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SELECTED THEORIES OF INVENTIO IN ENGLISH RHETORIC, 1759-1828

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University

By

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The Ohio State University

1949

Approved by:

[Signature]

Adviser
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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

A. The Problem

Of the five traditional "parts" or departments of rhetoric -- *inventio*, *dispositio*, *elocutio*, *memoria*, and *pronuntiatio* -- the first has in recent decades received comparatively little direct attention from scholars.1 Thus, for example, the history of inventionary theory, although touched at various points in studies dealing with individual rhetoricians or with particular periods in the history of rhetoric and treated indirectly in investigations concerning ethical and pathetic proofs, has never been singled out as a specific subject for extended research.

How has *inventio* been conceived of in different eras of

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1. Because the English words invention, disposition, elocution, memory, and pronunciation are in no single instance semantically equivalent to their Latin ancestors I have judged it advisable to retain throughout this study the Latin names for the five traditional departments of rhetoric. Difficulties in translation account also for the retention of certain other Latin terms. On the difficulty of translating technical rhetorical terms from the Latin see especially Charles Sears Baldwin, *Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic*. (New York, 1924), 66-8. Hereafter cited as *Baldwin*.  

1
rhetorical history? What scope and functions has it been assigned? What were its relationships with the other "parts" of rhetoric and with the neighboring subject-matters of logic and dialectic? These and similar questions remain largely unanswered.

Our general neglect of the history of inventio appears particularly strange in view of the fact that the field of public address is now experiencing a marked revival of Aristotelianism. Shying away from an emphasis placed in times not long past on elocutio and pronuntiatio, rhetoricians today generally advocate a broad, well-rounded type of instruction which, while it pays attention to all departments of the science, tends to stress the importance of knowing how to discover in any speech situation "the available means of persuasion." This is, of course, the very problem with which, in one way or another, inventio has traditionally been concerned.2

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2. A formal definition of inventio is not attempted at this or at any later point in the study. Because of the pronounced instability exhibited by this department through the centuries any acceptable definition would necessarily be so broad as to prove quite meaningless. Therefore, following Hudson, I merely designate inventio as the "inner" aspect of rhetorical activity -- a "mode of thinking about," of studying, the constituent elements in a speech situation. As such it is to be distinguished from the "outer" aspect of rhetorical activity -- i.e. the part concerned with "the incarnation in speech of the thoughts (or a selection from the thoughts) engendered by the preceding mental activity." See Hoyt H. Hudson, "De Quincey on Rhetoric and Public Speaking," Studies in Rhetoric and Public Speaking in Honor of James Albert Winans. (New York, 1925), 141-2.
Despite the fact current textbooks stress the importance of substance they very generally fail to give concrete directions for finding, analyzing, and synthesizing substance. On the contrary, they usually speak of invention activity in terms so vague and general as to be of little real help to the student. Read widely and thoughtfully, secure information from other persons, rethink your own experience, evaluate materials by judging their suitability to your prospective audience -- this is typical of the advice he is given. Directions as to what should be done with substance once it is collected are almost equally vague. Finding the "issues" in a dispute, settling upon the "position," and building the "case" are problems which, it appears, will somehow magically solve themselves if only one pays close attention to the proposition to be advanced and studies closely the meaning and relationship

of its terms. In short, despite the fact that in present-day speech education we pay an inordinate lip service to the crucial role played by inventio in the rhetorical act we give few systematic directions, either Aristotelian or otherwise, to aid students in the most difficult task of inventing.

It would appear desirable that over a period of time our knowledge of the history of inventio and our ability to teach sound and fruitful methods for inventing be brought into line with our evident veneration for this department of rhetorical endeavor. Moreover, it would appear that the second of these desiderata depends to an appreciable degree upon the first. The more we know about inventional systems of past ages, the better we shall be able to devise one suitable to present needs.

To trace the history of inventio in its entirety would, of course, be an extremely long and arduous task, and one considerably complicated by the fact that inventio has shown a pronounced instability both in importance and in content. The present study attempts a more limited contribution. It undertakes to examine five selected

inventional doctrines current during a definable period in the history of rhetorical theory. It also endeavors to show, both directly and by implication, the various changes which took place in the concept of *inventio* during that period and to account for some of the influences which appear to have been responsible for these changes.

The period chosen for investigation is 1759 to 1828. These dates mark, it will be recalled, two events of major importance in the history of English rhetoric: the publication of John Ward's *System of Oratory* and the appearance of the first edition of Richard Whately's *Elements of Rhetoric*. Three considerations dictate the selection of this period: 1. The years thus singled out constitute an era of unusual productivity in the field of English rhetoric. It has been estimated that between 1750 and 1800 more than two score rhetorical treatises came from the presses; 5 nor after 1800 is there a noticeable decline in output. 6 Among these works at least half-a-dozen


are of the first importance -- books which viewed in perspective stand forth as landmarks in the development of modern rhetorical theory. 2. During this period the nature of inventional theory changed radically and rapidly. In sixty-nine years -- almost precisely the traditional four-score-and-ten of a man's lifetime -- it advanced from the sterile and degenerate classicism of Ward to the strikingly fresh and essentially modern analysis of Richard Whately. Thus not only do we have a conveniently telescoped revolution in doctrine but, what is even more important, this revolution culminates in a type of rhetorical theory which is in many ways similar to that current at the present time.7 3. Previous students of the rhetoric of this period -- Sandford, Harding, Edney, Pence, Crawford, and Guthrie, to name but a few -- have suitably broken the ground for an analytical study of the type here undertaken. By drawing upon materials they have uncovered and depending in certain instances upon judgments they have advanced one may work with greater facility than would otherwise be possible and also, perhaps, with greater hope of productive results.

From among the rhetoricians whose major works fall into this period five have been selected for special study.

They are John Ward ([1679]-1758), George Campbell (1719-1796), Joseph Priestley (1733-1804), Hugh Blair (1718-1800), and Richard Whately (1787-1863). Each is representative of a more or less particularized development in rhetorical theory: Ward, example par excellence of the resurgent classicism; Campbell, leader of the group which sought in contemporary theories of epistemology and particularly in the "common sense philosophy" of Thomas Reid the radical principles of a new science of persuasive discourse; Priestley, spokesman in rhetoric for the doctrines of David Hartley's associationism; Blair, outstanding representative of the bellettristic school; and Whately, advocate of a modernized Aristotelianism which furnishes the basic philosophy underlying present-day theories of speaking. By studying the works of these men we may obtain a representative cross-section of certain major trends in the rhetoric of the period.

B. Method

In examining the inventionial doctrines of the men here named my attention has been given principally, of course, to the texts of their treatises. At the same time I have not hesitated to draw freely upon whatever analytical and critical studies were available. My very considerable debt to some of these is indicated by the frequency with which they are cited. If such borrowings
require any defence it may be argued that in a study
directed chiefly toward the interpretation and evaluation
of textual materials it appeared desirable to make all
possible use of pertinent biographical, bibliographical,
and critical data gathered by others, and also carefully
to consider the various judgments which have been advanced
concerning the works in question. Certain of the judgments
offered by earlier students I have accepted; many, however,
failed to meet the tests of a closer and more particularized
scrutiny and were, therefore, rejected.

In this connection it should be said that no new
biographical or bibliographical facts have been uncovered
in this study. Such was not its purpose. Whatever claim
to originality the investigation may possess lies in the
fresh analyses and judgments advanced. As already sug-
gested, my endeavor has been to restudy certain selected
rhetorical treatises in the light of knowledge only re-
cently made available through the efforts of others, and
thus to attempt more nearly definitive analytical
evaluations of certain portions of those treatises than
have hitherto been possible.

The general plan of the study is as follows: The
first chapter consists of a description of the invention
system developed by the classical rhetoricians together
with more detailed statements concerning certain aspects
of that system. Then follow, in a series of separate
discussions of the inventional systems set forth by the five men singled out for study. These chapters are designed to stand as more or less independent units. Certain pertinent relationships and influences are, however, pointed out. A final chapter undertakes both to summarize these doctrines and to correlate them in such a way as to make evident significant trends in the *inventio* of the period.

Speaking now in more detail concerning each of these major divisions of the study, the following facts may be observed:

The chapter on ancient inventional theory is designed to serve three specific purposes: 1. to introduce some of the problems with which *inventio* is concerned; 2. to provide a background for the discussion of modern inventional theory; and 3. to clarify the meaning of certain technical terms and concepts referred to throughout the study. Because it is designed to meet these diverse ends it should not be regarded as a comprehensive statement of ancient *inventio*.

The chapters dealing with the inventional systems of Ward, Campbell, Priestley, Blair, and Whately are organized according to this general pattern: An introductory essay brings into focus the general character of the man's *inventio*, evaluates it, and estimates its place in the
rhetoric of the period. Then in a more lengthy discussion, which is interpretative and critical as well as expository, his doctrine is explained and its apparent sources are traced. The chapter is concluded with a summary of the major items developed in this discussion.

My aims in expounding the inventio of each of the five men here considered are: 1. to present in a condensed and somewhat simplified form an accurate report of what he said concerning the nature and function of inventional activity; 2. to explain, where such explanations appeared necessary, what he evidently meant by what he said; 3. to trace out, in so far as practicable, the factors which apparently shaped his thinking about inventio; and 4. to evaluate the significance and gauge the influence of his doctrine.

For the most part I have adhered in my expositions to the order of presentation followed in the particular treatise under discussion. This appeared desirable for two reasons: First, the essential nature of any inventional system is quite obviously determined by its structure as well as by its content. Therefore, an exposition which deviates from that structure tends to present a somewhat distorted picture. Second, by organizing the analysis of each of the five doctrines according to a standard set of heads one would necessarily blur many of the subtle differences among them -- differences which it is one of the purposes of this study to make evident.
C. The Period

The period 1759-1828 has already been characterized as one of unusual productivity in English rhetoric. As an orientation to our particularized discussions of invitational theory it is desirable that we briefly survey the general nature of rhetorical activity during those years. Since the greater portion of the period has been intensively studied by Harding and all of it has been covered by Sandford and others it will be sufficient to describe in summary form the five major trends discernible in the rhetoric of the time. These I designate by the section titles Classicism, The Elocutionary Movement, Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, Psychological-Epistemological Theories of Discourse, and Neo-Aristotleianism.

1. Classicism. At the beginning of the sixty-nine year period here marked out for study English rhetoric was in two quite different senses of the word almost exclusively an "academic" science. Not only did it flourish principally within the walls of the colleges and academies, but it was, for the most part, completely unresponsive to contemporary thought and life. Untouched by the great revolution wrought in philosophy through the efforts of Locke and his successors and uninspired by the new vistas opening in science and literature, rhetoric adhered with a purblindness that now appears almost incredible to the doctrines set forth by the great
theorists of antiquity—chiefly to those of Quintilian, Cicero, and Longinus, and, to a lesser extent, to those of Aristotle. Because the rhetoricians of the sixties were, with few exceptions, "content to abstract, to adapt, to synthesize" from these writers, their textbooks were little more than "methodically arranged" compendiums of the classical treatises.8

This dominance of the ancients was the end result of a trend which had gradually gathered momentum throughout the entire first half of the eighteenth century.9 By 1660, as Sandford shows, the figure books had pretty much run their course.10 Between 1700 and 1759 three separate forces operated to enhance the position enjoyed by classical doctrines. These were the numerous editions of classical tracts, the translation into English of Continental works expressing the classical tradition, and the appearance of treatises written by Englishmen summarizing and expounding the ancient analysis.

8. Harding, 1, 278.


10. Sandford, 70.
A tabulation which is by no means complete reveals that Latin versions of Quintilian were printed in England in 1715, 1716, 1738, and 1758, with William Guthrie's important translation of the work coming off the presses in 1756. Longinus, extremely popular and influential throughout the entire century, was printed 1710, 1718, 1724, 1730, 1732, 1733, 1743, 1751, 1752-62, and translated 1712, 1739, 1742, 1752, 1757. De Oratore appeared in Latin 1706, 1714, 1716, 1718, 1732, 1745, 1746, 1749, and in English 1723, 1742 (Guthrie's translation), 1755, 1759. Dates for Ad Herennium are 1714, 1718; for Greek or Latin texts of Aristotle's Rhetorica, 1726, 1728, 1759; for his Poetica, 1728, 1731, 1745, with translations 1705, 1709, 1714.

Among modern Continental works in the classical tradition which were translated into English between 1700 and 1759 the most important were, perhaps, Bernard Lami's L'Art de Parler; Charles Rollin's Traité des Études, English versions 1742, 1749; and Fénelon's Dialogues sur L'Éloquence, English translations of which appeared in 1718 (Amsterdam), 1722, 1750, and 1760.

11. Also printed in French at London, 1734. The continued popularity of this work in England during the second half of the century is indicated by the fact that translations appeared in 1768, 1769, and 1770.
Original works by Englishmen which may be regarded as falling within the classical tradition are John Brightland, *A Grammar of the English Tongue* (1712); John Con-
stable, *Reflections upon Accuracy of Style* (1734); and John Holmes, *The Art of Rhetoric* (1739). The two last named treatises are little more than condensations of parts of Quintilian.

Just after the middle of the century this trend toward classicism culminated in the publication of two works of very considerable importance, John Lawson's *Lectures Concerning Oratory* (1752) and John Ward's *System of Oratory* (1759). Both consisted of school lec-
tures which had been delivered over a period of years, Lawson being "lecturer on oratory and history on the foundation of Erasmus Smith" at Trinity College, Dublin, and Ward professor of rhetoric at Gresham College in London. Moreover, both are, with few exceptions, strictly classical in nature and rehearse in more or less accurate form the doctrines of the ancients. Despite their obvious lack of originality these two treatises enjoyed a good deal of popularity both in England and in America until the latter part of the century when they began to be

12. Other editions 1758, 1759, 1760.
replaced by Blair and Campbell.13

Although interest in the classical rhetoric pure and unalloyed continued throughout the century, after Ward and Lawson rhetoricians appear to have become more generally receptive to contemporary influences.14 Their aim was no longer merely to restate what the ancients had said, but rather to adapt their theories to new and changed conditions, to take into account current philosophical, critical, and aesthetic doctrines, to evolve a rhetoric out of contemporary thought specifically designed to meet contemporary needs.

Since in our discussions of Campbell, Priestley, Blair, and Whately we shall examine some of the forms these efforts took, no more need here be said concerning them. Suffice it, therefore, to remark that among other


14. Continued interest in the unmodified classical doctrine is shown not only by the frequency with which editions of the ancient tracts appeared between 1759 and 1828 but also by the publication of a number of contemporary works which adhered to the classical analysis. Among these are Thomas Leland's A Dissertation on the Principles of Human Eloquence (London, 1764; Dublin, 1765) and Lord Monboddo's Origin and Progress of Language (Edinburgh, 1773-92). In the sixth and final volume of his great work Monboddo presents a discussion of rhetoric that does little more than summarize Aristotelian doctrines.

In this connection we may also note that the Newberry Library has an edition of Thomas Gale's Rhetores Selecti which it dates [1773] or [1795]. This work, originally published in 1676, contains excerpts from Demetrius Tiberius Rhetor and other ancient writers.
results this increased emphasis upon "the here and now" tended to free rhetoric from the narrow confines of the schoolroom and to bring it more and more into contact with the problems of everyday life. Rhetoricians not only began to draw a greater part of their materials from the world about them but they began to look upon the influencing of current affairs as the goal of rhetorical effort. As a result, rhetoric became less of an "academic" science and more of a popular one. Although the ancient treatises continued to be taught in the academies and universities, a new type of rhetorical theory began to emerge out of contemporary philosophy and criticism. Coincident with this trend was another development which also served to popularize rhetoric. This was the so-called elocutionary movement. To it attention is now directed.

2. The Elocutionary Movement. Already of some importance by 1759 and constantly gaining in influence was that emphasis upon the teaching of promuntiatio which

15. Rhetorical instruction in the English universities during the eighteenth century is well described in Christopher Wordsworth, Scholae Academicae: Some Account of the Studies at the English Universities in the Eighteenth Century. (Cambridge, 1877). See especially 87-9, 332, and 350-1. I have used a 1910 printing of this work.

The best account of the teaching of rhetoric in the nonconformist academies is to be found in H. McLachlan, English Education Under the Test Acts. Being the History of Nonconformist Academies 1662-1820. (Manchester, 1931). Hereafter cited as McLachlan.
historians of rhetoric generally refer to as the elocutionary movement. Although the elocutionists differed considerably among themselves on finer points of doctrine and employed widely diverse instructional methods they all agreed that training in delivery should constitute the prime subject of rhetorical education. With this end in view they concentrated in their teaching on such matters as accent and emphasis, pitch and modulation, pause and timing, articulation and pronunciation, and gesture.16

Why these professors of voice and action came to be called and to call themselves "elocutionists" is not altogether clear. Robb suggests the name may have arisen from the fact that their initial interest was in style and language (elocutio).17 Certain it is that the major figures of the school were concerned not only with "delivery" as we usually think of it today but also with pronunciation, lexicography, spelling, and idiom. Because they regarded language as something essentially oral rather than written they anticipated modern theories of language teaching.18


17. Robb, 23.

A powerful force stimulating the elocutionary movement was the intense criticism of British public address, and especially preaching, which had characterized the first decades of the century. Addison, Swift, Hume, and Chesterfield were among those who had raised their voices in protest against the crabbed composition and lifeless delivery of contemporary speakers. In 1771 Anselm Bayly, a sub-deacon of his Majesty's Chapel-Royal, wrote a work titled Practical Treatise on Singing and Playing in which he specifically lamented the fact that training in delivery did not constitute an important part of every youth's education. Additional pleas for the teaching of speaking and oral reading were made by Vicesimus Knox in his Liberal Education (1781) and by Richard Edgeworth in Practical Education (1798).

Although the history of the elocutionary movement reaches back to at least 1644 when John Bulwer published his exhaustive Chirologia, the first important eighteenth-century manuals on delivery appeared in 1748. These were Robert Dodsley's Preceptor and John Mason's An Essay on

19. This criticism is summarized in Sandford, 102-4 and Thonssen and Baird, 211-4.


Elocution. The movement received its chief impetus some years later from the work of Thomas Sheridan who, through his teaching and lecturing as well as through the publication of three important treatises, fathered what is commonly referred to as "the natural method" of reading. The other major pedagogical approach to the teaching of pronunciation, "the mechanical method," was developed principally by John Walker in his Elements of Elocution (1781) and Rhetorical Grammar (1785). Gilbert Austin's Chironomia (1806) is an extensive discussion of gesture.

Lesser works imitating the treatises here named continued to appear in considerable numbers throughout the period covered in this study. Sandford lists the titles of ten elocutionary manuals published between 1801 and 1813, and his tabulation is obviously imperfect. Elocutionism spread meanwhile from England to America and was for more than a century the dominant form of rhetorical

22. Sheridan's three important works on elocution are: Discourse Being Introductory to a Course of Lectures on Elocution and the English Language (1759), Lectures on Elocution (1763), and Lectures on Reading (1775).


24. Sandford, 137.
instruction in this country. Only in comparatively recent times has it been replaced by other systems of speech education.

One of the end results of the elocutionary movement was to help popularize rhetoric and change it from a purely "academic" subject to one more in touch with current problems and more responsive to current thought. Sheridan and certain of the other elocutionists lectured to popular as well as to learned audiences throughout the British Isles. Their textbooks were directed not only at school boys but at men and women in all walks of life. By placing emphasis upon the practical matter of acquiring skills that would directly enhance speaking effectiveness they not only exercised a generally salutary effect on the theory and practice of pronuntiatio but tended to vitalize rhetorical theory as a whole.

Another result of the elocutionists' efforts was to make rhetoricians in general increasingly aware of the importance of delivery. The ancients, as we know, usually treated this subject in a cursory fashion, assuming either that it could not be taught or that it was not worth teaching. On the other hand, among the moderns even so thoroughgoing an Aristotelian as Richard Whately modifies the classical distribution by devoting the entire fourth

25. Fritz, 75.
book of his **Elements** to **pronuntiatio**. This shift in emphasis foreshadows the balance among the "parts" usually found in present-day textbooks -- a balance which tends to raise delivery to a position of considerable importance.

Unfortunately, elocutionism was by its very nature open to serious abuses. Emphasis upon "manner" with a proportionate slighting of "matter" cannot but lead to an undesirable artificiality and eventuate in a rhetoric which seeks principally for display. Despite these evils, however, the movement met a need and performed a service. Although it hardly merits unqualified praise, it does not deserve a blanket condemnation.

3. **Rhetoric and Belles Lettres.** A third trend discernible in English rhetorical theory during the period 1759-1828 is the tendency to view rhetoric as one facet of the broad field of belles lettres; or, stated conversely, the tendency to "stretch rhetoric into the Science of Literature, or Literary Theory and Literary Criticism universally, and make it treat of the principles of Historical Writing, Poetry, and Expository Writing, as well as of Oratory."  

The roots of the belletristic rhetoric are deep. In 1658 the Dutch rhetorician Vossius in his *De Philosophia*  

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had placed his discussion of eloquence between the chapter devoted to politics and that given over to criticism; moreover, he had specifically asserted that "eloquence is twofold, oratorical and poetical..." During the eighteenth century the rhetoric of belles lettres played a role of major importance. Best exemplified, perhaps, by Hugh Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1783), it held that rhetorical theory, literary theory, and the science of criticism may all be grouped under a single head. Because they are, as we might say today, language arts, they have a common foundation in words and are merely more or less specialized developments of the same genus. Thus Blair, for example, reversing the order usually followed in rhetorical treatises, deals in his first twenty-four lectures with the general subject of language and style, and then in later discourses proceeds to delineate principles governing the various forms of discourse -- oratory, poetry, history, etc.


28. Belletristic rhetorics were not so numerous as elocutionary manuals, the influence of the school being exerted in large measure through unpublished academic lectures and through works on the general subjects of criticism and taste. We may mention, however, as another representative example, William Barron, Lectures on Belles Lettres and Logic (1806). A fact frequently overlooked is that Joseph Priestley's Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism (1777), a work treated in this study for different reasons, is also important as an example of the rhetoric of belles lettres.
Such a plan naturally tends to blur, although it does not completely obliterate, the Aristotelian distinction between practical and imaginative discourse. In addition, it has the effect of giving *elocutio* a position of greatly enhanced importance, reducing at the same time the significance of the place held by *invenio*. Both of these alterations arise from the fact that expression rather than substance is made the focal point of rhetorical theory. This evaluation of the part played in discourse by expression may be regarded as the key to the belles lettres analysis. The result is -- and here I borrow a phrase from Baldwin -- "to detain rhetoric in the field of diction and to consider it in aspects related to poetics."30

In the rhetoric of belles lettres nearly all specific rules and principles have a double function. On the one hand, they are guides to composing; on the other, standards for judging. Thus they are, at least in theory, equally useful to the writer or speaker and to the critic. In practice, however, it transpired that the second of these

29. For a discussion of the relationship between the belles lettres rhetoric -- especially as expressed by Kames and Blair -- and the traditional classical analysis see in particular George R. Crecraft, Three Scotch Rhetoricians of the Eighteenth Century: Kames, Campbell, and Blair. (Unpublished M.A. Thesis: University of Illinois, 1922.)

functions gradually came to overshadow the first. Therefore, rhetoric, now newly called by the name of "eloquence," became, as Saintsbury has said, "the Art of Literature, or in other words, Criticism." That is, it largely lost the character of a practical art concerned with composition and became almost exclusively "a speculative science" concerned with judging.

With rhetoric viewed as a tool for criticism it required but another short step to consider it a part of the general science of aesthetics and place it under a common rubric with inquiries into the nature of beauty and the foundations of taste. Therefore, we are not surprised to find in Lord Kames' *Elements of Criticism* (1762) -- a work designed to show how the common principles underlying all art forms might be derived from an examination of human nature -- some five hundred pages which may quite properly be regarded as "a combined rhetoric and poetic." In this and similar treatises rhetorical theory throws off the role assigned it by the ancients and acquires a new scope and


4. **Psychological-Epistemological Theories of Discourse.** Although the science of psychology as we know it today was not born until the latter decades of the nineteenth century, and the term "psychology" did not itself become current until late in the eighteenth, all of the great speculative thinkers of the Enlightenment, both in England and on the Continent, devoted themselves principally to a systematic study of the mental nature of man. How do our minds establish contact with the external world? What is the origin of "ideas"? How may the complex mental phenomena of understanding, memory, and imagination be accounted for? Beginning with Locke the main stream of English philosophic effort was for a hundred years devoted to exploring these and similar problems.

This concerted effort to examine and describe the nature of conscious processes produced three theories of mind which exerted important influences on rhetorical doctrine. The first two of these — provided we remember

33. At this point it may be observed that the belletristic rhetoric did not completely supplant the rhetoric of style per se. Although not important enough to warrant a separate heading in this summary the stylistic school continued to exist, and was represented by such works as Thomas Gibbons, *Rhetoric* (1767); John Stirling, *System of Rhetoric* (1770); and Peter Peckard, *Proper Stile of Christian Oratory* (1770).

that a nineteenth century term is being appropriated — may most conveniently be called the "psychology" of association and the "psychology" of the faculties. The third is the "common sense philosophy" of Thomas Reid.

The psychology of association was largely an English development and its influence is abundantly apparent in the writings of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. It was, however, at the hands of David Hartley that associationism received its most detailed treatment. Hartley undertook to explain how all psychical phenomena, even the most complex, arise from the association of simple sensations and ideas. Sensations themselves he described as vibrational. When vibrations die out they are replaced by images. These are organized by the mind according to the "laws" of association — contiguity in space, succession in time, and contrast in relation. Secondary associations and affections result in those pleasures and pains which are the more complex components of mental life. Movement everywhere is from the more simple to the more highly organized, from the unitary to the compound. The constituents involved in this movement are, however, merely simple sensations and images.35

Christian Wolff, a German (1679-1754), is generally

regarded as the father of the faculty psychology, and he
does appear to have been the first to use the expression
"mental faculty." In his *Psychologia Empirica* (1732) and
*Psychologia Rationalis* (1734) he asserted that the mind,
though basically a unit, functions "in distinct capacities,
now remembering and then imagining, each being a power
(faculty) as well as a process."\(^{36}\) The primary faculties
-- and in this later writers generally concurred -- he
described as knowing and feeling.\(^{37}\)

Locke attempted by a *reductio ad absurdum* to expose
the weakness of this analysis; Hume, on the other hand,
did much to keep it alive.\(^{38}\) Near the close of the century
it was forcefully stated in James Beattie's *Elements of
Moral Science* (1790-3). Beattie classified the powers of
mind as perceptive and volitional, and then in the in-
terest of greater accuracy added an affective faculty.
Perceptive powers he listed as nine in number, including
in his catalogue such items as "conscience" and "dreaming."
Although Beattie's treatise is in some respects extreme
it may be viewed as representative of the faculty "psy-
chology."

\(^{36}\) Jastrow, 590.

\(^{37}\) Ibid.

\(^{38}\) Harding, 342. See also Harald Höffding, *A History
(London and New York, 1900), 1.426 and ff. Hereafter
cited as Höffding.
Considering the strong bent of eighteenth-century thought toward empiricism it was, perhaps, inevitable that rhetoricians should be moved to explore the implications which these theories of mind held for the science of persuasive discourse. Remembering that the major writers of the period were, to a very noticeable degree, eclectic, one may yet point to certain among them as distinctly representative of the various psychological schools. Thus, associationism, represented principally by Joseph Priestley's Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism, also provides the theoretical foundation for Lord Kames' Elements of Criticism and, in a lesser way, for Blair's Lectures. The faculty psychology, on the other hand, was appropriated by John Ogilvie as the doctrinal basis for his book On Composition (1774), and is, as a matter of fact, more or less evident in all of the rhetorical treatises of the era.

41. Adamson, 398.
42. Ogilvie recognized four faculties -- understanding (or judgment or reason), imagination, penetration (or discernment), and memory. These he sought to adapt to a theory of composition. (Harding, 282.)
To it George Campbell owes not only his famous statement of the conviction-persuasion duality but also his epoch-making delineation of the "ends" of speaking. 44

The mention of Campbell brings us to a consideration of the influence exerted upon rhetoric by the so-called "common sense philosophy" of Thomas Reid. Reacting against the scepticism of Hume, Reid posited the existence of certain "common" presuppositions which underlie all human knowledge and which, because they are instinctive, are unassailable by doubt. 45 Moreover, he challenged the view of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume that between the knowing mind and the knowable world there intervenes a tertium quid called an "idea." Instead, he believed that under certain conditions "immediate" knowledge was possible. These doctrines furnished, as we shall subsequently see, much of the theoretical groundwork for Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776), and particularly for his treatment of "evidence."

5. Neo-Aristotelianism. The last of the five major trends which characterized rhetorical theory during the period 1759-1828 I have here termed neo-Aristotelianism. This movement, principally represented by Richard Whately's Elements of Rhetoric (1828), undertook to modernize the

44. Sandford, 110-1; 113.

45. A brief but penetrating summary of Reid's philosophy may be found in William Kelley Wright, A History of Modern Philosophy. (New York, 1941), 242-3. Hereafter cited as Wright.
Aristotelian analysis by bringing it into line with certain principles of contemporary science and philosophy.

Neo-Aristotelianism had its inception at Oxford in the first part of the nineteenth century. At that time the "first Oriel school," a brilliant group of teachers headed by Whately, Copleston, and Hampden, sponsored a revival of interest in Aristotle generally and in *Rhetorica* and *Ethica* particularly.46 The veneration in which these works were held is amply attested in Copleston's *Reply to the Calumines of the Edinburgh Review Against Oxford*.47 But in addition to regaining Aristotle himself the group attempted to correlate his doctrines "with all that they esteemed most valuable in modern philosophy."48 The result


48. E. Jane Whately, 1.19.
was a modified Aristotelianism which, while it retained the "flavor" of *Rhetorica*\textsuperscript{49} and adhered to its basic conceptions, set a new pattern in rhetorical theory. This pattern, further modified by twentieth-century theorists, is the one to which present-day works on rhetoric largely adhere.

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\textsuperscript{49} Thonssen and Baird, 143.
Chapter II

THE CLASSICAL DOCTRINE OF INVENTIO

A. Introduction

Upon no other department of rhetoric did the ancients lavish so much care and attention as on inventio. Moved by the same logic which prompted Cicero to adopt the title De Inventione to represent the whole of rhetorical science,1 countless theorists, both Greek and Roman, contributed to an inventional doctrine which stands out as the supreme achievement of classical rhetorical thought. This doctrine, transmitted to later ages principally through the works of Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and the unknown author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium, has exerted a decisive influence -- either positive or negative -- on all subsequent inventional theory. Therefore, no matter what specific period the student of inventio may single out for study it is imperative that he approach it equipped with a working knowledge of the classical analysis.

The survey of ancient inventional theory here presented does not pretend to be exhaustive. It merely summarizes the various assumptions upon which that theory rests and explains certain technical concepts which have an immediate bearing upon matters to be discussed in later

chapters of this study. My plan is first to define and delimit classical *inventio* by discussing its principal functions of inquiry and research, and by exploring its relationships both with *dispositio* and with the science of dialectic. I shall then consider in some detail each of its constituent parts -- the analysis of questions, the *status*, and the topics.

B. **Definition, Scope, and Function**

Even at the expense of belaboring a commonplace it is desirable to begin by emphasizing the fact that the Latin term *inventio* bears no semantic relationship to the English word "invention." Instead of connoting an act of intellectual or mechanical creation, it refers in a restricted technical sense to that process by means of which an orator systematically surveys the "opportunities" offered by any particular speaking situation in order to discover all of the potentialities for persuasion which may be inherent in it. More specifically, *inventio* was merely the name given by the ancients to that body of doctrine which advises the speaker concerning what questions need to be asked and to be answered in making a thorough

2. Baldwin, 67.
analysis of possible speech materials. Its chief function was, therefore, to provide a predetermined method by means of which the orator might go about discovering and gathering the substantive elements of his address.

If we would know something of the functional aspects of this process of searching for speech materials we may turn, as Howell has suggested, to Plato's *Phaedrus* and there note the passage in which Socrates avers that the inventional tasks of the orator, like those of the philosopher, consist essentially in dividing and unifying the various aspects of any piece of subject-matter by means of the twin tools of analysis and synthesis. Plato, it is true, neither develops nor makes more specific the implications of this most richly suggestive statement. Yet in it are found the seeds of what later became -- particularly through the unremitting efforts of the Latin rhetoricians -- the broad and fruitful doctrine of classical *inventio*.

The respective roles played by analysis and synthesis in the sum total of the inventional process will become clear when we examine later in this chapter the various

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methodological concepts which constitute the superstructure of the *status*. For the present it is desirable that our discussion be limited to the analytical functions of *inventio*. In approaching these we are, as Hudson remarks, "to suppose our speaker with a subject and a purpose; we are also . . . to suppose him to have in mind or to have within reach, so that he can quickly draw upon it and pass it in review, sufficient knowledge for his speech." 7

Working in terms of these given factors of subject and purpose, his initial step is to make a preliminary study of the "cause" 8 by considering it under the heads of the so-called "general topics" or "commonplaces." These regions house arguments which have applicability to the whole range of subjects commonly discussed in public speeches, and may be employed in connection with any of the three species of oratory. Upon occasion the orator will discover that one or more of these "general topics" provides him with material suitable to the specific cause

7. Hudson, 326.

8. "Cause" is the technical name assigned in Latin rhetoric to "definite" or "particular" questions. Such problems were called by the Greeks "hypotheses." See Cicero's *Topica*, 21. I have used the French-Latin text prepared by M. Delcasso for *Œuvres Complètes de Cicéron*, 36 vols. (Paris, 1830-7). References to *De Inventione* and *Partitiones Oratoriae* are to the same edition. (Vols. 2 and 5.) The first of these treatises was translated by J. P. Charpentier and E. Greslou; the second by M. Bompart. Unless otherwise indicated the citation *Topica* refers to Cicero's tract of that name.
at hand, and he will accordingly make direct use of it in his address. Frequently, however, his visits to these general loci will do no more than "serve to start investigation" in much the same way that a debater's consideration of the "stock issues" may initiate a search for matters which are more crucial to his proposal. 9

The second step consists of an exhaustive and systematic analysis of the nature of the cause in order to determine, as Cicero says, "what ground there may be for doubt." 10 This analysis is conducted in the light of the preliminary information secured through an exploration of the "general topics," and is based upon the principles of that classificatory system known as the status. By this means the cause is identified as to type and placed in the appropriate category.

The doctrine of status will be discussed at some length in a subsequent section of this chapter. For the present, it is sufficient to remark that once the cause has thus been classified the orator may proceed to the third step in the inventional process. This is an examination of those areas which are known to contain arguments


peculiarly appropriate to the particular type of cause he has before him. It is these "particular topics" which, to borrow a phrase from Wallace, deal with "the technical problems that lead [the speaker] to the crux of his subject."¹¹ In most instances, therefore, they provide the actual subject-matter of the address.¹²

C. The Relationship Between Inventio and Dispositio

In the light of the preceding analysis, it is apparent that many of the elements which in later ages came to be included within the scope of inventio and which today are still commonly associated with it were by the major Greek and Latin rhetoricians excluded from its province. As a matter of fact, they conceived of these elements as belonging to another of the so-called "parts" of rhetoric, namely dispositio.

Both Baldwin and Wagner have shown that the classical writers included under this second concept considerably more than the process of putting materials into order and organizing the speech according to the abstract principles of unity, coherence, and emphasis. In addition to these


elementary duties they assigned to *dispositio* the vital task of "selecting and adapting" the raw materials gathered by the analytical and synthetical processes of *inventio*.\(^{13}\)

The key to this distribution of functions is to be found in a significant passage in *De Oratore*, 1.31. Here Crassus asserts that the orator "ought first to find out what he should say; next to dispose and arrange his matter, not only in a certain order, but according to the weight of the matter and the judgment of the speaker."\(^{14}\) Drawing upon this and other pertinent remarks found in *De Oratore*, *Partitiones Oratoriae*, and *Orator*, Wagner concludes:

*Dispositio* . . . according to Cicero, is the adapting of the product of *inventio* to the particular situation at hand. It is of two kinds -- or, rather, there are two main parts of the process, two divisions of the work. One is grouping the ideas invented in the natural order -- the familiar exordium, narration, proof, and peroration. To Cicero this is a mere skeleton, offering useful broad divisions, or first steps, but of little significance in the work of organizing a real speech to be given to a real audience. The major work of *dispositio* is the 'exercising of prudence and judgment'; in brief it is building the speech -- each speech -- to meet the particular persuasive problems involved.\(^{15}\)

13. Baldwin, 52; Wagner, 288.

14. Italics mine. I have reproduced the translation of this passage given by Wagner, 286. In a note (293) Wagner says he has followed the rendering of J. S. Watson, *Cicero on Oratory and Orators*. (London, 1891), 178, "save for the last thirteen words" which he believes to be inaccurate for Cicero's *momento quodam atque iudicatio*. He adds, "The translation of Sutton and Rackham, *Cicero de Oratore*. 2 vols. (London, 1942), 1.99: 'with a discriminating eye to the exact weight as it were of each argument' is apparently sound but somewhat free."

This analysis applies, he believes, equally well to the rhetorical systems developed by both Quintilian and Aristotle.16

Baldwin, it may be noted, presents substantially the same thesis,17 and Howell takes occasion to point out that when Cicero in De Inventione "speaks of the six parts of an oration, he is in reality dealing with the method by which scattered particulars, already discovered by analysis, may be placed into an organic whole."18

In short, dispositio was thought by the classical rhetoricians to be "concerned with the principles of disposing (in the sense of using) the materials invented for a speech, in the best possible manner, for the purpose of effecting the end intended by the speaker in any given situation."19 It was "planned adaptation,"20 and included all of what later rhetoricians were to mean by "judgment."


17. "In general, dispositio has to consider: how to make the most of the stronger points without seeming to slur the weaker; whether the case will prevail more readily through argument or through appeal, through direct proof or through refutation; how to cover retreat at need by making sure that the case, if it cannot be won, shall at least not be damaged." Baldwin, 52.


20. Wagner, 291.
Even in the classical period this distribution was not universally adhered to,⁰¹ although it is unmistakably the doctrine advanced in the major treatises. As time passed and rhetorical theory lost the penetrating methodological insights which had characterized the work of the great Greek and Latin theorists the balance gradually shifted, and *inventio* took over the function of judging materials as well as of discovering them.⁰² In other ways also it gradually encroached upon what once had been the province of *dispositio*. Certain of these encroachments will be pointed out below. At this point it is sufficient merely to note that the classical concept of *dispositio* tended to exercise a restrictive influence on the scope of ancient inventional systems.⁰³

Because in classical rhetoric -- as in the rhetoric of many later periods -- the dividing line between *inventio* and *dispositio* was vague and unstable, inventional and

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⁰¹ Wagner, 291.

⁰² Such a view was, of course, typical of Ramean rhetoric. See for example Pierre de Ramée, *The Art of Logick. Gathered out of Aristotle,* and set in due forme, according to his instructions, by Peter Ramus, etc. Published for the Instruction of the un/learned, by Antony Wotton. (London, 1626), 113.

⁰³ Among modern scholars a broad interpretation of the functions of *inventio* has been maintained by H. D. Rix, *Rhetoric in Spenser's Poetry.* Pennsylvania State College Studies, No. 7. (State College, Pennsylvania, 1940), 7 and Donald L. Clark, *Rhetoric and Poetry in the Renaissance.* (New York, 1922), 27.
dispositional topics were likely to intermingle and to become considerably confused. Certain areas of doctrine were, therefore, the common property of both realms. From the point of view of *inventio* they served as means for deriving, through the twin processes of analysis and synthesis, the substantive elements of the address. From the point of view of *dispositio* they acted as guides in the selection and adaptation of speech materials.

For an example of this double functioning of certain concepts one may turn to the seventh book of *Institutio*. "The whole of this book," Quintilian announces in the Introduction, ". . . shall be devoted to arrangement. . . ." The reader does not, however, encounter in any of the subsequent sections a discussion of the parts of an oration, nor does he find treated the time honored principles of unity and coherence. Instead, what he encounters is really a dissertation on the building of legal cases, during the course of which Quintilian enters into a minute discussion of the status. But whereas in 3.6 status is treated by Quintilian primarily as an aid to invention, here he confines his discussion to the strategical problems involved.

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24. Wagner, 291.

in building a winning case. 26

In the same connection it should also be observed that Cicero's discussion of *status* in *De Inventione* 27 falls under the heads of *confirmatio* and *refutatio*, a clear indication that in his opinion it has functions other than those of exploration and discovery.

D. The Relationship Between Rhetoric and Dialectic

Rhetoric, as defined in the broad terms of the classical analysis, encroaches at two points upon the provinces of neighboring disciplines. In the area of *elocutio* it occupies a common ground with the science of poetic; in that of *inventio* it overlaps with the "faculty" of dialectic. An examination into this overlapping between rhetoric and dialectic will help to make clear the nature of ancient inventional doctrine.

Disavowing the Platonic view in which rhetoric and dialectic were regarded as antithetical, 28 Aristotle in the first sentence of *Rhetorica* described these two arts as "counterparts" -- that is, coordinate but independent

26. See particularly Chapter 1 where Quintilian tells how he himself went about analyzing cases in order to select the strongest argumentative position, etc.

27. See 7.2.4-21 and ff.

powers over words and arguments.\textsuperscript{29} Moreover -- and this is a point to be emphasized -- he evidently believed that in the area of \textit{logos} they shared a common procedure of analysis and synthesis. In other words, the inventional system developed by the dialectician could, he thought, be applied without significant alteration by the rhetorician in devising logical proofs.\textsuperscript{30}

Latin rhetoric, as typified in \textit{De Inventione}, did not, for the most part, accept this extreme position.\textsuperscript{31} It did, however, recognize that the two sciences definitely coincided in the realm of logical invention. Taking their cue from the \textit{inventio} of dialectic Roman writers sought to create for rhetoric an \textit{inventio} consisting of closely analogous, but at the same time autonomous, procedures.\textsuperscript{32} Thus they developed -- very possibly out of the dialectician's classification of propositions -- the doctrine of the \textit{status} and also considerably refined the topical method for gathering speech materials. Despite these innovations, however, the essential methodological unity

\textsuperscript{29} 1354a. All references to \textit{Rhetorica} are to The \textit{Rhetoric of Aristotle}. An Expanded Translation with Supplementary Examples for Students of Composition and Public Speaking. By Lane Cooper. (New York, 1932).

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Howell}, Introduction, 47, 49-50.

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Howell}, Introduction, 53.

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Howell}, Introduction, 53.
of the two sciences continued to be recognized and appreciated.

Rhetoric and dialectic were differentiated by Aristotle and his followers principally by the fact that they characteristically dealt with different types of subjects, rhetoric being concerned with disputes involving particular persons, places, or circumstances, and dialectic dealing with disputes not thus delimited. "Should a man marry?" "Is it his duty to produce children that the state may be strong?" "Is democracy the best form of government?" Because these questions do not involve particular persons or specifically stated conditions they are dialectical problems. On the other hand, were we to ask, "Should Cato marry?" "Should the United States fight to preserve its democracy against X aggressor?" these would be rhetorical questions.

In so far as general and particular problems may be

33. For a discussion of these two types of debatable questions see Section E 1 below.

When thus distinguishing between the characteristic subject-matters of rhetoric and dialectic it must, of course, be remembered that in Aristotle's methodological system both of these sciences are designed to deal with problems lying in the realm of everyday opinion and affairs, and thus are to be distinguished on the one hand from "analytic" and on the other from "eristic." In this connection see especially James H. McBurney, "The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory," Speech Monographs, 3 (1936), 51-5.

analyzed and debated by the same means, rhetoric and dialectic are in aim and method largely the same; in so far as general and particular questions require special methods of analysis and proof, rhetoric and dialectic are different. Thus, since both are to some extent concerned with discovering and using logical arguments, in the area of logos they coincide. On the other hand, they are by their very nature aimed at different kinds of audiences. Out of this fact arise certain divergencies. Because the dialectician deals with abstract questions of practical conduct and morals -- with speculative rather than actual cases -- he will attract auditors and opponents who are sufficiently educated to be interested in speculative matters. Such men theoretically eschew the allurements of style and the enticements of passion.\textsuperscript{35} As a result, the dialectician has no need either for elocutio or for pathos. By the same token he may engage in longer and more round-about chains of argument than would be suitable in the popular gatherings before which an orator debates questions of individual guilt or innocence, or appeals for some particular legislative enactment.\textsuperscript{36} As somewhat less important differences, it may also be noted that the dialectician unlike the public speaker is never

\textsuperscript{35} Howell, Introduction, 51-2.

\textsuperscript{36} Rhetorica, 1357a.
concerned with questions of fact or of procedure; nor does he have occasion to speak upon the debatable problems embodied in the quasi-states.37

The differences here recounted show that rhetorical invention is to be distinguished from dialectical invention principally by this fact: the establishment of a particular proposition before a popular audience requires a greater variety of inducements than the establishment of a general proposition before a learned audience. Pathetic appeal and stylistic attractiveness, among other items, must be added to logical argument if the orator is to achieve his end. Therefore, the inventional system of rhetoric is necessarily broader than that possessed by dialectic. It contains weapons and devices for which the dialectician has no use, and which are necessitated by the fact that rhetoric studies how to win the assent not of the scholar but of the common man.38


38. In present-day rhetorical theory we frequently recognize a similar distinction between speeches designed for learned audiences and those aimed at the general public. For a provocative statement of this distinction see Ernest J. Wrage, "Public Address: A Study in Social and Intellectual History," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 33 (1947), 453.
E. The Elements of Inventio

In the preceding sections of this chapter an attempt has been made to identify the classical doctrine of inventio by describing in summary terms its principal functions of inquiry and research. Furthermore, that doctrine has been localized and delimited by determining its relationships both with dispositio and with the science of dialectic. If we would understand the nature of ancient inventio still more fully we must now consider in some detail the function of each of its constituent parts. These have here been termed the elements of inventio.

1. Analysis of Questions. Lying at the basis of the classical doctrine of inventio is a fundamental dichotomy between two types of debatable questions, the definite and the indefinite. As already indicated, a definite question has particular relevance to specific persons, times, places, or events. An indefinite question is not thus circumstantiated; it deals with problems which are universal and timeless.

This dichotomy looks backward to one of the essential distinctions between rhetoric and dialectic, in as much as the characteristic subject-matter of the first consists of questions which are circumscribed and particular while that of the second is derived from so-called "general

39. See De Inventione, 1.6; De Oratore, 1.31; Partitiones Oratoriae, 18; Topica, 21; and Institutio, 3.5.5-18.
questions." Of more significance, however, is the fact that it also looks forward to, and, in a sense, furnishes the foundation for that body of analytical and synthetic procedures which make up the status. Thus Cicero in his mature treatise Topica, after distinguishing between general (indefinite) and particular (definite) questions, further divides the first of these into theoretical and practical. Theoretical questions, he says, are concerned with whether a thing is (conjecture), what it is (definition), or of what quality it is (genus). Moreover, each of these questions has fixed sub-species of its own. Under conjecture, for example, one might ask, "Does the thing exist?" "What is its origin?" "What is its cause?" or "What changes is it capable of?" Quality, in turn, considers a matter either by itself or in relation to something else. It may ask, "Is glory desirable?" or, on the other hand, it may inquire, "Should one prefer glory to riches?"

The subject of particular questions (causes) Cicero treats more summarily since that which has been said about general problems applies to them also. He does, however, take occasion to point out that the defence may answer an accusation in one of three ways: 1. It may argue that the act did not occur; 2. that if it did it does not merit the name given it; 3. that the law does not forbid it. The first type of cause is called con-
jectural; the second, definitory; the third, judicial. 40

Now, it is immediately apparent that what we have here is a summary statement of the general structure of the status. Or, approaching the matter differently, we may say that the status is, in large measure, merely a further refinement and development of this classificatory system. Thus, for example, when Cicero asserts that those types of indefinite questions which take the form of "theoretical" problems inquire concerning whether a thing is, or what it is, or of what quality it is, he is at the same time presenting a basic classification of some of the kinds of "general questions" and he is also outlining three of the standard argumentative positions which were recognized in all the major Latin treatises. Likewise, when, during the recital of the various types of "causes" he says that a speaker may answer a charge by claiming that the act did not occur, or that if it

40. Topica, 21-4. Cicero, it should be observed, here treats of indefinite questions as falling within the province of rhetorical discourse. In De Inventione, composed some forty years earlier, he had excluded them from rhetoric on the ground that general questions are the concern of the dialectician, not of the orator. (1.6). Partitiones Oratoriae, another later work, adheres to the same doctrine as Topica. (See 18).

Except for variation in this one particular all of the Latin treatises present substantially the same analysis of types of questions. Cicero's remarks may, therefore, be regarded as typical of the great body of Roman rhetorical thinking about this matter. (Cf. De Oratore, 1.31, Institutio, 3.5.5-16, etc.)
did it does not merit the name given it, or that the law permits such an action, he again suggests two of the same positions, and mentions another which was widely recognized.

This close relationship between status and the system whereby the various sorts of debatable questions were classified has not, I believe, been previously noted. Yet the two blend together so perfectly that within certain areas they tend, for all practical purposes, to merge and become one. It is feasible, therefore, to suggest the concept of a continuum: at one extreme stands the fundamental division of questions into "theses" and "causes"; at the other, the highly developed and intricate doctrine of status, with its roots reaching into the analytical processes involved in isolating and identifying the cause and its superstructure arising to those techniques by which the focal point of the speech may be ascertained and its whole substance and movement accordingly determined.

Whatever merit this hypothesis may possess must be demonstrated through a description of the nature and function of that doctrine itself. To this task attention is now directed.

2. Status. By the untranslatable term status the ancients understood, it appears, a method and a structure

which first of all enabled the speaker to discover that argumentative position where he might most profitably rest his case, and which then instructed him concerning how he might exploit the advantages of that position to their fullest extent. 42

As an initial step in explanation we recall that "state" was merely the name given to that locality where an argumentative speaker took up his stand. It was not -- and this point deserves emphasis -- the locality itself, but was rather the label by which that locality was designated. In other words, the "state" was once removed from what in modern argumentative terminology is frequently referred to as the "position." The speaker, said the classical rhetoricians, takes up his position in a certain terrain; that terrain is called by a particular name; the name is the "state."

An explanatory parallel drawn from the field of military science may be helpful at this point. A com-

42. *Status* is treated in *De Inventione*, 1.8-14; *Topica*, 24-5; *Partitiones Oratoriae*, 9-12; *De Oratore*, 2.24-6; *Institution*, 3.6; and *Ad Herennium*, 1.18-27. References to *Ad Herennium* are to the French translation (printed together with the Latin text) by M. Delcasso in *Oeuvres Complètes de Ciceron*, 1, the edition cited above.

Although strictly a development of Latin rhetorical thought *status* is clearly foreshadowed by Aristotle in *Rhetorica*, 1354a and 1417b. On this matter see Baldwin, 36 and Howell, *Introduction*, 55-7.
mander, motivated by many considerations of geography, strategy, and tactics, takes up, let us say, a certain defensive position; he takes it up on a certain hill; his maps give that hill a name. The "state" of his position is the name of the hill, rather than the hill itself or the particular disposition of his troops on that hill. Thus, by a sort of analogy, one may say that as the name on the commander's maps is to the actual disposition of his troops, so is the debater's "state" to his argumentative position.

Continuing our parallel, the next point to be observed is that the commander has stored up in his memory or recorded on available maps the names of many hills. Upon encountering one of these names he is reminded of a certain piece of terrain. Therefore, by passing in mental review the names of many hills he can determine which one among those available to him best suits his present purpose. At that place, working in terms of whatever particular geographical factors may be present, he "draws his line."

In much the same fashion an orator, skilled in the strategy of argument, knows the names of those localities where disputants commonly take their stands. These names recall to his mind the advantages and disadvantages which are involved in taking up a position in each of them. With this knowledge at hand he is better able to decide
where he can most safely rest any particular case. In this process of selection, however, the orator has one great advantage over the general. It lies in the fact that the number of localities habitually visited in argumentative disputes is relatively small. Therefore, they may without difficulty be classified and carried in the mind ready for instant use. One of the functions of the status was to provide the speaker with a comprehensive list of the names of the various types of standard argumentative positions; another, however, was to show him how he might most tellingly exploit the advantages of the position he chose.

Each of these functions will now be considered in some detail. Such a discussion must, however, be prefaced with the observation that during the classical period the doctrine of status underwent considerable alteration. As evidence of this fact we need only compare the treatment given it in Cicero's youthful De Inventione with that offered some one-hundred-and-sixty years later in Institutio Oratoria, or to note the diverse interpretations recorded by Quintilian in his sketch of the history of the concept. Even in Quintilian's own time there was, as he himself asserts, "still no agreement as to the number

43. See Institutio, 3.6.1-62.
and names of bases, nor as to which are general and which special."\(^{44}\)

**Status** was given its first full treatment in Latin between 91 and 81 B.C. in *De Inventione* and *Rhetorica ad Herennium*.\(^ {45}\) These treatises present, with perhaps only one important exception,\(^ {46}\) practically identical views concerning the nature and function of "states." The remainder of our discussion will, therefore, be drawn almost exclusively from *De Inventione*.

Thinking particularly, though certainly not exclusively, of the problems confronting the forensic speaker, Cicero begins by asserting that all controversies may be considered as falling into one of two basic categories. The first of these includes all disputes involving a question of principles accepted but unwritten; the second embraces those matters which turn upon conflicting interpretations of a written text.\(^ {47}\) A question of the first type is

\(^{44}\) *Institutio*, 3.6.22.

\(^{45}\) *Howell*, Introduction, 35.

\(^{46}\) The author of *Ad Herennium* causes disputes in scripto to fall under the concept of *status*. See 1.11.

\(^{47}\) *De Inventione*, 1.12-3.
called a dispute *in ratione*; one of the second, a dispute *in scripto*. 48

Unfortunately, Cicero does not make explicit the basis upon which this distinction rests. Howell has suggested that his intention may be explained by referring to the distinction drawn by the Romans between the *lex non scripta*, or common law, and the *scriptum lex*, or statute law. 49 This explanation, although it is obviously suggestive rather than definitive, enables us to approach Cicero's meaning, and is, therefore, useful, provided we remember that the ancients considered the doctrine of *status* to be applicable to deliberative and demonstrative as well as to judicial speaking. 50

For our present purpose, however, the methodological basis of this dichotomy is less important than the fact that Cicero -- at the time he wrote *De Inventione* -- looked upon these two types of questions as fundamentally different in nature. Only a dispute *in ratione* had, he thought, a "state" in the strictest sense of the term. To the second class of controversies he does not, as Howell has remarked, "assign a cognate term, saying merely that this class is distinct from the other." 51

48. Ibid.
50. See especially *Topica*, 25.
The reason for this limitation must remain a matter of conjecture, although it is not unreasonable to assume that it may, in part at least, spring from the fact that the subdivisions into which disputes in scripto may most naturally be divided bear a closer relationship to functional lines of argument than do the "states" adhering to disputes in ratione. Thus the speaker's position in a dispute in ratione may be located, Cicero tells us, in one of four areas. These he names respectively the "states" of Fact (Conjecture), Name (Definition), Genus (Quality), and Procedure (Judicial). A dispute in scripto, on the other hand, usually involves one of the following: 1. a disagreement concerning whether the literal meaning of a text or its apparent intention is to be accepted, 2. conflicting laws, 3. ambiguity, 4. conflicting interpretations of the meaning of a text, 5. divergent definitions.

Now, a speaker who is acquainted with this system of classifying disputes will first determine whether the particular case before him is a dispute in ratione or a dispute in scripto. Then he will still further localize it by assigning it to the appropriate subdivision of that category. When this is done he will re-examine his subject in terms of the known characteristics of the specific sub-

52. De Inventione, 1.8.
53. De Inventione, 1.13.
division into which it falls, and thus will be able to discover the "particular places" which will form the substantive elements of his speech. 54

Paralleling this analytical classificatory system by means of which any dispute may be identified as to type and the places especially adapted to it discovered is the methodology which guides the speaker in the actual construction of his address. This methodology, the terms of which are descriptive of the stages through which any actual dispute must pass, forms the second part of the doctrine of status.

According to Cicero, the "state" of a controversy is determined by the nature of the clash which occurs between the original charge brought by the accusation and the corresponding answer offered by the defence. 55 The charge he calls an intentio criminis, the answer a depulsio. 56 Out of the clash between these two elements emerges the quaestio, or "issue." By means of the quaestio the "state" may be located. 57 In order to illustrate his meaning, let us consider a series of simple examples.

If the accusation charges, "He has killed," and the defence answers, "He has not killed" the quaestio is "Has he killed?" and the dispute is centered in that area which is designated by the term Fact.

54. De Inventione, 1.12,15.
55. De Inventione, 1.8,13.
56. De Inventione, 1.13.
57. Ibid.
If the accusation charges, "He has committed murder," and the defence answers, "No, he has committed manslaughter," the quaestio is "Has he committed murder or manslaughter?" and the dispute is centered in that locality which is designated by the term Name.

If the accusation charges, "He has killed," and the defence answers, "Yes, he has killed, but he has done it justifiably," the quaestio is "Has he killed justifiably?" and the dispute is centered in that area which is designated by the term Genus.

Lastly, if the accusation charges, "He has killed," and the defence answers, "You are bringing your charge in the wrong court (or at the wrong time, or in the wrong manner)," the quaestio is "Has the charge been brought in the right court (or at the right time, or in the right manner)?" and the dispute is centered in that area which is designated by the term Procedural.

This variety of illustrations has been introduced to demonstrate the fact that the quaestio varies, as the nature of the clash between the intentio criminis and the depulsio varies, and that in each case the "state" is determined by the nature of the resulting quaestio.

Thus far, however, only the initial stages of a dispute have been described. Both the charge and the answer must, of course, be substantiated by major lines of argument. The chief line of proof offered by the accusation Cicero terms the infirmatio rationis, the central
argument of the defence he refers to as the *ratio*.

Just as the *quaestio* arises out of the nature of the clash between the *intentio criminis* and the *depulsio*, so does the *judicatio*, or point to be judged, arise out of the interaction of the *infirmatio rationis* and the *ratio*. Again an example should prove useful.

Cicero, in order to illustrate the "state" of Name, recounts how C. Flaminius, during his tribuneship, aroused the ire of the Roman people by his insistence that an unpopular law be enacted. Flaminius' father even went so far as to remove him bodily from the temple where he was presiding over an assembly of the people. For this act the father was charged with treason. The accusation said, "You are guilty of treason because you removed from the temple a tribune of the people" (*intentio criminis*). The defendant answered, "I am not guilty of treason," (*depulsio*). The *quaestio*, therefore, is, "Is he guilty of treason?" The *ratio*: "I have merely exercised my paternal authority over my son." The *infirmatio rationis*: "But, to oppose paternal authority -- something which is purely private in nature -- to the power of the tribune, which is derived from the people themselves, is treason." The *judicatio*: "Is it treason to oppose paternal authority


59. *De Inventione*, 2.17.
to the authority of a tribune?" In this example especial note should be taken of the relationship between the *quaestio* and the *judicatio*. Both raise the central point in contention between the two parties, but they do it in different ways. Through the interaction of the *infirmatio rationis* and the *ratio*, the *quaestio* has been narrowed down and given specificity in terms of the particular lines of argument advanced by each party. Thus, it is toward the *judicatio* rather than the *quaestio* that the speaker's attention is chiefly directed both during the preparation of his address and during its delivery. The *quaestio* constitutes nothing more than a step in analysis by means of which the "state" may be located; the *judicatio*, on the other hand, provides the central idea, "the unifying concept" of the entire discourse. It is the point upon which the judge's attention will be centered. In order, therefore, to establish his case the orator must convince the judge that his answer to the question asked by the *judicatio* is the correct one, and that his opponent's answer is wrong. Borrowing from modern terminology, one may say that the speaker's answer to the question asked by the *judicatio* constitutes the specific purpose of his address, and therefore, that it also is the factor which determines both the substance and the general movement of his effort.

Now, as Howell has correctly pointed out, it is Cicero's belief "that these various stages in a case can

60. Howell, Introduction, 43.
be predicted in advance by the speaker who studies the
Complaint and Answer." Thus he is able not only to
foresee the position which it will be most advantageous
for him to assume, but he also has prior knowledge of the
strongest arguments which may be advanced both by the
accusation and the defence with reference to that position.
In other words, reverting to the phrase employed upon a
number of previous occasions, the doctrine of status
guides a speaker in exploiting to the fullest extent the
persuasive potentialities inherent in the position he
chooses. It does this because "the resources of each
Position have been placed at his disposal [in advance] by
theoretical treatment."62

As an adjunct to the foregoing analysis it would be
interesting to pursue Cicero's views concerning which
of the parties to a dispute determines the "state." In
De Inventione, although his remarks on the matter are not
specific, he appears to give the impression that it arises
from the interaction of the intentio criminis and the
depulsio, and is, therefore, a joint product of these two
elements.63 His Topica is, on the other hand, quite ex-

61. Howell, 162.
62. Ibid.
63. See 1.8, 10 etc.
plicit, and asserts that the state is determined by "the argument on which the defence first takes its stand with a view to rebutting the charge." Quintilian, following his usual practice, first reviews the opinions of preceding writers concerning the matter, and then concludes that "the origin of the basis varies and depends on the circumstances of the individual case." A few paragraphs later, however, he admits that it is generally determined by the defendant.

The problem is an interesting one, especially since in a "state" of Fact it is the plaintiff rather than the defendant who entertains the conjecture, while in the "states" of Name, Genus, and Procedure the defendant chooses his own ground. It is, however, sufficient for our present purpose merely to note these facts in passing, and to realize that there was not in Latin rhetoric any general agreement concerning the knotty problem of which party determines the "state."

64. 25.
65. Institutio, 3.6.5.
66. Institutio, 3.6.20.
67. See especially Institutio, 3.6.15. Quintilian adds, "Again in syllogism [i.e. a dispute in scripto which turns upon conflicting interpretations of a written text] the whole of the reasoning proceeds from him who affirms. But on the other hand he who in such cases [fact or syllogism] denies appears to impose the burden of dealing with such bases upon his opponent. . . . Therefore we must admit that a basis [of this sort] can originate in denial." (Institutio, 3.6.15-6.) Quintilian, as we shall point out below, considered a dispute in scripto to have a "state."
In concluding our remarks on *De Inventione* it may be observed that this treatise presents a broad and well developed doctrine of *status* which takes into account its synthetic functions of guiding the speaker in the actual construction of his address, as well as its analytical functions of aiding him in the identification of the dispute and the discovery of relevant materials. We emphasize, however, that in this treatise the doctrine is limited so as to apply only to the dispute *in ratione*. Controversies arising over the interpretation of a written text are not considered to have "states" in the strict sense of the term, but are placed outside the pale of the concept. This limitation, it has been noted, is characteristic of the earlier Latin theory of *status*.

In the century and a half following the publication of *De Inventione* the concept of *status* underwent a fundamental change. Its scope was broadened so as to bring within its limits disputes *in scripto* as well as disputes *in ratione*. As Howell has pointed out, *Ad Herennium* is the earliest Latin treatise to present this wider view. Only a few decades later, however, Cicero had sufficiently modified his original doctrine so as to speak in *Topica* of the dispute *in scripto* as containing a quasi *status*

Quintilian goes even farther, bringing the two classes of controversies into the same category through the mediation of the procedural state. In 3.6.86-8 he says:

These four schemes or forms of action... called general bases fall into two classes... namely, the rational and the legal. The rational is the simpler, as it involves nothing more than the consideration of the nature of things. In this connection, therefore, a mere mention of conjecture, definition and quality will suffice. Legal questions necessarily have a larger number of species, since there are many laws and a variety of forms. In the case of one law we rely on the letter, in others on the spirit. Some laws we force to serve our turn, when we can find no law to support our case, others we compare with one another, and on others we put some novel interpretation. Thus from these three bases we get three resemblances of bases: sometimes simple, sometimes complex, but all having a character of their own... 70

This gradual modification of doctrine was accompanied by a corresponding change in terminology. De Inventione and Ad Herennium regularly employ the word constitutio when referring either to the concept as a whole or to the names of the various standard argumentative positions which a disputant may assume. Both Topica and Institutio, on the other hand, use the word status. Whether or not this alteration in name was a direct result of doctrinal changes or was merely accidental cannot here be investigated.

Before bringing to a close this discussion of the

69. See also De Oratore, 2.25-6 where Cicero asserts that "even the case, in which the written letter differs from the intention, involves a species of doubt...."

70. See also Institutio, 3.6.66-7.
classical doctrine of status I must single out for special emphasis two points which have been mentioned earlier. The first is that, despite the diverse interpretations placed upon it by different rhetoricians, there was quite general agreement that the concept had implications for demonstrative and deliberative as well as for judicial speaking. The applicability of status to these types of oratory is explicitly asserted in De Inventione,71 Ad Herennium,72 Partitiones Oratoriae,73 Topica,74 Institutio,75 and De Oratore.76 Nor is the reasoning upon which the ancients based this assumption difficult to comprehend. Political speaking, no less than forensic, centers in debatable propositions which are the result of preliminary conflicts of opinion. Though perhaps less formalized, these conflicts are not less distinct than the complaints and answers set forth in legal proceedings.77

71. 2.4.
72. 3.4.
73. 9.
74. 25.
75. 3.6.1.
76. 2.24.
77. Howell, Introduction, 42.
Moreover, the deliberative orator may argue — as any elementary debate text tells us — questions of name or of quality as well as those of fact. He departs from the advocate only in the respect that his interest is with fact present or future rather than with fact past. As for demonstrative speaking: this genre the classical theorists viewed as growing "out of a complex situation in which charges and countercharges upon the subject in question have interacted to produce a controversy upon the facts in a man's life, or the definition or quality of those facts, or the interpretation of written texts connected with his claims to a favorable or unfavorable reputation."78

Such an analysis is obviously based upon the fundamental assumption that all rhetorical discourse is essentially persuasive in nature. Not only does the lawyer speak in order to convince the judge, or the legislator in order to sway the assembly, but even the epideictic orator delivers his address with a view to persuading his hearers that the man he praises is noble and virtuous, and therefore deserving of admiration and of emulation. Consequently, his topics actually are of a two-fold nature. They are first of all devices for finding ways whereby an individual or an inanimate object may be praised or

78. Howell, Introduction, 43.
blamed, but they are also the sources of arguments appropriate to prove that the individual or object in question deserves praise or blame. In the discovery and exploitation of such arguments the doctrine of status naturally plays an important role.

The second of the items which must be brought forth for special comment is this: In classical rhetoric status, like certain other concepts, falls indifferently into the realm of inventio or into that of dispositio, depending on the point of view from which it is approached. The haziness of the line separating these two parts of classical rhetoric is shown by the intimate relationship existing among the system for analyzing questions, the status, and the topics.

3. Topics. The third of the constituent parts of classical inventio remains to be discussed. This is the doctrine of topics.

In explaining this doctrine it is well to begin by recalling that in ancient rhetoric the notion expressed by the Greek preposition ἀπό (or ἀπό) — meaning "from,"
"out of" -- plays a role of paramount importance.79 The great classical writers based their systems upon the premise that an orator approaches any particular speaking situation armed with certain previously acquired "resources." "From" these, "out of" these, he draws at need the tools which comprise the totality of his persuasive appeal. In their opinion, this arsenal consisted not only of stored-up arguments, examples, and maxims, but also of the speaker's personal assets of character and reputation, and even included his insight into the various means of affecting the emotions of his hearers. Thus they characteristically thought of rhetorical premises as being derived "from" a knowledge of the emotions in the same sense that a conclusion is derived "from" a premise.80 In each case the second element was considered to be inherent in, or implied by, or derived "out of" the first.

Closely associated with this basic notion of "from" was the concept of τόπος, or "place where."81 As Cooper has observed, the English word "topic" is generally understood as referring to "a rubric or category, a general heading under which specific details are collected or things are said. So to us 'topic' often comes to mean a theme, a subject under discussion, the matter of a paragraph


80. Cooper, 24.

81. Ibid.
or the like."  

By the ancients, however, the rhetorical term topic was generally employed to denote a place or region, a locality (locus) where some particular element of persuasion had its abode. Since, as I have already indicated, this element might fall within the provinces of ethos or pathos rather than in that of logos, they conceived of ethical and pathetic topics as well as of logical ones.

This conception of a "topic" as the place where an argument resides immediately suggests the figure of the chase. Each kind of game has its own favorite runs and haunts. To these the hunter must go if he desires to find animals of that particular species. The same is true of arguments. "They [too] are of different kinds, and the different kinds are found in different places . . . ."  
The orator must be acquainted with the runs and haunts of

82. Cooper, xxiv.

83. As Caplan writes: "The τόνος is the head under which arguments fall, the place in the memory where the argument is to be looked for and found, ready for use, the storehouse or thesaurus, the seat, the haunt . . . . or the vein or mine where arguments should be sought." (Caplan, 287).

84. See in this connection Baldwin, 50; Wagner, 286-7; and Hudson, 327.

85. Institutio, 5.10.21-2; Cooper, xxiv; Hudson, 329, etc. Perhaps the most famous example of the use of this figure is to be found in Bacon's Advancement of Learning. (See The Works of Francis Bacon. 7 vols. Edited by J. Spedding, R. L. Ellis, and D. D. Heath. (London, 1876-83), 3.390.)

86. Cooper, xxiv.
each of the various elements of persuasion, and he must also know how to draw them forth from their places when they will be of service to him in any specific speaking situation.

The function of the topics is to catalogue these haunts, thus providing a comprehensive index of all known persuasive materials. The speaker who systematically visits each of the various localities thus tabulated will, as a matter of course, encounter those materials and techniques which are particularly adapted to the cause in which he is engaged. Moreover, once his survey has been completed he may be confident that he has not neglected to consider any appeal or device which might have been of use to him. In short, the "secret" of fruitful rhetorical invention lay, the ancients thought, "in the conscious artistic use of the topics . . . ."87

Topical method may be looked upon as constituting a sort of highly refined mnemonic system, the purpose of which is "to procure the ready use of knowledge."88 It is a procedure whereby stored up information and experience may be methodically reviewed and re-studied with reference to any specific rhetorical situation.

87. Caplan, 287.
88. Wallace, 56.
Following more or less closely the pattern set by Aristotle, most classical writers on rhetoric developed topical systems articulated in terms of a major distinction between the so-called "general" and "particular" places. Topics of the first sort provided argumentative lines so broad that they could be applied to any kind of debatable subject-matter and to all three types of discourses — legislative, judicial, and demonstrative. Described by Aristotle as possibility and impossibility, past fact, future fact, and size, these places were in Roman rhetoric thought to include such items as definition, enumeration, genus, species, adjuncts, and cause. That is, no matter what his subject or purpose, the orator might find suitable speech materials by asking what a thing is, what its parts are, what accompanies it, causes it, etc. Because these topics could be applied indifferently in any of a large number of subject-areas they were viewed as belonging to rhetoric itself and were called rhetorical topics.

Particular places, on the other hand, were considered

89. See Rhetorica, 1358a, 1392a-3a, 1397a and ff.
90. See Institutio, 5. Preface. 5; De Inventione, 1.24; Topica, 23-5; Partitiones Oratoriae, 20ff.
91. Rhetorica, 1392a-3a.
92. See, for example, Topica, 3-20.
93. Rhetorica, 1358a.
to be the property of certain substantive disciplines such as ethics or politics. Therefore, when using them the orator admittedly employed premises lying outside the field of rhetoric. Because certain classes of subject-matter are characteristically associated with the ends proposed by each of the types of speeches -- public affairs with advice and dissuasion (legislative), character and reputation with praise and blame (epideictic), questions of past fact with guilt and innocence (forensic) -- particular topics were usually classified in terms of the three-fold division of speech purposes. Thus, pleasure, profit, honor, and advantage are among the particular places for deliberative oratory; deeds, achievements, honors, qualities of mind, and qualities of body, among those for demonstrative. The places for forensic speaking were customarily subdivided according to their applicability to a question of fact, of definition, or of quality. Physical ability, motive, etc. were considered places for fact; what a thing is and whether it is, for definition; unintended result and action to prevent a worse consequence, for quality. 95

This division of topics into "general" and "particular" places is significant. It is a concrete doctrinal mani-

94. Ibid.

95. See Rhetorica, 1359a-1377b passim; Partitiones Oratoriae, 9-14; De Inventione, 2.15ff, etc.
festation of the relationship which rhetoric as a form of power over discourse bears to those substantive sciences from which the subject-matter of discourse is derived. Aristotle, it must be remembered, characterized rhetoric as "a kind of offshoot, on the one hand, of Dialectic, and, on the other, of that study of Ethics which may properly be called political."96 In other words, rhetoric, like dialectic, has no peculiar field of inquiry, no body of subject-matter which constitutes its own exclusive province. The orator is skilled in speaking on a wide variety of subjects. He knows how to apply to each the principles of the art he professes, and he can with equal facility persuade or dissuade his audience with reference to any of them. Yet his speech must have substance; his skills and techniques cannot be applied in a vacuum. Consequently, he must borrow from other fields the materials which form the body of his address. As Aristotle remarks, his borrowing is characteristically made from some aspect of that science which studies public affairs.

Thus, in a very real sense, an effective address is the joint product of two experts. Each contributes his own special knowledge and experience, and these contributions are woven inextricably into the final result. The orator, who is an expert in the science of human relations

96. Rhetorica, 1356a.
but not a specialist in any particular field of subject-
matter, supplies certain general modes of persuasion and
certain standardized forms of argument which are
applicable to any type of subject and to any species of
rhetorical effort. These are the "general" or "universal"
topics. The subject-matter expert, on the other hand,
contributes those particularized techniques of inquiry
and research which are peculiar to the science he pro-
fesses. These are the "particular" topics.

The practicing orator makes use of both of these
sources of persuasive appeals. When he seeks an argument
bearing on some point in a special branch of knowledge
he visits the place in the appropriate science where
that argument is stored. 97 When he needs a broader and
less specialized mode of appeal -- say, to the general
principles of justice or expediency -- he draws upon the
resources of his own discipline. 98

The two fields are, however, not mutually exclusive.
A particular science may, of course, employ a "general"
topic, although it will usually do so in a somewhat
"particularized" fashion. 99 "Particular" topics, on the

97. Cooper, xxiv.
98. Baldwin, 14.
contrary, are given a rhetorical coloring when they are employed by the orator, and, as a result, they are frequently brought into a close relationship with corresponding "general" places. Bacon, an unusually acute student of ancient inventional theory, recognized this fact when he pointed out that they are in essence "a kind of mixture of logic with the proper matter of each science . . . ." 100

Since the point is relatively important, an example may be warranted. When the orator inquires whether a contemplated action will be lawful or unlawful, he is raising a question which is actually a sub-species of the "general" topic of "the Possible or Impossible." But he is raising it with reference to a specific circumstance and to a special science -- that of the law. Thus he will employ both general and more particular lines of argument, and these lines will intermingle in such a way as to lose their original identity.

Just as Cicero insists that there is no specific question which can be considered apart from the general problem of which it is a manifestation, 101 so we may say that there is no "particular" topic which when it appears in the orator's finished product does not bear an intimate

100. Quoted Wallace, 62.

101. De Oratore, 2.34, 31, etc.
relationship to one of the "general" places. The converse is also true. Each "general" topic will be particularized and given specificity by virtue of the fact that it is applied by the speaker to certain places, times, or events.

Although in practice the "general" and "particular" topics tended thus to intermingle, in theory they were considered to be distinct. Upon the basis of this dichotomy, therefore, the ancients built twin systems for classifying these two fundamental types of persuasive materials. The avowed purpose of these systems was to bring within the limits of the "art" of rhetoric some means by which the speaker might be aided in doing the hard work of creative thinking. Such aid, though in itself legitimate, is always open to serious abuses. Whatever begins as a guide and stimulus to thought may become a substitute for it. This danger was fully appreciated by the classical writers. Therefore, despite the fact that they made topical method the focal point of their inventional systems, they were not without misgivings concerning the efficacy of that method as the tool of a sound and fruitful inventio. Both Cicero and Quintilian, while admitting that a knowledge of places is useful to the speaker, also warn that such knowledge is not of itself sufficient. They insist on the primacy of thorough study and prolonged contemplation, and recommend that these activities both precede and accompany the
Their warnings were, however, ill heeded. As classical doctrine gradually degenerated into the perversions practiced in the schools of declamatio the topical method came to stand as the end of invention rather than as an aid to it. The original concept of topic as "place where" was altered, and students were taught standard passages and methods of development which might be employed indifferently in connection with all sorts of subjects. The result of this over-emphasis on loci was the hollow sententiae and colores, the meaningless aphorisms and epigrams of the declaimers. By their excesses the basically valuable topical method of the earlier classical theorists received so severe a blow that even in present-day rhetorical theory we still generally hold topics suspect.

F. Summary

The purpose of this chapter has been to survey briefly some of the more salient aspects of the doctrine of inventio as it was understood by the major rhetorical theorists of antiquity. Of the various interpretations and conclusions which were presented, the following appear to be of sufficient importance to warrant repetition:

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102. See De Oratore, 2.24; Institutio, 5.10.119-25, etc.
1. **Inventio**, as that term was understood by the major classical rhetoricians, referred only to the speaker's most primary task of surveying the "opportunities" offered by any particular speaking situation, with a view to finding certain pre-existent "proofs" that might be used in the substance of his discourse.

2. The scope of ancient **inventio** was severely restricted by the fact that **dispositio** was conceived of as "planned adaptation," and included all of what later rhetoricians and logicians were to mean by "judgment."

   a. As a result of this limitation the topics of **inventio** and those of **dispositio** tended to intermingle. Certain concepts became, after a fashion, the common property of both departments. From the point of view of **inventio** they served as means of deriving the substantive elements of the address. From the point of view of **dispositio** they acted as guides in the selection, adaptation, and use of speech materials.

3. Although Latin inventional theory, as typified in **De Inventione**, did not, for the most part, accept the Aristotelian view that rhetoric and dialectic possessed interchangeable inventional systems, it
did recognize that the two disciplines coincided in this area. Therefore, utilizing in so far as practicable the principles of inquiry and proof devised by the dialecticians, it endeavored to create in the province of logos analogous but independent procedures for search and confirmation.

4. The constituent parts of the classical doctrine of inventio were: 1. the classificatory system by means of which "questions" were categorized as to type, 2. the status, and 3. the loci. These I have termed the elements of inventio.

a. Analysis of Questions. The fundamental dichotomy between definite and indefinite questions looks backward to one of the basic distinctions between dialectic and rhetoric, and it looks forward to that body of analytical and synthetic procedures which make up the status.

b. Status. By the untranslatable term status, the ancients understood, it appears, a method and a structure which first enabled the speaker to discover that argumentative position where he might most profitably rest his case and which then instructed him concerning how he might exploit the advantages of that position to their fullest extent.
c. The technical term "topic" was generally employed in classical *inventio* to denote a place or region, a locality (*locus*) where some particular element of persuasion had its abode. The function of the doctrine of topics was to catalogue these *loci*, thus providing a comprehensive index of all known persuasive materials.
Chapter III

THE INVENTIONAL SYSTEM OF JOHN WARD

A. Introduction

John Ward's *System of Oratory* may be regarded as something of a literary curiosity. Written by a man whose chief scholarly interests lay outside the field of rhetorical theory, it professes to be nothing more than a faithful compendium of the best that had been said by the major classical theorists. Yet even this modest goal is not completely achieved. Liberally sprinkled with errors of comprehension and interpretation, the *System* gives at best but an imperfect picture of ancient doctrine. As a result, it is open not only to the mild charge of unoriginality but also to the more serious indictment of inaccuracy.

Neither of these deficiencies appears, however, to have detracted from its popularity or influence. Commended by reviewers, imitated by later writers, widely


2. *System*, 1.15.

3. See, for example, the review by William Rose in the *Monthly Review*, 20 (1759), 481-8.

4. Priestley, by his own acknowledgment, borrowed from Ward some of the "examples" used in *A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism*. He also is indebted to the *System* for certain of his materials on *inventio*. (See Chapter 5
used as a school text both in England and America, the System even today is generally praised by students of public address.

Both Sandford (110) and Harding (184, 189, 196 and 236) assert that John Walker in his Rhetorical Grammar (London, 1785) drew upon Ward freely. The authors of a modern textbook on argumentation quote him directly four times. (James M. O'Neill, Craven Laycock, and Robert L. Scales, Argumentation and Debate. (New York, 1925), 50, 189, 330, 348.) In Dr. Williams's Library in London is a manuscript by Andrew Kippis titled Notes on Professor Ward's System of Oratory -- The History of Eloquence, by A. Kippis. (See McLachlan, Appendix I. 285.)

Among the nonconformist academies in England Ward's work is known to have been used at Hoxton and Bristol and is listed in the catalogue of the library at Warrington for 1775. (See McLachlan, 123 and Appendix 1.) Harding reports (288) that it, together with Campbell's Philosophy and Blair's Lectures, "dominated" the field of rhetorical instruction in the English universities during the last part of the eighteenth century.

Guthrie has found that in 1767 the System was used as a textbook at Yale and four years later was "an integral part of the studies at Brown." Moreover, it is listed in the catalogue of the Harvard library for 1765 and appears again among the books recorded in 1773. As a result of these and other findings Guthrie concludes that "Ward commanded the [American] college field before 1780 ...." Fritz presents substantially the same data. (Charles A. Fritz, The Content of the Teaching of Speech in the American College Before 1850: With Special Reference to Its Influence on Current Theories. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis: School of Education, New York University, 1928. See Plate 1 in Appendix.) Hayworth asserts: "The first evidence of formal use of a textbook on public speaking [in America] is the use of Ward's Oratory in 1771 at Brown University." (Donald Hayworth, "The Development of the Training of Public Speakers in America," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 14 (1928), 494.)

6. See, for example, Harding 40, 41 and 166. Also the same author's article "Quintilian's Witnesses," Speech Monographs, 1 (1934), 12. Cf. Guthrie, 60-1; Sandford, 109-10, etc.

Monk is, so far as I have been able to discover, the only present-day writer whose judgment is distinctly un-
This incongruity between performance and reception may perhaps be accounted for by the fact that, whatever his shortcomings as a rhetorical scholar, Ward did grasp the all-important classical tenet that rhetoric is a complete, self-contained, self-sufficient discipline. Therefore, he declared unequivocally for its separation from logic, and he produced a system which placed almost as much emphasis on finding and arranging arguments as on expression. This emphasis, added to the prestige of his position as a professor at Gresham College and the fact that he himself was a dissenter, insured his treatise a warm reception, especially in the numerous nonconformist academies. Even with its deficiencies the System put into English a generally adequate overview of the theories of Quintilian, Cicero, and Aristotle. Dissatisfied with the excesses of the figure books and the narrow view of the elocutionists, serious teachers and students turned to it eagerly. In a very real sense, therefore, Ward laid the foundation upon which Campbell, Blair, and Whately favorable. He says: "The fact that they [Ward's lectures] were published and sold bears witness to the interest of the age in rhetoric and to the apparently infinite capacity of the eighteenth-century reader to endure repetition, for Ward says nothing that had not been said before."

built. It was not until their works gained popularity that his began to lose its position of dominance.\(^7\)

As one might expect, Ward's inventional system is drawn almost exclusively from the classical writers. His major sources in the order of their relative importance are Quintilian, Cicero, and Aristotle.\(^8\) The only modern author mentioned with any degree of frequency is Vossius, and he, of course, did little more than rehearse classical doctrine.\(^9\) Even Ward's illustrations are derived from the ancients, being, for the most part, taken out of the orations of Cicero. In addition, there are numerous references to Roman law—a subject in which Ward was expert—and to all phases of Latin literature.

It would appear that Ward's usual practice when preparing to treat one of the various aspects of \textit{inventio}

7. Guthrie, 56.

8. Cf. Harding, 47. Ward's preference for Quintilian is made evident in his first lecture. He writes: "But Quintilian himself outdid all, who went before him, in diligence and accuracy as a writer... [His] \textit{Institutions} are so comprehensive, and written with that great exactness and judgment, that they are generally allowed to be the most perfect work of this kind." \textit{System}, 1.14-5.

was to search through his favorite sources until he found that discussion of the matter which seemed best fitted to his needs. Then, with little or no modification, he would reproduce this discussion in his lectures. Thus, for example, his remarks on "internal" commonplaces are, as we shall see, drawn almost exclusively from Topica; those on the places for praise and blame and for judicial speaking, from Institutio; his analysis of the passions from Rhetorica, etc. In more than one instance adherence to an obvious source passes the bounds of scholarly decency and falls but one step short of actual plagiarism. By way of Ward's defence, however, it may be remarked that he is usually generous in acknowledging his indebtedness and furnishes frequent citations to the work from which he had borrowed.¹⁰

Such habits of writing could hardly fail to result in an inventional doctrine which is fundamentally an eclectic hodgepodge of ancient theories. Whatever unity may be observed in Ward's discussion is a result of the natural cohesiveness of classical rhetoric rather than

¹⁰. As a practicable means of showing the extent to which Ward drew upon certain of the classical treatises I have attempted to record in footnotes all of the more striking parallels between the System and the works of Cicero and Quintilian.
the consistency of his own system. In fact, it might
well be argued that he presents no system in the usual
sense of the word, but merely a collection of more or less
closely related discussions concerning the various facets
of inventio.\textsuperscript{11}

These disquisitions are loosely organized under three
major divisions corresponding to the three factors in a
rhetorical situation -- the speech, the speaker, and the
audience. To the first are related all matters having to
do with establishing "the proof of a thing" (logos);
to the second belong the problems of ethical persuasion;
and to the third, those of pathetic appeal. Within the
framework thus erected Ward pours out with more enthusiasm
than judgment the great body of ancient rhetorical lore.

The few departures which he makes from the classics
may, as we shall see, be classified into two groups:
l. errors of comprehension and interpretation, and 2. an
increased emphasis on the relation between finding arguments
and adapting them to the audience. Although no single item
in the first of these categories is in itself of major
importance, when added together they tend to call into
question Ward's competence as a student of classical
rhetoric. The second class of deviations is of more im-
portance. By stressing the problems of audience adaptation

\textsuperscript{11} Harding (49-50) advances an essentially similar
judgment concerning the System as a whole.
in connection with his discussion of inventio Ward appears to take the functions of selection and judgment out of the realm of dispositio. Thus he narrows somewhat the scope of this part of ancient rhetoric and helps lay the foundation for significant changes soon to follow.

B. Logic and Rhetoric

"Oratory," declares Ward, "is the art of speaking well upon any subject, in order to persuade." Its subject-matter is universal because "there is nothing, but what is capable of receiving much advantage and ornament from this art."13

In two important respects rhetoric is closely similar to its sister discipline of logic: 1. Neither has a content peculiar to itself. 2. Each is a methodology suitable for analyzing a wide variety of subject-areas.14

12. System, 2.19. Here, as elsewhere, Ward uses the terms "oratory" and "rhetoric" synonymously.


14. Ibid. Note should be taken of the fact that Ward uses the word "logic" in a sense no longer current. Whereas we now commonly think of the science thus designated as a tool for ascertaining the validity or invalidity of certain thought relationships, it was some centuries ago generally conceived of as the art of inventing and arranging proofs. Thus in the seventeenth -- and to a lesser extent in the eighteenth -- century the terms "logic" and "dialectic" were practically equivalent, and were "used interchangeably in Latin and English to mean 'the art of discovering and arranging arguments,' 'the art of argumentation,' 'the art of disputation,' and the like." See Wilbur Samuel Howell, "Nathaniel Carpenter's Place in the Controversy Between Dialectic and Rhetoric," Speech Monographs, 1 (1934), 24.
these similarities some writers "have excluded both invention and disposition from the art of oratory, supposing they more properly belong to logic." 15 Such a conclusion is, however, unwarranted. Although logic and rhetoric teach us to reason from the same principles and are "conversant" about the same subjects, they differ in method and purpose. The "short and concise way of reasoning" employed by logic stands in marked contrast with the characteristic "fluency and copiousness of oratory." 16 Moreover, logic finds its end in a "knowledge of the truth"; 17 rhetoric goes farther and attempts to carry men to action. 18 Therefore, it teaches us how to "conciliate the mind and affect the passions"; 19 it considers the various emotions and interests of mankind "with the bias they receive from temper, education, converse, or other circumstances of life; and teaches how to fetch such reasons from each of these, as are of the greatest force in persuasion . . . ." 20 In other words, it provides us with "more heads of invention" than does logic, and it

17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
employs them "chiefly [sic] as motives to action." 21 A somewhat similar situation obtains in the province of dispositio. The logician arranges his propositions so that "the relation between the terms may be evident, and the conclusion appear to be fairly drawn from the premises." 22 The orator, on the other hand, "consults the pleasure and entertainment of his hearers, as well as their instruction." 23

For these reasons rhetoric must be considered as having its own independent systems for inventing and disposing arguments. Although these are similar to their counterparts in the science of logic, they are not identical. Because its purpose and methods are unique rhetoric cannot borrow from logic the sciences of devising and arranging arguments. It is more than an art of style. It is a complete, comprehensive, self-contained entity which provides the skills and knowledge requisite to all of the aspects of speech preparation and delivery.24

21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
24. Ward refuses to accept Vossius' division of rhetoric into two "parts," inventio and elocutio. Such a dichotomy is, he believes, unrealistic. The functions of dispositio and pronuntiatio cannot be dispensed with. Hence, under such a classification we tend to group the first with inventio and the second with dispositio. The "parts" themselves have not been abolished; their names have merely been changed. (See System, 3.39.) Ward cites in this connection Logices et Rhetoricae Natura et Constitutione Libri II. (Hagae-Comitis, 1658), c. 17.
Ward was not the first modern writer to express this view. Yet his System was the first important and widely influential English treatise to state it so emphatically. Ward's analysis may lack the depth of Aristotle's famous comparison between the provinces of logic and rhetoric. His argumentation may be weak. These, however, are relatively minor considerations. What is important is that he declared strongly for the independence of rhetoric. Because of the wide circulation which his lectures enjoyed this declaration must have exerted considerable influence. Well may we say with Sandford\textsuperscript{25} and Guthrie\textsuperscript{26} that here is a landmark in the reversion of modern rhetoric to the classical tradition.

C. Inventio Defined

Having thus established inventio as a legitimate part of rhetoric, Ward proceeds to define it. Invention, considered in general, is, he says, "the discovery of such things, as are proper to persuade. And in order to attain this end, the orator proposes to himself three things; to prove or illustrate the subject upon which he treats, to conciliate the minds of his hearers, and to engage [sic] their passions in his favor ... these require different

\textsuperscript{25} 108.

kinds of arguments and motives . . . ."27

Strictly classical in its orientation, this definition, it will be recognized, 1. limits inventio to the discovery of speech materials, and 2. treats these materials as functional elements which may be put at the service of the orator in proving, conciliating, and persuading. Thus what we have is in essence the familiar Ciceronian doctrine which recognizes a point to point relationship between the provinces of logos, ethos, and pathos and the concepts of docere, conciliare, and movere.28 A successful exploration of the region where logical inducements reside will bring forth arguments which influence because they "instruct"; and successful explorations of the provinces of ethos and

27. System, 4.44. In Lecture 3, where he describes briefly each of the "parts" of rhetoric, Ward characterizes inventio in these words: "Every one who aims to speak well and accurately upon any subject, does naturally in the first place inquire after and pursue such thoughts, as may seem most proper to explain and illustrate the thing, upon which he designs to discourse. And if the nature of it requires, that he should bring reasons to confirm what he saith he not only seeks the strongest, and such as are like to be best received; but also prepares to answer any thing, which may be offered to the contrary. This is invention." (3.29-30). This careless and somewhat discursive statement which appears, on the one hand, to limit inventio to the discovery of "thoughts . . . proper to explain and illustrate," and, on the other, to bring within its scope the functions of selection and judgment, does not, we may feel certain, provide so accurate a picture of Ward's conception of this department as does the definition quoted in the text.

28. See Brutus, 49.185 and Orator, 21.69. I have used Cicero: Brutus, Orator. (Cambridge, 1942). The translation of Brutus is by G. L. Hendrickson; that of Orator by H. M. Hubbell. Cf. De Oratore, 2.27.
pathos will result in appeals that "delight" and "move." Each of the three areas in which inventio operates is directly related to one of the three purposes of oratory, and finds its ultimate justification in the fact that it helps make the achievement of that purpose possible.²⁹

The inventional system which is thus delineated Ward expounds in a series of eight lectures totaling some 125 pages. Both his doctrine and his illustrations are borrowed with little or no modification from the writings of the ancients, particularly Cicero and Quintilian. Ninety-five pages are given over to a discussion of "the invention of arguments proper to the proof of a thing." Then follow short individual lectures on the sources of ethical and pathetic appeals.

²⁹. Herrick has recently pointed out how in the Ciceronian tradition, not only inventio, but, in fact, all the functions of the orator are intimately related to the three ends, docere, conciliare, and movere. He writes: "Johann Sturm, probably the best known interpreter of the Partitiones Oratoriae in the sixteenth century, stated this relationship clearly. 'First [said Sturm] is invention, next disposition, third style, then delivery, all four of which are preserved by the memory. All these are related to the three [aims], that he should teach, delight, persuade, that is, that he should prevail with what is necessary to victory.' In other words, the successful exercise of invention, disposition, style, etc. will teach, delight, and persuade." (Marvin T. Herrick, "The Place of Rhetoric in Poetic Theory," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 34 (1948), 10.) Herrick's citation is to Ioannis Sturmii in partitiones oratorias Ciceroni, dialogi duo. (Strassburg, 1539), 18.
The invention of proofs involves, as Cicero has told us, "The discovery of such things, as are really true; or that seem to be so, and make the thing, for which they are produced, appear probable." These we call "arguments." For by Cicero's definition, an argument "is a reason, which induces us to believe, what before we doubted of."

Now, in order to understand the discussion which follows it is important to note that Ward is here employing the term "argument" in a severely restricted sense. Instead of equating it, as we today sometimes do, with the words "argumentation," "proof," or "inference," he uses it to denote a "reason" which enhances the acceptance value of a premise. Conceived of in this fashion, an "argument" is merely a partial constituent of proof and does

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30. **System**, 4.44. Ward properly cites as his source *De Inventione*, 1.7.

31. **Ibid.** See *Topica*, 2.

32. Throughout the history of rhetorical theory considerable confusion has always existed concerning the meaning of the word "argument" and its relation to the neighboring concepts of "argumentation," "inference," and "proof." In *De Inventione* (1.40) Cicero took occasion to point out that because of a certain ambiguity in argumentatio (argumentation) some persons were led to believe that an argumentum (argument) could have but a single part. At one point in *Institutio* (4.2.79) Quintilian felt called upon to make explicit the fact that he was talking about "arguments" and not about "argumentation" (argumentis dico, non argumentatione). In modern textbooks this confusion has been preserved and even perhaps augmented. Contemporary writers tend to use the words "argument," "argumentation," "inference," and "proof" almost interchangeably. See, for example, O'Neill and McBurney, 2; Foster, 129-69 passim; Baird, 3.
not in itself provide a demonstration. It enters into "argumentation" only when we show a discernible relationship between it and the conclusion toward which it is directed. If, as Ward points out, this relationship is not immediately apparent, it must be made evident through the process of comparing both the "argument" and the desired conclusion with a common third factor.33

Under the terms of this definition "arguments" may be divided into two classes: 1. those which are "general" in the sense that they are equally suited to all types of subjects, and 2. those which are "more particular," i.e. especially suited to demonstrative, deliberative, or judicial discourses.34

1. General Arguments. The greatest aids to invention are "A LIVELY imagination and readiness of thought,"35 and a thorough knowledge of the subject upon which we are to speak.36 But everyone has not "genius" and even knowledge may be improved by system. Art has, therefore, "prescribed a method" to assist us in finding an abundance of "arguments"

34. System, 4.46.
on any subject. This it does by means of "the contrivance of commonplaces which Cicero calls the seats or heads of arguments, and by a Greek name topics."37

Paralleling the traditional classification of proofs, Ward divides "commonplaces" into two sorts -- "internal" and "external." The former "arise from the subject";38 the latter, the orator "fetches from without."39 Internal topics are sixteen in number: definition, enumeration, notation,40 genus, species, antecedents, consequents, adjuncts, conjugates, cause, effect, contraries, opposites, similitude, dissimilitude, and comparison. The first three of these "comprehend the whole thing they are brought to prove"; of the remaining thirteen, some "contain a part" of the thing they are brought to prove, "and the rest its various properties and circumstances, with other considerations relating to it."41


38. System, 4.52.

39. Ibid.

40. This term, apparently derived from the Latin notatic, is used by Ward as a synonym for "etymology." See System, 4.53. Cf. Topica, 8.

41. System, 4.52. By those topics which "contain a part" of the thing they are brought to prove Ward apparently means genus and species. Antecedents, consequents, adjuncts, conjugates, cause, effect, contraries, opposites, similitude, dissimilitude, and comparison are, therefore, the places which contain "various properties and circumstances [of the subject], with other considerations relating to it." Cf. Topica, 2.
External topics are all taken from authorities, and are called by the general name of Testimonies. Testimonies are, in turn, either human or divine. Under the former are included writings, witnesses, and contracts. Topics for writings are: ambiguity, words and intention, contrariety, reasoning, and interpretation.\textsuperscript{42}

Ward's list of "internal" places he attributes both to Cicero and to Quintilian.\textsuperscript{43} There can, however, be little doubt that he drew his analysis almost exclusively from the former's \textit{Topica}.\textsuperscript{44} The parallels to \textit{Institutio}, except for an inevitable similarity in the places mentioned, are largely negative.\textsuperscript{45} In fact, Ward's discussion may properly be regarded as nothing more than a condensation of that portion of \textit{Topica} which is devoted to an analysis of "intrinsic" proofs.

With reference to "external" topics, Ward's specific source is not so clear. He reproduces Quintilian's censure of those who would eliminate extrinsic proofs from

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{42} \textit{System}, 5.63-73 passim.
\item \textsuperscript{43} \textit{System}, 4.52. The classification of common-places found in \textit{Topica}, and followed more or less closely in \textit{Institutio}, is, of course, merely a modification of the traditional places of \textit{inventio} first set down in the \textit{Analytica} and \textit{Topica} of Aristotle, and reproduced in many subsequent logical and rhetorical systems. See in this connection especially \textit{Wallace}, 57.
\item \textsuperscript{44} See 3-18. Cf. \textit{Partitiones Oratoriae}, 2; \textit{De Oratore}, 2.39.
\item \textsuperscript{45} See \textit{Institutio}, 5.10.20-94.
\end{itemize}
rhetoric, but there are no other evidences that he drew upon *Institutio* in this connection. Surprisingly enough, the general pattern of his remarks shows a certain similarity to Aristotle's analysis of inartistic proofs as set forth in *Rhetorica*, 1375a-1377b. Although the division of testimonies into human and divine -- a counterpart, incidentally, of the Aristotelian distinction between "ancient" and "recent" witnesses -- is a commonplace of Ciceronian rhetoric, no Latin treatise suggests Ward's treatment of writings, witnesses, and contracts quite so forcibly as does Aristotle's account of laws, witnesses, contracts, tortures, and the oath.


47. See *De Inventione*, 1.24; *Topica*, 20; *Partitiones Oratoriae*, 2, etc.

48. Aristotle's analysis of inartistic proofs may well be the source of a most interesting error of interpretation which appears in Ward's handling of this subject. As was noted above, he lists under the head of writings five so-called "places": ambiguity, words and intention, contrariety, reasoning, and interpretation. Now in reality these are, of course, not "places" at all, but quasi-states for disputes in scripto. (See *De Inventione*, 1.13; 2.40, etc.) At the same time, it must be admitted they bear a general similarity to the topics mentioned in Aristotle's discussion of laws (1375a-b) -- although one could hardly say that Aristotle describes them with the precision they later were to assume when in Roman rhetorical theory they had become attached to the lore of the status. Thus it may well be that Ward, dissatisfied with Quintilian's discussion of this matter because of its orientation toward the problems of the Roman courts, and finding nothing else in his usual sources which seemed adequate, turned directly to Aristotle. If so, it is not difficult to understand how he might be led to confuse the quasi-states about which he had read in Cicero and Quintilian with the external
2. **Status.** The ancients, says Ward, recognized that the principal point of dispute in any controversy might be classified under one of a small number of heads.\(^49\)

Out of this observation they devised the doctrine of *status* -- a concept useful both in determining the nature of the "question" and in discovering those arguments which are peculiarly appropriate to it.\(^50\)

The "State of a Controversy" is to be defined as "the principal point in dispute between the contending topics set forth by Aristotle."

Rhetorica must not, however, be considered as anything more than an indirect source. During the course of his discussion Ward also draws upon Hermagoras (11-2), *De Oratore* (2.32), *De Inventione* (2.42), and derives at least one example from Quintilian (7.9).

Other explanations of the error are, of course, possible. I have already pointed out (See Chapter 2 above) that in *De Inventione* Cicero does not recognize a dispute in scripto as having a state proper, and he fails to assign any specific name to the position assumed in this type of controversy. This very lack of definiteness on Cicero's part may have been the source of Ward's confusion. Or again, it may have arisen from some general remarks about the nature of inartistic proofs which are to be found in *Partitiones Oratoriae*, 14, where it is pointed out that these ready-made materials frequently become the subject of controversy between contending parties. As a matter of fact, Ward took occasion to stress this very point. ([System, 5.62-3.](#))

Neither of these explanations, however, takes into account the striking similarity between Aristotle's discussion of "laws" and Ward's treatment of writings. This affinity in and of itself gives a high degree of probability to the hypothesis first offered.

49. [System, 6.77.](#)

50. [System, 6.77.](#)
parties, upon the proof of which the whole cause or controversy depends." Quintilian describes it as "That kind of question which arises from the first conflict of the causes." This means that in judicial cases "it immediately follows upon the charge of the plaintiff [sic], and plea of the defendant." The common law gives to this clash of contentions the name "issue," and legalists describe it as "That point of matter depending in suit, whereupon the parties join, and put their cause to the trial." Now it will be observed that in this description of the status ward has departed in one important respect from the central stream of classical doctrine. The ancients drew a distinction between the quaestio and the "state," the second being nothing more than the name for that area in which the quaestio is located. Ward, however, disregards this rather fine point of difference. He speaks of the "issue" (his term for the quaestio) and the "state" as if they were identical. The reasons for this misinterpretation are difficult to assign. Perhaps they may be

51. Ibid.
52. System, 6.78. See Institutio, 3.6.5.
53. System, 6.79.
54. Ibid.
55. See Chapter 2 above.
traced in part to the fact that Quintilian in his dis-
cussion of status tends to blur many distinctions which
in the earlier De Inventione and Ad Herennium had been
treated with admirable clarity. It is, however, more
probable that the error arises merely from Ward's own
inattention to his sources.

On the perplexing problem of how the state is de-
termined Ward's remarks are brief and generally unsatis-
factory. When the charge is not denied by the defendant
but some argument is offered in explanation or defence,
the state is, he declares, determined by the defendant.57
This is because the party who advances a counter argument
has the responsibility to "make it good." When, on the
other hand, the defendant denies the charge the state is
located by the accuser because he then will have the
burden of proof.58

56. In 3.6.9, for instance, Quintilian obviously con-
fuses status, quaestio, and indicatio when he says "the
basis of the cause will be that point which the orator sees
to be the most important for him to make and on which the
judge sees that he must fix his attention. For it is on
this that the cause will stand or fall."

57. System, 6.79-80.

58. System, 6.80. Ward here departs from Quintilian
and advocates a doctrine of Celsus which Quintilian takes
pains to refute. The pertinent passage is Institutio,
3.6.13-4: "Cornelius Celsus . . . asserts that the basis
is derived not from the denial of the charge, but from
him who affirms his proposition. Thus if the accused
denies that anyone has been killed, the basis will originate
with the accuser, because it is the latter who desires to
prove: if on the other hand the accused asserts that the
The state of definition provides a peculiar case. Here accuser and defendant argue the meaning of a certain word or phrase. Therefore, the "state" may be considered as arising neither out of the intentio nor the depulsio, but out of the indictment itself. 59

In every cause the principal question gives rise, Ward declares, to various "subordinate" questions. 60 Consider, for example, Cicero's oration for Milo. The entire argument hinges on the "subordinate" question of whether Clodius assassinated Milo. 61 Such questions have "states" of their own. These may be the same as the state of the principal question or may differ from it. 62 When, however, we speak of the state of a cause we have reference not to "subordinate" questions but to the principal one. 63 In addition, causes may have within them certain "incidental" questions. 64 Although these have some reference to the

homicide was justifiable, the burden of proof has been transferred and the basis will proceed from the accused and be affirmed by him. I do not, however, agree. For the contrary is nearer to the truth, that there is no point of dispute if the defendant makes no reply, and that consequently the basis originates with the defendant." Cf. Institutio, 3.6.5-22 passim.

59. System, 6.81.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid. This example may have been suggested by Institutio, 3.6.92-3.
62. System, 6.82.
64. System, 6.83. Cf. Institutio, 3.6.7 and 91.
central issue and contribute toward its proof, they are not "necessarily connected with it, or dependent upon it." Incidental" questions also have states. They are, however, "different from that of the Cause." The reason advanced by ward to explain why "subordinate" and "incidental" questions have states is, to say the least, curious. "[E]very question, or point of controversy, must," he says, "be stated, before it can be made the subject of disputation. And it is for this reason, that every new argument advanced by an orator is called a question, because it is considered as a fresh matter of controversy." This is, of course, tantamount to using the words "state" and "stated" synonymously, or saying that a question has a "state" because it is "stated." The only other eighteenth century rhetoric in which I have noted this strange doctrine is John Holmes's

**The Art of Rhetoric Made Easy.**

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65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.


68. John Holmes, *The Art of Rhetoric Made Easy: or the Elements of Oratory Briefly Stated and Fitted for the Practice of the Studious Youth of Great-Britain and Ireland, etc.* (London, 1739), 10. Ward's pronouncement may well be a corruption of this sentence from *Institutio, 3.6.7*: "For every question has its basis, since every question is based on assertion by one party and denial by another."
In connection with his comments on "subordinate" and "incidental" questions Ward, following Quintilian, recognizes that the same cause or controversy may sometimes contain more than one principal "state." This, however, will occur only when the cause is divided into a number of separate charges. Thus all of the orations against Verres relate, says Ward, "to one cause, founded upon a law of the Romans against unjust exactions, made by their governors of provinces upon the inhabitants; but as that prosecution is made up of as many charges, as there are orations, every charge, or inditement [sic], has its different state." In the defence of Coelius two states are to be found in a single speech: 1. Did he borrow money from Clodia in order to bribe certain slaves to kill a foreign ambassador? and 2. Did he afterwards attempt to poison Clodia herself?

Although Ward's discussion thus far has been concerned only with the judicial genre he is careful to point out that since deliberative and demonstrative speeches are frequently "managed in a controversial way" they too may

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69. System, 6.84. See Institutio, 3.6.9-10; 3.10.9.
70. System, 6.84-5.
71. System, 6.85.
have "states." In support of this contention he refers to Quintilian's observation "that states belong both to
general and particular questions; and to all sorts of
causes demonstrative, deliberative, and judicial." Moreover, he cites examples. Cicero's oration for Pompey,
Cato on Carthage, and Cato and Caesar on Cataline (as
reported by Sallust) are, he believes, deliberative
speeches which exhibit definite states. Of the demon-
strative type he lists Cicero's answer to the soothsayers
and his invective against Piso.

Ward's comments on the values to be derived from a
knowledge of the states are both interesting and useful.
The speaker who has located and fixed firmly in his mind
the central question in dispute will not, he says, "be
very liable to ramble from the point . . . ." Then,
adding an observation which I have not been able to dis-
cover in any of his usual sources, Ward asserts that the
hearer also is aided by an accurate understanding of the
point at issue, since this knowledge enables him more
readily to fit together into a coherent and meaningful
pattern the individual arguments and appeals that compose

72. Ibid.
73. System, 6.85-6. See Institutio, 3.6.1 and
3.8.4-5.
74. System, 6.86.
75. System, 6.89.
the substance of a discourse. Thus the science of the status aids not only in preparing an address but also in insuring effective presentation and maximum comprehension. In other words, it has implications for dispositio as well as for inventio.

One may, if he desires, interpret this view as a manifestation of the general trend toward the concept of management. Here is an inventional device taken out of the narrow province to which the ancients had assigned it and given functions so broad that they encroach upon the traditional preserves of dispositio. It was by transformations such as this one that the field of inventio was gradually expanded to include "judgment," and the omnibus concept of management or conduct was born. Of this concept more will be said in the chapters which follow.

3. Particular Arguments. Ward's treatment of particular arguments is divided into three lectures. The first deals with topics suitable to demonstrative discourses, the second with those adapted to deliberation, and the

76. System, 6.89-90.
77. Lecture 7.
78. Lecture 8.
third is given over to a discussion of the places for judicial speaking. 79

a. Places for Praise and Blame. Following a precedent set by the majority of the classical writers, Ward introduces his discussion of epideictic speaking by remarking that a survey of the topics for praise will serve equally to illustrate their opposites, the topics for blame. 80 He next points out that although praise may be given either to persons or to things, rhetoric is principally concerned with the former since it is "those subjects, relating to social life, in which oratory is more usually conversant." 81 There can be no question but that both the plan and the substance of his remarks are drawn almost entirely from Institutio, 3.7. Unfortunately, this chapter is not altogether satisfactory as a source. Despite the fact Quintilian presents a more systematic and detailed discussion of panegyric than is to be found in any of the rhetorical treatises of Cicero, his analysis displays neither keenness of insight nor depth of penetration. Cicero's briefer and less formal treatments are far more provocative. Although Ward certainly was acquainted with these, he chose to follow Quintilian slavishly. All that

79. Lecture 9.

80. System, 7.92. See De Inventione, 2.59; De Oratore, 2.85; Institutio, 3.7.19, etc.

he says had been said before, and somewhat better perhaps, by the great Roman teacher. To point out specific parallels would be to belabor what is obvious even upon a cursory comparison. 82

Because of the close attention which Ward gave to Institutio in this connection it is difficult to understand why he does not reproduce Quintilian's remark that "a certain semblance of proof is at times required" in panegyric. 83 This statement is of considerable importance. It tells us that the topics for praise and blame are not merely localities where the orator may secure materials useful in amplifying and embellishing the deeds of famous men; the same topics also provide him with arguments which demonstrate the subject's true greatness. Such a doctrine is highly typical of the classical view that all types of speeches, demonstrative as well as legislative and forensic, have their common

82. Cf. for example, the following: System, 7.92 with Institutio, 3.7.19; System, 7.93 with Institutio, 3.7.6; System, 7.93-4 with Institutio, 3.7.1; System, 7.95 with Institutio, 3.7.2; System, 7.97-100 with Institutio, 3.7.10-8; System, 7.101 with Institutio, 3.7.15-6; System, 7.103-4 with Institutio, 3.7.27-8; System, 7.105-6 with Institutio, 3.7.23-5.

83. Institutio, 3.7.4. Particularly is this omission surprising in view of the fact that Ward recognizes epideictic speeches as having "states." (See System, 6.85 and our discussion of the point in the section immediately preceding.)
end in persuasion. The epideictic speaker, like the
statesman and the lawyer, seeks to influence the beliefs
and actions of his hearers. He desires that they not only
admire or disdain, but that they assent and imitate --
that they actually become better men and women.

Ward appears to miss completely this notion that the
topics for praise and blame have a didactic function.
Nowhere in his lectures on demonstration does he suggest
that these topics are the seats of arguments. Moreover,
in Lecture 13, "Of Narration," he specifically says:

LAUDATORY orations are usually as it
were a sort of continued narration, set off
and adorned with florid language and fine
images, proper to grace the subject, which
is naturally so well fitted to afford pleasure
and entertainment. 84

Since this is the case, proof or even "a certain
semblance of proof" is obviously unnecessary. The demon-
strative address looks inward upon the subject praised,
not outward to the audience. It recounts only such
deeds and qualities as the hearers readily admit to be
praiseworthy. This is done in order to enhance their
appreciation of noble actions and motives. Example
rather than precept or argument is the tool by which
such inspiration may best be imparted. The orator tells
a biographical story "set off and adorned with fine images."

84. System, 13.198.
This in and of itself is sufficient to enable him to attain the only end he has in view -- arousing the admiration of his hearers for the subject praised.

b. Places for Deliberation. Ward introduces his discussion of the places suited to deliberative speaking with some general remarks concerning the antiquity and usefulness of this genre. He then undertakes to delineate its essential characteristics. Unfortunately his remarks are confusing. Deliberation, he declares, always respects "something future." Its subject-matter consists, however, of "things . . . both present and future." Apparently his meaning is that, while we always advise concerning what should be done, the policies we propose have their foundations in present and past facts as well as in reasoned calculations concerning what may happen in time to come.

Looking as it does toward the future, deliberative speaking finds its end chiefly in "what is both good and profitable, or beneficial good. . . ." In other words, it aims at a mixture of expediency and desirability.

86. System, 8.108.
88. Ibid.
Because of this fact the topics of deliberation fall into two classes. Some are to be employed when the object of deliberation is admitted by all to be attainable, and the dispute centers merely in the question of whether or not this attainable end would be desirable. Others, on the contrary, are to be used when "altho a thing considered in itself appear beneficial, if it could be attained yet the expediency of undertaking it may still be questionable ... "

If we may borrow for a moment from the terminology of the status, what we have here is really a distinction between those places which are located in the area of "quality" and those which have their seats in the region of "conjecture." In describing the former Ward uses the phrase "motive for action"; the latter are, of course, sub-species of the general commonplace of the possible and impossible.

Topics tending to prove an attainable end beneficial are pleasure, profit, and honor. Pleasure, Ward cautions

89. System, 8. 110-3.
90. System, 8.113.
91. System, 8.111.
upon the authority of Quintilian, should not be presented as an aim in itself, but should always be coupled with the "useful." His example, drawn from Pro Archia, is on the pleasure to be found in studies. Profit or advantage, "when it respects things truly valuable, is a very just and laudable motive." With certain types of audiences, honor provides a strong appeal. In fact, "no argument will sooner prevail with generous minds, or inspire them with greater ardor."

Places for proving "the expediency of an undertaking" are possibility, probability, facility, necessity, and the event. Commenting on the first of these, Ward justly observes that the bare possibility of a thing is seldom a sufficient motive to undertake it, unless on very urgent occasions. Therefore, in most situations probability "will be much more likely to prevail." Facility is a sort of adjunct to the two places just mentioned. In Ward's own words, it provides "a further reason to induce them [the audience] to do it." Necessity provides a

93. System, 8.111. The reference is apparently to Institutio, 3.8.28-9.
95. System, 8.112.
96. System, 8.112-3.
98. System, 8.114.
"way of reasoning which will sometimes prevail, when all others prove ineffective. For some persons are not to be moved, till things are brought to the utmost danger."100

The event Ward somewhat vaguely explains as "the consideration of the event, which in some cases carries great weight with it. As when we advise to the doing of a thing from this motive, that whether it succeed or not, it will yet be of service to undertake it."101

The fact that during the course of his remarks on these matters Ward makes direct references both to Cicero102 and to Quintilian103 shows that he was acquainted with what these writers had said concerning deliberative oratory. On the other hand, it is not possible to discover in their writings anything which parallels Ward's discussion in the same sense that Quintilian's treatment of the topics for "praise" and "blame" parallels his observations on panegyric. In fact, certain refinements which Ward introduces in connection with the classification of speech ends suggest that the outlines of his analysis

100. System, 8.115-6.
may have been borrowed from some later writer. Cicero and Quintilian found the aims of deliberative speaking in the four-fold classification of utility, honor, possibility, and necessity. Ward doubled the number of these ends and recognized, as we have already noted, pleasure, profit, honor, possibility, probability, facility, necessity, and the event.

Moreover, he reverses the expository order followed in their treatises and considers the topics for proving a policy beneficial before he discusses those designed to prove it expedient. This distorts to a considerable degree the emphasis which they award to the second of these considerations. In *Partitiones Oratoriae*, for example -- a work which we know Ward consulted in this connection -- Cicero makes it evident that he considers the prime task in deliberative speaking to be a study of the proposal

104. *De Oratore*, 2.32; *Institutio*, 3.8.22-6.

105. Upon analysis it will become evident that with one exception Ward's ends are merely sub-divisions of the purposes recognized by Cicero and Quintilian. Pleasure and profit are, of course, merely different species of utility; probability is a higher degree of possibility; and facility, as we have already explained, is an adjunct to the argument from the possible. Therefore, the event alone stands as an addition to their listing.
in terms of its possibility and necessity. Such a study constitutes, he believes, the proper first step in analysis. If a course of action is impossible it obviously cannot be maintained, no matter how great its utility may appear to be. Furthermore, a necessity naturally takes precedence over that which is more honorable or more advantageous. The question of expediency is, therefore, basic. If it be slighted the speaker's appeals to honor and benefit can easily go amiss. Practically the same view is expressed in De Oratore and in Institutio.

Ward's modification of this emphasis may perhaps be explained on the basis of the fact that his entire discussion of deliberation is oriented in terms of the end sought rather than in terms of the means by which that end may be achieved. As a result, his treatment of the problem of giving advice tends to be idealistic instead of practical. Cicero and Quintilian preserved a more equitable distribution between means and ends. Therefore, they give a better balanced picture of the various considerations involved in deliberative oratory.

In connection with this question of the aim of de-

107. Ibid.
108. 2.32.
109. See 3.3.4, 16, and 18.
liberation it is interesting to explore Ward's concept of the "beneficial good." One of the most perplexing ethical problems a rhetorician faces is whether "honor," or "utility," or some combination of these qualities, is to be designated as the end of the legislative speaker. By and large, the ancient treatises tended to straddle the problem. Thus in *Partitiones Oratoriae* Cicero at first declares quite categorically *in deliberando finis utilitas*. He immediately proceeds, however, to distinguish between two types of utility. One consists of that class of things which he terms "necessary goods"; the other is made up of "goods" which, though they are desirable, are not absolutely necessary. Then, as one of the species under this second head, he lists "goods" that are *honestate ipsa* and spring directly from the virtues. By this means he assigns "the honorable" a place under one of the species of "the useful," and conceives of it as contributing toward the general end of *utilitas*.

The author of *Ad Herennium* likewise begins by asserting that every speaker who advises or dissuades should propose "utility" as his goal. But he says that in political deliberations there are two kinds of "utility." The first, which has for its purpose showing how present

110. 24.
111. Ibid.
or future dangers may be avoided, he designates as "security"; the second, which is further divisible into the "good" and the "praiseworthy," is honesta.\textsuperscript{112}

This type of solution was not, however, followed in all of the Latin treatises. Quintilian's realism prevented him from offering any solution at all. Instead, he makes some confused and self-contradictory remarks on the subject which seem to suggest that the two qualities are essentially irreconcilable and that practical demands frequently make it necessary for the orator to appeal to the end of "utility" rather than of "honor."\textsuperscript{113}

Cicero in De Oratore comes to a somewhat similar conclusion. Although he insists that in persuading "nothing is more desirable than worth," he also admits that in actual practice

\textsuperscript{112} See 3.2-4.

\textsuperscript{113} See Institutio, 3.8.1 and ff. where Quintilian says: "I am surprised that deliberative oratory also has been restricted by some authorities to questions of expediency. If it should be necessary to assign one single aim to deliberative I should prefer Cicero's view that this kind of oratory is primarily concerned with what is honourable . . . . But as we most often express our views before an ignorant audience, and more especially before popular assemblies, of which the majority is usually uneducated, we must distinguish between what is honourable and what is expedient and conform our utterances to suit ordinary understandings."

In 3.8.22 and ff. Quintilian is, however, somewhat more specific. He says that he can find no place for "necessity" as one of "the three main considerations in an advisory speech" and thinks those to be wiser who make the third consideration "possibility." Cf. De Inventione 2.57 where Cicero's distinction between "relative" and "absolute" necessity appears to solve the problem which puzzles Quintilian.
"expediency commonly prevails, there being a concealed fear, that even worth cannot be supported if expediency be disregarded." 114

The only Latin rhetoric which attempts to combine the two qualities in somewhat the same way that Ward does in his concept of the "beneficial good" is De Inventione. Here Cicero observes that Aristotle assigned to the deliberative genre the end of expediency, but he adds that in his opinion it is necessary to consider "honor" also. 115 In a subsequent chapter, 116 however, he takes occasion to point out an exception to this generalization. An act of self-preservation is, he says, justified when it is performed with the knowledge that at some future time it may be atoned for with a deed springing from talent or motivated by virtue.

Ward himself appears to realize that his concept of the "beneficial good" is a theoretical ideal rather than a practical reality, and that it does not provide a satisfactory resolution for so complex a problem. Immediately upon setting it forth he pauses to add the admonition that when the "profitable" seems to interfere "with that which is strictly just and honorable . . . [it is] most

114. 2.32. Topica categorically states, Deliberandi finis utilitas. (24).

115. 2.51. Cf. 2.4. See Rhetorica, 1358b.

116. 2.58.
advisable to determine on the safer side of honour and justice. . . ."117 Thus he recognizes that in actual deliberations it is not always possible to advocate a course of action which combines utility with honor, that the two qualities sometimes come into conflict in such a way that each totally excludes the other, and a choice must be made between them.

Ward's pronouncement that "it is most advisable to determine on the safer side of honor and justice" must, however, be regarded as a moral injunction rather than a rhetorical precept. Its inapplicability as a universally valid rule of persuasion is admitted near the close of Lecture 8 where Ward reproduces Cicero's observation that all mankind may be put into one of two classes -- "the ignorant and unpolished who always prefer profit to honor; and such as are more civilized and polite, who prefer honor and reputation to all other things . . . ."118 The first type, Ward acknowledges, may be moved by "praise, glory, and virtue," but the second are "only to be engaged [sic] by a prospect of gain, and pleasure."119 Therefore,


119. Ibid. "Besides," adds Ward, "it is plain, that the generality of mankind are much more inclined to avoid evils, than to pursue what is good; and to keep clear of scandal and disgrace, than to practice what is truly generous and noble." Cf. Partitiones Oratoriae, 26; also Institutio, 3.8.40.
if the orator is to achieve his end of persuasion the choice
is quite obviously not always to be made "on the safer side
of honor and justice." There are occasions when "utility"
will have to be selected as the goal towards which the
speech is directed.

c. Places for Forensic Oratory. Following closely
the example set by Cicero and Quintilian Ward patterns
his discussion of judicial speaking on the general frame-
work of the status. Thus his analysis, like theirs, may
be regarded as a specific application of this doctrine
to the problems of forensic oratory.

The principal source upon which Ward draws is the
seventh book of Institutio. He also appears to have con-
sulted De Inventione (2.4-51) with more than passing
attention. A detailed study of sources would, however,
contribute little to our present purpose since the two
treatises present essentially similar discussions. The
point which should be emphasized is that Ward follows
with excessive zeal the common doctrine they set forth,
omitting only some of the more esoteric refinements. It
cannot be doubted that he wrote with one or both of
these works constantly before him.

Declaring the subject of judicial speaking to be
"always something past"120 and its end to be "equity, or

120. System, 9.124. Cf. Institutio, 7.2.3-5.
right and equity,\textsuperscript{121} Ward proceeds to outline the "heads" suitable to questions of conjecture, definition, and quality.

(1). Heads for Conjecture. "When ... the accused person denies the fact, there are," says Ward, "three things, which the prosecution has to consider: Whether he would have done it, whether he could, and whether he did it."\textsuperscript{122} Hence there arise three topics: from the will, from power, and from signs.\textsuperscript{123}

The will is subject to the "affections." It may be moved by "passion, an old grudge, a desire for revenge, a resentment of an injury and the like."\textsuperscript{124} Moreover, it is enticed by the prospect of advantage.\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid. The first, says Ward, "arises from the laws of the country"; the second, "from reason and the nature of things." Thus he suggests a distinction which reminds us of the classical division between disputes in ratione and disputes in scripto. (See Chapter 2 above.)

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid. Cf. Institutio, 7.2.49. "Will," as Quintilian himself admits (7.2.56), includes "intention." Hence Ward's disregard of this factor may be regarded as a formal rather than a material omission. On this three-fold classification see also De Inventione, 2.4.

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid. Cf. Institutio, 7.2.35-49. Cf. 2.16.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid. Cf. Institutio, 7.2.35 and De Inventione, 2.5.

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid. Note that Ward does not follow Quintilian and Cicero in discussing "proof from persons." See Institutio, 7.2.28-34 and De Inventione, 2.9-11.
Arguments concerned with whether the accused could have committed the act center in the three sub-topics of place, time, and opportunity. Cicero, for example, in his oration defending Milo argued that Clodius had the advantage of all three.

Proof that the accused did or did not commit the crime alleged is derived from "Signs and circumstances, which either preceded, accompanied, or followed the commission of the fact." Signs preceding include threats, and the presence of the accused at or near the place where the deed occurred; signs accompanying are fighting, crying out, bloodshed; signs following, paleness, trembling, inconsistent answers, hesitation or faltering of speech, and being in possession of some object which belonged to the defendant.

Because signs are "taken from conjectures" they produce not proofs but merely "presumptions." Despite this fact, their persuasive power must not be underestimated. When "laid together" they may appear "very

126. System, 9.128. Cf. Institutio, 7.2.44. Quintilian appears to consider "opportunity" as included in "place" and "time." See also De Inventione, 2.12.


129. System, 9.129.

130. Ibid.
strong," and under Roman law a man was sometimes convicted on them alone.\textsuperscript{131}

The business of the defendant is to "invalidate" those arguments which the prosecution advances. This he does either by denying the allegations or by transferring them to someone else.\textsuperscript{132} Cicero in his oration for Roscius well illustrated the method to be used in shifting the charge. Here, as will be remembered, he threw it back on the accusers themselves.\textsuperscript{133}

\textbf{(2). Heads for Definition.} When assuming a position in the definitive state the orator is "principally concerned in defining and fixing the name proper to the fact."\textsuperscript{134} He seldom seeks, however, that "exact," scientific type of definition after which philosophers and mathematicians strive. The purposes of eloquence are adequately served by "larger descriptions, taken from various properties of the subject, or thing described."\textsuperscript{135}

Heads for definition are essentially the same for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{132} System, 9.129-30. Called by the ancients translatio.
\item \textsuperscript{133} System, 9.130.
\item \textsuperscript{134} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{135} Ibid. Cf. Institutio, 7.3.14-8.
\end{itemize}
both parties since each advances his own interpretation of the "fact" in question and attempts to refute the one advanced by his opponent. Argument centers in the clash of these opposing views and he who best supports his definition emerges victorious. Ward illustrates these remarks with an example found both in Cicero and Quintilian. When someone takes private money from a temple, is this, he inquires, theft or sacrilege? His remarks on the point are garnished with learned references to Roman law.

(3). Heads for Quality. Under the state of quality the defendant does not deny the charge but asserts that his actions were "right and equitable." He may urge, as did Epaminodas who refused to be replaced in the midst of a campaign, that he acted so as to "prevent some other

137. De Inventione, 2.17.
138. Institutio, 7.3.21.
139. System, 9.131. In his discussion of definition Ward does not reproduce the method of argument set forth by both Cicero (De Inventione, 1.8) and Quintilian (Institutio, 7.3.19 and ff.) as the one proper to causes falling within this state. They recommend two steps: 1. establishing "what a thing is" and 2. proving "whether it is" -- i.e. bringing the particular "fact" under the scope of the abstract principle defined. This omission is regrettable in view of the fact that the few remarks Ward does make on method are both vague and confusing.
140. System, 9.133.
thing of worse consequence." In this case arguments are taken from the justice, usefulness, or necessity of the deed. He may charge that the cause of the action really rests with the party damaged, or that some other person either made it necessary or motivated him to do it. He may plead that the deed was not done designedly or with ill intent. Pleas of this sort are named "concessions" and are made up of an "apology" and "entreaty." The "apology" represents the action as resulting from "inadvertency," "chance," or "necessity." The "entreaty" is, as its name implies, an appeal for mercy.

141. System, 9.133-4. Called in technical language "comprehension." (Institutio, 7.4.12) Note that in the ensuing classification Ward omits the so-called defensio absoluta, i.e. the position which admits the act but holds it unobjectionable. (See Institutio, 7.4.4-6.)


145. Ibid. It should be observed that in addition to the omissions indicated in several of the notes above, Ward chooses to disregard Quintilian's pleas of "extenuation" (i.e. "quantity") and "depreciation." (See Institutio, 7.4.15-20.) These certainly are of considerable importance in judicial speaking. Nor does he follow Cicero (De Invenzione, 2.40-51) and Quintilian (Institutio, 7.5-10) through the analysis of places to be employed in each of the various quasi-states. Had he done so he might well have avoided the error noted in our discussion of the status, for then he would most assuredly have understood that these are "questions" involving argumentative positions, and not mere topics.
E. The Ethos

Because the orator seeks to instruct, to conciliate, and to move, inventio has three distinct functions: it must furnish "such arguments as are necessary to . . . proof"; it must provide "means" for winning the "affection" and "good opinion" of the hearers; and it must supply appeals whereby the passions may be aroused and the will stirred to action. The first of these functions relates principally to the subject-matter of the speech; the second, to the speaker; and the third, to the audience. Therefore, as we pass from the area of logos to that of ethos we shift our point of view. Inventio is now to be examined not as a source of speech materials but as a factor in the speaker's personal persuasiveness. Up to this point our approach has been analytical and didactic; here, by necessity, it becomes chiefly descriptive.

Quintilian characterizes ethical appeal as a certain "propriety of manners." It has its source both in art and in nature. Art teaches the orator how to assume those qualities which the circumstances of his address require.

146. System, 10.140.
147. Ibid.
148. System, 10.141. Ward appears to be referring to Institutio, 6.2.8.
149. Ibid. Cf. De Oratore, 2.43 where Cicero says, ". . . by adopting a peculiar mode of thought and expression, united with action that is gentle and indicative of amiableness, such an effect is produced that the speaker seems to be a man of probity, integrity, and virtue."
Nature, as expressed in fixed and constant habits of virtue, enables him to display the appropriate qualities "with greater ease and facility." Moreover, a reputation for honor and integrity lends authority to what is said on any particular occasion. For these reasons the speaker must earnestly endeavor to implant in his mind desirable "habits" of thought and action.

The four qualities "more especially suited to the character of an orator, [and] which should always appear in his discourses" are wisdom, integrity, benevolence, and modesty. Each is an integral constituent of ethical appeal. In conciliating an audience it is of prime importance "that these qualities do not appear feigned and counterfeit." What is "fictitious" cannot long remain concealed; and once discovered it destroys the effect of all that has been said. Therefore, if the orator is to seem a good man he must actually be one.

The lecture on ethos is concluded with a summary


151. System, 10.141.

152. System, 10.142.

153. System, 10.147.
of way by which conciliation may be achieved by skilful audience adaptation. This is of interest primarily because it provides another example of Ward's persistent tendency to modify the classical inventio by transferring to it the functions of selection and judgment.\textsuperscript{154} In a passage reminiscent of Rhetorica Ward declares that if men loved truth for its own sake the orator would need only to present it "clearly and plainly."\textsuperscript{155} Such, however, is not the case. As a result, he must frequently "have recourse to art, in order to obtain that, which otherwise he cannot come at."\textsuperscript{156} He needs to know the "temper" and "inclination" of the persons he addresses.\textsuperscript{157}

Factors determining audience type and attitude are, as Aristotle has so wisely pointed out, four in number -- affections, habits, ages, and fortunes.\textsuperscript{158} Affections Ward defines as "certain emotions of the mind, which, during their continuance, give a great turn to the dis-

\begin{footnotesize}

\footnotetext{154}{Note in this connection that Quintilian treats both \textit{ethos} and \textit{pathos} under his discussion of one of the divisions of the speech, namely the peroration. (See \textit{Institutio}, 6.2.)}

\footnotetext{155}{\textit{System}, 10.148.}

\footnotetext{156}{\textit{System}, 10.149.}

\footnotetext{157}{\textit{Ibid.}}

\footnotetext{158}{\textit{System}, 10.150.}

\end{footnotesize}
position. Habit, he says, makes a just man "incline in one way, and an unjust man in another; a temperate man to this, and an intemperate man to the contrary." His discussions of "ages" and "fortunes" are by his own admission drawn from Aristotle.

In addition to its emphasis on audience adaptation, Ward's discussion of ethos commands our attention because it treats ethical appeal largely as a matter of "assuming" certain appearances or characters. The prime consideration, Ward constantly implies, is that the orator know how to appear virtuous, that he be skilled in "assuming" whatever "qualities" may be requisite in a given speaking situation. True inner goodness is important principally because it makes the appearance of goodness easier to achieve, and results in a general reputation that lends force to what may be said in any specific address. Virtue is to be sought not for its own sake, but because it makes the public speaker more accomplished in acting the role of a virtuous man.

Ethical appeal, as Ward conceives it, is, however, broader than the appeal inherent in virtuousness. It is

159. System, 10.150.

160. Ibid.

161. Ibid. See also 10.151-4.
the potential persuasive power derived from knowing how to display any character which the address may require. This could be one of piety or of good-fellowship, of ingenuousness or of mysterious superiority, of bravery or of timidity. All are types of ethical appeal because each is a role which the orator plays. In fact, it is not inconceivable that a speaker might on some occasion wish to appear an evil man. If so, this would be his ethos because it is the character he would assume.

Factors accounting for Ward's ethical doctrine are undoubtedly numerous and cannot here be fully traced. It may well be that the Renaissance custom of applying rhetorical principles to poetical theory and criticism was in part responsible. At the same time, we must not forget that a considerable body of ancient rhetoric, as typified by Quintilian's discussion of ethos in Institutio, 6.2, taught a somewhat similar theory. Our thinking is so strongly influenced by the traditional "good man" doctrine that we frequently overlook this fact. Yet in the chapter cited Quintilian presents a discussion of ethical appeal which is essentially similar to Ward's treatment. There, for example, we find clearly developed the notion that there are various kinds of ethos. Quintilian speaks of ethical appeal "in all of its forms"; he points out

162. Institutio, 6.2.18.
that "the skilful exercise of feigned emotion or the employment of irony in making apologies or asking questions" is "dependent" upon it; he tells us that the orator should "himself possess or be thought to possess those virtues for the possession of which it is his duty . . . to commend his client"; he places ethos beside pathos as a technique for handling the emotions -- its province being the gentler affections and its duty the calming of storms raised by the pathetic. Then in a significant passage he adds: "There is also good reason for giving the name of ethos to those scholastic exercises in which we portray rustics, misers, cowards and superstitious persons according as our theme may require. For if ethos denotes moral character, our speech must necessarily be based on ethos when it is engaged in portraying such character." Does this, we are moved to inquire, mean that the prosopopoëiae of the schools are "ethical"? Apparently the answer must be in the affirmative. Therefore, Quintilian's concept of ethos does not differ fundamentally from Ward's. Both men viewed ethical appeal as the persuasive force resident in the character assumed by the speaker. Both realized

163. Institutio, 6.2.15.
164. Institutio, 6.2.18. Italics mine.
165. Institutio, 6.2.9, 12, etc.
166. Institutio, 6.2.17.
that what a man really is can be significant in determining what he seems. The point at which they part company is to be found in the unequal emphasis given to innate virtue. Ward appears to give it no more than pious lip service; therefore, his analysis lacks moral depth. Quintilian, on the other hand, insists on it more strongly.167 As a result, he produces a more defensible ethical doctrine.

F. The Pathos

Ward's discussion of pathetic appeal need not long detain us. With certain relatively minor exceptions, it is drawn from Aristotle's analysis of the emotions as set forth in Rhetorica, 1378a-1388b.

After emphasizing the importance of pathos in the persuasive process168 and submitting the customary apologia for its employment,169 Ward reproduces Aristotle's definition of the passions as "Commotions of the mind, under the influence of which men think differently con-

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167. See Institutio, 6.2.13, 18, etc.
cerning the same things.\textsuperscript{170} He likewise lays down the Aristotelian dictum that in order to "manage" a passion one must understand its nature, cause, and objects.\textsuperscript{171} Then follow analyses of the various affections, ranged under the heads of demonstrative, deliberative, and judicial speeches. Especially suited to the first are joy and sorrow,\textsuperscript{172} love and hatred,\textsuperscript{173} emulation and contempt;\textsuperscript{174} to the second, fear,\textsuperscript{175} hope,\textsuperscript{176} and shame;\textsuperscript{177} to the third, anger and lenity,\textsuperscript{178} and pity and indignation.\textsuperscript{179} Each emotion is described more or less fully in terms of the three factors indicated above -- nature, causes, and objects. In addition, the proper method for arousing it is illustrated by a sample passage. These are, for the most part, drawn from the orations of Cicero.

\textsuperscript{170} \textit{System}, II.158-9. See \textit{Rhetorica}, 1378a. Unfortunately Ward omits in his statement of this definition Aristotle's important remark that these "commotions" are attended by pleasure or pain.

\textsuperscript{171} \textit{System}, II.158. See \textit{Rhetorica}, 1378a.

\textsuperscript{172} \textit{System}, II.159-60.

\textsuperscript{173} \textit{System}, II.160-2.

\textsuperscript{174} \textit{System}, II.162-4.

\textsuperscript{175} \textit{System}, II.164-5.

\textsuperscript{176} \textit{System}, II.165-6.

\textsuperscript{177} \textit{System}, II.167-8.

\textsuperscript{178} \textit{System}, II.169-72.

\textsuperscript{179} \textit{System}, II.172-4. For a comparison of this classification with those offered by other rhetoricians see \textit{Leu}, 391-2.
Ward, of course, departs from Aristotle in assigning specific emotions to each of the various types of discourses. Nor, it should be pointed out, is there a point to point correspondence between the list of passions which he offers and that found in *Rhetorica*. Despite these differences, the similarity of the two accounts, both in spirit and substance, is immediately discernible. As a matter of fact, Ward's descriptions of certain of the passions are little more than paraphrases of Aristotle's remarks. Freshness of conception and originality of execution are lacking. Ward's discussion is hackneyed and commonplace. It is of no importance in our present study.

180. See in this connection Lee, 214-5.

181. Aristotle

| Anger-Mildness | Love-Hatred |
| Love-Hatred | Fear |
| Fear-Confidence | Shame |
| Shame-Shamelessness | Benevolence and the lack of it |
| Pity | Indignation |
| Indignation | Envy |
| Envy | Emulation (and Contempt) |
| Emulation (and Contempt) | Emulation-Contempt |
| Love-Hatred | Joy and Sorrow |
| Joy and Sorrow | Hope |

182. Cf., for example, Ward's account of "emulation" (11.162) with that given by Aristotle (1388a-b).

183. In Lecture 30 Ward discusses the role played by figures in arousing the emotions, declaring them to be "the language of the passions." (System, 30.37.) His observations in this connection are of interest principally because they foreshadow the doctrine of "sympathy" later to be developed by Campbell.
The inventional doctrine set forth in John Ward's System of Oratory is, on the whole, a relatively faithful -- although somewhat simplified -- rehearsal of the classical theory of inventio, as expounded in the works of Quintilian, Cicero, and Aristotle.

1. After declaring both inventio and dispositio to be legitimate parts of rhetoric, Ward defines the first as "the discovery of such things as are proper to persuade." He then asserts that the raw materials of persuasion are to be discovered in the subject-matter of the speech, in the speaker, and in the audience. The first of these is the province of logos; the second, of ethos; the third, of pathos. A successful exploration of the three areas thus delineated will provide material that instructs, conciliates, and moves.

2. With these preliminaries disposed of, Ward treats in order the inventing of logical, ethical, and pathetic appeals. The great bulk of his discussion is given over to describing methods for searching out "arguments suitable to the proof of a thing." He first considers "general arguments." These may be used in any type of speech and with any kind of subject. Then he discusses the "more particular places" suited to demonstrative,
deliberative, and judicial speaking. The analysis of "general arguments" is drawn principally from Topica; and those of demonstrative and epideictic speaking from Institutio. The source of Ward's material on deliberation is not altogether clear. It is, however, related at least indirectly to discussions found in Partitiones Oratoriae, De Inventione, and Institutio.

3. Ward characterizes ethical appeal as a certain "propriety of manners" and declares that it is derived both from art and from nature. He treats ethos chiefly as a matter of assuming different characters or appearances. In many respects his analysis is similar to the one offered by Quintilian.

4. Under the head of pathos Ward reproduces with certain minor modifications the well-known account of the emotions set forth in Aristotle's Rhetorica.

The few departures which Ward makes from classical doctrine fall, by and large, into two classes: 1. errors of omission and interpretation, and 2. increased emphasis on the relationship between finding materials and adapting them to the audience.

1. Considered individually the items of the first class are -- with only one exception -- of little significance. Of those noted above, two relate
to technical distinctions between various terms in the status, and another confuses external topics with quasi-states. The fact that Ward's discussion of deliberative speaking treats places for proving a policy "beneficial" before considering the places for proving it "practical" results in nothing more than a minor distortion of the general classical insistence on the primacy of "necessity." The single noteworthy omission is Ward's failure to recognize that the ancients considered the places for epideictic speaking to be sources of proof as well as of praise. Because classical rhetoric viewed all the types of speeches as having their ends in persuasion this must be regarded as an unfortunate gap in a system the professed purpose of which was to reproduce the essence of ancient theory.

2. As we have just remarked, taken singly these deviations are of small importance. Yet when added together they certainly produce the impression that Ward was not a profound rhetorical scholar. This impression is heightened by an examination of the manner in which he habitually used his sources -- i.e. drawing from a single chosen treatise the substance of his remarks on a particular subject. It is confirmed by the fact
that his doctrine is essentially a collection of independent disquisitions rather than a closely-reasoned, coherent system.

3. The principal way in which Ward departs from the ancients -- and even here the departure cannot be considered as radical -- is to place an increased emphasis on the relation between finding arguments and adapting them to the audience. Audience adaptation is particularly stressed in his discussions of demonstrative and deliberative speaking, and in his treatment of ethos. Its importance is, however, made evident throughout the entire course of the lectures on inventio.

By means of this emphasis Ward tends to take the functions of selection and judgment out of the province of dispositio to which they had been assigned by the ancients and to place them in the realm of inventio. Thus inventional theory is broadened at the expense of the traditional lore of arrangement. This may foreshadow more significant changes which were soon to take place in rhetorical theory.
Chapter IV

THE INVENTIONAL SYSTEM OF GEORGE CAMPBELL

A. Introduction

George Campbell's The Philosophy of Rhetoric stands without challenge as one of the great classics in the field of rhetorical theory. Original in conception, comprehensive in plan, provocative in development, it furnishes much of the understructure upon which rest our present-day theories of discourse. The very general custom of classifying speeches in terms of the ends sought by speakers, the persistent tendency to separate "conviction" from "persuasion," the common assumption that rhetoric studies the adaptation of means to ends -- these


Campbell also wrote of rhetoric in his Lectures on Systematic Theology and Pulpit Eloquence. (London, 1807). Twelve lectures in this work are devoted to a practical and straightforward discussion of the problems of preaching. These are, however, of limited value to the student of inventional theory, their principal usefulness lying in the fact that they occasionally clarify or supplement some point discussed in the Philosophy. References are to Lectures on Systematic Theology and Pulpit Eloquence. By the late George Campbell. (Boston, 1810). Hereafter cited as Pulpit Eloquence. Citations are to lecture and page.

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are but a few of the basic doctrines which had their origin in the treatise of that mild-mannered, agreeable little eighteenth-century Scotsman to whom we now turn our attention.  

The specific thesis advanced in this chapter is that, in addition to his other contributions, George Campbell worked what amounts to a revolution in the field of inventional theory. In line with his fundamental premise that the rules of rhetoric are to be derived from an examination of the human understanding he departed from the traditional classical analysis and made the hearer rather than the speech itself the central factor in **inventio**. Therefore, instead of inquiring, as the ancients had done, how thought might be made to serve expression, he was, perhaps inevitably, led to ask the vastly different question of how previously derived arguments and appeals might most effectively be employed in influencing those particular persons to whom the discourse was directed.

The causes motivating this revolution lie principally in the intellectual environment of eighteenth-century Scotland. By tracing the premises of Locke to their ultimate and terrible conclusions David Hume had undermined...

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man's faith in the veracity of his own understanding. That faith needed to be reestablished. Men everywhere -- even the so-called "common men" -- were examining anew the traditional epistemological problems. What are the inlets of our perceptions? By what laws are ideas organized? How are the passions aroused? How is the will moved?

Campbell was an active participant in the debate which surged about these perplexing questions. For the most part, he defended the answers offered by "the common sense philosophy" of his friend and colleague Thomas Reid. Following somewhat in the steps of Kant, Reid had asserted that human knowledge may be anchored on certain innate, self-evident laws of reason which are the common property of all men. These laws are dictated, he believed, by the constitution of mind itself. Because of them we have a


reservoir of certainty which provides a foundation for all the isolated facts of everyday experience.

Here, thought Campbell, is a road out of the morass of scepticism. By adhering to Reid's doctrines we may guarantee the validity of the human understanding. But Campbell also recognized -- and this is the point to be emphasized -- that these innate, self-evident principles of mind were potentially something more than mere guarantors of the validity of knowledge. Out of them, he believed, might be derived the radical principles of those various arts and sciences which are exclusively human in the sense that they spring from and are concerned with the intellectual and emotional nature of man.

Now rhetoric, reasoned Campbell, is quite clearly a "human" art. Because it studies how one man may influence other men through the use of discourse, its basic principles may be inferred from examining the ways in which mind knows, is led to believe, is agitated and moved. Let us, therefore, he said, follow in the path which Reid has marked. Let us restudy the human understanding in the light of these laws which underlie all knowing and believing. Let us in this way attempt both to formulate and to validate the rules for securing comprehension and winning belief through the purposeful use of discourse.

In the introductory essay which he affixes to The Philosophy Campbell argues that rhetoric itself provides
a useful tool for investigating mental behavior. Guided, he says, "by the lights which the poet and the orator so amply furnish," we are enabled to view mental activity from a peculiarly practical vantage point.\(^4\) It is, in fact, no exaggeration to say that a study of rhetoric "is perhaps the surest, shortest, and pleasantest way of arriving at the science of the human mind."\(^5\)

Therefore, the art of public speaking should not be thought to consist of a static and lifeless body of \textit{a priori} principles. Rather it is an active, self-creating, self-perpetuating instrumentality which searches out its own laws and determines its own methods. Rhetorical laws have their origin in "the consciousness a man has of what operates in his own mind, aided by [a knowledge] of the sympathetic feelings, and by . . . practical experience . . . ."\(^6\) As the hypotheses thus formed are tested in actual "attempts" at influencing, specific rules gradually emerge.\(^7\) The final step involves a canvassing of "those principles in our nature to which the various attempts are adapted, and by which, in any instance, their success

\begin{itemize}
\item 5. \textit{Philosophy}, Introduction, 19.
\item 6. \textit{Ibid.}
\end{itemize}
or want of success, may be accounted for. Through this last process the laws of rhetoric are correlated with the laws of human behavior and the weight of psychological validity is added to that of artistic appropriateness.

Rhetoricians have, Campbell thinks, not been deficient in formulating rules for composition. Little can be added to the mass of dicta set down by the theorists of antiquity. These writers, as well as their successors, have, however, very generally failed to validate their rules by comparing them with the principles governing mental activity. To attempt such a comparison brings us, therefore, into "a new country" -- a country whose frontiers have at times been penetrated but whose heartland still lies unexplored.

Of the writers who have ventured into this unknown realm, Lord Kames in his Elements of Criticism has, Campbell


9. Ibid. Cf. Pulpit Eloquence, 1.166. Institutio, De Inventione, De Oratore, and Ad Herennium are, Campbell declares, works with which every public speaker should be conversant. (Pulpit Eloquence, 1.167.) In Pulpit Eloquence, 11.310-1 Campbell declares: "It is not my intention by these lectures to supersede the study of ancient critics and orators, but only to assist you in applying their rules and examples to cases so different from those with which alone they were concerned."

10. Ibid.
declares, advanced the farthest. Unfortunately, however, the subject of Kames' inquiry is "multifarious." He attempts to bring within his system every matter that may become "an object of taste." Moreover, he examines arts only as they "are calculated to delight the imagination." Thus, for example, he treats of rhetoric as if it were merely an "elegant" art, rather than a practical one as well. In short, Kames' analysis is sketchy and his view is narrow.

Despite these deficiencies Kames' method was, says Campbell, the correct one. From a study of the mental nature of man he attempted to infer and to validate the principles which must govern all criticism and all artistic creation. What is needed is an exhaustive analysis of rhetoric conducted according to the method which Kames employed. One way of viewing the task which Campbell set for himself is to say that he attempted to supply this analysis.

Let us, he said, view rhetoric as concerned with ends. Let us define eloquence as "that art or talent by which

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12. Ibid.

the discourse is adapted to its end;\(^{14}\) or, to speak more accurately, as that discipline, at once elegant and practical, which through the use of language seeks to "operate" on the minds of others so as to instruct, convince, please, move, or persuade them.\(^{15}\) Then, with these definitions in mind, let us, employing as a tool the cumulative rhetorical experience of mankind, look into the mind in an effort to discover how it knows, by what means it is convinced or pleased, on what principles it is moved to action. In this way we shall take the step which rhetoricians have hitherto failed to take. We shall explore the unknown country. We shall "arrive at that knowledge of human nature which, besides its other advantages, adds both weight and evidence to all precedent discoveries and rules."\(^{16}\) We shall not only complete, but we shall also validate the art of rhetoric.

It is almost impossible to overstate the effect which

\(^{14}\) Philosophy, 23. As Edney has properly observed, in reading Campbell we must constantly bear in mind the fact that he frequently uses the terms "rhetoric," "oratory," and "eloquence" interchangeably. See Clarence W. Edney, George Campbell's Theory of Public Address. (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis: The State University of Iowa, 1946), 20. Hereafter cited as Edney. Mr. Edney's essay, "George Campbell's Theory of Logical Truth," Speech Monographs, 15 (1948), 19-32, which appeared after this chapter was written, is a useful discussion of that aspect of Campbell's rhetoric.

\(^{15}\) Philosophy, Preface, v.

\(^{16}\) Philosophy, Introduction, 20.
this basic methodological assumption had on Campbell's doctrine of *inventio*. Implicit in the classical view of invventional activity is the assumption that the proper way to begin preparing an address is to analyze the subject into its organic parts and then fit these units into a functional synthesis. The states and topics are essentially guides to the discovery of appropriate speech materials. By taking advantage of the aids they offer, the orator is assured that his survey of the potential sources of subject-matter will be both thorough and purposeful. After the subject has been properly investigated the orator may select those matters which seem peculiarly adapted to win the response he seeks. Consequently, one who is skilled in the lore of *inventio* should, as Plato himself pointed out, have the qualities of a good logician.\(^{17}\) He should be able to recognize similarities and differences, to distinguish the universal from the particular, to trace out the relationships of cause, effect, and sign. In short, he should know how to analyze and to synthesize the substantive elements of a discourse.

Campbell, on the contrary, maintained that if one wished to influence men through the use of language he should begin his preparation not with an exhaustive analysis of the subject, but with an investigation into

\(^{17}\) Phaedrus, 277.
those principles of mind by which his hearers would be led to understand and to believe what he was going to say. Therefore, instead of knowing intricate techniques for studying subject-matter, it is more important that the speaker know how speech materials may be adapted to the basic laws of the human understanding. The orator need not be an expert logician, but he must be a keen student of practical psychology.

According to this analysis, the whole paraphernalia of states and topics -- the very substance of classical *inventio* -- lose their importance. The speaker's argumentative position is chosen not, as the *status* teaches, by surveying the various grounds upon which causes commonly rest. Rather, it is chosen by inquiring what principles of mental behavior will operate to effect the end desired. Likewise, a detailed knowledge of substantive topics will be of less importance than a familiarity with the various habits of mind. The orator knows, for example, that men are most readily moved by that which is close by, or important to them. Therefore, he finds his appeals in these laws governing the passions rather than in the traditional places of genus, species, or adjuncts.

At the same time, *inventio* ceases to be a process confined to the initial steps in speech preparation. Conceived of as the systematic adaptation of means to ends, it becomes instead an integral part of the entire speaking
act. Problems in the strategy of argument and the arrangement of materials are gradually absorbed into its province. The classical notion of *inventio* as a technique of search and discovery gives way to the more comprehensive eighteenth-century concept of the management or conduct of a discourse -- a concept which, broader than any of the five departments of classical rhetoric, comprehends under one head such diverse matters as the finding, selecting, evaluating, arranging, and using of arguments. The result is that the area of *inventio* is broadened and that of *dispositio* correspondingly narrowed. The selection of arguments, the evaluation of their strength, the determination of the manner in which they may most tellingly be presented -- these and many other considerations become inventionial problems. The whole rationale of the old order is swept away and the classical distribution of functions among the various departments of rhetoric is irretrievably lost. Under the new concept of management are grouped together matters which the ancients had carefully divided between the provinces of *inventio* and *dispositio*. At the same time, Campbell's very marked emphasis on the handling of arguments and appeals in an actual discourse paves the way for Whately's doctrine that processes of inquiry and discovery fall completely outside the province of rhetoric, and that *inventio*, in so far as it is a legitimate "part" of that science,
is concerned merely with classifying the various types of proof patterns and advising how these are to be employed in different sorts of speeches.\textsuperscript{18}

The factors accounting for Campbell's radical modification of classical inventional theory have their origins deeply implanted in eighteenth-century philosophic speculation. I can here do no more than suggest their nature. It may, however, be sufficient to recall that all of the great thinkers of the Enlightenment revolted in one way or another against the ancient view that objects of knowledge exist independent of the knowing process -- that they are perfected entities stored up in the hidden recesses of the universe awaiting that ingenious and resourceful man who shall know how to discover them. Instead, they tended to regard these objects as conditioned by the knower and the laws of his mind. In other words, knowledge is, they said, in a measure actually created by the knowing intelligence.

Translating this doctrine into rhetorical terms, it means that the facts and arguments constituting the speaker's appeals are not finished and complete probative factors which need merely to be searched out of their lairs. On the contrary, they are in part the creations

\textsuperscript{18} See the Introduction to Chapter 7 below.
of the persons who speak and hear them. The sources of persuasion lie not only in external things, but in mind itself. Consequently, *inventio* must not only provide us with an abundance of things to say; it must also teach us to say them at the right time, and in the right way, and under the right conditions. Facts and arguments improperly used will not be persuasive. We must arrange our discourse according to those principles of mind by which understanding and belief are partially created.

Campbell's essential greatness lay in the fact that he alone among his contemporaries recognized the rhetorical implications of this new epistemology and worked out in considerable detail a theory of discourse built upon its doctrines. His achievement was admittedly one of application rather than creation. Yet we must not for this reason underestimate the originality of his effort. At a time when such rhetoricians as Lawson, Ward, and Holmes were slavishly mouthing an arid and mutilated form of the traditional classical *inventio*, Campbell broke with the past and set out on new roads. For this reason alone his *Philosophy* deserves careful study by all who are interested in the history of *inventio*.

Because Campbell's dominant purpose is to show how rhetorical principles may be derived from and validated by an examination of the laws governing the human under-
standing, The Philosophy is not organized in terms of the traditional "parts" or divisions of rhetoric, but consists of a series of discussions concerning the various agents of mental activity -- the understanding, the imagination, the passions, etc. For this reason it is impossible to point to any one section of the treatise and say this is Campbell's discussion of *inventio* or that is his analysis of *dispositio*. In order to get a picture of his inventional doctrine it is necessary to survey the entire first book of his essay. When this is done we find that Campbell's *inventio* lies partly in the descriptions of how mind works, partly in the principles which he infers from these descriptions, and partly in the very method of his treatise. It is as much an attitude and a point of view as it is a concrete body of rules and principles.

The first book of *The Philosophy* may be roughly divided into five parts: Chapters 1 through 6 deal principally with the speech; Chapters 7 and 8, with the audience; Chapter 9, with the speaker; Chapter 10, with the occasion; and Chapter 11 contains some supplementary remarks aimed at accounting for the peculiar potency of pathetic appeal. Although the following analysis departs somewhat from Campbell's order of exposition, it pays at least passing attention to each of the areas thus delineated. The plan is first to trace Campbell's examination of the fundamental laws governing human mental
activity, and then to group under a second major head the rhetorical principles which he believes may be inferred from these laws. Such a scheme admittedly results in a certain amount of repetition. It is hoped, however, that this will be compensated for by an increased clarity of detail and more readily comprehensible view of the relationship among parts.

B. Analysis of the Human Understanding

When we undertake a critical inquiry into the nature of mind what first strikes our attention? The fact, answers Campbell, that mind is composed of certain "powers" or "faculties." These are four in number -- the understanding, the imagination, the passions, and the will. The faculties are, however, not separate and independent agents. Instead, they are so interrelated as to form a hierarchy. Each is founded upon one which precedes and is preparatory to one which follows. Knowledge furnishes materials to the imagination; the imagination culls and disposes those materials so as to affect the passions; and it is the passions which move the will.

Of these interrelationships among the various powers

21. Ibid.
of the mind, that between imagination and passion is especially intimate. Properly considered, imagination "terminates in the gratification of some internal sense; as a taste for the wonderful, the fair, the good, for elegance, for novelty, for grandeur." The pathetic builds upon the foundations which thus are laid. Taking hold of the gentle emotions created by the fancy, it "hurries" the hearer, almost before he is aware of it, "into love, pity, grief, terror, desire, aversion, fury, or hatred."23

The passions, classified in terms of their effects upon an auditor, fall into three categories. Some are by nature "inert and torpid." They "deject the mind, and indispose it for enterprise." Such are sorrow, fear, shame, and humility.24 Others stimulate the mind and move it to action. These are hope, patriotism, ambition, emulation, and anger. The third class consists of passions which are "intermediate." They do not directly restrain us from action, nor do they directly incite activity. Rather, they operate upon the mind in an "oblique" manner, and may be used either to arouse or to

22. Philosophy, 25.
24. Philosophy, 27.
pacify the listener. Of this kind are joy, love, esteem, and compassion. 25

1. How Mind Is Convinced: Logos. If, then, mind consists of a hierarchy of mutually subservient faculties or powers, the next problem is: How do these powers do their work? More specifically, how do we know and come to believe? How is the imagination engaged? How are the passions aroused and the will moved?

In answer to the first of these questions Campbell says that what we know we know in either one of two ways -- by "intuition" or by "deduction." 26 When this statement is put into context it is found to rest on a species of "the correspondence theory." That is, it assumes that logical truth consists "in the conformity of our conceptions to their archetypes in the nature of things." 27

25. Ibid. As Rowell has pointed out, this account of the "powers" of mind does not justify us in labeling Campbell as a strict adherent of the faculty psychology. Although he certainly describes mental activity as bound up with different agencies such as reason and will, the emphasis of his discussion is quite clearly placed upon the fact that these agencies act not independently but in concert, that the faculties merge and are mutually subservient. See Edward Z. Rowell, "Prolegomena to Argumentation," Part 2. The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 18 (1932), 234.

26. Philosophy, 57.

27. Ibid.
What Campbell is saying, therefore, is that this conformity may be perceived "either immediately on a bare attention to the ideas under review, or mediately by a comparison of these with other related ideas." In the former case we know, he says, intuitively; in the latter, by deduction.

a. Intuitive Evidence. Among those truths which we grasp intuitively some, such as the axioms of mathematics, we know by "intellection"; others, including the assurance of our own existence and the reality of our sensations and passions -- in short, "everything whose essence consists in being perceived" -- we know by "consciousness" itself; a third class, consisting of certain primary and self-evident principles not admitting of demonstration, we know by "common sense," which is "an original source

28. Philosophy, 57. This assertion is of considerably more significance than may at first appear. When Campbell speaks of a conformity of our ideas to their archetypes being conceived "immediately" he follows Reid in breaking with the so-called "idea theory" of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. These writers treated the "idea" as a tertium quid -- a third numerically independent element intervening between the physical world and the knowing mind. One of the corner stones of Reid's philosophy is the argument that "ideas" are mere fictions contrived by philosophers. This he attempts to prove by an exhaustive analysis of the perceptive act. See Andrew Seth, Scottish Philosophy. (Edinburgh and London, 1899), 74, etc. Hereafter cited as Seth.

29. Philosophy, 57.

of knowledge common to all mankind." 31

b. Deductive Evidence: Demonstrative and Moral. Deductive evidence -- which Campbell also calls "rational" -- consists of judgments "drawn from a comparison of intuitive evidence with other related perceptions." 32 It is derived either "from the invariable properties or relations of general ideas; or from the actual, though perhaps variable connexions, subsisting among things." 33

The first of the species thus distinguished is "built on pure intellection" and is, we are told, "solely con-


32. Edney, 133. Intuition, therefore, forms the foundation of "deduction" and is one of its fundamental constituents. The influence of Reid is here patent. He held that knowledge is a compound composed of sensations inseparably connected with the intuitive belief or judgment that they are present. (See Laurie, 132.) Reid also asserts, "All reasoning must be grounded upon truths which are known without reasoning." (Intellectual Powers, 482.) For a detailed discussion of Campbell's treatment of deduction see Edney, 133-77. Cf. Intellectual Powers, 328 ff.

versant about number and extension." It\textsuperscript{34} Its subject-matter is "abstract, independent truths" and it gives rise to apodeictic conclusions.\textsuperscript{35} By virtue of this fact it is properly termed "demonstration."

Parallel to demonstration stands the kind of deduction which is "founded on the principles we have from consciousness and common sense improved by experience."\textsuperscript{36} Reasoning of this sort is dependent on human volition and "decides, in regard to particulars, concerning the future from the past, and concerning things unknown from things familiar to us."\textsuperscript{37} It results in conclusions which are probable rather than certain, and is called by Campbell "moral evidence."\textsuperscript{38}

Moral evidence differs from demonstration in four specific ways: 1. It deals with a different type of subject-matter.\textsuperscript{39} 2. It produces varying degrees of probability.\textsuperscript{40} 3. It admits "a contrariety of proofs," and is, therefore, content to decide in favor of that side upon which the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{35} Philosophy, 66.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Philosophy, 65.
\item \textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{38} Ibid. Cf. Philosophy, 80-3. See also Intellectual Powers, 476-7 and 481-4.
\item \textsuperscript{39} Philosophy, 66.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
It is generally complicated, consisting of a bundle of independent proofs, no one of which may in itself be conclusive, but each of which "bestows on the conclusion a particular degree of likelihood." 42

Campbell presents the thesis that moral evidence is founded either directly or indirectly upon "those sources in our nature which give being to experience, and consequently, to all those attainments, moral and intellectual, that are derived from it." 43 These, he maintains, are two in number -- "sense" and "memory." 44

The senses are "the original inlets of perception." 45 Their duty is to "inform the mind of the facts which, in the present instant, are situated within the sphere of their activity." 46 Once "facts" have been exhibited by the senses they enter immediately into the memory. 47 Here

41. Philosophy, 67.

42. Ibid. Cf. Intellectual Powers, 482, where Reid says: "Such evidence [moral] may be compared to a rope made up of many slender filaments twisted together. The rope has strength more than sufficient to bear the stress laid upon it, though no one of the filaments of which it is composed would be sufficient for that purpose."

43. Philosophy, 69.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid. See in this connection McCosh, 243.

47. Ibid.
they remain as vouchers of those "past realities" which previously we knew by the evidence of the senses. Memory, therefore, is a "repository of all the stores from which our experience is collected . . . ."\textsuperscript{48} It is the cabinet where are filed the lessons learned by the senses in their contact with the external world.

Both "sense" and "memory" are, however, conversant only with single and unrelated "facts."\textsuperscript{49} In order that fragmentary perceptions may be interwoven into the context of organized experiential knowledge a third instrument is necessary. This is "association."\textsuperscript{50} Campbell treats association principally as a function of memory. "The mind," he believes, "retains the perceived consequences of uniform repetitions of similar facts under similar circumstances."\textsuperscript{51} Upon the basis of these memories it anticipates similar results in future situations of a like nature.

Experience, which consists of various sequences of past "facts" organized according to the principles of association, may, therefore, be viewed as that "retentive

\textsuperscript{48} Philosophy, 80. Cf. Reid on "memory" in Intellectual Powers, 339 ff.
\textsuperscript{49} Philosophy, 69.
\textsuperscript{50} Philosophy, 69-70.
\textsuperscript{51} Edney, 145-8.
associative process" whereby the mind tends to group ideas under the notions of cause, effect, adjunct, etc. In this way knowledge is organized so that it may be brought to bear in judgment and action.

(1). The Species of Moral Evidence. Campbell recognizes four types of moral evidence. This is tantamount to saying that he recognizes four avenues whereby the knowledge of "facts" probable and contingent may come into the mind. Two of these are founded directly upon experience; the others employ experience as a criterion.

At the head of the list stands that species which is "named peculiarly the evidence of experience." This is Campbell's rather lame label for the process by which mind abstracts the universal from the particular. Stated more fully, it is the process of isolating the essential characteristics of any individual "fact" so as to fit it into a context of similar "facts" previously encountered. In

52. Edney, 148. See Philosophy, 70.

53. The classification of moral evidence given by Campbell does not follow that set forth by Reid (Intellectual Powers, 432-4). Reid does, however, include in his list testimony (482-3) and "the probability of chances" (483-4).

54. Philosophy, 71-2.

55. Philosophy, 72.

proportion as past experience in the particular area concerned has been various or uniform, our inferences concerning the new "fact" will be more or less probable. 57

The second of the means is "analogy." Analogy, says Campbell, is merely "a more indirect experience, founded on some remote similitude." 58 Its force is measured by the degree of resemblance subsisting between that which is brought as argument and that to which argument is applied. 59

Third is "testimony." Unlike analogy and experience proper, testimony does not depend upon the evidence of our own observation. It consists of those "facts," oral or written, which come to us indirectly through the authority of other persons. 60 Following the theory advanced by Reid, Campbell argues that a belief in testimony is an "original principle" in human nature. 61 Unless a man

57. Philosophy, 72.
58. Philosophy, 75.
59. Ibid. Analogical reasoning is, thinks Campbell, "at best but a feeble support, and is hardly ever honored with the name of proof. Nevertheless, when the analogies are numerous, and the subject admits not evidence of another kind, it doth not want its efficacy." (Philosophy, 75-6.) Cf. Intellectual Powers, 237.
60. Philosophy, 76.
61. Philosophy, 76. One of the twelve "contingent" principles of "common sense" recognized by Reid is this: "There is a certain regard due to human testimony in matters of fact, and even to human authority in matters of opinion." (Quoted McCosh, 218.) James Beattie likewise viewed testimony as a principle of common sense. (See McCosh, 238.)
has some definite reason for doubting or disbelieving that which he is told he tends automatically to give it unlimited assent. For this reason "in what regards single facts, testimony is more adequate than any conclusion from experience." 62

The strength of Campbell's argument may best be gauged by the fact that he himself recognizes its limitations. First, that which we learn from others was, he admits, either by them or by still other persons, directly experienced. 63 Second, experience serves, he insists, as the criterion whereby we evaluate the probability or improbability of what we are told. 64 As both McCosh and

62. Ibid. Campbell's account of the probative force of testimony as set forth in The Philosophy of Rhetoric is drawn from a more complete statement to be found in his first important work, A Dissertation on Miracles. In this essay, written to answer Hume's contention that testimony cannot be accepted as proof of a miracle because the evidence of testimony is itself founded on experience, Campbell developed at length the thesis that belief in testimony is an inexplicable principle springing out of the very constitution of mind. See George Campbell, A Dissertation on Miracles. (Edinburgh, 1762), i.1. Cf. Philosophy, 76. This essay was long considered, as Stephen tells us, the "ablest" reply to Hume's argument. That writer answered it by pointing out that Campbell erroneously regarded testimony and experience as independent sources of information. (Leslie Stephen. History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century. (Third edition). 2 vols. (New York, 1902), 1.398. Hereafter cited as Stephen.)

63. Philosophy, 77.

64. Ibid. Reid, it may be noted, held a like view. See Edney, 165.
Laurie have remarked, the fact that Campbell thus falls back upon experience as the foundation of testimony reveals the weakness of his assumption that the belief in testimony is "a necessary principle."  

Campbell's final remark on the psychology of testimony emphasizes the probative force of those pieces of evidence which are produced by the concurrent statements of a number of independent witnesses. His argument -- later to be expounded more fully and more cogently by Whately -- is that in such cases "there is a probability distinct from that which may be termed the sum of the probabilities resulting from the testimonies of the witnesses, a probability which would remain even though the witnesses were of such a character as to merit no faith at all." This strength arises out of the concurrence itself, for it "is as one to infinite" that such agreement would be purely the result of chance. Therefore, if the possibility of concert among the witnesses be excluded, "there remains no other cause but the reality of the fact."  

65. McCosh, 240; Laurie, 163. For a more complete analysis of Campbell's argument see Stephen, 1.398-402.  
67. See Elements of Rhetoric, 1.2.4.  
68. Philosophy, 78.  
69. Ibid.
The last of the ways in which mind arrives at a knowledge of matters contingent is through the calculation of chances. Campbell, influenced perhaps by the doctrines of Locke, appears to have been impressed by the fact that we make some judgments neither upon the basis of direct experience nor as a result of testimony. Instead, we balance in our minds the probabilities for and against a proposition, and by this means settle upon a course of action.

In explaining this phenomenon Campbell is first careful to make clear the meaning of the word "chance." It does not, he says, imply "the exclusion of a cause, but our ignorance of the cause." Thus, when a die is thrown we know that the law of gravity will cause it to fall; furthermore, we know that when it comes to rest one face will point upward. Which of the six faces it will be is, however, unknown to us. This does not mean that a cause was not present. It merely means that the cause cannot be ascertained. As a result, we may say that any of the faces has an equal chance of appearing. And in the same way, if five faces were marked with like characters and the sixth with another, we should say there were five chances to one that the figure appearing five

70. Philosophy, 78-80.


72. Philosophy, 78.
times would be turned up.\textsuperscript{73}

So far as Campbell's \textit{inventio} is concerned, the point to be noted is that in "experience" judgments are reached as a result of "numbering and comparing the events after repeated trials . . . ."\textsuperscript{74} In calculating chances, however, judgments are made "without any trial, [and merely] from balancing the possibilities on both sides."\textsuperscript{75} Yet despite this difference, reasoning from experience and the calculating of chances "produce a similar effect upon the mind."\textsuperscript{76} Considering all of the possible results as having an equal chance of occurring, "if any of five shall produce one effect, and but the sixth another, the mind," says Campbell, "weighing the different events, resteth in an expectation of that in which the greater number of chances concur . . . ."\textsuperscript{77} This, of course, is essentially the same process employed in making inferences from experience -- i.e. "facts" held in the memory are reviewed and probabilities are determined by the preponderance of one type of "fact" over another.\textsuperscript{78} Such reasoning is

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{73} Philosophy, 78-9. The example is apparently drawn from Intellectual Powers, 483.
\textsuperscript{74} Philosophy, 79.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} Philosophy, 79.
\end{flushleft}
not capable of so accurate a mathematical expression as that in which we calculate the chances of a certain combination appearing on a roll of the dice; yet it too is fundamentally nothing more than a counting of probabilities, and derives its relatively higher degree of probity from the fact that it can take advantage of the uniformity of nature.\textsuperscript{79}

c. \textit{Syllogism}. In discussing the various sources of "evidence" whereby men acquire knowledge and are "convinced" of the justness of the views held by others Campbell, it will be noted, did not once mention the syllogism. This silence is in itself indicative of his opinion concerning its value. When, at the close of the discussion of moral evidence, he undertakes a direct examination into the nature and uses of syllogistic method his inquiry is centered principally in these two questions: 1. Is syllogism of any value as an instrument of investigation? 2. Is it of any value as an instrument of proof? Needless to say, the answer in both cases is a resounding "No."

Investigation, Campbell asserts, depends primarily on observation and experience. In these processes syllogism is of little or no utility.\textsuperscript{80} When we reason

\textsuperscript{79} Philosophy, 79.

\textsuperscript{80} Philosophy, 86.
from experience, attention characteristically moves from matters better known to matters less known, from things evident to things obscure; moreover, it advances from the particular to the general. 81 Syllogism, however, dictates exactly the opposite procedure. It leads the mind "from things less known to things better known, and by things obscure to things evident." 82 This is because it attempts to infer a particular proposition from a universal one. Yet, as everyone upon reflection will be forced to admit, particulars are always "more distinctly conceived" and "more deeply imprinted" on the mind than are universals. 83 Take, for example, this proposition: "A horse has 'feeling.'" We are more certain of the truth of this statement than we are of the assertion "All animals have 'feeling.'" 84 True logic -- that is, logic "which is always coincident with good sense" -- would take this into account. 85 It "would lead our reflections to the indications of perception and feeling given by these animals, and the remarkable conformity which in this respect, and in respect of their

81. Philosophy, 86.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Philosophy, 87.
bodily organs, they bear to our own species."\(^{86}\) This, not syllogism, is the proper method for carrying on an inquiry into the question of whether or not a horse has "feeling."

There are two reasons why syllogism is not a practical instrument of proof. First, it has not, says Campbell, "the least affinity to moral reasoning . . . ."\(^{87}\) This type of ratiocination is, like reasoning from experience, chiefly an analytical process in which "we ascend from particulars to universals."\(^{88}\) Syllogizing, on the other hand, is synthetic. It descends from universals to particulars. Second, the "whole foundation of the syllogistic art" lies in the two following axioms: 1. "Things which coincide with the same thing, coincide with one another." 2. "Two things, whereof one does, and one does not coincide with the same thing, do not coincide with one another."\(^{89}\) Upon the first of these principles all affirmative syllogisms are built; upon the second, all that are negative. Neither principle, however, leaves any room for probability. Each makes a dogmatic assertion, and if the phenomenon in question meets the requirements stipulated by the rules

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86. Philosophy, 87.

87. Philosophy, 84. In this view Campbell appears to have followed Locke. (See Edney, 180.)

88. Ibid.

89. Philosophy, 85.
the conclusion may be regarded as certain. 90

What, then, is the proper function of syllogism? Campbell says it is to serve as a guide in "the adjustment of our language, in expressing ourselves on subjects previously known . . . ." 91 "If," he continues, "you regard only the thing signified, the argument conveys no instruction, nor does it forward us in the knowledge of things a single step. But if you regard principally the signs, it may serve to correct misapplication of them, through inadvertency or otherwise." 92 Thus it might save a man from being imposed on by that type of sophistical reasoning which artfully alters the meanings of words, and it may reveal the underlying agreement in those disputes which are merely verbal. 93 These, however, are the limits of its usefulness. Syllogism is suitable neither as a method of inquiry nor as a method of proof. 94

90. Philosophy, 88.
91. Ibid.
92. Philosophy, 89.
93. Philosophy, 89-91.
94. Campbell summarizes his argument by pointing out that for the reasons given above syllogism cannot be styled "the art of reasoning." Properly conceived, it is merely "the science of logomachy, or, in plain English, the art of fighting with words and about words." This does not mean, however, that syllogism is necessarily something pernicious. Although it has "at least as often been employed for imposing fallacies on the understanding as for detecting those imposed" it may serve a useful and honorable end. Be-
2. Principles That Aid Reason in Promoting Belief:

Understanding, Imagination, Passions, the Will. Having considered the various types of evidence by which mind knows and is "convinced," Campbell next inquires what "principles in our nature" aid reason in promoting belief. This new inquiry calls for a fresh point of attack. Up to now Campbell has focused his attention chiefly upon an analysis of the substance and movement of the discourse itself. Here, however, he begins to view the rhetorical process from the standpoint of the listener. Under what conditions does the human understanding best function? What engages a man's attention? What stimulates his imagination? What causes the passions to be aroused? These are the matters now to be discussed.95

cause of this fact it is "unnecessary" to fix upon syllogism as a whole a name which ought to signify only its abuse. "I shall therefore," Campbell declares, "only title it the scholastic art of disputation." (See Philosophy, 91-2.)

As McCosh properly remarks, Campbell apparently "has no idea of the syllogism being merely an analysis of the process which passes through the mind in all ratiocination." (McCosh, 243.)

95. By way of introduction, it should be pointed out that Campbell's answers to these questions are remarkable both for their practicality and for their ingenuousness. Therefore, his treatment of pathos stands in marked contrast with the elaborate apologies offered by many rhetoricians. The fact speakers commonly employ appeals to the passions does not mean, Campbell insists, that rhetoric must be defined "the art of deception." Such appeals "will be found, on a stricter examination, to be in most cases quite legitimate, and even necessary, if we would give reason herself that influence which is certainly
Campbell's analysis of the listener is divided into two parts. First he investigates those fundamental principles of understanding, fancy, and emotion which are universal among men -- principles which stand forth as the common denominators of human nature in that they underlie, and in a sense bridge, the myriad differences existing among individuals and among groups. Then he concentrates upon the differences themselves and shows how such factors as education, occupation, habit, and "moral culture" affect our mental and social natures. The second of these parts may more properly be treated in a later section of this chapter.

a. Of Men in General. Campbell's discussion of "men
in general" centers in an analysis of the principles by which we understand, have our imaginations stimulated, remember, and are moved.

His treatment of "understanding" is generally unsatisfactory. It proceeds on the assumption that an argument will be comprehensible in proportion as causes making for its unintelligibility are avoided. These, it is asserted, occur either in the "sense" or in the "expression." In order for the "sense" of an argument to be intelligible it must lie within the sphere of the hearers' knowledge, it must not be "too abstract for their apprehension and powers of thinking," and the trains of reasoning employed in constructing it must be both short and simple. Campbell reserves more specific precepts for that part of his discussion which deals with "men in particular," thus recognizing that comprehensibility is in large measure to be gauged in terms of "the capacity, education, and attainments" of the individuals addressed. Obscurity arising from "expression" he treats under style.

Imagination is more adequately handled. Campbell

96. Philosophy, 95.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. Imagination Campbell defines as "that faculty of the mind, whereby it is capable of conceiving and combining things together, which in that combination have neither been perceived by the senses, nor are remembered." Pulpit Eloquence, 5.214-5.
conceives of this faculty as closely bound up with attention and conviction. 100 We attend, he says, to that which gratifies the fancy. 101 Certain "qualities in ideas" possess a peculiar compulsion. These are vivacity, beauty, sublimity, and novelty. 102 Imagination also influences belief. Although Campbell does not go so far as to accept Hume's dictum that "Belief consisteth in the liveliness of our ideas," he does admit that in many instances "belief... enlivens our ideas" and, conversely, "that lively ideas have a stronger influence than faint ideas to induce belief." 103 This grows out of the fact that "there is not so great a difference between argument and illustration as is usually imagined." 104 Taking Hume as his authority, Campbell maintains that moral reasoning -- he is thinking in particular of the argument from experience -- consists essentially in making evident a close and familiar resemblance between that which is to be proved and that which is brought as proof. 105 Such a resemblance

100. Philosophy, 95-6. See in this connection Lee, 226.
101. Philosophy, 95.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. Philosophy, 96.
105. Ibid.
is, however, usually prosaic and mundane. It has logical force but lacks the liveliness that engages the fancy.\textsuperscript{106} What gives the principal delight to the imagination is the exhibition of a strong likeness, which escapes the notice of the generality of people.\textsuperscript{107} This is the sort of resemblance that obtains in analogy. When the poet or orator adduces some striking similarity that was previously unrecognized he brings together reason and fancy in such a way that each may be said to have an equal claim. The strength of the argument is enhanced because the imagination is struck, the fancy pleased.\textsuperscript{108} It is for this reason that tropes and figures sometimes play a vital role in persuasion.\textsuperscript{109}

In addition to their power in commanding attention and influencing belief, vivid ideas also tend to impress themselves forcibly upon the memory. Therefore, the first principle governing this faculty is that vivid ideas are better retained than "languid" ones.\textsuperscript{110} But memory also operates according to the laws of association. Hume's principles of resemblance, contiguity, and

\begin{footnotes}
\item[106] Philosophy, 96.
\item[107] Ibid.
\item[108] Philosophy, 97.
\item[109] Ibid.
\item[110] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
causation are valid. They are not, however, all inclusive. To them must be added "order" both in space and in time. Order in space "is strengthened by the regularity and simplicity of figure, which qualities arise solely from the resemblance of the corresponding parts of the figure, or the parts similarly situated." Order in time provides what in composition is called "Method." By means of this principle we tend to group together those matters which have a natural "affinity" for one another because of their "contiguity in duration" or their temporal arrangement.

Continuing his analysis, Campbell next observes that while it is fancy that "bestows brilliancy on our ideas" and memory that "gives them stability," it is passion that "animates" them. As a result, action depends on passion. "To make me believe, it is enough to show me that things are so; to make me act, it is necessary to show me that the action will answer some end." This end is a state or quality which gratifies a passion. For

111. *Philosophy*, 98.
112. Ibid.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid.
the mind to be persuaded two things are, therefore, necessary: 1. some "desire" or "affection" must be aroused within it, and 2. the judgment must recognize a connection between the action recommended and the gratification of the affection excited. 117

Although Campbell devotes separate sections to the understanding, the imagination, and the passions, he does not deal directly with the faculty of will. Evidently this is because will is influenced by a joint appeal to understanding and passion. Therefore, he who knows how each of the faculties may be "operated" on, and who is aware of how they may be combined is adequately informed concerning will. 118

Closely related to the passions are the virtues. They too are "motives to action, being equally capable of giving an impulse to the will." 119 Like passions, "They necessarily imply an habitual propensity to a certain species of conduct, an habitual aversion to the contrary; a veneration for such a character, an abhorrence of such another." 120 The difference between them is akin to the distinction which rhetoricians draw between pathos

117. Philosophy, 100.
118. See in this connection Edney, 70.
119. Philosophy, 103.
120. Philosophy, 102.
and ethos, the first being concerned with "passion," the second with "disposition." In other words, it is one of degree rather than of kind. Specifically, Campbell says, the virtues occupy "the middle place between the pathetic and that which is addressed to the imagination, and [partake] of both, adding to the warmth of the former the grace and attractions of the latter."

How, then, is a "passion" or "disposition" excited? Campbell first offers a generalized answer: by "communicating lively ideas" concerning that "object" toward which it is directed. Then in a significant passage he adds:

A passion is most strongly excited by sensation. The sight of danger, immediate or near, instantly rouseth fear; the feeling of an injury, and the presence of the injurer, in a moment kindle anger. Next to the influence of sense is that of memory, the effect of which upon passion, if the fact be recent, and remembered distinctly and circumstantially, is almost equal. Next to the influence of memory is that of imagination, by which is here solely meant the faculty of apprehending what is neither perceived by the senses nor remembered.

Here, couched in the terminology of the faculty psychology, we have an evaluative classification of the sources of passion which stands forth as a clean addition to the psychology of rhetoric.

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121. Philosophy, 103.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
Descending to more specific matters, Campbell next discusses those various "circumstances" surrounding an object of passion which give it special potency in "operating" on the mind. These are seven in number -- probability, plausibility, importance, proximity of time, connection of place, relation to persons concerned, and interest in the consequences.125 In each case the name assigned to the "circumstance" adequately explains its nature. All Campbell is saying is that men tend to be moved more readily and more deeply if the outcome desired or feared seems probable, or plausible, or important, etc. Thus, the "circumstance" is in his view predominately a "logical" factor rather than an emotional one. If I desire something and my reason tells me that its acquisition is of importance to my well-being or happiness, I naturally shall desire it all the more strongly. If, on the other hand, I fear something and that object is close by, my fear will be enhanced.126

125. Philosophy, 104-12 passim.

126. This aspect of Campbell's doctrine was, as Edney remarks (314), derived no doubt from Hume. Therefore, it represents another example of his many borrowings from a man whose doctrines he professed to abhor. It would be interesting to investigate in detail the numerous relationships, both positive and negative, which exist between the theories of Hume and those of Campbell. We can here only pause to remark that Hume's thought was undoubtedly a major source of stimulation to Campbell, and one the full significance of which has not been properly recognized. Certain it is that this stimulation did not in all cases take the form of a desire to refute the doctrines of the great sceptic.
An "unfavourable" passion is calmed either "by annihilating, or at least diminishing, the object which raised it," or "by exciting some other passion which may counterwork it."\textsuperscript{127} Annihilation results when we show "the falsity of the narration, or the utter incredibility of the future event, on the supposed truth of which the passion was founded . . . ."\textsuperscript{128} Diminution proceeds by the exhibition of circumstances contrary to those which augment the passion -- improbability, implausibility, and the like.\textsuperscript{129} An unfavorable passion may be counteracted by a favorable one because deliberation as to conduct involves the weighing of conflicting motives which impel the mind in opposite directions. These act as "the two scales of a balance." Whatever is added to the one must be subtracted from the other. Therefore, in proportion as the favorable motive is stressed, the force of the unfavorable one will be diminished.\textsuperscript{130}

3. The Speaker: "Disposition." Chapter 9 of Book 1, which Campbell titles "Of the Consideration Which the Speaker Ought to Have of Himself," contains a brief but

\textsuperscript{127} Philosophy, 115.  
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{130} Philosophy, 116.
significant inquiry into the sources of ethical persuasion. This discussion commands our attention not only because it contains important additions to the standard classical treatment of ethos, but also because it provides a particularly clear example of the method by which Campbell derived rhetorical principles from an examination of the laws of the mind.

Campbell equates ethos with the English word "disposition." Thus the ethical appeal of a speaker has its ultimate source in those attitudes and actions which cause other persons to decide what sort of man he is. But "disposition" itself is merely an outward manifestation of the inner qualities we call "virtues." If a man is just, amiable, magnanimous, he will have a good "disposition," and he will be admired and trusted; if he lacks these attributes he will have a bad "disposition," and he will be disliked and doubted.

With his usual acuteness Campbell recognizes that "disposition" is, in large measure, a social product — that it is a result of group judgments as well as of the individual's own intentions and behavior. It is an estimate which is "obtained reflexively from the opinion

131. This term was probably derived from Reid. See Active Powers, 575-7.

132. See Philosophy, 118.
entertained of him by the hearers or the character which he bears with them."133 From this it might appear that ethical appeal is nothing more than the communication of an impression of virtue. Yet "to be good is the only sure way of being long esteemed good . . . ."134 Hence mere appearances will not suffice. In order to acquire a desirable reputation a man must actually be as well as seem virtuous.

An important characteristic of "disposition" is that as a determinant of action it occupies a "middle place" between "passion" and "imagination."135 A man is most apt to behave in a certain way because he is moved by passion, next because he has a "disposition" to that sort of action, and lastly because he is stimulated by the powers of the imagination. This is a natural consequence of the various degrees of power which the passions, the virtues, and the imagination exercise over the will.136

In investigating why "disposition" exercises so strong an influence over an audience Campbell follows precisely the method by which he believes all rhetorical problems

133. Philosophy, 118.
134. Philosophy, 119.
135. Philosophy, 103. Cf. Institutio, 6.2.9.
136. Ibid.
should be solved. What, he asks, is the "principle in
the mind" that is responsible for this phenomenon? Which
of the laws of human behavior explain the bond that appears
to exist between a "good man" and his auditors? The prob-
lem obviously is not an easy one. Campbell refrains from
venturing a blanket answer. Of this, however, he is
certain: "Sympathy is one main engine" by which the ethos
of a speaker is judged; it is "the human reaction upon
which ethical proof is built." This doctrine may, as
Sattler suggests, have been drawn from Adam Smith. In
any event, it constitutes a rather considerable modific-
tion of the traditional treatment of ethical appeal and
represents one of Campbell's major contributions to
rhetorical theory. Let us, therefore, examine the reason-
ing on which his view is based.

By way of introduction it should be said that the
word "sympathy" is for modern readers, at any rate, some-
what misleading. From the remark that this is the same
"communicative principle" which lies at the foundation of
our belief in testimony we infer that what Campbell is
speaking of may more conveniently be expressed as "trust."

139. Sattler, 338.
140. Philosophy, 119. Crawford (201) suggests that
Campbell's discussion of "sympathy" may have been drawn
from Hume.
We are influenced by a good man because we trust him; it is trust which creates a bond between speaker and listener. But how specifically does this element of trust operate as an aid to persuasion? Campbell approaches the matter negatively. Whatever weakens sympathy (trust) weakens, he tells us, the speaker's "power over the passions of his audience" and tends to impair his arguments. In other words, if a speaker is to be successful in playing upon the emotions of his hearers or in winning their belief they must have faith that he is a virtuous man. Listeners reject pathetic appeals that emanate from an orator of bad disposition and they mistrust his arguments. But the reaction -- and this is the point that must be emphasized -- is not primarily toward the man himself but rather toward his arguments and appeals as colored by his reputation. These speech materials stand between the speaker and his audience; they are the intermediaries through which the bond is cemented, the elements in the speaking performance which are trusted or mistrusted. In short, the principle of "sympathy" adheres not so much to the man himself as to what he says.

141. Philosophy, 119. Note particularly the following sentence: "Now the speaker's apparent conviction of the truth of what he advanceth adds to all his other arguments an evidence, though not precisely the same, yet near akin to that of his own testimony." Italics mine.
The chief factors which operate to impair the bond of sympathy between the speaker and hearer are "a low opinion of [the speaker's] intellectual abilities" and "a bad opinion of his morals." Of these the second exerts the stronger influence because it is an original principle of human reason that "qualities of the heart" move us more deeply than do those of the head. Because this is a fundamental axiom of mental activity it defies explanation, yet all our experience serves to corroborate its validity. To inquire into the reasons underlying the principle would be fruitless. The intelligent course is to accept it at face value and to realize that it explains, at least in part, the potency of good character as an element in persuasion.

The more "gross" the hearers, the more susceptible they are to prejudice. "[T]he rabble chiefly consider who speaks, men of sense and education what is spoken." Yet even the most highly educated and the most refined men are not completely "beyond the reach of preconceived opinion . . . ." Reason cannot withstand the compulsions resident in the "qualities of the heart." Before

142. Philosophy, 119.
143. Ibid.
144. Ibid.
145. Philosophy, 120.
146. Ibid.
these we lose our objectivity and tend to react in a more or less automatic fashion to the virtues or vices mirrored by the "disposition." Hence ethical appeals proceeding from evidence of good character find their strength in the fact that they are founded directly upon the natural principles of mind. 147

The chapter closes with a remark on the caution which the speaker must exercise when addressing an auditory that is unfavorably disposed toward him. 148 This will be considered in the section given over to outlining Campbell's constructive advice concerning the management of a discourse.

4. The Potency of Pathetic Appeal. As an adjunct to his discussion of the means of "operating" on the passions Campbell inquires why it is that pathos exercises so powerful an influence over the human mind.

All pathetic appeal is aimed, he asserts, either directly or indirectly at the emotion of pity. It derives its potency, at least in part, from that fascination which pitiable "objects" have for the mind. Consequently, if we can discover the sources of this fascination we shall understand why men are so strongly moved by appeals to their passions. Moreover, we shall better know how to use such appeals.

147. Philosophy, 119.
148. Philosophy, 120.
The proper approach to this problem lies, Campbell believes, not in a study of the "object" which gives rise to the fascination nor in an examination of the nature of mind as a whole, but rather in a careful introspective analysis of the attraction itself. What are its constituent parts? How do they interact? In an effort to answer these questions he sets forth six "principles" or theorems. These are so arranged as to form a demonstration.

Principle 1. "... almost all the simple passions of which the mind is susceptible may be divided into two classes, the pleasant and the painful."149

Principle 2. "... there is an attraction or association among the passions, as well as among the ideas of the mind."150

Principle 3. "... pain of every kind generally makes a deeper impression on the imagination than pleasure does, and is longer retained by the memory."151

Principle 4. "... from a group of passions ... associated together, and having the same object, some of which are of the pleasant, others of the painful kind -- if the pleasant predominate, there ariseth often a greater and more durable pleasure to the mind than would result from these if alone and unmixed."152

149. Philosophy, 151.
150. Philosophy, 152.
152. Ibid.
Principle 5. "... under the name pity may be included all the emotions excited by tragedy." 153

Principle 6. "... pity is not a simple passion, but a group of passions strictly united by association, and, as it were, blended by centering in the same object." 154

Because passions no less than ideas are subject to the laws of association almost all of them "attract or excite desire or aversion of some sort or other." 155 Thus love associates to it benevolence; hatred, malevolence or malice. 156 Love and hatred are, however, examples of the "simple" passions referred to in Principle 1. Contrasted with these are the "complex" passions which consist of clusters of "simple" affections grouped together -- again according to definite laws of association -- about a single "object." 157 In such clusters some of the passions are related to pleasant feelings, others to feelings which are painful. If the pleasant predominate, the cluster will give rise to "a greater and more durable pleasure" than would result if the pleasant passions stood "alone

153. Philosophy, 154.
154. Philosophy, 155.
155. Philosophy, 152.
156. Ibid.
and unmixed." It is beyond the power of human sagacity to explain why this is so. Yet experience clearly and conclusively demonstrates the truth of the principle.

At this point in his argument Campbell makes a fresh assumption. He first tells us that "under the name of pity may be included all the emotions excited by tragedy." Then in the sentence immediately following he says this: "In common speech, all [emotions], indeed, are included under this name that are excited by that species of eloquence which is denominated the pathetic."

If, then, tragedy finds its subject-matter in the pitiable, and if it is toward this quality that all the pathetic appeals of the orator are directed, the emotion of pity must exercise some strange fascination over the mind. If we can account for this fascination we may perhaps in a great measure solve the problem of why men are so strongly moved by pathetic appeals.

Upon analysis it will be discovered that pity is a "complex" passion. Of its constituent affections some

158. Philosophy, 153.
159. Ibid.
160. Philosophy, 154.
161. Ibid.
162. Philosophy, 155.
are pleasant, some painful. Commonly, however, the pleasant predominate. In other words, pity appears perfectly to meet all of the criteria set up by the fourth of the principles stated above. Therefore, its potency is to be explained in terms of the hypothesis which that theory advances.

In supporting this contention Campbell first reasserts the proposition that love attracts benevolence. He next points out that benevolence, in turn, attracts sympathy. Therefore, we entertain a sympathetic attitude toward those we love. Now, if this associative process works in one direction it will also work, although perhaps less perfectly, in the opposite direction. Consequently, we may say that sympathy will engage benevolence, and benevolence love.

Sympathy -- which is also called "commiseration" -- benevolence, and love Campbell declares to be the constituents of pity. The first is painful, the second neutral, the third pleasant. Love is, however, stronger than its counterparts. This strength enables it to give "a counterpoise of pleasure to the whole." Hence the

163. Philosophy, 155.
164. Ibid.
165. Ibid.
166. Philosophy, 156.
167. Ibid.
painful and neutral elements are outweighed and pity becomes pleasurable.

C. The Working Principles of Rhetoric

George Campbell evinced little or no interest in the elaborate collection of rules and principles which form the substance of classical rhetoric. Although not hostile to rules as such, he quite properly believed that the ancients themselves had developed the laws of composition with a thoroughness and a precision that left little scope for the inventiveness of later writers. Therefore, he did not seek to extend rhetorical theory, but rather to validate it. Can we, he asked, find in the principles of human behavior justification for the precepts which have been laid down concerning writing and speaking? Can the traditional a priori dicta be given the weight of psychological validity?

As a result, we do not find in The Philosophy a coherent system of practical rhetorical principles. The work is in no sense a handbook of rules for persuasion. Rather, it is an excursion into the psychological and epistemological foundations of rhetoric. Campbell's obvious interest lay in discovering the sources of persuasion, not in developing rules for persuading.

The scattered observations which Campbell does make regarding the application of theory to practice are, however, important because they illustrate how completely
his concept of rhetorical invention was tied up with that characteristic eighteenth century doctrine of the management or conduct of a discourse. We can find in The Philosophy few traces of the classical view of inventio as a systematic and guided search into the sources of speech substance. With the hearer rather than the address itself made the focal point of the rhetorical situation, a new inventional doctrine necessarily begins to emerge.

1. Address to the Faculties. Campbell's classification of the ends of oratory springs directly and avowedly out of his analysis of the "faculties." First, instead of classifying speeches, as had the ancients, in terms of the places or situations in which they are delivered -- i.e. into deliberative, judicial, and demonstrative -- he ranges them according to the aim or object which the speaker has in view. Second, instead of adhering to the classical doctrine that all oratory finds its ultimate purpose in persuasion, he asserts that the principal end of an address may be to give information or to stimulate the imagination. As a matter of fact, poetry -- especially the epic -- should, he believes, be

168. See, for example, Pulpit Eloquence, 7.243.

169. Philosophy, 23.
considered as "one mode of oratory." In short, because mind has four faculties -- understanding, imagination, passion, and will -- and because a discourse may be addressed to any one of these, the ends of speaking are four in number: "to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the passions, or to influence the will."

Any particular discourse admits only one of these ends as principal. Yet the interrelation and mutual subserviency of the various faculties make it necessary that the others serve as "means" to the accomplishment of the orator's object. The complex ends of oratory are built directly upon the simpler ones, and are nothing more than intricately balanced composites of more primary goals. Thus persuasion "presupposes," Campbell says, "in some degree, and therefore may be understood to imply, all the

170. Philosophy, 25.
171. Philosophy, 23. Cf. Pulpit Eloquence, 5.212. Students are generally agreed that this redefining of the ends of speech in terms of the faculties constitutes one of Campbell's major contributions to rhetorical theory. Prior to his time the very general practice had been to reproduce with little or no modification the traditional classical analysis. Most modern rhetoricians, on the other hand, adhere, at least in substance if not in detail, to Campbell's method of classification. Thus they talk of speeches to inform, to convince, to entertain, etc. This tendency, as well as the still widespread acceptance of the conviction-persuasion duality, is a definite trace of Campbell's "faculty" rhetoric. See in this connection Edney, 34 and 312; Thonssen and Baird, 131; and Sanford, 111.

other talents of an orator, to enlighten, to evince, to paint, to astonish, to inflame: but this doth not hold inversely; one may explain with clearness, and prove with energy, who is incapable of the sublime, the pathetic, and the vehement. . . ."173

In this hierarchy of ends address to the imagination occupies a place of particular importance. With few exceptions the speaker, no matter what his ultimate purpose, must engage the fancy.174 Only in this way may attention be commanded, belief won, or the passions aroused. Clarity alone, except in the case of mathematical demonstrations, does not suffice. The oration must also be striking and stimulating.175

The winning of a response of understanding depends on "perspicuity";176 one of conviction, on "argument."177

175. Philosophy, 24.
176. Ibid.
177. Philosophy, 25. Although there are but four faculties, and consequently but four "ends" of oratory, Campbell recognizes five types of speeches. This apparent discrepancy is explained by the fact that he distinguishes between two kinds of "instruction." The first consists in "explaining some doctrine unknown, or not distinctly comprehended," the second in "proving some proposition disbeliefed or doubted . . . ." Thus we have "explanation" proper set off from "conviction," the point of difference lying in the fact that the first supplies lack of knowledge while the second dispels error. (See Philosophy, 24.) In Pulpit Eloquence (5.229) Campbell explains the dependency of "conviction" on "argument" by asserting that the term
The fancy is awakened by "imitation" -- a realistic and vivid painting, "a finished picture" of the quality or condition toward which persuasion is directed.\textsuperscript{178} It "attains the summit of perfection in the sublime, or those great and noble images which, when in suitable colouring presented to the mind, do, as it were, distend the imagination with some vast conception, and quite ravish the soul."\textsuperscript{179} If, on the other hand, we would arouse the passions we must throw off the "drapery and ornament" of fancy, and in vivid strokes exhibit "those bright and deep impressions made by the subject upon the speaker's mind."\textsuperscript{180} Here the object is not pleasure but "emotion."

The "inert and torpid" passions are most proper for dissuading; those which elevate the soul and stimulate it to action, for persuading; the "intermediate kind" are equally adapted to either purpose.\textsuperscript{181} Most difficult of all the

\begin{itemize}
\item may properly be used only in connection with "speculative truth."
\item The operation of conviction is," he says, "merely on the understanding, that of persuasion is on the will and resolution." See also on the discrepancy between ends and types \textit{Pulpit Eloquence}, 5.214 and 217.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{178. Philosophy}, 27.
\textsuperscript{179. Philosophy}, 25.
\textsuperscript{180. Philosophy}, 27-8.
\textsuperscript{181. Philosophy}, 27.
aims of speaking is the moving of the will. In order to accomplish this end the orator must employ "an artful mixture of that which proposes to convince the judgment, and that which interests the passions ... the argumentative and the pathetic incorporated together." In a total pattern of compelling vehemence, the "affecting lineaments must be so interwoven with our argument, as that, from the passion excited, our reasoning may derive importance, and so be fitted for commanding attention; and by justness of reasoning, the passion may be more deeply rooted and enforced; and that thus both may be made to conspire in effectuating that persuasion which is the end proposed."

Let us summarize the foregoing doctrine in tabular form:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Discourse</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Essential Quality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explanatory</td>
<td>To enlighten the understanding</td>
<td>Perspicuity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controversial</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Argument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commendatory</td>
<td>To please the imagination</td>
<td>Imitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathetic</td>
<td>To move the passions</td>
<td>Emotionality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuasive</td>
<td>To influence the will</td>
<td>Vehemence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

184. Adapted from *Philosophy*, 23-30; *Pulpit Eloquence*, 5.218-21; and *Edney*, 313. Although his reason for doing so is far from clear, Campbell undertakes in *Pulpit Eloquence* (5.222-3) to correlate these types with the traditional classical divisions. He likens the controversial speech to the judicial, the demonstrative to the commendatory, the deliberative to the persuasive. For the explanatory and pathetic genres he finds no parallels.
2. Logic and Eloquence. In the study of man we frequently draw a distinction between "the living principle of perception and action" which is called soul, and "that system of material organs" which is named body. On a similar principle eloquence also may be divided into two parts -- the "sense" and the "expression." By the first of these eloquence "holds of" logic; by the second, "of grammar."

The purpose of logic is "the eviction of truth." "Pure logic" is, therefore, concerned only with the "subject" known, and it examines the "subject" solely for the purpose of gaining information concerning it. Rhetoric, on the other hand, is broader. It not only considers the "subject" itself, but also the relation that exists between the subject and those who speak about it and hear

185. Philosophy, 54. This distinction is explained more fully in Pulpit Eloquence (2.168-9). There Campbell says that the "sense" (or "soul") of a discourse is "that in any original performance, which it behooves a translator to retain in his version into another language, whilst the expression is totally changed." This metaphorical description of the constituents of a composition is frequently encountered in the rhetorical literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For a typical example see Bernard Lami, L'Art de Parler. (Paris, 1675), 3.1.1.

186. Ibid.
187. Ibid.
188. Philosophy, 55.
it spoken about. To use Campbell's own phrase, rhetoric studies "both the subject and the speaker for the sake of the hearers, or, rather, for the sake of the effect intended to be produced in them." Yet it is but a particular application of logic. Logic "forges the arms which eloquence teacheth us to wield . . . ." Consequently, "we must first have recourse to the former, that, being made acquainted with the materials of which her weapons and armour are severally made, we may know their respective strength and temper, and when and how each is to be used."

This is a requirement which holds for all of the various types of discourses. Conviction, says Campbell -- we must remember he is using the term to signify that sort of appeal to the understanding which seeks to remove prejudice and error -- is always either proposed as the end of speaking or it must accompany the accomplishment

189. Philosophy, 55.
190. Ibid.
191. Ibid.
192. Ibid. It should, of course, be kept in mind that when Campbell thus speaks of logic as the foundation of rhetoric he is not referring to the traditional logic of the schools, but rather to those "natural and genuine principles and grounds of reasoning . . . derived from sense or memory, from comparison of related ideas, from testimony, experience, or analogy." (See Pulpit Eloquence, 1.165 where this point is made more explicitly than in The Philosophy.)
of the end. When the orator addresses the understanding in an effort to establish the truth of a proposition that is disbelieved or doubted, or when he seeks to move the will, conviction is, quite obviously, his avowed purpose. When he addresses the understanding in order to give information, or speaks directly to the imagination or passions, conviction "ought ever to accompany the accomplishment of the end."

The importance of this principle becomes apparent when we consider that even in fiction and poetry where the truth of individual facts is not important, general descriptions of manners, characters, and actions must seem probable -- i.e. they must accord with our experience of things in the world of reality.

Now, lest the significance of this analysis be missed, it should be emphasized that what Campbell is saying is that a "conviction" of the reasonableness, the accuracy, the faithfulness -- in short, the truth -- of the speaker's "ideas" must ever be present in the hearer's mind. He will be able to give this impression if he makes his "ideas" conform to the laws of truth as discovered

193. Philosophy, 55.
194. Ibid.
195. Ibid.
196. Ibid.
and formulated by the science of logic. Thus viewed, rhetoric is logic applied in attempts to influence; it is the art by which men are led to believe that the speaker's ideas are valid representations of reality.

Viewed in the light of its evident purpose, Campbell's discussion of the relation between logic and rhetoric is, I believe, at least understandable, even if it is not completely convincing. The pathetic appeal no less than the logical argument must have an aura of credibility. The same is true of an explanation or of an address to the imagination. The speaker makes his materials appear credible by adhering to the principles which guide all valid inquiry and proof -- in other words, by following the laws of logic.

Whately, who sought to formulate not a science of logic but the science of logic, attempted to ascertain certain universal principles which all valid thinking everywhere, whether it would or no, was obliged to follow. Therefore, he criticized Campbell's doctrine. In a day when we recognize the possibility of an endless number of logics and no longer search for the logic, we are in a better position to appreciate whatever values there may be in Campbell's treatment of this science.

197. See Elements of Logic, 55.
3. The Speech: Logos. Of the two sorts of evidence from which man acquires knowledge of himself and the world about him, the first, intuition, bears no direct relation to rhetoric. Rhetorical appeals find their proper province in that species of deductive evidence which Campbell calls "moral."198 To this realm belong "all decisions concerning fact, and things without us,"199 all "the real, but often changing and contingent connexions that subsist among things actually existing."200 Rhetoric is, therefore, not a methodology for the investigation or demonstration of noumena; rather, it is an instrument by which we may examine those probabilities, opinions, and contingent truths that must guide men in the practical, everyday affairs of life. Because it employs the various forms of moral evidence rhetoric 1. permits of varying degrees of proof, 2. it recognizes a contrariety of proofs, and 3. its probative method is "complicated," being composed of a "bundle" of independent arguments or confirmations, no one of which is in itself conclusive, but all of which

198. Philosophy, 65.
199. Ibid.
200. Philosophy, 66.
when taken together may produce a high degree of probability. 201

The types of moral reasoning employed by the orator in establishing his contentions are experience, analogy, and testimony. Experience, it will be recalled, Campbell defines as "the tendency of the mind to associate ideas under the notion of causes, effects, or adjuncts . . . ." 202 The cogency of such an argument is measured by the degree of uniformity exhibited in the "ideas" forming its substantive basis. 203 Experience is of such a nature that it "is never contradicted by one example only." 204 The cumulative weight of past observation produces a presumption which overbalances the exception.

Analogy -- that is, argument from indirect experience -- "is at best but a feeble support." 205 When, however, analogies are numerous, and when the subject does not lend itself to evidence of another kind, some results may be obtained by employing this form of reasoning. 206 A device better suited to "silencing objections" than to establishing truth, analogy is of most value in repelling refutation.

201. Philosophy, 66-8.
202. Philosophy, 72.
203. Ibid.
204. Ibid.
205. Philosophy, 75-6.
206. Philosophy, 76.
Hence it is primarily a defensive rather than an offensive weapon; one which, though it cannot kill the enemy, wards off his blows. 207 Any particular analogy will be stronger or weaker, depending upon the closeness or remoteness of the resemblance in question. 208

Testimony, considered by itself, is no more reliable than human veracity in general, or than the veracity of the individual who offers it. 209 Furthermore, it is subject to the check of experience. 210 Yet, because testimony has "a natural influence on belief" it provides stronger proof for "single facts" than does argument from experience. When testimony is "ample" the proof may be regarded as positive. 211 Additional circumstances affecting the worth of testimony are the "reputation of the attester, his manner of address, the nature of the fact attested, the occasion of giving the testimony, the possible or probable designs in giving it, [and] the disposition of the hearers

207. Philosophy, 76.
208. Philosophy, 75.
209. Philosophy, 76.
210. Ibid.
211. Philosophy, 77.
to whom it was given . . . ."212 The concurrent statements of a number of independent witnesses provide particularly strong argument from testimony.213

Syllogism is of no value to the orator either as an organ of investigation or as a mode of proof. Because those matters about which he speaks lie in the province of moral reasoning he must follow the methods and procedures proper to moral reasoning. These are predominately analytical.214 They lead the mind from particulars to universals, "from things known to things unknown, and by things evident to things obscure . . . ."215 Although Campbell is not specific on the point, what he obviously means to suggest is that the analytical method of reasoning is the one best suited to eloquence.216 The speaker must organize his materials so as to direct the attention of his hearers from the individual facts of experience to the general conclusions and principles which those facts imply. To do otherwise would violate the natural laws which govern men's thinking about matters contingent.

212. Philosophy, 77.
213. Philosophy, 78.
214. Philosophy, 84-5.
215. Philosophy, 86.
216. See in this connection Crawford, 146.
4. The Audience: Pathos. In one of the most significant and most frequently quoted passages in all the literature of rhetoric Campbell writes:

In order to evince the truth considered by itself, conclusive arguments alone are requisite; but in order to convince me by these arguments, it is moreover requisite that they be understood, that they be attended to, that they be remembered by me; and, in order to persuade me by them to any particular action or conduct, it is farther [sic] requisite that, by interesting me in the subject, they may, as it were, be felt. It is not, therefore, the understanding alone that is here concerned. If the orator would prove successful, it is necessary that he engage in his service all these different powers of the mind, the imagination, the memory, and the passions. These are not the supplanters of reason, or even rivals in her sway; they are her handmaids, by whose ministry she is enabled to usher truth into the heart, and procure it there a favourable reception. 217

If, however, these different "powers of the mind" are effectively to be brought to the aid of reason, the orator must observe various rules and principles in addressing them. To secure understanding he will need to 1. stay within the sphere of the audience's knowledge, and 2. be concrete. 218 To command attention he must 1. engage the hearers' imaginations with "ideas" live, beautiful, sublime, and novel, 219 2. take advantage of

217. Philosophy, 94.
218. Philosophy, 95.
the "vivacity" produced by "striking resemblances" in imagery, 220 3. make his arguments "lively," 221 and 4. bring forth bold and compelling parallels that arouse admiration by their novelty. 222 In order that his remarks may be remembered, he must 1. see that they are "vivid," 223 2. arrange them according to the principles of association -- resemblance, contiguity, causation, and order in space and time, 224 3. when introducing new

220. Philosophy, 95.
221. Philosophy, 95-6.
222. Philosophy, 96.
223. Philosophy, 97.
224. Philosophy, 98-9. Order in time Campbell calls "method." By this principle the parts of a discourse are arranged "in such a manner as to give vicinity to things . . . which have an affinity; that is, resemblances, causality, or other relations in nature . . . thus making their customary association and resemblance, as in the former case, cooperate with their contiguity in duration, or immediate succession in delivery . . . ." "Method" is of particular importance in the narrative. (On this last point see Pulpit Eloquence, 2.172.)

In this connection we should recall Campbell's opinion that memory alone is never the principal end of a discourse. The orator desires that his "ideas" be remembered in order that instruction or persuasion may be achieved. As a "subordinate end," however, memory "is more or less necessary on every occasion." This is because rhetorical proof characteristically consists of "the sum of the evidence of all the arguments, often independent of one another, brought to support it . . . ." Unless these various individual elements are held in mind and correlated with other elements that make their appearance later in the reasoning sequence, the whole tenor and force of the argument will be lost. (Philosophy, 98.)

Cf. Pulpit Eloquence, 11.308-9 where Campbell discusses the particular applicability of time or chronological order to commendatory discourses.
"ideas" take care not to let the "vestiges" of previous ones be erased from the mind. To move the passions the orator will 1. by "communicating lively and glowing ideas" of some "object" excite a desire or aversion in the minds of his listeners, and 2. "satisfy their judgment that there is a connexion between the action to which he would persuade them, and the gratification of the desire or passion which he excites." 3. He will show the audience that the desired or feared condition is probable, plausible, of importance to them, close in time or place, has a direct relationship to them, will produce consequences that affect their interests, 4. make ideas of the imagination "resemble, in lustre and steadiness, those of sensation and remembrance," 5. introduce "rhetorical figures," especially "correction," "climax," and "vision," use

225. Philosophy, 98.
226. Philosophy, 100.
227. Ibid.
228. Philosophy, 103-12 passim.
229. Philosophy, 103.
230. Philosophy, 116. Campbell further remarks concerning figures: "Exclamation and apostrophe operate chiefly by sympathy, as they are the most ardent expressions of perturbation in the speaker." "Interrogation" gives rise to the same impression, but in an oblique manner. These figures imply that the orator has "the strongest confidence in the rectitude of his sentiments, and in the concurrence of every reasonable being. The auditory, by sympathy with this frame of spirit, find it impracticable to withhold an assent which is confidently depended on."

(Philosophy, 116-7.)
"implicit" rather than direct comparisons. To keep a passion alive and augment it, employ as "auxiliaries" to the main appeal materials that will excite such passions and dispositions as "a sense of justice, a sense of public utility, a sense of glory," 232 make evident "the sentiments of sages whose wisdom we venerate, the examples of heroes whose exploits we admire," 233 work by indirection, concentrating on the "circumstances" in the object itself rather than on showing "that these circumstances ought to accompany the passion . . . ." 234 In order to calm an

231. Philosophy, 116. As Edney correctly observes (98), Campbell "espoused reason over passion but at the same time recognized that emotional appeal gives aid to reason in promoting belief." Campbell is quite categorical in his assertion that reason alone will not move men's minds. (Philosophy, 100-1.) To make a hearer act it is necessary to show him that his action will gratify some affection or desire. (Philosophy, 99.) In fact, with rude and uncultivated persons pathos alone is sufficient. Once their passions are inflamed, "bold affirmations" may take the place of sound arguments. (Philosophy, 100.) With educated listeners, however, it is necessary to prove that the action proposed will gratify the passions raised. (Ibid.) They are not disposed to act unless assured that their actions will prove fruitful. In both cases, however, the fundamental impulse is emotional. It is desire that motivates action; it is passion that moves the will.

232. Philosophy, 114.

233. Ibid.

234. Philosophy, 114-5. Italics mine. In further explanation of this principle Campbell writes: "In the enthymeme . . . employed in such cases, the sentiment that such a quality or circumstance ought to rouse such a passion, though the foundation of all, is generally assumed without proof, or even without mention. This forms the major proposition, which is suppressed as obvious. [The orator's] whole art is exerted in evincing the minor, which is the antecedent in his argument, and which maintains the reality of those attendant circumstances in the case in hand." (Philosophy, 115.)
unfavorable passion or disposition 1. "annihilate" the object by "proving the falsity of the narration, or the utter incredibility of the future event, on the supposed truth of which the passion was founded,"235 2. "diminish" the object by introducing circumstances contrary to those which augment passion toward it -- i.e. by showing it improbable, implausible, etc.,236 3. turn back serious argument with ridicule, or ridicule with serious argument,237 4. conjure up another passion which will overcome the one to be calmed.238

In addition to following the general principles which have just been outlined the orator must adapt both his style and his arguments to the "special character" of the audience he is addressing. Likewise, his emotional appeals need to be directed "through the channel of [their] favourite passion."239 This channel is determined by such factors as occupation, habit of life, and political persuasion.240 Generalizations are dangerous and a detailed

235. Philosophy, 115.
236. Philosophy, 115-6.
237. Ibid.
238. Philosophy, 116.
239. Philosophy, 118.
240. Ibid.
analysis of the characteristics of different classes of men unnecessary. Yet certain basic rules may be formulated and will prove of use. "Republicans," for example, are most responsive to appeals to liberty and independence; advocates of monarchy are moved by appeals to pomp and splendor. The dominant motive in a mercantile state is interest; in a military state, glory. Men of genius desire fame; men of industry, wealth; men of fortune, pleasure.\textsuperscript{241} Unless the speaker keeps these facts constantly in mind he may dissipate his energies in arguments that run counter to the basic wishes and desires of his audience.

5. The Speaker: Ethos. Under the head of ethical appeal Campbell gives the following specific advice:

1. the speaker must appear himself convinced of that which he advances.\textsuperscript{242} 2. "Gross hearers" are more easily influenced by ethical appeals, real or apparent, than are cultivated men. This is because they respond directly to the man who speaks and only indirectly to what is said.\textsuperscript{243}

3. When the opinion of the audience is unfavorable toward

\textsuperscript{241} Philosophy, 118.

\textsuperscript{242} Philosophy, 119.

\textsuperscript{243} Philosophy, 120.
the speaker he must exercise extreme caution. Modesty, concessions, deference to the hearer's judgment -- these are devices by which he may "mollify" them and gradually "insinuate" himself in their favor. 244 4. When, on the other hand, people are favorably disposed and willing to follow the speaker he "may run as fast as [he] can, especially when the case requires impetuosity and dispatch. 245

6. The Occasion. Having concluded his presentation of the working principles of rhetoric Campbell next undertakes to show how these principles are to be applied in the management of an actual discourse. 246 Although his discussion professes to take the form of a comparative examination of the chief differences among judicial, deliberative, and demonstrative speaking, it is in reality little more than an account of some of the difficulties

244. Philosophy, 120.

245. Ibid. These remarks on the adaptation of the orator's speech and manner to the attitude of the audience may properly be regarded as an extension of the classical treatment of ethical persuasion. Ancient theorists spoke only in general terms when discussing ethos as a factor in the speaker-audience relationship. Their concern was more with analyzing the phenomenon and discovering its cause than with formulating rules by which the impression of good character might be created. For comments on the originality of Campbell's treatment see Edney, 212 and Sattler, 338.

246. See Philosophy, Book 1, Chapter 10.
involved in preaching. These are ranged under five heads: the speaker, the audience, the subject, the occasion, and the "effect intended." I shall summarize them briefly.

How important it is for the orator to be thought "a wise and a good man" varies, says Campbell, according to "the nature of his profession as a public speaker, and the character of those to whom his discourses are addressed."247 On both counts the preacher labors under greater disadvantages than any other public speaker. His character is subjected to closer scrutiny;248 he addresses extremely heterogeneous audiences;249 he does not have the excitement of a great or unusual occasion to lend drama to his efforts, or opponents to spur his exertions;250 he attempts the most difficult task in all the catalogue of persuasion -- "the reformation of mankind."251 Only with respect to the subject-matter of his discourses does the preacher fare better than the legislative or judicial orator. He deals with the loftiest and most affecting of topics -- the attributes and laws of God, the dignity of

248. Ibid.
man, the rewards of righteousness, the punishment of sin. These provide "scope for the exertion of all the highest powers of rhetoric." 252 On the other hand, the lawyer and the legislator speak chiefly of persons; the preacher chiefly of "things." Therefore, his materials have a certain abstractness and remoteness which make attention and understanding difficult. 253

In all probability, this is the weakest part of the entire Philosophy. Some of the same meagerness of conception and pedantry of performance that characterize his lectures on pulpit eloquence here find their way into what is otherwise a uniformly provocative and singularly unpedantic treatise. Moreover, it is difficult to understand why Campbell failed to make more explicit the relation between these observations and the principles derived from his examination of mind. What he says is not only commonplace but it is largely a priori. One cannot escape gaining the impression that Campbell has here forgotten his prime purpose of validating the laws of discourse by referring them to the principles of mental behavior, and that he is addressing himself chiefly to a defence of the widely criticized preaching of his day. His observations must, therefore, be regarded more as an excursion into a new field than as the completion of his general plan.

252. Philosophy, 127.

253. Philosophy, 128.
Summary

Campbell's inventional system is as much an attitude and a point of view as it is a concrete body of rules and principles. As such, it lies partly in his descriptions of how mind works, partly in the principles which he infers from these descriptions, and partly in the very method of his treatise. Therefore, following to a certain degree Campbell's own plan of exposition, I have 1. examined his analysis of the laws governing the human understanding, and 2. sketched the rhetorical principles which he believes may be inferred from these laws. This discussion may be summarized as follows:

1. Analysis of the Human Understanding.

   a. Mind is composed of certain "powers" or "faculties." These are four in number -- the understanding, the imagination, the passions, and the will. The faculties are not separate and independent agents, but are so interrelated as to form a hierarchy. Each is founded on the one which precedes it and is preparatory to the one which follows it. Together they account for all of man's mental activities.

   b. That which mind knows it knows in one of two ways -- by "intuition" or by "deduction." Deductive evidence -- the type with which rhetoric is principally concerned -- is
derived either "from the invariable properties or relations of general ideas; or from actual, though perhaps variable connexions, subsisting among things." The first of these sources gives rise to "demonstration"; the second results in a type of evidence which Campbell calls "moral." Moral evidence has its sources in "sense" and "memory." Through the principles of association the original "facts" of perception are organized into a more or less systematic body of experiential knowledge. The species of moral evidence are 1. the evidence of experience "peculiarly" so-called, 2. analogy, and 3. testimony. The first two depend upon the evidence of our own observation; the last, which is derived indirectly through the observations of others, is based upon an "original principle" in human nature.

Mind also arrives at a knowledge of things contingent through the calculation of chances. In this process both experience and testimony are disregarded. Judgments are reached by balancing the probabilities for and against a proposition without either putting the matter to actual trial or deferring to the opinions of others.
c. Syllogism is useful neither as an instrument of investigation nor as an instrument of proof. Its sole function is to guide in "the adjustment of our language in expressing ourselves on subjects previously known . . . ."

d. Passing from the area of **logos** to that of **pathos** Campbell inquires what "principles in our nature" aid reason in promoting belief. First he discusses "men in general," delineating those fundamental properties of understanding, fancy, and passion which are common to all mankind. Understanding depends upon the avoidance of various factors making for unintelligibility. Both attention and belief are influenced by the "brilliancy" which imagination bestows on "ideas." Passion "animates" our thoughts and is the source of action. The virtues, like the passions are "active principles." They "occupy the middle place between the pathetic and that which is addressed to the imagination, and [partake] of both, adding to the warmth of the former the grace and attractions of the latter."

Probability, plausibility, importance, proximity in time, connection of place, relation to persons concerned, and interest in the
consequences are "circumstances" that enhance the strength of a passion. A passion is calmed by the annihilation or diminution of the "object" which raised it, or by the exhibition of another passion which counterworks it.

e. As an adjunct to his discussion of the passions Campbell inquires why it is that pathetic appeals exercise such strong persuasive power over the human mind. His hypothesis is that all such appeals are aimed directly or indirectly at the emotion of pity and derive their potency, at least in part, from the fascination inherent in pitiable "objects." This fascination is explained by the fact that pity is a "complex" emotion composed of both pleasant and unpleasant elements. The pleasant, however, predominate and thus give a tinge of enjoyment to the whole. As a result, we experience pleasure when we encounter in literature, the theatre, or in any of the arts "objects or representations that excite pity or other painful feelings."

f. Ethos Campbell equates with the English word "disposition." A speaker's ethical appeal lies in those habitual attitudes and actions which cause other persons to decide what sort
of man he is. "Sympathy [i.e. "trust"] is the main engine" by which the ethos of a speaker is judged. The chief factors which impair the bond of sympathy between speaker and listener are "a low opinion of [the speaker's] intellectual abilities" and "a bad opinion of his morals." Of these the second exerts the stronger influence because it is an original principle of human reason that "qualities of the heart" move us more deeply than do those of the head.


a. Campbell's classification of the ends of oratory springs directly and avowedly from his analysis of the faculties. Because mind is composed of four distinct "powers" -- understanding, imagination, passion, and will -- and because a discourse may be addressed to any one of these, the ends of speaking are four in number: "to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the passions, or to influence the will." Address to the understanding has as its dominant quality either "perspicuity" or "argument"; to the imagination, "imitation"; to the passions, "emotion"; to the will, "vehemence."
b. Eloquence may be divided into two parts -- the "sense" and the "expression." By the first of these it "holds of" logic; by the second, of grammar. "Pure logic" is concerned only with the "subject" known, and it examines the "subject" solely for the purpose of gaining information concerning it. Rhetoric, on the other hand, is broader. It studies how the "subject" may be handled so as to instruct, persuade, etc. Thus viewed, rhetoric is logic applied in attempts to influence.

c. Rhetorical appeals find their proper province in that species of deductive reasoning which is called "moral." The types of reasoning employed by the orator in establishing his contentions are experience, analogy, and testimony. The methods proper to moral reasoning are predominately analytical. Attention must be directed from the individual facts of experience to the general conclusions and principles which those facts imply.

d. The passions are moved by "communicating lively and glowing ideas" of those objects toward which they are directed. To affect the will two things are necessary: 1. the
speaker must excite some desire or aversion in the minds of his hearers, and 2. he must "satisfy their judgment that there is a connection between the action to which he would persuade them, and the gratification of the desire or passion which he excites."

e. In order to secure strong ethical appeal the orator needs to appear himself convinced of that which he advances. In addition, it is necessary that his appeals be adapted to the prevailing tastes and opinions of his audience.

f. In an effort to show how the various principles of rhetoric are to be applied in the management of an actual discourse Campbell examines the more important differences among demonstrative, deliberative, and judicial speaking. He conducts his analysis in terms of five factors: the speaker, the audience, the subject, the occasion and the "effect intended."

His general conclusion is that in nearly all respects preaching is the most difficult kind of public address.
Chapter V

THE INVENTIONAL SYSTEM OF JOSEPH PRIESTLEY

A. Introduction

Although not without certain marks of originality, Joseph Priestley's Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism is in very large measure derived from two sources: David Hartley's Observations on Man and Lord Kames' Elements of Criticism. In addition, Priestley drew, though to a much lesser extent, on John Ward's System of Oratory and, it would appear, on some of the rhetorical doctrines of Francis Bacon.

Previous students of the Course have been well aware of the extent of Priestley's debt to Hartley. They have, however, quite generally failed to recognize that many of

1. As set forth in A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism. (London, 1777). Hereafter cited as Course. References are to lecture and page.


4. See Harding, 282-3, etc.
his lectures are little more than interpretative summaries of Kames' theories. Yet this fact is immediately apparent, and may be accounted for if we will consider the circumstances under which the work was written.

Priestley composed the Course as part of his varied but short-lived activities as tutor in classical languages and belles lettres at the nonconformist academy of Warrington. Not only had his formal training in rhetorical theory been meager, but he was considerably handicapped by the fact that heavy and varied instructional duties made impossible sustained attention to any single field of study. One definite advantage he did, however, possess. This was a long and intimate acquaintance with the associational principles developed by that great eighteenth-

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5. See in this connection especially Randall, 82-4.


7. In addition to his regular courses, Priestley taught at one time or another French, Italian, the theory of language and universal grammar, history, political science, elocution, logic, and one year he even went so far as to lecture on anatomy. See Thomas Huxley, "Joseph Priestley." An Address Delivered at the Presentation of a Statue of Priestley to the Town of Birmingham. Science and Education. (New York, 1896), 4 ff. Hereafter cited as Huxley. Cf. Thorpe, 59-60.
century physician-philosopher David Hartley. From this author's doctrines Priestley drew one of the fundamental elements necessary to the construction of any rhetorical system -- a comprehensive and coherent view of human nature upon which might be predicated specific laws and principles of persuasion.

But because of his limitations of background and of time, Priestley also needed a model which would guide him in the intricate task of translating psychological principles into rhetorical laws. Fortunately, he was able to find in the newly published Elements of Lord Kames a model which filled his requirements almost perfectly. For not only had Kames undertaken to show step by step how rhetorical and critical dicta might be derived from an examination of man's intellectual and emotional natures, but he had accepted as a valid explanation of mental activity the principle of the association of ideas.

8. The esteem in which Priestley held Hartley's work is indicated by the fact that he ranked it next to the Bible. (R. J. Hartog, "Joseph Priestley," D.N.B., 46.358.) Priestley was more than a mere commentator on Hartley. He further developed this philosopher's thought, giving it a more directly materialistic slant, and even going so far as to assert that mind and body are but different manifestations of the same substance. See John Greer Hibben, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment. (New York, 1910), 115-7. Cf. W. Windelband, A History of Philosophy. Translated by James H. Tufts. (Second edition). (New York, 1905), 455. These works are hereafter cited as Hibben and Windelband respectively.

9. See Elements of Criticism, Introduction, 6; also Chapter I in its entirety.
Kames apparently did not know Hartley, and had derived his associationism directly from the theories of Locke and of Hume, made little difference. The model was close enough to be eminently useful, and Priestley took full advantage of it.

A comparison of the Course with Hartley's Observations and Kames' Elements will convince one that Priestley must have written with these works nearly always open on the desk beside him. Ward he used, we are told, as a source of "examples," but he also found in the System a pattern for his discussion of "middle terms." The full extent of Priestley's debt to Bacon is not easily determined. Although direct references are lacking, he almost certainly had some knowledge of the Elizabethan's rhetorical system. It is hardly coincidence that both writers conceived of inventio as systematized activity for recollecting materials already held in the mind and that both designated dispositio by the name of "method." In addition, there are in the Course, as Wallace has remarked, certain turns of phrase which would arrest anyone who is familiar with the Advancement. Beyond this point, however, the student may not readily proceed. Al-

11. Course, Preface, iii.
12. See Advancement, 127 and 140.
though an exhaustive study might reveal additional parallels, they lie well hidden beneath the surface of the text.

Because Priestley did draw so heavily upon other writers, we should constantly remind ourselves that it was not his aim to be original. The purpose of academic lectures is, he tells us, "to bring into an easy and comprehensive view whatever has been observed by others."\(^{14}\) Therefore, he sought to present to his students materials which would be commended for their usefulness rather than for their novelty. At the same time, however, Priestley's active and facile mind could hardly fail to ornament any subject upon which it touched. As he himself quite correctly points out, "The plan [of the Course] is rather more comprehensive than any thing I have seen upon the subject, the arrangement of the materials, as a system, is new, and the theory, in several respects, more so."\(^{15}\) While, therefore, his lectures lack the originality of Campbell's Philosophy, they certainly stand a considerable distance above the pedantry of John Ward's System of Oratory.

The fact that the Course consists of academic lectures accounts to a large degree for the character of its con-

\(^{14}\) Course, Preface, ii.

\(^{15}\) Course, Preface, i.
tents. Unlike most of his colleagues in the academies and universities, Priestley followed the custom of speaking extemporaneously from "a pretty full text . . . digested with care." Therefore, even in their original form the lectures were mere outline summaries of the material which he presented to his classes. But in preparing the work for the press Priestley made, he tells us, considerable excisions, particularly in "the first part," aiming to retain only as much as seemed "necessary to preserve the appearance of a uniform system in the whole, and those parts which were the most original." Thus what we have in the printed version is at best merely a selection from among the notes Priestley referred to when speaking.

Moreover, it should be remembered that the Course was published partly with a view to illustrating the doctrine of the association of ideas. Therefore, Priestley may well have edited and revised the original manuscript lectures still further in an effort to emphasize and to clarify Hartlean principles.

16. Course, Preface, v. For additional information on Priestley's teaching methods see McLachlan, Appendix 1, 298. Also 210-22 passim. Huxley, 4-5, and Harding, 130, likewise give useful data.


18. Course, Preface, i.
Because a knowledge of these principles is essential to an understanding of Priestley's invention system we shall at this point pause to summarize them briefly.

1. **Hartley's Associational Psychology.** Stated in general terms, David Hartley's ponderous and obscure *Observations on Man* is an "attempt to explain all complex psychical phenomena by the association of simple sensations and ideas..." Unlike Locke, who had admitted into his system ideas derived from reflection upon the original items of sensory experience, Hartley begins by asserting that all ideas without exception, no matter how complex they may be, are derived from sensation. The reason Locke failed to realize this fact is that in a complex idea the constituent simple ideas are so closely associated that they lose their identity. Moreover, a complex idea is greater than the sum of its parts; it has "unique qualities not found in simple ideas taken separately."

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20. Stephen, 2.66-7. Locke's "idea of reflection" are, Hartley maintained, "simply the residuum which he was incapable of sufficiently analyzing." Ibid.


22. Hibben, 113-4. See also Wright, 225 and Höfding, 1.447-8.
Yet, upon close inspection, we shall see that there is no complex idea which does not yield to analysis and reveal itself as a bundle of simple sensations or ideas organized according to the "universal solvent" of the principle of association. All the various phases of mental activity -- memory, imagination, volition, reasoning, emotion, etc. -- also yield to the same analysis. Simple ideas have their origins in sensations; all the other phenomena of mind are to be accounted for by the organization of simple ideas according to the laws of the association of ideas.

But how may the principle of association itself be accounted for? Does it have a physiological basis? As a physician Hartley was keenly interested in this problem. Moreover, he believed that if he could discover such a basis, it would round out his system. The principle which explains all complex mental behavior would itself be explained.

Here, strangely enough, Locke came to Hartley's rescue. By the chance remark that all matter may be endowed


with sensibility he had unwittingly set off a materialistic interpretation of mind which was to grow throughout the eighteenth century. Suppose, reasoned Hartley, that matter is sensible. This would coincide with what Newton had to say in his *Optics* concerning "vibrations." It may be that both sensation and association are to be explained by vibrations in the brain, simple sensations and ideas resulting from simple vibrations, and complex ideas arising from the coalescence of such vibrations. Hartley did not go so far as to identify thought with these vibrations; he did, however, believe that thought processes are dependent on them.

Stopping, therefore, just short of a complete materialism, Hartley elaborated his doctrine by undertaking to show how association which was itself accounted for by vibrations would, in turn, account for all mental activity. He also attempted to point out how this basic principle furnished a foundation for the various arts and sciences. That is, he tested his hypothesis empirically by asking if there were any type of thought activity which it might

26. Hibben, 111-2; Wright, 225.

27. Huxley, 32.


29. Wright, 225; Windelband, 455.
be unable to explain. As we may imagine, he found none.

2. Evaluation. Drawing, therefore, upon the writings of Hartley, Kames, Ward, and Bacon, Priestley developed an inventional system which is of interest not only for its sheer curiosity value but also because it attempts to employ associational principles to explain the origin and nature of certain traditional rhetorical concepts.

Like Campbell, Priestley believed that the proper starting point for the science of rhetoric lay in a study of man himself. What are the laws governing the human understanding? How do we think? What causes us to believe and to be moved? From the answers to these questions will emerge by a simple process of inference the rules which must govern all purposeful composition. But Priestley had neither the talent nor the leisure to deduce from this premise, as did Campbell, a fresh and original system of rhetoric. Instead, what he presents is in essence a sketchy restatement of the traditional classical framework, ornamented at various points with novel doctrines of widely varying worth.

Two of these doctrines are so striking in nature that they immediately capture our attention. The first is Priestley's Baconian analysis of inventio: his assertion that invention activity is a sort of "artificial recollection" which has for its sole purpose enabling the orator to "recall" more readily than might otherwise be possible
certain materials already held in the recesses of his memory. The second is his treatment of ethos and pathos not as generic modes of persuasion, but merely as devices of "style" or "manner" which may be employed at the speaker's discretion in order to "attract" and "engage" the attention of his auditors.

Needless to say, neither of these doctrines exerted a permanent influence on the general course of rhetorical theory. Nor are the reasons difficult to explain. The first denies to rhetoric one of its essential functions -- that of devising a methodology whereby the speaker may investigate the raw materials which will constitute the subject-matter of his address. The second contradicts the true nature of the persuasive act; for as men long have realized -- and as experimental data now show -- hearers are actually "influenced" by ethical and emotional appeals, not merely "attracted" by them. Therefore, guided by sound rhetorical judgment, and influenced, one may add, by a constantly growing Aristotelianism, the writers following Priestley tended to disregard these doctrines.

Also disregarded was another aspect of Priestley's inventio which, despite its restrictive theoretical foundation, is far more worthy of study than either of the somewhat eccentric analyses discussed in the preceding paragraphs. This is his effort to show that topics are
not merely man-made devices useful in supplying the defects of a natural invention, but that they are, on the contrary, integral and inevitable parts of the inventional process. Adopting Hartley’s assertion that every proposition expresses the coincidence or non-coincidence of two terms, Priestley says that when this relationship is not immediately apparent it must be explored through the agency of a third or "middle term." These are to be found either by examining the terms individually or by studying the relation in which they stand one to the other. The various methods for studying individual terms and for ascertaining relationships may be reduced to a small number of standard types. These "points of attack" are the same for every proposition which we wish to explore. Therefore, they may be called commonplaces and are the topics of which rhetoricians speak.

Although this analysis may be implicit in the topical system, no rhetorician before or since Priestley has taken the trouble to make it explicit. Priestley’s efforts in this respect constitute a first-rate piece of constructive thinking. It is to be regretted that the more spectacular nature of some of his other doctrines has tended to obscure this fact.

B. The Nature and Province of Rhetoric

Near the beginning of his first lecture Priestley declares that the function of art is "to improve upon
nature, by adding to her powers and advantages . . . ."30

He then proceeds to define oratory as "the natural faculty of speech improved by art,"31 and to assign as its ends "the informing of the judgment, and influencing the practice . . . ."32

If, then, these are the purposes and ends of oratorical endeavor, what is the nature of that art or science which underlies and guides it? Following in a well-marked path, Priestley answers the question by delineating the area or province which rhetoric properly occupies. He examines its relations 1. with the subject-matter areas of an address, and 2. with other neighboring disciplines.

With reference to both these relationships Priestley's opinions are quite categorical. "The art of oratory can," he declares, "only consist of rules for the proper use of those materials which must be acquired from various study and observation, of which, therefore, unless a person be possessed, no art of oratory can make him an orator."33


31. Ibid. His complete statement is, "Thus ORATORY is the natural faculty of speech improved by art; whereby the use of it is perfected, facilitated, and extended; and consequently its value and influence greatly increased."

32. Course, 10.68.

33. Course, 1.2-3.
In other words, the investigation of subject-matter and the collection and evaluation of arguments are activities lying, he believes, outside the realm of rhetoric, and are preliminary to it in the sense that they need to be completed before the art of oratory will be of any service. Rhetoric has as its sole task determining the most effective use which may be made of those data furnished to it by extra-rhetorical means.

But not only must the speaker bring to rhetoric a thoroughly digested corpus of potential speech materials; he must also have acquired by previous study an adequate working knowledge of the sister sciences of grammar, logic, and psychology. That is, he must have learned from sources outside of rhetoric how to speak correctly, reason cogently, and arouse each of the various passions. Priestley takes special pains to decry the fact that dissertations on the passions have so frequently been included in works on rhetoric. There is, he somewhat illogically argues, no more reason to consider such analyses

34. Course, 1.3. The presumption is that Priestley excluded investigation from the province of rhetoric because, like Hartley, he conceived of logic as "the art of using words, considered as symbols, for making discoveries in all the branches of knowledge." See Priestley on Hartley, 187. The Baconian flavor of this definition has been remarked by Bower, 135. See Advancement, 123.

35. Course, 1.3-4.
a part of the science of effective discourse than "to
croud [sic] into it the elements of any other science,
or branch of knowledge, that the orator may have occasion
for."36

Having thus severely restricted the scope and content
of rhetoric, Priestley undertakes to state the precise
nature of the "assistance" which, in his opinion, it does
render to an orator. This assistance may, he believes,
be classified under the four major heads of Recollection,
Method, Style, and Elocution. Recollection, as its name
indicates, helps the speaker find those "arguments and
illustrations with which his mind is already furnished";
thus it is an aid to the invention of speech materials. 37
Method shows what arrangement will give these materials
"the greatest force, and contribute the most to produce
the effect intended ... 38 Style teaches the proper
"manner of expression,"39 and elocution instructs in the
use of voice and body. 40 Each of these functions is a

36. Course, 1.4.
37. Course, 1.5.

38. Ibid. Bacon, it will be recalled, also gives to
arrangement the name of "method." (See Advancement,
140 ff.) In connection with Priestley's use of this term
see also Ward, System, 1.2.21 and De Inventione, 1.5.

39. Ibid.
40. Course, Preface, iv.
legitimate part of rhetorical science; together they constitute its subject-matter and mark its limits.

C. The General Plan of the Course

An appropriate starting point for a description of the general plan exhibited by Priestley's rhetorical system is his tradition-breaking assertion that all of the various kinds of composition may be reduced to two fundamental genres -- narration and argumentation. Whenever we speak or write, he says, "we propose, simply to relate facts, with a view to communicate information, as in History, natural or civil, Travels, &c. or we lay down some proposition, and endeavour to prove or explain it." These, therefore, must be considered the ultimate types, the final categories, of which all more detailed classifications merely specify the species.

Now, continues Priestley, whether his purpose be narrative or argumentative, the orator, if he is to succeed, must always solve a two-fold problem. First, he must somehow secure and arrange the substantive elements of his address. Second, he must so "attract and engage the attention" of his auditors that they will listen to these materials.42 Put into somewhat different terms,

41. Course, 2.6.

42. Course, 11.71. Both here and elsewhere Priestley appears to use the term "attention" in the same sense as does Kames to mean "that state of mind which prepares one to receive impressions." See Elements of Criticism, Appendix, 483.
winning a response through oratory not only depends on having the proper things to say; it also depends on getting these things listened to by an audience. The second consideration is as important as the first. A successful speech cannot be delivered in a vacuum.43

The two fundamental rhetorical tasks here indicated suggest a major division of the art of oratory. It must be concerned in part with matter, and in part with manner. It must study the proper way to develop the content of an address, and, at the same time, it must also comprehend those elusive relationships which exist between the speech and the hearer, and the speech and the speaker. Of the various "parts," or departments, of rhetoric, recollection and method have to do, Priestley tells us, primarily with the speech itself. Together they provide the so-called "bare materials" which, when properly derived, are capable of impressing anyone who will voluntarily pay attention to them.44 The second major task -- that of winning and commanding the attention -- is the work of expression. Auditors are attracted to a discourse by "the grace and harmony of style, the turn of thought, or the striking and pleasing manner in which sentiments are

43. Course, 11.71.
44. Ibid.
introduced and expressed. These are the factors that cause men to listen to the proofs devised by the techniques of recollection and of method.

Following the major division between matter and manner, Priestley divides the Course into two distinct units. Parts 1 and 2, dealing with recollection and method, carry the running head "Of Oratory"; Part 3, devoted to style, the running head "Of Criticism." This change in caption should, however, not be taken to mean that when the orator has derived and arranged suitable materials his task is completed. It merely means that when he undertakes to determine how best to express those materials which the first two departments of rhetoric have provided he enters upon an area which is the province of the critic as well as of the public speaker.

D. Pathos and Ethos as Factors of Attention

In line with the philosophy expressed by this dichotomy.

45. Course, 11.71-2. Although Priestley is not specific on the point, the very structure of his system makes it evident that he regards the processes of recollection and method as falling entirely and exclusively within the province of rhetoric. These activities it shares with no other discipline. The same may not, however, be said of style. This department rhetoric shares with the science of criticism. More specifically, the laws governing expression serve a double purpose: they guide the orator in composition and they also provide the critic with rules and standards for judgment. Thus, in style rhetoric and criticism find a common ground.

46. Lectures 1-10.

47. Lectures 11-35.
between substance and expression, Priestley comprehends under the term "style" all those various materials, principles, and techniques by means of which the speaker may attract and hold the attention of his auditors. Thus, in a radical departure from the traditional analysis, he includes in this department whatever may give "life and beauty to the sentiment," as well as whatever gives "harmony to the diction."48 Phenomena of the first class produce, he says, "pleasures which may be said to be perceived by the mind"; those of the second class affect the ear only.49

Our present purpose does not require that we examine Priestley's discussion of those devices which give "harmony to the diction." It is, however, essential that we review his treatment of the qualities that enliven "the sentiment" -- "ornaments of thought," as he calls them.50 These qualities fall into three different classes:

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48. Course, 11.71. By "sentiment" Priestley means the thought- or idea-content of a discourse, as distinct from the expression. See especially Course, 11.72. Cf. with Priestley's discussion of the "harmony" of diction (Lectures 34-5) Hartley's twenty-ninth proposition, "To explain in what manner, and to what degree, agreeable and disagreeable sounds contribute in the way of association, to the formation of our intellectual pleasures and pains." (Priestley on Hartley, 81-2.)

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.
remarkable and general affections of the stronger passions; in the second, "those forms of address which are adapted to engage assent" because they reveal a certain character or personality in the speaker; in the third, "those finer feelings which constitute the pleasures of the imagination."

Now this classification is obviously censurable on the ground that it comprehends two entirely distinct phenomena. It confuses the facets or faculties in human nature toward which rhetorical appeals are directed with the forms or characters which certain of these appeals assume. Despite this fact, Priestley's intention is clear. He is asserting that those "ornaments of thought" by which a speaker engages the attention and interest of his auditors are derivable from three sources: appeals to the passions, appeals to the imagination, and the speaker's

51. Course, 12.78. See Lectures 12-4. Note that in the Elements of Criticism (Appendix, 483) Kames says: "The term sentiment is appropriated to such thoughts as are prompted by passion." See also his note on 2.4.74 where he says that music which raises emotions "may justly be termed sentimental." The whole of Kames' sixteenth chapter, "Sentiments," is pertinent to the point under discussion.

52. Ibid. See Lectures 15-6.

53. The "pleasures of the imagination" are listed by Hartley as follows: "First, the pleasures arising from the beauty of the natural world. Secondly, those from the works of art. Thirdly, from the liberal arts of music, painting, and poetry. Fourthly, from the sciences. Fifthly, from the beauty of the person. Sixthly, from wit and humor. Seventhly, the pains which arise from gross absurdity, inconsistency, or deformity." (See Priestley on Hartley, 252 and ff.)
own character as it is revealed through appropriate "forms of address."

Needless to say, in this analysis pathos and ethos are not assigned their customary roles as generic modes of persuasion. Instead, they take on the character of those elements which in present-day rhetorical theory we usually call "factors of attention." That is, their prime function is to get ideas listened to, not to get them accepted. Both because here in his treatment of style Priestley assigns ethos and pathos definite functions as attention factors, and because nowhere else in his treatise does he assign them any other functions, one can only assume that in his opinion pathetic and ethical appeals do not stand coeval with logical arguments as fundamental types of persuasive effort. On the contrary, they are, it would appear, purely adventitious or accidental elements which are arbitrarily injected into a

54. We shall not be overstating Priestley's position if we say that in his view to have one's passions engaged and to feel oneself interested are identical experiences or states. (See Course, 12.79). For a characteristic treatment of the "Factors of attention" in present-day rhetorical theory, see Alan H. Monroe, Principles and Types of Speech. (Revised edition). (New York, 1939), 175-80.

55. Priestley probably would say that to this extent ethical and pathetic appeals are persuasive; they associate pleasant or painful feelings with the complex idea which is the proposition to be proved.
discourse for the purpose of rendering it more attractive. As a result, ethos and pathos become for Priestley, strange as it may seem, stylistic elements, and under the head of style he presents lengthy discussions of pathetic and ethical appeals.

56. The factors which led Priestley thus to alter the traditional analysis of pathos and ethos cannot be conclusively determined. The following hypothesis is, however, not altogether improbable: His view is a natural consequence of the methodological assumption that inquiries concerning the principles of human nature are to be excluded from the science of rhetoric. (See Section B above.) By this exclusion Priestley, consciously or unconsciously, swept away the very substance of the classical pathos and made almost equally serious inroads upon the ethos. In ancient times these modes of influencing had been studied by rhetoricians primarily with a view to making evident those "means of persuasion" which reside in man's emotional nature. Under this view they were, of course, essentially invention phenomena. When, however, this field of inquiry is denied to rhetoric and assigned to other disciplines, pathos and ethos immediately lose their classical character. Given Priestley's basic doctrine that rhetoric "can only consist of rules for the proper use of those materials" furnished to it by extra-rhetorical sources, it is perhaps inevitable that pathos and ethos should be viewed as characteristic forms or types of discourse which, like the figures of speech and thought, may be employed at one's discretion in order to enhance the "bare materials" of his address.

While speaking to this point it should also be observed that in developing his doctrine of pathos Priestley, although a close student of Kames' discussion of the pathetic, apparently overlooked that writer's treatment of the "Influence of Passion With Respect to Our Perceptions, Opinions, and Beliefs." (See Elements of Criticism, 2:5.) Had he taken this material into account his analysis would have assumed a far different character.

57. In each of these discussions Priestley appears to have a double purpose: he seeks not only to teach the speaker or writer how to compose the mode more effectively, but also to provide the critic with a set of standards useful in judging the creative efforts of others. Thus in the area of style where rhetoric and criticism have a common ground he develops a single body of specific principles which are useful to both disciplines.
Following closely the lead of Kames, Priestley asserts that the "stronger passions" are to be engaged by presenting vivid word pictures of those actual objects or circumstances which naturally arouse them. In painting these pictures we must strive to create through language an "ideal presence" -- to make the audience feel that it is participating at first hand in the events being described. This sense of identification may be enhanced if we will employ in our composition the present rather

58. Course, 12.79. This principle is apparently based on Hartley's doctrine that the passions leave sensible traces of pleasures and pains. (See Priestley on Hartley, 202.) Therefore, they may be aroused by materials vivid enough to agitate these traces, thus calling up by association the original emotion.

59. Course, 12.81. The term "ideal presence" is borrowed from Kames. (See Elements of Criticism, 2.7.52-5.) In connection with Priestley's distinction between the "bare materials" of an address and those elements of "style" which engage the attention it is interesting to note this observation by Kames regarding "ideal presence": "Matters of fact, it is true, and truth in general, may be inculcated without taking advantage of ideal presence; but without it, the finest speaker or writer would in vain attempt to move any passion: our sympathy would be confined to objects that are really present . . . . Nor is the influence of language, by means of ideal presence, confined to the heart; it reaches also the understanding, and contributes to belief. For when events are related in a lively manner, and every circumstance appears to be passing before us, we suffer not patiently the truth of the facts to be questioned." (Elements of Criticism, 2.7.56.)
than the past tense and if we will use an abundance of sensible images. 60

Priestley's analysis of ethos leaves no doubt that he regards ethical appeals as adventitious phenomena which may be arbitrarily introduced into a discourse through the skilful use of certain devices of style. "Independent of the power of arguments, there are," he asserts, "several forms of address adapted to engage belief. . . ." 61 Each of these, however, is "nothing more than a different manner in which arguments may be introduced and expressed." 62 Therefore, it is completely within the power of the speaker either to employ or to reject them. 63

The "forms" or manners specifically mentioned by Priestley are these: 1. appearing to be yourself strongly

60. *Course*, 12.81-8 passim. Cf. *Elements of Criticism*, 2.7.55 and 4.122. The close similarity between the advice offered by Kames and that presented by Priestley relative to the arousing of the emotions has been remarked by Randall, 83. In addition to the doctrines here discussed, Priestley's analysis of pathos is interesting to students of rhetorical theory because it presents detailed explanations of how, according to the principles of the associational psychology, passions tend to produce belief (13.89); also how they are transferred from one object to another (13.92-7), and interact among themselves (14.98). On transference of emotions cf. *Elements of Criticism*, 2.4.67-82 passim and 2.5.41-3, 46.


62. *Ibid*.

63. *Ibid*.
convinced of the proposition you offer; 2. making evident a mastery of your subject-matter; 3. displaying what appears to be a super-abundance of proof; and 4. assuming a candid and unprejudiced attitude. All four of these are implemented, we note, through the use of techniques which are essentially stylistic. Thus, an impression of strong conviction arises from a natural and seemingly extemporaneous manner; the skilful anticipation of objections makes a speaker appear the master of his cause; seeming to suppress arguments gives the impression that one has a super-abundance of proof; and modesty in address promotes the appearance of impartiality.

E. Artificial Recollection

In view of the fact that Priestley has excluded investigation from the province of rhetoric and has placed ethos and pathos under the head of style we may suspect even before examining his invention system that it will depart quite markedly from the standard classical analysis. The fact of the matter is that he calls systematized inventional activity "artificial recollection" and declares

65. Course, 15.111-5.
67. Course, 16.120-1.
68. Course, 16.121.
that it has for its purpose helping the orator "recall" certain matters with which his mind is "already furnished." Therefore, invention is admittedly of no aid in discovery -- "in finding," to use Priestley's own expression, "things with which the mind [is] wholly unacquainted." Its function is merely that of a system of mnemonics, directing the speaker "which way to turn his thoughts" in order that he may draw from his storehouse of previously acquired arguments and illustrations those items which will be useful in supporting the particular proposition at hand.

This strange inventional doctrine, drawn apparently from Bacon, is not, Priestley readily confesses, of much assistance in composing narrative discourses. Its chief value lies in furnishing materials for argumentative addresses. How "artificial recollection" operates to effect this end is explained in a series of four provocatively lectures. To these attention is now directed.

69. Course, 1.5. In connection with Priestley's discussion of recollection see Hartley's account of memory, Priestley on Hartley, 208-16.

70. Ibid.


72. Course, 2.6. The reason for this will become apparent in the paragraphs immediately following.

73. Lecture 2, "Of the Nature and Use of Topics," Lecture 3, "Of Universal Topics," Lecture 4, "Of Particular Topics; and Objections to the Use of Topics Answered," and Lecture 5, "Of Amplification."
1. Middle Terms and Topics. In his System of Oratory John Ward had asserted that "in every proposition one thing is spoken of another . . . ." Therefore, he said, if we wish to find out whether or not two ideas agree -- "And by agreeing [sic] I understand this, that the one may be affirmed of the other" if this be not immediately apparent, we must compare them through the agency of a third idea to which their respective relationships are known. By way of illustration he considers the question "Whether virtue is to be loved?" and shows how by comparing the terms "virtue" and "love" with "happiness" their agreement may be established.

There can be little doubt that this discussion is the source of that part of Priestley's inventional doctrine which we are now to consider. There can also be little doubt, however, that Priestley, because of his familiarity with the writings of Hartley, had a far more penetrating insight than did Ward into certain psychological principles by which this doctrine might be explained. Moreover, Priestley was able to execute a piece of creative thinking of which Ward probably would have been incapable, and to draw from the premises thus established an explanation.

74. System, l.4.47.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. System, l.4.47-8.
of the nature of rhetorical topics. This second matter will be considered below. For the present, let us examine Hartley’s views relative to the "complex ideas" of "proposition" and "assent."

These Hartley explains as follows: A proposition is a "very complex idea" made up of a group of simple ideas united by association.78 This cluster consists, however, "not merely [of] the sum of the ideas belonging to the terms of the proposition, but also includes the ideas, or internal feelings, whichever they be, which belong to equality, coincidence, truth, and in some cases, those of utility, importance, &c."

Put into somewhat simpler language, a proposition, according to Hartley, is a complex idea, having two principal constituents: 1. the simple idea of the equality or coincidence (or of the inequality or non-coincidence) of its terms, and 2. accompanying simple ideas of the truth, utility, importance, etc. of what is asserted.

As for assent: This, says Hartley, is only a complex internal feeling which adheres by association to "such clusters of words as are called propositions."80 It arises when we recognize that the terms of a proposition coincide, and this recognition is its chief constituent. Also present, however, may be simple ideas of the utility or

78. Priestley on Hartley, 162.
79. Ibid.
80. Priestley on Hartley, 158.
importance of assent, or of respect, disrespect, ridicule, hope, fear, etc.\textsuperscript{81}

Now Priestley, taking, it would appear, Ward as a model, and armed with the insight which Hartlean associationism had given him into the nature of "proposition" and of "assent," sets forth as the foundation of his own system of \textit{inventio} the assertion that every proposition expresses the agreement or disagreement of two "ideas."\textsuperscript{82} He then introduces the concept of the "middle term"\textsuperscript{83} and, in an effort to explain its function, presents the following example:

\begin{quote}
'\textbf{Every good man is a wise man.}' \textsuperscript{84} [To show that the subject and the predicate coincide] I introduce another idea, viz. the \textit{making use of the means of happiness}; and by considering that a good man is one who lives and acts in such a manner as will secure his \textit{greatest happiness}, which is also the object of the truest wisdom; I see that the description of a \textit{good man} entirely [sic] agrees with that of a \textit{wise man}, and that they are \textit{the same person}, which the proposition asserts.\textsuperscript{84}
\end{quote}

It is at this point in his exposition that Priestley passes beyond Ward and, in a penetrating analysis of the example just cited, develops a theory concerning the nature and origin of rhetorical topics. Because of the

\textsuperscript{81} Priestley on Hartley, 166-7.

\textsuperscript{82} Course, 2.7.

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid. The similarity of this example to the one given by Ward (System, 1.4.47-8) is too obvious to require comment. It must be one of the "examples" which Priestley mentions in his Preface. (Course, Preface, iii.)
unusual significance of the passage in question I quote verbatim:

In this case, the relation that means of happiness bears to goodness is that of effect; goodness being the source of those actions which tend to produce true happiness; as the relation that the idea of the means of happiness bears to wisdom is that of means, or instrument, which wisdom employs to effect her purpose. And it is not improbable but that if a person had considered the natural effects of virtue and goodness, and what course of actions a wise man would be led to adopt, he would have hit upon this idea, which furnishes so clear an argument in proof of the proposition in question. Or again, the same idea might have occurred to a person who had carefully considered the definition of the terms of his propositions; since he would have found that property of goodness connected with those ideas which form the characteristic of wisdom. So that either the relation of cause and effect, that of means and end, or the definition of terms might have led the mind of the composer to the idea he wanted. These are called Common Places, Topics, or General Heads, under which arguments of all kinds may be classed, and an attention to them may suggest the arguments that fall under them.85

Upon reflection it will become apparent that in a condensed and rather cryptic fashion Priestley has here developed a doctrine which may be more fully stated as follows: Working from the implied premise that the purpose of "artificial recollection" is to supply middle terms, he points out that these terms may be derived in one of two ways -- by considering carefully the meaning of each of the two terms in the proposition, or by studying the nature of the relationship which exists between them. (We recall

85. Course, 2.8.
that the relationship exhibited in the example was that of cause to effect.) Now, as a result of examining many propositions we are able to catalogue all the fruitful methods of studying individual terms and also the different relationships in which they habitually stand one to the other. This knowledge gives rise to what are called "topics" or "common places" -- in other words, points of attack for studying terms and their relationships. The name "common place" is derived from the fact that it stands for a location from which or in which a speaker, no matter what his subject, may find appropriate arguments. By visiting these standardized points he will be able to recall middle terms through which the two constituent terms of a proposition may be shown to agree or to disagree. He will be certain to recall them because they are inherent either in the terms under examination or in their relationship. Moreover, because of this very inherency the arguments recollected will be useful in showing the agreement or disagreement at which he aims.

The importance of this contribution to the lore of topics should not be underestimated. Whereas Ward, following in the path marked by the majority of rhetoricians, had thought of them as man-made expedients designed to supply the defects of creative genius, Priestley attempts to show that they spring out of the very sources of all inventive activity. For this reason, as we shall see
in a subsequent section of our discussion, he even goes so far as to suggest that topics are the inevitable tools of all literary creation.

2. Universal Topics. Following this explanation of the way in which topics are derived, Priestley undertakes to name and to classify them. Adhering to the traditional procedure, he begins by distinguishing between "universal" and "particular" propositions, and then points out that topics suitable to the first are "very considerably distinct" from those suitable to the second.86

In Lecture 3 Priestley describes nine "universal topics" — definition, adjuncts, antecedents, consequents, means, analogy, contraries, example, and authority.87 Needless to say, this is a heterogeneous collection. Definition and adjuncts, the second of which he describes as "properties of the terms in the proposition."88 Priestley evidently means to fall into the first of the two classes described — that is, topics derived from individual terms. Antecedents, consequents, means,

86. Course, 2.9-10.

87. Course, 3.11-8 passim. Priestley explains the nature of each of these places by pointing out the kinds of subjects to which it is peculiarly suited and by presenting sample cases which demonstrate its successful employment. Except in one or two instances, he does not attempt formal definitions.

88. Course, 3.12.
analogy, and contraries he probably would say spring from the relationship between terms. It is difficult, however, to see how example and authority, since they are extrinsic proofs, fall into either of these categories. By including them in his catalogue of "universal topics" Priestley has probably committed an error serious enough to throw into question his entire doctrine concerning the derivation of places. It is regrettable that so ingenious a theory should be marred by what is obviously a simple mistake in tactics. 89

3. Particular Topics. The considerably less difficult problem of systematizing the "particular places" Priestley handles more skilfully. Concerning these, he says that his intention is merely to present "tables" of a general nature, leaving to the reader the task of supplying those various subdivisions into which each head may be further partitioned. 90 Thus, in the following tabulation only one item is worked out in detail, and it is assumed that from the model provided the student will be able to infer suitable divisions for the other heads. Some specific hints in this direction are offered under "Law concerning

89. Despite a presumption to the contrary, Priestley's list of "universal topics" bears no special relation to the list given by Ward in System, 1.52 and ff.

90. Course, 4.20.
it," but here Priestley, erring as did Ward, unfortunately
confuses quasi-states with places.\footnote{Ibid. See System, Lecture 5, passim.}

Priestley's catalogue is as follows:

\textbf{PARTICULAR TOPICS}
\textit{(Topics which "relate to particular Facts." )}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Subcategories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Person (May be divided into)</td>
<td>(Sex, Age, Personal Qualifications)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>(Fortune, Education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place</td>
<td>(Capacity or Ability, Profession or Employment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motive</td>
<td>(Nation, Tribe, Family)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manner</td>
<td>(Offices of Public Life)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument</td>
<td>(Relations of Private Life)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>(Connexion, Company, Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Concerning It (May be divided into)</td>
<td>(Precision or Ambiguity, Intention, Customary Form)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a significant paragraph Priestley points out that
because "particular topics" are not derived, as are general
ones, from propositional terms or term relationships, they
are useful in composing narrative as well as argumentative
discourses.\footnote{Ibid. I am unable to suggest a source for this
list of "particular places." Needless to say, it differs
radically from the standard classical analysis, which
was, of course, followed in all major respects by Ward.
(See System, 1.92-139 passim.)} He also makes several other remarks concerning
the nature of "particular" places. These, however, need not concern us here.

\footnote{\textit{Course}, 4.20.}
F. The **Place of Topics in Rhetoric**

The preceding exposition has made it abundantly apparent that the pivotal factor in Priestley's inventional system is his doctrine of topics. Recognizing this fact, he undertakes a defence of topical method. This defence commands our attention not only for its own sake but also because it is couched in terms of the associational psychology, thus providing another example of how Hartlean principles helped shape Priestley's rhetorical theory.

Because topics are, he reasons, generalized expressions of the various ways in which we may study propositional terms and their relationships, and because it is only by means of such study that arguments may be derived, topics are in a very real sense the inevitable tools of all inventional activity. Whether or not we recognize them as such, they are always either potentially or actually present.\textsuperscript{94} They are the indispensable elements basic to all systematic invention. Moreover, continues Priestley, they are the keys which unlock the mental processes of "artificial invention." Is not recalling merely a matter of introducing one idea into the mind by means of another with which it is associated? And is it not possible, therefore, "that particular ideas may be recollected by

\textsuperscript{94} Course, 4.22.
means of general ideas, which include them." 95

As he warms to his point, Priestley becomes considerably more dogmatic. It is "impossible," we are told, to "invent" without referring to certain standardized "heads" or places. 96 As a matter of fact, "It is even impossible to conceive in what other manner a voluntary effort to invent, or recollect, can be directed." 97 The speaker may not use any particular list of topics; he may not even know that they have been artificially distributed by rhetoricians. But though he is "ignorant of the name, he must be possessed of the thing." 98 Moreover, the places

95. Course, 4.22. In the Introduction to his edition of Hartley, Priestley explains exactly how, according to the Hartlean doctrine of vibrations, such recollection would be effected: "Now if two different vibrations take place in the brain at the same time, it cannot be but they will a little alter or modify one another, so that the particles of the medullary substance will not vibrate precisely as they would have done if they had taken place separately; but each of them will vibrate as acted upon by two impulses at the same time; and all the particles being acted upon in the same manner, it necessarily follows that, if from any cause whatever, one of these vibrations shall be excited, the other will be excited also, so that the whole state of the brain will exactly resemble what it was before; and this seems to correspond sufficiently to the recollection of one idea by means of another." (Priestley on Hartley, Introduction, xvii.)

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid. Cf. Priestley on Hartley, Introduction, xxvi, "For we have no power of calling up any idea at pleasure, but only recollect such as have a connection, by means of former associations, with those that are at any time present to the mind."

98. Ibid.
he employs must of necessity be arranged in some sort of order in his mind.\textsuperscript{99}

Since, therefore, topics of some sort are inevitable, should we not, asks Priestley, employ a list of places which is known to be complete and which has been carefully organized?\textsuperscript{100} Running over such an established catalogue will show a composer the whole extent of his subject, and this will prove of especial value to writers of sermons and moral essays.\textsuperscript{101}

Thus far Priestley's argument has been consistent and not without a certain cogency. Unfortunately, however, he now introduces a qualification which tends to undermine the structure of his reasoning. While not denying that topics are the paths along which one must necessarily follow if he is to derive artificially the materials of his discourse, he does acknowledge "that rhetorical topics are more useful in the composition of set declamations

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{99} \textit{Course}, 4.22-3.
\item \textsuperscript{100} \textit{Course}, 4.23.
\item \textsuperscript{101} \textit{Course}, 4.23-4. The particular value of topics for writers of sermons and moral essays apparently lies in the fact that the subject-matter with which they deal is not capable of precise definition and a high degree of organization.
\end{itemize}
on trite subjects, and to young persons, than in the communication of original matter, and to persons much used to composition. The explanation offered in support of this thesis grows out of one of Hartley's secondary laws of association. Therefore, it is desirable that we let Priestley expound the point in his own words:

... a person much used to composition will have acquired a habit of recollection, without any express attention to topics; just as a person used to the harpsicord, or any other instrument of music, will be able to perform without any express attention to rules, or even to the manner of placing his fingers. His idea of the tune in general, is so closely associated with all the motions of his fingers necessary to the playing of it, and these motions are also so closely associated together, that they follow one another mechanically, in what Dr. Hartley calls a secondarily automatic manner, which is almost as certain as a motion originally and properly automatic.

G. Additional Sources of Speech Material

Having thus developed, defended, and partially undermined a doctrine of topics, Priestley points out in summary fashion additional hints to the recollection of ideas.

We may, he says, derive arguments "from the manner

102. Course, 4.24. Priestley is, however, careful to argue that the abuse of topical method is no sound argument against its use. (See Course, 4.24.)

103. See Höffding, 1.447.

104. Course, 4.24-5. The example of the harpsichord player is itself taken from Hartley. (See Priestley on Hartley, 36.)
in which they are generally introduced, or the form into which they are thrown."\textsuperscript{105} By way of illustrating this principle he cites the argument in which we infer from the greater to the less or from the less to the greater -- i.e. a man will be suspected of having committed a less infamous crime if he is known to have committed a more infamous one, etc.\textsuperscript{106} Why Priestley considers this a "form" of argument rather than a "universal topic" he fails to make clear.

Additional sources of matter may be found in the "objections" to which our case is liable,\textsuperscript{107} in the "concessions" we ourselves might offer,\textsuperscript{108} and in the use of such figures as "irony," "question," and "exclamation."\textsuperscript{109} Moreover, Priestley makes the tantalizing but completely undeveloped assertion that "what will be advanced in these lectures upon the subject of method, will tend greatly to help the invention."\textsuperscript{110}

We may also note under the present head, although it is not perhaps in the strict sense a part of his inventional system, some general advice which Priestley

\textsuperscript{105} Course, 4.21.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{107} Course, 4.22.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
offers on the problem of literary creation. A writer may, he warns, "cramp his faculties, and injure his productions, by too great a scrupulosity in the first composition . . . "111 Whatever "ardour" we feel when composing should be freely indulged, for unless our ideas are expressed "in the very order and connexion in which they actually presented themselves to us," we shall transgress those basic principles of association which characterize all mental activity.112 As a result, our hearers will not easily understand or be much impressed by what we say, nor will our composition appear to them natural and animated.113 It is "almost impossible to counterfeit in such a case as this . . . "114 The only safe method is the natural one. We must express freely and without too great an attention to details "the whole state of our own minds while they are . . . affected and interested."115 The correcting of infelicities and the polishing of expression can be taken care of later.

In offering this advice Priestley is merely advocating

111. Course, 5.31.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
114. Course, 5.32.
115. Ibid.
his own method of composition. Whatever may be the intrinsic value of his remarks -- and it is probably considerable -- their chief interest for this study lies in the fact that they furnish one more example of the influence of associational principles on Priestley's rhetoric.

H. Amplification

Judging from the position accorded amplification in Priestley's rhetorical system we may be certain that he considered this subject a legitimate part of the general field of inventio. However, he does not present, as one might expect, a catalogue of topics for amplifying -- i.e. places designed to enlarge the actual idea content of a discourse. Instead, he indicates how, through the skilful

116. Priestley himself composed in shorthand since the rapid flow of his ideas far outran the pace of script. (See Thorpe, 74 etc.)

117. In connection with this discussion of the best means of composing Priestley draws an interesting distinction between the qualifications which make for an orator and those which make for a writer. It is his opinion, borrowed almost certainly from Kames (See Elements of Criticism, 1.21), that "persons of very exact judgment are generally the least copious in composition . . . . Whereas those persons who are unattentive to the minuter properties of things, find no difficulty in admitting a great variety of thoughts that offer themselves in composition. The first type are suited, he believes, to oratory; the second, to written composition. (Course, 5.30.)

118. Lecture 5, "Of Amplification," is included under the head of Recollection. Moreover, in the final pages of this lecture, Priestley reverts to the general problem of method in creative writing.
arrangement and expression of speech materials, an orator may create a sort of artificial amplification by making his ideas appear more expansive than in reality they are. As a result of this analysis he brings into the province of inventio matters not usually regarded as belonging to it.

Priestley introduces his discussion by asserting that amplification, generally considered, is "nothing more than a collection of such arguments and observations as tend to confirm or illustrate" the subject of an address.\textsuperscript{119} In argumentative discourses, however, it may take one of two rather more specialized forms: 1. it may consist of those "intermediate arguments" -- those less important inferential steps -- without which a demonstration cannot be understood by the non-expert; or 2. it may be found in "a more copious induction of particulars."\textsuperscript{120} The function of amplification in narration and description is to make our ideas interesting and affecting.\textsuperscript{121}

The general methods for amplifying are these: 1. Weave

\textsuperscript{119} Course, 5.26.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{121} Course, 5.28. As an example of amplification in non-argumentative discourse Priestley quotes from Spectator, 519. (See Course, 5.28.)
various "observations" and "reflections" into your narration or description. 122 2. Before proving a point explain minutely the proof pattern you intend to use and make evident each of its various parts; also point out the pitfalls which must be guarded against. "This very usefully enlarges a discourse." 123 3. Show, either before or after your contention has been developed, "the nature and strength of the arguments brought to support it, and [state] with some exactness the degree of influence they are entitled to." 124 4. Point out "the connexion of the sentences . . . more particularly than by single conjunctives . . . ." 125

Faults in amplifying are: 1. introducing under a topic some idea "which has no relation to it, not tending either to confirm or to illustrate it"; 126 2. illustrating that which does not require illustration; 127 and 3. failing to advance what is necessary to confirm or illustrate an argument. 128

122. Course, 5.29.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid.
128. Ibid.
I. Summary

Having excluded investigation from the province of rhetoric and having placed ethos and pathos under the general head of style, Priestley sets forth an inventional doctrine which is essentially Baconian in that it views inventio as systematized recollection aimed at helping the orator "recall" certain materials with which his mind is "already furnished." The salient points in this doctrine may be summarized as follows:

1. Drawing upon Ward and Hartley, Priestley first asserts that every proposition expresses the agreement or disagreement of two "ideas." He then explains that if this relationship is not immediately apparent it may be established through the agency of a middle term.

2. Middle terms are recalled in one of two ways: by considering carefully the meaning of one or more of the terms in a proposition, or by ascertaining the relationship that exists between them.

3. In a passage notable for its keen insight and marked originality Priestley points out that as a result of examining many propositions we are able to catalogue all the fruitful methods of studying individual terms, and also to classify the different relationships in which they habitually stand one to another. This knowledge gives rise, he says,
to what are called "topics" or "common places."

4. Following the traditional practice, Priestley divides topics into "universal" and "particular." His classification of "universal" topics is censurable since it includes the extrinsic proofs of "example" and of "authority." The list of "particular" places is not organized in terms of deliberative, demonstrative, and judicial speaking. Therefore, it departs from the standard classical analysis.

5. Because topics are generalized expressions of the various ways in which we may study propositional terms and their relationships, and because it is only by means of such study that arguments can be derived, topics are, Priestley argues, the inevitable tools of all inventional activity. Moreover, since they grow out of the laws of association they are the keys which unlock the mental processes of "artificial recollection." At the same time, however, Priestley admits that topics are of more use to young speakers than to experienced orators. Men long practiced in composition acquire, according to one of the basic laws of association, "a secondarily automatic manner" of inventing.
6. Although the pivotal factor in Priestley's inven-tional system is his doctrine of topics he also recognizes certain other sources from which speech materials may be derived. These consist of the "form" or "manner" in which an argument is introduced, "objections," "concessions," and the use of such figures as "irony," "question," and "exclamation." Moreover, he asserts that there is in his lectures on method materials which assist invention. He does not, however, make clear what he means by this statement.

7. Priestley views amplification as a part of the general field of inventio. He does not, however, present a catalogue of topics for amplifying. Instead, he indicates how, through the skilful arrangement and expression of speech materials, an orator may create a sort of artificial amplification by making his ideas appear more expansive than in reality they are. As a result of this analysis he brings into the province of inventio matters not usually regarded as belonging to it.
Chapter VI

THE INVENTIONAL SYSTEM OF HUGH BLAIR

A. Introduction

In assigning reasons for the importance of Hugh Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres scholars quite generally single out four distinctive characteristics of that work. These characteristics may be stated as follows:

1. The Lectures represent a calculated attempt to formulate a system of rhetoric out of the doctrines of the faculty psychology. 2. They contain a provocative theory concerning the respective roles played in creative effort by native "genius" and by cultivated "taste." 3. They stand as a prime example of the view that rhetoric comprehends within its province the whole field of criticism and belles lettres. 4. They present in lucid and popular form a judicious summary of classical rhetorical doctrine.

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2. See, for example, Sandford, 117, 120; Thonssen and Baird, 214-25 passim; Schmitz, 96-118 passim; Harding, 341; Saintsbury, 2.463; Adamson, 18-9; Sattler, 303-4; and Lee, 241 and ff.
Each of these factors bears, as one might expect, to a greater or lesser degree upon Blair's concept of the nature and function of inventio. The primary significance of his work, so far as this study is concerned, rests, however, upon an additional consideration. It is this: Blair stoutly maintains that the ancients erred in supposing the process of rhetorical invention might be reduced to a systematic art or science; furthermore, they were wrong in assuming that discovery is materially facilitated by "artificial" aids. "Art," he flatly declares, "cannot go so far as to supply a speaker with arguments on every cause, and every subject . . . ."3 It cannot light that inner spark which is the essence of creative "genius." In rhetorical activity, therefore, the role of art is necessarily limited to those tasks which may be performed in a more or less automatic or routine fashion. Art may assist the speaker in arranging and expressing arguments; it may teach him how to "manage" them so that they will have the maximum effect; it cannot, however, teach him how to "find" them.4

3. Lectures, 32.353. I have used Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres by Hugh Blair. To Which Are Added, Copious Questions; and an Analysis of Each Lecture, by Abraham Mills. (Philadelphia, 1848). Cited, as in this instance, as Lectures. References are to lecture and page.

4. Ibid.
The reasons which Blair advances in support of this doctrine, together with some of the motives which may have led him to advocate it, will be discussed later. At this point it is sufficient to note that in his pronouncement concerning *inventio* Blair makes explicit a view toward which Campbell clearly leaned, and for which Priestley categorically declared. I refer to the view that investigation and discovery -- the prime functions of classical *inventio* -- are really not legitimate parts of rhetoric at all; or, put differently, that the science of effective discourse cannot extend beyond teaching men how to "manage" successfully the various arguments and appeals which are supplied to it by external means.

Although decisive evidence is lacking, it is not probable that Blair's exclusion of discovery from the field of rhetorical science was a direct outgrowth of Campbell's theory. As will shortly become apparent, the two men reasoned from significantly different premises. Whatever its source, however, this drastic restriction of the province of rhetoric is in itself a major modification of the traditional classical analysis. But of even greater importance is the fact that in ruling out investigation as a function of inventional activity, Blair, like Priestley, paves the way for Whately's view that *inventio* consists of the systematic classification of various types of proof patterns, together with directions
concerning when and how these patterns are to be employed. In short, doctrinally these two writers stand, I suggest, midway between Campbell and Whately. Campbell shifted the focus of *inventio* from the speech to the speaker, and thereby tended -- without arbitrarily excluding discovery from its province -- to emphasize that aspect of inventing which looks to the management of arguments in a finished discourse. Priestley and Blair take one step more and categorically deny investigation a place in rhetoric. Whately, accepting the limitation thus imposed, constructs a new inventional theory built directly and exclusively upon the concept of management.

In the light of these facts it may be seen that Blair's contribution to the history of *inventio* was essentially a negative one. It consisted of clearing the ground from which later thinkers were to reap abundant harvests. Blair himself, it should be emphasized, offers little constructive advice on the important problem of how to "find" speech materials. For the most part, he seems content that rhetoric be confined to studying those principles according to which arguments are to be arranged and expressed. Beyond these limits rhetorical art is, he believes, of doubtful efficacy. Therefore, except for some remarks concerning imitation and the importance of studying

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5. See Section F of this chapter.
closely the subject-matter of the address, there is little in the Lectures which may be designated as invention doctrine.

Because Blair was in most respects an avowed disciple of ancient rhetorical and critical theories, one is immediately moved to inquire what may have accounted for his startlingly non-classical attitude toward inventio. Did it arise, perhaps, from a misunderstanding of the nature and function of ancient invention doctrine? Was it influenced by ideas current in the philosophy or psychology of eighteenth-century Scotland? Did it spring from purely personal biases and antipathies? The remainder of this chapter will be very largely given over to a discussion of these and similar questions. Such a discussion is germane to our study because the reasons which lead Blair to exclude from rhetoric all "artificial" aids to inventio are as much a part of the history of that department as are the elaborate invention doctrines developed by Cicero, Bacon, and Campbell.

In considering the various questions here specified it will be helpful to have in mind the substance of the criticism which Blair levels against ancient invention doctrine. It will also be desirable to review briefly the general nature of the Lectures. The two following sections are devoted to these preliminary matters.
B. Blair's Criticism of Classical Inventional Doctrine

Blair's criticism of the classical *inventio* is most vigorously and most succinctly stated in that portion of Lecture 32 which is given over to a discussion of the *confirmatio*. Influenced by the doctrines of the faculty psychology, Blair divides this part of an oration into two sub-movements, the "argumentative" and the "pathetic." With reference to the first of these, he asserts that although inventing is the essential "ground-work" of all conviction, art is unable to provide any real assistance in this activity. The great error committed by ancient rhetoricians lay in their failure to recognize so salient a fact. They attempted to supply the defects of "genius" by artificial means, and in so doing developed elaborate but sterile systems of internal and external *loci*, of places for persons and places for things -- devices which "might produce very showy academical declamations, [but which] could never produce discourses on real business." When one's aim is to present to an

6. 353 ff.
audience material that is truly "solid and persuasive," his arguments "must be drawn 'ex visceribus causae,' from a thorough knowledge of the subject, and profound meditation on it." 9 To teach students otherwise is simply to delude them. In attempting to render rhetoric too complete and perfect an art, it may actually be turned into "a trifling and childish study." 10

Any remarks which he might make on the doctrine of topics would, Blair believes, be quite superfluous. Those persons who think they might profit from a knowledge of topical lore should consult directly the works of Aristotle, Cicero, or Quintilian. There they will find it set forth fully and clearly. 11 But when one is preparing an address by which he seriously proposes "to convince a judge, or to produce any considerable effect upon an assembly, I would advise [him] to lay aside . . . common places and to think closely of [the] subject." 12 Demosthenes certainly did not consult the loci when he was meditating those great speeches designed to arouse the Athenians against Philip; and in proportion as the more copious Cicero

9. Lectures, 32.354.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
did have recourse to them, his orations suffered on that account.\textsuperscript{13}

Having thus indicted the classical theory that arguments and proofs may be artificially invented, Blair next brings a somewhat similar charge against the ancient doctrine of pathetic invention. In treating of pathos the Greek and Roman rhetoricians again attempted, he points out, to reduce invention to a purely mechanical process.\textsuperscript{14} With this end in view they examined "metaphysically" each of the various passions. They defined it, described it, treated of its causes, effects and concomitants. By this means they attempted to deduce fixed and universal "rules for working upon it."\textsuperscript{15} Aristotle in particular developed this aspect of rhetoric, and it must be admitted that his dissertation provides "a valuable piece of moral philosophy."\textsuperscript{16} It is doubtful, however, whether the sort of information he sets forth is actually of much use to the practicing speaker who is interested in influencing the beliefs and actions of men. One may be thoroughly learned in speculative knowledge concerning the passions, "and remain, at the same time, a cold and dry speaker."\textsuperscript{17}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{13} Lectures, 32.354.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Lectures, 32.358.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
Common sense will tell us that here, as in the case of arguments, "The use of rules . . . is not to supply the want of genius, but to direct it where it is found, into its proper channel; to assist it in exerting itself with most advantage, and to prevent the errors and extravagances into which it is sometimes apt to run."\(^{18}\)

C. The General Nature of the Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres

As the title of his work indicates, Blair conceives of rhetoric as something far more comprehensive than the mere theory of effective oral (or written) discourse. He views it, in fact, not only as intimately related to all phases of literature, but also as the direct counterpart of criticism.\(^{19}\) These relationships arise out of the thesis that eloquence, poetry, drama, and criticism all have a common foundation -- a common focal point of interest -- in language; they are, as we might say today, basically "language arts." Blair, therefore, erects the structure of his rhetorical and critical system upon the foundation of language and the doctrine of its proper and

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\(^{18}\) Lectures, 32.358-9.

\(^{19}\) "Whatever . . . the subject be, there is room for eloquence; in history, or even in philosophy, as well as in orations." Lectures, 25.261-2.
effective use. Lectures 4 through 24 are devoted entirely to this matter. Then follow units on eloquence, the writing of history, philosophical writing, and poetry (including drama). Prefatory to the whole is a consideration of the two fundamental concepts of taste and genius.

"Taste," Blair asserts, "consists in the power of judging; genius, in the power of executing." For the critic, the former alone will suffice; the creator, however, must possess a liberal endowment of both. "One may," he declares, "have a considerable degree of taste in poetry, eloquence, or any of the fine arts, who has little or hardly any genius for composition or execution in any of these arts..." That divine spark, that indefinable inventive, creative something which conceives and produces "new beauties" is lacking. The essence of this power is native "talent or aptitude." Although it may be enlarged

20. Lectures 25-34.
22. Lecture 37. The dialogue, epistolary writing, and fictitious history are also considered in this lecture.
23. Lectures 38-47.
25. Lecture 3.
26. Lectures, 3.29.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
through "art" and "study," "by them alone it cannot be acquired." Taste, likewise, partakes to some extent of the nature of a talent. It is "a power compounded of natural sensibility to beauty, and of improved understanding"; in other words, of "delicacy," which is inherent, and of "correctness," which is acquired.

1. The Lectures on Eloquence. The general plan of the ten lectures which Blair devotes directly and avowedly to the subject of eloquence is announced in the prospectus which introduces this unit of his course. "In treating of this, I am," he says, "to consider the different kinds and subjects of public speaking; the manner suited to each; the proper distribution and management of all the parts of a discourse; and the proper pronunciation and delivery of it."

Following some brief introductory remarks concerning the nature of eloquence and a review of its rise and development,
progress among ancient and modern nations, Blair launches a joint attack into the first and second of the heads outlined above. In four discourses he treats of the eloquence of popular assemblies, the eloquence of the bar, and the eloquence of the pulpit. Throughout these lectures his aims appear to be: 1. to sketch in broad strokes the essential nature of each species of oratory; and 2. by means of the analysis of selected models, to demonstrate the "manner" of composition and the general movement most properly suited to each type.

defined, the art of persuasion." (25.262).

From this definition arise certain consequences "which point out the fundamental maxims of the art." (25.262). "It follows clearly, that in order to persuade, the most essential requisites are, solid argument, clear method, a character of probity appearing in the speaker, joined with such graces of style and utterance, as shall draw our attention to what he says. Good sense is the foundation of all. No man can be truly eloquent without it; for fools can persuade none but fools. In order to persuade a man of sense you must first convince him; which is only to be done, by satisfying his understanding of the reasonableness of what you propose to him." (25.262).

The distinction between "conviction" and "persuasion" which is thus suggested, Blair develops in terms of the faculty psychology. Convincing and persuading are, he maintains, different things. "Conviction affects the understanding only; persuasion, the will and the practice." (25.262). Unless persuasion is founded upon conviction, it is likely to prove unstable. "But, in order to persuade, the orator must go farther than merely producing conviction; he must consider man as a creature moved by many different springs, and must act upon them all." (25.262).

33. Lectures 25-6.

Lectures 31 and 32 describe in some detail what Blair declares to be the six "natural" parts of an address, and expound various of the rules which should govern them. This discussion is divided as follows:

Lecture 31
1. Exordium
2. Proposition and Division
3. Narration (or Explication)

Lecture 32
4. The Argumentative Part
   a. Inventio
   b. Dispositio
   c. Elocutio
5. The Pathetic Part
6. Conclusion

Delivery is viewed not as mere embellishment, but as an integral element in persuasion. The "tone of our voice, our looks and gestures, interpret our ideas and emotions no less than our words do . . . ." In fact, they possess a power stronger than words because they are the elementary "language of nature." If a speaker's delivery be false or inappropriate, it may give the lie to all that he asserts.

The section on public speaking is concluded with a lecture entitled, "Means of Improving in Eloquence." To

36. Lecture 33.
37. Lectures, 33.365b.
38. Ibid.
40. Lecture 34.
be an eloquent speaker, in the proper sense of the word, is," says Blair, "far from being either a common or an easy attainment."41 It requires "a great exertion of the human powers," and the happy concurrence of "many talents, natural and acquired . . . ."42 Of the "means" for improving in eloquence, that which "stands highest . . . is personal character and disposition. In order to be a truly eloquent or persuasive speaker, nothing is more necessary than to be a virtuous man."43 Also important, however, are 1. "a fund of knowledge,"44 2. "a habit of application and study,"45 3. "attention to the best models,"46 and 4. "frequent exercise both in composing and speaking."47 With respect to the study of rhetorical theorists and critics, Blair expresses an equivocal scepticism. Although it would be a mistake, he believes, to neglect their treatises, he does not think "that much is to be expected from them."48

41. Lectures, 34.377.
42. Ibid.
43. Lectures, 34.378.
44. Lectures, 34.380.
45. Lectures, 34.381.
46. Lectures, 34.382.
47. Lectures, 34.383.
48. Lectures, 34.385.
With this outline of the Lectures in mind, let us now inquire whether Blair's attack upon the classical inventio may have sprung from a misunderstanding of its nature and purpose.

D. Evidences of Blair's Knowledge of the Classical Doctrine of Inventio

There is considerable evidence that Blair understood quite clearly the functions and the limits which ancient rhetoricians assigned to the inventional process. First, it may be noted that in referring to inventio he habitually employs such terms as "supply," 49 "discover," 50 and "find," 51 thus suggesting that inventing is primarily a matter of searching among those localities where arguments reside. Of still more significance, however, is the fact that in his system these terms are distinguished from another group

49. "In all the ancient rhetorical writers, there is, indeed, this defect, that they are too systematical . . . ; they aim at doing too much; at reducing rhetoric to a complete and perfect art, which may even supply invention with materials on every subject . . . ." Lectures, 34.386. Italics mine.

50. "For it is one thing to discover the reasons that are most proper to convince men, and another to manage these reasons with the most advantage." Lectures, 32.353. Italics mine.

51. The ancients professed to teach men "where to find arguments on every subject and cause." Lectures, 32.353. Italics mine.
of higher level concepts typified by the words "management" and "conduct."

By these he evidently meant to imply a great deal more than mere temporal or spatial arrangement of speech materials. In fact, we shall not far miss his meaning if we take these terms to include all rhetorical functions over and above the primary task of searching out the raw substance of the address. Thus in discussing, for example, the "conduct" of the exordium, Blair describes its purpose, distinguishes its species, lays down rules for its composition, and, interestingly enough, sets forth general topical methods for its development. In like vein, the section of Lecture 32 devoted to the "management" of the passions deals with matters of judgment, disposition, style, delivery, and audience adaptation. Without laboring the point unduly, the fact is that in Blair's distribution of functions between finding and managing we may clearly discern that narrowing of the province of inventio and that corresponding broadening

52. See Lectures 31-2 passim.


55. It should be easy and natural, correct in expression, modest, calm in manner, should not anticipate any material part of the subject, should be proportioned in length and kind to the discourse that is to follow. Lectures, 31.343-7.

56. Lectures, 31.342.

57. Lectures, 32.359-62.
of the realm of **dispositio** which constitute infallible signs of the classical analysis.

In the light of this distribution, two more particular aspects of the organization of Blair's system derive added importance. In Lecture 32 he specifically -- and, from all appearances, intentionally -- treats "selection" as an element in **dispositio**. Moreover, in the same lecture he causes his discussion of logical and pathetic proof to fall under the head of **confirmatio**, thus imitating the pattern set by Cicero and Quintilian. When these characteristics of structure are added to the accurate skeletal outline of classical topical doctrine which Blair presents in connection with his condemnation of systematized theories of logical invention, we may feel relatively certain that he had some appreciation of the ancient interpretation of **inventio**.

Another brief but significant piece of evidence further substantiates this thesis. This is Blair's appar-

58. See 354-5 where he says: "I proceed to what is of more real use, to point out the assistance that can be given, not with respect to invention, but with respect to the disposition and conduct of arguments . . . . Now, in all arguing, one of the first things to be attended to is, among the various arguments which may occur upon a cause, to make a proper selection of such as appear to one's self the most solid . . . ."

59. Lecture 32 **passim**. See Chapter 1 above.

60. See Lecture 32, 353-4.
ent acquaintance with three Latin sources which are among the most important purveyors of classical inventional lore. In a noteworthy passage he points out that "If any think the knowledge of them [topics] may contribute to improve their invention, and extend their view, they may consult Aristotle and Quintilian, or what Cicero has written on this head, in his Treatise De Inventione, his Topica, and second book De Oratore." 61 Despite the fact this is the only reference made in the Lectures to either De Inventione or Topica, it would seem to indicate that Blair had some knowledge of their contents. Certain it is that he was familiar enough with De Oratore, and must have read many times over what Cicero has to say about inventio in that dialogue.

The only aspect of Blair's inventional system which might cause one to question his knowledge of classical doctrine is the discussion of logos. Omitting any mention of status or the analysis of questions, he confines his treatment of this mode to an explanation of topical method. 62 Yet it is probable that this restriction was entirely intentional. Not only would Blair have failed to see how such esoteric matters added anything of practical value to the business of searching out arguments, but he found in the topics themselves adequate material for

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61. Lectures, 32.354.

62. See Lectures, 32.353-4; 25.269; 34.386, etc.
ridiculing the ancient notion that creative thinking could be done by an artificially contrived system. Therefore, though he must have read what the classical writers had said about states and questions, he preferred to disregard that portion of their *inventio*.

In any event, the great preponderance of the evidence affirms the conclusion that Blair understood with at least some degree of accuracy the classical analysis of this department of rhetoric. Consequently, we cannot claim that he condemned it because he was ignorant of its nature and purpose. Instead, we must attempt to find other causes for his attitude.

E. The Bases of the Criticism

Present knowledge concerning Blair does not make it possible to say categorically why he was led to criticize ancient inventional theory so caustically and to rule "artificial" invention out of the province of rhetoric. It is probable, however, that at the basis of his criticism lie two closely related factors. The first is his doctrine of original genius, which, as a matter of course, profoundly influenced his views concerning the respective roles played in creative effort by "nature" and by "art." The second is his theory concerning the purpose and methods of rhetorical training. Arising out of these are two other derived or subsidiary factors which give
further substantiation to the position. These are: 1. the general scepticism with which he viewed theoretical treatises on rhetoric and the abstract principles which they contained, and 2. his own personal inclinations and interests.

1. Original Genius. Genius, Blair rather vaguely defines as "that talent or aptitude which we receive from nature, for excelling in any one thing whatever." He says, "we speak of a genius for mathematics, as well as a genius for poetry; of a genius for war, for politics, or for any mechanical employment." In all these areas the term "imports something inventive or creative; [something] which does not rest in mere sensibility to beauty where it is perceived, but which can, moreover, produce new beauties, and exhibit them in such a manner as strongly to impress the minds of others." Although genius or talent may be improved by "art and study," these alone will not suffice. Where the original endowment is lacking, production will at best be unoriginal. Science may guide aptitude, and in this respect its function is an important one; it cannot, however, supply a substitute for genius.

Applying this doctrine to oratory, Blair asserts

63. Lectures, 3.29.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
that eloquence is not "an invention of the schools."\textsuperscript{66} This is proved by the fact that nature herself "teaches every man to be eloquent when he is much in earnest."\textsuperscript{67} Therefore, it is trifling to inquire whether "nature" or "art" contributes most in forming an orator. "In all attainments whatever, nature must be the prime agent. She must bestow the original talents. She must sow the seeds . . . ."\textsuperscript{68} The function of culture resides in "bringing these seeds to perfection."\textsuperscript{69} This task may not be unimportant, since genius is often "bold and strong," and exceeds the bounds which taste and good sense dictate.\textsuperscript{70} At the same time, it is always secondary and subsidiary, contributive rather than original.

Consider the qualities upon which Blair thinks oratory to depend. How many of them relate to genius rather than to education!

Viewed as the art of persuasion, it requires, in its lowest state, soundness of understanding, and considerable acquaintance with human

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{66} \textit{Lectures}, 25.263.
\item \textsuperscript{67} \textit{Ibid.} See also 25.264, "Almost every man in passion is eloquent."
\item \textsuperscript{68} \textit{Lectures}, 34.378.
\item \textsuperscript{69} \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{70} \textit{Lectures}, 3.30. See also 1.11 on the importance of the part which "art" plays in creation.
\end{itemize}
Quite clearly, orators are in Blair's opinion born, not made. Eloquence depends upon a concurrence of talents and natural skills which no set of man-made rules can supply in one who is barren of them.

2. The Purpose and Methods of Rhetorical Training.

What implications does this view concerning the parts played in creation by "nature" and by "art" have for the teaching of rhetoric and the training of prospective writers and speakers? Blair's most precise answer is to be found in one of the passages referred to in Section B of this chapter. In criticizing Aristotle's exhaustive analysis of the passions he declares, as we remember, that rules and instructions cannot remedy "the want of genius." Their role is necessarily limited to guiding "genius" into proper paths, thus preventing the errors and

71. Lectures, 25.264. See also 34.377, "How many talents, natural and acquired, must concur for carrying this [eloquence] to perfection? A strong, lively, and warm imagination; quick sensibility of heart, joined with solid judgment, good sense, and presence of mind; all improved by great and long attention to style and composition; and supported also by the exterior, yet important qualifications of a graceful manner, a presence not ungainly, and a full and tunable voice."
curbing the extravagances toward which it is sometimes prone. 72

Viewed in this light, the functions of rhetorical training are, of course, rather severely restricted. They consist in: 1. supplying those general principles of composition and criticism which will guide genius so that it may show itself to the greatest advantage, and 2. cultivating and "fixing" the taste. When instruction seeks to go beyond these limits and to provide a perfect and self-contained system which supplies the defects of genius, rhetoric becomes "a trifling and childish study." 73 The ancients were, therefore, actually "too systematical." In attempting to reduce rhetoric to a complete and self-contained art capable of inventing with equal ease materials on every subject, they overstepped the bounds of reason. One would imagine, sneers Blair, that "they expected to form an orator by rule, in as mechanical a manner as one would form a carpenter." 74 But this is obviously impossible. All rhetoric can really do is to give openings for assisting and enlightening taste, and for pointing out

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73. Lectures, 32, 354.
74. Lectures, 34, 386.
to genius the course it ought to hold. 75

On the second of the purposes of rhetorical training — the cultivating and "fixing" of the taste — Blair laid considerable emphasis. He consciously addressed his Lectures not only to future writers and speakers, but also to that great body of persons who, although they never intended to write for the press or to speak in public, "still wished to know about the elegances of speech and writing." 76 Instruction in rhetoric and criticism would, Blair believed, "assist them in discerning and relishing the beauties of composition," because the same principles which help genius to execute well also aid taste to criticize justly.77 To this second class of students, however, "rhetoric is not so much a practical art as a

75. Ibid. The pernicious influence of the sophists, Blair asserts, lay principally in the fact that they exceeded the bounds of legitimate rhetorical instruction. They did not, as they should have done, "content themselves with delivering general instructions concerning eloquence to their pupils, and endeavouring to form their taste; but they professed the art of giving them receipts for making all sorts of orations; and teaching them how to speak for, and against, every cause whatever. Upon this plan, they were the first who treated of common places, and the artificial invention of arguments and topics for every subject. In the hands of such men, we may easily believe that oratory would degenerate . . . and we may justly deem them the first corruptors of true eloquence." Lectures, 25.269.

76. Schmitz, 96. See Lectures, 1.11.

77. Lectures, 1.13.
speculative science . . . "78 Their needs and interests are far different from those of the prospective orator or of the professional rhetorician. To them the systematized methodologies of artificial inventional systems are so much excess baggage.

Therefore, the future orator, who in order to succeed in his chosen profession must possess a natural talent or genius for the various aspects of rhetorical endeavor, has little need for a tool which purports to compensate for defects in these qualities; nor does the layman-critic, who by his studies seeks only more intelligent appreciation and heightened enjoyment, find it a necessary part of his intellectual equipment. On these grounds, artificial systems of invention may be excluded from the province of rhetoric.

3. Blair's Scepticism Concerning Rhetorical Treatises and Abstract Rhetorical Principles. Blair's basic views concerning the purpose and methods of rhetorical instruction probably account for his very evident scepticism as to the value of rhetorical treatises and abstract rhetorical principles. Orators such as Demosthenes and Cicero, we are told, derived their power in moving the passions "from higher sources than any treatise of rhetoric."79 Cleon, Alcibiades, Critias, and Theramenes, all of whom were

78. Ibid.
79. Lectures, 26, 278.
distinguished for their eloquence despite the fact they were not professional orators, gained their power not from the precepts of the schools, but from "a much more powerful education, that of business and debate." Quintilian himself comes in for censure. He is "the most instructive, and most useful" of all the ancients; yet even he is prone to introduce into his work "too much of the technical and artificial system then in vogue . . . ." The essays of such French rhetoricians as Fénelon, Rollin, Batteaux, Crevier, and Gilbert contain

80. Lectures, 25.268.

81. Lectures, 34.387. Despite this fact, "I would not advise the omitting to read any part of his institutions." (Ibid.)

82. Francois de Salignac de la Mothe Fénelon, Dialogues sur l'Eloquence en Général et sur celle de la Chaire en Particular. (Paris, 1718).

83. Blair probably has in mind the best known of Rollin's several works on rhetoric: Charles Rollin, Traité des Études, ou de la Manière d'Enseigner et d'Étudier les Belles-Lettres . . . . (Paris, 1726-8).


86. The reference probably is to Balthasar Gibert, La Rhétorique, ou les Règles de l'Eloquence. (Paris, 1730). Gibert is better known for his Jugemens des Savans sur les Auteurs qui ont Traité de la Rhétorique . . . . 3 vols. (Paris, 1713-9).
some helpful suggestions. None of them, however, deserves particular recommendation. A writer such as Vossius, "who has gathered into one heap of ponderous lumber, all the trifling, as well as the useful things, that are to be found in the Greek and Roman writers, is enough to disgust one with the study of eloquence."88

At best, rhetorical rules and principles have a restrictive and corrective, rather than an inventive or creative function. Rules do not in themselves suffice "to form an orator."89 Provided one has a certain amount of natural aptitude for speaking, his progress will depend more on constant application and rigorous study than on any communicable plan of instruction. Yet, though rules do not "inspire genius" they may guide and assist it. "They point out proper models for imitation. They bring into view the chief beauties that ought to be studied, and the principal thoughts that ought to be avoided; and thereby tend to enlighten taste, and to lead genius from unnatural deviations, into its proper channel."90 In short, while art cannot supply defects in innate creative ability, it can prevent errors of judgment and of taste.

87. Lectures, 34.385.
88. Ibid.
89. Lectures, 1.11-12.
90. Ibid.
The caution which Blair here expresses is an example of the belligerent defensiveness which colors all of his arguments about the place of rhetoric in "academical education," and about oratory as a tool of social control. Men, he says, are generally on the watch; they are suspicious of being deceived by the orator. "When you speak to a plain man, of eloquence, or in praise of it, he is apt to hear you with very little attention. He conceives eloquence to signify a certain trick of speech; the art of vanishing weak arguments plausibly; or of speaking so as to please and tickle the ear. 'Give me good sense,' he says, 'and keep your eloquence for boys.'" This distrust arises out of the fact that throughout its long and devious history oratory has frequently been "disgraced" and "debased." "The graces of composition have been employed to disguise or to supply the want of matter; and the temporary applause of the ignorant has been courted, instead of the lasting approbation of the discerning." Even in his own day, thought Blair, "the love of minute elegance, and attention to inferior orna-

91. Lectures, 1.10.
93. Lectures, 1.10-1.
94. Lectures, 1.11.
ments of composition" engaged too greatly the public attention and regard. 95

Blair sought to counteract this tendency and also to do battle against the unsavory tradition of rhetoric by placing it upon a firm foundation of solid substance and "good sense." In Lecture 1, as a sort of apologia for the course he is about to deliver, he asserts that if his discourses have any merit it lies in the fact that they attempt to supplant the arid rules of "artificial and scholastic rhetoric" with principles of sound reason and good sense, and that, drawing attention away from false ornament, they direct it toward the virtues of solid substance and honest simplicity. 96

Now, by the phrase "artificial and scholastic rhetoric," Blair, it should be noted, means not only excesses in style, but also excesses committed in the name of invention. The evidential basis for this is clear. The sophists, we remember, he considers to have been "the first corruptors of true eloquence," and this chiefly for the reason that they gave their students "receipts" for making all sorts of orations, and taught "the artificial invention of arguments and topics for every subject." 97

95. Lectures, 1.12.
96. Lectures, 1.10.
97. Lectures, 25.269.
In fact, the ancients in general suffered, Blair believes, from the delusion that an orator might be formed by rule "in as mechanical a manner as one would form a carpenter."98 Particularly by their doctrine of topics did they unwisely seek to substitute method for genius.99 However, these attempts to render rhetoric "a perfect art" merely succeeded in rendering it trifling and childish.100

Here, then, would appear to be another pair of closely related causative factors, both of which must have more or less directly influenced Blair's attitude toward inventio. Not only was he generally sceptical of the abstract principles found in rhetorical treatises, but he was constantly on the defensive concerning the undue emphasis which previous writers had frequently placed upon elaborate schemes of ornamentation and invention.

4. Personal Biases and Interests. By training and by inclination, Blair was primarily a man of letters and a critic. His chief interests undoubtedly lay in the areas of style and of aesthetic theory. To these and to their manifold interrelationships his attention in the Lectures is principally directed. As has already been suggested, he conceived of rhetoric as including taste and criticism, and the theories of written style and com-

98. Lectures, 34.386.
100. Ibid.
position, as well as oratory. Thus, in his view, rhetoric and belles lettres are practically synonymous, or -- more precisely -- the principles of rhetoric are applicable to all forms of written and spoken discourse. Although throughout the ten lectures on eloquence Blair is quite obviously writing about problems that fall in the realm of public address, his treatment of them marks him as a literary man.

As a matter of fact, nearly all the non-professional activities of Blair's long life centered in the field of literature. His early efforts at poetizing, his edition of Shakespeare, his short-lived activities as a reviewer, his unfortunate championship of Macpherson and Ossian, his edition of the English poets and


102. The Works of Shakespeare. In which the Beauties observed by Pope, Warburton, and Dodd, are pointed out. Together with the Author's life; a Glossary; Copious Indexes; and a List of the Various Readings. 8 vols. (Edinburgh, 1753). See Schmitz, 21-4.


104. Schmitz, 42-60 passim; 88-96.

his perennial concern for the standardization of the Scottish tongue\textsuperscript{106} -- these, in addition to his \textit{Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres}, gained him during the latter portion of his life the undisputed title of arbiter of British letters.\textsuperscript{107}

It is not within the province of our inquiry to do more than sketch this important aspect of Blair's labors. Yet his interest in literature undoubtedly was of significance in determining his attitude on the subject of oratory, and it probably accounts in no small measure for the relative lack of emphasis which he gives to the logical and psychological problems of rhetoric -- the area in which, of course, \textit{inventio} resides.

Furthermore, as a trained critic, Blair was in a particularly fortunate position to judge of the value of commonplaces as tools in composition. Upon more than one occasion he singles out the defects which result from employing this means of invention. Especially are these discernible in the introduction.

It is too common a fault in introductions, that they are taken from some common-place topic, which has no peculiar relation to the subject in hand; by which means they stand apart, like pieces detached from the rest of the discourse.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{106} Schmitz, 61 ff., etc.

\textsuperscript{107} Schmitz, 126.

\textsuperscript{108} Lectures, 31.344.
And a few pages farther on:

When [in preaching] long introductions are formed upon some common-place topic, as the desire of happiness being natural to man, they never fail of being tedious. 109

Again:

In pleadings at the bar, or speeches in public assemblies, particular care must be taken not to employ any introduction of that kind, which the adverse party may lay hold of, and turn to his advantage. To this inconvenience all those introductions are exposed, which are taken from general and commonplace topics ... 110

On the other hand, the exordium of Cicero's Pro Cluentio comes in for special praise because "it is simple and proper, taken from no common-place topic, but from the nature of the cause." 111


110. Ibid.

111. Lectures, 28.305. That Blair should have selected the introduction as that movement of the speech in which the use of commonplaces is especially to be decried gives rise to one of the minor curiosities of his Lectures. The only formal list of topics which is presented anywhere in the discourses on eloquence is found under his discussion of the exordium. (31.342). Here he asserts that the exordium has three ends: "Reddere auditores benevolos, attentos, dociles," and he quotes Cicero and Quintilian as his authorities. (See Partitiones Oratoriae 8; Institutio, 4.1.5.ff., etc.). Speaking of these ends, he says: "Topics for this purpose [rendering auditors benevolos] may, in causes at the bar, be sometimes taken from the particular situation of the speaker himself, or of his client; or from the character or behaviour of his antagonists, contrasted with his own; on other occasions, from the nature of the subject, as closely connected with the interest of the hearers: and, in general, from the modesty and good intention with which the speaker enters upon his subject. The second end of an introduction is, to raise the attention
Although this discussion could be continued beyond the present point, enough has by now perhaps been said to suggest that Blair's literary interests, as well as his general scepticism concerning the value of rhetorical treatises and abstract principles, served to accentuate the bias with which he approached the problem of invention.

F. Blair's Constructive Advice Concerning Inventio

Since Blair categorically asserts that "artificial" aids to invention are of no use in discovering the substantive elements of an address, what, if anything, we may ask, does he substitute in their place? Does he give any constructive advice on the important problem of how to find speech materials?

At no one point in the lectures on eloquence does Blair set forth a unified and comprehensive account of the methods which he believes should be employed in performing this portion of the rhetorical task. Scattered throughout these discourses are, however, a number of remarks which, when they are brought together, constitute a relatively [attentos] of the hearers; which may be effected, by giving them some hints of the importance, dignity, or novelty of the subject; or some favourable view of the clearness and precision with which we are to treat it; and of the brevity with which we are to discourse. The third end, is to render the hearers docile [dociles], or open to persuasion; for which end, we must begin with studying to remove any particular prepossessions they may have contracted against the cause, or side of the argument, which we espouse."
coherent doctrine. This doctrine may be discussed in
terms of a fourfold division.

1. Blair insists that a speaker who would have material
which is "solid" and "persuasive" must draw it "ex
visceribus causae," from a thorough knowledge of the sub-
ject, and profound meditation upon it. 112 For the most
part, however, he is tantalizingly vague concerning the
nature of this eductive process. "[T]hink closely of the
subject," 113 we are told; "meditate profoundly," 114 give
"a diligent and painful attention to every cause," 115
make yourselves "masters of the business," 116 "fetch
materials from within." 117 This is the general nature
of Blair's advice. Upon only one occasion -- in dis-
cussing that portion of a sermon known as the "explica-
tion" -- are more specific directions given. Here he says:

112. Lectures, 32.354. See also 34.380, "Good sense
and knowledge are the foundation of all good speaking.
There is no art that can teach one to be eloquent, in
any sphere without a sufficient acquaintance with what
belongs to that sphere; or if there were an art that made
such pretensions, it would be mere quackery . . . .
Attention to style, to composition, and all the arts of
speech, can only assist an orator in setting off to ad-
vantdge, the stock of materials which he possesses; but
the stock, the materials themselves, must be brought from
other quarters than from rhetoric."

113. Ibid.
115. Lectures, 29.301.
116. Lectures, 27.286.
117. Lectures, 29.325.
Consider what light other passages of scripture throw upon it; consider whether it be a subject nearly related to some other from which it is proper to distinguish it; consider whether it can be illustrated to advantage by comparing it with, or opposing it to some other thing; by inquiring into causes or tracing effects; by pointing out examples, or appealing to the feelings of the hearers; that thus, a definite, precise, circumstantial view may be afforded of the doctrine to be inculcated. 118

Besides a thorough knowledge of the subject-matter of any particular address, the orator must, as a result of long and diligent study, be possessed of a broad background of general information about human affairs. Proficiency in rhetoric presupposes, says Blair, a thorough acquaintance with the so-called liberal arts. "It embraces them all within its circle, and recommends them to the highest regard." 119 He who wishes to speak or write effectively must first extend his knowledge by laying in "a rich store of ideas relating to those subjects of which the occasions of life may call [one] to discourse or to write." 120

118. Lectures, 31.5. Wittingly or unwittingly, Blair has here given us, it will be noted, a relatively accurate list of the usual commonplaces of classical rhetoric.

119. Lectures, 1.10. See also 34.381.

120. Ibid.
2. A specific technique which the orator may use in inventing -- and also, incidentally, in disposing\textsuperscript{121} -- materials is to "place himself in the situation of a serious hearer."\textsuperscript{122} Let him consider what he himself would expect and require in the way of substance. This will guide and facilitate the search. Blair makes a good deal of this suggestion, setting it forth both in the lecture on pulpit eloquence and in the lecture on legal speaking. In the latter place he repeats the advice given by Antonius in \textit{De Oratore} \textsuperscript{2}, that the advocate should study the case from three points of view, his own, that of the judge, and that of his opponent.\textsuperscript{123}

3. Blair advances as a third aid to invention imitation and the study of models, provided these practices are kept within reasonable bounds. A preacher may, he thinks, "pick up much for his improvement" by observing the preaching of others.\textsuperscript{124} He must, however, be fully

\textsuperscript{121} As a matter of fact, Blair's discussion of this point is somewhat confusing. In the lectures on pulpit eloquence and legal speaking he appears to treat it as a methodology of inventing. In Lecture 32, however, he discusses it under the head of "selection," which, as previously noted, he considers an element of \textit{dispositio}.

\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Lectures}, 29.317-8.

\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Lectures}, 28.301.

\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Lectures}, 29.320.
aware that "servility of imitation extinguishes all genius, or rather is a proof of the entire want of genius." 125 As aids to preparation, printed sermons and theological writings should not become substitutes for original thinking.

When a preacher sits down to write on any subject, never let him begin with seeking to consult all who have written on the same text or subject. This, if he consult many, will throw perplexity and confusion into his ideas; and if he consults only one, will often warp him insensibly into his method, whether it be right or not. But let him begin with pondering the subject in his own thoughts; let him endeavour to fetch materials from within; to collect and arrange his ideas; and form some sort of a plan to himself, which it is always proper to put down in writing. Then, and not till then, he may inquire how others have treated the same subject. 126

The discussion of the use of models as "a means of improving in eloquence" -- one of the five "means" which Blair outlines in Lecture 34 -- follows substantially the pattern suggested in the preceding paragraph. Good models provide "proper examples" of style, composition, and delivery. They open new ideas, and enlarge and correct those which we ourselves supply. "They quicken the current of thought, and excite emulation." 127

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125. Lectures, 29.320.
126. Lectures, 29.325.
127. Lectures, 34.382.
is there any genius so original that it may not profit from them. 128 On the other hand, "Slavish imitation depresses genius . . . ." 129 The speaker or writer should "endeavour to have somewhat that is his own, that is peculiar to himself, and that characterizes his composition and style." 130 Much depends on the model that is selected. Even in the most estimable writers and speakers there are certain flaws. We must study to emulate only their excellences, not their defects. In fact, it is safest to draw from a combination of several worthy models "the proper ideas of perfection." 131

4. The fourth of the more or less specific suggestions which are advanced with reference to inventio is that the speaker should keep constantly in view the end for which he speaks. This is the final admonition in the lecture on pulpit eloquence, and for that reason if for no other we may assume that Blair considered it to be of more than passing importance.

On the whole, never [he says] let the capital principle with which we set out at first, be forgotten, to keep close in view the great end for which a preacher mounts the pulpit; even to infuse good dispositions into his hearers, to persuade them to serve God, and to become better men. Let this always dwell

128. Lectures, 34.382.
129. Ibid.
130. Lectures, 34.382.
131. Ibid.
on his mind when he is composing, and it will diffuse through his compositions that spirit which will render them at once esteemed and useful. 132

G. Summary

The principal aspects of Hugh Blair's inventional doctrine may be summarized as follows:

1. Blair apparently understood with a considerable degree of accuracy the nature and the limits of the classical theory of inventio. Moreover, he fully appreciated the importance of the inventional process as an integral element in all writing and speaking. He did not, however, believe that this process could be made to supply artificially the defects of an "original genius" for creation. Therefore, he criticized the classical doctrine, and ruled out of the province of rhetoric all "artificial" aids to invention.

2. It is probable that Blair's attitude on this matter was influenced by his doctrine of genius, his views concerning the purpose and methods of rhetorical training, his scepticism as to the value of theoretical treatises on rhetoric and the abstract principles they contain, and his natural inclination toward those aspects of rhetoric which are most closely connected with belles lettres.

132. Lectures, 29.325-6.
3. Blair offered no unified and comprehensive substitute for the classical *inventio*. He did, however, suggest that the speaker should know his subject thoroughly and meditate upon it profoundly; that he should put himself in the place of a serious hearer; that, within certain limits, he might imitate worthy models; and that he should keep constantly in view the end sought by his address.
Chapter VII

THE INVENTIONAL SYSTEM OF RICHARD WHATELY

A. Introduction

Richard Whately's **Elements of Rhetoric** is the most recent of the five treatises included in this survey; it is also the most modern in spirit and method. From Whately more, perhaps, than from any other single writer stem our present-day concepts of rhetoric in general and of **inventio** in particular.

As Parrish has observed, the **Elements** is designed primarily as "a textbook of ecclesiastic rhetoric." For Whately, rhetorical principles are functional tools which a theologian may employ to demonstrate the soundness of his doctrines. Everywhere, therefore, his concern is more with the problem of establishing fact past than with the problem of deliberating fact future. The traditional threefold division of discourses into deliberative,


2. Wayland Maxfield Parrish, Richard Whately's **Elements of Rhetoric, Parts 1 and 2.** (Abstract of Cornell University Ph.D. Thesis, June, 1929), Unpaged. Hereafter cited as Parrish, **Abstract**. The first volume of the typescript dissertation is reported missing from the Cornell library.
epideictic, and forensic is disregarded. The probable and contingent nature of rhetoric goes unmentioned. Whately apparently believed that the Christian orator, starting out from the premises previously furnished by the revealed truths of religion, could attain to apodeictic certainty.

The general plan of the Elements reveals the pervasive influence of the psychology of the faculties. In the four major divisions of his work Whately deals successively with the subjects of conviction, persuasion, style, and delivery. Of these, the first receives the greatest emphasis and is of the greatest interest historically. The section devoted to style is relatively short and lacks originality. Sandford has remarked that it reads "more or less like a condensation of Campbell's more ample treatment." De Quincey thought it unsystematic and desultory. Whately's comments on delivery command attention principally because of his attacks on the elocutionists and his advocacy of the so-called "natural method."


Critical opinion concerning the Elements does not present a uniform picture. Though De Quincey found much in the work of which he did not approve, he called it
In addition to the four sections just noted, the Elements contains a rather lengthy introduction and an appendix. The introduction is important chiefly because it includes Whately's famous definition of rhetoric. The appendix, entitled "Containing Extracts from Authors, With Remarks," gradually grew in length as one edition of the work succeeded another. The seventh (1846) contains eighteen selections, covering in my copy some fifty-four pages. One section of the appendix is given over to a list of Baconian antitheta. This might lead the student to suppose that Whately's inventional system owes some debt to Bacon's rhetoric in general and especially to the antitheta. Such, however, is not the case. As a matter of fact, the broad doctrine presented in the Elements may be regarded as a reaction against the type of inventional theory which Bacon exemplifies. Therefore, the most tenable view is to regard this list of formulae

"incomparably the best book of its class, since the days of Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric." De Quincey's Works, 2.371. Jebb considered it "the best modern book on the subject [of rhetoric]." (R. C. Jebb, "Rhetoric," Encyclopedia Brittanica. 14th ed.) Saintsbury, on the other hand, judges the Elements "distinctly retrograde" when compared with Campbell's treatise. (Saintsbury, 2.470.).

as an appendage unrelated to the general framework of Whatelean inventio.

The key to Whately's inventional system is, I suggest, to be found in the distinction, drawn both in his Logic and in his Rhetoric, between the method of inquiry and the method of proof. The first, he tells us, begins with known premises and attempts to determine what previously undiscovered conclusions may follow from them; the second begins with conclusions standing as unsupported hypotheses and attempts to search out such arguments as may substantiate these asserted propositions. The type of mental activity characteristically employed in inquiry Whately calls "inferring"; that used in confirmation he designates as "proving." Furthermore, in a most significant paragraph he asserts that "inferring" is the business of the "philosopher"; "proving" that of the "advocate."

Looking more closely at the nature of proof we learn that it consists in "the assigning of a reason or argument

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9. Logic, 239.
for the support of a given proposition. . . . "\(^{10}\) When adducing proof one does not, as in the process of discovery, attempt to expand the area to which a particular predicate is applicable; rather, his endeavor is "to refer the subject of which [he] would predicate something, to a class to which that predicate will (affirmatively or negatively) apply. . . . "\(^{11}\) Put into the technical language of rhetoric, his purpose is to find appropriate "middle terms." It is, says Whately, exactly this searching for "middle terms" that constitutes "the inventio of Cicero."\(^{12}\)

Although this is certainly an imperfect description of Cicero's invention doctrine, the important fact is that Whately specifically associates inventio with the discovery of "middle terms" -- i.e. "reasons" or "arguments" which substantiate a given contention. Such a view of inventio necessarily rests, as I shall endeavor to show, on two important assumptions: The first is that an orator approaches his invention task with his basic proposition or proposal already formulated. The second

\(^{10}\) Logic, 238.

\(^{11}\) Ibid.

\(^{12}\) Logic, 239. Cf. Logic, 62, 66, 213, 224. On reasoning as a process of finding "middle terms" see Analytica Posteriora, 89b. Whately was very probably familiar with this passage.
is that his investigation of the raw facts bearing upon the cause has been completed before he begins to "invent." On both these matters Whately is quite explicit and unusually insistent. The purpose of those methods and principles which we collectively call **inventio** is, therefore, merely to help the speaker determine how this proposition may most effectively be supported in the light of the particular factual data available to him. More specifically, the speaker already knows what to say; **inventio** is concerned with the problem of how best to say it.

Needless to remark, such an interpretation departs considerably from the major stream of classical theory. The functions of the topics and of important areas of the **status** are by this single doctrinal change rendered entirely superfluous. The problem of discovering what to say is, in fact, taken completely out of the province of rhetoric and is attached to the method of inquiry -- i.e. that method which belongs to the "philosopher" rather than the "advocate."

The result of this alteration is that **inventio** becomes in the Whatelean analysis an integral part of that general function which in this study has been termed "management." In other words, inventional rules and principles directly govern the organization and conduct of the finished discourse. In most of the important classical treatises such matters were, of course, viewed
as lying within the province of dispositio. The tasks of evaluating, selecting, and handling materials, as well as the sheer mechanics of arranging them, belonged, as has previously been shown, to this "part" of rhetoric. The sum effect of Whately's doctrine is to merge the two fields. An orator skilled in invention lore will not only be thoroughly acquainted with each of the various proof patterns which may be employed in influencing others; he will also know how to "use" and to "order" them. Unless knowledge of these last two functions accompanies learning in the first, the substance of the speech cannot be effectively "managed."

In order to illustrate this general doctrine let us follow a speaker through the various invention tasks involved in preparing an address. First of all, he derives by some method extraneous to the science of rhetoric a general proposition which it will be his duty to support.13 Next, employing the method of inquiry, he searches out and accumulates those materials which constitute the factual content of his effort. Now, for the first time, he turns to methods and techniques residing in the province of rhetoric. Into what argumentative forms should these

13. The speaker may, of course, rephrase or modify this proposition in order to render it more easily supportable by "Argumentative Composition." Such activity Whately would consider an aspect of rhetoric. At the same time, however, the fact remains that the raw proposition itself is derived by non-rhetorical means.
various materials be put? To answer this question he runs over in his mind previously learned proof patterns, or, as Whately calls them, "arguments." That is, he considers the "Argument from Sign," the "Argument from Example," the "Argument from Progressive Approach," etc. Each of these has, as he already knows, certain advantages and certain disadvantages. Moreover, each is better adapted to proving one sort of contention than it is to proving another. In the light of such considerations he makes his selection.

But the problem of how most effectively to present his message is as yet only partially solved. The speaker must still consider what "use" is to be made of the patterns he has selected -- how they are to be handled in the particular situation which faces him. As aids in making this decision he will study such questions as the following: Is the presumption on my side or do I have the burden of proof? Is the proposition I am supporting one of "fact" or one of "opinion"? How much refutation and what kind of refutation will be needed to counteract the arguments of my opponent? These too are for Whately inventional considerations because if they are improperly dealt with the effectiveness of the speaker's "Argumentative Composition" will be impaired.

There can be little question but that Whately's constructive thinking about the problem of inventio is confined almost exclusively to the area of the logos. Al-
though pathos occupies a relatively important position in the general framework of his rhetorical system, his treatment of this mode is a curious mixture of traditional doctrines and ill-advised innovations. Except for some foreshadowings of the "motivation" theory, it has today little more than curiosity value. The analysis of logos is, on the other hand, intimately related to our present-day science of argumentation. 14 Reflection will, I believe, make it evident that the method frequently followed in textbooks on argumentation is to analyze the various forms which argumentative appeals may assume -- i.e. the argument from example, analogy, authority, etc. -- and then show when and how each of these forms is to be employed in actual attempts at influencing belief and behavior. These directions, together with attendant discussions concerning the burden of proof, types and methods of refutation, and the principles governing the composition of argumentative speeches, are obviously not aimed at teaching the student how to find materials, but rather how to manage arguments in an actual discourse. Moreover, the processes of discovery are nearly always referred to methods which show little similarity to the states and topics of the ancients. In these respects -- and also in our growing tendency to appropriate the methods of scientific

14. In this connection see especially Rowell, Part 2, 236.
investigation for the tasks of rhetorical discovery\textsuperscript{15} -- our teaching of argumentation is definitely Whatelean.

A similar generalization may be made about the treatment of \textit{inventio} in present-day public speaking texts. Here also attention is frequently centered on an analysis of argumentative types and on directions concerning their use, while the problems of discovery are treated in a non-classical manner.\textsuperscript{16}

If, then, Campbell may be said to have introduced a revolution into invention theory by broadening its base and by directing its emphasis to matters other than the discovery of speech materials, Whately brought that revolution to fruition. It was he who took the doctrine of management, so clearly foreshadowed by Campbell, and correlated it both with Aristotelian principles and with certain advances in contemporary logic and psychology. Out of these relationships evolved that comprehensive and fruitful neo-Aristotelianism which forms the foundation for much of our present-day thinking about rhetoric in general and \textit{inventio} in particular.

\textsuperscript{15} See, for example, such a work as Henry Lee Ewbank and J. Jeffery Auer, \textit{Discussion and Debate.} (New York, 1941), 77 ff.

\textsuperscript{16} See Bryant and Wallace, 148-68 and 371-402; Crocker, 133-44 and 145-56; Sandford and Yeager, 52-9 and 166-70; Sarett and Foster, 353-71 and 435-72, etc.
B. The Province and Nature of Rhetoric

Rhetoric, declares Whately, is "Argumentative Composition," generally and exclusively. Since, as is evident from a study of the Logic, he makes the term "Argumentative Composition" synonymous with proof ("Reasoning"), and, in turn, equates proof with syllogism, this is tantamount to saying that rhetoric is that kind of composition which partakes of the method of syllogistic proof. It is an organon whereby prior premises may be demonstrated, and, at the same time, a discipline concerned with studying how the patterns of valid reasoning devised and tested by logic may be employed in giving instruction and winning belief. Therefore, rhetorical method must be sharply distinguished from the method of inquiry. It presupposes that investigation is complete, and the rhetorician qua rhetorician is not concerned with this sort

18. Logic, Introduction, 31; 213, etc.
19. Passages bearing upon Whately's concept of syllogism as the universal category or form of reasoning are Logic, 43-4, 48, 52, 61, 214. For his refutation of Campbell's view that syllogism involves a petitio principii see Logic, 214.


20. See Logic, 238-9, etc.
of intellectual activity. How can conclusions most effectively be communicated so as to win understanding, belief, and action? This is the problem with which rhetoric is concerned.

But what, we may inquire, does Whately mean by the two words "generally" and "exclusively"? The first undoubtedly implies that rhetoric makes use not merely of certain selected methods of argumentation, but that it characteristically employs all of the various modes by which proof may be adduced -- in other words, that it is coextensive with reasoned discourse. "Exclusively," I suggest, means not, as both Parrish and Pence have supposed, that rhetoric is concerned with nothing except argumentation; but rather that no other art or science has as its sole province the finding and disposing of arguments. These functions rhetoric possesses alone; all its other functions, however, it shares with some neighboring discipline.

Whately appears to me to be quite explicit on this point. At the beginning of the second chapter of Part I of the Elements he writes: "The art of inventing and arranging Arguments is . . . the only province that Rhetoric can claim entirely and exclusively." Obviously, this is considerably different from asserting, "Rhetoric is entirely

22. Elements of Rhetoric, 40.
and exclusively the art of inventing and arranging arguments." If this were his meaning, Parrish would be correct in saying that Whately "uses 'rhetoric' arbitrarily to cover the particular activity in which he is most interested . . . [and] makes no attempt to justify his inclusion of rules for persuasion in a treatise which is to consider 'argumentative composition exclusively.'"

What Parrish overlooks, however, is that a similar charge may well be brought against Aristotle himself and all those writers who, following him, characterize rhetoric as a counterpart of dialectic. Moreover, it is highly improbable that Whately would have intentionally included in his treatise on rhetoric some fifty pages of material which he did not believe pertained to that subject.

Whately's meaning, therefore, seems to be that in communicating "the outcomes of thought" the public speaker employs some means which fall entirely and exclusively within the province of rhetoric -- i.e. means which are the property of rhetoric and of no other art or science. These are a knowledge of inventing and arranging arguments. In addition, he also employs various means which are the common property of rhetoric and of


24. This phrase is borrowed from James H. McBurney and Kenneth G. Hance, The Principles and Methods of Discussion. (New York, 1939), 4, etc.
some other discipline. These, we infer from the contents of Whately's treatise, are: 1. a knowledge of the subject (shared with the appropriate substantive science), 2. address to the passions (shared with poetry), 3. style (shared with all types of literature), and 4. elocution (shared with acting, etc.).

The means of influencing which reside entirely and exclusively within the realm of rhetoric are off-shoots from the science of logic. Whately, however, does not use the expression "off-shoot" in the same sense that Aristotle uses "counterpart" -- i.e. to characterize rhetoric as a system of probabilities standing beside analogous systems which produce correspondingly higher degrees of certainty. On the contrary, it is probable that by "off-shoot" he desires to imply five somewhat diverse characteristics of the science of effective discourse. These may be stated as follows: 1. Rhetoric is an "off-shoot" from logic in the sense that rhetorical principles -- that is, principles belonging to rhetoric entirely and exclusively -- arise out of underlying logical concepts. 2. Like logic, rhetoric is a purely instrumental discipline, without a


26. The very fact that Whately treats enthymeme as a truncated syllogism is prima facie evidence of the fact that he does not view rhetoric as the "counterpart" (in the Aristotelian sense) of logic. (See Logic, 118, etc.)
content of its own. Therefore, it is indifferent to the truth or falsity of the substantive premises which it employs; nor do there exist any special relationships between rhetoric and particular bodies of subject-matter, as Aristotle suggested when he described this science as an "off-shoot" of that "study of Ethics which may properly be called 'political.'" Rhetoric is merely a neutral tool. It is a means by which all subjects may be analyzed and turned to the ends of persuasion.

3. Rhetoric, again like logic, includes within its scope only those principles which have universal validity. The merely accidental -- a speaker's reputation, wealth, or rank, for example -- does not fall within its province, for these are matters which may or may not be present in any particular rhetorical situation.

4. Rhetoric is similar to logic in that it is both a science and an art. As a science it studies the means of influencing others through the medium of argumentative discourse; as an art it teaches how these means are to be employed. Moreover, rhetoric is not merely an art of influencing by

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27. See Logic, Introduction, 35, etc.


29. One of the obvious consequences of this doctrine is to rule out of the field of inventio topics peculiar to individual subjects.

30. See Logic, 42.

language, but rather it is the art of so influencing. All effective verbal persuasion must, either by design or by chance, adhere to the laws which it teaches. Rhetoric goes beyond logic in that it is concerned not only with "Argumentative Composition" itself, but also with the additional matters indicated above -- style, delivery, and the like. Therefore, it is an "off-shoot" from logic in the sense that it branches out from this science, adding to its principles of analysis and proof maxims governing the production of graceful and affecting discourse.

C. Whately's Doctrine of Inventio

Because Whately rules out of the province of rhetoric those accidental "persuasives" arising from the reputation, wealth, or social standing of the orator, it might be assumed that he excluded from the science of discourse the entire field of ethical persuasion. Such, however, was not his intention. Although he does not treat ethos as a separate and independent head coeval in importance with logos and pathos, he does, as we shall see, by a piece of original if somewhat dubious reasoning, bring ethos into his system as a sort of subdivision of pathetic appeal. Thus, in broad outline, the inventiona doctrine offered in the Elements deviates from the traditional pattern in that, while not overlooking ethos entirely, it does relegate this department to a position inferior to those occupied by logos and pathos. For this
reason the following analysis is organized in terms of those two heads.

1. The Logos. a. Analysis. In line with his basic assumption that if the orator would know how to discover those arguments best suited to convince others he must thoroughly comprehend the nature of each of the various forms which argumentation may assume, Whately in Part I of the Elements analyzes the species of logical proof.

(1). Causes and Reasons. When properly classified, arguments, says Whately, will be found to fall into two great classes - "causes" and "reasons." With the first of these the rhetorician qua rhetorician is not much concerned. Causes provide explanations whereby we may account for the existence of phenomena. As a result, they belong primarily to the process of inquiry rather than to

32. Elements of Rhetoric, 44. See also 51. In studying Whately's analysis of the types of "argument" it must constantly be borne in mind that he uses this term not as did the ancients to mean "assentible proposition," but rather to refer to that process by which conclusions are derived from premises (argumentatio). Thus he speaks of "Argument from Example," "Argument from Cause to Effect," etc. It is on the basis of this definition of "argument" that he denounces as "strangely unphilosophical" the Aristotelian distinction between artificial and inartificial "Persuasives." See Elements of Rhetoric, 40.

33. Elements of Rhetoric, 51. He will, however, refer to causes when instructing, since to make evident the cause of a phenomenon is to go far toward explaining its nature. See Elements of Rhetoric, 84.

34. Elements of Rhetoric, 44.
that of proof and, therefore, lie chiefly within the province of the philosopher. "Reasons," on the other hand, are the means "of our knowing, or being convinced" that certain things are so.35 Consequently, it is for "reasons" that the orator must search when he attempts to convince other persons of the soundness of his views.

"Reasons" -- the characteristic tools of rhetorical proof -- are of two kinds, "signs" and "examples."36 "By 'Sign,' . . . is meant, what may be described as 'an argument from an Effect to a Condition . . . ."37 In other words, we argue that any circumstance in so far as it is a condition of a certain phenomenon may be inferred from the existence of that phenomenon. If the condition can be shown to be "absolutely essential," the argument has the effect of a demonstration, and in proportion as it approaches this condition, its cogency is progressively increased.38

Now, among the circumstances conditional to any effect must evidently be the cause or causes of that effect. In some arguments from sign, therefore, the conclusion which follows "logically" from the premise will also be "the

35. Elements of Rhetoric, 50.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
Cause from which the premise follows, physically. "39 In such cases "these two kinds of Sequence [i.e. the logical and the physical] are combined ... ". 40 or, to put the matter more precisely, the reason for a thing's being [ratio essendi] and the reason for our knowing it [ratio cognoscendi] are identical. Because of this fact, the distinction between causes and reasons is "a fruitful source of confusion" and "hardly any argumentative writer ... has clearly perceived and steadily kept [it] in view ... ". 41 The point to remember is that although a condition may be a cause, it is not necessarily one. To cite an illustration, the wetness of the earth indicates that rain has fallen; yet it is in no sense the cause of the rain. 42 When doubt arises as to whether a particular argument is a "cause" or a "reason" it may be resolved by

39. Elements of Rhetoric, 49.

40. Ibid.

41. Elements of Rhetoric, 49-50.

42. Elements of Rhetoric, 50. Note that here Whately, departing from his usual practice, uses the word "argument" to mean "assentible proposition."

The basic distinction between ratio essendi and ratio cognoscendi stems, of course, from Aristotle, and Whately's description of the argument from sign adheres in all major respects to the analysis found in Analytica Priora (70a-b), De Sophisticis Elenchis (167b), and elsewhere. In fact, there is good reason to argue that Whately's exposition of the concept is actually less ambiguous than Aristotle's.
asking this decisive question: "Supposing the proposition in question to be admitted, would this statement here used as an Argument, serve to account for and explain the truth, or not?" If the answer is yes, the argument is a "cause"; if no, it is a "reason." 43

(2). Arguments from Sign. a. Testimony. Among those arguments from sign that "infer some 'condition' which is not the Cause" is the argument from testimony.

Whately's reason for departing from standard practice and thus classifying testimony as a kind of sign is, to say the least, curious. The transformation is worked by asserting that when one argues from the report of a witness "the existence of the Testimony" constitutes a premise, while "the Conclusion, [is] the truth of what is attested . . . ." 44 This arises out of the fact that the truth of the testimony must be regarded "as a 'Condition' of the Testimony having been given: since it is evident that so far only as this is allowed, (i.e. so far only as it is allowed, that the Testimony would not have been given, had it not been true,) can this Argument have any force." 45

In order to throw light on this none too lucid statement it may be said that Whately apparently assumes that

43. Elements of Rhetoric, 44.

44. Elements of Rhetoric, 51.

the witnessing of some actual event or condition (either by him who gives the testimony or by some other person) is a necessary antecedent to making a report concerning it. Therefore -- put into slightly different language -- what Whately is saying is this: The conclusion to be drawn from an argument by testimony is that the witness either is or is not truthfully reporting on the events in question. Obviously, no such conclusion may be drawn unless the witness makes a statement. Consequently, his testimony is the premise upon which the inference is based, and the "condition" necessary to the conclusion's being accepted is that the witness report truthfully.

It is not within the province of this study to attempt a detailed analysis of Whately's doctrine. Our interest is, however, aroused by the fact that it is, among other things, an ingenious if not wholly convincing attempt to make testimony an artistic proof. According to Whately's analysis, the report of a witness is not in and of itself a finished and complete piece of argument which may be thrown without further invention effort into the proof pattern of a speech. Instead, it is merely a springboard for establishing in the eyes of the audience the truth of the matter reported. Testimony does not furnish a conclusion which is ready made; it aims at one which must be invented.46

46. In this connection it should be recalled that the classical doctrine of quasi-positions recognizes that inartificial proofs may provide occasions for argument.
(b). The Calculation of Chances. Whately's remarks on "the Sophism of Composition" quite naturally lead him to undertake an analysis of the calculation of chances. This subject properly falls under a discussion of arguments from sign because in such calculations we measure the likelihood of a certain effect by reasoning back to the conditions which make that effect more or less probable.

As Campbell had previously recognized, a knowledge of chance is important to the orator since in most of the practical affairs of life we must act on incomplete evidence and must decide concerning matters which do not present definitely weighted alternatives for action. Consequently, we are forced to make judgments by balancing probabilities and by estimating the chances for one result as against those for another.

Whately's treatment of chance has been intensively studied by Pence and has been found to contain certain fundamental weaknesses. We need not retrace his argument. What is important in this investigation is the fact that Whately considers the subject of chance a legitimate

47. See Elements of Rhetoric, 63 and Logic, 179-83.
48. See Philosophy, 78 and ff.
49. Elements of Rhetoric, 66.
part of rhetorical theory and that he attempts to give it a precise and practical treatment which will be useful to the orator both as he attacks and as he defends. In this respect, if in no other, his effort must be regarded as superior to the more philosophical but less practical analysis offered by Campbell.

Whately begins by pointing out that the fundamental nature of chance is frequently misunderstood. Many persons assert that in those cases where the chances against any particular result are the same as those against any other particular result -- in these cases each one of the possible results has an equal chance of occurring.51 Thus the sophist may even argue that the Iliad could have been produced by the fortuitous shaking together of the letters of the alphabet since the chances against their falling in meaningful order, however remote such a possibility might be, are not greater than against their falling in any other conceivable order.52 And, likewise, the chances against the cards in a pack being in regular sequence are not greater than against their being in any other particular order.53

The truth of the matter, however, is "that any sup-

51. Elements of Rhetoric, 63.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
position is justly called improbable, not from the number
of chances against it, considered independently, but from
the number of chances against it compared with those which
lie against some other supposition." 54 Therefore, in the
case of the Iliad, although the chances against the letters
falling into meaningful order are no greater than against
their falling into any other particular order, the chances
against their having fallen thus by chance are much greater
than against their being the work of "design." In a similar
way, the chances against the cards having been put in
order by design are fewer than against their having fallen
this way by chance. 55

This doctrine of probability has its foundation in
what Whately calls "the self-evident, but often-forgotten
maxim" that disbelief is in reality a form of belief. 56
"To disbelieve," he says, "the real existence of the city
of Troy, is to believe that it was feigned; and which
conclusion implies the greater credulity, is the question
to be decided." 57 Some may deem it more probable that
Homer should have celebrated actual accomplishments of
historical characters; others may incline toward the belief

54. Elements of Rhetoric, 64.
55. Ibid.
56. Elements of Rhetoric, 65.
57. Ibid.
that his work is entirely fictitious. In either case, however, a positive conviction is entertained. Therefore, the contrary of belief is not disbelief, but "ignorance" or "doubt." 58 "And even Doubt may sometimes amount to a kind of Belief; since deliberate and confirmed Doubt, on a question that one has attended to, implies a 'verdict of not proven'; -- a belief that there is not sufficient evidence to determine either one way or the other." 59

It is in the light of this Hegelian-like analysis that we must understand Whately's discussion of the calculation of chances. The reasoner, it should be re-emphasized, does not contrast a probability with an improbability; he compares one probability with another. His decision is awarded to that one of the alternatives which appears to have the preponderance of likelihood in its favor.

(c). Argument from Progressive Approach. In his discussion of testimony Whately pointed out that when a number of unrelated signs concur in establishing a certain conclusion they assume, as a result of this concurrence, a total force greater than the sum of whatever force they may have individually. 60 Related to this principle is the so-called argument from progressive approach. Here the probative value of a series of individual arguments

58. Elements of Rhetoric, 65.
59. Ibid.
60. Elements of Rhetoric, 57. Cf. Philosophy, 78.
is enhanced not by their chance concurrence in a particular conclusion, but merely as a result of the order in which they are arranged -- or, put more specifically, "from their progressive tendency to establish a certain conclusion." The strength of the argument lies, therefore, not so much in the intrinsic value of the various proof elements which compose it as in the particular pattern according to which those proof elements are disposed.

As an example of this sort of argument Whately describes the process by which we conclude that a body set in motion will eternally continue in motion unless hindered or stopped by some impeding force. Discovering that the effect of the original impulse is more and more protracted in proportion as friction is reduced, we infer that if it could be removed entirely motion would continue for ever. 62

(3). Arguments from Example. The second basic type of "reason" is the argument from example. As Whately himself points out, the term "example" is employed in the Elements "in its widest acceptation," and comprehends such argumentative forms as induction, experience, and analogy. 63 This grouping is justified on the ground that all of these arguments "consider one or more, known, individual objects or instances, of a certain Class, as a fair sample, in

61. Elements of Rhetoric, 66.
63. Elements of Rhetoric, 69. See in this connection Pence, 28-30.
respect of some point or other, of that Class; and consequently draw an inference from them respecting either the whole Class, or other, less known, individuals of it."64

(a). Induction. Induction Whately defines as an argument which "stop[s] short at the general conclusion."65 In other words, it is what we today customarily describe as an argument by generalization. Distinguished from induction is example proper. Here inference proceeds from a particular, through a generalization, to another particular.66 For all practical purposes, therefore, it may be regarded as identical with the Aristotelian argument from part to part.67

(b). Experience. Passing now to experience, Whately

64. Elements of Rhetoric, 69.


66. Ibid.

67. Whately also notes this additional difference between induction and example: When, he says, "we draw a general conclusion from several individual cases, we use the word Induction in the singular number; while each one of these cases, if the application were made to another individual, would be called a distinct Example. This difference, however, is not essential; since whether the inference be made from one instance or from several, it is equally called an Induction, if a general conclusion be legitimately drawn." In this connection he is careful to point out that the number of instances required to establish a conclusion depends on the nature of the subject-matter under consideration. See Elements of Rhetoric, 70-1.
asserts that it consists of those matters which have passed "under our own observation . . . ." Therefore, "Experience, in its original and proper sense, is," he says, "applicable to the premises from which we argue, not to the inference we draw." Moreover, it has reference only to individual fragments of past experiencing, and cannot in and of itself tell us anything about the future or about the general rules and principles governing phenomena. In short, experience can yield only experience; and experience itself is nothing more than a series of independent acts of experiencing. Whately gives this example:

A Farmer or a Gardner will tell you that he "knows by experience" that such and such a crop succeeds best if sown in Autumn, and such a crop again, if sown in Spring. And in most instances they will be right; that is, their Experience will have led them to right conclusions. But what they have actually known by experience, is, the success or the failure of certain individual crops. Therefore, the problem consists in discovering how the farmer, from that which is "actually known by experience" -- i.e. merely "the success or the failure of certain individual crops" -- can predict the success or failure

68. Elements of Rhetoric, 71.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
of future plantings.\textsuperscript{71}

Whately argues that reasoning from experience, like the other species of example, may be reduced to syllogistic form -- the ultimate category of all reasoning. The individual has stored up in his mind "certain major premises or principles" relating to the subject under examination; from observation he obtains data which supply him with appropriate minor premises. Therefore, that which is reported as the phenomenon experienced is in reality "the conclusions drawn from the combinations of those premises."\textsuperscript{72}

But what, we may inquire, is the nature of these "major premises or principles" which are stored up in the mind? Of what do they consist? Whately's answer to this question is not so direct as the reader has a right to expect. Yet it is fairly certain that he speaks to the point in an example which describes the reactions of a number of different individuals upon looking at the same book. One who has never learned to read sees, Whately says, only black marks on the paper; another recognizes them as letters but cannot read the language in which the book is written; a third has an "acquaintance" with the language, but does not understand it well; a fourth knows the language but is unfamiliar with the subject-matter.

\textsuperscript{71} Elements of Rhetoric, 71.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
of the book, and, therefore, cannot follow the author perfectly; a fifth, who has the necessary language and subject-matter backgrounds comprehends the work accurately and completely. 73

Now the point to note in this example is that "The object that strikes the eye [in other words, the physical source of the experience] is to all of these persons the same; the difference of the impressions produced on the mind of each is referable to the differences in their minds." 74 This, it would appear, can only be taken to mean that the major premise consists of the background of knowledge and previous experience which an individual brings to any new act of experiencing. But it is reasonable to assume that Whately would be willing to extend the concept so as to include under it the purpose, the state of mind, and even the biases and prejudices of the individual who is subject to the experience. What he appears to be saying is, therefore, substantially this: Each new item of experience is, consciously or unconsciously, fitted into a particular frame of reference. Upon the basis of this organized past knowledge we are able to generalize concerning those fresh pieces of information furnished us by the senses. In other words, the new experience is interpreted in terms of prior experiences with members of the

73. Elements of Rhetoric, 71-2.

74. Elements of Rhetoric, 72.
same class, and a conclusion relative to new data is thus formulated. If our reasoning has been valid this conclusion will have certain predictive value. It will give us an idea of the probable nature of future events and will thus tend to suggest appropriate courses of action. 75

(c). **Analogy.** The last of the species of example is the argument from analogy. As Whately conceives this mode, it is generically related to the argument from experience in that it too is concerned with the searching out of resemblances. 76 But whereas experience depends for its cogency upon a "direct resemblance" between premises, analogy makes evident a resemblance in the relations which each of two probative elements bears to some common third element. 77

75. How, it may be asked, would an orator use this form of argument in a speech? Whately's answer presumably would run about as follows: We know, for example, from past experience that the promises of dictators are not to be trusted. Therefore, we are apt to regard any new promise with well-grounded suspicion. The orator may take advantage of this cumulative experience by using it as a major premise from which to argue against the acceptance of fresh promises.

Such an argument would, of course, be effective only with persons who had appropriate backgrounds of experience. Men who, let us say, in 1937 had isolated themselves from the rest of the world and thus knew nothing of the broken promises of the past would not be so readily convinced by this appeal as would the generality of mankind.


77. Ibid. Whately recognizes that his definition of analogy departs from the commonly accepted signification of the term. He does, however, attribute to Aristotle the phrase "resemblance of relations." See *Elements of Rhetoric*, 72; cf. in this connection *Logic*, 177.
Take, for example, an egg and a seed. Although they certainly are not alike in appearance, size, or in many other respects, yet they are analogous in that they bear like relations, one to the parent bird, one to the old plant. In other words, the common property of relation provides a genus under which both fall. By demonstrating this fact, "many Arguments might be drawn from this Analogy." Because analogy is, therefore, a resemblance of relations rather than a "direct resemblance," and because to be analogous two things need not necessarily be alike, the strongest arguments of this genre are not, as in the case of experience, always drawn from closely similar phenomena. On the contrary, continues Whately, the strength of an analogy may sometimes actually reside in the fact that the "illustration" is found in something "considerably remote" from the point to be illustrated.

This naturally raises the question of "what differences do . . . and what do not, nullify the analogy between two cases." In a series of pertinent examples Whately shows that "the justness of [the] inference must . . . depend on the correctness of the 'Analogy,' in

78. Elements of Rhetoric, 72-3.
79. Elements of Rhetoric, 73.
80. Elements of Rhetoric, 74.
81. Ibid.
That is, in evaluating any analogy we are not, he maintains, concerned with the degree of similarity or of difference taken in gross, nor even with those individual differences or resemblances which are "intrinsically" the greatest. Rather, our attention should center solely in those resemblances and differences which bear directly upon the particular case in hand. Thus two widely divergent phenomena which happen to coincide at only one point — provided that point is the crucial one — will provide a stronger argument than will two relatively more similar cases which do not so converge.\(^8\)

Of particular pertinence to our investigation is the fact that Whately makes this test applicable not only to analogy but also to arguments from "Precedents, or acknowledged Decisions of any kind . . . ."\(^8\) This he is able to do because, by a piece of reasoning very similar to that used in the case of testimony, he brings precedents into the realm of artificial proofs. In his own words, "every recorded Declaration, or Injunction, (of admitted authority) may be regarded — in connection with the persons to whom, and the occasions on which, it was delivered — as a known

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\(^8\) Elements of Rhetoric, 77.

\(^8\) See Elements of Rhetoric, 74.

\(^8\) Ibid.
case; from which consequently we may reason to any other parallel case . . . ."85 Considered from this point of view, precedents partake of the essential nature of example. Therefore, the crucial question naturally will be "to whom, and to what [the precedent] is applicable."86

(d). Real and Invented Examples. Induction, example proper, experience, and analogy all are generically alike in this respect: Each takes "one or more, known, individual objects or instances, of a certain Class, as a fair sample, in respect of some point or other, of that Class; and consequently draw[s] an inference from them respecting either the whole Class, or other, less known, individuals of it."87 Now, the sample which is selected as representative

85. Elements of Rhetoric, 74-5. Aristotle, it will be recalled, included "maxim," a closely related form, under enthymeme. See Rhetorica, 1393a.

86. Elements of Rhetoric, 75. As an addendum to his discussion of analogy Whately points out that the "argument from Contraries" should properly be regarded as a species of analogical reasoning since "it is so far forth only as [contraries] agree" that they may be employed in argumentation. Thus, we call virtue and vice contraries because though greatly dissimilar, both fall into the general class of "moral habits." On the other hand, we should not say "'Virtue' is contrary to a 'Mathematical Problem'" for these two terms do not have a point of agreement in a common species. "In this then, as in other arguments of the same class, we may," Whately asserts, "infer that the two Contrary terms have a similar relation to the same third, or, respectively, to two corresponding (i.e. in this case Contrary) terms; we may conjecture, e.g. that since virtue may be acquired by education, so may vice; or again, that since virtue leads to happiness, so does vice to misery." (Elements of Rhetoric, 80.)

87. Elements of Rhetoric, 69.
of the class may in the case of any of these various modes of argument be, as Whately recognizes, either "real" or "invented." This means, it may be drawn either from the actual experience of mankind or it may be a fictitious creation adduced to illustrate or to prove the point in question.

Aristotle himself distinguished between these two types of examples and expressed the opinion that while the invented kind is more readily available, actual instances tend to be more convincing. Whately, however, here departs from his mentor, and in a penetrating analysis points out that no such generalization is warranted. The value of any particular sample is, he declares, to be judged not on the basis of its reality but on that of its "intrinsic probability." Thus an historical fact which happens to depart from some general trend, or one which is not closely parallel to the point to be proved, will have less force than an admittedly fictitious sample illustrating perfectly the contention to be established.

At the same time, however, Whately admits that an invented example which does not possess "intrinsic probability" is completely worthless, "whereas any matter

88. Elements of Rhetoric, 80-1.
89. Rhetorica, 1393b-1394a.
90. Elements of Rhetoric, 81.
91. Ibid.
of fact which is well established, however unaccountable it may seem, has some degree of weight in reference to a parallel case . . . ."92 Unfortunately, he is not explicit as to what course the orator should follow when confronted with the choice between employing a number of actual cases which are only roughly "parallel" or inventing a strikingly similar fictitious example. Perhaps generalization is impossible. In any event, Whately confines himself to an abstract analysis of these two types of instances.

b. Synthesis. Having analyzed the various types of arguments with a view to making clear the nature of each, Whately next turns his attention to a discussion "Of the various use and order of the several kinds of Propositions and Arguments in different cases."93 Under this head he treats the following matters: the ends or aims of argument, presumption and burden of proof, questions of fact and questions of opinion, the normal arrangement of arguments, the importance of determining whether the proposition advanced is known by the audience and acceptable to it, refutation, and the sufficiency of proof. Of these, the first three may be regarded as concerned principally with the "use" of arguments, and the next two with the "order" in which they are to be employed. The discussions of refutation and the sufficiency of proof do not fall


93. Part 1, Chapter 3.
clearly into either of these classes, and are most appropriately viewed as appended disquisitions.

Upon reflection it will become apparent that the diverse matters here grouped together have one point in common: each deals in some way or other with the evaluation, selection, and arrangement of previously gathered speech materials. Therefore, considered in terms of the framework provided by the major rhetoricians of antiquity, they belong not in the realm of inventio but rather in that of dispositio. According to the Whatelean analysis, however, inventio is conceived of not as a systematized process for searching out the substance of an address; instead, it is a body of knowledge conversant with all of the various forms which argumentation may assume. What effect does this radically different conception of inventio have upon the various topics now under consideration? The thesis here presented is that it markedly alters the nature of those among them which are concerned with the "use" of arguments. It implies that these are not so much aspects of the lore of dispositio as mere extensions of the data previously provided relative to the nature of argumentative forms. Obviously, if we are to understand fully the nature of any particular proof pattern we must not only know what it consists of, but we must also understand how it works to effect belief. Therefore, when Whately discusses the "use" which may be
made of various arguments he is merely approaching the problem of *inventio* -- as he understands it -- from a different point of view. This is reflected by the fact that his method, which up to this point has been predominately analytical, now becomes synthetical. Assuming that the student understands the nature of each of the argumentative possibilities at his disposal, how is he to select from among them those particular movements which will be most useful in gaining the specific end at hand? This process, no less than the one concerned with examining all of the argumentative possibilities, depends upon a thorough knowledge of the nature of arguments.

As a result of this view certain matters which were by the classical rhetoricians considered to be dispositional problems are now, because of an altered conception of the nature of *inventio*, brought within the province of that part of rhetoric. By this transference the field of *dispositio* is considerably narrowed and that of *inventio* correspondingly broadened.

Also of importance is another characteristic of Whately's analysis. This is his tendency so to interweave his discussion of "use" and "order" as to produce a unified doctrine which can only be described by that broad and hybrid term "management." Put more specifically, because Whately's interest centers in the question of how arguments are to be employed in an actual discourse he treats
all of the different matters bearing on this problem as a unit, and without regard to their status as inventional or dispositional concepts. What type of proof is best adapted to achieving each of the speaker's different ends or aims? What course of action should be followed if one has the presumption in his favor? How is a "matter of fact" established, and how a "matter of opinion"? When questions such as these are brought together and treated as a unit there naturally results a body of doctrine which is broader in scope and more pervasive in character than any of the subject-areas represented by the major methodological distinctions of classical rhetoric.

(1). The "Use" of Arguments. Whately's discussion of the "use" of arguments may, for the reasons above given, be considered a legitimate part of his inventional system. Under the head of "use" fall three considerations: a knowledge of the ends or purposes of argument, the twin problems of presumption and burden of proof, and the determination of whether the "matter" for argument involves a question of fact or one of opinion. Let us examine each of these subjects in the order indicated.

(a). The Ends or Aims of Argument. Whately recognizes two broad general purposes which the orator may have in speaking: 1. he may seek "to give satisfaction to a candid mind, and convey instruction to those who are ready to
receive it,"94 or 2. he may endeavor "to compel the assent, or silence the objections, of an opponent."95 From this analysis it is apparent that Whately, unlike Campbell, draws a clear distinction between the giving of information and the winning (or refuting) of belief. In fact, he goes so far as to differentiate between the argumentative movements best suited to each of these types of rhetorical activity, asserting that arguments a priori are chiefly useful in the first and arguments of the so-called "other class" in the second.96

(b). Presumption and the Burden of Proof. Parrish has remarked that Whately's discussion of presumption and the burden of proof "seems to be characteristically the product of his own mind."97 Certainly he did not find in any of the major rhetorical treatises, either ancient or modern, a direct precedent for his doctrine. Although the status deals with neighboring matters, it is,

94. Elements of Rhetoric, 84.
95. Ibid.
96. Arguments a priori are useful when conveying "instruction" because they "account for" the existence of a phenomenon, and to know how anything came into being is, Whately believed, tantamount to understanding it. We must remember that he is using the term a priori in the special sense described above -- to designate those arguments which account for the existence of phenomena.
97. Parrish, "Whately and His Rhetoric," 76.
as I have already shown, principally a system for locating the area in which a dispute lies. Presumption and burden of proof are, on the other hand, concepts which bear intimately upon the actual handling or management of a discourse. Instead of aiding in the analysis of a case and the discovery of speech materials, they are guides to the selecting, ordering, and handling of data previously gathered. Thus their chief function is to direct the speaker in determining the argumentative strategy that should be employed in any particular rhetorical situation. In short, whereas the status (like the topics) is an attempt to systematize the process of search and analysis, presumption and burden of proof are concepts whereby system may be introduced into the various processes involved in the proper management of a discourse. 98

Whately conceives of presumption and burden of proof as correlative phenomena standing in what might be called an antithetical relationship. This view has its genesis in the fact that he defines presumption, not as "a preponderance of probability," but rather as "such a pre-

98. The various processes which in Chapter 1 of this study have been designated as constituting the "superstructure" of the status -- i.e. determining the quaestio, infirmatio rationis, etc. -- bear, of course, upon the management of the speech itself. As is there shown, however, the fundamental purpose of the status was to act as a guide in discovering materials.
occupation of the ground, as implies that [a disputant's case] must stand good till some sufficient reason is ad-duced against it . . . "99 Thus, for example, when we say that by presumption a man is innocent until proved guilty we do not mean either that his innocence is to be taken for granted or that he is antecedently more likely to be innocent than guilty. We merely mean that it rests with his accusers to bring the charge and that if their charge be repelled he will stand acquitted.100 In other words, because we presume him to be innocent until proved otherwise, the accused is not required to assume the offensive in the argument. He needs only to defend the ground which he has by presumption been awarded.101

On the other hand, that party to the argument who does not have the presumption in his favor must launch an attack upon the ground pre-occupied by his opponent. This is what is meant by declaring that he has "the burden of proof." And when a moment ago it was asserted that presumption and burden of proof were correlative phenomena standing in an antithetical relationship my intention was to describe the very situation now evident -- namely, that in Whately's view the party who does not have the pre-

100. Elements of Rhetoric, 87.
101. Ibid.
sumption (who does not preoccupy the ground) automatically assumes the opposing role and shoulders the burden of proof. He it is who has the task of "going forward," of carrying the fight to his opponent.

Whately properly recognizes that the entire character of a "discussion" will very often depend on where the presumption lies. Specifically, he says:

A body of troops may be perfectly adequate to the defence of a fortress against any attack that may be made on it; and yet, if, ignorant of the advantage they possess, they sally forth into the open field to encounter the enemy, they may suffer a repulse. At any rate, even if strong enough to act on the offensive, they ought still to keep possession of their fortress. In like manner, if you have the "Presumption" on your side, and can but refute all the arguments brought against you, you have, for the present at least, gained a victory: but if you abandon this position, by suffering this Presumption to be forgotten, which is in fact leaving out one of, perhaps, your strongest arguments, you may appear to be making a feeble attack, instead of a triumphant defence.102

Although this passage illustrates the important role played in "discussion" by that which we call "presumption," it also displays a confusion in Whately's use of the terms "presumption," "position," and "argument." First of all, it may be noted that here as elsewhere Whately appears to assume that presumption is a condition or property that adheres to the "sides" of the argument. To use his own expression, it is something which you may or may not have "on your side." But he next says this: If one suffers the presumption "to be forgotten" he abandons his most favorable

102. Elements of Rhetoric, 87.
"position" and is forced to fight on less auspicious ground. Obviously, this must be taken as implying that presumption relates not to "side" but to "position."

Just because the troops issue forth out of the fortress to do battle on the plain does not mean that they have changed sides. They have merely altered their position. In the same way, the orator who chooses to hurl counter-charges when it would be sufficient to ward off the blows aimed at him, makes a decision relative to the position he will assume, not to the side he will take. His side, as we know, is determined not by the strategy of his argument but by whether he gives affirmative or negative answers to the questions raised by the major issues in the dispute. It is, therefore, fixed once and for all by a factor completely unrelated to position.

The consequences of this confusion are shown in a number of ways. Whately says, for instance, that the presumption "will often be found to lie on different sides, in respect of different parties."103 Thus in a "question" between a communicant of the Church of England and a member of any other church each will believe that the presumption is on his side.104 Moreover, it is perfectly possible, he asserts, for occasions to arise in which

103. Elements of Rhetoric, 90.
104. Ibid.
neither party has the presumption.105 And again, the presumption may shift from one party to another depending upon the relation between the positions chosen by them.106 All of these doctrines arise, it appears, out of the fact that he is thinking of presumption as adhering to position rather than to side. For if presumption were a function of side it would be located by means of the answers offered to those questions which constitute the major issues. In this case, as we may easily see, not more than one party to a dispute could possibly have the presumption in his favor because only one disputant may answer these questions in such a way as to assume the burden of proof. By the same token, there cannot be a dispute in which one party does not have the presumption because -- again, if there is to be any argument -- one of the disputants must initiate the attack. And above all, the presumption could never shift since it would be determined once and for all by the answers offered on the issues. The person who changes his answers on the issues does not merely change his position; he "shifts his ground" so as to admit the vital points in contention and, therefore, automatically loses the argument.

But in addition to this tendency to associate presumption first with "side" and then with "position"


Whately, as we remember, also asserts that to abandon the position in which presumption favors you is tantamount to "leaving out one of, perhaps, your strongest arguments..." In other words, he now makes analytical chaos of an already bad situation by equating the terms "presumption" and "argument." Considering Whately's definition of argument (as explained above) and taking into account what he has just said concerning the relationship between "presumption" and "position," this can only be regarded as a slip of the pen. Clearly, his meaning is, not that the speaker gives up one of his strongest arguments, but that he deliberately leaves the ground upon which his case might most effectively be argued.

Whately's inadequate handling of the logical nature of presumption is compensated for by his analysis of its social and psychological foundations. He recognizes that the pre-occupation of the ground in any particular controversy is determined not only by a logical analysis of the case, but also by such factors as social tradition and the nature of the human understanding. Institutions, traditions, and the like, have presumptions in their favor because they possess, we are told, a certain "Authority" that exercises an influence over belief. As this authority becomes established and the related presumption is made "habitual," there arises with respect

107. Elements of Rhetoric, 90.
to it a prevailing attitude which Whately describes by the term "Deference."\textsuperscript{108} "Deference" is at once the medium through which "authority" is transmitted, and the mental principle which makes us prone to accept it. Unlike the similar states of "admiration" and "esteem," "deference" is not always "the result of a judgment of the understanding."\textsuperscript{109} Rather, it is frequently "apt to depend on feelings; -- often, on whimsical and unaccountable feelings."\textsuperscript{110} As a result, it may be gained by so subtle a means as speaking manner.\textsuperscript{111} Likewise, it is sometimes aroused by those things which are venerable, or near at hand, or for which we have a deep personal affection.\textsuperscript{112} Because "deference" is thus an attitude which is often shaped by factors operating below the conscious level men may be "deceived" concerning the reasons underlying their willingness to accept certain authorities and their tendency to reject others.\textsuperscript{113}

Without specifically calling it such, Whately treats

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{108} Elements of Rhetoric, 90.
\item \textsuperscript{109} Elements of Rhetoric, 91.
\item \textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{111} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{112} Elements of Rhetoric, 92-3.
\item \textsuperscript{113} Elements of Rhetoric, 92.
\end{itemize}
deference almost as if it were a "faculty" or special power of mind.¹¹⁴ We admit, he says, the authority of those persons, ideas, or institutions which arouse in us this "feeling."¹¹⁵ Therefore, his interest centers in analyzing the nature of deference and explaining the circumstances by which the "feeling" is aroused. In so doing he shows how presumption is related to certain principles governing human mental activity, how it grows out of the habits of thought.¹¹⁶ Thus, for example, we have a presumption for that which is near at hand or for that which arouses our affections, etc. because, as Campbell would put it, the very "constitution of mind" causes us to venerate such things. If a speaker occupies the ground encompassed by one of the natural "feelings" he will have presumption in his favor just as he would have it if he stood upon some generally accepted custom or belief.¹¹⁷

The importance of Whately's discussion of deference has not been sufficiently noted by previous students of the Elements. It constitutes an unusually acute piece of constructive analysis and deserves more attention than it has hitherto received.

(c). Establishing Matters of Fact and Matters of

¹¹⁴. See Elements of Rhetoric, 91-2.
¹¹⁵. Ibid.
¹¹⁷. Ibid.
Opinion. Continuing his discussion of the "use" which is to be made of the various types of arguments, Whately distinguishes between those argumentative patterns suited to establishing "matters of opinion" and those adapted to proving "matters of fact." In the first case we are, he says, to employ arguments from antecedent probability and, to a lesser extent, "the Testimony (i.e. authority) of wise men ..." Fact past, on the other hand, is proved "chiefly by Signs, of various kinds (... including testimony)," and fact future by antecedent probabilities and examples.

We are not, however, to forget, Whately warns, that examples may sometimes be used in proving matters of opinion "since a man's judgment in one case, may be aided or corrected by an appeal to his judgment in another similar case." The rules to be observed here -- as indeed they must be observed whenever examples and parallel

118. Whately defines a "matter of opinion" as something concerning which "we are not said properly to know but to judge . . . ." (Elements of Rhetoric, 99.) This definition must be borne in mind if we are not to be misled by his remarks. Had he used the word "opinion" as a synonym for "probability" -- i.e. distinguished "opinions" from "certainties" -- we should certainly have a right to be confused by his assertion that "matters of opinion" are to be established chiefly by arguments from antecedent probability.


120. Ibid.

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid.

123. Elements of Rhetoric, 100.
instances are used as proof -- are these: 1. the cases cited should have the force of arguments and not be mere "illustrations" of the point in question, and 2. we should carefully distinguish those comparisons having probative value from those introduced as ornaments of style.

(2). Refutation. The basic plan of Whately's analysis of refutation is to bring together into a single and unified body of doctrine all that the practicing orator needs to know concerning this subject. Thus he discusses both the "collocation" and "conduct" of refutatory arguments. As a result, this portion of the Elements cuts across the traditional classical division of the "parts" of rhetoric and provides a prime example of the concept of management.

Speaking first of the place which refutation should occupy in the all-over pattern of the speech, Whately notes three possible points at which it may be introduced. As a general rule, it is, he says, to be placed in the "midst" of the discourse, "nearer the beginning than the end." But when there are generally current "very strong objections" to what we offer or when our opponent has just

125. Elements of Rhetoric, 102.
126. Elements of Rhetoric, 110.
brought against it a battery of arguments, we should undertake their refutation in the opening paragraphs of our address. At other times, on the contrary, the most advisable plan is to postpone refutation until the proofs supporting our own contentions have been fully developed. In this case, however, "it will be better to take some brief notice of them early in the Composition, with a promise of afterwards considering them more fully, and refuting them."

Turning next to a discussion of the argumentative patterns involved in refutation, Whately points out that there is no distinct class of refutatory arguments "since they become such merely by the circumstances under which they are employed." Therefore, those who assert that "Indirect Reasoning" is the characteristic mode of refutation are in error. Either "direct" or "indirect" proofs may be employed indifferently for refutation as for other purposes.

In an interesting and significant discussion Whately describes the limitations of refutatory arguments. Too

129. *Ibid*.
130. *Ibid*.
much, he says, is frequently "expected" from them, "especially by unpracticed reasoners."\textsuperscript{133} In the first place, they are prone to demand refutations where none may properly be asked for; in the second, they attribute to them more than they actually accomplish.\textsuperscript{134} "It is," writes Whately, "in strictly scientific Reasoning alone that all the arguments which lead to a false conclusion must be fallacious. In what is called moral or probable reasoning there may be sound arguments, and valid objections, on both sides."\textsuperscript{135} As to the overrating of a refutation: this results from forgetting that when an argument is satisfactorily answered merely the argument itself, and not the conclusion toward which it is directed, will thereby be obliterated.\textsuperscript{136} The proposition maintained may, of course, still very well be valid and there may be numerous other proofs by means of which its validity could reasonably be established.

Whately takes care to point out that it is unwise for a disputant to advance more than he is able to maintain with strong and solid arguments, for the convincing refutation of one inferior proof will often have the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{133} Elements of Rhetoric, 115.
  \item \textsuperscript{134} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{135} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{136} Elements of Rhetoric, 116.
\end{itemize}
psychological effect of destroying his entire argumentative structure. Consequently, "a weak argument is positively hurtful . . . ." One would do better to omit altogether than to run the risk of having his opponent settle upon this point for a devastating rebuttal.

The same principle results in "a most important maxim" relative to the fashion in which an orator should himself state those objections which have been leveled against his case by others. If he does not give them their full force, the stronger pronouncement coming from that advocate who seeks to repel them will lead the audience to believe that they are unanswerable. Likewise, when "decisive" objections are brought against some portion of an address the wise course is freely to admit their cogency. To deny it would only make the rest of the speaker's arguments suspect and call into question his reputation for honesty and fair dealing.

2. The Pathos. In the traditional Aristotelian analysis logos, ethos, and pathos stand as separate and independent means of persuasion. Logos comprehends all attempts to win belief and inspire action through the presentation of reasoned proofs. Ethos consists in

138. Elements of Rhetoric, 117.
139. Ibid.
evincing by means of the speech itself a personal character that will win confidence. Pathos designates an effort so to play upon the emotions of an audience that its perception will be warped and its judgment biased; for, as Aristotle himself said, "we give very different decisions under the sway of pain or joy . . ."141 In short, these three terms represent three different and distinct methods for achieving the same end, and despite the fact an orator usually employs them jointly, at no point in the rhetorical act do they lose their essential identity.

Whately worked a major alteration upon Aristotle's analysis by treating these "means" not as independent but rather as inter-dependent factors. Instead of viewing pathos as a distinct type of persuasive influence, he conceives of it -- to borrow Lee's expression -- as "a linear adjunct" to the logos.142 In other words, it is for him "an integral part of a total, connected persuasion process . . . ."143 Thus interpreted, pathos not only

143. Ibid.
loses its identity, but it breaks away from the functional Aristotelian concept of "biased perception" and becomes, as one may see, more intimately allied with our present-day doctrine of "motivation." In somewhat the same fashion Whately also violates the integrity of the ethos by treating it as a peculiarized aspect of pathetic appeal. 144 This modification he justifies on the ground that Aristotle's own manner of treating the concept suggests that he had in mind not the real character of the speaker, "but the impression produced on the minds of the hearer, by the Speaker, respecting himself." 145

A third important characteristic of Whately's treatment of pathos is his intentional avoidance of a comprehensive analysis of the various passions. His announced purpose is merely to set forth some precepts respecting their excitement and management; or, as he himself more precisely puts it, to present "A few miscellaneous Rules ... relative to the conduct, generally, of those parts of any Composition which are designed to influence the Will." 146 By this mode of treatment Whately divorces pathos from the area of discovery and purposefully transfers it, as will readily be understood, to the province of management. For him pathos is not a term designating

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144. See Elements of Rhetoric, Part 2, Chapter 3.
146. Ibid.
the region where a particular type of persuasive appeal may be found; rather, it implies a body of precepts governing the use of these appeals in actual discourses.

Except for the matters just indicated, Whately's discussion of pathos is not of much interest or importance. As is generally recognized, the stress of his system rests upon the subject of logical proof, and it is here that his originality as a rhetorical theorist is chiefly displayed. Even when treating of pathetic appeal Whately's dominant interest in the laws and formulae of logic frequently manifests itself. What other rhetorician, for example, would be likely to pause to point out that when "hearers are . . . induced, on insufficient grounds, to give the speaker full credit for moral excellence, from his merely uttering the language of it, the fallacy which in this case misleads them may be regarded as that of 'undistributed Middle' . . . .?"148

The authors to whom Whately most frequently refers in connection with his discussion of pathos are Aristotle, Cicero, and Campbell. For the most part, however, these

147. See Sandford, 123; Thonssen and Baird, 139; Parrish, "Whately and His Rhetoric," 75-6.

references bear upon relatively isolated matters which do not in any significant way help to shape the general nature of his doctrine. Certainly the analysis he presents is not characteristically Aristotelian or Ciceroian, and the major influence exerted by Campbell is probably in connection with the view that "conviction" and "persuasion" are mutually dependent modes of influencing. To this particular point let us now turn our attention.

Whately's analysis of pathos as "a linear adjunct" to logical argument is set forth in the opening paragraphs of Part 2 of the Elements. Although this doctrine clearly has its roots in the common eighteenth-century distinction between appeals addressed to the understanding and those directed at the emotions, the teachings of the faculty psychology are not here so evident as in the writings of Campbell and Blair.

Persuasion Whately defines as "the art of influencing the Will." It involves, he declares, two distinct

149. On the generality of this distinction see Harding, 98.

150. Elements of Rhetoric, 128. The use of emotional appeals in effecting persuasion is justified by Whately on the following grounds: 1. Passion may sometimes have a worthy no less than an evil end. 2. A knowledge of pathetic appeals will provide a means of defence against an unscrupulous opponent. 3. "Conviction" alone is not sufficient to move the will. 4. We do not issue a blanket condemnation against logical arguments though they are sometimes used by sophists to hide rather than reveal the truth. 5. Certain of man's "generous feelings" require constant stimulation. See Elements of Rhetoric, 131.
steps: 1. "the Conviction of the understanding" and 2. an "Exhortation" to action. "For in order that the Will may be influenced . . . the proposed Object should appear desirable; and . . . the Means suggested should be proved conducive to the attainment of that object . . . ." In other words, pathos and logos, instead of being separate modes of persuasion, operate jointly in the process of winning belief or action. As "Dr. Campbell has remarked . . . there can be no Persuasion without an address to the Passions . . . [and] he is right, if under the term Passion be included every active Principle of our nature." Reason alone can no more influence the will than "the eyes, which show a man his road can enable him to move from place to place; or than a ship provided with a compass, can sail without a wind."

It is here that Whately's concept of pathos departs from the Aristotelian doctrine of "biased perception" and allies itself with our present-day theories of "motivation." According to Whately, the purpose of pathetic appeal is not to make men render judgments while under the influence of an emotion -- for example, when they are angry at someone; it is a means for arousing their desires

151. Elements of Rhetoric, 128.
152. Ibid.
153. Elements of Rhetoric, 129.
for causing them to want certain "objects" so acutely that they will act to acquire them. In short, pathos is a process of motivating action; it is a dynamic rather than a static concept.\footnote{Evident at least as early as 1675 in Bernard Lami's L'Art de Parler, this interpretation of pathos is clearly discernible in John Lawson's theory that the desire for happiness lies at the basis of all our emotions (See Lee, 385), and is, of course, abundantly manifest in Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric.}

If then the purpose of pathetic appeal is to arouse desire, we must next inquire how this end may be achieved. The salient point to be borne in mind is, says Whately, this:

\ldots the Feelings, Propensities, and Sentiments of our nature, are not, like the Intellectual Faculties, under the direct control of Volition. \ldots One may, by a deliberate act of the Will, set himself to calculate, -- to reason, -- to recall historical facts, &c., just as he does, to move any of his limbs; on the other hand, a Volition to hope or fear, to love or hate, to feel devotion or pity, and the like, is as in-effectual as to will that the pulsations of the heart, or the secretions of the liver, should be altered.\footnote{Elements of Rhetoric, 131-2.}

As a result, the feelings cannot be reached directly; we cannot openly ask men to become angry, fearful, sad, or candidly request that they desire thus and so. We may, however, "by a voluntary act, fill the Understanding with such thoughts as shall operate on the Feelings."\footnote{Elements of Rhetoric, 133.}
This, Whately believes, is the key to successful pathetic appeal. If we wish to kindle "feelings" of reverence and admiration for "some extraordinary Personage" we must present a vivid picture of his actions and sufferings, his virtues and wisdom. In this way we may by indirection arouse the desired emotion. In more technical language, a passion is not excited by attending to it directly, but "by thinking about, and attending to, such objects as are calculated to awaken it."  

It may have been observed that up to this point Whately has indiscriminately grouped together in his discussion all of the so-called "active principles" of our nature -- i.e. he has generalized about them as a class. Now, in a short and unsatisfactory chapter, he attempts to divide these "principles" into their various species.

Following the classification offered by Dugald Stewart in his Outlines of Moral Philosophy, Whately distinguishes among "appetites," "desires," and "affections." The first are characterized by the fact that they have "their origin in the body"; the last "imply some kind of disposition relative to another Person" and include "Self-love, or the desire of Happiness" as well as the "Moral-

158. Elements of Rhetoric, 133.

159. Elements of Rhetoric, 134. Whately's theory that the emotions are to be aroused by presenting vivid pictures of those objects toward which the speaker desires they be directed may be regarded as a somewhat more refined statement of Campbell's dictum relative to the communication of "lively ideas." See Philosophy, 1:7.4.103, etc.

Faculty. As to the nature of "desire" Whately is strangely silent.

It is at this point in Whately's analysis that we encounter the significant paragraph in which he makes ethical proof a sub-division, as it were, of the pathos. Specifically, he says:

Under the head of Affections may be included the sentiments of Esteem, Regard, Admiration, &c., which it is so important that the audience should feel towards the Speaker. Aristotle has considered this as a distinct head; separating the consideration of the Speaker's Character . . . from that of the disposition of the hearers; under which, however, it might, according to his own views, have been included; it being plain from his manner of treating of the Speaker's Character, that he means, not his real character, (according to the fanciful notion of Quintilian [sic],) but the impression produced on the minds of the hearers, by the Speaker, respecting himself.

In thus advancing as the reason for his interpretation some vague internal evidence allegedly drawn from Rhetorica itself Whately makes it evident that he had not accurately read Aristotle on this matter. Admittedly Aristotle does present the thesis that the character of a speaker is revealed through his speaking. In this sense ethical appeal may indeed be regarded as something that is created


by the orator. Furthermore, it must, in some measure at least, be created anew in each fresh speaking situation. On the other hand, however, Aristotle certainly did not hold, as Whately appears to assume, that ethical appeal is wholly a matter of skilfully invented appearances -- that it is the "assuming" by artistic means of certain fictitious roles. In order to seem good, Aristotle believed, a man must of necessity be good. Art might come to his aid in making this intrinsic goodness evident to others; it could not, however, for long sustain an impression of virtue unless he actually were virtuous. 163

Now, given Whately's interpretation (or misinterpretation) of Aristotle's theory -- i.e. assuming that ethical appeal is completely a matter of appearances -- it is, of course, quite feasible to look upon ethos as a sort of sub-division of pathos. Any speaker will naturally "assume" that sort of character which tends to make him the "object" of favorable emotions. Therefore, our problem consists in explaining what may have led Whately thus to interpret Aristotle.

Two hypotheses suggest themselves: 1. Whately may have been influenced by the very general seventeenth- and eighteenth-century practice of viewing ethical appeal as the "assuming" of a role. This doctrine has been discussed

163. Pertinent passages are Rhetorica, 1356a and 1367b.
in connection with our exposition of John Ward's treatment of ethos and does not require further comment here. 2. It is probable that Whately brought to his reading of Rhetorica certain preconceived notions arising out of his conception of the nature and province of rhetoric. We must remember that he limited rhetorical theory to those principles and precepts which have universal validity, and that he specifically excluded from it such "accidental" factors as the reputation, wealth, and social position of the speaker.\textsuperscript{164} Such an analysis would naturally color his interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine.

Having described the various "active principles" underlying and motivating human behavior Whately next presents two long chapters entitled "Of the Conduct of any address to the Feelings, generally" and "Of the favorable or unfavorable disposition of the hearers toward the speaker or his opponent."\textsuperscript{165}

\textsuperscript{164.} \textit{Elements of Rhetoric}, Introduction, 17.

\textsuperscript{165.} Part 2, Chapters 2 and 3. This division of materials suggests, of course, the Ciceronian distinction between appeals aimed at moving the hearers and those designed to conciliate them. As a matter of fact, in discussing "disposition" Whately specifically relates it to "conciliation." It would, however, require considerable forcing to fit all of Whately's observations under one or the other of these familiar heads.
In addressing the "feelings" the following rules are to be kept in mind: 1. An appeal aimed at arousing the passions "should not be introduced as such, and plainly avowed; otherwise the effect will be, in great measure, if not entirely, lost." This injunction applies both when the motive involved is praiseworthy and when it is base. In the first case hearers are apt to be repelled by "the idea that they need to have these [good] motives urged upon them . . . " In the second, a frank avowal will put them "on their guard" and cause them "to fortify their minds" against appeal. 2. In order to excite an emotion "it is necessary to employ some copiousness of detail, and to dwell somewhat at large on the several circumstances of the case in hand . . . " 3. A more striking impression of the object toward which the emotion is directed may often be produced by "introducing circumstances connected with the main object or event, and affected by it, but not absolutely forming a part of it." By means of such indirect or oblique descriptions

166. Elements of Rhetoric, 136.
167. Elements of Rhetoric, 137.
168. Ibid.
169. Elements of Rhetoric, 139.
170. Elements of Rhetoric, 141.
"the general and collective result of a whole, and the effects produced by it on other objects, may be vividly impressed on the hearer's mind . . . ."\textsuperscript{171}

4. Comparison and climax are devices of composition which tend to excite and to augment an emotion.\textsuperscript{172}

5. When striving to arouse a passion the speaker may either "express openly the feeling in question" or he may give the appearance that he is "laboring to suppress it."\textsuperscript{173}

On some occasions the two methods are to be used jointly. In such cases the orator should at first seem to be holding back his emotion and then when the hearers have been worked up to the proper pitch suddenly give full vent to the passion.\textsuperscript{174}

6. When the particular "object" in question is not likely to excite the emotion desired attention may first be directed to another "object" which will call forth the proper feeling and then the passions thus aroused may be transferred to the desired "object."\textsuperscript{175}

Some of the considerations involved when the speaker seeks to arouse a disposition favorable to himself are

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{171} \textit{Elements of Rhetoric}, 141.
\item \textsuperscript{172} \textit{Elements of Rhetoric}, 142-3.
\item \textsuperscript{173} \textit{Elements of Rhetoric}, 143.
\item \textsuperscript{174} \textit{Elements of Rhetoric}, 144.
\item \textsuperscript{175} \textit{Elements of Rhetoric}, 145.
\end{enumerate}
these: 1. Self-commendation demands "a peculiar tact."
It must proceed subtly and by indirection.176 2. In es-
establishing a good impression -- i.e. one of "good Sense,
good Principle, and Good-will" -- the orator should remember
that different audiences will not agree as to what consti-
tutes each of these virtues.177 3. A reputation for elo-
quence may at times be an actual disadvantage, for men
are apt to view with suspicion one who is known for his
facility in speaking.178 4. The successful speaker must
show not only "ability" and "integrity"; he must also
display "good will" toward his hearers. Without this
last quality the first two, instead of enhancing his
appeal, may make him appear superior and coldly aloof.179
5. In order to persuade others a man needs first to make
evident the fact that he himself is sincerely convinced
of the proposition he advances.180

The rules for managing those passages which have for
their purpose the disparagement of an opponent may,
Whately believes, be inferred from what has just been said

176. Elements of Rhetoric, 146.
177. Ibid.
178. Elements of Rhetoric, 150.
180. Elements of Rhetoric, 155.
concerning self-commendation. 181 Therefore, he does not discuss this head. Instead, he turns his attention to a number of more general matters relating to the excitement of the passions and the conciliation of an audience.

First of all, it is pointed out that although men in general are admittedly "too much disposed to consider more, who proposes a measure, than what it is that is proposed" we must not automatically conclude that all arguments drawn from "the character of the advocates" and similar "probable" sources are necessarily "irrelevant and inconclusive." 182 Only in strictly scientific matters may such proofs be completely ruled out. 183 To take for granted, says Whately, "that, in every case,

181. Elements of Rhetoric, 156-7. The exact way in which rules for disparagement are to be inferred from those for self-commendation is not, unfortunately, altogether clear. Whately appears to mean that in some cases these "rules" furnish topics for arguments. Thus, a speaker might, for example, charge that his opponent did not bear good will toward the audience, that he was not himself convinced of the proposition he advanced, or, perhaps, his reputation for eloquence might be used as a warning against his sincerity. On the other hand, it is difficult to see what inference we are to draw from the principle that self-commendation must proceed by the indirect method. Does this mean that disparagement is to be direct or indirect? When speaking exclusively of the "places" for praise and blame it may be feasible to offer the blanket statement that the second are inferable from the first; when, however, we are concerned with the problems of conduct or management no such generalization appears possible.

182. Elements of Rhetoric, 156.

decisive arguments to prove a measure bad or good, independent of all the consideration of the character of its advocates, could be found, and also could be made clear to the persons addressed, is a manifest begging of the question. The truth of the matter is that useful proofs no less than obvious fallacies may frequently result from references of a personal nature.

Second, Whately declares that among those factors likely to mislead men in forming favorable or unfavorable judgments concerning others, one of the most influential is "experience." We tend to forget the fact that an extensive practical acquaintance with one field does not as a matter of course make a person competent to judge concerning other areas. The crucial question, therefore, is not how much experience a man has had, but what it is that "constitutes Experience in each point." 186

Entering upon a different matter, Whately next asserts that an unfavorable passion is to be allayed "not by endeavoring to produce a state of perfect calmness and apathy, but by exciting some contrary emotion." 187

184. Elements of Rhetoric, 156.
186. Ibid.
For rhetorical purposes emotions which "in strictness" are not contrary may be regarded as such. Thus "anger" may be allayed by "fear" no less than by its exact contradictory "Good-will." In addition, "it will [often] be easier to give a new direction to the unfavorable passion, than to subdue it; e.g. to turn the indignation, or the laughter, of the hearers against a different object. Indeed, whenever the case will admit of this, it will generally prove the more successful expedient; because it does not imply the accomplishment of so great a change in the minds of the hearers."

Whately's last general observation on the management of the pathetic portions of a discourse is to point out that we must view with caution the traditional doctrine that serious argument may often effectively be met with ridicule. This rule is, he says, "only occasionally applicable in practice." If the nature of the situation be misjudged or if the attempted ridicule fails "great injury" will be done to the speaker's cause. When ridicule is employed in refutation one must proceed

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188. Elements of Rhetoric, 161.
189. Elements of Rhetoric, 163.
190. Elements of Rhetoric, 162.
191. Ibid.
cautiously and "keep a little aloof, for a time, from
the very point in question" until by the introduction of
suitable topics men's minds have gradually been brought
into the proper mood.\textsuperscript{192}

In later editions of the \textit{Elements} the discussion of
pathos is concluded with an appended lecture entitled "On
the Intellectual and Moral Influences of the Professions."\textsuperscript{193}
Whately apparently intends this discourse to be an exten-
sion of his remarks on the creation of a favorable dis-
position in the hearers, and it is probable he conceived
of it as serving a function somewhat similar to that served
by Aristotle's discussion of the various "types of human
character."\textsuperscript{194} Although this lecture is in many respects
interesting and instructive it contains no material perti-
nent to the problem here under investigation.

\textbf{D. Summary}

The major characteristics of Whately's inventional
system may be summarized as follows:

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textbf{The Logos.} Having defined rhetoric as "'Argumenta-
tive Composition,' \textit{generally} and \textit{exclusively}," and
having declared that the principles and
methods of rhetoric \textit{per se} have their roots in
\end{enumerate}

\textsuperscript{192} \textit{Elements of Rhetoric}, 163.

\textsuperscript{193} "Delivered before the Society of the Dublin Law
Institute, \textit{on the 31st of January}, 1842."

\textsuperscript{194} See \textit{Rhetorica}, 1388b.
certain underlying logical concepts, Whately pro-
ceeds: 1. to describe analytically each of the
various forms which logical proof may assume, and
2. to show how these different proof patterns are
to be used and ordered in an actual discourse.
These discussions constitute, I have argued, the
substance of his doctrine of logical invention.

a. Analysis. Considered analytically, proofs
fall into two major classes — "causes" and
"reasons." The first account for the existence
of phenomena; the second are the "means" whereby
we know or are convinced. Although an orator
may sometimes adduce "causes" when he is seek-
ing to give instruction, "reasons" constitute
the principal tools of rhetorical activity.

(1). "Reasons" are of two kinds — "Signs" (i.e.
arguments from an effect to a condition) and
"Examples." Under the head of "Signs" Whately
lists testimony, the calculation of chances,
and argument from progressive approach. Testi-
mony he considers a kind of sign on the ground
that the existence of the testimony itself stands
as a premise and the truth of what is attested,
as a conclusion. By this analysis he brings
testimony into the realm of artificial proofs.
The calculation of chances is a sign because
in this type of reasoning we attempt to correlate an effect with some condition which might be responsible for it. Such calculation Whately views as the weighing of one probability against another. In the argument from progressive approach a number of unrelated signs have their cumulative force enhanced because of "their progressive tendency to establish a certain conclusion."

(2). The various species of "Argument from Example" are induction, example proper, experience, and analogy. These are of a common genus because in each one or more individual objects or instances is regarded as a fair sample of the class in question, and is used as the basis of an inference concerning the whole class or other members of it.

Induction "stops short at the general conclusion." Example, on the other hand, proceeds from particular to particular. Experience, as such, does not provide a valid basis for predicting the course of future events. New experience may, however, be interpreted in terms of prior experiences with phenomena of the same class and in this way conclusions relative to new data may be formulated. Analogy,
Whately views not as a direct resemblance, but as a resemblance of relations. In any of the species of "Argument from Example" the sample which is selected as representative of the class in question may be either "real" or "invented." Invented samples are often no less compelling than real ones, for the value of a sample is to be judged not by its "reality" but by its "intrinsic probability."

b. **Synthesis.** Having analyzed the several types of proofs with a view to making clear the nature of each, Whately next discusses "the various use and order of . . . Propositions and Arguments in different cases." Under this head he brings together a number of diverse matters which find unity only in the fact that they all deal with the management of previously gathered speech materials. The subjects treated are: the ends or aims of argument, presumption and the burden of proof, and arguments designed to establish "matters of fact" and "matters of opinion."

(1). Whately, unlike Campbell, recognizes two separate and distinct purposes which an orator may have in addressing an audience -- the conveying of instruction and the winning of
assent. In the first, arguments a priori are chiefly to be used; in the second, arguments of the so-called "other class." Presumption and the burden of proof are two concepts which may be considered as guides to the selecting, ordering, and handling of previously gathered speech materials. Presumption is defined as a "pre-occupation of the ground." He who must attack the ground pre-occupied by his opponent is said to have the burden of proof. Although Whately's discussion of the logical nature of these concepts displays a good deal of confusion, he properly recognizes that presumption is in part determined by social and psychological factors. After distinguishing "matters of fact" from "matters of opinion," Whately indicates the types of arguments best adapted to each.

(2). Whately recognizes two methods by which arguments may be refuted: 1. proving the contradictory of the proposition maintained by one's opponent and 2. overthrowing the arguments upon which the opponent's proposition rests. In either case, direct or indirect arguments may be employed; there is no special class of refutatory arguments as such.

2. The Pathos. In the traditional Aristotelian view
logos, ethos, and pathos stand as separate and independent means of persuasion. Whately worked a major alteration upon this doctrine by treating pathos as "a linear adjunct" of logos, and by interpreting ethos as a peculiarized type of pathetic appeal. The first of these modifications allies his doctrine of pathos with present-day theories of "motivation," and shifts its emphasis from the area of discovery to that of management. Ethos is subordinated to pathos on the ground that in describing ethical appeal Aristotle made it evident that he had in mind not the "real" character of the speaker, "but the impression produced on the minds of the hearers, by the Speaker, respecting himself."

a. Following a brief analysis of the various "active principles" underlying and motivating human behavior -- "appetites," "desires," and "affections" -- Whately sets forth a number of "miscellaneous Rules" relative to the conduct of the pathetic portions of a discourse. First, he outlines the precepts to be observed when addressing the "feelings." Next, he surveys those principles which should guide the speaker
when he seeks to arouse in the minds of the audience a disposition favorable to himself.

b. The discussion of pathos is concluded with some general remarks concerning the management of emotional and ethical appeals.
Chapter VIII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Introduction

We have now examined in considerable detail the inventional systems developed by John Ward, George Campbell, Joseph Priestley, Hugh Blair, and Richard Whately. Although from time to time certain important relationships among these systems were suggested, the plan of the study has been to treat them largely as independent units. In what respects are the doctrines here studied essentially alike? How do they differ? What is the place of each in the inventio of the period as a whole? What contribution do they singly and as a group make to the lore of inventio and to the general corpus of rhetorical theory? These and similar questions remain, for the most part, unanswered.

The summary which follows attempts, therefore, a twofold task. It undertakes to point out the various relationships existing among these inventional systems, and to assess, in so far as practicable, their respective places in the history of rhetoric. By directing attention to these matters we may reveal, at least indirectly, certain important trends in the inventional theory of the period as a whole.
B. The Selected Theories of Inventio

1. John Ward. Despite certain errors of omission and interpretation, John Ward's System of Oratory (1759) is a relatively faithful compendium of classical rhetorical doctrines. In a study of eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century inventional theory its significance arises from this very fact. The System is the representative par excellence of that classicism from which all important later treatises in some way or other depart. Thus it is the pivot upon which English inventional theory of the period 1759-1828 may be said to turn, and it provides a basic point of reference against which subsequent modifications of classical doctrine may conveniently be measured. In addition, the System has in its own right a claim to importance in the history of inventio. Climaxing a trend which had gained momentum throughout the entire first half of the century, it declares unequivocally for the separation of rhetoric from logic, and insists that the science of discourse must comprehend processes for finding and disposing "proofs." Not since the days of Thomas Wilson had a widely influential English work on rhetoric asserted so forcibly the independence of that science.

2. George Campbell. George Campbell's The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776) emerges from this study as the crucial work in the history of modern inventional theory. Led
by his study of contemporary philosophy -- particularly the writings of Thomas Reid -- to believe that the radical laws and principles of rhetoric may be derived from an examination of the human understanding, Campbell broke with classical doctrine and made the hearer rather than the speech itself the central factor in *inventio*. The sources of persuasion lay, he assumed, not so much in the substance of the orator's address as in the structure and habits of the listener's mind.

This radical change in focus means that instead of inquiring, as *inventio* had traditionally done, how thought might be put at the service of expression, Campbell was motivated to ask the vastly different question of how appeals might most effectively be employed to influence thought. In this inquiry lay the groundwork for the doctrine of management -- that synthetic concept which, broader than any of the five classical departments of rhetoric, brought together under one head such diverse matters as the finding, selecting, evaluating, arranging, and using of arguments. For if the sources of belief lie not only in external proofs but in mind itself, *inventio* cannot be content with teaching us how to find appeals; it must also teach us to present them at the right time, and in the right way, and under the right circumstances. Its scope and content are appreciably broadened, and in this broadening the classical distinction between *inventio*
as search and **dispositio** as evaluation, selection, and arrangement is irretrievably lost.

Moreover, because Campbell undertook to infer the principles of rhetoric from an analysis of the human understanding, his Philosophy is not organized according to any of the several patterns found in classical treatises. Instead, it is arranged in terms of the various aspects of mental activity -- understanding, imagination, passion, and will. This pattern impresses upon Campbell's invention doctrine the unmistakable mark of the faculty psychology.

3. **Joseph Priestley**. Though decidedly inferior to Campbell's Philosophy both in originality and in depth of insight, Joseph Priestley's *Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism* (1777) interests the student of **inventio** because it, like Campbell's treatise, is an ingenious attempt to infer the principles of rhetoric from an examination of human mental processes. But while Campbell used as the foundation for his system the "common sense philosophy" of Reid and, to a lesser extent, the doctrines of Locke and Hume, Priestley drew upon the associational psychology of David Hartley.

Another fundamental difference between the rhetorical systems of Campbell and Priestley lies in the fact that while Campbell broke with tradition and organized his Philosophy in terms of the various aspects of mental
activity, Priestley adhered by and large to the classical structure. Therefore, his Course should be regarded as a reinterpretation of ancient rhetoric -- though admittedly a radical one -- and not, as is the case with Campbell's work, a departure from it.

The invention system developed in the Course rests upon three assumptions: 1. Because processes of investigation and discovery fall outside the province of rhetoric, inventio is merely an "artificial" method for "recalling" more readily than would otherwise be possible certain "matter" stored up in the recesses of memory. 2. The specific functions of rhetoric are to devise and order the "matter" of an address, and to recommend the "manner" best calculated to win for it attention, comprehension, and acceptance. 3. The various species of discourse may be reduced to two fundamental types, narration and argumentation. Individually these assumptions alter important aspects of the classical inventio; together they help clear the ground for developments soon to appear.

4. Hugh Blair. Motivated by a cluster of related factors, all of which spring directly or indirectly from the doctrine of "original genius," Hugh Blair -- though understanding quite clearly the classical theory of inventio -- declares in his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1783) that the ancients erred in supposing invention activity reducible to a systematic science. "Artificial"
aids cannot, he said, supply arguments on every subject; they cannot light the inner spark of creation. Art extends only to those tasks which may be performed in a more or less routine fashion. It will aid us in arranging materials and in expressing them; it cannot, however, teach us how to find them. Attempts to systematize the inventional process are, therefore, only pretentious shams. Rhetoric reaches its natural limits once it has ascertained the methods for managing effectively whatever materials may be supplied to it by extraneous means.

Thus Blair, as Priestley before him, denies that the science of rhetoric may properly include a formalized method for artificially providing speech materials. But whereas Priestley substitutes for such a method the Baconian doctrine of "recollection," and in its name constructs a comprehensive inventional system, Blair falls back on the theory of native "genius," and consequently confines his remarks on inventio to a few scattered observations concerning the importance of such items as exhaustive study and the wise use of models. These minor differences are, however, of less importance than the fact that both men, by excluding inquiry from the province of rhetoric, pave the way for the epoch-making inventional system of Richard Whately.

Richard Whately. There can be little question but that Aristotle's analysis of the methodological
sciences exerted the decisive influence on Richard Whately's
dinventional system. At the same time, in certain crucial
respects Whately departs from that analysis. Therefore,
his *Elements of Rhetoric* (1828) has in this study been
described as neo-Aristotelian.

So far as *inventio* is concerned, Whately's most im-
portant departure from Aristotle lies in the fact that he
follows Priestley and Blair in denying to rhetoric an
independent organon for investigation and discovery. This
denial is couched in a distinction, drawn both in his
*Rhetoric* and in his *Logic*, between the method of inquiry
and the method of proof. Inquiry -- the process of expand-
ing the area to which a predicate applies -- is, he de-
clares, the business of the "philosopher"; proof -- the
finding of such "reasons," as will lead others to believe
what one asserts -- this alone falls within the province
of the "advocate." Accepting the challenge implied in
the exclusion of a method of inquiry from the realm of
rhetoric, Whately develops an inventional system which
attempts to systematize the process of selecting cogent
"reasons" just as the ancients had attempted to systematize
the process of finding proofs.

*Inventio* performs in the area of *logos*, he believes,
two special functions: it catalogues the various types
of "reasons" ("arguments," "proofs"), and points out the
strengths and weaknesses of each; it advises concerning
how and under what conditions each should be employed.
The speaker who is skilled in the lore of inventio will, therefore, know all the argumentative patterns into which his materials might be put, and he will know the circumstances most favorable to each pattern. By taking advantage of this organized body of knowledge and experience he may be assured that his subject will be handled in the most telling fashion possible, just as the speaker who uses the schema of the states and topics will be assured that he has overlooked no potential source of proof. In other words, this new inventio, instead of being concerned with the problem of what to say is concerned with the alternate problem of how best to manage those substantive elements made available by extra-rhetorical means.

C. Trends and Influences

Certain important respects in which English invention theory of the period 1759-1828 departed from classical doctrine have been noted in the preceding section of this summary. We shall now review those influences which apparently were of major importance in fostering these departures. They were: 1. the intense and sustained contemporary interest in epistemological problems; 2. the doctrine of "original genius"; and 3. the growing importance of scientific method. The first tended to undermine the notion that inventio is concerned principally
with discovering what may be said on the subject under discussion; the second threw into question the fundamental classical assumption that artistic creation may be reduced to an "artificial" science; the third, by supplying a basic tool adaptable for use in investigating many different types of subject-matter, obviated the necessity that rhetoric develop an investigatory system of its own.

Speaking of the movement generally, we may say that the concern of philosophers with epistemological problems exercised the dominant influence on English inventional theory after 1776. Emphasizing the active part played in the knowing process by the mind of the knower, Locke and his followers showed the extent to which the nature of any rhetorical situation is determined by the structure and habits of the human understanding. It was this more, perhaps, than any other single factor which led writers such as Campbell and Priestley to view *inventio* not so much as a process for searching out the "means" of persuasion as a method for adapting those "means" to the end sought by the speaker. On a more particularized level contemporary schools of epistemology and psychology were influential in determining specific aspects of inventional doctrine. In addition to his thesis that ethical appeal is dependent on "disposition," Campbell draws from Thomas Reid the important distinctions between "intuitive" and "deductive" evidence, and between
"demonstrative" and "moral" reasoning. His arguments for the validity of sensory knowledge and against syllogism are derived from the same source. To Hartlean associationism Priestley owes not only his basic conception of *inventio* as artificial recollection but also his novel interpretations of logical and pathetic proofs. The psychology of the faculties left its traces on nearly all the rhetorical treatises of the period. Its influence is, however, most marked in Campbell and Whately. Both in the *Philosophy* and in the *Elements* it supplies the theoretical understructure for the analysis of "conviction" and "persuasion." Moreover, it provides the groundwork for Campbell's classification of speech purposes and furnishes Whately a plan of organization for his entire treatise.

The second general factor influencing the nature of invention theory during the period 1759-1828 was the doctrine of "original genius." In his *Réflexions Critiques sur la Poésie et sur la Peinture* (1719) Du Bos had categorically asserted: "Les hommes qui sont nés avec un génie déterminé pour un certain art, ou pour une certaine profession, sont les seuls qui puissent y réussir éminemment . . . ."1 Accepting this view, later writers

came to think of "genius" as an "instinctive and extraordinary capacity for imaginative creation, original thought, invention, or discovery."² The term connoted for them something native and inborn, as contrasted with those aptitudes and skills which may be acquired by study. Without natural endowment a man may not hope to succeed in any species of creative activity. On the other hand, the mere fact he is so endowed does not guarantee that he will produce works of artistic merit. This is because "genius" is wild and impetuous; it needs the guidance and restraint placed upon it by "cultivated taste" and a priori rules. Here art plays its part. The function of such an art as rhetoric is, therefore, "not to supply," as Blair says, "the want of genius, but to direct it where it is found, into its proper channel; to assist it in exerting itself with most advantage, and to prevent the errors and extravagences into which it is sometimes apt to run."³

Needless to say, in proportion as this doctrine gained acceptance the classical view of inventio as an "artificial" means for supplying "the defects of genius" was discredited. The lore of states and topics lost its importance. These tools not only become superfluous;

³.'Lectures, 32.358-9.
they became suspect. It has been suggested above that some of the evident distrust we even yet entertain toward these devices may well stem from the eighteenth-century doctrine of "genius."

The third general factor influential in shaping the nature of inventional theory during the period under study was the growing importance of scientific method. One of the corner stones of classical rhetorical theory is its insistence that rhetoric must comprehend a unique system for investigating subject-matter. Though related to the method of dialectic and borrowing from the method of logic, this organon stands independent and alone. The distinction drawn by Whately -- and clearly implied by Priestley -- between "the method of inquiry" and "the method of proof" is a direct denial of this important classical assumption. By limiting the province of rhetoric to the finding of such "proofs" as will lead others to believe premises which themselves were derived by non-rhetorical means, Whately implies that the speaker finds his materials by using the same method of investigation as does the "philosopher." In other words, the method of the inquiring scientist, guided by its organon "logic," furnishes forth material for the orator also. A common basic process of search and discovery, broad and flexible enough to be adapted to many areas of knowledge, underlies rhetoric just as it underlies all the other arts.
and sciences, and makes it unnecessary for rhetoric to have its own method of inquiry and investigation.

D. Postscript: Misconceptions, Hypotheses, and Questions

A study such as this one which attempts to present a more nearly definitive statement of some particular body of rhetorical doctrine may be regarded as having two possible values: 1. it may correct various misconceptions concerning the doctrine examined, and 2. it may help pave the way for more comprehensive inquiries into the rhetoric, oratory, or criticism of a period.

Speaking to the first of these matters, it hardly need be pointed out, I think, that our discussion has throughout definitely called into question the work of those students who assert that the rhetorical systems of Campbell, Priestley, Blair, and Whately fall into the so-called classical tradition, and are chiefly important by virtue of the fact that they do so. Although it is, 4 See, for example, Sandford's analysis of Blair and Whately (117-24), and his comments on Priestley's handling of inventio and dispositio (116). These writers, together with Campbell, are treated by Sandford under the general heading "Works in the Classical Tradition," and it is asserted that all of them either "follow ancient models closely or reinterpret them in the light of current criticism." (107. cf. 137–8). See also Thonssen and Baird, 139, 143; and the previously cited article by Guthrie in Speech Monographs (15), 70.
of course, true that all four of these writers drew to a
greater or lesser extent upon the ancients, it is equally
true that each found the principal motivating force of
his rhetoric in a doctrine which is modern rather than
classical -- Campbell, in the philosophy of Thomas Reid;
Priestley, in Hartlean associationism; Blair, in the
document of "original genius"; and Whately, in the
dichotomy between inquiry and proof. Moreover, if our
analysis has been correct, it is apparent that as a group
their place in the history of rhetorical theory is secured
principally by the fact that they did build their systems
on contemporary philosophical, psychological, and critical
principles, for in so doing they laid many of the founda-
tion stones upon which present-day doctrines of discourse
rest.

Only in the broadest sense of the word may the
rhetoric which we are now teaching in our schools and
colleges be called classical. Although we adhere to the
general framework of the Aristotelian analysis, we depart
from it in so many particulars that its character is
largely undermined. To mention but a few of these depar-
tures: 1. We commonly classify speeches not according to
the circumstances under which they are delivered (legisla-
tive, forensic, epideictic), but according to the end or
purpose which the speaker has in view (to entertain, to
inform, to persuade, etc.). 2. We teach almost no
"artificial" means of inventing (states, topics, etc.).

3. We usually conceive of *dispositio* as concerned only with the mechanical arrangement of speech details. 5 4. We sometimes include in *inventio* such matters as "judgment" and audience adaptation. 6 5. We generally view pathetic appeals as aimed at motivation rather than at the securing of emotionally biased judgments. 7 6. We characteristically define advocacy as "a communication of the outcomes of thought," and, as a result, stress those aspects of rhetoric which are concerned with studying the adaptation of "means" to ends.

Now all of these characteristics of present-day rhetorical theory will be familiar to the student of the treatises of Campbell, Priestley, Blair, and Whately because it is in those works that they, along with many other modern concepts and doctrines, apparently had their origins. Thus, as I have showed, our classification of speech types comes from Campbell, as does, perhaps, our view that pathetic appeals are tools for motivating an audience. In addition, we may very probably trace to his

5. See, for example, Sandford and Yeager, 8; Sarett and Foster, 364-8; Arleigh E. Williamson, Charles A. Fritz, and Harold Raymond Ross, *Speaking in Public* (New York, 1948), 90-2.


7. Sarett and Foster, 490-5; Bryant and Wallace, 412-6, etc.
Philosophy, with its marked emphasis upon the listener, the breakdown of the classical balance between the functions of *inventio* and those of *dispositio*. From Priestley, Blair, and Whately, on the other hand, comes our assumption that rhetoric is a technique for communicating the "outcomes of thought." In denying to that science functions of inquiry and research they radically altered the ancient emphasis on the means of finding speech materials. Moreover, as a result of both these modifications of classical doctrine, "artificial" methods of inventing naturally lost much of their importance.

It is not my contention that all previous students of the period have failed to note these basic facts. They have not, however, always evaluated them properly. Whereas Sandford, Thonssen and Baird, and others tend to stress the classical aspects of the treatises of Campbell, Blair, and Whately, and believe that they are valuable and important in proportion as they do follow the ancients, the analysis here presented emphasizes the non-classical nature of these works and asserts that they are important and valuable chiefly for the fact that in certain very significant respects they do depart from the classical tradition. A careful study of available evidence leads me to suggest that this second interpretation is somewhat
nearer the truth.  

So far as pointing the way toward future studies is concerned, there grow out of this investigation several hypotheses which appear to be worthy of scrutiny. In addition, there arose during its preparation a number of questions, the answers to which would greatly enhance our knowledge of eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century rhetoric and oratory. The more important among these hypotheses and questions are briefly described below.

**Hypothesis I.** Inventional theory, not only in the period here studied but in all periods, is peculiarly sensitive to contemporary doctrines of epistemology and psychology.

It may be that in classical rhetoric *inventio* was

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8. In addition to challenging the view that the treatises of Campbell, Priestley, Blair, and Whately fall into the classical tradition, the results of this study appear to question three other assumptions made by earlier students. These may be stated as follows: 1. John Ward's *System* is not, as Harding (50) and Guthrie (60) assert, a faithful and accurate exposition of classical doctrines. On the contrary, in several important respects Ward misinterpreted the ancients quite egregiously. 2. It is inaccurate to characterize Whately's rhetoric as Aristotelian. (Thonssen and Baird, 139; Parrish, Abstract, n.p.). Because in so many ways he departs from Aristotle, it may more accurately be called neo-Aristotelian. 3. When Whately says that rhetoric deals with argumentative composition "exclusively," he does not mean that it has no concern with emotional appeal. Rather, his meaning appears to be that it shares this subject, as it does the subject of style, with other neighboring disciplines.
conceived of primarily as a process of search and discovery because ancient philosophers generally viewed knowledge as something independent of the knowing process -- as something pre-existent, stored-up, and waiting to be searched out by the knower. The various constituents of classical *inventio* -- the *status*, topics, etc. -- were, therefore, tools specifically designed to bring pre-existent knowledge from its lair.

Following Locke, however, concepts of *inventio* appear to have changed because current doctrines of epistemology began to view knowledge as conditioned by, and in part actually created by, the knowing mind. Because of this fundamental revolution in philosophy theories of *inventio* tended to shift focus and to center more in the mind of the listener than in the speech itself.

In the twentieth century still another influential school of epistemology -- that of the Pragmatists or Experimentalists -- may be said to have furnished the ground-work for the *inventio* of a new type of rhetorical activity, that of group discussion. For, as is generally conceded, John Dewey's analysis of the process of reflective thinking lies at the basis of contemporary discussion method.

Because of this relationship it may, perhaps, be expected that fresh doctrines of rhetorical invention
will spring up in periods when old theories of epistemology are being overthrown by new analyses of the knowing process. Moreover, invention will probably undergo alteration at times when new psychologies appear.

Hypothesis II. Rhetorical invention is also related -- although perhaps somewhat less closely -- to the critical theory of a period.

In Chapter VI of this study we have seen the influence which the doctrine of "original genius" apparently exerted on Hugh Blair's attitude toward inventio -- how it motivated in him a distrust of "artificial" aids to inventing and caused him to rule such devices out of the science of rhetoric. Furthermore, we remember that Campbell, by his own admission, drew directly upon the general philosophy of criticism developed by Lord Kames and, in fact, undertook to apply Kames' method in treating of rhetoric "as a useful art . . . closely connected with the understanding and will . . . ."9 This application was germane, he believed, to all five of its "parts," inventio as well as the rest.

Considerations such as these would seem to suggest that inventio as well as the other departments of rhetoric may upon occasion be influenced by contemporary critical theory. Did the general trend of later eighteenth-century

rhetoric away from classical doctrine bear any relationship to those forces which underlay the Romantic Movement? Is it possible that the veneration showed somewhat earlier by Ward and Lawson for all aspects of ancient rhetoric -- including *inventio* -- is to be in part explained by the fact that contemporary literature and criticism were almost exclusively dominated by classicism? These and similar problems deserve investigation. Not only would such inquiries serve to clarify the various forces which operate to shape rhetorical theory in general, and *inventio* in particular, but, what is perhaps of greater importance, they would more fully exhibit the relationship between the rhetorical theory of a period and the general doctrines of composition and criticism then current.

**Hypothesis III.** The dividing line between *inventio* and *dispositio* is tenuous and unstable. In a particular period in the history of rhetoric one of these departments may be considerably broadened and enlarged at the expense of the other, or the distinction between them may be broken down so that, for all practical purposes, they merge and become one.

Between 1759 and 1828 the general trend in English rhetorical theory appears to have been toward an expansion of the scope of *inventio* and a corresponding contraction of that of *dispositio*. From Ward, who preserves in all major respects the classical distribution, it passes to
Campbell, who altogether ignores *dispositio* as such, and Whately, who reduces it to a process of arranging arguments according to the laws of logic. Accompanying this trend is the tendency, so many times mentioned in earlier chapters of this study, to fuse the two into the broader functional concept of management.

The general analysis here presented would appear to indicate that the instability of the line between *inventio* and *dispositio* is probably to be accounted for by the fact that it is an artificial rather than an actual one. First, as was shown in the discussion of ancient invention theory, certain aspects of the *status* apply almost equally well to both departments, and may be regarded as invention or dispositional, depending upon the point of view from which they are approached. Second, and probably of equal importance, is the point that the tasks of finding, evaluating, selecting, disposing, and using speech materials, though separable in theory, are not separable in practice. In the process of speech preparation mind flits so capriciously from one to the other that they become inextricably intermingled. The temporal sequence outlined in theory breaks down when one actually engages in speech preparation.

For these reasons, in any particular system of rhetoric

one may be emphasized over the other, or their content interchanged, depending upon whether the finding of speech materials or the adaptation of those materials to an audience is the dominant characteristic of that system.

Since the balance of functions between inventio and dispositio appears to be of considerable importance in determining the general nature of a rhetorical system, a careful tracing of the line dividing them during important periods in the history of rhetoric would seem to be a most useful contribution.

Hypothesis IV. Broadening our view beyond the realm of inventio, it may be said that this study follows earlier investigations in suggesting the importance of the role played by the faculty psychology in shaping present-day rhetoric. Those of our textbooks which are organized so as to deal individually with the subjects of "exposition," "conviction," and "persuasion" stem, at least indirectly, from this theory of mind. Moreover, from the faculty psychology, as applied by Campbell and Whately, comes the doctrine that "persuasion" and "conviction," though separate modes of influencing, operate jointly to secure belief or action, the first implanting some wish or desire in the mind of the hearer and the second "proving" the means proposed conducive to gaining the end desired. These two influences are in themselves sufficient to determine the general character of a
rhetorical system, since the first provides a possible framework and the second an analysis of the persuasion process.

Further investigation may reveal additional ways in which the psychology of the faculties has been extremely influential in determining the nature of present-day rhetoric. In fact, it is possible that a careful evaluation might show this psychology to be the most important single factor operating to shape the various non-Aristotelian characteristics of current rhetorical theory. Moreover, there is the fascinating question of why modern rhetoric has in so many respects clung to the faculty psychology long after this psychology has itself been discredited. Why has rhetorical theory not been more congenial with recent psychologies? Or has it embodied their doctrines in many subtle ways which escape the notice of the casual observer? Is the so-called "James-Winans theory of persuasion" a denial of the faculty psychology? These are but a few of the problems awaiting investigation.

In addition to these hypotheses there arose, as I have said, during the course of this study certain questions which, though falling outside the scope of the project at hand, might furnish the starting points for future inquiries. Three such questions are listed below and each is briefly explained. Among these, the first is at once the most important and intriguing, but also,
perhaps, the most difficult to explore.

**Question I.** Is it possible to discern in the oratory of the period any influences of the invention theories here described?

Is there external evidence to show that Burke, Fox, Pitt, and Sheridan knew the invention doctrines of Campbell and Priestley, and consciously used them in preparing their speeches? May one find in the speeches themselves indications of these doctrines at work? Questions bearing upon the application of theory to practice must always command the interest of the historian of rhetoric, since his studies assume increased importance if it can be demonstrated that the theories he examines actually influenced the writing and speaking of an age.

**Question II.** What is the exact nature and extent of the influence exerted by Hume on the rhetorical theory of George Campbell?

Though Campbell was, like his mentor Reid, an avowed antagonist of the great sceptic, his *Philosophy* shows Hume's influence in positive as well as in negative ways. Some of these have been suggested in the preceding discussion and others have been noted by Crawford and Edney. Their full extent and importance remain, however, to be evaluated. Is it possible that Campbell was influenced by Hume more than he cared to admit or more, perhaps, than he himself knew? Such a possibility appears to warrant study.
Question III. What is the exact nature and extent of Bacon's influence on Priestley?

In his exhaustive study of Bacon's rhetoric Wallace was unable to give a satisfactory answer to this question. It appears to be more than coincidence that both Priestley and Bacon, alone among the major English rhetoricians, conceived of *inventio* as a process for artificially recollecting previously known facts and arguments, and called *dispositio* by the name of method. Moreover, there are in Priestley's *Course* certain turns of phrase which seem to be derived from Bacon. Beyond these surface parallels, however, it is difficult immediately to proceed. Would an exhaustive comparative study reveal other and more fundamental similarities? Could such similarities be substantiated by external evidence? The answers to these questions would lead to an improved understanding of Priestley's rhetorical system.

In view of these hypotheses and questions suggesting further inquiries, one may perhaps ask what position this study itself occupies with reference to past and future investigations.

Speaking first of its place among studies in English rhetorical theory of the period 1759-1829, we might say that it appears to lie in something of a middle ground. Drawing both directly and indirectly on the spade-work of such earlier students as Sandford, Harding, Edney,
Pence, Crawford, Parrish, and Guthrie, it presents a more nearly definitive statement of the *inventio* of the period than would have been possible without their efforts. On the other hand, such a statement is in itself of little value unless used in exploring other aspects of the rhetoric of the age or in tracing the relationships which exist between *inventio* and the general theory of composition expressed in the oratory, literature, and criticism of the time. It is perhaps in studies such as these that an investigation of the type here reported finds its ultimate justification.

Of extended inquiries into the nature of invention theory, this study is, so far as I know, the first. As an initial effort it does little more than break the ground. To the questions What is *inventio*? What are its relations with the other "parts" of rhetoric? What are the influences shaping an invention system? it provides but imperfect answers. Perhaps its most positive contribution lies in making evident how painfully little we know of the nature of invention theory and of its long and devious history. If through an awareness of these deficiencies future students may be motivated to examine *inventio* further, this investigation will have achieved one of its purposes.
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Reviews


Theses


I, Douglas Wagner Ehninger, was born in Michigan City, Indiana, October 24, 1913. I received my secondary school education in the public schools of Michigan City. My undergraduate training was obtained at Northwestern University, from which I received the degree Bachelor of Science in 1936. Also from Northwestern University I received the degree Master of Arts in 1938. I have taught various courses in public speaking and related fields at Purdue University, Western Reserve University, The George Washington University, The Ohio State University, and the University of Virginia. At the present time I am an instructor in the School of Speech and Drama at Virginia.