RELIGION, REVOLT, AND THE CREATION OF REGIONAL IDENTITY IN CATALONIA, 1640-1643

DISSERTATION

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By

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ABSTRACT

The decade of the 1640s was a time of social and political upheaval that affected every country in Europe. Specific studies of revolts in England, France, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Sweden have identified the presence of a religious component that shaped the identities of rebellious factions and served to maintain a spirit of opposition throughout these crises. Although the religious element of the 1640 Catalan revolt has been overlooked, the regional clergy played an enormous role in sustaining what was essentially a revolt in the name of religion.

The burning of the Sacrament in two small villages began the revolt; the Catalan church’s continued financial donations continued resistance through the critical first two years of war, long enough to turn the rural rebellion into a revolution. Clerics wrote many of the early pamphlets justifying secession, helping to tie the provincial Church more closely to the insurrection. During the winter of 1640-1641, facing imminent defeat at the hands of the royal army, monks, friars, and priests sought neither repentance nor forgiveness, but rather prayed for divine deliverance from their attackers.

Following the unexpected rebel victory at Montjuïc in January 1641, the enthusiasm of the Catalan clergy for the revolution did not diminish. Throughout the campaigns of 1641 and 1642, the first estate gave great sums of money to finance Catalan soldiers as well as their French allies in their fight against Castile. Furthermore, despite
the untimely death of Pau Claris, other clerics filled important positions of leadership in the new Franco-Catalan government, serving as judges, administrators, tax collectors, and even heading a new Inquisition in Barcelona. Eventually, growing numbers of Catalan clergy would turn against the revolutionary regime, using their money and their positions as leaders in society to win the hearts and minds of many back to their allegiance to Philip IV.

A study of the many roles filled by the ecclesiastics of Catalonia during the first three years of their revolution is critical in helping one to understand more completely one of the last specifically religious revolts in Europe.
To Sarah
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation could not be completed, or even started, without an incredible amount of aid rendered to the humble author. Looking back on the process, not only does the modern graduate student stand on the shoulders of giants, but he is hoisted up there and prevented from falling off by a good many friendly beings as well.

First, I would like to thank the various institutions whose financial support has proved invaluable to the construction of this dissertation: The Ohio State University that graciously supplied me with two years of fellowships, the Tinker Foundation, the Mershon Center, and the Intercollegiate Studies Institute. The bulk of this project was researched during a ten-month trip courtesy of a Fulbright Scholarship, and I especially want to thank those people responsible for making such a trip possible.

Second, no graduate study would be possible without capable librarians behind it. I have a deep appreciation for Laurie Lye who heads the Interlibrary Loan department at Casper College Library. Without her patience and hard work and great success at procuring much-needed books out in Casper, Wyoming, this dissertation would have taken much longer to complete. Finally, most of the dissertation writing was done in the second-floor alcoves of the Natrona County Public Library, in Casper, Wyoming, and I would like to thank Bill Nelson, the ladies at the reference desk, and all the rest of the staff for their patience and hospitality.
A very special thanks is due to the four translators who have helped me with the many quotes and citations listed throughout in this dissertation. Marta Strook provided valuable insight on Castilian translation; Donato Angelotti aided me immensely with his superb Italian translations; Margo Perry helped make the German language more intelligible to me; while the inimitable Xavier Gil gave me much-needed help on the Catalan translations.

On a lighter note, the course of my investigation was made considerably lighter by the number of church documents destroyed through the zeal of various anti-clerical movements in Catalonia, the most drastic occurring in early 1936. I wish to thank those involved for their open-minded concern for the future.

For those unknown Italians who robbed me of my computer and notebook containing three months of research while I purchased a train ticket an hour before leaving Rome—may finding the complete sermons of John Henry Newman make you better than you are now. And in a strange way, thank you: for without your care and concern for my property, I would never have enjoyed the many blessings that have flowed from that seemingly-unfortunate encounter.

In light of that perceived disaster, much praise is due to my younger brother Stephen for his incredible aptitude with the computer and his skill not only in finding my old hard drive ( Providentially changed before my research trip) but in restoring it to my new computer and presenting it to me as a wonderful Christmas present.

Finally, this lengthy paper could not be written without the constant support of several people, all of them intelligent, kind, and generous with their time helping me begin and complete the final stages of my academic apprenticeship.
To Dr. Geoffrey Parker of The Ohio State University, thanks beyond measure is due for his willingness to take under his wing yet another graduate student eager to have him as an advisor. Through him I have come to appreciate Spanish history in a broader context; through him as well I have been introduced to a number of great historians which I could not have otherwise accomplished without his patronage. His kindness and warmth in the months following my “Roman Holiday” have only managed to increase my respect and love for him.

Additional appreciation goes to Dr. Dale Van Kley, my other advisor, also of The Ohio State University, whose genius inspired this project in the first place. Were it not for his course on the religious origins of the French Revolution, I would doubtless be more adrift than ever in the wide world of graduate school. Many thanks is due to his his patient reading of troublesome Catalan texts, his continued advice on early-modern religion, and his persistent attempts to get me to write better.

To Dr. David Stewart of Hillsdale College, my undergraduate advisor, mentor, and friend, who first opened to me the joys of Catalonia, and the delights of teaching. Without his gentle nudging, his constant enthusiasm, or his sound advice, this project would have been dropped long ago into the dustbin of old and forgotten ventures.

To Xavier Gil, professor at the Universitat de Barcelona, who was invaluable in his assistance during my Fulbright year, for helping me acclimatize to the wonderful city of Barcelona, for inviting me over several times to his house and to be a part of his family while in “academic exile,” for providing me an opportunity to air my views at the V° Congrés d’Història Moderna de Catalunya in December 2003, and for proof-reading my
article that later emerged from the talk. One final thanks is offered for his tireless efforts at improving my Catalan translations found in this work.

While the above persons deserve much credit for the academic success—if any—which this dissertation may bring, there are a few other people, living outside the ivory tower, who are nonetheless worthy of recognition. Without their continual love and care, not only this work, by I myself, would undoubtedly have turned out much differently. It is to this group collectively that the thesis is dedicated.

First, for my family—my father, mother, six brothers, Annie the dog, and the inimitable Cousin Danny—for grounding me in virtue, which is the basis of all academic success, for reminding me that history is not the most important thing in this world, and for providing great times of relaxation and enjoyment, laughter and joking.

For dear Teresa, my mother-away-from-home in Barcelona, who has meant so much to me.

And finally for Sarah, my long-suffering sweetheart and now wife, who has endured patiently a long ten months of separation, the passions of a devout Buckeye football fan, my incessant prattling, and the doom of being married to a guy who thinks history is funny.

Two quotes have guided my research project. G. K. Chesterton provided much needed inspiration for getting this draft started, and supplied the general defense of this finished work: “If something is worth doing, it is worth doing badly.” To help me evade the pitfall most common to academics—that of permanently living and talking in the unreal world of their own discipline—I turned to the writings of C. S. Lewis, who observed, “I have come to the conclusion that if you cannot translate your own thoughts
into uneducated language, then your thoughts are confused. Power to translate is the test of having really understood your own meaning.”

It is my hope that the dissertation will be presented in clear and understandable language to the profit of all who open its cover.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACA: Arxiu de la Corona de Aragó, Barcelona
ACB: Arxiu Capitular de Barcelona
ACG: Arxiu Capitular de Girona
ACT: Arxiu Capitular de Tarragona
ACV: Arxiu Capitular de Vic
ADG: Arxiu Diocesa de Girona
ADPO: Archives Départementales de Pyrenees-Orientals, Perpignan
ADU: Arxiu Diocesa de Seu d’Urgell
AHCB: Arxiu Històric de la Ciutat de Barcelona
AHT: Arxiu Històric de Tarragona
AHV: Arxiu Històric Municipal de Vic
AHN: Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid
AMG: Arxiu Municipal de Girona
AMU: Arxiu Municipal de Seu d’Urgell
ASV: Archivo Segreto Vaticano, Vatican City
APCC: Arxiu Provincial dels Capuxinos de Catalunya, Barcelona
BAEV: Biblioteca Arxiu Episcopal de Vic
BC: Biblioteca de Catalunya, Barcelona
BN: Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid
FB: Fullet Bonsoms
PREFACE

Aside from attempting to fill in a missing (and vitally important) gap in current Catalan historiography, this thesis hopes to place the revolt of the Catalans in its appropriate context of the series of revolts that shook Western Europe during the 1640s. In all of these other revolts, religion played an important part—in Portugal, England, France, and southern Italy. To ignore these religious principles and their important contributions to group identity in early-modern Europe is to purposefully blind ourselves to the events of the past and to ignore an important element in the human condition. The importance of religion in human life has tended to be overlooked for the past century or two or has been unjustly regarded as a series of psychological phenomena reducible to materialistic impulses. This degrades the human condition into mere biological matter, deprived of free will, etc.

Furthermore, this study hopes to bridge a serious gap currently present in international academia as well. Unlike the United States, the study of regional history in Catalonia today is plagued with the division of knowledge into two realms. Religion, and any aspect of history obviously colored with religion, has been left for priests and friars to handle. “Real” history, or at least history seen through a purely secular lens is reserved for the “real” academic historian. Despite the opportunity for dialogue between the two
camps, either through private conversation or public conferences, the two sides rarely seem to meet, or if they do, they usually talk past one another. It is the hope of this paper to attempt to break down the wrongful exclusion of religion as a serious subject of historical study in its own right, bringing in a more holistic approach to history and hopefully shedding a clearer light on the human condition, specifically mid-seventeenth century Catalonia.
INTRODUCTION

Catalonia, the Spanish Monarchy, and Europe, 1600-1640: Politics and Religion Before the General Crisis

“And now, my Lord, to take all Nations in a lump, I think God Almighty hath a quarrel lately with all Mankind, and given the reins to the ill Spirit to compass the whole earth; for within these twelve years there have the strangest Revolutions and horridest Things happen'd not only in Europe, but all the World over, that have befallen mankind, I dare boldly say, since Adam fell, in so short a revolution of time. There is a kind of popular Planet reigns everywhere…”

James Howell

Prologue

It was springtime in Catalonia: the warm Mediterranean breezes that opened the planting season helped dispel the bitter memories of winter months that had seen not only the usual cold weather, but also the deaths of several thousand Catalans who fell before the fortress of Salses in northern Roussillon during the successful siege of 1639-1640. With their sacrifice, those fallen Catalans had driven the invading French from their homeland and bought themselves a brief respite from the war that had now entered its fifth year. Unfortunately, the temporary peace that had been so dearly bought would be shattered in a matter of months. This time, however, the perpetrators came not from outside the Principat of Catalonia, but from within.

In late April 1640, a company of Neapolitans under the command of Francisco Moles, part of the large army that Philip IV had stationed in Catalonia, passed through the diocese of Girona on their way to the front lines and arrived at the small town of

1 Joseph Jacobs, ed. Epistolae Ho-Elianae: the familiar letters of James Howell, historiographer royal to Charles II (London: D. Nutt, 1890), Book III; Letter I, 512-514. Although the date given for the letter is 20 Jan. 1646, this cannot be correct.
Riudarenes. Here the citizens, no doubt aware of Moles’s reputation for permitting his men to loot the homes of Catalan hosts, had stocked the local church with most of their belongings. The small church was then locked for the duration of the soldiers’ stay, and the inhabitants of Riudarenes provided only the bare minimum of support required by law to the tercio. The soldiers, disgusted at the treatment they received from those whom they were supposed to defend, left Riudarenes on 1 May, but not before taking their revenge on the village. Breaking into the church, the Neapolitans not only confiscated the private goods that had been secreted away, but they also robbed the sanctuary of its sacred vessels, priestly robes, ornaments, and alms, while desecrating the altars and saints’ images and finally burning the sacred vessels carrying the elements of the Mass. In a final act of frustration, they set the church on fire and marched north.

Unbeknownst to the Neapolitan soldiers, two Capuchin friars from Girona, out on their regular tour through the diocesan countryside, witnessed their depredations and tried in vain to save the sacred vessels from complete destruction. With the charred remains in their hands, the two friars returned to Girona where their accounts met with a stunned and outraged response from the citizens. The chapter clergy called an emergency meeting and assembled a committee of canons to investigate the truth of the Capuchins’ accusations. The chapter also dispatched a letter to their bishop, Gregorio Parcero, who was in Barcelona attending a religious council, requesting his immediate presence back in Girona.

After a two-week investigation, both bishop and chapter concluded that Moles and his Neapolitans were guilty of destroying not only a house of God, but all its contents including the Eucharistic elements: a serious crime that called for excommunication. The
destruction of the Communion wafers was particularly heinous in the eyes of the Catalans, for it was the doctrine of transubstantiation—the belief that the bread and wine consumed by the believer in the Mass became the literal body and blood of Christ—that lay at the center of the Catholic Reformation and provided an essential component to any Catholic community and its identity. On 14 May, Francesc Pejoan, vicar-general to Bishop Parcero, in company with the cathedral clergy of Girona, pronounced the Neapolitan tercio and its commander, Moles, excommunicated from the Catholic Church. The religious service—designed to reinforce the faith of the offended Catalan community at large—concluded with the reading of Psalm 109, a particularly vindictive prayer offered against those who were declared enemies of God and enemies of his chosen people.

The official condemnation of a portion of the royal soldiers soon fostered a deeper resentment among the population against all the tercios stationed in Catalonia. By the end of May, matters had turned from diffuse discontent to open revolt against the king of Castile and his sacrilegious soldiers. Another act of church burning and destruction of the Sacrament at Montiró on 30 May, this time by a Castilian tercio under Juan de Arce, stirred up the rural Catalans even more. Bands of local militias, believing themselves to be defending their homeland against the sacrilege of foreign heretics, took to sniping at the king’s tercios.

This series of rural disturbances soon affected the migrant workers, or segadors, across Catalonia who were preparing for the early grain harvest, a harvest that gave all signs of being poor on account of the drought that year. Popular violence against the monarchy culminated in a bloody riot during the Corpus Christi festival in Barcelona on
7 June, in which local unemployed *segadors* joined with the urban population to seek out and destroy the lives and houses of all “traitors” to the patria; in the uprising several houses were burnt and the viceroy, a Catalan nobleman the Count of Santa Coloma, found his death. Relations between Madrid and Catalonia continued to deteriorate. By the end of the summer—barely eight months after making a heroic effort in the name of “Spain” to defend their homeland at Salses—the Principality of Catalonia would be in a state of open rebellion.

With such an apparently minor incident—the burning of a few buildings and a few pieces of bread—the Revolt of the Catalans had begun.

This revolt and the nineteen-year war it caused—known in Catalan history as the War of the *Segadors*, or, more recently, as the War of the Secession—not only had an enormous impact on the identity of Catalonia during the seventeenth century, but it has made lasting contributions down to the present.\(^2\) In the first place, the heightened affections and loyalties stemming from the revolt created a temporary unity among most Catalans that had seldom been seen. Moreover, the War of the Segadors would be the first in a series of violent Catalan uprisings against the reigning power in Spain, uprisings that have occurred in every subsequent century since: a rebellion against Philip V in the War of Spanish Succession; strong support for the Carlist movement during the three wars of succession in the nineteenth century; and the opposition to Franco in the Spanish Civil War of the twentieth century. Finally, even as they enjoy the autonomy granted them under the current Spanish monarchy, the Catalans continue to commemorate the

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\(^2\) As mentioned before, the term *segadors* refers to migrant field-workers who led that great disturbance in Barcelona on the feast of Corpus Christi (June 1640). Though popular uprisings had been going on in Catalonia for several months, it was the actions of the *segadors*, and the failed attempts by both the Catalan and Castilian governments to resolve the issue that led to the “revolt” proper.
events of 1640 in their “national” anthem, “Els Segadors.” From a cultural and historical perspective, then, the War of the Segadors has been, and is today, of great symbolic importance for the Catalan people.

The Catalan revolt occurred amidst a time of great upheaval throughout the world. The middle decades of the seventeenth century were full of political, religious, economic, and social turmoil affecting the entire continent of Europe and beyond. Country rose up against country; members of one religious confession slaughtered those of another, despite sharing the same God and—in essence—the same creed. The continuity of war and the changing scale on which it was waged played havoc with royal budgets, as more and more kingdoms went into debt to finance ever-larger navies and armies. It was a time of troubles and an era of devastation.3

Among the kingdoms most affected by these dramatic changes was the composite monarchy on the Iberian peninsula ruled by the Habsburg dynasty, and only beginning to be known as “Spain.” Made up of the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon—as well as Portugal from 1580 to 1640—Spain had amassed the first nearly global empire by the end of the sixteenth century. But the following years of crisis would test the king, Philip IV, and his ability to maintain the numerous lands under his sway. For over a decade after coming to the throne in 1621, Philip, along with his chief minister, the Count-Duke of Olivares, had managed to hold at bay most of the enemies seeking to deprive him of his lands. Only in the Netherlands had such an attempt to break away from Habsburg control been successful, and even then, the resumption of war with Castile in 1621 had led to

3 One should point out that similar chaos affected the Eurasian empires of Russia, China, and the Ottoman Turks at this time as well. For the most general view of this era, see Geoffrey Parker and Lesley Smith, eds., The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century (London: Routledge, 1997).
some serious military reversals for the Dutch. Even the outbreak of war with France in 1635 initially failed to make a significant dent in any of the Habsburg holdings in Europe.

Then in 1640, a series of revolts shook the composite Spanish monarchy. Beginning in the middle of that year, one of their more important regions, Catalonia, rose up against Castile. Only a few months later, in December 1640, João, the Duke of Bragança, aided and abetted by the local clergy and nobility, rose up against Philip IV, defenestrating the king’s representative in Lisbon and proclaiming the restoration of an independent Portuguese empire. Philip IV proved unwilling to recognize the Portuguese claim and so began yet another war that drained both countries for nearly twenty-eight years. In 1641, the Duke of Medina-Sidonia, brother-in-law to the rebellious Duke of Bragança, launched a failed revolt against Philip IV in Andalucia, which nevertheless created quite a stir in Madrid. Still later in the decade, the Spanish-held territories of Sicily and Naples would both revolt against the excessive demands made on their men, foodstuffs, and money in order to finance Castilian military campaigns against the Dutch, the French, the Catalans, and the Portuguese. Despite eventually losing Portugal and her overseas empire, as well as a portion of northern Catalonia, Spain survived these revolts of the 1640s shaken, but still largely intact.

The political upheaval affecting the Habsburg monarchy during the 1640s—the Catalan revolt and the accompanying revolts in Portugal and Andalusia and, still later,

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4 In addition to this vast outpouring of military might, Philip IV also diverted a great sum of money to his cousin, the Holy Roman Emperor to aid his cause in suppressing the Protestant princes of Germany and their Swedish allies.

5 For an interesting—and as far as I know, the only—overview of these 1640 revolts in Spanish-held Europe, see Sir John Elliott’s essay, “Revolts in the Spanish Monarchy,” in Robert Forster & Jack Greene, eds., Preconditions of Revolution in Early Modern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 109-130. Elliott asserts, however, that the peripheral nature of these revolts proved to be the very factor that kept monarchy intact throughout the decade and into the eighteenth century.
uprisings in Sicily and Naples—constituted the “Spanish version” of a broader phenomenon known as the "general crisis of the seventeenth century,” a period of dramatic social, economic, political, and even climatic change throughout various parts of the world. In political terms, the decade of the 1640s was one of rebellion and revolution: the Fronde, the English Civil War, the political crises in Sweden and the Netherlands, the murder of Sultan Ibrahim in 1648, and the overthrow of the Ming Dynasty in China.

While many national scholars have been drawn to the numerous revolts affecting Western Europe in the 1640s, the widespread phenomenon of rebellion has been the subject of only one comparative study.6 While many of the other revolts—the Fronde, the Portuguese revolution, the abdication of Queen Christina of Sweden, and especially the English Civil War—all have a very visible religious dimension to them, such a dimension has been largely absent from the historiography of the revolt of the Catalans. This absence is ironic, considering the Catalan revolt was the only uprising during the 1640s to be led by a cleric—Pau Claris—and to be fought, at least for the first few years, over religious principles, specifically the purity of the Catalan faith as opposed to the pretended pretensions of Castilian Catholicism.

**The Case for Religion in the Catalan Revolt**

Scholars of the Catalan revolt admit that the excommunications of foreign *tercios* in the spring of 1640 by the bishop of Girona certainly added a religious dynamic to the growing discontent of the community, one that can be seen in the earliest pamphlets justifying the revolt. The currently available evidence, however, also depicts a more

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6 That study is by Roger Merriman, entitled *Six Contemporaneous Revolutions* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938).
divisive role for religion among the clerical elite over the potential creation of a "Castilian Caesaropapism," complementing the role of religion in mobilizing popular participation. While the revolt of the Catalans appears not to have been accompanied by any religious or doctrinal differences with the Castilians, the appeal to the purity of Catalan Catholicism was extremely effective, inciting clerics and the lower orders of society to defy the encroaching “tyrannical” and secularizing policies of Castile.

This work will attempt to explore in greater depth the first revolt in Catalonia, which in turn helped to bring about—whether directly, in the case of Portugal, or indirectly, in the cases of Sicily and Naples—the other internal rebellions within Castile’s European empire. In particular it will focus on the role of the regional clergy in addition to Pau Claris who took the lead in shaping not only the ideas expressed in the 1640 revolt, but the hearts and minds of the Catalans who fought against their rightful lord, Philip IV.

The portion of Catalan clerics who sided with the rebellion influenced the course of the revolt in several significant ways. From the first, many of the cathedral chapters in the land—who largely supported the revolt—gave of their wealth to support the fighting in a region already hard-pressed by five years of war. As recognized leaders of the community, several canons and monks took their place in important positions of authority, serving on the Council for War, the Council of State, and the regional tax-collecting agency, the Junta de Batalló.

Furthermore, clerics such as Gaspar Sala and Josep Font wrote many of the early pamphlets that appeared justifying the Catalan secession, helping to tie the provincial Church more closely to the insurrection. While all of them decried Castilian
encroachment upon provincial rights personified by the tyranny of the Count-Duke of Olivares, they also all heralded the purity of the Catalan church under assault. These works enjoyed a wide currency in Catalonia and also among the warring enemies of Castile.

More impressive, however, is the reaction of the clerics as they ministered to the citizens of Barcelona facing imminent defeat at the hands of the royal army. During the winter siege of 1640-41, monks, priests, and even some bishops sought neither repentance nor forgiveness for their crimes, but rather prayed for divine deliverance from their attackers. Many Catalans saw the defeat of the king's forces at Montjuïc in January 1641 as a sign of divine Providence; this unexpected victory helped to sustain the faith of the Catalans in their cause for many years to come. The continual participation of the religious community as authors of pamphlets, as financial backers, and as pastoral providers to the packed churches of the Principat under siege reveals the significant role that they played in the revolt of the Catalans.

An in-depth study of the ecclesiastical estate in Catalonia is necessary, first, because the clergy as an estate was the social group most responsible for the initial uprising in the spring of 1640. Even more than the destruction of personal or common property, it appears clear that the violence committed by soldiers of Philip IV against the sacred body of Christ was the chief reason for the staying power of the popular revolt. The ecclesiastical censure of these heretical acts, culminating in the excommunications from the diocese of Girona, provided the lower orders with an important spiritual justification for their otherwise untoward behavior. Even more importantly, the Catalan clergy, serving the principality in spiritual and secular roles, proved to be the glue that
held together the diverse factions in Catalonia during the trials and tribulations of 1640-1641: long enough to transform a revolt into a revolution, and to instigate a conflict of nearly twenty years that laid waste to the entire Principat.

**Scholarly Background to the Catalan Revolt**

From a historiographical perspective, studies of the revolt of the Catalans stayed primarily within the realm of popular provincial histories until 1956, when Josep Sanabre published his *magnum opus* entitled, *La acción de Francia en Cataluña en la pugna por la hegemonía de Europa, 1640-1659*. This historical work is extremely important, not only in its illuminating manner of separating accurate history from popular traditions, but also in the attempt to cover the nineteen years of war that exhausted both Castile and France and severed the northern counties of Roussillon and Cerdagne from the Principat of Catalonia. Despite the high quality of the scholarship, however, this great book was written in a historical milieu that placed some limitations on the historical study. Sanabre wrote his work during the first decades of the Franco regime—hardly ideal conditions in which to produce a complete history of a subversive rebellion and war by the very people who had spent years resisting Franco and his government. Although Sanabre described in great detail the Catalan resistance against France throughout the war, he paid scant attention to the number of Catalans—aside from a few prominent nobles and lawyers—who aided the French, or at least opposed the Castilian, during the decades-long conflict.

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8 It is particularly for the amazing breadth and depth of Mossèn Sanabre’s work—consulting Castilian, Catalan, French, and Vatican archives and libraries—that his book remains a classic nearly fifty years after its publication. No other scholar has attempted the massive undertaking of publishing a book on the entire Revolt of the Segadors.
A few years after Sanabre, the distinguished English historian, Sir John Elliott, published the second classic work on the War of the Segadors. Entitled, *The Revolt of the Catalans: A Study in the Decline of Spain, 1598-1640,* Elliott’s work records the longer history of Catalan political squabbles with Castile in the half-century leading up to the crisis of 1640. His study is very effective in describing the political, economic, and social tensions that contributed to the sentiment of ill-will towards Castile unleashed in the Catalan revolt. Chief among these issues was the growing centralization and "Castilianization" of the Iberian peninsula through the policies of Philip IV and his minister, Olivares. By means of such instruments as the Union of Arms and an expanding government bureaucracy, Olivares sought to bring the peripheral regions of the peninsula under the direct control of Madrid. In addition to these military and fiscal obligations to the Spanish Empire, the use of Castilian gradually spread into Catalan, leading some Catalans to suspect that the Count-Duke hoped to establish it as the pan-Iberian language.

Opposition to Olivares stemmed primarily from the Catalans' fervent love for their native tongue and for their own tradition of government, grounded on constitutions that limited the authority of the king. To reduce the general motivations of the Catalans, however, to an extended discourse on language and politics, as one of the most recent studies exploring the ideological roots of the revolt does, overlooks any role that the Church might have played in generating and sustaining a spirit of rebellion in this fervently Catholic land. Indeed, Elliott himself admitted in his book that a good study of

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the clergy in this period did not exist, although the Catalan revolt was unique among the contemporaneous rebellions during the 1640s in that it was the only revolt to be led by a cleric.\footnote{There is a great need for a study of the Catalan clergy and religious orders in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,” Elliott, The Revolt of the Catalans, 588.}

Successive historians of the Catalan revolt following Elliott and Sanabre have tended to fall into two separate categories of interpretation. The first school of interpretation, much in the vein of Elliott, has published a number of works exploring seventeenth century Catalan political ideology and institutions.\footnote{For examples of this kind of writing see Basili de Rubí and Ramón Vidal. Les Corts generals de Pau Claris: dietari o procès de corts de la junta general de Braços del 10 de setembre de 1640 a mitjan març de 1641: manuscrit de Miquel Marquès (Barcelona: R. Dalmau, 1976); Núria Florensa i Soler, El Consell de Cent. Barcelona a la Guerra dels Segadors (Barcelona: CYAN Blames, 1996); Antoni Simon i Tarrés, Els orígens ideològics de la Revolució Catalana de 1640 (Barcelona: Abadía de Montserrat, 1999); and Joan Lluís Palos’s article “Les idees i la revolució catalana de 1640” Manuscrits (17) 1999: 277-292.} Another historical approach to the Catalan Revolt has considered the events of 1640 and beyond from a sociological perspective. Among the numerous scholars who have developed this angle on Catalan history are Jordi Nadal and his work on Catalan demographics; Joan Busquets i Dalmau, Joan Bada, and Maria Rosa González Peiró and their introductory studies of Catalan clergy; and Eva Serra, James Amelang, and Antoni Simon i Tarrés and their interest in the lower orders of Catalan society.\footnote{For a brief summation of the classic strains of historiography relating to the War of the Segadors, see the article by Ricardo García Cárcel, “La revolución catalana: algunos problemas historiográficos,” in Werner Thomas and Bart de Groof, eds., Rebelión y Resistencia en el Mundo Hispánico del Siglo XVII. Actas del Coloquio Internacional Lovaina, 1991 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1992), 122-135.} The most recent work on the social context of the Catalan revolt is by Luis Corteguera, whose study of artisans and popular politics in Barcelona not only revealed a common political consciousness between the various social orders in the city, but also argued that, given the nature of composite
monarchies, popular involvement in politics could significantly affect the operation of government in the center and in the periphery of the Habsburg dominions.\textsuperscript{14}

At the present time, two interpretations of the revolt of the Catalans have tried to unite the political, ideological, and social findings of this wide array of scholarship. The first of these interpretations comes from an article by Joan Lluis Palos entitled “Les idees i la revolució catalana de 1640,” in which the author located definitive political concepts present in the justification pamphlets of 1640 and sought to place them in their appropriate historical context. The Catalan “constitutions” are fundamental to this thesis, and Palos argued that these statutes played an important role in the political consciousness of Catalonia—and elsewhere—during the seventeenth century. Both religious and secular Catalan writers would draw upon the heritage of their “constitutions” to justify their break with Castile.\textsuperscript{15}

Palos’s article, however, went beyond a simple tale of intellectual history. While Richard Weaver has reminded us all that “ideas have consequences,” it goes without saying that people must have ideas.\textsuperscript{16} The particular ideas that an individual or a group will hold can—and often does—change, becoming more sharply defined as it encounters external circumstances or is undercut by internal developments. Much as the sculptor’s chisel chips away at the rough-hewn marble, those who articulate “old” ideas shape them


\textsuperscript{15} Palos, “Les idees i la revolució catalana de 1640,” 280. see also Xavier Gil’s chapter on “Aragonese constitutionalism and Habsburg rule: the varying meanings of liberty,” in R. L. Kagan and G. Parker, eds., \textit{Spain, Europe and the Atlantic world. Essays in honour of Sir John Elliott} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 160-187. Catalan “constitutions” were the basic statutes or laws by which the Principat and Comtats were governed. The constitutions were proposed during sessions of the Corts, either by the King or by the Corts themselves, and could only be passed at such a time.

to ever-new circumstances and contexts; as the spectators begin to perceive the shape the stone takes, they express approbation or discontent.

In much the same way, Joan Lluis Palos observed that regardless of the motives influencing Catalans to choose one side in a particular debate—fear of state innovations or pride in traditional constitutionalism for example—their alliance to a particular cause was rarely static.\(^\text{17}\) Indeed, it is increasingly apparent that personal issues and conflicts were as responsible as intellectual conviction in encouraging desertions among the pro-Catalan and pro-Castilian camps from the autumn of 1640 onwards. With this in mind, one can better understand the seemingly odd behavior of judges like Felip Vinyes, the once bold defender of Catalan liberties who became a fervent pro-monarchist following the Corts of 1626, or the most famous Catalan jurist, Joan Pere Fontanella, whose opinions on legal controversies during the 1620s and 1630s moved from a pro-royalist stance to one that staunchly supported the Diputació.\(^\text{18}\)

Such changes or “flip-flops” did not stop once the War of the Segadors began in earnest, nor were these decisions limited to the legal profession; for example, Catalan clergy who had passionately advocated the cause of the Generalitat and their French allies came to attack the regime with much the same fervor. The most notable example is of Abbot Gaspar Amat: one of the most active supporters of the Catalan revolt in 1640, he led a failed coup against the Franco-Catalan government four years later, a turnaround

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\(^\text{17}\) Palos, “Les idees i la revolució catalana de 1640,” 283.

\(^\text{18}\) The Diputació—also known as the Generalitat—was a six-person executive committee made of up three Diputats and three Oidors representing the three estates of Catalonia; the Diputat Eclesiàstic served as the body’s president. They exercised authority between the Corts from the Palau de la Generalitat in the heart of Barcelona, and were responsible for defending Catalan constitutions and liberties, collecting taxes, and providing occasional donations to the crown. Every three years, on the feast of the Magdalene (22 July), the names of eligible candidates were placed in a silver basin, to be drawn at random by a young boy under the age of eight. The new officers would sworn in around the middle of August.
that resulted in his exile. At the same time, lawyers such as Francesc Viladamor who had skillfully praised the regional priests who supported the revolt in 1640 as well as sharing the government posts with them turned more regalist in their philosophy as the French cause became more desperate.\(^1\)

Certainly, with Elliott’s deep work on the half-century leading up to the revolt, one can see that constitutional issues were important to the Catalans and to their perception of themselves as Catalans, in contrast to the more innovative “Castilian” crown. Debates during the Corts of 1626 and 1632 bear witness to the fact that the “constitutions” were not merely concerned with the preservation of local rights, but also a great number of privileges as well.

The important question to ask, however, and the one which dissatisfies many historians of this revolt, is the extent to which such a lofty ideological philosophy penetrated through Catalan society. All are agreed that the lawyers and literati, from Fontanella and Viladamor to Sala and Claris, were aware of their traditional political legacy and staunchly vowed to defend it. But did they speak for the whole history of the revolt? In particular, do other voices explain the willingness with which the clergy were willing to fight and support this revolt against the king? Something does not seem to fit.

The other modern interpretation, led by Antoni Simon i Tarrés, drew attention away from political writings to the actual series of events of 1640. The beginnings of this revolt, after all, occurred in the rural countryside, when a series of Catalan villages, upset at the harsh treatment dealt them by Neapolitans and other military tercios, rose up in

\(^1\) For a good study on the shifting positions of the Catalan legal community see Joan Lluis Palos, *Els juristes i la defensa de les Constitucions: Joan Pere Fontanella, 1575-1649* (Vic: Eumo Editorial, 1997); and Elliott, *Revolt of the Catalans*, 169-170; 281-282.
revolt. The Catalan official sent to restore order—a well-known agent of the king—was set upon and both he and his bodyguard were burned alive in the village of Montiró. As word spread, the military regiments in other Catalan villages began to increase their abuse until one day in May 1640 a Neapolitan tercio under the command of one Leonardo de Moles burned the entire village of Riudarenes to the ground, including the parish church, where the inhabitants had stored their possessions.

The brutal sack of Riudarenes, and particularly the destruction of the Sacrament inside the parish church, led to a series of rural uprisings against all of the king’s soldiers quartered in Catalonia, and to the famous revolt on Corpus Christi, when migrant workers transformed into a “Christian army” broke into Barcelona under the cover of celebrating a religious festival, and upon slight provocation by the soldiers stationed there erupted into violence. By nightfall, two Catalan judges deemed sympathizers to Castile and the viceroy had found their deaths and had their homes destroyed. Similar waves of popular unrest rocked the countryside until September 1640, when the advance of the royal army into the principality united most Catalans behind the opposition leaders.

This interpretation, however, while explaining much of how the subsequent war received its name—Guerra dels Segadors after the segadors or migrant farm workers—fails fully to satisfy the onlooker. Were the dramatic effects of quartering so very traumatic that migrant workers who had no houses in which to quarter troops, revolted? A deeper explanation is needed, one that is capable of uniting both the revolt of the migrant workers with the carefully thought-out legal defense of the urbane social orders. The answer may be found in the oft-overlooked element of religion.
Religion would not only provide the necessary spark for igniting the Catalan revolt: the rebellion was led—in contrast to every other revolt that shook Europe during the 1640s—by a cleric, Pau Claris.\textsuperscript{20} Born in 1586 to a family of well-connected lawyers from Barcelona, there is little evidence concerning the famous canon’s early life. Aspiring to a position in either the secular or ecclesiastic hierarchy, Claris studied at one of the premier Catalan universities at Lleida.\textsuperscript{21} During the reigns of the early Hapsburgs, and in particular that of Philip II, universities began to focus specifically on training bureaucrats, known as letrados, to manage the growing Spanish Empire. By the late sixteenth century, however, the quantity of students graduating from these universities began to create a glut of hopeful letrados on the market. Despite the severe competition, Claris was fortunate enough to be appointed by Philip III to one of the twenty-four canonries in the diocese of Urgell in 1612.\textsuperscript{22}

Whether through his strength of personality or through other means, Claris managed to gain a good deal of influence among the other clerics at Urgell. He appeared prominently in their dispute with the crown seven years after his arrival, and he later served as the representative of the Urgell canons at the Corts of 1626. Claris continued to

\textsuperscript{20} While the Irish Catholic priests were formidable as a body in guiding the revolt through its early stages, the revolt began as a secular movement, and a clear clerical leader of the revolt—eventually the papal nuncio, Rinuccini—did not arise until some years afterwards. Claris, on the other hand, as the Diputat Eclesiàstic held a position of great importance in Catalonia before the revolt, and took over reins of leadership from the first moments of crisis onward.

\textsuperscript{21} There is some suspicion regarding the Universitat de Lleida, which was directed by the Augustinians. Not only was Claris a prominent graduate-turned-rebel, but Gaspar Sala—the noted author of several pamphlets justifying the revolution—was one of the top professors in theology there. Whether or not a particular professor or school of thought originated or developed there is currently unknown, but the connections between the school and leaders in the Catalan rebellion present an interesting coincidence.

stand out as an opponent of the Crown through his leadership during the décima crisis of 1634. In this and later conflicts, the charismatic canon continued to cultivate political ties with other families throughout the Principat and served as the chapter’s syndic to Barcelona during the 1620s and 1630s. Claris would be elected Diputat in 1638, in which capacity he by no means refrained from voicing his fervent passion for his patria and its privileges.

More than any other contemporary revolt during the 1640s—with the possible exception of the English Civil War—religion was central to the Catalan rebellion. Religion served not only as the immediate cause of the rising of the Catalan countryside in May 1640, but also provided the glue that bound so many disparate factions within the Principat together. Finally, the religious cause of the Catalans found its champion in the charismatic priest, Pau Claris, who guided the revolt through the critical first months. It is impossible to understand the outbreak of the Catalan revolt as anything other than a revolt over religion.

Catalonia and the Habsburg Monarchy

Regardless of whether scholars place their interpretative emphasis on political or social events, they generally agree that the novel initiatives enacted by Philip IV and his chief minister, the Count-Duke of Olivares, accelerated already-present tensions between Castile and Catalonia. Although many Catalan pamphleteers would testify to their long history of continued obedience to their lord and king, such behavior was far from common particularly during the two decades leading up to the Catalan revolt.

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23 ACA: Consejo de Aragon, leg. 280, no. 4, Bishop of Girona to J. L. de Vilanueva, 24 June 1634.
The signing of a twelve-year truce with the Netherlands in 1609 brought to a temporary end the messianic imperialism of Philip II, which had drained the Castilian treasury during the sixteenth century and had placed a growing burden on the various component members of the Habsburg composite monarchy. By the time the truce expired in 1621, however, factions within the court at Madrid had convinced the king that a rested Castile could resume the offensive once more, and ought to be able to defeat the Dutch rebels who had defied the king for so long. The war with the Netherlands resumed, marking the beginning of nearly forty years of continuous war between Castile and various powers in Europe: the Netherlands, England, France, and Portugal, in addition to revolts that arose in Italy. The numerous international pressures under which Castile—like her neighbors France and England—suffered during this time were bound to have serious ramifications. Indeed, the innovative internal policies that Philip IV and Olivares enacted to counter these growing stresses contributed to a growing discontent among the various parts of the Habsburg empire.

In large measure, the Count-Duke’s internal initiatives were spawned by a do-or-die mentality that infected the entire Castilian court—and other courts in Europe as well—at this time. It was this pre-eminent concern for reputación, a term encompassing political and religious ambitions for maintaining the purity, strength, and superiority of the empire created by the Habsburg ancestors, that was greatly responsible for continuing not only the external policy of war against the Netherlands and France, but the internal policy of centralization as well. 24 Just as the Castilian refusal to seek out peace with her

24 For more on the centrality of reputación and a fear of decline affecting Spanish domestic and international policy see Sir John Elliott’s chapter, “Foreign Policy and Domestic Crisis: Spain, 1598-1659,” in his Spain and its World, 1500-1700 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 114-139.
enemies brought further devastation to her people and her treasury, so too did Philip IV’s innovative royal concern to unite the disparate groups of his empire lead to growing resistance and ultimately rebellion. The first, and most drastic reaction against this “Castilianization” of the Spanish empire came from the Mediterranean Principality of Catalonia.

Originally part of the Crown of Aragon, the Principat of Catalonia and the Comtats of Roussillon and Cerdagne, had never been comfortable with the united monarchy established by Ferdinand and Isabella in 1469. The relationship between the crown and this region, possessing a vibrant history of constitutionalism and urban rights as opposed to the legacy of a strong monarch of Castile, continued to deteriorate throughout the sixteenth century. Much of the Catalans’ discontent stemmed from the increasing tendency of Castilian kings to reside in and around Madrid, only rarely visiting their region that had long been accustomed to enjoying the royal presence. In addition, despite possessing a large merchant community, renowned throughout the Mediterranean, Catalonia had never shared in any of the benefits of Castile’s overseas empire.

This Mediterranean region would prove to be most troublesome for Philip IV and Olivares, constantly resisting the centralizing policies of king and minister. Indeed, so great was the difference between Castile and Catalonia that Sir John Elliott, the *doyen* of seventeenth-century Spanish history, has remarked: “From the standpoint of Madrid, the principality of Catalonia, with its own distinctive language, laws, history, and institutions was an almost ungovernable province.”25 Rather than ameliorating this tense situation,
the harsh centralist policies of Olivares initiated during the 1620s resulted in a series of political, juridical, and economic confrontations that remained unresolved for decades.

Headlining Olivares’s centralizing plans was an innovative defensive plan entitled the Union of Arms. It had become the dominant perception in Madrid that for too long Castile had been left to shoulder the burdens of defending the vast intercontinental realm she had amassed. It would be far better, and indeed more just, if the various provinces within the empire that benefited from a stable government and relative security contributed something to the general defense, especially at a time when Castile was waging war on several different fronts against determined enemies. In essence, the king’s minister sought to create a fighting force in which every part of the Spanish empire would be forced to contribute and supply a given number of troops. The total size of the force was to be around 140,000 soldiers.

While the plan seems eminently reasonable, it met with great opposition from every quarter. Much of this resistance centered on the fact that the data that Olivares consulted for developing the Union of Arms was incredibly unreliable: in Catalonia, for example, the calculations set the population at a million inhabitants, whereas the reality was probably at most half that number. In addition, however strongly regions like Catalonia or Andalusia might have felt about defending the Habsburg dominions, they were used to doing so on their own terms. The Union of Arms, in contrast, bestowed a greater power on the king than many local provinces were prepared to accept. In the end, the Union of Arms came to naught: internal dissension, coupled with the inability of

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26 For a more detailed description of the Union of Arms and the manner in which it was received in Catalonia, see Elliott, The Revolt of the Catalans, 204-215.
27 Ibid, 238.
funding to meet the military needs of Philip IV, soon led Olivares to consider other methods of protecting “Spanish” territory and reputación.

Despite the failure of his pet project, Olivares persevered in his attempt to coerce peripheral regions of the Spanish empire—particularly Catalonia—to contribute more generously to the royal coffers. At the meeting of the Corts\textsuperscript{28} in 1626 and 1632, the chief minister blindly ignored prudence and tradition alike in his desire to urge the Catalans to greater efforts; the regional representatives, who deeply cherished their political heritage of constitutions and privileges, and insisted on having their grievances redressed before contributing a sou to Madrid, proved extremely recalcitrant. While the Catalans reluctantly gave a small sum at the Corts in 1626, heightened tensions between the Principat and the Crown in intervening years led to the abrupt dissolution of the Corts of 1632 without any definite fiscal contribution to the Habsburg war chest at a time when it was most needed.

Through such instruments as the Union of Arms and increasing fiscal demands created ostensibly for the defense of Catholicism in Europe, Philip IV and the Count-Duke of Olivares sought to unite the interests of the various component regions of the Habsburg monarchy against enemies such as the Dutch and the French. Ultimately outlying territories—from Peru to Catalonia—would understand their military and fiscal obligations to the Spanish Empire and would contribute willingly to the common defense and to preserve the security which, according to Olivares, they had too long taken for

\textsuperscript{28} The Corts were regional gatherings of the Catalan estates organized through royal proclamation and attended by the monarch in person, at the provincial capital, like Barcelona. Representatives or syndics from each of the three estates would gather to the temporary royal court to present their petitions before the king as well as to consider his requests for financial “donations.” The kingdom of Aragon as whole also held Corts General, in which representatives from each of the three constituents—Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, gathered together with the king, meeting in generally convenient locales such as Lleida or Monzón.
granted. Despite the apparent logic of the Union of Arms, the measure met with great resistance throughout Philip’s lands, particularly in places such as Catalonia, where the ruling elite felt they had profited little by being joined to Castile and Habsburg ambition. As this pressure from the center continued, however, the majority of Catalans managed to uphold a spirit of “convivencia” with Madrid. Indeed, when the French occupied the county of Roussillon in 1639, Catalan nobles and commoners alike would rally to the colors and, through great personal sacrifices, would beat back the invader.

Standing in contrast to the spirit of “convivencia” characteristic of Catalan-Castilian relations during the 1630s was the unhappy state of affairs between Castile and the former kingdom of Portugal. Tensions between these two powers reached a disturbing level in the 1620s, and again in the early 1640s, when the Dutch, finding themselves once again at war with Castile, decided to launch a series of assaults on her overseas colonies, including those of the former Portuguese empire. While the formal governing process from Madrid to Lisbon had been clarified, it remained an open question as to which party was responsible for the defense of Portugal’s colonies. Increasingly both sides accused the other of not contributing their “fair” share in defense of places like Brazil, whose capital, Salvador, fell to the Dutch in 1624. Although the Portuguese and Castilians were able to set aside their differences long enough to recapture Brazil the following year, tensions between the two continued to fester.

29 It must be remembered that ever since 1580, Portugal and her empire had become part of “Spain.” Though Castile governed Portugal through a viceroy like Catalonia or the Americas, they had promised to appoint as governor only those of royal blood. Although this promise was not always observed, during the 1630s Philip IV’s cousin, Margaret, who was descended from the old royal family of Portugal, held the position.
The war with France in 1635 merely exacerbated these feelings of ill-will, as successive memoranda from Olivares in Madrid to the vicereine, Margaret, in Lisbon urged a more aggressive taxation policy. Two years into the war, the king’s minister proposed that all households throughout Portugal were to be officially registered so that a more complete system of taxation could be enacted. In Évora, Olivares’s plan met with open opposition. The crowds directed their hatred chiefly against the despised tax collectors, who suffered bodily harm and the destruction of their property along with other forms of persecution. The rebellion gradually spread throughout southern Portugal during the summer months of August and September before Madrid formulated a suitable reply. By means of a mild response—one that offered amnesty to the masses but harshly punished the ringleaders—Philip IV and Olivares were able to quell the revolt—for the time being at least. Yet the hostile innovations created by Olivares in order to finance the constantly rising cost of warfare had by 1638 successfully alienated large sections of Portuguese nobility, clergy, and townspeople. The country lacked only a decisive event to throw the whole land into open rebellion; it would not be long in coming.\(^\text{30}\)

**The International Context of the Catalan Revolt**

Although the Catalan commitment to the Habsburg monarchy might not have met the full expectations of Olivares, the Principat nevertheless proved itself loyal to Madrid when external challenges arose in the 1630s. Unfortunately for Philip IV, wars and rumors of war were not the only foreign pressures threatening the security of his empire. There were religious, political, and economic demands operating on Castile, as well as on

\(^{30}\) For more on the legacy of Olivares and his policies in Portugal, together with the revolt of Évora and other events leading up to the Restoration of 1640, see Jean-Frédéric Schaub, *Le Portugal au temps du Comte-Duc d'Olivares, 1621-1640: le conflit de juridictions comme exercice de la politique* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2001).
nearly every other kingdom and principality in Europe during the first few decades of the seventeenth century. While such pressures are separated here for the sake of convenience in discussing them, it must be recognized that these categories are quite fluid. Religious disputes over the Protestant and Catholic Reformations easily blended into the causes for Castile’s involvement in The Thirty Years’ War, which in turn elevated tensions attendant upon the economic costs of war.31

Perhaps the pre-eminent events behind the pressures of the early seventeenth-century, and indirectly affecting the revolt of the Catalans, were the Protestant and Catholic Reformations. Europe’s re-awakening to important Christian beliefs was also, unfortunately, the beginning of violent disagreements over issues like justification, the nature of the Eucharist, and the requirements for practicing clergy. As Lutherans, Calvinists, and Catholics separated out and gathered in to their several camps, the concept of a unified Christendom dissolved.

The divide was made permanent as several societies in Europe began to adhere to one of the many confessions, infusing the complications of international politics and personal ambition in what may have been otherwise a purely scholastic dispute. The fusion of religious differences and political machinations led to a series of Wars of Religion that devastated large portions of France and the sundry principalities of the Holy

Roman Empire. While Castile remained relatively immune from the advance of heresy, the general spirit of reform and an insistence on pure and true faith nevertheless pervaded her society.

Political and religious groups alike were cognizant of the high stakes operating during the era of the Thirty Years’ War and the Protestant and Catholic Reformations. A number of reasons made it nearly impossible for either side to back down from the conflict until a decisive victory had been won. In the first place, both sides were dealing with religious truth, a fact that is hardly appreciated at all in our modern world of religious relativism. Religious adherents of whatever stripe—be they theists, deists, pantheists, or animists—though they welcome academic disputation, are never comfortable with forceful opposition. We may believe that the Protestants’ bitter resistance to transubstantiation or the Catholics’ deep antipathy to married clergy was silly, but we have a much different view regarding religious truth than they did. By the same token, it might have amused them to witness our present-day squabbling over fashions like sports or politics.

Religion’s foundational role in establishing a community and in providing a central component to the community’s identity was present throughout the early-modern world. Creeds rather than commerce, faith rather than politics, bound the wide array of citizenry together, whether in London, Paris, Madrid, or Barcelona. This was particularly true during the Reformation era, when popular consciousness regarding matters of doctrine—especially surrounding Holy Communion—attained a greater height than usual. In late sixteenth-century Paris, for example, religious ceremonies such as saint’s day processions and, most importantly, the Mass, were themselves the preeminent
expressions of communal identity. Oftentimes the Eucharist bread, which at the words of institution was transformed into the body of the resurrected Christ, came from the shops of local bakers, thus adding an additional element of community to this sacramental feast.

The great Reformation-era divide over the nature of the Mass brought out the significance of the sacrament much more vividly. For Protestant and Catholic alike, only true believers could participate in this solemn act: the community of the faithful depended on the active involvement of its constituents. To be denied communion, or to be declared excommunicate, was a dreadful punishment indeed, for it meant being cut off from the most elemental level of one’s community. It was far more dreadful in that era to be a man “without” a congregation than a man without a country.

Throughout the sixteenth- and early seventeenth-centuries, then, it was understood that no society or state was possible without institutionalized religious underpinnings, and that religious creeds provided the fundamental source of a community’s identity. Thus, the intensification of religious awareness throughout Europe made each side that much more cognizant of their opponents, and therefore more suspicious of any “heretical” infiltration into society. The behavior of princes, pamphleteers, and armies was carefully scrutinized lest traces of heresy be found. Communities watched eagerly for the first hints of heretical leaven lest it infect the whole loaf of society. This is a crucial point that will inform the very outset of the Catalan revolt. At the heart of this conflict was the sacrilegious burning of the Holy Sacrament,

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32 in the sense of the word meaning “separate from,” or “outside.”
the very body of Jesus Christ; to destroy an icon so emblematic of Catholicism and the Catholic Reformation could only mean that the soldiers who committed the atrocity were Protestants at heart, bent on obliterating not only the symbol of Catalan unity-in-community, but its adherents as well.

In addition to the heightened religious situation throughout the continent, the beginning of war between France and Spain in 1635 was of paramount importance, affecting numerous events for years to come. In many ways the war represented the fulcrum that tilted the ever-tense relations between Catalonia and Castile downwards toward a serious and seemingly irreparable rupture. One more war—coming on top of seventeen years of extensive martial commitment to fighting the Dutch—raised the stakes even higher in Castile’s bid to hold on to their vast empire. In the first place, the close proximity of France increased Spanish concerns about the safety of their homeland; not only would the frontiers of their American and Asian colonies need protection, but now the regions of Navarre and Catalonia as well. Secondly, the existence of yet another enemy diverted more of the royal budget towards military concerns and away from any internal improvements or paying the already large national debt to Genoese bankers. Now more than ever, the Count-Duke of Olivares hoped to enact his policies to encourage a greater cooperation among the various regions of his lord’s empire: after all, with the French so close to one’s own territory, how could even the recalcitrant Catalans keep from contributing to the preservation of the composite Spanish monarchy?

In addition to military concerns, the war with France also added a new development to the already-shaky European mindset; for the centuries-long war between Bourbon and Habsburg represented the first serious break within European Catholicism
at a time when the forces of Protestant German princes were threatening to swamp the Holy Roman Empire.\textsuperscript{34} By so doing, France not only affected the course of the Thirty Years’ War in the Empire, but also created a crisis of confidence among European Catholics.\textsuperscript{35} So long as the fight in Europe had pitted Catholic powers against Protestants, the Catholic populations in countries such as Portugal, Castile, and France, could understand full well whom they were to support. Once two Catholic powers started fighting among themselves, however—and the two greatest Catholic powers of that time—it introduced a level of insecurity for sincere Catholics. Which side deserved their support? Which side spoke for the True Faith and could be trusted to win the battle against heresy?

At such a time of political and religious instability, the kings of Castile and France sought to elevate their authority over traditionally recognized bounds in order—so they claimed—to preserve the nation or empire during this excessive time of troubles. The increased need for a greater military machine, expressed in terms of more men to fight and more money to pay the soldiers, soon created a general level of discontent within both Castile and France. At the same time, political innovations within these two monarchies upset many of their traditionally-minded subjects, be they peasants, priests, or lawyers. In the 1630s the increasing fiscal demands placed on these subjects to

\textsuperscript{34} The conflict between the ruling houses of France and the houses of Castile and Aragon—later assimilated into the Habsburg family—had begun as early as the late fifteenth century over the territories of the Italian peninsula. The Valois-Habsburg rivalry intensified under the French king Francis I who openly sided with the Lutheran princes in their fight against the Emperor Charles V. After a brief respite during the late sixteenth century—while France was torn apart by religious civil wars—the conflict between these two great powers continued under Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu.

\textsuperscript{35} The outbreak of war between Louis XIII and Philip IV in 1635 was merely the resumption of a much longer conflict that had been fought between the kings of France and Castile dating back to the days of Francis I and the Emperor Charles V, when the French king aided the first Protestant princes of the Holy Roman Empire in their war against Charles.
continue this dynastic struggle led to a series of revolts within each kingdom’s peripheral regions, the Portuguese rebellion in Évora, 1637; and the *Va Nu-Pieds* uprising in Normandy, 1639.

Like his enemy Philip IV, King Louis XIII of France was engaged in the difficulties of raising sufficient funds to break the ring of Habsburg territory that encircled his realm. It is quite ironic that both sides were experiencing significant internal rebellions as a result of the war declared in 1635 and yet neither side was ever sufficiently overcome by the difficulties at the same time to settle on terms of peace.\(^{36}\) Louis’s minister Cardinal Richelieu, much like his counterpart, the Count-Duke of Olivares, eagerly pursued means whereby revenues might be raised to fund not only the French war effort, but also to maintain their subsidies to the Swedes, who were doing their best to keep the Austrian Habsburgs at bay in the Holy Roman Empire, as well as to the Dutch in their war with Castile. To further this end, Richelieu proposed to extend the *gabelle*, a tax on salt, to the province of Normandy, which had hitherto been exempt from it. Salt was a common necessity in most households, and therefore certain to bring in a goodly sum of money; in essence, the *gabelle* required each household to pay for a certain quantity of salt at artificially inflated prices. Among those most passionately opposed to the new tax in Normandy were the local salt-workers, who feared their livelihood would be cut off and so rose up with others in their *patria* in revolt. Since the workers generally wore no shoes when working, the uprising took this abject condition for its name: the *Nu-Pieds*, or “Bare-feet” rebellion.

\(^{36}\) For a more complete account of this irony, see Geoffrey Parker’s chapter on the French struggles in his work, *The World Crisis*, forthcoming.
Much like the uprising in Évora two years earlier, popular violence sought out the royal tax collectors: many of these unfortunates met their death, while tax offices throughout Normandy burned to the ground. Eventually, the Norman peasants raised their own army, numbering in the thousands, to protest the collecting of any more taxes, causing king and cardinal to send in an army of their own. Unlike the Castilian response, however, Richelieu determined to put down the rebellion by force. An army of nearly 5,000 men was dispatched to Normandy and after a pitched battle with the insurgents, put an end to the Nu-Pied uprising.37

The troubles experienced by the two most important Catholic powers extended to other European countries as well. Like the Habsburgs in Castile, the Stuart dynasty ruled over a composite monarchy, constituted of England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland. Although Britain had largely kept out of European affairs since the inception of the Thirty Years’ War, Charles I spent most of his reign in need of cash to pay either for his five-year war with Spain (1625-1630), or his three year war with France (1627-1630), or other debts that flowed from England’s military efforts. Like his cousins in France and Castile, Charles I was not above enforcing old laws that had not been forgotten for centuries in order to extract money from his subjects. While these financial novelties stirred up considerable opposition in Parliament, the first open revolts stemmed from the king’s involvement with religious innovations.

Unlike Castile—which had firmly dealt with Lutheranism under Charles V and Philip II—and France—which had relegated the Huguenots to the status of second-class citizens and largely solved the bitter disputes of the sixteenth century—England was still

37 Pretty much the only monograph on the Nu-Pieds specifically is M. Foisil’s study, La revolte des Nu-Pieds et les révoltes normandes de 1639 (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1970).
a land divided into different religious factions. The fact that both Scotland and England were united under one crown only served to exacerbate these differences. In the southern kingdom, the dominant faith was Anglicanism—the Church of England—which, for over a century had sought to pave a middle way between the “excesses” of Catholicism and Presbyterianism, both of which were practiced in the British Isles, although open practitice of Catholicism was illegal.38

While this Aristotelian “golden mean” proved adept at getting numerous people to be content with some facet of the Church of England, its theological and liturgical vagueness opened the door for problems. The Stuart desire to create some degree of uniformity throughout wildly different regions only served to compound the religious tensions between Scotland and England.39

The king’s meddling began with rather minor affairs, such as the location of the high altar on which Holy Communion was celebrated, which had for decades been the provenance of local churches and dioceses. When dissenting congregations voiced their disapproval or manifested their resistance to these innovations, they incurred fines and imprisonment. The greatest outcry, however, came in 1637 when Charles I and the Archbishop of Canterbury, William Laud, decided to create a uniform Prayer Book for

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38 Anglicanism arose out of the great debate fueled by Henry VIII’s attempt to divorce his wife, Catherine of Aragon in 1533, in which the officials in Church in England “deposed” the Pope and named the King, the Head of the English Church. Under the rule of Edward VI and Elizabeth I, the Church of England kept many of the older rituals of Roman Catholicism—a sacramental view of the Lord’s Supper, altar rails, and surplices—while incorporating several Protestant ideas—a vernacular Bible, a renewed emphasis on preaching, and a disdain for Roman excesses—as well. Presbyterians on the other hand were the theological descendents of John Calvin and John Knox, a Scotsman who first transplanted Calvin’s ideas from Geneva. Presbyterians refused to acknowledge bishops or any other form of church hierarchy, adhering instead to a parliamentary General Assembly of churches to decide important matters. Their liturgy was generally devoid of the Anglican pomp and rituals, and placed a heavy emphasis on preaching and exposition of the Scriptures.

39 For a succinct overview of the extensive problems facing the Stuart kings during the early seventeenth century, and the origins of rebellion and civil war, see Geoffrey Parker’s chapter “The downfall of the Stuart Monarchy, 1625-43,” in his The World Crisis, forthcoming.
use throughout the kingdom of Scotland. This document, designed by a committee of Scottish bishops, was set up to be the exclusive liturgical handbook for Scottish church services, beginning in July 1637.

Rather than submit to such a drastic innovation, which challenged large portions of Scottish communities in one of their most fundamental marks of identity—faith—the northern kingdom rose up in revolt. The initial uprising, spearheaded by several zealous clergymen, lasted for several months, during which Charles I—in one of his classic cases of indecision—did very little to counteract the malaise. Throughout the winter and early spring of 1638, Scottish ministers and petty nobility formed a union called the National Covenant, which committed them to defying the king until the hated liturgy-book was taken away.

Although Charles used force to suppress this dissension, he was hampered by financial constraints: Parliament would not give him money to go and crush the revolt. When some funds were finally scraped together in the summer of 1639, the king proved unable to browbeat or coerce the Scottish ministers and their followers into submitting to the royal will. The royal inability to face down rebellious subjects would have dangerous ramifications for Charles Stuart in a few short years.

**Conclusion**

The beginning of war with France in 1635 turned Catalonia into a strategic frontier zone. Yet oddly enough, this fact exacerbated much that was bad in the relations between Catalonia and Castile rather than bringing about a temporary reconciliation. The increased presence of imperial soldiers throughout Catalonia, along with the need to transport, quarter, and feed these troops between campaigns, further escalated the
heightened sense of tension between Catalans and Castile. In addition, conflicts that had lain dormant for a long time—such as the usage of Catalan or Castilian during church services, or the extent to which the crown could legitimately tax the Church—revived in the Provincial Councils of 1636 and 1637, the latter held while French armies were at that moment invading Roussillon.

Despite his awareness of Catalan discontent, the Count-Duke of Olivares continued to press forward with grand designs in his quest for a united Spain.\textsuperscript{40} It appears that no one, Catalan or Castilian, cleric or laity, expected the chaos that erupted in the spring of 1640, culminating in the fire and death of the Corpus de Sang, which rent not only the Catalan polity, but ultimately the Catalan church as well. The revolt appears all the more surprising after the remarkable fidelity displayed by the entire Catalan community in the long campaign to recapture Salses.

Although popular animosity regarding the quartering of soldiers had festered for four years, no voice rose up during that time advocating revolt or separation. The Catalans suffered assaults on their tradition institutions, their political liberties, and their economic privileges with a patient spirit. The event that finally broke the silence was the burning of two churches—together with the Holy Sacrament—at Riudarenes and Montirò, and the excommunication of the soldiers responsible that followed these crimes. Previously the difficulties with Madrid had only offended certain segments or factions of

\textsuperscript{40} Among the many attempts to persuade the Catalans to participate in Olivares's Union of Arms, religion was cited as an important factor, and not just because of the current context of the Thirty Years' War. Writing to the Catalans towards the end of the Corts of 1626, Philip IV would exhort them, "Mis enemigos han hecho guerra contra mi . . . por quince años: por este mismo tiempo deseo que juntéis Armas mis Reinos y Señorios, para que el terror de este poder escarmienten los injustos y pérfidos intentos de los enemigos de Dios y míos. . . ." Later on the king informed his subjects, "si queréis que vuelva a Castilla sin conseguir seguridad y firmeza de la Religión Católica y de todos mis Reinos, por no venir a lo que os propongo, será en buena hora. . . ." "Felipe IV i les Corts catalanes," in Jordi Galofré i Illamola-Simal, 
\textit{Documents de Catalunya recull de textos històrics} (Barcelona: Barcanova, 1990), 111.
the Catalan population. But this sacrilege constituted a greater offense: a crime committed against all of the Principat. In a “patria” so divided into bitter factions and rivalries like Catalonia, only a religious spark had the power of raising an entire people.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{41}The more one studies the history of Catalonia in the seventeenth century, the more one realizes that significant unions between Catalan factions are very rare. The great antipathy between the members of the Church (particular the cathedral canons) and the city fathers of Girona, Barcelona, Vic, and the Seu d’Urgell only a few years before 1640, and the dissolution of this concord a few years after 1640 gives a greater importance to the unity that emerged during the critical year of revolt.
CHAPTER 1
Catalonia: Land of Factions, Faith, and a Devotion to “la patria i ciudad ahont se habit”

“The Letter kills, but the Spirit brings life,”

St. Paul

“[W]hen…a man talks to you of the Spirit and Intention, and complains of the dryness of the Word, look at him askance. He is not far removed from Heresy.” (or, The Spirit kills, but the Letter brings life),

Hilaire Belloc

Having examined the numerous external and internal pressures affecting the composite “Spanish” monarchy, it is time to turn to consider Catalonia more closely. Just as the kingdom of “Spain” was itself composed of different provinces and regions, with distinct histories and traditions of political or economic liberty, so too Catalonia was comprised of disparate communities, from small villages under the protection of a local baron to larger cities enjoying numerous privileges from the king. It is necessary to first understand the typically divided nature of Catalonia—in which factions were pitted against factions in the major cities, and each major city was in league or opposed to another—to better comprehend the dramatic way in which the tragic events of 1640 could overcome these internal dissensions and create some sort of a unity.

Spain, as many Americans understand it today, is a single country, unified for centuries—with the possible exception of the Basque people. The marriage between Ferdinand and Isabella in 1469, which for all intents and purposes created the geographic

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42 II Corinthians 3:6
nation we know today, did not produce a single ruler, however, but rather a composite monarchy originally made up of two kingdoms, Castile and Aragon. Aragon itself was also a composite monarchy, composed of three regions: Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia. The conquest of Granada in 1492 and the acquisition of mountainous kingdom of Navarre from France in 1512 extended the joint monarchy to more or less its present boundaries.

Despite maintaining the appearance of unity throughout most of the early modern period, each kingdom kept its unique laws and “constitutions,” which to varying degrees limited the king in the exercise of his authority in that particular realm. The main challenge of royal government was to mollify the concerns regarding the safety of various constitutions protecting provinces from arbitrary rule, while at the same time trying to extend royal control over those same provinces. The marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella united only a family; it would take well over two centuries to rein in the independent polities of the Iberian peninsula that clung tightly to their beloved traditions. And chief among those die-hard polities was Catalonia.

In the early modern period, the official title of this land was referred to as the Principat of Catalonia, covering present-day Catalonia and Andorra, and the Comtats of Roussillon and Cerdagne, which now form the Department of Pyrénées-Orientales over the mountains in France. The Catalan people are linguistically different from the rest of the Iberian peninsula as well as from the dialects of southern France. As an independent kingdom for centuries, Catalonia even enjoyed a brief imperial history in the Middle Ages that began with the Aragonese expansion into southern Italy. Through the formation of the Catalan Grand Company, perhaps the first mercenary outfit of its kind in
Europe, and the development of an unbeatable navy under Admiral Roger de Lauria, Catalan-Aragonese military, political and economic influence stretched across the Mediterranean as far as the Peloponnesus.44

Since the Early Middle Ages, the people of Catalonia have possessed a strong sense of regional identity, particularly in the face of aggressive political and social campaigns from the rest of Spain and France. Yet, this common identity rarely masked the reality that underneath the common flag, underneath the common heritage and tongue, lay deep-seated enmities between families, between social groups, and between cities. Despite the appearance of a unified political entity, the region of Catalonia has been—and indeed, continues to be—rife with social conflict, operating on a number of different levels and dividing the larger provincial cities and their surrounding lands against each other. A serious investigation of the 1640 Catalan revolt must therefore begin by examining the nature of Catalan society in the early seventeenth century, a society with a strong adherence to the Catholic faith, and with a population largely focused on nine major urban and ecclesiastical centers: Barcelona, Perpignan, Tarragona, Tortosa, Lleida, Girona, Vic, Solsona, and the Seu d’Urgell.

44 Formed in 1281 to fight with the Sicilians in their rebellion against the Angevin Empire—now famously known as the Sicilian Vespers—this band of mercenaries eventually went to Anatolia where, in the service of the Byzantine emperor they carved out a substantial realm from numerous Turkish princes who exercised control in the power vacuum that existed between the passing of the Seljuk dynasty and the rise of the house of Osman. After a few years, the Catalan mercenaries turned against the Byzantine emperor, fighting in the service of a Frankish nobleman styled “the Duke of Athens.” After seizing several cities on the Greek mainland from the emperor, the Catalans, true to form, turned on their master, killed him, and assumed the title “Duke of Athens” for their king back in Barcelona. For more on the Catalan Grand Company and their first leader, Roger de Flor, see Francisco de Moncada, Roger de Flor y los almorávares (Madrid: Ediciones Alcántara, 1998). Despite the prestigious title, no royal personage from Barcelona ever occupied the dukedom. The most recent monograph published on the origins of Catalan-Aragonese naval power, which occurred during the same time as the formation of the Grand Company, is Lawrence V. Mott, Sea Power in the Medieval Mediterranean: The Catalan-Aragonese Fleet in the War of the Sicilian Vespers (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2003). I am gratefully to Dr. John Guilmartin for bringing this work to my attention.
Natural and Internal Resistance to Order: Geography and Banditry in Catalonia

When one looks at a physical map of Spain in the general area of Catalonia, it would appear that the Principality had been blessed with that most sought-after quality, natural borders: the sea to the east, rivers to the south and west, and a mountain chain to the north. Unfortunately, the political boundaries of the Principat and Comtats during the seventeenth century stretched beyond those natural borders, extending southward beyond the Ebro, westward across the Segre, and northward over the Pyrenees. Within its political boundary, Catalonia and Roussillon are mostly mountainous, with three large and fertile valleys, the Urgell valley in the west, along the borders of Aragon; the Empordà valley along the east in the diocese of Girona; and the plains of Roussillon, which run open-ended from the Pyrenees to the Mediterranean.45

A few miles within the Catalan frontier, three cities protected the way into the heart of Catalonia. In the north, the small town of Salses, with its unique sunken fortress built by Ferdinand II in the late fifteenth century, guarded the main road south from Languedoc; mountain spurs hemmed in the town on one side, while the great salt marshes, the Etaing de Salses, restricted passage on the other side. To the south, the city of Tortosa is the key to the Ebro, a slow-moving river that forms a wide delta upon reaching the Mediterranean. All the roads from Catalonia to Valencia pass through this urban center, and it is extremely tough for invading armies that might seek to bypass it. The Marquis de los Vélez would enter Catalonia through Tortosa in 1640, and, despite the advantages of modern technology, Franco was obliged to follow the same path in

45 Pierre Vilar, Catalunya dins l’Espanya Moderna. Recerques sobre els fonaments econòmics de les estructures nacionals vol. 1 (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1964), 81-82. Also see maps at the end of this chapter.
To the west, the city of Lleida, which lies along the Segre river, provides a similar bulwark to enemies coming across the border of Aragon. Although Lleida’s defenses were constructed on a smaller scale than Tortosa, the extensive desert land and high sierras that run westward into Aragon—which made invading armies reluctant to choose this route—made grand fortifications less necessary.

The geographic structure of the Principat in general is oriented southwest to northeast, following the pattern of mountain ranges and valleys. As a result, the major communication lines ran this way too: during sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it was far easier for Barcelona to communicate with Girona and even the rural town of Vic, which lie to the north and northeast, than it was to communicate with the larger city of Lleida, lying to the west. Although the major roads in Catalonia ran along the coast, from Tortosa to Perpignan, there was one route that traversed the region laterally: it was the royal highway, along which gold from the Indies traveled to Barcelona, there to make its way to the various Spanish tercios fighting in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe.

Catalan bandits loved to prey upon the royal highway from Lleida to Tarragona. During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, bandits roamed this road as well as the northern hinterlands and central mountains of the region, preying on gold trains

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46 Vilar, 91-92. Because of this tenuous position, Tortosa has been less likely to join in with its fellow Catalans during seasons of revolt. The city sided with Philip IV in 1640, and stayed loyal to the Bourbons in the War of Succession, thus earning the enmity of many of their fellow countrymen. Even today, many people in Barcelona regard the Tortosans as “not true Catalans.”

47 Vilar, 95-96. Ironically, Lleida is built on the western banks of the Segre, thus making it easier to defend the city from the eastern approaches (that is, from inside Catalonia), where the river acts as a grand moat, rather than from the west. French armies moving from the Principat discovered this harsh military reality in their vain attempts to take the city under Marshal La Mothe in 1644, the Count de Harcourt in 1646, and the Prince de Condé in 1647. Though initially loyal to the Franco-Catalan cause, Lleida fell to the forces of Philip IV in 1643.
heading for Italy and the Spanish road, or engaging in smuggling activities with France.\textsuperscript{48} The poor roads and the decentralized nature of early modern society compounded the difficulty facing any government authority that sought to stop these problems, and made places like Vic and Urgell the headquarters for brigands and smugglers during the early seventeenth century. In general, Catalan banditti formed themselves into two main groups, each based on two rival noble houses in the north, the \textit{nyerros} or the \textit{cadells}.

The \textit{nyerros} were led by Tomàs de Banyuls i de Llupià, the lord of Nyer, a small village lying the Conflent valley in Roussillon. During the baron’s heyday in the late sixteenth-century, he turned both the village of Nyer and the neighboring abbey of Sant Miquel de Cuixa into hotbeds of smuggling. In 1579, the viceroy, Fernando de Toledo, temporarily seized both town and abbey, forcing Tomàs de Banyuls to suspend operations in the area and, for a time, he and many of his associates took their business to the smuggling centers south beyond the Pyrenees. It was here, among the towns of Seu d’Urgell and Puigcerdà, that the \textit{nyerros} came into conflict with the lord of Arsèguel and his supporters, known as the \textit{cadells}. The competition between these two rival factions soon became immersed in the larger Catalan tradition of feuding and robbery. The internal disruption caused by these groups peaked in Catalonia from 1588-1592, surfaced again for a few years around 1618, and briefly arose once more from 1628-1634, when the capture and death of the infamous outlaw Serralonga effectively ended the glory days of Catalan bandits.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{48} Xavier Torres Sans, \textit{Els Bandolers (s. XVI-XVII)} (Vic: Eumo, 1991), 45-47. This book is currently the definitive study on banditry in early modern Catalonia and has some good maps, on pp. 48-51; 55-56.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid, 41. For some of the effects of brigandage on the Catalan church during this time, see A. D. Wright, \textit{Catholicism and Spanish Society under the Reign of Philip II, 1555-1598, and Philip III, 1598-1621}.\textsuperscript{48}
While the names of individual bandits passed away into obscurity during the seventeenth century, the names *nyerros* and *cadells* became fixed in the common terminology of Catalonia. The two families were not the only rivals within Catalonia and Roussillon: on the contrary, every noble family in the Principat was in some way allied or at odds with each other, and personal rivalries and feuding was quite common. Yet much of the internal conflict in cities like Vic or Manresa during the 1630s and 1640s was attributed to fighting between *nyerros* and *cadells.*

It is possible that every person calling himself a *nyerro* or *cadell* was related by blood or patronage to the house of Nyer or Arsèguel, but it seems more likely that the names of Nyerro and Cadell turned from specifically-defined factions into an heuristic device. The practice of using these labels as a convenient epithet continued during the revolt as those loyal to the Franco-Catalan cause soon broke into factions that warred against each other for privileges and positions. After 1640, Josep de Margarit and Josep Fontanella would become the leaders of one faction (although Fontanella wound up making himself so universally disliked, that both sides refused to acknowledge he was one of them), while Josep d’Ardena and Francesc Viladamor led another. All four men were strong pro-French Catalans, and all four would go into exile in 1652 rather than accept a Castilian victory. Yet both sides freely used the appellations through the later years of the war, though more in the attempt to stop “self-serving” petitions (and promote their own) than to hint at suspected treason.


50 See MS in BAEV by Diego Sanz, entitled *Relacio breu dels successos, segonas intention y locuras, que an suçeget y se son fetas en la ciutat de Vich desdel any 1634, fins al de 1641*; and Elliott, *Revolt of the Catalans*, 463–465.

51 Although just when such a shift occurred is uncertain.

52 Elliott suggests that Fontanella and Margarit were probably *cadells*, Elliott, *Revolt of the Catalans*, 480.
Group allegiance had a strong influence on the mindset of many Catalans during the seventeenth century. In an era where few things were certain, where turmoil and changing fortunes were the order of the day, familial and group—not personal—privileges were one of the most important factors of a person’s life. Individualism was very rare—for the most part, people lived in a group, usually defined by what sort of work they did. Society was organized on the model of a vast chain of being, and the good of the cosmos depended on this order being maintained. The best way this could be done was through the confirmation and sustaining of group privileges.

On the one hand, influential leaders within the Principat could tap the powerful effects of group loyalty in Catalonia and raise a greater number of the population in times of trouble or discontent. If the perceived threat was great enough, rivals could be persuaded to set aside their personal grievances for the good of the commonwealth, as occurred both in 1639 and for a time in 1640. On the other hand, the inherent divisiveness of these groups, and the tendency for any alliance to degenerate into feuding factions, hampered the Catalans from being able to sustain a united front for very long. When the Catalan leadership turned to France in the winter of 1640 and sought a closer relationship with a power whom they had long recognized as their enemies, they added a volatile element that hastened, rather than retarded, the break-down of any significant, unified Catalan resistance.

By means of the particular geographical features of the Principat and Comtats, and supported by the three defensive strongholds of Salses, Tortosa, and Lleida, Catalonia might have been able to shut itself off from Castile and France with relative ease. But, despite the appearance of stability, the numerous factions within Catalonia
presented a grave security problem for any government attempting to maintain order and control. While the banditry problem in the Principat would largely be resolved by the beginning of Philip IV’s reign, the ambitious centralizing policies of his chief minister, the Count-Duke of Olivares, would continue to upset life in Catalonia.

In addition to its physical geography, the unique ecclesiastical and urban geography of Catalonia and Roussillon played an important part in shaping the context as well as the events of the Catalan Revolt. In short, the chapter will introduce the *dramatis personae*—religious as well as secular—and portray with the best possible care the context in which, and the causes for which, these actors lived, fought, and died. Furthermore, it will describe the spirit of division that characterized early-modern Catalonia, united though its people were by a common creed, a common tongue, and a common political heritage. By understanding the important role that religion played in the lives of the Catalan people, as well as the prevalence of rivalry and discord that existed among religious and secular communities throughout the Principat and Comtats during the early seventeenth century, one can better appreciate the power with which religious concerns overcame an inherent tendency towards faction and produced an unprecedented level of unity in the fall of 1640.

**Catalonia, A Land of Factions**

Above all else, Catalonia could be typified by a universally self-centered attitude, expressed in the small rural hamlet as strongly as in the cosmopolitan capital, and irritating to many elsewhere in the composite Spanish monarchy. This is not to imply that the Catalans were heartless people, immune to appeals for aid from their king for causes that were not immediately apparent to their own self-interest; rather, they may
have loved their local patria too much\textsuperscript{53}, and responded with a jealous anger towards any attempt to introduce competing loyalties, be it from Barcelona or Madrid. Their passionate devotion for, and adherence to, the many “constitutions” that granted privileges to cities and social groups alike maintained some degree of order within the Principat of Catalonia and the Comtats of Roussillon and Cerdagne.

Such concern for constitutions did not go over well, however, when the growing power of the Castilian monarch forced the Catalans to recognize the distasteful reality that they were part of a larger community. Not only that, but the Catalans were gradually made aware of the increasing burdens and responsibilities associated with belonging to the composite monarchy, especially financial burdens that created a disparity when the kings’ requests were compared to political traditions expressed in the Catalans’ constitutions. It was this growing chasm between tradition and the changing reality of the early-modern world that led to most of the social tensions that afflicted the external and internal affairs of Catalonia and laid the foundation for a serious rupture with their lord and king.\textsuperscript{54}

These tensions, which at times were prone to break out in violent reactions, can be grouped into two major spheres: one external, in which Catalonia tended to operate as a

\textsuperscript{53} Often when one speaks of patria in the early-modern period, the object of devotion is a much smaller locale than is generally considered. In other words, rather than conceiving of their patria as one big “mother-country,” or “fatherland,” seventeenth-century Catalans were more often than not referring to their home town, or their home county, called a vegueria. For more on early-modern notions of patria, see Sir John Elliott, “Revots in the Spanish Monarchy,” in Forster & Greene, eds., Preconditions of Revolution in Early Modern Europe, 114; and I. A. A. Thompson’s chapter, “Castile, Spain, and the monarchy: the political community from patria natural to patria nacional” in Richard Kagan and Geoffrey Parker, eds. Spain, Europe, and the Atlantic World: Essays in Honour of John H. Elliott (Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 125-159.

\textsuperscript{54} Technically, Barcelona was ruled by a Count, and the entire region of Catalonia and Roussillon by a Prince, but since these were all secondary titles of the Habsburg kings of Castile, I will keep the general title “king” for the sake of convenience.
unit, and the other, internal, where one’s loyalties to a particular *patria* or institution resulted in bitter conflicts with other Catalans. The first, and largest of these spheres was the realm of broad regional conflict, manifested by pitting a group of Catalans against the other members of the Crown of Aragon—the kingdoms of Aragon and Valencia. Much of the time this was an ecclesiastical conflict: the Catalan diocese of Tortosa had lands within the official realm of Valencia, while the diocese of Lleida controlled the territory around Monzón, a town several miles beyond the Catalan-Aragon border. The bishops of these two dioceses continually sought to receive the tithes due them from these lands, as well as the rents from religious houses, while the inhabitants within those areas constantly fought against them. The issue of ecclesiastical jurisdiction over these disputed zones did not disappear and indeed continued to rankle in the minds of bishop and chapter alike.

An additional component to the regional sphere of conflict came along with the union of the two crowns in 1469. Catalonia resented the new political developments that began from the very outset of this royal amalgamation with Castile. Not only did their king, Ferdinand, absent himself for long periods of time from their capital at Barcelona, but the fiscal burden of maintaining the union also irritated Catalonia, which, because of a substantial trade network, was richer than either Aragon or Valencia, the other two regions that constituted the kingdom of Aragon. The monarchy’s subsequent imperial expansion together with the accension of the foreign Habsburg dynasty exacerbated

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55 While the stress and strain affected all levels of society, this thesis, because it is specifically concerned with the clergy, will concentrate on portraying the ecclesiastical reactions to these various tensions.

56 In fact, the debate surrounding this extended jurisdiction became quite an issue during the War of the Segadors when the bishop of Lleida fled his city to Monzón, yet still claimed authority over the Catalan diocese, a point which his own chapter boldly ignored.
matters even further. Philip II determined to place the permanent capital of “Spain” in Castile and embarked on projects designed to centralize the ecclesiastical and political institutions of his composite kingdom, which heretofore had flourished under disparate, and sometimes conflicting, traditions. As will be seen in the following chapter, the furtherance of these policies under his grandson, Philip IV, during the 1620s and 1630s would alienate many social groups in Catalonia, but especially the ecclesiastical estate.

A second “layer” of conflict present in early-modern Catalonia involved the internal rivalries and alliances formed among the province’s many small towns. As we shall see, not only were these towns in constant rivalry with one another before 1640, each one was also prone to internal disputes. The most intense of these internal disputes pitted elements of the Catholic Church—the bishop, cathedral chapter, or religious order—against the local town government, which at this time was generally made up of a three-or-four person council.57 Ironically, many of the well-known actors in the drama of 1640—Pau Claris, Josep Fontanella, Enric d’Alemany, and Gregorio Parcero—first come to the historian’s attention during these earlier conflicts. These priests and lawyers would cut their teeth on local controversies, developing friendships with one another as well as solidifying a method of approaching “conflict resolution.” When the crisis came in 1640, these men and others would step into the breach, carefully articulating Catalonia’s grievances against the king while at the same time bringing social order to their beloved patria.

57 In Barcelona, these men were referred to as consellers; in Girona, jurats; in Vic, cônsols; in Lleida, pahers; despite the variance in titles, their positions and authority were generally the same.

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Catalonia, A Land of Faith: An Ecclesiastical Gazetteer

There are a number of difficulties facing any attempt to discuss the influence of the Catholic Church in Catalonia. Chief among these problems is the lack of solid data: no one has yet “crunched the numbers” to identify exactly how many people served in the Catalan religious community during the first half of the seventeenth century. From the data assembled in other periods, however, one can estimate that the total number of clergy in Catalonia during this time was probably around 6-7% of the population, although in some locales, like Girona, the figure approached ten-percent. The best sources also indicate that “the number of clerics in Spain increased both absolutely and proportionately” during the last decades of the sixteenth century and the first half of the 1600s, which could indicate a growing awareness (prominence?) for the Church and its members in the social milieu.

Unlike the nobility, the first estate was not a closed social order. On the contrary, priests, canons, friars, monks, and bishops came from a variety of different backgrounds and moved comfortably at every level of society. According to Dominguez Ortiz, the local parish priest was very much tied to his pueblo and it environs, in other words, his patria, which became a family for him. On the opposite end of the spectrum, there were a number of clergy with great influence in political affairs throughout Catalonia and Castile, serving as representatives of their estate in the Corts or the Braços General.

58 Antonio Dominguez Ortiz, La Sociedad Española en el siglo XVII, vol. 2; El Estamento Eclesiástico (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1970), 8; Elliott, Revolt of the Catalans, 27; Joan Busquets i Dalmau and Antoni Simon i Tarrés, Girona al Segle XVIII (Girona: Ajuntament de Girona, 1993), 44.
59 Wright, Catholicism and Spanish Society, 119.
60 Dominguez Ortiz, La Sociedad Española en el siglo XVII, vol. 2; El Estamento Eclesiástico, 172.
61 The Braços General was a gathering of the three estates in Catalonia. In the Middle Ages, this body exercised viceregal authority during those times when the king was absent from the Principality. By the
Two of the most important political positions in Catalan government—the Diputat Eclesiàstic and the Canceller, were both clerics. Finally, members of the religious orders occasionally served important roles as advisors and confessors and preachers for the Diputació and the Court at Madrid.

Bishops and Chapters

The first “order” within the ecclesiastical estate in Catalonia was made up of the bishops and the cathedral chapters. There were nine bishoprics in the Principat during the seventeenth century, the newest one, Solsona, being created by Philip II in 1593. While the annual rents for bishopric like Toledo or Seville ranged from 100,000 to 200,000 ducats, the proceeds from dioceses in Catalonia were much smaller. The primary reason for this was that a majority of the tithes in the Principat went to secular lords rather than to the Church.

The episcopal positions inside Catalonia were often filled with foreigners, unlike any other body within the Catalan church. The presence of so many non-Catalans in positions of authority in the principality’s dioceses became a serious point of contention.

seventeenth century, however, over a hundred years had elapsed since the last calling of the Braços General, although several attempts were made by the Catalan Diputació—the six-man executive that governed Catalonia in between the calling of the Corts—to organize one, claiming a state of emergency.

The Canceller was a cleric who served as president of the first chamber of the Audiència, the seventeen-person Catalan supreme court. In addition to ruling on cases, the Audiència had come in recent decades to serve in an advisory role for the Viceroy in Barcelona; thus people also referred to the court with the name “Consell Real.” Next to the Diputat Eclesiàstic, the Canceller was the most powerful cleric to hold office in Catalonia.

Dominguez Ortiz noted that beginning in 1635, there were fewer preachers at the royal court in Madrid. Ostensibly this practice of supporting clergy diminished because of mounting war costs, but also because of unwanted opinions occurring among the priests, some speaking out against the nuncio in their homilies, such as one “Trinitarian Capuchin,” who wrote that “el papa es contra nosotros por sus intereses particulares,” while others, such as the Capuchin Pare Ocaña, spoke out in his sermon against, “el papel sellado y tanto tributo, ponderando que todo ella seria más de llevarse si se emplease en defensa del Reino.” Dominguez Ortiz, La Sociedad Española en el siglo XVII, vol. 2; El Estamento Eclesiástico, 200.

Ibid, 30.
between bishops and the Catalan clergy under them.\textsuperscript{65} Whether they were royalists or not, oftentimes a bishop’s personality was at the heart of conflicts between the see and the chapter. Conciliatory bishops like Gregorio Parcero and Garcia Gil Manrique were uncommon and there were numerous examples to the contrary: Archbishop Juan de Guzmán in Tarragona set off innumerable fights with the cathedral chapter during his tenure in the 1620s-1630s, as did Bishops Garcia Gil in Vic, Pau Duran at Urgell, and Bernardo Caballero de Paredes in Lleida.

The chapter clergy constituted a significant portion of the total clergy, having dignitaries, canons, prebendaries (honorary canons) and chaplains all told in their lot. A typical chapter in Catalonia might have seven dignitaries, twenty-one canons, and twenty-four prebendaries, while a small one, only three dignitaries, ten canons, and six prebendaries.\textsuperscript{66} As with bishoprics, there was a great disparity in the wealth generated by chapters throughout the composite monarchy. Chapters in Toledo and Seville gathered an average of two thousand ducats per year, while Catalan chapters had great difficulties collecting as much as three hundred ducats.

\textsuperscript{65} Nearly one-half of all vacant bishoprics in Catalonia from 1600-1620 were filled by foreigners. Ibid, 21. Both Sir John Elliott and Dominguez Ortiz contend that, contrary to nineteenth-century Catalan historians, the appointment of “foreigners” to Catalan dioceses was probably not a conscious effort by Madrid to control the peripheral clergy.

A further controversy lay in the number of regular clergy who were appointed as bishops, which brought them into conflict not only with the secular clergy in the chapter, but sometimes with other members of their order. Dominicans, Franciscans, and Benedictines respectively constituted the largest number of regulars who become bishops. The reason for this is still a matter of debate, but the general consensus among scholars like Joan Busquets and Joan Bada is that regulars were more agreeable than their secular counterparts to pursuing royalist policies, especially in Catalonia.

In November 1626, Philip IV inquired of the Consejo de Camera why Capuchins, Discalced Carmelites, and Jesuits were not nominated to the prelates of Spain. The Consejo resolved that in many cases it was against their own constitutions: the Capuchins and Carmelites had taken vows of humility and poverty, while a specific constitution of the Jesuits made it illegal for any member of their order to become a bishop—points that, at the time, these three orders kept with great strictness. Dominguez Ortiz, La Sociedad Española en el siglo XVII, vol. 2; El Estamento Eclesiástico, 22-23. Dominguez Ortiz observed later in his work that once a member of a religious order became a bishop or dignitary it often meant burning his bridges with the rest of his order. Ibid, 110, n. 80.

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid, 39.
The social background of these chapter canons was incredibly complex, although their salaries were fairly low. The cost of living in most Catalan towns—apart from Barcelona—appears to have been quite adequate for a canon’s salary, particularly if, as was the case in Girona, the canon was well-born. But rarely did cathedral clergy live extravagantly.\(^6^7\) While the rents in larger Catalan dioceses were greater, the local clergy were also expected to put on more extravagant liturgies and special masses for the people, balancing out whatever fiscal advantage they might have had over their brethren in smaller bishoprics.

**Parish and Rural Clergy**

In many ways the parish and rural clergy were very similar to a “Third Estate:” they were a very heterogeneous group, mostly poorer and less educated than the cathedral clergy, although there were exceptions.\(^6^8\) Their lack of education was particularly trying for bishops inspired to implement Tridentine reforms throughout their diocese, and many Catalan Jesuits and Capuchins undertook missionary work to rectify the spiritual need in the countryside during the seventeenth century. Indeed, it was as a result of one of these rural missionary trips that the sacrilegious fires of Riudarenès became known first in Girona and then throughout Catalonia.

A further area of concern for bishops was that many of these rural parishes were the patronages of a local baron who collected the tithe for himself rather than for the church. While most of the tithe was collected in kind and not in cash, the rural Catalan parishes were still regularly poorer than their Castilian counterparts. Tithes collected

\(^6^7\) Ibid, 40. In 1600, Phil III asked the Spanish ambassador in Rome to petition Pope Clement VIII to reduce the number of canons in Barcelona’s chapter from forty to twenty-five to alleviate the extreme poverty of all. Ibid, 40, n. 79; also pp. 41-42.

\(^6^8\) Ibid, 49-50.
from one of the poorest Castilian parish during the seventeenth century might amount to three-or-four hundred ducats; while a Catalan parish would be considered wealthy if it raised half that amount.\(^69\)

The priest in rural areas was always in direct contact with the parish; sometimes he was seen as a village elder or as a judge to mediate disputes. Even here, though, there are conflicts between priests and beneficed clergy over who could get the patronage of a particular lord, even though the rents were pitifully small. More than money, these entrants sought the privileges of ecclesiastical estate, especially the liberty of not paying taxes.\(^70\) Many of them lacked the concept of a vocation present in a parish priest, which may help to explain why the Catalan church was permeated with violence, ever-present in the Principat during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.\(^71\)

**The Regular Clergy: Numbers and Orders**

As with other statistics dealing with the Catalan church, the data on regular clergy within Catalonia during the seventeenth century is very sparse. The most current information suggests that there were over 250 religious houses in the Principality, forty-eight in Barcelona alone.\(^72\) As with the secular clergy, the largest growth in the regular orders came during the last decades of the 1500s and the first half of the 1600s; after 1650, there was a marked decrease due either to a “spiritual saturation” within the orders, or to other social or economic reasons. Regardless of the particular motivations to join a religious community, the growth of traditional orders as well as the introduction of new

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\(^{69}\) Ibid, 59; see also Elliott, *Revolt of the Catalans*, 288.

\(^{70}\) Domínguez Ortiz, *La Sociedad Española en el siglo XVII*, vol. 2; *El Estamento Eclesiástico*, 64-65.

\(^{71}\) Ibid, 66-67.
ones could not fail to work a spiritual leaven within the various regions that constituted “Spanish” society.\textsuperscript{73}

There were three major branches among the regular orders: the \textit{Moncales}, or monastic branch; the Mendicants; and the Regular Clergy. Moncales consisted of the oldest orders, namely the Benedictines and Cistercians. These orders had houses in urban areas in Castile, but in rural areas in Catalonia, such as Montserrat, Ripoll, and Cuixa. Many of the Benedictine houses were founded during the early Middle Ages in northern Catalonia.

By the mid-seventeenth century, there were two different “congregations” of Benedictines serving in Catalonia. The older one, called “Congregación Claustrales de la Provincia Tarraconense,” traced its roots back to the earliest history of the order in Spain. By the 1630s, there were nearly twenty abbeys and other houses attached to this congregation in Catalonia. More recently, however, a “reformed” or “Observant” Congregation had been established under the auspices of the Catholic Kings of Spain.\textsuperscript{74} Centered on the monastery at Valladolid, this “Observant Congregation” had made some

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{72} Joan Bada, ed. \textit{Catalònia Religiosa. Atles Històric: Dels Orígens als Nostres Dies} (Barcelona: Claret, 1991), 63. Other cities with large numbers of religious houses were Girona, with 15; 13 in Lleida; 12 in Tarragona; 11 in Tortosa; 10 in Vic; 9 in Manresa; and 8 in Perpignan. The Catalan total of around 250 was again roughly one-tenth of the numbers computed for all “Spain.” Dominguez Ortiz has calculated the total population of regular clergy in 1623, as being 44,915 persons (male and female) in 2141 houses (Dominguez Ortiz, \textit{La Sociedad Española en el siglo XVII}, vol. 2; \textit{El Estamento Eclesiástico}, 70, n.3).
\item \textsuperscript{73} Dominguez Ortiz, \textit{La Sociedad Española en el siglo XVII}, vol. 2; \textit{El Estamento Eclesiástico}, 71.
\item \textsuperscript{74} Though labeled “reformed,” there appears to have been little difference in the spiritual lives of the two congregations, save that the Congregation Claustrales maintained the old form of electing abbots from among their number, while the abbots of the Congregation Observant were appointed by the king. Another issue, which is only addressed obliquely in the protests of Catalan brothers suggests that the king was very concerned about their vow of poverty, and, believing it to be incompatible with the amount of money these monks took in as rent, hoped to relieve them of such a fiscal “temptation” by taking care of it himself!
\end{itemize}

The Catalan memorial from Ripoll makes it clear to the court that neither side was pretending to live in accordance with the severe rule of St. Benedict: “Las cuales Congregaciones, si bien en muchas coasa son diferentes, pero convienen en esto, \textit{que ni la una, ni la otra guarda la primitiva regla de san Benito en su rigor, por benignidad, y dispensaciones de los sumos Pontífices.” BC: FB 6112: Memorial Para la Magestad del Rey Nuestro Señor en Favor del Monasterio de Nuestra Señora de Ripoll, sobre la reforma que se insta (Barcelona: Pere Lacavalleria, 1628), f. 311v, emphasis mine.
headway into Catalonia as the king appointed “Observant” abbots: the famous house of Montserrat, now controlled by Castilian abbots, had switched to the new Congregation, as had two or three other monasteries. Following the “defection” of Montserrat, the abbey of Ripoll in northern Catalonia took over leadership of the “Claustral” Benedictines.

The Cistercians arose later in the Middle Ages, and most of their houses can be found in the southern region of Catalonia, in the dioceses of Tarragona and Tortosa. Like the Benedictines, the order came under pressure to “reform” by Ferdinand and Isabella, but the Catalan branch of the order resisted until 1613. Again, much like the Benedictines, the Cistercians enjoyed a reputation throughout the Iberian peninsula: the monasteries of Poblet and Santas Creus in southern Catalonia were among two of the most prestigious houses in all “Spain.”

Despite royal intervention during the sixteenth century, the Benedictines and Cistercians enjoyed a great amount of autonomy within the walls of their houses and good relations with both the Principat and the Crown. While not too ascetic, their diets were not full either, and during the seventeenth century members of both orders sought to follow a middle road, avoiding the strictness of the Jesuits and Capuchins as well as the tendency to grow too lax in their devotions.

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75 The most notable change among the Cistercians was turning the position of abbot into a three-year elective post rather than a life-time position.
76 The abbot of Poblet was also a secular lord and was considered the most important personage in Catalonia after the Duke of Cardona. He held seven baronies in many places, and was able to present priests for parishes throughout Catalonia and even into Valencia. By 1603, there were around 300 people working at Poblet, and one-third of them were monks. The yearly rent averaged 15-16,000 escudos. At the smaller house of Santas Creus, there were 140 people, with fifty monks, and seventy dependents, all of whom the records listed as “French.” The yearly rent for this house was around 9-10,000 escudos. Dominguez Ortiz, La Sociedad Española en el siglo XVII, vol. 2; El Estamento Eclesiástico, 86; 91.
77 Ibid, 86-88.
The Mendicant Orders, founded during the reform movement of the thirteenth century, were more democratic than the moncales, and emphasized evangelism over manual labor. The Franciscans were by far the largest of these orders, and within the order, the majority of its members in Catalonia adhered to the “Observant” branch, or followed stricter “daughter houses” of the order, such as the Capuchins. The Capuchin order, introduced into Catalonia before any other place in the Iberian peninsula, remained very popular in the Principat and Comtats, helping with poor and sick, and attempting to end the myriad of noble feuds that troubled the region. Some friars even became noted diplomats, like Père Joseph, who was a personal aide to Cardinal Richelieu. Another religious organization whose members enjoyed vast success after Trent was the Minimites, who became noted for their pastoral and educational duties in Catalonia.

The second largest Mendicant order was the Dominicans. Under the reign of Philip II and Philip III, the Dominicans were the strongest order in Castile. From their headquarters in Valladolid and Salamanca, they exercised control over Inquisition and also served as the chief proponents of reforming all the regular clergy. Early in the reign of Philip IV, however, the Dominicans lost royal favor due to the popular belief that they had contributed to the mediocre rule of Philip III: the king’s confessor, the Inquisitor-General, and one of the state councilors—all Dominicans—were exiled from the court. This was a serious blow to the order, and though they maintained their

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78 Ibid, 96.
79 Philip II was greatly suspicious of the Capuchin order and personally ordered that the Capuchins not be allowed to spread beyond Catalonia during his reign. While his descendants relaxed this prohibition, it was many years before the Capuchins enjoyed the same popularity in Castile as they had in Catalonia. Wright, Catholicism and Spanish Society, 136.
80 Ibid, 142.
81 Ibid, 130.
82 Ibid, 135.
prominence in the realm of education and in the Inquisition, their favored position in the Castilian monarchy was gone. As a result, the Dominican order became increasingly concerned with any perceived threat to their houses and positions, and began a running war with the Jesuits who were establishing schools of their own in the Principality during the early seventeenth century.

The third order of clergy, which was the only branch to be technically called “regular clergy,” consisted of Augustinian and Premonstratensien Canons. Members of these orders lived in one house, like the moncales, but enjoyed a less ascetic lifestyle than either them or the mendicants. As a result, the Canons became the target for reforms following the Council of Trent. Some houses underwent secularization being placed under control of the local bishop, while others kept their “regular” status, but endured serious changes in their discipline, which took the Jesuits’ constitutions as their model.83

Perhaps the most important “native” religious order in Catalonia was the Ordén de Nuestra Senyora de la Merced, or the Mercedarian Order. Founded around 1215 in Catalonia by Peter Nolasco, a Frenchman, the order’s mission was to ransom Christians, regardless of their social rank or station, who had been captured by the Moors in Granada and Northern Africa. Nolasco’s confessor, another famous Catalan cleric, Ramon de Penyafort, encouraged him in this project and drew up the rules for the order. The Mercedarians enjoyed a rapid growth throughout the kingdom of Aragon, and spread into

83 Dominguez Ortiz, La Sociedad Española en el siglo XVII, vol. 2; El Estamento Eclesiástico, 101.
Portugal and France, but the heart of the order centered around three of the oldest houses in Barcelona, Perpignan, and Vic.\textsuperscript{84}

After the fall of Granada in the late fifteenth century, the order continued its ransoming activities, but also became involved in other royal projects. Members of the order accompanied Columbus on his later voyages, established religious houses overseas, and became influential in converting the Indians. Philip II attempted a reform of the order in the late sixteenth century but, like the Benedictine order, only succeeded in forming a splinter “Reformed” order, with four houses: three in Castile and one in Sicily. The Catalan heart of the order remained unchanged.

One final religious order, slightly different from the others, was the Society of Jesus, otherwise known as the Jesuits. The first houses of the Jesuits were small and located in urban areas. Among the changes they brought to Catalan spirituality was a renewed focus on the Sacraments. The Society of Jesus saw these holy mysteries not as an obligation or privilege to be taken sparingly, but as aids to spiritual improvement. The order used these sacraments to promote a more articulate lay faith, particularly in the remote and peripheral regions of the Iberian peninsula.\textsuperscript{85}

Female orders were more rare in early-modern Catalonia, unlike the present day, where there are more nuns than monks. The chief reason for this was that wealthy patrons in the Principat built fewer houses for women at this time.\textsuperscript{86} Tridentine reforms

\textsuperscript{85} Wright, \textit{Catholicism and Spanish Society}, 161; 163.
\textsuperscript{86} Domínguez Ortiz, \textit{La Sociedad Española en el siglo XVII}, vol. 2; \textit{El Estamento Eclesiástico}, 113.
were primarily aimed at sealing off the nuns from the outside world—cloistering them—which in turn, would affect the amount of influence they would be able to have on society.  

The Inquisition

Perhaps the most popularly imagined and little-known—and never expected—institution connected to the Catholic Church in Catalonia was the Inquisition. Beyond conjured images of torture and hooded officials, the Inquisition was probably the most controversial institution within the Catalan Church, its legacy rife with conflicts, due in large part to the close relationship enjoyed between the Holy Office and the Crown. Even more than the figure of the viceroy, it was the Inquisition that helped create a sense of unity within Catalan society as bishop, cathedral chapter, town fathers, and even on occasion the Audiència and the viceroy, worked together to thwart the designs of this detested body.

The Inquisition as an institution had been present in Catalonia since the thirteenth century, although only with the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, did the monarchy became attached to it as one facet of their ambitious religious policies. Among the monarchs’ first goals was getting the pope to grant them the power to nominate a new

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87 Ibid, 121-122.
88 Indeed, both the viceroy and the bishop of Barcelona were quite sensitive about the competing privileges and powers of the Inquisition, and fiercely protested whenever the Holy Office infringed on their jurisdictions. Wright, Catholicism and Spanish Society, 170.
89 Which included among other objectives, the power to appoint bishops throughout their empire. Joan Bada Elias, La Inquisició a Catalunya, segles XIII-XIX (Barcelona: Barcanova, 1992), 50.
Inquisitor for the Crown of Aragon in 1483. Their selection, a Castilian named Tomás de Torquemada, caused great discontent throughout the kingdom, and especially from the Consell de Cent.90

The animosity between Catalan clerical and secular institutions and the Holy Office increased when the royally appointed Inquisitors went about punishing contrary to Catalan constitutions, most notably confiscating goods and detaining people indefinitely.91 An additional bone of contention arose over the jurisdictions of the Inquisitors located near the frontiers of Catalonia; through the middle of the seventeenth century, the Inquisitor of Zaragoza was in charge of the diocese of Lleida, while the Inquisitor of Valencia oversaw the see of Tortosa.92

Two Inquisitors directed the Barcelona Tribunal, together with a modest staff. All of these officials had to live in the diocese, although their secular informants, or familiars, could be spread out. Much to the dismay of the Catalans, the officers of the Barcelona tribunal were mostly “outsiders.”93 Most of the Inquisitor officials lived in the Palau Reial in Barcelona—which also functioned as the viceroy’s residence—right across a narrow street from the cathedral, and only a few blocks away from the Consell de Cent. The basement of the Inquisition served as a prison, but apparently a very weak one as there were many escapes. Because of this, the Inquisition would frequently resort to

90 Joan Bada, *La Inquisició a Catalunya*, 51-52.
91 At first, there was just one Inquisitor General, serving both Castile and Aragon from 1483-1507, when Ferdinand bowed to pressure and gave the kingdom of Aragon its separate general, nominated from among its own inhabitants. This dual office lasted until 1518, when it was returned to a single General, in which condition it remained, even following the occupation of Portugal in 1580. Also 1483, Ferdinand and Isabella created the *Consejo de la Suprema Inquisición*, which became incorporated into the other royal Councils by Philip IV in 1625; there was one General overseeing the Holy Office, aided by two secretaries, one covering Castile, the other, everything else. Ibid, 54-55.
92 Ibid, 56. Despite the outset of rebellion, the Inquisitor of Barcelona maintained control over Roussillon until 1641.
93 Ibid, 57.
using the city jail instead. In most cases, condemned secular criminals were sent to royal jails, while condemned clergy were sent to convents, to serve their sentences.⁹⁴

Among all those who worked for the Inquisition, it was the Familiars who caused the most problems: they were the intermediates between the Office and the people. One had to be the head of a household and at least twenty-five year old, of “untainted” blood, virtuous, and—ironically—peace-loving. Unfortunately, by the 1600s, the popular image of familiars was an arrogant trouble-maker; much of this stemmed from the numerous privileges the familiars enjoyed which were denied to their fellow lay compatriots. For example, they enjoyed an exemption from royal taxes, and in some cases, local ones; they were allowed to carry firearms prohibited to other Catalans; and—more significantly following 1635—they were free from the obligation to quarter and feed the king’s soldiers. Despite the many privileges, it appears that many Catalans were unwilling to put up with the social ostracism that accompanied the office of familiar: the number of familiars dropped dramatically during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, from 1163 in 1568, to 849 by 1600, and to 132 by 1653.⁹⁵

The continual problems with the familiars and the Office for which they worked led to a determined effort by the Catalan polity to restrict the Inquisition’s influence in the Principat and Comtats. Catalan representatives at the Corts of 1599 pushed for a series of changes to the Inquisition: first, they sought to reduce the number of familiars in the Principat and Comtats; second, they insisted that all familiars were to be naturals of

⁹⁴ Ibid, 61.
⁹⁵ Ibid, 58-60. What is more interesting is that the dramatic decline of familiars occurred during a time of otherwise unprecedented growth in the number of religious vocations, i.e. an increase in the number of secular and regular clergy throughout Catalonia and Castile. The stigma of being a familiar seems to have continued even with a change in government. Bada notes that nearly three hundred familiar positions were available for sale in 1642 when the new Franco-Catalan Inquisition began, and remained unfilled despite the accompanying privileges.
Catalonia; and third, they were to be considered laity, and were not to receive the ecclesiastical liberties due to parish priests, cathedral canons, or regular clergy. The Principat’s tensions with the Holy Office continued into the seventeenth century, despite the restrictions placed on the institution at the Corts of 1599. In February 1624, the Consell de Cent petitioned Philip IV to appoint a Catalan to at least one of the Inquisitor offices, as his father had promised. At the Corts of 1626, Catalan representatives spent a significant amount of time seeking to further curtail the powers of the Inquisition and its members. The old demands of 1599 were resurrected with the demand that the inquisitors swear they were, without a doubt, naturals of Catalonia. Furthermore, a more specific policy on limiting the number of familiars was developed at the Corts.

The new plan called for a maximum of 40 familiars in Barcelona; 6 for villages with more than one thousand hearths; four for those between 400-1000, and two for those between 200-400, and one for those with only a hundred hearths. Using the Corts of 1512 as precedent, the delegates attempted to annul certain civic and fiscal exemptions of the familiars, and to limit the authority of the Holy Office to very specific matters of faith. When presented with these changes, Philip IV observed that such a policy was not followed in Castile and appears to have refused their request.

Still, the complaints continued: in 1628, the Generalitat published a list of abuses by the Inquisition and spent much time trying to resolve the numerous disputes that

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96 Ibid, 75.
97 Eufemíà Fort i Cogul, Catalunya i la Inquisició (Barcelona: Editorial Aedos, 1973), 247.
98 Joan Bada, La Inquisició a Catalunya, 76-77. Another concern expressed at the Corts was the extent to which Inquisitors from Valencia and Zaragoza could exercise their jurisdiction in the disputed areas of Catalonia—around Lleida and Tortosa.
99 Eufemíà Fort i Cogul, Catalunya i la Inquisició, 248.
continued to break out between the Inquisition and the many other social groups within the Principat and Comtats. Some tension between Catalonia and the Inquisition was mitigated in 1630, when Cardinal Zapata restricted the ability of inquisitors to issue excommunications.

Although the king had generally supported the Inquisition in its difficult relationship with Catalonia, he was not above considering its officials another ready source of income. By 1639, Philip IV was taking in a quarter of all fines gathered from causes not related to faith, and had started forcing Inquisition familiars to pay for soldiers. These unfortunates—despised by their fellow countrymen and now being economically persecuted by their defender—managed to raise 200 foot soldiers in 1635, and 325 in 1638.

Catalonia and the Catholic Reformation: The Provincial Councils

The most unique component of the Catalan church during the early modern period was the Provincial Council. The Council was a type of ecclesiastical congress, in which abbots, bishops, and representatives from all the monasteries and cathedral chapters in Catalonia gathered together to discuss the state of religion within Catalonia and to enact specific policies to further the True Faith in that land. In general, the Council met once every four years, although in times of emergency, it could meet more frequently. Furthermore, a significant part of most Councils dealt with the collection of taxes or donations for the royal cause. This body of clerics received its official inauguration

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100 Ibid, 249.
101 Joan Bada, *La Inquisició a Catalunya*, 77.
102 Ibid, 78. Bada also mentions that the familiars raised 150 infantry and 100 cavalry at the beginning of 1641. We do know that a portion of the Inquisition familiars sided with the Principat in 1640, but whether these soldiers were meant to serve the Generalitat or the Crown of Castile, the author does not specify.
following the Council of Trent and its meetings within Catalonia gave Catholicism in the
Principality a distinctiveness that set it apart from the rest of the Iberian peninsula, and
indeed, from the rest of Europe for over two hundred years.

Ever since the outbreak of Protestantism, Philip II had eyed the popes in Rome
with suspicion, attributing the division in Christendom at least in part to their dissolute
behavior. This attitude of sincere and pious disgust frequently extended uncritically to
later occupants of the see of St. Peter, and wrought in Philip the notion that the task of
reforming Europe and reclaiming the true faith lay on his shoulders and the shoulders of
his heirs. Shortly after the pope promulgated the decrees of Trent in June 1564, Philip,
after consulting with the returning bishops in Catalonia, publicly declared his support for
the document. A few months later, in accordance with one of the final articles of Trent,
Philip ordered ecclesiastical councils to convene throughout the seven provinces of
Spain. By so doing, however, and by placing a lay representative in charge of each
gathering, the king guaranteed that the prelates would assemble under royal, not papal,
auspices, to decide how best to implement the reforms.103

Although most of the Spanish bishops accepted Philip's request to have a royal
representative presiding over an ecclesiastical convention, the bishops in Catalonia opted
on another course of action. By so doing, they maintained what had been the traditional
Catalan view of church-state relations. While acknowledging the king's title, His
Catholic Majesty, Catalan clerics refused to accept secular dominance in matters of faith
and shared with the primal see of Tarragona a strong affinity for Rome. This sentiment

103 For this section, I am greatly indebted to the works of Ignasi Fernández Terricabras, “Els bisbes de
Catalunya, Felipe II i l'Execució del Concili de Trento.” (Analecta Sacra Tarracoensis. vol. LXVII,
1996, 321-332); and Felipe II y el clero secular. La aplicación del concilio de Trento (Madrid: Sociedad
Estatal para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, 2000).
appears to have affected a majority of clerics serving in the province, whether born there or no. The series of events surrounding Philip II's convocation of councils reflected this divergence of opinion between center and periphery in a very striking manner.

Thus, while much of the kingdom responded favorably to the king's command and prepared for meeting the following September, the bishops of Catalonia, led by the archbishop of Tarragona, Fernando de Loaces, had already convened a provincial council among themselves in Barcelona on 4 October 1564. Entirely unaware of the king's larger plan, the bishops desired only to implement the decrees as quickly as possible and establish them throughout Catalonia, which they did in a matter of weeks, writing to Philip shortly before they concluded the proceedings. Most displeased with their conduct, the king ordered the ecclesiastical assembly suspended immediately. Only after the other provincial councils began to meet, and after the king's representative, the count de Aitona, was present, did the Catalan council resume its previous decisions, now receiving official endorsement. While Trent ordered provincial councils to be held within each Catholic country for administrating these reforms, it was only in Catalonia that such gatherings convened on a regular basis, lasting until 1757.104 Royal disputes with the pope over jurisdictional questions—in which neither party acknowledged the legitimacy of the other to preside over the councils—prevented such bodies from meeting in Castile following the grand council at Toledo.

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104 While more research needs to be done, it appears that Catalonia was one of the only provinces in Catholic Europe to hold regular meetings of a Provincial Council in the years following Trent. In his article, "Prospettive sinodali nel Settecento," Daniele Menozzi states that even in Italy such convocations were infrequent until the early 1700s, Daniele Menozzi, "Prospettive sinodali nel Settecento" in Claudio Lamioni, ed. Il sinodo di Pistoia del 1786 (Rome: Herder Editrice e Libreria, 1991), 11-31.
The Catalan Provincial Councils were unique in that they represented the only organization where different clerical groups could publicly debate important religious, fiscal, and political decisions. Given the penchant for Philip II and his grandson Philip IV to embroil themselves in wars, much of the time spent in these Councils from their establishment in 1564 up through 1640 concerned financial matters: how much the Catalan church was to raise, and how it was to go about collecting the funds.

While the provincial councils continued to place the Tridentine reforms in the institutional mind of the Catalan church, the enacting of specific reforms in individual dioceses proved more difficult. Most of the time, regional poverty lay at the heart of these matters, which hampered the number of reforms that could have been enacted, particularly the plan to erect a seminary in each diocese for the education of new priests.\footnote{Wright, Catholicism and Spanish Society, 36.}

Catalonia and Rome: the Pope, the Nuncio, and the Apostolic Collector

The first half of the seventeenth century was a dramatic time for European Catholicism. In the first place, the Church was in the midst of a Reformation of its own, attempting to formulate answers to the new Protestant theologies. The chief goal of the Council of Trent and its implementation into European society was to clarify Roman Catholic doctrine and theology and to demonstrate how the leaders of the church were to relate to the leaders of civil society. The practical working-out of Trent was made more difficult because of the inter-Catholic rift that continued between France and Castile. Although external secular concerns about controlling territory and influence on the Continent divided the two powers, their kings and ministers pursued similar domestic
policies, endeavoring to place religious concerns below the temporal interests of the state. Far from reclaiming its place as a leader of Catholic thought and policy in the seventeenth century, the See of St. Peter became subject to the desires of Bourbons and Hapsburgs in their pursuit to overwhelm, or at least, control papal influence within their own countries.  

Matters only worsened in the 1630s, as the Thirty Years’ War passed into its second decade with little hope of a Catholic victory against the Protestant princes of Germany and their Lutheran Swedish allies. As if that were not enough, growing international tensions between France and Spain—over the former’s blatant financial aid to Swedish armies in the field—marked an increase in the fighting between the two powers as to who would control the papal elections. Since the Italian states were either too independent, or else merely the client-state of either great power, the seventeenth century popes were generally elected with the aid of cardinals from one of the two major factions. The heirs of St. Peter were expected to repay a portion of the fruits of their election to their unofficial patrons, generally in terms of favorable decisions on the current wars. This in turn became a power struggle in which popes sought to curb royal interference in Roman politics as well as in religious matters within their own kingdoms.

All these troublesome considerations came to rest upon the shoulders of Pope Urban VIII, who governed the Holy See from 1623 to 1644. Elected chiefly on the merits of French intrigue and enjoying that country’s patronage for several years, Urban

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106 This conflict between Crown and Crozier reached its apex in the mid-to-late eighteenth century with the expulsion of the Jesuits from such staunchly Catholic lands as Portugal, Spain, and France, and the temporary abolition of the Order by the Pope himself. This particular conflict appears as a hallmark of the various “Catholic Enlightenments” led by the Marques de Pombal in Portugal, Carlos III in Spain, and Joseph II in Austria, without necessarily compromising the devotion of king or county to Catholicism itself.
had a natural proclivity towards siding with France, all the more so after his relationship with Philip IV gradually deteriorated over the Habsburg king’s numerous fiscal squabbles. Nevertheless, Urban could not overlook the French alliance with the heretical Dutch and the Swedes.

For much of his tenure, Urban VIII, together with his brother-Cardinals, Antonio and Francisco Barberini, sought to maintain peaceable relations with both Castile and France, occasionally decrying Philip IV’s high-handed manner with the Papal Nuncio, occasionally reproving Louis XIII for involving himself with the Protestant cause. When war broke out between France and Spain in 1635, the pope refused to take up sides, piously—and sincerely—admonishing both countries to resolve their differences and concentrate their resources on battles that were more important. Unfortunately his calls for reconciliation went unheeded for many years.

In order to maintain communication with the Catholic princes throughout Europe, the papacy developed two different diplomatic positions: the Nuncio and the Collector. The Nuncio was a sort of papal diplomat, staying at the royal court, and keeping Rome informed on the policies being made at Madrid or Paris. The Nuncio had a particular concern for any royal projects involving money that were to come from ecclesiastical sources, acting in the Pope’s interest. During the centuries-long conflict between the throne of France and the composite monarchy in Castile, the nuncio also sought to restore

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107 Ferdinand Gregorovius, Urbano VIII e la Sua Opposizione alla Spagna e all’Imperatore. Episodio della Guerra dei Trent’Anni (Rome: Bocca, 1879), 5-7.
108 By an interesting coincidence, Urban’s brother Antonio was a Capuchin, and had been made the Cardinal Protector of the order in 1624. Two years later he attended the Barcelona Corts with his brother Francisco as a special Papal legation to welcome Philip on his accession. Throughout the many years as Protector of the Capuchins he worked to restore order in the internal governance of the community, as well as to better serve the poor. During the revolt of 1640, he seems to have followed the general attitude of the Order and taken a pro-Catalan stance. Basili de Rubí, Un segle de vida caputxina a Catalunya, 1564-1664 (Barcelona: Caputxins de Sarrià, 1977), 406; 422-23.
harmony to the shattered remains of Catholicism, urging both Bourbon and Habsburg alike to put aside their differences for the greater good of the Faith.

In addition to larger diplomatic concerns, the nuncio could confer also ecclesiastical benefices upon applicants. His most influential role—and at times, the most controversial—was the power to judge in cases of church administration and discipline otherwise reserved to the pope. In addition to being one of the first permanent nunciatures in Europe, the Madrid Nuncio served as the head of a special tribunal, the Rota, which served as a court of appeals from legal disputes in dioceses and archdioceses. Should the ruling of the nuncio prove unsatisfactory, appeal was always possible to Rome. Thus the nuncio also played a key role in the stability of the Catholic Church inside Spain. Particularly with regards to administration—and the collecting of finances, this would result in a series of problems with the Crown in Madrid.

Unlike the Nuncio, the Collector’s purpose was quite specific: he was there to ensure that moneys from vacant sees and abbacies went to the Papal coffers—where it legally belonged—instead of falling into the hands of the monarch—as it so often did. While not a diplomat, per se, the Collector could, and often did, observe much that was around him, for unlike the nuncio, he was not a permanent resident at the court, but traveled around to the various regions of the kingdom. This distinction would come to play a critical part in the developments of the Catalan revolt.

By the seventeenth century, there was one Collector for Aragon and two for Castile because of its greater size. For a while under Ferdinand and Isabella, there had been a single collector—from Castile—who was given authority over the collection, but such an organization proved too unwieldy and furthermore was unpopular. As the office
of the nuncio became more prominent in the 1500s, the office of Collector became attached to the nunciature, although a division between the fiscal and diplomatic office was still maintained. Philip II would take advantage of the nunciature’s dual roles when acceded to the throne of Portugal in 1580. The king removed the Portuguese nuncio, leaving the Apostolic Collector as the top papal envoy to the assimilated kingdom, free to pursue his economic functions while being denied any diplomatic intervention regarding Philip’s policies in Portugal.109

Conflicts within the Catalan Church

Despite being called to “one body in Christ,” the Catalan church proved to be nearly as fractious as the secular society it taught and led. Regrettably the Body of Christ became divided against itself on several different levels. In the urban centers, some part of every cathedral chapter was usually at odds with their bishop, his appointed vicar-generals, or, in the case of Vic, the archdeacon major. Members of various religious orders fought against each other as well, either in the rural areas, where the regular orders such as the Jesuits and Capuchins were strong and competed for audiences, or in education centers, where Dominicans clashed with the Jesuits over teaching positions and methods. Conflicts also blossomed between strong cathedral chapters, or bishops, and religious orders within a particular diocese. Finally, the tendency for Inquisition familiars—generally secular individuals who were more concerned with their special privileges than religious devotion—to become arrogant and abuse their positions was a source of constant irritation for practically every religious or lay Catalan.

109 For more information on the nuncio and collector, see their entries in the Diccionario de Historia Eclesiastica de España, dirigido por Quintin Alden Vaquero; Tomas Marin Martinez; Jose Vives Gatell (Madrid: Instituto Enrique Florez, 1972).
Perhaps the biggest internal disputes among the larger cities of the Principat and Comtats involved cathedral chapters and their bishops. During the Middle Ages, chapters had enjoyed numerous exemptions from episcopal jurisdiction, thanks in large part to papal grants of privilege. Following the Council of Trent, however, and the council’s renewed emphasis on bishops, the chapters’ historic autonomy led to conflicts, as many reforming bishops complained that such bodies regularly inhibited in their diocesan visitations and reforms. In many cases, the bishops were commanded to act as papal delegates—a sort of religious viceroys—a function that would have great implications later.

For a majority of the cases inside Catalonia, the disputes between chapter and bishop became drawn out, particularly since a significant portion of cathedral canons had some background in civil or canon law—sometimes both. As one historian has noted, though, such legal disputes were common outside of the Principat: “Litigation, the curse of golden-age Spanish society, was indeed a chief occupation of many cathedral chapters of the peninsula throughout the post-Tridentine period.”

**Church Conflicts Outside Catalonia**

The composite nature of both the church and the secular authority in Catalonia and Castile led to a host of conflicts between Catalan religious institutions and the Crown or its representatives. On a grand scale, the domineering personalities of rulers such as Charles V and Philip II encouraged a trend toward caeseropapism within Castile and

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100 Dominguez Ortiz, *La Sociedad Española en el siglo XVII*, vol. 2; *El Estamento Eclesiástico*, 45; Wright, *Catholicism and Spanish Society*, 65. Needless to say, Philip II stood behind the prelates in their squabbles with the capitular clergy. That Philip appointed bishops while the Roman Curia appointed most of the cathedral clergy—aside from the position of dean, and the entire chapter of Granada which was royally appointed—undoubtedly had some influence on the king’s decision to take sides.

101 Wright, *Catholicism and Spanish Society*, 68.
Catalonia, especially the latter and his messianic grand strategy. Royal initiatives under the Habsburgs to shape the Catholic faith to its expectations caused a great deal of trouble, most notably among the religious orders, as well as in peripheral areas of the empire such as Catalonia. Despite the monarchy’s best intentions, the ultimate fruit of royal intervention into ecclesiastical matters was a general sentiment of discontent that in some cases obstructed the very reforms Philip II and his descendents hoped to attain.

Royal control over church reform reached its greatest extent with the Inquisition. As one historian has described it, “[n]ot only was episcopal and indeed primatial authority to be subordinated to that of the Inquisition in Spain, but that tribunal was to be maintained as entirely competent to determine questions of orthodoxy and heresy, as far as possible, without subjection to Roman judgment.” The evolution of the Holy Office into another arm of secular power troubled a great many religious and lay Catalans. Throughout the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, these conflicts would range old opponents—bishops, chapters, city fathers and the Audiència—together against the Inquisition, particularly the familiars who worked there.

In addition to the royal appointment of bishops and the annoyance of the Inquisition, a third dispute between the Habsburg monarchy and the Principat of Catalonia arose over the matter of Church finances. Contemporary sources are equally vague as to the amount of wealth possessed by the church in Spain during the early modern period. The general impression of the historian Dominguez Ortiz, however, is that churches throughout the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon contained visible signs of

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112 Ibid, 5.
113 Ibid, 6.
their wealth through decorations, which beautified even the simplest parish churches. This historian’s estimate put the total amount of Church revenues around 1/6 or 1/7 of the total “national” income, but noted that the distribution of such funds was quite uneven.\textsuperscript{115} The regions of Galicia and Catalonia were, in general, the poorest: whereas a canon of Toledo or Seville might make two thousand ducats per annum, and a canon from Córdoba, eight hundred-to-one thousand ducats, Catalan canons, in comparison, were earning only two-hundred fifty lliures per annum.\textsuperscript{116}

The fundamental income for the church was the tithe on agricultural products, although in Catalonia, constitutions or papal grants often times apportioned this sum to secular lords, such as the Marquis de los Vélez.\textsuperscript{117} Though exempt from direct taxation, the clergy paid the monarchy through indirect taxes and donations, but in all cases there needed to be the foundation of a papal concession. The need for approval from Rome was the source of countless fights between the Castilian monarchy and the Pope, beginning with Ferdinand and Isabella in the fifteenth century.

The first fiscal privilege granted to the kings of Castile was the cruzada: this measure, given by the pope to the Catholic Monarchs, allowed Ferdinand and Isabella to tax the clergy of Castile and Aragon in order to finance military campaigns against the Muslims as well as to confiscate the lands of heretics.\textsuperscript{118} In 1561, Pope Pius IV granted Philip II a second concession, called the subsidio, which allotted 420,000 ducats annually to be raised from the church and destined, like the cruzada, to fight the Muslims. The

\textsuperscript{115} Dominguez Ortiz, \textit{La Sociedad Española en el siglo XVII, vol. 2; El Estamento Eclesiástico}, 130; 133.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid, 134. The Castilian ducat appears to have been worth 1-1.5 Catalan lliures during the seventeenth century. See Elliott, \textit{Revolt of the Catalans}, Appendix I, pp. 553; 555.
\textsuperscript{117} Dominguez Ortiz, \textit{La Sociedad Española en el siglo XVII, vol. 2; El Estamento Eclesiástico}, 135. For a discussion of the many problems on collecting and identifying what needed to be paid, see Ibid, 137-146.
\textsuperscript{118} Under Charles V and his descendents, the stipulation that the ecclesiastical tax go towards financing wars against the Muslims was soon expanded to include Protestant heretics as well.
outbreak of the Dutch Revolt a few years later prompted the new pope, Pius V to grant yet another financial privilege, called the *excusado*, by which 250,000 ducats were taken from ecclesiastical revenues every year.

These fiscal grants to the kings of Castile were known as the “Three Graces,” and had to be renewed every five years: all together, these measures brought in nearly 800,000 ducats per year from across the empire.\(^{119}\) Over one-tenth of this amount came from Catalonia: 16,500 lliures from the *quarta* or *subsidio*, seven thousand lliures from the *excusado*, and 62,000 lliures from the *cruzada*, for a grand total of 85,500 lliures every year.\(^{120}\) In addition to all this, Pope Urban VIII granted Philip IV in 1632 the special privilege of collecting a portion of all ecclesiastical tithes, called the *décima*, which was to place 600,000 ducats into the royal coffers. This extraordinary gift met with great resistance, particularly among the Catalan clergy, and it was a few years before the king was able to raise the given amount.

Continual disputes between the Habsburgs and the Church in their lands over money extended internationally into a chronic conflict between the Crown and the Papacy. This was particularly evident under Philip II, where at one point the Spanish Nuncio compared the “obstruction of papal wishes with the activity of heretics in divided France or even in enemy England.”\(^{121}\) The king’s grandson, Philip IV would also experience great frustrations in his dealings with the pope, and, together with his minister, Olivares, compiled a list of grievances against the Holy See during the 1630s.

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\(^{119}\) Ibid, 153.

\(^{120}\) Sir John Elliott, *Revolt of the Catalans*, 93.

\(^{121}\) Quoted in Wright, *Catholicism and Spanish Society*, 29.
which he then sent to the Spanish ambassador in Rome, the Marquis of Castel-Rodrigo to present before His Holiness, Urban VIII.

Philip IV’s desperate search for finances needed to sustain a growing number of military commitments exacerbated already tense relations with Rome. At the same time, new policies from France—but lately recovering from the disasters of religious civil war—seeking to make itself a rival Catholic power, and thereby to obtain favors from the see of St. Peter, only compounded the king’s dilemma. Disputes over vacancies, the estates of deceased bishops, and the behavior of papal nuncios and collectors plagued the relations between Rome and Madrid so much that in late 1639 Urban VIII recalled the nuncio, Fachinetti, from the royal court leaving the communication lines dead for nearly a year: a critical period of time for Philip IV, who would soon face the biggest crisis of his reign devoid of an ally in Rome.

Catalonia, A Land of “Patria-tic” Devotion: The Major Cathedral Towns

The rest of the chapter will examine six of the major cathedral cities of Catalonia in greater detail, exploring the numerous rivalries that existed at this most fundamental level of Catalan society. It was the town, the primary locus of early-modern patriotism, or patria-tisme, that brought out one of the most significant elements of the Catalan spirit: a strong identity with, and adherence to, those special privileges that made one’s social group distinct from all others. At times, as we shall see, this passion could

122 Out of the nine cathedral towns, Lleida, Tortosa, and Solsona will not be discussed at great length in this study. In the first place, the state of the archives in Lleida and Tortosa is poor; even Tarragona’s ecclesiastical archives are not in the best condition. There are other factors to consider as well: Solsona because of its small size, had—in general—not much influence among the other rebellious dioceses; Tortosa, after a brief uprising by the people—who espoused the rebels’ cause—against the town/church hierarchy, refused to support the rebellion (see Josep Sanabre, La Acción de Francia en Cataluña, 209-210); and Lleida, which, though controlled by the Catalans for a while, soon fell to the Castilians and became as virulently loyal as it had been rebellious. In the interest of space, the study of Tarragona will serve as a counter-example of a clergy and people, once in revolt, who became loyal once more.
be strongest at the smallest possible levels of communion, creating fierce feuds between two groups within the Church as well as between two groups of town officials. The intensity of these spirited contentions permeated Catalonia from the bustling metropolis of Barcelona to the quiet center of Vic to the apparently peripheral Seu d’Urgell. From this perspective, division rather than unity, and enmity rather than concord, were the watchwords of seventeenth-century Catalonia.

The majority of the cathedral towns of Catalonia laid claim to some prestige that set them apart from their “siblings” and rivals. Tarragona’s prestige lay not only in her possession of the sole archdiocese in Catalonia, but in her claim to be the primal see in all of Spain—a claim disputed by the archdiocese of Toledo and still debated in some circles. The prestige of Barcelona lay in her position as the secular capital of Catalonia, an arrangement that gradually created in her consellers and citizens the distinction of being the “first city” in the province, and provoked quite a few conflicts with counterparts in Tarragona and Perpignan. Ironically, Perpignan’s claim to prominence was mirrored in that of Barcelona—a former political capital now the largest urban center in a sizeable geographic region—just on a smaller scale.

The minor cities in the Principat also touted important status symbols that they felt inflated their prominence within Catalonia and made their situation quite unique. The church in Girona enjoyed a special place of honor in the land, albeit indirectly through the office of the Jutge Apostolic, a title given to the Bishop of Girona in 1551 by the pope that endowed him as the supreme judge over matters pertaining to ecclesiastical crimes and misdemeanors. Far to the south, Tortosa boasted the richest and biggest diocese in Catalonia, while off in the western regions, the diocese of Lleida could lay claim to a
very important provincial university, particularly in the faculty of civil and canon law: many alumni had gone on to prominent positions in Barcelona.

The three smallest cities, however—Vic, Solsona, and the Seu d’Urgell—had very little to be proud of during the seventeenth century and so resorted to various means of compensating for it. The chapter of Vic took pride in its history, pointing to the famous Abbot-Bishop Oliba, who had done much to advance the political liberties of the Catalan church during the early eleventh century, as well as to the time when their cathedral had served as the archdiocese of Catalonia while Tarragona was under Moorish control. The chapter of Solsona—not even fifty years old in 1640—sought to hide under the protective wings of Tarragona and seemed to prefer a quiet existence. In complete contrast, the Seu d’Urgell seems to have sought notoriety by becoming the most obnoxious and troublesome diocese in the province. Time after time the cathedral chapter would engage in bitter disputes against either their own bishop or against the local citizenry, sometimes taking on both opponents at the same time. The stories that came out of the small mountain town created an image not unlike the legendary Deadwood of the “Wild West,” save that in Urgell the men of the cloth were as likely to be carrying concealed pedrenyals as they were to carry breviaries.

**Barcelona: queen of the Principat**

As the largest city in Catalonia throughout the early modern period—indeed, it continues its regional dominance unto the present day—Barcelona was the most powerful and influential city in the Principat. For a long time, it was the metropolis from among the three provinces constituting the Crown of Aragon—by the seventeenth century, nearly one in every ten Catalans lived in Barcelona—and served for many centuries as its
administrative capital.\textsuperscript{123} Furthermore, as one of only three ports in the Mediterranean capable of outfitting an entire galley fleet for an extended campaign, Barcelona was of key strategic and economic value.\textsuperscript{124} More cosmopolitan than any other city in the Principat or the Comtats, it was the main port from which gold from the New World was shipped to Italy—usually Genoa—there to be sent along the Spanish Road, a military corridor connecting Spain’s imperial supply bases in the south with their armies fighting in Flanders and elsewhere.

When the crowns of Aragon and Castile united, Barcelona lost its status as a political capital, but retained its prestige among the other urban centers in Catalonia.\textsuperscript{125} Though kings no longer maintained the grand palaces, Barcelona did become the headquarters of the viceroys sent from Madrid to govern the Principat and Comtats. Furthermore, the city preserved its prominent economic position in the Mediterranean market. Drawn by the city’s prestige, lawyers, merchants, and office-seekers all flooded into Barcelona looking for employment or positions of influence in the viceregal administration. Likewise the city boasted the largest number of religious houses in the Crown of Aragon. The leaders of the great noble factions of the province—such as the Cardonas, the Moncadas, and the Queralts—maintained palaces there, while even lesser

\textsuperscript{123} Jill Elliott, \textit{Revolt of the Catalans}, 27.

\textsuperscript{124} “There requirements for a logistical base capable of supporting a major operation could … be satisfied only by a major port city with excellent harbor facilities and either a rich hinterland to its rear or a well-developed trade network supporting it. During the sixteenth century only three cities of the Mediterranean satisfied these requirements beyond doubt: Barcelona, Venice, and Constantinople. It is no accident, therefore, that these cities formed the nuclei of the great Mediterranean naval powers in the age of the galley: Spain, Venice and the Ottoman Empire. These three cities, perhaps more than the nations to which they belonged, dominated Mediterranean naval warfare.” John Francis Guilmartin, \textit{Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the 16th Century}, rev. ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003), 116.

\textsuperscript{125} It is interesting to note that this political diminution of Barcelona happened only after the deaths of Ferdinand and Isabella. In fact, the returning Columbus found the Catholic Monarchs holding court in Barcelona, and it was on the steps of the \textit{Plaça del Rei}, across the street from the cathedral, that the official news of Columbus’s discovery of America was proclaimed.
nobles sought a townhouse. Finally, a significant royal presence was retained through the viceroy and the Audiència, the royal judiciary, both of which were housed in Barcelona.

In size and in relative influence—be it political, economic, or religious—Barcelona dwarfed other Catalan towns, and by doing so created a jealous rivalry with many of them. Cities such as Tarragona and Lleida resented the undue influence of Barcelona and often conspired with smaller towns like Solsona and Manresa to thwart particular designs of the city council or cathedral chapter. Of especial annoyance to Tarragona, the primal see of Catalonia, was the continued attempts by the Barcelona chapter either to remove the archbishopric to Barcelona, or else to declare Barcelona an independent see under the special direct control of the pope.126 These rivalries were long-standing even in the seventeenth century, and continued through the early modern period. For many Catalan towns, the path Barcelona followed in political affairs would shape their own destiny, whether by following its lead or by perversely choosing the other side.

Although thwarted in attempts to physically translate the archdiocese to Barcelona, the city enjoyed a great deal of ecclesiastical prestige. Barcelona was far from being the richest diocese—in fact, Tarragona, Tortosa, and sometimes even Lleida gathered more in rents during the seventeenth century127—yet the bishop of the city enjoyed the authority of overseeing the collection all ecclesiastical rents for the Holy See,

126 Of interesting note, the creation of Barcelona as an independent see in 1964 by Pope Paul VI again raised the ire of Tarragona and other Catalan cities. From Antoní Pladevall, “Les institucions i organització de l’església catalana” in I Congrés d’ Història de l’Església Catalana des del Orígens fins ara vol. 1, (Solsona, 1993), 183-184. Forty years after the event, however, the antipathy appears to have finally died down.
as well as the specific church taxes paid directly to the king in Madrid. In addition, it was considered a sign of prominence to be named to the cathedral chapter; several of its members were closely attached to regional nobles, such as the vicar-generals Ramon de Sentmanat i Lanuza, the future bishop of Vic, and his brother, Galceran; and the archdeacon Don Ramon de Queralt i Codina, brother to the future viceroy, the Count of Santa Coloma. For much of the seventeenth-century, the diocese enjoyed long and stable episcopal reigns; after the twelve-year tenure of Bishop Juan Sentis, Bishop Garcia Gil Manrique governed the see during most of the 1630s. Manrique was a Castilian by birth who nevertheless enjoyed the respect of his chapter—something not every foreign prelate in Catalonia could take for granted.

In spite of, or perhaps because of, its great influence in the province, Barcelona was host to numerous squabbles between the church and secular authority during the sixteenth- and seventeenth- centuries. This created a situation unique in Catalonia’s traditional institutional relations, however, in that bishop and chapter generally joined forces against the town council, whereas in many other dioceses, relations between chapter and bishop were not so good. The atmosphere surrounding Barcelona, former capital of a land nourished on law and legalisms, together with its various internal disputes over particular privileges, epitomized the contentious Catalan spirit, present both among the clergy and the laity. It was perhaps ironic that the largest fight between these two groups should erupt over the rather minor issue of licensing.

For many years, the cathedral canons of Barcelona had enjoyed the perquisite of having their own personal baker, whose wares were exempt from city taxes through an
extension of ecclesiastical privilege. In December 1633, however, the Consell de Cent began receiving anonymous reports that the church baker was selling bread to the laity at inflated prices, claiming that such high costs were due to the tax he had to pay for a license—leaving out the minor detail that he had never purchased a license from the city. Deeply suspicious of the baker’s activities, the Consell brought the accusations before the chapter, arguing that any bread not used in church ceremonies must be sold under license at pre-arranged prices just as in the case of every other bakery. The canons ignored the accusation.

On 4 January 1634, Andreu Marragut, the head of the committee of bread for the city, organized a sting on the bakery and found at least two loaves weighing less than they should for the price being charged. After a brief trial, the baker was found guilty of selling bread to the laity unfairly and without a license, and was promptly jailed. Deeply upset at the outrage to their personal baker, the canons of the cathedral got the

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128 Literally “the council of the One Hundred,” the Consell de Cent was the local council of Barcelona, which met in the town hall overlooking the Plaça de Sant Jaume, only two blocks away from the cathedral and directly opposite the square from the Generalitat, where the six representatives of the Catalan people, called the Diputació, met.

129 Although it is not mentioned in the subsequent legal battle and there is no contemporary record of the harvests for 1632-1633, several areas of Catalonia, including the typical grain-centers of Perpignan and Girona, had undergone years of dearth and famine from 1628-1631. Whether the dearth persisted for the next few years is uncertain, but no doubt the fear of another poor harvest was of great concern to the Consell de Cent. The city’s concern about prices, therefore, seems to be predicated on keeping its citizens well-fed during times of want, while at the same time keeping as many bakeries operating as possible. The church baker, by setting up inflationary prices, threatened to upset the current order.

130 BC: FB 5402: Informacion de la Justicia que tiene la Ciudad de Barcelona en la Causa sobre que aora trae pleito con el Cabildo...en el tribunal y Corte Eclesiastica del Illustissimo Señor Arçobispo de Tarragona (Barcelona, 1634), ff. 2-2v.
vicar-general to issue a series of warnings, promising excommunications against the members of the city council who planned the operation, should they fail to release the baker.\textsuperscript{131}

Under normal circumstances, the threat of excommunication was a serious affair, but the members of the city council were more determined than normal. In the manner of most typical landlords, the irate council pressured one of their members, Francisco Socies, Master of Houses and Fountains in Barcelona, to bring the obstinate chapter to heel by shutting off the water leading to the Cathedral.\textsuperscript{132} Imagine the surprise of the canons when they came out to the cathedral cloister at 11:00 am on 5 January, only to discover that the fountain was dry!

The chapter was furious; that same day they went to the vicar-general demanding instant excommunication of the town leadership. Despite the city’s defense before the “Reverend Lord Judge and Ecclesiastical Official of the most Illustrious Chapter,” that it was the cathedral canons who “have been usurpers of the rights, liberties, and Ecclesiastical prerogatives,” the vicar-general excommunicated the entire five-member council as well as Francisco Socies.\textsuperscript{133} Since the see of Barcelona was vacant, any party wanting to appeal the case from the capital could direct their pleas either to Antonio Pérez, the archbishop of Tarragona and the highest prelate in the province, or Pope Urban

\textsuperscript{131} At this time, the Church in Barcelona was without a leader. Bishop Juan Sentis died in 1632, and Garcia Gil Manrique, though appointed in 1633, had not yet arrived to take up his responsibilities. In times of such vacancies, the vicar-general—generally a canon from the cathedral chapter—took over the administrative and executive roles of bishop.

\textsuperscript{132} BC: FB 4873: Resolución Theológica en la Duda Que en Esta Ciudad de Barcelona ha Havido Sobre si los que concurrieron en quitar el agua que sale en las Fuentes de los Claustros de la Santa Iglesia del Asseo desta Ciudad por espacio de algunas horas, incurrieron en las censuras de las Constituciones Provinciales Tarraconenses, Y Apostolicas (Barcelona, 1634), f. 1.

\textsuperscript{133} “Reveren Señor Iuez y Oficial Eclesiastico del muy Ilustre Cabildo…[los canonges] han sido usurpadores de los derechos, libertades, y prerogativas Eclesiasticas” Ibid, f. 1v; FB: 5402, p. 3.
VIII. Neither side proved willing to make any concessions, even despite the drastic penalty placed on the Barcelona consellers, and both chapter and council prepared notes for another hearing. The clerics, not waiting for their opponents to get the first word in, wrote to the archdiocese of Tarragona, while the Consell de Cent assembled a Junta of Theologians in Barcelona to carefully analyze their position and prepare their own defense.\(^{134}\)

What occurred next was rather typical for Catalonia—a verbose, legalistic pamphlet war that obscured the original issue. The matters of bread and licenses were quite forgotten now: instead, both sides debated endlessly over the rightful ownership of municipal water. Did the water belong to the city all the time, only passing through the church’s spigots? Or did the sanctity of holy ground make the water the church’s as soon as it passed under the foundation of the church building, meaning the city council could not touch it without violating clerical immunity?\(^{135}\)

In stating their case, the city fathers of Barcelona confessed that they had a high regard for ecclesiastical privileges, but argued that secular concerns needed to be recognized equally in order for society to be maintained in tranquility and order. After all, they argued, it was “quite necessary for the same Republic, comprising in it not only the secular estate, but also the Ecclesiastic” that both estates pursue the common good and not merely the preservation of their own special liberties. In addition to this rather academic discussion, the council prepared a thrust aimed at garnering popular support.

\(^{134}\) The ostensible purpose was that, “Queriendo la Ciudad en este caso proceder Christianamente como acostumbrá en los demas y justificar su causa, no solo en los tribunales de la tierra; pero principalmente en el de Dioz (sic)” FB: 5402, p. 4. The cathedral canons, meanwhile, wrote frequently to both the Spanish nuncio and the Pope, Ibid, pp. 15 passim.

\(^{135}\) In the words of the Resolución Theológica, “que el muy Illust Cabildo fuese señor de las aguas que salen en las Fuentes del claustro...” or “que todas las aguas eran de la Ciudad.” FB: 4873, f. 1v.
The basis of this emotional argument was that by focusing too much on their own privileges regarding the baking of bread, the cathedral chapter was short-changing the indigent in the city by charging them high and unfair prices. The consellers declared that the Church’s actions caused “great prejudice to the poor and to the needy of the Republic.” In making these claims, the Consell de Cent were well aware that the stakes were high: violation of ecclesiastical immunities guaranteed by Provincial Councils meant “descomunion mayor,” the same punishment meted out against robbers who stole from the church, or highwaymen.

In the end, the assembled Junta of Theologians declared against the vicar-general’s hasty excommunications, noting that the syndic of the city had visited the chapter and made his allegations clear, and also that the excommunication should have come at the end of a thorough investigation. The matter moved on to the Archbishop of Tarragona, but there it seems to have been forgotten in the midst of newer troubles. The furor generated by such debates may appear rather silly to the modern reader—just

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136 “tan necessaria para la misma Republica, compreheniendo en ella no solo el estado secular, mas también el Eclesiastico, y que en esto assí mismo se hace grande perjuyzio a los pobres y a los menesterosos de la Republica.” FB: 5402, pp. 22-23.
137 FB: 4873, f. 2v-3. The Junta was constituted of members of the Dominican, Carmelite, Capuchin, and Jesuit Orders, with several prominent members of the Inquisition.

DOMINICANS: M. F. Juan Mur: Provincial for Crown of Aragon, Cathedratico in Lleida; Calificador of Inquisition; Fray Chrysostomo Bonamich, Calificador of Inquisition; Fray Francisco Palau; Fray Domingo Balle; Fr. Onofrio Amat

CARMELITES: Fr. Serafino Fernos, Provincial for Catalonia and Mallorca; Fray Cirilo Ximenez, Provincial and Prior of Convent in Barcelona; Fray Martin Codina, Prior of Convent del Carmen in Vic.

CAPUCHINS: Fray Pablo de Serrian: Minister. Provincial for Catalonia

JESUITS: Fray Jaume Puig, Rector of the Company, Calificador of Inquisition “en el Supremo de la Inquisicion” also Pare Joan Ferrer, Calificador of Inquisition; P Vincente Navarro, Calificador of the Inquisition (and future Provincial General of the Order in Catalonia); Ibid, f. 4-4v.
as intense shouting matches in the bar over sports statistics might puzzle the early modern Catalan—but they were the bread and butter of the seventeenth century Catalan literati.138

The more remarkable observation about this bread-and-water conflict is that such a rupture occurred at a very tense time for Catalonia in general and Barcelona in particular. War with France was imminent and relations between the Catalans and their king had broken down over the royal demand for money for military preparations. First, 1634 had witnessed a period of internal rebellion among the Catalan clergy, as cathedral canons—led by the dioceses of Vic, Urgell, and Girona—refused to pay the fiscal demands imposed upon them by pope Urban VIII, arguing that the pressure placed by Philip IV and the Spanish cardinals in Rome on the pontiff made such demands unjust. At the same time, the Consell de Cent in Barcelona had begun to resist the collection of the *quints*, a royal claim to one fifth of the town’s revenues. So bad had affairs gotten that Philip IV and his minister Olivares were preparing orders for the viceroy to leave Barcelona, together with the Audiència, and move to Girona until the city showed itself more willing to come to terms and contribute its fair share to the monarchy’s growing problems. That the Consell de Cent could find, on top of all the other problems facing them, the will and the spirit to openly confront the cathedral chapter over what appears to be a relatively minor issue, illustrates the fierce passion with which secular and religious Catalans alike defended their traditions and privileges.139

Despite a common opposition to the financial demands placed on them by Philip IV, the rift between the city of Barcelona and the cathedral chapter would continue to

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138 As a further sign of Barcelona’s litigious interests, the two Fullet Bonsoms, FB 4873 and FB 5402 are quite thick and detailed in their descriptions of canon law and civil privileges.
139 For more on the dramatic events of 1634-1635 which led to the temporary removal of both viceroy and Audiència to Girona, see Elliot, *The Revolt of the Catalans*, 288-304.
fester throughout the remainder of the 1630s, breaking out now and again over minor matters such as the order of appearance in religious processions. It appears as if nothing could shake or stop the polarizing personal conflicts between council and chapter. Perhaps the continual squabbling was a factor of Barcelona’s material wealth and prosperity; were it the case, a period of hardship might have done much to reconcile the two social groups. Certainly an extended period of suffering in the northern-most diocese of Catalonia served to bring together city and church leaders. Whereas Barcelona illustrates the degeneration of a relationship into a battle of legal minutiae between civil and ecclesiastical authorities, the example of Perpignan demonstrated what could happen when rival elements within a community faced a continual series of disasters.

**Perpignan: second city and rival**

Across the Pyrenees in the Comtat of Roussillon lies Perpignan, the second-largest city in Catalonia during the seventeenth century. Despite the great mountain chain nearly sealing off the Comtats of Roussillon and Cerdagne from the rest of the Principat of Catalonia, the northern lands were of great spiritual significance to the Catalan people. In the first place, Roussillon was home to the famous Mount Canigou—considered sacred by the Catalans for centuries. In addition, the first religious houses in Catalonia originated in Roussillon: San Michel de Cuixa, was founded around 878; and San Martin de Canigou, in the early eleventh century. Finally, the northern reaches of Catalan territory possessed an economic significance. The broad valleys of the Vallespir and the Conflent proved to be extremely fruitful for wheat and wine products, while the mountains themselves revealed several rich lodes of iron ore. Indeed,
Barcelona would come to be heavily dependent on Roussillon grain for its sustenance, a factor that would always be considered in relations between the two urban centers.

Although these northern districts of Roussillon and Cerdagne had been a part of Catalonia for many centuries, they nevertheless had good cause for considering themselves a separate but equal area. Following the Muslim invasion of Europe in the eighth century, Charlemagne and his successors fought over the land of Roussillon, known then as the Spanish Marches. During the Reconquest, the bishopric of Elna became attached to the archbishopric of Toulouse, further strengthening the ties between the two regions. Later in the Middle Ages, the crown of Aragon was divided. As the capital of the newly-created Kingdom of Mallorca, Perpignan grew to become the most prominent city in the region. Despite the presence of a royal court for nearly seventy years, only a few secular patrons donated money to build new monasteries or convents or otherwise improve the spiritual presence within the capital. Instead, fiscal support for new houses and clergy came from the pope. The historian Claude Colomer writes that Roussillon was long considered “'patria obedienciae’, that is to say that the Pope drew the bulk of the fees for the consignment of the Court of Rome concerning that province, during the eight months when he appointed all the benefices of ecclesiastical patronage.”

Roussillon suffered greatly as a frontier zone, first between Christendom and Muslim lands, later when the ruling house of Catalonia briefly divided in two, and finally

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140 “c’est-à-dire que le Pape tire des gros droits pour les expéditions de Cour de Rome concernant cette province, qu’il nomme durant huit mois à tous les benefices de patronat ecclésiastique,” Claude Colomer, *Le Clergé Régulier en Roussillon du Rattachement à la Révolution* (Perpignan: Société Agricole, Scientifique, et Littéraire des Pyrénées Orientales, 1996), 41. These months were January-February; April-May; July-August; and October-November. Despite the upheaval caused by the French annexation of Roussillon and Cerdagne following the War of the Segadors, this religious connection remained stable: Roussillon was still known as a “pays d’obédience” into the eighteenth century.
between the French and Aragonese crowns. Despite being conquered and held as French territory during the fourteenth century, King Charles VIII restored the counties to Ferdinand of Aragon in 1494. The French ruler had hoped that such a gift would keep the Aragonese away from his intended campaign in Italy. It failed to appease, however, and as the rivalry between the two thrones continued, Ferdinand’s descendents, Charles V and Philip II, both worked to improve the fortifications around Perpignan. The constant wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries devastated the economy and to some extent the spiritual life of Roussillon, as armed forces ruthlessly occupied numerous religious houses or else destroyed them.  

The first Habsburg monarchs were not only deeply concerned with the military situation in Roussillon; spiritual issues soon became vitally important as well for the security of the monarchy. While both Charles V and Philip II dedicated their lives and reigns to stamping out the growing Protestant heresy in Europe, many inhabitants of Southern France soon became attracted to Calvinism. The threat of Huguenot preaching or teaching slipping through the loose borders of Roussillon, and thence over the Pyrenees into Spain proper, deeply affected Philip II, who eagerly worked to bring some reforms to the land. The king’s particular concern involved the regular clergy, since it was from their ranks that the notorious Augustinian Martin Luther had arisen. The thought may have crossed Philip’s mind that if only the local German prince had watched

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141 Ibid, p. 26. Most of the time, the respective kings were blamed for the devastation, but could salvage their reputation among the people. In 1639, for example, the invading French army destroyed the Capuchin house outside of Perpignan; Louis XIII, however, regained some favor with the local inhabitants by building a new house inside the ramparts in 1642. On the other hand, Philip IV, despite many promises to rebuild the religious houses destroyed in the disturbances of 1640, never did so, further alienating the townspeople from the royal cause at a critical time.
the developments in Wittenberg more closely, and had been willing to exercise his authority at the right time, perhaps that devilish monk would never have caused so much trouble.

Determined that his kingdom would not succumb to the same spiritual illness as had beset the Holy Roman Empire, Philip II embarked on a series of reforms aimed specifically at creating new dioceses along the troublesome frontier with France as well as overseeing numerous changes among the regular orders. One of his first decrees affecting Catalonia took the Benedictine house of St. Génis des Fontaines in Roussillon away from the traditional “Clastral” Benedictine rule—widely practiced in Catalonia—and placed it under the rule of Santa Maria de Montserrat.\textsuperscript{142} While on the surface, the strengthening of connections between a Roussillon Benedictine house and the premier Benedictine house in all Catalonia may appear to have appealed to Catalans, in fact, it worked just the opposite effect, for Montserrat had recently agreed to submit to the new, centralized and reformed “Congregational” Benedictine house of Valladolid. Through this and other measures, the heavy hand of regalist reform was beginning to make itself felt among Benedictine abbeys and Augustinian convents in the Catalan north.\textsuperscript{143}

\textsuperscript{142} This Benedictine abbey, located high in the central mountains of Catalonia, contains the precious “Moraneta,” the Black Virgin of Montserrat, said to have been carved by St. Luke himself. It was—and is today—the spiritual heart of the Principat of Catalonia, located only 50 km northwest of Barcelona.

\textsuperscript{143} It is interesting to note that St. Génis had been under the supervision of Montserrat since 1504, but had refused to implement the new reforms. Colomer, \textit{Le Clergé Régulier en Roussillon}, p. 27n. Didier Baisset, in his article, “La Diffusion du Protestantisme en Roussillon ou le Choc avec un Catholicisme Marqué par la Religiosité Hispanique.” in \textit{Le Roussillon de la Marca Hispanica aux Pyrénées-Orientales}. (Perpignan: SASL de PO, 1995), 41-46, notes that while most regular clerics in Roussillon—chiefly Benedictines and Augustinians—displayed a fierce loyalty to the pope, and were aware of the threat of heresy was a constant problem in their land, they were nevertheless reluctant to enact reforms. One of the most complete works on Philip II and the reforms that he imposed upon the regular orders throughout Spain has been written by Ignasi Fernández Terricabras, \textit{Philippe II et la Contre-Reforme: l'église espagnole à l'heure du concile de Trente} (Paris: Publisud, 2001). Terricabras has found that in addition to seeking internal reforms of the
An additional “reform” more pleasing to the Roussillonais was the transferal of the cathedral and bishop’s palace from the backwater town of Elna to Perpignan, a reform undertaken by Philip III. Perpignan at the beginning of the seventeenth-century possessed many favorable qualities, with more than a hundred years of prosperity in its recent past, an expanding population, and a more central geographic location in Roussillon. Although the old town of Elna had been the site of a cathedral since late Antiquity, its demographic, economic, and even religious growth had stagnated for quite some time.\textsuperscript{144} In the early Spanish Councils under the Visigoths, Elna is listed with Carcassone and others as belonging to the archdiocese of Narbonne. Matters stayed this way until 1511, when—under pressure from the kings of Spain—Julius II separated it from Narbonne and made it answerable only to the Pope—something that Barcelona was pushing for in the same era. In 1517, Pope Leo X returned it to Narbonne; Gregory XIII split it again in 1573, a decision that was subsequently appealed to Rome but confirmed by Urban VIII. Sieges of 1285 and 1344 had ruined Elna as a major city, while beginning in 1389 measures were taken by Perpignan to petition for their becoming the regional see. Extensive petitions were sent to Rome in 1573 and 1585 claiming that Elna was depopulated, sickly, and exposed to Moorish attack, Pope Clement finally agreed to move the see in 1601, which was done the following year.

The move proved of great benefit for nearly every social element within Perpignan. The powerful merchant community already established there enjoyed the added privileges of economic success that usually accompanied the creation of a

\textsuperscript{144} Interestingly, the diocese of Elna claimed St. Eulalia as their patron saint, like Barcelona, and even laid claim to her relics.
cathedral town. Augustinian canons in the church of Saint John were grateful since their church was constituted the new cathedral, giving them the special rank of a chapter. The move satisfied King Philip III too, for with the move came the prospect of more canons beholden to royal favor for their appointments. Overseeing the nomination of this frontier clergy was yet another way to advance royal control over the reformation of church practices begun by his father during the mid-sixteenth century.

This rise in ecclesiastical prestige, combined with a growing population and a strong economic base, gradually created a latent hostility in Perpignan directed against the Principat generally and Barcelona in particular. Philip III fed this antagonism—and actually introduced this social poison among the consciousness of Barcelona’s elite who had heretofore given scant interest to the social affairs of Perpignan—by a decree that gave the citizens of Perpignan the same privileges as honored citizens of Barcelona, with the single exception that they still had to meet in braç real along with the artisans and not in the braç militar, with the nobles.¹⁴⁵

In 1628, citizens of Perpignan, emboldened by these recent signs of royal favor, petitioned Philip IV to separate the two lands, turning Roussillon into its own province with its own viceroy, completely independent from Barcelona and the south. The citizens exhibited their desire for this change by hiring several lawyers at great expense to present the case in person before the king in Madrid. Not to be outdone, the consellers of Barcelona financed their own legal team in the capital, and even sponsored a few pamphlets to be published to aid their cause in the dispute, which lasted for nearly a year.

Although both Perpignan and Barcelona claimed to speak for their respective territories at large—the Comtats and the Principat—the vituperative arguments presented before the king were quite particular in nature: each city attacked the other. The biggest reasons cited by Perpignan in support of secession were Barcelona’s unfair trade advantages, which seemed to suck any money raised in Perpignan south into coffers of the capital, as well as an extreme neglect by the Generalitat of Roussillon’s frontier defenses. Further complaints listed Barcelona’s ignoring of the pressing bandit problem in the north. In an interesting move, given the tendency for Catalan lawyers to stress local privileges, Perpignan’s lawyers appealed to the king’s absolute right to negotiate with individual cities for the common good, even if such dealings went against the laws and constitutions of Catalonia. Barcelona, on the other hand, ably assisted by Joan Pere Fontanella, the most famous lawyer in the land, asserted that the Aragonese kings had ceded their right to such regalist actions in the constitutions, and that any action to disunite the Generalitat must be taken in the Corts alone.

The situation continued to deteriorate, and in early 1629, the city fathers of Perpignan dusted off an old medieval privilege entitled “Ma Armada.” By invoking this power—which was to be used only in times of emergency—the town council placed the city under martial law, and confiscated all the grain exports, most of which were headed south towards Barcelona. Although they hoped this action would give them leverage in their debates before the king, Perpignan’s fathers came under intense pressure from the rest of the Principat to lift their ban. Aware of the council’s vacillation and fearful that they were about to cave to this external pressure, nearly two thousand people took to the streets of Perpignan in favor of maintaining the ban, carrying *pedrenyals* and shouting
“Long live the King and the privileges.” In an attempt to forestall a serious riot, and to calm the people down, the bishop, Don Francisco Lopez y de Mendoça brought out the Sacrament “but it was abused by the mob.” Only after six hours, and with the aid of many other clergy from the city, did the protest eventually die down.\footnote{Ibid, 123. The cry of the crowd for the king, “Visca el Rey y los privilegis,” was typical of early modern societies at this time, which argued that problems in society came not from the king, but from the evil advisors who unfortunately surrounded him. In this way, popular uprisings continued to persevere in their loyalty to the king’s person while protesting royal policies. For more on this, see Elliott, “Revolts in the Spanish Monarchy,” in Forster & Greene, eds., Preconditions of Revolution in Early Modern Europe, 114-15. The city seems to have used the right “Ma Armada” once again in the 1630s; it is last mentioned in 1644, René Bes, Les Relations entre la Ville de Perpignan et la Cité de Barcelona, 137.}

The intense, popular animosity that sought to encourage secession soon faded away, however, as the region was hit with problems requiring more pressing concern. From 1629-1632, a series of physical disasters shook Perpignan and its environs, sabotaging any attempt to place the northern city on an equal footing with Barcelona.\footnote{Elliot, Revolt of the Catalans, 273, which also notes that prior to this, there was a series of poor harvests in France and Spain, in 1628 and 1629 because of droughts; in 1630 because of a wheat blight. The dearth of food—only exacerbated by the plague which hampered exports from France and Perpignan—continued to affect Barcelona well into the middle of 1632.}

In July 1631, one of the city surgeons, Hieronym Cros, would write that, “it pleased Our Lord to punish our \textit{patria} with the plague of contagious illness.”\footnote{ADPO: 2J-67: Memorias de Hieronim Cros, 1596-1638. “volge No Sr castigar nostra Patria ab la plaga de la malaltia contagiosa,” p. 67.} Hundreds fled Perpignan to the refuge of the nearby hills and mountains. Aside from the high death toll, hardly anybody seemed to know where the horrible malaise had arisen.\footnote{ADPO: G 241; the most common opinion concerning the outbreak of the plague was that it came from French chickens, or “Pollestres” [sic] (176v-177). Cros, on the other hand, believed the transmitter to be French women. ADPO: 2J-67: Memorias de Hieronim Cros, p. 69. See also de Rubi, Un segle de vida caputxina a Catalunya, 414-420.}

Conditions
became so bad that the town fathers placed the city under quarantine in August; the surgeon Cros, together with most of the cathedral canons, abandoned the city and went south to Elna.\textsuperscript{150}

Among the few who stayed included the recently-appointed bishop, Gregorio Parcero, who did what he could to care for his flock, carrying the Holy Sacrament around the entire city, and offering up prayers for Divine succor, though even he was forced to flee the city.\textsuperscript{151} The Capuchin order, practically the only religious order left in the city, nobly ministered to the sick. Five of these heroic friars eventually caught the fatal disease and died.\textsuperscript{152} Masses for the dead, which numbered over six thousand, resumed once Bishop Parcero returned to the city in March of 1632, and continued well into August of that year when the pestilence finally began to diminish.\textsuperscript{153}

Despite the series of disasters that befell the city of Perpignan on 10 September 1632, the city was aware enough of outside events to offer up public prayers “for the

\textsuperscript{150} The chapter left town on 28 July 1631, but kept up prayers and public processions in their new residence for the distraught town. ADPO: G 241, f.177v.
\textsuperscript{151} Cros writes of Parcero: “es veritat que lo Bisbe tingue molt gran cuidado en fer grans devocions y professons, y particularment fen feu una ab lo Santissima Sacrament per tots los llocs i ab oracions proprias de molt gran devocio i en Elna mon Senyor mateix aportava lo Santissim Sacrament i dona la benedictio deves PPa a la Sanctissima Verament que desde aquell dia se conestre molt gran milloría…” ADPO: 2J-67: Memorias de Hieronim Cros, p. 71. Bishop Parcero—who later would attain unwanted notoriety and fame for his role in the 1640 uprising—was appointed bishop of Elna-Perpignan in August 1630, and officially ordained only a few months before the outbreak of the plague.
\textsuperscript{152} Cros mentions the Capuchins in his memoirs. “Moriran per tots los convents frares, y per les parroquias tots los curats, en St. Jaume, i la real Frases capuxins que servien las curas ne moriran molts en St. Joan moriren dos curats.” Ibid, p. 72. This noble action brought high praise and commendation from Bishop Gregorio Parcero, and further endeared the people to the Capuchin order. Colomer, Le Clergé Régulier en Roussillon, 31. From his refuge in Villefranche-en-Conflent, Bishop Parcero wrote to the Capuchin Provincial, Bernard de Manlleu, on 24 October 1631, for more Capuchins to come and nurse the sick. Manlleu not only promised reinforcements, but he even went to visit the plague-stricken region the following month. It would not be Manlleu’s last mission of mercy for Catalonia. de Rubi, Un segle de vida capuxina, 417-419.
\textsuperscript{153} de Rubi, Un segle de vida capuxina, 420. ADPO: G 241, f. 178-180. Cros notes that the quarantine was only lifted in July 1632, and that, unlike the bishop, most of the canons had returned by late August. ADPO: 2J-67: Memorias de Hieronim Cros, p. 71. No sooner was city life returned to normal, than 3,000 soldiers, mostly Flemish and Neapolitans, also returned to garrison the town. Ibid, p. 76.
great necessity that the lord King has from the many heretics that … are risen in the parts of Germany and Flanders and that of the new diabolical invention (discovery) bound up that they have published out of liberty of conscience.” Yet, nature had not finished her afflictions. On 14 October, then on 21 November, and 11 December, horrible downpours flooded the city, demolishing houses and even damaging the cathedral roof. During the October deluge, the rain came down for nine hours straight, causing severe flooding, and “creating the greatest damage to houses that has been recorded in many years.” The torrential rains did not spare the houses of God either, causing the roofs of the bishop’s palace and several monasteries in town to collapse.

Amazingly, once the rains had stopped, Perpignan and its outlying regions received no moisture for the next five weeks until the heavy showers in November; the same pattern of deluge and drought was repeated during the first weeks of December. These remarkable occurrences in the weather, which particularly damaged the harvest that year, brought out the clergy and the surviving townspeople for prayers and public processions invoking the aid of God and His saints to restore some sense of balance and order to their lives. By the end of those three years, plague, flood, and famine had

154 “per la gran necessitat que tenia lo senyor Rey dels molts heretjas que … eran alsats en las parts de l’Alemanya e Flandras i que de la nova inventio diabolica trossa que avian publicada de libertat de conscientia.” ADPO G 241, f. 193. A procession through the four city parishes and the religious houses was organized on 15 September.
155 ADPO: 2J-67: Memorias de Hieronim Cros, “hague molts grans enderrocs de cases que sen recordaran molts anys. Primerament se enderroca la mitat del palau del Bisbat perque com la aigua del corrac no pogue passar per tapar se lo corrac pegg contra lo ort de capitol y enderroca la parety…y una paret entra lo monastir de St. Domingo….” p. 78.
156 ADPO: G 241, ff. 195-197.
devastated the population of Perpignan, war with France loomed on the horizon, and the continued poverty of the region put an end to the dream of autonomy.\footnote{Compared with Barcelona’s funds of 1632, the chapter of Perpignan could only muster 7545 ll 6 sous 4 diners, Ibid, f. 198. For a personal account of this period, see also ADPO: 2J-67: \textit{Memorias de Hieronim Cros, 1596-1638}. Cros was a surgeon, and his diary includes interesting notes about the weather during this time. For example, there was both an unusually severe cold in March 1634, and drought in June-July of that year. Also in 1635, he notes \textquotedblleft per lo hivern aquest any feu uns grandissims frets, y lo mes de Abril estigue pocs dias que no plogues, y casi lo mes de maig no estigue sis dias que no plogues\textquotedblright\@ ADPO: 2J-67: \textit{Memorias de Hieronim Cros}, p. 98. Incidentally, the town attributed the ending of the terrible plague to the special intercession of Saint Vincent de Paul. Bishop Parcero decreed that the saint’s feast day, 10 March, be set aside for a special religious thanksgiving ceremony to commemorate the plague. This day of thanksgiving was celebrated every year for the next 133 years. ADPO: BIB 5695: M. Puiggari, \textit{Catalogue Biographique des Évêques d’Elne} (Perpignan, 1842), p. 109.} Soon after these natural disasters passed, Perpignan was beset with troubling ecclesiastical news. In late 1633, Philip IV transferred the beloved Bishop Parcero to the neighboring diocese of Girona, then currently a hotbed of clerical resistance to the crown. Parcero would depart Roussillon on 6 February 1634, leaving the diocese empty for several years. His replacement, Gaspar de Prieto, would only govern for seven months, from March to October 1637; upon his demise the diocese would stay vacant for another year, until Francisco Pérez Roy arrived in December of 1638.\footnote{It appears from some of his episcopal correspondence, however, that Bishop Parcero remained in touch with the cathedral chapter of his first diocese for many years, even after the appointment of Pérez Roy. During the troubles of 1639 and 1640, Parcero took a leading role among the bishops of Catalonia, raising money and supplies to alleviate the suffering of the inhabitants of Perpignan and the Comtat of Roussillon.} Unfortunately for the community, Bishop Pérez Roy did not enjoy the same relationship with his chapter and the town as Parcero. Instead, a certain tension settled over the religious community of Perpignan, especially between the bishop and the leading cathedral canon, Josep de Viver i de Sant-Martin, archdeacon of the Vallespir.\footnote{Bishop Pérez Roy would depart Perpignan during 1641, leaving Archdeacon de Viver, long the most prominent cleric in the region, in charge as vicar-general.}

As the most important outpost near the front lines in 1635, Perpignan and its outlying region felt the impact of the war earlier and more continually than other areas of
Catalonia, with significant consequences on its subsequent history during the revolt. This area would have played host to Spanish imperial forces for a longer period of time, and would engage in its own revolt during the late summer of 1640. The harsh royal reaction to this disturbance would play right into the hands of the Catalan rebel leaders, who saw in the brutal repression, fraught with sacrilege, a confirmation of the king’s neglect for the spiritual welfare of his realm, and a further reason to stand fast against such oppression. Contrasted to the “exemplary” behavior of Perpignan during the first months of the 1640 rebellion was the model of Tarragona, which soon earned the undying antipathy of “true” Catalans in their fight against Castile.

**Tarragona: the Catalan Esau**

Two days journey—seventeenth century style—southwards from Barcelona along the beautiful Catalan coast lies the city of Tarragona. It was the first Roman capital in Spain and served as a critical crossroads, channeling traffic north-south along the Mediterranean shore, and also serving as the end-point for one of the few east-west roads across the province. Along with this secular pride of place, Tarragona was early on made the archdiocese of Catalonia, responsible for an area that stretched from beyond the Ebro to over the Pyrenees. The funds stemming from clerical rents made Tarragona—along with Tortosa to the south—the richest dioceses in Catalonia.

Yet Tarragona fell behind in matters of economic and religious importance to Barcelona during the early-modern period. As the royal budget increased in the face of

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160 Indeed, the last of the regular orders to establish a presence in Roussillon before the rebellion was the Discalced, or Reformed Augustinians, who singular purpose was to minister to these foreign soldiers stationed in Perpignan and its environs. See ADPO: 1C 1334.

constant—and ever more expensive—wars (an important consequence of the Military Revolution), the kings of Castile from Philip II onward frequently kept the archdiocese vacant, so as to have access to the wealth which otherwise would have been spent on the church. In the face of these prolonged vacancies, the provincial church in Catalonia began to fight over which diocese ought to exercise control over the others. Tarragona’s chapter vehemently argued that the absence of an archbishop made no difference, that the regional clergy should be answerable to the archdiocesan chapter and the chapter’s vicar-general. The cathedral clergy of Barcelona, on the other hand, made the compelling case that Trent had ordained bishops—not canons—to rule the church, and that the Bishop of Barcelona, being the most senior official of the Catalan Church after the archbishop of Tarragona, ought to preside over the Church’s internal affairs in his absence. The arguments between Barcelona and Tarragona—together with their ecclesiastical allies, the chapters of Vic and Solsona respectively—grew heated, and provoked a great amount of correspondence with the Holy See.

As the only cathedral city capable of presenting a significant challenge to Barcelona’s dominance in religious matters, Tarragona usually headed opposition alliances with other cathedral chapters during the internal ecclesiastical disputes of the seventeenth century. Most often, they were allied with Tortosa, the richest and most southern diocese in Catalonia, and the one that most consistently maintained a pro-Castilian stance. When Philip II created the diocese of Solsona in 1593 out of parts from the dioceses of Urgell, Vic, and Girona—thus earning the enmity of nearly every other Catalan diocese, Tarragona took Solsona (the smallest diocese) under her wing, creating another constant ally. Of greater interest, in light of the continual demands by Philip IV
for fiscal contributions from his Catalan subjects, is that regardless of whether the archbishop was aggressively promoting the royal interest, or inclined to diplomacy, the archdiocesan chapter generally tended to support royal measures of taxation. Although the chapter canons mixed this support with considerable haggling about the amount to be paid, it was nevertheless an unusual stance for a Catalan ecclesiastical constituency in the mid-seventeenth century.

Perhaps as a result of the extended absence of archbishops, the canons of Tarragona sparred more frequently with city officials rather than taking out their wrath on their fellow clergymen. One of the Catalan historians of Tarragona, Antoni Jordà i Fernández, has studied the city during the seventeenth century and has noted the various levels of discontent and conflict that pervaded the community. Along with very occasional confrontations with the archbishop, the cathedral canons mainly fought with the city fathers over matters of ecclesiastical privileges and their extension into the daily business world. As was the case with Barcelona, Tarragona’s city council resented the church’s exemption from taxation on matters perceived as being unnecessary to the sustaining of church life.

Whereas with Barcelona the issue had been the canons’ baker selling to the laity without a license, in Tarragona the matter centered on vineyards owned by the clergy outside the city. The preeminent wine-growing region in Catalonia, Tarragona had long-standing import duties on wine; the amount owed differed based on the type of wine—white or red—as well as locale of origin—either within or without the municipal lands. In addition, the town clergy had enjoyed an exemption from these duties on

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wine grown on their own lands within the municipality. But several canons also held vineyards beyond this, in the fertile Camp de Tarragona. By 1638, facing continued fiscal demands from the king to support his wars, it seems that some cathedral clergy were looking for any way to restore some balance to their incomes. In the spring of that same year, the city council passed a new regulation, stipulating that any cleric importing wine into Tarragona would have to declare the type of wine he was carrying.

Although harmless in itself, this measure aroused the suspicions of the cathedral canons who condemned this innovation as but the first step towards sacrificing the clerical exemption.\(^1\) Outraged, the chapter, citing “the violence that they have made and [yet] make, in great contempt of our estate,” excommunicated several members of the city council.\(^2\) Coming a few weeks before Easter, the pre-eminent religious celebration for early-modern Catholics, this excommunication was an incredible step for the canons to take, and one that shocked the community. With no archbishop to whom to appeal, or to moderate the pre-emptive actions of the clergy, a divide began to emerge between a sizeable portion of Tarragona’s citizenry and their religious leaders.

The controversy came to a head on Good Friday, when the excommunicated councilmen together with a number of citizens entered the cathedral in defiance of their sentence and disrupted the service. Thoroughly piqued, the chapter sent off detailed letters of grievance to the Spanish Nuncio, and to the viceroy, Santa Coloma. Although Don Francesc d’Erill i Sentmanat, abbot of the influential San Cugat de Valles, and Canceller of Catalonia, came to mediate between the parties, further disturbances between the excommunicated city leaders and the canons prompted the religious

\(^1\) Ibid, 63-64.
\(^2\) “les violencies quens han fetes y fan, en gran menyspreu del nostre estat,” Ibid, 64.
hierarchy in Tarragona to write for help to the Inquisition in Barcelona, citing “the oppression and violence that four or five excommunicates from this city have given us.” As secular and spiritual leaders of Catalonia sought to resolve the conflict, matters continued to deteriorate in Tarragona, with the civic leaders conducting illegal “sit-ins” in the presbytery, disrupting the Corpus Christi procession—perhaps the most important religious celebration in Catalonia outside of Christmas and Easter—and going so far as to “make us [the clergy] a mockery and a laughing stock, a thing quite intolerable for the Christian Religion.”

Matters had certainly reached a critical state when influential townsfolk could brazenly mock Church officials; after all, they were “role-models” for the community, and just how far their behavior might encourage others to duplicate their defiance was an issue for concern. In early June, the nuncio, Campeggi, finally issued his decision on the matter, siding wholly with the town council. He ordered the ecclesiastical censures to be removed, and the clergy to swear under oath what sort of wine they were importing to the city. Disgusted by this ruling, the chapter refused to abide by it, appealing instead to the Rota in Rome. By the time the case reached the tribunal in Rome, it was already early 1639. The affair would remain unresolved before the revolt came, and for many years afterwards, a certain wariness pervaded church-city relations in Tarragona.

Yet when it came to the grander political scene, Tarragona’s position reverted more towards its latent antipathy against Barcelona. Despite their initial resistance in the

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165 “la opresion y violencia en que nos tienen quatro o sinco descomulgados desta ciudad.” ACT-C-68, fol. 121v, cited in Ibid, p. 65.
166 “fent mofa y escarni de nosaltres, cosa molt indigna de la relgió cristiana.” ACT-C-68, fol. 122v.
167 The Rota Romana was the Supreme Tribunal of the Catholic Church; in Rome, under the oversight of one or two cardinals. By 1644, if not much earlier, this post was held by Antoni Barberini, brother of Urban VIII. See the entry “Rota Romana” in Diccionario de historia Eclesiastica de España.
name of Catalan brotherhood, Tarragona quickly caved before the besieging army of the Marquis de los Vélez. For much of the war, Tarragona would serve as the polar opposite to Barcelona, going out of its way at times to be extra-loyal to the king. During the war, Tarragona would become the home to the new viceroy, and the haven for loyal Catalans who gradually increased in number as the war progressed. In addition the place became a city of refuge for members of the Inquisition, who were expelled from territory held by the Catalan rebels beginning in 1641.\footnote{AHN: Inquisition: Libro 1226: Relació de Francisco de Cabrera, Inquisidor de Tarragona, (1643?), ff. 878-883.}

Ultimately, the city fathers, seeing Barcelona falling in disgrace through persistent rebellion, sought to turn this to their advantage. Brushing over the first months of their own alliance with the rebels, Tarragona sent an embassy to Philip IV asking for royal recognition as “faithful city” and as such, to be placed under partial royal control. From then on, the city’s seal would reflect its status as an urban center protected by both the archbishop and the king. In the eyes of many Catalans still holding out against Castile, Tarragona had behaved no differently than Esau: the older brother who sold the birthright of Catalan privileges and constitutions for the mess of pottage labeled protection. It would take at least a generation for the bitter feelings engendered by Tarragona’s betrayal to heal. But that story belongs to another century, and another Catalan revolt against a crowned king.\footnote{It is ironic perhaps, or a fine example of the shifting alliances between Catalan cities that, during the War of Spanish Succession (1703-1715) Tarragona, together with the new industrial center of Igualada, and Barcelona would compose “The Iron Triangle” of pro-Austrian resistance against the Bourbon, Philip V.}
Girona: at the Catalan crossroads

From its very geographical location, lying as it does along the main road from Perpignan to Barcelona, the town of Girona seems to have been naturally marked as a crossroads for Catalonia. Its position enabled it to serve as a facilitator of goods and information that flowed from the southern Principat to the northern Comtats and vice-versa. In addition, the city was situated in the midst of farmland, and thus was more able to relate to, and provide for, the complexities of rural and urban affairs. The junction of town and country, and of north and south Catalonia, Girona remained a second-rate center in the province. Whereas the population of Barcelona and Perpignan stayed around forty thousand and ten thousand respectively during the seventeenth-century, Girona’s population during that time rarely rose above six thousand. Although Girona’s central location in Catalonia made its citizens more inclined to be inwardly-focused on their own affairs—a position the town shared with the central dioceses of Vic and Solsona in contrast to the frontier dioceses of Lleida and Perpignan or the cosmopolitan capital of Barcelona—both city and chapter nevertheless served as a mediator in many of the political or ecclesiastical disputes that arose in Catalonia.

The political organization and early seventeenth-century experience of Girona shared many common elements with other provincial cities. Like Barcelona, Girona was governed by a Consell General, composed of sixty men from the various social estates,

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170 Joan Busquets i Dalmau, La Catalunya del Barroc Vista des de Girona. La crònica de Jeroni de Real (1626-1683) vol. 1, (Girona: Ajuntament de Girona, 1994), 299; Elliott, The Revolt of the Catalans, 26-28. Indeed, the city of Girona suffered greatly as a result of the nineteen-year War of the Segadors, and the horrible plague that swept through the province in 1650-1651. Only by the end of the century did the city population come close to matching the heights of earlier decades. Even though the city remained small, the area covered by the diocese of Girona was, and still is, one of the largest in Catalonia, containing nearly 70,000 inhabitants during the seventeenth-century.
and led by four jurats.\textsuperscript{171} Within the Consell there were numerous committees, or juntas, that oversaw various elements of the city life: among others, there was a special junta for plague, one for war, and one to deal with the local economy, which was primarily centered on the grain-producing farmland nearby.\textsuperscript{172} Like Perpignan, Girona suffered a series of harvest failures, which led to catastrophic famines in 1629 and 1630. At the end of that year, the city passed an ordinance banning the export of any wheat from the veguer, or county. By April of 1631, conditions had not improved, and the city was reduced to rationing. Matters were slow to improve during the following year, and a minor revolt by Catalonia’s transient harvesters, known as segadors, added to the diocese’s suffering.\textsuperscript{173}

For reasons that have yet to fully uncovered (by this historian), the city of Girona was less prone to fierce internal disputes than its counterparts either in larger cities like Barcelona, or in small rural areas like Vic and Urgell. In part, the banditry problem that infested the foothills of the Pyrenees and the central mountain range around Vic appears to have been largely absent around Girona. Even if there were bandits operating along the coastal plains, they kept their disputes to themselves rather than taking them into the local town, as happened regularly in Vic or Urgell. In addition, only a small number of families seem to have had extensive control over the city government for much of the sixteenth- and early seventeenth- centuries. More importantly, these leading families of

\textsuperscript{171} Out of the sixty seats on the Consell General, certain numbers were held available for nobles, honored citizens, merchants, and artisans. Like the Consell de Cent in Barcelona, the first jurat, or jurat en cap had preeminence over the others.  
\textsuperscript{172} Busquets i Dalmau and Simon i Tarrés, \textit{Girona al Segle XVII}, 30-31.  
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid, 10-11; 14-15.
Girona—such as the Saconomina, Ferrer, Bas, Real, and Vivet—frequently intermarried, a practice that also reduced the tendency of competing factions to degenerate into armed rivalries.174

Perhaps a further contribution towards preventing discontent or open fighting was the sizeable religious population inside the city of Girona, overwhelmingly Catalan by birth, and taking a benevolent attitude towards the people whom they served. The total number of clergy—both regular and secular—within the city limits during the 1600s stayed around five hundred, or nearly ten percent of the population. Unlike other parts of Catalonia, the bishops of Girona were generally Catalans themselves rather than outsiders: through the seventeenth century, there were eleven Catalans who held the episcopal office as opposed to only four “foreigners”—and two of them were the well-liked Bishops Manrique and Parcero who governed during the 1630s. In keeping with the overtones of a crossroads, the see of Girona was traditionally considered a staging point for later episcopal transfers, mostly to Tortosa, but occasionally to Barcelona, and even the archbishopric of Tarragona.175

In addition to the bishop’s palace and the cathedral chapter, Girona housed ten monasteries, four convents, and at least four parish churches within its ancient city walls; all told, the city possessed one of the highest proportions of religious buildings—houses and churches—to total population to be found in Europe. The Jesuits and the Capuchins enjoyed the highest esteem from among the lower orders of society, while the

175 Ibid, 44-47. Other examples of Girona’s ecclesiastical uniqueness among other Catalan dioceses are that chapter minutes were recorded in Latin rather than in Catalan, and the system of dating had changed from beginning the year on 25 December (as had been customary throughout Catalonia) to beginning it on 1 January (as much of the rest of Spain was doing at this time). The exact significance—if any exists—of these unique elements is unknown.
Franciscans and the Dominicans possessed the two largest convents—numbering sixty and forty friars respectively, or nearly one-fifth of the total ecclesiastical population. On the upper end of the social ladder, sons and daughters of the elite entered the powerful and influential Benedictine houses of Sant Daniel, which bordered the city walls and Sant Pere de Galligans, which, though home to only a dozen monks, possessed vast amounts of property in the surrounding countryside.

Unlike the other Catalan towns we have discussed, the story of church-city relations in Girona during the seventeenth century is a mild one. Compared with the events of Barcelona and the Seu d’Urgell, one might even be tempted to call it boring. In general, bishop and chapter, monk and friar worked together to instill the Tridentine reforms among their flock, a pious work that was well received. While the city’s prelates enjoyed a relatively brief tenure, it was quite rare for the cathedral canons to move from one diocese to another, and so they provided an abiding sense of stability and tranquility; many canons, most notably the archdeacons Don Bernat de Cardona and Dr. Pere Joan Albert, had spent their entire lives serving in Girona. The two vicar-generals, Francesc Pejoan and Don Francesc d’Aymerich, had served together for well over a decade, while another, Jaume Pla, had served as the chapter’s secretary for nearly as long.

Indeed, during the twenty years immediately preceding the War of the Segadors, the chapter of Girona had known only one major dispute, and that was over the collecting of the décima in 1632-1633.176 Even then the chapter took only a secondary role in the ecclesiastical resistance, writing letters of support to the bitterly-divided neighboring diocese of Vic in their fight against Philip IV. In part to diffuse Girona’s alliance with

176 This controversy eventually represented the first serious rift between Philip IV and a significant portion of the Catalan church.
Vic, the king appointed Bishop Gregorio Parcero of Elna to be transferred south and take up residence there in early 1634. The bishops of Girona in the seventeenth century, in addition to their role as the supreme ecclesiastical judge in the region, had traditionally served as mediators in larger provincial disputes. Bishop Parcero would not fail the king in his appointment, winning over the dissident canons and convincing the chapter to pay the contested décima. Within a year of his arrival, he would become the most beloved prelate in Catalonia, a reputation he maintained for the next thirty years until death as bishop of Tortosa.

Born in March 1566, in the village of Túi, in Galicia, Gregorio Parcero took up the Benedictine habit when he was quite young. He rose in the ranks of his order and eventually became the Abbot-General of the reformed Congregation of Valladolid. Ironically this was the very congregation that Philip II and his descendents were attempting to spread throughout the Benedictine houses in Catalonia despite great resistance. That the head of this “foreign” branch of one of the most esteemed religious orders in Catalonia would come to be so admired by even die-hards like Pau Claris, speaks volumes to Parcero’s character and personality. Through his entire ministry, Parcero showed himself devoted to serving his flock, caring for them both physically and spiritually. This pattern of behavior manifested itself through his decision to stay in the midst of the devastating plague in Perpignan to his bold pronouncements against the violence and sacrilege committed by Philip IV’s troops in the diocese of Girona in 1640. There was hardly a canon in his cathedral that was not on friendly terms with him; furthermore, many members of the regular orders, but especially the Capuchins, were devoted to him as well.
Yet, despite his calm ways, Parcero could also be a strict disciplinarian. On 26 March 1639, the bishop issued a stern warning against the activities of one Fra Domingo Vilalta, OP. Although Parcero had given the friar a license to preach in the parish church in the small village of Besalú, Vilalta had violated the bounds of his jurisdiction and had begun to preach in other locations, raising fears within the local Benedictine abbey that the Dominican was encroaching upon their spiritual domain. Anxious to preserve a unity among his ministers, as well as to remind the friar of his own need for obedience, the bishop warned Vilalta to stay away from his new territory or else face censure: “we will suspend and annul each and every license that the said Father [Vilalta]… has of us or of our officials … to preach and hear confessions in the said village of Besalú and throughout the said diocese of Girona.”

Writing on the same day to the jurats of Besalú, Parcero reinforced his decision that on pain of excommunication no priest was allowed to officiate services or preach in the village chapel without his express permission. As far as one can tell, the friar submitted to Parcero’s judgment and the disturbance between the Dominican and the Benedictines subsided.

In general, then, the religious population both in the city of Girona and throughout the diocese enjoyed a peaceful co-existence with the local secular government. While the cathedral chapter did participate in a spat of rebellion during 1633-1634 concerning the décima, their involvement was considered unusual, and relationships between the king and cathedral canons remained quiescent during the remaining years of the decade. Thus

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177 “suspenem y annullam totas y qualsevols licentias que lo dit Pare...tinga de nostra o de nostres officals....pera predicar y confessar en la dita vila de Besalú y en tot la present diocesi de Girona.” ADG: I.4 Protocols de Lletres: U-244: f.145.

178 “no dexen predicar en la dita Capella a ningun predicador que no tinga expressa llicentia nostra...” ADG: I.4 Protocols de Lletres: U-244: f.145v.
it was remarkable—and yet in many ways quintessentially representative of Girona as the symbolic crossroads of Catalonia—that the dramatic events of 1640 should occur in the diocese’s own backyard. Despite their tradition of calmness, the devastating effects of the church burnings and the destruction of the Sacrament in two small parish churches would have the effect of turning this peaceful diocese into a hotbed of popular resistance.

**Vic: the eye of the storm (the center of Catalonia)**

In a province such as Catalonia, dominated as it is by mountains in the northern and central regions, the plains of Vic are one of the most fertile areas in the land. Nestled between the first range of coastal mountains and the Pyrenees, the city of Vic dated back to pre-Roman days, when it was known as Ausona. Like Urgell in the north, Vic was a market-town surrounded by fields—in fact, the present-day graduate student can find the smell of manure blowing quite regularly through the archive windows in both locales. Being a second-tier city of Catalonia, the town councilmen coveted—and received—the special patronage of Barcelona, while the cathedral chapter of Vic created alliances with the chapters of other small towns like the Seu d’Urgell and Girona.

Philip II unexpectedly strengthened the religious triumvirate bond in 1593 when he took large areas of land from all three dioceses—chiefly Urgell and Vic—to create the new see of Solsona. The heavy-handed manner in which the Habsburg monarch stripped the three dioceses of their lands not only encouraged a bitter and suspicious attitude toward future royal activity in church affairs, but also began a spiteful relationship with Solsona. In typical Catalan fashion, a series of legal battles began between Solsona and Vic, in which the former disputed Vic’s authority to collect ecclesiastical rents on secular land located within the new diocese. The triumvirate of Vic-Girona-and Seu d’Urgell
united again in the 1630s, when the city of Manresa—the most populous city in the
diocese of Vic and home to the famous cave in which St. Ignatius of Loyola received his
visions—petitioned Philip IV to create it as a new diocese.¹⁷⁹

Whereas in Barcelona and Tarragona, the local conflict pitted cathedral chapters
against the town councils, the struggles in Vic were more factional, cutting across the
divisions of church and government. Vic’s location as one of the centers of Catalan
banditry in the seventeenth century—as well as the related feuding between “nyerros”
and “cadells”—meant that popular violence from family factions occasionally spilled
over into the city, particularly on market days when the gates were left open for visiting
farmers and merchants. Although the heyday of the bandits had largely passed by the
1630s, the family feuding continued, oftentimes melding into whatever dispute happened
to be current around town.

In ecclesiastical circles, most of the internal conflict pitted the cathedral chapter
against other religious persons or groups who sought to trespass upon their traditional
liberties and powers. In the first category lay the numerous conflicts between the chapter
and the diocese’s archdeacon major. The office of archdeacon was one of great authority
within a diocese, representing the next tier in Catalonia’s Catholic hierarchy immediately
below the bishop and immediately above the cathedral chapter. Each see was divided up
into two or three zones and one archdeacon assigned the responsibility of overseeing that
particular area. Just as secular governments answered to a jurat en cap or a conseller en
cap, so too did the archdeacons answer to one of their own, who was given the title,

¹⁷⁹ For more on the inter-diocese conflict, see Joan Busquets i Dalmau, “Nova pretensió d’un bisbat per a
Manresa al segle XVII. L’oposició de Vic i Girona” in I Congrés d’Història de l’Església Catalana des del
archdeacon major. The office was open only to cathedral canons, who diligently sought after the coveted role. More often than not, the archdeacons also held office as the vicar-generals of the province, thus combining a number of administrative responsibilities in one person.

In smaller dioceses like Vic and Solsona—where there was on occasion only one archdeacon—the archdeacon major was able to wield a great deal of power. This power could often lead to trouble with his fellow canons, who generally sought to remind him that he was after all a fellow canon like them. Such conflicts were particularly frequent during the early seventeenth century in Vic because of the frequent absences created by the death or transferal of the bishop, which occurred on average two years out of every ten.\(^{180}\) With archdeacons such as Melchior Palau occupying the same position for many years at a time—as in the chapter of Girona, the overwhelming majority of canons in Vic were appointed to these posts and stayed for the rest of their lives—some form of challenge was bound to erupt either from other canons who disapproved of the “uppity” manner of the archdeacons or by the religious officials themselves who arrogated a good deal of power in lieu of the absent prelate.

Unfortunately, the religious discord inside Vic extended beyond the particular personal problems of the cathedral canons. For all of its small size, Vic was home to ten different religious houses, including Franciscans, Dominicans, Capuchins, Jesuits, Discalced Carmelites, and the particular Catalan order of Our Lady of Mercy.\(^{181}\) Among the regular clergy, the largest house inside the town belonged to the Franciscans whose

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\(^{180}\) During the first half of the seventeenth century, the diocese of Vic was vacant from 1607-1609; 1613-1615; 1625-1627; 1634-1635; and 1638-1640.

\(^{181}\) Vic’s adherence to the faith can still be witnessed today: thirty-five churches and religious houses, including the cathedral, are crammed inside the limits of the old medieval section of town.
county missionary movement attracted a lot of nobles as patrons to their order, much the same as contemporary conditions in Girona. While the cathedral chapter welcomed the friars’ devotion and spiritual contributions, the canons would not greet all other regular clergy with the same hospitality. For a number of reasons, the chapter’s hostility turned on the Society of Jesus. From the first days of their arrival in town in 1628 through the beginning of the revolution in 1640, the chapter of Vic would wage a bitter cold war against the Jesuits, seeking continually to diminish their influence and doing their best to rid the town of the “malicious” and “arrogant” Order.

The central thrust of the canons’ opposition to the Jesuits is a matter of some uncertainty; however, it appears that the chapter was primarily concerned that the Society would seek to open up a new school in town, thus depriving the cathedral clergy of their traditional monopoly on education. Regardless of the canons’ initial motivations or suspicions, events soon caused the matter to degenerate. The Jesuits were undoubtedly aware upon their arrival that certain portions of the local clergy highly disapproved of their presence. Rather than seek some sort of reconciliation or understanding with the chapter, however, the Society of Jesus did their best to exacerbate matters and infuriate the secular clergy.

To make matters worse, the canons’ antipathy stood in stark contrast to the benevolent and generous behavior of the current bishop of Vic, Fray Andrés de San Jeronimo. Within a matter of days after the Jesuits’ arrival in 1628, the prelate, with the support of the city council, donated the chapel of St. Just to the Jesuits so that the Society

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182 It should be noted that Dominicans throughout Catalonia steadfastly opposed the introduction of the Jesuits during the turn of the seventeenth century for precisely the same reasons. Yet, it was only in Vic that the cathedral chapter became the Society’s major foe; oddly enough, the Dominican order there appears to have been rather quiescent.
could start a college there. It appears from the cathedral records that the chapter of Vic claimed a special attachment to this chapel. Whether this was in fact true, or whether the canons would have resented any church property being given to the Jesuits, the chapter was extremely upset that the whole deal had been made without their being consulted. That members of the Company were arrogantly taking houses near the chapel “without asking for anything, whenever [the Company] comes to the City, as if they were owed it and had an obligation,” served only to rouse their fury further.

The final straw came when the Jesuits reneged on their promise to pay the traditional tithe to the chapter, claiming on the basis of a papal privilege that they were exempt from such donations to the secular clergy. Initially the chapter had acceded to the Society’s ownership of the chapel of St. Just on condition that the Jesuits comply with their promise to pay the tithe. Now, to their dismay, they found that Jesuits had no intention of fulfilling their end of the bargain. The chapter petitioned King Philip IV to remedy this blatant violation of customary obligation. In addition, they launched a general complaint against the obnoxious behavior of the Jesuits before the court, but to no avail; the king rebuffed their appeal.

Spurned by the crown, the chapter tried to stir up local resistance to the Jesuits. In this, they were largely unsuccessful; indeed, many of the city fathers voted instead to tear down old walls and buildings owned by the chapter in order to make more room for the new college. Grumbling against the times, the chapter of Vic would resort to sabotage

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186 Ibid, p. 386.
on occasion: thwarting the building of their house, the construction of their school, and the further designs the Jesuits had for the improvement of the city itself.\textsuperscript{187}

During the turbulent 1630s, Vic’s religious community became involved with the political affairs of the province. In 1633, they became the first cathedral chapter to openly defy Philip IV and his demands on the Catalan church for money to support his growing military commitments, sparking a revolt that would last the greater part of two years. The leader of the cathedral clergy was Enric d’Alemany, canon and vicar-general in Vic since the mid-1620s. At the Corts of 1626 he had vigorously opposed new fiscal levies requested by the monarchy and, with the help of fellow clerics like Pau Claris, was able to rally the rest of the Braç Eclesiàstic to his side. During the local synod of the following year, he was named head of ecclesiastical judges in the diocese as well as its sacristan. In his position, he became well connected with the fiscal and political affairs of other dioceses, particularly those of Urgell, Girona, and Barcelona. He was a good friend of Pau Claris, and in 1634 worked with his fellow cleric to oppose the new imposition of the \textit{décima} on the church. As a result of d’Alemany’s obstinacy against the crown, Bishop Manrique of Barcelona placed the entire city of Vic under interdict on 24 March 1634, a penalty that thoroughly disrupted the close alliance between the chapter and town, and which eventually brought the rebellious clergy to heel.\textsuperscript{188}

Forced to bow to the crown’s fiscal impositions, the clergy of Vic nevertheless would not remain inactive. During the French invasion of 1639, the cathedral chapter would help organize three separate companies of soldiers to march to the relief of Salses.

\textsuperscript{187} 30 December 1639. So ticked off are they at the Jesuits’ desire to place a college in Vic, that the chapter writes to Rome. \textit{ACV: Secretaria: Liber 2 (1630-1641) (Arm 57/56); f. 243.}

\textsuperscript{188} \textit{BAEV: Diego Sanz: Relacio breu dels successos, segonas intentions y locuras, que an succehit y se son fetas en la ciutat de Vich desdel any 1634, fins al de 1641, ff. 1-22.}
Although their city would be plunged into a horrible and bloody civil strife during the summer months of 1640, the urban clergy would be able to rally the citizens of Vic once more, scraping together one last desperate band of reinforcements to help the beleaguered city of Barcelona during the pivotal winter days of January 1641. Only the chapter canons from the small, mountainous diocese of Urgell would be able to compete with their counterparts in Vic with regards to their constant devotion to the rebellion during its bleakest and darkest hours.

**Seu d’Urgell: Secularism and the Chapter triumphant**

Miles away from the hustle and bustle of Barcelona and Perpignan lies the tiny cathedral town, Seu d’Urgell. Nestled in a small Pyrenean valley only a few miles from Andorra, Urgell could either be considered an inland Barcelona, or its complete opposite. On the one hand, the nearly continuous activity of smuggling—whether by the French coming over the mountains from Andorra, or the Roussillonais approaching from the valley of Puigcerdà—created a miniature cosmopolitan atmosphere that still exists during market days in the twenty-first century. Yet, for clerics such as Pau Claris, who had lived most of their lives in bigger cities like Lleida or Barcelona, coming to Urgell must have been a letdown of sorts. Despite its social backwardness, in no other town did the clergy exercise such secular power as they did in Seu d’Urgell, beginning with the prelate. Presiding over the Catalan diocese farthest removed from royal authority, the bishop there was given powers as viceroy for Andorra—a position he held co-equally with the Count of Foix-Béarn until 1995, when the tiny nation received a greater degree of autonomy.
It was ironic, then, that the long arm of royal authority turned out to be the biggest bone of contention in ecclesiastical affairs, which, given the nature of a small town, invariably spilled out into the secular realm. Many clerics—cathedral canons, friars, and monks—were engaged officially or unofficially in smuggling, supplementing their meager pensions by doing a brisk business in the illegal import trade. This led them into serious wrangles with the bishop, whose concern with politics generally made it seem that his primary responsibility was not guarding his flock against the wolves of heresy, but trying to prevent the shepherds from fleecing their sheep.

Whether as an accompanying result of the smuggling enterprise or ever-present temptation to exercise their practical autonomy, the chapter of the Seu d’Urgell certainly engaged in conduct that was quite different than their fellow Catalan canons. Many formed conscious alliances with local barons, alliances that they would use to get closer to the smuggling trade, or as protection against the contrary policies of the bishop. They also were quite involved in rather scandalous secular matters, such as the purchasing of arms. For example, shortly after the outbreak of war against France, the chapter ordered one of their number, Pau Claris, to continue to place and order one hundred muskets “in the accustomed manner,” strongly suggesting that the canons in Urgell were already quite familiar with the particular negotiations involved in the sale of weapons.

Geography may actually have had a part to play in developing, not necessarily the canons’ hostility against their bishops, but the nearly unanimous manner in which they resisted the prelate. Unlike the larger cities of Barcelona, Perpignan, or Girona, the small size and isolated location of the Seu d’Urgell did not offer its citizens a variety of choices

\[{189} ACU: I. Conclusions Capitulares: volume, 1608-1639; 2 May 1635: “Fonch resolt que lo Sr. Cane Claris continue en comprar mosquets fins al numero de Cent ab la comoditat acostuma,” f. 433v. Emphasis mine.\]
for their residences. The canons in Seu d’Urgell all lived on the same street, a block from the cathedral, and in many cases right next-door to each other. This pattern of living may have facilitated a stronger sense of community—and also perhaps, a greater reluctance to express open dissent—among the canons, which was absent in other dioceses where members of the chapter lived in different neighborhoods.

This stronger communal identity was reflected in the very “democratic” policy held by the canons of Urgell, in which they enforced their own discipline on their members and endeavored to communicate the principle that no one canon was above any of the others. For example, in 1636 after the canon Hyacinto Rosell publicly exhibited behavior that was unbecoming and disgraceful to his fellow canons, the chapter resolved to prevent him from entering their session for two months and from collecting his rent from the nearby village of Alas. More impressively, the chapter of Urgell would maintain this strident attitude of self-discipline throughout the early stages of the revolt and the war, at a time when many ecclesiastical traditions were being overthrown in the name of political expediency. Despite the high positions of authority later attained by two of their members, Jaume Ferran and Llorens de Barutell—who respectively became Inquisitor General and Canceller of Catalonia under the French—these men were referred to as “canons,” and were still required to attend regular chapter councils every year in early May. Furthermore, they were ordered to come dressed as a canon, and not in the garb of their particular office.

190 ACU: I. Conclusions Capitulares: volume, 1608-1639, f.441 (7 March 1636). “fonch resolt que sie privat del Sr. Cane Hyacinto Rosell de la entrada de Capitol y Beneficite en veu activa y passiva, per espay del corrent mes de mars y abril proim vinent…”y also…”se li dona ordre dexas la capbrevasio de Alas, y que encontinent vinga a donar satisfaccio al Capitol del que se li expossa, sots indignació y desgracia de dita Capitol.”
Perhaps the most definitive characteristic of the religious situation in the Seu d’Urgell, however, was the way in which the cathedral canons were repeatedly at odds with their bishop, no matter where his birthplace was or how accommodating he appeared at first. Remarkably, this lively bishop-chapter feud only increased with the appointment of Catalan Pau Duran to the see of Urgell in 1636. At the time of his appointment, Duran was the only Catalan prelate then serving in the province, and no doubt Philip IV’s chief minister Olivares expected to find the Catalan clergy grateful that their annoyingly frequent petitions on this point had been answered.

What occurred was beyond all royal expectations. Far from being pleased by the birthplace of their new bishop, many canons in Urgell railed against Duran’s rather implacable royalist attitude and his attempts to cut down on smuggling across the borders. In this pursuit, Bishop Duran found an unusual ally in the people of Seu d’Urgell, themselves upset at the activities of the canons, many of whom were cutting in on their share of the contraband trade. Not to be outdone, however, members of the anti-Duran faction, most notably, Pau Claris, Jaume Ferran, Josep Soler, and Don Llorens de Barutell struck up an alliance with the local notable of the hills, one Baron Boquet, whose relatives were also members of the chapter.

The deteriorating relations between these two main factions—Bishop Duran-and-town against Canons-and-Baron—came to a head in a decisive controversy begun in December 1639. On 9 December, Bishop Duran, suspicious of the chapter’s activities, arrogantly informed the chapter of his intent to visit the chapel of St. Miquel, which is located on the opposite side of the cloister from the cathedral. The chapel had been one of the earlier churches in the town, and, being enclosed in the cathedral complex, had
been reserved to the exclusive use of the cathedral canons. Pope Paul III confirmed this traditional privilege of *infra claustra* in a bull written during the mid-sixteenth century. Despite the endemic conflict between bishops and the chapter, no prelate before Duran had ever dared to violate this sanctuary.

Aware of the bishop’s intent to proceed regardless of whether he received their approval—and perhaps with something of their own to hide—a committee of anti-Duran canons, including the Sacristan Bartolomeu Viver, Josep Cesses, Hyacintho Sansa, and Hyacintho Rossell—determined to lock the doors of the chapel that night, giving the keys to Viver for safe keeping.\(^\text{191}\) News soon reached Duran of the chapter’s defiant attitude, and the following morning, at 9:00 am, when the canons were saying mass in the cathedral, Duran sent his most trusted vicar-general, Andreu Perpinyà, with a number of townsmen—who, as has been mentioned, had little love for the chapter—to break down the chapel doors.\(^\text{192}\)

Infuriated at this unheard-of violation, the canons of Urgell immediately sent letters to the other cathedral chapters urging them to come their assistance, and to Rome asking for a papal censure of Duran. The issue continued through May 1640, when the chapter called upon the services of Joan Pere Fontanella and his son, Josep, Catalonia’s

\(^{191}\) Although their names are not well-known, these four men were the ring-leaders of chapter during the many absences of the more familiar canons, Claris, Soler, or Barutell.

\(^{192}\) ACU: IV, Cartes de Pau Claris (transcribed by Mossen Pere Pujol), undated letter recounting the events of 9 and 10 December 1639 in the form of a draft for a legal brief, mentioning the “indult de Paulo tercer”; “la fractio de les portes i la Invasio fet lo vicari general en la Iglia”; and “lo que es contra privilegis y immemorial … de dita Cathedral tal que noy ha memoria de homens en contrari.”

Perpinyà’s role in these proceedings is interesting. Since being appointed vicar-general in 1635 (ACU: I. Constitutions Capitulars, 18 September 1635, f. 438), he apparently had been on relatively friendly terms with the chapter. It seems that this particular episode introduced the first conflict between the canons and himself. While Bishop Duran would aggressively take up the royalist side—and suffer the immediate appropriation of his lands and rents by the chapter—Perpinyà stayed on in Urgell and was tolerated for a while before being forced to leave.
pre-eminent legal family, to write a thorough brief that the chapter could present at the Provincial Council being held Barcelona. For a number of reasons, the brief was never heard.

In terms of regional diplomacy, the Seu d’Urgell was able to exert an influence far beyond its humble surroundings. Within the famous triumvirate that they shared with Vic and Girona, the canons of Urgell would play a dominate role, particularly as the relationship between Philip IV and the Catalan church continued to degenerate in the 1630s. During the first years of the war, the Catalan monk Sebastien Soler, an Augustinian who served the cathedral of Urgell for many years as their lector, wrote to Philip IV informing him that, “the dioceses of Vic and of Girona observe and seek to imitate the said chapter of the Seu d’Urgell.” The election of canons Pau Claris and Jaume Ferran to the offices of Diputat Eclesiàstic and Oídor Eclesiàstic in 1638 would serve to increase the publicity of such dissident clerical views throughout Catalonia.

**Conclusion**

Seventeenth-century Catalonia was a land riven by faction and conflict. On a regional level, antagonism directed against royal impositions from Castile stood alongside internal disputes either between the local church and town officials, or between two factions within both social institutions. Perhaps the two biggest internal rivalries during this time involved the economic and political dispute between Perpignan and Barcelona from 1628-1630 and the religious strife between Tarragona and Barcelona.

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193 “el Obispado de Vique, y el de Gerona esten a la mira y obren a imitacion del dicho Cabildo de la Seo de Urgel” BN: MS 4010: Letter from Fra Sebastien Soler, Augustinian to Philip IV on how to restore order to Catalonia, f. 91.
concerning which Catalan diocese ought to take primacy during the vacancy of the archbishopric.

It is unfortunate that even the church was not exempt from bickering factions, which created chronic divisions within the Body of Christ. On the regional level, antagonism was directed against the excessive fiscal demands placed by the king and his viceroy on the Catalan church to fund Spain’s growing military commitments. This opposition to royal taxation appears to have reached its zenith during the décima crisis of 1633-1634, when nearly one-half of the Catalan dioceses expressed their resistance either openly or through writing. Internally, it appeared that nearly every cathedral chapter was at odds with either their bishop or his officials, or a regular order, or the local town government, the case of Girona being remarkable for its exception to this state.

One must always be conscious of the numerous levels of conflict present in Catalonia before turning our attention to the revolt of 1640. Practically every diocese and every town was divided into factions, most of which were attached in some way with divisions among prominent noble families in the region. Each city had its two major factions, often times pitting chapter against chapter, town against town, with various groups called in as allies. That all these groups, or at least a significant mass within these groups, were able to come together at a critical time, when common sense would indicate that they would pull farther apart, says something significant: only an assault on closely-held religious principles and practices would be powerful enough to bring the considerable weight of the province together in revolt.
CHAPTER 2
Tensions between Secular Authority and the Church: Catalonia, 1632-1640

Although the course of Catalan-Castilian relations never ran smoothly from the inception of the united kingdom, tensions between the two gradually increased during the first decades of the seventeenth century. With the accension of Philip IV and the rise of his privado,\(^{194}\) the Count-Duke of Olivares, an effort was made to bring about a truly “Spanish” polity out of the empire amassed by marriage and conquest: a Spanish polity, led by Castile, and supported by contributions from the rest of the empire. Beginning with Olivares’s ambitious Union of Arms in the 1620s, this innovative policy created resentment against Castile throughout Philip’s vast dominion, from Catalonia to Mexico.\(^{195}\) Regional discontent against the pretensions of Castile affected all levels of society, nobleman, cleric, merchant, and peasant. The political tensions that existed between the center—Castile—and the periphery—Catalonia—during the first four

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\(^{194}\) The term privado or valido refers to the king’s chief minister. While Philip II had kept his own council in the sixteenth century, he was not as confident in his son’s ability to do likewise. When Philip III came to the throne, he took on a nobleman, the Duke of Lerma, (whom, incidentally, Philip II had tried to banish) to guide him above the factions that dominated the king’s councils. Lerma assumed upon himself the title of valido, and enjoyed this favored position for many years, much to the discontent of other nobles at court. Philip IV followed the model of his father, choosing as his chief minister, the Count-Duke of Olivares, who adopted the title privado: a different title than Lerma’s, but maintaining the same powers and influence.

\(^{195}\) The Union of Arms—a pet-project of Olivares—was quite innovative, and called for every division of the Spanish Empire, from Aragon to Naples to Peru, to supply a set number of armed men each year in defense of the sprawling empire. From a modern perspective—rather oblivious to the strength of tradition, and to the fact that the only common element uniting these disparate lands and peoples was the person of the king and a distant bureaucracy—such a program seems efficient and fair. From the perspective of Catalonia, and many other regions, the Union was an outrageous innovation that any true-born native would vigorously oppose. For a closer study of the reactions provoked by Olivares and the Union of Arms see Geoffrey Parker in his upcoming work The World Crisis.
decades of the seventeenth century have been admirably depicted in Sir John Elliott’s *The Revolt of the Catalans*. There were also, however, multiple ecclesiastical conflicts that occurred between the center and periphery—the Castilian Crown and the Catalan Church—during the decade before the revolt on Corpus Christi, 1640.

During the years 1632-1640, Philip IV succeeded in alienating the majority of Catalan clerics serving in cathedrals, abbeys, and parish churches in a series of confrontations primarily over money and church privileges. Although this unintentional antagonizing of the Catalan church coincided with a growing irritation by other secular Catalan groups, no revolt took place. Indeed, when the French invaded the Comtat of Roussillon in the summer of 1639, Catalan clerics seemed to set aside their discontent with the Crown in their support of local and royal efforts to face down the enemy. So, are these long-term “causes” of revolt merely fictitious, an attempt to give an important event such as rebellion, important causes? Or were these disagreements over money and privileges suppressed in the face of imminent danger, to be resumed with greater vigor once the threat subsided—*and* when confronted with an even greater problem?

While various historians have addressed some of these religious tensions, they have generally assumed that their presence directly contributed to latent feelings of mistrust and bitterness among Catalan clerics towards the monarchy, feelings that made clerical support of the rural revolts in 1640 quite understandable. A closer study of the causes and resolutions of these conflicts, and, more importantly, an examination of clerical attitudes towards the monarchy and “Spain” during the French invasion of 1639-1640 reveal quite a different story. At that time, clerics from all over the Principality proved to be valuable allies, providing much needed spiritual and material assistance:
some even gave their lives in the desperate campaign to recover the fortress of Salses for the “Spain.” Indeed, virulent “anti-Felipista” sentiment among the Catalan clergy during the early months of 1640 is remarkable for its absence, prompting yet another question: what could have caused such a dramatic reversal in the hearts and minds of the Catalan religious community, to turn from their sacrificial giving to the king’s cause in the winter of 1639 to supporting armed rebellion by the spring of 1640?

**The Corts of 1632**

Most of the problems occurring between Catalonia and Castile arose over twin concerns that were oft intertwined in the early-modern world: finances and privileges. This was true both of the secular nobles and townsmen of Catalonia as well as the regional clergy. By the 1630s, the debt that had plagued the Spanish monarchy for two generations, and the continuing demands facing the Crown because of military obligations, exacerbated the king’s need for more funding in short order. Faced with the financial urgency, the king and his chief minister, Olivares, became less concerned with the numerous privileges and special constitutions governing fund-raising in the Spanish Empire and more concerned with getting ready cash quickly. The Crown’s first conflict with the Catalan church—an institution that particularly cherished its historic privileges—during this decade would come over the king’s fund-raising activity, at the Corts of 1632.

The traditional means by which a monarch in Spain met and dealt with his Catalan subjects was the Corts. In many ways similar to the Estates General in France, or the Parliament in England, the Corts was an assembly of Catalans divided into three groups based on social estate. The first estate was the clergy, made up of bishops, abbots,
syndics from the cathedral chapters, and delegated members of the regular orders. The second estate consisted of the nobles, ranging from the powerful Duke of Cardona, the greatest landholder in all the Principat, to the lowest barons in the foothills of the Pyrenees. The third estate was made up of townsmen, syndics from the various city councils. Although the Catalan Corts was quite similar to its Castilian counterpart, the Cortes, the stronger parliamentary tradition in Catalonia—and the other provinces in the Crown of Aragon—meant that the former institution continued to function until the beginning of the eighteenth century, while the Castilian Cortes soon became neglected and disused.¹⁹⁶

The primary business of the Corts was for a new king to swear allegiance to protect the constitutions of that particular land, and to bestow favors upon faithful subjects for services rendered to the crown. The body also provided a chance for all the estates to present their grievances before the king. The Catalan clergy had used this occasion to push for a series of reforms affecting Inquisition-familiars during the Corts of 1599, and again in 1626.¹⁹⁷

In return for granting privileges and settling disputes, the king asked for a certain amount of money to fill the royal coffers. The estates—assembled in their own group—would decide on how much money to “donate” to the crown for the following years until the next convening of the Corts. Much of the time during the reign of Philip IV, the amount offered was considerably smaller than the king’s request. As Elliott has

¹⁹⁶ Due to the immense documentation generated during each convening of the Corts, there are few general histories present. For an excellent study of the history of the Catalan Corts of 1585, see Eva Serra and Josep Bringüé i Portella, Cort General de Montsò (1585). Montsò-Binéfar. Procès familiar del braç reial (Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, 2001).
¹⁹⁷ For more on these specific changes, see Chapter 3.
shown, this was due in Catalonia’s case to the fact that estimates of the province’s population and total wealth were fabulously over-estimated by both court administrators and (ironically) the Catalans themselves. Thus, both King and Estates grew upset at each other, the king believing the greedy Catalans were holding a large portion of their wealth back, while the Estates grew angry at the king’s exorbitant demands; tensions mounted throughout the early seventeenth century.\(^{198}\) Often times, the king would try and approach each estate individually, hoping to sway the royalist elements there to pass contributions without interference from troublesome persons in other estates. More often than not, this tactic worked against the clergy—all of the bishops and cathedral deans, as well as most of the abbots, owed their positions to the king—and also the nobility, rather than against the townsmen of the third estate.

The accension of Philip IV in 1621 added an additional level of tension to the already unstable relations between the Crown and Catalonia. One of the most important constitutions in the kingdom of Aragon was that each new king had to present himself at each provincial capital before he could be legitimately recognized as the appropriate authority. During his trip, the nobles would come to pay homage to the king, but only after he had been made to swear to protect the traditions and constitutions of that land. This had been the precedent maintained beyond Ferdinand and Isabella, and Charles V, Philip II, and Philip III had all sworn the oath in Barcelona.

Philip IV, however, was very sick when he came to the throne, and, despite the clamors of the Catalans, the minister Olivares argued that it was not in the best interest of

\(^{198}\) See Elliott, *Revolt of the Catalans*, 238-239, where he observes both king and Catalan alike overestimated the population of the province, believing it to be over a million inhabitants, whereas the truer number was around 400,000.
the realm to have the king endanger his health by traveling. The king will come, Olivares promised, when he feels better. Disgruntlement soon changed to impatience and later outrage as the king’s health improved and yet the journey was not made. The Catalan lawyers and leaders in the Diputació became suspicious that Philip, and especially his chief minister, the Count-Duke of Olivares, were working to override Catalan privileges and establish a series of innovations in the traditional monarchy. In their minds, such uncalled-for alteration bordered on tyranny, the unlawful usurpation of traditional rights guaranteed to the Catalans by the king’s ancestors.

Such fears died down, however, after a few years of Philip IV’s reign, particularly when the young monarch came to Barcelona in 1626 to swear allegiance to the constitutions of Catalonia and to hold the first Corts in over twenty-five years. The king’s sole desire, on ascending the throne, was to maintain the integrity of his inherited empire, a task that was becoming increasingly difficult in the face of a renewed war with the Dutch and growing hostility with France. By 1632, between fighting the Dutch, funding Hapsburg cousins fighting Protestants in Germany, and squabbling with France over Mantua, it was evident that the Spanish monarchy was in need of serious fiscal help. Despite the sour taste of dealing with Catalonia in the past, Olivares and Philip had no choice but to call the Corts once more, present the dire necessity before the delegates, and hope for a generous Catalan response.

What they got, however, was a tight-fisted response to their demands, and an increased attention to apparently trivial matters such as whether the Consellers of Barcelona could wear their hats in the presence of the king or his viceroy. Despite his growing annoyance with the Catalans’ petty and stubborn attitude, the king made a direct
appeal to the regional clergy, hoping that a donation from one estate—particularly one ostensibly concerned with moral obligations to natural lords—would prompt the other two to contribute to the royal coffers as well. Unfortunately for Philip IV, the ecclesiastical response to the king’s plight was not encouraging. The chapter of Tarragona, writing on behalf of the entire ecclesiastical estate represented at the Corts, informed the king that “since such a matter ought to be treated in the collected gatherings of the Corts, we are remitting the payment of our obligations until that time.”

One of the biggest reasons why the religious community in Catalonia was reluctant to contribute voluntarily to the king’s coffers—apart from the procedural irregularity of seeking a separate donation from a particular estate—was a dearth of pro-royalist leadership in the provincial church at the time of the Corts’ convening. The bishoprics of Lleida and Barcelona were vacant, as were several abbacies; these were positions usually held by men who were more inclined than cathedral canons to support royal policies in Catalonia. While the king enjoyed a temporary benefit from such vacancies—the moneys generated by these important posts were being directed to the royal coffers in Madrid—the absence of a number of church officials greatly affected the willingness of cathedral canons and monks to make long-term contributions to Philip’s treasury. This ecclesiastical reluctance to part with their money increased as it became apparent that Philip IV expected the rest of the church in Catalonia to sustain their normal fiscal contributions, while refusing to appoint Catalans or Castilians to the vacant abbeys or bishoprics.

199 “pues esto se ha de tratar estando la Corte junta, remitimos para ella la ejecucion de nuestras obligaciones,” Antoni Jordà i Fernández, Església i Poder a la Catalunya del segle XVII. La Seu de Tarragona (Barcelona: Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 1993), 14.
Despite the general unwillingness to accede to Philip’s fiscal demands, there existed a variety of opinion concerning the church’s obligations in matters of taxation among the nine dioceses of Catalonia. Barcelona, Vic, and the Seu d’Urgell were adamantly opposed to any significant gift to the crown, claiming that recent economic difficulties in previous years had reduced their income considerably. Another school of thought, led by the archdiocese of Tarragona, felt that a fiscal contribution was inevitable; some of their canons hoped that a generous response would incline the king to appoint native Catalans to the vacant episcopal seats. But despite the valiant donation by the city of Tarragona of 4,000 lliures in 1631, the local chapter did not match their generosity and the Corts of 1632 closed without any official grant of money by the Catalans to the king.

The lukewarm response by Catalan clerics was further chilled by the king’s abrupt decision to leave Barcelona and head back to Madrid, leaving his brother, the Cardenal-Infante, in charge. Although the decision appears to have been designed as a threat to get the Catalans to pay up, it backfired. Secular and clerical representatives alike rose up in protest of this unusual proceeding. Led by the archdiocese of Tarragona, the cathedral chapters bitterly opposed the innovation, citing from one of the Catalan constitutions that such a procedure was limited to a state of emergency, which clearly did not exist at the time.

Irritation at the blatant disregard for their local law was only part of the strong provincial reaction: the Catalans were also upset that their king, who prior to 1632 had only spent a few weeks in their land, would grow ever more distant from them, and ever

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less concerned with their welfare. In many ways they begrudged Castile the continued presence of the king. In their attempts to mediate the situation, the chapter of Tarragona even went so far as to seek a meeting with the much-detested Protonotary of the Council of Aragon, Jerónimo de Villanueva, humbly claiming, “forgive us, Castile, if for once, it becomes us to enjoy the presence of our King and Lord.” Their efforts were in vain, however; Philip left Barcelona, and would return to the city only after twenty years of revolt and war, this time in the role of the conqueror. The king’s first bid to encourage Catalan co-operation—particularly among ecclesiastical estate—in his empire was a failure. It would not be his last.

**Bishop Garcia Gil Manrique and the Décima woes, 1632-1633**

As if anticipating delay or even failure to achieve an immediate grant from the Generalitat, Philip IV embarked on an independent project to secure a portion of Catalonia’s imagined wealth from the hands of its clergy. On 21 December 1631—only a few months prior to the convening of the Corts—the king wrote the chapter of Tarragona asking for an extra donation to the royal coffers of an amount to be determined by them. After consulting among themselves, the chapter soon responded that they were in difficult straights financially and could not contribute a lliure. With the collapse of the Corts, Philip IV needed to look elsewhere for revenues. Like his counterpart Charles I in England, Philip turned to the royal chronicles and old legal records, looking to

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201 “perdóñenoslo Castilla si por una vez que nos cabe el gozar la presencia de Nro. Rey y Señor.” ACT-C-68, fol. 67. Jordà i Fernández speculates that some of the Chapter’s objection might be due to the fact that the Cardenal-Infante was at the time Archbishop of Toledo, against whom Tarragona had sparred for centuries over which of the archdioceses held primacy over the other Spanish sees, Jordà i Fernández, *Església i Poder*, 15. Indeed, the contention about ecclesiastical primacy between Tarragona and Toledo continues sporadically to this present day.

202 Ibid, 17. In addition to the reality of their tight fiscal situation, the chapter was disinclined to donate any funds to the king until after the meeting of the Corts, resolving to pay Philip IV only once.
resurrect old “regalian rights” of the monarchy that had been neglected for many years. During the first months of 1632, having failed to inspire voluntary contributions from the Catalan clergy, the king turned to the prospects of Roman muscle. Specifically, Philip had the Spanish cardinals in Rome pressure Pope Urban VIII to give him a three year “grace’ to collect ecclesiastical rents from the province normally given to His Holiness—an old measure historically used by kings in the Middle Ages but long since abandoned. In 1633, Urban settled on a compromise: a décima that permitted Philip IV a one-year allowance of up to 600,000 ducats from the rents of the church throughout his empire, including revenues raised from hospitals, and other “pious causes.”  

Most of this would come from clerical rents greater than 100 ducats, and benefices greater than 24 ducats.

Catalan clerics resisted several aspects of this new measure. In the first instance, there was the perceived constitutional violation in the granting of the décima. The king ought to have paid attention to the clergy’s sincere statements of poverty and duress; the path to Rome, though technically legal from the king’s perspective, was to the Catalan canon merely a heavy-handed approach to getting what the king wanted. Secondly, the fiscal donation would affect most of the influential clergy in Catalonia; all the cathedral chapters, monasteries, and secularized Augustinian houses earned over the 100-ducat limit; only a portion of the rural benefices brought in less than 24 ducats. Finally, there

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203 The only religious group exempted from this general demand was the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem. Generalitat de Catalunya, Historia de la Generalitat de Catalunya i dels Seu Presidents, vol II: 1518-1714 (Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, 2003), 198.
204 Antonio Dominguez Ortiz, Politica y hacienda en el reino de Felipe IV (Madrid: Editorial de Derecho Financiero, 1960), 246.
205 Elliot, in his Revolt of the Catalans, citing statistics of Tarragona (the second richest diocese) in 1632, noted that Catalan clerics were getting roughly 250 lliures a year for a canonry, 120 lliures for rectory and 80 lliures for ordinary benefice (p. 288). See also ACT-C-68-f. 59.
was an overriding concern among the entire religious community that the “one year grace” would be extended indefinitely; they entertained serious doubts that the Pope, having bowed once to pressure from Madrid would be able to stand fast against the continued demand for cash. As a result the church in Catalonia would lose its long-held privilege of voting donations and contributions to the king and be reduced to the level of increasingly poor and helpless vassals. In their minds, agreeing to pay the décima, apart from caving in to the specious demands of “necessity,” would irretrievably link them to the king’s fiscal demands, which, like the grave, the barren womb, the desert, and the fire, “are never satisfied…that never say ‘Enough!’”

As news of the king’s request and the pope’s approval arrived in Catalonia, syndics from the cathedral chapters gathered in Barcelona to protest. Most of them wrote to the king informing him of the grave misunderstanding of clerical resources; others wrote to the Pope asking him to change his mind; all of them urged their ambassadors at the respective capitals to court allies to their side. When the new measure was announced by the Papal nuncio, Cesare Monti, to the archdiocese of Tarragona in April 1632, it was refused with great indignation by the cathedral canons. The nuncio found himself in a difficult spot, being pressured by both Madrid and Rome to collect the requisite funds from a reluctant province. By the end of July, he gave the chapter at

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In his Appendix A on coinage, Elliott notes that 1.1 lliures made a ducat, so the numbers come out 275 ducats, 132 ducats, and 88 ducats respectively. Again, bear in mind that these numbers would be lower for most of the other Catalan diocese, but probably still over the low number assigned in the décima.

Proverbs 30: 15-16.

Jordà i Fernández, Església i Poder, 19.
Tarragona thirty days to decide definitely whether they would pay up or not. In an effort to end the standoff, Monti appealed to the chapter, citing the desperate need of the King for fiscal support.\(^\text{208}\)

While Monti was fretting about collecting the money, however, the archdiocese had reached an accord with the chapter of Urgell whereby the two dioceses agreed to stand together and resist the fiscal initiative.\(^\text{209}\) A few days later on 7 May, they received word from the Girona chapter that they too would join the resistance. Emboldened by this help from unexpected quarters the chapter of Tarragona wrote to their syndic in Barcelona, the canon Tresánchez, to work with the deputies of Girona’s chapter but admitted that it would be tough to get the papal bull annulled.\(^\text{210}\) Rather than directly resisting, the chapters decided to try a Fabian strategy, working through the nuncio to retard the application of the \textit{décima}.

Led by Tarragona, the cathedral chapters of Catalonia sent to the nuncio a series of concerns that they wanted settled before any money exchanged hands. First, the church institutions demanded that such fundraising powers must be approved—or at least discussed—in a Provincial Council, just like the other fiscal obligations on the Church like the \textit{quarta} or \textit{excusado}.\(^\text{211}\) The second major concern was that unlike Castile, where ostensibly nearly all the benefices and curates exceeded the 24/100 ducat level, there were several poor Catalan clerics who would be exempt from payment, and the canons

\(^{208}\) Ibid, 20.
\(^{209}\) See Rourera i Farrè, \textit{Pau Duran}, 57 where the date of the accord is 5 May 1632.
\(^{210}\) ACT-C-68, fol. 64v.
\(^{211}\) ACT-C-68, fol. 68v.
wanted to know how the difference would be made up—they especially feared that those who could already pay would have to pay more.\textsuperscript{212}

Such appeals failed to move the nuncio, however. As the cathedral chapters continued their resistance beyond the nuncio’s thirty-day grace period, Monti began to take a firm stand. He ordered canon Hortoneda of Tarragona, the “sub-collector of the Apostolic Bank” to forcibly sequester the rents of the archdiocese to pay the \textit{décima}. The canon succeeded in his efforts, and in fact, went beyond expectations by collecting not only the canons’ rent, but also those of certain laity such as the organist and the bellringers, who were exempt from the \textit{décima}.\textsuperscript{213} Outraged, the chapter wrote protests to the Bishop of Barcelona—bypassing their own archbishop, Juan Guzmán, in the process—and to the nuncio during the first days of September, arguing against the legal violations and using Hortoneda’s actions as a basis for charging the collectors as a whole with gathering more than needed to line their own pockets.\textsuperscript{214}

Still determined to take a hard line with Tarragona—in the hope that sternness at first would lead to more willing contributions from the other dioceses—the nuncio told the chapter he would hold onto the rents until they paid up the full contribution to the \textit{décima}. In his mercy, however, Monti gave them a deadline of forty days, roughly to the middle of November, to bring the sum to the storehouses. On another front, Archbishop Guzmán tried to restore order by pressuring the canons into paying.\textsuperscript{215} While the

\textsuperscript{212} Jordà i Fernández, \textit{Església i Poder}, 20-21.

\textsuperscript{213} Ibid, 21.

\textsuperscript{214} That the chapter should have ignored Archbishop Guzmán at this time is scarcely surprising. The prelate and his chapter had quarreled bitterly ever since Guzmán’s appointment in 1627. It is quite possible that the appeal of Barcelona was merely a matter of politics, the chapter undoubtedly believing that the archbishop would refuse to hear their case.

\textsuperscript{215} For the extent of the deadline, see the letter from Monti to the chapter at Tarragona dated 2 October 1636, cited in Jordà i Fernández, \textit{Església i Poder}, 21.
archdiocesan chapter was besieged by these demands, where, one might ask, were the canons of Girona and Urgell, who had pledged their support? The reasons for their summer silence is unknown—probably they were tied up with the controversial Corts in Barcelona—but in October, with Tarragona apparently lost to the cause, the chapter of Girona took up the mantle of Catalan liberties and began a vigorous campaign in Rome and Barcelona to convince some outside authority to intervene.  

It soon appeared as if Girona’s help had come too late. Tarragona, having stood alone for several months, was beginning to think of moderate compromise. At a meeting of chapter syndics in Barcelona to discuss the nuncio’s forty-day reprieve, the archdiocesan delegates were rather downhearted; alone out of the syndics, they expressed no hopes of success of the renunciation of the décima, even though they supported the popular decision to secretly see if their agents in Rome could subvert this. Pessimistically, they thought the Spanish cardinals there would sniff it out and stifle it. Although they dallied past the end of November, the chapter of Tarragona wrote secretly to the Nuncio on 2 December 1632, asking one last time to delay payment. This time they sought to delay implementation of the décima until the Corts ended, to see if the décima would be lumped into the total sum to be donated to the king, or at the very least to wait until a Provincial Council could be assembled and the donation be made within the constitutional provisions of Catalonia.

At this point, a decision from Madrid, ironically intended by the king as a means to facilitate the transfer of wealth from Catalonia, actually helped defer Tarragona’s quandary and served to delay church payments for nearly two more years. Philip IV and

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216 Ibid, 21-22.
217 Ibid, 22.
his ministers, when first presented with the Catalan challenge, were outraged by the collective clerical defiance. Among other schemes of retribution plans were discussed to move the archdiocese from Tarragona to Zaragoza. In the end, however, cooler heads prevailed and—under the assumption that the Catalans would give greater heed to the request coming from a respected member of their church—responsibility for collecting the décima passed from the Papal Nuncio to the bishop of Girona, Garcia Gil Manrique.²¹⁸ The choice of Bishop of Girona was not too surprising, as that particular episcopal position had traditionally enjoyed the prestigious office of Jutge Apostolic, responsible for overseeing clerical behavior throughout Catalonia. In addition, Girona’s traditional reputation as a pacifier and mediator of disputes throughout the Principality made the selection of Manrique—himself a man of peace and moderation—seem logical. Though the events surrounding the collection of the décima were not entirely favorable for anyone supporting the royal position, the episcopal selection catapulted Garcia Gil Manrique into regional prominence and influenced the subsequent relationship between bishop and king for years to come.²¹⁹

An Aragonese by birth, Manrique had studied philosophy and theology at the University of Salamanca and had already served the province as bishop of Girona for five years before the current crisis. A few months after his appointment, in late November 1633, Philip IV would appoint Manrique bishop of Barcelona, giving him even greater prestige within the Principality of Catalonia. In addition to his important spiritual position as the shepherd of the region’s capital and the most senior bishop in the

²¹⁸ Generalitat de Catalunya, Història de la Generalitat de Catalunya i dels Seu Presidents, 198.
²¹⁹ The decision to appoint Manrique, although done with the intent of raising more money from Catalonia while ruffling fewer feathers actually served to increase the difficulties in collecting the décima, and delayed any serious contribution by the Catalan clergy to the king’s coffers for another two years.
province, Manrique had recently been elected President of the Generalitat (Diputat Eclesiàstic) upon the unexpected death of the former diputat, Lluís de Montcada i de Gralla. This made him the leading secular and ecclesiastical power within the province and as such, the center of the new fiscal dispute.

These positions and the time spent in the province enabled Garcia Gil Manrique to acquire a good knowledge of Catalan customs and usages, more so than probably any other bishop born outside of Catalonia. For this reason, he was also one of the most respected non-Catalan bishops, although many disagreed with his adherence to the crown and its policies. Like Bishop Parcero in Elna—who in turn would become his successor at Girona—Manrique was known for his fairness. For example, he sided with the Generalitat in a dispute with the Inquisition in March 1633, over the Holy Office’s ability to tax vessels, their owners, and their crews that arrived in Barcelona’s port, citing that such a policy was “contradictory [to] the customs of the Land and prejudicial [to] the city.”

Despite his promising reputation, Manrique was named diputat and collector at a difficult time: the king needed money badly and, given the bitter state of mind among Catalans of all stripes following the Corts, Manrique had the complicated job of trying to raise the money for the king while not further alienating the extremely constitution-conscious clergy, many of whom had already sent out ambassadors to Rome and Madrid asking that the décima be revoked.

The political machinations of Catalonia’s cathedral clergy complicated matters even more. With the nuncio apparently indifferent to the Catalan arguments to void the décima, the regional clergy instead tried to reduce the amount of money they would have

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220 “contrafent els costumes de la Terra i perjudicant la ciutat.” Ibid, 198.
to pay and sought out the Generalitat as their ally. After the disastrous affronts given them by the royal court during the Corts, the Generalitat proved to be a willing ally, desperately seeking to restore their prestige in the eyes of the Catalan people. Eventually in mid-July 1633, a Junta de Braços was convened and, on its recommendation, the Generalitat sent a personal envoy to Rome to persuade the Pope to cancel the décima.  

Around the same time, a group of 18 clerics, made up of representatives from every Catalan chapter save those of Tarragona and Perpignan, approached Manrique and demanded “a moratorium on the décima matter until their appeals to king and nuncio were answered.” Vainly the bishop sought to turn aside their antipathy and to encourage their cooperation in the matter. The clerics informed his representative in no uncertain terms that any compromise with the décima was impossible: “the violation of the laws of the Land was incompatible with the charge with which he is entrusted, and for this reason, should he persist in the enactment of the royal will, [they] will proceed against him and his supporters in accordance with the right and rules of the institution of which he is a member and knows.”  

Not to be outdone with the challenge that enforcing the new fiscal measure meant treason to the laws of the patria, Manrique, drawing upon his knowledge of Catalan legal tradition, appealed to a constitution created under Ferdinand II entitled Poc valdria, which seemed to create a precedent for this unusual royal demand on the church’s

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221 Jordà i Fernández, Església i Poder, 23. A Junta de Braços was generally an 18-person committee made up of representatives from each estate or braç. The Diputació could create a Junta—which served as an advisory board—any time a matter of extreme importance arose. Due to the short notice with which these Juntas were summoned, it was filled with representatives who happened to be in Barcelona at that time, including one of Barcelona’s Consellers.

222 Generalitat de Catalunya, Història de la Generalitat de Catalunya i dels Seu Presidents, 198.

223 “que la violació de la legislació de la Terra era incompatible amb el càrrec de que guardia, per la qual cosa, si persistia en la pragmatització de la regia voluntat, es procediria contra ell i els seus fiadors d’acord amb el dret i les regles de la institucio en que ell s’enquadra i coneixia.” Ibid, 198-199.
finances through a grace bestowed by the pope. Furthermore, the bishop appealed to praxis, “and to the theological virtues.” As for his own conscience, Manrique expressed, “his own determination to carry out these orders, [which] was the result of the imprescriptible obedience that the ecclesiastics retain towards the Holy Father and out of charity that dictates help for those in need.”224 Further attempts by both parties to change the other’s mind proved fruitless and the religious deputation left Girona, still intent on refusing payment.

Coinciding with Manrique’s firm stance, a division began to appear between the obstinate clerics in the Principality. On the one hand stood the chapters of Urgell, Vic, Girona, and Lleida, which demanded the immediate recall of the décima; on the other hand were the more moderate chapters of Tarragona and Elna (and probably Solsona and Tortosa), which recognized the political impossibility of renouncing the bill and sought instead only to reduce the amount.225 Despite a city council that was generally opposed to royal policies, the chapter of Barcelona seemed to waver on this issue, at times siding with those who absolutely rejected any décima, at times believing in the realpolitik decision just to diminish the fee. This conflict was increased by two factors in the year 1633: the first, a rumor that the décima, although only given lease for a year, was to be made a perpetual gift; the other that the clerics of Castile and León were going to gather in a “Congregación del Clero de Castilla y León”—almost like a Castilian Provincial

224 “i a les virtuts teologals … i la seva resignacio a complir aquelles ordres era fruit de la imprescriptible obediencia que els ecclesiastics retien al sant pare i de la caritat que dictava l’ajust als necessitats.” Ibid, 199.
225 Rourera i Farré, Pau Duran, 58.
Council—where they would appeal to the pope to exclude them from the décima, claiming that they had already paid their fair share, and foist it all on the Catalans.  

A new assembly of chapter delegates came to Barcelona in November to protest the rumored objections of the “Congregación” and elected a canon of Tarragona, Antoni Massanes, a cleric with considerable negotiation experience already in Madrid, to go and present their claims to Rome. A few days before Massanes left for Rome, at the beginning of February 1634, the chapter of Valencia wrote to the chapter of Tarragona—a letter that was subsequently passed along to the still-wavering Barcelona chapter—inquiring about whether the Pope was going to hear the pleas of Castile and Leon, in which case, they promised their full support to the Catalan chapters to protest. Unfortunately for the Catalan chapters, this new appeal to Rome soon collapsed: Canon Massanes fell sick on his journey and died at the beginning of June, without having even started his negotiations.

The Décima continued, Remonstrance and Resistance, 1634

Though their appeals to Rome, the Diputació, and Bishop Manrique had all failed, cathedral chapters throughout Catalonia nevertheless had impeded the collection of the décima through 1633. At the best, however, this was just a Fabian strategy; Manrique was patient enough with the original complaints, but remained determined to collect the revenue. In March 1634, the décima collectors went out to Vic—then without a

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226 ACT-C-68 fol. 78v; 14 August 1633. There may have been some truth behind the rumored protests inside Castile and Leon, because Philip IV did send Diego de Saavedra Fajardo to Rome in an attempt to prevent these clerical complaints from getting too much notice in the Curia. Jordà i Fernández, Església i Poder, 23n.
227 Cited in Jordà i Fernández, Església i Poder, 25.
228 Ibid, 25.
bishop—where they met with fierce resistance by the canons. By this time, the chapter of the small diocese appeared to be primarily concerned with the vague perpetuity of the collection, and not necessarily the amount. Knowing the previous history of royal spending habits, they simply did not trust the king’s word when it came to gathering money. Unlike the dithering of the past years, the chapters of Girona and the Seu d’Urgell stood behind Vic in their resistance to Manrique, and no funds were collected.

So pivotal were the events that followed in the city of Vic that a prominent citizen of that town, Diego Sanz, began his account of the 1640 rebellion with the décima crisis of 1634, from which, he claimed, all subsequent disagreements between Catalonia and the Crown proceeded. Sanz noted that the ecclesiastical tax was bestowed by Urban VIII “as the Christian Princes have sought help,” upon Philip IV, “assistant of the Catholic religion, vigilant shepherd of Christ’s flock for the terror of heresy, a check on the common enemy, and the exaltation of the Catholic faith.” Although the king’s motives in asking for the financial aid appeared righteous, the result, as Sanz described it was that “it exasperated the Catalan clerics … [who] defended themselves now with reasons, now with Scripture, and finally with rather violent recourses.”

The urban clergy, inspired by the cathedral canons and their leaders, Melchior Palau, the archdeacon, and Don Enric d’Alemany, the sacristan, indicated their defiance

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229 Elliott, Revolt of the Catalans, 288. For the most complete description of the following events see MS in BAEV, by Diego Sanz, entitled Relacio breu dels successos, segonas intentions y locuras, que an succèxit y se son fetas en la ciutat de Vich desdel any 1634, fins al de 1641. The choice of Vic might have been chosen because of its proximity to Girona, to its smaller size, and to the friendship that existed between the two dioceses. All of these conditions might have conspired to make for a smooth collection, encouraging other dioceses to follow suit.

230 “com han soliciitó ampau dels Princeps Christians … auxiliar de la religio cataloica, vigilant pastor del rebaño de Christo per terror de la heretgia, frè del enemich comu y exaltacio de la fe Cathòlica.” Sanz, f. 1.

231 “se exasperaren los eclesiastichs Catalans…defensantse ya ab rahons, ya ab scripturas, y finalment ab recusacions casi violentas.” Sanz, f. 1.
of the décima by closing down all the churches.\textsuperscript{232} Perhaps surprised by the concentrated resistance in a typically quiet diocese, Bishop Manrique also suspected that Vic was secretly aided by the canons of Urgell, and in particular, the canons Pau Claris and Jaume Ferran.\textsuperscript{233} Due to the continued resistance of the cathedral canons, the city of Vic was placed under interdict on 24 March 1634, probably by Bishop Manrique exercising his role as \textit{Jutge Apostolic}. It was a strict measure: “not only did the ecclesiastics feel interested in these [measures]; but the [support of the] laity attenuated also; in such a manner that within a few days he [the bishop] lifted the interdict, and the authorities determined to sequester the ecclesiastical rents—the décima and the taxes—for payment.”\textsuperscript{234}

In the following month, the Duke of Cardona—the present viceroy and head of the most influential Catalan noble family—sent two agutzils to Vic to restore order and compel the clergy to pay the tax. When these officials were badly treated, the duke—after debating whether to send a dozen companies of cavalry to Vic\textsuperscript{235}—sent out two members of the Audiència, Dr. Grau, a cleric, and Dr. Mir, a lay judge, who began sequestering church property in Vic. If the clergy would not willingly pay their tax to the king, it would be forcibly taken from the properties under their jurisdiction.

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\textsuperscript{232} Elliott, \textit{Revolt of the Catalans}, 289.
\textsuperscript{233} Ibid, 289. Let it be noted that although the cathedral canons of Vic appeared to have maintained a comparative peace with the town fathers, the city of Vic itself was frequently engaged in feuds between local families that more than once spilled into violent conflicts inside the city walls. These extended fights often shut down the city for days until a peace could be reached. As Sanz notes throughout his diary from 1634-1641 these internecine fights appeared to intensify as the decade wore on, and lasted into the first months of the Catalan revolt.
\textsuperscript{234} “no sols, o sentiren los eclesiastichs interessats en ellas: pero los seculars se ateraren també; de tal manera que dins breu dies se alzando entredit, y se determinan segrestar las rendas dels eclesiastichs per pagar aixi las decimas com los gastos.” Sanz, f. 1v.
\textsuperscript{235} Diego Sanz writes that these troops were to be sent “per terror de tots y castich dels capellans,” Ibid, f. 2v.
Naturally, the sequestration greatly irritated the religious communities in Vic. Coinciding with their take-over of ecclesiastical property, the Audiència sent an embassy to Melchior de Palau, the Archdeacon of Vic—who in times of a vacant see exercised powers tantamount to a bishop himself—inviting him to negotiate with the Generalitat.236 Palau, acting as the official representative of the city’s clergy, tried to ensure ecclesiastical solidarity in the struggle by forbidding all other clerics from communicating with the two ambassadors, even though his immediate subordinate, the sacristan Don Enric d’Alemany, was good friends with Dr. Grau.237

By the beginning of May, conditions in Vic were quickly deteriorating; in the words of Sir John Elliot, the events soon “made it appear…an organized rebellion.”238 On 10 May, over a month after the town’s churches had been closed, the city fathers held a meeting to decide what role they should take in the matter. At the conclusion of the council, they agreed to send a note to the viceroy, Cardona, indicating their intention to support the royal enforcement of the décima. By this time, however, the clergy in Vic did not stand alone: the chapter of Girona had begun sending letters of encouragement to the town’s religious communities, exhorting them to stand fast in their refusal to pay the décima. Emboldened by the support of their fellow clerics, groups of chaplains and their

236 “Apenas foren arribats los dits Srs. Dell ConCELL, quant envaïren un recaudo al Ardiacha de Vich què deya Melchior de palau, que en estas contrrièrriàets era lo timo, y en estos encuentres lo amparo del bras ecclesiastich,” Ibid, f. 3v.
237 “que antes noy agues Audiencia en Cathaluña, y avia en la Seu de Vich Ardiaca ab las vices que ell tenia, y que sí Mir estavan aqui per orde del Rey de España y eran sos ministres, que ell era ministre provehit del sumo Pontifice, ab esta resposta no se si atrevida, o animosa se escusa de anar los a Visitar, y ningun Eclesiastich y ana en carga folsen ab dits Jutjes molt amichs, en particular D. Henrich de Alemany…nols visita, essent intimi familiar del Dr. Grau,” Ibid, f. 4.
238 Elliott, Revolt of the Catalans, 289.
friends formed armed bands that took to roving around the cathedral, defying orders from city officials to disperse.\textsuperscript{239}

The estrangement between clergy and city manifested itself in various ways during this time. Sunday, 14 May, saw minor confrontations between city officials and monks at the houses of Nuestra Senyora del Carmen and Nuestra Senyora de la Merced.\textsuperscript{240} The following day, Drs. Grau and Mir visited the city hospital to pay homage to the Holy Christ statue there, but the priests had closed the doors to the chapel. The chapel was opened after protest on the condition “that the said judges would not work to innovate anything.”\textsuperscript{241} As the week wore on, the two judges could not leave their houses without being treated with catcalls in the streets as “Jews, enemies of God and of the Church.”\textsuperscript{242} With events such as these, the month of May ended on much the same bitter tone as it had begun.

Matters degenerated a few days later, when Francesc Brunells, the sotsveguer of Vic, arrested a priest Pau Capfort on suspicious charges and threw him in prison.\textsuperscript{243} Upon hearing the news early the next morning, Archdeacon Palau excommunicated Brunells and ordered the cathedral bells to toll so that the entire town might know of it. Palau also demanded Grau and Mir to release the priest within three hours or face the

\textsuperscript{239} “En aquest temps tant revoltat com la Ciutat de Gerona solo clero della estigues ab lo matex conflicte se anava avisant ab los de Vich de tot lo que passava, animantse los uns als altres. Quant posaren los del acompanyament devant la Seu per posar en las portar lo cartel en lo campanar se posaren a tota presa a tocar lo rotillo de las messas dels faosos de la Semana Sta. Y fahent mosa de la jurisdicció real, y irisio dels mandates, mostrant poch temor y obediençia a ells desde lo Campanar ahucavan alguns eclesiastichs al acompanyment com si Vessen lo llop,” Ibid, f. 6. See also ff. 6-8v.
\textsuperscript{240} That is, the Carmelites and Mercedarians. Ibid, ff. 9v-10.
\textsuperscript{241} “que feren dits jutjes de no innovar cosa,” Ibid, f. 10.
\textsuperscript{242} “jueus, enemichs de Déu, y de la Iglésia.” Ibid, f. 10v. Sanz records this as occurring on Wednesday, May 16, which cannot be since he describes May 15 as Monday. I’m assuming since Sanz notes activities on different days that Wednesday is right but the number is wrong.
\textsuperscript{243} Catalonia was divided up into seventeen counties or vegueries, each one presided over by a royal official known as a veguer. Each vegueria, was divided into subdivisions, governed by the sotsveguer.
same punishment. Not to be outdone, the deputies of the Audiència ordered Palau to withdraw the excommunication or face a 500 ducat fine, and an excommunication himself at the hands of Dr. Grau, in his capacity as commissary of the Cambra Apostolic. 244

As news of the arrest spread, the “capellans” of Vic rose up and together with a band of students—derided by Diego Sanz “as they are young people who … draw out evil from good”—surrounded the houses Drs. Grau and Mir, while others manned defensive positions within the cathedral. 245 Upon hearing the news, other chaplains from small villages organized themselves into a militia company and made ready to march on Vic; faced with this incipient threat, the councilors closed the city gates on 31 May. When the sotsveguer tried to assert his authority, the citizens of Vic completely disregarded him. Some even went further and taunted him with his excommunication, claiming that his jurisdiction over them was no longer valid. 246 Rather than exacerbate the issue, Brunells left in disgrace for Barcelona until a more opportune moment arose for his return.

As May passed into June, the conflict between the city clergy and the king’s ministers continued without any sign of abating. Early in the month, Archdeacon Palau and Sacristan Alemany—under penalty of a 1000 ducat fine—met with Bishop Parcero, who served as a mediator during the last months of Vic’s active resistance to the décima. 247 Despite the bishop’s reputation for inspiring reconciliation, the meetings failed. Desperate to bring matters to a conclusion, and dismayed at the poor fruits of

244 The 500 ducat fine would have represented two-years worth income for Palau. Ibid, ff. 14-14v.
245 “com són gent jove que … dicernexen lo mal del bé.” Ibid, f. 15.
246 Ibid, ff. 15v-16.
247 Ibid, ff. 16-16v.
clerical negotiation, the Audiència recommended that the Viceroy send out Catalonia’s hard-line governor, Don Aleix de Marimon, to Vic. The Duke of Cardona concurred with the council’s decision and Marimon arrived at the city on 4 June.

Coinciding with the Generalitat’s decision to take a hard line with the rebels was a growing consensus among several of Vic’s clergy, led by the archdeacon Melchior de Palau, in favor of more conciliatory measures. Although weary of the struggle—which like Tarragona before them had been undertaken with little help from other dioceses—the clergy of Vic wanted to acquiesce on their own terms, which meant one final appeal to the Pope, whom they saw to be the only valid arbiter of things religious. As a token of good faith, the Archdeacon allowed the cathedral to be opened on Corpus Christi, so that religious festival—so important to Catalans and to communal worship—might not be compromised. Indeed, the celebration would do much to restore a sense of a community united in the holy sacrifice of Christ, especially after so many months of bitter feuding. In addition to resuming services, Archdeacon Palau also indicated that some clerics might begin to consider contributing to the décima; in return the episcopal interdict was suspended.

Contributing to the ecclesiastical and secular desire for reconciliation in Vic—albeit in a perverse way—was a bitter conflict involving villagers within the diocese and a company of 250 Polish cavalrymen on their way to Roussillon. On Monday, 12 June, these soldiers arrived in the tiny hamlet of Sant Julià de Vilatorta,

248 “fins a tant que cansat los eclesiàstichs de tantas vexacions, considerant lo gran empenyo en què estàvan postas, lo poder del rey, pus en voler ell tothom se aderex, vèurer la concessió del Sumo Pontífic, universal dispensador de les coses eclesiasticas ab la libera y general administració, y imaginant que no bastarian representacions per retorcedir de son intent lo Sumo Pontífic, en particular en cosa concedida a un monarcha com lo cathòlich rey, determinà lo ardiacha dectar publicar lo segrest.” Ibid, ff. 17-17v.

249 Ibid, f. 17v.
which, “was seized with some natural quarrel,” between the two sides. Both parties exchanged fire, and while no casualties apparently resulted from the matter, news of the soldiers’ imputed violence spread like wildfire. When the information reached Vic, the city fathers closed the gates and organized a relief force to set out in search of the marauders. The malignant rumors regarding the Polish troopers continued as they marched northwards, creating a unique sense of unity within the diocese: “all the land was prepared and united without recognizing the diverse spirits of nyerro or cadell…All were friends in that moment.”

When small parties of Catalans inflicted some casualties upon the soldiers, it was praised as a sign “that the Catalan nation is as excessive and indomitable in vengeance as it is loyal in friendship. … and since this was only done out of fear, in spite of being very fond of the land, it was not contrary to the natives. And so, the revolution came to a stop.” Matters eventually became so bad that the viceroy sent out a party to bring the captain of the cavalry to justice. Although easily considered a minor matter, the malignant effect of foreign soldiers roaming at will among the Catalan countryside served to remind the region’s inhabitants that there were greater issues at stake than the particular way in which the king sought to take money from the church. When faced with the serious threat of violence against their fellow patria neighbors, the Catalans of Vic laid down their deepest social divisions and fought as one against a common foe. A

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250 “se travà ab alguns natural pendència.” Ibid, f. 18.
252 “que la nació cathalana és excessiva y indòmita en la venjanza qual lleal en la amistat. … ahont quant no fos sinó per tema, a més de ser molt afecta a la terra, no féu cosa en contra dels naturals. En assò vingué a parar aquesta revolució,” Ibid, ff. 19v-20v.
similar attitude would manifest itself when faced with a French invasion in 1639, and once again during the disturbances of the succeeding year.

The secular clergy of Vic certainly took the unexpected conflict with the king’s soldiers seriously: regardless of the obdurate position taken by a few monks and friars, the cathedral hierarchy was beginning to lean towards reconciliation with the Crown. On 2 July, the same day that some abusive leaflets circulated around Vic, a Dominican preached a fiery sermon in the cathedral. Sanz records his message thus:

[he] discoursed about these things from the décima pointedly and freely against His Majesty and in favor of the ecclesiastical estate, saying it was a hard thing for the clerics to have to pay without showing them the bull of His Holiness … that this was also against all reason and justice, as can be seen that God gave the Law to Moses in writing because He wanted us to know them.253

The religious authorities, however, were not amused and in response, banished the brother from Vic. The following Sunday, Archdeacon Melchior Palau excommunicated the authors of the works, although their identity remained unknown. That same day, as the cathedral bells tolled out the ecclesiastical judgment upon the anonymous criminals, the first clerics in Vic began contributing their portion of the décima. The following week, on 16 July, the cathedral hierarchy expelled a Capuchin, Fra Atanasi, for preaching against the royal decree and encouraging continued resistance to the tax.254

On 23 July, Sacristan d’Alemany returned from Barcelona with the news that, as a gesture of good-will both the cities of Vic and Barcelona agreed to release all the members of the clergy who had been incarcerated as a result of the collective resistance, and, as Diego Sanz recorded it, ”all the captives and [absentees] which were many, all of

253 ibid, f. 21v.
254 Ibid, f. 21v.
them clerics, returned here as well.” Two days later, Drs. Grau and Mir returned to Barcelona, while the governor Aleix de Marimon stayed on until 6 August, when he too returned, confident that the long fight at Vic was over. Whatever opposition the Catalan clergy might offer to the décima now, would be confined to legal loopholes and caveats and not to violence.

While all the disturbances at Vic were shaking the province, the Catalan chapters were still pressing their fight in Rome for the revocation of the décima. Massanes’s replacement in these negotiations was none other that Josep Soler, canon of Urgell, a first cousin to Pau Claris, and future Diputat. The effect of Soler’s appointment, however, shifted the province’s representation of the issue from the more moderate Tarragona to the radicals, now definitely led by Vic, Urgell, and Barcelona. Upset by this change, and fearing that one failed negotiation would lead to the enactment of the full décima, the chapters of Tarragona and Solsona began to work with the chapters of Zaragoza and Valencia to start another direction in the negotiations. This action was discovered and sabotaged by a pair of canons from Urgell, Claris and Ferran, who directed their agents—Soler in Rome and Don Llorens de Barutell in Madrid—to redouble their efforts, loudly proclaiming their stance in the fight against “the total destruction of the Churches.”

Led by Urgell, the negotiations were not successful; the date of the first payment was pushed back to the end of 1634, by which time Tarragona’s syndic in Rome Dr.

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255 “y ab manlleuta soltaren tots los presos avian aportats de Vich a Barcelona y alzaren los procehiments, y tots los presos y ausentats que éran molts, tots eclesiàstichs, tornaren aquí matex.” Ibid, f. 22.
256 Jordà i Fernández, Església i Poder, 25.
258 “la total destrucció de les Iglesies.” ACT-C-39, 28 August 1634.
Riber wrote that, “things are very different from what they are thinking. The affairs of king do not run along the paths of justice … it will be very important to impede [the measure in Rome] so that the grace will not be perpetual, because it is certain that the needs of the King will continue.” Although on the surface the décima was a diplomatic failure, the Catalan church did manage to delay payments for some time, before becoming aware of Philip’s great determination to collect church monies. By February 1639, the new Nuncio Campeggi was called to collect the final payments of the tax. Out of all the cathedral chapters in Catalonia, Tarragona led the way, paying 2,479 lliures out of the 3,000 required of them. This sum of roughly 600 lliures per year paid by the archdiocese’s 13 canons and 11 dignitaries, amounted to roughly 22 lliures per person, around one-tenth of his annual income. Thus grudgingly, and with a sense of having defended the honor of ecclesiastical privileges, did the Catalan clergy begin contributing to the war chest of their king.

**The décima crisis in the context of other Catalan conflicts**

The financial dispute with the clergy, coming on the heels of the disastrous Corts, amplified the tension between the province of Catalonia and the Crown. What was worse, other social groups soon found themselves facing similar royal pressure. The resistance by the Catalan church in 1634 was accompanied by a serious disturbance among the Consell de Cent in Barcelona that led the viceroy to leave the city with the

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259 “las cosas son molt diferents del que ay pensan. Las cosas dels reys no van per via de justicia…será molt impedir que la graica no es perpetuás, perque las necessitats del Rey perseveran.” ACT-C-39; 3 November 1634.

260 During the Catalan revolt, after Tarragona turned back to the royalist side, the chapter would try to curry favor with the Crown by reminding the king that they were the first to pay off their fiscal contribution to the décima. Jordà i Fernández, *Església i Poder*, 27.

261 Ibid, 27.
Audiència and relocate first to Perpignan and then to Girona. Although Catalan churchmen were forced to pay the décima, the resolution of the crisis was not a complete victory for the king. The secular dissension in Barcelona, coinciding with the religious discontent, pointed to the beginning of new relations between local cathedral chapters and city councils. This mutual discord provoked by the grasping nature of Philip IV’s financial policies could have marked a new era in Catalan church-city relationships.

But such proved not to be the case. Barcelona’s clergy and city council fell out over the issue of water rights in 1634-1635, and the chapter of Urgell still vigorously opposed its city leaders and bishop alike, choosing to ally with the local cadell Baron, Boquet, instead. What occurred in the mid-1630s in Catalonia was that two of the most prominent Catalan social institutions—the Church and the urban elite—began engaging in vigorous protests against royal policies regarding finances and privileges. This mutual dissatisfaction, however, was not accompanied by the appearance of a common bond uniting the two dissident camps. As a result of this, the king was able to deal with both groups separately, and relatively successfully at that.

Subsequent challenges to royal authority in Catalonia—the quartering of soldiers, the smuggling activities in Barcelona and Urgell, and preparations for improving the region’s defense—would affect various social groups within Catalonia. In no case, however, was discontent at royal abuses, innovations, or demands enough, in and of themselves, to bring these outraged groups together. As has been demonstrated elsewhere in history—in the American Confederacies and various presidential elections; in the Protestant Reformation; and the French Revolution—mutual dissatisfaction against

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262 See Elliott, Revolt of the Catalans, 290-303.
a person or institution proves to be a weak social glue, incapable of drawing out a wide base of support, and almost fated to collapse. Unlike their successful resistance at the Corts of 1632, the clergy, facing the royal will alone, submitted after an extended struggle. As the time approached for the regular convening of the Church’s Provincial Council, the ecclesiastical estate had much to ponder: how far could they continue to resist the royal demands for more money? How far could they count on the aid either of the Generalitat, the Diputació, the Consell de Cent, or even each other? Was the Catalan church doomed to slip into the pliable acquiescence that characterized the church hierarchy in Castile, or would some attempt be made to preserve its regional identity and independence from the growing powers of the centralized monarchy?

The Décima resolved: the Provincial Council of 1636

By 1636, four years had passed since Philip IV had first tried to release a portion of Catalonia’s wealth through an appeal to the power of Rome. The paltry sums forwarded to the royal treasury did not seem to be worth the immense trouble that the décima had created. It became apparent to the king that the only way to eke funds out of these clerics, consumed by traditions of privileges and forms, was to wait for their own voluntary contributions. And so, in 1636, with the troublesome issue of the décima still rankling in their memories, the Catalan clergy gathered in Tarragona for regular meetings of Provincial Councils. Many of the syndics from the cathedral chapters were intent on raising the matter of the décima again, hoping to rescind the troublesome measure.

The royalist Archbishop of Tarragona, the Benedictine Antonio Pérez, was fully aware of the intense discontent among the Catalan clergy from the outset of the convention. It had been four years since the dissolution of the Corts—in which the
church failed to forward any significant cash to the king; two years since the disastrous collection of the décima; and one year since the commencement of war between France and Spain. The burning question was whether the lower members of the Catalan ecclesiastical hierarchy—notably the cathedral canons—would finally recognize the extreme necessity of helping their king, particularly now that an enemy sat right on their doorstep, and, of their own volition, extend the collection of the décima.

If recent history was to be any judge of the matter, such hopes of Catalan generosity were merely pipedreams. In 1625, a council had been called, and was attended by practically all the Catalan representatives, saving only the Bishop of Barcelona who was the acting viceroy. At the end of the meeting, it was tentatively suggested that the clergy re-establish and contribute to another traditional grace, the Excusado—an old fiscal privilege originally bestowed by the pope on the kings of Castile and Aragon, dating back to the days of the Crusades and the Reconquista. The cathedral canons unanimously refused to pay it since present conditions failed to meet with the stipulated requirement, viz. there being no war with the Turk at the moment, nor had been for the past fifty years, and so the Council dissolved.263

Needless to say, with a tradition of political dissent, diocesan in-fighting, and a strict conformity to legal niceties in its past, the Council of 1636 did not meet under auspicious circumstances. Beginning on 10 January 1636, the convention—in which over fifty representatives were present—lasted for over five months and held a total of forty-two sessions.264 Syndics from every chapter were present, as were abbots, and all of the

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263 Basili de Rubí, Un segle de vida caputxina, 407-408. It should be noted, however, that in the 1630s, the Catalan church grudgingly accepted the renewal of the excusado, albeit on their own terms.
264 The final session was held on 27 June 1636. Ibid, 408.
bishops save that of Perpignan and Vic; the former most likely because of the long distance, and the latter because he was but newly appointed, and had not yet been confirmed in his see. Out of the seven bishops attending, only one—Pau Duran of Urgell—was a Catalan, but he was far from being sympathetic with the views of other Catalan clergy—particularly the chapter syndics.

As was expected, the main debate revolved around financial issues: not only the organizing of more regular contributions to the décima, but also the prospect of a five-year extension on other taxes such as the subsidio and the excusado.265 As soon as Josep Claresvalls—himself a Catalan Augustinian—introduced the first measure in favor of the décima during the tenth session, it was greeted with loud opposition and voted down.266 Just as had occurred with the financial debates at the 1632 Corts, the regional clergy divided into two bitterly antagonistic camps, pitting most of the cathedral syndics against the abbots and bishops. Scarcely a month into the proceedings and faced with the intolerable pugnacity of the cathedral canons, Archbishop Pérez of Tarragona wrote to the viceroy Cardona, communicating the hostile environment surrounding the council. Furthermore he hinted that several persons were desirous that the body be prorogued; more importantly, it was desired that the council reconvene not in Tarragona, but in Girona. Pérez had come to this decision after consulting a number of clerics, particularly the abbots, whom he wrote were “mas afectos al servicio de su Magd,” as well as the

265 Elliott, Revolt of the Catalans, 321.
266 de Rubí, Un segle de vida caputxina, 409.
canon-treasurer of Tarragona’s cathedral and Don Josep de Claresvalls, “the good Prior of Santa Anna.”

It seemed apparent, not only to the archbishop and other royalist clerics, but to all involved, that tempers and passions proceeded unchecked and that no results favorable to the king—or to the province for that matter—could be expected. Indeed, this intense level of discord is the only stated reason in the prelate’s letter for suspending and changing the location of the council. For the archbishop to suggest either of these propositions was a hazardous enterprise. There was little or no precedent for either of these innovations, and both could be expected to inflame rather than cool already ardent spirits, especially given the native Catalan penchant to adhere to tradition. Although he does not explicitly give a reason why Girona was to be honored as the new site, it is fairly certain that Archbishop Pérez felt that the close proximity of the Viceroy and the Audiència would put the cathedral canons in a more thoughtful state of mind. Ironically, the only example that Archbishop Pérez could find of a Provincial Council that had been

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267 “entre ellos el Thesorero desta Sta yglesia con el buen Prior de Sta Anna sobre si tendrían inconveniente significar al consilio lo que V. Ex. ordenava serca de prorogar para Gerona, gueran todos de parescer que la prorrogacion se hiziese...” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos-280, doc. 24; Letter from Archbishop Pérez to Duke of Cardona, 27 February 1636. The Collegiate church of Santa Anna in Barcelona was a former Augustinian house that had been secularized. The Prior, Claresvalls, was a noted royalist Catalan priest, who was also an influential staff member for the Jutge Apostolic. In 1640 he was given charge of the prosecution against Pau Claris in the regional church court, but failed to establish a case against the Diputat. During the war he left Barcelona for Rome where he penned his memoirs in 1647. The location of this work, consulted by Josep Sanabre for his work La Acción de Francia en Cataluña, is currently unknown.

268 “mas que ninguna manera se nombrasse Girona porque seria alterarlo y alvorotarlo todo ya, todos sin humano remedio fundandolo en muchas razones y algunas de las mas apretadas en el servicio de Su Magd...también por que no digan que todo lo lleva a Girona...” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos-280, doc. 24; Letter from Archbishop Pérez to Duke of Cardona, 27 February 1636.
prorogued was the very first one following the Council of Trent, when it was very clearly done in the name of promoting royal (secular) interests and concerns.  

When the proposition to suspend the council was introduced, it actually found a more favorable audience among the clerics, despite its innovative nature. Religious representatives on both sides of the fiscal divide had become increasingly frustrated with the other side’s recalcitrance. The feeling of frustration joined with a growing concern—particularly among the lower levels of the church hierarchy—about expenses. Since every syndic had to pay for his own travel, room, and board, the indefinite prolonging of a council filled with endless argumentation, “consuming their lives and their houses, and their churches,” was to be avoided at all costs. In late February, the assembly voted to reconvene in Tarragona after a rest of a few months.

As delegates left to return to their native dioceses, however, both factions reiterated their views regarding any and all financial contributions to the monarchy in no uncertain terms. Archbishop Pérez thoughtfully noted the differing attitudes:

Before arriving, I gave charge to all the Chapters that they had not told me calmly what particular difficulties they have which they do not wish to avoid with your Majesty, and which are of lesser importance … It is beyond a doubt that they desire the grace of His Holiness to extend over all the clergy of Catalonia and not to impede your Majesty with the burden of conforming their benefices and tithes because out of the previous practice more than 15,000 ducats have been lost. Another desired that Your Majesty level out the party of Aragon, or that you will not be

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269 “mas que para ello haura consultado los exemplars para guardar la forma que mis antecessors havian guardado en cosas semejantes y no haviendo descubierto otro exemplar que el del Sr. don Fernando de Loazes…” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos-280, doc. 24; Letter from Archbishop Pérez to Duke of Cardona, 27 February 1636.

270 “consumiendo sus vidas y sus haziendas y las de sus yglesias.” Although determining to reconvene on 15 May, the council apparently left without discussing whether or not to move the location from Tarragona. In the Archbishop’s letter he writes “sin indicacion de lugar cierto que si bien se ha de entender y entiende en la misma ciudad de Tarragona,” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos-280, doc. 24; Letter from Prior Claresvalls to Duke of Cardona, 1 March 1636. This may indicate that while Pérez would have loved to move the council elsewhere, to advocate such a recommendation would have met with a greater storm of protest than he was willing to encounter, and so remained more a pious wish than a direct proposal.
obliged to pay them. As for the bishops of Tortosa and Barcelona, about whom I wrote to Your Excellency, I presume that they are complying with the new distribution of our benefices.271

Another commentator, the Prior Josep Claresvalls, left Tarragona in great disgust, upset at the way in which the bishops and abbots had let themselves be out-maneuvered by the cathedral canons and their allies. From his perspective, any delay in confirming donations to the crown meant another victory for selfish, uncaring canons like Pau Claris. Claresvalls communicated all this—thoughtfully leaving out particular names, however—in a letter to the viceroy, Cardona.272

The Provincial Council of 1636 (continued): the failure of language as a unifying principle in early-modern Catalonia

When the religious council resumed its discussions in May, discussions regarding financial contributions proceeded more smoothly than before. The cathedral canons ultimately agreed to the five-year extension of the subsidio and even the excusado, and the general atmosphere was more peaceful than in the past. Unfortunately, financial concerns were not the only topics that produced significant quarrels at the Provincial Council. The issue of the language in which sermons ought to be delivered also reared its

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271 “Antes de llegara, esto hize cargo a todos los Cabildos de no haverme dicho con lisura que dificultades tenian por menor y en particular para no con evidar con su Magd…es sin duda que quieren que pues la gracia de su Sanctidad viene sobre todo el clero de Cathaluña no impide su Magd el cargar a todos conforme sus beneficios y diezmos por que de lo que antes se cargava se han venido a perder mas de quinse mil ducados. Otro se quieren que su Magd los allane el partido de Aragon, o que no les obligue a que le paguen. Lo de Tortosa y de Barca que a VE escrivi presumo que ya se acomodaran con el nuevo repartimiento de los beneficios nuevos.” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos-280, doc. 24; Letter from Archbishop Pérez to Duke of Cardona, 27 February 1636.

272 “no tengo de anyadir mas que donde quiera que fuere la Provincia es lance forçosa la presencia y assistencia de todos los obispos y Abades que han faltado prevenidos, y grangeados primero que sino faltan a lo que deven, y se deve confiar dellos el servicio de Su Magd se conseguira con effeto, por menor han passado muchas particularades que no se escriven…” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos-280, doc. 24; Letter from Prior Claresvalls to Duke of Cardona, 1 March 1636. After receiving both the Archbishop and the Prior’s account of the turmoil, Cardona—from his headquarters in Girona—wrote back to Pérez on 6 March 1636. In his letter to the prelate, he indicated that he was sending along his reports to Madrid, “sintiendo que si V Magd no obliga al Arçobispo a que se celebre aca el consilio hallo en el poca maña para reducir los votos ni allanar dificultades, V Magd lo mandara ver y se servira de ordenar me lo que fuere de su mayor servicio.” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos-280, doc. 24; Letter from Duke of Cardona to Archbishop Pérez, 6 March 1636.
head. Like the resistance to the décima, the question of language had both religious and secular interests at its heart. On the one hand, a good many canons, bishops, and abbots were sincerely concerned about the spiritual health of their congregations; preaching, especially in rural areas, had to be conducted in Catalan, because the inhabitants understood no other language. Whether such matters were to apply to the sermons heard in cathedral towns, where knowledge of Castilian had permeated through universities, publications, and commerce, was another matter, and one that drew impassioned responses from both factions.

The controversial issue was raised in the eighteenth session, by, of all persons, the Castilian bishop of Tortosa, Justino Antolínez of Valladolid. Bishop Antolínez was deeply concerned for the spiritual welfare of his flock and had considered the issue of language to be of supreme importance as an overseer of the Body of Christ. He himself, though a foreigner, had learned Catalan and used it whenever he delivered a sermon in the cathedral. Before the convening of the Council, in fact, Antolínez had censured the lector of his see, a Dominican, Fra Espinell, for preaching in Castilian. The bishop had made known his displeasure in no certain terms: “[he] has not wanted nor desires to give permission to preach either in the see or outside it—[neither in nor out of the season of Lent]—in the Castilian language.” This proposal met its fiercest opposition from only one prelate, the Castilian bishop of Lleida, Bernardo Caballero de Paredes.

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273 de Rubí, Un segle de vida caputxina, 409-410.
274 “no le ha querido ni quiere dar licencia para predicar ni en la seo ni fuera de ella [ni dins ni fora de la Quaresma] en lengua castellana.” de Rubí, cited in Ibid, 410, his italics. Following the confirmation of his position by the Council, Bishop Antolínez censured another Dominican friar from Aragon who had preached in Castilian during the Lenten season. The cathedral chapter concurred in their rebuke, remarking that, “No es el primero de hábito aragonés con quien se hace esto…No será dificultoso a v.p., que es medio catalán y se ha criado en Cataluña, el aplicarse a la lengua catalana y predicar en ella.” de Rubí, Ibid, 411n. Italics mine.
Questions concerning the spiritual preeminence of the Catalan language had arisen during the Provincial Council of 1591, which was presided over by Archbishop Joan Terés. The matter was published in the third resolution as follows, “That the bishops not tolerate preaching in another language save the maternal, which the foreigner cannot understand” in which the clerics came down decisively on behalf of the pro-Catalan advocates. Approaching the issue from a non-partisan perspective, the religious authorities in Catalonia determined that to preach in a foreign tongue to the unlearned was an offense against the Gospel and the evangelical mission of the Church. To talk about salvation and other important spiritual matters in a language unintelligible to the congregation would prove to be a stumbling block for the faithful and an insult to non-believers. Indeed, it became apparent to the representatives at the Council that most of those preachers who had been using Castilian did so purposefully and ostentatiously, to show off their learning.

Now, a generation later, the issue seemed to take on a greater prominence. The 1636 resolution was listed second only to the décima, and called forward the following resolution “on preaching in the Catalan tongue.” Much of the constitution’s wording

275 “Que els bisbes no tolerin la predicació en altra llengua que la maternal, on no s’entengui la forastera.” The exact language of the decision is as follows: “Ha arribat a la nostra oïda, i nòs mateix ho hem escoltat sovint amb dolor en les Esglésies que hem presidit, que molts predicadors de la paraula de Déu s’obliden del seu ofici. La llengua…ens és donada per a comunicar-nos, per la qual cosa l’Esperit Sant afavorí els Apòstols amb vàries llengües; en canvi, els tals predicadors busquen la fama popular i els propis interessos i no pas els de Jesucrist…prediquen en una altra llengua que els oients a penes entenen, si és que l’entenen gens, i abandonen la natural i maternal del poble al qual sermonegen. D’aquesta manera…els més pobres retornen a casa dejuns i sense cap fruit de la predicació…no tolerin de cap manera l’explicació de l’Evanegli en llengua forastera en llurs esglésies, en les quals probablement només s’entén l’idioma matern i natural.” Josep Marquès, Concilis Provincialis Tarraconeses (Barcelona: Facultat de Teologia de Catalunya, 1994), 164-165.
276 Ibid, 35. This issue of academic pride does not seem to have motivated the resurrection of the language issue in 1635-1636. Rather it seems to be the fledgling attempt by the Catalan church to assert their regional pre-eminence in language—and, as occurred the following year, birthright—in the face of a growing Castilianization of “Spain.”
drew upon the 1591 decision: all Catalan preachers were to preach the Word in their mother tongue; and bishops were not allowed to give a license to preach in any other language but Catalan. The Council made a special point of emphasizing the necessity of preaching in Catalan during the holy seasons of Advent and Lent: “We prohibit totally, moreover, that in the seasons of Advent and Lent preachers, following whatever their own kingdom or nation follows, from preaching in anything but the Catalan idiom, and this in such a manner that the common people are not able to give towards a dispensation.” Outside of these special liturgical periods, bishops could license foreign preachers to preach in their native tongue during certain feast days. Anyone caught in violation of this decree would have his license revoked.

Some Catalan historians, looking backwards from 1640, have seen the Provincial Council of 1636 to be a “watershed moment” in the history of Catalonia: the first time in the Principality’s “modern” history when members of an important social estate arose and made a bold declaration of Catalan identity. Given the importance of the literary revival, the Renaixement, in the formation of Catalan identity during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, these scholars attempt to raise this religious council to the same level of significance. Furthermore, they have pointed to the solidarity of the Catalan clergy on the issue of language—extending even to the infamous royalist Pau Duran—as the first

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277 “estatúim i ordenem amb aprovació del sagrat concili que en endavant tots els predicadors catalans no puguin mal predicar la paraula de Déu sinó en llenga materna i catalana, i que els bisbes i els altres prelats de la nostra província als quals per toca no els donin llicència de predicar sinó en llenga materna i catalana.” Ibid, 165.
278 “Prohibim totalment, a més a més, que en els temps d’Advent i Quaresma els predicadors, sigui quin sigui el seu regne o nació, prediquin sinó en idioma català, i això de tal manera que els ordinaris no puguin donar cap dispensa.” Ibid, 165.
279 En canvi, fora del temps [of Advent and Lent, the bishops and others] que tenen jurisdicció ordinària podran donar llicència, a predicadors forasters i no catalans, de predicar en llenga forastera en alguna festa. … Els predicadors que faltin a les dites coses de qualsevol manera, seran privats de la llicència de predicar.“ Ibid, 165.

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real solidarity evidenced by this diverse body. The clergy’s blunt opposition to the Castilian language is then seen as significant in creating a latent resistance movement among the first estate toward the fateful policies of Olivares and Philip IV that would emerge in full force four years later.

Contrary to the view that the battle over the Catalan language represented a decisive moment in the creation of a regional identity, the Provincial Council of 1636—especially when placed in the context of the prolonged dispute over the décima—seems to be quite minor and unimportant. The controversy did not lead any Catalan cleric to make statements against the Crown: their support of the Catalan language, religious propriety was stressed, not the need to take a stand against the centralizing policies of Castile. Such language would arise in the pamphlets of late 1640, attempting to justify a revolt that had already taken place, but not four years in advance of rebellion. The Capuchin scholar, Basili de Rubí has insisted that there was hardly any controversy in the matter, and that the Council was merely confirming the decisions of 1591 and 1602. Indeed, the fact that only two pamphlets emerged from this dispute—one in favor and one opposed to the Council’s resolution—and the fact that the most outspoken critics were themselves Catalans, seems to vitiate the “identity formation” approach.

How then is one to explain the matter: why did it emerge in 1636 and seemingly fade into obscurity? It is quite probable that the issue came up merely as a way for the

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280 de Rubí, Un segle de vida caputxina, 410. Another great work that contains many speeches delivered at the Councils of 1591, 1636, and 1637 (especially the proposal of Bishops of Tortosa and Urgell) has been edited by Modest Prats, Política lingüística de l’Església catalana, segles XVI-XVII (Girona, 1995).
281 The two pamphlets can be found in the Biblioteca de Catalunya, Fullet Bonsoms 9967: Diego Cisteller, Memorial, en defensa de la Lengua Catalana; and FB 9966: Juan Adrian Gomez (in reality a discredited Catalan priest, Alexandre de Ros) Memorial en defensa de la lengua castellana. Both were published in Barcelona, 1636.
Catalan church to assert its independence against the incursions of royal centrism. Only a

couple of year before, in the dispute over the décima, the regional church had caved in
under secular pressure, and fears were aired about the Catalan church succumbing
entirely to the king’s will. There was a legitimate concern that the visible church would
in time become a royal institution instead of a spiritual institution. Asserting themselves
in a “safe” topic such a language represented a modest attempt by the Catalan clergy to
show the crown that they were still in control over the governing of the regional church,
despite their forced contributions to the royal coffer. The larger issue was primarily
about ecclesiastical autonomy, whether the king or church officials should have the
ultimate say on the proceedings within the church. Thus, its placement in the
constitutions immediately following the décima, to show the king that, though they might
have caved in on one issue, did not mean that they were going to passively accept
“Castilianization” in all forms of church administration. Furthermore, it may have been
designed to unite the disparate conglomeration of religious syndics attending the Council,
particularly in light of the bitterness surrounding the décima.

But, one might inquire, why was the issue not pressed more forcibly, why was
there no seventeenth century Renaisement? For the very simple reason that the Catalan
concept of patria remained very localized. The primary understanding was one’s
hometown, or diocese, or veguer, not “the Principat,” or “the Comtats” at large. The
squabbles that divided the region of Catalonia into numerous feuds affected both secular
affairs and the Church. True, these hatreds were suppressed from time to time when the
Generalitat was faced with an imminent threat, be it natural disaster or war. But it was
still a temporary identity dependent on external circumstances for its creation and sustenance. A true “Catalan” identity still lacked a positive cause for existence and would for many years to come.\textsuperscript{282}

Despite the warm sentiments that surrounded the conclusion of the Council in June 1636, the continued war with France and its subsequent financial pressures led to the calling of another Provincial Council in the following year. But by 1637, Archbishop Pérez had left Catalonia for another diocese, leaving the see of Tarragona vacant. Being the second most lucrative see in Catalonia, the king of Spain had from time to time left it empty, thereby allowing the rents and revenue to flow directly into the royal coffers. While beneficial to the monarchy, it created chaos when applied to church leadership. When a Council was scheduled to convene during these times, a debate arose between the chapter of Tarragona, which claimed that the vacancy meant that control passed to the archdiocesan chapter, and the bishops of Barcelona, who claimed (with Trent in support) that control ought to come to the most senior bishop in the province. Needless to say, history seemed to favor the chapter’s side, since they had called councils during episcopal vacancies in 1567, 1586, 1603, and 1623.\textsuperscript{283}

Over the objections of the archdiocese chapter, however the majority of clerics in Catalonia accepted Manrique’s authority to convene a provincial council, which began meeting on 8 January 1637 in Barcelona. Financial issues again dominated discussions, and, in imitation of the previous council, Catalan clerics approved some financial

\textsuperscript{282} It is interesting to note that even now, after decades of active attempts by the Generalitat to instill a Catalan identity among its people that old prejudices die hard. Tortosa is still looked upon as “not really Catalan,” while Barcelona maintains a love-hate relationship with the rest of the province. How the Catalans and these traditional sentiments will react to a new threat to their identity in the form of increasing African and Muslim immigration, and the increasing globalization of English—elements currently recognized by the local government—remains to be seen.

\textsuperscript{283} Jordà i Fernández, \textit{Església i Poder}, 36.
contributions. But at the same time, they pressed for a resolution to the king demanding that any future ecclesiastical appointment in Catalonia, from cathedral canons to bishops to abbots, be given to Catalans alone.\footnote{“no es pugui atorgar cap dignitat ecclesiastica als que no siguin naturals del país.” de Rubí, Un segle de vida caputxina, 411.} This time, even the pugnacious Pau Duran approved the measure, although commentators from Pau Claris to Basilí de Rubí have suspected his true motives.\footnote{Both clergymen accuse Duran of supporting the resolution only because of his greater desire to be named Archbishop of Tarragona or Canciller of the Audiència.} Unlike the tendentious meeting of the previous year, the Council of 1637 appears to have been conducted without much dispute and concluded after two months.\footnote{There is a note that the council was still meeting as of 4 March, but we have only fragments of the proceedings from the Council of 1637 as well as the Councils of 1640. Josep Sanabre supposes that Manrique took them with him into exile to Mallorca and Castile. As of the moment, the only fragmentary records of these meetings extant in Catalonia can be found in the Arxiu Capitular de Tarragona.}

The biggest effect of the Provincial Councils of 1636-37 was the reconciliation made—albeit grudgingly—between the king and his ecclesiastical supporters and the lower orders of the Catalan church hierarchy who still resented the constant demands for their money. Although acquiescing to the royal fiscal demands, a good number of regional clergy, led by the cathedral canons, determined to save face or reputación by insisting on other matters pertinent to their autonomy. Though resolutions to preach only in Catalan and to appoint only native Catalans to future ecclesiastical posts were easily confirmed by the Provincial Councils, they were not so easily enforced, particularly the latter which was dependent on the royal will. Indeed, Philip IV would continue to appoint Castilians and even Italians to bishoprics inside Catalonia, and this neglect, combined with continual demands for more money, alienated increasing numbers of the ecclesiastical estate. As Sir John Elliott noted: “The clergy were more heavily and
regularly taxed than anybody else, and their resentment turned them into the most
doughty defenders of an oppressed Catalonia.” To make matters worse the Catalan
clergy no longer sought for recourse in the Provincial Councils. In the future, dialogue in
the ecclesiastical forum would prove insufficient to handle more serious grievances
brought to its attention. In fact, although Provincial Councils were called twice in 1640
to deal with the violence that was tearing the region apart, the ecclesiastical body would
dissolve before any major decisions were decided.

A miscellany of troubles

Along with the financial difficulties of the king, and the reluctance by the Catalan
clergy to alleviate the royal distress outside of traditional procedures and means, several
other problems arose between Church and Crown that continued to drive a wedge
between these two important social institutions in Catalonia. Though some of the
disputes seem to involve matters that might be considered trivial to modern eyes, they
were of considerable importance to the people of the seventeenth century. Seemingly
minor issues such as precedent, dress, or ceremony were highly important to early-
modern society. In a world driven by prestige rather than wealth, in a society made up of
orders not classes, one’s position in life was defined by the privileges one enjoyed.

287 Sir John Elliott, Revolt of the Catalans, 244.
288 It is interesting to note that in addition to these larger concerns, the legal quarrels concerning the right to
convene or preside over these councils continued from 1637-1640, with the chapter of Tarragona appealing
to the Rota in Rome, the viceroy in Barcelona, and the Council of Aragon in Madrid for support. Bishop
Manrique, on the other hand, used the services of Dr. Riber, the ex-syndic for Tarragona, as well as the
eminent lawyer, Felip Vinyes, to cement his authority to preside over the councils. In the end, Manrique
won out, with the chapter of Tarragona severely castigating the betrayal of Riber as a “cosa molt fora dels
limits de un home que professa religio christian...” Jordà i Fernández, Església i Poder, cited on p. 38.
289 Sir John Elliott puts it nicely: “In the seventeenth century, questions of ceremonial and precedence were
supremely important, since they were the visible evidence of the degree and status of each individual and
corporation in the great hierarchical society of mankind.” The same is applicable not just of the
seventeenth century, but for most of the early-modern period. Elliott, Revolt of the Catalans, 278.
Nobles, for example, were considered a privileged set, not because they possessed vast amounts of cash—many, were in fact, quite poor—but because of their tax-exempt status, and their right to carry a sword. The same was true of the clergy, who likewise enjoyed tax exemptions and their own judicial process.

What makes these conflicts over privileges more important when considering the Revolt of the Catalans is the growing number of clergy that Philip IV was alienating by his actions. Whereas the cathedral canons carried the burden of protest during the 1632 Corts and the décima crisis, a series of initiatives undertaken by the king during the 1630s angered other clerics, particularly the members of certain religious orders. Chief among the regulars who became increasingly frustrated with the heavy-handed policies from Madrid were the Benedictines—the oldest and most prestigious order in Catalonia. In general, the regulars agreed whole-heartedly with the resolutions demanding the use of Catalan in sermons and the appointment of Catalans as abbots and bishops. As was suggested earlier, much of this support seems to stem from the desire for local autonomy, to keep to the old ways, to maintain the traditions of their fathers. Sir John Elliott has noted this passionate devotion in Pau Claris, who wrote to his fellow canons of Urgell in 1639, to “see to it that in your time your holy church does not lose an atom of its prerogatives and privileges.”

The first trouble with the Benedictines began in the spring of 1628, when Fra Francisco García Calderón, an “Observant” Benedictine, arrived in Barcelona with letters from Philip IV to the viceroy asking for his help and assistance in getting the Catalan

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290 Pau Claris to Canons of Urgell, 20 December 1639 in ACU: Cartes, 1630-1640; also cited in Elliott, Revolt of the Catalans, 344. Elliott goes on to emphasize the dedication of principle in Claris: to defend the heritage of Catalans through the ages “so that not one iota was lost” (345) and to pass along this legacy to future generations.
monks of Ripoll—since the “defection” of Montserrat now the leading “Claustral” Benedictine house in the Principat—to switch over to the new “Observant” order. Along with the royal dispatches was a commission from the Spanish Nuncio giving his approval to the king’s decision.²⁹¹ Upon their receipt of the letters, the Catalan monks were greatly upset and wrote back to the king, protesting that such a measure would not only be prejudicial to the monastery itself but also to the other houses of their order.²⁹²

There were three basic reasons behind the Benedictines’ remonstrance. First, the monks denied that the king had any power to intervene in ecclesiastical matters save in special judicial cases, and only then to proceed with prudence and moderation.²⁹³ Second, Philip, as a descendent of Count Guifre el Pelós—the first Count of Barcelona and the founder of the abbey—was obliged to defend the house without removing or changing anything related to its functions.²⁹⁴ Finally, the king was not only the defender of the abbey, but its patron as well, which made him doubly-bound to preserve the integrity of the religious institution.²⁹⁵ Following hard upon their desire to be left alone,

²⁹¹ “pidiendole assistencia y auxilio de oficiales, y ministro seculares, para yr al dicho Monasterio a reformarle, y reducirle a la primitiva regal del Padre S. Benito en todo su rigor, en virtud de una commission del Nuncio de su Santidad en los Reynos de España.” BC: FB 6112: Memorial Para la Magestad del Rey Nuestro Señor en Favor del Monasterio de Nuestra Señora de Ripoll, sobre la reforma uqe se insta (Barcelona: Pere Lacavalleria, 1628), f. 310. The papal confirmation was dated around 30 April 1627, which implies that Philip IV had long had this project in mind.

²⁹² “viendo el perjuyzio que de ahi resultava al dicho Monasterio, y temiendo juntamente las inquietudes, que han de ser muy grandes, que avia de causar la ejecucion de dicha reforma, no solo en el dicho Monasterio, pero tambien en todo el Principado,” Ibid, f. 310.

²⁹³ “sino extrajudicialmente, con la modestia, y moderacion … Mayormente quando de los procedimientos del Iuez Eclesiastico se temen escandalos en el pueblo, y turbacion de la paz publica, y rixas, y otros movimientos, en los quales casos no puede VM dexar de salir al remedio, como se platica en todo el mundo, Castilla, Napoles, Francia, &c.” Ibid, f. 310. The monks cited as their authority on this matter the writings of Abbot-Bishop Oliba, perhaps the most famous Catalan Benedictine of the early Middle Ages.

²⁹⁴ Ibid, ff. 310v-311.

²⁹⁵ “Como patron, es V Magestad por consiguiente defensor legitimo deste Monasterio, como lo trae un grande ministro de V Magestad en el Reyno de Portugal … y la reforma tanto viene para el Abad, como para los Monjes. Oyga pues, V Magestad si es servido, las quexas deste Monasterio, que trae contra la dicha reforma, y verá que justificadas son, y que puesto está en razon, no permita VM se passe adelante en ella…” Ibid, f. 311.
the monks defended their house and their order by claiming that accusations leveled against Ripoll were spurious and false and therefore the Nuncio’s commission was misleading, and that such reforms could not proceed without serious harm to the entire community.

The monks of Ripoll seemed well aware of the fact that they spoke for all the other Catalan Benedictines who were not under the rule of the Castilian “Observants.” The most important issue in their memorandum to Philip IV concerned vindicating the charges of laxness or worse. As such they devoted a great amount of space in describing the orthopraxy of their life. They were obedient to their abbot, and daily followed the decrees of the Council of Trent. They still lived in cloisters, but also owned houses and other benefices in the vicinity. They ate only in the consistory during Advent and Lent, and did not leave the monastery without the permission of their superior, who, according to the reforms of Pope Benedict XII, served a period of three years as “President” of the Congregación Claustral. Furthermore, the Congregation had followed these regulations for the past six centuries, and particularly when it came to matter of administering the property that they had amassed through wills and donations.

It appears that the Catalans felt that the wealth of Ripoll—rather than a sincere concern for pious living—was motivating the king’s reforms. And, quite frankly, they resented it. Indignantly, they pointed out that only the individual monks of the order were sworn to poverty, not the Order itself. Furthermore, as the Pope had approved the

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296 Ibid, f. 312.
297 “Acerca del qual modo de vivir, aunque han dudado algunos con demasiado escrupulo, si era figro en conciencia, en particular en respeto de tener administracion de rentas a su cuenta, y para si propio, que parece repugna al voto de la pobreza, pero no ha faltado quien le ha defendido valientemente…” Ibid, f. 312; emphasis mine.
rules of St. Benedict, only he could pronounce that the Order as a whole must forfeit what
it had been given. It was true, the monks continued, that some other regular clergy
lived a stricter life, without the large abbeys, and without holding rents over certain tracts
of land. But the application of these harsher measures did not make them right, nor did it
imply that all regular clergy should subscribe to the same rule.

Therefore, the monks argued, it was unjust for the king and Nuncio to declare that
any monk who refused to accept the so-called “reforms” of the Observants would be
expelled from Ripoll, and placed in another house. To insist on these draconian
punishments was bound to stir up a hornet’s nest, at the very least because of the
collective prestige within the abbey’s walls. As the monks themselves pointed out: “all
the Monks that live in the Monastery of Ripoll, are Nobleman of the most important
houses of the Principat, having very influential fathers and relatives,” all of whom would
be moved to protest the expulsion of their son, nephew, or other relation, particularly
under the dubious circumstances in which Ripoll was being forced to change. Even less
would these influential Catalans be likely to stand for foreigners replacing their family
seats in the famous religious house. Such a novelty would not be received well at all.

298 “que no obsta dezir, que el Papa no puede quitar la ley divina, que manda se guarde la pobreza, que se
ha votado, y prometido; porque estos Monjes solo votan vivir sin propio, y eso absolutamente quanto al
dominio, empero quanto a la adminstracion facti & iuris, condicionalmente, sio es con licencia del
Superior; y el Religioso, que tiene el dicho privilegio verdadero, o tacito del Papa, tiene consequentemente
la dicha licencia.” Ibid, f. 312v.
299 “Esto es muy dificultoso de platicar, y està lleno de inconvenientes, porque todos los Monjes que viven
en el Monasterio de Ripoll, son Cavalleros de los mas principales del Principado, tienen padres y deudos muy principales, y se colocaron allí, por ser muy honrosa la colocacion, y no lo hizieran en otros
Monasterios donde se reciben de todo estado de gentes. Claro, esta, que no se ha de tomar bien que los
despidan de su Monasterio, mayormente forasteros, y los embien donde quisieren, porque esto es una de las
mas graves penas, que se pueden dar por delitos a un Religios…”
“Esto avia de parecer muy grande novedad, ver echados los Monjes de sus Monasterios con tantas
canas, y tantos años de ancianidad, con tanta nobleza que posseen, y mendigar acogimiento en otros
Monasterios, donde como forasteros no avian de tener cargos, ni honras, antes perder las que antes tenian
por su ancianidad, y por otros respetos devidos a sus personas y siendo como son de familias nobles, y

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The Catalan Benedictine argument was quite simple: the diversity attainable within the unified Body of Christ means that no one way of living is, or ought to be, the way for all professing believers. By the same token, neither is one particular monastic way better than others. Benedict, in crafting his Rule, may not have been as strict as some newer fraternal movements such as the Dominicans or the Capuchins. This should not invalidate the ancient rule, however. The monks who had taken oaths to this Rule and not another sincerely thought that it would be treason to themselves and to their Order to change their vows without likewise changing their habits. In much the same way, this appeal to ecclesiastical diversity also worked in appealing to keeping the old Congregació Clastral de Tarragona; there is one rule for the Castilians, which is fine. But if there existed another rule for Catalans, why should they change?\(^3\) The “reforms” instituted by the monks at Valladolid were not necessarily more “spiritual” or more “righteous” than the rule which was lived by at Ripoll, Amer i Roses, or Poblet. The Benedictines saw in the king’s request a demand for conformity for its own sake. They

\(^3\) Alone among religions and modern ideologies the Christian Church seems to be unique in its ability to maintain diversity in unity; in other words, it is not a cultural religion. No other religion, with the possible exception of Buddhism, can make this claim. This is particular evident in comparison with the myriad of modern ideologies which either preach strict unity of belief and see diversity as something to be shunned—socialism, and radical secularists—or those that try to create a diverse society but wind up producing a boring, bland, monolithic conformism—witness the global economy, pluralism. Even the neo-conservatives (as opposed to adherents of the conservatism described by Russell Kirk which is more practical religion than ideology) fall into this with their passion for spreading democracy hither and yon. Against these modern belief-systems the Church stands unique—and has stood for centuries—although not always advertising this peculiar combination of unity-in-diversity. After all, this is the institution that sees itself as a Body; encourages both monastic and non-monastic living; enjoys churches filled with icons or stripped bare of design; teaches predestination and the free-will of man….
were asked to sacrifice their autonomy to the secular power through a mandate clothed in pious language, and refused to comply.

What concerned the king as well was not just the particular rule that was being followed, but also the means of enforcing obedience to the rule. It is apparent that he did not trust the Catalans to look after their own integrity; only Castilians trained in the new “reformed” rule, and sent from Madrid could be trusted with such an important task. At the best, this was just another form of paternal concern; at the worst, it was a grave insult to the Catalan religious community. They couldn’t be trusted to keep the sanctity of their vows, but must be made to adhere to a different set of regulations, enforced by a foreign power, and for their own good. It can be seen as only natural that the Catalan Benedictines would bristle at such changes without casting doubts regarding the sincerity of their profession.

Philip IV ultimately agreed not to press for the immediate reform of Ripoll, though whether moved by the monks’ logic or convinced that he would reap more trouble than gain from the matter is uncertain. Nevertheless, both parties remained wary of each other; what was worse, relations between the two congregations of Benedictines continued to deteriorate. From the perspective of the “Congregación Claustral,” those houses now under control from Valladolid and Madrid had “betrayed” their heritage. This was particularly true of Montserrat, home to some of the most sacred treasures of Catalonia, such as the Muranetta, a black wooden statue of the Virgin and Child. Indeed, Montserrat would come under special retribution during the Revolt of the Catalans: alone among the religious houses in Catalonia, it was marked for a special purge. The abbot, Castilian Juan de Espinosa, along with nearly seventy monks were
expelled from the mountain abbey and, placed under military guard, were then escorted to the Lleida border and there deported.

Conflict between the Catalan Benedictines and the Crown would lie dormant for some time, emerging coincidentally only a few months before the extreme crisis in the summer of 1640. The issue was raised by two prominent Benedictine monasteries, San Cugat de Valles and San Pere de Camprodon. Both houses still held to the *Congregació de los Claustrales de la Provincia de Tarragona*, rather than to the reformed congregation centered on Valladolid; both were quite influential and prestigious—San Cugat was located near the hills of Barcelona, and San Pere in the diocese of Girona—and both had recently lost their abbots, the Catalans Don Francisco de Eril, and Dr. Pedro Finot. News had reached the abbeys that Philip intended on filling both these vacancies with his brother, the Cardenal-Infante. Not only would this royal appointment place the large incomes of both positions into the royal coffers, but it would also put a foreigner in charge of the houses, virtually spelling the end for the monasteries’ place in the *Congregació Claustrales* of Tarragona.301

Both of these innovations disturbed the monks greatly, and they issued a lengthy petition to the king, asking him to change his mind. Once more, they appealed to similar arguments used a decade earlier at Ripoll. They asserted that from their founding “the Sacred Religion has always flourished, which your Monks profess, with strict observance

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301 Again, it must be remembered that the Provincial Council of 1637 had insisted that all future dignitaries of the Church in Catalonia be given to Catalans. While this had no binding on the king’s appointments, the violation of the Council’s recommendation certainly grieved many in the religious community.
of their Constitutions, and of regular discipline.”

To replace both abbots with one man, even though he was the brother of the king, would harm the effective teaching of both houses. Even worse, the king’s blatant disregard of the Benedictine Rule as well as the reforms of Trent would result in the weakening of religion among the inhabitants of Catalonia and the ruin of the two monasteries. After all, had not similar abuses among regular orders led to the troublesome Luther in Germany?

The monks’ appeal continued, asking the king to consider “that which will be best for the service of God our Lord…and the conservation of Religion,” and to appoint an abbot from one of their own numbers instead of the Cardenal-Infante. Their religious organization, the Catalan Benedictines claimed, was quite strict in the observance of their vows “as the most observant Franciscan.” In addition to desiring an abbot from among their own order, the great responsibilities of the office disqualified the Cardenal-Infante from serving as abbot over two monasteries at the same time. Not only was the abbot responsible for holding councils and attending congregations of the Order “from which flow wise resolutions for the governing of the entire Order,” but also needed to attend all the Provincial Councils “where issues concerning the governing of the Ecclesiastical

302 “ha florecido siempre la sagrada Religion, que sus Monges professan, con observanica puntual de sus Constituciones, y de regular diciplina.” BC: FB 5142: Suplica al Rey feta per la Congregació de la Orden de San Benito de los Claustrales de la Provincia de Tarragona (n.d.), ff. 241-241v.

303 “el efecto de la poca fuerte de la Religion, que no la permite merecedora de tan grande dicha. Pues ser aquellos Monsterios regidos, y governados por la Serenissima persona de su Alteza, fuera su mayor felicidad. Mas porque los daños, que se consideran de semejantes encomiendas, amenaçan con evidencia la ruina de aquellos Monasterios…” Ibid, f. 242.

304 “lo que aya de ser mãs del servicio de Dios nuestro Señor … y conservación de la Religión,” Ibid, f. 242.

305 “como el mas observante Franciscano.” Ibid, f. 242v. The use of the Franciscan as the standard of piety and true Religion is interesting, possibly suggesting that the Franciscan Order, and particularly their offshoot, the Capuchins, were considered more rigorous in their discipline than other regular clergy.
Republic are resolved,” as well as the Corts.\textsuperscript{306} From all this, it was clear that residence in the abbey was essential, as was continued involvement in the affairs of the Catalan church. Neither requirement the Cardenal-Infante could meet if he spent all his time in Madrid, or worse, overseas.

What was at stake here was the preservation of order within the Benedictine houses; true, there were advantages to having a sympathetic Catalan in charge San Cugat and San Pere, but as the monks explained:

> The evidence is clear, Sire, that His Highness (the Cardenal-Infante), now for his nobility, now for his greater occupations, now because the Recommendation does not require his residence, cannot give his presence to these Churches, neither will the subject houses attain to that strength which his presence might honor them, see them, visit them, consol them … the sheep without a Shepherd will go astray … Without the presence of a Prelate, who with power and authority pays attention to them, one can certainly fear the diminution [of that power] with which one is able to stand against the risk. Lamentable misery! that one might seek to reduce that which reason asks for and that always has prolific increases. The smallest fault is seen as a larger one in the eyes of God.\textsuperscript{307}

Although an oversight committee for the Order had assigned temporary Vicars to the houses, in order to maintain discipline as well as collect rents for the king, the Benedictines charged that more was needed. The vicars were nothing more than mercenaries; nothing could provide an adequate substitute for real leaders.\textsuperscript{308} The residence of religious superiors, be they bishops or abbots, illustrated in Scripture, in the

\textsuperscript{306} “de donde salen las acertadas resoluciones para el gobierno de toda la Religion”; “donde se resueluen las cosas concernientes el gobierno de la Republica Eclesiastica.” Ibid, f. 243.

\textsuperscript{307} “Evidencia es clara, Señor, que su Alteza, ya por su grandeza, ya por sus mayores empleos, ya porque Comendatario no le obliga la residencia, no ha de conceder a estas Iglesias su assistencia, ni los súbditos alcanzarán la fuerte de que su presencia los honre, los vea, los visite, los consuele … las ovejas sin Pastor andarán descarradas … Que sin la assistencia de Prelado, que con poderio, y autoridad lo atienda, cierta se puede temer la diminucion por seguro se puede contra el riesgo. Desdicha lastimable, que se viesse reduzir a menos, lo que la razon pide, que tenga siempre prolixos aumentos; y que la falta mas breve, se tiene por de mayor quantia en los ojos de Dios.” Ibid, ff. 243-243v.

\textsuperscript{308} “los vicarios siendo no mas que mercenarios, y las ovejas agenas, no tendran de ellas el cuidado, que conviene: facilmente las desampararan, y dendaran de reconocerlas, y curarlas. Que ni Aron, ni Hur substitutes de Moysen, en una breve ausencia del gran Governador, que recebia de Dios la ley en el monte…Como no se han de temer possibles las desdichas originadas de las ausencias de los Prelados titulares, que los sagrados Decretos tienen por imposibles; estando de por medio sus presencias?” Ibid, f. 243v.
writings of the Church Fathers, and lastly through the Council of Trent, was essential for the purity and security of the Church.

As with the Ripoll controversy a decade earlier, the monks of San Cugat and San Pere appealed to the king in his position as patron and defender of the abbey as he was with all other religious institutions in his empire. As such he was obliged to preserve rather than innovate, to feed rather than starve the sheep, and to defend the illustrious heritage of the Order. Appointing an abbot who—because of temporal concerns—could never reside at either house he was supposed to control, would greatly harm the community.

Whether they saw behind the king’s appointment or not, the monks spent a great deal of space in their memorandum striking out directly against the king’s need for cash. Abandoning issues of whether the king ought to leave the monasteries leaderless, the Benedictines addressed the practical concerns of the matter, arguing that the absence of a permanent abbot would lead to smaller, not larger sums entering the king’s coffers. Quite simply, if an abbot were not permanently in residence, there would be no one to go round and collect the rent from his domains. Also of concern, the superior’s absence would lead to a breakdown of social order: if the abbot was absent, how could the vassals be compelled to pay their rent? What would happen if disputes between monks broke out? Who would calm sedition or discord, particularly if it was a matter of public

309 Ibid, ff. 245-245v.
310 “Y aviendo la los Santos Padres encomendado tanto, deve V Magestad servirse, no abrir camino por donde se impida, y se dexen de lograr los frutos, que en la Iglesia se han pretendido conseguir, y que del cumplimiento destos aciertos fertile, y dichosamente se han cogido mediante la residencia de los Prelados. Guardando, defendiendo, y executando lo que con divino acuerdo se ha ordenado; y no permita, que estas Iglesias se pongan a tanto riesgo, y mas por la corta comodidad, que a su Alteza se le seguiria de la misera resulta de la renta destas Abadas.” Ibid, f. 244.
knowledge that vicars were solely interested in money and not in the cure of souls.\footnote{1} The king ought to look to his grandsire, Philip II—who rarely, if ever, suffered a monastery to remain vacant long—as an example for how the king ought to deal with religious houses.\footnote{2}

Although both sides in this conflict cloaked secular concerns in pious rhetoric—the king’s desire for cash and royal control against the monks’ desire to preserve the autonomy of their houses, and to keep the revenues in the province—this memorial to Philip does reveal that the Catalan Benedictines were aware that the royal desire for “reform” rested not so much on a renewed spiritual vigor as on centralized control and re-direction of ecclesiastical wealth. The king’s attempt to attain greater control over one of the largest religious orders in Catalonia did more than earn him the enmity of monks in isolated houses. As the most prestigious order in the region, the Benedictines had connections to most of the nobility in Catalonia, a land that placed a

\footnote{1} “Esta ausencia de Prelados propios no solo ha de causar los referidos daños en lo que es tan sustancial, y lo total de la Religion; pero en lo accessorio de las rentas, que consistiendo en muchedumbre de partidas breves, esparcidas por diversas partes distantes, y propinicas; de ejecucion dificil; de averigucion por su antiguedad trabajosa, y tanto, que obliga a continua assistencia en la revolucion de los conocimientos, y a su renovacion, a que los Abades propios con vigilancia se aplican, y atienden, por lo que para sus aliminetos, y de los Monges (cuyas porciones son inevitables) para las limosnas, y hospitalidad … Como quedarian los vassallos de los Abades (que los tienen numerosos) sin propio dueño? Como las jurisdiciones sin el veradero Administrador? Como se castigarian los delitos? Como se sedarian discordias, y aplacarian sediciones? Que los Procuradores solo cuydan de las extorsiones, del desuello de los subditos, sin atender a la piedad, que es el mas alto timbre del gobierno de los señores naturales.” Ibid, ff. 244v-245. Emphasis mine.

\footnote{2} “Valer puede de exemplo, traer se deve por dechado lo que el Señor Rey don Felipe el prudente…informed por larga experiencia de los daños, que las diuturnas vacantes que avia avido de Abadias desta Religion, y algunas provisiones de otras en encomienda, las avia acarreado en lo espiritual, y temporal; que para su reparo, y que no cundiessen mas, hizo viva instance con el Papa, que se proveyessen en titulo; asi se efectuo con evidentes medras del Estado Religioso, y reditos Abadales; que si la recuperacion no fue total, pues la rayzes que avia echado la perdida, la hizieron impossible, a lo menos los nuevos proveyedos dándose buena maña….A su imitacion los que oy son consiguen considerables acrecentamientos; de que se verian agenas estas dos Iglesias, si se buelven al pernicioso estado de estar encomendadas; destruyendo lo que tan cuerad,y acertadamente se reduxo a devidos terminus, reparando lo que estava caydo.” Ibid, f. 245v.
great deal of worth on family relations. Thus it is possible that Philip’s religious policies in the region may have contributed to alienating a number of Catalan laity as well.

The fact that many Benedictines were involved in education may have led to even more harmful ramifications for the king. Significantly, a good number of Benedictine monks taught at the Universitat de Lleida, one of Catalonia’s preeminent institutions for teaching canon and civil law. The university—whose alumni included Pau Claris—was also home to Dr. Gaspar Sala, the future revolutionary pamphleteer. Since no study yet exists on this important educational institute, any connection between Benedictines and a university that turned against the king in 1640 must remain pure conjecture. The connection itself, however, illustrates that the ecclesiastical policies of Philip IV affected far more than people who wore a religious habit.

Just as Philip IV had proceeded to alienate a great number of secular clergy by his determination to collect money in the face of traditional privileges, so too did he estrange the old Benedictine establishment in Catalonia, by seeking to micro-manage their vocation, and bring their order under closer supervision from Madrid. By proceeding to trample on traditional religious rules and procedures in the name of necessity, the king was in danger of creating a serious estrangement with the Catalan Church. Even from a purely secular point of view, this was a hazardous enterprise. Though the king would be

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313 Prior to 1563, the only seminary offering clerical training in Catalonia was Lleida (there was one in Valencia, and 15 in Castile, 6 of them in Salamanca). After the Council of Trent, each diocese was to have a seminary of its own, although the Catalan dioceses were slow begin work on these religious centers, chiefly because of their poverty. Nevertheless, Tarragona completed its seminary in 1568; Urgell in 1592; and finally Barcelona and Girona in 1598. Even with the growing number of seminaries, the Universitat of Lleida still maintained its historical pre-eminence over the others. Henry Kamen, The Phoenix and the Flame (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 340-341.

314 Again, the connections between this institution and clerics who would later take part in the uprising of 1640 beg for an indepth study of the Universitat during the early seventeenth century.
the short-term recipient of extorted funds to pay for his wars, he risked losing financial and psychological support from clerics in the long run.

The desire for local autonomy even worked its way into less important monastic houses. In 1636 a conflict arose between the king and the Premonstratensian Canons, a minor order founded in 1120 in France and introduced to Spain twenty years later. In 1567, Philip II, driven by a public concern to preserve the integrity of the church in Spain, pressured the pope to reform the regular orders in his kingdom, among them the Augustinians, Benedictines, Cistercians, Dominicans, Carmelites, and the Premonstratensian Canons. The pope approved most of the king’s reforms, but due to certain unclear clauses in the Canons’ particular rule—through which the pope could still assert some authority—the Roman Pontiff only reformed certain customs and observances, while leaving other matters, such as their habit, untouched.315

In 1620, the Catalan brothers had decided to change their habit to reflect reforming changes occurring in war-torn Germany and Flanders. They faced unexpected opposition for this proposal, however, from the Pope, who refused to authorize it.316 After spending over a decade fighting with Rome, the Premonstratensian Canons turned to Philip IV in 1636 and asked him to use his influence to protest the Pontiff’s decision. The fundamental proposition of the Canons’ argument, however, was that neither king nor pope had the authority to determine such matters directly relating to the internal workings of a religious order. Rather, the Congregation itself was the only body with the

315 BC: FB 5303: Manifesto de la Justificacion que la Religion Premonstratense de España ha procedido en la reforma del habito Monastico que usava en el Canonico Regular de su institucion (1636), f. 68.
316 Ibid, f. 72.
legitimate power to decide these issues. While truly a minor incident in the king’s daily agenda, the attitude of this small body of Catalan monks reflected a growing sentiment among the entire regional clergy: one that feared the encroachment of royal power upon what ought to be autonomous institutions. What may have started out as annual requests for extraordinary taxes was slowly turning into a sort of Spanish Caesaropapism.

Ecclesiastical relations between the Castilian center and the Catalan periphery during the 1630s were, for the most part, extremely poor, due in large measure to Philip IV’s incessant desire to tap into the wealth of Catalonia’s religious communities as well as to the intransigence of Catalan clergy to cede any of their traditional privileges in order to subsidize various innovative royal policies. Yet, despite the series of disputes that affected the church in Catalonia during this decade, the body of Christ in this region seemed just as divided as before. Even more significantly, the numerous differences between the Church and the Crown did not lead to any noticeable outcry for rebellion, nor to any open anti-Felipista sentiment by the beginning of 1640. Although the conflict over the décima was bitterly resisted and led to a protracted four-year quarrel, it did not garner the sympathy of more than a handful of cathedral chapters at any one time. Even worse, the clerical antipathy to the décima alienated the very townspeople they served, further fracturing resistance, especially in the town of Vic. Royal assaults on the fiscal or governing privileges of religious houses like the Benedictines or the Premonstratensian Canons proved incapable of stirring up the entire Catalan Church by its very particular assaults on one order at a time.

317 Ibid, f. 90. See also their lengthy correspondence with both Rome and Madrid in BC: FB 5304; 5306; 5307; 5309; and 5310.
While monetary issues proved incapable to rouse the Catalan Church to a unified and prolonged resistance against Philip IV and Olivares, it is also significant that the defense of the Catalan language in sermons, though capable of uniting nearly all the clergy in this cause, clearly lacked any staying power and so became of little significance beyond the Provincial Council of 1637. Clearly, as far as the Principality’s churches and religious houses were concerned, finances, privileges, and the Catalan language were of paramount importance, but such causes failed to generate any sense of lasting unity upon a people and a church that enjoyed a long tradition of factionalism and division. Forced financial contributions might provide a strong impetus for resistance, but lacked the ability to create any unity; the cause of language provided a unity but not the force.

Something greater was needed if the Catalan church would be able to stand on its own—to say nothing of its ability to stand with other elements of Catalan society—against royal policies that encroached on their freedoms and way of life. Religion would be that factor. Ironically, however, the powerful ability of religion to stir the Catalans to great efforts was first seen in support of Philip IV, during the campaign to recover the frontier fortress of Salses in 1639.

**Epilogue: Clerical response to the French invasion, 1639**

Although war had been declared between Spain and France in 1635, most of Catalonia at first largely escaped any devastating effects so typical of European warfare during the early seventeenth century. Despite their location as a frontier province, and home to three of the five passes across the Pyrenees into Spain, Catalonia was slow to recognize the potential danger of invasion, and even slower to contribute to the campaigns in Navarre during 1637 and 1638. In the summer 1639, however, after some
minor offensives on the western end of the Pyrenees—and most likely, having depleted the foodstuffs of that area—the French decided to shift campaign areas and invaded the fresh and fruitful lands of Roussillon. From pamphlets, letters, and proclamations, it seems evident that most of the Catalan clerics, if not all of them, were solidly behind Spanish attempts to defend Catalonia, despite their recent antagonism against the crown.

Perhaps the chief reason for the particular bitterness with which Catalan clergy assailed their northern enemies was the popular perception that France was a land that not only allied with heretics, but provided them with a safe home as well. Such an attitude was common even among Catholics in France. They were uneasy with Cardinal Richelieu’s international policy that made them allies—or more appropriately—creditors to the Lutheran Swedes and their king, Gustavus Adolphus. The declaration of war against Spain further alienated several Catholics who began publishing biting works against the King’s minister. One of the more notable critiques that received a good audience in Spain—where anti-French pamphlets were flourishing—was written by Cornelius Jansenius, entitled Le Mars François.\footnote{See BC: FB 2180: Cornelio Jansenio, \textit{Le Mars François ou La Guerre de France} (1637) also the translation into Castilian, FB 33.} Most of these works harped continuously on the sinfulness of France’s alliance with heretics, while a few, generally those written in Spain, delivered lengthy panegyrics on the devout and pious policies of the Hapsburg dynasty.\footnote{Such titles include: Gonzalo Céspedes y Meneses, \textit{Francia engañada Francia respondida} (BC: FB 26); Francisco de Quevedo Villegas, \textit{Carta al poderoso Luis XIII...en razon de las nefandas acciones, y sacrilegios execrables que cometio} (FB: 31); and \textit{Defensa de España contra las calumnies de Francia} (published in Venice; FB 32).}

Such propaganda only increased as the war between the two great powers became more intense and martial outrages began to be inflicted upon rural communities. In a
short work with a long title, Pare Ambrosio Bautista, an abbot of the Premonstratensian Canons, covered the highlights of recent French military history, placing it the context of the fight between Orthodoxy and Heresy. Though Denmark, the Palatinate, Transylvania, and even Sweden had marched against the Habsburg family—that pillar of the Church—and failed, the deadly viper of heresy was not content to lie low. This time, the Hydra was rising again, aided by a king and minister who claimed devotion to the True Faith. Filled with scorn, Bautista refuted the French claim to orthodoxy:

If it is true that he who helps the Heretic against the Catholic, is truly Catholic, you are close to considering the Heretic to be a Catholic. You are close to denying openly the truth, the Religion, and the Faith. If the Church deserts her children, what will the enemies of the Church do? Therefore, the afflicted Catholic, though he does not want to follow Calvin, might continue because of fear, popularity, or Vice … What Catholic Prince places Luther and Calvin in such high estimation?

Surely the French claims to the purity of their lily was a sham; though both Habsburg and Bourbon might assert they and not the other was the true Defender of the Faith, it was clear to Father Bautista, as it was to many a cleric in Spain, that France’s impious actions spoke louder than her devout declamations.

Regardless of whether a great many Catalans had read these defamatory articles, or formed their opinion of the French based on the immigrants in their communities, the invasion of Roussillon shocked the entire region. Clergy from all over Catalonia began

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320 BC: FB 8961: Pare Ambrosio Bautista, *Discurso Breve de las Miseries de la Vida, Y Calamidades de la Religion Catolica, en declaracion de los malos intentos de algunos ministros de Francia que han procurado las omisiones y desacatos han usado sus soldados, y confederados contra las lugares Sagrados y sus Ministros.* (Barcelona, n.d.).

321 “De la desesperacion…vuelve a nacer la violencia, y el poder, las gotas de la Hydra son cabezas venenosas. La embidia de los Catolicos ayudo otra vez a levantar los Hereges y vieronse en un instante volverse a quemar los Templos. Desentrañaronse entonces los tres veces Christianos, por los mil vezes hereges, boliendo a su primer riesgo la Romana Religion.” Ibid, f. 5.

322 “Si el que ayuda al Herege contra el Catolico, es verdadero Catolico; cerca esta de ser tenido por Catolico el Herege. Cerca esta de ser negada abiertamente la verdad, la Religion, y la Fe. Si a la Iglesia desamparan sus hijos, que han de hazer sus enemigos? Así, el aflagido Catolico, que no quiere seguir a Calvino de vicio, le aura de seguir de miedo…Que Principe Catolico pone en tan alta estimacion a Lutero, y a Calvino?” Ibid, ff. 5-5v.
participating in the desperate fight to save their land within days of the French offensive. Perhaps the best example of this defense comes in the open letter of Bishop Parcero to his flock in the diocese of Girona. Dated 11 June 1639, the bishop’s letter lamented the recent French invasion, together with the sieges of Opol and Salses. Through the bishop, the viceroy, Santa Coloma, asked for all citizens to take up arms and come to the aid of “the Principat and the Comtats.” Furthermore, Bishops Parcero—continuing to speak for the viceroy—also requested that the priests lead prayers to God:

We adjure you to call upon God Our Lord as a remedy for all this, because he helps us in so distressing an occasion, and Illumines and gives victory to the arms of His Majesty, and that in the Churches of the said city and our diocese of Girona they [the clergy] will make prayers, orations, [and] processions, and they will say many masses. [I]n order to fulfill our pastoral office we have been ordered this…

On the first Sunday or feast day following this pronouncement, the priests were to assemble the people together and read this letter in their churches. That same day, and the next two Sundays following were to be celebrated with a “a solemn procession through the customary places of your parishes carrying on the first day the Most Holy Sacrament clearly with the assistances of the clergy from those areas … and of all the people, speaking and singing prayers [and] petitions.”

Parcero proceeded to define what the clergy’s role in defense ought to be: fundamentally, they ought be leaders at church, “interceding there effectively to God Our Lord with their orations that they might serve to Confound and Punish the enemies and to

324 “procurem se acude al remey de tot a Deu Nostre Senyor per que nos ajude en esta ocassio tant apretada,y Illumine y done victoria a las armas de sa Magt, y que en las Iglesias de dita ciutat y Bisbat nostre de Gerona se fassen pregaries oraciones profesions, y se digan molts missas Perço per cumplir a nostre pastoral ofici havem manat fer,” Ibid, f.69.
325 “una professo solemne per los llochs acostumats de vostres parrochies aportantlo primer die lo Santissim Sacrament patent ab acistentia del clero en les parts … y de tot lo poble dient y cantant las orations, [y] pregarias.” Ibid, f. 69-69v.
assist the arms of His Majesty giving them victory for the conservation of the Holy Catholic Faith of this Principat and Comtats and of his realms.”

Finally, on account of the rumors running rampant that the French were intending to sail down the Catalan coast and land a large body of troops for a surprise attack, Parcero advised and encouraged all parish priests who ministered along the coast to be on the look-out for enemy ships, and to prepare secret caches where the treasures of their particular church might be hid in case of an assault, and furthermore be ready with the Holy Sacrament to organize processions if need arise.

Later in the year, on 2 October, Parcero wrote to the “Rectors sacristans domers y altres curats del Bisbat de Girona,” telling them of a letter he received indicating that a large part of the king’s army was in hospital in Perpignan. In response to the urgent needs of the army, Parcero encouraged all the inhabitants of the city and the diocese “with all promptness to send to them in said hospital: and as becomes all Christians we have an obligation to assist with these necessities and to procure all consolation for these our brothers that suffer for our defense.” In significant imagery, Parcero countered the secular necessities of Olivares’s “razón del estado,” with his own Christian necessity, the necessity of charity. In conclusion, he reminded the priests under his watch of the urgent

326 “pregant alli effectuosament a Deu Nostre Senyor ab llurs orations sia servit de Confondre y Castigar los enemichs y assistir a les armes de sa Magt donant li victoria per conservation de la Isglesia Santa Fé Catholica de aquest principat y comptats y de sos regnes.” Ibid, f. 70.

327 “Advertim y encarregam a vosaltres los rectors circumventions de la marina que estigan molts vigilants y en veure desembarcar lo enemich en alguna part hont y haje peril procureu ab molt gran cuydado de recullir la plata y ornaments de las Isglesias aportant ho en lloch tuto y segut…” Ibid, f. 69v.

need “necessitat” to continue their prayers and petitions for the defense of the province, as well as to display the Holy Sacrament for continual devotion.\textsuperscript{329}

Girona was not alone in its prayers and works of mercy in aid of the province. In a letter sent to the chapter of Tarragona dated 17 June 1639, the viceroy, then in Figueres, asked for prayers from the clerics not only for success in battle, but also that the victory might lead to, “the exaltation of the Holy Catholic Faith and to reach the point of attaining the universal peace of all Christendom.”\textsuperscript{330} Soon after receiving this letter, the chapter notified Tortosa, so that by the end of June prayers were being said for defeat of the French in all the Catalan dioceses. Meanwhile, in the following month, the chapter of Tarragona paid for a levy of 1,000 men to march to the aid of Perpignan.\textsuperscript{331}

Along with Tarragona, the dioceses of Vic and Urgell, though among the poorer lands of Catalonia, would contribute to the effort. News of French invasion reached Vic on 13 June. Within four days, a levy of one hundred men, armed with pikes, muskets, and arquebuses had been assembled.\textsuperscript{332} After three days of religious services—including a mass of the Rosary, a mass for the dead, and a special mass of St. Bernard—a Te Deum, and the distribution of the Sacrament—the company left for Figueres, arriving on Corpus Christi. On Monday 20 June, the archdeacon Melchior Palau—the same man who had led the resistance against the décima but five years earlier—met with the city clergy to discuss what they could do to help the war effort, ultimately deciding to raise a company

\textsuperscript{329} “Y per major la necessitat vos encarregam que continueu las pregarias missas y orations que ab altres nostres lletres tenim ordenat, y que tots los dies de Diumenges y festes de precepte del pnt mes tingau en vostras yglesias lo Sm Sacrament patent,” Ibid, f. 96.
\textsuperscript{330} “la exaltació de la Santa Fe Catholica y per arribar a alcanssar la pau universal de tota la cristiandat.” ACT-C-39, cited in Jordà i Fernández, Església i Poder, p. 33
\textsuperscript{331} Jordà i Fernández, Església i Poder, 33.
\textsuperscript{332} Diego Sanz, Succesos de Vic, ff. 35v-36.
of their own, which the archdeacon led in person to the front. Quite contrary to their attitude regarding the décima, the secular clergy of Vic pledged 3000 lliures out of their rents. Diego Sanz noted in his memoirs the speed with which the clergy acted in this regard, as within a day of their approving the resources, a company of 150 soldiers was created. The archdeacon Melchior Palau, with several relations and four other priests serving as chaplains, soon left for the front.

The strength of clerical opinion concerning the defeat of the French even extended to the capture of clerics as suspected spies. The most notable case occurred in Girona during August 1639. The case concerned one Fra Jaume de Santa Anna, a member of the August Order of the Holy Trinitarians for the Redemption of Captives. It appears that many suspected his sudden tour around the province to be suspicious, and accusations flew that he was in the pay of the king of France to spy out the Catalan defenses. The case was brought before the vicar-general of Girona, Francesc Pejoan, who determined that the friar was guilty as charged and sentenced him to two months incarceration in the city jail.

As religious groups in the southern Principat prayed and contributed to the war effort far from the front lines, a similar activity was present in the occupied Comtat of Roussillon. From the beginning of the invasion in June 1639, clerics showed their desire to defend their patria. Vicente de San Raymundo, himself a citizen of Perpignan, noted that upon the first news of invasion, the city councilors began making preparations for the

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333 “dient-los entenia fer lleva de una companyia de soldats, pus en semblant defensa se feya la causa de tots, seculars y eclesiàstichs.” Ibid, f. 37v. Two brothers of Melchior Palau would accompany him to Salses, where they would lose their lives from disease.

334 “Y als 21 començà a fer la lleva de soldats lo estat eclesiàstich ab tal calor y brevedad que prest tingué cent sinquanta soldats. Lo senyor ardiacha se posà ab sotà curta y espasa, ab quatre capellans axí matex en son costat que li assistian.” Ibid, f. 37v.

local defense. Along with some Castilian, Mallorcan, and Portuguese soldiers who were stationed there, the city’s defenders also included members of the clerical estate: “they [the city fathers] put vigilant guards along the walls, in whose ranks also entered the Secular and Regular Clergy, who immediately reported to their posts fully armed, whenever the alarm was sounded.”336

While the first assault on Perpignan was beaten off with the aid of clerical fighters, other Catalan cities, and even the universities at Barcelona and Lleida, began to contribute as well.337 Special recognition, however, was given to the clerics from all over Catalonia, who not only saw fit to encourage their parishioners in their sermons, but actively raised soldiers for the relief of Salses and the recovery of Roussillon. Vicente de San Raymundo observed: “The Ecclesiastical Prelates that have temporal jurisdiction, such as the Bishops, Abbots, Priors, and Chapters, also raised their levies of men, the clergy aiding their diocese in all things, [and] who, in due course, sent the major portion of the army that was being formed in Perpignan.”338

As the orthodox clergy gave faithfully of their resources to the defense of orthodox territory, so too the author notes that the numerous heretics in the ranks of the

336 “pusieron vigilantes guardas por los muros, en la qual entravan tambien los Clerigos y Religiosos, que con puntualidad armadas acudian a sus puestos, quando se tocava alarma.” AHCB: B.1640-8-(op)-5: Vicente de San Raymundo, Sucessos por dias de la Guerra de Rossellon (Barcelona: Jaume Mathevat, 1640), ff. 6v-7. Emphasis mine. It is unfortunate that one cannot discover when in 1640 this particular history was published, whether before the rebellion or not. But the positive portrayal of the Spanish and the extreme bitterness with which the French are painted—particularly with the brush of heresy—suggests an earlier publication. See also BC: FB 6130: Memorial de la Invasion Francesa por Rossellon el Anyo 1639 por el mes de Junio, ff. 90-91.
337 “Prosiguieron las demas Universidades ha hazer levas de gente suya, las quales acudieron con tal diligencia armadas, pagodas, y municionadas,” Vicente de San Raymundo, Sucessos por dias de la Guerra de Rossellon, f. 8. The aid of these “universitats” is particularly important in light of their unwillingness to contribute neither to the Salses campaign of 1640 nor to the Catalan uprising later that year.
338 “Los Prelados Eclesiasticos que tienen jurisdiciciones temporales, como son los Obispos, Abades, Priores, y Cabildos, hizieron tambien sus levas de gente, ayudando en todas la Clerecia de sus Diocesis, las quales a su tiempo embieron al gruesso del exercito se formava en Perpiñan.” Ibid, 8v.
French army began wreaking havoc upon the Catalan churches. On 4 July, a band of French soldiers, after burning some houses around Salses, entered the sacred places of worship, and proceeded to raid the sacristy, destroyed the altar, and images of saints, and threw a statue of the Crucified Christ and an image of the Virgin out the window. When the news reached Perpignan, the citizens were filled with horror of the atrocity and feared what such a large army might continue to do in their “Catholic lands.”339

This particular work of sacrilege would have very important effects on the Catalan population. In the first place, such desecration further emphasized the lines that separated the Catalans as “good” Catholics from the French, who, while claiming to be Christians, conducted themselves in a manner befitting Protestant heretics. While the French offenses stopped short of the ultimate sacrilege—the destruction of the elements of the Mass, which was a specifically Protestant activity—the utter disregard for sacred objects earned the contempt of Catalans throughout the Principality who now began to link the secular defense of the patria with the sacred defense of the Faith. Significantly, the union of these two powerful ideas in the minds of the Catalan population would endure beyond this particular campaign, with tremendous ramifications for subsequent Castilian policies.

339 “A 4 de Julio llegó aviso, como algunos soldados herejes del campo Frances, despues de aver saqueado, y devastado los lugares ocupados, profanavan sus Templos, trocando lo sagrado dellos en cavallerizas, quemavan los Sacrarios y Altareas, ultrajavan las Santas Imagenes, tirandoles arcabuçaços en particular en Clayran colgaron dende una ventana a un Christo Crucificado, y a una Imagen de su santissima Madre, y subiendolas, y baxandolas, hazian sacrileges mosas, y escarnios a sus divinas Magestades. Estremeciose Perpiñan con estas nuevas, avisó las penas afligian a nuestra gente Catalana, viendo a vista de su numeroso exercito, en sus Catolicas tierras, cometer el enemigo tales sacrilegos a su salvo y sin ser ofendido.” Ibid, f. 10. This detailed account incurs the just sanction of righteous indignation, but one item significantly not burned, or at least not mentioned as being burned or otherwise defiled was the Eucharist bread, which, as we will see later, was quite important.
By the beginning of July, reinforcements in the form of a Neapolitan tercio arrived to bolster the defence. Despite the benefit that these new soldiers brought to the city’s defense, there still existed great tensions between the Catalans and the “foreigners” as the author of the campaign records:

On the 29th of July there occurred a great encounter between the soldiers of the Catalan and Castilian nations, who, moved by fate, began to fight, … which threatened great ruin, the diligence and shouts of the Commanders and Captains being unable to check their fury. The Lord Bishop brought out the Most Holy Sacrament in their midst, accompanied by many members of religious orders, [and] the faithful Catalans (in an act that greatly pleased the Prelate) threw down their arms, and knelt to the earth giving thanks to our Lord.340

The use of the Sacrament to get soldiers to stop fighting was common in Catholic lands, where great numbers held a special veneration for the Consecrated Host. Beyond the elimination of immediate violence between the people of Perpignan and their defenders, the Sacrament also seemed to focus the fervor of the Catalan soldiers on what was truly important. A few days after their squabble with the Castilians, Catalan soldiers marching out to meet their foe were heard crying, “Viva España, mueran Gavatxos.”341

The regional clergy played other important roles during the campaign to relieve Salses in addition to serving as peacemakers and administering the Sacrament to its defenders. In particular, the Capuchin order received high praise from Vicente de San Raymundo. The brown-hooded friars served as chaplains in the Catalan regiments as chaplains, and appeared to stay close to the men, resulting in some of them being

340 “A 29 de Julio sucedió un encuentro grande entre soldados de las naciones Catalana y Castellana, los quales de tal suerte se empeñaron … que amenazaba grande ruina, sin poder detener su furia la diligencia y gritos de los Cabos y Capitanes. Trajo el Santíssimo Sacramento a su presencia el señor Obispo acompañado de muchos Religiosos, los Catalanes obedientes (de que se edificó mucho el Prelado) rindiendo luego sus armas, se echaron por tierra venerando a N. Dios,” Ibid, 12. Emphasis mine.
341 “Long live Spain, death to the gavatx,” Ibid, 16. The Catalan term “gavatx,” an epithet of considerable venom but unknown etymology was, and has been, primarily reserved for the French.
captured during surprise sorties by the French around Salses.\textsuperscript{342} The author concluded his work with the recapture of Salses on the day of Epiphany—which happened also to be the day of Sant Ramon de Penyafort, a great Catalan saint, who along with Saint Dominic prevented the Albigensian heresy from spreading from France into Catalonia—observing that such a fortuitous result confirmed that God and the saints were aiding the forces of Catalonia and Spain.\textsuperscript{343}

It is very interesting to see that, despite the reluctance and even downright refusal by the ecclesiastical estate in Catalonia to contribute to the royal coffers during the 1630s, when their\textit{ patria} was threatened the clerics rose to the occasion. Everywhere, the clerical response was clearly in favor of Spain, even on the part of such chapters as Barcelona, Vic, and Urgell, which would take a leading role to rebel against the Crown just a few months later. The extent of the support given to the campaign of 1639 was great: priests and monks alike gave of their finances, their time, and even their lives to lead and encourage their fellow countrymen to bold endeavors. In light of this response, one must ask the question, what could prompt such a drastic reversal of attitudes in such a short span of time? Was the Catalan effort to recover Salses merely a gesture, an attempt to secure the integrity of the\textit{ patria} at the expense of several hundred lives? Or did something else arise within Catalonia, an event so drastic and far-reaching in its consequences as to sever the bonds of loyalty that had previously held this unique province in communion with Castile? What, in particular, could have inspired a great number of the regional clergy, so diligent in pointing out the heretical nature of the

\textsuperscript{342} Ibid, ff. 16v; 18v.

\textsuperscript{343} “Rendiose la fortaleza conforme lo capitulado a 6 de Enero deste presente año día de los Reyes, y propio del gran Catalan san Raymundo (para que vea la Francia que a España al valor de los naturals de la tierra le acompañan los valimientos de los del Cielo).” Ibid, f. 20.
French and the orthodox spirituality of their own armies, to suddenly change their perception of the king’s army and the lord who led them?

**Conclusion: the revolution that never was**

The disappointing results of the Corts of 1632 created a deep estrangement between the king and most of the leading elements of Catalan society. Even the beginning of war with Catalonia’s traditional enemy France in 1635 would not heal the serious rift between the parties. Although the king would not return to Catalonia for twelve years, he would continue to sponsor fiscal measures outside the proceedings of the Corts that greatly upset Catalan society. With the Corts prorogued indefinitely, the sole remaining source of revenue for the king was the Church. For the next eight years following the disaster of 1632, Philip IV would attempt several measures to bring the church to donate from their largess to the royal coffers. In the first attempt, he would seek to resuscitate some old papal privileges; later he would try to reap financial aid through clerical division. While partially successful in both cases, Philip IV also created a long “winter of discontent” among several clergy. These extra-legal royal intrusions into church finances and church administration alienated several cathedral chapters—guardians of church traditions—as well as members of regular orders like the Franciscans, Capuchins, and Augustinians. The creation of this antipathetic clergy would prove the king’s undoing in the disturbances of 1640, when the “glorious summer” would unite the royal cause with uncensored sacrilege and cast a large number of clergy into rebellion.

Given the intense pressure placed upon the nobility and townspeople by the ill-managed Corts of 1632, and given the extreme emotions with which the clergy resisted
innovative taxes and an attempt to direct church policy through the Provincial Council, one might ask why such groups did not combine more strongly in their resistance to the Crown? Why did a general uprising, which seemed to come from insignificant sources in the spring of 1640, not occur with more obvious causes of discontent four years earlier? The question is a sound one. Its answer lies in the fact that while each of the major social groups—nobility, clergy, and rural peasantry—suffered under the rule of an increasingly demanding Castile, their objections to royal policy were not sufficiently related to create a common cause. Their objections were too scattered, their resistance too fragmented. The older rivalries between city government and church privileges still rankled among many in power.

Ironically, the Catalan love of traditional privileges and constitutions contributed to the fragmentation of their society. By cherishing their traditional tax and import exemptions, the Catalan clergy in Barcelona and Tarragona isolated themselves from the city fathers during a time of significant fiscal and political tension. By relishing their local control too much, the chapters of Vic and Urgell likewise isolated large numbers of their fellow citizens, resulting in both cases to the temporary closure of the cathedral. The unwillingness of either group—civil or ecclesiastical—to sacrifice their rights for common peace, or in the interests of a greater defiance of the crown, left both parties open to the innovative tax policies and defense schemes emanating from Madrid. For the province to come together again, it would take a sudden and shocking blow that threatened to affect not just one or two privileged social groups, but the entire Catalan population.
In 1639, the religious hatred that Catalans had towards France—a kingdom tainted with the tolerance of heretical Huguenots—was able to overcome their frustrations with Madrid, shocked as they were by the accounts of desecration and sacrilege against their churches by elements of the French army. In 1640, however, a similar shock would come from within the Principality, at the hands of the very soldiers called upon to defend the province. This time, however, the Neapolitans would “rush in where Frenchmen feared to tread,” committing an even more heinous sacrilege than any the French had done, for they burned, not only churches, but the sacramental elements of the Mass as well: the sanctified body and blood of Jesus Christ. Only such a powerful assault on the Catalan identity would be able to effect a significant unity among such a divided people. In the reconciliation that would follow, Catalan churchman and councilman alike would overlook many of their past differences—forgetting them long enough to make history by becoming one of the first Catholic rebels against a Catholic monarch in the modern history of Europe.344

Fissures existed between Catalonia and Castile long before the 1630s; while they were serious, they were also common everywhere, affecting every social estate. While

344 The first of these Catholic-on-Catholic revolts was the formation of the Catholic Ligue against Henry III of France during the late 16th century—and the king’s murder by a Catholic priest. Two earlier examples of Catholic rebellion against a Catholic monarch occurred in portions of the Holy Roman Empire during the Middle Ages, one protesting the usurpation of clerical power by the secular authority, the other condemning “false” Church practices endorsed by the Emperor. The first of these rebellions came as a result of the investiture controversy in the late eleventh century, when elements within the Empire (aided by Pope Gregory VII) opposed the Imperial prerogative to appoint persons to clerical offices. In the early fifteenth century, the Empire was again shaken by an extended rebellion led by the Hussites, Bohemian followers of the Czech theologian, Jan Hus, whose teachings concerning the priesthood of believers and the right to receive both bread and wine at Communion were condemned at the Council of Constance in 1415. By 1433, a reconciliation had taken place between the two sides, and the Hussites were given the freedom to practice taking Communion with bread and wine.

Unlike either of these rebellions, the Catalan revolt took issue against a king who claimed to adhere to the Catholic faith, while behaving in a manner that seemed to belie such claims, viz., supporting troops who committed the most horrible sacrileges imaginable, not once, but repeatedly.
the intensity of these center-periphery quarrels may have increased under Olivares, and may have become more acute in the face of Castile’s numerous military and political commitments, the Catalan people still proved eager to fight for Castile, rather than against her when the time arose. These old disputes over finances, or privileges, or language are necessary for understanding the context of the Catalan revolt, but proved insufficient to create the revolt of 1640. More important than their litmus test for a good ruler, the Catalans had a basic litmus test for discovering true believers by 1640.

The extended conflict between Catalonia and the French had produced an “us vs. them” mentality, in which devotion to the Catholic faith became the critical issue that divided the two camps: orthodoxy and heresy; sanctity and sacrilege. The popular focus on respecting or desecrating churches became utterly inseparable from the defense of their respective patria; the fight to preserve the Catholic faith against heretics or infidels proved capable of rallying previously divided Catalan communities to a single cause. As soon as the tercios of Philip IV started behaving like the French, however, the Catalans turned on them, bringing the same volatile issue of religion to bear on their relations with Castile, and fighting with the same determination—and even greater sacrifice—that had inspired their actions of 1639.
CHAPTER 3
From Segadors to Secessió (January-September 1640)

"You write to me fearful news, touching the revolt of the Catalan from Castile, of the tragical murdering of the Viceroy, and the burning of his house: Those Mountaineers are mad Lads. I fear the sparkles of this fire will fly further, either to Portugal, or to Sicily and Italy; all which Countries, I observ'd, the Spaniard holds, as one would do a Wolf by the ear, fearing they should run away ever and anon from him."

James Howell

"But as the first foundation and motive of the wars of Catalonia was the offended Sacramental God, which served to bolster His People, the Catalans, He sought with His mighty hand to temper them as steel to conquer their enemies although they were unequally matched."

Gaspar Sala

The Kindling of the Flames

Catalan society had united to defend itself against a common enemy in 1639, and with the aid of the king’s tercios, had succeeded in limiting the French invasion to northern Roussillon. It was unfortunate, then, that during the first large-scale effort at cooperation between the province and the rest of the Spanish monarchy, the first tremors of violent division would be felt. As the siege of Salses progressed into the early days of January, members of the Neapolitan tercio under Leonardo de Moles got into a scuffle with the Catalan regiment under the Count of Santa Coloma. Although both commanders became personally involved in the fray, the military in-fighting was

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346 "Pero como el primer fundamento, y motivo de las guerras de Cataluña era Dios Sacramentado ofendido, para alentar los suyos, quiso con mano poderosa ensayarlos a vencer con desigual poder a los enemigos.” B.1641-8-(op)-80: Gaspar Sala Epitome de los Principios, Y Progressos de las Guerras de Cataluña en los años 1640 y 1641. Dedicated to Diputació and Consell de Cent (Barcelona: P. Lacavalleria, 1641), f. 11v.
contained before developing into any serious outbreak of violence. Nevertheless, word of the conflict spread throughout the Catalan countryside as the soldiers headed to their homes for the winter. This antipathy was increased the following month, when a band of Neapolitan soldiers, looking for food and plunder, broke into the country home of a nobleman, Antoni de Fluvia at Palautoredera, in the diocese of Barcelona, killing the elderly man in his chapel.

The death of Fluvia, a wealthy man respected in his community, noted for his piety and his friendly aid to the Capuchin order, caused a small uproar among the notables in Barcelona.

Bishop Manrique undertook an investigation of the affair, and within a few days issued an excommunication against those royal troops responsible for profaning the private chapel with murder. It would not be the last ecclesiastical rebuke against such excesses in Catalonia that year. Furthermore, the affair resulted in the calling of a special 18-member Junta de Braços: this consulting body, made up of six representatives from each estate, was traditionally called during moments of crisis to advise the Generalitat. In last days of February, the committee decided to send a special ambassador to Madrid to state the excesses before the king and ask for redress of their grievances.

Despite these efforts, the violence in the countryside continued, although still on a small scale. In the face of mounting troubles, including a high rate of desertion along the Roussillon front, the Marquis de los Balbases ordered a grand re-stationing of the royal...
troops. In order to lessen the potential desertions during the seasonal lull, the foreign tercios—Neapolitans, Walloons, and even an Irish regiment—were to be quartered in northern Catalonia and Roussillon; the Spanish tercios, on the other hand, were to be stationed in the dioceses of Lleida and Tarragona, closer to the borders of Aragon and Valencia. Balbases’s plan involved great risks, not least of which was the movement of a large body of soldiers across a territory that was growing more hostile by the day. The success of the scheme was further jeopardized due to the fact that there were very few serviceable roads through rural Catalonia in the mid-seventeenth century. The small number of viable routes to Roussillon meant that the same Catalan villages would be forced to bear the burden of supporting the royal troops twice, the one tercio moving north towards the front, and the other marching south. Even should Balbases’s design succeed without incident, Catalan villagers and royal infantry alike had to face the bleak prospect of meeting once more when full campaigning started in earnest.\textsuperscript{351} The situation was ripe for problems.

One of the most intriguing questions surrounding the Catalan revolt is how quickly passions in the Principat and Comtats changed against Castile in 1640. Representatives from every element of Catalan society had participated through prayer, finances, and force of arms in the victory at Salses in January of that year. Nevertheless, a growing number of Catalans would become disenchanted with their king and his ministers. Less than twelve months after the successful recovery of Salses, the Generalitat would find itself defending its cities once again: not just Perpignan, but Barcelona, Lleida, and Tarragona. This time, however, the Castilian royalist army would

\textsuperscript{351} It should also be mentioned that the same towns undoubtedly had to feed and house the troops stationed in the south of Catalonia in late January already as they moved into winter quarters.
be at their gates, while they looked for help to their bitter enemies, the French. Remarkably, even a sizeable section of Catalan clerics would attach themselves to the malcontent faction, offering their money, men, munitions, and prayers to the rebels. What could have caused such a reaction? What could have thrown the Catalans into the hands of one of their long-standing enemies, one they had despised and cursed only a year ago? Surely only an event or a series of events of a dramatic nature could have brought about this remarkable transformation.

One answer to this puzzling riddle of the Catalans as a group has been put forward by Antoni Simon i Tarrés, a noted social historian of seventeenth-century Catalonia. He has written several works on the origins of the Catalan revolt of 1640 in which he argues that the demands of quartering a royal army for an entire winter, particularly after the drain placed on Catalan farming and manpower during the Salses campaign the year before, proved to be the decisive spark that touched off first rebellion and then war. The rural communities of Catalonia, struggling to survive after poor harvest and supporting a large army, were able to put up with a great amount of hardship. But the repeated offenses committed by the soldiers of Castile and Naples proved too much for even the Catalans’ hardy spirit. The revolt of 1640, according to Simon i Tarrés, was fundamentally a social upheaval, a collective refusal to allow these abuses to continue any longer. The inhabitants of rural Catalonia met military cruelty with a violence of their own: ambushing parties on their way to the front, and even going to the larger towns of Vic, Girona, and Barcelona, to continue their protest against the harsh policies of Castile together with any Catalan who chose to side with the government.
There is some evidence, however, to suggest that, while Tarrés is right in placing a great deal of importance on the lodging of troops, this in itself was insufficient grounds for inspiring the dramatic springtime revolt of 1640. In the first place, royal soldiers had been stationed in Catalonia for nearly two decades prior to 1640.\footnote{Antonio Pladevall i Font, and Antoni Simon i Tarrés, \textit{Guerra i Vida Pagesa a La Catalunya del Segle XVII segons el “Diari” de Joan Guàrdia, pagés de l’Esquirol, i altres testimonies d’Osona} (Barcelona, 1986), 59.} While the number of “foreign soldiers” may not have been as great as in 1640, the Catalans appear to have been able adequately to support them—there are no reports of soldiers starving and the first accounts of martial abuse seem to be motivated out of human greed and envy rather than want. Even the weather seemed to improve in the year before the revolt. Having been the victim of poor harvest conditions in the earlier half of the decade, the farmer Joan Guàrdia, living near Vic, sought fit to mention the good weather that occurred throughout 1639 and to rejoice in the good harvest.\footnote{That foreign soldiers had been stationed on Catalan soil for some years before the revolt is made clear in the justification pamphlets written during the beginning of the war; a fact that was not disputed even by pamphleteers on the king’s side.}

In the second place, military abuses had occurred in prior years as well. This is also true when one considers the harsh—and altogether disrespectful—attitude taken by several of the king’s soldiers while stationed in Catalonia. Though many of these soldiers professed a nominal adherence to the Catholic faith and were enlisted in service to His Most Catholic Majesty, there were more than a few incidents that demonstrated their disregard for the sanctity of religious buildings and which provoked the people to protest. In late 1637, the Diputat Eclesiàstic, Fra Miquel d’Alentorn i de Salbà, decried these abuses in a letter he wrote on behalf of the Braços, the Chapter of Barcelona, and the city of Perpignan to the king and the viceroy. Not only was the letter a vehement
protest against the stationing of soldiers against the Constitution, but it also listed a number of outrages committed by the king’s army on rural Catalans. Among the chief offenders who engaged in this violence was one Leonardo de Moles, billeted with his men in the village of Villafranca de Penedes, in the diocese of Tarragona. Several reports had come before the Diputació about the offences committed by his tercio: his troops had burned a few houses, extorted money from their hosts, and even killed a few people when they left for the front. Still, despite the disturbance caused by de Moles, the abbot closes the letter by wishing the king well, continuing to hold both him and the Catholic faith for which he was fighting in his prayers.

The awareness of the damages wrought by the king’s army on Catalonia extended even to areas that were immune from the immediate effects of quartering. The diocese of Lleida, for instance, though remarkably free of the burden to lodge royal tercios, was nevertheless quite sympathetic to the plight of their fellow countrymen. On 18 June 1639, the Sanctuary of Mare de Déu de les Sogues in the hamlet of Bellvís suddenly began to toll without human hands. The friars of the sanctuary immediately saw this as “a divine protest against the excesses that the soldiers encamped in our [land] have committed.” Similar interpretations were given to visions that other friars in the diocese had in the weeks and months to come.

It appears then, that while the quartering of foreign troops on Catalan soil was a deeply-felt grievance, it in itself was not enough to provoke a serious armed resistance

354 BC: FB 35: Letter from Diputat d’Alentorn i de Salbà, Abbot of Amer i Roses, to the King and Viceroy, 4 December 1637, f. 1.
355 Ibid, f. 2v.
356 “una protesta divina contra els excèsos que cometien els soldats acampats en aquelles rodalies.” Josep Llandonosa, Lleida durant la guerra dels Segadors (Barcelona, 1971), 9.
that bordered on rebellion. At best, while rural inhabitants suffered, a majority of Catalans living in urban centers like Lleida, Tarragona, Barcelona, Urgell, and Vic remained only distantly sympathetic with their brothers’ plight. A more powerful catalyst would be needed—something on the order of magnitude as the French invasion—to rouse the entire province to action. That very spark would be lit in the spring of the new year, when some Neapolitan soldiers rather thoughtlessly burned a small rural church—and more importantly, the Sacramental bread—in the diocese of Girona. What prolonged quartering, bickering over privileges and money, or hostile invasion failed to do of their own accord, was accomplished by the smallest of incidents; the burning of a few small pieces of bread. Yet that religious offense proved great enough to stir up an entire people against their lord and king. The burning of bread moved the Catalan complaint against Castile beyond the concern of a single social group—either the clergy or the rural villagers—and struck at the religious heart of the body politic. For from that one seemingly insignificant act of destruction would come rebellion, civil war, invasion, and a hostile occupation of Spanish territory that would last—with all the horrors that accompanied it—for nearly two decades.

From the beginning of the troops’ movement across the Catalan countryside, clerics seem to have played an interesting role in the fomenting of the rural rebellion against the forces of the Spanish king. When rumors of the passage of Juan de Arce and the Count-Duke’s tercio reached the tiny hamlet of Santa Coloma de Farners, a cleric, Dr. Francesc Monagut, stirred up the people to resist the troops. Rather than actively resist with arms, however, the citizens chose rather the simple refusal to allow soldiers in their homes. Irritated by the callousness of the people whom they were supposed to defend, de
Arce simply moved his men north towards Girona, while notifying both Santa Coloma in Barcelona as well as Leonardo de Moles in the nearby town of Riudarenes. Equally disgusted by Catalan ingratitude, the Count of Santa Coloma sent Monrodón, the aguztil, to Santa Coloma de Farners to restore order, and to ensure that their reception of Moles would be different. Outraged at the heavy-handedness of Monrodón, whom many perceived as an arrogant traitor, the people of Santa Coloma de Farners assaulted Monrodón and his small entourage, holing them up in the local inn, which they promptly set ablaze, killing all inside.

Word of the village’s resistance soon spread to nearby Riudarenes. Here the citizens, fearful that the Neapolitans would turn to looting their homes, had stocked the local church with most of their belongings, which the parish priests locked and guarded. Throughout the tercio's stay the inhabitants of the town provided only the bare minimum of comfort—bed, light, and salt—as had been the law in Catalonia. The soldiers left Riudarenes on 1 May, eager to reprimand the Catalans for the murder of a government official. Before they departed, however, the soldiers determined to take revenge on their ungrateful hosts. Breaking into the village church, the Neapolitans not only confiscated the private goods that had been secreted away, but they also robbed the sanctuary of its sacred vessels, priestly robes, ornaments, and the alms gathered for the local confraternities. Their ire led them further, desecrating the altars and the images of the saints; in their rage they did not even spare the Sacrament itself. In a final act of frustration, they set the church on fire. Though the priests were able to save a relic or
two, everything not taken with the troops, including the vessels containing the sacred elements of the Mass, went up in smoke.\footnote{Ibid, 71; Josep Sanabre, \textit{La acción de Francia en Cataluña en la pugna por la hegemonía de Europa, 1640-1659} (Barcelona, Distribuidor: Librería J. Sala Badal, 1956), 62.}

Unfortunately for the soldiers, there were outside witnesses to their guilt: two Capuchin friars sent out specifically from Girona to keep an eye on the traveling regiments. The Capuchin order had flourished in Catalonia ever since its arrival to the province in the mid-sixteenth century. During that time, the friars, with their long brown hoods, flowing beards, and sandals, had earned a high reputation for their integrity, devotion to poverty, and sincere pastoral interest in the countryside. By the 1620s and 1630s, however, the Capuchin influence had extended beyond rural communities. Under the leadership of Fathers Pau and Jeroni de Sarrià, the order had blossomed politically as provincial diplomats, and culturally into the Catalan universities and schools.\footnote{de Rubí, \textit{Un segle de vida caputxina}, 452-456.} Nevertheless, they were pre-eminent preachers to the poor and served as their confessors as well. The brotherhood became so popular among the lower social orders that many wealthier families had to seek special dispensations in order to have a Capuchin confessor.\footnote{Ibid, 457-458.} Through their devotion to the mission of witnessing to the poor and isolated villages in the Catalan hinterland, the Capuchins developed close ties to the rural communities, and often served as advocates on their behalf. For the past three years,
members of the order had denounced the enforced quartering of troops as a “diabolic scheme” of Olivares, and furthermore were aware of the Neapolitan tercio’s reputation for brutality.\textsuperscript{360}

Thus the two friars, following clouds of smoke, came to the rise of a small hill and looked down into the village of Riudarenes during the afternoon of 1 March. To their horror they saw the soldiers with torches setting the church on fire, while others ran out with the few precious vestments and ornaments that decorated the building. By the time the Capuchins could clamber down the hill, the troops had left the small town. Hoping to find something salvageable from the flames, one of the friars ran into the fiery chapel, and in the smoke found the remains of the chalice holding the Eucharistic bread near the altar. Grabbing it in his hands, the friar turned and ran from the church where he hurriedly placed the chalice on the ground and turned round to enter once more. By this time, however, the fire had eaten its way through the roof supports and the entire structure collapsed on itself, preventing any further heroics by the Capuchins. Thoroughly incensed and saddened at this flagrant outrage against the Church, the friars gathered up the charred remains of the silver chalice—the bread inside had been burnt to cinders—and reverently carried it back to Girona.

While the brothers returned to their convent, word of the sacrilege was spreading like wildfire through the surrounding communities. In a scene much like the aftermath of the battle of Concord in the American Revolution, the nearby towns gathered up their fighting men and headed off to snipe at the heels of the retreating Neapolitans. With them was yet another Capuchin, who, it is said, yelled out to the royal troops in a loud

\textsuperscript{360} The Capuchin historian, Basili de Rubí notes that the duke of Cardona had reprimanded Leonardo de Moles back in 1637 for some excesses his men had committed, Ibid, 471-472.
voice, accusing them of their detestable crime and prophesying a terrible judgment—all from a safe distance away. That the rural Catalans were able to assemble over a thousand men so quickly was not surprising. To draw another parallel with colonial New England, the Principat had a tradition of collective militia action, dating back to the civil wars of the fifteenth century. This exercise continued through the bandit wars of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The villagers used the ringing of church bells as signals, and the farms and fields of the diocese resonated with the deep tolling peals during the first week of May. The atmosphere among the rural clergy was electrifying: in a letter to the viceroy describing the local sentiment a week after the fire, Don Ramon Calderes wrote that “the town councilors and the superior classes are showing themselves to be devoted to His Majesty’s service, but few of the clergy and the members of the religious orders are similarly inclined.”

While church bells spread the word through the countryside, the outraged priests wrote a letter to the cathedral chapter in Girona detailing the dreadful affair. The canons elected one of their number, Pere Coderch, to inform Bishop Parcero, who was currently in Barcelona attending the Provincial Council, and begged him to deal with, “the sacrilege and the detestable crime.” The archetype of a Counter-Reformation bishop, Guillermo Parcero was a well-educated Benedictine, sincere in his faith and concerned for the spiritual welfare of his congregation. Admired throughout Catalonia, Parcero had been bishop of Perpignan before being appointed to Girona in 1633, and had acquired a

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361 Elliott, Revolt of the Catalans, 421.
362 AGS: GA, leg. 1328, Calderes to Santa Coloma, 8 May 1640, cited in Elliott, Revolt of the Catalans, 422.
363 “el sacrilegi i el crim detestable.” Since the see of Tarragona, for financial reasons, had been kept vacant since 1634, it fell to the bishop of Barcelona, Garcia Gil Manrique, to serve as host for the Provincial Council. At this time, native Catalans held only two of the province's dioceses: Pau Duran in Urgell, and Ramon de Sentmanet in Vich, both favorable to Castile. Joan Busquets i Dalmau, "Revolta popular i religiositat Barroca." (hereafter Busquets i Dalmau 1976) 66n.
reputation for his strong defense of the local Catalan interest. By the time the bishop had returned to his see, word about Riudarenes had spread throughout the province. Friars in villages and rectors in hamlets stirred up the people, appealing to the intrinsic tie that bound Catalonia to the Christian faith, and denouncing the impious desecration of the tercios.\(^{364}\) A letter written by some Diputats\(^{365}\) following the affair depicted the event in the following terms:

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\ldots \text{it is the most atrocious and alarming case than any I have seen in all Christendom. Committed with as much impudence by Christians, and of the same creed too, without any repentance of the deed; as if it were nothing and yet giving themselves up to that desire, as is done every day in Flanders with military license, as if here they desired us to approve the doctrine of Luther and Calvin, together with the malice and great abhorrence that the disciples of those two teachers have for all the Sacraments, and for the Sacrament of Sacraments, against the Catholic faith, which they desire to destroy from all the world if possible.}\(^{366}\)
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Against this wave of popular unrest, the viceroy Santa Coloma did little, aside from writing to the consellers of nearby towns, promising that justice would be meted out, while at the same time writing to Madrid for further instructions.\(^{367}\) At this point, however, this critical lack of response by the secular authority in Catalonia enabled the situation to grow from a local disturbance to a regional rebellion. Throughout the province Castilian and foreign troops, already viewed with fear and mistrust, now fell under the suspicion of heresy, being portrayed as barbarians who delighted in desecrating churches and spreading sacrilege wherever they went. Even in the northern Catalonia

\(^{364}\) Ibid, 67.

\(^{365}\) Catalonia was governed through a body of legislators called the Dipuatació, which consisted of six officials—two nobles, two clerics, and two members of the urban elite—who were picked by lottery to serve as Diputats during the interim between Corts, or gatherings with the king.

\(^{366}\) *Informe enviado por los disputados al P. Bernardino, acerca del incendio de la iglesia de Riudarenes*, in La Real Academia de la Historia, Memoria Histórico Español. vol. 20, Crónica escrita por Miguel Paret (Madrid: Imprenta y Fundición de Manuel Tello, 1888), Appendix IV, no. 73. Emphasis mine.

\(^{367}\) AHV: Correspondència Rebuda (v.13-1637-1640): Fearing further outbursts in the central dioceses, the viceroy wrote to the town leaders, in which he warns them not to imitate the resistance of Santa Coloma de Farners, and talks confidently of the stern consequences which would accompany any disobedience. Santa Coloma to Consellers of Vic, 4 May 1640.
and Roussillon, the antipathy continued, which led the loyal bishop of Perpignan, Pérez Roy, to write a letter of protest to the king, decrying the soldiers for sacking homes and churches.  

The Excommunications and the Rising of the Countryside

The burning of the church and the desecration of the Holy Sacrament, more than these other sources of tension, which inspired a large portion of Catalan society to take up arms, not only to defend their patrias from “foreign” aggression, but more significantly, to protect their churches from continuing sacrilege. The Catalan revolt of 1640 signified something more than a community reacting to an assault on its privileges and icons, something beyond disagreement over the proper rites and practices of the Church, or the proper role of church-state relations. At the heart of the provincial outcry was a desire to defend its holy preserves from the encroachment of heretical poachers. In the words of Durkheim, it was the Catalans’ attempt to protect the domain of the sacred from the hands of those who sought to profane it.

The sacral nature of the Mass and its elements received a renewed emphasis from the Council of Trent and the bishops who were responsible for implementing the Tridentine reforms in Catalonia. At the forefront of these reforms was a reiteration of

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368 Busquets i Dalmau 1976, 70. As we will see, Perpignan would endure a number of indignities in June and July that would turn a large number of its inhabitants against the crown, even though a French army was lying just beyond the borders! It would also serve to unite, for a while at least, the Comtats with the Principat, with both sides temporarily forgetting their previous enmity.

369 “Whether simple or complex, all known religious beliefs display a common feature: They presuppose a classification of the real or ideal things that man conceive of into two classes—two opposite genera—that are widely designated by two distinct terms, which the words profane and sacred translate fairly well. The division of the world into two domains, one containing all that is sacred and the other all that is profane—such is the distinctive trait of religious thought.” Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. trans., Karen Fields (New York: Simon & Schuster Inc, 1995), 34.

370 For a good source on how the Tridentine reforms were implemented in Barcelona, see Joan Bada Elias, Situació Religiosa de Barcelona en el segle XVI (Barcelona: Editorial Balmes, 1970).
the sacral nature of the Mass, in defiance of Lutheran and Calvinist doctrine, expressed in the doctrine of transubstantiation, which proclaimed the bread and wine offered in the ceremony to be the literal body and blood of Christ.\textsuperscript{371} Flowing from the official doctrine of transubstantiation, the aura of the sacred extended, in the Church's view, to all elements associated with the ritual. The vessels that held the bread and wine were considered sacred, and not to be touched by laity. The priest himself, because he was the minister of the sacrament, became set apart, and many endeavors were made to restrict clerical participation in rowdy parties. Indeed, the church itself, as home of the elements, was also declared sacred: following Trent, the doors to the church were locked at night, in an attempt to prohibit unlawful visitors, and certain activities—such as dancing, singing, and setting off fireworks—were forbidden in the church during feast-day celebrations.\textsuperscript{372} Finally, the Church encouraged the widespread recognition of the special feast celebrating this holy mystery, Corpus Christi.\textsuperscript{373} Catalan bishops, inspired by the Council of Trent, implemented reforms such as these during the late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-centuries that fostered an atmosphere of common respect for the sacred, a respect that would result in a religiously inspired Catholic rebellion against the forces of His Most Catholic Majesty.

The affair at Riudarenes, though mild compared to some of the ravages committed in Germany during the Thirty Years' War, utterly shocked and outraged the people of Catalonia. The wrath engendered by such an act of pillage, however, also

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{371} On the nature of sacraments in general, see \textit{The Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent}, session 7; the doctrine of transubstantiation is contained in its own session, the thirteenth. \\
\textsuperscript{372} Henry Kamen, \textit{The Phoenix and the Flame}, 182-84. \\
\textsuperscript{373} The Council of Vienne first declared Corpus Christi to be an official Church celebration in 1311, and Barcelona may have been one of the first cities to celebrate it, in 1319. Ibid, 182.}
demonstrates the ties that bound the community together with the Catholic Church. Built, furnished, and constantly maintained by local labor and resources, the church in rural Catalonia served not only as a place of worship, but also as the chief icon that unified the community. Such identification to their common place of worship as well as to the Catholic faith had been a cornerstone of provincial identity since the days of Charlemagne. The holy sacrament of the Mass featured prominently among the ceremonies of the Church that further strengthened this common identity, both in religious as well as secular terms. For it was the community that made the bread to be consecrated by the priest, it was the community that provided the vessels to contain the holy bread, and it was the community that partook in the sacrament that bound all believers together. This consciously communal ritual dominated the landscape of Catalonia following the reforms of the Council of Trent, which placed a greater emphasis on all aspects of the Mass, from more frequent and regular confessions and communion offered by the priest, to educating the congregation about the ceremony through catechisms, and to the creation of confraternities that fostered a specific devotion to the Eucharist.  

The appropriate ecclesiastical response to such an outrage against not only the house of God, and the vessels of the Mass, but also against the people of Catalonia, was excommunication. This sentence—the most serious that could be issued by the Church—barred the guilty from the fellowship of believers and from partaking of the Sacrament they had so willfully profaned. The seriousness of this crime, matched by the

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awe with which the Catalans viewed the altar, was both a mark of their devotion to the faith as well as a distinct product of Tridentine reforms. For it was around the doctrine of transubstantiation—the belief that the bread and wine consumed by the believer in the Mass became the literal body and blood of Christ—that the Church of Rome based subsequent programs of their Reformation. Though the bishops of Catalonia had issued excommunications against small groups of soldiers only very infrequently, such pronouncements had not been without precedent even in 1640.375

Whether he desired it or not, Gregorio Parcero was placed squarely in the center of the sacrilegious issue. What he would decide, how he would decide, would have great ramifications for the rest of Catalonia, if not Spain. There were several options facing him. He could ascribe the soldiers’ conduct to a regrettable but determined response to repeated irritation and agitation by the rural Catalan population. He could assume that the soldiers were only after their fair share of the comforts promised them, now secreted away in violation of ecclesiastical sanctuary. Finally, he could take a hard line, dealing out the strict measure of ecclesiastical justice.

On 14 May, assisted by the canons of his cathedral in Girona, and in particular Francesc Pejoan, his vicar-general, Bishop Parcero pronounced the Neapolitan tercio and its commander, Moles to be excommunicated from the Catholic Church.376 It was an elaborate ceremony, with great attention to the artistry that surrounded public ceremonies of the Baroque era. The service concluded with the reading of Psalm 109, a song that

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375 Bishop Manrique had issued an excommunication against a small group of soldiers for their murder of Don Antoni de Fluvia in his chapel at Castell de Palautordera.
376 It is interesting to note that this was not the first time that Parcero had taken a stance counter to Castile in support of the church. In 1634, he protested the excessive taxation of the décima in the already-vacant see of Vic, a position also expressed by none other than Pau Claris, who would play an important role in the events to come. Ricard Garcia Carcel, *Pau Claris, la revolta catalana* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1985), 35.
begins with a cry for divine judgment against the evildoers (“O God, whom I praise, do not remain silent”), and ends with praises and a prayer for preservation (With my mouth I will greatly extol the LORD; in the great throng I will praise him. For he stands at the right hand of the needy one, to save his life from those who condemn him”). The psalmist laments in particular the injustice of the wicked, repaying good with evil: “With words of hatred they surround me; they attack me without cause. In return for my friendship they accuse me…They repay evil for good, and hatred for my friendship.” What follows from this is an extended litany of desired worldly punishment—extending not only to the guilty party, but also to his offspring: “May his descendants be cut off, their names blotted out from the next generation”—accompanied by everlasting spiritual judgment: “May the iniquity of his fathers be remembered before the LORD; may the sin of his mother never be blotted out. May their sins always remain before the LORD, that he may cut off the memory of them from the earth.” After all the desired cursing is complete, the psalmist turns to the Lord, this time rejoicing in the Divine salvation of His people, the preservation of the sheep from the ravenous wolves and roaring lions seeking whom they may devour: “Help me, O LORD my God; save me in accordance with your love. Let them know that it is your hand, that you, O LORD, have done it. They may curse, but you will bless; when they attack they will be put to shame, but your servant will rejoice. My accusers will be clothed with disgrace and wrapped in shame as in a cloak.”


The cumulative effect of the excommunication ceremony—the Scripture readings, and the passing of judgment—was a heightened awareness and concern for the faith of the community, who were asked to respond "fiat, fiat fiat," when the sentence had been declared. Thus, Parcero's actions, while on the one hand fulfilling the responsibilities of a bishop rightly concerned for his flock, on the other hand, fostered a deeper resentment against all foreign soldiers stationed in Catalonia, present or future. As matters turned more from discontent to open revolt, those Catalans who became involved in activities against the crown saw themselves first and foremost as defenders of the province against the sacrilege of foreign heretics. This ecclesiastical censure confirmed the rebellious Catalans in their way: throughout the summer they would conduct themselves with the air of those who are confident that God and justice were on their side.

For all the problems that Parcero’s actions wrought in the long-term, he has found very few critics (aside from the Count-Duke Olivares, and possibly some modern commentators). A contemporary in Barcelona, Francesc Ferrer, described him as a “man of great virtue.” Another writer, Juan Gaspar Roig y Jalpi, presenting a city history of Girona in 1678, although of royalist sympathies, nevertheless describes Parcero:

> With the spirit of a true Elijah, he excommunicated and anathematized Don Leonardo Molas (sic), Juan de Arce, and other commanders with their Tercios for the outrages they had committed, declaring in a letter that his inclination was not moved by any coercion or force, but only by a zeal for the honor of God and for the fulfillment of a true Pastor’s obligations.

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378 Busquets i Dalmau 1976, 82.
379 “lo senyor bisbe de Gerona que no era catala, sino castella; ques deya don Gregorio Parcero home de gran virtut rebuda informacio de tot lo que passa escomunica als cabos y a tots los soldats del exercit que ya eran passats molta part de ells al Rossello…” AHCB: Ms. B-148: Dietari of Francesc Ferrer, or “Successos de Catralunya en los anys de 1640 y 1641,” p. 4. Emphasis mine.
380 “Con ánimo de verdadero Elias descomulgó, y anathematizó a Don Leonardo Molas, Juan de Arce, y otros Cabos con sus Tercios por las insolencias que hizieron, declarando en una carta, que su ánimo no se movió de alguna coacción, o fuerça, sino solamente del zelo de la honrra de Dios, y del cumplimiento de
Roig y Jalpi further notes the intense pressure facing Parcero, who was “in deed, discreet, prudent, and very fitting for a true Prelate, because all was done with mature understanding and with holy deliberation. Having completed all the reports himself, he agreed not to rely upon another power to calm the People who were irritated from all sides. And they, seeing that all the proceedings were right, were quieted for the time being.”

**Conflict, Corpus and Consequences: El Corpus de Sang, 7 June 1640**

Although the popular violence within the city of Girona may have ceased following the excommunication ceremonies, the rest of Catalonia continued to be wracked with violence. This was particularly true even in the rural reaches of the diocese of Girona, as the troop movements continued in the face of occasional roadside sniping by bands of peasants. Indeed, the soldiers themselves were aware of the growing unrest. Commanders like Don Ramon de Calders, and Don Juan de Garay sought to stem the rising tide of aggression, acting on orders from the viceroy, the Count of Santa Coloma, by razing both Santa Coloma de Farners and Riudarenes as an example to Catalans who continued to resist the re-establishment of order. Such actions, however, only seemed to draw more violence down upon themselves and their men.

Beyond his immediate decision to bring the rural uprisings to heel by a display of force, Santa Coloma did little to improve the situation. As much as certain sectors of

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las obligaciones de verdadero Pastor.” AMG: XXII: Biblioteca Auxiliar, 1.5. no. 20: Juan Gaspar Roig y Jalpi, *Resumen historial de las grandezas y antiguedades de Gerona…”* (Barcelona, 1678), pp. 303-304.

381 “por hecho discreto, prudente, y muy digno de un buen Prelado; porque a más de que todo aquello se hizo con maduro acuerdo, y santíssima deliberación, aviéndose hecho todos los informes devidos, convinó no hazerlo de otra suerte, para sossegar al Pueblo, que estaba de todo punto irritado, con lo qual, viendo que se procedía como era razón, se quietó por entonces.” Ibid, p. 304.
Catalan society might desire to see the guilty soldiers effectively punished, the viceroy could not take any action against the culprits without approval from Madrid. In fact, certain officials in Madrid were unwilling to recognize the soldiers as the guilty party, claiming either that the people of Riudarenes had burned the church themselves, or that such an action was not as grievous as the murder of the agutzil, Monrodón. In any event, the Count’s dithering brought upon him the reproach of his fellow Catalans, and the disappointment of his lord and master, who became persuaded that Santa Coloma was no longer the man for the job.

Despite their long-held grievance against quartering, the villagers of central Catalonia were not the only participants in the early weeks of violent rebellion. Various Catalan ecclesiastics beyond the investigative committee established by the chapter of Girona became involved at this time. Some members of the regular clergy also played a prominent part as leaders in this nascent rebellion. Among the orders, it was the Capuchins who earned the most censure. Their long-standing reputation as defenders of the poor, combined with their zeal for the Holy Sacrament, served to inspire their efforts to rouse the rural population of Catalonia against the perpetrators of such heretical deeds. Their activities on the side of the rebels did not pass unnoticed by the king or his soldiers.

In late May, Philip IV wrote to the provincial heads of all the orders, but especially the Capuchins, commanding these superiors to do their utmost in bringing the rebellious clergy back in line.\textsuperscript{382} On the 26\textsuperscript{th} of that month, only two weeks after the first excommunications, some soldiers under the Castilian Juan de Arce, seeking sanctuary from growing numbers of irregular Catalan forces, entered the coastal town of Mataró

\textsuperscript{382} de Rubí, \textit{Un segle de vida caputxina}, 533.
and lodged in the Capuchin convent there. Before they left, they took their revenge on that Order which had first reported the sacrilege at Riudarenes and had continued to exhort their countrymen to violence. They stripped the sanctuary of all its silver.\textsuperscript{383}

Although one of Catalonia’s spiritual leaders, Parcero, had sternly judged the actions of Moles and his Neapolitans, the soldiers escaped a corresponding political chastisement from the king, their commander. The royal silence on this matter was of great importance: unlike many modern-day conceptions regarding a barrier between the affairs of the church and the state, it was expected of early-modern monarchs to uphold the principles of the Faith, and to work alongside the religious hierarchy in their executive functions. Philip’s failure—as His Catholic Majesty—to come out and publicly join his censure with that of Parcero’s was quite disturbing to the Catalans.\textsuperscript{384}

As soon as it became apparent that the king would not immediately confirm the ecclesiastical judgment—indeed, it appeared that Philip doubted whether the soldiers had even committed the crime—a sense of despondency and despair crept over Catalonia.

\textsuperscript{383} \textit{Ibid}, p. 532. According to one military source, however, fear of reprisal also served to motivate some rural clerics to favor the Catalan cause. One of the tercio captains, writing in mid-May regarding a band of Catalan militia wrote that: “they had been harassing us since [Girona] and were constantly in sight, never ceasing to tell the Capuchin friars that if they sheltered us, they would have their house burned [i.e. by the marauding Catalans].” “que nos binieron siguiendo hasta esta villa y siempre estan a nuestra vista y se atreveron a decir a los Padres Capuchinos que si nos recoxian, les havian de quemar la casa.” \textit{Jefes de los Tercios al Virrey}, 19 May 1640, in Eulogio Zudaire Huarte, \textit{El conde-duque y Cataluña} (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1964), Appendix to chapter XI, 455.

\textsuperscript{384} The king’s dilatory behavior regarding the sets of excommunications was probably motivated by two considerations. The first concern was that to remove one of the largest tercios from the border without an adequate replacement was to court a French invasion and possibly military disaster. The second concern—which Catalan conspiracy theorists and most histories have tended to suggest—was that Olivares and other ministers in Madrid raised doubts concerning the culpability of the king’s troops. The earliest published justifications from Madrid in the fall of 1640 continually hinted that the Catalans had set the church of Riudarenes on fire themselves just to create an incident, a suggestion that provincial responses hotly attacked.
Tied to this blatant disregard for justice was the problem of the weather, which in turn led to the feeling that all was not well in Catalonia. That year there had been an unusually cold winter in Roussillon and the northern Principat, which pushed back the spring harvesting season and caused some slight discomfort in the land. In March, incessant rains threatened to damage the early harvest through much of central Catalonia, while a drought through April and May threatened the chances of itinerant reapers or *segadors* through the province to find steady employment. The presence of a large number of armed, unemployed, and potentially dangerous migrant workers would pose a significant problem for city officials throughout the entire province of Catalonia during the early summer months. In addition to the simple economic problem of the *segadors*, the lack of rain had led to heightened religious tensions as peasants petitioned the cathedral towns to organize processions, invoking the Lord and their local saints to save their crops by sending rain.

The intense spiritual fervor combined with gloomy prospects of a poor harvest, the continued presence of detested soldiers in their land, and the constant need to feed and quarter them all there had led Catalans to voice dire predilections concerning the future of region, especially with no royal pronouncement from Madrid or Barcelona

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385 Mariano Barriendos and Javier Martín-Vide, "Los Riesgos Meteorológicos en Barcelona a través de los Registros Históricos (ss. XIV-XIX). Primeros Resultados sobre su comportamiento climático pluresecular." in *Avances en Climatología Histórica en España*, Javier Martín-Vide, ed (Barcelona: Oikos-Tau, 1997), 37. On 17 January 1640, the city of Barcelona was subject to a powerful storm coming off the Mediterranean. These storms, known as *temporales de mar*, caused severe flooding in several of the low-lying neighborhoods in the city. Furthermore, the effect of a severe drought brought the prospect of a poor harvest in a land already at war. Ibid, 30; 35

386 Ibid, 33.

387 In the Seu d’Urgell, thirty farmers went to the city council and besought them to ask the cathedral chapter for a procession, but the hostility with which town and chapter viewed each other prevented any such ceremony from occurring. AMU: Llibre de Actes: 1617-1658 (vol. 116); 16 April 1640, f. 315. A month later, however, with no end to the drought in sight, forced the council to change their minds, and a procession to Saint Armengol was organized, f. 316.
concerning the punishment of the excommunicated soldiers. Many people—both clerics and laity alike—began to fear the hand of God raised above them in imminent judgment. It was noted by one historian that Pare Guillem de Jossa i de Granollachs, a Catalan Jesuit from a noble family, and the last confessor of viceroy Sta. Coloma, “not once, but many times, warned him, in person, and also through letters, that if he did not reprimand the crimes and evil deeds which the soldiers had committed against Catalonia, God would punish him swiftly and severely.”

These warnings came to an end, however, on 7 June, shortly before the festival of Corpus Christi, when “Father Guillem spoke to him in precise terms that that same day would be one of judgment if the remedy did not come presently, and as he [Santa Coloma] delayed in this, the disastrous end of the death of the Viceroy proved that the warning had been heard from Heaven.”

Incensed by the outrages committed against the churches of Catalonia, citizens and rural aristocrats alike, together with their local clergy, became increasingly upset. Throughout the countryside, farmers joined with the drifting—and relatively unemployed—segadors and began to march on Barcelona. Several rallying cries were heard issuing from this band of outraged Catalans as they processed through the countryside, conscious of the reduced harvest that awaited their sickles on account of the

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388 “no una, sinó mantes vegades, li advertí, ja de paraula i també per mitjà de cartes, que si no reprimia les malifetes dels soldats i els contrafurs que es feian a Catalunya, Déu el castigaria prompte i severament.”
389 “le habló el Padre [Guillem] en terminos precisos que aquel mismo día sería el del castigo si no ponía luego el remedio, y como éste se dilató, el desastreoso fin de la muerte del Virrey, comprobó que el aviso había sido [oídos?] del cielo.” BAEV: Varias 254; 15: Ferran de Sagarra, Les Lliçons de la Història. Catalunya en 1640, (Barcelona, 1930-31), p. 36, emphasis mine. Sagarra cites this from a MS Principio del asiento que el Colegio presente de la Compañía de Jesús de Nuestra Señora de Bethlem tuvo en esta ciudad de Barcelona; y occasion que de venir a ella la Compañía in the Arxiu Historic de la Provincia de Aragon, de la Compañía de Jesus (in Rome?). Although Sagarra notes that there is more from this manuscript, historian Miquel Batllori notes in his own work, Catalunya a l'època moderna: recerques d'història cultural i religiosa (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1971) that these archives were ravaged during the Second World War and most of the manuscripts were lost.
disastrous weather and perhaps fearful of losing the rest in a few months to rampaging armies. In nearly all of these outcries, religion played a central role in shaping the identity of its members: "Against the enemies of the holy Catholic faith;" "Long live the Holy Mother Church and the King our Lord;" "Long live the land and the king, and death to traitors and bad Christians." These expressions of popular piety, the fruit of an increased devotion to the Mass, planted in the hearts of the marchers a desire for revenge; the body and blood of their Lord had been destroyed, and it was their mission to avenge this blow against the enemy.

By the last days of May, an army of segadors, rural peasants, and lower clergy had assembled outside the walls of Barcelona. One of their leaders—whose name has never been recorded, but who styled himself, “Captain-General of the Christian Army”—wrote an open letter to the inhabitants of the city. Designed to draw the citizens to their standard, the letter denounced those in Catalonia, "who have forgotten the cause of God . . . but the rustics and the lower people, stirred by the Holy Spirit, have formed a great army that has been called the Christian Army." The presence of an armed and potentially unruly gathering gave the viceroy and the local city officials reason for serious concern. Rumors continued to abound about the presence of Spanish tercios, whether they were all marching on Barcelona or for the front in Roussillon. Upon receiving one such rumor—that a force was moving down the coast—the bishop of Barcelona closed the doors of the cathedral, so as to prevent anyone from ringing the

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390 "Contra els enemics de la santa fe catòlica i l'Eglésia;" "Visca la Santa Mare Iglésia i lo Rei nostre Senyor;" "Visca la terra i lo rei i muiren los traidors i mal cristians." Busquets i Dalmau 1976, 72.
391 “[quien] havia oblidat la causa de Déu...però els rústecs i el baix poble, moguts per l'Esprit Sant, han format un gran exèrcit que en diuen l'exèrcit cristià.” Ibid, 72. It appears that the letter from the “Capità General de l'Exèrcit Cristià” achieved no small measure of popularity. Within a month the contents had spread across the province to Lleida, where the bishop was able to get a hold of a copy and pass it along to Olivares, Elliott, Revolt of the Catalans, 460n.
bells and stirring up the people. Despite his efforts to maintain peace and stability, the bishop did not have—indeed, one wonders if anyone had—the power to seal the city off completely for very long. For it was apparent to many in Barcelona that urban religious communities were divided. As much as the bishop might strive for peace, the lower clergy were clearly advocating something entirely different. In one of his last letters to the king, the viceroy Santa Coloma informed His Majesty that parish priests were preaching “inflammatory sermons from the pulpits rousing the congregations to fight for the preservation of their liberties…”392

On 22 May, a few days before the important religious feast of Pentecost, the segadors and their allies entered the city, calmly and in order. They processed to the city prison where they released Tamarit, the patriotic Diputat Militar who had been in confinement for just over two months.393 Following this blatant act of defiance, however, the crowd listened to the urgings of the bishops of Barcelona, Urgell, and Vic—the latter two being the only Catalans currently occupying bishoprics in the province—and calmly processed out of the city to the cries of, "Long live the Holy Mother Church and the King our Lord."394 The day's activities signaled an overwhelming victory for the segadors, who felt confident that they would be afforded such liberties in the future. It was not safe for any soldier in town, however, and tensions soared, fanned by several clerics. Just two days after this dramatic entrance, Dr. Jerónimo Guerau of the Audiència wrote to the viceroy accusing the priests, members of the religious orders, and even nuns of exhorting the people: "The priests, monks, and nuns that should have spoken with humility towards

392 AGS: GA, leg. 1328, Santa Coloma to King, 19 May 1640; cited in Elliott, Revolt of the Catalans, 445.
393 One history of the revolt notes that the procession to liberate the Diputat Militar was led by a crucifix. AHCB: Ms. B-57, f. 30.
394 Elliott, Revolt of the Catalans, 430.
Your Excellency have spoken with extraordinary frankness of what they have seen in your lands and they have recounted what has occurred with the Churches and with the women.” Against this union of rural laborers, urban confraternities, and secular and regular clerics, stood the viceroy, together with the city elite, who sought to pacify the city as much as possible, contradicting the rumor that the city was going against the king, "and basing [their actions] on the constitutions of the Holy Churches." As the violence continued to spread, Catalan sentiment gradually changed from one of endurance and reaction to one of willingness to engage in pre-emptive strikes against all soldiers polluting their land. On 4 June, a riot broke out in the city of Perpignan, sparked by these repeated desecrations. For a week, the town lay in control of the insurgents—the soldiers formerly stationed there appear to have moved out, either towards the front lines by Salses or the domestic lines by Girona—and the fortifications were strengthened. By 11 June, the now-infamous Count-Duke’s tercio under de Arce had arrived within sight of Perpignan, and demanded entrance, which the city fathers refused. Instead, they sent messengers out into the countryside to rally enough militiamen to drive off the tercio. The stalemate would continue for several days.

Only a few days after the initial rioting in Perpignan—the second-largest city in Catalonia—civil unrest would reach a decisive turning point in the streets of the region’s capital, Barcelona. As with the “rescue” of Tamarit, popular violence on this dramatic

395 "Los eclesiástichs, religiosos y vells que son los que haurien de parlar ab modestia, assiguro a V. E. que parlen ab extraodrinaris encariments del que han vist en ses terres y del quel's refereixen han fet ab les Iglesies y ab les dones." Zudaire Huarte, El conde-duque y Cataluña, Appendix to chapter XI, 455.
397 Elliott, Revolt of the Catalans, 458.
398 A band of 4000 men apparently did gather and move on Perpignan, but arrived too late to succor the town. Ibid, 458.

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occasion would emerge from the context of another religious celebration. Following Pentecost, the next important feast day among Catholics was Corpus Christi. This year, it was going to be celebrated on 7 June, and was one of the most momentous sacred festivals in Catalonia. Established back in the thirteenth century, the rite had been revised by the Council of Trent in an attempt to convert it to a more sacred ceremony, centered on the consecrated Host. By emphasizing the clerical procession, and the solemnity with which the processions were carried out, the Church hoped that the sacral nature of the day would be preserved, especially for a feast-day that celebrated an element of the Mass. The only effort to control the town's celebrations usually took the form of trying to contain such expressions of wild merriment, such as fireworks, to places outside the church building. As one of the largest and most significant celebrations in Catalonia—appealing both to the community's cultural and religious heritage—Corpus Christi served to bind Catalans together. Along with the priests who would lead the procession and carry the vessels containing the Host, Barcelona's confraternities would march along, displaying not only their religious fervor but also their communal identity as well.

Unfortunately, the day before the ceremony, news had trickled into the city about yet another church-and-Sacrament burning in Montiró, this time by Castilian troops of the Count-Duke’s tercio. It was under the impact of such news that "the avengers of the body of Christ" broke loose in Barcelona. Chanting "visca la tierra, mueran los

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399 Elliott, *Revolt of the Catalans*, 446. Elliott notes that, unlike the affair at Riudarenes, the viceroy Santa Coloma did write a stern letter to the tercio commander, Juan de Arce, condemning the sacrilege in no uncertain terms. Unfortunately for the Count, his concern was too little, too late.
traydores y enemigos de la Santa Fe,"\(^{400}\) the local townspeople and the migrant *segadors* began searching for the viceroy and other "traitors" who had connived with Castile to bring troops into the province. In vain did their fellow Catalans, the bishops of Vic and Urgell, attempt to calm the crowd and divert them from their rage. The bishop of Barcelona was hearing Mass in the cathedral when he got the news of the riot and together with the chapter and other clerics—in town for the Provincial Council—went to the viceroy's palace, where they tried to calm the mob, but to no avail. Taking advantage of the confusion, Santa Coloma, together with a few of his followers, made his way to the city docks in order to escape by boat. Unfortunately, some of the mob spotted the escape and gave chase, killing the viceroy on the beach. In so doing, they destroyed the last symbol of Castilian authority in Barcelona, creating a void that would soon be filled by the Catalan *Diputació*.

The reaction to the bloody "Corpus de Sang" was instantaneous and dramatic and permeated the entire province. A poem commemorating the events of the spring was printed and distributed throughout Catalonia. Brief, but descriptive, the last stanza depicts the extent to which religion played a serious part in the revolt of 1640:

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El bisbe els va beneir amb la mà dreta i l'esquerra:
—On és vostre capità, a on és vostra bandera?
Varen treure el don Jésus tot cobert amb un vel negre:
—Aquí és nostre capità, aquí és nostra bandera.
A les armes, catalanes, que ens han declarat la guerra! 401

[The bishop came to bless us with the right hand and the left:
—Where is your captain, and where is your standard?
They (the *segadors*) went to find the Lord Jesus all covered with a black veil:
—Here is our captain, here is our banner.
To arms, Catalans, for they have declared war!]
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\(^{401}\) "El romanç dels segadors," in Galofré i Illamola-Simal, *Documents de Catalunya*, 113.
Around the same time as the Corpus Christi revolt, similar reactions against the sacrilege at Riudarenes and Montiró were occurring in the northern reaches of Catalonia. Only a few days after Corpus, some troops—quite possibly the Count-Duke’s tercio—were heading north into Roussillon, and passed through the town of Ceret. Before leaving, the soldiers burned the parish church of Saint Francis, further stirring up the people. Within hours, the local reports claimed, nearly a thousand men had gathered from the local fields and mountains, and were joined by two thousand more from the valley of the Conflent; their spirits were high, and the sense of division so typical within Catalan society was forgotten. Rather, these humble peasants stood their ground “as good brothers, and we will defend the Holy Catholic Faith and die for Her and the Lutherans will die.”

Shortly after Barcelona’s “Bloody Corpus,” matters finally came to a head in Perpignan. After three days of patiently waiting for the city to capitulate, the Castilian commander, Juan, de Acre ordered a daily bombardment of Perpignan on 14 June. Early on the morning of the 16th, the city was stormed. As if understanding that violence against churches, abbeys, and convents was the best way to strike back at a host that had maltreated them, the Castilian soldiers carried out their commander’s orders with a ruthlessness perhaps to be expected only in enemy territory.

Throughout the entire city, religious buildings were spared neither from bombardment nor from forced entry. The Franciscan convent was smashed to pieces, the Capuchin convent set on fire, and serious damage done to the homes of canons and friars.

AHV: Correspondència Rebuda (v.13-1637-1640); copy of letter from Consellers of Ceret to Figueres, passed along to Vic, 11 June 1640.
throughout the city. Those who resisted, be they clergy or laity, were arrested and thrown into the citadel’s prison.\textsuperscript{403} Not even the hopeful embassy of the bishop of Perpignan, carrying the Sacrament and interceding on behalf of the city, would move the men or their commander. Upon the failure of his mission, Bishop Pérez Roy and the chapter of Perpignan locked themselves up in the citadel, carrying with them the Sacrament for fear that the German troops stationed nearby might be covert Lutherans or Calvinists and, encouraged by violence perpetrated by Catholics, themselves seek to desecrate the Eucharistic elements.\textsuperscript{404} Not since the French invasion of the previous summer had such violence been inflicted on the Catalan people.

The sack of Perpignan, coming out along with a second excommunication ceremony presided over by Bishop Parcero at Girona against Juan de Arce and his soldiers for their actions at Montiró, served to increase public outcry and solidify the identity of the rebels. Pamphlets were printed, headlines appeared in the nascent gazettes of Barcelona, and a grand petition was addressed to the king through the Council of Aragon. Though the king promised to rebuild the damaged structures of Perpignan, he did nothing. This inactivity—combined with a stubborn refusal to reprimand the culpable soldiers—would weigh further on the minds of Catalan clerics who were already disturbed that the king had done nothing to punish the sacrilegious soldiers. In the midst of a European struggle ostensibly for the survival of Catholicism, the true Faith, Philip’s


\textsuperscript{404} It was a common practice among Protestants, particularly Calvinists with their explicit denial of anything other than a spiritual presence in the Mass, and their iconoclastic distaste of images, when sacking a Catholic church, to desecrate pictures and statues, to spill the wine, and to trample on the communion bread. For more on this, see Barbara Diefendrof, \textit{op. cit.}
apparent condoning of activities typical of the Protestant foe began to tarnish severely his reputation in Catalonia.

**Restoring Order Among the Flock**

The first matter of importance for most of the clergy in the central dioceses of Girona, Vic, and Barcelona, following the excommunications, the Corpus revolt, and the sack of Perpignan, was the quieting of the countryside. For as much as they may have abhorred the soldiers’ nefarious activities, the Catalan churchmen still realized that it was far worse for persons to start taking justice into their own hands. In the turmoil surrounding the church burnings and the excommunications, in an atmosphere saturated with violence, anticipating such a result did not require much mental exertion. Indeed, during much of late May and June, these three towns were exposed to local violence on a scale not seen for a long time.

Ironically, a few of the military commanders realized the clerical potential for quelling violence. Right from the beginning of the troubles, Leonardo de Moles had wanted the two Capuchin witnesses to accompany his men back to their quarters at Blanes, so that the outraged civilians would not attack them on their way.\(^{405}\) Again, a few days later, when Moles went to punish the village of Santa Coloma de Farners, he sent two Capuchins as emissaries to express his moderate intention of only destroying “a twentieth of the most important houses.”\(^{406}\) As time wore on however, and the provincials showed no signs of ameliorating their antagonism, the tercios in Catalonia abandoned this policy in favor of all-out violence.

\(^{405}\) de Rubí, *Un segle de vida caputxina*, 530. Unfortunately, the Capuchins did not take Moles up on his offer. Instead, one of them began to preach an extempore sermon to the people, while the other carried the burnt chalice in his hands, and made an impromptu procession through the village, at each stop calling on the soldiers to confess and repent of their sin.

\(^{406}\) “una vintena de cases de les més principals.” Ibid, 531.
The widespread agitation throughout the central regions of Catalonia inspired something akin to the Great Fear that struck revolutionary France in the summer of 1789. Very soon after the first excommunications in mid-May, the violence began to expand beyond those towns immediately threatened by the soldiers’ route. On May 27, the province received word that a riot had broken out inside Vic, which resulted in the death of their conseller-en-cap, Don Bernat Pons.\textsuperscript{407} Not even the religious habit could keep fear away. On 1 June 1640, Bishop Parcero wrote to the superior of the Augustinian monastery of St. Barthomeu de Belloch, calling upon the Regular Canons to protect the women of the nearby convent in Peralada: “on behalf of the Reverend Prioress and Canonesses … it is revealed to us that they do not desire to loiter or remain in that village and convent out of fear.” The bishop proceeded to give the lady Prioress permission at any time to remove herself and the women under her care to a safer place whenever she thought it necessary.\textsuperscript{408} That same day, the bishop ordered canons Jaume Boxeda and Martí Sala to accompany the nuns from their village to the local castle where they could stay saying, “we give them full exercise of their faculties in everything for as long as may be necessary.”\textsuperscript{409} This situation extended to the furthest reaches of the province. On 6 July, the city of Barcelona wrote to the Consols of Urgell regarding “the perilous state in which we are in this Province” which was so bad that “all the Universities, Cities, and Churches have managed to place faithful watches and guards to suppress the turmoil of

\textsuperscript{407} AHV: Correspondència Rebuda (v.13-1637-1640): Letter from Bishop Ramon de Sentmanat to the Consellers of Vic, 27 May 1640.
\textsuperscript{408} “per part de las Rnts Priora y Canongessas … nos es estat exposat que per lo temor que tenan no vagen assequiar dita vila y convent concedim licentia que sempre y quant aparega a dita Señora Priora Star en aquex-parill ella.” ADG: I.4: Protocols de Lletres: U-246, f. 59.
\textsuperscript{409} “tot lo temps sera necessari de que de tot los donam plenay libera facultat.” ADG: I.4: Protocols de Lletres: U-246, f. 59.
restless people that walk among the land."⁴¹⁰ Within a week, the notoriously secular chapter had procured arms from some “friend” and together with some of their allies began guarding the three churches in the cathedral complex.⁴¹¹

The first steps taken by many of the Catalan clergy during these early weeks was to turn the secular retaliation against the foreign soldiers or worse against fellow Catalans who supported the king, conceiving it as Divine intervention and deliverance. After all, the problems within the region were not all the product of violence and quartering: larger concerns such as the war with France and the drastic weather conditions affected the Catalan psyche as well. Taking the bigger picture in account suggest that the clergy were concerned with encouraging attitudes of repentance rather than turning the other cheek against their immediate persecutors. As the most senior religious authority within Catalonia, Bishop Manrique wrote a series of letters advocating this particular behavior.

In his letter to the citizens of Vic, recounting the series of catastrophes, he emphasized:

The difficulties with which this entire province has been afflicted are as great as we have ever experienced, and the Divine Majesty being disposed on this occasion that you may find him if He pleases, it has appeared to us we are not satisfied with our obligation without procuring on our part to apply all the means that we can to be of profit for delivering us from such afflictions and to attain the peace and quietude that we desire; and as it would be most efficacious to listen to God our Lord and with all affection to implore His divine clemency to restore us as before to apply to Him with particular prayers and petitions and considering that repenting of the sins as one ought with more fervor to listen to the remedy that we have from not ordering that these continue and increase in all the province.⁴¹²

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⁴¹⁰ “Lo estat perillos en que estamos en esta Provincia;” “totes les Universitats, Ciutats y Iglesies procuren posar guardis y custodias per fide reprimir tumulots de gent moguda que van per la terra.” AMU: Lletres de Actes, 1617-1658, Consellers de Barcelona to Consols de Urgell, 6 July 1640, f. 317-317v.

⁴¹¹ Ibid, f. 318.

⁴¹² “Las desdichas ab que de present se troba affligida tota esta provintia son tant grans com tots experimentam y havent disposat la divina magt que en esta occasio se trobas congregat aquest SIP nos ha aparegut no satisfariam a nostra obligatio sino procuravem per nostre part aplicar tots los medis que pugan ser de profit pera desliurarnos de tants afflictions y alcansar la pau y quietut que desitjam, y com lo mes efficas sie acudir a Deu nostre Sr y ab tot affecte Implorar la sua divina clementia resolguere als principis aplicarlo ab particulars orations y pregaries y considerant que arepents los danys se deu ab mes fervor acudir al remey havem de non ordenat ques continuassen y augmentassen en tota la provintia,” AHV: Correspondència Rebuda (v.13-1637-1640): Letter from “President” Manrique to the Consellers of Vic, 1 June 1640. It is probable that the title “President” refers to the bishop’s position as head of the Provincial
Needless to say, Manrique’s devout encouragement proved ineffective in rural Catalonia, particularly as the violence begun by the quartering continued, and the urban centers proved incapable modeling this alternative. Though prayers and petitions increased even after the bloody Corpus revolt, it soon became apparent that the situation required a greater religious response.

Where exhortations to prayer failed, some ecclesiastical figures took it upon themselves to visit the afflicted and encourage a spirit of reconciliation through their own persons. As was mentioned before, during the uprising at Corpus, the bishops of Barcelona, Vic, and Urgell, and other members attending the Provincial Council urged the rioters to desist and return home. Among the regulars, the Franciscans and Discalced Carmelites also tried to dissuade their rowdy brethren from any more acts of violence and destruction. Following Corpus Christi, the most notable attempt at reconciliation involving the church hierarchy was the embassy of the two Catalan bishops, Pau Duran of Urgell and Ramon de Sentmanat of Vic. Upon receiving the viceroyalty in mid-June, the Duke of Cardona headed north towards Girona and Perpignan, seeking in the first place to ascertain for himself the culpability of the Neapolitan soldiers, and second, to restore some semblance of order to the province through personal appearances. The two bishops—Duran, a confirmed defender of the crown, and Sentmanat, a quiet sympathizer with the people—accompanied him. Despite

Council then meeting in Barcelona, and concerned up until its decision to prorogue until November with the current crisis.

413 Bishop Manrique, as senior bishop of Catalonia had called a Provincial Council in late April, 1640, to discuss the troubled relations between the rural population and the soldiers. The Council convened in early May, was disrupted by the sacrilege at Riudarenes, and reconvened in June only a few days before the Corpus riot. The holding of the Council explains the otherwise unusual presence of so many bishops in Barcelona at this time.
the bishops’ good intentions, many of their fellow countrymen expressed doubts regarding the success of their venture. The Jurats of Girona wrote to the town of Vic in a gloomy tone that the trio had come: “to compose and give stability (if it is possible) to these revolutions, by which we are still in the same [miserable] state.”

The great turmoil that shook the province fundamentally affected all manner of relationships throughout Catalan society. The pre-modern view of the world was grounded on a belief in a worldly order reflective of the Divine Order, and encapsulated in the great Chain of Being, together with its correspondences throughout the natural world. Thus, when disorder threatened in one section of the Chain, a similar, or congruent, unruliness would be expected in another area. Disorder in the body politic—territory vs. prince—leads to disorder within the larger social bonds—peasants vs. lords—within the bonds of a particular estate—parish clergy or friars vs. bishops and abbots—and finally within the family or individual himself—the division of family members into partisan faction, or the visitation of famine or plague causing illness. As the Catalan rebellion turned into a full-fledged revolution within the Spanish empire, the leaders of Catalan society found it increasingly difficult to control renegade factions within their midst. The clergy was not immune from such turmoil, even early on in the revolt, and it was with great difficulty that these troublemakers were brought to heel.

One interesting example, arising early in the summer, concerned a parish priest from the diocese of Vic. Little is known about the man, Mossén Ramon Rosich, save that

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414 “per compondre y donar assiento (si es possible) a estas revoluciones, que per encara estan en lo mateix estat.” AHV: Correspondència Rebuda (v.13-1637-1640): Letter from Jurats of Girona to Consellers of Vic, 26 June 1640.
he “[was] disturbing in such a manner that troubles that city”\textsuperscript{415} and that he seems to have began causing problems in late June. Respecting the bishop’s right to prosecute ecclesiastical matters, and perhaps hoping that his authority would be more widely respected than their own, the consellers wrote to Ramon de Sentmanat, currently in transit with Bishop Duran and the viceroy to Perpignan.\textsuperscript{416} Upon receiving the letter—which in addition to relating the problem with Mossén Rosich, also lamented the bishop’s untimely absence—Sentmanat responded first of all by lamenting the general “very great novelties and alterations of the Provincials” which had caused his absence, and conveying his hopes that through prayers, God might be pleased to restore peace and order.\textsuperscript{417} Coming to the case of Mossén Rosich, however, the bishop determined to order his vicar-general, Dr. Dionis Monserrat, to collaborate with the city officials to capture the troublemaker and to punish him severely in order to make an example out of the priest.\textsuperscript{418} Within a month, Mossén Rosich had been found and imprisoned, and Bishop Sentmanat not only approved the firm hand taken, but advised further cooperation between the city fathers and the church hierarchy in the future.\textsuperscript{419}

\textsuperscript{415} “esta inquieta de manera que perturba a eixa ciutat”
\textsuperscript{416} This concern about the legitimacy of the Consellers authority within the city of Vic is all the more probable since the recent urban revolt that resulted in the death of the Conseller-en-Cap not more than a week or two before this incident.
\textsuperscript{417} “novedats tant grans y alteracions dels Provincials;” “asseguran los que stich ab lo desconsuleo se podran pensar V Magas en no poder acudir a ma residencia y tener ocaio de assistir en exa Ciutat havent hi las novedats tant grans y alteracions dels Provincials, Deu nos vulla affavorir ab que gossem de totat quiettut y lo medi han usat V Magas en fer se fesen rogativas es lo mes asertat”
\textsuperscript{418} “dono orde al Dr. dionis Monserrat peraqa avida a tot lo que V Magas les aparezeca dech complir a ma obligacio y axi estimo molt las captura se es feta de la persona de Mo ramon rossich ordenant se fortiffique lo process y conforme resultara dell se fasa un castich exemplar, que no desijo sino que los que estan debaxo de ma Jurisdictio vistan ajustats a sa obligacio y axi estimare a V Magas…” AHV: Correspondència Rebuda (v.13-1637-1640); Letter from Bishop Ramon de Sentmanat to the Consellers of Vic, 9 July 1640
\textsuperscript{419} AHV: Correspondència Rebuda (v.13-1637-1640); Letter from Bishop Ramon de Sentmanat to the Consellers of Vic, 8 August 1640.
Ironically, more than any single effort by the bishops of Catalonia, the chief means of calming down riotous and unruly crowds throughout the province was nothing less than the exposing of the Holy Sacrament within parish churches, drawing people to worship and to pray for peace. Unlike the activities of particular clerics, this hopeful remedy was implemented within days of the catastrophe at Riudarenes. On 5 May 1640, the vicar-general of Girona, Francesc Pejoan, sent a notice around to the churches and monasteries in the city of Girona letting them know that the Sacrament will be exposed “to pray to God our Lord that He might be pleased with us and to remedy and guide [us] with peace and tranquility all these Things, in particular within this Principat, for His Holy Service, and that of the King, our lord, and the universal Benefit of the Land.”

This policy continued even as the foreign soldiers persisted in their wanton disregard for the Sacrament. During the more extreme situations of urban rioting, such as happened in Vic, Perpignan, and Barcelona during the month of June, members of religious orders like the Franciscans—or, in the case of Perpignan, the bishop himself—would take out the sacred chalice bearing the Eucharist bread and parade it before the crowds, beseeching them to reverence the Sacrament, to desist from their violence, and to return to their homes.

Despite the humble means used to restore social order, it is remarkable that in every single recorded case, the rioters, in an amazing display of reverence, halted their destruction, at least temporarily. Thus, for example, during Corpus Christi in Barcelona, a group of violent men were thwarted in their attempts to burn the house of a "traitor"

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420 “per supplicar a Deu nre Senor sia servit apredarse de nosaltres y remediar y encaminar ab pau y quietut totas las Cosas en particular del Pnt Principat per lo Seu Sanet Servey y del Rey nre Sr y Benus universal de la Terra,” ADG: I.4: Protocols de Lletres: U-245, ff. 144-144v
when some Franciscans came out from their religious house and calmly laid the image of Christ on the faggots.\footnote{Elliott, Revolt of the Catalans, 446-477. It is interesting to note that the Sacrament-bearing Franciscans were members of the sub-order, the Friars Minor, which, like the Capuchins, was a group of reformed Franciscans, de Rubí, Un segle de vida caputxina, 462.} In other places, priests and members of the regular orders were able to arrest the crowd's wrath by bringing out the Sacrament, while offering their houses as refuge for the intended victims of their swords.\footnote{Witness the kindness shown by the chapter of Girona and Bishop Parcero—the excommunicators—who saved the lives of a tercio captain, Don Ramon de Calders, by hiding him in the cathedral during the rioting at Pentecost in Girona, 26 May 1640, Elliott, Revolt of the Catalans, 431-432.}

During the early months of the Catalan rebellion, the province witnessed the double application of the Sacrament: some clergy used the Sacrament to \textit{stop} civil disorder, while others—often times, members of the same cathedral chapter, or of the same religious order—used it to \textit{initiate} civil unrest. It is either a great irony or a sign of how highly the Catalans thought of religious symbols that the main instrument in stopping these urban disturbances was the very Sacrament that had suffered insults at the hands of the Neapolitans and others. The continual public presence of the Sacred Host doubtlessly impressed upon the minds of Catalans throughout the province the chief distinction between themselves and the forces of Castile. Whereas the latter neglected to respect such a sacred item, and by so doing betrayed their own faith, the Catalans were showing it proper deference. As the summer months wore on, and reconciliation between Catalonia and the king with his army became less likely, the Sacrament would be lifted high by various clerics once more. This time, the Host would not deflect popular violence, but instead would redirect it against a foe willfully sacrilegious and obdurate in the face of religious reproof.
By early August, the growing sentiment among many Catalan clerics, in particular the cathedral chapters and the mendicant orders such as the Franciscans and Capuchins, was an impatience with the king’s dilatoriness in actively working to restore justice to the province, to address the sacrilegious burnings of May and June, and to come to any sort of an agreement with the Catalan authorities. When rumors or letters detailing any response from Madrid reached Barcelona, it was noised abroad that the king was irate with the audacity of local Catalan leaders to arrogate powers, even in these times of crisis. Persuaded by his corrupt ministers in Madrid, the news went, the king was not about to pass sentence on any of his soldiers, but instead was now planning an invasion of Catalonia. All that Catalans could expect would be that Castile was going to impose a strict obedience to Philip IV’s policies upon the troubled province, regardless of his soldiers’ irreligious conduct. As an example of this policy, the king wrote to the Minister General of the Friar Minors, commanding him to go to Catalonia personally to preach loyalty to the crown and to punish the rebel clerics within his order. This violent and uncompromising response to their problems seems to have taken many Catalans off guard; their surprise was soon replaced by indignation and defiance, an attitude that even began to infect some of the higher clergy.

Nevertheless, this change of heart took place gradually over the course of three months. Following the rapid succession of violent incidents in their cities during late May and June, the immediate response of the religious community in Catalonia was one that sought to restore internal order to the body politic as soon as possible. Only after the king had proved unwilling to aid their efforts—and by sending in an army, in effect

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423 de Rubí, *Un segle de vida caputxina*, 553.
considered their efforts to be traitorous—did their concern for internal stability become a concern for the defense of Catalonia and the Sacrament that united and defined it.

**Restoring Order on a Provincial Level-Persons**

While many Catalan clerics spent the summer months alternating between righteous indignation at the burning of the churches at Riudarenes and Montiró and earnestly trying to keep the local social unrest and chaos at a minimum, other members of the Church were actively engaged in the larger work of trying to restore order and justice throughout the province. Their efforts, which initially depended on publicized actions speedily ordered from Madrid, did not bear immediate fruit, leading them to question the willingness of King Philip IV to deal with them in an honest and upright manner. These questions would remain unresolved into the first days of September, when, royal aid still not forthcoming save in the presence of a large army massing along the Valencian borders, a number of Catalan clerics, together with members of the other estates, would swear an oath of allegiance to the Principat.

Before the rift between Crown and Province opened any wider, two clerics sought to bridge the gap, to re-establish a loyalty between Castile and Catalonia that was directed, not towards Madrid, that City of Man, typified by the body of the king, but rather towards the eternal City of God, in which all believers enjoyed a citizenship that was sealed with the Sacramental body of Christ. Though united in their faith and in their unwillingness to serve as diplomats, the two men were in many ways profoundly opposite: one was a Castilian, the other, a Catalan; one was an important bishop, the other, a lowly mendicant friar; one was appointed by the king, the other nominated by the Diputació. Yet despite these differences, Bishop Garcia Gil Manrique and the Capuchin
Fra Bernard de Manlleu sought to bring about a renewed harmony between Catalonia and Madrid in the face of continual French threat and centered on a renewed devotion to the Eucharistic ceremony. Through the intransigence of Olivares and Philip as well as of the Catalan leadership, both man ultimately failed in their respective missions, and the episodic resistance within Catalonia would begin to harden into an organized resistance to the Crown.

The embassy of Bernard de Manlleu, March-September, 1640

Although historically Catalonia had always maintained at least two ambassadors in Madrid—one from the Generalitat, and one from the Consell de Cent—the disturbances that occurred during the early months of 1640 necessitated extraordinary measures. Prompted by the first noises of problems with quartering and in particular the shocking murder of Don Antoni de Fluvià, the 18-person advisory board to the Diputació recommended a special embassy to the Crown. The person chosen for this important diplomatic mission was Bernard de Manlleu, a Capuchin friar.424

The choice of Manlleu appeared sound for a variety of reasons. First, the Capuchins had a very long history—extending almost as far back as the foundation of their order—as diplomats, particularly among the princes of France and Spain and their sundry quarrels that had been going on for nearly two centuries.425 In the second place, Fra Bernard had served Catalonia well throughout his lifetime of service and devotion in the order. He was born near Vic in 1586, and in 1605, he entered the convent of St. Eulàlia de Sarrià, on the outskirts of Barcelona, where he was ordained a priest. In 1628,

424 For a fairly exhausting study of Bernard de Manlleu’s embassy to Madrid in 1640 see the works by Fra Valenti Serra de Manresa, the current archivist of the Arxiu Provincial dels Caputxinos de Catalunya in Barcelona.
425 de Rubí, Un segle de vida caputxina, 451-452.
he became *definidor provincial*—an office akin to the Censor in the Roman Republic—to which post he was successfully re-elected every term until his death. His notable and faithful service to the Roussillonais during the plague years of 1631-32 had not passed unnoticed. He has been described as a man “of prophetic spirit and of singular unction, he was an excellent teacher of novices,” and his zealous devotion appears to have made up for any serious lack in appearance.\(^{426}\)

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Manlleu was the confidant-confessor to a number of influential Catalans: the Duke of Cardona, the Count of Santa Coloma, and Pau Claris in addition to serving as the official confessor of the Consell de Cent.\(^{427}\) His relationship with the viceroy Santa Coloma appears to have been particularly close. As his biographer, Basili de Rubí writes: “The Count of Santa Coloma had in Father Bernard a mentor and spiritual director … He frequently visited or wrote to him.”\(^{428}\) In 1639, the viceroy had specifically asked the friar to pray for his safety and even requested Manlleu to accompany him on the campaign to relieve Salses. The friar was pressed with other duties at the time—serving not only as *definidor provincial*, and *guardià* of the Capuchin convent at Montcalvari, but also as acting head of the region, since both the *ministre-provincial* and *pare provincial* were off visiting specific houses.\(^{429}\)

\(^{426}\) “d’esperit profètic i de singular unció, fou un mestre de novices excel·lent,” de Rubí, *Un segle de vida caputxina*, 494.

\(^{427}\) Ibid, 451. Pau Claris appears to have been particularly close to the Capuchin order. It was noted that Jeroni Corts de Sarrià, the *Ministre Provincial* at the time “tenia un ascendent singular sobre Pau Claris” in much the same way that Manlleu had “un ascendent singular sobre el comte de Santa Coloma.” Ibid, 493; 494.

\(^{428}\) “El comte de Santa Coloma tenia en el pare Bernardí un mentor i un director espiritual…El visitava o li escrivia amb freqüència.” Ibid, 480-481.

\(^{429}\) In his stead, Manlleu sent Pare Lleó de Calaf, who was captured by the French. Several other Capuchin friars also accompanied the relief force to Salses; five of them perished from the plague that year. Ibid, 480.
When Manlleu was first offered the opportunity of serving the province, his immediate response was to refuse it. The prospects for the mission were not optimistic, and Bernard de Manlleu appears to have taken a serious account of his personal qualities and found himself lacking in many respects to this job. On top of this, he had a sincere longing for spiritual retirement and did not relish the prospect of casting himself in the limelight, especially with such heavy responsibilities attached to this embassy.\textsuperscript{430} Although he pleaded not to go, someone in the Generalitat evidently believed he was the right man for the job, quite possibly because his position as confessor to both factions in Barcelona would enhance a spirit of political disinterestedness, while his intimacy with the viceroy would make his loyalty to the king appear beyond reproach. Certainly the President of the Generalitat, Pau Claris, praised him to the skies in his letter to the \textit{Pare Provincial}, Pau de Sarrià.

As part of his Fabian tactics to delay receiving the appointment as ambassador, Manlleu pointed out to Claris that he first needed permission to leave the convent from his provincial father, who was also pessimistic about the friar’s possible success. The humble friar also pleaded to severe nervousness when asked to speak in public. Claris confidently dismissed this diffidence in his letter to Sarrià in early March. Father Bernard, Claris declared, could be the only choice for the Generalitat “in spite of the impediment in his speech, for Moses suffered in the same way, and yet was chosen by God to redeem the children of Israel.”\textsuperscript{431} Although the \textit{Pare Provincial} gave his

\textsuperscript{430} In fact, several letters from Manlleu to the Diputació while he was in Madrid seem to indicate from the start a willingness to find a replacement, and to return home and to live in peaceful obscurity.

\textsuperscript{431} ACA: G, 909, Lletres secretes, 1605-1674, Diputats to Pare Provincial of the Capuchins, 6 March 1640,
approval, Manlleu’s departure was further delayed by the need for the Pare General of the Order to give his authorization, which occurred later in the month.\textsuperscript{432}

As the Generalitat persevered in establishing the Capuchin as their official ambassador, the situation in Catalonia continued to deteriorate. On 10 March, the viceroy placed two of Barcelona’s five Consellers under arrest; on 14 March, the General’s letter giving permission to Manlleu to leave arrived, and the following day, he set out. In the end, the Diputats appear to have made some concession to Fra Bernard’s extreme reluctance, and decided to send another Capuchin, Fra Joan Omedes i Centelles—otherwise known as Fra Juan de Sardenya—as Aaron to their “Moses.” Unlike the Biblical story, however, Sardenya appears rarely to have worked well with his counterpart, and, on account of his close relations with the Count-Duke, was accused of sabotaging the mission.\textsuperscript{433} Only three days later, the viceroy placed Francesc de Tamarit, the diputat militar, under arrest, and asked Bishop Parcero, the “Jutge del Breu” or chief ecclesiastical judge in Catalonia, to begin a criminal investigation against Pau Claris. Santa Coloma was quite upset at the departure of Bernard de Manlleu for Madrid. He had apparently asked the Marquis de Villafranca to prevent the travel of the Pare General from France into Roussillon, so that Manlleu wouldn’t get official permission to travel, although he later denied this in a letter to Madrid on 24 March.\textsuperscript{434}

Manlleu arrived in Madrid on Good Friday, 6 April, and went to stay in the Capuchin convent of San Antonio. There, he met with Joan Grau i Montfalcó, the regular

\textsuperscript{432} The General of the Capuchins, an Italian, was actually on a mission through France and Spain at the time, though whether this was part of a regular semi-annual itinerary, or was a special trip on account of the war between the two countries is uncertain.
\textsuperscript{433} de Rubi, \textit{Un segle de vida caputxina}, 499-500. Unfortunately, the only basis for stating that Sardenya had close connections with Olivares comes from Manlleu’s letters back to the Generalitat, and the fact that Sardenya met with the duke more times than Manlleu.
\textsuperscript{434} Ibid, 502.
agent of the Generalitat, who resented the special ambassador’s interference with his affairs. On the king’s orders, a 12-man deputation sent from Barcelona to protest the arrest of Tamarit were intercepted before they reached Madrid and held by agents of the Protonotary, Jerónimo de Villanueva, in Alcalá. As soon as they were able, they wrote to Manlleu, asking him to intervene with the king and get them released, thus distracting the Capuchin from his original mission before he had even presented it. His first meeting was before Cardinal Antonio Borja, a member of the King’s Council, about two weeks after his arrival in Madrid, and on April 27, he stood before the Council of Aragon to ask that the ambassadors be free to come to Madrid. The council listened politely but refused to advocate his request before the king.

Following that lone appearance, Fra Bernard de Manlleu was shunned until 10 May, when Fra Juan de Sardenya and he were granted an audience with the King. The meeting was only a half-hour long, however, and conversation was limited to the excesses of the soldiers. While news of the burning at Riudarenes had reached both the friar and the king, Manlleu was not permitted to speak to His Majesty either about the continued imprisonment of Tamarit or his fellow ambassadors. At the end of the audience he and Sardenya distributed copies of the memorial they received from the Diputats. Despite all this, Manlleu somehow managed in that brief space to convey a good impression; he would become a favorite with the king who enjoyed hearing from him and admired his sanctity.

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435 Ibid, 507.
436 Ibid, 514.
438 Ibid, 521.
Also on the afternoon of the 10th, Manlleu met with the Count-Duke in the Buen Retiro, where they discussed the troubling state of affairs in Catalonia. Olivares pressed him in particular with the cold-blooded death of Monrodon—a detail that Claris had somehow forgot to transmit to Manlleu in his most recent letter—and used that incident as an argument against all the suffering Manlleu painted for him. The Count-Duke made it clear that he wanted the Generalitat to punish the murderers of Monrodon before they could expected the king to take steps towards punishing the soldiers who had burnt the church.439 When the friar brought up the subject of the imprisoned ambassadors, Olivares brusquely cut him off, telling him that the king did not want to be bothered with all these ambassadors—but in the end, agreed to release them.

After these brief meetings with the king and his chief minister, Bernard de Manlleu passed the rest of his time in Madrid quietly; though he may have come before the king again, his talks were limited to homilies rather than direct advocacy. On the last day of May, the Pare General of the order, Joan de Moncalieri, finishing up a tour of Valencia and Andalusia, arrived in Madrid, where he met with the friar. The General confided in Manlleu that he was planning to return to Aragon and Catalonia in order to celebrate the religious festival connected with the convening of the triennial Capuchin provincial council.440 Manlleu duly passed this information on to the Diputació in a letter dated 2 June, in which he further explained his belief that his mission was over. Tamarit had been released—albeit by mob action, not by royal decree; the soldiers were moving out of the province; and a force led by Don Juan de Garay and the Marquis de Mortara were ostensibly setting out from Perpignan to Barcelona to punish those culpable for the

439 Ibid, 523.
440 Ibid, 543.
destruction of the Sacrament. All in all, the Capuchin doubted that he would be able to accomplish anything further by staying in Madrid—indeed, it is doubtful if he accomplished anything while serving the Generalitat. Certainly the king was not looking with a more sympathetic or religious eye towards solving the Catalan Problem.

Pau Claris received the letter on the 6th of June, and at first was inclined to accept the friar’s resignation. He put off answering the letter, however, until the next morning, June 7, Corpus Christi. By the afternoon, Claris had revised his letter and asked Manlleu to stay on and continue his work in light of the new catastrophe that had arisen. Reluctantly, Manlleu asked General Moncalieri—still in Madrid—who gave his approval, assuredly much to the disappointment of the friar. Manlleu would continue his efforts through the fall, although with only a small degree of success. By the time of his eventual recall, the situation in Catalonia had gone far beyond the simple diplomacy expected of the Capuchin in the early days of March. The time for words had passed; the time for action had begun.

Bernard de Manlleu was not the only clerical ambassador serving the Generalitat during the spring and summer of 1640. On 19 March, after the arrest of the Diputat Tamarit, a twelve-member special embassy—three from each estate, or braç, and three from Barcelona—was sent to Madrid to request his release. Among the representatives from the clergy was Francesc Oluja, the influential dean of Lleida. Another cleric, Melchior Palau, the archdeacon of Vic, was sent out by Santa Coloma in May in an attempt to present a more sympathetic view of the count’s actions. Palau arrived late in the month and apparently spent little time before the court until after the events of Corpus Christi reached Madrid. Olivares asked Palau for his suggestion and was outraged when
the cleric replied "that one not only ought to excuse the given motive for sedition, but also to put forward means by which to pardon and assuage the villains." In the end, though all of their missions had failed, the Catalan leadership looked back on their negotiations as further proof of their loyalty to the crown. Had they been merely interested in rebellion, it was argued, would they have bothered to fund three separate embassies to the king, or wasted the services of these influential men? While it was fairly evident that the Catalan-sponsored clerics were proving unable to heal the breach between Catalonia and the Crown by July, it was not yet clear whether the new viceroy, Bishop Garcia Gil Manrique, would be able to restore order, uniting the highest ecclesiastical and secular authorities in his person.

The viceroyalty of Bishop Garcia Gil Manrique, July-November, 1640

One of the more obvious problems in Catalonia following the disturbances of Corpus Christi was the need to replace Santa Coloma. Although scholars have discovered that Philip IV was planning on removing the viceroy before the festival, it is unclear whether the Duke of Cardona—the actual replacement—was in fact, the intended replacement. Placing Cardona in the seat of authority was a satisfactory choice for many Catalans. The most powerful Catalan noble, and a former viceroy, Cardona held the confidence of many clerics and merchants in Barcelona, to say nothing of the other Catalan nobility.

441 "que no sólo se debe excusar el dar motivo para la sedición, sino poner los medios de sosegar y reducir a los villanos." Junta de Ejecución, in Zudaire Huarte, El conde-duque y Cataluña, Appendix to chapter XII, 460. Again, Palau was the archdeacon who had helped lead a rebellious protest against Castile only six years before. It appears, however, that he was friends with the viceroy, and was soon able to gain a more powerful position in Madrid, where he occasionally served as an advisor to Olivares on Catalan affairs.
442 See Elliott, Revolt of the Catalans, 398; 439; 442-443.
Upon assuming control, Cardona organized an expedition to Perpignan to straighten out the problems there, taking with him Pau Duran and Ramon de Sentmanat, the only two Catalan bishops in the region, probably as a further sign that the Catalan secular and religious hierarchies were determined to root out the troublesome elements while remaining loyal to the crown.\textsuperscript{443} The biggest problem with the Duke’s appointment, however, concerned his health, which, considering his age, was not good. Shortly after he arrived in Perpignan in late July, Cardona passed away, leaving Catalonia again without a viceroy, one of its major cities in the throes of conflict with royal tercios, and a countryside still upset over the delayed punishment of sacrileges. In this position, Philip IV chose as viceroy Garcia Gil Manrique, the bishop of Barcelona. There were many favorable reasons for choosing Manrique.

He had come to Catalonia in 1628 as bishop of Girona; had spent time as the Diputat Eclesiàstic from 1631-1634, during a particularly tense time of Catalan relations with Castile; and had emerged with respect from many both inside and outside the Church. These positions and the time spent in the province enabled Manrique to acquire a good knowledge of Catalan customs and usages. With his previous history as a negotiator favorable to the Crown’s interest, Manrique no doubt seemed the perfect choice. The appointment of a cleric, and the most senior cleric of Catalonia at that, would also show that the crown was interested in protecting the Church, showing that the church of God was on their side. Indeed, upon his appointment to the highest secular

\textsuperscript{443} This was particularly true of Pau Duran, whom we have seen was especially loyal to the crown’s interests in Urgell. Ramon de Sentmenat, however, appeared reluctant to join the party. Already some canons were upset at the small amount of time he had spent in his own diocese, and it is possible that an unwillingness to offend a tempermental chapter more than a desire to sabotage the expedition led to his reluctance. Both bishops completed the trip to the Perpignan but left shortly after the death of Cardona.
position in the province, Manrique made it clear that his concerns for the people of Catalonia were to be his top priority, and that local leaders would be expected to help. Though not espousing a particular plan to restore order and confidence, Manrique wrote, “recognizing the miserable state in which we find ourselves, you will assist me in procuring, in the first place, the quietude of the Province.”

As noble-minded as the decision might have been, the appointment of Manrique to the position of viceroy was not enough to convince many Catalans that any significant change had occurred in the king’s mind regarding the disgraceful sacrileges. The soldiers remained unpunished; justice remained undone. Furthermore, from a legal perspective, the appointment of bishops as viceroys was an extremely controversial one. In the recent history of Catalonia, the presence of a bishop-viceroy was a sure sign that instability and chaos were not far behind. Since 1629, when Philip IV had tried to make Luis Díez de Aux de Armendáriz, the bishop of Urgell, viceroy, the Catalan church had protested the matter to Pope Urban VIII, claiming that the king was going against a papal bull regarding ecclesiastical immunity and the Catalan clergy’s constitutions, which kept ecclesiastical and secular jurisdictions distinct and separate.445 The issue revolved around the oath that each viceroy took to the king, in which the official swore to observe and respect the laws of the Principat and to punish all offenders. Unless endowed with a special dispensation from Rome or Madrid, however, the bishop-viceroy was unable to order any secular punishment for criminals. As the Catalan jurist Felip Vinyes wrote

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444 “con attendencia al miserable estado en que nos hallamos, me assistiran Procurando en primer lugar la quietud de la Provincia.” AHV: Correspondència Rebuda (v.13-1637-1640): Letter from Bishop Manrique, Lieutenant and Captain General of Catalonia to Consellers of Vic, 5 August 1640.
445 For a detailed description of the legal complications regarding the fusion of an ecclesiastical representative with a position of civil authority see Història de la Generalitat de Catalunya i dels Seu Presidents. vol II: 1518-1714, 185-191.
regarding felons under the rule of bishop-viceroys: “they are not able to be punished save by God, in observance of the oath to which they [the bishops] are obligated [to follow].”

This religious and legal objection had serious pragmatic ramifications for each and every bishop-vicerey. At the center of the Catalan resistance to such nominations was the understanding that the viceroy’s authority was not grounded in the office itself, but rather delegated from the king. His ability to execute justice corresponded to the powers granted to the highest secular magistrate—powers that were forbidden normally for the clergy to exercise. The Catalan historian, Eva Serra, has pointed out the paradox that, despite the apparent union of civil and ecclesiastical authority in the bishop-vicerey, the holder of such an office was usually more dependent on Madrid, since it required a special investiture from the king or Pope for him to be able to prosecute any offender, rebel, or disturber of the peace in the civil courts. This problem—so important in a land riven by civil unrest, and so desperately in need of a clear and forceful authority—was immediately apparent to many Catalans. Francesc Ferrer of Barcelona commented on this in his diary, following Manrique’s ceremonial oath in the cathedral:

This oath only appears good, for forthwith the bishop took the vow, it was rumored that all was done by the privado out of a desire to finish off the land, by having a cleric as viceroy, without having a brief from His Holiness to punish delinquents, the privado trusting that by the great disturbances, [and] wounds that are present in Catalonia, we are going to kill and finish off one another. 

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446 “però ells no poden èsser castigats sinó de Déu, per la religió del jurament que estan obligats.” Ibid, 186.
447 Ibid, 185.
448 “Asso no aparague molt be per que encontinent se digue que tot eran trassas del privat per voler acabar la terra, fer virrey a un ecclesiastich, sens tenir breu de sa santedad per castigar als delinquents reffiantse lo privat que per les grans inquietuts, qice lesores y avia dins Cathalunya nos vindraim a matar y acabar los uns als altres.” AHCB Ms. B-148: Dietari of Francesc Ferrer, or “Successos de Cathalunya en los anys de 1640 y 1641,” pp. 4-5. Emphasis mine.
Despite the best of intentions, Manrique was hampered from the beginning in his attempts to bring peace and order to the land that he had served for almost a decade. The archives do not reveal any significant decree or order, proclamation or prohibition that Manrique issued during his brief tenure as viceroy. In many ways, he was overshadowed by the charismatic Pau Claris, who was daily gathering Catalans to a different standard, one that bore not the Lion and Castle, but the Cup and the Bread.

By the end of September, with the king’s army stationed right outside the Catalan border, and with the Diputació and the Braços General assuming command over the province, it became evident that both Manrique and Manlleu had failed in their attempts at reconciliation. Two months later, Manrique would be officially removed from his post as viceroy in favor of the Catalan commander of the king’s invasion force, the Marquis de los Vélez, while Manlleu would finally receive his long-awaited orders to return home to Barcelona.449 As the two men encapsulated so many differences before their respective missions, so too did they differ in the wake of them. Manlleu, arriving home around the beginning of the new year, continued to serve the Capuchin order as definidor provincial, but faded into the blissful obscurity that he had sought ever since the beginning of his diplomatic mission. Little more is known about him, save that his efforts at peace were quite forgotten in his lifetime, and that he died in 1644 at the convent of the Ermites in Girona.450 Bishop Manrique, on the other hand, would continue to serve as a religious figurehead for many months to come until his final expulsion from Catalonia in 1642.

449 The Catalan leadership in Barcelona refused to countenance the king’s new appointee as viceroy, and their letters to Manrique up until January of 1641 continue to refer to him with the viceregal title of “captain-general.”
450 de Rubí, Un segle de vida caputchina, 494.
Restoring Order on a Provincial Level—Through Petitions & Payments

While Manlleu and Manrique both fretted about their respective jobs, other clerics from around the province were beginning to feel that something more concrete needed to be done. Two months had already passed since the first excommunications against the Neapolitan tercio and its commander, and still Madrid had dawdled on making an official pronouncement either confirming or repudiating the sentence. In the vacuum created by the royal silence, a great uncertainty remained. Many Catalans realized they did not have the authority to execute any secular judgment on the guilty soldiers—such as expelling them from the province—but yet could not understand the king’s reluctance to act. Another embassy was sent to Madrid, made up of nine members—three from each estate—to ask once more for prompt justice and for better appointments. In return for their concern, the new ambassadors were stopped short of Madrid and placed under house arrest. In the face of deteriorating relations between themselves and their king, the Generalitat authorized a letter to be sent to the pope providing a brief history of past events as well as present difficulties with the king. As they waited to hear from either Rome or Madrid, many towns began to take preliminary measures to ensure their own safety, either against renegade bands of soldiers or unruly bands of locals. In this effort, they were helped by local religious orders and cathedral chapters, which gave of their time, energy, and finances in order to defend themselves against the present dangers. The events of Corpus Christi only heightened this local urgency for defense: in a letter dated shortly afterwards, the city of Barcelona recommended that cities exercise their royal
Privileges to create militia companies manned by students and confraternity members “in the service of God and for the public weal.”

The appointment of the Duke of Cardona, though in many ways satisfying to the Catalan families in power, did little to assuage the panic that was passing through the countryside. Much like the Great Fear in France during the summer and autumn of 1789, the small villages of rural Catalonia fell prey to every whispered rumor of large armed bodies of men. Ironically, few of these rumors, if any, were about the royal tercios of King Philip; on the contrary, most of them were filled with stories of unemployed but armed peasants, wandering about without a leader. In the face of social collapse—real or perceived—the Catalan government in Barcelona redoubled its efforts to get the king to approve some measures for restoring justice to their land, beginning with a public rebuke and censure of the sacrilege wrought by the king’s own army. The larger cities also began taking matters into their own hands, though it is not clear whether this was a tacit realization that the gristmills of Madrid’s bureaucracy ground exceedingly slow, or the first small step towards autonomous rule.

Soon after Cardona’s exit from town in late June 1640, the city of Barcelona began making preparations to ensure the defense of their city against another armed foe. The city’s precarious financial state, however, forced the governors to look for help. On 4 July, the Consell de Cent sent an embassy to Bishop Manrique, asking him to order a series of clerical donations to subsidize the new fortifications around the city. For whatever reason, Manrique agreed to this proposal and sent out two of Barcelona’s

AHV: Correspondència Rebuda (v.13-1637-1640): “per defensa de aquella en tenem et en virtut de Privilegi real concedit a esta Ciutat de poder ordenar als…Confraries…al sevey de Deu nre Sr de Sa Magd beenfici y policia de la cosa publica…” Consellers of Barcelona to Consellers of Vic, 11 June 1640.
consellers with his blessing to the town’s religious orders. As before, the Capuchins—being faithful to their vow of poverty—were not able to donate any money for the cause, but Jeroni de Sarrià, now guardià of Montcalvari, wrote to the Diputació: “Right willing are our persons and the sweat of our brows, working on whatever project that in the present occasion Your Lordship will command us for the fortification of the city.”

The example of Barcelona

The news of the offenses committed by the Neapolitans first came to the attention of the Barcelona chapter on 4 June 1640, when a delegation from the Generalitat consisting of canons Jaume Pla from Girona, and Don Llorens de Barutell from Urgell came to the church recounting the horrors of the sacrilege. That same day, the chapter sent an embassy to the viceroy Santa Coloma, led by canons Cassador—another acting vicar-general—and Callar. There then follows an interesting gap in city and provincial news until the following week, when on 11 June—four days after the Corpus riot—the chapter received an embassy from the city of Barcelona, describing in more detail all the horrors of the church burnings. What is even more interesting is that following this graphic account was appended the small line, “Quescriga al Rey donantli rahon del fet del dia de Corpus.” Evidently, the city was inclined to link the two events together, and

452 “de bona gana són les nostres persones i la suor del front, treballant en qualsevol cosa que en la present ocasió V Sria ens ordenés per a la fortificació de la ciutat.” de Rubí, Un segle de vida caputxina, 576. On 6 August 1636, the city of Barcelona asked Bishop Manrique to request all chapters, monasteries, and colleges donate money towards fixing the city’s fortifications. While the Capuchins were unable to forward any cash, on 30 September, a band of 60 friars, led by Bernard de Manlleu came to work at 6 o clock in the morning until “the appointed hour,” giving a good example to the people. The works were stopped by Philip IV a few weeks later. Ibid, 473.

453 ACB: I. A. Resolucions: Llibre de la Sibelle: 1625-1645, f. 306. It is interesting to note that Pla and Barutell were used continually as ambassadors for the Generalitat during the summer and fall of 1640, and that both would rise to become two of the most outspoken advocates for the French cause during the revolt. It is possible that their already-aggressive attitude influenced members of the Generalitat in selecting them.
even to raise the outrages of the soldiers as an excuse for the violent behavior of Barcelona’s crowds, and the unfortunate murder of the viceroy. Nothing further concerning the disturbances of the countryside is mentioned in the chapter’s proceedings until 25 June, when the following item is noted: “On account of the many events occurring in Catalonia, and in the said City [of Barcelona] it is hereby resolved to offer three masses of supplication each week.”

Indications that several within Barcelona feared negotiations would not go well in Madrid may be perceived by the embassy sent to the chapter by the city council early on 5 July stating that the city was preparing to commence re-fortifying its walls. Significantly, the ambassadors pointed out to the canons assembled that after five years of financing the war the city’s treasury was nearly exhausted, and asked the church to step in and provide the necessary aid, promising that all would be spent on the engineering project. Now, the city could be giving two reasons for asking for this money. The first, and the one that was used by cities in the rural heart of the revolt like Vic and Girona, was to guard the city against armed attack by the segadors or other displaced, angry and armed migrant workers. However, it is tempting to see in this request a foreshadowing of a larger conflict against trained bands of men, against France, or—could it be?—against Castile.

Unwilling to commit to anything then and there, the chapter promised an answer the next day, and immediately sent out a summons bringing in all the canons currently in

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454 “that you will write to the King giving him a reason for the events of Corpus Christi.” ACB: I.A.Resolucions: Llibre de la Sibelle: 1625-1645, f. 306v.
455 “Per raho dels molts succeses succèits en Cathalunya, y en la prenenat Ciutat fa resolt que cada semman se digan tres misses de pregaries.” ACB: I. A. Resolucions: Llibre de la Sibelle: 1625-1645, f. 307.
town. On 6 July they agreed to contribute funds for the project and sent a letter to the bishop and the town councilors spelling out precisely their planned path. For such an assignment, the chapter appointed three important and significant men: the sacristan, Hieronym Roig, and the two most noble canons, Don Jacinto Carbonell and Don Joachim Descaller, to take charge of the chapter’s contributions to the fortifications. Within a few days, the sacristan reported back to the chapter that a meeting with Manrique had gone well, and that the bishop had approved the means to raise the money for the city. A grand total of 600 lliures was raised.

Yet it was not only with the secular defense of the city that the Consell de Cent was concerned, but also with their standing before God. On 13 July, another embassy from the City arrived in the cathedral, asking the canons to advise them on how they could atone for the various “offenses against the Lord our God.” Among the suggestions the city put forth was the celebration of another Corpus, in order to atone for the horrors that interrupted the scheduled feast almost before it began. After some discussion, it was agreed to reschedule the Corpus festival in the light of the “movements and restlessness that are present in Barcelona.” That same day, more prayers were offered for the state of the city and those living in it. From a cynical perspective, the offering of another festival on the scale of Corpus would mean added expense: Corpus Christi was

458 ACB: I. A. Resolucions: Llibre de la Sibelle: 1625-1645, f. 309. The money would be delivered in full to the city before 21 August, at which date the city sent an embassy of thanks to the chapter. ACB: I. A. Resolucions: Llibre de la Sibelle: 1625-1645, f. 310.
459 “tants ofenses a deu ne sr volguenem aconsellar a la Ciutat lo ques podra fer per remediar tants ciutis com hi ha en ella y també volguem tenir a be en son cas, y lloch fer la professo de Corpus per quant per las inquietuts y avia agut diá nos pogue fer…” ACB: I. A. Resolucions: Llibre de la Sibelle: 1625-1645, f. 308v.
460 “que dilate fer la professo de Corpus que los moviments y inquietuts hi ha dins Barca” ACB: I. A. Resolucions: Llibre de la Sibelle: 1625-1645, f. 309.
one of the most popular and most extravagant of all the Catalan processions at this time, if not the most popular. All the city government, all the provincial government, all the high clerics of the church, and all the guilds of Barcelona paraded through town, bedecked in lavish costumes. The expense generated by such a festival was enormous—certainly more than a city eager to spend every penny on defense would be willing to contribute. And yet, in the face of this danger, the leading citizens of Barcelona felt the need to get right with God first, even while preparing the public defense.

August appears to be the decisive month for the chapter, turning its attitude from an eager willingness to help to a frustrated desire to take matters into their own hands. On 2 August, the chapter welcomed Bishop Manrique in an unusual appearance at their meeting. He came to inform them that Philip IV had named him the new viceroy. With customary deference to tradition, Manrique sought the chapter’s approval before officially accepting, and the vicar-general Boldo, speaking for the body, declared that they were pleased with the grace the king had bestowed. Furthermore, the chapter promised prayers and masses for his term in office, “in the service of God, of his Majesty, and for the common good and that of the Principat.”

By 30 August, however, the very day of the calling of the Braços, the chapter met and nominated Sacristan Hieronym Roig, Archdeacon Corts, and canons Paga, Pleja, Bisbe Vidal, and Ximenis to represent the cathedral canons at the Braços General.

461 ab nostras orations y sacrificis pregaram a ne sr en caminas fas actions al servei de Deu, de sa Magt y benefici del be public y principat.” ACB: I. A. Resolucions: Llibre de la Sibelle: 1625-1645, f. 310.
Tension was rising high in the city of Barcelona by the fifth of September. On that day, the canons organized a grand procession inside the cathedral “for the great necessities of the present concerns of Catalonia, Thursday and Friday [that is, the calling of the Braços General] and that it should be conducted as may be read …. in the Archives for the prayers and armed which the City has demanded.” ⁴⁶³ A few days later, the cathedral chapter added a special resolution, dedicating every Thursday to prayers for the necessities of the province, with a special mass in the chapel of Santa Eulalia beginning on 10 September and continuing until the final resolution of their grievances. ⁴⁶⁴

The Oath to the Principat

By the thirtieth of August, the decision had been made by the Generalitat to call the Braços General. This body, a sort of Catalan Estates General, had once been quite common during the medieval period, ruling the province in the name of the king in the interim periods between Cortes. For over a century, however, the body had never been called, although recently attempts had been made by Catalans to call the assembly in terms of a state of emergency. Regardless, the calling of the Braços General marked a significant step for the Catalans. Up till now, no talk of rebellion and resistance to royal troops had been discussed; the only trouble had come from rural areas and their uncoordinated attacks along the roadsides. Despite this apparent calm, the Catalans in Barcelona and elsewhere felt that the injustice of the soldiers had not been addressed at all. Now, the localized burnings and raids were to become important to the entire

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⁴⁶³ “por las necessitats grans de las Cossas Corrents de Cathalunya, dijous y divendras y ques fassa com para leia … als Arxiues per les pregaries, y armas se an de demanara la Ciutat.” Ibid, f. 311.

⁴⁶⁴ These prayers and masses were done “according to the forms of 1624 and 1639” ACB: I. A. Resolucions: Llibre de la Sibelle: 1625-1645, f. 311v.
province: members of the three estates from all over were being asked to participate in this gathering.

The first meeting of the Braços began on 10 September—even though few delegates had arrived by that time. As the syndics from Girona noted, the talking that day was concerned for three hours about “the soldiers who through the encroachments made against the inhabitants of this province, burned and robbed Churches and particular houses.” Further discussion centered on a letter “written by the Lord Bishop of Girona and from Fra Bernard de Manlleu and a decree published in Madrid” to the effect that Philip was already at Zaragoza with an army “desiring to come to Catalonia in order to punish the rebels.”

The first order of business was to make a final appeal to the crown to recognize the violation of the moral law committed by the soldiers and to rectify it in order to satisfy natural justice. As such, a grand petition to the king was written, published, and sent to the king, and also distributed to the various Catalan towns setting forth the Catalan agenda. Fundamentally it called for the re-establishment of justice, peace, tranquility, and an end to the sacrileges, “in order to impede the entrance into Catalonia of sacrilegious and excommunicated soldiers, who have twice burned the Most Holy Sacrament … that are now in Roussillon…with great insult to God our Lord, to Your

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465 In the confusion and upheaval, few noticed the letter from Dr. Francesc Pejoan, vicar-general of Girona, to Pere Borrell, presbyter and rector of the church at Montiró, which gave the latter permission to bless and rededicate the rebuilt church. ADG: I:4: Protocols de Lletres: U-246, 29 August 1640. Whether the church of Riudarenes was likewise rebuilt and rededicated remains a mystery.

Majesty, an irreparable damage to Province and its Inhabitants, and a violation of its Laws,” while at the same time stressing their “loyalty, fidelity, and obedience.”

Despite these measures, the Braços began to pursue steps towards expanding their own authority within the province, as if expecting a rejection of their proposals. Just three days after their commencement, the Braços decided first to raise taxes in order to support “our natural defense,” and second, to double the membership of the advisory Junta to thirty-six. Not one of the six new clerics added were from Barcelona, an indication that the revolt had moved beyond the regional capital to the rest of Catalonia. Later that day, two 12-person juntas were established: a Junta de Guerra and a Junta de Hazienda: once more, in accordance with Catalan custom, each estate was represented equally. Even more than this, nearly every category of clergy within Catalonia was represented in these Juntas.

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467 “para impedir la entrada en Cathaluña a los soldados sacrilegos, y descomulgados, por haver quemado dos vezes el Santissimo Sacramento…que se hallan en Rossellon…con notable agravio de Dios nuestro Señor, de Vm, daño irreparable de la Provincia, y Provinciales, y contrafaccion de sus Leyes;” “lealtad, fidelidad, y obediencia.” Ibid, 18 September 1640. It is interesting to note that the broadside was translated from Catalan to Castilian before publication. Both the Catalans and the king received Castilian versions of the redress. This may suggest that linguistic nationalism—though popular and almost definitive of nationalism in the nineteenth century—was not as important to the Catalan mind as, say, linguistic, religious, or customary nationalism. Rather than define themselves by a particular tongue, the Catalans found special significance in their history: the introduction of Christianity, the special attachment to natural law and justice, etc.

468 “la nostra deffensa natural.” AHCB: Ms. B-143, Francesc Puig, canon of Tortosa, Dietari de la guerra dels Segadors, pp. 9-15. A compilation of Puig’s account as well as that of the city notary of Barcelona, Miguel Marquès, has been published by Basili de Rubí, and Ramón Vidal. Les Corts generals de Pau Claris: dietari o procés de corts de la junta general de Braços del 10 de setembre de 1640 a mitjan març de 1641: manuscrit de Miquel Marquès (Barcelona: Fundació Salvador Vives Casajuana, 1976).

469 The new members included: Fra Miquel Salavardenya, abbot of San Miquel de Cuxa; Don Miquel Sala, infermer and canon of Tarragona, and their syndic; Dr. Jaume Pla, canon and syndic of Girona; Dr. Diego Palau, canon and syndic of Vic; Dr. Josep Geroni Bessora, canon and syndic of Lleida; and Dr. Fra Josep Montaner, prior of Scala Dei—an order of hermit-monks. AHCB: Puig, Dietari, pp. 13-14.

470 Clerical members in the Junta de Guerra: Fra Francesc Miquel, knight of St. John; Fra Don Miquel Torrellas, knight of St. John; Fra Raphael Domenech, Benedictine monk from Ripoll; Batista Beltran, canon of Tarragona, and expert on fortifications. Clerical members of the Junta de Hazienda: Fra Miquel Salavardenya, see above; Dr. Joan Pau del Rosso, dean of Barcelona’s chapter; Fra Soler, abbot of St. Pau del Camps, Barcelona; Don Llorens de Barutell, canon of the Seu d’Urgell. AHCB: Puig, Dietari, pp. 15-17.
Throughout these opening days, the Braços General made it clear that the primary reason for their actions was defensive in nature, and specifically directed to redress the injustice created by the troops back in May and June. Whatever may have been the secular or political motivations behind their policies in the autumn of 1640—and historians have freely speculated on these ulterior motives—every single public declaration and explanation for their actions was couched in the terms of a spiritual and natural defense. Thus their letters to the king, the king’s confessor, and the Pope, written on 15 September so that their persecutors might be without excuse should they invade Catalonia, professed a concern for the sacred: “out of fear [for] the oppressions of the soldiers which we have seen, and to prevent the holy temples of so Christian a province from being profaned another time or the Most Holy Sacrament from being burned.”

Thus the following day, when the Braços authorized the formation of official Catalan regiments, to defend their land against invasion, they forced only the following regulation that all their flags must carry on them “the insignia of the Most Holy Sacrament, with letters that read for God, for King, and for Patria.”

By the closing days of September, the situation remained bleak for the Catalan leadership. The king still refused to answer their petitions, and the royal mobilization of a new army along the borders of Aragon and Valencia continued. On 22 September, a faction within the city of Tortosa, which had been wary of explicitly aligning itself with the rest of the province, officially declared for the king. The prior of the city himself traveled to Madrid to profess in no uncertain terms the strict loyalty and love that the

471 “per temer las oppresiones de soldats en que ses vista, y impedir que los temples sagraed de una provinica tant christiana no sian altra vegada profanats ni cremat lo Sanctissim Sagrament.” Ibid, p. 25.
472 “la insignia del Sanctissim Sagrament, ab lletra que diga pro Deo, pro rege, et pro patria.” Ibid, p. 34.
denizens of Tortosa had for their king. An attempt was made to win back Tortosa’s allegiance by the Braços General, and once more, the campaign was spearheaded by a cleric, in this case, Josep Claresvalls, prior of the collegiate church of Santa Ana in Barcelona. A native of that city—which was, coincidentally, the richest see in Catalonia—Claresvalls was described as “a person of good impression and powerful in the city of Tortosa.” He had long played an important role in the religious disputes of the province, serving as Archbishop Guzman’s right-hand man during the Provincial Council of 1634, and ranking second in the judicial hierarchy of the Church as “jutge del breu” under Bishop Parcero. He was also a confirmed royalist. Though accompanied by the Conseller-en-Cap from Barcelona, Claresvall’s mission—perhaps not surprisingly—was unsuccessful. It appears that he stayed in Tortosa following the political excommunication of the town by the Braços General a few days later.

In response to Tortosa’s defection, the Braços General decided that definitive steps were needed to reveal once and for all who they could trust within their own lands: an act that would separate, as it were, the faithful sheep from the treacherous goats. On 27 September, the Braços assembled in the halls of the Generalitat and took a solemn Oath to the Principat whereby they acknowledge their primary loyalty not to the king, but to their land. One by one, following the example of the Diputat Claris, the delegates—nobles, clerics, and citizens—stepped forward, placed their hand on two missals, and swore the oath. The assembly was unanimous in its consent: when one of

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473 Ibid, pp. 72-74.
475 That is to say, the declaration by the Braços that the citizens of Tortosa were “enemichs de la patrià.”
the representatives, Don Cristophol de Reart, a member of the military order of Alcantara hesitated, fearing that by taking the oath he would be going against the king, he was told that such fears “were not an impediment.” He was reminded “that all of the representatives of the Braços had sworn, and thus it was certain that the ecclesiastics who were to be found there, had with their oath vowed to their superiors and prelates to obey it, and that they had departed from there having all sworn the oath.”

This assurance—that the other clerics had already done so, and done so unanimously, out of obedience to their superiors—apparently convinced the nobleman, and the unanimity of that session was forever immortalized in the Catalan justification pamphlets of later months.

Having taken this decisive step, the Braços immediately took the Oath to the Principat outside the halls of the assembly, had it published the same day in broadside, and began to voice their desire that the bishops still remaining in the province come to take the oath as well, as if to further assuage the consciences of the reluctant. The first bishop to do so was Ramon de Sentmanat of Vic—still waiting to be confirmed in his office by Bishop Parcero—who arrived in town the very next day, 28 September. Bishop Parcero took the oath on 8 October and Fra Don Pedro de Santiago, the bishop of

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476 “no era impediment … que tots los dels Braços avian jurat, pues era cert que los eclesiastichs, que en ells se trobavan, havian ab jurament promes a sos superiors, y prelats obeirlo, y seus embaren de axo avian tots prestat lo jurament.” Ibid, pp. 101-102.

477 Writing back home, the syndic of Vic, Montserrat Sayz declared: “Prestasen Jurament de unio y fideliat” (They swore the oath of Union and Fidelity) AHV: Correspondència Rebuda (v.13-1637-1640); Syndic Montserrat Sayzs to the Consellers of Vic, 28 September 1640.
Solsona, on 19 October, leaving only Bishop Garcia Gil Manrique as the only active bishop in rebel-held territory unsworn.\textsuperscript{478}

The relation between the Church hierarchy and the Crown was not as legally tight as some have supposed. Abbots and bishops and even some chapter canons, though nominated by the king, never took an official oath of loyalty. Rather, they were bound in their conscience to the classical Catholic understanding of St. Paul’s lines in the Epistle of Romans that “All authority is ordained by God,” as well as other scriptural references and Biblical examples. Thus, the creation and taking of the Oath to the Principat fell short in the eyes of many Catalans of any act of rebellion against the king. Like the American patriots in 1776, many argued that they were only affirming the higher allegiance to natural law, to the law of their natural land, against innovation—in the case of Philip IV and Olivares, sacrilegious innovation—by the crown. The Oath made this quite clear, as did the defense of it by the jurist Francesc Viladamor and the Augustinian, Gaspar Sala. Countless times in diaries there is stressed the right of a people to a natural defense that trumps an otherwise assumed authority to the rightly crowned king.

Delegates from Girona, writing back to the town council on 26 September, emphasized this point in their letter:

> the resolution taken by Your Lordships to take up arms is solely in order to secure the natural defense of this Province, [and] to impede the invasion that the militias are prepared for; … so that they will not carry out against the people and goods of the Provincials the thefts and cruelties experienced, and above all, the horrendous sacrileges that have been committed, burning churches, and in them, the Most Holy Sacrament (may it be forever praised) against all law and disposition of constitutions of our Generalitat.

\textsuperscript{478} Ibid, pp. 106; 138-143; 178-182. The activities of Bishop Pérez Roy of Perpignan-Elna is a matter of debate. While present in the late summer of 1640, the bishop is known to have fled the city sometime between October 1640 and September 1642 when the French finally captured Perpignan.  

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Again, in the famous phrase, this was “in the very great service of God our Lord, of his Majesty [the king], and the well-being and conservation of this Province.”

With the swearing of the Oath to the Principat, the delegates of the Braços General—the nobles, professionals, and clerics—had taken a decisive step. In bringing the light of natural law to bear against the perceived tyranny, they were courting the title of “rebel” and “traitor.” For this moment, at least, formed in the crucible of an already-divided province, a significant number of Catalans declared that they were willing to leave behind the easier path of least resistance. Many undoubtedly knew the way would be hard, that the power of rational persuasion would be insufficient to change the mind of the king, and that armed conflict would soon follow. Many clerics, especially the charismatic Pau Claris who had begun to assume the leading role in this rebellion, became fully persuaded that their stand against a tyrannical violation of natural law and the Divine Body of Christ was just, and they began to shoulder the responsibilities that accompanied such a drastic measure. Through the autumn and winter of 1640 several clerics would assume roles as political leaders of an interim government, literary leaders of an international defense, and spiritual leaders of the “remembered community” of Catalonia. With the spirit of Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego, they had taken the first step towards the furnace by defying the king. The conclusion of their trial remained to be seen.

479 “la resolutio ha preta VS de ques pregan las armas es solament en orde a la deffensa natural desta Provintia, pera impedir la invasio que amanassan las militias ... paraque no executen contra las personas y bens dels Provintials los robos y crueltats experimentades y sobre tot los horrendous sacrilegis que han como cremant yglías y en ellas lo Sm Sacrament (que sia alabat pera sempre) contra tot dret y dispositio de las nras Generals constitutions ... en tan gran survey de Deu nre Sr., de sa Magt, y benei y conservatios desta Provintia.” AMG: I. Adminstració Municipal-1. Consell Municipal-2. Correspondència-7. Amb Barcelona-lligall 2 (1640-1659), 26 September 1640. Emphasis mine.
Conclusion

If there were a single symbol that could adequately stand apart from, and yet describe the reason for the precarious state of Catalonia during the summer of 1640, it would be the Eucharistic Bread. Possessed of a single substance yet with two natures—natural and spiritual—it likewise represented a single great religious mystery, yet was capable of uniting and sundering a political society. The ministers who protected and preached the importance of the Sacrament also used it during the summer months of 1640 to advocate, or remind the people of a specific social and religious path. Furthermore, from the manner in which these priests brought up references to the Bread or even displayed it to crowds, it seems evident that the Sacrament served Catalonia as more than a mere talisman: it became their social compass, ever pointing—what was perceived at the time to be—towards modest resistance on the grounds of spiritual self-defense. It was possible to argue for a natural defense that sought to take up arms and drive the offending sacrilegious, and probably heretical, soldiers from their midst, but in the same breath argue against the bloody-mindedness that quite often comes over protesting crowds.

By using the Eucharist as the touchstone for the early events of the Catalan rebellion, one can clarify, or unify, what might seem to be a dual role played in the opening stages of the revolt by religion and its ministers. On the one hand, the displaying of the Sacrament could be used to incite the rural populations into assaulting the royal tercios, especially as they marched along the narrow by-ways of Catalonia. On the other hand, there are a number of examples in which the Sacrament would be brought out to calm down urban rioters, or at least to divert them from their present course of
destruction. Likewise, just as convents and monasteries housed members who were keen on rousing the farmers and day-laborers to defend their homes against unlawful seizure or sacrilege, and the Capuchin houses by Barcelona served as a magnificent stage on which one could behold the burnt chalices that started the rebellion, they also provided blessed sanctuary for those fleeing for their lives.480

In other words, from the very beginning, most Catalan clerics were not fire-breathing revolutionaries seeking to line up any suspected royalist against the wall—indeed, few ever became such creatures—but rather preservers of the social conscience, dedicated to keeping the social body pure and free from all taints of religious ills. As we have seen, this was all the more important in the face of Catholic-on-Catholic international violence, in which the question was often raised, who was the true representative of the Faith, and what was a true Catholic supposed to do? These were not easy questions to answer: indeed, though raised anew and on an intra-national level by the revolt of the Catalans, they were rarely resolved until the fall of Barcelona twelve years later.

480 As one example, on 26 May—the day before the celebration of Pentecost, rebels in Girona forcibly entered the city’s convents looking for soldiers who were said to be hiding there. One of the commanders, Don Ramon Calders was saved, along with others in the cathedral. Elliott, Revolt of the Catalans, 431-32; de Rubí, Un segle de vida caputxina, 528.
Map 3.1 showing the locations of the major confrontations between royal troops and Catalan peasant militia forces during the spring of 1640. Victor Hurtado and Jesús Mestre i Campi, eds., *Atles di’història de Catlunya*. 3a ed. (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1998), 157.
CHAPTER 4

The Darkest Hours: Catalonia, September-December 1640

Finally, the soldiers of Your Majesty burned (oh what sadness!) not only, altars, images, and Temples: but they turned to carbon and ash (oh horrible sacrilege!), the reserved forms, to which was really united, and in which exists the Son of the Eternal Father, Prince of all things visible and invisible, King of Kings, and Lord of Lords, Jesus Christ our Redeemer … How great did the neighbors [of Riudarenes and Montiró] stir themselves as Catholics, and with arms did they rally to avenge the sacramental God! What a marvel, that the Principat became upset, and trembled, seeing Christ so nefariously offended! The land did not stir itself nor did the insensible creation conspire at the passion of Christ, until they saw the heart of Christ wounded by the arms of the soldiers. Nor did Catalonia rise up until they saw that the soldiers offended the heart of Christ’s Mystical Body.

Fra Gaspar Sala i Berart

Their Captain was God, and their design was not to enrich themselves, neither to make a great name, neither to conserve the houses, lands, and slaves, except through Faith in God, and his law, their patria, and their Republic, and from this, moved by that destiny, they threw themselves upon their enemies with intrepid and daring spirits and with gallant resolve they decimated their enemies and conquered them, attaining glorious victories with which they honored their patria and magnified their name throughout the world.

St. John Crysostom commentary on Maccabees

By September 1640, the situation in Catalonia was nearing a crisis. The scandals and abuses caused by the soldiers in the spring had not yet been resolved, and the reports coming out of Madrid indicated that the Crown had no interest in resolving them. The

481 “Quemaron al fin los soldados de V. Magestad (ó que dolor!) no solo, altares, imagines, y Templos: pero deuieron a carbon, y ceniza, (ó sacrilegio horrible!) las formas reservadas, a quien estaba realmente unido, y en ellas existente el hijo del eterno Padre, Principe de lo visible, e invisible, Rey de Reyes, y Señor de Señores, Jesu Christo nuestro Redentor….Que mucho se comoviesen los vezinos, como catolicos, y con las armas acudiesen a desgravar a Dios sacramentado! Que maravilla, se alterasse, y estremeriesse el Principado, viendo a Christo tan nefariamente ofendido! No se conmovió la terra en la passion de Christo, ni se conjuraron las criaturas insensibles, hasta que vieron el coraçon de Christo lastimado, por las armas de los soldados. Ni se alteró Cataluña, has ver que los soldados ofendían el coraçon del cuerpo mystico de Christo,” Gaspar Sala, Proclamación Catolica, (Barcelona, 1640), 15; 19.

482 “Su Capitan era Dios, y su desinio no enriquecerse, ni ganar gran nombre, ni conservar las haziendas, las tierras, y los esclavos, sino la Fè de Dios, y su ley, su patria, y su Republica, y desta suerte se abalançavan a los enemigos con anoimo denodado, y con gallarda resolucion, y los desbaratauan y vencian, alcançando gloriosas vitorias con que honravan su patria y esclarecian su nombre por el mundo.” Cited in BN: 2-4661: Alonso de Andrade, El buen soldado catolico (1642), p. 20.
numerous embassies sent by the Generalitat to the king had proved fruitless; their appeal to the Pope had not yet been heard. The once-optimistic hopes of reconciliation were now clouded with doubt. Early in the month, the assembled members of the Braços General learned that an army was being assembled against them. The king, in whose name they had tried to restore justice, called them traitors, and their attempts to save their province from chaos, rebellious. Faced with a stubborn refusal by the Court to rectify these misunderstandings, the Catalan leadership, after some deliberation, chose to stand fast in their position. While they could have chosen to concentrate resistance solely upon an anti-Olivares stance, the Catalan leaders decided to garner support for their cause by reaffirming their traditional identities—a Catalan loyalty to one’s patria and to the Faith. An Oath to the Principat was proposed, written, and sworn. From now on, the Catalan leadership—consisting of the Diputació, the Braços General, and its executive committees—would consider their primary allegiance to be to the land of their fathers, its religion, and its constitutions. With their finances, with their abilities, and with their blood they would defend it against the onslaught of an insolent and undoubtedly pseudo-Catholic army, led by a misguided Prince and his Machiavellian minister.

As preparations for a “natural defense” continued into the autumn, the clergy of Catalonia were not standing by idly.483 While some of their number—particularly bishops and royalist vicar-generals—highly disapproved of the province’s military preparations, a high percentage of chapter canons and regular clergy supported efforts to make a stand against perceived tyranny and sacrilege. Their contribution to the cause of Catalan liberty—through positions of political power, through finances, through written

483 As will be seen below, a Junta of Theologians declared the Catalan position to be one of justified “natural defense.”
defenses, but especially through winning hearts and minds—helped turn the fervor of the initial rebellion—rural in nature, and socially divisive—into a sustainable revolution—urban-led and socially cohesive. As leaders in the newly-created government juntas, clerics worked to execute justice throughout the province, to collect taxes, and to begin negotiations with foreign powers. Despite the incessant direct taxation by the king that had drained their treasuries, the Catalan chapters donated large portions of their individual and collective wealth to finance defensive measures. With their legal training and their acquired skills of logic and writing, monks and cathedral canons penned sophisticated and erudite defenses of Catalonia’s resistance to the king’s army. Finally, and most importantly, as the first campaign turned against the Catalans, and as the future began to look very bleak, religious communities—particularly in Barcelona—spurred the people on to greater efforts. Rather than preaching repentance and seeking out the king for mercy, these men and women, through their visions, their prayers, and their offices actually encouraged a stronger defense against their king and sovereign.

It is highly probable that without this vast and multifaceted contribution by the ecclesiastical estate, the Catalan revolt would have collapsed in the late months of 1640, subdued not just by superior numbers, but by convincing political and religious arguments of loyalty to their king. Yet even with all the money, all the prayers, and the moral support given by the clergy, the fledging revolutionaries could not stop a larger and better-trained army under the Marquis de los Vélez. In trepidation, the Catalans mustered all they had for a last-ditch stand outside the walls of Barcelona; on January 26, the “holy
battle” was fought, and against all odds, the Catalans won. The “religious capital” won by the miraculous victory over the king’s army on the slopes of Montjuïc confirmed many Catalans in their belief that God was fighting on their side. The pious mask of the Machiavellian Olivares had been stripped off once and for all, so that all might behold the righteousness of the Catalan cause.

**Ruling the Province**

Perhaps the most public and prominent spot in which the Catalan clergy served their province during the autumn months was in positions of leadership within the Diputació, the Braços General, and the three governing juntas established in September 1640. The most prominent of these clerical figures was Pau Claris, canon of Urgell, Diputat Eclesiàstic, and President of the Generalitat.

Joining Pau Claris in the upper echelons of Catalan government as *Oidor Eclesiàstic* was his fellow cleric from the Seu d’Urgell, Jaume Ferran. A relative of Claris, and one of his allies in the six-year feud between Urgell’s chapter and bishop, Pau Duran, Ferran shared many similar views regarding Castilian oppression and a desire to resist further encroachments on Catalan liberties. Far less is known regarding Ferran and his activities before the war with France. Unlike Claris, Ferran does not seem to have received a legal education, but this did not stop his attaining prominent ecclesiastical

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484 Francesc Puig, canon of Tortosa, and a prominent member of the rebel government referred to the fight as “la Sagrada Batalla de Montjuïc,” AHCB: Puig, *Dietairi*, p. 859. For his perspective on the battle, see Ibid, pp. 859-879.
485 With the death of Don Francesc d’Erill, and the delayed appointment of Pau Duran to the vacant position of Canciller of Catalonia, Claris, as President, occupied the highest secular post open to members of the clergy in Catalonia, from May 1640-February 1641.
486 Although the election to the Diputació was through a lottery, the presence of two virulently anti-royalist canons from the extremist diocese of Urgell appearing as victors in 1638 have suggested to some historians a conspiracy. The contingency seems unlikely, however, most theories arguing from the revolt two years later, rather than any evidence at the time.
roles both in his local chapter and in the Generalitat at large. He appears early on in the shared leadership of the cathedral chapter in the Seu d’Urgell along with Claris and Don Llorens de Barutell. In 1634, he joined with Claris and the chapters of Vic and Girona to resist the imposition of the décima. Three years later, Ferran and his illustrious relative traveled to Barcelona to protest the quartering of troops in canons’ residences—ordered by Duran in an attempt to quell their resistance to his policies—and for this work he was chosen to enforce discipline within the chapter in subsequent years.487

United once more in leadership, this time on a provincial scale, Ferran and Claris worked together to resist royalist encroachments on traditional political liberties. During the early months of the crisis, the two encouraged Manlleu’s embassy with the Court, while exhorting local dioceses to stand fast against social disorder. As relations with Madrid continued to deteriorate, it appears that these two clerics turned their sights toward resistance. This not only meant strengthening the internal resources of Catalonia—particularly manpower and finances—but also casting their sights on potential allies in the upcoming contest of arms, in this case, France. Although the complete history of the initial Franco-Catalan negotiations during the summer of 1640 will probably never be known, it is certain that both Claris and Ferran played a prominent role in fostering dialogue between Catalonia and its long-time enemy to the north.488

488 The only contemporary documentation about the initial contact between Catalonia and France can be found in AMAE: Corr. Pol. Espagne, Supplément 3. For the most likely history of this secret diplomacy, see Josep Sanabre, La acción de Francia en Cataluña, 91-94. For a detailed analysis of the historical record, as well as an investigation into potential motivational factors, see Elliott, Revolt of the Catalans, 468-480.
As far as the best studies can tell us, these subversive—and treacherous—
discussions began sometime in the late spring, when certain Catalan leaders concluded
that negotiations with Madrid were not only going nowhere, but that the king was quite
serious in his decision to invade the province.489 Claris and Ferran, among others, sent out
feelers to Richelieu through yet another relative of Claris, Francesc Vilaplana.
Subsequent ambassadors to the north included canons Don Llorens de Barutell of Urgell,
as well as Dr. Diego Jover, Dr. Joan Batista Vila, and Jaume Bru, all of Barcelona.490

As we will see in subsequent chapters, the alliance with the French proved in
many cases to be Catalonia’s undoing. The alliance of “brothers” lasted from November
1640 only until January 1641 in theory, and in practice up until Claris’s untimely death in
February 1641.491 From that time on, no other Catalan leader would be able to command
such a broad base of appeal in the province. Furthermore, the French insistence on
particular means and methods, their inability to curb their own soldiers’ passions and lack
of discipline in the Catalan countryside, and their ineptitude on the battlefield slowly
began to turn a significant portion of Catalonia against them. How the clergy,
particularly those who were in the forefront of the rebellion in late 1640, handled the
changing tide of opinion will be demonstrated in the following chapters. Suffice it to say

489 As early as 31 May 1640, the French Marshal Espenan, stationed at the fortress of Leucate, wrote to the
Prince of Condé in Narbonne that some Catalans were seeking out the protection of France in the current
difficulties, de Rubí, Un segle de vida caputxina, 557. Documents from AMAE: Corr. Pol. Espagne,
Supplément 3 reveal that Cardinal Richelieu did not place much hope in the Catalan revolt at first,
expecting it to fizzle out. I am grateful to Dr. Geoffrey Parker for coming across this information in the
AMAE, for bringing it to my attention, and for taking extra notes on this for me.
490 AHCB: Puig, Dietari, pp. 240; 247.
491 On 10 November 1640, the French ambassador, du Plessis-Besançon, returned to Barcelona with letters
of “germandat entre lo rey christianissim y la provincia” AHCB: Puig, Dietari, p. 247. This was the first
official alliance between France and Catalonia. See also AMAE: Corr. Pol. Espagne, Supplément 4; and
that they played a significant part in bringing the French down into an alliance in the first place.

Beyond the Diputat and Oidor positions, beyond the participants of seventeenth-century “secret diplomacy,” a number of clerics performed important political functions as legislators in the Braços General and as administrators in the three executive juntas created in September and October 1640. Two knights of St. John, a Benedictine from the north, and a canon from Tarragona occupied posts in the Junta de Guerra, while two abbots, the dean of Barcelona, and a high-ranking canon from Urgell formed a third of the members in the Junta de Hazienda. In addition to these men, a six-person junta was formed in early October, the Junta de Justicia. Created through the suggestion of the Braços General concerning the ability of the fledgling rebel government to enforce their decrees, the Junta de Justicia was in essence a special judiciary, acting in the place of the Royal Audiència, the latter institution containing too many public, or suspected royalists.

Unlike the executive juntas, the Junta de Justicia only had one cleric serving on its staff: a knight of St. John of Jerusalem. The reason for this can be explained by the activities of the tribunal: its chief purpose was to judge infractions committed by soldiers in the province, as well as to confiscate the goods of those who would not swear the Oath to the Principat. Ecclesiastics—as members of a separate judicial system and beholden to spiritual authorities—could not be involved in civil corporeal punishment. The Catalan leadership was aware of this, in fact they had opposed the appointment of Bishop

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492 The Junta de Guerra served as an executive committee responsible for directing the war effort in Catalonia: raising troops, appointing officers, and advising the Diputat Eclesiàstic on strategy. The Junta de Hazienda, on the other hand, exercised control over the logistics: planning taxes and organizing tax collectors, as well as supplying the rebel armies in the field.

Manrique to the post of viceroy for this same reason. Thus it was that the cleric on board served more as an advisor and a token participant from the first estate rather than any Inquisitorial figure, who might mix ecclesiastical and secular judiciaries.

So far we have examined the activities of Catalan clerics who came to Barcelona to participate in the restoration of order and justice through the Braços General, a dangerous step, and one that brought upon them the title of “traitor” to their king. But a few ecclesiastics served the new provincial government outside Barcelona, working in the rural regions to curry support for the new regime, even as the king’s army began its advance from the south. On 27 September, just one day after the swearing of the Oath to the Principat, the Diputats informed the city of Vic that they would be sending the theologian Fra Matheu Garau y Astor, the Prior of the Carmelite house in Barcelona to them. Their motives were clear: the father was to help organize the mobilized militiamen into a coherent defensive force, and to begin storing up provisions for that force when they moved out. Later that year, Fra Raphael Domenech, a Benedictine from Ripoll, was used as a courier between Barcelona and Francesc Tamarit, now the Catalan commander on the Roussillon front.

Another well-known figure who moved throughout the province during the fall of 1640 was Francesc de Montpalau, sacristan of Ripoll. Born early in the seventeenth century, the fourth son of a nobleman, Francesc de Montpalau followed the example of his uncle—who also bore the same name, and who was a Benedictine at the monastery of

494 “en la ocasio p[rese]nt ab la gent del somatent se ha aliat per al Socorro y defensa del p[rese]nt Principat…per la provisió y sustento de la gent del Socorro pera que pagan resuhrir al enemich ab lo valor y esfors que es menester…” AHV: Correspondència Rebuda, (v.13-1637-1640), Diputats to the Consellers of Vic, 27 September 1640.

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Sant Salvador de Breda—and took up holy orders early in life. The earliest records show him as a monk at Ripoll by 1621, along with his brother Ramon. Francesc became a VID: a doctor in both laws at the Universitat de Lleida, and both brothers then were stationed at the monastery in Berga, Francesc as sacristan and Ramon as “provost.” By 1638-1639, Montpalau had become a regular figure in committees in Barcelona with title Sacristan of Ripoll; in this role he served on embassies from the Generalitat to the viceroy, Santa Coloma, in January 1639 protesting violations against the constitutions. During the autumn months, he would be commissioned by the Braços General to comb the countryside, urging conformity with the new taxes passed in Barcelona to fund the rising costs of revolution. Through his efforts, a good deal of money was sent to the coffers of the capital.

The Embassy of Fra Bernard de Manlleu (concluded)

While the Diputació in Barcelona was sending out feelers to their long-standing enemies, the French, friars Bernard de Manlleu and Juan de Cerdaña, “Capuchins of known holiness” were still working diligently to try and heal the growing political rift at Madrid. Alas for the Catalan cause, the longer the friars’ mission to the capital was

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496 It is to be recalled that Claris also attended Lleida around this time, and that furthermore many, if not all the monks at Ripoll during this time were educated at this very institution. Lluís Constans, Francesc de Montpalau, Abat de Bayoles, Ambaixador del General de Catalunya (Barcelona: Institut d’Estudis Catalans, 1960), 16.
497 Ibid, 16.
498 Ibid, 18.
499 Montpalau would rise high in the favor of the French during the war, becoming Abbot of Banyoles in 1642, a position he held until his death in 1674. In 1644, he was sent to Rome from the Generalitat to negotiate clerical appointments. Later in the war, he was named “abat comendatari” of St. Michel de Cuixà (1648-1660) on the death of the pro-Catalan, Miquel de Salavardenya, and segrestador for the rents from St. Martí del Canigó (1652-1674). Both houses were in Roussillon, which became French territory in 1659, and where Francesc stayed following the Peace of the Pyrenees. Towards the end of the war, Louis XIV nominated him for bishop of Girona, a position he never fulfilled.
500 “capuchinos de conocida santidad” AHCB Manuscrits: Ms. A-51: Don Alberto de Torme y Liori, Miscellaneos Historicos y Politicos sobre la Guerra de Catalunia desde el año de 1639, f.48v.
extended, the more internal problems it created. The first signs that Manlleu was in over his head began with a series of letters emanating from the pen of the long-standing ambassador of the Generalitat, Joan Grau. Contributing to this petty jealousy in the autumn months of 1640 was the disillusionment expressed by a small number of Catalans who were beginning to doubt the wisdom of their rebellion, especially as the king’s army moved successfully through the south.

Fra Bernard de Manlleu provided a convenient scapegoat for both these parties, and accusations began to circulate that the holy man had purposefully misrepresented the Catalan cause in Madrid. By December, sufficient animus had been raised against the friar that he felt bound to offer an explanation of his activities at court. In his report to the Diputació on 6 December, he countered the chief accusation, that he never delivered Parcero’s true letter. Manlleu swore that he handed the paper off to Olivares, but also mentioned that at the time he could tell that the count-duke had misgivings about the paper’s authenticity, and doubted whether he ever gave the important document to the king.

Joan Grau also accused Manlleu of failing to deliver to the king an important memorial, written around the summertime by a Portuguese lawyer. In his defense for not passing along “the memorial which a Portuguese jurist has printed,” Manlleu argued:

> The case was that having consulted with all the ambassadors [presumably his fellow Capuchin, Juan de Sardenya, and Joan Grau] if it was convenient to present it, because it contained the burnings of the churches and of the Holy Sacrament, because I had experienced that the first would be censured, and was repressed by him because it said that the soldiers had broken off an arm of a Holy Christ, and that, by having this

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501 APCC I-9a; section XI. It seems particularly ironic that these desperate Catalans would place more stock in the single piece of literary evidence written by a foreigner—Parcero—than in the repetitive, personal intercession by one of their own countrymen.
While scholars have not been able to identify the “Portuguese jurist” who wrote in defense of the Catalans in the summer of 1640, it is interesting that Manlleu chose to suppress the memorial because of the venom directed towards “the Spanish.” Of course by the time Manlleu was composing his defense to the Diputats, several Portuguese jurists had united with the nobility and the clergy to overthrow the Spanish viceroy and to establish João, duke of Bragança, as the new king of Portugal.  

Despite Bernard de Manlleu’s tireless work on behalf of the province, and particularly of those leading the rebellion, others of his order were not as supportive, and he blamed the failure of his mission on diplomatic sabotage. In particular, the friar accused his fellow ambassador, Fra Juan de Sardenya, of betraying sensitive information about the province to Don Alonso de la Carrera, a member of the king’s council. Furthermore, Manlleu declared that Sardenya had delivered a copy of Gaspar Sala’s apology for the Catalan rebels, the Proclamación Católica, to the Inquisitor Don Adam de la Parra, over Manlleu’s own objections. While Manlleu had strongly disapproved of handing over Sala’s work, he defended the talks with Carrera, a member of the Council of Castile. Apparently, the two Capuchins were hoping to use the sympathetic

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502 “Lo memorial impress que havia fet un jurista português… Lo cas fou que havent-se consultat amb tots los ambaixadors si convenia dar-lo, perquè contenia les crèmes de les esglésies i del Ssm Sagrament, perquè jo tenia experiència que lo primer fora censurat, i fui repress per ell perquè deia que los soldatas havien romput un braç a un Sancristo i que, per estar aquest memorial impress, havia de corer per tot lo món en descèdit dels espanyols; per no irritar a sa maj i a sos ministers, com aleshores se tractava de concert, foren tots conformes de parer que no’s donàs i que s’escigués de nou…….” APCC I-9a; section XI, pp. 9-10. Emphasis mine.

503 For a more detailed examination into the relations between Portugal and Catalonia and their contemporaneous rebellions in 1640, see Conclusion.

504 APCC I-9a; section XI, p. 18. This might explain how Sala’s work was so quickly condemned by the Inquisition. Check date, but I think the Holy Office condemned the work about a month after its first publication.
ear of Don Joan Arias, nephew to Don Alonso, to make an end-run around the Council of Aragon and their mis-representation of the Catalans’ plight.\textsuperscript{505} It seems as if Manlleu’s defense convinced some members of the Diputació; in any event, with the increase of hostilities and the invasion of the province in October, Manlleu made increasing efforts to leave Madrid and return home. His request was granted in mid-December, and the friar was able to spend the remaining years of his life in the quiet obscurity that he had desired.\textsuperscript{506}

Of what use was Manlleu’s embassy? Although ultimately unsuccessful at restoring peace between the king and his subjects, the mission may have ably served the Catalan rebels in a number of ways. First, by sending a member of the Capuchin order, a group well-known for their non-partisan attitudes and desire to mediate, the Catalans were sending a message to the king and to Rome—the Pope’s brother, Antonio, was not only his Secretary of State, but also Cardinal-Protector of the Capuchin order—that they were making every effort to straighten out their differences with the royal troops. Furthermore, by having a friar little skilled in diplomacy or in the manners of court denounce the religious sacrilege by the soldiers, it would be apparent that the Catalans considered the religious issue of far more importance than political and legal privileges. To some, it may have harkened back to the untutored prophet Nathan, bringing to David’s throne the condemnation of the king’s adultery with Bathsheba. The Catalan

\textsuperscript{505} APCC I-9a; section XI, p. 19. At the time, the Council of Aragon was dominated by the Protonotario of the Council, Jerónimo de Villanueva. Villanueva was himself a Catalan, who, through a process of complete ingratiation succeeded in winning this important post, along with the friendship of Olivares. A staunch royalist, his was the de facto “expert” position on Catalonia in the king’s councils, and thereby earned the virulent hatred of the rebel Catalan leaders. For more on Villanueva and his role in the revolt, see Elliott, \textit{Revolt of the Catalans}, pp. 254; 256-259; 351-367 and passim.

\textsuperscript{506} Fra Bernard would die serving his order at the age of 58, in the convent of the Ermites in Girona, 1644. de Rubí, \textit{Un segle de vida caputxina}, 494.
leaders, particularly the clergy, were very much concerned with Philip IV’s attitude and response toward the sacrilege, because it was readily apparent to the seventeenth-century mind—more so than our own—that one’s religious outlook shaped and defined one’s actions and attitudes about more mundane matters.

By late summer, diplomats from the Generalitat in Madrid were passing along information that confirmed the king’s opposition to the current Catalan leadership in Barcelona. The last letter from Philip IV received by the Diputació before the convening of the Braços General was quite straightforward in declaring the king’s determination that his will would prevail in the province. Other documents seemed to confirm this hardline stance, most notably an intriguing letter entitled “A letter from a Confidant from Madrid.” Although the letter contains no signature, the most likely author was Joan Grau, the Generalitat’s envoy in Madrid. Published in Barcelona towards the end of August, this lengthy epistle relayed Philip IV’s latest attempt to mix a modicum of negotiation with the threat of force. Once again, the letter reflected the royal perception that the burning of the churches in no way justified Catalan resistance. On the contrary, the king called only for justice against the murderers of the viceroy.507

Grau also mentioned that Philip reserved a special role for the nobles and clerics of Catalonia, which was designed to restore peace and order to the land. In an attempt to secure the loyalty of these two estates, the king and his councils were ostensibly preparing to arrange a meeting in Roussillon, probably Perpignan, where he wanted these social leaders to swear an oath of allegiance.508 Moreover, the oath was not the only

507 BC: FB 6141: Carta de un Confident de Madrit... (1640), f. 143-143v.
508 “Tambe se son despachades cartillas per tots los ecclesiastics y nobles perque acuden a un lloc del Principat la qual en ditas cartillas esta en blanc hots (tots?) obligatio del jurament tenen prestat, Diuse per
requirement that the king was to make on the religious estate. Further measures to ensure obedience among the regular orders—probably the Benedictines and Capuchins who had been actively encouraging resistance all year—included encouraging the Generals of every order represented in Catalonia to enforce obedience to their authority.\footnote{509}

While the Catalans were understandably disappointed that the king continued to hold them in the wrong, one can appreciate that the death of a viceroy may have mattered more to Philip than the disputed burning of some bread and buildings. After all, the viceroy represented the personage and authority of the king. He was his sovereign’s vicar in the regional capital, and there was but a fine line separating an assault on the king’s lieutenant and the king himself. As one might have foreseen, the author-ambassador countered the king’s wooing of Catalan religious authorities by referring to the soldiers’ sacrilege, and rhetorically asked how true Catholics and Catalans could passively let these crimes go unpunished.\footnote{510} The royal blindness to the destruction of the Eucharist bread, combined with the Catalans’ repeated insistence and references to the crime, confirmed the ever-widening rift between the king and his subjects.

Following this discussion of royal policy, Joan Grau went on to mention the defection of Tortosa from the Catalan cause, led by “the Prior Isidor of Tortosa on behalf of the Chapter and the City.” The prior informed the king that he and his fellow clerics

\footnote{509} “Axi matex ses dit ques valdran dels Generals, o altres Prelats Superiors de los Religions que son en Espanya perque sos subdits que son en Cathalunya dexen les armes y procuren ab sa auctoritat que tene per medi de les Confessions sossegar lo Principat per poderlo après assosegat atreballarlo a son salvo,” Ibid, ff. 144v-145.

\footnote{510} The rhetorical phrase used is “will we not fight like tigers?” Ibid, f. 145.
would assist the royal efforts “against the Disturbers that have revolted [here].” Tortosa’s obstinate defiance of the Braços General made it more than likely that the royal invasion force would come from the south. The major north-south corridor roads ran through Tortosa, which would also provide a suitable staging post for the fall campaign. Furthermore, rumors had reached the Catalan diplomats that the southern route would be probable for another reason: “as well as to head off some revolutions that are stirring in Valencia on occasion of having placed Castilian soldiers in prison.”

The ambassador concluded his letter with an analysis of the king’s motivations for going into Catalonia. To his mind, the move of force was nothing less than pure Machiavellian tactics. “that today we do not have words from Monarchs that obligate them any longer than the observation of them serves their own ends. Being an established fact that they all follow the doctrine of Machiavelli in this as if it were established truth, and to this end they hasten to quote the master who taught them.”

Complementing this was a complete denial of the facts regarding the burning of the churches. Despite repeated accounts of the disasters to Olivares, the privado and enough members of the king’s councils remained unconvinced. By this point in time, it became apparent to the Diputats that further negotiations would be fruitless. Reluctantly they ordered Fra Bernard de Manlleu home, much to the humble friar’s joy.

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511 “lo Prior Izidor de Tortoza de part del Capitol, y Ciutat;” “contra los Inquiets que la revoltaven.” Ibid, f. 145v.
512 “tambe pera atajar algunes revolutions que son mogudes en Valentia per ocasio de haver volgut posar als presidis soldats Castellans.” Ibid, f.146.
513 “que vuy per los Monarcas noy ha paraules que obliguen mes temps del que es util per sos fins la observancia dellos. Essent cosa assentada que tots segueixen la doctrina de Machavello en axo com si fos veritat assentada abe que se accorren de allegar lo mestre que la ensenya.” Ibid, f. 148.
514 “lo Compte Duch encara que persistex que tots los dits prosehiments y dita carta son extrets y violentats que no diria tal dpt Bisbe de Gerona sy estave segur de sa persona, de aqui Inferescan lo tracte dels de assi que no vull alleragar mas.” Ibid, f. 148.
Manlleu’s embassy was, by and large, a failure. Despite its success at spreading news of the disastrous sacrilege around the Court, it did little to win any sympathy for the Catalan cause, or serve to mitigate the harsh policy undertaken by Philip IV on the advice of Olivares. Although Bernard de Manlleu was not the last Catalan cleric to seek a peaceful reconciliation between his province and the king he served, from September 1640 onwards a majority of Catalonia’s clerical leaders would dedicate themselves to defending their land and their belief against their king and his men.

**Financial Aid: Funding “revolutions”**

One of the first areas in which the Braços General called upon the regional clergy for their support concerned finances. Money lay at the heart of the successful and stable government, and, more importantly, at the heart of any military effort during the seventeenth century. Pious talk might be well and good for rousing the local militia to take time off during the day and snipe at traveling bands of soldiers. It was quite another matter to finance, feed, and equip a sizeable field army capable of putting up a fight against one of the largest armies in Europe. With many of the wealthier nobles having fled to Castile or remaining aloof from the rebels, the Braços considered the clergy to be their best source of revenue as Catalonia prepared to meet the king’s armies. Several difficulties presented themselves to the fledging government that sought to persuade the first estate to part with their fiscal resources.
In the first place, financial donations from cathedral chapters to military efforts in Catalonia had been offered only in times of emergency. Following upon their extraordinary contributions to defend their brothers in Roussillon from attack in 1639, the regional clergy consistently began to offer support to their own cities during the widespread social chaos following Corpus Christi. By September, however, with the current Catalan government acting without official sanction from the Crown, one finds these same chapters donating silver from the sacristy and more to the regional-wide resistance movement. These contributions were duly recorded in the Actes Capitulares of several chapters; so the giving was public and not secret, despite the questionable legitimacy of the now-autonomous Diputació. Furthermore, clerical funding was donated throughout the province, testifying to a widespread disillusionment with the Crown. Although Philip IV and his ministers might have seen the early months of the Catalan revolt as primarily a Bareclona coup, it is clear that fiscal support was given from all the major dioceses, including Tortosa, the self-declared “loyal” city.

This ecclesiastical activity is all the more remarkable since, among all the estates in seventeenth-century Catalonia, the clergy had been taxed more regularly and at a higher cost than any other estate. True, a number of city treasuries throughout the province had been severely depleted during 1639 on account of funding the relief of Salses, and had not been fully restored due to the poor harvests, the paying of soldiers, and the political exigencies of that summer. Nevertheless, the giving up of clerical

515 As testimony to this principle, witness the very modest efforts given by churchmen to the war effort, until the very serious French invasion of Roussillon in 1639. See Chapter 3, Epilogue.
516 Granted the number of people giving from Tortosa appears to have been smaller in comparison with the other Catalan dioceses. The most notable member of the chapter to provide for the common defense was Francesc Puig, and yet he spent most of his time in Barcelona. That the canon was able to draw in absentia upon a steady flow of cash from a diocese ostensibly loyal to Philip suggests that popular sentiment cannot be divined merely by examining the sympathies of the civic and religious hierarchies in each town.
salaries and church silver to pay for the raising of companies on account of the cities’
treasuries being “exhausto” should not suggest neither that the chapters possessed
boundless wealth, nor the opposite extreme of having to give up the widow’s mite. We
should, however, recognize that the fiscal giving by the clergy was generous enough to
fund a large number of Catalan soldiers through the first campaign.

As we shall see, the extent to which the clergy supported this first—and most
tenuous year—of revolt is extremely significant. They gave nearly their all; later records
show that they were unable to match their donations of 1640 in subsequent years, despite
the best efforts of their French “protectors” to encourage a selfless generosity. While
ultimately successful in helping to achieve the short-term goal of preserving a fledging
Catalan autonomy, the large fiscal sacrifices contributed to a greater reliance upon
France, and thereby a greater French governing presence in Catalonia. By the end of
1641, some Catalans would come to regret this turn of events, realizing all too well the
adage that he who pays the piper calls the tune…

Catalonia’s fiscal state in 1640 was very precarious. As we have seen in previous
chapters, the province had spent a sizeable amount of their revenues combating the
French invasion the year before. Then there was the winter quartering of the soldiers,
which further drained the resources of the countryside. Faced with the great social
upheaval during the summer months, every major city pleaded with their local chapter to
donate a portion of their funds to the common defense since the secular treasuries were
nearing bankruptcy. This attitude merely transferred itself to a regional focus shortly
after the convening of the Braços General. As Francesc Puig, canon of Tortosa—one of
the few clerics from that diocese who rose against the king in rebellion—noted in his
diary, secular and regular clergy alike were being asked to donate before the Oath to the Principat was promulgated: “when, indeed, [one considered] the said communities outside Barcelona, it was resolved in the decision that that all ought to transmit to the chapters of the cathedral churches, so that they might be directed and ordered as best as it might prepare them, and when to the seculars, from the merchants further down, they sent it to the priors and heads of the schools and confraternities, respectively, as had been done in Barcelona.” 517

On 20 September 1640, the Junta de Hazienda reported to Pau Claris that methods other than voluntary donations would be needed if the Principat were to stave off defeat. The committee recommended that the entire ecclesiastical estate be taxed first: “the distribution was sent to all the ecclesiastics, bishops, abbots, dignitaries, canons … Benedictine monks who held offices, commanders of the order of Saint John of Jerusalem, rectors, and curates of parish churches, and to the monasteries and convents of the regular orders, both to male and to female houses, throughout all the province.” 518 Further details made it clear that religious houses in Barcelona were not exempt from this payment despite the tradition of special fiscal exemptions enjoyed by the capital and other cities. Rather than enforcing a flat-tax on the clergy, the Braços General decided that the money would be raised from all sectors of the ecclesiastical estate by calculating

517 “se feu repartiment a tots los ecclesiastics, bisbes, abats, dignitats, canonges…monjos de la religio de Sant Benet que tenian officis, commandors de la religio de Sant Joan de Hierusalem, retors i curats de iglesies parochials, y als monestirs i convents de orderis monacals, assí de homens com de donas de tota la província.” AHCB: Puig, Dietari, pp. 54-55. See also, ACV: 56-34: Secretaria: Cartes (1631-1640), 15 September 1640, Diego Palau, syndic, to the chapter of Vic. “Las cosas de Catalunya estan en tan infelis estat que a no obrir los ulles y descuydar nos en la defensa tenim certa nostra Ruina.”; and ADU: Sallés; Index B de Conclusions Capitulars: 28 September 1640, f. 14; S.286.
a certain percentage of their total rents and benefices. Thus bishops, abbots, and the wealthier cathedral chapters—such as Tortosa, Barcelona, Tarragona, and Lleida—could be expected to foot more of the bill than their impoverished brethren.\footnote{519} 

Ironically, part of the clerical opposition to Philip IV’s fund-raising schemes during the 1630s had been about the very issue of a graduated ecclesiastical tax. Whereas the larger dioceses had resisted similar measures in prior years, the sincerity and concern with which the rebel Catalans faced this present crisis largely removed any serious objections to the plan. A three-man delegation would be sent round the province both to collect the funds as well as to remind the clergy of the cause for which they were ‘donating’: “representing to them the peril in which the province found [itself], of being invaded, and the necessity they have of making calculated (designed) provisions for war, devoted (giving) to their own defense and conservation.”\footnote{520} The syndic of the Seu d’Urgell, Don Llorens de Barutell clarified the purpose of the tax in a letter to his fellow canons a few days later, indicating the estimated force to be raised at six thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry.\footnote{521}

There are at least two interesting aspects about the passage of this first fiscal measure directed towards the Church. The first is that the Braços General approved and enacted this appropriations bill a full week before the Oath to the Principat was taken.

\footnote{519} “tots los estaments no se ha pogut servar igulatat los Canonicats de aqui de Bara y Lleyda a 20 ll los que tenen patrimoni aquisit de Consideratio lo taxten segons la estimatio ques fa de sa hazienda.” ADU: III Cartes Rebudes, 1630-1640, letter from Don Llorens de Barutell to Chatper of Urgell, 24 September 1640.

\footnote{520} “representarlos lo perill en que trobava la provincia de esser invadida, y necessitat que tenen de fer prevensions de guerra encamina, das a sa propria defensa y conservacio.” AHCB: Puig, Dieta, pp. 55-56. Needless to say, this request was quite ironic, given that Olivares himself had been using necessity as a defense of his intolerable polices in Catalonia for many years.

\footnote{521} ADU: III Cartes Rebudes, 1630-1640; “com se est feta la taxta per los Capitulars...en Estat estma que ha de ser una de las dos, o perdre ho tot o salvar ho tot, lo exercit que se alista per axir a la defensa natural ha de ser de 60 C homens, y 5 C cavalls” Barutell to Chapter of Urgell, 24 September 1640.
indicating the power already present in Claris and the more committed rebels at the gathering. Furthermore, although it is difficult to estimate the taxable percentage of the clergy’s annual income, it appears to have amounted to five or ten percent. A recent study of Catalan chapter incomes during the seventeenth century reveals that they were based on canonical distributions, distributions of anniversary mass donations, “distribuciones del manna,” and salaries, as well as from other “miscellaneous” sources.\footnote{Pedro Fatjó Gómez, “El Comportamiento Económico de Una Elite Eclesiástica del XVII: Los Capitulares de la Seo de Barcelona” in \textit{I Congrés d’Història de l’Església Catalana des del Orígens fins ara} vol. 1, (Solsona, 1993), 343.} The first of these sources—chapter distributions—was the most regular source of revenue, and was given out every day by the “caritater” for the hours and offices the canon attended.\footnote{Although fairly dependable, the sum allotted varied from day to day, depending on the services within the ecclesiastical calendar. Ibid, 344.} The average yearly income for each of the thirty-six Barcelona canons—in the top third of ecclesiastical revenues—fluctuated around 250 lliures per year in 1610s and between 320-340 lliures from 1620-1650.\footnote{Despite the progress of the war, these revenues would continue to rise to around 400 lliures in 1650, and 440 lliures in the 1670s. Ibid, 344.} Additional funding would amount to a few dozen lliures for anniversary masses per year, as well as around fifty to a hundred lliures if they served as ambassadors to Madrid or Rome. All told, then, the income rose from about 400 a year in early 1600s to about 600-1000 a year in 1690s—a decent amount, to be sure, but not one by which many could become rich.\footnote{As possible exceptions to this, two canons in the 1640s, Miquel Joan Osona and Pau del Rosso, were able to amass 10.000 lliures by their death. Ibid, 345; 349.}

At a rate of roughly twenty to forty lliures per canon, the tax ordained by the Braços would command roughly ten percent of their yearly income: an amount roughly equal to that of the royal \textit{décima} that the Catalans strongly objected to only a few years before. As if the large amount required by the new government were not enough, other
factors contributed to the paucity of funds that had been deposited within the first few weeks of the ordinance. In the first place, the poor harvest that year meant that ecclesiastical revenues from tithes and rents were smaller than they had been in previous years: to give up even an additional twenty lliures would mean a greater constraint on a cleric’s personal budget. Moreover, the social crisis of the summer had already affected the coffers of chapters in Vic and Girona with the unexpected need to raise and supply soldiers for local defenses, and to organize religious processions to calm their respective communities. Finally, for a cathedral chapter to contribute financially to a government with a tenuous legitimacy, against their sovereign was a significant step, not to be taken lightly. Contributing to a town’s defense against social disorder was one thing; to directly aid and abet rebels in their fight against Philip IV was another matter entirely. For many cathedral canons—particularly those who had not attended the Braços General—their personal crisis came with the rather mundane decision to contribute financially to the rebels’ cause during the autumn of 1640.

Pau Claris seemed well aware of the great trial that was now presenting itself to his fellow clerics across the Principat and Comtats. He admitted to the problems the Generalitat faced in collecting the needed revenue in a private letter to his brother canons in Urgell. Sympathizing with their troubles, he nevertheless praised “the diligence which it is said you have made in placing in execution the decree of the tax of the clergy in this Bishopric and in responding to the difficulties that Your Lordship represented in your
letter.” At the close of his epistle, Claris emphasized again the “very great necessity” of contributing something to the cause before matters got any worse.\footnote{526}{“la diligencia quens diu ha feta en posar en exequitio lo de la tatxa del clero de aqueix Bisbat y responent a las dificultats que VS representa en sa carta;” “diem que la paga ha de ser una y aquexa de prompta per ser la necessitat tan urgent y obervanrse en los demes Bisbats de aqueixa manera…” ACU: IV: Letters of Pau Claris (transcribed by Mossen Pere Pujol) 9 October 1640.}

With so many of their colleagues enjoying positions of power in the new government, it was not long before the chapter of Urgell received more information regarding the ecclesiastical tax. On 10 October, Don Llorens de Barutell, Urgell’s syndic in Barcelona, confided to the chapter that sterner measures would have to be taken in order to bring in the much-needed cash. Among other measures, the newly erected Junta de Justitia was planning on moving forcibly against Bishop Duran’s estate, determined to collect the five hundred lliures he was assigned to pay.\footnote{527}{Barutell noted with pleasure that only two days earlier, on 8 October, Bishops Parcero and Sentmanat had set a good example to all the regional clergy by depositing at least three hundred of their required five hundred lliures into the banks at Barcelona. Furthermore, the syndic wanted his chapter’s input on the wisdom on appointing Don Josep de Cadell, a powerful baron based near Puigcerdà and head of the infamous cadell family of nyerro-cadell fame, as head of a local militia company. Finally, Barutell passed along “un sermo tan devout” that had been recently preached in Barcelona for their spiritual comfort during these troubling times.\footnote{528}{Not only did Barutell desire their input, but it also appears that the cathedral chapter of Urgell had the power to appoint him in this position. ADU: III Cartes Rebudes, 1630-1640; 10 October 1640.}}
By October 12, sensing that the *reales* and *lliures* were still not flowing in as planned, Pau Claris and the Braços began work on a new fundraising campaign. They were incited in this work as much by the need to improve fortifications along the southern and western fronts as to raise, arm, and train more Catalans. A three-part plan was devised. First, the rebels sought out donations from the Inquisition. The Holy Office was a previously untapped source, left untouched either because of its presumed poverty, or—more likely—because its strict adherence to the Crown virtually assured a rejection. Needless to say, the Generalitat’s embassy was promptly refused.529

Next, a public appeal was made, stating the need for 300,000 *lliures* to carry on the defense, and efforts were renewed to bring in as much money as possible from the coffers of the cathedrals and religious houses.530 In this, the Braços were more successful; the regional clergy constituted one-third of the representatives in this deliberative body and appear to have supported the movement. Diego Palau, the canon-syndic from Vic, reminded his chapter of this point in one of his letters, hoping that they would understand and excuse his irregular correspondence because of his duties in Barcelona while reiterating that “*that I, for my part, have continued to heed my obligation, being very attentive to carrying out my conscience as well as a testimony to God our Lord.*”531 Thanks in part to Palau and other like-minded canons, the chapter of Vic had salted away an unspecified amount of money by mid-October. So pleased were they at this accomplishment that they informed the Diputats of their sizeable deposit in

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531 “*Com be VS te entes en lo principi los brasos deliberaren que en la Junta de trenta sis personas y assistessen entre altres los syndichs dels capitols y com a tal nous poguerem escusar axi que io per ma part he continuat a acudir a ma obligacio estant molt attenta descarregar ma conciencia y de asso de testimoni a Deu nre Sr.*” ACV: (Arm 56/34): Secretaria: Cartes (1631-1640), 4 October 1640. Emphasis mine.
the city bank of Barcelona, placed at the disposal of the greater good.\footnote{ACV: (Arm 57/56): Secretaria: Liber 2 (1630-1641); Chapter Resolution, October 1640, f. 265.} Later in the month, the chapter of Urgell joined their illustrious company.\footnote{ADU: III. Cartes Rebudes: 1630-1640. In a letter written 24 October 1640, Chaplain Guillem Vaquer informs the chapter that the 300 ll they donated has been deposited in the bank in Barcelona.} By early November, the chapter of Girona wrote to the chapter of Barcelona regarding these taxes and their payment, informing them that they were still facing great difficulties in accumulating the required sum, but would do their best to persevere.\footnote{ACB: I. B. Correspondencia: Cartas Rebudes (1640-1679). Letter from the chapter of Girona to Chapter of Barcelona. 11 November 1640.}

The third and final policy decision was to make use of the property of the declared enemies of the new regime. The Braços General, following in the tradition of warfare at the time, attempted to make certain that fellow Catalans who remained loyal to the crown also paid their fair share of the costs of war. These involuntary “contributions” not only enabled the rebel government to assert their own legitimacy and identify potential trouble-makers—for who but a surly rebel could refuse to obey such a righteously-inspired decree?—but they also spared the “true” Catalans from shouldering the full burden of early modern warfare.\footnote{Similar conduct to that taken by the rebel Catalan government also appeared during the Fronde, as well as in the English Civil War. In a pamphlet entitled Relació molt verdadera de las Victorias que han tingut las armas del Rey Christianissim (que Deu guart) contra las armas del Rey de Castilla, which appears to have been translated from French by one Antoni Pomes, and published in late September or early October 1642, in contrast to the date published on the cover, which says 1640. The Relació contained a summary of international news, including the news that the King Charles I had confiscated property of rebels in the Parliament stronghold of Coventry as well as a description of Parliament’s reaction to the king’s aggressive action. AHCB: B.1640-8-(op)-3: Relació molt verdadera de las Victorias que han tingut las armas del Rey Christianissim (que Deu guart) contra las armas del Rey de Castilla (Barcelona: Jaume Mathevat, 1640), f.3. International news bulletins in the form of Relacios like this became very popular in Catalonia during the war, and were largely translations from French. The progress of the English Civil War appears very often in these relacios and it is interesting to note that at first the Catalans seem to identify with Parliament against a tyrannical king, but later, with the “righteous” king against a sacrilegious Parliament. Also of note, it may be only in keeping with the full text of the document, but to publish an article which title commemorates the victories of the French King “(may God defend him)” over the King of Castile (not...}
The first to fall under the censure of the new Catalan government as well as the first to have their goods confiscated were the citizens of Tortosa. Exasperated at that city’s refusal to join with the rest of the Catalan territory—indeed, the citizens of Tortosa had sent a proclamation to the king, saying that they would welcome a royal occupation force, and henceforth desired to be known as “the most faithful city”—the Braços General promptly declared that all worldly goods of anyone who hailed from the town were now forfeit to the Generalitat. On 24 September, the Braços issued an order that all citizens of Tortosa currently residing in Barcelona were to leave the town immediately, to be accompanied home by the chief city councilor and Dr. Josep Claresvalls, the prior of Santa Ana, and a native of Tortosa. With the dispossessed Catalans went a final warning: those who did not follow the orders of the Diputat Real and Conseller-en-Cap “will be decried (lit. shouted) as enemies of the patria”.536

In the end, Tortosa’s city fathers did not waver in their support for the king and so fell under the ban of Catalonia’s new government. They would not be alone. Through the autumn and winter months, the property of several individuals and several towns were confiscated. On 4 January 1641, the Braços condemned Pau Duran three weeks after

discovering his continued presence in the king’s invasion force and confiscated his 
property, no doubt much to the delight of the chapter in Urgell.537

It is fair enough to say that without the fiscal support given by cathedral chapters 
and religious houses during the fall of 1640, the Catalan war effort would have fallen far 
short in the defense of the province. It is evident that neither individual towns nor 
individual nobles had sufficient funds or means to raise the amount needed to finance 
even a few thousand militiamen or cavalry regiments.538 Based solely upon their secular 
contributions—political leadership, diplomacy, and financial donations—the Catalan 
clergy played an enormous role in the defensive struggle against Castile. This was not 
all, however; their work as thinkers and authors served to strengthen the hearts of their 
countrymen, while at the same time spreading word of their just cause abroad to France, 
Portugal, and Rome.

Justifying the Revolt to the Outside World: Defending the Principat with the Pen

It was not only with their privileged political positions nor with their wealth alone 
that the clergy in Catalonia supported the revolt, now evolving towards a serious 
rebellion or revolution. Many cathedral canons as well as a number of monks from the 
older orders—particularly Benedictines and Augustinians—had been schooled in canon

538 That is not to say that Claris and the other rebel leaders were any less insistent on collecting secular dues. In a proclamation dated 26 October, Claris sent word throughout the province of the pressing need for immediate fiscal and military aid. One can sense a beginning desperation in his plea to the Catalan towns to do “al que es necessari y forçó socorrer per propria, y natural defensa;” and that “ser necessariament précis acudir als gastos de esta defensa, y solució, y paga dels cabos, y soldats, axi Provincials com auxiliars, y per las municions, y pertrets de Guerra.” The basis of the secular contribution appears to be a sort of stamp-tax, amounting to one real for “joch de cartas grans” and a sou for “xicas.” While accounts reveal that the Diputació was playing host to the French ambassador du Plessis-Besançon at this time, and that part of their proclamation admits to funding “auxiliars” (read: French soldiers) it is uncertain whether the Frenchman suggested this particular fiscal policy. BC: FB 5396: Ara Ojats (26 October 1640), f. 340.
law, and in some cases civil law as well. A few of these educated clerics would use their legal and writing skills to turn out well-argued justifications defending the actions of Catalonia since the beginning of the current troubles. One common theme is present in all of these early (1640-1641) documents: the continual use of the burning of the Sacrament at Riudarenes and Montiró as the pre-eminent reason for the revolt. For secular jurists and devout clerics alike, the burnt chalices served as a touchstone for the Catalan cause, long after the last embers had cooled. Like the Alamo, the Maine, German “beastliness” in Belgium, or Pearl Harbor, these damaged treasures would be the rallying-call for all true Catalans, an inspired impetus for a “natural defense.”

Strict adherence to the Catholic faith among priests and laity alike provided far more to Catalonia than just an initial impetus to revolt: in other words, the burnings of the Sacrament not only explain the harsh reaction of the countryside during the months of May and June. They also nurtured and sustained the province's identity, and inspired its leaders to persevere in the path they had chosen. Furthermore, the rhetoric contained in both secular writings and sacred homilies called for more than just retribution against the guilty church burners; they imbued Catalans with a sense of their allegiance to the pure and historic Catholic faith, an allegiance that marked their land as blessed by God, and obligated them to defend it. Although written during the constraints of wartime, these justificatory pamphlets soon acquired a wide currency throughout Portugal and France as well as in other countries in Western Europe. Presses throughout the continent seized upon a few of these tracts and translated them so that news of the revolt eventually reached Lisbon, Venice, Paris, Vienna, and London. In pages full of Baroque floridity,
priestly and legal writers alike offered up their sentiments to the world, proclaiming the justice of their cause.

Among the most prominent of these early apologists was Gaspar Sala i Berart, an Augustinian monk. Born in Saragossa, Sala moved to Barcelona in 1622 where he studied philosophy and theology before going on to teach at the university in Lleida. By 1636, he had established himself back in Barcelona as the rector of the Augustinian school there, where he remained until the war broke out. In his *Proclamación Católica*, the first printed pamphlet defending the cause of his adopted province (published 12 October 1640), Sala presented the common understanding among Catalans as to the reasoning behind their creation of a new republic.539

**The Proclamación Católica**

Religious themes speak from the first pages of Sala’s work. In the first place, the author chose to title his work the “Catholic Proclamation” rather than the “Catalan Proclamation,” implying on the title page that he would be treating subjects pertinent to all Catholics in Philip’s realm, not just the minority Catalans. Next, the first illustrations—aside from the city of Barcelona’s coat of arms on the cover—reflect the pamphlet’s religious message contained within. The second page is entirely taken up with an engraving of a Eucharist custody, with the crucifixion depicted in the shape of a 539 Remarkable as this work was during its time, only a few copies exist in the present day; as far as I could tell, only one copy exists in Catalonia, at the Biblioteca de Catalunya, Barcelona. What is more interesting, though other justification pamphlets such as Francesc Viladamar’s *Noticia Universal* and even Sala’s later work, *Secret Publichs*, have been studied in recent publications, this first, and most influential work has not. This is unfortunate, not only because of its strong presentation of religious reasons for Catalan resistance, but because it appears to have formed the basis for subsequent defenses of the Catalan position and attacks against the Spanish monarchy. For a study of these other contemporary works see, Eva Serra and Xavier Torres, eds. *Escrís politics del segle XVII*, 2 vols. (Institut Universitari d’Història Jaume Vicens i Vives. Eumo Editorial: 1995); and Antoni Simon i Tarrés, *Els Orígens Ideològics de la Revolució Catalana de 1640* (Barcelona: Abadía de Montserrat, 1999).
Commutation wafer. Around the chalice runs a verse from John 6: “If any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever.”\textsuperscript{540} The very next page is an illustration of Santa Eulalia, who was not only one of the patron saints of Barcelona but also figured prominently in the Eucharist feast, thus presenting to all its readers the close-knit bond uniting the political community with the community of faith.\textsuperscript{541}

Artwork aside, the motive impelling Sala to write this pamphlet was a religious one, a direct response to the continued sacrilege and “new customs” forced on the entire Principat and Comtats by the king’s soldiers.\textsuperscript{542} It was not just a few fear-mongers that had raised concerns, Sala wrote. On the contrary, “This voice is so common, this murmuring so pervasive against such great evils that even the distant Provinces sympathize with us.”\textsuperscript{543} The author repeated that he did not enter into this writing lightly: “It would deny the fatherly piety of a Monarch so Catholic, to presume on Your Majesty … without first discussing the crimes that motivated [these words.]”\textsuperscript{544} While much of the work is concerned with the political history and privileges of the Catalan people—in light of current events as well as with precedents established during the Middle Ages—the Augustinian monk was equally interested in solidly establishing the reputation of the Catalans as a devout and faithful people. Thus the first chapters included the

\textsuperscript{540} John 6: 51; in context with the rest of the verse, this passage clearly speaks to the service of Holy Communion. “I am the living bread which came down from heaven: if any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever: and the bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world.”

\textsuperscript{541} Francesc Puig noted this connection between the saint and the Lord’s Supper when he refers to the famous banner of Santa Eulalia brought out only as a last resort in the campaign of 1640.

\textsuperscript{542} “los soldados de V Magestad...no contentos de los estragos, y exorbitantes sacrilegios hasta aora cometidos, publicamente amenaçan universal ruyna, y saco general al Principado: con introduccion de nuevas costumbres, en la forma, y con la impiedad que en Perpiñan, y en otros pueblos, se comiençan a ejecutar estos designios.” BC: FB 5229. Gaspar Sala, \textit{Proclamación Católica} (Barcelona: Jaume Matevad, 1640), p. 1.

\textsuperscript{543} “Esta voz es tan comun, este rumor es tan general, que de tan grandes males se conduelen hasta las Provincias estrañas.” Ibid, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{544} “Seria negar la piedad de padre a un Monarca tan Catolico, presumir en V.M….sin preceder delitos, que los motiven.” Ibid, p. 1.
following headings: “The Catalans’ faithfulness to Kings;” “The Catalan Cult of the Catholic Faith;” “Catalan Devotion to the Virgin, Our Lady;” “Catalan Devotion to the Holy Sacrament of the Altar.” Only after establishing the sincerity of the Catalans as true Catholics and as true subjects to Catholic kings, did Sala begin to discuss the Principat’s political privileges or recent sufferings.

In essence, what was at stake in the revolt of 1640 was reputation. Other scholars, particularly Sir John Elliott, have commented at length on the importance of reputación in defending the vast extent of the Spanish Empire, begotten through the deeds of valorous ancestors. But more than mere political security and defense, there is a religious component involved: the king’s reputation as “His Catholic Majesty,” fulfilling the duties of a true Defender of the Faith in standing fast against heretic and infidel, and in preserving true doctrine inside his realm. In a word, political loyalty is inseparable from religious faith: the sentiment of faithfulness and belief underlying both temporal and spiritual reality is the same. As Sala himself declared, “This Faith, Sir, [faith in the king] is an echo of the divine: because just as one infers from the evidence the love of God to the next; so too, from the greatness of the Catholic Faith in its vassals, one can deduce their fidelity to their Kings. He who is not faithful to God, how can he then be faithful to men?”

What Olivares—and many modern historians—focused on was the political “realities” of the 1640 conflict; the Count-Duke ignored the seriousness of the religious crisis at his own peril.

546 “Esta Fé, Señor, es eco de la divina: porque así como en antecedente se infiere con evidencia, del amor de Dios, el del proximo: asi de la grandeza de la Fè Catolica en los vassallos, se deduze la fidelidad con sus Reyes. Quien no es fiel a Dios, como lo será a los hombres?” Sala, Proclamación Catolica, p. 7.
But the reputation of the Catalan Principat was also at stake during the waning months of 1640. Rebellion was a serious charge during the seventeenth century—very little of the 1960s romance of resisting authority, if any, was present at this time. Traitors and disturbers of the body politic occupy the lowest circles of Dante’s Hell, with their chief, and first rebel, Satan. The Old Testament denounced such activity in no uncertain terms: “For rebellion is as the sin of witchcraft, and stubbornness is as iniquity and idolatry.” Yet that same verse contains a judgment against Israel’s king, Saul, whereby through his disobedience to Divine Law, his kingdom was taken away from him.

Given the context of early-modern society—and of early-modern revolutions up until the French revolution—resistance to the king was based on resisting royal innovations, rather than erecting a grand new society. Any justifiable resistance to a divinely-ordained authority could only come about through royal policies, not local discontent. To further illustrate from the Old Testament, in a passage used by Catalans in their revolutionary sermons, Saul’s deep hatred of his servant David led to the latter’s flight from the court as a declared rebel, even though David was “a man after God’s own heart” and Saul was not. For many years, the righteous David—unjustly denounced—was hunted. Though a loyal subject, he resisted his lord, but refrained from killing Saul, though twice the king was in his power. Many Catalans during the first months of the revolution turned to David as their example: they did not want to fight

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547 I Samuel 15:23.
548 The example of David was used briefly by the Junta de Theologians in their approval of the revolt, BC: FB 2121: Proposició del Cas. Se refiere a si es lícito y permitido a los provincials, en conciencia, tomar las armas para resistir a los que de presente la invaden y a los que amenazan invadirla, opinando afirmativamente (Barcelona, 1640), p. 7; in the Easter-tide sermon by the Discalced Carmelite, Pare Fra Josep de Jesus Maria, AHCB: B.1641-8-(op)-27: “Sermo Predicat en lo Aniversari Que ab Exemplar Devocio…” (Barcelona, 1641); and also in the justification pamphlet, BC: FB 6101: Catalana Iusticia Contra Las Castellanas Armas: Dedicated to Dips (Soler in now, Claris is dead). By Josep Font, Sacristan of Sant Pere de Ripoll (J. Mathevd, 1641), f. 22.
against the king, but neither would they lay down their arms while he unjustly continued to oppose them.  

A spiritual confidence, therefore, lay at the base of the Catalan resistance in 1640. It was as if the religious fervor of the people and their leaders hearkened back to the words of another Augustinian monk, “God and my conscience, I can do no other.” And it became the work of Gaspar Sala and others to establish this confidence, assuaging at the same time psychological concerns regarding rebellion, by means of a religious and political defense. In other words, what the Junta of Theologians was to do for the legally educated elite, Sala, Sarroca, and others were to do for the broader masses, as well as for an international audience.

This, then, was the foundation of the Catalan cause. A strong faith in God, particularly, as Sala wrote of the Deity as “the Lord of Hosts” who had always saved the people of Catalonia from conquest and rewarded them for their faith. The author moved on from this thesis to lay down claim after claim attesting to the purity of the Catalan faith, which had so recently come under assault by the actions of heretical soldiers. Most of these claims dealt with the primacy of the Catalan faith. Thus, the first Gentile convert, Sala argued, was probably a Catalan; the first steps taken by St. James when he brought the Gospel to Spain were undoubtedly taken in Catalonia.  

Furthermore, the historian monk related, the first bishop consecrated by the Apostle in

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549 A further point brought out in a work written before the revolt, observed that the high priest, Ahimelech, aided David in his flight from Saul, even giving him weapons—the sword of Goliath—and food—the consecrated “shew bread.” In revenge for the priest’s actions, Saul ordered Ahimelech and all the priests in the city with him to be killed. AHCB: B.1636-8-(2): Fr. Diego Niseno, El Gran Padre de los Creyentes Abrahán (Barcelona, 1636), ff. 45v-47.  
550 “Señor de los ejércitos, aunque sufre, sean invadidos; pero no permita sean vencidos, en premio de los servicios, que tienen hechos a la fe Católica, como las historias lo publican.” Sala, Proclamación Católica, p. 8.  
Spain, as well as the first Ecclesiastical Council in Spain—the first to proclaim the celibacy of the clergy—were both in Catalonia, and Sala found an account praising the citizens of first-century Barcelona for their devotion to the new religion.\textsuperscript{552} Even in witnessing to the pagans, Sala argued, Catalonia led the way. For the twelve priests who accompanied Columbus to the New World and the Papal legate who accompanied them, there were all Catalans, to say nothing of the first Indians who converted to the Holy Faith, who were baptized in Barcelona.\textsuperscript{553}

Moving through history, the Augustinian remarked that not even the invasion of the Moors could harm the Catalans’ faith. With a veiled reference perhaps to the Mozarabic rite established throughout the rest of Spain under the Moors, or perhaps to the recent sacrileges, he writes “that while the Moors were in Barcelona, there was always a Bishop, their Temples were never profaned, the holy bodies of their patron saints unharmed, because the Moors could not suppress the Catalans totally.”\textsuperscript{554} Significantly, Sala even claimed that during the Reconquista, only Catalonia sent ambassadors to Rome, and that through the efforts of these men, Catalonia became the true birthplace of the Inquisition!\textsuperscript{555} The monk went on, defying his readers to identify a

\textsuperscript{552} Ibid, pp. 9-10.

\textsuperscript{553} Ibid, p. 11. Sala would complement this spiritual primacy with a primacy of blood, asserting that all the Old Christian families throughout Spain were merely descendants of the Catalans. “Las sangres mas principales de Castilla…todos son reliquias se restauraron en Barcelona.” “No tiene la Nobleza de España raiz mas anciana, que la de Cataluña…y assi los grandes Señores se precian de propagarse de Catalanes.” Such arguments, vitally interesting in an age of “limpieza de sangre,” but coming from a people already seen as insolent could not help but irritate the great houses of Castile. Ibid, p. 118.

\textsuperscript{554} “que mientras [h]uvo Moros en Barcelona, [h]uvo siempre Obispo, sus Templos nunca profanados, los cuerpos santos de sus patrones illesos: porque no pudieron los Moros supeditar del todo a los Catalanes.” Ibid, pp. 9-10.

\textsuperscript{555} “Por los Catalanes goza España el Santo Tribunal de la Inquisicion, y fue su primer Inquisidor el Santo Catalan Raymundo de Peñafort a cuya instancia se erigio en la Ciudad de Lerida antes que en otra Ciudad de España.” Ibid, p. 10. See also Busquets i Dalmau 1976, 78. Unfortunately, the Holy Office in Madrid disapproved of Sala's argument. Though strongly censured, the Inquisition only banned his book for the first time in 1653, and again in subsequent disturbances within Catalonia in 1677, and 1707, when it was
single Catalan heresiarch. On the contrary, he said, Catalonia is the touchstone "where the false sectarians soon display the base quality of their errors"; the Catalan faith was as the resplendent Sun with its rays, and by its light one can discern truth from error.\textsuperscript{556} So concerned were the Catalans with their faith that they incorporated several penalties into their own political constitutions, "guided by this zeal of the Holy Faith." \textsuperscript{557}

In addition to their assertions of primacy as Christian witnesses, Sala argued that the Catalans were in the forefront of doctrinal positions as well. His third chapter dealing with the devotion to the Virgin Mary opened with the declaration: "For the other Kingdoms, Paul V’s decree [on the Immaculate Conception of Mary] was a novelty: but not for this Principat." \textsuperscript{558} Beyond even theological considerations, the Catalans had even written this statement of faith into one of their Constitutions 150 years earlier. That the monk would spend such time on this point is of great importance. Not only was the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception another factor separating the true Catholics from the Protestants, but the kingdom of Castile had prided herself on being the first people to acknowledge this belief, and to persuade the Vatican to proclaim it. Now, according to Sala, their pride was unfounded; Castile had been trumped by the very people whose faith she now questioned.

\textsuperscript{556} "donde los fingidos sectarios muestran presto la baxeza del metal de sus errores:" Sala, Proclamación Católica, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{557} "guiados deste zelo de la fe santa." Ibid, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{558} "Para los demas Reynos fue novedad el decreto de Paulo V: mas no para este Principado." Ibid, p. 11. As part of his proof that Catalans had historically held such a high view of Mary, Sala refers to the Black Virgin of Montserrat, said to have been carved by St. Luke and brought to the region before the end of the first century.
As a final proof of the Catalans’ true devotion to orthodox Christianity, their love of the Sacrament and the pious celebrations during the octave of Corpus are mentioned.\(^559\) So great was their devotion that, although they had born patiently the assaults on their political and economic liberties during the previous decade, they would not tolerate any attack on God, particularly as revealed through the Sacrament of the Mass.

The Catalans suffered much from your majesty’s soldiers; but the crimes that were committed against God, they did not suffer. The fraudulent atrocities, with which they had been used, although they felt them, they tolerated them. But they were unable to contain their patience for such unwonted sacrileges. And these they stopped … in formidable explosions. There is no enemy, Sire, more opposed to the Catalan, than haughtiness and sacrilege: because the one insults their greatness, and the other profanes their devotions.\(^560\)

Drawing from the great St. John Crysostom, Gaspar Sala rhetorically asked, how could a good Christian stand by idly while his Lord is offended in such a horrible manner? Indeed, the Church Father had raised the question merely as a hypothetical: how much more, the Augustinian argued, ought Catalan fervor be moved when presented with such an actuality? He concluded the section with the reflection that “The silence, which in other enormous grievances, is nought but justice, and a fortress, would be a grave sin.”\(^561\)

Having established the Catalan legacy of loyalty beyond a shadow of a doubt not only to their secular lords but also to the King of Heaven, Gaspar Sala moved on to address—albeit obliquely—the terms of self-defense advocated by the province. Sala's defense of the Principat’s actions stemmed from two sources: the first carried on his


\(^{560}\) “Sufrieron los Catalanes de los soldados de V. Magestad mucho: pero los agravios, que han hecho a Dios, no los sufrieron. Los atroces supercherias, que con ellos han usado, aunque las sienten, toleraron: pero sacrilegios desusados, no pudieron caber en su paciencia. Y así como encuentros antiparísticos, pararon en formidables estallidos. No ay (Señor) enemigo mas opuesto al Catalan, que el sobervio, y el sacrilego: porque aquel ultraja sus grandezas, y este profana sus devociones.” Ibid, p. 14.

\(^{561}\) “El silencio, que en otros agravios, sino es justicia, es fortaleza, en enormidades, seria grave culpa.” Ibid, p. 15.
religious themes, being the repeated injustices the people and their churches had recently suffered at the hands of imperial soldiers; the second traced the heritage of Catalan political autonomy, extending back to the reign of Charlemagne, which had been ruthlessly trampled upon by the policies of Olivares. For the first, Sala not only went into detail regarding the crimes of Moles and Arce, but also published in fine print along the sides of several pages the original excommunication by Don Francesc Pejoan on 12 May.562

The sacrilege was horrible enough, Sala asserted, to move the Catalan people to tears. Furthermore, the monk claimed that the soldiers’ actions were no better than their models, the Jews, who tormented Christ on the Cross—a particularly nasty reference, given the Castilian nobility’s obsession with “limpieza de sangre.”563 Again, they are compared with the pagan Roman soldiers who chose to bet on Christ’s garments rather than cut them up; but these soldiers are not afraid to burn the Sacramental body of their Lord in whom they ostensibly believe? This time, Sala declaimed, there would not be a second Calvary: “There, rocks arose against the sacrileges [the earthquake that occurred during the Crucifixion, Matt. 27: 50-51] while here the Catalans rose up against these [present sacrileges]: at Calvary, Christ lacked faithful followers and friends, but in Catalonia, we are all his.”564

One must understand that for Sala, the political health and spiritual health of the community were inseparable. The ability to perceive and also execute political justice

562 Ibid, pp. 15-17
563 “Aí que dolor! Aí que sacrilegio!” “Haveys imitado...a los Judios, ellos atormentaron a Christo en la Cruz. Y vosotros en el altar.” Ibid, p. 17.
564 “Allá se levantaron las piedras contra los sacrileges, y aquí los Catalanes contra estos: faltavan en el Calvario fieles y amigos a Christo, pero en Cataluña todos son suyos.” Ibid, p. 19.
was wrapped up with the spiritual faith of the community, and both were dependent on God: “just as His Divine voice is accustomed to be placed in the mouth of the people, He puts into their hands the sword of His justice, to execute punishment.” When a political magistrate rises up against a member of the religious hierarchy, a cardinal for example, all those who are bound to the offender through contracts are freed of their obligations; how much more so, when the Incarnate Word was under assault and nothing was done to reprimand the offenders? The monk concludes this section with a judgment against the king, as if garbed in the very robes of the prophet Elijah whom he praised earlier. “Punish, Your Majesty, punish those sacrileges, before God takes up the scourge for vengeance: because either He has to fail in His word (which is impossible) or He will not fail in His justice. Such sins are not to be remitted in the other world.”

As Sala dealt with the recent history of 1640, he noted that political disturbances have often come with the refusal of the political authority to redress popular grievances. In his discussion on the Corpus Christi riot, Sala drew not only on revolts in the Classical period or Late Antiquity, such as the revolt by the city of Livia against the Seleucid king Acheus or the revolt of Antioch against the emperor Theodosius. But then, interestingly, the monk referred to “The inhabitants of Mexico, who, in the time of Your Majesty rose up against the Viceroy, moved by the unjust imprisonment of the Archbishop of that City.” What lesson may be drawn from this? Only that “invariably in all republics there

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566 “Castigue, V. Magestad, Señor, castigue estos sacrileges, antes que tome Dios el açote para la vengança: porque o ha de faltar a su palabra (que es impossible) o no faltara à su justicia: que estas culpas no son para remitidas al otro mundo.” Ibid, p. 29.
have followed consequences from popular commotions at the cost of exactores, and arbitristas (special names?)\textsuperscript{567}

By refusing to address the several Catalan petitions for redress, the king was risking his legitimacy among his subjects for the sake of political expediency. And yet, as Sala concluded, by pursuing what was only superficially expedient, Philip IV was sacrificing the past services that the Catalans had offered. As he wrote:

The Ecclesiastics served with their rents, and levied soldiers for Salses, without paying towards the ordinary subsidy. Instead of receiving a reward, they were denied places in bishoprics and abbeys, and the recommended Abbots were introduced, leading to the ruin of Ecclesiastical patrimonies, and of Monastic observance, that took so long to be introduced in Catalonia … The Churches went to the king with continued prayers and luminaries before the exposed Most Holy Sacrament: and now, Lord, they have witnessed enough effects of this ingratitude: burning their Temples, images, altars, and holy places, without respecting His royal presence in the sacred Eucharist vessels.\textsuperscript{568}

The risk the king ran was the dissolution of the body politic. Moving from mere prophecy to concrete exposition, Sala wrote that the king, though the source of law, is not the source of the political contract, which relies on deeper truths and morals. “It is not lawful for the Prince to contravene the contract: he made it freely, but illicitly it was revoked, although he has never been subject to the civil laws, though he is still subject to that law of reason. And although he is Lord of the laws, he is not Lord of contracts that

\textsuperscript{567} “Los de Mexico en tiempo de V. Magestad se levantaron contra el Virrey, movidos de la injusta prision del Arçobispo de la Ciudad … en todas las republicas se han seguido infaliblemente consecuencias de comociones del pueblo, a costa de los exactores, y arbitristas.” Ibid, p. 69. For more on the 1624 rising in Mexico against the Viceroy los Gelves, see Geoffrey Parker in forthcoming…

\textsuperscript{568} “Sirvieron los Eclesiasticos con sus rentas, haciendo levas de esoldados para Salsas, sin arender al subsidio ordinario: y en vez de premio, desvian de sus esperanzas no solo los Obispados, pero los Abadengos: y introduziendo por este camino los Abades comendatarios, ruyna de los patrimonies Ecclesiasticos, y de la observancia Monastica, que costó tanto de introduzirse….Acudieron las Iglesias con deprecaciones, y luminaries continuas delante el Santissimo Sacramento patente: y hasta a este Señor le han cabido efectos deste deconocimiento: que mandole sus Templos, imagenes, altares, y sacrarios, sin respetar, su real presencia en las custodias.” Ibid, p. 74.
have been made with his vassals, so that in this act, he is a particular person, and the vassal acquires equal rights, because the pact has to be made among equals.  

This social-political covenant formed among Christian equals is interesting—on the one hand it takes into account a Christian notion of the equality of man in their condition before God, before whom the oath is made, while on the other hand placing the responsibility of preserving the covenant on both parties, king and vassal alike. Just as the vassals are bound not to fail in their fealty to their lord, so the lord is duty-bound to protect them from external foes, and to ensure the practice of justice throughout the community. Those who break their vows in this covenant face the most dreadful of consequences—even emperors are bound by their oath.

Once more, Sala stresses the unity of politics and religion in the social compact, which he argues is forever preserved in the constitutions of Catalonia. Any who might seek to break a single one of these constitutions—incorporating, as we have seen, not only strict political ideals but religious doctrines as well—would face the wrath of two enemies: “the one being the conscience of Kings, the other, the consciences of the Catholic Church.” For a king to go back on the promises of his ancestors was not only seen as an assault on the conscience of the royal family, but also perjury, and therefore a moral sin. For “los impios Machiavelistas” who base all their arguments on “conservar el estado,” their enemy was not their own conscience, but rather the doctrine of the Catholic Church. Through the defense of both, the Catalan constitutions are secured:

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569 “No le es licito al Principe contravenir al contracto: libremente se haze; pero illicitamente se revoca: aunque nunca estuviesse sujeto a leyes civiles, lo está a la de la razon. Y aunque es Señor de leyes, no lo es de contratos, que haze con sus vassallos, pues en este acto es particular persona, y el vassallo adquiere ygual derecho: porque el pacto ha de ser entre yguales.” Ibid, p. 114.

570 “Los unos lo son de la conciencia de los Reyes, los otros de la Iglesia Catolica.” Ibid, p. 119.

571 Ibid, p. 120.
“the laws of Catalonia are Visigothic laws established in national councils by the most learned Bishops of Spain, and these men did not have to determine anything against the laws of God.”

The dual nature of the monk’s defense, though grounded specifically in religious faith of an organic society—and the political faith which flowed from it—could not help but strike a resonant chord throughout the Republic. It is even possible that Sala’s Proclamación would appeal to other concerned Catholics—and even Protestants—beyond the borders of Castile or Catalonia.

One final point of interest in the Proclamación is that Sala continues to refer to the king as “Nuestro Señor.” Though lines had been clearly drawn between Philip IV and the Catalan leadership in Barcelona, the majesty of their ruler was still acknowledged—bringing to mind the number of Continental officers who continued to drink to the health of George III well into 1777. A few commentators have noted that the Proclamación, like other Catalan works in late 1640 and early 1641, are written in Castilian rather than Catalan, calling into question the “nationalism” of the rebel faction. In response to this observation, one might argue that Catalan identity, though centered on language and literature in the late 19th century Renaissance, may not have placed such a high emphasis on words and speech two hundred years earlier. It is more likely that seventeenth century Catalan society conceived of itself in more organic terms, united by faith and blood rather than the vagaries of language. This is not to deny that language had some part in inspiring Catalan revolutionaries—witness the importance of preaching in Catalan brought up at the Provincial Council of 1636—just not as great as modern students of nationalism are wont to think. A final consideration is that more foreign

572 “Las leyes de Cataluña son las Gothicas establecidas en los concilios nacionales por los Obispos mas doctos de España, y estos no avian de determinar cosa contra las de Dios.” Ibid, p. 122.
courts would be familiar with the Castilian language rather than Catalan. One must remember that these pamphlets were aimed at—and in many cases achieved some recognition among—international audiences. The first several meetings between du Plessis-Besançon and Claris were in Castilian—an irony commented on by both parties at the time. Nevertheless, the Catalan leadership of 1640 was willing to compromise on linguistic “purity” in their bid to win foreign help; they were not so willing to compromise on religious purity.

Unlike another defensive revolutionary appeal, such as the Declaration of Independence, the Proclamación Católica, ends, not with a bold statement of autonomy, but rather a final appeal to the power of the king to stop the present invasion “that threatens us and disposes with the greater cruelty, than if Heretics, Turks, or Moors invaded Catalonia.” Although both treatises are concerned with the distribution of justice, Sala’s work seems to play more on the plea for right judgment rather than mercy. “They invoked their innocence before Your Majesty: and charged all the evils, crimes, effusions of blood, death of innocents, and sacrilege, to the consciences of those who with malice aforethought, and without premeditation of that which might follow them to the detriment of the monarchy … It is not just, Lord, that insolent soldiers shed Catalan blood.” Despite this plea, both works conclude with a determination to fight. “For as the sovereign Kings live, the Catalans lose a lot of blood, not to die infamously as slaves,

573 Incidentally, the meetings between Cardinal Richlieu and the Catalans, as well as between the Portuguese rebels and the Catalans were conducted in the lingua franca of Castilian as well.
574 “que se amenaça, y dispone con mayor crueldad, que si invadieran a Cataluña, Hereges, Turcos, o Moros.” Ibid, p. 134.
who have never lost their honor to save their lives. Rather, the Catalans have given their lives for their honor—yes, many times.”

Other works

Following a reversal of fortunes during the early months of 1641, Catalan spirits began to rise, a change that is witnessed in the more triumphal pamphlets that were produced during this time. Such documents served not only to invigorate the inhabitants of the province, they also continued to proclaim the justice of their cause. One such pamphlet was the Politica del Comte d'Olivares, written in May of that year by one Josep Sarroca, a doctor in theology, who dedicated the work to the cathedral chapter of Urgell, whose members—Claris, Ferran, Barutell, and Soler—had been at the forefront of the revolution for several months. Though written in a less inflammatory vein than Gaspar Sala, Sarroca nevertheless denounced the policies of Olivares as Machiavellian and diametrically opposed to the activities of a good and righteous ruler. Furthermore, although focusing primarily on long-term secular policies, the author also incorporated a substantial religious element in his writings, demonstrating that though the immediate crisis was over, religion would continue to play a critical role in the characterization and defense of the Catalan cause.

Sarroca begins his pamphlet by stating the historical case, which is that the neglect of just precepts and principles of governance resulted in the subsequent collapse

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575 “Delante V.M. alegan su inocencia: y cargan todos los males, daños, effusion de sangre, muerte de inocentes, y sacrilegios, sobre las conciencias de los que con dañado intento, y sin premeditacion de lo que puede seguirse en detrimento de la monarquai… No es justo, Señor, que soldados insolentes derramen la sangre Catalana… Para que vivan los señores Reyes, se dessangran los Catalanes, no para morir infamemente como esclavos, que no perdieron jamas la honra por la vida, la vida si, por la honra muchas vezes.” Ibid, p. 135.
of "aquesta grandiosa monarquia," the house of Hapsburg.\footnote{Josep Sarroca, \textit{Política del Comte d'Olivares}, in \textit{Escrits polítics del segle XVII}, ed. Eva Serra. vol. 2. (Vic: Eumo Editorial, 1995), 59.} In a list of disasters beginning with the revolt in the Netherlands and continuing through the rising power and pride of the Ottomans, the unpunished heresies of England, and military defeats suffered in Flanders and Italy, the author charts the Divine judgments that have befallen the Spanish crown for its sins. In this context, Catalonia and Portugal—the latter country revolted against Spain in December, 1640—became only the latest provinces to rise up against the disastrous course on which the monarchy was set thanks to the centralizing policies of Olivares. In perhaps the most astonishing part of his work—surpassing even Sala's references to the Indians of South America—Sarroca establishes a common cause between Catalonia and the heretical Protestant Netherlands, which broke from Castile over eighty years ago because of similar, “tyrannical” impositions.

The \textit{Política} is an important work that demonstrates the skillful ways in which Catalan writers defended their cause to the world. Scholars imbibed with Renaissance and Baroque learning relied upon classical authorities as well as the teaching of the church to support their propositions. Though not entirely an elaborate discourse on political theory, Sarroca quotes at length from various Roman authors such as Pliny, Virgil, Tacitus, and Plutarch to support his ideas of the ideal state. Furthermore, he draws liberally on both Aristotle's \textit{Politics} as well as St. Thomas Aquinas's \textit{On Kingship}, which he uses to condemn the recent policies by Olivares as an attempt to turn a once-great kingdom into a tool for his own rise to fame. In particular, Sarroca lists seven precepts taken from both Aquinas and Aristotle and demonstrates the ways in which Olivares has violated them in his quest for power. These precepts affect three general
characteristics of a reign, all of which condemn those princes who seek the throne for their own profit. Such grasping after power or money is a sure mark of a tyrant in the making. The signs that remain are seen better by being paired, revealing the methods and behaviors of the unjust oligarch. Although these theories are expressions against royalty, Olivares's status as valido had become so great that many believed Philip IV was but a puppet in his hands, and Sarroca felt justified in applying them to the powerful minister.

The first principle to be expounded in the tract concerns the greedy self-advancement of the governor. Foremost in Sarroca's allegations is the planned imposition of a single law and a single currency under one ruler. Here, it is not only the novelty of the decision that is questioned, but also the sinister attempt to do away with local constitutions and governments. Furthermore, Sarroca questions the lack of royal concern for the prosperity of the region, which he claims demonstrates an attempt to stifle the economic fecundity of Catalonia, while at the same time denying the province its just share of the kingdom's riches.

Second, there is the method by which the hopeful tyrant insinuates his policy through the land, namely, by swearing that he is doing the opposite. Sarroca describes the various changes imposed on the province for years leading up to the revolt and the way in which civil and ecclesiastical officials alike had lost the trust of their subordinates. In the ecclesiastical as well the political arena, Catalans resented the favors that the king bestowed upon forasteros and their more sycophantic countrymen. Despite the king's promises that he would protect the privileges of the province, the appointment of those

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who cared little about Catalan church rites or their concerns for political autonomy and who sometimes sought to eliminate them led to feelings of betrayal, if not tyranny. The inability of Olivares to appoint magistrates in whom the Catalans could put their faith represented a further strike against the king's favorite. Even his eleventh-hour appointment of the Duke of Cardona as viceroy of the province came too late, and was further nullified by the death of the duke after only a month in office. All these events raised further questions in the mind of Sarroca about Olivares and his true intentions for Catalonia.

Finally, for Sarroca, there was the blatant unwillingness expressed by both the king and his minister to listen to the fears and petitions of his subjects. Not only were the requests of the Catalans refused in the Corts of 1626 and 1632, but their discontent in later years was also ignored. Complementary to this charge was the accusation that the prince had refused to recognize the valorous deeds of his people. As the events of the winter of 1639 clearly demonstrated, after the Catalans had organized men and supplies for the successful siege of Salses, the king rewarded them with the further burden of supporting the imperial troops billeted throughout their land.

Through the brief narration of events that follow this section, the author never fails to deny the active hand of God, which has led Catalonia to break with Castile and has delivered them at Montjuïc. Biblical parallels fill the pages of this pamphlet, allowing the reader a glimpse into Catalan society, and how its subjects considered themselves during a time of particular strife. This self-image is apparent only a few pages into the dedication, where Sarroca writes of canons in Urgell being filled with the
spirit of the high priest Melchizedek.\textsuperscript{578} As the history of the revolt unfolds this imagery becomes more vivid: the burning of churches by Moles and de Arce and the further indignities committed upon crosses and images throughout Catalonia are described in all their diabolic horror. Furthermore, Sarroca even portrays the call of Olivares for the creation of "una llei, un rei, i una moneda" in terms that hearken back to the tyrant Antiochus Epiphanes in the books of Maccabees, but foreshadow the coming of Antichrist in the Apocalypse.\textsuperscript{579} As the struggle is narrated through the concluding pages of the Notícia, the reader cannot but be affected by the grandiose religious artistry that depicts the Catalan David, fighting for God, his patria, and his laws, against the great Castilian Goliath.\textsuperscript{580}

As one reflects on the clerical authors such as Sala or Sarroca who took up their pen to "justify the ways of man to man," one might be tempted to see little or nothing unusual in this. After all, many clerics during the seventeenth century had attended university—Sala himself was still a professor at Lleida—and with their legal and literary training, it might be expected that such educated men would naturally become authors. It is not enough, however, merely to account for academic training; rather it is the philosophy underlying their arguments that is most important. In general, Catholic scholars who justified rebellion against their lawful ruler, even if only under rare

\textsuperscript{578} Ibid, 57.
\textsuperscript{579} "one law, one king, one currency." Sarroca wrote of Philip IV’s introduction of the stamp duty throughout Castile, Portugal, and Catalonia, “que a mon veure apar lo caráter de l’Anticrist,” Ibid, 61; 130. For the corresponding Biblical verses see 1 Mac. 1: 41-43; 49 and Revelations 13, especially verses 16-17. It is interesting to note that the imposition of the stamp tax into Portugal in 1636 prompted a widespread revolt against the Habsburg monarchy and Olivares led, in part, by Portuguese clerics. See Geoffrey Parker in forthcoming.
\textsuperscript{580} Sarroca, Política del Comte d’Olivares, 101; 118. See also, Josep de Jesús Maria, Sermó predicat en lo aniversari, in Ibid, 170. Similar imagery had been used by the city-state of Florence against their more powerful enemy, the duchy of Milan, during the war fought between them from 1400-1402.

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circumstances, did so at their own peril. Although none of these Catalan ecclesiastics—even the bishops—had sworn any oath of loyalty upon their confirmation to their post, the reigning understanding regarding the Church’s attitude towards secular authority had been quite clear. The Apostle Paul, writing during the reign of the corrupt Emperor Nero, reminded his audience that “all authority is given under God,” and therefore ought to be obeyed; rebellion against these appointed magistrates, kings, and emperors, is nothing less than rebellion against God.

During the Middles Ages, the great scholar St. Thomas Aquinas, drawing on natural law and the works of Aristotle, formulated a slightly different view on Church-State relations. By the sixteenth century, the Calvinist Huguenots had adapted and modified the Thomistic position of justifiable, defensive resistance during the great French civil wars. Writers known as the Monarchomachs began arguing that Christian resistance to the secular power was justified whenever immorality was made the law of the land and forced upon a believing population. Drawing upon early Christian tradition—yet another feature of the *ad fontes* philosophy underlying Christian Humanism—these writers noted that second century Christians had resisted the decrees

581 “Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powrs that be are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same: For he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake. For this cause pay ye tribute also: for they are God’s ministers, attending continually upon this very thing. Render therefore to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor.” Romans 13: 1-7. While Sarroca published the rumor that Olivares was born in Nero’s palace in Rome, he does not suggest that the Catalans follow the Apostle’s lead and be made “subject unto the higher powers.” On the contrary, the Machiavellian policies of the Count-Duke and the protonotary Villanueva have caused the king to perjure himself with regards to his coronation oath to protect the liberties of the Principality. This perjury and the continued activities of Olivares to oppress the Catalans fly in the face of God’s law and so, according to Sarroca, the Catalans are freed of their obligation to obey. Sarroca, *Política del Comte d’Olivares*, 58-62; 134.
of Roman society to worship the Emperor as a god, and asserted that certain aspects of French society provided modern parallels. Of course, when the future Henri IV and the Huguenots began to get the upper hand, members of the orthodox Catholic League began turning to Aquinas to justify their own persistent rebellion should a heretic come to the throne.

In 1640, only two generations removed from the French Wars of Religion, the Catalans turned back to these old arguments of justified rebellion. Although Josep Sarroca touched on this alternative Thomistic tradition, it was a Catalan lawyer, Francesc Martí Viladamor, who most clearly expounded on this subject at length in his justificatory pamphlet, the *Noticia Universal*.\(^{582}\) Perhaps influenced by the monarchomach writings of François Hotman and his *Franco Gallia*, by Théodore de Bèze, or by members of the Catholic League such as Guillaume Rose or Jean Boucher, Viladamor argued that power and sovereignty resided fundamentally in "el pueblo" who in turn ceded this authority over to the king.\(^{583}\) Although not a cleric, Viladamor’s vindication of the Catalan rebellion included an important role for all true adherents to the Catholic Church.

At the center of Viladamor’s defense lay the undeniable fact of the soldiers’ sacrilege, which demanded retribution. Furthermore, the Catalan jurist—drawing on the

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582 See Sarroca, 60-66; Francesc Martí Viladamor, *Noticia Universal de Cataluña*, in *Escrits politics del segle XVII*, ed. Xavier Torres vol. 1, (Vic: Eumo Editorial, 1995). Originally published roughly two months after Sala’s *Proclamación Católica*, Viladamor’s work became almost as well known. The lawyer moved on to publish a number of works defending the Catalan cause throughout the twelve-year resistance, and enjoyed the patronage of Louis XIV. He fled to Roussillon in the 1650s, where he continued to rise in prominence within the local government.

583 Viladamor, *Noticia Universal*, 135. It is worthy to note that Hotman’s writing were very influential in the Aragonese revolt of 1591 against Philip II, an uprising which, interestingly enough, the Catalans did not support. See Ralph E. Vegeu Giesey, *If not, not. The oath of the Aragonese and the legendary Laws of Sobrarbe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 18-30.
events following the institution of the Lord’s Supper, when Jesus asked his disciples if they had any swords and Peter’s defense of his Lord in the Garden of Gethsemane—argued that the Church and all the faithful ought to take the lead in executing justice. Viladamor observed that Jesus asked for swords, not to prevent him from being seized by the Romans, but to teach the disciples the importance of defending the body depicted in the Sacrament of which they had just partaken. In addition, he argued that the command to defend Jesus was not just given to Peter—or to the specific church of Rome that the apostle signified—but to all his disciples who partook in the Sacrament, in other words, to the church at large. Although close to concilar theory, this justification seems to give primary responsibility for resistance to the church rather than to the secular community. In the jurist’s final exhortation, he reminded his compatriots: “For those of you who shrink from the fear that you will not successfully complete the enterprise, listen: that fear discredits the valor of your blood; trust in God, that He will prepare you for such a Catholic deed.”

The language of political resistance found in the texts Sala, Sarroca, and Viladamor actually originated during the sixteenth century and was widespread throughout Europe by the time of the revolt. Although the Reformation was the fountainhead of new concepts regarding political resistance—specifically in the

585 Viladamor, Noticia Universal, 97. Such an illustration expanding the defense of the church from Peter to all the church appears in similar illustrations used in favor of Gallican liberties.
586 “Si os encoge el temor de que no os salga bien la empresa, attended, que el miedo desacredita el valor de vuestra sangre, y fiad en Dios, que os alentará para tan católica ejecución,” Ibid, 128-129.
development of theories of constitutionalism—each Catalan writer would adapt this philosophy and its vocabulary to suit their purposes.  

Theories of constitutionalism, which have been closely tied to Calvinist-Huguenot theories of resistance as worked out by George Buchanan and Théodore de Bèze and Philippe du Plessis Mornay in France, originated from Roman and canon law during the Middle Ages, and came to the notice of Catholic scholars like John Mair of the Sorbonne. These theories, which taught that authority was not only derived from, but was inherent in, the people assembled, and that the ruler served only as a minister of the commonwealth, passed into Castile through a student of Mair’s, the Dominican, Francisco de Vitoria, in the early sixteenth century. Dominicans such as Fernando Vazquez and Domingo de Soto, and Jesuits like Luis de Molina, Francisco Suárez, and Juan de Mariana then spread this constitutionalism through their teachings at universities in Castile, Portugal, and Catalonia. Despite obvious religious disagreements between Protestants and Catholics, then, Catalan writers in 1640 were able to draw heavily on the political theories that these doctrinal opponents shared, citing both the Huguenot François Hotman and the Jesuit, Roberto Belarmino.

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587 The classic work regarding early modern political theory is Quentin Skinner, *The foundations of modern political thought* vol. 2, *The Age of Reformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). While Joan Lluís Palos has used Skinner to trace the political ancestry of some important ideas used during the Catalan revolt, exactly how Gaspar Sala, Josep Font, Josep Sarroca, or Francesc Viladamor became acquainted with these ideas remains a mystery. Furthermore, a project that applied Skinner’s conclusions of how certain political and religious views influenced not only a theory of society and government, but also of the church—a study that may prove very fruitful in the case of the Catalan revolt with its appeals to Rome—still needs to be undertaken.


With the Pen: Responses

Although the Catalans had grounded their justifications in orthodox religious doctrine and in a strand of Catholic political theory, Madrid was not convinced. When faced with Catalan resistance and the beginnings of a pamphlet war—which had the serious potential of enlisting international aid—Olivares and his fellow ministers could no longer merely revert back to the position of “necessity” or “razón de estado.” Such arguments had failed to convince a majority of Catalans of Olivares’s centralizing policies for decades; it would certainly not be enough to palliate an enraged population now. So the traditional interpretation of Saint Paul’s letter to the Romans became the basis for Castile’s accusations against Catalonia: the doctrine that any resistance to the established powers constituted a devilish resistance against God.

Upon reflection, the royalist position had many points in its favor. First, the royal house of Spain had enjoyed the title of “His Catholic Majesty” for almost 150 years; endowed with Papal blessing, such a title had never been threatened with removal, nor had the Pope criticized the king for any of his soldiers’ actions in the spring. Second, recent history revealed that only heretics would dare rebel against the established authority. Luther and the German princes against Charles V; John Knox against Mary, Queen of Scots; Henry VIII against the Pope; French Huguenots against Henri III; and perhaps most strikingly, the Dutch against the Spanish crown—all were examples of religious schism fomenting political sedition. The only possible positive resistance a true Catholic could point to were the actions of the Catholic League against Henri III—who was a Catholic, but not Catholic enough for them—and the League’s subsequent

590 Indeed, resistance to some of the privado’s innovations like the Union of Arms fomented widespread discontent throughout the Spanish Empire, including the Americas.
resistance to Henri IV while the latter was still a Huguenot. But Philip IV was no heretic—even the Catalans admitted that.

With both a literal Christian teaching and the lessons of history apparently in their favor, the royalists began the fall campaign on the offensive. The military invasion of the province was coupled with an aggressive war of words accusing the Catalans for having provoked this quarrel in the first place. In November of 1640, after establishing his army in Tortosa, the Marquis de los Vélez issued a proclamation in the name of the King, accusing the Braços General of having fomented this rebellion with sinister purposes:

Under the pretext that they were in search of a means whereby to settle the public quietude, to reintegrate Justice: being instead possessed of a spirit to disturb the peace and to introduce War, with the intention of compelling all the votes they had within Barcelona, to which they came in their depraved intention of offering resistance to our standards, prohibiting our entrance into Catalonía … towards such an end so iniquitous and detestable, they have committed different crimes of treason [lesa Magestad] and of express Rebellion, scheming by various means against the prosperity of our Crown.  

Furthermore he called upon all loyal Catalans not to follow after “the blind and depraved intentions of the Diputats” while warning all those who joined themselves with the seditious and rebels, though they might come over later—if it is possible. But they must do so in such a manner that by no means exceeds the stated limit, having given them orders so that they might come over to serve in our Camp. They will not give the rebels any money, support, powder, rope, bullets, arquebuses, muskets, nor other arms, nor any other thing…

Any Catalan who ignored this warning would be viewed “as enemies, rebels, and disturbers of the public peace and quietude.”

591 “con pretesto de que eran para buscar medio como assentar la quietud publica, reintegrar la Justicia; siendo con animo de turbar la paz, y de introduzir la Guerra y con intencion de compelir a todos los votos, teniendo los dentro de Barcelona, a que viniessen en su depravado intento de hacer resistencia a nuestras banderas proybiendonos la entrada en Cataluña… para un fin tan iniquo, y detesable, y que han cometido diferentes crimines de lesa Magestad, y de expressa Rebelion, maquinando por varios modos contra la prosperidad de nuestra Corona.”  

592 “los ciegos y depravados intentos de los Diputados … juntarse con los sediciosos y rebeldes, la retiren luego que les sea posible, pero de manera que por ningun caso excedan el dicho termino, dandole orden para que se passe a servir en nuestro Campo, y que no contribuyan a los rebeldes con dineros,
Furthermore, the Castilian position remained unmoved in the face of Catalan arguments that acts of sacrilege provided sufficient cause for rebellion. One advocate of the king’s cause, Don Francisco de Rioja, piqued by what he saw as the insolent tone of the Proclamación Católica, issued an intense response in which he questioned, not only the burning of the churches themselves (claiming it was the work of impious civilians) but also the extreme actions taken by the clergy on behalf of the province—conduct that was for Rioja clearly unbecoming to a man of the cloth. Just as Sala had drawn on religion and history to assert Catalan claims of innocence, his opponent would work along the same two paths. The Catalans not only have obligations as vassals, Rioja claimed, but as Christians: in both roles, they—and their ancestors before them—have ignored these duties for their own selfish ends.

Rioja began his pamphlet by attacking many of Sala’s claims for a Catalan primacy in matters of faith. According to the nobleman, for example, St. James may have landed in Catalonia originally, but left shortly thereafter, having reaped a very small harvest. While admitting that the first council of Spain was held in Collioure, Rioja pointed out that most of the bishops were from Andalusia, not a single one from Catalonia. He brought up Catalan complicity with the Moors, and the murder of the

magentimientos, polvora, cuerda, balas, arcabuces, mosquetes ni otras armas, ni cosa alguna...” “como a enemigos, rebeldes, y perturbadores de la paz y quietud publica.” Ibid, f.147v

593 This assertion, that the Inquisition in Barcelona had not formally condemned the soldiers for burning the churches, and so therefore, it was still a matter of dispute, was actually the typical defense of the royal court early on. Their insistence that a royalty-biased organization, quite distant from the events, was a better judge than the local bishop, who had amassed evidence to the contrary, really infuriated the Catalans, particularly as Parcero himself was not a Catalan and had not the slightest taint of partiality. Needless to say, when the Barcelona Inquisition actually found the soldiers guilty in early December 1640, this argument was quietly dropped.

594 “podrá cumpliendo con las obligaciones de vassallo, i de Cristiano” BN: R-30807: Don Francisco de Rioja, Aristarco o Censura de la Proclamacion Catolica de los Catalanes, f. 4.

595 Ibid, 9. Collioure is in Roussillon, and for many years served as the summer palace for the Kings of Mallorca.
Abbot of San Cugat in Perpignan under orders of Pere III in 1170, comparing it to the murder of Zacharias son of Barachias, slain under orders by Joash, king of Judah; the Catalans were also condemned for the murder of Don Ugo Cervellon, Archbishop of Tarragona, “because he defended ecclesiastical liberty.”

But it is Pere II and the Albigensian Crusade that suffer the most serious attacks from Rioja’s pen, for in defending his territory against the Albigensian crusade, Pere II was setting himself against the Pope and the blessed Dominic Guzman—founder of the order that bears his name as well as the Inquisition. That Sala passed over an event with such important ramifications for the supposedly pure and orthodox history of Catalonia was unfortunate but, according to Rioja, only to be expected:

But he who wrote the Proclamación, as a good Catalan, had by a little inconvenience, to make of his King, an author of Heresies, which leaves out telling the truth, that the Principat would sure of invasions as long as they opposed a Holy Guzmán, as occurred to their King Don Pedro [Pere II], who opposed Saint Dominic [Guzmán]. But he who defends rebellions, and makes rebellions, and denies obedience to his King and Natural Sovereign, and gives it instead to France, he cannot find it strange to speak evil of the Minister who has worked the hardest in faithfulness and in quality service to his King.

Considering that their history contained such memorable defenses of heretics, opposition against spiritual authorities, and several other flaws, the Catalans appeared extremely hypocritical in their charges against such a loyal and devout minister as Olivares, another

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596 “Pagavan los Catalanes à los Moros, quando estavan à su obediencia, ciertos derechos,” Ibid, 11; for Joash imagery, see f. 12. Joash was a child-king who started out rightly under the tutelage of the high priest Jehoiada—a priest who led a coup against the ungodly queen Athaliah to put Joash on the throne—but later fell away into idolatry and had Jehoiada’s son, a prophet, killed inside the Temple. For this sacrilege and crime, later cited by Jesus as an epitome of rebellion and murder, Joash was murdered in his bed by two servants. See II Kings 11-12; II Chronicles 22-24; and Matt. 23: 35. 597 Rioja even plays up the parallels between Cervellon’s murder and the slaying of his fellow archbishop, Thomas a Becket during the same year. Aristarco o Censura de la Proclamacion Catolica de los Catalanes, f. 12. 598 “Pero el que hizo la Proclamacion, como buen Catalan, tuvo por menor inconveniente hazer a su Rei fautor de Hereges, que dejar de dezir el concreto, de que el Principado estaria seguro de invasions mientras se le opusiese un Guzman Santo, como le sucedio al Rei don Pedro, estandole opuesto Santo Domingo. Pero de quien defiende rebelliones, i las haze, i niega la obediencia a su Rei i Señor natural, i la dà al Francés, poco se puede estrañar que diga mal del Ministro que mas se desvela, en la fidelidad i en la fineza de servir a su Rei.” Ibid, ff. 13-13v.
“Holy Guzmán.” The de-mythologizing of the Principat’s history as construed by Sala was of great importance for Rioja’s apology. For the sincerity of one’s profession—in both religious and political bodies—can be established by persevering in virtue. The demolition of Catalan pretensions to constant loyalty and faith through the ages would shift the focus away from implied royal innovations and towards the legacy of Catalans as rabble-rousers and rebels of questionable religious orthodoxy.

More than disputed interpretations of history, however, Rioja’s subsequent arguments are very concerned with the theological implications of Sala’s viewpoint. More than historic loyalty to the king, the issue at stake here was the ability to correctly discern which party speaks for the True Faith. Thus, while the apology begins with the historical account, it really tries to take Sala apart on his theological assertions. The first one to fall under Rioja’s pen is the Catalan devotion to Mary, especially the Immaculate Conception. Here, the nobleman counters that merely pious words are not enough to prove devotion. Drawing on extremely unconventional sources for a Catholic apologist, Rioja explains that:

Mohammed says in his Koran … of our Lady Dona Maria omnibus viris et mulieribus splendidior et mundior atque lotior, soli Deo persever anter studens … and this is no great credit to Mohammed, working as he worked, to produce this writing …Luther says many times in the Gospel of the Conception of our Lady, that she was conceived without original sin…

Even the heretic can mimic the right words of faith; it is the attitude of the heart that matters most, and in this the Catalans are sorely lacking. Rioja sarcastically comments,”

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599 The Count-Duke’s full name was Gaspar de Guzmán y Pimentel.
600 “Mahoma dize en su Alcoran…de nuestra Señora D. Maria omnibus viris et mulieribus splendidior et mundior atque lotior, soli Deo persever anter studens…i no seria gran credito de Mahoma, obrando como obrò, dejar escrito…Lutero dize muchas vezes en el Evangelio de la Concepcion de nuestra Señora, que fue concebida sin pecado original.” Ibid, 13v-14.
it the piety and devotion of the Catalans that they will act because of “Faith”, what is not
determined by the Church, and they hold is a mortal sin to have any other opinion.⁶⁰¹

This emphasis on heart-felt belief rather than mouthing pious platitudes is
repeated with regard to the Catalans’ supposed devotion to the Sacrament. Here Rioja
draws on the example of kings, all of whom talked well but fell short of true orthodoxy.

Henry the Eighth wrote with more zeal in defense of the Most Holy Sacrament against
Luther, and was later a heretic; and Solomon, who was the first to build the Temple to
God, fell into idolatry; and Constantine, the first Emperor who favored Christian and was
baptized and convened the Council of Nicea against the Arians, later became an Arian.⁶⁰²

The only place where true devotion went on in Catalonia, according to Rioja was in
Tortosa, where their fidelity to their Heavenly and Temporal Kings remained altogether
intact. As if his assertions were not enough, Rioja draws on the testimony of a Catalan
member of the Inquisition of Valencia, who asserts that the Catalans “had on their lips the
honor of the Most Holy Sacrament, but in their works, disrespect and contempt.”⁶⁰³

Following upon the dubiousness of Catalan professions of orthodoxy, Rioja levels
some serious charges against the regional clergy. Their behavior in condemning men
before they had been properly tried before the Inquisition was not only rash, it was

⁶⁰¹ “Esta es la piedad de los Catalanes, i la devocion, hazer ellos de Fe, lo que no a determinado la Iglesia, i
pecado mortal el opinar de otra manera” Ibid, 14v. What is very interesting is that Rioja has now twice
determined that the faith of the Catalans is fundamentally similar to Protestantism. The first, regarding the
passage in Romans 13, taken quite literally and sufficient to stand against Thomistic logic, sounds very
much like the doctrine of Sola Scriptura; the second, in which the attitude of the heart is stressed over mere
words or formalist practice, sounds much like Luther’s original condemnation of Catholic practices in the
1500s. Clearly Rioja—like the Catalans—held to some other defining characteristic that separates true and
false Catholics. For the Catalans it was the devotion to the Sacrament; for Rioja, it appears to be devotion
of the Church and all her teachings, including obedience to one’s King.
⁶⁰² “Con mas zelo escrivio Enrique Octavo de Inglaterra en defensa del Santissimo Sacramento, contra
Lutero, i fue Herege despues: i Salomon, que fue el primero que hizo Templo a Dios, idolatró; i
Constantino el primer Emperador que favoreció Cristianos, i se bautizó, i solicitó el Concilio Niceno contra
los Arrianos, fue despues Arriano.” Ibid, f. 15.
⁶⁰³ “tienen en los labios la onra del Santissimo Sacramento, pero en las obras su desacato i desprecio.” Ibid,
15.
irresponsible. Furthermore, Rioja suspected these inflammatory speeches were politically motivated by malcontents in Barcelona:

They requested Preachers who moved the people in their Sermons to the defense of their constitutions, … and all in order to raise the people in revolt. And he who was involved in this, and with the purity and truth of preaching, and has made these statements in other times, how can one believe that he could speak of the soldiers in any other way except by raising their atrocities and testimonies?604

Furthermore, Rioja contended that such rebellious speech had permeated throughout the Principality by various clergy, claiming that “the highest Religion is the greatest disobedience, and the highest Glory is injuring the Prine.”605 It is clear from The clergy was largely responsible for the rising of the countryside, working such treachery,

With the small amount of religion and piety that has always been in them and is well testified in the cases that I have referred to against their kings and against the Church. They look to God as long as it serves them to find Him, to obtain what they want, and for this reason, “miracles” follow to persuade them He is with them. And they cry with sorrowful voices, publishing the burnings of the Temples and of the species of the Holy Sacramen to incite the people so that they burn with indignation against their king.606

The particular message of Don Francisco Rioja is that beginnings in faith and in loyalty are not enough; what matters is how one acts under pressure and how one finishes the fight, whether still in the fold of faith and the fold of His Catholic Majesty or no. Once again, one can discern references to the larger picture: the fight between Faith and Heresy in Europe. Who would prevail? Which country professing its Catholic faith

604 “Solicitaron Predicadores que en sus Sermones moviessen la gente a la defensa de sus constituciones, … i todo para levantar el pueblo. I quien hace esto con ella, i con la pureza i verdad de la predicacion, i lo a hecho otros tiempos; como se puede creer que hable de los soldados de otra manera, que levantandoles atrocidades i testimonios?” Ibid, 16v.
606 “con la poca religion i piedad que a avido siempre en ellos, i ai; i bien lo testifican los casos que e referido contra sus Reies, i contra la Iglesia; buscan a Dios en cuanto les sirve el buscarle, para conseguir lo que desean: por esto singen Milagros, para pesuadir que esta de su parte, i lloran con vozes doloridas, publicando incendios de Templos, i de especies del Santissimo Sacramento, para concitar la plebe, i encenderla en indignacion contra su Rei.” Ibid, ff. 22v-23.
would triumph? Which would be exposed as but a sham, a pseudo-Christian, a wolf in sheep’s clothing?

For Rioja and many Castilians—indeed, many Catalans up through 1639 shared this sentiment—the French were clearly the false Christians, with their tolerance of the Huguenots, and their blatant support of Sweden and Holland in their fight against the Catholic Hapsburgs. But following the burning of the churches and the inexplicable silence on the part of Philip IV to punish the wrongdoers, or at least utter a statement condemning their actions, a good number of Catalans began to change their minds. One must remember the chaotic times in which this series of events occurred. Without the grand conflict of the Thirty Years’ War, without the current Catholic civil war between France and Spain, and without the ominous weather conditions that bespoke of temporal punishments, the Catalan revolt may well have failed to materialize. Rather than delve deeper into what is obviously a counter-factual question, the reader must continue to reflect upon the important “crisis of conscience” (to use a phrase used by both Theodore Rabb and Paul Hazard) that was affecting all of Europe at this time, even the backwater regions, like Catalonia.

**Manning the walls in defense**

The contribution by the clergy to the rebels’ cause was not limited to directions given from positions of power in the government, nor to mere financial donations to the local authorities, nor by publishing sophisticated arguments intended for distribution abroad. On the contrary, a number of clergy actively defended their province with their lives. While a few Capuchins seem to have joined the roving militia bands sniping at royal soldiers during the late spring, the first reference of the secular clergy becoming
involved in the fight against the king came in August, when three canons in Perpignan, Ros, Vallés, and Colí were imprisoned, accused of violating ecclesiastical immunity and promoting resistance when Moles and de Arce's men were preparing to move out to the front lines.607

As the Castilian army under the Marquis de los Vélez moved along the coastline, the towns of Tarragona, Barcelona, and Vic began to give thought to their military protection. At this decisive moment, clerics either answered the call to arms by the city fathers, or in some cases even volunteered to man the city walls and contribute to the communal defense. Such an attitude was not entirely unique. In an account of the war in Roussillon, we find numerous references to both secular and regular clergy manning their posts, ready to give the alarm should the French attack.608 Similar actions occurred in the other urban centers of the Principat; priests and regular clergy—religiosos—alike fanned the civilian populations into a spirit of martial order. Following the departure of the bishop of Lleida to Aragon, members of the order of St. John of Jerusalem moved into the bishop's residence and began fortifying the town, aided by neighboring Franciscan and Benedictine monks.609 Down south in Tarragona, Benedictines had already occupied the vacant abode of the archbishop and proceeded to inspire the citizens in their

608 Chiefly, the defense of Perpignan on 10 June 1639, “pusieron vigilantes guardas por los muros, en la qual entravan tambien los Clerigos y Religiosos, que con puntualidad armadas acudian a sus puestos, quando se tocava alarma…. Los Perlados Eclesiasticos que tienen jurisdiciones temporales, como son los Obispos, Abades, Priors, y Cabildos, hizieron tambien sus levas de gente, ayudando en todas la Clerecia de sus Diocesis, las cuales a su tiempo embieron al grueso del exercito se formava en Perpiñan.” AHCB B.1640-8-(op)-5: Sucessos por dias de la Guerra de Rossellon (Mathevat, 1640), 6v; 8v.
609 de Rubí, and Vidal, Les Corts generals de Pau Claris, 303-4.
In Girona, nine infantry companies were formed just among the confraternities in the city, consisting of university students, gentlemen, merchants, jurists, notaries, and even some "gent de pluma." By the end of January 1641, the monks in Girona, following the precedent set in Barcelona earlier that month, organized themselves into three companies.

In desperate straits as the Castilian army moved up the coast, the city of Tarragona issued a proclamation detailing their do-or-die defense plan. The first section of the plan laid out the signals to be used in the event of an attack: a trumpet call would mark the arrival of the enemy at the gates. The remaining sections detailed the assigned posts of the various communities within Tarragona, starting with the clergy. The cathedral chapter and other secular clergy “will dispose themselves to go before the Archbishop’s Palace and place themselves in order to go wherever necessity requires them, and in case they will have to stand guard on the walls, they will make themselves useful by guarding the Archbishop’s Palace well and properly, and to guard the wall from the said Palace unto the Tower of the Wagon Gate,” while the members of the various religious orders “will make themselves useful by going to the Plaza of the Orphaned Children, and from there to the posts that shall be marked for them.” An explanation followed clarifying this point: the city fathers had planned for each regular manning of...

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610 Ibid, 304.
612 The first company consisted of Dominicans, Jesuits, and Discalced Benedictines; the second, Franciscans, Capuchins, and Minorites; the third, Carmelites, Mercedarians, and Augustinians. Ibid, 136.
613 “se serviran acudir davant lo Palau Archiepiscopal, y posats en orde se serviran acudir abont la necessitat demanara, y en cas haja de ferse guarda en la muralla, se serviran guarnir lo Palau Archiepiscopal be y degudament, y guardar la que hi ha desdel dit Palau fins a la Torra del portal del Carro;” “se serviran acudir a la plaça dels Infans Orfens, y de allí als puestos que sels senyalaran.” BAEV: Varias 200; 149: Orde que han de tenir los capitans y oficicals de les companies de la present ciutat de Tarragona, y los soldats de aquelles, y demes, als quals toca la defnsa de la dita Ciutat, en cas que aquella se haja de posar en arma, (1640), f.149-149v.
the walls to be in sight of his own convent, and thus be more inspired in its defense.\textsuperscript{614}

Following the clergy came assignments for the \textit{cavallers}, the honored citizens, professionals, and students.

\textbf{Winning Hearts and Minds within Catalonia:}

The previous sections of this chapter have looked at the contributions by members of the Catalan clergy in non-clerical roles, as ambassadors, political officials, financial donors, and authors. Aside from these temporal positions, many Catalan clerics also used their calling as priests to promote resistance. Moreover, it was in their unique vocation as spiritual counselors and leaders in society that the Catalan clergy had the largest influence during the critical autumn months of 1640. Laity dominated the government juntas and administration, also serving as leaders and ambassadors; nobleman such as the Viscount de Joc had donated their own resources to form militia bands, and lawyers like Francesc Martí de Viladamor had written justification pamphlets. While participating in other activities with secular authorities, it was in their spiritual work that the clerics—high and low, regular and secular—had the most influence during the critical months of late 1640. These activities, affecting the minds, hearts, and souls of the Catalan people, occurred simultaneously over the autumn and winter, but for the sake of clarity we will look at specific examples in relative chronological order.

\textbf{Winning Minds: the Junta de Theologians}

The calling of Braços General and the Oath to the Principat had certainly solidified those Catalans in opposition to the king, and given them a positive focus for their discontent. This was not enough, however, for many of them. Yet political

\textsuperscript{614} Ibid, Section 25: “En cas que als Religiosos fels hajan de senyalar puestos en la muralla se procurara que cada Religioso se pose si possible sera, en vista de son Convent,” f. 150v.
confirmation or decision by caucus provided insufficient justification for many Catalans. It appears that many were still hesitant in their actions and were troubled in their conscience. True, they had attempted all measures of reconciliation, sending ambassadors, writing letters, asking for redress, trying to stamp out the social discontent and violence against royalist sympathizers. Still, they lacked a spiritual or religious confirmation—in their minds, the truest confirmation—of their deeds. No matter how noble their intentions, without a spiritual confirmation their psyches would continue to be troubled.

One should not be surprised that in these troubling and uncertain times, the Catalan leaders turned with one accord to the theologians. The need for a theological justification was all the greater since the Church condemned rebellion, and several Biblical examples illustrating the folly and danger of revolt were undoubtedly familiar to Catalan church-goers. First, there was Lucifer, the greatest angel of them all, who for his pride and arrogance brought everlasting condemnation upon himself and his followers. Next, there was the example of the Hebrews, and their persistent rebellion against God in the wilderness, disobedience that denied many the opportunity of seeing the Promised Land. A third testimony was the history of Israel under the kings. The first monarch, Saul, disobeyed God, and as punishment had the crown taken away from him and his family. Under the third king, Solomon, the kingdom was split in two because of his idolatry. Although Jeroboam’s rebellion was divinely ordained and even sanctioned, his subsequent activities led the northern kingdom of Israel down a path of continued rebellion and destruction. In the New Testament, the Catalans were aware of Jesus’s
injunction to render under Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, as well as St. Paul’s declaration that Christians ought to obey all those in authority.

Granted, in recent years, Christian theologians on both sides of the confessional divide had argued that in some cases rebellion might be justified. There are some Biblical examples to this effect as well. David, although he refused to take the life of Saul, the Lord’s Anointed, did become a rebel against the king, who unjustly sought to kill him. During the time of the divided kingdom, prophets spoke out continually against the evil practices of the kings. Perhaps the most significant example of justified revolt is contained in the Apocryphal books of Maccabees, where the rebellion by the high priest and his sons against the “abomination of desolation” wrought by Antiochus IV Epiphanes was praised and celebrated.

It was with these theological references in mind that a special Junta of Theologians convened in Barcelona on 12 October 1640—coincidentally the same day that the Proclamación Catolica was published. Their mission was to analyze the conduct of Catalan and Castilian alike, the validity of the excommunications, the nature of the appeals to the royal court, as well as the popular violence against Santa Coloma and Monrodón, and to determine whether the path of continued resistance was justified.615 It appears that the Junta took only a few days to decide this most important question, publishing its verdict in a 23-page work.616

615 It is interesting to note, that, though the Junta was quiet certain of the justness of the Catalan cause, they were not too eager to list their names, as members of prior juntas had been. The work was “signed,” “concurren en ella Religiosos y Seculares, naturals, y estrangers.” BC: FB 2121: Proposició del Cás. Se refiere a si es licito y permitido a los provincials, en consciencia, tomar las armas para resistir a los que de presente la invaden y a los que amenazan invadirla, opinando afirmativamente (1640), p. 22.
616 Lluís Constans, Francesc de Montpalau, 22. One might compare the relationship between the Diputació and the Junta with that of Henry V and the Archbshop of Canterbury and the Bishop of Ely, appealing to religious scholarship and conscience before deciding whether to go to war. “May I with right and
The study began with a historical investigation into state of affairs in Catalonia. For the junta, this meant going back to 1626, the year of the first quartering. Since that time, soldiers in the pay of the king of Spain had not only abused the provincials, but had gone so far “in the end, to rob and burn Churches: and in them the Most Holy Sacrament two times, with the spirit of sacrilege, as has largely been mentioned / answered? in the Diputat’s report.” The report went on to note the many embassies sent out from Catalonia to appeal to the king for help or remedies and that all were refused. The revolt on Corpus Christi Day is mentioned, as is the response by the Diputació to restore order, all this while the king was preparing an invasion force. The Junta ultimately decided that the Catalans had the moral authority to prosecute their rebellion against the king of Spain on three grounds: legitimate authority, just cause, and appropriate method.

As far as a legitimate authority was concerned, the Junta cited several statements by Augustine and Aquinas. “Common wisdom holds that the legitimate authority for declaring war in a perfect Republic that does not recognize a superior in things temporal resides in that same Republic. But in the Republic that recognizes a legitimate Prince, it resides in him.” As regards just cause, the junta declared that “The right of defense is natural and necessary: and to the proper person the rights are permitted...With the most

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conscience make this claim? The sin upon my head, dread sovereign.” Henry V, I, ii, 96-97. One may also consider the commentaries that have been written concerning this scene, which deal with the motives attached to the ecclesiastical approval, motives which Antoni Simon i Tarrés questions in the case of Catalonia.

617 “fins a robar, y cremar las Iglesias; y en ellas lo Santissim Sagrament dos vegades, ab animo sacrilego, com llargament consta de la proposicio fera per los [Diputats].” BC: FB 2121: Proposició del Cas. p. 1.

618 “La justificacio de las armas se deu collegir de las condiciones, que pera guerra justa senyalen los SS Pares, y Doctors, ques poden resumir en tres. Autoritat legitima, causa justa, y modo convenient” Ibid, p. 3.

619 “Comun sentir es que la autoritat legitima de convocar guerra en la Republica perfeta, que no regoneix superior en lo temporal, resideix en la mateixa Republica. Pero en la Republica que regoneix Princep illegit, resideix en aquest.” Ibid, p. 3.
propriety, and most…it must be confessed the right of defense to the Republic, which as a particular, is to be for the commonweal, the most excellent, the most universal, the most divine, and the most necessary; and thus it follows it is most necessary to preserve it."\(^{620}\)

Finally, as regards just method, the Junta pointed to the willingness of Catalonia to engage in diplomatic discussions surrounding the events of the spring, as well as the refusal by the king to consider seriously their requests. Given that the king had raised his standard before the Catalans, and sent out an army against them, the Catalans were justified in their defensive determination, to preserve their liberties and the sanctity of their Faith.

As far as the Junta was concerned, this was fundamentally an issue of legitimate defense: the Catalans were clearly not the aggressors either in the social disturbances of the spring, nor the military maneuvers of the fall. According to natural law, and the tradition of Church doctors like Bellarmine, this right of defense was common to all, both as individuals and collectively in the republic.

They conceded that right of defense to the slave and the vassal with respect to his lord, and to the inferior with respect to his superior universally, when they were unjust, and assaulted right … And when the Republic was able to abdicate that right of defense (that which expressly spoken of particulars) … it does not answer, nor does it conform to reason, that they have abdicated this right from all subsequent cases to the person of the King; and even less in those cases which we have been shown, of which the present intent is one.\(^{621}\)

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\(^{620}\) “Lo dret de la defensa es natural, y necesary: y a la persona particular li permeten los drets...Ab mes proprietat, y mes apretadament se ha de confessar lo dret de defensio a la Republica, que al particular, per fer lo be comu mes ecelent, mes universal, mes divino, y mes necessary: y per consequent es mes nessaria la conservacio dell.” Ibid, p. 4.

\(^{621}\) “Concediren aquest dret de defensio al esclau, y vassall respete de son senyor, y al inferior respete de son superior universalment, quant son injustament, y contra dret invadits...Y quant pogués la Republica abdicarse aquest dret de defensio (lo que parlant expressament dels particulars)...no consta, ni es conforme a raho, que se haja abdicat dell pera tots casos en orde a la persona del Princep; y menos en los casos que senyalarem, que fan al intent present.” Ibid, p. 6.

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The defensive nature of Catalonia’s actions is repeatedly emphasized throughout this document. “This war of Catalonia is, in the present occasion, rigorously defensive. Because it is defensive when injury is imminent, or as others say, *in fieri* … From all the evidence it may be inferred that this war of Catalonia is defensive.” Since the king’s troops had already inflicted damage upon the Catalan people, their goods, property, and religion, and since the approach of los Vélez or Garay suggested no change in attitude, Catalonia was certainly justified in preventing “la invasio injusta” from the south as well as from the north.

The Junta referred once again to the constant, unprovoked violence committed by the foreign soldiers against the Catalans and their faith. These acts were unjustified and had remained unpunished by the Prince. In such a circumstance, Catalonia was justified in following the example of David in taking up arms to defend itself: “It is not Catalonia that provoked the war, rather she was forced by repeated and violent provocations to take up the obligation of self-defense. Those wars of David, that were happily undertaken against human powers, divine assistance, and glorious success, were defensive.”

Perhaps most startling aspect of this verdict is the justification given by the theologians that members of the clergy could lawfully donate their money to the cause of “natural defense.” The junta drew their conclusions from the oft-cited and oft-debated passage in the 22nd chapter of Luke, when towards the end of the Last Supper Christ tells

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622 “Aquesta guerra de Cathalunya en la present ocasio es rigurosament defensiva. Perque defensiva es quant esta imminent la injuria, o com altres diven *in fieri*…De tot lo qual ab evidencia se infereix que es defensiva aquesta guerra de Cathalunya.” Ibid, pp. 6, 7.
623 “No es Cathalunya la que provoca la guerra, sino la que aforsa de iteradas provocacions violentada hix a la obligacio de defensa. Aquellas guerras de David, que felices experimentaren sobre potestats humanas, socorros divinos, y gloriosos succesos; defensives eran.” Ibid, p. 7.
his disciples that “he who hath no sword, let him sell his garment, and buy one.”⁶²⁴

While theologians in the Middle Ages argued over the second part of the verse—regarding the two swords of Christ, and what they stood for, and whether the church or state had the greater temporal authority—the Catalan theologians went straight for the first half, asking the question, why did Christ need the swords anyway? Their answer:

Christ requested of his disciples to they were provided with swords at the cost of their tunics (Christ did not pay attention to expenses, to patrimony, for a just defense). Christ did not have strict designs to execute, neither to dye those swords in enemy blood: in spite of all this, since in the circumstances of those times the perfidious Hebrew militia had convocated, and taking up arms so as to attack Christ, he [Christ] desired on the same occasion for our instruction to attain arms beforehand; that in the same way that they were used against attack, it would be of credit for defensive [conflicts].⁶²⁵

Jesus was not interested in weapons because he was about to launch a political coup, nor was he interested in shedding the human blood that sought to crucify him. Rather, it was out of concern for his disciples, that they would be able to show themselves worthy to defend their Lord and His cause. In the seventeenth century, the body of Christ would come under assault again: not only the Sacramental body, but the sacred body of Christ, the Church.

In such times as these, the Junta decided, a fight for the Body of Christ, “being a defensive war, does not need the authority, or the good pleasure of the Prince.”⁶²⁶ For too long had the Catalans stood patiently by while godlessness and suffering abounded.

“Ab major dret justifican totes aquestas injurias la defensa de la Republica per la major

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⁶²⁵ “Solicitava Christo a sos dexebles a que previnguessen espases a costa de sas tunicas (que no reparava Christo en expensas, de patrimoni, pera una justa defensio). No tenia Chrsito designes de executar rigors, ni teñir aquellas espases en sanch enemiga: ab tot axo, perque en aquellas circunstancias de temps estava la perfidia Hebreu convocant milicia, y empunyant armas pera ser invasio en Christo, vol en la mateix ocasio pera nostra ensenyansa pervenir anticipadamente armas; que per lo mateix cas que eran contra invasio, tenian credit de defensives…” Ibid, p. 8.
⁶²⁶ “que essent aquesta guerra defensiva, no te necessitat de autoritat, ni beneplacio del Princep” Ibid, p. 8.
These accusations were confirmed “ab informacions autenticas notorias” that the Principat and Comtats had been the victim of evils that affected the entire land.

Catalonia is a state grievously burdened in all those good lineages, with so many deaths, disgraces, thefts, sacrilegious robberies of Churches, burning of her Temples, and of the Most Holy Sacrament, and is not able to hope in better prudence, with such proven experiences, and with such properly suspicious [excarments/excraments?], better favor neither clemency in the new invasion … not counting the aforementioned enormous events, sufficient evidence for the justice of her arms.\footnote{Ibid, p. 14.}

In addition to the aforementioned sacrileges, the Junta listed the king’s numerous violations of traditional Catalan pacts and constitutions.

The theologians, having begun with philosophical and theological reasoning followed by the contemporary witnesses of injustice, concluded by looking at the response of Biblical figures to similar situations. As regarding the solemnity with which oaths are taken and fulfilled, the Junta pointed to Joshua and the two Israelite spies, who kept their word to the faithful harlot Rahab as Jericho fell. And regarding the defense of the Lord’s house and people, the theologians looked no further than the book of Maccabees.\footnote{“Aquesta causa feu a Iosue tant cuydados de advertir als dos Exploradors, de la obligacio del jurament” (Joshua 6); “aquesta era la causa, que sobre justificar las armas que manejaven ditzosament las mans dels Machabeos, inferiors en numero, al exercit numerosissim de Nicanor…” Ibid, pp. 16, 17.} In 2 Maccabees 13:14, as the Hebrews are preparing to battle the Gentile general, Nicanor, Judas Maccabeus exhorts his followers:

\begin{quote}
Words that encode the causes that are represented in the petition and motivate the justice of these arms, taken in defense of laws, and of the Temple; [which was done] to insult not only these particulars, or the Republic, but God our Lord so sacrilegiously offended, in
\end{quote}
As further historical examples, the doctors of religion turned to a famous church conflict involving the Emperor Theodosius and Ambrose, bishop of Milan. In 388, some Christians in Mesopotamian city of Calinicus, having been insulted by Jews during a religious procession, went and pulled down the town’s synagogue. Upon receiving the news, Theodosius ordered the Christian community and their bishop to pay for the rebuilding of the Jewish holy place and promised extra punishments as well. The Christians of Calinicus appealed to Bishop Ambrose who sided with them; he wrote a stern letter to the emperor asking him to rescind the order, and, when that failed, the bishop turned to the extraordinary measure of refusing to say Mass until a pardon had been granted.

The Catalan theologians contended that if the bishop of Milan had condemned the Emperor for forcing Christians to pay for a new Jewish synagogue, and, moreover, kept Theodosius under a sentence of virtual excommunication until he had countermanded the decree, how much more should Catalans resist a king who not only permits church burnings, but also refuses to pay for their restoration? Thus the Junta concluded that the Catalans could “with security of conscience, take up arms and defend themselves from the soldiers that infest the Comtat of Roussillon, as well as from those who threaten them on the frontiers. This resolution is taken, after a proper examination, by the Junta of

630 “Paraulas en ques cifran las causas ques representan en la peticion y motivan la justicia destas armas, presas en defensa de Ileys, y del Temple; pera desagreiar no solament als particulars, y a la Republica; sino a Deu nostre Senyor tan sacrilegamen ofes, en robos de vasos, y ornaments sagrats; en cremas de Temple, y hostias consagradas.” Ibid, p. 18.

631 “en occasio en que los Christians avian entregat dignament al rigor de las flamases una Sinagoga, per fer aquella accio contra edicts, y pactes imperials, mana, que a gastos dels Christians, se reparassen aquellas ruinas; a que se opposa Sant Ambros. Que diguera en cas de crema de Iglesias Catholicas, y dilacio tarda de sos reparos?” Ibid, p. 19.
Theologians, that the Diputació created … as much for the public good, as for the obligation of their conscience, and for the security of the Province’s consciences.”

The effect of the Junta’s decision justifying the revolt was uplifting. If we may believe the account of Gaspar Sala, it particularly served to confirm Pau Claris in his heart of hearts that the Catalan cause was just: “Claris was not intimidated by this, neither dismayed in his breast, before as well as after consulting the case in a Junta of Theologians and Canons.” Furthermore, news of the junta’s decision traveled fast. By 15 October, Don Llorens de Barutell was writing back to Urgell, informing his fellow canons that the Junta had made their decision and that it was going to press at that moment. Six days later, Barutell again wrote to his chapter, sending along some fiscal updates and two memorials crafted by the Junta of Theologians. But such a declaration, no matter how intellectually satisfying, would still only appeal to, and possibly influence, the more educated Catalans. If the lower social orders were to be won over, particularly in light of Tortosa’s defection and the early successes of the king’s army, a popular appeal would have to be made.

**Winning Hearts: the November Corpus**

Perhaps the biggest and most significant contribution of the religious estate to the revolt of the Catalans in the early months and successive years of struggle was as pastors, teaching and encouraging their flock to pursue the moral choice of rebellion. During the early modern period, in an era of low literacy rates, the pulpit, not the pamphlet, was a

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632 “ab seguretat de conciencia, prendre las armas, y defensarse dels soldats que infestan lo Comtat de Rossello; y dels que li amenassan invasio en las fronteras. Aquesta resolucio prenguè, després del degut examen, la junta dels Theolechs, que feu la Deputacio...axi a la utilitat publica, com a la obligacio de sa conciencia, y seguretat della en los Provincials.” Ibid, p. 22.


634 ADU: III, Cartes Rebudes, 1630-1640. 21 October 1640.
more effective means of popular communication. Preaching could reach a larger audience, a broader audience (both in rural as well as urban parishes), and, combined with the moral authority of a man of God, could be more convincing than a broadside or educated scholastic work. Astonishingly, as the opening months of the conflict began to turn against the Catalans, a significant number of clergy did not suddenly recant, nor did loyal clerics begin preaching repentance and turning from error. Rather, prayers and petitions to God and to the saints increased as their peril became worse. This is recorded by many an observer, both secular and religious.

The first example of this spiritual influence upon the Catalans in the fall of 1640 came with the decision by the Church to hold another Corpus Christi celebration during early November in order to atone for the unfortunate cancellation of the original festival in June. Along with the transmitting of new letters to the Pope in the hopes of exonerating themselves before a spiritual judge, this decision appears to be in part a desire by churchmen and secular rulers to clear their consciences before God before the real struggle with the crown began. It furthermore would offer to the king an example of Catholic devotion, showing the rest of Spain which party was sincerely devoted to preserving and protecting the Body of Christ, both literally in the elements as well as figuratively in the church, or community of saints. On 6 November, Francesc Puig noted in his diary, “All these feasts were celebrated in this city, of that as it already said, that it has a particular devotion to the Most Holy Sacrament in demonstration of the great
designs it has to return with a vengeance against the aggravating and enormous sacrileges of repeated burnings, against His Divine Sacramental Majesty.”

Also contributing to the spiritual importance of this November Corpus was the political situation Catalonia faced at the beginning of November. In the first place, there was the official condemnation of Tortosa. Although the government had passed resolutions to confiscate the goods of all Tortosans, the official publication of the city was only distributed throughout Barcelona on 3 November, coincidentally the eve of the Three Day Corpus. In addition to making public the internal division of the Principat, there was the matter of external aid from France. On the first of the month, Pau Claris wrote back to his fellow canons in Urgell informing them that the first steps had been taken to seek French help. “For the natural defense of this Principat the Braços General have decided to appeal to the King of France in order that he might aid us with a number of cavalry and infantry.” As part of these accords, the secret French ambassador, du Plessis-Besançon, had arrived to confirm a deal; he would leave on the last day of the celebration. It is quite possible that some further soul-searching was going on among the Catalan elite as they attended services from 4-6 November. An alliance with France was

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635 “totas estas festas foren fetes en esta ciutat lo qual com ja se dit es la que te particular devocio al Sanctissim Sagrament en demonstracio dels grans desitcs tenia de tornar per la venjansa dels agravi y enormes sacrilegis de reiterates incendis, contra sa Divinia magesta Sacramento.” AHCB: Puig, Dietari, p. 241. See also BC: FB 5970: Hieronym de Fontpedrosa, Amorosos Desagravios de JesuChristo Sacramento, en la insigne, y Fidelissima Ciudad de Barcelona, y Otava del Corpus reiterada (Jaume Romeu, 1640), where the author writes: Por los tumultuosos alborotos de el dia del Corpus, de este anno presente de 1640, se dexò de hazer la Procession ordinaria (extraordinaria siempre) por temor de mayores alborotos, mas como esta nacion jamas consiente que se diga, que por cuydados (aunque sean de guardar la vida) dexò los del Dios Sacramento, aunque se continuo en todas las Parroquias, y Conventos por toda la Octava lo solemne de luzes, pebetes, flores, y musicas que se acostumbra, por no aver hecho las Processiones como antes.” f. 389.

636 AHCB: Puig, Dietari, pp. 226-229.

637 “Per la defensa natural de aquest Principat deliberal los Braços generals acodir al Rey del França pera que nos auxiliari ab numero de cavalleria y infanteria.” ACU: IV: Letters of Pau Claris (transcribed by Mossen Pere Pujol) 1 November 1640.
yet a further confirmation of their rebellion, but it was also playing with fire. Would the French terms be such that Catalonia could retain its independence or autonomy? Was this the right thing to do?

Although the common sentiment had been voiced for some time, an official decision regarding a new celebration of Corpus Christi was reached only on 3 November, after consultation with the Barcelona chapter. Rather than the afternoon procession, this feast of repentance and devotion would last three days, beginning on Sunday November 4 and running until the sixth. All prelates still present in the province—with the exception of Bishop Pérez-Roy, who apparently was confined to Perpignan—would celebrate the office: the bishops of Barcelona and Girona, the two oldest prelates, and those of Solsona and Vic, the two youngest prelates. In addition to bringing in the other bishops, the presence of syndics from each cathedral chapter and important monasteries in Catalonia further emphasized the spirit with which the new Corpus was to be celebrated. Unlike the Corpus in June, the viceroy would not be holed up in his residence, but would be an active participant; nearly every religious site in Catalonia would have its representatives. No longer would it be a Barcelonan Corpus; it would be a Catalan Corpus, to be celebrated by a diverse number of nobles, priests, monks, friars, and commoners.

More than a mere gathering of the peoples to spiritual repentance and renewal, the Corpus also represented the popularizing of the “natural defense” position taken by the Diputació and the Braços General. With the Junta of Theologians claiming Catalonia’s actions were justified by the burning of the Sacrament, and Gaspar Sala’s work coming

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For a detailed account of the Corpus, see AHCB: Puig, *Dietari*, and FB 5970: Hieronym de Fontpedrosa, *Amorosos Desageavios*.  

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out in favor of the same policy, it was natural—as well as needful—that such confirmation of their break with Madrid be brought before the entire Catalan body politic. This confirmation could only come through the realm of religion and religious symbolism; it is doubtful that any other kind of appeal would be able to unite urban and rural, rich and poor, clerical and laity, educated and simple.

The official ceremony began on Saturday night, as the city gave itself up to a festive celebration. Given the short notice, the citizens responded eagerly, vying among themselves to display their support and piety. As the procession started, candles and lights illuminated every portion of the city, shining forth brilliantly into the darkness. Again, this was not solely for the elite, or the guilds and merchants of town. On the contrary, the impression left is one of universal celebration and devotion.

There was no one who could have seen a corner without light, from the most elaborate Palace, unto the most humble court, or the least inhabited house, the tears of tenderness and joy, mixed with those of feeling, were of even greater pleasure to God than those material lights, because in this manner each one feels the insults of that offended Sacramental Deity, that would give life, without doubt, to the most hard and obstinate. The white torches burning with prodigality (although for God there is no such thing) … were all a grand metaphor of that divine fire that burns in the devoted breasts of the Barceloneses.

As the procession passed by the cathedral and the important parish churches—Santa Maria del Mar, Sants Just i Pastor, and Santa Maria del Pi—they were greeted by musket fire from the citizen militia, whose “loving hearts are filled with joy and who,

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639 "no huvo quien viesse rincón sin luz, desde el mas sobervio Palacio, hasta el mas humilde cortijo, o menos habitada casa; las lagrimas de ternura y gozo, mezcladas con las del sentimiento, eran mas de gusto aun para Dios, que estas materiales luzes; porque de manera sentia cada cual los agravios de aquella Sacramentada Deidad ofendida, que diera la vida, sin duda, el mas duro, y obstinado … hachas blancas ardián con prodigalidad (aunque para Dios no la ay); … todo metafóra grande del divino fuego, que ardía en los devotos pechos de los Barceloneses.” FB 5970: Hieronym de Fontpedrosa, *Amorosos Desagravios*, f. 389v.
peradventure, are admitted by their Most High and Sacramental Lord." By the evening of the first day, the city’s daily bread was given over to the celebration of the Divine loaf, which the community partook of at every Mass, and which it was now swearing to defend even with its life. Barcelona is not a “citie upon a hille” geographically, but spiritually its citizens were determined to make their lights shine in the darkness, boldly declaring their determination to stand fast as a model for the rest of Catalonia.

In contrast to the jubilation of the evening, the first day of services, a Sunday, provided a more solemn tone to the religious feast. In the mid-morning, the Diputats along with delegates of the Braços General and the various Juntas soberly filed into the cathedral. Bishop Manrique presided over the mass, while the Bishop of Solsona changed his tune of reluctance and gave a sermon, exalting the Catalans’ Christian devotion. Both the mass and the sermon were received “con venerable aplauso.” Here again, we see the blending of politics and faith, as well as the irony of it all. Present were the two bishops most loyal to the king—the accounts generally referred to Manrique as viceroy rather than bishop of Barcelona—and yet both of them agreed, not only to participate in the Corpus celebrations, but to take an active and leading role. All the Catalan governors were in attendance—minus the Diputat Militar and the Diputat Real, who were off on duty elsewhere—and the cathedral was packed to overflowing.

The procession began a little after 3:00 in the afternoon. Among the traditional elements of a Catalan religious parade—replete with demons, dragons, and giants—there

641 “[no hay] casa huvo que no tenia para pan aquel día su dueño, y tuvo para celebrar los jubilos del Pan divino.” Ibid, f. 389v.
642 Ibid, f. 389v.
were also some figures that symbolized the dramatic events of the previous months, all “offered in humble performance to God, the Sacramental King.”  The main attraction, however, were three floats, one depicting the church at Riudarenes, with two angels keeping watch over the communion bread; and another depicting an angel surrounded by mysterious lettering that moved, teaching the crowd about the “bread of God.” The third float was that of the True Church, brilliant and beautiful, surrounded by pillars of Faith, and resplendent as the sun.

Following all these festive displays were the crosses of the cathedral and every parish and convent inside the city. These too were decorated with flowers and other pretty objects, and followed by the members of each order, with the elders preceding the novices. Furthermore, each order had three members who were decked out in finery, each one carrying a special reliquary of gold or silver. The canons of the cathedral followed the regulars, and were in turn followed by the Consellers and the members of the bourse, dressed in their official festive garb. Finally, to the sound of trumpets, a nobleman carrying the Sacrament in an elaborate custody paraded through the crowd, accompanied by all four bishops, the Braços General, the Oidors, and lastly, Pau Claris.

644 “seguianse los tabernaculos…en particular salieron tres con grandes peañas, que los llevavan en peso: en una estaba la Iglesia de Riudarenas muy al vivo, y dos Angeles que en ella guardavan su pan: El otro de un Angel, con muchos y muy mysteriosos letreros, que se movia al parecer al natural, y un razimo, que abriendose enseñava el pan de Dios retratado. El tercero contenia la Iglesia, y en forma de Hermosa Vid se abalancava a cubrir y amparar los mortals, y significando ue en columnas de Fe, se sostenia aquel palacio del Sol, siguiendo a estos muchos versos impressos, que declaravan la cifra de los misterios que contenian.” Ibid, f. 390.
645 Ibid, 390v.
Once the province’s leaders had passed, there followed

All the inhabitants of Barcelona, the men first, and following the noble and plebeian women, accompanied God out of love and placed their thoughts on that which had served as a target for so many heretics. The plazas and the walls were surrounded by musketry and, as the Most Holy Sacrament appeared, they fired loud volleys, to which those entrenched on the bulwarks responded, saluting the God of Hosts and Victories. The houses were a display of power in the brocades and silks that hung from the windows … through the plazas there appeared Altars of extraordinary richness and brightly adorned. In particular, one saw at the Plaza of Saint James a soft, beautiful, and black altar displaying an imitation of the Sacramental Majesty and later, off to one side, there were other valiant hieroglyphs that declared mysteries, …like the figure of a venerable old man with a torch in his hands, giving to understand, that although the turbulent times passed as the Heavens permitted, the one religion of the [True] Faith in Barcelona would never pass away: the candle being a metaphor for this, always lit, always burning.  

The same celebration would continue every night, with Fontpedrosa recording the notable circumstance that, “in all three nights, there was not even the smallest hint of dissension or hatred, this being the truth, that through a miracle they had feasts without disasters.”

He attributed such wonders to the God of peace.

On Monday, 5 November, Bishop Parcero, who had been held in high regard by Catalans after his bold denunciations of the spring, celebrated the sacred office. The preacher was Fra Pedro Chuenca y Cardens, a monk of the order of St. Francis de Paula. Once more, the officials showed up in the cathedral, and the press of crowds necessitated other services to be held in nearby parish churches. That afternoon, the

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646 “todos los de Barcelona, los hombres primero, y luego las mugeres nobles, y plebeyas, acompañavan a Dios, de amor puestos sus pensamientos al blanco que lo avia sido de tanto hereje: las plaças y los muros estavan rodeados de mosqueteria y en assomando el Santissimo Sacramento le hazian sonoros salvas, a quien respondian los bien pertrechados Baluarte saludando al Dios de los egercitos y Vitorias, las casas fue una ostentacion del poder lo que colgaron por las ventanas de broacados y sedas...por las plaças parecian Altars de extraordinaria riqueza y lustroso adorno: en particular en la plaça de Santiago se vio en un docil hermoso y negro sentada la imitacion de la Magestad Sacramentada, y despues de estar a un lado y otro valientes geroglificos que declaravan misterios … en figura de un viejo venerable con una antorcha en las manos, dando a entender, que aunque corriessen los tiempos tan turbulentos como permitiesseen los cielos, jamas dejava de fer el uno culto de la Fè en Barcelona, siendo la vela metafora de esto, siempre encendida, siempre ardiente.” Ibid, ff. 390v-391.

647 “siendo notable en todas tres noches, que no huvo, ni el mas minimo alboroto de dicensiones e enojos, siendo verdad, que por maravilla se hallan fiestas sin desastres: en estas como eran del Dios de la paz no se hallaron.” Ibid, f.391.

648 Ibid, f. 391. While the reports fail to mention the monk’s background, the last name suggests that he too was a foreigner to Catalonia.
Diputació, quite possibly full of a renewed conviction by the religious ceremonies, decided to act on du Plessis-Besançon’s proposals. They sent nine envoys to France in order to learn just how much support Cardinal Richelieu could be expected to give them. There were three delegates from each estate. Representing the clergy were Dr, Diego Jover, archdeacon and Dr. Joan Batista Vila, both important canons of Barcelona, and Don Llorens de Barutell, an influential canon from Urgell, and a close friend of Claris.

The Corpus celebration ended on Tuesday with a special Catalan presentation. The sole remaining Catalan bishop—Ramon de Sentmanat—presided over the Eucharist, while the renowned Augustinian preacher, Gaspar Sala i Berart gave an enthusiastic homily. Once more, the parishes and religious houses throughout Barcelona were swept with a religious fervor. The Sacrament itself had been exposed for three days to the prayers and adoration of the people; the Discalced Carmelites appear to have been particularly noteworthy in their celebration of this three-day feast.

The final night’s lights were even greater than before, perhaps coinciding with the feast day of St. Severus, a former bishop of Barcelona. There was a spontaneous celebration and procession at the parish church of Santa Maria del Mar, in which several local clergy participated, including the archdeacon of the church. “The procession followed through the streets, many reverend Clerics with brocade caps, many flags, and the processional cross of the Lamb of God, many noblemen and lords with lights and

649 Ibid, f. 391v. Pau Duran, the other Catalan bishop, had by this time gone over to the king’s army, and was, by early November, accompanying the Marquis de los Vélez on his invasion north towards Tarragona. A staunch loyalist, Duran was promised the archbishopric of Tarragona for his support, a position in which he was never confirmed.
white torches so great since there were 220 torches alone." Among governors and governed alike, the scene now in Barcelona was one of renewed purpose. They had satisfied their own consciences and souls through this three-day feast; and they had confirmed with their actions what their justificatory pamphlets had professed, namely that Catalans were a people of faith, devoted to the Lord and His Church, and neither the gates of Hell or the policies of Madrid would stand against it.

While it is important to emphasize the Corpus celebrations in terms of instilling a spiritual morale throughout Catalan society, the presence of so many clerics, particularly the bishops, is also noteworthy. By early November, it was fairly evident to the ecclesiastical estate that the Diputació had begun taking steps asserting its independence from Madrid. While the king had not officially censured the traditional ruling body as rebellious, he certainly refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Braços General, the advisory 36-member Junta, or any of the executive juntas. Furthermore, when asked by the Braços and Diputació to come and swear the Oath to the Principat, all four bishops had been extremely reluctant to comply—Bishop Manrique indeed, as viceroy, refused to swear at all.

Yet only a month after agreeing to fall in line with the Braços and swear the Oath to the Principat, here were the bishops agreeing without hesitation to participate both in

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651 “Siguiose la procession por las calles, muchos reverendos Clerigos con capas de brocado, muchos pendones, y el guion del cordero Dios, muchos cavalleros, y señores con luzes y achas blancas tanto que huvo solo de achas en esta procession docientas y veynte.” FB 5970: Hieronym de Fontpedrosa, Amorosos Desagravio, f. 391.
652 As a side note, on 6 November, the last day of the Corpus celebration, the Provincial Council, prorogued from late June, met again in Barcelona. Headling the agenda was a desire to have the Inquisition in Barcelona “renovaren i ratificaren les excomunions llancades pel bisbe de Girona.” Bishop Parcero was now the presiding minister, since Manrique was too occupied with his role as viceroy. After a brief meeting or two, the council closed on 12 November. de Rubí, Un segle de vida caputxina, 645.
653 See AHCB: Puig, Dietari, 31 October 1640 (pp. 208-216) and 7 November 1640 (pp. 243-244).
the celebration of the Corpus office, as well as in the citywide procession following the church service. Granted, one might argue that the nature of the two requests were completely different—the oath being secular, the Corpus being religious—and thus suggest that the prelates felt compelled to participate in the Corpus. Both requests, however, were unusual, and furthermore were made at the request of an executive body whose legitimacy was dubious at best. Whatever the bishops’ private feelings were concerning Catalonia and the dangerous slide toward rebellion, their presence—and public participation—during all three days of the Corpus feast provided some well-needed legitimacy to the Diputació and the Braços at a critical time.

Finally, lest one focus too much on elite participation or on the use of religious symbols to unite a disparate community in resistance against the crown, a good deal of money was spent on this three day celebration by the city government and cathedral chapter alike. From the accounts that have survived, the three-day affair was quite a celebration, perhaps even equivalent to a royal visit. Not only were city churches packed during the sunlight hours, but there was also no work done in the city for those days. Instead, the people devoted a large portion of time preparing decorations for the three evening processions through town. An eyewitness, Fontpedrosa, wrote that the citizens, “left their ordinary work, and worked on making inventions, beacons, lanterns, torches,
and other lights for the night.”\footnote{“ dexaron su trabajo ordinario, y trabajaron en hacer invenciones, faroles, linternas, hachones, y otras luces para la noche.” Fontpedrosa, f.389. Among the decorations and floats prepared were “atabales, trompetas, chirimias, cavallicos, dragon, mula, memoria de la Daroca, y las demas cosas,” FB 5970: Hieronym de Fontpedrosa, \textit{Amorosos Desagravio}, f. 389v.} Aside from the funds spent on constructing these decorations, the city also bestowed liberal monetary prizes.\footnote{“los tabernaculos, è invenciones, que la Ciudad de a cada uno que mas se esmerare a 25 y a 30 escudos de premio” Ibid, f. 390.}

In the midst of all these doings, the Catalan government was aware that an invading force was on its way north. It was also aware that funds in the treasury were at a precarious level. Despite these harsh facts—and the practical consequences that were no doubt apparent—the Catalan rebels deliberately sacrificed money that could be used to finance the war effort and poured it into an extravagant religious ceremony. Other revolutionary movements—certainly none of the modern ones, even the American Revolution—went so far in this regard.\footnote{While some revolutionary governments have issued days of prayer and fasting—see the American Revolution, and the Confederacy during the Civil War among others—as an attempt to concentrate the spiritual focus of their cause, the Corpus celebration seems to go beyond this. There is a difference between personal sacrifice food for a day, and the deliberate siphoning of money from the war effort to a three-day, communal church services. Similar displays of religious dedication also appeared in Scotland and England during the civil wars of the 1640s.} Though cynics might declaim that such elaborate contributions were necessary to beguile the people into standing fast and fighting, people generally tend to put their money into things that matter most to them. That the Catalans were willing to forgo “practical,” military concerns during this critical time, choosing instead to set aside three days for repentance and worship of God, suggests that religion was more than just a toy of the elite, to be manipulated at will at the expense of credulous dupes, but rather an important part of the Catalan revolution.

The three-day celebration of Corpus served a series of purposes. First, it reinforced in the hearts and minds of many Catalans the purpose for which they were
carrying on a fight against their king. The continual presence of the Eucharist in all the parish churches, plus the heightened sense of religious devotion undoubtedly affected the people’s determination to stand against the invading army under the Marquis de los Vélez. As Fontpedrosa concluded in his account, this was act of super-devotion on the part of Barcelona and Catalans everywhere. After all, they had not burned the Sacrament. In the second place, it may have helped provide the Catalan leadership with an additional focus, especially as the events were undertaken right around the sending of the first embassy to France. Vigorous contact with a former foe was dangerous enough; the Catalans could not but know they were playing with fire. Yet the question remained, was the cause worth the cost? Finally, the Corpus celebrations served to unite a province that was already facing dissolution over the rebellion. Just four days before, the goods of all citizens of Tortosa had been confiscated; the bishop of Solsona was seeking an excuse to leave the province and head for Madrid; and the first advance by the king’s army was underway.

The Corpus helped to restore a unity between laity and clergy, calming for a moment, the people’s concerns over the legitimacy of their revolt while renewing the focus on the Body of Christ. Despite this initial morale boost, the first military campaign of the revolt would not go well for the Catalans or their newfound French allies. Within just a few weeks, the clergy of Catalonia would be called upon to yet greater efforts in

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657 “Estas son las loables, y solenísimas fiestas que la muy Católica y leal Barcelona a echo al Santissimo Sacramento agramado, aunque ella ni los Catalanes en tales agravios le an ofendido, y esto an hecho porque en aquel día amargo del Corpus, no se pudo hazer la procession, que ha sido como el que corriendo buelve alas para corer con mayor impetus al blanco que tremola el ayre a sus desseos: todo se ha hecho para Gloria de Dios, cuya sea toda alabanza, y cuyo poder introduzga la paz que se dezech, para que fin ahogos (aunque estos no lo impiden) le veneremos con jubilos originados del alma.” Ibid, f. 391v.
order to sustain the fight. As we shall see, their later contributions overshadowed their initial assistance and proved to help the province in a vital way.

**Winning Souls: the Black days of December**

Despite the first sentiments of euphoria that percolated through Catalonia following the Second Corpus, a wave of pessimism succeeded. Barely a week after the religious ceremonies, Pau Claris would write back to his friends in Urgell: “The affairs of this Province are in such a miserable estate as Your Lordships have had in the news until today; Glory to God the arms of the Province are of [good] reputation and we think that they will be better in a few days because of the arrival of the auxiliary [help from France].”

Under the command of los Vélez, perceived by Catalans to be the Herod of his day, Castilian troops marched northwards from Valencia, leaving tales of murder, rapine, and pillage in their wake. The ruthless treatment that was now the hallmark of the Count-Duke's policy steeled the determination of some, while providing hesitant Catalans with the excuse they needed to declare their loyalty to Spain. This split affected both members of the rebellious Catalan government and that of the church. For all those who worked to inspire their communities in favor of revolt, there remained some areas that would stay faithful to Madrid, encouraged by sacred and secular authority to remain steadfast in their sympathies. Apart from the bishops of Lleida and Urgell who left early

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659 Sarroca, 113. The news of town burnings and execution of leaders by royal troops spread rapidly through Catalonia, affecting rural communities as well as the major urban centers of the province. See among others, Joan Guàrdia, *Guerra i vida pagesa a la Catalunya del segle XVII: segons el "Diari" de Joan Guàrdia, pagès de l'Esquirol, i altres testimonis d'Osona*. eds., Antoni Pladevall and Antoni Simón i Tarrés (Barcelona: Curial Edicions Catalanes, 1986), 61.
in the conflict, a Franciscan, Roger de Montbiró, created trouble in Tarragona when he began to persuade the citizens there not to resist the Castilian advance.\footnote{de Rubí and Vidal, \textit{Les Corts generals de Pau Claris}, 262.}

Throughout the month of December, as the Catalan forces were pushed back repeatedly by the royal army, and as their hope in material French support dwindled, the spirit of many Catalans began to wane. Worse still for the new government were the rumors of traitors appearing in their midst, willing to betray their countrymen in hopes of future rewards. The Diputació attempted to put a stop to this defection by publishing a harsh decree on 13 December condemning “traitors, and other who disrupt, and cause sedition, and tumults…to kill, burn, steal, and commit other crimes…and results from here [?] an impediment of the just defense of this Principat, so that it is right to reprimand and punish in the same manner as one punishes those who are traitors to the county.”\footnote{“traydors, y altres se amotinen, y causen sedicions, y tumults…pera matar, cremar, robar, y cometer altres delictes…y resulta de aqui notoi impediment de la justa defensa del present Principat, lo que es raho reprimir, y castigar, y axi mateix ho es de castigar los que son traydors a la patria.” BC: FB 5395, \textit{Ara Ojats} (13 December 1640).}

Furthermore, the Diputació, speaking for the advisory 36-man Junta, as well as the \textit{Junta de Justitia}, proclaimed that any person denouncing and producing evidence that would lead to a conviction of suspected traitors—no matter their degree or station—would be rewarded with the substantial sum of three hundred lliures.\footnote{Ibid, f. 338.}

Around Christmas time, as the army of Castile approached the city gates, the canons of Barcelona went and spoke to the bishop about taking up arms in defense of the city. Looking to the ruthless treatment with which los Vélez had meted out to inhabitants of Cambrils, the canons were eager to defend their city, lest the same fate befall them. Led by Francesc Paga and Fructuós Bisbe Vidal, they petitioned the bishop to grant them...
the right to take up arms alongside the more secular confraternities. There was even talk of forming their own company, as other chapters in other dioceses had done, and carrying the banner of the cathedral with them to the walls of the city. So eager were the canons that they declared they would join the local parish clergy and the monasteries in town and form a company with them if Manrique refused their request, manning the bulwarks day and night and sharing in all the inconveniences of other true soldiers of Catalonia.

On Christmas Eve, 1640, after receiving word that the city of Tarragona had surrendered to los Vélez without offering a fight, a portion of Barcelona’s lower orders rioted. As had occurred during the Corpus Christi disturbance, a popular fear swept through the city; yet this time, the proximity of danger—in the guise of the Marquis de los Vélez and his army—seemed to increase the level of violence perpetrated by the crowd. Armed groups roamed the streets of Barcelona, seeking out suspected traitors. Among those targeted for destruction was the widow of the Duke of Cardona, the most powerful nobleman in the Principality. Although her husband had enjoyed a great popularity among the Catalans during his terms as viceroy, the duchess was suspected of carrying on a secret correspondence with the court in Madrid, and some believed she and her children were plotting to overthrow the rebel government. Fearing for her life and the life of her sons, the Duchess of Cardona threw herself on the mercy of the Diputació,

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663 “…ho feren acudint a als funcions de la mateixa manera que les companyes de les confraries de la ciutat, fent y fomant lo capitol sa companya dels canonges y dignitats y demés ecclesiàstichs de ella, a la qual foren agregats tots los canonges y dignitats de las altres iglésias catedrals de la província…” de Rubí and Vidal, Les Corts generals de Pau Claris, 296.
664 “…axí mateix las parròchias y monestirs que eran numerosos de capellans o frares, respectivament feren y formaren cada una sa companya…axí en assistir a la guarda de las murallas, baluarts, y altres puestos de la ciutat de die y de nit…” Ibid, 296-7.
asking for refuge; she was placed in the convent of the Discalced Carmelites and her sons were placed in the Inquisition cells.

Yet even as Barcelona, the bulwark of Catalan resistance, threatened to implode, canon Francesc Puig observed on Christmas Eve that many inhabitants were still full of a determination to stick it out till the end:

Neither this [the Christmas Eve riots] nor any of the above-mentioned matters gave the Diputats occasion to proceed confusingly in continuing to apply efficacious and suitable means for the defense and conservation of [the Province] but that as often they had always had set before them the desires that they were defending the cause of God, and they were soliciting the punishment of such enormous sacrileges as the soldiers of His Majesty have committed in Catalonia.

The supreme confidence that the Catalan leadership had in the justice and Divine support of their cause had carried the Principat to the brink of conquest and collapse. The rebels would be given no respite during the Christmas season, however, for more troubles were soon to follow.

Following up on the easy victory at Tarragona, and playing upon the division among the Catalans, the Marquis de los Vélez sent an embassy to the Diputació shortly before midnight mass. The ambassador delivered demands of surrender, not terms of peace. Outraged, the Catalans responded defiantly. Despite the boldness of their answer, any casual observer could tell that the rebel cause was on its last legs. The military help from France had proved to be a failure; with Tarragona gone, only a few

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665 “Ni tampoc ninguna de las sobreditas cosas dona als deputats ocassio pera procehir confusament en continuar lo aplicar medis efficases y convenientes a la deffensa y conservasio della pero que molt se sempre tenian davant los vulls que deffensavan la causa de Deu, y solicitavan lo castic de tants enormes sacrilegis com los soldats de sa magestad havian fet en Cathaluña,” AHCB: Puig, Dietari, pp. 429-430.

666 Ibid, p. 443.
fortified towns like Martorell stood between Barcelona and almost certain defeat. From a secular assessment, the Catalans’ hopes were shattered; it seemed as if their inspiration had left them as well.

And yet the news was not all black. During the Christmas Eve riots, monks from the religious house at Valldonzella, having been driven out by the soldiers of los Vélez and desiring to revenge themselves, entered the city and joined the defense of Barcelona. In the evening, as the riot quieted down, church bells throughout Barcelona tolled out a Te Deum, giving thanks to God for keeping the city from falling into complete chaos. On Christmas Day, as the people were in church, Jaume Ferran, a canon from Urgell, serving as the Oidor Eclesiàstic, rode off with a general's insignia on his breast towards the neighboring village of Llobregat in a final attempt to curry support and allies before the siege began in earnest. The efforts by Barcelona’s clergy to rouse the population to a continued defense was nothing short of amazing. Pau Claris even went about from Christmas Day until late January dressed in the full regalia of a general, a circumstance unheard of for the President of the Generalitat. Furthermore, in a pattern begun on Christmas Eve, the cathedral chapels, parish churches, and monasteries of Barcelona were open around the clock, serving the spiritual needs of soldiers going off to the front, along with relatives seeking prayer and consolation for their beloved.

Little by little, the smaller towns of Catalonia sent small bands of soldiers together with chaplains, to join the embattled city for what seemed certain to be its final defense. On that fateful Christmas Eve, reinforcements totaling eight hundred men from Vic arrived along with a detachment of “ex-tercio chaplains and Capuchins, stirred by a
particular devotion.”⁶⁶⁷ Five days later, another group of Franciscans came, along with their sister-order the Clarissans of Pedralbes. The religious men and women of Pedralbes were relatives to some of the most prominent noble families in Catalonia, a point to remember when one considers that rather than rejoicing at the coming of the king’s army, they chose to wall themselves up with the embattled rebels. Furthermore, they were accompanied by a number of local families, who had also left everything they had, fearing the arrival of los Vélez. A few days later, in Lleida, friars from the order of St. John of Jerusalem—the Hospitalers—Benedictines, and Franciscans fortified their city, taking over the bishop's residence as a headquarters, and preparing to meet the intended attack in their region.⁶⁶⁸

Although the waning days of December passed without incident, by January, the army of the Marquis de los Vélez was again on the move, marching against Barcelona from the south and west. The next battle would be by Martorell, along the river Llobregat, site of the only bridge connecting Barcelona not only with Tarragona and the south, but with several towns in the interior. If the Spanish were to take the town, hopes of rural Catalans coming to the aid of their capital would be severally diminished. As it was, news of Tarragona’s complete collapse had struck the other rebel centers very hard. In Lleida, Girona, and Vic, cries of desperation were voiced in the city assemblies. While the former cities elected to keep all the remaining men at their disposal to garrison their own towns, little Vic roused itself to form a last-ditch relief force, and moved south to the aid of Barcelona. With the little band went the city’s Conseller-en-Cap, as well as

⁶⁶⁷ “tercio capellans y frares capuchins que movian a particular devoció.” de Rubi and Vidal, Les Corts generals de Pau Claris, 300.
⁶⁶⁸ Ibid, 303-4.

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a few members of the cathedral chapter. Even in these dark days the clergy from Vic still sought to encourage their fellow fighters.

Looking in the records kept by the Catalan Corts, descriptions abound of packed churches and large numbers swelling the cathedral almost daily for confession and communion during the siege of Barcelona. And yet, these sermons, and the prayers that were offered to Mary, to Sant Jordi, and to Santa Eulàlia, were all united in the aim of effecting the defeat of the king, and the deliverance of Catalonia. As the city notary Miguel Marquès, observed:

> All the churches were visited continually, and communion was held quite frequently, the chaplains and monks, in addition to the prayers and particular devotions that were offered in the churches and houses, processed to the cathedral, professing their faith, beginning with the parishes and later the monasteries, and they were accompanied by many devout and virtuous people...singing the litany with great devotion and from time to time crying and imploring our merciful God with a great abundance of tears, that the sight would break the heart of the greatest sinner.°69

Later on he observes that, “Professions (of faith) occurred continuously in the parish churches and in the religious houses, drawing to them a great number of people, youths and young ladies.” The passion and depths of devotion expressed during the late months of autumn appear only to have intensified as the siege began in earnest.

As tensions mounted within the province, and as French support for the Catalans began to wane in the face of mounting costs without much gain, the notary, Marquès, included an extended reverie on Providence in his account of the government's proceedings. In the midst of such turmoil, the notary offered up a brief oration of

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°69 “Totes las iglésias eran molt visitadas y en elles hi havia gran freqüència de communions, los capellans y religiosos, adamas de las oracions y devocions particular que en sas iglésias y casas feyan, acudian a la seu en professó començat las parròchias y seguit lo monestirs, a las quals professons accompanyavan molta gent devora y virtuosa...cantant la llitania ab gran devociò y de quant en quant cridant y demanant ab molta abundància de llàgrimas a Déu misericòrdia, que veurerho rompia lo cor del major peccador.” Ibid, 388-91.

°70 “Las professons de las parròchias y monestris anaren sempre continuantse, acudint en elles molt gran concurs de personas, minyons y donzellas.” Ibid, 389.

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thanksgiving to God, “to Him who gave the province infinite grace through His mercy that has given inspiration to the Diputats.” The actions of the Diputats in allying Catalonia with France, which up until now had brought only disaster, was still seen as part of God's greater Providence. "The depths of Divine Providence have served to make us comfortable, as He has said and that Catalonia remains despite the uncertain support of the Most Christian King (France).” Such expressions of confidence and hope are even more startling for their appearance following the recall of Marshal Espenan, previously the head of Richelieu's task force, to France. It appeared certain that “God, our Lord, permitted it so as to purify Catalans to innocence and justice, with the living and universal Spirit, as He promised He would cause in us.”

Despite their precarious situation, the Catalans believed that they did not need the "horses and chariots" of the king of France, but that God would work through their weakness to bring down the haughty and arrogant power of Castile. Caught up with this renewed communal devotion, Marquès himself, wrote further in his own memoirs of Providence, praising the Lord for having providing Catalonia with such leaders like Claris, who stood like a rock amidst the swirling waves of despair.

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671 “a qui donà la província infinitas gràcias per la mercè que li havia fet de inspirar als deputats.” Ibid, 384-5.
672 “Fonch la divina providència servida de acomodarho, com se ha dit y que restàs Cathaluña molt ayrosa ab lo rey christianíssim.” Ibid, 385.
673 “la permeté Déu nostre Señor per a purificar als innocents y justs catalans ab lo viu y universal sentiment que com se ha dit ell los causà.” Ibid, 386.
674 Similar references to Divine aid supporting the cause of rebels against the Spanish king can be found in the correspondence of the Portuguese ambassador, Pere Ignácio Mascarenhas, a Jesuit with great influence at the new court, sent by the new king João IV to Catalonia in 1640. He arrived on the day of the battle of Montjuïc, and his letters afterwards are redolent with religious imagery, especially his descriptions of Providence and the role of the clergy in the battle. See M. Àngels Pérez Samper, Catalunya i Portugal el 1640 (Barcelona: Curial, 1992), 279; 347-369.
And yet, the other side was not without clergy advocating peace. On 6 January 1641, the Sunday before the battle of Matorell, Miguel Sala, enfermer and canon of Tarragona, brought to the Diputació and the Consell a letter he had received from the chapter of Tarragona. The letter urged that the Catalans listen to the terms offered by the Marquis de los Vélez in the interest of peace. Furthermore, the archdiocese chapter proposed that they act as mediators between the two parties, suggesting that three or four canons be sent to Madrid to negotiate or at least to persuade the king to think better of the Catalans. The Diputació treated the letter with scorn. Without much debate, the proposal was denounced as a forgery, and Francesc Puig wrote confidently “we know that the war is a punishment from the wrath of God that does not spare anyone, destroys the innocents, weakens great and small, and consumes our forces.”

By the second week of January 1641, the situation in Barcelona grew more desperate, and the parish clergy, along with several orders of monks, began organizing themselves into three battalions, serving guard duty on the city parapets alongside the guilds, confraternities, fishermen, merchants, and even some segadors. During the last few days before Barcelona was cut off entirely, neighboring monks—chiefly Franciscans and Capuchins—filtered into the city, though their small numbers in no way swelled the

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675 “nos sab que la guerra es castich de la ira de Deu que no perdona ningu, alcansa als innocents, grans y xichs debilita, y consumeix las forças.” AHCB: Puig, Dietari, p. 515-516.
676 One diarist at the time, Joan Guàrdia, a prosperous farmer from Vic, declared that the clerics and the artisans in particular played a decisive role in the liberation of Barcelona. “si no foren los padres y gent de ribera tot astava pardut,” Guàrdia, Guerra i Vida Pagesa, 61. de Rubí and Vidal, Les Corts generals de Pau Claris, 296. The "gent de Ribera," literary "people who live by the seashore," was a community comprised of artisans and shopkeepers as well as a few urban elite. For more information on the neighborhood see James Amelang, "People of the Ribera: Popular Politics and Neighborhood Identity in Early Modern Barcelona," in Barbara Diefendorf and Carla Hesse, eds. Culture and Identity in Early Modern Europe. Essays in Honor of Natalie Zemon Davis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 119-139.
ranks of the defenders. Although their predicament was grim, the Catalans remained in good spirits. As one observer noted:

The province was constantly full of devotion and Christian piety…and by such an attitude the Diputats, and also the city, that had always observed with them and with great uniformity, purged themselves of the vices, sins, and offenses committed against God our Lord…and from this penance they multiplied orations and devotions and made continual prayers, public professions of faith, and sought the Sacrament of our Lord manifested in the churches and in the cities, and many people by turns…were filled frequently with the hope that He could support us.677

Throughout this crisis, the clergy ceaselessly played the role of comforters, confessors, and exhorters. Several of their prayers besought God to look with favor upon the Catalans and their plight. They considered the siege to be an unambiguous defense of their reputation, a reputation that had never profaned the Lord's temples nor His sacrament and that was now facing ruin at the hands of the irreligious and inhumane. As Marquès records further:

The prayers, pious and devout, mental as well as vocal, throughout the province and the city [of Barcelona] were offered with affecting tears in of tormenting pain and darkened sentiments made to the Sovereign Majesty in which the monks, accompanied with many disciples and with further rigorous penance…supplicated the Father, the Lord and Author of Life, Prince of Peace, and Dispenser of Victories…to take pity on this province and desire to look upon her…because of his infinite mercy.678

Throughout their difficulties, the bishop of Barcelona and other clerics led the city in daily worship, praying to the Virgin Mary and vowing to dedicate their altars and beseeching her intercession on their behalf.

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677 “La província, en la qual en tot temps llueix tant la devoció y pietat christiana…y per ella los deputats, y també la present ciutat, que sempre obrava ab ells ab molt gran uniformitat, en que s' extirpasses los vics y peccats y ofensas a Déu nostre senyor…y de que s' multiplicasen oracions y devocions, y que s fessen continuas pregàrias, públicas professons, y que estigués nostre Señor sagramentat patent en las iglésias, en las ciutats y pobles grans per son torn…tant sovint com la possibilitat de ells podia suportar.” de Rubí and Vidal, Les Corts generals de Pau Claris, 388.

678 “Las oraciones tant pies com devotas, axí mentals com vocals, que uniformament tota la província y la present ciutat ab llàgrimes affectuoses en aquestes tormentas de dolors y tenebres de sentiments feyen a la magestet soberana, en les quals las monjas, acompanyant las ab molts disciplinas y demés acostumades rigurosas penitèncias…eran suplicarli qu com a Pare, Señor, Autor de la vida, Princep de la pau y dispensador de las victòrias…de apiaurirse de aquesta província y voler mirar per ella… devant sa infinita clemència.” Ibid, 389.
On the 10th of January, 1641, crowds packed the parish churches as Benedictines offered up prayers to the Virgin of the Montserrat—Catalonia’s pre-eminent shrine—pleading for her mediation, reminding her of their devotion to her, and of the insult done to her Son by the soldiers.\(^679\) In the evening a deputation from the Benedictines together with some notable citizens made their way to the monastery of Montserrat, requesting permission to bring some of the relics into the city, asking the abbot to accede to their petition on behalf of the injuries committed "to the said monastery and house (the Benedictines) and to our sacred religion."\(^680\) Although the abbot, Joan Emanuel de Espinosa, a Castilian by birth, feared risking such holy treasures to possible confiscation by Castilian troops already enveloping the city, he reluctantly agreed, and on 14 January the commission returned with a few relics to great rejoicing.\(^681\)

The future of Catalan relations with France also looked grim, particularly after the departure of the Marquis d’Esperanç\(^682\) to France. Granted their French general had only lost battles, surrendered cities, and behaved unexpectedly cowardly in the face of the Castilian advance. Granted too that more French aid under the trusted du Plessis-Besençon was ostensibly marching towards Barcelona and could arrive within a week.

\(^{679}\) Ibid, 399.
\(^{680}\) "al dit monestir y casa y a sa sagrada religió." Ibid, 401.
\(^{681}\) Ibid, 413.
\(^{682}\) D’Esperanç was the first French commander sent to Catalonia in December 1640 to organize the defense of the Principat against the Marquis de los Vélez. His only actions upon arriving in Catalonia was to move to Tarragona, to petition the Diputació for more supplies and men to hold off the Castilian army, and to surrender the city to los Vélez without firing a shot in defense. His behavior irritated not only the Catalans but Richelieu as well who replaced him after the fall of Tarragona with a more skillful general, the Marshal la Mothe. Shortly after d’Esperanç’s exit, Pau Claris sent a desperate letter to du Plessis-Besençon, pleading with him to return to Barcelona with more aid. At the same time, the Frenchman received instructions from the Secretary of State, Noyers, that Cardinal Richelieu, far from conceding the fight in Catalonia to Olivares and Philip IV, was determined to send more troops to Catalonia rather than cutting his losses. AMAE: Corr. Pol. Espagne, Supplément 4, ff. 157-160. Later sources indicate that du Plessis-Besençon played an important role in the first—and potentially last—siege of Barcelona, AMAE: Corr. Pol. Espagne, Supplément 3, f. 216v.
All the promises of France seemed to be but a pipe-dream; the harsh reality that the rebels had not a single victory to their account, that a large force was drawing near Barcelona, and that the current troops available for their defense were untrained civilians—all this was slowly sinking in. George Washington during his retreat through New Jersey in 1776 or during the dire winter at Valley Forge could scarcely have felt more confident.

In this hour of need, the clergy of Barcelona yet again supplied the want. As had happened on the 14th and 17th of September, the 4th, 16th, 22nd, and 24th of December, on 8 January, Puig notes “all the churches were visited by many, and in them there was a great concourse of communions.” Throughout the day, visitors to the packed churches left penitent, confessed, and comforted that God, through the working of his saints Jordi and Eulalia, would not suffer “aquesta christianissima provincia” to fall to the sword of the sacrilegious.

On 21 January, the Castilians attacked and took Martorell, a small, fortified town just past the river Llobregat. With the king’s army now across the last natural barrier to Barcelona, it was evident that a Castilian victory here would place a besieging army around the city's defenses within a day or two. Faced with the deteriorating situation, the entire clerical corps inside Barcelona was called upon in two roles. First, the religious leaders served as a spiritual reinforcement in the city itself, offering up Masses throughout the day as well as offering prayers to God, "that our arms would obtain victory and that the enemy would retreat in confusion," and showing the Sacrament at

683 “totes las iglesias eran molt visitadas, y en ellas y avia gran frecuencia de communions.” AHCB: Puig, Dietari, p. 704.
685 "Encontient los deputats embiare recaudos a totas las iglésias per a que en lo punt traguessen y tinguessen patent lo santíssim sagrament y supplicassen a Déu nostre señor que las nostres armas
the city gates to the troops on their way to join the fight. Second, and even more importantly, a significant number of priests and monks joined those going off to defend Martorell: "the churches, monasteries, colleges, and confraternities sent soldiers...to provide help to the army." It was the Dominicans and the canons of the cathedral who particularly distinguished themselves on this day, marching and fighting with good spirit. Although they were eventually pushed back, the Catalan army retreated in good order. By the evening of 21 January, the royal army began occupying the farmland around Barcelona. It was clear to everyone that the final battle was soon to come.

The following night, as los Vélez arranged his troops around Montjuïc, a few Capuchins from three neighboring houses made their way into the city to support the defenders or die with them. On 23 January, the captain of the Catalan camp, Josep de Rocabartí, deserted to the enemy, yet the city did not lose hope. The churches were filled with parishioners "continuing their orations and devotions for the success of the province's arms." Such invocations increased only a few nights later when los Vélez issued an ultimatum to the city. Knowing that the attack was to come tomorrow, the Catalans beseeched God not to let them become slaves to the evil Olivares, and implored Mary and all the saints to intercede on their behalf as true servants of God, pleading for deliverance and for the defeat of the king.

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686 "las iglésias, monestirs, collegis y confrarieas fessen los soldats...per anar lo dit socorro al dit exèrcit." Ibid, 419-20.
687 Ibid, 425.
688 "continuant las oracions y devocions per la bona directio de las armas de la província...las iglésias eran molt freguïentadas y assistidas, y en particular la seu y la capella ahont està lo cos de la gloriosa santa Eulàlia patrona de aquesta ciutat." Ibid, 442-3.
689 Ibid, 446-47.
As dawn broke over Barcelona on 26 January, the Castilian troops of los Vélez surged forward in their attempt on the heights of Montjuïc. Though the fighting was relatively brief, it was nonetheless quite bitter. The notary Marquès wrote in his memoirs that at one point, when the battle lay in the balance, a Capuchin friar, seizing a crucifix in his hands, succeeded in rallying the Catalans. Aided materially by recently arrived French troops and heartily encouraged when a Portuguese ship entered the harbor bearing news of the country's revolt against Olivares and a special ambassador to Barcelona, the invigorated Catalans eventually pushed the superior Castilian troops back, inflicting heavy casualties among the assailants while suffering few of their own.

With the royal army falling back towards its base at Tarragona, the city of Barcelona erupted in a spirit of joyful thanksgiving. Church bells rang, calling people to what must have been a glorious Te Deum celebration throughout the streets and barrios of Barcelona. Through it all, Marquès noted, it was the trust that the humble Catalans placed in the Providence of God that enabled them to withstand the mighty ranks of their enemies. In their minds, God had lifted the lowly and brought down the arrogant oppressors as a reward for their unceasing vigilance and devotion in the adoration of Christ and of his Sacrament.

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690 Ibid, 449.
691 “...nostaltres, los catalans, posavam sols nostres confianças en Déu, y sos sants y en la justificació de nostra causa.” Ibid, 451.
692 “Y últimament, com sia Cathaluña la enamorada del santíssim sagrament del altar, la única en sas alabanças, la singular en sa reverència, la que fa mala cara a sos approbris, la terrible a sos injúrias, la que abrassa en son divino amor y la que, zelosa y encesa en foch de amor de tant sobera sagrament se era ab gran ánimo exposada a la catòlica defença de tant alt sagrament, és ben cert lo tinguè molt de veurer ya, com veu en lo die de vuy cumplit, que injúrias a dit sagrament fetas, defençadas, avian de parar en glòrias de sa deguda veneració.” Ibid, 453.
Epilogue: Winning Souls: Mystics

In this battle, several members of the religious orders had played an important role. One of the minor orders, the Clarisses-Capuchins (the female version of the strict Franciscan order) was particularly devoted to the sacramental body of Christ. Sor Àngela Astorch, a Catalan who founded many convents in other parts of Spain, was heart-broken when word reached her of the fall of Brazil to the Dutch in 1624: “[when I heard that] the heretical enemies of Our Holy Catholic faith had sacked the colony of Brazil, it caused me terrible pain and worry that such people would brazenly open the sacred vessels containing the Most Holy Body of the Sacramental Christ, and it gave me a passion and anxiety that they be recovered and brought back to Spain.”

This same fervor for the Sacramental Body of Christ continued in the order for many more years. It even appears that this devotion to the Holy Body transcended political boundaries, for we find that a convent of the Clarisses-Capuchins in Murcia was founded in the 1640s by Aleix de Boixadors, Inquisitor of Murcia, “in order to make amends for the profanations” that the troops had wreaked “as soon as the news arrived concerning the tongues of fire that sacrilegiously attacked the Sacramental species in the Principat of Catalonia.”

Perhaps the most notable of these sisters was Sor Eufràsia Berenguer (d. 25 April 1641), a Catalan of noble birth, who took the habit in 1613 at Lleida. A true devotee of the Eucharist, Sor Eufràsia also enjoyed a reputation as a mystic. During the dark days of

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693 “los herejes enemigos de Ntra. Sta. fee chatólica avian saqueado la isla del Brasil, y dióme terrible pena y cuydado que abrian echo los tales de las custodias y del SSmo Cuerpo de Christo Sacramentado, y me dió una passion y ansia de recogerlas y traerlas a España,” Valenti Serra de Manresa, Les Clarisses-Caputxines a Catalunya i Mallorca: (Barcelona: Facultat de Teologia de Catalunya, 2002), p. 112n.
694 “per tal de reparar les profanacions”; “[a]penas llegaron las voraces llamas del fuego acomete sacrilegas las especies Sacramentales en el Principado de Cataluña.” Ibid, 113 and note.
the winter of 1640, around the time of the Advent uprising in Barcelona, the sister interceded with God on behalf of the province:

For the space of two straight days He appeared to the Mother Sor Angela Serafina … who, on her knees, asked urgently for a good deed for the province of Catalonia. On another occasion it is said that the said mother displayed great happiness and three times cried aloud, “Victory, Victory.” And it is also said that the blessed Saint Eulalia, patron saint of Barcelona, on one occasion appeared to Sor Angela Serafina very happy and, with a palm in her hand, spoke twice or three times: “Victory, Victory.”

On the 22nd of January, just days before the battle of Montjuïc, Eufràsia again had a vision, this time of Christ:

The sweet Jesus, in the figure of a quite venerable youth, wearing on his head a royal crown, caressed her. The said mother also saw him with a crown on his head similar to that which the sweet Jesus later carried in his breast with great love. She beseeched him, asking for victory for Barcelona, because the citizens were very frightened since they had but few people and the enemy being very great. With extremely great affability and love, towards her, Jesus gave her to understand that it would be as she desired. And on this occasion it is said that she beheld the Most Holy Virgin who had under her mantle the City of Barcelona. One cannot tell how great a consolation it caused in Barcelona when she said this, as the vision came to pass on the 22nd, and on the 26th, the victory on the mountain of Montjuïc occurred.

These visions were not limited to Barcelona, for a few weeks later, before her death, she had a final vision relating to her hometown of Lleida, which at the time was also threatened by the Castilian offensive. In a report that had a great calming influence among the peoples of western Catalonia, Sor Eufrasía spoke of seeing Jesus in a vision

695 “Por espacio de dos días continuos vio a la madre Sor Angela Serafina…que de rodillas pedia con instancia un buen sucesso para la provincia de Catalunya, y en otra occasion dize que se le mostro muy alegre la dicha madre y por tres veces le dixo vitoria, vitoria, dize que tambien la bendita Sta. Eulalia patrona de Barcelona en una ocasion se le aparecio muy alegre y con una palma en la mano y dixo por dos o tres vezes victoria, victoria.” APCC: Manuscript 1-1-17: Resumen de la vida de Sor Eufrasia Berenguer (+1641), f. 19-20. The mystical sister also had a similar vision of St. Eulalia during the season of Epiphany, immediately before Montjuic (see below). These two sections are all the more remarkable as they mark the only excursions into political events in an otherwise apolitical spiritual biography.

696 “le azia el dulce Jesus muchas caricias el qual en figura de un mancebo muy venerable trahija en su cabeza corona real. Viose la dicha tambien con corona en su cabeza semejante a la que trahia el dulce Jesus el qual luego la llego a su pecho con grande amor. Ella le suplico diese vitoria a Barcelona que entonces los ciudadosanos estavan muy temorjados por tener ellos poca gente y ser muchos los contraries mostrándose el summo ben grande afabilidad y amor le dío noticia se ario lo que ella dezeava, y en esta occasíon dize que vebia a la Santissima Virgen que tenia debaxo de su manto a la Ciudad de Barcelona no puede dize significar el consuelo le causo lo dicho esto se passo a 22 como queda dicho y a 26 huvieron la victoria en la montanya de Montjuique.” Ibid, f.20-20v.
extending his hand over Lleida. Accompanying this holy sign was the promise that “The Most Sacred Virgin also showed her the City of Lleida under her mantle, as on other occasions she had shown the City of Barcelona.”

The messages of these visionaries undoubtedly had a powerful impact on the Catalan rebellion, all the more so as their prophecies came during the bleak and black days of the first campaign. These visions were all the more influential because they were situated within the popular early-modern Christian belief in a present and real Divine Agency that acted and intervened in the affairs of the world. Although ravaged in the upper social orders by Deism and atheism in later centuries, the notion of Providence played strongly upon the minds and hearts of the entire society during this epoch. Even Philip IV, suffering from personal tragedy as well as political turmoil, would turn to a mystic, Sor Maria de Jesus only a few years later. Seeking not only consolation from his worldly sorrows, the king would come under the influence of Sor Maria, through her visions and counseling, too strong an influence according to some royal ministers. The mystics’ ability to console and inspire the Catalans in their rebellion, joined with the preaching and spiritual guidance of parish priests and monks inside Barcelona, produced a heighten religious atmosphere inside the besieged city. The improbable testimony to their prophecies—born out by the passage of events—served to inspire Catalans for many months, indeed years, beyond the victory at Montjuïc.

Philip had lost more than a bid to nip the Catalan revolution in the bud; he had lost the spiritual aura of being a True Witness for the Faith that had surrounded the throne

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697 “La Santissima Virgen dize que también le mostro debaxo de su manto la Ciudad de Lerida como en otras ocasiones le astrado [avia mostrado] la Ciudad de Barcelona.” Ibid, f.21; Serra de Manresa, Les Clarisses-Caputxines, 167.
since the beginning of his reign. Not only would the king have to work at crushing the rebels in the field; he would have to work harder to re-establish his religious legitimacy among his subjects. The war against the French had now embarked on a new theme. For Philip and for his subjects, this international conflict had suddenly become more personal: the king’s ability to protect his subjects and their faith from assault was now in question. Out of this crisis, the Catalan revolution began; only when those questions were resolved would the conflict be over.

Conclusion

Thanks in no small measure to the participation by the regional clergy—and the seemingly miraculous outcome on the slopes of Montjuïc—the Catalan rebels had managed to stave off the first attempt by Philip IV to regain control over the province. While the religious fiscal and political contributions were helpful in chairing committees or fielding a small company of soldiers, it was the spiritual efforts of the Catalan ecclesiastics that had the greatest significance throughout the province. With a leadership inspired by theological assurances that justified their “natural defense” before God and man, with mystics who spoke of auspicious visions, and by menas of a widespread effort by the lower clergy—parish priests, friars, monks, and canons—to stay loyal to notions of Catalan purity, the Catalan revolutionaries fought with greater confidence and boldness. The amazing success at Montjuïc only served to increase the popular notion that God and right were on their side, that the Lord beheld with favor his loyal subjects fighting for the honor of his Crucified Son, and would grant them the victory. In the long war to determine who spoke for the true Catholic faith in Europe, the first blow had been stuck, and Castile was on the losing side. What the future held was still uncertain, however.
Overlooked in the victory celebrations following Montjuïc and lasting well past St. Eulalia’s day on 11 February was the new political reality encompassing Catalonia. True, their French allies had been disappointing, and the victory outside Barcelona had been won primarily by Catalan troops. But the general public was unaware of the costs that the desperate diplomatic efforts would cause. By the time of Montjuïc, the Catalan leadership had already signed over their province’s independence to the French; on 23 January, Catalonia had become an official protectorate of France, with obligations of loyalty and service to their new king, Louis XIII. What neither the French nor the Catalan leaders realized at the time was how drastic that move was to be; and the number of problems it would cause in the future.

As we will see in subsequent chapters, the alliance with France added a new dimension to the Catalan revolution. No longer was it simply the province fighting in defense against injustices that had long continued unresolved; no longer was it merely a conflict to preserve the honor and devotion due to the Body of Christ. From now on, the Catalans would become more deeply entangled in one of the most divisive conflicts of the seventeenth century: the battle between France and Spain for the supremacy of Europe.
CHAPTER 5
From Republic to Protectorate, January-December 1641

“Ten al Frances por amigo, no le tengas por vezino”⁶⁹⁸

“now are our brows bound with victorious wreaths;
  Our bruised arms hung up for monuments;
  Our stern alarums changed to merry meetings;
  Our dreadful marches to delightful measures.”

Richard III, I, i, ll. 5-8

“O felix Cathalonie, tu semper in fide permanebis”

St. Vincen Ferrer

As the royal army of the Marquis de los Vélez withdrew from the slopes of Montjuïc in January, it seemed as if the world had turned upside down. Far from the easy victory expected by both sides, the royalist defeat now opened up a host of questions. As frightened as they were of defeat, the potential sack of Barcelona, and harsh punishment for rebellion, the Catalans seemed almost as frightened of their success. In the heat of the moment during the fall of 1640, the rebel government had signed themselves over to France, losing their independent republican identity officially within a week. As we will see, this cession of authority to their not-always friendly neighbor to the north eventually placed Catalonia at the mercy of French grand strategy, controlled at the time by Cardinal Richelieu and later by his protégé, Cardinal Mazarin.

⁶⁹⁸ “Have the French for a friend, not for a neighbor” As improbable as it may sound, this is ostensibly an ancient Greek proverb found in AHCB: B.1640-8-(op)-5: Vicente de San Raymundo, Sucessos por dias de la Guerra de Rossellon (Barcelona: Mathevat, 1640), f. 5. The author attributes Einhart, chronicler of Charlemange, with being the first to put said proverb into writting: “no porque en su amistad conozcasse firmezas grandes...sino para que con las alianças dellas...se redima la oppression y ultraje le amenaza la condicion le da el clima de su cielo...Assi que la Francia segun su condicion nativa, no puede complazersel en la paz dentro sus umbrales, mientras tenga vezinos que infestar.”
Most accounts of the Catalan revolt end shortly after the battle of Montjuïc. National historians, seeing the French take-over in 1641 and the eventual demise of the revolutionaries, write about the last ten years of major fighting as one long decline into defeat. Those few studies that do examine these years have tended to emphasize the activities of Catalans who resisted the French once they assumed control over the province.\(^699\) Certainly there is nothing glorious in losing the war; there also does not seem to be anything glorious about being ruled by the French. But these accounts leave out an important and interesting time period from the moment the Franco-Catalan force defeated los Vélez, and Catalonia could conceivably fall under French control, to the moment when the French actually began to assume authority over the province. For much of the year 1641 Catalonia was only nominally under the control of the French. The Braços General continued to meet under the continued state of emergency, and orders were signed by Pau Claris until his sudden and suspicious death in February 1641, and later by the Diputats Ecclesiastics, the doctors Josep Soler and Bernat de Cardona i de Raset.\(^700\)

During this time, Catalan clerics continued to play a vital role in the evolution of the rebellion to a full-scale revolution. For a while at least, the President of the

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\(^699\) This is certainly the case with the only history of the war to date, Mossen Josep Sanabre’s *La Acción de Francia en Cataluña* (published 1956). In defense of the long-suffering historian, it is quite possible that Sanabre’s emphasis on Catalan resistance during the years 1641-1659 was related to the fact that his work was re-researched, written, and published during the Franco years, when publishing of a historical, determined Catalan resistance to the power in Madrid would have been politically dangerous.

\(^700\) On the suspicion that Claris—a determined and charismatic character who had already caused much trouble for Spain—was poisoned by foreign agents, see the book by Ricardo García Cárcel, *Pau Claris, la revolta catalana*. Claris was succeeded in the office of President by his fellow canon—and possibly relative—Josep Soler from Urgell, who filled out his term until the triannual choosing that summer. Soler had been the former delegate from the Generalitat to Rome and returned home in the summer of 1640 when the new ambassador, Abbot Joan Masó, was sent to persuade the Pope of the righteousness of the Catalans’ cause. Don Bernat, a canon from Girona, elected in July, 1641, was related to the famous Cardona family.
Generalitat and the Diputació still held local power from Barcelona over the entire region, save the cities of Tarragona, Tortosa, and Perpignan and their environs. Money from clerical sacristies continued to provide the much-needed fiscal support for the war effort. Several members of regular orders joined the Catalan army as chaplains when the new campaigning season began in the spring. In addition, clerics such as Gaspar Sala continued to publish works proclaiming not only the justice of the Catalan cause, but now, adducing proof that Divine favor attended them. Sermons were preached in the pulpits of Barcelona encouraging this point of view—that the blessed intervention by Saint Eulalia and others had vindicated the righteous arms of Catalonia against the sacrilegious foe. Amidst all the celebration and thanksgiving, just how much past French aid and future French control the Catalan representatives had accepted—part of the treaty that had signed Catalonia over as a vassal province to France—were conveniently overlooked. This would soon change.

As the full nature of the compact signed between Catalonia and France began to manifest itself, a growing number of Catalans, both secular and ecclesiastic, began to feel uneasy with their new protector. While many of these worriers had undoubtedly thought it right and just to defend themselves, and possibly desired some level of independence from Spain, the thought of becoming subservient to another power, and especially one as bitterly hated as France, was an entirely different matter. For some clerics in particular, though they had never sworn an oath to serve Philip IV, they certainly had come to view him as their natural lord, or magistrate. To suddenly turn against the Habsburgs and become partisans for the house of Bourbon—whose religious behavior they had condemned for years because of the royal aid given to Protestants and the toleration of
heretical Huguenots within France—caused a great deal of anxiety among many ecclesiastics.

A line of division began to emerge very quickly within the ranks of the Catala clergy, between those who had supported resistance to Spain in the name of defending the faith and the province’s constitutions, and those who were willing to forsake all past claims of loyalty to the king in order to achieve a better life under France. It appears that those who refused to acknowledge French control were motivated more by conscience than by politics, whereas secular advancement, in terms of promotion to high ecclesiastical positions, tended to mark the clergy who for the next ten years of their lives dedicated themselves to the new order in Catalonia.

The presence of a larger French army, led by French marshals, intendants, and viceroys, would serve to increase the division between the clergy who continued their support for the new order and those who were increasingly hesitant about it. Furthermore, the addition of a foreign element—and one bent on having its own way in Catalonia—served to change many clerics’ minds about the nature of the Catalan Revolution. While initially in favor of natural defense against an unrepentant sacrilegious foe, many religious figures in Catalonia could not or would not countenance the permanent overthrow of a Lord’s Anointed. From conceiving themselves as a David defending themselves from the unjust attacks by Saul, the Catalans had become another northern-kingdom of Israel, separating themselves from the rightly-appointed kings of Jerusalem and in so doing, risked falling afoul of deeper problems. As we will see, the increased involvement of French Jeroboam-esque ideas concerning the proper roles of the ecclesiastical and secular authority would only serve to augment this discomfort.
A rejuvenated Catalonia: symbol of Divine grace?

Given the intense “crisis of conscience” that accompanied the events of 1640, many of the Catalan clerics saw in the unexpected victory at Montjuïc a sign from God, indicating Divine support of their cause. In this general sense, the Catalans were no different from other revolutionaries of that decade.\textsuperscript{701} Where the Catalans proved deficient, however, was in adumbrating a divine program, or drawing on specific Biblical parallels to their situation beyond the early months of 1641. “Where there is no vision, the people perish:” it may have been this inability by the Catalan leadership to produce a lasting, unifying social vision—which had enabled the common faith of the people to overcome other dividing social elements such as rank, property, or wealth during the first months of the revolt—as much as pressing military concerns that led first to the union with France and to the defeat of the Catalan revolution in later years.\textsuperscript{702}

\textsuperscript{701} Almost all contemporaneous revolts in the 1640s expressed similar religious features such as the concept of a “chosen people,” including Portugal, the Parliamentary-Cromwell faction in the English Civil War, the Covenants in Scotland, and the Catholic rebels in Ireland. The cases of Portugal and England also show how different “patriotic” revolutionaries expressed this religious identification.

Although Portugal had strong secular reasons for presenting a united front during their revolt—they had been an empire before its annexation by Spain in 1580—there were still factions inside the country that advocating loyalty to Spain. Most notably among these was the Archbishop of Lamego, who was deeply involved in a plot to kill King João IV. In addition to the claims of history, Portuguese apologists for the “Restoration” referred quite frequently to the Jewish Babylonian captivity, and their position as God’s people returning from a pentitential exile under foreign rule.

The English Civil War presents a stronger support for the importance of a religious sense of community; a certain brand of Protestantism helped unite otherwise disparate members of the British Isles and shaped the nature of Cromwell’s protectorate. Here, they were the people of Israel leading the fight against sinful kings who had broken God’s commandments. For an important study that looks at the long term effects whereby sacred ideas such as a community, a chosen people, and an elect nation have become the sources of modern nationalism, see Anthony Smith, \textit{Chosen Peoples} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

\textsuperscript{702} Proverbs 29:18. One possible counter-example among the pre-modern revolutions is the American Revolution, where, despite some New England sermons referring to God’s chosen people, a common religious-social identity never occurred. Of course, the placement of the American Revolution in the pre-modern revolutions—which I would distinguish as being “preventitive, political, patriotic revolutions” rather than pro-active social revolutions based on “metaphysical madness” (to borrow a phrase from Edmund Burke)—has been debated as well.

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One of the more important factors behind the Catalan failure to establish a broad social identity beyond the first few months of the war lay in the extremely powerful local identities that composed the Principat and Comtats. Catalonia was simply too fractured by *patrias*. Compounding this social fragmentation was a dearth of charismatic figureheads to guide and encourage the revolutionary faction. Pau Claris initially provided this dynamic leadership, but left no successor upon his death. Only religion, especially the Catalans’ fervent devotion to the elements of the Mass, had been able to unite such disparate communities in 1640, and continued to be a powerful motivator for the Catalan rebels, encouraging them in their resistance against Castile.\footnote{Other factors contributing to the Catalans’ inability to create and promote a lasting social identity can be seen in the relatively sudden origins of the revolution, particularly among the clergy, who were so influential in shaping popular perspectives, as well as in the rather non-existant political goals of the revolutionary faction in 1640 and beyond, and finally, in the horrendous conflict of their French allies, which soon convinced a growing number of Catalans—both clergy and laity—that life under Castile had been a good deal better.}

With the Catalan victory at Montjuïc, the assertion of a particular social ideal—grounded in their religious identity—was necessary. Yet, despite their victory over the king’s forces, few Catalans seemed to support an outright break with Castile; as we will see in the case of Bishop Manrique, some even considered the rebels’ victory at Montjuïc no bar to continuing negotiations with the king. Instead, it appears that many provincials had either forgotten, or were unaware of, the political reality that they were no longer their own masters. The facts of their present relationship with France, however, would be brought to their remembrance soon enough.

While social confusion and conflict would come soon enough, the first publications emerging after the unexpected victory over the king impressed upon Catalan readers the belief that God had truly been fighting for them all along. The sense of dread
during the advance of los Vélez only a few months before was forgotten in a blissful confidence that the Catalans were certainly the true Catholics in this conflict. The struggle to know for certain which country or which people stood for the True Faith was of paramount importance at this time, and the Catalan revolution had continued largely along these religious lines since the fall of 1640. Montjuïc not only represented a military triumph, but also a psychological one for Catholics struggling to reconcile the Church’s hesitancy to approve resistance to established powers with the Church’s insistence on defending the Body of Christ.

Moreover, the notion of Divine support existed in three circles of social identity. The first contained the city of Barcelona itself. Perhaps this might have been expected: as Barcelona was the largest city by far in Catalonia, and drawing Catalans from all over to itself as the political, economic, and administrative capital. Since the vacancy of the archbishop at Tarragona, Barcelona had also acted as a religious capital, hosting two Provincial Councils in 1636 and 1640. The burnt remains of chalices from Riudarenes and Montiró, located in the Capuchin convent on the hills overlooking Barcelona—which had become quite a pilgrimage site during 1640 and 1641—and the urban revolt during Corpus Christi served only to increase this distinction. Finally, the fact that the decisive battle of Montjuïc was fought right on the outskirts of the city heavily contributed to its particular identity as favored of God.

The second sphere of identity was concerned with the tenuous urban relations inside Catalonia. As has been noted in earlier chapters, the major cathedral towns of the Principat and Comtats were engaged in almost constant feuding over privileges, forming unstable alliances of convenience with each other. The victory at Montjuïc brought an
end to this contention: the Divine favor shown at Barcelona encouraged former rivals such as Perpignan and Lleida to cease their enmity—for the present at least. They did so, not so much to partake of Barcelona’s “spiritual capital,” but because personal testimony seemed to indicate that the Lord favored all true Catalans. The salvation of Lleida and the arrival of the French before the walls of Perpignan encouraged them in this view.

Finally, the notion of Divine favor extended even to the new alliance with France. Most Catalans entered into this compact with their former enemy with a good deal of unease and mistrust. Yet, through popular verse and religious ceremonies, a good number of hesitant Catalans were brought into reluctant agreement with the opinion of the minority that France, not Spain, spoke for true Catholicism. This three-way spiritual confirmation of secular policy gave a strong impetus to the Catalan war effort through much of 1641 and 1642. In the end, however, it proved unable to persuade many to preserve in their original rebellion—aided, it must be said, by the disastrous effects of French rule from Barcelona.

The Catalans inside Barcelona celebrated their newfound confidence only two weeks after the victory at Montjuïc with a special tribute to the city’s patron saint, Eulalia, whose feast-day fell on 12 February. Before commencing with their joyful festivals, the Catalans first held several days of services to mourn for the dead, honoring

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704 It is important to note that while a Castilian army under Juan d’Arce occupied the citadel of Perpignan from 1640-1642, their influence for the cause of Philip IV barely extended to cover the entire city. The majority of the town’s population appears to have been in strong support of the revolt—at least up until the French siege of 1642.

705 It is true that Barcelona’s enmity with the southern cities of Tarragona and Tortosa increased all the more as both cities continued in their loyalty to Philip throughout the war. But, having been declared “enemichs of the patria” in late 1640, they clearly were also cut off from the benefits accruing to all Catalans faithful to their Divine Lord rather than their secular master.
those who gave their lives in defense of “their beloved patria.” Only after a proper interval of time during which the noble deeds of their friends and relatives were commemorated did the city of Barcelona, “pious in recognizing the hand of God … [hasten] to pay the obligations to the intercession and vigilance of their Patron Saint who, with obtaining the great victory, had crushed the arms of Castile.”

The festivities began at 12:00 noon on St. Eulalia’s day, when all the city bells began to ring. Shortly thereafter the cannon and muskets, which had defended the city only weeks earlier, started firing, adding to the din. All along the way to the cathedral, the people strewed the streets with all the finery they had. The noted Jesuit and Calificador of the Inquisition, Jaume Puig—later famous for his eulogy sermons in memory of Richelieu and Louis XIII—gave the message at the cathedral. So great was the press of people into the main church that “many were forced to retire to other Churches, not giving prevention space for many hours before, that the spacious capacity of such a sumptuous Temple was occupied to the design of them that had to hear it.”

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706 “que depreciant lo precios de ses vidas, las rendiran lliberals en defensa de sa amada patria, eternizant lo valor de ses armes, y noble de sa sanch, los afectes de sa voluntat animosa.” BC: FB 6162: Relacio de las Festas que la Illustre Ciutat de Barcelona ha fetas a sa insignie Patrona Sta. Eulalia (Mathevat Brothers, 1641), f. 250. See also the same pamphlet in AHCB: B.1641-8-(op)-54.

707 “piadosa en regenexerlas de la ma de Deu… pagar las obligacions en que la intercessio, y vigilancia de sa Patrona Santa la avia pisada ab la grandiose vitoria que alcança de las armas Castellanas.” BC: FB 6162: Relacio de las Festas, f. 250.

708 “Dispararen los baluarts, y torres la artilleria, a compañada de ben ordenadas carregues de mosqueteria. Esmerás entre tos la celebrada montanya de Monjuich com a theatre que fou de tantas dichas, pegovant foch a sos pedres, que foren antes ruida de las esquadras enemigas…” AHCB B.1641-8-(op)-54: Relacio de las Festas que la Illustre Ciutat de Barcelona ha fetas a sa insignie Patrona S. Eulalia, en accio de gracies de la vitoria alcançá en la Montaña de Monjuich (Barcelona; J. Mathevat, 1641), ff. 1-1v.

709 “Predicá un doct y agut sermo de las alabanças de la Santa lo Reverent Pare Iuame Puig de la Compañia de Jesus y Calificador del Sant Ofici, ab tan gran concurs de tota la Ciutat, y vehins a ella,” AHCB B.1641-8-(op)-54, f. 2.

710 “fou forços reitrase molts a altres Iglesies, no donant lloch la prevencio de moltas horas antes, que ocupa la capacitat espayosa de tan sumptuous Temple al desitg que tenian de oyrlas.” FB 6162: f. 251.
Following the service, another procession began, reminding many of the three-day Corpus festivities the previous November. Bishop Manrique led the way, smartly dressed in his special pontifical robes, followed by the cathedral chapter, all the parish clergy, and all the nuns, monks, and friars of Barcelona, carrying the precious banner of St. Eulalia. After them came the Consellers, the Cavallers and Citizens, and the Diputats and Oidors following. Unlike a typical church procession, which normally would make stops at parish churches or sites of religious significance, this parade stopped at each local militia’s district headquarters, where they commemorated those who took part in the battle of Montjuïc.

While the religious participants seem limited to only the Barcelona clergy and to the celebration of a specifically Barcelona patron—unlike the November Corpus in which church leaders from all over the province took part in worshipping Christ—the message of St. Eulalia’s Day was meant to be spread abroad in all Catalonia. Just as Barcelona was in many ways—for good or ill—the representative of Catalonia, so too was Eulalia, its patron, a representative for the saints guarding other Catalan villages and towns. In this way, the blending of spiritual and political celebrations brought about a particular sense of Catalan identity. God, through the agents of his saints, particularly those near and dear to Catalonia, had delivered his people from the hands of the sacrilegious pseudo-Catholics. In this growing age of uncertainty and mistrust, particularly in matters of faith, God had sent the Catalans an answer: they were witnesses to one of those rare

711 Ibid, f. 251.
712 Ibid, f. 251v. The response at each of these stops was tremendous: “Y peraque ab particular demonstracio festejassen a sa Patrona los que mes immediatament sentiren lo favor y amparo dels merits de tan illustre Santa, que foran las companyias de dita Ciutat, manaran los senyors Consellers que repartidas en esta forma en varios puestos de la Ciutat, saludassen ab bellas carregas de mosqueteria…a la venerable Imagen de la Santa, al passar per son districte” AHCB B.1641-8-(op)-54, f. 2v.
moments in temporal history where the sheep and the goats were clearly delineated. They had been weighed in the scales of Divine Justice, and had not been found wanting. As a result, the Catalan leadership decided to embark on a new social policy. They desired to respond to this Divine grace with a renewed devotion and a spirit of thankfulness to the extent of banning balls and profanity during the time Carnival and ordering a series of anniversary masses to be said for the souls of the departed brethren instead.\textsuperscript{713}

**Praising God and His Saints beyond Barcelona-a last gasp of Catalan unity?**

Beyond producing extravagant religious ceremonies, the success at Montjuïc provoked the publication of a number of pamphlets that spread throughout the province. All of them carried a similar message: that God had blessed the efforts of all Catalans who stood fast and defended the sacramental body of Christ. The redemption of Barcelona was but the first step in the restoration of peace and justice in the province. Or as one anonymous account put it, “But, ultimately, one cannot but admire the marvelous works of God in everything, and all the more in defending this enlightened and most noble City from such underhanded treasons.”\textsuperscript{714}

\textsuperscript{713} “Y los días de Carnestoles dedicats antes a balls y profanitats, manar dir generals Aniversaris per les animes de sos deffunts deffensors. Esperant de la Divina Clemencia, que ab la demonstració de animo tan religios, y agrayt, prosperara disposament sos interes. LAUS DEO.” FB 6162, f. 252. Capuchin friars in Madrid were able to successfully ban comedies and theatres in Castile following the disasters of 1640, Dominguez Ortiz, *La Sociedad Española en el siglo XVII*, vol. 2: *El Estamento Eclesiástico*, 184. Again, one is tempted to make comparisons with England during the Civil Wars; in 1642 and again in 1645, theatre performances were banned (by the royalists?) and later, under Cromwell, similar restrictions were placed on theatres and dancing.

\textsuperscript{714} “Pero en fin no ay que admirarse de las obras de Dios en todo maravilloso, y mas en defender esta esclarecida y nobilissima Ciudad de trayciones tan solapadas.” AHCB: B. 1641-8-(op)-4: *Breve y Verdadera Relacion de la entrada del Marques de los Veles en Cataluña* (Barcelona: Mathevat, 1641), f. 54v. On the cover of this pamphlet is a large picture of Saint Eulalia with her cross and martyr’s palm, and Montjuïc looming in the background.
Thus the unifying blessing of Divine favor served to knit together cities that had been engaged in long-standing rivalries with each other. Chief among these were the union (temporary) of Barcelona with Lleida, and the more lasting union between Barcelona and Perpignan. Scarcely a decade earlier, Perpignan had petitioned Philip IV that the Comtats of Roussillon and Cerdagne be declared an independent province, separate from the rest of the Principat. By early 1641, probably shortly after the success at Montjuïc, a poem was published in Barcelona addressed to the city, now her suffering sister to the north, advising her to stand firm, and hope in deliverance from the French.

The use of verse to propagate this gospel of redemption was probably not an accident. Since classical times, scholars had used rhymes and meter to spread their teachings, perhaps the most notable being the heretic Arius, whose verses declaring Christ as merely “the first created being” achieved great popularity among the dockhands of Alexandria. Although the poet remains anonymous to this day, the fact that Jaume Mathevat, official printer for the City and University, published the five-page work suggests an author closely related to upper echelons of Barcelona society.

In the opening verses we see first the primacy of Barcelona over Perpignan despite the unified cause for which they fought. As was common in early modern analogies of power, the familial relationship was used to describe the relation between the first and second cities of Catalonia. The first stanza is replete with mother-daughter imagery describing the relationship between the two cities, as well as with expressions of the mutual fear they are facing in the menace of the “exercit Castellà.”

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715 BN: VE 1378-20: Resposta que fa Cataluña a una Carta que li ha enviada la vila de Perpiñà, ab la qual plora sas desdichas pateix en recompensa de innumerables services (Barcelona: Jaume Matevat Estamper de la Ciutat y Universitat, 1641), f. 1.
thereafter, Barcelona encourages her daughter-city to stand fast in the face of this peril, and not to turn away from the path she has trod, or to imitate the traitors in Tortosa, Tarragona, and other southern towns. On the contrary, Barcelona promised that, together with the power of France, the Catalans would raise the help needed to deliver Perpignan from the hands of the money-hungry, inhuman, sacrilegious, and tyrannical Castilians.716

Moving on from the message of hope and strength in the confidence “that God wills to help me,”717 the city of Barcelona reminds Perpignan of their reason for carrying on the fight. Here again, rather than bringing up a host of complaints such as quartering or the violation of numerous political constitutions, the poet asserts that it was solely for a Divine cause:

My fortune is in [such a] state
That they have vexed my reputation only
    That from the holy Church
    They desired not to leave a thing

    This is a shameful thing,
    For which my people take up arms
        Not to strike back
        But for the holy SACRAMENT.718

Furthermore, though the power of the king of France is acknowledged, the author refused to put his trust either in “horses and chariots”719 or in “lo Duch y Protonotari [i.e.

716 Ibid, ff. 1-1v.
717 “Pero ara molt clar veig/ Que Deu me vol ajudar,” Ibid, f.1v.
718 Ma ventura es estada
    Que nom empreñian sola
    Que de la Iglesia sagrada
    Volien noy restas cosa
        Esta es cosa averiguada
        Que pendrer las armas ma gent,
        No foren mas bofetadas
        Sino per lo sant SACRAMENT.”  Ibid, f. 2.
719 Although never quoted, the latter material from this poem sounds much like Psalm 20, a famous song of deliverance that fits the Catalan situation well, particularly the final verses: “Some trust in chariots, and some in horses: but we will remember the name of the LORD our God. They are brought down and fallen: but we are risen, and stand upright.” Psalm 20: 7-8.
Olivares and ...the Duke and the Protonotary [Villanueva]” but rather in God and His Saints.\textsuperscript{720} For final clinching proof of this Divine aid in their cause, the poet cites the numerous examples of support, not only from God, but also from the Virgin of Montserrat, the saints Madrona, Policarp, and Eulalia. The activity of these saints is evident, not only in the victory at Montjuïc, but also in “a thousand other miracles.” The Catalan response is obvious: “We will sing Alleluia/ Yes united, and in agreement,/ And in concord with the French/ we gather to Fight/ PRAISE GOD.”\textsuperscript{721}

A triumphant attitude is present throughout the work. Catalonia had come through the crucible of war so far, tried but victorious. As perhaps might be expected after the numerous defeats at the hands of los Vélez, the Catalan psyche underwent a drastic change with the result of a single battle. Far from considering the future with a bleak eye and despairing at the thought of trying to recover the rest of the Principat and Comtats from Castile, the attitude among many rebels seemed to be one of incurable optimism. One battle had proved sufficient to answer the critics and the hesitant; God had clearly spoken, and had spoken for the Principality against the tyranny and unjust rule of foreigners over Catalonia. It is significant that such words came well before any serious attempt by the French to exert their own brand of royal authority over the Catalans’ political and religious institutions.

The celebrations in honor of Santa Eulalia extended beyond the borders of Catalonia to the neighboring region of Languedoc. By early February, three clerical ambassadors-hostages, Dr. Joan Batista Vila, Dr. Diego Jouer—both important officials

\textsuperscript{720} “lo Duch y Protonotari,” Ibid, f. 2v.
\textsuperscript{721} “Cantarem Aleluya/ Sí unanimes, y conformes,/ Ab lo Frances concords/ Acudim a Pelear./ LAUS DEO.” Ibid, ff. 2v-3.
in the Barcelona chapter—and Don Llorens de Barutell from Urgell had arrived in
Toulouse, where the local governor and archbishop had civilly welcomed them. Upon
hearing of the festivities in Barcelona, the three Catalans decided to hold a similar
ceremony out of sympathy for their suffering brothers. In a letter sent by Dr. Vila and
published in Barcelona under the title, *Copia de una Carta enviada per lo Doctor Joan
Batista Vila Canonge de la Santa Iglesia de Barcelonaltre de las Renes del Principat
de Cataluña, de Tolosa a un amich desta Ciutat*, the cleric commented piously on how
grieved he and his fellow clerics were to hear of the great sacrifice many of his
countrymen gave so that Catalonia might live, and rejoiced in the Divine succor bestowed
through the intercession of Santa Eulalia.722

In order to commemorate the miraculous deliverance, the convent of our Lady of
Mercy—which apparently was built upon a church dedicated to Eulalia—opened its
doors to Vila and his colleagues.723 Dr. Diego Jouer, Archdeacon and canon of
Barcelona, presided over the mass, while Vila and a fellow canon from the cathedral in
Toulouse assisted. According to his report, not only was the music delightful to the ear,
but also the sermon given—amazingly—by “a Portuguese chaplain (a subject in whom
could be found doctrine, spirit, and devotion in equal parts).”724 The Catalans were not

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722 “Era tanta la afflicció que patiam, qual se dixa considerar, en ocasio tan apretada, y tan llastimosa
desdicha: augmentaves lo dolor vehentnos ausents de nostra patria amada, y no poder donar la sanch de
nostres venes en socorro della, desijtjant la gloria de morir com a lleals Catalans: pero com nons era
possible lograr esta fortuna en las armas, recorregueren a la divina misericordia de Deu nostre Senyor
(unich remey a les majors necessitats) valentnos de la intercessio de nostra patrona y advocada santa
Eularia Prothomartir gloriosa…”ACHB: B.1641-8-(op)-90: *Copia de una Carta enviada per lo Doctor Joan
Batista Vila Canonge de la Santa Iglesia de Barcelonaltre de las Renes del Principat de Cataluña, de
Tolosa a un amich desta Ciutat* (J. Mathevat, 1641; letter dated 16 February), f. 1.
723 The decision by the church to play host was apparently treated with a sign of Divine favor the very same
day: “Volgue Deu aconsolar los aquex dia, mostrantse ya al descubrir del alba lo cel sere, y favorable
despres de aver plogut casi un mes enter.” Ibid, f. 1v.
724 “predicá lo Sermo tot en alabança de Santa Eularia un capellá Portugues (subjecte en qui concorregueren
igualment doctrina, esperit, y devocio.)” Ibid, f. 2. Emphasis mine
382
alone in their worship, either. Despite possessing hardly any strong ties to their southern neighbors, all the principal citizens of Toulouse participated in the service, along with the city’s town council members. This display of unity between rival regions—the first substantial liaison established between Catalans and French aside from the personal work of du Plessis-Besançon—is extremely interesting. Although little was to come of it, the “international service” demonstrated another way in which the Catholic religion and its priests were able to transcend political and regional boundaries early in the Catalan revolt.

**Religious Identity in Poetry**

One immense social change that came over Catalonia following the victory at Montjuïc was an explosion of publications. Be they pamphlets, broadsides, verses, or even gazettes, the presses of Barcelona were printing at record paces for at least the first three years of the revolt. While Antoni Simon i Tarrés has commented on the unusually high literacy of seventeenth-century Catalonia (compared with the rest of Spain) and noted the prevalence of journal-and-diary-writing during this time, and while Henry Ettinghausen has researched the introduction of the gazette into Catalan society, little seems to have been done regarding Catalan verse. Thus, the following comments are based solely on personal observation with little recourse to any significant studies.\(^{725}\)

The massive public relations work needed to convince the population that the formerly despised “gavatx” were now respectable allies including members of the clergy.

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\(^{725}\) The only exception to this seems to be a new work that has just come out in German: Karsten Neumann, *Das Wort als Waffe. Politische Propaganda im Aufstand der Katalanen 1640-1652* (Herbolzheim: Centaurus Verlag, 2003). Neumann’s work is very good at providing an overall assessment of Catalan propaganda during the War of the Segadors, with much of the detail coming before the peace treaty of Münster in 1648. In addition to discussing the role of music, theatre, and poetry, the author devotes a whole section to the role of the clergy, pp. 203-214.
While some, like Gaspar Sala, wrote large texts justifying a Catalan alliance with France as something natural and possessing historical precedent, others turned to verse or drama to convey a similar message. That a significant number of Catalans, including clerics, were able to swallow an alliance with France was quite remarkable. The Catalans had been fighting the French for five years, and had been bitter enemies for much longer. What was at work among the Catalan psyche during the fall of 1640 and the spring of 1641 was either crass Machiavellian realpolitik, or willful self-delusion on a massive scale, or perhaps a sincere belief that they had been duped all along into thinking that Castile truly spoke for Catholicism.

Several themes dominate these newly published verses in Catalonia. Nearly all of them have a simple meter to them, making them easier to be sung or chanted. As perhaps was customary at the time, religious imagery—especially through metaphor—dominates the verses; no poem is complete without referring to Catalonia as a particular Biblical figure or group of people. Finally, all of these poems, regardless of whether they contain paeans to Louis XIII and France, make reference to the Divine cause for which the Catalans are fighting. Even if quartering or tyrannical encroachments had been the cause of the revolt in 1640, religion and religious themes dominate the popular verse and the political justifications during the first three years of the war.

For example, one of the first long poems to be published during the revolt appeared sometime in late 1640. With the brief name, so typical of seventeenth-century poetry and prose, this anonymous work is entitled, Relacion Verdadera de Algunos Casos, que han sucedido en el Principado de Cathaluña, y Condado de Rossellon, hechos por los Soldados, en sus transitos, dentre este año, and has a rhyming pattern very similar
to some of the works of Dr. Seuss. Whether this was consciously chosen or not, the short, terse lines enable the reader to quickly comprehend the subject matter. The poem begins with a grand view of the Spanish realm, whose lands, especially Catalonia, have been crushed by the infamous work of Olivares and the Protonotary, Juan de Villanueva. Such misery only increases when war is declared, and the burden of support falls heavily on the locals.

The arrival of the Spanish does nothing to ameliorate the situation; on the contrary, the soldiers exasperate their hosts:

They rob and destroy
the lodgings,
abandoning their owners
the poor and the hungry.  

Despite the valiant efforts of the Catalans to redeem their land from the French invaders, their actions are despised and ignored by the king’s troops. Instead, once the siege of Salses is over, they take advantage of the Catalans even more, engaging in activities not fit for those who call themselves Christians. Though, like Adam in the Garden of Eden, they may have started off well, obeying the laws and maintaining their discipline, they soon give way to uncontrollable passions, wreaking violence upon those they were supposed to be defending:

Barbarians I call them
Because barbarous are their works
So much so that they cannot exist
In Christian breasts

A Modenese Tercio
And the Neapolitans
Irish, Walloon,

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726 Roban y destruyen/ los alojamientos/ dexando los Patrones,/ pobres y hambrientos.” BC: FB 6135: Relacion Verdadera de Algunos Casos, que han sucedido en el Principado de Cathaluña, y Condado de Rossellon, hechos por los Soldados, en sus transitos, dentre este año 1640, (…), f. 115.
Many Castilians

Moved to lodge themselves
In the Principat
Destroying everything
Which God had made …

They commit Destruction
Adulteries, Thefts
Of human lives
They are bloody Wolves.

They rape women,
Deflower virgins
Before their husbands,
In this they dare.

Neither do they respect the Church
Nor do they esteem justice,
In their strange malice
They abuse everything.  

This leads the amateur author to the ultimate crime: the burning of the Sacrament by the Neapolitans under Leonardo de Moles

The Church was full

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727 Barbaras les digo,  
porque son sus hechos  
tales, que no caben  
en Christianos pechos.  
Tercio Modonez,  
los Napolitanos,  
Yrandes, Bolon,  
muchos Castellanos.  
Passan a alojarse  
por el Principado  
destroying todo  
quanto Dios a criado…  
Cometen Estrupos,  
Adulterios, Robos,  
de humanas vidas  
son sangrientos Lobos.  
Deshonran mugeres,  
Virgenes desuellan,  
delante sus maridos,  
en esto se atreven.  
Ni Iglesia respetan,  
ni estiman justicia,  
todo lo atropellan  
Of coffers and crates,  
With diverse jewels,  
And quartered riches.

The wild Soldiers  
Who were sent for our defense  
Yearning for money,  
They burned the doors

They burned everything  
The Sacred and the profane,  
Sacrilegious Evil  
Neapolitan Tercio …

They burned the Church,  
O hard of heart!  
With the Sacrament  
Most Holy and pure …

Let those who have experienced it,  
and are open to reason, judge  
If these are Christians,  
Or if they are Heretics?²²⁸

Were these soldiers Christians, or Heretics, disguising their true colors by marching under the Catholic arms of Castile? The local response by the citizens of Santa Coloma de Fariners and other small towns seems to indicate that, for many rural Catalans, the soldiers would be known by their fruit. By burning the church and the Sacrament, these

²²⁸ “La Iglesia está llena  
de cofres, y caxas,  
con diversas joyas,  
y ricas alajas.  
Las puertas quemaron  
los Soldados fieros,  
con son de defensa,  
y ansia de dineros.  
Todo lo saquearon  
lo Sacro y profano,  
sacrilgo Tercio,  
vil Napolitano …  
Quemaron la Iglesia,  
o coração duro,  
con el Sacramento  
Santíssimo y puro…  
Iuzgue quien bien siente,  
y admite razon;  
estos si son Christianos,  
Neapolitans had transgressed whatever charitable excuses might be offered. In retaliation for this blatant attack on the Church and the Faith, and thus everything that Catalonia stood for—and ostensibly Castile as well—the Catalan people rose up in anger, seeking justice for the criminals in the name of God and the King.

Shouts of “the Lutherans must die” …
Long live the King of Spain:
Long live the church.

Long live God and long live
The Christian Law:
May those traitors die
Who affront the King. 729

This unwillingness on the part of Philip to punish his troops led to an inevitable rise of disorder throughout the countryside. Drawing upon the assumed Chain of Being, this author demonstrates that when one link in the chain of social relationships is broken, the effect spreads throughout the whole community, as water ripples across its surface when an object breaks its plane:

The earth shook
Without learned counsel,
Expecting to avenge
The insults towards God …

From the surrounding areas
Come the people
to annihilate
the insolent troop.

Because these are they that
without much piety
killed don Anton [Fluvià]
Within Saint Abbot Antonio.

729 “Gritos mueran Luteranos,
voz esquiva,
viva el Rey de España:
la Iglesia viva.
Viva Dios y viva
la Christiana ley:
mueran los traydoers,
que afrentan al Rey.” Ibid, f. 116v.
And this God permits
(in an unexpected way)
that by the same measure
the troop would pay for their sins. 730

The activities of Juan de Arce and the men of his Count-Duke’s tercio next come under
the author’s attack. The repeated assaults on the Catalan people and their Faith are
underscored, as is the continued reluctance by Santa Coloma the viceroy to do anything.
The critique here is harsher: it might have been that the incident at Riudarenes was an
accident; but the burning of the Sacrament at Montiró indicated to the Catalans a repeated
pattern, an evil pattern that if not remedied by the immediate execution of justice could
lead to the collapse of the entire community. The pride of Castile and of their (perceived)
Catalan toadies like Santa Coloma exacerbated conditions, for they were all crying
“Peace, peace” when clearly the peace had been broken. 731 With the official powers
refusing to sit in judgment upon these offenders, it became necessary for the Catalan
people themselves to execute justice, which they did on the day of Corpus Christi. 732

730 La tierra alterada
sin consejo sabios,
vengar pretendia
de Dios los agravios…
De la vezindad
acude la gente,
para aniquilar
la tropa insolente.
Porque esta es aquella,
que tan sin piedad,
mataron a don Anton
dentro San Anton Abad.
Y assi Dios permite,
(caso no esperado)
que en igual districto
pague su pecado.” Ibid, f. 117.
731 See Jeremiah 8:9-12.
732 BC: FB 6135: Relacion Verdadera de Algunos Casos…, f. 117v.
Though inaccurately described, the viceroy’s death is further used as a pedagogical example of what happens to those who trifle with justice, and who care more for man and man’s opinion than the house or Sacramental Body of God:

He died without wounds,  
Nobody touched him  
His immense affliction  
Alone suffocated him

It was a work of God  
He paid for his sins  
Of omission and injuries  
Of ill-treated God

Oh unjust Soldier!  
Know ye not  
The Sacrament is worth  
more than an Alguzil.\footnote{\textit{Murio sin herida, nadie le toco, su aflicción inmensa solo le ahogó. Obra fue Divina, pagó su pecado, de omission y injurias de Dios maltratado… O Soldado injusto … mas que un Alguzil vale el Sacramento.”} Ibid, ff. 117v-118.}

The remainder of the piece continues to justify the Catalan cause through an appeal to the bystander. Would the Turk, or even the French (still perceived as lovers of heretics in this work) have done much worse than what supposedly Catholic soldiers were inflicting on innocents whom they were supposed to defend. What justice the king has offered is but a travesty of the word. What is more important, for the author at least, is to return to honest, sincere, and pious devotion within the church. In its emphasis on devotion and purifying the Church, not only from sacrilegious assault but also from worldly elements,
the proposed remedy may mark the beginning of a new shift in Catalan religiosity toward a more “puritan” conception of the church and liturgical worship.\footnote{Ibid, ff. 118-118v.}

Although most of these pamphlets were printed anonymously, at least one of these new verses appears to be composed by a member of a regular order. Entitled *Al Generoso Principado de Cataluña y sus Hijos*, it notes that it was published “Con Licencia de los Superiores” which may indicate that the author had cleared it with the heads of his particular order before sending it off to press. More clearly than others, this author attempted to illustrate the true nature of the Catalan revolt through Biblical and Apocryphal imagery. Thus, Olivares becomes an Esau, waiting for the time to strike out at his brother Jacob, while the Catalans are exhorted to press on in their resistance, trusting that if “God is for us, who can be against us?”\footnote{“Viendo que ya el Conde Duque con falços labios reaçota, y con manos de Esahu tu voz de Iacob ignora…. Que pena a tan grave culpa? que a la arrogancia loca pero pues Dios es por ti quien contra ti? (generosa) Sal en campañâ, y castiga de Dios la quema notoria, pues si possible estuviera como quedaras lloroia?” FB 2811: Al Generoso Principado de Cataluña y sus hijos. Romance. Compuesto por un Soldado Catalan bien afecto a su Patria Cataluña (Barcelona: G. Nogues, 1641), f. 1.} The Catalans are to stand fast like the Maccabees in the defense of their God; like Joshua against the Canaanites; like Judith who boldly cut off the head of the tyrant Holifernes; like Esther standing firm against the impious treachery of Namaan; and like David fighting against the proud pagan, Goliath.\footnote{“Attende a los Macabeos de quien el Texto blasona, que por a Dios defender}
Not only does this author call upon his countrymen to resist such attacks with the strength of arms in battle, but should that fail, he also holds out examples of Godly suffering. Through the witnesses of Abel, Isaac, and above all the crucified Christ, the Catalans are to understand that even if the battle goes ill and the rapacious Castilians were to attain the victory, God would be satisfied in the bloody sacrifice of their country, selflessly surrendering their lives, fortunes, and honor in the Lord’s cause. The destruction of Roussillon in particular is described as “the actions of freed slaves, of heretical and crazy men, barbarians without either law or God, blind without the beautiful Light.” By exacting vengeance upon these unfortunates, Catalonia will achieve such a

737 The destruction of Roussillon in particular is described as “the actions of freed slaves, of heretical and crazy men, barbarians without either law or God, blind without the beautiful Light.” By exacting vengeance upon these unfortunates, Catalonia will achieve such a
greatness and *reputación* as had not been seen since the days of Esther or David.\(^{738}\)

While this religious saturation might be expected of a man of the cloth, the concluding section on vengeance might not. As clearly as he denounced Olivares in the beginning and declared the justice of the Catalan cause, the author explicitly condones a glorious vengeance upon all the king’s men.

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Trample, burn, kill,
Wound, fell, scorch, cut down.
You should not show mercy
To those who burn God.\(^{739}\)
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Santa Coloma’s death and the discomfort of Olivares are but early signs of God’s judgment being enacted against a blind and foolish people; the only security for Catalonia lies in their determination to see this fight out, confident in the belief that God is fighting alongside them to preserve his honor and *reputación* among the nations.\(^{740}\) The effect of these pamphlets on the Catalan population cannot be determined—very few of the diaries surviving from the revolt mention more than a couple of publications, and these are usually the officially-sponsored works by Gaspar Sala or Francesc Martí Viladamor. What is significant about these documents, however, is the expression of a new—and possibly therefore vague—conception of Catalan identity.\(^{741}\) Beyond merely expressing the identity of one’s city or one’s family, a new mark of identity emerged: that of a true Catholic defending Faith and hearth—rarely do these two seem disconnected in any descriptions—even in defiance of their secular lord and king.

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\(^{738}\) Ibid, f. 2.
\(^{739}\) “Atropella, quema, mata, hiere, tala, abrasa, corta, ques mal con quien quema a Dios usar de misericordia.” Ibid, f. 2.
\(^{740}\) Ibid, ff. 2-2v.
\(^{741}\) See also *Chosen People* by Anthony Smith.
The subtle shifting of symbols towards a new Franco-Catalan identity

Slowly, but inexorably, the realization that Catalan relations with France would become closer began to emerge in print. One of the earliest indications of this trend comes from a series of three letters written by Louis XIII to the citizens of Barcelona in early 1641. In the second of these letters, he gives thanks to God “for the fall and disgrace that the enemies have received before Barcelona,” while in the last letter, dated 5 March, he promises to extend to Catalonia the same protection he offered to the Duke of Mantua nearly a decade ago.742

Later that spring, the city of Barcelona celebrated the official inauguration of Louis XIII as Count of Barcelona, the inherited title of Catalan princes since the Middle Ages. Coinciding with the Easter festivities as well as with the return of spring, the author described the new relationship in all its beauty: “In the faith that the glories of the French lily do not have to be ephemera of our designs, but permanent glories … the day that the Catalan Glory celebrated in immortal memories the glories of the Sacramental King of Love, it desired for us to be transformed into such a grandiose metamorphosis.”743 Just as with St. Eulalia’s celebration, the official proclamation was accompanied by cannon fire from the fort atop Montjuïc. The same day the city received

742 “per la cayguda, y dany que los enemichs han rebut devant Barcelona,” BC FB 6144: Copia de Tres Cartas Escrits per sa Magestat Christianissima Luis XIII to the Diputats (Barcelona, Pere Lacavalleria, 1641). 23 February 1641 and 5 March: “he volgut avisarvos de la Protecció que tinch dada a mon cosi lo Duch Carles contra la violencia de España,” ff. 167v-168v.
743 “En fe de que las glorias del LLiri Frances no han de ser efímeras de nostres desitgs, sino glorias permanents….lo dia que en immortals memorias celebrava la Gloria Catalana las glorias del Sacramentat Rey de Amor, que per nosaltres volgué transformarse en tan grandiose metamorfos.” FB 7551: Relacio de las Solemnissimas Festas, que la Molt Lleal y Fortissima Ciutat de Barcelona a fet a 31 de Mars…a la nova de admetrens lo Christianissim Rey…debaix de sa protectio com a Comte de Barcelona...” (Jaume Romeu, 1641), f. 1. It is interesting to note that the author is well aware of the Catalan’s traditional antipathy towards France, but he attempts to overlook this by appealing to justice instead: “dant entre ellas [citizens] jurament de fidelitat en sos pits may cambiats, sempre seguidors de la justícia,” f. 1v.
word of a naval victory by the Archbishop of Bordeaux whom the author lauds as, “the person of Moses and Joshua praying to God while fighting, handing over Castilian arrogance to his holy feet.”\textsuperscript{744} When night fell, the city continued in a state of celebration. As in the prior month, lights illuminated the medieval quarter from the plaza of Sta Anna to Santa Maria del Mar. All this lasted until the third night of Easter, which is described as “Easter for a thousand reasons.”\textsuperscript{745} The author concludes that such celebrations only served to enhance Catalonia’s devout reputation.\textsuperscript{746}

Perhaps the final testimony to the changing attitudes towards France appeared in a summer sermon by Fra Hieronym Puigvert, a monk from Poblet, on the occasion of the Immaculate Conception. Dedicated to the Virgin Mary—the cult of the Immaculate Conception had its origins in Spain before Rome declared it to be an official doctrine later in the seventeenth century, and so could be seen as a pre-eminently Spanish religious tradition—Puigvert nonetheless addressed the sermon to the Maréchal de Brézé, the new captain-general of the province.\textsuperscript{747} Like most sermons on this particular theme, the purity of Mary—and the corresponding need for her followers to be pure—stands at the forefront of the message. Though couched in religious terms, Puigvert’s sermon attempts to convey to his listeners the relationship between true Catholic devotion and the

\textsuperscript{744} “la persona de Moyses, y Iosue, pregant a Deu, y pleant, rendida la arrogancia Castellana a las sagradas plantas suas.” Ibid, f. 1v.
\textsuperscript{745} “Pasqua per mil modos.” Ibid, f. 2.
\textsuperscript{746} “Asso es lo que los insignes Catalans han obrat novament en demostracio de las primicias de sa fe, aguardant totom los progressos de tan als principis, pera gloria del gran senyor dels exercits, repartidor de las victorias Deu nostre Senyor, la resurrectio del qual sia gloriosa a tota nostre nacio…” Ibid, f. 2v.
\textsuperscript{747} BC FB 6194. de Brézé succeeded Bishop Manrique in the office of captain-general for several months before being presented with the official title of viceroy, since according to Catalan law, a viceroy could only be appointed \textit{after} the king had personally come to swear his oath in Barcelona. Philip IV had neglected to do this, pleading ill health for the first years of his reign, and this had offended many Catalans, who saw it as the first step towards the suppression of their regional constitutionalism. That Louis XIII and Louis XIV would also fail in this regard helps explain why many Catalans soon grew upset with the French regime.
cause of France. He begins by noting that the symbol of purity so perfectly expressed by Mary is the lily, which by coincidence is also the symbol of the royal house of France. Thus true Catalan loyalty belongs to this perfect lily.748

Devotion to Mary in the spiritual realm may therefore be tied to allegiance to France in the temporal world. Certainly Mary helps those who truly and whole-heartedly devote themselves to her praise. Puigvert uses the siege of Tournai in 1340 to illustrate the remarkable powers of this heavenly aid. Driven to desperate measures by the army of Edward III, the French city handed over the keys of the city to Mary, who in turn procured a victory for the besieged town in the face of almost certain defeat. The analogy is quite clear for the monk: “The same thing happened in Barcelona.”749

According to Puigvert, the victory in January 1641 “was miraculously [won] by means of the devotion that Barcelona had for the Immaculate Conception of Maria, the flower of the lily being the instrument, which is but a shadow of the pureness of Mary as well as of her coat of arms and weapon.” The arms of France were merely “the instrument used by Mary for our defense, and to assure us with pledges of security, always victory.”750 To confirm this position, the monk appeals to the mystical vision of Sor Eufràsia Berenguer, “a Holy Nun of this City, the same which communicated to a person of equally religious, docile, and disposed, when they came to the resemblance, in

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748 “Si be adverteixen trobaran, que entre totes les flors, la que naix mes Hermosa, es la flor del Lliri... Flors bellissimas son estats tots los Sants...Pero Maria, en lo instant de sa Concepcio fou Lliri, vestit y adornat de Divina gracia....Tots los Sants foren flors de la terra, pero Maria, Angelical lliri, celestial Flor....Y que entre totes les referides lamines symbolos de la Concepcio de Maria, a la que mes tinga obligacio Catalunya, sia a la flor del Lliri, es evident.” Ibid, f. 25. Emphasis mine.
750 “fou milagrosa per medi de la devocio que Barcelona te a la purissima Concepcio de Maria, sent lo instrument la flor del Lliri, sombra si de la puresa de Maria, tambe blaso, y arma ... lo instrument pres per Maria; pera nostra defensa, y pera assegurarnos ab prendas de siguritat sempre victoria.” Ibid, f. 25v.
the greater value, to Mary, who with her mantle, protected and covered the city.” The great Catalan devotion for the purity of Mary could only be directed toward one channel, viz. loyalty to France. Whereas the French clearly had displayed through their actions a desire to preserve the true faith, While Castile merely uttered pious platitudes and acted in quite a contrary manner.

As the fledgling Franco-Catalan relationship began to emerge in 1641, clerics and laity alike wrote pamphlets and verses reminding their countrymen of the true spiritual reason for the revolt while declaring that the best temporal means to achieve the preservation of the Faith lay in an alliance with the Bourbons. Furthermore, in the repeated usage of the Corpus procession in other religious processions, we see the continued efforts of the Catalans constantly to remind the population of the Body of Christ that had saved them from defeat despite being burnt in disgrace. More than the Catalan tongue, more than the political constitutions, it was the mystical Sacramental Body that shaped the identity of this smaller Body of Christ—the orthodox Catalan body politic. This imagery would be reiterated over and over again, on pamphlet covers, in sermons, and even in political tracts. For the next few years of war, the majority of the rebel clergy would give of their money and their lives to support this just cause, the natural defense of the Body of Christ.

The last Peacemakers-Manrique and the failed negotiations with Zaragoza

By the spring of 1641, the situation in Catalonia expressed a popular enthusiasm and confidence of Divine support and favor, especially within Barcelona. While some of this fervor extended into establishing closer secular ties with France, a handful of clerics

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751 “una Santa Religiosa desta Ciutat, la qual comunicà, a una persona si Religiosa, docta, y fonc, quen ven al parexer, en lo major apreto a Maria, que ab son manto la ciutat amparava y cubria.” Ibid, f. 25v.
spent this period of political limbo engaged in quite different activities. Most studies of this time period concern themselves with the sudden and suspicious death of Pau Claris, seeing in his demise the decay and corruption of the Catalan revolt. Much fruit may be found, however, in examining the events of that spring following the battle of Montjuïc, before the frontier battle lines hardened throughout the province. Despite the rebels’ victory, one faction in Catalonia continued to feel that reconciliation with the king was still possible, and indeed, to be desired. Chief among the proponents in this “peace party,” was the bishop of Barcelona, and still-acting viceroy, Garcia Gil Manrique.\footnote{The Catalan rebels refused to acknowledge the appointment of the Catalan Marquis de los Vélez as viceroy in November 1640 and continued to refer to Manrique as the king’s viceroy and “captain-lieutenant” in the Principat. Never possessing the full authority of office, Manrique was generally ineffective as a viceroy, all the more so after the victory at Montjuïc.} In early February, only a few weeks after the great battle, Manrique and others tried to open up negotiations with Zaragoza, the same town that had attempted to mediate the differences between Catalans and king the previous autumn.\footnote{In making a bid for peace following what many considered to be a decisive battle and therefore break with Castile, the Catalans seem to imitate the actions of American patriots during the summer of 1775. Despite enduring the “shot heard round the world” at Lexington and the bloodier fights at Concord and Bunker Hill, the Colonials sent a plea for reconciliation to George III in July 1775 entitled The Olive Branch Petition. Among the signers of this petition included John Hancock, Benjamin Franklin, Samuel Adams, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry, and Roger Sherman, who would later take a more aggressive stand by signing—in the case of Franklin, John Adams, and Jefferson, writing—the Declaration of Independence. Similar negotiations for peace conducted while fighting occurred during the Fronde as well as in the English Civil War, when Parliament and Charles I discussed the Newcastle Propositions in 1646.}

As we have seen, Bishop Manrique’s reputation, even among the virulent Catalan rebels, was quite high. Manrique’s former service as President of the Generalitat, and his genuine desire to learn and understand Catalan legal and political precedents made him admired throughout the province, despite his well-known loyalty to the Crown. Gaspar Sala, certainly not one to mince words on pro-Castilian “foreigners,” referred to the
bishop as a “prelate in whom virtue, prudence, and wisdom are united.”

Although Manrique had been deprived of the secular executive powers as viceroy, he nevertheless strove to restore order in Catalonia. His work in the autumn and winter of 1640 was overshadowed by the growing drama of Catalan resistance, and following the battle of Montjuïc, one would think that the bishop—in the interest of prudence if nothing else—would quietly retire to the background, perhaps even relinquishing the title of viceroy to the Marquis de los Vélez, whom the king had ordained four months previously.

Such was not the case, however. Whether out of political concerns—perhaps seeing adroitly into the future that the seemingly light yoke of France would soon become an insufferable burden—or, as is more likely, sincerely motivated by a desire to bring peace within the European Catholic community, Bishop Manrique actually reopened lines of communication with the rest of Spain that had been cut off during November and December of the past year.

The chief locus of negotiation was Zaragoza, the capital of neighboring Aragon, and soon to be the headquarters of Philip IV as he actively sought to inspire his army against the French and Catalan forces. Throughout much of the late summer and early autumn of 1640, the citizens of Zaragoza had interested themselves in the growing tension between Catalonia and the Crown. The ambassadors from Zaragoza appealed to the Catalans on the basis of their common heritage as part of the old Crown of Aragon; additionally, being the center for Philip IV’s mobilization against the Principat, the

754 “Prelado en quien concurren virtud, prudencia, y sabiduria.” B.1641-8-(op)-80: Gaspar Sala Epitome de los Principios, Y Progressos de las Guerras de Cataluña en los años 1640 y 1641. Dedicated to Diputació and Consell de Cent (Barcelona: P. Lacavalleria, 1641), f. 9.
envoys could argue from a greater position of strength. The violent irruption of los Vélez in southern Catalonia and the continued defiance of Catalan leaders like Claris and Tamarit had put temporary halt to the Aragonese attempts at mediation, but evidently some well-meaning sympathies remained. It was to the city fathers of Zaragoza, then, that Manrique—himself an Aragonese—turned in series of letters running throughout the spring of 1641.

Manrique, although certainly the most important person within Catalonia engaged in negotiations, was not the only priest with such concerns. On 21 April, Fray Jacinto Adorer, secretary to General of the Order of Merced, Fray Dalmacio Sierra, sent a letter to the Council of Aragon from Barcelona through the good offices of the city of Zaragoza.\footnote{The Order of Merced was fundamentally a Catalan religious organization, with most of its houses within the rebel-held portions of the Principality. Precisely why the General of the order was still in Barcelona—either out of sympathy with the rebels, or in an attempt to mediate peace—is unknown, but his position was unusual to say the least.} The purpose of the letter—according to Adorer—was to demonstrate to Philip IV that General Sierra was a “faithful vassal” and that “as a sign of his performance” he would inform the king of the goings-on in Catalonia. In support of Bishop Manrique’s request for clemency, Dalmacio Sierra noted that more had to be done by the king.\footnote{“fiel vasallo … en señal de su rendimiento,” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos: Secretaria de Cataluña: leg. 289; doc. 71: Fray Jacinto Adorer, secretary to General Fray Dalmacio Sierra, to the Council of Aragon, 21 April 1641.} The general observed pessimistically that evil had taken hold of the province to such an extent that the news of royal pardons was not believed.\footnote{ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos: Secretaria de Cataluña: leg. 289; doc. 71: Fray Jacinto Adorer, secretary to General Fray Dalmacio Sierra, to the Council of Aragon, 21 April 1641.} Sierra implored the king to write another letter to the Diputats, making it perfectly clear in the missive that the offer was genuine and in good faith.
Despite this optimistic hope, however, the general reminded His Majesty that, by writing this epistle, he was risking his life. The war had created a hostile environment for travelers, especially those who might be carrying letters from a party inside rebel-held Barcelona to someone in Valencia or Castile. According to the general, the only persons enjoyed any sort of immunity with regards to the mail were the region’s bishops. Thus he felt that only by inserting this letter in the correspondence of Manrique could any sort of safety be hoped for; furthermore, Manrique still held a unique position of trust with the rebel Catalan leadership:

Already the dangers of losing one’s life are quite notorious, sacrificing it in the service of His Majesty and in the name of his general. One might offer to introduce these dispatches to Barcelona and give them to the Bishop of that City so that by his hand the Diputats and Consellers might receive them, in spite of the risk that it would have … and they will trust that Prelate more because somebody has imposed other necessities on him.\(^{758}\)

Whether the danger was so great that Sierra feared to flee Barcelona, or whether he believed more could be done in the king’s service by remaining in the rebel capital, the General of the Order of Merced chose to stay where he was for the present. Yet he concluded by informing Philip that he had designated Pare Maestre Fray Marcos Salmeron to be his vicar to the order’s convents in Aragon and Navarre. Although he had confirmed Salmeron in this position, Sierra asked the king to “to order the Pare Maestro

\(^{758}\) “ya los peligros de perder la vida tan notoria sacrificándola en servio de Su Md y en nombre de su general se ofrece introducir estos despachos en Barcelona y darlos al Obispo de aquella Ciudad para que por su Mano los Reciban los diputados y ciudad por el riesgo que puede tener…y porque se fialran mas de aquel Prelado pues le han interpuesto ellos otras necess[idades].” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos: Secretaría de Cataluña: leg. 289; doc. 71: Fray Jacinto Adorer, secretary to General Fray Dalmacio Sierra, to the Council of Aragon, 21 April 1641.
Fra Marcos Salmeron that he might come to Aragon to give passion and aid with his authority from there in whatever occurs.”759 Although the rebellion was so far contained to Catalonia, the general noted that the conditions in the rest of Spain’s frontiers with France were not secure by any means, “and without General and with the Monks very worried in such dangerous times, utilizing his presence, they would be able to give the lie to the suspicions which the wicked might hold.”760

Another way in which the clergy corresponded with the king was in the realm of grand strategy. It is apparent that Philip reconciled himself to an extended conflict in Catalonia following the defeat of his army at Montjuïc. As a result, he began to advertise, particularly among loyal Catalans, for suggestions as to how he might best conquer and subdue the rebellion. One of the members of the religious community who wrote back with a detailed strategy was Fra Sebastien Soler, a Catalan member of the Augustinian order living in the Convent of Sant Augustin de Palamos. He had been sent news of the king’s “contest” through the new Pare Provincial of the Order, Maestre Fra Pablo Alonso, who was staying in Barcelona after his election at the recent convocation of the Order within the Crown of Aragon in May.761

759 “mandase al Pre Mro Fray Marcos Salmeron que fuese a Aragon a dar calor y ayudar con su autoridad desde allí en lo que se ofreciese.” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos: Secretaría de Cataluña: leg. 289; doc. 71: Fray Jacinto Adorer, secretary to General Fray Dalmacio Sierra, to the Council of Aragon, 21 April 1641.
760 “y sin General y muy inquietos los Religiosos en tiempo tan peligroso y usando della se podran dementir las sospechas que tuiessen los malos.” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos: Secretaría de Cataluña: leg. 289; doc. 71: Fray Jacinto Adorer, secretary to General Fray Dalmacio Sierra, to the Council of Aragon, 21 April 1641.
761 Both sides seem to be suspicious of this convocation, which brought Valencian and Aragonese Augustinians to Barcelona. In particular the secular authorities seemed to view the religious convention as a means by which subversive plotting would be undertaken. So great was the opposition put forward by the Consell de Cent to this council that the Augustinians pleaded with the chapter of Barcelona to intercede on their behalf. ACB: I.A.Resolucions: Llibre de la Sibelle: 1625-1645; 30 April 1641, f. 322v.
Among other things, the friar advocated a rigorous naval blockade, utilizing the coastal positions in Roussillon; the chief aim of this “Anaconda” strategy would be not only to disrupt communications and supplies with France, but would also aim at capturing Girona.\footnote{“qué servia de amparo en las borralcors a los Navios y Galeras; seria medio para tener a Gerona, y no solo seria disposicion para tener el otro Puerto de Cadaques; y demas lugares de la Marina, pero aun se le quitarian al Enemigo que esta fortificado en Mataro los viveres y se le impedirian los que por mar enbia a Barcelona y a Rosas.” BN: MS 4010: f.90-94—Letter from Fra Sebastien Soler, Catalan Augustinian to the king, n.d.} Above all, Soler identified for King Philip the true stronghold of the rebellion, which he said, centered on the three bishoprics of Vic, Girona, and the Seu d’Urgell—for whom the Pare Provincial Alonso had served fourteen years as lector.\footnote{A lector was responsible for reading the appointed passages of Scripture each Sunday and feast-day for the assembled congregation. Cathedral chapters in Catalonia at this time generally chose a member of the regular clergy for this task and confirmed his appointment around the beginning of the liturgical year in December.} Soler suggested that the king help Alonso to try and win over the chapter of Urgell, because of the immense influence that tiny body had, not only on the diocese itself, but on the other two neighboring sees as well.\footnote{“Que para conseguir con brevedad la reduccion de todo el Principado importa advertir, que tres Obispados el de Vique, el de Gerona, y el de la Seo de Urgel … son los que arrifraran (amfraran? Arriman?) y socorren a Barcelona, y el dicho PP ofrece reduzir luego el Cabildo y Ciudad de la Santa Iglesia de Urgel, de los quales depende todo el Obispado; y como el Obispado de Vique, y el de Gerona esten a la mira y obren a imitacion del dicho Cabildo de la Seo de Urgel, empeñado este en el serbicio de V Mgd…” Ibid, f. 91.} As soon as the king could control these three central dioceses, Soler wrote, he would win the remainder of the province; the monk was certain that, once converted to the royal cause, the inhabitants would write and persuade the Diputats and Consell de Cent in Barcelona to treat for peace.

Equally essential to making these overtures, however, was a general pardon that must be published by the king, including in a prominent place the promise not to take away any of Catalonia’s privileges. Only the fear of a harsh reprisal, Soler indicated, was keeping the Catalans allied to France; only proclaim leniency and a willingness to
forgive, and the three dioceses—together with the rest of Catalonia—would overthrow the French and come back to their rightful lord.\textsuperscript{765}

Soler also suggested that, as part of Philip’s attempt to win over the hearts of Catalans in the regions controlled by the Franco-Catalan army, that changes be made in the way that Catalans who lived around Tarragona and Tortosa—and who were still loyal to His Catholic Majesty—were treated. Chief among the irritating points was the cavalier attitude with which the king had treated some recent religious appointments made during the recent congregation of the Augustinians in Barcelona. Although priors for the Augustinian convents at la Selva and Cambrils in the diocese of Tarragona had been elected and confirmed by the Pare Provincial Alonso, the king had chosen to ignore the results, and chose two Augustinians from Valencia to serve the houses instead. This was a major grievance to the clerics who had stayed loyal to Philip and had expected to be left alone from royal incursions into their affairs. Rumors had begun to circulate around Tarragona that, should the rest of the province fall to Castile, that “foreigners” such as these Valencians would govern all the religious houses, and that all Catalan monks and friars would be exiled to America.\textsuperscript{766}

\textsuperscript{765} “y esten muy ciertos que V Mgd tiene dado y concedido Perdon General y que el no averse publicado o ha sido descuydo a sus ministros, o que los Ministros de Francia an procurado offusscar y impedir que el tal Perdon no llegasse a noticia de los Catalanes, y esto es lo mas cierto … por lo qual seria del servicio V Mgd que se sirbiesse de mandar excrivar a las tres dichas Ciudades y Cabildos disculpandoles pues lo que an obrado asta ahora contra el servicio de V Mgd ha sido por el miedo de los motines, y por averse hallado el frances con poder en Cataluña, y como ahora (agora?) no subsiste ninguna de los dos causas se espera que obraran todos en servirle.” Ibid, ff. 91-91v.

\textsuperscript{766} “Que los Pdres Valencianos con el amparo del Governador de Tarragona, ora aya sido orden de V Mgd, o no, dado por alguna siniestra informacion; an echado del Conbento de la Selva y del de Cambriles a los Priores que legitimamente fueron elegidos en el Capitculo celebrado en Barcelona por el PP y diffinitorio; y an embiado a Religiosos Valencianos por Priores de los dichos Conbentos; publicando y amenazando que no solo vendran a governar los Conbentos del Campo de Tarragona pero aun todos los demas del Principado, desestroyendo los Religiosos Catalanes a indias luego que se tenga a Barcelona,” Ibid, f. 92. Emphasis mine.
Such a policy was disastrous from Soler’s perspective, and not only because it affected his order in particular. Instead, he focused on the imperative need for the king to win over some significant portion of the Catalan people, and thought that the regional clergy served as the keystone to this approach. Convince the clerics that you are willing to forgive, and they will in turn exert their influence on the people and help change their minds towards reconciliation as they had turned secular minds towards resistance during the previous winter. Furthermore, by appointing Catalans to executive positions over fellow Catalans—a point which had concerned Catalan clergy for the past ten years—the king would be signaling to the ecclesiastical estate a willingness to reduce the number of innovations enacted under Olivares. If the king wanted to make any progress at winning over the Catalans, he would have to start by treating the religious community with grace and mercy; as the monk asked rhetorically, “if one already proceeds with severity and threats towards the Regular clergy, what can the seculars hope and promise themselves in the benevolence of Your Majesty?”

The final impression that Fra Soler conveyed to the king was the remarkable fluidity of the borders between the rebellious lands and its neighboring provinces, despite the presence of war and the interest of both France and Castile to quarantine Catalonia from the rest of Spain. Soler wrote regarding this:

767 “Y sien en el estado de los Ecclesiasticos, ni en el de los seglares de las Ciudades, y Villas que estan a la Obediencia de V Mgd no ha avido mudanca, ni se ha innovado por causa de las Guerras en los gobernors ordinares, pues todos los que govieren y residen son Catalanos; que razón, Señor, puede aver para que estando los Priores, y demas Religiosos Catalanos del Convento de Cambriles y del de la Selva igualmente obedientes y a la obediencia de V Mgd que los demas seglares y ecclesiastiocs de los dichos lugares; y que con estos sea V Mgd Rey y Señor piadoso dexandoles governar, del mismo modo que antes de la Guerra, y solo con los Prelados y demas Religiosos Catalanos de los dichos dos Conbetos se usse de Rigor…. Ni embiado Castellanos, ni de otra nacion para que governacen” Ibid, ff. 92-92v. Emphasis mine.
768 “si con los Religiosos se procede ya con rigor y amenazas, que puede esperar y prometerse los seglares de la benignidad de V Mgd?” Ibid, f. 92v.
that this War already, in the present state, does not impede the Commerce or the correspondence from one Kingdom to another as it used to. Because of this Your Majesty ought not to permit that that there would be any offense given to the Authority and office of the said Padre Provincial because he is a Catalan, nor to the aforementioned Priors, for he, in, following his duty, is in the service of God.  

Soler then goes on to mention with approval the nomination of Padre Fra Francisco Rueda as Prior of the Augustinian house in Tarragona, which Soler himself had refused, citing that Rueda had shown himself worthy of the king’s trust after having spent ten months in jail in Barcelona.  

The letter closes with an assertion, that despite the malicious rumors circulating about the fidelity of the Pare Provincial Alonso—and he does appear to be the only regional head of a religious order other than the Capuchin Provincial to have stayed in Catalonia during the rebellion—that the father is a loyal subject of the Spanish king.

Despite the continuing activities undertaken by other clerics, Bishop Manrique’s negotiations would last only into June, when a new Franco-Catalan army had been organized and sent down to the “Campo de Constantine” outside Tarragona. By this time, French generals and Catalan politicians had come to realize that the negotiations were not in their best interest. While European foreign policy was moving in a direction of fighting-while-negotiating (later to be carried to its fullest expression during the wars of Louis XIV), Manrique’s desire to fully reconcile Catalonia with Spain was considered fool-hardy, not say treacherous. The early pride in defeating los Vélez, combined with

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769 “que ya la Guerra, en el estado que oy esta, no impide el Comercio, ni la correspondencia de un Reyno a otro como solia: por todo lo cual deve V Mgd servirse de no permitir se haga agravio a la Authoridad y oficio del dicho Padre Provincial por ser Catalan, ni a los Priors nombrados por el en cuya conformidad sera del servicio de Dios.” Ibid, f. 93.

770 “ha padecido en la Carcel Real de Barcelona por tiempo de diez meses que en ella estuvo con mucho peligro de su vida” Ibid, f. 93v.

771 “Que algun emulo mal intencionado que tiene mala voluntad al dicho PP le ha procurado descomponer con algunos Ministros alegando y publicando, que el tal Provincial es muy francez (lo que no ha sido en el interior, ni en su corazon como constara por obrar) y assi para el credito, y reparo de la mala opinion en que le podrian tener,“ Ibid, ff. 93v-94.
early successes at the siege of Tarragona led Josep Quintana, the Diputat Reial, to write a
terse letter to the elders of Zaragoza informing them that the negotiations were over. Neither the French nor the handful of Catalan elite would forget Manrique’s involvement in this scheme, nor his still influential leadership among Catalan clerics. Though he did not know it, Manrique’s tenure in Catalonia was coming to an end.

**Supporting the new (military) fronts at Tarragona & Lleida**

During the “Great Fear” that plagued the Catalan countryside following Corpus Christi, and the succeeding autumn months, local city councils stepped forward into the power vacuum to establish authority as best they could. As was noted in the previous chapter, often they had to request both moral and financial report from the local clergy—especially the cathedral chapters. One might think that, with the removal of the immediate military threat in January, that the ecclesiastical estate would put a halt to their donations. Instead, Catalan clerics in both the regular and secular order continued their efforts to support the fledgling army in the new year, albeit on their own terms.

By February 1641, the initiative lay squarely with the Catalans and their French allies. Having defeated the Castilian army at Montjuïc, both the military and political leadership felt that a decisive reconquest of lands occupied by the Marquis de los Vélez would force Philip IV to sue for peace, granting Catalonia autonomy. The focal point of the spring campaign would be Tarragona, the city whose loss devastated the Generalitat’s morale only a few months before. Tarragona presented a profitable target: not only was it

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772 Despite the termination of negotiations, it appears that the Catalans were wary of upsetting the Aragonese. On 2 July 1641, Diputat Soler wrote to the Jurats of Zaragoza apologizing for the activities of some Miquelets who had, without orders, crossed into Aragon and begun a small guerrilla campaign. Such attacks, the Diputat Eclesiàstic remarked, “tingunt gran pesar” and he gave orders to the local commanders to stop this behavior. ACA: Generalitat: G. 115, f. 203v.
an important commercial town, the head of the second richest diocese in Catalonia, but Bishop Pau Duran was reportedly staying there—waiting in vain for the papal bulls that would confirm him in that coveted Episcopal seat. To capture the city would be a huge coup, militarily, economically, and politically. Although Tarragona is a coastal town, and therefore more difficult to besiege successfully, the recent success of the Archbishop of Bordeaux against a Spanish fleet made the French confident that they could handle any attempt to succor the city by sea.

Yet, despite the confidence, men and material were still necessary, and money to support the new offensive. Once again, the major cities of the Generalitat turned to the church. Using similar arguments to those espoused in October 1640, the civic councils of Catalonia’s cathedral towns went to the cathedral chapters and begged them to consider the bankrupt condition of the city finances. Beyond local appeals for aid, the Generalitat appointed a few clerics as “segrestadors,” in charge of collecting funds from chapters and religious houses. Chief among these men were three regulars—Fra Don Francesc de Monpalau and Fra Rafel Domenech from Ripoll; and Fra Don Gispert Amat i Desbosch of the Abbey of San Pere de Galligans in Girona—and one secular canon, Dr. Don Enric d’Alemany of Vic.

Perhaps an even more basic contribution requested of the clergy was prayer for the Catalan cause. Since the first church burnings at Riudarenes and Montiró, city fathers

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773 An interesting term to use: sequester implies that they were also to confiscate church property (specifically the property of those suspected of royalist sympathies), and collect “tercias reales.”

774 The suggestion that these four men were the chief collectors among the religious community comes from a letter written by Josep Soler, the Diputat Eclesiàstic, on 29 June 1641. The siege of Tarragona was going badly, and it was critical for all true Catalans to rally to the cause. In addition to sending out letters to all chapters and big cities, Soler specifically addressed this missive to these four clerics. ACA: Generalitat: G. 115, ff. 194-194v).
throughout Catalonia had requested the local chapters and bishops to offer up prayers imploring Divine aid and assistance. During the first months of the summer, these petitions were for a restoration of peace and quiet in times of social upheaval; later, they had changed to defending the Principat from its enemies. By spring 1641, these requests were for a successful conclusion to the first Franco-Catalan offensive; though couched in terms of conservation and preservation of the province and its army, the subliminal message—praying for the defeat of Castile—continued the sharp break in loyalties that the Barcelona clergy had created right before Montjuïc. That these official requests for intercession during the Tarragona campaign came not from local councils, but from the Diputat Eclesiàstic was a further indication that the Catalan rebels were continuing in that unity which had been so evident during the previous winter.

This continued ecclesiastical support of the Catalan cause—which, with the virtual annexation of Catalonia into France, had now turned completely into a revolution—is perhaps a more shocking historical revelation than their initial aid in 1640. Whereas the latter was purely defensive, and could be argued on the grounds of a natural self-defense, the campaign of 1641 was unabashedly aggressive in its purpose. Even if the clergy bought into the belief that “one last campaign” was all that was needed to bring Castile to the peace table, it would still only serve to confirm the secular proposition that separation from Castile was right and just. Very few clerics—save the minority already

775 “La conservació de aquesta Provincia consiteix vuy en render lo exercit que te lo enemich ... y ordenar ques fassan en aquexa Sta Isglesia y demes de aquexa Ciutat les pregaries que per semblant y occasions se acostuman fer,” ACA: Generalitat: G. 115 (Consejo de Guerra, Cartas, deliberaciones, 1641): Rafel Antich, secretary to the Diputació to the chapters of Girona, Vic, Urgell, Solsona, Lleida, and Manresa, 14 June 1641, ff. 141-141v.
attached to the French cause—were willing to vocally espouse such a cause; certainly many still were wary of the French “alliance,” and yet they continued to give of their resources. Why was this?\textsuperscript{776}

Part of the explanation lies inside chapter politics, and in the personalities of the officers then in charge. These conditions varied from chapter to chapter throughout Catalonia.\textsuperscript{777} Perhaps the largest active support came—unsurprisingly—from the Seu d’Urgell. By far the most secular of the nine dioceses, Urgell’s canons had a reputation for dirtying their hands in secular matters. Indeed, in their constant guerrilla war against Bishop Duran, several of the canons had armed and barricaded themselves inside the cathedral for a few days. Many of the early Catalan clerical leaders in the revolt were drawn from their ranks—Claris, Ferran, Barutell—and the current President of the Generalitat was another canon, Josep Soler. As the spring campaign unfolded before Tarragona, the chapter gave willingly to the cause, while Don Gaspar Amat, abbot of

\textsuperscript{776} Indeed, there is something about the decision by the Catalans in 1640 and 1641 to rebel against their king, even to the point of war, while relative penury was staring them in the face. The typical economic/materialist argument that wars or rebellions are undertaken merely in the name of “self-interest” does not seem to apply to the Catalan revolt. Despite the economic downturn caused by the war with France, it still was not in the economic self-interest of the Catalans to rebel, turning from certain, traditional privileges to an uncertain future with France. Furthermore, the typical stereotype of Catalans in general—and citizens of Barcelona in particular—was one that put a strong emphasis on financial interests and gain. To find that such people were willing to put their financial security—and political security—on the line in 1640 suggests a deep concern for the issues at stake. Would the effects of quartering alone be able to produce such a hazardous venture? Or the fear of losing certain political traditions? The Diputació once had the power to appoint viceroy before the king swore the oath, during an extended controversy from 1621-1626.

\textsuperscript{777} Unfortunately the quantity and quality of the chapter records surviving to this day are not uniform. Those at Perpignan, Tarragona, and Tortosa appear to be in the worst shape and so only receive limited treatment in the following section.
Sant Pere de Galligans in Girona, was given the responsibility, not only of collecting the rents of the exiled Bishop Duran, but also of sequestering the bishop’s property.

While the small, but unruly city of Urgell was eagerly looking for ways in which to support the rebellion, matters were different in Barcelona. Most of this, apparently, had to do with Barcelona’s new position as the richest diocese still in rebellion, as well serving as the main target for los Vélez during the 1640 campaign. The great amount of money and energy spent by the Barcelona chapter on defending the city through the winter of 1640-1641, although fundamental in protecting the place, also brought the extent of the chapter’s wealth to the attention of the Consell de Cent and the Diputació. Despite the fact that many within the chapter were strong supporters of the Catalan cause, they were reluctant to bestow more than what was perceived as absolutely necessary to future campaigns—particularly offensive campaigns farther away from Barcelona. As a result of this strict stewardship, tensions arose between the chapter and city, especially as the latter began—within an almost indecently short space of time—to make further requests on the chapter’s finances.

As early as 11 February, the Diputació sent Don Francesc de Vilalbo to the canons informing them of the lamentable state of city’s finances and beseeching their help in the form of a donation: “that the House of the Diputació is so exhausted in order to sustain the costs of the War that if the most Illustrious Chapter would contribute silver from the sacristy or to the Tax or freely lending towards it,” it would be greatly

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778 “las rendas caygudes de la terça de Maig del benefici del Bisbe de Urgell esta be que trets los mals fan dits beneficis cobre VM lo demes y lo mateix que haja acomoda,” ACA: Generalitat: G. 115: 26 June 1641, Rafel Cerda to Amat, f. 184.
appreciated.\textsuperscript{79} Four days later, the chapter decided to appoint two canons—Pau del Rosso and Fructuos Bisbe Vidal—to scour the sacristy and other places for silver up to the amount of one-thousand lliures; a modest sum, but some contribution to the war effort, or as it was called “the works of the province.”\textsuperscript{780} Although pleased with this signal “grace” bestowed by the institution, the Diputació soon came around asking for yet more money. On 3 April, another embassy was sent from the Generalitat asking the canons to give up more silver and to dip into their account at the city bank, “in order to alleviate the costs of the Generalitat.”\textsuperscript{781} As the cathedral chapter was loathe to donate more money—particularly since a plan of campaign had not yet been decided upon—the city came calling again two days later. This time, they appealed not just to the lamentable state of the province’s finances, but also to the good example that the church ought to set for the rest of the Catalans, particularly other clerics, during this war.\textsuperscript{782} In the end, pressure from the city and Diputació, the creation of a definite purpose for the money, i.e. the siege of Tarragona, and the persuasive powers of canons strongly in favor of rebellion—namely Pau del Rosso—told on the chapter, and a further amount of silver entered the fledgling Catalan war chest.

Among the clerics of Girona, Don Gaspar Amat stood out for his remarkable ability to procure funding for various Catalan companies, even for the cavalry companies

\textsuperscript{79} “que la Casa de la Diputatio esta tant exuastas pera sustentar los gastos de la Guerra que si lo molt Ille Capitol los volia deixar plata de la sagristia o a Censal o prestici gratios.” ACB: I.A.Resolucions: Llibre de la Sibelle: 1625-1645: 11 February 1641, f. 319.

\textsuperscript{780} “sie feta commissio pera que vejen a la sagristia y demes llochs si trobara algunas cossas de plata pera poder dexar als Diputats y que sie fins a mill lliures pera subvenir als treballs fen en per estas Cossas, y treballs de esta provincia.” Ibid, 15 February 1641, f. 319.

\textsuperscript{781} “pera aliviar los gastos de la genaralitat,” Ibid, 3 April 1641, f. 320v.

\textsuperscript{782} “per don un exemple als demes eclesiastichs,” Ibid, 5 April 1641, f. 321.
which stood most in need.783 Not only did Amat use his influence within his monastery in Girona, but also served the Principat in various administrative positions. In early 1641, he was appointed Segrestador of the Benedictine abbey of St. Esteve de Banyoles, also in the diocese of Girona. As the siege at Tarragona continued, Amat’s efforts on behalf of the Principat became more urgently needed. In a letter accompanying one rushed payment to the troops of 500 lliures, the Diputat Soler wrote “in order to help the rest we will manage [to send?] the Lord Abbot of Sant Pere de Galligans the quickest way that will be possible asking him to do this so as to procure money to help those companies.”784 Both the city of Girona and the cathedral chapter soon supported the abbot’s fund-raising efforts, sending the enormous sum of 2000 lliures to the Catalan coffers, which Amat transported to Roussillon.785 The abbot’s important work gathering funds, resources, and men for the province continued well into the last days of the siege of Tarragona and beyond, and may have procured his election by lot as Diputat Eclesiàstic in 1644.786

783 “en lo que toca a la falta que VS te de diner segons la relacio quens ha feta lo Sr Oydor y Abat de St Pere de Galligans vehem es molt justa y procurarem torne aqui per procurarne y ab ell socorrer a les companies de cavalls...” ACA: Generalitat: G. 115: (Consejo de Guerra, Cartas, deliberacions, 1641), Francesc de Tamarit to Don Tomas de Banyuls, 25 April 1641, f. 3.
784 “pera socórrer la demes procurarem vaia lo Sr. Abat de St. Pere de Galligans lo mes prest sera possible pregantlo ho fassa peraque procurar diner per socórrer exas companyes.” ACA: Generalitat: G. 115: Soler to General Josep Çacosta at Tarragona, 7 May 1641, ff. 31-31v.
785 ACA: Generalitat: G. 115: Soler to Jurats of Girona, and to Chapter of Girona, 16 May 1641. In his letter to the Chapter, Soler praised the canons for their pledge of an additional 1000 lliures “a censal,” f. 59v. The very next day, Soler would write to Amat, “supplea de nou a dit Capitol sie servit del comu o, particular de nou fernos donar alguna partida a Censal per Subvencio a les necessitats pnts” while at the same time, asking him to try and collect 10-12,000 lliures in his new tour around the diocese, “y ser medi per aqueles persones riques de dita Ciutat y veggaria nos socorrán axi matiex dantz a censal les maiors quantitats los sera possible,” Ibid, f. 60v.
786 ACA: Generalitat: G. 115: Soler to Amat, 12 July 1641, ff. 239-240. See also the letter of 26 May 1641, when Antich writes to Çacosta about Amat’s activities: “deu ser ja en Gerona, y alla procurara diner y prehir aqui per pagar la cavalleria, balas de moquet, y arcabus y polvora,” Ibid, f. 79v. While the Diputat and Oídor elections were chosen by blind lot from a silver dish, rumors began to circulate by 1644 that the French were stuffing the dish with copies of candidates’ names who might prove more favorable to their rule. See also Sanabre, La Acción de Francia en Cataluña, 325.

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The chapter of Vic was in general inclined to support whatever Barcelona decided. This position was only enhanced during the first years of Bishop Ramon de Sentmanat who entertained sympathetic views with the rebels’ position, and whose brother, Galceran, served as vicar-general to Bishop Manrique in Barcelona. Furthermore, the chapter appears to have been dominated at the time by Don Enric d’Alemany, another fire-eater and associate of Claris. During the first years of the war, d’Alemany would use his influence over other canons to see that Vic contributed their share to the Catalan war effort. In mid-May, he was sent by the Diputació to see if he could get the universities to divulge any payment—which they had consistently refused to give—in order to pay the troops besieging Tarragona. Despite Vic’s enthusiasm for the Catalan cause, they were one of the poorest of all the dioceses, and could not manage to pay large sums like Girona or Barcelona.

In the pursuit of viable sources to prosecute the spring campaign at Tarragona, now turning into a full-blown siege, the Principat, taking a page from the course of war in Germany, sought to make their opponents pay for the fight. In this case, the dioceses of Tarragona and Tortosa were the green pastures eyed for enforced “contributions.” For several reasons these southern lands were ripe for plunder. In the first place, the swift passage of los Vélez’s army in 1640 had left the farther reaches of these dioceses relatively free from fiscal demands. Moreover, during that fall, the Catalan rebels had poured not only arms and munitions, but also a good deal of cash into the defense of Tarragona: a defense, which as has been seen, never materialized.

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788 A letter, dated 1 July 1641, from the secretary of the Generalitat to the Chapter at Vic thanks them for their donation of 40 lliures but hints—not too subtly—that larger amounts would be acceptable. ACA: Generalitat: G. 115: f, 197. See also Ibid, 27 June 1641: Rafel Cerdas to Alemany, ff. 186v-187.
Needless to say, the governors in Barcelona sought eagerly to regain that which they had foolishly entrusted to their cousins in the south. On 18 May, the secretary to the Diputació, Rafel Antich, wrote to the Diputat Militar, Tamarit—now in charge of the Catalan forces before Tarragona—urging him to confiscate “the money that we have in the Bank of Tarragona, and the taxes collected from diverse ecclesiastical and secular person from that same city” with great haste. At the very least, Tamarit was to collect Tarragona’s rightful share in the tax passed in October, 1640, if not from the city itself, than from any lands in the archbishopric that fell under Franco-Catalan control. In the same letter, Antich sent the Diputat a copy of the see’s obligations. Once more the secretary urged speed in collecting the money, showing that the Principat’s need was very great.

The following week, Antich again wrote to Tamarit, this time directing his attention further south towards the diocese of Tortosa. If the Catalans in Barcelona were embittered towards Tarragona, their zeal in punishing Tortosa was even greater. Not only was the southern-most see the richest of all the Catalan ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but that diocese, alone among all Catalan regions, had actively stood against the rebellion in 1640. Despite the fact that the Generalitat had declared the city of Tortosa and all its inhabitants “enemichs de la patria” in September of that year, they were nevertheless eager to demand these false Catalans still owed back taxes to Barcelona and were

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789 “el diner que tenim en la taula de la ciutat de Tarragona, y tatxas fets a diversas personas ecles y Seculars que son axi en la dita ciutat ... cobrar de totas las peronas que sera posible y fer las executions necessaries peraque entre diner prest,” ACA: Generalitat: G. 115: 18 May 1641, Rafel Antich to Tamarit, ff. 69-69v.
790 “tambe enviarem la tatxa feta al archabisbe y capitol pera que VS cobre de las Rendas del archibisbat, la tatxa del archabisbe, y del capitol, y particulars de Tarregona quant Deu Vulle sian dins de aquella ciutat, que ab son favor confiam que sera prest,” Ibid, f. 69v.
responsible for future payments.\textsuperscript{791} The government in Barcelona appeared very eager to prosecute a fiscal campaign as they were to engage in the siege of Tarragona. Although such a policy suggests a desire to display their new-found power, backed by French muscle, to assert their legitimacy by collecting taxes, and to alleviate loyal Catalans from monetary burdens, the repeated application to proceed in haste does suggest that money was not flowing as freely into the rebels’ coffer as had been hoped. Clearly, a renewed effort was needed, especially from the ecclesiastical estate.

Along with contributions from the cathedral chapters, some regular orders also gave to the war effort. In mid-May, the “Pare Guardia” of the Capuchins brought word to the Oidor Eclesiàstic, Jaume Ferran, that gold had been discovered in a mine recently opened within their lands. As proof of the friar’s claim, a piece of the mineral-rich soil was brought for inspection. Ferran was suitably impressed and gave orders to the Capuchin to continue mining, bringing all the proceeds to the coffers of Barcelona.\textsuperscript{792}

The Capuchins were continually recognized for their willingness to serve the province in the war. When the Generalitat ordered Abbot Gaspar Amat to search for two men, “zealous for the good of the Province,” to help him in raising troops for the on-going

\textsuperscript{791} “Tambe rebra VS ab esta sis memorials de les tattas que inseguint la deliberatio dels Braços se feren per lo consell de hazienda als Bisbe, dignitats, Canonics, y dems persones eclesiastques del bisbat de Tortosa, y axi mateix a les persones layques de dita Cituat...a unes y altres se enviaren los manamentes pero com après sobrevingue la vinguda, o entrada del enemich en aquella Ciutat,” ACA: Generalitat: G. 115. 23 May 1641, Rafel Antich to Tamarit, f. 74.

\textsuperscript{792} “en resposta die que ne lo particular de la mina trobada ensaret lo pare guardia dels Caputxins de dita vila quant vingue assí estos dies atras per la electio de Provincial de Llur orde aporta un tros de terra de la dita mina...la prova his troba que de una onsa de la terra de la mina ne redunda un granet de or que pesava set diners...donarem orde al dit Pare Guardia del ques devia der, pero pues VS ho volem pendrer y beenficiar a la Provencia nos estabe fassa VM assiento ab les persones li aparexearn al proposit.” ACA: Generalitat: G. 115: Jaume Ferran to Çacosta, 13 May 1641, f. 51.
siege at Tarragona, they specifically advised him to look for Capuchins.\footnote{ACA: Generalitat: G. 115: Letter from Josep Soler to Don Gaspar Amat, 30 June 1641, includes “dos patents en blanch queran ab esta perque VM puga llençar ma de dos personas que sien aproposit per axo y zelosas del be de la Provincia que cuyden de sollicitat aquesta nova leva repartintlos VM en les parts de dita vegaria…y millor sera molt aproposit que vaian alguns religiosos caputxins repartits per la vergaria, los quals demanara VM en nom noster als Prelats del monestirs y en lo despatexar les cartilles nos ha dit persona pratiga que la regia cort las des patexava ab molta prestesa…per en ella consisteix la reempctio de la Provincia…” f. 195v. Emphasis mine.} The precise reason why Soler wanted Capuchins in particular is unclear: perhaps it stemmed from their history of serving as army chaplains—along with Jesuits—in the Catalan armies during the 1630s, perhaps their initial discovery of the sacrileges had infused the whole order in Catalonia with a fiery zeal which Soler hoped would inspire any flagging spirits of the besieging army.

Beyond merely giving of their preaching ability and speculative gold mines, other religious orders contributed other forms of mineral wealth. In Roussillon, the Catalan cause was aided by Melchior Soler i d’Armendaris, the abbot of Sant Martí del Canigó, an important Benedictine house on the slopes of the sacred mountain. Originally a discalced Carmelite of the old persuasion, Soler later became a Benedictine when Philip IV made him abbot of Sant Marti in 1623, a position he held until his death thirty-five years later. As abbot of one of the more influential abbeys in Roussillon, Soler inherited the title of “visitador” for all Benedictine houses in Catalonia that adhered to the old Claustral Congregation of Tarragona. Ever since 1625, he had obtained permission to mine the mountains in and around Canigou, looking for iron, and continued these efforts during the war, enriching both the Comtats and himself while infuriating some of the monks under his rule.\footnote{ADPO: Série 1B 445. \textit{Mamale Curie} from 1635-1641.}
One other component among the ecclesiastical community that also supported the Catalan campaign was the episcopacy. By the spring of 1641 only three out of the seven rebellious bishops had stayed in Catalonia: Manrique in Barcelona, Parcero in Girona, and Sentmanat in Vic. As we have seen, Manrique was not inclined to actively support the continuation of the rebellion, and was seeking ways in which to bring the conflict to a peaceable end, and a return to the *status quo.* Parcero and Sentmanat, on the other hand, appear to have willingly served the Principat in their offensive against Tarragona, albeit without the extreme devotion their chapters may have demonstrated.

Such assistance came in the form of spiritual guidance, prayer, and even financial support. Of further interest, the appeals to Parcero and Sentmanat came only in late June, when the Catalan leadership in the field before Tarragona was beginning to doubt whether the siege would be successful. On 22 June, the secretary of the Diputació would write to Parcero informing him of the desperate straights facing the army, and asking him to use his influence to enlist more men to carry on the siege.795 Two days later, Parcero appeared in Barcelona before the Diputació; to their great joy, he agreed to fund five soldiers for two months in the field.796 It was a modest and token amount, no doubt, but still it was the first positive episcopal response of the campaign. Perhaps encouraged by this response, Josep Soler, the Diputat Eclesiàstic wrote Bishop Ramon de Sentmanat in

795 ACA: Generalitat: G. 115. 22 June 1641, Rafel Antich to Bishop Parcero, ff. 172-172v.
796 In contrast to Parcero’s response, the chapter of Girona sent 420 lliures to fund 30 men for the same time of two months. To both, however, Soler sent back grateful replies for aquest Socorro y benefici que ba ell fan a la defensa del Principat,” ACA: Generalitat: G. 115. 27 June 1641, Soler to Chapter of Girona, f. 180.
Vic, repeating the present necessity to take Tarragona, and asking him to mobilize all the clergy under his authority to likewise raise more men throughout the diocese.\textsuperscript{797}

Despite the spiritual and fiscal encouragement by Catalonia’s clerical communities, the siege of Tarragona was a failure. The Archbishop of Bordeaux, who had previously held the Spanish fleet at bay during the spring of 1641, failed to prevent a relief force from delivering much needed aid in July. Though only the second campaign of what would prove to be a drawn-out conflict, the assault on Tarragona was quite important. From a morale standpoint, the defeat shook the Catalans who had hitherto imagined that, with Divine aid, their cause would triumph after a few battles. Now, the realization that the conflict might go on indefinitely began to take hold, and sermons which had emphasized rejoicing in fighting for God turned towards the spiritual value of enduring suffering. For the suffering would come.

From a materialistic standpoint, the first campaign, coming on the heels not only of the emergency defense of 1640, but of the unprecedented efforts to relieve Salses in 1639, thoroughly devastated Catalonia’s fiscal resources. While cities, cathedral chapters, and religious orders may have been able to float ready cash to provide for the two early campaigns, by the summer of 1641 all of Catalonia’s institutions were suffering from a lack of revenue. No matter how wealthy these establishments may have been before 1639, they could not indefinitely sustain the cost of early-modern warfare. The

\textsuperscript{797}“supplicam a VS quant encaridament podem que com a tant zelos del be de la Provicnica sie servit ordenar y aiudar en que los Preveres de aquexa Cathredal Rectors, y demes persones eclesiasticas de son Bisbat fassan lo maior esfos que pugen en enviar gent comformes ho feran pera Salses ates que aquesa el maior necessitat, mes propria y en que va la restauracio de la Provincia,” ACA: Generalitat: G. 115. 24 June 1641, Jospe Soler to Ramon de Sentmanat, f. 178; the Diputat would write the same to the chapter, Ibid, f. 178v.
end of available funding unfortunately coincided with the concrete beginnings of French rule in the Principat. Already suffering financially—what with payments to the Dutch since 1626 and to the Swedes since 1630 and full-fledged war with Spain since 1635—the French were in no mood to finance yet another military effort. The interests of Richelieu and his successor, Mazarin, lay in making Catalonia foot the bill as much as possible without the locals rising up in discontent. From the very beginning, the Catalan clergy resisted with all their strength the French attempts to eke the last lliure and sou out of their treasuries.

With a stalemate in the south, the military efforts of both sides turned towards a new campaigning area. The city of Lleida was seen as the key to Catalonia’s Western Front. Located along the Segre River, Lleida stood out as the Principat’s chief citadel of the west, offering not only a stronghold capable of thwarting a modest assault, but also providing a convenient staging point for offensives into Aragon. Although a small royal army had been formed along the Aragonese border in late 1640, the main thrust of the king’s campaign had been with los Vélez in the south. Now that the first offensive had stalled, Philip IV determined to push into Catalonia from the west. The joy and confidence that the citizens of Lleida had felt during the winter months soon turned to nervous anxiety as the city fathers realized that they were soon to become the next target for the royal army.

Neither the presence of Quintana, the Diputat Reial, nor the repeated assurances by the new Diputat Eclesiàstic, Soler, could calm their fears. Given the current conditions of the province, however, the Catalan government could not really offer much more. As Soler wrote to the Dean and Chapter of Lleida in April, the only reason more
help was not given was due to a lack of available funds.\textsuperscript{798} In fact, the Diputat suggested that the city and cathedral follow the precedent of Girona in having both contribute to the mutual defense: “that [since] it is impossible that we should be able to come up with the money for the fortifications of this town, it appears to us right that the laity as well as the ecclesiastics allow and follow up some expedient with which one will be able to pay as those in Girona have done.”\textsuperscript{799} Further help came from the presence of two Portuguese companies who deserted to the Catalan cause in late April.\textsuperscript{800}

**Onward Christian Soldiers: The Corpus Celebration of 1641**

It was not just in the realm of finances that the church gave support to the war. For the new offensive, members of the regular clergy left their houses to serve as chaplains to the Franco-Catalan army. Although no pitched battle was ever fought, the Catalan chaplains played an important part in keeping up the morale of the besiegers. For one thing, they only used the Catalan language in their preaching and exhorting. Writing from the field in February, notary Jaume Ilyavila recorded that “All the Preachers spoke in Catalan, for they have forbidden the Castilian tongue.”\textsuperscript{801}

Along with language, the Catalan chaplains focused on maintaining the purity of their soldiers’ faith: reminding them, as the popular verses and erudite scholars before them, of the true reason for this war. Although their efforts do not appear to have

\textsuperscript{798} “no es estar sino per falta de diner tenim per sustentar tant gasto.” ACA: Generalitat: G. 115: (Consejo de Guerra, Cartas, deliberacions, 1641) letter from Soler to Dean and Chapter of Lleida, 24 April 1641, f. 1v.
\textsuperscript{799} “ques impossible que nosaltres pugam acudir ab diner per les fortifications dexa plassa nos apar es raho que aixi los llaychs com los eclesiastichs ho concideren y sequen algun expedient ab que si puga acudir com han fet los de Gerona.” Ibid, f. 1v. Emphasis mine.
\textsuperscript{800} “eren passades a Leyda dos companyes enteres de Portuguesos ab sos Capitans y Officials, de tot lo qual havem tingu lo contento que es raho, hi tindrem maior ab lo favor de nostre Sr…” ACA: Generalitat: G. 115: 27 April 1641: Soler to La Motte, f. 8v.
\textsuperscript{801} “Tots los Predicadors parlen en Catala, quells han privat la llengua castellana” AHCB: I B X-77, 27 February 1641, from Jaume Ilyavila, notary, to Rafel Montaner, the Consell’s notary, f.1.
reached the spiritual heights of other revolutionary armies—such as Cromwell’s New Model Army—the Catalans’ first offensive was saturated with religious fervor. One of the biggest incidents during the rather uneventful—and eventually unsuccessful—siege was the celebration of Corpus Christi in the Field of Constantine. Because the Corpus holiday is determinant on the Accension—and thus on Easter—it is a rotating festival, and so came on 30 May rather than 7 June. Nevertheless, the Catalans celebrated with great fervor this day of special significance.

On Wednesday, 29 May, the vigil of Corpus, Rossell, the Third Conseller of Barcelona, and colonel of his own tercio brought to the attention of the chaplains the importance of celebrating the upcoming feast:

“so great a veneration and devotion that the said Principat, and the Provincials that dwell therein, and have been accustomed to received such a high and mysterious Sacrament of the Eucharist, as one can see in the festal, and joyous [behavior] that they make in similar days with such great happiness and devotion, they decided unanimously and in conformity with that, to hold a solemn Office in that Camp, and a procession with all the adornments that for a similar solemn festival would be made.”

Rossell called upon the Reverend Salvador Maseras, the head chaplain of the tercio to make all the arrangements for the celebration. Priests throughout the camp were invited to participate and preparations were made for altar to be erected and decorated; special singers, and even a procession afterwards throughout the military encampment.

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802 “la tanta veneracio y devocio que lo dit Principat, y Provincials de ell tenen, y han acostumat tenri a tant alt y misters Sagrament de la Eucharistia, com se veu ab los festeos, y regosijos ques fan en semblant dias ab tant gran alegria, y devocio, determinaren unanimes, y conformes de que se fes en dit Camp un solemne Ofici, y profeso ab tots los adornos que per semblant festivitat tant solemne fer convenia.” AHCB: B.1641-8-(op)-68: *Relacio verdadera de las sumptuosa Festivitat que ses feta en lo dia del Corpus de Christo*, (G. Nogues, 1641), f. 94. The Eucharistic imagery is very strong on the cover of the pamphlet.

803 “per lo qual effect donaren orde al Reverent Salvador Maseras Prevere, y Capella major de dit Tercio… que previngues lo que era necessari prevenir per dita festa, currantse de avisar los demes Sacerdotes que eran presents en dit Camp, adornant lo Altar ab la decensia, y adorno convenia, prevenint los cantors, y demes havien de assistir en la profeso, y Ofici se havia de celebrar, y fer del preciosissim cos de Christo Sacramentat: insegunint la qual orde dit Capella major ab la diligencia qual convenia prepará lo que era necessari per dit efecte….” Ibid, ff. 94-94v.
In the evening of 29 May a notice was sent out, ordering the soldiers to gather branches for the entrance of the Body of Christ when the priests carrying it passed through their camps; the action—reminiscent of the first Palm Sunday, in which the Jews honored Christ as King—was typical in Corpus celebrations. Even with the short notice involved, the participation of the clergy was overwhelming. A contemporary account affirmed that over thirty priests and four friars helped lead the worship. Among those who officiated at the first mass were Fathers Josep Angel Dominico, Josep Argemir, Sebastia Mamble, Hieronym Castanyer from the Order of Merced, Josep Parent, Trinitarian, and Bonaventura Boxeda from the Seraphic Order of St. Francis. There was much singing by the soldiers, which caught the attention of the Catalan nobles and even the French. Moving towards the sound, the two nations united in their religious praise; later they would deepen their fellowship through a shared partaking of the Eucharist. More perhaps than Sala’s legal history, the Corpus celebration served as the first true bond made between Catalans and French across the social scale. Nobles, officers, common soldiers, and priests, all alike became one through the medium of this particular religious feast, possessing such significance for the Catalans. As the account mentions touchingly:

All the Catalan Noblemen gathered, that were in number above eighty, and Gentlemen [and] Soldiers, Catalans as well as French, with much conformity and familiarity, all driven to such a great devotion they proceeded, with the said Priests celebrating the Masse on that morning of Corpus, the majority of the Noblemen and Infantry received the Most Holy Sacrament with very great veneration, setting a very great example.  

804 “que eran en numero de mes de trente, y dels quatre Ordens Mendicans, y en particular en dit Tercio assistexen lo Pare Joseph Angel Dominico, Pare Joseph Argemir, Pare Sebastia Mamble, Pare Hieronym Castanyer de la Orde de la Merce, Pare Joseph Parent Trinitari, Pare Bonaventura Boxeda del Orde del Seraphich Pare Sant Francesch, en la primera Missa ques celebrà en dit Altar, en dit dia del Corpus se consagrà lo preciosissim cos de Christo...” Ibid, f.94v.

805 “acudiren tots los Cavallers Cathalans, que son en mes numero de vuytanta, y Mosiurs, Soldats, axi Cathalans, com Francesos ab molta conformitat, y familiaritat, los quals commoguts a tant gran devocio
As the celebrations wore on through the day, Francesc de Tamarit, the Diputat Militar arrived, and announced that the tercio of the French marshal, La Motte, which had been in action throughout the day would like to participate. As the French general arrived before the altar, he was preceeded by Fra Antoni Teula, another member of the Order of Merced, carrying a Cross. La Motte was joined in this second worship service by a number of influential Catalan nobles, most notably Don Josep de Margarit i Biure. With a sizeable crowd already assembled, Salvador Maseras, assisted by two Augustinians and a third member of the Order of Merced, began the procession, carrying the Sacrament through the Field of Constantine, uniting in faith, those who for many years before had been great enemies.

Once the official procession was over, the soldiers began another celebration. The Sacrament was carried on the palm leaves, and la Motte ordered cannons to fire, saluting the precious object. Once more, Father Maseras presided over the official ceremony, while Josep Argemir, chaplain to Don Josep de Pinos gave a particularly pleasing sermon; at the conclusion of the festive mass, a great number of soldiers again received the Sacrament of the Lord for whom they fought. Following this second ceremony, the Host was removed and hidden, ostensibly out of fear of the proximity of the Castilian enemy. After all, the soldiers were undoubtedly reminded throughout the

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806 “la Mota ans de celebrarse lo Ofici solemne se parti la professo solemne ab la custodia, acompanyada de gansanons ordinaries devant, ab la Creu alta que aportava Fra Antoni Teula del orde de la Merce," Ibid, f.95.
807 “assistint dos Religiosos de Sant Augusti, y de la Merce ab altre assistant de la mateixa Orde, seguia la dita professo grandissim numero de gent del exercit així Català com Frances…” Ibid, f.95v-95v.
808 “lo dit Capella major celebrá lo dit Ofici solemne, predicá en aquell lo dit Pare Joseph Argemir, Capella de don Joseph de Pinos, lo qual ab sa doctrina dexa admirat lo auditori,” Ibid, ff. 95v-96.
day, that if King Philip’s soldiers had not hesitated to burn the precious bread in the helpless churches of Riudarenes and Montiró, what, save force, would prevent them from desecrating it once more. Finally, at the hours of Vespers and Complines, Father Angel Dominico removed the Sacrament from its safe-keeping and marched through the camp, accompanied by the soldiers who sang with a renewed heart, confident that their devotion to such a righteous cause would soon see their enemies confused and put to flight. And so the celebrations continued for the entire eight days of Corpus.809

The psychological effects of the extended religious festival appear to have been profound. There was, after all, much to divide the Catalans from their new-found French allies: decades of bitter resentment; suspicion of the heretical Huguenots that populated southern France; and the recent invasion of 1639 undoubtedly fostered tension between the two sides. Yet, by reminding the Catalans of the war’s true cause, and by appealing to the Catholic devotion among the French regiments, priests, monks, and friars alike were able to overcome these obstacles, and, for a while, concentrate their military preparations against Castile, and their renegade Catalan allies. Chiefly as a result of this renewed religious attitude, an observer of the camp could note:

they remain very content, and satisfied, and armed with great devotion, the Catalans as well as the French, and the enemy is very confused because of the little devotion which he has; seeing that it has been evident, and is evident to have burnt the most precious body of the Sacramental Christ, for which so just a cause Catalonia and its army are [risen up in] defense, that God permit to grant

809 “fonch determinat per dits Senyors se reserves lo Santissim Sagrament en lo dit Ofici, com en efecte se feu, per no tornar a reyterar lo que dit enemich feu en Riudarenes y Montiró, si be li havia de costar molt mes; sumit lo qual, y acabat lo dit ofici solemnne lo qual se canta ab gran Cantoria a dos cors, y ab molta melodia...feu despres lo dit Pare Angel Dominico una molt devota platica ahonor y alabança del Santissim Sagrament per confondre lo enemich, lo que se enten se continuara tots los demes dias de la octava del Corpus ab molt a devocio.” Ibid, f. 96.
Aragon: Legajos: Secretaria de Cataluña: l. 289, doc. 96.

This optimistic state continued even as it became evident that the siege of Tarragona would take longer than expected. On 5 July, a report from the front would declare, “there is nothing in the camp but good spirit, and to confide in God that he will fight for us.”

Agents of God and Crown

Clerical activities to engage popular support for the Catalan cause continued even behind enemy lines. On 8 April 1641, the Constable of Naples—then in charge of the military defenses around Tarragona—wrote to Philip IV regarding the recent arrest of an Augustinian monk, Fray Tomas Vergada. This monk, born in Cambrils, had been traveling through the small towns in southern Catalonia and visiting soldiers in their quarters. In his meetings, he would distribute passports signed by Don Josep de Margarit i Biure, along with money and promises of safe passage if they would defect to the Catalan side. Such conduct, the Constable complained, was a “gravest insult to the army of Your Majesty.” Although the conspiring Vergada had been arrested, the Constable was in a quandary as to how to punish the monk, because the privileges of ecclesiastical immunity guarded him from the normal judgment regarding suspected traitors. Of further interest, is the suggestion put to the king by his general that Vergada

810 “restats molt contents, y satisfets, y armats de devocio grandissima, tant los Catalans, com los Francesos, y lo enemich molt confus per sa poca devocio te; puix ha constat, y consta haver cremat lo cos preciosissim de Christo Sacramentat, la qual causa tant justa defensa Cathalunya, y son exercit, que permeta Deu donarnos en tot victoria, y confondre, y preterir tals sacrileges, y incendiaros per sa divina bondat, y misericordia, la qual nos concedesque Deu y nos fia en guarde de tots. Amen.” Ibid, ff, 96-96v.
811 “noy ha sino bon animo, y confiar ab Deu que pelea per nosaltres.” BC: FB 6163: Copia de una Carta escrita a Esta Ciutat, desde la Campanya de Constanti a 5 de Juliol 1641, f. 257v.
812 “Insulto dañossissimo para el exercito de V Magd.;” “como este Religioso andava por los quartiles persuadiendo a los soldados que se fuesen dandoles pasaportes en nombre de Don Joseph Margarit de los quales viene tambien copia en dicha declaracion ofreciendoles dineros, buen passage,” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos: Secretaria de Cataluña: l. 289, doc. 96.
was not unusual among clerics in his subversive activities and needed to be made an example of: “because under the habit of the Regular clergy, many have dared, and dare every day, similar evils.” But all the Constable could do was to ship Vergada to Valencia, where the provincial general of his order would deal with him.

The suspicion of clerical activities supporting the Catalan cause extended even to “foreigners” who had spent a long time in the province. Such was the case Alonso de Truxillo, the Benedictine abbot of San Feliu de Guixols in Girona. Born the illegitimate son to a nobleman in Jerez de la Frontera, Andalusia, around 1590, Truxillo moved to Catalonia early in the seventeenth century, and took the Benedictine habit at Montserrat in 1609. Aside from his duties in his order, Truxillo was noted for his preaching and poetical abilities, and served as qualificador of the Inquisition in Catalonia. He had been elected abbot—according to the Catalan Benedictine tradition—of San Feliu in 1637, and maintained a friendship with Bishop Parcero. In 1640, Parcero had sent him north to Perpignan shortly after the city was “sacked” by Don Juan de Arce. Shortly after Truxillo’s arrival, he and the Franciscan “guardian” for the province were arrested by Don Juan de Garay, the military commander of Perpignan under suspicion that they had

813 “porque con la capa de Religiosos se han atrevido y se atreven cada dia muchos a semejantes maldades.” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos: Secretaria de Cataluña: l. 289, doc. 96.

814 The fate of Tomas Vergada appears to have been quite lenient. On 6 May 1641, Fra Pedro de Malvenda, the general of the Augustinians for the Crown of Aragon, informed Philip IV that he had placed Vergada in the conven of St. Felipe “para guardar la resolucion que de orden de su Magd se remare,” but nearly two years later, the Council of Aragon, perhaps reviewing old records, discovered that nothing further had occurred to make Vergada an example, and suggested that something ought to be done. The king apparently cared very little about the case by then, writing back to the council “se cometa a sus superior el conocimiento y castigo.” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos: Secretaria de Cataluña: l. 289, doc. 96, letter from Philip IV to Consejo de Aragon, 2 May 1643.

815 The suspicion of clerics and key officials also extended to neighboring regions. The viceroy of Aragon, the duke of Nocera, was removed from office in July of 1641, by Olivares, under suspicion that he had not sufficiently prepared the defenses of Aragon to resist a Franco-Catalan invasion. Enrique Solano Camón, *Poder Monárquico y Estado Pactista (1626-1652). Los Aragoneses ante la Unión de Armas* (Zaragoza: Institución “Fernando el Católico,” 1987), 125-127.
been working to conspire against the Castilian presence in the city. Following the abbot’s arrest, he had been deported to Madrid, where he stayed under surveillance at the Benedictine house of San Martin.

In mid-April, 1641, the abbot petitioned the king for a temporary release so that he could go celebrate the tri-annual Benedictine regional conference. As one of the most important Benedictine leaders, Truxillo complained that “his absence would be of great damage to the temporal and spiritual state of his convent, and to his personal Reputation,” and asked Philip IV to grant him a special license to attend the conference “with an active voice.” Five days after receiving the abbot’s request, the Council of Aragon passed it along to the king with the suggestion that Truxillo be allowed to return to Catalonia, but only under close scrutiny. The General of the Benedictines had approved such a policy. But, cognizant that several other members of the same order strongly opposed the Crown, the Council also recommended that the Constable of Naples be made aware of the situation.

While elements of regular and secular clergy within Catalonia were causing trouble for the Crown, further difficulties were created by the unwillingness of clerics loyal to Philip to move into Catalonia. Those who did enter into the region, such as Pau

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816 Garay’s somewhat improbable denunciation linked Parcero and Truxillo—persons moderately inclined to support Catalonia—with the fanatical rebel Don Aleix de Sentmanat, and the quite-loyal Bishop Pérez-Roy of Perpignan. “el Abad fue a ella (segun dije) embiado por el Obsipo de Girona atratar con el de Elna, Don Alexos de Semanat, y otros, algunos negocios, que por la cautelas, forma con que procedia se conocio con evidencia se rende servicio de V Magd como dije Don Juan que constara de los papels que tiene y informacion que se hara...” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos: Secretaria de Cataluña: l. 289, doc. 7. The Guardian of the Franciscans was regarded with more suspicion, “por haver ayudado a la mala disposicion del Pueblo.”

817 “sera de mucho daño a lo temporal y espiritual de su comunto y a la Reputacion de su persona su ausencia, Supca a Vra magd le aga mrd de mandar se le de licencia para Asistir al dho Capitulo con voz activa.” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos: Secretaria de Cataluña: l. 289, letter from Abbot Truxillo to Consejo de Aragon, 14 April 1641.

818 ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos: Secretaria de Cataluña: l. 289, letter from Consejo de Aragon to Philip IV, 19 April 1641.
Duran, did so only to those areas protected by royal soldiers. One of the first examples involved Juan de Samatier, the newly appointed Benedictine Abbot to the twin monasteries of Amer i Roses, located in the northern coast of the diocese of Girona. Samatier, described by the Council of Aragon as “virtuous and zealous in the service of Your Majesty,” had served his king for twenty-six years in office as “Lieutenant of the vicar-general of all the fleets, as well as prosecutor of general naval investigations.”\footnote{“virtuoso y celoso del servicio de V Mgd. … “Theniente de vicario general de todas las armadas y con el de fiscal de la general Inquisicion del mar.” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos: Secretaría de Cataluña: l. 290, doc. 22. Letter from Consejo de Aragon to Philip IV, 27 May 1641.} The former abbot, Miquel d’Alentorn, had led the monastery since 1621, and had served as Diputat Eclesiàstic immediately before Pau Claris (1635-1638). While not as vocal in his displeasure as his successor, Alentorn was known for his strong antipathy towards Castile, and concentrated his hatred against the governor of the Principat, Aleix de Marimon. His family had long served Catalonia in various civic and ecclesiastical positions, and his father, Alexandre d’Alentorn, the lord of Seró i la Donzell, had been the Diputat Militar in 1614, and was friends with the famous “nyerro” bandit chief, Perot Rocaguinarda.\footnote{Generalitat de Catalunya, \textit{Història de la Generalitat de Catalunya i dels Seu Presidents.} Vol II: 1518-1714, 200.}

When Alentorn died in 1639, Philip seemed determined to appoint as his successor, someone who was a loyal to Castile as Alentorn had been to Catalonia.\footnote{It appears that one Francesc Vahils governed the abbeys in 1639, before Samatier officially took office. Whether he was elected by the monks, or appointed by Philip is uncertain, but it seems that he died shortly after assuming his role as abbot.} The official letter appointing Samatier as abbot was signed in December 1639, but because of the on-going problems between the Crown and the Papal Nuncio, Samatier was not confirmed by Rome. Only when the disagreements were patched over in July 1640, was
the papal bull of appointment sent out, reaching Madrid in November of that year. By this time, however, the situation in Catalonia did not appear conducive for an extremely royalist abbot to take up his office in the heartland of the rebellion, and so Samatier begged for several months to stay in Madrid until conditions improved, a condition the king approved in June of 1641.

The reluctance of many clerics to take up their appointed posts within Catalonia contributed to several problems both secular and spiritual. From a political viewpoint, the lack of dedicated ministers who were also loyal to Castile hindered the efforts of Philip IV to win back the hearts and souls of his subjects. Not until his magnanimous actions following the fall of Lleida in 1644 did the Spanish king manage to attract a growing number of Catalans to return to his standard, and even then, diehard pockets in Urgell, Vic, and Barcelona remained stubbornly defiant. Of at least equal importance, the clerics who defied the king’s orders and stayed in Castile also hurt the spiritual welfare of their flock. These abbots, bishops, and priests were important, not for the preaching of obedience to Philip in particular, but of encouraging virtuous living and by setting a good example to their congregations.

As the number of spiritual leaders within Catalonia diminished due to death, imprisonment, or exile, the popular spirit of the region became more unruly. With the

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822 “porque entonces no corria el despacho del Nuncio en esta Corte hizo profession dela fee ante el Ordinario y haviendo embiado a Roma sus despachos no le quiso pasar su Santd la gracia por no yr hecha ante el Nuncio con que fue necesario volver a Madrid y hazer nuevas diligencias, a cuia causa se dilato la expedicion de las bullas hasta 16 de Julio 1640 y llegaron en Noviembre…” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos: Secretaria de Cataluña: l. 290, doc. 22.

823 While Philip’s candidate waited in Madrid, the Catalan monks at Amer i Roses elected Andreu Pont as their abbot. A strong advocate for separatism in 1640, Pont helped expel all non-Catalan Benedictines from the sacred house at Montserrat. The following year, he was sent to Rome to convince the pope to take Montserrat away from the reformed branch of the Benedictine order—under supervision from Castile—and restore it to the old native branch. Not much else is known about him, save that he was elected Diputat Eclesiàstic in 1647.
absence of a significant royal presence in the land—early on a product of Philip’s careless attitude towards the Principat, and later, the minority of Louis XIV—and the departure of most of the influential landed nobles, social leadership devolved upon particular local strongmen or upon the Church. As increased political issues generally erased the latter’s influence, a general spirit of rebellion and upheaval penetrated Catalonia. Countless charges of misconduct passed unpunished by the ecclesiastical authorities, since the ones capable of enforcing justice—the bishops and abbots—had been removed from the province. The Catalans would learn too late, perhaps, the value of institutions that preserve social order. Beyond mere defeat on the battlefield, the Catalan rebellion collapsed on itself as the social conflict, briefly submerged during the first year of rebellion, reemerged on its deadly course.

**Resisting the new (domestic) front-Clerical support for the Junta de Batalló**

Despite the generosity with which the cathedral chapters in particular bestowed their wealth to their local city councils, this spending was not undertaken without some consideration of their situation. Most canons had been perfectly willing to contribute to the local defense of their town against the marauding *segadors*. They had even been willing to risk their loyalty to the crown by funding the revolution during Catalonia’s darkest hours, when success seemed an impossibility, and condemnation as traitors almost certain. Finally, as we have seen, many chapters were willing to donate treasures from their sacristy during the first Catalan offensive in the spring of 1641, especially when beseeched by town council or the Diputació.

Although the Catalan clergy appeared to enjoy the Franco-Catalan government being established in Barcelona, they nevertheless greeted the new fiscal policies proposed
in the capital with a rather lukewarm response. There were several reasons for this. The first might have been the close involvement of the French in the government. Despite the efforts of pro-French ecclesiastics like Gaspar Sala and Pau del Rosso around Barcelona, or Jaume Pla in Girona, or Enric d’Alemany in Vic, a significant proportion of the Catalan clergy remained wary of having given France so much control over the region’s affairs. This was not only because the French officially tolerated heretical Protestants, or supported Lutheran Sweden in her bid against the Catholic Hapsburgs of Germany; it was also because of the intense violence that the French soldiers had visited upon the Catalans in the months and years prior to their alliance. In the second place, the Catalan clergy were notoriously prone to argue over the right of the sovereign to tax them; the extended dispute over the décima in the 1630s was proof enough for that.

Finally, and most importantly, was the fact that the clerics were running short of money themselves. Catalonia was not a very wealthy province—contemporary assertions to the contrary. Among the nine dioceses, only Tortosa and Tarragona were known for their wealth, and both towns lay in the hands of the Castilians. Furthermore, with more Catalans being called up for military service, the want was felt throughout the countryside: the tithes that the chapters would have collected were gone; many of the wealthy noble families who had patronized particular monasteries or chapels had fled the land. In short, the available sources of ecclesiastical revenue were severely curtailed by the war. As the final straw, the donations required for the first two campaigns took a significant toll on the church’s resources: despite the popular stereotype, most clergymen did not live lives of idle wealth, dining on the finest foods and drinking the finest wines.

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Although the Church had served nearly a full year as Catalonia’s major financial reserve—particularly with the abandonment of the major noble families—it could not stand indefinitely.

Neither the French nor their allies in the Diputació, however, seemed cognizant of this fact. As the first campaign against Tarragona wore on, the French began complaining to the Diputació that Catalonia was not carrying its fair share of the burdens of war. The nature of the Catalan militia units, as with all early-modern militia units was their latent instability. As freemen drawn away from their own occupations, these men would stay and fight provided their salaries were continually paid. In addition, most of these companies had formed with the intention of fighting for a limited time only; there was no sense of “for the duration” in their contracts. Furthermore, as irregulars, they were of little use during a siege, where a far greater emphasis was placed on discipline and order, and where insubordination was sharply curtailed. It was not the intention of the French, however, to fight the entire war for the sake of Catalan liberties, neither was it their intention to foot the bill.

Throughout the month of May, the Diputació and the Braços General—still enjoying emergency powers for nearly eight months—suggested that the province’s military and fiscal involvement in this war be regularized. To this end, on 24 May 1641, a new governing junta was proposed. Given the present necessities facing the Principat and Comtats at this time, the Braços decided to create and fund a small standing army of five thousand infantry and five hundred horse. Called simply, “the Battalion,” this army
was ideally meant to procure the province’s safety during times of peace and war. In reality, it served as tangible evidence for the French that Catalonia was indeed contributing its fair share to the war effort. This unprecedented ordinance, in open conflict with a number of Catalan constitutions, needed a great deal of help, including many back-room meetings with influential members of the church and secular society, before there was the slightest possibility of it becoming law. Perhaps one of the most significant signs about the great opposition that the Catalan people had for the measure is that the first publications regarding the Batalló only emerged in October, five months after its initial proposal.

Every attempt to make the measure more palatable to the Catalans was taken, especially by trying to link the requirements with provincial traditions and constitutions. For example, the very first, fundamental objection, directed against the principle of a standing army, was answered by an appeal to convenience. Rather than continually calling out the somentent general and dealing with untrained irregulars, and rather than having to wait for their king to land in Catalonia and declare this provincial-wide enlistment, the Batalló would provide a ready-armed, fully trained band with which to defend Catalonia from its enemies.

824 “[per] la necessitat del present Principat y Comtats…se intentava formar un Battaló que agues de servir en temps de pau, y de guerra.” BC: FB 108: Apuntaments donats per la Junta del Batallo… (12 Oct 1641), f. 142. Arguments from necessity—particularly those that infringed upon traditional Catalan liberties—were a staple in the rhetoric of the hated Count-Duke of Olivares. It was extremely ironic, then that the dreaded phrase became continuously more common among the Catalan leadership as the war progressed, and new ways of waging the fight were needed.

825 Ibid, See point 1, on how the Batallo “subrogat en lloch de las convocacions de somentent general, ost y cavalcada, y de la ques feye en virtut del Usatge Princeps Namque.” f. 142v. A later paragraph, though, goes even further towards palliating Catalan objections by stating that the standing army would only fight within the borders of the Principat and Comtats, and would disband following the conclusion of their war against Castile. See, point 17: the Battalo “hage de servir dins lo present Principat…y no fora dells sempre
As for concerns with the degradations of foreign troops, and the desire that no false mercenary serve under the Catalan flag, point 11 stated that all soldiers in the Batalló, “have to be natives of Catalonia, or its Comtats, and if they are foreigners, they have to be married in the Province, or must have lived two years in it.” Also typical for their time, the Catalan authorities believed they could fill the ranks with the dregs of society, and called upon even the smallest villages to force all their “vagabonds and disruptive and pernicious folk,” to the colors, “under penalty that if they refuse, of being imprisoned by the officials of the said Cities … and without any other declaration carried to the galleys of the present Principat” for five years.

The wages would be rather modest: Captains would earn 50 lliures a year; lieutenants, 30 lliures, and chaplains and quartermasters would earn 15 lliures per year. When taken together with the salaries of the rank and file the total costs of maintaining the Catalan infantry in the Batalló worked out to 28,375 ll 10 sous per month; the cavalry 6683 ll, for a grand total of 35.058 ll 10 sous, per month. This was an extraordinarily large amount to require, each month for at least several more years, especially when one considers the province’s already weakened fiscal condition.

In order to “provide for the common defense,” while at the same time not ignoring the general welfare, the Junta in charge of the Batalló hoped to raise 45.000 ll
each month; such a levy could only be raised with the increased and continual support of every member of every estate in Catalonia. And such was their request: “[The Junta] itself beseeches the clerics that have inheritances, or houses of their patrimony in the said Cities, villages, and places, desiring in the same way to contribute with the aforementioned nobles and exempt persons.”

Clerics and nobles who had businesses or a second house in the country would have to pay taxes on those as well. While secular leaders were undoubtedly upset at the forfeiture of their tax exemptions, it was apparent in the following section that the church in Catalonia was still seen as the golden goose, to whom much had been given, and therefore, from whom much would be required. The penultimate section was a public appeal to the Church, asking its ministers to willing contribute a sizeable amount. Perhaps the oddest section in this novel piece of proposed legislation was the last one, in which the delegates of the Junta de Batalló requested King Louis XIII to enforce these decisions in the Comtats of Roussillon and Cerdagne. Whether the appeal is merely an acknowledgement of the still-troubled situation up north—where Perpignan, Colliure, and Roses still lay in the hands of Castilian soldiers—or the beginning of a stronger royal presence in Catalonia, the Junta de Batalló and the Principat’s new military establishment further linked France and Catalonia together.

By so doing, identity boundaries within the province were further delineated: it was becoming increasingly difficult for Catalans who had initially disapproved of

830 “se suplique als ecclesiastichs que tindran heretats, o, cases de son patrimoni en ditas Ciutats vilas, y llochs vulen semblantment contribuir con dits militars y personas exemptas.” Ibid, f. 146.
831 Ibid, point 25: “Que se servesca VS representar als molt Illust. Bisbes y estament Ecclesiastich vullan voluntariament ajudar al dit Batalló per roho de la azienda mere Ecclesiastica que tenen assenyalment la quantitat certa quells aparexera attes se tracta de cosa tocant a la defensa comuna.” f. 146v.
Castile’s disinterest in the church burnings of 1640 to stand behind any and all attempts by the French—and the Catalan minority who supported them—to direct the province’s resources towards the war effort. The social coherence of revolt, engendered during the dark autumnal days foreboding imminent defeat, was beginning to collapse with the increased French presence in the region. What exactly the majority of the Catalan clerics initially opposed to Castile desired in 1640-1641 is uncertain: only the partisans of France enumerated their desire for independence, which they later modified to annexation under the Bourbons. Even then, this minority seems to have supported the French cause more because of the political offices they enjoyed as a result of favors than for any other reason.832 What becomes evident under the continued rule of the French is a desire by Catalan churchmen to persevere in the defense of their ecclesiastical privileges. The fiscal necessities imposed upon them through the formation of the Junta de Batalló was far greater than any décima collection proposed by Philip IV, and the cathedral canons in particular were determined to fight this portentous innovation tooth and claw.

Barcelona led the way in this, as in so many other matters pertaining to the church and her liberties. On 16 September 1641, representatives from the various chapters of rebel Catalonia gathered in Barcelona to draft a compact concerning the formation of the Batalló. Written as an address to the incoming viceroy, the Maréchal de Brézé, it acknowledges, that “the ecclesiastical estate has congregated itself several times to compare the mode and form with which it will be able to come up to (have recourse to)

832 At the very least, a royal apology for the sacrilege committed by his soldiers, combined with a more favorable policy towards Catalonia, which in turn, would only be possible after the expulsion of the hated Olivares and his toady, the Protonotario Villanueva seem to be the basic concessions expected by most of the clerics who initially opposed Castile. Certainly the dismissal of the latter officials and the promise made by the king in 1644 at Lleida for a more lenient rule did a lot to convince a majority of clerics to return to the fold of Castile.
the subsidy of the batalló that has been formed in this province for the common defense.”  

While placing this document in the context of their continual support, the canons were specifically interested in identifying the relevant problems that would limit the financial amount the religious estate would be able to provide.

The specific concerns are enumerated at the end of the resolution. They begin by acknowledging that they have nothing against the principle of contributing “to the Batalló which has been formed for the common defense” but only in the method in which the levy would be gathered. The first issue concerned hereditary property held either by a specific cleric or a religious house; according to the Batalló’s constitution, the clerics would be taxed a specified amount, just as petty nobles would be taxed on their patrimony. In response, the clerics answered that such taxes would be assigned an amount by the local chapter and collected by clerics so as to maintain traditional ecclesiastical privileges.

Another issue concerned the quantity of money to be raised by the clergy, as the government seemed inclined to request a certain amount rather than a percentage of the church’s yearly income. After searching through their extensive records, the collected chapters concluded they would only raise for the province, the maximum amount

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833 “Lo bras ecclesiastich se es Juntat diversses vegades pera conferir lo modo y forma ab que podia accudir a la subventio del batalló que en esta Provincia ha de formarse per la defensa comuna.” ACB: Cabildo: IV. Decima, Subsidio, Excusado; E. Batalló—“Consentament y pactes por contribuir lo estat ecclesiastich de la Prova Tarrconense a la formacio del Batalló,” f. 1.

834 As the author wrote, the compact was written “tant per al seguretat de les conveniencies de tots com també per la bona directio y forma se ha de guardar en la tatxa y exactio assegurant a VS que les dificultats y ha considerades son estades tant rellevantes que nols han donat lloc de delliherar ab mes brevedat y que dit estament de sitja a justar se en tot lo que ses clitats li donaran lloc ab lo sentir desl de mes com ha VS, pogut veuer en totes les occasions se son afectes fins asi y fara axi mateix de asi al devant ab tota conformitat,” Ibid, f. 1.

835 “en lo Batalló que per la defensa comuna se ha de formar,” Ibid, capitol 22.

836 Ibid, Capitol 23. The same policy applied in Capitol 24 for “los sensals sensos y altres haziendas vulgarment dites Burgesals mere laiques que dits ecclesiastichs per sos titols tenen y posseixen.” f. 1v.
approved by the pope in prior years. Unfortunately for the French and their Catalan clients, the highest sum given papal sanction was bestowed by Clement VII in 1524, in consideration of “la necessitat y utilitat comuna de dit Principat,” and only amounted to 30,000 lliures, scarcely sufficient to pay the Catalan regiment for only a single month.837 From the canons’ perspective, to ask for more was out of the question. Even collecting the sum of 30,000 lliures would be difficult, for a large portion of the richer regions of the province lay under Spanish control; as such it was not possible to collect any definite amount, casting the whole burden on those churches “que estaran libres de la oppresio del enemich.” Only when “all the Province will be free from the enemy’s oppression and subdued to the obedience of the Most Christian King” would the church in Catalonia be able to pay the large sum in full.838

In addition to their disheartening prospects at collecting any sizeable amount of cash for the Batalló, the clergy also made it clear that such arbitrary taxation would only be tolerated for a short while. Staying true to the banner of Catalan constitutions and liberties, the churchmen insisted that a Corts must be organized under Louis XIII, where levels of taxation were debated and approved. The Braços General was adequate for handling emergency measures, but, as the canons pointed out, only in the Corts General was taxation legal.839 By sticking to their guns, the Catalan clergy actually shone forth as

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838 “tota la Provincia estiga libre de la oppresio del enemich y reduhida a la obediencia del Rey christianissim,” Ibid, f. 2.
839 “siesols durador fins a la conclusio de les primers corts a les quals se dexepera que ab mayor deliberatio convenient a dit estament y a la Provincia se fasse per no trobarse forma de Juntar los Braços generals sino es en corts general sab que Durant la contributio no estiga subyecte a altre contributio de dit bras y estament ecclesiastich y cesse encontient esta contributio.” Later on in the same capitol, they argue that they will keep paying only as long as the other estates contribute. Ibid, f. 2v
the truest defenders of Catalonia, defending their historic legal principles against many of
their compatriots who were willing to sacrifice to the demands of necessity or exigency.

Further clauses expounded the means by which the tax would be collected among
the church. There would be quarterly payments, collected by clerics only, as decided of
old by those bishops responsible for collecting papal dues, “and not by the hands of the
seculars so that the Apostolic Judge and Commissary Subdelegate cannot [collect]
without the means of ecclesiastical persons, neither can the exaction be but through the
hands of ecclesiastical persons.” Finally, the canons declared that the decision to raise
the 30,000 lliures nullified any other tax on the church, and they insisted that the salaries
of the clerical tax collectors would come from out of the 30,000 lliures raised, a point that
must have proved extremely distasteful to the Franco-Catalan regime.

In light of the difficulties that the clerics felt they would have to go through in
order to collect this money, they closed this accord with a petition to the viceroy that it
would be quicker just to ask the Pope to grant a “grace” in order to collect the
contribution, as the Spanish kings had done in the past. While it is possible that this
advice was included to show the canons’ goodwill in dropping a “helpful hint” to the
governor as he sought to negotiate the Catalan constitutions, a far more likely scenario is
that the clerics included this appeal to Rome, knowing full well that such an important

840 “y no per mans de seculars de manera que no pugue lo Jutge y comissari Apostolich subdelegat sino a
persones ecclesiastich ni la exactio puga ser sino per mans de persones ecclesiastiches.” Ibid, f. 2v.
841 “se entenga hazen de ser libres de tota exactio de manera que nos puga exigir cosa de dit estament a
mes de dites trenta milia lliures y los salaries dels exectors hazen de defalcarese de dits trenta milia lliures,”
Ibid, f. 3.
842 “sie servit lo mes prest li sera possibile demaner a S Sd en quant sera menester gratia particular dels
contribuyents puga librament corer la executio de dita contributio no retardantse per axo la contributio den
del dia que VS aparexera comensar de exigir de dit estament la dita contributio.” ACB: Cabildo: IV.
Decima, Subsidio, Excusado; E. Batalló—“Consentament y pactes por contribuir lo estat ecclesiastich de la
Prova Tarrconense a la formacio del Batallo.”
procedure would undoubtedly bog down in the ecclesiastical bureaucracy—not to mention, papal approval of such a tax would be tantamount to an official recognition of France’s claim to Catalonia.

Since the debate and ultimate enactment of the Junta de Batalló was one of those rare moments where practically the entire body of Catalan clergy stood in opposition to a royal policy—be it Spanish or French—it is natural to find that several motives underlay their resistance to the new tax levy. The first concern of the clergy was more political in nature. Basically, the Junta represented nothing more than another way to tax the clergy without their consent, and also without papal consent. As such, it constituted a fundamental violation of ecclesiastical immunity of property, as well an assault against the Catalan tradition of raising taxes only through the medium of the Corts.

The second issue pertained to the end for which the Junta was established: by supporting such a body, the clergy were, in essence, giving a tacit acknowledgement that they are paying for the cause of France, not simply against Castile. More than a mere semantic difference, this shift raised the stakes quite a lot—just as the enforced Oath to the King in 1643 would raised them higher still. No longer could the clerical attitude be merely an insistence on Catalan purity against Castilian sacrilege. On the contrary, supporting the Junta meant supporting the actions of a particular Catalan minority and their French patrons in power in whatever strategy they chose to pursue. To put it simply, it required of the Catalan clergy a sincere and dedicated effort to help France win. Few Catalan clerics were willing to go to such lengths in 1640; they would not become persuaded in later years.
Third, and most importantly, the ecclesiastical estate simply lacked the financial resources to meet the new demands of early-modern warfare, even when added to the burden placed on other Catalan estates. As Sir John Elliott has written in his study on the causes of the revolt, both Catalonia and Castile entertained an exaggerated view of the province’s population, resources, and wealth.\(^{843}\) This inflated outlook caused numerous problems between Crown and Principat, with the former convinced that Catalonia simply would not pay her fair share in the defense of Spain and her empire. Whether the French bought into the inflated statistics regarding Catalan population and wealth, just as Elliott believes many Catalans themselves and certainly Olivares did, is uncertain. But the general tone of the correspondence suggests that they believed a number of clerics were holding something back. The resulting disparity between French expectations and the actual contributions supplied by the Catalan clergy did not endear the two factions to each other at all, and relations continued to deteriorate throughout the long conflict.

In the end, all the clergy’s protests, though they centered on traditional privileges, found little hearing with the French and even with their secular Catalan countrymen. It is probable that the French alliance—where patronage promised advancement and defeat promised exile or death—corrupted a number of Catalan elite who had led the revolt during the autumn of 1640. The goals of the revolt, never clearly enunciated anyway, soon changed from the explicit defense against sacrilege and the more vague defense of Catalan constitutions, to a win-at-all-costs mentality. Having changed their objectives, many Catalans enjoying a newfound power were also convinced to change their stance towards their own cultural legacy. Necessity, that dreaded phrase of the hated Olivares,

\(^{843}\) See Elliott, *Revolt of the Catalans*, 238-239.
soon became the new watchword in Barcelona; and it seems that the irony was completely lost on those who used it. With a good portion of the secular leadership having turned their backs on their tradition of constitutional government, only the clergy stood in the gap against a nascent regime that threatened to become as absolute an authority as Philip IV had ever been—perhaps even more so. Their first efforts of resistance, beginning even as the new French viceroy assumed office, failed completely: the Junta de Batalló was established as planned. The defeat would not lessen the clergy’s concern regarding their new masters. By refusing to compromise with political and military “necessities,” however, the clergy would begin to make for themselves an enemy within their borders; what began as political disagreement would end in harassment, oppression, and persecution.

Conclusion

1641 proved be a decisive year for Catalonia. Its opening would mark the first victory by the rebels over the royal army on the hills overlooking Barcelona; its ending would contain the first grumblings against their new masters, a portent of the troubles to follow. The conflict that had begun in righteous indignation against the heavy-handed and tyrannical policies of Castile had now become yet another front in the centuries-old struggle between France and Spain for dominance among Catholic powers in Europe. With this introduction of Catalan affairs into a more continental perspective, the attitudes of the two countries involved changed as well. France, whose reluctant acceptance of the Catalan cause appeared, even from the very beginning, to be calculating rather than altruistic in nature, would be interested in the war in Catalonia only insofar as it helped
them achieve their larger war aims. Spain, on the other hand, did not relish the possibility of any French control south of the Pyrenees, and so had much more to lose in Catalonia, thereby waging war with all the more passion. These two factors would largely shape the future military campaigns within the Principat, as well as the appeals made by both sides to claim the hearts and minds of the Catalan people.

The Catalan clergy—both regular and secular—appear to mirror the popular attitudes concerning the war and the two powers who were involved in the continuing war. At the first, many provincial clergy, particularly the lower members of the church hierarchy, firmly believed that the victory at Montjuïc was a sign from God, indicating Divine approval of the Catalan cause. Continuing to cast the conflict in religious terms—protecting the communal body of believers while defending the Sacramental Body of Christ—these priests and friars encouraged popular resistance during the early months of 1641. This support of the province’s efforts extended even to the offensive siege of Tarragona, where clerics served as chaplains to the new Franco-Catalan army.

The failure of the rebels to follow up on their success at Montjuïc however, dealt a severe blow to the Catalan cause, a shock that was not realized at first by contemporaries. In an age where decisive campaigns were more the exception rather than the rule, the French generals—and their Catalan clients—did not overly concern themselves with the setback at Tarragona; they merely shrugged their shoulders and prepared for the next round. In a province richer in natural resources or manpower, such

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844 As the Catalans eventually discovered with outraged fury, such aims did not include the permanent establishment of Catalonia as a republic in the style of Venice or the Netherlands—which latter aim France pursued at the Peace Conference at Münster—nor annexation of the Principat and Comtats into France. As news of this betrayal leaked back into Catalonia, around 1644-1645, resistance to the French became even more widespread than in previous years.
as Bavaria or Flanders, such an attitude was *de rigueur*. In Catalonia, however, a land whose assets failed to measure up to the popular conception, every campaign mattered. As both church and local records attest, even the very early months of rebellion against Castile put a severe strain on all possible sources of revenue; the very first offensive campaign crippled church and state finances severely. For Catalonia to be victorious it required either a quick end to the conflict—a scenario extremely unlikely in early-modern warfare—or sufficient diversions by allies on other fronts—such as Portugal, Germany, the Low Countries, Italy, or overseas—which failed to materialize. Rather than being a stout cudgel, with which the French could deal the decisive blow to Castile, Catalonia was nothing more than a weak reed that broke in the hands of its user (see Bible quote).

By late 1641, however, the new French viceroy, the Maréchal de Brézé did not recognize the tenuous state of affairs in Catalonia. Neither did the Diputació or the Braços General, which, in their haste to please their new masters, pushed forward the Junta de Batalló over the vocal protestations of the clergy. The fact that opposition was raised to this standing army even by clerics who had been strong proponents of rebellion scarcely a year before ought to have been a warning sign to the French, and the ruling Catalan laity. Those in power ignored the ominous rumblings of discontent and pushed forward the measure to the consternation of chapter canons and regulars alike, who were beginning to see in the French a more heavy-handed rule than they had experienced under Castile. Very soon this discontent would turn once more into resistance and rebellion, bringing upon several important clergymen, the wrath of the new civil power.

As clerical independence in Catalonia appeared to become swamped by the secular Franco-Catalan authorities—forced to donate large sums to the war effort and
curtailed by the votes of the Braços and the new powers of the viceroy in voicing their opposition—a faint light glimmered from across the Mediterranean. In 1642, after nearly a year and a half of war, Pope Urban VIII would finally arrive at a decision regarding Catalonia and its future. But, as we will see, the introduction by the Supreme Pontiff into Catalan affairs was not a very great boon for the clergy. Like the Apostle Paul, the Catalans had appealed to Rome for aid in defending their cause; like the Apostle, they would receive no relief from the chains that had been placed upon them.
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<td>Secretos publicos, piedra de toque, de las intenciones del enemigo, y luz de la verdad.</td>
<td>BARCELONA</td>
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<td>Epitome de los principios y progressos de las guerras de Cataluña.</td>
<td>BARCELONA</td>
<td>1641</td>
<td>P. Lacavalleria</td>
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<td>Viladomor, Francesc Martí</td>
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<td>Noticia universal de Cataluña, en amor, seruícos, y finezas, admirable. En agrauios, opressiones ... sufrida. En constituciones ... valerssa ... [etc.]</td>
<td>BARCELONA</td>
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<td>Política del comte d'Olivares. Contrapolítica de Cataluña y Barcelona</td>
<td>BARCELONA</td>
<td>1641</td>
<td>Jaume Romeu</td>
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<td>Jésus Maria, Josep de</td>
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<td>Sermó predicat en lo aniversari…</td>
<td>BARCELONA</td>
<td>1641</td>
<td>Gabriel Nogués, Estamper de la Deputació</td>
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Table 5.1: Chart of Domestic and Foreign Publications of Early Catalan Sermons and Religiously-Oriented Pamphlets of Revolt, 1640-1643
CHAPTER 6
The “High-Water Mark” of the Catalan Revolt, 1641-1642


846 “to fill up (make complete) what you have depended on from our power for your good and well-being, we have resolved to come to your land so as to feel at first-hand, the effects which have been secured through our protection, in placing you all under obedience to us.”) ACV: Secretaria: Cartas Reales, 1602-1753 (Arm 57/30), Letter from Louis XIII to the cathedral chapters of Catalonia, 28 January 1642.

“The first full year of the Catalan revolt contained much positive news for the rebels, who celebrated their newfound position with such joy that even obscured the untimely and lamentable death of Pau Claris. 1641 encapsulated the honeymoon period between the Catalans and their French allies, as both sides enjoyed the blessings of an otherwise unusual union. The Catalans in Barcelona could take pleasure in their successful revolt from Castile, and in the comfortable exercise of autonomous rule—even with the arrival of the first French viceroy, much of the decision-making came from the halls of the Generalitat and the Consell de Cent. The French on the other hand, and Cardinal Richelieu in particular, could enjoy the continued discomfort of the Habsburgs, attained at relatively little cost to themselves, and the addition of a group of people who seemed
willing to place themselves under the protection of Paris—a far cry from the bitter rebellions in Normandy that had troubled king and cardinal in prior years. Although the Franco-Catalan forces had failed to recapture Tarragona, and Philip IV still held the important cities of Roussillon—Salses, Perpignan, Colliure, and Roses—the military leadership could be pleased that they had suffered no serious setback during 1641. The few Castilian offensives into rebel-held territory had been pushed back, and what little word had been received from Rome proved optimistic as well.

From an international perspective as well, the Catalan rebellion seemed a fait accompli. Although the events in Catalonia moved far more rapidly than Rome could process the news stemming from the revolt, certain decisions made by Urban VIII during 1641 encouraged the Catalans in their belief that the Holy Father condoned their rebellion in defense of the Holy Sacrament. Although checked in their desire to have St. Eulalia’s Day proclaimed a universal feast for the Church, the religious community in Catalonia took great pleasure in hearing that the Pope was continuing to appoint Catalan nominees to abbeys and cathedral chapters. They took especial pride in the papal condemnation of Bishop Paredes of Lleida—who was attempting to control his diocese from his self-appointed exile in Aragon—and the accompanying commendation of Lleida’s chapter for seeing to the spiritual welfare of the Catalan people during such troublesome times.

This papal sympathy for their condition, as well as their initial military successes against Castile, produced a heightened sense of confidence among the rebels in Catalonia.

847 Whereas 1640 saw the Catalans fighting on their own against the first attempt by Philip IV to regain control over the province, 1641 saw both the dramatic victory of the rebels at Montjuïc as well as the failed attempt by Franco-Catalan forces to recapture Tarragona. The rest of the year petered out as the opposing lines stabilized: the remote areas of the diocese of Tortosa, most of the diocese of Tarragona, and practically all of the diocese of Lleida remained in the hands of the rebellious Catalans.
In their letters to their syndics in Rome and their appeals to the Pope regarding religious festivals or ecclesiastical appointments during 1641, the Catalans showed little remorse for their actions in resisting Philip IV. On the contrary, a majority of the population still strongly maintained their innocence and pure defense of the Consecrated Host against the sacrilegious and pseudo-Catholic forces of Castile and her empire. This prevailing attitude of a religious war would manifest itself through the campaigns of 1642 as soldiers at the fronts and urban pamphleteers alike drew on the imagery of the sacrilege of 1640. The continued Franco-Catalan success—as well as Castilian brutality—in this second year of war added further evidence to the popular Catalan understanding that theirs was the right side in this battle of conflicting Catholic powers.

1642 constituted the high-water mark in Franco-Catalan rule over the Principat and the Comtats of Roussillon and Cerdagne. The year would mark the zenith of Catalan cooperation with the new French government. Secular and religious leaders of the revolt, such as Don Josep de Margarit i Biure, Don Josep d’Ardena, Josep Fontanella, Gaspar Sala, Jaume Ferran, Don Llorens de Barutell, and Pau del Rosso enjoyed new positions of power within their homeland as a result of cultivating French patronage: they would not be alone. The year would also mark the last significant defeats of the Castilian army as Philip IV attempted yet again to reclaim the troublesome principality. The military campaigns in 1642 affected the north, south, and west of Catalonia, creating new opportunities for the Catalan clergy to act either on behalf of their former king, or on the side of their new master. In every single occasion, significant numbers of clergy prayed for, paid for, and fought alongside their fellow countrymen in defense of their patria against the Castilian invaders, just as they had done during the offensives of 1640 and
1641. This continued support for the rebellion involved increasing sacrifices from both the secular clergy and the religious orders, sacrifices that were only partially recognized and recompensed by the Franco-Catalan government in Barcelona.

**The Character of the New French Leadership and their Catalan Clerical Allies**

Although the rebellious Catalans had won a temporary measure of security following their victory at Montjuïc, Cardinal Richelieu was unsatisfied with the performance of some of his personnel and engineered several changes to the French leadership in Catalonia. The French military commander, Espenan—who had embarrassed himself and his country at Tarragona—and the chief French liaison in Catalonia, du Plessis-Besançon—who, it was felt, conceded far too much to the Catalans in the original covenant of January 1641—were relieved and ordered to return to France. In their place came the Marshal Philippe La Mothe Houdancourt as commanding general and René de Veyres, Seigneur d’Argenson as Intendant-General.\(^8\)\(^4\) Both men would play critically important roles in Catalonia for the next several years, protecting its frontiers and implementing many of Cardinal Richelieu’s designs.

The sole historian to research the entire War of the Segadors, Josep Sanabre, focuses much of his attention during the years from 1641-1652 on the French administrators in Catalonia, their attitudes towards Catalans in general, and the ways in which they sought to mould the new territory towards French ideals. He noted that both La Mothe and d’Argenson formed part of Richelieu’s special coterie, and were active

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\(^8\) Sanabre, *La Acción de Francia en Cataluña*, 138. du Plessis-Besançon was greatly put out by his recall and wrote a lengthy defense of his time and activities spent during the early months of the revolt in Catalonia, material which Sanabre relied upon for his epic history.
supporters of the Cardinal’s anti-Spanish policies. As Intendant, d’Argenson was responsible for matters pertaining to administrative affairs within the French army: this would mean procuring pay and subsistence for the men as well as resolving issues of discipline.

The character of the Intendant d’Argenson was quite significant for the historian Sanabre, who classified him as one of the craftiest governors sent by the French to Catalonia. Among his many powers, Sanabre asserts that the Seigneur was able to dominate over the interim-Diputat Eclesiastic, Josep Soler, duping the canon from Urgell to promote all sorts of pro-French policies in return for promotion as a canon in Barcelona. D’Argenson’s persuasive talents also seem to have been particularly effective on the subsequent Diputat Eclesiastic, Don Bernat de Cardona, the archdeacon major of Girona.

Whatever may have been d’Argenson’s psychological powers, it was true that Cardinal Richelieu did entrust him with a great deal of authority. Aside from filling the leadership gap in Catalonia left by the death of Pau Claris, d’Argenson worked as a

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849 Ibid, 148. Another account indicated that d’Argenson, rather than du Plessis-Besançon, was originally marked to be the first liaison between France and Catalonia during the autumn of 1640.
850 D’Argenson, together with the “spiritual intendant,” Pierre de Marca are the two clear-cut villains in the historian’s epic work. What de Marca was able to perform by way of spiritual legitimacy, however, d’Argenson appears to have done by means of his domineering personality. But the portrait of d’Argenson as painted by Sanabre (La Acción de Francia, 172-174) is problematic, and it is here that Sanabre’s perspective may be questioned. The official documents of the Generalitat at this time all carry the Diputats’ signatures, whether it be Soler or Cardona; the presence of an “evil genius” influencing these decrees still needs to be proven. Sanabre himself admits that most of the bibliographic material he consulted was rather vague on the issue of d’Argenson’s temperament, yet he seems to spot the Seigneur behind every “bad” policy decision made in the name of the Diputació. While other sources seem to indicate that Josep Soler was largely a man used to taking orders—whether from Claris and his fellow canons in Urgell or d’Argenson—the same has not been said about Cardona. It is one of the points of this thesis to show that the Catalans, both pro-French, and pro-Spanish, were responsible agents in every step of the great drama of rebellion and war. At the very least, one should be hesitant before accepting a rather extreme “passive-and-naïve Catalonia controlled by the conniving French” position.
851 Sanabre, La Acción de Francia, 141; 149.
leading member on the Junta de Guerra, influencing nearly every internal decision made by the Generalitat. During the middle of 1641, the Intendant assumed control over the French policy in Catalonia before de Brézé assumed power—and he would serve the province again in the same role the following year, in between the departure of de Brézé and the swearing-in of La Mothe.

Despite the future problems that would occur between the Catalan church and the new regime in Barcelona, the initial dealings between the two institutions were quite cordial. Soon after he occupied the post of viceroy, the marquis de Brézé directed his efforts towards two policies: the first, rewarding the faithful ecclesiastical servants of the French cause, and secondly, re-organizing church affairs to enable regional money to more smoothly and securely enter the king’s coffers and pay for the French army defending Catalonia.

Among the first to benefit was Jaume Pla, one of Girona’s most distinguished canons and often their delegate to Barcelona. In late January, de Brézé confirmed him in the post of “Inquisitorem Apostolicum Plentis principatus.”¹⁸⁵² On 18 March 1642, he wrote to Don Llorens de Barutell, one of the more prominent canons of Urgell and former friend to Pau Claris, bestowing upon him the title of Canceller, although the position was...
not confirmed until the following month. As Canceller, Barutell became the most powerful cleric—next to the Diputat Eclesiastic—in the region.

In addition to the exalted positions such as Canceller, Viceroy de Brézé also made a number of lesser clerical appointments. A majority of these involved the position of “segrestador,” a cleric who assumed fiscal responsibility over a given parish or house due to the death or flight (or later exile) of the previous churchman. Thus, for example, on 20 March 1642, de Brézé appointed Dr. Fra Don Felip de Lentorn, a Benedictine from the house of St. Esteve de Banyoles, segrestador over the double monastery of Amer i Roses. The monasteries had been without an abbot since the departure of the Catalan candidate, Andreu Pont, for Rome in 1641, and the refusal of the Castilian candidate, Juan de Samatier, to come to Catalonia. Other Benedictine houses received similar treatment. Fra Francesc Monfar—a Benedictine monk from San Cugat de Valles and currently abbot-elect of the abbey of St. Pere de Camprodon—being named segrestador of the St. Esteve de Banyoles on the death of the abbot Mantilla. Furthermore, Fra Don Francesc de Montpalau, the monk of Ripoll who provided a great service for the Diputació in

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853 ACU: VI. Llibre de memòries del canonge Alexandre Duran, f. 21v. As his duties required him to spend most of his time in Barcelona, the chapter of Urgell sent two delegates to congratulate him on coming into the prestitigious title in early May. ACU: I. Conclusions Capitualares, 1 May 1642, (f. 34; S. 252).
854 It may be argued that, as the French viceroy began expanding their power in Catalonia, the Diputació became reduced to a figurehead—with the sole exception of Diputat Eclesiastic Don Gaspar Amat in 1645—the Canceller became the highest rank acheiveable by a cleric in Catalonia. In his appointment of Barutell, the viceroy waxed poetic on the canon’s talents: “cuius fidem, lierarum eminentiam, prudeniam, integretatum, negotiorum usum, aliasque virtutes, et animi dotes, servitus non vulgaribus, per te regiae maiestati, ac patriae praestitis habemus. Tu enim? Fui ste unus ex obsidibus per deputatos generalis Cataloniae…” ACA: Cancelleria: Intrusos: Legajo-111 (Officialium) (1642-1650), ff. 65-65v.
855 ACA: Cancellaria: Intrusos: Legajo-113 (Diversorum) (1642-1644), ff. 4v-6.
856 ACA: Cancellaria: Intrusos: Legajo-113 (Diversorum) (1642-1644), ff. 6v-7.
1640, and who was currently abbot-elect of Banyoles, became *segrestador* of St. Pere de Camprodon, on the death of the abbot Fra Pere Finot.\(^8^5^7\)

Still other ecclesiastical supporters of the French cause found themselves rewarded for their efforts. Within a few months of assuming office, de Brézé named the famous Gaspar Sala abbot-elect of the prestigious monastery San Cugat de Valles, located on the hills overlooking Barcelona. The appointment of Sala—an Augustinian—to a Benedictine house did not sit well with the majority of the brothers at San Cugat, faithful Catalans though they were.\(^8^5^8\) Upset at the high-handed manner with which Philip IV had appointed non-members of the Order over them, they were not about to suffer the same treatment from the French quietly. In an attempt to assert his viceregal authority, de Brézé ordered “the friend of his Royal Majesty,” Fra Josep de Malla—a Benedictine from Ripoll, the *segrestador* of San Cugat de Valles to send a “gift” of an unspecified amount.\(^8^5^9\)

Another cleric to benefit from his adherence to the rebel cause was Francesc Puig, the archdeacon major of Tortosa, and one of the only clerics from that diocese to join the rebellion, let alone play a prominent part in the 1640 defense. For his efforts, de Brézé delivered to his care charge over all the ecclesiastical rents of the diocese of Tortosa. This meant that Puig would be the official collector and administrator over all the rents owed to chapter, canons, dignitaries, and benefices. Of course, it was a mixed blessing.

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\(^8^5^7\) ACA: Cancelleria: Intrusos: Legajo-113 (Diversorum) (1642-1644), ff. 7-7v.
\(^8^5^8\) The same houses of San Cugat and St. Pere de Camprodon had issued a lengthy protest to Philip IV in 1640 because of the threat that the non-Benedictine Cardenal-Infante would become abbot over them.
\(^8^5^9\) ACA: Cancelleria: Intrusos: Legajo-113 (Diversorum) (1642-1644), ff. 11v-12.
since much of the diocese of Tortosa was in the hands of Philip IV, but despite this, Puig did manage to amass a significant revenue from the diocese before he disappears from the scene around 1645.\textsuperscript{860}

Further appointments were directed at relatives of influential Catalans. The most obvious example was that of Fra Don Vincenç de Margarit i Biure, brother to the famous Josep. In early July, Louis appointed the Dominican Bishop of Lleida.\textsuperscript{861} Although he never received official papal confirmation, the selection of Margarit proved that Louis XIII would not be shy about episcopal nominations in Catalonia. If anything, it further marked the desire by the French to pronounce the struggle in Catalonia a \textit{fait accompli} to the international community, while at the same time bolstering their support among natives by showing their concern for the spiritual well-being of their new subjects. In this, the French king would find a valuable ally—at least initially—in the personage of Pope Urban VIII.

\textbf{The International Aspect of the War of the Segadors: Catalan Contacts with Rome}

The revolt of the Catalans occurred during a dramatic time for European Catholicism. In the first place, the Church was in the midst of a Reformation of its own, attempting to formulate answers to the new Protestant theologies. The chief goal of the Council of Trent and its implementation into European society was to clarify Roman Catholic doctrine and theology and to demonstrate how the leaders of the church were to relate to the leaders of civil society. The practical working-out of Trent was made more difficult because of the inter-Catholic rift that continued between France and Spain.

\textsuperscript{860} ACA: Cancelleria: Intrusos: Legajo-113 (Diversorum) (1642-1644), ff. 13v-16v.
\textsuperscript{861} ACG: Cartas, 1640-1642; Don Bernat de Cardona, Diputat Eclesiàstic to Canon Pere Joan Albert, 7 July 1642.
Although external secular concerns about controlling territory and influence on the Continent divided the two powers, their kings and ministers pursued similar domestic policies, endeavoring to place religious concerns below the temporal interests of the state. Far from reclaiming its place as a leader of Catholic thought and policy in the seventeenth century, the See of St. Peter became subject to the desires of Bourbons and Hapsburgs in their pursuit to overwhelm, or at least, control papal influence within their own countries.862

Matters only worsened in the 1630s, as the Thirty Years’ War passed into its second decade with little hope of a Catholic victory against the Protestant princes of Germany and their Lutheran Swedish allies. As if that were not enough, growing international tensions between France and Spain—over the former’s blatant financial aid to Swedish armies in the field—marked an increase in the fighting between the two powers as to who would control the papal elections. Since the Italian states were either too independent, or else merely the client-state of either great power, the seventeenth century popes were generally elected with the aid of cardinals from one of the two major factions.

The heirs of St. Peter were expected to repay a portion of the fruits of their election to their unofficial patrons, generally in terms of favorable decisions on the current wars. Already struggling to make sure that kings would not take over religious

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862 This conflict between Crown and Crozier reached its apex in the mid-to-late eighteenth century with the expulsion of the Jesuits from such staunchly Catholic lands as Portugal, Spain, and France, and the temporary abolition of the Order by the Pope himself. This particular conflict appears as a hallmark of the various “Catholic Enlightenments” led by the Marques de Pombal in Portugal, Carlos III in Spain, and Joseph II in Austria, without necessarily compromising the devotion of king or county to Catholicism itself.
matters, nor dominate too much the politics within Rome, the pontiffs and the Catholic
Church were next beset by the problem of internal revolts by Catholics against their
lawful Catholic rulers.

The Revolt of the Catalans was the first of these “new” revolts, and would be
followed in the same decade with a revolution in Portugal in 1640, the Fronde in 1648,
and two small revolts in Sicily and Naples in 1647-48. These Catholic-on-Catholic
revolts presented an interesting problem for the papacy. On the one hand there were
significant theological considerations: the church had long held that the heads of state and
“the powers that be” are ordained of God; rebellion against these magistrates was a
heinous crime, comparable to the sin of witchcraft. On the other hand there were
international diplomatic considerations: any divisive infighting between Catholics would
virtually ensure a Protestant victory in the Holy Roman Empire and the Low Countries,
seriously compromising Catholic efforts to re-evangelize these heretical lands. Finally
there were internal political considerations: since the policies of France’s ministers
Richlieu and Mazarin were seemingly behind all of these major revolts—save for the

863 “Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be
are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they
that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil.
Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same:
For he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not
the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.
Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake. For for this cause
pay ye tribute also: for they are God's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing. Render
therefore to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear;
honour to whom honour.” Romans 13:1-7; See also I Samuel 15:22-23, “And Samuel said, Hath the LORD
as great delight in burnt offerings and sacrifices, as in obeying the voice of the LORD? Behold, to obey is
better than sacrifice, and to hearken than the fat of rams. For rebellion is as the sin of witchcraft, and
stubbornness is as iniquity and idolatry. Because thou hast rejected the word of the LORD, he hath also
rejected thee from being king.”
Fronde—favoring the rebels and thus the French might upset the balance of power in Rome during the next papal election, and further politicize the office of the Bishop of Rome.

All these troublesome considerations came to rest upon the shoulders of Pope Urban VIII, who governed the Holy See from 1623 to 1644. Elected chiefly on the merits of French intrigue and enjoying that country’s patronage for several years, Urban had a natural proclivity towards siding with France, all the more so after his relationship with Philip IV gradually deteriorated over numerous fiscal squabbles. Nevertheless, Urban could not overlook the French alliance with the heretical Dutch and the Swedes. For much of his tenure, Urban VIII sought to maintain peaceable relations with both Castile and France, occasionally decrying Philip IV’s high-handed manner with the Papal Nuncio, occasionally reproving Louis XIII for involving himself with the Protestant cause.

When war broke out between France and Spain in 1635, the pope refused to take up sides, admonishing both countries to resolve their differences and concentrate their resources on battles that were more important. Unfortunately his calls for reconciliation went unheeded for many years. In the midst of all this conflict then, where defenders of the True Faith went about trying to slit each other’s throats, while completing ignoring the Protestant menace in the north, a letter arrived in Rome in late September 1640, containing a detailed justification by the Catalans of their revolt. Attached to the justification was an appeal to His Holiness to sanction their rebellion against their king whom, they claimed, had forfeited any pretension to rule over them because of his condoning the sacrilegious burning of the Consecrated Host. Faced with this
extraordinary appeal to justify revolt against an established—albeit troublesome—authority, and taking into consideration all the international and internal politics surrounding France, Spain and the Papacy, what was the Vicar of St. Peter to do?

Urban, the Barberinis, and tentative relations with rebellious Catalonia

As we have observed, popular ideas of Papal independence notwithstanding, the See of Saint Peter was fought over constantly by a series of factions during the early modern period. Chiefly divided by the main patrons of France and Spain, the Popes of this period held differing ideas of how much influence the two great Catholic countries of the West ought to have in Rome. After an extended period of popes chosen by the Spanish faction, the election of Urban VIII to the papacy in 1624 turned the tide in favor of France. It soon became broadcasted in Rome that the new pope, together with his brother-Cardinals, Antonio and Francisco Barberini would be following a different tack in international policy. When war broke out in 1635 between Spain and France, this attitude was modified a bit by pious—and sincere—attempts at unifying the disparate parties to engage in a solid front against Protestants in Germany.

The larger issue of rebellion, however, and its particular condemnation in the Bible, militated against the otherwise strong pro-French attitude in the Papal Court. As the Catalans—and later on the Portuguese who also appealed to Rome to justify the restoration of João IV—were to discover at their cost, the typical Roman response would be hesitant to approve such drastic measures. Even a pro-French Curia, such as that led

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865 By an interesting coincidence, Urban’s brother Antonio was a Capuchin, and had been made the Cardinal Protector of the order in 1624. Two years later he attended the Barcelona Corts with his brother Francisco as a special Papal legation to welcome Philip on his accension. Throughout the many years as Protector of the Capuchins he worked to restore order in the internal governance of the community, as well as to better serve the poor. During the revolt of 1640, he seems to have followed the general attitude of the Order and taken a pro-Catalan stance. de Rubí, *Un segle de vida caputxina*, 406; 422-23.
by the Barberinis, would think carefully before condoning such actions, even if they were inspired by accusations of sacrilegious or tyrannical behavior on the part of a supposedly Catholic monarch, or even if the rebellions were, in part, suggested and paid for by a Cardinal of the Faith.866

The first year of correspondence between Catalonia and the pope had been fraught with misunderstanding and faulty communication. In general, Urban VIII’s greatest desire appears to have been that reconciliation could come about between Catalonia and Castile. Due to a number of factors, however, this proved impossible. In August 1640, the Generalitat sent their first letter to the pope, detailing the numerous outrages that had been committed against the Catalan people and especially against the Sacrament. Towards the end of the next month, despite having taken the Oath to the Principat, the Catalans reiterated their fundamental loyalty to Philip IV who seemed determined to punish them.

The first response that Urban made to the situation came in mid-October, as the new Catalan government was setting about collecting money, men, and munitions to resist the imminent invasion force led by the Marquis de los Velez. The pope wrote to the Spanish nuncio, Faccinetti in Madrid, that while he sympathized with the Catalan suffering and approved of their devotion to the Sacrament, he felt that they still owed their loyalty to Philip. Furthermore, he suggested that Philip remove his armies from

866 That Richelieu had a modest role in encouraging the Portuguese Revolt (or Restoration) of 1640 is fairly certain. Studies concerning his relationship with the Catalans depicts first an attitude of disbelief that such a people would—or could—rise up against Spain, followed by a change in spirit around October or November, 1640, which sought to use the revolt to advance greater ends for France, such as the acquisition of Roussillon.
Catalonia and pursue a policy of clemency.\textsuperscript{867} At the same time, Urban sent a letter back to Barcelona, basically repeating the same message of submission and clemency.

For whatever reason, the nuncio only communicated the first part of the message to Philip, with the result that the king believed Urban was completely behind his determination to crush the Catalans if they resisted; and so, as the rebels refused to come to terms and immediately lay down their arms, he proceeded with force. At the same time, the Catalans believed that the king was ignoring the pope by continuing in this heavy-handed measure, and so felt themselves justified in persisting in their rebellion. Confusion reigned with these multiple messages being sent to Barcelona and Madrid—ironically, both sides believed the other was defiantly ignoring the pope and wrote to Urban complaining about the hardened hearts of their opponent.\textsuperscript{868}

Philip IV went further than mere complaining, however. In December 1640, as the Castilian offensive continued smoothly towards Tarragona, the king called upon the services of Cardinal Albornoz, the head of the Spanish faction in Rome, and other like-minded officials to force the Pope to appoint “one or more bishops to punish and proceed against the clergy of Catalonia of whatever condition” who had been involved in any part of the revolt.\textsuperscript{869} Urban defiantly refused to listen to this, and the defeat of the Castilian army at Montjuïc made the Spanish proposal moot—at any rate, for the immediate future.

At the same time as military fronts were stabilizing in Catalonia during 1641, new religious conflicts sprang up too, demanding to be resolved. In all these religious matters the Roman Curia continued to pay attention to the requests of the cathedral chapters,

\textsuperscript{867} Sanabre, \textit{La Acción de Francia en Cataluña}, 167.
\textsuperscript{868} Ibid, 168.
\textsuperscript{869} Ibid, 168.
monasteries, and convents in Catalonia, endeavoring to establish justice in the war-torn land. Specifically, the pope addressed himself to three concerns that appeared in the French-controlled portions of Catalonia: the appointment of clerics to fill vacancies caused by death; sundry other internal ecclesiastical affairs; and external financial relations between the Catalan church and the new Franco-Catalan regime. The pope’s continual concern with Catalonia, despite resolving all three of these conflicts through 1641, culminated in perhaps the most significant step in foreign policy: the granting of a special Papal embassy to Catalonia in the summer of 1642.

**Rome’s Tacit Confirmation of the Catalan Revolt: The Lleida Controversy**

The earliest of these momentous events involving the rebel Catalans and Rome began in the diocese of Lleida. As may be recalled, the Castilian Bishop Bernadro Caballero de Paredes—perhaps the most staunchly royalist bishop in Catalonia after Pau Duran—had left his diocese in September 1640, disguised as a Capuchin friar, and made his way in secrecy to Aragon. As the war had progressed, bishop and chapter carried on a running feud for power, each side declaring itself to be the legitimate ecclesiastical authority in the diocese. Indeed, the fight became so bitter as to approximate the relations between the chapter of Urgell and Bishop Duran; a fight in which recreated in minature the conflict between Castile and Catalonia. The military consequence that Lleida became one of the two major fronts in the war only served to increase the bitterness between these two ecclesiastical camps.

Early in 1641, Bishop Paredes re-established the Episcopal Tribunal of Lleida at his new headquarters in Monzon, Aragon, creating, in essense an alternative “diocese of Lleida.” Even more galling to his critics, the bishop justified this otherwise remarkable
action by an appeal to Catalan history, arguing that dangerous times called for drastic measures. But the legitimacy of this proceeding was doubtful, even from the loyalists’ perspective. Certainly the chapter of Lleida condemned this extraordinary measure and chose to ignore it.

Contrary to the spirit of Christian charity, the bishop openly demonstrated through words and deeds that little love was lost between he and his flock. In fact, while several members of the king’s council were advocating a prudent and merciful policy towards Catalonia, Bishop Paredes wrote to the Consejo de Aragon, excoriating his own diocese in bitter terms: “The people of Lerida [Lleida] are unworthy of all charity, favor, and mercy, because without cause and occasion they have revolted against Your Majesty with such obstinacy, ferocity, and contempt, as they have witnessed in the faction of Tamarit.” The contest of authority between these rivals came to a head in the spring of 1641, when the vicar-general of Lleida died, leaving an important vacancy to be filled.

The vicar-general was one of the most important ecclesiastical offices in seventeenth-century Catalonia. Nominated by the bishop of a diocese—and generally one of the cathedral canons—he fulfilled most of the daily administrative functions of the bishop, presiding over the canon’s regular meetings, much like the American Vice-President oversees the workings of the Senate. At times the bishop’s choice of vicar-general could serve to give an episcopal voice or direction to an otherwise wary or hostile

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870 While it was true that two former bishops of Lleida had removed the Tribunal to Monzon, they had done so only in times of great trouble, when the safety of the religious community was in danger. Furthermore, the bishops had been accompanied by their chapters—or at least a significant portion of them—during their removal. Neither case seemed to apply to Bishop Paredes’s actions.

871 ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos 289, Letter from Consejo de Aragon to Philip IV, 12 June 1641.

872 “que la gente de Lerida es indigna de todo beneficio, favor, y merced, porque sin causa y occasion se ha revelado contra V Magd con tanta obstinacion, fiereza y desacato, como lo han mostrado en la faccion de Tamarit…” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos 289, Letter from Bishop Paredes of Lleida to Consejo de Aragon, 18 May 1641.
body of churchmen; on the other hand, the appointment of a powerful canon as a vicar-general could serve to amplify the chapter’s perspective and interest in diocesan affairs. When the position of vicar-general fell vacant, the chapter, declaring the bishop’s absence to be inexcusable, and thus his powers null and void, assumed the authority granted them under the Councils of Trent and elected Dr. Miquel Perpinya to be the new vicar-general.

It was customary for a bishop to appoint one of the chapter canons to this position, but Paredes would have none of it. His hatred for his brother clerics excluded not a single one:

“...they all in general and in particular, have taken and [continue to take] up arms against Your Majesty and that from the chapels of their Church they have made magazines to guard the powder and balls that are gathered for the defense of the City, and the Chapter has prepared arms and munitions for itself, naming captains in the same dignitaries, and Canons, forming companies to defend themselves in the time of invasion.”

Outraged at this affront to his episcopal powers, the bishop protested his chapter’s nomination, although he himself was not sure who would be an agreeable candidate to nominate. The job would certainly be a difficult one, even if the chapter approved of the bishop’s decision; staying in Lleida, the vicar-general would be relatively independent of the bishop’s orders, and would have to patiently endure a great deal of animus directed at him by the cathedral canons. Ultimately both Bishop Paredes and the Consejo de Aragon

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873 “...y estos todos en general y en particular han tomado y toman las armas contra V Magd y que de las Capillas de su Iglesia han hecho al magazines para guardar la Polvera y balas que tienen Recogidas para la defensa de la Ciudad, y el Cavildo ... se ha prevenido de armas y municiones nombrando Capitanes en las mismas dignidades, y Canonigos, formando companias ora defenderse al tiempo de la invasion....” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos 289, Letter from Bishop Paredes of Lleida to Consejo de Aragon, 18 May 1641.
thought it convenient not to appoint Catalan vicar-general, desiring to choose instead a person “that I will judge to be more suitable to follow the service of God and of Your Majesty.”874

Temporarily baffled by the dearth of alternatives, Bishop Paredes dug in his heels at Monzón and sought to strengthen his authority by calling upon the Spanish Nuncio, Cesare Facchinetti, to support his cause. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1641 the nuncio sought to reparse relations between the chapter of Lleida and its bishop by writing a series of letters to the chapter, but to no avail. In his report to Philip IV on the matter, Facchinetti noted three major obstacles lay in the way of a successful mediation.

First, was the fact that the Diputat Militar, Josep Quintana had refused to let any letters from the Nuncio enter Lleida or be received by the chapter.875 In the second place, the theologians of Lleida—particularly the Augustinians—had been exercising a special control over the chapter and city, arguing that they ought accept no letters from the Nuncio, except if they were sent immediately from the Pope or from the Augustinian Superior. Finally, because the general understanding in Rome was that no negotiations or correspondence could be carried on with any hope of diplomacy.876 The only consolation that the Nuncio offered was a personal letter to the Pope explaining the situation,

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874 “no tiene por conveniente nombrar Vicario General Catalan, haga eleccion de la persona que Juzgare ser mas apropositio para conseguirse el servicio de Dios y de V Mgd…” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos 289, Letter from Bishop Paredes of Lleida to Consejo de Aragon, 18 May 1641.
875 This may be misleading, because in the chapter’s letter to the Nuncio in October (see below), mention is made of correspondence between chapter and bishop over the appointment of a vicar-general.
876 1) “por que entiende que no querran recibirla carta como sucedio quando escrivio la otra vez que el Diputado Quintana no permitio recibirle las cartas.” 2) “porque teme que no ha de obrar nada la carta ni hazer por ella lo que les dixere, porque lo Infiero de lo que ha sucedido en los particulares de los Augustinos que se han dado ordenes que no acudan al nuncio por ningun caso sino Inmediatamente a su Santid: y a sus Superior de aquella Religion.” 3) “porque de Roma le tiene advertido que en etas cossas no se entrometa y proreda con mucha suabidad.” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos 289; doc. 70. Letter from Nuncio Facchinetti to Philip IV, 2 October 1641. Emphasis mine. Again, the presence of the Augustinians at the University of Lleida, and their influence in the town is a fascinating subject, as yet unexplored.
informing Urban that, while it was true that Paredes had left his diocese, that he had also established a new court in that portion of Aragon which still was under the authority of Lleida. A vain hope, but the only one which seemed to present itself.\textsuperscript{877}

The summer wore on, and Paredes, irritated by the continued defiance of his chapter, took what revenge he could; he named a minor licentiate Miquel Arnal, from Aragon, to be his next vicar-general, pending the king’s approval.\textsuperscript{878} By this time, however, to the great disgust of the Bishop of Lleida, the chapter of Lleida obtained a special bull from Rome to appoint their own vicar-general. The only consolation the bishop had at this end-round his own authority to appoint a vicar-general, was the rumor that reached him that Monsiuer de Robles, the French governor of Lleida, “treated the Clergy very bad;”\textsuperscript{879} a fact, even if true, which did not seem to matter much to the clerics who remained in Catalonia.

The chapter of Lleida considered the pope’s bull a signal victory, confirming not only their resistance to Bishop Paredes, but for the rest of the Catalan church that had broken with Castile, and they were determined to share the good news with others. On 12 October 1641, Dr. Miquel Perpinya, wrote a jubilant letter to the chapter of Vic, informing them that his election as the new vicar-general had been secured.\textsuperscript{880} Beyond informing their fellow clergymen, Dean Oluja and the chapter of Lleida also posted a

\textsuperscript{877} ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos 289; doc. 70. Letter from Nuncio Facchinetti to Philip IV, 2 October 1641.
\textsuperscript{878} ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos 289, letter from Bishop of Lleida [at Barbegal in Aragon] to Philip IV, 31 July 1641.
\textsuperscript{879} “que Monsir de Robles … trato muy mal al Clerigo.” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos 289, letter from Bishop of Lleida [at Barbegal in Aragon] to Philip IV, 21 September 1641.
\textsuperscript{880} “Lo Capitol desta igla en virtut de bulleo del Papa me ha elegit vicari-general de la igla y Bisbat que si be es estat favor y honra.” AEV 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), 12 October 1641, Dr. Miquel Perpinya to Chapter of Vic.
stinging reply to the Spanish Nuncio—yet another indication that, despite Diputat Quintana’s efforts, correspondence was still being maintained by both parties.

In the first place, they denounced the behavior of Bishop Paredes, particularly his flight from his see and his desire to return with vengeance, “without having occasion to leave disguised, where he was greatly loved and adored by this Chapter and Citizens, abandoning his vicar general and having the Castilian soldiers entered along this fronter and sacked the village of Gransa, and burned the abbey that was nearby with the Church, and robbed all the ornaments.”\(^8\)\(^8\)\(^1\) The bishop’s actions supporting this modest raid into Catalonia, together with Pau Duran’s eagerness to accompany the army of the Marquis de los Velez in 1640, were loudly condemned by the rebellious clergy, who argued that such attitudes belied true episcopal concern for the well-being of the people. Regretably, the Crown was unable to deny the activities of either bishop.

Furthermore, the chapter argued, Paredes’s absence—undertaken solely out of willfulness rather than any important internal matter—had caused “great harm to the ecclesiastical estate and his Jurisdiction.” Wedding licenses had been unobtainable and so many couples could not marry; and furthermore, without a vicar-general, the diocese had no one to protect ecclesiastical liberties.\(^8\)\(^2\) They had written several letters to Bishop Paredes, asking him to appoint a vicar-general to oversee religious matters in person, but he had refused, claiming that the establishment of the Episcopal Tribunal in Aragon

\(^{81}\) “con abito de capuchino, sin tener ocasion de salir disfrazado, adonde era tan querido y amada deste Cabildo y Ciudadanos, dexo su vicario general y haviendo los soldados Castellanos entrado en esta frontera y saqueado el Lugar de la Gransa y quemado la Ababdia yque esta Junta con la Yglesia, y robado todos los hornamentos...” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos 289, letter from Dean and Chapter of Lleida to Nuncio Facchinetti, 12 October 1641.

\(^{82}\) “se han seguido grandes daños al estado ecclesiastico, y su Jurisicion, porque muchos que para sus matrimonios tenian neccesidad de licencias se estavan sin ellas amancebadaos y no casados, y ... por no haver Vicario general no pudo valerse de la immunidad ecclesiastica.” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos 289, letter from Dean and Chapter of Lleida to Nuncio Facchinetti, 12 October 1641.
voided any need for a vicar-general elsewhere. Such conduct, the chapter argued, was inexcusable, violating the explicit intentions of the Council of Trent for bishops to remain in their sees at all cost. Frustrated, the chapter, advised by “a Special Cleric,” had given the bishop an ultimatum of fifteen days in which to name a vicar-general or else they would automatically give the seat to Perpinya. Paredes—either waiting for royal approval of licentiate Arnal, or else in ignorance that such an ultimatum had been delivered—maintained an obstinant silence and so, the chapter concluded, had no grounds for complaint.

Rome’s Tacit Confirmation of the Catalan Revolt (continued): Religious Appointments

With a successful conclusion to the Lleida fight, the Catalan church was cheered by the fact that the Holy See had not forgotten them. Furthermore, Urban VIII’s approval of Dr. Perpinya was but one sign that the pope was determined to fill vacancies of chapter canons or abbots in Catalonia, which had been created by death or exile. During the first week of February 1642, the chapter of Girona received papal bulls confirming Dr. Jaume Pejoan as their new canon, replacing Baldiric Balle who had died within the past year.\footnote{ACG: Actes Capitulares, vol. 23, 8 February 16423, ff. 262v-263. Canon Balle was present at the annual chapter convention in April of 1641, so that his death, the chapter’s request to approve Dr. Jaume Pejoan, and the papal confirmation seems to have happened with remarkable quickness. Yet, in late November 1642, the chapter would receive another papal bull appointing Joan Caxa as cathedral canon filling the vacancy created several months before by the death of Canon Antic Mas i Vardes, ACG: Actes Capitulares, volume 24, 20 November 1642, f. 83.} Later that year, another papal bull confirmed Joan Caxa to replace the deceased canon Antic Mas in Girona. Other bulls confirmed Dr. Damian Capi as canon of Urgell.\footnote{ACG: Cartas, 1640-1642, 31 May 1642. Some of the vacancies at Perpignan-Elna were not filled until after 1642.}
Papal confirmation of canons and vicar-generals in rebel-held portions of Catalonia tended to raise hopes of an eventual complete recognition of their new status under France. But on one matter, the Pope was adamant: no bishops were appointed or confirmed in their roles. Regardless of whether Philip IV or Louis XIII nominated the men, Urban VIII refused to recognize any shifts in title from 1640 onwards. Such a move seemed to be taking neutral ground for Rome: appointments of lesser clergy showed that Rome was not indifferent to the state of religion in Catalonia. But the position of bishop, containing the political baggage of a royal nomination could not be tolerated without tacitly giving support for the legitimacy of that king over the region. As is the case with most neutral or centrist positions, both sides were heartily opposed to what was perceived as papal intrasignee. Within the Franco-Catalan camp, nominees like Don Vincenç de Margarit i Biure—brother to Josep Margarit, the leading rebel among the nobility—waited in vain until the end of the war for an official confirmation to the episcopacy.885

As for the clergy who remained loyal to Philip, the pope proved unwilling to reward them for their suffering. Chief among these was Pau Duran, Bishop of Urgell, who, despite the immanent presence of a French army to the north, obstinately remained in Tarragona, writing memoranda to the king, asking for more pressure to be placed on Rome to force the issue, and vainly hoping to achieve the coveted rank of archbishop

885 Don Vincenç, a Dominican, was nominated first as Bishop of Lleida in 1642, then—when that city fell to Spain in 1644—bishop of Solsona, and ultimately, Bishop of Perpignan. The Papal bulls which finally approved of this last episcopal office arrived in Perpignan in 1669, ten years after the official separation of Roussillon from Spain, and just three years before his death.
before his death. Urban VIII’s ruling in favor of the revolutionary chapter of Lleida in their fight with their loyalist bishop and his decision to approve subordinate clerics nominated by the Franco-Catalan government were quite important displays of papal favor of the Catalan revolt. The pope’s role in such issues, however, was more that of a mediator in religious problems than as a direct proponent of a particular religious or political policy. This moderate attitude would change by the summer of 1642, however, resulting in the pontiff’s most significant decision of the war: his resolution to send Vincente Candiotti, a diplomat working for the French nunciature in Paris, on a special diplomatic mission to Barcelona as an “Apostolic Collector.”

The unusual embassy of Vincente Candiotti

The arrival of Candiotti to the docks of Barcelona in late August 1642 marked a new era in Roman-Catalan relations. French officials and Catalan clerics derived much hope from his coming, while Spanish observers could only sigh in disappointment. While this special representative from the Holy See arrived only towards the end of the second year of fighting, negotiations between Catalonia and Rome concerning the shifting political situation of the province had been underway for some time. Indeed, by January 1642 the Diputació, fully confident of their position as representatives of a province of France, wrote two separate letters to the pope asking him to respect this new political reality. While not explicitly demanding any immediate action from Rome, the intent of the letter was clear: as both Catalonia and France had entered into this new

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886 The Bishop described himself in the letter as “Obispo de Urgell, electo de Tarrgona del Inconveniente que es que no saque las bullas de Arcobispado por los accidentes que pueden suceder en la turbacion de las cossas de Cataluña, y lo que en Roma se intenta por les mal affects contra él …” ACA: Consejo de Aragon: Legajos 290; doc. 138. Letter from Duran to Consejo de Aragon, 14 January 1642.
covenant of their own free will, the Catalan breach with Castile was no longer an issue. The Pope could, and the letter suggested *ought to*, overlook the continued Spanish claims of rebellion, and recognize that the Catalan people were once more loyal subjects of a kingdom. Nearly two years had elapsed since the first violent upheavals in central Catalonia, two separate Spanish invasions had been successfully fought off, and the amount of land controlled by the Generalitat far outnumbered the holdings of the loyalists.

Whether Rome saw the justice of the Catalan complaint or not, Urban VIII soon began to grow more concerned with the spiritual state inside Catalonia and indeed, inside all of Spain when Cesare Facchinetti, the papal nuncio in Madrid, resigned in April 1642. The exact causes of Facchinetti’s departure are uncertain, but it is probable that he was either frustrated at his inability to bring about a successful reconciliation with Catalonia, or—more likely—harried out of office like his predecessor, Monti, by the stubborn determination of Philip IV to keep the activities of papal nuncios under royal oversight and control. The departure of the nuncio left Urban VIII without any independent source of information from Spain; all he could rely on now would be filtered through the Spanish or French cardinals at court, neither of whom could be depended upon for providing objective news.

It was at this point in time that Rome finally decided to intervene in Catalonia in a way that shocked both Philip IV and Louis XIII: Urban would send his own personal delegate to Barcelona in order to report on the current state of affairs. On the one hand the pope seemed determined to send a message to the king of Spain that further attempts
to control papal nuncios would in turn be met with a cold shoulder from Rome. It was a lesson that Urban VIII had tried to teach Philip IV before in 1639, but apparently without success. The deprivation of a direct communication with Rome in the form of a nuncio could not but have hurt Philip IV at this time, counting on the Holy Father not just to encourage obedience and dissuade rebellion in Catalonia and Portugal, but also to approve tax measures on the clergy. At the same time, the pope’s decision to send not a nuncio, but a second-rank diplomat-observer, demonstrated Rome’s purpose in restoring some ecclesiastical authority in the province without judging the issue of political legitimacy, as well as re-asserting the traditional Christian belief that not all social institutions belong to Caesar, no matter how Christian or Catholic Caesar might be—a belief lost on Philip IV, Louis XIII and later monarchs.

As members of the Catalan church were enjoying appointments to religious posts long denied them by Philip IV, and as the whole of Catalan society drew comfort from significant decisions from Rome that seemed to confirm the justness of their cause, it was still evident that the rebel’s fight was far from over. Philip IV would not relinquish his lands so quickly, even such a land as had caused him so much grief in the past two decades as had Catalonia. As joyful as they were by external signs of success, the Catalan clergy proved that they were still willing to make great sacrifices to ensure the continued success of their righteous break with Castile.

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888 While the papal delegate, Candiotti, was sent to Barcelona in 1642, the next papal nuncio to Spain—Giulio Rospigliosi—would not be appointed until July 1644.
889 Candiotti’s embassy would become more important by the end of 1642, when the first cracks in the alliance between the church and the government in Barcelona began to appear, signaling an end to the honeymoon period enjoyed by these two institutional pillars of Catalan society. But this is the subject for another chapter.
External Ecclesiastical Concerns: Clerical Participation in the campaigns of 1642

From the very beginning of the Castilian military campaigns to subdue Catalonia, the regional clergy had given significant portions of their wealth to support the rebels’ effort. This aid continued even after the victory at Montjuïc—which, as we have shown, did not appear to be the great turning point that modern historians of the revolt have portrayed—through the failed siege of Tarragona in 1641. The notion of a short war, so very popular in our own day in proportion to the distance from which we experience its harsh and brutal demands—was quite foreign to the early-modern world. For a variety of reasons warfare in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was a long and drawn-out affair, in which attrition, or the wearing down of the enemy before your own side gave out, was, more often than not, the deciding factor. The war in Catalonia would be no different. Continual demands for manpower and money were made on the local population, while at the same time, generals sought to carry the war into the enemy’s territory, living off the resources of the enemy in order to preserve their own.

For two years now, the Catalan church had supplied several companies of men to the war effort, and had received recognition for their contributions. Even as ecclesiastical worries mounted in the face of the growing powers of the French viceroy and a financial organization—the Junta de Batalló—that sought to take more from the religious estate, the Catalan cathedral chapters continued to contribute willingly to the war effort throughout 1642. At the same time, however, the strain of trying to maintain the same levels of financial donations—which were drawn from commoners themselves suffering to try and make ends meet—was beginning to tell. Though valiant efforts by cathedral chapters helped repel two separate Castilian offensives, by the end of the year their
treasuries were reaching the brink of exhaustion. The question then became, how would the Franco-Catalan government react to the diminishing returns from the church, and the extent to which the Catalan church would concentrate its spiritual efforts on raising men and coin for the next military campaigns.

There were three major military campaigns during 1642, with significant clerical involvement in each of them. The first offensive was led by the Marquis de Povar who set out from Aragon in the spring that year in a desperate attempt to relieve the fortress of Perpignan. After his defeat at the hands of the Marshal de la Mothe, a secondary campaign occurred in the southern diocese of Tarragona, where Castilian forces under the Marquis de Mortara sought to lay waste one of the major agricultural sections of the rebel-held territories, but met with bitter resistance by locals, led, on one occasion by the village priest. The final military venture of 1642 was the siege of Perpignan, directed for a time by King Louis XIII himself. The fall of Rousillon’s capital was the first decisive military venture since Montjuïc and marked a new era in Franco-Catalan relations. In all three of these operations, Catalan clergy aided their countrymen and the French cause through prayers, increased financial contributions, and even voluntary military service. Indeed, even after the fall of Perpignan, the Catalan clergy continued to support the successful alliance, giving substance to the prevalent notion that Catalonia’s efforts were in some way marked by Divine favor.

**Saving Perpignan from Povar: March-April 1642**

Whatever may be said of the hopes and aspirations of France and Castile, their future military plans lay as an open book to each other. As early as November 1641,

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890 This rather Quixotic adventure was deemed necessary because of the French naval supremacy along the Catalan coast during the past two years.
French officials informed the Diputació of their concerns that Spain would try and launch an assault from Perpignan or Roses and asked them to pass this information along to city councils and cathedral chapters alike, beseeching the latter for prayers of protection. That same month in Girona, the chapter’s activities paralleled the critical days of 1640: the canons held a special mass commemorating the Sacrament, following which the holy bread was exposed for the rest of the day in each parish and monastic church. Other—and more unrealistic—concerns about a surprise sortie from the embattled city continued to plague the province, especially as the first French viceroy, the Maréchal de Brézé, made his way from Paris to Catalonia. On 3 December, the Sacrament was exposed again in Girona, and the canons held a special mass for the city’s patron saint, Narcissus. These concerns proved to be little more than vague rumors, however, and no Spanish offensive materialized. As the new year came to the divided land, however, the Castilian army took the initiative. During the first days of February, the Marquis de Povar moved north from Tarragona in an attempt to relieve the isolated garrisons in the north.

Though the plan appears to be the product both of military necessity and wishful thinking, the desperate straights facing Perpignan, the current French supremacy on the sea, as well as a potential threat to the rebel capital of Barcelona, may have combined to form this rather bold plan. The marquis’ movements—which, if fully carried out would have taken the Spanish tercios along the very same path as their predecessors in 1640—primarily threatened the cities of Barcelona and Vic. In response to this direct

892 ACG: Actes Capitulares: volume 23; 3 December 1641, f. 255v. These prayers were repeated in early February 1642 in response to a letter from Francesc de Tamarit, ACG: Actes Capitulares: volume 23; 3 February 1642, f. 262.
threat, clergy from both cities joined with the town fathers and rededicated themselves to resist the Castilian army.

Even before they had received news of the marquis de Povar’s advance, the city of Barcelona began to set about improving its defenses. Little had changed since the battle of Montjuïc: the small earthwork-and-timber fort still stood, much to the chagrin of the French viceroy de Brézé and his military engineers. For months they had tried to get the Diputació and the Consell to agree to place a more permanent fortification atop Montjuïc, but the Catalans were reluctant. Although the fort would greatly strengthen the city’s defenses from external assault, it was also situated to command the city itself. Should any disagreement between French and Catalans arise, the fort’s commander could just as easily turn his guns upon the civilians down below.

Frustrated in their attempts to fortify Montjuïc, the French planners moved towards improving the city walls. By building a series of earthworks in front of the walls, they achieved a defense-in-depth approach that was typical of early-modern warfare. As before in 1640, different guilds or social bodies were given charge of protecting the various sections of the town’s defenses. In the case of Barcelona’s clergy, they were given charge over a demi-lune, constructed in front of the “Portal Nou” or New Gate, located to the south of the town.893

On 19 February, an embassy from the Consell de Cent approached Barcelona’s chapter to ask them voluntarily to improve the fortifications in front of the Portal Nou, offering the canons shovels, baskets (gabions?) or any other equipment the clergy would

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need.\textsuperscript{894} Time off from the fortification business was given on 22 February, when the chapter began making preparations inside the cathedral for the arrival of the Viceroy de Brézé.\textsuperscript{895} Defensive preparations extended even to Girona. Jeroni de Real, one of the city’s jurats, noted in his diary on 28 March 1642, “it was necessary that the ecclesiastics, chaplains, and friars were requested to stand guard over the walls and gates.”\textsuperscript{896}

As active clerical participation in defense of their patria increased, so too did the Catalan religious response. On 14 March, the Jurats of Girona again approached the chapter for a special service regarding a Castilian army marching to relieve Perpignan; once more the chapter organized a procession through the streets, and ended with a special mass and prayers to St. Narcissus.\textsuperscript{897} Two weeks later, the Sacrament was exposed for public veneration in Girona and Barcelona, to encourage the people to pray for the current “necessities” of war.\textsuperscript{898}

By a remarkable coincidence, the very day that the Sacrament was unveiled, a group of French and Catalan soldiers met and defeated the marquis de Povar at a small

\textsuperscript{894} ACB: I.A.Resolucions: Llibre de la Sibelle: 1625-1645, 19 February 1642, f. 338v. Ironically, in June, another embassy from the city arrived at the chapter, asking them to voluntarily help to level a portion of the city walls in order to make way for a larger fortification. The chapter agreed to pay ten men four lliures a day for however long the city needed them. ACB: I. A.Resolucions: Llibre de la Sibelle: 1625-1645, 6 June; 11 June 1642, f. 346.

\textsuperscript{895} ACB: I.A.Resolucions: Llibre de la Sibelle: 1625-1645, 22 February 1642, f. 340. A four-person committee made up of the Dean Pau del Rosso, and Canons Dr. Don Joachim Carbonell, Josep Rouira i Boldo, and Dr. Don Francisco Sans. Although de Brézé had sworn the oath of viceroy in Girona a few weeks before, the ceremony in the cathedral was to recognize his official entrance into Barcelona and the official oath not only as viceroy to the people, but to speak for Louis XIII himself in promising to protect the Catalans.

\textsuperscript{896} “fou necessari que los ecclesiàstichs, capellans, y frares las prenguessan per la guarnitió de las murallas y portals.” Busquets i Dalmau, *La Catalunya del Barroc*, vol. II, 176.

\textsuperscript{897} ACG: Actes Capitulares, volume 24, 14 March 1642, f. 4v.

\textsuperscript{898} The chapter record states that such prayers were made “per sparare ad pugnam,” ACG: Actes Capitulares, volume 24, 28 March 1642, f. 8. In Barcelona, the threat was more specific: “fossen servits tenir patent lo Sm Sacrament ys resolgue que fes lo offici ab 12 Capas ys tinges patent per raho que los Castellans ab 2300 Cavalls y 2700 Infants venian de Tarragona per passar per Catta y anar a donar socorro a Perpa,” ACB: II. J. 3. Exemplaria, 30 March 1642, f. 49.

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eminence overlooking the village of Sant Celoni, in the southern diocese of Vic.\(^{899}\) Though the Castilian defeat had come at the hands of both the French and Catalan armies, and the stakes appeared much smaller than Montjuïc, the entire Catalan community celebrated in grand style. News of the victory arrived in Barcelona at 5:00 that evening, just as the Sacrament was being removed to its holy custody, and coinciding with news confirming another victory by the Marshal de La Mothe over the Spanish at Vilafranca in the diocese Tarragona.\(^{900}\) The jubilant Consell de Cent called upon the cathedral chapter early the next morning asking for a special three-day feast, which would feature a *Te Deum* service, two processions, and a commemorative mass for the souls in Purgatory. The clergy agreed, and the celebrations opened that very afternoon in the cathedral, with the viceroy de Brézé and the Intendant d’Argenson occupying special posts of honor.\(^{901}\)

Rains and the Easter celebration postponed the conclusion of the festivities until the Sunday following the Resurrection—known as Quasimodo Sunday in Catalonia—at which time a fabulous procession was made, according to the forms of the Corpus Christi procession. The only changes made to this was that the cathedral canons walked with their surplices and the consellers got to carry the special canopy protecting the

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\(^{899}\) Coincidentally or not, the name of the height was called by the locals, St. Jordi’s Hill, linking the patron saint of Catalonia even further to the rebels’ cause.

\(^{900}\) ACB: II. J. 3. Exemplaria, 30 March 1642, f. 49.

\(^{901}\) Bishop Manrique, however, remained in his choir stall during the ceremony, and did not give a benediction to the crowd, finished the mass, and made the procession, placing …“Lo Sr. Bisbe estava al Cor, lo qual no dona la benedictio, acabada la Missa, ys feu la professo, posantse al Gremial dit señor Bisbe y acabada sens ana al altar major, y tanpoch dona la Benedictio sino que sen ana ab los Srs Semmaners que fejan lo Offici que eran lo Dega, Pau del Rosso, Fructuos Bisbe Vidal, y Pere Joan Pleya, Canonges, y notta que los deputats estavan assentats ab un banchs de espanllera a la vexa devant lo altar Major girant las esantlles al Cor, y lo deputat ecclesiastich estava en un Cap de banch prop del Sr. Virrey…” ACB: II. J. 3. Exemplaria, 31 March 1642, ff. 49-49v.
Sacrament; likewise Bishop Manrique, though he joined the procession, did not wear his special ceremonial garb.  

The revelries extended throughout the rest of Catalonia. Beginning on Thursday, 2 April, the city of Girona held a three day celebration, full of prayers to God, the Blessed Virgin, the Four Martyrs, and St. Narcissus for delivering them once again from the hands of their sacrilegious enemies. The first night’s procession was the most spectacular, with the statue of the Blessed Virgin of Victory paraded in front and accompanied by a myriad of candles. The great celebration concluded on Saturday with a special service for the dead and the souls in purgatory.

The city of Vic likewise celebrated in high style, organizing a citywide procession involving all the religious community, giving thanks to God for the gracious victory that He had bestowed upon such a devoted people. As further proof of the city’s general contentment with the current regime, the chapter dedicated the three days immediately following Easter to a continued celebration of this extraordinary victory.

Even after the defeat of Povar, the religious community of Barcelona remained at fever pitch, more mindful now than they had been for several months about the progress of the war. Indeed, so great was the continued support of the war that the very first session of Barcelona’s annual chapter congregation in 1642 involved renewed prayers for

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903 ACG: Actes Capitulares, volume 24, 2 April-5 April 1642, ff. 10-11.
904 “pera donar a la divina magestat las degudas gratias de tanta victoria, lo mateix dia ordenàrem una prophesso, ab interventio de totas la religions, y tot lo ciutadans en particular, feren vistosas lluminarias tres vespers continuos y ademes ara, pera total demonstratio del general contento, prevenim altres festas pera los tres primers dias, passants los de la Pascua, pera donar agratits majors gratias encara, a sa Divinia Magestat pera tant senyalats benefici de la Sua poderosa ma rebuts,” ACV: Secretaria: Liber 3 (1641-1648) (Arm 57/57), letter from Chapter of Vic to Diputació, 14 April 1642, f. 15v.
the war.  

Two months later, on 1 July 1642, there was a naval battle off the shores of Barcelona, and once again the chapter brought out the Sacrament in the cathedral from three in the afternoon until nine at night, for public devotion and prayers.

The first Castilian offensive of 1642 had involved the three dioceses of Barcelona, Vic, and Girona, yet that did not mean that other cathedral chapters further away from the action were any less willing to contribute to the war effort. True to their radical stance, the chapter of Urgell continued to be whole-heartedly behind the rebellion. While other chapters who had shown an initial enthusiasm for raising soldiers, such as Barcelona and Vic, began to husband their fiscal resources with the creation of the Junta de Batalló in late 1641-1642, Urgell’s canons stayed true to the cause. On 18 February 1642, the chapter decided to organize and pay for yet another company of 100 men. In addition to this active military support, the cathedral chapter also sponsored a series of propaganda pamphlets praising the rebels’ cause and reiterating the sacrilegious charges against the king of Spain. It was not only the secular clergy around the Seu d’Urgell, however, who became involved in the military affairs. As Cardinal Richelieu was making plans for


906 ACB: II. J. 3. Exemplaria; 1 July 1642, ff. 50-50v.
907 “una companyia de 100 homens per causa de guerra, y estos pagats y armats de sos diners, com es de veuer.” ACU: I. Conclusions Capitulares: 18 February 1642, (f. 32; S. 344). While the volumes of the Conclusions Capitulares, 1608-1639 and 1654-1688 are still in the archive, the tantalizing volume, 1640-1653 is missing. It may be in Paris in the Fonds Baluze, or it may be destroyed. What remains in the Urgell archives concerning the war years is a smorgasbord of information from secretary Francesc Sallés in the early 1700s.

Francesc Sallés i de Rius, native of Vic, was Archdeacon of Berga from 1708 to his death in 1738. During that time he compiled a few indices about the Urgell chapter during the war years of the Segadors. His first work, called Índex A, is an index of conclusions capitulares (from 1286-1798). In 1722, growing frustrated with this work, Sallés tried a more thorough index, called Índex B, dating from 1335-1665. There are 2,699 entries in Índex B, including 687 entries from 1640-1697, contained in a book which is now lost, as opposed to only 415 in Índex A. 490 entries deal with the war itself. Information cited during the war years from the Llibre de Conclusions del Capitol thus contains both a folio number for the lost original as well as an “S” number identifying the order in which Sallés recorded it.

908 Charles Vassal-reig, in his history, La Prise de Perpignan (1641-1642) (Paris: Occitania, 1939), notes that not only the chapters of Vic and Urgell, but also reformed Augustinian canons at cervera and Figueres actively helped to create propaganda for the war effort during the winter of 1641-1642, pp. 86-87.
the siege of Perpignan, a letter arrived from one Barrault—a former ambassador to Spain, presently living in the Catalan county of Foix—informing His Eminence that “un abbé de ce diocèse” [Urgell] had come to him asking the ex-emissary to use his influence with the Cardinal to procure, “200 muskets, powder, and an officer” to organize new recruits.909

Following their defeat at Sant Celoni, the Spanish army returned to the diocese of Tarragona where they regrouped. As they waited for the French response, which they believed might fall on Tarragona or Tortosa, a number of tercios went out on raiding parties across southern Catalonia. The provincial clergy would encounter the foe once more, but this time, it would not be the cathedral canons who had actively promoted the revolt since late 1640, but the humble parish priest or the itinerant friar. The Catalan revolt has often been portrayed as the work of a particular sub-section of society, and the cathedral chapters—because of various reasons and because most of the remaining records testify to their activity—have received a lion’s share of recognition. But the war affected all levels of Catalan society, as we shall see, and the individual rural cleric, relatively free from the thoughts and persuasions of erudite canons, had to make up his own mind. By looking at the clergy’s choices one can obtain a clearer grasp of the concerns shared by many “other” rural Catalans.

Clergy Suffering for the Cause: The summer country campaigns

From the first campaign of the Marquis de los Vélez in the autumn of 1640, the fighting in Catalonia became known for its bitterness. The epitome of Castilian barbarity for many a Catalan rebel that year was Cambrils. A small village numbering 200 or 300

909 Letter from Barrault to Richelieu, in AMAE, 840; cited in Charles Vassal-reig, La Prise de Perpignan, 62.
houses, Cambrils served the rebels as a supply center south of Tarragona. There, nearly two thousand men under the Baron de Rocafort held off the entire Spanish army under los Vélez before finally succumbing to the weight of numbers and the town’s poor defensive position. Upon their surrender, the leaders and many of the rebels in arms were massacred, and the village church burned.

The news came as a shock to the Catalans: Francesc Ferrer wrote in his diary, “era llastima veurer a nostres germans tant maltractats per nostres enemichs per voler deffensar la terra…Asso se senti de tal manera per tota Cattalunya que la consideracio de aquest fet la dexo al pio lector per no saber o explicar.”\(^9\)\(^1\) A few months later, the monk Gaspar Sala, in his history of the first campaign, described the tragedy in light of his perspective of the revolt as a battle between true and false Christians. The Catalans, he argued, “fought for God offended, and for the laws of the patria, which their ancestors had bought with their blood.”\(^9\)\(^1\) Their death was glorious:

> In order that the world would see clearly the enemy’s inhumanity and the glory and valor of those noblemen who gave their life for God, for their patria, and for their laws …The words given by the Marquès, that neither faith nor compact were obligatory between King and vassals—are not worthy of belief. It is a proposition made by a soldier in disrepute, and by a greatly suspected Christian.\(^9\)\(^2\)

As los Vélez continued his march towards Barcelona, he left similar tales of desolation in his path, “as in the times of the Moors.”\(^9\)\(^3\) The cruelty towards civilians during this first military campaign would only continue as the war progressed. The entrance of a French


\(^9\)\(^2\) “peleavan por Dios ofendido, y por las leyes de la patria, que sus passados avian comprado a precio de sangre.” AHCB: B.1641-8-(op)-80: Gaspar Sala Épitome de los Príncipios, Y Progressos de las Guerras de Cataluña en los años 1640 y 1641 (Barcelona: P. Lacavalleria, 1641), f. 15.

\(^9\)\(^3\) “para que fuese al mundo mas vistosa la inhumanidad del enemigo, y la gloria, y valor destos cavalleros, que rindieron la vida por Dios, por su patria, y por sus leyes. … No vali la fè, y palabra dada por el Marquès, respondiendo, que entre Rey, y vassallos no obligava la fè, ni el pacto, proposicion en un soldado de descredito, y en un Christiano de grandes sospechas.” Ibid, f. 15v.
army into Catalonia and the appearance of a conventional war fought between conventional armies did not lessen this bitterness, either. With few exceptions, however, the organized religious communities in Catalonia escaped the wrath visited upon the typical rural parish priest.

The increased presence of the French on the Catalan front did not diminish the antipathy that many Spanish soldiers felt towards the rebellious province. Violence along the fighting borders increased considerably during the first few years of the war, from 1641 to 1644, as the troops of Philip IV sought to take over Catalonia by force and fear. Whether the rebellion itself was the cause of the bitterness, the long-standing antipathy towards the French or the Castilians and their foreign soldiers, or whether the continuity of wars had simply dulled the sensibilities of the population, neither the rural clergy nor the churches they served were exempt from their wrath. Their Catalan flocks suffered the unenviable position of being in the middle of what appeared to be more of an international war than an internal rebellion, and a number of pamphlets record the indignities endured by these commoners from both sides. While an equal share of guilt in death and destruction probably fell on both the French and Spanish soldiers, the current Catalan leanings towards France militated against many of their exploits appearing in print, at least within the rebel-held territory. Castilian outrages, on the other hand, enjoyed a wide circulation.

In many cases, the outrages caused by the Spanish forces were collected and published in Barcelona. One such document, *Relacio Verdadera de las Hostilidats, y Sacrilegis que lo exercit del Rey de Castella ha fet contra las Iglesias*, published in the fall of 1642, detailed the latest hostilities from the most recent Spanish offensive in the
southern diocese of Tarragona. A few months earlier, Castilian soldiers under the Marqués de Mortara entered the small village of Coll de Illa. Upon meeting with no resistance, they promptly occupied the place and commenced looting both houses and church. The soldiers celebrated the following day, a Sunday, by burning church and community to the ground.

The next day, 1 September, found Mortara and his men outside the village of Poblet, home to one of the oldest and most respected monasteries in Catalonia, and spent the day admiring its beauties. Other nearby villages were not so fortunate. The village church at Pila was assaulted with axes and destruction was even visited upon the Eucharist bread at the altar; at Sarreal, not only was the whole village burned, including the church up to the sacristy, but the soldiers carried off twenty young ladies for their pleasure. The village of Barberà, however, was spared because “the Rector was known by those of Tarragona.”

It was at the small hamlet of Pla, however—where Mortara’s men joined up with other tercios under the command of the Marqués de Torrecussa—that the most horrific event occurred. Irritated by the destruction visited upon their homes and churches, as well as by the violation of their women, a band of fifty men led by Mossèn Jaume Gausch

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914 The full title is Relacio Verdadera de las Hostilidats, y Sacrilegis que lo exercit del Rey de Castella ha fet contra las Iglesias, y sacraris ahont estava lo Santissim Sacrament, y sos altars, y crema que ha fet desde Tarragona fins a Torra de Segre (Barcelona, J. Mathevat, 1642). BC: FB 6075. On the cover there is an engraving of a Custodia containing the Sacrament, and over it the Papal arms, keys, and tiara.

915 Relacio Verdadera, f. 158.

916 “estigueren tot lo dia mirant aquellas claustres…en Poblet per espia matexas del Convent donaren saco general” (158v); do they burn the town because of monastic spies?

917 “la Iglesia portansen espallant lo sacrari ab destrals al Santissim Sacrament Mal que tant nosaltres hem plorat en aquest mon, si be ells en la altre ho suspiraran…”—meaning? “carrying destruction [to the tabernacle] with axes to the Most Holy Sacrament Evil that we have so greatly lamented in this world, if that they will sigh well in the other.” Ibid, f. 159.

918 “nols feren res, per quells tragueren refresch y lo Rector era conegut de ells de Tarragona,” Ibid, f. 159.
barricaded themselves in the church at Pla, offering resistance to the Castilian force, which the account probably overestimates at 14,000 men and 5000 horse. In response to Torrecussa’s demand to surrender, the priest replied that “this place is held on account to the Most Christian King of France, and thus for it, he was determined to lose his life for his King, if they intended to damage it.”

Against the defiance offered by this zealous man of God, the Marqués, “as angry as another Diocletian,” gave orders to burn the village and to assault the church, which held fast for three hours against the forces of Castile. Finally, the soldiers broke through the walls of the church, and with great violence burned everything, chopped the sacristy to splinters, and carried off the vessel containing the Holy Sacrament. Ostensibly the Spanish lost 100 men in the assault; the Catalans, on the other hand suffered only a single flesh wound. Nevertheless, the Castilian soldiers surrounded the church’s defenders and killed thirty-three of them on the spot, although they had apparently given quarter. Miraculously, nine men, including their captain, Mossén Gausch, were able to escape, even though the priest suffered a serious slash on the head; when asked, they attributed their survival solely to the gracious hand of God.

Having taken what they could out of Pla, the regiments of Mortara and Torrecussa marched to Figuerola; there the soldiers burned yet another church, and carried off the

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919 respongue que açuella plaça anave a compte del Christianissim Rey de França y axi que ell estava determinat de perdre la vida per son Rey, si intentaven dañarlo…” Ibid, f. 159v.
920 Ibid, f. 159v.
921 miraculosament sen salvaren 9 y al Capita [Gausch] no obstant que era Sacerdot, y li havian donat també quartel, li donaren una coltellada al cap…Lo qual després per volunta de Deu ni sabent ells com los escapa.” Ibid, ff. 159v-160. In initial reports, however, the fate of Mossén Gausch was perceived as much worse. In a letter to the Seigneur d’Argenson only a day or two after the battle, Dr. Pere Morell, a future vicar-general of Barcelona, wrote that the Castilians had “cut off the head of the Priest of Play, and put it on a pike.” Rumor of the atrocity quickly spread throughout Barcelona and the papal collector Candioti noted it in one of his letters back to Rome, BAV, [BT] Barb. Lat. 8535; Candioti to Francesco Barberini, 6 September 1642, f. 7r.
Sacrament. For further entertainment, they stripped the village priest of his cassock and shoes and mocked him.922 A few days later, they arrived at Montblanch—at whose gates St. Jordi slew the dragon—and wrecked the main church, once more carrying off the sacred vessel that held the Sacramental bread. The local parish churches of Sant Miquel and Santa Ana also suffered from their ravages.923 On 25 September, the Castilian soldiers returned to Barberà where, notwithstanding the supposed good stead of the priest there, they stole the Eucharistic custody, throwing the contents on the ground, where they were later found by the rector. To the rector of the nearby village of Espluga, however, their conduct was more severe: “they placed a halter around his neck to make him reveal where the money was and they wanted to hang him.”924

The anonymous author explained the purpose of this chronicle of catastrophes at the end of his history: it was nothing less than to assure his audience that payment from the hand of God was coming upon Castile, the children of his wrath, and to incite them to fight “in defence of the Churches, to the which Ecclesiastics and laity are obliged to trust in God our Lord as captain over them.”925 Two years of war had not changed the simple message of 1640: the Castilians were determined to turn their violence against the Sacramental Christ and against any persons who dared defend the sanctity of His Temples. It is interesting that although Jaume Gausch takes up arms for the king of France, he seems to be in the minority; the author certainly praises the village priest for his bold act of defiance rather than the king for whom he fought.

922 “al Rector li llevaren la lloba, y despres lo feren assentar, y li llevaren las sebates, y mitjas burlantse de ell.” Ibid, f. 160.
923 Ibid, f. 160.
924 “Al Rector de Espluga possaren lo dogal al coll per ferli traurer diners, y volian penjar.” Ibid, f. 160v.
925 “nols faltara la paga de la ma de Deu nostre Señor, ni a nosaltres valor si intentam pelear, per defençça de las Iglesias, a la qual Eclesiastichs, y seculars estan obligats confiar de Deu nostre Señor com ha Capita de ells.” Ibid, f. 160v.
Such an attitude is all the more remarkable when one considers that the French had done little to warrant such a bold statement of loyalty. To date, their military ventures consisted of a surrender of Tarragona (1640), a failed siege of Tarragona (1641), and another before Tortosa (1642). Yet despite this, the hearts of these rural southern Catalans were clearly in support of the Generalitat. Religious conflict, much more than military success or failure, was the concern of these villagers, and the majority of them appeared willing to suffer much for the sake of their God, in whose Sacramental body the Catalans found their identity.

The “Gausch incident” would also have repercussions among the commanders of the French and Spanish army. For the Catalans, it appeared perfectly reasonable for a cleric to take up arms in defense of his church and still retain his ecclesiastical privileges, should he be captured. From the scanty information that exists on the subject, it appears that the policy of the French armies in Catalonia was to treat captured chaplains with the respect due their office. In the minds of some Catalans, chaplains and defensive-minded clergy were both serving their Lord in the armed forces; it seemed only natural that both should enjoy the privileges attending men of the cloth. News of the priest’s wounding at the hands of the Castilians spread around the region and the Catalan concern proved so great that the French commanding general, Marshal de La Mothe, wrote a series of letters to the Marqués de la Inojosa concerning it. Through this communication he urged that the Castilian commander respect the same usages with captured clerics as the French
did—usages that appear to have been defined by the “Chaplain Major of the Comte de Sanguien.”

Fragments of another pamphlet, published around the same time as the Relacio, further emphasizes the religious aspect of this conflict. In particular, this anonymous author deals at length with the imagery conjured up from a conflict between the rural Catalan irregulars—called Miquelets—and the Spanish army. The Count of San Guin, commanding another royalist raid into southern Catalonia, met with fierce resistance at the village of Arnes, then held by a band of Miquelets.

The count offered terms to the besieged residents, but the irregulars refused to surrender, believing any Castilian promises to be false. Instead, the Miquelets brashly went out to face the army, commending their souls to God, and desiring “to die fighting as true Catalans before surrendering themselves to the Castilians.” Unfortunately the Miquelets were no match for the professional tercios of Philip IV; they were defeated and fled the village, “before the Castilians forgot, not only in word, but in deed, that they were Christians (if they ever were.).” The victorious army—which was in reality composed of Walloons, Castilians, and Aragonese—proceeded to sack the place, burning

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926 “Ya tinch escrit a VE y encomanat la persona de mossèn Jaume Guasch capella de la vila del Pla, dient se servesque V Exc. usar ab ell los mateixos tractes, que yo mano se usen entre Eclesiastichs de aqueix exercit que arriban a mon poder, conforme siu tambe ab lo Capella major del Compte de Sanguien…usara ab dit Gausch la matexa liberalitat.” FB 5623: *Copia de la carta que lo Excellentissim Señor Mariscal de la Motta ha escrit al Excellentissim Señor Marqués de la Inojosa Gene. del exercit del Rey de Castella* (Barcelona: J. Matheavt, 1642), f. 134v.

927 “morir pelando como a vedaderos Catalanes antes que rendirse a Castellanos.” BC: FB 9007, fragment of a pamphlet, f. 5.

928 “pero antes olvidandose los Castellanos no solo de la palabra, ni tampoco de si eran Christianos (si es que lo fuessen).” Ibid, f. 6.
houses and plundering the church with a cruelty that the author compared to Herod slaughtering the Innocents, and to the Roman sack of Jerusalem.\footnote{Ibid, f. 6v. The connection with Herod was also drawn to the cruelty of los Vélez in 1640.}

In the midst of their plundering, the soldiers threw the mayor, the town councilors, the village priest, and other persons into the jail. Later in the day, they violently dragged the village priest from his cell, stripped him nearly naked, and bound him with horse fetters to a “vile animal.” Another priest, Mossèn Cabés, appeared to be abused also.\footnote{“se llevaron presos el Bayle, y los Iurados con otras personas del pueblo...y lo que excede toda credulidad es que se llevaron con grande deshonor el Cura del lugar preso, y atado con grillos cavalleros en un vil animal, poco menos que en pelo, y con el llevaron preso otro Clerigo llamado mossen Cabes.” Ibid, f. 7.} Despite the great hardships endured by these rural communities, the author of the pamphlet ended on an encouraging note; the true Catalans, he argued ought to be happy in the news that God will deliver them from the evil hands of Philip IV and his soldiers, just as the He did the Hebrew slaves from Pharaoh in Egypt.\footnote{“alegre que se le trae Dios armado a sus manos, como los Egipcios a los de su pueblo de Israel. Entonces esté segura Cathaluña de su mayor Gloria, quando viere entrar por ella armadas, y sobervios los que sacrilegamente abrasaron, y convirtieron en cenizas el mayor Sacramento de la gracia, que su divina Magestad como tiene deputado en la otra vida un lugar para castigo los malos, assi parece tiene señalado en esta a nuestro Principado para castigo de Castellanos,” Ibid, f. 7.}

The resistance that the Catalans offered to the Spanish during their summer offensives into the diocese of Tarragona is significant for a number of reasons. First, rather than passively accepting their fate, or endeavoring to switch sides, the commoners in small rural villages sought to find a way to fight back. Second, they chose as their leader, not a village elder, but a priest, the more fitting because the degradation suffered by these people affected not only their homes, but their temples as well. Third, the fact that the rural clergy were willing—indeed, in the case of Jaume Gausch, \textit{eager}—to stand and fight against the Spanish indicates a level of support for the French cause, or at the
very least, a level of hatred against Spain and her sacrileges, that extended beyond a Barcelona hierarchy, or beyond the levels of cathedral canons and their love of privileges. In the hopeless defense of Pla one can see the true roots of the Catalan revolt: the defense of Lord’s House and of His Sacramental Body.

**Catalan Clergy and the fall of Perpignan**

On 10 September 1642, after several months of bitter siege, the city of Perpignan capitulated to Louis XIII, placing the unofficial capital of the Comtats of Roussillon and Cerdagne in the hands of the French. As was customary for the time, the French celebrated their conquest with a series of religious services. On the very day of their entrance into town, the Archbishop of Narbonne—who had held jurisdiction over Perpignan for a number of years—presided over the first service of thanksgiving and reconciliation.⁹³² The Bishop of Nîmes delivered the sermon commemorating the restoration of Perpignan to the throne of France. Following the mass in the cathedral, there was a procession through town, undertaken in the style of Corpus Christi. Accompanied by the Bishops of Albi and Nîmes, the Archbishop led the procession, carrying the Holy Sacrament with him through the major streets and neighborhoods of Perpignan.⁹³³

If anything, festivities over the fall of Perpignan were even greater in Barcelona. The day after the city fell, the Consell de Cent sent an embassy to the chapter of Barcelona asking them to prepare a special religious ceremony to give thanks for the victory. After some discussion, the canons agreed to hold four consecutive offices, from

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⁹³² After all, the date marked the first time a prelate from Narbonne had preached there in over 200 years, Vassal-reig, *La Prise de Perpignan*, 269.
⁹³³ Sanabre, *La Acción de Francia en Cataluña*, 231. When word of the victory reached Paris, the city celebrated a *Te Deum* in Notre Dame.
Friday to Monday; on the last day, there would be a special procession through the city, following the route normally followed for Corpus Christi. Tuesday would be commemorated with a special mass in honor of the valiant Catalan dead. In return for this extraordinary response, the Consell de Cent agreed to supplement some of the costs.

But the dawning of the first day of celebration revealed a Spanish fleet numbering over forty vessels off the shoreline of Barcelona. Faced with this new threat, the city postponed all festivities, religious offices, and the torch-lit procession; instead the cathedral chapter ordered the Sacrament to be unveiled in all the parish churches and religious houses in the capital. Despite the menacing aspect of the Spanish flotilla, the present danger seemed only to encourage the rebellious Catalans in their defiance. Vincente Candiotti, the papal diplomat just recently arrived in the province observed, “This has served to demonstrate that all the citizens are very much united in the armed defense of the patria and in favor of the French faction.”

Fortunately for the rebels, the fleet—which had been rushing to the relief of Perpignan and had not yet heard of the city’s fall—moved on the next day, permitting the citizens of Barcelona to continue in their revelry. The city council arranged with the chapter for a postponement of the three-day festival until 21 September, St. Matthew’s day; interestingly, while the Governor, Margarit, the Consellers, and the Diputats came to each of the three services, Bishop Manrique quietly refused to participate in the

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936 “La detta armata di Spagna in questo porto ha dato la dovuta gelosia a questi Cittadini essendosi messi tutti in arme per la difesa della patria col vedersi grandissima unione, et una costanza particolare pel partito francese.” BAV, [BT] Barb. Lat. 8535, Candiotti to Francesco Barberini, 16 September 1642, f. 8v.
subsequent religious processions—an absence that would not pass unnoticed by the civil authorities.937

The celebration in Barcelona resounded throughout the province. Groups gathered from all over the province to take part in the three-day festival, replete with processions and prayers.938 The extended revelries in the capital culminated in two separate celebrations: an extended thanksgiving office in the cathedral on 11 September, followed by a shorter service in the Plaça Sant Jaume, right outside the halls of the Consell de Cent and the Diputació, two weeks later. Among the prominent guests attending both ceremonies, the people gave the greatest cheers for Vincente Candiotti, the Papal envoy who had just recently arrived in Barcelona; René I de Voyer, the Seigneur d’Argenson, acting-viceroy; and the Catalan governor, Don Josep de Margarit i Biure.939

Both before and after the extraordinary Te Deum office, the Holy Sacrament was unveiled in the cathedral, so that the people would not forget that their faithful devotion to Christ’s sacrifice was the reason why Divine grace had bestowed success upon them.940 Three separate clerics offered up homilies during the thanksgiving service: Fray Pedro Pedrigas, a member of the Barcelona religious Order of Merced, Jaume Puig, a Jesuit, and—naturally—the honey-tongued Gaspar Sala.941 The preacher at the shorter

938 ACG: Cartas, 1640-1642; Dona Marianna de Vallgornera y de Cardona to chapter of Girona, 18 September 1642.
939 “No faltò el illustissimo señor Vincencio Candiotto Collector General Apostolico en el Principado de Cataluña, a quien reconoce el agradecimiento las deudas de su presencia.” BC: FB 6106: Triumphos del Amor, Glorias del Afecto, y Fiestas de la Lealtad Verdadera (Barcelona: G. Nogues, 1642), pp. 48-49.
940 “Estuvo patente el Santissimo Sacramento, y aunque se descubrió para alcanzar de su Divina Magestad nuevas victorias, pero este fue celestial favor a la fiesta, para que no quedasse sin su presencia la que primariamente se rendia a las glorias del Sacramento,” Ibid, p. 50. The public displaying of the Sacrament, either during times of anxiety and insecurity or to celebrate military victories, had become quite a tradition in Catalonia since the summer of 1640.
941 Sanabre, La Acción de Francia en Cataluña, 232; Vassal-reig, La Prise de Perpignan, 288.
ceremony at the Plaça Sant Jaume was none other than Pare Fray Josep de Jesus Maria, a Discalced Carmelite who had given a rousing sermon on St. Jordi’s Day, justifying the Catalan revolt earlier in the year. Following these religious ceremonies, the jubilant crowd spread throughout the entire city.

Many Catalans saw in the fall of Perpignan the triumph of the good and the just over evil and hypocrisy, as well as the continued humbling of arrogant Castile, which had begun on the slopes of Montjuïc almost two years before. Perpignan, because of the obstinate resistance put up by the Spanish garrison, had been a thorn in the side of the rebels, and not only because of the hope it gave Castile that it might one day reconquer the Principat and Comtats. Far worse, in the minds of the Franco-Catalan leadership, was the distressing way in which Perpignan’s defense was, “always reinforcing … incredulity among the domestic enemies of the Patria, giving earnestness to their obstinacy, and resolution to their malice.”

One anonymous commentary on the festivities placed a special emphasis on the several religious interpretations or lessons that he inferred from such an historic event. Such an account, replete with analogies and metaphors, reflects quite well the nature of early-modern writing, as well as displaying the serious nature of their times. These people took their Scripture very seriously and much of this analysis is couched in

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942 BC: FB 6106: *Triunfos del Amor, Glorias del Afecto, y Fiestas de la Lealtad Verdadera* (Barcelona: G. Nogues, 1642), pp. 2-3. As was customary, the bishop or vicar-general of Barcelona was responsible for reading the book through first before attaching his seal of approval. Only then could the book be published. In this case, the vicar-general, Miquel Joan Boldo, acting in place of the exiled Bishop Manrique, asked Fra Thomas Ros, a Dominican, to review the work. Ros declared himself satisfied with, “la piedad en el afecto grande, con que afecta la unidad al amor de la Patria, que afectan todos,” and the 128 page book—significantly dedicated to the Seigneur d’Argenson—came out on 10 December 1642.

943 “siempre reforçava ... en los domesticos enemigos de la Patria la incredulidad, dando ahinco a la obstinacion, y brios a la malicia,” Ibid, p. 4.
apocalyptic terms: the battle between Good and Evil, Christ and Antichrist in the end times.  \textsuperscript{944}

The author, for example, continually portrays Castile as Babylon, the archetype figure of Antichrist in St. John’s \textit{Revelations}. Catalans could rejoice in the fact that their brothers to the north could now enjoy their liberties: “Faithfulness can be comprehended by them, recognizing in the protection of so pious a King, their deliverance from the captive tyranny, I do not wish to say of Babylon, but of Castile.” \textsuperscript{945} Later on, in the fourth section of the work, a special importance is placed on the particular day of the celebration, a Thursday. The author refers to “the vision of weeks” in the book of Daniel, where, in the end times, the Antichrist makes a covenant with the people of God for one “week,” in which he works his abominations. In the middle of this week—three-and-a-half days, or Thursday—Christ will come, he “that delivers the most faithful Perpignanese from the ferocious captivity (not of Babylon, but of Castile), completely finished from that day with the advent of a King, one that is Just and Anointed, renewing in their minds the memory of Christ’s Advent.” \textsuperscript{946}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{944} Several of the early Church Fathers, especially Saint Augustine, conceived of the figure of Antichrist, not as a person—as is the more modern Evangelical Protestant conception—but rather institutionally, such as a corrupt church. In the same way that the True Church is the Body of Christ, Augustine believed that Antichrist would be the renegade Church, preaching false doctrine while clothed in the same priestly garb of the true Church, and attempting to deceive “if it were possible,” even the elect. Early-modern apocalyptic references, at least in Catalonia, appear to follow closely this Augustinian interpretation. In contrast, the modern evangelical conception of Antichrist as a person—now notoriously spelled out in the \textit{Left Behind} series—appears to have originated with the deeds of that singularly dangerous individual, Napoleon Bonaparte.

\textsuperscript{945} “la fidelidad podrá ser las comprehenda, reconociendo en la proteccion de tan piadoso Rey la libertad del tyrano cautiverio, no quiero dezir de Babilonia, sino de Castilla,” BC: FB 6106: \textit{Triumphos del Amor}, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{946} “que libra … los fidelissimos Perpiñaneses de la fiera captividad (sino de Babilonia, de Castilla) acabada y desfecha con el advenimiento de un Rey, y por Iusto, y ungido, renueva la memoria del advenimiento de Christo,” Ibid, p. 21.
\end{footnotesize}
The fourth section describes an even more explicitly spiritual interpretation of political events. In case any of this should appear contrived to the modern mind, it needs to be understood that the early-modern understanding of the world was far more “of a piece” than our own. Whereas our tendency is to separate and isolate the scientific world from the political world and this in turn from the ethical-religious world, and at the same time isolate ourselves from our own history, the medieval and early-modern mind tended to look for analogies to their situations in Nature, History, and Revelation. Consequently, this particular Franco-Catalan interpretation of the fall of Perpignan aimed at more than mere patriotic applause; it sought to bring a series of special meanings to the otherwise confusing events of their day.

Various sections in the pamphlet present this holistic version of life. The Palau de Sant Jaume paid honor to St. James who first brought the faith to Spain: naturally, Catalonia was the first region to hear and receive the True Faith. The 25th of September—the day of Barcelona’s celebration—represented the day on which Clovis, the king of the Franks, was baptized into the Catholic faith. Even the fact that the feasting occurred on a Thursday was symbolic for the anniversary of the Institution of the Sacrament, bringing about the seemingly inevitable reiteration that the Catalans’ defense of the Holy Body was the chief reason for the war in the first place.

In addition to the many parallels drawn by the author, the essence of the September celebration was the supreme justification of the Catalan cause: “Catalonia has

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947 The author of the work is careful to note the connection between the celebration locale and the Apostle of the True Faith: “Esta sin duda es la causa de la eleccion del lugar.” (p. 23) Even if James was the saint of Spain, the author considered him much more the saint over Catalonia, since it was only there he could find innocence and justice.

948 “dia en que se instituyó el soberano Sacramento del Altar, a cuya defensa, y vengança se levantaron zelosas las armas de Cataluña, y oy vitoriosamente triumphantes dan al mismo Sacramento las gracias, escogiendo el dia de su institución divina.” Ibid, pp. 17-18.
justice: this is her best resistance. The hand of God is not shortened, so that it cannot save the most helpless, neither is His divine ear closed, so that he cannot hear the voices of those who call out. Catalonia invokes innocence in all her clamorings to God … later Catalonia hopes with certainty for her salvation.”

The book concluded with a series of remarkable allegories or “hieroglyphs” as they are called by the author: Catalonia is the Phoenix, rising from the flames of the burnt Sacrament; Saint Michael, the patron saint of France is invoked to save the land from the Castilian tiger: “But Catalonia does not have to be afraid, if with the protection of the glorious Saint Michael, it is indisputably his Province?”

Praise was also given to the French commander in Catalonia, the Maréchal La Mothe, “our undefeated Captain, our French Joshua, the zealous Maccabee.”

Even the peasant militia of Catalonia are clothed in religious wrappings: “Saint Michael hurled from Heaven/ the Evil Angels for their arrogance,/ and thus the Miquelets/ have put the Castilians to flight.”

News of Perpignan’s fall spread like wildfire throughout the province. In spite of the Catalan church’s ongoing difficulties with the new regime, they appeared willing to set aside these differences, at least temporarily. On 10 September, the Jurats of Girona presented news of the glorious victory to the cathedral chapter, and asked for a special

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949 “Iusticia tiene Cathaluña, esta es su mayor resistencia, no esta la mano de Dios abrevidad, par que no pueda salvar al mas desvalido, ni su divina oreja cerrada, para que no oyga las vozes de quien le llama, Cathaluña la invoca inocente, todos son clamores a Dios…luego espere Cathaluña por cierta su salvacion.” Ibid, pp. 29-30.
950 “Pero no ha de ser temida Cataluña, si con la proteccion del glorioso San Miguel es incontrastable su Provincia?” Ibid, p. 110.
952 “Sant Miguel del Cel llança / Angels mals per arrogants, / y axi tambe Miquelets / fan fugir als Castellans.” Ibid, pp. 118-119.
ceremony. The chapter agreed to a special Te Deum celebration, which was led by both the Jurats and the canons through the entire city.\footnote{ACG: Actes Capitulares, volume 24, 10 September 1642, p. 60.}

Outside of Barcelona and Girona, however, the popular response to the fall of Perpignan was much more muted. At the very least, there seemed to be rather mixed sentiments in the smaller towns. Certainly the Catalans were full of joy at the defeat of the Castilians occupying the capital of Roussillon. At the same time, however, certain elements within Catalonia expressed dismay at the French triumph. Part of this sadness flowed from sympathy towards their northern brethren who had suffered terribly during the long siege inside Perpignan, as well as for those in the countryside who had to support the large French army; another contributing factor was concern about how the French would handle such a decisive victory.

In Vic, the celebrations over the fall of Perpignan were somewhat ambiguous. When the news reached Vic on 12 September, the cathedral bells rang out at noon time “out of happiness for the fall of Perpignan” and a general procession was organized for that evening.\footnote{ACV: Secretaria: Liber 3 (1641-1648) (Arm 57/57); 12 September 1642. For whatever reason, the celebrations in Vic seem also to have been postponed for two weeks, to be renewed on 26 September with a solemn procession involving the Bishop Sentmanat, the city consellers, and the entire religious community. ACV: Secretaria: Liber 3 (1641-1648) (Arm 57/57); 26 September 1642.} Later ceremonies, however, were more muted. Several weeks later, the chapter wrote to Governor Margarit that, while they were thankful for the victory, their celebration consisted of holy offices and a procession through town, “with all possible Solemnity, without other demonstrations.”\footnote{“ab tota la Solemnitat posible, sens altres demonstrations,” ACV 57-45: Segretaria, Cartas Enviadas, (1640-1660); Chapter of Vic to Margarit, 2 October 1642, f. 22.}

Though they did not know it at the time, the Catalan ecclesiastical celebration for the fall of Perpignan would mark the last time the province’s religious community would...
voluntarily celebrate a French victory, or even a Franco-Catalan victory for that matter. Continuing conflicts with the new regime in Barcelona would lead to an ever-growing divide between Church and State that slowly began to tear Catalonia apart as early as 1644. The Catalan church was becoming increasingly disgusted with the high-handed manner in which secular authorities were treating church officials. More than that, the ecclesiastical estate was becoming increasingly tired with the continued fiscal demands made on them by the Intendant d’Argenson and the Junta de Batalló, although this frustration would not prevent the clergy from contributing to one final effort this year.

In October, the French army under the general La Mothe defeated Philip IV’s latest attempt to drive the French out of Aragon. Despite the victory, their excursion into Aragon had produced in response a Castilian army that now threatened to besiege Lleida. Among the many military necessities arising out of this situation, one of the chief needs was to pay and support the French garrison lest they should impose too much on the local population. As the Spanish army moved on Lleida to divert La Mothe from further exploiting his advance into Aragon, the entire urban society came forward to help. The papal collector, Vicente Candiotti was quite impressed at the diligence both secular and religious groups to contribute speedily to the defense of Lleida, and made note of it in one of his letters back to Rome: “It is a grand occasion to have seen such a fierce and powerful military [La Motte’s army in relief] and exquisite to see the due diligence in securing new ways to find money the effort with which all the City [Magistrate]
leadership, the Cathedral Chapters, and military confraternities are trying to counter and overcome the enemy forces, and how prompt they are to take up arms.\textsuperscript{956}

**Epilogue to Perpignan: Rome and the Feast Day of St. Eulalia**

The Catalan communication with Rome was not purely to continue to defend their actions as rebels against their king. They were also interested in promoting the worship of St. Eulalia, to whose favor the victory at Montjuïc had been attributed. In particular, a good many Catalan clerics were desirous of elevating St. Eulalia’s festival to new heights in recognition for the peculiar benefits they had received from her intercession. As far as one can determine, the Barcelona chapter seemed to have provided the impetus for elevating St. Eulalia’s feast day into something far greater in late 1641; their specific desire was to place the feast day on the same level as the Corpus Christi celebration.\textsuperscript{957}

By the time St. Eulalia’s day rolled around in 1642, this extra solemnity had been adduced to the celebration in Barcelona, based solely on the approval of the local cathedral chapter. Among the changes included a grand procession, in which Diputats, Oïdors, Consellers, and all the clergy of Barcelona, from the bishop to the parish priest, marched through the streets of the city, carrying the Sacrament before them. In general, the procession was made in the afternoon, which—on account of it being darker earlier

\textsuperscript{956} “Et apportando veramente grand’ occasione d’esser stimato il sudetto essercito tanto poderoso si fan qui esquisite diligenze per trovar danari e far nuove levate, e tutti i Maigstrati delle Città, i Capitoli delle Cathedrali, le Confraternite e tutti i coprio d’adunanze di qualsivoglia altre provisioni militari, onde con questo sforzo pensano questi, no solo di contrapesare le forze dell’essercito contrario, ma anco di superarle et invero e meraviglia il vedere con quanta prontezza universalmente si prendono le armi,” BAV, [BT] Barb. Lat. 8535, Candidotti to Francisco Barberini, 28 October 1642, ff. 30r-v.

\textsuperscript{957} The Barcelona syndic in Rome, Canon Joan Maso wrote back to the chapter in March 1642, complaining about that body’s silence for many months, and adding that the chapter’s request for the feast of St. Eulalia would be very difficult to press through in Rome. He noted in particular the opposition of the cardinals to the project. In the midst of the letter one finds that Maso had been in contact with Canon Dr. Miquel Joan Osona on this matter for several months. ACB: I.B.4. Comissions. To the Santa Seu, 1642-1688: Letter from Canon Joan Maso to Barcelona chapter, 23 March 1642.
because of winter—necessitated the purchase of numerous torches, illuminating the grand progress as if it were day. A noblewoman from the diocese of Girona, Dona Marianna de Vall Gornera i de Cardona, on her way to visit her relative, Dr. Don Bernat de Cardona, canon of Girona and currently the Diputat Eclesiastic, commented favorably on the changes, even though it seemed to wear out the Diputat Cardona.\footnote{ACG: Cartes, 1640-1642: Dona Marianna de Vall Gornera i de Cardona to Chapter of Girona, 13 February 1642.}

It appears that only by the summer of 1642, eight or nine months after Catalan syndics in Rome presented the original proposal to modify St. Eulalia’s Day, did the Congregation of Cardinals take up the matter. Unfortunately for Catalonia, it soon became apparent that the Church hierarchy was not in favor of the innovation; even beyond the determined opposition of the Spanish Cardinals, the Congregation moved with the prudence—or dilatoriness—so customary in Rome. Abbot Masso, one of Barcelona’s representatives to the Holy See related to his fellow clerics the major difficulties: specifically, the Congregation wanted to determine the history of the feast day, and whether it had been celebrated throughout the whole diocese of Barcelona. Only when the chapter could send a copy a brief written by Pope Paul V, detailing the exact ritual, could Masso then take it to Cardinal Alejandro Cesarino to see if His Eminence could use his influence to expedite a papal bull that would have a great effect on the Church, the city of Barcelona, and the Principat.\footnote{“Se procurara també allenar la dificultat que fa la congregacio de ques puga celebrar lo offici per tot lo principat axis com altre temps se celebra per tot lo Bisbat y per superar esta dificultat es necessari enviar lo breu de Papa Paulo Quint y quant VS enviara tots estos papers podra escriurer una carta al Sr. Cardenal Alejandro Cesarino en actio de gracias, y suplicarlo bulla expedir esta Causa quam primum, y un graciarlo també del effecte que te ala Sta Eulalia la Iglesia, Ciutat, y Principat…” ACB: I.B.4. Comissions. To the Santa Seu, 1642-1688: Letter from Abbot Masso to Barcelona chapter, 18 August 1642. Cardinal Alejandro Cesarino had not only presided over the conclave that elected Urban VIII to the papacy, but also}
With the fall of Perpignan in September 1642, came a renewed emphasis on the Catalan attempt to elevate the status of St. Eulalia’s feast day to one of equal importance as Corpus Christi. The day after the chapter of Barcelona received word of the city’s fall, the canons wrote to their syndic and fellow canon, the Cabiscol Joan Maso, in Rome, attaching letters from agents of the Diputació, the Consell de Cent, and even, ostensibly Bishop Manrique, all of which were full of support in elevating St. Eulalia Day to become one of the major feasts of the liturgical year.  

Still, the Congregation of Cardinals remained reluctant to approve the Catalans’ request, this despite repeated assurances from Barcelona that the elevation of St. Eulalia’s feast would be “of benefit to such a great Virgin and Martyr, and here we all owe her our Liberty that unless we had been placed under her protection and shelter, we would be slaves of the Castilians, notwithstanding the Protestants from there desired it.” While sympathizing with the frustration of the Catalan chapters, their syndics urged patience, hoping that within a few months the cardinals or the Pope would weigh in decisively on this matter. At the very least, the clergy in Barcelona as well as Rome, were hoping and praying for a decisive French victory inside the Principat; such a success, coming soon on the heels of the fall of Perpignan could not help but solidify the new political reality of a French-controlled Catalonia in the international community.

served the pope as “cleric of the Apostolic Chamber.” As such, he enjoyed a close relationship with the Barberinis, a relationship which the Catalans were hoping to exploit.  

960 Maso wrote back to the chapter the following month referring to the “Instructio y cartas per los agents de la Diputació, Ciutat, y Sr. Bisbe ab los quals me conferire els donare raho del que se haura de fer en este particular,” ACB: I.B.4. Comissions. To the Santa Seu, 1642-1688: Letter from Canon Joan Maso to Barcelona chapter, 13 October 1642.  

961 “ser en benefici de una tant gran verge y Martir, y aqui devem tots la nostra Libertat que sino fos estat per sa protectio y emparo siriem esclaus dels castellans, no obstant que volen los protestants de assi,”
Unfortunately for the Catalan efforts, Urban VIII was not convinced that such special intervention by Saint Eulalia before Montjuïc deserved official recognition or commendation. In late December 1642, the Pope referred the matter to the Holy Congregation of Rituals. The Congregation later informed Abbot Masso and the other Catalan syndics that Catalonia’s desire for St. Eulalia and her feast day was impractical. The chief reason for these grounds of dismissal was that, for the Pope to elevate the feast of St. Eulalia, he would also have to make it universal. Regardless of the Pope’s particular political persuasions at the time, the elevation of the feast would at the least continue the unseemly divisions within Catholicism, and at the worst would greatly offend Spain.\footnote{ACB: I.B.4. Comissions. To the Santa Seu, 1642-1688: Letter from Abbot Joan Masso to Barcelona chapter, 27 December 1642.}

Despite their frustration in this matter, the Catalans seemed to comply with Rome’s decision; the letters from 1643 onward are largely absent of any renewed request. Doubtless one of the main reasons why their letters from 1643 onwards contained little about St. Eulalia and her feast was due to the greater concerns that filled their correspondence: concerns regarding the lack of bishops to govern the church in Catalonia, and the insufferable way in which the French governors and their Catalan allies were violating time-honored ecclesiastical liberties. As the war dragged on, a greater number of Catalan clerics began to realize that a turning point had been reached.

Symbolically, the defeat of the Catalan proposal regarding St. Eulalia’s Day signaled the end of a distinctly Catalan component to the rebellion. Just as their military operations were largely conducted by the French and primarily for French aims, and their political leaders were largely subjected to the great influence of la Mothe and
d’Argenson, so too was the Catalan religious identity fading into the background. The Catalans’ initial concern for defending the purity and sanctity of the Holy Sacrament—the concern which had unified them as nothing had before—was gradually forgotten as the war between France and Spain wore on: St. Eulalia was slowly being squeezed out by the competing devotees of Saint James and St. Michael.

**Conclusion: Persistent Popular Conceptions of Religious Warfare**

While the Franco-Catalan government in Barcelona concerned themselves with amassing sufficient men, money, and munitions to continue the fight against Castile, writers, poets, and pamphleteers freely proclaimed the justice of the Catalan cause to an ever-interested public. Popular poetry, along with the brief *relaciones* relating the most recent military exploits, continued to emphasize this religious aspect of the war. One of these poetical accounts, entitled *Romance Emibiado de Madrid a un Cavallero Catalan desta Ciudad. Por un aficionado a los Catalanes*, praised the gallant Franco-Catalan army that continually marched out “In search of the enemy/ (that seeks its own damnation)”⁹⁶³ Despite the serious demands made by the military on the average Catalan farmer, and despite the continuing fiscal burden being placed upon the Catalan priest, the general tone of this “romance,” as well as others continued to stress the nature of the fight in terms of sacrilege and defenders of the True Faith. These works encouraged its public to give thanks to God for His aid in battle: each victory testifying to Divine support for their Cause:

> To His Divine Majesty,  
> Give thanks for such favor,

⁹⁶³ “En busca de la enemiga/ (que os busca la perdición),” BC FB 5877: *Romance Emibiado de Madrid a un Cavallero Catalan desta Ciudad. Por un aficionado a los Catalanes.* (Barcelona: Sebastian de Cormellas, 1642), f. 57v. The frontespiece of this particular “romance,” is decorated with the Virgin and Child.
Another poetical example that more explicitly linked the continued expression of Divine favor with the Catalan defense of the Holy Sacrament was *Cataluña Agradecida*, written by Don Hugo de Hizovol, a nobleman. While any comment about the reception of this work—and many others—must remain speculative, it is probable that verses such as these circulated throughout the lower orders in Catalan towns where they could be memorized and recited. Possibly, knowledge of these poems circulated among the Catalan peasants; if so they would have undoubtedly received a warmer reception than the lengthy erudite volumes of Sala, Viladamor, and Font, which seems to have enjoyed a primarily urban audience, both in Catalonia, and abroad—in places like Lisbon, Paris, and Amsterdam.

Many of the stanzas in Hizovol’s work aim at opening the eyes of Castile and its supporters to the true nature of the conflict. Catalonia has been fighting for the sanctity of the Church and its Sacraments, and God has clearly rewarded them by granting them several victories. Philip IV and his subjects need only to open their eyes to behold this wondrous working of Providence; only then can the conflict stop, when the Castilians realize who they are up against.

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964 A Su Magestad Divina;/ dad gracias por tal favor;/ que con patentes Milagros/ al enemigo prostrò,” *Ibid*, f. 57v.
965 BC: FB 7578: *Cataluña Agradecida* by Don Hugo de Hizovol, Catalan nobleman (Barcelona: J. Romeu, 1642).
966 “NO adviertes, que Cataluña;/ de fiel a su Dios blasona;/ que es Sol que amanecer suele;/ en la noche tenebrosa?” *Ibid*, f. 314v.
Much of the poem’s narrative is shaped around the atrocities of 1640, despite the fact that such abuses were now two years old. Nevertheless, for Hizovol, they are quite clearly the reason why the Catalans took up arms in the first place, and furthermore, why they would continue to fight.

They burned, they burned
(an act that amazes the faithful
and makes them tremble at the mere thought)
the pearl of God, the shell:

Which is the Divine Bread,
that candid Host,
where there truly is…
[the Body of our Lord] …

Catalonia, saddened,
To such great zeal was provoked:

That [only] such a motive
Could cause war to break out,
[Catalonia is] being reborn like the Phoenix
Between ashes and incense.\(^ {967}\)

Hizovol’s account of the initial campaign of the war praises the Catalan people through analogies to righteous warriors of the past. He paints the humble segadors who initially rose up against the traveling tercios as Davids who boldly defied the blasphemous oaths and physical strength of the Castilian Goliath, or as Gideons,

\(^ {967}\) Quemaron, ellos quemaron
(hecho de que el fiel se asombra,
y tiembla solo en pensarlo)
de la perla Dios, la concha:
Que lo es aquel Pan divino,
aquella candida Hostia,
donde está tan realmente …
[el cuerpo de nuestro Señor] …
que Cataluña afligida
a tal zelo se provoca;
Que le fue motivo aquesto
para que la guerra rompa,
renaciendo como a Fenix
de entre cenizas, y gomas.”
\(Ibid\), f. 315.
defending the sanctity of Israel’s land against the ravages of the mighty heathen host of Midian.\textsuperscript{968} Finally, the nobleman makes references to the last great holy war fought in Catalonia: “Their powerful arms/ Like their Fathers they raised/ To throw off the Moors.”\textsuperscript{969} All that Castile needed to do is confess her sins before God and they will be redeemed:

\begin{quote}
What will afflicted Castile do?
make a river of your eyes,
and ask God for pardon
that he might take away your sins.

Confess that you have offended Him,
That your insane soldiers
Sacrilegiously burned
The pure and candid Host.\textsuperscript{970}
\end{quote}

While many Catalans—particularly the Barcelona dock-workers who lived in the \textit{Ribera} neighborhood—may not have shared Hizovol’s Christian charity that sought to turn Castile and her supporters to repentance, they seem to have sincerely believed that their cause was not only just but righteous as well. Expressions of this popular piety were not merely limited to the great and dramatic events of the war, such as the surrender of Tarragona in 1640 or the fall of Perpignan in 1642. Every minute detail of the war involving the Catalans and Castilians became cause for either a celebration or a

\textsuperscript{968} Ibid, ff. 315v-316.
\textsuperscript{969} “sus armadas poderosas,/ como sus Padres hizieron/ para echar las gentes Moras, Ibid, f. 316v.
\textsuperscript{970} “Que harás Castilla afligida?
 haz un rio de tus ojos,
y pide perdón a Dios,
que tus culpas así acota.
Confiesa averle ofendido,
que tu soldadesca loca
quemó sacrilegamente
la pura y candida Hostia.”
Ibid, f. 317v.
disturbance. Unfortunately, several times bad news from the front would serve as a catalyst for the lower orders to begin forming mobs, seeking to turn their wrath against more tangible objects, such as anyone who might be in the least suspected of Castilian sympathies.

In September 1642, only day or two before the fall of Perpignan, the acting-viceroy, Seigneur d’Argenson published a letter in Barcelona containing the most recent news from the front. In the epistle, the Intendant made mention of the latest Castilian atrocity: the slaughter of an innocent curate. Upon receiving the horrific account, there was a spectacular popular outcry that soon led to violence in the streets. The papal collector, Vincente Candiotti commented on this remarkable change in the behavior of the townspeople: “that these people, showing an extraordinary zeal of religion, change themselves so much, that if they see a neighbor take up arms against any innocent Castilian [they proceed against him with great fury] and even d’Argenson is powerless to stop them in their wrath.”

This particular case shows the complex role that religion played on the more popular level of the Catalan revolt. On the one hand, the reaction by the lower orders in Barcelona demonstrated that a number of Catalans were still—two years removed from the burning of the Eucharist—fiercely motivated for a desire to defend the Christian faith, its Sacraments, and its ministers. Unfortunately, such was the powerful effect of religion

971 The bitter enmity which the Catalans hurled against the Neapolitans or other foreigners, which had been prevalent in 1640, seems to have been channeled either consciously or not into a hatred against Castile. Just when and why this occurred—whether it was one of the products of French rule or something completely different—remains a mystery.
972 “che questo popolo, mostrando un straordinario zelo di religione, s’alteró tanto che si vedde vicino a prendere l’armi contro qualche Castigliano innocente rimasto qua, se l’istesso Monsù d’Argenson non havesse moderata la furia.” BAV, [BT] Barb. Lat. 8535: Candiotti to Francesco Barberini, 9 September 1642, f. 6v.
in Catalonia that popular outrage too often developed into a violent reaction, blindly striking out at enemies real or perceived. Indeed, so great was the level of this violence—which undoubtedly was manifested during the Christmas Eve riot of 1640—that even the French authorities could not control it—a point which is worth bearing in mind should one consider whether d’Argenson purposefully planted this information in the hopes of revitalizing morale. This symptom of popular violence which may have had sincere religious concerns at its root, has been observed among the lower orders, not just of Barcelona, but in Vic and Lleida as well, and it could tie in with what both Professors Simon i Tarrés and Amelang have observed in their own histories of Catalonia at this time. While both scholars have observed sundry social causes behind popular uprisings, they may have failed to perceive any potential religious motivation that may have served as a catalyst to the occasional riotous wrath of the lower orders.

Throughout the campaigns of 1642, the Catalan public received constant information regarding the behavior of their foe that only served to harden the image of Castilians as lawless, godless oppressors. The church burnings, thefts, and the desecration of the elements of the Mass all directly pointed to Protestant, or heretical practices, and reaffirmed in the Catalan mind the notion that the Castilian forces were but pseudo-Catholics, falsely professing the Faith and membership in the Church, while in practice destroying her sacred places, and killing her ministers. Although the vigorous measures currently underway by the French viceroy and his secular Catalan allies to tighten their grasp around the provincial clergy were beginning to irritate Catalan clerics, the popular perception that France was aiding Catalonia in defending the pure Catholic faith was still prevalent over much of the land. This attitude, however, would begin to
change as the clerical resistance to the heavy-handed French policies became more manifest and more public.
CHAPTER 7
The Fracturing of the Catalan Church, 1642-1643

I find that in this city [Barcelona] and other areas of the principality that I passed through, one lives quietly and with[in] the rule of law. Mars is not infuriated. But it is only on the surface, because tacitly there is confusion and a great division among these souls because many preserve their ties to the faction of the Catholic King [Philip IV].

And, what is more noteworthy, among the bishops Bishop Manrique of Barcelona in particular does not bother to hide his affections and is the cause of some disorder and consternation among the other prelates. Yet the French are greatly unsuspecting of these clerics.

Those then with their allegiance to Spain do not dare to speak—actually they try to show they support the French—but have difficulty in so doing. You could see the displeasure on many faces after the despairing news received from Perpignan, which depresses you.

Vincenzo Candiotti, papal envoy and Apostolic Collector to Barcelona

As the Catalan revolution—having now expanded into a full-scale war—finished its second year of conflict, there was much for the rebels to take pride in and rejoice. Altogether, obstinate fighting by Catalans and their French allies had turned back invasions from Aragon and Valencia; furthermore, the appointment of the first French viceroys had brought a new measure of political stability. Of even greater importance, Urban VIII’s recognition of the Catalan rebels’ right to nominate its own clerics and the arrival of his own diplomat, Candiotti, provided an additional measure of ecclesiastical legitimacy to the Catalan position. The fruits of the military campaigns in 1642—most

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973 “E questo è in quanto all guerra, nel rimanente poi io trovo che in questa Città e ngel’altri luoghi del Principato per dove son passato, si vive con molta quiete, e con regole di buona giustizia, ne par un paese ove Marte vada infuriondo, il tutto però è in apparenza, perché tacitamente si stà in confusione et in una muta divisione d’animi poiché molti si conservano ben affetti al partito del Re Cattolico, fra quail vi è qualch’uno di consideratione, e particolarmente tutti I Vescovi che son rimasti e massime questo di Barcelona che ne anco dissimula, onde vien cagionato, per quanto intendo, qualche disordine e paimente di persone Ecclesiastiche, delle quail I francschi son grandemente insospetttiti.

Questi però affezzionati à Spagna non osano far parola, anzi cercano di mostrare il contrario, benché difficilment lo sanno fare et a molti che mi son stati insegnati se gli legge appertament sul volto il dispiacer che sentono massime dopo la nuova ricevutasi delle cose disperate di Perpignano, il che gl’atterra ominamente.” BAV [Busquet’s Transcript, hereafter, BT], Barb. Lat. 8535: Candiotti to Francesco Barberini, 2 September 1642, ff. 4-4v.
notably the fall of Perpignan, along with the consolidation of French authority over much of the Principat and Comtats—created the sense of a new Catalan unity made possible by French military aid and expertise. Even the financial aspect of the war appeared to be a solid footing, with the Junta de Batalló providing regular “donations” from the clergy and forfeited estates of those who had remained loyal to Castile and fled the province. An observer of the revolt might conclude that rebellious Catalonia could look forward to a rosy future.

But the social condition within Catalonia was anything but stable by the end of 1642, despite a string of near-continuous political and military successes. The year saw the formation of a substantial faction among the regional clergy who were, at the least wary and at the most opposed, to the French regime, especially with the new government’s disregard for the church except insofar as it served to advance their own temporal interests or enhance the security of their position. The very inability of the French either to recognize the seriousness of the clerical discontent or to counteract it effectively would prove to be the undoing of their rule in Catalonia. By the time Philip IV began to enjoy some military successes in the region—in 1644—the French had already lost the hearts and minds of Catalans in Lleida and elsewhere. Even in Roussillon, their initial attempts to establish order met with fierce resistance on the part of rural priests and monks. By the end of the decade, only the extremely zealous clerics in the chapters of Urgell, Barcelona, Vic, and Girona—and a handful of regular clergy—would continue to support the waning French cause.

This growing social rupture is crucial to understanding the Catalan revolt: pure material success did not appear to hold much weight in the ecclesiastical or social
mindset of many Catalans. Instead, as the French grew more secure in their position as masters of Catalonia, the less they minded the political, legal, and social traditions of Catalonia and sought instead to impose their own legacy of rule and order on the land. Far from enjoying the status of an autonomous province beholden to French protection, Catalonia was slowly taking on the nature of a conquered territory, subject, not to their own customs, but to those of France. Rather than the warm and loyal acceptance of the new French rule, one witnesses instead the beginnings of growing discontent within the region, particularly among members of the Catalan clergy. Not even the increased publicizing of continued Castilian sacrilege and hostility to the Faith appeared to reverse this incipient ecclesiastical antipathy.

This changing attitude among the regional clergy raises a number of questions. Was the religious discontent with the French regime just a failure of ecclesiastical nerve, a re-assertion of traditional Christian views regarding revolution, leading priests canons and monks to doubt whether their motives to revolt in 1640 were right after all? Was it the expression of selfish greed, manifested in the Church’s unwillingness to donate large sums or to sacrifice privileges for the continuing war effort? To what extent did ecclesiastical discontent in Catalonia fit into the larger picture of the revolt? This chapter seeks to offer some answers to these important questions.

**The Origins of Religious Discontent**

The initial ecclesiastical concern between the Catalan clergy and their new allies came from the Protestant threat from France. Despite the best attempts by Richelieu to exterminate Huguenot centres like La Rochelle, the Protestant heresy still thrived in southeastern France, far away from the controlling powers in Paris. Furthermore, not
only was this region geographically close to Roussillon, but it was also one of the poorest regions in France; many a young Huguenot entered the army as a way to earn a living and so found himself in Catalonia, fighting—ironically from the Catalan perspective—for the very Sacrament that their spiritual ancestors had degraded in the streets of Paris only sixty years earlier.\(^{974}\)

Whether by accident or design, the first concerns regarding the French as deadly carriers of heresy arose in the diocese of Girona. By the middle of 1641, roughly a year after the excommunication of the Neapolitans for sacrilege, Bishop Parcero of Girona started writing letters to the parish clergy of his diocese, warning them against the prevalence of “Lutheran” teaching in the French army and exhorting them to be vigilant lest such heretical views begin to circulate among the population. This appeared particularly evident near the coastal town of Blanes.\(^{975}\)

Now such a discovery of “Lutheranism” among the native inhabitants of Catalonia had been rather rare, although among the rank and file of foreign soldiers occupying Catalonia it was no anomaly.\(^{976}\) Out of all Philip IV’s troops stationed in the region from 1639-1640, almost half were foreign, with the majority coming from either Italy or the Low Countries. The variety of religious beliefs among such a diverse body led the Inquisition in Catalonia to prosecute over 120 cases for “Lutheran” beliefs during

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976 On 21 June 1627, a rare *auto de fé* was held in Barcelona in which a merchant from Manresa who had returned from a journey to France was accused of “having attended Huguenot sermons” and of having eaten meat on Fridays. The Inquisition forced him to pay a 1000 ducat fine and sentenced him to three years in a convent. Eufemíà Fort i Cogul, *Catalunya i la Inquisició*, 248. Again such an action was rare in Catalonia and there would not be another *auto de fé* until 1644.
those two years—most of which were absolved or reconciled.\(^7\) Now, a year later, a different set of foreign troops occupying Catalonia for its defense brought the issue of heresy to light again. This time, however, the occurrence of “Lutheran” teachings and practices would be used as weapon against the Principality, challenging the Catalan revolt at its most basic level, viz. that it was a revolt undertaken primarily in the defense of the Holy Sacrament against the impure or impious Catholics of Castile.

Much of the information supplying this branch of Philip IV’s propaganda campaign came from Castilian or Castilian-friendly familiars of the Inquisition and other former officials from the Holy Office in Barcelona. Once these officers were safe in exile they began compiling accusations of heresy against the French and their Catalan allies to use as propaganda. One historian has found that during the war, Castilian inquisitors exiled from Catalonia brought with them into exile whole registers listing of French heretics and their Catalan clients.\(^8\)

By the end of 1641, accusations began to spread that the plague of rebellion in Catalonia had brought with it the stain of heresy, and that the supposed concern of rebel Catalans for the Sacrament in 1640 had been a sham. Such statements circulated rapidly to all parts of the Iberian peninsula, due in large measure to fluidity of the frontier lines during this revolt, a common occurrence throughout pre-modern warfare. The pro-Philip Catalans in Tarragona—headquarters of Bishop Pau Duran, the exiled Inquisition, and a large portion of Philip’s army—soon began their own propaganda campaign, drawing in particular upon the questionable religious purity of Catalonia’s French defenders. One of

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\(^7\) Joan Bada Elias, *La Inquisició a Catalunya*, 78.

\(^8\) “Els inquisidors castellans arribaren a ésser expel.lits de Catalunya i s’emportaren amb ells una sèrie de registres que havien fet dels heretges francesos i els seus seguidors catalans.” Fort i Cogul, *Catalunya i la Inquisició*, 249.
the first works written from Tarragona that sought to confront the Catalan rebels on spiritual matters was entitled, *Manifesto que hizo Tarragona, sobre persuadir al Principado sus quietudes*, and—not surprisingly—was printed and distributed in Madrid.

Many of the examples given in this four-page pamphlet of the supposedly-shocking accounts of French sacrilege appear quite trivial: during the French occupation of Reus in 1641, not one soldier took off his hat to the Sacrament when it progressed through the city; furthermore there was a report that some soldiers threw a statue of the Virgin Mary onto the street, and in general behaved quite poorly to the citizens of the town. Where the pamphlet did seem to touch a nerve, however, was in its assessment of the state of religion in Catalonia, which, from the perspective of fellow Catalans in Tarragona, had changed for the worse.

In Religion we are suffering an inexcusable commerce of heretics (lit. “heretic trade”) because liberty of conscience is permitted in France, and it is inevitable that many Huguenots have entered the land [by being in the French army], and those who have entered Catalonia up to this day, have the liberty to speak and move around, arguing with one and all …We know from a sermon you all can read, they say that the heretics do enter, but individually and in secret,…

The Catalan ought to repent in his heart, seeing this infernal seed in his land; that the Bishops of Barcelona and Girona are trying to go to Rome on account of not being able freely to exercise their Ecclesiastical jurisdiction; and that the Inquisition is not able to speak, when the heretics speak, whose preaching has taken hold in Catalonia.

What are lives for if they are not to be lost in cases such as this? Is it necessary to have heresy introduce itself more than it dares among heretics and lukewarm Catholics?  

Faced with such accusations, the pro-French Catalans had little choice but to show their censorious brethren that such charges were unfounded. Although popular verses

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980 “En la Religion padecemos un comercio de herejes inescusable, por ser permitida en Francia la libertad de conciencia, y ser forzoso que entren muchos Ugoñotes, y en los que hasta ay han entrado se experimenta licencia de hablar, y andar se argumentando con unos y con otros … Sabemos que la predicía se leen, dizien, que los herejes entren si solamente, y en secreto. Rebentar deviera es corazón, que es Catalán, viendo en su tierra esta infernal semilla, y que los Obispos de Barcelona y Girona tratan de irse a Roma por no poder usar con libertad de su jurisdicion Ecclesiastica, y que la Inquisicion no puede hablar, quando hablan los herejes, y la Predica tiene territorio en Cataluna. Paraquando son las vidas, sino son para perderse en casos tales?…Ha menester la heregia para introduirse mas que atrevimiento en los herejes, y tibieza en los Catlicos?” *Manifesto que hizo Tarragona*, f. 20v.
continued to mock Castilian religiosity and praised the faithful orthodoxy of the rebels’ position, the subsequent dealings of the Franco-Catalan government with the Catalan church—particularly the harsh dealings with Bishops Manrique and Parcero in late 1642—gave diminishing hope that such was the case in reality. The revolutionaires might speak with the loudest voice for purity, but their voice might not be the more truthful.

**The Catalan Church in Revolt: A Rebellion producing further rebellions?**

By 1642, growing numbers within the Catalan church were beginning to realize that they were facing a struggle more important than the complicated haggling over finances and privileges with the Franco-Catalan government and the Junta de Batalló, and perhaps even more important than the ongoing battle with Huguenot soldiers. Philosophical aftershocks of the initial revolt had begun to permeate the thoughts and actions of Catalan clergy with effects that threatened to create serious damage not only among the Church as an institution, but among Catalan society as well. Many of these regional clerics were beginning to realize that in accepting and approving of rebellion in 1640, they had opened the doors to an institutional crisis. Gradually the lower orders of the Catalan clergy—individual monks, friars, and parish priests—began to assimilate the rebellious attitudes that had initially inspired and sustained the revolt and to turn such defiance against the newly established social order. In other words, if the cathedral canons and abbots were able to justify their rebellion against pro-Castilian bishops such as Duran and Paredes and to completely cast off their episcopal authority, what was to prevent a parish priest from resisting the orders of the remaining prelates, or even of the local cathedral chapter? In their eagerness to overthrow the yoke of Castile, the pro-
French clergy in Catalonia had begun to undermine their own authority over the remaining members of the regional church. In their single-minded concern for the defense of the Sacrament, the rebellious Catalan clergy appear to have overlooked a simple truth: that revolutions, once begun, are very hard to contain, and that authority, when once questioned at a higher level, becomes vulnerable to assaults further down the social ladder.

The general spirit of rebellion began to pervade Catalan society as early as a few weeks after the revolt on Corpus Christi, with tragic results. As studies by Simon i Tarrés and Eva Serra have shown, the Catalan revolt contained an important element of civil war that manifested itself among the lower orders of secular society during the summer of 1640, tearing cities like Vic apart with irregular violence. Families aligned against other families, fighting in the villages and towns as well as on the battlefields; the social strife let loose by the revolt continued to plague the province throughout the remainder of the war.

Whether because their role as spiritual leaders of the community militated against their joining this initial civil war, or whether there were other reasons behind it, the clerical “civil war” did not manifest itself for several months following the outbreak of revolt. But the destructive spirit of divisiveness was present in the church nevertheless. The very act of theologically justifying revolt against the king seemed to lead inexorably to lower members of the church hierarchy advocating resistance against the commands of

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their superiors—be they chapter canons, bishops, or abbots.\textsuperscript{982} While the initial outbreak of revolt had splintered the Catalan church into those loyal to Philip and those loyal to the Principat, the continuing spirit of rebellion fractured the church even further, pitting former allies against each other and doing serious harm to the effectiveness of the ecclesiastical voice within Catalonia.

The first evidence that all was not well within the Catalan church comes around the middle of 1641, when one notices an increase in the number of disciplinary cases coming before cathedral chapters or vicar-generals in the peripheral dioceses.\textsuperscript{983} By January 1642, news reached Barcelona concerning the activities of one Don Francisco Vilanova Sala de la Neu y Cervera. This Portuguese nobleman had been arrested in the mountain valleys of Andorra, where he had been preaching sermons in favor of Philip IV. At the same time, a growing number of farmers and minor officials in the Vall d’Aran—in the northwest reaches of the diocese of Urgell—began a year-long agitation in favor of the Spanish king and against the pro-French chapter. A few days later, the chapter of Lleida informed the government in Barcelona that a university student who had issued a fiery pamphlet “against the patria” had been given the garrote.\textsuperscript{984}

Growing unrest against the cathedral chapters—whether exhibited by clergy or laity—soon manifested itself in the provincial capital. On 30 June 1642, the chapter of

\textsuperscript{982} A similar tension no doubt existed a century earlier when Martin Luther, though defending his break from Rome—and the German princes’s break with the Holy Roman Emperor—nevertheless felt called upon to urge obedience upon the German peasants during their revolt in the 1520s.

\textsuperscript{983} One of the first examples of this religious disorder appeared in Girona. On 1 July 1641, Francesc Pejoan, the vicar-general sequestered the parish rent from the church of St. Miquel de la Bisbal as punishment for the obstinancy of the parish priest with regards to a decision made by the chapter. ADG: I.4: Protocols de Lletres: U-247, ff. 69-69v.

\textsuperscript{984} ACG: Cartas, 1640-1642; Dr. Jaume Boxeda in Barcelona to Canon Joan Pere Albert, 16 January 1642. The garrote was (a peculiarly French?) form of execution whereby a wire or cord was placed around the neck and gradually tightened, strangling the victim.

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Barcelona opened proceedings against the rector of Santa Eulalia de Raisana. It appears that this itinerant preacher traveled around the borders of the dioceses of Vic and Barcelona, and had refused to pay any ecclesiastical tax to the civil authorities, particularly the Vicomte de Joc. The chapter referred the case with their censure of the rector to Bishop Manrique for judgment. The following week, Manrique’s vicar-general, Miquel Joan Boldo, appeared before the chapter to discuss the matter further; by the end of the month, the rector had been brought to pay the money he owed. At the same time, it appears that the religious services in the cathedral were being continually interrupted by growing numbers of beggars, who, not being content to wait for their alms until after mass, had rudely and irreverently entered the sanctuary, disrupting canons and worshippers alike. The vicar-general, upon witnessing the matter, gave orders to the monks to expel the beggars and restore order to the house of God.

Other disciplinary problems continued to vex the Seu d’Urgell. On 8 April 1642, the chapter assessed the new dean, Dr. Joan Ramon Domènech, a fine of ten reales for creating a disturbance at the past meeting, as well as for maintaining sole possession over the keys to the chapter room. It appears that the dean proved recalcitrant about paying the assessed fine, because the next week he was arrested and fined an additional 50

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987 “Que lo Sr. Vicari General nos fass me de passar anat contra el Ror de Sta Eulalai de Raisana … Que lo Sr. Vicari General ordene als monjos fassen exirlos pobres que van acaptant per la Iglesia por quant Inquieten y perturben la devotio deles que ho missa,” ACB: 1.A.3. Resolucions Capitulars (1640-1650), 7 July 1642, f. 104. Although the resulting disturbance of religious offices appears to be unique to Barcelona, the growing level of poverty among the inhabitants of Catalonia was a constant throughout the Principat and Comtats.
988 ACU: I. Conclusions Capitualares: 8 April 1642, “fou privat lo dega deu reals per aver-se tocat un gran rato a capitol, y no haver comparegut ni aver entregat las claus de la aula capitular” (f.33;S.221). Domènech, a native of Vic, had been appointed—ostensibly by the Catalans or Louis XIII—and approved—“provehit authoritat apostolica”—on 18 March 1642. ACU: VI. Llibre de memòries del canonge Alexandre Duran, f. 21v.
ducats for having lost his temper during a chapter meeting. Another unspecified action was taken later in the year against Dr. Joan Augustí, the Archdeacon of Cerdagne, for overstepping certain regulations stipulated by the Council of Trent. Rather than appealing the case to the *Jutge Apostòlic* the chapter decided to set up its own investigation, probably because of the news indicating Bishop Parcero’s falling-out with the secular Catalan hierarchy and his imminent exile. Indeed, perhaps the only positive aspect of conformity to the current ecclesiastical hierarchy came in the middle of the year, when Joan Comelles—who had been causing trouble with his fellow canons since 1637 and who had been suspended from his duties since June of 1640—finally submitted to the discipline of the chapter and was reinstated to his office.

One way in which the Catalan church sought to maintain order in the face of disorderly behavior was to resort first to the exact decrees from the Council of Trent and second—if the Council was silent on a particular matter, as often was the case—to the specific traditions of their church, as contained in their historical archives. Thus, for example, when the chapter of Urgell met for their annual Easter Accord in 1642, the new dean, Domènech failed to show up—perhaps due to the difficult first month of his office. In the absence of their traditional head, the chapter organized a commission to examine the old constitutions in order to determine who had the precedence.

Another way to solve their ecclesiastical difficulties was to appeal to Paris and Rome. Early in 1642, Canons Jaume Ferran and Joan Vila visited France to speak with

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989 ACU: I. Conclusions Capitualares; Índex A; 15 April 1642, S. 2.
990 “una causa criminal contra lo ardiaca de Cerdanya, conforme las facultats estan disposades per lo sagrat concili de Trento.” ACU: I. Conclusions Capitualares, 4 October 1642, (f. 46; S. 19).
991 ACU: I. Conclusions Capitualares, 7 May 1642, (f. 38; S. 274).
992 “quant a esser llochtinent de dega en absencia sua, fou fet commissio per a mirar la constitució antiga de esta iglesia en ordre de presedencia en capitol,” ACU: I. Constitutions Capitulares, 9 May 1642, (f. 40; S. 77). The study revealed that the oldest canon would take charge over the convention.
the secretary of State, Noyers regarding the troubles they were having with the vicar-general appointed by Bishop Pau Duran before he left the diocese. Hoping to get rid of the lieutenant through legal means first, the two canons approached Noyers with the hope that he could persuade Richelieu to use his influence in Rome in order to supplant the vicar-general.  

One of the main reasons for increasing unrest inside the ecclesiastical community—to say nothing of outright rebellion—had to do with the collection of the Batalló. The constant demands placed on the common Catalan cleric by this administrative authority quickly turned to resentment, much of which was directed against the specific collectors themselves. Most of the time, this meant cathedral canons; they had sought positions within the Batalló so that they might ease some of the financial burden on the church at large, but instead, what they received was biting criticism from both the Franco-Catalan regime for not collecting enough, as well as from the parish priests and monks for collecting too much. In mid-May 1642, one of these collectors for the diocese of Girona, Jaume Pla, would write to the chapter concerning the difficulties he and his fellow canons from Barcelona were having collecting the Batalló: “we are greatly condemned along with the promoters of this [Batalló] and in particular from friars who have worked themselves into a fury by not paying, and as they have consulted with the Other Friars from here, and people say that … already they are more insolent, and

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993 Noyers would write concerning the affair to the Cardinal’s secretary, Chavigny: “Ils sont grandement affectionnés au bien de leur patrie. Ils parleront, à Narbonne, de ceux de leur chapitre d’Urgel (lequel est l’auteur de la liberté de la Catalogne). Ils désirent que S.E. écrive à Rome, pour les délivrer des vexations du grand vicaire de la Seu d’Urgel, qui, en l’absence de leur évêque retiré à Tarragone avec les Castillans, se sert du dit évêché, pour cabales et functions contre les Catalans.” cited, in Vassal-reig, La Prise de Perpignan, 174-175 (emphasis mine).
Such bitterness against the tax-collecting activities of cathedral chapters would reach its zenith in the diocese of Vic.

**Ecclesiastical Rebellion: the many troubles of Vic**

By the middle of 1642, a spirit of rebellion permeated the Catalan church; in addition to the personal conflicts going on within individual dioceses, ecclesiastical insurgency was also appearing on the institutional level. In many cases, this manifested itself in the resumption of old quarrels. One of the bigger quarrels was between the cathedral town of Vic and its larger neighbor—and bitter rival—to the south, Manresa. The dueling controversy between the two towns had gone on for many years and was only exaggerated in the 1630s when the richer, and more populous town of Manresa had desperately sought its own cathedral from Philip IV, playing off the king’s distaste for Vic’s rebelliousness. Although the towns found themselves under a new master, their relations did not improve well at all. Indeed, Manresa took the first chance it had to assert itself against Vic, which began in 1642 with the exercise of the Junta de Batalló.

The division between these two urban centers began, as might be expected, over the issue of money. In early February, the Junta de Batalló announced that collections for the war effort were to begin on 1 March. The responsibility of each diocese had finally been computed on the basis of their previous décima, quarta, and excusado payments to

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994 “que som molt vituperats nosaltres con promotors de asso y en particular de frares ques donan a las furias per no pagar y com ells consultan ab los Altres Frares de aqui y diuen que no se parla ja son mes insolents, y de nostres beneficats nia prou.” ACG: Cartas, 1640-1642, Jaume Pla to Canon Joan Pere Albert, 19 May 1642.

Philip IV. In the case of Vic, this amounted to 6,000 ducats.\textsuperscript{996} Greatly irritated at the decision—which they felt failed to take into account the vast amounts of wealth that they had spent on “military necessities” through much of 1640 and 1641, the syndics from Barcelona, Lleida, Girona, Urgell, Solsona, and Vic congregated to debate whether they should continue the fight against this new regalism.

They decided after hours of debate that even though such a policy was not good for the chapters, the religious community should pay the government on account of the present necessities of war.\textsuperscript{997} The representative from Barcelona was the most vocal in both his distaste for the new tax as well as in his reluctance to pay, and much of the discussion among the other canons revolved around whether they should follow his example. By 19 February, the Oidor Eclèsiastic, Canon Francesc Gerona of Lleida, informed Diego Palau that his chapter had determined to go along with the tax, and the rest of the chapters soon followed suit.

As head of the diocese, Vic and its officials were responsible for the collection of funds for the Batalló. Even before their decision in February to comply with the amounts computed by the Batalló, however, the chapter of Vic had already estimated sums for each religious institution in their diocese. Unfortunately, the cathedral canons did not reckon on the deep antipathy of Manresa. On 1 January, one of the leading clerics at Manresa, Dr. Josep Pons del Graner, wrote the chapter a pre-emptive challenge, informing them that he and his brother canons would refuse to pay any part of their

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[996] ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Dr. Diego Palau to chapter of Vic, 6 February 1642.
\item[997] \textit{aunque iusque no sero per propria Conviencia per que segons la necessitat nos podia menos reservantse sempre estar al sentir dels Ille Capitols,”} ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Dr. Diego Palau to chapter of Vic, 13 February 1642.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
ecclesiastical rents in tax to the chapter of Vic. Pons del Graner asserted that since the rents were due specifically to the clergy of Manresa and not to Vic, they ought to go directly from the bank in Manresa to the coffers of Barcelona and not risk losing any passing through Vic.998

The chapter’s initial reception to this letter was one of scorn; as they were still concerned with setting the level of taxation on the church, however, they did not deign to reply to Pons del Graner. Three months into the official collection of the Batalló, Manresa had stored a sizeable amount of wealth in their own coffers without a sou sent on to Vic. Thoroughly upset at the intransigence of Manresa to heed their authority in the matter of collecting funds for the Batalló, the chapter of Vic wrote to their syndic in Barcelona, Diego Palau, asking him to bring the matter before the government. In their letter they decried such blatant disobedience, “which is of obvious damage to the Province.”999

Manresa’s obstinate defiance of the authority of Vic to collect on the predetermined sums slated for the Batalló encouraged other religious groups to join in their rebellion. In late May, thoroughly disgusted at the treatment he and his order had received at the hands of the chapter of Vic, the Pare Rector of the city’s Jesuits went to Barcelona to protest before the Junta de Batalló. Their appeal found favor in the eyes of the secular representatives on the council, who ordered the chapter at Vic to moderate the

998 “la primera que encara que las decimas en quant son de VS son rendas ecclesiasticas y que collectada per orde de VS no devrian pagar dita impositio ab tot axo arrendades com vuy son seson fetes substantia y patrimoni de dita arrendadors als quals no ha pogut passarla exemptio que tindria VS…Esta raho confirmar dient que tots los arrendors des fruys arrenda lo Sr. bisbe y los que arrendan assi los señors canonges pagan igualment los drets…” ACV: 56-35: Secretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Dr. Josep Pons del Graner to chapter of Vic, 1 January 1642.

999 “lo que es dany evident de la Provintia,” ACV 57-45: Secretaria, Cartas Enviadas, (1640-1660), chapter to Diego Palau, 18 May 1642, f. 16v. In subsequent days the chapter carried their complaints to a higher level, writing the President of the Batalló on 22 May and once more on 25 June (ff. 16v-17).
As further proof of their seriousness, the Diputat Real informed the chapter that a resolution concerning the lowering of taxes on the entire church was heading to the Braços General for a vote, and hinted that their moderation on the Jesuits would undoubtedly help their larger cause to pass successfully. The chapter at Vic, determined not to be bullied, wrote back to the Jesuits shortly after receiving the letter from the Diputat Real. In their epistle, the canons responded that, while they undoubtedly were moved by the case, the specific taxation levels “had been set by Barcelona;” unfortunately the canons felt they were powerless to affect any change in the rates.

Needless to say, the Jesuits did not take kindly to Vic’s sympathetic response and their dispute, like that of canons from Manresa, continued to ferment.

Not only Manresa and the Jesuits proved difficult in heeding the authority of Vic. The Benedictine abbey of Ripoll, one of the oldest established religious communities in Catalonia, also protested the tax burden placed upon them by the Junta de Batalló. In early August, the abbot and other officials of the monastery wrote a letter to the head of the Junta citing difficulties in scraping together enough funds to pay their share of the quarta and the excusado, and asking them to make no distinction between them and the other monks in Ripoll. Unlike Manresa’s bitter refusal to submit to the authority of Vic, the concern of Ripoll was the continual impoverishing of the religious community, particularly its leaders.

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1000 “Lo Pare Rector de la Casa de la Companyia de Jesus de aquexa Ciutat, nos ha representat com en raho de las rendas que tenen y possehexen, se auria pres algun error, y con seguentment en la tatxa … y que desitjaria, que nosaltres, constant del error, lals moderassem.” ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Dr. Hieronym Pastos, Diputat Real to Chapter, 30 May 1642.
1001 ACV: Secretaria: Liber 3 (1641-1648) (Arm 57/57), letter from chapter of Vic to the Pare Rector of the Company of Jesus at Vic, 11 June 1642, f. 17.
1002 ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Diego Palau to Chapter, 5 August 1642.
In late June, the monastery at Ripoll sent a special ambassador the Junta de Batalló, asking that their collection be undertaken by one of their own members, as better to be able to give a reliable estimate of their wealth and the amount to which they could be taxed. Unlike the situation at Manresa, the Junta ruled almost immediately on the matter. A few days later, a compromise was reached with the Benedictines, the Junta de Batalló, and syndics from all the cathedral chapters. Following a resolution put forward by the delegate from Barcelona and supported by the one from Girona, the tax assessment and collection at Ripoll would be carried out by the Benedictine abbot of San Pere de Rodes and one of the monks at Ripoll, Fra Don Francesc Montpalau, who, as we have seen, was an intimate of the current regime. In this way, an arbitrary reckoning of the abbey’s wealth could be made, although it would be conducted over the head of the current abbot, Jaume Pallarès.

While the matter with Ripoll appeared to be easily solved, the dispute with Manresa dragged on: in early July, Palau lamented at the “the exceedingly slow-to-mature deliberation” of the junta. In an effort to bring the case to a more speedy resolution, Palau began working with the syndics of other chapters in Barcelona, in an attempt to bring united pressure to bear on the Batalló. By 19 July these talks had

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1003 ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Diego Palau to Chapter, 29 June 1642. The abbot of the coastal monastery, San Pere de Rodes had come into conflict with the Franco-Catalan government in the spring of 1641, over the collection of a tenth of all fish taken along the abbey’s shores. The Intendant D’Argenson, however, with the help of two French Benedictines, managed to resolve the dispute peacefully. Vassal-reig, La Prise de Perpignan, 38.

1004 “la tant madura deliberatio”, ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Diego Palau to Chapter, 3 July 1642. Palau’s frustration undoubtedly continued as this case wore on throughout the year!
produced fruit. The representatives rallied to the defense of Vic, sending letters to the Governor Margarit as well as to the Diputació for a ruling favorable to the rightful authority of the cathedral chapter.\textsuperscript{1005}

Nevertheless, any ultimate decision stayed up in the air, and the clergy at Manresa remained obstinate.\textsuperscript{1006} In an attempt to calm the canons’ righteous anger, Bernat de Cardona, the Diputat Eclèsiastic, informed the cathedral chapter that they would not be responsible for paying the difference owed by the diocese because of the refusal by Manresa, the Jesuits, and the Benedictines to pay their entire share.\textsuperscript{1007} This pro-active position taken by Cardona—apparently without any machinations by d’Argenson—was reinforced by his new title. As “Jutge i Comissari Apostolich” for the Batalló, the Diputat exercised supreme authority over these collections.\textsuperscript{1008} Cardona assured all the clerics that he was confident that the collection of money—including that stored up in the

\textsuperscript{1005} See also the chapter’s letters to the Diputat Cardona, in ACV 57-45: Segretaria, Cartas Enviadas (1640-1660), 6 July and 19 July 1642.

\textsuperscript{1006} “Los ecclesiastichs de Manresa persistexan en voler deposar a la taula de Manresa,” ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Diego Palau to Chapter, 19 July 1642.

\textsuperscript{1007} ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Diego Palau to Chapter, 25 July 1642.

\textsuperscript{1008} ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Proclamation by the Junta de Batallo to the religious communities of Manresa, Ripoll, and Vic, 29 July 1642. Cardona’s new title is very interesting for two reasons. First, because Bishop Manrique of Barcelona had been—at least through 1640—the official Comissari Apostolich, responsible for collecting all funds owed to Rome, while Bishop Parcero had exercised power as the Jutge Apostolich for Catalonia. The fact that Cardona had assumed part of these powers, at least in the workings of the Junta de Batalló says something for the diminishing respect the Franco-Catalan government had for these two episcopal leaders. Second, because this decision seems to emanate from Cardona and the Junta de Batalló itself and not from the Intendant. It suggests that certain Catalans in power sincerely believed in the French policies and were not merely pawns in the hands of the evil genius d’Argenson. Note that even Barcelona’s chapter saw fit to acknowledge Cardona as the rightful Collector (possibly this was part of the deal confirmed by the Pope in 1641). See ACB: I.A.3. Resolucions Capitulars (1640-1650); 31 July 1642, f. 108v.
bank at Manresa—would be sufficient to handle the Generalitat’s immediate needs, and that each group’s expected contributions would be generously reduced by thirteen lliures.\(^\text{1009}\)

As summer turned into fall, Manresa continued their stubborn defiance to contribute to the war effort based upon the sums set for them by the chapter at Vic. In frustration, the chapter’s syndic in Barcelona, Diego Palau, visited Vincente Candiotti in order to see what authority the papal representative might have over such matters.\(^\text{1010}\) As we will see, however, in this matter, as in other cases, the papal envoy was quite powerless to affect any immediate change.

In early October 1642, the Sacristan of Manresa and other clerics were called before the Junta de Batalló to answer for their obstinacy. The syndic Palau wrote back to the chapter with misgivings about the possible verdict that might be handed down. In his letter, Palau identified the Sacristan of Manresa as the person chiefly responsible for inciting the other clergy to discontent and rebellion. Unless these men would be satisfied with depositing the money for the Batalló in the bank of Manresa, under the name of the Subcollector for the diocese, Palau believed the fight would continue.\(^\text{1011}\) Events proved Palau to be right in his suspicions: the clergy at Manresa refused to countenance any sign of submitting to Vic’s chapter, and their resistance lasted for many years to come.

\(^{1009}\) ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Proclamation by the Junta de Batallo to the religious communities of Manresa, Ripoll, and Vic, 29 July 1642.

\(^{1010}\) Palau also used the occasion to petition for aid in the current case of ecclesiastical immunity the Franco-Catalan government was prosecuting against the chapter of Solsona. ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Dr. Diego Palau to chapter of Vic, 6 September 1642.

\(^{1011}\) ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Dr. Diego Palau to chapter of Vic, 8 October 1642. This subcollector was the canon Diego Nadal, appointed in March 1642 (ACV: Segretaria: Liber 3 (1641-1648) (Arm 57/57), fol. 8).
The exemption of Manresa from contributing to the Batalló through Vic raised hopes among the Benedictines at Ripoll and the Jesuits that prolonged obstinacy might ultimately deliver a more favorable decision from Cardona. To the great disappointment of the canons at Vic, the monks at Ripoll chose to resurrect their opposition around the same time that the Batalló and Cardona were deciding what to do about Manresa. Not content to rely upon the representation of Palau, the cathedral chapter of Vic wrote to the Junta de Batalló itself, urging it to give definitive authority to the Subdelegat of the Junta for Vic that would force the monks and Jesuits to pay. This continued defiance in the diocese was having serious ramifications throughout the Generalitat as well, a point that the canons stressed in their letter to the Junta, saying: “because they [the monks] are not paying, by their example, other ecclesiastics in other parts do not pay. Neither do the Jesuit fathers here pay.”

As was the case with Manresa, any ruling by Cardona on the disobedience of the regulars would have to wait until the upcoming year. Other events of greater importance for the regional clergy and the Barcelona government were coming to the surface needing more immediate attention.

Among the more interesting aspects of this squabble between Vic and Manresa was the increasing influence exercised by the centralized government in Barcelona. Rather than settling the matter with Bishop Ramon de Sentmanat, the clergy of Vic could have brought the case before Bishop Parcero, as Jutge Apostolic, responsible for handling ecclesiastical complaints, or even before Bishop Manrique, as the most senior bishop, and the one responsible for collecting ecclesiastical “donations” to secular causes. Either
because the canons felt that collecting money for a secular purpose threw the case into
the hands of the secular authorities, or because the difficulties Parcero and Manrique
were currently facing with the government, the chapter fully accepted—and indeed took
heart in—the Junta’s assumption of judiciary powers. Diego Palau commented on this in
one of his letters to Vic referring to a letter from the Junta de Batalló where the secular
body attested that their “sole Intent is to act as well as possible in the role of an
Ecclesiastical Tribunal.\footnote{ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from
Dr. Diego Palau to chapter of Vic, 8 October 1642.}

“Unsuspected” Ecclesiastical Rebellion: the Catalan Inquisition

Despite the pressure facing the Church from their new government, Catalan
churchmen still found time to resurrect old controversies among themselves. In addition
to these old disputes, new rivalries also sprang up during the war. Chief among these
new controversies was one spawned by the new Inquisition in Catalonia. One the
“constitutions” agreed to by the French in the Pacts of Peronne was that the “new”
Inquisition—the one adapted by Ferdinand and Isabella to prosecute state matters—was
to be overthrown and the “old” medieval Inquisition—answerable, not to the state but to
the Congregation of the Inquisition in Rome—be restored in its place. This “new-old”
Inquisition was to have power only over cases that directly related to matters of
Faith—there would be no mixing of state affairs as before, at least in theory.
Furthermore, the Pacts stipulated that all members of the Inquisition—officials and
familiars—be native Catalans. As much as the Catalan church hierarchy had despised the pretensions of the “new” Inquisition and its familiars, they all joined in the desire to be appointed Inquisitors in the “restored” Holy Office. Unfortunately they were not alone in this regard: the Dominicans, whose order had started the medieval Inquisition in Spain, were greatly desirous of returning the Inquisition to its “rightful” practitioners.

The origins of the dispute arose out of a letter, which the Prior of the Dominican house of Santa Catharina Martyr in Barcelona wrote to Louis XIII asking him to consider the Order when the time came for the appointment of Inquisitors. The prior began his appeal to the king by reminding Louis how valiant St. Dominic had been in pursuing the heresy of the Albigensians, and how his order had brought the Inquisition to Catalonia in 1207 to punish heretics. In order to combat the numerous heresies from destroying the Principat, St. Dominic and St. Raymond de Penyafort established the first house of the Inquisition in the very same monastery of Santa Catharina in Barcelona. The Dominicans retained control over the Holy Office—according to the prior—until the accension of the Habsburg Emperor Charles V, into whose hands the governance of the

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1014 For this and more information about the Inquisition in Catalonia, see Joan Bada, La Inquisició a Catalunya, and R Lopez, “Inquisición y guerra en Cataluña. La actuación del Tribunal de Barcelona” Pedrables, no. 8/II (1988) pp. 539-548.
1015 BC: FB 7590: Copia de una Carta que lo Prior, y Convent de Santa Catarina Martyr de Barcelona (Barcelona, 1642), f. 304v. Although he openly admits to the king that the Dominicans went after and executed “many secular French nobles and plebeians, who with arms, and other aid, helped them [the heretics],” the Prior paints Catalonia in a far worse state: “Pero ahont particularment se esmeraren en introduyir, y fundar aquest Santissim Tribunal de la Inquisicio, sonch en nostre Principat…lo qual per la era de 1200 se trobave en molt infeliz estat, per las molts heretges.” Spain was not just afflicted with Albigensians, but with Waldensians, Jews, and Muslims. Even so, the prior was only partially correct in his history: the Franciscan order also played an important role in subduing the Waldensian and Cathar heresies and in establishing the Inquisition in Catalonia. See also Joan Bada, La Inquisició a Catalunya, 20-25.
1016 BC: FB 7590: Copia de una Carta, f. 305.
Tribunal passed. Now that the lands of Catalonia and Castile were once again separated, the prior concluded, what could be more natural than to place the Dominicans back in charge of what was rightfully their vocation.

The prior’s proposal to staff the new Inquisition entirely with Dominicans soon reached the ears of the cathedral canons during the turbulent summer of 1642. What is most interesting is that these secular clergy, who had paid little heed to Inquisition matters in the years prior to the revolt, now became galvanized in a campaign to break the monopoly of power held by ‘the dogs of God.” Just as the chapter of Vic had taken the lead in uniting the Catalan chapters to stand up for their rights regarding the collection of the Batalló, Bishop Parcero of Girona and his chapter led the movement to protest this sweeping innovation” in the Holy Office.

It appears that Bishop Parcero and the chapter of Girona were the first secular clergy informed of the Dominicans’ intent to dominate the new Inquisition, though exactly how this occurred is uncertain. In any event, on the evening of 11 June 1642, news of the Dominican efforts to control the Holy Office reached the clerics. They immediate wrote to the Diputació; the Consell de Cent; Pere Coderech, their syndic in Barcelona; and the other cathedral chapters. Letters were even sent to Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu. The issue of who ought to control the Inquisition was an important

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1017 “en las Imperials mans del qual, renuncia la Religio (per causas que se ignoran) lo govern de aquest S. Tribunal, y comencaren a entra en ell persones de differentes estats.” Ibid, f. 305.
1018 Why Parcero and Girona should be so concerned about the Dominican order controlling the Inquisition is unknown. Perhaps it related to Parcero’s role as Jutge Apostolic; perhaps it was the ambition of one of the leading canons of Girona—Jaume Pla—to exert a special influence on appointments.
1019 ACG: Actes Capitulares: volume 24; 11 June 1642, p. 36.
one for the clergy in Girona. In their letter to the cathedral chapters, they noted that because such a matter “touches on the Interest and Authority of all the Chapters,” they all must approve the Inquisition officials.1020

One of the reasons why, at this late date, the church was appealing first to the Diputació—aside from the fact that one of their own canons, Don Bernat de Cardona, was the Diputat Eclesiastic—was that the viceroy de Brézé had resigned his office in May, on account of ill health.1021 Although the Intendant d’Argenson had assumed temporary authority, the chapters nevertheless directed their immediate complaint to the sextet that traditionally held power during the absence of the viceroy. At the very least, such attitudes demonstrated a belief that the Diputació was still a legitimate influence in the governing of Catalonia, and not just a pawn in the hands of the French. Such optimism would change before the year expired.

In order to oppose this great pretension on the part of the Dominicans, the chapter of Girona urged a union of all the chapters, directing letters to the Diputació and the Consell de Cent, asking them to appeal to Louis XIII to change his mind, and trying to show that it would be far better for the Province if a variety of clergy held offices. It is fascinating that Girona’s concerns were voiced in terms of honor and merit and

1020 “Perque lo que toca al Interes,y Auctoritad de tots los Capitols, es be que de tots ells se aprove, y fomente: nos ha aparegut donar ab esta a VS rao del que poc hi dies fa havin entes de la pretensio que tene los Religiosos de St. Domingo de procurar per sa Religio, y subiectes della las plassas del Tribunal de la Santa Inquisicio de aquest nre Principat, lo que si alcansaran estaria tant mal ab totas las Cathedrals, quant estar be que de essas puga sa magestat, que Deu guarde, fere leccio de subiectes cabals pera aquellas, y altres puestos majors, quals merexen molts dels quiv ocupan, y merexran los qui per temps ocuparan puestos honorifics en ellas ames de asso be ven VS que la major part de la renda de ques sustentan ditas plassas, es renda que nosaltres treballan, y no es be que podent la gosar personas de nre gremi, la gosen Religiosos, aqui no faltan puestos calificats en sa Religio ab que ser premiats.” ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Dr. Joan Vilar, canon and secretary of Girona to chapter of Vic, 16 June 1642.

1021 Sanabre, La Acción de Francia en Cataluña, 203-204.
appropriateness; the chapters, it appears, held such a high view of themselves, that they were entitled to positions of authority in Catalonia’s new religious bureaucracy. They had donated the money, raised companies of men, and continually made prayers and processions for the Franco-Catalan war effort. After all, why shouldn’t they be rewarded?

It soon became apparent that the various cathedral chapters, though they desired to stand with Girona in the fight to protect any communal privileges, differed on the way in which resistance to the Dominicans could best be undertaken. The earliest ones to respond, the chapters of Vic and Barcelona, approved of the means suggested by Girona and noted that they had already written the Diputació and Consell de Cent with regards to overthrowing the regulars’ pretensions. The chapter of Lleida would write back soon afterwards with their approbation.1022

The chapter at Vic, perhaps stirred by their own troubles, was quite effusive in their commendation of Girona’s actions. In their letter, they praised their fellow canons for being able “to divert the pretensions of those regular clergy [the Dominicans]: more is certain that in their carrying it out, they will bring forth very ruinous consequences for all.” Beyond this, the chapter of Vic was convinced that there was an intrinsic desire among the Dominicans to use this time of upheaval and confusion to strip the cathedral

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chapters of the honors and privileges rightfully due them. Vic’s letter ended by considering an appeal to the Diputació, the Consell de Cent, and even Louis XIII should the exasperating disobedience continue.

The dean and chapter of Solsona, on the other hand, wrote back with a more moderate perspective, suggesting that the Prior’s claim to Inquisition offices was due to the fact that their Vicar-General was passing through the land. Given enough time for the official to make his passage through Catalonia, and the subject would undoubtedly drop. More importantly, however, they reminded the chapter of Girona that if this Inquisition truly were to be a revival of the older, medieval institution, then only the Pope could appoint officials to the Holy Office, not the king. As such, the chapters should be interceding, not with secular governors in Barcelona, but with the Pope.

In contrast to Solsona’s more “spiritual” response, the chapter of Urgell—perhaps given the prevalence of their dealings with the secular government—urged a more secular response. Going perhaps as far towards the other extreme as possible, the canons from then north argued that any ecclesiastical response should make but a token appeal to the authorities in Barcelona and appeal directly to Louis XIII in Paris. Furthermore, they informed the chapter of Girona that they had already written to the King himself about

1023 “done lo senyor la Sua gratia a VS pera poder continuar tant acertadas actions, y a tots pera poder divertir las pretextions de exos religosos; pus es cert que lo efectuar-se aportaria molt ruins consequencias pera tots; y sans dubta tal pretextio tira a fins mes intrinsicsechs encara, que de si no demonstra, y no sera lo menor, voler exterminar las honras y premis que se donan y se podan donar a las personas virtuosas y subjectas cabals, que ara se troban, y se trobarán en las cathedrals,” ACV 57-45: Segretaria, Cartas Enviadas, (1640-1660), chapter of Vic to chapter of Girona, 26 June 1642, f. 18v. Emphasis mine.
1024 “de la pretextio dels frares dominocos si be quant passa per esta terra lo Vicari General de sa religio digue assi lo mateix que lo quil sibes considere nos pot donar poch cuydado peraque no es cosa que la Magt del Rey Christianissim la pugue fer sino que la ha de fer lo summo Pontifice y aixi se devirie procurar scriver a Roma a nostres agens fassen asse les diligenties conventients pera est negoci,” ACG: Actes Capitulares: volume 24; 29 June 1642.

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Needless to say, the other four rebel chapters rejected the advice of both
Solsona and Urgell and began the traditional Catalan appeal process to the Generalitat for
redress.

In general, the response of the secular authorities in Barcelona was positive. During
the first days of July, the Consell de Cent wrote back to a number of chapters,
thanking them for their prudence in bringing the matter of Inquisition appointments to
their attention. The Consell assured the chapter that the chief concern in selecting these
officials would be their virtue and talents rather than their allegiance to a particular
religious order. From such a polite response, it seemed evident that the city council of
Barcelona—well aware of the difficulties that could be caused by particular Inquisition
officials—was ready and willing to support the chapters in their fight against the
Dominicans.

The disputes with both Manresa and the Dominicans encouraged the various
cathedral chapters to work together on matters of prestige that affected them all. It also
revealed that there was a concern for ecclesiastical promotion influencing those who
openly supported the French cause, which other scholars—in particular Joan Bada—have
suspected. It was ironic, that while the Pacts proclaimed the restoration of the
Inquisition, and its deliverance from the corrupt hands of the state, the Catalans were
squabbling amongst themselves to see who could curry favor in the state to be appointed
to these coveted high posts. And yet, even with a successful closure to the Inquisition
issue, new controversies were rising up in Catalonia. Regrettably, these new disputes

1026 ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Consell de Cent to chapter of Vic, 3 July
1642. See also ACG: Actes Capitulares: volume 24; 3 July 1642.
were not between various elements within the Church, but between the sacred institution and the new captains of secular government in Barcelona. And, as many Catalan clerics would soon learn, the state would prove to be a far more formidable opponent.

The Beginnings of Ecclesiastical Resistance and Secular Retaliation: Finances

Directly tied to the growing concerns about the influx of heresy into their land, many in the regional religious communities were likewise worried about the shifting political identity of Catalonia as a protected province of France. While most Catalan clerics believed that the French would only be placing a fairly light governmental burden upon them, many were disabused of this by late 1642. The previous chapter has noted the great extent to which members of the Catalan clergy gave of their energy and resources to sustain the Franco-Catalan military effort through a third campaigning season. With the apparently decisive fall of Perpignan in September, many in the first estate felt that the fiscal contributions they had given to the new government would be lightened. They would be sorely mistaken.

Even after the military successes of 1642, the Franco-Catalan regime still sought to draw more money and support out of the clergy. The chapter of Barcelona was hit hard by the continuing demands made on their treasury for the war effort. On 19 September, shortly before the grand celebrations commemorating the fall of Perpignan, Pau del Rosso, the pro-French dean of the chapter, spoke with d’Argenson asking him to use his position to intercede on their behalf with Louis XIII to alleviate the great demands made on the Church that had suffered much from the war.¹⁰²⁷ Instead of acceding to del

¹⁰²⁷ “Que lo Sr. Dega parle ab lo Sr. DeArgenson peraque nos fassane de Interpossarse ab sa Magd pera que les tres Canonges que acostimaven donar los Reyes del trago se appliquen a alguna Administratio altessos
Rosso’s request, Don Josep Margarit i Biure, the Governor of Catalonia, wrote letters alternating between urgent requests and stern commands to each of the cathedral chapters. His initial letters joyously proclaimed the “rather miraculous victory” of the Franco-Catalan army. At the same time, however, the governor was interested in determining how much support the regional church could provide to sustain the rebels’ advances. In particular, Margarit called upon the Barcelona chapter to try “as you have on other occasions” to raise a company of soldiers in defense of Lleida.  

Much to the governor’s disappointment, the canons refused his request, citing the great financial strain—as well as a probable strain on available manpower—under which the diocese was suffering. Despite this rejection—which they claimed was based on an overestimation of their wealth as calculated by the Diputació—the chapter did pledge some money in lieu of manpower.  

At the same time, the cathedral chapter sent a committee of pro-French canons del Rosso and Taverner, as well as “moderates” Carbonell and Sentmanat, to the secretary of the Diputació to rectify the unfortunate discrepancy between government estimates and the reality of their treasury. Two years of continual demands on the religious community in the name of “necessity” had worn down this zealous cathedral chapter. The continued disturbance of war alone had

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\[\text{los grans gastos apart la Iglesia } y\ \text{molts danys per Causa dels guerres.}\] ACB: 1.A.3. Resolucions Capitulars (1640-1650), 19 September 1642, f. 115.

\[\text{“y que esperave lo Sr Governador que per part de est Capitol se acudiria com se avia experiment en altres occasions fent leva de alguna Compania de soldats.”}\] ACB: 1.A.3. Resolucions Capitulars (1640-1650); 26 October 1642, f. 128v.

1028 Again, one is not certain, but it may well be that the French and Catalan officials in Barcelona were basing their demands on the same exaggerated reports about Catalonia’s population and wealth that the Conde-Duque de Olivares had used during the 1630s, which had provoked so much resentment from the Principat.
hindered a portion of the ecclesiastical rents from arriving in Barcelona, and no amount of desire, which the chapter insisted was present, could compensate for this diminished balance. 1030

The case was even more desperate in Vic, where the chapter informed the governor that they simply did not have the available manpower or resources to contribute a significant company to the defense of the province. Their contributions in the past three years had severally drained the chapter at Vic. Through an extraordinary effort they had managed to raise an independent company of 25 men for the relief of Salses in 1639, and an unbelievable company of 70 men for the defense of the Principat in 1640. By the next year, however, they could only afford to raise ten men for the army. As much as the chapter desired to support the “Guerra de la Principat” or the “Guerra de la Provintia” (as they were called at the time) they simply could not do much more; all their past—thankless—services to the defense of Catalonia had worn them out. 1031

Faced with the reality of revising their estimates of ready ecclesiastical cash, Margarit and the Diputació turned to exhorting each cathedral chapter to raise the sum of 500 lliures—a not too considerable amount on paper, but in reality a much harder task to fulfill, given the church’s continual giving throughout the year. Even with the diminution of the government’s request, many chapters continued to delay payments, citing numerous difficulties with collecting the necessary amount. Disgusted with the particular

1030 “Responqello vicari general ab demonstrations de gran sentiment ... [a] lo Sr Maryscal de la Mota y tota esta provincia y que ab est Capitol estava tant exaustio com representa per no cobrar se ses rendes y en particular les de la Diputacio sobre la qual tenim sinch milia lliures y pide altres particular totavia perse la necessitat tant urgent se incurialo que podria fer per no faltar a nra obligatio....” ACB: 1.A.3. Resolucions Capitulars (1640-1650); 26 October 1642, ff. 128v-129.
1031 ACV: Secretaria: Liber 3 (1641-1648) (Arm 57/57), letter from chapter of Vic to Governor Don Josep de Margarit, 10 November 1642, f. 28. See also the chapter’s letters to the Diputat Cardona, in ACV 57-45: Secretaria, Cartas Enviadas (1640-1660), 6 July and 19 July 1642.
tardiness within the diocese of Vic, the Junta de Batalló rebuked the church officials for allowing “los sometents generals” to disturb the gathering of the military tax. The end of the letter, however, sought to rally them to great efforts by stressing the nature of the present “greatest necessity.”

By the middle of November, only the chapter of Barcelona had given 500 lliures to Margarit to aid in the war effort. The chapter of Girona was still debating whether to contribute cash like Barcelona, or whether to raise another company of soldiers, while the remaining five chapters had given nothing because of the great difficulties in raising either money or men. Despite this, the syndic from Vic, Diego Palau, encouraged his chapter to make an effort to contribute something. Ultimately some small sum was donated to the cause, but the comparison between these contributions and the dramatic ecclesiastical efforts in 1640 was striking. Even more significantly, for the first time since the outbreak of the revolt, the Catalan church had openly refused a request by the rebel government for money.

The constant economic drainage of the cathedral chapters, together with the growing disillusionment about the new regime in Barcelona, threatened to undermine one of the rebels’ chief bastions of support. Without the continued contributions of the

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1032 “La necessitat tenim de acudir ab diligentia a les pagues de la gent de Guerra, de aquexos districtes nos obliga a ser importunes...que asseguiram a VS que en estes partides, a no avernos socorregut ab cantitat considerable. Lo estament ecclesiastic, de esta Bisbat a causa del avien los sometents generals destorbada la Contributio general de la Provincia ho auriem passat ab treball, esperam de VS que com sempre en las majors necessitates nos ha mostrat ab les obres son bon animo, ho fara en esta en la qual la summa necessitat nos obliga a suplicarlei tant Vivament...” ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Junta de Batalló to chapter, 11 October 1642 (received 15 October).

1033 “Lo capitol de Barna ha donat sineh centas lliures al Sr. Governador per ajuda de la Guerra sens fer soldat algu, que han tingat per milor dar diner que fer soldats—y las ditas 500 ll no van en Compte del que pagan per lo batailo sino ques donan demes. Lo syndich del Capitul de Gerona ella dit: que tenia resposta de sou Capitul que farian gent o darian diner, de Solsona noya sindich, de Urgell menos de Lleyda, y Elna no es menester saber per que jas dexa considerar que ditas Iglesias estan del tot atreballadas...” ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Diego Palau to Chapter, 11 November 1642 (received 14 November).
church, fiscal demands to feed and maintain an army in Catalonia would increasingly devolve among the province’s commoners. Such demands, if they continued in their high costs, could, in turn, create social instability and unrest against the Franco-Catalan government. It was essential for the new rulers in Barcelona to apply to the church as often as possible for support; but it was becoming increasingly obvious that the revenues from the first estate were not inexhaustible.

The burden of taxation, specifically pronounced in the “voluntary” contributions of the church and the formation of the Junta de Batalló, combined with the continued absence of Louis XIII from swearing to protect the constitutions in person, began to worry a good many Catalans. Included in this growing number of malcontents were a good many clergy, perhaps because the French government could never hope to offer them as much as they had certain noble families, or perhaps because they were able more clearly to see the designs of Richelieu. Whatever their initial reasons, the desire to protect their old privileges, combined with a regret at losing independence to the French, and the imposition of the French way of rule—complete with the Gallican liberties of the monarch—thoroughly disenchanted all but the most partisan of clerics in Catalonia.

Slowly, resistance to the new order began to rise among members of the first estate. The preaching, which had done so much to maintain a level of fervent devotion to the Sacrament in the face of royal commands, by 1642 began to remind listeners that, after all, Catalonia had traditionally belonged to Spain and not to France. Other clerics, particularly seculars and regulars down at the parish level, even began to spy for the Castilian army. Their activities soon came to the attention of the French viceroy and the Catalan leaders, who began taking steps to stop this. In doing so, they would begin a
confrontation with the clergy in Catalonia that served only to hasten the collapse of popular support for France. For in their actions and in their haste to prosecute suspected clerics, the French government crossed a series of lines that preserved the immunity of the church from arbitrary influence of the crown. By so doing, the French made themselves out to be even worse violators of ecclesiastical immunity than Philip IV had ever done. True, his soldiers had burned the Sacrament, but they were Neapolitans, and hard to control anyway. The greater the French aggravation, the more clerics and laity alike looked back to the “leeks and garlic of Egypt” when, despite the rule of Castile, things were not really so very bad.

One of the first clerics who fell under government suspicion during the interregnum of d’Argenson included Canon Hieronym Anglasell of Girona, who was expelled by the order of Richelieu “per convenir al bien publico.”1034 Canon Anglasell had been the chapter’s syndic in Barcelona since at least 1639, and had a brother, Dr. Bernat Anglasell, who was a member of the Audiència in 1640. Hieronym Anglasell was one of the four leading canons in Girona, serving on most of the important chapter committees. Along with canons Jaume Pla, Joan Vilar, and Josep Riera, he exposed the attempted take-over of the “new” Inquisition by the Dominicans to the rest of the Catalan church.1035 In addition, he was among the leading advocates in Girona, who protested mightily to Louis XIII and Cardinal Barberini regarding the infringements on Catalan ecclesiastical immunity during the summer of 1642. In mid-September, the canon was brought up on the vague charge that he had overstepped his particular jurisdiction as a

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1035 See ACG, Cartes, 1640-1642: the initial charges against Anglasell, 15 September 1642 and 22 September 1642; and the letters of appeal to Cardona and Margarit, 6 October 1642.
cleric. As with the Barcelona chapter, his fellow canons of Girona implored the Diputat Eclèsiastic, Don Bernat de Cardona—himself a canon of Girona—and the governor, Don Josep de Margarit i Biure, for clemency, but to no avail. By the end of the year, the canon had been forced to leave Catalonia.

The breaking point: Conflict over Ecclesiastical Immunity

Unfortunately for the Catalan church, the proceedings against Canon Anglasell were not an exceptional exercise of secular authority in the region. To the growing dismay of many clerics who had initially supported the French order in Catalonia—particularly the cathedral chapters—it became readily apparent that the new Franco-Catalan regime would brook no active resistance, and very little passive questioning, of its rule. Beginning in mid-1642, a series of judicial proceedings began against certain churchmen that proved to be the turning point in Catalonia’s ecclesiastical support not only of France, but of the rebellion as well. By seeking to secure and solidify their legitimacy in the eyes of the Catalan people, the French officials—and their Catalan allies—wound up destroying the very republic they had helped to create. The more they tightened their grip, the faster Catalan hearts and minds slipped through their fingers.

On 30 May the chapter of Barcelona, disturbed by growing news that various clerics and chaplains were being arrested and held in secular jails in strict violation of traditional liberties and immunities granted to men of the cloth, formed a commission to meet with Bishop Manrique to discuss the matter.1036 Exactly when the first arrests of clerics who opposed—or were suspected of opposing—the new French regime in

1036 “Se feu comissio peraque se solicite al Sr Bisbe sobre la Inmunitat eclesiastica y los Capellans que estan presos al Sacrista Roig, Don Francisco Sans, Don Hiacintho Descallar, y Cange Palia (Plaja?)” I.A.Resolucions: Llibre de la Sibella: 1625-1645, 30 May 1642, (f. 345v).
Catalonia began is uncertain. What is certain, however, is that the trouble began within the diocese of Solsona. During the early months of 1642, French and Catalan officials had been arresting clerics in this smallest of Catalan dioceses, throwing them in jail on the charge of suspected treason and holding them in these royal prisons indefinitely. Despite several attempts by the Solsona chapter either to gain their brothers’ release or at least to obtain their removal to ecclesiastical jails, the secular authorities adamantly held on to their prisoners. Thoroughly frustrated by the government’s intransigence, Solsona’s canons sent out letters to the other cathedral chapters in late May, asking for their support and counsel. The chapter of Barcelona proved to be most helpful, sending one of their senior canons, Josep Rouira i Boldo, to serve as an advisor.

As we have seen in earlier chapters, the ecclesiastical community within Catalonia was never whole-heartedly behind either the partisans of France or Castile. Though the Church had grappled with the new regime in Barcelona over matters of taxation and military support, in general relations between the two social institutions had been relatively amiable. By the middle of 1642, however, a sufficient number of these arrests had been made to warrant action on the part of the cathedral chapters of Vic, Girona, and Barcelona. More disconcerting to these canons than even the arrests was the fact that their fellow clerics were being held indefinitely in secular jails, rather than being delivered up to the judicial court presided over by Bishop Parcero. Such a procedure violated a number of ecclesiastical privileges and the chapter of Barcelona—as
representative of the Catalan chapters—felt called upon to write both Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu letters to this effect.  

Just as the chapter of Girona had taken the lead in stirring up the religious community of Catalonia against the pretensions of the Dominicans, the chapter of Barcelona took it upon themselves to inform its fellow canons of the disturbing violations wrought by Catalan and French officials against the traditions of ecclesiastical immunity. Shortly after receiving the initial letter from the diocese of Solsona, the chapter of Barcelona sent out letters to each of the remaining dioceses protesting against their brothers’ imprisonment on the pretext of being “ill affected to His Majesty and to the Province.” According to the letter, government officials had defended their actions by appealing to the *jus belli* (Law of War) in which any who gave aid to the enemy or spoke words against the king should be thrown in jail. Regardless of the legitimacy of these claims—and, in a noticeable caveat, the chapter of Barcelona did not say whether they believed such accusations to be true or not—the thrust of the ecclesiastical protest was that the state had no right to interfere in what was essential a church matter.

Apparently the matter was so grave that the chapter of Barcelona informed Solsona that Bishop Manrique was considering calling a Provincial Council in Barcelona with Bishops Parcero and Sentmanat to formulate a detailed response to Louis XIII or Richelieu over the current outrages.  

For the next few weeks in the capital, the

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1037 ACB: I.A.3. Resolucions Capitulars (1640-1650) 20 June 1642: “Respecte de la Relatio que an fet los Comissaris pera que se lliuren de les presons lo ecclesiachis que estan detinguts en les pressons seculars de que la Cort secular afermat de dret se resolgue fes explique al Sr Bisbe passé avant per los medis de Justicia apretadamet y que per altra part fen done raho als Capitols de esta provincia y dels perjudis se fan a la Immunitat Eclesiastica y ques escrija al Sr Rey y Cardenal Duch,” f. 102v.

1038 The chapter of Solsona seemed to find even greater comfort in the planned Council, as they wrote to the chapter of Barcelona: “pera tots de gran Consuelo que la mateixa diligentia que ha fet VS ab los capitols aques fet lo Sr Bisbe de Barna ab los Srs Bishes de esta Provinica peraque de Conformitat ordenassen
cathedral chapter, working with other clerics from outside the diocese—probably the syndics currently attending matters in town—organized a special Junta, led by Barcelona’s sacristan Hieronym Roig. They met with Bishop Manrique, and Roig even created a special clerical embassy to the Diputació and to Governor Josep Margarit i Biure, who appeared to be the person behind these outrageous arrests.  

More details surrounding the controversy were revealed to the various Catalan cathedral chapters by late June. Twelve priests had been arrested throughout the province, and held in royal jails awaiting trial in a secular court. All of the accusations were vague references to speaking out against the current war, which the Intendant d’Argenson and the governor Josep de Margarit believed to merit the serious charge of lèse majesté, or treason.  

Meanwhile, the cathedral chapters across Catalonia began sending delegates to Barcelona, and preparing to fight this secular innovation tooth and nail. Once again, the chapter of Vic was one of the first to respond to their brothers’ call, placing their most influential canons—the sacristan, Don Enric d’Alemany; Dr. Josep Bojons, who held the

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1040 “Ho podem escusar lo representar a VS (sots pena de faltar a nra obligacio) lo desconuelo gran tenim vehent la opprecio que vuy patex nron estament ecclesiastic ch es lo cas señor que havent donat estos seños Ministres Regios de algun temps a esta part en capturar y cumplir los carsels Reals de personas ecclesiastics ja ab pretexto de mal afectes a sa Magt y a la Província, o, Jure belli com diuen per haverlos presos en la Guerra haver donata favor als enemichs o, dit algumas paraulades no tenint Jurisdictio pera poderho per etiam considerant (lo cas en termens mes fort) que haguessen comes crimen laese magesstatis.” ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Diego Palau to Chapter, 22 June 1642.
keys to the city gates; Dr. Joan Francesc Agut, their archivist; and Canon Salles—at the disposal of their fellow chapter. The chapter of Girona also got involved after receiving a letter from the marquis d’Argenson. The contents greatly disturbed the chapter, and despite d’Argenson’s claim a few days later that he would write to Rome arguing in favor of ecclesiastical immunity, the chapter decided to set about the matter themselves. On 10 July, the chapter sent off letters to Louis XIII himself, as well as Cardinal Antoni Barberini, Bernat de Cardona, and the chapter of Solsona. In addition, a special committee, consisting of Canons Jaume Pla, Joan Vilar, Hieronym Anglasell, and Josep Riera, was created to formulate a convincing appeal to Rome.

At the same time as the government moved forward with the prosecution of these priests, chapter representatives from Barcelona, Girona, Solsona, and Vic began meeting regularly to discuss potential strategies aimed at transferring the cases to the ecclesiastical courts where they rightfully belonged. In this Bishop Manrique provided invaluable assistance for the cathedral canons. His first suggestion to the canons was to appeal

1041 ACV: Secretaria: Liber 3 (1641-1648) (Arm 57/57), letter from chapter of Vic to chapter of Barcelona, 28 June 1642, f. 19. The choice of d’Alemany is remarkably ironic. It was the bold sacristan of Vic who, along with Pau Claris and others, first began serious clerical opposition to the fiscal demands of Philip IV at the Corts of 1626. Ever since that time, d’Alemany had been an outspoken supporter of Pau Claris. That he should now be taking up the fight against the legal pretensions of the French demonstrates that more than mere political or ecclesiastical advancement was behind a good many Catalan clerics who had initially adhered to the political banner of France in 1640-1641. See also ACV: Secretaria: Liber 3 (1641-1648) (Arm 57/57), letter from chapter of Vic to chapter of Barcelona, 2 July 1642, f. 20.
1042 ACV: Actes Capitulares: volume 24; 1 July 1642, pp. 41-42.
1043 On d’Argenson’s letter to Canon Pere Joan Albert, see ACG: Cartas, 1640-1642, 5 July 1642.
1044 ACG: Actes Capitulares, volume 24, 10 July 1642, p. 44. The presence of Pla on the committee is interesting as he was one of the chief beneficiaries of the French regime. The fact that he was willing to write a formal protest of the heavy-handed manner that the French had adopted towards the church may serve to mitigate criticism from some scholars who assert that Catalan clerics supported the revolt merely, or chiefly, looking for political advancement.
1045 Diego Palau from Vic lamented the absence in these meetings of representatives from either Lleida or Urgell. Lleida’s delegate could not take part in the discussion because he had not received a direct order from his chapter to do so, while Urgell’s representative—the Francophile Don Llorens de Barutell—did not feel that the matter was urgent enough to require his support. “Lleida per què lo syndic no te orde y Urgell no te syndich y no obstant axo atesa la necessitat ya en fer esta diligencias,” ACV: 56-35: Secretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Diego Palau to Chapter, 16 July 1642.
specifically to those clerics with official positions in the current government, men like Jaume Pla the Inquisitor; Francesc Puig on the Junta de Batalló; and Llorens de Barutell, the Canceller of the Audiència. The bishop thought that if influential clergy within the regime could generate sufficient pressure, Margarit and d’Argenson might be forced to transfer the cases over to the ecclesiastical courts. In addition, Manrique offered to bring his own authority to bear on the issue, writing a detailed legal explanation to Margarit that discussed the merits of the canons’ case.

The canons praised Manrique’s wise counsel, all the more so as the cases did not originate in his own diocese. Such an attitude demonstrated, “his Holy zeal as such a great Prelate.” Unfortunately Governor Margarit regarded the bishop’s involvement with extreme annoyance and ignored the prelate’s letters. In response, Manrique ordered one of his vicar-generals to send several admonishing letters to the governor, reiterating the bishop’s bold declaration that the secular authority had no jurisdiction whatsoever in this matter, the issue clearly belonging to the ecclesiastical courts.

Finally goaded by these blunt declarations, Margarit compiled a brief of his own, in which he based his authority solely upon the extraordinary measures the state needed to take in response to certain necessities of war. Word of the governor’s grounds for prosecution soon circulated among the entire Catalan religious community, causing one canon to lament that, “[there] would result from this a very great detriment, or, to put it

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1046 “Lo Sr. Bisbe de Barcelona aqui tocare: petir los ecclesiastichs que estan en poder de la Cort Secular encara que no sien sos Subdits per estar dins de sa diocesi monstrant son Sant zel com a tant gran Prelat,” ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Diego Palau to Chapter, 22 June 1642.
better, the total ruin of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and liberty." Unfortunately for Manrique’s designs, the Canceller Barutell sided with the government and against the clergy, although Diego Palau hinted that motives other than a concern for justice—such as a fear of upsetting the French and losing his job—might have been at work in the judge’s decision.

In an attempt to show the government in Barcelona the extent to which the regional clergy were behind this issue, the syndic from Vic urged his Bishop Ramon de Sentmanat to stand with Manrique and Parcero, raising their voices and their pens to support such an important issue. As if to emphasize the universality of the threat facing the church, Vic’s syndic, Diego Palau, added in his letter the most recent provocation by civil authorities.

A few weeks before, a Judge of the Audiència had entered the house of a cathedral canon in the diocese of Vic without provocation nor—as was the custom—being accompanied by the vicar-general. There the judge discovered a priest who was suspected of subversive activities against the French; the cleric was arrested and thrown into the royal jails. Beyond that the Judge searched the house of the canon, opening up any and all papers to look for evidence. It appears that canons such as Diego Palau of Vic were hoping, by their continued publicity of this case to create a unanimity which would be able to stand up to the innovative policies from Barcelona, unlike their

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1047 “resultaria de asso molt gran detriment, o , per millor dir, la total ruhina de la llibertat y Jurisdictio ecclesiastica.” ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Diego Palau to Chapter, 22 June 1642.

1048 “a aso se pot temer per ser ministres regios los matexos consultors que crida peraque lo aconsellen.” ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Diego Palau to Chapter, 22 June 1642.
previous attempt to block the formation of the Junta de Batalló: a unanimity not seen since the sacrilege of 1640.¹⁰⁴⁹

After a couple of weeks passed without any response from Paris, another embassy was sent to Margarit on 16 July after a council a few days previously, where the syndics of the Chapters of Barcelona, Girona, Solsona, and Palau met again with Bishop Manrique to consider their options. They decided to continue to fight against the cases remaining in the hands of the secular authorities. Palau lamented that despite their best efforts to serve Louis XIII faithfully and honestly, the obstinate arrogance of lieutenants like Margarit were making this service difficult to sustain. Regardless of whether Margarit would grant them their request, the canons also determined to make an appeal to the Diputació the following day.

Throughout all this wrangling, the cathedral canons insisted that they had nothing more than the king’s best interest at heart; it does seem that many of them disapproved of the defendants’ statements. But they felt that justice could best be served in the ecclesiastical courts, following the custom and established precedent of centuries. Here we see something very critical, and rather symbolic of the manner in which the French governed and ultimately lost Catalonia. One might call it exceeding suspicion. On the immediate surface, there seemed little chance of the ecclesiastical court determining anything less than that these dozen priests had made these malicious statements and handing down an effective punishment. Granted, this punishment would probably have been something short of exile, but there was little reason to doubt that the public would

¹⁰⁴⁹ Palau also noted that the assembled canons were sending off letters to Louis XIII and Richilieu, confidentially admitting—rather naively as it turned out—that King and Cardinal alike would undoubtedly side with the Church in this dilemma.
have been made aware that the pulpit and the cassock did not represent license to speak irresponsibly about the king or government. Rather than follow this course, however, the Franco-Catalan government insisted on trying the cases themselves in the secular courts. By so doing, they would ensure that the appropriate verdict was reached, but the means by which they achieved these ends served only to inflame the spirits of otherwise loyal clergy.

As might have been anticipated, Margarit was not willing to approve the clerics’ request; placing these serious cases before the ecclesiastical tribunal headed by Bishop Parcero with Bishop Manrique as his lieutenant—two persons whom Margarit was beginning to regard with increasing mistrust—could result in a verdict unfavorable to the cause of France. The Diputació, whether directed by d’Argenson or not, quietly agreed with the governor. Undaunted by this setback, however, the ecclesiastical legal defense entered an appeal for a second conference before the Audiència. Again, the determination of the regional clergy was not to question whether or not their fellow priests had talked ill of Louis XIII, but to ensure that their traditional liberties and privileges were protected.

The second appeal pitted the clerical lawyers representing the cathedral chapters against the Regent of the Audiència and lawyers for the Diputació in order to establish on the one hand, whether royal ministers could lawfully arrest clerics, hold them in the secular jails, and try them before a secular court. Ironically, the chief lawyer for the Diputació at this time was none other than Josep Fontanella, son of the famous Catalan jurist, and long time lawyer for the church in Catalonia against the incursions of Philip IV.
or royalist bishops. The conference opened on 1 August, and despite the great hopes of syndics like Diego Palau for a vindication of ecclesiastical liberties, the outcome fell against the clergy.  

Disappointed by this outcome, the chapter representatives returned to the cathedral in Barcelona where, with Sacristan Roig at their head, they became embroiled in discussions about what course to pursue next. Many times, to the constant regret of numerous canons, these meetings bogged down in a diplomatic morass, with the various syndics offering up different plans to rectify the issue. In the best of Catalan tradition, these negotiations dragged on for quite some time until a larger external concern thrust itself upon the ecclesiastical consciousness, requiring prompt action. At the end of several days, the canons decided to once more appeal their case to a higher tribunal.

The issue of clergy who disagreed with some of the new royal policies in Catalonia was soon joined by a number of laity who expressed similar dissatisfaction. In early August, the chapter of Vic wrote to their syndic in Barcelona, Diego Palau, regarding one Pere de Ballo, a citizen of Vic who, along with others, had voiced their discontent with the King of France. In this regard, the syndic had little good to say about those who had "publicly spoken ill of the Most Christian King, a thing for which all should be well punished."}
When it came to the imprisoned clergy, however, Palau talked a different line. In the very same letter, the canon conveyed information that the royal ministers in Catalonia had passed a resolution “that is not advantageous for the ecclesiastical estate.”

Apparently the case went before the Audiència, where an unnamed judge upheld the government’s actions and refused to countenance the priests’ release. Upon consulting the rest of the clergy assembled in Barcelona to plead for their brothers’ release, it was decided to make an embassy to the Seigneur d’Argenson that same evening, “because being so great a minister, he would be able to console us, as we confidently expect.”

As dubious evidence for d’Argenson’s sympathy with the ecclesiastical position, Palau noted that a few days before a monk had been caught carrying suspicious letters, and whom d’Argenson—esteeming the case to be a minor one—sent off straight to his bishop.

A week passed and still the case made for those clerics unjustly imprisoned in royal jails had only just begun. Around the sixteenth of August, an embassy composed over every Catalan chapter met with the Intendant d’Argenson, who was then serving the province as interim-Viceroy. Palau seemed optimistic that justice would be done and the clergy released: “we are confident that it will result in the happy outcome that you have

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1053 Per lo negosi dels ecclesiastichs presos dich a VS que per part dels ministres Regios se ha pres la Resolutio no convenient al estament ecclesiastich.” ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Dr. Diego Palau to chapter of Vic, 10 August 1642.

1054 perque any de passar anant en las diligencias que lo dret y lleys de la patria nos permets ha resolt esta tarda fer embaxada al Sr de Argenson perque com a minister tant superior sie ferint a Consolarnos, com ho confiam,” ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Dr. Diego Palau to chapter of Vic, 10 August 1642.

1055 “Estos días atras portaren un Religios que li trobaren algunas Cartas; y Argenson, no ostant era cas grande lo inbia a son Prelat…” ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Dr. Diego Palau to chapter of Vic, 10 August 1642.
desired … and that in all cases, justice will be served.”

Again, the canons representing their constituent chapters were very quick to remind the Intendant that their sole desire was to restore the common respect for ecclesiastical immunity, so that the church might with confidence give service to the king and to the well being of the commonwealth.

Despite the optimism, however, the case regarding the imprisoned clerics dragged on into the autumn months. The Seigneur d’Argenson refused to give an official decision, and so the canons sought out greater assistance from the Bishop of Barcelona. Between nine and ten in the morning of 2 September, a number of clerical advocates met with Manrique. Diego Palau, being one of their number, remarked that every one displayed great zeal and valor on behalf of all the cathedral chapters in Catalonia and that the bishop seemed favorable to their cause. What remained to be seen was whether the Seigneur d’Argenson would rule in favor of justice or not, a point upon which Palau and other syndics remained doubtful, and for which they hoped for a favorable brief from Bishop Manrique. There was only one option left open to the Catalan church: an appeal to the special diplomat recently arrived from Rome: Vincente Candiotti. Upon this newcomer’s abilities and powers the fate of ecclesiastical liberty in Catalonia would fall.

1056 “De la Embaxada ferem al Sr. de Argenson per part dels Ille Capitols confiam resultara lo bon exit que se destija(n); y al que senten s’entregaran al ordinari ecclesiastich tots los ecclesiastichs presos en les presons Reals: y en tot cas se administrara Justitia.” ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Dr. Diego Palau to chapter of Vic, 19 August 1642.

1057 Hanent ho axi assegurat al Sr. de Argenson que ames es Just se fasse es be per que sentenga que la Inentio dels Capitols sols es esta reincident lo prejudici se feya a la Inmunitat Ecclesiastica atençat sempre al Servey del Rey…y a la quietut publica…” ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Dr. Diego Palau to chapter of Vic, 19 August 1642.

1058 ACV: 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Letter from Dr. Diego Palau to chapter of Vic, 2 September 1642.
The unusual embassy of Vincente Candiotti (continued)

The previous chapter examined the context of the Catalan revolt in the international Catholic community, and the initial decisions made by Urban VIII in favor of the rebels’ position. As the Franco-Catalan government began to assume a greater control over the Catalan church, however, the pope’s council in Rome became more cautious in their dealings with the Principat. The arrival of Candiotti thus can be seen not only as the pinnacle of Roman approval of the Catalan revolt, but also as the first mark of a growing concern for the spiritual and material wellbeing of the Catalan church, under a new government. The first months of Vincente Candiotti’s embassy to Barcelona would reveal a harshness between the secular government and the church that seemed to temper even the pro-French zeal of the pope’s brother-cardinals. Unfortunately, attempts at understanding Papal diplomacy between France, Spain, and the Catalan rebels are hampered by the absence of letters from Rome to agents in Madrid, Paris, and Barcelona. What we can piece together from Candiotti’s letters sent to the Holy See provides us with a unique example of Catholic diplomacy in the face of great crisis.

Among the many interesting puzzles of the Candiotti embassy is the timing of his appointment. The Italian was sent to Catalonia from Paris, where he was serving in the embassy of the French nuncio, only in August 1642, nearly two years since the Catalans declared their right to “natural defense” in the famous Oath to the Principat. It was not to a province looking for direction that he was sent, but rather one struggling with the nascent rule of the French. More significantly, it was at this time that the first arrests of
clerics for crimes of lèse majesté were being made public.\textsuperscript{1059} On top of this, it is possible that from a military perspective—more than a year after Montjuïc, followed by two Spanish defeats—Rome perceived that the rebellion was a \textit{fait accompli}.

Finally, there was a sincere religious component to sending over a Papal representative. Out of the eight bishops serving in Catalonia when the revolt broke out, one had kept his see loyal (Tortosa); two (Urgell and Lleida) had already left the province; one (Solsona) was seriously contemplating flight; and a fifth was holed up in his city by the French (Perpignan-Elna). That left three bishops, Ramon de Sentmanat in Vic, Gregorio Parcero in Girona, and Garcia Gil Manrique in Barcelona, to govern the province religiously. Unfortunately, the latter two prelates were already falling under suspicions of treason by the French authorities, thus compounding the episcopal dilemma. In the post-Tridentine mindset of a Catholic community, which placed a central role on bishops, the Catalan situation was fast becoming a calamity. Candiotti might have been sent there as much to provide services in the capacity of a permanent “acting bishop” as to observe and provide a first-hand account back to Rome.

A point further suggestive of the multiple expectations Candiotti’s mission raised was that he was endowed with the special power of “appellation.”\textsuperscript{1060} In other words, he represented the highest court of appeal in ecclesiastical cases, which meant that

\textsuperscript{1059} It appears that French legal tradition, which made crimes of this sort offenses against the crown, and therefore taken out of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and placed in the royal courts, was responsible for this breach of ecclesiastical immunity.

\textsuperscript{1060} In fact, Candiotti stressed the possession of this particular power in his letters of introduction to the various cathedral chapters in Catalonia. “Sa Santedad (que Deu guart) y lo Allm Sr. Nunçio de Paris mi Sr. me han fet merce de honnarme de enviarme en aquest Principat de Cathaluña, Comptats de Rossello y Cerdanya, per Collector general, y Jutge de les causes del Tribunal Ecclesiastich conforme VS veura ab la carta inclusa de sa Señoria Illma pera VS.” AEV 56-35: Secretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Vincente Candiotti to chapter of Vic, 3 September 1642. It appears that one letter was merely copied and sent to all but the three dioceses—Perpignan, Tarragona, and Tortosa—not yet under Franco-Catalan control.
difficulties arising between Catalans and the French (or at times, between two Catalans—cathedral chapters protesting the arrest of clerics, for instance, or refusing to contribute to the Junta de Batalló—were to be resolved through his best judgment. This was quite agreeable to the French who were growing increasingly uncomfortable with the number of Catalan clerics who opposed their governing of Catalonia. What made matters worse was the infuriating refusal by either Bishop Parcero—as Jutge Apostolic—or Bishop Manrique—as senior bishop in the province—to prosecute or even reprimand these troublesome ecclesiastics. The coming of Candiotti, though ostensibly an impartial judge of clerical matters, was seen by the French and their secular Catalan allies as a way round the current episcopal impasse.

Finally, the papal mission was an assertion, albeit one colored by France’s political dominance, of canon law, which declared that the Pope had the right, independent of civil authority, to send legates (nuncios or other diplomats) to any kingdom he so desired, with or without ecclesiastical jurisdiction.1061 Understanding the many political and ecclesiastical complications of Candiotti’s mission, one can see that in part it demonstrated papal supremacy in the political realm over Spanish objections to the embassy—a significant point, since Urban VIII had had enough of the continual interference by Philip IV and Olivares in the affairs of Spain’s nuncio since the 1630s. This interference was a source of conflict that had led to the expulsion of the Spanish

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1061 Chapter V; §265: “Romano Pontifici ius est, a civile potestate independens, in quamlibet mundi partem Legatos cum vel sine ecclesiastica jurisdicctione mitendi.” Lorenzo Miguelez Domínguez et. al. eds, Código de Derecho Canónico y Legislación Complementaria (Madrid: Editorial Católica, 1952), p. 111. The note beneath explains that “Este derecho emana de la soberania que en el orden espiritual y aun en el temporal tiene el Romano Pontifice, y de la obligación que le incumbe de velar por su rey, espardida por todo el mundo….El derecho de legación ha sido ejercitado por los Romanos Pontífices desde los primeros siglos de la Iglesia.” emphasis theirs.
nuncio in 1639. Furthermore, it was a significant step for Urban in international politics, attempting to reassert Roman primacy in the midst of inter-Catholic turmoil.

Vincente Candiotti arrived in Barcelona in late August 1642, and soon sent out letters to the various chapters informing them of his arrival and his role in the province. Within a few days, he wrote what would be the first of many weekly reports during his ten-year stay in Catalonia, addressed, as usual, to Francisco Barberini, brother-cardinal to the pope, and the Secretary of State in the Vatican.\(^{1062}\) In his first letter, he seemed quite aware of his responsibility to Rome to provide accurate information regarding the state of the war and the spirit of the Catalans, as well as of his unique jurisdiction over regional ecclesiastical matters.\(^{1063}\)

Shortly after his arrival in Barcelona, Candiotti sent out letters to each of the cathedral chapters in which he acknowledged the great honor bestowed upon him by Urban VIII and announced that his duties were to be the General Collector for papal revenue in Catalonia, as well as the Judge of causes coming before the Ecclesiastical Tribunal. Furthermore, Candiotti indicated a willingness to serve the clerics in any way

\(^{1062}\) For these letters, and for many worthwhile conversations regarding Candiotti and the Catalan church, I am deeply indebted to the kindness and generosity of Professor Joan Busquets i Dalmau. He has not only transcribed Candiotti’s entire correspondence to Rome—selections of which will be published in a forthcoming book—but also was gracious enough to let me examine his transcripts for this thesis. My humble thanks are small praise and compensation for this time-consuming and difficult work.

\(^{1063}\) BAV [BT], Barb. Lat. 8535: Candiotti to Francesco Barberini, 27 August 1642, f. 1v. Despite Candiotti’s confidence in his roles, it appears that his official title was the source of some confusion among the Catalan church. The syndic from Vic informed his chapter, for example, that “a papal nuncio has arrived, in charge of the matter of Spoils, and over all ecclesiastical cases of appointments.” “ha arribat un nuncio apostolich, per los negocios de Spolis y per las causas de appellatio del [estatment] ecclesiastich” ACV: Secretaria: Liber 3 (1641-1648) (Arm 57/57), letter from Diego Palau to chapter of Vic, 5 September 1642, f. 23v (Emphasis mine). Also, The chapter of Girona was informed by the French nuncio that Candiotti was coming “with the necessary authority” especially “as appertains to the matter of spoils” as well as other matters generally in the provenance of the Nuncio of Spain. ["con le facolta necessare; tanto per quello, des appartana all matiria dei spogli, com per conoscu le cose spitanti al foro ecclo per appellationone o per altre nulla forma, dels costumava da mons Imm Nuntio di Spagna."] ACG: Cartes, 1640-1642; French nuncio to Canon Albert, 28 July 1642.
possible, placing his services at their disposal. From various reports, it appears that Candiotti maintained particularly close relations with Bishop Manrique and other members of the Barcelona chapter.

In one of his earliest reports, Candiotti informed Rome that the situation in Catalonia was incredibly complex; though outward appearances indicated that the Franco-Catalan government had established and maintained order successfully throughout the Principat and Comtats, a great many Catalans, even in the capital of Barcelona, still held some allegiance to Castile. In addition to detailing his observations about the local environment of Barcelona, Candiotti also passed along his first impressions of Bishop Garcia Gil Manrique, whose acquaintance would last only a few weeks. When the papal envoy presented his papers from the French nuncio, Grimaldi, the Bishop was quite surprised: “At first he [Manrique] marveled at the novelty of the negotiation, afterwards he showed courtesy; the next day he came to compliment me on this.” Evidently Urban’s decision had not been communicated to any of the Catalan political or ecclesiastical hierarchy. Nevertheless, Manrique did all that he could to make the collector comfortable in his new surroundings. When Candiotti called upon the bishop at his palace the following day, Manrique offered to house him in the Teatrine convent located near the Plaça Santa Ana: one of the more important public squares in Barcelona, and quite close to the cathedral and government buildings.

1064 AEV 56-35: Segretaria: Cartes (1641-1645), Candiotti to Chapter of Vic, 3 September 1642.
1065 BAV [BT], Barb. Lat. 8535: Candiotti to Francesco Barberini, 2 September 1642, ff. 4-4v.
1066 “Fui da Mons.r Vescovo presentandogli la lettera che pur havevo di Mons.r Grimaldo a lui diretta, sul principio mostrò di prendere meraviglia della novità del negotio, ma poi riscotendosi a poco à poco si mostrò cortese, et il giorno sequente vene à complire me in questo convento de P.ri Teatini dove mi trovo
The initial response by the Catalan church towards Candiotti’s embassy was one of gratitude. On 1 September, the chapter of Barcelona sent a special embassy to Candiotti, welcoming him and offering to aid him in any particular way. On the twelfth of September, the chapter of Vic, aware of the great honor bestowed on them, sent a letter of thanks to the French nuncio if Paris, praising “the zeal and great providence of His Holiness” in sending Candiotti “for the execution of ecclesiastical affairs.” The same day, they sent a letter to the new envoy himself, using the title “Collector General,” and admitting that they were “particularly content” to have him.

To many in the Catalan church, the timing of his arrival with the escalating conflict over ecclesiastical immunity was seen as remarkably providential. Much to their chagrin, however, the Franco-Catalan officials did not seem any more inclined to respect the Church’s position; on the contrary, they soon took up the offensive against Catalonia’s most senior bishop.

**The Church under Attack: the exile of Bishop Garcia Gil Manrique**

Ever since the turmoil in Catalonia had begun in the spring of 1640, the provincial bishops had been in the limelight of the action. Their participation in halting the violence of the Corpus Christi celebration, their firmness in dealing with sacrilegious soldiers—these and other factors made them highly respected as men of principle. There

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1068 “Lo zel y gran providential de Sa Santedad...se experimenta, honrant esta provintia ab persona de tantas prendas com lo Sr. Vicens Candiotto, per la expeditio dels negociis ecclesiastichs; lo que estimam molt, y a V S Illma la diligentia en despatxarlo ab tanta brevedat, suplicant ab totes veras tingga per be continuar la merce y honra tenim rebuda...” AEV: 57-45: Segretaria, Cartas Enviadas (1640-1660), 12 September 1642, Chapter of Vic to French nuncio, f. 21v.
1069 “Particular contento havem tingut, per la acertada electio que Sa Santedat ha feta...” AEV: 57-45: Segretaria, Cartas Enviadas (1640-1660), 12 September 1642, Chapter of Vic to Candiotti, f. 22.
were men who, like Thomas More, dared to defy the king rather than disobey the moral law of God, and who were willing to suffer for it. While most of the loyalist bishops, like Duran and Paredes, had fled the Principat, Bishop Pérez-Roy of Perpignan had stayed along with the Castilian garrison that occupied the city. Before his eventual departure from the see, Pérez-Roy was constantly accusing the French of deluging Catalonia with their heresy, and decrying both the viceroy, de Brézé, and the general, La Mothe, as “being at the head of an army of Lutherans.”

At the head of this body of men stood the former viceroy, Bishop Manrique of Barcelona. Following the failed negotiations with Zaragoza in the spring of 1641, Manrique appears to have faded back into administering his diocese and remained quiet about the progress of the Catalan revolt. Even here, however, his authority was hampered, and the spiritual health of the religious houses in the diocese of Barcelona—and around the Principality—deteriorated.

The conflict between the Church and the fledgling Franco-Catalan government drew Manrique back into practical politics. On 25 October 1641, as the conflict between the two institutions came to a head over the Junta de Batalló, Manrique went to the chapter meeting and asked them for license to go to Rome. The apparent occasion was a

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1070 The historian Charles Vassal-reig, however, observed a more bitter attitude by the bishops towards the French, even as early as the entry of the first viceroy, de Brézé, into Catalonia. He noted the ill-will caused by “the premeditated abstention of their bishop [i.e. Manrique], and the hostility of those of Perpignan, Girona, and Urgell.” According to Vassal-reig, Cardinal Richelieu’s idea of expelling the bishops was not the only solution. The secretary of state, Noyers devised a plan whereby the French would encourage the cathedral chapters to subvert the bishops’ authority in their dioceses, and saw a perfect opportunity for such an experiment in Perpignan. Vassal-reig, La Prise de Perpignan, 92; 285.
1071 Vassal-reig, La Prise de Perpignan, 162.
1072 Scarcely a month into his stay in Catalonia, Candiotti would observe that, “Some convents have lost their non-Catalan population, exiling subjects of the Catholic King. Those who are left are few in number and cannot live without the necessary discipline.” BAV, [BT] Barb. Lat. 8535, Candiotti to Francesco Barberini, 16 September 1642, ff. 11r-11v. This discipline should have been administered by the bishop in the absence of the abbot or superior, but, as Candiotti, noted, Manrique’s contrary political position resulted several members of the lower clergy defying his spiritual authority.
clause in canon law—called *ad limina*—whereby a bishop was expected to visit the Holy Father and give an account of his activities in shepherding the diocese. Manrique’s stipulated reason was that he could better serve the diocese there as an advocate, informing the Pope of the state of affairs in Catalonia. The bishop’s request shocked the entire community: for a bishop to leave his diocese was a serious undertaking in a post-Tridentine church that was dedicated to improving pastoral care and influence in every diocese.

News of Manrique’s desire to leave soon made its way to the Consell de Cent. The very next day, the city councilors requested the chapter send an embassy on their behalf to persuade the bishop to have pity upon the city should their guide and shepherd leave them, and to change his mind. In addition to the aforementioned spiritual concerns, the city councilors might also have been quite nervous as to what Manrique might tell Urban when he arrived in Rome. Apparently the embassy worked, for Manrique agreed to remain and serve in Barcelona. But it was becoming increasingly apparent to the Franco-Catalan government as well as to the Catalan church that Manrique’s position in Catalonia was very insecure. The prelate had already made plain

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1073 ACB: I.A.Resolucions: Llibre de la Sibelle: 1625-1645: “Dit dia entra lo Sr. Bisbe en Capitol y demana licensia per anar a Roma per visitar limina apostolorum y per otros negosis tocans a las inquietuts correns y los Cgs amostraran grandissim sentimyent y tots se offerirende servirlo y acumpanyarlo ques fassa embaxada de quatra Capitulars al Sr Bisbe estimantli la honra y marse feu al capitol offerisse si marse sa Extia lo serviam en Comu y particular” 25 October 1641, (f. 333v). It is yet uncertain if Manrique needed to go to the chapter, or whether the prelate thought such a move was more politic.  
1074 “[The consellers] demanaran que fessem una embaxada al Sr Bisbe demanantli fos servis de mudar de pensament en anar a Roma y no voler denar esta Ciutat tant desconsolada de que en un temps tant a treballas reste sens pastor y prelat.” ACB: I.A.Resolucions: Llibre de la Sibelle: 1625-1645, 26 October 1641 (f. 334).
his disapproval of this French alliance, and yet remained highly respected among clerics and laity alike.\textsuperscript{1075}

Within weeks after the fall of Perpignan in the autumn of 1642, the French began to move against Bishop Manrique. Just as they were seeking to consolidate their control over Catalan territory in the north, so too did the French seek to consolidate control over Catalan hearts and minds in the south. Such an undertaking could only occur when the more prominent adherents to Philip IV and Castile were silenced or removed. Chief among the targets of the Seigneur d’Argenson—who, according to the historian Sanabre, was most responsible for this—was the Bishop of Barcelona.\textsuperscript{1076}

The bishop’s steadfast refusal to condone the creation of the Junta de Batalló and other policies enacted by the new government had “soured and altered the spirits of the secular ministers, who are actively seeking counsel to find a way to free themselves of this man. … Moreover they are troubled by his resolute allegiance and willingness to serve the King [Philip IV] and the ever increasing protection of the Apostolic see and your Sanctity, his supreme judge.” Yet the Franco-Catalan authorities had to move with

\textsuperscript{1075}Vincente Candiotti, in one of his early letters back to Rome informed Cardinal Barberini that Manrique had “openly professed [that he would] continue as he was born in Castile and a beneficiary of His Catholic Majesty, an obligation and particular devotion to that Majesty” which may necessitate his departure. He noted that Manrique had already fallen under great suspicion by the French ministry, “who are trying every means possible at the very least to remove him from hence,” believing him to be an active instrument for evil in the province. “Come accenai con le mie prime lettere a V. Emza, questo Mons. Vescovo professando apertament di continovar come nato in Castiglia, e beneficiato dalla Maestà del Rè Cattolico, una obligatione et devotine particolare a quella Maestà della quale non sia mai per rimoverlo qualsivoglia fortuna dell’armi francesi, è venuto talmente in sospetto di questi ministri di Francia, che tentano ogni via possibile per farlo almeno partir de quà, credendolo instrumento attivisimo di fargli qualsivoglia male.” BAV, [BT] Barb. Lat. 8535, Candiotti to Francesco Barberini, 16 September 1642, f. 10r.

\textsuperscript{1076}Sanabre, \textit{La Acción de Francia en Cataluña}, 215. In Sanabre’s history—the only complete work on the entire War of the Segadors from 1640 to 1659, the French are generally portrayed as “the bad guys,” and d’Argenson one of the worst. Despite this interpretation, and even though the French were supportive of the efforts to remove Bishops Manrique and Parcero, it was the new Catalan elite—particularly the governor, Don Josep de Margarit i Biure—who did the dirty work. It was the Catalan officials who brought forward the charges of \textit{lèse majesté}, and who expressed an eagerness to drive the shepherds away from their flock.
great care: Manrique was a well-respected and well-beloved prelate, even if his allegiance was still to Philip IV. Candiotti observed the dilemma facing the viceroy and his Catalan allies in power, noting, “They are trying to avoid any appearance of violence so as not to incense the populace, who have a great commitment toward the Ecclesiastic Hierarchy and toward this man in particular whom is regarded as pious.”

The blow came on Friday 26 September 1642—only a few days after the great celebration in the Plaça Sant Jaume—when a special meeting of Barcelona’s chapter was called. In one of his rare appearances before the chapter, Bishop Garcia Gil Manrique informed his fellow clerics that he had just come from a meeting with Governor Margarit and the Regent Josep Fontanella i Gavarrer—son of the famous Catalan legal authority. This powerful duo had informed him in, in the name of the King of France, that, he was an enemy of the state, and that “it would be agreeable to his Royal Service that you leave from this province.”

Bishop Manrique found himself in quite a difficult position. The order to remove himself from the diocese of Barcelona, indeed from the land of Catalonia, flatly contradicted not only the canon law laid down at the Council of Trent, but also the Apostolic Bulls confirming him as a bishop. Here was a dilemma indeed: to obey the secular authorities and prove false to his vocation, or to defy the secular authority and face whatever harsh consequences might follow. The extent to which the bishop wanted

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1077 “Simil risposta inasprice maggiormente et altera gl’animi dei detti ministri e stanno facendo frequenti consulte per torvar il modo da liberarsi da quest’huomo, ne vorrebbero venir se fosse possibile ad alcuna apparente violenza per non dar meteria alla Provincia di crederli men che riverenti verso la Hierarchia Ecclesiastica, e particolarmente verso quest’huomo comunemente reputato pio. e tanto più gli dà da pensar la facenda quanto che lo vedono risoluto di sacrificarsi al suo Rè col sottoporsi a qualsivoglia strapazzo, e che ano si va mettendo sotto il riparo della Sta. Sede Apostolica e di Sua Santità, suo giudice competente.” BAV, [BT] Barb. Lat. 8535, Candiotti to Francesco Barberini, 16 September 1642, f. 10v.

1078 See ACB: 1.A.3. Resolucions Capitulars (1640-1650), 26 September 1642; and BAV, [BT] Barb. Lat. 8535, Candiotti to Francesco Barberini, 30 September 1642, ff. 15v-16r.
to stay in Catalonia is evident from the correspondence of Candiotti who informed

Cardinal Barberini:

pertaining to the oath, the bishop already pledged it to the Catholic king [upon becoming
the viceroy in 1640], and he cannot otherwise pledge. If God would absolve him from
that first oath and command an oath and fidelity to the French crown, he would obey,
otherwise he would not renge from any other requests or commands. And as for his
interests and wealth, he does not care about them, nor does he deem them valuable. 1079

Bishop Manrique, the most senior ecclesiastical figure in Catalonia and the one who had
most openly expressed his continued loyalty to Castile, was willing to renounce his
allegiance to Castile, but yet could not reconcile such a decision with the word of God or
the teachings of the Church or his conscience. Manrique’s deliberation was another
critical moment of the Catalan revolt: would the most influential cleric in Catalonia
switch his loyalty and help bring the Catalan church back in accord with the new regime?
The weeks passed, however, and the bishop remained adamant in his convictions.
Though it grieved him, Manrique advised the chapter that he felt obliged to stay in
defiance of the secular authorities.

The reaction to the news was electric. Despite the bishop’s adherence to Philip
IV and his repeated attempts at reconciliation after Montjuïc, Manrique continued to hold
a prominent position among both lay and clerical Catalans. Even the fiery monk Gaspar
Sala held the bishop in high esteem: “a prelate in whom virtue, prudence, and wisdom are
found together.” 1080 The very day of his condemnation, a saddened Manrique appeared
before his chapter and informed them of his sentence. Enraged and seriously concerned

1079 “in quanto al giuramento l’ha prestato una volta al Rè Cattolico, e che non può ora diversamente
giurare, che se N. Sre. l’assolve dal primo giuramento, e gli commanda di giurar fedeltà alla Corona di
Francia, lo farà, altramente a commandamento o requisizione di chi che sia non può farlo, ne lo farà mai; e
che per quello che riguarda all’intresse de’ beni, egli non stima, ne ha in prezzo queste cose.” BAV,
[BT] Barb. Lat. 8535, Candiotti to Francesco Barberini, 16 September 1642, ff. 10r-10v.
1080 “un Prelado en quien concurren virtud, prudencia, y sabiduría,” AHCB: B.1641-8-(op)-80: Gaspar
Sala Epítome de los Princípios, Y Progressos de las Guerras de Cataluña en los años 1640 y 1641.
Dedicated to Diputacio and Consell de Cent (Barcelona: P. Lacavalleria, 1641), f. 9.
at losing one of the best churchmen in the province, and, more importantly, one who had always sought to understand the Catalans, the chapter wrote letters to Margarit, to La Mothe, the head general, to de Brézé, the viceroy-elect, and the President of the Generalitat, to no avail. Shocked at such a drastic decision on the part of the ruling government, the chapter of Barcelona hastily wrote to the other chapters, to see if, by uniting their strength against this measure, the bishop’s removal might be rescinded.\footnote{“Io Sr. Bisbe a fet essent baxat personalment a Capitol ab la qual nos feu a saber com lo Sr. Governador y Regent en nom de sa Mag del Cristianissim nre Sr le notificar en Convenia a son Real Servey se parties de esta provincia peraque lo Capitol li aconsellas lo que devia fet trobant se obligat en virtut del matrimoni espiritual ab lo qual esta obligat stresissimament a no dexar sa Iglesia sens orde expres des a S Sd, se resolguè que per ser lo negoci tant grave se notifique pera dema Capitol sub poena prestiti perqae tots los Srs. Canonges se troben en ell.” ACB: 1.A.3. Resolucions Capitulars (1640-1650), 26 September 1642, ff. 116-116v.}

So grave was the matter before the entire Catalan church that the Barcelona chapter met again the following day. After much discussion, the canons elected four commissioners—the Sacristan Roig; the Archdeacon of Santa Maria del Mar, Jaume Corts; and canons Pagas and Ximenis—to visit Manrique and inform him that they would do all that was in the power to fight the resolution taken by Margarit and d’Argenson. As proof of their devotion to their bishop, the chapter prepared other emissaries to take letters to Margarit, d’Argenson, the Consell de Cent, the Diputació, and, above all, Vincente Candiotti, who they felt would be of great assistance in persuading the regime to rescind the expulsion order.\footnote{ACB: 1.A.3. Resolucions Capitulars (1640-1650), 26 September 1642, ff. 116v-117. The chapter sought to exercise some wisdom in their choice of delegates. The Archdeacon of Santa Maria Mar, as the most senior and most influential Catalan in the chapter, was sent to Margarit and Fontanella, accompanied by the younger canon Pagas; Sacristan Roig and Canon Ximenis—who had been in close contact with the papal envoy—were sent to Candiotti; two of the more fervent pro-French canons, Pau del Rosso and Josep Rouira were dispatched to d’Argenson; the canons who enjoyed noble status, Carbonell and Sentmanat, to Consell de Cent; while Canons Cassador and Ximenis—who seemed to have some family ties to persons of influence in the Principat—pleaded Manrique’s case before the Diputació.}
All of these embassies stressed the wide esteem and admiration in which Manrique was held as well as the great distress which the chapter would find itself if Manrique be taken from them. Furthermore, they urged Margarit and d’Argenson, as partisans closer to the king than others, to use their authority to intervene and prevent this ecclesiastical calamity from taking place.\textsuperscript{1083} In all their letters during the next few weeks, the chapter of Barcelona would display a great love and affection for their bishop, painting a relationship that was completely opposite to that of Bishop Duran in Urgell or Bishop Paredes in Lleida.

Unfortunately, the Franco-Catalan government would have none of it. On 30 September, the gauntlet came off: the French and Catalan officials in Barcelona informed Manrique quite bluntly that they did not desire his presence in Catalonia any longer. They had given him enough time to consider his position on the oath-taking, and, finding him resolute in his allegiance to Philip IV, told the prelate that “given the condition of his birth in Castile, in lands under the protection of the King of Castile, and having been a minister and viceroy in this Principat, taken together, produced not a little suspicion, which possibly could occasion great unrest, his continued presence in Catalonia was not judged to be desirable.”\textsuperscript{1084} Though the government’s animosity towards Manrique had been present for some time, the harsh determination with which the Franco-Catalan authorities wanted him out of the principality shook the prelate considerably. Candiotti, who appears to have been an eye-witness at this sentencing, observed “The Bishop, upon

\textsuperscript{1083}“Lo Desconsuelo gran ab que restaria est Capitol si perdes un tant gran prelat y tant digne de ser estimat per les molts parts concorren en sa persona … no passar avant en la execuito de dit orde y als demes se interposen ab se seniories peraque nos priven de la pressentia de un tant lo prelat aqui tant ama y estima est Capitol.” ACB: 1.A.3. Resolucions Capitulars (1640-1650), chapter of Barcelona to Governor Margarit and Seigneur d’Argenson, 27 September 1642, f. 117.

\textsuperscript{1084}BAV, [BT] Barb. Lat. 8535, Candiotti to Francesco Barberini, 30 September 1642, f. 15r.
hearing these words, lost his stoic appearance that had made him appear stronger during the negotiations and responded that he could not contradict the will of such a King, but that he wanted first to settle his affairs with his chapter.”\textsuperscript{1085} That afternoon, Manrique met with the assembled chapter to discuss the latest turn of events; it was a depressing meeting, not a single cleric could express any hope that the governors might change their mind.

The initial replies back to Barcelona’s chapter concerning the tense situation came on the following day. The responses from Margarit and d’Argenson were among the first letters received; while the two appreciated the strong feelings that the canons conveyed in their petition, they felt honor-bound to obey the king’s decree. The Diputació responded in like manner: they felt they simply had no power or authority to contradict or resist the order from Paris. The only positive response came from the Consell de Cent, which was ironic, considering the bitter tensions that had existed between said institution and the cathedral chapter for several decades. The consellers replied that they respected the great work Bishop Manrique had done for the city and promised to do all in their power—which everyone realized was very little—to prevent the prelate from leaving. Thoroughly depressed by the spineless response that the Catalan officials had given, the chapter quietly informed Manrique and awaited the worst.\textsuperscript{1086}

\textsuperscript{1085} Monsr. Vescovo a queste parole, perduta in parte quella costanza, che nella negotiatione secreta lo faceva parer molto più forte, rispose, che non poteva contradire alla volontà d’un tanto Rè, ma che voleva prima parteci pane il suo Capitolo,” BAV, [BT] Barb. Lat. 8535, Candiotti to Francesco Barberini, 30 September 1642, ff. 15r-15v.

\textsuperscript{1086} ACB: 1.A.3. Resolucions Capitulars (1640-1650), 1 October 1642, ff. 117-117v. A more detailed response from the Consell de Cent came the following day, in which they represented to the chapter: “lo gran sentimento y desconsuelo avien tingut del treball del Sr. Bisbe y de Considerar avien de perder un prelat de tant grans parts y y que avent fet tota la diligentia possible per part de la Ciutat, procurant se sobre essegues en la executio del orde de Sa Magd sels avia report per ultima ressoutio perso y minister que era
On 3 October, Bishop Manrique sent word to the chapter that, upon further consideration, he had decided to leave in peace. For the past week, the bishop had weighed his responsibility as a pastor against the intractable determination of Margarit and d’Argenson to force him to leave. While in his heart, Manrique felt seriously concerned about fulfilling his responsibilities as a shepherd for the people of Barcelona, he also was loath to escalate the conflict into potential violence. Communicating this concern to his chapter, they in turn responded once more with the conviction that they had done all they could to keep Manrique in Barcelona. Furthermore, the chapter expressed a willingness to do all in their power to help the bishop should he choose to delegate these responsibilities to them before his departure.\footnote{ACB: 1.A.3. Resolucions Capitulars (1640-1650), 3 October 1642, f. 119.}

The same day, the chapter received an answer from the last of the embassies—the papal delegate in Barcelona, Vincente Candiotti. The Apostolic Collector had gone before d'Argenson, Margarit, and the rest of the Franco-Catalan officials to plead against Manrique’s exile, only to receive the same pat answer: the king has ordered the bishop to be removed from Catalonia; there was nothing they could do to prevent this.\footnote{ACB: 1.A.3. Resolucions Capitulars (1640-1650), 3 October 1642, ff. 118v-119.} The chapter’s last avenue of appeal had failed: the secular authorities had listened to the Pope’s representative and had promptly dismissed him—to send a written appeal to the Pope himself would not only be time-consuming, but perhaps bootless as well.

On 7 October, the French and Catalan officials in power issued their final notice: Manrique had to leave Catalonia within ten days. Disappointed by the news, but not crushed, the bishop began putting his affairs in order prior to his upcoming departure.
First of all, he visited Candiotti to pay his last respects before leaving Barcelona, advising him of the resolution taken by the Diputació in accordance with other French officials in Barcelona that he would go to Valencia rather than Rome. While there, Manrique planned to write an extensive account of his sufferings to the pope, explaining how he had abandoned his church only under duress and under the threat of a forced eviction and reiterating once more his innocence in provoking this dreadful pass. While some members of the Barcelona chapter urged Manrique to go to Rome under the auspices of the Sacred Limit, the bishop refused, arguing that the threat of force, rather than a spiritual desire to render an account to Rome was the primary motivation for leaving Barcelona. Candiotti concurred in the prelate’s decision, also advising Manrique that, “the length of travel, the interests, and his age, necessitated a place closer and as comfortable as possible.”

Later that evening, Manrique would return to visit his chapter one final time, accompanied by his faithful vicar-general, Miquel Joan Boldo. The canons greeted the bishop warmly and then went over all that they had done to prevent his removal since that

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1089 “[H]oggi è venuto anco da me facendo complimento di partenza, et avisandomi della risolutione presa d’andarsene per mare nel Regni di Valenza di dove, come dic’egli, disegna di dar conto di questo fatto all Santità di Nro. Sigre. Ha soggiunto che non gl’è parso bene di venirsene a Roma, ne anco con l’occasione de Sacri Limini, dome lo consigliava qualch’uno del suo Capitolo, poiché non ha stimato adequate di farlo hora, che la forza de secolari lo induce a partire, oltreche ancop la lunghezza del camino, e gl’interessi presenti lo disuadone e le propria complessione et etta lo necessitano a cercar alla sua persona un luogo piú vicino, piú quieto e piú commodo che sia possiblie.” BAV, [BT] Barb. Lat. 8535, Candiotti to Francesco Barberini, 7 October 1642, f. 17r.

Candiotti reiterated in his letter to Rome that the threat by the secular power was the sole reason that forced Manrique to leave. He also observed that Bishop Parcero also was being forced to go into exile and that he had already applied to the royal authorities for a passport. The Apostolic Collector noted that the only reason why Bishop Sentmanat had not been hunted down was because he was a native Catalan. “Mi ha detto ancora, che Monsr. Vescovo di Girona si trova pur costretto a partire, e che gia ha manto a chiedere a i Regii il passaporto; di ció no ho altro rincontro, ma è probabile per esser quello di Galittia, e gran riconoscitore delle mercedi fattegli da S. Mta Cattolica, di modo che in tutta Cattalognà non restarà se non il Vescovo di Vich, al quale potrebbe riuscire di non esser cacciato per esser di nascita Cattalano.” BAV, [BT] Barb. Lat. 8535, Candiotti to Francesco Barberini, 7 October 1642, f. 17v.
fateful day two weeks ago. At Manrique’s request, the chapter notary placed all these activities into writing, one copy of which they placed in their official Resolutions, while giving another copy to Manrique.\footnote{ACB: 1.A.3. Resolucions Capitulars (1640-1650), 7 October 1642, f. 126v.}

As their final gesture of love and good-will, the chapter elected Canons Francesc Taverner and Josep Ximenis to accompany Bishop Manrique to the ship that would be taking him away. Realizing that he might never see his chapter again, the bishop gave to the canons a thousand lliures from his own rents, so that the chapter might duly celebrate his passing with a feat “de St. Egid,” should Manrique die as the Bishop of Barcelona, and should he be transferred to another cathedral, to offer up two anniversary masses instead.\footnote{ACB: 1.A.3. Resolucions Capitulars (1640-1650), 17 October 1642, ff. 127-127v.}

It was with great reluctance that Manrique departed Barcelona on 17 October 1642, accompanied by a mournful body of followers, made up of laity and clergy alike. Shortly after his ship rounded the southern horizon, the vicar-general Miquel Joan Boldo published the names of the vicar-generals, appointed by Manrique only a few days before. They were the Sacristan Hieronym Roig; Don Galceran de Sentmanat, brother to the Bishop of Vic; and himself. The ecclesiastic trio was given “full power to govern this bishopric in his absence.”\footnote{“Lo Sr. Vicari general Boldo publica la nominatio dels tus vicaris generals y governadors de est Bisbat que lo Sr. Bisbe Don Garcia Gil Manrique a feta de les persones de dit Sr. Canonge Boldo sacrista Roig y Don Galceran de Sentmenat aqui adonat ple poder pera governar est bisbat en sa ausentia…” ACB: 1.A.3. Resolucions Capitulars (1640-1650), 17 October 1642, f. 127.} The chapter was quite pleased with the nominations—Roig and Sentmanat were two of the most popular canons in the diocese—and sent a letter
back to Bishop Manrique, thanking him for his kindly appointment, requesting one final benediction from the holy officer before he departed.

Contrary to the bishop’s desire and their own promise, the French refused to send him to Valencia. Instead, they shipped him to the small town of Vinaroz, in the diocese of Tortosa. Soon after his arrival, Manrique wrote a letter to the pope, stressing his obedience to the Council of Trent concerning the behavior of bishops. In bitter words, he sought to exonerate himself, detailing the purely political motivations behind his exile, and the force that was needed in order to remove him from his diocese.\textsuperscript{1093} To confirm all that he said, Manrique encouraged Urban VIII to write to Vincente Candiotti, with whom the prelate had carried on a close relationship, particularly during the weeks before his exile.\textsuperscript{1094}

The forced exile of Bishop Manrique—to be shortly followed by Bishop Parcero—though it may seem mild or insignificant to modern minds, was a dramatic and drastic step for the French government, particularly since it had only begun to assume control over Catalonia. Important ecclesiastically, and therefore socially as well, the expulsion of the bishops more than anything else confirmed the fact of a new and different government in Catalonia. Rather than rejoicing at being part of the Sister of the

\textsuperscript{1093} Specifically, Manrique believed that it was his refusal to swear an oath of loyalty to Louis XIII that brought about his exile.

\textsuperscript{1094} Sanabre, \textit{La Acción de Francia en Cataluña}, 215-216. Indeed, Manrique met with Candiotti secretly on 30 September after receiving his final ultimatum from Margarit. During the course of the conversation, the bishop revealed to the papal observer that he would not lightly take leave of the city and diocese which had been entrusted to him. “S’intende tuttavia che si vada secretamente preparando alla partenza, benché vorrà forse aspettare qualch’altra espressione che desidera d’haver in scritto, come disse a me, per poter in ogni caso di partenza mostare di non haver se non sforzatamente abbandonata la sua Chiesa. Cosí dunque di sette Vescovati che sono in questo Principato cinque ne saranno senza Prelato e la Diocesi d’Urgel è da molto tempo in quà anco senza Vicario Generae, ven come mal affetto alla Francia trattenuto di non poter partire di Barcelona.” BAV, [BT] Barb. Lat. 8535, Candiotti to Francesco Barberini, 30 September 1642, ff. 16r-16v.
Church, Catalan clerics and laypeople alike began to question if in making the alliance with France, they had done a wise thing. Certainly expediency in January 1641 had made the offer attractive. But was it still worth it now? The French had continued the Castilian system of taxation and quartering troops on the population; this was a rude, but perhaps expected outcome. But the expulsion of religious figures, and particular leaders in the community with such prominence as a bishop on the mere suspicion that he was not completely loyal to the regime was quite another matter. This was an innovation—one of the things most dreaded by Catalans of all stripes, conservative as they were.

The expulsion of Bishop Manrique and the fall of Perpignan were the two most important acts of 1642, if not the most significant events of the war since Montjuïc. For a bishop to be forced out of his own diocese was a dramatic event in post-Reformation Europe. Such a decision went totally and wholly against the Council of Trent and denied every principle that a true Christian bishop concerned for his flock, or a true Christian prince concerned for his subjects, ought to have. The Catholic Church placed so great an importance on the principle that a shepherd should stay with his sheep that only special permission from the Pope could permit it. That a king and his ministers could expel a pious and virtuous bishop merely on the grounds of political expediency was Machiavellian and clearly distasteful in the eyes of the Catalan clergy as well as the flocks they pastored.1095

Though devastated by the loss of Manrique—a devastation that would be reinforced by the expulsion of Parcero a few months later—the clergy of Catalonia did not waver in their dedication to traditional usages and privileges. Thus deprived of

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1095 A further tribute to the dramatic nature of Manrique’s expulsion, only the relationship between Henry II and Thomas Becket seems to suggest itself as a historical precedent.
leadership, the religious community in Catalonia was thwarted in their actions to bring about a direct confrontation on the matter of ecclesiastical immunity. Even though one bishop was still left in the province—Ramon de Sentmanat—his relative inexperience and isolation in Vic made him practically useless to develop an organized resistance to the new French policies.

From this moment on, however, one begins to see the development of a third faction among the clergy, distinct from pro-Philip or pro-Louis factions that had arisen in 1640-1641. This new group would consist of clerics who had originally opposed Castile in 1640 on religious grounds, sincerely believing them to be sacrilegious pseudo-Catholics. They had placed their trust into the hands of the king of France, but were only now beginning to realize that in accepting protection from the Bourbons, they were being forced to cede too many of the traditional liberties they had enjoyed under the Hapsburgs. The French need to violate judicial privileges regarding ecclesiastical immunity for the stated cause of security, or winning the war, was much more serious in the eyes of a growing number of clerics than Philip’s grasping economic violations. For one thing, the results were far more serious: better to pay a few extra lliures a year and live a more Spartan existence than to be thrown in jail under potentially spurious charges of sedition. Having become increasingly aware of the French desire to more actively control the affairs of the church, it would only be natural for nervous Catalan clerics to ponder what further demands would be made on them. The response was not long in coming.

**Conclusion: The Rise of a New Order—the Oath to the King**

On 4 December 1642, the Marshal de La Mothe entered Barcelona where, during a celebration in the Cathedral, he swore to defend the pacts uniting Catalonia and France.
Following this the vicar-general, Hieronym Roig, administered to him the viceregal oath, after which, the French general paid homage to the tomb of St. Eulalia, below the cathedral choir, and hosted a series of feasts throughout the city.\textsuperscript{1096} Despite these ostentatious displays of honor to the Catalan people and the patron saint of Barcelona, all of which symbolically hearkened back to the glorious winter of 1640-1641, the general atmosphere inside Barcelona was one of deeply ambiguous feelings towards France and their Catalan clients. Even the cathedral chapters, though they wrote congratulatory notes to the new viceroy on his appointment and in general seemed inclined to be civil towards their new leader, remained suspicious.\textsuperscript{1097}

On 6 January 1643, the new viceroy, the Marshal de La Mothe had proclaimed from the customary plazas in Barcelona—including the Plaça del Rei, which fronted the viceroy’s residence as well as the site of Barcelona’s Inquisition—an order from Louis XIII himself, that all Catalan nobility, clergy, and government officials would have to swear an oath of loyalty to the king on 26 January.\textsuperscript{1098} Copies of this proclamation were distributed throughout the region. Unlike the Oath to the Principat, which many of these same Catalans had taken two years ago in the halls of the Consell de Cent, this new oath would take place in the Audiència. Despite the strong overtones of submission to royal

\textsuperscript{1096} ACB: II. J. 3. Exemplaria; 10 December 1642, f. 52; Sanabre, \textit{La Acción de Francia}, p. 240. These proceedings stood in marked contrast to the uproar created during 1621-1622, when the Catalans protested the appearance of a new viceroy before Philip IV had sworn his oath in Barcelona to protect the constitutions. Few Catalan officials in the Consell de Cent or the Diputació seemed to mind that \textit{two} French viceroys were governing Catalonia while Louis XIII had not yet sworn his oath in person.

\textsuperscript{1097} For example, see Girona’s congratulatory letter to La Mothe, ACG: Actes Capitulares, 7 December 1642, p. 94. On the 29th of December, La Mothe wrote a gracious reply, thanking the chapter for their kind words and especially for their faithful contributions to the Junta de Batalló, Actes Capitulares, 29 December 1642, p. 101.

\textsuperscript{1098} In La Mothe’s declaration, reference was made to a royal order back in June 1642, in which Louis articulated this desire; for whatever reason—not least of which being a growing concern with the loyalty of the Catalan clergies and nobles still in the region—seven months were to elapse without such a decree being enforced.
authority and a definitive ceding of their privileges not to the king, but to one of his lieutenants, the majority of lay Catalans tacitly accepted this declaration.\textsuperscript{1099}

The Oath, however, did not appeal to the majority within the Catalan church, which became the first institutional body to endure and later confront these French innovations. The future of French rule over Catalonia would, to a large extent, depend on whether they could maintain control over the hearts and minds of the Catalan people and their spiritual and social leaders. Philip IV had forfeited this claim on the people’s affection and loyalty in 1640 by steadfastly refusing to punish his soldiers for their crimes, and thus created a more solid opposition among the clergy and lower social orders. Would Louis XIII and his viceroys be able to profit from Spain’s mistakes? Or would they prove just as demanding as Castile in asserting one law, one way of governance, one relation between church and state, even if, by so doing, they jeopardized their control over Catalonia?

The insistence of the Franco-Catalan government on the Oath to the King bore significant testimony to the rise of a new order in Catalonia, one that none of the rebels had expected back in 1640. This new order was nothing less than absolute control by the secular bureaucracy emanating from Barcelona—and by extension, Paris—over the only other major social institution, the Church. Priests or monks who stood in its way faced imprisonment; bishops, exile. In an age that was becoming increasingly desperate in its search for political security and stability, the French government under Louis XIII and Richelieu were taking no chances. The Catalan leaders of society—all of them—must

\textsuperscript{1099} Sanabre does mention that the king’s absence was the only serious objection made to La Mothe’s proposal. See Sanabre, \textit{La Acción de Francia en Cataluña}, 273-274.
swear allegiance to their new king. Nothing less would be acceptable to Cardinal or King; they would brook no conscientious dissent. It was an all-or-nothing declaration.\textsuperscript{1100}

The clergy in general, and especially the bishops, protested this measure, which now forced them to make a choice they could not avoid and which they had not foreseen in 1640. Indeed, Manrique and Parcero rather openly expressed their discontent with the oath. It was not because the prelates owed anything much to Philip IV. True, he had nominated them, but they had taken no official oath upon receiving their office. Nothing bound them to Philip IV other than the personal conviction that the French king was not entitled to their service—that and the belief that taking the oath committed them to a course that explicitly condoned rebellion.\textsuperscript{1101}

It was significant that all the bishops—and many other clerics—who remained in the province during the crisis of 1640 emphasized the \textit{defensive} nature of the Catalan position. Rather than advocating rebellion or revolution, these religious authorities argued that Castilian innovation and sacrilege were the true culprits. In resisting the king and his soldiers, the Catalans were merely attempting to maintain the \textit{status quo} of tradition: traditional respect for Catalan political liberties and, more importantly, for the Sacramental Body of Christ.

\textsuperscript{1100} It was precisely this spirit, together with a rumor that an oath of fidelity might be required of all Catalan clergy that brought about the forced exile of Bishop Manrique. In one of his earliest conversations with the bishop, Candiotti noted that Manrique was prepared to leave the province should such a requirement be forced upon him. Ideally, Manrique hoped to travel to Rome, there to present his case before the Pope and labor for the people of Catalonia. Failing this, the prelate appeared content to travel to Castile, or any other land subject to Philip IV, taking nothing with him. Despite the popular reputation that Manrique had earned for piety, and the respect that many of his opponents had with regards to his steadfast loyalty to Philip IV, the French and their Catalan allies in power saw the bishop only as “a true enemy of the State.” BAV, [BT] Barb. Lat. 8535, Candiotti to Francesco Barberini, 16 September 1642, f. 11r.

\textsuperscript{1101} Manrique’s position was unique among the other clergy in Catalonia who were suspected of being loyal to Spain, for he had formerly been a viceroy, and therefore the only cleric who had taken an oath to Philip IV.
The entry of France into the equation posed somewhat of a problem for the clergy. On the one hand, many still hoped for reconciliation with Castile, once the king’s eyes had been opened and his spirit turned to repentance. By the same token, these same clerics had serious reservations about any move to become part of France—a country whose policies seemed to conflict with the proper course a truly devout Catholic, not to mention a Cardinal of the Church, ought to take. True, there were some clerics, like Gaspar Sala, who seemed willing to believe they had been snookered into believing Castile to be the better Christians, but the general course of action the French had taken under de Brézé, and the interregnum of d’Argenson seemed to indicate otherwise.

Despite the drastic manner in which the Franco-Catalan government had ridden roughshod over ecclesiastical privileges during 1642, the proposed Oath to the King proved to be no less of a shock to the Catalan church. Although many Catalan clerics were nominated to their positions by the king, neither bishops, nor abbots, deans, or canons, were never obliged to swear an oath of loyalty to the king upon accension to their office. Rather, it was understood that, as dutiful priests and Christians, they were duty-bound to obey the rightful king of the realm, as an authority established by God.

The fact that now they were asked to violate the spirit of their office—allegiance to the king—and take on themselves an oath they had not before used—and indeed, which seemed to imply that they would simply switch loyalties on whim or the course of war—offended many Catalans. It is significant that many clerics, though favorable to
French intervention in 1640 and 1641, refused to take the oath of allegiance. Many even began to reconsider their positions, turning back towards Castile in their hearts, and later in their pulpits.\textsuperscript{1102}

By the end of 1642, it was clear to a number of clerics in Catalonia that something was wrong. French aid, once eagerly looked for and hailed as a present salvation, now began to take on some disturbing characteristics. The continued insistence on ecclesiastical contributions to the war effort above and beyond the stipulated amounts of the Junta de Batalló concerned some religious figures who began to think that they were being used by the secular government as the goose who laid golden eggs—they would be soaked dry and then discarded. This concern about the rapacity of the secular Franco-Catalan regime grew in strength when considered from a spiritual point of view. The eviction of important religious figures such as abbots, canons, and archdeacons demonstrated a careless disregard for the spiritual welfare of the Catalan people: even more than their predecessors, the French seemed disposed to regard ecclesiastical positions as only so much income which could be redirected into royal coffers with more or less efficiency. The first refusals by the Catalan church to pay for the war effort in 1642 was due to financial exhaustion. Later clerical resistance would be attributed to open discontent with the policies emanating from the Franco-Catalan government in Barcelona.\textsuperscript{1103}

\textsuperscript{1102} It may not be too much of a stretch to compare the Catalan clerical reluctance to swear the Oath in 1643 with the general reluctance on the part of the French religious community to swear the Constitution of the Clergy in 1790. While the former Oath was not as explicit as the latter document in asserting the primacy of temporal concerns over that of the spiritual, the suspicion of the clergy as a subversive “fifth column”—holding allegiance to something greater than the King or the State—does manifest itself in both cases.

\textsuperscript{1103} Candiotti’s last letter of 1642 to Rome indicates that the Catalan clergy were not alone in their growing suspicion that the new Franco-Catalan government was not serving the best interests of the Catalan people.
As greater numbers of Catalan clerics grew wary of the new government’s design, the French in turn became more suspicious of the political attitudes surrounding the religious community. Eventually, this preoccupation with the loyalty of religious figureheads in society grew so great that the French were determined to exile all those who were not explicitly in favor of their rule. Their decision, which aimed at complete security of their position, only backfired upon them with disastrous results. The deliberate eviction of Bishop Manrique over the protests of the entire religious community—including many who had no love to lose for the bishop’s political positions—and the public knowledge that that upright and just Bishop Parcero would soon follow Manrique into exile, increased the suspicion among the Catalan clergy that in throwing off the Castilian yoke of wood, they had replaced it with a yoke of iron.\[1104\]

Almost as significant as Bishop Manrique’s forced exile was the collapse of the Diputació’s power in the eyes of the clergy. Many appeals had been made to Dr. Don Bernat de Cardona, the Diputat Eclesiastic throughout 1641 and 1642, in the hopes that he might be able to modify secular demands regarding the Junta de Batalló, or prevent the eviction of Manrique or Parcero. By the end of 1642, however, it became quite evident to all observers that the Diputació was no more than a figurehead of Catalan government.

\[1104\] “It came to pass last Sunday that the lottery-votes for the five Consellers was held in Barcelona by the Councilman of that city. The outcome was beneficial to the patria and especially to the pro-French faction. However, many were left with the suspicion that the outcome was not left totally to chance.” “Seguí domenica passata la nuova estrattione, solita a farsi per sorte, del Magistrato e Congilgiere di questa Città, e veramente è caduta la sorte in persone di molto avvedimento e benissimo affette alla patria et al partito di Francia, perloche molti non restano senza sospettare che non sia stato totalmente gioco di buona fortuna.” BAV [BT], Barb. Lat. 8535: Candiotti to Francesco Barberini, 3 December 1642, f. 36v.
True power would lie in the office of the viceroy—even more so than in the days of Castile. The only Catalans who would exercise power in the new regime would be those who entertained close patron-client relationships with the French, and who, perhaps, were willing to sacrifice the principles of ecclesiastical liberty in return for political advancement.\textsuperscript{1105} It was this realization that helped spawn clerical resistance against France among those Catalans who had initially supported a break with Spain, if not the unpopular alliance that followed.

The ominous religious situation in Catalonia even began to affect the more secularly-minded Catalans. Despite the presence of Candiotti, the legitimacy of the Catalan concord with France still remained without official papal approval. Even worse, the diminishing number of ranking ecclesiastical officials—abbots, bishops, and even vicar-generals—threatened the stability not only of the church, but of society as well. To whom would the canons and the people of Catalonia turn to when troubled by doubts about the current situation? Who could now speak authoritatively on the subject? It could be either the current ecclesiastical leadership in exile—whose message would be profoundly contrary to French interests—or, worse, each man might turn to his own opinion and social chaos would erupt. Neither option was attractive to the French or their Catalan allies in government.

On 4 November 1642, the Diputació wrote an impassioned letter to Urban VIII, pleading with him to appoint abbots and bishops to their region in place of those who had died or fled the province. In particular, they pointed out to the Pontiff the calamities that

\textsuperscript{1105} Several Catalan clerics joined their secular brethren in allying themselves to the new patrons of power. Among the most notable—or notorious—priests included Gaspar Sala, Bernat de Montpalau, Pau del Rosso, Jaume Pla, Francesc Puig, Jaume Ferran, Don Llorens de Barutell, and most of the chapter of Urgell.
would soon befall their land without the continued presence of guardians of the Faith.¹¹⁰⁶ Yet, as before, Pope Urban remained adamant: despite continuing approval for canons and benefices, he confirmed no bishops at all. The papacy’s response proved to be equally frustrating for the French governors, although for different reasons. They had pinned their hopes that the declining number of bishops to serve the land would force the pope’s hand on episcopal elections, thus providing the final confirmation of their rule over Catalonia.

For the Catalans, however, Rome’s position was a serious trial. Bereft of spiritual leadership, cathedral chapters began turning in on themselves with increasing frequency; the presence of a dedicated pro-French party in every chapter only served to exacerbate matters. With the canons fighting among themselves, beneficed clergy below them also began ignoring their authority. Having sanctioned revolt against an established secular authority, the chapters gradually found themselves unable to assert their own authority against those lower down the ecclesiastical hierarchy. This gradual spiritual impoverishment and chaos would have serious ramifications for the Catalan church as well as Catalan society during the remaining ten years of war.

The political desire for security and justice pursued by innovative and heavy-handed measures—which, in essence, was nothing less than the goals expressed by Philip IV and his minister Olivares—wound up costing the French—as it did the Castilians in 1640—the hearts and minds of the Catalan clergy. Even worse, the simple fact that the clergy enjoyed the privilege of social leaders and were able to interact with more of the common Catalans than their countrymen in the Barcelona bureaucracy, meant that the

¹¹⁰⁶ ACA: Generalitat: N.921: Cartes al Rey i Papa, 1635-1652; Letter from Generalitat to Pope Urban VIII, 4 November 1642, ff. 77-77v.
more the clergy lost faith in the French regime, the more this dissatisfaction would spread throughout the lower orders. This is not to imply that the commoners of Catalonia had no mind or will in the matter, that they were passive instruments to be directed or brainwashed by their parish priest. Rather, the alienation of the clergy from the new Franco-Catalan government indicated that popular resistance or reluctance to obey the regime would be tacitly condoned by their spiritual mentors.

Indeed, as the war progressed, and frustration with France increased on a popular level, one finds few clergymen openly avowing obedience to authority in the pulpit. The very silence of the clergy to speak out against the deteriorating obedience to the Barcelona regime speaks volumes to the effectiveness of the secular polices of 1642. Their innovations in the realm of finances—seen in the Junta de Batalló—and in the realm of justice—seen in the continued imprisonment of clerics in royal jails—achieved a certain end through force, which might have just as easily been accomplished by following the traditional channels of liberty and privilege. The desire to brush over these liberties—to consider them obstacles rather than opportunities—revealed to growing numbers of the Catalan clergy that the French ultimately cared little about the traditional liberties they held dear, certainly no more than Philip IV.1107

1107 It is important to note that accompanying this changing perception of the Franco-Catalan government in Barcelona was a parallel change in the perception of Philip IV. Beginning in early 1643, the King of Spain undertook several changes to his government—exiling the detested Olivares—as well as to his life. This simultaneous shift in perception was at the root of the eventual 180-degree swing in Catalan temperament towards France and Spain.
CONCLUSION

"I doubt not but you have heard long since of the revolt of Catalonia from the K. of Spain; it seems the sparks of those Fires are flown to Portugal, and put that Country also in combustion ... There is no offensive War yet made by Spain against K. John; she only stands upon the defensive part, until the Catalan be reduced: And I believe that will be a long-winded business; for this French Cardinal stirs all the Devils of Hell against Spain, insomuch that most Men say, that these formidable Fires which are now raging in both these Countries, were kindled at first by a Granado hur'd from his Brain: Nay, some will not stick to say, that this Breach 'twixt us and Scotland is a reach of his."

John Howell108

"In view of the fact that all six of these revolutions [Catalonia, Portugal, Naples, England, France, Holland] broke out at the end of the period which is generally known in European history as the century of the Wars of Religion, it is interesting to observe how little the majority of them were affected by differences in church government and creed...(England excepted). In Portugal and in Naples there was no religious issue at all. In Catalonia, as we have already seen, the cause of Rome was most unjustifiably utilized as a war cry by both sides."

Roger Merriman109

Following the enforced Oath to King Louis XIV in January 1643, the Catalan clergy remained active in the war: while many continued their passionate and violent defense of the rights of France over Catalonia, a goodly number began to use their influential positions in society to bring the rest of their flock back to the Habsburg fold. Though the purely spiritual grounds for resistance against Castile had faded, a new ecclesiastical ideal was being forged in the fire: the defense of church privileges and liberties against the encroaching power of the Bourbon state. In this way, the Catalan church became the true heir of the Fontanellas, the Clarises, and the Viladamors. Whereas other secularists had willingly ceded away their traditional liberties and constitutions for the sake of military necessity to the French, the Church stubbornly held on to the one means by which the overwhelming power of the state could be thwarted. From the moment that the French government in Catalonia began to oppress the church

109 Roger Merriman, Six Contemporaneous Revolutions, pp. 90-91.
and violate its time-honored liberties, they also began assaulting the political freedoms of the Catalan laity.

In response to the harsh policies enacted by the Franco-Catalan government in Barcelona—ironically implemented to ensure the security and preservation of the principality—the Catalan clergy began to rise up in revolt against their new temporal masters. In 1644, the Diputat Eclesiàstic, Gaspar Amat, the abbot of Sant Pere Galligans in Girona, who had tirelessly worked to raise money and manpower to fight Castile in 1640 and 1641, was arrested along with several other clerics in Barcelona after the viceroy La Mothe uncovered their plot to overthrow the current regime and return Catalonia to the Habsburg dynasty. Amat’s treason created a great uproar in both the religious and lay communities of the principality because of his position as the foremost cleric in Catalan politics. His defection was all the more ironic since the French officials in Barcelona were suspected of engineering his selection as Diputat and had even bribed him with a higher salary to ensure his loyalty—or so they thought. The abbot, together with his clerical co-conspirators, were incarcerated in the capital and later sent to prisons in France for the duration of the war.

The following year, three canons of Barcelona’s chapter were arrested and deported to Rome for organizing a failed coup against the Franco-Catalan authorities. In 1646, Ramon de Sentmanat, the last remaining bishop in Catalonia, was forcibly exiled, leaving the Catalan church without a visible leader for at least the next six years. Despite the absence of an ecclesiastical head, however, members of the principality’s lower clergy continued to stir up their congregations: by their words and their examples these friars, priests, and monks brought about significant resistance to continued French
dominance in Catalonia and ultimately contributed to the French withdraw from the Principat in 1652-1653.

During the first three years of the Catalan Revolt, religion had been the main factor both in prompting the initial uprisings in the countryside, as well as in sustaining the revolt during Philip IV’s first—and nearly successful—bid to reduce the principality to obedience. It was the burning of the churches, together with the desecration of the Holy Sacrament, that liberated the pent-up political or social tensions and set Catalonia aglow with a passion to defend not only homelands from foreigners, but more significantly, to protect churches from sacrilege. The Catalan revolt, rising from the flames of Riudarenes and Montirò, signified something more than a community reacting to an assault on its privileges and icons, something beyond disagreement over the proper rites and practices of the Church, or the proper role of church-state relations. At the heart of the provincial outcry was a desire to defend their holy preserves from the encroachment of heretical poachers. In the words of Durkheim, it was the Catalans' attempt to protect the domain of the sacred from the hands of those who sought to profane it.1110

By 1643, however, the inspirational force of religion had greatly diminished: following the Oath to the King, it became evident to all that French control over Catalan policy had become too great for clerics who disagreed with the conduct of such policies to reverse. Religion nevertheless continued to play an important role in the developing

1110 “Whether simple or complex, all known religious beliefs display a common feature: They presuppose a classification of the real or ideal things that man conceive of into two classes—two opposite genera—that are widely designated by two distinct terms, which the words profane and sacred translate fairly well. The division of the world into two domains, one containing all that is sacred and the other all that is profane—such is the distinctive trait of religious thought.” Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, 34.
conflict. Clerics who had advocated revolt in 1640 now began to change their tune; risking fines, imprisonment, or other forms of persecution, they boldly denounced the heavy-handed domination of the regional church by the secular authorities. From the Church’s perspective, the Catalan revolt had changed from a fundamentally religious conflict that pitted the faithful devotees of the Sacrament against the sacrilegious forces of Castile to an ecclesiological struggle, where the reigning issue was defining the role of the church in this new Franco-Catalan polity, and what powers the state could, or ought to, exercise over the church.

The Catalan revolt fractured and ultimately failed as a result of their being forced to choose to accept certain policies created by the Franco-Catalan government in Barcelona. As the war progressed, increasing numbers within Catalan society turned away from the revolt under the pressure of these forced choices. These former rebels came to regret bitterly the aid from France as the revolution crumbled before their eyes. The longer the revolt went on, the more factions arose, leading the French and their Catalan allies in power to make choices they could not avoid—and, more importantly, choices that no one foresaw back in early 1641, such as the Oath to the King. Caught between conflicting goals—the military measures needed to defeat Castile and preserve the Catalan revolt on the one hand, or the political measures needed to pacify the already-restless population on the other hand—the Franco-Catalan government gradually found itself facing the unenviable position of an either/or. Furthermore, it was not just France that was applying pressure to the rebel government. The particular strategy of Philip IV beginning in 1643 to offer a full pardon to many of the Catalan rebels, the partial acceptance of the revolt in Rome, and even, for a brief time in 1640 and 1641, the
diplomacy of Zaragoza’s citizenry and viceroy—these events together contributed a great deal to the setting in which the Catalan revolt originated and developed.

While large numbers of the Catalan clergy who turned against Castile in 1640 might have expected to participate in greater liberties for their church by siding with France—on account of the tradition of Gallican liberties and independence—all they managed to acquire was the newest aspects of that tradition. Unlike the older characteristics, which gave a relative ecclesiastical independence from Rome to the French church, the Catalans endured the newest ramification of this policy, which was nothing less than the total unaccountability of the king—or viceroy, or Diputació—to either the church, expressed through the authority of the Pope or of church councils, or to his subjects. This view of the church-state relationship also tended to place the “business” aspects of church administration (i.e. the collecting of rents and tithes) under state control and subordinate to the greater policies of the state.¹¹¹¹ The harsh reality of French conduct towards the Catalan church, standing in great contrast with what the regional clergy might have expected from the land of Gallican liberties, could not but serve as a great disillusionment for the Catalan clergy who had given so much for the cause of revolution.

**Religion in the context of other interpretations**

¹¹¹¹ This view was later defined in the first article of the Declaration of the Clergy in France, written in 1682, stating that St. Peter and his successors, the Bishops of Rome, have dominion over all things spiritual, but not in the civil or temporal realm. Kings are therefore not bound to follow the Church’s teachings in the temporal sphere and furthermore, cannot be deposed by the church, nor their subjects released from their vows of allegiance. I am grateful to Dale Van Kley for bringing this point to my attention.
As noted on page 14 above, traditional interpretations of the Catalan revolt have evolved along two basic lines: political-intellectual and social. The former position has tended to emphasize the long-term causes of the disturbances in Catalonia, noting that tensions between the center and periphery of the Habsburg’s composite monarchy existed as far back as the reigns of Philip II and Philip III. The social perspective, on the other hand, has tended to emphasize the short-term causes of the revolt. While recognizing the context of political tensions, this view nevertheless places the impetus for the 1640 uprising on the immediate problem of quartering and the disturbances that accompanied the winter lodging of foreign soldiers among an impoverished Catalan population. When situated among these two interpretative traditions, the case for religion fits better with the social rather than with the political interpretation. Though the Catalan church had come into conflict with the growing fiscal demands of Philip IV during the 1630s, as late as January 1640, the first estate in Catalonia was still loyal to their rightful king. Although many factors contributed to the outbreak of the Catalan revolt, the most significant one was the defense by a Catholic people of the one Sacrament that defined them and their community. Such a powerful motivation lasted for several years afterwards, serving as a touchstone for the Catalan people in homilies, tracts, pamphlets, and popular rhetoric.

The cause of religion did not replace the feelings of long-standing political discontent or social unrest. Instead the anger raised by the burning of the Sacrament channeled the energies created by these tensions or conflicts, instilling the Catalan people with a power they may not otherwise have possessed, even if the political concerns of the Catalan elite to protect the constitutions, and the vital concerns of Catalan peasants to protect their homes and property from abuse at the hands of foreign soldiers had united.
Before the religious issue appeared in the spring of 1640, these other potential “causes” lacked either the generating or the sustaining power to cast a significant portion of Catalonia into revolt against Philip IV. Following the burning of the churches and the destruction of the Sacrament, however, these past tensions were resurrected and given a new power such that the force stemming from the Catalans amounted to more than the sum of their constituent provocations.

Religion alone supplied the glue that held the Catalan revolt together, long enough to unite a traditionally-fragmented society and to defeat the king’s first offensive to subdue them. During the important first years of the revolt, the clergy of the Principat not only helped cause a fissure between Catalan and Castilian society, but also helped to sustain this rift with their preaching, their writing, their fiscal donations, and in some cases, their lives. Even after the charismatic Claris died in February 1641, the power of religion continued to draw former rivals together in defense of the Catholic Faith while the Catalan clergy continued their vital support for the Catalan war effort. Although it was but one provocation among many, it alone had the staying power to preserve an autonomous Catalonia for a time, long enough for the French to establish a stable government with their Catalan allies and secure the rebels’ borders.

Through the burning of the Sacrament in Riudarenes and Montiró, a bond was formed between previous disparate groups: the rural populace and their clergy; the cathedral chapters and religious orders; and the urban dwellers with their representatives. Together they fought in the early years of the revolt in defense of their religion and their native land. Without the intense religious fervor—fanned rather than diminished by the early defeats of 1640—it is doubtful whether the church burnings would have caused any
significant disturbance, or helped turn a social rebellion into a calculated revolution. While further investigation of clerical conduct and participation during the remaining decade of revolt has yet to be pursued, it cannot be doubted that religion provided the significant component that defined and drove the Catalans' struggle against Castile, a sentiment reflected in the hearts of those who considered their Catholicism, especially their devotion to the Holy Sacrament, to be an integral part of their identity as Catalans.

**Religion in the context of other revolts during the 1640s**

The Catalan revolt did not take place in a vacuum, but in a time of great upheaval. A few years prior to their rupture with Castile, the Catalans would have heard the news of important rebellions in Scotland, Portugal, and Normandy. Though these three revolts were but a year or two in duration—aside from the Scottish revolt which lasted into 1640—they nevertheless had a significant impact on the future domestic policies of England and Ireland, on Castile, and on France, respectively. The unresolved problems stemming from those uprisings would erupt during the 1640s into civil wars of longer durations—at least four years in France, seven years in England, and twenty-six years in Portugal—to say nothing of the nineteen-year war between Catalonia and Castile. Furthermore, all of these disturbances—with the exception of the Fronde—would break out within a year or two of the Catalan revolt. In December 1640, only a few months after the Catalans had murdered their viceroy, the Portuguese threw off the Castilian yoke in similar fashion, murdering not the vicereine Margaret—who happened to be the king’s cousin—but her bitterly detested and despised secretary, Vasconcellos.
In October 1641, Irish Catholics in Ulster and elsewhere turned on their English and Scottish Protestant neighbors, burning many of their settlements and forcing their Protestant inhabitants out into an unusually bitter winter where many perished. Already, as a result of the crisis in Scotland, King Charles I had been forced to summon Parliament in order to finance an army to put down the insurrection. Now, the uprising in Ireland led to a new debate over who should exercise supreme command over the forces needed to suppress this new revolt. This new crisis, coming on top of the Scottish insurrection, the proposed abolition of the episcopacy, and other, long-standing grievances, exacerbated the conflict between Parliament and the king, resulting in the raising of the royal standard at Nottingham in 1642 and the beginning of civil war in England.

The power of a religious element in society to unite with political and social tensions and create revolts appears frequently among the contemporaneous revolts of the 1640s in Western Europe. Historian Theodore Rabb has posited a "crisis of conscience" underlying and affecting social disorders and state breakdowns during the "General Crisis" of early modern Europe; a cursory glance at these insurrections strengthens his argument. The general background to the woes of the Hapsburgs and other monarchs was the Thirty Years' War, the last great religious war in Europe that began with a religious and political uprising among Protestant elements in Bohemia against the Catholic Holy Roman Emperor. In the 1640s, within a few years of the Catalan revolt, England, France, Ireland, and Sweden found themselves in the midst of

1112 The first modern scholar to place the Catalan revolt in context with the other political disturbances affecting Europe during the mid-seventeenth century was Roger Merriman, in his book, Six contemporaneous revolutions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938).
violent social unrest as well. Studies on each of these cases have revealed a significant religious element—be it the support of clerics or of a particular doctrine—which not only served as an important catalyst to the impending social upheaval, but also contributed towards demarcating the identities of the opponents.

In England, the reforms of Archbishop Laud created a wave of anti-episcopal sentiment that swept over both the center and the peripheries of the kingdom, bringing in its wake a militant spirit not found among purely constitutional supporters of Parliament. While those in Parliament sought to preserve the monarchy, only disapproving of Charles's actions, the religious puritanical Anglicans called for an overhaul of the entire church, leading historian John Morrill to conclude: "The English Civil War was not the first European revolution: it was the last of the Wars of Religion."\(^{1113}\)

There is evidence that the Catalan rebels were well aware of recent revolts as early as 1641-1642, when their connections with France brought about a dramatic increase in the publication of relaciones, small pamphlets of around four pages carrying the latest in international news.\(^{1114}\) Portuguese ambassadors and clerics were the first to bring information of their kingdom’s uprising to Barcelona, arriving in person on the same day as the battle of Montjuïc. From the rebel capital, pamphlets detailing the dramatic news were distributed to other major cities in the Principality. In these initial accounts, the Catalans could read of the extraordinary sympathy that the Portuguese had for all that they had suffered. Unfortunately the common cause of Portugal and Catalonia

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1114 For more on the development of the relación during the Catalan revolt, see Henry Ettinghausen, La Guerra dels Segadors a través de la prensa de l'època 4 vols. (Barcelona: Curial, 1993).
came to very little purpose other than the exchange of ambassadors, letters, and relaciones.

Despite encouragement from factions on both sides—as well as from the French—to provide more aid to each other, no substantial aid was sent either from Lisbon to Barcelona or vice versa. By 1644, printed references to the events in Portugal began to decline, and as the Catalans began to suspect the French of compromising the initial cause of their revolt and of using them as pawns in their larger conflict with Castile, concern for others diminished accordingly.\footnote{Another explanation may lie in the fact that fighting between Portugal and Spain—which would continue until 1668—soon died down along the frontier as Philip determined to place a greater priority on settling her conflicts with the Netherlands and Catalonia first.}

The Irish uprising of 1641 is particularly significant in that it was the only other revolt during this tumultuous decade in which religion functioned as the critical glue, holding together various members of a disparate society. Furthermore, it was the only other revolt that was guided from its earliest days by the clergy. Although much of Ulster would come under the authority of Owen Roe O’Neill, the Catholic clergy in Ireland—including the bishops—served, as they would in Catalonia, as the social glue that bound the various rebels together for the critical first years. These clerics not only brought a unifying focus to the widespread rebellion, but also provided a measure of legitimacy to the insurrection and furthermore, as the first governors of the revolt, helped calm the social tempest caused by the violence.\footnote{Interestingly, Pope Innocent X would send a papal nuncio, Giovanni Battista Rinuccini to Ireland in 1645, similar to the appointment of Candiotti to Catalonia three years earlier. Rinuccini was the only nuncio sent to Ireland before 1922, and led the revolt for four years until his departure in February of 1649. Unlike Candiotti in Catalonia, Rinuccini exercised the full authority of a nuncio, most significantly ordaining nine bishops during his tenure in Ireland. The best recent monograph on religion and the Irish revolt is Tadhg Ó hAnnracháin, Catholic Reformation in Ireland, The Mission of Rinuccini, 1645-1649 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).}
News of their fellow Catholics’ rebellion reached Barcelona a few months after the initial outbreak. While no explicit parallels were drawn between the Irish situation and the Catalan revolt from the pertinent “relaciones,” it is evident that the material included in these news reports had significant parallels to the Catalan experience. At the very least, the amount of information concerning the Irish insurrection may reveal a special interest on the part of Catalonia: the Ulster rebels received as much attention as the English Civil Wars, and only the revolution in Portugal would receive more space in the gazettes.

The first news of this Catholic uprising appeared during the first months of 1642, in a gazette entitled *Relacio verdadera dels Successos de Llevant... Y també de Londres, sobre un sollevament quey ha hagut entre Christians, y Inglesos.* While containing accounts of flooding in Naples, the arrival of the Bishop of Lamego as Portugal’s ambassador to Rome, and the growing tension between the bishop and the French ambassador on the one hand, and the Castilian ambassador—and former commander of the royal army in Catalonia—the Marquis de los Vélez on the other hand, the most interesting news came from London. During a session of Parliament, the fiery Mr. Pym addressed the House concerning the rebels in Ireland, “who have made a solemn oath to maintain the Catholic Faith, though it cost them their lives and goods as a result, without compromising their faithfulness in the service of the King of Great Britain.”

The pamphlet then informed the Catalan public that Parliament had resolved, “that they will not tolerate that Religion any more in Ireland,” and had called upon the

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1117 BC: FB 9121: *Relacio verdadera dels Successos de Llevant... Y també de Londres, sobre un sollevament quey ha hagut entre Christians, y Inglesos* (Barcelona: J. Romeu, 1642).
1118 “estos han fet una protestacio solemne de mantenir la Fè Catholica, perdent sos bens, y vidas en la consecucio, sens perjudici de sa fidelitat al servey del Rey de la gran Bretaña,” Ibid, f. 3v.
Protestants in Scotland for help in reducing the Ulster rebels to obedience.\footnote{1119} 

Furthermore, seven Irish clerics had already been captured and imprisoned for their role in fomenting the rebellion. Though the French ambassador asked King Charles that they be pardoned, the people of England demanded the execution of the seven priests, and criminal proceedings opened “against all the Catholics, and that Bishops and Catholic Lords be dispossessed of their houses and positions.”\footnote{1120} 

Perhaps the most intriguing document for the seventeenth-century Catalans, however was found in a gazette published around May 1642, succinctly entitled, \textit{Extraordinary News Come from Paris, from the 30\textsuperscript{th} of April ... which tells of the Laws newly created and established by the Catholics in Ireland who have become mixed with the insurgents, and the form of Oath they made and swore to the King of Great Britain against the said insurgents and their league.}\footnote{1121} Much of the issue is taken up with the progress of the revolt in Ireland, in particular with the formation of the Catholic Confederation, an attempt by Irish Catholic lords and clergy to distance themselves from the intense violence of the previous autumn and winter. Like the Catalan revolt, the rebels in Ireland believed that their resistance was justified to ensure the continued

\footnote{1119} “que no volian tolerar la Religio mes en Irlanda, y renovaren, y reduiren la resta de las altras demandas.” Ibid, f. 3v. 
\footnote{1120} “En procesuio de lo qual fou representat al dit Parlament, que lo Embaxador de França demanava al Rey...lo però pera los 7 Eclesiastichs condemnats... Lo altre día demanà lo Poble que fossan executadas las morts dels set presos, y ques proseguís contra tots los Catholichs, y que Bises, y Milords Catholichs fossan despossehits de haziendas, y dignitats.” Ibid, f. 4. 
\footnote{1121} AHCB: B.1642-8-(op)-24 Novas Extraordinarias, Vingudas de Paris, de Tretze de Abril (1642)...en las quals se dona avis de las Lleys novament feitas,y establertas ab los Catholichs de Irlanda ques eren mesclat ab los sollevats,y la forma del Iurament que feren, y prestaren en mans del Rey de la gran Bretanya, contra los dits sollevats,y de llur lliga: y la presa de Coblliure...Impressas en Llondres en llengua Francesa, y traduydes en nostra vulgar llengua Cathalana (J. Mathevat 1642). The particular news of the Irish Catholics was first printed in London—in French—and translated again into Catalan when it reached Barcelona.
practice of their Catholicism while, at the same time, they sincerely believed that such actions did not make them rebels but rather the true servants of Charles I.

Although Catalonia and Ireland stand out as the two most notable revolts in the 1640s that began as religiously inspired revolts, there were several differences between them. First, there was the open manner with which the Irish accepted those whose religious principles had been suspect. Unlike the Catalan revolt, which led to the quick expulsion of any Catholics who were not Catalan, the leaders of the Catholic Confederation were willing to receive any professing Catholic regardless of his origins, or even of his past beliefs. One of the new laws passed by the Confederation insisted that any former Protestant, so long as he or she was reconciled to the Catholic faith and was persevering in its teachings, was free from personal harm and confiscation of land.1122

A second contrast between Catalonia and Ireland concerned the initial choice of government the rebels determined. Catalan leadership, looking to their principality’s strong political tradition that portrayed the king as merely the first among equals, sought to create an independent republic. When it became apparent that the rebels could not preserve their own security without calling upon foreign aid, leaders such as Claris, Tamarit, and Fontanella bowed to the political and military realities and signed over Catalonia as an autonomous principality under French protection. Although the French government would come to exercise far more power over the region than its technically autonomous status would imply, the vision of a Catalan republic, modeled after Venice, continued to survive.

1122 “Que si algun home, o dona, que haja fet profecio de la Religio protestant, y se reconcile a la Santa Iglesia Romana, tant quant preserverá en ella, que no se li fasque dany algu, ni en sa persona, ni bens,” Ibid, f. 2.
The Irish Catholics of the Confederation, on the other hand, considered the form of a republic something to be shunned, and were quite eager to swear their allegiance to a king. The pamphlet articulated their reasoning for such a decision, a reasoning for which the rebel Catalans could readily provide evidence: “Since Republics have no head, they realized it would be difficult to rule and govern with the petty division among themselves: some would usurp their powers of jurisdiction, some would steal land from others. So they determined to elect the king of England to be their king.”

Although the Europeans of that day believed the republic to be a less stable form of government lacking the ballast of a monarchy—only Venice and Switzerland could be cited as successful republics since the days of Rome—and furthermore lacking the tradition of a monarchy, it is nonetheless quite arresting that such a phrase would appear in publication distributed among a Catalan population that had favored republicanism instead of the rule-by-king or viceroy. Given the historical circumstances at that time—the early murmurings of the Catalan church against a heavy-handed French rule—Franco-Catalan officials in Paris and Barcelona may have hoped that the evidence of fellow Catholics freely choosing to reject republican government—and even home rule—and instead, embracing service to a distant king, would serve to counteract any expression of discontent. An even greater coincidence appears in the pamphlet describing why the Irish chose to be faithful to Charles. It appears that the Catholics appealed to historical precedent, mentioning that in centuries gone by the Irish under the

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1123 “Pero com las Republicas sens cap sia dificultos poderse regir, y governar tenian a menut discensions entre ellas, usurpantse allí las unas la jurisdiccio, y terras de las altres, determinaren de anomenar son rey, al de Inglaterra,” Ibid, f.1v.

1124 On the other hand, the news did come as a French translation, ostensibly from other sources, and Cardinal Mazarin did send help to the Catholic rebels in Ireland during the revolt.
famous O’Neal had sworn fealty to the English kings, in much the same manner as the early Catalan princes had become vassals of Charlemagne.\textsuperscript{1125}

While the Catalan and Irish revolts provide the clearest examples of the importance of religious causes in fomenting rebellion, sustaining rebellion, and in providing insurrectionists with a fundamental identity, there is evidence to suggest that clergy of both Protestant and Catholic confessions and religion may have played a greater part in the other contemporaneous revolts of the 1640s as well. Although a full comparative study between the religious elements in the Catalan revolt and these other contemporaneous revolts stands in need of further study, some work is already being done. One scholar who has already touched on this subject is John Morrill in his research on the English Civil War.

Across the Channel, the French also experienced significant social unrest led by religious leaders only a few years later during the Fronde. Following closely upon the defeat of Condé and the consequent reconciliation between the princes of the realm and Cardinal Mazarin in 1650, the young Louis XIV faced a revolt by the parish priests of Paris, who rose up against him in what became known as the "Curés' Fronde."\textsuperscript{1126} Proponents of church reforms that would limit the growth of royal Gallicanism,\textsuperscript{1127} these clerics sought an ecclesiastical independence from the control of the state in order to achieve these ends, a position that necessarily allied them with Rome as well as with discontented elements still present in France. Despite the arrest of their leader Gondi, the

\textsuperscript{1125}Ibid, f.1v.
\textsuperscript{1127}Gallicanism was a set of liberties enjoyed by the king of France that emanated from the belief that the monarch enjoyed an independent relationship with the divine. Thus, he was liable not to the church, nor the people, but to God alone. In addition to the aura of sacrality that surrounded him, the king was granted a set of liberties by the pope that placed the church under the oversight of the crown.
archbishop of Paris, in 1652, the curés in the capital continued to defy the king and his minister, Mazarin, meeting independently for a number of years in diocesan synods. By 1650, similar religious and political disturbances had also swept through Northern Europe. In the Netherlands, the religious and political situation had been in a state of flux since the beginning of the seventeenth century. Religiously, the seaward core of the United Provinces, especially Holland, leaned towards Remonstrantism, or Arminianism, while the landward provinces and the Stadholder were staunch Calvinists. This see-saw of influence and the intricate ties that bound religion and politics was seen most clearly in 1618-19 when Maurice of Nassau, prince of Orange, purged the province of Holland of its municipal councils that were hostile to him. The collapse of this political opposition also paved the way for the Synod of Dordrecht (or Dordt) to convene, which established a rigorous Calvinism as the religion of the United Provinces.

While peace had brought an end to nearly eighty years of war with Castile, the people of the Netherlands were still left in a period of turmoil. Tensions arose as early as 1648, following the willingness on the part of Holland to come to terms with Catholic Spain in the Peace of Münster, a conciliatory attitude to which the hard-line Calvinists mightily objected. These orthodox Calvinists, already upset with Holland’s internal tolerance of Catholics and other Protestants, added a significant religious component to an already-present economic quarrel between the provinces.

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1128 These meetings were held under the auspices of Gondi’s vicaires généraux who stayed in Paris during his time of imprisonment, and later when Gondi escaped and fled to Rome, from 1654-1662. Golden, *Godly Rebellion*, 10-11.

1129 Adding to this Calvinist opposition to the supremacy of Holland was their frustrated attempt to “re-convert,” or in some cases, “re-re-convert” the Catholic populations of the southern Generality Lands.
Open conflict in the Netherlands broke out the following year, when the Stadtholder, William II, and the province of Holland could not resolve their dispute over the size of the army. In an attempt to stabilize his authority over the United Provinces, the Stadtholder sought allies among the strict Calvinist Predikanten, much as his uncle Maurice had done a generation earlier. Part of William’s express aims—in addition to his political goal of reasserting his authority over the provinces—was to remove the Arminian preachers in Amsterdam and replace them with more orthodox Calvinist ministers. The Predikanten were only too willing to help the William’s cause, fearing that a victory by Holland would enable the “sovereignty” of a single province to overthrow the church policy that had been laid out at the Synod of Dordtrecht and give the temporal authority an unjustified control over spiritual affairs. William II's death before the besieged city of Amsterdam in 1650 signaled only a temporary resolution to the tensions that lay between the royal house of Orange and members of the Estates of Holland.  

While religion was playing a role in the developing political crisis of the Netherlands, a similar predicament arose in Sweden—aside from France, the most powerful country in Europe to emerge after the Thirty Years' War—where the growing rift between Queen Christina and the Swedish Riksdag or parliament was becoming more pronounced. The queen's sympathy with the Roman Catholic faith, in strong contrast to her subjects' devout Lutheranism, created severe difficulties in the land, which

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1131 "with the exception of Christina, all Swedish sovereigns from 1611-1718 had a deeply ingrained piety...[and] a healthy respect for the spiritual authority of the clergy." Michael Roberts, "The Swedish
intensified when she received Jesuit confessors in her palace at Stockholm. In 1654, Christina's decision to convert to Catholicism resulted in her forced abdication.

Morrill notes the intense factionalism present in English political debates since the 1620s but observes that such political background provides a necessary but not sufficient explanation for the sudden collapse of relations into civil war.\(^{1132}\) He then identifies three distinct factors present in English society by 1642 that created an implacable hostility towards Charles, factors that, coincidentally, parallel Catalan historiography on the Revolt of the Segadors: local opposition, constitutional opposition, and religious opposition. Morrill contends that, “the localist and the legal-constitutionalist perception of misgovernment lacked the momentum, the passion, to bring about the kind of civil war which England experienced after 1642. It was the force of religion that drove minorities to fight, and forced majorities to make reluctant choices.”\(^{1133}\) While the exact parallels between England and Catalonia break down in the details—naturally, each revolt was shaped by different circumstances and led by different individuals—Morrill continues to stress the importance of religious tensions and conflicts that erupted in England, Scotland, and Ireland as a result of the particular policies of Charles and Archbishop Laud.\(^{1134}\)

One cannot see the revolt of the Catalans as anything but a revolt for religion; aside from the many counter-revolutions that followed in the wake of the Vendée revolt during the French Revolution, it may mark the last revolt for religion in Western

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\(^{1132}\) John Morrill, “Religious Context of the English Civil War,” 156.  
\(^{1134}\) He writes, “I believe it is almost impossible to overestimate the damage caused by the Laudians … [as a result of whose policies, Puritans] saw James I and even more Charles I as abdicating their responsibilities under God to promote true religion.” Ibid, 162.
Europe. Although the other contemporaneous revolts of the 1640s varied in the extent to which religion served as a fundamental impetus to rebel, they all presented the fusion of religious motivation with political determination in inspiring resistance and revolution against the established authority—monarchy. While most of these revolts failed, the religious imagery and symbolism used helped to shape—however temporarily—the identity of the rebels continued.

In England this religious source for identity would extend beyond Cromwell’s Commonwealth, as a proto-republican ideology that has come to be known as the Commonwealth-man strain of political thought. In contrast, the religious aspect of Netherlands revolt, though present, was not very significant, and in France, the effect of an alternative Catholic political tradition to the rising tide of absolutist ideology was just beginning. By the eighteenth century, however, Jansenist beliefs would find common cause with the political ideas coming out of the parlement of Paris, creating a powerful political-religious alliance that affected extraordinary results during the French Revolution.

The issues raised by the Catalan revolt—the extent to which a society can be stirred by religious principles, and the relationship between secular and religious institutions—remain vitally important to our present day, characterized both by shades of an extreme religious militarism as well as growing grass-roots conviction of the

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1135 While the revolt in the Vendée is the most well-known of these revolts, the “totalitarian” or “holistic” nature of the French Revolution sparked off numerous revolts in which religion played a critical role. These include a revolt in Belgium in 1787, and again in 1798, Tuscany in 1787, and Spain in 1808.

1136 I am grateful to Dale Van Kley for bringing the ramifications of the Dutch and French situations to my attention. For the ways in which Jansenism and parlementary traditions played out during the eighteenth century, see his Religious Origins of the French Revolution (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996).
importance of religion in the policies of their governments.\textsuperscript{1137} To those who would assert the necessity of a “naked public square” in order to ensure the safety of modern democracy, one can point back to the Catalan revolt—and others in the early modern world—to illuminate an important lesson.\textsuperscript{1138} A society without religious liberty cannot take its own political liberty for granted, or as one seventeenth-century writer put it, “religion and liberty stand and fall together.”\textsuperscript{1139} Given the intoxicating desire for power, and the wealth of good intentions which affect persons in authority, our modern society, much more than the early-modern world of the seventeenth century, stands in need of institutions that will stand in the gap to oppose the sway of government into territory over which it has no legitimate authority.

For over a millennium, the Church fulfilled that vital role, even at times going so far as to encourage and defend armed resistance against tyranny. In the haste to condemn the actions of radical Islamists, we stand the risk of fearing and hating all those who express any sincere religious belief, without recognizing the amazing benefits organized religious principles can have on democracy. This, indeed, may be the most important lesson one can learn from the War of the Segadors: the extraordinary link between

\textsuperscript{1137} Outside of the obvious example of the United States, many persons in Northern Ireland continue to act and think as if the crisis of 1641 has not passed—although the marches on 12 July celebrate the events of 1690, many of the banners in those marches commemorate the acts of 1641. I am grateful to Geoffrey Parker for pointing out the continuity of these early-modern conflicts in the present day.

\textsuperscript{1138} One should note that there are alternatives to either a “naked public square,” and a public square filled with religious symbols, particularly when discussing the pluralistic societies of the present day. One vein of thought might argue that religion ought still be able to have a voice in the public square; though political ideas might have their origins in religious principles, they ought to be expressed in a language common with other citizens. The presence of religious symbols in the public square may or may not be necessary to the continuance of religious liberty in society.

\textsuperscript{1139} Geoffrey Parker, \textit{Europe in Crisis, 1598-1648}, 2d ed. (Oxford, Blackwell, 2001), xvii. European Protestants during the 1640s were well aware of the strong connection between political and religious liberty; indeed the earliest interpretations of the Thirty Years’ War, some published even before the Treaty of Westphalia, emphasized this association to their audiences throughout the continent. See Geoffrey Parker, ed. \textit{The Thirty Years’ War}, 2d ed. (London: Routledge, 1997), xii-xiii.
religious and political liberties. Only when these disparate freedoms are sustained through the veins and arteries of tradition can society remain healthy and flourish. Deprived of this essential spiritual nourishment—especially when tradition is mocked or forgotten—the human community will begin to wither and die.
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