WHAT MAKES LEADERS “THINK WAR?”:
FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION DECISION MAKING
IN POST-COLD WAR GERMANY

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University

By

Jeffrey D. Martinson, M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University
2005

Dissertation Committee:

Professor Donald A. Sylvan, Adviser
Professor John Mueller
Professor Alexander Stephan

Approved by

Adviser
Political Science Graduate Program
ABSTRACT

This dissertation’s focus on “what makes leaders think war” or the decision making behind foreign military interventions in the post-Cold War era addresses important questions in IR scholarship on several levels – from the general problem of war through the more specific issues of its manifestation in the post-Cold War era in major power foreign military interventions to the still more niche puzzle of German behavior in this area. As it stood, previous attempts to explain German post-Cold War foreign military intervention policy left many scholars unsatisfied, leading some to conclude the phenomenon is either “inexplicable” or has some “irrational” cause.

This research surmounts this impasse by focusing on decision making rather than decisions per se, as well as by employing a problem representation framework, which emphasizes the process of option generation rather than option selection. Four broad approaches drawn from both the International Relations and German Studies literatures (realism, institutionalism, universalism and historicism) were tested in this manner, with the conclusion that German decision making vis-à-vis foreign military interventions is indeed systematic and theoretically structured, with different approaches each accounting for a portion of the behavior.

Specifically, the two most relevant approaches are institutionalism and universalism. Institutionalist thinking explains all parties to some degree, while
universalist thinking mainly explains leaders on the left. Conversely, realist thinking mostly explains perceptions of two right parties, especially the Christian Democrats. Historicist ontologies are exceedingly minor portions of the decision making equation. Disaggregating “culture” into the conceptually distinct components of institutionalism, universalism and historicism moreover provides better insight into decision making and clarifies distinctions about “which culture” different members espouse. Finally, leaders change in their ontologies over long periods of time, but tend to be consistent in their ontology scores within individual decision making occasions. In terms of the latter (changes over long periods) one can see an interesting pattern of increased support for war as complexity increases among universalists – contrary to the decision making literature’s established wisdom. In terms of the former (stability intra-decision occasion) one can see that decision makers are not cynical or pragmatic, but seem to adhere to principles in their rhetoric.
DEDICATION

To Alice
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The list of people due my thanks for their assistance on this project extends far beyond what I am able to convey in this short space. My family, in-laws, friends, classmates, teachers, staff members, coworkers and others have all played crucial roles in getting me to the point where I now find myself. I hope each one of them recognizes the tremendous personal debt of gratitude I feel toward him or her. Among these, I must of course count my dissertation committee members as most helpful mentors along the last stages of the path. Please accept the fact that no words can convey my profound appreciation for all your help. Thank you all.
VITA

July 28, 1973 .............................. Born – Portland, Oregon

1995 ........................................ B.A. Political Studies and German Studies, Pitzer College

1999-present ............................. Graduate Teaching and Research Associate, The Ohio State University

2002 ........................................ M.A. Political Science, The Ohio State University

PUBLICATIONS


FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Political Science
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vita</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>xiii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapters:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German interventions as important case</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous attempts at explanation</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed new attempt at explanation</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypotheses</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Research Design</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent variable</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision making occasions</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pragmatism proposition</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criteria for accepting/rejecting hypotheses</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Gulf War 1</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The event</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The internal and external contexts</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tests of approaches</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realist approach</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historicist approach</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalist approach</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalist approach</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monolithic cultural approach</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pragmatism proposition</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preliminary conclusions</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Kosovo

The event
The internal and external contexts
Tests of approaches
   Realist approach
   Historicist approach
   Institutionalist approach
   Universalist approach
   Monolithic cultural approach
   Pragmatism proposition
Preliminary conclusions

5. Afghanistan

The event
The internal and external contexts
Tests of approaches
   Realist approach
   Historicist approach
   Institutionalist approach
   Universalist approach
   Monolithic cultural approach
   Pragmatism proposition
Preliminary conclusions

6. Gulf War 2

The event
The internal and external contexts
Tests of approaches
   Realist approach
   Historicist approach
   Institutionalist approach
   Universalist approach
   Monolithic cultural approach
   Pragmatism proposition
Preliminary conclusions

7. Conclusions

7.1 Realist approach
7.2 Historicist approach
7.3 Institutionalist approach
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.4 Universalist approach</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5 Monolithic cultural approach</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.6 Pragmatism proposition</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.7 Summary and suggestions for future research</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Perspectives on the Puzzle</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Ideal-Type Expectations of Leaders’ Expressed Preferences</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Universe of Decision Making Occasions</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Gulf War 1 Timeline</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Direction and Strength of Ontology Change by Party and Period</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Summary of Preliminary Findings</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Kosovo Timeline</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Votes During Kosovo Decision Making Occasion</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Direction and Strength of Ontology Change by Party and Period</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Summary of Preliminary Findings</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Afghanistan Timeline</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Votes During Afghanistan Decision Making Occasion</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Summary of Preliminary Findings</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Gulf War 2 Timeline</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Votes During Gulf War 2 Decision Making Occasion</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Direction and Strength of Ontology Change by Party and Period</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Summary of Preliminary Findings</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table | Page
--- | ---
7.1  Top Two Ontologies By Party and Occasion | 241
7.2  Top Two Ontologies By Number of Seats and Occasion | 242
7.3  Summary of Findings | 265
## LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Ideal-Type Ontology Indicators &amp; Hypothesized Connection to Preferences</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Decision Maker Ontologies: Realism</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Decision Maker Ontologies: Historicism</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Decision Maker Ontologies: Institutionalism</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Decision Maker Ontologies: Universalism</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Decision Maker Ontologies: Universalism, Institutionalism &amp; Monolithic Culture</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Decision Maker Ontologies: Realism</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Decision Maker Realist Ontologies : Split-Period</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Decision Maker Ontologies: Historicism</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Decision Maker Historicist Ontologies: Split-Period</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Decision Maker Ontologies: Institutionalism</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>Decision Maker Institutionalist Ontologies: Split Period</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>Decision Maker Ontologies: Universalism</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>Decision Maker Universalist Ontologies: Split-Period</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>Ontology Score Change for Holders of Universalist Ontology</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

War and its causes have long been dominant preoccupations of international relations (IR) scholars and with good reason. Aside from natural disasters such as droughts, floods and epidemics, wars claim more lives than any other class of events. Indeed, the last World War alone is estimated to have cost the lives of some 50 million soldiers and civilian (Keegan 1989). Perhaps most tragically, wars – unlike natural disasters – are a class of man-made events. Humans make them happen. At some point prior to war, at least some people “think” in terms of “war”, thus initiating a causal chain with egregious consequences.

The present-day issue of foreign military interventions and the decision making behind them brings together those studying war as strongly as ever. With a number of recent, on-going and potential military interventions as their subject matter, IR draws on a wealth of data with which to test theoretical propositions. That said, even years of research have not helped scholars with regard to a number of perplexing cases which continue to elude satisfying degrees of understanding. This dissertation focuses on one of these examples, namely the case of German post-Cold War foreign military intervention decision making.
Fortunately the question of what makes Germans “think war” or decide to intervene abroad militarily benefits tremendously from parallel studies in other literatures. In particular, war and its causes have also been a long dominant preoccupation of scholars studying German culture and again with good reason. For them, the nefarious actions of Germans and others during World War Two demand investigation into the war’s origins. Thus, for over sixty years, scholars in this domain have asked what in caused men to “think war” in 1939, and, what, if anything, would or could lead them to “think war” again (Mathaes 2002)?

Many IR scholars have already discovered the benefits to using cultural insights to inform their own studies on German foreign policy. These IR “culturalists” have borrowed cultural and sociological insights in order to buttress their otherwise materially and instrumentally based explanations for German behavior (Desch 1998). My research argues that these efforts are a good first start but need to be carried further. In particular, I seek to contribute substantially to our understanding of war instigation and German foreign military intervention decision making by specifying how leaders’ worldviews, or ontologies, affect their decisions. Rooted in IR but drawing from other literatures and methodologies including political psychology and area studies, it seeks to test hypotheses and generate theory in the specific domain of German post-Cold War foreign military intervention decision making but with the expectation that the insights gained will in fact be generalizable to other domains as well.

This chapter is devoted to introducing the research questions of the dissertation. In doing so, I first underscore how the historical and political importance of German
foreign military interventions in particular serves to sharpen the already focal position such questions have in the theoretical literature about states in general. I then describe the leading theoretical approaches used to explain German foreign military intervention decision making, the expectations they foster, and the problems they have with the empirical record. At this point it will become apparent why cultural studies should figure so prominently in IR scholarship – namely, due to former’s already heavy reliance on the latter, but in a way that I argue is conceptually and empirically underexamined. To rectify this problem, I propose a new collection of theoretical approaches for testing in the case of German post-Cold War foreign military intervention decision making. Finally, to conclude the chapter, I list the hypotheses that can be derived from these approaches. In subsequent chapters I outline the research design I use to test the hypotheses, test the hypotheses themselves across a series of four decision making occasions and lastly conclude with a report on how the new approaches faired, what new insights have been gleaned in the domain of German decision making and where future research can go in order to improve our understanding further still. First, however, I turn back to the larger questions of the importance of this study, politically, historically and academically.

As I pointed out in the first paragraph, war is a critical area of study for IR scholars and with good cause. However, over the last half century, scholars must contend with the fact that the incidence of war has dramatically changed. Wars where major powers battle one another (like the world war mentioned above) have by all
reasonable accounts ceased to occur.\textsuperscript{1} Even during the forty-year-long Cold War, when major powers were armed to the hilt in preparation for war, none fought each other. In place of major power wars, a “Long Peace” of non-violent (if still conflictual) relations has ensued (Gaddis 1987).

Of course, all is not quiet in the world. Despite the (perhaps temporary) end to war between major powers, a number of other types of war do still persist.\textsuperscript{2} Examples include war between lesser powers, war between national or ethnic groups (often, but not necessarily intrastate wars) and – the focus of this research – war as instances involving major power interventions. Increasingly over the past decade, IR scholars have focused their efforts on explaining why wars of these nature still occur.

This research focuses exclusively on just one type of war on this list, namely major power interventions. Such examples of war stimulate IR scholarship for a number of reasons. First, as outlined in detail above, they are one of the few classes of war still empirically in evidence. Major power interventions are one of the few “places where one can find the action.” All other instances of major power war are either speculative (World War III) or historical (World War II). This is particularly noteworthy to IR scholars aspiring to be more than historians.

\textsuperscript{1} The post-1945 period features just one major power war, the Korean (1950-3), in which the US and China fought each other directly. See J. David Singer, “Interstate War” data set, and for definitions of major powers, see his “Material Capabilities” data set, both available from the Correlates of War Project, http://www.umich.edu/~cowproj/.

\textsuperscript{2} Explanations for the Long Peace as well as predictions of its longevity vary widely. Some attribute its existence to changes in beliefs towards war, much as changes in beliefs towards dueling led to its demise over a century ago. Such explanations are sanguine about its durability. See Mueller (1989). Meanwhile others attribute its existence to uni- and bipolar international power structures and nuclear deterrence. Such explanations hold that were the structure to become multipolar, or the world to lack effective nuclear deterrence, then war between major powers would likely return. See Waltz (1990). For further summary and synthesis of these (and other) explanations see Levy (1991).
Accordingly, major power interventions are the only contemporary examples of “major” powers at war. As their name implies, major powers are at the pinnacle of the international power structure. Being at the top provides perks and imposes limitations. Major powers possess both heightened opportunities and heightened constraints, as compared to lesser powers. On the one hand, major powers have greater assets in terms of their military, economic and diplomatic resources, while on the other, their increased prominence often brings with it liabilities and constraints, vis-à-vis allies and foes alike. Taken together, these special attributes of major powers augur to make their leaders’ thoughts on war particularly rich and complex (Vertzberger 1998: 116-135).3

In addition, major power interventions, despite their “residual” status, have actually maintained if not increased in frequency over the past decade. Certainly the major power of interest in my research – Germany – has increased its practice of intervention. Other major powers would appear to have done likewise.4 Also, a wide variety of means are employed in major power interventions. Sometimes interventions join combat already underway, while at other times, interventions themselves initiate combat. Some interventions are strictly unilateral, some collective and multilateral, and

3 Consider the illustrative case of Serbia and the US in 1998, just prior to the Kosovo intervention. While Serbs acted more or less unconstrained and exclusively in accord with their own interests, US decision makers were obliged to consider not only their own interests and material capabilities but also the interests and capabilities (and willingness to act upon them) of allies (e.g., Greece), adversaries (e.g., Russia), and other entities (e.g., Muslim states.)

still others something in between. Finally, there are many times when major powers choose not to intervene, despite conditions that had triggered intervention in the past.

For these various reasons, IR scholars have explored major power interventions. Some of this research has focused on major power interventions short of war, however, since my research is interested in them as a vestige of major power war, I focus on interventions that are strictly military endeavors. In other words, such events place major power soldiers in situations where they may likely kill or be killed. In this vein, I borrow Vertzberger’s definition of interventions, which states that:

“[c]onceptually ... intervention is coercive state-organized and state controlled, convention-breaking, goal-oriented activities by one sovereign state in the territory of another, activities directed at its politics structure with the purpose of preserving or changing that structure, affecting thereby its domestic political process and/or certain of its foreign policies by usurping autonomous decision making authority through the extensive use of military force [and involves] the direct, overt commitment of uniformed, combat-ready military formations, including ground forces (i.e., battalions, brigades, and divisions rather than military advisors or irregular forces used in covert operations), to conduct, when necessary, conventional ground warfare operations that are, in expressed purpose, continuous but limited in time” (Vertzberger 1998: 114).6

Finally, even with this broad definition, and despite the general agreement that major power interventions are an “endemic and pervasive feature of international relations, embedded in the very structure of power relations between [lesser states] and the highly industrialized countries [major powers] of the North,” IR scholars are unable to agree on general causes for such interventions (Lyons & Mastanduno 1995: 11). For


6 Again, in applying this definition, I exclude other forms of intervention from my analysis, including economic and cultural intervention, which in recent years has fallen under the rubric of globalization
example, a variety of responses are given to questions like: Why do major powers decide to intervene? Why do major powers decide not intervene? Why do major powers decide to intervene in the manner in which they do (Rosenau 1995; Krasner 1995)? Granted, with respect to different major powers or major power/intervention incidents, different mainstream theories of IR do seem able to account for decision making. Excluded from these examples, however, has been the case of Germany – at least in terms of the satisfaction of the IR community with regard to the conclusions drawn. This research seeks to rectify this situation by examining the decision making behind Germany’s post-Cold War foreign military intervention decision making.

1.1 German Interventions an Important Case

The importance of German interventions rests on two factors: 1) what Germany used to be and 2) what Germany is today. These factors compel IR scholars to seek better understandings of German interventions not just on theoretical grounds, but because of history and politics, many would argue, normative grounds as well.

In the first sense (“what Germany used to be”), Germany’s importance to intervention scholarship today rests on what Germans did half a century ago. At that time, Germans committed some of the worst atrocities in human history. Tens of millions of non-combatant men, women and children were killed in instances of unspeakable horror. Many millions more suffered non-lethal, but nonetheless devastating deprivation as a direct consequence of German actions. These losses were
incurred not only as a result of general German wartime activities, but also due to the special activities toward racial purification. As the nearest historical antecedent – until recently – of German use of military force, these memories cast a long shadow over the world of today. For these reasons, scholars and lay persons alike (including within Germany) are justified in critiquing Germany’s present day interventions. They are justified in asking: Are the interventions of today morally acceptable? Are the decision making processes behind intervention or non-intervention similarly upstanding (or ignominious)? Will the interventions of today precipitate a descent to the kinds of horrors that occurred before? While such questions might seem alarmist, in the end asking them is of little cost compared to price history has charged for ignorance and apathy.7

In the second sense (“what Germany is today”), Germany’s importance to intervention scholarship rests on its current status as a major power. It fits the definition of major power in many ways. Economically, Germany’s output ($2.2 trillion in 2001) accounts for on average between 30% and 35% of the entire European Union’s gross domestic product. In contrast, France and Britain have GDPs of $1.5 trillion each.

Virtual State (1999 both of which prominently feature German non-military foreign intervention. 7 The subfield of German cultural studies that examines the Holocaust has been the academic locus for scholarship on German atrocities during World War Two (although this subfield is itself shared across several fields such as history, Jewish studies, philosophy and others.) Despite divisions between “intentionalists” (e.g., Daniel Goldhagen) and “functionalists” (e.g., Christopher Browning), both would question Germany’s current interventions and the decision making behind them. The intentionalists would be interested because they hold that the atrocities of World War 2 stemmed from hatreds endogenous to German culture and psychology. Thus, intentionalists would want to know whether those hatreds were re-emerging today. Functionalists, in contrast, attribute the atrocities of World War 2 to the “banality of evil” – bureaucratic one-ups-manship, small group conformity, etc. – combined with manipulative leaders, in such a way that it could have occurred anywhere (and indeed did, as some of functionalists would argue, in places like Cambodia and Bosnia.) Thus, functionalists would also be
Germany’s economic dominance is even more pronounced in terms of its export totals; at $560 billion Germany exports are almost double that of either France ($293 billion) or Britain ($287 billion). Because of these numbers, and despite the structural strains of reunification and “relatively weak performance throughout much of the 1990s”, Germany still ranks third in the world behind in the US and Japan (CIA 2002).

In addition to economic prowess, Germany also possesses other major power qualities. Demographically, it is Europe’s most populated nation at 82 million, again far exceeding its major power neighbors France and Britain (at 59 million each.) Militarily, it possess Europe’s second largest contingent of active duty military personnel and second largest defense budget (both after France.) German military expenditures are 22% higher than the next highest spender, Britain, even without having to support a similar nuclear weapons capability (CIA 2002). Indeed, with the sole exception of nuclear weapons, Germany possess all the bona fides of major power status (Mearsheimer 1990; Layne 1993).

However, in spite of the compelling nature of these two factors (“what Germany used to be” and “what Germany is today”) many IR scholars are dissatisfied with their level of understanding over these phenomena because their theories – which successfully explain the behavior of other major powers – frequently fail to explain German behavior. As two observers have lamented:

“[t]he accepted truth is that the only thing predictable about Germany is unpredictability. Germany consistently confounds us, rendering incontrovertible theories irrelevant on a regular basis” (Markovits & Reich 1997: 25)

interested in knowing about current German interventions, but for different reasons. See Goldhagen 1996; Browning 1992; Schatz 1997.
Germany’s behavior, to be sure, has been inconsistent. For example, in 1990, Germany denied its treaty obligation to intervene against Iraq if the latter attacked a NATO ally (Turkey). Then, in 1993, Germany intervened in Somalia and the Adriatic (Serbia), to act to logistically support for interventions carried out by other major powers. In 1999, Germany spearheaded demands for intervention against Serbia, and sent its own planes to attack and ground troops to occupy Kosovo. Germany similarly intervened in Afghanistan after September 11th. Finally, though, Germany has resolutely refused to participate in any prospective interventions against Iraq today, per the American president’s plans.

Such inconsistencies are certainly vexing. When they have decided to delve into the issue, some scholars have said they make German decision making look “crazy” (Haar 1997). That said, such inconsistencies do not automatically warrant Germany’s exclusion from the data set of major power interventions. There may be a “method behind the madness”, or an as yet unrevealed pattern. Granted, this pattern with respect to German interventions is likely to be extremely complex and “triggered and justified by some combination of interests,” but a pattern nonetheless (Vertzberger 1998: 115). One change that may facilitate recognition of any systematic tendencies would be to allow for the possibility that any pattern behind a German intervention decision making will not be a “straight” explanation explainable simply in terms of one theoretical approach to the exclusion of all others.
I would maintain, however, we’re not yet to the point of giving up. Indeed, while there may be inconsistency in German intervention behavior, this does not necessarily translate into unpredictability. Inconsistency and predictability need not be mutually exclusive. Instead, we can analyze the process of German major power foreign military intervention decision making, applying theoretical approaches embodied in the realist, liberal institutionalist and cultural literatures to the satisfaction of the IR community. In order to achieve this, however, certain modifications and specifications to these approaches need to be made in order to make them relevant to the German case.

This is where German cultural studies and IR meaningfully interact. I argue that the cultural literature can help IR scholars providing insights into and inspiring the creation of better theory. From an epistemological perspective this follows a long tradition of “theoretical cross-fertilization” pursued previously by others in the study of social science.8 Conversely, I argue that cultural scholars can learn from this study’s IR research design in a way that also improves its theory; specifically, I contend that the dominant conclusions of the cultural literature with regard to the impetus behind Germans “thinking war” is wrong and that a better answer lies in a variety of IR theories of behavior. That this ambitious project is at all possible is due to the inherent overlap and/or complementarities of the IR and cultural literatures with respect to the questions raised. For the next few pages, I briefly sketch these elements of overlap and

---

8 With specific regard to the study of foreign military interventions, these would include Duffield (199X) and Berger (1998), both of whom borrowed from cultural studies, and also more generally, Allison (1971) who borrowed organizational theories of bureaucracy; Waltz (1979) who borrowed economic
complementarities before turning to the actual leading approaches used to explain 
German foreign military intervention decision making.

The overlap begins with the puzzle under investigation. As stated before, this 
research speaks to the IR community by investigating in-depth the decision making 
behind major power post-Cold War foreign military interventions, a class of behavior 
puzzlingly on the rise whilst all other types of major-power war languish in seemingly 
permanent decline. This aspect of the dissertation puts to task IR’s realist, liberal 
institutionalist and cultural theoretical approaches in an attempt to explain this aberrant 
trend in the incidence of major power war. In the cultural studies sense, the research is 
appealing for its rich empirics; it puts names, faces and policy consequences to a 
particular decision making that occurred in a German, rather than American, British or 
Chinese context.

In terms of complementarities, the research addresses the two fields by drawing 
strengths from each and using them to treat weaknesses in the other. For example, with 
regard to analytical priorities, IR scholarship is focused on creating broadly 
generalizable theories, which are then put to “yes or no” tests as to whether they apply 
to explain a given class of events. IR research is not so much interested in sustaining 
valid explanations for being strong enough as it is in rejecting alternative explanations 
for being too weak. Cultural studies, on the other hand, adopts a more flexible approach 
with regard to theory testing. Since scholars in this area are focused on explaining just 
one country, or “type” (i.e., German speaking) of country, they are more willing to  

theories of the firm dynamics; and Wendt (1999) who borrowed postmodernist theories of
allow for non-generalizable, multifaceted and idiosyncratic conclusions. Weak but plausible explanations are often times proffered alongside strong but incomplete explanations to create complex, often seemingly contradictory analyses.

The analytical priorities of the two fields are reflected in their conclusions about German foreign military intervention decision making. As noted above in the quote by Markovits & Reich, IR scholars have no consensus conclusions. Some IR scholars have even written that German foreign military intervention decision making is best viewed as “crazy” (Haar 2001). For cultural studies, however, certain conclusions have indeed coalesced, albeit into a complex brew of varied explanations including large portions of institutionalism and historical arguments, but explicitly leaving out ingredients like realist arguments, which would supposedly ruin the mixture. Cultural studies’ “conclusions” don’t speak to IR scholars, though, due to the latter’s requirements for alternatives rejection and generalizability. Cultural studies’ hodgepodge and historically-bounded explanations cannot accomplish this.

I argue that this impasse can be surmounted and both literatures can gain from the other with certain modifications. First, by focusing on decision making at a process level, rather than state decisions, this study gets at the possibility that a variety of different (and possibly competing) theoretical explanations can indeed account for a single outcome. This is a gain to IR. Second, by focusing on empirical tests of discrete theoretical arguments and using clearly defined operational indicators, this study seeks to add some precision to typical cultural conclusions. In other words, it seeks to reveal

intersubjectivity.
the proportions involved in the supposedly unique mixture of causes behind German foreign military intervention decision making by specifying the relative importance of various explanations toward explaining decisions to go to war or not go to war. This is to the benefit of cultural studies. The following table summarizes the main points regarding the mutual benefits to be derived in sharing knowledge between the IR and cultural studies communities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literature</th>
<th>International Relations</th>
<th>Cultural Studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevant interest</td>
<td>Major power foreign military interventions</td>
<td>German militarism/Antimilitarism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analytical priorities</td>
<td>Broad theoretical generalizability/rejection of alternative explanations</td>
<td>Particularism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant conclusions re: German foreign military interventions</td>
<td>Crazy/inexplicable</td>
<td>Germany’s unique culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complementarities</td>
<td>Focus on process expands understanding</td>
<td>Disaggregating culture expands understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural studies can inspire better theory</td>
<td>IR can inspire better precision</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1.1 Perspectives on the Puzzle**
In the following section, I outline several approaches that have been employed in the past to explain German interventions. Each of these approaches offers predictions of when, where and why German interventions should occur. Then, in the next chapter, I outline a strategy for empirically testing the ability of each of these approaches to explain German interventions of the 1990s and beyond by employing a novel mix of IR theory with insights from cultural studies and political psychology.

1.2 Previous Attempts at Explanation

The three theoretical approaches used in previous attempts to explain German foreign military intervention have been: 1) realism, 2) liberal institutionalism or 3) culturalism. Before beginning to describe them, it’s important to draw some distinctions about the types of insights these approaches deliver. First, there is a distinction to be made between the theorist-oriented, analytical qualities and the practitioner-oriented, prescriptive qualities of the approaches. To a degree, each approach contains both qualities. Realists thus offer an analytical framework for scholars to use in describing, explaining and predicting international behaviors, as well as normative exhortations to leaders regarding how they ought craft their decisions. Thus, in the first sense, realists model “reality”; in the second, they coyly note that to buck it is irrational. As an example, realist Ken Waltz notes (analytically) that “[i]n a world of nation-states, some regulation of military, political, and economic affairs is at times badly needed” which is in and of itself an exhortation to leadership (Waltz 1979:
Answering his own question of “[w]ho will provide it?”, he writes “we”, the United States (Waltz 1979: 207). Naturally this only succeeds if “we” accept and practice assertions regarding cause and effect. Leaders must be pushed to do so, because:

“[o]f course, states occasionally ignore the anarchic world in which they operate, choosing instead to pursue strategies that contradict balance-of-power logic. The United States is a good candidate for behaving in that way, because American political culture is deeply liberal and correspondingly hostile to realist ideas. It would be a grave mistake, however, for the United States to turn its back on the realist principles that have served it well since its founding” (Mearsheimer 2001: 402).

Neoliberal institutionalism (henceforth, “institutionalism”) similarly mixes observation with advice. Commenting on how both analysis and practice drive theoretical work, a scholar of the approach, Bob Keohane notes that “[c]hanges in our views are typically prompted by inconsistencies between conventional understandings of world politics and what we observe going on around us, or dissatisfaction with the normative implications of the actions we observe” (Keohane 1993: 270). The work that results is therefore aimed at both improving understanding as well as action.

As the following text will reveal, the conflation of analyst- and practitioner-oriented qualities as is endemic in the literature behind these approaches is unproblematic for this study. Just as Machiavelli’s advice to Medici was later borrowed by political theorists in pursuit of better understanding, why prevent others from borrowing Doyle’s insights on Democratic peace in pursuit of better governance? If anything the practitioner-oriented elements of the approaches are even more appropriate for this study than others given its focus on decision makers at the highest echelons of
state power, therefore the ones for whom such elements are composed. If decision makers are adhering to the principles of the approach it serves as more evidence for its validity (albeit on ‘practitioner” grounds.)

A second distinction that needs to be drawn regarding the approaches deals with explicit versus implicit, or deduced theoretical expectations. Many writers whose works I recount write explicitly about German foreign military intervention decision making – describing, explaining and predicting it. When citing such sources, the testable implications of the approaches for this study are easily extracted. Still other authors, however, only address the issue of German foreign policy more generally, while another large group ignores German decision making altogether. When using sources such as these, the testable implications of the approaches are implied or deduced from the literature. As with the distinction between analysis- and practitioner-oriented writings, the distinction between explicit and deduced implications of the approaches is unproblematic for this study. Regardless of the manner in which the implications of derived, each one is clearly specified as it applies to the subject of German foreign military intervention.

Having clarified these aspects of the theoretical approaches at the heart of this dissertation, I now turn to the approaches themselves. The first approach takes into account “classical,” structural variables as determinants to German intervention behavior. It is the realist approach. This rational actor model argues that German decision makers are compelled by their state’s (perceived) position within the international power structure to behave in ways that seek to maximize their state’s
gains. Moreover, with the Bundestag as the specific organ in which these decisions are made, its members should refer to realist logic in their argumentation. As leaders of Europe’s richest and most populous country, German decision makers should argue to vigorously protect and or expand their state’s position. German decision makers should think like leaders of other similarly positioned major powers, and consider interventions with the same frequency and intensity and for the same self-interested reasons as those others (Layne 1994)⁹

These expectations all derive axiomatically from realism’s core tenets. First, it argues that the given state of international anarchy “fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate even when they share common interests” (Grieco 1988: 485). When states interact, they do so under the shadow of power relationships – both their relative power relationship to each other as well as to the entire system of states. Power, in turn, is understood as the ability of a state to move other states in accordance with the first state’s will (Baldwin 1971: 71-77). “Material capabilities” are the yardstick by which power is gauged, with military capabilities being the most important single determinant to power, and even though “relative military capacity ultimately depends on a state’s productive (i.e., economic) capacity” the latter is only important due to its relationship to the former (Brooks 1997: 446).

Finally, while realists disagree on certain points, and are thus divided into various, usually dichotomous, camps (such as on the question of whether states need their power

⁹ Layne uses a process-tracing approach, agreeing with Van Evera that “if a theory has strong explanatory power, process-tracing case studies provide a robust test because decision makers ‘should speak, write, and otherwise behave in a manner consistent with the theory’s predictions.’” Walt echoes this premise,
to be constantly expanding (power realism) or whether they merely need it to be maintained (security realism)) all nonetheless share: “a systemic focus; [all] are state-centric; [all] view international politics as inherently competitive; [all] emphasize material factors, as opposed to nonmaterial factors such as ideas and institutions; [all] assume states are egoistic actors that pursue self-help” (Brooks 1997: 446).

“[T]he accumulation, manipulation and balance of power by sober unsentimental statesmen focusing above all on the limits imposed on states by the international distribution of material resources,” is the preferred manner of decision making according to realists (Legro & Moravcik 1999: 6). One of the most celebrated (or vilified, depending on your approach) exemplars for such behavior was Otto von Bismarck, the Prussian aristocrat, soldier, statesman and ultimately Chancellor of the German Empire from 1871 to 1890. His practice of Realpolitik (the origin of the term realism) toward the nations of the world involved wars, alliances, balances, concordats that were – in his estimation – extremely malleable if it became necessary to change them suddenly. Moreover, the rationales for any changes were based on power calculations whereby Bismarck thought his state had something to gain by making the change. Thus, Prussia’s policy was to ally with Austria in 1864, when the latter could help it get half of Schleswig-Holstein, and then to switch sides and attack Austria two years later in order to get the other half – amity pursuant to material gain followed by enmity pursuant still more material gain. In the words of another 19th century realist writing: “Ideally, one should also seek evidence showing that the key elites made the choices they did via a process of reasoning at least roughly similar to the mechanisms implied by the model” (1999: 35).
practitioner, Lord Viscount Palmerston, states have “no eternal allies and no perpetual enemies, only interests that [are] eternal and perpetual” (Brown 2002: 82-83).

As a consequence, ideas and institutions like democracy take secondary importance to material interests. Leaders who for whatever reason fail to respond “realistically” to international affairs risk political or national suicide (Wolfers 1949: 187-189; Waltz 1979: 195). Thus, after World War Two, Hans Morgenthau (like Bismarck both German and a realist) implored American leaders to adhere to the tenets of realism in their foreign policy decision making in contrast to their alleged practice of Wilsonian idealism during the interwar period (Morgenthau 1948). As a realist, he recommended this even though Wilson’s idealism was grounded democratic concepts, hallmarks of the American ethos, and thus making realism seem rather amoral in comparison. Morgenthau and his compatriots counter argued that their approach was in fact the more moral of the two, since realism dealt with the world as it truly existed – in anarchy, with power the currency of the realm, and with war a regrettable but useful *ultima ratio* that can provide gains (or decreased losses) to states. Thus, as one realist noted:

“Much of what strikes people as immoral practices of governments may prove to be morally justified by the peculiar and unhappy circumstances which the statesman has to face and which, moreover, he may often be unable to change[…]” (Wolfers 1949: 177).

To deal then or today via any other approach was and is to be hopelessly naïve and to commit the same mistakes whose results were World War Two (Carr 1946). Such morality is absurd in the eyes of realists such as Arnold Wolfers, who wrote:
“If men are held to be morally bound to act in accordance with an absolute ethic of love such as the Sermon on the Mount, obviously no set of circumstances, even circumstances in which the survival of the nation were at stake, could justify acts such as a resort to violence, untruthfulness, or treaty violation. The concern for self-preservation and power in itself would be evil” (Wolfers 1949: 178).

In the decades that followed this advice Morgenthau and his successors continued to preach realism to practitioners and prospered as theorists of the approach, becoming the most dominant approach in IR scholarship. By the early 1990’s, realist theorists promoting the approach were among the first to attempt to explain and predict German foreign military intervention decision making during the post-Cold War era (Mearsheimer 1990; Layne 1993; Pedersen 1998; Grieco 1999; Loriaux 1999; Waltz 2000). Mearsheimer predicted German acquisition of nuclear weapons as “[t]he most likely scenario” and argues this is a good thing; “Germany will feel insecure without nuclear weapons; and Germany’s great conventional strength gives it significant capacity to disturb Europe if it feels insecure” (1990: 110-111). He specifically prophesizes foreign military interventions noting Germany and other European major powers:

“would still compete for influence among the lesser powers and be drawn into lesser-power conflicts. The superpowers, despite the security that their huge nuclear arsenals provide, have competed intensely for influence in remote, strategically unimportant areas such as South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Central America. The European powers are likely to exhibit the same competitive conduct, especially in Eastern Europe, even if they possess secure nuclear deterrents” (Mearsheimer 1990: 112).

Similarly, Layne foresaw a Germany that would be functionally like any other major power, including the US. He interpreted examples of Germany “exerting its
leadership in European security affairs” and the “rejection of external constraints heretofore imposed on its behavior” as harbingers of deepening “ambitions and interests” and that it would soon “emulate the United States and acquire the full spectrum of great power capabilities, including nuclear weapons” (Layne 1993: 162). Since the US conducts military interventions, as well as possesses nuclear weapons, the implications are clear. On the latter, Layne continues where Mearsheimer left off, writing “[it] seems to be widely understood, in the United States and in Germany […] that their accession to the nuclear club is only a matter of time” (Layne 1993: fn 133). Finally, Loriaux concludes his discussion of Germany’s intervention decision making in the early 1990’s, including a deployment to Bosnia in 1995, with the observation that “growing responsibilities in international security affairs” for Germany will translate into even greater “activity and independence” (Loriaux 1999: 368).

Unfortunately for fans of realism, however, most of these accounts have not been borne out in scholarly analyses of German decision making. Obviously incorrect were predictions of a German nuclear arsenal. Even on the more subtle points of “more activity and independence”, though, the evidence does not seem to support the realist expectations. For example, Baumann et al.’s consideration of overall German military behaviors in the post-Cold War years did not fit the realist approach’s predictions (Baumann et al. 2001). What’s more, neither power nor security realism seem to explain German decisions. While some of these conclusions are irrefutable (i.e.,

---

10 Baumann et al. tested both “Waltzian” and “Waltian” neorealism.
11 Even attempts to explain German foreign policy as one which is institutionally embedded (and constrained) by its membership in organizations such as NATO and the EU have failed to unravel the puzzle; both organizations have been run roughshod by Germany – once in the case of Desert Storm,
German nuclearization did not occur) I disagree with the whole-cloth rejection of the realist approach. I expand on this argument later, but not before describing the next two commonly used approaches for explaining the puzzle under study.

The second approach, institutionalism, also argues that German decision makers are interested in the material costs and benefits their country faces as a result of their choices. The divergence from realism is that in the institutionalist theoretical approach, calculations are made in absolute rather than relative terms. Despite a shared recognition of international disagreements, institutionalists believe that “‘conflict coexists with significant room for mutual gains’ (Martin 1992: 513; Janning 1996; Hellmann 1996). In addition, when the very existence of the state is not at stake – which they argue is exceedingly unlikely – leaders can rely on institutions to foster the kinds of more efficient action that lead to such gains. For example, problems of collaboration such as world food production, or problems of coordination such as pollution, represent issue areas where states never care who gains more than others, so long as all gain somewhat. For realists, in contrast, it will likely make a difference whether food aid is going to a state such as Iraq or North Korea versus Mexico or The Philippines. Institutionalists posit the same collaborative motives to certain kinds of interventions to end instability and bloodshed abroad. The resulting decisions are expected to be “cooperative,” broadly defined. To wit, the cooperation is “not equivalent to harmony,” but rather simply what occurs “when actors adjust their

when Germany leaders made clear their intention that German aircraft not to attack Iraq were Turkey (a NATO ally) attacked by Iraq, and again in the case of Germany’s diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, against the express wishes of its EU partners.
behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others” (Axelrod & Keohane 1985: 226).

While the institutionalist literature is dispossessed of the same pinpoint predictions for German behavior or even the same general focus on security issues, two strands of the approach have important implications for deriving expectations for this study: the Democratic Peace Proposition and the Concert/Collective Security argument.

The Democratic Peace Proposition (DPP) claims as its patron saint Immanuel Kant, the late Enlightenment German philosopher and author of “On the Perpetual Peace”(1795 [1932]). In it, Kant argued that international institutions, international trade and republican government would serve to bring peace to regions of the world where those qualities existed. The aforementioned Wilsonian idealism of the early 20th century was the intellectual offspring of this argument, as is the current argument for DPP. Six principles are elaborated in this current permutation:

1) leaders that are democratically elected do not need to turn to external ambition as a means of legitimating their rule; 2) the masses – the sector which stands to lose the most and gain the least from war– can use the electoral process to prevent elites from engaging the state in war; 3) citizens in one democratic state will respect the political structure of other democratic states, and therefore be hesitant to engage in hostilities against them; 4) the electoral process tends to produce elites that are risk-averse and policies that are centrist – both attributes militating against decisions for war; 5) states willing to submit to the rule of law and civil society at the domestic level are more likely to submit to the their analogues at the international level; 6) democratic debate exposes policy to the marketplace of ideas, thereby allowing unsound ideas to be critically evaluated and challenged” (Kupchan & Kupchan 1991: fn 100; Doyle 1983).
Monadically, or as it pertains to a single country, the DPP strand of institutionalism thus expects to see these principles exhibited as characteristics in the behavior of German foreign military intervention decision making (Keller 2005). In terms of those that are most conceptually and empirically distinct from realism’s expectations, these would be points two and three – institutional respect – because in the realist approach institutions (and all ideas) are epiphenomenal to what is truly significant in international relations – state power.

A second strand of relevant institutionalist theory, on collective and concert security, also looks to the early 19th century for its intellectual roots. In this case the root is the Concert of Europe, formed in 1815 and eventually including Austria, Britain, France, Germany and Prussia. This early institution was a loosely regulated body created for maintaining international peace after the Napoleonic Wars. One hundred years later, leaders imbued with Wilsonian idealism expanded the idea of peace maintenance to include all countries of the system, creating collective security, and formalized its regulation into the League of Nations. The failure of both these organizations did not end institutionalist attempts to influence decision makers, and in 1945 the UN was founded on a hybrid Concert/Collective basis. The Security Council was to serve as the major power forum (concert security), with the General Assembly giving voice to all states equally (collective security). Finally, in the 1990’s, and despite a 40-plus year history of UN dysfunction, some institutionalists were expecting the greatest successes from concert/collective security institutions yet (Bennett et al. 1993). Kupchan & Kupchan envisioned German participation in such a system and:

25
“the security group would undertake joint diplomatic and military initiatives. Such actions could range from joint declarations of policy, to joint recognition of newly independent states, to coordinated peacekeeping activities. The demand for peacekeeping in Europe is likely to be related to border conflicts arising from national and ethnic rivalries. Forces might be needed to prevent hostilities, to circumscribe fighting, or to enforce a ceasefire” (1991: 156).

Far from being a minor player in this group, they also envisioned a major role for Germany, since the nucleus for it would be NATO and “the United States, Britain and Germany effectively call the shots in NATO” (1991: fn 122). That said, Germany would be bound to it’s allies and the rules and procedures of the organization were it become time to intervene or not intervene. Here again, Germany’s "democraticness" would be expected to make such alliance commitments tremendously strong (Reed 1997).

While the nature of these “expectations” are probably more exhortative that predictive, they nonetheless provide a set of criteria by which to gauge the institutionalist approach’s ability to account for German post-Cold War foreign military intervention decision making. Also, an institutionalist approach seems particularly well-suited to an examination of Bundestag decision making, given the latter’s inherent bias towards rules, procedures and organizations. Of course, this is practically the definition of Bundestag – an elected (i.e., procedurally instantiated) federal diet (i.e., organization) of legislators (i.e., rule-makers.) While these characteristics are to a certain extent present in all parliamentary set-ups and would therefore be expected to generate some level of bias in favor of institutionalist explanations for behavior, the tendency is perhaps even stronger in Germany. As compared to the US legislature, for
example, “Germans […] are more inclined to defer to ‘the state,’ [i.e., an institution] which is often identified with the government [whereas] Americans inherently distrust the state and seek to minimize and diffuse its power” (Thaysen Uwe et al. 1990: 539)

These biases hold up in survey results of individual German parliamentarians which illustrate a strong institutional conformity when it comes to perceived roles and norms of behavior (Herzog et al. 1990: 101-109).\textsuperscript{12}

Up to this point, and despite these embedded inclinations towards institutionalist explanations, though, institutionalism (again like realism) seems to have some difficulty explaining patterns of German decision making. Above all, it does not explain instances when German decision makers have deviated from the preferences of institutions or the letter of law, either in its general foreign policy (as when Germany ignored the EU and recognized Slovenia and Croatia unilaterally) or in specific regard to foreign military interventions (as when Germany moved from non-interventionism to interventionism without changing an iota of its Grundgesetz, an averred legal basis for its inability to use force abroad.) Other deviations have included disavowing alliance pressures in 1991 and 2003 as well as contravening the wishes of the UN in 1999. I argue nevertheless that much support can still be found for institutionalism especially if modifications are made to the methodology of testing it as an explication for decision making.

\textsuperscript{12} For example, a majority of members answered the same way (85% - Dual Model, Government vs. Opposition) when asked “What model best describes the relationship between parliament and government in Germany?” Moreover, the variance was small when differentiated by party between 89% and 73%. These examples of conformity demonstrate a strong shared commitment to institutional norms and hence further underscore the potential bias towards an institutionalist approach in analysis of German foreign military intervention decision making.
In addition to the “pure” forms of realist and institutionalist approaches, however, there are also those who espouse a synthesis of the two. Among realists, these include “modified structural realists” such as Krasner (1982; 1991) whereas among institutionalists their ranks include “realist” institutionalists such as Krebs (1999). Many of these synthetic works are criticized for playing fast and loose with core tenets of their foundational approaches (e.g. Legro and Moravcsik 1999). That said, analyses like those of Katzenstein (1997) which foresees a “European Germany” which aggressively pursues its interests (i.e., realism) on behalf of a pan-European entity (i.e., institutionalism) is a potentially useful combination of approaches which this study will consider. Empirically, one would observe German decision makers using the same cost benefit and relative gains calculations as expected by the realist approach, but with the relevant body of concern being supranational institutions, such as NATO or the EU, as expected by the institutionalist approach, and, hence, not the state bodies expected to be relevant by realists.

The third commonly used approach is culturalism, and as its name suggests, it makes culture the central factor in explaining German foreign policy. Unsurprisingly, this approach has borrowed great portions of its content from cultural studies although it also has a more “purely” political science provenance in the form of the political culture works of Ingelhart (1971) the social capital work of Putnam (1983), and the identity works of Wendt (1992), among others (Holsti 1970; Herrmann 1986). Scholars appropriating these insights to explain the particulars of German behaviors in their work have included Hanrieder (1982), Maull (1990), Katzenstein (1997), Desch (1998),
Berger (1998) and Duffield (1999). Such explanations emphasize the impact that beliefs in a special “German role” have on the preferences of decision makers. In particular, German decision makers are argued to have developed a unique post-World War Two aversion to militarism generally and interventionism specifically. This aversion takes the form of an all-encompassing *culture* of antimilitarism. Over time, in a self-reinforcing cycle, this culture has fostered the establishment of and respect for institutions (e.g., organizations, laws, principles) which then *further* strengthen the culture. In this last regard – the emphasis on institutions – culturalism thus overlaps significantly with institutionalism.

From this its also obvious that another important component of the culturalist approach: socialized historical memory. In other words, even without direct personal experience of World War Two or the Nazi time, German decision makers are expected to nonetheless use those events as a reference point for their decision due to their having been socially experienced and instilled as ersatz memories through the particular German culture. As Berger writes:

“[M]odels used in the study of international relations by and large fail to deal systematically with the political culture and historical memory. Researchers studying German foreign policy encounter a super-abundance of references to historical issues in the German public discourse on defense and national security” (2002: 78-79).

Continuing he notes:

“[T]he emphasis on non-military instruments are rooted in a distinctive interpretation of the German past and of German national identity that has come to permeate the entire German political system”(Berger 2002: 80).
Slightly different versions of the approach however grant that culture has a varied impact on different leaders, based on their position along the political spectrum. Leaders from the right of the political spectrum, for example, are expected to be less constrained by this culture of antimilitarism than leaders from the left. This version expects slight differences amidst a context of overall similarity such that “German political controversies concern which international context to choose, the United Nations for peacekeeping operations, as the center-left prefers, or NATO for peace enforcement, as the center-right maintains” (Katzenstein 1997: 33). Again, these differences notwithstanding “[t]hat the context for military action must be international, is however, beyond dispute in Germany” (Katzenstein 1997: 33).

In effect, the culturalist approach posits “role” predispositions that are shared across the political spectrum within the German society; in the intervention context, German rightists are expected think more like German leftists than like British or French rightists. Conversely, the cultural argument does not posit that German leaders will necessarily foist their beliefs onto leaders of other major powers, nor that they will necessarily use those beliefs to judge the actions of others. Rather, the approach argues that culture describes a particular “role”, unique to Germans, which will stimulate or hamper particular kinds of thinking. Vis-à-vis the dominant IR approach culturalists conclude that their approach:

“create[s] obvious anomalies for a realist interpretation. For example, there are virtually no traces of Germany’s return to realist “normalcy,” to balance of power politics in an anarchical international system. Germans shun the concepts and practice of power politics (Machtpolitik) and balancing (Schaukelpolitik). Only in a few restricted intellectual quarters has German unification led to a renewed interest in the theory and practice of political realism. To date, this
intellectual interest has remained without any apparent wider political resonance in Germany… In addition to historical, psychological and political reasons for their current lack of appeal, we need to consider also the intellectual shortcomings of realist analyses” (Katzenstein 1997: 9).

While the culturalist approach seems to do the best job of explaining German post-Cold War foreign military intervention decision making, it still has problems with the empirical record on a couple of points. First, in its “blanket-effect” version, it fails to explain some rather extreme differences in thinking between various leaders in different parties. Also, even the versions that make allowances for “right-left” differences do not adequately explain intra-party disagreement. This is especially evident in a case where many in a generation of leaders who had devoted much of their lives to the abolition of armed conflict (in particular, the Greens) suddenly became some of the most vociferous advocates of intervention. Indeed, the German shift in governance from center-right (ostensibly less culturally constrained) to center-left (ostensibly more constrained) actually correlated with an increase in German foreign military interventions. Finally, the legal and institutional component of the cultural approach, like the institutionalist approach itself, does not explain instances when German decision makers have deviated from the preferences of institutions or the letter of law. I argue that the culturalist approach can be improved by disaggregating it into its constituent parts, which can then in turn be used to better explain German behavior of the type under study. In the following section I describe a new collection of theoretical approaches that I includes this disaggregation of culturalism as well as improvements to our tests of the realist and institutionalist approaches.
1.3 Proposed New Attempt at Explanation

The alleged failure of extant approaches to explain German decision making I contend is more likely due the specifications of the theories and research designs than to flaws in the underlying theoretical logic. Specifically, I propose three theoretical and methodological modifications that will make for better tests of the realist, institutionalist and culturalist approaches.

First, I propose the use of process level of analysis, which is better at explaining decision making as distinct from decisions. Second, I advocate the disaggregation of the culturalist approach into constituent parts, one of which overlaps with the institutionalist approach, but to which can also be added two others, namely “historicism” and “universalism”. Finally, I suggest broadening the testing allowances to measure the relative strengths of each approach toward explaining German post-Cold War foreign military decision making, rather than stipulating unequivocal “yes or no” rejection of alternatives.

As the first proposal suggests, process level examinations, specifically focusing on the thinking being employed by decision makers, offer the most leverage with respect to decision making studies. It is human decisions and human interactions that are ultimately responsible for the occurrence of war, including major power interventions. While many of these decisions may be subsequently filtered or modified through interactions with other environmental variables (e.g., decisions by others,
existing material capabilities, etc.), the initial human decision making process is a necessary condition for intervention. This study is thus primarily interested in such initial inputs to war causation, as they are generated in the minds and words of men and therefore exemplifies “a psychologically oriented approach to foreign policy [...] emphasizing the pervasive influence of boundaries on decisions imposed by cognitive mechanisms and personality structure rather than the environmental constraints represented by the contextual variables of power, interests, and domestic opinion” (Walker et al. 1999: 612). Other levels of analysis, such as systemic or domestic levels of analysis, cannot account for many of the particularistic processes that drive the thinking of men. These other levels of analysis are indeed useful in their own ways, but foreign policy analysis aims for less abstraction. It pursues international relations scholarship “from the heart of necessary microfoundational theoretical work in IR” and recognizes, as does this study, that in the first instance “[a]ll that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision makers acting singly or in groups” (Hudson 2005: 1).

Accordingly, the outcome of interest to this study is not German intervention policy per se. Instead, it focuses on expressed decision maker preferences with respect to intervention. There are a number of reasons why actual German policy might differ from these expressed preferences. For example, the precipitating crisis might resolve itself before a decision can be made (e.g., an enemy leader might die), or another crisis might supercede the first (e.g., a catastrophe on one’s home territory superceding a threat to a some distant ally). For these and other reasons, expressed decision maker
preferences for intervention may not always correlate with actual German intervention. However, it is highly likely that expressed preferences will always be in evidence when interventions *do* occur. They therefore represent a necessary – if not sufficient – factor.

This focus on individuals and processes is consistent with other tests of realist, institutionalist and culturalist approaches (although the norm with the first two approaches would be to use a system or organizational level test.) Berger, for example, an advocate of cultural explanations in German post World War Two case, utilizes an “in-depth analysis of the statements of the chief participants in the opinion-forming segments of society [in which] Public opinion data, popular culture and other reflections of popular attitudes can be used as supplements [...] although political scientists may wish to focus in the first instance on the political debate” (2002: 81). Similarly, Welch’s cultural analysis of five great power wars between 1870 and 1982 uses five types of evidence for individual behavior: public statements and documents; private statements and internal documents; published accounts from contemporary journals; the conclusions of historians; and circumstantial evidence (1997: 33-39). Finally, Mastanduno’s test of realism’s explanatory power in the case of US policy toward Japan is accomplished through the analysis of the public and private “contemplations” of individual “policy-makers” and the “policy process” which those individuals and their thoughts fashioned (1991: 73-75).

Finally, in order to facilitate a process level of analysis, I apply concepts and methods developed in the problem representation literature. The many examples in Sylvan & Voss (1998) demonstrate how these concepts and methods can be used to
specify how options are specified in the first place, prior to any cost/benefit or other calculations that lead leaders to select certain options over others. This literature is actually quite broad in its foci and methods of inquiry, but overall the lessons imparted by them lend themselves to the study of German foreign military intervention decision making. In particular, problem representation studies help in cases where seemingly vast disagreements exist among leaders over not only option selections but also over which options are, or are not, even conceivable. The alternative, namely “the usual emphasis on option selection without acknowledgement of ontology and problem representation is tantamount to concentrating carefully on a tail while being unaware that its movement is being controlled by a dog” (Sylvan & Thorson 1992: 727).

Studies of problem representation are motivated by the same lessons of the “cognitive revolution” as a number of other individually and empirically grounded approaches to IR. Chief among them is the charge to “devise methods that have a sound theoretical base for inferring the values that give our cognitive frames and games explanatory power” (Herrmann 1988: 175). In other words, in terms of IR, by what logic does one infer the presence of realist perception among decision makers? The presence of institutionalism? A number of approaches have addressed this concern and include the national role conception work of Holsti (1970); the national images work of Cottam (1977) and Herrmann & Fischerkeller (1995); and the operational code work of George (1969) and Walker (1977), among others. Problem representation works share the perspective of these examples in that “the rationality of individuals and nation-states [is] and open question” (Sylvan & Voss 1998: 5). In terms of this study the relevant
connection is the shared acceptance that the totality of decision makers’ perceptions may incorporate dissonant elements that are “objectively” irrational (e.g., hard-core realism and hard-core culturalism), but that are nonetheless comprise a functioning and systematic decision making process.

The conceptualization of problem representation specifies two chief theoretical components: ontologies and problem representations, and I focus on the former. It describes the general “Weltanschauung” possessed by a decision maker and “consist of objects and the relations among those objects. The contents of an ontology do serve to constrain or undermine certain policy arguments” (Sylvan & Thorson 1992: 728). Ontologies can be examined with different levels of detail, usually relating to the specificity of the particular issue area (e.g., foreign policy versus foreign aid policy versus foreign aid policy in Africa, etc.) Partially as a result, scholars have observed ontologies as being both consistent and inconsistent, or varying, within national groups (Breuning 1998; Voss et al. 1998). For the purposes of this study, I expect and therefore measure for variation among German decision makers.

This study’s next “new” proposal calls for a disaggregation of the culturalist theory, which is essentially the dominant explanatory approach in cultural studies and has been used by some in IR to explain the German case. I rename this the “monolithic cultural approach”. Again, this approach has been the most successful in its explanatory abilities, but I maintain that a disaggregation will allow for even more precise pronouncements about the impact (or non-impact) of culture on decision making.
As stated above, one of the components of the culturalist approach is already specified in the theory of institutionalism, creating a problem of redundancy. Two other components are distinct in their own right, however. Each can be conceived of and operationalized independent of the other. The first is the emphasis on history. As a component of culturalism, it is expected that German decision makers will have as their constant cue the disastrous and transformative experience of the Nazi period and World War Two. The events of those years, whether experienced first-hand or conveyed through socialization, are argued to continuously impart explicit lessons guiding behavior in the present. These lessons are argued to convey edicts on matters ranging from fiscal policy to foreign policy, and are thus an important aspect of the culturalist approach. For lack of a better term, I call this the “historicist” approach, or “historicism.”

The remaining component focuses on the value of “universalism”. Here, a value is understood a “general, relatively stable guiding principles in our lives that influence perception, evaluation and behavior” (Cohrs 2002). As such, values have a number of interesting traits. First, values exist as “priors” to political decision making. In other words, values influence political preferences more than political preferences influence values. Second, people can possess certain values and not others, and certain values can exist in opposition to each other, so that possession of some value “A” might mean that some value “Z” is almost certainly not in possession.

Universalism as an approach is drawn from the literature on German post-Cold War political psychology (Cohrs 2002). In addition, universalism is one of the
components of the Schwartzian Value Inventory, also know as the Schwartzian circumplex of values, which illustrates a variety of complementary, orthogonal and oppositional values (Schwartz 1992). Universalist values represent concerns “for the good of all mankind, world harmony, and world peace” and are perceived, as components of culturalism, as moving German decision makers to support or not support intervention. People possessing universalist values are generally seen as opposed to interventions, and universalism itself is seen as oppositional to alternate values that might be thought of as realist (i.e., the “aggrandizement” value) or near-oppositional to values that might be seen as institutionalist (i.e., the “conformity” and “tradition” values.)

Universalism *per se* in thus unrelenting in its disavowal of violence as a means of political action. Habermas underscores this dogma, noting:

> “Only from the distance of a universalistic perspective […] would the political-moral differences between culprits and victims, between ‘victims’ of one kind or another, between the war dead and the resistance fighters, between murderers, the collaborators and the murdered, be indifferent” (1994: 65).

Role models for decision making in this vein include figures such as Jesus, Ghandi and Martin Luther King, Jr. – all martyrs in the cause of nonviolence. More recent manifestations of the universalist credo include those of Bradol, President of Medecins sans Frontiers, who espoused his mission as “[o]pposed to power but not actively engaged in its conquest” (2004). One also sees it evidenced in the following party platform:
“Our peace policy is directed against all forms of aggression, militarism whether inward or outward, competitive armaments and the arms madness. It is oriented towards a peaceful like together in solidarity….We are against all forms of tutelage, interference, occupation and pillage, whether political, economic, military or cultural, especially in the Third World but also in relation to all states, nationalities, and minorities” (Coleman & Coleman 1993: 66, emphasis added).

It’s noteworthy that the preceding is from the German Green’s platform of 1983, the first year it achieved representation in the Bundestag. This reinforces the approach’s relevance for this study. In sum, the culturalist component of universalism offers – along with the piecing out of institutionalism and historicism – some relief from the intrinsic multicollinearity of the aggregate, monolithic cultural approach. The increased specificity with which one can then potentially use a redefined “culturalism” – through its components – may allow for explanation of the few anomalous cases where monolithic culturalism fails.

The final proposal is to broaden the expectations attributed to the approaches, in order to measure their relative impacts rather than to eliminate all but one explanation. By considering previously (and perhaps prematurely) rejected possibilities, and focusing on German decision making, more accurate explanation of German foreign military intervention decision making is sought. In terms of hypotheses, the general and overarching one of this study is that German decision making is indeed structured, in terms of one or more of the approaches outlined above, and is not, as others have claimed, “schizophrenic” or inexplicable. As competing approaches, moreover, realism, institutionalism, historicism and universalism are each individually hypothesized to be the dominant explanation for German decision making. Granted,
were any of these hypotheses confirmed, it would be desirable to then also explore predictions about the specific choices decision makers will make (i.e., to intervene or not), however, for the reasons of theoretical indeterminacy stated above, this is not yet possible. At best, one might hypothesize probabilities or tendencies (e.g., universalist problem representation might be more likely to lead to an expressed preference for non-intervention) but even this limited undertaking us fraught with problems. In the end, given the general lack of understanding with regards to German decision making, the mere elucidation of patterns is in itself a substantial improvement.

1.4 Hypotheses

Each of these approaches thus have particular ideal-type expectations with respect to the kinds of decisions German decision makers will make. More specifically, the four approaches each have expectations as to how those decisions will be made. The table below summarizes these hypotheses as they relate to the decisions. After describing the operationalization of the independent variable in the next chapter, I also outline the hypotheses as they relate to the processes of decision making, or the connections between how and what leaders decide.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components of Expressed Preferences (Frequently Mentioned by Decision Makers)</th>
<th>Realism</th>
<th>Historicism</th>
<th>Institutionalism</th>
<th>Universalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National interest at stake: strong action (up to and incl. military intervention)</td>
<td>Strong aversion to German military intervention. Possible support for others’ intervention. Vigorous use of diplomacy.</td>
<td>Support for military intervention conditional on its perceived means (i.e., if “institutionally legal”) first, with ends a secondary issue.</td>
<td>Strong aversion to German military intervention. Strong objection to others’ intervention. Vigorous use of diplomacy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National interest not at stake: no action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1.2 Ideal-Type Expectations of Leaders’ Expressed Preferences**
CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH DESIGN

This chapter describes the research design of the dissertation. I do this in six parts, beginning with a discussion of the study’s overall scope and domain. Second, I describe the dependent variable. Third, I explain the independent variable, including a discussion of the ontology methodology. Fourth, I outline the decision making opportunities covered in this study. Fifth, I describe an important alternative theoretical explanation that arises as a concern specifically due to the research design of the study and how I address that concern. And finally, I describe the criteria for accepting or rejecting hypotheses.

2.1 Dependent Variable

As explained in the previous chapter, that which this study attempts to explain, the dependent variable, is decision makers’ expressed preferences vis-à-vis foreign military intervention. Where possible, this will be measured in terms of votes or motions in favor or against intervention during each of the relevant decision making opportunities under consideration. Where votes are not held, the content of leaders’
speeches will be used to determine whether they support or oppose intervention. These inferences will be cross-checked against the conclusions of secondary sources.

2.2 Independent Variable

The independent variables of this study are the ontologies of decision makers with respect to foreign military intervention opportunities. The general and overarching hypothesis of this study is that through these ontologies, German decision making is indeed structured, in terms of one or more of the approaches outlined above, and is not, as others have claimed, inexplicable or “schizophrenic.” As competing approaches, moreover, realism, institutionalism, historicism and universalism each individually hypothesizes its own framework to be the dominant explanation for German decision making. Now, were any of these hypotheses confirmed, it would be desirable to then also explore hypotheses about the specific choices decision makers will make (i.e., to intervene or not), however, for the reasons of approaches’ indeterminacy in this regard, this is not entirely possible. At best, one might hypothesize probabilities or tendencies (e.g., universalist ontology might be more likely to lead to an expressed preference for non-intervention) but even this limited undertaking us fraught. In the end, given the general lack of understanding with regards to German decision making, the elucidation of even general patterns is in itself an improvement.

Operationalization of the independent variable is in the form of leader statements, given in parliamentary sessions, on the issue of intervention. The overall strategy is to look for similarities between ideal-type indicators of ontology and the
actual statements of decision makers. The indicators are concepts, phrases and terminology that the various approaches expect decision makers to frequently use, were their thinking guided by or emblematic of that approach. Ultimately decision maker ontologies will be categorized as more or less concordant with the various ideal type ontologies, thus resulting in a description of individuals as “realist thinkers” or “universalist thinkers”, for example. The following describes the expected observations for each of the ideal types:

In terms of realism, one expects statements that fall under the heading of “Maximizing Relative Gains” - need for survival or need for aggrandizement (Brooks 1997: 457). Decisions would be predicated on a need to “keep up” with the other states of the world, lest they “be conquered or destroyed by their more powerful counterparts,” or, much more probably, “that a decrease in their power capabilities relative to those of other nation-states will compromise their political autonomy, expose them to the influence attempts of others, or lessen their ability to prevail in political disputes with allies and adversaries (Mastanduno 1991: 76). The notion will be conveyed that states, and their leaders, that do not engage in realist-based decision making do so at their own peril, and hence are fleeting and rare examples to behold among the likes of major powers. Statements regarding the maximization of gains would involve explicit cost-benefit calculations, devoid of sentimental tincture, or at least any such systematic references, because, as Morgenthau argued “[h]istory shows us no exact and necessary correlation between the quality of motives and the quality of foreign policy. This is true in both moral and political terms” (Morgenthau 1978:6).
Instead, leader calculations will deal with tangibles such as financial outlays, manpower levels, equipment, distances, opportunity costs, expected casualties, and, when dealing with intangibles, the concept of “power”.

Realist statements will also involve consideration of Germany’s world rank – this indicator is implicitly or explicitly derived from “Germany’s” cost-benefit calculations being compared to net cost-benefits calculations for other states. Will Germany lose/gain more or less than others? Will Germany rise in “rank” as a result of this proposed behavior or fall? Finally, such statements will also place emphasis on the entity of “the German state,” in terms of it’s needs, obligations, actions, because the state is the focus of action in realist thinking. Statements that give Germany a state pride of place vis-à-vis other possible actors in IR (e.g., individuals, NGOs, INGOs, etc.) in pursuing German interests and maximizing gains indicate realist thinking. It may also be the case that other states are also given pride of place, as would be expected from the above discussion of “relative gains concerns,” however, Krasner and others have demonstrated that state-centered reactions can be precipitated by non-state (i.e., institutional) initiating causes, and such cases are consistent with the expectations of the realist approach.

As mentioned before, the historicist approach is premised on the idea that German decision making on foreign military interventions is heavily influenced by above all else Germans’ unique and all-pervasive memory of World War Two. Thus historicist argue that “[r]ather than a merely tactical calculation aims at maximizing ‘objective’ German national interests, the new multilateralism and the emphasis on non-
military instruments of diplomacy are rooted in a distinctive interpretation of the German past and of German national identity that has come to permeate the entire German political system” (berger 2002: 78). By this logic, when it comes to decision making on foreign military intervention, to be German is to be unlike anyone else. In addition, history should impact decision makers across a broad spectrum in a uniform manner. One would therefore expect to see any of a number of specific references to World War Two and the Nazi time: the names of leaders, domestic events (e.g., Die Gleichschaltung – The Synchronization), external events (e.g., invasions, non-aggression pacts), specific engagements, the Holocaust, slave labor, and so forth.

Parliamentarians will also be expected to refer to these elements of history euphemistically or symbolically. In this vein one can expect references to concepts such as a “special German responsibility”, the “Special Path”, and the “special German historical experience” among others. Two special contemporary situations, both of which are uniquely tied to the German World War Two and Nazi time situation, are also to be counted as indicative of historicist ontology – Jews/Israelis and the Innere Führungs Prinzip (Internal Leadership Principle) of the German military. In terms of the former, the connection to history is obvious and continuing references to Jews and Israel today clearly bear this weight regardless of the ostensible context in which those terms are raised. Likewise, in terms of the latter, the “internal guidance principle” instilled in German soldiers since the reconstitution of the military in 1955 is in direct contradiction to the principle of self-dissolution in an “authority state” that reigned in Nazi era Germany. Again, utterances of these kinds are anticipated by the historicist
approach because “[h]istorical memories and in particular of the catastrophic human, political and moral consequences of the unconstrained pursuit of power continue to exercise and almost startling hold on the national consciousness of the reunited Germany” (Berger 2002: 99).

Since “[t]he ‘Universalism’ value […] represents a preference for social justice and tolerance” mention of these factors will be an important indicator for it (Dahl 2004: 17). In this sense justice is “defined as the drive to correct a perceived discrepancy between entitlements and benefits” (Welch 1993: 19). The important thing here is that the discrepancy need only be “perceived” not “real.” Content of the justice or injustice is inconsequential. The values importantly apply to others, by being “other-referential” (Welch 1993: 43). In other words, leaders may act based on a perceived (rather than objective) discrepancy in the entitlements and assets of others. Tolerance will be expected to operate similarly – what is important is that leaders speak of tolerance as important in terms of what they perceive to be tolerant, rather than what an “objective” observer would conclude.

Across the world, these values are commonly derived from religious beliefs. Among German decision makers, one would thus expect these to be Christian beliefs and references to Christianity and its tenets of nonviolence and reconciliation will therefore be coded. References to the avatars of the universalist tradition such as Buddha, Kant, Gandhi, and Martin Luther King, Jr. will be coded as well. In addition to references to religious and classical philosophical origins, though, universalist values can also stem from adherence to modern philosophies. Thus, references to the modern
logics of justice based on either individual (Rawls) or the community (e.g., Walzer) 
rights will be taken to indicate a universalist values ontology. In fact, Walzer’s Just and 
Unjust Wars, actually includes a rigorous set of moral criteria that need to be met before 
a war can be called just; such stringent “recipes” for action would obviously be at home 
in the rhetoric of decision makers with universalist ontologies. Non-religious, 
“humanist” antecedents include the many pacifist movements of the late 19th and early 
20th Centuries, such as the Woman’s International League for Peace and Freedom, and 
the writings of authors such as Remarque (1929) and (Nobel Peace Prize winner) Von 
Suttner (1889) on the horrors of war (see also Mueller 1989; 1991). Many of these 
movements were strongly influenced by marxist logics which viewed wars as a 
manipulation of capitalists to distract, weaken and cull workers (Hunt 1921; Parry 
1966).

Finally, institutionalism expects decision makers to cite international institutions 
in their speeches on foreign military interventions (UN, NATO, EU, OCSE, etc.) In 
addition, references to the German Constitution (Basic Law) and constitutions more 
generally;, the (important) role of sovereignty and democracy, and respect for 
procedures and due process are all anticipated examples of institutionalist ontology. 
This is because, to institutionalist thinkers, the means are at least as important as the 
ends. They perceive the behavior of international actors as a “threat if it displays a 
willingness to ignore accepted procedure” (Cohen quoted in Welch 1993: 26).

Alliances and alliance commitments will be taken as sacrosanct and the 
procedures in place in different organizations for making collective decisions should be
referred to as inherently legitimate – where those procedures are circumvented or otherwise disregarded, one should expect the institutionalist thinker to protest. Collective action – such as in a collective security endeavor – will generally be favored, whereas its opposite, unilateral action, will be generally frowned upon. Exceptions to this last circumstance would be situations in which a unilateral action were understood to be stipulated by some higher order of law. In any event, institutionalism expects parliamentarians to employ a legalistic rigor in all their statements regarding foreign military intervention decisions.

I summarize the expected operational indicators of each approach in the table below as well as their expected relationships to decision maker outcomes:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components of Ontology (Frequently Mentioned by Decision makers)</th>
<th>Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Realism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Historicism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Universalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximal gains: Strategy; Benefit/loss calculations; Consideration of “world rank”; emphasis on German “state”; Invocation of other states’ behavior.</td>
<td>“Lessons Learned”; Invocation of German precedent/exceptionalism; Relevant comparisons to other states/societies; Special concerns for Israel/Jews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realism ▼</td>
<td>Historicism ▼</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Components of Expressed Preferences (Frequently Mentioned by Decision makers)</td>
<td>National interest at stake: strong action (up to and incl. military intervention)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National interest not at stake: no action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.1 Ideal-Type Ontology Indicators & Hypothesized Connection to Preferences
As with the decision making occasions themselves, it is expected that leaders’ ontologies will be “interconnected” and not discrete. Not only will a leader’s ontology in one occasion be predicated in part by his or her ontologies on prior occasions, but each occasions’ “momentary” ontology will be a combination of different elements of ideal ontologies. In other words, statements over time as well as any given statement will almost always indicate a mixture of ideal ontology types and be related across time. To capture the relative strength of ontologies, I employ a four point ordinal scale. Each of the scale’s possible values (1, very strong; 2, moderate; 3, weak and 4, imperceptible) refers to the degree to which the ideal type ontology is in evidence in the leader’s statements. This scale is closely related to Welch’s seven point scale (1993: 40).

Two last points on the independent variables needing clarification regard 1) its source data and 2) its treatment in the analysis. First, I focus on individual ontologies and expressed preferences as they occur in the context of parliamentary debates. This focus is premised on practical as well as theoretical and methodological grounds. First, given the swath of recent history I examine, time and resource constraints alone militate for the bracketing of the research design. Like Welch, for example, I might have considered extra-parliamentary speeches, letters, memoirs, interviews, etc., as well the small but growing body of secondary literature on the matter of German post-Cold War foreign military intervention policy. Such an approach, however, would require either a much greater expenditure of time and energy or the omission of several of the decision making occasions. Given resource constraints of the solo researcher, and the reasons
for why the German post-Cold War situation is really an “era” of decision making in which previous decisions bear heavily on subsequent ones, neither option is acceptable.

Beyond pragmatics, though, there are other theoretical and methodological reasons for focusing exclusively on parliamentary debates. Theoretically speaking, a focus on parliamentary statements allows one to center more specifically on the political psychology of individuals. As Sylvan and Pevehouse cogently argue, leaders’ public statements reveal their ontologies, acknowledging that “to the degree that an official frames a tradeoff in one way for public consumption and another in her innermost thoughts, it probably means that the leader in question feels constrained by domestic or international opinion or pressure to articulate the choice in a certain manner. It is that manner – the sum of the views and constraints – that constitutes the particular ontology” (Sylvan and Pevehouse 2002: 61). With regard to questions of policy, these public representations are at least as important as private representations. In the domain of contemporary Western-style government with its petitioning, associational, deliberative and representative character, open opinions are the most consequential. These opinions, admittedly often calculated for audience impact, are what leaders use to convey information about themselves and their stances to voters, superior and subordinate government officials, adversaries and others. By focusing on parliamentary debates, I ensure that only public ontologies and expressed preferences are examined, and avoid potentially revisionist or otherwise fallacious private representations and expressed preferences that one might find in interviews, memoirs, etc.
An examination of extra-parliamentary sources such as memoirs, interviews, secret meeting transcripts, etc., would be to compare dissimilar data. Moreover, it would be difficult to correct for the dissimilarities, to know when one source recorded a private ontology versus a public ontology and to be able to weight them accordingly. Parliamentary debates, in contrast, with their routine procedures, stable fora, and other regularities offer a consistency and uniformity that overcomes these problems.

Some might argue that parliamentary debates are a less important venue for the consideration of interventions than other venues, such as cabinet on committee meetings. In the US case, for example, it has been argued that the executive is the relevant arbiter of foreign policy (Wildavsky 1966; Peterson 1994). Or, alternatively, in the Japanese case, it has been argued that the bureaucracy determines the bulk of foreign policies (Johnson 1982). In the German case, however, these patterns appear less likely. In fact, largely due to the perceived abuses of executives and bureaucrats in previous German governments, the German parliament has been enshrined as the most important center of German decision making. The Constitutional Court has solidified this through repeated findings supporting the concept of “overall legal responsibility” and a “doctrne of essentials.” These concepts derive from the Basic Law’s (Constitution’s) statements on the principles of the “Legal State” and democracy. More concretely, the parliament is has been charged with regulating “all essential questions” of governance and not leaving them to an administration. The court has demanded a “positive intervention of the state” in order to grant benefits and opportunities to the citizens, rather than allowing for a “negative liberty” whereby only proscribed activities
are delineated. Overall, these rulings have had a number of effects, including the placement of a tremendous amount of decision making power in the hands of parliament and parliamentarians, and including in the area of foreign policy decision making (von Beyme 1997: 11-18).

All German parliamentary debates are available via the internet for the period under study through the German Federal Parliament’s “Documentary and Information System for Parliamentary Proceedings” (henceforth, “DIP Site.”)¹³ This resource allows for the electronic search of verbatim parliamentary transcripts by keyword, speaker, session number, document number, date, organization, and or type of proceeding. The DIP Site thus permits a targeted retrieval process based on any number of possible variables.

In terms of the second point, it is important to clarify here how the data is analyzed in a manner that provides the greatest possible explanatory leverage. Recording units represent one day’s worth of debate for each individual parliamentarian. In other words, each leader’s ontology and expressed preference are based on “daily” evidence at the recording stage. This recording unit –decision maker utterances “per day” – allows for the measurement of changes in leader thinking over time. It also allows for a variety of individual speakers to be accounted for, maximizing the potential for diversity and completeness in the data. However, individual parliamentarians come in and out of the Bundestag on a regular basis, and few remain long enough to make long-term comparisons across decision making occasions.

¹³ http://dip.bundestag.de/
Partially for this reason, statistical power is maximized by aggregating individual observations into party ontologies. These party ontology scores, which average the ontologies of party colleagues for a given period of time into one score, capture the thinking of whole portions of the Bundestag. Results are then presented for all parties by arraying them on a left-right spectrum, matching the general political orientations of the parties. Since the same five parties were represented in the parliament for the entirety of the period under study, these steps ensure that appropriate and meaningful cross-occasion comparisons can be made. Meanwhile, individual leader statements can still be utilized in order to embellish understanding of the particular logic and phraseology employed by decision makers using each of the ontologies.

Having described the independent variable and some important considerations regarding its source material and application to the analysis, I now turn to a discussion of the decision making occasions and related matters.

2.3. Decision Making Occasions

In this section, I list the decision making occasions this study considers, and explain how these occasions are not discrete, independent events, but rather closely related occurrences along an unbroken continuum of German foreign policy behavior in the post-Cold War era (hence my somewhat technical use of the term “decision making occasions” rather than “cases.”)
Table 2.1 Universe of Decision Making Occasions

The above decision making occasions constitute the overall research project’s universe of observations. They are periods of time ranging from days, to weeks, to months. Each of these occasions is alike in that it constituted a “consideration” phase for a particular (potential) foreign military intervention. In addition, as post-Cold War occasions, they represent the “puzzle” of German foreign military intervention policy – times in which German behavior seems inexplicable or crazy. For Germans in particular, this post-Cold War era began some time in 1989, certainly by the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall in November but perhaps many months earlier (Mueller 2003; Baumann 2001).

In addition to the above reasons, a number of other criteria were used to arrive at this list of decision making occasions. First and foremost, all represent instances of high plausibility that decision makers would consider whether or not German troops should be sent to intervene somewhere overseas. On some of these occasions German decision makers’ final expressed preferences (both as individuals, which is the focus of
supported the use of force abroad. On others, the use of force abroad was not supported, and indeed sometimes even criticized when supported by other states. For example, in Afghanistan and Somalia, German commandos and regular army took part in Operation Enduring Freedom (after a delayed arrival due to transport problems) while in Gulf War II, German most decision makers refused to support Operation Iraqi Freedom and roundly condemned the US for its advocacy of it.

Another criteria toward which I am sympathetic but could not fully utilize comes from the literature on “crisis events.” This literature defines occasions when perceptions among decision makers of “a threat to basic values [with] a high probability of involvement in military hostilities and the awareness of finite time for response to the external value threat” or, similarly, of “a situation that threatens high priority goals of the decision making unit, restricts the amount of time available for response [and] surprises the members of the decision making unit by its occurrence” as “international crises” (Hermann quoted in Brecher 1979: 447). However, since I begin with the puzzle of German behavior, which a priori problematizes the “basic values” and “high priority goals” of German decision makers, the explicit use of these definitions is inappropriate. In effect, my research concludes where the literature on crisis events would have me begin, were I to use its definitions to create the list of decision making occasions.

Similarly, an “objective” set of crisis criteria poses problems. Such criteria would require a catalogue of catastrophes, man-made and otherwise, including wars,
famines, mass dislocations, economic ruination and environmental collapse or some combination of these events. Then, some threshold value would have been applied to trigger inclusion on the abovementioned “international crisis” grounds. If the number of dead, dislocated or starving were more than a certain absolute or relative value (e.g., percentage of total national or regional population,) then it would have constituted an event to which German decision makers would (or “could” or “should”) have responded with consideration of foreign military intervention and thus relevant to the universe of decision making occasions.

However, I believe many important decisionmaking occasions are likely missed by such objective criteria. As the differing opinions expressed before Gulf War II demonstrate, many times the “values” of death, destruction, dislocation, etc., that justify foreign military interventions, let alone consideration of such interventions, are entirely speculative. Using another example, the interveners in Kosovo did not wait for the (further) collapse of Albania, the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia or Greece before considering whether or not to send forces overseas. Thus, explicit statements of what constitutes an international crisis, using objective measures and threshold values would not have predicted the proper timing of decisionmaking regarding Kosovo or Gulf War II, or indeed may not have predicted consideration at all.

In order to overcome these pitfalls, I use simple hindsight to know precisely the events which precipitated consideration of foreign military intervention, as well as those, while perhaps similar, did not. In this way, my universe of observations does indeed contain instances of “international crises”, although not arrived at in the same
manner as prescribed by the crisis event literature or any “objective” criteria. That said, I expect the results of my research with respect to ontologies and policy preferences will provide scholars with the ability to predict crisis events, in the German context and according to the methods of the crisis event literature.

Finally, additional characteristics of decision making occasions I examine, while not criteria for their inclusion, are nonetheless interesting to note. These include the varying levels of debate they exhibited, the different governments in power when they transpired and the different regions in which intervention was considered. For example, in the Rwanda case, there was very little debate on the “question” of whether or not Germans should intervene militarily. In other words, consideration was rather sparse and muted. On the other hand, in the example of Bosnia Pre-Dayton Accords, debate was so rancorous that it included lawsuits pitting parties of the same ruling coalition against each other in the Constitutional Court. Likewise, the occasions include ones with left- and right-leaning coalitions in power, as well as examples of when African, Asian, Middle Eastern and European interventions were considered. Again, however, these characteristics of occasions are not a critical function of the dissertation’s hypothesis testing, but may help to facilitate comparisons across decision making occasions by maximizing similarities and minimizing extraneous differences.

Having established the criteria used to arrive at a universe of decisionmaking occasions, I now turn to the issue of why I use “decisionmaking occasions” and not “cases” in describing them. This distinction stems from the pervasive connectedness of Germany’s post-Cold War foreign military intervention decisionmaking, in particular,
and foreign policy, in general. In many ways, it represents an “era”, still underway, in which the same issues of Germany’s new position in Europe and the world assert themselves again and again. At each decisionmaking occasion, German leaders look to previous visits of the issues, and thus events influence each other. In that sense, the era really constitutes just one case, at least in the traditional sense of cases as discrete, independent observations. Still, while this era may be one continuous “landscape” of policy, it noticeably possesses hills and peaks, or occasions when stakes are higher, opinions more divisive, and advocacy more heated. I argue that these times are justly differentiated from one another as “decisionmaking occasions.” Of course, there are pluses and minuses to employing this strategy of “one era, many decisionmaking occasions,” some of which I address below.

On the one hand, any research design smacking of a single-case contradicts the oft-repeated dictum “find more cases” (King et al. 1994). This is the idea that the more discrete cases one examines with respect to a particular explanatory variable or set of variables, the more certain one can be of one’s conclusions. On the other hand, though, IR scholars have always been confronted by a paucity of cases; there was only one Cold War, for example. IR scholars have not recoiled from examining such events, however, and a rich methodological literature has adapted and promoted responses to this dearth of cases. It demonstrates that for the case of German foreign military intervention policy, much can in fact be gained from adopting a single-case approach (George 1979). For one, it avoids the tempting, but false assumption that German decisionmakers’ considerations of foreign military interventions are indeed completely discrete events.
In fact, the past is always bearing on the present. Years of experimental and quasi-experimental research have shown that prior decisions bear on subsequent ones, whether via subconscious or conscious means (Jervis 1976).

2.4. Pragmatism Proposition

The preceding discussion argues for the merits of a problem representation methodology toward improving our knowledge of an important puzzle in IR. This argument, however, is strongly contradicted by an alternative possibility that crops uniquely in light of my application of problem representation. Specifically, what if leaders are willing to “say anything” and their words are “worthless” in terms of illuminating their ontologies? I call this alternative possibility the Pragmatism Proposition.

Indeed, it bears consideration whether the ontologies of German decision makers belie their crass political calculations and not their principles or “true” beliefs regarding the issues at hand. According to this view, the whole notion of “ontologies” as conceptions of a situation forged from the raw material of deeply rooted decision maker beliefs is problematic. Instead, the argument goes, decision makers are merely responding to the political winds and consciously creating representations of the decision making opportunity that they calculate will win them maximum political advantage. Whether stated in terms of the difference between tactics and beliefs, marketing and convictions or pragmatics and principles, this dilemma poses an important question for this research.
In this section I outline the logic of this alternative proposition, its explication in the literature on foreign policy decision making and public opinion, and argue for a test of the proposition as an alternative explanation for the rhetoric of German foreign military intervention decision making.

The proposition that German foreign policy decision making is “pragmatic”, dictated by political concerns, high among them a concern for the “political winds” or the preferences indicated by public and constituent opinion, is an attractive one for a number of reasons. Specifically, these are 1) it’s theoretically based explanation for German decision making; 2) the fact that those theories are well-explicated in the literature; and 3) this last point notwithstanding, that these theories, and the general pragmatism proposition are nonetheless relatively untested in the domain of German decision making, hence any new insights into the subject will indeed be revelatory and novel.

On the first point, the pragmatism proposition provides a theoretically-based (but non-ontology) answer to the puzzle of German post-Cold War foreign policy. It also counters the notion of many others that German foreign policy decision making is “crazy” or “inexplicable.” According to the “pragmatism” proposition, seemingly dramatic and contradictory shifts in decision maker expressed preferences are in fact structured responses to public opinion cues or attempts to influence parliamentary politics. To the extent that preferences are inconsistent and unstructured, this is due to the “unprincipled” nature of the public’s views; leaders, on the other hand, are “principled” in following the public’s wishes, regardless of how much those wishes
contradict previous expressed preferences or representations of foreign policy matters. In this view, leader thinking and behavior follows public opinion.

Another approach would emphasize the effect of intra-parliamentary “opinion” and bargaining on ontologies and expressed preferences. According to this view, politicians change their thinking and behavior in ways that affords them political benefits from other members of parliament both inside and outside their own parties. Ontologies and expressed preferences thus usually reflect the compromise outcomes hashed out between actors and parties in a give-and-take process. Borrowing from the language of physics, political scientists have referred to these processes and outcomes and the interactions of vectors and resultants, respectively. Regardless the language, this approach represents a general counter-argument to thesis that ontologies belie the “true” thinking of decision makers regarding foreign military intervention opportunities.

As mentioned above, another reason to delve deeper in the pragmatism versus principles questions is because it speaks to so many literatures within political science. The general theoretical outlines covered in the preceding two paragraphs summarize the a number of works, some stretching back more than fifty years. The ones I will discuss here include the Almond-Lippmann Consensus, the Two Presidencies Proposition, Jentleson’s “Pretty Prudent” public proposition, the notions of opinion activation espoused by Nincic and Russett, the writings on agenda setting and priming, and, finally, parliamentary bargaining. I will relate the main concepts of each of these in turn.
The Almond-Lippmann Consensus finds its origins in research on public opinion toward foreign policy conducted in the years immediately following World War Two (Almond 1950; Knopf 1998). Three “consensus” points arose from this research, namely that 1) the public’s opinions about foreign policy were fluid and constantly changing, 2) there was no structure to those opinions to explain the fluidity and change, and 3) consequently (and rightly) the public therefore had little impact on the formation of foreign policy.

In a similar vein, Wildavsky (1966) and his intellectual successors have maintained that the Almond-Lippmann findings regarding the public’s unstructured, self-contradictory and ultimately non-influential thoughts toward foreign policy could likewise be used to describe the foreign policy “public opinions” of US legislators. Specifically, these scholars argue that a situation of “Two Presidencies” exists, in which the Congress participates fully in matters of domestic politics, but deferring to the executive almost completely on matters of international politics, purposefully remaining ignorant toward foreign policy issues in the process. The result of this pattern is that Presidents are much more successful at achieving their desired legislative results in the foreign policy rather than the domestic policy arenas.

The implication for the pragmatism proposition of the Two Presidencies Proposition, like the implication of the Almond-Lippmann Consensus, were their predicted pattern to be found in the German foreign military intervention decision making context, would be that decision maker reactions to the “political winds” are in fact unlikely. On the contrary, the writings of these two literatures would lead us to
expect that neither the public nor the bulk of parliamentarians would care about foreign policy issues. Furthermore, even if the public were interested, legislators would be unlikely to respond, do to the deference on foreign policy that they would show to the executive. These conclusions, however, represent just one side of the extant literature on public opinion, its effects on foreign policy and the ramifications of those effects on the pragmatism proposition.

A different side of the literature takes a number of contradictory stances. First, despite the general “consensus” behind the Almond-Lippmann findings and their persistence over several decades, not all scholars find the findings compelling. Jentleson, for example, has argued that in response to such events as the Vietnam War and the Watergate crisis, public opinion has become more informed and structured. These “improvements” are argued to be especially pronounced with respect to issues where American lives are at stake; in other words, instances of terrorism, hostage taking and foreign military intervention. When measured with regard to these matters, Jentleson (1992) finds that public opinion is cautious, defensive, reactive versus proactive, and, in general, “pretty prudent.” Finally, lawmakers, it is maintained, become aware of these public dispositions and react sympathetically to them, thus giving the public an input in the foreign policy decision making process.

Similarly, critics of the Two Presidencies thesis contend that congressional behavior has changed since certain political traumas of the late Sixties and early Seventies. Sigelman (1979) and Fleischer and Bond (1998) found that distrust of the executive engendered by the Vietnam and Watergate experiences has motivated
legislators to seek more influence over foreign policy. An additional motivation behind this behavior is supposedly the public’s own increased interest in foreign policy post-Vietnam and Watergate.

Other authors such as Nincic and Russett (1976) have explored the processes of public opinion formation vis-à-vis foreign policy and subsequently found that it is far less unstructured and changing than the Almond-Lippmann Consensus maintains. Nincic (1997) for example, claims the US public is “sensible” with regard to its opinions on foreign policy, drawing on simplified and abstract notions of actors, relationship and objectives that frequently exist as subconscious “nodes” in the minds of individuals, but which can then become activated when the a particular set of foreign policy observations in seen in the context of those nodes. For instance, members of the public may have well-developed concepts of “good guys” and “bad guys” and how those types act and what their goals are. An observation of international events takes on very structured meaning when individuals like Saddam Hussein and George Bush invokes the “good guy-bad guy” node; this can entail expectations of motives, future behaviors and possible responses to the situation.

The political psychology literatures on agenda setting and priming augment these findings by exploring the processes by which public opinion, whether in the form of nodes or otherwise, is activated. In both literatures the mass media plays a pivotal role. For one, the work on agenda setting contends that public opinion’s content, specifically the prioritization of issues, is shaped by media content. In addition, media content is also argued to influence preferences and attitudes towards these issues.
While these findings also indicate that the media’s influence can be weakened when members of the public are either well-informed about or very interested in and issue ahead of time, these qualifications do not weaken the importance of the findings to the pragmatism proposition – to the extent that politicians can influence the media, and to the extent that politicians are practically aware of the effects of agenda setting and priming, we should expect decision makers to be encouraged in their attempts to express “pragmatic” preferences or ontologies of foreign military intervention decision making opportunities.

On balance, this “second side” of the literatures on public opinion concludes that public opinion does have structure, that it does matter, and most importantly for this study, that it does sway leaders. In contrast to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus and Two Presidencies Thesis, the expectation of these literatures is that foreign policy pragmatism, while not inevitable, is certainly very possible.

Finally, a third compelling reason exists for exploring the Pragmatism Proposition. To wit, even with these numerous studies notwithstanding, the fact is that the issue of public opinion’s influence on foreign policy is relatively understudied in terms of German decision making. Each of the foregoing studies exclusively examined US behavior. As Brettschneider (2001) points out, the apparent appropriateness of many of these findings to the case of Germany should not be taken on face-value. Until each proposition has been specifically tested in the German context, they should be utilized with skepticism. Thus, the area of study is still untouched, and any findings in it will add to our understanding of German decision making.
While it's arguable that three general approaches would lend themselves to testing the incidence of pragmatism versus principles in the area of German foreign military intervention decision making, only would seem to be able to do so in a highly systematic and impartial manner. Among less desirable alternatives, one could examine the record of statements by leaders to find references to the importance of public opinion or intra-party strategy to their ontologies and expressed preferences. This first approach however may be somewhat naïve in its anticipation of such political reflection. That said, studies such as Foyle (1997) have found two important US leaders (i.e., Eisenhower and Dulles) open enough in their public statements to be able to code them as respecting or disrespecting the degree and appropriateness of public opinion’s influence on foreign policy. And, even in the German context, such frank insights exist, as when Adenauer is alleged to have remarked:

“I must enhance my capabilities through public-opinion research – so that I can see where I can lead the way and meet with willingness and where I must carefully wait until I’ve won a Bundestag election and can do what I have to immediately thereafter” (Brettschneider 2001: 246).

These types of studies, however, are incompatible with the study being conducted here. The number of years and decision makers under analysis would make such an in-depth approach difficult to realize in anything but the most haphazard and non-systematic way.

A second, but also problematic, approach would be to compare public opinion polls to decision maker ontologies and expressed preferences. An important facet of this approach would be the temporal ordering of the polls and the leaders’ ontologies
and expressed preferences. If a “relationship” is found in terms of when polls precede
the leaders’ thoughts and statements, then that would auger for an influence of public
opinion on foreign policy. However, if the relationship is one in which the polls
“follow” the leaders’ ontologies and expressed preferences, then reverse is true –
politicians would be said to have influenced public opinion. The literature outlined
above allows for both possibilities. The problem here lies again with the data, although
this time specifically in terms of its quality rather than quantity. As studies have shown,
public opinion polling, perhaps especially with regard to foreign policy, is fraught with
biases, inconsistencies and errors (Mueller 1993). Thus, it is hard to trust the opinion
polls’ notions of what policy directions the public supports. Also, the theory behind
public opinion’s influence on leaders specifies that particular constituencies will push
decision makers in particular directions. To the extent that the polls neglect this
information, the expected impact of public opinion cannot be known.

The third and last approach would seem to offer the best chance for drawing
conclusions about the pragmatism and principles question. It would investigate the
patterns of decision maker ontologies and expressed preferences over time, both within
and between decision making opportunities. If decision makers are being pragmatic,
one would expect these patterns to show movement (either random or toward a “new”
ontology) both during and across decision making opportunities. Instead of being
bound by their ontologies leaders would “use” only those ontologies that “work” best,
discarding those that do not and replacing them with new ontologies and expressed
preferences until satisfactory ones are found. A superior feature of this approach is that
it allows for the systematic and impartial analysis of all parties and all decision making occasions. Also, these analyses can be constructed in a number of ways so as to be able to make inferences in addition to simple comparisons from some decision making opportunity to another, or within a decision making opportunity, for example, by comparing across decision making occasions in election and non-election years or across occasions regarding the same world regions. Finally, these changes over time can also be tracked against public opinion data to get some sense of the power public opinion possesses to “influence” decision makers ontologies, and thus finally test some of the hypotheses elaborated at length in the American foreign policy literature but somewhat lacking in analyses of German foreign policy, especially with regard to the post-Cold War era.

2.5. Criteria for Accepting/Rejecting Hypotheses

As mentioned before, this study recognizes the possibility that each of the four approaches may possess both strengths and weaknesses when it comes to explaining the puzzle under consideration. I therefore will describe the relative ability of each approach to substantiate its associated hypothesis. In this section I outline the criteria I use in order to accomplish this analysis.

Analysis is focused on each of the decision making occasions in turn. Each of these chapters begins with a brief description of the event, followed by a lengthier description of the internal and external contexts in which the decision making occasion took place. A timeline summarizes the chronology of the context events and how the
parliamentary debates fit into this context time wise. Where possible, votes on measures related to the foreign military intervention decision making discussion are listed along with votes percentages for each of the parties. The last step before analysis of the ontologies themselves is to summarize the observations in terms of the length of the debate, number of sessions, speeches and speakers, and the party distribution of the speeches.

Evidence for each of the ontologies is considered in the same order in which they were presented in the previous chapter: 1) realism, 2) historicism, 3) institutionalism, and 4) universalism. I present average ontology scores for each of the occasions in graphical form and then the results of an ANOVA (which determines whether leaders’ different average scores are statistically significant or not.) I then follow with an in-depth analysis of the evidence for each ontology. This includes representative statements from leaders with regard to the ontologies, providing the reader with a sense for how each plays itself out in the actual words of decision makers.

Next, I move to consideration of evidence for alternatives to the four main approaches, namely the monolithic culture approach and the pragmatism proposition. To explore the merits of the first, I again graph the average ontologies for leaders, but in an aggregated form that reintegrates historicism, institutionalism and universalism. To explore the second, I employ a two-stage statistical (i.e., double-significance) analysis of leader statements over time. The timeline established at the beginning of each chapter is used to discern highly plausible instances for triggering pragmatic change in leader statements. The events include occasions such as Bundestag elections,
installation of a new Bundestag, votes by the UN Security Council, and the beginning of hostilities in a potential intervention region among other examples. ANOVA tests measure for statistically significant changes in leader ontology across time as demarcated by these “pivotal break points” in the chronology. In other words, if leaders are saying something different before an election than after this test red flags the occurrence of ontology change. A second test utilizing OLS regression, however, is necessary to discern the direction, strength and precise timing of such changes. Thus, for each of the leader & ontology pairings found to be statistically significant in the first test, the second checks precisely how these changes are supposed to have played themselves out in terms of exactly when the change ensured, how dramatic the change was, and whether it entailed and increase of decrease in a particular ontology score. Evidence for these tests is then analyzed and discussed.

The last step of each decision making occasion chapter is to briefly summarize the chapter’s findings in tabular form. Initial comments are put toward understanding the relationship of the decision making occasion to the preceding occasions, but the majority of in-depth summarizing is saved for the conclusion chapter.
CHAPTER 3

GULF WAR 1

Beginning with Gulf War 1 and continuing with the following three chapters, I investigate critical decision making occasions in Germany's post-Cold War era. Through them, I seek to understand the thinking behind German leaders' decisions to intervene or not intervene militarily in various contexts. These decision making occasions (i.e., Gulf War 1 in 1990-91; Kosovo in 1994-9; the Afghanistan intervention in 2001; and Gulf War Two 2002-03) vary on a number of qualities (as outlined in the research design chapter) and are thus render appropriate data for testing explicit hypotheses entailed in the approaches of realism, historicism, institutionalism and universalism. In addition, these four moments in German post-Cold War history provide a chance to test certain counter-hypotheses, such as those contained in the pragmatism proposition (i.e., that decision makers' public "perceptions" of issues are primarily affected by political considerations and not representative of underlying beliefs) or the monolithic culture approach (i.e., that culture is in fact still best understood as inseparable features of a unified German culture.) Lastly, these intervention occasions provide data to test other essentially deductive and emergent and thus as yet unidentified hypotheses. This possibility cannot be denied and arises out of
the sheer quantity of data, amounting to hundreds of hours and thousands of pages of speeches. It recognizes that even the best crafted research designs risk overlooking important variables if so rigidly defined that new or unexpected patterns that do not fit into preconceived notions of relevance.

The remainder of this chapter is organized in the same manner as the other empirical chapters. First, I outline the event and its internal and external contexts. Second, I summarize the evidence with regard to each of the four main approaches – realism, historicism, institutionalism and universalism. Next, I explore evidence for the monolithic cultural approach and pragmatism proposition. Finally, I conclude with some preliminary observations about the overall pattern of the evidence and some questions to consider in light of these observations when analyzing the next decision making occasion.

3.1 The event

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces attacked and quickly conquered neighboring Kuwait. This action, which followed months of increasingly tense recriminations between the two Persian Gulf countries, was immediately and near-universally condemned by world leaders, US leaders foremost among them. The UN Security Council voted the day of the invasion to formally condemn it and demand the end of hostilities. Germany, like its European neighbors, France, Britain, Italy and others, approved the condemnation and, like the US, also froze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets. Even the Soviet Union and China acquiesced to these US-led efforts against Iraq and in so
doing illustrated the emerging post-Cold War era's new-found cooperation between former Communist and Non-Communist adversaries.

On August 6, the UN authorized the first of several economic sanctions on Iraq and Kuwait. The day before, on August 5, US president George H. W. Bush had declared the Iraqi occupation “would not stand” and the day after announced the first of several troop deployments in order to ensure it. Once again, other countries followed the US’ lead on these measures. In the following weeks, a number of them, including European powers France and Britain even committed their own troops to the effort of enforcing UN sanctions, preventing further Iraqi conquests and pressuring for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

Germany’s previous behavioral similarities to its European neighbors notwithstanding, however, Germany would not follow in this last behavior. Its leaders refrained from contributing troops to the operation, despite the participation of many of its neighbors and calls from the US for it to do so as well. As the onset of war between the US-led coalition and Iraq approached, however, a majority of German decision makers continued to oppose the deployment of German troops to the war effort. This is not to say that the possibility of sending troops was not put forth and discussed. Indeed, as the parliamentary record makes clear, some decision makers found it as unimaginable that Germany would not intervene militarily as others found it that Germany would. This bulk of this chapter explores the German leadership's parliamentary debates over the use of force abroad, and the perceptions they illustrated toward the question of German foreign military intervention. Before getting to the
debates themselves, though, I first turn to a brief description of the internal and external contexts to those discussions.

3.2 Internal and external contexts

Even from the relative clarity that 15 years hindsight grants, the external and internal context of the Gulf War 1 decision making occasion can only be described as complex. To German leaders at the time, experiencing events as they unfolded, this perception was doubtlessly intensified. The collapse of the Soviet empire and the impending reunification of East and West Germany were the main international and domestic concerns of German decision makers in the summer of 1990. Perhaps making these issues more difficult, the two concerns were closely interrelated.

By August 1990, while one still heard much of the exuberant rhetoric that began the previous November (when the Berlin Wall “fell”), such rhetoric had been augmented by other, more sober conversations. Myriad details related to the end of the Cold War and reunification, ranging from legal to economic through military issues confronted Germany's leaders. Their conversations regarding them took place bilaterally – between the two Germanys – as well as multilaterally – in the Two Plus Four negotiations between East and West Germany and the World War Two victors: France, Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. Again, while the outcomes of these conversations may seem “obvious” today, it must be understood that at the time no outcome was certain and a great deal of time and effort – from all sides – went into ensuring that valued rights and interests were upheld. For West Germany, specifically,
and for the two Germanys more broadly, these rights and interests were centered on a desire for swift and peaceful reunification, the continued good will of a benign and stable Soviet Union, and, to a lesser extent, the same from its European neighbors (Salmon 1993: 91-92).

Amidst this backdrop of uncertainty, it is perhaps not surprising that the Bundestag waited until August 23, 1990, to discuss the issue of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. This was three weeks after the invasion. Indeed, two “extraordinary” sessions were convened prior to the 23rd but were dedicated to issues of post-communist “transition” and German reunification. No speeches regarding Iraq, Kuwait, the conflict between the two or the world’s reaction to them were recorded in either of the first two post-invasion Bundestag sessions. This silence is perhaps all the more striking considering the almost 900 German nationals being detained against their will in Iraq and Kuwait following the Iraqi invasion. Again, this indicates the intense preoccupation of German decision makers with other matters, although this may have also been due to a perception that the detainees were under no real threat. In any case, as will be seen later, the overall reaction to news from the Gulf stands in stark contrast to the prompt parliamentary attention given to events precipitating other decision making occasions.

The parliamentary discussion initiated on August 23 started with Free Democratic Foreign Minister Genscher. It ended almost exactly six months later, on February 28, 1991, when Christian Democrat Rita Süssmuth, Bundestag President,
announced the US’ unilateral cessation of hostilities. Over that time, 20 sessions contained codeable speeches as outlined in the research design chapter.

Of course, those six months also saw events progress: first, with respect to the crisis in the Gulf, and second, in terms of German reunification and the post-communist transition. As just one example, in December 1990, the first all-Germany elections were held for the Bundestag. As a result, the Christian Democrats, Free Democrats, Social Democrats and Democratic Socialists all grew their delegations, but Green party membership was reduced by over 80% from 42 to 8 seats. The following table summarizes the key events – which have been put forth in the secondary literature as important intervening moments – which contributed to the internal and external contexts as the Gulf War 1 decision making occasion unfolded. In addition, all parliamentary sessions are listed, including both those for which speeches were coded and those for which speeches were not. (Adapted from Leyden 1997; CNN 2000, 2001a.)

\[\text{This compares to the approximately 4600 British, 3000 US, 490 Italian, 480 French and 450 Canadian nationals also being unwillingly detained (Miller 1994).}\]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Bundestag Session</th>
<th>Session Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8/23/90</td>
<td>- East German parliament accepts Oct. 3rd Reunification date</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>8/23/90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/31/90</td>
<td>- East German parliament accepts Unification Treaty with West Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/12/90</td>
<td>- Two Plus Four Treaty signed by all parties</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>9/12/90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Britain and France announce the deployment of troops to the Gulf</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/15/90</td>
<td>- US Secretary of State Baker travels to Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/3/90</td>
<td>- Germany formally reunified</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.1 Gulf War 1 Timeline**

Continued
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/8/90</td>
<td>- US announces doubling of US troop deployment (then at 230,000; increasing to 460,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/29/90</td>
<td>- UN authorizes force to liberate Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/2/90</td>
<td>- German federal elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/6/90</td>
<td>- Iraq frees all foreign nationals being held against their will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/17/90</td>
<td>- UN sets deadline of January 15th for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/20/90</td>
<td>- First session of the 12th <em>Bundestag</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Turkey requests NATO defense assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1/91</td>
<td>- NATO’s Allied Mobile Force sent to Turkey (with 18 German planes and 200 troops)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/12/91</td>
<td>- US Congress authorizes use of force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- US Secretary of State Baker travels to Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/15/91</td>
<td>- UN deadline passes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/17/91</td>
<td>- War begins with air bombardment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/30/91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued
Table 3.1 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>6</th>
<th>1/31/91</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2/1/91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2/20/91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2/21/91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/22/91</td>
<td>- US gives Iraq 24 hours to leave Kuwait or face ground attack</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2/22/91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/24/91</td>
<td>- War escalates to include ground attack</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 (NC)</td>
<td>2/27/91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/28/91</td>
<td>- US announces unilateral end-to-hostilities</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2/28/91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.3 Tests of approaches

As mentioned previously, the statements coded for the Gulf War 1 decision making occasion were gleaned from 20 sessions. They in turn totaled 167 individual observations and reflected the thoughts of 96 speakers from five political parties. The party breakdown in terms of number of statements per party was: 25% Christian Democrats, 20% Free Democrats, 24% Social Democrats, 20% Greens and 10% Democratic Socialists. The government throughout the period consisted of a Christian
Democrat/ Free Democrat coalition. Thus, slightly fewer than half the statements were from governing coalition party members with the rest from opposition party members. As mentioned above, the end result of these discussions was a decision against intervention. More specifically, it was a default decision not to intervene; no vote on intervention was brought forth and the occasion passed without German decision makers ever being formally tallied on their preferences. To the extent that these preferences in favor of or in opposition to interventions were knowable, then, was through leader statements during the debate.

Overall, the analysis of decision maker ontologies in the first decision making occasion yielded a number of surprises and counterintuitive findings as evaluated by the expectations of the four main approaches: realism, historicism, institutionalism and universalism. I present the evidence for each approach, followed by discussion below.
Figure 3.1 Decision Maker Ontologies: Realism

3.3.1 Realist approach

There is more evidence for the realist ontology than previous studies, especially culturalist works, anticipated (Figure 3.3.1). An exception might be Habermas’ observation of the occasion. Summarizing his findings, Hohendahl writes:

“Those people who opposed the war either argued that the conflict had little to do with the freedom of Kuwait and was carried out to secure economic interests of the West, or they assumed that the US used the Kuwait question to shape the balance of power in the Middle East [realist ontology.] The voices in favor of the war used either principled arguments – for instance, a description of Saddam Hussein as and evil force that had to be eliminated [universalism] – or they relied on more specific arguments, such as an intolerable threat to Israel’s security [historicism]” (Hohendahl 1994: xi-xii; brackets my own).

Habermas is only partially correct because he attributes realist ontologies to the
wrong parties. As it turns out, the highest scorers in realist ontology were members of
the Christian Democrat Party, the group most supportive of intervention. This
misattribution notwithstanding, the *Bundestag* data still provide noteworthy confirming
evidence for the realist ontologies that Hohendahl and Habermas mention. To realists
like Layne, Mearsheimer and Waltz this would be unsurprising; they expected as much.
But most culturalist arguments maintain that realism is not to be found in German post-
Cold War foreign military intervention decision making. As Markovits & Reich claim:
“[t]he historical orientation of Germany’s ideology and foreign policy is consistent with
realism, yet its modern ideology and foreign policy contradict it” (1997: 11). To the
extent that “ideology” inheres in leaders and “foreign policy” reflects their worldviews,
though, such arguments are not supported by data for an important portion of German
leaders.

Of course, culturalists and others may underestimate or miss the influence of
realist thinking due to its relative weakness compared to other ontological categories. It
is not a dominant or secondary ontology, even among those exhibiting it most strongly.
Still, its presence at all is a contradiction to most culturalist expectations.

As noted, Habermas misses the correct party attribution of such realist
ontologies. Since most Christian Democrats approved of intervention in some form
(again never formally tallied) it is in fact intervention supporters in the Gulf War 1
occasion who are most likely to think in realist terms. Support for intervention,
however, is not determinately related to realism as well as vice-versa. Free Democrats
also exhibit the ontology to a small degree, yet they opposed intervention. Realist
perceptions were nearly non-existent among opposition party speakers and, as stated above, are weak overall when compared to scores for universalist and institutionalist perceptions. Thus, the realist approach is also incorrect to the extent that it predicts realist ontologies will *dominate* decision making.

An analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicates that the difference between parties in terms of their members’ adherence to realist ontologies is in fact statistically significant (d.f. 3, 139; F = 20.429; p < .001). Substantively, the most likely group to exhibit realism, the Christian Democrats, espouse it on average not quite “moderately,” with an mean score of 1.45 on the three point measure.

While, on average, realist perceptions take a backseat to other ontological understandings in the Gulf War 1 decision making occasion, there are a number of individual statements where the realist representation nonetheless assumes a more dominant position.\(^{15}\) These statements, as expected by realist scholars, paint a picture of international anarchy in which force and power are valid, even preferred instruments of foreign policy. In addition, explicit comparisons of costs and benefits bring up the importance of acting in certain ways in order to avoid losses and/or accumulate gains. Finally, the statements depict Germany as “just like any other state”, undifferentiated from others in the international system except in terms of its surfeit of power relative to the most other states of the world. This power is reasoned to have a compelling effect

\(^{15}\) All quotes presented here and in the following three chapters, while *illustrative* of the ideal-type ontologies expected by each of the four approaches, were not *exclusively determinative* of any individual’s coding result. In other words, snippets of speech, necessarily presented here out of the entirety of their context, were not used to code individuals’ rationalizations according to their prevalence for realist, historicist, institutionalist or universalist ontologies. Instead, the entire context of each decision maker’s statement was used to inform this coding decision.
on German action. For example, we see this when Christian Democrat Schäuble uses strong language to portray the situation as one involving revolving sets of enemies and constantly renewed threats:

“We will not be living in a secure world. The peace will always remain threatened. [...] the new enemy is here, and the future Germany will be ready to fight against him.”

Schäuble’s Christian Democrat colleague, Richard Hornheus, also employs realist imagery to describe the situation at hand, but instead of emphasizing enemies and anarchy, focuses on the benefits Germany could accrue were it to act in particular way:

“It is not just a question of “one must help, when one has the possibility to do so.” It is not just a question of solidarity, or however one always tries to characterize it. It is much more, so I stress, deeply in our own interests – in our own egotistical interests, if you please – that we do everything that is in our power to help overcome the current and concrete difficulties [being faced.]”

Yet another Christian Democrat, Simon Bötsch, espouses a realist sense of the means or tools necessary in order to make foreign policy action effective:

“I want you to realize, that just the sending of soldiers represents an indispensable means for resolving the crisis, because in this region only this makes deterrence believable. Diplomacy without power is ineffective. One must move decisively against aggressors, if one wants to hold them back from further conquests.”

---

16 Original: Wir werden nicht in einer sicheren Welt leben. Der Friede wird immer bedroht bleiben. – Schäuble, CDU, 20.9.90
17 Original: Es ist nicht nur eine Frage von “Man muß helfen, wenn man die Möglichkeit dazu hat.” Es ist nicht nur eine Frage von Solidarität, oder wie immer man dies bezeichnen will. Es ist vielmehr – ich betone das – zutiefst in unserem Interesse – ein egoistisches Interesse, wenn Sie so wollen --, daß wir nun alles tun, was in unseren Kräften steht, um die jetzt aktuellen und konkreten Schwierigkeiten [überwinden zu helfen.]” – Hornheus, CDU, 22.11.90
18 Original: Ich würde mir wünschen, daß Sie begreifen, daß gerade die Entsendung von Soldaten ein unverzichtbares Mittel zur friedlichen Beilegung der Krise darstellt, weil nur dann die Abschreckung in diesem Bereich glaubhaft ist. Diplomatie ohne Macht ist wirkungslos. Aggressoren muß man entschlossen entgegentreten, wenn man sie vor weiteren Überfällen abhalten will.” – Bötsch, CDU, 14.01.91
Finally, it was not just Christian Democrats, or even more broadly, right and center-right leaders alone who portrayed the Gulf War I decision making occasion in realist terms. While they are certainly much more likely to do so, others, such as Green party member Hoss see the situation in realist terms, as well. These few statements and expressions on the situation by Social Democrats, Greens and Democratic Socialists account for the non-zero realist ontology scores for these parties. Hoss cites a realist view, however, in order to persuade people away from it. Outraged by its persistence, he exclaims: “The old regime of crisis resolution – violence and war as the Ultima ratio – lives on.”

As these quotes demonstrate, realism was alive and well as an ontology or way of viewing the situation in Gulf War I. It does not predict to a preference in favor of intervention due to its presence in the statements of both pro-intervention Christian Democrats and anti-intervention Free Democrats. It does, however, rate very low among the remaining left-leaning anti-intervention parties. As such it may be a condition for war-rejection, that realist ontologies not be employed to any great extent. This possibility will have to be considered as I examine the next occasions. First, I turn to the next ontology, historicism.

---

19 Original: Das alte Regime der Krisenbewältigung, Gewalt und Krieg als Ultima Ratio, lebt fort.” – Hoss, Greens, 15.11.90
Figure 3.2 Decision Maker Ontologies: Historicism

3.3.2 Historicist approach.

The findings for historicist thinking in the Gulf War One decision making occasion mirror those for realism in some interesting ways. For example, as with realism, evidence for historicist thinking is relatively weak as compared to the other ontologies (see Figure 3.3.2). Moreover, as with its expectations regarding realism, the culturalists’ expectations vis-à-vis history are not substantially supported by the evidence. Where culturalist scholars anticipate a strong role for historicist perceptions, the Bundestag data on the other hand show that history is on average only a weak component to the ontologies of decision makers. Again, the values are not drastically lower than for realism, and are in fact for some parties higher, but the expectation of
culturalists is that they would be higher for historicist perceptions and lower for realist perceptions.

History should be omnipresent according to culturalists. The thrust of their argument is that Germany’s unique national experiences lives on through collective memory, in so far as one “interpret[s] collective memory as a contemporary experiencing, a constant reinterpretation, of the historic past. Collective memory is always present” (Markovits and Reich 1997: 14). To a large degree, however, this is not the case in for German decision makers in the Gulf War 1 occasion.

Another feature of the data is the “flatness” of the results across all parties. ANOVA tests of the relationship between party membership and historicist problem representations, to the degree they existed, reject any correlation between the two (d.f. 4, 139; F = .919; p = .455). Stated differently, these findings mean there are no statistically discernable differences between the level of historicist ontologies among any of the five parties. This also contradicts culturalist expectations, which would have predicted – amidst a general “wash” of history coloring all parties' perceptions of foreign military interventions – that left-leaning parties would nonetheless exhibit noticeably higher scores on historicist ontology, due to minor differences between the left and right in this regard.

To the extent that historicist thinking does obtain, realists are rejected in their expectations of entirely “unsentimental” and “sober” decision makers who will adjudicate based on material considerations rather than ideational ones. Leader arguments based on historical references are weak on average, but historicist ontologies
trump realist ontologies by a wide margin for the three parties of the left. In short, realist and historicist expectations are neither well-supported by the Gulf War evidence, but nor are they completely rejected.

To the extent that historicist ontologies are in evidence, they rely on a “perpetrator imagery”, or an awareness of what “Germans” have done to other “peoples,” rather than a “victim imagery”, or a sense of what “Nazis” – a subset of “Germans” – have done to other “peoples” – a subset of whom were Germans. Thus, during the Gulf War 1 decision making occasion, one observes statements like Free Democrat Kinkel’s, when he argues:

“Precisely because we did things in such terrible ways in our century of experience, we must understand those who fully and finally reject war as a means of policy”

Similarly, Social Democrat Thierse argued:

“Because I understand very well that the Israelis never again want to be victims, I ask understanding for the fact that the Germans – perhaps not all – never again want to be perpetrators.”

While more evidence will be necessary in order to solidify the conclusion, the results serve as preliminary refutation of the culturalist contention that history has an all-pervasive (let alone party-specific) impact on German intervention decision making. The evidence simply does not support the culturalist premises. Again, analysis of other

---

20 Original: Gerade weil wir in unserem Jahrhundert Erfahrungen so entsetzlichen Art gemacht haben, müssen wir diejenigen verstehen, die den Krieg als Mittel der Politik total und engültig ablehnen. – Kinkel, FPD, 91.02.01

21 Original: “Gerade deshalb, weil ich sehr gut verstehe, daß die Israelis nie mehr Opfer sein wollen, bitte ich um Verständnis dafür, das Deutsche – vielleicht nicht alle – nie mehr Täter sein wollen.” – Thierse, SPD, 1.2.91

89
decision making occasions will explore the possibility that historicist perceptions are more strongly in evidence at other times., so this is to be considered further.

![Mean Score](image)

**Figure 3.3 Decision Maker Ontologies: Institutionalism**

### 3.3.3 Institutionalist approach

Like the realist ontology, the institutionalist ontology seems to reside mostly in the perceptions of members from right-leaning parties (Figure 3.3.3.) Moreover, the average values for these perceptions are higher than for realism, ranging from about 2.2 to 2.8 on the three point scale, placing it in the moderate to strong range of usage. Institutionalism is thus the dominant ontology among Christian Democrats and Free Democrats. These differences – in terms of the strength of the right’s versus the left’s institutionalist ontologies – are statistically significant in an ANOVA test (d.f. 4, 139; F = 17.298; p < .001). In other words, when looking at the nominal categories of party
membership, the different levels of institutionalist ontology are statistically relevant, and the right-leaning parties’ higher scores are meaningfully higher.

This is not to say, however, that the left and center-left parties are entirely unlikely to exhibit institutionalist ontologies, rather that they are not as likely to be as strong in their use. Institutionalism is in fact the secondary ontology, on average, among left-leaning parties, excepting the Democratic Socialists. Interestingly, though, Social Democrats and Greens score almost as high on institutionalist thinking as did Christian Democrats and Free Democrats respectively on realist thinking, the later two's tertiary ontology. Put another way, these two parties of the left speak in institutionalist terms roughly as much as the two parties on the right speak in realist terms – at least during the Gulf War 1 occasion.

As the institutionalist literature leads us to expect, the language of institutionalist perceptions focuses on rules and procedures, internal and external organizations as well as implicit and explicit promises between Germany and other states, including but not limited to the US, the Soviet Union and states of the European Community. For the most part, these references are made in order to explain how they bar or prohibit German leaders from making certain choices. For example, Free Democrat Genscher states:

“We have announced that the Basic Law [the German constitution] doesn’t allow the sending of troops to regions outside of alliance territory. However, the federal government began on Monday to discuss with the Social Democratic opposition an addition to the law. The goal is that the German army will in future, in the context of NATO and the UN Security Council, be able to take
Thus, in a quintessentially institutionalist argument, Genscher argues that certain regulations (the Basic Law) limit behavior, but, were the right procedure (working with the opposition) followed, such regulations might be substituted by others (allowing for interventions) so long as implementation the new regulation were supervised by the appropriate procedural bodies (NATO, the UN Security Council, and presumably still the Bundestag.)

As if to not be outdone in institutionalist representations of the issue, Social Democrat Lafontaine – while not explicitly questioning the end result Genscher proposed – uses his own institutionalist perspective to question the proper procedure to initiate consideration of the proposal, stating:

“It is not clearly in order – this is the position of the Social Democratic Party of Germany – to discuss now, immediately, a constitutional change to allow the intervention of federal armed forces in the Gulf. We have a whole range of questions to clarify first.”

Altogether, these findings allow one to preliminarily conclude that the institutionalist approach is accurate, at least in part, for describing the perceptions of German decision makers with regard to foreign military interventions in this occasion.

---

22 Original: “Wir haben erläutert, daß das Grundgesetz die Entsendung von Truppen in Regionen außerhalb des Bündnisgebietes nicht erlaubt […] die Bundesregierung am Montag begonnen hat, mit der sozialdemokratischen Opposition eine Ergänzung des Grundgesetzes zu erörtern. Das Ziel ist es, der Bundeswehr in Zukunft die Teilnahme an Aktionen zu ermöglichen, die im Rahmen der Charta der Vereinten Nationen vom Sicherheitsrat beschlossen werden.” – Genscher, FDP, 23.08.90

The important contingency to this conclusion relates to the approach’s greater applicability primarily to leaders from parties to the right on the political spectrum. In overall terms, support for institutionalist ontologies as an explanation for German decision making is much greater than that found for realist or historicist ontologies. This matches the expectations of the institutionalist literature, which contends that institutionalist views “are the most widely shared by the mainstream foreign policy establishment” (Hellmann 1996: 19). Institutionalism however does not predict to different preferences on foreign military intervention. Both the Christian Democrats and Free Democrats scores highly in terms of the ontology, but differed in their policy preferences. Also, institutionalism was high enough on the left to make it unlikely that its absence is a necessary condition for an anti-opposition preference, as is conjectured given the relationship between realist ontology and left-leaning parties. Like the other preliminary conclusions, these await further examination in additional decision making occasions. First, I turn to results for the last of the main approaches, universalism.
3.3.4 Universalist approach

The universalist ontology, like the institutionalist, is in strong evidence during the debates preceding Gulf War I. In contrast to institutionalism, however, universalism is the domain of left-leaning parties (Figure 3.3.4.) Democratic Socialists, Greens and Social Democrats score mean levels at least twice as high as the levels observed for Free Democrats and Christian Democrats. Again, as with all ontologies except historicism, these party differences are statistically significant according to ANOVA tests (d.f. 3, 139; $F = 25.504; p < .001$).

Statements from universalism-referencing speakers capture the universalist literature's expected emphasis on notions of world harmony, the collective fate of
mankind, and the inappropriateness of violence to solve conflicts regardless of the circumstances or context. These rationales are often posited in debate in explicit contradiction to rationales offered as a part of realist or institutionalist ontologies by other Bundestag members; in these instances the point is made that “universal” values trump any other considerations, such as those based on Germany’s geopolitical position, legal strictures or any other non-universalist consideration. In this sense, universalism is expressed in a fairly “purist” or “dogmatic” form during the Gulf War 1 occasion.

Examples of universalist arguments include the following three statements, representing each of the three left parties. In the first, SPD leader Lafontaine speaks in perfectly universalistic terms, noting the applicability of its values across national borders and to all peoples when he declares:

“I said unity is a venture of freedom and solidarity. I mean that this value is universal, that it cannot be defined by the borders of a nation-state […] When one doesn’t restrict the concept of freedom and solidarity to the ‘reality’ of one nation-state, then one is obligated to one’s neighbors and especially to those on earth for whom things are the worst.”

Green member Kottwitz likewise illustrates a universalistic perspective and explicitly contradicts a realist or institutionalist perspective when she rules out German military interventions in any context, ever:

“The intensified military engagement in [NATO] region south and the debate about “out of area” interventions troubles in the worst way. Germany, in the context of having built itself into a military great power of western Europe, is evidently supposed to be build itself into a global military power with world-

24 Original: Ich sagte, die Einheit ist ein Wagnis der Freiheit und der Solidarität. Ich verwies darauf, daß diese Werte universalistisch sind, daß sie nicht in den Grenzen eines Nationalstaates definiert werden können. […] Wenn man die Begriffe von Freiheit und Solidarität nicht auf die Lebenswirklichkeit eines Nationalstaates einengt, dann ist man den Nachbarvölkern und im besonderen den Menschen verpflichtet, denen es auf der Erde am schlechtesten geht. – Lafontaine, SPD, 4.10.90
wide capabilities for action. (I would like to have your worries! – Bötsch, CDU) That is precisely the opposite of a policy of self restraint that we Greens promote. For is, German armed forces interventions ‘out-of-area’ also must remain a closed-off subject into the future. Participation in a UN peacekeeping operation with or without changes to the Basic Law in the present situation would be used to open the door to other forms of intervention.”

Taking the point even further, Democratic Socialist Gysi puts on a white armband, representing – pacifism -- as he takes to the podium and declares that all wars should be (or indeed already are) illegal:

“In a world – I repeat – which is as interconnected as ours, there are no just, rather only criminal wars anymore.”

The preliminary conclusion from these findings parallels those for the institutionalist approach, namely that one can conditionally accept the appropriateness of the universalist approach for explaining German decision making vis-à-vis foreign military interventions. The qualification is that it only seems to explain the perceptions of leaders belonging to parties on the left of the political spectrum. Also, universalist ontologies might offer a connection to pro- and anti-intervention tendencies; the Democratic Socialists, Greens and Social Democrats – all of which opposed intervention – had substantially higher universalist scores than the Christian Democrats

---

26 Original: In einer Welt – ich wiederhole das --, die so miteinander verbunden ist wie unsere, gibt es keine gerechten, sondern nur noch verbrecherische Kriege. – Gysi, CDU, 17.01-.91

96
or Free Democrats. Even though the Free Democrats also opposed intervention in the Gulf War 1 decision making occasion, it may be the case that universalist ontology is a necessary, but not sufficient, cause for an anti-intervention stance. Once more, this proposition will need to be tested against the remainder of the occasions to better gauge its merits. Prior to that, I conclude the analysis of this occasion by testing evidence for the monolithic cultural approach and the pragmatism proposition.

![Figure 3.5 Decision Maker Ontologies: Universalism, Institutionalism & Monolithic Culture](image)

**Figure 3.5 Decision Maker Ontologies: Universalism, Institutionalism & Monolithic Culture**

### 3.3.5 Monolithic culturalist approach

As noted above, evidence for the disaggregated historicist approach is relatively weak as compared to the culturalist literature’s expectations. Likewise, the incidence of realist thinking is relatively strong as compared to all but the realist literature’s
expectations. On these two counts, then, a culturalist approach – monolithic or otherwise – fares poorly.

To the extent the culturalism predicted institutionalist and universalist ontologies, however, it fares much better. However, because the literature fails to disaggregate the monolithic notion of culture into theoretically tractable, constituent parts or, where it has, the literature has not tested the parts, what the monolithic cultural approach misses is a full sense of how the right and left of the political spectrum each constitute their own cultural perceptions (Berger 1998; Duffield 1999). In other words, the less refined approach (monolithic culture) is too blunt for understanding the varying underlying components of German leaders’ thinking.

To illustrate this failing of the monolithic culturalist approach, consider Figure 3.3.5 above. It combines the ontology scores for the disaggregated cultural components of universalism and institutionalism with what the monolithic cultural approach would measure in terms of its variable (i.e., "culture"). In the figure, one observes that the strength with which parliamentarians from different parties use these rationalizations varies systematically in leftward and rightward patterns. However, if one considers only "culture" writ large, these difference are lost, as the latter describes a relatively undifferentiated set of party-ontology relationships in Gulf War 1 from one end of the political spectrum to the other. I take this an initial support for employing the disaggregated notions of culture – historicism, institutionalism and universalism – rather than the previous monolithic German culture approach embodied in the culturalist literature.
3.3.6 Pragmatism proposition

The pragmatism proposition, which argues that decision makers choose how they perceive issues or at least how they “publicly perceive” situations due to political calculations, is an important counter claim in this study. To get at whether parliamentarians are acting in a pragmatic versus principled manner, a two stage statistical analysis is conducted. In essence this analysis asks “Do decision makers vary their perceptions, as though shifting their stories according to the political winds? ” or “Do they stick to one story, as if guided by some underlying principles or perception?” Presumably, if decision makers act pragmatically, one will see systematic variance in their cynically constructed "stories". Conversely, if underlying cognitive processes and not political calculations are responsible for expressed perceptions, then one will see consistency. In this sense, my analysis amounts to a simple but robust test of decision makers’ rhetorical consistency or stability.

The Internal and External Event Timeline (Table 3.2) was used to define four “pivotal events” which could be reasonably expected to have altered the political calculus by which perceptions were crafted, were perceptions being “crafted” and not born instead of some change-resistant belief structure or set of principles. A few individual pivotal events were in fact representative of numerous occurrences, such as the acceptance of the Two Plus Four Treaty and the British and French announcements to send troops to the Gulf. Like the timeline itself, these four events were chosen based on the weight given them in the secondary literature, and include both domestic and
international occurrences. Finally, in order to conform to the parliamentary data, these “dates” actually refer to the nearest recorded Bundestag session after the event occurred.

In chronological order, the events and dates were: 1) the acceptance of the Two Plus Four Treaty and British and French announcement of troop deployment to the Gulf, with the first effective Bundestag session on September 13, 1990; 2) official German reunification, effective October 4; 3) US announcement of troop increase for offensive potential, effective November 15; and 4) UN authorization of force, UN deadline for retreat, first session of the unified German Bundestag, dispatch of German planes to Turkey, the US Congress’ authorization of force and the start of the war, effective January 18, 1991. Analytically, these four events served to divide the decision making occasion into five periods.

Next, ANOVA tests discerned any statistically significant differences in mean ontology scores for each of the ontology categories (i.e., realism, historicism, etc.) and each of the five parties between all of the five periods. Of the 20 relationships tested (5 parties x 4 ontology categories) four yielded statistical significance. In other words, the test indicated that these four party/ontology relationships were significantly different from one another on the basis of the periods involved. While this result (4 out of 20 possible) is not indicative of large numbers of changes in the professed perceptions of decision makers, it still indicates that some pragmatism may be involved. However, what the ANOVA fails to reveal are the exact periods when "perception" changes occurred as well as the direction of those changes. In order to gauge these relationships,
a second stage test applied linear regressions to the data.

The four significant relationships picked out by the ANOVA tests -- namely, Greens/realism, Social Democrats/institutionalism, Free Democrats/institutionalism and Free Democrats/universalism -- were further examined in a series of four linear regressions each. This entailed dichotomizing the overall timeline four times by the pivotal event, thereby demarcating "before" and "after" periods of time, which were then entered as independent variables in a bivariate regression. In other words, the test examined whether the shift from one "before" one pivotal event to "after" it could predict to significant differences in the party's ontological score. Stated yet another way, it tested whether ontological changes were noticeable as a differences in a dichotomization of period 1 versus periods 2-5, of periods 1-2 versus periods 3-5, of periods 1-3 versus periods 4-5, and so on. Each result is independent of the others, so that as many as four significant relationships might be observed for each party/ontology pairing. In the end, these tests will provide an answer to the questions, "Precisely when did ontological changes noticed in the ANOVA results occur, in which direction did the ontologies change, and with what intensity?" The table below summarizes the findings of these tests:
### Demarcating Pivotal Event

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Ontology Relationship</th>
<th>#1 -- September 13</th>
<th>#2 -- October 4</th>
<th>#3 -- November 15</th>
<th>#4 -- January 18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greens/Institutionalism</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>-.536* (t=-3.420, N=30)</td>
<td>-.406 (t=2.394, N=30)</td>
<td>-.409 (t=-2.412, N=30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Democrats/Universalism</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>-.486 (t=-3.047, N=31)</td>
<td>-.407 (t=-2.444, N=31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democrats/Universalism</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>.275 (t=1.763, N=39)</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>No change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Correlations are Standardized Betas. In bivariate regressions, their interpretation is exactly the same as for a Pearson’s R; positive and negative correlations indicate direct and inverse relationships, respectively, with absolute values of one depicting “perfect” correlations and values of zero depicting “absolutely no” correlation.

### Table 3.2 Direction and Strength of Ontology Change by Party and Period

As in the first stage of tests, where only 3 of 16 relationships obtained, many relationships in the regression proved statistically insignificant (6/12.) What remained, however, do relate an intriguing story. For example, of the three parties, the Greens exhibited the most change, with shifts noticeable across three of the four demarcation points. The Greens showed a decreased likelihood for institutionalist ontology in the total period after October 4th as compared to total period before, as well as for the total periods before and after November 15th and January 18th. Interpreting the coefficients in these cases, we can see that the Greens were roughly half as likely to express their
perceptions in terms of institutionalism in each of the "after" periods as compared to the "before's" (-.536, -.406, -.409, chronologically.)

How to digest these findings? For one, it is interesting that the significantly time-affected ontology is institutionalism -- a second-ranked ontology among Green party members, significantly overshadowed by perceptions couched in universalist terms. Thus to the extent that there is evidence for pragmatism among Greens in the first decision making occasion, it relates to a seemingly secondary set of principles. On the other hand, although a "secondary" set of principles as far as Greens were concerned, institutionalism is in fact one of the components argued by the culturalist literature to comprise a major part of a monolithic German culture. This culture is moreover argued to affect perceptions of all German parties as a general "filter" or "wash" in a way only weakly related to left-right ideological placement.

In addition, the significant relationships for Free Democrats and Christian Democrats predict to their secondary ontologies, universalism. The number of periods where changes are statistically significant are fewer -- two and one for the Free Democrats and Christian Democrats, respectively -- but at least among the Free Democrats the direction and intensity of change is the same as for the Greens. Interestingly, though, the pragmatism noticed in Christian Democrat ontology is in the positive direction, albeit with about half the intensity observed in the shifts among Greens and Free Democrats (.275.) In sum, the findings for Greens, Free Democrats and Christian Democrats (to the extent that they exist) regarding the pragmatism proposition, contradict findings presented earlier in this chapter; rather than discredit the
monolithic cultural approach, the findings stemming from the tests of the pragmatism proposition support it.

Thus at this point a number of questions persist: What does it mean that the seeming manipulation of message occurs to secondary ontologies? What does it mean that these changes are not matched by any counter movement in the other ontologies? In other words, why is it that we only see the abandonment or adoption perceptions, and not the concomitant adoption or abandonment of a replacement perceptions? The logic of the pragmatism proposition expects both behaviors, that is to say the regular rejection and assumption of ontologies according to the political winds.

As with all this chapter's findings, the full meaning of these results will be best understood in comparative context, something which will only come with the analysis of subsequent decisionmaking occasions. Based on purely quantitative grounds, though, the generally weak findings in support of the pragmatism proposition (i.e., significant message inconsistency in fewer than 10% of the cases (3/16 x 6/12 = .093)) would seem to lend initial support to the idea that decisionmakers are in fact acting in a principled way. Where there are examples of pragmatism, though, interesting possibilities arise, so the full exploration of these and a final conclusion on the matter must still be undertaken.

3.4 Preliminary Conclusions

As mentioned at opening of this chapter, the Gulf War 1 decision making occasion affords no occasion for comparison, given its position at the beginning of the
era under study. At this early point in the research it is therefore still premature to make any global conclusions about the ability of the four main approaches, the pragmatism proposition or the monolithic cultural approach to explain German foreign military intervention decisionmaking. That said, I will not shy from offering at least some preliminary findings.

This occasion provided a situation in which a number of approaches would have been plausibly relevant in explaining the perceptions of German leaders. In the end, though, only two seemed to carry substantial weight: institutionalism and universalism. Realism, while not a dominant ontological representation of the occasion was nonetheless a surprise presence (to all except realist scholars) in the thinking Bundestag parliamentarians. Historicism, on the other hand, was the surprise laggard, appearing less prominently than anticipated (by the culturalists.) All these findings must be tempered by the lack of comparative opportunities at this point; it may turn out that history plays a big role, if only on other occasions. Finally, the monolithic cultural approach seemed perfectly able to explain the reasoning behind German leaders’ decisions, if only at the loss of detail and precision in terms of what components of culture described the perceptions of which members (i.e., right- versus left-leaning party members.) Of course, the full import of the observations from Gulf War 1 will only be realized through comparison to the subsequent decision making occasions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Expectation</th>
<th>Support?</th>
<th>Pattern over Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>Cost Benefit Calcs</td>
<td>Conditional: Right: Moderate</td>
<td>(Not Applicable due to the lack of previous decisionmaking occasions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Left: None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historicism</td>
<td>WW2, Nazi Era as guide</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalism</td>
<td>Laws, Orgs, Procedures</td>
<td>Conditional: Right: Moderate</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Left: Weak</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>Morality, absolutes, global harmony</td>
<td>Conditional: Right: None/Weak</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Left: Moderate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pragmatism</td>
<td>Ontologies change with political winds/over time</td>
<td>Generally Weak (25% of ontologies)</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conditional: Decreasing support for Institutionalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monolithic Culture</td>
<td>All parties affected by German cultural mores</td>
<td>Misses nuances found by Institutionalist and Universalist approaches</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3 Summary of Preliminary Findings
CHAPTER 4

KOSOVO

The second decision making occasion occurred in reaction to violent civil strife in Kosovo, a region of Serbia in the Yugoslav Federation, as German leaders questioned with whether military intervention would be appropriate for restoring peace to the area. Like the other occasions, Kosovo provides superb material for testing the approaches of realism, historicism, institutionalism and universalism for their ability to explain German foreign military intervention decision making. In addition, the occasion also provides material to test counter claims, especially the pragmatism proposition and the monolithic culture approach.

In other ways the occasion is unique. For instance, Kosovo decision making took place over an extraordinarily long period of time – 51 months. The average duration of the other three was just seven months each. In addition, Kosovo was also the only instance of potential military intervention in Europe. Finally, Kosovo was the only occasion that involved a change in government in Germany. To be sure, other occasions involved elections, but the Kosovo example is the one in which elections led to a new coalition in power.

Given these features, the subject of this chapter would seem an especially good case for several of the approaches under study. For starters, the realist approach ought
to go far in explaining German foreign military intervention decision making because Europe (the locus of crisis) is purportedly critical to German national interests. Moreover, Germany’s major power status is particularly noteworthy in that regional context thus reinforcing the systemic pressures to act or not act. Historicism would likewise be expected to have particular relevance because Europe was the locus for Germany’s Nazi and World War Two crimes. Any military intervention there would surely be under scrutiny from Germany’s past victims, their survivors and friends. Next, institutionalism ought do well in explaining decision making because the very organizational and legal network in which modern Germany is embedded starts with pan-European entities such as NATO and the EU. Lastly, with the electoral considerations of the period, it’s also plausible to expect the pragmatism proposition to obtain. In particular, if politicians in opposition can say anything, but those in power are constrained, then we should expect to see a lot of inconsistency in leader ontologies in the Kosovo occasion as government changed hands in its midst. In sum, proponents of many of the competing approaches under study in this dissertation can justifiably look with anticipation to the Kosovo case for substantiation of their claims.

4.1 The event

On the evening of March 24, 1999, aircraft of the German Luftwaffe joined other NATO forces to initiate what would become a 79-day battle between NATO and Serbia over the fate of Kosovo. In the many days and nights that followed, German aircraft continued their sorties into enemy territory. Finally, Serb authorities relented and
allowed a NATO-led peacekeeping force to govern Kosovo, albeit on behalf of Serbia. This study deals with the decision making behind the initial attacks of March 24, 1999, a night which marked the first offensive application of military force by the German Federal Republic since its founding fifty years earlier.

The origins of the Kosovo conflict are as convoluted and complex and its opening salvos were concussive. It was part of a larger pattern of conflicts that accompanied the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, and had included combat in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, as well as general violence and discord throughout the remainder of the former republic. The time taken to make the historic decision to intervene ultimately reflected its path-breaking importance to Germany. For 51 months German decision makers considered and re-considered whether or not the use of military force to achieve policy goals vis-à-vis Kosovo.

The 1999 Kosovo war followed resolution of the violent conflict in Bosnia some four years earlier. At the time, there was optimism that the Bosnian peace would infect Kosovo as well. The peace accords dealing with the Bosnian conflict, however, did not directly address grievances of disagreeing sides in Kosovo and so (in hindsight) such optimism was regrettably misplaced. In the months following the Bosnian peace and as discord continued to affect Kosovo, the UN Security Council, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, the United States, Russia, Germany, the UK, France, and Italy all attempted many times to resolve the conflict through a mixture of carrots and sticks aimed at both side of the dispute but to no avail. In the end, the various entities could not agree on a solution and split their
preferences, with NATO deciding for war as the best means for resolving the impasse. This chapter analyzes how German decision makers, for their part, came to support this decision.

As the 51 month decision making period points out, the decision to intervene was hardly instantaneous. It was also highly contentious. As in Gulf War 1, many leaders continued to perceive German foreign military intervention as impossible, even unthinkable. Some of these decision makers would come to change their opinions in this regard, while others would maintain the stance. Others found it just as incredulous to think that Germany would not intervene militarily in Kosovo. Still more viewed the situation as one finely balanced between these two extremes, wherein pros and cons both existed in abundance and whereby decision makers could effectively adjudicate in order to arrive at the best decision. By 1999, support eventually coalesced in favor of intervention, however the rationales behind this support remained as diverse as ever.

4.2 Internal and external contexts

Like the event itself, the external and internal contexts to the Kosovo occasion were complex. Partly this was due to the length of time over which the decision was made; in 51 long months many things could (and did) occur to shape and reshape the decision making context. In many ways this complexity persisted from the previous decision making occasion, specifically as it regarded the collapse the communist order in eastern Europe and the reunification of east and west Germany.
The reverberations of communism’s collapse continued to be felt throughout the 1990’s. The Soviet Union’s successor, Russia, was vastly reduced in power and influence. Its economic output by 1994 was a mere fraction of that of the Soviet Union ten years prior. Its premier military alliance, the Warsaw Pact, formally disbanded in 1991 and Russia’s last troops in Germany left in 1994. As if to highlight its tremendous retreat from influence and power, Russia’s number one “foreign” policy concern in 1994-99 appeared not to have been its diminishing sway over its erstwhile allies in Europe (which were seeking to join NATO and the EU) or Asia (where Vietnam was becoming capitalist in all but name) but rather the suppression of separatist Chechens inside Russia.

“Capitalization” of the erstwhile communist world (and, in some places, its democratization) translated into no immediately apparent threats to the “Western Allies” led by the US and including among its number Germany. Again, as in Gulf War 1, Russia, China and other former adversaries of the western alliance were still not members of it. But neither were true enemies, having become more positively inclined toward it and by 1994 in many respects associates to it. This western-led empire was not by conquest but “by invitation” and most states of the world sought entry (Ikenberry 2001:52 fn.4) To the extent that others threatened this system (and Germany) it was mostly perceived as occurring through “rogue” states such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Libya, or through “failed” states such as Somalia, Zaire or the subject of this chapter, Yugoslavia.
Partially on the grounds that it would prevent other failed states from emerging, German leaders and others pushed for the expansion of institutions into the former communist sphere of influence in Europe. These were envisioned to include the EU, NATO, OSCE and others, and the expansion was to cover both deepening and broadening of the institutions – covering more territories and areas of control and intensifying the extent of oversight.

In 1994, the former Yugoslavia was one region of Europe largely left-out of these plans, at least for the time-being. The collapse of Yugoslavia had occurred simultaneously with the collapse of communism more generally throughout Eastern Europe. However, whereas most transformations were peaceful, Yugoslavia was one of violence and chaos. Wars ranging with casualties ranging from a few battle-deaths to thousands occurred in Slovenia (1991), Croatia (1991-95) and Bosnia (1992-95) as former these Yugoslav republics ceded from the larger entity.

German forces participated – in a limited fashion – in various UN-supported endeavors in the early 1990’s aimed at ending the fighting in the former Yugoslavia. Examples were Operation “Sharp Guard,” a NATO-led Adriatic embargo, with 550 German soldiers involved on two frigates and in naval aerial reconnaissance aircraft and Operation “Deny Flight,” another NATO-led airspace surveillance mission over Bosnia and Herzegovina, with 484 German soldiers in AWACS patrol aircraft. On February 8, 1994, these AWACS crews were mission-vital when NATO jets shot down four Serbian aircraft violating a no-fly zone. While not the goal of this chapter to
analyze the decision making behind these interventions, suffice it to say that their occurrence created a great deal of controversy among German leaders.

Symbolizing this controversy was the 1994 Federal Constitutional Court case brought by Free Democrats, Social Democrats and Greens against the government, seeking clarification (and if necessary court injunction) on the appropriateness of foreign military interventions. The court rendered its decision on July 12, 1994, arguing that German foreign military interventions were constitutionally legal if conducted under the auspices of the United Nations and if supported by a simple majority in the Bundestag (Gow 1994). Even with this finding, however, strong differences persisted with respect to German parliamentarians’ views on the appropriateness of military instruments of policy both in the former Yugoslavia specifically and in the rest of the world more generally (Beard 1994).

The internal context in Germany during the Kosovo decision making occasion was also complex, as well as marred by its own unfortunate violence, although never coming near the levels seen in the former Yugoslavia. Reunification of east and west Germany was a troubled process. The assassination of the official in charge of the privatization of East German assets in 1991 cast a pall over economic and social integration. The growing characterization of the Christian Democrat/Free Democrat government’s reunification forecasts as the Steuerlügen (tax lies) stood in stark contrast to the ebullient and rosy expectations of 1990. Annual GDP growth rates after 1992 were less than half pre-unification rates, with an average annual increase of 1.5% in GDP between 1993 and 1998 (as opposed to the 3.7 and 3.6% annual rates in the last
two years prior to reunification.) Nationwide German unemployment hovered over 4 million, or about 10 percent, although it was much higher in the east and among young people (Library of Congress 1996; CIA 2002).

Amidst this environment, scores of attacks against “foreigners” living in Germany resulted in roughly a dozen killed and dozens more wounded. These attacks occurred in relatively well-to-do western regions as well as in poorer eastern ones. Several hundreds of thousands of refugees from the former Yugoslavia were among the targeted populations. Bundestag elections in late 1994 maintained the Christian Democrat and Free Democrat coalition in government, but with a vastly reduced majority. Instead of the 67 seat surplus they enjoyed in 1990, they now had to rule with a mere 5 seat majority. Another round of Bundestag elections in late 1998 put a new coalition of Social Democrats and Greens in government, itself with a mere 7 seat majority. In sum, the internal context was similarly volatile and divisive.

Discussion about what would ultimately become the green-lighted Kosovo intervention began on December 14, 1994, initiated by Federal Minister of Justice, Sabine Leutheussen-Scharrenberger in perfunctory comments at the beginning of the legislative period. Over the ensuing 51 months, German decision makers would raise the issue of Kosovo and the appropriateness of different policies toward the situation there – including military intervention – again and again in the course of 17 sessions.

These sessions fell into two distinct timeframes, specifically, pre-1997 and post-1997 phases. This seems due to the fact that after December 1995, when the Dayton Peace Accords were ratified and German decision makers agreed to send troops to
Bosnia, the question of Kosovo became moot. German leaders stopped raising the issue of Kosovo for 12 long months, only returning to the issue in December 1996, when the Bosnia mission was extended. Even though many parliamentarians at that point observed that peace in Kosovo had not necessarily followed peace in Bosnia, most nonetheless expressed the hope that it still would. Discussion of potential intervention in Kosovo thus took another long pause, this time lasting 15 months, until March 1998. This was the longest break between debates on Kosovo, and its end seems to indicate the rise new beliefs among many German leaders that peace in Kosovo would need to be achieved through a mechanism separate from that employed in Bosnia. In other words, Kosovo was deemed to require new initiatives and undertakings vis-à-vis those that ended the Bosnian war. From that point on (March 1998) discussion of the Kosovo problem, and how Germany ought to respond, continued unabated until NATO air strikes began twelve months later.

Due to the large 15 month pause in the discussion among German leaders, this chapter takes the additional step of dividing the overall Kosovo decision making occasion into two periods. The dividing line is 1997, the “silent” year of the debate, and the one which seems to equate with a shift in the thinking toward the Kosovo problem from one which saw it as side story to Bosnia to one which viewed it as more isolated and idiosyncratic. All other elements of the analysis are the same and otherwise mirror the other decision making chapters. The bifurcation of the data to account for the long pause is merely an additional feature to this chapter, made possible and necessary by the occasion’s length and structure. Through-out the remainder of this
chapter I make distinctions between these two analyses by referring to them as the “overall” and “split-period” analyses.

At this point, having outlined the event behind the decision making occasion, its internal and external contexts, I now present a list of these events (noted in the secondary literature regarding German politics and society during the time) in Table 4.2 before turning to the analysis of the four main approaches and the two counter claims. (Adapted from NATO 1999 and CNN 2001b.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Bundestag Session</th>
<th>Session Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/21/95</td>
<td>- Dayton Accords accepted by all parties</td>
<td>12/14/94</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12/14/94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/9/95</td>
<td>- Not Coded (NC)</td>
<td>3/9/95</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3/9/95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/30/95</td>
<td>- Not Coded (NC)</td>
<td>6/30/95</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>6/30/95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49-73/95</td>
<td>- Not Coded (NC)</td>
<td>49-73/95</td>
<td>49-73</td>
<td>49-73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued

Table 4.1 Kosovo Timeline
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/14/96</td>
<td>IFOR morphs into NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR)</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/5/96</td>
<td>- Albanian government besieged by rioters and arms depots looted after sudden economic collapse</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/23/98</td>
<td>- US Special Envoy Gelbard denounces KLA as terrorist organization</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1 Continued
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Summer 1998</td>
<td>- Fighting intensifies with 100’s dead and 10,000’s dislocated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/17/98</td>
<td>- Russian government defaults on domestic loans, defers international loan repayment and devalues ruble</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/23/98</td>
<td>- UN Security Council Resolution 1199 (SC 1199) demands end to hostilities and beginning of meaningful negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/27/98</td>
<td>- Bundestag elections</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 10/16/98   | - Bundestag votes to approve NATO use of force against Serbia in support of SC 1199  
- Ceasefire brokered between KLA and Serbs; 2,000 unarmed Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) monitors enter Kosovo to verify ceasefire |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Begins</th>
<th>Ends</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12/16/98</td>
<td>US &amp; Britain begin a three-day air bombardment of Iraq for stated violations of UN disarmament requirements</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11/10/98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/15/99</td>
<td>“Racak Massacre” in which 45 Kosovo Albanians are executed</td>
<td>4-5 (NC)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/30/99</td>
<td>Contact Group (US, Russia, UK, France, Italy and Germany) proposes “Status Quo Plus” plan for conflict resolution and NATO threatens air strikes against Serbia</td>
<td>7-20 (NC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/6/99</td>
<td>Rambouillet talks begin between Contact Group, Serbs and Kosovo Albanians</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2/24/99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/18/99</td>
<td>Rambouillet Accords signed by all parties but Russia and Serbia</td>
<td>22-29 (NC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/22/99</td>
<td>OSCE monitors leave Kosovo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/24/99</td>
<td>NATO begins air strikes against Serbia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued
4.3 Tests of the Approaches

As stated above, the speeches coded for the Kosovo decision-making occasion were gleaned from 17 sessions. They totaled 276 individual observations. These statements reflected the thoughts of 110 speakers from all five political parties. The party breakdown in terms of number of statements per party was: 24.2% Christian Democrats, 15.8% Free Democrats, 28.9% Social Democrats, 19% Greens and 11.4% Democratic Socialists. The governing coalition changed during the occasion, so reportage of proportions of government-versus-opposition speakers are inappropriate in this case.

Unlike the previous decision making occasion, several votes occurred during discussion of potential intervention in Kosovo. One vote involved a matter indirectly related to Kosovo, but was nonetheless an agenda item in which much discussion of Kosovo to place so I have therefore included it. Four votes involved the Bosnian peace accords and for reasons stated above I have included these as well. The purpose of reporting votes is to provide background information on levels of support or opposition to foreign military intervention among the various political parties. As in the 1990-91
decision making occasion, votes are not the only indicators of favor or disfavor toward the subject. Vote information is thus an important piece of the puzzle and helpful (when present) for thorough understanding of each decision making occasion but not necessary in order to achieve it altogether.

Each of the votes, its subject matter, overall percentage of support and the percentage of support from each of the five parties are listed in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Bundestag Session</th>
<th>Subject Matter</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Abstain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/30/1995</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Rapid reaction force Bosnia</td>
<td>58.9%</td>
<td>39.4%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Votes:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>89.1%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>78.8%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>97.9%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/6/1995</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>Bosnia peacekeepers</td>
<td>82.8%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Votes:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>44.9%</td>
<td>44.9%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>77.0%</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>99.7%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/13/96</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>Bosnia peacekeepers extension</td>
<td>81.7%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Votes:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>80.2%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>99.3%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/26/1998</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>NATO expansion</td>
<td>89.2%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Votes:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>97.2%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>99.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued

Table 4.2 Votes During Kosovo Decision Making Occasion
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Bundestag Session</th>
<th>Subject Matter</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Abstain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/19/1998</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>Bosnia peacekeepers extension</td>
<td>91.7%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>91.7%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>70.2%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>95.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/16/1998</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>Kosovo air strikes</td>
<td>86.2%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>63.0%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>87.6%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>54.1%</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>98.8%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/13/1998</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kosovo air surveillance</td>
<td>92.8%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>87.8%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>97.6%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>98.9%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turning now to the data on ontologies, an initial observation is that it illustrates an interesting mixture of both consistency and change from the previous decision making occasion. That is, amidst these differences and similarities intriguing patterns emerge. In the following I explain these patterns and, as in the previous chapter, present the evidence for each approach and the two counter claims. In addition, from this chapter onwards, I also reiterate overall results from previous chapters, so comparisons can be made with prior decision making occasions.
Figure 4.1 Decision Maker Ontologies: Realism

4.3.1 Realist approach

There was more evidence for realist ontology than anticipated by the culturalist literature (Figure 4.3.1.1). While culturalists write that “there are virtually no traces of Germany’s return to realist ‘normalcy,’ to balance of power politics in an anarchical international system” and that “Germans shun the concepts” of realism, simply put, such expectations are not born out in the evidence from the Kosovo decision making occasion (Katzenstein 1997: 9). Realist theorists, on the other hand, need to recognize that realism is not the dominant way in which German leaders are representing the Kosovo intervention case. “More” evidence for realism vis-à-vis culturalists
expectations must therefore be understood in terms of the ontology’s overall secondary or tertiary status to much stronger institutionalist and universalist ontological evidence. Culturalists are easily debunked, but since they expect such miniscule evidence of realist thinking the bar is so low that any amount of realist ontology refutes their claims.

To the extent that realism does manifest itself, the strongest adherence is on the right of the political spectrum. Party differences with respect to ontology score were statistically significant for realism (d.f. 4, 271; F = 7.967; p < .001). As realist theorists would expect the emphasis among German realists was on threats, opportunities, the role of power and force, and an unavoidable major power role of Germany as a military intervener in the world. Overall, these ontologies portrayed a process of calculation with respect to the decisions at hand; whether Germany should intervene or not had to do with the costs and benefits of using military force in terms of the resultant power balances. Typical of these statements were those of a Free Democrat leader early in the debate:

We honestly say nevertheless that the readiness of the warring parties in former Yugoslavia to at long last take part in the peace negotiations and carry out the peace pact was only brought about by massive military intervention.

Others even used the term “reality” to refer to a policy prescribing the use force, arguing for instance:

Unfortunately there are today still circumstances under which responsible security politics can and may not do without military means as the Ultima ratio.

Original: Sagen wir doch ehrlich, daß die Bereitschaft der Kriegsparteien im ehemaligen Jugoslawien, sich an den Friedensverhandlungen zu beteiligen und den Friedensschluß letzen Endes zu vollziehen, erst durch massiveres militärisches Eingreifen herbeigeführt wurde. – Irmer, FDP, 12/6/95
Whoever doesn’t see that after years of brutal warfare in Bosnia, in Yugoslavia, quite simply refuses the reality.\textsuperscript{28}

…and…

There is no realistic alternative to the participation of the German Federal Armed Forces [in the situation]\textsuperscript{29}

These kinds of arguments are what realist theory predicts. Still other parliamentarians, while acknowledging a realist’s “reality” to the Kosovo situation, spoke decidedly somberly about it. Echoing the “tragedy of international politics” arguments of some realists, their statements were typified by the following:

We want nothing else [other than peace]. We do not want “muscular plays”; we do not want great power feelings, no “cannon politics”, but we do not want to decisively and without Hurra make our contribution - no more and no less.\textsuperscript{30}

Such utterances match the expectations the realist theory, which anticipates decision makers who are “sober unsentimental statesmen” arriving at their choices not on emotional grounds but on purely material ones as they “compete for [national] influence” (Moravcik & Legro 199: 6; Mearsheimer 1990: 110).

While these comments were more likely to come from those on the right of the political spectrum, there were nonetheless infrequent and weak references to realists

\textsuperscript{28} Leider gibt es heute noch Umstände, unter denen verantwortungsvolle Sicherheitspolitik auf militärische Mittel als Ultima ratio nicht verzichten kann und darf. Wer das nach Jahren brutaler Kriegsführung in Bosnien, in Jugoslawien nicht sieht, der verweigert sich ganz einfach auf der Realität Kinkel, FDP, 30/6/95

\textsuperscript{29} Original: Es gibt in Wahrheit ja auch keine realistische Alternative zur Beteiligung der Bundeswehr an den von UNO und NATO gemeinsam gewünschten und geforderten und für notwendig erachteten Maßnahmen. – Rudolf Seiter, CDU, 30/11/95

\textsuperscript{30}
ontologies on the left as well. More common, though, were lamenting observations of realist thinking in the form of especially regarding supposed dominant position in the thinking of the parties of government, the Christian Democrats and Free Democrats. Defending his vote for German military intervention in Bosnia, one member nonetheless explicitly rejected realism as his grounds:

[My vote] is a “no” to tendencies on German rights, who, through the so-called normalization of the military role of the Federal Republic rid themselves of the burden and lessons of German history and downplay military means [as a tool] for regional and national policy interests.³¹

The “split-period” evidence, or the analysis comparing the pre- and post-1997 timeframes, embellishes the overall trend (Figure Kosovo Realism: Split Period). The table below shows how realist ontology scores increased for Greens and Social Democrats from period one to period two, while this relationship was reversed for all other parties.

The data also show that the largest changes in realist ontology score were for the two largest parties – the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats. Again, these changes were in different directions, with Social Democrats increasing in their realist ontology scores and Christian Democrats decreasing. This makes it difficult to ascribe any preference tendencies to levels of realist ontology because the Social Democrats’ increased support for intervention (as observed in its voting pattern) is contradicted by

³⁰ Original: Nichts anderes wollen wir. Wir wollen keine Muskelspiele; wir wollen keine Großmachtgefühle, keine Kanonenpolitik, sondern wir wollen ganz bescheiden und ohne Hurra unseren Beitrag leisten – nicht mehr und nicht weniger. - Friedbert Pflüger, CDU, 6/12/95
³¹ Original: Es ist ein Nein zu Tendenzen auf der deutschen Rechten, sich mit einer sogenannten Normalisierung der militärischen Rolle der Bundesrepublik der Last und Lehren der deutschen
the Christian Democrats’ consistent support for intervention in the face of falling realist ontology scores. That said, the magnitude of change is much greater for Social Democrats than for Christian Democrats, so perhaps it is this feature of the change that is most important.

Finally, the split-period evidence indicates that despite the increase in Social Democrats’ realist scores, realist ontologies remained primarily a domain of the right, especially the Christian Democrats. Some additional interesting patterns do emerge with respect to the realist ontologies of Democratic Socialists, Greens and Social Democrats and other ontology scores, about which I reserve discussion until later in this chapter.

These findings, in tandem with the findings from the Gulf War 1 decision making occasion, indicate a weak to moderate relevance of realist ontologies. This is specifically with regard to thinking about military interventions among Christian Democrats and with regard to right-of-center parties more generally. Such scores are more than the culturalist and institutionalists would expect, but less than the realists would expect. Thus none of the approaches are particularly well-served by the results. Most critically, the realist approach is not an overarching explanation for German decision making because it is not substantially supported by the evidence other than in a limited manner.

Geschichte zu entledigen und militärische Mittel für eine regionale und nationale Interessenpolitik zu verharmlosen. – Norbert Gansel, SPD, 30/6/95
Figure 4.2 Decision Maker Realist Ontologies: Split-Period

Figure 4.3 Decision Maker Ontologies: Historicism
4.3.2 Historicist approach

Overall scores for historicist ontologies are consistent with those for Gulf War I. As such, they are weak, particularly as compared to culturalists’ expectations. Averages for the five parties during the overall time period range between 0.60 and 0.87 on the three point scale (Figure 4.3.2.1). While commensurate with numbers for realist ontologies (i.e., low) these are hardly the “super-abundance of references to historical issues in the German public discourse on defense and national security” expected by culturalists like Berger (2002).

An ANOVA test of the relationship between party membership and historicist ontologies likewise rejected any correlation that would suggest different parties have different levels of adherence to historicist perceptions (d.f. 4, 90; F = 1.358; p = 2.55). These findings are consonant with previous findings regarding historicist ontology, namely the systematic lack of any “super-abundant” evidence in support of it. This is especially interesting given certain features of the Kosovo case which distinguished it from the Gulf War I case. First, Kosovo involved a region of the world which had previously seen German military intervention. Yugoslavia was occupied from 1941 to 1945. The level of atrocities committed were on a scale equal to anywhere else in Europe and included mass executions and death camp deportations. Second, there were hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Yugoslavian war-zones, including Kosovo, living in Germany during the decision making occasion. Their presence was felt by many and contributed a first-hand, more direct quality to the occasion as stories of their experiences were transmitted through contact with German social workers, teachers,
business owners and neighbors. Assuming that these refugees were either direct
witnesses or survivors of direct witnesses to the German occupation of World War II,
one would expect such traumas to have also been part of the social transmission
process. Despite these special connections to the past, however, historicist ontology
scores were – overall – not remarkably higher than as in the Gulf War I occasion. The
only exceptions are in the scores for Democratic Socialist and Green party members,
where scores were slightly higher than in 1990-91.

The split-period results tell a marginally different story. Primarily, they differ
by illustrating higher scores for historicist ontology in the first period (i.e., pre-1997)
than in the second. The averages for the five parties range between 1.27 and 0.76 for
the first period and 0.81 and 0.34 for the second. ANOVA analyses for both time
periods rule out any statistically differences between parties with regard to their
ontology scores. In other words, historicist ontologies are still “flat” indicating no
differentiation in their usage between different parties. Examined in isolation, the
historicist scores for the first period are moderately higher than for those during Gulf
War I. The second period’s are lower for all parties compared to Gulf War I.
Figure 4.4 Decision Maker Historicist Ontologies: Split-Period

A couple of additional characteristics reveal themselves in the historicist evidence. For one, note the Christian Democrats’ reversal from highest to lowest average scores between the first and second time periods (1.27 versus 0.34, respectively). This result is all the more striking given the decreased averages for all the other parties as well. Note also that this change in average score is the same direction as the Christian Democrats’ change in realist ontology average score for the Kosovo occasion. With this four-fold reduction in average score in the second part of the decision making occasion, Christian Democrats demonstrate a dramatic retreat in the importance of historicist reasoning in their speeches, even given the already relatively low scores in the first part. The Greens, on the other hand, demonstrate the
greatest consistency, with average scores of 1.10 and 0.81 between the first and second periods, respectively. This means that Greens were the most steadfast in their reference to historicist rationales in their speeches in both the pre- and post-1998 periods. That said, they were similarly weak average scores in both periods.

Most importantly, the evidence reveals that differences such as they exist between historicist ontology scores (which of course were shown in the ANOVA to be statistically insignificant differences) do not in and of itself predict to particular expressed preferences vis-à-vis foreign military intervention in the Kosovo case. Relatively higher scores for the Christian Democrats in the first period were in evidence despite that group’s support for intervention in votes of that period. Historicist thinking, therefore, does not seem to act as a “brake” on willingness to militarily intervene according to German decision makers. Similarly, consistently strong opposition to foreign military intervention emanated from groups that nonetheless demonstrated both relatively high and low levels of historicist thinking. One need only look at the ontologies exhibited by the Democratic Socialists (1.18 and 0.70 in the first and second periods, respectively) compared to their votes (averaging 0.0% and 1.1% in the first and second periods, respectively).

It is only in the first part of the split-period analysis that one gets a sense of any importance for historicists ontologies and at least some confirmation of the culturalist claim that “[a]nalytical traditions that neglect the effects of collective memory, as variants of realism and liberalism often do, miss crucial determinants of Germany’s stance toward Europe” (Katzenstein 1997: 296). While its important is isolated to the
first part of the debate, and even then it’s relatively weak (therefore probably not a “determinant” to policy), one would nonetheless be missing an interesting part of the story to neglect the historicist approach outright.

The specific statements of leaders further illustrate these points. From the very earliest stages of the debate historical reasoning (to the extent that it was being used) was used to justify both pro- and anti-intervention positions. In an example of the former, Christian Democrat Schäuble looked to the pre-war Nazi time, arguing:

Mr. Fischer [Green], to draw lessons from Srebrenica is correct. But I find we must also draw lessons from Munich in 1938. The earlier an aggressor is convinced that he butts up against decisive and overwhelming resistance the more secure the peace and the less convinced he is of this the more endangered.32

Contrast these words with the specific historical argument made on the same day by an anti-intervention parliamentarian, the Green Nickels:

I would like it to be remembered that history teaches us that the attempt to defend peace with force came accompanied by flowing rivers of blood, that millions and billions of value became in the very end scrap iron and sorrow. These violent means, accumulated in total, have lead to suppression, terrible genocides and wars [... ] From this it is clear that the attempt by means of force to create, to secure and to maintain peace contains in it the destruction of that which one actually wants to defend.33

32 Original: Herr Kollege Fischer, die Lehre aus Srebrenica zu ziehen ist richtig. Aber ich finde, wir müssen auch die Lehre aus München 1938 ziehen. Je früher ein Aggressor davon überzeugt wird, daß er auf entschiedenen und überlegenen Widerstand stößt, desto sicherer ist der Friede, und je weniger er davon überzeugt ist, desto gefährdeter. – Schäuble, CDU, 6/12/95

33 Original: Ich möchte daran erinnern, daß die Geschichte uns lehrt, daß der Versuch, Frieden mit gewaltsamen Mitteln zu verteidigen, davon begleitet ist, daß Ströme von Blut geflossen sind, Millionen und Milliarden von Werten letzten Endes zu Schrott und Leid geworden sind. Diese gewaltsamen Mittel, im Übermaß angehäuft, haben zu Unterdrückung, zu entsetzlichen Völkermorden und Kriegen geführt. […] Daran wird deutlich, daß letzten Endes der Versuch, mit gewaltsamen Mitteln Frieden zu schaffen, zu sichern und zu erhalten, auch die Vernichtung dessen beinhalten kann, was man eigentlich verteidigen will. – Christa Nickels, Greens, 6/12/95
Interestingly, there were two types of reactions to the different ways in which history was related to expressed preferences pro- or contra-intervention. For instance, delegates sometimes made explicit reference to one another’s alternative historical views in a somewhat sympathetic manner, in which regard Schäuble commented:

In view of this one can spin it and spin it as one wants: The dreadful occurrences of World War 2, of the Hitler era, do not give us the right and the argument to now stand aside, to say “The others should send troops, but not us!” and thereby assume in reference to others a position of moral presumption. For that we have no basis.  

Alternatively, delegates sometimes questioned the underlying facilities of observation among their interlocuters, as when Democratic Socialist Gysi remarked:

What changed? You did not answer the question. You have passionately spoken here, Mr. Gerhardt [Free Democrat]. But you did not answer the question of Mr. Fischer [Green]. Is the history of the years 1941 to 1945 in former Yugoslavia suddenly no more? That was nonetheless your argument against him. How do you not argue with him? What changed?

In one exceptional debate, reaction to these different perspectives on history took a decidedly chaotic and confrontational turn. It began when Social Democrat Verheugen made brief mention of the Social Democratic Party’s isolation among German parties in 1934 in rejecting Hitler’s Enabling Act. When Christian Democrat

---

34 Original: Angesichts dessen kann man es drehen und wenden, wie man will: Was im Zweiten Weltkrieg, in der Hitler-Zeit, Furchtliches gewesen ist, gibt uns nicht das Recht und das Argument, jetzt beiseite zu stehen, zu sagen, die anderen sollten Truppen entsenden, aber nicht wir, und damit aus der Sicht der anderen eher eine Position moralischer Überheblichkeit zu beziehen. Dazu haben wir keinen Grund. – Wolfgang Schäuble, CDU, 30/6/95

Schäuble interjected that he found this comment disrespectful, Verheugen fell back on “historical fact” remarking:

It is the incontestable historical truth: The German conservative parties regarded the employment of military means as the normal expression of foreign policy. That sank Germany into misfortune twice. I have to take nothing of it back.  

To this the SPD, PDS and Greens gave lively applause while FDP delegate Nolting shouted: “Shamelessness!” Christian Democrat Waigel took to the podium to correct the “unbelievable falsification of history, that you [Verheugen] undertake here” and to recount the many conservative party opponents (and victims) of the Nazi regime. In the midst of the conservative and free democrat applause that these statements drew, Schäuble then shouted “Born traitors! Such wretchedness I have seldom experienced!” The uproar that this last remark engendered caused the session to spin nearly out of control, with the president resorting to the gavel for some time to restore order.

As the next speaker took the podium, a slew of speakers appealed to the president, including the Green Fischer, who along with the others was reminded that “he did not control the session.” Finally, as if to summarize this momentary imbroglio, the current podium speaker, Democratic Socialist Andrea Lederer attempted to be heard over the uproar in noting “I believe we getting here an impressive demonstration of how complicated the disagreements over history are.” She then tossed in her own view that:

---

36 Original: Es ist die unbestreitbare historische Wahrheit: Die deutsche konservativen Parteien haben den Einsatz militärischer Mittel als normalen Ausdruck der Außenpolitik betrachtet. Das hat Deutschland zweimal mit ins Unglück gestürzt. Ich habe davon nichts zurückzunehmen. – Verheugen, SPD, 30/6/95

37 Original: Ich glaube, wir bekommen hier gerade ein eindrucksvolles Beispiel vorgeführt, wie kompliziert die Auseinandersetzung mit der Geschichte ist. – Andrea Lederer, PDS, 30/6/95 Later
The arguments referring to the historical responsibility of Germany are still valid. German soldiers have no right to be in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{38}

As this episode illustrates, history was a contentious, if in the aggregate somewhat infrequently referenced element of decision maker thinking in the Kosovo decision making occasion. However, these qualities do not translate into an overall level of importance for historicist ontologies. Overall averages are below 1.0, or indicative of weak reference to history as a guiding point for leaders’ decisions on foreign military intervention. These thereby results contradict the culturalist argument that:

However much one may decry the ritualisation of German guilt, and however many instances one can find of German leaders choosing to ignore the potentially negative symbolic consequences of their actions – such as moving the capital from Bonn to Berlin – it is hard to maintain that the horrors of the Nazi past have been forgotten (Berger 2002: 94-95).

At least in terms of consideration of foreign military intervention in the Kosovo occasion, the this seems to have been precisely the case – history largely drops out of the debate. Instead, what German leaders referenced with much greater regularity and just as much contention were views not on history but rather indicative of the remaining two ideal-type ontologies – instutionalism and universalism.

\textsuperscript{38} Original: “Die Argumente, die auf die historische Verantwortung Deutschlands verweisen, sind nach wie vor gültig. Deutsche Soldaten haben auf dem Balkan nichts zu suchen.” – Andrea Lederer, PDS, 30/11/95
4.3.3 Institutionalist approach

Like Gulf War I, institutionalism was again the ontology most frequently in overall evidence (Figure 4.3.3.1). It was the number one scoring ontology for three of the five parties in the Kosovo (overall) occasion, with only the Democratic Socialists and Greens reducing it to second place (against their universalist scores.) Unlike Gulf War I, though, these party differences were not found to correlate with statistical significance to the different overall ontology scores (d.f. 4, 90; F = 9.039; p < .001). Thus, in terms of the overall measures, no statistical difference could be discerned between the highest average of 2.29 and the lowest average of 2.05.
Emphasis among decision makers espousing an institutionalist perception of the decision making occasion was once more on rules and procedures – especially “due process” – organizations and alliances, and implicit and explicit commitments and obligations between states. These are the expectations of the institutionalist literature. Katzenstein, for example, writes of “the institutional presence of Europe as a set of norms” which in turn engender “explicit political considerations” (Katzenstein 1997: 20). While Anderson perceives a country which since its inception has developed “a reflexive support for exaggerated multilateralism” and “satisfying partners’ expectations about appropriate German conduct” (Anderson 1997: 85). Examples of arguments that espoused institutionalist principles include the following remarks from each of the five parties.

Speaking to the issue of due process and democratic control, SPD member Scharping stated:

I want to make clear that for the Bundestag faction of the SPD: We hold onto the notion of parliamentary oversight and also to the fact that such measures can be only decided constitutionally if a clear mandate of the United Nations and pertinent so-called "Rules of Engagement" are present.\textsuperscript{39}

Speaking to the issue of deliberative and representative democracy (a la the democratic peace) Green member Nickels said:

The foundations for it [our deliberation] are not obtained via a decision which the Federal Government demands of us. One absolutely cannot do without it

\textsuperscript{39} Original: Ich will für die Bundestagsfraktion der SPD feststellen: Wir halten am Parlamentsvorbehalt und auch daran fest, daß solche Maßnahmen grundsätzlich nur beschlossen werden können, wenn ein klares Mandat der Vereinten Nationen und die dazugehörigen sogennanten “Rules of Engagement” vorliegen. – Sharping, SPD, 6/12/95
[deliberation]. Even if otherwise nobody here in this house chooses to endure, to demand what’s due: it is our obligation as Greens to do this.

For their part, Christian Democrats Seiters and Schmidt invoked Kant’s democratic peace proposition by name in their statements. Regarding the issue of interstate institutions of collective action, note the following remarks of left and right politicians on the matter:

An alliance consists of giving and taking. Whoever refuses to pay an appropriate contribution to the security of peace and stability, will in return not be able to count on the solidarity of the partners. Liberty, justice, defense against aggression, solidarity with defenseless ones, the rescue of human lives - all that abandoned for a higher moral and the principle of non-violence. This is an ethically as well as politically untenable position.

In the decision of today is not only our solidarity in question. It goes also to the issue of our inherent German interests and to the consequence and believability of our previous policy. Germany has from the outset, with respect to the former Yugoslavia, upheld policy in NATO, in WEU and European Union, in the Contact Group and above all in the UN – where we have at the moment the presidency of the security council – alongside [our allies.]. From this arises for us a joint responsibility.
Notice how Schulte refers to the distinction between “ethics and politics” in her rationalization. In so doing, she recognizes the distinction between decisions that are morally based (i.e., universalism) and those that are rule-of-law based (i.e., institutionalism). Of course, in referencing both these bases in her statement, underscoring the compatibility (if not identicality) of the two. Another Social Democrat, Norbert Gansel, attempted to integrate these different impulses by noting the trade-offs involved between the two:

This conviction of humanitarian internationalism also belongs — like pacifism — to the tradition of the German left, to the legacy of a liberal socialism. Our “yes” is therefore a “yes” to the UN, to the real utopia of the world community, but also to the concrete organization with all its shortcomings and defects, to the organization, whose authority and operability in the interest of obtaining world peace must be obtained and strengthened.  

The split-period analysis reveals a statistically significant relationship between institutionalist ontology and party membership in the first period but not in the second (first period ANOVA d.f. =4,95; F=2.758, p<.10; second period ANOVA d.f. = 4,166; F=.615, p=.652). On closer inspection, though, one can see that this difference is entirely attributable to the difference between Free Democrats’ average scores and those of the other four parties. At a score of 2.76 for the Free Democrats versus 2.36 for the next highest institutionalist ontology score (Christian Democrats) the Free Democrats

---

Präsidenschaft im Sicherheitsrat haben, mitgetragen. Daraus erwächst uns Mitverantwortung. – Klaus Kinkel, FDP, 30/6/95

44 Original: Auch diese Überzeugung des humanistischen Internationalismus gehört – wie der Pazifismus – zur Tradition der deutschen Linken, zum Vermächtnis eines freiheitlichen Sozialismus. Unser Ja ist deshalb ein Ja zur UNO, zur realen Utopie der Weltgemeinschaft, aber auch zu der konkreten Organisation mit all ihren Fehlern und Defekten, zu der Organisation, deren Autorität und Funktionsfähigkeit im Interesse des Weltfriedens erhalten und gestärkt werden muß. – Norbert Gansel, SPD, 30/6/95
were substantially more likely than any other party to reference the legalistic, procedural and alliance arguments that are part and parcel of the institutionalist ontology.

Also notable in the split-period analysis is the movement of scores in the positive direction (toward higher averages) for the parties of the left, between the first and second periods. For the right parties, however, the change was in the negative direction, toward lower average institutionalist ontology scores. For the moment I will leave this observation at that, but I will return to the point after bringing in the analysis of the universalist ontology scores in the next section.

### 4.6 Decision Maker Institutionalist Ontologies: Split Period
4.7 Decision Maker Ontologies: Universalism

4.3.3 Universalist approach

Universalist ontologies maintained high overall average scores as compared to Gulf War I (Figure 4.3.4.1). As before, universalism was also primarily associated with the left, and the party differences were statistically significant (d.f. 4, 90; f = 13.162; p < .001). They were the number one ontology (highest scoring) for Democratic Socialists and Greens and the number two ontology for the remaining three parties.

Leaders espousing a universalist rationale for their decisions emphasized the moral, ethical, religious and philosophical prohibitions against violence as an instrument of policy in their speech. Fighting in general is denounced in such ontologies as without merit and essentially destructive. Ideally, the preferred alternative
was a pacifistic course of action. They were thus mainly negative in their recommendations, that is, less likely to offer positive alternative solutions to the problems in Kosovo, but largely resolute in their opposition to violence as a means for such a solution.

Examples of this pattern – rejection of war, but little suggested as an alternative – come through in the following statements, such as the previously quoted passage from Green Nickels who noted:

[T]he attempt to defend peace with force came accompanied by flowing rivers of blood, that millions and billions of value became in the very end scrap iron and sorrow. These violent means, accumulated in total, have lead to suppression, terrible genocides and wars [... ] From this it is clear, that the attempt to create, to secure and to maintain by means of force peace inherently contains in it the destruction of that which one actually wants to defend.45

Summarizing his take on the matter, Nickels’ party colleague Fischer similarly stated:

There are no military solutions, Ladies and Gentlemen, only a political solution, and this [military] solution is not convincing, because it does not and cannot lead directly to a durable peace treaty.46

Finally, speaking once more to the point, Democratic Socialists Gysi and Lederer commented:

45 Original: [D]er Versuch, Frieden mit gewaltsamen Mitteln zu verteidigen, davon begleitet ist, daß Ströme von Blut geflossen sind, Millionen und Milliarden von Werten letzten Endes zu Schrott und Leid geworden sind. Diese gewaltsamen Mittel, im Übermaß angehäuft, haben zu Unterdrückung, zu entsetzlichen Völkermorden und Kriegen geführt. [...] Daran wird deutlich, daß letzten Endes der Versuch, mit gewaltsamen Mitteln Frieden zu schaffen, zu sichern und zu erhalten, auch die Vernichtung dessen beinhalten kann, was man eigentlich verteidigen will - Christa Nickels, Greens, 6/12/95
46 Original: Es gibt keine militärische Lösung, meine Damen und Herren, es gibt nur eine politische Lösung, und diese Lösung ist nicht überzeugend, weil sie nicht direkt in einen Friedensschluss, der trägt, führen kann und führt.- Fischer, Greens, 30/6/95
Whoever really wants peace, must in the first instance seek it with completely different means and methods than militarily. 47

My God, in which situation this country that it concerns to secure somewhat militarily is what we politically wants? Do we want to actually intersperse only somewhat militarily? Where are politics and reason here? 48

These types of comments are exactly in keeping with the universalist approach’s expectations of “policy directed against all forms of aggression […] oriented towards a peaceful life together in solidarity” (Coleman and Coleman 1993: 66). Moreover, the speakers’ lack of specific alternatives to foreign military intervention (other than to not intervene) is consonant with the universalist expectation that leaders will be “[o]pposed to power while not actively engaged in its conquest” (Bradol 2004). In other words, universalism anticipates opposition to power politics and policies of domination (as with interventions) but does not propose a replacement policy of domination or power.

As with the historicist ontology, disagreement existed with regard to whose universalism should be paramount. While such an observation may seem counterintuitive in reference to a philosophers of supposedly overarching and all-encompassing principles in this way, it was precisely the case in the Kosovo decision making occasion that leaders argued over how to define universalism. Free Democratic leader Kinkel preferred to brand leftist “universalists” as “cultural relativists” – practitioners of the antithesis concept to universalism. He admonished them by stating:

---

47 Original: Wer wirklich Frieden will, muß in erster Linie nach ganz anderen Mitteln und Methoden suchen als nach militärischen – Gregor Gysi, PDS, 6/12/95

48 Original: Mein Gott, in welcher Situation ist denn dieses Land, daß es darum geht, etwas militärisch abzusichern, was wir politisch wollen? Wollen wir eigentlich nur etwas militärisch durchsetzen? Wo sind hier Politik und Vernunft abgeblieben? - Andrea Lederer, PDS, 30/6/95
Cultural dialogue does not however mean value relativism. The prohibition on torture and other awful human rights abuses is not negotiable.\(^{49}\)

Others combined elements of both historicist and universalist ontology to support the latter, as when Green party member Fischer stated:

For us as a pacifist party it is certainly everything but a simple conflict. You may amuse yourself with that, I don’t care. Germany, German history never suffered from pacifism, ladies and gentlemen – on the contrary: never.\(^{50}\)

Still others combined elements of realist and universalist or institutionalist and universalist ontology, in these instances to support military intervention, as when Free Democrat Gerhardt discussed the role of power in protecting peace and Christian Democrat Pflueger discussed the difference between personal and public obligations (i.e., rules) vis-à-vis universalist principles:

The minimum, which must be expected here, Mr. Fischer, is that one explains his position completely clearly. I deplore along with you the fact that in the history of Germany pacifistic founding traditions found so little attention among the middle class. You know however just as well as I do that you have no means from this pacifistic ivory tower to really help humans in need, and that international rights abusers in the world encourage you, if you argue exclusively pacifistically. You will be able to move against them only if you let them know that in the end you are ready to move against them also militarily; otherwise diplomacy becomes ineffective. That is the substantive point.\(^{51}\)

---

\(^{49}\) Original: Der Dialog der Kulturen bedeutet im übrigen keinen Wertrelativismus. Das Verbot der Folter und anderer schlimmer Menschenrechtsverletzungen ist nicht verhandelbar. – Klaus Kinkel, FDP, 5/12/96

\(^{50}\) Original: Für uns als pazifistische Partei ist das gewiß alles andere als ein einfacher Konflikt. Darüber mögen Sie sich amüsieren; das macht nichts. Deutschland, die deutsche Geschichte hat nie am Pazifismus zu leiden gehabt, meine Damen und Herren – im Gegenteil: niemals. – Fischer, Greens, 30/6/95

\(^{51}\) Original: Das mindeste, was hier erwartet werden muss, Herr Kollege Fischer, ist, daß man seine Position ganz klar erklärt. Ich beklage mit Ihnen, daß in der Geschichte Deutschland pazifistische Grundtraditionen im Bürgertum so wenig Beachtung gefunden haben. Sie wissen aber genausogut wie ich, daß Sie aus diesem pazifistischen Elfenbeinturm heraus kein Mittel haben, um Menschen in Not wirklich zu helfen, und daß Sie, wenn Sie ausschließlich pazifistisch argumentieren, internationale Rechtsbrecher in der Welt ermuntern. Sie werden ihnen immer nur dann entgegentreten können, wenn
I believe that one must differentiate here between individual-ethical positions and the social-ethic. The individual can say: I do not want to take a weapon in hand; I want to extricate myself completely from that. We always respected that. It is stands even in our constitution that the individual, who is really a pacifist, must naturally be protected. [...] But the state cannot refuse nevertheless the defense of liberty and human rights. That is the crucial difference, which I ask to you understand. 52

A very pointed give-and-take of in these disagreements can be seen in the words of leaders regarding the specific issue of whose morality was the correct morality. Espousing the notion that actions against violence were more important than words in support of nonviolence, Christian Democrat Rühe argued:

Securing the peace in Bosnia means the end of a bloody civil war, the end of the massacres at innocent civilians, the end of the ethnical cleaning, the end of terror and rape [...] Therefore I said, it is a question of morals, because all this can be ended. It revolves not around words, but rather revolves around acts. 53

The peace movement has contributed nothing to the solution of the problems. The peace movement has abdicated, because it showed that it demonstrates only for something when it goes against the USA. Here is the possibility of recovering believability [for the pacifists] by demonstrating together with the USA for the penetration of this peace also with military means. 54


54 Original: Die Friedensbewegung hat nichts zur Lösung der Probleme beigetragen. Die Friedensbewegung hat abgedankt, weil sie gezeigt hat, daß sie nur dann für etwas demonstriert, wenn es gegen die USA geht. Hier wäre die Möglichkeit, Glaubwürdigkeit zurückzugewinnen, gemeinsam mit
Making the counterpoint that the first principle of policy (and universalism) should be “first, do no harm” and offering a rare proposal for possible replacements for non-universalistic system were speakers like the Green Christa Nickels who put forth her vision of morality at length in the following passage:

I would like to ask you [Rühe] to take back the word "immorally" and I would like to ask you whether you cannot accept that one takes conflicting positions in this conflict - this is really a serious conflict, it is historically important - mutually with respect for understanding and not impose upon the whole the label of “immoral”. [...] I decidedly reject the notion, if you portray the dilemma in which we are now advising with the label "immorally". The Greens as a political force are defined by the realization of the peace movement that advice in favor of military force has historically clearly led to a dead end. It is our task, amidst all the difficulties in which we find ourselves, to implant this realization in policy and convert from realism to it. They [the peace movement] have difficulties with military defense and thereby with how to tame and restrain military intervention; this you know precisely. I utterly reject [though] that you impose on us the label of “immoral” and with this equate that we would do nothing. The peace movement has done an infinite amount of things in this conflict. The evangelical women’s assistance unselfishly helped local women who were raped and violated. There were many donation funds and few public means, with which it could be promoted.\footnote{Original: Ich möchte Sie [Volker Rühe] bitten, das Wort “unmoralisch” zurückzunehmen, und ich möchte Sie fragen, ob Sie nicht akzeptieren können, daß man die widerstreitenden Positionen in diesem Konflikt – dies ist wirklich ernsthafter Konflikt, er ist historisch wichtig – gegenseitig mit Respekt zur Kenntnis nimmt und das Ganze nicht mit dem Ztikett “unmoralisch” belegt. […] Ich weise entschieden zurück, wenn Sie das Dilemma, in das wir geraten sind, mit dem Etikett “unmoralisch” versehen. Die Grünen als politische Kraft definieren die Erkenntnisse der Friedensbewegung, das militärische Gewalt historisch in eine Sackgasse geraten ist, ganz klar. Es ist bei allen Schwierigkeiten, die wir damit haben, unsere Aufgabe, das in die Politik einzupflanzen und in Realpolitik umzusetzen. Sie haben Schwierigkeiten mit der militärischen Verteidigung und damit, den militärischen Einsatz zu zähmen und zu bändigen; das wissen Sie ganz genau. Ich wehre mich ganz entschieden dagegen, daß Sie uns mit dem Etikett “unmoralisch” belegen und dies damit gleichsetzen, wir würden nichts tun. Die Friedensbewegung hat in diesem Konflikt unendlich viel getan. Die Evangelische Frauenhilfe hat den Frauen vor Ort, die vergewaltigt und geschändet worden sind, uneigennützig beigestanden. Es gab viele Spendengelder und wenig öffentliche Mittel, mit denen das gefördert wurdeder.– Christa Nickels, Grünen, 30/11/95}
Turning to the split-period analysis regarding universalist ontology, however, one can see that the frequency of such arguments over “whose morality” pertained decreased slightly. As the decision making occasion progressed from period one to period two (i.e., from the pre-1997 to post-1997 timeframe) universalist ontology scores decreased for four of the five political parties. Only the Democratic Socialists indicated an increased average score in period two. The largest drop in average score was for the Christian democrats (1.77 to 1.00) which represents a 25.7% decrease in terms of the three-point measure. The Social Democrats decreased from a 1.97 to 1.53 average score and the Free Democrats from 1.59 to 1.23 average score, a 14.7% and 12.0% change in terms of the measure. Even the Greens decreased in their average universalist ontology score, from 2.55 to 2.22, or an 11% drop. Finally, ANOVA analyses indicated that the average score differences between parties were statistically significant in both time periods.
4.8 Decision Maker Universalist Ontologies: Split-Period

When one examines the patterns in these score changes in combination with score changes in other ontologies, especially with regard to institutionalist ontology, a compelling explanation for the decrease in these kinds of disagreements surfaces. Recall that in the earlier discussion of realist and institutionalist ontologies that these scores increased from period one to period two of the Kosovo debate for the parties of the Left. Only the Democratic Socialists decreased in average score for any of the ontologies, specifically the realist ontology. Greens and Social Democrats, on the other hand, increased in both measures.  

---

56 Note: Holders of Universalist Ontology defined as those with universalist ontology > 0.
By the later part of the Kosovo debate (i.e., post-1997) left-wing leaders using universalist ontologies were more likely to use universalism in combination with one of the “materialist” ontologies – typically institutionalism or realism – than in the earlier part of the debate. In other words, as compared to period one, the second period saw universalist Social Democrat and Green party leaders with increased average scores vis-à-vis institutionalism and realism. Democratic Socialists using universalist references were also more likely to speak in terms of institutionalism is the second period, but not more likely to speak in terms of a realist ontology.

In the first period, it was members of these parties who were espousing “purist” universalist perspectives – often times placing them rhetorically at odds their own party colleagues – who were representing the side of the debate that saw military intervention as untenable, under any circumstances. By the second period, however, while still maintaining an element of universalist ontology in their speeches, left-leaning universalist ontology holders were more likely to now speak in more complex terms about the problem in Kosovo – that is, in ways that additionally portrayed the situation in realist or institutionalist terms. These changes in average score stand out in comparison to the smaller increased averages in universalist ontology for the Democratic Socialist, Green and Social Democratic members more generally. Thus, it was especially among universalist speakers of the left parties that institutionalist and realist scores increased. The table below illustrates these findings:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Realist Ontology</th>
<th>Institutionalist Ontology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democrats</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Democrats</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrats</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Socialists</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4.9 Ontology Score Change for Holders of Universalist Ontology**

Green and Social Democratic party members’ more complex perceptions in the second period of the Kosovo decision making occasion paralleled higher levels of agreement with respect to many of the first periods ontological contentions such as “whose morality” was correct. By 1998 the more dominant view among decision makers was that universalist values were in fact best served or conditioned by a perspective of the situation drawing from institutionalist or realist references. As before, history was also sometimes used in tandem with universalism in decision maker speeches; post-1997, however, these pairings were more commonly in used in speeches that supported foreign military intervention than in the pre-1997 timeframe. Examples of these kinds of post-1997 statements include the Christian Democrat Rühe’s “reminiscing” on the early period:

I would like us to be reminded of the debate which we led in 1995 in the German Bundestag, and of the disagreement with the Greens during the situation at the time. I said at that time: There are enough examples in history, which show it can be immoral to use soldiers; there are however also other situations,
in which one must say that it is deeply immoral not to use soldiers if it is the only chance to stop war and massacres.\textsuperscript{57}

Evidencing his party’s change – along with other members of the political left – from a more purist universalist ontology to a more complex one that incorporated other perspectives on the intervention matter, Green party leader Fischer declared:

War prevention in Europe cannot be viewed solely by the criterion of [human]rights perspectives. About this, I find, we should think again seriously.\textsuperscript{58}

Accordingly most of the latter period’s more harmonious discussions seem due to increased complexity of thinking about the situation. Specifically, one witnessed increased institutionalist and realist ontology scores among left-leaning parliamentarians, most notably among those who espoused universalist ontologies, adding the others to form a complex combination of perspectives. Despite these trends, it is intriguing to note at least one instance in which a member of the right became less institutionalist, and more universalist. Specifically, consider the words of Free Democrat Gerhardt, who as a member of the “most institutionalist” party nonetheless brings in universalist bases as a legitimizing principle for institutions themselves:

It may be correct to refer to the collapse or in any case the danger of the collapse of a world order which arises from a conflict between the monopoly on the use

\textsuperscript{57} Original: Ich möchte an die Debatte, die wir 1995 im Deutschen Bundestag geführt haben, und an die Auseinandersetzung mit den Grünen in der damaligen Situation erinnern. Ich habe damals gesagt: Es gibt genug Beispiele in der Geschichte, die zeigen: Es kann unmoralisch sein, Soldaten einzusetzen; es gibt aber auch andere Situationen, in denen man sagen muß, daß es zutiefst unmoralisch ist, Soldaten nicht einzusetzen, wenn dies die einzige Chance ist, Krieg und Massaker zu stoppen. – Volker Rühe, CDU, 16/10/98

\textsuperscript{58} Original: Kriegsverhütung und Kriegsverhinderung in Europa können nicht alleine unter dem Gesichtspunkt von Rechtsstandpunkten gesehen werden. Darüber, finde ich, sollten wir noch einmal ernsthaft nachdenken. – Joseph Fischer, Greens, 10/11/98
of force of the United Nations and the decision of NATO [to use force despite the lack of UN approval]. But a world order, which in the end is no longer able to prevent the use of force against people, loses legitimacy. Therefore we cannot only discuss the world order as to the aspect of whether it is wounded. A world order must constantly legitimize itself with all its on-going political efforts in that it upholds the idea of humanity in this world. Therefore not only a discussion of formal international law is permissible, but also one that is deeply emotional, humane in allowance for humanity.  

59 In sum, universalist ontologies were quite important in explaining German decision making in the Kosovo case, especially with regard to the left parties, and moreover with regard to how the dominant universalist decision making logic became transformed from one which was relatively “purist” to one which was more “complex.”
4.3.5 Monolithic culturalist approach

The graphic above, showing institutionalist and universalist problem representations as compared to a monolithic culture measure illustrates yet again that important differences between members of different parties are missed by the latter’s more simplified conception which gloms together what I demonstrate are conceptually and empirically distinct and independently functioning components (Figure 4.3.5). In this instance, two particularly important developments are overlooked. First, the culturalist measure picks up a drop in Christian Democrats culturally-based perceptions of the intervention question, however, it misses that it is explainable primarily in terms
of the extent to which the situation was viewed as one where laws, organizations, precedents, procedures and other tenets of institutionalist thinking were involved. Universalism, on the other hand, remains largely unmoved from its (admittedly low) previous levels. Another development unnoticed by the monolithic culturalist approach is the Social Democrats’ movement to a more institutionalist-based perception as compared to the Gulf War I occasion. While this change is indeed small, it will be shown to have actually portended a growing trend toward less and less universalist thinking and more and more institutionalist thinking among Social Democrats. “Culture writ large” misses this distinction. Using it to describe perceptions, the Greens and Free Democrats demonstrate roughly the same adherence to culturalist beliefs as one another, as do the Social Democrats, Free Democrats and Christian Democrats. Of course, this despite the obvious differences between the parties when examined with culture disaggregated.

4.3.6 Pragmatism proposition

As before, a two stage test was employed to check the validity of the pragmatism proposition. Seven pivotal events were selected based on their having been noted in the secondary literature regarding German politics and society during the occasion and due to their international and domestic ramifications plausibly having had some influence on decision making vis-à-vis a Kosovo intervention. These events delineates the decision making occasion into eight periods. These were: the Dayton Accords (effective with the Bundestag session of November 30, 1995); the deployment
of German troops to Bosnia (effective November 14, 1996); the intensification of fighting and dislocation in Kosovo (effective March 5, 1998); UN Security Council Resolution 1199 and Bundestag elections (effective October 16, 1998); the seating of the 14th Bundestag, Bundestag vote to allow airstrikes and OSCE cease-fire (effective March 5, 1999); the “Racak Massacre”, the “Status Quo Plus” plan and the start of the Rambouillet talks (effective February 24, 1999); and the start of NATO airstrikes (effective March 25, 1999).

As in chapter one, these periods were used to to inform several ANOVA analyses, testing 20 party/ontology relationships. Of these 20 relationships, seven were found to be statistically significant. All significant results were for either Social Democratic or Christian Democratic ontology pairings. For Christian Democrats all ontologies were significant, whereas for Social Democrats it was the case that all but the historicist ontology yielded significant results.

Each of these seven party/ontology relationships were thus further examined in a series of seven linear regressions each. This entailed dichotomizing the overall timeline six times by the pivotal event, thereby demarcating "before" and "after" periods of time, which were then entered as independent variables in a bivariate regression. In other words, the test examined whether the shift from one "before" one pivotal event to "after" it could predict to significant differences in the party's ontological score. Stated yet another way, it tested whether ontological changes were noticeable as a differences in a dichotomization of period 1 versus periods 2-5, of periods 1-2 versus periods 3-5, of periods 1-3 versus periods 4-5, and so on. Each result is independent of the others,
so that as many as seven significant relationships might be observed for each party/ontology pairing. In the end, these tests will provide an answer to the questions, "Precisely when did ontological changes noticed in the ANOVA results occur, in which direction did the ontologies change, and with what intensity?" The table below summarizes the findings of these tests (Note: Correlations are Standardized Betas. Positive and negative correlations indicate direct and inverse relationships, respectively, with ones depicting “perfect” correlations and zero depicting “absolutely no” correlation. Positive coefficients indicate increased ontology scores after the pivotal event.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Ontology Relationship</th>
<th>Demarcating Pivotal Event</th>
<th>#1 – Nov 30, 95</th>
<th>#2 – Nov 14, 96</th>
<th>#3 – March 5, 98</th>
<th>#4 – Oct 16, 98</th>
<th>#5 – Nov 11, 98</th>
<th>#6 – Feb 24, 99</th>
<th>#7 -- March 25, 99</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrats/Realism</td>
<td></td>
<td>.683 (.211) N=79</td>
<td>.447 (.204) N=79</td>
<td>.606 (.193) N=79</td>
<td>.583 (.197) N=79</td>
<td>.454 (.220) N=78</td>
<td>.773 (.254) N=78</td>
<td>None (No change)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrats/Historicism</td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrats/Institutionalism</td>
<td></td>
<td>.467 (.240) N=79</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>-.411 (.232) N=78</td>
<td>-.701 (.270) N=78</td>
<td>-.956 (.320) N=78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democrats/Realism</td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3 Direction and Strength of Ontology Change by Party and Period
Many relationships proved statistically insignificant in the regression analysis (23 of 49.) The majority, however, were statistically significant with 26 of 49 revealing some relationship between party/ontology and a specific pivotal event. Interestingly, neither Social Democrats/historicism nor Christian Democrats/realism were among these results. Neither garnered any statistically significant relationships in the regression stage of analysis. At least in terms of linear relationships, therefore, the tests auger against systematic patterns of change over time for these two party/ontology pairings.

The results are reversed with regard to Social Democrats/realism and Christian Democrats/historicism. For the former, 6 of 7 time periods yielded statistically significant results, while for the later the count was a perfect 7 relationships for 7 periods. Social Democrats/institutionalism, Christian Democrats/institutionalism and Christian Democrats/universalism also generated a number of statistically significant relationships.
Looking to the Social Democrats’ relationships, the fact that realism increases across each of the pivotal events is not surprising given the findings discussed earlier in this chapter. Social Democrats were seen to be generally increasing in their realist ontology scores from period one to period two (i.e., in the “split-period” analysis.) This was taken as an indication of increased complexity vis-à-vis representations of the Kosovo situation. Of course, such changes are identical to the kinds of changes one would find were Social Democratic parliamentarians acting in a pragmatic manner with respect to their speeches. We therefore cannot rule out the alternative explanation provided by the pragmatism proposition that Social Democrats are being cynical in their speech, and not portraying deeply held principles when speaking about the possibility of foreign military intervention.

Similarly, the 4 out of 7 significant relationships in Social Democrat/institutionalism pairings would support a possible pragmatic behavior. The nature of this relationship, however, is not entirely foreshadowed in the previous discussion in the same way as the results for Social Democrat/realist pairings. To wit, the first result (B=.467 after pivotal event #1) makes sense in terms of the earlier analysis because this indicates an increased level of institutionalist ontology after November 30, 1995, as compared to the period before. Remember that the findings presented earlier were taken to reveal an increase in Social Democrat (and left parties more generally) complexity, or a move away from “purist” universalism. However, the negative and substantively significant results vis-à-vis periods #5, #6 and #7 describe an opposite situation with regard to the Social Democrat/institutionalism relationship. These
coefficients (-.411, -.701, -.956 for events #5, #6 and #7, respectively) show that institutionalist ontology scores were dropping among Social Democrats in the post-1997 period.

As it turns out, both patterns accurately reflect what occurred. First, as stated in the earlier analysis, it is correct that Social Democrats, especially those who otherwise espoused universalist ontologies, were indeed on average also espousing greater levels of institutionalist ontology in period two, the post-1997 period. Now, the post-1997 period equates with pivotal events #3, #4, #5, #6 and #7. The pre-1997 period therefore includes only pivotal events #1 and #2. With respect to events #3 and #4, which captured the intensification of fighting in Kosovo, the extension of the peace mission in Bosnia, UN Security Council Resolution 1199 and Bundestag elections, among other things, no systematic decrease (or increase) is observed in Social Democrats’ institutionalist ontology scores. In fact, the scores for these periods are quite high and contribute to the slightly higher overall average for institutionalist ontology among Social Democrats in the post-1997 period.

But this is only half the story. The rest comes from the significant results gleaned from the pragmatism proposition test results. Note that the first of the post-1997 pivotal events after which the test found Social Democrats to have significantly changed their institutionalist ontology was #5, or October 16, 1998, or after a military intervention plan was first approved for Kosovo (but before attacks started) and a crisis seemed averted through the installation of an OSCE observer force. The second significant relationship regards pivotal event #6, or November 13, 1998, after the
seating of the new Bundestag (with the Social Democrats in power.) Finally, the third relationship involves pivotal event #7, or the two sessions in late March 1999, after NATO attacks had begun.

It makes sense that institutionalist ontology scores might decline after each of these events. For one, the vote to support intervention in October, 1998 and the subsequent Serbian rapprochement would have changed the issue from one of justification with respect to war to one of relief that it was no longer institutionally “necessary” Even if this were the case, though, the moderate coefficient (−.411) means that even these changes were relatively modest. The changes after events #6 and #7 were even stronger, though (−.701 and −.956, respectively.) An explanation for this might be a shift from relief at war prevention to lament at war’s inevitability, as it became clear that the OSCE observers could not ensure peace (event #6) and after war itself had begun (#7). After those points, discussion moved away from relatively mechanistic references to institutionalism to realism (e.g., war is necessary if tragic) and universalism (e.g., war is simply tragic). In light of this alternative explanation, consider the words of Social Democratic Defense Minister Scharping:

Our goal remains termination of the tragedy taking place there – [a goal aimed] not against the Serbian people, but rather against a dictatorship which disgraces and scorns the dignity, liberty and life of people.  

Echoing the same message, Social Democrat Zumkley stated:

60 Original: Es bleibt unser Ziel, die Tragödie zu beenden, die sich dort abspielt – nicht gegen das serbische Volk, wohl aber gegen eine Diktatur, die schändlich und verächtlich mit der Würde, der Freiheit und dem Leben von Menschen umgeht. – Scharping, SPD, 25/3/99
NATO has now had to act decisively in order to achieve the goals of ending the violence in Kosovo, preventing a humanitarian disaster and above all else to finally create the conditions that will help the many thousands of refugees who must inhabit the forests under the worst climatic conditions because strife prevails, because they were driven out from their villages, because their villages were burned.\footnote{Original: Jetzt müßte die NATO entschlossen handeln, um die Ziele zu erreichen, nämlich die Gewalt im Kosovo zu beenden, eine humanitäre Katastrophe zu verhindern und vor allem die Voraussetzungen dafür zu schaffen, daß endlich den vielen tausend Flüchtlingen geholfen wird, die unter schlimmsten Witterungsbedingungen in den Wäldern hausen müssen, weil Unfriede herrscht, weil sie aus ihrem Dörfern vertrieben worden sind, weil die Dörfer verbrannt worden sind. - Zumkley, SPD, 25/3/99}

The Christian Democrats/institutionalism results show the same pattern with respect to last three pivotal events, but they also have a moderate negative coefficient relationship with pivotal event #4, after December 5, 1996, when the Bundestag voted to extend the Bosnian peacekeeping intervention. The long pause of 15 months of no discussion of Kosovo followed. This was also the time when many were beginning to see the Kosovo situation as requiring a different set of solutions from Bosnia. Christian Democrats’ lower institutionalist scores may therefore relate to a weakening of institutionalist perspectives on the situation, given the seemingly limited efficacy of the institutionally-robust (i.e., UN-, NATO-, and OSCE-brokered) Bosnia mission.

Finally, the Christian Democrat’s declining historicist and universalist ontologies across almost all the pivotal events are not surprising given discussion of these ontologies earlier in this chapter. The split-period analysis illustrated that

\footnote{Consider also the prescient words of Green party member Fischer who said in November 1998: “There was no alternative to the Holbrooke-Milosevic-Treaty except suffering and death. Thank god it worked. I don’t know what we would have discussed, if it hadn’t worked, and it had come to intervention [in Kosovo.]” Of course, war did come, and at least amongst Social Democrats, they discussed from a less institutionalist perspective. Original: “Eine Alternative zum Holbrooke-Milosevic-Vertrag gab es nicht, außer Krieg und Leid und Tod. Er hat Gott sei Dank funktioniert. Ich weiß nicht, wie wir diskutieren würden, wenn er nicht funktioniert hätte, und es wäre dort zum Einsatz gekommen. – Fischer, Greens, 10/11/98}
Christian Democrats scored the highest historicist ontology scores for the first period and the lowest for the second of all five parties. The pragmatism proposition test results confirm the direct and timing of these changes. Similarly, universalist ontology scores were also previously shown to drop significantly from period one to period two for Christian Democrats, a feature which the pragmatism proposition test again supports.

Of course, all of this discussion of explanations for the pragmatism proposition test results ignores the main alternative – that Social Democratic and Christian Democratic leaders are behaving cynically with regard to their statements, and not speaking about the Kosovo situation from genuine ontological perspectives. With the findings as they are, this possibility certainly cannot be ruled out. The alternative explanations offered immediately prior do account for the pattern of changes in leaders’ ontology scores, but these changes could just as easily be explained by political calculations on the part of decision makers regarding the arguments they make. At this point, enough support seems to be provided to tentatively accept this latter notion. Thus, in contrast to the Gulf War 1 decision making occasion, there seems to have been a large degree of political pragmatism underway among Social Democrat and Christian Democrat leaders in the Kosovo decision making occasion.

4.4 Preliminary Conclusions

The second decision making occasion, Kosovo, provided a situtation in which a number of approaches were plausiblile for explaining the perceptions of German leaders. In the end, all seemed to carry portions of the explanatory weight with
institutionalism, universalism realism and historicism playing parts. Institutionalism became slightly more important to the Social Democrats and Greens than before Kosovo and, indeed, even during the occasion itself. Similarly, realism scored higher, and therefore was a more central ontological component to these two parties’ speeches than either previous period. Perhaps pivotally, institutionalism became the dominant ontological representation of Social Democrats, surpassing universalism, albeit only very slightly. The question going into the next decision making occasion is whether this dominant position for institutionalism will maintain or increase?

Historicism was once again the missing ontology among decision makers in the overall scheme of things. This is especially the case considering the culturalists’ emphasis on history as driving German decision making throughout the 1990’s. What does draw notice, however, is an increased level of historicist ontology across all parties in the pre-1997 period. Post-1997 scores are so low, though, that the higher previous scores end up looking anomalous. Will such high levels ever again occur?

Realism, while not a dominant ontological representation of the occasion was nonetheless a surprise presence in the thinking and rationalizing of right-wing, especially Christian Democrat Bundestag members. It was also seen to be on the rise, if from very low origins, for parties of the left, even the Democratic Socialists. Such low overall levels, though, tend to discount realist expectations that realist thought dominates German foreign military intervention decision making, just as historicism’s low levels discount the culturalists’ arguments.
The pragmatism proposition garnered significant evidence of political “shiftiness” among Social Democrat and Christian Democrat decision makers. While these changes can be alternately explained as part of process of gradual ontological change and more genuine reactions to changing events, the main counter claim that politicians speak cynically and not according to worldview principles cannot be rejected in the Kosovo occasion.

Finally, the monolithic cultural approach is somewhat able to explain the reasoning behind German leaders’ decisions, if only at the loss of detail and precision in terms of what components of culture are influencing the thoughts of which members (i.e., right versus left-leaning party members) and how those influences subtly change.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Expectation</th>
<th>Support?</th>
<th>Pattern over Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>Cost Benefit Calcs, Security</td>
<td>Conditional:</td>
<td>Remains ontology of the Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Right parties: Weak</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Left: None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historicism</td>
<td>WW2, Nazi Era as guide</td>
<td>Conditional:</td>
<td>Registers only in early part of the Kosovo debate and nowhere else</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-1997: Weak</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Post-1997: None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalism</td>
<td>Laws, Orgs, Procedures</td>
<td>Conditional:</td>
<td>Consistently strong scores for the Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Right: Strong</td>
<td>Increasing importance for the Left during Kosovo occasion and since Gulf War 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Left: Strong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>Morality, absolutes, global harmony</td>
<td>Conditional:</td>
<td>Still strong for Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Right: Weak</td>
<td>More complex (mixed with other ontologies) for Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Left: Strong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monolithic Culture</td>
<td>All parties affected by German cultural mores</td>
<td>Can’t explain Christian Dems delining culturalism, slight transition from Universalist to Institutionalist predominance</td>
<td>Misses changes and subties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pragmatism</td>
<td>Ontologies change with political winds/over time</td>
<td>Conditional:</td>
<td>Possible pragmatic behavior by two largest parties, Social Dems and Christian Dems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Christian Dems and Social Dems: systematic over time</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other parties: no change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.4 Summary of Preliminary Findings**
CHAPTER 5

AFGHANISTAN

In this chapter I analyze the third decision making occasion, in which German leaders questioned whether or not to intervene alongside the US in Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks on the US in late summer 2001. It is a short occasion, lasting only two months, but the plausible applicability of each of the approaches toward explaining it portend for its being a thought-provoking instance of decision making.

5.1 The event

On September 11, 2001, Islamic terrorists hijacked four US airliners and crashed them into the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon, killing some 3,000 people and throwing the US and most of the world into shock. This action, seemingly so unprecedented, actually followed years of violent interaction between Islamic terrorists and the US. It included earlier attacks on the World Trade Center, the USS Cole and US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Each of these terrorists attacks, in turn, spawned military reprisals from the US, including cruise missile bombardment of suspected terrorist hideouts in the Sudan, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
With this pattern established, it was not surprising that the US followed the September 11 attacks with an armed intervention against Osama Bin-Laden’s Al-Qaeda network (the assumed perpetrators) and the Taliban regime of Afghanistan which provided it safe haven. In time, this intervention would eventually include contributions from almost three dozen countries. In the following, I explain how Germany came out of this decision making occasion as included among their number.

5.2 Internal and external contexts

Internationally, the context at the time of the terrorist attacks of September 11th was virtually unchanged from the previous decision making occasion; it was a largely peaceful one, still defined by US unipolarity and an “empire by invitation” of cooperative major powers such as China, Russia and the European powers. Following the attacks, accordingly, the US received moral and material support from most corners of the world, with the few hold-outs such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea still systematically opposing US efforts and still labeled by the latter as “rogue states.” These few exceptions notwithstanding, the external context was generally permissive, even supportive, of intervention against the alleged terrorist plotters and their supporters in Afghanistan.

The internal context as compared to the external one, however, was far more complex, if for different reasons. Germany’s Red-Green government of Social Democrats and Greens (elected during the previous decision making occasion) was beleaguered by economic problems. Chief among them was rising unemployment This
in turn only exacerbated disagreements between the government’s more leftist and centrist contingents. The opposition, especially the right opposition of Christian Democrats and Free Democrats, stood only to gain from such incipient divisions within the government. Of course, all opposition parties could hope for increased power were the government to face dissolution, but the right opposition stood in a uniquely good position to succeed it were it to fall.

The discussions on whether to intervene alongside the US after September 11th saw a continuation of these tendencies, namely the governing coalition’s factional differences and the opposition’s critical posture toward them. As the forthcoming analysis of decision maker ontologies shows, one fissure between leftists and centrists in the governing coalition was the question of whether or not to intervene in Afghanistan. Particularly reluctant to support intervention were those Greens and Social Democrats who believed one or more of the following ideas: 1) that the US – while still a victim – had at least partially brought its suffering on itself, 2) that the US was worsening the problem of terrorism by responding to it with violence and/or 3) that the US was being hypocritical, using political and not humanitarian criteria to pick-and-choose regimes to call terrorist or not. Thus, despite the Bundestag membership’s generally uniform sympathy for the US and condemnation of terrorism, there were disagreements within the Bundestag and even the government itself about these issues.

Within this context and in a rare move, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder combined the question of whether or not to intervene in Afghanistan with vote of confidence on his government. Were he to have failed, meaning had he lacked the support of a simple
majority of the *Bundestag*, then the Federal President would have been compelled to dissolve parliament and convene immediate elections. Again, this gambit, while not unprecedented, was highly unusual, having been employed only three times previously. Moreover, of the three previous attempts to use it, only one had succeeded (February 1982) and only temporarily (the incumbent lost a second confidence vote in December 1982.)  

Discussion about what would ultimately become the green-lighted Afghanistan intervention began on September 12th, led off by Schröder in a special session devoted to the previous day’s tragedy (the session on the 11th had been cancelled as news of the attacks emerged.) In nine of the twenty sessions that followed, 55 parliamentarians made 95 statements on the issue. These concluded slightly more than two months later, on November 16th, when the Bundestag voted on the intervention/confidence measure, and *Bundestag* president Wolfgang Thierse (Social Democrat) announced its passing.

The events that occurred during the overall period are listed below in Table 5.2.

---

62 While these instances were indeed rare, it is also true that they always dealt with questions of international affairs; the 1972 and 1982 votes essentially boiled down to support for *Ostpolitik* and NATO’s Dual-Track Process, respectively.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Bundestag Session</th>
<th>Session Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9/11/01</td>
<td>- Terrorist attack on US</td>
<td>185 Not Coded (NC)</td>
<td>9/11/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/12/01</td>
<td>- NATO invokes Article V, pledges assistance to US</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>9/12/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/14/01</td>
<td>- US Congress authorizes force against terrorists and their allies</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>9/19/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>188-89 (NC)</td>
<td>9/25/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/7/01</td>
<td>- US &amp; Britain begin air bombardment of Afghanistan</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>9/27/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/9/01</td>
<td>- NATO deploys AWACS planes to US (includes German crews) - Chancellor Schröder meets Bush</td>
<td>191 (NC)</td>
<td>10/10/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>192</td>
<td>10/11/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>193-94 (NC)</td>
<td>10/12/01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued

Table 5.1 Afghanistan Timeline
Table 5.1 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10/18/01</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/19/01</td>
<td>196-97 (NC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/8/01</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/9/01</td>
<td>- First major land victory: Mazar e Sharif falls to US allies, general rout of Taliban begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/9/01</td>
<td>199 (NC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/14/01</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/15/01</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/16/01</td>
<td>- Bundestag votes confidence in Schröder government and to contribute 3,900 troops to Afghanistan conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/16/01</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.3 Tests of the Approaches

As stated above, the speeches coded for the Afghanistan decision making occasion were gleaned from nine sessions and totaled 95 individual observations. These statements reflected the thoughts of 55 speakers from all five political parties. The party breakdown in terms of number of statements per party was: 22% Christian Democrats, 12% Free Democrats, 35% Social Democrats, 19% Greens and 11% Democratic Socialists. Thus, slightly more than half the statements were from governing coalition party members with the rest from opposition party members.
As alluded to above, a majority of parliamentarians ultimately voted in favor of intervention. This vote actually reflected a diminished tally of intervention supporters, given its connection to the question of confidence. The final count of 336 in favor and 326 against most likely reflects opposition to the government rather than opposition to military intervention alongside the US in Afghanistan. That said, four Greens (10% of the delegation) still voted against the measure and one Social Democrat left her party and voted against the measure as well.

Overall, the findings illustrate a great deal of consistency with previous decision making occasions, especially the overall pattern exhibited in the Kosovo decision making occasion. The general results of observations on the four main approaches, as well as the monolithic culture argument and the pragmatism proposition, are each presented in turn, followed by discussion.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Bundestag Session</th>
<th>Subject Matter</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Abstain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9/19/2001</td>
<td>14/187</td>
<td>Support for the US in light of the terror attacks</td>
<td>92.5%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party Votes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PDS</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>94.6%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td></td>
<td>84.4%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td></td>
<td>99.2%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FDP</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/27/2001</td>
<td>14/190</td>
<td>Macedonia intervention extension</td>
<td>91.4%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party Votes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PDS</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>97.2%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td></td>
<td>89.9%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td></td>
<td>99.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FDP</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td></td>
<td>96.4%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/16/2001</td>
<td>14/202</td>
<td>Afghanistan intervention and Confidence in Government</td>
<td>50.9%</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party Votes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PDS</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FDP</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.2 Votes During Afghanistan Decision Making Occasion**
5.3.1 Realist approach

As the above graphic illustrates, realism was again an important ontology to parties on the right. Again, this contradicts the expectations and descriptions of German decision making voiced in the culturalist literature. Markovitz and Reich write:

“If Germany is becoming more normal, then surely German leaders should behave in a manner more consistent with Realist assumptions. But we suggest that is not the case. The definition of security is, for Germans, inconsistent with even the weakest form of the Realist argument” (1997: 11).

On the contrary, such culturalist claims are simply not supported by the data.
Not only were realist ontologies important in the Afghanistan decision making occasion, they were the most important ontology (on average) among Christian Democrats in that instance. Even among Free Democrats, for whom the ontology was second most important in the Afghanistan occasion, realist average scores increased about 27% from 0.98 to 1.25. On the left, where among Social Democrats’, Greens’ and Democratic Socialists’ realist ontology scores decreased, it is still inaccurate to say that realist arguments were somehow unimportant.

The strongest adherence to realist ontologies is indeed on the right of the political spectrum. These party differences were also statistically significant (d.f. 4, 91; F = 9.830; p < .001). As in the two occasions before, the emphasis among realist thinkers was on threats, opportunities, the role of power and force and an unavoidable major power role of Germany as a military intervener in the world. For example, sometimes leaders cited existential threat as part of their reasoning, as when Christian Democrat Glos argued:

“I want again to make the CDU/CSU delegation clear: We hold as indispensable the military intervention. We want Al-Qaeda to be fought. We know that the security of our own citizens depends on it.” Michael Glos (Christian Democrat; November 16, 2001)

At other times, they chose instead to emphasize more abstract notions of the national well-being, as when Glos’ party colleague Merz stated:

“The intervention of [German] armed forces is demanded by solidarity with America as well as the national interests of our own land for our own security.” Friedrich Merz (Christian Democrat; November 16, 2001)

Often, a speaker’s realist ontology focused on questions of human, materiel and
financial resources by way of criticizing the government's alleged disregard for these matters. In particular, right-of-center opposition members supported the government’s intervention plan, but only as a minimum first step towards protecting and pursuing German interests. These instances appeared to be examples of “one-upmanship” both objectively – in terms of what resources should be applied to the Afghanistan intervention in particular and the German military more generally – but also ontologically. In other words, right-leaning opposition members appeared to want the government to not only act in a different way (i.e., dedicate more resources) but also perceive things in a different way (i.e., as a situation defined by threats and power and not by institutionalism and universalist values. Consider the reasoning of Merz as he spoke in this regard on two occasions:

“It comes, however, just to the issue of money. We must ask ourselves, why the [German] appropriations for the collective foreign and security policy of the EU – such as it is – fail so profoundly?” Friedrich Merz (Christian Democrat; October 18, 2001)

“Ladies and Gentlemen, a land such as Germany, the second largest NATO partner, the most populated country in the EU, situated in the geopolitical middle of Europe, must also take notice of its international responsibility. Absolute priority for security from inside and abroad, strategic coordination of the security tasks in a spectrum of duties, that reaches from prevention to massive military strikes together with the alliance partners even in distant crisis regions – for this we must prepare: politically, materially, personnel-wise and also naturally financially.” Friedrich Merz (Christian Democrat; September 19, 2001)

Comments like these bear an uncanny resemblance to writings by realist theorists regarding how leaders of major powers (should) behave. Consider the words
of realist Mearsheimer and the number of points where his logic matches that of Merz in his statements above:

“[G]reat powers strive for hegemony in their region of the world. Because of the difficulty of projecting power over large bodies of water, no state is likely to dominate the entire globe. Great powers also aim to be wealthy – in fact much wealthier than their rivals, because military power has an economic foundation. Furthermore, great powers aspire to have the mightiest land forces in their region of the world, because armies and their supporting air and naval forces are the core ingredient of military power” (Mearsheimer 2001: 138).

The Bundestag comments moreover differ strikingly from culturalists’ accounts, who write:

“Thus Germans reject the use of force even where their interests are patently threatened, whereas Americans invoke its use even where the threat to their national interest is not readily apparent” (Markovits and Reich 1997: 148).

The realist ontology findings, in relationship with the findings from decision making occasions one and two, indicate a clear relevance of realist ontologies, at least with regard to the thinking about military interventions by members from the Christian Democrats, specifically, and the right-of-center parties more generally. If we extrapolate this pattern into the future, we should expect an increasing explanatory power from the realist approach toward explaining and predicting the intervention-related perceptions of right-leaning German decision makers. I will test that proposition against the data of the fourth decision making occasion, but first I turn to the next ontology – historicism.
Figure 5.2. Decision Maker Ontologies: Historicism

5.3.2 Historicist approach

Evidence for historicist ontologies shows it to once again be weak, or, to paraphrase Markovitz and Reich “inconsistent with even the weakest form” of culturalist expectations (Figure 5.3.2). An ANOVA analysis of the relationship between party membership and historicist ontologies likewise rejected any correlation that would suggest different parties have different levels of adherence to historicist perceptions (d.f. 4, 90; F = 1.358; p = 2.55). These findings are consonant with previous findings from decision making occasions one and two regarding historicist ontology, namely the systematic lack of any significant evidence in support of it.
On hardly sees the “the salience of a particular collective memory” or “acute collective memory which serve[s] as a critical restraint” as expected by culturalists (Markovits and Reich 1997: 149). It is especially interesting that historicist ontologies should score so low given certain features of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Al-Qaeda terrorist network. First, given the seemingly totalitarian nature of the Taliban regime, aimed at exercising complete (if in practice admittedly imperfect) control over every aspect of Afghans’ lives, one would reasonably expect significant comparisons to Nazi totalitarianism. Indeed, few were to be heard. Second, given the Taliban/Al-Qaeda intolerance of other religions in general – and of Judaism in particular – one would reasonably expect significant references to the Holocaust, to threats against Israel and to persecution of Jews generally. Any of these references would have been recorded as representative of historicist thinking. However no such references were observed. In sum, as these findings (of no evidence) accumulate, we can conclude with increasing confidence that history, contrary to the culturalist literatures’ expectation, is not an important component in the thinking of German decision makers with regard to foreign military interventions.
Figure 5.3 Decision Maker Ontologies: Institutionalism

5.3.3 Institutionalist approach

Institutionalism was again an ontology frequently in evidence (Figure 5.3.3). Similarly, party differences were found to correlate with statistical significance to the different ontology scores (ANOVA, d.f. 4, 90; F = 9.039; p < .001). Emphasis among decision makers embracing institutionalist rhetoric was once more on rules and procedures – especially “due process” – organizations and alliances, and implicit and explicit commitments and obligations between states. A typical example of an institutionalist perspective on the Afghanistan intervention was voiced by Gerhard
Schröder:

“We want to make it clear – these military operations are legitimate according to civil law and legal measures through the conclusions of the UN Security Council for the defense of our open and democratic society and for the protection of the international peace.” Gerhard Schröder (Social Democrat; October 18, 2001).

Institutionalist ontologies captured the logic of international institutions as predicted (and recommended) by institutionalist theory. In particular, institutions were deemed the mechanism through which questions of conflict resolution were legitimately pursued. Even if conflict could not be avoided in general terms, institutions were viewed as limiting the potential for abuse of power and the extension of hostilities beyond a narrowly defined scope. As one institutionalist writes:

“[T]he formation of international regimes represents a collective response to a variety of conflict situations. Instead of turning to self-help strategies, including the threat or use of force, states may manage their conflicts in a regulated, more peaceful manner. The value premise which shows up in this analytical perspective points towards the quest for stable peace, or for international security communities, supported by international regimes as institutions of conflict management which help prevent the recourse to self-help strategies. [...] According to this line of reasoning, the existence or formation of international regimes as such is desirable” (Rittberger 1995: 11-12).

Some changes also show up in relationship to previous decision making occasions in terms of institutionalist ontologies. For one, in contrast to Social Democratic and Free Democratic basic stability versus average scores in the Kosovo debate, the three other parties drop in average institutionalist scores. The most profound drop inheres in the speech of Democratic Socialists. From Kosovo to Afghanistan the difference is 1.97, or 64% in terms of the measure itself. Even among Greens and Christian Democrats the decreases were non-trivial, although the nominal
and real changes were much less than for Democratic Socialists. Of course, these observations should only be taken as illustrative and not definitive, given the quasi-interval nature of the measure, but they nonetheless tell a fascinating story. For Christian Democrats, the drop in institutionalist ontology scores accounts partially for the realist ontology’s becoming that group’s number one ontology. If institutionalist scores among Christian Democrats had maintained levels similar to those in the Kosovo occasion, even the large increase exhibited in realist ontology would not have trumped the former as the chief manner in which they spoke about Afghanistan. For Democratic Socialists, the retreat from institutionalist ontology likewise served to underscore another ontology – in this case, it was universalism, which as before was their primary ontological frame, although this time much more clearly so as Democratic Socialists hardly evinced any other ontological frames.

Social Democrats’ stability vis-à-vis institutionalist ontologies, on the other hand, in the face of declining realist and (as it will be shown below) stable universalist ontology scores meant that institutionalism became the unequivocal number one ontology in speaking about the Afghanistan situation for members of this party. As a result of these changes the “fulcrum location” of institutionalist ontologies “shifted” leftward to the center of the political spectrum. In other words, while it was possible to declare institutionalist representations of intervention discussions a “domain of the right” in early 1990’s, this was not true in the later half of that decade and in the Afghanistan decision making occasion. As noted in the previous chapter, this trend had begun during the Kosovo debates – especially during the second, post-1997 period. By
the Afghanistan occasion the tendency seemed solidified with Social Democrats espousing institutionalist arguments ahead of all others.

![Figure 5.4 Decision Maker Ontologies: Universalism](image)

**5.3.4 Universalist approach**

Universalist ontologies maintained their high levels in the observations of leader thinking in the third decision making occasion (Figure 5.3.4). Once more, universalism was primarily associated with the left, and party differences were statistically significant (d.f. 4, 90; f = 13.162; p < .001). Universalist scores decreased for two parties, increasing for another two, and remained the same for one Social Democrats were
those displaying stable average universalist scores since Kosovo. During the overall Kosovo period they averaged a 1.70 universalist score, while during the Afghanistan period they averaged 1.76. This consistency explains the continued ascendance of institutionalist ontologies in the Social Democratic party.

Free Democrat and Christian Democratic Bundestag members, on the other hand, averaged substantially lower universalist ontology scores at 0.67 and 0.90, respectively. In terms of the measurement scale these represented 23% and 12% drops for Free Democrats and Christian Democrats, respectively. (As always, these measures should be understood as illustrative of the rough patterns of change, given the quasi-interval nature of the coding scheme.)

Greens and Democratic Socialists moved in the opposite direction, yielding increased universalist ontology scores in the Afghanistan versus Kosovo occasion. The Green change was small, but the Social Democrat scores increased dramatically from 2.10 to 3.00 between the second and third decision making occasions, equating with a 30% change.

Complexity changes for universalist thinkers moved again in the same direction as in the Kosovo occasion. Recall that in that previous instance realist and institutionalist ontologies for holders of universalist ontologies increased from period one to period two of the Kosovo debate only for the parties of the Left. Likewise, only the Greens and Social Democrat holders of universalist ontologies increased in realist ontology scores. These patterns repeated for universalist thinkers and realism, with the exception that now generally universalist thinkers of all parties increased in realist
scores, Greens and Social Democrats just increased noticeably more. As before, Democratic Socialists with universalist ontologies were the only left party to decrease in realist ontology scores.

Universalist complexity vis-à-vis institutionalist ontologies again saw an increase for left-leaning party members, however, they were now outpaced by the increases for Christian Democrats and Free Democrats. For all these changes, increased scores for institutionalist ontologies and realist ontologies were substantially greater than the score changes for the overall party membership, regardless of whether or not speakers were espousing universalism. In sum, universalist thinkers were even less “purist” in the Afghanistan debates than in the Kosovo period two debates, despite the already increased complexity among universalist thinkers on the latter occasion. The table below illustrates these findings:

---

63 Changes in institutionalist and realist ontology for all party members from Kosovo Period Two to Afghanistan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christ Dems</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Dems</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soc Dems</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem Socs</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Ontology Score Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Type</th>
<th>Kosovo 1 v. Kosovo 2</th>
<th>Kosovo 2 v. Afghanistan</th>
<th>Kosovo 1 v. Kosovo 2</th>
<th>Kosovo 2 v. Afghanistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democrats</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Democrats</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrats</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Socialists</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>2.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figure 5.5 Ontology Score Change for Holders of Universalist Ontology

Examples of these multifaceted representations of the Afghanistan situation include the following comments, in these instances coming from members of the ruling Social Democrat/Green party coalition:

“We have never – in no instance – had any doubts that the political preparations of the post-Taliban processes and the humanitarian assistance for refugees must rank at least as high as the military battle against the Taliban regime and that this will rank as high in the future.” Peter Struck (Social Democrat; November 16, 2001)

“A substantive requirement for the SPD as well as for the Greens was always that by all military interventions, human rights must be maintained and that the legitimization of these interventions must take place through the United Nations.” Andrea Nahles (Social Democrat; November 16, 2001)
“[Developmental aid] is the foundation of our policy when we speak of preventative policy. To this also belongs – as Ultima ratio – the military dimension.” Joseph Fischer (Green; November 16, 2001)

Figure 5.6 Decision Maker Ontologies: Universalism, Institutionalism & Monolithic Culture

5.3.5 Monolithic culturalist approach

The graphical illustration of institutionalist and universalist problem representations as compared to a monolithic culture measure shows that, yet again,
important differences between members of different parties are missed by the latter’s more simplified conception (Figure 5.3.5) In this instance, two particularly important developments are overlooked. First, the culturalist measure picks up a drop in Christian Democrats culturally-based perceptions of the intervention question, however, it misses that it is explainable entirely in terms of the extent to which the situation was viewed as one where laws, organizations, precedents, procedures and other tenets of institutionalist thinking were involved. Universalism, on the other hand, remains largely unmoved from its (admittedly low) previous levels. Another development unnoticed by the monolithic culturalist approach is the Social Democrats’ “tipping” to a more institutionalist-based perception. While this change is indeed small, it may portend a growing trend toward less and less universalist thinking and more and more institutionalist thinking. “Culture writ large” misses this distinction. Using it to describe perceptions, the Greens and Free Democrats demonstrate roughly the same adherence to culturalist beliefs as one another, despite the obvious differences between them.

5.3.6 Pragmatism proposition

Repeating the procedure explained in the previous chapters, a two stage test was employed to check the validity of the pragmatism proposition. As such a short occasion, only two pivotal events were used. These delineated the decision making occasion into three periods, namely those demarcated by the start of the US-led intervention (effective October 11, 2001) and the fall of Mazar-e-Sharif and the general
collapse of the Taliban (effective November 14.) Using these periods to define the
terms of the ANOVA, 45 party/ontology relationships were tested.

Just one party/ontology relationship (i.e., Christian Dems/realism) yielded a
significant result. A near-total lack of significant results would seem a preliminary
indication that pragmatism, or systematic changes in ontologies over time, are not a
feature of the third decision making occasion. That said, the single significant result
shows the Christian Democrats expressing perceptions inconsistently with regard to
realism ($F = 2.856; \text{d.f.} = 2,18; p < .1$) However, in the subsequent second stage of
testing (i.e., linear regression of the party/ontology relationship against the periods) no
statistically significant patterns were noticed. Even a third, less restrictive regression,
testing for patterns in the data against all dates (thereby slightly increasing the test's
statistical power by increasing variance in the independent variable) did not result in
any statistically significant relationship.

In the end, these findings are most likely point out two things: 1) the general lack
of any major message inconsistency, thus pragmatism, but also 2) the general weakness
of the test in small N situations. Specifically, the mean realism scores for Christian
Democrats in each of the three periods are 2.00, 1.22 and 2.50, respectively, illustrating
an apparently concave, curvilinear relationship between ontology and time. Testing for
this apparent pattern of statistical significance, however, requires more observations
than the eight, nine and four speeches available from Christian Democrats for each of
the three periods, respectively. With this later problem in mind, the overall test results
should be understood contingently: there appears to be no strong pragmatism in the
Afghanistan decision making occasion, but *weak* pragmatism may be involved that is unfortunately masked in statistical tests by the small number of observations.

### 5.4 Preliminary Conclusions

The third decision making occasion, Afghanistan, provided a situation in which a number of approaches would have been plausibly relevant in explaining the perceptions of German leaders. In the end, three seemed to carry most of the weight: institutionalism, universalism and realism.

Institutionalism became less important to the Christian Democrats than before, but maintained its importance among Social Democrats. Perhaps pivotally, it continued as the dominant ontological representation of Social Democrats, again surpassing universalism, albeit only slightly.

Historicism was once again the missing ontology among decision makers. This is all the more surprising given the adamance of culturalists with respect to its (alleged) importance and omnipresence. That said, evidence for historicism simply did not rise to the level of their expectations, and, moreover, was completely absent with respect to Christian Democrats, Free Democrats and Democratic Socialists.

Realism, was the dominant ontological representation for Christian Democrats. For other parties it was either the second or third most important ontology. This is a surprise presence in the thinking and rationalizing of *Bundestag* parliamentarians to all but realist theorists. Of course, realists would have perhaps predicted a more dominant position for realist thinking, but its presence nonetheless indicates some validity to the
approach as an explanation for decision making in the Afghanistan occasion.

The monolithic cultural approach is perfectly able to explain the reasoning behind German leaders’ decisions, if only at the loss of detail and precision in terms of what components of culture are influencing the thoughts of which members (i.e., right versus left-leaning party members) and how those influences subtly change.

Finally, the pragmatism proposition is not supported by the date. Leader ontologies were by and large consistent during the Afghanistan decision making occasion. Table 5.3 below summarizes the findings thus far.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Expectation</th>
<th>Support?</th>
<th>Pattern over Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>Cost Benefit Calcs</td>
<td>Conditional:</td>
<td>Remains domain of Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Right: Moderate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Left: None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historicism</td>
<td>WW2, Nazi Era as guide</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>No import</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalism</td>
<td>Laws, Orgs, Procedures</td>
<td>Conditional:</td>
<td>Less important for Christian Dems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Right: Mixed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Left: Weak</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>Morality, absolutes,</td>
<td>Conditional:</td>
<td>Still strong for Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>global harmony</td>
<td>Right: None/Weak</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Left: Moderate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Possible curvilinear relationship to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Realism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monolithic Culture</td>
<td>All parties affected by</td>
<td>Strong, but misses root of</td>
<td>Misses changes and sublties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>German cultural mores</td>
<td>Christian Dems “declining</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>culturalism” and slight transition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>from Universalist to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Institutionalist predominance of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>thought</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pragmatism</td>
<td>Ontologies change with</td>
<td>Weak &amp;</td>
<td>Overall: No import</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>political winds/over time</td>
<td>Conditional:</td>
<td>Possible Isolated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Possible curvilinear relationship to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Realism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>among Christian Dems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3 Summary of Preliminary Findings
CHAPTER 6

GULF WAR 2

The fourth decision making occasion took place in reaction to US plans to invade Iraq and depose the regime of Saddam Hussein. The discussion thus marked the second time Germans had been asked to support such an action against the same foe. Like the other occasions, Gulf War 2 provides superb material for testing the approaches of realism, historicism, institutionalism and universalism for their ability to explain German foreign military intervention decision making, as well as to compare their abilities vis-à-vis the previous Gulf War 1 decision making occasion. Lastly, the occasion also allows the pragmatism proposition and the monolithic German cultural approach counter claims to be tested as well.

In other ways the occasion is certainly unique. Specifically, the claim by US President Bush that Iraq harbored weapons of mass destruction (WMD) including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, meant the stakes of the potential intervention were ostensibly higher than any of the other occasions. In addition, the highly institutional nature of Iraqi oversight in the period since Gulf War 1 (e.g., 16 UN Security Council resolutions between 1990 and 2003) meant that the UN context to the decision making was perhaps stronger than for any other. Finally, while it was not unique in that Bundestag elections were held, it was the only in which a Social
Democratic/Green government sought re-election.

Given these qualities to the occasion, it would seem an especially good case for several of the approaches under study. For starters, the realist approach ought go far in explaining German foreign military intervention decision making because of the high stakes dimension brought by the alleged possession by both sides of nuclear, biological and/or chemical weapons. Historicism would likewise be expected to have particular relevance because of Iraq’s record toward the state of Israel, as well as the prospect of a WMD holocaust. Institutionalism ought do well in explaining decision making because of the strong institution of UN oversight. Lastly, with the electoral considerations of the period, it’s also plausible to expect the pragmatism proposition to obtain. In sum, proponents of many of the competing approaches under study in this dissertation can justifiably look with anticipation to the Gulf War 2 debates for substantiation of their claims.

The remainder of this chapter is organized in the same manner as the other empirical chapters. First, I outline the event and its internal and external contexts. Second, I summarize the data in evidence for each of the four main approaches – realism, historicism, institutionalism and universalism. Next, I explore data in evidence for the monolithic cultural approach and pragmatism proposition. Finally, I conclude with some preliminary observations about the overall pattern of the evidence and some questions to consider in light of these observations when analyzing the next decision making occasion.
6.1 The event

The origins behind the decision making event itself with surely continue to be written about long into the future, doubtlessly with greater detail and perspective than can be offered here. Fortunately, a relatively superficial description of “the event” that brought this particular instance of foreign military intervention decision making to the fore suffices for the purposes of this study. Unlike Gulf War 1, Afghanistan and Kosovo, the justifications for Gulf War 2 – as given by its protagonists – were occurrences that it was argued might happen rather than ones that had happened. And again, at this point no one knows exactly when Iraq became a target of imminent US-led foreign military intervention. What is known precisely is that on March 19, 2003, the intervention began in earnest.

Following more than a year of war-drums, it was anything but surprising. Some controversial accounts indicate that intervention in Iraq was a policy goal of the Bush administration upon inauguration. Whether true or not, what is clear is that nine months later by September 11, 2001, voices in the US were calling for just such an action is response to Iraq’s UN intransigence and support for terrorists, both deemed “acts of war” (Mylroie 2001). As US leadership came to support this view, decision makers in many other capitals also grew supportive of intervention. As a major power and close ally, Germany was also solicited for support in this undertaking. This chapter explores the process by which a majority of German leaders came to oppose the plan to invade Iraq.
6.2 Internal and external contexts

The Gulf War 2 international context was very similar to that of the Afghanistan decision making context. A special difference stemmed from the new US policy of pre-emption that followed the September 11 attacks and began to be felt around the world in terms of state behavior. Specifically, the US-led “empire of invitation” became somewhat more starkly defined, at least in the US’ perspective. States which had previously been ambivalent or somewhat skeptical of the western political and cultural order were now viewed as potential terrorists abettors. Moreover, states which overtly and actively opposed the US order were now clearly branded as terrorist states. These sentiments were summed up in President Bush’s speech of November 6, 2001, when he said “[y]ou are either with us or you are against us in the fight against terror” (White House, Nov. 6, 2001).

Germany along with the other members of the western world were clearly on the side of the US. German participation in the Afghanistan foreign military intervention seemed to indicate this unambiguously as the Gulf War 2 decision making occasion first got underway. States associated with if not members of the western world such as Russia and China appeared to also back the US side at the beginning of the occasion.

This loose coalition of states in opposition to terrorism watched as the Afghanistan intervention succeeded in removing the Taliban from power and Al-Qaeda from many of its former congregation points. The fact that the top leaders of these two movements were neither caught nor killed only slightly dampened the general satisfaction with what the intervention had achieved. International diplomacy has
brought together previously disparate exiled and in-country anti-Taliban factions in order to form a new Afghan government. The culminating talks between these groups took place in Bonn, Germany, and German Foreign Minister Fischer and other leaders were active in its negotiations. On December 22, 2001, the Bonn conference ended with an agreement on the Afghan Interim Authority that placed Hamad Karzai in power as President and a NATO-led, UN-approved International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul to oversee the government’s security. Germany’s 2,000 intervention troops in Afghanistan transitioned thereafter into the ISAF command, which German lieutenant general Van Heyst commanded starting in February 2003.

The internal context during the Gulf War 2 lead-up was also very much like the internal context of the previous occasion. Germany continued to be beset by economic problems. Unemployment hovered around 10% nationwide (Weber 2005). The terrorist attacks in America had triggered debate over German domestic anti-terror legislation. Many of the terrorists of September 11 had lived and studied in Germany. The Red-Green government of Greens and Social Democrats wanted to fight terrorism at home – and perhaps even more so, appear to be fighting terror at home – but disagreed internally about which methods to use. Far left elements of the government opposed domestic military intervention in order to protect vulnerable potential targets such as transportation and energy facilities. The more right-leaning elements of the government as well as the right-leaning opposition parties approved of such measures. The debate about which measures to use continued to occur throughout the entire Gulf War 2 decision making occasion.
As a result – and as in the Afghanistan occasion – opposition parties watched as the Social Democrat/Green coalition argued amongst themselves. The government had rallied around Chancellor Schröder in order to survive a November 2001 vote of confidence but faced another public election in September 2002. Opposition Christian Democrats and Free Democrats justly looked forward to a high probability of acceding to power as a result.

In the immediate run-up to the Bundestag elections devastating floods afflicted northern and eastern Germany. The government responded swiftly and generously to those affected, apparently gaining much positive favor in the public eye as a side-benefit. For this and a variety of other reasons the Red-Green government was narrowly reinstated. Its majority was four seats in one of the smallest majorities in the history of the Bundestag.

Discussion about what would ultimately become the rejected idea of German participation in an Iraqi intervention began on January 24th, 2002 led off by Foreign Minister and Green party member Fischer in a session that included, among other agenda items, discussion of Germany's "foreign policy culture." With this as its innocuous beginning the debate would continue for another 14 months, concluding with the announcement on March 19th, 2003, by Bundestag President and Social Democrat Thierse that war had begun the previous evening. The events that occurred during the overall period are listed below in Table 6.2 (Adapted from Frontline 2003; CNN 2003).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Bundestag Session</th>
<th>Session Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/24/02</td>
<td>-First recorded session, topic: &quot;foreign policy culture&quot;</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>1/24/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>213</td>
<td>1/26/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>214-16 (Not coded, NC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/29/02</td>
<td>- Bush State of the Union Address, includes Iraq in “Axis of Evil”</td>
<td>217 (NC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>218 (NC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>219</td>
<td>2/22/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>220</td>
<td>2/27/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>221</td>
<td>2/28/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>222-26 (NC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>227</td>
<td>3/21/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>228 (NC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/12/02</td>
<td>- UN revamps sanctions regime against Iraq</td>
<td>229 (NC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>230 (NC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>231</td>
<td>4/19/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>232 (NC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>233</td>
<td>4/25/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>234-35 (NC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>236</td>
<td>5/16/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>237-39 (NC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>240</td>
<td>6/7/02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued

Table 6.1 Gulf War 2 Timeline

200
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8/06/02</td>
<td>- Foreign Minister Fischer makes first mention of &quot;no war, even with UN approval&quot; stance</td>
<td>251 (NC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/12/02</td>
<td>- Bush speech at UN General Assembly</td>
<td>252 (NC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/13/02</td>
<td>- Last Session of 14th Bundestag</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/11/02</td>
<td>- US Congress authorizes use of force against Iraq</td>
<td>1 (NC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/17/02</td>
<td>- First Session of 15th Bundestag</td>
<td>2 (NC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5-7 (NC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/8/02</td>
<td>- UN Security Council Resolution 1441 passed</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continued</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued
Table 6.1 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/15/02</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 (NC)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/4/02</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/5/02</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/18/02</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/19/02</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/4/02</td>
<td>17-18 (NC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/5/02</td>
<td>19 (NC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/18/02</td>
<td>20 (NC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/19/02</td>
<td>21 (NC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/16/03</td>
<td>22 (NC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/28/03</td>
<td>23 (NC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/5/03</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/12/03</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/13/03</td>
<td>26 (NC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/19/03</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/19/03</td>
<td>28-30 (NC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/13/03</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/14/03</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/19/03</td>
<td>33 (NC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/19/03</td>
<td>3/19/03 - War begins with air attacks against Iraq</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2/5/03 - Secretary of State Powell gives WMD evidence at UN Security Council
6.3 Tests of the Approaches

While Germans never directly voted on intervening in Iraq, a number of votes got at issues of foreign military intervention more generally, including extensions of intervention missions elsewhere. In addition, two CDU sponsored motions aimed to show support for the US policy more broadly.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Bundestag Session</th>
<th>Subject Matter</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Abstain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/7/2002</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>Kosovo intervention extension</td>
<td>92.5%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Votes</td>
<td></td>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>85.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>98.8%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/14/2002</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>Afghanistan intervention extension</td>
<td>92.4%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Votes</td>
<td></td>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>83.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>94.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>98.5%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/14/2002</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>Macedonia intervention extension I</td>
<td>93.2%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Votes</td>
<td></td>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>81.1%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>98.5%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/29/2002</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Macedonia intervention extension II</td>
<td>98.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Votes</td>
<td></td>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>96.0%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2 Votes During Gulf War 2 Decision Making Occasion

Continued
Table 6.2 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Bundestag Session</th>
<th>Subject Matter</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Abstain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/15/2002</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>War on Terror intervention extension</td>
<td>97.3%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Votes</td>
<td></td>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>94.5%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>92.9%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>96.7%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/5/2002</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Macedonia intervention extension III</td>
<td>97.3%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Votes</td>
<td></td>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>94.5%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>92.9%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>96.7%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/13/2003</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Declaration of support for military measures</td>
<td>46.8%</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>against Iraq</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Votes</td>
<td></td>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>93.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>98.7%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/13/2003</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>“Europe and America must stand together”</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
<td>53.1%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Votes</td>
<td></td>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>98.3%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.3.1 Realist Approach

Realist ontology scores during Gulf War 2 debates were remarkably similar for all parties to those exhibited in the Kosovo (overall) occasion. The largest difference in this regard was among the Greens, where the Gulf War 2 average was 0.13 lower than the Kosovo overall average realist ontology score. The Democratic Socialists and Christian Democrats were both 1.00 lower than their previous averages, while the Social Democrats and Free Democrats were only 0.01 and 0.04 lower than theirs. Because of this the occasion bore the appearance of time having been reversed. The Bundestag membership seemed to be reverting to old arguments for the new debate.
Also because of this, many of the same conclusions can be drawn about realist ontologies in the Gulf War 2 occasion as were drawn in the Kosovo occasion. Of course, the intercession of the Afghanistan occasion between Kosovo and Gulf War 2 embellishes these similarities somewhat, as I will explain below.

In terms of similarities, party differences for realist ontology scores were again statistically significant according to ANOVA (d.f. = 4, 371; F = 17.950; p < .001). Also, realist thinking was strongest on the right of the political spectrum, especially among Christian Democrats, but also present in the rhetoric of leaning Social Democrats. As such, there was again both more evidence for its influence than anticipated by the culturalist literature but less influence than anticipated by the realist literature. In other words, scores were greater than the “virtually no traces of Germany’s return to realist “normalcy,”” described by culturalists but lower than the “perfect realist normalcy” that would be expected were realist impulses dominating German decision making. On the other hand, culturalists might deservedly take some solace from the direction of change for the highest users of realist ontology in the current instance as compared to Afghanistan. Specifically, for Christian Democrats and Free Democrats change was in the negative direction. Christian Democrats moved from a 1.76 to a 1.55 average, while the Free Democrats moved from 1.25 to 1.94. These changes equated with modest 7.0% and 10.0% decreases in terms of the 3 point measure. The change was large enough, though, to reduce realism to the second most important ontology among Christian Democratic leaders as compared to Afghanistan where it was the first. These findings notwithstanding, realist theorists get some (but
slightly weaker) confirmation of their expectations with smaller increases in realist ontology scores for the parties of the left as compared to Afghanistan.

All these observations, however, are just embellishments on the overall fact that realist ontology scores reverted to Kosovo-occasion levels during the Gulf War 2 discussions. Realist ontologies were still the domain of the right, Christian Democrats substantially more likely to express their reflections on the situation in such terms. Like Kosovo, realism was the second ranking ontology behind institutionalism for both parties of the right. On the left, it was third, behind both institutionalism and universalism.

As realist theorists would expect the emphasis among German realists was on threats, opportunities, the role of power and force, and an unavoidable major power role of Germany as a military intervener in the world. Overall, these ontologies portrayed a process of materialistic calculation with respect to the decisions at hand; whether Germany should intervene or not had to do with the costs and benefits of using military force in terms of anticipated resultant power balances. Leaders often called for explicit use of such calculations as when CDU member Schäuble commented: “We [Germany] need a realistic threat analysis.”


Even Greens infrequently engaged in this kind of realist calculus as did Göring-Eckard when he maintained:

Nothing would be better to us than to have the people in this country freed as quickly as possible from the terror regime of Saddam Hussein. We also know however that war in this region would lead to destabilization. It would have
unbelievable consequences for this country and the entire region. It would have consequences vis-à-vis terrorist dangers for all of us.\textsuperscript{65}

Schäuble’s CDU party colleague Glos underscored the role of force in settling disputes with autocrats when he affirmed:

Dictators such as Saddam Hussein or Slobodan Milosevic have enormous difficulty with the language of diplomats and diplomacy. They don’t trouble themselves with humanitarian arguments and they don’t bother themselves with the needs of the people in their own land. I know that no one in wanted war or wants war; however it is always so: When recourse to the use of weapons, as a last resort, as ultima ratio, is excluded, there exists the great danger that dictators will misunderstand it. They take it as an blank check – world history shows it again and again – grasping onto it to the very end.\textsuperscript{66}

Others focused on German national interests, as when Social Democrat Struck stated:

“We no longer stand apart under the caution of history when our security interests our concerned and others are counting on our contribution.”\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{65} Original: “Nichts wäre uns lieber, als daß die Menschen in diesem Land von dem Terrorregime des Saddam Hussein so schnell wie möglich befreit würden. Wir wissen aber auch: Krieg in dieser Region würde zur Destabilisierung beitragen. Er hätte unglaubliche Folgen für dieses Land und die gesamte Region. Er hätte Folgen hinsichtlich der terroristischen Gefahren für uns alle.” – Göring-Eckardt, Greens, 14.3.03

\textsuperscript{66} Original: “Diktatoren wie Saddam Hussein oder Slobodan Milosevic tun sich mit der Sprache der Diplomaten und der Diplomatie ungeheuer schwer. Sie kümmern sich nicht um humanitäre Argumente und sie kümmern sich auch nicht um die Not der Menschen im eigenen Land. Ich weiß, daß niemand in Deutschland Krieg wollte oder gar Krieg will; aber es ist doch immer so: Wenn ein Waffengang als letztes Mittel, als Ultima Ratio, ausgeschlossen wird, dann besteht die große Gefahr, das Diktatoren das missverstehen. Sie betrachten das dann oft als einen Freibrief und – das hat die Weltgeschichte immer wieder gezeigt – klammern sich bis zuletzt daran.” Michael Glos, CDU, 19.3.03

\textsuperscript{67} Original: “Wir stehen nicht mehr unter Hinweis auf unsere Geschichte abseits, wenn unsere Sicherheitsinteressen betroffen sind und wenn andere auf unsere Beitrag setzen.” – Struck, SPD, 25.7.02
Another interesting trend was the mixing of institutionalist and realist rhetoric. Such statements highlighted the importance of German power, material factors and capabilities for foreign military intervention, but within the context of alliances and treaty arrangements. Institutions were clearly posited as intervening elements in the pursuit of German interests.

"It is not just a platitude, but the simple truth and a profession of our politics that nothing be at cross purposes with a stable contribution of the German army in the transatlantic alliance, in which NATO. That is for us not only a cornerstone of German policy, it is for us Raison d’Etat."68 –

"Regarding foreign interventions: The reputation of the Federal Republic of Germany as a reliable partner in the European Union and in the Atlantic community has been damaged in the years of the red-green government. The import and influence of Germany in the alliance have decreased."69

In still other instances, realist and institutionalist ontologies were mixed, but without reference to national German interests at all, but rather to those of a European political entity. For example, the Free Democrat Gerhardt pushed for more European power when he argued:

68 Original: “Es ist nicht nur eine Binsenweisheit, sondern einfach die Wahrheit und ein Bekenntnis unser Politik, daß nichts an einem stabilen Beitrag der deutschen Armee im transatlantischen Bündnis, in der NATO, vorbeiführt. Das ist für uns nicht nur ein Eckpfeiler deutscher Politik, daß ist für uns Staatsräson.” – Gerhardt, FDP, 25.7.02

69 Original: “Bei den Auslandeinsätzen. Das Ansehen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland als verlässlicher Partner in der Europäischen Union und in der atlantischen Gemeinschaft hat in den Jahren der rot-grünen Regierung Schaden genommen. Das Gewicht und der Einfluss Deutschlands im Bündnis haben abgenommen.” – Schäuble, CDU, 25.7.02
"It is also true that we Europeans must recognize that we have tremendous political and economic potential, but in terms of global politics haven’t really learned to walk yet."70

Even Greens joined in this kind of perspective as Fischer

"The USA is a global power at its zenith, a hegemonial power against its will. It is the first time in the history of modern times that we have a hegemonial power without a counterweight. This creates very specific problems. The time does not permit it that I speak to them. However, the unique possibility, not to hold-out against it, but rather to inaugurate in partnership a balance, will be the European integration process. Europe is not a power, rather a power in the making."71

Finally, while comments such as Fischer’s were rare coming from left-leaning parliamentarians, especially Greens, evidence for realist thinking was much more prevalent from the right. In particular, right leaning members of the Bundestag frequently criticized the government’s decisions from a realist perspective, as reflected in the following comments from FDP member Westerwelle and CDU member Stoiber:

"In January it came finally to a summit of the European Union with an declaration of the heads of state which expressly approved military intervention as means of last resort for the removal of weapons of mass destruction from Iraq. If you would have represented this attitude from the outset, we would today not find ourselves so close to war. The fact that we are today so close to

70 Original: “Zur Wahrheit gehört auch, daß wir Europäer erkennen müssen, daß wir zwar ungeheure politische und ökonomische Potenzielle haben, aber weltpolitisch noch nicht richtig Laufen gelernt haben.” – Gerhardt, FDP, 27.6.02
war is owed to the failure of diplomacy, explicitly the failure of the foreign policy of this government.”

"War is always a catastrophe… [Then one must do something to stop it! – Heil, SPD] …wherever it occurs in the world. But desire for peace alone is not sufficient in order to retain peace. [We’re doing something to stop the war! – Heil, SPD] The desire for peace of the Federal Government did not impress the dictator in Baghdad. It was the American-British determination which led to the resumption of inspections and to the diplomatic initiatives. The German contribution equaled nothing. […] If it had gone according to you no inspectors would be in Iraq.”

---


73 Original: “Krieg ist immer eine Katastrophe (Dann muss man auch etwas dagegen tun! – Heil, SPD) wo auch immer auf der Welt. Doch Friedenswille allein genügt nicht, um den Frieden zu bewahren. (“Wir tun was gegen den Krieg! – Heil, SPD) Der Friedenswille der Bundesregierung hat den Diktator in Bagdad nicht beeindruckt. Es war die amerikanisch-britische Entschlossenheit, die zur Wiederaufnahme der Inspektionen und zu den diplomatischen Initiativen geführt hat. Der deutsche Beitrag dazu war gleich null. […] Wenn es nach Ihnen gegangen wäre, wären im Irak keine Inspektoren.” – Stoiber, CDU, 14.3.03
Evidence for historicism shows it to once again be weak (Figure 6.3.2). An ANOVA test of the relationship between party membership and historicist ontologies likewise rejected any correlation that would suggest different parties have different levels of adherence to historicist perceptions (d.f. 4, 371; F = 1.124; p = .149). These findings are consonant with previous findings regarding historicist ontology, and are the third instance of a systematic lack of any significant evidence in support of it. At the risk of being redundant, it can nonetheless not be overestimated that we never see the “super-abundance of references to historical issues in the German public discourse on
defense and national security” expected by culturalists (Berger 2002).

Historicist thinking was exhibited across all parties at levels that were well below those seen in the Gulf War 1 and Kosovo decision making occasions. In that sense, the ontology did not “revert” to some previously seen levels as had the realist ontology. On the other hand, historicist thinking was evidenced by all parties in the Gulf War 2 debates, in contrast to its absence among Democratic Socialist, Free Democrat and Christian Democrat leaders’ speeches in the Afghanistan occasion.

These results are again surprising given the culturalists’ expectations and the particular elements of the occasion that would seem to lend themselves to higher historicist ontologies. As mentioned before, Saddam Hussein’s animus towards Jews and Israel, his gassing of his own civilians, his alleged possession of nuclear weapons and the general comparisons made between him and Hitler would all auger for a high relevance of historical reasoning in the Gulf War 2 decision making occasion.

In the instances when history was referenced, it was usually in service to points being made in terms of some other ontology, such as realism or institutionalism. For example, as quoted above, SPD Defense Minister Struck referred to a lack of historical relevance when he stated:

“We no longer stand apart under the proviso of history when our security interests our concerned and others are counting on our contribution.”

Or, in another example, CDU member Glos referenced history, but in order to make a point about alliance commitments – an institutionalist stance:

---

74 Original: Wir stehen nicht mehr unter Hinweis auf unsere Geschichte abseits, wenn unsere Sicherheitsinteressen betroffen sind und wenn andere auf unsere Beitrag setzen. – Struck, SPD, 25.7.02
"[W]e carry responsibility for our country, now and the far into the future. In the 57 years passed since total defeat in the Second World War, thanks to the policy of intelligent statesmen Germany has developed into an equal, esteemed partner. We belong to the western value community. For a people from whom the Holocaust was launched because it did not put a timely stop to the deeds to of the dictator, this is not just self explanatory."75

Even oblique references to history such as these were rare in the Gulf War 2 decision making occasion. Instead, it was the weakest ontology in evidence for all five political parties. The culturalist claim that “[a]nalytical traditions that neglect the effects of collective memory, as variants of realism and liberalism often do, miss crucial determinants of Germany’s stance” in foreign policy decision making is unsupported in the case of the Iraq intervention occasion.

6.3.3 Institutionalist Approach

Institutionalism was again the strongest ontology in evidence and the primary ontology for all parties except the former communist party of Democratic Socialists (Figure 6.3.3). With this party included, institutionalist ontology were found to correlate with statistical significance to different parties (d.f. 4, 371; F = 28.510; p < .001). However, if ANOVA is run without the Democratic Socialists, no statistically significant differences are in evidence among the remaining four parties (d.f. 3, 337; F = .731, p = .534). This means that all the remaining parties were basically uniform in their espousal of institutionalist thinking in the Gulf War 2 decision making occasion.
Emphasis among decision makers espousing an institutionalist perception of the decision-making opportunity was still on rules and procedures – especially “due process” – organizations and alliances, and implicit and explicit commitments and obligations between states.

There were differences, however, in precisely how these elements were prioritized. Members of the ruling Social Democrat/Green coalition referred to the importance of due process in particular, and the need to explore all diplomatic options before resorting to force. They therefore did not rule out military intervention in all instances as would someone voicing a strong universalist ontology, however, they ruled out intervention in terms of the specific instance being pushed by the US. Thus SPD Chancellor Schröder underscored the democratic process that had led to his rejection of military intervention in Iraq:

"This courage toward peace is the mandate of Red-Green, granted to us on 22 September 2002. And we will hold ourselves precisely to this mandate, Ladies and Gentlemen." - Schröder, SPD, 13.2.03

Other left members of parliament wanted to highlight the consultative and deliberative aspects of institutions. An example would include Social Democrat Schultz’s exhortation on US intervention proponents – whom Schultz viewed as indispensable partners – to consider alternative means for international order enforcement:

"Europe and America can only realize their interests on a long-term basis

together. This applies also to the fight against international terrorism. We must, however, clarify again and again to the Americans that the fight against hate and terror, against contemptible dictatorships, against hunger, poverty and epidemic cannot by any means be carried out only with military means, but that it requires also lasting and patient civil strategies."77

Members of the opposition Christian Democrats and Free Democrats speaking in terms of an institutionalist ontology stressed the importance of alliance commitments and the maintenance of institutional enforcement more than institutional due-processes. The emphasis was not so much an explicit rejection of the latter in favor of the former, but rather – like the left’s focus on processes as opposed to blind solidarity – a matter of rhetorical prioritization and implicit argument. Compare the comments of the Christian Democratic leader Merkel in this regard to those of the Social Democrat in the preceding paragraph:

"Mr. Federal Chancellor, we are arguing here about the question: How can I -- as part of a community of friends to whom I feel obligated by common values – realize as large as possible portion of my own ideas? I cannot do it by deciding things without consultation and closing off parts of alliances, without informing others. I thus weaken the European union, NATO, the UN, the security council and the work of the inspectors." 78

Others on the right similarly criticized the Red-Green government for their alleged abandonment of Germany’s allies, with detrimental effects on Germany’s future


in such organizations, as when CDU and FDP members argued:

“With your rejection of the necessary and desired support for Turkey in the NATO Council on Monday you endanger the alliance abilities of Germany.”79

How reliable is our profession of multilateralism, if we say from the beginning: ‘Regardless was the Security Council decides, we will not [go along]’?80

Finally, the previous comments notwithstanding, not all government opponents elevated solidarity with allies to the point where it diminished the importance of due process. Free Democrat highlighted the importance of the former when he spoke regarding the importance of legitimizing actions through the UN Security Council:

"We have always oriented ourselves with international law. We want a European alliance acting in an alliance of the commonwealth of nations. We therefore hold firmly to our stance after the Bush ultimatum: We reject every nationalist unilateral action without an appropriate resolution from the United Nations [...] For the Free Democrats the Security Council is and remains the place for the international legal authentication of conflict resolution."81

While the institutionalist approach cannot predict the outcome of deliberations which are embedding in its ontological logic, it nonetheless does specify the content of the deliberations quite clearly. Just as institutionalists would expect “[p]ower in exercised – at least to some extent – through agreed-upon institutional rules and practices, thereby limiting the capacities of states to exercise arbitrary power in

79 Original: “Mit Ihrer Verweigerung der erforderlichen und erwünschten Unterstützung der Türkei im NATO-Rat am Montag gefährden Sie die Bündnisfähigkeit Deutschlands.” – von Kläden, CDU, 12.2.03
80 Original: “Wie glaubwürdig ist unser Bekenntnis zum Multilateralismus, wenn wir von vornherein sagen: ‘Egal, was der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen entscheidet, wir nicht?’” – Hoyer, FDP, 12.2.03
arbitrary and indiscriminate ways or use their power advantages to gain a permanent advantage over weaker states” (Ikenberry 2001: 19).

Each of the cited leader statements follows these expectations. From Schröder’s reference to democratic legitimization (and binding) vis-à-vis the German decision to not intervene in Iraq to the Hoyer’s reference to the procedures of the UN in his criticism of that same decision, all reference institutionalist expectations of how decision making should look. Each captures the institutionalists notions of either the democratic peace proposition or that “[a]ll states are legally obligated to act multilaterally when international law or the charter of an international organization prescribes such a course” (Hoffmann 2001: 343). The fact that such divergent opinions as those evidenced in the Gulf War 2 decision making occasion could arise underscores the broad applicability of the logic to the occasion.

Resolution der Vereinten Nationen ab. […] Für die Freien Demokraten ist und bleibt der Sicherheitsrat die völkerrechtliche Legitimationsinstanz für Konfliktlösungen.” – Westerwelle, FDP, 19.3.03
6.3.4 Universalist Approach

Universalist ontologies dropped across all parties as compared to the Afghanistan occasion. This was one of the big surprises in the Gulf War 2 occasion. For all their decreased importance, universalist ontologies nonetheless remained relatively high for parties of the left. They were still higher for those parties than scores for realist or historicist ontologies. Universalism was the most important ontology for Democratic Socialists and the second most important ontology for Greens and Social Democrats. Regardless of party, leaders espousing universalist rationales for their decisions focused on philosophical, religious, ethical and moral prohibitions against
state-sponsored violence in their speech. Fighting in general, and foreign military intervention in particular was denounced. Ideally, the preferred alternative was a pacifistic course of action. These types of comments are precisely the universalist approach’s expectations of “policy directed against all forms of aggression […] oriented towards a peaceful life together in solidarity” (Coleman & Coleman 1993: 66).

However, as the data demonstrate, the incidence of universalist ontology was down. The Greens, for example, exhibited a mean universalist score of 1.17 in the Gulf War decision making opportunity, as compared to its Afghanistan mean universalist score of 2.56. This drop of –1.17 from one occasion to the next represents a 39% change in terms of the measure itself. This change is particularly striking given the Greens’ previous programmatic relationship to universalist values as mentioned in the introduction.

Likewise, the Social Democrats’ mean universalist score dropped, although less profoundly, from 1.76 in 2001 to 1.12 in 2002/03. This –.64 decrease equals a 21% drop in terms of the measure. The Free Democrats and Christian Democrats also exhibited lower scores compared to the Afghanistan instance, although at -.17 (5.6%) and -.24 (8%), respectively, they were of a considerably lesser magnitude. Finally, all these party differences were statistically significant (d.f. 4, 371; f = 24.25; p < .001). By asserting institutionalist ontologies as their primary justification or referent framework regarding possible intervention in Gulf War 2, Greens and Social Democrats seem to have exposed themselves to a pitfall that the universalists Habermas decried when he wrote:
“[Some peoples’] error is connected with their choice of the wrong model; namely, the normalizing, leveling interventions of a bureaucracy insensitive to uniqueness and to individual rights in individual cases. But this is more closely related to certain qualities of the means of administrative power than to the normative idea of equal treatment” (Habermas 1997: 79).

One sees this concern over the proper “administration of universalism” clearly put forth in the argument of SPD member Erler when he states that in the principles of his party:

"[W]e insist on a return to the political goal of comprehensive disarmament and arms control for all countries on the basis of international treaties. The weapons are the danger, even if they are in hands of the good countries. One cannot guarantee protection from forbidden access and misuse. Where were Anthrax letters sent from with the consequence that government buildings and the parliament [sic] building would have to be closed for several weeks? Where did plutonium arrive on the free market? That wasn’t in any rogue states, but in the civilized world, from among us. This shows that on the contrary, it concerns the weapons themselves. It concerns a regime for securing complete disarmament. An Iraq war leads to a movement away from this and into a new world order in which no answer can be found to these dangers.”

---

Again, Erler’s statement demonstrates both the importance of universalist ontology but also its connectedness to institutionalist concerns for procedure and organization. As such it again brings in the anti-universalist elements that Habermas decries as:

[based] exclusively on methods and procedures designed to guarantee the validity of their results. […] Here all that matters is a procedure designed to guarantee the impartiality of judgment. This procedural rigor has nothing overpowering about it” (Habermas 1997: 78).

Also, the change first observed in the Afghanistan decision making opportunity persisted, whereby Social Democrats were more likely to represent the intervention situation from an institutionalist perspective rather than from a universalist perspective. For the first time, however, the Greens now joined the Social Democrats in their representation of military intervention decision-making in the same way. Moreover, where the differences between levels of institutionalist and universalist ontologies had been slight in the Afghanistan occasion, those levels were now much more disparate.

The mean universalist and institutionalist ontology scores for Social Democrats were 1.76 and 2.18 in 2001 but 1.12 and 2.43 in 2002-03. Stated yet another way, the disparity between average levels of institutionalist and universalist ontologies increased from 14% (.42/3.0) to 43.6% (1.31/3.0) from the Afghanistan to the Gulf War 2 occasions. Again, these differences are even greater for the Greens, who averaged universalist and institutionalist ontology scores of 2.56 and 1.56, respectively, in 2001 but 1.39 and 2.47 in 2002/03. The disparity thus increased and reversed valence, changing from a –33% (-1/3/0) institutionalist versus universalist disparity in the
debates over Afghanistan to a 36% (1.08/3.0) disparity in the debates over Iraq.

To be sure, isolated instances involving relatively “purist” utterances of universalist ontology were still observable in the Gulf War 2 decision making occasion, as when Green member Sager lamented:

"We will experience a war which is unnecessary, not fair, wrong and superficial. We will not be able to prevent this war, it is so fatal. We will experience a war that is led against the majority in the security council, against the majority of the population in the European Union and against the will of millions humans in this world [...] I am happy that millions of people in the world demonstrated against this war, and I am expressly grateful for the fact that the Pope positioned himself so clearly against this war."83

Others similarly emphasized the religious dimensions to their universalist ontology:

“I stand here to say: this war is wrong. It means an ignorance of every moral, ethical and Christian responsibility. I thank the churches for having sharpened all of our consciences in this regard.”84

Likewise, SPD member Münterfering spoke in terms of a right to life:

"In Iraq war threatens. Mr. Glos even called it an “exchange of arms.” That sounds like a walk. War is however destruction, war is death, war is misery, war is poverty. Mr. Glos, if you say humans in Iraq have a right to live in freedom, I say “yes, and they have above all a right to live and therefore we do not want war in Iraq.”85


Members of right-leaning parties were less likely to couch their statements in terms of universalism, but when they did they often tried to make a case about the misuse or limitations of the universalist ontological approach in deliberating best practices toward Iraq. For example, CDU member Haibach felt universalist thinkers has targeted the wrong “bogeyman”:

"You should in all your entitled or un-entitled criticisms of the American attitude however please never forgot that it is nevertheless Saddam Hussein and not George Bush who for decades has trampled human rights, oppressed his population and threatened and menace his neighbors with war."86

Similarly, Free Democrat and Christian Democrat decision makers rejected the notion that they were somehow bogeymen, as when FDP leader Westerwelle declared:

“One who wants a different foreign- or security policy is not a war-monger, but just as great a friend of peace as you on the side of the government delegation.”87

Christian Democrat Glos made the argument that universalism was less applicable to the actions of states than individuals, stating:

“We know also - let me say in these serious – the ethical conviction of pacifism as attitude of the individual is acceptable and quite honorable, but for the security of global peace and for the containment of dictators it is not suited. Here an ethic of responsibility is asked for.”88

---

86 Original: “Sie dürfen bei aller berechtigten oder unberechtigten Kritik an der amerikanischen Haltung aber bitte nie vergessen, daß es doch Saddam Hussein und nicht George Bush ist, der die Menschenrechte seit Jahrzehnten mit Füßen tritt, seine Bevölkerung unterdrückt und seine Nachbarn mit Krieg bedroht und überzieht.” – Holger Haibach, CDU, 13.3.03
87 Original: “[W]er eine andere Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik will, ist kein Kriegswilliger, sondern ein genauso großer Friedensfreund wie Sie auf der Seite der Regierungsfaktionen.” – Westerwelle, FDP, 19.3.03
88 Original: “Wir wissen auch – lassen Sie mich das in diesen ernsten Zeiten sagen – Der gesinnungsethische Pazifismus mag als Haltung des Einzelnen akzeptabel und durchaus ehrenwert sein,
His party comrade Vatz, on the other hand, argued that universalism and foreign military intervention were:

“two sides of the same coin. I must add to this that the re-establishment of human rights is not a happy side-effect of the anti-terror campaign, rather it is a value unto itself.”89

Finally, leaders from the far-left Democratic Socialists – the party with the highest scores for universalist ontology – criticized the other parties’ bemoaning of the situation by proposing action to realize universalist goals. For example, PDS member Petra Pau argued:

"You deplore the powerlessness which strikes us all in the face of the steadfastness of the US leadership. I understand that very well; it’s the same for many people. But please: Use at least the power which was vested in you as government parties. Prevent Germany from becoming jointly guilty through the back door! You become otherwise guilt yourselves."90

The secular trend whereby universalist thinkers were becoming increasingly complex, or more likely to “combine” institutionalist or realist ontologies to existing universalist ontologies as they referred to the decision making occasion, took a new turn in 2002-03. Compared to the Afghanistan occasion, universalist thinkers were less complex in terms of realism for three of five parties and in terms of institutionalism for

---

89 Original: “zwei Seiten derselben Medaille sind. Ich muss hinzufügen: Die Wiederherstellung der Menschenrechte ist kein erfreuliches Nebenprodukt des Antiterrorkampfes, sondern ein Wert an sich.” – Vaatz, CDU, 15.11.02

90 Original: “Sie beklagen die Ohnmacht, die uns alle angesichts der Unbeirrbarkeit der US-Führung befällt. Das verstehe ich sehr gut; das geht sehr vielen Menschen so. Aber bitte: Nutzen Sie wenigstens
five of five parties. However, if we compare the increases backwards across two intervals – namely by contrasting the Gulf War 2 scores with the Kosovo period two scores, then we see that these decreases in realist and institutionalist ontology scores for universalist thinkers in no instance exceed the gains attributed to the movement from Kosovo period one to period two. In other words, Bundestag leaders espousing universalist ontologies may have been less complex in terms of their additional usages of realist and institutionalist ontologies in Gulf War 2 as compared to Afghanistan, but they were still more complex in those terms as compared to Kosovo period two. Stated yet another way, in 2002-03 universalist thinkers maintained, and actually slightly “improved” on the complexity gains they acquired by 1998-99. Moreover, as the reader will recall, these complexity increases were already substantial in terms of the shift from the period before 1998. The table below illustrates these trends.

die Macht, die Ihnen als Regierungspartei anheim gestellt wurde! Verhindern Sie, daß Deutschland durch die Hintertür mitschuldig wird! Sie würden sonst selbst mitschuldig. – Petra Pau, PDS, 19.3.03


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Realist Ontology</th>
<th>Institutionalist Ontology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kosovo 1 v. Kosovo 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kosovo 2 v. Afghan</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan v. Gulf War 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kosovo 1 v. Kosovo 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Christian Democrats** | (0.16) | 0.08 | 0.03 | (0.07) | 1.33 | (0.86) |
| **Free Democrats**      | (0.09) | 0.28 | (0.08) | (0.16) | 0.97 | (0.75) |
| **Social Democrats**    | 0.69   | 0.52 | 0.02 | 0.39   | 0.52 | (0.40) |
| **Greens**              | 0.15   | 0.42 | (0.12) | 0.48 | 0.94 | (0.87) |
| **Democratic Socialists**| (0.28) | (0.03) | (0.14) | 0.36 | 2.32 | (0.58) |

**Figure 6.5 Ontology Score Change for Holders of Universalist Ontology**

For now, I will leave this observation as it stands. As an emergent quality of the study (i.e., complexity was not hypothesized to impact foreign military intervention decision making) it will be dealt with in the next chapter, where I tie all the findings together.

With regards to universalist ontologies per se, it is clear that they were again quite important in explaining German decision making in the Kosovo case, especially with regard to the left parties. There they remained one of the top two ontologies for two of the three parties and number one for the remaining party. By itself this is impressive, and given the opposition of these parties to the Gulf War 2 intervention
opportunity, would seem to butress the proposition raised in the first chapter that universalism may be a necessary – if not sufficient – ingredient for anti-interventionist preferences.

There is a major problem with this contention, however, in that universalist ontologies, despite ranking either first or second for three of five parties, nonetheless decreased dramatically in its usage among those parties (except the Democratic Socialists.) For the Greens, universalism slid convincingly to a number two ontology vis-à-vis institutionalism. As a result, their rhetoric closely matched the numerical characteristics of the Christian Democrat ontologies in the first decision making occasion – a time when the latter supported intervention in Iraq! Thus the comparative aspects of universalist ontology scores over time would seem unsupportive of the idea the universalism is a necessary component of German foreign military anti-interventionism.

Again, I further explore this trend, the trends in the evidence for the other three main approaches, the trends in the evidence for the pragmatism proposition and monolithic culture approach, as well as the emergent universalist complexity results in the next chapter. First, I turn to the remaining two components of this chapter, the monolithic cultural approach and the pragmatism proposition.
6.3.5 Monolithic Culturalist Approach

The graphical illustration of institutionalist and universalist problem representations as compared to a monolithic culture measure shows that, yet again, important differences between members of different parties are missed by the latter’s more simplified conception (Figure 6.3.5.2.) In this instance, two particularly important developments are overlooked. First, the culturalist measure picks up a drop in Christian Democrats culturally-based perceptions of the intervention question, however, it misses that it is explainable entirely in terms of the extent to which the situation was viewed as
one where laws, organizations, precedents, procedures and other tenets of institutionalist thinking were involved. Universalism, on the other hand, remains largely unmoved from its (admittedly low) previous levels. Another development unnoticed by the monolithic culturalist approach is the Social Democrats’ continued “tipping” to a more institutionalist-based perception, as well as the Greens new adoption of such representations. At the very least, the continuation of these trends illustrate a change in the emphasis in what is "German culture," namely less and less universalist thinking and more and more institutionalist thinking. “Culture writ large”, however, misses this distinction. Using it to describe perceptions, the Democratic Socialists and Christian Democrats, for example, demonstrate roughly the same adherence to culturalist beliefs as one another, despite the obvious differences (when looking at sub-components) between them.

6.3.6 Pragmatism Proposition

Four events were defined as pivotal and likely to relate to changes in ontology. In chronological order, the events and dates were: 1) the “Axis of Evil” speech by US president Bush on January 29, 2002, with the first effective Bundestag session on February 22, 2002; 2) the Bundestag campaign and election, effective October 23; 3) the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1441, authorizing further weapons inspections in Iraq and effective November 13; and 4) US Secretary of State Powell’s speech before the UN Security Council, effective February 12, 2003. Analytically, these four events served to divide the decision making opportunity into five periods.
Next, ANOVA tests discerned any statistically significant differences in mean ontology scores for each of the ontology categories (i.e., realism, historicism, etc.) and each of the five parties between all of the five periods. Of the 20 relationships tested (5 parties x 4 ontology categories) three yielded statistical significance. In other words, the test indicated that these three party/ontology relationships were significantly different from one another on the basis of the periods involved. While this result (3 out of 20 possible) is not indicative of large numbers of changes in the professed perceptions of decision makers, it still indicates that some pragmatism may be involved. However, what the ANOVA fails to reveal are the exact periods when "perception" changes occurred as well as the direction of those changes. In order to gauge these relationships, a second stage test applied linear regressions to the data.

Social Democrats/institutionalism, Free Democrats/institutionalism and Free Democrats/universalism -- were further examined in a series of four linear regressions each. This entailed dichotomizing the overall timeline four times by the pivotal events, thereby demarcating "before" and "after" periods of time, which were then entered as independent variables in bivariate regressions. In other words, the tests examined whether the shift from "before" one pivotal event to "after" it could predict to significant differences in the party's ontology score. Stated yet another way, it tested whether ontological changes were noticeable as a differences in a dichotomization of period 1 versus periods 2-5, of periods 1-2 versus periods 3-5, of periods 1-3 versus periods 4-5, and so on. Each result is independent of the others, so that as many as four significant relationships might be observed for each party/ontology pairing. In the end,
these tests provide an answer to the questions, "Precisely when did ontological changes noticed in the ANOVA results occur? In which direction did the ontologies change? and What was their intensity?" The table below summarizes the findings of these tests:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrats/Institutionalism</td>
<td>#1 – January 28th, 2002</td>
<td>.224 (t=2.416, N=112)</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>.189 (t=2.024, N=112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Democrats/Institutionalism</td>
<td>#2 – September 14th, 2002</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>.308 (t=2.198, N=47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FreeDemocrats/Universalism</td>
<td>#3 – November 8th, 2002</td>
<td>.414 (t=-3.085, N=47)</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Correlations are Standardized Betas. In bivariate regressions, their interpretation is exactly the same as for a Pearson’s R; positive and negative correlations indicate direct and inverse relationships, respectively, with absolute values of one depicting “perfect” correlations and values of zero depicting “absolutely no” correlation.

**Table 6.3 Direction and Strength of Ontology Change by Party and Period**

As in the first stage of tests, where only 3 of 20 relationships obtained, only a few of the relationships in the regression tests proved statistically insignificant (4/12.) Moreover, these few significant results convey a somewhat inconsistent story, both as compared to each other and as compared to findings from the other decision making opportunities. For example, of the three parties, the Free Democrats exhibited the most
change. However, these shifts occur across two of the four demarcation points, and at different times for each of the two relevant ontology variables. The Free Democrats showed a decreased likelihood for universalist ontology in the total period after January 29th as compared to the period prior. Interpreting the coefficients in these cases, we can see that the Free Democrats were substantially less likely to express their perceptions in terms of universalism in the "after" period as compared to the "before" (−.414). Conversely, Free Democrats were *more* likely to represent the situation in terms of institutionalism in the period after Colin Powell’s speech to the UN in February 2003 (.308).

The Social Democrats also show movement at two points, but only in terms of their institutionalist ontologies. These changes occur across the first and fourth demarcation points, and are the lowest of the group (.224 and .189, respectively.) These values indicate that as one moved from one period to another, the likelihood of institutionalist representation, among Social Democrats, increased, if only slightly.

How to digest these findings? For one, it is interesting that the significantly time-affected ontology is institutionalism -- the top-ranked ontology among Free Democrat and Social Democrats during the Gulf War Two decision making opportunity. In three of the four instances where directional change was indicated, institutionalism was involved. Thus to the extent that there is evidence for pragmatism among Free Democrats and Social Democrats in the 2002-2003 decision making opportunity, it relates to a seemingly primary set of principles. This contrasts with previous findings where only “secondary” problem representations changed and
primary problem representations were more permanent.

Thus at this point a number of questions persist: What does it mean that the seeming manipulation of message occurs in this instance to primary ontologies, in particular institutionalism? What does it mean that these changes are not matched by any counter movement in the other ontologies? In other words, why is it that we only see the abandonment or adoption of perceptions, and not the concomitant adoption or abandonment of a “replacement” perceptions? The logic of the pragmatism proposition expects both behaviors, that is to say the regular rejection and assumption of ontologies according to the political winds.

Based on purely quantitative grounds, the generally weak findings in support of the pragmatism proposition (i.e., significant message inconsistency in about 5% of the cases \((3/20 \times 4/12 = .05)\)) would seem to lend initial support to the idea that decisionmakers are in fact acting in a principled way.

### 6.4 Preliminary Conclusions

The fourth decision making opportunity, Gulf War 2, provided a situation in which a number of approaches might have worked well for explaining the ontologies of German leaders. In the end, all but historicism seemed to carry portions of the explanatory weight with primarily institutionalism, universalism and realism playing parts.

Institutionalism became more important to the Social Democrats and Greens than before. In fact, institutionalism became the dominant ontological representation of
Greens for the first time and maintained that position for Social Democrats and Free
Democrats. Christian Democrats also reverted to a condition whereby institutionalism
scored highest.

Historicism was once again the missing ontology among decision makers in the
overall scheme of things. This is especially the case considering the culturalists’
emphasis on history as driving German decision making throughout the post-Cold War
era.

Realist scores remained generally stable, with slight decreases in scores for
parties of the right and slight increases for parties of the left. The complexity
characteristics of universalist thinkers – which relates to both realism and
institutionalism – reverted to 1998 descriptions. Low overall levels for realist
ontologies, though, tend to discount realist expectations that realist thought dominates
German foreign military intervention decision making, just as historicism’s low levels
discount the culturalists’ arguments.

The pragmatism proposition garnered limited evidence of political “shiftiness”
among Social Democrat and Free Democrat decision makers in about 5% of the
party/ontology relationships.

Finally, the monolithic cultural approach is able to explain the reasoning behind
German leaders’ decisions, if only at the loss of detail and precision in terms of what
culture components are influencing the thoughts of which members (i.e., right versus
left- leaning party members) and how those influences change subltely.

These various conclusions become slightly less conditional with each addition
decision making occasion. Nonetheless, I save full consideration of the overall conclusions of the study for the next chapter. Regarding the penultimate conclusions then, Table 6.3 below summarizes the findings thus far.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Expectation</th>
<th>Support?</th>
<th>Pattern over Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>Cost Benefit Calcs,</td>
<td>Conditional:</td>
<td>Remains ontology of the Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Right parties: Weak</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Left: Even weaker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historicism</td>
<td>WW2, Nazi Era as guide</td>
<td>Weak for all parties</td>
<td>Low overall, slight increase since Afghan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalism</td>
<td>Laws, Orgs, Procedures</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Consistently strong scores for the CDU, FDP and SPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Increasing importance Greens since Afghan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>Morality, absolutes, global harmony</td>
<td>Conditional:</td>
<td>Moderate for Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Right: Weak</td>
<td>More complex (mixed with other ontologies) for Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Left: Strong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pragmatism</td>
<td>Ontologies change with political winds/over time</td>
<td>Conditional:</td>
<td>Possible pragmatic behavior by two largest parties,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social Dems &amp; Free Dems show</td>
<td>Social Dems and Christian Dems as well as Free Dems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>some inconsistency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monolithic Culture</td>
<td>All parties affected by German cultural mores</td>
<td>Crudely accurate</td>
<td>Misses changes and subtilies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.4 Summary of Preliminary Findings
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

This research project began with the statement of several important questions in IR scholarship – from the general problem of war through the more specific issues of its manifestation in the post-Cold War era in major power foreign military interventions to the still more niche puzzle of German post-Cold War foreign military intervention decision making. Wars are problems worthy of study for obvious reasons. Major power foreign military interventions demand investigation for the reason that they are one of the few remaining issues of war in the post-Cold War era. I demonstrated how Germany’s decision making vis-à-vis foreign military intervention over the past 15 years has been an especially puzzling issue for IR scholars. Finally, I described the most prominent approaches proffered to explain this puzzle and suggested my own improvements and additions to them so that our analysis of the puzzle might be improved.

In each decision making occasion chapter, I provided a running commentary on how well each of the approaches is able to account for German leaders’ thoughts on whether or not to intervene militarily. I also evaluated the ability of the two counter claims to account for German decision making in each of these instances. Now, in this
concluding chapter, I return to the initial questions and those initial conclusions to make some summary judgments about each of the approaches and counter approaches, or propositions. In so doing, I divide this chapter by addressing three concerns. First, I summarize the abilities of the four main approaches – realism, historicism, institutionalism and universalism – to account for leaders’ thinking regarding war. Second, I also summarize the findings regarding combinations of ontologies, or how the approaches work in synthesis in order to account for decision making in this domain. Finally, I explain how these two sets of findings illuminate some avenues for future research as well as some theoretical and methodological vehicles that might be useful in pursuing them.

Figure 7.1 Decision Maker Ontologies: Realism
7.1 Realist Approach

Returning then to the four main approaches outlined in the literature the detailed evidence laid out in the preceding chapters can finally be summarized. First, in terms of realism, there was much more evidence for its influence than anticipated by the culturalist literature. Recall what culturalists to say about realism in the this decision making context:

“The Germans have eliminated the concept of “power” from their political vocabulary. They speak the language of “political responsibility” instead. Hans-Peter Schwartz has referred to a new forgetfulness of power, which has replaced Germany’s old obsession with power. Some observers view this rhetorical turn as little more than a cynical ploy in which the old wolf has put on new sheepskin. This book contends instead that it indicates a deeper transformation in both style and substance of German and European politics. The culture of restraint that characterizes Germany’s foreign policy an the conscious avoidance of assuming a high profile […]” (Katzenstein 1997: 1-3).

“If Germany is becoming more normal, then surely German leaders should behave in a manner more consistent with Realist assumptions. But we suggest that is not the case. The definition of security is, for Germans, inconsistent with even the weakest form of the Realist argument” (Markovitz and Reich 1997: 11).

“[T]here are virtually no traces of Germany’s return to realist “normalcy,” to balance of power politics in an anarchical international system. Germans shun the concepts and practice of power politics (Machtapolitik) and balancing (Schaukelpolitik). Only in a few restricted intellectual quarters has German unification led to a renewed interest in the theory and practice of political realism. To date, this intellectual interest has remained without any apparent wider political resonance in Germany… In addition to historical, psychological and political reasons for their current lack of appeal, we need to consider also the intellectual shortcomings of realist analyses” (Katzenstein 1997: 9).
The evidence could not have been in clearer contradiction of such claims; realism was alive and well amidst the speeches of German leaders. It was consistently strongest amongst Christian Democrats, hovering around a score of 1.5 (in terms of the 3 point measure) over the four decision making occasions. Free Democrats had the second highest realist scores, averaging 1.0 across the four occasions, which – although qualified as “weak” according to the measure – is still more than the “less than weak” evidence expected by some writers.

An even more compelling picture of realist ontology’s influence is seen when one tracks the two most important ontologies for each party over time. Realism was only once a primary ontology for any of the political parties, namely for the or the Christian Dems in the Afghanistan occasion. Where it was most strongly in evidence, on the right of the political spectrum, it was more often (2 out of 3 occasions) second to institutionalism. On the left of the political spectrum, it was typically a third-ranked ontology, behind both institutionalism and universalism. These party differences were also statistically significant in every ANOVA. Again, this finding is in an of itself compelling but even more so given the results on the next ontology, historicism.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Demo Soc</th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th>Soc Dems</th>
<th>Free Dems</th>
<th>Christ Dems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gulf One</strong></td>
<td>Uni – Inst</td>
<td>Uni - Inst</td>
<td>Uni - Inst</td>
<td>Inst – Uni</td>
<td>Inst - Uni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gulf Two</strong></td>
<td>Uni – Inst</td>
<td>Inst – Uni</td>
<td>Inst – Uni</td>
<td>Inst – Real</td>
<td>Inst - Real</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1 Top Two Ontologies By Party and Occasion

As the patterns in the above table indicate, the ontologies of German decision makers vis-à-vis intervention policy have exhibited both consistency and change. It might be said that the pattern has in fact been one of consistent change. A subplot to this change has been the transition in the Afghanistan and Gulf War 2 occasions to realist ontologies as the first or second most important for Christian Democrats and Free Democrats. From this evidence, one can conclude that realism is not only alive and well but indeed – by virtue of its increasing relative importance – truly “comes to life” in the decision making occasions of the 21st Century.

There is one caveat to this portrayal, however: it understates the importance of large parties while overstating that of the smaller ones. Thus, in the following table, party ontologies are roughly weighted according to proportion of seats held in the Bundestag during each decision making occasion. The effect is to simply underscore the importance of realist ontologies in the latter instances of German foreign military intervention decision making.
Table 7.2 Top Two Ontologies By Number of Seats and Occasion

While the same general trends are exhibited in this table as in the previous one, they are amplified by the seats-weighting to show the importance of realism to the Afghanistan and Gulf War 2 occasions. (It also shows the overwhelming dominance that institutionalist ontologies came to possess over the period, at least in terms of the numbers of parliamentarians who espoused those ontologies – more about that later.) Numerically the Christian Dems have been the strongest party in Germany since 1945, and even when out of power still held 40% of Bundestag seats.⁹¹ Therefore to write that just one party had realism as its first or second most important ontology acquires more meaning if that party is the Christian Democratic Party.

To realist theorists like Layne, Mearsheimer and Waltz these findings are unsurprising; they expected as much. Again, the results are most stunning to those who
predicted something very different. As Markovits & Reich wrote: “[t]he historical orientation of Germany’s ideology and foreign policy is consistent with realism, yet its modern ideology and foreign policy contradict it.” Once again, to the extent that “ideology” inheres in leaders and “foreign policy” reflects their worldviews, though, such arguments are not supported by data for an important portion of German leaders.

Finally, it must be noted that the trends show that realism – while important – is not the overall dominant ontology for all decision makers at all times. Institutionalist and universalist ontologies are more important than realist ones in terms of their prevalence over time. I will return to each of these ontologies in turn. First, however, I will address another question raised by tables 7.1.1 and 7.1.2: what’s missing? Obviously it’s historicist ontologies that are absent. This is not a surprise considering my evidence, but is given the prominence of historicist expectations in the literature on the subject. Again, this is a problem for the culturalist literature above all else.

91 Moreover, adding the Social Dems allows one to account for 80 to 85% of parliamentary seats throughout the entire period with just two parties.
Evidence for historicism shows it to be relatively weak in all occasions, even for the most frequent “users” of the ontology, Democratic Socialists and Greens. Successive ANOVA analyses of the relationship between party and historicist ontologies likewise rejected any correlation that would have suggested that any such relatively stronger usage by different parties was in fact statistically significant. In other words: according to the ANOVAs, historicist ontologies were weak for one, weak for all. Again, in and of itself this finding is important, because of historicist thinking's
purported importance according to the culturalists’ literature. Consider what one wrote on the subject:

“One of the main reasons why analyses and commentaries on German foreign policy, both academic and non-academic, frequently have been off the mark is that the major theoretical models used in the study of international relations by and large fail to deal systematically with the political culture and historical memory. Researchers studying German foreign policy encounter a superabundance of references to historical issues in the German public discourse on defence and national security” (Berger 2002: 78-79).

Or, as another two culturalists stated even more succinctly:

“That history and collective memory matter in the exercise of contemporary power is the core of our understanding of Germany” (Markovits & Reich 1997: 206).

Contrary to these expectations, the evidence from the four decision making occasions indicates that historicist rationales were not critical to German thinking on defense and national security issues. Taken together with the findings vis-à-vis realist ontologies, these two facts indicate that Germany is indeed not so much the historically burdened entity (at least with respect to foreign military intervention decision making) that others have made it out to be. It’s not quite the power-, security- and material interests-abjuring “civilian power” many scholars have portrayed it to be. Moreover, these findings relate to the specific, avowedly most-constrained aspect of German decision making – military intervention policy. Rather than shying away from thinking that represents the problem of military intervention decision making in realist terms, many German politicians seem perfectly capable of espousing views that make such terms the secondary or even primary lens by which to view the matter. Conversely,
even more leaders are unfettered by ontologies that make World War Two, the Nazi
time or the Holocaust important reference points for adjudicating post-Cold War
decisions of whether or not to intervene militarily abroad.

These conclusions should not imply German decision makers are reckless or
otherwise somehow at fault for their views, but it does move us one step closer to
removing from plausible consideration the notion that Germany is fundamentally
different from other major powers in the international system. In other words, it’s
neither neurotic nor sociopathic, but instead, decision makers in the Bundestag appear
“normal” and concerned with current, real-world circumstances when debating possible
responses foreign military intervention situations, much as studies have shown leaders
to be in other states.

Why then is historicist thinking so weak in light of the expectations? Two
reasons seem most plausible and suggest future directions for research in order to
evaluate them. To wit, it may first of all be the case the historical influences simply
defy measurement because it has a quality of “silence” that makes it most impactful, or
second, it may be the case that history influences decision making indirectly through
alternative ontologies such as universalism or institutionalism.

In terms of the first possibility, it has been noted elsewhere that historicist
ontologies as analytic entity suffer from a conceptual and operational “mushiness”.
(Markovits & Reich 1997: 18). As such, attempting to study them is fraught with
difficulty. Advocates of the historicist approach persist, nonetheless, in positing an
important role for history in German decision making and for it to be directly voiced as
in a “view of the past articulated by national leaders and the political class” (Markovits & Reich 1997: 18). What if, however, leaders make “statements” about the past by remaining largely silent with respect to obvious historical references to current decision making occasions? This may be the case if decision makers are using implicit arguments. Perhaps references to history are so oblique as to be subliminal in their impact. In fact, research has shown that sometimes implicit arguments can actually be stronger than explicit ones. For example, Mendelberg’s investigation of US campaign rhetoric found that explicit mention of racial issues weakened candidate appeal among voters. Conversely, symbolic or implicit mention of racial issues often drew voters closer to a candidate and made their overall appeal stronger. Perhaps it’s the case in Germany that historical references are so symbolic that they impact deliberations without many of the discussants consciously aware of it.

Of course, my research design already acknowledged symbolic references to history by regarding such “coded” components of speech such as mention of Israel, Jews, “our responsibility”, “our historical legacy”, and various other terms as constituting parts of historicist ontology. It is therefore unlikely that the importance of silent, symbolic or implicit messages was missed.

Maybe symbolic historicism is already present in the data, but it’s hiding in the form of one of the other ontologies, specifically universalism or institutionalism. Although the literature clearly stakes out a role for history that is conceptually and operationally distinct from the other ontologies, it is still possible that these others are
themselves imbued with doses of historical importance. Writing on the subject of
universalism and history, for example, one author notes:

“For the historian, it is noteworthy that abstract, universal imperatives of
international human rights doctrine have been formulated with specific
violations in mind. For example, the drafters of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights were largely driven – though not only – by their recent memory
of a World War II and fascism. […] Yet, once human rights doctrines are
formulated, the tracks of the historically specific and the particular are often
erased with universalist rhetoric intended to be binding for human rights for
everyone everywhere. Indeed, the very attractiveness of human rights as
universal ethic is its resistance to historical, social or economic
contextualization. The power of human rights discourse rests, to some extent,
on its ahistorical, even anti-historical formulation. For the historian, however,
the formulation and invocation of human rights doctrine is ineluctably
intertwined with the larger political, social and cultural history, and with the
very realms it is intended to supercede, the nation and the sovereign state”
(Wildenthal 2000: 1052).

With this in mind, perhaps universalism and also institutionalism (i.e., since
organs like the UN can embody universalistic values) are actually indicators of the
importance of historicist thinking. Maybe it is in these “cognate” ontologies that we
find its impact. Why should these relationships be privileged, though? Clearly all
ontologies have historical antecedents. Even realism is founded on lessons learned at
various points in history. With this as the case, then history has no special role to play
for universalism or institutionalism – it effects everything and is therefore a constant,
not a distinguishing variable.

In light of these illuminating thoughts on the matter, I re-submit my argument
made in the beginning of this undertaking: universalism, institutionalism and
historicism are each distinct ontologies, whereby each entails its own theoretical and
methodological implications. In other words, each one is a presents its own self-contained logic of the situation and does not by itself require others in order to function as a framework for leaders’ thinking towards war. Granted, they can be seen frequently in combination with one another (e.g., as universalism and institutionalism do) but that is not a requisite for their appearance in discussions. If historicist thinking makes itself felt through either not being felt (i.e., subliminalism, symbolism or silence) or through one of the other ontologies (i.e., hidden in universalism or institutionalism) then axiomatically it no longer exists as an historicist ontology. It either isn’t present or is something else.

Figure 7.3 Decision Maker Ontologies: Institutionalism
7.3 Institutionalist approach

The preceding conclusions regarding historicist ontologies notwithstanding, culturalist scholars can nonetheless take heart that at least some parts of their approach, once disaggregated, can meaningfully account for decision maker thinking. Namely, these are the institutionalist and universalist ontologies.

Where the ability of an approach to explain intervention occasions hinges on its quantitative evidence, institutionalism is far and away the most successful of the four approaches tested. It is always in evidence among the top two ontologies for all parties in every single intervention debate. Moreover, it is at some point the primary ontology for all parties except the former communist Democratic Socialists. While during some occasions the difference between left-right adherence to institutionalist ontology was statistically significant, these differences became statistically indistinguishable (i.e., except when including the Democratic Socialists) by the time of the Gulf War 2 debates. Put differently, by the latter decision making occasions all parties were characterizing the situation in institutionalist terms to such a similar degree that no differences could be discerned between the parties in terms of their adherence to an institutionalist view of the occasion.

These findings are exactly what institutionalists (and culturalists writing about the institutionalist aspects of their theories) would expect. They correctly anticipate that “the institutional presence of Europe as a set of norms” will in turn engender “explicit political considerations” (Katzenstein 1997: 20). Others write of Germans as instilled with “a reflexive support for exaggerated multilateralism” and “satisfying partners’
expectations about appropriate German conduct” (Anderson 1997: 85). According to the institutionalist approach, we should see “[p]ower in exercised – at least to some extent – through agreed-upon institutional rules and practices, thereby limiting the capacities of states to exercise arbitrary power in arbitrary and indiscriminate ways or use their power advantages to gain a permanent advantage over weaker states” (Ikenberry 2001: 19).

Indeed, all of these predicted qualities are present in the data on German foreign military intervention decision making. Not only that, but there is also a clear trend toward a more institutionalist emphasis so that by the end of the timeframe four out of five parties exhibit it as their dominant ontology as opposed to the two out of five who did at the beginning of the timeframe. Part of this increase was connected with the increasing complexity seen among holders of universalist ontologies as they became less likely to evidence purist universalist ontologies, and instead more complex ones that included other elements like institutionalism and realism. In sum, the institutionalist approach does a tremendous job accounting for decision making in the occasions considered in chapters three through six.
Universalist ontologies were – like institutionalist ones – dominant modes of representing foreign military interventions situations among the decision makers examined. It remained at high levels relative to realism and historicism, but dropped over time for all parties except the Democratic Socialists by the last decision making occasion, Gulf War 2. As noted before, universalism was associated with the left, but this is also where the decreases in its usage were greatest (again excepting the Democratic Socialists.) As stated in each of the relevant chapters these party differences were found to be statistically significant in ANOVAs for each occasion.
These findings confirm the expectations of the universalist approach. It accurately predicts an impact on decision making of moral principles, concern for world harmony and concepts of pacifism among German leaders. Universalism is more important for leaders on the left of the political spectrum. This can be claimed due to the ontology’s higher scores for parliamentarians from those parties as well as the relative ranking of universalist ontologies for among them. Universalism was the highest scoring ontology for the Democratic Socialists in all the decision making occasions, for the Greens in three out of four and the Social Democrats in 1 out of four. Thus, the farther to the left the member’s political party membership, the more likely he or she was to maintain the universalist ontology as number one in each successive decision making occasion. Of course, in those cases where universalist ontologies were not number one for left-leaning parties, it did not signify the elimination of the ontology altogether, only that it was now second most important.

Universalism was also an important ontology for Bundestag members on the right, although not to the same extent it was for their leftist colleagues. In fact, the further the to the right of the political spectrum one moved, the less likely the member would espouse universalist ontologies. That said, Free Democrats voiced universalist ontologies as their number two ontology in three of four occasions while Christian Democrats did so in one two of the four occasions.

Another interesting feature of universalist thinkers examined in chapters four, five and six was their progressive “complexification” over time. In essence, universalist thinkers became less “purist” and more likely to combine universalism with other
ontologies, notably realism and institutionalism. Scholars write of this situation as one in which:

“Individuals progress and may become generally fixated at various levels along the dimension of simplicity-complexity of information processing. Individuals at the simple end are characterized by rigid evaluations of stimuli, the rejection of dissonant information, submissiveness to authority and prestige suggestion, etc. At the complex end of the dimension, individuals are shown to exhibit flexible and open cognitive systems; the use of many dimensions in an integrated combinatorial fashion; a search for novelty and further information; and the ability to consider multiple points of view simultaneously” (Suedfeld and Rank, quoted in Young and Schafer 1998: 84).

The changes in complexity generally mirrored changes toward greater institutionalist and realist thinking among the whole memberships of all parties but the Democratic Socialists. However, the complexity changes that involved just universalist-ontology using decision makers were stronger than the changes occurring for other, non-universalist thinkers of the same parties. In other words, the largest shifts toward greater complexity were noticed when comparing universalist thinkers from one occasion to universalist thinkers from a subsequent occasion, and these shifts were larger than those observed between the whole membership of the parties from one period compared to the next.

Progression in complexity was neither perfectly uniform nor perfectly consistent for all parties and all occasions. In some instances, universalist thinkers actually decreased in complexity. This was true for all parties with respect to institutionalism in the Gulf War 2 case, for example. On average, however, complexity scores netted increases for both realist and institutionalist ontologies among those who held universalist values for Free Democrats, Social Democrats and Greens. The parties at
the extreme right and left ends of the political spectrum only evidenced increased net institutionalist ontology scores. The largest net changes were connected to parties from the left.

What is most significant in these findings is that these changes correlated with increased support for military intervention among Greens, Social Democrats and Free Democrats in the Kosovo and Afghanistan occasions. Conversely, decreased complexity correlated with decreased support for intervention in the Gulf War 2 decision making occasion. These findings turn existing theory regarding decision maker complexity, which has hitherto found that:

“that drops in integrative complexity might signal subsequent surprise attacks or other ‘hawkish’ behaviors in military leaders. [Some scholars’] analysis of Russian and American rhetorics lead them to conclude that high integrative complexity might be related to cooperation and compromise rather than aggression” (Satterfield 1998: 669).

Again, what the data in this study suggests is that these trends may be reversed in these examined German decision making contexts. There is no argument to be made, however, that institutionalist, realist or universalist ontologies are unique to Germany (only historicist ontology could have been so.) Therefore the finding regarding the relationship between increased complexity on willingness to support war is possibly generalizable to other contexts. At this point I can only hypothesize about the conditions under which the same relationship would hold, but the evidence from this study point in a few seemingly clear directions. First, I would expect increased complexity would relate to increased aggressiveness or support for aggression whenever universalist ontologies – which heavily reject violence – are the baseline relative to
which leaders become more complex. Surprisingly, despite the strong face-validity of such a contention, the literature has ignored it as a possibility and has instead argued from an exclusively “more complexity – more peace” point of view, in every case “not concerned with the substance of cognition, but how information is processed” (Young and Schafer 1998: 84).

Second, I would further hypothesize that whenever realist ontologies are part of the complexification mix support for war is likely to increase. This hypothesis is ventured without qualifications regarding whether or not decision makers are universalist thinkers. Again, despite the face validity of such a contention, the literature has not to my knowledge investigated such a content specific possibility. Were it found that increases in complexity related to increases in realist ontology are in turn related to increased support for war, then scholars would finally have some sense of direction regarding the influences of realist perceptions – as compared to the present-day indeterminacy regarding when realists will think war versus peace. In other words, while it is clear that realist thinking will always involve force-, power- and material calculations, it is unclear what those considerations will mean in terms of preferences for intervention, among other things.

One could also hypothesize a similar complexity-to-conflict relationship between rising complexity with institutionalist ontologies, however, the spotty evidence in the German decision making context doesn’t lend much credence to this notion. Complexity for universalist thinkers increased in the area of institutionalist ontology for both Christian Democrats and Democratic Socialists (and quite dramatically among the
latter) despite the fact that members of these two parties had completely opposite intervention preferences. I would therefore not pursue this hypothesis with much anticipation of its confirmation.

Each of these ontologies is likely to be found among decision makers elsewhere in the world. Universalism is likely to be as pervasive in its presence among decision makers worldwide as it is all-encompassing in its concern for humankind. Institutionalism and realism, likewise, are purported by theorists to apply across various countries and timeframes. In the context of this study, universalism and its presence in combination with increasing or decreasing alternate decision making ontologies allows one to suggest these generalizable patterns, but only new tests using different data can fully demonstrate their theoretical validity.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ontology Score Change</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Realist Net Change</th>
<th>Institutionalist Net Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Realist Ontology</td>
<td>Institutionalist Ontology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democrats</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Democrats</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>(0.75)</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrats</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Socialists</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 7.5 Progression of Complexity By Party and Decision Making Occasion*
7.5 Monolithic cultural approach

The summarized evidence does not indicate any advantages to a Monolithic Culture approach. This approach, which argues that institutionalism, universalism and history blend together to form a cohesive “whole” that is German culture and which in turn affects all decision makers, is improved upon by disaggregating the three components for individual examination. Thus, the first table, which illustrates trends among parties in their primary and secondary ontologies is an advancement over the Monolithic Culture approach because it yields insights into the specifics of each party’s “cultural” lens, with either institutionalism or universalism – two conceptually and observationally distinct characteristics – as each party’s most important ontology, rather than passing off all combinations of institutionalism, universalism and history, regardless of their weights, as proof of German culture’s impact. Were one to employ the latter strategy, then all the decision makers under study would appear to have the same representations of the military intervention occasions. Of course, this strategy is one which has been promoted by those culturalist scholars who have not taken the extra step of empirically examining a disaggregated German culture.

Naturally, these conclusions should not imply German decision makers are reckless or otherwise somehow at fault for their views, but it does move us one step closer to removing from plausible consideration the notion that Germany is fundamentally different from other major powers in the international system. In other words, it’s neither neurotic nor sociopathic, but instead, decision makers in the Bundestag appear “normal” and concerned with current, real-world circumstances when
debating possible responses foreign military intervention situations, much as studies have shown leaders to be in other states.

The preceding conclusions notwithstanding, culturalist scholars can nonetheless take heart that at least part of their approach, once disaggregated, does provide some meaningful explanation of decision maker ontologies when it comes to the components of universalism and institutionalism. Universalist ontologies remained at high levels relative to realism and historicism, but dropped over time for all parties except the Democratic Socialists by the last decision making occasion, Gulf War Two. As noted before, universalism was associated with the left, but this is also where the decreases in its usage were greatest (again excepting the Democratic Socialists.) Once again, these party differences were found to be statistically significant in ANOVAs for each occasion. Again, this finding partially confirms an expectation of the culturalist literature with respect to the impact of moral principles, universalist concepts and pacifism on German decision making. There is no reason to expect, however, that these qualities are unique to German leaders’ thinking on military intervention matters, as the same qualities could comprise the ontology of leaders from many other states of the world. Briefly put, universalism is likely to be as pervasive in its evidence among decision makers worldwide as it is all-encompassing in its concern for humankind.

7.6 Pragmatism proposition

The intra-occasion ontologies scores of the political parties demonstrated a large degree of stability, overall, with a couple of noteworthy exceptions, especially in the
Kosovo decision making. Significance tests which measured whether leaders systematically varied their ontological representations of the situation, for each occasion, scored 29 “hits”, or instances with systematic change in ontologies. They were evident in all but the Afghanistan case, and from speakers of all parties but the Democratic Socialists. Over half the instances occurred during the Kosovo occasion (19) and over half were also attributable to the two major parties, the Christian Dems and Social Dems (13 and 9, respectively.) Thus, one can conclude that some degree of ontological change, or perhaps more to the point, “message change”, occurred at several points in the midst of the four decision making occasions.

As stated before, these statistics however are noteworthy exceptions and not the rule in the decision making occasions under study. First, it is important to remember that these 29 results are drawn from a field of 300 possible significant relationships. In other words, given the nature of the tests, which analyzed every party/ontology relationship across 15 critical time periods (5x4x15=300), the resulting number of 29 significant relationships is relatively small at less than 1/10 of all relationships. In addition, the bulk of these significant relationships arise out of the second occasion, the Kosovo War, also by far the longest of any of the decision making occasions at 51 months (compared to the first, third and fourth occasions at 7, 2 and 15 months, respectively.) In fact, it might be as compelling to note which parties did not deviate during that period in their ontological representations (the Dem Socialists, Greens and Free Dems) as those that did (the Social Dems and Christian Dems). In sum, while these examples do illustrate a particularized pattern (examined in the relevant chapter)
of inconsistency in ontology, they could not be said to portend pervasive pragmatism on
the part of parliamentarians. The reasons for these shifts, which moved both the Social
Dems and the Christian Dems more rightward in their ontologies (i.e., away from
moral-pacifist representations to legalistic-materialistic representations) are difficult to
know completely, but the nature of the shifts (e.g., gradual) are perhaps even more
indicative of change in deeply-held principles than change in superficial postures. Had
the changes been of the latter sort, one would have expected them to have occurred
more rapidly, as is the expectation of the pragmatism proposition test.

7.7 Summary of Findings and Suggestions for Future Research

In conclusion, one can see that German post-Cold War foreign military
intervention decision making is best explained via a variety of approaches. The two
most relevant approaches among Bundestag leaders are institutionalism and
universalism. Institutionalist thinking explains all parties to some degree, while
universalist thinking mainly explains leaders on the left. Conversely, realist thinking
mostly explains the perceptions of members from the two right parties, especially the
Christian Democrats. Historicist ontologies are minor portions of the decision making
equation. Disaggregating “culture” into the conceptually distinct components of
institutionalism, universalism and historicism moreover provides better insight into
decision making and clarifies distinctions about “which culture” different members
espouse. Finally, leaders change in their ontologies over long periods of time, but tend
to be consistent in their ontology scores within individual decision making occasions.
In terms of the latter (changes over long periods) one can see an interesting pattern of increased support for war as complexity increases among universalists – contrary to the decision making literature’s established wisdom. In terms of the former (stability intra-decision occasion) one can see that decision makers are not cynical or pragmatic, but seem to adhere to principles in their rhetoric.

The findings have implications for each of the literatures. Those who give pride of place to history or an inseparable German culture are not supported by the evidence. History may have played a founding role for components of some of the other explanatory approaches (e.g., universalism) but it does not play a role by itself. In addition, monolithic culture misses many details observable if one disaggregates culture. The culturalists cited throughout this test, and including Berger, Katzenstein, Markovits & Reich and others are not supported by the evidence in these respects.

Realist theorists have conditional support for their arguments in the form of right-of-center parties’ ontology scores. Realist predictions of nuclearized Germany have not manifested themselves (yet) nor does realism dominate the thinking of all decision makers all the time. However, it does dominate some members sometimes, therefore it would seem to draw some support from the evidence. The authors mentioned in the preceding chapters and including Mearsheimer, Layne, Waltz and Mastanduno are strengthened by this data.

Culturalists such as Berger, Katzenstein, Markovits & Reich and others are redeemed in the support they get on the institutionalist and universalist approaches. These approaches are part of what they discuss as a larger monolithic culture. While
their third component – history – is shown to be unimportant, these other two actually amount to the most important. Institutionalist and universalist theorists however include other writers looking at matters other than German behavior. Therefore, the findings also support more abstract theorists such as Keohane, Martin and Hoffmann on the institutionalist side, and others like Habermas, Tönnies and Schwartz on the universalist side.

Returning to the “two perspectives on the question” table from chapter one, I believe the potential offered by integrating both the German Studies and International Relations has been realized. In particular, the use of “culture” – albeit in a modified form from what cultural studies scholars write about – informs IR analysis by pointing it in a direction that accepts conclusions incorporating a variety of otherwise seemingly exclusive approaches to explain decision making. Thus, whereas previous IR studies would tend to declare one or the other approach “the” explanation for German decision making, I use conditional statements to declare where and when an approach applies as opposed to another within the same decision making occasion. The evidence supports this given the variety of approaches gleaning strong support from different corners of the Bundestag at different times. Exclusivist conclusions that support one approach at the expense of all others can at best only be partially correct in this context and always partially wrong. In the following table I outline these conditional confirmations and disconfirmations of the various approaches and counterclaims.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach &amp; Authors</th>
<th>Expectation</th>
<th>Support?</th>
<th>Pattern over Time</th>
<th>Implications for Authors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>Cost Benefit Calcs, Security</td>
<td>Conditional:</td>
<td>Ontology of the Right</td>
<td>Moderately Relevant to German Case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mearsheimer 1990;</td>
<td></td>
<td>Right parties: Weak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Layne 1993;</td>
<td></td>
<td>Left: Even weaker</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedersen 1998;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grieco 1999;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loriaux 1999;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waltz 2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historicism</td>
<td>WW2, Nazi Era as guide</td>
<td>Weak for all parties</td>
<td>Low overall, slight increase since Afghan</td>
<td>Irrelevant to German Case (Probably Just in Domain of Foreign Military Intervention Decision Making)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanrieder 1982;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maull 1990,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katzenstein 1997;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desch 1998,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berger 1998,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999, 2002;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duffield 1999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalism</td>
<td>Laws, Orgs, Procedures</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Consistently strong scores for the CDU, FDP and SPD Increasing importance Greens since Afghan</td>
<td>Strongly Relevant to German Case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin 1992;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janning 1996;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hellmann 1996;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bennett et al. 1993;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kupchan &amp; Kupchan 1991</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>Morality, absolutes, global harmony</td>
<td>Conditional:</td>
<td>Moderate for Left More complex (mixed with other ontologies) for Left</td>
<td>Strongly Relevant to German Case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohrs 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Right: Weak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Left: Strong</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 7.3 Summary of Findings**
Table 7.3 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pragmatism</th>
<th>Ontologies change with political winds/over time</th>
<th>Conditional: Social Dems &amp; Free Dems show some inconsistency</th>
<th>Possible pragmatic behavior by two largest parties, Social Dems and Christian Dems as well as Free Dems</th>
<th>Weakly Relevant to German Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mueller 1973, 1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monolithic Culture</th>
<th>All parties affected by German cultural mores</th>
<th>Crudely accurate – overstates historicism, doesn’t differentiate between left and right “cultures”</th>
<th>Misses changes and subtleses</th>
<th>Relevant But Uninsightful to German Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insitutionalist Realism</td>
<td>Insitution-Based (Not State-Based) Cost Benefit Calcs, Security</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Increases for all parties</td>
<td>Moderately Relevant to German Case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, I contend that other data, found in other decision making contexts, is amenable to this research design, and would allow the extension of it. Of course, the first such extension could be to examine German foreign military intervention decision making in more decision making occasions. There are many left in the universe of cases I specified in chapter two and doubtlessly will be future such occasions. Another extension could involve examination of foreign policy decision making in areas other than interventions, such as alliance formation and expansion, defense spending, foreign trade and environmental accords. Finally, German decision making could be examined with respect to debates in non-foreign policy domains or at other times like during the Cold War.
Moving beyond Germany, the research design has potential in other national contexts was well. An obvious choice might be Japan, which has similarly been purported to bear a heavy burden of World War 2 history. What of the impacts of realist, institutionalist and universalist thinking? These questions would be well-served with the research design developed in this study. Other national examples might include the US, Russia, France or the UK – all of which have participated intermittently in foreign military interventions during the post-Cold War era. Regardless the context, I contend that the main approaches examined in this research are portable given certain content modifications in order to make them case-appropriate (e.g., anticipating historical references.) While these different contexts may not represent the same interminable puzzle that German foreign military intervention decision making had been, perhaps the extend to which this study successfully unravel that particular puzzle bodes well for its abilities elsewhere.
APPENDIX
CODING SCHEME

In this section, I elaborate on the coding scheme used to categorize decision maker problem representations and expressed preferences. This task involves several steps. In so doing, I differentiate between the elements of decision maker comments that pertain to their problem representations and those that pertain to their expressed preferences, since they will be gleaned from the same statements. Established content analysis practices indicate that such distinctions can be accomplished with proper coding procedures.

In the case of the problem representations, the overall strategy is to look for similarities between the ideal type indicators of problem representation (see Table 1.2) and the actual statements of decision makers. The indicators are concepts, phrases and terminology that the various approaches would expect decision makers to frequently use, were their thinking guided by that approach. Ultimately decision maker problem representations will be categorized as more or less concordant with the various ideal type problem representations, thus resulting in a description of individuals as “realist thinkers” or “justice centrality thinkers”, for example. A similar method of comparison is used for ideal type expressed preferences (see Table 2.1, which also lists the hypothesized connections between problem representations and policy preferences.)
Problem representations will be distinguished from expressed preferences based on the semantic role of the concept, phrase or terminology. Words whose purpose is to provide “pictures,” “views,” “perspectives,” “senses”, etc., of a situation are categorized as problem representation indicators. While those whose purpose is to perform or propose some action, such as “doing nothing,” “invading,” “negotiating,” “voting,” etc., are categorized as expressed preferences.

Finally, as with the decision making occasions themselves, it is expected that leaders’ problem representations will be “interconnected” and not discrete. Not only will a leader’s problem representation in one occasion be predicated in part by his or her problem representations on prior occasions, but each occasions’ “momentary” problem representation will be a combination of different elements of ideal problem representations. In other words, statements over time as well as any given statement will almost always indicate a mixture of ideal problem representation types.

In order to gauge these mixtures, I employ a four point ordinal scale. This scale qualitatively captures the apparent impact the particular problem representation had on expressed preferences and, among the literatures being addressed, is most closely related to Welch’s seven point scale (1993: 40). My modified four point scale captures the following values: 1 - very strong; 2 - moderate; 3 - weak; and 4 - imperceptible.

In terms of realism, one expects statements that fall under the heading of “Maximizing Relative Gains” - need for survival or need for aggrandizement (Brooks 1997: 457). Decisions would be predicated on a need to “keep up” with the other states of the world, lest they “be conquered or destroyed by their more powerful
counterparts,” or, much more probably, “that a decrease in their power capabilities relative to those of other nation-states will compromise their political autonomy, expose them to the influence attempts of others, or lessen their ability to prevail in political disputes with allies and adversaries (Mastanduno 1991: 76). The notion will be conveyed that states, and their leaders, that do not engage in realist-based decision making do so at their own peril, and hence are fleeting and rare examples to behold among the likes of major powers. Statements regarding the maximization of gains would involve explicit cost-benefit calculations, devoid of sentimental tincture, or at least any such systematic references, because, as Morgenthau argued “[h]istory shows us no exact and necessary correlation between the quality of motives and the quality of foreign policy. This is true in both moral and political terms” (Morgenthau 1978:6). Instead, leader calculations will deal with tangibles such as financial outlays, manpower levels, equipment, distances, opportunity costs, expected casualties, and, when dealing with intangibles, the concept of “power”.

Realist statements will also involve consideration of Germany’s world rank – this indicator is implicitly or explicitly derived from “Germany’s” cost-benefit calculations being compared to net cost-benefits calculations for other states. Will Germany lose/gain more or less than others? Will Germany rise in “rank” as a result of this proposed behavior or fall? Finally, such statements will also place emphasis on the entity of “the German state,” in terms of it’s needs, obligations, actions, because the state is the focus of action in realist thinking. Statements that give Germany a state pride of place vis-à-vis other possible actors in IR (e.g., individuals, NGOs, INGOs,
etc.) in pursuing German interests and maximizing gains indicate realist thinking. It may also be the case that other states are also given pride of place, as would be expected from the above discussion of “relative gains concerns,” however, Krasner and others have demonstrated that state-centered reactions can be precipitated by non-state (i.e., institutional) initiating causes, and such cases are consistent with the expectations of the realist approach.

As mentioned before, the historicist approach is premised on the idea that German decision making on foreign military interventions is heavily influenced by above all else Germans’ unique and all-pervasive memory of World War Two. Thus historicist argue that “[r]ather than a merely tactical calculation aims at maximizing ‘objective’ German national interests, the new multilateralism and the emphasis on non-military instruments of diplomacy are rooted in a distinctive interpretation of the German past and of German national identity that has come to permeate the entire German political system” (berger 2002: 78). By this logic, when it comes to decision making on foreign military intervention, to be German is to be unlike anyone else. In addition, history should impact decision makers across a broad spectrum in a uniform manner. One would therefore expect to see any of a number of specific references to World War Two and the Nazi time: the names of leaders, domestic events (e.g., Die Gleichschaltung – The Synchronization), external events (e.g., invasions, non-aggression pacts), specific engagements, the Holocaust, slave labor, and so forth.

Parliamentarians will also be expected to refer to these elements of history euphemistically or symbolically. In this vein one can expect references to concepts
such as a “special German responsibility”, the “Special Path”, and the “special German historical experience” among others. Two special contemporary situations, both of which are uniquely tied to the German World War Two and Nazi time situation, are also to be counted as indicative of historicist ontology – Jews/Israelis and the Innere Führung Prinzip (Internal Leadership Principle) of the German military. In terms of the former, the connection to history is obvious and continuing references to Jews and Israel today clearly bear this weight regardless of the ostensible context in which those terms are raised. Likewise, in terms of the latter, the “internal guidance principle” instilled in German soldiers since the reconstitution of the military in 1955 is in direct contradiction to the principle of self-dissolution in an “authority state” that reigned in Nazi era Germany. Again, utterances of these kinds are anticipated by the historicist approach because “[h]istorical memories and in particular of the catastrophic human, political and moral consequences of the unconstrained pursuit of power continue to exercise and almost startling hold on the national consciousness of the reunited Germany” (Berger 2002: 99).

Since “[t]he ‘Universalism’ value […] represents a preference for social justice and tolerance” mention of these factors will be an important indicator for it (Dahl 2004: 17). In this sense justice is “defined as the drive to correct a perceived discrepancy between entitlements and benefits” (Welch 1993: 19). The important thing here is that the discrepancy need only be “perceived” not “real.” Content of the justice or injustice is inconsequential. The values importantly apply to others, by being “other-referential” (Welch 1993: 43). In other words, leaders may act based on a perceived (rather than
objective) discrepancy in the entitlements and assets of others. Tolerance will be expected to operate similarly – what is important is that leaders speak of tolerance as important in terms of what they perceive to be tolerant, rather than what an “objective” observer would conclude.

Across the world, these values are commonly derived from religious beliefs. Among German decision makers, one would thus expect these to be Christian beliefs and references to Christianity and its tenets of nonviolence and reconciliation will therefore be coded. References to the avatars of the universalist tradition such as Buddha, Kant, Gandhi, and Martin Luther King, Jr. will be coded as well. In addition to references to religious and classical philosophical origins, though, universalist values can also stem from adherence to modern philosophies. Thus, references to the modern logics of justice based on either individual (Rawls) or the community (e.g., Walzer) rights will be taken to indicate a universalist values ontology. In fact, Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars, actually includes a rigorous set of moral criteria that need to be met before a war can be called just; such stringent “recipes” for action would obviously be at home in the rhetoric of decision makers with universalist ontologies.

Finally, institutionalism expects decision makers to cite international institutions in their speeches on foreign military interventions (UN, NATO, EU, OCSE, etc.) In addition, references to the German Constitution (Basic Law) and constitutions more generally; the (important) role of sovereignty and democracy, and respect for procedures and due process are all anticipated examples of institutionalist ontology. This is because, to institutionalist thinkers, the means are at least as important as the
ends. They perceive the behavior of international actors as a “threat if it displays a willingness to ignore accepted procedure” (Cohen quoted in Welch 1993: 26).

Alliances and alliance commitments will be taken as sacrosanct and the procedures in place in different organizations for making collective decisions should be referred to as inherently legitimate – where those procedures are circumvented or otherwise disregarded, one should expect the institutionalist thinker to protest. Collective action – such as in a collective security endeavor – will generally be favored, whereas its opposite, unilateral action, will be generally frowned upon. Exceptions to this last circumstance would be situations in which a unilateral action were understood to be stipulated by some higher order of law. In any event, institutionalism expects parliamentarians to employ a legalistic rigor in all their statements regarding foreign military intervention decisions.

In this section, I provide some anonymous statements and analysis of how those statements are coded with the four point scale for their indications of the problem representation types.

Example 1:

“I’m sure, as in the past during the whole Kosovo crisis and the Kosovo war at the end, we will have – and I don’t mean not only Germany and the United States, I mean the Europeans and the United States, we will have a common position because we have the same aim.” “We started together to make or to find a way for peace, for peaceful agreements in the Balkans – against war, against hatred, and against the policy of Belgrade which is directed to war. Milosevic has caused four wars and, without resistance of the Western alliance, without the United States and Europe and many others, I’m sure that we would now in the next spring have the next, the fifth war, and therefore, there was no alternative than to stop Milosevic.”
Analysis: Strong, is the adherence to a universalist problem representation, with the repeated reference to “war” and “hatred” as the most objectionable features of the occasion as well as by the reference to “finding a way for peace...agreements.” Institutionalism is moderate, with the emphasis on common positions. Both these scores are not inconsistent with a historicist argument, but the wording does not make adherence to a historicist problem representation explicit, therefore the latter is scored as imperceptable. Realist problem representation shows up as weak, however, with references to resistance and stopping Milosevic.

Example 2:

“[T]here are also strategic consequences from this conflict for German foreign policy. But it is already difficult for me to use the adjective ‘German’ in this connection. It is above all a matter of the European perspective. The roles that result for our country are always European.” In response to questions about whether political weight depends on military strength: “It has been very difficult for all of us – and I do not exclude myself – to realize that the political means and standards of the democratic Europe are not effective in southeast Europe. There the ideas of the 1920’s and 1930’s still prevail.”

Analysis: This statement contains moderate indications of a realist problem representation, with mention of strategic consequences. It also illustrates moderate importance for history, in which “ideas of the 1920’s and 1930’s” are important. Next, there is a moderate score for institutionalism with the emphasis on European goals. There are no distinct (imperceptable) indications of universalism.

Example 3:

“There are serious indications of concentration camps in Kosovo.” “It is a systematic extermination, which reminds in a terrible way of what happened and was carried under Germany’s name...at the start of World War II and during that entire war in place like Poland.” “Milosevic belongs at a war crimes tribunal in The Hague and not at the negotiating table.”

Analysis: Here, one sees strong indication is of a historicist problem representation with the mention of concentration camps, WW2 and “what took place in Poland.” However, an additional weak element indicates a institutionalist problem representation with due process brought up (“belongs at a war crimes tribunal”) The speaker’s disgust with war is consistent with
universalism, however, the framework is clearly historical and contains no separate references that would be uniquely universalist. For this reason universalism is coded as imperceptible. Finally, there is no indication (imperceptable) of realist thinking.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allison, Graham 1971 *Essence of decision; explaining the Cuban missile crisis* (Little, Brown)

Almond, Gabriel 1950 *The American People and Foreign Policy* (Harcourt Brace)


Baldwin, David 1971 “Thinking About Threats” in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.

Barry, James 1998 *The Sword of Justice: Ethics and Coercion in International Politics* (Praeger)

Baumann, Rainer. 2001 “German security policy within NATO,” in *German Foreign Policy Since Unification*. Volker Rittberger (ed) (Manchester: Manchester U Press)


Bennett, Andrew et al. (eds.) 1993 *Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Gulf War* (St. Martin’s)


Brown, David 2002 Palmerston and the Politics of Foreign Policy, 1846-1855 (Manchester U Press)

Browning, Christopher 1992 Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 1010 and the Final Solution in Poland. (HarperCollins)

Busch, Eckart and Frithjof Berger (eds) 1989 Die Parlamentarische Kontrolle : Institutionen und Funktionen des Deutschen Bundestages (Berglen, Wirtemberg Verlag)

Carr, Edward 1946 The Twenty Years’ Crisis. (St. Martin’s)

CIA World Factbook 2002 (Brassey’s)


Cottam, Richard 1977 Foreign Policy Motivation (U Pittsburgh Press)

Coleman, William & William Coleman 1993 A Rhetoric of the People: The German Greens and the New Politics


DIP - Dokumentations- und Informationssystem für Parlamentarische Vorgänge, Deutscher Bundestag retrieved from http://dip.bundestag.de on November 22, 2005

Doyle, Michael 1983 “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs” in Philosophy and Public Affairs


Goldhagen, Daniel 1996 Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (Knopf)

Gow, David 1994 “Row Clouds Bonn’s Court Case for Military Force Abroad,” in The Guardian (London), April 20, FOREIGN PAGE

Grieco, Joe 1988 “Anarchy and Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism” in International Organization.

Grieco, Joe 1999 “Realism and Regionalism: American Power and German and Japanese Institutional Strategies During and After the Cold War” in Unipolar Politics Ethan Kapstein & Michael Mastanduno (eds.) (Columbia U Press)

Haar, Roberta 2001 Nation States as Schizophrenics: Germany and Japan as Post-Cold War Actors. (Praeger).


Habermas, Jürgen. 1994 The Past as Future. interviewed by Michael Haller, forward by Peter Hohendahl, translated by Max Pensky (U of Nebraska Press)

Hanrieder, Wolfram 1982 “Germany as Number Two? The Foreign and Economic Policy of the Federal Republic” in International Studies Quarterly

Harnisch, Sebastian et al. 2004 Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik: Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schröder (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft)

Heinze, Helmut 1979 Gesprochenes und geschriebenes Deutsch : vergleichende Untersuchungen von Bundestagsreden und deren schriftlich aufgezeichneten Version (Düsseldorf : Pädagogischer Verlag Schwann)


Herrmann, Richard and Michael Fischerkeller 1995 “Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model: Cognitive-Strategic Research After the Cold War” in *International Organization* (Summer)


Holsti, Kalevi 1970 “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy” in *International Studies Quarterly*


Hudson, Valerie 2005 “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations” in *Foreign Policy Analysis*


Inglehart, Ronald 1971 “The Silent Revolution in Europe” in *American Political Science Review*

Janning, Josef 1996 A German Europe-A European Germany? On the Debate over Germany's Foreign Policy, in *International Affairs*. Vol. 72, No. 1. (Jan)


Keegan, John 1989 *The Second World War.* (Hutchinson)

Keller, Jonathan 2005 “Leadership Style, Regime Type and Foreign Policy Crisis Behavior: A Contingent Monadic Peace?” in *International Studies Quarterly*


Mathaes, Alexander 2002 “The Presence of the Past” in German Studies Review (Feb)

Mauhl, Hanns 1990 “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers” in Foreign Affairs (Winter)

Mearsheimer, John. 2001 *The Tragedy of International Politics*. (W.W. Norton & Co.)

Miller, Ronnie 1994 *Following the Americans to the Persian Gulf* (Fairleigh Dickinson U Press, 1994)

Morgenthau, Hans. 1948 *Politics Among Nations* (Knopf)

Mueller, John 1989 *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War.* (Basic Books)


NATO 1999 “NATO's role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo” retrieved from http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm on October 25, 2005


Parry, Albert 1966 “Russia’s Other Peace Movement,” in *The Nation.* Vol 203 (August 22)

Patterson, William and David Southern 1990 *Governing Germany.* (Basil Blackwell)

Pedersen, Thomas 1998. *Germany, France and the Integration of Europe. A Realist Interpretation* (London and New York: Pinter)


Pokrant, Marvin 1999 *Desert Storm at Sea* (Greenwood Press)


Reed, William 1997 “Alliance Duration and Democracy” in *American Journal of Political Science*.

Remarque, Erich Maria 1929 *Im Westen Nichts Neues* (Propyläen Verlag)

Rittberger, Volker 1995 “Research on Regimes in Germany” in Regime Theory and International Relations Volker Rittberger (ed.) (Clarendon)


Russett, Bruce and Miroslav Nincic. 1976 “American Opinion on the Use of Military Force Abroad” in *Political Science Quarterly* (Vol. 91, No. 3)

Salmon, Trevor, 1993 “Europeans, the EC and the Gulf,” in *Iraq, the Gulf Conflict and the World Community*. James Gow (ed) (Brassey's)


Schatz, Adam 1997 “Browning’s Version,” in *Lingua Franca* (Feb.)


Schick, Rupert and Wolfgang Zeh 1999 *The German Bundestag: Functions and Procedures* (Neue Darmstädter Verlaganstalt)

Singer, J. David “Interstate War” data set, and for definitions of major powers, see his “Material Capabilities” data set, both available from the Correlates of War Project, http://www.umich.edu/~cowproj/.

Sturm, Roland and Heinrich Pehle 2001 Das neue deutsche Regierungssystem. (Leske und Budrich)

Suedfeld, Peter et al. 1977 “War, Peace, and Integrative Complexity: UN Speeches on the Middle East Problem, 1947-1976” in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 21, No. 3. (Sep)

Sylvan, Donald and James Voss (eds.) 1998 Problem Representations in Foreign Policy Decision Making (Cambridge U Press)

Sylvan, Donald and Stuart Thorson 1992 “Ontologies, Problem Representation and the Cuban Missile Crisis” in Journal of Conflict Resolution

Sylvan, Donald and Jon Pevehouse 2002 “Deciding Whether to Intervene,” in International Intervention: Sovereignty versus Responsibility. Keren, Michael and Donald Sylvan (eds) (Cass)

Thaysen, Uwe et al. (eds) 1990 The U.S. Congress and the German Bundestag : comparisons of democratic processes (Boulder : Westview Press)


Tim Weber 2005 “German unemployment weighs on voters” in BBC News (September 16) retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4248034.stm on October 26, 2005

Tönnies, Sibylle 1995 Der westliche Universalismus : eine Verteidigung klassischer Positionen (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag)


Von Beyme, Klaus 1997 *Der Gesetzgeber: Der Bundestag als Entscheidungszentrum*. (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag)

Von Suttner, Bertha 1889 *Die Waffen Nieder!* (Bibliothek der Provinz)


Walker, Stephen 1977 “The Interface Between Beliefs and Behavior” in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.

Walker, Stephen et al. 1999 “Presidential operational codes and foreign policy conflicts in the post-cold war world,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. (Oct)

Walt, Stephen 1999 “Rigor or Rigor Mortis?” *International Security* (Spring)


Waltz, Kenneth 1979 *Theory of International Politics* (McGraw Hill)

Waltz, Kenneth 1990 “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” in *American Political Science Review* Vol 84, No 3 (Sept.)

Waltz, Kenneth 2000 “Structural Realism After the Cold War” in *International Security*.


Welch, David 1993 *Justice and the Genesis of War* (Cambridge U Press)


Wendt, Alexander 1992 “Anarchy is What States Make of It” in *International Organization*.

Wildavsky, Aaron. 1966 “The Two Presidencies,” in *Trans-Action*. VI (December)

Wildenthal, Lora 2000 “Human Rights Advocacy and National Identity in West Germany” in *Human Rights Quarterly* v. 22
Wolfers, Arnold 1949 “Statesmanship and Moral Choice” in *World Politics*. Vol 1, No 2 (Jan)


Zimmer, Matthias 1997 "Return of the Mittellage? The Discourse of the Center in German Foreign Policy," in *German Politics*. (Spring)