfalia Schalke, and suffered various forms of oppression due to their class and their ethnic background. Soccer truly began to flourish as a mass spectator sport in Germany when the working class took to the game, and Schalke 04, from the Ruhr region, was definitely a working class club. The team was composed of mainly miners and factory hands, proletarian and of Polish background. The elitism of the WSV (regional league) led to conflict with Schalke 04. By 1930, 70% of the membership of the WSV was of the working class. Ironically, Schalke’s and other Ruhr teams decision to join the WSV, a bourgeois federation, rather than the worker’s sporting federation was based on profit. While the fans were working class, the teams still tended to belong to the middle class. Professionalism, or at least partial under the table pay, was not likely to occur in the workers’ sporting federation. In 1930, the DFB and their crusade against professionalism began an inquiry into Schalke 04 for illegal payments to the players. The team was declared professional and banned, as well as fined a large amount. However, a year later, pressure on the DFB overturned the judgment and the players were “rehabilitated” and the club reformed.6

While the soccer game in Germany shifted to a game of the masses, more and more emphasis was placed on working class values in shaping the style. Schalke 04 was successful and idolized for their teamwork on the field and their contribution of the “Schalke Top” to style. This teamwork emphasis lasted even through the rising dominance of the middle class in Germany. The working class also contributed a hardness to the game, with an emphasis on the tackle, making Germans formidable opponents with an unlimited desire to win. The middle class values that contributed to the shaping of current German style would include the emphasis on military precision (due to their emulation of the military model) and a deeply embedded, but disguised, belief in eugenics and the physical superiority of the German athlete. German national teams always seem to emphasize strength and physical power.

Regarding politics and German soccer, one can almost always say that German soccer is politics, and has been shaped and affected by politics since its earliest days. Early soccer clubs played a political role for the German middle class, as formation of the clubs was seen as a sign of freedom. Because the turnen movement was so heavily invested politically, their move to shut out soccer grounds to the young clubs was a formidable obstacle. Although many early clubs were spin-offs from turnen societies, the independent clubs that were being established by the lower middle class in the name of soccer and socialization struggled to find sites to play their game. Clubs had to apply for inclusion in the register at the county courthouse in order to use public lands and buildings. The added benefit of being registered was some form of tax relief. Hence,
many German clubs, even today, don’t own their own grounds but play on government sponsored properties. It was in 1905 that Crown Prince Wilhelm began to display an interest in the game, occasionally attending local games and presenting cups. This interest by the Prince spurred the interest of the highest military circles in the game of soccer, and the fact that the Prince’s brother played the game led to an increased popularity and acceptance not only by the middle class, but also by the army and the navy.\footnote{Hesse-Lichtenberger, \textit{Tor!}, 23, 28, 44.}

After World War I and the fall of the Wilhelm Republic, FIFA banned the German national team from play. In 1919, FIFA wanted to reinstate Germany, but a splinter group influenced the decision for them to continue the ban. By 1920, England was leading the attempts to keep Germany out of FIFA, and only four countries are willing to play Germany in friendly internationals. During the Great Depression, Germany suffered tremendously, already being in a post-war depression. The country’s political situation remained unstable, and there was no workable concept to recover from the depression. From 1920-1933, governmental power changed hands on a regular basis. Although Germany was invited to the 1930 World Cup, they refused to attend or host the event due to the professionalism of the other teams. Despite the clamor within the German league for professionalization, the DFB continued to promote the ideology of amateurism.\footnote{Tomlinson, \textit{Going Global: the FIFA Story,” Off the Ball: The Football World Cup} ed. by Alan Tomlinson and Garry Whannel (London: Pluto Press, 1986), 89; Hesse-Lichtenberger, \textit{Tor!}, 69, 76-77, 92; Lanfranchi, “Exporting Football,” 34.}
The involvement of the DBF in politics has been well documented by Udo Merkel. Although Koppenhel’s official history of the DBF insists the league was not involved in politics, Merkel succinctly points out that this is a falsehood. The DBF annual report of 1912 clearly stated that soccer would not only improve the health of the people, but also improve the military might of the nation. The DBF joined the *Jungdeutschlandbund* (a paramilitary and nationalistic organization based on a desire to improve the physical fitness of the nation) in 1911 when the organization was formed. After World War I, the DBF continued to glorify the war, patriotism, and the military. Although the DBF showed the face of political neutrality, within it continued to strongly identify with the ideology of the former Empire. The DBF continued to use, upon occasion, the black, white and red colors of the old Empire rather than the new tricolors of black, red and gold promoted by the Weimar Assembly. The DBF crusade to promote only amateurism was faltering by the early 1930’s, and by 1932 the issue was put on the agenda for the annual meeting early in 1933. The meeting was never held as the Nazi regime seized power.9

The National Socialist Party, or the Nazis, emphasized sport as an inexhaustible source of military power, and consequently, sporting officials were appointed and controlled by the party. The Nazis are famous, or infamous, for their use of sport for propaganda purposes, and thoroughly politicized all sport in the country. Sport was not only used for propaganda purposes, but to promote patriotism within the country as well as to increase the military preparedness of the nation. In 1933, Hitler vetoed the notion that

---

soccer should be allowed to professionalize. Rather, he wanted to use the sport as an ideological instrument to promote the image of a democratic working class nation that placed more emphasis on patriotism than making money. Physical education, and all physical sport, was to be used for nation building as well as a means of “shaping the superman.” Of course, the “beautiful body” had been a political theme in Germany for many years, and the eugenic concept of power and body were well aligned within German habitus.10

In 1933, Hitler’s minister of education, Bernhard Rust, ordered the expulsion of all Jews from welfare organizations, youth groups and sporting clubs. The newly appointed sports minister, Hans von Tschammer und Osten, banned “worker sport” or communist sport in the same year, and in 1935 the sport clubs of religious groups was banned, effectively eliminating all the Jewish clubs. Soccer became the first sport in Germany to align with the Nazis by enacting the removal of Jews from the soccer clubs a full five to ten weeks before the law was enacted. The DBF jumped on board the National Socialist movement early. The Jewish president of Bayern Munich, Kurt Landauer, was duly ousted, and he left the country. However, his official removal did not extinguish

the loyalty the club felt to him, and appointments to his position merely went through
the motions of accommodating the Nazis. Realizing this, the Nazis supported and aided
Bayern Munich’s rival club, 1860 Munich, as much as possible. In 1933, the Nazi
regime restructured German soccer into sixteen *gaue*, or districts, which through a play-
off system would lead to a national championship. In 1935 the competition was called
the DFB-Pokal, or the equivalent of the German FA Cup.\(^{11}\)

As Merkel has so efficiently pointed out, the DFB aligned with the Nazi movement very
early, and in contrast to worker and religious sport organizations, was allowed to
continue operations. This was partly due to the fact that the DFB was a member of
FIFA, and thus represented Germany to the rest of the world via membership in the
organization. Felix Linnemann, president of the DBF joined the National Socialist’s
Workers Party, as did the majority of other soccer league officials, national team coach
Otto Nerz and assistant coach Josef Herberger. In 1934, Von Tschammer und Oster
integrated all youth soccer into the Hitler Youth, which effectively forced young players
into joining the Nazi organization if they wanted to play. Soccer training now included
hiking, marching, shooting and other exercises to enhance military preparedness.
Linnemann continued to show support for the Nazi regime via articles published in
*Kicker* magazine between 1933 and 1939, promising soccer’s full support for Nazi
ideology.\(^{12}\)

\(^{11}\) Hesse-Lichtenberger, *Tor!*, 79-81, 84-85; Merkel, “The Hidden Social and Political,” 182; Krüger,
“Breeding, Baring and Preparing,” 49.

The German national team participated in the 1934 World Cup at the urging of the Nazi regime, who manipulated soccer for its off-field successes. The Nazis believed participation in the World Cup would be a means to show other countries that Germany was still a friendly country, fully participating in international venues. The use of sport for propaganda value was beginning, and while Hitler did not begin to understand sport, he saw the usefulness of it in his crusade. Soccer began to come under pressure. The German team finished third in the 1934 World Cup, bringing Hitler some acclaim for his team. In 1935 the German team traveled to Tottenham and played amid much praise by the British press. The team traveled to Scotland in 1936 to emphasize their “racial bonds” with the country. The English national team traveled to Germany in 1938 and in Berlin, gave the Nazi salute in pre-game rituals. The DBF press officer, Von Mengden wrote that the “footballers are political soldiers of the Führer.”

The 1936 Olympics, held in Berlin, has received much academic interest as an ultimate example of the use of sport for political propaganda. Beneath the surface lurked more sinister embedded concerns. The Nazi method of using the man for the glory of the state and preferential treatment of elite athletes as symbols of the state helped cement the belief in scientific selection that is still an issue in the German psyche today. The manipulation of the 1936 Olympics to enhance the prestige of the Reich had a huge chink in its armor, and that was the soccer team. Given that Germany still did not have professional players, the national team was free to compete in the Olympics and was

expected to win gold. Britain, Italy and Austria sent amateur squads that had been hastily assembled. Hitler was in attendance at the first game, against Norway, along with his top officials. Nerz elected to field a team with “young talent” and rest the first team for later matches, which proved to be a mistake. When Norway went up 2-0, Hitler stormed out of the stadium. The German team was eliminated from competition, and the national team soccer lost prestige with Hitler.14

However, the club teams in Germany continued to be of benefit to Hitler, in terms of support of the regime. Schalke 04, in particular, with their winning ways during the 1930’s and 1940’s, and despite earlier protests that politics and religion played no part in their club, won the support of the Nazi regime. From 1934-1942, Schalke supported the regime and the regime supported them. Of course, the regime was thrilled to have the worker’s organization most popular club in their camp, and showed their support. Instances of interference in clubs and league are numerous. For example, Barry Schultz, a star player for the former German Worker’s Sport Federation received a call from four SS officers urging him to play that day for the SSC Friesen Cottbus club or suffer an untimely end to his career. After the German defeat at Stalingrad in 1942, players were often threatened with being sent to the front in they did not comply with Nazi demands. Rapid Vienna, winning the championship over Schalke 04 in 1941, much to the dismay of the regime, saw their leading scorer, Franz Binder, posted to the front after the game. Although the British suspended their national leagues during

World War II, Germany contained theirs as a means of “sustaining the work ethic.”

The leagues were too large a propaganda tool to suspend. Kuper notes that the Germans fail to remember the great games of the 1930’s due to Hitler, but the games were played and Schalke dominated.¹⁵

The German national team stopped play as World War II started and nine players were drafted. By 1943, all international competition had been cancelled, but the German league continued to play to instill a sense of normalcy for the population. League play was finally cancelled in 1944, mainly due to air strikes, although the Nazi government insisted the cancellation was merely for technical reasons. One mid-war game needs to be mentioned due to the political and horrendous outcome of the game, and that is the 1942 game played by Dynamo Kiev and a team from the Luftwaffe. Dynamo Kiev was a Ukrainian team playing under the German occupation of their country. Being warned before the game that they would be killed if they won, the game started slowly. But, as Galeano notes, Dynamo Kiev could not resist the temptation of dignity, and won the game 5-3. Murray says all but three players were executed, while Galeano says that all eleven were shot on the edge of a cliff while wearing their soccer uniforms.¹⁶

Post-war soccer was heavily influenced by the four zone system agreed to at Yalta. The Soviet zone dismembered the old soccer clubs and seized their property, then totally

¹⁶ Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 110, 119, 121; Murray, The World’s Game, 76, 84; Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, 35.
reconfigured soccer with a political orientation. In the French zone, soccer like most other activities had to be approved by the military, and the French tended to turn down such applications. The American zone was the most liberal, and allowed soccer league games to restart in October of 1945. The British zone was sometimes harsh to soccer, and other times encouraging, depending on the individuals involved. Grounds, when available, were deplorable, and equipment was almost non-existent. Of course, FIFA again had banned Germany from international play, but had partially lifted the ban in 1949 by allowing German clubs to play friendly games against foreign teams. Germany was excluded from the 1950 World Cup, but the DBF was readmitted to FIFA in the fall of that year.17

Germany won the 1954 World Cup and used the victory as a means of catapulting themselves back into the global arena. Soccer became an site, one of the few, where German idealism could be expressed. Values that had been corrupted under the Nazi rule could be physically and verbally expressed on the soccer field. During the 1960’s, match reports began to portray a more political vocabulary, consistent with the times. By the 1970’s, a post-war trend emphasizing elite sport had been well established in Germany, and the trend indicated that German elite sport must be successful by any method necessary. This attitude was reflected by the alleged, and later proven, use of steroids by both the West and East German elite athletes of many sports. Elite sport was being promoted by the governments to prevent malaise, and acceptance of the

steroids by the athletes was done in the name of national security. In Germany today, elite sport is still financed and organized by the government than in most other countries. Although the German government, on the surface, does not always expresses a great deal of interest in sport, preferring to focus on economic victories, the two are frequently tied together. In 1974, the German president, Walter Scheel, was the first to publicly congratulate the winning World Cup team. In 1982, Helmut Schmidt was in attendance for the final World Cup game between Germany and Italy. In 1990, Helmut Kohl attended the final between Argentina and Germany, but at home in Germany, he is seldom seen at soccer grounds.18

The specter of the Nazi past still haunts German soccer, which exhibits both modern capitalistic efficiency and militaristic and nationalistic leanings. At the 1978 World Cup, the German coach brought in a Nazi war hero (Colonel Hans-Ulrich Rudel) to speak to the team at their Argentine training camp. Rudel, an unapologetic Nazi, had been banned from political meetings in Bavaria. In 1984, after a public outcry about the failure of the team to do so, Coach Franz Beckenbauer ordered the national team to learn the words and sing the national anthem passionately at international matches. But the most persistent association with Nazism is the neo-Nazi hooligan movement that began to make its presence felt in Germany during the 1980’s.19

---

19 Wagg, “On the Continent,” 119; Glanville, Story of the World Cup, 218; Udo Merkel, Kurt Sombert and Walter Tokarski, “Football, Racism and Xenophobia in Germany: 50 Years Later- Here We Go
Nazi symbols and terminology were seen on the German soccer grounds with some regularity, including chants, flags, and swastikas. Many of the signs and symbols were modified, so as to prevent prosecution by the government, which banned them by law. Clubs began to be viewed as either right wing or left wing. By the 1990’s, soccer was seen as a popular forum for political demands and critique of the government. By 1992, a player’s movement began against the neo-Nazi hooligans, and clubs jumped on board to promote the movement against racism and xenophobia. The German media’s soccer coverage has long aligned soccer success with the economic and the political over the historical connections, and a soccer victory on the international stage is often used as a synonym for political victory.20

As Germany reunified, a high period of Neo-Nazi hooliganism erupted, inspired by right wing youths and political affiliations. In 1994, England and Germany cancelled a match that was to take place on Hitler’s birthday in Berlin. Fears of the potential for violence from the Neo-Nazi hooligans were too great. At the 1998 World Cup, right wing German fans were particularly problematic for the French officials at Lens, and

---

violence broke out. It is clear that Germany still has a far right wing problem that, unfortunately, frequently uses the venue of soccer to express itself.\textsuperscript{21}

At this point, it should be clear that class and politics intersect with German soccer in very tangible ways. Germany is unique in that the middle class were the purveyors of the sport during its introductory phase. The German masses were initially skeptical of the sport, and did not become involved with the game until the 1920’s. While class has had some impact on shaping the game, the impact on soccer style is subtle. German playing style still seems to represent, mainly, middle class values and models, including the military model. The masses have contributed the conception of teamwork into the game, perhaps most notably demonstrated by the Schalke 04 teams of the 1930’s.

The intersection of politics and German soccer is significant. Politics and soccer have been closely intertwined in Germany since soccer’s inception. The DBF has been affiliated with politics since the beginning, and politics have impinged and shaped German soccer over its history. From Nazi interference in the game up to the recent right wing youth movement, soccer has been seen as a forum in Germany for expressing political views. The impact of politics upon the style of play, again, is subtle. Perhaps the best example would be the influence of the “win at all costs” attitude of the late 1970’s and 1980’s that led to a brutal style of play, influenced by the governmental

emphasis on elite sport and victory. The neo-Nazi movement, demonstrated by the hooligan youth, appears to have had little impact on style of play, but a large impact on the perception of Germany as a nation. This particular problem remains unresolved. The conclusion is that both class and politics have impacted on German soccer, but their impact on style is play is nuanced and subtle.
CHAPTER 15

BRAZIL: CLASS, POLITICS AND SOCCER

Class and politics in Brazil are extremely significant topics, especially when discussing soccer. This chapter explores how class and politics have not only intersected with soccer, but in Brazil, have influenced and shaped the game and the style in which the game is played. While soccer has frequently been viewed as a means of overcoming class and a hierarchal society in Brazil, often being viewed as a “way out and up,” I would argue that this is true for a small number of players but definitely not for the majority. Yes, a Ronaldo, a Pelé, a Rivaldo all would transcend class to a certain degree because of soccer, but considering the millions that play the game, the majority does not. Politics in Brazil is so thoroughly enmeshed with the game of soccer that it is difficult at times to tell where one ends and another begins. Governmental interference is almost a given in Brazil for the national team, and at the club level, directorship is seen as a springboard for local politics.

Soccer had arrived in Brazil from the English middle class, the engineers, clerical workers, and natives that had resided in Britain for schooling, as well as the British elite. From 1849-1903, sport was a re-creation of Europe for the socially elite. By 1889, horseracing was the elite sport, but the masses consumed the sport as spectacle,
although were marginalized as to involvement. Regatta grew in popularity and also attracted a following from all the classes, but again, participation was limited to the elite. It was into this atmosphere that soccer was introduced, and in the early years, the upper class tried to keep the game elite as a means of reinforcing class barriers. Brazil had long been a hierarchal, class based society. The latifunda or plantation agricultural system in Brazil allowed the development of an almost medieval feudalism that led to sharp class divisions within the country. The concept of class is historically entrenched, and for Brazilian elites, the arrogant style of dealing with social and political differences permeates the heart of the Brazilian power structure.¹

The development of soccer in Brazil followed the traditional pattern. Soccer was brought to the indigenous émigrés and the elites, and then spread to the masses at a later date. That is not to say that soccer was not played by the lower class early in its history, but the games were not organized and tended to be “pick-up” or “kick-about” games. Early soccer was an elite game, partly due to the cost involved for shoes and uniforms. The spread of the game in Brazil was directly related to the established hierarchal

system, and as there is a larger gap in Brazil between the elite and the masses than many other countries. In some ways, soccer has led to a greater mixing of the classes, but the horizontal linkages that occurred were still dominated by vertical and hierarchal ties. Noblesse oblige tended to be what unified the upper and lower classes, even in soccer. Early soccer remained elitist and racist. Around 1910, soccer reflected opposite reputations, and served as the private hobby of the wealthy as well as the preferred pastime of gangs of poor youth. That decade saw the increased involvement and appropriation of the game by the working class. The organized game still tended to belong to the upper middle class situated in an urban setting, with an emphasis on amateurism.²

During the 1920’s, the lower urban class and Afro-Brazilians entered the game. The São Paulo clubs increased their gate price to limit access to the lower classes. The whole issue of amateurism began to be debated. As in other countries and other times, amateurism was a ploy for the elite to continue to control the game. The lower class urban whites and blacks were not comfortable with amateurism, but the upper class strengthened their stand for it. In 1927, no first division players were allowed to be

stevedores, soldiers, waiters, taxi drivers or barbers. Players had to know how to read and write, but ways and means of subverting the system led to a “brown amateurism” that existed for over a decade.3

By the 1920’s, most of the clubs had become well established. Soccer clubs in Brazil tend to be large-based, social organizations. Members may join for a fee, and then participate in the entire social, as well as the soccer, activities of the club. But even the club system in Brazil is very class based, and each club carries its own reputation as belonging to a specific group. As soccer was still an urban establishment, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo clubs dominated the scene. The Rio club, Fluminense, was the club established by the elites, generally old, high status families. Social membership was restricted, and early players, at times, whitened their faces with rice powder to appear less racially mixed. Early games featured men attending in suits and hats, women in the latest fashions, social dances, and players that were young businessmen or university students. Fluminense’s arch rivals, Flamengo, was the club of the poor and the Afro-Brazilians, the working class club. Historically, many of their players came from the favelas. Deep and entrenched class antagonisms exist in South America, and the rivalry between Fla and Flu is merely representative of it. Vasco was the established club of the Portuguese families, generally shop owners and lower middle class. Vasco recruited players from the working class suburbs of Rio, but members of the club were not the

same social class as the players. Botafoga is the club that represents the modern working class in Brazil. They are young, urbane, politicos, and nouveau riche.⁴

The clubs in São Paulo were just as striated. Palmeiras was the club of the Italian descendents in the city. São Paulo was the middle class club and the first team to tour overseas in 1925. The 1925 team featured eleven players with college degrees. Corinthians (named after the touring amateur team from Britain) was the club of the masses. Corinthians remain renowned as the only São Club founded by the working class. Their fan group, or torcida, called the Hawks was founded on opposition of the elites who actually ran the club. The Hawks are famous for an urban uprising that includes ideas of political thought, something fairly uncommon when discussing soccer clubs. In the state of Minas Gerais, the team Atlético accepted lower class members to reduce costs for all, but there was no social mingling within the club.⁵

Although many soccer clubs offer modest fees to target the middle class, the club directors are always the elite or the nouveau riche. The directors frequently use soccer as a political springboard for further office, and Lever mentions Dr. Laudo Natel moving from the presidency of São Paulo FC to governor of the state, and Sr. João Falcão serving as state deputy and president of the São Paulo Football Federation. The

---

poor that cannot afford membership in the clubs can join the torcidas, or fan organizations, to support their local teams. The club directors are often called cartolas, and their power extends beyond the soccer club, often linking established oligarchies, and frequently serving as a means to move onto the national political scene. Even the torcidas reflect class divisions that are present in Brazil. Traditional intercity rivalries are rooted in the class symbolism of the teams. Although Lever noted that in the 1980’s traditional club stereotypes were starting to break down, there is still evidence that they exist and actually thrive during competition with a direct rival.\(^6\)

Brazilian soccer professionalized in 1933 which caused many of the elites to leave the playing field, as the urban lower middle class and poor entered the game. Factory teams helped cement the appropriation of the game by the masses, and oftentimes the elite used soccer to ease industrial unrest, using it as an opiate. During the 1920’s, immigrants had been encouraged to participate in soccer to divert them from trade union militancy. The elites viewed soccer as a safety valve, not only in the factories, but in the general population. Of course, the hierarchal system was maintained even in the face of professionalization. Paid players were excluded from club socials, and the elites began to assume the role of club patrons. Soccer began to be viewed as escape routes out of the favelas, and by 1940, 75% of the players were from the lower social class. Most of them had little education. By the late 1940’s, club membership was opening

more and more for the middle class. The involvement of the lower classes and the
influence of the Afro-Brazilians from the lower classes, influenced the style of play by
Brazil. Brazilian soccer only became great after the masses became involved in the
game. At the same time, soccer began to be used to explain the weaknesses of the
“povo”, or the masses in the culture. The elitist tendencies of the society were not
erased by mass involvement in the game, but in many ways became accentuated.7

While some authors insist that Brazilian society ignored race and was strictly a class
based society, or that it was class and not race that barred non-whites from membership
in clubs or as players (such as Costa-Lima and Levine), it must also be noted that Afro-
Brazilians are most notably from the lowest economic status. Brazil has many degrees,
or particularism, of blackness and status, that class is often emphasized over race. Even
the famous Pelé spoke in 1980 of never facing racial discrimination but rather social
discrimination. Brazilians’ perception, generally, is that racial discrimination does not
exist in their country, but that discrimination based on class does. Most of the Afro-
Brazilians are of the lowest economic ranks, and tend to serve as domestics and laborers

7 Lever, “Soccer as a Brazilian Way of Life,” 141; T. Bar-On, “The Ambiguities of Football, Politics,
Culture, and Social Transformation in Latin America,” Sociological Research Online, 2 (1997,
A Concluding Chapter,” Sport and Society in Latin America: Diffusion, Dependency, and the Rise of
Holding Brazil,” 129; Levine, “Sport and Society: The Case of Brazilian Futebol,” 235, 238, 240;
Maurice Biriotti Del Burgo, “Don’t Stop the Carnival: Football in the Societies of Latin America,” Giving
the Game Away: Football, Politics and Culture on Five Continents ed. by Stephen Wagg (London:
Leicester University Press, 1995), 55; Mason, Passion of the People? , 122; José Thadeu Goncalves in
cooperation with Professor Julio Mazzei, The Principles of Brazilian Soccer (Spring City, PA.: Reedswain, 1998), 46; Coutinho, Bye, Bye Soccer, 96; Joseph A. Page, “Soccer Madness: Futebol in
Brazil,” Sport in Latin America and the Caribbean ed. by Joseph L. Arbena and David G. LaFrance
(Wilmington, DE.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2002), 36, 48; Meihy, “A National Festival,” 503; Stephen
Wagg, “The Business of America: Reflections on World Cup ’94,” Giving the Game Away, 186; Daflon
in the work force. Black success was an exception, except in the fields of soccer and music, but even there, it was limited in numbers.  

It is a myth that soccer led to upward mobility. Yes, it did for a few, but the vast majority never saw a change in their class or status because of playing soccer. By the early 1980's, clearly 80% of the soccer players were from the lowest social class. Newly “discovered” youngsters saw their parents sign over guardianship rights to the affluent clubs to develop these children. The club pays the parents a monthly stipend, and provides medical, dental and nutritional services for the children as well as soccer training. The children are considered pre-professionals; they are under contract to the club. The sport has provided social mobility for one group of individuals, and that is coaching staff. Coaches are generally ex-professional players, seldom with college degrees, but a vast knowledge of how to play the game. The physical trainers at the clubs are far more likely than the coaches to hold university degrees. Professional referees are generally from the middle class as they must be literate as well as pass a certification course in order to be licensed.

---


Although there is little doubt that interest in soccer transcends class, the game in Latin America also reinforces class in a variety of ways. It is an interesting contradiction that needs to be further explored. Brazilian society is marked by unfairness and discrimination against the poor, and this is often reflected in soccer. Traditional and lower class women fear that their attendance at mass spectacle games will damage their reputation. Professional players have become the new export product of Brazil, and players agree to this, seeking a means to escape their class status. Daflon and Ballvé insist that social tensions of race and class are played out in every aspect of soccer. Bar-On would agree with this synopsis. Even Murray would insist that a paternalistic approach to the lower classes exists in Brazilian soccer today. During the 1960’s, João Havelange, then president of the Brazil Sport Federation claimed that soccer players are as children with no rights. Certainly separate rules exist for those in the soccer world of the elite status. Team favoritism often occurs when an elite team plays a lower class club team. Soccer clubs still exhibit overt class features, and Brazilian elites still control the game although their cultural influence may be presently decreasing. Mason notes that elite control over soccer is stronger in Brazil than in Argentina and Uruguay, perhaps conceding to their hierarchal culture.10

The counter-argument is less overt, but offers some in-depth insight into how the arena of soccer opens up a free space in a hierarchal society. First, while soccer team loyalties in Brazil do tend to transcend class at times, they do not eradicate social divisions. They merely ignore them. Lever would argue that Brazilian soccer helps unify a vastly divergent country, leading to individuals being good citizens by the unifying mechanism of soccer. Ramos would argue that soccer diverts attention from class interests, providing a different focus for the citizenship. But Roberto DaMatta presents the most convincing argument, that soccer and carnival provide an open space for players and fans to experience true democracy in a society that has a highly problematic perception of their own social order. Both soccer and carnival are Brazilian rituals that tend to unite the population. Soccer and samba schools allow two poles of the society to intermix, while soccer, samba and Umbanda (Afro-Brazilian religion) link the cultural low with power status. DaMatta also points out, and this is highly significant, that the term “middle class” has negative connotations in Brazil. Shirts would also argue that the Brazilian bourgeois have been unable to impose their identity on Brazil. Soccer allows an escape from class as it provides one of the few arenas where individual achievement can be applauded and celebrated. Brazilian society, according to DaMatta, is not divided into classes that can be labeled modern or traditional, but rather a model that includes both, a “both-and” situation. Brazilians see their class hierarchy as providing equal, but different, categorizations of persons. Flynn would argue that soccer and samba both transcend class and color, and Toplin that soccer unites classes. Bellos would agree, noting that wearing a fan uniform is a way of denying race or class.
in Brazil. While I agree with DaMatta that soccer opens a free area that is out of the hierarchal culture, I also note that class divisions do influence and impact soccer off of the playing field.11

The 1950’s saw the development of society soccer in Brazil which was soccer strictly for the elite as a means of reclaiming a small portion of the game. Players paid to participate in what was a social cementing of upper class males. No women were allowed, and participation was all about status. By 1955, membership for Fluminense had dropped to under 10,000, and the club was being criticized for their exclusivism. Fluminense did not hire any black players until the 1960’s. Class division even entered into the blame for the 1950 World Cup loss, the tragedy of Brazilian soccer. The four black players on the team took most of the blame for the loss, and the rest of the blame was distributed to the invasion of the hotel prior to the game by the rich and powerful. It supposedly distracted players from their concentration for the game.12

In 1970, former professional player, Tostão, called for soccer reform for the lower class players. That decade also saw the start of involvement of the middle class players in the game. The political regime in power expressed their favoritism for white, middle class,

golden boys on the national team, and this potentially influenced further middle class participation. A 1991 survey in São Paulo found that the majority of the soccer players were now white, middle class, and a fourth had a college education. The trend of the lower class dominating the professional ranks in Brazil started to change. The rise of beach soccer, particularly teams and tournaments sponsored by Globo, the television giant, was a huge draw for lower class soccer players. It was considered “fairer” for the poor as they did not have to purchase soccer cleats to participate. Up until the 1980’s, the beaches was the territory of the elite, so beach soccer opened the door for legitimate access. Although many of the top players in Brazil are still from the favelas, the rising involvement of the middle class portends a change that may impact on soccer style in the future.13

In Brazil, politics is “asserted and inserted” into soccer, and has been from its inception.14 The intersection of politics and soccer has manifested itself in several ways: governmental interference in the game, governmental use of the game for propaganda value, local political use of club officership as a springboard for politics, and the use of soccer as an arena to express political views. While Brazilian intellectuals connected with soccer early, it took longer for the political elite to become involved. In 1919, President Pessoa realized the benefits that soccer could provide, and

---

went out of his way to congratulate the Brazilian team that had just won the South American championship for the first time in its history.\textsuperscript{15}

The 1930-1945 dictatorship of Getúlio Vargas fully cemented the connections between soccer and politics in Brazil. Vargas set out to use soccer for his own benefit, setting the pattern that countless other Brazilian politicians were to follow. Vargas expanded state control over the game in the name of modernization, and used the game to enhance the image of Brazil both at home and abroad. Soccer was a means to legitimize his regime, attract foreign aid and investment, and increase tourism. But of equal importance to Vargas, soccer was used to increase the feeling of Brazilian nationalism and increase social harmony in a vastly divergent culture. Vargas sought the support of the masses through soccer. When soccer professionalized in 1933, soccer players finally achieved employee status under the Ministry of Labor. In 1941 Vargas created the Conselho Nacional de Desportos (CND) to oversee sports in Brazil, particularly soccer. The CND was not connected with the club system, and its mission was strictly to serve governmental and political interests, at the same time emphasizing the importance of soccer to the federal government. Of course, the CND was established by Vargas, and the members on it were chosen by Vargas. The CND has a long history of using the national team for political gain in a variety of ways, but usually as a propaganda tool. Although the CND was the first official federal sport policy enacted in Brazil, it did allow the clubs a measure of freedom. The CND also mobilized

\textsuperscript{15} Rachum, “Futebol,” 194-195; Mason, Passion of the People?, 62.
management and leadership in the clubs enabling them to assume more responsibility with the added benefits of increased political esteem.\textsuperscript{16}

It was during the Vargas regime that the trinity of soccer, samba and Carnival was established, a co-joining that Vargas encouraged as a cohesive element in the culture and as a means of establishing national identity on a global basis. Given that Vargas was considered a fascist dictator during the decade of the fascist dictators, the fascist principles of a beautiful body were embraced as a means of reinventing Brazilian social unity. Brazilian sport clubs became sanctuaries for Brazilian fascism, which had some distinct differences from European fascism. Through Vargas’ modernization policies, by the end of World War II, soccer was a national industry in Brazil closely regulated by the government. Vargas took a personal hand in soccer as did President Dutra. The connection between soccer and politics was used to gain votes.\textsuperscript{17}

The tragedy and triumph decade of the 1950’s saw further political use of soccer. Glanville notes that the 1950 World Cup team was chosen as a political team to please the current political strength of São Paulo. After Brazil won the World Cup championship in 1958, local dignitaries presented Pelé with his first car, and in 1960,  


\textsuperscript{17} DaCosta and Labriola, “Bodies from Brazil,” 167, 173; Levine, “Sport and Society,” 238; Mason, \textit{Passion of the People?}, 63-64; Humphrey, “No Holding Brazil,” 130.
the president of Santos (Pele’s club team) who was also the deputy of São Paulo, was warned that if Pelé left the club, he shouldn’t bother running for reelection, and in fact, his life might be in danger. In 1962, the national government declared Pelé a “national treasure”, which also happened to prohibit him from foreign contracts. Pelé was too useful a tool to allow escape.\textsuperscript{18}

But political interference in the game wasn’t only directed at Pelé. In the 1962 World Cup in Chile, Garrincha was red carded in a semi-final game against Chile. Tancredo Neves, Brazil’s prime minister, telegrammed FIFA president Stanley Rous asking that the red card be overlooked. It was, and Garrincha played in the final. In 1964, Brazil was taken over by a series of military dictatorships that lasted until 1985. The military regimes were notorious for their use of soccer as a manipulative tool. These regimes dedicated to elitist supremacy were more than willing to manipulate soccer, using the opium of soccer to diffuse any possible discontent. Soccer promotion became an issue of national security, and the regime gave top priority to winning World Cups, sparing no expense in the process. Brazil was thoroughly enmeshed in using soccer as foreign policy by this point, but the domestic emphasis was the manipulation of soccer for political interests to maintain governmental power and exclude alternate systems. The regimes needed the quiescence of the masses as they ended democracy, and unfortunately in Brazil, the masses were dedicated to soccer and exhibited a disinterest in politics. This disinterest in politics by the masses has been problematic for Brazil.

over the years, and may in part be a symptom of a rigid hierarchal society. The masses have seldom held power in the country, and political power has been so acute that it is entrenched within the elitist system. This is slowly changing. During the regimes, Brazilian government was powerful not only as a class instrument, but as a domain that controlled the resources and laws. The paradox in Brazil is that Brazilians will organize for fun, such as Carnival and soccer, but tend not to organize to demand their rights. Brazilian democracy, even now, refuses to allow differentiation of social groups, which prevents formation of political groups. The Brazilian dilemma, as DaMatta puts it, is that even modern law serves to block segments of the population from their rights, leading to the law being a tool for imprisoning the masses. Soccer was used as an opium as a means to divert attention, because to many, soccer mattered more than politics, and was used as a substitute for politics. DaMatta acknowledges that the use of soccer in Brazil has often followed the Baudrillard axiom that work and war were real, but that religion and sport were fantasy, leaving soccer more open to being used as a tool by the military regimes. 19

The regime used Pelé to justify the regime’s failure to spend money on health and education. They insisted that Pelé got by without that assistance from the state, and

therefore, everyone could. Instead, the money was invested in soccer stadiums, the bigger the better and the building frenzy continued throughout the regimes’ rule.\textsuperscript{20} President General Emilio Médici took power in 1969. He was an astute politician and understood the power of the media and television, as well as the power of soccer in Brazil. Médici was a genuine soccer fanatic, which made him all the more dangerous in terms of interference in the game. His favorite team was Flamengo, and he was quick to influence club policy regarding which players he felt should be put on the team. Part of his popularity came from his image as the number one fan of the game, and he used this image to benefit his government as well as influence soccer.\textsuperscript{21}

The year of 1970 was a high point for interference by the Médici regime in soccer, and it happened to coincide with a World Cup championship. The initial coach for the national team was João Saldanha, who had been appointed in 1969. Médici invited Saldanha and the team for lunch at the palace, but Saldanha would not alter the training schedule to allow the team to attend. Saldanha also did not place one of Médici’s favorite players on the team. He was frequently short-tempered and combative, reportedly did not get along with Pelé, but perhaps most significant of all, at least in Médici’s eyes, was that he was an outspoken communist sympathizer in his younger days, which caused a problem for the right wing military regime. Saldanha was

---


\textsuperscript{21} Garry Jenkins, \textit{The Beautiful Team: In Search of Pele and the 1970 Brazilians} (London: Pocket Books, 1999), 19-21; Mason, \textit{Passion of the People?}, 64; Lever, \textit{Soccer Madness}, 64.
replaced with Mario Zagalo assisted by Claudio Coutinho (a retired army captain who was a former physical training expert) five days before the team was to leave for Mexico. Jenkins asserts that the replacement was at Pelé’s instigation, but Lever, Page, Humphrey, and Murray all insinuate that Médici was behind the coaching change.22

Interference was not limited to a coaching change, though. Médici had his hand in all preparations for the World Cup, from player selection, to tactics, to style, to instigating “scientific preparation” to represent the “modern Brazil.” The national team players were strictly forbidden to air any political views. The scientific training was intense: Coutinho had done some work at NASA, and brought fitness testing to the Brazilian national team with a vengeance. Players were tested for speed, endurance, lung capacity and strength. They were placed on curfews, banned from drinking or smoking, and placed in isolation from wives and families. Fortunately, the style of play was not tampered with enough to change it from “the beautiful game.”23

After the victory, Médici went into high gear, realizing the propaganda tool that he had on his hands. He declared a public holiday, and opened the presidential palace (for the first time) in a welcome-home party for the team. Players were handed tax free bonuses ($18,500 dollars), and Médici posed for photographs with the trophy in his arms, and

then willingly headed a soccer ball for the camera. A special carnival parade was prepared in Rio. “Forward Brazil,” the theme song written to inspire the team became the regime’s song, was constantly aired on the radio and television. The regime’s slogan, “No One Will Hold Brazil Back Now,” was placed on billboards under a picture of Pelé leaping into the air. Soccer became a means by which the government could transmit its message of progress and modernity, even while it exploited soccer. But some fans felt “the cheers of the crowd drowned out the screams of torture,” that were hidden by the military government. The regime identified the World Cup win with the fight for national development and the collective good of the country, and treated it as a public relations coup. Médici stated: “I identify this victory won in the brotherhood of good sportsmanship with the rise of faith in our national development.” The win provided the regime with more power, and as Médici said, “Soccer is the fatherland. Soccer is power.” Of course, Médici also assumed some personal credit for the win. What the win did give him was, basically, five more years in power.

The big debate in intellectual circles often surrounds the premise that soccer is an opiate to the people. In the case of Brazil, this certainly becomes an issue at the forefront of

---

discussion when considering political implications and the game of soccer. Lever
would undeniably say that soccer has served as an opiate in Brazil, but would also
qualify that the dictatorial control over sport allowed sport to coexist with the military
government. Page would agree. However, Lever does point out that soccer was not a
complete opiate because it actually increased schisms, and few people were fooled by
the governmental manipulation of soccer. I agree that at that particular point in time,
the military dictators did attempt to use soccer as an opiate, but I am not convinced that
it was an entirely successful venture. Levine would say that soccer is not an opiate, but
is tied up with social mobility and self esteem, but this seems to be hedging the issue.
To make the claim that soccer is an opiate takes away individual agency. Galeano
makes a specific point that today’s game, where sport is an industry, has taken the joy
out of the game and based it on strength, thus turning it into a soporific, and to that
extent I would agree. But did soccer distract the Brazilians from the military regime?
Not on a long term basis, as Arbena would note, and maybe not at all. Bellos points out
that Brazilian politics has always been largely devoid of ideological debate, and that has
allowed soccer to intermix with politics. Through many years of dictatorships, it is not
unlikely that Brazilians felt little control, except in the areas of soccer, samba and
carnival. The fact that the government appropriated Pelé and appropriated soccer to win
political support, and Pelé publicly stated there was no dictatorship in Brazil and
remained politically mute, does not mean that he was unaware. Later he admitted to
pressure from the regime. Under military dictatorships, without a massive outcry from
the people, one goes along to get along. But soccer also served as a call for change.

448
Edilberto Coutinho wrote *Bye, Bye Soccer* during the military regime as a protest of the soccer manipulation. In fictionalized format, he detailed how players were scapegoated for the government or ignored politics, and then pointed out how players often had two sets of answers to public interviews: one answer was a political one, and the other was a soccer answer. They did not always coincide. During the 1970’s, as civil liberties were curtailed, soccer was one of the few spaces to express a political voice, although professional players seldom took advantage of the fact. It was too risky at the time.\(^\text{26}\)

By 1971, the CBF, with extreme encouragement from the military regime, had created the national tournament for clubs in Brazil. Placement in the league now became a political tool to be manipulated for votes and esteem. Politics had directly led the expansion and a championship because the regime wanted political support. But the quality of soccer declined due to the intervention from politics. Clubs scrambled to fly vast distances to play meaningless competitions between teams with little equity. A small provincial team held little chance of beating one of the larger, cosmopolitan teams with a large budget. But the regime didn’t just interfere in soccer, and use the game for political clout. It was a much darker time than that. Telephone tapping, torture, persons that had been “disappeared”, and imprisonment of anyone speaking out against the regime effectively shut down any political views contrary to the government’s,

including views that soccer players may have held. The regime’s attempt to control the success of soccer led to a sacrifice of some of the joy in the game. It was during this period that the soccer fan clubs became more prominent, particularly a group of fans supporting Corinthians, called the Hawks. The Hawks filled a social as well as a political need, becoming one of the few fan clubs to start their own samba bloco. The Hawks fan club promoted increased democracy from within their organization, partially as a means of fighting the loss of democracy in the country. By 1973, the regime was more overtly using soccer. An announcement by the labor minister granted a 16% increase in the monthly minimum wage to $51.23 was accompanied by the give-away of 15,000 free tickets to the Fla-Flu game. The government also began regulating ticket prices for “popular” admissions to the club games to ensure the lower class audience would be present. Reserved seat prices were not controlled.27

As the 1974 World Cup approached, João Havelange left as CBF president to assume the mantle of president of FIFA. The new CBF president was Heleno Nuñes. Nuñes was a retired admiral and the leader of the government party in the state of Rio de Janeiro, further enmeshing politics in the soccer administration. The regime spent $6 million dollars on preparations for the World Cup, but military advisors appointed to the team who had no soccer expertise interfered with team preparations. At the instigation of the regime, the military advisors chose to “Europeanize” the playing style of the national team, with horrible results. A physical education army officer was appointed

as the coach, and he exalted European tactics and conditioning. The players were forced
to assume nationalistic postures when speaking to the press and Pelé was upset that he
was not named to the team. The team failed to place in the top three at the World Cup
to the bitter disappointment of the Brazilian people, and no doubt, the regime.28

By 1978, Nuñes was actively interfering in national team selection. To win votes from
his ARENA party in Rio, Nunes forced the coach (Coutinho) to choose a Vasco player
for the national team. The government became further involved in the World Cup,
which was held in Argentina under another military regime. And of course, the national
team coach was an army captain. Brazil and Argentina were tied on points after the
second round of their group. After Brazil played, Argentina knew they had to beat Peru
by four goals in order to advance. Argentina won 6-0, amidst claims of cheating and
bribery by Brazil. The fact that the Brazilian foreign minister had called off tripartite
talks with Argentina and Paraguay over hydroelectric cooperation, quite unexpectedly,
may have fueled the fire. But it wasn’t until a *Sunday Times* story in 1986 confirmed
the bribery that the situation was publicized. Peru received its bribe in two ways:
35,000 tons of grain shipped to Peru over two months, and an Argentine bank unfroze a
$50 million dollar credit amount. The match was supposedly fixed by direct negotiation
between the two governments, and mediated by FIFA’s Argentine representatives.
There have always been suspicions that Havelange was aware of the bribe.29

---

By the 1980’s, cracks began to appear in the regime’s power, and a few of the most significant were directly related to soccer. It is not unusual for soccer and politics to intersect in Brazil, but now, soccer was formenting a political movement in direct opposition to the regime. The star of the Corinthians, Dr. Sócrates, a bright, middle class leftist physician was the instigator of the Corinthians Democracy movement, which eventually swept the country. Corinthian Democracy opened the debate against the regime in the national political arena, and added impetus to the call for free elections. Corinthian Democracy also challenged the legal, military and governmental influence on Brazilian soccer and led to abertura, or the demilitarization of the national team, which directly impacted on the style of play. The 1982 World Cup team returned to “soccer samba” and delighted the masses with its beauty. The impact in the political arena was significant. As Lever and Mason point out, soccer clubs are often the only experience the masses had with grass roots democracy. A common expression during the 1982 elections was “Aqui, futebol é só politica,” or “Here, soccer is always politics.” DaMatta notes that Brazilian soccer has been a force in reinforcing democratic cultural values. Although it was rare for soccer players to take a political stand publicly, Sócrates did speak out forcefully, and advocated free thought, free speech, and free elections. Corinthian Democracy also critiqued the inherent paternalism in soccer and the regime, and eventually led to more political freedom and freedom in style of play. Although the critique was a product of the political liberalism of the late 1970’s, Dr. Sócrates was instrumental in bringing it to the forefront of public

opinion. At the free election rally in São Paulo in 1984, speaking before 1,500,000 people, Sócrates pledged that if the free election amendment passed, he would turn down a million dollar contract to play in Italy, and remain in Brazil to participate in the rebuilding of democracy. Unfortunately, it did not pass, and Sócrates did go to Fiorentina in Florence to play. But the Corinthian Democracy movement had sparked discussion and a political movement toward open elections and political amnesty, which was finally realized with the election of President Collor de Mello in 1989, the first elected president in thirty years, and also the former president of a soccer club.30

Of course, the end of the dictatorship did not negate the intersection of soccer and politics. That was engrained too deeply in Brazilian culture, and the border between the two was often vague. The late 1980’s and early 1990’s did see some retraction of the state from soccer, but it did not last long. In 1990, the government appointed Zico as Sports Secretary. Zico was a former player, and vowed to reform the game in Brazil. Zico attempted to end the archaic transfer law, but his reform failed to pass in Congress due to the tremendous lobbying power of the soccer establishment. Zico resigned.31 In 1993, President Franco went on public television to beg Coach Parreira to put Ronaldo on the national team for the 1994 World Cup. Parreira ignored him. October elections were pitting Franco’s Finance Minister, Cardoso, against the leftist leaning socialist,

31 Bellos, Futebol, 306; Del Burgo, “Don’t Stop the Carnival,” 64; Gordon and Helal, “The Crisis of Brazilian Football,” 151, 154; Mason, Passion of the People?, 135-136.
Lula. A full fourth of Brazilians said they would decide who to vote for only after they knew who had won the World Cup. Romario supported Lula, and Pelé supported Cardoso. Brazil won the World Cup, Cardoso won the election, and Pelé was named Sports Minister in 1995.\(^{32}\)

Prior to his appointment, Pelé had become more vocal regarding corruption within the Brazilian soccer system. João Havelange was not amused, and banned Pelé from the World Cup drawing in the United States. Part of the problem with Pelé’s outspoken views, in Havelange’s eyes, was that Pelé was publicly accusing the head of the CBF, Teixeira, of outright corruption. Teixeira was Havelange’s personal choice as head of the CBF, and also happened to be his son-in-law. In 1993, Pelé had attempted to buy the broadcast rights for Brazil’s national championship from the CBF. The CBF demanded that Pelé deposit $1 million dollars in a Swiss bank account to have the right to have his bid reviewed. Pelé exposed the bribe from Teixiera in an interview with *Playboy*, earning the enmity of Havelange. Cardoso saw a kindred spirit, and named Pelé Minister of Sport, where he served from 1995 to 1998. In 1996 he proposed the “Pelé Law” which required clubs to open their books, operate as capitalistic ventures, and gave players free agency at the end of their contracts. The opponents, and there were many, were quite vocal. The law was totally emasculated, and when it passed, only 11% of the original bill remained. The cartolas in Congress altered the bill, and as

\(^{32}\) Kuper, *Football Against the Enemy*, 223; Mason, *Passion of the People?*, 150.
voting blocks within the Congress are often by soccer club, the connections between soccer and politics become even more direct.\textsuperscript{33}

Brazilian clubs are still direct political funnels for votes. Local cartolas receive favors from the federal government in exchange for secure votes. Many politicians use clubs to get elected, and receive their campaign money from soccer sources. Once elected, according to Brazilian law, the elected politicians are immune from any prosecution, so political careers are often based on avoidance of prison sentences. Bellos asserts that the CBF’s motto is “Ethics are for philosophers,” as it breaks the law with little fear of the judiciary. Of course, the CBF also funds trips for judges and their wives to World Cup games, and funds political careers from its budget.\textsuperscript{34}

In 2000, the Senate launched a CPI into soccer. A CPI has stronger investigative powers than the police in Brazil, and the fact that two houses of the Senate were now investigating soccer rocked the country. The CPI’s were seen as a slow process of democratization, but the consensus was that the sporting crisis was also a political crisis. Communist party deputy, Aldo Rebolo began to gain political momentum to resurrect an inquiry into Nike and investigate what had happened in the 1998 World


Cup. Only in Brazil would the star player, Ronaldo, be deposed and have to explain to Parliament why Brazil lost the World Cup.\textsuperscript{35}

As has been demonstrated, politics and soccer are immutably intertwined in Brazil. Politics functions on several levels within Brazilian soccer; from interference by the federal government in national team composition, style, and coaching, to the whole arena of club soccer and the use of clubs by the cartolas to become involved in politics. The military regimes over the course of the last century, ranging from Vargas to Médici, used soccer for propaganda, to increase national cohesion, and in some instances, as an opiate of the people to prevent unrest or public discussion of policy. But soccer also served as a political arena for dissent, allowing a grassroots democratic movement to start to grow, and in the case of the Corinthians, to flourish. Soccer and politics cannot be separated in Brazil, and in essence, they remain one.

CHAPTER 16
RACE, SPORT AND SOCCER

The construction of race is problematic, but most academics would acknowledge that the concept of race is socially and culturally constructed, with but a small amount of biological determination. Racial identity is based on social construction, and Miles would argue that the notion of three distinct races based on biological determinism is a non-supportable argument. However, many individuals still comprehend race as biological, and it is that understanding that forms the basis of racism which has led to a striating and differentiating social structure. These social structures are open to cultural interpretation. As Stuart Hall points out, racism has different structures in Britain than in the United States. How race intersects with the subject of sport, and specifically soccer, needs to be further analyzed. There is a plethora of anecdotal evidence available, but deconstructing racism in sport requires more than stories. Sporting racism is a longstanding process involving politics, economics, culture and mythology.  

The examination of some of the mythology involved in sporting racism is enlightening, and also explains why little research has been carried out regarding racism in sport. Perhaps one of the most prominent myths is that the integration of minorities is successfully achieved in and through sport. Yet the overwhelming anecdotal evidence would suggest that this “successful achievement” hasn’t really been accomplished. Another prominent myth is that sport offers an avenue of social mobility for socio-economically deprived groups, particularly minority groups. An article entitled “How Sport Helps Blacks Clear the High Hurdles” in the *Sunday Times* explains that athletics can be a quick way to fame, money and to clearing social barriers for blacks in Britain. But what it doesn’t explain is that the success is limited to but a few, and those few at the top. It doesn’t explain that individual success further perpetuates another myth, that of the racially superior athlete. As Shogan points out, Michael Jordan’s blackness fades when he is represented as successful and responsible. His success as a black athlete, instead of breaking down the myth and the stereotype, becomes inverted as he is represented as white.2

The meritocratic sports model is an ideal, but currently a work in theory and not in practice. The cultural performances of “raced” behavior continue to solidify racial categories. While noting that racism and xenophobia differ in different geographical locations, it is interesting to note that a global stereotype of blacks in sport does appear to exist. Blackness is invariably set up in a binary contrasted to whiteness, and the

---

discussion of race invariable centers on study of blackness or other ethnic minority, and rarely on the other side of the binary, or whiteness. In this binary, white is generally constructed as clean, pure, contained, orderly, and controlled. Blackness is constructed as strong, athletic, potent, animalistic, innately coordinated, and frequently as masculine. Success for white athletes is attributed to intelligence and hard work, whereas it is attributed to “natural ability” for blacks. The black identity has been athleticized in a racist fashion. Dominance in sport is, therefore, seen as evidence of genetic difference, and black success merely reconfirms the existing stereotype. For non-athletic blacks, public recognition and definition of masculinity is limited to but a few other areas, such as music.³

Racism and xenophobia exist in the sporting world, and always work in a way to confirm the “other” as different. The most notable examples are taunting on the field, chanting from the stands, bias shown when evaluating performance, the low number of minorities in coaching and managerial positions, and stacking. Some of the research in sport in the United States has examined the issue of “stacking” players in particular positions. It was found that positions in sport are not necessarily based on physiological or even psychological differences, but rather on socially constructed stereotypes that play out racial discrimination. Within soccer, “stacking” often refers to centrality of positions on the field.⁴ Even access to certain sport fields has an element of racism.

³ Jose Parry and Noel Parry, “Sport and the Black Experience,” Sport, Racism and Ethnicity, 152; Shogan, Making of High-Performance Athletes, 63-67.
⁴ Maguire, “Sport, Racism and British Society,” 97, 118.
Swimming, ice skating, and horse racing are frequently mentioned examples of sport with low numbers of black involvement. Access and bias place their own constraints.

Several studies have examined the issue of stacking in British soccer. Blacks tend to be stacked into peripheral positions of the field, such as wingers, strikers, outside midfielders and marking backs where speed, not brains, is emphasized. The racial selections are based on the premise that blacks have “erratic qualities,” are more emotional than intellectual and therefore should not hold a central position that requires quick analysis. Maguire’s data pointed out that in Britain during 1989-90, 21% of the forwards were black, whereas no black goalkeepers could be found. Issues of centrality were also highlighted, as 72% of the playing blacks were in non-central positions. The analysis confirmed the stereotyping existing in Britain at the time was blacks could play an attacking role with limited responsibility but emphasizing flair, imagination and ability. British coaches and players associated black players with particular characteristics including lower intelligence, speed, grace, flair and increased potential for “natural” ability.5

The idea of black physical prowess has continued despite genetic and biological approaches to race being discredited. This is not a new phenomenon. In 1916, Chile protested a game lost to Uruguay because Uruguay had two blacks on the team. During the 1938 World Cup, the Italian press commented when Italy beat Brazil that “We value

the triumph of Italic intelligence over the brute force of Negroes.” But two Afro-
Brazilians, Leônidas and Domingos da Guia were the Cup’s two most valuable players.⁶

Soccer tends to underpin and sustain social divisions, and despite increasing numbers of
minorities in top division teams, racial stereotypes are not breaking down. In the
1980’s, Real Madrid fans yelled “Go back to Africa,” at black players. Italian fans
whistled at black players and called opposing fans “Jews.” Racist chanting at English
clubs became common. In 1991, England passed the Football Offenses Act to try to
regulate the rising tide of hooliganism associated with racist behavior, such as racial
chanting or throwing objects on the field. By 1993, racist incidents across Europe were
still increasing.⁷

Other incidents of racism are recorded. A 1990 English game between Leeds and
Bournemouth featured a group of Leeds fans dressed in Ku Klux Klan robes. Richie
Moran, a black soccer player in England, left the game because of the direct and
indirect institutionalized racism that existed in soccer. He details examples of abuse
from the terraces: teammates telling him “It’s okay, mate, you’re one of our niggers,”
and being told to “Go back to Jamaica,” when he was of Nigerian origin, locker room
racist remarks relating to the size of his manhood, racist abuse by an assistant coach

⁶ Garland and Rowe, *Racism and Anti-Racism in Football*, 52; Eduardo Galeano, *Soccer in Sun and
⁷ Giulianotti, *Football: A Sociology*, 163; Maguire, “Sport, Racism and British Society,” 117; Galeano,
*Soccer in Sun and Shadow*, 164, 184-85; Les Back, Tim Crabbe and John Solomos, “Racism in Football:
Patterns of Continuity and Change,” *Fanatics! Power, Identity and Fandom in Football* ed. by Adam
Brown (London: Routledge, 1998), 77; Steve Greenfield and Guy Osborn, *Regulating Football:
with the head coach telling him he ought to just tolerate it, and being told to cut his
dreadlocks. One of his coaches suggested a “coon versus white” practice game. He
noted that a BBC commentator suggested that it was getting difficult to announce
games because most teams had several black players and “they all looked the same.”

The 1998 World Cup featuring the winning multiracial French team stirred further
discussion about race within the game of soccer. The French team was used to present
an image of a new, cohesive but multicultural French country. World Cup
commentators still talked of African teams in paternalistic and patronizing ways, saying
the teams could not defend but had natural attacking flair and speed. By 1999, 24% of
the English fans report hearing racist chanting in the English Premier League and at
national team competitions. Ape noises, racist taunts, and the throwing of bananas on
the field were noted. UEFA president, Lennart Johannson, made racist jokes about
“darkies” in South Africa to a Swedish newspaper.

Racism in soccer breaks down into several categories. Maguire identifies overt racism
(racial incidents) and covert racism (minorities having to be better than whites to justify
their positions.) As soccer increased its anti-racist credentials, black players are often
effectively discouraged from challenging racism. They tend to internalize their

8 Greenfield and Osborn, Regulating Football, 144; Richie Moran, “Racism in Football: A Victim’s
Football,” 197-198; Garland and Rowe, Racism and Anti-Racism, 4; Greenfield and Osborn, Regulating
Football, 135; Franklin Foer, How Soccer Explains the World: An Unlikely Theory of Globalization (New
response and use it to motivate themselves to greater achievements on the playing field. Greenfield and Osborn identify three areas of racist attitude within soccer: access to the game by ethnic groups, relationships between those within the game, and relationships between fans and players. The equating of racism and hooliganism, and their connections to right wing activity tends to be problematic. The connection tends to lead to a caricature of racism, when far right hooligans are blamed for all the racist attitudes. Soccer grounds are open areas where race is also openly expressed. Fan racism tends to be more easily identified than more incidious racism, such as under-representation of minorities in management and administrative positions. But the attitude of “They’re just ordinary blokes, not hooligan Nazis” reinforces the racialized hierarchy inherent in the game.¹⁰

Soccer provides racists a place to play out a social problem, and it is the social problem that must be addressed. It is because soccer (and the streets) are areas where the construction of stereotypes about black men have been generated, and actually become part of the commonsense racism of today, that they need to be confronted, stereotypes banished, and attitudes changed.¹¹ Two important points need to be made before addressing race in Brazil and Germany. First, racism in soccer is not limited to those of


African descent. Anti-Semitism still exists and is worthy of a detailed study, however, the primary objective of European soccer hatred seems to be aimed at Africans and Asians. Theories abound about the influence of the economic situation’s impact on racist attitudes, particularly in Europe, but there is little controversy that the attitudes are deeply ingrained and remain hidden until they erupt. Soccer, with its chanting crowds providing anonymity and its open arena for displaying political beliefs, provides an area for the displaying of racist beliefs.12

Second, when exploring connections between race and style, a fine line needs to be walked between “celebrating diversity and reimposing old racial stereotypes.”13 When discussing race and soccer style, it is easy to fall into the trap of stereotypical pronouncements. I do my best to examine style in as non-biased a light as possible, yet not denying the racial influences on style and their contribution to the shaping of style. Brazil and Germany certainly provide vasts contrasts in this area. It is almost undeniable that concepts of race and racial construction have influenced both teams’ playing style. What is important to note is that racial construction is constructed as part of national identity. My aim is not to trace back stylistic inventions to a “three race” type of category, but rather to explore how Brazil and Germany constructed their definitions of race, and how that influenced their soccer style.

12 Foer, How Soccer Explains the World, 71.
CHAPTER 17
GERMANY, RACE AND SOCCER

Germany’s construction of race has a long history, but it is important to understand that German racial construction is always played out in the binary of “we” versus “the other.” This is significant not only in terms of soccer and soccer style, but in terms of how Germans see themselves and how they see others. Much of Germany’s racial construction has been combined with the concept of “volk” and what the meaning of “volk” implies to Germans. In order to differentiate themselves from the rest of white, Anglo-Saxon Europeans, Germany tried to instill in people the belief that they were separate and different from those they politically called “the other.” The concept of a German race has historically developed and is socially and culturally constructed. But German racism always revolves back to the concept of “other,” although exactly who the “other” was has fluctuated throughout history from the Slavic peoples to Jews to gypsies to the Turkish peoples. The issue of race has still not been resolved in Germany, and continues to rear its head on the soccer field today.

In the mid 1800’s, three concepts motivated the development of racist belief in Germany. One was the rise of Social Darwinistic theory, second was the increasing nationalistic fervor, and third was the increase within Germany of the lower classes and
their connections with the labor movement. Binding these three concepts was the idea of “other” and an increasing alliance of the people and aggression. Among the most prominent of the early proponents of racist ideology was Heinrich von Treitschke. Von Treitschke was the intellectual leader of the Bismark faction, a lecturer at the University of Berlin, and a member of the Reichstag. He preached that history was a struggle of race versus race, and he assigned racial characteristics to specific groups of people. In his view, Orientals were effeminate, Latins were shallow-minded, blacks were submissive, and Germans were national warriors with high spiritual influence. Germans’ role in history was to subjugate inferior races, particularly the Slavic race, which he felt threatened Germany’s eastern flank. He combined nationalism, racial superiority and colonialism into one package, and sold it to the German people at a time when Germany was a newly formed nation and shaky with their national status on an international stage.¹

During the mid 1800’s racial theorizing turned to racism, and allied with Social Darwinism, began to lead to licensed aggression within Germany. The favorite enemy became other races, which eventually led to the conceptualization of the Aryan race. Social Darwinism took a different track in Germany than it did in England and the United States, as it became not socialist but aristocratic, and thus was adopted and accepted by the bourgeoisie. Otto Ammon refined Social Darwinism into a racial anthropological approach directed against Socialism, and ventured some of the first

racist opinions on the superiority of the white race, particularly the upper class. By 1873, an aristocratic Social Darwinism was virulent in racial theory in Germany, partially based on the 1871 report by the London Anthropological Institutes that racially analyzed French and German as races. France was designated as having effeminate and nervous racial traits, whereas Germany was characterized as “bone and muscle.” Social Darwinism was translated in Germany not as survival of the fittest, but rather, survival of the fittest race.²

From 1864-1871, an increasing minority problem occurred in Germany as massive numbers of Polish immigrants moved into the Ruhr region. The influx of Polish immigrants led to a homogenization policy by Prussia, which was administered as “Germanisation.” This growing group of workers, often associated in German minds with the labor movement, was interpreted as a threat by the German ruling class. By 1900, a population explosion was occurring in the German masses (but not the aristocratic classes), and Social Darwinism had become radicalized, leading to a combination of theories of racial hygiene and eugenics. The Turnen movement, still prominent and nationalistic, excluded minorities and used gymnastics and sports as a vehicle for segregating minorities. Nationalism, which Germans termed kulternation, had been steadily rising since the early 1800’s. Kulturnation was the basis of German

---
belief on Germaness, basing a family of history, blood ties, and language as the formation of citizenship. Particular emphasis was ancestry, which led to a closed rather than open, or a Particularist rather than Universalist, definition of who was German. Being German was not a choice, but rather a destiny based on blood lines.³

Anti-Semitism had a long history in Germany, dating back hundreds and hundreds of years. After 1848, the myth of Judaism and capitalism became embedded in the petite bourgeoisie of France, Germany and Austria. Germany constructed the racial identity of Jews, not as a religion, but as a biologically determined race separate from their own. This construction was crucial in the rise of modern anti-Semitism. Scientific anti-Semitism became more prevalent in the 1890’s, and was shaped by political means connected to industrial capitalism. Primitive xenophobia led to political anti-Semitism and occurred in an atmosphere of rising militant nationalism associated with German unification. Modern anti-Semitism sought the physical extermination of Jews as a political end, and bolstered this argument with racial and biological “evidence.” The Germans believed they were destined to rule over the Slavs and the Jews, and by 1905, Woltmann was advancing the theory that the German race was to dominate the earth. The student associations, so prominent in Germany, also demonstrated both an anti-foreign (especially French) bias as well as anti-Semitism. The lower middle class

adopted this anti-Semitic belief, and by the 1920’s, the middle class was channeling anger at outsiders against the “other” which it defined as strangers and Jews.4

The idea of the Aryan superman was based on nineteenth century theories involving three concepts: the theory of biological justification of competition, the creation of the “other” based on pseudo-science, and the historic concept of military masculinity. These three concepts combined in Germany to represent the ideology of the master race. Interestingly enough, the concept of a superman was shaped individually in other countries, but in Germany the concept was based on the idea of a super race. The German idea of *volkgeist* resembled the idea of race, and by 1928, Günther was advocating “up-breeding” in Germany as a means of reaching the Aryan ideal. At this point, the social-biological concepts combined with the increasing nationalism to create German racism. The rising power of the Nazis already had a clear hegemony in the field of racial consciousness, which they exploited to further their political purposes.5

Nazi theory coalesced around those it considered the “other,” particularly the Jews, the Slavs, homosexuals, communists, the disabled and the Romany. Hitler was able to sell the idea that being a member of the German race held greater value than membership in

---


previous social groupings, such as the student association, the middle class or the aristocracy. But racism did not end with the fall of the Nazi regime in Germany. Race had become an element of German national identity. Now, racism has focused on anti-immigration feelings based on issues of culture, religion, and employment. Wagg notes that Germany is showing the fiercest expression of ethnic and racial hostility since World War II. During the 1960’s, Germany used the term *gastarbeiter*, or guest worker, to describe workers imported as cheap labor. By the late 1960’s, the state of the economy, the rise of the neo-fascist parties and open racism had led to a change in the terminology of immigrants. They were then called *fremdarbeiter*, a term used in the 1950’s and re-emerging, meaning foreign worker. Now, the most common term is *ausländer*, or foreigner, and refers to all persons whose origins are outside of Germany, no matter how many generations they have lived in Germany, and irrespective of whether citizenship is held. The “foreigner” label is often applied to those that have lived in Germany for decades. German anti-immigrant racism began to increase as the issue entered the mainstream political agenda. The Republican Party in Germany began to advocate for cultural separatism and encouraged that non-citizens not be granted the same rights as citizens. Their focus on cultural separatism emphasized the right of each culture to develop freely, and thus rejected the charge of racism inherent in the philosophy. 

---


Germany’s liberal policy on political asylum as well as an open door policy to ethnic Germans has led to a huge increase in immigration. Germans currently fear Turkish and Slavic miscegenation. The reunification of the two Germanys has further increased tension and resentment for repatriates. The 1992 Rostock incident indicated a trend of racism that had been suppressed and was now coming to the forefront of public attention in a variety of ways. The growth of the right wing Republican Party who advocated that Germany be a closed ethnic community and demanded total rejection of a multicultural community is present. They label their concerns as volksgemeinschaft, or a defense of German rights.8

Article 16 (1993) reduced and restricted immigration due to a “moral panic” of the German population. Germans overall were showing a growing displeasure with European immigration, even though Germany had been rather aggressively segregating migrants, particularly those of Turkish extraction, in separate schools and communities. Of the migrants living in Germany, 25% had lived there for over twenty years, and 50% for over ten years. By 2001, “foreigners” comprised a full 9% of the German population. Immigrants had to wait fifteen years to apply for naturalization, and even then had difficulty qualifying. In a poll published in Handesblatt in 2002 indicated that


8 Evans, “Languages of Racism within Contemporary Europe,” 46-48; Merkel, Sombert and Tokarski, “Football, Racism and Xenophobia in Germany: 50 Years Later- Here We Go Again?” 146; Gerd Knischewski, “Post-War National Identity in Germany,” Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe, 144.
54% of the Germans believed that immigrants were not interested in assimilating, and 43% believed that immigrants were more violent than ethnic Germans.\textsuperscript{9}

The discontent over immigration spilled into racist philosophy by young, lower class males with sympathy for racism, neo-Nazism and anti-Semitism. The rise of right wing parties in Germany should be considered a concern. Currently, they attract about 10% of the vote, are dominated by young people, and do not include moderates in large numbers. Should moderates start to be attracted to the parties due to immigration concerns, Germany could easily shift back into a racist political philosophy. The increase in violent incidents with xenophobic or racist backgrounds is a concern. German president Horst Koehler proclaimed in 2005 that “racism and right wing extremism have no change in modern Germany.” As he spoke the words under Berlin’s Brandenburg Gate, a mile down the road 3,000 neo-Nazis applauded a singer extolling “Our hearts are with heroes like Rudoph Hess.” Support seems to be growing for far right wing parties.\textsuperscript{10} The history of racism in German soccer has been evident since the 1933 expulsion of Jewish players from soccer clubs. The significance wasn’t merely that it occurred, but rather that the timing of the nazification of German clubs was


\textsuperscript{10} Judis, “Domestic Threat”, 24; Evans, “Languages of Racism within Contemporary Europe,” 48; Merkel, Sombert and Tokarsi, “Football, Racism and Xenophobia in Germany: 50 Years Later- Here We Go Again?”, 150; Matthew Schofield, “Germany’s neo-Nazis Protest Events Marking End of WWII,” \textit{Columbus Dispatch} (May 9, 2005): A-5.
forced through even before Hitler ordered it. National team coach, Nerz, and the DFB were notably susceptible to racist ideology.\textsuperscript{11}

Several key features of racism are exhibited in German soccer. Merkel, Sombert and Tokarski identify three main areas: fan chants, jeers, and racist attitudes displayed by coaches, particularly to black players. I also add concerns about right wing hooliganism activity associated with soccer, and the lack of integration of soccer teams, as well as racist attitudes displayed by German players. Germany prefers to ignore racism and racial issues due to sensitivity over the Nazi past. However, the soccer bureaucracy often turned a blind eye to issues that should have been addressed. Since World War II, the DFB has taken a half-hearted approach to combating racism and xenophobia. In 1993, the DBF spokesperson said that “foreigners have become fully integrated into organized club football. We don’t think there are any particular problems for foreigners in regulated football.”\textsuperscript{12} The reality is far different. In 1963, the Bundesliga featured five foreign nationals in the whole league. By the 1992-93 season, there were five per team, with an accompanying increase in verbal xenophobic and racist attacks from the fans. Black players in particular face a cold and hostile reception involving racial slurs. Even the numbers are indicative of concern. In the French first division, 50 blacks are employed as players, whereas in Germany only 20 are. Young black players do tend to

\textsuperscript{11} Ulrich Hesse-Lichtenberger, \textit{Tor! The Story of German Football} (London: WSC Books, 2002), 31-32, 78-80; Merkel, Sombert and Tokarski, “Football, Racism and Xenophobia in Germany: 50 Years Later-Here We Go Again?”, 154.
be imported and trained, but then are sold at a profit for the clubs. One German author notes that foreign athletes, particularly blacks, are appreciated in Germany only as long as they perform. Several black players, including Julio Cesar, have initiated opt-out clauses in their contracts due to racism.¹³

After the 1998 World Cup win by a multicultural French team, the German press showed increased interest in the multiracial team and the way that black players dealt with hostility. When Gerald Asamoah was the first black to be named to the German national team in 2001, Der Spiegel called the national team a “cultural treasure.” But the German press has also contributed to the racism exhibited in Germany. One newspaper called Asamoah a “warrior from the Ashanti tribe.” Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung, referring to Cameroonian soccer players, said “They seem to have learned their feeling for the ball in the cradle.” Kicker magazine ran an article entitled “Why our Bundesliga Stars Cannot Play as Well as the ‘Black Lions’ from Africa: The Artists from Africa: It’s Pure Nature.” The article details that “The catlike suppleness of the Africans is innate, not achieved by training.” ¹⁴

Much of the German racist abuse centered around the black player in soccer, whereas Turkish migrants were the focus of societal abuse. Germany had, as indicated by the

¹³ Merkel, Sombert and Tokarski, “Football, Racism and Xenophobia in Germany: 50 Years Later- Here We Go Again?”, 153, 156, 158; Kim, “Germany’s Soccer Team Scores a Multiracial First,” 2.
newspapers, a belief in the natural advantages and superiority of the black athlete. German construction of race, in soccer, centered on this belief with an almost fatalistic aspect. Hoberman notes that this belief is even more pronounced currently in Germany than it was during the Nazi era, and that the response is a relatively benign exoticism that celebrates rather than vents racist feeling. I would challenge that the feelings are not so benign, based on countless reports.\textsuperscript{15}

In the 1988 Holland versus Germany game, the German crowd made loud and pointed jeers directed toward the two black Dutch players, Gullit and Rijkaard. The fans made monkey noises and pointed out their own, all white team. Skinheads harassed black players in the Bundesliga. In 1992, German national team player, Lothar Matthäus, invited a women’s volleyball team to check out his black teammates physical credentials, saying “The black guy has the biggest one of us all.” A German coach remarked that he liked black player’s skill and speed, called them “black antelopes,” and then noted that unfortunately, they had little intellectual capacity. Gerald Asamoah, the first black German player on the national team, compared himself to Jackie Robinson. Asamoah left Ghana at age twelve, and notes that being the first black on the German national team means he is viewed differently from every other player on the field. He testified that racism is a constant, if latent, companion for black soccer players in Germany.\textsuperscript{16}

The reality is that blacks are not the only group suffering racist abuse in German football. After German reunification, increased ethnification and deliberate ethnic segregation was observed in German sport. There was a growth of ethnic sport clubs, particularly Turkish, so that players could participate without hatred being directed against them. The West German population, despite being of the same ethno-national community as the East Germans, denigrated and disassembled East German soccer after reunification. Despite demonstrating racist attitudes toward black Dutch soccer players, Germans seem bewildered by Dutch hysteria toward Germany’s soccer team, and attribute it to another kind of racism. The European press, particularly the British press, is quick to display both xenophobic and jingoistic attitudes toward German soccer. The editor of the Daily Mirror acknowledged that he would not print racist comments about West Indian cricket players, but would about Germans.17

The rise of hooliganism and accompanying racist terminology has appeared on a global basis. So what makes Germany different, and how has it impacted on the way, or the style, that is played in the game of soccer? Stiehler and Marr have attributed six reasons for the cause of what they term a “current crisis in German football.” One of

---

their reasons is that too many foreigners play in important team positions, with the implication that German youth are not being developed in those positions. Despite a large Turkish contingent in the German population, there are no Turkish players in the professional league in Germany. The first black made the national team in 2001. Particularly, the national team has demonstrated an “ethnic purity” that contrasts with multiethnic teams from other countries.\(^{18}\)

This ethnic purity is what has impacted on soccer style. The German national team is renowned for their consistent, reliable but not creative playing style. Although in 2005, this stereotype appears to be open to new construction; my theory is that this particular style has evolved at least partially due to the absence of multiethnic players. I do not advocate the belief that “black players are gazelles” or are endowed with super-athletic abilities. This is not a biological construction of style, but rather a cultural one. As the German national team has, until recently, remained an entirely closed ethnical team, stylistic changes are slower in being introduced. Variety may be the spice of life, but in soccer terms, the flavor of differences can lead to increased creativity. The lack of creativity has been a recurring criticism of the German team. Whereas Wagg points out that the German national soccer team has been a focus of nationalistic sentiment expressed mainly in military terms,\(^{19}\) it becomes clearer why the team has maintained such an ethnic purity. Germany’s whole conceptualization of the “other” in terms of


race and ethnicity, play out in the German national soccer team. The binary of “we” versus the “other”, and increased nationalistic sentiment surrounding the team, has led to invisible racial barriers being erected around this national symbol. Monoculturalism led to a blandness of playing style that effectively displays those virtues connected with national habitus that Germans see themselves displaying: discipline, strength, control and success. However, construction of national identity and playing style is never a closed arena, and is constantly reacting to cultural changes which may be occurring within the German national team at this point. Under Jürgen Klinnsman, the team displayed a more creative playing style in the Confederations Cup 2005. (Of course, of all anamolies, the defense was a porous sieve… very un-German if we go by the stereotypical image.) Should this creativity on offense extend into the 2006 World Cup, the German soccer style stereotype will be challenged. The conclusion is that race, or lack of a multicultural environment, has influenced the German national team soccer style.

The issue of race remains unresolved in Germany. It appears to be an unacknowledged and deniable issue both in soccer and the general culture. No doubt the Nazi historical connection has made Germany hyper-aware of presenting a non-racist image to the global community. However, it would appear that racist and xenophobic attitudes have merely been buried, rather than addressed. The growing foreign population, and the fact that citizenship is so difficult to obtain, is significant. The rising tide of far-right political influence, although controlled at this point, indicates that immigration is
problematic in the German mind. (Note: It was only in the 1990’s that citizenship was changed so that it was not strictly “blood based.”) Germany is eventually going to have to publicly address the far right, rather than fail to acknowledge it. Racial concerns remain hidden and buried in Germany, but in a globalized and multicultural world, need to be addressed or the country risks entering an isolation syndrome.
The construction of race and its application to soccer is more complex in Brazil than it is in Germany. In Germany, the construction is always in the binary of “we” versus the “other.” In Brazil, racial construction all takes place in the “we” spectrum of the binary, and race has been problematic for many years. Most Brazilians would say, “No, we do not have a race problem. What we have is a class problem.” And in many ways, they would be correct. Class, or social hierarchy in inevitably bound up with the concept of race in Brazil, and racial construction is often hidden within the hierarchy. Racism in Brazil is not overt, as class is, but rather functions in a covert manner, unacknowledged and hidden. But it does exist, and has had tremendous impact on both soccer and how soccer style has developed. Whereas Germany has made a historic issue of maintaining ethnic purity, Brazil has developed at the opposite end of the pendulum. In Brazil, racial blending has occurred for several hundred years, and is often a celebrated part of national identity. This racial blending has also been a concern for Brazil.

The 1550 establishment of a plantation system, or latifunda system, in Brazil led to the importation of black slaves to work the latifundas. By 1580, the state of Bahia already had 3-4,000 slaves. The indigenous native population had not proved to be appropriate
latifunda workers on several accounts. Hundreds of years of a simple shifting-cultivation mode of subsistence had not prepared the native population for a dawn to dusk mode of heavy work. Some natives were enslaved, although the effort was official banned, by “just” wars against recalcitrant groups of natives. Under the Catholic doctrine, the “savages” were to be saved, not enslaved, as part of their colonial doctrine. The Jesuits, often portrayed as the saviors of the indigenous population, actually did more to harm the natives’ numbers than many other groups. The Jesuits carried their salvation messages to the natives, but this was not efficient and lacked results. So the Jesuits rounded up the natives and crowded them into mission villages, where they succumbed to white men’s diseases very rapidly. Smallpox was particularly virulent to the native Brazilian, and after a mere 70 years of colonization, about 95% of the indigenous population had disappeared from the Atlantic forests.¹

The Portuguese colonizers began to import African slaves, first to supplement, then as a substitute for the indigenous workers. During the 1500’s, it was the Guine cycle of slaves, which left little impact on the culture as the numbers were limited to about seven thousand. These slaves were generally Sudanese, and Islamic. The 1600’s was dominated by the Angola and Congo cycle of slavery, mainly of the Bantu populations. The Mina Coast cycle lasted until about 1780, and the last cycle saw slaves from the Bight of Benin imported, which ended around 1851. This last cycle included the

Yoruba, which eventually achieved hegemony over the other slaves. Around a total of 4 million slaves were imported to Brazil by the colonial government, which comprised 40% of the total global slave trade. During the colonial era, Brazil was numerically dominated by the slaves, and since the 1600’s, Brazilians have included blacks in their written history.²

Miscegenation occurred freely and early. While interracial marriage is not uncommon, most of the mixing took place outside of marriage, and was referred to by some as “nighttime integration.” The intermixing of black and white led to a substantial numbers of mulattos in the population. As early as 1711, this mulatto category was widely accepted and plainly visible in the culture. J.A. Antonil, in Cultura e Opulencia do Brasil, noted that “Brazil is hell for Negroes, Purgatory for Whites, and Paradise for Mullatoes.”³ During the colonial era, Portuguese law prohibited intermarriage between the races, but the law was never enforced. By 1831, slave trade in Brazil was supposedly ended by treaty with Britain, but in actuality, it continued for at least twenty more years. In 1845, the British Aberdeen Bill, whereby slave ships could be searched and slaves on board were freed, began to impact Brazilian importation of slaves. In 1848, 60,000 slaves were imported, but by 1850, the slave trade was being terminated.

However, termination of the slave trade merely meant new slaves were not being imported, not that slavery had been abolished. In 1840, the Brazilian emperor had personally freed all of his own slaves. The Law of the Free Womb passed in 1871, making all children born to slaves in Brazil free persons. By 1872, the number of free black persons more than doubled the number of those still held in slavery. The states of Ceara and Amazonas declared all slaves free in 1884, but it was not until 1888, with the passage of the Golden Law, that slavery was officially abolished within the country. (Abolition precipated the fall of the monarchy, according to Burns.) The 1888 response to the abolishment of slavery was an increased emphasis within the culture on personal hygiene, including bathing, clothing and type of shoes, and the creation of a vagrancy law.\footnote{Degler, \textit{Neither Black nor White}, 43, 52; Burns, \textit{A History of Brazil}, 129, 133, 157, 180-183, 189, 194, 201; Roberto DaMatta, \textit{Carnivals, Rogues, and Heroes: An Interpretation of the Brazilian Dilemma} (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 153; Jan Rocha, \textit{In Focus Brazil: A Guide to the People, Politics and Culture} (New York: Interlink Books, 2000), 9.}

Slavery was a national institution in Brazil, as opposed to a regional institution in the United States. But sectionalism was also apparent, as the latifunda system cycled through sugar plantations, a gold rush, coffee, and rubber plantations in the monocultural society. Brazil never did develop a full blown racial defense of slavery, and slaves were not considered less than human, as they were in other places. In Brazil, slaves were considered only temporarily degraded, not historically or socially subhuman. There were fewer limits on manumission of slavery in Brazil than the U.S., and slaves were allowed one free day per week for their own. That did not mean there was not torture
and ill-treatment of the slaves, as there was. The average life span of a slave was approximately seven years after starting work on the plantations. Whereas the slave system was sustained by birth in the U.S., Brazil imported a heavy male ratio, so the population tended to decrease rather than increase, and more slaves needed to be imported to maintain the work force. Whereas the slave was often feared, the black man was not, and Brazilians rarely defended slavery on racial grounds. Religion was used to support slavery, however, but the Catholic Church did recognize marriages between blacks, and allowed slaves to join Catholic brotherhood organizations.  

In the mid 1800’s, participation by blacks in sport was not readily accepted. Monteiro Lopes, a well known black politician, was denied entrance to a regatta in Rio de Janiero. What made the event noteworthy was when Maria de Melo, considered a radical woman for her times, left the event and went to the harbor to gather up support. She and thirty blacks invaded the regatta in protest. Blacks had been accepted as soldiers in the Brazilian army, as whites had never been in the majority of the population until European immigration had been increased. During the 1800’s, Brazil began encouraging immigration from European nations, particularly Portugal, Italy and Germany. Because centuries of miscegenation in Brazil had blurred the racial and cultural distinctions that separated Africans and Europeans, Brazilians developed the theory of *embraquecimento*, or the doctrine of whitening blacks and indigenous populations by further intermixing with white Europeans. Whitening became an

---

officially promoted policy, but white remained the somatic norm. In 1890, the
government ordered all records pertaining to slavery to be destroyed, and from 1889-
1914, the elite accepted and promoted the theory of whitening the population.6

Around 1900, the myth of the three races was being actively promoted, along with the
concept of “whitening.” The myth of the three races and the concept of
embraquecimento were associated not only with the expansion of the white population
but with the eugenics concept of strengthening the body and promoting its well being.
The Brazilian environment, and the monocultural system, did not allow the “clearing”
of racial impurity as Argentina had done. The blacks and indigenous natives as well as
the mulatto population outnumbered the whites. The cultural tradition, the fable of the
three races led to the formation of a Brazilian national ideology that each of the three
designated races contributed something positive to the making of Brazilians. It was a
logic of inclusion “articulated on planes of complementary opposition” as DaMatta puts
it. The black population supposedly brought happiness and rhythm, the Indian
population brought tenacity and synchronization with nature, while the white European
population brought language and social institutions. The resultant blending, or mixture,
led to a coherent and harmonious nature. For the Brazilian population, diversity is not
the correct word, but rather blending. Banck refers to Brazilian culture as a true creole

6 Victor DeMelo and J.A. Mangan, “A Web of the Wealthy: Modern Sport in the Nineteenth-Century
Culture of Rio de Janeiro,” The International Journal of the History of Sport, 14 (1997): 171; Degler,
Neither Black nor White, 80; Skidmore, Black Into White, 40, 44, 64; Voeks, Sacred Leaves of
Candomblé, 132; Lamartine P. Da Costa and Plinio Labriola, “Bodies from Brazil: Fascist Aesthetics in a
South American Setting,” The International Journal of the History of Sport, 16 (1999): 164; Chris Taylor,
Burns, A History of Brazil, 39.
culture, whereby two or more widely separate historical currents mix in a center-periphery relationship. Evidence of Brazil’s ideological evolution toward a pluralistic concept of society can be traced back to the 1800’s, as opposed to a biracial society like the United States. Phenotypes began to be emphasized as a subtle means of categorization.\(^7\)

The whole concept of miscegenation has led to intermediary categories of race that are not evident in other countries. In Brazil, the emphasis is on appearance rather than race, but the aspects of appearance are racial phenotypes. The hierarchal culture allowed movement within the status categories by color of skin and hair and facial characteristics. The Brazilian mulatto was not considered or categorized as being black, as opposed to the United States where any African blood categorized the individual as being black. Brazil adopted the cultural policy that any white blood led to an individual being categorized pardo, or mulato. Degler identifies categories of classification in Bahia state in 1971. The lowest level of society was composed of pretos (black) or preto retinto (dark black.) Next would be cabra (slightly less black), cabo verde (lighter than the preto, but still dark but with straight hair, thin lips and a narrow, straight nose.) Next is the escuro (dark, but still lighter than preto.) The mulato is divided into two

classes, *mulato escuro* (dark) and *mulato claro* (light.) *Pardo* would be a lighter mulatto. *Sararã* has light skin and red or blond hair that is kinky or curly. The *moreno* has light skin and straight hair, but is not considered white. The *branco de terra* is a light color, and is treated as a white in social classifications. By 1980, the census was officially listing four racial groups. *Branco* was white, and 54.8% of the population classified themselves as branco. *Pardo* was brown or mulatto, and 38.6% classified themselves in this category, while 5.9% classified themselves as *preto* or black, and .67% as *amarelo* or Asian. As DaMatta has pointed out, Brazil has institutionalized the intermediary, and he notes the categories of *mulatto* (blending of black and white), *cafuso* (blending of black and Indian) and *mameluco* (blending of white and Indian.) By 2002, the last census listed over 100 racial categories to choose from. Chappell notes that 53% declared themselves white, 22% mulatto, 12% mestizo (white and Amerindian), 11% black, and 1% Japanese. Many individuals designate themselves lighter or a higher category for social status reasons. Because social status can be improved by whitening, increased miscegenation was promoted. The Brazilian identity card includes *cutis*, or skin color, on it.8

Carl Degler is widely recognized in academic circles for his development of the mulatto escape hatch theory. He summarizes that the designation of intermediary categories

---

liberates social tensions in Brazil and allows for compensations in a rigidly hierarchal
culture. The mulatto escape hatch allows upward mobility but also encourages stronger
class lines. DaMatta would agree, noting that the Brazilian system is functional and
exhibits original sequences of social compensation. However, the Brazilian racial
system is not a reflex of class structure (Marxism) but has its own etiquette and
symbolism embedded within. It is significant that Brazil lacks the tradition of formal
separation of the races. In the United States, the motto is “separate but equal”, whereas
in the Brazil the motto might well be “equal but different.”

During the 1920’s, Brazil proposed color bars for immigration, and the 1920’s and
1930’s saw the consolidation of the whitening ideal being strengthened. Brazilians
believed that they could not build a true culture due to the miscegenation, and the
national identity of the country was a concern. The 1933 publication of The Masters
and the Slaves by Gilberto Freyre had an immediate impact on how the country
regarded itself and the shaping of the Brazilian national identity. Freyre, although now
regarded as racist in his views, proposed that Brazilian culture was a composition of
“Apollonian rationality and Dionysian malevolence.” He proposed a new, pro-mulatto
view of national identity, and focused on the malandro, that mixed race artful dodger
character so beloved by Brazilian peoples. Freyre promoted that the African and the
Indian positively shaped Brazilian culture, creating a country of peoples that were
unique and had inherited the strengths of all three cultures. Given that the myth of the

9 Degler, Neither Black nor White, 5, 182, 279; DaMatta, “For an Anthropology of the Brazilian
Tradition,” 274, 281, 289; Skidmore, Black into White, 40.
three races was also embedded into the culture, Freyre’s theories were readily accepted and officially promoted by the government. During the 1930’s, attention shifted from an emphasis on the native, indigenous population (which had gone through a period of glorification) to the Afro-Brazilian. Meanwhile, the Brazilian elite steered a course midway between Freyre’s theories and what was remarkable close to Nazi theory. The exaltation of the black culture was used in the creation of the Brazilian national identity.¹⁰

After World War II, Brazil demonstrated revulsion toward German racism, and also continued to reject institutionalized racism. By the mid 1950’s, the whitening goal for the country ceased to be considered respectable. In 1951, Brazil passed the Alfonso Arinos law, which penalized discrimination in public places. In the 1960’s, the initial attacks began on the myth of racial democracy in Brazil. By 1980, the MNUCDR, or Blacks Against Racism, had formed, but had little political power, and little support from the black population. Afro-Brazilians tend to reject racial origins, and there are no groups equivalent to the NAACP. The mid 1980’s featured some of the first Brazilian discourses on black samba and white exploitation, and the beginnings of racial consciousness. It wasn’t until 1986 that a black won a Brazilian beauty contest. This was enhanced in 1995 by the celebration of the 300th anniversary of the death of Zumbi,

¹⁰ Skidmore, Black into White, 64, 173, 190-192, 197; Oliven, Tradition Matters, 25, 84; Bellos, Futebol, 36; Rout, “Brazil: Study in Black, Brown and Beige,” 372.
the Afro-Brazilian that fought off the Portuguese from his quilombo. But the myth of racial democracy remains strong in Brazil, particularly among the black population.\textsuperscript{11}

While the myth of racial democracy is still promulgated in Brazil, racial prejudice does exist and is practiced through covert exclusion. It is a strictly a myth that racism does not exist in Brazil, although many would promote the concept that it is class and not racial prejudice. The further south one travels in Brazil, the greater the increase in the bias. Brazilian racial tolerance does not mean equality, although there is an element of prejudice against prejudice. While there are aspects that do involve the social hierarchy, the blacks are always at the bottom and the whites at the top of the economic and social pyramid. President Cardoso finally admitted publicly that “Yes, there is prejudice. We have denied racism and that has led to cultural and social problems.” It wasn’t until 1997 that the Brazilian Supreme Court upheld the first case against racial prejudice, when a black man was fired to “whiten the department.” Rocha calls Brazil’s racism a “social apartheid.” Costa-Lima notes that Brazilian society officially ignored racial discrimination, and thus it became more sophisticated than in the United States. He designates Brazilian discrimination as having two aspects: one based on race and class, and the other with a diachronic perspective which forces a fragile identity and distrust

of oneself. The Afro-Brazilian is marginalized in the society which has led to omission of the black in popular media, such as television.  

Racism is called *pre conceito de côr* in Brazil, and DaMatta calls it a “peculiar form of racism.” He notes that after abolition, the aristocrats created counter-customs to reestablish their hierarchy, and the privileged areas became the house and the body. It was from theories of the body that Brazil developed their form of racism, and it displayed two distinct phases. The first phase exhibited a rigid and hierarchal ideology of the backward black and the civilized white. After Freyre’s racial theories became accepted, interstices or mediating points appeared during the second phase, which led to a further glorification of miscegenation and the mulatto. DaMatta contrasts the racial systems in Brazil with the United States. In the United States, a legal countersystem was established to control what had been abolished. Racism became an ideology with a code of laws, the Jim Crow laws. In Brazil, racism developed with a strong aesthetic and moral component, but not a legal one. Brazil highlighted the areas of personal relationships without legislation, and personal relationships became the privileged areas for prejudice. In Brazilian modernity, there is interplay between the constitutional code and the hierarchal, moral code. There is where racism plays out in Brazil. Whereas America has an egalitarian code that leads to race and hierarchy, Brazil’s daily life

---

features inequity. Brazilian society falls halfway between liberal individualism and hierarchal holism, making it both a traditional and a modern society. As Rout puts it, “Things (racism) are more subtle here.” 13

Archetti calls Latin American societies hybrid societies, because of the abundance of mixed race populations. His designation of hybrid sets up the binaries of purity versus hybrid, inclusion versus exclusion, and notes that boundaries always exist between the groups. Brazilian favelas (shanty towns) are 71% black. With a population of 170 million, Brazil has more blacks than any other country except Nigeria. The patron saint of Brazil, Nossa Senhora da Aparecida, is a black Madonna. Blacks and mulattoes comprise about 50-60% of the population, but of 513 Congressmen, only 11 are black. The income of blacks is half that of whites. One fourth of the whites and 40% of the black population are illiterate. Blacks die thirteen years younger than whites in Brazil. Apartment buildings often feature two elevators, one for upper class and one for lower class (read black.) In 2003, the State University of Rio de Janeiro became the first university in the country to institute a quota system to correct inequities that have suppressed blacks. Only 2% of the university students had been black, and 44% of the black students had dropped out after admission. The new affirmative action program would institute 20% of the students be black, 20% be from disadvantaged public schools and 5% would be Indian or physically handicapped. All 45% would be from lower income brackets. Over 300 law suits have been filed to block the quotas, and an

enormous amount of fraud has been identified as whites apply presenting themselves as mulatto or black to gain admission priority.\textsuperscript{14}

No national civil or military leader is black in Brazil. One Catholic archbishop is. Blacks are considered best as artists, criminals and soccer players. Animosity exists between Afro-Brazilians and mulattos. Few blacks are found as businessmen in Brazil. Upper class whites interact more freely with blacks than do the middle class, and Degler surmises that the middle class is more threatened as it is a more permeable designation. Success can whiten a black man’s image in Brazil. Former soccer player, Robson, states: “I was black and know how it feels.” Both of Pelé’s marriages were to white women, and Pelé’s children are officially registered as white.\textsuperscript{15}

The intersection of race and soccer has an extended history in Brazil. Given that race is such a contested area in Brazilian culture, it should little surprise that it has impacted, and continues to impact, both on soccer and soccer style. This intersection plays out in several ways: first as a means of exclusion to the sport, then as a means of inclusion with paternalistic implications and a means of promotion in a hierarchal system, and finally as a means of defining and promoting both soccer style and national identity. It is my contention that Brazil has used race to define their soccer style, but this is an


“edgy” area that lends itself to racial stereotyping. What I intend to show is that Brazil has used race along with historical and traditional Afro-Brazilian cultural somatic influences to develop their particular style of play in soccer. The character of typical Brazilian soccer is directly related to representations of blacks in the culture. While in the past these stylistic formations were assumed to be racial characteristics, now they are more readily perceived as Afro-Brazilian culture.\(^\text{16}\)

Historically tracing how racial issues have impacted on the game of soccer in Brazil is an important contribution to understanding how playing style in Brazil has embraced an Afro-Brazilian definition, and why that definition now stands as the standard for Brazilian soccer style. Not long after 1888, Afro-Brazilians began to appear on rosters of smaller clubs. They were not always welcome, as early Brazilian soccer was predominantly elitist, so class and racial barriers existed. Italians, Germans, Spanish and Portuguese were the first assimilated into the game and poor whites and mixed race individuals appeared later. By the early 1900’s, blacks that worked at coffee factories, the docks, and railroad yards were being exposed to soccer, and generally participating, although not on sanctioned teams. Soccer allowed blacks expression without repression, much as jazz served the same purpose in the United States. The earliest indication of a black player on the roster of a semi-major team was around 1906, when América recruited a black player. What had caused a crack to open in the playing door was Bangu’s addition of Brazilians to a factory team in 1904. Bangu added the factory

worker/player, which allowed poor whites, blacks and mulattos to enter the playing field and test their skills against the larger, more elitist clubs. From 1906 to 1922 in Rio de Janeiro, no team with blacks or mulattos won the carioca championship. In 1909, the racial barrier was broken for good by Arthur Friedenreich.  

Friedenreich had a German father and a black mother, but was accepted as elite because of his light skin and European style upbringing. He had green eyes, and crinkly hair that he would iron for half an hour before games and then slick down with brillantine. He played for Germânia as a boy, having a German father, and as Galeano puts it, “He brought to the solemn stadiums of whites the irreverence of brown boys.” Friedenreich scored the winning goal in the 1919 South American championship, and had his game boots displayed in a jeweler’s window. Being accepted by the elite, he was upset when chosen to play with the blacks in black versus white games, which were becoming common. Friedenreich scored more goals than Pelé in his career, and played until he was 43. He was the first “soccer hero” in Brazil.

---

It is apparent that blacks were in attendance at games. When the English Corinthians visited in 1910, a small black child ran out of the stands onto the field and kicked the visiting player in the rear end. Blacks and mulattos were also playing the game, but mainly by forming their own teams and arranging their own competitions. Prior to 1914, blacks from São Paulo were forming teams, and apparently at least black “pick up games” were occurring in Rio. A report by a team from Exeter City noted observing two black teams playing barefoot near the docks. But blacks were not accepted on the large club teams in Rio, such as Flamengo, Fluminense and Botafoga. The São team of Palmeiras actually shut down their soccer team for awhile so to prevent black players, as did Bahiano de Tenis. Some blacks were playing on the factory teams, and this was more acceptable as the factory teams were perceived as helping to exert social control. Until 1918, the Federacão Brasileira de Sports actually banned blacks from any team sports. But of course, this did not apply to higher class mulatto players. The Rio club of Fluminense was one of the last clubs to accept black players, but they did sign the mulatto player, Carlos Alberto, in 1916.19

Carlos Alberto covered his face with rice powder before games, in order to appear whiter. It usually sweated away. The rice powder has become symbolic in the rivalry between Fla versus Flu, even today. Flamengo fans chant “pó de arroz” or rice powder at the Fluminense fans, who chant back, “Silence in the favelas!” Flu fans throw talc in

the air before games. The rivalry exposes both racial and class lines within Rio. Carlos Alberto was acceptable to Fluminense because he was a mulatto, but Afro-Brazilians had a more difficult time penetrating into the game.20

During the 1920’s, blacks began to enter the game in the wake of poor whites and mulattos. Bangu was the first club in Rio to field a black player according to one author, whereas another states that in São, Epaminadoes was the first followed by São Cristovão. In 1921, the President Pessoa ordered that only a team of white players should be fielded for the South American championship. He did not want Brazil’s national identity to be perceived as Afro-Brazilian by other South American countries, particularly Argentina.21 But it was also in 1921 that América signed Mantiega, a poor black sailor, whose nickname meant “butter” indicating his smoothness with the ball. Nine players, some from Rio’s leading families, resigned in protest. A mulatto on the team took to wearing a cap so his curly hair would not associate him with Mantiega. Mantiega was forced to remove his cap whenever someone spoke to him. It was not an easy life, and when Mantiega defected on a trip to Bahia, the nine resigners returned. It should be remembered that Brazil had not accepted professionalism at this point, so to

---


bring a player in off the docks because of his athletic ability meant he had to be paid under the table. “Brown professionalism” lasted from about 1915 to 1933.22

It wasn’t until 1923 that the color line was really breached, when Vasco fielded a team with four blacks and mulattos, although the number and “classification” varies. It wasn’t just the addition of the players that caused problems within the league, but that Vasco was an openly semi-professional team. They had recruited the best of the working class players, all races, put their players into semi-confinement before games, and paid them full time with non-existing jobs.23 The other teams in Rio were outraged, to say the least, particularly when Vasco won the Rio league that year, and the other teams withdrew and reformed as a separate league, excluding Vasco. The new league introduced a literacy test on the field, where players had to fill out forms with names and employment listings to prove that they were amateurs. This AMEA card lasted from 1924 to 1929, and was a direct reflection of class and race bias. Few poor blacks or whites were literate. Vasco was then invited back into the league after the AMEA card was established, and teams took to offering reading and writing crash courses to keep the better players eligible. Costa-Lima theorizes that when soccer surpassed rowing in popularity, the change in the somatic ideal threatened white supremacy, which led to stricter measures of control including the literacy measures.24


24 Mason, Passion of the People?, 50; Leite Lopes, “Successes and Contradictions,” 63; Bellos, Futebol, 33; Costa-Lima, “Inter-Relations,” 2.
The same year that Vasco won the league with a multiracial team, 1923, a Brazilian team traveled to Montevideo, Uruguay on a ship. During a formal dinner aboard ship, a white Fluminense player pretended to drink the lavender water placed at each place for finger washing. The working class players on the team had never seen such a practice before and solemnly drank all the finger bowls. They became a joke between coaches, who had been in favor of continued bans on blacks for reasons of etiquette. In 1925, Antônio Prado Júnior took a Paulistano club on the first European tour, and included his mulatto cousin, Joaquim, from the wealthy black branch of the family. This time, the racial bias came not from the Brazilians, but from the French. A French relative asked Antônio who “that monkey” was, and Antônio answered, “That is no monkey. That is your cousin.” As blacks fully broke into soccer during the 1920’s, racism and class bias went hand in hand. But as Murray comments, from the 1920’s onward, the strength of the game in Brazil came from the black players. By 1927, the numbers of blacks playing the game had increased significantly, enough so that in São Paulo, a black versus white game to celebrate Abolition Day was being played. The black team won the first two matches, which further increased recruitment of black players.25

During the 1930’s, international image became a greater concern to Brazil. The 1930 World Cup team for Brazil featured a team of all white players. But soccer had begun to play across class and race lines, and in 1931, Vasco toured Europe with blacks and mulattos on the team. Barcelona ended up hiring two of the black Brazilians, but they

both suffered social discrimination and ended up refusing Spanish citizenship and returning home. In 1932, the president of the CBD tried to keep Leônidas, a black star, off the national team, but eventually bowed to pressure from the press and both Leônidas da Silva, Tim, and Domingos da Guia were on the roster for the 1938 World Cup. That World Cup still offers more questions than answers. Domingos da Guia and Leonidas both were sat for the semi-final game, and Brazil lost. Allegations were made that they were benched due to race, but the coach said he was merely saving them for the final game. Both players were considered the MVPs of the tournament, and received much attention and acclaim, and Brazil was considered to have challenged the dominance of both Argentina and Uruguay as being the giant of South American soccer.

Leônidas da Silva and Domingos da Guia were considered the top players in Brazil during the 1930’s. Domingos was a talented defender that at one point had been afraid to play at Bangu because blacks were tackled hard and unfairly there. His brother asked him if he wasn’t good at dancing, and Domingos admitted he was, and then used that to his advantage while playing. He claims that he invented the short dribble he used based on the miudinho, a type of samba. Domingos was the first black player for Fluminense. Leônidas, or the Black Diamond, was officially named the MVP of the 1938 World Cup. Europeans loved his flamboyant style, and he was credited with the

---

27 Taylor, The Beautiful Game, 84; Bellos, Futebol, 35; Mason, Passion of the People?, 55.
invention of the bicycle kick. (Actually, the kick was invented in Chile.) Leônidas was the first soccer star, and a black at that, to endorse a product in Brazil, which of course was named after him: the Diamante Negro chocolate bar. He was featured in magazines, toothpaste ads, and he was recruited for the opening of stores. His autograph was much sought after, and his mother was given banknotes by the crowd whenever he scored. He was a national hero, but being a hero did not protect him from the taint of racism. His wife said that “being black, he always had to do more,” but he also was taunted with calls of “nigger” and threats of lynchings.28

The tide was starting to turn within Brazilian soccer leagues in regard to professionalism. Compared to other Latin American countries, Brazil was late in professionalizing, and race and the social hierarchy were the main reasons. But Brazil began losing players, not only overseas, but to nearby countries that had accepted professionalization earlier. Brazil finally went professional in 1933, and blacks became national soccer idols, although racist beliefs certainly still existed. Brazilians were quick to accept black soccer heroes, but also quickly to blame them when things went wrong. Name calling on the field, such as “little pinky mulatto” did not disappear, although the percentage of blacks in soccer was much higher than the percentage in the general population. Professional soccer was seen as a means of emancipation for black players, which was a necessary belief in order for the game to develop into the national sport. The inclusion of blacks was also a business strategy, as it was intended to unify the

players and the public in a social emancipation through sport, while making money, of

pursuit. The pragmatic beliefs of coaches and club directors aided the admission of

blacks into the game, even when the whites resisted.29 Along with professionalization,

more blacks and mulattos, as well as poor whites, could enter the game in the hopes of

making a living off of their athletic ability. Although there is next to little opportunity

for upward mobility, the poor believed that soccer offered the chance of glory and

riches. In 1933, Bonsucesso fielded a team with eleven black players, and Bangú won

their league with eight mulattos, and one black. The blacks continued to be treated with

hostility, but mulattos were not.30


Brazilians began to be regularly recruited to play overseas after the league

professionalized, but mainly the white and mulatto players. Blacks were blocked from

Italy and most of Europe, and more or less condemned to local success although Fausto

did play in Spain and Switzerland. The “good professionals” were white, and the

“talented players” were black. Fausto later claimed that he felt like an orange left as a

pulp by his white bosses, evidence that paternalism in soccer toward black players was


29 Allison, “Association Football,” 219; Leite Lopes, “Successes and Contradictions,” 54; Mason, Passion

of the People?, 49; Coutinho, Bye, Bye Soccer, 59; Rachum, “Futebol: The Growth of a Brazilian


30 Evanson, “Understanding the People: Futebol, Film, Theater and Politics in Present-Day Brazil,” 403;

Bellos, Futebol, 33; Levine, “Sport and Society: The Case of Brazilian Futebol,” 238; Leite Lopes,

“Successes and Contradictions,” 69.
rampant both in Brazil and elsewhere. After professionalization, suspicions of bribe
taking were mainly leveled against blacks.31

Freyre’s publication of The Masters and the Slaves in 1933 did begin to change how
Brazilians regarded their national identity, and this played out on the soccer field as
well as in other areas. Mario Filho, newspaper man and instigator of carnival and a
carnival atmosphere at soccer games, also was behind the integration push in soccer.
The publication of his book, O Negro no Futebol Brasileiro, described the
characteristics that blacks and mulattos had brought to the game of soccer, and
attributed soccer with integrating the same groups into society. By 1935, Flamengo of
Rio was considered the universally mixed race club, and its popularity soared. The Fla
versus Flu rivalry became even more of a class and race rivalry. Leônidas inclusion in
the 1938 national team was perceived as due to the way Brazilians were now regarding
their racial mixture.32

It was with the addition of blacks and mulattos to the game that led to the stereotype of
what is considered the traditional Brazilian style of playing soccer. This style began to
be formulated during the 1930’s, and was supposedly the reflection of harmony
between blacks and whites in the culture. That Brazilian style is due to their racial

Anthropology: A View from Latin America,” European Review of Latin American and Caribbean
32 Gordon and Helal, “The Crisis of Brazilian Football,” 144-146; Murray, The World’s Game, 50;
mixing has become so cemented in thought that it transcends academia and is now considered common sense. The inclusion of the malandro, that mixed race dodger from Brazilian folklore, as part of the Brazilian national identity, played directly into the formulation of soccer style, and quickly became intertwined with stylistic identity. Rather than a Darwinian racial hierarchy, Brazilians began to equate *raça*, or race, with vigor and energy. The Brazilian style of playing represents the mixed race Brazilian body style, and resembles Afro-Brazilian activities of the body. These activities include samba, frevo, choricho (all dances) and capoeira, which was a martial art invented by Angolan slaves and disguised as a dance to fool the slave owners. In capoeira, the two combatants never make physical contact. Capoeira is a body philosophy, and is considered a dance and a sport, much as soccer is. Brazilians believe that their black and latino roots have led to flair and artistry in soccer. But it is the subconscious bodily techniques that arose after the massive influx of blacks and mulattos that evolved through a historical process that has led to the formulation of the Brazilian style of play. The style is not arbitrary, but is created and linked to those ethnic Afro-Brazilian qualities and now are rooted in self-image and identity. The links with music and dance are real. The style was regarded as invented by the working class and became nationally dominant as it inverted the social and racial stigma present in the culture. This style became embodied, and now is socially invented and legitimized, which leads to its reproduction. Even the reliance on the dribble in Brazilian soccer can be traced back to racial issues: black players had to avoid physical contact with white players in order to avoid retaliation. The dribble was evolved as a means of self-protection and
guile, and was often directly related to dance moves. Brazilian style has evolved from black cultural aesthetic movements, particularly dance and capoeira, and due to its beauty and success, has been legitimized and reproduced.33

Freyre continued to promote his earlier theories on the uniqueness of the Brazilian national identity due to its racial mixing throughout the 1940’s. In 1945 he was also advocating that Brazilian soccer style was an added benefit of this racial mixture, and was delineating that a “mulatto quality” included surprise, guile, astuteness, swiftness and individual brilliance, and contrasted in a binary opposed to a European style. By 1959, he also noted that Brazilians play soccer as if it were a dance, and surmised that it was probably the result of African blood, and added the rejoinder that such Brazilians reduce everything to dance, work, and play, and that this tendency was increasing in Brazil over all, not being limited to the Afro-Brazilian ethnic group. He contrasted black “Dionysian” style to white “Apollonian” style in soccer, as two opposites in a binary, which Brazilian players combined to their benefit. While his remarks do display a racist bias, at the time, they were well received by the Brazilian peoples. Brazilians were now optimistic and proud of their racial mixture. Then came the 1950 World Cup.34

34 Mason, Passion of the People?, 122; José Carlos Sebe Bom Meihi, “A National Festival,” from “Two Essays on Sports,” The Brazil Reader: History, Culture, Politics, 503; Bellos, Futebol, 27, 36-37; Levine, “Sport and Society: The Case of Brazilian Futebol,” 240; Matthew Shirts, “Sócrates, Corinthians, and
The 1950 World Cup loss was a Brazilian tragedy, and one that Brazilians unwittingly compared to Hiroshima. But the fallout of the loss had longtime repercussions, and embedded racial overtones, with Brazilians once again questioning their national identity. Racism lurked beneath the inferiority complex, as Page put it. The Social Darwinism that still echoed within the elites of the culture, leading to the whitening theory, was now questioned. The old, pessimistic model, that Brazilian culture was racially impure and therefore could not succeed on a global basis, was resurrected. The black element in the society caused a national lack or character, so they said, all from the loss of a soccer game. Immediately after the game, racial stereotypes resurged, particularly regarding soccer, and the black players on the team were blamed for the loss. Three black players on the team suffered the most targeting of racist remarks, but Barbosa and Bigode really took the heat. Many citizens expressed the belief that Brazil would never win a World Cup with a racially mixed team. Barbosa, as goalkeeper, was stigmatized for the rest of his life. In 1963, he reportedly burned the Maracanã goal posts in his back yard to “end the curse.” In 1993, he went to the national team’s training camp to wish the team luck before the competitions began for the 1994 World Cup. He was not admitted because he might bring the team bad luck. Brazil, since that loss, has favored white goalkeepers for reliability and rationality, definitely a racist
influence since 1950. It wasn’t until 1999 when Dida assumed the goalkeeper position for the national team that a black was allowed back in goal.35

Fluminense finally began signing black players in the 1950’s, something they had managed to avoid for a good many years. However, they immediately set policies in place to exclude blacks and other working class players from elite activities sponsored by the club. The loss by the national team in the 1954 World Cup further fueled racist theories within Brazil. Blacks and mulattos were now identified as emotional with less drive for achievement.36 The head of the Brazilian delegation, Lyra Filho, issued a report that was scathing in its indictment of the mixed race style of soccer that Brazil played. He said:

The Brazilian players lacked what is lacking for the Brazilian people in general…The causes…touch on the foundations of social science in the comparative study of races…The ills are deeper…They go back to genetics itself. It is undeniable that Hungary has a better disposition, like many other countries…In fact, rarely can Brazilian players read and write correctly or display basic revelations of spiritual life…This blatant state or organic and functional insufficiency is not limited to Brazilian ballplayers; it is widespread in most layers of the national population…The people are not enlightened by the culture of the soul, nor of the spirit, and still experience the primary outbursts of their instincts…In Brazilian football, flashy trim lends artistic expression to the match, to the detriment of yield and results. *Exhibition jeopardizes competition.* It would be easy to compare the physiognomy of a

---


Brazilian all-star team, made up mostly of blacks and mulattos, with that of Argentine, German, Hungarian or English football... The study of Brazilian football has still not been dissociated from the knowledge applied to capoeira. Capoeira displays a cultural state, the survival of which is diluted in the psychosocial life of blacks and mulattos.  

Winning the 1958 World Cup reversed some of the racial stigma that Brazil applied to itself. The reversal of racial stereotypes was now defined as the Brazilian style, as exemplified by a black Pelé and a mixed race Garrincha. After the World Cup wins in 1958 and 1962, the Brazilian national team was praised for its “animal suppleness” and “ankle flexibility.” Of course, these were characteristics typically attributed to race, so racist attitudes did not disappear. Rather, the mixed racial population of Brazil was, once again, being celebrating as a source of artistic and successful soccer. In 1957, the first indigenous Indio-Brazilian had been added to the team, nicknamed “Indio.” Indigenous Brazilians were on the very bottom of the social ladder in Brazil, lower even than most blacks, so Indio’s selection was significant. The 1958 winning national team was the first multiracial team to win the World Cup, and featured three black players and two mixed race players. The blacks were considered the second string players to the starting white players, but as history has proved out, Pelé, Garrincha and Didi went on to become the superstars of the tournament. All three players had to overcome racial prejudice in their lives and on the team. Didi was nearly left off the squad when he married a white woman. The run of three World Cup wins, from 1958 to 1970, was the golden era of Brazil soccer and was used to demonstrate the best possibilities of a

multiracial society. It also served as a cover for social injustice, for it was in the 1960’s and 1970’s that a white, upper middle class hegemony was reasserted in Brazil. It was also the start of a trend that has repeated itself over and over in Brazil, and that was the idolization of black and mulatto soccer stars during their playing days, and the discarding of them afterwards.\(^{38}\)

The hedonistic lifestyle, money available for soccer players, and general lack of education led to some real problems for many players. Garrincha, the most beloved soccer player in Brazilian history died penniless and an alcoholic. Black players driving luxury cars were, and are, routinely stopped by policemen in Brazil. Lack of discipline, drinking and bribe taking are more readily attributed to black soccer players than white ones. A “cordial racism” existed within the Brazilian league, whereby blacks from other teams were stigmatized, but not those on the home team.\(^{39}\)

As Brazil prepared for the 1970 World Cup, the military regime interfered with those preparations. The regime decided to “whiten” the team so that Brazil appeared more European while playing in the World Cup. The inclusion of blacks and the “right image” were in conflict for the national identity, it was believed. The initial coach, Saldanha, later replaced declared he was not a racist, but that black players could not be goalkeepers. He also attributed the greatest of Brazil soccer style to four characteristics,
and one of them was the heightened muscular abilities of black players. As the dictators tried to whiten the team, the success of Pelé was seen as a challenge. After winning the 1970 World Cup, race was again redefined as a positive attribute of Brazilians, and Pelé was regarded as a “Super-Negro.” It was after that World Cup that Brazilian players, including blacks and mulattos, began to be recruited by the large European clubs.40

A discussion of Pelé’s views on race seems appropriate at this point. Pelé’s rise should not obscure the effects of institutionalized racism, according to Evanson, and Bellos notes that Pelé is not considered a black role model in Brazil, although he often is so regarded by the rest of the world. In 1965, Pelé married a white woman, but flew to Germany to do so. The publicity was tremendous, particularly in Brazil, as a mixed race marriage for a member of the elite was considered rare. Pelé did break some social and racial barriers: he was the first black appointed to a cabinet position in Brazil, he was the first black on the cover of Life magazine, and he was the first black to truly integrate the advertising industry in Brazil. His first marriage, to Rosemeri Cholby, was held up as an example of Brazilian racial integration. Because of his status, his children were officially designated white on their birth certificates. If you were rich and black in Brazil, your name must be Pelé, according to Taylor. However, Pelé has been accused

of racism many times, such as in 1997 when he had an illegitimate child. In interviews, Pelé has stated that no racial discrimination exists in Brazil, and that due to miscegenation, all men are brothers in the country. He claims there are no antagonisms between the races, but that racism does exist in the United States and South Africa. Later, he somewhat recanted his position on Brazil, saying that Brazil never had segregation, but that racism was hidden, and existed as a social, but hidden, racism. He remembered when he was young (16-17 years old) and never saw any other blacks on national teams outside of Brazil. He also admitted that the military dictatorships had used him, and his race, to promote their agenda. Due to Pelé’s social status, and the hierarchal system present in Brazil, he probably has had fewer problems with race than the average black or mixed race Brazilian. However, his myoptic statements need to be regarded in a political light, as it would be highly unlikely that he had never faced racism in his native country. He grew up poor in a country where racial and social stratifications exist. He had to have been aware of them, particularly in the white dominated paternalilistic soccer system.41

By the 1980’s, racism was still evident in Brazil, and still mainly unacknowledged. The 1982 World Cup team was being described as “Brazil, driven by drums,” as an allusion

to its racial underpinnings. Flamengo continued to use a black vulture for their club mascot as an allusion to race. Argentina continued to use racist chants whenever they played Brazil. (As Archetti points out, Argentinians never imagined they could play like Brazil because they had no blacks on their team.) Brazilians in the affluent southeast continued to deride northerners as paraibas, because they had so many blacks in the area. In the book, By, Bye Soccer, Coutinho described the plight of soccer players as “little niggers tied up in gold and silver chains…a handcuffed slave like his African grandfather.” By 1983, 80% of the soccer players were from the lowest social classes, and Brazilian authorities continued to insist there was no racial discrimination. Soccer coaches tried to steer Janet Lever away from interviews with black players, exhibiting a blend of racism and sexism. The 1984 Olympic soccer team featured only four black players, despite the higher proportion of blacks evident in the sport.42

By the 1990’s, the success of blacks in soccer remained a minority. In 1997, the CBF issued a report noting that few actually improved their standard of living by playing soccer, and the majority that played received a minimal salary with little education. Of 7103 professional soccer players, 54% earned less than $40.00 a month. The European press was still describing Brazilian players with old style racial characteristics: ABC described Ronaldo’s ability as “natural” and emphasized his “laid back attitude” as part

---

42 “Brazil driven by drums” quote heard by author in broadcast of 1982 World Cup game featuring Brazil versus Scotland. Other racially leaning quotes during Brazilian games include: “Brazil oozed sunshine and confidence,” “Every goal must be extravagantly celebrated.” The 1970 World Cup final also featured such quotes as “He is the white Pelé,” and “Pelé has that sixth sense, that cat sense he seems to have.” Taylor, The Beautiful Game, 76-77, 81; Archetti, Masculinities, 76; Giulianotti, Football: A Sociology, 160; Coutinho, Bye, Bye Soccer, 23; Lever, Soccer Madness, xii, 130; Levine, “Sport and Society: The Case of Brazilian Futebol,” 237; Moore, “Reflections on Blacks in Contemporary Brazilian Popular Culture in the 1980’s,” 222.
of his character. They also said that Juninho was relaxed and saving energy during a
game. _El País_ called Brazilians “undisciplined and frivolous.” It was almost a case of
the more things change, the more they stay the same.43

Soccer, probably more than anything else in the culture, reflects the microcosm of class
and race in Brazil. Soccer has had some positive impacts on the racial situation in
Brazil. It has provided a forum for increased contact and communication between
persons of different class and race, an open space which previously had only existed
during Carnival. As the gap between the elite and the masses increased in Brazilian
society, soccer has provided a space for greater mixing. DaMatta has emphasized how
black players can escape from fate or race in soccer, and construct their own
biographies in an open arena. Soccer allows fans to dress up, providing them a uniform
way of denying race and class. Soccer is considered the most integrated area of culture
in all of Brazil. Sport and soccer specifically, provide one area that black men and
women can compete. But soccer has also contributed some negative aspects in the area
of race.44

Soccer has continued to be legitimized as an arena for black Brazilian success, where in
actuality, soccer has done little for the black masses. Soccer has also contributed to the

---

43 Daflon and Ballvé, “The Beautiful Game?”, 25; _ABC_ (June 17, 1998) and (March 17, 1998), and _El País_
(February 22, 1998) as cited by Liz Crolley and David Hand, _Football, Europe and the Press_ (London:
Frank Cass, 2002), 142.
53; DaMatta as cited by Archetti, _Masculinities_, 191; Bar-On, “Ambiguities,” 6; Bellos, _Futebol_, 127;
Taylor, _The Beautiful Game_, 78; Moore, “Reflections on Blacks in Contemporary Popular Culture in
Brazil in the 1980’s,” 221.
formation of stereotypes and an erudite racism that is considered natural, and has been
internalized by blacks and mulattos. DaCosta has acknowledged the presence of an
inverse racism, or the mythologizing of black supremacy in soccer created by the press
and Brazilian social scientists. By being able to use the social hierarchy as a means of a
social stratification, Brazilians can continue to ignore racism. “Oh, we don’t have
racism, we have class bias here.” It was a mixture of class and racial bias that kept non-
whites out of soccer for many years. It was the defense of amateurism in an attempt to
keep the sport for the elite whites that operated so long. It was the soccer clubs with
membership rules maintaining white soccer that reconsolidated ideas of white
supremacy. It is the assumption that all blacks in Brazil play soccer, and that all soccer
in Brazil is played by blacks or mulattos, when in fact, blacks are a minority of the
population. It is in the Brazilian references to soccer players by their skin color and
nicknames that allows the continuation of hidden racism. (Bellos writes a unique
chapter on nicknames, including their relationship as a relic of slavery and a way to
reinforce a culture of submission within the black and mulatto community. Nicknames
such as “darky”, “telephone”, “petrol,” and “midnight” exist commonly on the soccer
field.) Racism may remain “hidden” in Brazil, but it operates through paternalism,
through class bias, and through language and cultural custom.45

45 Moore, “Reflections on Blacks in Contemporary Popular Culture in Brazil in the 1980’s,” 221; Leite
Lopes, “Successes and Contradictions,” 73; DaCosta, “ Epilogue: Hegemony, Emancipation and
Mythology,” 181-182, 193; Levine, “Sport and Society: The Case of Brazilian Futebol,” 237; Gordon and
Helal, The Crisis of Brazilian Football,” 143; Bellos, Futebol, 32, 227-228, 230; Daflon and Ballvé, “The
Beautiful Game?”, 23.
CHAPTER 19

THE CONSTRUCTION OF GENDER AS IT INVOLVES SPORT AND SOCCER

Scholars have long established that modern sport has intimately influenced the construction of gender, and most particularly the shaping of masculinity. The body and physical activity play a major role in the construction of gender historically, and the shaping of sport as a means of constructing masculinity has played out in the modernization phase of sport history. In the phases of sport globalization as depicted by Maguire, Jarvie, Mansfield and Bradley, phase one and two (roughly the 17th century through the mid 19th century) featured sport as becoming a male preserve which reinforced a male body culture, or habitus. By the third phase (1870-1920), the elite white male was the privileged basis of sport with an emphasis on “gentlemanly” amateur participation, and the structure of sport was being determined by men. The middle class reformers directed a rational organization of sport featuring of masculine physicality. The fourth phase featured a specific, Western masculine culture, but resistance was beginning to challenge the hegemonic masculinity.¹

Over time, sport became one of the most important means to promote a conception of masculinity that featured controlled force and rationalization. That modern sport privileged European males was a direct outgrowth of imperial sport which favored, created and maintained white, male elites. The patriarchal nature of modern sport led directly to male hegemony in the sporting world. Male achievement sport became a global phenomenon, and not only embodied male values and expressed male identities, but established a western, masculine culture as a male preserve. From the 1890’s to the 1920’s, organized achievement sport increased in importance until it became the primary masculinity validating experience.²

As sport modernized and became a masculine oriented sphere, it became a privileged arena for a highly gendered rhetoric on nationalism. National sport and myths of masculinity became interwoven in the construction of national identity. In the 19th and 20th centuries, nationalism was built on masculinity and the idea of strong men bonding strongly became the essence of nationalistic thought. The modernistic project of constructing manhood and nationality through sport introduced foreign cultural practices to countries, which were adopted to define manhood and state. As Archetti

---

points out, the nationalistic discourse on sport and soccer playing style was a mechanism through which male cultural power was established. As this process occurred, women and homosexuals became marginalized even further in the sporting world.3

Sport reproduces class and gender divisions, and the centrality of sport to male identity formation also created resistance and contested terrain by those marginalized. Sport has been, historically, the most gender specific form of popular culture, what with male hegemony established through patriarchal structures. Organized sport has become the central context in which masculine gestures, power and practices are normalized, and thus sport is one of the central sites in the production of masculinity. Femininity and masculinity are learned skills, as are sporting skills, and male athletic embodiment has defined what masculinity is within the culture, whereas female athletic embodiment is often defined as a contradiction. Fear of gender deviance has led to athletic females being strictly monitored as well as “reconstructed” in terms of femininity. The presence of strong female athletes has challenged not only male hegemony, but basic

constructions of gender within the culture. This has been problematic in terms of sport, as gender differences have been woven into the fabric of sport.4

For many years, women were entirely excluded from professional sport, and sport labor migration is still a male preserve. The sports media has reinforced the view that sport is a hegemonic domain of the male, that females have a lesser athletic ability and that athletic success is the domain of masculine power or the “failed female.”5 Today the media frequently mediates constructions of gender within the sporting world. An interesting study of sporting and victory displays was done by Graeme Bassett in 1998. He determined that victory displays by athletes were construed as masculine and could be formulated to display a wider definition of masculinity. Triumph and victory displays conferred dominance and carried codings related to male identity and changing notions of masculinity. Female triumph displays were seldom emphasized by the media, and when done so, did not contain the element of taunting that male displays did. The triumph displays emphasized the male sporting hegemony, and often contained phallic symbols such as raised fingers, raised champagne bottles and hip canting, all prominent in international soccer. Women’s triumph displays were usually shown with


symbols of the nation (wrapped in a flag) or reflected the masculine gaze of the sporting world and the media. The sporting body has further become the metaphor for male power, and the gaze of the spectator is disciplined by the media.6

The masculine hegemony in sport values traits that are deemed masculine, such as toughness, aggressiveness, and ruthlessness. Armstrong and Giulianotti cite Adorno as arguing that sport provokes a desire to do violence to others, and Dunning notes that macho values of masculine identity tend to increase under social conditions where fighting is frequent and the balance of power is skewed toward men. Precisely because sport has been defined and shaped by men, masculine values favoring men are played out on the playing field. Or as a former basketball player put it to show another angle of hegemonic dominance, “the stronger women get, the more men love football.” Even the fans construct a masculine identity through sport, although interestingly enough, today it is often through fashion and clothing, a former female world, but masculinized through its association with sport.7

However, an important point must be made in terms of gender and sport. Maculinity and feminity are not fixed and universal pluralities. Local concepts of gender must be comprehended by accounting for the local and national ideologies, and their

---
relationship. The next chapter will delve into the construction of gender in Brazil and Germany, and how it influences soccer and soccer style. But first, it is important to examine how gender, particularly masculinity, is constructed within the world of soccer.8

Soccer reflects and defines the world of masculinity. I think it would be safe to say that soccer, in many ways, has a definition of masculinity that is even more cemented than in many other sports. Although the terrain is contested in places, the soccer world still reflects those male virtues that help define the game and the style of play, including grit, persistence, teamwork, endurance of pain, courage, physical strength, tactical and rational planning and moral endurance. Soccer can truly be “ritualized warfare,” as Bromberger puts it. In Britain, as in other countries, soccer was bound up with the construction of martial masculinity, and often is considered the last bastion of masculinity. English masculinity is defined through soccer. Soccer has been a male preserve with male allegiance to preserve and protect their domain, a masculine area for men to escape.9

Soccer’s hegemonic masculinity can be traced back to the English public school boys’ adoption of the game and their creation of the rules by which it would be played. Until

8 Archetti, Masculinities, 113; MacClancy, Sport, Identity and Ethnicity, 16.
the 1960’s, soccer reproduced the modern sexual divisions within labor and leisure, and
the playing aesthetics were all masculine influenced. Soccer, as a form of modernity
that was heavily gendered, was a male sport reflecting dominant forms of masculinity
from the start, forms of masculinity that constructed and reproduced leading to the
hegemonic forms of masculinity now represented within the sport. This hegemonic
masculinity was formulated and constructed in an oppositional relationship to feminity
and homosexuality, by emphasizing power, authority and aggression. Soccer players
are expected to conform to these masculine ideals, which often leads to a hyper-
masculinity exhibited within the sport.10

What is interesting in soccer, but is not present in most other sports, is the construction
of hyper-maleness that shuns feminism and homosexuality leaving soccer grounds an
area of uncensored maleness. One method of affirmation of masculinity is to deprive
others of theirs. By establishing dominance, by scoring or winning, the dominant team
affirms their masculinity while at the same time inferring homosexuality on the other
team. This process is completed not just by players and taunting or victory displays, but
also by fans and very specific chants. This introduction of sexuality into public
discourse in soccer is fairly new, and seems to be more openly represented in Latin

262; Andrew Parker, “Soccer, Servitude and Sub-cultural Identity: Football Traineeship and Masculine
Construction,” Soccer and Society, 2 (2001): 59-61; Richard Haynes, “Every Man(?) A Football Artist:
Football Writing and Masculinity,” The Passion and the Fashion: Football Fandom in the New Europe
ed. by Steve Redhead (Aldershot: Avebury, 1993), 71; Eduardo Archetti, “Multiple Masculinities: The
Worlds of Tango and Football in Argentina,” Sex and Sexuality in Latin America ed. by Daniel
countries. The relations between masculinities are being played out in terms of dominance and marginalization in an arena that formerly was taboo. Giulianotti notes that this domination emphasis is indicative of sexual control, even male rape, and serves as a feminizing mechanism of the losing team. This public emasculation or feminization of the other team is a graphic metaphor representing sexual power, and is even reflected by the fans of the game. Whether a carnival fan or a hooligan, the fan is represented as a male heterosexual with drinking considered a masculine inheritance.¹¹

Fandom activities reveal a further masculine domain of male cohesion and attributed masculinity. Fandom confers recognition in everyday life to other men, and central to fandom is masculine pride in a team. For male fans, soccer is often a central arena in their construction of their own masculinity as it affirms their status as a man as well as articulates its nature by such community activities as group chanting. One of the key elements of hooliganism is masculine honor and its connections with a violent, masculine identity. The heavily masculinized fan culture is often shaped by advertising and the media, and plays into such consumption habits of young males as programs, fanzines, bubblegum cards, stickers, books, comic books and video games, all with a masculine tilt. Fanzines, or fan magazines, are edited, written and read by men. Stadium chants also demonstrate a masculine construction. Archetti has delineated

some of these chants from Argentinian soccer which feature a father/son motif. Our team is the dominant, all knowing father; your team is the dominated, powerless son.\textsuperscript{12}

The interaction of women and soccer has been a highly contested arena in recent years, and while women have made some progress as players and fans, in other areas of the soccer world they continue to be marginalized. Women writers and researchers in soccer are few, and what ones exist are often ignored or given little acclaim. \textit{The Guardian} claims that while soccer is a male preserve often attractive to hooligans, increasing female fandom would undermine the masculine image and change the atmosphere. The feminization of soccer would pacify the fans, and soccer would suffer.\textsuperscript{13} More women are being recognized as reporters, but the media continues to be a masculine world in soccer. In 1997, the Equal Opportunity Commission in Britain did back a top female coach in her sex discrimination suit against the Football Association, but women have barely penetrated the male hegemony of coaching. (A show in Britain in 1990, \textit{The Manageress}, featured a female coaching a soccer team. Gary Lineker, England’s foremost striker, noted he would play for a manager “that looked like that,” reflecting a typical reaction.)\textsuperscript{14}


The masculine hegemony in soccer is often threatened when attempts to make change occur, and then a retrenchment often occurs leading to a stronger male bonding within the sport. Haynes asks, “Can soccer be deconstructed?” and that is a fair question. That masculine values and masculine identity are so embedded in the world of soccer does not mean that it cannot or should not change, but an acknowledgment that time will create change is inevitable. Sites of resistance within the sport are growing, and given soccer’s world wide popularity, eventually a plurality of gender constructions will have to occur.\(^{15}\)

Christian Bromberger calls soccer a universal referent, one of the rare if the only, element of a world-wide masculine culture. But the defined masculinity is not concrete, in that a plurality of masculinities can function within the soccer realm, and different forms of masculinity are enabled. Soccer portraits how aspects of masculinity are conceived and played out over time, providing a number of male identities, moralities, and male virtues. Many of these are shaped by culture, and more specifically, by nationalities. Soccer, as a masculine passion, leads to an internalized national identity expressing national capabilities and potentialities. These cultural differences in masculinity and nationality are reflected in different playing styles. Soccer style becomes a legitimized definition of a somatic practice that is masculine, allowing the

national to become naturally masculine. This identity does not need to be accepted by all the males in the country, but by naturalizing the identity, it becomes a common-sense notion, allowing it to be reproduced. As playing style is an open construction, so is masculine identity, and both are open to historical change. However, both are constructed locally and nationally, and as they move into the habitus of the country, gain legitimacy. Archetti delineates how notions of masculinity play into the shaping of the Argentinian soccer style, and how each nation’s conceptions of masculine virtues are transformed into soccer style. Archetti advocates that these masculine styles are multiple and permanent, but I would advocate that they, also, are open to change over time. Whereas the Argentinian style is based on a cult of force and masculine courage, other South American teams reflect different Mediterranean values such as local chauvinism, masculine honor or shame. Cultural differences reflecting masculinity in soccer can be seen when comparing northern and southern European teams, or when deciphering an aggressive, highly masculine style such as Uruguay.

The construction of gender within the realm of soccer revolves around the construction of masculinity, at least up to this point in time. The cult of masculinity has permeated the game from top to bottom, whether it is the global governing body (FIFA), coaches, 

---

players, fans or the media. All revolve around the construction of masculinity and how it is played out in the culture. Masculinities vary from place to place, and tend to be constructed on a local and national level. How masculinity is constructed and then interpreted affects how the game is played via visions of male virtues that become embedded and then become characteristics of playing style. Playing style is directly affected by the local and national definition of what is masculine. It is now time to examine our case study nations of Brazil and Germany.
CHAPTER 20

GERMANY AND BRAZIL: THE CONSTRUCTION OF GENDER AND HOW IT
INFLUENCES SOCCER AND PLAYING STYLE

Germany and Brazil construct gender in different ways, reaching different definitions of
masculinity and marginalizing women in the soccer realm differently. This chapter will
explore how each country constructs gender in terms of sporting life and culture, and
how that construction plays out in the area of soccer. I will also examine how
masculinity has helped shaped playing style in both countries enhancing my theme of
cultural intersections influencing soccer playing style. Each country has historically
shaped gender in different ways, and this sets up an interesting contrast in gender
construction, soccer, and masculine identity.

In the early 1800’s, German turnen shaped the sporting life of the culture, and the
German gymnastics movement was associated with definitions of manliness. Women
were discouraged from participating in turnen at that time as the goals of turnen were
preparing soldierly males and political action. Germans accepted the Enlightenment
discourse that the male was the brain and the female the body of the culture. In
Germany, this eventually segued into a bourgeoisie acceptance that the male was safe
whereas the female was dangerous, or a contaminating force. The male, as the brain,
was to repress all dangerous drives and that would enable him to become solid and reliable, both characteristics that are still engrained in the German habitus. In the process of adaptation over the course of time, women became representative of the interior, and men of the exterior, relating men to the concept of a “bodily armor” of the yet formulated nation. Manhood was carefully and precisely separated from the sources of dissolution, as represented by womanhood. Masculintiy was also being associated with nationalism, even before the country of Germany existed. Many of these concepts were promoted through turnen. As Germany looked to their past, as Germans were wont to do, the concept of *furor teuronicus* equated masculinity with the male soldier.

Equating masculinity with the soldier male can be traced back to the Enlightenment. 1 The soldierly male is historically the guiding and foremost concept in the construction of masculinity in Germany. Male German values and morals were all associated with a military metaphor, such as strength, skill, readiness to battle, and all these values were construed in Germany as masculine. Weakness has long been regarded as contemptible in German life, but as the country formed politically, physical violence became more central in social life via the student corps. Adding to the definition of masculinity was Gobineau’s racial theory formulated from 1853-1855. Gobineau genderized races in his theory, and then assigned masculine and feminine traits to those races. Hindus,

---

Egyptians and Assyrians were designated feminine races, while the Chinese, Romans
and Germans were designated the masculine races. Associating racial theories with
constructions of gender appealed to the Germans and further reinforced their
conceptualization of their country as masculine, thus tieing race, gender and nationalism
all together.\(^2\)

The Germans began to equate masculinity with gladiator notions, and based somatic
conceptions on the muscular, male nude which represented its phallic power. The only
vulnerability that could be demonstrated by this conception of masculinity was
individual self sacrifice for the supremacy of the collective. The beautiful male body
fashioned by sport and war has been a political theme in Germany throughout history.
By the late 1800’s, this idealization of masculinity was seen as the foundation of the
nation in Germany, just as soccer was being introduced.\(^3\)

During the 1920’s and 1930’s, Germany further increased their associations between
masculine construction and the soldierly male. Soccer became intertwined with the two
when German officers began to realize that the ideal German soldier was also the ideal
German soccer player. Given the importance of the soldier mentality in the general
population between the two World Wars, looking to soccer players, by then assuming a

\(^2\) Norbert Elias, *The Germans: Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and
the Superman*, 111-112, 114-115; Pfister, Fasting, Scraton and Vázquez, “Women and Football- A
Contradiction?,” 18.
huge increase in popularity in the general culture, seemed to be a sensible training solution, at least in the German psyche. Soccer and fatherland had been connected in Germany since soccer was introduced, so during a nationalistic era turning to the soccer player and associating him with soldierly virtues was almost a given. As Germany neared the start of World War II, soccer training took on many of the aspects of military training, further linking soccer and military. During the same period, tough masculine norms were being reproduced through soccer in the Ruhr region as the lower classes became involved in the game.4

As fascism increased in Germany, the model of the fascist body which physically integrated the mental and the moral led to the image of the ideal male as more and more a martial image. Aryan masculinity was associated with power, and as such, the Nazi view of the athlete was always subordinate to the stereotype of German masculinity associated with the military. In Germany, war became an invitation to manliness, and World War II created a new masculinity over all of Europe which then took on a German identity. This German masculinity featured hardness, ruthlessness and aggressiveness as moral traits. As Elias points out, Germany had always idealized the warrior image, historically, and he connected this idealization with earlier weaknesses that Germany displayed militarily.5

After World War II, changing historical circumstances produced different versions of the mythic German masculinity that are now more associated with the high performance athlete, including soccer players. Masculinity is very much associated with sporting success, and soccer has proven one of the more successful sporting ventures in Germany.\(^6\) Soccer still remains mainly a male oriented world in Germany, and has definitely contributed to the construction of masculinity in the country. However, Germany has traditionally associated masculinity with the military model, and this connection plainly plays out in soccer. The stereotypical image of German soccer style, as regimented, machine-like, powerful and aggressive can be directly related to their construction of masculinity as soldierly. All the traits in the stereotype relate to military traits, and many of those traits are still valued masculine moralities, embedded within the habitus of the nation. The critique of German playing style has always been a lack of fluidity and creativity, something that would never be valued in the military model. Soldiers follow orders; they do not create beauty except in a precision ordered, powerful essence. However, given that style is an open arena, open to change and influence, this stylistic equivalency to the military model is certainly open to change, and may currently be in the process of doing so.

Brazil, on the other hand, constructed gender in quite a different manner. Brazil presents a more machismo construction of masculinity, part of its heritage of South

---

America and Portugal. Brazil represents a more traditional genderized and hierarchal culture, where men are men and women occupy a more ambiguous position.

Machisimo still defines the real man, although concepts of machisimo vary from country to country. Soccer has long been a premier way for Brazilian men to demonstrate their masculinity, and so, has been important in the construction of that masculinity. In Latin America, gender differences assume great significance in difference other than gender, and thus become potent signifiers. Gender is central to understanding a Latino reality, historically and in the present, as it shapes so much of the culture.7

In Brazil, masculinity is constructed as continuous, whereas feminity is a dichotomy. Men thus become classified by their degree of masculinity, but with women, their classification is based on moral character so gender construction ends up sending messages on morality. Women occupy the ambiguous positions of virgin and whore, with motherhood being representational of the Virgin Mary, and the whore representing a controlling and manipulating womanhood that confers masculinity on men. The Virgin mother is associated with the home and surprisingly, death, whereas the whore represents the streets and life. It is the whore who is glorified during the regular celebrations of Carnival. This dichotomy of feminism is historical; with connections reaching back to the 1600’s when convents were forbidden in Brazil because more

women were needed to increase the population. It is also a dichotomy that is represented by a traditional hierarchal society dating back millenians.8

By 1900 the Brazilian elite adopted the Greek male as the somatic ideal for masculinity, and saw it as best represented by the rower’s body type. The rising passion of soccer in the early twentieth century, with an entirely different bodily ideal began to threaten the Greek somatotype, as well as the elite hegemony of sport. As soccer moved into the working class and became a passion, female attendance at games decreased. Soccer was being constructed as the essence of masculinity in Brazil.9

Latin American soccer, including Brazil, construed soccer as one of the ultimate expressions of machisimo. This expression was demonstrated on the field by individual power, much as a macho male would establish superiority by winning a physical or verbal battle. Soccer became an expression of pride and manhood emphasizing the prowess of conquest. Outrageous acts of courage or athletic demonstration held more attraction than European scientific values within the realm of play. A soccer hero embodied individual resistance that transcended boundaries. He broke the rules, and in

Brazil, this was embodied by the image of the malandro. In Argentina, the *pibe* (naughty boy) became emblematic of masculinity on the soccer field, but in Brazil, the malandro held sway. The malandro, an artful dodger of mixed racial background, embodied the construction of masculinity in soccer, twisting his way out of trouble to always survive and win. While Archetti emphasizes that Latin American masculinity is not fixed or universal, he also notes that the male to male combat demonstrated in soccer is a prime means of constructing masculinity on the continent. Soccer also became a masculine expression for national identity, playing out the concept that national playing style is influenced by the culture.¹⁰

Brazilians believe their national passion is a man’s game requiring masculine endurance with touches of violence. They made soccer a test of their masculinity, and manhood is played out on the soccer field. Playing soccer is a universal experience for boys, and only around 8 percent report not playing the game on a fairly frequent basis during childhood. Gilka Machado, renowned poet in Brazil, wrote a poem about the 1938 World Cup, mentioning soccer players as the glory of the Fatherland and the miraculous reality of the Brazilian man. Soccer not only defines Brazilian masculinity, but it has become, until recently, an exclusive male world expressing Brazilian masculine notions of nation and victories. Brazilian soccer constructs masculinity in machismo terms

emphasizing virility, strength, trickery and craftiness. There is an old saying in Brazil, oft repeated, that a man can change his wife, but not his mother or his soccer team.\textsuperscript{11}

What is unique about Latin American constructions of masculinity and soccer, particularly in contrast to European ones, is the notion of dance that is involved. Whereas in European and other western cultures, dance is almost regarded as an effeminate notion, in Latin America, dance is often used to construct masculinity. Archetti discusses how tango can construct masculinity in Argentina, but this construction connected with dance can also be recognized in Brazil, and not just in terms of samba. In Brazil, the construction of masculinity is associated with all dance, and stereotypes of Brazilian soccer style often depict play as being balletic or rhythmic. Some of these notions, no doubt, can be attributed to racial construction of Afro-Brazilians demonstrating or expressing a sense of rhythm from their African heritage, but this stereotype does not delve deeply enough into how masculinity is constructed. The connections with \textit{capoeira}, being a fighting dance, as well as the emphasis on the samba within the culture, all play out within the construction of masculinity. The representations of machismo also coincide with dancing ability, and these notions are carried over into the sporting world and soccer. Macho males can dance, and thus soccer demonstrates these dancing abilities in Brazil and Argentina. This theory may

not hold true in other South American countries, but at least in Argentina and Brazil, dance does shape the construction of masculinity.\textsuperscript{12}

Another unique dimension of masculinity in Brazil connected with soccer is how the soccer ball is viewed. In Brazil, the soccer ball is always female. Brazilian players are said to “caress the ball” and are supposed to “be good to her.” The ball may be called \textit{gorduchinha} (pudgy) or \textit{menina} (baby) or specific names such as Maricota, Leonor or Margarita. Pelé is pictured kissing the ball, and a monument erected to the ball by DiStéfano is enscribed, “Thanks, old girl.” Nilton Santos called the ball “his best lover.” Domingos testified that: “This ball here helped me a lot. She or her sisters, right?...she was the key...without her nobody plays at all...and I was very happy with her.”\textsuperscript{13} Didí stated:

\begin{quote}
I always felt a lot of affection for her. Because if you don’t treat her with affection, she won’t obey. When she’d come, I’d take charge and she’d obey. Sometimes she’d go one way and I’d say: “Come here child,” and I’d bring her along...I’d treat her with as much affection as I give my own wife. I had tremendous affection for her. Because she’s fire. If you treat her badly, she’ll break your leg. That’s why I say: “Boys, come on, have some respect. This is a girl that has to be treated with a lot of love...” Depending on the spot where you touch her, she’ll choose your fate.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{12} Eduardo Archetti’s book, \textit{Masculinities: Football, Polo and the Tango in Argentina} (Oxford: Berg, 1999) demonstrates how this is played out in Argentina. Little has been written on how masculinity is constructed in Brazil, but notions connecting dance and soccer style are demonstrated by Leite Lopes, Bellos and other authors. It should also be noted that Brazilian definitions of machismo are shaped in a different manner than other Latinos, as they were a Portuguese colony and not a Spanish one.


\textsuperscript{14} Testimony collected by Roberto Moura and cited by Galleano, \textit{Soccer in Sun and Shadow}, 106.
There is an element of sexism and dominance demonstrated in the Brazilian construction of masculinity, and regarding the soccer ball as female and requiring obedience and respect is reflective of that. Garrincha, the most beloved Brazilian player, perhaps is most cited as the exemplifier of Brazilian masculinity and soccer, and is as famous for his sexual exploits as he is for his soccer. Garrincha married young, sired eight children with his wife, sired two more with two other girlfriends, and had affairs galore. Garrincha was perceived by many as the ultimate masculine figure in the world of soccer.15

Masculinity, in Brazil, is constructed in direct opposition to femininity and homosexuality. Gender construction other than Brazilian masculinity is not only marginalized, but actively degraded within their soccer world. In 1969, coach of the national team, Saldanha, commenting after a fight broke out in a game against Peru, said he was pleased “to see the Brazilian team contained no women.” Brazil does have a transvestite soccer club, Roza FC, which allows a different construction of gender to participate in soccer in what is basically a homophobic society. Homosexuality in the game is strictly hidden, but said to be institutionalized in Brazilian soccer. Charges of being gay can ruin a player’s career. Reinaldo was targeted with comments in 1981, which he claimed were voiced due to his sympathy for workers’ causes. Soccer has been called a redoubt of homosexuality in Brazil, but appears to be receiving more notice in recent years. The movie, Asa Branca, Um Sonho Brasileiro, depicts the story of a Brazilian boy that grows up wanting to play soccer as a World Cup star. To reach

15 Bellos, Futebol, 104; Del Burgo, “Don’t Stop the Carnival,” 66.
his goal, he lives with a cartola, and in one scene, Asa becomes representative of the paternalism, exploitation and homosexuality present in soccer. Women are portrayed as disruptive and impediments to his career.\textsuperscript{16}

Brazil has constructed masculinity around soccer, and has maintained soccer as an exclusive male domain. Indigenous tribes also use soccer as a valuable way to men to demonstrate their masculinity. Fandom is considered a masculine pursuit in the country, and as Neves Flores points out, fan groups may display class or ethnic divisions, but they all stress masculinity. Women are considered to taint the sport, and the coaching staff of the national team has supported this view for years. At the 1958 World Cup, the Brazilian coach had all the hotel staff replaced with men. Parreira, the coach of the ’94 World Cup (and current coach) allowed no women into the player’s hotel, including wives and children.\textsuperscript{17}

Brazil has constructed a machistmo version of masculinity around soccer, and this has influenced the playing style that Brazil exhibits. Of particular note is the concept of the malandro, machisimo values of courage and individual exhibition, and notions of masculinity associated with dance. Brazil’s construction of masculinity contrasts with Germany’s construction of the soldierly male, but both countries versions of manhood


play out in their soccer styles. And both countries use soccer as part of their
collection of masculinity. Women play different roles in the culture when comparing
Germany and Brazil. Brazil features a more Latino traditional concept of womanhood,
but in both countries, women are marginalized in soccer, and soccer is considered a
masculine world. This construction is open to change, and does appear to be slowly
changing. The construction of masculinity in both countries allows some plurality in
the interpretation of masculinity, or multiple masculinities as Archetti would word it,
but these masculinities have remained fairly consistent and reproduceable for some
time. However, as in other areas, the construction of gender remains an open arena, and
changes do occur. Whether new constructions of masculinity will play out on the
soccer field remains to be seen, and whether women will eventually contribute to the
formation of soccer style remains to be determined in the future.
CHAPTER 21
SIGNIFICANT PLAYERS: GERMANY

This chapter and the following one are included in this larger work for two specific reasons. One, contrary to what many coaches believe, I believe that one person can affect and influence playing style at a specific point in time, and also cause a disruption or change in style over a historical period. Second, I feel that it is important to examine, historically, some of the key players in the case studies to see if they fit or challenge the typical stereotype for that country. Germany presents a unique case in that several of its top players, historically, disrupted the stereotype of German players. In this chapter, I will examine several forwards (Uwe Seeler, Gerd Müller and Jurgen Klinnsman), two goalkeepers (Toni Schumacher and Oliver Kahn), a defensive midfielder/sweeper (Lothar Matthäus) and the ultimate sweeper (Franz Beckenbauer.) These players were chosen because they represent the top players produced in Germany at different historical periods and thus provide a means of analysis both on impact on style and stereotypical images. It is helpful to remember that the typical stereotype of the German player is tall, muscular, demonstrating physical and attacking play, good in the air, hard tackling, and lacking in creativity on the field.
Uwe Seeler was born in November 1936, and was playing for SV Hamburg junior teams by age eleven. He was short, squat, and chunky, and his teammates often called him “fatty.” By 1953 he was playing on the FIFA youth tournament squad for Germany, and had developed a short and muscular physique. Hesse-Lichtenberger notes that his looks were deceptive as one could tell he would be good in the air, difficult to separate from the ball and possessed a fighting spirit, but what was not apparent was that he was very quick moving over a short distance. He could explode over the first few yards he had the ball, and was agile enough to perform bicycle kicks and scissors kicks while shooting. Galeano says that he had a jolly face, was short and stout, and had one foot larger than the other that led him to have an unsteady gait.¹

He played for SV Hamburg from 1954 to 1972, and played alongside both his father and his older brother while on the team. By 1958 he thrilled the crowds with his bicycle kicks while scoring. In 1961, Inter Milan offered large sums for him to play in Italy. Herberger, concerned about losing another national team player to Italian clubs, landed Seeler a job with Adidas as a representative, and he drove around Germany with a trunk full of soccer cleats. Remember, this was immediately prior to professionalization in Germany, so the lure of money from the Italian clubs attracted quite a few of the top German players. However, Seeler’s love was soccer, not money, and he remained in Germany. Glanville calls him the stalwart, highly mobile center forward that was a symbol of German soccer for years. He played in the 1962 World Cup, but did not

showcase his quick first stop, as Glanville notes he showed little variation of pace. By 1964, he was regarded as the best player in Germany.\(^2\) He played again in the 1970 World Cup, which was his fourth, and demonstrated how resilient he was, as well as how extraordinary his skills were in the air.\(^3\)

Uwe Seeler fits parts of the German stereotype for soccer players, and then deconstructs other parts. He was obviously dominant in the air and a prolific goalscorer, and he was the consummate disciplined, hard worker. Yet he was short and squat, although very muscular. And he was obviously extremely agile and flexible, if he was renowned for his bicycle and scissor kicks. His influence on German playing style is indirect, and would probably consist of his influence on the development of the aerial game and his tenacity for scoring underlined by strength. Gerd Müller, in many ways, continues the tradition started by Uwe Seeler.

Müller also played center forward and was a prolific goalscorer. He was built similar to Seeler in that he was short, squat, awkward looking with a low center of gravity. He was not fast over distance, but like Seeler, had lethal acceleration over his first few touches on the ball. And he had uncanny goal scoring instincts, but unlike Seeler, he put the ball in the back of the net however he could. He did not shoot with a great deal of force but could sense in some way how to get the ball to go where he wanted it. He scored with his knees, his feet, his rear end, even his skin seemed to help propel the


\(^3\) Hesse-Lichtenberger, *Tor!,* 225-229; Glanville, *The Story of the World Cup,* 141, 166, 179.
soccer ball. He would score with such impossible actions, often pushing the ball in with his foot rather than striking it, that he was recognized as the most dangerous striker of his day. He was called “Der Bomber,” not because he boomed the ball, but because it was a name tagged to him by a Glasgow newspaper and picked up internationally. Again, his nickname reflects another reference to World War II when describing the German players. He was not well liked outside of Germany.4

As a young man, Gerd worked twelve hours a day in a textile mill. He was told that he would not go far in soccer, probably because he was considered a “stumpy tub of a player.” But no one scored more goals than he did in Germany, and he was often referred to as a goal-scoring machine. He was remarkably competitive, but of course, that sometimes backfired. He was sent off in a 1968 game for punching another player, and his reputation internationally was one of mean-spiritedness. In the 1970 World Cup, he whispered to Beckenbauer that “we are being cheated” referring to calls by the officials, and he often played as if he felt the whole world was against him. He was suspended from games more than once.5

In 1972, the talented German team won the European championship, and Müller was a big part of why they did. He scored his trademark goal against England while being surrounded by half the English team. At the 1974 World Cup, “Der Bomber” scored

5 Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, 144; Glanville, The Story of the World Cup, 204; Winner, Brilliant Orange, 94; Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 204, 210, 234.
everything, and as Galeano put it, by strolling along and slipping unnoticed into the box, he was able to finish any type of service that came along. What isn’t mentioned is the amount of practice he put into perfecting his ability.6

Müller confirms some stereotypes and distorts others. Like Seeler, his physique does not fit the stereotypical German player. He was short and squat, but his goal scoring ability (win however you can by getting the ball into the goal) and his nickname are indicative of a broader German pattern. The fact that he was considered a goal scoring machine brings the machine image into the equation, and his personal attitude helped reinforce the belief that Germans would win at all costs. His influences on playing style are less distinct, but one could argue that his attitude while playing was hard and determined and the machine like quality had some impact on overall style.

Contrast the build of Seeler and Müller with Jürgen Klinsmann, the tall blond striker of the 1990 World Cup. Klinsmann played for several European teams before being signed at Tottenham Hotspurs in 1994 for 33,000 pounds per week, a heavy investment. Tottenham fans, interestingly enough, honored him with a chant: “Klinsmann was a German, but now he’s a Jew.” Germans, it appears, can never stray too far from their history. In 1995, Klinsmann signed with Bayern Munich, setting the stage for his ongoing battle with Lothar Matthäus, a fellow team-mate.7 Newspapers frequently

---

6 Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 204, 210, 237, 248; Glanville, The Story of the World Cup, 203; Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, 142, 144.
7 Glanville, Story of the World Cup, 311; Bill Murray, The World’s Game: A History of Soccer (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996), 126; Paul Dempsey and Kevan Reilly, Big Money, Beautiful Game:
emphasized his stereotypical German playing style, such as when *France-Soir*
described Klinsmann as the mythic hero, and the Soviet newspaper, *Izvestia* describes
him as “the man who literally blasted the Dutch defense.” *The Times* called him the
“blond bomber” that would help Germany to conquer Europe, and later noted that “No
one exemplifies the German approach more admirably with his unremitting
competitiveness…and battler’s mentality.” Hesse-Lichtenberger
also mentions his professionalism and eerie fighting spirit making him a complete team player.8

Klinsmann retired from play after the 1998 World Cup, but was appointed the German
national team coach in 2004. At 39 years old, he is the youngest coach in the country’s
history. He has long been a critic of the DBF, and has publically made it known that he
intends to make some much needed changes as he works with the national team, and
many of these changes focus on style. Klinsmann, unlike other former German players,
is well liked in Germany, and brings a sense of optimism to the national team that was
much needed. However, he recently has received much criticism for the amount of time

---

he has spent at his residence in the United States, and some of the team’s recent failures are being attributed to having a coach live out of the country.9

Klinsmann provides a nice contrast with Seeler and Müller, as he is more representative of the typical German player. He is tall, blond, a prolific goalscorer, and able to dominate his opponents. Yet he is also disciplined and the consummate professional. He is well liked in his home country, something that almost seems unusual for German national team players, and was welcomed warmly as the new national team coach. He was a strong player with a powerful shot as opposed to Müller’s “get it into the net however” scoring and Seeler’s acrobatics. Contrasting with Klinsmann’s high regard is Lothar Matthäus, the sometimes defensive midfielder, sometimes sweeper.

Matthüs was the son of a watchman, born in Herzogenaurach, who would wear Adidas shoes only when he could not avoid it. He was one of the “bad boys” of German soccer, admired for his skill but never revered in Germany, despite his obvious success. At the 1980 European championship, when he was 19, he posed with his girlfriend for the cameras, telling her to “give me a French kiss for the photographers.” His comments about a game at the 1982 World Cup reflect his playing philosophy, “We’ve gone through, and that’s all that counts.”10

9 Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 325; No author noted, “Jurgen Klinsmann Named New German Coach,” 1-2.
10 Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 140, 298-299, 311; Glanville, The Story of the World Cup, 286, 296.
When he left for Inter Milan in 1988, a German weekly referred to him as an “aging child star.” But Matthäus improved greatly at Inter, and broke through into the top ranks at the 1990 World Cup. Glanville called him the commanding general of the team, and France-Soir called him a mythic hero, the same term they used for Klinsmann. As Color reverted to more stereotypical terms, calling Matthäus the “resurgence of the German Luftwaffe” with “legs like machine guns,” and noted he “combined Wagnerian musicality with his usual steamroller style.” Matthüs was often referred to in military terms, and specifically, military terms referring to World War II. During the 1990 World Cup, a Soviet newspaper ran a cartoon of Matthäus in a tank, wiping the sweat off of his face after playing in a tough game. At a 1989 game against Holland, banners were hung comparing him to Hitler. Germany won the World Cup in 1990, and Matthäus was named the World Sportsman of the Year, an honor seldom given to soccer players.11

Much of the reason Matthäus was not highly regarded had to do with his penchant for the media spotlight and his egomaniacal attitude. He was known as “the loudspeaker” in Germany, and assistant coach Ribbeck said he had to get his two cents in even if it was only discussing the menu. Head coach, Völler, told him to “go talk to a toilet seat.”

In 1992, Lothar tore his cruciate ligament, and Inter released him back to Bayern

---

Munich thinking his career was over. Arriving in Munich, he announced, “I used to be a big mouth, but I’m a different person now.” Unfortunately, his statement wasn’t true. At an airport, he invited a women’s volleyball team to check out the genitals of teammate Adolfo Valencia, stating “he has the biggest one of us all.” At Oktoberfest, he told a Dutch tourist, “Hitler must have overlooked you.” A German magazine called him a “child of the times: ambitious, assiduous, superficial and media trained, but a complete professional.”

It wasn’t just his mouth, but his aggressive and boastful personality that continued to create problems for him. His return to Bayern Munich triggered his hatred of Jürgen Klinsmann. Whereas Klinsmann regarded him with annoyance and probably labeled him as stupid, Matthäus detested Klinsmann and suggested that he and Klinsmann settle their difficulties on live television. The national coach, Berti Vogts, realizing the potential problems that would occur on the national teams during Euro ’96, banned Matthäus from the national team. But Lothar continued to boast and brag, and finally his teammates at Bayern Munich sent a fax to Beckenbauer pleading with him to settle Matthäus. Beckenbauer had taken Matthäus under his wing after the 1990 World Cup, and continued to have a soft spot for him. Whether it was Beckenbauer’s magic, or merely the wake-up call of being banned from the national team, something seemed to get through to Matthäus, and for the remainder of his playing years he stayed out of the media. In 1998, when he was 37 years old, Berti Vogts lifted his ban on Matthäus and

---

12 Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 152, 296, 298, 299.
placed him on the national team again. He played as sweeper in the 1998 World Cup, but was labored on the field and didn’t display his earlier brilliance.\textsuperscript{13}

Lothar Matthäus represents a more stereotypical German player, one that is defensive minded but capable of scoring, and one that is highly proficient and brilliant on the field. But he also represents the ugly side of German football, with his innate confidence spilling over into arrogance, his tough style of playing, and his disdain by the German people. The fact that Europe tended to describe him in World War II military terms is probably indicative of how his style of play was regarded, awed by his technique, but very much detested. How Matthäus influenced playing style was through his hardness, his emphasis on winning at all costs, and the attitude that victory was the ultimate goal and it little mattered how one achieved it. Matthäus offers an interesting contrast with the ultimate sweeper, Franz Beckenbauer, known as “the Kaiser.”

Beckenbauer was born in 1945 in the poorest part of Munich, Giesing. Beckenbauer made his international debut in a game against Sweden in 1965, as a right halfback. He made surprising runs through the midfield area, a move that would later become his hallmark.\textsuperscript{14} Beckenbauer picked up the nickname of “the Kaiser” or “the Emperor” along the way. One magazine said he looked like the eccentric Bavarian sovereign Ludwig II, or the Mad King Ludwig. (Perhaps it was his hairstyle of the day.) Others said it was due to his rapt, alterboy look. But a picture taken at a post-match banquet in

\textsuperscript{13} Hesse-Lichtenberger, \textit{Tor!}, 299, 300, 311, 321, 325, 327.
\textsuperscript{14} Hesse-Lichtenberger, \textit{Tor!m}, 205-206, 216, 227; Murray, \textit{The World’s Game}, 184; Galeano, \textit{Soccer in Sun and Shadow}, 124.
Vienna, of Beckenbauer standing next to a bust of the Austrian emperor, Franz Joseph, who had been Kaiser from 1848 to 1916, sealed the nickname for eternity. Germans often note that he received the nickname for his outstanding skills and his arrogance both on and off the field, but he was the Kaiser. During the 1966 World Cup he finally convinced the coach to move him back to sweeper, and since he had to mark Bobby Charlton in the final, his excursions into the midfield area were more limited than normal. The *Daily Mirror* pronounced him “phlegmatic and arrogant.” But he scored his first World Cup goal against Switzerland, running through the entire field playing give and go’s with Uwe Seeler.¹⁵

Losing to England in the 1966 World Cup final fueled the German players for a rematch in 1968. This time, in a 1-0 final, Germany beat England for the first time in its playing history. And Beckenbauer scored the sole goal. Jokingly, he said “…it was a real piledriver. No, come to think of it, it was a crappy deflected shot with my left foot.” Germany met England again in the quarterfinal of the 1970 World Cup, and Germany won with Beckenbauer scoring a goal. Again, he was told to mark Charlton, but not to hesitate to go forward in his normal fashion, which he did. The semifinals matched Germany and Italy, which Germany lost 4-3. Beckenbauer played the entire second half of the game with his arm strapped to his chest as a result of a severe bruise to his shoulder that he suffered earlier. All in all, Beckenbauer participated in five World

Cups, as either a player or a coach, and never finished below third place. During the 1970 World Cup, it was said that he was gracefully inventive, and that he accelerated with power and grace. Making forays into the attack became a hallmark of his play, as was his elegance and light touch on the ball.\textsuperscript{16}

Beckenbauer’s style and how he created a new role for the sweeper position are key factors. Galeano says that Beckenbauer played with “hat, gloves and cane,” and proved that “elegance can be more powerful than a tank and delicacy more penetrating than a howitzer,” played attack like a fire, and defense that wouldn’t allow even a mosquito to get through. Others note that he glided while on the field, and was able to go forward fluidly with a casual dribble. He was the exception to the rule of tough, physical and aggressive play (in fact, he never had enjoyed the physical side of soccer.) His sophisticated style of play was termed “Latin” by the French newspaper \textit{Libération}. Dutch player, Willem van Hanegem, said “Beckenbauer was okay. He seemed arrogant, but that was just because of his style of play. Everything was easy for him.” Beckenbauer was an all-around athlete with many skills, physical and mental endurance, fast thinking, and excellent tactical vision. He had a regal grace that allowed him to float down the field, and yet, he was not always loved in Germany, and Germany was never proud of him. Hesse-Lichtenberger hypothesizes that it was because everything appeared to come easily to Beckenbauer, and Germans tend to view

\textsuperscript{16} Hesse-Lichtenberger, \textit{Tor!}, 231-232, 234; Galeano, \textit{Soccer in Sun and Shadow}, 124, 134; Glanville, \textit{The Story of the World Cup}, 166, 181.
someone like that with suspicion. They want to see someone working hard, sweating and battling through opponents with hard tackling and a fighting spirit.\textsuperscript{17}

During the 1970’s, Beckenbauer’s influence on whatever team he played on, intensified the performance of his teammates. As Archetti puts it, he was an emblematic player whose influence on his teams surpassed his own ability. During the 1974 World Cup, he defined the role of the sweeper as an attacking player as well as running the team himself. The 1974 World Cup took place in Germany, and an emotional loss to East Germany resulted in Coach Schön completely falling apart, unable to talk, locking himself in his room, and refusing to attend press conferences. Beckenbauer took over, accompanying Schön to a press conference and doing all the speaking with the press, calmly and sincerely. He organized the departure for the new camp, and changed the lineup for the upcoming match. In the final game against the Dutch team, the match-up of Beckenbauer versus Cruyff had been highly publicized. Beckenbauer came off like a star in the game, and Germany went on the win the World Cup. As Murray states, Beckenbauer took on the role of both captain and coach and handled them with the aplomb of the born aristocrat.\textsuperscript{18}


\textsuperscript{18} Eduardo P. Archetti, \textit{Masculinities: Football, Polo and the Tango in Argentina} (Oxford: Berg, 1999), 188; Glanville, \textit{The Story of the World Cup}, 192, 199, 202; Hesse-Lichtenberger, \textit{Tor!}, 239-240, 244; Murray, \textit{The World’s Game}, 184.
From 1974 to 1976, Bayern Munich featuring Franz Beckenbauer won the European club championship three times. In April of 1977, at 31 years of age, Beckenbauer accepted at 2.5 million dollar fee to transfer to the New York Cosmos. The DFB was livid, and gave him the cold shoulder for many years. They also passed a temporary ban on all transfers abroad until after the next World Cup to prevent other players from leaving Germany. In 1986, he was announced as the new German national team coach. A German newspaper had fabricated a story stating that Beckenbauer had said “I am ready,” but in actuality he commented that he felt a moral obligation to take the team. He did not have the formal vocational requirements that Germany required for a coaching position, (no coaching license), so he was called the supervisor of the team rather than head coach. He told the press that he would rebuild the team around the proverbial German virtues of solid defense and a fighting spirit, but would be rebuilding for the future as the current players were “blind”, a German idiom meaning lacking creativity. He sent one player off the team for calling him a clown, and despite having to referee personalities on the team, the team made it to the finals, losing 3-2 to Argentina. The night before the final, after losing his temper with journalists, Beckenbauer offered his resignation to Neuberger, saying he wasn’t diplomatic enough to handle the press. His resignation was not accepted.19

The 1990 World Cup featured Beckenbauer coaching a team that played boring soccer, but winning the tournament by defeating Argentina in the final. But Beckenbauer, now

---
wearing a suit and glasses, appeared serene during the tournament, knowing he was going to resign as national team coach as soon as it was over. Beckenbauer currently is the head of the 2006 World Cup, and has overseen the building and refurbishment of the stadiums in preparation.²⁰

Beckenbauer does not meet the standards for the typical stereotype of the German soccer player except for the accusations of arrogance. Instead of large, muscular, powerful, and hard he was described in terms of grace and elegance and attributed with playing with a more Latin style. His leadership abilities were displayed early, and he was rarely seen as “just one of the team” but rather moved in a theatrical spotlight for most of his career. “Floating” down the field is never used to describe German players, and yet that is exactly how Beckenbauer was often described. So, his playing style sets him apart from the more typical description of German playing style. However, in one particular area, his influence on playing style was pivotal, and that was the description of the sweeper, or libero, position. Germany has historically relied on the sweeper position, using it as a position to organize and direct the defense. Beckenbauer certainly did that, but he made the position into an even more influential one with his startling runs through midfield into an attacking position. Because of his unique skill and his outstanding success in the position, Germans became more cemented in their belief in

the sweeper position, even when the rest of the world was changing defensively to a more zonal defense. Hesse-Lichtenberger puts together quite a convincing argument in *Tor!* as to why Germany’s reliance on the sweeper system has handicapped its teams. He mentions that even their youth systems are based on a strong sweeper position, but that few, if any, individuals can live up to the playing ability that Beckenbauer exhibited when he played sweeper. He also points out that Germans tend to be averse to change, as well as their reliance on a “man in charge” who gives the orders. Because of these habitus traits, Germans are loathe to change from a sweeper based defense, although the national team has experimented with zonal defenses at times. Beckenbauer has been a significant influence on style due to his success in the position of sweeper.\(^{21}\)

The last players to be examined are goalkeepers, an area in which Germany has long held dominance over the rest of the world. Interestingly enough, the goalkeepers examined run fairly close to the stereotypical image of the German soccer player. They are large, aggressive, excellent in the air, and highly successful. The goalkeepers examined are Harald “Toni” Schumacher, and Oliver Kahn.

Toni Schumacher played during the era of the “bad boys” in German soccer, and lived up to the image himself. During the 1982 World Cup Schumacher really turned into the evil villain in the eyes of the world. Glanville notes that he was one of the best two goalkeepers in the tournament that year, but he will not be remembered for that. Rather,\(^{21}\) Hesse-Lichtenberger, *Tor!*, provides an excellent summary of the sweeper system, why Germany relies on it so heavily, and why they have been hesitant about changing it. Pages 326-328 provide some interesting details.
memories of Schumacher and the ’82 World Cup surround the semifinal game against France. It started with a group of French fans behind Schumacher’s goal, and when a ball went over the goal line they refused to return it to the keeper. A referee provided him with a replacement ball, whereupon Schumacher turns and pretends to heave the ball at the fans. The fans felt there were elements of aggression in his actions, and booed and hissed. A short time later, on a pass from Platini, Battiston broke free and dribbled toward the goal. Battiston had his eyes on the ball as Schumacher charged him. Knowing a collision was inevitable; Schumacher turned his body to ease the impact on himself, but turned his hip into Battiston’s face at full force. Battiston went down, unconscious. Galeano stated that Schumacher was indifferent after knocking out Battiston, and Glanville said that Schumacher hit him with a forearm which knocked out two teeth and resulted in an injury so bad that there were fears Battiston would die. Murray stated that Schumacher bludgeoned Battiston and broke his jaw. The real problem wasn’t even the horrendous foul, but rather Schumacher’s reaction afterward. When told Battiston had lost two teeth, Schumacher commented that “There’s no compassion among professionals. Tell him I’ll pay for the crowns.” His body language implied he just wanted the injured body off the field so that he could take the goal kick. Even fifteen years after, he commented that “…given the same circumstances, I would do it again.” To add insult to injury, Schumacher saved the crucial penalty kick during the shoot out to win the game for Germany. Hesse-Lichtenberger notes that the real tragedy was the attitude the German team conveyed at the time, of which Schumacher was only one, and that was that winning by any means was all that counted.
Schumacher certainly epitomized that credo. France saw the hit on Battiston not as an isolated problem, but rather a metaphor for German soccer.22

Schumacher was back in goal for the 1986 World Cup in Mexico. Schumacher was a terror in the training camp, and made life difficult for the coaching and playing staff. He complained when the coach preferred another keeper over him, and ended up injuring a teammate badly in training. He was referred to as the “Villain of Seville” but was unbeatable in the goal. He was arrogant but brilliant during the tournament.23

In 1987, Schumacher published a book, *der Anpfiff* (the “Starting Whistle”), which stirred up a great deal of controversy among his teammates as well as the larger German and soccer public. He said, “There are too many drugs and not enough women,” referring to German soccer. He recounted that during the 1986 World Cup, injections, pills and a mysterious mineral water that gave the team diarrhea were all available and encouraged. The players were supposedly forced to take sleeping pills, although Schumacher said he spit his out as he preferred beer. He confirmed that the use of anabolic steroids and stimulants were common in the professional game, and were encouraged as a means of “anything necessary to win.” Schumacher admitted that he occasionally took drugs. But his book brought cries of treason and tarnished his

---


reputation even further. He was asked to leave his team, Cologne, and lost his spot on the national team. He was forced to play in Turkey if he wanted to play at all. Despite the controversy he engendered, in 1998 soccer experts named him the greatest goalkeeper of the twentieth century for his athleticism and goal stopping ability. He, like Maier, represents one aspect of German soccer playing style, and that is the emphasis on a strong, dominant goalkeeper who frequently had a “bad boy” image and was a controversial public persona. Oliver Kahn continued the tradition.24

Oliver Kahn was born in Karlsruhe and made his Bundesliga debut in 1990. By 1993 he was playing for the national team, and by the 1994 World Cup, was the reserve goalkeeper. He was voted the German soccer player of the year in 2000 as well as the best European goalkeeper. At the 2002 World Cup, he was named the Most Valuable Player, even though his team finished second to Brazil. Grant Wahl insisted that it was only the dominance of the “teutonic goalkeeper” that kept Germany from being eliminated earlier in the tournament. Galeano noted that his opponents thought he had to be the son of Ghengis Khan, even if he wasn’t.25

But Kahn has not been without controversy, seemingly a perpetual problem for German national team goalkeepers. Although he is called King Kahn in Germany, he underwent some severe criticism shortly after the 2002 World Cup. When not playing at Bayern Munich, fans taunt him with monkey noises and throw bananas at him. One source says

24 Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, 172-173; Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 54.
this is because he looks like a chimpanzee, but another source claims it is because Kahn angrily made monkey noises at Andreas Herzog, a former teammate at Bayern Munich. There have been accusations of racism involved with the taunts.26

The similarities between the two German goalkeepers are fairly obvious. They were big, muscular and powerful players with a tendency to be overly aggressive (physically and verbally) and get themselves into trouble. They were all strong personalities capable of directing teams on the field; outstanding physical specimens with lightning quick reflexes, and excellent shot stoppers. Both reflect a German stylistic emphasis on size, strength, and leadership being necessary in the goal. Goalkeepers are trained to be physical specimens as well as hardened and shaped to exhibit power and dominance. Germany has consistently turned out the world’s top goalkeepers and this emphasis is reflective of the importance accorded to goalkeeping by the German style of play.

When reviewing the players that have been examined, several patterns emerge. One, on the whole, German forwards do not always fit the typical German stereotype. Two of the three were short and squat, although very muscular. Uwe Seeler was acrobatic; Gerd Müller could score from all parts of his body. Only Jürgen Klinsmann was tall, blond and powerful. Lothar Matthäus certainly fit the bad boy image, but it is important not to carry the stereotype too far, as he certainly wasn’t the only “bad boy” on the team at the time. Rather, he more probably reflected the historical period he represented. Franz Beckenbauer is certainly the anomaly of German soccer, failing to fit the

stereotype. The two goalkeepers, Schumacher and Kahn are remarkably similar in a variety of ways, and certainly representative of strength of personality as well as musculature. Each of these players had some impact on the shaping of soccer style as it is played in Germany, although certainly in indirect manners. For the forwards, it was scoring in any way possible and being strong on the ball. For the sweepers, it was a definition of that position that still lingers in the German system. For the goalkeepers, it is the emphasis on strength and aerial play. Individual players do influence the system and the style of play.
In contrast to Germany, I have selected only four players from Brazil, and all forwards. Historically, Brazil has always been known for its creative attacking style of play. Significantly, one of the main critiques of Brazilian play has been its lack of defense, and while this critique can be disputed, and several prominent Brazilian players have been defensive players, overall, the most famous players are strikers or midfielders. The players I have chosen to examine are icons in Brazil, and are not recent players. Certainly, an argument could be made that there are current players who are influencing the style of the game. Ronaldo and Ronaldinho are two that come to mind immediately as being instrumental in shaping the current style. Yet with Brazil, when discussing playing style, the golden era of Brazilian soccer (1958-1970) is what comes to mind. But a unique playing style can be attributed to Brazil as early as the 1930’s, and that style, while undergoing some changes, is what shaped the style of the golden era. The four players I will look at are Artur Friedenreich, Leônidas da Silva, Mane Garrincha and Pelé. All four players had varying amounts of Afro-Brazilian blood in them, which is significant when delineating style, as many focus on the Afro-Brazilian shaping of soccer playing style.
Artur Friedenreich was born in 1892, just four years after the abolition of slavery. He was a coffee colored mulatto, the son of a German father and an Afro-Brazilian mother. His German-Brazilian father was a merchant from Blumenau, and his mother was dark enough to be considered “almost black.” Friedenreich had green eyes and crinkly hair. Friedenreich looked white, except for his hair, and was accepted as a member of the elite due to his white father and his connections. In the Brazilian hierarchy, Friedenreich considered himself white, and was offended when chosen to play on Afro-Brazilian teams during black versus white scrimmages.1

Friedenreich rose to stardom in 1910 at the age of eighteen, and by 1914 he was playing for the national team. But it was during the 1919 South American championship that he gained his notoriety. He scored the winning goal to win the championship for Brazil, as well as the adoration of the fans. He was called Pé de Ouro, or Foot of Gold, and was the first nonwhite to gain national recognition. Brazil almost did not have Friedenreich for the 1921 South American championship, which took place in Argentina. Mindful of Argentina’s “whiter” status, President Pessoa ordered that the national team be comprised of only white players. The press convinced him to change his mind when they realized Friedenreich would be left off the team.2

---


Friedenreich was renowned for his dribbling and shooting, and his ability to bring his colleagues into the game. No one ever scored more goals than he did, not even the great Pelé, as Friedenreich scored 1329 goals over the course of his career. According to Galeano, Friedenreich broke all the rules in the English manual of play and more significantly, founded the Brazilian style of play. He did not send long balls forward, but would instead dribble through a crowd of players by to take the shot. Galelano said he opened the Brazil style to fantasy as he played entirely without right angles when passing or dribbling, and concentrated more on the pleasure of playing rather than the results. Friedenreich played for twenty six years, and because it was during the amateur period in Brazil, he was never paid for playing. When he retired, the club gave him a house and a pension from the local brewery, which was unheard of in that time period.3

Friedenreich is significant as the founder of the Brazilian style of play, that style which includes dribbling much more than the European teams, shooting, playing creatively and with individual flair. He initiated the emphasis on how the game is played over what the final score was, although scoring was always one of the greatest joys of the game to him. But it was the emphasis on how he scored rather than that he did score that was a significant change. Friedenreich’s play also helped popularize the game in Brazil. Just as he was retiring, a new hero appeared, Leônidas da Silva. Leônidas was from a poor family and he received very little formal education as a boy. His father was...
a telegraph line watcher, and Leônidas went from playing sandlot soccer to professional soccer at age fourteen. Leônidas was Afro-Brazilian, and one of the first prominent black Brazilian players. His wife later commented that “Being black, he always believed he had to do more to have his worth recognized.” And he did do more.4

The first time a black represented his country on the national soccer team in the World Cup was Leônidas in the 1934 tournament. His appearance for Brazil reflected the changes that were occurring in Brazil in terms of how Brazilians viewed their country. The CBD president, Renato Pacheco, had tried to keep him off the 1932 South American Cup team, but again, pressure from the press kept him on the team. It was during the 1938 World Cup that Leônidas really achieved great fame, and amazed the entire world in the process.5

The 1938 World Cup took place in France, and it was the French that gave him the nickname he would be called by the rest of his career, “The Black Diamond.” The first game was against Poland, and Leônidas was so amazing that an electrical current ran through the crowd whenever he touched the ball. He scored four goals in that game on a water-logged field. At one point, he took off his cleats with the intention of playing barefoot, but the Swedish official made him put them back on. He did score a goal

5 Daflon and Ballvé, “The Beautiful Game?,” 24-25; Levine, “Sport and Society” 239; Taylor, The Beautiful Game, 84; Mason, Passion of the People?, 55.
barefoot when his shoe became stuck in the mud. Leônidas and Tim, the other Afro-Brazilian player, were benched during the semi-final game, causing many conjectures over the years as to why this occurred. The coach supposedly said he was resting them for the final, but Brazil lost the semi-final game and played for the third place consolation, in which Leôndias scored twice. Leônidas was voted the Most Valuable Player of the tournament, scoring eight goals in four games. The Black Diamond returned home a hero, and became the first black sporting idol in Brazil.\(^6\)

It was said that there were three national idols in Brazil during the 1930’s: General Vargas, Orlando Silva (a popular singer) and Leônidas. Upon returning home from the 1938 World Cup, Leônidas was the most famous name in the country. Lacta launched a Diamante Negro (Black Diamond) chocolate bar, which is still the second best selling bar in Brazil today. As well as a candy bar, cigarettes were named after him. He received fan letters and white women even asked for his autograph. He was asked to advertise toothpaste, and his mother was given banknotes whenever he scored a goal. While he had been popular with the Europeans while in France, in Brazil he was now adored.\(^7\)

---


Leônidas’ impact upon playing style was stunningly significant. He was a small man, but possessed a tremendous amount of flexibility. In fact, when he wasn’t being called “Black Diamond” he was often called the “Rubber Man” as the acrobatics he performed on the field demonstrated extreme flexibility. He played the attacking center forward position with style and flair. Galeano stated that he had the speed and cunning of a mosquito and played in a manner that suggested black magic. He was famed for his bicycle kick, or the chilena as it was called in Brazil, but he did not actually invent it, although Brazilians would all tell you otherwise. When he scored, even the opposing goalkeeper would congratulate him, at least so Galeano says. Leônidas was seen as embodying the essence of Brazilianess, and his style as a proud advertisement for Brazil’s unique racial composition. Leônidas personified the Brazilian style of play: creative, exciting, showy, and individualistic.8

Manuel Francisco dos Santos, or Mané, known to the world as Garrincha, was born in 1933 in Pau Grande, a village about 31 miles from Rio de Janeiro. His nickname, Garrincha, meant little bird (it was a bird similar to a small wren) and was given to him by his sister Rosa as a child. Rosa said Garrincha was a sweet child, much like the little Garrincha bird. Garrincha was born with a congenital deformity of the legs which caused them to be bent. Giulianotti said that childhood polio gave him the bent legs, Page said it was due to malnutrition, Galeano said it was both hunger and polio, but the most likely explanation for his deformity came from Ruy Castro, his biographer. Castro

8 Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, 72, 161; Bellos, Futebol, 37-40; Jenkins, The Beautiful Team, 143; Glanville, The Story of the World Cup, 36; Mason, Passion of the People?, 43-44, 55; Page, “Soccer Madness,” 38.
traced Garrincha’s ancestry to the Fulniô Indian tribe. The tribe has over a dozen individuals with the same bent legs and exquisite soccer skill. They also have the same features as Garrincha had: full lips, wide nose and a jaw-heavy face. Garrincha’s left leg curved outward, and his right leg curved inward. The congenital problem could have been corrected when he was a youngster, but lack of money and medical attention was the norm. Although several sources indicate Garrincha was a mulatto, in actuality he would have been a mestizo, a mix of Indian and Afro-Brazilian blood.9

At age nineteen, he went to try out at Botafogo. Nilson Santos, national team player, was playing for Botafogo at the time, and after Garrincha dribbled past him and nutmegged him in the process, Santos recommended it would be better to have him on the team rather than to play against him. In his first game for Botafogo, he scored three goals.10 What made Garrincha such a special player was his dribbling skills. Yes, his bent legs did aid in that process, as opponents never knew which way he was going to go with the ball. Countless authors note that he, even more so than Pelé, represented the essence of the Brazilian style of play which emphasized slow dribbling, maniacal possession of the ball, and brilliant individual moves. Archetti emphasizes that Garrincha best represented the style of soccer played in the streets or the favelas.

---


Garrincha transformed the way that wingers had played. Prior to him, the position was all about speed, but Garrincha didn’t need to be fast because his style was based on improvisation and intuition. Garrincha always played right wing, and his style never changed over his career. He had a tendency to lean to the right while dribbling which made his entire body look unbalanced. But it never was. He had a tendency to humiliate people while he was dribbling, and he was always dangerous and unpredictable. There were times when he would dribble past a defender four times before shooting the ball, just for the fun of it. Glanville said he was a vein of luminous virtuosity with a panther’s swerve and acceleration and a thumping shot with either foot. Galeano said he would crack jokes with his legs and then back up to prolong the pleasure. One time he dribbled and faked, pretended to shoot, and watched while the defender ran face first into the goal post. He then nutmegged the goalkeeper and walked “Chaplinesque” back to the center circle for the kickoff.11

The specialness that was Garrincha endeared him to the Brazilian people. He was called the “Joy of the People” whereas Pelé was called “the King.” Galeano states that no one made the people more happy than Garrincha, that he would perform devilish tricks that made the people laugh. He would cause opponents to crash into each other and fall with their legs twisted up trying to catch him. He created the “rascal’s mischief,” and embodied all that the concept of the malandro created. Being raised in the shantytown suburbs of Rio, he was the malandro. He was street-wise, and Sodre

11 Archetti, “The Meaning of Sport in Anthropology,” 97-98; Bellos, Futebol, 98-99, 109; Glanville, The Story of the World Cup, 93, 124; Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, 92, 100; Mason, Passion of the People?, 124.
called him the “archetypal malandro.” He was one of the boys: clever, artful and
cunning. Leite Lopes called him the “anti-athlete with unstoppable dribbling skills.”
The Brazilian poet, Vinícus de Morae called him the “angel with bent legs.” Stedile,
the founder of the Landless Movement in Brazil said he was the synthesis of Brazil as
he was poor and creative, but his simplicity and soccer talent filled everyone with
happiness. A famous movie was made about his life in 1963, and it was called
“Garrincha: The Joy of the People.”

One of the reasons Garrincha was so beloved was his enthusiasm for the game. He
basically embraced the amateur ethos of playing, and was never the archetypal
professional that Pelé was. Garrincha improvised and put on a show while embodying
the habitus of the factory worker. He bore all the marks of the lower class (drinking,
womanizing, no education, unable to handle money), and exhibited a total detachment
from all things professional in his career. He never learned business management or
public relations, and was never educated enough to coach. He played the game for what
it was, a game. For Garrincha, the real objective was not the score or the outcome, it
was to dribble around the opponents. He displayed no discipline for schedules, diets or

12 Maurice Biriotti Del Burgo, “Don’t Stop the Carnival: Football in the Societies of Latin America,”
_Giving the Game Away: Football, Politics and Culture on Five Continents_ ed. by Stephen Wagg
(London: Leicester University Press, 1995), 66; Galeano, _Soccer in Sun and Shadow_, 104; Sodre quote as
cited by Kuper, _Football Against the Enemy_, 199; John Humphrey, “Brazil and the World Cup: Triumph
and Despair,” _Hosts and Champions: Soccer Cultures, National Identities and the USA World Cup_ ed. by
John Sugden and Alan Tomlinson (Aldershot: Arena, 1994), 70; Leite Lopes as cited by Pierre
Lanfranchi and Matthew Taylor, _Moving With the Ball: The Migration of Professional Footballers_
the Ball: The Football World Cup_ ed. by Alan Tomlinson and Garry Whannel (London: Pluto Press,
1986), 129; Bellos, _Futebol_, 109, 110, 112. Bellos, _Futebol_, cites Vinicus de Moraes on page 110.
Stedile cited by Taylor, _The Beautiful Game_, 93; Mason, _Passion of the People?_, 124.
promises. They did not matter to him. A referee once threatened to send him off for
dribbling around a man too much. His coach at Botafogo tried to convince him to
dribble less by placing a chair on the field. When Garrincha reached the chair, he was
supposed to cross the ball. Garrincha dribbled around and through the chair.13

Garrincha was always represented as having well below the average intelligence.
During the 1958 World Cup, a psychologist working with the team ranked Garrincha’s
intelligence so low that he wouldn’t even have qualified as a bus driver, and said his
aggression level was zero. Playwrite Nelson Rodrigues said: “He is considered a
retard… but we are because we think and rationalize. Next to …the prodigious
instananeity of his reflexes…we are hippopotamuses.”14 Garrincha was considered an
idiot savant. He always called his defenders “John”, because he said it didn’t matter
who they were if they were marking him. Humphrey said he was semi-literate, and got
by on his wits and cunning. Garrincha was always accused of thinking only in the short
term. Galeano said he had the brain of an infant, and Del Burgo that he lacked
intellectual pretension but had “animal-like” agility. Ruy Castro said it was a created
myth that he was a childlike genius, and that the myth of infantile genius nearly an idiot,
did not do justice to him. According to Castro, Garrincha participated in the
construction of his public image, particularly after his retirement, to gain sympathy.
The image of a fool was convenient for him because he felt fools were always loved and

13 Mason, *Passion of the People?,* 124; Leite Lopes, “Successes and Contradictions,” 72; Archetti, “The
Meaning of Sport in Anthropology,” 97-98; Del Burgo, “Don’t Stop the Carnival,” 66-67 McCann,
always pardoned. Castro states that the real Garrincha was quick witted and insightful before he succumbed to severe alcoholism.¹⁵

Of course, some of the stories about Garrincha reinforce the idea that his intellectual capacity may have been limited, but some of the descriptions designated to him appear almost reflective of racial bias. Del Burgo emphasizes his instinct and spontaneity, his surprising moves and variety, as well as what he calls “Chaplinesque naivety.” The emphasis on his “natural ability” comes up often when discussing Garrincha. Jenkins mentions he was the most natural talent of all, and poet Paulo Mendes noted that he played football by pure inspiration and magic. Glanville comments on his superb natural talents, calling him a child of nature from Pau Grande in which genius overwhelms effort.¹⁶ On the other hand, there are stories that seem to reinforce the stereotype of Garrincha. For example, after the coach finishing discussing defensive tactics one day, Garrincha asked him,” Have you told the other team this? Then how are they going to know what they are supposed to do?” He felt it was madness to plan out any tactics or even to scout the other team. Or there was the time that the coach was explaining tactics and Garrincha was reading a Donald Duck comic book. The coach remarked, “And you… you will do whatever you want.”¹⁷

¹⁵ Bellos, Futebol, 103, 113 Humphrey, “Brazil and the World Cup,” 70; Page, “Soccer Madness,” 42; Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, 104; Del Burgo, “Don’t Stop the Carnival,” 66; McCann, “Estrela Solitaria/João Saldanha,” 128-129.

¹⁶ Del Burgo, “Don’t Stop the Carnival,” 66; Jenkins, The Beautiful Team, 9; Paulo Mendes cited by Bellos, Futebol, 102; Glanville, The Story of the World Cup, 93, 99, 112.

¹⁷ Kuper, Football Against the Enemy, 199; Bellos, Futebol, 103.
In 1955, Garrincha played in his first international match for the Brazilian national team. He was included on the 1958 World Cup team, but did not play in the first two games. Both Pelé and Garrincha were mainly included on the team because the other players had rebelled and insisted that they should be on it. The coach stated that it was “Garrincha’s reluctance to defend” that was the reason he did not start the first two games. But when he did finally play, his darting runs and crosses were thrilling. In the final game against Sweden, it was said that the man defending Garrincha was lonely because Garrincha was beyond control. Garrincha was twenty four years old and yet exhibited a stunning artistry at the World Cup. He was, without a doubt, the greatest dribbler at the Cup. But there were also reports from fellow players that he didn’t have a clue as to what was going on for most of the tournament. When the final game ended, he supposedly asked, “Is it the end (of the tournament?)” A teammate said that Garrincha didn’t even know who the opponent was in the final game.18

During the 1962 World Cup, Galeano said that people asked what planet Garricha was from, as he was so dazzling. In 1962, Garrincha was, without doubt, the star of the tournament. During the semifinal against Chile, it appeared that Garrincha was determined to win the game all by himself. He leapt and dribbled with a fanatic drive, until he was sent off for cheekily kneeing a Chilean defender in the rear end. As he left, a bottle was thrown that cut his head. Brazil went ballistic, and took steps to ensure that he was going to be able to play in the final game. (At that time, a send-off did not

automatically mean a player missed the next game.) The president of Peru intervened, and the prime minister sent a telegram to Stanley Rous (FIFA president) regarding the incident. The linesman that had made the call mysteriously left Chile the next morning. Garrincha was exonerated and allowed to play in the final. Brazil won the tournament, and Garrincha was a hero.19

In 1962, Botafogo also won their second consecutive state championship, with Garrincha playing at right wing. The Brazilians began to see Garrincha as symbolizing and affirming their values over European ones. Brazilians valued “a show” over final results, wanted joy in the game rather than precision—in short, they wanted Carnival on the field. After all, he was a poor, undernourished player that would never have passed a European soccer club’s medical exam, and yet he could dribble rings around them and make the blond, muscular giants look foolish. Leite Lopes notes that Garrincha was the prime example of the transformation of the body and social stigma into physical and athletic capital. Del Burgo adds that by emphasizing the body, Garrincha was the best example of combining both soccer and Carnival. His outlook on life focused on somatic fulfillment, such as drinking, playing and womanizing. He shunned education of the mind or the character, and focused on the body and its pleasures, and what his body could do for him. He celebrated and was a celebration of life, never looking ahead to the future but playing as hard as he could in the here and now.20


On January 19, 1983 he spent the morning drinking, came home, fell ill and called an ambulance. His body was bloated from alcoholism, and he fell into an alcoholic coma, and died the next morning. He was forty nine years old with thirteen children, and the “Joy of the People” died an alcoholic and in extreme poverty. He lived the final ten years of his life in declining personal and material circumstances, and for five years had lived in a rented house in Bangu.21

The soccer player that was so beloved and so admired died a broken man. The hero that had gone from the slums to stardom and back again was now being mourned by millions. The country embraced a national sense of guilt and cried over Garrincha’s exploitation. His death was seen as a national as well as a personal tragedy. The body was laid out in state in the Maracanã stadium as the country paid homage to their mythological symbol, the man who had truly brought joy to the soccer fields. Thousands and thousands came to see the casket covered with the flags of Botafogo and Brazil. The body was carried from the Maracanã on a fire engine, and crowds lined the roads between Rio and Pau Grande. It took the fire engine two hours to travel 35 miles, and 8,000 more people waited at the cemetery. The crowds were so large that the priest did not perform mass, but rather gave a simple benediction before internment. Later,

---

Garrincha’s death was interpreted as the end of the romantic era, or the golden age, of Brazilian soccer by both fans and soccer analysts.  

Garrincha defined the Brazilian style of play, and was the most beloved player in Brazilian soccer history. Interestingly enough, he was not that fond of Pelé, and felt that Pelé always got more headlines than he did. But where Garrincha was beloved, Pelé was revered.

Edson Aranatas do Mascimento da Silva, better known as Pelé, was born in Três Corações in the state of Minas Gerais on October 23, 1940, the oldest of five children. Dondinho, his father, was an itinerant semi-professional soccer player that tore his knee ligaments in his first professional game. He always pushed Pelé in his soccer playing, and taught him how to head the ball and shoot with either foot. Dona Celeste, his mother, possessed great inner strength, and ranked Pelé’s passion for soccer just beneath bank robbery and the seven deadly sins. Pelé picked up his nickname playing on his first soccer team. He didn’t like it, and at times got into fights over the name. Nobody really knew what it meant (the word has no meaning in Portuguese) but the name stuck.

---


23 Jenkins, *The Beautiful Team*, 184; Bellos, *Futebol*, 112.

At the young age of fifteen, de Brito, former international and youth coach, took Pelé to Santos. Pelé was considered too small at first (reports vary that he weighed from 130 to 145 pounds and was 5’7” to 5’8” tall), so he was fed high protein meals, started on calisthenics and dewormed. After five days at Santos he ran away out of homesickness, but Big Sabu, the groundskeeper spotted him, and Pelé returned. He was placed on a juvenile contract of $60 a month plus expenses, which allowed Pelé’s father to make monthly payments on their first house. He received his first chance on the senior team when Vasconcelos (a starter) was injured, opening up a spot. In 1957, he made his debut with the national team in a game against Argentina in the Rio Branco Cup, and he played in his first World Cup the following year. He was consecrated the “king” in Sweden, playing as a substitute. He was mainly placed on the 1958 World Cup team for experience, particularly after the team psychologist recommended that he not be selected because:

Pelé is obviously infantile. He lacks the necessary fighting spirit. He is too young to feel aggressions and react in an adequate fashion. Beyond this, he does not have the sense of reasons necessary for team spirit.

In the quarter finals against Wales, Pelé scored the winning goal, his first ever World Cup goal. Against France, he scored a hat trick. He was a prodigy at age seventeen.
In 1960, Italian clubs were willing to offer over a million dollars for Pelé to come play for them. The Brazilian people were outraged, and the Brazilian government in a panic. Congress passed a resolution declaring Pelé a “non-exportable national treasure”, preventing him from possible accepting the offer. The Brazilian Coffee Institute helped make up the loss of money to Pelé, since he wasn’t allowed to accept the offer, and Santos offered him a generous contract. They awarded him a $27,000 signing fee, paid him $150,000 a year, bought him a car, and a new home for his parents. In 1961, La Gazetta Sportiva noted that Pelé had “excellent build, sprint speed, resistance to fatigue, and a great capacity to absorb knocks.” Also in 1961, in a game against Fluminense, he dribbled past seven players and the goalkeeper to score…one of his more famous goals. His Santos coach said in 1962 that Pelé was the ideal soccer player as he was fast on the ground and in the air, had the physique to play, he could kick, had ball control, was unselfish and modest, and was the only forward he knew that aimed the ball at a precise point in the net while shooting.29

Unfortunately, his 1962 World Cup experience did not live up to his earlier promise, and that year’s World Cup was Garrinha’s World Cup. Part of the reason was that Pelé limped off in the second game with a torn thigh muscle and missed the rest of the

29 Lever, Soccer Madness, 141; Foer, How Soccer Explains the World, 123; Murray, The World’s Game, 119; Jenkins, The Beautiful Team, 181; Mason, Passion of the People?, 87; Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, 131.
tournament. Despite that, by the age of twenty one, he was considered the best player in the world. By 1963, he was also the highest paid sportsman in the world.30

What made Pelé the best soccer player in the world? Quite honestly, he had a unique combination of skills and body somatics that worked well in the game, and the discipline to maintain a professional athletic lifestyle. Jenkins says it was because he could outjump and outsprint any defender. Kissinger said that Pelé incarnated the character of the Brazilian team in which virtue without joy was a contradiction. Mason mentioned that he always looked as though he enjoyed playing, was right footed, and had strong thighs and exceptional balance. Foer said that he could shoot from impossible angles, caress the ball rather than dribble it, and had a charismatic style. Page said Pelé had speed, mobility, oneness with the ball, uncanny vision, could shoot with either foot, was audacious, and had instinctive creativity. Murray called him the greatest soccer player ever, while Bar-On mentioned that he was graced with the title “Safo” which meant he possessed a divine spark and was capable of forbidden things on the soccer field. Galeano said he could evade players without touching the ground, stop so suddenly that opponents would get lost, jump as though on a staircase, and make us believe that immortality exists. Del Burgo called him a malandro and Glanville said he was gymnastically agile, well muscled, could juggle and head the ball, was cool in battle, and his face never lost its innocence. Bellos emphasized that Pelé led a self-imposed ascetic life, concentrating on training and self improvement. Lever noted his

30 Bellos, “Pelé,” 11; Bellos, Futebol, 103; Glanville, The Story of the World Cup, 112, 121; Jenkins, The Beautiful Team, 181; Mason, Passion of the People?, 88.
highly developed peripheral vision, and his well placed center of gravity. Pelé makes it simple. He says his talents were all gifts from God.31

Pelé became the most recognizable figure in Brazil and the most written about individual in Brazilian history. Streets, babies, coffee, candy bars, and stadiums were named after him. He was one of the first blacks to integrate the advertising industry, but he always refused to advertise alcohol or tobacco. He was the first black to appear on the cover of *Life* magazine, and the Duke of Edinburgh came to Pelé (rather than the other way around) to meet him in 1964. In fact, in Brazil there is a saying that if you are black and rich, your name must be Pelé.32

Despite all the acclaim, Pelé is considered as belonging more to the global heritage than to Brazil. Brazilians put him on a pedestal, but they do not love him as they did Garrincha. To Brazilians, Pelé symbolizes winning and the dreams of upward mobility. He was the first global superstar. He has been criticized in Brazil for a variety of reasons. Perhaps the first was his being used as a symbol by the military regime during the “Brazilian economic miracle.” He remained politically mute for many years, and in 1972 announced “There is no dictatorship in Brazil.” He openly criticized Muhammed

---


Ali for his political views, recalling his own military service. He became one of the richest men in Brazil, but Galeano said, “Off the field he never gave a minute of his time and a coin never fell from his pocket.” According to Foer, playing in the USA made Pelé a capitalist, as well as the perfect postmodern image of a brand name backed by multinational companies such as Mastercard, Viagra, Nokia, Samsung, Coca-Cola and Petrobas. Pelé reportedly pockets $20 million a year in sponsorships.

Perhaps the biggest critique of Pelé has been his stand on race. He has been called the “Brazilian Steppinfetchit” and Brazil does not regard him as a black role model. Partially, this is because both his current and his ex-wife were white, and his children are officially registered as white. He has publically stated that in Brazil, due to miscegenation, there is no antagonism between the races, but later clarified that by saying racism was a hidden, social racism in Brazil and was not open segregation like in the United States.

Pelé continued to play for Santos throughout the 1960’s, and they became somewhat of a traveling circus playing games around the world. Pelé played for Santos for eighteen years, winning two championships with them. He has visited eighty eight countries


while playing soccer. In 1967, the Nigerian-Biafran war called a cease-fire for 48 hours so that the people could watch Pelé play in an exhibition game in Lagos.35

As the 1970 World Cup approached, Pelé faced some opposition from the coach, João Saldanha, and he has since been accused of undermining Saldanha. In 1969, Saldanha announced that Pelé was short-sighted in one eye and was not fit to play in the World Cup. Now, Pelé did use glasses for reading, but never appeared to need them on the field. Pelé was being guarded around the clock due to a kidnapping threat by Cuban trained guerrillas. But it didn’t seem to matter once the tournament started. Pelé was totally amazing on the field, demonstrating acrobatics that left him “still floating in the air,” according to Galeano. Glanville called him “fiendishly inventive” and said that his final apotheoses fulfilled all the promise. Of course, Brazil beat Italy in the finals of that World Cup to become the first three time World Champions.36

In 1978, Pelé played his last game, and it was a game featuring the Cosmos versus Santos. He played one half for each side. His farewell speech was lit in neon on the Giant’s stadium scoreboard. He had scored a total of 1282 goals in his career, and played in over 1300 games. He had played with flat feet for years. His sportsmanship


was legendary, even though he had been sent off in several games. In 1981, *L’Equipe* had named him the sports champion of the century.37

In 1994, President Cardoso appointed Pelé the Extraordinary Minister of Sport, and he served in that cabinet appointment from 1995-1998. He was the first Afro-Brazilian to serve in a cabinet position. Pelé proposed a bill that became known as Pelé’s Law, and it was an attempt to reform the soccer industry in Brazil. Pelé’s Law was an attempt to make soccer clubs more transparent capital venture companies with an open book policy on financial dealings. He also advocated free agency for the players, saying “Soccer players are still slaves in Brazil.” He faced enormous opposition from the club cartels as well as those members in Congress that were elected because of their soccer club affiliations. Havelange threatened to kick Brazil out of the ’98 World Cup if the law passed, but it was never clear exactly how he could have done that. Within two years after he had retired, Pelé’s Law had been dismantled, and less than 11% percent of the original bill remained, although it passed in 2000.38

Pelé, as a global superstar, undoubtedly helped shape Brazilian soccer style. In fact, between Pelé and Garrincha, playing during the Golden Age of Brazilian Soccer, they defined the style that is commonly referred to when speaking of Brazilian playing style. It is a style based on individuals doing outrageous athletic stunts on the field, creative,

exciting, individualistic, and above all, scoring. It is an attacking style, as evidenced by the four different attacking players that have been examined. It is a style that features somatic movements of the mixed racial composition of Brazil, whether it be mulatto, mestizo, or Afro-Brazilian. Artur Friedenreich helped initiate the style, Leônidas da Silva popularized the style, Garrincha made the style beloved, and Pelé globalized the style.
CHAPTER 23
GLOBALIZATION AND SPORT

Most experts concur that globalization processes are accelerating, and impacting in a variety of cultural areas. This chapter explores globalization theories, and more importantly, how globalization processes impact on sport, and specifically soccer. It is not my purpose to dissect theories of globalization, but rather, to analyze how and in what areas globalization is impacting the game of soccer, and indirectly, how it is impacting soccer style. Different interpretations of global processes allow one to dissect how those processes affect cultures in certain areas. Sport, and thus soccer, provides an excellent area for such an analysis. Perhaps the biggest controversy when discussing global processes appears to be questions of increasing homogeneity, which would particularly change playing style, and the debate over this will be addressed. Issues of national identity and the sense of sporting nationalism will also need to be addressed, as national identity is inexplicably bound up with cultural definitions of playing style.

One of the most prominent global theorists, Roland Robertson, presents five phases of the historical path of increasing global density and complexity. Phase one is the germinal phase, and takes place in Europe from the early 15th century through the
middle of the 18th century. During this phase there is a growth in the idea of the national community and an increase in power by the Catholic Church. Phase two runs from the mid 18th century to the 1870’s, and is called the Incipient phase. The Incipient Phase demonstrates an increased homogeneity, movement toward the unitary nation-state, the formation of international relations and the ideology of the citizen as an individual. Phase three is called the Take-Off phase and lasts from the 1870’s to the mid 1920’s. The take-off phase exhibits the increase of national societies, the development of a generic, although masculine gendered, individual, the development of a single international community, an increase in the speed and form of communication, and the beginnings of global competitions such as the Nobel Prize and the Olympics. Phase four is titled the Struggle for Hegemony, and dates from the mid 1920’s through the late 1960’s. This phase features world wars and the Cold War, the crystallization of the third world, and the formation of international mediating bodies such as the United Nations. Phase five, from the late 1960’s onward is called the Uncertainty Phase, and exhibits trends in the increase of individual rights, increased global communications and networks, the end of bipolarity with the ending of the Cold War, and an increased recognition of multiculturalism and polyethnicity. 

Robertson emphasizes that globalization is a long, uneven and complicated process which includes hidden and invented traditions. He sees the trend toward unicity as inexorable, but along with that trend also would be trends of increased ethnicity.

---

regionalism, and individual self consciousness. The process of differentiation is key, and would increase over time as globalization processes increase in speed. Indications of these processes in contemporary time would be the increased global complexity, the increased political presence of Islam, a discourse on post-modernism and increased indications of ethnic revival. Robertson theorizes that the continued search for national identity would increase conflict within a culture as political-ideological and religious movements would also be increasing. Nationalism, or particularism, would be seen to develop only in conjunction with internationalism, and so he does not argue that a nationally constituted society is in decline. Rather, he envisions that the concept of nationalism is being revamped in different areas of the world as part of a multicultural society. Central to his theme on globalization is the idea that global processes produce variety and diversity as a basic aspect of their process, that global and local are not opposite attributes of the world system. Continued globalization would involve an increase in global and local emphasis, along with an increase in complexity and density.²

Robertson delineates three major forces that have contributed to increased globalization: the spread of capitalism, the concept of western imperialism, and the increased intensity of the global media. He contends that the global culture is contested terrain, but does see a shift from ethnicity and nationalism to a more supra-national emphasis reflected by trends of Americanization, cosmopolitanism, and that fact that only one super power exists at the present time. He sees no reason to believe that globalization will lead to

homogenization, but sees how both homogenization and heterogenation will both become features of life in modern day society. Robertson would speak of the particularization of universalism and the universalization of particularism.³

Joseph Maguire furthers Robertson’s theory, and elaborates on areas that relate directly to sport. He asserts that not only are global processes long term, occur unevenly, increase the intensification of global interconnectedness, but also are gathering momentum. Globalization process will lead to a world with a single global culture, but that culture will not be homogenous, but rather a general mode of discourse. Globalization processes are not the outcome of relations between nations but an independent process with no causal feature. Therefore, these processes are multidirectional, involve power balances, are blind and unplanned, and bound up in disjunctures. Sharp contrasts between different strata are disappearing. He sees four key insights as indicative of these global processes: decreasing contrasts and increasing varieties, the co-mingling of western and non-western cultures, the emergence of a new amalgam, and the increased effort of established groups to integrate “outsiders.” A reaction to these global processes will be an increased nationalism as a defensive manoeuver against the global flows.⁴

⁴ Maguire, Global Sport, 3, 38, 39, 42, 46, 188.
Maguire and Robertson both emphasize a particular process that plays out in the sporting arena, and that is the concept of willful nostalgia bound up with the concept of invented traditions. Robertson notes that globalization is the primary cause for increased willful nostalgia, that is a major feature of globalization, and that it was particularly virulent during the take-off phase. What he sees occurring presently is a nostalgia bound up with consumerism, one that is more economic and simulated, and is often driven by politics. He also sees symptoms of a collective nostalgia.5

Maguire perceives willful nostalgia as having four dimensions: a historical decline or loss; an absence or loss of personal wholeness and moral certainty; the loss of individual freedom, autonomy or personal authenticity; and the loss of rural life, traditional stability and cultural integration. Speed and increased globalization are exacerbating willful nostalgia.6 Baudrillard furthers this conceptualization by noting that when reality is no longer what it used to be, nostalgia assumes its full meaning. Oliven uses the term “tradition” to infer the same process as willful nostalgia. He comments that until recently, it was assumed that the importance of national identity was decreasing, but that by the end of the 20th century there was an upswing in emphasis on national identity. He emphasizes that tradition is the key variable in this process because modernity reinvents tradition. As the world moves toward a “global

5 Robertson, Globalization, 155, 159-161.
6 Maguire, Global Sport, 189-190.
village” concept, with economics becoming transnational, the national and the region emphasis return with a doubled impetus.⁷

Several other authors also view the revitalization of nationalism as part of the globalization processes. Arnason notes that globalization increases national identity, and Anderson notes that the end of nationalism is not in sight. Perhaps one of the strongest voices speaking out for increased nationalism due to global flows is Alan Bairner. He states that nationalism’s death is greatly exaggerated, and that nationalism coexists alongside globalization, and is at times even strengthened by it. He views the persistence of nationalism and identity politics of ethnic groups as being increased by global flows. He points to the former Yugoslavia as an example of ethnic and national rivalries able to transcend superficial moves toward hegemony and increase their own version of nationalism. Maguire and Poulton further advocated that resistance, in the form of hardened identity codes, is increased when faced with the concept of the outsider. Nationalism increases when faced with globalization or Europeanization.⁸

The homogenization process indicated by globalization takes several forms. Stuart Hall is a proponent of the Americanization concept, whereby the United States through a means of cultural imperialism, leads to an increased homogenization of the world. Hall

argues that this homogenization is defined by western capitalism, but is not complete
and does not work for completeness. Rather, the reach is selective and partial, and
largely uncontested. Houlihan critiques the Americanization theory by offering
evidence of increased resistance to Americanization by ethnic, national, fundamentalist,
and feminist groups, as well as cultural imperialistic trends demonstrated by both
Europe and Japan. Hamelink also advocates a cultural synchronization process
produced by globalization, and Houlihan further critiques this by pointing out that
conscious acceptance of capitalism is close to impossible, and weakness of resistance
is attributed to false consciousness. Homogenization theorists tend to point to the
weakening of national identities due to globalization processes being powered by
western notions of civilization. Said would join this group, believing that modern
imperialism sets in motion global processes. Klein advocates that a
market-driven globalization does not want diversity, and that fears of local culture or
national identities lead to an Americanization process. Wallerstein advocates the
layered nature of globalization, but adds the prime effect is the establishment of a
homogenous frame of reference within which local particularity is constructed.9

A number of academics emphasize that global flows will increase the emphasis on local
identities and a variety of other identities, leading to a more pluralistic world culture.

---

9 Hall cited by Houlihan, *Sport and International Politics*, 179-180; Hall also cited by Barrie Houlihan,
“Homogenization, Americanization, and Creolization of Sport: Varieties of Globalization,” *Sociology of
Americanization, and Creolization of Sport,” 360, 363; Maguire, *Global Sport*, 213; Said cited by J. A.
Mangan, “Prologue: Imperialism, Sport, Globalization,” *Europe, Sport, World: Shaping Global Societies*
ed. by J.A. Mangan (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 3; Philippe Legrain, “Cultural Globalization is Not
Americanization,” *Chronicle of Higher Education* (obtained online from [http://chronicle.com](http://chronicle.com) from the
issue dated May 9, 2003): 2.
King comments that global processes will reduce the emphasis of nationalism, but a response will be the strengthening of local and urban identities, particularly large cities. Featherstone does not view the situation as a global culture, but a globalization of culture which features an emerging set of third world cultures. He envisions a swing away from homogenization as evinced by cultural imperialism to a culture featuring increased diversity and increased emphasis on the local. Gordon and Helal see globalization as negating nation-states and fragmenting identities, leading to an emphasis not on nationalism but ethnic groups, gender and consumer groups. The terminology several authors present for this process that emphasizes the increase of local identity is glocalization, an interweaving of global networks with local identity. Porro and Russo, Brick, Maguire and Tuck, and Giulianotti all use the term glocal when describing how global process flows impact sport. MacAlloon points out that “we are all cosmopolitans and locals at the same time,” and adds that the struggle for local identity may increase awareness of globalization. He further adds that the paradox has become the paradigm in that global interconnection and cultural differentiation occur everywhere simultaneously, and that globalization processes do not lead to homogeneity.10

The terms creolization and hybridization are frequently used to express the multiplicity of identities being formed in a globalized culture. Hannerz defines creolization as the interaction between the local and the global, whereby people make their own synthesis from the combination. Typically, creolization would occur during the multidirectional movement between core groups and peripheral groups. The peripheral group would absorb meanings and forms from the core group, transform them, and adopt them as their own. The emphasis during this process is on the selection that occurs by the periphery, and one of the results would be the reduction in the complexity of language forms. Archetti also advocates the notion of creolization, particularly evident in sporting styles, and adds that meanings circulate through commerce, tourism, political propaganda and the media, and that concrete spaces are not needed for the process to occur. Waters adds that globalization can be defined as global flows demonstrated by creolization and hybridization. Maguire and Tuck view global processes as having three implications for nationalism, one being the pluralization of identities leading to hybridization, and the other two being national and local identities are strengthening through resistance, and a weakening of nationalism due to global integration.11

---

Several authors fully advocate that nationalism is in the process of disappearing, mainly due to the repositioning of nation-states into a more regional pattern. Hobsbawm is one of the biggest proponents that nationalism is in its death throes, stating that the supranational restructuring of the globe is leading to the decrease of the nation-state. He sees nationalism decreasing as the transformation of the international division of labor and the rise of international networks undermine national economics. He also notes the massive waves of international and intercontinental migration apparent since 1914, and believes regionalism is more rational economically now than nationalism. He predicts the downfall of the nation-state, but does admit a resurgence of ethnic nationalism during the 1990’s, but argues that it is due to reaction. Blain, Boyle and O’Donnell also view the rise of regional alliances increasing regionalism and supraregionalistic influences, and decreasing nationalism. Legrain notes that the bonds of nationality are loosening, but national identity is not completely disappearing. He foresees the rise of regional cultures, and identifies the growing identity of Scottish and Basque cultures as exemplifiers.¹²

Billig views the fragmentation of nation-states as inevitable in post-modernity, and notes that nations are being attacked from above by supranationals like the European Union and from below by local identities which are transnational, like gender or

lifestyle identities. He believes the national is being replaced by politics of identity.

Featherstone sees nationalism segueing into a more cosmopolitan figuration as diplomatic language increases and transnational intellectuals become more prominent.

Smith believes that since World War II nation-states and nationalism have been becoming obsolete. He notes that the power of nationalism is not eroded by capitalism and transnational organizations, but by telecommunication systems and the internet which allow the construction of larger institutional units leading to the re-emergence of ethnic communities due to a common language. Maguire, Jarvie, Mansfield and Bradley, using the concept of core Peripheral multidirectional flows also note a shift from the ethnic and national to the supranational, which in turn can create new interdependency chains. In another source, Maguire notes that a European identity still remains in the emergent stage. Oliven details two processes that are occurring simultaneously, the rise of the supra-state such as the European Union, and at the same time the collapse of a super-power (USSR) and the increase of ethnic and regional conflicts through exacerbated nationalism. King sees supranationalism leading to a pan-European perspective as a concern, but hypothesizes that a new Europe is likely to be comprised of overlapping sovereignties with allegiances between nation-states.13

Foer critiques the “liberal political thinkers” who blame nationalism for modernity’s evils and urge the abandonment of nationalism for cosmopolitanism. He claims they

13 Billig cited by Jon Garland and Michael Rowe, Racism and Anti-Racism in Football (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), 139.; Featherstone, Global Culture, 9; Anthony D. Smith, “Towards A Global Culture?”, Global Culture, 172, 175; Maguire, Jarvie, Mansfield and Bradley, Sport Worlds, 6; Maguire, Global Sport, 202; Oliven, Tradition Matters, 113; King, “Football Fandom,” 419.
are not realistic as humans crave identity with a group. He also notes a characteristic of global debate often involves the glorification of all things indigenous. Debord emphasizes another characteristic of the globalized planet, the making of the spectacle into the chief product of modern day society. He notes this process turns reality on its head, produces a pseudo-world with an emphasis on commodity fetishism that tends to unify society. Porro and Russo note that globalization leads to a crisis of representation whereby unitariansim increases regional identity leading to conflict between the region and the center. Alabarces and Rodriguez also note that global processes can interrupt the popular culture for a national population, and give the example of Brazil moving from a national identity based on soccer, samba and carnival to one based on publicity and Formula One.14

Giulianotti perhaps spells out the globalization theory in one of the most distinct ways, putting its alignment with post-modernism. He notes that, per Robertson, globalization processes began long before industrialization, but has led to a cultural hybridity and a dependence on international markets. Some of the characteristics that he notes are the movement of populations to the suburbs, the increase of the white collar worker leading to a splintering of the working class, the fluidity and “neo-tribal” emphasis on social

and cultural identity, the collapse of the division between high and low culture designations, and the opposition to meta-narratives.\textsuperscript{15}

After analysis of the variety of theories on globalization, I would offer my own theory. I do not see the fall of the nation-state in the near future, but rather a strengthening of it as a reaction to increased global flows. I see a growing regionalistic pattern, but I surmise it will be a loosely held alliance within which nation-states negotiate for power. However, what appears to be significant is the “increasing varieties” as Maguire states it, but I see it in slightly different terms than he does. Given the global political situation in recent years, it appears that a trend of increasing ethnic, tribal, and religious groups is arising. From the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, to religious and ethnic divisions in Iraq, to continual confrontations on the African continent between ethnic groups, it would appear that a rising tribalism is in evidence. Whether tribal/ethnic groupings will eventually replace nation-states is debatable, as power relationships are veered toward larger entities. But the trend is apparent. How it impacts on sport will be an interesting phenomenon to watch.

It is now time to examine how globalization has impacted the sporting world. Maguire proposes sportization phases that correspond to Robertson’s phases of globalization, and these provide a framework which makes analysis more clear. Phase one of the sportization phase starts later than the corresponding globalization phase, roughly around the 17\textsuperscript{th} and 18\textsuperscript{th} centuries with the beginnings of sportization of modern sport.

By phase two (mid 1700’s to 1870’s) the games movement is underway, instituted by the British. Accompanying the games movement is the increase in team sports and early evidence of the muscular Christianity movement. During Robertson’s third phase, the take-off phase of globalization (1870-1925), Maguire also sees the take-off phase of sportization occurring. There was a diffusion of modern sport, based on a male achievement model and defined by the British, and the internationalization of sport. Phase four, the struggle for hegemony, corresponds with a reduction in the contrasts of sporting cultures, an East versus West battle for hegemony with the West dominating but not totalizing control, and the influence of the Cold War on sporting events. The fifth phase, the uncertainty phase occurring from the late 1960’s onward exhibits an increase in non-Western stars in the sporting arena, the globalization of sport including third world countries in Africa, Asia and South America, the creolization of sport (with extreme sports, snowboarding, etc. gaining popularity), as well as the creolization of sporting cultures (with elite female sport, sport migration increasing, the Gay Games and Paralympics.) During the fifth phase, Maguire postulates that a single sport can no longer represent an entire nation.16

Maguire also identifies several strands of globalization processes that are evident in sport. These include decreasing contrasts between and increasing varieties of ethnic, gender and national identity; the increase of invented traditions; and waves of nostalgia. Maguire, Jarvie, Mansfield and Bradley also note that the globalization of sport is based

on interdependency chains that lead to power networks, globalization is not recent but the rate and speed of it is increasing, and that it takes a long term perspective to trace the process and its impact upon sport. They emphasize the multidirectional flows between core and peripheral nations, with the ability of the local to act/impact back on the global, but not gain hegemonic control. They insist the debate surrounding sport can no longer be an either/or debate over the binaries of universalism versus particularism, homogenization versus difference, integration versus fragmentation, or centralization versus decentralization. The emergence of new varieties of body culture and bodily identities with its decreasing contrasts (elite, male achievement sport) but increasing varieties no longer can fit into set, binary categories.17

Houlihan identifies several key features of global sport: the emergence of unified international federations which serve as rule arbiters, policy makers, and set broadcast and anti-doping guidelines; the rise of global sporting events such as the World Cup and the Olympics, and the internationalization and increase in power of sporting good manufacturers and media. Others would add the increasing sport labor movement (which is now multicultural and polyethnic), the rise of the spectacle in sport, the commodification of sport, the role of nationalism and sport, and the increase of achievement sport.18 Guttmann’s theory regarding the modernization of sport fits aptly into the paradigm of global flows, in that it emphasizes the scientific, rationalized and

valorization of sport, the decrease of indigenous sport, the gendered control of sport, the consumer emphasis increasing in sport, the West versus the non-West elite, and the machine like athlete.19

An examination of these global strands is important at this point, starting once again with the question of homogeneity and nationalism. Most academics acknowledge the role of nationalism in sport, and how international sporting events increase nationalism. Lever concludes that sport helps nations cohere by linking participation and fandom to make a common city, state and national identity. She believes that sport reinforces cleavages within but transcends them making sport an agent that both divides and unifies simultaneously, increasing nationalism and according to critics, leading to international tensions. Maguire and Poulton also see an increased nationalism apparent in the sporting world, as international sport binds people to national identity. They also acknowledge that this can cause a drag on regional identity (such as Europeanism) and help keep it in the emergent stage. For example, the idea of a “European team” competing in the Olympics was firmly rejected. Regionalism is undermined by sport and its connections with increased nationalism. Bairner would add that while global flows are thought to be decreasing signs of national identity and weakening the sport/nation link, in reality, the relationship between sport, national identity and

nationalism is as strong as ever. Sport, in his opinion, continues to play a greater role in maintaining national identity than the construction of a global identity.\(^{20}\)

Sport, in itself, becomes a site of resistance for globalization, often through the process of willful nostalgia. Rememberance of past glories, whether they are imperialistic notions, sporting, or other achievements, binds a nation together leading to increased nationalism. Brazil manages to achieve this process at every World Cup, remembering and re-living former accomplishments. Sport acts as an “anchor of meaning” when globalization processes increase. Increased globalization leads to increased nostalgia.\(^{21}\)

It is extremely doubtful that sporting nationalism is becoming obsolete due to globalization. The nation still defines the team in international competition, and nationalist sporting federations still maintain control of national teams. International sporting societies are still comprised of nations, not regions, although regional affiliations often carry more weight in power networks of international organizations. (For example, UEFA often carries the most weight in FIFA.) Even those that see the decline of the nation-state acknowledge the role that sport has in maintaining it. Porro and Russo note that as the nation-state declines, international sport is one of the last areas of nationalism. Houlihan believes that although signs of commercialism are


undermining nationalism in sport, the national still dominates and forces commercialism to adapt. He defines sport as a global “Esperanto” which nations use to say things about themselves. Tännö would disagree, believing that nationalism within sport is becoming less important due to commercialization and internationalism. However, given the current popularity of such events as the Olympics and the World Cup, it does seem apparent that nationalism is alive and well within the sporting world, and in fact, sport does seem to function as an area of resistance to global processes.

However, the concept of homogenization and cultural imperialism cannot be so easily dismissed. In terms of elite achievement based sport in a global world, it would be difficult to argue that the British games model and modernization of sport have not held dominance. In terms of global sport, the model is mainly British, and represents a Western male culture. Sport, as a Western cultural product, tends to reflect the values of an advanced industrial society. The diffusion of sport, outward mainly from Britain, often replaced indigenous sport or caused indigenous sport to undergo changes of meaning and values. As Mangan points out, global sport is not merely the manifestation of twentieth century globalization, as it began much earlier and was linked with nineteenth century imperialism. The diffusion of British sport to South America is but one example. There was no challenge to the acceptance of British sport as it was willingly adopted in a one-way process. After adoption, it underwent transformation

and adaptation, mainly in terms of style, to better reflect the local identity. Wagner would disagree, saying that the blending of sporting traditions led to increased homogenization but it was not imperialistic. I disagree. 23

Cultural imperialism has had a homogenizing affect, in terms that modern sport has diffused around the world, international sport is defined specifically in terms of elite, Western notions of sport, and everyone plays by the same rules. This does not mean that indigenous sport has been eliminated, but rather than global sport has been defined in homogenous terms. Mangan notes that globalization processes tend to lead to an increase in indigenous sport, but that the momentum toward a global monoculture driven by technology, marketing, mass media and international sport studies is apparent. Sport is not longer monolithic, not Eastern or Western, and no longer the preserve of the elite, but does exhibit itself in a to and fro form of cultural diffusion. In other words, global sport exists but exists within the context of local meanings. Global sport is characterized by an increasing variety of styles of play, and it is through resistance and counter flows that new styles emerge. Sport organization is globalized, but cultural dominance is not complete. There is not a passive reception of sporting practices and values, but a two way flow of assimilation and adaptation. While most countries may accept a mainly English version of sport, each country plays that sport in its own style.

There is an element of resistance within the imperial framework. Bairner points out that the current pattern of cultural flows, with distinctive identities, flourishes within the context of global processes, and that now, it is something different than British cultural imperialism. Most sport academicians are reluctant to endorse a single, cultural imperialization process as being evident in current times. The give and take process, particularly from core to peripheral nations, makes more sense in terms that there is choice inherent in the acceptance of the flows and adaptation apparent after acceptance. The pattern is not always simply a receptive one, either. This is evidenced by the increasing importance of Eastern sport in Western culture, such as martial arts.24

The commodification of sport, involving big business, advertising, and the amount of money involved in sport has significantly increased due to globalization patterns. Maguire emphasizes that the global commodity chain involving marketing and consumption patterns in core countries also has diffused out to peripheral and semi-peripheral countries. The power of a company, such as Nike, has permeated most aspects of the sporting world. The securing of exclusive rights to the Brazilian national soccer team is but one aspect of their penetration into sport, but an important one. Transnational companies infusion of cash into sport permits and enhances a slippage in the power relations within sport, with the power base shifting from sporting federations and international federations to big business.25

25 Maguire, Global Sport, 130, 132; Maguire, Jarvie, Mansfield and Bradley, Sport Worlds, 4.
The globalization of the market place has impacted directly on sport in terms of influencing sport in aspects of participation, commodification of the players and fans, as well as setting a model for the internationalization of sporting teams. Major league baseball has been a loser in the globalization process, as Foer points out. Failure to master the global economy and failure to market itself to a global audience has contributed to the decrease in popularity of baseball. The IOC’s recent ruling to eliminate both baseball and softball from the Olympic agenda is indicative. The Sporting Goods Manufacturing Association of America estimates that between 1987 and 2000, the number of teens playing baseball decreased by 47%. For the same period, soccer increased, and by 2002, 1.3 million more children were playing soccer than baseball in the United States.26

The infusion of money and the commodification of sport have led to the formation of an “international” model for sporting teams. Teams have become brand names, if they are successful, and appeal to a global audience rather than a local one. Manchester United is perhaps the prime example of this, being hated in their own country, but economically and wildly successful on a global basis. Manchester United now tops the list for richest sporting franchises on a global basis, being valued at $289 million. The New York Yankees is second at $280.4 million followed by Juventus ($251 million), AC Milan ($230 million), the Washington Redskins ($227.3 million) and Real Madrid ($221.5 million.) These teams have global merchandising patterns and hefty television incomes that allow them not to rely on admission prices for their main source of

---

income. Sport as spectacle has become the norm, taking much of the element of playfulness out of a game that is now a market commodity.\textsuperscript{27}

Sport migration patterns have been vastly influenced by the globalization processes, and the rate of increase is significant. More athletes are moving from local teams to other countries, and the flow is generally from semi-peripheral and peripheral nations to core nations. Arbena notes that this global migration pattern is an unfortunate consequence for poorer countries in that as athletic talent is exported, the quality of sports in those countries tends to decrease. Teams often have to sell off talented players due to economic demands, and the talent drain has become a business in itself.\textsuperscript{28}

To conclude, globalization processes have been at work for hundreds of years, but the pace of the processes has increased rapidly in the last several decades. The process is uneven, but momentum has increased. Time has sped up and space has decreased. Nationalism, particularly in its close bond with sport, still seems to be the preeminent imagined community. But the way people are defining themselves in terms of identity are multiple and increasing exponentially leading to increasing layers of identity, which in turn impact on sporting identity. Increased migration of players, increased money and commodification of sport and an increasing variety of styles of sport are all apparent as aspects of globalization. While sport has been homogenized via former


aspects of cultural imperialization, global flows and increased variety of style and identity are intertwined. There is a growing element of regionalism apparent, but it has not impacted on the sporting world significantly. International sport is still aligned with nationalism, and willful nostalgia, particularly connected with sport, increases and thus increases nationalism in a symbiotic relationship. Sport remains a site of resistance, in some aspects, to globalization processes.29

CHAPTER 24
GLOBALIZATION AND SOCCER

Globalization processes have impacted on the sport of soccer in a variety of ways. This chapter details how these processes and global flows are playing out in soccer, and how they impact on soccer as a sport, and soccer style. The areas investigated include the homogenization of soccer, the movement from game status to entertainment status, the soccer labor migration with its impact on style, and the collapse of designations for high and low culture that are apparent in soccer.

Although many claim that soccer style is homogenizing, and teams that compete internationally are becoming more and more alike, a counter-claim can be made that an increasing variety of styles are apparent within the game. While a cultural imperialism of western sport remains dominant, soccer and soccer style carved out a unique category for itself. Yes, all nations adopted the British style of the game of soccer, but in the process, each nation appropriated and changed the style, remaking it in its own image. Host countries often copied and then creolized the style of visiting teams. Through this process, some of the traditional centers of soccer power have lost their dominance. Uruguay, an early dominant force in soccer, is an example. Certainly many authors have written about the crisis in British soccer and its loss of dominance on the global
scale in a game that they developed and diffused. The globalization processes have changed the balance of power within soccer by increasing the hybridity of both players and style. Soccer style is based on local tradition, be it invented or not. Globalization has failed to diminish the games’ local cultures. Style is not being homogenized, but increasing the power of local entities. And as Finn and Giulianotti point out, the evolution of soccer is not toward conformity or uniformity, because there is no contest without differences. Soccer is not becoming homogenous because it has autonomy, and globalization processes are not pre-determined or monochromatic. Some scope of agency allows and encourages differences in style and organization.¹

Some authorities argue that globalization processes have led to homogenization of style because professionalization demands particular somatic types and high performance levels. Mason asserts that from the middle of the twentieth century when soccer became more internationalized, it also became a more homogenous style that undermined differences. Wagg comments that efficiency is now the goal, and inefficient is unacceptable even if it is artistic. Carrying that thought process further; it

would appear he believes that homogeneity is becoming apparent in the sport.\(^2\) Galeano has been particularly outspoken on the impact of globalization on soccer:

> Obedience, speed, strength and none of those fancy turns: this is the mold into which globalization pours the game. Soccer gets mass-produced, and it comes out colder than a freezer and as merciless as a meat-grinder. It’s a soccer for robots. Such boredom supposedly means progress, but historian Arnold Toynbee had already seen enough of that when he wrote, “Civilizations in decline are consistently characterized by a tendency toward standardization and uniformity.”\(^3\)

Galeano also comments that the twenty-first century sanctifies uniformity in the name of efficiency and sacrifices freedom to success. He believes that technocracy has led to lightning speed and brute strength in the game which negates joy, kills fantasy and outlaws daring.\(^4\)

Others also question whether a truly national style of soccer play can exist within a global culture. Some comment that a player can play anywhere in the world for teams who increasingly seem to play in the same way. In 1960, Bob Ferrier, a British journalist, recognized a gradual standardization of soccer styles. After the 1990 World Cup in Italy, there was a general outcry that playing styles had become homogenous and Europeanized. Experts howled about the conformity, saying “We are all Europeans now” and believed that difference and spontaneity was in danger. But that belief seemed


to change somewhat after the ’94 World Cup, and changed further after ’98. The ’94 World Cup demonstrated that despite globalization, there was an increasing pattern of emphasizing national identity via soccer style. The ’98 World Cup, which was believed to have been a tribute to globalization, instead revived old soccer stereotypes via the expression of national playing styles.\(^5\)

I believe that a strong case can be made against homogenization within the sport based on analysis of trends and “fads.” What some academics see as the “homogenizing affects of globalization” are not new phenomenons in the world of soccer, but rather an accelerated spread of tactical or stylistic innovations that are successful, and so are copied and adapted to other teams. Giulianotti notes this rapid spread is a process of globalization that initially dramatized cultural differences. During the 1960’s and early 1970’s, international teams wanted to copy the Brazilian style of fluid ball movement paced to dance-like rhythms. Other teams were mainly unsuccessful because they did not have the historical or cultural heritage to implement such a style in a rapid enough manner to be an elite team. During the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, “total football” as demonstrated by Germany and Holland was the rage. It was such a strong and dominant style, and was a stylist innovation. Few teams, however, had the all-around level of player to successfully adopt the style. The past decade has seen the rise (and

---

perhaps now the fall) of the zonal defense, be it a three man or four man flat back style. The majority of the teams in the last several world cups have adopted this configuration. The increased communication, added to the increased international media exposure and increased international tournaments, does enhance the rapidity of the spread of new soccer styles. What is important to recognize, is that each team (or country) adapts that style to the players they have available in order to be successful. Just because the current “trend” is a flat back four zonal defense, does not mean that style has become homogenized.6

Lever further argues against homogenization in soccer: “Soccer confrontations sustain traditional pluralism, countering cultural homogeneity, while accentuating the wholeness of the social system.”7 Some “soccer systems” do appear to be influenced by a form of Americanization, in that soccer’s current trend does seem to emphasize efficiency and productivity. The game has had rule changes that emphasize these points: eliminating time-wasting by penalizing diving or throwing the ball away, match balls are kept in a variety of locations around the field to keep the game moving, players are penalized for the professional foul which inhibits scoring, slow motion replays are being used to determine calls (although these are mainly used by television announcers at this point.) Players wear the same number for all their international appearances,
rather than being assigned a number for each individual game. Increased scoring seems to be the name of the game, in order to attract more excitement and fans to the game.\textsuperscript{8}

The question of nationalism in the face of increased globalization plays out on the soccer field. Soccer, at the international level, increases nationalism. Sugden and Tomlinson comment that soccer increases local, regional, and national cultures, celebrating them in the midst of global globalization. Soccer, although thoroughly globalized, offers new means to display social differences or re-invent traditions. While soccer was diffused at a period of time that exhibited the importance of nationalism and the creation of national identity, it still offers an area to display national identity, particularly through aspects of style. Germany still plays differently than Brazil. Globalized soccer is not erasing or homogenizing nationalism; instead, nationalism has increased as a reaction to globalization. Bale comments that soccer increases national and regional identity because it serves to identify a place in the mind of outsiders. Smaller countries, in particular, retain a strong national identity expressed through soccer. Soccer nationalism is the antithesis of the European Union identity, but provides a forum for the expression of nationalism. Fans reject a supranational identity on the soccer field, unless it is an exhibition game.\textsuperscript{9}

\textsuperscript{8} Giulianotti, \textit{Football: A Sociology}, 143.
Some authors do see a lessening of the connection between soccer and nationalism. Giulianotti believes that soccer’s continued modernization potentially undermines the centrality of the nation-state, but Porro and Russo see a paradox, in that while the nation-state is decreasing in importance, nationalism is more alive than ever through soccer and its production of symbols and identities. Gordon and Helal perceive that the making of soccer into an entertainment product may actually bring it back to a national sport. Others see soccer moving from a local and parochial interpretation to a more global and cosmopolitan one due to transnational television and soccer magazines. I agree with this with a caveat. Club soccer is certainly becoming more cosmopolitan and less rooted in a nationalistic or local identity. But national teams playing for the World Cup are still rooted in nationalism, and increase the power and intensity of nationalistic fervor and identity.10

The globalization of club soccer has demonstrated several aspects of global processes. Clubs have truly become transnational organizations with little regard for national boundaries. Players often experience a crisis of identity after migrating, unsure whether their being is rooted in their national or club identity. For these elite players, identity is almost post-national and certainly fluid, particularly when compared to the concrete national identity displayed during the 1950’s. The club versus country conflict is increasing as superstars are forced to miss national games due to club responsibilities,

and clubs complain about the frequency of international games as well as injuries sustained while playing for the national teams.¹¹

Elite player migration is, inevitably, a part of the globalization process. Clubs are increasingly multicultural, elite players are increasingly mobile, and migration patterns are increasing at a rapid rate. From the 1990’s onward, player agents are frequently regarded as the key factor in the acceleration of soccer migration. Prior to 1980, a move out of country could ruin a player’s international career, as he was regarded as not being loyal to his country. This image changed dramatically as more and more players chose to follow the money to the larger and richer leagues. The growth of soccer in Asia is a direct result of globalization. Japan has developed a prominent league recruiting large numbers of Brazilians to stock the teams. South America became a donor continent, losing large numbers of international level players to European leagues for the top players, and Asian or peripheral-nation leagues for those less prominent. This phenomenon has led to a policy of investing in producing talent and then selling it for profit which enables the South American leagues to continue functioning. It has become a double edged sword. Not only do the peripheral and semi-peripheral nations deplete their talent resources leading to mediocre play within their own leagues, but core nations, by buying large numbers of these migrant players, fail to produce and develop their own youth systems. FIFA president, Sepp Blatter, has accused rich

European teams of robbing poorer countries of their talent, calling it “social and economic rape.” For example, Spain and Portugal are the main destination for South American players, but club team captains generally are local players. Lanfranchi and Taylor delineate other global pipelines that exist in the soccer labor market, such as Africans to Europe, Brazilians to Japan, and Yugoslavians to anywhere in Western Europe.

Another aspect of globalization that plays out in soccer and is related to the commodification of the sport is the “disappearing live fan.” This process has two aspects. As soccer has been transformed into a consumer product and then into entertainment, soccer has been translated from a sport to a spectacle. It has at times become a business with few participants and millions of spectators. There has been a shift towards the television fan, which is now a globalized phenomenon. Soccer governing bodies encourage the television deconstruction of national boundaries into cosmopolitan and globalized fans as it increases profitability. But cohabiting with this process is a version of Baudrillard’s hyperreality. The end of the panoptic system leads

---


to a place where the real is confused with the model. An implosion of meaning occurs, and simulation begins. The collapse of reality into hyperrealism occurs in the minute duplication of the real. The disappearing live fan is a reality as not only is soccer becoming a spectacle mediated by television fans, but games are frequently occurring without any live fans at all. In 1987, Real Madrid played Napoli in an empty stadium. In 2004-2005, several similar occurrences happened, including a World Cup qualifier for North Korea. As teams increasingly rely on commercialism, sponsors and television money, the live fan is no longer needed, and thus is being slowly eliminated.14

Perhaps indicative of this hyperreality, the gap between the construction of high and low culture is collapsing, much as the gap between former elite national team and third world countries is also narrowing. In the past, although soccer was initiated and diffused by the elite, through much of the 20th century it was dominated and mediated as a working class sport. Its association with the working class designated it a low cultural status. But with the globalization of soccer and the increasing entry of the cosmopolitan fan, the middle class is becoming more prominent in soccer, which is contributing to a collapse between the high and the low in terms of cultural status. This collapse of the high/low status is also being fueled by the commodification of the sport and the increased profitability available. Soccer is chic, and is slowly separating from its working class designation, spurred by globalization processes. When the Three Tenors,

Pavarotti, Domingo and Carreras staged a concert as a tribute to the game of soccer prior to World Cup ’90, a recombination of high culture (opera) with low culture (soccer) was reflected, as is the appearance of football jerseys on fashion runways. Both are indicative of a breakdown of the high and low in culture.\textsuperscript{15}

The breakdown of high and low culture around soccer, the commodification of the game and its players and fans, the disappearing live fan, the increased labor migration patterns are all indications of the influence of globalization upon the game. Soccer is truly globalized, although regional and local patterns may still underpin the game. And yet, soccer as a sport demonstrates a resistance to globalization by increased nationalism, particularly during international tournament, another signifier of global processes. It would appear that homogenization is not occurring on a widespread basis in terms of playing style, but trends and fads of playing style have been apparent for some time. These trends are fads are communicated and diffused more rapidly via means of international transportation, communication, and media aspects. So, globalization is impacting style, in a manner of speaking, but style itself remains rooted in the resistance demonstrated by national identity. The commodification of the sport is a concern. True afficienados of the game bemoan the deconstruction of the local team with its local players and its local style. Globalization flows have had a tremendous impact on the sport of soccer, and appear to continue their influence in the future.

CHAPTER 25

THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON BRAZILIAN AND GERMAN SOCCER

Globalization processes have impacted greatly on the sport of soccer, but it is important to determine how they have impacted on the case study nations of Germany and Brazil, and how these processes influenced the game of soccer within those countries, and impacted on soccer style. Given that Germany would be designated a core nation, or first world country, and Brazil a semi-peripheral, or second world nation, has influenced how globalization processes have impacted and been interpreted by each country. Germany and Brazil have been impacted by elite player migration flows in opposite ways. Germany has become a destination country, and Brazil significantly loses top stars to other destinations. Germany has been impacted by the regional organization of the European Union, as well as the reunification of the country. Each country has resisted globalization impulses through soccer, but in unique ways. This chapter explores the impact globalization has had on each country, and how those processes may have impacted playing style.

Germany, like many other countries, was exposed to the cultural imperialistic diffusion of sport, particularly soccer, by touring English teams. In 1899, the British Football Associated sponsored a tour to Germany. During the European phase of global sport
development, German turnen not only held hegemony in Germany, but was intent on
doing some cultural imperialistic globalizing of its own. By the late 19th and early 20th
century, a pan-German movement spurred by turnen was apparent in Brazil. As
Germany was late in coming to nationalization, it demonstrated a widespread wave of
nostalgia from 1880-1900. German angst, or lack of self assurance, was seen as a
product of the discourses on modernity. This nostalgic paradigm in German history was
due to its late unification (relative to other European countries) and its lack of an
unbroken, historical past, which led to pessimism about its future and modernization. It
was during this time period that soccer was being introduced, so it is understandable
that during a nostalgic wave that the country would reject foreign sport.¹

As Germany was late to nationalization, it was also late to professionalization of its
soccer clubs. During the mid twentieth century, soccer clubs averaged about one per
town, with larger cities having multiple clubs. Partially as a result of
professionalization in the 1960’s and partially as a response to globalization processes
which have emphasized the commodification of soccer, the number of local clubs has
decreased. Perhaps more pertinent, the local club no longer exists as a symbolic
extension of the local community. In the Ruhr region, established clubs, such as
Schalke 04 and Borussia Dortmund, still are emblematic of local identity and also serve

to increase regional identity, but this is not the norm throughout the rest of Germany.

The traditional soccer club focused on social life and comradeship centered on the local team. Gehrmann notes that since 1963, soccer became a combination consumer act and circus, with distance placed between the consumer/fan and the player.²

The conceptualization of local, regional, and national identity has been a slippery one in Germany for the past two centuries. Given its participation in two world wars, national identity has been problematic, and has continued to be so after the reunification of East and West Germany. Since 1950, Germany has, at times, embraced Europeanization and a more regional pattern of identity, perhaps as a means of negotiating their national identity. They greet European integration as a substitute for national identity, and at times viewed the European Union concept as a European Germany rather than being German Europeans. For many years, France and Britain were against a federated Europe out of fear that Germany would dominate. Maguire and Poulton comment that if there would ever be a fully federated Europe, then English versus German rivalry would exist for a millennium. Judis reports that during the 1990’s, German support for the

---
European Union decreased, and Germans ranked 12th out of the then 15 countries in belief that their country benefited from the EU.3

Given that trans-national groupings and identities are indicative of patterns of increasing globalization, Germany’s participation in the European Union has had some significant impacts on its soccer. The Bosman Ruling and the increased soccer migration patterns have had a tremendous impact on German soccer. The Bosman Ruling has increased the movement of professional soccer players across national boundaries, and along with television, has created a two tier league within Germany. The rise in percentages of foreign players within the Bundesliga has been tremendous, from 15% in 1993 to 42.6% in 2001. German clubs have the highest percentage of non-nationals in the European Union, with the highest proportions being Croatians, Poles, and Hungarians.4

For the past several decades, Germany has been considered to have the most cosmopolitan soccer league in the world, a direct result of globalization processes. During the 1960’s and 1970’s, Germany was the top destination of Swedish players.

---


From the 1970’s onward, Germany was the main destination for Yugoslavian players. In 1990, two thirds of 170 Czech players playing abroad played in Germany and Austria. By the 1993/94 season, Germany became trade import oriented, in terms of soccer. A German pipeline to Turkey is a prominent connection, but it is a one way flow. From 1992-1995 no Turkish players played in the Bundesliga, despite Germany’s large Turkish population. The only Turkish players evident were all playing at the lower levels in Germany. They are still considered foreigners in Germany. Seventeen World Cup nations are represented among the players in the Bundesliga, and it truly is the most cosmopolitan league. Currently, Bundesliga teams are allowed three foreign players and unlimited European Union players. Interestingly, teams in the Ruhr region which do maintain a more localized identity, mainly have German players. The rest of the Bundesliga clubs are multinational teams.5

Wagg notes that globalization has had three major impacts on European, and thus German, soccer. The first is the changing social and economic base which has contributed to the creation and migration of transnational elite players. Second is the

---

commercialization of clubs and increased media influence. The third is the internationalization of soccer cultures at the level of consumption, or the fan base. The commodification of German soccer is an important point to note, given the German cultural emphasis on business and economic success.\(^6\)

Despite sharing television revenues, Germany has historically had limited competition at the top of the tier. During the 1980’s and 1990’s, two clubs always fought it out at the end of the season for the Bundesliga championship. Bayern Munich was always one of those clubs. Bayern Munich was considered a “national public” model for successful sporting clubs. As Giulianotti points out, the modern German game was dominated by the pan-national enterprise of Bayern Munich. Bayern Munich jumped into globalization early, and profited from it. They bought big name players and big name coaches, and were amazingly successful on the field, and they were the team that Germans most loved to hate.\(^7\)

Guilianotti comments that Germany has entered a post-modern period with a new sense of national identity reconstructed within the global milieu. Starting around 1984, Germany was swept with waves of nostalgia, a common reaction to globalization. One German soccer myth is that soccer unities ethnicities and integrates minorities, but after reunification (1989-90), there was a definite re-emergence of ethnic separation noted in sport. Political talk of the reunification of brothers and sisters in a unified Germany

held little appeal for West German youth. The boom that was apparent in West German soccer merely widened an already large gulf after reunification. The East Germany part of the nation, replete with its own league and teams, was to be merged with the Bundesliga. Perhaps more significantly, the East German clubs lost players to West German ones because the salaries were much higher. East German clubs struggled to survive economically, and most did not make it. Only two East German clubs joined the Bundesliga. East German players played the game with a different style (robotic, politicized, and heavily influenced by the Stasi) and had a difficult time adjusting to a different style within a capitalistic system. The youth in both parts of Germany favor individuality, those from East Germany had been exposed to more institutionalized and less leisure sport than the Western Germans. The implications of coming out of a very rigid and institutionalized system certainly impacted how the East Germans played, and in turn, impacted their integration in the West German system.8

Germany also began to demonstrate two other strands of globalization in sport: pluralization and differentiation. Sport clubs, including soccer, saw an increase in the number of women that became active participants. It is estimated that from 20% to 35% of the women are now active in sporting clubs in Germany. In terms of differentiation, the three categories of sport (elite, amateur and leisure) grew further and

further apart. There are now 80 sporting federations in the country with 66,000 clubs. The number of children participating in soccer is decreasing, and concern is being expressed that the reason is complacence and lack of rigor and discipline in an affluent lifestyle. Indirectly, this has had an impact on the German national team.9

Even given that Germany likes to consider itself a homogenous society, the decrease in the number of youth players is bound to impact the quality of soccer being played. In Euro 2004, only three of the starting players for the national team played their club ball abroad. The player pool has been decreasing, and is starting to have a significant impact on the team. As early as the World Cup ’94, and then again in ’98, Germany was accused of having bad soccer with appalling behavior. The lack of youthful talent, added to Germany’s failure to adapt to changing trends within the game, have led to some disastrous results for the national team in recent years. In 2000, the Germans were accused of being the worst team at the European Championship, and did have their worst showing since 1938. Even German newspapers were in an outcry, comparing a bratwurst in soccer kit to a German player. Coach Rudi Völler did attempt a flat back three zone at the tournament, but abandoned it quickly. By 2004, Germany was playing with a flat back three or four system, just when Greece, coached by the German Otto Rehhagel reverted to what he called the “old German system with man markers and sweepers.” Greece won the tournament. It seemed that Germany became so entrenched in a style that they are hesitant to make changes with the times. Hesse-Lichtenberger

says that other nations move forward and improve, but Germany sits on its laurels and keeps doing what they have always done. The “nostalgia” element inherent in globalization becomes a concrete notion, and one that Germans are slow to change. However, change does appear to be happening on the national team. At the tournament in 2005, the German team demonstrated a “new” fluidity of style in the attack, but struggled mightily in defense.\textsuperscript{10}

Brazil, like Germany, was exposed to soccer fairly early in its imperial diffusion phase. Since soccer was not indigenous to Brazil (although some Indio-Brazilian tribes played a soccer-like game) the game was imported through British exposure. In 1904, all soccer terminology was in English as was common for such a colonial importation. Traveling teams, generally amateur but some professional came to Brazil in the sportization phase of globalization. By 1914, Brazil had started to develop its own style of play, adopting and refashioning the British game, and the British influence on soccer style began to decline. Giulianotti notes that Brazil owes a debt to international pollination as the early British tours and the influence of the 1960’s Euro-science movement had an impact on the development of Brazilian soccer style.\textsuperscript{11}

Given that the Brazilian people are a mixture of Portuguese, Indian, and Afro-Brazilians, they can easily be classified in a globalized term as creoles. Soccer, as well


as the people, was also creolized in Brazil. Brazilians took a game imported from the British and made it into something different, reflecting their own style. The game had the same rules, but it was a different game with a different emphasis on the game. Much of Latin American soccer was articulated as anti-British, meaning it turned from the elite, gentlemanly, amateur game into a game for and by the masses. Although early on a hegemonic British tradition (as well as some German influence) was established, the creolization of the game was a successful appropriation of something that had previously belonged to a specific social group. But the game itself could not have been appropriated without the early globalization processes manifested by the British, particularly their traveling teams.\textsuperscript{12}

Even more so than Germany, the globalization processes that have sped up and influenced the migration patterns of elite players have impacted Brazil heavily. Even from the early soccer periods, Brazilians were extensively recruited to play overseas. As transportation industries have globalized, the impact on the amount of players going overseas also increased. As early as 1930, Italian recruiting agents traveled to Brazil, and by the following year recruited 39 players to play in Italy. Of course, this was before Brazil professionalized soccer, so players wanting to be paid were easily lured

overseas, as long as they were white. But with Brazil, soccer migration was not just a problem; it was termed a diasporo as so many players have gone to Europe.13

In 1970, all of the national team players still played in the Brazilian league. But by 1994, only half of the team still played in Brazil. In 1998, only 9 of 22 were playing in country, and by 2002, only 10 out of 23 were paid soccer stars in Brazil. By 2003, all 11 starters were playing overseas. The 2006 World Cup team lists only two players pursuing their careers in Brazil. The destinations for these players were diverse, but heavily featured European leagues.14

After 1970, Brazilian players went to Europe to participate in a globalized European soccer and attain higher salaries than were available in Brazil. The numbers of young Brazilians overseas have increased rapidly, and the European experience starts earlier and lasts longer than previously. Portugal has been a favored destination, as the language barrier does not exist for Brazilians there, and Brazilians have found it easy to assume Portuguese citizenship if they desire. In 1993, 126 Brazilian soccer players performed professionally in Portugal. In the 1999-2000 season, 74 Brazilians were

13 Mason, Passion of the People?, 52.
playing in the Portuguese first division. Spain was another favored destination, again, due to language similarity. In 1993, 11 Brazilians played in Spain, but the numbers have increased significantly since then. Brazilians can obtain dual nationality in Spain in two years, and by doing so, the players no longer count in calculations limiting non-European players per team.

One of the biggest importers of Brazilian soccer talent has been Japan, particularly since the 1980’s. With the formation of the J-League in 1993, even more Brazilians were recruited. By 1993, 32 Brazilians played professionally in Japan. The J-League allowed three foreigners playing per club, but half of the 46 foreign players in the league were Brazilian. Brazilian players in Japan can be naturalized and obtain citizenship which allows them to play for the Japanese national team, but they must abandon their Brazilian nationality and citizenship, and most are reluctant to do so. By 1995, more than 20 players were playing for Japan, including some famous names, such as Leonardo, Jorginho and Dunga.

Italy has also been a destination country for Brazilian players, with 13 Brazilians playing in the top league in Italy in 1991. By the 1999-2000 season, Brazil was the

---

largest exporter to the European leagues, featuring 147 players in top teams. During 1999, 650 completed transfers for Brazilian soccer players occurred, with players traveling to Armenia, Senegal, China and Jamaica as well as prominent soccer countries. By 2000, 5000 Brazilians played out of country in 66 different countries, and an increase of 4729 over the 1993 figures. As discussed in an earlier chapter, the new monocultural export for Brazil has been top level soccer players for the past fifteen years. This export of players has allowed a much needed cash infusion to financially struggling clubs. Unlike Germany, which is a destination country for soccer migration, Brazil and other South American countries rarely, if ever, see any transfers into their countries from Europe. The pipeline is one way, and it runs outward.18

Brazilians believe that even though the diaspora of soccer players continues, they can overcome it and stem it to a certain extent by finding and developing more gifted younger players. However, globalization has impacted the Brazilian style, although resistance to this influence is notably increasing. During the late 1980’s and 1990’s when Brazil set about modernizing their soccer style in light of global flows, Miller and Redhead noted that too many national players playing abroad led to a sameness and negativity of play. In the 1994 World Cup, Brazil won by playing a much more defensive style than the traditional Brazilian emphasis on flamboyant scoring. Mason noted that during the 1970’s, there were two distinct playing styles on a global basis: the

Brazilian South American style and the European one. But that changed by 1994, and he believes that national playing styles no longer exist, that all teams play in a similar manner, that caution has influenced the game to the extent that the ultimate pinnacle is not to lose, and that due to homogenization, the Brazilian style is no longer evident. Powers states that it is hard to create the playing style of *jogo bonito* when the soccer diaspora has all of the players playing overseas. Kuper agrees, commenting that the Brazilian style fleetingly reappeared in 1982, but barely exists anymore. Tostão, a former Brazilian player, comments that today in Brazil, globalization has led to uniformity, conformity and tactical sterility. He says, “You can play the same in Minas Gerais as you can in Japan.” And he adds that force and speed are increasing the art but decreasing the beauty of play, although admits that the 1994 World Cup team took some initial steps to return to tradition.19

It would be fruitless to argue that Brazil did not go through a stylistic period when they attempted to modernize and Europeanize their style, and undoubtedly the massive immigration of their top national team players was influential in what appeared to be a global trend of homogenization. However, I would heartily disagree that Brazil is still mired within this trend. Instead, what I see on the playing field is a definite and coordinated effort to return to a “Brazilian style” that is solely reflective of their culture.

---

This return to style reflects a decided resistance to globalization processes, and involves a very noted willful nostalgia. As early as 1992, Brazil began to reject a Europeanized version and soccer style and attempted to return to their “roots.” Brazilians called for a reinstatement of the values of street soccer, played with love, passion and magic. There is nostalgia for the amateur game that carries embedded memories of spontaneity and carnival from the early working class games. Brazilian style, once again, is valuing individual resistance within the game of soccer. By 1994, Brazilian coach, Parreira, noted that willful nostalgia helped to shape Brazilian style, saying that the ’86 and ’90 World Cups indicated soccer as a brutal business was not hospitable to Brazilian play. By the 2002 World Cup, Brazil returned to the style of individualistic, joyful play. Current top players are indicative of this trend: Ronaldo, Ronaldinho, Adriano, and Robinho are all flashy scorers. What globalization processes have impacted is a Brazilian concentration on defense and the movement toward being results oriented.20

Globalization has had a definite impact on how soccer is being “read” in Brazil. Since the time of Vargas, when soccer was used to promote global identity and as a means of unification for a diverse population, soccer has been connected to the unification of social life. As soccer becomes more and more a consumer product in a globalized society, globalization weakened the impact of Brazilian soccer as a unifying force. Oliven comments that Brazilians have difficulty in accepting cultural divisions, and

cultural homogeneity is emphasized through the media. Despite issues of globalization, corruption within the game in Brazil, and massive elite player migration, the Brazilian passion for soccer has not changed significantly as it is so deeply ingrained as a definition of national character. Should national identity ever fragment under globalization flows, the situation might change, but at present, the current pattern still holds.\(^\text{21}\)

The best example of commodification of the sport in Brazil was the Nike deal with the national team. The Nike contract gave them exclusive rights to the Brazilian national team. It was accomplished to increase their market share of soccer merchandising, but allowed Nike to dictate the Brazilian playing schedule to Nike’s benefit. The deal was arranged in 1997, and Nike agreed to pay $200-250 million dollars in a ten year agreement to sponsor the Brazilian national team. In return, Brazil agreed to play in five Nike-organized matches per year. A Brazilian Communist congressman, Aldo Rebelo, investigated the contract, and was concerned that Brazil was forced to play a bunch of lesser nations purely for marketing purposes. He said, “My fight is the preservation of national identity in front of the pressure of globalization.”\(^\text{22}\)


Globalization has put its stamp on Brazilian soccer in other ways. From the 1980’s onward, fan violence has increased, mainly between supporter organizations. Dr. Sócrates has noticed a decreasing amount of creativity in the game, which he says is not lacking but is limited, and attributes it to the decreasing amount of land available for children to play soccer. In 1977, billboards began appearing around Brazilian fields, advertising both American and Brazilian products. In 1983, publicity began appearing on club uniform shirts. 1987 featured live television coverage of most of the league games. All were indications of the influence of globalization.23

With the addition of live television coverage, attendance decreased at Brazilian league games. Brazil even features its own hyperreality: a 1997 game between Juventude and Portuguesa in the quarter finals of the national championship had only 55 spectators in actual attendance. The same year debuted some rule changes by the Brazilian league that were certainly indicative of a post-modern trend. Coaches could call a five minute time-out in each half, probably to allow television commercials to be aired. A limit on personal fouls was established, similar to American basketball. Each player had a five foul limit, and the team had a fifteen foul limit. Surpassing the fifteen foul limit awarded the opposing team a free kick from the top of the “D” with no wall allowed, for each subsequent foul. One game between Corinthians and Flamengo exhibited how the new rules would actually play out. Corinthians reached their limit of fifteen fouls, and

23 Bellos, Futebol, 143, 360; Gordon and Helal, “The Crisis of Brazilian Soccer,” 150.
the last five minutes was played as though soccer was a non-contact sport. Or as Taylor put it, it looked like “twenty-two hemophiliac Romanovs” were playing the game.24

Brazil has been affected differently than Germany in terms of global flows. Brazilian clubs, even with temporary foreign investors, are not able to pay players the large sums of money that they receive in Europe. Along with increased global transportation and communication, the lower salaries have increased the elite player migration overseas. The impact of an entire national team playing out of country initially was predictable. The style of play when the team was together was inefficient, more mechanical, and less “Brazilian” and more homogenized than it had ever been. However, as willful nostalgia increased resistance to globalization trends, Brazil has returned to its old style of play featuring attacking individualism, dance-like movements, and flair on the field. The current monoculture and latifundah trend in Brazilian soccer, the selling off of young or elite players to make money for the clubs, results in mediocrity within the Brazilian league. The “pure” Brazilian game has become more bland and less exciting.

Fan attendance has been greatly impacted with the advent of television and rising violence between fan groups. Brazil never seems to suffer with a shortage of youngsters playing soccer, as it is such an entrenched part of the culture. However, a trend is developing in which more and more of the young soccer players are from the middle class, and fewer are from the favelas. As available lands for soccer fields are decreasing, established soccer schools and camps with their own fields attract those

children with the means to pay for participation. Children in the favelas are finding fewer and fewer places to play. Whether this will impact the style of Brazilian soccer in the future is yet to be determined, but would seem likely.

Comparing the two countries shows that Germany receives players from around the world to play in their soccer leagues, whereas Brazil donates players to the rest of the world. Germany has a great many more financial resources than Brazil, and therefore the economic development of clubs is more commodified. Increasing fan violence is noted in both countries. Brazil emphasizes the homogenizing force of soccer within their country, using soccer as a means of unification of diverse populations. Germany, particularly after reunification, has further diversified, failing to absorb East German clubs. Both countries seem to demonstrate some strands of willful nostalgia as a measure of resistance to globalization flows, but in terms of style, it is much more dominant and pronounced in Brazil. Brazil does not have the regionalistic influence, in terms of the European Union, that Germany has. Whereas Germany sometimes wants to downplay their national identity and merge it into a European identity, (although resistance to this notion is increasing), Brazil does not have a highly developed regional system to compete with national identity. The soccer programs of both countries are influenced by globalization processes, but have responded in different ways.
CHAPTER 26

THE INTERSECTION OF SPORT, SOCCER AND RELIGION:

BRAZIL AND GERMANY

This chapter explores the intersection of sport and religion within the realm of culture. I do not wish to imply that religion shapes sporting style, let me make that clear. But, it is also clear that sport and religion do intersect in a variety of ways, and that soccer, in particular, offers several prominent examples of how this intersection plays out in terms of culture. Specifically, this chapter will examine how religion impacts on values, somatic conceptions of the body, sport diffusion, and how some individuals consider soccer a religious ritual. I also explore how conceptualizations of religion can shape soccer style.

Bordieu’s perspective that the link between bodily disciplines, beliefs, rituals and powers exists in each society, certainly is appropriate to mention at this point. Gruneau notes that disciplines, habits and ceremonies constitute and express the relative power of classes, regions, racial and ethnic groups and gender, and would also apply to religions.1 Religions (and parents) are two of the key factors that shape our values. Given that values shape our beliefs and help determine what we hold dear, it seems

---

likely that societal values would also influence the field of sport, and of course, they do. Whether sport itself is held to be a valuable commodity is determined by the culture. The United States and western culture value high performance, or professional sport, whereas other cultures may place more emphasis on indigenous or folk sport, or amateur sport, or recreation as opposed to sport. The globalization process has permeated most cultures, to the extent that all offer some form of high performance sport, but in many areas of the world, participation is strictly limited. Contrast Indonesia, with its own indigenous sporting heritage, to a United States that comes close to the idolization of athletes.

Religion also has a hand in shaping bodily disciplines and somatic beliefs of each culture. Some cultures favor muscularity, strength, and great size, and others favor speed, or height, or flexibility or lightness of foot. How the culture even views the body is highly reflective of religious beliefs within the culture. Tracing back to Plato and his separation of the mind and the body, with the mind, or soul, having dominance over the body has impacted how sport is viewed within a culture. Judaism and Puritanism both are examples of religious beliefs favoring the mind or soul, over the body, and both groups tended to view sport with some suspicion, if not outright disdain, because sport was a somatic discipline. Plato’s separation of mind and body has “haunted” mankind over the centuries, and still has implications in today’s educational systems as bodily disciplines are held in much lower regard in academic settings.
Other implications arise when analyzing Platonic and neo-Platonic discourse regarding sport. The early strains of ascetism, prominent in early Christianity, were in opposition to what was often considered a hedonistic sporting culture. Greek sport practiced in the nude and its involvement with wagering and prize money, presents a sharp contrast to a more ascetic lifestyle focusing on the development of the spirit. Although Catholicism and Protestantism eventually worked out an accord with sport, many centuries passed in the process. Sport, itself, has been linked with religion and worship since the Olympic games of ancient Greece, held in honor of the Greek gods and goddesses. The Aztec and Mayan cultures featured religious ball games associated with worship and sacrifice. Native American lacrosse was so highly ritualized in some cultures, such as the Cherokee, that an argument can be made that it was also a religious act.²

Historically, from 1540 to 1799, Shrove Tuesday folk football games were part of religious celebrations. Even medieval societies held semi-institutionalized fights between local groups, traditionally playing them on Holy Days. Playing with a soccer ball, in a game that was a mix between soccer, rugby and free-for-all was one way to arrange and legitimize such fights. The 1618 Declaration of Sports by King James I allowed soccer to be played on Sundays, supposedly after Sabbath services were over. Given that the Sabbath was the only free day that peasantry had available to play (excepting for Holy Days), by 1692 many people were associating the Sabbath with

soccer. This, of course, further increased Puritan hostility toward the game, which they already held in suspicion. The Puritans remained bitterly hostile toward all sport, including soccer, and came to see their mission as being one of erasing all sport and play from men’s lives. However, other Protestant groups were more accepting of the game as it represented a more scientific world view, in their eyes.3

Early on, Protestants were more involved in the sporting world than Catholics, and soccer was no exception. Catholic disinterest in part sprang from the earlier Platonic theories of separation of the mind and the body, with the mind being given priority. Also influencing the Catholic mindset was the early acceptance of Protestants to the scientific world view, and the early reluctance of the Vatican to acknowledge the same view. As modern sport diffused out from Protestant England, it spread more rapidly to other Protestant countries than to Catholic countries. Several exceptions existed, including France, and certainly all Catholic South and Central America rapidly accepted the soccer. Italy, being the seat of Catholicism, was more resistant, however, calcio, a game similar to modern soccer, had been played there for centuries.4

Although the increasingly pervasive secularism apparent in sport made it suspicious to religious leaders from the 17th through the 19th centuries, the link between Protestant religion and English ludic activities remained strong, and strengthened in protest against Marxism. The ludic diffusion of sport out from Britain was often motivated by cultural imperialism, but the key component of a religious dimension cannot be ignored. Missionary educators, the YMCA, and proponents of Muscular Christianity were significant factors in the diffusion of sport, particularly soccer, from Britain. The religious involvement in sport diffusion led to an enthusiastic co-joining of the gospel of Christ and British games; enthusiastic at least by those carrying the message. The British diffusion of soccer (and its connections to religion), and the resulting hegemonic dominance of western style sport, is still apparent in a globalized society. Soccer is played world-wide on the western calendar. There are no games played on Christmas, but league games and World Cup qualifiers can, and are, played during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, when Muslims cannot eat or drink during daylight hours. Obviously, lack of fluids and nutrition put Islamic teams at an early disadvantage, but the FIFA calendar operates under western religious assumptions.\(^5\)

Although I could make a strongly cogent argument to agree with Goncalves that soccer provides one with an opportunity to develop spiritually, an equally strong claim can be

made that the modern game of soccer has replaced religion itself as the institution that
binds people together and provides an emotional feeling associated with a ritualistic
ceremony. Giulianotti points out that soccer and religion are not mutually exclusive,
but interact in complex ways. The game of soccer has, in many ways, turned into a
religion in itself. Although athletes may pray before games, soccer is considered to
exist within the secular sphere of life, not the religious. Religion is considered to be “on
the sidelines” for the game. However, given the enormous amount of symbolic
interaction between soccer and religion, it is easy to see why sport, and soccer, may be
viewed as a secular religion, or the religion of the populace. From the worship of the
star athletes to the pre-game rituals of having certain meals, a pre-arranged and
unchanging order of entrance onto the field, and even a pair of lucky socks or a lucky
shirt, all resemble ritualistic connections with religion. Giulianotti even points out that
a visit to the “sacred” Maracanã stadium in Brazil becomes a quasi-religious experience
in itself.6

Christian Bromberger itemizes how soccer has become a religious ritual with all the
ingredients present, beginning with the pre-match meal that is mandatory and
unchanging (communion?) to the variety of player superstitions and rituals. After the
meal is a period of fasting prior to the game, for what athlete can play well on a full
stomach? The faithful, or the fans, enter the picture with codified gestures and
brotherhoods (fan clubs.) The officiants are present in the form of referees. The

6 José Thadeu Goncalves in cooperation with Professor Julio Mazzei, The Principles of Brazilian Soccer
(Spring City, P.A.: Reedswain, 1998), 40; Giulianotti, Football: A Sociology, 17, 20; Guttmann, From
Ritual to Record, 24-25.
organizations that run the clubs or teams are rigidly hierarchal, and the laws of the game (in soccer they are known as the Laws, not the rules) pertain to all players. The game takes place in a closed space (stadium) consecrated to the cult, and games take place on a liturgical calendar. The pitch is considered sacred ground with the expectation of a sacrifice, the ritualistic “killing” of the opposing team. There will always be a victory of good over evil, and the match itself takes the form of a sequential ritual. The players are idolized in the terms of saints and saviours, who enter into a “retreat” before the big games. There is a specialized language for the world of soccer, including the chants made by the fans. Fetishism is more than apparent as players proceed through their idiosyncratic preparations for games, and Goncalves would add that superstitions, regardless of their silliness, affect a player’s mental readiness for the game. Fans make pilgrimages to away games, as well as to “shrines” of collected memorabilia. It is certainly apparent that many parallels can be drawn between soccer and a ritualized religion. Religious tensions have also led to soccer fan violence, and scholars have recognized that historic soccer rivalries have been based on religious differences, including the classic confrontations between the Scottish teams, Celtic and Rangers, and their opposition set up along Protestant versus Catholic lines.

---

Germany is an interesting religious conundrum, as it displays little “religiosity” in its day to day dealing within the world. Soccer is considered strictly a secular activity, although some of the soccer clubs have their roots in religious organizations. I surmise that soccer is little shaped by religious thought within Germany, but there are some inferences that play out in terms of style.

In 962 A.D., Otto I was the first German king to be crowned the emperor in Rome, and the Holy Roman Empire began to profoundly influence German history. The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation was important for two specific reasons in German history. First, it provided a basis for legend, idea and memory upon which the later country of Germany was to rely. And secondly, it was an obstacle that generated positive reactions and developments. The Holy Roman Empire was responsible for the particularism that was to develop in Germany by dividing the realm into separate territories with an abundance of rulers. As other nations developed toward unity, Germany remained mired in particularism. Elias notes that both Germany and Italy were latecomers to European power due to the process being delayed by the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, which favored kingdoms, duchies, and free-city states. This particularism was developed early and had far reaching consequences.9

The one thing that had united all the small German states had been religion and that was changed in 1517 when Martin Luther challenged the secular orientation of the Roman Catholic Church, the authority of the Church, and the authority of the Pope. Luther’s theses spread rapidly throughout Germany. In 1520, Luther published three pamphlets calling for religious reformation and the establishment of a German national church independent of Rome. Protestantism was originally a German affair and became a popular movement within a few years. Northern and eastern Germany fell firmly into the Protestant camp, so principalities such as Brandenburg, Pomerania and Prussia became Protestant while the south and the west remained Catholic. Man’s religion was being determined by his territorial ruler, at that point. The Reformation strengthened the dividing line between what was now two broader Germanies, and this dualism still exists within the country today.

Germany, unlike other burgeoning nation-states, was not united by a common, or dominant, literature or religion. The rift between the Catholics and Protestants since Reformation and the ensuing Thirty Years War left a deeply divided Germany. From 1700 to 1786, the decline of the Holy Roman Empire occurred, and led to an increase in the power of Prussia. Over the centuries, Roman popes had robbed German kings of any kind of power, so as the power of the Empire decreased; it left a void that Prussia neatly assumed. As Germany moved toward unification and nation-state status in the late 1800’s, the concepts of volksgeist (national spirit) and volkstum (national folklore)

---

led to the belief that the history of a people or a nation was accordingly the realization of a divine plan, which in turn led to the national German myth, that Germany was an established former Empire. The pan-German belief took hold, and German Jesuits spread their doctrine around the world. Throughout the twentieth century, Germany has remained religiously divided between Catholicism and Protestantism. And yet, religion has not been a prime motivator in the German quest for national dominance. The Nazi movement relied heavily on the German myth of earlier glory, but did not rely on religion as a call to political belief. In modern day Germany, religion appears to have taken a back seat to politics and economic development. Perhaps it is because the country has remained so divided in belief.11

How has sport intersected with religion in Germany? During the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the Romantic revolution swept through Germany, emphasizing the anti-scientific. This led to the survival and resurgence of some pre-modern sport, such as hunting and fishing, and hindered the emergence of modern sport. The rise of turnen as developed by GutsMuths and Jahn was related to this Romantic revolution, as they were defenders of Romantic nationalism. Hence, their antipathy and outright hatred of what

---

they termed “modern sport.” The dominance of turnen within Germany has been
discussed in previous chapters, but it is worth re-emphasizing that turnen was directly
responsible for the slow diffusion of modern sport spreading out from Britain.12

According to Eric Hobsbawm, there has been a correlation between sport and
Protestantism observed in Germany up until about 1960. Studies by Güther Lüschen
and Hans Lenk, cited by Allen Guttmann, also note that Protestants are over-represented
in German sport. In the general population, Protestants represent 52% of the German
people (and Catholics 44%), but as members of sporting clubs, Protestants make up
60% of the population and Catholics only 37%. Lanfranchi surmises that the Protestant
religion aligned with the games movement as a force against Marxism, and was
particularly predominant in Germany. However, religion played only a small role in the
early history of soccer in Germany.13

In 1891, the trading regulation amendment in Germany led to the prohibition of work
on Sundays. This amendment applied mainly to white collar workers, as it had been
effectively diluted in application to factory workers. The Sunday amendment permitted
the rise of soccer play on Sunday, and effectively placed the early game in the hands of
the middle class. Soccer clubs began to be formed, and some of them arose out of

12 Allen Guttmann, From Ritual to Record: The Nature of Modern Sports (New York: Columbia
13 Eric Hobsbawm, “Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914,” The Invention of Tradition ed. by
Güther Lüschen and Hans Lenk cited by Guttmann, From Ritual to Record, 82-83; Pierre Lanfranchi,
“Exporting Football: Notes on the Development of Football in Europe,” Game Without Frontiers:
Football, Identity and Modernity ed. by Richard Giulianotti and John Williams (Aldershot: Arena, 1994),
30.
religious organizations. Borussia Dortmund was formed as an outreach of Trinity parish, an ecclesiastical organization founded in 1900 to perform social work in the slums. The parish expressed deep concern that the soccer players were going to the pub after Sunday morning games rather than to mass, so the soccer portion of the club broke away from the parish and reformed as a secular organization. The nearby club of Schalke also emphasized the secular, and an early member was quoted as saying, “We wanted to play football. We wanted to have nothing to do with anything else. Politics and religion played no part whatever in our club.” Protestant and Catholic churches were reluctant to get involved with soccer as Sabbath games were being played.14

Gillmeister makes an important point when he notes that the making of German soccer is due to four factors, and one of them is the high percentage of Jews involved in the early history of the game. Walter Bensemann, a Jew, was one of the founders of German soccer, establishing several clubs and helping to found the DBF. In 1899, he was kicked out of the South German FA for organizing an overseas tour for an all-star team. Bensemann founded kickers magazine in 1920, one of the most enduring and respected soccer publications in the world. Another prominent Jew involved in the soccer world was FC Bayern Munich club president, Kurt Landauer. When he was removed from his presidency during the Nazi reign, Bayern Munich stood by him after

he stepped down. In 1939 he escaped to Switzerland, after being confined in a concentration camp, and in 1940 the entire soccer team from Bayern Munich visited him. He returned from exile in 1947 and was quickly elected president of the organization again.15

As it appears that religion has intersected only slightly with soccer, it is interesting that Crolley, Hand and Jeutter documented an interesting phenomenon in German soccer reporting. They found that a German messianic vocabulary was either very prominent in reports, or was remarkably absent. This messianic vocabulary included such comments as those found in *Süddeustche Zeitung* about Lothar Matthaus: “…media disciples gathered in feverish expectation in order to give birth to the new Messiah out of their sweaty, steaming midst,” and then call him “redeemer and Savior.” Crolley, Hand and Jeutter equate this messianic vocabulary with Germany’s cult of the leader, something deeply embedded in their habitus.16

Indirectly, German soccer style has been influenced by both Catholicism and Protestantism. The Catholic belief that emphasizes an intermediary between man and God can be discerned in the German desire for a strong leader to make on the field

decisions in a soccer game. This soccer leader also assumes the role of being an intermediary between the coach and the players, much as a priest would do.

Beckenbauer and the 1974 World Cup would be a prime example, as he interceded for the entire team with the coaching staff and the German football association. A strong, on the field leader will influence style by directions that are indicated both verbally and non-verbally. This leader generally wants the ball played through him, and thus becomes the funnel for further play, which in turn influences how the game proceeds.

The Protestant influence on German style is even more nuanced. The Reformation’s main point was the removal of the intermediary between man and God. While removal of the intermediary endows the individual with direct access to God, it also further emphasizes individual responsibility. This responsibility is reflected in the group, such as a soccer team, whereby every individual is an individual, but also part of a greater whole. On a soccer team, an individual must assume responsibility for their “job” but must also focus on the greater benefit of the team. This team emphasis plays out in terms of style: teamwork and precision. Although the Reformation caused a schism in the religious world, much of German Lutherism remains embedded in a greater ritualism than other Protestant branches. Ritualism, from both Catholicism and German Lutheranism influenced the conceptualization of machine-like, detail oriented German soccer players.
Brazil presents a fascinating study of religious adaptation and syncretism, as well as provides a variety of examples of intersection between soccer and religion. Religion is a big part of the culture in Brazil, but it functions in unusual ways. Religion and soccer intersect on a regular basis, and in fact, religion is a part of soccer in the country and thus has some influence on style. How religion can have an impact on soccer is an interesting proposition and I would venture relates back to how Brazilians ultimately view soccer, which is as a game that can be determined by fate, or luck, or the deity. Given the Brazilian emphasis on chance, it becomes clearer how religion could become intertwined with an athletic contest.

Brazil Catholicism is old, arriving in 1500. While the Catholic Church played a fairly minor role in the beginning, the Portuguese king wanted to propagate Christianity in the new world, and Portuguese colonization led to a more militant Catholicism that kept religion central in Brazil. The arriving Jesuit missionaries brought with them the context that existed in Portugal, and that was that Catholicism and the state were entwined. In Brazil, the Catholic Church pervaded every aspect of life.17

Brazil is considered the world’s largest Catholic country, with estimates ranging from 70% to 90% of the population declaring themselves Catholic. Unlike Western Europe, progress and modernity do not seem to be impacting on Brazilian religious belief.

DaMatta says that in Brazil there are three vertices: the state, the people, and the church. He further notes that in the Protestant world, work and the body led to an egalitarian union between the body and the soul, overcoming the Platonic conceptualization. But in Brazil, a Catholic system, the soul is considered superior to the body. This leads to the person being more important than the individual, or as in the Brazilian system, the body is less than the soul.18

In many ways, Brazil does not follow a Vatican-scripted Catholicism. An unusual Brazilian custom is the “paying for promises.” It is a common custom in Brazil to pray to a saint, making a vow that if the request is granted, a special task will be performed. Paying for promises is a common occurrence in the soccer world, as special tasks are often fulfilled when a team wins a big game. For soccer matters, a Brazilian might pray to St. George, Corinthian’s patron saint. In 1985, Pope John Paul II embarked on a campaign to tame the Brazilian Catholic Church.19

What is most unique about Brazil’s religiosity is the syncretism between Catholicism and Afro-Brazilian religions. In Brazil, the two religions are acceptably combined into one, and individuals experiment with beliefs and accept those beliefs with which they are comfortable. Brazilian religion is “pick-n-mix”, as Bellos calls it. Numbers vary

19 Rocha, In Focus Brazil, 28, 31-32; Bellos, Futebol, 203-204, 206, 212.
regarding how many Brazilians practice a combination of Candomblé and Catholicism, ranging from seven million to forty million.20

Umbanda is the Afro-Brazilian religion that incorporates Amerindian and spiritualist elements, and is practiced by mainly white, middle class Brazilians. In Brazil, a spiritualistic belief took off among middle class Christians and mixed with Candomblé (a more Afro-Brazilian oriented belief) to form Umbanda. Macumba is the generic term for Umbanda and Candomblé. The unbelieving often dismiss these Afro-Brazilian centered religions as witchcraft, but Candomblé in particular was the principle exception to New World Christian hegemony in Brazil.21 Afro-Brazilian religion is practical and hedonistic. It seldom addresses questions of an afterlife, such as salvation or redemption. The belief systems, instead emphasize healing of health problems, sexual magic, flexibility, and acting as spiritual brokers between the material and spiritual world. The practitioners rely heavily on the use of plants, medicinal and otherwise, in their faith practice.22

To understand the religion and attraction of Candomblé to Brazilians, one must understand that it is a religion of the orixás, or Afro-Brazilian gods and goddesses. The supreme god is Olórun, the creator, who is distant and unapproachable. He is not worshipped. The orixás are the earthly ambassadors of Olórun, and twelve of these

---

personalities are well developed in Brazil. It is in these orixás that the overlap of Catholicism and Candomblé occurs, and what makes the Brazilian religion so fascinating. Oxalá is considered the equivalent of Jesus, Omolú is St. Sebastian or St. Lazarus, Iansã is St. Barbara, Ogun is St. Anthony, and Ogum is St. George. Caipó was a god that the Amerindians worshipped before the arrival of the Portuguese, and now is considered a part of Candomblé. Iemanjá is the goddess of the seas, or the equivalent of the Virgin Mary. On New Year’s Eve, over one million people on Rio de Janeiro’s beaches throw offerings into the sea for Iemanjá. Exu is a powerful, greedy, short-tempered but occasionally benevolent Candomblé god equivalent to Satan. The black gods and the white saints lead to a color blind blending in Brazil.23

Because Christian conversion began in western Africa long before the slaves were transported to Brazil, the catholic saint/Yoruba orixá was believed to already be a familiar concept, if not an established religion. Purgatory and mediating spirits find a common ground, and provide a way out of the strict either/or system of Protestantism for Brazilians. This syncretism provides a sense of flexibility and a bending of the rules that is highly characteristic of everyday life in Brazil. The blending of religion and medicine in Candomblé can also be viewed as a form of popular resistance to cultural domination.24

23 Voeks, Sacred Leaves of Candomblé, 54, 59-61; Rocha, In Focus Brazil, 33-35; Bellos, Futebol, 186; Lever, Soccer Madness, 52.
Religion, Carnival and soccer are often considered the holy trinity in Brazil, and Brazilians will commonly say that soccer is a Brazilian religion. But in actuality, soccer is but a platform to express and perform that religion. It is interesting to see how Catholicism, Candomblé and Pentecostalism all intersect with soccer in Brazil. Lever determined in her survey of Brazilian fans that there was no difference of commitment in fandom between Catholics and Candomblé practitioners, but Baptists were weak fans. She also determined that if a fan was very devout to their church, their commitment to soccer and fandom was considerably less. She theorized that both soccer and religion provide identity, communal rites and produce a collective consciousness in Brazil. Active church participation in Latin American countries tends to be heavily gendered. Mainly women participate in church religion, and only 16% of the men attend on a regular basis. Lever contends that sexual segregation is self perpetuating in that women attend church and men attend soccer matches.

Catholicism is prominently represented in the Brazilian soccer world. Catholic fans believe that prayers and sacrifices can influence the outcome of games. Flamengo fans regularly place red and black candles (the team colors) on altars of Rio de Janeiro churches. Most teams feature a pregame circle of players, holding hands and touching feet, praying on the field, believing that the prayer will have God forgetting the other team. Most pray for protection from injuries, and many teams say the Lord’s Prayer and Hail Mary. Many goalkeepers say a prayer to each post before a game, and are

---

25 Bellos, Futebol, 223.
26 Lever, Soccer Madness, 102.
generally considered the most religious players on a team. One priest says that
goalkeepers’ pre-match rituals should be considered true liturgies. A brilliant
goalkeeper is called and “saint” and his saves are “miraculous.” Television in Brazil
sometimes superimposes a halo around a goalkeeper’s head.27

Catholics “paying for promises” is a concept that is highly regarded within the Brazilian
soccer realm. It is not unheard of for a fan to carries his team banner while climbing up
a hill to a religious shrine, while on his knees. When Botafogo won the championship
in 1957, Didí left the field, still in his uniform, and walked across Rio de Janeiro end to
end to fulfill a promise to his patron saint, Our Lord of Bonjim. Five thousand fans
accompanied him on the five mile journey.28

Visiting the shrine of Our Lady of Aparecida is considered a sacred ritual by teams
winning a title. The shrine contains a room called the Room of Miracles, which has one
entire wall devoted to soccer. There are pictures of hundreds of teams, a cabinet of
sport trophies, and a glass locker full of jerseys. Twenty soccer jerseys are dedicated to
the shrine each month, most from poorer fans of Corinthians. Corinthian fans believe
that Our Lady of Aparecida is a Corinthians fan, and so are very faithful to the shrine.29

27 Lever, Soccer Madness, 102; Tony Mason, Passion of the People? Football in South America
(London: Verso, 1995), 101; Garry Jenkins, The Beautiful Team: In Search of Pelé and the 1970
Brazilians (London: Pocket Books, 1998), 55; Bellos, Futebol, 216-217, 223; José Thadeu Goncalves in
cooperation with Professor Julio Massei, The Principles of Brazilian Soccer (Spring City, PA.:
Reedswain, 1998), 40.
28 Lever, Soccer Madness, 102; Eduardo Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow , 2nd ed. (London: Verso,
2003), 66-67; Bellos, Futebol, 202-204; Jenkins, The Beautiful Team, 165.
29 Bellos, Futebol, 207, 210, 212.
The Vasco da Gama stadium features a chapel the size of a church built right within the stadium in 1950. The chapel is called “Our Lady of the Victories” and is located twenty meters behind the goalposts. It will hold a hundred people, so the Padre Lino only holds Saturday functions. He also goes with the team into the changing rooms before games and at halftime, depending on his relationship with the coach, and purifies players with holy water before games. He once threw holy water on the field at halftime when the team was losing, and they ended up winning 3-2. Father Goes was a Catholic priest assigned to Flamengo. When the team was going through a losing streak, he had them attend mass and say the rosary before each game, regardless of their religion. Flamengo then won the championship three years in a row.30

Only the Catholic Church provides more of a future for poor boys than soccer, according to Brazilians. Clodoaldo, as an amateur youth player, lived at the church until he was turned over to the Santos club. At Santos, he lived in the stadium until he made enough money to move out. He considers himself a devout Catholic and honors the church, and the game, that raised him. Catholicism’s emphasis on the “embodiment of the divine” is at the root of many soccer beliefs. Outstanding players are considered “touched by the divine” and most Latin American soccer stars are treated as symbols of the greatest of the Spirit incarnate. The report of Maradona’s winning goal against England, using his hand to score, is still referred to as “the hand of God goal.” The Jornal dos Sportes reported in 1970, when Brazil beat England in the World Cup, that

“Whenever the ball flew towards our goal and a score seemed inevitable, Jesus reached his foot out of the clouds and cleared the ball.”

But Catholicism is not the only dominant religion present in Brazilian soccer. Candomblé is eminently present at most soccer matches, and may even have closer ties to the game than Catholicism. Most teams have a masseur on staff, and many of the masseurs just happen to be specialists in Candomblé, or so Realidade magazine reported in 1966. As early as 1932, Mario Filho was writing of a Macumba ritual at that year’s Copa Rio Branco, in which Brazil beat the current World Cup champions, Uruguay. Nights before games, many offerings are placed at crossroads for good luck. It is a Candomblé ritual to wash the player’s soccer cleats in water (to quench the thirst of the saints) and then to wash the player’s feet and pour the dirty water on the opponent’s field. Before games, many players wash their feet with special herbs prescribed by the Pai de Santo, or Candomblé priest.

Father Santana, Vasco’s legendary masseur, is always introduced with the eleven starting players. His job description is two-fold: relax the players with massage, and pamper the orixás. One year, after Vasco won a championship, Father Santana lit 24 candles on the field. He always goes with his wife to the cemetery on the nights before

---


games, and only enters the stadium on game day with his Umbanda charms. He is the best known Afro-Brazilian spiritual figure in Rio de Janeiro, and in 1991 was crowned the Black King of Carnival. (The Black King is to act as an intermediary between mankind and the orixás during Carnival.) He has been a masseur to the Kuwaiti national team, where he converted (temporarily) to Islam and changed his name to Ahmed so that he could give massages to the Kuwaiti royalty.33

Father Nílson, Corinthians’ Candomblé priest, also reflects the intersection of religion and soccer. The old Brazilian saying, “If macumba works, then the Bahian championship would end in a draw,” offends Father Nílson. He believes that Corinthians won the game against Vasco in 2000 because of the homage he paid the god, Exu. (Corinthians won on penalty kicks.) Exu was paid with manioc powder, steak and onions, cigers and cachaça, all placed by the train line at the entrance to the Father Nílson’s hometown. He also pushed five boats filled with food, candles, champagne and whiskey (as well as player’s personal items) out to sea during a fifteen day ceremony, where Father Nílson ate no meat. During 2000, Corinthians fired Father Nílson, and then went on their worst run in history, losing nine games straight. Father Nílson believes that his service to Corinthians is merely interrupted so that he can eventually make a glorious return.34

---

33 Bellos, Futebol, 190-193; Lever, Soccer Madness, 102.
34 Bellos, Futebol, 195-198.
Carlito Rocha, the chairman of Botafogo during the 1940’s and 1950’s exhibited perhaps the most renowned Brazilian soccer superstitions associated with Candomblé. He thoroughly believed that his pre-match rituals were essential for the team’s success, and forced all the players to comply with them. All stadium curtains had to be tied up, so the opponent’s legs would also be tied. He would spread a kilo of sugar on the stadium walls before a game, and urged the players to write the name of the opponent they were marking on the bottom of their cleats, so the opponent would always be crushed. But the most bizarre ritual appeared in 1948 when the team adopted a stray dog named Biriba, and when opponents threatened to score, Rocha would send the dog off the bench onto the field to run after the ball and break up the attack. Botafogo was winning games, and when Biriba urinated on a player’s leg just before a big game, and Botafoga won the game, the player’s fate was sealed. Prior to every game, Biriba had to urinate on the same player’s leg before the game could start. At one point, a player was left off the travel squad so a bus seat would be available for the dog to travel to an away game. When the team started losing in 1949, the dog was forgotten.35

As in the society, Catholicism and Candomblé blend within the realm of soccer to produce a unique Brazilian quasi-religious amalgam. Many players practice this blend of two religions, almost as if fearing that ignoring one religion would bring superstititious ruin upon their career. Nelson Rodrigues, famous Brazilian author, journalist and dramaturgist, said: “In football, as in everything else, no Brazilian can

exist without a charm around his neck, without his saints and his sets of vows- in a word, without his personal and non-transferable God.” Many believe that a Macumba faith filled with African gods, Catholic saints, interconnected forces, spirits and vibrations, can influence the outcome of soccer matches. Perhaps Vasco da Gama best reflects this blend of two religions and soccer. Father Lino, Catholic priest of the stadium chapel, and Father Santana, Candomblé masseur for the team, reflect the microcosm of Brazil. The amalgamation of African gods and Christian saints gives rise to soccer players with an even higher concentration of superstitions regarding their game. Soccer players worldwide are renowned for idiosyncratic superstitions, particularly on game days, but Brazilian players seem to have more taboos and superstitions than the rest of the world. And in fact, the Brazilian national team is regarded as the most superstitious team in the world.

One of the most interesting blends of religions in Brazil, connected with soccer, is the renowned Pelé. Pelé makes no bones about his Catholic belief system, and yet, there are some indications that his beliefs reflect the fluidity in Brazilian religions. Pelé’s wife is a born-again, Baptist Christian gospel singer. Pelé insists that he did not change his religion, nor she her’s, but says they are very similar, and the only difference he can see is that the Baptists have no saints. Pelé insists that he does not do anything related to Afro-Brazilian religions, but he did used to wear white a lot, although he claims he was not fanatical about it. But Tony Mason, in his book, *Passion of the People*?

Football in South America, features a picture that he captions “Pelé and Coutinho making umbanda blessing before a big game.” Given the unique blend of religions in Brazil, this picture most likely reflects the reality of Brazilian soccer.  

Given the predominance of Catholicism and Candomblé in Brazil, the Protestant evangelical movement has risen rapidly in the past twenty years and has also penetrated the soccer world. Bellos notes that Protestant Evangelists currently are the most visible presence in soccer, which reflects the increase of these churches in the lower classes. In less than thirty years, the number of these churches and their participants has risen from very few to over 20 million. The early evangelical churches used to crusade against popular music and soccer, calling soccer balls “the devil’s eggs.” But that crusade has changed dramatically, and now is actively recruiting soccer players into the faith. Some soccer clubs are wary of the evangelicals, afraid they will disturb team unity. But the number of players participating in the evangelical faith is increasing rapidly.

In the early 1980’s, the Athletes for Christ was founded, first in Minas Gerais. By 1984 the movement had spread to Rio de Janeiro, and then to São Paulo by 1985. In 1985, the organization had 300 members, most of them professional soccer players, such as Jorginho and César Sampaio. The movement stressed discipline and the asceticism needed for a professional athletic career. Now the Athletes for Christ boast of over

---

39 Bellos, Futebol, 219-221.
7000 soccer players as members. By 1994, such national team players as Zinho, Mazinho, Jorginho, Müller, Paulo Sérgio and Taffarel were outspoken members. One of the founding members of the organization, João Leite, is often called “God’s Goalie.” He and Baltazar were instrumental in forming the first Brazilian Athletes for Christ group in 1981. He regularly distributes Bibles to referees and his opponents at games.40

Given the abundance of evidence, it seems clear that religion permeates Brazilian soccer much more than it does German soccer, and in all likelihood, permeates Brazilian soccer even more than most other countries. Perhaps Italy, or some of the Muslim nations allow the penetration of religion into a secular sport equal to what occurs in Brazil, but in the majority of nations, religion remains peripheral to the sport. What is entirely unique about Brazil is the syncretism displayed by religion, both in the culture and on the soccer field. The unique blend of Catholicism and Candomblé merely reflects that blend of the Brazilian racial composition, a melding of Portuguese, Amerindian, and African with some German and Italian thrown in for good measure. The juxtapositioning of Catholic saints and African orixás, provides a unique flavor to Brazilian religion. The fact that this blend, along with a rising numbers of Protestant Evangelicals, all play out in the soccer realm is indicative of the penetration of a pragmatic religiosity in Brazilian life. Combined with the natural superstitiousness of soccer players, a heightened awareness of supernatural intervention is present in Brazilian soccer.

This awareness plays back to the Brazilian conceptualization of soccer as a game determined more by fate than by skill, and has a direct impact on style. The interplay of their concept of religion and their concept of soccer as a game becomes a cyclical pattern of reinforcement. The soccer game is decided by forces beyond the control of the players, but the forces can be bargained with and influenced. The flexibility within their religious belief systems, the pick-n-choose approach to religion, allows for individuality in a rigid, hierarchal society. That this individuality is also reflected in only a few other cultural domains, such as soccer and Carnival, is significant and further explains the penetration of religion into soccer. Brazilian soccer celebrates individuality, and in a sense, Brazilian religion also celebrates individuality. That religion in Brazil also reflects the unique blend of the people, and that this unique blend influences soccer style is emblematic.

The emphasis upon fate and luck as determinant in a game’s outcome also influences style by putting the coach into a position of secondary status. Truly, Brazil honors few coaches, and coaching turnovers are frequent and anticipated. When it is believed that the coach is merely a figurehead in terms of determining the outcome of the game, it becomes understandable why coaches are less valued than in other countries. The entire concept of fatalism embedded within soccer produces an effect even on the practice field. If a player believes that the outcome of the game is out of his hands, practices would be of less importance and reflect a more relaxed attitude. Teamwork would be less emphasized, as would a machine-like quality.
If fate dominates over skill, process becomes more important than product. The development of flair for show and individual achievement becomes emphasized when the outcome of the game is believed to be predetermined or influenced by other than skill and coaching. How one plays becomes more important than the outcome because how one plays can be directly impacted. The game becomes a venue for the individual demonstration of style. The deep permeation of religion within the Brazilian soccer realm plays out via means of style. The accompanying superstitions, common to many soccer teams, begin to hold more importance as players attempt to influence fate. But the deep seated notion that secondary influences (rituals, superstitions, prayers, offerings, etc.) will ultimately determine the game becomes reflected in playing style through an emphasis on individualistic display, and a lesser emphasis on outcome.
CHAPTER 27

TRAINING PHILOSOPHY AND REGIMENS OF GERMANY

This chapter and the following one explores the unique qualities and philosophies that Germany and Brazil display when preparing their teams for competition. These two chapters are perhaps more coaching oriented than previous ones, but it would appear to be important from a cultural perspective to explore exactly how each team has developed their unique training philosophy: what have they emphasized as important, how do they treat their players, and how is the training implemented. All of these characteristics influence a soccer nation’s playing style, and thus should be examined in detail. Richard Giulianotti notes that while a certain body shape may influence the physical possibilities of play, the cultural contribution cannot be ignored, and that the question of how the player ‘learns’ his or her position from other players and the coaching staff, as well as what skills are being emphasized, play out in terms of shaping and cementing style within a country. Again, setting a specific act historically is important, but an overall view reflecting trends of emphasis allows conclusions to be drawn as to how style is being shaped contextually.¹

As early as 1900, when soccer was mainly a social game in Germany, early players were being criticized for individualism while on the field. Critics believed that

individual displays were a disruptive factor that spoiled team interaction. Numerous brochures emphasized the importance of teamwork within the game. Thus began the early contributions and emphasis on teamwork as opposed to individualism within the game of soccer in Germany. As soccer became more influenced by the military, the language used further emphasized a strengthening of team spirit. The period from 1900-1920 demonstrated a middle class refusal to completely regard themselves as recipients of order, and continued to allow a degree of individualism to exist within the soccer game. But the emphasis from both the military and the middle class definitely stressed determination, calmness, superiority and stamina. To win, a player must not lose his head on the field, play rashly, or be unfit.²

By the 1912 Olympics, the DFB Playing Committee decided to choose the members of the team to represent Germany, after the teams representing them had suffered several serious defeats. Prior to then, the selection of a national team had been put into the hands of the regional Football Associations, so the eleven best players were never on a team together. Rather, the eleven players were always chosen from eleven clubs and there was no national coach. The Associations could rarely agree on the line-up, and in the team’s first nine games, seven different goalkeepers were used. The DFB appointed three National Football Instructors to find and nurture talent, but not to coach the team. During the 1910’s and 1920’s, southern clubs shaped and influenced German soccer, and the South German Football Association was the driving force

behind the DFB. The southern clubs tended to emphasize the English style of play, but with the addition of the Scottish passing game. Clubs such as Nuremberg regularly played English clubs, so it was natural that some of the direct style would be adopted and adapted.³

Part of the problem early German national teams faced was the continued emphasis that the DFB placed on amateurism. Some of the top players were unable to play international games because they could not afford to leave their jobs for two to three days to travel and then compete. When the DFB finally began to pay travel costs, they did not reimburse the players for loss of wages incurred while traveling and playing games out of the country. Players that had turned professional and played out of Germany were never chosen for the national team. They were considered pariahs for violating the amateurism rule. The continued emphasis on amateurism haunted German national soccer teams for decades.⁴

After World War I, the international game lay dormant for quite some time in Germany, as other countries refused to play them. English amateur teams even refused to play the German national team because its “performance was too modest.” As the rest of the world professionalized and evolved their soccer game, Germany lagged behind. Germany maintained only one national team instructor, and he had no influence on team selection, so the quality of the team remained poor. As the club system and club teams

⁴ Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 60, 66.
developed, German soccer became more sophisticated and developed, mainly through the influence of the clubs. Fred and Hans Ballmann at Schalke had immigrated to England before World War I, where they had learned the training methods employed by British clubs. When they returned, they brought new methods that they taught the other Schalke players. They emphasized increased training intensity and a systematic approach to training. The 1925 Hertha Berlin club combined the technically more proficient southern German style with the northern direct style (or Flying Hussar style) to produce a style that emphasized speed and directness, but with the wing players sending in high crosses to be headed into the goal. The early emphasis on heading is already apparent in the German game at this point.⁵

By 1924, Germany was having a difficult time finding anyone that they could play on an international level, as the DFB so valued amateurism they would not allow the national team to play against any professionals. That meant that if another country’s national team had any professional players, Germany would not play them. Finally, in 1924, the DFB made a move toward naming a national team coach. While they did not hire a coach, they did appoint a “national team advisor.” Again, amateurism influenced the German approach. The DFB was concerned that actually hiring a national team coach would be taking steps toward professionalism, something they were vehemently opposed to do, but realistically realizing it was probably ordained for the future. In

⁵ Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 56-57, 68-69; Siegfried Gehrmann, “Football Clubs as Media of Identity in an Industrial Region. “Schalke” and “Borussia” and the Ruhr Area,” Football and Regional Identity in Europe ed. by Siegfried Gehrmann (Münster: LIT, 1997), 85.
1925, the president of the DFB, Lenneman, appointed Otto Nerz as the national team coach, and did so without approval of the rest of the board.\textsuperscript{6}

Nerz thoroughly embraced the English style of play and the WM formation featured at Arsenal, and so implemented this with the German national team. He initially faced resistance from the players as they much preferred the more elegant and flowing Austrian style that some of the clubs had adopted, but after several years Nerz was able to convince the players of the efficiency of a direct style. Not only did Nerz favor a direct style, but he emphasized a scientific approach to the game and by 1928, the team began winning. Goalkeeping was being emphasized with specialized training. Nerz maintained a tight control over the team, with the Prussian emphasis on discipline and leadership authority. Two players were banned from the national team in 1928 for one year for losing their tempers in a game. Control and discipline was emphasized.\textsuperscript{7}

After several losses for the national team in 1931, Nerz came under criticism for his obsession with theory and athleticism. He wanted players running in straight lines down the field of play in a direct fashion, and his emphasis was thoroughly on runners and not on artistic play. He particularly did not like the style of play of Schalke, which was dominating club play in Germany, and continued to emphasize fast, physical and direct play. He bemoaned that the two best and most creative players on the national team were from Schalke and that they disregarded his authority and lacked the pace of

\textsuperscript{6} Hesse-Lichtenberger, \textit{Tor!}, 70-72.  
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., pp. 72-74.
play that he wanted. He told them: “Your odds and ends football at Schalke, all that passing around, doesn’t impress me one bit…its just fiddling and dribbling around, anyway.”

In 1932, a player from the Austrian Wunderteam (which emphasized passing and a balletic grace while playing) said of Germany: “They play strictly by army regulations. It is their strength-through-kicking football.”

As the 1934 World Cup approached, the decision was made that the German national team would enter the competition, despite their reservations over professionalism, and would participate to gain propaganda value. It would appear that some things were considered more important than a moral stance by the German higher ups. The country began to infuse large sums of money into preparations for the national team, and Glanville reports that the team “prepared thoroughly.” Nerz, once again, elected to adopt the Arsenal WM formation, his favorite, but sold it to the players as a modern, flexible system by adding a stopper. He also emphasized defense in training, a trait that the Germans would be recognized by for many years, adding “We will build from the rear, based on a solid defense.”

Germany took third place in the 1934 World Cup, and appeared well organized and very muscular, but had difficulty finishing the ball. Perhaps Nerz’s continued emphasis on defense, strength and organization was inhibiting the more graceful style.

---

9 Ibid., pp. 89, 92. Hesse-Lichtenberger quotes the Austrian player on page 89.
demonstrated by the Schalke players. Certainly Nerz continued his disciplinarian and authoritarian demeanor, actually throwing a player off the team for eating an orange in a train station. Germany was establishing the stereotype of the typical German team focusing on strength in leadership, bodily strength on the field, organized and disciplined, and defensive oriented. Preparations began for the 1936 Olympics, to be held in Berlin, and where Hitler wanted to showcase the athletic talent of Germany. The DBF, in particular, felt that it was necessary to dominate in the Olympics as it was an all amateur competition. What better way to show that amateurism, as chosen and emphasized by Germany, was the better philosophy. Nothing short of winning the gold medal was expected of the German national team. The head of the DBF, Felix Linneman, demanded that the German team start some of their younger talent in their first game, to rest the veterans in preparation for later, more stenuous opponents. Nerz was not happy was this plan, but acquiesced in face of the hierarchy. The results of the first game at the Olympics are history. Germany lost 2-0 to Norway, Hitler stormed out of the stadium, and Germany was eliminated from the soccer competition.11

The DFB, the German national team, and Nerz were humiliated, particularly for losing in Hitler’s presence. Five weeks later Herberger was named coach of the German national team. Herberger favored a more Scottish, and less English, style of play featuring a foundation of technique and passing rather than athleticism. He also favored a more flexible formation with not all positions as fixed as in the classical WM. The future was looking brighter for the 1938 World Cup team, dubbed the Breslau-Elf, until

11 Glanville, The Story of the World Cup, 29; Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 94, 97-99.
Germany once again subjugated sport to political aims. Word came down from above (Linneman? Hitler? The Commissioner of Sport?) that the next World Cup team fielded by Germany was to be half German players and half Austrian players as Germany had invaded and overtaken Austria. Herberger faced the monumental task of melding two separate playing styles and two groups of players that hated each other into one team, with the strict injunction that the breakdown of the team was to be equally German and Austrian. The successful Breslau Elf was dismantled, and Germany was eliminated in the first round of the World Cup.12

As World War II commenced, the German national team attempted to keep playing, but under conditions that were not favorable for training or developing a standard philosophy. In 1941, the team lost 4-2 to Sweden, when players had little stamina due to pulling guard duty, sleep broken by air raid warnings, and military training. Eventually the national team program was disbanded as war became the priority for the country. After the war, the DFB was not restarted until 1950. Herberger was again renamed the coach, but he added a caveat to the conditions. This time, the DFB would have no say in how the team was run or who was selected. No more dismantling outstanding teams for political aims. His condition was accepted and the German national team began training again. Of course, international competition was out of the question. No one in FIFA wanted to play Germany, so the national team staged competitions within its own club system in order to play games. By 1952, Herberger was complaining of the lack of competition within the German league, and expressing

12 Hesse-Lichtenberger, *Tor!*, 100-101, 104.
early concerns about the need to professionalize the league. Of course, the DFB still maintained its amateur emphasis which had long been abandoned by the rest of the world. FIFA finally relented and allowed Germany back into competition in time for the 1954 World Cup.13

Details of the preparations for the 1954 World Cup are more available than earlier years. Herberger chose a quiet town, Spiez, for the training camp, and players were roomed together based on their positions: players on the right side of the field defensively were roommates, and forwards were roommates. Two weeks before the competition began; players watched a film of the 1953 game between England and Hungary, twice. They were instructed to look for flaws in the Hungarian game upon which they could capitalize, as Hungary was, far and away, predicted to be the favored team of the competition. Germany not only prepared for their opposition, but in typical German fashion prepared for all the minute details, such as the weather. The playing fields were inspected weeks ahead of time, and Adi Dassler had prepared special shoes for the team to meet any weather conditions. In fact, during the tournament he sat on the German bench replacing removable studs in players’ cleats, the debut of removable cleats in the soccer world.14

The Germans won their first game and advanced out of group play via a play-off game against Turkey, which they won, and continued advancing throughout the tournament,  

14 Ibid., pp. 154, 161-162.
finally meeting Hungary in the finals. They defeated them 3-2, to win their first World Cup championship. Herberger had built the German team around players from Kaiserslautern, and only Rahn, the big German forward, held his position firmly. The rest of the players switched positions at speed, foreshadowing the total football movement of the 1970’s. Glanville noted that Herberger had “formidable ascendancy” over his players, with the power to make them give more than they actually possessed. This was a trait that Germany was to reflect many times over the coming years; a strong willed coach urging lesser players to accomplish feats greater than their talent would indicate.15

Two months after the 1954 World Cup, quite a few members of the German team came down with jaundice, leading to accusations of drug use. Some of the players publically hypothesized that the jaundice was caused by the use of a dirty syringe used to inject “vitamins and glucose.” What is apparent is that during the post-war years in Germany, the promotion of elite sport was a priority. Germany believed that producing athletic specialists by means of any techniques that worked was acceptable. Financing and organization of elite sport by the government greatly increased, and is today still more emphasized in Germany than in most other countries. The ban on professionalism continued, however, and a German player that played professionally out of country was never allowed to play again for Germany. In 1958, Germany lost in the semi-finals, but

15 Glanville, *The Story of the World Cup*, 63, 79-80, 82-83.
once again displayed superiority in “teamwork and stamina.” Herberger was certainly not neglecting physical conditioning or the ingrained German value of teamwork.\textsuperscript{16}

The 1962 World Cup was considered a disgrace for Germany, and directly led to the formation of a professional league, the Bundesliga, to prevent repetition of the disgrace. Herberger played only three forwards when most other teams were playing five, and played a defensive oriented system featuring a catenaccio formation with a sweeper. The German national team demonstrated tactical experience, and definitely displayed physical hardness, but also showed little variation in their pace of play. They played tightly and cautiously, with the sweeper sometimes leaving his position to make runs forward. Germany lost in the quarter-finals, a huge embarrassment to the German public.\textsuperscript{17}

Under a new coach, Helmut Schön, the German team began preparing for the 1966 World Cup. Although Schön continued the use of the flexible catenaccio with a sweeper system, emphasizing defense, he did adopt a 4-2-4 formation to give the team more impetus in the attack. The national team was granted an unheard of three week vacation in June, just prior to the start of the World Cup, and players were ordered to rest and relax, certainly antithetical to most perceptions of the German character. Schön


\textsuperscript{17} Hesse-Lichtenberger, \textit{Tor!}, 183; Glanville, \textit{The Story of the World Cup}, 117-118, 124-125.
emphasized that behaving like sportsmen and gentlemen was far more important than winning during the play of the World Cup, again shattering a stereotype of the German player. But Schön’s preparations and emphasis apparently resonated with the players, and Germany advanced to the finals only to fall to England 4-2.18

During the late 1960’s, Bayern Munich dominated Bundesliga play. They favored a possession oriented game with a slow build-up from the back, and featured Beckenbauer moving forward from the sweeper position to enter the attack. Bayern’s dominance and the quality of their star players were to influence the national team style in the coming years. Meanwhile, by 1968, Max Merkel was coaching the Nuremberg team, and instilling a tough disciplinary regimen. His training methods were aimed at what he considered German “loafers and prima donnas” and were intended to return the players to a condition of hardness. He forced players averse to tackles into practicing twice a day, focusing on tackling, against players wearing extra long studs in their shoes, just to toughen them up. At the 1970 World Cup, again coached by Schön, the team advanced to the semi-finals before losing to Italy. They again featured a flexible catenaccio style, defensively oriented, with a sweeper.19

Prior to the 1972 European championship cup, Schön again adopted a lighthearted approach in the training camp to decrease anxiety and doubting among the players regarding their abilities. The day of their first game he instituted a ball juggling contest

18 Glanville, The Story of the World Cup, 152; Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 227-228.
19 Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 191, 209; Glanville, The Story of the World Cup, 170.
on the front lawn of their hotel. Germany defeated England for the first time in their history, but unfortunately, the light hearted feeling didn’t last into the 1974 World Cup training camp.\footnote{Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 237.}

The 1974 World Cup training camp was established at Malente, and due to the problems at the 1972 Olympics in Munich, the team was ensconced in a high security prison setting, with guards, patrolling guard dogs on the grounds, sharpshooters situated around the compound, and helicopters flying overhead. Gerd Müller and Franz Beckenbauer spent hours practicing one-two combinations on their own in preparation, but before the team could even take to the field, mutiny broke out in the camp. Beckenbauer was on the phone to the vice president of the DFB (who was also FIFA vice president) negotiating more money for the players, who were upset when they found out what other national teams were paying their players. The situation was finally resolved in the early hours of the morning, but Schön was close to a nervous breakdown. Germany advanced through their first two games with little problem, playing their version of total football, again with a flexible catenaccio featuring a forward running sweeper in the person of Beckenbauer. In total football, the players became interchangeable, with any one player being able to move into multiple positions. Germany and Holland were the two teams featuring the new style, and it
took a large number of talented players to be able to play this style. Germany and Holland had the players, and a showdown between the two teams was coming.\textsuperscript{21}

Schön was so close to a nervous breakdown after losing to East Germany that he returned to camp, locked himself in a room and was fed strained food, after seeing the players all drunk and smoking cigars. Beckenbauer took over the running of the team, restructured the starting formation, and accompanied Schön to publicity meetings. They team went on the win the World Cup, defeating Holland in the final. Hesse-Lichtenberger says that Germany willed themselves into playing decent soccer through determination for the rest of the tournament. What it did demonstrate was that Germany still needed strong leadership to be successful, and fortunately for them, Beckenbauer was able to step in and provide it.\textsuperscript{22}

In 1976, at the Congress of German Sport Physicians, several prominent physicians publically minimized the medical hazards presented by steroid use, and recommended their use under medical supervision for professional athletes. Rumors of rampant drug use permeated the atmosphere of the German national soccer team, often accompanied by a “win at all costs” attitude. The Interior Ministry responsible for sport policy also advocated the use of steroids, saying “…it is clear there are sports disciplines in which

\textsuperscript{21} Hesse-Lichtenberger, \textit{Tor!}, 210, 238-240; Glanville, \textit{The Story of the World Cup}, 192, 199; José Thadeu Goncalves in cooperation with Professor Julio Mazzei, \textit{The Principles of Brazilian Soccer} (Spring City, PA.: Reedswain, Inc., 1998), 161.

\textsuperscript{22} Hesse-Lichtenberger, \textit{Tor!}, 242-244.
the use of these drugs is necessary to remain competitive at the international level.” 23

The German desire for strength in soccer was taking some unprecedented turns.24

Schön remained coach of the 1978 World Cup team, but the team didn’t advance out of the second round of play. Players protested that they didn’t like having two center midfielders. Players complained of being lonely and bored at the training camp in Argentina, so Schön invited a Nazi fighter pilot war hero into the camp to talk to the team, which caused somewhat of an international stir. Jupp Derwall took over as head coach of the team after the 1978 World Cup, and took the team to the finals in 1982. The coach and his assistants were publically criticized by the players, some even saying they needed an iron hand like Herberger had been. Derwall trained the team for a strong defense (how German!) and insisted on a strong goalkeeper. But the atmosphere among the players during the tournament was horrible. Hesse-Lichtenberger noted that their arrogance was taken to new extremes which led the national team into an ugly downward spiral after the World Cup, and insisted that the team was morally bankrupt and shockingly sluggish. Glanville said the team was mean spirited, overly physical, negative and unadventuresome. There was a brawl among the team in the locker room at halftime of one game.25

23 Hoberman, “Primacy of Performance: Superman not Superathlete,” 81-82. Hoberman quotes the Interior Minister on p. 82.
25 Glanville, The Story of the World Cup, 217, 248, 261-262; Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 249, 314, 317. 680
By the 1986 World Cup, Beckenbauer had been installed as the “coach”, or rather technical advisor as he held no coaching license which was mandatory within the German system. He was longingly regarded as being the new “savior” of the national team, a position he had once fulfilled as a player. At the pre-tournament camp, once again there were squabbles between the players, a situation that was now being regarded as customary in the German camp. Even under Beckenbauer, the team played a game that was regarded as dour and cautious, grindingly efficient (after all, they were being coached by the man who had spent hours perfecting his own technique with the ball) with an unbeatable goalkeeper. What Beckenbauer did bring to the team was morale, making up for their lack of tactics and technique with spirit. He said that the team didn’t possess much more than the proverbial German virtues: fighting spirit and solid defending. So, Germany played a very defensive game, packing their players into the back and cautiously going forward. With the inevitable emphasis on defense, Germany advanced to the final and lost to a more talented Argentinian team.26

Beckenbauer had publically stated that he would not stay on as national team coach past the 1990 World Cup. He had a more talented team this time around, but unlike the typical German team, they did not improve over the course of the tournament. They did advance to the finals, beating Argentina this time, to win the World Cup championship. Beckenbauer’s successor, Berti Vogts, favored a more “friendly” approach to coaching his players, which inevitably led to discipline problems. Vogts coached the 1994 and 1998 World Cup team, and both teams featured bad soccer and appalling behavior by

the German team. Vogts adhered to the German philosophy of teamwork over individualism, saying in 1996 that “there are no stars, the team is the star.” During the 1992 European championship, Galeano noted that the German players were raised on fasting, abstinence and hard work. The 1998 team, in particular, was accused of old fashioned style of play and a lack of creativity, but was trained for fitness with much crossing from the flanks and quick play in the attack.²⁷

Several themes are becoming apparent in terms of German coaching philosophy, not the least of which is the emphasis on a strong defensively minded team. The German team has relied on the flexible catenaccio style with a strong libero, or sweeper, for a great many years. This system is thoroughly engrained in the German mind, being instilled during youth soccer and being played by all levels within the country. As Hesse-Lichtenberger points out, it is also a huge stumbling block to the national team, as it takes a strong “father-figure” to employ the slow build up from the back, and forces a creative midfielder to fall back and carry the ball forward. He insists that German players are not independent minded enough to play without the father-figure image of a sweeper. Rudi Voller, the next coach of the national team, did try to employ a flat back three system at the European championships in 2000, with very limited success. By 2000, most of the international teams were displaying a zonal marking system, whether it was a flat back three or four. Germany has struggled with the system. By the 2004

European championships, Germany started with a three back zonal system, and quickly went to a four back system. They played horribly, leading to Voller’s resignation.28

Another area of soccer philosophy that German seems to excel at is the attention to detail and lack of humor about the game. Oliver Kahn, goalkeeper for the German team, is described as obsessed by perfection. He trains fanatically, is hyper-competitive, and gives much attention to every nuance of his play. The German national teams’ lack of humor, prank playing, and camaraderie is almost an anomaly among international soccer teams. But the German national team considers it unseemly and unthinkable, as the soccer hierarchy rules unchallenged. Spiegler says the German teams have the stiff professionalism of a Big Five Accounting Firm. Even at the club level, fines are levied for minor infractions and bonuses granted for games started, goals scored, and wins. Competition is so intense that injuries occur as frequently in practice as they do in games.29

The German attention to detail really rose to the surface during a 2003 presentation/conference featuring the Bundesliga coaches and the DBF staff, held to assess the recent failures and draw up a plan for the future. Tipping commented that the “Teutonic approach of thoroughness, attention to detail, and willingness to serve the common cause” dominated the conference. German soccer coaches are generally

regarded as “enhancers of technique” rather than a more British definition of the coach being the “organizer of victory.” Hence, German coaches do demonstrate a more detailed approach to coaching. Everything, every detail, must be analyzed and evaluated.30

Coaching has always been a strength of the German soccer system, and coaching training has a high priority within the system, far more than it is in other countries. The national coaching network was set up in the 1950’s, and was so prestigious that the United States employed a top German coach to establish their own coaching licensing system. Dettmar Cramer, one of the coaches of the 1954 World Cup team and coach of the 1976 European champions, Bayern Munich, established the first national coaching schools in the United States in 1970. In 1974, the United States hired him as the first full time national team coach. Cramer’s credentials are impeccable, but what is most interesting is his philosophy on training and team selection.31

Cramer has always emphasized that for Germans, the important moments in a game occur when the ball changes sides, and the resulting reactions of the players. He opines that since the 1970’s, time and space are more limited on the field so players must play at high speed. The first thing he looks for in player selection is speed: speed of movement and speed of running. His second priority is how detail oriented the player is

(again, a rather German trait) in terms of whether they use every part of the foot when passing, use of both feet, etc. He also looks for a high rate of work to create space on the field and confidence. Again, these are stereotypical traits of the German game, but they do allude to what is valued in the game by Germany. Cramer insists that repetition is the mother of perfection and that a coach needs both leadership and authority. These are all recurring themes within the German system. Cramer also delineates the main differences between the German soccer philosophy and the Dutch philosophy, which provides a nice contrast. In Germany, the attack begins at the moment the other team loses possession of the ball, defense is aggressive and offense minded, and training is everything. The Dutch, on the other hand, do not believe in artificial exercises, but rather emphasize seeing the whole picture during a game. Quite an interesting contrast.32

The 2003 conference by the DFB and the Bundesliga addressed German failures in soccer, and ten tasks were itemized as necessary to improve the overall German soccer system. These included research into talent development, execution of that research, emphasis on individual development, developing a common theme for the entire country, focusing on technical training, introducing new methods to make the training motivational and fun, communication between organizations, filtering down new methods from top to bottom, examining youth club coaching and finding new motivation for all members of the soccer community. The general conclusion after the

results of the 2002 World Cup was that Germany was technically deficient when compared to Brazil, and this deficiency led to their loss.33

Of great concern to the German soccer community over the past several decades, but even more so since the Bosman ruling is the lack of talent and the lack of development of German youth soccer players. Reduced numbers with reduced ability certainly impacts on national team selection. Pelé made the comment in 2002 that Germany hasn’t had one new player in ten years at the international level. Hesse-Lichtenberger also noted that few youth were moving upward through the German system which led the national team to rely on old men, or “gray hairs” as he calls them. He surmises that German youth are now complacent and unable to face the rigorous conditions that the German soccer program practically mandates in their youth programs. He believes that installing the youth into a set up that deliberately mistreats them to keep them sharp and hungry and directly led to the reduced numbers coming through the program. Landon Donovan, United States national team player, has been through the German youth system, being drafted by Bayern Leverkusen while a youngster, and assigned to their developmental regionalliga squad. Donovan says, “People keep telling me I have to battle- that’s the German theme in life.”34

German youth coaches place great emphasis on developing courage and resilience by placing the young players in harsh conditions. They institute two a day practices, and place youth players in match-ups against veterans to push them to excel. Donovan recounts being yelled at on the team bus one day for wearing a thin warm-up suit after a game and not a heavier sweatshirt. Leverkusen coach, Peter Hermann, shares his philosophy about young players.

> Your body is your capital, and you have to do everything for it… You must say, ‘For ten years I will do everything for football.’ You must train hard, you have to eat the right foods, you have to watch games to learn tactics. You must only go to the disco when you are on holiday. You must blow-dry your hair so it isn’t wet when you go outside.

Two conflicting philosophies have arisen within Germany regarding youth talent development, as indicated at the 2003 conference addressing German soccer failures. One group of coaches, generally DFB national team staff, believes that lack of international games at the youth level as well as lack of sufficient training is the problem. Bundesliga coaches believe that the youth are having too many physical demands placed on them at a young age resulting in burn out and drop out.

The German DFB is investing enormous amounts of money in youth development. They have set three goals for the development of youth talent: identification, training, and developing an environment for success. They have decided training should focus

---

37 Tipping, “Germany’s Goal: To Be No. 1,” 37, 39.
on one v. one situations with the emphasis for winning more than 50% of the confrontations, increased comfort on the ball and increased creativity, and the development of an aggressive ball oriented defending technique, or in other words, the teaching of zonal rather than man-marking defending. They want training to focus on individual technique in detailed and specific areas, encourage increased competition, perseverance and sacrifice for the team, encourage and train for creativity and have fun and motivate the players. They cite a comparison with the Brazilian youth national teams: Germany’s U-20 teams play six games per year, whereas Brazilians typically play 80 professional games by the time they are 18.38

The opposing philosophy, represented by the Bundesliga coaches, was that too many physical demands are being put on the young players which end up robbing them of a career in soccer. Psychologist, Uwe Harttgen, a former professional player, cautioned about the development of a “soccer robot” mentality with the youth development, and insisted that social and moral development was as important as technique development. He believes that professionalizing players too early causes pressure on the youth.39

Despite mentioning it, the conference did not spend much time addressing how German youth talent was to be selected. What is interesting is that this area has always been a concern and a priority within Germany. Much of their selection process has been based on early measurement of physical attributes. Krüger notes that athletic talent selection

38 Tipping, “Germany’s Goal: To Be No. 1,” 37, 39.
39 Tipping, “Germany’s Goal: To Be No. 1,” 39.
on the basis of anthropometric measurement has been further developed in Germany than any other country, and he ties this technology to a similarity to that which was used for racial selection. Apparently, in his opinion, Germany still has a predilection for developing blood and breeding lines.⁴⁰

Several recurrent themes are apparent when examining German soccer philosophy and training methods. The emphasis on hardness, physicality, fitness and conditioning are all displayed through the years by a variety of national team coaches and club coaches. The emphasis on bodily perfection specific for the sport accompanied by an emphasis on hardness and strength permeates the German soccer community, and has done so for many years. This is more than just a stereotypical observation, as training in this area is advanced and accentuated for youth as well as for the professional clubs and national team.

Another area that has been repeatedly emphasized is the focus on defense. While the old adage, “the best defense is a good offense,” floats around the soccer world, Germany seems to believe that structuring everything from the defense is more likely to lead to success. Their recurring motto might well be “everything builds from the back,” a quote that I have heard from numerous coaches. The motto would explain the heavy German emphasis on top goalkeeping, something for which they are internationally recognized. Where Germany is currently running into problems is their inflexibility in

adopting new defensive measures, something that the 2003 conference has identified as a key concern. Getting past the dominant German sweeper system is a must for the German national program, and being able to play a variety of defensive schemes, including zonal formations, is necessary. Germany is still struggling with this notion. Watching the 2005 Confederations Cup, it was apparent that Klinsmann has much work to do in this area. The German team’s defense was as porous as a sieve, something that is highly uncharacteristic, given their soccer history. The majority of the top international teams today play a zonal defense, and Germany must learn to adapt.

The German emphasis on coaching is an interesting situation. Whereas other countries do see coaches as “organizers of victory”, Germany focuses on the need for a strong leader/teacher as their coach. The authoritarian mode of coaching in Germany is deeply ingrained, and coaches that do not fit the mold have been less successful, particularly at the international level. Germans appear to want strong leadership and value it, and they want coaches that provide that leadership as well as authority based on successful play. Former national team members are valued as coaches in the German community, if they receive coaching training, whereas in other countries coaching staff often comes from the ranks of less well known, lower level players, journalists, or those devoted to the game but without playing experience. For example, current top level international coaches that are former German players feature such names as Jurgen Klinsmann (German national team coach), Otto Rehhagel (Greece national team coach) and Lothar
Matthäus (former Hungarian national team coach.) Franz Beckenbauer also springs to mind as a former player turned coach.

The German attention to detail within the soccer realm is apparent, from the importance of a “professional attitude” which eliminates humor and playfulness from training, to details about equipment and training methods. The fact that the 2003 conference acknowledges that training environment is a concern and must be addressed is a huge step of change for the German soccer community. Long noted for their harsh youth training conditions and their emphasis on discipline, structural changes will have to occur. Accompanying this is their renewed interest in promoting creativity in the game of soccer, an area where Germany has historically been criticized as lacking. The conference seemed to key in on development of creativity through environment, and the development of individual skill. What they failed to address was the authoritarian attitude of many of their coaching staff as well as the almost militaristic emphasis on teamwork which can stifle individuality on the soccer field. Creativity cannot flourish in soldiers, or soccer robots.

The German coaching philosophy, and hence their training regimen, has long focused on discipline, fitness, teamwork, defense, preparation, and leadership. Of course, many of these values have been culturally influenced, as has been shown in other chapters of this work. Whether the German soccer community can change outside of the cultural framework of the larger community, and in fact, actually emphasize concepts that
would be alien to the culture (such as creativity and individualism) will require long
term plans and much work. Given the high levels of achievement that the German
soccer teams have consistently incurred, as well as their penchant for attention to
detail, one must be tepidly optimistic. Given that soccer style is a cultural construction,
it will be interesting to watch and see if cultural changes do occur, or whether German
soccer will remain in a static state because of their successes. I sincerely doubt that
Germany can “Brazilianize” their brand of soccer, and it would be a sad situation to see
German soccer lose its unique and successful qualities. Rather, Germany should
continue to emphasize and develop those qualities that make them unique: teamwork,
building from the back, physicality in the game, and organization.
CHAPTER 28
TRAINING PHILOSOPHY AND REGIMENS OF BRAZIL

This chapter examines some of the unique qualities and training regimens of Brazil, and delineates some of the Brazilian training philosophies. Brazilian soccer philosophy differs greatly from Germany, focusing more on individual skills being combined into a cohesive team approach to the game. This is not always easy to accomplish in Brazil, particularly in a globalized society with the overwhelming majority of the Brazilian national team players playing their club seasons in Europe. But given Brazil’s historical emphasis on individual talent and creative play, bringing a team philosophy and melding eleven individuals into it has always been a challenge for Brazilian coaches. This chapter addresses some of the unique skills that individual Brazilian players have developed as well as historical approaches to team training at the national team level. Whereas Germany has always valued a strong defense and organization, Brazil has valued different stylistic qualities in its game.

In the first decades of the twentieth century, as Afro-Brazilian players were entering the game, Brazilians, as did other South American teams, seemed to place more emphasis on creativity in the dribble, as opposed to European teams. The early emphasis on the importance of the dribble has been attributed to the early black players
using the dribble as a means of avoidance around other players. By avoiding other
players with intricate footwork, the black player not only avoided being fouled, but
avoided being called for fouls. This emphasis on the dribble rapidly evolved into a
possession style game, whereby possession of the ball was as highly prized as beautiful
goals. Defense rarely rated the applause that skilled dribbling would incur. During the
1978 World Cup, Coach Coutinho commented that the dribble was a waste of time and
proof of Brazil’s weakness, but Brazilians didn’t buy his philosophy. Brazilians prefer
dribbles and flicks over physical challenges or long distance passes, with the emphasis
always on the dribble.¹

Juggling is also a highly valued individual talent in Brazilian soccer and one much
focused upon in street play, as not much area is needed to perform the skill. Individual
juggling contests occur all over the country on a daily basis. Rio beaches feature
hundreds of children juggling balls, bags, shoes and what-not for long periods of time as
amusement.²

Another skill that is highly valued in Brazilian soccer, and a skill for which they are
world renowned, is dead ball kicks or acrobatic stunts with the ball. As early as the
1938 World Cup, Brazilians were crediting Leônidas with inventing the bicycle kick,

¹ Alex Bellos, *Futebol: The Brazilian Way of Life* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2002), 34, 35, 77; John
Humphrey, “No Holding Brazil: Football, Nationalism and Politics,” *Off the Ball: The Football World
Cup* ed. by Alan Tomlinson and Garry Whannel (London: Pluto Press, 1986), 136; Matthew Shirts,
“Sócrates, Corinthians, and Questions of Democracy and Citizenship,” *Sport and Society in Latin
America: Diffusion, Dependency, and the Rise of Mass Culture* ed. by Joseph Arben (Westport, CN.:
when in reality a Chilean, Ramon Unzaga, first used it in 1914. During the 1950s, Didí
developed the banana kick, or curved ball kick, known in Brazil as the *foglia secca* or
falling leaf kick. Stanley Matthews watched Brazil play, and said it was the first time he
had ever seen a bent kick. In the late 1970’s, Zico added another aerodynamic
invention: by striking over and across the ball he could add a swerving horizontal
movement to a dipping or rising lateral movement, thus making a double banana shot.
Roberto Carlos in 1996 combined speed and bend, by striking the ball’s air valve to
increase the swerve. Guilianotti theorizes that Brazil’s innovations with dead ball
strikes are a result of the cultural emphasis on individual skill and public display of that
skill.⁢³

Compared to the German system of training children, focusing on toughening,
conditioning, and the sweeper system, the Brazilian system is highly developed, and
their apprentice system is considered the best in the world. Early youth train takes place
in the club system, as schools generally do not contain athletic facilities. Clubs sponsor
“sieve days” or free play try-outs for children, at different suburban locations. Children
selected are placed into age appropriate programs, and are legally contracted to the club.
They are considered pre-professionals. The children can turn completely professional at
any point. Once selected to the club, the children work with three professional trainers
and a coach. They attend practice and training three times a week, and generally play
around fifty games a year. The clubs house the children, enroll them in school, and

---

Press, 1999), 137-138; Brian Glanville, *The Story of the World Cup*, rev. ed. (London: Faber and Faber,
attend to their health needs. Botafogo, for example, has 80 children in their escolinha, or soccer school. Most of the children are from the favelas, and most are from southern Brazil, but a few are scouted and brought in from other parts of the country.⁴

Parents sign over their guardianship rights to clubs, and children from the interior or smaller towns are moved to the big city. As of 1983, the club would pay the children’s expenses as well as $25.00 per month, which was often the equivalent of half of the father’s monthly income. Brazil has determined that raising and developing players is more economical than paying signing bonuses and transfer fees. They can also sell the developed players for a large profit, particularly on the international market. Juvenile players that don’t make the big team by a certain point generally have their contracts sold to minor clubs, which further brings profitability to the developing club. Smaller clubs often act as farm teams for larger clubs, and do some of their own preliminary developing of players. Young players must give up their passé (labor market pass) to the club which leads to a loss of all wage bargaining and transfer rights for the player until the age of thirty, unless they are sold before then and re-negotiate a contract with the new club. At thirty, they may become free agents. Players who challenge the system tend to be shunned by other clubs and are not considered for national team selection. The abundance of young players, seeking fame and fortune as well as a way out of the favelas, ensures quantities of selection for development, although this may be in the process of changing. Currently, it would appear that more and more of the soccer

talent is being developed through suburban soccer schools and academies, rather than solely through the clubs. Pelé has commented that Brazil is always good because they always have many young players in the developing process. This provides a direct contrast to Germany, where numbers are dropping and the development process is harsh.\(^5\)

The development of young players is most certainly a key factor in the overall success of the Brazilian soccer program. But once the youngsters are developed and playing professionally, what do Brazilian teams focus on as important at the international level? A historical survey of the Brazilian national team and pre-World Cup preparation provides some interesting observations and information. The 1950 World Cup team was coached by Flavio Costa, who cloistered the team for four months in a house outside of Rio de Janeiro. The married men were forbidden from seeing their wives. Bedtime was at 10:00 p.m., and all players had to drink a “vitamin drink” just before bedtime. Players had curfews, isolation from wives and families, and bans on alcohol. However, they were permitted to smoke, as most of them did. It was believed by the coaching staff that asking a player to quit at such a tense time would be detrimental to his concentration. The staff at the camp included cooks, doctors, and a priest.\(^6\)


The 1950 team emphasized using the normal Brazilian method of attack which was short passes alternating with deeper, sharply angled balls to the wingers. Stanley Matthews commented on the short passes of ten yards or less, as well as the Brazilians’ ability to use all parts of the body to control the ball. He was also amazed at the light weight cleats the team used, and obtained a pair in order to copy them. Of course, this was the tragic World Cup for the Brazilians, and they lost to Uruguay in the finals.

Zizinho always believed they lost the game because of Costa’s insistence on playing a WM formation. Zizinho stated that the final game was the first time he had ever played that formation, which meant that Costa had not previously trained the team in such a formation.\(^7\)

Although other countries have also used it, Brazil made an art form of the practice of *concentração*, or concentration. After hearing their description, one is reminded of concentration camps rather than a place to be able to concentrate. In Brazil, concentration is a rigidly disciplined training camp contrived by a paternalistic system that believed professional players all had Bohemian lifestyles which needed to be overseen and controlled. Concentration was not only a means of keeping players together to bond as a team, but also a means of preventing the loss of “the edge” due to sex, alcohol or other indulgences. It is often called the *come e dorme* tradition, as athletes are housed in special barracks and kept under constant surveillance to prevent not only drinking, but Candomblé rituals. However, concentration for the national team lasts much longer in pre-Cup preparation, sometimes extending for months. Players

---

\(^7\) Glanville, *The Story of the World Cup*, 52, 55; Taylor, *The Beautiful Game*, 12; Bellos, *Futebol*, 63.
griped, but few changes were made in the system until Sócrates challenged it in 1982.

Even though it has relaxed in some ways, it has not been abolished.  

The 1958 World Cup team, which won the Cup, provides much interesting detail about training. Rather than continue with the third back formation, the coach, devised a 4-2-4 formation, which solved the old Brazilian problem of pivotal covering in the defense. Brazil presented the most organized team of the tournament during the flow of play. But the organization extended to much, much more than just the play on the field.

Dr. Hilton Gosling was in charge of the medical team for the players. He spent an entire month in Sweden in 1957 visiting 25 towns to locate what he considered the ideal headquarters for the pre-Cup concentration. The medical team was comprised of doctors, a dentist, Américo the masseur, and a psychologist. The concentration was severe, as seventeen year old Pelé wrote his mother not to write him back as he was not allowed to receive mail while in concentration. Dr. Gosling felt it was important to know, via the psychologist, whether players were happy playing soccer or whether they were merely playing for money. The psychologist, a gray sweatered, unshaven man, had the players draw pictures of a man. The figures were analyzed to see if the forwards were able to project aggression and the defenders able to contain it. He determined that Garrincha’s aggression level was zero, and that he exhibited an

---


9 Glanville, *The Story of the World Cup*, 64, 88, 93-94.
intelligence level so far below average that he couldn’t have qualified to be a bus driver. Pelé was determined to be too juvenile and immature, but then, he was only seventeen at the time.10

Dr. Gosling and his staff gave each player intensive and thorough medical exams. Most of the players were found to have worms or parasites, and many were also anemic. One player had syphilis, which had to be treated. The dentist found 470 teeth which needed work and 32 teeth which needing extracting. In addition to the medical concerns, Dr. Gosling was very determined to enforce the concept of concentration. Before the players arrived at their training grounds in Sweden, he had 28 hotel staff members that were female replaced with men. He insisted that a local nudist colony, which could be seen at a distance from the training ground windows, all be clothed. Nothing was too unimportant to be addressed by the coaching and training staff. But Brazil did go on to win the World Cup that year.11

From 1950 to 1970, Brazil was considered to have the most sophisticated preparation of national teams. They pioneered the use of doctors, coaches, psychologists and a host of technicians, as well as implemented trained coaching personnel. Goncalves notes that the Brazilian national team is trained in highly scientific and closely monitored methods. Team physicians are required to have a two year specialized course in sport medicine. Since 1945, all coaches must be graduates of the Upper College of Physical

10 Mason, *Passion of the People?*, 84; Glanville, *The Story of the World Cup*, 93; Bellos, *Futebol*, 100.
Education. Physical trainers must be graduates of a four year course, and managers of a two year course. The emphasis on education, training and preparation of the national team is considered far ahead of any of the developed European countries.\textsuperscript{12} At the national level, the CBD president and directors appoint a Technical Committee that includes the coach and training staff. The Technical Committee selects and prepares the national team. Being the national team coach can ruin a coach’s career in Brazil, as the coach is always blamed for any defeat. To be burned and buried in effigy is an expected part of the job, but bomb threats and hostile mobs often can accompany the position, also. Mario Zagalo, the 1974 World Cup coach lived through such a scenario.\textsuperscript{13}

The 1962 Brazilian team continued their advanced emphasis on sport medicine and sport science. Knowing that the World Cup was to be held in Chile, the team\textit{concentração} was held at high altitude to increase lung capacity and red corpuscles. Carbon impressions were made of each player’s feet so that individually sized cleats could be made. Dr. Gosling was, once again, in charge of the medical program for the concentration. The team trained to play a 4-3-3 formation in 1962, which was a common formation of the time.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{12} Mason, \textit{Passion of the People?}, 125; Goncalves, \textit{The Principles of Brazilian Soccer}, 4.
\textsuperscript{13} Lever, \textit{Soccer Madness}, 58, 125, 126; Levine, “Sport and Society: The Case of Brazilian Futebol,” 241.
\textsuperscript{14} Mason, \textit{Passion of the People?}, 84; Taylor, \textit{The Beautiful Game}, 97; Glanville, \textit{The Story of the World Cup}, 119.
For the 1966 World Cup, Brazil spent 300,000 pounds on “scientific preparation” of the national team. The team had a four month concentration training camp which was monitored by 200 medical staff.\textsuperscript{15} But it is the 1970 World Cup team about which most has been written, and the team that most openly speaks of pre-Cup preparation and training regimens.

Saldanha had been appointed coach of the national team, and led the team through qualifications. He had little coaching experience, but João Havelange personally chose Saldanha who was a popular broadcaster that would do away with the previous attitude of coaching by committee. He favored individualism and improvisation over a defined system and strategy, and trained the players for rapid movement of the ball in small spaces, always going forward. Off the field, he ended some of the strict training regimens and curfews, as well as supported the players in contract negotiations. Despite this, and perhaps because of his political leanings (he was an avowed communist under a right wing dictatorship), he failed to get along with several of the key players. Just prior to the Cup, Saldanha was replaced with Zagalo, with whispers that the replacement was at the request of Medici, the dictator of Brazil.\textsuperscript{16}

It is known that Medici appointed Coutinho to oversee the team’s fitness levels. Coutinho was a retired army captain and a military physical training expert. He was determined that the 1970 World Cup team would take a scientific approach to training.

\textsuperscript{15} Giulianotti, Football: A Sociology, 133; Glanville, The Story of the World Cup, 142.
even further. In a secret mission, Coutinho attended a NASA training program to study how the Apollo astronauts were put through physical training. He returned to Brazil with a fitness program based on the American Cooper test used at NASA, and every Brazilian player was tested for speed, endurance, lung capacity and physical strength. Coutinho’s counts and coefficients formed the basis for individualized programs that minutely measured all progress. The physical conditioning programs were designed specifically for the altitude the players would encounter playing in Mexico. Gerson noted that prior to 1970, Brazilian soccer players got by on 80% technique and 20% physical conditioning. The ratio changed abruptly in 1970.17

The preparations for the tournament were heavily underwritten by Havelange, then President of the CBF, and the concentration lasted for three months. The last three weeks before competition started the team was moved to their Mexican training camp in Guanajuato. Ten days before leaving for Mexico, the team had their eating and sleeping schedules altered to match the Mexican time zone. The chef at the camp began cooking with Mexican oils and using only Mexican imported fruits and vegetables so that the players would have few digestive adjustments to make.18

Just prior to departing for Mexico, the three Cobras (Pelé, Carlos Alberto and Gérson) met with Zagalo and chose the team and the tactics that they wanted to play. The Cobras did not want a center midfielder, feeling that the team held shape and fluidity

better without one. Zagalo was insistent that the players all had to wear two shirts: both
an offensive and a defensive one. The strategy designed by Zagalo with the input of the
Three Cobras was designed to create space for the speed of Jairzinho and Pelé. The
defense was not expected to be equal to the attack presented by Brazil, but the
formation would allow the left midfielder to penetrate the opponent’s defense.19

The scientific attention to detail continued. Impressions were taken of the player’s feet
so that individualized hand made cleats could be made that even distributed their weight
over the entire length of the shoe. New kits were prepared without collars so the
players would not be weighted down with heavy, sweat soaked uniforms. The players’
shirts and shorts were hand tailored and individualized to avoid any type of friction. The
attention to detail also centered on the technique of players. Gérson mentioned that he
hit hundreds of balls before and after regularly scheduled training sessions, honing his
skill at making long pin-point passes to small targets. He would start by placing passes
to a target 20 yards away, and then move to 30, 40, and 50 yard passes, endlessly
repeating the drill until he was close to perfect.20

Between the 1970 World Cup and the one in 1974, the world witnessed the revolution
of total football, particularly as played by the German and Dutch teams. Partially due to
the insistence of the right wing dictatorship at promoting Brazil as being a scientifically
advanced nation, and partly in reaction to the global soccer trends, Brazil made some

20 Jenkins, *The Beautiful Team*, 30-33.
significant changes within their program and their soccer philosophy. Brazil decided they needed to “Europeanize” in order to compete with the strongly physical teams and the new tactics. Post 1970 Brazilian teams gave more value to European soccer and their emphasis on discipline, marking, tactics and force in the game. Karel Kolsky, the great Czechoslovakian coach of the 1970’s, concluded that Brazil only needed 60% of the training that Europeans needed to maintain physical conditioning, but Brazil increased their emphasis on physical conditioning even further during this period. The 1974 World Cup showed Brazil had trained thoroughly for harsh defensive play, totally unlike their glorious attacking style of yesteryear. It was largely unsuccessful.\(^{21}\)

The 1978 World Cup coach for Brazil, Coutinho, further imposed an alien European style on the team, strictly based on fitness and discipline. He believed there were many similarities between a soccer team and a military platoon or regiment, and did not hesitate to say so. Of course, Coutinho was a 39 year old ex-army captain (the same assistant coach sent to NASA for scientific research prior to the 1970 World Cup), and he still enthused over the Cooper Test system of assessing soccer athletes, which emphasized physical endurance. He exalted tactics and physical conditioning over technique and talent, and imposed that philosophy in his training regimens. He originally tried to impose what he called “polyvalence” during training (which was his

\(^{21}\) Jenkins, *The Beautiful Team*, 10, 250; Glanville, *The Story of the World Cup*, 191.
definition of total football) but abandoned that philosophy and decided to emphasize fitness at camp. He wanted to players to demonstrate a “European hardness.”

Coutinho, probably with some input from the dictatorship, wanted to “modernize” Brazilian soccer. His training emphasis was definitely on discipline, teamwork, and physical force using imported technical jargon. He considered the dribble a waste of time, and favored the European term of “over-lap” rather than dribbling. (One ex-coach commented that over-lapping was what Garrincha did by himself!) What Coutinho did not want were the traditional Brazilian talents of improvisation, individual expression and art. His strategy for the team, emphasized in training, was defense. As a result, the team was defensive and much disorganized during the tournament, although he did introduce a version of the 4-4-2. Goncalves credits Coutinho with establishing the new Brazilian soccer philosophy and making the 4-4-2 the official Brazilian system by playing two midfielders and two inside forwards. Despite his system, the team did not play well, and did not advance to the final. The team played poorly, in the Brazilian public’s opinion, although they did finish third without losing a game.

The 1982 World Cup coach, Tele Santana, was more attuned to the inner rhythms and patterns of the Brazilian soccer game, and adjusted the training regime in line with that.

---


Players were encouraged to attack, and the midfield, featuring Dr. Sócrates, returned to its “superb” and “glorious” play, as Glanville terms it. Of course, he also adds that the goalkeeper was inept, as usual, for Brazil. What was interesting about the 1982 concentração was the challenge made to its harshness, led by Dr. Sócrates. Santana did agree to certain changes, indicating a more flexible approach to players than demonstrated by Coutinho and his European methods. The team played beautiful soccer, but did not win the championship.24

The 1990 team again tried to Europeanize, with little success. The coach, Lazaroni, was considered the sternest of all of the Brazilian coaches. Former coach Zagalo criticized the addition of a sweeper publically, noting that it was absurd to play with one and deprive the team of a midfielder in attack. Lazaroni emphasized that he wanted to team to become “less playful.” Because of the continuing Brazilian tradition of technique on dead ball plays, the team seemed to be playing a defensively oriented game with their only offensive orientation built around free kicks. The tactics that Lazaroni developed deprived the forwards of midfield support, and emphasized a defensive entrenchment. To Brazilians, Coutinho, Zagalo and Lazaroni are considered not just losing coaches, but traitors, as they were proponents of dull, Europeanized, defensive soccer.25

25 Glanville, The Story of the World Cup, 272, 307, 311, 314, 320; Kuper, Football Against the Enemy, 203-204.
The 1994 World Cup team, coached by Carlos Parreira would synthesize the attacking Brazilian style with the defensive rigor needed to compete with European teams. He had three philosophies that he coached by: Brazil must be defensively organized, fitter than their opponents, and express themselves in the Brazilian way. While the first two philosophies sound shockingly similar to Coutinho, Zagalo and Lozaroni, it was the addition of the third principle that made their style of play semi-acceptable to the Brazilian public. Perhaps the greatest difficulty facing Parreira was developing the individualistic players into a unit, particularly at a time when many of the players were plying their professional careers overseas.\(^{26}\) Parreira noted that: “We’re playing the traditional Brazilian way, 4-4-2, which is the way they’ve played since they were kids, so when they come back, they won’t find anything they don’t know.”\(^{27}\)

Parreira details his very extensive preparations and philosophy for the 1994 World Cup team in his video “My Way.” He established a target goal, which was to win the World Cup, not just play well in it. He also had to overcome the myth, which meant selling his goals to the team as Brazilians often seem to care more about how they play rather than the final results, and establishing a coherent and definite style of play that produced results but was also acceptable to the Brazilian players. He stated that it took one year to change their style completely, and part of the process involved moving back to a traditional flat back four zonal defense, which allowed the outside backs to move


forward into attack. He planned to use technique as a weapon, and work strictly on organizing the team players without the ball. The player with the ball was to have freedom to be creative. Parreira also planned to attack with ten players.  

Parreira wanted to always impose the Brazilian style on the game, and said, “We never change despite the opponent.” He stressed the need to win outside the field, which included such items as team harmony and unity, preparation, organization, and discipline, and also included the Brazilian conceptualization of concentração, which Parreira enforced. No wives were allowed, and no visitors were allowed to stay overnight. Parreira emphasized that he wanted willing players, no sulking, and instituted the tradition of the players all holding hands to enter the field prior to introductions. 

Parreira emphasized the development of group dynamics, or instilling motivation and determination in the team. Players were asked to do what each was requested to do, plus give 10% beyond that. Rather than turn this over to a team psychologist, as previous coaches had often done in Brazil (or a Nazi fighter pilot as the Germans had once done), Parreira brought in an engineer to speak for 8 hours on group dynamics. He had the team do such activities as change a tire together to increase cohesion and team work. 

29 Ibid.
His last goal was the establishment of the soccer philosophy. He keyed in on several aspects, many of which were traditional Brazilian values in the game. For example, he emphasized that the team would always play their own style, and that style would involve emphasis on technique. The team would tactically move off of the ball, and focus on keeping the ball on the ground with possession of the ball being coveted. The team would play in a block, emphasize speed and patience, and move the ball from left to right to find the perfect moment to penetrate. Five to seven players would then move into the attack. The team would also concentrate on free kicks.31

The philosophy and training regimen was successful, as Brazil won the 1994 World Cup. But not all Brazilians were happy with the style the team exhibited, and more than once, Parreira was hung in effigy on the Brazilian streets. However, the media foresaw the return of the “beautiful Brazil.” One British newspaper said:

> For Brazil, possession is coveted. The pace is leisurely…then the moment of explosive acceleration, a rapid exchange of passes which leaves opponents for dead, victims of the sublime combination of pace and technique.32

The 1998 World Cup was a disaster, although Brazil did play through to the finals game. Training and player selection have been often attributed to Nike rather than to Brazil, at least according to Brazilians. But two things are important to note in the years between 1994 and the 2002 World Cup. For one, Brazil played more games than any

---

31 Ibid.
other country in the world. During the eight year time period, the Brazilian national
team played 138 games. Meanwhile, the Brazilian club schedule extended to 49 weeks
per year. The other significant fact was noted by Dr. Sócrates, who said that during the
1970’s, players ran about 4 kilometers during a game, but by 2002, were running 12
kilometers a game. Meanwhile, space was decreasing because of the increased running,
and physicality also was increasing, leading to Brazilian players being required to play
one touch ball to be successful. But Brazil was also dealing with other issues besides
Nike, the number of games and increased running. After the 2000 Olympic loss, Brazil
proceeded to run through four national coaches in a period of nine months. No one
really wanted the job and the accompanying headaches. Finally, Big Phil Scolari was
persuaded to take the position as national team coach for the 2002 World Cup.33

Scolari’s coaching philosophy emphasized battling midfield players, which he tended to
favor over skilled technical players. Again, the emphasis was put on winning the World
Cup, and not playing the game with style. “If we have to play ugly to reach our
objective, then we will play ugly,” he said. Scolari also reinstituted concentração very
strictly. Players were expected to honor a 40 day chastity ban. Scolari commented that
he was all for the chastity ban, because “players can’t control their sexual appetites.”
This paternalistic attitude has permeated Brazil soccer since earliest times. Scolari also
believed in taking a psychological approach to the game. Before every tournament
game he showed the team videos of Brazilian fans celebrating after triumphs and

33 Bellos, Futebol, 335, 350; Bellos interviews Dr. Sócrates and includes his comments on pg. 363; Page,
despairing after defeats. Players were encouraged to make sure their legacy was celebration. Of course, Brazil did defeat Germany in the championship game to win the 2002 World Cup, and they appeared to do it with a return of Brazilian style coupled with strength and a defensive scheme.  

Several coaches have detailed the Brazilian philosophy of soccer. Graham Ramsey is one of the original national coaches for the United States Soccer Federation and has condensed Brazilian philosophy into eight “powers.” The first power is the power of fitness: Brazilians believe each player must be fit enough to play without substitution. Second is the power of team spirit, and third is the power of the pass, which emphasizes that ball possession is valued and one player need not run all over the field. Fourth is the power of the passing angle, and fifth is the angled play. Flat passes are seldom seen in Brazilian soccer, and angled passing and angled runs are emphasized from an early age. The power of regained possession is also emphasized. If a player loses the ball he must press the individual with it, while teammates move to support and steal the resulting pass. Brazilians also emphasize the power of the pack, by playing in close proximity to each other rather than spreading out across the field. This system of support allows for rapid passing with reduced running. And lastly, Brazilians emphasize the power of passion, as they are always playing soccer and love the game.  

---


Others note Brazilian training emphases that vary from that of other countries. Bellos notes the precision of the shot from any distance which allows an attack to be made by small numbers of players rather than a collective advance. Highly skilled, technical players can be a threat individually within the game, and Brazil certainly never seems to lack for technical expertise within its system. Technique is emphasized over and over in training, which Germany is now trying to emulate. Jenkins notes the Brazilian theory of *meio de campo*, or control of the game from the midfield, as well as that of *lançamento*, switching defense into attack with one long, precise pass. The great Brazilian teams have always emphasized strong midfield play, with the midfielders demonstrating much of the creativity. Mention Pelé, Dr. Sócrates or Ronaldinho, and note their positions. All are or were midfielders. Creativity in the midfield players is highly emphasized in Brazil, and an expected component of their game, along with moving into support positions in the midfield area.³⁶

Goncalves does the clearest job of minutely detailing the Brazilian soccer philosophy. He believes that “Brazilian soccer is a national philosophy. Every player of any age at any level will play with the same concept tactically and technically.”³⁷ Goncalves also provides what he calls the four major aspects of Brazilian soccer that make it different from soccer played elsewhere. These aspects are both tactical and technique oriented, and specifically developed in the players by the coaching associations in Brazil. The first aspect is keeping the ball on the ground except in three specific situations: long

switch of the point of attack, a long cross, or a shot outside the 18 yard box. Brazilians are noted for their rapid, on the ground passing in tight spaces in the midfield area. They are also known, for the accuracy of their long, pinpoint passes. These traits of the game are historically documented, and have enabled the Brazilian team to develop the stereotype of the creative player. The emphasis of keeping the ball on the ground (and is accompanying emphasis on the dribble) is a South American contribution to the game. European teams tend to place more emphasis on aerial balls and direct play.38

Connected with the first aspect, Goncalves’ second and third aspects are related. Number two is emphasizing the triangle pass, and number three is minimizing the number of touches on the ball. Both of these tactics allow the quick, one touch passing in tight spaces for which Brazil is known. Triangulating passes allows off the ball movement in a forward direction with support in any direction, and the one touch passing allows quick movement of the ball without excessive running. The fourth major emphasis in Brazilian training and soccer philosophy deals with receiving the ball. Brazilians are trained to always receive the ball facing the opposite direction from which the ball is sent. This is a unique skill, and one that takes endless repetitions to make it second nature. As far as I am aware, no other country emphasizes this skill as Brazil does. But mastering opposite side reception means that the ball is instantly shielded and requires but one touch to redirect it. In a fast paced game, this skill also opens up spaces for off the ball runs strategically. The emphasis on these four techniques in Brazilian soccer allows the perception that the game is played at a

38 Ibid., p. 204.
leisurely pace and players don’t do as much running. In reality, this emphasis on technique supports two Brazilian stylistic features: coveted possession with many passes leading to sudden and rapid changes of pace in the attack, and support for all midfielders that allows creativity on the ball.\(^\text{39}\)

Goncalves also notes several other important training characteristics in Brazilian soccer. He maintains that a flat back four defensive strategy is the norm at all levels, and is taught from the earliest ages rather than a man marking schema. Touch, a highly valued technique, is taught by training players barefoot. A miss-kicked ball or a long ball hurts. The pain encourages players to keep the ball on the ground with short passes. Small rubber balls are also used to teach control and touch. Final penetration of the ball into the attacking zone is usually done on the ground and with flair. Creativity is highly valued in the attack and finish. Technical skill development is always taught as a progression of skills, and emphasis is on the development of using both feet equally, limiting time and touches. Whereas Europeans often favor small sided games for training, Brazilians prefer a large field which provides players the space to learn and develop creativity. Circuit training is often used in technique development, and here the influence of samba and capoeira are very apparent. Situations and stations within the circuit often mimic movements seen in capoeira or samba, but with a ball. As players develop these movement patterns they are receiving direct cultural influence.\(^\text{40}\)

\(^{39}\) Ibid., pp. 202-206.  
\(^{40}\) Ibid., pp. 5, 73, 88, 93, 206.
The emphasis on physical conditioning is widely apparent in Brazilian soccer. Goncalves calls it the “Total Training Method” which has a variety of soccer related goals. This method, he summarizes, is a most important component in the development of Brazilian style. Its goals include increasing respiratory capacity, increasing the volume of blood pumped by the heart, hypertrophy of muscle tissue, increasing muscular strength and decreasing lactic acid. It involved warming up that emphasizes flexibility, power training involving low intensity weights for muscle endurance, high weights for muscle power and weights with speed to increase potency. It also includes circuit training and interval training, and lots and lots of sit-ups for core muscle strengthening.41

To summarize unique training regimens and philosophical emphasis in Brazil, I note several significant trends. One blatantly apparent emphasis in Brazil is the focus on the development of technical skills. No other country in the world rivals Brazilian technical ability with a soccer ball. Many would attribute these skills to playing street ball in the favelas or on the beaches, but that is only a partial answer. Skills such as dribbling, juggling, and dead ball kicks are all highly emphasized and training development emphases through the progression of a players’ growth. These skills are highly valued on a cultural basis, so young players want to develop them and work many hours to master them, far more so than European or North American youngsters. This continual emphasis on technique development also lends itself to valuing and nurturing creativity

41 Ibid., pp. 64, 67, 68-73.
within the game. Because skill level is so high on an individual basis, individuals are permitted and encouraged to be creative with that skill in the flow of the game.

When national team coaches have tried to force an alien conception of the game on Brazilian teams, conceptions that limit creativity and focus on strength, defensive schema, and a Europeanized style, the outcry from the Brazilian public is tremendous. And, the teams are generally not as successful as those that play to the Brazilian strengths of creativity and technique. Coaches are frequently publically criticized in Brazil, particularly those coaches that impose a foreign philosophy on the national team. Part of the reason for the public outcries against coaches is directly related to how the public perceives ownership of their national team. Because the national team is viewed as a paramount symbol of Brazilian national identity, its failure or success is often tied into how Brazilians regard themselves, hence the open practices that would be unimaginable in a country such as Germany or England. The culture takes ownership of its national team and wants participatory rights in that ownership. Open practices allows that participation, as does open criticism of the coaching staff.

Whereas most countries have fairly well developed youth training programs, Brazil epitomizes youth development through their club systems. Children are taken under the wings of the club at a very early age compared to other countries. This historical trait, and it is historical and has its roots decades ago, is partially a response to the economic situation in Brazil. Parents cannot afford high level training for the national sport, and
therefore clubs became the conduits to provide this training. In the process, clubs have also been a youngster’s parents. Clubs provide housing, board, education and medical care as well as soccer training. It would be inconceivable in most European countries for parents to sign over guardianship of their child to a soccer club; however this is a fairly normal situation in Brazil. Although more and more children are paying for participation in soccer schools located in the suburbs, and living at home attending their neighborhood schools, it takes money to do so. Middle class parents can afford this, but children from the favelas cannot. What is unique in the Brazilian system is the continued emphasis on fun in the game. Children are treated as children, and soccer is presented as a source of fun. No harsh training methods, lots of playful games, and enjoyment of the training are all hallmarks of the Brazilian youth system, in contrast to many of the European systems. The club system of youth development remains a significant factor in Brazilian culture.

Another unique feature in Brazilian soccer philosophy is the emphasis on scientific preparation for the national team. All countries like to believe that their training methods incorporate the most up to date methodology, but Brazil has been fanatic about being at the forefront of sophisticated training regimens. From Coutinhos involvement with NASA training to detailed descriptions of Total Training Methods, Brazil has focused its national team preparations on being the most fit athletes in the soccer world. Overemphasis in this area has at times become problematic, when Brazil focused exclusively on hardness and fitness over technique and tactics. The “scientific
preparation” that has included medical doctors, dentists, equipment manufacturers, engineers and psychologists provides a model for other countries to follow. Germans are renowned for being detail oriented, but Brazilians seem to outpace them when it comes to soccer preparations. Of particular note is the development and use of sport psychology within their system. While at times this has backfired (i.e., the 1958 team provides some humorous examples), overall it appears to have contributed to Brazilian success.

The use of concentration in pre-tournament preparation is not unique to Brazil, as most countries use some form of concentration prior to the World Cup. But Brazil has culturally embraced this paternalistic concept, also using it in its club system. Brazil’s concentração is so highly developed and highly paternalistic that it has become a type of art form in itself. The paternalism it exhibits is culturally derived. A hierarchal society, a mixed race culture, and a professional soccer career for individuals lacking education all combine to create such a system. Such paternalism would be unacceptable in other countries with more of a history of individualism and self determination, but in Brazil, although players may complain, little is done to change the system. Scolari’s comment that “players are unable to control their sexual appetities” is more than revealing; it is a reflection of the Brazilian cultural system. That concentração may extend for long periods, and include such manipulative measures as no mail, no conjugal visits, and razor wire surroundings to “protect” the players reflects how developed and entrenched this concept is.
The last unique Brazilian training focus to be summarized is the emphasis on creativity, midfield play and one touch passing. These are all stereotypical Brazilian hallmarks when describing Brazilian style. However, they are also tactical and technical skills that are highly developed through the Brazilian training system. That the culture also highly values them adds incentive for the system to focus on their development, from the youngest players onward. These highly developed skills are just that, highly trained and encouraged, not “natural” manifestations due to heritage or birth. The influence of samba and capoeira can be detected, but again, these cultural influences are learned, albeit at a very early age. Training process that include playing barefoot to develop touch and short passing ability, to the use of small rubber balls to further refine such tactical skills are all part of the Brazilian system. Countless hours are spent in play and practice to hone such skills. Perhaps due to the heat, Brazilians learned early on that great amounts of running during the game could be avoided by having the ball do the work rather than the player. The emphasis on keeping the ball on the ground and one touch passing it around until a change of pace in the final penetration proved effective as well as creatively flamboyant, at times. The culture rewarded this style of play, further encouraging its development.

The comparison to the German system becomes an apparent vision of contrasts. Whereas Germans focus on attention to detail, Brazilians do also in their “scientific preparation.” Whereas Germans value coaching education, Brazilians also value it, but less so. Coaches are in the position of public scrutiny far more in Brazil, and the open
practices are unique. Youth development differs greatly from Germany to Brazil. Brazil’s is more highly developed but maintains its emphasis on child-like fun. Germany never intended fun to be a component of youth training. Germany tends to emphasize defensive strategy and development in their training regimens, along with a high emphasis on fitness and hardness. Brazilians value fitness, but also focus on the development of technique and creativity over tactical schemes. The two countries provide an interesting contrast in how their unique philosophies shape the sport of soccer within their cultural realm.
CHAPTER 29

GERMANY AND UNIQUE CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON SOCCER STYLE

In this chapter and the next, I explore what may be termed “unique cultural influences” on soccer style of each country. For Germany, two of these cultural influences have been touched on in earlier chapters: the extensive permeation of the military and the dominance of Bayern Munich. However, both subjects deserve some further exploration into how they contour German soccer. The affect of the military on soccer is not specifically a unique phenomenon. Certainly other countries can be cited that have had a military influence on the development of soccer within the country, such as Argentina, Brazil and Russia. However, the military outlook and regimentalism has certainly shaped how German soccer style has developed, and is worthy of a closer look. I will also argue that the dominance of Bayern Munich since the middle 1960’s has had a profound impact on the national team make-up and its playing style that is unmatched by other clubs within the Bundesliga.

The penetration of the military into soccer during its formative years has greatly shaped the style of German soccer, even though the military has had little significant presence within the game since World War II. But as has been demonstrated, the German habitus and thus the soccer psyche of the country, has been deeply influenced by the
military. Elias identifies the onset of the glorification of the military during the 1800’s when Napoleon invaded Germany and revealed the true weakness of the German states. The German population reacted with shame and embarrassment, as well as fear. They began to idealize the military and their bearing and warlike actions as a symbol of increasing strength. As urbanization occurred, and urban models of behavior favored the arts of negotiation and persuasion, these models were smothered on various levels by the German military models of command and obedience. After the military victory and formation of the country in 1871, these military models of behavior were further idealized and held with high regard. They were based on a military aristocracy that had only undergone a courtly taming to a small extent, and still exhibited much of the brutality and vigor of the battlefield. The burgeoning middle class widely absorbed these models of behavior which had a tremendous influence on the development of German national character at a period of time when it was most susceptible, during its beginning steps of nationalism.¹

Soccer appeared in Germany during the Wilhelmine period of early nationalization of the country. It is significant that German soccer’s initial development occurred when the military was so highly valorized, which then permitted the penetration of military language into the game as well as military styled training. The aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war directly led to German soccer increasing its military language and imagery. Given that soccer was initially rejected and spurned by the turnen

associations, which held considerable influence in German life, meant that early soccer afficienados had to detect a means to “normalize” the game into the German cultural in order for it to prosper. The use of military language within the mechanics of the game was a deliberate attempt to impress the ruling elite and assure the public of their patriotism in light of the visible presence of prejudice against what was considered an “English game.” Associating soccer with the military, which held status and prestige within the culture, would invariably increase the acceptance of the game.²

The penetration of military language into the soccer realm at the turn of the century is interesting, in that today, the language would most likely be identified and classified as typical soccer language. However, at the time, particularly in Germany, the words that were being inserted into the German soccer game were strictly associated with the army and war. The introduction of military terminology was meant not only to increase soccer’s status, but also to strengthen the team spirit and cohesiveness of the soccer players on a team. Words such as angriff (attack), verteidigung (defense), decking (protect), and flanken (wing) became a regular part of the soccer vocabulary. The “football battle” would ensue, with the purpose being to bring the ball into “enemy territory.” The “battle formation” was laid down by the captain of the team (there were no coaches in early German soccer), and the captain was often called the “Kaiser.” The

captain held the authority of the team, and was expected to maintain discipline on the team at all times. Merkel cites an early publication circa 1882 that describes soccer as “Two parties of usually eleven fighters are in a state of war. The main task is to move a large leather ball into enemy territory… The majority of the army will follow behind.”

When Crown Prince Wilhelm attended a soccer game in 1905, the highest military officials took notice of the game. Military authorities began to allow soccer teams to use their parade grounds for training and matches, a significant breakthrough for soccer at a time when fields were not readily available, as most of the early fields were associated with turnen organizations. Early soccer players often struggled to find areas to train and play their game, particularly when teams began to break away from their earliest association with the turnen clubs. That the military allowed them to use their grounds permitted the continued development of the sport, as well as enhanced the entrenchment of the military model within the game. By the early 1900’s, Berlin players were using military parade grounds for soccer, and the trend began to spread around the country.

---


From 1910 onwards, soccer became part of the military training regimen, which further allowed the penetration of the military model into the game. The military quickly foresaw that a parallel existed between the ideal soccer player and the ideal soldier, particularly when that soccer player had already adopted not only military language but military values. This connection with the military advanced the game to national interest prior to World War I. The fledgling football association, the DFB, quickly seized upon and promoted the military model within the ranks of early clubs. They argued that soccer was militarily useful precisely because of similarities between it and warfare. The DFB regularly provided military institutions with coaching information and materials, and officers were offered soccer training courses to further enhance the use of the game. Both the German army and navy quickly introduced soccer into their training programs, and a tournament competition was started in each branch of the military. Prior to the start of World War I, a reciprocal cycle was established between soccer clubs and the military. The military used soccer as a training requirement, and the soccer clubs incorporated such things as army pack marches in their athletic training.6

In 1911, the DFB took a further step to associate German soccer with the military and rising nationalistic fervor. The DFB and the largest white collar union in the country both joined the nationalistic paramilitary organization, the Jungdeutschlandbund, during

---

its inception. The DFB felt that this would further enhance soccer’s association with the military, and thus increase its prestige. The Jungdeutschlandbung had been founded with public funds and was created to fight what were considered flaws in the youth of the country, namely increased hedonism, decreased mental and physical fitness, increased crime rate, and a decrease of patriotism among the young. It was an organization bent on preparing the country for war, and the DFB jumped on board with both feet. By the 1912 annual report, the DFB was promoting the game of soccer as improving the health and the military might of the nation.7

As World War I approached, the German military establishment began to promote soccer as a means to improve teamwork and physical fitness. During the war, matches were held between regiments and companies at the front as well as at staging areas. Soccer had been thoroughly immersed in the military training cycle, and in turn, was being ever more molded by the military. As the war turned into a war of position, more and more troops participated in soccer games to ward off the tedium of trench warfare. After Germany’s defeat, the DFB continued to glorify both the war and the military through their soccer organization.8

---

During the interwar years, the Weimar Republic featured soccer publications listing the educational and military values attached to the game. The DFB continued its association of soccer and the military. The publications featured such values as courage, strength, deciveness, altruism and masculinity being developed by soccer and useful in the development of the military. Military concerns obviously did not disappear during this period, despite the disbanding of much of the military machine. Soccer continued to promote, and it seemed to be the general consensus of the nation, that sport increased the physical conditioning of males in preparation for war. In fact, soccer began to make its break through in Germany in those post-World War I years. Due to their defeat and the emergence of a welfare state, along with the temporary ban on conscription, sports in general and soccer in particular became a substitute for military drill and reserve duty training regimens.9

As the Nazi regime rose to power, sport was seen as a major source of military power. Dwertmann and Rigauer pose the question as to what extent German sport underwent a de-civilizing process by its association with the military under the Nazis, but never question that the process occured. Wagg concurs, and notes that German soccer had its hallmarks rooted in militaristic discipline which he surmises arose from the conjunction of turnen and the Prussian junker habitus. Lanfranchi further notes that the militarization of soccer during the 1930’s in Germany summed up the development of

the team and the game during that decade. What the Nazi regime ended was the participation of independent working class organizations, the communist soccer clubs, the Social Democrat soccer clubs and any clubs that were religiously affiliated. Most soccer leaders, particularly those in the DFB, quickly joined the NSDAP when it came into power.¹⁰

The NSDAP created the German Reich’s Committee for Physical Exercises, and placed Felix Linnemann in charge of one of its twenty two departments, the Special Office for Football. Linnemann was the president of the DFB, and from 1937 onwards a member of the NSDAP. The DFB allowed youth soccer in Germany to be run for the Hitler Youth, and youth team practices regularly included hiking, marching and shooting at soccer practice in order to prepare the youth players for the military. By 1936, the last youth teams had been absorbed totally into the Hitler Youth.¹¹

Meanwhile, Linnemann reiterated his commitment to Nazi ideals and his enthusiasm to implement them through soccer in a variety of articles featured in kicker magazine from 1933-1939. Nazi ideology directly impacted the German national team when Linnemann ordered the coach to field a 1938 World Cup team of exactly half German players and half Austrian players. This team was to show the world how powerful and

wonderful Naziism could be in a proud propaganda sweep. Instead, it showed the
dismal side of a militaristic intervention in the game as the two diverse styles could not
be melded. As the war started, the national team struggled to remain intact, but within
the first weeks the military called up nine members.¹²

By 1942, military soccer teams were abundant in Germany. These teams had an
advantage over the regular club teams in that there was stability in their playing rosters,
whereas club teams had members constantly being conscripted. Little is known about
the playing style of military clubs, but the broad generalization that it was militarily
influenced, heavy on discipline and physicality, would not be out of line. In 1943 all
international competition was cancelled, but the national championship in Germany
continued at the request of hundreds of soldiers.¹³

The post-war period saw soccer being used to display a new Germany based on
economic success, but the military influences already imprinted on the German style of
play remained to a certain extent, and the history of military involvement in the game
continued to intrude. For example, during 1978 at the World Cup training camp in
Argentina, a speaker was brought into camp to help motivate the team. He was Colonel
Hans-Ulrich Rudel, a Nazi wartime fighter pilot said to have destroyed one thousand

¹² Merkel, “The Hidden Social and Political History of the German Football Association (DFB), 1900-
50”: 184; Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 104, 110.
¹³ Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 119-120.
Russian tanks. He was an unrepentant Nazi, banned from speaking at any political meetings in Bavaria, but welcomed into the training camp of the national soccer team.14

The press has often commented on the stereotypical playing style of the German national soccer team and how it reflects a military image. But even as late as the mid 1990’s, the German press itself reflects this connection between German soccer and the military. Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung noted the German national team played with discipline, a fast game, and a fighting attitude. Spiegel acknowledged that the team was known as the Teutonic panzer. And Die Welt commented that the Prussian general, Von Clausewitz, was wrong in that war was not the continuation of politics, but soccer was. Even Henry Kissinger, of German heritage, in an article he wrote on the 1990 World Cup, commented that the German national team plans its game in the same way as the German army officers of the country. The imprint of the military on the German soccer playing style has become embedded and will take a conscious effort on the part of the players and the coaching staff to change it.15

The other unique feature examined is the intersection and the influence exerted by Bayern Munich. Bayern Munich holds the dubious honor of being the most hated club in Germany. Many Germans would deny that Bayern Munich has influenced on

German soccer style, and would cite other examples such as the Schalke 04 team of the 1930’s as having a more significant or creative style. And yet, Bayern Munich’s influence on German soccer and their success cannot be denied. Giulianotti notes that the German game is dominated by the pan-national enterprise of Bayern Munich. Bayern Munich does dominate German soccer in a variety of ways. For one, they are the most successful club in recent history, and thus, tend to place more players on the national squad than other clubs. Their financial success is a model for most clubs in Germany. They are a globalized club with big name stars, and amazingly dominant in the Bundesliga.16

In 1900, Franz John and eleven others started Bayern Munich at a meeting in a pub. The clubs’ name, Bayern, was almost comical as there were no Bavarians in the founding members. There were Saxons, Hanseatics, Jews, Prussians and foreigners. In its founding season, Bayern Munich beat all the other Munich clubs. They joined the Associated of Southern German Soccer Clubs, and thus became a member of the DFB. Bayern Munich owes its existence to two Jewish soccer enthusiasts: Big Franz (Franz John) and Little Franz (Joe Pollack), and is often called a “Jewish club” due to early supporters and the founding members being from the ranks of the pre-World War I Jewish bourgeoisie.17

Bayern Munich won their first German championship in 1932, and was on the rise when the Nazis took power. Partially because of their reputation as a “Jewish club” they did not find favor during the Nazi years of power. In March 1933, Kurt Landauer, the Jewish president of Bayern Munich was forced to step down. The club stood behind Landauer, and accepted orders from above only on protest. Landauer escaped to Switzerland, and in 1940, the entire club visited him there. Bayern Munich installed a new president who went through the motions of obeying the regime, but the club was always regarded with suspicion.\(^\text{18}\)

After World War II, Landauer returned and was re-elected club president. During the 1950’s, Bayern Munich remained in the middle ranks of the German clubs, but finally won the cup in 1957. They were not named in the initial thirteen clubs when the DFB announced the formation of the Bundesliga in 1963. They immediately filed a protest, but were not promoted to the Bundesliga until 1965.\(^\text{19}\)

The significant players on the Bayern Munich team were also the leading players on the national team: Sepp Maier, Franz Beckenbauer, Gerd Müller. Branko Zebec became the head coach in 1968, and remained there for ten years. During his tenure, Bayern Munich won four championships. Zebec moved Franz Beckenbauer from a midfield position to sweeper which resulted in his first Bundesliga. Bayern Munich was the first

\(^{18}\) Gillmeister, “The Tale of Little Franz and Big Franz: The Foundation of Bayern Munich FC,” 90; Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 59, 81.

\(^{19}\) Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 81, 187, 201, 224.
Bundesliga club to win three titles in a row, from 1972-1974. But despite their continued success, or perhaps because of it, the club was not loved in Germany.20

Bayern Munich has more supporters and fans than any other club in Germany, but all those people who are not fans hate them. This hatred was often carried onto the field and its surrounding environments. In 1968, Sepp Maier was attacked by a Hanover fan, and in the same match, Beckenbauer was fined DM 1,000 for “provoking the crowd” when he pretended to urinate on spectators who were jeering him. In the 1970-71 season, while playing Duisburg, Bayern Munich was jeered off the field. The team was encircled and items thrown at the players while at Oberhausen, and at Bremen, their bus was attacked by angry fans. Bayern Munich players were called the “vain stars” in the press, and Beckenbauer was “the Kaiser” implying he was aloof and conservative. The Daily Mail called the team the “parasites of football.” When the team won the 1974 championship, only 1500 fans showed up for the party. But despite their lack of regard by German fans, they were outstandingly successful.21

Besides winning the Bundesliga in 1969, and 1972-74, they were a major force in the European Champion Clubs Cup, which had been started during the mid 1950’s. Bayern Munich won the European championship in 1972 with players such as Maier, Beckenbauer, Müller, Paul Breitner and Uli Hoeness. The 1974 German national team, which won the World Cup, featured six members from Bayern: Maier, Beckenbauer,

20 Ibid., pp. 188, 202-203, 211-212.
21 Ibid., pp. 203-204, 216, 222-223; Daily Mail (1975) quoted on p. 222.

The 1980’s was the Bayern Munich decade. The team played a technocratic soccer style, and seemed to love champagne and money more than they loved their fans. The public hated them because they always won decisively and in a calculating manner, and they seemed to take their success for granted. They liked playing a possession game, which often infuriated their opponents. From the 1980’s onward, a new pattern emerged in the Bundesliga. There were always two clubs fighting for the title at the end of the season, and one of the clubs was always Bayern Munich. From 1980-1990 Bayern Munich won seven Bundesliga championships.23

During the 1980’s, Bayern Munich players were regarded as “limited but determined.” Despite being hated by the public, Bayern Munich played more benefit games and did more to raise money for charitable causes than any other team during this time period. But they also continued to confirm their hold on power and money within the Bundesliga. The binary that occurred within the league made Bayern Muncih the largest rival of each team. Within the city of Munich, the 1860 Munich fans maintained greater civic support, but Bayern Munich attracted their attendance from the Bavarian

23 Ibid., pp. 209, 213, 223, 252, 255, 259.
provinces. They are currently averaging 35,000 fans per game, and represent a national public model of corporation rather than a local one. By the late 1980’s, Bayern Munich had a new business strategy to make money. They bought young players from other Bundesliga clubs, developed them, and sold them to Italy for huge fees.24

From 1987-1994, the team failed to develop any forwards, and was often called the “striker’s graveyard.” Being dominant in the Bundesliga was one thing, but Bayern Munich was no longer as successful against other European club teams. When they began losing games within the league, an outcry arose within the organization. The club asked Beckenbauer and Rummenigge to join the board of directors, and both were immediately elected vice-presidents. In 1995, Jürgen Klinsmann was signed by Bayern Munich, setting off a rivalry between Klinsmann and Matthäus that spilled over onto the tabloid magazines. Beckenbauer was asked by the board to take over the coaching duties, which he did. The team then won the UEFA Cup.25

In 1998, Bayern Munich hired Ottmar Hitzfeld to coach the team, and he turned their fortunes around entirely. Bayern Munich won the 1998 Champions’ League, and the 1999 Bundesliga title. Beckenbauer was elected the president of Bayern Munich. Four of the national team members were from Bayern Munich in 2002, and by 2004, they

25 Hesse-Lichtenberger, Tor!, 264, 295-300.
were listed number five on the list of the world’s richest soccer clubs, with a value of $187.1 million. The club currently has 90,000 members.26

Bayern Munich continues to extend its influence and dominance over the Bundesliga. They have won 18 Bundesliga championships since 1969, and recently won their twentieth German title. But their influence extends beyond the Bundesliga into the German national team. Not only have the top players on the national team frequently come out of the Bayern Munich club, but much of the coaching staff has also. Franz Beckenbauer coached the national team to a World Cup victory, and is currently president of Bayern Munich as well as head of the organizing committee for FIFA World Cup 2006. Given the changes in national team coaching staff in 2004, former Bayern Munich players were offered the job. Ottmar Hitzfeld turned it down, but Jürgen Klinsmann eventually accepted it, and now manages the team for the 2006 World Cup. The impact on playing style that Bayern Munich has on the national team will continue to be influential, but determined more by coaching staff appointees and number of players on the team. Given the legacy that players from Bayern Munich have with the national team, it is expected that the impact could be influential, as it has at times in the past forty years.27


To summarize, Germany exhibits two unique influences on their national soccer system which in turn influence both how soccer is perceived within the country and ultimately influences playing style. The influence of the military has permeated the DFB since its founding, and in addition, also permeated the soccer system. Partially this is a result of the influence of the military tradition on national habitus, but also is a result of the military’s direct influence on the game in its early years. Pre-World War I to World War II, the military had a significant impact on soccer and its training methods. The military establishment saw soccer as a means to strengthen its warriors and its population, thus contributing to the war effort. Post-World War II German soccer has lacked this heavy influence by the military, but hints of it still linger in training methodology and team cohesion.

The influence of Bayern Munich is more subtle. The national team does not always play in the same style that Bayern Munich exhibits, but there are some amazing parallels. Partially this is the result of the number of players that play for Bayern Munich and the national team, as well as the overlap in coaching staff. There is no doubt that Bayern Munich has dominated the Bundesliga since its conception, and appears to continue to do so in the near future. Given its penchance for developing in the mold of Manchester United, it has become an internationalized team in terms of fan base. This has further increased the antipathy that many Germans hold for the team.

_Tor!, 347; Kevin Fylan, “Kahn Rescues Point for Bayern at Hertha.” (Obtained online from www.yahoo.com/sports dated February 7, 2006): 1-2._
That the team has also accrued so many “European Footballer of the Year” players speaks of its dominance, as well as its performance in the Champion’s League.
Three cultural influences in Brazil that are examined in this chapter are the soccer lottery, the influence of dance, and the Carnival. Separating samba and Carnival is somewhat problematic as the two frequently overlap and interact with soccer as a single entity, at times. The sport lottery, while not unique to Brazil, is such a dominant cultural phenomenon that it cannot be neglected when thoroughly examining Brazilian soccer and what shapes the game. I further explored the conceptualization of dance, particularly samba, and the Brazilian martial arts form, capoeira and their intersections with soccer as direct connections are visibly noticeable between movements in all three somatic experiences. Carnival intersects soccer in a variety of ways, but the significance of how it reflects stylistic interpretations in the game is important.

The Loteria Esportiva (LE) or the sport lottery was initiated in 1969 during the reign of the military regime. It was created by the Department of Finance to produce revenue for government programs, and was modeled after European sport lotteries. The sport lottery was based solely on soccer games. After paying administrative costs and brokers’ commissions, the government profits are split between the Department of Social Security and the Department of Culture and Education. The Department of
Social Security funnels their money into programs to support the elderly, the handicapped, orphans, and adult literacy and hygiene programs. The Department of Culture and Education channels their lottery money into public parks, swimming pools, basketball courts and athletic facilities.¹

The sport lottery in Brazil has definitely been a monetary success. It is a member of INTERTOTO, headquartered in Switzerland, which is a public company that runs lotteries and distributes profits to social, cultural, or sport projects. Twenty three countries belong to INTERTOTO, and in absolute money collected, the Brazilian lottery is the most successful of all the countries. In 1977, for example, Brazil took in over $367 million on the lottery.²

The Brazilian sports’ lottery is based on a listing of thirteen games per week, and the games must represent all regions of the country. The winner must select the correct outcome of each game, and call whether it is a win, lose or draw. The winners each week divide 31.5% of the gross intake for that week, so a winner may net a little or a lot, depending on how many other winners there were and how many people played in that particular week. The game is cheap to play, and 58% of the lower class bet the minimum, or 20 cents. The average bet on the weekly sport lottery is 69 cents. Extra

money, up to $86.00 extra, can purchase extra marks meaning additional games can be marked win, lose, or draw. The more money invested, the fewer games need to be predicted, thus increasing the chances of winning. Obviously, the rich are twice as likely to win as they play more often and for larger stakes. Seventy million blank fliers are distributed weekly for the sport lottery in Brazil.³

A Marplan Survey indicates that 92% of the adults in Rio de Janeiro bet in the sport lottery at least once a month. 62% bet in the sport lottery at least once a week. The Marplan Survey also indicates that 41% choose their choices by logic, 33% choose randomly, and 17% choose their favorite teams. The sport lottery has been determined to be the second best indicator of Brazilian soccer fandom, second only to having played the game. Lottery pools within organizations, businesses, and neighborhoods are also common, with generally six to ten people pooling their money to buy markers and tickets. Coutinho wryly comments that “getting thirteen points is happiness without having to become an angel” in Brazil.⁴

But the sport lottery in Brazil is more than just a peripheral happening, as it has directly changed the structure of soccer within the country. The sport lottery directly led to a national championship for soccer in Brazil, and the national championship was created merely to enable year round soccer for the sport lottery. The soccer season was

³ Lever, Soccer Madness, 64, 80-81; Lever, “Sport in a Fractured Society: Brazil Under Military Rule,” 91.
⁴ Lever, Soccer Madness, 80-81, 112-113; Edilberto Coutinho, Bye, Bye Soccer (Austin, TX.: Host Publications, 1994), 2, 6.
expanded dramatically after the inception of the lottery, from forty games to eighty five games per year. In return for this significant increase in the number of games, the Ministry of Education and Culture offered money to the CBD. The CBD was to use their cut of the lottery money to pay for air transportation necessary when playing a national championship in such a large country, and also to provide money for preparation of the national soccer team for World Cup competition. Coutinho notes that winning the national soccer championship is almost as good as winning the lottery, spoken tongue in cheek.⁵

Lever contended that the sport lottery has provided a means of cohesion for a vast country, in that it educated the population about the geography of the country and united the culture. As all regions of the country must be represented in each weekly lottery, Brazilians must learn about and be aware of the soccer teams outside of their direct region. All municipalities in Brazil of 5000 people and over participate in the lottery. She theorized that the lottery pulls together the urban masses, including people of all social classes and ages, and is one of the only exceptions to the sexual apartheid apparent in soccer. The increased awareness of the geography of the country has contributed to territorial unification, in Lever’s opinion. As well as the profit from the lottery, the military regime saw the unification of the country as a significant factor.⁶

Despite the cohesion that may have incurred with the implementation of the lottery, there are also some strong critiques of it and its impact upon the game of soccer. Lever admitted that with the inception of the lottery, changes occurred in the nature of intracity rivalries, and impacted them even more so than the national championship did. Whereas Fla vs. Flu will always be a significant game, in the past, intracity rivalries always gained a greater degree of anticipation and participation. (This is in opposition to what typically occurs in Europe, where the great intrastate rivalries tend to be between cities within the country.) With the implementation of the sport lottery, intracity rivalries began to diminish in some of their popularity to intraregional rivalries established by the national championship and the sport lottery. Pelé also offered a strong critique, insisting that corruption has beset the lottery.\(^7\)

Evanson offers further critique of the impact of the sport lottery on the game of soccer. He believes the national sport lottery was an attempt to exploit soccer’s popularity in Brazil, and that it has become the most popular game of chance with few weekly winners, enormous prizes, and huge quantities of money contributed to the government’s coffers. His theory is that the lottery damages soccer in Brazil in two ways. First, it damages the fan, who is also the bettor, encouraging the fan to bet against his own team, encouraging a violated loyalty. Secondly, the game is damaged as the potential for throwing matches is present and highly increased.\(^8\) And in fact,


several scandals have occurred recently in Brazilian soccer due to match fixing. One referee was arrested for fixing matches in eleven CBF games, and the games were ordered to be re-played, an unprecedented move in Brazilian soccer. Allegedly, de Carvalho was fixing matches to benefit an Internet gambling ring. A second referee was arrested for fixing matches in the Paulista, the São Paulo state championship.9

DaMatta further clarifies the Brazilian philosophy toward sport and gambling, which differs markedly from the philosophy in the U.S. The Sport Lottery itself refers to a set of values that are related to the Brazilian system of good and bad fortune, something which is remiss in many European cultures. The Brazilian philosophy of soccer closely relates the association of soccer with being a game, rather than merely a sport. Being a game, soccer victory depends on fortune and destiny rather than just player talent, coaching, and skill. Soccer thus becomes a game of chance in itself, further allowing the permeation of gambling inherent in the very nature of the game. In other countries, such as the United States, gambling is associated with sport, but is absent from the very concept of the game.10

That the national sport lottery has altered the Brazilian game of soccer is obvious. Conclusions about the lottery’s impact on style are nebulous, but given the direct link


between the sport lottery and game fixing, the establishment of a national championship and the related vast increase in the number of games being played, as well as the fixation of the country with those games, all indicate that there has been an impact. At the national team level, the effect is even further distanced, but one can but question how the increased playing time has affected young talent rising through the ranks. Established star players all play overseas, and would be less affected. But younger players in the Brazilian club system may face increased risk of injury and fatigue, as well as receiving the benefits of increased public exposure and experience in competition. Further, more detailed research will be necessary to determine, specifically, if the cumulative effect is more positive or negative.

The second unique feature to be examined is the Carnival, and how the effect of the carnivalesque has saturated the Brazilian game of soccer. Carnival as a public celebration was introduced by Italian immigrants, but Brazilians assimilated and adapted it into their own party. By 1931, the residents of Rio’s black communities were beginning to parade through the city as part of their celebration. Mário Filho, then editor of Mundo Esportivo was responsible for making Carnival competitive and soccer matches carnivalesque. He turned the early parades into a competition, with his newspaper inventing categories and appointing a committee to judge the entrants. It was so successful in the first year that the tradition was continued, with the contest itself being invented by soccer journalists. Since the late 1930’s, when President Vargas merged popular culture and political goals, the carnival themes have always been topics
of national history meant to spread and encourage national consciousness. Carnival became thoroughly popularized during the 1930’s as it emerged from the favelas.\textsuperscript{11}

The most important festival of the year in Brazil is Carnival. Carnival lasts from the Saturday before the start of Lent until the morning of Ash Wednesday. Whereas the earlier, 1800’s version of the Portuguese holiday was heavy and somber, the Brazilians have turned the holiday into a colorful festival infused by Afro-Brazilian culture. Preparations for Carnival begin as early as August, and then run frenziedly from through Lent. In Brazil, every town and city has a Carnival celebration, but Rio de Janeiro’s is world renowned for its size and lavishness. The Rio Sambodrômo, an enormous terrace designed by architect Oscar Niemeyer, is the final destination of the parade of the samba schools.\textsuperscript{12}

The system of samba schools is highly hierarchized, with the top tier featuring twelve schools, based on their rankings from the previous year. The first group of samba schools must limit participants in the parade to 2500 each. There are eighteen schools represented in the second tier, and fourteen represented in the third. Lastly are the blocos carnavalescos, or Carnival blocs, which are more loosely organized than the samba schools. The blocos claim to express purer Carnival values than the samba


\textsuperscript{12} Lever, \textit{Soccer Madness}, 52-54; DaMatta, \textit{Carnivals, Rogues, and Heroes}, 83, 99.
schools, and generally are representative of neighborhood groups. Samba schools began in the favelas, and a samba dancer participating in the parade may spend up to a month’s wages on the elaborate costume required for the parade. Approximately 40,000 samba dancers take part in each parade, after months of rehearsals.\textsuperscript{13}

The \textit{desfile carnavalesco}, or carnival parade, may feature 12,000 people among 12 different associations. The samba schools dress and dance their chosen theme, accompanied by floats. The theme must be historic, and is often used to satirize historical events in Brazilian history. The theme also is given epic treatment, often representing opposition between a chosen hero and some mass, such as the military. The parades run for four days of singing, dancing and drinking, bringing together both Catholics and Umbandandistas in what was originally a religious celebration. The parade ends at the Sambodrômo, where seats may be purchased to view the exhibition.\textsuperscript{14}

There have been critiques of the Carnival, both from in Brazil and outside the country. In 1986, Bryant Gumble of the \textit{Today Show} visited Rio during Carnival, and asked “Why so much celebration with luxury and waste when so many are poor in Brazil?” Following western logic, this was an incongruous situation. But that is Brazil. The poor inhabitants of the Rio favelas are the persons most willing to invest what little money they have in an elaborate ritual of ostentation. Carnival provides an escape from the


\textsuperscript{14} DaMatta, \textit{Carnivals, Rogues and Heroes}, 81-83, 97; Lever, \textit{Soccer Madness}, 53; Rocha, \textit{In Focus Brazil}, 61.
moro, or the hills where the favelas are located. The conservative archbishop of Rio, Dom Eugenio Sales, frequently criticizes the excesses of Carnival. Once he brought a court injunction against a samba school to stop a replica of the Corcovado Christ from being displayed on a Carnival float. Yet the Carnival goes on. In 2003, violence ordered by drug gangs threatened to disrupt the Carnival parades. President Lula sent in 3000 soldiers to maintain control.15

Before delineating the intersections of soccer and Carnival, it is necessary to deconstruct the concept of Carnival, both on a general basis and then specifically in Brazil. Some of the most insightful and analytic analyses of Carnival come from Bakhtin, who saw Carnival as the populist utopian vision of the world seen from below, and a critique of “high” culture that was exhibited through inversion of the hierarchy. Bakhtin specifically mentions carnival laughter as being the laughter of all people, universal and directed at all, and benevolent, but also gay and mocking. The laughter within carnival always carried with it the possibility of violence. The body jouissance of carnival was deeply associated with the possibility of social breakdown, lending further excitement.16

15 Roberto DaMatta, “For an Anthropology of the Brazilian Tradition or ‘A Virtude está no Meio,’” The Brazilian Puzzle: Culture on the Borderlands of the Western World ed. by David Hess and Roberto DaMatta (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 279; Damatta quotes Bryant Gumbel on 279; Flynn, “Sambas, Soccer and Nationalism”: 327; Rocha, In Focus Brazil, 61; Larry Rohter, “Brazil’s Military Getting Increased Role in Society,” Columbus Dispatch (March 16, 2003): A13.
Some of the specific characteristics inherent in carnival are worth noting. Carnival provides a temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and order, a suspension of hierarchal rank, privileges, norms and prohibitions, is a feast of change and renewal, and is hostile to all that is immortalized and complete. In short, carnival serves as an inversion of culture. This challenge to hierarchy is at the core of much of carnivalesque behavior. Carnival behavior teases and threatens authority, and always possesses the potential for social chaos. Carnival exhibits role reversal, denying power to those normally in charge. It is the festival of the “other.” This inversion of the ordinary reorders the binary of cultural existence, and alters the daily values associated with it. For those normally with authority, carnival is viewed as a short time safety valve. For those of the masses, carnival is a licensed affair and a vehicle for social protest with an accompanying site in which to express it.17

Some very specific characteristics evolved around carnivals, which in Europe began to decrease in frequency with the advance of capitalism. One characteristic of carnival was the freedom from etiquette and decency, with an acceptance and legitimization of profanities, oaths and curses. Another was the emphasis on inside-out logic, which accompanies the inversion of hierarchal positions. Parody and travesty, along with humiliation and profanations were symbols of carnival. Pleasure was achieved by the

combination of laughter, excess, and disrespect. It was a festival of the street culture, where rational time was suspended and the world was turned upside down.18

The focus of carnival is on the body, but it is an exaggerated body with an emphasis on the lower regions. The belly, feet, legs, buttocks, and genitals are given priority over the upper regions of the body. The themes of fertility, growth and abundance are associated with these exaggerated bodily images, with the principles of degradation emphasizing the belly and the reproductive organs. The inversion of emphasis leads to the status degradation through exposure of grotesque aspects of the body and the emphasizing of exaggerated features. This grotesque body image licenses the celebration of fattening food, intoxicating drink, and sexual promiscuity. The symbolic and ritualized intermixing of the subject promotes the concept of disorder, and flaunts the material body as “pleasurable grotesquerie.” The conceptualization of filth and mess, along with eating, inversion, dirt, sex and stylized bodily movements became the thematics of carnival. Carnival norms were always considered “dirty” when measured next to the bourgeois lifestyle.19 The rituals of carnival featured abandonment to hedonistic excess, much eating and drinking, singing, wearing costumes, engaging in elaborate social interplay, enjoying sexual activities, and the intentional inversion of social boundaries. Carnival became an authorized transgression and universalized. The

regional version of carnival exhibited many of the same tendencies and traits, but also focused on regional ideologies of shame, honor, and reputation, often with a masculine interpretation. An examination of specific carnival traits in Brazil will more clearly highlight the connections between carnival and soccer in that country.\textsuperscript{20}

DaMatta provides the most clearly detailed work on Carnival in Brazil. Brazil has made Carnival into their particular symbolic representation of nationhood, and as Renato Ortiz has pointed out, Brazil’s choice of representing their national identity with the three symbols of soccer, samba and Carnival were directly related to the nation’s performance in those areas. Brazil was better than any other country in celebrating Carnival, playing beautiful soccer, and singing and dancing the samba. Brazilian Carnival became a perpetual institution that enabled all Brazilians to feel their specific identity as a distinct social and political entity over time. It is a period of four days when Brazilians transform the particular into the universal, and reflects one of the three ways that Brazil ritualizes its social world, along with military parades and religious processions. All three are national rituals that reinforce national identity.\textsuperscript{21}

In Brazil, as elsewhere, Carnival represents the epitomy of inversion. It is a moment in time when the culture is decentralized and the hierarchal society that traditionally holds


\textsuperscript{21} DaMatta, \textit{Carnivals, Rogues, and Heroes}, 15, 24, 26; Renato Ortiz quoted by Pablo Alabarces and Maria Graciela Rodriguez, “Football and Fatherland: The Crisis of National Representation in Argentinian Soccer,” \textit{Football Culture: Local Contests, Global Visions}, 121.
sway takes a back seat to the poor. Carnival allows the poor to “become rich” for the four day period, and is a dedicated time for the most disorganized component of society, the masses. In Brazil, the poor are transformed into the noble, and it is often called festa do povo, or feast of the people. Social positions are inverted, and as Lever points out, Carnival is the only occasion for the poor to come down from the favelas and take center stage in the city. Interestingly, when DaMatta compares Carnival in Rio to Mardi Gras in New Orleans, he points out how equality is stressed in the Rio Carnival whereas hierarchy is more emphasized in New Orleans. He theorizes that due to the rigid hierarchy prevalent in Brazilian society there is generally little competition of performance in the daily life of the favelas. However, during Carnival, with the presence of inversion, a huge emphasis is placed on competition between equals, particularly samba schools and blocos.22

The date for Carnival is based on the religious calendar, and is not a fixed date as other ritualized holidays. It is a rite without a patron, so it belongs to all Brazilians. That Carnival takes place at night and so complements the inversion principle, as in Brazil; there is a complete reversal of day and night during Carnival festivities.23 The physical space in which the Brazilian Carnival occurs is also significant, as Carnival occurs in the street and there is a strict separation of the street and the home in Brazil. The street becomes a manifold space, in which a multitude of events occur in a single area. The participants of Carnival both depict others and play themselves at the same time, and

---

23 DaMatta, *Carnivals, Rogues, and Heroes*, 34-35, 87.
the separation of the roles of actor and spectator are blurred and questioned. Because Carnival is “of the street,” the entire event becomes an open encounter. Whereas modesty and restraint are indicative of the home, the street is representative of open exhibition based on exaggeration, naked bodies and the normalization of sin. Connected with this street versus home attitude, is the inversion of the glorification of womanhood. Woman as virgin is intimately connected symbolically with the home, whereas woman as whore is likewise connected with the street. Through the inversion of Carnival, the glorification of the prostitute occurs, further emphasizing the naked body. Carnival also plays on the sexual tensions and racial identity present in Brazilian society. During Carnival, white Brazilians play out the fantasy of interacting with the “sexy mulatto” whereas Afro-Brazilians play out the fantasy of perde a côr, or losing their black identity.24

In Brazil, Carnival is organized by ad hoc groups and voluntary associations based on neighborhoods, class, or region of origin. Groups are communities, and are open-ended. Given that the law of Carnival is to have no law, this organization inversion, from the neighborhoods of the poor upward, is reflective of the typical inversion of hierarchy present in most carnivalesque situations. DaMatta points out the paradox of Brazilian Carnival. In Brazil, people never organize to protest or demand their rights, but they will organize to have fun. Thus Carnival represents antagonist and contradictory fields in that it is an open social field situated outside the normal

hierarchal cultural setting. Established celebrities and soccer stars join their favorite samba schools for Carnival, demonstrating the open ended social groupings.\textsuperscript{25}

The emphasis on the body during Carnival, particularly the lower regions, is predominant in Brazil. There is a glorification of the waist downward during Carnival, as opposed to the head and the soul. Samba dance groups, featuring rhythmic movement of the waist, hips, and feet are the dominant forms of music and dance during Carnival. The dance groups are in constant movement, and feature much personal innovation within a choreographed routine. The gestures, musical forms, and the harmonies all represent a sung story, not a spoken one. That samba dancing and singing comes from below, from the masses of the poor and mainly Afro-Brazilian, represents another inversion within the ritual of Carnival. During Carnival, samba is legitimized and held up for glorification. Samba dress is called the \textit{fantasia}, or fancy costume or disguise. This fantasia refers to dreams as well as the clothing, and represents the hidden desires of Carnival characters. Fantasia focuses on the world of the peripheral, with the focal point being the forbidden, the illicit, and the impossible.\textsuperscript{26} DaMatta points out the inherent oppositions within the Carnival: there is diversity within uniformity, there is homogeneity within difference, there is sin within a religious time cycle, and there is aristocratic and lavish dress next to the real life poverty of the people. Carnival in Brazil is not only inversion but drastic binaries of opposition.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{25} DaMatta, \textit{Carnivals, Rogues, and Heroes}, 37, 42, 47, 89, 91; Lever, \textit{Soccer Madness}, 54.

\textsuperscript{26} DaMatta, \textit{Carnivals, Rogues and Heroes}, 39-41, 86, 109.

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., pp. 39, 104.
The parallels and intersections of Carnival and soccer within Brazil are numerous, and some more obvious than others. Much has been written about the carnivalesque and fandom, particularly in regard to Brazil, but soccer and Carnival also provide some other interesting parallels. First, both Carnival and soccer provide Brazilians with a very specific formation of national identity, but whereas Carnival is independent of results orientation, soccer identity formation is based on beauty and success within the game. Both soccer and Carnival create their own social space that follows their own rules and logic. Because this space is open ended and situated apart from daily life and hierarchy, it also serves to reinforce the everyday world. Soccer and Carnival are not everyday, they are considered “special.” They are both rituals that unite the lowly and allow a temporary freedom from hierarchization. Soccer, Carnival, and Candomblé all unite the low and the weak with magical, mystical powers providing outlets for potential unrest. They are safety valves within the Brazilian culture.28

Soccer and Carnival both became part of the popular cultural tradition during the same time period, so it is not unexpected that they share some of the same characteristics. Archetti points out that while soccer is not a classical ritual of inversion where comedy dominates, as in Carnival, there are two significant parallels between the two. Soccer promotes an equality among the players which ruptures the hierarchies of daily life, and soccer also suspends order which allows the fan to participate. Miranda Pareira notes that soccer increases communication between the class structures in Brazil, something that only occurs elsewhere during Carnival. She notes that soccer and Carnival both

28 Ibid., 15, 62, 120, 135-136.
represent a fleeting moment of equality, both are considered societal safety valves, both increase commercialization and violence, and both are inspired by intera-city rivalries. Coutinho comments that soccer also undergoes a process of institutional abuse and deformation, much as Carnival does, but that both provide an escape mechanism from reality.29

The increased celebratory mood displayed by both soccer and Carnival is reflective of the time period, congruent with the rise of the urbanization, and the increased popularity of music stemming from the lower classes. Wisnik notes the correlation of Brazilian modernization and industrialization with an increased celebratory mode, both reflected in soccer and Carnival. Both soccer and Carnival are shaped by conceptualizations of modernity and the need to organize it. Soccer often serves as a civic Carnival within Brazil. Archetti points out that soccer should not be grouped with other Brazilian sports, but rather with cultural trends such as Carnival, Candomble, popular music and Catholicism. Whereas the advent of professionalism removed some of the carnivalesque spontaneity inherent in Brazilian soccer, it also led to a public consciousness calling for the reinstatement of the values of street soccer. Street soccer also exhibits many of the characteristics of Carnival: inversion of authority, emphasis on lower parts of the body, and exhibitionism.30

30 Shirts, “Sócrates, Corinthians and Questions of Democracy and Citizenship,” 99-101; Shirts also quotes Wisnik on page 100; Giulianiotti, “Football and the Politics of Carnival: An Ethnographic Study of
Both soccer and Carnival share an attitude of resistance, and represent where resistance
can be legitimized in the Brazilian hierarchal society. Del Burgo calls Brazilian soccer
a “carnival of resistance,” and comments that the new soccer in Brazil is a carnival and
public festival which encodes and plays out conflict. This was particularly true under
the dictatorship.\(^{31}\) Soccer and Carnival also share some of the same organizational
structures. Samba schools and soccer clubs both tend to be localized, neighborhood
type groups. The Corinthian Hawks feature this overlap most pointedly when they
founded their own samba bloco that grew into an escola, or samba school, in São Paulo.
Whereas most samba schools are community based, only the Hawks originated from a
soccer fan club.\(^{32}\)

Del Burgo also draws an interesting comparison between Carnival and the most beloved
Brazilian soccer player of all, Garrincha. Garrincha is described as a body with desires
and powers full of demands and contradictions. His name is synonymous with the
emphasis of the body, particularly the lower body. Garrincha was famed for not only
his dribbling abilities, which could never be matched, but also his sexual exploits and
drinking. He epitomized the challenge to authority and his negation of order. He was
illiterate and an alcoholic, often uncoachable, and epitomized everything the hierarchal
structure of Brazilian culture decried. He made money, and lost it quickly, married the

---

\(^{31}\) Del Burgo, “Don’t Stop the Carnival: Football in the Societies of Latin America,”
Giving the Game Away: Football, Politics and Culture on Five Continents ed. by Stephen Wagg
\(^{32}\) Bellos, Futebol, 126, 137-138; DaMatta, Carnivals, Rogues and Heroes, 38.
Samba queen, and displayed all resistance to authority. He was the malandro and the symbolic Brazilian Carnival spirit year round.\(^{33}\)

The most blatant example of the interweaving of Carnival and soccer has got to be the carnivalesque displayed in fandom. Giulianotti coins the phrase “carnivalesque” to describe soccer fan behavior emphasizing singing and chanting. Whereas this behavior has been present in soccer fans since the game professionalized, Brazil was the birthplace of the original carnivalesque fans, and their behavior has been copied worldwide. The carnivalesque in soccer is demonstrated by the use of Latin American melodies consistently equating soccer with Carnival, and fanship has become part of a complex social process played out as Carnival. The World Cup is often called the greatest Carnival of them all, but the birthplace of the carnivalization was definitely Brazil. Crowds were not just observers of the game in Brazil, but participants in an elaborate ritualized sense of joy. They waved banners, set off firecrackers, tossed talcum powder, chanted cheers. The fans entered into a relationship with the players that allowed the players to feed off the energy from the crowd in a symbiotic relationship. This is the carnivalesque atmosphere of Brazilian soccer.\(^{34}\)

---

\(^{33}\) Del Burgo, “Don’t Stop the Carnival: Football in the Societies of Latin America,” 66.
By the 1980’s, fan cultures were featuring fancy dress, costumes, jazz and samba bands, and inflatables, and fans often were so involved in their carnivalesque celebrations that they could not see the field of play. After the 1994 World Cup win, the whole country held an impromptu Carnival. Congress was adjourned, schools closed, businesses shut down. People ran into the streets and held a noisy carnival of dancing, singing and fireworks to celebrate the victory. The carnivalesque fan is symbolic of Brazil in the world’s eyes, and a great many countries try to emulate the atmosphere, if not the actual features, of the Brazilian carnivalesque soccer fan.35

The third unique characteristic of Brazilian soccer is its ties with both popular music and dance, particularly Brazilian samba. Only South American countries have associated dance with their stylistic interpretation of the game of soccer. The association of soccer with samba and the related martial arts form of capoeira has existed for many decades, and is reinforced in a stereotypical fashion by media accounts, famous personalities, and soccer experts. Pelé, describing the Brazilian style has commented, “That wasn’t football, that was music.” He further elaborates that it is easy for Brazilians to be creative in soccer because of the qualities of Brazilian bodies

and the type of music that Brazilians produce. Coach Saldanha said that “Brazilian football is a thing played to music.” It is both a dance and a game.

Perhaps the earliest association between soccer and dance was created by Mario Filho, who not only encouraged fans to dress up in costume for soccer games, but to integrate dance into their celebrations. He also championed samba schools by offering large prizes for costumes and dance during Carnival parades. Gilberto Freyre, with his publication in 1945 of *New World in the Tropics*, furthered the connections between dance and soccer by drawing parallels between Brazilian soccer, samba and capoeira. He said that Brazilians play soccer as if it were a dance, and this was the result of African blood, as Africans reduce everything to dance. He also noted this tendency was not characteristic of ethnic or regional groups, but had become generalized to the entire population. As a sociologist, Freyre connected both politics and soccer with Brazilian mulattoness, which he characterized by elasticity, surprise, rhetoric, capoeira moves and the samba. Freyre’s views were widely accepted in Brazil because they represented a new pride in the mixed racial characteristics of Brazil and fostered a more positive national identity.

---

The issue of self-identity, and more importantly, national identity was played out in the establishment of soccer style as samba-like. Archetti notes that the association of the Brazilian soccer style with samba was not arbitrary, but rather rooted in Brazilian self-imagery and identity. Samba, soccer, and Carnival all became means of a social identity that was not provided by Brazilian central institutions, such as the legal system, the Constitution or financial order. These cultural means of identification were provided by secondary sources, but did provide solidarity and social identity. Brazilians identified themselves with soccer and samba, and thus sold that image to the world. As the Austrian newspaper, Kurier, states, Brazilians soccer players are the samba kings.39

While samba is considered an African influenced dance that spread from northeastern Brazil to the rest of the country, modern samba was born in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro around the turn of the century.40 Peter Flynn comments that sambas were:

…the purest folk music, a spontaneous, unsophisticated expression of life on the morro (hill), including its poverty, hard work and bitterness…only later, as carnival developed, was there growing emphasis on romantic love, on enjoying the carnival and on singing the praises of Brazil. 41

All Brazilians, including the children, dance the samba. Whereas sambas often express suffering in a subtle manner, political sambas are true to their social origins and

---

40 Lever, Soccer Madness, 49, 53.
functions originating from the Afro-Brazilians. Sambas of protest, often called bossa nova, are uniquely Brazilian. The name samba, although of controversial origins, is often associated with an African term meaning navel, hence the connections with hips and waist. Samba was initially repressed in Brazil, but later domesticated and sponsored by the state as a means of fostering national identity. The first samba schools, or Escolas de Samba, were formed in 1928, and along with soccer and Carnival, developed as cultural icons within the same time period. Samba music employs dozens of percussion instruments such as chimes, triangles, and berimbau made from catgut. Brazil is unified in its adoration of samba, as contrasted to the United States where a wide variety of music is considered representative of the country.42

There are a multitude of connections between soccer and samba, not the least that they started in the same time period. Both are physical activities that provide a “way down out of the favela”, and there is a direct transference of skills between Brazilian style soccer and samba. Both somatic forms are bodily exporting performances. The Brazilian soccer player, like a samba dancer, must possess jogo de cintura which is the capacity to use the body to provoke confusion and fascination in opponents. The direct translation of jogo de cintura is “waist game”, and both samba and soccer represent the philosophy of using the waist to deceive. Brazilian soccer is often described as the merging of sport and samba. The Brazilian emphasis on the dribble which moves the

whole body is often described in musical terms, and the cultural influence of both samba and capoeira, learned at a very young age, contribute directly to the style of play. The rhythmic emphasis in the Brazilian style of play can be directly related to the rhythmic emphasis in samba. Giulianotti points out that Latin American soccer exists within a grouping of cultural practices, but mostly revolves around national dance. He correlates the carioca soccer rhythm of play in Brazil directly with samba music.

The connections between soccer and samba do have some political overtones. The government has frequently used soccer and samba to mobilize and unify the nation. Medici politically linked soccer and samba with the government inspired samba written to celebrate the World Cup victory of 1970. In 1982, after each World Cup victory, crowds flowed into the street to samba in celebration. Since the 1960’s, samba bands are a feature of most soccer games, and fans often adapt songs from the escolas de samba clubs into soccer songs. Even the Brazilian word for fan, or support, has samba connotations. Soccer team supporters are called torcedors, which means someone who bends and twists for his team. The term can be taken literally or as allegory, but connects samba with soccer through fanship.

The other “dance-like” physical movement influence on soccer has been Brazilian capoeira. Capoeira was originally a martial art invented by Angolan slaves that was disguised as a dance to fool the slave owners. The two dancers, or opponents, wear knives on their heels, and dance around their opponent trying to cut him. Although the dancers never make contact in modern day capoeira, they wear silk scarves to protect the neck during the dance. The objective is to defeat the opponent through trickery and guile by taunting the opponent, usually to music, with deceptive kicks and trips. The correlation between soccer and capoeira is the body language. The hip swinging necessary to dance capoeira is very similar both to samba dancing and soccer dribbling in Brazil. Capoeira is considered both a dance and a sport, but Flynn comments that while soccer became a sport, capoeira which was originally a sport became a dance.45

Taylor noted that while correlating samba, soccer and capoeira is commonplace, there is truth in the delegation because, as he says, “any country that has samba, capoeira, frevo (lively music) and chorinho (slow, sentimental music) has to play a different kind of soccer.”46 Galeano said it more lyrically, speaking of Brazilian soccer which he called:

...soccer made up of hip feints, undulations of the torso and legs in flight, all of which came from capoeira, the warrior dance of black slaves, and joyful dances of the big city slums.47

Even the national team soccer players celebrate with the samba. After the 1998 World Cup victory, a ten man conga line led by Ronaldinho sambaed and sang their way to the interview room.  

To conclude, three significant cultural characteristics epitomize Brazilian soccer, and influence either directly or indirectly the playing style. The sport lottery has shaped the game in an indirect way, in that it has had little influence on playing style other than causing player fatigue. However, it has changed the organizational structure of the sport in Brazil by the creation of a national championship. It has also altered fan participation by redirecting some localized and community based soccer loyalty into a more nationalistic and materialistic focus. An intensely fervid fascination with playing the sport lottery has increased a more broad based knowledge of the teams competing, while the increase in the number of games necessary to complete a national championship has directly impacted on the players.

Carnival, soccer, and samba are so intertwined in the Brazilian cultural experience that it is often difficult to discuss one without bringing up the other two. Given that all three came into cultural prominence during the same time period, and were often presented in correlation together, it would be safe to assume that they have interacted in significant ways. The carnivalesque atmosphere of soccer stadiums is a prominent feature often mentioned, but carnival has also shaped soccer and style in other ways. Both carnival

---

and soccer feature an inversion of authority and showing off that is limited in a hierarchal and rigidly structured society. They feature somatic emphasis on the lower regions and waist areas of the body, require specialized “costumes” and are sources for community loyalty.

Samba and capoeira have directly enhanced soccer playing style by the insertion of similar bodily movements featuring the waist, hips, legs, and feet. The rhythms of samba and capoeira can be delineated in soccer movements, particularly dribbling. The influence of Afro-Brazilian origins on soccer stylistic movements, samba and capoeira are duly noted. The insertion of samba bands and samba instruments into the soccer stadium goes hand in hand with the conceptualization of the torcedor, or soccer fan. These three components, unique to Brazil, have greatly influenced soccer, and how it is played within the country.
Simply stated, my thesis is that the intersection of culture and sport shapes the style of soccer. While this short thesis statement may not appear groundbreaking in an academic atmosphere, in actuality, it is precisely that for several reasons. Little academic analysis of soccer style has been written and published. Many authors comment on style but very few focus on a rigorous academic analysis of what comprises soccer style. Those that do, tend to focus on a few key components, such as national identity or interpretations of gender, as Archetti does so successfully. But as a coach, and a sport historian, I always wanted more. I needed to understand all the elements that made up and influenced soccer style so that I could develop a “style” with my own teams. I was fascinated when watching international games and always looking for those elements that made one national team play differently than another. Why did Brazil play one way and Germany play in such a constrasting fashion? And what style did the United States really play? Why did regional groupings and specific teams reflect certain stereotypes? Were they really stereotypes or was something deeper being revealed?
These are the questions that really drove the development of this dissertation. When I turned to the literature for answers, I found only glimpses but not completion. Stereotypes were so deeply ingrained within the psyche of the public as well as the academicians that it was difficult to break down, deconstruct, what shaped them and proceed beyond them in order to analyze. Even the definition of style was nebulous and problematic. Giulianotti’s historical analysis of playing style, based on trends within the game became an incisive pinpoint of light in my quest for answers. Here was an historical overview of stylistic trends within the game of soccer. Now I had to extrapolate into specifics for Brazil and Germany in order to understand and delineate what made their playing styles unique. My background in cultural studies obviously paved the way for my main thesis, and that was that it was mainly cultural factors that intersected with and influenced the style of play that each country develops.

My first task was the development of a working definition of soccer style. A survey of the literature provided a plethora of answers, but little agreement. Without a workable definition of style, I was convinced that my arguments could not proceed without being amorphous and unsupportable. To break new ground meant to accurately define, first, what needed to be analyzed, and in this process I established a cohesive, encompassing definition of playing style. This definition, based on years of coaching and more years of academic reading and analysis of games is stretching the limits of what most consider to be a definition of style. It goes much beyond previous definitions and encompasses specifics. Generally, coaches hold the belief that style is the artistic component of the
game. Academics seem to analyze style as being the answer to “how is the game being played?” My definition of style is specific and direct, as I identify seven signatures of style. These specific signatures go beyond earlier definitions, and include tactics, techniques, bodily or somatic images, conceptualizations of the game, values, traditions, and ecological components. The use of this definition and the application of it to Brazil and German soccer style enables the specification, or particularism, as to what precisely that style is. I would not neglect, as a sport historian, situating this in a historical context. The definition allows for historical fluidity and change, and does not become a concrete block for analysis. Rather, it provides the means for situating a definition beyond the stereotype, while acknowledging that the stereotype does exist.

Once a workable definition of each team’s style was in place, I could begin my determination of what shaped and influenced each country’s particular, now defined, playing styles. This was the heart of my dissertation. As I began lining up my categories and supporting evidence that cultural influences shaped playing styles, I began to find more and more cultural categories. Wanting to be as complete as possible, the dissertation expanded dramatically. I finally settled on categories that I felt had the most impact on playing style. These included the history of the individual country as well as the sporting history of the country, the formation of national habitus and national identity, the impact of colonialism, how class and politics shaped playing style or intersected with the shaping of style, and how race, gender and religion shaped and intersected. I explored the impact of globalization on playing styles in Germany
and Brazil, as well as what significant individuals may have contributed to shaping how the game is played. And I examined unique features that were not reflected on a global basis but were culturally constructed. Lastly, I allowed my coaching side to impact by examining specifics training philosophies and regimens to analyze how they have impacted on playing style.

My conclusions are evident: both Brazil and Germany’s playing style is shaped and influenced by both historical context and cultural influences. In essence, it is history and culture that create playing style in soccer. Simplistic when reduced to a few words as a thesis statement, but much more penetrating and detailed when analyzed. This analysis becomes “ground-breaking” mainly because of its depth and detail. As an academic, I have taken the analysis of style far beyond what has been previously written. Rather than a simplistic approach that playing style is the artistic component of the game influenced by a few elements, I have expanded the argument beyond nationalism and elements of national identity. In fact, detail and expansion are where this dissertation does “go beyond,” into an area that was fertile for exploration. Those who have written on style generally pinpoint one or two components and focus their studies and analyses on those, but this dissertation seeks to analyze all the components that make up playing style, and does so by analyzing the two case studies, Brazil and Germany. It provides the answer to the question, “What shapes playing style in Germany and Brazil?” But it also opens the door for further academic exploration. In
fact, I believe that my dissertation offers more questions for exploration than it does answers, and provides many opportunities to “go beyond.”

Perhaps the first question that arises from the study is whether transference of the thesis can, and does, occur with other case study countries? Is playing style in Zimbabwe or China shaped by the culture, and if so, in what way? How does the culture make the playing style unique to that country? My belief is that the thesis statement will hold true when applied to all countries, but with one caveat, and that is the historical perspective. Third world countries and countries with a fairly “new” soccer program will most likely need to go through a process of soccer development, a period of time in which the program “tries on” a variety of styles, grows and changes, and adapts to current trends within the soccer world. It is in the longevity of the program, the historicity of the program, that culture begins to penetrate and affect style. The United States provides a unique example of this point.

The United State’s playing style has sometimes been referred to as an “un-style” or “anti-style.” My belief is that this is true, at this point in time, mainly because the game of soccer is making its initial penetration into the popular culture. Although soccer was being played in America for many years, it was considered a “foreigner’s game.” It is only within the past several decades that soccer has made great leaps in popularity as it became the game of suburban children, and eventually attracted enough interest to legitimize a professional league. Soccer could be considered in the “inception stage” of
penetrating popular culture, and therefore has had less time for the culture to influence and impact upon playing style. There is less history available within the American game to adequately influence a consistent style. I would theorize that this will change within the next few decades and a consistent style, reflecting the American culture will emerge.

Emerging nations, or third world countries, are often in similar positions. The soccer programs have not had the longevity that say an England or an Argentina program have had, and thus are still in the process of determining style of play, and creating their own style from their own culture. China will be a fascinating study in several years time, as surely their own cultural interpretation of soccer style will reflect the unique elements of a far eastern society. Emerging nations will also need to be analyzed, in more detail, regarding the impact of colonialism. Whereas Brazilian soccer was initially far more influenced by Britain than they were by Portugal (especially since Britain was the country that imported soccer into Brazil at a time when Brazil was throwing off the yoke of colonialization), I would not suppose this same influence would hold true for nations that received their soccer through colonialization. Zimbabwe, the former country of Rhodesia under British rule, would make an interesting study. On the surface, it would appear that their soccer style is more reflective of an anti-British cultural bias. “We will play any way except a British style,” may well reflect a rebellion and antagonism toward their former colonizers, and in fact, may serve as a specific area of promoting their own national identity.
Given that there are regional stereotypes of playing style such as Latin American or northern European, or British, further study needs to be undertaken to determine if these stereotypes can be deconstructed. Are there exceptions to a generalized stereotype, and if so, why? Geography and climate may well play into style in even a greater emphasis than has been assumed. Many Latin American teams value possession of the ball and play soccer at a slower pace. Has this style developed because of heat issues? What other geographical issues may impact on playing style? Do teams from more mountainous countries exhibit any particular characteristics? I remember hearing in a dance class, many years ago, that countries with many hills and mountains tend to develop dances that involve more emphasis on the ball of the foot and the toes, and feature more jumping and up and down movement. Does this cultural phenomenon hold true in soccer style?

Certainly further work needs to be established on the impact of racism on the game of soccer. Currently, most of the work tends to revolve around fandom or racism toward black soccer players. But little academic work has been undertaken regarding racism exhibited toward Latino or Asian players, and yet stereotypes certainly abound around not just nationalisms, but regional groups of players. With the worldwide migration of elite soccer players, studies into this area seem pertinent, particularly as more Asian players are beginning to penetrate the top European leagues. The history of Latino players emigrating to the top leagues is long established, but little work has been done on how these players have or have not assimilated into new cultures.
The intersection of sport and religion, particularly soccer and religion seems an exceedingly ripe area of exploration. In countries with an established, state sponsored religion, how does that religion intersect with soccer playing style? And is that intersection and influence different than countries that feature a pluralism of religions? Does religion shape how the game is received in the country? Does an Israel demonstrate a different style than a Kuwaiti team? Do Japan and India play differently, and if so, how much does religion, as a part of culture, influence their style of play? Or does it? Given that German soccer style seems little influenced by religion, and Brazil demonstrates many intersections of soccer and religion, how much influence does religion have on soccer style in Haiti or Italy or Libya? I would hypothesize that religion’s influence on playing style may play out in the conceptualizations of the body, such as whether the mind is given ascendancy over the body in religious terms. However, I believe that it is likely that further examination would lead to the conclusion that religion does impact substantially on how soccer is perceived in the country and how it is allowed to permeate the culture. Are there restrictions on when the game may be played due to religious reasons? Is sport viewed as an important part of the culture or as peripheral to the culture? Are players allowed or expected to bring their religious beliefs onto the playing field? How does the country perceive the game: is it sport determined by superior skill, or is it a game determined by luck, fate, or divine will? Does religion use sport in any way, such as a means to promote itself or to promote the social and common good? How has religion impacted upon the structure of soccer within the country? All these areas need further exploration and documentation.
Another area ripe for further exploration is the impact of globalization upon playing styles. This is a very controversial area, with experts taking up several opposing opinions on how playing style is developing historically. Given the pace of global trends in this area, are scholars and coaches starting to see a homogenizing affect upon playing style? Many would say so, but others would heartily disagree. While I do believe there is evidence that points to homogenizing trends, with trends being the key word, there also is a reinforcement of nationalism through global tournaments such as the World Cup. The World Cup receives so much acclaim and publicity, and in itself, reinforces the conceptualization of nationalism, along with other sporting giants. But IF nationalism should start to decrease outside of sport, and trends such as cosmopolitanism or regionalism become more dominant, then we will most likely see a change within the structure of soccer, itself. I believe it is more likely that current trends are reflecting a change, not toward regionalism, but a more ethnic/tribal/religious affiliation. We may see, in the future, a World Cup featuring the Kurds versus the Basques, or the Catholics versus the Muslims. Or how about the Ndebele versus the Shona? Or the Shia versus the Sunni? If particularism is on the upswing, will soccer styles influenced and shaped by culture, also particularize and become more defined?

Related to globalization, further examination of the current binary opposition that is escalating between club soccer and national teams is critical. Clubs are becoming multinational, business oriented corporations. Leagues and club teams, in peripheral (as opposed to core) nations appear in disarray, in terms of money, graft, and elite
emigration patterns. As peripheral nations are deskilled, what will happen to national
teams and their status? Will capitalistic business concerns override nationalistic
identity and pride? Currently, it would appear that the club system is not only gaining
strength politically and monetarily, but may be instigating a challenge against FIFA for
control of the game. Should this occur, national teams and the World Cup will decrease
in stature and importance. Is the club versus national team controversy related to
globalization trends? Very likely so, and the outcome may depend ultimately on
whether nation-states continue to be politically dominant. Currently, clubs argue that
too many national team games, exhibitions, and Cup qualifiers pull players away from
their dominant source of income, the club salary, thus impacting on the club’s ability to
produce a quality product and continue to pay high salaries (and make a substantial
profit.) Should globalization trends increase regional or cosmopolitan status above
nation-state status, there is little doubt that clubs will prevail over FIFA.

Further related to this question is the impact on athletes by the increasing number of
games played. This would be a ripe area of research for sport exercise and sport science
researchers. Brazil, since the inception of the national sport lottery has increased the
number of league games incredibly. Corporate contracts and sponsorships (such as
between Brazil and Nike) also have effected the increasing number of games. And yet,
more games appears to have both a negative and a positive impact on Brazilian players.
League coaches complain about fatigue and increased injuries, as do national team
coaches. But Germany points to the increased number of games that Brazilian national
youth teams play as a reason for their excellence in technique and understanding of the game. As the number of teams has increased in the World Cup, the number of games played has also increased. Have we reached the pinnacle of human physiological development for soccer players? And does the number of games impact on playing style and how it develops? It is most likely that increased number of games will allow a style to develop more quickly, as well as entrench the style as a means of identity.

Within the past two years, corruption within the game of soccer has been more openly exposed than ever before. In all likelihood, this corruption has existed for decades, hiding in the dark places of every country’s soccer programs. Both Brazil and Germany have suffered with referee scandals within the past two years, both connected with gambling interests. Referees have influenced the outcome of league games, been caught and prosecuted. An indepth expose based on academic scholarship to determine how these scandals will impact on the game of soccer is needed. If the integrity of the game of soccer, itself, becomes questioned, then the value of sport is also being questioned. In light of how this may impact in terms of business, attendance figures, and generally perception of the game, as well as those values and philosophies demonstrated by soccer, needs to be explored. There have been, historically, accusations (although apparently unproven or at least unpublicized) of referee manipulation at the World Cup level. As far as I am aware, there has been little sport historian exploration of this subject. Most fans will remember Maradona’s “hand of
God” play against England, which he has recently admitted publically. In conjunction with globalization trends, the intrusion of technology upon soccer must be analyzed.

FIFA has explored a variety of technological means for enhancing the accuracy of refereeing. At this point, none have been adopted. A worthy study of what technology is available and precisely how this will impact on the game is overdue. One of the elements of the soccer that seems to be appealing to many people is that the basic essence of the game has not changed over time. While there have been rule changes and trends of emphasis by the referees (the professional foul at the last several World Cups would be an example), the basic essence of the game remains the same. With the addition of technological innovations to enhance fairness (such as the microchip placed in the soccer ball), will perceptions of the game change? How will these changes impact upon playing style? Will changes impact on the free flowing pace of the game? Will soccer eventually become like professional basketball, with pre-determined quarters, three point shots to increase scoring, and time-outs? Changing the essence of the game, removing its “playfulness” and replacing it with technological innovations to monitor how the game is played will invariably impact on style. And yet, I cannot willingly argue against technological change that will make the game fairer. They are needed and necessary, particularly at the elite, professional level. However, I do not, and millions of fans do not, wish to see the game played in a sterile, robotic fashion. At that point, style surely would be given a death sentence.
Another fruitful area for further research, one for which this dissertation opens the door, is the whole question of youth training and soccer. Youth training, like soccer style, is definitely culturally influenced. Brazil trains their children much differently than Germany, and the United States much differently from Brazil and Germany. A closer examination of youth training methodology and the ethical questions connected with them are overdue for examination. If Brazilian children are still playing beach and street soccer, and German children are pursuing other activities, it would appear that youth participation may be foreshadowing a change in playing style. How has the United State’s version of youth training, which is expensive suburban soccer teams, altered the development of style within the United States? Given that professionalization of the game is in the inception stage within America, and that America does not have the highly developed connections between club system and youth training (whereby clubs provide the majority of youth development through their system) as do the majority of other countries in the world, how does this affect the development of style? The United States is in the unique position of fostering soccer development through schools, often, such as high school and college teams. American youth reflect a delayed development in soccer skills compared to a global arena in which most countries begin early selection and training through soccer clubs, with professionals. Is the American style of play slow in developing its own identity because the children are developed on a different timetable and a different system? Ethical questions begin to arise: is early professionalization what we want for children? Should the game change from play to sport at an earlier age? As third world countries enter the
high stakes arena of elite sport, how are their youth being developed? Who is doing the
developing? And how does youth development affect playing style as national identity?

But perhaps the most significant question that arises from this dissertation, at least in
my own eyes, is “What cultural elements have I missed that impact upon soccer playing
style?” I have tried to be an inclusive and in-depth as possible, however, the reality is
that culture is still such a nebulous, ephemeral field at times. Cultures change, and
soccer changes. But what significant influences have been neglected? For example, I
have thoroughly explored how the construction of masculinity has shaped and
influenced soccer playing style. But how has the construction of femininity shaped and
influenced the women’s playing style? The Brazilian women reflect many somatic and
stylistic elements of play that Brazilian men demonstrate, but does this analogy hold
true in other countries? It does not seem to do so in the United States. The U.S. men
and women play vastly different styles. Is the feminist movement having an impact on
playing style? And what about countries where the emancipation of women is
negligible and women are not permitted to play the game at all? Does the women’s
game impact at all upon the style of the men’s game and vice-versa? For example,
Brazilian women emphasize many of the stylistic traits in their game that Brazilian men
do. So, at first glance, it would appear that my thesis that cultural elements impact and
shape playing style would hold true. In countries where women and men play
differently, how much does the construction of gender play into the differences?
Case study analysis work also needs to be done regarding countries with multi-ethnic populations. Brazil presents itself as a creole society, demonstrating a blending of three ethnic elements into a somewhat harmonious whole. Germany still represents a monocultural society, at least in terms of their national soccer team. Their minority populations, particularly the Turkish, are effectively locked out of national team consideration. But what about African nations with a population split on tribal basis or religious basis. I would guess that the culture holding the most hegemonous power would ultimately shape the style of soccer being played, but would elements also be present from those groups out of power?

Are there other cultural elements that play out in soccer style that I have missed? Certainly consideration should be given for the acceptance or rejection of soccer as the major sport of the country. Countries that still value indigenous sport over globalized, modern sport may well bring elements of their indigenous sport to the game that would certainly impact upon playing style. The United States demonstrates a proclivity for the favoring of other sports (football, basketball and baseball), and the status of soccer as a minor sport certainly has impacted on the country’s development of a coherent national playing style. So, the popularity of the sport must be factored into cultural analysis. Are there other cultural elements that need to be regarded?

At this point, I would like to address what will most likely be some critiques of this work. First, some will critique this analysis and case study as being mainly literature
based with little hard number documentation or first source citations. I would answer this critique by saying that yes, it is a literary based analysis. But along with all the reading and opinions, I also offer two additional elements of authenticity. I have spent thousands of hours watching World Cup games, Brazilian club games, German club games and any other soccer (of all ages and levels) that has been available. I could have counted up the number of free kicks or slide tackles and provided a statistical analysis. However, my emphasis was that cultural elements shape soccer style. Although I have extended the definition of style to some fairly specific parameters, style still is the artistic element of the game. In some sense, it is still that indefinable element that says “This is my country, and this is how we play.” If style were only the artistic element, then a value judgement is being made upon a rating system, and that value system would vary from person to person. Merely by rating the artistic ability of a team provides a value judgement. Most people would admit that Brazil plays “the beautiful game.” But does not Germany also play a beautiful game, but in a different stylistic manner? Cannot crisp and efficient, physical play demonstrate a beauty of its own?

Second, soccer style is not about numbers and data. Rather, it is the joy and the beauty of the game. I wanted to look at the broader picture than specific games to try and figure out what “made” soccer style. Why does one country, at the national team level, play differently than another? And how did they get to play that way? I would also answer the critique of literature analysis by bringing up my many years of coaching at a variety of levels. I am analyzing from both the view of an academic sport historian as
well as a trained soccer coach and former player. Hopefully, my true love for this game seeps into all the pages of analysis. When answering my thesis question, literature analysis provides me with a broader canvas to paint upon than coaching. It is through literature analysis, specifically historical analysis that one can begin to see trends and historical blips that altered direction in the development of style. National soccer style is not cemented, but rather is a progression. Each team makes stylistic changes every time they play, and each team alters their playing style over a historical period of time. But what becomes entrenched often cannot be analyzed by a specific point in time, such as watching one game. Literary analysis opens up the door for broadening the vision and providing framework for theory.

The second critique that may be made against this work is the lack of first source material in both Portuguese and German. While this is admittedly a weakness, in a globalized society it is becoming less of one than it used to be. By diligent searching, I was able to obtain quite a few works that had been translated into English that in previous years had not been available. This was extremely helpful. I do speak and read a minute amount of Portuguese, and am listening to my language tapes regularly, but I was extremely fortunate to have Brazilian relatives that I could turn to with questions. “Tell me what the average Brazilian would think of this.” “When you were in elementary and middle school, what was emphasized about Brazilian history?” “How was soccer organized in your city?” “Who were your soccer heroes and why?” My German exposure was somewhat more limited, but I was able to pick the mind of a
German exchange student and his family, as well as Dr. Jay Martin, for some insights into German style and how it developed. I would also add that sometimes, it is easier for an “outsider” to analyze because entrenched notions of personal national identity do not get in the way of analysis.

One critique that has been leveled is that I am not an authority on Brazil or Germany. That is true, although I have tried to render that notion with coursework and extensive reading. However, I am an authority on soccer and cultural studies, and ultimately, that is what I am writing about: how soccer style is shaped by culture and history. The process of writing this work has been an exhilarating one, full of surprises on the long journey. It has been fulfilling work, and one that I sadly end. The journey of exploration, step by step, ultimately must end for another one to start. Hopefully, you will be able to follow in my footsteps from one cultural element to another and reach the same conclusion. That, for a sport historian, makes the journey worthwhile. And hopefully, this work will not only answer some questions, but raise further questions for you to start your own journey of exploration.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Arbena, Joseph L. and David LaFrance (ed.). *Sport in Latin America and the Caribbean* (Wilmington, DE.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2002).


Cajueiro, Marcelo. “Soccer Proves to be a Major Game for Pay TV Services.” Variety, 368 (1997): 44.


Dell’apa, Frank. “World Cup Serves as Unifying Mechanism.” *Columbus Dispatch* (June 25, 2002).


Fleishman, Jeffrey; Ralph Frammolino and Sebastian Rotella. “Europe’s Backlash.” *Columbus Dispatch* (September 11, 2005): B3.


Gehrmann, Siegfried (ed.) *Football and Regional Identity in Europe* (Münster, LIT, 1997).


“Germany Unification Era: The Pre-unification Era (1790’s-1867) and the Unification Era (1870’s-1880’s.)” (obtained online from http://www.geocities.com dated August 11, 2004).


Gole! The Official Film of the 1982 World Cup directed by Tom Clegg. (Soccer Learning Systems).

Goncalves, José Thadeu in cooperation with Professor Julio Mazzei. The Principles of Brazilian Soccer (Spring City, PA.: Reedswain, 1998).


MacAloon, John J. “The Turn of Two Centuries: Sport and the Politics of Intercultural Relations.” *Sport...The Third Millennium* ed. by Fernand Landry, Marc Landry and Magdeleine Yerlés (Sainte-Foy: Les Presses de L’Université Laval, 1991), 31-44.


Murphy, Patrick. “Banking on Success: Examining the Links Between Performance and the Increasing Concentration of Wealth in English Elite Football.” *Singer and Friedlander Football Review 1998-99 Season* (Produced by The Centre for Research into Sport and Society at the University of Leicester; obtained online at http://www.le.ac.uk).


Powers, John. “New World Gaining on Soccer Elite.” *Columbus Dispatch* (June 11, 2002).


Schofield, Matthew. “Germany’s Neo-Nazis Protest Events Marking End of WWII.” Columbus Dispatch (May 9, 2005): A5.


