ABSTRACT

In 1552, Ivan IV of Russia conquered the neighboring Kazan’ Khanate, marking the first time in the history of Russia where the state consciously conquered non-ethnically Slavic people, specifically the Muslim Tatars. This created a variety of new problems for the state, primarily how to incorporate the new population within the preexisting structures of the Muscovite state. This study presents evidence that the state adapted earlier cultural models to suit the circumstances created by the conquest of Kazan’. The specific models discussed are religious processions, now utilized in conjunction with the state’s authority for a combined religious-political expansion of the state, and monastic colonization which allowed the state to exert a base level of control in the countryside of the new territory and encourage economic development. The evidence for this study is drawn primarily from three sources: unpublished saints’ lives, published chronicles, and published gramoty, or legal documents. The conclusion drawn from this evidence is that in fact the Muscovite state used the resources and rituals of the Orthodox Church to assist in the long-term conquest and control of the new territory and developed new models that were suited to future expansion, primarily the conquest of Siberia.
Dedicated to my parents
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I also must thank several of my fellow graduate students for their willingness to listen to some of my ideas concerning Kazan', and for suggesting secondary literature that has influenced some of my thinking on Russian history and colonialism: Jennifer Anderson, Aaron Retish, and Tricia Starks. I am especially grateful to Paul Hibbeln for editing an early version of this thesis, and allowing me to test out nearly every idea on him before it saw print.
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Monasteries founded in Kazan' and Sviiazhsk uezdy during 1552-1682.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The conquest of Kazan' in 1552 was a pivotal event in the formation of the Muscovite state. For the first time in its history, Muscovy conquered and annexed a large section of territory occupied by a native Turkic population organized in the form of a viable, political entity. It also was the first Muslim state conquered by an Orthodox country after the fall of Constantinople in 1453; the political and religious ideology accompanying the conquest bolstered the image of Muscovy as the defender of Orthodoxy. The conquest also marked the entrance of the Muscovite government into a period of active involvement in the expansion of its eastern border, a process that would continue with the conquest of Siberia.

The existing historiography on the conquest of Kazan' focuses on two major topics. The first is understanding the conquest as an extension of previous policies and relations toward the Khanate, traditionally arguing that the conquest was the inevitable result of Muscovite-Kazan' relations. The second is
the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in the conversion of the non-Russian residents of the area. This topic has two related aspects. The first, and most discussed in the extant literature, argues that the Church’s activity in Kazan’ was only concerned with the conversion of the Muslim population. The second argues that the conversion of the Muslims of Kazan’ allowed the Church to develop an ideology of a moral conquest. Despite the importance of 1552 in Russian history, the historiography has failed to discuss any other concerns.

There can be no doubt that these earlier monographs are useful, since both of these topics are portions of the history of Muscovite-Kazan’ relations. What the earlier monographs lack, however, is an in-depth discussion of the effect of the conquest on the region and its native peoples. The first study solely dedicated to the topic is Kazan’: Istoricheskii ocherk by N. F. Kalinin, which outlines the basic Soviet interpretation. Kalinin discusses the Kazan’ Khanate and its relations to Moscow until the end of the seventeenth century. Establishing the interpretation followed by many others, Kalinin argues that the conquest was the inevitable result of increasing Muscovite interference in Khanate politics. After the conquest, Kalinin is especially concerned with the uprisings among the Muslims in Kazan’ in the 1560s, but follows that event only with the political aspects of Muscovite control. For Kalinin, the uprisings are

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1 N. F. Kalinin, Kazan’: Istoricheskii ocherk (Moskva: Tatknigoizdat, 1955), especially pp. 17-64, which focuses on the conquest.
evidence of resistance to Muscovite expansionism, an important consideration with regard to his Marxist interpretation of history. Kalinin, however, does not concern himself with any aspect of the social, religious, or economic interaction between Muslim residents and the Muscovite state after 1560.

Western interpretations of the conquest of Kazan' have also left many topics unexplored. Edward Keenan's dissertation, *Muscovy and Kazan' 1445-1552: A Study in Steppe Politics*, is a diplomatic history of the conquest which agrees with Kalinin's argument that the conquest was the result of traditional politics between the two powers.² Keenan dismisses any argument that could involve social or religious causes as factors in conquest, and he also is not concerned with the result of the conquest for the ruling or subject populations in the region. He does discuss some aspects of the conversion of the Kazan' Tatars, but only as a result of political concerns.

A more thorough account by a Western scholar was published shortly after Keenan's study, Jaroslav Pelenski's *Russia and Kazan: Conquest and Imperial Ideology, 1438-1560s*.³ Pelenski adds elements of cultural history into the political narrative of Kalinin and Keenan, especially the formation of an

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imperial ideology that allowed the state to justify conquest. This is a change from the work of those previous scholars who approached the topic as a diplomatic issue and not one of “moral conquest” as Pelenski describes. Pelenski is especially concerned with the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in this matter, with its assistance of the development of the moral justification for conquest, with its concern for conversion of the native population of the region, and its development of miracle cults to encourage conversion in the period following conquest. Pelenski considers the conquest of Kazan’ to be one of the key signposts of the increasing perception in the sixteenth century of the tsar as the defender of Orthodoxy, as well as the “ideal ruler.”\footnote{Pelenski devotes much attention to this specific aspect of imperial ideology, see especially his chapter, “Historical and Dynamic Justifications for the Kazan’ Conquest,” pp. 92-103.} Pelenski’s study, however, also is limited to the period shortly after conquest, and is not concerned with the development of economic policy or the social interaction of conqueror and subjects. The most recent studies of the region have done little to expand on the work of these earlier scholars.\footnote{A recent book by S. Kh. Alishov, Kazan’ i Moskva: Mezhgosudarstvennye otnoshenia v XV-XVI vv., (Kazan’: Tatarskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1995), follows closely the argument and approach of Keenan, but extends the period of conquest to include the uprising of the 1560s like Kalinin.}

None of these studies see the issue of conquest extending beyond the 1560s, which leaves many questions about Muscovy’s authority in Kazan’
untouched. There has yet to be a study of the period from conquest until Peter
the Great's rule that has attempted to uncover the ways in which the interactions
of Muscovite and Muslim culture were negotiated. One possible approach to
this issue is by studying the continuing role of the Russian Orthodox Church in
Kazan' during and after the conquest, a role which was not limited to conversion
efforts. The Church attempted to introduce Russian cultural habits through
religious rituals, and also assisted in the economic development of the region
through monasteries.

Until very recently, issues of the relations between the Muscovite state
and its ethnically non-Russian population was not a concern in the
historiography of Russia. The Soviet Union influenced an era of "Cold War"
historiography, where the concern for the study of Russian history was a search
for the origins of the totalitarian, monolithic state. Monolithic included the idea
of "mono-ethnic," since the multiple ethnicities of the Soviet Union were
ignored. The fall of the Soviet Union and the resulting interest in the
multinational character of the Russian Empire have created both the need and
the possibility of redefining the expansion of the Russian state.6 Expansion has

6 Recent historical works in the imperial period have begun to include
aspects of colonial theory into their interpretations of the Russian Empire. See:
Daniel R. Brower, and Edward J. Lazzerini, eds., Russia’s Orient: Imperial
Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917, Indiana-Michigan Series in Russian and
East European Studies, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 1997),
especially the essay by Lazzerini, “Local Accommodation and Resistance to
been a concern in the historiography of Russia since the nineteenth century, but the early works on Muscovite expansion portrayed Russia as undergoing a process of reaching its “natural borders,” ignoring the colonial aspect of conquered populations. Most of the more recent works on empire find their basis in a standard interpretation of the expansion of the Muscovite state in Robert Kerner’s The Urge to the Sea, published in 1942. Kerner’s work, in addition to proposing a new interpretation of Russian expansion, was groundbreaking as the first scholarly work to focus solely on the eastward expansion of Russia. Kerner’s basic idea was that the eastward expansion of Russia occurred as a result of the fur trade. When the northern trapping region had been exhausted, the trappers began to move eastward following rivers and

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Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century Crimea,” pp. 169-187; Lazzerini successfully employs the methodology of the Subaltern School, with a careful consideration of not just the ruling power and its subjects, but also the relationship between various minority groups. This complicated picture of colonial relations is well suited in the Russian Empire, with its multiple ethnicities.

Most major studies of Russian history had discussed the issue of expansion, beginning with V. O. Kliuchevskii in his Kurs russkoj istorii. Kliuchevskii stated: “The history of Russia is the history of a country in the process of colonization.” Kliuchevskii, Kurs, vol. 1, (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1956.) The idea contained within Kliuchevskii’s statement was of a country occupying its “natural” territory. This approach to the history of Russia stresses expansion over colonization, since the conquered territories became naturally included within Russian boundaries, despite the presence of ethnically non-Russian populations.
easy portages. This water system facilitated travel into Siberia.\textsuperscript{8} Following the fur traders came the institutions of the state, both the military and the Russian Orthodox Church. New ostrogs, or small forts, established by the state proved to be centers of the military, political administration, and the Church. The first ostrog in Siberia, Tiumen, was founded in 1586; the first church in Siberia was built in Tiumen that same year.\textsuperscript{9} Perhaps most importantly for the future study of the Russian Empire, Kerner observed that “what the private trader and trapper or the military commander with his ‘serving men’ and Cossacks could not do in bringing about pacification, the priest and monk and nun did.”\textsuperscript{10} This combination of church and state would affect the entire development of the empire, including the conquest of Kazan’.

Historians since the publication of Kerner’s monograph have reiterated the pattern of expansion as observed by Kerner. Historians have added a social dimension to the pattern of expansion, on occasion adopting the Turner thesis to

\textsuperscript{8} Robert Kerner, \textit{The Urge to the Sea: The Course of Russian History: The Role of Rivers, Portages, Ostrogs, Monasteries, and Furs}, (New York: Russell and Russell, 1942), pp. 67-69, \textit{passim}. The role of the fur trade in expansion is also presented by one of Kerner’s students, see Raymond H. Fisher, \textit{The Russian Fur Trade, 1550-1700} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1943).

\textsuperscript{9} Kerner, \textit{Urge to the Sea}, p. 86. The growth of the political administration in Siberia was the topic of another of Kerner’s students, see: George V. Lantzef, \textit{Siberia in the Seventeenth Century: A Study of the Colonial Administration}, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1943).

\textsuperscript{10} Kerner, \textit{Urge to the Sea}, p. 86.
a Russian model. Both A. Lobanov-Rostovsky and Joseph Wieczynski utilized this American expansion model to the Russian case.\footnote{A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, "Russian Expansion in Far East in Light of the Turner Hypothesis," \textit{The Frontier In Perspective}, Eds. Walker D. Wyman and Clifton B. Kroeber, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957), pp. 79-94; and Joseph Wieczynski, \textit{The Russian Frontier: The Impact of the Borderlands upon the Course of Early Russian History}, (Charlottesville: UP of Virginia, 1976). Another historian wrote a brief note on the application of the Turner thesis, see: D. W. Treadgold, “Russian Expansion in Light of the Turner’s Study of the American Frontier,” \textit{Agricultural History}, 26 (1952), pp. 147-152. Treadgold did not attempt as large an integration of the Turner thesis as Lobanov-Rostovsky or Wieczynski.} Both concluded that the important element of the expansion was Russian peasant settlement into the newly conquered territory, agreeing with the conclusions of earlier scholars.\footnote{This idea can be traced back as early as Kluichevskii, and peasant settlement remained one of the most important features of Russian expansion for all of the early scholars, as a key to the Russian state filling its territory.} Lobanov-Rostovsky also argued that if the native population converted to Orthodoxy, then these converts would be considered “Russian.”\footnote{Lobanov-Rostovsky, “Russian Expansion,” p. 84.} Wieczynski observed that the Russian peasants being settled into this new territory were actually from the borderlands of Russia, such as Perm which suggested a kind of borderland continuity.\footnote{Lobanov-Rostovsky, “Russian Expansion,” p. 84.} They both agreed that there was a distinct borderland mentality, different from the center of Russia. This conclusion, however, is clearly influenced by the model of the Turner thesis. The Turner thesis is limited
in its applicability; it does not account for a sustained effort by the state to integrate a foreign populace, as is true for Russia. Both authors observe this facet, but they fail to extend this as a criticism for the adoption of this model.

There are several important attributes introduced to the study of Russian expansion from this approach, despite the difficulties of the Turner thesis into an earlier, and culturally different, time. First, a foreign model of expansion can be studied and adopted, with a warning for cross-cultural incompatibility, to the process of Russian expansion. Second, these two works raise the idea of the social character of expansion, and consider, albeit in a limited way, the non-Russian population. While they do not observe a process of cultural negotiation between Russian and non-Russian peoples, their work was a necessary step in the reinterpretation of the expansion of Russia.

The publication of the volume edited by Michael Rywkin in 1988, *Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917*, marked a major watershed. This was the first concerted effort by scholars to carefully study the entire process of expansion. Several articles highlighted the ethnic complexity of the expansion process, further dismantling the rather simplistic interpretation of Kerner. The Russian

14 Wieczynski, *Russian Frontier*, p. 76.

15 Michael Rywkin, ed., *Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917*, (New York: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1988). 1988 was not the absolute beginning of this approach; Janet Martin’s entry into this volume resembled her earlier article, see:
state encountered numerous ethnically different populations in the process of
expansion. The problem with these articles as a group, however, is that they
tend to focus merely upon the short-term expansion, or upon the concerns of the
metropole in regard to the conquered territory.¹⁶ None of these articles attempt
to understand the process of colonization as it occurred in the territory or the
long-term effects of Russian attempts at integration.

Recent histories of colonialism have greatly added to the understanding
of the studies of the process of conquest and colonization. While none of the
models of colonialism are directly applicable to the case of Russia, these studies
raise interesting new approaches and questions that can be investigated. Studies
of the conquest of the New World, a contemporaneous event to the conquest of
Kazan', are especially suggestive. In Patricia Seed's recent study of Europe in
the New World, she successfully "dehomogenizes" European conquest to show
how cultural distinctiveness influenced possession of both territory and people.¹⁷


¹⁶ In Russian Colonial Expansion, please see: Michael Rywkin's "Russian
Central Colonial Administration: From the Prikaz of Kazan to the XIX Century,
a Survey," pp. 8-22, as an example of a study of the metropole's concerns. Please
see Henry R. Huttenbach's "Muscovy's Conquest of Muslim Kazan and
Astrakhan, 1552-56: The Conquest of the Volga," pp. 45-69, as an example of a
narrowly focused "conquest" study.

¹⁷ Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe's Conquest of the
Parallels to Seed's "ceremonies of possession" can be identified for Russia, especially in the use of Orthodox processions after the conquest of Kazan'. Edward Said and those historians who have criticized his approach have added multiple layers of complexity to the understanding of cultures when they are brought into conflict.¹⁸

One scholar, Mark Bassin, has employed Said's methodology of cultural colonialism into the study of Siberia.¹⁹ Bassin argues that central Russia treated Siberia as its Orient, by understanding it through a filter of their own preconceptions. There were both Russians in the heartland and in Siberia, and also numerous ethnicities in Siberia, each with their own understanding of what

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¹⁸ Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, (New York: Knopf, 1993). Maria Todorova's recent monograph, *Imagining the Balkans* (New York: Oxford UP, 1997), begins with the basic model of Said's idea of "Orientalism" to create a new conception of "Balkanism." One of the distinctions that Todorova makes between these two ideas is that in the region of Balkans, the concept of the "Balkans" as understood by Westerners was not just imposed from the outside, but accepted by residents of the region and given a different meaning. This two-way conception of cultural ideals is missing from Said's model.

One historian has used Russia, as a part of Eastern Europe, as one type of "Orient" for Western Europe. See: Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization in the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1994). Wolff argues that the separation between Eastern and Western Europe was formulated in an "Orientalist" way through cultural preconception of uncivility in Eastern Europe.

Siberia was and what Siberia could provide for the Russian empire. Bassin’s important contribution is to prove that post-colonial studies can successfully be applied within the context of the Russian state.

Employing these new methodologies of colonial studies forces a revision of the older, one-sided interpretations of the post-conquest administration in Kazan’. In addition, the Subaltern school and the idea of resistance to colonial authority forces any future study of Russian expansion to confront the issue of a simplistic state-subject model. This complex issue is at the heart of Russian ownership of native-occupied territory and lack of success in conversion attempts. While some steps have been made to integrate these new methodologies into the study of Imperial Russia, there has been no attempt to integrate these ideas with the expansion of Muscovite Russia. The conquest of Kazan’ must be reconceptualized by drawing inspiration from these outside models in order to grasp the full complexity of the interaction of cultures, and to see the conquest as a process of negotiation, not just as the quick march of the frontier.

20 For an example of the Subaltern School’s work, see: Ranajit Guha, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, eds., *Selected Subaltern Studies*, (New York: Oxford UP, 1988). Partha Chatterjee’s *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*, Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993); also employs the methods of the Subalterns successfully. Chatterjee argues that resistance includes the maintenance of native culture in the face of colonial authority; this is especially relevant to the
URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN PREMODERN RUSSIA

One of the issues in the long-term negotiation between conquerors and subjects in Russia is the urban character of colonial process. The extant historiography on the Russian Empire addresses politics and religion, and has begun to address social issues, yet no study concerns the foundation of urban centers throughout the conquered regions as an integral part of conquest. This omission is partially a result of recent studies of the Russian Empire in the post-Petrine period, when these new urban centers were already established. Muscovy in the early modern period is considered primarily non-urban, but the state still established urban cores for its colonial expansion. In the conquest of Kazan’, Russia entered into a territory with urban centers, and then proceeded to develop the urban infrastructure. The study of this dynamic process will do much to enrich our understanding of Russian colonialism.

The avoidance of the subject of urban expansion accompanying the colonial expansion of Russia must be connected to the limited historiography of urban development for Russia in general. Most of what has been written remains a response to the arguments presented by M. N. Tikhomirov, a Soviet scholar of the Stalinist era whose work has been largely discredited. The basic premise of Tikhomirov’s work is that Russia followed a separate path of urban maintenance of a separate language by the Volga Tatars after conquest and the lack of success of conversion attempts.
development than the West, because Western Europe had an old Roman urban structure from which to develop.\textsuperscript{21} Several scholars of the medieval West have disputed this notion and convincingly demonstrated the integration of the pattern of urban development of Russian territory into those of Western and Central Europe. One of Tikhomirov's primary causes for the differentiation of Russian and Europe was that urban development in Russia was more dependent upon agriculture than long-distance trade, as he believed was the case for Europe.\textsuperscript{22} Tikhomirov was constrained in his conclusions by Marxist-Leninist ideology which dictated that Russia was "feudal" in that period; in other words, having a primarily agricultural economy. However, almost every Western, urban historian since the 1960s has argued that even in the most commercial portions of Europe, agricultural development of the immediate hinterland of a town was necessary for all trade.\textsuperscript{23}


\textsuperscript{22} Tikhomirov, \textit{Ancient Rus}, 63.

\textsuperscript{23} A good, general overview of the arguments for the origins of towns is Edith Ennen, \textit{The Medieval Town}, Trans. Natalie Fryde, (New York: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1979). For a recent work concerning the necessary agricultural preconditions for trade, see Helen Clarke and Bjorn Ambrosiani, \textit{Towns in the Viking Age}, (Leicester: Leicester UP, 1991). Clarke and Ambrosiani summarize the extensive findings from archeology that prove that for all of northern Europe, a surplus of agriculture in the near hinterland of a town always preceded trade.
Historians of Russia have continued to attack most of Tikhomirov’s other arguments. Many scholars have questioned Tikhomirov’s computations concerning the number of towns in medieval Russia, which Tikhomirov increased by including towns that were not within Russian territory and by using a very broad definition of “town.” Tikhomirov defined a town as any settlement with walls, a standard definition of “town” in the first half of the twentieth century.24 One of the first scholars to criticize Tikhomirov’s number of towns was R. A. Rappoport, who excluded fortresses from Tikhomirov’s list which reduced the number of towns by a third.25 Following Rappoport, Lawrence Langer continued to scale the number of towns downward by defining a “town” as a settlement where a majority of the residents were engaged in nonagricultural pursuits. In Langer’s estimation, this reduced the number of settlements that were towns in Russia before the Mongols by two-thirds from Tikhomirov’s estimate.26 Another scholar, R. A. French, proposed a fourth definition of “town,” by requiring that a town contain some element of

24 Tikhomirov, Ancient Rus, 68.


urban culture which would include some fortresses but not all. French prefers to identify "towns" as "organizers of effective space," which has the advantage of being a more flexible definition of towns. For French, settlements that served an administrative, ecclesiastical, or economic function could all function as towns; this definition corresponds with the current definition by scholars of the medieval West, unlike the definitions of Tikhomirov, Rappoport, and Langer. Ironically, French's estimate for the number of towns of medieval Russia is closest to Tikhomirov's, despite a vastly different definition of "town."

Tikhomirov's work remains the only thorough study of urban, premodern Russia despite the fact that it has been severely criticized. Recently, some historians have produced case studies that re-envision the approach to urban history in Russia. Two of the most interesting of these are by David Miller, who relies heavily upon archaeological evidence to argue that urban expansion and development continued throughout the entire early modern period.


28 French, "Russian Town," 255.

Employing new methods to study the urban history of Russia will likely result in a new interpretation of the development of Russia not dependent upon Tikhomirov. This lack of a substantial interpretation of the urban character of Russia, however, does not allow a historian of the creation of empire to ignore the issue. Studies on the urban character of the Russian Empire will extend our knowledge of urban development of Russia, and will provide important case studies to juxtapose life on the periphery of Russian territory with the established center.

THE CONQUEST OF KAZAN' AND THE CONVERSION OF THE TATARS

With the capture of the city of Kazan’ in 1552, the issue of incorporating an urban element into Russian colonialism entered into the forefront of problems facing the Muscovite state. 1552, however, was not the beginning of Muscovy’s involvement in the politics of the Khanate. During the previous seventy year period Muscovy had varying degrees of success in controlling the election of the Kazan’ Khan, from actively selecting the Khan to just influencing policy. This influence was gained from interpersonal relationships between tsar in Moscow and varying political candidates for important secular seats in Kazan’. At times, structures, including walls and especially churches, slows during the Mongol conquest, it never stops and soon resumes at its early pace. He also argues that the great expense of building in Muscovy in stone was very costly, and the ability to build in stone argues against Tikhomirov’s belief that the Mongols stunted the urban growth of Moscow.
however, the Muscovite government was completely excluded from the power structure of the Kazan’ government, when the candidate they had supported lost control.\textsuperscript{30} In one respect the conquest was the final stage of a series of developments in the political and economic relationship between Muscovy and Kazan’, but 1552 was also a clear break from the earlier tradition of interaction. After conquest, there was no autonomy from the Muscovite state. A Russian governor regulated the populace, and a visible Orthodox presence was integrated within the power structure of the region. Ivan’s first actions in Kazan’ were to call for the construction of the Blagoveschchenii Cathedral, the first Russian Orthodox church in Kazan’ on the site of his victory, and to establish a Russian trading quarter within the city walls. Before the conquest, Russian merchants were not allowed to remain inside the city.

\textsuperscript{30} Russian-oriented sources such as Pelenski’s \textit{Russia and Kazan}, or Alishev’s \textit{Kazan’ i Moskva}, stress the role of Muscovite influence. Tatar-oriented sources, such as Azade-Ayse Rorlich’s \textit{The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National Resistance} (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), or D. M. Iskhaakov, “O nekotorykh aspektakh formirovaniia gorodskoi kul’tury Volgo-Ural’skikh Tatar na natsional’noi etape (XVIII-nachalo XIX vv.),” \textit{Kazan, Moscow, St. Petersburg: Multiple Faces of the Empire}, ed. Catherine Evtuhov, Boris Gasparov, Alexander Ospovat, et al., (Moscow: O. G. I., 1997), pp. 249-252, stress the maintenance of independence despite Muscovite interference. Rorlich’s focus is upon the modern era; and Iskhaakov is more concerned with expressions of Tatar culture that were maintained through the imperial period. Despite the differences in emphasis in the Russian versus Tatar scholarship, it is apparent that despite the relative amount of influence, Muscovy was involved in Kazan’s internal politics since the time of Ivan III.
Previous studies of the conquest of Kazan’ end either with the conquest itself or with the Muslim uprisings in the 1560s. These approaches fail to explain the ongoing relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Muslim and pagan populations in the region. One aspect of this interaction has been explored, however, and that is the conversion of the Tatars. The historiography of this topic began with the work of Apollon Mozharovskii, who studied the history of the Russian Orthodox Church in the region, specifically the conversion of the Muslim Tatars that began after the conquest of Kazan’ and continued until the nineteenth century. Mozharovskii’s study closely followed the history, and successes, of the Orthodox missionaries in the region, and his study remained widely accepted and utilized by scholars of Kazan’ as recently as the seventies.

A large part of the cause for the long-term acceptance of Mozharovskii’s narrative of missionary efforts in the region is a result of the equally long-term belief that conversion to Russian Orthodoxy was equivalent with Russian ethnicity. With the rise of new scholarship concerning the multiethnic character of the Russian Empire, this simple equation of Orthodoxy equals “Russianness”

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32 Though Pelenski thoroughly cites primary sources for his conclusions concerning Orthodox-Muslim relations, he also extensively cites the work of
has come under severe critique. One scholar in particular, Michael Khodarovsky, has problematized this equation by looking at a range of factors which defined a person’s identity in early modern Russia. In his work, Khodarovsky has differentiated four categories of identity: political, economic, ethnolinguistic, and religious. In order to be assimilated into the Empire, by becoming “Russian,” a non-Russian needed to accept these four categories created by the state. Not only would a non-Russian have to accept Orthodoxy, but also the economic status and opportunities allotted to him by the state. Khodarovsky’s idea questions the simplistic interpretation of Mozharovskii in the nineteenth century, for whom conversion to Orthodoxy was the only goal of the state in Kazan’. Mozharovskii’s approach has also been challenged recently by scholars working from an Islamic viewpoint rather than an Orthodox one. Their Mozharovskii. For an example, see: “The Expansion of the Orthodox Christian Faith,” in Pelenski’s Russia and Kazan, pp. 251-275, passim.

critique of the traditional interpretation represented by Mozharovskii begins with the times in which Mozharovskii lived. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Volga region experienced great waves of Re-Islamization, or reconversions to Islam. Mozharovskii was part of a generation of Russian Orthodox Church historians attempting to uncover why past missionary efforts had been successful and why current ones were not. His biases guided his study toward those specific issues, which ignored the aspects of the conversions as a social process and not just a religious experience. One of the most interesting of these scholars, Ildus Zahidullin, also argues that the initial conversion of the Muslim Tatars, which Mozharovskii argued was highly successful, was due largely in part to the economic and social incentives offered by the Muscovite state to converted Muslims. The greatest economic cause was the tax

34 Some Islamic scholars have gone to the opposite extreme of ignoring the converted population of Kazan' entirely. This approach is equally as problematic as only looking at the converted population. See, Allen J. Frank, Islamic Historiography and 'Bulghar' Identity among the Tatars and Bashkirs of Russia, (Leiden: Brill, 1998), pp. 20-24; and Rorlich, Volga Tatars, pp. 37-40.


36 Ildus Zahidullin, "La conversion à l'orthodoxie des Tatars de la région Volga-Oural, aux XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles, et ses causes économiques et sociales," L'Islam de Russie: Conscience communautaire et autonomie politique chez les Tatars de la Volga et de l'Oural depuis le XVIIIe siècle, eds. Stéphane A.
exemptions offered to converts; the primary social cause of rising Orthodoxy in the region was the constant waves of migrating Russians into the region that continued throughout the early modern period. Unlike Mozharovskii, Zahidullin finds little evidence for the success of the missionaries in converting the Muslim population, since conversion continued without concerted missionary attempts in the seventeenth century, but came to an end in the eighteenth century with the forced conscription into the army of formerly exempt Tatars.37

The work of Zahidullin stresses the need for a reinterpretation of the relationship of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Muslim Tatars as more than merely a religious interaction, but one with political, economic, and social aspects. Many of the studies of Kazan’ to date have consigned the Church merely to the role of converting the infidel, but this is one issue among many. Neither can the interests of the Muscovite state and the Church always be seen as synonymous, as recently argued in an article by Ajdar Nogmanov. Nogmanov argues that the Russian state followed a "dual policy" toward the Tatars, at some times promoting religious tolerance in the area and at others restraining it. Nogmanov believes this is representative of the tensions between the state and


the church, and can be traced with a careful study of Russian legislation from 1552 up to the reign of Catherine the Great.\textsuperscript{38} Nogmanov, however, jumps from the conquest in 1552 to the *Ulozhenie* of 1649 to the *Spiritual Regulation* of Peter the Great and is surprised to find a discontinuous policy in a period of more than one hundred and fifty years. Despite Nogmanov's avoidance of historical events between major signposts, he and these other recent scholars have all demonstrated the need for a reevaluation of the conquest of Kazan', and, more specifically, the interaction between the state, the Orthodox Church, and the Muslim population in the period after the conquest.

The conquest remains a signpost as the beginning of the expansion of the Muscovite state and the Orthodox Church into Siberia. One other issue that needs to be introduced into the study of Kazan' is how the conquest of Kazan', and the introduction of non-Russian populace, altered the patterns of expansion Moscow had followed earlier. Moscow had been following a centuries old pattern of expansion by time the state conquered the Kazan' Khanate in 1552, but the expansion that preceded Kazan' was not similar to the way in which Moscow seized Kazan'. First in the incorporation of other Russian principalities, Moscow encountered cultures quite similar to its own. There were no or only slight

\textsuperscript{38} Ajdar Nogmanov, "L'évolution de la législation sur les musulmans de Russie, de la conquête de Qazan à la guerre de Crimée," *L'Islam de Russie*, pp. 115-130.
distinctions in language. Politics may have varied among the Russian principalities, but all were united in the superstructure of ruling princes. Russian Orthodoxy provided a bonding force that frequently was used by Moscow to encourage obedience to the Muscovite prince.

The expansion of Novgorod, and later Moscow, into the northern, sparsely settled territories never met the resistance of a strong political entity, as the Muscovite state would face in the Khanate. In this northern region, monastic colonization played a vital role in establishing urban proto-centers that could foster the settling of various northern tribes. There were no unifying bonds of a common language or religion between the conquerors and subjects, but this region was incorporated into the Russian state without intense pressure to accept Russian culture. When Moscow conquered the Finnic-speaking city of Perm in the fifteenth century, the state left most of the native institutions intact, including their own language. While the city was converted to Russian Orthodoxy, the Orthodox religious texts were translated into their Finnic language. There was not a forced assimilation of Russian culture in Perm until the late-sixteenth century, after the conquest of Kazan. 39

39 Fedotov argued that the Permians “retained such a low level of culture that they could not appreciate and preserve the precious legacy of Stephen—their national language.” Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind, vol. 2, p. 245. Furthermore, their inability to maintain their national language allowed their Russification in the sixteenth century. Fedotov also argued that all of the Permians fellow Finnic tribes were also assimilated due to their low level of
Kazan' was a non-Russian, political entity seized by the Muscovite state in 1552. After this conquest, the Muscovite government and the Russian Orthodox Church made concerted efforts to transform the Muslim population into "Russians", complete with the language, occupations, and religion of the state. This was the model for the incorporation of the non-Russian populations of Siberia as well, and also served to a lesser degree to incorporate the Catholic populations of Muscovy's western border. After 1552, the government began to search for new forms that would allow for the incorporation of this new territory into its preexisting structures, not allowing Kazan' to maintain its old forms of organization as had been allowed in Perm for some time after its conquest.

Some historians, only studying the political culture of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, have argued that the conquest of Kazan' followed the preestablished patterns of expansion, but these observations were not contextualized by events occurring in Kazan'. In particular, Nancy S. Kollmann's and Paul Bushkovitch's studies of Muscovite court rituals make this


argument. Kollmann includes the conquest of Kazan’ as a part of the processions preceding Ivan IV’s battles, including the conquest of Novgorod and Tver’. Her focus, however, is on these processions, not the actions of the state after conquest. Also, Kollmann argues that Ivan’s actions involved using the symbolic power of Russian Orthodoxy to consolidate political authority in the center of Muscovy, but Kazan’ was part of the periphery and its Muslim residents not motivated by the symbols of Orthodoxy. Bushkovitch interestingly links the conquest of Kazan’ with a developing idea of Moscow as the New Jerusalem, with Kazan’ playing the role of the conquered infidels. This indicates some divergence from earlier conquered cities in which the idea of “infidel” was sometimes but not always used for justification. Bushkovitch’s focus, however, concerns one specific court ceremony in Moscow, and not its general implications. The weight of the evidence, if the evidence is placed on the long process of assimilation and not the immediate action of conquest, is that Kazan’ marks a clear break from the earlier expansionist activities of the Muscovite state.

This study will focus on two developments in Kazan’, economics and politics, and will attempt to relate them to greater developments in Muscovite culture. The study will not concern itself with the issues of the conquest of

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Kazan' already discussed in the historical literature, namely, the diplomatic relations of Moscow and Kazan', the conversion of the Muslims, or the development of an imperial ideology. In the period following the conquest, the Muscovite government adopted existing cultural patterns and utilized them in new ways, specifically Orthodox processions and monastic colonization. The divergence from the established models began with the arrival of Archbishop Gurii, whose presence signified the increased role of the Russian Orthodox Church in the governance of Kazan'. Gurii's procession into Kazan' drew on a heritage of political-religious symbols, but for the purpose of a public display of possession in a similar manner to West European powers in the New World. Following Gurii's arrival, the state drew on another established pattern--of monastic colonization--to develop the economic infrastructure of the region. While this was not a well-developed ideology of development, the state knew that monasteries were one method for encouraging the development of a trade route, specifically the Volga. The conquest of Kazan' should not be limited to a brief look at the events of 1552, but rather a broad view of a century of cultural contact and economic development. The results for the future of the Russian Empire would be profound.
CHAPTER 2

ORTHODOX CONQUEST:
ADAPTING PUBLIC RITUALS FOR COLONIALISM

The study of rituals is much more developed in the historiography of Western Europe than of Russia. The importance of public rituals is their ability to "represent considerable political capital in the interplay of power and propaganda."¹ Numerous ceremonies displayed these types of relationships throughout the medieval and early modern period; frequently these rituals involved the use of religious imagery or materials, especially icons or relics.² For example, religious festivals involving an altarpiece commissioned to celebrate


² The basis for an understanding the role of religion in public ceremonies is Clifford Geertz's chapter, "Religion as a Cultural System," pp. 87-125, from his monograph, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973). Among other ideas, Geertz believes that two forces motivate religious activities: "moods and motivations." Moods are motivated by a variety of religious imagery, and the power of this imagery is important in influencing the
the Sienese victory at the Battle of Montaperti placed merchants and bankers in the front of the procession to the altarpiece. This arrangement placed the merchants ahead of the bishop and feudal nobility. The resulting visible hierarchy in the procession signified the merchants' dominance in Sienese society.³

In the modern era, public rituals have frequently been divorced from religious imagery, but their effects are no less powerful. In his study of modern politics, David Kertzer argues that the manipulation of symbols allows political authority to be reinforced. "Identifying oneself with a popular symbol," he writes, "can be a potent means of gaining and keeping power, for the hallmark of power is the construction of reality."⁴ One of the results with which Kertzer is especially concerned is the ability of ritual and symbolism to either include or exclude persons from an organization.⁵ This is not a unique phenomenon of the modern era. In Benjamin McRee's study of guild ceremonies in the Middle Ages, he reaches a similar conclusion concerning membership rights involved participants and witnesses of public rituals that use religion. See Geertz, pp. 96-97.


⁵ Kertzer, pp. 17-25, passim.
with rituals. Guild ceremonies clearly defined barriers in the community by emphasizing the social exclusivity of guilds.  

Similar rituals were taking place in Russia in the sixteenth century. In Moscow both the Epiphany Ceremony and Palm Sunday Ritual had become significant events, closely related to the political culture of the court.  

Nancy S. Kollmann, studying the same period, produced a broad account of all the processions of Ivan IV. Kollmann argues that Ivan's frequent travels around

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6 Benjamin R. McRee, "Unity or Division? The Social Meaning of Guild Ceremony in Urban Communities," *City and Spectacle in Medieval Europe*, pp. 189-207. See also a section on "Passages of Status" in Edward Muir, *Ritual in Early Modern Europe*, New Approaches to European History, (New York: Cambridge UP, 1997), pp. 27-31; Muir looks in general at all social rites that defined changes in status, specifically changes oriented around aging. Compared to both Kertzer and McRee, the types of rituals that concern Muir are more common, such as marriages and motherhood.

7 See Bushkovitch, "Epiphany Ceremony," and Michael S. Flier, "Breaking the Code: The Image of the Tsar in the Muscovite Palm Sunday Ritual," *Medieval Russian Culture: Volume II*, pp. 231-242. These two authors observe a similar interaction in these ceremonies of two central figures: the tsar and the metropolitan of Moscow. Bushkovitch stresses the prominence of the metropolitan, and subservience of the tsar and boiar. This ceremony, he believes, indicates that there was a close connection between tsar and boiar as a political body, and that the tsar's willingness to place himself in a subservient role to the metropolitan indicates a limit on tsarist authority. Flier argues that though in the Palm Sunday ritual the tsar was once again in a subservient position vis-à-vis the metropolitan, the important factor is that the tsar continued to lead the metropolitan through the ceremony. He does not accept this is an indication of a limit to tsarist power. Together, however, these articles provide some rich insights into the functioning of the tsarist court, and the prominent position of religious rituals in the life of the court.

8 Kollmann, "Pilgrimage, Procession."
Moscow to local towns and monasteries was a way for Ivan to define the political center of his realm. It also gave Ivan the ability to demonstrate the political hierarchy of the boyars by positioning them in the processions. The stops at monasteries also placed the aura of the sacred around Ivan, conflating his political authority with the religious authority of monasteries, especially the important Holy Trinity Monastery.\(^9\)

As Kollmann indicates, however, the importance of Ivan IV’s processions extended far beyond the center of Muscovy. Ivan III used a procession during his conquest of Novgorod in 1478. Accompanied by his male kinsmen acting as a warband, Ivan processed into Novgorod, heard services at the Holy Sophia Cathedral, and exiled the former city leaders.\(^10\) Ivan III utilized both political and religious authority in the process of conquering Novgorod. Kollmann observes that a similar process of conquest was used in the taking of Tver’ in 1485 and of Smolensk in 1514.\(^11\)

Orthodox ritual was omnipresent in Ivan IV’s conquest of Kazan’ in 1552. The metropolitan of Moscow blessed him before his departure, he stopped in

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Vladimir and Murom for blessings at their cathedrals, and he proceeded immediately to the cathedral in Sviiazhsk upon his arrival there.\textsuperscript{12} Finally, when Ivan took Kazan', he commanded that a church be built on the spot where his banner stood during battle.\textsuperscript{13} In these details, these actions resemble the basic form of the combination of religious and secular authority that had marked the conquest of Novgorod seventy years earlier.

A break from this pattern occurred three years after the conquest with the arrival of Archbishop Gurii on 28 July 1555. Following the conquest of Novgorod, Tver', and Smolensk, the cities had been blessed by the local religious authority. In Kazan' before the conquest, however, there was no permanent Russian Orthodox presence in Kazan' or a local, Orthodox hierarch before the arrival of Gurii. The first monastery was founded outside Kazan' in 1552; the first Orthodox church was founded in Kazan' by Ivan immediately following the Muscovite victory. The Church hierarchy, however, was not

\textsuperscript{11} Kollmann, "Pilgrimage, Procession," p. 176.

\textsuperscript{12} Sviiazhsk was the Muscovite staging area near Kazan'.

\textsuperscript{13} All of these events are recounted in Kollmann's account, citing the PSRL. See "Pilgrimage, Procession," p. 177. These events are also discussed in George V. Lantzeff and Richard A. Pierce, \textit{Eastward to Empire: Exploration and Conquest on the Russian Open Frontier to 1750}, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1973), pp. 64-67.
officially present until Gurii’s arrival. The need for the hierarchy was obvious; a strong presence of Orthodoxy would be required to convert the population of Kazan’ and the surrounding region. Gurii, along with the members of his procession, were intended to begin the process of conversion of the native Muslim and pagan population.

Early in 1555, in response to the request of the voevoda of Kazan’, a council was convened to decide the best way to convert the populace of the former Kazan’ Khanate. Secular figures present at the council included Ivan IV, his brother Prince Iur’i Vasil’evich and the boiars of the Muscovite court. The religious figures included Metropolitan Makarii, the Archbishop of Novgorod and Pskov, as well as the local bishops from Rostov, Suzdal, Smolensk, Riazan, Tver’, Kolomna, and numerous others including important abbots from local monasteries. Members of both groups participated in the discussion, with Ivan and Makarii being mentioned the most prominently. While there is no mention of the specific process or debate over selection, the outcome is well known. This council decided to create an archbishopric in Kazan’ and selected important

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14 Kollmann’s article does not present the conquest of Kazan’ as a break from earlier traditions. She, however, is only looking at the processions of Ivan III and IV, and the change represented by Gurii is not necessary for her argument relating to the importance of processions to the tsar and his family.

15 The Tatar populace of Kazan’ was Muslim, and the Chuvash of the region were animists.

16 *PSRL*, vol. 29, pp. 234-5.
churchmen to fill the positions that would be created. The selected group included Gurii, onetime Father Superior of the Iosifo-Volokolamskii Monastery who would become the new archbishop of Kazan'; German, another onetime Father Superior of the Iosifo-Volokolamskii Monastery who would become the bishop of Sviiazhsk; and Varsonofii, former Father Superior of the Pesnoshskii Monastery who would become an archmandrite of a new monastery he would found in Kazan'.\(^{17}\) All three of these men held positions in influential monasteries near Moscow. Ivan IV also personally knew all of the men selected. This exported hierarchy would be closely connected to events in the center of Muscovy. The responsibilities for this new archbishopric would be to oversee Kazan', Sviiazhsk, and their environs, and shortly would gain responsibility for the lower Volga, including Astrakhan. The new archbishopric was also placed third in the hierarch of archbishoprics, after Moscow, Novgorod and Pskov, and just before Rostov.\(^{18}\) This position placed Kazan' ahead of the remaining central

\(^{17}\) *PSRL*, vol. 20, pp. 481-2; *PSRL*, vol. 21, part 2, pp. 650-651; *PSRL*, vol. 31, p. 133; and *PSRL*, vol. 34, p 189. The level of detail in these volumes varies widely, but all refer to the presence of Ivan IV in the selection process. Vol. 34 does not refer to the selections of Varsonofii and German along with Gurii’s. Also recounted in Mozharovskii, “Izlozhenie khoda,” p. 11. Mozharovskii’s narrative closely resembles the chronicle account, with occasional references to the appropriate Saint’s life.

\(^{18}\) Mozharovskii, “Izlozhenie khoda,” p. 11. A short version of these events stressing the procession of Makarii, Ivan IV, and Gurii with important icons to the Frolovskii gates is found in *PSRL*, vol. 29, p. 240.
Russian bishoprics, which is surprising for a newly established archbishopric. All of these factors indicate the importance for both the Church and state in establishing the prominence of Kazan' in the Russian Orthodox Church.

In previous conquests of cities, local churchmen blessed the activities of the tsar. Even in Novgorod, where problems within the local church were used in part to justify the conquest, the local archbishop blessed Ivan III. There was no effort to replace the local institutions of the Russian Orthodox Church. In Kazan' an entire new church structure was needed. Ivan IV's actions during the conquest of Kazan' closely resembled his activities in cities like Novgorod and Tver'. Three years after conquest, the actions of the Church, and Ivan personally, indicate that this conquest was different than any other, requiring new measures to ensure the prosperity of Orthodoxy in the region.

After being elected earlier in 1555, Gurii prepared an entourage to travel to his new see. He planned to travel down the Volga with a large procession, most significantly including German and Varsonofii who had important roles to fulfill in Kazan'. Gurii's procession began inside the Kremlin in Moscow. At a church service in the Uspenskii Cathedral, Metropolitan Makarii, Ivan IV, and the entire assembled church council gathered together to bless Gurii. Before the liturgy, Makarii blessed some holy water for Gurii to take with him on his procession, and which was needed for blessings in the new see. This entire group proceeded to the Frolovskii gates, carrying church banners and holy icons,
while all the bells of the Kremlin were rung. Ivan IV received a blessing from Gurii, and then departed. Makarii then blessed the entire procession and returned to the Kremlin as well. The rest of the assembled Church council proceeded with Gurii for a distance outside the city to help Gurii prepare for his journey.\footnote{Life of Gurii and Varsonofii, Sbornik, Saratov 1073, 1630s-1650s, ff. 156r.-158r.; Mozharovskii, "Izlozhenie khoda," p. 12-13.} These activities are a close replica of Ivan IV’s departure from Moscow on his way to conquer Kazan’. The connection of these two events raises the idea of a religious conquest, this time with Archbishop Gurii leading the battle.\footnote{See above for a further discussion of the activities of Ivan that symbolized this conquest as a religious event, including Ivan’s order for the construction of an Orthodox cathedral on the very spot of his final victory.} The repetition of this blessing ritual was an important factor during the entire four-month procession down the Volga upon which Gurii was embarking.

Gurii’s procession stopped at every major Orthodox cathedral or monastery along the Volga. He first stopped at the Simonovskii monastery, where the archmandrite and the brothers of the monastery met him with a banner and crosses. His next stop was in Kolomna, where Archbishop Feodosii greeted him with another procession of local churchmen and their banners and relics. These blessings were followed by others as Gurii continued his lengthy trip down the Volga on his way to Kazan’. All of these rituals resemble the
blessing by Makarii at the walls of the Kremlin.\textsuperscript{21} These blessings symbolized the support of the Orthodox community for the holy mission of conversion. They were also a symbol of the connection of Kazan' to the Orthodox community, the inclusion of Gurii and his bishopric within Russian Orthodox hierarchy, and the deference of these other churchmen to Gurii since Gurii's position in the Church was now more prominent than the people who blessed him on his journey. In total, Gurii made more stops at religious sites than did Ivan on his way to Kazan', but the purpose of Gurii's procession was different than Ivan's. The form of the ritual remained the same, but the significance had begun to change from the earlier established pattern. Not only was the secular ruler replaced by an ecclesiastical one in the procession, but while Ivan's received blessings to sanctify the physical conquest, Gurii's received blessings to sanctify the religious conversion, or spiritual conquest, of the Tatars.

Upon the arrival of Gurii's procession in Kazan' on 28 July 1555, they embarked on a blessing of the local Kremlin. Gurii led them around the walls of the Kremlin, sprinkling the walls with holy water; in front of each gate he read a prayer for the preservation of the Orthodox tsar, his Christian army, and the entire Orthodox community. While circling the Kremlin, he made the sign of the

cross in all four corners of his new bishopric. These actions of Gurii are rich with ritual significance. By circling the Kremlin and sprinkling it with holy water, Gurii made the Kremlin a blessed, Orthodox place, and “home” for the new bishopric. The purpose of the sign of the cross was to extend his blessing over the land and people under the suzerainty of this Kremlin. These actions also invoked the earlier blessing by the metropolitan of Moscow and the blessing of local churchmen all along the Volga. It was also a sign of possession over this territory. Gurii’s actions turned Kazan’ and its environs into an Orthodox place in a way Ivan IV’s order to construct a cathedral three years earlier could not.

For the non-Orthodox of Kazan’, Gurii’s arrival marked the beginning of the imposition of a new belief system, and the intrusion of a new cultural system into their daily lives. Gurii’s procession was a symbolic announcement of Muscovy’s spiritual and cultural possession of Kazan’.

In addition to the cultural ramifications, the procession resounded with political authority. The encirclement of the Kremlin of Kazan’ by an Orthodox procession signaled the exclusion of the former Muslim rulers of Kazan’ from the power structure. Gurii used Christian rituals, but Christian rituals lacked religious significance to the Muslim residents of Kazan’. To the non-Orthodox, the ceremonial blessing was a large group of Russians dressed in ceremonial

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robes carrying pictures and books around the Kremlin. The concept of Russian control over the political center of the former Kazan' Khanate and the corresponding political exclusion of the Muslims was hard to miss. Ivan's construction of a cathedral in Kazan', while also a physical sign of Russian presence, did not have the same political overtones as did Gurii's procession. Gurii's action, however, remained a religious ritual despite the political overtones that would have been understandable to the Muslims.²³

For the Muscovite authorities, Gurii's procession was a success. The native populace of Kazan' was aware of the triumphant entrance of Orthodoxy into their homeland. Gurii's focus in Kazan' from this point forward was the management of the Russian Orthodox Church and its finances, but Varsonofii's concern became the foundation of a new monastery. The "Life of Gurii and Varsonofii" stresses the work of Varsonofii to convert the Muslims of Kazan', but

²³ The difference observed here between the intended significance of the conquerors, and the perceived significance for the subjects, is a common occurrence in the European conquest of the New World. In addition to Seed's Ceremonies of Possession, see: Sabine MacCormack, "Limits of Understanding: Perceptions of Greco-Roman and Amerindian Paganism in Early Modern Europe," America in European Consciousness, 1493-1750, Ed. Karen Ordahl Kupperman, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), pp. 79-129. MacCormack argues that European understanding on the New World was based on preconceived ideas, formed in Europe before conquest. The result is that the comprehension of the rituals and culture of the New World for Europeans was flawed from the beginning. While the Russians had great contact with the Muslims of the Khanate before conquest, the mixing of cultures would have similarly been based on a misunderstanding of Muslim culture by the Orthodox.
it is impossible to know if this is in fact the actual focus of his life either as archmandrite of the Kazanskii Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery or when he became archbishop of Kazan’ following Gurii’s death. Their combined *vita* focuses upon the attempts to convert the non-Orthodox population and was not written during their lives. It also begins with the selection of Gurii and Varsonofii and does not mention the conquest of Kazan’. The focus upon the conversion efforts made by these two is likely the result of the interests of Germogen, the author of their *vita* later in the sixteenth century. What is definite in their “Life” is that Gurii was buried in the Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery which became the foundation for a miracle cult that was actively encouraged by the Russian Orthodox Church.\footnote{“Life of Gurii,” ff. 170r.-171v., recounts the construction of a tomb for Gurii in the monastery and the laying of his body to rest. Gurii died on 5 December 1563; Varsonofii on 11 April 1576. See E. Golubinskii, *Istoriiia kanonizatsii sviatykh v Russkoi tserkvi*, (Moskva: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1903), pp. 118-119. Golubinskii adds that the relics of both Gurii and Varsonofii were moved from the monastery to a new stone cathedral in Kazan’ on 4 October 1595.}

The miracle cult of Gurii and Varsonofii has been discussed in the literature concerning the conversion attempts of the Russian Orthodox Church in the area.\footnote{For the most thorough examination of the growth of the Russian Orthodox miracle cults in Kazan’, see Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan*, pp. 251-281. For the most recent scholarship on this long-standing discussion, see: R. G.} This focus on Gurii’s life has ignored one other important result of
Gurii's activities that continued to affect Muscovite expansion. Gurii's procession became a new model of visible possession of non-Orthodox territory. Whereas before Kazan', the tsars (especially Ivan III) had relied upon a combination of political and religious authority in their own processions after Kazan' the focus shifted. As soon as three years after Gurii's procession to Kazan', this new pattern of religious procession with implications of spiritual conquest was utilized by the Muscovite state during the conquest of the city of Narva (or Rugodiv' as it was known contemporaneously).

In 1558, Ivan sent an army including a voevoda carrying a list of demands to Narva in May. In early conquests Ivan had acted with religious authority, symbolized by his numerous stops at cathedrals or by receiving blessings from the church hierarchy. For Narva, Ivan commanded that Pimin, Archbishop of Novgorod, accompany the warband carrying miraculous icons, a religious role that earlier would have been Ivan's. After Ivan's initial demands were ignored, the warband laid siege to the city. The climax of these events was reached on 11 May 1558, when, after initial failures to take the city, miraculous icons finally enabled the successful end to the siege of Narva. Archbishop Pimin was carrying an icon of the Holy Mother of God which burst into flames. Then another icon in the name of Saint Nikolai, Saint Vlasiia, and Saints Kozm'a and

Dam'ian burst into flame as well. The chronicles interpreted these signs as a
demonstration of God's will, and the resulting victory of the Muscovite troops
was due to this blessing. The siege having ended, Pimin immediately processed
to the Voskresenie Khristoi Church in Narva, and blessed it to remove the taint
of Catholicism. Following this event, Pimin began to convert the Catholics of
Narva. On 9 August of that same year, these miraculous icons were returned to
Moscow. The reputation of the flaming icons had preceded Pimin's return, and
the reception for these miracle-working icons was impressive, with Pimin and
his party greeted at the gates of Moscow by Metropolitan Makarii, Ivan IV, and
his wife Anastasiia.26

While the form of this religious procession differs from Gurii's in some
details, several parallels suggest the commonality of Gurii's and Pimin's
processions. Most of the differences can be explained through the difference to
Gurii traveling to his new see well after the conquest, whereas Pimin was
present during the conquest. In both cases, the metropolitan and the tsar, as well
as icons with strong connections to Moscow, are dominant images in the blessing
of the city. Both cases witness the blessing of the conquered city as the first

135. Vol. 21 contains the most complete account of these events. All of these
chronicles agree, however, that Narva was taken by the Muscovite troops on 11
May 1558, and also that the flaming icons were the means of success, volume 31
does not mention Pimin's blessing of the Voskresenie Khristoi Church or his
conversion of the Catholics of Narva.
official act of the Russian Orthodox Church, to be followed by the conversion of the populace. It is clear from both accounts that both the Muslims of Kazan’ and the Catholics of Narva are equally un-Christian. The Catholics of Narva are referred to as “unholy,” a term that is not even applied to the Muslims after the conquest of Kazan’. Whereas in Guriǐ’s procession, his arrival signaled the beginning of a new era of Orthodoxy in Kazan’, Pimin’s arrival and his miraculous icons were essential for the physical conquest of Narva, and his actions also symbolized the birth of a new era after that event. Guriǐ’s procession was the beginning of the Russian Orthodox Church’s active participation in reinforcing the conquest of a non-Orthodox people; Pimin’s procession and activities in Narva were a further extension of this interaction between Church and state in conquests.

Another significant similarity in both the actions of the Pimin and Guriǐ is the absence of Ivan IV in their processions and blessings. In the earlier conquests of the Muscovite state, and even in the conquest of Kazan’ in 1552, Ivan and his predecessors had evoked Orthodox rituals in their actions. Guriǐ, however, followed the path of Ivan down the Volga and processed into the city, blessing the most important secular building—the local Kremlin. In this way, Guriǐ’s religious procession can be seen as a religious reenactment of the secular conquest. Also, in their minds the conquest would not have been complete

27 PSRL, vol. 21, p. 659.
without the blessing of the Church. This idea is reinforced by the perception of
the non-Orthodox subjects, for whom Guri's religious actions resounded
politically with the exclusion of Muslims from the center of power in Kazan'.
Guri's procession, mimicking the pattern of Ivan's conquest, represented a kind
of religious conquest infused with political imagery following Ivan's political
conquest infused with religious imagery. The natural extension and further
conflation of this religious procession as a model of political conquest is found in
Narva, where in fact Ivan no longer traveled in his army using Orthodox ritual,
but a member of the Church hierarchy acted in his place. The events of Kazan'
and the involvement of the Orthodox Church in Kazan' had begun to create new
models of interaction between the Church and state concerning the conquest of
non-Orthodox people.

Beginning with Guri's procession, the Muscovite government adapted
earlier cultural patterns to fit into new situations, specifically the conquest of a
non-Christian population. For Siberia, a massive expanse of non-Christian
territory, the state would continue to adapt when faced with new possibilities.
Siberia did not have an established system of urban centers such as Kazan',
Astrakhan, or Narva. The Russian state founded new centers as the state slowly
expanded throughout Siberia. Active at every stage of this expansion, however,
were the missionaries, monks, and priests of the Orthodox Church. An
establishment of a church or a monastery in the frontier outposts quickly
followed the founding of the outpost. For the Russian state, the Orthodox Church was closely linked with its policies of expansion.
CHAPTER 3

ORTHODOX COLONIZATION: BUILDING MONASTERIES AND SECULAR INFRASTRUCTURE

The procession of Guriıı was one example of the adoption of earlier cultural patterns for the new requirements of a burgeoning multi-ethnic empire by the Muscovite government, but other examples exist as well. This adoption is most visible in the state's attempts to gain control over not only the new urban centers of the Lower Volga, but also the countryside. The traditional historiographic argument concerning the conquest of Kazan' was that Moscow desired possession of the entire Volga trade route.¹ To dominate the entire river the Muscovite government needed to seize the old towns of Kazan' and Astrakhan, and also to create new towns such as Saratov and to control, or at least manage the resources, the countryside. Guriıı's procession was an element in the control of the preexisting urban centers. The Russian Orthodox Church also became an important contributor to the management and economic

¹ Recent sources continue this interpretation, see Frank, Islamic Historiography, p. 25.
development of the countryside along the Volga. One Church institution had already displayed its ability to manage the people and resources of the countryside in Russia's north: the monastery. The pattern for monastic colonization in Russia's north was well-established for entering into sparsely populated territory, but outside of Kazan' monastic colonization would have to adapt to a new situation where it could function as part of the town's hinterland, supplying goods to the urban center.

Monastic colonization is the defining type of settlement pattern of Muscovy's northern territory, and, in fact, one of the driving forces of urbanization throughout Europe in the premodern world. Though there is still no single monograph dedicated to the role of monasteries in the development of the Muscovite north, several authors have discussed aspects of the process. The existing discussion of monastic colonization in Russia, however, has focused

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2 Two influential scholars discussed the role of monasteries in urban development: Kerner, *Urge to the Sea*; and Tikhomirov, *The Towns of Ancient Rus*, especially pp. 176-185. Following these two, few others have discussed the role of monasteries as a key in urbanization. Lawrence Langer briefly discussed the important role of monasteries in trade in: "The Medieval Russian Town," p. 25.

Historical geography has offered other approaches to monastic colonization, specifically including monasteries as one type of development, but these studies have not looked in-depth at the process of monastic development. R. A. French discussed monasteries ability to foster "non-agricultural settlements," but he was only discussing monasteries in the north during the sixteenth century; see: "The Early and Medieval Russian Town," p. 265. D. J. B. Shaw argued that monasteries served a role in the development of the southern

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more on the "monastic" element rather than the "colonization" aspect. Most Western scholars argue that there was no resistance by the peasantry to the monastic ownership of land, despite the fact that the monastery frequently seized already settled territory. This primarily is a result of ignoring monasteries' role in economic development, a role left to secular groups.

3 For example, both George P. Fedotov and John Fennel do not discuss the connections between the rapid spread of monasteries in the fourteenth century with urban development. See Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind, Vol. 2, (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1966), pp. 246-7, 261. Fedotov does discuss the monasteries' ability to receive land grants for the land they possessed, but this is not extended or related to a discussion of urbanism. Fennell argues a similar case in his: A History of the Russian Church to 1448, (London: Longman, 1995), pp. 205-211. Neither Fedotov nor Fennell see any resistance to monastic landownership.

4 There is one notable exception to Western avoidance of the issue of peasant resistance. See: Lawrence N. Langer, "Plague and the Countryside: Monastic Estates in the Late Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries," Canadian-American Slavic Studies, 10 (1976): 357-364, and also Langer, "The Black Death In Russia: Its Effects Upon Urban Labor," Russian History, 2 (1975): 64-67. Langer argues that the Black Death encouraged the government to support monastic landowning. This reasoning, however, cannot be the justification for landowning in Kazan'. Langer was influenced in his work by the Soviet scholars of peasant resistance to landowning. One graduate student, Michael Stanislawski, argued that monastic land "confiscations" had to end due to increased resistance from the peasantry. This made it necessary for monasteries to seek immunity charters from the Grand Prince. See: "Aspects of Land Tenure in Muscovy, 1480-1505: The Economic Background of the Council of 1503," The Council of 1503: Source Studies and Questions of Ecclesiastical Landowning in Sixteenth-Century Muscovy, Eds. Edward L. Keenan and Donald G. Ostrowski, (Cambridge, MA: Kritika, 1977), especially pp. 15-16. Stanislawski's argument
especially merchants. Soviet scholars, eager to see class struggle whenever possible, discussed peasant resistance but failed to mention the beneficial role of monastic economic development, preferring to classify the monastery as a necessary, but evil, stage of development. The scholars of Western urban development have approached the issue of monastic urban development from a different perspective, arguing that this development is one kind of a common pattern of town growth. This perspective is generated by a more fully developed literature on urban development, a literature that cannot be matched by the existing literature concerning Russia. The result of this body of work for the West is a conceptualization of the role of monasteries in general urban development, which included administrative, religious, and economic centers that all contain urban elements. This Western approach to the role of

seems to fit the pattern of Kazan', where the tsar' granted charters to monasteries over the objections of other parties.


6 A concise account of the urban development in the West can be found in Edith Ennen, "The Different Types of Formation of European Towns," *Early
monasteries, not treating them as a distinct element apart from urban development as in the current Russian historiography, forces a reevaluation of the pattern of monastic colonization in Russia, integrating the multiple functions a monastery can fulfill in the countryside. Though the Western literature does not have to incorporate the colonization aspect of the Russian development of Kazan', it does offer parallel cases of adding urban elements into a region with preestablished urban centers.

Another problem of the existing historiography concerning monastic colonization in Russia is the limited region and time period under study. Traditionally, historians have limited their discussion to the Russian north during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, but monasteries were integral to the settlement of the newly conquered territory in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. One reason for avoiding monastic colonization in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is the limited availability of sources, usually consisting of only published financial records and the vitae of their founders. Another issue is that some monasteries founded in the expanding Russian territory were built in regions with preexisting urban centers, such as Kazan', and this situation falls outside the model of monastic foundations in the "wilderness" of the earlier period. The issue of monastic colonization in these more urban areas is not just

the cultivation and settlement of new territory, but the relationship between
town and countryside and the role monasteries can play in this relationship.
Cities are dependent not only upon long-distance trade routes such as the Volga,
but also on the ability of the surrounding countryside to provide for its needs
and to enable growth. Scholars have termed these connections an urban
network, or "hierarchy of settlements differentiated according to population or
commercial and administrative functions."\textsuperscript{7} Monasteries function as this type of
settlement, able not only to foster economic development, but also the spread of
secular administration. The various types of connections resulted in the building
of state infrastructure, which promoted Muscovite rule of its conquered territory.

MONASTERIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE INFRASTRUCTURE

The procession of Gurii in 1555 was the adaptation of an old model to suit
new purposes. The foundation of monasteries in the Kazan' and Sviiazhsk
uezdy beginning in 1552 were a similar adaptation. The monasteries of the
Russian north that had begun to spread in the fourteenth century were well
known by the sixteenth century. Their active involvement in the northern trade
and close ties to the cities of Russia had made the state aware of their potential.\textsuperscript{8}

\textsuperscript{7} Gilbert Rozman, \textit{Urban Networks in Russia, 1750-1800, and Premodern

\textsuperscript{8} The Solovetskii Monastery, for example, was heavily involved in
commerce, especially the sale of salt. It even possessed trade representatives for
Also, the need to spread Russian Orthodoxy required an active monastic community in the new region. Therefore, after the conquest of Kazan', the state founded numerous monasteries in the new region and granted them extensive land rights, similar to the grants of the monasteries of the north in the fourteenth century. The results, however, were important not only for the growth of Kazan', but also the development of a new pattern of imperial possession of the countryside.

From sheer numbers, it is apparent from Table 3.1 that monastic foundations were numerous in the period from the conquest until 1682. These monasteries were founded both within cities, such as the urban Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery in Kazan', but also outside the cities, such as the Zilantov-Uspenskii Monastery. Though the early monasteries were all male, the list of monasteries for these two uezdy does include three female monasteries. Also, many monasteries continued to be founded along the Volga in that same period, including the Makarev-Zheltovodskii Monastery outside Saratov and the urban Astrakhanskii Troitskii-Sergiev Monastery that was founded by Ivan IV in 1573. This large group of monasteries, founded throughout this conquered region, must have had some type of effect on the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Founded</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazan’skii Zilantov-Uspenskii</td>
<td>Male Monastery</td>
<td>1552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sviazhskii Uspenskii Bogoroditskii</td>
<td>Male Monastery</td>
<td>1555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazan’skii Spaso-Preobrazhenskii</td>
<td>Male Monastery</td>
<td>1556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazan’skii Ioanno-Predtechenskii</td>
<td>Male Monastery</td>
<td>Second Half of the Sixteenth Century, by Archbishop German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazan’skii Bogoroditskii</td>
<td>Female Monastery</td>
<td>1579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sviazhskii Ioanno-Predtechenskii</td>
<td>Female Monastery</td>
<td>End of the Sixteenth Century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazan’skii Troitskii Feodorovskii</td>
<td>Female Monastery</td>
<td>1595-1607, by Metropolitan Germorgan and Voevoda Iv. Iv. Golitsyn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazan’skaia Sedmiozernaia Bogoroditskaia</td>
<td>Male Hermitage (Pustyn’)</td>
<td>1613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazan’skaia Raifskaia Bogoroditskaia</td>
<td>Male Hermitage</td>
<td>First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sviazhskaaia Podgorodnaia Makarevskaya</td>
<td>Male Hermitage</td>
<td>Middle of the Seventeenth Century</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: Monasteries Founded in Kazan’ and Sviazhsk uezdy during 1552-1682.

interaction between the native populations of the region and the Muscovite government. What the result was of the monastic presence in the Volga region must be uncovered from the extant records.

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With the monasteries, Moscow gained a solution to an otherwise vexing problem: the incorporation of the countryside into their new administration. As discussed above, the state was aware of the ability of monasteries to gather agricultural goods in the countryside and to bring them into the cities. Many monasteries sold their goods in cities. The state also held monasteries responsible for gathering taxes from monastic tenants; these taxes brought other wealth from the countryside into Kazan'. After the conquest of Kazan', the state needed to export its institutions of government and apply them to the former Khanate. Though Ivan IV quickly established a ruling administration in Kazan' under the jurisdiction of a voevoda, this was only a practical solution for the administration of the town itself. The quick foundations of new monasteries did promote the presence of monks, such as Varsonofii, who were actively interested in converting the local Muslim population. It also was one way of extending Muscovite regulation and taxation into the countryside, when monasteries became responsible for regulating and administering to the territories under their control. In this way, monasteries acted as regional centers of administration for the Muscovite state. While Muslims were initially encouraged to convert with the promise of freedom from taxation, the rest of the unconverted population was expected to add revenue to government coffers.\(^\text{10}\)

\(^{10}\) For a thorough discussion of Russian policies concerning exemption from taxation, see Nogmanov, "L'évolution de la législation sur les Musulmans
From this perspective, it is not surprising to see the government’s active involvement in the establishment of local monasteries. *Gramoty* exist which give explicit instructions concerning the construction of churches, buildings, furniture, the size of the monastery, and the number of monks and servants, as well as other items. An excellent example of this type of *gramota* is one from the establishment of the Astrakhanskii Troitskii-Sergiev Monastery, dated 5 March 1573. According to the will of Ivan IV, the Troitskii-Sergiev Monastery was to be built. It would contain a church, called Zhivonachalnye Troitsy, a refectory six *sazhen* (2.13 meters) long, a cellar thirty *sazhen* long, and twelve cells. These new buildings would be built from wood which was to be imported from Kazan’. This monastery would have twenty-five brothers and their servants.  

The voevoda and diaki of Astrakhan were instructed to support this new monastery. In addition to physical buildings, the state gave extensive land

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12 *AI*, vol. 1, p. 184; this regulation appears frequently with the foundation of a new monastery. See also: Episkop Nikaron, “Vladennyia gramaty Kazanskago Spasopreobrazhenskago Monastyr’ia,” *Izvestiia obshchestva arkheologii, istorii, i etnografii*, 11 (1893), 357-8. Hereafter, “Spasopreobrazhenskago.” In this *gramota*, from 12 January 1592, the local streltsy reported their annual gift to the Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery, which was ten rubles.
rights to monasteries, along with numerous other privileges, such as fishing
rights to the Volga and the rights to collect tolls for merchants travelling over
their land.\textsuperscript{13}

In central and northern Russia during the mid-sixteenth century, the state
had begun to attempt to regulate and limit monastic landowning. In the Stoglav
Council of 1560, the Russian Orthodox Church developed policies to mediate
between the state's desire to limit monastic wealth, specifically estates, and the
Church's desire to continue to allow monasteries to accumulate wealth. The
compromise was that monasteries were not allowed to accept new land grants
without the explicit permission of the government.\textsuperscript{14} This policy was partially a
result of extensive debates concerning the role of monastic landowning and its

\textsuperscript{13} Almost every \textit{gramota} in reference to monasteries in this region
covers either grants of land or upholds claims to land rights. Several will be
mentioned below, but for reference, see: G. Z. Kuntsevich, comp., "Gramoty
Kazan'skogo Zilantova monastyr'a," \textit{Izvestiia obschestva arheologii, istorii, i
etnografii}, 17 (1901), pp. 270-272; hereafter, "Gramoty Zilantova."

\textsuperscript{14} For a thorough explanation of the policies of the Stoglav Council, see
Jack Edward Kollmann, \textit{The Moscow Stoglav ("Hundred Chapters") Church
Council of 1554}, 2 vols., (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation: University of
Michigan, 1978). It is Kollmann's conclusion that the Russian Orthodox Church
was trying to mediate between these two positions; see especially, vol. 1, p. 436.
This viewpoint is questioned in S. V. Veselovskii, "Monastyrskoe zemlevlade
v Moskovskoi Rusi vo vtoroi polovine XVI v.," \textit{Istoricheskie zapiski}, 10 (1941),
pp. 95-116. Veselovskii looks at one small region of the center of Russia and
concludes through land grants that the state under Ivan IV did not regulate or
attempt to limit land acquisition by monasteries as long as donations were made
"for the soul." Veselovskii's narrow sample, I believe, hinders its ability to be
generalized.
effects on the spirituality of monasticism. The situation in Kazan', however, seems to defy any argument of the state's attempt to limit landowning. The state was actively encouraging monastic possession of land, and even local villages.

In the Kazan' and Sviiazhsk uezdy, the Kazanskii Zilantov-Uspenskii Monastery can be seen as a model monastery. It was the first monastery founded in the region, and though the Kazanskii Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery would surpass it in importance, especially as the home of the relics of Gurii and Varsonofii, the development of the Zilantov Monastery is typical for the region. The Zilantov Monastery was founded in 1552 by Ivan IV, one verst outside the city walls of Kazan'. The first examined gramota is from 19 June 1560, responding to the archmandrite's request to move the monastery to the nearby Zilantov mountain which was part of their lands. They were having problems being located in a field because rain was flooding their cemetery. They also had asked for confirmation of their rights to fishing waters in the Volga, fields for grazing, and berry fields to be retained over the requests of the voevoda of Kazan', who also claimed the land. The Muscovite government

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15 A good summary of this debate can be found in Donald Ostrowski, "Church Polemics and Monastic Land Acquisition in Sixteenth Century Muscovy," *Slavic and East European Review*, 64 (1986), pp. 355-379.
sided with the monastery and ordered boiar Mikhail Ivanovich Volynskii, then voevoda of Kazan', to respect the monastery's claims.\(^\text{16}\)

Other *gramoty* extend our knowledge of the monastery's holdings and their privileges. A *gramota* of 28 February 1585 is the first to mention the monastery's village of Kinder. Kinder was apparently providing too much for the monastery according to the government's expectations. In that year, Kinder supplied the monastery with 56 bales of hay, 29 bundles of oats, 10 poods of salt, and 15 rubles. This amount was apparently much more than the village was expected to provide. With the monastery becoming self-sufficient, the Muscovite government ordered that the yearly tithe from Kazan' for the monastery to be cut in half.\(^\text{17}\) This was an important step on the road to utilizing the countryside to its full potential. If the monastery could be completely provided for by Kinder and its other villages, then the state's expenses in the region would be reduced. It is not surprising, therefore, to discover that all of the monasteries in this region were in control of local villages.

The prestigious Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery, even though it was located within the cities walls of Kazan', had several villages in the countryside.

\(^{16}\) "Gramoty Zilantova," pp. 270-272. Incidentally, I believe that the flooded area was a recurring problem; later documents refer to a swamp adjacent to the monastic fields which was likely the ground of the original monastery; see: "Gramoty Zilantova," pp. 294-296, from May 1632.

\(^{17}\) "Gramoty Zilantova," pp. 272-274.
On 15 June 1586, Prince Mikhail Butiagovskii, then voevoda of Kazan', informed 
the Muscovite government that to fulfill Kazan's tithe, the village of 
Iakovlevskoe with its lands and peasants were being given to the monastery. 
The peasants of Iakovlevskoe were ordered to plow the monastery's fields so 
that the monastery's taxes (obrok) could be paid.\(^{18}\) A gramota of 5 November 
1595 gave the monastery ownership of the village of Polseka with its land and 
peasants.\(^{19}\) Another gramota of 29 January 1601 upheld the monastery's rights to 
the village of Sukhaia, which had been granted on an earlier date.\(^{20}\) These 
extensive holdings attest to the wealth of the monastery, but included with the 
grant of each village was an order for the monastery to pay its taxes. Not only 
does the monastery gain wealth from the villages, but it also assumed 
responsibility for collecting taxes in the countryside. Each village placed under 
the control of the monastery assumed a role in the chain of taxation that led back 
to Moscow, but without government expenditure to seize taxes. 

Along with the lands, villages, and collected taxes, the Muscovite 
government's interests in monasteries included their ability to encourage trade. 
By the middle of the sixteenth century, when Moscow seized Kazan', the

\(^{18}\) "Spasopreobrazhenskago," p. 357.

\(^{19}\) "Spasopreobrazhenskago," pp. 361-362.

Muscovite government was actively involved in trade, especially trade in its northern regions and also along the Volga. The state's interests in trade were varied, from encouraging Russian and foreign traders to either settle in certain areas or manage various monopolies. The state also maintained and expanded its role as a merchant company, from arranging the import and export of goods, to developing warehouses. With the seizure of Kazan' and Astrakhan, Moscow gained complete control over the entire Volga trade route and was actively trading with Persia.

The monastic gramoty of the Kazan'-Sviiazhsk region reveal some of the inner workings of the state's understanding of a trade route. In the gramoty from the Zilantov Monastery, there are several references to a series of cities on the Volga, though not with any specific references to the idea of a "trade route," as it would be understood by modern urban planners. For example, one gramota refers to the cities of Viatka, Perm, Astrakhan, and Kazan' as a group; it concerns the transport of goods, such as salt and fish, along the Volga.

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22 Bushkovitch, Merchants of Moscow, pp. 30-31.

23 "Gramoty Zilantova," pp. 276-277. References to goods moving to and from these four cities are also mentioned in a gramota of 26 February 1621, "Gramoty Zilantova," pp. 286-290; and one from 22 July 1585, see: Istoriia Tatarii
scholarship identifies these four cities as the primary stops of the Lower Volga trade route. The gramota reveals that the Muscovite state had a similar idea of the connection between these places as an economic unit.

An important result of this idea of the connection of these cities for the state was the state's ability to regulate trade along the Volga. Regulation was achieved with a system of tolls, of which the Zilantov Monastery was a part. On 22 July 1585 the Muscovite government expanded the economic privileges of the Zilantov Monastery to include the right to charge tariffs on goods moving across their lands. For example, a netcaster moving his fish across their land was required to pay the monastery one altyn.24 Another gramota dated on that same day was sent to the voevoda of Kazan', Prince Bulgakov, to inform him of the rates that had been established for Zilantov Monastery. This gramota included rates for different sizes of boats: a trading boat (tovarniĭ lodok) would pay one grivna, a small boat for fishing (botik) would pay one dengi, and a larger, ocean-

24 "Gramoty Zilantova," pp. 276-277. Though there is not yet a survey of the toll system in Muscovite Russia, Bushkovitch began to develop an argument in his Merchants of Moscow. He argued that the state was beginning to consolidate its tolls, though the granting of rights to the monastery would argue against consolidation. Admittedly, Bushkovitch's argument was not comprehensive. See, pp. 36-42.
going boat (plavnyi lodok) would pay two dengi.\textsuperscript{25} None of the individual amounts is very large, but the volume of trade on the Volga resulted in a large source of revenue for the monastery. Fishing was one of the primary trades of the region and the higher rates set for fishing boats in Zilantov's water implies not just a tariff for the movement of goods across their lands but also a fee for fishing rights.\textsuperscript{26} This revenue was sufficiently important to the monastery that the voevoda of Kazan' was responsible for enforcing the rates.

In addition to functioning as a component of the trading system by collecting tolls, monasteries could encourage further development of the trade route by establishing the resources necessary to support trading posts outside a city. For the Zilantov Monastery, this is evident in a gramota from May 1632. They were "supplied" ten granaries and two small huts inside a fortress on their land so that the "trading people" would come down river from the cities on the Volga.\textsuperscript{27} This is the most overt statement of the government's intention to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[25] Istorija Tatarii, p. 156.
\item[26] The importance of fishing rights to the local monasteries can be seen in the volume of gramoty concerned solely with claims for fishing rights. For example, Istorija Tatarii, pp. 156-157, dated 10 June 1588, concerns granted fishing rights of the Volga near Tetiushki, located between Kazan' and Astrakhan, to the Troitskii-Sergiev Monastery located in Astrakhan. "Gramoty Zilantova," pp. 292-293; dated 14 March 1624, concerns the Zilantov Monastery's claims to fishing rights to the Volga near Tetiushki. "Spasopreobrazhenskago," pp. 361-362, dated 30 March 1599, concerns the Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery's rights to the Volga near Kazan'.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
involve the monastery in the development of the Volga trade route. The purpose for these buildings was to allow merchants to have access to storage facilities on monastic land. The buildings were important for the monastery as a source of rental income. They also served a purpose of drawing more merchants down river, further developing the use of the Volga as a trade route. From these *gramoty*, there is not a sense of a greater "masterplan" of urban development that would be found in the modern era. The Muscovite state, however, did follow certain steps that were known to improve commerce.

Monasteries in and around Kazan', especially the urban Spaso-Preobrazhenskii, were highly successful ventures in terms of attracting traders and goods to the city. In a few published trading books from Kazan', written in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the role of the Spaso-Preobrazhenski's courtyard as a market for traders is clear. Several times in the book of Nikita Vasil'evich Borisov and Dmitrei Andreevich Kikin, written between 1565 to 1568, the monastery appears as a central market for Kazan' with a variety of goods and numerous merchants. Among the lists of merchants that could be

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28 Bushkovich argues that rental of trading warehouses was very common, and part of the collection of tolls along trade routes. *Merchants of Moscow*, p. 37.

29 For example, see *Materialy po istorii Tatarskoi ASSR: Pitsovye knigi goroda Kazani 1565-68 gg. i 1646 g.*, (Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo akademii nauk, 1932), p. 14 or 43.
found in the monastery’s courtyard were the Father Superiors of the Zilantov Monastery and the Troitsii-Sergievskii Monastery from Astrakhan, as well as other local churchmen.\(^{30}\) The involvement of local monasteries with merchants continued into the seventeenth century, where it is possible to find references to money exchanged in 1646 between Timofei Buturlin and the Zilantov Monastery for some non-specified goods.\(^{31}\) While the exact details of these transactions are unclear, other documents have already established the monastery’s interests in fish, grain, and salt. Thus the state promoted the local monasteries’ involvement in the Volga trade route and local merchants’ interaction with the monasteries. The available evidence supports that the state was successful in developing the economic infrastructure of Kazan’ through trade.

Another important function of monasteries in terms of the region’s administrative development is the monasteries’ role as a source of tax revenue. While the tax rates were not explicitly indicated in the documents, for the Zilantov Monastery, it is clear that the monastery was under close supervision in order to regulate its finances. The *gramota* that included the initial reduction on the tithe the Zilantov Monastery received from Kazan’ in 1585 also included a yearly audit from bailiffs.\(^{32}\) The intention of the yearly audit was to continue to

\(^{30}\) *Materialy po istorii*, p. 9.

\(^{31}\) *Materialy po istorii*, pp. 78, 94.

\(^{32}\) “*Gramoty Zilantova,”* pp. 272-274.
lower the tithe; with the reduction of the tithe, the state reduced the burden of supporting the monastery.

The issue of taxes was not limited only to the monastery. In a gramota of 14 March 1624, the Muscovite government ordered the voevoda of Kazan’ to pay Kazan’s taxes in full. The local authorities in Kazan’ were having difficulties collecting their obrok from fishing rights to the Volga. In addition to the secular authority of Kazan’, this gramota contained instructions for the Zilantov Monastery, which also had not paid its taxes in full because of problems collecting obrok from fishing rights. After the general instructions to the voevoda, Patriarch Filaret issued separate orders to the monastery, specifically ordering Zilantov to keep its fish from the Volga for itself so that the monks would not starve. The previous year the monastery had paid its taxes in fish, but claimed that this deprived them of too much food. In this gramota, after instructing the monastery that it had to keep its fish, it told them that the intention of their fishing rights was to feed the monastery’s people, either as food or as commercial goods. For that current year, the monastery was ordered to find a different way of paying its taxes and the state did not lower the amount of the taxes to Zilantov or to Kazan’.\textsuperscript{33} The Muscovite government’s concern for both secular and religious authorities in Kazan’ was the complete payment of the

\textsuperscript{33} "Gramoty Zilantova," pp. 293-294.
region’s taxes. Local issues, such as the difficulties of collecting taxes from a non-Russian population (storonnye liudi), were not treated sympathetically.  

This is one break that is noticeable between the monastery and the state; when their interests did not coincide, the monastery did not win its case. The monastery’s role as a tax collector was treated equivalently with that of the secular authority’s, suggesting that the monastery could act as an secular administrative center in the countryside for the Muscovite government.

The role of monasteries was not limited to the realm of economic exchange such as trading and taxes in the countryside. Monasteries were capable of extending the state’s administrative authority due to their legal authority. Monasteries in Kazan’, such as Zilantov, had legal rights, along with economic ones over their villages. For the Zilantov Monastery, its legal powers over its village of Kinder were explained in a gramota of 28 February 1585. The monastery had total legal authority over all matters except in cases of murder or robbery “caught red-handed,” where the voevoda of Kazan’ had jurisdiction.

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35 “Gramoty Zilantova,” pp. 272-274. In cases where the parties involved in the dispute were from both the monastic lands and the city of Kazan’, the archmandrite of the monastery and the voevoda of Kazan’ shared authority. The monastery’s legal rights over Kinder were also confirmed in a gramota of 3 August 1613, and another of 26 February 1621. See: “Gramoty Zilantova,” pp. 281-285, and 286-290, respectively.
An urban monastery, such as the Spaso-Preobrazhenskii, lacked legal authority within the town but did retain rights to regulate law among its villages.\textsuperscript{36}

For both monasteries, the ability to regulate and enforce law in their villages produced some immediate advantages. For example, in disputes over the payment of rents, the monasteries had first look at the claims. This clearly gives the monastery a legal advantage over all of its peasants. In addition, in Muscovite Russia the judge in a legal case was also responsible for collecting the fines from the case. For the state, the influence of the monasteries in their villages was invaluable. With the monastery’s expansive legal powers, the abbot could also influence daily interactions between villagers by regulating behavior through law, acting as an administrative arm of the state. Without access to legal records from the monasteries it is impossible to judge the effectiveness of their legal powers, but it demonstrates that at least to a limited extent the monasteries became involved in the daily interaction among villagers. In addition to involvement within the village, the monastery also alerted the state’s authority, the voevoda of Kazan’, of legal matters which required his attention. This connection involved the secular authorities in disputes in the

\textsuperscript{36} Each gramota confirming the monastery’s claims to a village grants the monastery the right to hear petitions from its villagers. This is not as thorough an explanation of legal authority as seen in the gramoty of the Zilantov Monastery, but its intention seems to be the same. For example, “Spasopreobrazhenskago,” pp. 357.
countryside, expanding the influence of the voevoda without requiring direct action by the secular authority. Monasteries acted as a broker for Muscovite secular authority in the countryside. All of this was done without an expense to state coffers.

This has ramifications for the extension and development of the Muscovite state in this newly conquered region. For the conquest of Kazan', the state was able to utilize monasteries as an institution of government, both by regulating law in the countryside, providing revenue in the form of taxes and encouraging the growth of a trade route. The success of the monasteries, however, was limited in some areas. The Zilantov Monastery's success in gathering the economic production of Kinder, for example, has to be evaluated against its need to have its rights guaranteed to Kinder and its populace. While 28 February 1585 is the first date Kinder is mentioned as belonging to the monastery, already on 18 May of that same year another gramota confirmed the monastery's rights almost in the exact same language. Some other problem must have arisen to cause the monastery to appeal for its privileges once again.

The gramoty raise several possibilities for this need for confirmation. One reason was that the local government officials of Kazan' were attempting to seize control or gain land at the expense of the monastery's claims. This seems to be

the case concerning the earliest *gramota* of the Zilantov Monastery, from 1560, where the *gramota* was a response both to the monastery’s request to be able to move from the flooded field and to have their claim upheld over the request of the voevoda.\(^{38}\) There are many possible reasons for the voevoda’s request for the land. For example, if the land had been granted to the voevoda of Kazan’, then the income generated by the land would have gone into the voevoda’s coffers. All of the above reasons concerning the monastery’s ability to integrate the countryside could have factored in to the state’s support of the monastic claim, but an immediate reason could be the state’s willingness to support the monks who were the caretakers of a Russian graveyard in this Muslim territory.

A different problem with government officials arose at the Zilantov Monastery in 1598, but once again it required the monastery to appeal for its rights to be upheld. The monastery complained that the ministers and couriers of the government had seized their peasants’ carts. The result was that the peasants were not able to produce the goods to pay their rents and earlier loans of grain to the monastery. This would prevent the monastery from paying its taxes for the year.\(^{39}\) The local officials perhaps believed the monastery to be an easy source of revenue and helpless to support their claims. In this *gramota* of

\(^{38}\) “Gramoty Zilantova,” pp. 270-272.

1598, however, the Muscovite government sided with the monastery’s claims for their peasants, their land, and the goods on it, such as the stolen carts.

In addition to problems with local government officials, another possible cause for the constant monastic appeals to uphold their claims was difficulties with their peasants. Several gramoty have already referred to the monastery’s occasional inability to pay the taxes which were gathered from its villages. In one gramota from 14 March 1624, the voevoda of Kazan’ received the response to his problem of 1621 when the region’s taxes had not been gathered in full. The fisherman who rented rights to the Volga fishing waters, both from Kazan’ and nearby monasteries including Zilantov, were continuing to fish but not paying their rents. This situation was deemed unacceptable to the central government, which instructed the voevoda to collect all the required taxes. These fishermen who had not paid could still fish in the Volga, but they had to pay for the privilege. The gramota did not offer solutions to the problem of collection, just mandated payment.40

The problem of fishermen who would not pay for the right to fish can logically be extended to peasants who did not pay rents for the usage of a monastery’s fields. Though in the gramoty examined there is no direct evidence that the peasants in the villages belonging to various monasteries did not pay,

there are indications that this was a problem. The extensive details of legal
privileges, as argued above, gave individual monasteries the right to adjudicate
in all rent disputes. If a villager placed a claim against the monastery for unjust
rents, the abbot of the monastery would preside in the case. The reiteration of
the rights of monasteries over certain villages suggests that the claims of the
monastery over the village and its land had been contested.

Despite the difficulties involved in monastic battles with local officials,
fisherman, and peasants, the evidence supports the conclusion that the role of
the monasteries as the link between town and countryside was highly successful.
While most of the gramoty discussed above have shown near continuous
support by the Muscovite government for the monasteries, even in cases where
the verdicts in the gramoty disagreed with the monasteries’ intentions, the result
for the state was the same. Monasteries were able to act successfully as economic
developers and administrative centers in the countryside. The connection forged
by monasteries between town and countryside allowed the government to focus
upon the preexisting urban centers, but still encourage the integration of the
entire region within Muscovite authority.

There are indications that the pattern established in Kazan’ and Sviiazhsks
was applied in other parts of the developing empire. Several monasteries were
founded in and around Astrakhan after its conquest. In between Kazan’ and
Astrakhan, the state founded the city of Saratov in 1590 on the Volga, and used a
very similar model to the development of the Kazan' uezd. Saratov began as a military outpost, but the Makarev-Zheltovodskii and the Trinity Monasteries, which were located to the north of the outpost, were both heavily involved in the fishing industry. These two monasteries generated large revenue and encouraged the development of the region. By 1634 a "primitive but distinct trade quarter" had been established.\textsuperscript{41} From this point on, Saratov only became more incorporated into the Volga trade route and the city's development accelerated accordingly.\textsuperscript{42}

In addition to the similarities along the Volga, the conquest of Kazan' was also the beginning of the Muscovite state's active entrance into Siberia. Though the government did not actively participate in the conquest of Siberia initially, it did endorse private efforts, especially with the Stroganov family and their defeat of the Sibir Khanate.\textsuperscript{43} More importantly, the government administered Siberia


\textsuperscript{42} Monasteries' abilities to encourage the development of preexisting urban centers has also been observed in Western Europe. See: Ross Balzaretti, "Cities, Emporia and Monasteries: Local Economics in the Po Valley, c. AD 700-875," \textit{Urban Evolution in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages}, Eds. N. Christie and J. T. Loseby, (Brookfield, VT: Scolar Press, 1996), pp. 213-234.

along with Kazan' until 1637 under the auspices of the Kazanskii dvorets. From this fact, it would not be surprising to discover that a similar mechanism for controlling the countryside was employed.\textsuperscript{44}

While a complete picture cannot yet be drawn, certain factors suggest parallels. The first monastery was founded in Tobolsk in 1588; then others in Turinsk and Verkhoturie in 1604 and in Tiumen in 1616.\textsuperscript{45} These dates are all very close to the founding of those towns. The close proximity of town and monastic foundation makes a similar process occurring in Siberia to Kazan's experience likely. In 1621 the first Archbishop of Siberia arrived in Tobolsk, and by 1668 Tobolsk became the seat of the Siberian Metropolitan. This Metropolitan was placed fourth in the hierarchy of the Russian Church.\textsuperscript{46} The prominent position in the hierarchy is similar to the privilege enjoyed by Kazan' in the sixteenth century. This reveals the importance of this region for the growing Muscovite state. Some scholarship has argued that the pattern of close

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\textsuperscript{45} Lantzef, \textit{Siberia in the Seventeenth Century}, p. 177.

\textsuperscript{46} Lantzef, \textit{Siberia in the Seventeenth Century}, p. 35.
government control over monastic landowning did not carry over into Eastern Siberia, where the monasteries tended to have larger tracts of land and great autonomy from all state institutions. It remains possible, however, that the result of these larger monasteries on the development of infrastructure was as effective as in Kazan'. The autonomy from governmental regulation matters less than the ability of the monastery to gather materials from the countryside and transport them to near urban centers. While it cannot be conclusively asserted that the pattern of infrastructure development utilized in the Kazan' uezd became the standard pattern for the development of Siberia, there are many similarities in the actions of the state.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

The conquest of Kazan' was a significant turning point in the history of the Muscovite government. Before 1552, Muscovy had successfully united the various provinces of Russia under its control, expanded its control of its northern border, and conquered a variety of ethnic groups including the Permians. Kazan', however, stands apart from these earlier conquests. Kazan' was an independent Muslim state, and Moscow's victory marked the first successful expansion of Orthodoxy against Islam since the fall of Constantinople. The unique relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Muscovite government in the conquest of Kazan' created a series of opportunities for both institutions to increase their reputations. In this, the conquest must be considered a success for both parties in proving the ability of Moscow to act as the defender of the faith.1

1 See Pelenski, Russia and Kazan, for a thorough discussion for the building of an imperial ideology following conquest.
Kazan' also created a new set of problems for the state: how to integrate a distinct political, cultural, and religious entity as well as its populace within the existing institutions of Muscovy. For Moscow, the solution was to adapt existing models of conquest and expansion. Two of these adaptations have been the focus of this study: the procession of Archbishop Gurii down the Volga and the construction of Muscovite infrastructure through the use of monasteries. The available evidence suggests that, for the state, adapting these specific Russian Orthodox Church attributes was successful. Gurii's procession reinforced the idea of Muscovite political conquest and heralded the arrival of the Russian Orthodox hierarchy within the formerly Muslim city. The monasteries founded within the region gathered the economic resources of the countryside and fostered the development of trade. Most importantly, the state continued some of these patterns of conquest after Kazan', both on its western frontier in Narva and on its eastern frontier in Siberia. In many ways, the building of a Russian Empire began in 1552.

Some earlier historians have argued that the conquest of Kazan' and Siberia were part of a Muscovite expansion and not colonial in nature. Several factors mediate against this type of interpretation. The process of cultural interaction and misunderstanding that marked the European conquest of the New World was certainly present in the Russian conquest of Kazan'. Each European country developed some public display of possession, which was
developed from culturally significant models at home. This is a feasible explanation of the religious procession of Archbishop Gurii. Many of the actions of the state in Kazan’ also fit better into a model of colonialism than of expansion. For example, in order to encourage the migration of Russian peasants to the Kazan’ uezd, the state offered exemptions from taxation as an incentive. This process exactly corresponds to the actions of West European countries to encourage migration of settlers into newly seized territory throughout Eastern Europe during the twelfth through fourteenth centuries.2

In this colonial framework, the Russian Orthodox Church played an active role. Current historiography limits the Church’s role to conversion attempts, and this role inadequately portrays the complex relationship between the state and the Church in conquest and expansion. What is astonishing is the facility with which the Muscovite state was able to adapt earlier patterns of Orthodox rituals and monastic colonization to a new situation. Both Ivan III and Ivan IV were well known for their usage of a public procession rich with political and religious imagery. Within three years of the conquest of Kazan’, this pattern of political and religious authority was reinforced by Archbishop Gurii, and established a new trend of religious leaders processing in political

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conquests. Monastic colonization was similarly quickly adopted starting in 1552, and the state began to rely on the monasteries’ abilities to regulate the countryside, not just in agricultural production, but also for taxation and legal administration. Also, the monasteries became integral for the development and control of the entire Volga trade route.

Previous studies have begun to show the varieties of the state’s involvement in economic development in the pre-Petrine period. These studies have not incorporated the Russian Orthodox Church as an active element in this economic development.3 Scholars of the Russian empire in the imperial period also need to reconsider the urban character of the Russian colonialism. When Russia entered into territory already partially urban, such as Kazan’, the state developed urban infrastructure by building monasteries. When the Russian state created new cities, such as Saratov along the Volga or Tiumen in Siberia, monasteries and churches were established as well, utilizing their ability to manage the resources of the hinterland. To date, studies of the Russian Empire have focused upon a multiplicity of factors, including political, religious, and, recently, social characteristics, yet no study has considered the importance of the state’s urban development or the Church’s integral role in this development.

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3 Here I refer especially to Bushkovitch’s Merchants of Moscow, which extensively documents the state’s role in economics but fails to incorporate religious institutions as economic promoters.
This study of the Kazan' region begins to lay the groundwork for a more extensive consideration of the urban development of conquered territory in the premodern era. The importance of the conquest of Kazan' as a turning point in the history of Russia should not be underestimated.
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