THE AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENT AND
THE AMERICAN METHODIST CHURCH:
1912 - 1920

A Thesis
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree Master of Arts

by
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Approved by

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Religion has played an important part in the development of American history. It has been a force that has shaped attitudes and motivated actions—thus, shaping American history. This study examines the influence of religion in the period, 1912-1920, regarding neutrality and eventual involvement in World War I, and the shaping of a peace after the war. Since Protestantism was the major "religion" of the United States and the American Methodist Church was the largest Protestant denomination, numbering 7,782,048 members in 1918, this study focuses on this organization.\(^1\) In this era when issues of war and peace were central concerns, a look into the American Peace Movement cannot be ignored. Thus, this study will focus on the relationship between the Peace Movement and the American Methodist Church. An examination of how the Methodist Church mirrored the Peace Movement's attitudes and actions during this period—and how they did not—can provide a key in understanding the role of religion in American history.

This study will attempt to answer some of the following questions: What factions of the Peace Movement did the Methodist Church mirror? What were the Church's and the Peace Movement's attitude toward maintaining world peace? Did either group effectively influence American Foreign policy?
in any way? How effective were either group in helping to shape the attitudes of world views of its members regarding war and peace? How influential can a religious group be toward shaping attitudes and policy if it chooses to do so?

In this study, the term, American Peace Movement, will mean any organized attempt to influence attitudes of both the American people and their leaders toward achieving and maintaining peace. Thus, this is an umbrella term which includes such diverse groups and people as Andrew Carnegie's Endowment for International Peace and Jane Addams' Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. The information on the Peace Movement was gleaned from secondary literature.

The information on the American Methodist Church has been acquired mainly through original sources. One important source was the New York Christian Advocate for the years 1912 through 1920. Many Conferences printed Advocates but the New York issue was generally recognized as the national voice of the Northern Church. The New York Christian Advocate was simply called, The Christian Advocate, while the other Advocates included the place of publication in their title such as The Nashville Christian Advocate. The Christian Advocate was a weekly publication written for both ministers and laity. In this sense, it can be considered a popular source. Another source used in this research was the Methodist Review. The Review was a monthly periodical of
the Northern church written on a more intellectual and theological level. The *Review* was probably meant more for the ministers than for the laity.

Yet another set of sources used in this research comes from General and Annual Conferences. A General Conference in the Methodist Church was that Church’s highest authority. It met quadrennially in May and published during this period of meeting, a report of its proceedings in the office Journal of the Conference and a day by day coverage of its meetings in the *Daily Christian Advocate*. The present study focuses on the General Conference held between the years 1912 and 1920. In form, the General Conference was a sort of Congress for the entire church, being made up of delegates from its various subdivisions and presided over by the Bishops, who in turn were permanently elected by the General Conference. After 1872 lay members were permitted to attend as delegates along with the clergy. The conference operated through committees, some of which were standing and others merely *ad hoc*, to consider special problems. The reports of some of these committees contained significant material for this study.

Each Conference was generally opened by the "Episcopal Address" to which all the Bishops agreed and signed their names. On occasion, these addresses contained important points of view which were accepted by the General Conference. Since the Bishops were also the highest individual supervisory
agents of the denomination, their individual expressions of opinion have been accepted as representing the attitude of the church. At each General Conference, editors for the Advocates and the Methodist Review were elected, thus further enhancing the importance of viewing these publications as important expressions of Methodist attitudes.

Below the level of the General Conference were smaller divisions known as Annual Conferences. These varied somewhat in size and membership, and changed in number and geographical territory as the population of the country increased and the membership of the church grew. These Conferences met once a year, usually in the spring or fall, and passed resolutions, adopted committee reports, and expressed the point of view of their constituents on religious and secular matters. The Annual Conferences consisted totally of clergy with a Bishop presiding. During the period being studied, Laymen had a separate conference which occurred simultaneously with the Annual Conferences. These lay conferences were advisory, having very little influence. A survey of the proceedings and conclusions of the Annual Conferences can be significant in reflecting attitudes within the Church; and thus for this research Annual Conferences from various sections of Ohio and Pennsylvania were studied.

In examining the Paris Peace Conference and Methodist participation in it, the personal correspondence of Bishop James Cannon, Jr., of the Methodist Church, South, and
H.B. Carré of Vanderbilt University, proved helpful. These letters described Cannon's and Carré's attempt in behalf of the Anti-Saloon League to fight for World Prohibition at the peace table. They are an example of prominent individuals' actions and attitudes trying to shape the postwar world.

Secondary sources were also used in researching the American Methodist Church. These were, for the most part, general histories of American Methodism. They proved helpful in providing background information on Methodist doctrine, structure, and history. Thus, all of these sources made possible the examination of a sampling of national, regional, and local views within the Methodist church on the issues of war and peace.

In order to better understand the period being studied, Chapter II will examine the roots of both the American Peace Movement and the American Methodist Church. It will trace these roots through the nineteenth and twentieth century up to the outbreak of World War I. Hopefully this background will provide understanding of themes, goals, and solutions formulated by both groups during this time. With this knowledge, the attitudes and actions of both the American Peace Movement and the American Methodist Church during the war and immediately after—as detailed in Chapters 3 and 4—can be more clearly illustrated.
CHAPTER II: THE AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENT AND
THE AMERICAN METHODIST CHURCH
1815 - 1914

Partly as a reaction to the War of 1812, the first non-
sectarian and organized peace movements were formed in the
United States. David Low Dodge, a well-to-do Connecticut
merchant, and forty of his friends organized the first
movement in New York in August of 1814. The New York Peace
Society, as it was called, took a nonresistant stance against
all types of warfare, both offensive and defensive.3

Unknown to the New York group, Noah Worcester, a Unitarian
minister of Brighton, Massachusetts, was also in the process
of forming a peace organization. In December, 1815, the
Massachusetts Peace Society was founded by Worcester and about
sixty friends. Like Dodge, Worcester argued against war and
presented the idea of a world court or league of nations to
work out any problems between nations. But Worcester avoided
the issue of defensive war for fear of losing support among
some of his followers. Christian principles motivated Dodge
and Worcester to condemn war. Simultaneous with the founding
of the New York and Massachusetts peace societies, societies
also began in Ohio and Rhode Island.

These separate peace societies were part of the early
nineteenth century humanitarian reform movements. They
included such interests as prison reform, the abolition of slavery, temperance, restraints on capital punishment, and peace. Thus, these new nonsectarian peace organizations grew out of both religious and humanitarian roots.

These new peace societies remained decentralized and, for the most part, ineffective until May 8, 1828, when William Ladd organized the American Peace Society in New York. The Society stated its objective as the education of people regarding the evils of war and the search for the best means of abolishing it. Most of the local peace societies became auxiliaries of the new national organization, though some remained independent.

The new organization was not really national in character for its field of operations was mainly confined to New England and Pennsylvania. In these sections of the country sympathy for the Society came especially from the congregational, Baptist, and Methodist denominations.

Under the leadership and inspiration of William Ladd, the American Peace Society promoted the idea of a Congress and Court of Nations. In 1840 Ladd published, with the approval of the American Peace Society, an Essay of a Congress of Nations. In this essay Ladd described a Congress of Ambassadors who would deal with the diplomacy of international affairs and a Court of Nations who would deal with international judicial concerns.
The American Peace Society, throughout the pre-Civil War years, sent endless petitions to Congress regarding the use of force in various crises and situations. Most of these petitions were received with either lukewarm lip-service of sympathy or apathy. The majority of the American people were apathetic to the cause of peace during the first half of the nineteenth century.

American peace reformers had a sense that they were part of an international movement. They encouraged and communicated with various European peace societies, especially the London Peace Society.

During these pre-war years the American Peace Society experienced controversy and dissension within its ranks. The controversy centered around the Society's attitude toward defensive war. After much discussion, Ladd finally arrived at a position that viewed all war as anti-Christian; therefore, even defensive war was unacceptable. Mainly as a result of Ladd's influence, the American Peace Society came out in 1837 against the concept of defensive war. With this announcement, some members left the Society. 5

The organization did not condemn private self-defense and capital punishment. This neglect caused further ruptures in the ranks of peace, as more liberal reformers such as William Lloyd Garrison and his New England Non-resistance Society left the American Peace Society in frustration over its too moderate stance.
While the American Peace Society catered at times to the elitist factions of society, a man by the name of Elihu Burritt was founding the League of Universal Brotherhood in 1847 in order to carry the peace message to the masses. Though Burritt expanded phenomenal energy for peace both in England and in the United States, the League lived a short life and by 1855 was practically defunct (in the United States).

From the mid-1820s to the outbreak of the Civil War, the peace movement was tested almost constantly by wars and rumors of war. To these crises the movement, for the most part, gave a weak response. They did protest, making speeches and lobbying in Congress. But their protests fell on the deaf ears of an apathetic public. The American Peace Society was not always as active as other groups in attempting to deal with these crises partly because its moderate secretary, George C. Reckwith, believed that the goal of the Society was to spread Christian principles, not to meet political emergencies.

One of these tests was the Mexican-American War. Despite protests from the peace movement, the war was relatively popular among the American public. Though peace movement protests did not stop the war, they did help to contain the violence.

The pre-Civil War period also saw the initiation of international peace conferences: London in 1842, Brussels
in 1848, Paris in 1849, Frankfort in 1850, and London in 1851. These conferences supported and publicized such ideas as arbitration and a Congress/Court of Nations. The American peace movement often played an integral role at these conferences. Elihu Burritt was one peace leader who helped to organize these conferences.

An important concept that grew out of this period was that of stipulated arbitration: a definite pledge by a nation to arbitrate without exception all future disputes. William Jay, the President of the American Peace Society, popularized this idea between 1842 and 1854. The American Peace Society sent petitions and resolutions to Congress. But the South and West were against the idea, so the petitions failed.

This opposition revealed the sectional character of the peace movement. Most of the peace movement's strength, in terms of the number of organizations and members, lay in the northeast. By 1850 New England was saturated with peace organizations. The West, especially, seemed like fertile soil for peace ideas. Yet, the West's response to peace, for the most part, was apathy. The issue of slavery claimed the mind of most Westerners, especially those living in or near Kansas. The West was still anti-British and the close cooperation between the London Peace Society and the American Peace Movement did not please many Westerners. The
South was either apathetic or hostile to the peace movement. Many Southerners equated the abolition movement with the peace organization. Thus, they had nothing to do with it.

The American Peace Movement, for the most part, did not respond to the threat of civil war. The American Peace Society dodged the issue of slavery. Beech with maintained that civil war was not within the sphere of the Society. He pointed out that the American Peace Society existed only to oppose international war. One exception to this lack of response came from Elihu Burritt, who, after 1856, put all his energy into a campaign for compensated emancipation.7

Many friends of peace were against slavery and gradually came to the conclusion that war might be the only thing that would eradicate slavery. On May 27, 1861, at its annual meeting, the American Peace Society declared its loyalty to the cause of the Union. The Society looked at the Civil War as a gigantic rebellion to be suppressed by the police power of the government. Many members viewed the horrible conflict as God's way of freeing the slaves.

The American Peace Society's treasurer, Joshua P. Blanchard, disagreed with the organization's position. Throughout the war he rebuked the Society for its bewildering infidelity to its principles. A minority of voices joined his but they carried little influence.

During this pre-war period neither the Society of Friends nor the other Peace Churches were members of the
American Peace Movement in any great numbers. But when war came, many of them were against the war. Partly due to President Lincoln's sympathy for their views, exemption legislation was passed. Southern Friends did not fare as well as their Northern associates. Due to the South's seriously depleted manpower, many Southern Friends were mistreated in their attempt to follow their consciences.

Between the founding of the first American peace societies in 1828 and the Civil War, the American Peace Movement grew to a national organization and the floundered and split over such issues as defensive war and the abolishment of slavery. By 1865 the American Peace Movement was fragmented, weak, but still in existence.

After 1865 this fragmented movement began slowly to regroup its organizations and activity. The traditional base for the movement, which included sectarian pacifists, radical pacifists, and New England reformers, still existed. Many peace movement members felt that old methods, applied on a larger scale than before, would still work. They wanted to work for arbitration treaties, a world Congress, and a Court of Nations, and the reduction of armaments. Some peace seekers sought new methods. This group desired to probe the world and remove the very roots of war. They attacked the legacy of North-South bitterness left by the Civil War.
Out of this regrouping that occurred between 1865 and 1911, there emerged a new breed of peace seeker. This group progressively responded to the tensions and opportunities of America's rise to world power by joining European activists in pressing for an international system of peacekeeping machinery. This group, unfortunately, cared more about the Anglo-Saxon race than about mankind. They were more concerned about achieving world order than about following the Christian and humanitarian principles expressed by the founders of the peace movement. These new peace seekers saw peace less as a means of social salvation than as a self-conscious effort in Great Power, especially Anglo-American, cooperation. This group promoted specific proposals rather than a general vision or goal.

Included among these 'cosmopolitan' peace reformers were a small but potent body of lawyers and businessmen. This group pressed government to humanized war by establishing judicial and arbitral means of settling disputes. Because of increasing industrial interdependence across nations, they also proposed to regulate on an international basis certain functions such as the postal system. These cosmopolitan peace reformers often centered in north-eastern cities in the U.S., tended to collaborate with like-minded European peace seekers.

One of the concerns of these cosmopolitan peace reformers was the codification of international law and the
regularization of arbitration procedures. In 1866 prominent law reformer, David Dudley Field, called for an international committee of jurists to develop a revised and updated code of law for the consideration of major governments. In 1872, as a result of this committee, Field published the Draft Outline of an International Code.

Meanwhile the American Peace Society continued to exist during this post-war re-grouping phase. It persisted in its attempts to interest preachers and other opinion shapers in the traditional ideas of the congress of nations, an international court, and the creation of a permanent arbitration system. During the 1870s the Society slipped in funds, membership, and relevance. This was due in part to the death of its leaders during those years and to the depression of the mid-1870s. Gradually, from this low point, the Society began to recover.9

This recovery was helped along by the spirit of new leadership. A new generation of intellectuals, reformers, businessmen, and professional people replaced old leaders. Though often cosmopolitan in style, this leadership changed the orientation of the American Peace Society very little from its pre-war stance. Robert Treat Paine, a Brahmin reformer, and Benjamin Trueblood, a Quaker educator, recharged the American Peace Society, which was still the largest peace organization in the United States.
American Peace Society leaders supported Field's call
for an International Code and Arbitration Congress. Through
this Congress and the support of other organizations such
as the International Law Association, the American Peace
Society became a part of the international law reform
movement.

Out of the reorganization of peace societies at the
dead of the Civil War grew the Universal Peace Union. The
Peace Union was founded in 1866 for the purpose of abolishing
war. This group began as a reaction against the compromising
tactics which the American Peace Society had adopted during
the civil War. Their attitude was based on the principles
of Garrisonian nonresistance. The members believed in
striving to live the Christian ethic of love and nonviolence.
They preached universal brotherhood, immediate disarmament,
the outlawry of war, and the need for international treaties.
They also denounced imperialism. 10

These ideas were personified in the Peace Union's First
president, Alfred Love. Love, a Quaker and successful
Philadelphia woolen merchant, had refused both lucrative
government contracts and military service during the Civil
War. As president of the Universal Peace Union, he took the
lead in linking the American anti-war movement with the new
one emerging in Europe, especially in France and England.
under Love's direction the Union supported several related
reforms, such as improved Indian relations and women's rights. Love led the Union along this idealistic path until his death in 1913.

Despite its high-sounding goals, the Universal Peace Union failed to expand beyond approximately 300 members—mostly progressive in Quakers, Shakers, and Garrisonians. It was never able to raise its annual budget above $1,000. The organisation seemed out of step with the style of the cosmopolitan peace movement.

During these postwar years the Historic Peace Churches did not emerge as assertive leaders of the new peace movement. Despite the Russian-German Hutterite influx to the Great Plains during the 1870s, the sectarian witness to peace was softening. Brethren, Mennonites, and other religious nonresisters persisted in their inward-looking ways in the postwar period, while the Quaker peace vision grew blurred.11

In 1867 a group of midwestern Quakers formed the Peace Association of Friends in North America in an attempt to strengthen and even spread the sect's peace testimony. This group lent support to the American Peace Society. It especially tried to proselytize ministers of the Gospel in the hope that they would expound Christ's teachings of brotherhood and nonviolence to their congregations.

Yet, despite the formation of the Peace Association of Friends, the Quaker's distinctive peace commitment diminished in postwar America. The very absence of wartime government
pressure loosened the communal bonds of the Society and eased sectarian demands upon the younger members. The very success in their missionary activity in the West won to the group new members who valued the experimental Inner Light but ignored the testimony of nonresistance. Distracted and divided, the Friends failed to concentrate their full strength behind organized pacifism in the last part of the nineteenth century. Yet they still contributed, in people like Alfred Love and Benjamin Trueblood, a disproportionately large number of leaders to the advancing peace reform.

Nationalism, and with it the rising tide of navalism and imperialistic fervor, menaced the peace movement's attempts to arouse an American public for peace. The spirit of nationalism gave many Americans great faith in their nation. They began to believe that peace would only come if the rest of the world accepted American standards and values. After 1870, the American newspapers were generally unsympathetic to the cause of peace. The United States was involved in realizing its place in the world; and the voice of the American peace movement often fell on deaf ears.

Yet these peace seekers occasionally were able to make an impact on political goals. For example, in January of 1890 Senator John Sherman of Ohio (chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) succeeded after much effort in getting an identical concurrent resolution endorsing the principle of international arbitration passed in both
Houses. This verbal support lent some prestige to those peace groups who supported arbitration.

During the late nineteenth century, American peace societies kept in contact with those in Europe. In 1899, the WCTU (Peace Department of the Women's Christian Temperance Union), the American Peace Society, and the Universal Peace Union sent representatives to Paris for a Universal Peace Congress. Though the Congress had no specific program, it did mark the beginning in a series of European meetings. This series demonstrated the expanding power of the international peace reform movement.¹²

As stated earlier, this cosmopolitan nature of the movement was practical. It was also filled with racial Anglo-Saxonism and reasoned Christian optimism. Encouraged by businessmen such as Andrew Carnegie, cosmopolitan peace reformers worked to promote specific proposals such as an Anglo-American arbitration agreement, rather than to attack the wickedness of war. This movement commanded the respect and attention of practical people. Its members were distinguished by their commitment to the triumph of peace through the domestic global extension of Anglo-American supremacy. They felt as though they were riding the wave of the future.¹³

The fascination felt by cosmopolitan reformers for the entwined ideals of arbitration and Anglo-Saxonism gradually drew the mainstream peace movement away from any involvement with nonresistant and socially concerned pacifism. Most of
the American peace organizations, at the end of the nineteenth century, viewed international arbitration as the panacea for the creation of a warless world. Out of this interest grew the annual arbitration conferences held at Lake Mohonk in the Catskill mountains of New York state. These conferences were inaugurated by Albert Smiley, a Quaker philanthropist. Smiley selected his own guests for these conferences, thus giving an elitist character to his meetings. Along with the promotion of the idea of arbitration, these conferences popularized the idea of a permanent international court and lent a glow of respectability and prestige to the peace movement itself.

While the American peace movement was reinvigorating itself, the crisis in Cuba was erupting into the Spanish-American War. The Universal Peace Union, under the leadership of Alfred Love, vigorously protested both the coming of the war and the war itself. The Union worked incessantly for peace from the first days of the crisis. Love sent petitions to Spain, requesting concessions that would help to preserve the peace. The Union, despite its vigorous activity, was unable to influence events. Instead, their actions often backfired. As a protest to their actions, the Union was thrown out of its headquarters in State House Row in Philadelphia and Love was often burned in effigy and victimized by sensational journalism.
The American Peace Society responded to the coming war with less vigor than that shown by the Union. The Society did not strongly support McKinley’s prewar pacific attitude. They failed to protest his gradual capitulation to the interventionists. The Society’s leadership neither circulated petitions nor helped to form mass rallies against the war. In general, the timidity of the peace advocates in the final crisis stemmed from their elitist assumptions. Trueblood and other peace leaders believed in the need for long-range educational programs rather than emotional rallies. They were not prepared to deal with a short-term immediate crisis. When war came, even the pacifists were relatively quiet. Fear of reprisals and realization of their status as a tiny minority convinced them that antiwar protests would serve no practical purpose.

Except for the Universal Peace Union, then, few groups protested the war vigorously, though individuals proved more fearless. Even during the hostilities, men such as William Lloyd Garrison, Love, and Trueblood publicly encouraged conscientious objection even in the wake of letters written against them accusing them of disloyalty.  

Other leaders of the American Peace Society subordinated their intense disappointment with the war to their larger certainty that the international peace movement would break forth somewhere in a new tidal wave after the war closed, just as it had seemed to do after each of the war periods of
the nineteenth century. Despite the war, optimism was still an attitude of most American peace reformers.

Although the American peace movement did not convince many Americans to oppose the war, it did help to beat the spread of a surprisingly powerful anti-imperialist movement that was growing in the country. The peace movement continued to urge mediation and arbitration in their efforts to curb imperialism. Peace leaders encouraged President Theodore Roosevelt to mediate the Russo-Japanese conflict. They sought to substitute international cooperation for competitive imperialism.

The peace movement expressed many warnings about the dangers of imperialism. Some in the movement were concerned about the United States' move away from its traditional isolationism. Others felt that imperialism would ruin the concept of free trade. Still others, such as Carnegie, saw imperialism as too expensive a venture, requiring the building and upkeep of an enlarged army and navy. Many peace seekers protested when the United States government took possession of Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines.

In the midst of this growing imperialism in the United States and an increasingly threatening situation in Europe, the first Hague Conference was called by Czar Nicholas II in August, 1898. The purpose of the Conference was to consider arms limitation, rules of war, and an international court of justice. As the time for the Conference approached, the
American peace movement was fighting against expansionism and for disarmament. They looked with hope to the Conference. Though members of the peace movement worked hard at popularizing the upcoming Conference and encouraging President McKinley to send an American delegation, their influence did not bring great results. McKinley did send a delegation but its membership included one Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan, a naval strategist, was an avid imperialist and no friend to the peace movement. There was also a general lack of public concern, partly because of the isolationist feeling that still existed throughout the country in spite of a growing interest in imperialism.16

The first Hague Conference accomplished little. True, it did create the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the first international tribunal in history. But the Court was not really a court but only a panel of arbiters from which nations could voluntarily select their own adjudicators. Though the nations did agree on conventions defining procedures for the establishment of commissions of inquiry, arbitration, and the warfare, there was little to be done if nations chose to ignore the conventions.

The turn of the century saw the American peace movement optimistic in spite of an arms race and growing imperialism. Public figures paid lip service to its goals. Leaders looked back over the nineteenth century and saw as accomplishments the ending of civil wars. They looked forward to the twentieth century and saw the ending of international war.
Between 1901 and 1914, forty-five new peace organizations appeared in the United States in a growth spurt unequaled in the history of the peace reform. These new organizations represented extensions of the domestic and professional priorities of those economic elites who presided over the ordering of American industrialization. Four groups often joined forces in these organizations. From the business world came several innovative business leaders who were directing the country's corporate consolidation. They turned to the peace reform out of an interest in the extension of order both at home and abroad. From the legal profession came some lawyers and law professors who promoted the peace issue as they championed the importance of courts. From the clerical world came some clergymen who used the peace movement as a means for urging the pursuit of Christian service. And from the academic world came some educators who saw the peace movement as a tool for bringing harmony through the international spread of right reason. These 'practical' peace advocates constructed a newly national movement on the old cosmopolitan faith in human reason, progress, Christianity, Great Power harmony, and the need for working peacekeeping mechanisms.17

America's rise to international power provided an environment conductive to many ideas and goals of these practical peace leaders. Nationalism reigned among many peace members. Between 1906 and 1914 they saw little in
American institutions that needed reforming except for an overly provincial senate that failed to share their enthusiasm for arbitration treaties. Thus, many peace leaders turned to European diplomacy for reforming. This group believed that it was the secret diplomacy, militarism, and nondemocratic institutions of the major European powers that stood in the way of a peaceful world. In the wake of deepening old World tensions, practical peace reformers attempted to maintain European stability and preserve the international capitalist order. Their efforts in this regard included the establishment of European peace societies that were designed to consolidate public opinion behind governmental steps toward stronger international peacekeeping mechanisms such as international arbitration and a judiciary. They also applied pressure on the United States government to assume the lead in taking those steps.18

The plans of practical peace movement leaders reflected a longing for regularity, for the channeling of change into slow processes. Convinced that in foreign policy as in domestic matters the dangers of violence and turmoil came largely from the 'turbulent masses', the conservatively inclined leaders of the peace movement sought to educate the populace in a respect for law and treaties and in qualities of self-restraint that would make them less ruthless and warlike. The leaders of the peace movement maintained
close ties with the establishment while trying to remain a movement for reform, though it was a relatively uncontroversial establishment reform movement.

These plans and attitudes were represented by many of the legalists who, after 1905, were becoming a significant part of the American peace movement. The dream of a world court and the progressive codification of international law had intrigued American peace seekers from the time of William Ladd. Legalists desired to convert international conflicts into cases and to supplement diplomatic negotiations by judicial decisions. These ideas did not really grip organized peace activists until the early twentieth century when Silhu Root, a Wall Street lawyer who had helped undermine the country's surge toward economic concentration and who had headed the departments of War (1899-1904) and State (1905-1909) in the administrations of McKinley and Roosevelt, and his followers sought to advance beyond the Hague system of arbitration into the judicial settlement of disputes. With Root's encouragement, legalists worked after 1905 to organize the peace reform upon the principles of courtroom justice. They wanted to invest in judges in responsibility for international order.¹⁹

Organizations soon grew out of this interest. In 1906 the American Society of International Law was founded by Columbia University law professor, George Kirchwey, and law school administrator, James Brown Scott. The Society
became a 'scientific' center for the study of international law and was meant to be a means of familiarizing the country's worldminded elite with the importance of judicial means of keeping peace. In 1910 the American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Dispute was founded by millionaire Baltimore publicist, Theodore Marburg, and New York mining magnate, John Hays Hammond. This Society was dominated by lawyers and law school professors. It promoted the idea of an international court and provided one more select center for spreading an understanding of peace as the product of impartial judicial decisions.

In addition to their own organizations, many lawyers gradually took leadership roles in peace societies. They began playing an important role at the annual Mohonk Conferences. This group constantly emphasized the need for a judicial resolution of international problems. Many legalists became impatient with the older peace societies and their leaders, often labeling them as impractical visionaries. They saw too many flaws in the older peace advocates' encouragement of arbitration. In their view an international court, isolated from political pressures, was the practical solution.

Despite the disdain that many legalists felt toward the traditional peace societies, the lawyers' emphasis on law rather than force in international relations served to
cast them in the role of heroes in the eyes of the peace societies. The lawyers' program for peace was adopted by many peace societies in their search for respectability. Many legalists revived the popular idea that American institutions and the American process of federation provided a perfect example for future world organizations. They looked to the Supreme Court as the international judiciary model. Out of this idea grew the World Federation League. This League was founded in 1910 by Hamilton Holt, editor of The Independent, Richard Bartholdt, a Republican congressman from St. Louis, Missouri, and other interested reformers. It was founded for the purpose of mobilizing public sentiment to support a centralized governing body empowered to keep the peace. World federationists dreamed of an international constitution based on the American Constitution that designed an international government with a legislature, judiciary, and perhaps even an executive.20

Many of the ideas of both the World Federationists and the legalists were discussed at the Second Hague Conference held during the summer of 1907. American legalists played a significant part at the Conference. They worked for a world court, a body with more definite powers and organization than the Tribunal created at the First Hague Conference. Though slightly improved, the Court of Arbitral Justice remained a weak instrument. Another concern of many American delegates was disarmament. Disarmament proposals
failed because the European armaments race was so far developed that the Conference's prospects were almost zero. The Conference was generally a disappointment to peacemakers. Other than the improved formulas for the permanent court of arbitral justice and ten new conventions governing the rules and techniques of warfare, little was accomplished. The Conference ended with plans for a third Conference to be held around 1915. The Americans went home, hopeful at least over the accomplishment that international conferences seemed to be a permanent part of the world scene.21

Besides lawyers, another establishment group that became part of the American peace movement early in the twentieth century was the American business group. The peace movement actively tried to enlist their support. They used the argument that business prosperity depended upon stable conditions and uninterrupted trade relations. Some peace reformers argued that peace must come with international economic interdependence. Leaders of the practical peace movement expressed great confidence in the political power of business sentiment. In return, the peace movement offered to businessmen international contacts that could prove helpful for their commerce. Though American businessmen joined peace societies, they took few leadership roles and put forward no ideas of their own about the international scene as had the American legalists. Yet businessmen did add
prestige and power to the prewar peace movement. Their presence helped to reinforce its conservative tendencies toward nondisruptive and lawful resolution of conflict.

Two entrepreneurs who were exceptions to this lack of business leadership in the prewar peace societies were Edwin Ginn and Andrew Carnegie. Both men were not new to the peace movement and both used their money to set up peace foundations in 1910.

For years Edwin Ginn, a Boston textbook publisher who tended toward pacifism, wanted to organize the peace movement for real effectiveness along business lines. His desire resulted in 1910 in Ginn's founding and funding of an International School for Peace. The School was later renamed the World Peace Foundation. The Foundation was organized on the model of a prewar university and was directed by an eminent board of trustees packed with educators like David Starr Jordan and influenced by peace reformers like Edwin D. Mead. Its aim was to strengthen the international peace spirit through research and education. Distribution of materials for the purpose of molding opinion for peace was an important project of the Foundation. Ginn controlled the purse strings and this occasionally led to problems. Ginn had a passion for activity and efficiency while Mead and Jordan were more for research. This problem over priorities led to the Foundation's lack of a focus on any single
distinctive program. When Ginn died in January, 1914, he left the Foundation in a power struggle over priorities; and the Foundation for all practical purposes was ineffective from that time on.

The year 1910 also saw the birth of another peace movement. On December 14 of that year Andrew Carnegie contributed $10 million in U.S. Steel Corporation bonds toward the formation in New York of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Carnegie desired to promote international good will and peace through an appeal to the intellectual elite of all lands. Elihu Root became president while many other lawyers held dominant positions within the organization. The Endowment encouraged and sometimes subsidized the research and educational activities of like-minded organizations such as the American Peace Society. The Endowment also developed direct lines of access to top U.S. policymakers. It was dedicated more to research than to exhortation and in this sense was not connected to the programs of older peace societies. Both Carnegie and his trustees practiced excessive caution, tending toward seeking slow, long-range progress rather than immediate action while rejecting any extensive popular agitation. Carnegie's pet project of acquiring an arbitration treaty with Great Britain ended in failure. He then turned to planning the Third Hague Conference and the 1915 celebration of one hundred years of peace between the United States and Great
Britain. The Endowment under legalist influence also worked for the creation of a world court and the gradual development of international law. 23

While new societies and groups were forming, the older peace societies continued their specific goals amid some struggles for survival. Alfred Love, head of the Universal Peace Union, was getting feeble and it was difficult for him to play a vigorous part in the Union. He was tired out from the way he had been attacked for his protests during the Spanish-American War. Love's brand of uncompromising pacifism did not please many of the new recruits to the peace movement who regarded Love's position as unrealistic and sentimental. After 1900 the financial condition of the Union was desperate and Love was forced to plead for affiliation with the American Peace Society in hopes of obtaining supporting funds. The Society refused, thus helping to seal the fate of the Union. After 1905 Love and the Union watched rather than guided the growth of the peace movement. With Love's death in 1913 the Union faded into extinction.

In contrast to the Universal Peace Union's death rattling, the American Peace Society, in the early twentieth century, surged with new life as it took advantage of the new interest in peace. In 1900 the Society was still an organization where genteel reformers might continue to satisfy their impulse toward civic respectability and public action. In
the years from 1900 through 1905, the Society did not seem a likely source of vigor for pressing the peace campaign in the century ahead. But after 1905 new forces became a part of the movement and the scene began to change. One sign of this change was the Peace Society's move of its headquarters from provincial Boston to national Washington. New leaders of the peace movement who began to emerge around 1905 found Trueblood and the American Peace Society too sentimental and moralistic in approach, too insistent upon disarmament as an integral part of the peace movement, and too visionary and impractical. The peace movement was rapidly renouncing the ineffectual Victorian sentimentalism and moralism which seemed to be embodied in the American Peace Society and some of its leaders. To counteract this trend some new practical peace reformers worked at breaking up the Boston monopoly by getting new directors appointed. These directors were men of greater national prestige with wider political connections and more sympathy with the new practical directions of the peace movement than men like Trueblood and Mead. International lawyers now hold three positions. Carnegie even used his money and prestige to try to oust Trueblood; but he was unsuccessful though he was able to make sure that Trueblood for the most part was ineffective within the Society.
Through the Carnegie Endowment, many of the smaller peace societies were consolidated with the American Peace Society. The Endowment allotted $31,000 to the Society for distribution among these smaller peace groups. Thus, these groups became dependent upon the American Peace Society for funding, and consolidation of some kind often occurred.

The Endowment was also responsible for the American Peace Society's loss of independent status. As a result of the financial situation, an understanding was worked out that would allow the Endowment to exercise a decisive veto power over the appointment of the new executive secretary as the American Peace Society was being reorganized along more efficient lines. After 1912 the Society received 70 percent of its income from the Endowment and fell into a position of dependency. By 1914, the American Peace Society leaders had largely accepted their satellite position.25

Another group that received financial help from one of the new Foundations was the series of Cosmopolitan Clubs. The Clubs were begun on various college campuses in 1903. Their purpose was to promote international understanding among university students. Louis Lochner of the University of Wisconsin and George Nasmyth of Cornell University became important national leaders of the Clubs. The group was partially supported both by Gian and his Foundation and by
the American Peace Society. Though not avowedly pacifist, the Cosmopolitan Clubs expressed the same idealistic internationalism of the leading pacifists.

Protestant clergy were another establishment group that played a part in the prewar peace movement. More and more Protestant clergy after 1900 were beginning to perceive the problem of war as a growing social issue. This view can be seen as connected to the Social Gospel Movement. Between 1911 and 1915, three major Protestant organizations were formed. First, the interdenominational Protestant leader, Charles MacFarland and Frederick Lynch, a Carnegie confidante and long-time peace worker, moved the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America to establish in 1911 a Commission on Peace and Arbitration. With this organizational lever, Lynch pried from Carnegie a $2 million endowment for the formation of the Church Peace Union. Formed in February of 1914, the Church Peace Union originated as an interfaith front of prominent religious peace workers who were interested in building a more systematic and effective crusade against war.26

Ironically, the Union's first major peace action, an international church peace conference scheduled for Constance, Germany, was disrupted by the outbreak of the European war. Fleeing from Constance, members of the conference's Continuation Committee met shortly after in London and formed the World Alliance for International Fellowship Through the Churches.
In the summer of 1915 Church Peace Leaders organized an American branch of the Alliance, seizing one more victory in interdenominational Protestantism's prewar drive toward Christian federalism and international peace. Yet, their efforts did not affect clerical thinking at the grassroots level—nor did the Protestant effort stop European Christians from slaughtering one another after 1914 in the name of tribal salvation.

Despite the popularity of the peace movement and the verbal support of Cabinet officials, Presidents, Senators, and Congressmen, the movement accomplished little to influence American policy makers to work toward such goals as arbitration treaties or a world court. True, arbitration treaties were in process: Bryan's 'cooling-off' treaties were passed; and two Hague Conferences did occur. But Bryan's treaties contained an unacceptable clause concerning the freedom of involved nations to follow their own course of action, and the Hague Conferences accomplished little but the sharing of ideas.

Nevertheless, most peace reformers were optimistic in 1914. They saw the increase in their membership rolls and the popular and elitist support of their organizations as a sign that people were becoming more civilized and that peace was at hand. Even the arms race in Europe did not dampen the spirits of most American reformers.
While the American Peace Movement was growing and developing during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the American Methodist Church was becoming an important force in the lives of many Americans. From its beginnings in the United States as part of an Anglican missionary venture, the American Methodist Church took root and rapidly grow, first in the colonies and later in the new nation as an independent Church. By the time of the War of 1812, Methodists numbered 174,560. Growth continued as the Methodist itinerant preacher followed every frontier trail available, adding to the Methodist flock along the way.27

The Church's response to the War of 1812 depended on geography. Most of the educated, conservative members of the seaboard area opposed the struggle; while the western evangelists, such as Peter Cartwright, often echoed the militant whoops of the 'War Hawks'. Cartwright even served as chaplain under General Andrew Jackson and took part in the battle of New Orleans. Though individual Methodists may have been upset by the war and eager to join Dodge and Worcester in their protest societies, the majority of American Methodists did not.

The founding of the American Peace Society by William Ladd in 1828 found many eastern and especially northeastern
Methodists supporting the Society's work for peace. As mentioned earlier, these geographic areas were those where the Peace Society had its center of concentration. When the Mexican-American War erupted, geography again played a significant part in determining Methodist response to the war. By the time of the war the Church had already been divided into the Northern and Southern Churches.

In the northeast, the Methodists were often critical of the war for several reasons: the American Society's influence was strong in this area, the people were geographically removed from the conflict, and the feeling ran strong that the war would benefit only the southern states and, thus, the extension of slavery. Many Southern Methodists, however, were in favor of the war as were many other Methodists, both Northern and Southern, who lived along the frontier. The clergy in these areas often reflected lay sentiment. In fierce competition for men's souls, it would have taken a rare courage for a Church to denounce a popular war. Rescuing the Mexican masses from the oppression of the Roman Church was a popular argument used by Methodist clergymen and other Protestant denominations in justifying the war. Many from this group also viewed the Mexican War as simply an incident in the westward expansion of the frontier, the extension of America's manifest destiny. The consummation of the American Dream was seen as indivisible
from the fulfillment of the Kingdom of God. Hence the Mexican War was acceptable as a stage in the progress of the world's last, best hope--America.²⁹

This North-South split determined Methodist response to the Civil War. The Northern Church, like many in the American peace movement, saw the conflict as necessary to preserve the Union, God's Kingdom on earth. They also felt that the conflict was God's way of freeing the slaves. A Northern preacher, toward the end of the war, in Evanston, Illinois, echoed these ideas when he said:

I am aware that grievous doubt exists in the minds of many Christians with reference to God's approval of war...but...the war in which we are engaged is a holy duty and as obligatory upon Christians as it is to pray...Where there is a...great principle of revealed truth to be settled...then we do feel that God calls us to the war as distinctly as God called the hosts under Joshua by name to meet the Amalekites in Rephidim.³⁰

The General Conference of the Northern Church gave strong support to the Union and President Lincoln when it met in 1864. Bishop Matthew Simpson was a close friend of the President. Four hundred and fifty Methodist ministers volunteered to help the Union soldiers in work that resembled the military chaplaincy, while many laymen served as fighting men. Lincoln sent a personal comment concerning the Northern Methodist contribution to the 1864 General Conference. He states, "It is no fault in others that the Methodist Episcopal Church sent more soldiers to the field, more
nurses to the hospitals, and more prayers to heaven than any. This support was present throughout the war in Methodist periodicals. On the local scene, money was being contributed to help the effort, especially to help the wounded soldier. A generous Methodist farmer in Illinois is reported to have given one gift of $10,000.

The Southern Methodist viewed his cause with as much sacredness as did his counterpart in the North. At the outbreak of the war, the Southern Methodist Church issued the following statement:

We appeal to Heaven for the rectitude of our motives. ...The war on our side is exclusively and avowedly one of defense—how is it on their side? The Lord be judge. ...A consciousness of the right makes us strong and indomitable. We have invoked the God of Battles; so have they. He will hear both and we fear not the results.

In 1862, nearly a fifth of the preachers of the Tennessee Conference were in the service of the Confederate Army, which is probably not an unfair indication of the devotion of the Southern Methodist ministry as a whole to their cause.

The year 1865 found the Southern Methodist Church in a shambles. During the postwar years, the Church slowly recovered from its fragmented state. In contrast to this shambled situation, the Northern Church was still strong in 1865 and the postwar period saw continued growth. At this time the 'cosmopolitan' peace movement was taking shape.
expressing its support for arbitration as a nonviolent solver of world problems. The Methodists also supported the idea of arbitration. In 1884 Bishop Matthew Simpson took a stand for arbitration, stating that it was a humane and Christian substitute for war. In 1887 the Methodist Northern Conference adopted a resolution supporting the principle of arbitration as a substitute for war.

Almost from the day of its formation, the Methodist Church has had great interest in foreign missions. Starting from the original impulse, "The world is my parish", supplied by its founder John Wesley, the missionary spirit within Methodism has continued to develop from its fundamental interest in universal redemption. The American Methodist Church was true to this tradition when it formed the Methodist Missionary Society in 1819. This Society was originally formed to aid the work of evangelizing the American Indian. By the end of the nineteenth century, the desire to evangelize spread from the Indian to the newly arrived immigrant to lands beyond American borders. American affiliated Methodist churches were started and developed in most European countries and many places on the Asian continent. This missionary spirit helped shape American Methodist world views.

Like some American peace movement members, many Methodists believed that the United States and its institutions contained the key to civilize the world. They believed
that their missionary activity was vital to this civilising task. In this light, American imperialism seemed acceptable, if not desirable. This attitude was in contrast with some peace reformers who saw imperialism as a dangerous road that often ended in war.

Many American peace reformers were also concerned about the increase in popularity of navalism and the views of such people as Captain Mahn. Some Methodists did not share in this concern. The editor of the Pacific Christian Advocate in 1897 believed that thoughtful Americans who felt that the United States would be a factor in "the future conflicts of a militant Christendom" would find a comrade in Mahan. 34

The special position of the Anglo-Saxon peoples was a notable feature of Methodist thought during this period. This view was shared by many cosmopolitan and practical peace reformers. Rev. John Robinson, a minister in Ohio in 1880, described this race as the "most intelligent, practical, enterprising and powerful," the colonizers and men of commerce, and thus specially fitted for mission work. 35

In 1898, while the fervor for war with Spain over Cuba was mounting, The Christian Advocate opposed U.S. involvement in the hostilities; but once war was declared, the paper supported it, while protesting its effect on movements for political and social reform. 36 The Wesleyan Christian Advocate also counseled patience in the face of
the blowing up of the 'Maine', and when war came, faced it with regret, believing it might have been averted if Spain had had "a better type of Christianity," and hence a better form of civilization. This attitude was similar to American peace reformers who uttered some protests before the war but once the war began, quieted their protests and looked to better things after the war.

For the Methodists, the Spanish-American War was a humanitarian crusade to free Cuba from Spanish oppression and from "that system of iniquity, the papacy." For them the fruits of the crusade—Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Guam, and Hawaii—presented a golden field for evangelization. Even in 1914 Methodists were still supporting the U.S. retention of the Philippines Islands. In an article in the January, 1914, issue of the Methodist Review, Edwin A. Schell, president of Iowa Wesleyan, praised the good that the United States had done for the Philippines. He also explained why the Filipinos were not ready for independence and urged the continuing of Protestant evangelization of those islands. Thus, some Methodists endorsed national expansion. They used their official meetings, their press, and pulpit to encourage a large number of Americans to support imperialism. As has been mentioned earlier, imperialism was considered a problem if not a menace to the cause of peace by many members of the American Peace Movement.
Like many peace movement members, Methodists were optimistic about the possibilities of achieving international peace as the twentieth century began. Also like their fellow clergymen who were part of the peace and the Social Gospel movements, Methodists began to view war as a social evil. Nearly a third of the episcopal address at the Northern General Conference of 1908 was devoted to social themes. One of these themes was international peace. In this section the bishops expressed gratification with the great advance made during the quadrennium toward a peaceful settlement of international disputes by Christian methods. They expressed regret that questions of national honor were still being withheld from the jurisdiction of the Hague tribunal, which might greatly delay the day of abiding peace.39

The prewar years found American Methodism reporting and speaking out in favor of the mainstream American Peace Movement organizations and some of their goals. Both The Christian Advocate and The Zion’s Herald contained articles reporting favorably about the activities of such peace groups as the American Peace Society and the World Peace Foundation. Lucia Ames Mead, a prominent peace reformer, even occasionally wrote the paper. An example of this support can be found in the May 14, 1913, issue of Zion’s Herald which described in detail the ideas expressed at the Fourth National Peace Congress.
As mentioned earlier, disarmament was one of the goals of the peace movement. This position was supported in a May, 1912, Methodist Review article titled, "Democracy and distress", by Daniel Dorchester, Jr., a minister from Brooklyn, New York. Reverend Dorchester wrote, "We are crying out for disarmament among the nations to avert the horrors of war and to lighten the burdens which are crushing out the lives of the people." Disarmament, among other issues, was supported at the 1912 Northern General Conference.

In their Episcopal Address at this Conference the bishops criticized the lords of finance for pressuring for wars for trade while the people were praying for an end of war and pleading for international arbitration. They argued for the use of international law and The Hague in solving international disputes. The bishops reproached both Europe and the United States for increase in armaments and warships. The bishops ended their statement on peace and arbitration by congratulating President Taft, "...in declaring that all disagreements, involving questions of whatever sort, should be submitted to an international court...", and by proclaiming, "...Let every Methodist pulpit ring out clearly and insistently for peace by arbitration."40

At this same Conference, the delegates passed a resolution calling for an international tribunal for settlement and adjudication of any differences that might arise between nations. In a speech that accompanied the
Resolution, one of the delegates states, "This is the moment for international unity and universal peace....Thank God, the time has come when we realize that a nation has no more right to strike down another nation by force than a citizen has to strike a man who differs with him with his fist." Another resolution was passed at this Conference supporting the principle of international arbitration. 41

Later that same year annual conferences were held.

At the Cincinnati, Ohio, Annual Conferences, the Standing Committee on Reforms commented on the armed peace in existence that kept war ever present while it laid a heavy financial burden on the people. The Committee also described the growth of world peace and encouraged the use of arbitration treaties. It recommended that every pastor observe some Sunday in the year as Peace Day.

The Central Ohio Annual Conference of 1911 formed a World-Wide Peace and Arbitration Standing Committee. Its report praised, "...the new emphasis now being placed upon manhood in contra-distinction to wealth or color or family...." The committee went on to describe, "...our age to be an hour auspicious in the history of our race to destroy this relic of human barbarism and usher in the long-expected vision of prophet and seer, when they should beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning-hooks and the nations should learn war no more." The committee resolved to encourage arbitration and to pledge support for, "this the only rational way...." 42
The eve of World War I found both the American Peace Movement and the American Methodist Church generally optimistic about hopes for world peace. Both groups believed that solutions for war were at hand. Both groups supported the principles of arbitration, an international court, and the development of international law. Both groups also supported disarmament and expressed some anxiety over the intensifying arms race in Europe. The peace reformers were more active in trying to change government policy than the Methodists were, though the Church did praise and encourage policy it approved of. Both groups tended to respond with patriotism whenever a crisis erupted into war. Neither group was prepared for the events that exploded in Europe during the summer of 1914.
The assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne, in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, set in motion a series of momentous decisions in European chancelleries that soon plunged Europe into war. In late June various American peace workers were preparing for a journey to Europe where they expected to participate in various peace meetings. Despite the news of the assassination, and the unfolding of the crisis, American peace leaders were not unduly alarmed and many did not change their travel plans. As peace members traveled through Europe their lack of alarm and disbelief changed to fear that war was really imminent.

A few peace workers did their best to prevent the war. When Edwin and Lucia Ames Mead, coming from a Conference in London, arrived in Brussels on their way to the Constance Conference, they were met by Senator Henry La Fontaine, a leading Belgian peace worker and president of the Gerne Peace Bureau. Both La Fontaine and the Meads were concerned about the critical situation. After a conference with other Belgian peace workers, they agreed to telegraph the European members of the Gerne Peace Bureau and other European peace workers asking them to come to Brussels.

More than fifty peace workers assembled in Brussels for a meeting on July 31. They were mainly from Britain, Holland,
France, Italy, and Germany. The group drafted messages in which they called on foreign ministers, premiers, and sovereigns of Russia, Germany, and Austria to check mobilization and to summon an international conference. Upon Mead's urging, they also dispatched a cable to President Woodrow Wilson requesting him to mediate the critical situation. Wilson hesitated, partly due to cautionary advice and the fact that his wife was dying. When he did offer to mediate, it was too late. The other leaders answered the appeals with gunfire. Meanwhile, the delegates who were able to get to Constance prayed together for some miracle to end the unfolding nightmare. This group also sent resolutions to President Wilson and other European leaders asking for mediation of the crisis. They were forced to flee in the wake of a mobilising Germany before any other action could be taken.

As peace leaders recovered from their initial shock and disbelief over the reality of war, they looked for explanations. Many American peace reformers did not look further than the arms race for symptoms for this European mass-produced slaughter. They often neglected the issues of economic and imperial rivalries, Germany's ambitions, and Balkan nationalism. Their oversimplifications often blinded their vision. Their spirits sagged as they saw all the effort and money expended during the prewar years end in total failure on the blood-soaked terrain of Europe's 'no man's land'. Their sense of
defeat and frustration involved issues and attitudes sacred to them. Many conservative peace leaders, who had placed their hopes for world order in the hands of an international elite of intellectuals, lawyers, and statesmen, were forced to concede that irresponsible government leaders had brought on the maelstrom, while the supposedly warlike masses had remained quiet. American legalists were dismayed at the belligerents' flagrant violations of the Hague Conventions in starting and ruthlessly prosecuting the war. The warring powers treated international laws as worthless scraps of paper. Many legalists feared for the very existence of international law.

Some of these legalists believed that the only way to vindicate international law was to punish the lawbreakers. Because Germany had attacked first, freely admitted its violation of the treaty guaranteeing Belgium's neutrality, and upset the existing rules of international law governing naval warfare with the introduction of the submarine, nearly all legalists singled out Germany as the principal outlaw.
Belief in German war guilt was shared by other peace leaders as well. They frequently made this accusation on moral grounds focusing on German militarism, aggressive war plans and munitions entrepreneurs.

After the initial shock of the war the American Peace Movement divided and headed into about three different directions. For some members, patriotism won out over
international idealism and they supported both the Allied cause and America's eventual involvement. Other members and groups tried to work for immediate peace while other wanted the Allies to win the war so they could control the shaping of the peace—especially along the lines of a League of Nations. These new directions marked the weakening of some of the older peace organizations and the rise of new groups.

The World War brought confusion and disunity to many of the older peace societies. Because of retirement, illness, or death, leadership positions in these organizations had changed. This often led to indecision and disunity about courses of action. For example, the faltering Universal Peace Union had collapsed upon the death of Alfred Love in 1913. Albert Smiley, the founder and host of the Mohonk Conferences on International Arbitration, had died in December 1912; and Edwin Ginn, founder of the World Peace Foundation, had died early in 1914, leaving that organization in confusion. Edwin Mead, another of the seasoned peace workers, attempted to hold the World Peace Foundation to a firm anti-preparedness stance but was undercut by the trustees and suffered a nervous breakdown in early 1915. Within the American Peace Society the aging Benjamin Trueblood had recently, at the insistence of the Carnegie Endowment, been forced to share his authority with a new Endowment-approved executive director. Trueblood suffered a physical collapse late in 1913, recovered
sufficiently to edit the Advocate of Peace, the Society's publication, during most of 1914; and then resigned as of mid-1915 mainly due to illness and frustration.

With Trueblood seriously ill after 1915, the American Peace Society lost its leading crusader. After this the more cautious officers of the society, and the trustees of the Carnegie Endowment, which provided the society with most of its funding, soon guided the peace group toward a more conservative course. This conservative course caused the American Peace Society to give weak, half-hearted responses to the war and America's precarious neutral position. They did support the initiatives of other groups in calling for a national day of prayer and in sending to the President a resolution asking for a conference of neutrals. The society opposed the most vehement preparedness advocates, but it did not make antipreparedness a crusade. The peace group upheld neutral rights and international law but did not attempt to educate the public on what exactly were a neutral's rights in wartime. The society's leaders were unable to agree upon a proposed declaration of principles that would have opposed increases in American military or naval strength and the private manufacture of armament.

The American Peace Society's main response to the war by late 1914 had been primarily a reassertion of optimism in its traditional methods and programs. It advocated periodic international conferences at The Hague and an
international judiciary as prerequisites for a stable and peaceful postwar world. The Society began directing its attention to problems after peace would be restored. By the end of 1915 the American Peace Society was beginning to drift away from any significant connection with the active peace movement.

The Carnegie Endowment, like the American Peace Society, also did not respond to the war crisis with much activity. Its commitment to research provided the Endowment with a program that was relatively impervious to the dislocations of war. The scholarly program had never promised quick results. Elihu Root reminded the trustees in 1915 that the changes they sought were necessarily so gradual that they could "be produced only by persistent effort, running through generation after generation and century after century." Thus, the outbreak of war was no cause for panic.

But the war could not be ignored entirely. The directors quickly cut off support for European societies lest the contributions be interpreted as taking sides. They used the same 'unneutral' argument when they withheld from publication several potentially controversial completed works on armaments and socialism. This decision led to the burial of many other so-called controversial manuscripts. While outwardly neutral, many of the Endowment's leaders were privately pro-Allied. For example, Root had long distrusted Germany as the main opponent of his program for an international
court and James Brown Scott privately revealed his pro-
British sympathies soon after the war began.

This position of avoiding all controversial questions was
further emphasised when the Endowment refused to take any
position on military expenditure, proposals to end the war,
or even specific programs for a peace settlement. The trustees
generally agreed that "the less said by us just now, so much
the better." Carnegie agreed that, under the circumstances,
"wisdom is silence." Many of the trustees who spoke at
meetings in 1914 agreed that any encouragement of peace should
cease. In late 1915, twenty-four out of twenty-eight
trustees voted to omit any special meeting of the board, as
the trustees again concluded that "the less said about peace
in these days the better." The funding of research continued,
however. For example, by 1917 the Division of Economics and
History had received large increases in research funds. Thus,
the Endowment went through the period of American neutrality
wrapped up in uncontroversial programs.

The World War also brought confusion and disunity to
the World Peace Foundation. Although Samuel Dutton, chairman
of the endowed group's committee on organization, urged the
development of a well-defined policy on American neutrality
and postwar world order, the trustees had a difficult time
in deciding what changes in the foundation's programs were
necessary. The old confidence in the future was gone. With
Edwin Ginn dead and Edwin Mead seriously ill, the Foundation
drifted aimlessly. The trustees could not agree on a positive program. They curtailed many of the Foundation's activities, thus saving its funds for some future peace operation. The trustees even curtailed their publication department.

This future peace operation of the Foundation turned out to be the endorsement of a new international organization, the League to Enforce Peace. The idea of a league of the great powers to enforce the peace was primarily the brainchild of Hamilton Holt, William Short (a New York Peace Society leader), and Theodore Marburg (a Progressive peace reformer of long association with the movement) who agreed that the World War necessitated the creation of an authoritative world organization if future wars were to be prevented. Officially founded in June, 1915, the League to Enforce Peace gained the support of prewar peace leaders as well as many newcomers who for the first time began to show sustained interest in international organization. They sought an international organization in which member nations pledged to use economic or military force against any one of their number refusing to submit its justiciable disputes to a world court or its nonjusticiable disputes to a council of conciliation for judgment before resorting to hostilities.

The leadership of the League to Enforce Peace agreed that nations were not prepared to provide for an international police force but assumed that they might be willing collectively to guarantee use of their economic powers and military forces against violators of the cooling-off guarantee. Fully
convinced of Germany's aggression in August, 1914, they further assumed that the world's leaders could easily identify the outlaw at the onset of any given future war and thus could move rapidly to punish the violator. They were confident, however, that the threat of united force among the members would prove sufficient in deterring war in almost every instance.

In January of 1916 the trustees of the World Peace Foundation appropriated $18,000 annually to the League. The trustees actually increased their appropriation in 1916 and in 1917 and abandoned all interest in the immediate questions of American neutrality. By late 1916 the Foundation became little more than an administrative agency that distributed the largest single portion of its annual income to the League to Enforce Peace.

Some trustees and directors of the Foundation lost interest in the organization due to their concern over the possible unpleasant consequences of forceful sanctions. They often directed their attention to other internationalist organizations more congenial to their outlook. For example, Samuel Dutton, who placed greater faith in the purely judicial body rather than a world organization with political authority, increasingly devoted more of his time to another new group, the World's Court League. This group's main purpose was to mobilize American public sentiment behind a permanent international court following the World War. In October, 1916, Dutton agreed to serve as the World's Court League secretary.
Both the Church Peace Union and the Commission on Peace and Arbitration of the Federal Council responded with uncertainty to the crisis of war in 1914. The Federal Council requested President Wilson to set aside a day of prayer for peace. The Church Peace Union continued its prewar peace essay contest and its efforts to get peace sermons preached. At the time of the crisis the Churches were in the midst of a campaign for renewed relations with Japan and that seemed to dominate their interest.

But a more concentrated action soon came forth from the Union. By the end of 1914, some of its trustees urged the Union to support the antipreparedness movement. But other trustees and Union members disagreed with this position. An example of this disagreement was found at the annual conference of the World Alliance (organization founded by fleeing Church Union members from the Constance conference) where one speaker voiced this feeling: "How to stop the war we do not inquire. We do not want the war stopped until peace can be established on a basis of justice." Several other delegates called for preparedness while still others questioned the desirability of peace. In the thinking of many Federal Council leaders, "...peace was now primarily understood to be the period after the war, not something to be regained by immediate cessation of hostilities. Arbitration...was spoken of mainly as the way to prevent war."
Thus, the Union and World Alliance's support of antipreparedness was weakened; and these groups, after 1916, gave it very little support.

Much of the disagreement over policy concerned the Church Peace Union's main aim of national and international church unity. Fear of both offending other churches and displaying internal disunity caused many members to avoid any controversial statements on peace. Frustrated in their search for unifying and acceptable programs for peace, the Federal Council leaders began to discuss the greater appreciation the redeeming values of war. Leaders spoke on the theme of the religious value of suffering and sacrifice and that Americans, as neutrals, were missing the opportunity to serve and sacrifice for their fellow man. The trenches and training camps had created favorable conditions for Christian ministry, opportunities not to be missed because of adherence to a 'peace policy'. A concrete expression of this attitude can be found in the Federal Council's role in war relief. In 1916 the Federal Council operated on a budget of $84,000. It raised and handled an additional $59,000 of war relief funds. Thus, since war relief was an instrument that easily united member churches, war relief became an important activity of the Council. Interest in preaching peace advocacy and anti-preparedness, however, declined as these were seen as divisive.
Meanwhile, the Church Peace Union under Lynch's direction continued to seek, despite sharp differences of opinion among the trustees, to maintain some continuing role in the peace movement. This task became increasingly difficult as new and more radical peace organizations formed, creating a wide gulf between them and the more conservative peace groups. Even so, in the fall of 1916 the Church Peace Union made a final attempt to exert leadership within the peace movement. In late October of that year the Church Peace Union financed a "Conference of Peacemakers" which sought to bring together representatives from both old and new peace groups in an effort to unite the peacemakers behind a single, unified platform. The Conference, however, was basically a failure. No concrete resolutions of note were passed. The fissure in the peace movement was beyond repair. The gap between the two groups was too wide to be bridged. A second conference was attempted in early 1917; but by then the Church Peace Union was receiving resignations from several trustees in protest against Lynch's continuing connections with the peace movement. Lynch quickly lost enthusiasm for what had already proved a futile endeavor.

Some peace advocates had become dissatisfied with the timidity of the peace organizations in the months following the outbreak of the war. Some disassociated themselves from existing peace groups to form new ones. Thus, just as proponents of international organization founded new groups
like the League to Enforce Peace and the World's Court League, so did pacifistic Americans start and recruit new blood for peace organizations of their own. This formation is often seen as the rise of the modern American Peace Movement.

One of these new groups was the Woman's Peace Party that emerged to become one of the most influential elements of the peace movement. Jane Addams helped organize it in January of 1915 with a platform calling for both peace, suffrage, democratic control of foreign policy, removal of the "economic causes of war", and the nationalization of armament manufacture. In a special resolution, the organizing conference denounced "further preparedness for war" as a "menace to our civilization."

In April of 1915 Jane Addams headed a Woman's Peace Party delegation to an international woman's conference held at The Hague. This convention called for the voiding of all secret treaties, the democratization of foreign policy, the nationalization of armament manufacturing, liberty of commerce and prohibition of government protection for overseas investments, the political enfranchisement of women, and representation of "the people" (including women representatives) at the eventual peace conference. In an effort to end the war promptly, the convention sent its leaders to visit the heads of state of the main belligerent and neutral nations to seek expressions favorable to mediation by a conference of neutrals.
With the sinking of the *Lusitania* in May of 1915 fresh in the minds of Americans, and with Germany apparently holding the advantage territorially, the women's campaign to end the war through mediation subjected the Woman's Peace Party to widespread criticism. The party's informal connection with the Peace Ship adventure sponsored by Henry Ford in December of 1915 did not help its popularity with the American public.

Another group that emerged because of the inadequacy of the existing peace movements was the Fellowship of Reconciliation. This group was formed from a British group in 1915. Among the founders of the American Fellowship were Y.M.C.A. leaders, Quaker and non-Quaker social workers, reformers and philanthropists. Many of these people, especially the Quakers, sought to find mutual support for a more uncompromising stand on the peace issue than the secular peace organizations were taking. Other new members joined because they were distressed by what they considered the shallow and inert Christianity of the present churches. This group saw in the founding of the Fellowship of Reconciliation in America an opportunity to enter into the fellowship of the sufferings of the world, to share in Europe's sorrows, and thus to engender a "spiritual awakening." Both groups sought to explore together the religious ethic and to reestablish a solid moral basis for private affirmation and public action in time of crisis.
The members of the new organization declared themselves unable to take part in war. They proclaimed that Christians were forbidden to wage war. Instead they were obliged to seek a world order in which all relations would be based upon love. The organization reflected Quaker pacifism which dominated the early statements of the fellowship. All the major offices were held by Quakers, but non-Quakers and even non-Christians eventually came to play a larger and larger role in the Fellowship of Reconciliation.

By 1916 the Fellowship was drifting toward increased involvement in issues of domestic social reform. Many of its members were integrating their pacifism with the demand for drastic social reorganization. As U.S. entry in the war became more of a possibility the Fellowship moved toward a broader, more radical social gospel position. Through its publication, the News Sheet, these social radicals tried to evoke sympathy for striking workers, and to demonstrate how closely the roots of war were bound together with business expansion. Through the same publication members like Norman Thomas placed war within the context of the multiple evils of a ruthless, competitive social order.

Yet another group that rose during the American neutrality period was the American Union Against Militarism. This group was organized in April, 1916, by some of America's leading liberals. The American Union became the center of opposition
to the Wilson administration's military requests. With at least 1,000 members organized in twenty-two cities, the American Union Against Militarism generated contributions of $50,000 in a year-long fight against plans for conscription and in an attempt to reinvigorate a domestic reform crusade. Activists in the American Union distributed literature, petitioned legislators, and formed rallies across the country. Organizing and agitating, the American Union was able to check some of the influence of militant interventionist groups. Yet neither the American Union's organization nor its arguments could halt the government's preparedness program in almost every aspect eliminating only the proposal for a "Continental Army." 49

When the war was finally declared in April, 1917, virtually every prominent prewar peace advocate supported the U.S. military effort with varying degrees of enthusiasm. They conceded that the President's motives were sincere and his purposes lofty, and they rationalized that war was justified as a last resort to promote a liberal, anti-imperialistic postwar world order in place of 'Prussianism,' 'militarism,' and 'autocracy.' 50

For example, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace set aside its low-keyed peace preachments and research in favor of the slogan, "Peace Through Victory." Its trustees issued a unanimous resolution that, "the effectual
means of promoting a durable international peace is to prosecute the war against the Imperial German Government to a final victory for democracy...\textsuperscript{51} The organization even turned over its offices in Washington to the official propaganda arm of the government, the Committee on Public Information.

The American Peace Society endorsed Wilson's campaign "to secure recognition of the claims of justice and humanity" through force of arms. It held that the world had passed beyond any reconciliation except by force. The Society, dominated by the Carnegie Endowment, seemed to equate pacifist with patriot.

In response to American entry into the war, the League to Enforce Peace flung money, organizers, and pamphlets into a massive campaign to persuade the public that the war was being waged for the sake of a league that would protect the future peace against potential aggressors. Its members stated as their goal, not peace agitation, but a postwar league. The League's attitude was expressed in May, 1918, at a league-sponsored "Win-the-War-for-Permanent-Peace" Convention. One speaker at the Convention proclaimed that the United States was engaged "in the holiest war of history," a crusade in which, "war is worship; war is prayer..." Other speakers at the Convention stressed Germany's perfidy and her plans for a "premature peace."\textsuperscript{52}
The League's ideas about its proposed league of nations were restated after American intervention. The prewar peace movement goals of order and stability remained important ones for the group. The proposed league would accept as legitimate the territorial status quo (presumably after an Allied victory); it would also guarantee nations the right to restrict immigration, to safeguard "certain doctrines such as the Monroe Doctrine," and to retain spheres of influence. Gradually, the League's original vision changed to the conception of a small group of "civilized nations," headed by the United States and Great Britain, imposing peace and justice upon the world. The idea of a league of nations tended to become identified with the ideas of a "league of democracies" or a "league of victorious allies."

Protestant peace spokesmen in the Church Peace Union, Federal Council of Churches, and the World Alliance for International Fellowship Through the Churches greatly blessed the United States' intervention. Church peace leaders joined the League to Enforce Peace activists in forming the government sponsored National Committee on the Churches and the Moral Aims of the War in a sustained effort to educate their church members in these moral aims. Many leaders saw in this government sponsorship a great opportunity to present their ideas. The purpose of the campaign of the new National Committee on the Churches and the Moral Aim of the War was to encourage Americans to support the President's
policies in prosecuting the war for Democracy, International Justice, and a League of Nations. The Committee had no intention of advocating a premature peace—a peace negotiated before the complete defeat of Germany. These actions and relationship with the government encouraged these three organizations to cut all ties with the increasingly radical peace organizations.

Meanwhile, progressive peace seekers and anti-war socialists, part of these increasingly radical peace organizations, split over the war issue. The Woman’s Peace Party shrank as suffragists within the party seized on the war emergency as a means of affirming women’s patriotism and winning their first objective—a constitutional amendment granting women the vote. Other members responded inconsistently. Jane Addams and Lillian Wald, for example, each refused to endorse the war; but both toured the country in support of administration efforts to improve national food and health policies for the sake of the war effort.

Organized socialists likewise split. At a special April convention in St. Louis, the Socialist Party bravely declared its opposition to the U.S. intervention. But the Party floundered when several of its best known supporters, including Upton Sinclair, joined Samuel Gompers and the American Federation of Labor in supporting the war in return for unprecedented governmental assistance to organizing labor.
The American Union Against Militarism, backed by Louis Lochner's (ex-Chicago Peace Society and Cosmopolitan Club leader) Emergency Peace Federation, immediately attacked Wilson's declaration of war and rallied anti-war activities in different parts of the country. Then intensifying preparation for war and rising resentment toward the war's opponents broke the will of such American Union Against Militarism leaders as Paul Kellogg and clearly split the organisation. Regrouping in September of 1917, half of the American Union leadership backed the young pacifist and social worker Roger Baldwin in forming the Civil Liberties Bureau (forerunner of the 1920 American Civil Liberties Union) as a means of protesting conscription, protecting the rights of conscientious objectors, and defending First Amendment freedoms in the face of the war effort.

In the same month the second half of the Union leadership joined Kellogg and Wald in forming the cryptically titled "Committee on Nothing at All." The Committee on Nothing at All, which became the League of Free Nations Association in November of 1918 (and, three years later, the Foreign Policy Association), gave organizational force to a new strain of liberal internationalism that supported United States intervention as the quickest way toward major international reform.
In the meantime, the active antiwar opposition narrowed to a hard core of antiwar socialists, Fellowship of Reconciliation-related liberal pacifists, and scattered urban intellectuals who wanted an immediate, negotiated peace without annexations or indemnities. Although they maintained a noisy press and persuasive arguments, most antiwar activists operated with an acute sense of personal loneliness and without any real success in restraining the U.S. war effort.

The American Methodist Church responded to the war crisis in some ways and attitudes that were similar to certain factions of the American Peace Movement. The events of the summer of 1914 following the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand shocked American Methodists. Many American Methodists had shared peace leaders' hopes that permanent international peace was possible and not far from reality. They expressed shock over the war, "...at the very moment when international peace is the uppermost question among civilized nations, in the very week a Peace Conference was to have met in a Central European city, this monstrous iniquity should have sprung upon the world with unrestrained fury." The Methodists believed that Hague tribunals and the like would not work until the political leaders of the world became authentic Christians.
Christian Advocate articles were placing the blame for the war on autocratic government, especially Germany's, as early as August, 1914. Statements such as "The German Kaiser owes an apology to the human race..." and "...nobody can believe that Austria would have proceeded to such lengths with Servia (Serbia) if she had not been sure of the support of Germany. Hence in the final analysis, Germany becomes responsible for the present war." The American Methodist Church had both an American German Conference within the United States and a German Conference in Germany itself. Bishop J.L. Nuelsen was bishop of the European branches of the American churches. When war broke out, Nuelsen was forced to flee to Switzerland and try to minister to his congregations from there. In a letter published in The Christian Advocate, Bishop Nuelsen pleaded for the spiritual and eternal needs of the human soul—especially the German souls. He asked for prayers for all European people suffering because of the war, most especially "our" fellow German Methodists. The presence of German Methodists complicated the attitude of American Methodists toward German guilt: "We feel an inexpressable tenderness for the German people... But no pious proclamations from the throne of Germany can make the wretched deeds of the imperial government consonant with the ideals of righteousness." This position of placing
the blame on the German imperial government but not on the people was maintained by the American Methodists throughout the war. President Wilson also held this position.

The Methodists supported another idea of Wilson's—that the war was being fought to "make the world safe for democracy." They spoke about the "...folly of maintaining autocratic governments" and hurling autocracy to ruin. When this would happen, "A new world is surely in process of supplanting an old world." In looking for one positive result of this conflict they looked with hope to the "...expectation that absolutism will be laid in its coffin. If this shall be the result, possibly the enormous sacrifice of blood and treasure involved in this continental war will not be too big a price to pay for it."58

Some Methodists were among those Americans who attended the Peace Conference at Constance that fateful summer. Both Bishop Luther B. Wilson of the Methodist Church, North and Bishop E.R. Hendrix of the Methodist Church, South were on the board of trustees of the Church Peace Union and members of the Conference. Bishop Nielson also attended and spoke at the Conference. The Christian Advocate reported on the Conference's progress, dilemma, and resolutions, presenting them in a supportive light. The Christian Advocate also supported the founding of the Women's Peace Party and their efforts in working for a future which shall know no war.
Along with the Women's Peace Party and other groups, the Methodists were concerned about the suffering in Europe. The September 10, 1914, issue of The Christian Advocate called for gifts and donations to the Board of Foreign Missions in order to help those Europeans affected by the war. The following week the Board of Foreign Missions established the Methodist War Relief Fund. By June of 1915 donations to this fund amounted to $101,503.00.

Annual Conferences held during September of 1914 approved of Wilson's neutrality policy and his October 4 Peace Day of Prayer. They also supported efforts for international conciliation and arbitration. For example, the Ohio Conference Report of the Committee on Reform stated, "We insist that war is out of date, and that no difficulty can arise between nations which cannot be settled by arbitration." 59 This Committee also stated that the war was not an indication of a breakdown of Christian civilization but of the survival of pagan ideals.

The Social Service Committee of the West Ohio Conference lamented, "Just as the prophecy of our Lord and the dreams of his disciples of good will among men seemed about to be realized and the peace of the world secure, we find ourselves witnesses of the bloodiest conflict beneath which our world has ever trembled." 60 Thus, the optimism of the prewar years had suffered a blow.
Just as some of the peace movements tried to use education to stave off American interest in the fighting, so, too, the Methodist Church made some attempts in this area. The September 17, 1914, issue of The Christian Advocate contained an article on "The Sunday School and World Order." This article suggested to Sunday school teachers that "...our boys must be brought up to hate war." The teachers were encouraged to "...expose in their classes the fallacy of settling international disputes by force of arms." The article also encouraged both the teachers and their superintendents to publicly lead prayers for peace in their Sunday schools.

Many American Methodists were concerned about the war in relation to the possible failure of Christianity. This theme appeared in their newspapers frequently during the war years. The continuous Methodist response was that Christianity was not failing, civilization was increasing in spirit, and the war was only an interruption in the process.

A Christian Advocate article of October 8, 1914, stated "...that folly it is...to suppose that even a world war can defeat the growing aspiration of mankind for social order and international peace. Can we not see that in a hundred years we have made a mighty advance in public sentiment respecting the time significance of war? Where but among small or obscure sects was it condemned as murder a century ago?" In a Methodist Review article, Bishop R.J. Cooke
of Portland, Oregon, expressed his views on the subject. Bishop Cooke wrote that war was inevitable; materialism, not Germany, was the cause. Throughout his article Bishop Cooke emphasized the falseness of materialism in all aspects of life. He even equated this to Darwin's theory of survival of the fittest and militarism. According to Cooke war was not necessary if Christianity would be lived by people. He urged the European people to look toward the postwar period with repentance and hope.63

Another idea that appeared in Methodist publications concerned the idea that war was a punishment from God for man's iniquities--especially in 1914, Europe's iniquities. Americans were warned about their own materialism lest they suffer a similar fate. This attitude of the purifying quality of war was shared by other church peace groups, especially some Church Peace Union members.

Meanwhile, the Church continued to support the Church Peace Union and its efforts for peace. These efforts included a message that the Union sent to President Wilson which expressed appreciation of his attitude as the Chief Executive of the nation on the question of national armament. This message ended with the following paragraph:
The present war in Europe has demonstrated beyond doubt the futility of military preparedness as a safeguard of international peace. We trust, therefore, that your policy will be sustained by the Congress of the United States, and to this end we pledge our hearty cooperation and support.

The church also supported the various projects of the Union such as relief work in Europe and the study of relations between the United States and Japan.

The Methodists were concerned about their missionary work. They worried about the havoc wrought by the war over the mission fields. The Church increased their efforts in this area, advertising for more support, especially monetary support, to both help the suffering in Europe and all those in their mission fields affected by the war.

The anti-military preparedness position of the Church Peace Union was a bit qualified by some Methodists who tried to balance militarism and vulnerability:

It is doubtless true that a spirit of excessive militarism, manifested in virtually making every able-bodied man in the nation subject to the call to arms, will develop in a people a certain arrogance and belligerence, always dangerous to the peace of its neighbors. But it is clear that a nation carried away by a sentimental disinclination to combat, can find itself the prey of some bully without a conscience. Common sense would seem to demand that the middle course be taken.
Thus, the Methodists seemed to express ideas closer to groups like the League to Enforce Peace than groups like the Fellowship of Reconciliation.

The proclamation of the blockade of the British Isles by submarines in early 1915, and the retaliatory measures adopted by the British government for the isolation of Germany, triggered a response from the Church. Methodists expressed disgust over the talk concerning the need for rules of war, especially the new phenomenon of submarine warfare. The Church did not seem to be in complete touch with the horrible implications of recent events.66

As the war dragged on, the Methodists became less sure of the "good" of the war. An example of this attitude can be found in an April 29 Christian Advocate article which described "...the intellectual and moral fogginess of our age..."67 This attitude is further expressed in an Episcopal address given at a Bishops' meeting held in Des Moines, Iowa, in May of 1915 shortly after the sinking of the Lusitania. The bishops stated that they

...are moved with the deepest concern by the unprecedented conditions of tumult and strife which fill the world and which threaten the integrity and life of nations. The Christian Church is grievously disappointed and struck with horror by the enmity of nations to the sword for settlement of political questions. It is returning backward a thousand years by which the shadow is gone down on the dial.68

Though this attitude did not dominate Methodist publications and statements, it was always there in the background.
The Methodists supported Wilson's response to the sinking of the Lusitania. The Christian Advocate approved the moral denunciation and expressed relief that the voice of the jingo was silenced; but stated that, "The nation desires peace, but not at any price." 69 Nine hundred Methodist men of New York City, assembled for a dinner, sent Wilson a telegram expressing sympathy and support for his actions. 70

Later, when Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, resigned over Wilson's second Berlin note concerning a German response to the Lusitania sinking, The Christian Advocate expressed both regret that Bryan was deserting the ship and support for President Wilson who was still trying to preserve peace. 71

The presence of German Methodists directly complicated the American Methodist attitude. Through The Christian Advocate, German Methodist ministers sent an open letter to the American Methodists. In this letter, while they thanked the American church for all of its past support and hoped that friendship would knit together again after the war, they also defended their allegiance to Germany and criticized the American Methodists for finding fault with German militarism while they said nothing against French, Russian, and English militarism and the one-sided contraband situation. The editorial staff on the Advocate responded to this letter. The Advocate explained that the one-sided contraband was simply
due to the effective blockade of Germany. The editors also criticized the armament industry on both sides of the Atlantic.\textsuperscript{72}

In commentaries in their newspapers, the Methodists supported the need for a World Court and an International Police—ideas similar to League to Enforce Peace and other peace societies. They wrote about the need for calling a conference of the neutral powers to offer mediation.\textsuperscript{73} The Church criticized the flaws in the Hague Conventions concerning the outlawry of gas which the belligerents were rising. They urged the need for the World Court backed by adequate police power where offenders could be effectively dealt with.\textsuperscript{74}

The Methodists also supported the ideas of the League to Enforce Peace. In their press they printed its platform and stated that its plan was a hopeful one recognizing that it "...reconciles the demands of the pacifists for the limitation of armaments and eventual disarmament with the demand of the militarists for the protection that armament affords."\textsuperscript{75} Methodists also felt that this plan was not a settlement for now but a guarantee against possible hostilities in the future.

Annual Conferences in Eastern Pennsylvania and Ohio expressed their views concerning the war. The Philadelphia Conference met in March, 1915. Its Committee on Legislation
and Reform presented resolutions that declared their abhorrence of war, its un-Christian aspects, and "...that the nations should be federated, with just international laws, and a court to administer and execute the same." The Ohio Conference continued its declaration against war. The Conference urged the expansion of the Hague Tribunal into an effective World Court with an International Police Force. The West Ohio Conference sent a message to President Wilson pledging its prayer and support with confidence that he would direct the affairs of state wisely.

As the American munitions traffic increased, The Christian Advocate reported on American protests. And as "preparedness" became more and more the concern and popular idea of the day, the Methodists were reluctant to jump on the bandwagon. Methodist opinion stated that "...preparedness shall go no farther than the minimum requirements of defense against attack by land and sea." In place of militarism the publication encouraged the development of international law based on the New Testament.

Not all Methodists were reluctant about preparedness. Some believed that "...the duty of our nation...is to cherish and defend our God-given rights and heritage. To imagine we can do this, if the test comes, without 'preparedness' in folly." They also believed a preparedness position was not a precarious voyage but the possible upholding of
Christendom and civilization, mandated by the United States' position as the moral leader of the world.

In 1916, an election year, the Northern General Conference was scheduled to meet. Some attending this Conference did not want to discuss the war or any related issues. But this group was overruled and a World Conditions Committee was appointed. Their report stated that:

We...desire to express to Woodrow Wilson...our prayerful sympathy...We also declare our willingness to cooperate with him in promoting those interests which are at once the interests of this nation and of the whole family of nations...We assure our brethren now bearing arms, and all who suffer bereavement and loss through the ravages of war, of our fellowship with their sufferings, and our prayers in their behalf...

We recommend: That the Federal Council of the Churches...be requested to arrange for a Council of Churches to meet at the time and place of the European peace conference, to devise plans for reestablishment of cooperation and the more complete articulation of righteousness and peace and the advancement of the Kingdom of heaven on earth...We also recommend that our membership in the Federal Council of the Churches...be authorized to provide for a representation of the Methodist Episcopal Church in such council.

This report was adopted by the Conference on May 29.

E.B. Chappell, D.D., a delegate from the Methodist Episcopal Church, South addressed the Conference. Chappell looked to a postwar world with a new world order. Both the United States and American Methodism must not shirk the leadership role that the new world order will bring. They
must use this opportunity after the darkness of war, to fulfill the vision of love and peace in the world.81

Other evidence of the beginning concern for shaping the postwar world can be found in Methodist publications of the period. For example, the Methodist Review described a postwar Europe, especially a postwar Germany, as a fertile place for Christ's/Methodist work. The editors felt that the Churches in Europe would be liberated from their past ties to state sects and a catholicity of religions would be possible. Thus the war acted as a disrupter of traditional church structures, especially church-state relationships.

Thanksgiving and Christmas of 1916 brought both prayers of thanksgiving for a "safe" United States and concern for a war-torn Europe. To express this, the Advocate used such phrases as, "...the prayer of gratitude that we are not as other nations are...sincere petition...that those who have the control and direction of our national policies...may be so guided by the Divine Wisdom that we may continue to be 'kept out of war'...and...we open our hearts in deep sympathy for the stricken peoples of the world..."82 At Christmas of that year, the Advocate urged the belligerents to respond to the German Chancellor's announcement that the Central Powers were willing to consider the terms of peace. The Advocate wrote that negotiations leading to a permanent peace were far better than reaching a settlement through killing.83
The year 1916 continued to find local support for peace amongst Methodist groups as well. At the 1916 Philadelphia Annual Conference, resolutions were passed that expressed this protest against the "horrible slaughter." The Conference also resolved that:

...a committee of five be appointed to represent this Conference in co-operating with any other committees in presenting this protest to our representatives in Congress, that it may be presented through them to the House and Senate...to the President of the U.S.84

They further resolved to request their Church papers to publicize this protest for the knowledge of the whole Church. January, 1917, found Germany resuming unrestricted submarine warfare and Wilson trying to direct secret negotiations with the British and German governments. On January 22, Wilson delivered his famous plea before Congress and the world. Both The Christian Advocate and Bishop Luther B. Wilson publicized their support of the President's call for "peace without victory--among equals"--by negotiations.95 The Advocate also supported Wilson's diplomatic break with Germany on February 1. The Advocate voted support for this severing of diplomatic ties, while expressing hope that peace without U.S. involvement would be possible.86 But now, with the sinking of peaceful American vessels, the Advocate saw no other option than to restrain "...the
lawbreaker by exerting all the force at its command. (But) God grant that even at the eleventh hour prudent counsels at Berlin may avert the catastrophe. 87

While these crises continued to develop during March, both the Philadelphia and Central Pennsylvania Conferences were meeting. The Philadelphia Conference sent a resolution to President Wilson expressing the Conference's confidence in his decisions. 88 The Central Pennsylvania Conference also sent a resolution to Wilson expressing, among other things, that "...We fully endorse the present attitude of our government on the mighty concerns and international conditions." 89 While the Conference was still in session, Wilson telegraphed his cordial thanks for Pennsylvania Methodist support.

When Congress finally declared war, the American Methodist Church continued its support of governmental policy. They did so without war mongering and jingoism. The Christian Advocate declared:

It is an untraveled path on which this nation has entered. What is ahead of us as a people or as individuals no one can say. We believe that the righteousness of the cause will warrant any sacrifice, and that some stages of the way will be marked by blood and tears, at the end of it lies larger prospect of freedom and peace than any which the world has ever known. 90

This editorial also warned against any racial suspicions against naturalized Americans.
When the United States became committed to war, the concept of war serving Christianity found its way into the editorials of The Christian Advocate. The editorials emphasized that war presents to Christianity an opportunity for spiritual service. Along with spiritual service the Methodists were encouraged to give material service as well. 91

This material support was promised to the government by the Federal Council of Churches (the Methodists were supporting members), The Christian Advocate, the Home Missions Board, and the Bishops. For example, the Home Mission Board announced the sending of a resolution to Wilson promising help in all forms of preparedness. 92 From their semi-annual session at Grand Rapids, Michigan, the Bishops proclaimed:

We stand with the President...when he said: 'The right is more precious than peace...the world must be made safe for democracy...'. We urge that your patriotism take on sacrificial forms... We shall expect our hospitals (and staffs) to offer their wards...for the care of war orphans at home and abroad...We send you a message of hope...the approaching dawn of a better day. God reigns. 93

The Methodist people responded to the call of their Bishops. Liberty bonds were purchased; both ministers and lay people volunteered to minister to the soldier; and war relief funding increased. Article after article in The Christian
Advocate described the Methodists' various services for the war effort. The Methodists even set up their own committees such as the Methodist War Emergency Committee, to to the task.

As the American Methodists took the side of the Allies, they still took time to speak kindly about their fellow Methodists in Central Power nations. The Christian Advocate stated that "...though technically 'enemies', and temporarily cut off from the fellowship, the old friendly feeling (with our Central Power brethren) will abide." Bishop Cooke expressed similar attitudes. He wrote:

> If the Church of God in America fails to act toward all men of every race and color and tongue in the light of eternity, then the church as an organized institution of religion will not only have failed to serve the nation in its hour of need, it will also have failed her Lord himself and list its chance with the aliens when the war is over.

Thus, the Methodists were sensitive about their fellow Methodists overseas and alien Americans at home.

Methodists also expressed opinions on conscientious objectors. In a published letter in the Advocate, Bishop Cooke wrote that conscientious objection was not a church matter but a state matter. But then he went on to criticize the conscientious objector with such statements as "He will not go to war, but is willing to enjoy the results of war... must abide by the consequences of his opinions...a man without a country..." Emily Green Balch, of the Fellowship of
Reconciliation, disagreed with Bishop Cooke. In a letter to the Advocate editor, she wrote, "...Let us least be fair enough to recognize that he believes that he is serving not himself but us." The Christian Advocate expressed support for the religious conscientious objector who had held his belief for a number of years but little support for the "convenient" objector who was merely trying to avoid the draft.

Throughout the war the Methodists were generally optimistic. However, as during the period prior to the U.S. intervention, a more critical attitude was sometimes aired. For example, one Advocate read, "...what do we behold... Bitterness, hatred, cruelty, destruction, wantonness, bestiality, sacrilege, suffering...have been let loose upon the world." As the war raged into 1918 and American involvement became much more than merely sending weapons and money to the Allies, the American Methodists continued to be loyal to the American cause. For example, a January 31 statement by the Publishing Agents announced the change in editorial policy of Der Christliche Apologiste (the German-speaking Conference publication) from an unsupportive Allied position to a supportive one, partly due to the appointment of a new associate editor. And when the German-speaking
Conference met in February, 1918, they spoke out, after an eleven month silence, in support of President Wilson and the American cause. 101

This change in policy by German-speaking Methodists may have resulted from “pressure” by the Methodist Church and is an example of the intensification of the pro-war stance of the Church. Another example can be found in a published reply from Wilson to Bishop Theodore Henderson of the Methodist War Council concerning rumors of a premature peace. Wilson accused Henderson that “our present and immediate task is to win the war. Nothing shall turn us aside until it is accomplished.” 102 The Advocate printed this reply and commented that “Against the Kaiser’s argument of terror, enforced during Holy Week by every weapon that perverted science could devise...(the President) with the united nation at his back, prepared for the utmost sacrifice...”103 Articles concerning the purchase of Liberty Bonds; getting involved in helping the war effort, especially through agencies such as the Y.M.C.A. and the Red Cross; and support of mission efforts increased in momentum and quantity throughout the summer of 1918. Articles concerning Methodist determination to win the war because it was a fight waged for God’s justice also increased in number and intensity during that summer.
In early May the Methodist Church, South held its General Conference. One of the first motions of this Conference was to send a telegram of support to Wilson. Among other ideas the Conference wrote, "...We assure you that the church we represent stands united with you in the invincible determination to secure for humanity the opportunity to reach the full development through liberty." The Conference also discussed its involvement in war work—describing such activities as chaplain work and work in the Red Cross. The General Conference encouraged Annual Conferences to continue their dedication to this war work.

Many annual conferences of 1918 also expressed support for the war effort. Again the increased momentum for the war can be seen. For example, the Philadelphia Conference passed a resolution which, in addition to offering support, stated:

We repudiate the foolish pacifism which speaks of peace by negotiations. Victory alone is the road to true peace. We urge the speedy enactment of the laws which will meet out to German propagandists and traitorous Americans, the full penalty of spies.

The Central Pennsylvania Conference expressed similar feelings of support; advocated work in such agencies as the Red Cross; and encouraged the selling of Liberty Loans. The Conference also expressed the same criticism of "so-called pacifists" who were "seditiously" pro-German. The
Entertaiment for the Conference even included the singing of "There Will Be No Kaiser Any More."

106 Similar ideas of "righteous vengeance" can be found in the New York Conference. The Christian Advocate reported on various annual conferences and their tone of "thrilling patriotism."

Not all Methodists expressed this intensity. James A. Beebe, of the Iliff School of Theology, Denver, wrote in the Methodist Review on "The Christianization of Patriotism."

Beebe gave his full support to Wilson and his terms of peace. But he did so with less strong phrases as those used by the Advocate and annual conference resolutions. Beebe ended his article by repeating the opportunity Christianity had in the midst of this dark hour theme.

In response to such events as the Austrian Note and German messages, The Christian Advocate wrote: "America has no will to destroy Germany. Revenge and reprisal are not the motives of her mighty war effort. But America does unitedly strive for such an ending of this war as shall make it impossible for the ruffian blood of Prussia to launch another thrust at the heart of liberty." 107 Thus, as the war drew close to its end, the Methodist Church continued its unquestioning support of the American role in it.

Thus, one sees parallel developments between the American Methodist response to the war and American involvement and
the response of traditional peace societies and the League to Enforce Peace. In 1914 the American Methodist Church deplored war, urged negotiation, the need for a World Court and an international Police Force. But once the United States entered the war, the conflict was seen as necessary in order to achieve a higher good—liberty. Like many of the peace societies, the Methodists from the beginning were pro-British despite the presence of over 63,000 German-speaking Methodists within the United States. The Church took a slightly stronger anti-preparedness position than some of the peace societies but this was aimed more at armament manufacturers than the government. Throughout the whole crisis Wilson received no public criticism from the Methodists. Along with the Church Peace Union, the Methodist Church maintained a more moral tone to their reasonings than did some peace societies. Unlike peace reformers such as Andrew Carnegie, who thought in terms of what was good for business, the Methodists reasoned in terms of what was good for people's souls. Finally, it seems that the Methodists had no obvious relationship to the more liberal peace societies and pacifist groups, who supported such issues as conscientious objection, domestic social reform, and who were conflicted about the U.S. involvement in the war.
On November 11, 1918, at 11:00 A.M. an armistice was signed ending World War I. The task at hand was to piece four years of destruction into a whole that would mean permanent peace. Long before the last shot was fired, many individuals and groups began thinking about and describing their particular version of a postwar world. Woodrow Wilson had his Fourteen Points while the other Allies planned their demand of a just due from Germany. Peace advocates had their vision of a postwar world governed by arbitration or international law or a world legislature. Some groups combined all three ideas with each group's specific emphasis on the types of structure of combination. An example of this planning can be found in the League to Enforce Peace. This group, as had been discussed, envisioned a league dominated by leading Allied powers which would enforce peace mainly through the use of sanctions. By 1918 the League to Enforce Peace was focusing mainly on the structure of the new organization rather than guiding principles such as arbitration. The Church Peace Union with the Federal Council supported the formation of such a league and helped to publicize the idea. The World Peace Foundation also continued to support the League to Enforce Peace through financial grants, and in October of 1917 it issued the first of a series of pamphlets under the heading, A League of Nations.
Not all groups endorsed the ideas of the League. Many pacifists could not accept its plank on force. The American Peace Society continued to support the ideal of a congress of nations while at the same time denying it any power. The Carnegie Endowment focused its interest on an international court. It concentrated on publishing many works that would build public opinion favorable to the idea of building peace through law. The World's Court League also supported the concept of an international judicial organization. After April of 1917, it suffered from a limited budget. Efforts to affiliate with the League to Enforce Peace were made, but the issue of sanctions kept them apart.

The ideas of these various groups occasionally were sent to the President. However, Wilson was not very receptive. He was still immersed in conducting the war. And it seems that he was also reluctant to be tied down by any one plan before he went to Paris and consulted with the other world leaders. Though Wilson developed his ideas independently of the peace societies, they were similar to them in many ways. But Wilson practically eliminated the idea of a world court. And he broadened the concept of employing arms and economic pressures in order to compel the submission of disputes, to include "the use of any force" in many more situations than the League had originally outlined. Meanwhile, League to Enforce Peace officials and other enthusiasts were already in touch with European leaders.
Wilson left for the Paris Peace Conference on December 4, 1918. The League to Enforce Peace sent Hamilton Holt and Oscar S. Straus to Paris hoping to air their views. Straus, a veteran of Theodore Roosevelt's cabinet, had loyally supported the League to Enforce Peace. Holt planned to attend the conference to report activities in The Independent.

The official instructions to Straus and Holt ordered them to support Wilson in his plan, to keep their society informed on how it could best support the President, and to find some means to co-ordinate the work of the League to Enforce Peace with similar societies in Europe. Others were present to aid Holt and Straus. These included Frederick Lynch of the Church Peace Union and Fannie Fern Andrews of the American School Peace League, an affiliate of the American Peace Society.109

Delegates from Holt's group and other European Societies met and formulated a "Protocol" as a guide for the statesmen who were drafting the Covenant. The "Protocol" stated that all nations should be equal in voting; an international court should be created to hear justiciable disputes; a committee on conciliation should determine whether questions should be referred to the court or to arbitration; and a representative council should develop international law and maintain order. The statement on sanctions was less definite. Holt had urged the use of military as well as economic force to execute decisions of the court, but the provision finally
read, "economic, and, if necessary, military enforcement."
The delegates also agreed that members should prevent or
curtail "jointly, by the use of all means at their disposal,"
all disturbances of the peace," but they did not elaborate
upon what this meant or how it should be applied. They also
agreed that the proposed league should control armaments,
an idea which initially aroused opposition from the
Americans who insisted that any direct regulation would be
objectionable to governments. Special resolutions endorsed
such ideals as an international labor bureau and Mrs. Andrews' 
dream of an international commission on education. 110

These resolutions reached the statesmen drafting the
Covenant. Holt met with Wilson on January 30, 1919, and
with Colonel Edward House, Wilson's personal adviser, on
January 31. He and Straus also talked with House and other
officials after February 10. What they learned in these
conversations often disturbed them. Holt wanted a proposed
league to have the authority "to create and develop interna-
tional law." He also questioned the creation of nine powers
vested with extensive authority. This made the league not
one of peoples but of governments. He wished a genuine
democratic deliberative assembly, with a council functioning
as an executive agency and conciliatory body. Holt's ideas
were not heeded. 111
On February 14, Wilson presented the Covenant to a plenary session of the peace conference and to the world. Article I fulfilled the goal of all internationalists because it realized Ladd’s old dream of a congress meeting “at stated intervals” and whenever else needed. Article II provided that each nation be given one vote regardless of its size or strength. Article III created a council in which the major powers dominated. This area was part of the Draft Proposal of the League to Enforce Peace. Article X which embodied the modern concept of collective security, called for members “to respect and preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League.” In case of aggression or danger of such, “the Executive Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.”

The League to Enforce Peace and other internationalists disliked such an opended clause.

Article XII through XV dealt with the idea of arbitration. By 1919 many internationalists had moved away from their earlier pre-arbitration stance due, in their view, to its limitations. The Covenant did not place a court of justice in the heart of the proposed organization as did such organizations as the League to Enforce Peace. This provision for a court was included over the objections of Wilson.
Article XVI contained the clauses for sanctions under Article XII. The members of the League would compel the submission of disputes to pacific settlement. This article incorporated the basic philosophy of the League to Enforce Peace, consisting of compulsory hearing and enforced delay. But where the League to Enforce Peace called for an automatic use of both economic and military forces to compel the submission of a dispute, the Covenant did not. Only after Council action could arms be used. In the final formulation, even this stance was diluted so that in actuality only public opinion could operate as a genuine sanction. Finally, Article XVIII gave the League the power to control trade in armaments, a point which pacifist internationalists had often advocated.

The Covenant roughly reflected views similar to those held by traditional peace spokesmen, these being views which most internationalists had adopted as well. The Preamble observed that the proposed league would seek cooperation, peace, and security, "by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war." The signatories would agree to maintain justice, respect treaties; and pursue "one, just and honorable relations" with their neighbors. These ideas in addition to the emphasis upon arbitration mirrored a pacifist outlook. The Covenant also achieved a "Congress of Nations," the old "American plan" of Ladd and Burritt. It advanced that principle of conference which
had been realized on the broad scale for the first time at the Hague meetings. It now made that system permanent insofar as an assembly was concerned.114

The Covenant's provisions on force and judicial procedures were not exactly in line with such groups as the League to Enforce Peace, who from experience knew how conventional-minded men were and how alarming bold ideas could be. That group had long ago begun talking about the need for a limited use of sanctions. Yet soon the Peace League would change its position to one of greater force. This was not a change of heart on the part of the League so much as a concession to the Wilson camp.

Wilson would allow no submission to him of plans by any peace groups before he went to Paris. Throughout late December, January, and the first weeks of February, the League to Enforce Peace officials adopted a wait-and-see attitude until they could determine what the President had done at Paris. Other groups followed the same philosophy. The World's Court League, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the American Peace Society did not modify their programs. They still hoped for a judicial system, for the development of law, and for some type of federation, but they began no new campaigns at home.

On February 15, 1919, the newspapers first printed the Covenant. Many individuals and groups began proposing
amendments. The League to Enforce Peace could not agree upon an official slate of changes so they initially only adopted a resolution which asked for "a more specific reservation of the Monroe Doctrine." The World's Court League did not become involved in the discussions because in February it merged with the New York Peace Society to form the League of Nations Union. The new group officially took a vague stand by supporting the Covenant without being "not irrevocably committed to any particular detail." Since the World's Court League had already changed the name of its journal to the League of Nations Magazine, the new association actually endorsed the Wilsonian program more strongly than its official statement would imply. Some conflict within the new association in regards to support of the Covenant was thus implied. This was played out with the periodical campaign for acceptance of the League while most of the leaders of the Union were withholding their full participation in the crusade for ratification in 1919. It seems this conflict arose because such men as Theodore E. Burton and Charles Levermore were too dedicated to the judicial concept to be enthusiastic about the Covenant. 115

The American Peace Society and some of the nation's leading liberals also expressed doubt which kept them from fully endorsing the League of Nations. The Society noted a lack of "judicial processes" in the Covenant which made the
"Prussian in its conception and in its dangers." Thus, they refused to support a program which embodied economic and military sanctions. A large number of individual pacifists likewise hesitated despite their earlier advocacy of an international organization. They expressed concern over the neglect of law and courts and of the League's essentially undemocratic organization.

With these criticisms in mind, Wilson returned to Paris on March 14, after a brief visit to the United States. He proceeded to present revisions to the Covenant. On April 28 the revised Covenant became an integral part of the Treaty of Versailles. The revised Covenant contained a reference to the Monroe Doctrine in a new Article XXI. A new paragraph in Article XIII provided for the exemption of domestic questions by defining justiciable disputes. Article XXII indicated that no government had to accept a mandate against its will. These and other revisions still did not incorporate the legal and procedural ideas which most internationalists held. They wanted a court, not in the future, but as an integral part of the league and as its major agency. They wanted a league with power to formulate and codify law. The revisions continued to subordinate law to sanctions.116

The first organized group to condemn the Treaty of Versailles came from the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, whose international congress at Zurich,
meeting May 12-17, 1919, declared:

This International Congress of Women expresses its deep regret that the terms of peace proposed at Versailles should so seriously violate the principles upon which alone a just and lasting peace can be secured, and which the democracies of the world had come to accept... By guaranteeing the fruits of the secret treaties to conquerors, the terms of peace tacitly sanction secret diplomacy, deny the principles of self-determination, recognize the right of the victors to the spoils of war, and create all over Europe discords and animosities, which can only lead to future wars... By the demand for the disarmament of one set of belligerents only, the principle of justice is violated and the rule of force continued.

In 1919 the Woman's Peace Party had merged with this group; Jane Addams and other Peace Party members were among the Zurich Conference participants.

The League to Enforce Peace campaigned for the proposed league, as defined in the Treaty of Versailles, in the United States. It held a number of "State Ratification Convention" between May 21 and June 7, sending a special railroad car with Taft and other notables on tour. Additional speakers delivered an average of twelve thousand addresses a day in May. The League to Enforce Peace also enrolled members in increasing numbers. By the spring of 1919, over three hundred thousand persons, some of them prominent, had joined. The efforts of the League to Enforce Peace helped maintain opinion highly favorable to membership and to the proposed league. Support for Wilson may have been waning among the American public, but no marked decline occurred concerning the League of Nations.
But public attitudes did not determine the course of events in the Senate, where the Treaty faced many pitfalls. In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chairman Henry Cabot Lodge proposed some amendments which centered on some procedural changes and the deletion of toning down of Article X. As Wilson became intransigent over these resolutions/reservations, the League to Enforce Peace experienced international dissension over whether or not to accept the amendments and thus weakening their influence. Other peace organizations who tried to influence the Senate made very little impact.

This ineffectiveness also touched the League of Nations Union, which has to suspend publication of its magazine in July, 1919, due to inadequate resources. It had also sought unsuccessfully to merge with the League to Enforce Peace.

Other groups, though not suffering from ineffectiveness, took a less active part in acquiring ratification than such groups as the League to Enforce Peace. The American Peace Society continued its destructive criticism on some issues while it supported other reservations in an ambiguous fashion. It objected most to the provisions for the use of force and to the inadequate judicial machinery. Even as the Senate tallied its votes, the Society suggested that a third Hague Conference convene to create a peace structure based upon principles of justice. The Carnegie Endowment
took no official stand, but it did publish literature on internationalism and the peace treaty. The World Peace Foundation likewise operated indirectly through its subsidy and publication program.\textsuperscript{118}

Religious bodies played a more prominent role during the ratification controversy than did the older peace organizations. The Church Peace Union continued to support the work of the World Alliance for International Friendship and also the Committee on the Churches and the Moral Aims of the War. Their concern was to assure that the United States joined the proposed League; the terms under which they joined were of lesser concern. The Federal council of Churches also participated in the campaign. It sponsored meetings, underwrote speaking tours, and flooded ministers with pamphlets. The results appeared in an almost universal endorsement of the League by the major Protestant denomination, their clergymen, and their journals.\textsuperscript{119}

This campaign had little influence on the Senate. On November 19 it failed to approve a treaty. In response to this Senate refusal, the League to Enforce Peace and other societies embarked upon a new campaign. First, they sought to arouse the American people and in this way compel the Senate to reconsider the treaty. They launched appeals in the form of articles, broadsides, speeches, editorials, and prayers, all of which called for agreement. Second, they
approached senatorial leaders on both sides. They particularly sought the elimination of the irreconcilables from discussions, since the latter had helped write the Lodge reservations. These groups reasoned that only the true friends of the League should draft the qualifications, for only they could arrive at a reasonable formula acceptable to all supporters of the Covenant. The President would then be forced to accept their handiwork.120

For a few weeks it appeared that an agreement would be reached. But then on December 14 an announcement was issued from the White House that the opposition should formulate the reservations, that the Democratic senators should be firm, and that under no circumstances should there be a compromise on Article X. On January 8, Wilson blamed the Senate for the deadlock and insisted that the United States accept the Treaty "without changes which alter its meaning." The Senate, for a time, opened discussions on the Treaty. But when it came to Article X, negotiations collapsed and the Senate remained divided both along party lines and between revisionists and irreconcilables.

During this period internationalists united for the first time during the Treaty fight. Representatives of twenty-six societies favoring membership in the League sought to coordinate their work by sending delegates to conferences in Washington on January 13 and February 9. Their delegates discussed the situation with Lodge and other key figures and
later issued an open letter to the President and the Senate urging ratification with compromise reservations. They claimed to represent fifty million people who wanted the United States in the League and who would not understand why a few fine points in wording in the proposed reservations should abort that desire. Many of these persons and groups again embarked on lengthy speaking tours early in 1920.

On February 9 the Senate voted to reconsider the Treaty of Versailles. But a stalemate soon developed as no new spirit of compromise evolved between the White House and Lodge. And on March 19 the Treaty went down to defeat a second time. The pro-League peace groups were in despair. They saw their dream of a League of Nations begin without the United States; and they saw no hope that the Senate would ever reconsider the issue.

Thus, though the peace movement had definite ideas about a post war world, they were basically unable to execute their ideas. Wilson often ignored them. The Wilson Papers disclose only a cursory correspondence; hence, none of them influenced him directly, and he refused to approach them. He did acknowledge on rare occasions their support in the struggle, but he still chose his own path. Wilson also contributed to the division in the ranks of the various groups because they rarely knew whether to follow him or their own convictions. He never assumed charge of the organized forces favoring
ratification, nor did he co-operate with them in any united campaign. The groups themselves, such as the League to Enforce Peace, split over the reservations for Senate ratification.

Even if the Treaty with its Covenant had been passed, it would not have contained all of the ideas of the various peace groups. For example, many groups wanted to place more emphasis on arbitration and a world court with all its relatedness to international law. Some groups wanted to see world union; this the Covenant did not provide. The Covenant reflected little of previous peace work; it did not even mention the Hague system. The pacifists did not support the League mainly because of its punitive aspects and undemocratic structure. Though they spoke out against the Treaty, their opposition was not a determining factor in its defeat.

Meanwhile, some Methodists expressed opinions about the shape of the peace and a postwar world. One opinion focused on the belief that Germany should not be allowed to dictate any terms of the peace. Some, such as Bishop Cooke, advocated Germany’s unconditional surrender. Another opinion focused mainly on a postwar Europe, and to a lesser extent, the United States, and the need and opportunity for evangelization. There was general concern over salvaging Christianity in war-torn Europe and there was a specific concern regarding
Methodist missionary activity. The General Conference of 1916 appointed a commission to study the whole field of Methodism in Europe and to formulate plans for the furthering of Methodist mission work there.\textsuperscript{123}

An example of this concern was the Centenary program. Initiated at the General Conference of 1916, the Centenary was a celebration of the one-hundredth anniversary of the beginning of Methodist missions, and the establishment of the Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Thus, in the midst of the most devastating war the world had ever seen, the Methodists were launching the largest program for the Christianization of the world ever planned up to that point in time. The program was a combination of education for the purpose of developing evangelistic awareness, the cultivation of the Church’s prayer life, and a fund raising campaign in order to facilitate the evangelization process. The spirit to save the world was high among American Methodists. In their view, the evangelization crusade was mandated by the reasons the world was engulfed in war and also by the human suffering incurred. These evangelistic attitudes were evidenced in many Methodist statements during the war and were intricately woven with their ideas for peacekeeping.

The Methodist response to news of the armistice was one both of joy and relief. The Bishops published a
message of 'felicitations' to the President and the military forces hoping that building a permanent peace would now be possible. The Methodists also expressed their relief and joy through practical measures.

This practicality took the form of reconstructing projects—both in Europe and the United States. After the signing of the armistice, a Department of War Emergency and Reconstruction was organized as part of the Centenary campaign. It took over the duties of the National War Council. Two committees, one on reconstruction abroad and a second on reconstruction at home, were formed. The committee on home reconstruction gave special attention to effects of the infamous influenza epidemic, especially in relation to the emergency situations in Methodist hospitals and orphanages. It also assisted the disband soldiers to return to their schools and colleges. The committee formed for reconstruction work abroad included such activities as: relief of immediate suffering caused by the war, the restoration of property, the care of orphans, and the extension of schools and churches wherever possible. The War-Work Commission of the Methodist Episcopal church, South performed similar activities.

In addition to practical independent action, the Methodists also had some ideas concerning the upcoming Peace Conference. The Advocate urged that the Peace Conference be guided by the Christian principles of justice, reparation, restitution—but not by revenge. They also supported Wilson's
decision to go to Paris himself for "...no voice but his
can express so forcibly the idealism of America which
ought to dominate the deliberations." In its end of the
year editorial, the Advocate supported the idea of a League
of Nations.

Various groups of Methodists with various causes also
traveled to Paris during the Peace Conference. Some traveled
with the Federal council group that went to Paris to represent
American ecumenical Protestants and their views. Included
in the American delegation was W. W. Pinson, general secre-
tary of the Board of Missions of the Methodist Episcopal
Church, South. This group presented Wilson with resolutions
concerning a league of nations. Wilson introduced these
resolutions to the Peace Conference as representing the
sentiment of the Protestant churches in the United States.

Another group, including Methodists, who lobbied at the
Paris Peace Conference was the Anti-Saloon League. The
League was an interdenominational organisation closely tied
to Methodist leaders and congregations across the nation.
Flushed with the success of their prohibition campaign,
some members of this group also campaigned for prohibition
of alcoholic beverages among the Allied forces. Included
in the campaign group were Methodists such as Bishop
James Cannon, Jr., of the Southern Church. Though this
concern was publicised in the Advocate and a study group sent
to the trenches in France, it was not a popular idea, and
little came of the campaign. This idea of concern for American soldiers overseas and their possible moral corruption due to drink, developed into concern for the whole world, its morality and corruption—the Anti-Saloon League's presence at the Paris Peace Conference. Bishop Cannon and Dr. H.B. Carré, of Vanderbilt University, were among the League's emissaries in Paris attempting to promote the cause of world prohibition in those countries who were still not independent, such as the African states. They advocated for the concept that no clause of any treaty with a newly formed country would take away that nation's right to prohibit the use of alcohol and narcotics if it chose to do so.\textsuperscript{129} They also hope to have a Bureau within the structure of the new League of Nations that would promote world prohibition, Cannon and his co-workers at Paris succeeded in getting into Article XXII of the Covenant of the League of Nations a provision making it incumbent upon mandatory powers to prohibit in certain mandated territory, "...such abuses as the slave trade, the arms traffic, and the liquor traffic." And they influenced the writing of Article XXIII with a clause calling for the naming of a committee for protection of children, which included the alcohol question in its program.\textsuperscript{130} Beyond this they were unsuccessful in implementing their world prohibition program.
Cannon took advantage of the international gathering at the Paris negotiations to arrange a world conference on alcoholism in the French capital for April 2-5, 1919. He and Carré traveled throughout Europe encouraging attendance to the upcoming conference. When the meeting was held, it was attended by forty-five delegates from twelve countries. At the conference plans were made for a world-wide temperance movement that culminated two months later, on June 7, in the organization of the World League Against Alcoholism. Cannon was chairman of the League's executive committee.

Ernest H. Cherrington, a Methodist and prominent Anti-Saloon League official was general secretary.

Other Methodists traveled to Europe during 1919 but not for the purpose of dealing with the Paris Peace Conference. Some went to study the post-war situation while others began work on helping to heal a devastated Europe. These projects were sponsored by the Centenary Rehabilitation Program. For example, Bishop E.H. Hughes served with the Y.M.C.A. mostly in France, and Bishop Hendrix went on a study tour of war-ravaged Europe in order to make Methodist relief more effective. These trips were examples of Methodist post-war activity and interest in Europe.

Meanwhile, back in the United States, American Methodists were expressing their hopes and views regarding the goals of the Paris Peace Conference. Optimism ran high. Democracy had destroyed autocracy forever. E.G. Richardson, D.D. of Brooklyn, New York, writing in the Methodist Review,
expressed that, "When the councilors assemble to settle the vast questions that the war has raised, the arbiters of world destinies will be representatives of the people..." Bishop Barry called upon the people to pray that God will be with the leaders at the peace table. The Advocate encouraged the assembled diplomats to feature religious liberty as part of the future treaty, especially in places in Europe where state churches still existed. According to Methodist thought, as a result of this victory of democracy, a new earth was being built, new nations were being formed. The Reverend Gardner S. Eldridge, D.D. of Jamestown, New York expressed some of these ideas when he wrote that the aim of the new world engineer was "...equality: that one child shall not see life from the top of the mountain and another from the depth of the valley; that one class shall not lord it over another, nor one man exploit another, nor one nation have superior rights to another..." This concern for equality, especially for the newly formed Central European countries was widely expressed throughout 1919.

American Methodists supported the idea of a League of Nations. Bishop William F. Anderson of the Department of War, Emergency and Reconstruction expressed his support for a League "...founded upon the principle of friendly cooperation and the law of good will." The Advocate stood firmly behind Wilson and the League idea. The editors wrote
that this was the most important war prevention feature of the Treaty. They had sharp criticism for those Senators and partisans who were sneering at the League as men capable of dashing the hopes of the people for the satisfaction of beating an opponent in an election. In the editors' view, "America owes it to herself and the world to stand strongly for a League of Nations." The editors detailed what they saw as the framework of this new League. They saw its structure as containing:

(1) an International Court, (2) a Council of Conciliation, (3) an agreement to use economic pressure and concerted force to coerce recalcitrant nations, (4) some form of administrative or executive organization, and (5) a congress for the revision and codification of international law... (even if necessary) ... a parliament of man, a federation of the world.  

Thus, the Methodists wanted a strong organization that was both judicial and political in structure. Many of these ideas became part of the final edition of the Covenant.

That March in the Methodist Review, Bishop Cooke discussed this new League in detail. After raising many questions concerning its effectiveness, enforciability, and possible harm to the Monroe Doctrine, Cooke went on to define conditions under which a League of Nations might exist. First, Cooke believed that before a League could exist there would have to be partial disarmament by all nations. He also believed that only justiciable cases,
not cases involving a nation’s honor, should be determined by the League. Cooke also raised the question, "...can a League be made a permanent institution without the moral aid of the Churches?" According to Cooke, "The Church of God alone is the Social Savior of the World." Thus, according to Bishop Cooke, without the help of Religion and the Churches, the new League would not work.

Oscar MacMillan Buck, writing in the March 27 issue of The Christian Advocate, presented a similar theme as Bishop Cooke’s regarding the value of the Church in maintaining peace and insuring the success of this new League of Nations. Buck argued for the need of a League of Nations due to the smallness of the world and its surrounding dangers such as labor upheaval, Germany’s unbroken and unrepentant state, European intrigues, and the yellow and black peril. He believed that a League of Nations was necessary in order to avoid utter chaos and destruction. But Buck worried about the safety of the League and the inevitable infiltration of man’s selfish spirit into it. According to the writer, the safeguard for the League was the missionary enterprise. He argued that, "Only as the spirit of Christ is built into the lives of the leaders and the peoples of the League will the peoples of the world be saved from their worst enemy, which has broken the treaties and federations of men in the past—human selfishness." And only the missionary enterprise was capable of bringing forth the spirit of Christ to all peoples of the earth.
As early as March of 1919 some Senators were criticizing the proposed League of Nations. While the Advocate was affirming the good intentions of these men in thinking of the good of their country, they were also challenging them, "in this solemn hour" to go beyond that—to the realization that American life was shed for the purpose of ending all war. In order to achieve this, according to the Advocate editors, associated action among nations was needed. The editors pleaded with Americans not to shut themselves up in shells of isolationism. They challenged the United States to take the leadership position offered to it; and to guide the world toward permanent peace.142

On May 10 the meeting of the Board of Bishops announced support for the proposed League of Nations. They stated that "...the Bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church pledge their constant prayer and their full endeavor to cultivate both a national and international spirit that shall make the covenant more effective. ..."143

Annual Conferences held that year also supported the League of Nations. At the Central Pennsylvania Conference, the Special Committee on the State of the Church and the Nation reported that "We unqualifiedly endorse the project and declare that we earnestly participate in what seems to be the almost universal desire for a so-called League of Nations...devoted exclusively to the double purpose of
preventing war and preserving democracy.\textsuperscript{144} The Philadelphia Conference also gave its support to Wilson at the peace table and to a League of Nations. The Conference went on to comment on the Church's vision of world evangelization. In its State of the Church and of the Country report, it stated:

> While the Church as an organized body has no place at the peace table in Paris, she is vitally interested in the outcome of those counsels. We are not so much concerned as to the actual form which the international compact may assume, as the peace, and justice and righteousness may be most firmly established in the earth.\textsuperscript{145}

Thus, form was not of the essence for many of the Protestant groups, but spirit and existence were paramount. The Philadelphia Conference's statement also evidenced the Methodist belief in separation of church and state. Laymen support at a "grass roots" level was also behind the League of Nations concept, as evidenced by the fifteen thousand Methodist laymen, the "Minutemen" of the church's Centenary Movement, working door-to-door for endorsement.\textsuperscript{146}

This optimistic and supportive attitude on the part of the Methodists did not reflect the whole scene, however. There were some misgivings expressed about the Peace Conference. The Christian Advocate expressed some concern that the peace being concluded would be indecisive.\textsuperscript{147}

There were also some misgivings about Germany's treatment in the peace treaty. The Advocate was almost contradictory in its attitude. After describing the bitter terms
of the Treaty for Germany, and urging that people not exult in Germany's fate, the editorial went on to exult in the 'triumph of the Treaty's principles of right, the vindication of the moral order of the Universe.' The editorial ended with this thought:

As he reads the provisions of the treaty which is to be the international framework of the new world era, the Christian who has profited by the hard schooling of the war will say from the depth of his heart, not that the Allies have enforced their will upon a prostrate foe, but 'Verily, the Lord God Omnipotent reigneth.'

It seems that there was some confusion between just vindication and bitterness.

The North Germany Conference shared similar feelings when they sent the following message to Methodists in Great Britain and the United States:

The outlines of the peace treaty of Versailles are in contradiction with the fourteen points of President Wilson and are repugnant to the principles of justice and humanity. We urgently pray you to use your influence to bring about an entire alteration of this treaty in a Christian and liberal sense...A peace treaty of penance and punishment will lead into anarchy and misery.

There was also some minority dissent concerning certain League reservations. Leading this group was Bishop T.B. Neely who, from his Philadelphia headquarters, led a small but vocal campaign. Neely's group was against the Monroe
Doctrine reservation because it allegedly was a unilateral policy completely alien to the spirit of the League of Nations. These dissenting views, however, were only a small element; and the majority of Methodists wholeheartedly espoused the existence of a League of Nations. In response to the Senate's first rejection of the Treaty, some Methodists expressed dismay and urged the Senate to reconsider the issue. They also viewed the quarrel between the President and the Senate, especially Lodge, as 'unseemly'. They urged both sides to compromise, listen to the will of the people and pass the Treaty. Between the two Senate attempts at ratification, the Methodists participated in the Federal Council's efforts to effect ratification. These efforts were outlined earlier in this chapter. Believing that public opinion was behind the League and optimistic of its passage, the Methodists, among other groups, were shocked when the Treaty failed for a second time in the Senate on March 19, 1920. Their vision of a bettering world was temporarily dimmed a bit.

Both the American Methodists and many traditional Peace Movement members advocated U.S. membership in a League of Nations. Both groups labored hard for the Treaty's ratification. They were also comfortable with a World Court, although some Peace Movement members felt that this was mandatory. It was in the area of structure where the two
groups differed. The Methodists in general were accepting of the structure of the League, as spelled out by the Covenant. The only dissenting Methodist voices were that of Bishop Cannon in the Anti-Saloon League and Neely's group were against certain League reservations. The Peace Movement members, however, wished to change several specific points of the Covenant. The pacificists, for example, expressed concern about the punitive clauses and the undemocratic organization of the League. The Methodists, on the other hand, felt that force was sometimes necessary to ensure peace. Finally, a difference between the two groups can be seen in their concentration of post-war efforts. The Peace Movement members were primarily focused on the Treaty, while the American Methodists branched out. They supported the Treaty but moved on to their Centenary programs, aimed at solving the world's ills and promoting peace through evangelization and more concrete efforts.
CHAPTER V: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

After comparing the histories of the American Peace Movement and the American Methodist Church one finds that the two groups do mirror each other in certain goals and activities relating to the prevention of war and the preservation of peace. Both organizations had Christian roots. They also both supported the ideas of a World Court of International Tribunal and the use of arbitration to solve disputes. Some within the Peace Movement and the Methodist Church supported the idea of force in preserving world peace. This force could possibly take the form of economic sanctions or military action. Many within the Peace Movement and among the Methodists also favored the development and codification of international law.

Concern for social reform was part of the motivation behind both groups. In the early nineteenth century, this was true in the Peace Movement as many social reformers (such as abolitionists and penal reformers) flocked to the Movement giving it vitality and direction. Though this reform spirit died out somewhat by the early twentieth century, its light was never totally extinguished. The Methodists, as part of the Social Gospel Movement, also saw war as a social evil requiring a social solution.
Throughout the time studied, 1815 - 1920, both groups maintained an optimistic attitude. Peace was possible. The world was getting better and people were finally achieving civilization. Even the horrors of World War I did not fundamentally crack this attitude. War was despised but once the United States was involved, it was cleansed of its hideousness to become a holy crusade for liberty and democracy and God's Kingdom. Even with the failure of American participation in the League of Nations, these groups did not despair. Peace was still possible--keep on educating and evangelizing and peace would reign.

Those who lost their optimism, mainly the various pacifist groups, splintered from the mainstream movement. Alienated from the peace movement and often the American public, they remained on the periphery, basically ineffective--especially in the midst of a patriotic and nationalistic war. The Methodist leadership did not sympathize with those pessimistic factions and often criticized them.

After 1914, both groups supported Wilson's neutrality. Some groups within the Peace Movement worked against military preparedness, though as 1917 loomed closer on the horizon, these groups expressed the anti-preparedness stance with less and less enthusiasm. The Methodists were more vocal about the anti-preparedness campaign than most members of
the Peace Movement. But they too, lessened their vigor as American involvement in the war became even more likely.

Both groups supported the war effort after April, 1917. Any criticism of war stopped. Any efforts to end the war immediately, ceased. Any talk about peace focused on planning the shape of the future peace. Methodists barely tolerated the rights of conscientious objectors.

After the Armistice, some members within the Peace Movement and the American Methodist Church continued to try to influence shaping the peace. Some even attended the Paris Peace Conference. But for the most part, both groups placed their trust in their president and adopted a wait-and-see attitude. When the ratification battle ensued, the Peace Movement had more specific views about the Lodge reservations than did the Methodists. But both groups desired compromise and a League of Nations at almost any price.

Neither group had pacifist roots and any pacifist-oriented members soon left the fold and formed organizations of their own. Especially in the Methodist view, pacifism was impractical when dealing with a selfish human race.

Neither group seemed to ever be able to significantly influence American policy. In some situations, it did not even appear that they wished to. The Peace Movement was usually always a mainstream movement having within its membership many of the elites of American society, especially governmental elites. In many situations, when government...
did move along similar goals as expressed by the Peace Movement, it is not at all verifiable that the peace movement was the prime mover behind governmental action.

Both groups were influential in shaping the attitudes of the American people. In this area, the Methodist church with the largest membership among the Protestant denominations, was more effective than the much smaller peace movement organizations. Methodist clergymen, through their sermons, if they chose to do so, could reach more of the American public on any given Sunday, than all of the peace societies put together. Their publications, especially the various Advocates also reached more people on a weekly basis than the Peace Movement could usually reach with that amount of frequency.

During the 1920s and 1930s the American Peace Movement divided over the wisdom of establishing or joining a League of Nations. The pro-League group's activity focused on research about the value of the League of Nations and the publication of that research. The larger organizations within this group also financially supported smaller peace societies with similar goals. Among this faction were such organizations as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the World Peace Foundation, and the League of Nations Association.
The various organizations within the anti-League group, for the most part, came into being during World War I. They were smaller in number and more radical than the group that supported the idea of a League of Nations. They worked for such goals as the outlawry of war and the eradication of militarism in education. In order to achieve these goals, they often indulged in pressure politics with a limited amount of success.

Like the pro-League peace group, American Methodists supported the concept of a League even after its second Senate defeat. This support was not as intense as it had been a year earlier. At the General Conference in May, 1920, Bishop W.F. McDowell addressed the delegates encouraging them to petition both the President and Congress to reach a compromise and save the League of Nations. Despite a positive initial response to this request, the Conference was not able to agree upon any declaration in regard to world peace or a League of Nations.152

After the November elections, some Methodists continued to call for American involvement in a League of Nations. While they blamed the first failure of the League on party politics, they continued to praise the idealism of Wilson. Now that the election was over these Methodists urged both Democrats and Republicans to come together and work out a plan for the joining of the League of Nations.153
Soon though, Methodists, like many other Americans, were turning to more nationalistic and local concerns such as the problems of labor and the city. Despite this trend, the Methodists never completely lost their international perspective. Their missionary enterprise continued to be a focus of interest and activity. Individual church members continued to participate in some aspect of international cooperation such as Bishop Cannon's involvement in the World League Against Alcoholism and his attendance at every session of the League of Nations throughout the 1920s as a means of finding aid for the world prohibition movement. Both group and individual work on the international scene kept international concerns such as the need for arbitration alive in the minds of many Methodists. But this aliveness never turned into vigorous attempts to influence governmental decisions regarding American participation in the League of Nations.
NOTES

1 The Christian Advocate 93 (February 21, 1918), p. 230.
2 At this time the Methodist Church was still split into a Southern and Northern Church.
4 Merle Curti in his book, (p. 39) has quoted Dr. Brown Scott's view that Ladd's plan, in all its essentials, was realized in the Hague Conference of 1899 and the resulting tribunal.
5 Curti, op. cit., p. 82.
6 Ibid., p. 189.
8 Charles De Benedetti in his book, The Peace Reform in American History (Indiana University, 1960) has labeled this period the cosmopolitan peace reform.
9 Ibid., p. 60.
10 Ibid., p. 60.
11 Ibid., p. 62.
12 Ibid., p. 65.
13 Ibid., p. 66.
14 Curti, op. cit., p. 170
15 David L. Patterson, op. cit., p. 65.
16 Patterson, op. cit., p. 106.

De Benedetti, op. cit., p. 80.

Ibid., p. 82.


Patterson, op. cit., p. 120.

Ibid., pp. 133-134.

Marchand, op. cit., p. 115.

Ibid., p. 16.

Ibid., p. 118.

De Benedetti, op. cit., p. 86.


The split occurred at the 1844 General Conference when disagreement over the slavery issue and related power problems erupted, taking the two sides past the point of reconciliation. A union of the Northern and Southern Churches was not to occur until 1919.


Ibid., p. 870.

Cameron, op. cit., p. 189.


Ibid., p. 31.

Cameron, op. cit., p. 314.

Miller, op. cit., p. 7.


Cameron, op. cit., p. 322.

Journal of the Twenty-Sixth Delegated General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church (New York: Methodist Book Concern), 1912, p. 217.


Minutes of the Central Ohio Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, 57th Session (Cincinnati: Methodist Book Concern), 1912, p. 217.

Marchand, op. cit., p. 162.

Ibid., p. 163.

Ibid., p. 164.

Ibid., p. 361.

Ibid., p. 361.

De Benedetti, op. cit., p. 96.

Peterson, op. cit., p. 249.

51 Marchand, op. cit., p. 159.

52 Ibid., p. 159

53 The Federation was a group founded by Lochner and Jane Addams in December, 1914, for the purpose of agitating for peace.

54 "The European Horror," The Christian Advocate 89 (August 6, 1914).


58 Ibid.

59 One Hundred and Third Session of the Ohio Annual Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church (Columbus, Ohio: Press of Spahr and Glenn), 1914, p. 50.

60 Minutes of the West Ohio Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church (Cincinnati, Ohio: Methodist Book Concern), 1914, p. 444.

61 "Is Christianity a failure?" The Christian Advocate (October 8, 1914), pp. 1409-1410.


63 "Shall the War Blame or Blight Us?" The Christian Advocate 89 (September, 1914).

64 "Practical Efforts for Peace," The Christian Advocate 89 (December 24, 1914), pp. 1806-1807.


70 "The President Speaks," op. cit., p. 666.


74 Ibid.


88 130th Session of the Philadelphia Annual Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church (Philadelphia: Methodist Book Room), 1917, p. 82.

89 Minutes of the 49th Session of the Central Pennsylvania Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church (Harrisburg: J.J. Nungesser, Publisher) 1917, pp. 36, 56.


94 "War Havoc," The Christian Advocate 92 (April 19, 1917).

99 "When Will the Christ be Born?" The Christian Advocate 92 (December 20, 1917), pp. 1355-1356.
100 "Important Statement," The Christian Advocate 93 (January 31, 1918), p. 132.
101 "German Methodists for America Only," The Christian Advocate 93 (March 21, 1918), p. 354.
103 Ibid., p. 420.
104 Journal of the Eighteenth General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South (Richmond, Virginia: Publishing House), 1918, p. 32.
106 Minutes of the Central Pennsylvania Annual Conference (Harrisburg: J.J. Nungesser, Publisher), 1918, pp. 52-54.
110 Ibid., p. 267.
111 Ibid., p. 269.
112 Ibid., p. 270.
113 Ibid., p. 274.
114 Ibid., p. 281.
115 Ibid., p. 281.
116 Ibid., p. 307.
117 Ibid., p. 312.
119 Kuehl, op. cit., p. 323.
120 Miller, op. cit., p. 320.
121 Kuehl, op. cit., p. 327.
122 Ibid., p. 336.
127 "At the Peace Table," The Christian Advocate 93 (December 19, 1918), p. 1653.
130 James Canton to Dr. Ivey of the Nashville Advocate, February 17, 1919, Temperance and Prohibition Papers: Ernest H. Cherrington Series, The Ohio Historical Society, Columbus.


"To Insure a Safe Democracy," Ibid., p. 4.


"Stand By the League," The Christian Advocate 94 (February 13, 1919), p. 194.


Ibid., p. 217.


"A Solemn Hour for America," The Christian Advocate 94 (March 6, 1919), pp. 190-291.


bibliographical essay

This brief essay is intended to highlight the most helpful sources to this research and to mention those sources that could have been helpful if time and travel had permitted. References to specific sources such as articles from The Christian Advocate and the Methodist Review can be found in the footnotes.

In studying the American Peace Movement there are many scholarly and competent works available for research. Peter Brock's Twentieth-Century Pacifism (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, company, 1972), is a brief and balanced text that treats pacifism from an international viewpoint. Charles Chatfield, in For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914-1941 (Knoxville, Tennessee: University of Tennessee Press, 1971), traces the development of modern, liberal pacifism through the interwar period in relation to peace coalitions and foreign policy issues, and also in relation to reform movements, emphasizing the relationship between thought and political history. This book includes an extensive bibliographical essay. Merle Curti's Peace or War: The American Struggle, 1636-1936 (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1936) is a classic study of American interest in peace. This
book is a balanced chronological narrative. Merle Curti, The
American Peace Crusade: 1815-1860, (New York: Octagon Books,
Inc., 1965), provides help in comprehending the evolution of
peace seeking through the Civil War. The book is also helpful
as an introduction to the nineteenth-century peace movement.
Charles De Benedetti's The Peace Reform in American History,
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980) is, except for
the last chapter, an attempt at a broad synthesis of existing
scholarly writing on American peace reform from 1607 through
1961. The last chapter, covering the period 1961-1975, is
based solely on the author's own interpretation. The Encyclo-
pedia of American Foreign Policy: Studies of the Principal
Movements and Ideas, edited by Alexander De Conde (3 vols.,
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978), contains a number
of useful essay articles on such topics as peace movements,
antwwar dissent, arbitration, mediation and conciliation.
Most valuable to this study are the pieces by Bernice A.
Carroll on "Peacemaking," Charles Chatfield on "Pacifism,"
and Robert H. Ferrell on "Peace Movements." Warren P. Kuel
in Seeking World Order: The United States and International
Organization to 1920, (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press,
1969), traces the step-by-step development of American ideas
for international federations, leagues, courts, legislatures,
and a variety of other simple and complex plans for inter-
national organization. C. Roland Merchant's The American
Peace Movement and Social Reform, 1896-1918, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971), analyzes the peace movement comprehensively placing emphasis on the network of interrelationships between the peace movement and the domestic concerns of its various groups of participants. The work includes a comprehensive bibliography. David Patterson's Toward a Warless World; The Travail of the American Peace Movement, 1887-1914, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976) is a narrative account of the rise of the modern peace and internationalist movement with particular attention to organizational roles, social origins, and attitudes. The book reflects careful, comprehensive scholarship.

Other works that were not used for this study, but could prove to be helpful are: Ruhl J. Bartlet's The League to Enforce Peace, (Chapel Hill: University of N.C. Press, 1944), which is comprehensive study of this organization; Peter Brock's Pacifism in the United States: From the Colonial Era to the First World War, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968) is thorough in its coverage of pacifism in sects, peace churches, and antebellum reform; and Sondra R. Herman's Eleven Against War: Studies in American International Thought, 1898-1921, (Stanford, California, 1969) which mainly uses an intellectual history approach.

In researching the material on the American Methodist Church many sources were available. The most helpful in
learning about Methodist attitudes have been sources written by the Methodists themselves: their Journals and Minutes from General and Annual Conferences, their press in the form of *The Christian Advocate* and the *Methodist Review*, and the correspondence found in the Ernest H. Cherrington Papers (Ohio Historical Society, Columbus). These sources were helpful in understanding what the Methodists thought about themselves and their views on the issues of war and peace.


Other sources could have provided helpful. A perusal of the collection of Lake Junaluska, N.C., home of the World
Methodist headquarters until it moves to New York, would have provided valuable information. Another source that could prove useful are the Federal Council Papers. They could possibly provide insights into the role of any Methodist participation in Council activities, especially the trip to the Paris Peace Conference. Studying Christian Advocates and the 1914 General Conference Journals from the Southern Church could also have better clarified the Southern position on the issues of war and peace. James Cannon, Jr.'s Bishop Cannon's Own Story: Life as I Have Seen It (Durham, 1955) could have added more understanding to his role at the Paris Peace Conference. Bishop Cannon's papers are at the Divinity School Library of Duke University. This source could also provide an understanding of Cannon's role. An examination of the Wilson Papers and those of other government officials involved in the high levels of policy making could also prove useful to the assessment of influence of the Church's ideas on policy. Some writers claimed that the secular press was more blatantly patriotic than the Methodist press. A comparison of the two types of newspapers could facilitate the discernment of the weight of this statement and shed some light on the extent of any shared ideas and attitudes on the war and the shaping of the peace.