FORGING A COALITION ARMY:  
WILLIAM III, THE GRAND ALLIANCE, AND  
THE CONFEDERATE ARMY IN THE SPANISH NETHERLANDS, 1688-1697

DISSERTATION

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By

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* * * * *

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores the origins and creation of the allied army that fought in the Spanish Netherlands during the Nine Years’ War. In 1689, the Dutch Republic, England, Habsburg Austria, Spain, Brandenburg-Prussia, and later Savoy, along with a number of lesser German states united to combat the ambitions of French king Louis XIV. These states formed coalition armies to fight in the various theaters of war surrounding the kingdom. Arguably the most important of these was the army in the Spanish Netherlands, often referred to by contemporaries as the “Confederate Army.”

Due to the Spanish Netherlands’ strategic importance to both the Dutch Republic and France, the so-called “Cockpit of Europe” attracted immense armies on both sides. France assembled the largest army until the Napoleonic Wars during the Nine Years’ War; and the largest of its field armies was deployed in the Low Countries Theater. For the allies, the burden of the war effort in the Spanish Netherlands fell to England and the Dutch Republic, the wealthiest and militarily strongest of the coalition’s members. The combination of geography, politics, and strategy merged resulting in the greatest of the allies’ armies, the army the army of Stadhouder-Koning William III.

This dissertation explores how diplomatic, political, and military factors intersected to create the first modern coalition army. Commanded by William III, the Confederate Army was the largest, best equipped and arguably best led and organized of the coalition forces arrayed against France. The composition of this army was the result of a combination of factors. The geographic location of the coalition partners, and the theater of war; the economic power of the army’s principal contributors; and the unity of command William III brought to the Confederate Army; all of these factors contributed to that organization’s character. Together, they forged a unique army in the history of European warfare in the early modern period, and a forerunner of later coalition armies.
To my parents
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It was the summer of 1993 at the Newberry Library in Chicago while researching my Masters’ Thesis when I first unearthed Humphrey Bland’s *A Treatise of Military Discipline*, a discovery that would change not only the focus of my research but the direction of my life as well. Bland’s praise for the Dutch Army piqued my interest in that subject and led me on a voyage of self-discovery that took me from Columbus to Leiden and back again. That journey would not have been possible without the help and support of many people on both sides of the Atlantic. The contribution of so many people has made this a much better dissertation than it otherwise might have been. Any shortcomings or failings in this work are entirely mine.

First, I wish to thank Professor John Rule for his advice, guidance, and support. He stuck by me during this long process and continued to serve as my advisor well after his retirement. Dr. Rule fostered my interest in the age of Louis XIV and has been invaluable in helping me to understand the intricacies of the early modern diplomacy. Had it not been him, I very likely would not have become a student of the late 17th century.

Professor John Guilmartin also deserves my thanks. “Dr. G.” has been my mentor since I first asked him to sit on my MA committee in 1992. His wide-ranging knowledge of military history has helped me to better understand the broader context of my own work. As my co-advisor, Dr. Guilmartin has been invaluable, not only for his insight into a myriad of military topics but also for his advice on the dissertation process. His encouragement and counsel helped me to put it all in perspective and I thank him for that.

I must also thank Professor Geoffrey Parker. This dissertation grew, in part, from a term paper I wrote for him when he was at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Since he joined my committee in 1997, he has been invaluable to me, not only for his eye for detail and his tremendous breadth of knowledge, but for his unwavering support as well. This dissertation has benefited from both his vision and
his sharp critique. As a mentor and as a friend, he provided me with the motivation and energy to see the project through.

I also thank Professor John Lynn of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I met both he and Geoffrey Parker as part of the special relationship between the military history programs of Illinois and Ohio State. Both his books and his lectures on Louis XIV’s French Army provided me a valuable model for my own study of William’s Anglo-Dutch forces. Dr. Lynn’s critique of my work and our discussions about early modern military history have been extremely helpful to me, and have certainly made this a better dissertation.

On the other side of the Atlantic, Dr. Augustus J. Veenendaal, Jr. deserves my thanks as well. Guus served as my advisor while I was in the Netherlands. He helped me to navigate the Dutch archives and encouraged me to keep at it when seventeenth century Dutch handwriting seemed impossible to decipher. In many ways, Guus, and his wife Jannie, were my surrogate family when I was in the Netherlands. I spent my first and only Christmas away from my own family with his. Without his advice and support, this project would not have been possible.

I must also thank my colleagues who provided me with support, wisdom, and friendship which helped me emerge from dissertation process relatively unscathed. At The Ohio State University, I was fortunate to be part of a great history department strong in both the early modern and in military history. I especially thank Professors Allan Millett, and Carla Pestana for their comments on various chapters of this dissertation. Their insights have no doubt made this a better work and helped me to address the dissertations broader aspects. Dr. Jamel Ostwald has served both as a friend and as a sounding-board for my many queries on early modern military history. It is not often when one meets a person whose professional interests so closely coincide their own. Our discussions and debates have improved this dissertation immensely. I must also thank Doug Palmer, whose comments have helped me to paint in broader brushstrokes. I also thank Mark and Susan Spicka and Mike and Jen Pavelec for their friendship and support. Finally, I thank John Tully for helping me put this dissertation into electronic format.

During the course of this dissertation, I spent four years in The Netherlands not only learning modern Dutch, but the 17th century variant and the paleography that goes with it. None of this would have been possible without generous grants to fund my research. First, I must thank The Ohio State University, Office of International Education and FLAS for awarding me a fellowship to study Dutch. The two quarters I
spent at the University of Leiden in 1996 provided me with a foundation in Dutch without which I could have never attempted this project. I must also thank the Netherland-America Foundation for grants in 1996-97 and 1998 that enabled me to conduct the lion’s share of the research for this dissertation.

While I was in The Netherlands, the history department at the University of Leiden became my home away from home. I thank the Sectie Vaderlandse Geschiedenis, especially Professors Jaap Bruijn, Femme Gaastra, and Simon Groenveld. I particularly thank Professor Bruijn who adopted me as an advisee, provided me with valuable comments on several of my chapters, and made me feel at home by including me in the Promovendi gezelschap. I still miss their meetings and the dinners at the Chinees. I also thank Professors Wim van den Doel and Leonard Blussé of IGEER for their assistance with securing additional funding for my project and providing me with a place to work. I also thank Dr. Blussé for the many sailing expeditions on the Ijssel Meer.

Most of the research for this project was conducted in what was once called the Algemeen Rijksarchief (now Het Nationaal Archief) in The Hague. Thanks go to its staff who put up with my many requests for copies and microfilms. When I first arrived in the ARA in the fall of 1996, I was lucky enough to be befriended by a wonderful group of historians. Marie-Charlotte Le Bailly, Stephan van Galen, Michiel de Jong, Ivo van Loo, and Annette de Wit, true "archive rats," who helped me to navigate the early modern Dutch Republic and decipher its handwriting. They made the often gloomy winter days fly by, encouraged me when my resolve sometimes wavered, and became my closest friends. Special thanks go to Dr. Olaf van Nimwegen who shared his knowledge of the Dutch Army and its archives with me. Were it not for Olaf, I would have never found many of the sources that made this dissertation possible. He too, provided me with excellent insights into the early modern Dutch Army and its wars against Louis XIV. Thanks also goes to Professor Victor Enthoven of the Royal Naval Academy, Den Helder, for guiding me through 17th century Groningen's finances.

Although I conducted the bulk of the research for this dissertation in the ARA, I also visited archives and libraries elsewhere, both in the Netherlands and in England. I thank the staffs of the provincial archives in Groningen, Gelderland, Utrecht, and Zeeland. Thanks also go to the librarians in the Douza Zaal at the University Library in Leiden, and their patience with my numerous requests for maps. Special thanks goes to Mr. Woelderink and his staff at the Koninklijk Huisarchief, The Hague. Not only were they attentive to my requests for copies but they also treated me to my first Princendag from the Royal Stables, something I will never forget.
My research also brought me across the Channel to England, and I thank the staffs of the British Library, London, and the Public Record Office, Kew for their courteous assistance both in finding useful documents and making legible copies from often illegible documents.

Finally, thanks go to my parents, John and Bonnie Stapleton, to whom I dedicate this work. They have probably heard more than they ever wanted to about the Dutch Republic, the Glorious Revolution, the Nine Years’ War, and William III’s army. I thank them for their love, encouragement, and support. Without them, I never could have done this.
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A NOTE ABOUT DATES, NAMES, AND PLACES

The British Isles and the Continent used two different calendars during the latter 17th century, the English Old Style or Julian Calendar and the Continental New Style or Gregorian Calendar. During the years covered by this study, the New Style Calendar preceded the Old Style Calendar by ten days. Thus, 12 July 1692 on the Continent would be 2 July 1692 in England. Because the war in the Low Countries Theater is the focus of this study, all dates in the text are shown in the New Style unless otherwise noted. The new year is taken to begin on 1 January.

Seventeenth century names were far from standardized within a single language, let alone three or four. For example, Dutch general Hendrik van Nassau-Ouwerkerk is often referred to in English as Overkirk, and in French as Auverquerque. For simplicity's sake, names in the text are written in the language of the individual's origin. If there are different versions of a name in a particular language, then the modern version in that language has been used. I have chosen to refer to William III as "William" rather than "Willem," however, not out of deference to the English but because that is how he signed his name!

Likewise, place-names can cause confusion, particularly in the bilingual lands of the Spanish Netherlands, the present day Kingdom of Belgium. Except where there is an accepted English equivalent, all place-names follow modern day conventions as well as the language border between the French-speaking and Flemish-speaking parts of the country. (Thus, while Gent is the modern Flemish spelling of the town in Flanders, I have opted for the anglicized Ghent in the text.) Other towns without an accepted anglicized spelling are spelled according to local rules.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The wars against Louis XIV were fought by coalition armies. In the autumn of 1688, Louis’ forces invaded the Palatinate triggering the largest European conflict of the age, a war that would eventually involve — either directly or indirectly — every state in Europe. The Nine Years’ War (1688-97) as it has come to be called, marked the beginning of a period of almost twenty-five years of war. When the Peace of Utrecht ended the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713), the balance of power in Europe was restored and Britain had emerged as a major European power. Britain’s rise from a relatively isolated European power of the second rank in 1688 to a great power following the Peace of Utrecht twenty-five years later came as a result of its participation in those coalition wars against Louis XIV. In 1689, William III, Prince of Orange and Stadholder of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland, and Overijssel became king of England, Scotland, and Ireland, the result of the Glorious Revolution. William’s acceptance of the crown bound together the fortunes of Britain and the Dutch Republic. Allies in a war waged largely for European — and thus Dutch — interests, Britain and the Dutch Republic fought side by side under the leadership of the Stadholder-King. As Captain-General of both armies, William forged a coalition army unique in military history. Using his Anglo-Dutch forces as the core of his army, William created the first “modern” allied military organization with a unified command structure, logistics administration, and even fighting doctrine. Although the “Confederate Army”, as it came to be called, suffered numerous setbacks during the Nine Years’ War, by the latter years of the conflict it had emerged as a military organization every bit as capable as Louis’ own forces. The army would later demonstrate the significance of its tutelage under William during the War of the Spanish Succession through its re-conquest of the Spanish Netherlands highlighted by a
string of impressive field victories while under the command of William’s successor and protégé, Sir John Churchill, First Earl of Marlborough.

This study explores the origins, composition, and organization of William III’s Confederate Army. Its creation marked the beginning of a long line of similar allied military organizations, the hallmark of Anglo-Dutch relations during the latter seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Through an examination of the coalition army assembled and commanded by William III during the Nine Years’ War, this study hopes to shed light on a little studied aspect of military history in the early modern period, coalition warfare. Although an official Anglo-Dutch military relationship can be traced to the Earl of Leicester’s expedition to aid the rebellious northern Netherlands in their war of independence against Spain, in many ways, William III’s Anglo-Dutch army laid the groundwork for future coalition armies. Indeed, its success during the War of the Spanish Succession undoubtedly convinced both British and Dutch leaders of the necessity of maintaining their military relationship. In 1740 when war again erupted on the continent, Anglo-Dutch forces again united against their old foe, France, during the War of Austrian Succession. The Anglo-Dutch alliance became the cornerstone of both states’ foreign policies, an alliance begun in large part because of William III’s intervention in 1688. Although this relationship went into decline following the Austrian Succession War, it was rekindled again at the end of the Napoleonic Wars.\(^1\) Indeed, the even Duke of Wellington’s allied army at Waterloo reflects the importance of the Anglo-Dutch military relationship to both states, a relationship that would continue through the Second World War to the present day.

The Nine Years’ War saw the creation of the first modern coalition armies. In the Low Countries, Germany, Northern Italy, and Spain, the armies of the Grand Alliance faced the awesome strength of Louis XIV’s French army. Although every

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\(^1\) Dutch Republic succumbed to revolution and French armies in 1795 and was replaced by the Batavian Republic (1795-1806). What had at first been a state allied to Revolutionary France became a French satellite in 1805 after a Napoleon-backed coup toppled the short-lived state. In 1806, the Emperor's brother, Louis Napoleon, was crowned king of the new, but equally short lived, Kingdom of Holland (1806-1814). The Dutch state's alliance with France against Britain cost it much of its overseas Empire and severely damaged its domestic economy. When the Kingdom of the Netherlands was established in 1814 with William I of Orange at its head, the Anglo-Dutch military relationship resumed. For details, see Jonathan I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1995), 1112-1130; and J.C.H. Blom, and E. Lamberts, ed., *Geschiedenis van de Nederlanden* (Rijswijk: Nijgh and Van Ditmar Universitair, 1993), 218-244.
theater was important in the war against France, it was in Germany and the Low
Countries where the allies could muster the most troops and thus had the greatest
possibility to damage Louis XIV. Along the German frontier, armies comprised of
princely confederations, imperial “Circles”, and the Emperor’s own Habsburg troops
combined to form “confederate armies” in the upper and middle Rhine regions aimed
at French occupied Lorraine. In the Low Countries, the armies of the Spanish
Netherlands, Dutch Republic, England, and Brandenburg-Prussia formed another
“Confederate Army” for operations in the Spanish Netherlands and the adjoining
territories.

A combination of factors made the Low Countries the most important of the
Nine Years’ War’s operational theaters. The Low Countries, much like Lorraine in the
east, was one of the most contested territories. During Louis’ early reign, he had begun
to chip away at the belt of fortified towns that defended the Spanish Netherlands’
southern frontier. The steady weakening of the buffer between the Dutch Republic and
France made its defense of vital importance to the Dutch Republic, especially in the
wake of Louis’ attack in 1672. The presence of so many fortified towns in the region,
and the heavy manpower requirements siege warfare demanded meant that the allies
had to deploy sizable forces to the Low Countries if it were to defend its own territories
and threaten Louis’. In addition, the comparatively dense population of the Low
Countries allowed for larger concentrations of troops. These factors were helped by
political geography. It was here where the militaries of the coalition’s two strongest
members — England and the Dutch Republic — could deploy their troops to the best
effect.

Although each of the allied armies facing Louis XIV attempted to solve the
problem of coalition warfare in different ways, William III’s Confederate Army was
unique in that he had legal control over the militaries of two states, the Dutch Republic
and Britain. As Stadholder and King of England, William III was faced with an almost
impossible task of dovetailing Dutch and British interests. In the war at sea, the Dutch
Republic was forced to make considerable concessions to their new coalition partner,
concessions that made the Dutch the junior partner in the war at sea. On land, the
situation was reversed. The Dutch Republic and its army took the lead in the war on
land, a fact often obscured by the array of British Army historiography. The purpose of
this study is, in part, to redress this balance through an examination of the allied army
in which both the British and Dutch participated, William III’s Confederate Army.
Central to this study is the role William III played in the process coalition building. As Captain-General of both the Dutch and English militaries, he enjoyed tremendous influence over how Anglo-Dutch military cooperation was to be achieved. William’s decision to rely on the Dutch Republic’s military and administrative institutions reflected not his pragmatism as a military commander, but it also symbolized the truth behind the Anglo-Dutch military relationship; a relationship dominated by William III and the Dutch Republic, in that order. Important in understanding the significance of the Confederate Army is the Glorious Revolution’s impact on the Dutch Republic.

The Glorious Revolution and the Dutch Republic

On 7 February 1691, William III, King of England, Scotland, and Ireland, Prince of Orange, and Captain-General of the Union addressed the States General of the United Provinces for the first time since his departure for England in October 1688. “Their High and Mightinesses” no doubt had eagerly anticipated the Prince’s words. In the days leading up to the King’s address, The Hague had been a scene of extravagant festivities, all in celebration of the Prince’s return to his native Dutch Republic. He very nearly did not survive the journey. His first crossing attempt was forced back to England by icy easterly winds. On 26 January, ten days after his first aborted attempt, the Prince set out a second time from Gravesend, this time aboard the royal yacht Mary. After four days at sea pelted by snow showers, dodging floating ice and fog-hidden privateers, the convoy finally reached the shallows off the Dutch coast. In spite of the fog and harsh conditions, William chose to ignore the advice of his captains to turn back instead relying on the opinion of his helmsman, seaman Jansz. Hartevelt, the same man who had guided the Prince’s ship Den Briel to the English coast in 1688. Setting out from the fleet in the afternoon in three launches, the prince and his entourage picked their way through the fog and ice toward the Dutch coast. After more than sixteen hours of braving the frigid air in open boats, William at last made landfall at Goeree in the wee hours of 31 January 1691. William and his followers finally arrived in The Hague at dusk to the cheers of the waiting townsfolk.2

William’s return to the Continent marked the conclusion of a series of events set in motion by himself and the States General in the fall of 1688. Historians have attributed William’s and the Dutch Republic’s decision to intervene in English domestic affairs to a number of factors: the threat Louis XIV’s policy of réunions posed to the Dutch Republic’s security; the Prince of Orange’s desire to protect his wife’s (and his own) claims to the English throne; the deterioration of Franco-Dutch trade relations and the tariff war that ensued; the “immortal seven’s” invitation and William’s desire to see English liberties restored; James II pro-Catholic domestic policy and pro-French foreign policy and a host of others.³ Regardless of which factor played the deciding role, most historians agree that William and the Dutch government were at least in part driven to act by their determination to see the Bourbon-Stuart alliance broken and England’s military resources brought into the anti-French camp.⁴ In this, William’s “Grand Design” was entirely successful. Even before William and Mary were officially crowned King and Queen of England, the Prince of Orange and officials from the States General had begun to establish the foundations of Anglo-Dutch military cooperation. The Anglo-Dutch Alliance that emerged from these talks in the winter and spring of 1689 established the framework for maritime cooperation between the two states until the conclusion of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1713. The guiding principles of Anglo-Dutch cooperation in the land war however, had been established much earlier. In 1678, the Dutch Republic and England had concluded the Treaty of Westminster, the original basis for Anglo-Dutch military cooperation.⁵ Before he was crowned king, William activated the defensive treaty as the Republic’s Stadholder. During the war’s first two years, England had provided the 10,000 men the provisions of the treaty required. William’s return to the Dutch Republic as King of England, however, marked a new phase in the Anglo-Dutch military relationship. With Ireland virtually pacified,

³ See Chapter 2.


⁵ G. N. Clark, The Dutch Alliance and the War Against French Trade, 1688-1697 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1923), 8-43.
William could now employ the weight of England’s military resources in the cause of
the Dutch-led Grand Alliance.

William’s speech to the States-General marked the realization of the Dutch
Republic’s goal in supporting his expedition in 1688. After thanking the States-General
for their assistance in his “Grand Design,” William stated: “...God Almighty had been
pleased so to bless His Enterprise, as thereupon to Crown it with desired Success, more
favourably and speedier than He could ever have hoped.” Consequently, Parliament
offered him the crowns of England, Scotland, and Ireland. His decision to accept those
crowns was not “out of any boundless Ambition” but rather
to preserve the Religion, Well-being, and Tranquility of the aforesaid Kingdoms,
and to be in a more Powerful Condition of Assisting the Confederates, and
particularly This State [italics mine], and to defend them against the over grown
power of France. That His Majesty could well have wish’d it to have been in His
Power to have given them all Assistance necessary; but that He had been so
hindred by the business of Ireland that He could not effect it as he desired. William’s — thus the Dutch Republic’s — motives for unseating James II cannot be
more clearly stated; to insure that Britain be in a position to better assist the Dutch
Republic in its war against “the overgrown power of France.”

At the same time, William makes clear his reason for attending the Congress, for
embarking on the risky voyage: to lead allied armies against France and thus preserve
the security of the Republic:

...He was come over, not only to concert with the Confederates about Measures
to be taken the next Campaign, but also to take up on Him the Charge of
Captain-General of This State [italics mine]. That His Majesty from His Youth
upward hath had a very great Love and Affection for This State: and that the
same was usually encreased by Tokens and Proofs of Kindness that He had
found both from the Government and People. That his Affection for This State
was so great, that it was not possible to be much greater. That He should
always keep and preserve the same, and contribute all that lay in his Power for

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6 His Majesty’s Speech to the Assembly of the States-General of the United-Provinces at the Hague The 7th
of February N.S. Together with the Answer of Their High and Mighty Lordships (London: Richard
Baldwin, 1691).

7 His Majesty’s Speech to the Assembly of the States-General.
their Welfare, and at all times should be ready to venture his Life and Person for them. That he hoped God would be pleased to use him as an Instrument to remove all the Apprehensions They now labour under and by settling Europe in Peace and Safety, to put this State also into a full Security.\(^8\)

Only by leading the Dutch army (along side his own British forces) against the French could he succeed in removing “all the Apprehensions They [i.e. the Dutch] labour under....” William had set sail for England in November of 1688 with the goal of securing Britain for the Anti-French coalition. His return to the Continent as King signified the success of his venture and the fulfillment of his “contract” with the States General. True to his words, William returned to insure the security of the Dutch Republic. From 1691 until the end of the Nine Years' War, William would lead the allies, spearheaded by his Dutch and British armies, against Louis XIV. For the Dutch Republic, William’s success meant more than simply a Dutchman on the English throne; it meant security. It meant 100,000 more men and 125 more ships for their struggle against the France. It meant a strong ally in its struggle for survival.

**The Dutch Republic and the Glorious Revolution in Historiography**

The role of the Dutch Republic in the events of 1688, if not unknown, is certainly one of the most under explored aspects of the Glorious Revolution. Although recent historiography has emphasized it more, the events of 1688 are still more or less examined in their English rather than European context. Although the historiography of the Glorious Revolution has radically changed in recent years and placed more emphasis on both the Dutch and Europe, few scholars have attempted to explore the effects 1688 had on the Dutch state. That is not to say that there have not been important advances in our knowledge of the complicated events of 1688. Gone are the days when the Glorious Revolution was seen simply as another example of dynastic ambition or a “civilized” overthrow of an unpopular monarch. Recent studies have emphasized the nuances of William’s intervention in English affairs; the factors that led Parliament to extend the invitation to the Prince of Orange, the domestic (i.e. Dutch) factors that contributed to William’s decision to intervene, the political situation in Europe and in the Dutch Republic and their impact on the situation, opposition of (and

\(^8\) Ibid.
support for) James II in England and host of other relevant but previously understudied aspects of the Revolution. Just the same, the impact of the Glorious Revolution on the Dutch and the Dutch role in the alliance that was the result of William’s “Descent on England” has gone mostly unexplored.

There have been a number of studies exploring the Glorious Revolution’s European context. Perhaps surprisingly, this understudied aspect of the revolution only began to receive attention from Anglo-American historians some fifty years ago. Although the seminal G.N. Clark’s *The Dutch Alliance and the War Against French Trade, 1688-1697* examined certain elements of Anglo-Dutch cooperation in the wake of the Glorious Revolution, this important study focused principally on the maritime consequences of William’s intervention in English affairs rather than on the revolution settlement and its aftermath as a whole. Nevertheless, Clark’s work marks an essential starting point for any examination of the Anglo-Dutch alliance. It would be thirty years before Anglo-Dutch scholars would reexamine the events of 1688 and their relationship to Europe. In 1954, Lucille Pinkham wrote *William III and the Respectable Revolution*, one of the first books to explore the Glorious Revolution’s European origins. Pinkham’s book, described by J. P. Kenyon as “the first serious attempt to deal with the European politics of the Revolution,” marked an important departure in the study of the Glorious Revolution’s origins. Although it could not unhinge the long-standing acceptance by the historical community of Trevelyan’s narrative of the important events of 1688, Pinkham’s book, nevertheless began the process of calling into question Trevelyan’s English-oriented interpretation of events.9

Pinkham was not the only scholar to explore the Revolution’s European roots. Not surprisingly, scholars in the Netherlands had long recognized the Dutch antecedents of the events of 1688 if not necessarily William’s motivations. In 1933, N. Japikse wrote his famous two-part biography of William III, *Prins Willem III De Stadhouder-Koning*, still one of the best studies of the Prince of Orange’s life. Japikse examines the role both William and the States General played in the events of 1688, more than twenty years before Pinkham wrote her work on the Glorious Revolution.10 Like Japikse, Dutchman Pieter Geyl also explored the Dutch role in the events of 1688.

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9 J. P. Kenyon, “Introduction,” in Eveline Cruickshanks, ed., *By Force or By Default? The Revolution of 1688-1689* (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, Ltd., 1989), 1-7; and

In his three part study of the Dutch Republic, *De Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Stam* published in 1931, and later published in English as *The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century*, Geyl also emphasized the importance of the European situation in William’s and the States General’s decision to invade England. Geyl’s take on William’s role was predominantly dynastic, though he makes clear that his decision — and that of the States General — was colored by French aggression on the Continent and their desired to “deliver England from its long servitude to France...” and in so doing, secure it as an ally against Louis XIV.11 Dutch scholars contributed other works to the early scholarship of the Glorious Revolution — the most notable being Gregorius van Alphen’s *De Stemming van de Engelschen Tegen de Hollanders in Engeland* — but these works with minor exceptions follow the vein of Japikse’s and Geyl’s studies.12

It was only in the 1960s when historians in Britain and the United States had begun to discover this other side of the Glorious Revolution. In 1966, Stephen Baxter wrote *William III and the Defense of European Liberty*, still considered one of the best biographies of the Stadholder-King. Integrating both English and Dutch sources, Baxter provided the best study to date of the diplomatic background surrounding the Dutch decision to intervene in England. Baxter argued that William intervened for dynastic reasons; William *expected* to inherit the English throne and James II’s antagonistic domestic (and foreign) policies, coupled with the birth of a direct heir, compelled him to intervene. William’s determination to see the power of Louis XIV weakened in large part determined how he would rule in England once he became king. Just the same, it did not provide the reason for his intervention in England. Rather, it provided it with the cover to insure its success. The crisis in Cologne and Louis’ subsequent invasion of the Palatinate allowed William to intervene in England unencumbered. For Baxter, William was the principal actor in 1688. William engaged Britain on the Continent in order to redress the balance of power in Europe. Although Baxter considers the various factors at play in 1688, he still ascribes William’s decision to dynastic ambition flavored with a certain degree of sympathy for England’s troubles, rather than one influenced by


the threat Louis’ policies posed to the Republic.\textsuperscript{13} His story paints the States General as a body more or less subservient to the whims of the prince rather than one with its own voice, its own policy agenda. Thus, while Baxter’s treatment does explore the European dimensions of the Glorious Revolution, in the end he sees William’s intervention more as an element of English dynastic politics — a prince determined to fulfil his own dynastic interests — rather than a Dutch reaction to events in England and on the Continent.

The other important study to explore the Dutch role in the Glorious Revolution written during the 1960s was John Carswell’s \textit{The Descent on England}. Published in 1969, \textit{Descent on England}, whose subtitle is \textit{A Study of the English Revolution of 1688 and its European Background}, describes the events of 1688 more from a European perspective than Baxter does. Carswell breaks down his study into three sections, each exploring a different element of the revolution’s complicated origins. The first part examines the European power structure and the roles William, James, and Louis — and the political situation in which they found themselves — played in setting the stage for the revolution in England. The second describes the various events leading up to the decision to intervene, while the third describes the Glorious Revolution itself, paying particular attention to William’s preparations and the eventual (military) overthrow of the Stuart monarchy. Unlike Baxter’s study, which focuses almost exclusively on the Prince of Orange’s role in the Glorious Revolution, Carswell’s explores the events leading to the revolution step-by-step, handling each one in considerable detail. For example, Carswell’s study is the first, to my knowledge, to explore the impact the French tariff war had on the Dutch Republic’s decision to support William’s plan to invade England. In his conclusion, Carswell notes external factors gave the Revolution its dynamic. James II’s unpopular domestic policies, while important, only provided the Dutch and William the opportunity to intervene successfully. In other words, while James’ policies might have made him unpopular in England, the force behind the revolution came from abroad in the form of William and his Dutch army.\textsuperscript{14} Although Carswell’s study largely neglects the aftermath of the revolution and how it affected Europe (particularly the Dutch Republic), his study nevertheless laid the groundwork

\textsuperscript{13}Baxter, \textit{William III}, 223-237.

for future investigations into the Dutch role in the Glorious Revolution and firmly placed the event in its larger European context.

The tercentenary of the Glorious Revolution witnessed an explosion in the scholarship on the events of 1688. That is not to say that the field remained stagnant in the intervening twenty years. On the contrary, no less than five important studies exploring various aspects of the 1688 Revolution appeared between 1969, when Carswell’s book first appeared, and the celebration of the Revolution’s three-hundredth anniversary. Nevertheless, academic conferences held in celebration of the tercentenary fueled renewed interest in the events of 1688 and led to significant revision of the accepted narrative.

Arguably, the most important book to appear in the wake of this renewed interest in the Glorious Revolution is Jonathan I. Israel’s collection of essays entitled, *The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its world impact*. *The Anglo-Dutch Moment*, as its title suggests, explores the Glorious Revolution not only from an English perspective, but also from a European or even a world perspective. One of the most important essays to appear in the book is Israel’s own piece entitled “The Dutch Role in the Glorious Revolution.” In it, he explores the rationale behind the Dutch decision to intervene in England. Rather than focusing on William III, Israel places the government bodies of the Dutch Republic in the spotlight. William’s invasion of England required the acquiescence of both the States General and the States of Holland, the provincial government of the Republic’s most important province, for it to come off. Without their direct support for such a venture, William would not have had an army to take to England let alone the transports and escort ships to get them there. Unlike Carswell, who, in spite of his focus on the Dutch Republic, tends to portray the Prince of Orange as the dominant actor on the other side of the channel in the 1688

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drama, Israel instead sees the States General and the States of Holland as equally important arbiters of events.

For Israel, two factors — one economic and one strategic — compelled the Dutch state to support William III’s intervention in England. Israel maintains that William’s decision to invade England was largely an outgrowth of Dutch strategic interests as they were viewed by the Prince of Orange. Louis’ réunions policy decreased the size and depth of the Spanish buffer — later to be known as the “barrier” — separating France from the United Provinces. William had wanted to intervene to defend this barrier on behalf of the Spaniards but was stubbornly opposed by Amsterdam who viewed renewed conflict with France as damaging to its trade. Amsterdam, supported by other Holland and Zeeland towns, refused to support the Prince of Orange’s proposals to join in a coalition with the Emperor and Spain to stop French expansion. They also vetoed all of William’s attempts at increasing the size of the Dutch military in anticipation of future French aggression. The fissure between the Prince of Orange and the towns of Holland and Zeeland began to heal rapidly when the French embarked upon a renewed trade war with the Dutch. This trade war, which began more than a year before William set sail for England, convinced the States General — and more importantly, Amsterdam — of Louis’ ill-will toward the Dutch. More significantly, it persuaded Holland’s regents that Louis could not be trusted, and so to support the Prince of Orange in his strategic initiatives. On the other side of the Channel James II’s apparent Francophillic policies, furthermore, convinced William of the necessity of intervening in England. According to Israel, William’s motives were as much to safeguard the Republic as they were to further his wife’s (and his own) English claims. Only with English assistance could the Dutch succeed in the coming war with France. If James were to side with Louis, the Republic might face the same strategic dilemma it had done in 1672. Consequently, William’s intervention in England is viewed as a “pre-emptive strike” aimed at eliminating a potential French ally while securing England’s support for the Republic and the allied cause in one stroke. For Israel, the French threat to Dutch trade provided the motivation for the Holland and the States General to support William’s strategy. Only an attack on trade could unify the divergent interests of the Orangists and the Amsterdam regents against France and convince them to embark upon such a dangerous gamble.17

17 Israel, “The Dutch Role in the Glorious Revolution,” 105-162.
The other chapters that comprise this important work emphasize the wider implications of what many historians had previously accepted as an almost purely “English” historical event. Israel’s thesis, that the Dutch Republic and the Prince of Orange were at least co-actors in the 1688 drama, is supported by a second chapter on the nature of the Dutch expedition tasked with this risky venture. Co-authored by Israel and Geoffrey Parker, “Of Providence and Protestant Winds: the Spanish Armada of 1588 and the Dutch Armada of 1688” compares the Dutch and Spanish Armadas, interestingly enough, separated by precisely one-hundred years of history.18 Parker and Israel show how indispensable the Dutch Republic was to the expedition’s success, and demonstrate, in much the same way that Carswell does in his Descent on England, just how important the Republic was in providing the resources for William’s “Dutch Armada.” According to Israel and Parker, the presence of so many Dutch military assets in William’s expeditionary force reflected not only the Republic’s contribution to the Prince of Orange’s “descent” but also showed how serious the Dutch perceived Louis’ threat to be. That they were willing stake so much on such a risky venture says much about not only their confidence in the Prince of Orange’s plan but the danger the current diplomatic situation posed to them and to Europe.

Israel’s Anglo-Dutch Moment highlights the importance of the Glorious Revolution to European, rather than just English, history. Established firmly in its world context, Israel portrays the Glorious Revolution as a major turning point not only in the affairs of England, Scotland, and Ireland but of the world. The shift in the European balance ushered in by William and Mary’s succession to the throne ended Louis XIV’s European hegemony. The wars that erupted on the continent saw Britain emerge as a new first-class world power while the Dutch state went into decline. This phenomenon had a profound effect on European diplomacy in the 18th century. Perhaps even more significantly, the overthrow of the Stuart monarchy and the waves of support the prince received from both Protestants and Catholics on the Continent called into question the utility of religion as a factor in state policy. In this sense, the Glorious Revolution, which in turn ushered in the series of Coalition wars fought against Louis XIV, mark the end of what at least one historian has called the “Age of

Religious Wars.” In this sense then, the Glorious Revolution was a pivotal moment in European history as well.¹⁹

Jonathan Israel’s work was one of several compilations published in celebration of the Glorious Revolution’s three-hundredth anniversary. The Revolution of 1688-1689: Changing Perspectives edited by Lois Schwoerer, much like Israel’s Anglo-Dutch Moment, also underscores the importance of the revolution to European history.²⁰ K. H. D. Haley’s chapter, entitled “The Dutch, the invasion of England, and the alliance of 1689” also emphasizes the Dutch role in the events of 1688. Much like Israel, Haley argues that William’s invasion of England was prompted more by Dutch strategic concerns than by any intrinsic desire to restore English freedoms. The difference between them lies in their interpretation of the factors that led to the Dutch decision to support William’s invasion plan. Whereas Israel places the emphasis on the trade war that erupted between France and the Republic, Haley believes that aggressive French foreign policy, coupled with the fear that Louis was preparing to attack the Republic again ala 1672, led the Republic to embark upon its English adventure. For Haley, French trade restrictions alone could not have induced the Republic to embark on such a risky venture. Rather, he maintains that concern for the security of the United Provinces convinced the States General to support William’s program. The trade war that preceded the Glorious Revolution was more a symptom of souring Franco-Dutch relations than a significant reason for intervening in England. According to Haley, it was the combination of Louis’ Réunions policy of the 1680s coupled with the knowledge of French ambitions in Cologne, the very region from which Louis launched his fateful attack against the Dutch in 1672, that pushed the States General and William to act. Central in convincing the Dutch to intervene in England was the belief that, on the one hand, war with France was inevitable, and on the other, that if James remained on the throne England would at best remain neutral in the coming war with France and at worst ally with Louis XIV. The States General’s decision to support William III’s intervention in England demonstrates not simply its determination to see the English Church and its liberties restored but rather to insure that England’s resources were


directed in the proper direction. Thus, Haley saw William’s “Grand Design” as one jointly undertaken by the Prince and the States General in an effort to safeguard the Republic’s security and restore English liberties, in that order.21

The works that appeared since the tercentenary of the Glorious Revolution illustrate the degree with which that scholarship has changed historians’ perceptions of the events of 1688. No longer is the Glorious Revolution seen simply as an event out of English history. The most recent historiography emphasizes, and accepts, the European part of the drama which, in turn, has led to a reinterpretation of the Glorious Revolution’s importance in English history. According to many of these new works, the Glorious Revolution signaled not just a resolution of the one-hundred year conflict between Parliament and the Crown but a revolution in government affairs leading to the emergence of the modern British state. The most important of these new works is Jonathan Scott’s England’s Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in European Context. Scott’s book is important in that it fully integrates the new historiography into a new interpretation of England’s seventeenth century political narrative. Scott integrates new historiography into his interpretation of the resolution of the struggle between Parliament and King. For example, Scott accepts Israel’s argument that the Glorious Revolution was driven by Dutch domestic politics. Indeed, this point is most important because it in large part helps to explain William’s actions as monarch and his determination to see English resources motivated in support of the Dutch in spite of significant opposition in Parliament. As Scott points out, William’s determination to see England’s resources fully mobilized against France transformed not only its politics but also the state itself. England’s military effort in the war against Louis XIV is in large part responsible for its emergence as a great power in 1714. Not only did William lead a “Glorious Revolution” but he ushered in both a diplomatic revolution and a financial revolution as well. By 1715, Britain had emerged as a Great Power of the first magnitude, in large part due to the way it rose up to meet the demands of war.22


But what of the Dutch Republic? Although historians like Israel, Haley, Scott, and others have emphasized the important role the Dutch played in the Glorious Revolution and the creation of the modern British state, little has been written about how the Glorious Revolution affected the United Provinces. Both Haley and Israel rightfully point out that domestic issues drove the Dutch decision to intervene, whether it was the French assault on Dutch trade or the growing military threat its foreign policy posed to United Provinces or some other factor that proved the deciding factor. Most historians agree that the Dutch perceived war to be unavoidable in 1688 and that for both William and the States General William’s expedition was intended to break the Franco-English alliance and redirect English resources in support of the Dutch — or rather the “allied” — cause. Those “resources” manifested themselves in the form of Britain’s economic and military power. Just over two months after William and Mary were crowned King and Queen of England, the House of Commons voted to support a war with France. Contemporaries were not blind to what this meant, nor were they blind to William’s true motives for intervening in England, regardless of what his propaganda sheets might have claimed. Writing shortly after William and Mary’s coronation, the Marquis of Halifax noticed — not incorrectly — that the Prince of Orange “hath such a mind to France that it would incline one to think, hee tooke England onely in his way.” Even before he had been crowned king, Dutch deputies had initiated negotiations with British officials with regards to Anglo-Dutch naval cooperation. And while the first years of war saw England’s military primarily engaged in Ireland to protect the “Protestant Succession” from James II’s return, William had already the groundwork for English participation in the war on the Continent. In 1689, William invoked the mutual defense clause in the Anglo-Dutch Alliance of 1678 as Stadholder of Holland by requesting England’s support in its war with France. Then as King of England, he granted that support when he sent 10,000 of his British troops to the Continent in support of the Republic. As the end of the war in

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25 Clark, *The Dutch Alliance and the War Against French Trade*, 8-43.
Ireland drew to a close, England’s expanding military sent troops to the Continent to assist their Dutch allies in ever increasing numbers.

The “Dutch” character of England’s new foreign policy was not lost contemporaries in England. Although William might have freed Britain from “Popery”, England’s economy was now being drained of its wealth by a monarch more concerned with the needs of his fellow Dutchmen than his own English subjects. Tory MP Sir Thomas Clarges, a sharp critic of William’s foreign policy, commented “I cannot take notice that though we were drawn into this war by the Dutch — they being the principals — yet we must bear a greater share of the burden. These things, I am afraid, are occasioned by having one of the Dutch estates in your council.”26 Clarges’ allegations with regards to England’s contribution, as we shall see later, were false. Nevertheless, that Britain was engaged in what many viewed as a “Dutch War” fought for Dutch interests alludes to the Dutch motives behind both the Glorious Revolution as well as William’s policies. Although Jacobite pamphlets were propaganda pieces designed to undermine the new king, there is nevertheless some truth behind their allegations. One pamphleteer echoed the sentiments of many Englishmen when he wrote “this war, and all the charges we have been at, [is] purely for the Dutch.”27

The Anglo-Dutch Alliance, the Nine Years’ War, and Coalition Warfare in Historiography

The Glorious Revolution, and the diplomatic revolution that accompanied it, saw the creation of and Anglo-Dutch military alliance, the fruit of which would be seen on the high seas and in Flanders’ fields. The return of William III to the Republic that cold January morning in 1691 marked the successful conclusion of the States General’s plan. England had been secured for the anti-French coalition. As intended and promised, William had returned to the continent to lead both the Dutch army and his own British forces. His return also marked the birth of the Confederate Army. Beginning in 1691, the coalition forces in the Spanish Netherlands Theater were forged into a more or less unified allied army with William at its head. For the next six years, William III’s Anglo-

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27 Wagstaffe, His Majesty’s most gracious Speech, 604, as cited in Rose, England in the 1690s, 119.
Dutch troops would form the bulk of Confederate Army’s forces. But if the Anglo-Dutch forces provided the bulk of the army, William’s Dutch forces gave it its expertise. *Het Staatsche Leger*, or “The States Army” — the military forces of the States General — was one of the most professional military organizations in the early modern world. Its role within William’s Confederate Army has largely been overlooked by historians. In part, this has to do with the way in which military organizations are studied by historians, and in part it is the result of historiographical biases caused by the combination of neglect on the part of Dutch historians on the one hand, and over-exposure on the part of Anglo-American scholars on the other. Consequently, we know much about the British forces that participated in the Confederate Army and very little about their Dutch who comprised the largest contingent for most of the war.

*Armies and the Early Modern State*

Most histories of early modern armies have focused on the relationship between the military organization and the state of which it was a part. Part of the focus on the military of a particular state is a natural part of military history. Histories of military organizations were always in part written as a way to foster tradition in a given institution. This is particularly true of military histories written in the nineteenth century; histories that tended to emphasize the glorious deeds of a given organization. By the second half of the twentieth century, the original reasons for writing nation oriented military histories had changed. Whereas the early histories were written as a way to celebrate the history of a particular army, later histories emphasized the importance a given military organization had within the context of a state’s history. These more recent histories tended to focus on where the military organization fit within the state both socially and politically. The most recent studies have emphasized the role that military institutions have played in the creation of the modern state.

While important, this emphasis on the relationship between military organizations and state formation has led historians to focus their attention on national military establishments almost in isolation rather than on the larger multi-national military organizations in which the armies actually participated in times of war. Indeed, during the second half of the seventeenth century, very few European armies acted as independent military organizations in wartime. With the possible exception of France, which possessed by far the largest army in Europe during the latter seventeenth century, only Spain during the War of Devolution (1667-68) and the War of Réunions
(1683-84) ever faced the French army alone. During the other wars of Louis XIV — the Dutch War (1672-78), the Nine Years’ War (1688-97) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713) — European armies operated in concert, organized into multi-national, ad-hoc allied military organizations, organizations hardly examined by historians. The wars of the latter 17th century, in fact, marked the beginning of a period dominated by coalition warfare. Like the wars of the eighteenth century and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars that followed them, Louis XIV’s were largely coalition wars. This period of coalition warfare only came to an end on the battlefield of Waterloo with the defeat of Napoleon’s army at the hands of Wellington’s Anglo-Dutch force, a distant relative of the Anglo-Dutch armies that so often faced the armies of Louis XIV and Louis XV. Louis XIV’s wars ushered in an important era in the history of armies and warfare. The French army that came into being during Louis’ reign is often seen as the prime example of how the Military Revolution and the emergence of modern military organizations influenced the creation of state bureaucracy. Not surprisingly, Louis XIV’s French Army has been the focus of numerous studies.

Other armies have, likewise, been the focus of historians of early modern Europe. The British Army, with its rich tradition, has long been a popular topic with historians since the nineteenth century. After all, it was during the wars of Louis XIV, when the British Army emerged as one of Europe’s most important military organizations. Because of the military traditions associated with the British Army and because of the importance that institution played in British history, its importance during certain periods in history has been emphasized, and in some cases overstated. This is particularly true of the second half of the seventeenth century when the army was a relatively minor organization when compared to the military institutions of Continental Europe. However, because of the British Army’s importance to British society in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and because of the desire to glorify its deeds and its traditions, historians have paid closer attention to its role in the coalition wars of the later seventeenth century than other military organizations lacking the same rich traditions.

The Dutch and British Armies in Historiography

The Dutch army, on the other hand, has received scant attention from historians of early modern Europe. As a major European power during the seventeenth century the
United Provinces of the Netherlands, or the Dutch Republic as it is more commonly called, played a central role in the wars against Louis XIV’s France. The Nine Years’ War was arguably the most important of these wars for the Dutch Republic for numerous reasons. When the United Provinces entered the Nine Years’ War, it was a European power of the first order. But after the Treaty of Utrecht was concluded ending the War of the Spanish Succession, the Dutch Republic emerged exhausted, well on its way to becoming a second rate power. The Nine Years’ War saw the Dutch Republic at its peak, both in diplomatic influence and in military power. It would never again enjoy the same power and prestige.

Although the War of the Spanish Succession has received the most attention from scholars of early modern Europe, it was the Nine Years’ War that stretched both the English and Dutch treasuries to the breaking point and the French treasury to bankruptcy. John Lynn, a noted historian of the French army, maintains that France put forth its greatest war effort of the “long seventeenth century”, at least in terms of manpower, during the Nine Years’ War — not during the Spanish Succession War as was previously believed. During the Nine Years’ War, the French army reached its peak strength of 340,000 officers and men. For the allies, most particularly the Dutch,

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28The general war in Europe fought between 1688 and 1697 by France, Savoy and their lesser allies on one side and the United Provinces, England, the Habsburg Empire, Spain, and their German allies on the other has been given any number of titles by historians over the years. French historians earlier referred to the conflict as the “War of the League of Augsburg” since it lays blame for the conflict at the feet of the anti-French coalition made up of a host of lesser German states, Sweden and Spain and supported (but not signed) by Dutch Stadholder William III. Because England was not a member of the League of Augsburg and the States General never approved it, the title is not really an accurate one. German, Dutch, and English historians sometimes referred to the conflict as the “War of the Grand Alliance” since it was the name of the treaty signed by the Holy Roman Empire, the Dutch Republic, and England in 1689 in an effort to curtail Louis XIV’s expansionist designs. This too, however, carries with it its own historiographical baggage: it implies that England was dragged into a continental conflict more or less against its will. “The Nine Years’ War” is today the most accepted title for this war since it merely describes the duration of the conflict, from the French invasion of the Palatinate in September 1688 to the conclusion of hostilities in the fall of 1697 with the Treaty of Rijswijk. For a discussion of the origins of this name, see especially John Childs, The Nine Years’ War and the British Army, 1688-1697: The operations in the Low Countries (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 5.

29Negotiations were formally opened on 29 January 1712 and concluded on 12 April 1713. For details see Linda Frey and Marsha Frey, ed., The Treaties of the War of the Spanish Succession: An Historical and Critical Dictionary (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995), 455-457.

30Although it should be noted that while the Nine Years’ War witnessed the greatest French effort in terms of manpower and ended with the French treasury exhausted, The War of the Spanish Succession was according to Lynn “the longest and most exhausting war of [Louis
the war saw a proportionately equal or even greater commitment of manpower. At the peak of the war, the Republic fielded an army of 101,885 men,\textsuperscript{31} and while it is true that more than half of that number were soldiers of so called “foreign” origin, at least 35,000 of that number were Dutch subjects—still an impressive commitment when one considers that the Republic numbered only 1.9 million inhabitants.\textsuperscript{32}

The Dutch army of the late seventeenth century was not only large but it was also widely admired by contemporaries for its military expertise. Humphrey Bland, an Englishman who served along side Dutch troops during this period and author of A Treatise of Military Discipline, attributed the army’s excellence to its officer corps since “their officers are generally promoted by their service; by which means, the majority of them are men of experience[...].”\textsuperscript{33} Bland maintained, furthermore, that the average Dutch soldier was better trained and drilled than his counterparts in other armies, and thus could perform more difficult maneuvers in battle than either his British allies or his French foes.\textsuperscript{34} And Bland was not alone in his admiration for Dutch military prowess. Captain Robert Parker, an officer of the Royal Irish Regiment and veteran of the wars with Louis XIV’s France, often mentioned the excellence of the Dutch soldiery in his memoirs; he was also in part responsible for training British troops in the “Dutch Exercise”— a musketry drill more commonly referred to as “platoon fire.”\textsuperscript{35} The

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\textsuperscript{33}Humphrey Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline (London, 1727), 146.

\textsuperscript{34} Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline, 146-147.

\textsuperscript{35}Robert Parker was appointed in 1708 by the Commander-in-Chief of the Queen’s troops in Ireland to train them in the “discipline practiced in Flanders,” otherwise known as “platoon-fire.” For details see Robert Parker, Memoirs of the Most Remarkable Military Transactions From the Year 1683 to 1718 (London, 1747), 148; and J. A. Houlding, Fit For Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1981), 175-176; and Chapter 7 below.
French contemporaries also commented on steadiness of Dutch troops and the excellence of their drill, which according to Guillaume Le Blond “furnished the model that other nations in Europe have adopted.”36 The Dutch were equally innovative in the use and development of artillery, as well as in military engineering. Menno van Coehoorn, whose works of engineering can still be seen in the Netherlands today, rivaled the French engineer Vauban in his ability to conquer fortified towns.37 These examples suggest that the Dutch army was one of the most important military institutions in Europe during the late seventeenth century; better trained and more experienced than the small British army and certainly on par with the French army of Louis XIV in terms of expertise.

Unfortunately, while Dutch army during the period of the Dutch Revolt has been examined to some degree,38 very little is known about the army of the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries apart from some vague stereotypes regarding its “mercenary” nature. There are a number of reasons for this. One is that military history is not viewed with much esteem by Dutch historians and, as a result, it has been largely neglected in the Netherlands. Even in countries where military history has finally gained a measure of respectability in the academic world – such as in the United States, Britain and France for example – its study is still, to some degree, regarded with suspicion by academics. Only in the last twenty-five years, with the emergence of the “new military history” with its emphasis on the relationship between military organizations and the societies that support them has this view slowly begun to change.39

36G. Le Blond, Elements de Tactique, Ouvrage dans laquel on traite de l’arrangement et de la formation des troupes... (Paris, 1758), 405-406.

37For Coehoorn’s contribution to military engineering, see Christopher Duffy, The Fortress in the Age of Vauban and Frederick the Great, 1660-1789. (Siege Warfare; v.2) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), 63-71.

38For the military aspects of the Dutch Revolt, see especially Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries’ Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972; for a more recent survey of the Dutch side, see Marco van der Hoeven, ed., Exercise of Arms: Warfare in the Netherlands, 1568-1648 (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 1997).

39For an excellent essay on the disregard of military history by historians of the 17th century France, see the Preface in John Lynn’s Giant of the Grand Siècle, ix-xvii.
In the Netherlands, however, the process of acceptance has been even slower in coming. Unlike in England where Dr. H.L. Zwitzer maintains that Dutch historians still consider military history “an unfashionable theme.” In his view, historians of the Republic – especially those Dutch historians of the “vaderlandse traditie” – have tended to emphasize the importance of maritime history at the expense of the army and the Republic’s continental role. Simon Schama suggests that this image of the Dutch Republic as strictly a maritime power is not a new one, but is, rather, an ingrained part of Dutch society. The perception of the army as somehow alien or “non-Dutch” goes back to the days of the Republic when, according to Schama, “collectively, and institutionally, the navy was seen as less intimidating and more vaderlandse than the army.” Historians Jaap de Moor and Hans Vogel have another view. They maintain that the lack of interest in military history in the Netherlands is the result of what they term “the Dutch pacifistic tradition,” a term that they maintain is more a 20th century construct than a true tradition, especially when one considers the history of the Netherlands as a whole. Thus, for a number of reasons, the military history of the Netherlands has either been overlooked or ignored. This trend has only recently begun to change with the publication of a number of important books in one way or another relating to the military history of the Republic. Unfortunately, most are written in Dutch and are, as a result, limited to Dutch specialists rather than historians at large.

But there are other reasons for its neglect as well. One problem for historians of early modern Europe in general has been their general lack of familiarity with Dutch sources. This is not particularly surprising; familiarity with Dutch sources — especially seventeenth century Dutch sources — requires a thorough reading knowledge of seventeenth century Dutch, a language somewhat different from its present day


43 The most important of these are Marjolein C. ‘t Hart, The Making of a Bourgeois State: War, Politics, and Finance During the Dutch Revolt (Manchester, 1993); Olaf van Nimwegen, De Subsistentie van Het Leger: Logistiek en strategie van het Geallieerde en met name het Staatsleger tijdens de Spanse Successieoorlog in de Nederlanden en het Heilige Roomse Rijk (1701-1712) (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1995); van der Hoeven, ed., Exercise of Arms; and Zwitzer, “De Militie van den Staat.”
counterpart. Added to the difficulty of old Dutch is the fact that the vast majority of documents pertaining to the government apparatus are still contained in archives. Although some collections of government documents have been compiled and printed, the bulk of them have not. Therefore, scholars of the Dutch Republic must also master *schrijftaal* or “written Dutch,” a skill very few early-modernists outside of the Netherlands possess. Consequently, many non-specialists tend either to shy away from Dutch sources or rely on the limited number of available printed sources.

Perhaps even more imposing than the 17th century Dutch language, however, is the Republic’s administrative apparatus itself. In a time when countries like France and England were becoming more and more centralized, the Dutch Republic remained, until its demise at the hands of the French in 1795, a very decentralized state. The Dutch Republic was more like a loose confederation of “statelets” than a single unified nation. Each province had its own representative and administrative bodies. Only in matters of foreign policy or national defense were the provinces bound to act in concert.\(^4^4\) In times of war, each province was responsible for providing its share of the costs as well as for raising and supplying the regiments in its establishment. As a result, any study of the Dutch army of the 17th century requires research at all of the various levels of the Republic’s bureaucratic machinery.\(^4^5\)

The relative dearth of studies on the Republic’s military history for the reasons described above, and the lack of English language monographs on the Republic’s army, has led English-speaking historians, in turn, to construct over-simplified or plainly inaccurate views of the nature and workings of the Republic’s army based almost solely on English or French source material. This is particularly true of the period of the Republic’s wars with France during the time of its alliance with Britain. Current scholarship on the Anglo-Dutch alliance is more reminiscent of works published by anti-Dutch pamphleteers in the 17th century than by 20th century scholars. Most likely this is due to the sources used by historians rather than their own particular biases, but it has, just the same, led to an extremely slanted pro-British view of Anglo-Dutch


\(^{45}\)For a good diagram of the various levels of bureaucracy in the Dutch Republic in the 17th century, see Michiel de Jong, “Dutch Public Finance During the Eighty Years War: The Case of the Province of Zeeland, 1585-1621” in van der Hoeven, ed. *Exercise of Arms*, 135.
relations. In one case where the ignorance of Dutch source material has led to a biased representation of events, David Chandler, in his book *Marlborough as Military Commander*, describes instances where he maintains the famous captain, the Duke of Marlborough, was denied the chance to engage the enemy due to the meddling of Dutch *gedeputeerden te velde* or “field deputies,” who he likens to Soviet “political commissars.”  

Interestingly, he never makes use of the plentiful Dutch archival sources that describe their activities and duties. Later, Chandler praises Marlborough for his celebrated march to the Danube in 1704, a feat he apparently carried out in spite of, rather than with help from, his Dutch allies.

Recent Dutch and American scholarship, however, has finally begun to call such biased interpretations into question. Dutch field deputies, while not serving officers in the Dutch army, were in any case very well versed in its administration and were largely responsible not only for the provisioning of the Dutch army but the British army as well, a fact overlooked by historians until very recently. Furthermore, Olaf van Nimwegen has shown that it was the Dutch food contractors and their contacts, in cooperation with Marlborough, who arranged for the allied army to be fed on its famous march to the Danube in 1704. This example illustrates how a lack of research in Dutch archives has led to an inaccurate view of the role of the Dutch in the allied war effort against France. Marlborough may have been a great commander but he did not do it alone as some British historians like to maintain. The Dutch Republic played a critical role in the war efforts of the allies during the War of the Spanish Succession and the Nine Years’ War which preceded it. It provided more troops in the main theater of


47 Chandler maintains that Marlborough kept his plans from the States–General because he feared they would obstruct his planned march to the Danube since “…it was abundantly evident that the Dutch States–General would never willingly permit any major weakening of the Netherlands forces…” and yet it is clear from the Dutch sources that the Raad van State was most definitely aware of his plans since not only did it provide nearly as many men for the operation as England, but organized the operation’s logistics as well. For details see *Marlborough as Military Commander*, 127; and especially van Nimwegen, *De Subsistentie van het Leger*, 133-137.

48 van Nimwegen, *De Subsistentie van het Leger*, passim, especially Chapters 2 and 3.

49 According to van Nimwegen, Marlborough sent Adolf Hendrik van Rechteren-Almelo, the States special ambassador to the German courts in the region to arrange for the provisioning of the army on its march to the Danube. For details see van Nimwegen, *De Subsistentie van het Leger*, 138-143.
operations than England in both conflicts but more importantly, served as a magazine for the allies; grain, fodder, bread and other foodstuffs as well as arms and ammunition were collected and stockpiled by Dutch food and weapons contractors for use by the allied armies. Not surprisingly, the financial burden borne by the average Dutch citizen was significantly greater that of his English counterpart.\(^5\)

Still, in spite of these facts, the role played by the Dutch army in defeating Louis XIV’s France during the Nine Years’ War and the Spanish Succession conflict remains obscure, while the British contribution is well documented and, one might even argue, overstated. Books like David Chandler’s before mentioned Marlborough as Military Commander and The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough, while excellent in many ways, tend to downplay the contribution of the Dutch to the allied cause,\(^51\) while more dated scholarship, like the still cited works of Sir John Fortescue, C.T. Atkinson, and Sir Winston Churchill portray the Dutch as little more than minor contributors to what they style as a primarily British war effort against France.\(^52\) As a result of such biased scholarship, the period of the Nine Years’ War and the War of the Spanish Succession—a period where the Dutch military commitment reached its peak and in some ways overshadowed that of Britain—is often portrayed as one dominated by Britain rather than one shared by two allies.

For the Dutch Republic and its army, the Nine Years’ War was of critical importance. Louis XIV’s aggressive foreign policy was a direct threat to the integrity of the Republic. As a result, the Dutch put forth a maximum effort against the designs of the Sun King. During the Nine Years’ War, the Dutch army provided the core of William III’s confederate forces arrayed against Louis XIV’s France. It was they who

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\(^5\)According to D. W. Jones, “no one else surpassed England’s military mobilization, let alone her total mobilization of the naval and military arms together.” However as Jones himself points out Britain paid out £1.56 and £1.96 per head in remittances during the Nine Years’ War and the War of the Spanish Succession respectively, while the Dutch paid £2.16 per head during the Nine Years’ War and a whopping £3.08 during the Spanish Succession War, and that with a population of just under 2 million inhabitants. For details see D. W. Jones, War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1988), 28–29; and Chapter 4 below.

\(^51\)David Chandler’s most important works on this period are Marlborough as Military Commander (London: B. T. Batsford, Ltd., 1973) and The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough (London: B. T. Batsford, 1976).

played the prominent role in the conduct of the war; it was King William and his officers that provided the bulk of the leadership for the allied army in Flanders rather than his English allies; it was Dutch food contractors who kept the army fed in the field; it was Dutch money that provided the army with the weapons and ammunition that it required; and it was Dutch military expertise that enabled the allies to survive the initial French onslaught and finally prevail. Even more significantly, the Nine Years’ War provided the military forces of what would later become “Marlborough’s army” with its training ground; most of the officers and men who would later serve along side the Duke of Marlborough during the War of the Spanish Succession learned their trade under the tutelage of William III and his officers. As a result, the armed forces of Britain, as well as the Republic’s lesser allies, adopted Dutch military practices. And while made up of contingents of many states, what would later become “Marlborough’s army” was in many ways very uniform in the way in which it was organized and trained. The army that Marlborough successfully led during the War of the Spanish Succession was essentially one he inherited from his successor, Stadholder-King William III. Marlborough’s army, though commanded by an Englishman, was essentially a Dutch creation that learned its trade during the Nine Years’ War.

Thus, this study seeks to fill important gaps in the literature surrounding not only the Dutch Army but also the history of coalition warfare. Through an examination of the coalition army led by William III, this study hopes to shed light not only on the important role the Dutch Army played in the Nine Years’ War, but nature of the Anglo-Dutch military alliance and how it manifested itself on the battlefield. Only through a careful examination of the process whereby the Confederate Army was assembled, organized, led, and supplied can historians truly understand the intricacies of coalition warfare and the crucial role the Dutch Republic played in the allied war effort. By studying the nature of William III’s Confederate Army, this dissertation will show military organizations influenced one another as well as how the patron-client relationship coexisted within not only national military organizations but international military organizations as well. Although historians have often said that the British Army received its tutelage at the hands of the Dutch under William, this study seeks to show how that might have occurred. In addition, by exploring the Confederate Army, this study also hopes to add to our knowledge of a rather enigmatic character in the realm of military history, William III.
Organization of this Study

This dissertation is divided into seven body chapters. Chapter 2 describes the Nine Years’ War’s background. Paying particular attention to the Dutch Republic’s diplomatic situation, the first chapter provides the historical framework for the study. In Chapter 2, I argue that William’s inability to defeat the French in the Spanish Netherlands during the Dutch War contributed to his decision to secure an alliance with England in the 1680s. James II’s succession to the English throne coupled with Louis’ Réunions policy however, undermined his attempts at insuring the Republic’s security, and led to his and the States General’s decision to intervene in English affairs. William’s ‘Grand Design’ — the Glorious Revolution — and the Republic’s decision to support him in his plan shows his and the States General’s determination to safeguard the Republic at any cost, even if it meant overthrowing a sovereign king. In the end, the Glorious Revolution succeeded in its goals: to secure for the alliance England’s resources against Louis XIV. The manner in which those resources were mobilized demonstrates the Dutch motives behind the Glorious Revolution. Although in the early stages of the war, England’s resources were largely committed in Ireland, the defeat of the Jacobites in 1691 saw a tremendous infusion of English resources into the war on the continent. Nevertheless, the Dutch “character” of the allied army William led in the Low Countries reflects the central role he and the Dutch Republic played in the war on the Continent, and the Dutch policy it pursued. The Dutch motives behind the revolution of 1688 are crucial in understanding England’s role in Confederate Army. William and Mary’s succession to the English throne in early 1689 and England’s entrance into the war on the side of the Grand Alliance marked the success of what was essentially a Dutch policy initiative. The chapter concludes with a brief overview of the Nine Years’ War in order to provide the historical context for the subject of this study.

The remaining six chapters are divided into two thematic sections. The first examines the process of assembling the component parts of a coalition army. It looks at the army’s historical background, from its political underpinnings, to the role geography played in determining its composition, to the respective military potentials of its members. The army’s origins go back to the first European coalition war fought against Louis XIV’s France, the Dutch War (1672-1678). In many ways, that war shaped the Confederate Army’s composition and undoubtedly colored William’s determination to secure England’s assistance in the coming war with France at all costs. Chapter 3
(“Coalition Warfare and the Growth of Armies”) looks at army growth as a phenomenon during the period. Of particular importance are the factors that influenced army growth and how they then translated into actual armies in the field; in other words how much of a given state’s military potential could actually be utilized in war? The questions posed in Chapters 2 and 3 are central in understanding how and why coalition armies were assembled to fight against Louis XIV’s enormous army.

Chapters 4 and 5 address the important question of resource mobilization. Who decided how much each state would contribute to the coalition? How many men? How much equipment? How much money? In addressing these questions, these chapters sets the stage for an examination of a much larger question: which state exercised the most influence within the Confederate Army itself and the Grand Alliance as a whole? Chapter 4 explores the financial cost of military commitment. Through a comparison of British, Dutch, and to a much lesser degree, Spanish finances, Chapter 4 seeks to determine which state bore the greatest burden in fighting the war in the Spanish Netherlands. Financial burden did not necessarily correspond to army size or influence within the coalition. One might argue that the burden on the Spanish was as great as that on the Dutch and the British. It did not, however contribute to troops in the field. Through an examination of the financial cost of coalition warfare, Chapter 4 suggests which partner might have exercised the most control over the conduct of the war in the Low Countries.

Chapter 5 examines how that financial commitment translated into forces in the theater. How much of a state’s costly military establishment was contributed to the coalition and how did this express itself in terms of directing the activities of the Confederate Army? These are the two principal questions this chapter seeks to answer. Through an examination of the relationship between force commitment and military influence, I will show that William III enjoyed almost unchallenged authority within the Confederate Army structure. The dominating presence of the Anglo-Dutch forces within the Confederate Army gave William greater control of the army as a whole and greater legitimacy as the allied commander.

The second section of this dissertation explores the process by which the contingents that comprised the allied force in the Low Countries were shaped into a cohesive, unified military organization and how that force was finally structured. Central to this story is the role William III himself played in that process. As Captain-General of both Dutch and British Armies, William was influential in both of those
organizations. William’s knowledge of the States General’s Army and its personnel — not to mention the role he played in its officers’ selection and advancement — undoubtedly influenced how he would put together the Confederate Army. Indeed, his “reform” of the British Army after 1688 reflected the reliance he had on his own Dutch military organization. Chapter 6 explores the Anglo-Dutch officer corps as a unifying force, within the Confederate Army. William’s influence as a coalition commander, and the respect that he commanded in the international community, was in large part due to his role in selecting the Confederate Army’s officers. William’s reform of the Dutch Army in the 1670s made him its “Chief Patron.” Consequently, most of its officers owed their advancement to him. The events of 1688-89 caused William to attempt a more limited reform of the British Army, focusing on the officer corps. The Stadholder-King’s installation of trusted Dutch or foreign officers in key positions in the British Army helped bring that organization into his larger Dutch organization in the Low Countries.

The result of William’s appointment of selected key officers in the British Army is demonstrated in the following chapter. Chapter 7 explores the army’s command structure and organization in an effort to understand both how William put together a unified multi-national force as well as to whom the Confederate Army answered. In other words, was it really “William’s Army”? If it was truly was the Stadholder-King’s army, in whose interest did the army fight? Chapter 8 poses the same questions with regards to the army’s administration and logistics structures. Who supplied the allied army? Did all of the army’s contingents share a common administration or were they supplied separately? Both chapters illustrate the degree with which the Confederate Army was an integrated allied military organization. Clearly the relationship between the British and Dutch forces strengthened by William’s direct influence on both organizations. Nevertheless, William’s influence extended to appointments in the Spanish Army as well. His position as both Stadholder and King gave him additional political clout which he used to strengthen the ties between the various contingents and to lessen the rivalries within his multi-national army. The size of the army, coupled with the presence of local contractors, led William to rely on one uniform logistical network, the same network utilized by the Dutch Army. William’s officer appointments, the Confederate Army’s chain-of-command, and its logistics structure illustrate the important influence the Dutch Army had on the Confederate Army as a whole.
By exploring these issues, this dissertation will illustrate the importance of the Confederate Army as a military force. Under William III’s command, it pursued a policy in line with the Dutch Republic’s strategic concerns. Indeed, the Confederate Army resembled a much-expanded version of the Dutch Army that made up its core. Its composition, the important role the Dutch Army’s played within the Confederate Army in terms of both manpower as well as command, coupled with the fact that William III the organization himself supports the thesis that mobilizing British resources in support of the Dutch was an important motive in the Dutch Republic’s support of William’s invasion of England. Such a conclusion supports, and expands upon, our current understanding of the Dutch Republic’s — thus and William III’s — role in the Glorious Revolution and its aftermath. This interpretation, furthermore, challenges the traditional, Anglo-centric view of the Glorious Revolution. For William and the Dutch, Britain’s involvement in the conflict marked the fruition of their goals. Although William pursued a war strategy that he deemed in the best interests of both states, his decisions were colored by continental, or rather Dutch, concerns more than they were British ones.

Limitations of this Study

Any study of a multi-national army suffers from certain obvious limitations. The Confederate Army comprised forces from four national military organizations, the Army of the States General, the British Army, the Spanish Army of Flanders, and the Army of Brandenburg-Prussia. In addition to these, German and Scandinavian auxiliaries were hired into the service of the Dutch, British, and Spanish armies. To exhaust the source materials surrounding all of these organizations would require research in all of the pertinent archives. This study has purposefully focused its attention on the Anglo-Dutch relationship because Britain and the Dutch Republic provided and paid for the bulk of the Confederate Army’s forces. Although Spain played an important role in the Confederate Army, it rarely comprised or paid for more than 10% of the forces that comprised the allied force. Likewise, the army of the Elector of Brandenburg was deployed for most of the war in the region between the Low Countries and Germany. Thus, while important, it played a relatively minor role in the army’s overall organization. In addition, archival research indicates that the command structure of the army was built by and around William III. Consequently, I have chosen
to focus on British and Dutch source material. Where I do explore the Spanish and Prussian armies, I have relied primarily on secondary source materials.\textsuperscript{53}

The Confederate Army was unique in early modern Europe and was succeeded by similar organizations during the War of the Spanish Succession and the War of Austrian Succession thirty-five years later. It was not the only allied force confronting Louis XIV during the Nine Years’ War, however. In Germany and along France’s southeast border, other coalition armies fought against Louis XIV’s forces. Each had its own character, each was comprised of elements from different states, but were not necessarily organized along the same lines as the Confederate Army. Indeed, this is not a comparative study of coalition armies. Rather, it is a study of one coalition army. This study is not, by its very nature, intended to show that the Confederate Army was representative of coalition armies. Only research on other coalition armies during this period can determine how representative William III’s Confederate Army really was. It is intended, however, to show its significance as a military force, both in terms of its composition and in terms of its origins.

This study, furthermore, does not examine directly the Confederate Army’s competence as a military organization. To ascertain its competence would require a study of the army’s performance in war, something I hope to do in the future but a topic beyond the scope of this study. Rather, its purpose is to explore how the Confederate Army was assembled, organized, led, and sustained. Although this indirectly suggests a degree of military competence, it does not assess its effectiveness as an organization. My purpose here is to explore the factors that influenced the army’s creation in an effort to assess whose interests were forwarded by its existence.

William III’s arrival in The Hague in the winter of 1691 was a revolutionary moment in the military relations of Britain, the Dutch Republic, if not Europe as a whole. It signaled a “diplomatic revolution” of the first magnitude. Now England, would fight in the allied camp. The man who represented the heart of the opposition against Louis XIV, William III, would lead it as part of an international coalition.

\textsuperscript{53} For the Spanish army in the Low Countries, I have relied upon Etienne Rooms’ massive dissertation which explores its organization during the second half of the 17\textsuperscript{th} century. For details, see Etienne Rooms, “De Materiele Organisatie van de Troepen van de Spaans-Habsburgse Monarchie in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden,” in three volumes plus three volumes of appendices (Ph.D. diss, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 1998.)
directed against what one historian has called “the Giant of the \textit{Grand Siècle},” the army of Louis XIV. For the first time since Henry V, an English king would personally lead the British Army in battle against France, much to the anxiety of many Englishmen. William’s speech to the States General confirmed his determination to halt the power of the French monarch, as well as his intention to resume his responsibilities as the States General’s “Captain-General”. The question on the minds of many in England, however, was where William’s true interests lay: toward Albion or the Republic; toward the land of his mother, or that of his father. Whether his interests were those of a “natural born Englishman”, or, as one Tory referred to the Dutch, of “the Devills Children.”\footnote{Francis Hopegood to Thomas Coke, 31 July 1696, BL Add MS 69944. ff. 10 as cited in Rose, \textit{England in the 1690s}, 119.}
CHAPTER 2
THE DUTCH REPUBLIC, ENGLAND, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE

INTRODUCTION
William III’s return to The Hague in the winter of 1691 was an important event, not only in the history of the United Provinces, but in the history of Europe as well. The Prince of Orange’s activities in the days that followed his triumphant arrival illustrated his continued influence both in the Dutch Republic and in Europe as a whole.¹ Not since Sir Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester’s appointment as Governor-General in 1586 did a “foreign prince” hold so much sway over the Dutch Republic’s affairs.² William’s return in the winter of 1691 saw his influence in both England and the Republic at its peak. Later, as the war in the Low Countries grew in scope, William would concern himself much more with English affairs while Holland’s Raadpensionaris Anthonie Heinsius increasingly took the reins of the Republic’s government into his own hands. But in the winter of 1691, one could truly speak in terms of a “dual monarchy” not merely in terms of William and Mary’s rule over Britain but over William’s rule over Britain and the Dutch Republic.³

Part of the significance of William’s triumphant return to his homeland — indeed one of the principal reasons for his visit to The Hague — was his attendance at the meeting of the Allied Congress to plan the coming military campaign against Louis XIV. If William’s return to the continent was important to the citizens of The Hague and the Dutch Republic, it was crucial to the members of the Anti-French coalition, the

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³ Stephen Baxter refers to William and Mary’s reign as a “Dual Monarchy.” For details, see Baxter, *William III*, 269-287.
Grand Alliance. Indeed, the presence of the Electors of Brandenburg and Bavaria, the Duke of Brunswick, the Landgrave of Hesse, and the Governor of the Spanish Netherlands, among others, demonstrate the significance of the meeting. William’s return, in the eyes of allied princes, signaled not only the return of the coalition’s true leader, but it also a change in the allies’ fortunes, as well. 1690 had been a bad year for the allies. William’s victory at the Boyne had been overshadowed by the Dutch Army’s defeat at Fleurus, the Anglo-Dutch fleet’s defeat at Beachy Head, and the Duke of Savoy’s loss at Staffarde. The Stadholder-King’s return brought unity to the alliance and renewed vigor to the allied war effort. William’s popularity, both within the Republic and in Europe as a whole, stemmed from the fact that most believed the Prince of Orange the embodiment of the alliance arrayed against the Sun King. Historian Pieter Geyl explains:

William cut a greater figure than any of his predecessors had done, not so much because of the royal crown he now wore, but rather because more than ever he had become the soul of European resistance against Louis XIV. It was a right instinct that moved public opinion in the Northern Netherlands to acclaim him such.

And this opinion was not confined to observers in the Republic. In honor of his position as leader of the alliance, the Emperor Leopold himself conferred upon him the title “Majestas Potentissime,” thus demonstrating the influence the Prince of Orange held within the Grand Alliance. William’s presence at The Hague gave the coalition a renewed sense of purpose and direction. In his opening speech, the Prince of Orange defined the task facing the members of the Grand Alliance thus:
The states of Europe had too long indulged themselves in a spirit of division, or of delay, and of attention to particular interests. But, while the dangers which threatened them from France reminded them of past errors, they pointed out also the necessity of amending them for the future. It was not now a time to

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4 The battle of Staffarde, fought between French forces under Marshal Catinat and Savoyard forces under Victor Amedeus on 18 August 1690 was an overwhelming French victory. For details, see Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV, 213.

5 Geyl, The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, Part II, 255.

6 Japikse, Prins Willem III de Stadhouder-Koning, II., 328; Baxter, William III, 293; and Geyl, The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, Part II, 255.
deliberate but to act. Already the French King had made himself master of the chief fortresses around his kingdom, which were the only barriers to his ambition; and, if not instantly opposed, he would seize the rest. All ought, therefore, to be convinced that the particular interest of each was comprised in the general interest of the whole. The enemy’s forces were strong and they would carry things like a torrent before them. It was in vain to oppose complaints and unprofitable protestations against injustice. It was not the resolutions of diets, nor hopes founded on treaties, but strong armies and firm union among the allies which alone could stop the enemy in his course. With these they must now snatch the liberties of Europe out of his hands or submit for ever to his yoke. As to himself, he would not spare his credit, his forces, or his person, and would come in the spring at the head of his troops to conquer or perish with his allies.7

In response to William’s stirring words, the members of the Grand Alliance agreed to put aside their differences and act together. This was a crucial moment. Not only did the member states agree to put aside their political differences and rivalries (for the time being) but their religious ones as well. At the time of the congress in 1691, the coalition comprised most of the countries of Western Europe, both Protestant and Catholic. Its first members — the Habsburg Empire, the Dutch Republic, Spain, England, and Brandenburg-Prussia — had been joined by Savoy, Bavaria, Saxony, the Palatinate, Hesse-Cassel, Liège, Württemberg, Münster, Hanover, and a host of lesser German states. Together they pledged to field 220,000 men to oppose Louis and his allies in 1691. To demonstrate their resolution, they further agreed to continue the war until France had returned all the territories it had taken from its neighbors since the Peace of the Pyrenees.8

The use of the Peace of the Pyrenees as the point to which the allies hoped to “turn back the clock” is indicative of the origins of the coalition’s antagonism with France. The collection of states that would become the Grand Alliance had no common enemy in 1659 when the Thirty Years’ War was finally put to rest. When Louis XIV officially declared his majority in 1661, France was not Europe’s obvious hegemon.

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7 Luttrell, Historical Relation, ii., 136-139 as cited in Childs, Nine Years’ War, 156-57.

8 Childs, Nine Years’ War, 157.
Ironically, it was traditional Bourbon/Habsburg rivalry and the age-old French fear of being encircled by the Austrian and Spanish Houses of that family rather than any hegemonic plan Louis might have entertained that set the stage for the coalition wars of the latter 17th century. The death of Philip IV in 1665 and the succession of the infant Carlos II to throne brought to Spain a period of internal instability and external weakness. The decline of Spain coupled with the arrival of a strong France on the European diplomatic scene set the stage for a series of wars fought with the purpose of strengthening France at the expense of Spain. The power vacuum created by the decline of the Spanish Habsburgs brought former allies — France and the Dutch Republic — into conflict over the fate of the Spanish Netherlands.9

As the tables of this conflict in policy turned increasingly against the Dutch Republic and its allies, and as France increased in strength, more and more Western European states began to feel threatened by what they perceived to be Louis’ seemingly insatiable desire to expand the frontiers of France. His invasion of the Dutch Republic in 1672-73 witnessed the emergence of France as the strongest state in Europe, while his policies of aggrandizement in the 1680s saw the states of Europe gradually put aside their own differences to stand up to what they saw as French aggression, or even to fight what they perceived to be Louis’ desire to establish Universal Monarchy.10 At the same time, it also saw the emergence of an individual who used Louis’ own policies against him to strengthen his position both at home and abroad. Just as the Sun King exploited Spain’s weakness to secure his country’s frontiers, William of Orange exploited the collective fear of Louis XIV’s hegemony — both real and imagined — against him. Indeed, William’s own legitimacy depended on the threat Louis posed to the collective security of Europe. Without Louis’ aggressive policies — policies pursued with seemingly no regard to how they would be perceived by his neighbors —


William could neither have orchestrated the “diplomatic revolution” of 1688, or the anti-French alliance Louis had so long feared.\textsuperscript{11}

This chapter explores the origins of anti-French opposition during the first three decades of Louis XIV’s reign, culminating in the formation of Grand Alliance of 1689. The anti-French alliance owed its origins to the conflicting policies of France and its neighbors. When, in 1667, Louis sent his forces into the Spanish Netherlands under the guise of defending his wife’s right to her inheritance, the young Bourbon monarch unknowingly precipitated a chain of events that would finally lead to the creation of a great military alliance against him. Louis’ pursuit of an aggressive policy against the weakening Spanish Habsburg Empire, exemplified by his assault on the Spanish Netherlands during the War of Devolution, brought France and its then ally, the United Provinces, into conflict. The Sun King’s determination to see the Republic hurt by its “disloyal” position with regards to France and the Spanish Netherlands no doubt in part contributed to Louis’ decision to invade the Republic in 1672. That attack, and the overwhelming success of French arms, coupled with Louis’ decision to invade Germany the next year, laid the groundwork for growing French antagonism. The alliance that emerged during the Franco-Dutch war served as a precedent upon which the later Grand Alliance concluded in 1689 would be based.

Louis’ continuation of an aggressive foreign policy — whether intended defensively or otherwise — had the effect of uniting more states against France. That William III, Prince of Orange, would come to be the psychological — and in many ways political — leader of that burgeoning coalition is not surprising. William himself was a product of Louis’ aggressive foreign policy. Louis XIV’s devastating attack on the Dutch Republic in 1672 — the so-called Rampjaar or “Year of Disaster” in Dutch historiography — allowed William to become Stadholder. The powers granted the young Prince of Orange following the devastating invasion allowed him to become the central political figure in the Dutch Republic, and the strongest Stadholder in Dutch history. At the same time, the fear fostered by Louis’ aggressive foreign policy legitimized the Prince of Orange’s political position within the Dutch Republic. This fear, coupled with the continuation of Louis’ policy of Reunions in the 1680s coupled with the looming issue of the Spanish Succession, convinced William and the Dutch

\textsuperscript{11}For William’s war propaganda, see Claydon, \textit{William III and the Godly Revolution}, passim (especially 129-147); and Rose, \textit{England in the 1690s}, 105-122.
Republic that an alliance with England must be secured to balance growing French power. James II’s pro-French position coupled with Louis’ renewed saber-rattling led William and the Dutch to make the unprecedented decision of invading England in order to secure it for the anti-French opposition. The “Glorious Revolution” was fundamental in creating the Grand Alliance and even more importantly, in assembling a “Confederate Army” in the Spanish Netherlands. Indeed, Louis antagonistic policies served to solidify William’s position by pushing first the States General of the United Provinces, and then Holland — and thus England — into the growing group of states uniting to keep France in check. The French attack on the Palatinate in 1688 proved to be the straw that broke the proverbial the camel’s back. That decision, coupled with Louis’ harsh anti-Dutch tariff policy, gave William the support needed to execute his “Grand Design,” and thus create a European-wide anti-French coalition cornered on an Anglo-Dutch alliance. As a result, William III would emerge not only the spiritual leader of the anti-French coalition — the so called defender of “European Liberty” — but more importantly the Captain-General of the largest coalition army of the Grand Alliance, as well. In order to better understand this development, we must first turn our attention to the conditions that brought on this conflict, the decline of Spain and the weakness of the Spanish Netherlands in the latter 17th century.

The Dutch Republic, the Spanish Netherlands and the origins of the Anti-French Coalition

The Spanish Netherlands’ strategic importance during the early modern period was the result of its unique geographic position, being sandwiched between two powerful rival states, the fledgling Dutch Republic and Louis XIV’s France. Although, the principal belligerents of the Low Countries’ Wars — Spain, France, and Dutch Republic (and later England) — each fought there for different reasons, and each in pursuit of its own “foreign policy” goals, the French attack in 1667 ushered in a period of almost constant war in the region. From the year when young Carlos II succeeded to the Spanish throne until his death in 1700, the Spanish Netherlands was almost constantly under siege by French forces. Twenty years of Carlos’ thirty-four year reign found the Spanish Netherlands Europe’s battleground as Louis XIV sought to expand his territories at the expense of the sickly Habsburg king and his weakening kingdom. Indeed, it was the decline of Habsburg Spain and its inability to adequately defend its Netherlands territories that would eventually pit former allies France and the Dutch Republic
against each other. After the Peace of Nijmegen, Spain, and its provinces in the Southern Netherlands, provided little more than a dueling ground for the growing rivalry between France and the Dutch Republic.

The origins of anti-French antagonism in the 1670s and 1680s had its roots in the Peace of the Pyrenees in 1659. The treaty that marked the end of the Thirty Years’ War, and the beginning of Louis XIV’s reign also marked the beginning of a shift in the balance of power in Europe, a shift no one perceived at first. When Louis XIV declared his majority in 1661, he pursued a policy long followed by French monarchs: he tried to break the Habsburg encirclement of France. When Louis invaded the Spanish Netherlands in 1667, the so-called War of Devolution seemed to be just another in a long line of Franco-Spanish conflicts. Seemingly triggered by Spain’s failure to pay Louis’ wife’s dowry, (one of the conditions of the Peace of the Pyrenees) and taking advantage of the unrest in Spain following the death of Philip IV, the French army marched across the border in 1667 and seized the disputed territories. The French army’s overwhelming success demonstrated the marked shift in the balance of power between France and Spain in a way that shocked the rest of Europe. Still at war with Portugal and racked by internal squabbles following Carlos II’s succession, Spain was hard pressed to respond to the attack. It also lacked allies; the Dutch Republic had been allied with France since 1662 leaving no one to come to Spain’s aid. In 1664, only one year earlier, Louis had supported the Dutch against Münster and continued to support the Republic in its maritime war with England, albeit half-heartedly. At the

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same time, England, while at war with the Dutch, supported Portugal in its war against Spain. Diplomatically isolated, racked by internal power struggles and fiscal crisis, and incapable of sending forces to the region, Spain could do little to fend-off the French invasion.\textsuperscript{16} The swiftness of Louis’ opening campaign vividly demonstrated the shift in the balance of power and led other states to take notice. In the course of a single campaign season, the French army captured no less than eight important frontier fortresses including Lille, a vital hub for the Flemish textile industry.\textsuperscript{17}

The speediness of the French conquests in the south caused considerable concern across Europe, particularly in the Dutch Republic. The idea of a powerful France as its new southern neighbor led to increasing demand within Dutch political circles for a defensive alliance with Spain in order to maintain the sovereignty of the Spanish Netherlands, and thus its southern buffer. The conclusion of the Second Anglo-Dutch War in 1667 at Breda and the recognition of Spain’s weakness brought a change to Europe’s diplomatic climate, as well as to Louis’ continued prospects for conquest in the Netherlands. Both the Dutch Republic and England, concerned with Louis’ successes there, began seeking out diplomatic solutions to curb his ambitions in the region. The \textit{Raadpensionaris} or “Grand Pensionary” of Holland, Jan de Witt’s, pursued a policy that forced the Republic to tiptoe between its obligations to France and its own security. The centerpiece of de Witt’s foreign policy since the conclusion of an alliance with France in 1662, had been to satisfy Louis with regards to the Spanish Netherlands but at the same time insure there remained a barrier between the two states. The inability of the Spanish crown to defend its territories, however, threatened to undermine that policy, particularly if Louis persisted in his belief that the conditions of his wife’s dowry gave him rights to the Spanish Netherlands. Although Louis later

\textsuperscript{16} According to Geyl, the Marquess of Castel-Rodrigo had done everything in his power to convince the Spanish government of the hopelessness of the defensive situation in the Spanish Netherlands but “received but small comfort from Madrid in response to his appeals for help, and in the Netherlands itself he was not only alarmed by the wretched condition of the means of defense and of the beggarly army, but also by the general dejection of the people.” For details, see Geyl, \textit{The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, II.}, 96; and C. Smit, \textit{De Buitenlandsche Politiek van Nederland, Eerste Deel: “De Republiek der Vereenigde Nederlanden” (‘s-Gravenhage: L.J.C. Boucher, 1955), 132-133.

\textsuperscript{17} In 1667, France captured Aalst, Ath, Bergues, Binch, Charleroi, Douai, Furnes, Courtrai, Lille, Oudenaarde, and Tournai. When the treaty of Aix-La-Chapelle was signed the next year, France retained all of these, but returned Franche-Comté to Spain. For details, see John A. Lynn, \textit{The Wars of Louis XIV, 107-108; G. N. Clark, The Later Stuarts, 1660-1714, 72-73; Rooms, “De Materieel Organisatie van de Troepen,” 18.}
let it be known that he was willing to return his conquests in the north in return for the Spanish-held Franche-Comté, de Witt felt obliged to take steps to insure that Louis’ demands in the Spanish Netherlands remain limited should he change his mind. Public sentiment in the United Provinces in fact was strongly anti-French, and even supported an alliance with Spain. Indeed, Castel-Rodrigo, the Governor of the Spanish Netherlands, had even approached de Witt about a possible military relationship in exchange for certain towns, so desperate were the Spanish for foreign support. At the same time on the other side of the Channel, England’s pro-French policy was becoming increasingly unpopular, especially following the news of French successes. These circumstances led to the conclusion of the Triple Alliance, an unlikely partnership between the Dutch Republic, England, and Sweden.

The Triple Alliance was concluded less for the inherent friendship of its partners than for their concern for growing French power in the face of Spanish weakness. The basis of the treaty, ironically, had been suggested to the signatories by Louis XIV himself. According to its provisions, Spain was to cede an equivalent to what was owed to the French Queen in order to satisfy Louis, thus keeping with de Witt’s policy of placating the King of France, while the Spanish Netherlands was to remain intact. Spain had little to say about the arrangement much to the frustration of officials in Brussels and Madrid. However, in a secret clause, it was also stated that should Louis’ continue his conquests in the Spanish Netherlands, then force would be used to push him back to the old 1659 frontiers. This clause would be the cause of future trouble for

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18 Geyl, The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, II., 97-98; Israel, The Dutch Republic, 780-783; Clark, England Under the Stuarts, 68-74; and Paul Sonino, Louis XIV and the origins of the Dutch War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 24-28. Although Castel-Rodrigo suggested this to the Dutch envoy in Brussels, this arrangement was never concluded.

19 According to Sir George Clark, Charles II’s pro-French policy was growing increasingly unpopular. After the reverses of the Second Anglo-Dutch War, Charles was looking for a way to restore English honor. The Triple Alliance seemed to provide that opportunity, particularly because of the intense anti-French sentiment among the English people. For more, see Clark, The Later Stuarts, 73-74; Geyl, The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, II., 100-101; and Sonnino, Louis XIV and the origins of the Dutch War.

20 Sweden’s involvement in the Triple Alliance had more to do with Baltic politics than the situation in the Spanish Netherlands. Indeed, it was Dutch and English concerns for the Baltic Trade that led them to solicit Sweden’s support for the Alliance. Sweden’s entrance into the alliance stemmed from its commercial treaty with England which it had concluded in 1665 and with the insurance that it would be backed by the Dutch Republic and England in its rivalry with Denmark. For details, see Clark, The Later Stuarts, 73-74; and Geyl, The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, II., 98-99.
de Witt and the Dutch. In fact, when word of the clause reached Louis XIV’s court, it was met with outrage.\textsuperscript{21} Nevertheless, while Louis’ generals urged him to strike the arrogant Dutch while the iron was hot, the king himself showed no signs of violating the treaty’s stipulations and was content to bide his time. Peace between Spain and France was concluded in Aix-la-Chapelle in May of 1668 ending the War of Devolution.\textsuperscript{22} In both the Dutch Republic and England, the Triple Alliance was viewed as a diplomatic coup. In Holland, the alliance was celebrated as a great victory for de Witt’s diplomacy, and in England its architect, Sir William Temple, was applauded for seemingly breaking the island nation’s dependence on France.\textsuperscript{23}

In fact, little had been accomplished; rather the situation for both the Spanish Netherlands and the Dutch Republic had been exacerbated. Although it has been argued that the Triple Alliance paved the way for the Anglo-Dutch partnership that would finally come into being after the Peace of Nijmegen, at the time the alliance itself worsened the diplomatic situation between the affected parties, particularly Spain and the Republic. Spain, the most directly affected by the treaty’s conclusion was not a signatory. Much to their annoyance, the Republic would not go to war with France in spite of their offers of territory to do so. Spain’s irritation over the Republic’s refusal to enter the war led to a situation in the Spanish Netherlands that favored future French aggression. Rather than ceding Franche-Comté to Louis XIV and three fortresses\textsuperscript{24} in the Spanish Netherlands as de Witt had hoped, Castel-Rodrigo chose to undermine the

\textsuperscript{21} According to Paul Sonnino and others, Sir William Temple was chiefly responsible for the treaty that became the Triple Alliance. Nevertheless, it appears that Louis XIV held the Grand Pensionary of Holland, Jan de Witt, most responsible for it and the insult it represented to the French Crown. In his Mémoires for the dauphin, Louis wrote “I learned during my voyage that the Dutch had finally induced the English to conclude an alliance...aimed directly at me.” Louis motivation for attacking the Republic in 1672 can be insinuated from an entry he added ten years later with regards to the Dutch War: “I must confess that their insolence struck me to the quick and that I came close, at the risk of endangering my conquests in the Spanish Low Countries, to turning my arms against this haughty and ungrateful nation.” For details see Paul Sonnino, Louis XIV and the origins of the Dutch War, 23. For Sir William Temple’s role in the conclusion of the Triple Alliance, see Clark, The Later Stuarts, 71-73.

\textsuperscript{22} Aix-la-Chapelle is the present-day city of Aachen.

\textsuperscript{23} G. N. Clark notes that “the Dutch alliance of Temple was long regarded as a master-stroke of diplomacy...” mostly because it “anticipated the successful combination of the Dutch and English against France in 1689.” For details, see Clark, The Later Stuarts, 73.

\textsuperscript{24} These were Lille, Tournai, and Ath. For details, See Geyl, The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, II., 99; and Israel, Dutch Republic, 781-784 (especially Map 12).
members of the Triple Alliance by retaining the Franche-Comté and relinquishing instead the original three fortresses as well as Courtrai, Oudenaarde, and Thielt, thus rendering Flanders virtually indefensible. In doing this, Castel-Rodrigo not only demonstrated his annoyance with de Witt’s fence-sitting policy, but also made it imperative that the Republic side with the Spanish if in fact it wanted to preserve the integrity of the Spanish Netherlands and thus its southern buffer. Such conditions were not a good basis for future diplomatic and military cooperation.25

**Louis’ Response: the Treaty of Dover and the Dutch War**

Although England was officially allied with the Dutch Republic against France over the issue of the Spanish Netherlands, almost immediately the king of England, Charles II, took steps to improve his relationship with France while undermining that with De Witt and the Dutch. According to some, Charles II’s movement toward France while maintaining the Triple Alliance seemed to reflect less a change in English policy than an opportunity to create a public affairs coup for the restoration monarch.26 When he signed the Triple Alliance, Charles was in need of public support, particularly after the failed war with the Dutch. The Triple Alliance provided him with that; but it did not signal a true change in policy. Rather, it reflected an opportunity seized by a monarch keen for good press. Almost immediately, England began to show its true colors toward its economic rival. Supported by his advisers and bolstered by his own pro-French feelings, Charles now began to undermine Temple’s earlier diplomacy. Even as the Triple Alliance became fact, Charles undercut the future of the alliance by leaking information regarding its secret provisions, thus providing Louis fuel for his anger against de Witt and the Dutch. On 1 June 1670 and in great secrecy, Charles II and Louis XIV concluded the Treaty of Dover, the first step toward the Republic’s own diplomatic isolation. The secret treaty had as much to do with English domestic politics and Charles’ desire to return his country to the Catholic faith as it did England’s wish to


26 In the words of Pieter Geyl, Charles’ conclusion of the Triple Alliance with the Dutch “had been no more than a sacrifice to the spirit of the nation, which he had offended by his mismanagement of affairs. It did not mean he had banished from his heart the alternative policy, so often tried after 1661, of joining France against the Republic.” For the rationale behind Charles II’s anti-Dutch position, see Geyl, *The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century*, II, 101-102.
embarrass the Dutch. The treaty required England to declare war on the Dutch. In addition, Charles was to declare his Catholic faith publicly. In return, Louis would provide £166,000 per year in subsidy payments and 6,000 French troops should they be needed in England. Charles was to consult Louis when he was to make his declaration.27

In the end Charles would never publicly accept Catholicism or acknowledge the secret treaty. Nevertheless, the treaty’s existence had the effect Louis desired: the diplomatic isolation of the Republic. With Sweden also gravitating again toward France, Louis’ design was almost realized. Louis’ preemptive strike against the Duke of Lorraine in 1671 insured that at least some of the German princes would side with the Dutch in the coming war. Just the same, at the time of the French attack, the Republic would be virtually alone. Meanwhile the Spanish, stung by the Republic’s refusal to come to its direct aid earlier, refused the same aid to the Dutch as war clouds grew on the horizon. Spain’s alliance with the Dutch allowed only that they send “auxiliaries” in the event of attack but it refused to enter the war directly. Furthermore, while the Emperor and the Elector of Brandenburg were both alarmed at Louis’ machinations, neither was in a position to directly intervene in the attack that was sure to come.28

Louis XIV’s decision to invade the Dutch Republic in 1672 came as much from his desire for revenge against the “impudent” Dutch Republic and his desire to cow them, as from his pursuit of Gloire and his desire for control of the Spanish Netherlands. The Peace of Aix-La-Chapelle ended the War of Devolution in 1668, but Jan de Witt’s decision to support the Spanish cause had permanently damaged the relationship between he and Louis. In describing his rationale for attacking the Dutch, Louis noted the Republic’s opposition to his decision to conquer lands he felt were rightfully owed to his wife in lieu of the dowry that was never paid:

[When] to no avail I requested that Spain should recognize the just pretensions of the Queen [to the Spanish Netherlands]...I took up arms to validate the rights of that princess....In my successful campaign neither the English nor the Emperor opposed my cause....I found in my way only my good, faithful, and longtime friends, the Dutch who rather than being interested in my

27 Clark, The Later Stuarts, 76-77.

fortune...wished to impose their law upon me and to make peace, even dared to threaten me in case I should refuse to accept mediation....

Louis’ reaction to de Witt’s opposition suggests revenge as the chief motive. Once again, in describing his reaction to de Witt’s diplomacy, Louis’ anger is difficult to conceal: “I confess that their insolence stung me to the quick and I was ready, at the risk of whatever might happen to my conquests in the Spanish Low Countries, to turn all my forces against this arrogant and ungrateful nation.” Louis’ disappointment at discovering the existence of the Triple Alliance, as well as its intention, as these passages suggest, undoubtedly contributed to his decision to take revenge against the “ungracious” Dutch. But this explanation alone is too simplistic given the other factors involved. According to John Wolf, one of the foremost authorities on the reign of Louis XIV, Louis was just as driven by economic factors. Jean Baptiste Colbert, Louis’ finance minister supported an attack on the Republic to undermine its trade. Already, an undeclared war was being waged between the French and Dutch over trade and the conquest of the Republic would further this process. Furthermore, Louis’ minister of war Louvois, not to mention his leading generals, wanted to destroy the state that had deprived them of their conquests in the Spanish Netherlands. Finally, a Dutch Republic stripped of its power could not intervene in a later conquest of the Spanish Netherlands, long a goal of the French monarchy. Consequently, mere revenge does not fully explain the young king’s motives. Nevertheless, Louis’ declaration of war on 6 April 1672 followed shortly thereafter by invasion of the Republic itself essentially laid the groundwork for the creation of a Dutch-led an anti-French coalition. His decision to strike against the Dutch Republic created a resilient foe, one around which a great coalition of states could form. Much of its determination to stand up to the French “Giant” in the 1680s stemmed from what they perceived to be an unprovoked attack in 1672. In order to understand why the Dutch became such a determined foe later on, it

29 Cited in Wolf, Louis XIV, 213.


33 Sonnino, “The Origins of Louis XIV’s Wars,” 116-118;
is first necessary to discover why the Republic opposed Louis’ invasion of the Spanish Netherlands in 1667.34

**Dutch Foreign Policy and the Growing Opposition to France**

For much of its early history, the Dutch Republic pursued a policy that kept France at arm’s length while at the same time maintaining good relations. Indeed, the cornerstone of de Witt’s policy had been to maintain strong relations with France. France was the Republic’s most important trading partner and had been an important ally in its war for independence from Spain. Such a policy depended upon an independent Spanish Netherlands, however. De Witt and his contemporaries recognized the danger of Louis XIV as the Republic’s direct neighbor. Dutch policy toward France during the second half of the seventeenth century is best exemplified by the old Dutch proverb, *Gallus amicus non vicinus*: better a Frenchman for a friend than for a neighbor.35 In the minds of many in the Republic, the idea of a strong France on its border, regardless of the relationship between the two states, threatened the very existence of the Republic. During the 1660s, de Witt explored the idea of creating an independent Southern Netherlands state based on the Swiss canton system but his proposals met a lukewarm reception in Paris, Brussels, and in Amsterdam. Louis’ policy toward the Spanish Netherlands was steeped in the history of the Bourbon-Habsburg rivalry. Even if Louis was prepared to accept de Witt’s plan, it is unlikely that the Republic would have accepted such a program. An independent Southern Netherlands forced Amsterdam to face the likelihood of a rejuvenated Antwerp, unencumbered by the provisions of the Treaty of Münster.36 If the territories fell into French hands, the situation might even be worse for Amsterdam; not only would the

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36 Based on the Treaty of Münster, the Dutch Republic retained control over the Scheldt Estuary, thus limiting the economic potential of Antwerp. For details see Israel, *Dutch Primacy in World Trade*, 197-199; Smit, *De Buitenlandsche Politiek van Nederland*, I., 57-58.
tiny Republic lose its advantageous economic position vis-a-vis Antwerp and the Spanish Netherlands, but it would have to worry about a powerful neighbor on its southern frontier as well. The situation as it then existed — an independent but relatively weak Spanish Netherlands — was the best for Amsterdam and the Republic, but it was doubtful that the Spanish Netherlands would be able to defend itself against France alone. Consequently, de Witt tried to pursue the difficult policy of balancing his relationship with France while maintaining the integrity of the Spanish Netherlands, the very provinces Louis was determined to have.  

De Witt’s answer to Louis’ successful 1667 campaign was to seek a middle way: a policy whereby the Spanish Netherlands might be defended without either going to war with France or allying with Spain. As we saw above, the construction of the Triple Alliance in 1668 did this. Unfortunately for de Witt, it also sowed the seeds of war with France and his ultimate demise. Although de Witt and the Republic had viewed the conclusion of the Triple Alliance as a diplomatic success, Louis’ reaction shortly thereafter suggested that the Dutch could never placate him. Indeed, the revision of Colbert’s tariff list in 1667 coupled with Louis’ refusal to seriously negotiate with the Republic prior to 1672 suggests that there was no course open to de Witt that could have prevented the French attack. In the years leading up to the invasion, de Witt’s position at home and abroad deteriorated as well. Although allied to England and Sweden through the Triple Alliance, French diplomacy had effectively detached these states from the Dutch. At the same time, Dutch intelligence was so poor that the Grand Pensionary of Holland scarcely realized the danger before it was too late. Meanwhile, he faced increasing opposition at home from his own States party in the face of the French economic assault. Concerned with the severity of Colbert’s Tariff list, many in Amsterdam saw it as a signal that an impending war loomed on the horizon between France and the Dutch Republic. Among those critical of de Witt were members of his own political party. Led by Coenraad van Beuningen, these men began to drift away from de Witt and even reached an understanding with the Orangists, at least with regards to foreign policy. Unprepared to change his position, de Witt’s faced increasing


opposition until 1671 when it became clear that war with France was inevitable. In the end, de Witt simply could not satisfy both French and Dutch interests. He could not support Louis XIV’s expansion in the Spanish Netherlands while at the same time maintaining the both the region’s territorial integrity and the Republic’s buffer with France. In pursuing that policy, he left his state vulnerable.  

Although Louis’ invasion of 1672 very nearly crushed the Dutch Republic, the impact it had on Dutch domestic policy was critical to future relations between the two states. In the years leading up to the French attack, anti-French members of the States party, and those of the pro-Orange party — both of which were critical of de Witt’s seemingly pro-French policies and the ill-preparedness of the Republic’s armed forces — began to ally while mustering widespread support. De Witt’s “Perpetual Edict” which seemed to offer a compromise between the Orangists and de Witt’s constitutional policy, the “True Freedom,” came increasingly under fire as the threat of war grew. Ironically, while Louis prepared for war, de Witt set out to reach a compromise between the House of Orange and the Stadholderate, and the provincial states that would have limited the Prince of Orange’s power. The Perpetual Edict, which was passed with little opposition in 1667, established the power of the state firmly in the hands of the provinces rather than in those of the Stadholder. Although the Captain-Generalcy would continue to be the prerogative of the Prince of Orange, his duties as Captain-General would be separate from his former duties as Stadholder. In fact, the Stadholderate as a post was abolished, while his political functions as Stadholder of Holland were transferred to the States of Holland.

The supreme irony of Louis XIV’s invasion of the Dutch Republic is that it deprived him of what supporters he had in the Republic while at the same time strengthening his enemies there, particularly the Prince of Orange. As de Witt’s position weakened with Louis’ increased aggression, William’s improved. In 1668, William’s role in the Raad van State was expanded beyond the mere advisory role envisioned by de Witt and many of the details of his policy of “Harmony” were left unresolved. On the eve of the war in 1671, William was appointed Captain- and Admiral-General of the United Provinces. Although de Witt did not oppose the


40 Baxter, William III, 53-54; Israel, The Dutch Republic, 791-793; and Rowen, John de Witt, 139-142.
appointment, he did push for it being limited to one campaign, at least for the time
being. The French invasion in the spring of 1672 shocked the Dutch as Louis’ forces
sliced through the Republic’s inadequate defenses. The speed and overwhelming
nature of the French assault coupled with the feebleness of the Dutch defense again sent
shock-waves across Europe. Advancing from Charleroi on 11 May, Louis’ army
marched north and captured key fortresses on the Rhine, crossing that barrier only a
month into the campaign. With virtually the whole Republic opened by the French
army’s lightning advance, Louis seemed poised to conquer the entire Dutch state. By
the end of June, his forces had captured Utrecht and virtually everything before it;
seemingly little stood between Louis’ armies and Amsterdam itself.

The rapidity of the French advance combined with the feeble Dutch response
came as a shock not only to the Republic and Europe but to France as well. The
collapse of the Republic’s defenses came as a complete surprise and convinced many to
restore the Stadholder to his former power and prestige, particularly since many held
de Witt responsible for the catastrophe. The rapidity of the French advance even
suggested to some that only treason could have caused such a disaster. In the
meantime, anti-government riots rocked the Republic’s remaining cities as de Witt’s
popularity plummeted. Holland, saved by inundations and the Prince of Orange’s
defensive measures, continued to hold back the French tide while delegations sought to
negotiate some kind of settlement. Although the Republic offered huge concessions,
they were not enough for Louis. The Sun King’s excessive demands — which included
Nijmegen, the Generality Lands, and public toleration of the Catholic faith throughout
the United Provinces — created popular anger at France and its king. As civil unrest
grew, those deemed treasonous or pro-French were targeted for attack while popular
support demanded that the Prince of Orange be made Stadholder. On 2 July, the
province of Zeeland appointed young William Stadholder of that province; the next
day, the Prince of Orange was appointed Stadholder of Holland. Then on 8 July, the
States General made him both Captain and Admiral General with all of the powers
formerly associated with those offices.

Meanwhile, de Witt’s position disintegrated along with those who had
supported him. Throughout the Republic’s remaining cities, regents associated with
the de Witt government were assaulted in the streets. In Dordrecht, the homes of two
leading States party members were sacked. In Amsterdam, riots and protests erupted,
angrily denouncing the de Witt government. On 21 June, Jan de Witt himself was
wounded in a knife attack. But the worst was still to come. William’s nomination as Stadholder had essentially marked the end for de Witt and his government. From July onward, William became the dominant figure in the negotiations with France and England, negotiations that would ultimately demonstrate his strength as a leader. At the same time, de Witt’s power waned. After recovering from the June attempt on his life, de Witt resigned all of his posts. He was succeeded by Gaspar Fagel, a man sympathetic to the Orangist cause. His nomination as Grand Pensionary strengthened the Prince’s influence in the States of Holland and helped insure that province’s support of his policies. Shortly thereafter, both Jan de Witt and his brother were murdered when a blood-thirsty crowd set upon them outside the Binnenhof. The slaughtered de Witt was succeeded by the young — and vehemently anti-French — Prince of Orange who now enjoyed widespread support; support he never would have received were it not for Louis’ invasion. Many states had wanted to see the Republic humbled, but few wanted to see it destroyed. Consequently, the more determined Louis was to humiliate the Dutch, the more Europe’s states became alarmed at what appeared to be France’s hegemony. 41

In Dutch history, 1672 is known as the Rampjaar or the “year of disaster.” Louis’ invasion of the Dutch Republic ended the de Witt era, but it ushered the age of William III. Beginning in 1673, Spain and the Dutch Republic acted as unequal allies against the Sun King’s expansionistic designs in the Low Countries. The French attack on the United Provinces in 1672 sparked outrage among many European states and laid the ground-work for the coalition wars against Louis XIV, wars that were fought primarily in — and at the expense of — the Spanish Netherlands. In 1673, Spain joined the Austrian Habsburgs, the Dutch Republic, and the Duke of Lorraine in a military alliance formed in response to Louis’ invasion of the Dutch Republic and the Empire. The Alliance of The Hague, as this alliance came to be called, was formed to curb French ambitions and force it back to its borders. Louis’ seemingly hegemonic designs and the dangers this war posed to the balance of power led other states to join the coalition against him. In 1674, Brandenburg-Prussia joined The Hague Alliance while the German Diet in Regensburg declared for the alliance leaving only Sweden attached

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41 For the Rampjaar, see Geyl, The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century 127-141; Israel, The Dutch Republic, 807-811; Baxter, William III, 70-85; and Japikse, Prins Willem III, De Stadhouder-Koning, I, 212-263.
to France. After Louis’ initial success in 1672, the focus of the so-called “Dutch War” shifted as well, from the Dutch Republic proper to the Spanish Netherlands and Germany. Having been unable to conquer the defiant Republic, Louis XIV turned his attention toward more ripe pickings, namely the vulnerable Spanish Netherlands. As would be the case in all of Louis XIV’s wars, the Spanish Netherlands would become the principal battlefield as well as the principal victim of his designs. From 1674 to the end of the war, the Dutch and Spanish fought Louis XIV’s forces in the Spanish Netherlands and, predictably, Spain emerged the loser at Nijmegen. In spite of the Prince of Orange’s best efforts, France acquired additional fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands, including the important Flemish stronghold Ypres, and Dinant on the Meuse.

The Dutch Republic, French Reunions, and the Glorious Revolution

The Dutch War altered forever the Republic’s policy toward Louis XIV’s France. Unlike de Witt who had pursued a policy of conciliation with the French king in the name of trade, William III was determined to oppose the Sun King at every turn. Although at first Amsterdam and the States of Holland refused to be swayed by the Prince of Orange’s “Hawkish” stance toward France, Louis’ continued conquests in the Spanish Netherlands crowned by his revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 persuaded more and more policymakers in the Republic of the validity of the Prince’s position. In the end, Louis’ saber-rattling combined with his gradual assault on Dutch trade would finally sway the die-hards in the States of Holland and the Amsterdam Vroedschap to accept the Prince of Orange’s position. Nevertheless, their acceptance was at first reluctant and slow in coming. Their decision to support William’s policy and his strategy for alleviating the Republic’s vulnerability in the event of a renewed war with

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42 Baxter, William III, 100-112; Geyl, The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, II., 143-147, 152-161; and Ekberg, The Failure of Louis XIV’s Dutch War, 172-183.

43 The Peace of Nijmegen returned to the Spanish Netherlands Veurne, Fort Knokke, Courtrai, Oudenaarde, Charleroi, and Ath, all taken by France during the War of Devolution or during the Dutch War. As part of the Nijmegen settlement, France received Ypres and its environs, St. Omer, Valenciennes, Maubeuge, and Dinant. For details, see Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV, 122-159; Geyl, The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, 160; and Israel, The Dutch Republic, 782 (Map 12), 824-825.
France was at least in part due to the knowledge that Louis could not be trusted, a realization that was largely due to the experience of 1672.

At first, the Republic was not willing to aid the Governor of the Spanish Netherlands in spite of what the Republic had endured. The Nijmegen Peace itself illustrated the rift that had formed between the Prince and Amsterdam when the States General, under pressure from the vroedschap, concluded peace with Louis XIV without its allies, not only damaging the Republic’s reputation diplomatically but undermining the Prince of Orange’s position as well. Out of frustration, William fought a final battle after the treaty was signed, which threatened to undermine the treaty. In spite of William’s disapproval, the peace held. The circumstances surrounding the treaty’s conclusion, however, both hurt the Republic diplomatically and set the tone for the stormy relationship between William and Amsterdam.

Almost before the ink had dried at Nijmegen, Spain’s growing weakness tempted Louis. Not satisfied with the acquisitions gained at Nijmegen, the Sun King continued to nibble at the weakened Spain though its Low Countries provinces. According to Pieter Geyl, the Peace of Nijmegen “was nothing but a springboard for fresh [French] conquests.”44 During the 1680s, Louis’ used legal claims to justify the conquest of additional territory in Spanish Netherlands and Lorraine. It was against this background of seemingly arbitrary French demands at the expense of the Spanish Netherlands that the Dutch Republic’s policy evolved from one that sought to avoid conflict to one of proactive military response culminating in William’s expedition to England in 1688.

Initially, the States General was satisfied to let Louis nibble away at the Spanish Netherlands, however, much to the delight of Louis and annoyance of Brussels. Spanish frustration with the Sun King’s aggrandizing policies stemmed more from the seemingly arbitrary nature of his of Reunions. Louis’ Reunions policy provided the strategic framework for the Dutch Republic’s eventual decision to intervene in England.45 Louis’, once again, fixed his attention upon key fortresses along the French

44 Geyl, The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, II., 161.

45 It is difficult to justify Louis XIV’s Reunions by 20th century legal standards, but contemporaries found such justifications less specious. Essentially, Louis used legal claims — most dating back to the middle ages — to justify annexing territories in the Spanish Netherlands and elsewhere along the French border. John O’Connor notes: “Precision was conveniently supplied by various judicial bodies; one of them, the Chamber of Reunions at Metz, provided
frontier. In 1681, his forces seized Strasbourg and in 1684 Luxembourg, two formidable and important fortresses. The latter, known as the “Gibraltar of the North,” was an impregnable place that controlled one of the key invasion routes into Germany. Louis’ seemingly unquenchable appetite for conquest insured that Spain remain aligned with the tacit anti-French coalition led by the Dutch Republic, in spite of the fact that its territories were more directly exposed to French privations than those of any of its members. Not surprisingly, William became increasingly alarmed at the gradual march of the French border further and further north. While this French expansion directed toward the Spanish Netherlands might have worried William, the States General, led by Amsterdam and the States of Holland pushed for a policy of appeasement. Determined to see its finances and trade restored after the exhausting Dutch War, Amsterdam did all that it could to avoid an open break with France.⁴⁶

Amsterdam and Orange at Odds: The Reunions and Dutch Foreign Policy, 1678-1685

The period between the conclusion of the Nijmegen peace in 1678 and Louis XIV’s revocation of the Edict of Nantes seven years later saw the Dutch steer a policy course more in line with the wishes of Amsterdam than the Prince of Orange. Whereas the Prince of Orange saw Louis XIV’s policies in the Spanish Netherlands and Lorraine dangerous to the Dutch Republic and in need of response, the Amsterdam Vroedschap, and to a lesser degree the States of Holland, while worried by French encroachment were less convinced that his policies posed an immediate danger to the Republic. Concerned that any additional military expenditures would adversely affect Dutch trade, Amsterdam was unwilling to actively support the Spanish Netherlands against Louis XIV. The Prince of Orange, on the other hand, saw Louis’ expansion into the Spanish Netherlands as a direct threat to the Republic’s safety. For William, 1672

the name that would soon be applied to all such proceedings. French archivists reported to French judges, who instructed French troops to occupy what was defined as French sovereign territory. The French did have some valid legal claims but the manner in which they acted led to alarm and hostility in the Spanish Low Countries, Liège, and numerous German states, especially since there was no clear sense of just when and where the process would end.” For details, see John O’Connor, “The Diplomatic History of the Reign,” in Sonnino, ed., The Reign of Louis XIV, 150, 151-153. For a more detailed examination, see Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV, 161-171.

⁴⁶See in particular Geyl, The Netherlands in the 17th Century, 161-169.
demonstrated that the Sun King could never be trusted. Consequently, while sympathetic to the Spanish cause, Amsterdam was unwilling to support William’s desire to support the Spanish, particularly if it meant embroiling the Republic further costly warfare. The Republic did act, albeit short of directly engaging its troops against France, however. In October 1681, in response to Louis’ reunion of Strasbourg, the Republic concluded the Association Treaty with Sweden in hopes of deterring further French aggression by confirming the territorial arrangements laid down in previous peace treaties. It would not be enough.47

Louis’ moves toward Luxembourg and the Spanish Netherlands threatened renewed Franco-Dutch war and sparked sharp disagreements between Orange and Amsterdam. Real difficulties began in 1682 when Spain requested aid from the Dutch in the face of Louis’ blockade of Luxembourg. According to the Spanish-Dutch Treaty of 1673, the Republic was required to provide 8,000 men to Spain in case of attack. Alarmed by Louis’ siege and convinced that its conquest, the States General agreed to support the Spanish, but before the troops could be sent to aid the Spanish, Louis lifted the blockade and his troops withdrew.48 It was not the end of Louis’ incursions, however. The next year, Louis did more than just mass troops on the border of Spain’s lowland possessions. In 1683, with a French army massed opposite Flanders, raiding parties plundered the Spanish Netherlands. In response, the Spanish governor sent his own parties into France threatening to escalate the conflict. With war between France and Spain again on the horizon, the Dutch sent 8,000 troops to the region at the request of the Spanish governor. In the face of war to the south, William III urged the States General to augment the Dutch Army by an additional 16,635 men in preparation for potential open war with France. Amsterdam, led by Coenraad van Beuningen,49 thought such an augmentation a bad idea. Instead of deterring France from further conquests, van Beuningen believed an expansion of the army would bring France and the Republic closer to open conflict. There were other factors to consider as well. Both Brandenburg and Denmark were in the French camp, so no assistance would be

47 Geyl, The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, II: 162; and Israel, The Dutch Republic, 829-830. For the French point of view, see Andrew Lossky, “‘Maxims of State’ in Louis XIV’s Foreign Policy,” in Hatton, ed., William III and Louis XIV — Essays, 11-12.

48 Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV, 163-165.

49 Coenraad van Beuningen(1622-1693) was one of Amsterdam’s Burgomeesters.
forthcoming from them. The Holy Roman Empire, likewise, could not be relied upon to send aid since the bulk of the Emperor’s forces were engaged with the Turks. That left England, and van Beuningen rightly believed that the prospects for English assistance were slim at best. Convinced of the veracity of his position however, William continued to do everything in his power to change Amsterdam’s position, but without success. He then turned to the provincial assemblies, hoping that by gaining majorities in Holland and Zeeland, he could swing the States General over to his position, in spite of Amsterdam. In the end, however, Amsterdam prevailed. In 1684, the crisis receded, and the Dutch convinced Spain to give in to Louis’ demands.50

The Treaty of Regensburg, signed on 15 August 1684 allowed Louis to retain most of his Reunions, including Strasbourg and Luxembourg, while he returned Courtrai, Dixmuiden, and other minor acquisitions to Spain. According to John Lynn, the Regensburg treaty marked the high point of Louis’ conquests. The Reunions were the briefest and most successful of the Sun King’s wars.51 For William, the lesson was clear. Since the conclusion of the Peace of Nijmegen, he had tried to bully Amsterdam, along with the provinces of his cousin, Prince Hendrik Casimir, into opposing France.52 Clearly, such a strategy could not work, particularly in the face of Louis’ own adroit diplomacy. Political division within the Republic had led the Dutch to abandon the Spanish and seek peace terms to the detriment of the Spanish Netherlands, not to mention the Dutch Republic and even the Empire. Only with a broader coalition within the Republic itself could William mobilize it to oppose France more forcefully. To do this meant reconciling differences between himself and Amsterdam, as well as between himself and Hendrik Casimir. Moderation and compromise rather than arm-twisting and bullying was the only way forward.53

From roughly the fall of 1684 though 1685, William implemented this new strategy of reconciliation and compromise. During the winter debates regarding the military and naval budgets, William reached an accord with Amsterdam. Amsterdam

50 Baxter, William III, 190-192; and Israel, The Dutch Republic, 834-835.

51 Also called the Treaty of Ratisbon. Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV, 168-169.

52 See Chapters 6 and 7 below.

had been concerned with the decline of the navy and opposed an increase in military spending. When the Raad van State cut the military budget limiting the size of the army to under 40,000 officers and men, Amsterdam was not satisfied and pushed for even deeper cuts. Unwilling to see the military cut so severely, William resisted and with the support of Utrecht, Gelderland, and Overijssel, Orange prevented Amsterdam’s additional cuts. In an effort to smooth things over, however, William accepted the city’s complaint with regards to the navy. Concerned that previous naval cuts were allowing Britain to surpass the Republic in terms of naval strength, William put pressure on the inland provinces to agree to an increase in naval spending, thus demonstrating that he could compromise.\footnote{Israel, The Dutch Republic, 835-837; and Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VI., 154, 157-158. For a more detailed description of the negotiations between Amsterdam and William over the navy, see Baxter, William III, 194-195.}

At the same time, William tried to find a middle-ground with the Friesian Stadholder, Hendrik Casimir. In order to smooth relations between Nassau and Orange, William sent Georg-Friedrich, Prince von Waldeck, Field Marshal of the Army and one of William’s most trusted diplomats to negotiate with the Friesian Stadholder. One particular difficulty between had been William’s influence over officer appointments, even in regiments that fell under the authority of Hendrik Casimir.\footnote{Friesland and Groningen fell under the authority of the Friesian Stadholder, generally a member of the House of Nassau, while the remaining five provinces plus Drenthe were the responsibility of the Stadholder of Holland from the House of Orange.} To smooth relations between the Princes, William surrendered the power to appoint officers in the Fries and Gronings regiments to Hendrik Casimir while retaining his rights to appoint officers from the other regiments and command the army in the field. This compromise went a long way toward healing the rift between the two men. Finally, William set out to build a wider political coalition to support his program. Through a combination of appointments and patronage, William succeeded in improving his position in Holland. William’s task of creating wider-based more unified support was simplified by Louis’s own policies, however.\footnote{Israel, The Dutch Republic, 837-840; and Baxter, William III and the Defense of European Liberty, 194-196.}

William’s change in strategy towards both Hendrik Casimir and the Amsterdam regents enabled Orange to gain more political allies at home, allies he would need...
should France threaten its neighbors in the future. His conviction that Louis would not be satisfied by the Treaty of Regensburg, and that he would seek future conquests to the detriment of Dutch security drove William to seek compromises with his domestic political opponents. Although it would take more than possible future aggression to move Amsterdam to support his initiatives against Louis XIV, William’s fence-mending after his failure in 1684 had begun the process of building support for his policies and set the stage for a rapprochement between Orange and Amsterdam.

The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, an Emergent Anti-French Coalition, and Glorious Revolution, 1685-1688

William gained even more support for his opposition to Louis XIV in the wake of Louis’ revocation of the Edict of Nantes the following year. Although historians have argued that Louis’ persecution of the Huguenots alone did not alter France’s international position, that act, in combination with his Réunions policy, did much to muster growing opposition to the Sun King’s diplomatic initiatives. Indeed, Louis himself did as much to improve Orange’s political position in the Republic as the Prince’s own concessions to his opponents did. It is within the context of his Réunions followed by the flight of the Huguenots that one must view the gradual change in Dutch policy toward France and the solidification of opposition both within the Republic and Europe to Louis’ ambitions in the Low Countries and the Empire. Louis’ seemingly endless territorial demands coupled with his persecution of Protestants provided the impetus for the creation of an active opposition to France within the Empire and a hardening first of Holland’s and later Amsterdam’s position toward the Sun King’s policies. This growing perception that Louis’s posed a real threat to the European balance led to the creation of growing consensus with regards to the French king’s designs and the danger he posed to peace. Although in 1685 active opposition to the Louis was limited to Spain and a small collection of German states, by 1688 Louis himself had become more or less diplomatically isolated.

The death of Charles II of England and the succession of his openly Catholic brother James II, furthermore, created additional anxiety in Europe, particularly for the Dutch. James’ succession to the English throne on 6 February 1685 caused alarm among Europe’s Protestant states. Although current historiography has discounted the notion that James intended to work closely with Louis XIV, there was certainly the perception
that this very thing would happen, particularly in Protestant circles. This fear was exacerbated eight months later when Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes, an event that shook not only Europe’s Protestant states, but the entire continent as well. These two events, in combination with Louis’ Reunion policy, led European statesmen not only to question whether or not Louis’s word could be trusted, but whether Louis’s true goal was “Universal Monarchy,” a position held by many in the Prince of Orange’s camp. Consequently, the combination of James II’s succession and Louis’s revocation of the Nantes edict caused increased fear towards Louis’s apparently hegemonic designs and skepticism toward his assurances of peace. Growing opposition to France, which emerged first in Germany and Spain, was still in its infancy in the Republic in 1685 when Louis announced the end of Protestant toleration. Only when it became clear to Dutchmen that Louis’ policies were a direct military threat to them did there finally emerge a common position in the Republic between the Prince of Orange, Holland, and Amsterdam.

\textit{Germany, the League of Augsburg, and the Dutch Republic}

Significant in changing Holland’s and Amsterdam’s position toward the Sun King was France’s deteriorating diplomatic position in Germany. Brandenburg-Prussia’s volte-face in the years following Louis’s revocation of the Nantes edict was crucial in enabling Orange and the Dutch Republic to pursue a more proactive policy with regards to France. Brandenburg-Prussia had always been an important Dutch ally. In the years immediately following the Dutch War, however, Friedrich-Wilhelm, the “Great Elector” of Brandenburg-Prussia had gravitated into the French camp. The Elector’s seemingly pro-French position during the first years of the 1680s had stemmed from the nature of the Nijmegen peace itself. The separate Dutch peace had undermined his position in the Baltic. In part, the Great Elector hoped to secure his Swedish conquests through his association with France, and in part he desired to revenge himself on the Dutch for


\footnote{For a discussion of the causes of Louis’s deteriorating position in Europe in the 1680s, see Geoffrey Symcox, “Louis XIV and the Outbreak of the Nine Years’ War,” 181-187.}
concluding a separate (and for the Great Elector) disadvantageous Peace.\textsuperscript{59} But the Great Elector’s apparent realignment was more pragmatic than ideological in nature.\textsuperscript{60} Although Friedrich-Wilhelm continued to accept French subsidies, he never trusted Louis XIV. Rather, he followed what he believed to be the safest course for his state. Having no faith in the League of Association of 1681, the Great Elector chose to align with France because it offered him greater security than joining the League — which would amount to an open break with Louis XIV — could offer him. Only when circumstances in Europe changed, the result of the Louis’s revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the growing acceptance of the Prince of Orange’s position within Dutch body politic, did Friedrich-Wilhelm begin to more actively oppose Louis XIV’s policies.\textsuperscript{61}

Although Louis’s revocation of the Edict of Nantes provided the catalyst for creating an emergent anti-French coalition, the foundations of that coalition were being laid even before he announced the expulsion of the Huguenots. Louis’s Réunions had resulted in the loss of significant Imperial territory and had led states there to form alliances of mutual defense which, in turn, helped break down barriers between Protestant and Catholic within the Empire, especially in the realm of self-defense. All of the Burgundian Kreis, as well as significant parts of the Upper and Electoral Rhenish Kreise were occupied by French troops due to the failure of Imperial collective security arrangements.\textsuperscript{62} This failure led many German princes to seek protection through the creation of their own military constellations outside the traditional imperial ones. The first significant alliance formed largely to oppose Louis’s Réunions and beyond the confines of traditional imperial structures was the Wetterau Union concluded on 19 September 1679. Organized in large part by Georg Friedrich von Waldeck,\textsuperscript{63} the


\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{61} Harold L. King, “Brandenburg and the English Revolution of 1688,” passim; Troost, William III, Brandenburg and the anti-French coalition,” 300-301; and Peter Wilson, \textit{German Armies}, 60-61, 179-181.

\textsuperscript{62} Wilson, \textit{German Armies}, 58-59.

\textsuperscript{63} Georg Friedrich von Waldeck (1620-1692) was best known as William’s Field-Marshal and military tutor during the Dutch War. Serving both in the Dutch and Brandenburg-Prussian armies during his early military career, Waldeck was appointed Field-Marshal of the States’
Wetterau Union, or the Frankfurt Alliance as it is sometimes called, united ten of the smaller imperial states affected by the depredations of their neighbors, both inside and outside of the Empire.64 Like other collective defensive arrangements, the Wetterau Union acted in concert; an attack on one member constituted an attack on all of them. But it was in its organization where it was truly revolutionary. Drawing on his experience reforming the Dutch Army, Waldeck’s Wetterau Union was unique in that rather than requiring the member states to contribute their own contingents to the coalition force, the Union itself would raise its own integrated army with common arms, equipment, doctrine, and even command structure. Member states would pay their shares of the costs for the army’s upkeep to a central treasury established in Frankfurt. That treasury would then disburse the funds needed to support the Union’s military organization, while Waldeck would serve as the army’s commander-in-chief. Although clearly Waldeck stood to gain the most by such a scheme, the Wetterau Union nevertheless attracted many lesser German princes, both Protestant and Catholic, and by the end of 1681, its roll included not only some of the empire’s smallest states but some of its more sizable ones as well.65

Waldeck’s unique solution to the problem of collective security, not surprisingly, attracted the attention of Emperor Leopold, and helped provide the impetus for him to become more actively involved in the organization of the Empire’s defense. For Leopold, the Wetterau Union posed a potential challenge to the older, more established imperial defensive arrangements — arrangements that he controlled

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64 The ten original members of the Wetterau Union were the Counts of Stollberg, the Counts of Westerburg, most branches of the House of Nassau, as well as Hanau, Solms, Isenburg, Wied, Wittgenstein, Walde, and Manderscheid. These states were joined in 1679 by Hessen-Kassel and Cologne, in September 1681 by Fulda and Hessen-Darmstadt, and shortly thereafter by Schwarzburg, Gotha, Eisenach, and Würzburg. By the end of 1681, the Wetterau Union had become a significant extra-Imperial organization, and for that reason attracted the attention of Emperor Leopold. For details, see Wilson, German Armies, 154-156.

65 Wilson, German Armies, 63-64, 155-159.
— and for this reason, it challenged his own authority. With Waldeck at its head and many of the Princes of Nassau among its members, the Wetterau Union had strong ties to the Prince of Orange. Consequently, its existence and growing list of members threatened to shift the axis of power in the Empire from Vienna to The Hague. Under these circumstances, Leopold was forced to address the issue of more effective security arrangements not for military reasons but rather to prevent the erosion of his political position within the Empire. At the same time, the rapid expansion of the Union with the addition of several major princes sympathetic to Leopold pushed the alliance closer to him. Leopold’s own reforms streamlined military cooperation within the Empire while at the same time bringing the Union under Imperial supervision if not overt control. His defense scheme which culminated in the establishment of the Laxenburg Alliance was an important step in making active opposition to Louis XIV a reality, if only passively. The Laxenburg Alliance was intended to provide forces for the defense of western Germany in case of French attack. Although historians have argued that the military effectiveness of the Emperor’s program was limited — certainly the Great Elector thought so — it nevertheless served the purpose of creating organized opposition to future Reunions. With a formal structure in place to defend against Louis’s “legal” claims in Imperial territory, the Laxenburg Alliance suggested Leopold’s intention to oppose future French claims of territory in Imperial Rhenish territories.

While German princes made their plans for opposing Louis XIV, Friederich-Wilhelm of Brandenburg-Prussia also began distancing himself from the Sun King. Louis’s revocation of the Edict of Nantes, viewed with alarm in Brandenburg-Prussia and the Dutch Republic, actually helped mend relations between the two Protestant powers. Friederich-Wilhelm had long been suspicious of Louis’s intentions but he also realized that there existed no real power prepared to oppose him. With Leopold

66 The Dutch Republic’s ties to the Wetterau Union were strong, specifically its military ties. Many of the Dutch Army’s highest ranking generals were members of the House of Nassau, and Hendrick Trajectinus, Count von Solms, one of William’s most trusted generals’ lands were directly affected, not to mention the fact that the Dutch Army’s First Field-Marshal, Prince von Waldeck, headed the Wetterau Union’s army. These connections no doubt were obvious to outside observers at the time. Wilson, German Armies, 63-64, 155-159.

67 Müller, Wilhelm von Oranien und Georg Friedrich von Waldeck, I., 64-88; and Wilson, German Armies, 155-159.

68 Ibid.
occupied in the East, there was no real chance mustering an effective opposition to French power. Consequently, the Elector steered a middle-course until opportunity permitted him to align against the Sun King. The Regensburg Truce, according to Wouter Troost, provided just enough wiggle-room to enable the Great Elector to seek closer relations with the Dutch Republic without triggering war without causing unwanted repercussions. In early 1685, the first steps toward improving relations between Friedrich-Wilhelm and William III were begun with the negotiation of the Dutch-Brandenburg Treaty. Intended to redress longstanding financial disagreements between the Dutch and Brandenburgers while at the same time establishing a framework for bilateral military cooperation, the treaty almost fell victim to Dutch internal squabbling. One of its articles had stipulated that the two states would maintain the European peace against those who might disturb it, a clause aimed directly at Louis XIV. Unwilling to risk antagonizing France, Amsterdam opposed the clause when Louis’s ambassador d’Avaux informed members of the Vroedschap of its anti-French content. Fortunately for William and the Great Elector, news of Louis’s revocation of the Edict of Nantes in the fall of 1685 quickly softened Amsterdam’s position allowing the passage of the treaty in October 1685.70

Although the revocation of the Edict of Nantes was not the only reason for the surge in anti-French feeling in Europe in the mid-1680s, it certainly contributed to it. With the Dutch Republic and Brandenburg-Prussia well on their way to creating a real bilateral military alliance, Louis’s diplomatic fortunes began to turn against him. The Regensburg Truce, followed the next year by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, caused European states to wonder what Louis’s true intentions were. Although most of the states involved were pleased to avoid war with France in 1684, Louis’s revocation of the Nantes edict the following year caused his neighbors to wonder where Louis’s ambitions would stop. Consequently, his attack on French protestants removed any good will that might have been established by his promises at Regensburg, and began creating opposition to his diplomacy, especially as it regarded to those “disputed” territories in the Empire. In any case, steps had already been begun to oppose any

69 For details on the origins of the poor relations between Brandenburg and the Dutch Republic, see Wouter Troost, “William III, Brandenburg, and the anti-French coalition,” 323-327.

future French aggression against the Empire. The Laxenburg Alliance had provided the framework for collective security within the Empire. Now the Emperor, flushed with victory over the Turks, was prepared to take his defensive preparations further to create a more potentially dangerous anti-French coalition, the League of Augsburg. Concluded on 9 July 1686, the League of Augsburg was essentially an expanded version of the Laxenberg Alliance. Duplicating the Laxenberg Alliance’s structure, the League of Augsburg included not only the old alliance’s former members but new ones as well, among them the King of Sweden, the King of Spain, and the Elector of Bavaria. Militarily, the League of Augsburg differed little from the previous alliance. Early versions of the agreement provided for an army of 58,000 men for the protection of the Empire. However, the final agreement called for an army of just 41,000 men of which 16,000 were to be Austrian. In the end, the League of Augsburg’s military provisions proved less important than its political ones. As John Wolf points out, “[w]hile this League of Augsburg was not yet really a hazard for France, it was a straw in the wind pointing to a dangerous future.” Its formation demonstrated Leopold’s growing power within the Empire, as well as the growing German opposition to Louis’s territorial ambitions.

The establishment of the League of Augsburg in many ways ushered in a change in William’s position within the Dutch Republic, as well. While German princes met in Augsburg to conclude the new defensive treaty, William met with the Great Elector in Clèves ostensibly to cement relations between Brandenburg and the Dutch Republic. Although the meetings at Clèves, which lasted from 14 to 23 July 1686, were intended to iron-out the Brandenburg-Dutch alliance, they were also designed to send a signal to France. While they met, more than half of the Dutch Army — some 22,000 men in all — had assembled just across the border on the Mookerheide for

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71 Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, Part VI, 112-113; and Wilson, German Armies, 181.

72 Wolf, Louis XIV, 429.

73 The League of Augsburg was concluded on 9 July 1686, only five days before William and Friedrich-Wilhelm’s meeting in Cleves. For details, see Troost, William III, “Brandenburg, and the anti-French coalition,” 330; Carswell, The Descent on England, 78-80; King, “Brandenburg and the English Revolution of 1688,” 8-9;
maneuvers. After the meetings had concluded, William and the Elector reviewed the army in its mile-and-a-half long tented camp on the outskirts of Nijmegen. In the days that followed, the two apparently discussed the diplomatic situation in Europe, and it is likely that it was during these meetings that they discussed the situation in England, and possibly intervening there. Regardless of what the two men discussed, the meeting between William III and the Elector of Brandenburg, in combination with the League of Augsburg, represented a growing meeting of the minds with regards to Louis XIV. According to Rébenhac, Louis’s representative at Cleves, the accord between the Prince of Orange and the Great Elector signified Brandenburg’s departure from the French sphere. Likewise, the League of Augsburg, while deemed militarily insignificant, demonstrated nevertheless open German opposition to Louis XIV. With the war in the east going well, the League of Augsburg suggested a willingness on the part of the Emperor to intervene in the West that had not been present during Louis’s Réunions. That willingness, coupled with growing anti-French opposition in Europe, led Louis’s to pursue a more aggressive policy in hopes of making his conquests more permanent.

This increase in opposition to Louis helped to stiffen the Dutch Republic’s position with regards to France, as well. As German states showed their opposition to Louis’ seizure of disputed territories, the Dutch gradually came to accept the Prince of Orange’s view of Louis’s hegemonic intentions. They were helped along by stories of the harassment of Dutch citizens residing in France following the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. In September 1685 on the eve of the revocation, Louis’s government began detaining Dutch merchants who had naturalized in France. When many were prevented from leaving and were forced to renounce their religion, acts in violation of

74 Details of the Dutch camp at the Mookerheide are mentioned in Carswell, *The Descent on England*, 79-80.

75 John Carswell notes: “The conference [in Cleves] and its military sequel impressed, and was meant to impress, the rest of Europe, especially King Louis, whose ambassador had been present, and King James. The gesture showed that the means of intervention in England were not wanting; and it was made against a rapidly developing military and diplomatic situation.” While it is likely that they must have discussed the worsening situation in England and how it would affect any move against Louis XIV, it is impossible to know what was discussed or what plans were made based on the surviving evidence. What is clear is that the groundwork for future military cooperation between the Republic and Brandenburg-Prussia established at the meeting in Cleves. For details, see Carswell, *The Descent on England*, 78-80.

the treaties that allowed them to conduct business there, anger in the Dutch Republic toward France and its king grew. Stories of the Dutch consul in Nantes being forcibly converted to Catholicism and rumors of Dutch merchants being detained fueled growing antagonism toward Louis XIV, even in Amsterdam. In 1686, further incidents including the accidental deaths of consumers of tainted prunes from ships fumigated in France to kill Protestant stowaways had begun to turn the once sympathetic Amsterdam against Louis.77

Even more important than poisoned prunes and the violation of expatriate Dutch merchants’ rights was the gradual deterioration of economic relations between the two states. One of the principal reasons why Amsterdam concluded a separate peace in 1678 was Louis’ promise to revert to the more advantageous 1664 tariff list, a real improvement over the 1667 list which had contributed to the souring of relations prior to the Dutch War. Louis’s decision to grant this concession at Nijmegen had secured for France a truly advantageous peace, which set the stage for Louis’ Reunions of the 1680s. But it did not come without a price. In the years immediately following the peace, Dutch goods returned to the French market place eventually muscling out its domestic competitors, while the Dutch merchant fleet resumed its earlier dominance over the French carrying trade. France’s economy suffered.78

The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, furthermore, saw the flight not only of Huguenots but also their capital and their skills. The exodus of this important element of French economic life damaged the economy while helping that of their Calvinist Dutch rivals. Huguenots were welcomed in the United Provinces, thus strengthening the very economy that was causing France the most hurt. Perhaps not surprisingly, Louis XIV felt compelled to implement new protective tariffs in an attempt to bolster it. In August 1687, he banned the importation of Dutch herring unless it was certified as having been salted with French salt. The next month he struck again, re-implementing the 1667 tariff list, an act in violation of the Nijmegen peace and one certain not to win many fans in Amsterdam. France was arguably the Dutch Republic’s most important market for its products and such moves were seen as attacks on them. By December of 1687, virtually all areas of the Dutch economy were reeling from Louis’s protective measures. Dutch fishing and textile industries were particularly hard hit; for Leiden,

77 Baxter, William III, 210-211.

78 Israel, The Dutch Republic, 843-844.
one of the hubs of the Republic’s cloth trade, the Sun King’s “heavy impost in effect [meant] an absolute ban on the sale of our lakens ... in France.”79 Regardless of the rationale behind France’s new protective tariffs, the result was to push Amsterdam into the arms of the Prince of Orange.80

Equally alarming to Orange and the States General was Louis’s seemingly insatiable appetite for German territory. From almost the beginning of his reign, Louis and his advisors had sought to extend the French border to the Rhine, in essence to create a defensible eastern frontier to protect France from invasion while at the same time creating a gateway for French intervention in German affairs.81 In the north, the centerpiece of Louis’s security strategy had been to create a frontier protected by fortified towns. As we have seen, Louis had turned to the Réunions to rationalize the hodgepodge of territory along his northern and eastern frontiers. Following the advice of his great engineer Vauban, Louis embarked upon these Réunions to rationalize his frontiers and make them defensible by capturing or “acquiring” strategic fortress towns. By 1684, Louis controlled a formidable double-line of fortresses along France’s northern frontier stretching from Dunkirk on the Channel coast to Luxembourg.82

In the east, the situation was more problematic, however. Although his Réunions campaign had brought him the important fortress of Strasbourg, with the bastion of Kehl on the Rhine’s eastern bank, the vital fortress at Philippsbourg remained in the Emperor’s hands. When Elector Karl II of the Palatinate died in 1685, however, Louis saw his chance to obtain this important fortress. Turning again to the “Chamber of Reunion,” Louis unleashed his lawyers on Karl’s rightful successor, Philip-Wilhelm von Neuburg, in favor of the weaker claims of his brother’s sister, the duchess of Orleans. In the end, Louis’s legal machinations were unsuccessful. Worse, they only served to alienate the new elector and push him into the hands of the anti-French


80 Israel, “The Dutch role in the Glorious Revolution,” 114.


coalition. The “loss” of the Palatinate and the real or imagined threat it posed was one of the underlying factors behind Louis’ decision to invade that territory in 1688.83

Louis had greater success with those ecclesiastical principalities found along France’s eastern frontier but by 1688 some of these even seemed uncertain.84 The Archbishopric of Cologne was one of the most strategically important of these territories. Ruled by the aged Maximilian-Henry of Wittelsbach, Cologne had long been a French satellite; in 1672 it had served as one of the French army’s staging areas for the attack on the Dutch Republic. William-Egon von Fürstenburg, bishop of Strasbourg and Maximilian-Henry’s most important advisor, insured that the elderly archbishop remained loyal to France, thus giving Louis a degree of control over this important gateway. To insure his continued control of Cologne, Louis intended to have von Fürstenburg elected as the ailing Maximilian-Henry’s successor. Unfortunately for Louis, the Pope was less willing to see a French candidate succeed to the Archbishopric.

Although Louis’s candidate was elected as Coadjutor by a vote of nineteen to five, the Pope would not confirm von Fürstenburg’s succession. In response, on 1 April Louis delivered the pontiff an ultimatum: confirm von Fürstenburg or prepare for war. To give his words muscle, Louis moved the Channel fleet to the Mediterranean, presumably in anticipation of attacking the Papal States. The Sun King’s saber-rattling and the growing European opposition to his territorial ambitions made the diplomatic situation in the spring of 1688 increasingly dangerous.85

Clearly for the Dutch Republic at least, Louis’s control over this strategic portal could have dire consequences. If von Fürstenburg were to succeed Maximilian-Henry as Elector of Cologne, then the Dutch Republic would never be safe from the French threat. Maximilian-Henry also controlled the bishoprics of Liège and Münster.


84 Symcox, “Louis XIV and the Outbreak of the Nine Years’ War,” 179-212; and Wilson, German Armies, 88-89. These included the Archbishoprics of Trier, Speyer, and Cologne.

territories that formed the frontiers of the southern and eastern Netherlands. With these territories in French hands, the Spanish Netherlands “buffer-zone” would be effectively bypassed, thus making attack along the more vulnerable Rhine valley possible, while rendering the Republic’s important bastion at Maastricht useless. To those observing Louis’ diplomatic moves, it appeared that general war in Europe was only a matter of time — perhaps as soon as 1688 — and it was likely that the Republic would be directly involved. Although the return to the 1667 tariff list in the autumn of 1687 might have seemed to be little more than a response to the Republic’s dominance in France’s domestic trade, to some observers it marked but the first step on the road to war.

The Origins of the Glorious Revolution

It is within the context of this growing opposition to Louis XIV’s aggressively “defensive” foreign policy and the fear that European-wide war was close at hand that one should view the Dutch Republic’s decision to intervene in England. James II’s succession to the English throne in 1685 and his pro-Catholic domestic policies alarmed not only William III but many Protestant (and Catholic!) German princes as well. Few contemporaries would have failed to notice that if war broke out, England’s role would be crucial. Although the Dutch Republic, Brandenburg-Prussia, and Spain were prepared to stand-up to Louis XIV, it was unlikely that the League of Augsburg’s German members would be strong enough to offset the military power France. The Dutch War demonstrated that a similar coalition of states was unable to defeat Louis XIV’s. Only an active and allied England would give the coalition the necessary weight to curb the Sun King’s ambitions and the restore the balance of power.

Unfortunately for the allies, England’s willing participation was not likely. Its monarch, James II would not be drawn into a European war, whether on Louis XIV’s side or on the side of the coalition. And, unfortunately for the Stuart monarch, few in Europe were aware of his obsession with domestic politics. To observers on the Continent, James’s pro-Catholic policies suggested that England was likely to side with Louis XIV in the coming war. Following Monmouth’s abortive coup, James appeared

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86 Symcox, “Louis XIV and the Outbreak of the Nine Years’ War,” 179-212 (especially 188-190).

to be on the path to creating an absolutist, Catholic, England. In the months following the uprising, Parliament was prorogued while James augmented the army to levels never before seen in peacetime. More troubling still was his retention of large numbers of Catholic officers in violation of the Test Acts, this at a time when Protestants were being expelled from France.88 Then in July 1686, while Orange met with the Great Elector in Cleves and European statesmen negotiated the League of Augsburg, James named four Catholics to his Privy Council in total disregard of the Test Acts. To the Prince of Orange — as well as to others — James’ actions strongly suggested that England was being drawn into the French camp, a state of affairs that was unacceptable.89

It is difficult to know with any certainty when William first conceived of toppling James II. Some maintain that William had begun considering intervening in England as early as 1679, while others, like William’s American biographer Stephen Baxter, maintain that “every shred of surviving evidence corroborates the latest of all possible dates, which is that given by Gilbert Burnet: the spring of 1688.”90 Nevertheless, strong circumstantial evidence suggests that informal discussions must have begun well before that. In his examination of Brandenburg-Prussia’s role in the Glorious Revolution, Harold King suggests that the Prince of Orange and the Great Elector undoubtedly discussed the situation in 1686 and notes that lack of evidence about what went on in their meeting “is in itself further evidence that they discussed the religious and political peril, [and] the necessity of bringing England and the Empire into the common plan...”91 For any Dutch attack on England to succeed, it was vital that its eastern flank was covered. For this reason, it is possible — even likely — that some discussion of a possible intervention in England took place between the two men. But as Baxter rightly points out, what was said is not known; there is no surviving written record of their meeting. Just the same, two statesmen of their experience could

88 Childs notes however, that there remained a much higher proportion of Protestant to Catholic officers in spite of James’ position with regards to the Test Acts. For details, see Childs, The Army, James II, and the Glorious Revolution, 19-23; and Clark, The Later Stuarts, 120-125.

89 Israel, The Dutch Republic, 841-842; Jonathan Scott, England’s Troubles: Seventeenth Century English Political Instability in European Context, 207-225

90 Baxter, William III, 224.

no doubt read a map. It was essential for the Dutch Republic to secure its eastern border before any such plan could be even considered. Consequently, William needed Brandenburg’s support before he could embark upon an invasion of England. Given James’s obvious pro-Catholic domestic agenda, even as early as the summer of 1686 it was obvious that England was not likely to participate in a war against France. That fact must have been obvious to statesmen of William’s and the Great Elector’s experience. Even if there were private discussions of such a strategic option, it is clear that conditions in England had to be ripe for such a move to work. As a result, it was likely that nothing more than discussions took place before 1688.

Although William might have pondered intervening in England well before 1688, it seems that no real planning took place until the early months of that year. The earliest indications that the Prince of Orange was putting together such a plan seem to be the winter of 1687-88. During the summer of 1687, William sent his most trusted diplomat, Everard van Weede van Dijkveld to England, to both convey the Prince’s greetings and his support to James as well as to gauge the popular sentiment against him. During his visit, Dijkveld indeed discovered that there was growing opposition to James’s policies. To this was added the news in the fall that James’s wife was pregnant with a direct heir to the throne. The birth of a child to James and his second wife, Mary of Modena, would nullify William’s wife Mary’s claim to the throne and that of her sister Anne, not to mention the more indirect claim of the Prince of Orange himself.

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92 John Carswell believes that it was very likely the two men spoke about England. He explains: “The Prince and the Elector were not rigid or hasty planners. Both believed in keeping alternatives open for as long as possible, and intervention in England was no new idea. The meeting at Cleves produced no formal document. It made a possibility probable. But it also produced the certainty that if such intervention took place, it would have the support of Brandenburg. The major problem in the invasion of England was protection of the home base from French attack. The army of the United Provinces was not strong enough to provide both an expedition of the required strength and a covering force at the same time, nor would the Republican assemblies...ever permit their country to be exposed yet again to invasion. It must have been clear to the Prince and the Elector that any move against James must wait for victories on the Danube that would release Imperial and Brandenburg strength for the Rhine; for further evidence of James’s position; and as a possible bonus, for some indication of a false move by King Louis. Until then the alternative of an understanding with James if he consolidated his position was still open.” For details, see Carswell, *The Descent on England*, 80.

93 Both William and Mary had strong claims to the English throne. Mary had the strongest claim, being James II’s elder daughter. William, on the other hand had a claim through his mother, James II’s sister Mary. The son born to James’ second wife, Mary of Modena, had a stronger claim to the throne. This is what made the birth of James Edward Stewart such a pivotal moment for the Glorious Revolution’s actors, both in England and in the Dutch Republic. Indeed, the birth of a son triggered the famous invitation of the seven. For details, see David
The news of the queen’s pregnancy helped build greater opposition to James’s Catholic policies while at the same time encouraging the Prince of Orange that any intervention on his behalf would be greeted with considerable support, particularly among the Whigs.94

But any move on England by William required the support of Holland and the States General. That support was not likely to come unless it was certain not only that war with France was imminent, but that an invasion of England was the only way to serve the best interests of the Dutch Republic and England. As 1687 became 1688, observers in the Dutch Republic became convinced that war with France was almost inevitable. With Louis’s re-imposition of the 1667 tariff list and his attempts at securing the right of succession for his candidate to the Archbishopric of Cologne, officials in the States General and Holland began to see the truth behind William’s reading of French intentions. Economic warfare with Holland seemed a precursor to general war between France, the Republic, and the Empire. And with relations between the Republic and England growing tenser by the day, observers in Amsterdam could not help but see the parallels between events in the winter and spring of 1688 and what befell the Dutch state in 1672. The turning point, according to K. H. D. Haley was the birth of the Prince of Wales on 20 June 1688. With a Catholic male-heir to the English throne now a certainty, William knew that the only way to secure England for the allies was to overthrow his father-in-law and reconvene Parliament. Orange now began secret talks with select members of the States of Holland and the Amsterdam vroedschap. At the same time, the Prince of Orange’s pleas to strengthen the Republic’s armed forces no longer fell on deaf ears and the States General began taking the requisite steps to prepare the state for possible war.95

As May turned to June and June to July, the situation in Germany and England seemed only to make European conflict more likely. On 3 June only seventeen days before the birth of James II’s son, Maximillan-Henry died, essentially nullifying von Fürstenburg’s previous election (he had been elected Coadjutor to an Archbishop who

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94 Baxter, William III, 224; Clark, The Later Stuarts, 126-134; and Scott, England’s Troubles, 217-225.

was now dead) and requiring a new one, and, consequently, a new crisis. 19 July was
set for this election; it was a date on which the fortunes of Europe seemed to hang. At
the same time in England, James II was faced with a religious crisis of his own which
directly influenced the Prince of Orange’s position toward England. The prosecution of
seven bishops who refused to distribute James’s second Declaration of Indulgence led
to another domestic crisis, a crisis that would serve as the proverbial straw for those in
England who opposed him. The combination the bishops’ open defiance to him and
the birth of the Prince of Wales led opponents of James to act, which in turn, made
Dutch intervention in England a real possibility. On 16 July 1688, the Prince of Orange
received a petition from “the immortal Seven” — seven of the kingdom’s most
influential opponents of James II, men determined to see his Catholic tyranny
overthrown. The receipt of an invitation from James’s opponents was crucial for the
Prince of Orange. Not only did it show that there was support for William in England,
but it give military intervention the legitimacy it needed for it to gain support from the
States General, the States of Holland, and Amsterdam. Events on the continent
provided the invitation additional legitimacy, however. The day after William received
the invitation, Pope Innocent gave his answer to Louis: he would support Clement of
Bavaria. Two days later, the canons voted. In spite of von Fürstenburg winning
fourteen of twenty-three votes, he was short of the two-thirds majority he needed to be
elected. Only the Pope could break the deadlock and he was resolved to foil Louis’s
plans. Now as July drew to a close, war in Europe seemed only a matter of months
away.

With the English side of the equation settled, it only remained for the Prince of
Orange to win the support of Amsterdam and the States General for his audacious plan
to bring England into the coalition. The invitation of the seven — regardless of whether

96 Symcox, “Louis XIV and the Outbreak of the Nine Years’ War,” 192-193; and Rule, “France
caught between two balances,” 46-49.

97 The “immortal seven” were William Cavendish, First Duke of Devonshire; Thomas Osborne,
Earl of Danby; Charles Talbot, Duke of Shrewsbury; Richard Viscount Lumley, First Earl of
Scarborough; Henry Compton (Bishop of London); Admiral Edward Russell, Earl of Orford; and
Henry Viscount Sidney, First Earl of Romney. For their role in William’s government, see
Horwitz, Parliament, Policy and Politics in the Reign of William III, 18-21

Years’ War,” 194-199; and Haley, “The Dutch, the invasion of England, and the alliance of 1689,”
28-29.
or not it represented the majority of Englishmen — allowed William to present the program to the States General and to Amsterdam not as a coup but as Parliament’s deliverer. His goal, as his supporters (and propagandists) pointed out, was to reconvene Parliament — it had been out of session since 1687 — and point England in the proper diplomatic direction: away from France and into the arms of the coalition. Already preparations for the undertaking were well underway; the army was being built up with both new recruits and foreign troops. Weapons, ammunition, provisions, and other necessities were being stockpiled in the Republic’s ports, magazines on the frontier were being stocked, and troops were on the move to beef-up the Republic’s most vulnerable garrisons. And diplomacy was underway to secure the Republic’s eastern frontier.\textsuperscript{99} If anything were to happen in Cologne, it seemed likely that the Dutch would go to war. On 10 August 1688, d’Avaux reported that according to one of Amsterdam’s more important burgomeesters:

If any disorder took place over the affairs of Cologne or some other place, it would not be in their power to prevent the consequences, and ... they would be carried away willy-nilly by the torrent ... if they tried to open their mouths they would be reproached with throwing the Republic into its present state, and they would be asked if they wanted to come to an understanding with the enemy to see the annihilation of their religion and the destruction of their trade.\textsuperscript{100}

D’Avaux and others knew that William’s design was aimed at England. In response to the threat of Dutch intervention, Louis raised the stakes, which in turn, served to legitimize further William’s planned intervention and suggested, through his threats, a connection between England and France. His ultimatum to the Pope on 6 September to support von Fürstenburg or suffer the consequences was followed by additional, more tangible, threats. The Sun King let it be known that failure to comply would result in a descent on the Papal States and the seizure of the papal territory of Avignon. This


\textsuperscript{100} Cited in Haley, “The Dutch, the invasion of England, and the alliance of 1689,” 29-30.
ultimatum, in combination with French troop movements toward Cologne and the Palatinate suggested that war was imminent.101

With war in Germany only days away, the Prince of Orange prepared to unveil his plan to the States of Holland and Amsterdam. During the summer months, he and his representatives had been busy negotiating with German princes for hiring troops to replace the Dutch ones that would be absent for the English operation. These troops had begun assembling in Cleves while those of the Dutch army massed in the outskirts of Nijmegen.102 On 18 September, the same day Pope Innocent sent his defiant reply Louis XIV that he would not support von Fürstenburg, William addressed the States of Holland in a secret session. William began by describing the negotiations he had undertaken to secure German support for his plan. He explained that he, along with the allies, wanted to “establish a posture whereby they could not be attacked by surprise, and to do this it would have been necessary for this State to pass several resolutions to save it.” Understanding how difficult it would have been to do this before there were actual hostilities, William took the liberty to negotiate for the hiring of just over 13,000 troops in the event of war.103 He explained that these troops would be under oath, service, and pay, and established on the same footing as those of the States General and would be answerable to the same “commands, discipline, and authority.” In explaining why he had done this without informing the States of Holland or the States General, he stated that knowing how few secrets there are in this business, [and understanding] the governments of the [provinces] compete so much so, [and] to such a scandalous degree, that from many of the Regents as well as very many of the good incumbents and Patriots, nothing which in the meeting was propounded, discussed, or resolved, remains secret. [Therefore] having acted with a necessary caution, [I elected] to give no prior knowledge [of my negotiations]...”104

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103 Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VI, 119.

104 Cited in Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VI, 119.
At the same meeting, William presented for the first time an outline of his plan to the States of Holland. In support, he presented two memorials illustrating the danger Louis XIV posed to the Republic and the connection between the French and English governments. William argued that since Louis had declared he would treat any attack on James as an attack on himself, he proved that there existed a military relationship between the two states. The second memorial connected the Cologne matter with England and the Dutch Republic. It stated that Louis would regard any Dutch interference as an act of war. The fact that Louis issued these declarations at a time when Dutch intervention in England seemed only a matter of time alluded to a closer relationship between the Sun King and James than in fact actually existed. Nevertheless, these unveiled threats implied just such a relationship, and convinced officials in the Dutch Republic again that William’s reading of Louis’s intentions was correct.\textsuperscript{105} Two days later, William presented the same evidence and his plan to the States General.

In spite of William’s evidence and Louis’ threats, Amsterdam was still reluctant to support the Prince of Orange’s plan. On 24 September Louis issued a manifesto explaining why he was about to go to war. According to his “Mémoire des raisons” Louis described his fear of hostile forces forming against him, which required him to strike. He demanded that Fürstenburg be made archbishop of Cologne and that the provisions of the Regensburg Treaty be made permanent. Although he allowed the Emperor three months to decide, his invasion of the Palatinate a few days later virtually insured Emperor Leopold’s opposition.\textsuperscript{106} The long awaited European conflict had begun. On the same day as Louis’ invasion, the Amsterdam \textit{vroedschap} met to discuss a ban on French goods. In spite of France’s aggression, Amsterdam remained divided and consequently, was unprepared to take any punitive steps. Only when in response to Dutch threats to ban French goods, Louis impounded Dutch ships in French ports, did the Amsterdam \textit{vroedschap} throw their support behind William’s plan. On 29 September 1688, \textit{Raadpensionaris} Gaspar Fagel in a secret session of the States of Holland outlined the Prince of Orange’s plan and the rationale behind it: France’s punitive trade

\textsuperscript{105} Israel, “The Dutch Role in the Glorious Revolution,” 119-120; and Haley, “The Dutch, the invasion of England, and the alliance of 1689,” 25.

\textsuperscript{106} Lynn, \textit{The Wars of Louis XIV}, 192; and Symcox, “Louis XIV and the Outbreak of the Nine Years’ War,” 200-201.
restrictions had damaged the Dutch economy, and that there were indications that war with France was inevitable. Failure to act, according to Fagel, would lead to disaster. England must be struck before James II could consolidate his power and use his large army against his opponents at home. Should he do this, it was likely that he would throw his lot in with Louis XIV, thus subjecting the Dutch Republic to their worst nightmare: a re-play of 1672. Fagel explained that the purpose of the Dutch invasion of England was to make the nation and Crown “useful to their friends and allies, and especially to this state.” Other factors, like defending Protestantism as well as the dynastic interests of William and Mary, as Jonathan Israel points out, were included in the resolution but were not nearly emphasized as much as securing the Dutch state from danger. As the deputies from Haarlem reported home after Fagel’s speech, the purpose of the project was to “make this state secure from all external danger.”

Such an expedition required the united support of the entire Dutch state and at the crucial moment, the Prince of Orange received it. On the same day that Fagel unveiled the plan in the States of Holland, news reached the surrounding town councils. One by one they voted and approved the 29 September resolution vowing to throw all necessary resources into the operation. By early October, Holland and the rest of the provinces had unanimously approved and gave Orange their full support. During the month of October, the Republic put all of its military and naval forces at his disposal with the knowledge that the overthrow of James II was in the security interests of the state. Thus, while William’s propaganda in England emphasized that he would come to restore the liberties of Protestants and overthrow James’s absolutism, it is clear from the plan that its true purpose was to reconvene Parliament and utilize English resources for the anti-French coalition, not necessarily in that order. Although little was said about William becoming king of England after the ouster of James II, such an outcome was implied, not only by Dutch officials but by William’s German supporters, as well. Indeed, during some of the Prince of Orange’s initial troop negotiations with the Elector of Brandenburg in the summer of 1688, the Elector’s representative negotiated with William as Prince of Orange and not as representative of the Dutch Republic. According to Harold King, Frederick III realized that any subsidies that he

107 Cited in Israel, “The Dutch role in the Glorious Revolution,” 119-120.

108 Cited in Israel, “The Dutch role in the Glorious Revolution,” 119-120.
hoped to gain from William would likely come from William as king of England rather than from the Dutch Republic as Prince of Orange. Such a recognition demonstrates that among those privy to the details of William’s plan, the purpose was not simply to reconvene Parliament with the understanding that it would, of its own volition, devote its treasure to the war with France, but that William would become king of England and as king, he would insure that England joined the anti-French coalition. The Dutch Republic would not be willing to risk its army and navy — not to mention its treasure — on such a risky venture without some assurances that England would join the anti-French coalition.

The Glorious Revolution and the Grand Alliance

The success of the Prince of Orange’s invasion of England and the “Glorious Revolution” that resulted from it did all that it was supposed to do. Through a combination of planning, circumstances, and luck, James II was overthrown and the Prince and Princess of Orange emerged from the revolution king and queen of England, Ireland, and Scotland. It is beyond the scope of this work to follow the details of the Glorious Revolution, the Convention Parliament, and William and Mary’s ultimate joint succession to the English throne. Much had been written about how their succession to the English throne was justified, whether or not the Convention Parliament was legal, and how William directed the government in the months before he was officially crowned king. What concerns us most here were the steps the Prince of Orange — now William III of England — took to mobilize the Crown’s resources for war, the role of the Dutch Republic in that process, and how Britain ultimately became part of the Grand Alliance.

When William arrived in England in the late fall of 1688, there already existed the means to utilize England’s armed forces in support of the Dutch Republic.

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110 Israel, “The Dutch role in the Glorious Revolution,” 120.

111 For William’s consolidation of power, see especially Horwitz, Parliament, policy and politics in the reign of William III, 17-49.

According to the existing treaty’s provisions, each side swore it would come to the other’s aid in case of attack. The details of that military commitment were established in the “Separate Articles,” which stated that aid in the form of ten-thousand men and twenty ships-of-the-line, would be sent by the supporting state within two months of the attack that triggered the treaty’s activation. These forces would come under the control of the state under attack and would essentially serve as part of that land’s military forces, participating in “all military duties and services of war.”

Because these provisions were still in place when William and Mary were crowned King of and Queen England, they became the basis for British participation in the war in the Low Countries.

The determination of William and the Dutch Republic to see England’s resources mobilized against Louis XIV is illustrated by the speed with which negotiations to that end were organized and undertaken. In January 1689, a full month before William and Mary were officially crowned as heads-of-state, representatives from the Dutch Republic arrived in England to negotiate the intricacies of Anglo-Dutch cooperation against France. What is suggestive about this first group is how they came to be in England in January. According to an entry in the diary of William’s personal secretary, Constantijn Huygens, dated 20 December 1688 — just two days after the Prince had arrived at St. James Palace — he notes that he had written to the States General on behalf of the prince asking when delegates from the committee for secret affairs would be sent to England. In a postscript, he writes that William recommended that “a residing [Burgomeester] from Amsterdam, [as well as] Odijk and Dijckvelt” be sent, promising the three of them “passports in the King’s name.”

It is an interesting passage, not only for whom William recommended but because he promised the men passports “in the King’s name” before he actually was King of England.

His choices were hardly surprising. Odijk and Dijckvelt were among the Republic’s most seasoned diplomats with considerable experience in England. “Odijk” or William Hadriaan van Nassau-Odijk was a leading noble from Zeeland and a cousin

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113 Cited in Childs, The Nine Years’ War and the British Army, 25.

114 For details, see Constantijn Huygens, Dagboek van Constantijn Huygens, den zoon, van 21 October 1688 tot 2 Sept. 1696 (Handschrift van de Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam) (Utrecht: Kemink & Zoon, 1876), I. 42; and Clark, The Dutch Alliance and the War Against French Trade, 1688-1697 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1923), 15.
to the prince. A member of Zeeland’s provincial assembly, in 1674 he had been named extraordinary ambassador to England, and in 1678, he was one of the representatives sent to negotiate the Peace of Nijmegen.115 The other named gentleman, Everhard van Weede, heer Dijkvelt was the William’s most trusted diplomat as we have seen. Ironically, the same man who had been sent to England re-affirm the Republic’s friendship and affection to James II.116 Now he was entrusted with sorting out the details of the Anglo-Dutch military alliance. The third representative from the Republic was Nicholas Witsen, Burgermeester of Amsterdam. Witsen had served in Holland’s Gecommitteerde Raad or “Council of Deputies,” the body tasked with the day-to-day affairs of the province. In 1688, he was one of Holland’s Burgomeesters and one of considerable diplomatic and military experience. Like both Dijkvelt and Odijk, Witsen had served as a gedeputeerde te velde or “Field Deputy” — military representatives of the government who accompanied the army on campaign. Thus, Witsen, Dijkvelt and Odijk, were not only seasoned diplomats but were well versed in military affairs as well.117

The States General acted quickly on the Prince of Orange’s request. According to Huygens, the letter was sent on the 20th of December; we can presume the letter reached the Dutch Republic about a week to ten days later. On the 8th of January 1689, the States General passed a resolution appointing the requested deputies, and two days after that, their instructions were drawn up for them and they were briefed on their duties. Their instructions came from the States General’s committees on foreign affairs, military affairs, and admiralties. Indeed, the bulk of their duties concerned Dutch as opposed to British affairs since William was still Stadholder of Holland and his input was necessary in preparing for the coming campaign season.118 Although apparently


116 For Dijkvelt’s career, see Schutte, Repertorium der Nederlandse Vertegenwoordigers Residerende in het Buitenland, 21; J.H. Hora Siccama, Aanteekeningen en Verbeteringen op het in 1906 door het Historisch Genootschap uitgegeven Register op de Journalen van Constantijn Huygens den Zoon (Amsterdam: Johannes Müller, 1915), 752-754; and Clark, The Dutch Alliance, 15-16.

117 For Nicholas Witsen’s participation in the negotiations with England, see J. F. Gebhard, Nicholas Witsen, 2 vols. (Utrecht, 1881); and Schutte, Repertorium der Nederlandse Vertegenwoordigers Residerende in het Buitenland, 108.

118 Clark, The Dutch Alliance and the War Against French Trade, 1688-1697, 15-17.
little survives of their meetings, the fact that this delegation arrived before William was officially crowned King of England is certainly supports the contention that the Glorious Revolution was conducted principally out of Dutch motivations. Their duties, in part, must have been to insure that English resources would be mobilized as quickly as possible to aid the Dutch in the now escalating war on the continent. The fact that the bulk of the proceedings focused on naval cooperation is interesting since it was here where the intricacies of precedence and honor were the strongest and the most ticklish, particularly considering the difficulties inherent in two vehement maritime enemies suddenly forced to work together. In the end, the Dutch were compelled to forfeit virtually all of their requests in return for English cooperation; perhaps the hardest to swallow was the decision that combined fleets would always be commanded by English officers (regardless of rank!). In return, England would provide the bulk of the fleet’s warships. Thus, the negotiations made clear that Britain would be the senior partner in the war at sea.\footnote{For the details of the revised Anglo-Dutch Treaty For Mutual Protection (8 March 1689), see Clark, The Dutch Alliance and the War Against French Trade; B. Cox, King William’s European Joint Venture; and John Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William III, 1689-1697: Its State and Direction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), 250-253.}

No such agreement was concluded with regards to the war on land, however. In fact, the English Army was hardly in a state to participate in full-scale warfare on the continent in any case, at least not right away, and certainly not in significant numbers. The successful Dutch invasion and James II’s subsequent flight, combined with the Earl of Feversham’s unfortunate order to disband the king’s forces caused the army’s soldiery to scatter and made William’s problems worse. Some regiments stayed at their posts while others simply fell apart, the soldiers walking home, weapons and all. William immediately issued orders to re-assemble the broken formations and by the time he was crowned king in February, most of the army had been reassembled. Perhaps most problematic was the question of loyalty. Roughly one-third of the army’s officers had abandoned their posts upon William and Mary’s succession, most refusing to serve their new master, while another third were deemed politically unreliable. This left a dearth of qualified officers to lead an army on the verge of its greatest expansion until the Napoleonic Wars.\footnote{Childs, The Army, James II, and the Glorious Revolution, 168-202; and The British Army of William III, 4-33. For a discussion of army growth, see Chapter 3 below.} Unfortunately, William had little time to institute a
reform of the English Army in the way that he had done for the Dutch Army. With close to 15,000 of the Dutch Republic’s best formations still in England — more than one-quarter of the entire Dutch Army, in 1689 — and with the threat of French attack in the Low Countries growing by the day, William was forced to rely upon stop-gap measures to get English troops in the field as quickly as possible.\textsuperscript{121}

Rather than sending his Dutch troops and the crack formations of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade back to the Low Countries — they were the only reliable troops then at his disposal at that time — William enacted the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of Mutual Support as Stadholder of the Dutch Republic. In February 1689, he ordered a British expeditionary force assembled, and by late March, a corps comprising eleven regiments of foot and two of horse, 10,972 men — or 12,907 officers and men — marched to the coast for embarkation and deployment in support of the Dutch in the Low Countries.\textsuperscript{122} Under the command of the recently promoted, Sir John Churchill, First Earl of Marlborough, the actions of this force demonstrated the army’s questionable loyalty to its new monarch when several of its formations mutinied en-route to the coast. During the most serious of these uprisings, the mutiny of the Royal Scots Regiment — one of the oldest and most prestigious formations in the British Army — William’s own Dutch troops had to be sent to put down the rebellion.\textsuperscript{123} When the English troops finally arrived on the continent, the Dutch Field Marshal, Georg Friedrich, Prince von Waldeck, was unimpressed. Most of the regiments were poorly equipped and severely under-strength. Many lacked serviceable weapons. Indeed, according to both English and Dutch sources, Marlborough’s corps mustered no more than 6,000 men upon its arrival rather than the more than 11,000 called for in the official establishment.\textsuperscript{124} Its


\textsuperscript{122} PRO SP 8/5 “King William’s Chest, 1689,” ff. 12.

\textsuperscript{123} For a description of the Royal Scots’ mutiny, see Childs, \textit{The British Army of William III}, 21-23.

\textsuperscript{124} For details, see PRO SP 8/5, \textit{King William’s Chest, 1689}, ff. 25, 46; ARA. RvS. 1.01.19, #626, \textit{Ingekomen Missieven, Jan.-Juni 1689}, “Memoire waer de Nieuwe Engelsche Regimenten logiren
poor condition meant that several of its weakest regiments were destined to spend the
campaign in garrison rather than having to endure the hardships of active
campaigning. Nevertheless, Marlborough’s forces were quickly integrated into the
larger allied army in the Low Countries. Upon its arrival, his officers were required to
swear oaths to their not having purchased their commissions — the same oaths sworn
by all officers in Dutch service (and in the case of British officers, a lie!) — while his
soldiers trained in “the Dutch exercise” so that both William’s English and Dutch
troops were on the same page tactically.\(^\text{125}\)

Marlborough’s expeditionary force represented the first English troops to
actively participate in the anti-French coalition. Their orders for deployment to the
continent came before England even officially entered the conflict and most likely
represent a symbolic gesture on the part of William. Although the ten-thousand-man
force was no doubt appreciated, their lack of adequate equipment and clothing meant
that much of the force would spend the first campaign of the war in garrison.\(^\text{126}\)
The fact that William dispatched them to the continent no doubt sent a strong signal to the
States General; one that intended to insure them that he would live up to his part of the
bargain. Nevertheless, while William might have had reasonable success in committing
this small expeditionary force the Low Countries Theater, convincing Parliament to
declare war on France proved a more difficult undertaking. Part of the difficulty lay
with the fact that England, at first, had no interest in joining the war on the Continent.
The most pressing matter in the early spring of 1689 was the rebellion in Ireland. In
early March, James II had returned to the British Isles after a brief sojourn in France.
Scotland too, was not entirely in William and Mary’s camp. Consequently, Parliament
— not to mention William himself — was at first ill-disposed toward sending troops to
the Continent. More important was the formal entrance of England in what would
come to be known “The Grand Alliance.” Because the Dutch were already at war with

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sullen (Zanten, den 16 April 1689)”, “Waldeck to the Raad van State, Breda den 25 April 1689”;
CSPD, 1689-90, 130-131 (“Waldeck to William III, Maestricht, 1 June 1689”); and John Childs, The
Nine Years’ War and the British Army 1688 – 1697, 114.

\(^\text{125}\) British Library, Add. MSS. 21,506, ff. 96 and 98 (Marlborough to Blathwayt, Maastricht 2 May
1689; and Marlborough to Blathwayt, Breda 29 May 1689).

\(^\text{126}\) See Chapter 7 below.
France, they were anxious to see England declare war on France. Not only would it mark the success of William’s, and the States General’s, English venture but it would relieve the Dutch from shouldering the lion’s share of the allied war effort in the Low Countries.

Unfortunately for the States General, England would be able to do little to lessen the load, in spite of William and Mary’s succession to the English throne. As early as 22 January, William had pushed the Convention Parliament to join the anti-French coalition and declare war on Louis XIV. Parliament, however, did not feel the same sense of urgency as the Dutch. At the time of William and Mary’s succession in mid-February, France was still not a direct threat to England. But as the situation in Ireland — and to a lesser degree Scotland — changed, Parliament became more disposed to William’s point of view. On 25 April (OS), the House of Commons called for war against France. Addressing Commons, William stated truthfully that war was “already declared in effect by France against England.” On 17 May, with the support of Parliament, William declared war on France. It would take longer for England to become a party to the Grand Alliance, however.

The England’s role in the Grand Alliance is tied directly to William III and the Dutch Republic. The Maritime Alliance, or more properly the “Treaty on Combined Fleets,” formed the foundation of Anglo-Dutch cooperation. As we have seen, the negotiations pertaining to these treaties began before William was officially crowned king in January 1689. The treaty was finally hammered out on 21 May 1689, though it was dated 29 April. The conclusion of Treaty on Combined Fleets was followed by several other military treaties that brought England closer both to the Dutch Republic and to the growing anti-French alliance. The cornerstone of the Anglo-Dutch military relationship during the Nine Years’ War and beyond, however, was laid down in the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. The Treaty of Friendship and Alliance made reference a number of Anglo-Dutch treaties concluded during the course of the wars

127 France declared war on the Dutch Republic on 26 November 1688 making good on their threat that a Dutch invasion of England would result in a French declaration of war.

128 Although the Grand Alliance Treaty of 1689 was begun in the Spring of 1689, it was finally concluded on 20 December 1689. For details, see, Cox, King William’s European Joint Venture(Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1995), 118-119.

129 Clark, The Anglo-Dutch Alliance and the War Against French Trade, 39-40.
with France. In particular, it was based upon the 1678 “Treaty of Defensive Alliance,” the treaty that William invoked as Stadholder to “request” English forces be sent in support of the Dutch, and the recently concluded Treaty on the Combined Fleets. Negotiated by the same principals as the Treaty on Combined Fleets, the “Treaty of Friendship and Alliance” was finally concluded in August of 1689. The alliance called for “His Majesty and His Successors and the Lords States General, and their Subjects and Inhabitants” to conclude a “close Alliance and faithful League in order to maintain and continue mutually Order, Peace, Friendship, and Neutrality at sea and on land .... and to defend, assist and maintain, keeping in possession the Lands, Towns and Places that belong at present and that will belong later both to His Majesty and His Successors as Kings of Great Britain and to the said Lords States General, the said Treaties wherever those Lands, Towns and Places be located.” Central to the treaty was a clause stating that no separate peace would be negotiated by its parties.

The Anglo-Dutch Alliance was the foundation upon which the Grand Alliance was eventually built. England’s entrance into the war and its alliance with the Dutch Republic was followed six months later by the conclusion of the Grand Alliance. Already in April of 1689, the Dutch Republic had entered into negotiations with the Emperor to establish a formal military alliance against France. On 12 May 1689, an alliance between Vienna and The Hague was concluded with the goal of returning France to the frontiers of 1648 and 1659. During the summer and autumn months as the war entered its first campaign season, representatives from Vienna, London, and The Hague — using this initial agreement as a basis — hammered-out the details of what would eventually become the basis for the allied coalition. Its final form was manifested in the Grand Alliance of 1689. On 20 December 1689, the treaty was ratified by William III representing England, Raadpensionaris Anthonie Heinsius of Holland and Treasurer Jacob Hop of the States General representing the Dutch Republic, and L.W. Königsegg and T.H. Straatman representing Emperor Leopold. The treaty, comprising ten articles, lists in somewhat vague terms the goal of the coalition: to force France back

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130 The Treaty of Defensive Alliance dated to 3 March 1678. For details see Cox, King William’s European Joint Venture, 124.

131 Cox, King William’s European Joint Venture, 124-125.

132 Smit, De Buitenlandsche Politiek van Nederland, I, 155-156.
the boundary concluded in 1648/59. The most important element of the treaty, stated in no less than five of ten articles, emphasize that no signatory shall conclude a separate peace from the others. The details of military cooperation are absent from the treaty, details to be concluded in each of the principal theaters of war.\textsuperscript{133}

The conclusion of the Grand Alliance in December of 1689 in a sense marked the successful conclusion of the Dutch Republic’s “Grand Design.” With William and Mary on the English throne and England’s army and navy fully committed to the war with France, the Republic’s goal of mobilizing England’s resources for the anti-French coalition appeared to be realized. Nevertheless, challenges in Scotland and Ireland meant that the bulk of Britain’s armed forces would be deployed to secure realm rather than to assist the coalition in the Spanish Netherlands. Consequently, during the first three years of the war, only the small English expeditionary force could be committed to assist the coalition, and that force would steadily shrink until the war in Ireland ended. Thus, while the Republic might have hoped to utilize Britain’s might against France, such ambitions would have to wait until the threat to William and Mary’s reign had subsided. Perhaps it was for that reason that the Dutch Republic orchestrated the war against France in the Low Countries during the war’s first years.

But the dominant role the Dutch Republic played in during the Nine Years’ War, particularly in the war’s first three years, was not only due to the diversion of most of the British army to Ireland. The Dutch Republic and the Prince of Orange together, much more than political actors in England, were the key arbiters of events in 1688 and 1689. William’s expedition to secure England for the alliance did just that. Once accomplished, England’s resources would be used to in the war against France in the way they had envisioned. Although the war in Ireland would temporarily postpone the commitment of large numbers of English forces in the Low Countries, they would ultimately be used in pursuit of Dutch, or rather coalition, goals. The veracity of this is suggested by the rapid integration of the small English corps into the larger Dutch-dominated confederate military structure.\textsuperscript{134} In many ways, William’s return to the Dutch Republic in late-January 1691 marks the true realization of both the Prince of Orange’s and the Dutch Republic’s goal in embarking upon the invasion of England.

\textsuperscript{133} Cox, \textit{King William’s European Joint Venture}, 118-119 (Figure 5.1).
\textsuperscript{134} See Chapter 7 below.
William’s triumphant return to The Hague for the first time since his departure for England in 1688 symbolized their plan’s success. William had returned — as king of England — to command the coalition army in the Low Countries. It also meant that more of England’s forces would be committed to fight in the Low Countries.

William’s invasion of England was many things to many people. Although to some Englishmen, William and Mary’s succession to the throne may have represented a “Glorious Revolution,” to others it represented an armed coup, a coup that ushered in what some historians have called a “War of English Succession.” Only with the end of the war in Ireland in 1691 could William be certain that his position was secure. For the Dutch Republic, however, the invasion of England was a calculated well-planned military operation designed to bring England into the war against France, a war from which its legitimate king had chosen to remain aloof. The events that followed William and Mary’s successful coup brought England into that war on the side of the Dutch Republic, just as those who orchestrated it had hoped. Although such a view might appear extreme, the manner of England’s participation in what would come to be called the Confederate Army demonstrates the dominant role the Dutch Republic played in the war in the Low Countries. William’s return to the Dutch Republic in late-January 1691 marked not only his acceptance of the reigns of command but it symbolized the success of his, and the States General’s great gamble. It was now up to them to forge a coalition army.
CHAPTER 3
COALITION WARFARE AND THE GROWTH OF ARMIES

INTRODUCTION
The Nine Years’ War was a conflict that taxed the early modern state’s resources to its very limits. All of the war’s participants saw their military establishments grow to unprecedented size. The example most often cited by historians — Louis XIV’s French army — reached its peak size during this period rather than during the War of the Spanish Succession as was previously thought. Blossoming to over 420,000 officers and men on paper, it became the largest army in Europe; it would not reach the same gargantuan proportions again until the wars of the French Revolution almost one-hundred years later.¹

France was not the only early modern state to see its army’s numbers multiply. Every one of the war’s major participants saw their respective armies double or even triple in size, the result of the conflict’s demands on military manpower. On the allied side, the Dutch Republic’s army grew from a peacetime strength of just under 40,000 in 1686 to 102,000 ten years later at the war’s peak, while the English army, in the wake of the Glorious Revolution, experienced a similar manpower explosion, expanding from approximately 40,000 in 1688 to just over 101,000 in 1696. The Holy Roman Empire, Brandenburg-Prussia, and Savoy all saw their armies grow during the Nine Years’ War.² Even Spain, a land plagued by fiscal difficulties throughout the later seventeenth

¹ Lynn notes that while the paper strength might have reached 420,000 in 1696, its actual strength was probably closer to 340,000. For details, see Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, 47, 53; and Lynn, “Recalculating French Army Growth During the Grand Siècle, 1610-1715,” in Rogers, ed., The Military Revolution Debate, 117-147.

² For Savoy, see in particular Storrs, War, Diplomacy, and the Rise of Savoy, 1690-1720, 23-30. For the Brandenburg-Prussia’s army, see Jany, Geschichte der Preußischen Armee, I, passim; and for the Empire, see Wilson, German Armies, 87-100 (especially Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5).
century, managed to maintain a military of approximately 50,000 men for much of the war's duration.  

The growth of armies, not surprisingly, was mirrored by a like growth in state expenditures. The costs of maintaining these marching behemoths strained every muscle of the early modern state's fiscal-military apparatus. In France, an annual military budget of over 100,000,000 livres coupled with crop failures in 1692 and 1693 contributed to Louis XIV's abandonment of offensive operations in 1694, and undoubtedly helped bring France to the negotiating table. Although enjoying stronger state financial institutions than Louis XIV's France, the Maritime Powers also suffered from the seemingly endless drain on their fiscal resources. In the Dutch Republic, all of its seven provinces saw their debts increase dramatically. In Holland alone — by far the Republic's wealthiest province — the province's debt increased by 28 million guilders. Zeeland, the Dutch Republic's second most prosperous province, saw its expenditures exceed its income in the first year of the war. By the war's end, its debt had increased from virtually nil to f1,500,000. Even less prosperous provinces, like Overijssel, Drenthe, and Groningen saw their respective debts increase.

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3 Etienne Rooms' figures fluctuate between 32,000 at the start of the Nine Years' War and just under 17,000 at its conclusion in the Spanish Netherlands alone. Parker gives 50,000 as the Spanish army's total strength in 1700. For more, see Parker, "The 'Military Revolution' — A Myth?" in Rogers, The Military Revolution Debate, 44 (Table 2.1); and Rooms, "De Materieel Organisatie van de Troeppen van de Spaans-Habsburgse Monarchie in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden," Bijlagen Deel III, 404-410.


5 According to E.H.M. Dormans, interest on loans in Holland’s southern quarter alone increased from almost 88 million guilders in 1689 to just under 110 million guilders by 1698. For details, see E.H.M. Dormans, Het Tekort: Staatschuld in de tijd der Republiek (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1991), 75-76.


7 For Overijssel, see W. Fritschy, Gewestelijke finantiën ten tijde van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden: Deel I, Overijssel (1604-1795) (The Hague: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 1996); for Drenthe, see W. Fritschy, Gewestelijke finantiën ten tijde van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden: Deel II, Drenthe (1602-1795) (The Hague: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 1998); for Groningen, see Viktor Enthoven, Gewestelijke finantiën ten tijde van de Republiek der
surprisingly, the financial strain of war — and the chorus of complaints from the provincial states that accompanied it — caused an increased war-weariness within the Republic and an eagerness for peace which, in turn, contributed to William III’s late-war peace initiatives.

England too suffered from the increased financial demands of late-seventeenth century warfare. When the war began, England had yet to tap its fiscal-military potential. Boasting a modest army but the second largest navy in Europe, the island nation’s expenditures on defense were so minimal during the reign of the late-Stuarts, that its national debt stood at nil in 1688. After nine years of war, however, that debt had increased to just under £17 million, a harsh testimony to England’s commitment to continental affairs under its new sovereign.\(^8\)

The manner of resource mobilization — the mustering of men, money, and material — in support of the allied war effort in the Spanish Netherlands reflects not only the nature of the allied war effort in that theater but the nature of the states involved in that effort as well. Unlike France, which was rich in natural resources and manpower, England and the Dutch Republic in particular, were forced by necessity to utilize their financial wealth to keep up with the Louis’ ever expanding legions. Money was transformed into soldiers; first in the Dutch Republic and later in England, military officials turned to the German soldier market to augment their respective armies. Not surprisingly, military expenditure is closely related army growth, particularly in lands so dependent upon foreign mercenaries. As will be illustrated below, there is a direct relationship between the growth of the Dutch army, and the increase of its military expenditures. Likewise, the shrinkage of the Spanish army in the Low Countries is directly related to the Spanish Netherlands’ dwindling coffers, the result of France’s occupation of that government’s more wealthy domains.\(^9\)

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\(^9\) For the Spanish Netherlands’ financial crisis during the Nine Years’ War, see especially Reginald de Schrijver, *Jan van Brouchoven, Graaf van Bergeyck 1644-1725*, 70-98.
And yet resource mobilization is not simply about the growth of armies and the cash needed to support them; it is about how resources were mobilized and committed to war. Central to this chapter is an examination of the relationship between army growth and the commitment of military forces to the conduct of the war. For the British (after 1690), Dutch, and (until 1694) Spanish, the Low Countries was its principal theater; the war would be decided in “Flanders’ fields,” not the Rhineland, Italy, Savoy, Spain or one of the far-flung colonies. The commitment of military forces to the Spanish Netherlands, and the funds to pay for and support them, reflects more than anything else, each state’s dedication to the allied cause, as well as their respective policy priorities. Through a comparison of Britain’s, the Dutch Republic’s, and Spain’s, military allocations to the “confederate army” in the Low Countries, this chapter will also shed light not only on the composition of that army but the relative importance of the Flanders theater to each of the “confederate army’s” main contributors.

**The Growth of Armies, Army Style, and Coalition Warfare in the later Seventeenth Century**

The growth of European armies, particularly those of the 17th and 18th centuries, while important, is surprisingly, a topic generally overlooked by military historians. Since the publication of Geoffrey Parker’s seminal work, *The Military Revolution: Military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500-1800*, the role of the military in the formation the modern state has had a central place in the historiography of early modern Europe. One of the critical elements of the “military revolution” thesis is the growth of armies, which according to Parker, came as a direct result of changes in military technology and their adaptation to the battlefield. Although there has been considerable debate over various elements of Parker’s “military revolution” thesis, almost all historians

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11 Parker’s thesis is summarized in the first chapter of *The Military Revolution* thus: “First, the improvements in artillery in the fifteenth century, both qualitative and quantitative, eventually transformed fortress design. Second, the increasing reliance on firepower in battle – whether with archers, field artillery or musketeers – led not only to the eclipse of cavalry by infantry in most armies, but to new tactical arrangements that maximized the opportunities of giving fire. Moreover, these new ways in warfare were accompanied by a dramatic increase in army size.” These developments, in turn, led to the creation of large state bureaucracies to support Europe’s expanded armies. For details see Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution*, 24, and Chapter 2 (“Supplying War”), passim.
acknowledge army growth’s importance in European history, particularly with regards to the development of the modern state.\textsuperscript{12} For the most part, however, it is assumed that we already understand the patterns of European military expansion. Yet, with the notable exception of John Lynn’s pioneering work on the 17\textsuperscript{th} and 18\textsuperscript{th} century French army, we know precious little about the nature of that military expansion. In his essay “A Military Revolution? A 1660-1792 Perspective,” Jeremy Black notes that “[o]ne of the most useful, and necessarily collective, projects that military historians could engage in would be the production of an authoritative data-bank on army strengths in the early-modern period.”\textsuperscript{13} Indeed, since the publication of that work, important strides have been made in this direction. The studies of Christopher Storrs, James Wood, James Scott Wheeler, Peter Wilson, and others have begun to fill in the gaps in our knowledge of the various patterns of army growth.\textsuperscript{14} Yet in spite of these important studies, we are still just scratching the surface. We still know little about the how army growth manifested itself, and even less about how that expansion really influenced society. Works have appeared which purport to explain the relationship between military growth and state finances. But many of these are fraught with errors, not due to sloppiness of scholarship but rather because the surveys on which they rely are flawed

\textsuperscript{12} This is a central element of the “army and state formation” school of historiography. Essentially a spin-off of the “military revolution” thesis, the “state formation” school of historiography maintains that military necessity provided the catalyst for creating the state fiscal bureaucracy needed to pay for expanded standing armies. Charles Tilly’s book \textit{Coercion, Capital, and European States} exemplifies this school of historiography. See Charles Tilly, \textit{Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992} (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992 ed.).


or are based on outdated research.\textsuperscript{15} Until we have a clearer picture of early modern armies themselves, such studies will continue to rest upon shaky foundations.\textsuperscript{16}

The notable exception to this void in the historiography is the work of John Lynn. Focusing on the 17th century French army, Lynn is one of very few military historians to examine army growth in any detail. In 1980, Lynn wrote the first of many articles and books that examine the expansion of the French army during early modern period. Using Parker’s “military revolution” thesis as a starting point, Lynn’s studies have set out to examine virtually every element affecting army growth in early modern France.\textsuperscript{17} Initially his concerns rested with the methodology of counting soldiers; later he went on to test various elements of Parker’s thesis. Central to Lynn’s argument is that the expansion of the French army was more closely tied to the policies of the

\textsuperscript{15} One such work that seems to be taken by non-specialist historians as authoritative is David Chandler’s \textit{The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough}. Although it is an adequate survey for undergraduate and graduate students, it is wholly inadequate as foundation for more rigorous scholarship. Unfortunately, non-specialist historians tend to rely upon it when writing about the nature of armies and warfare in the late 17th and 18th centuries. This is particularly troubling because the book is fraught with numerous errors, both in terms of basic facts, as well as its assumptions about late 17th century warfare itself. For example, although logistics is explored, it does not adequately examine its relationship to strategy and planning. A better book is Olaf van Nimwegen’s, ‘\textit{Subsistentie van het Leger}’. Unfortunately, van Nimwegen’s insights are still unavailable to the English-speaking audience. For a details, see David Chandler, \textit{The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough}, passim; and Olaf van Nimwegen, ‘\textit{De subsistentie van het leger}: Logistiek en strategie van het Geallieerde en met name het Staats leger tijdens de Spaanse Successie Oorlog in de Nederlanden en het Heilige Roomes Rijk (1701-1712)’ (Amsterdam: De Betaafsche Leeuw, 1995), 9-19.

\textsuperscript{16} One work which suffers from this problem is D.W. Jones’, \textit{War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough}. Although its examination of England’s finances is impressive, Jones’ assumptions pertaining to the British Army and the war in the Spanish Netherlands are incorrect, particularly with regards to British involvement in the campaigns in the Spanish Netherlands. Jones makes assumptions about the rationale behind army’s logistics administration in the Low Countries that are incorrect, primarily because he relies too heavily on Chandler’s flawed examination of military logistics in the \textit{Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough}. For details see, D.W. Jones, \textit{War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough}, 28-65, especially 28-39; and Chandler, \textit{Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough}, 13-21.

monarchy — particularly during Louis XIV’s reign — than with changes in military technology. Although Lynn concedes that there was a “military revolution” similar to the one described by Parker, he also maintains that technology alone did not account for army growth. Rather, a land’s unique foreign policy and defensive needs played a more important role. In the case of France, while the construction of fortresses to guard its frontiers did affect army size in peacetime, in wartime, the needs of the state determined the size of its army.\(^8\)

Lynn’s work is particularly important because of its thoroughness. He examines the French army at its smallest unit level — the company — and uses a variety of sources to corroborate his evidence. He also distinguishes between wartime and peacetime armies, a critical distinction if one is to truly understand the nature of military expansion during this period. Armies always grew in times of war. The true measure of army growth in the early modern period were changes in an army’s peacetime rather than its wartime strength. It is this change that is truly critical in that it illustrates not only the State’s ability to support armed forces for prolonged periods but also the military demands of the government in peacetime. Lynn’s analysis of army size and his discussion of the methodology involved with that work, culminating with his chapter on army growth in his *Giant of the Grand Siècle*, furthermore, illustrates the complexity involved with measuring army strength in the early modern period, as well as the need for similar rigorous studies of other early modern armies.\(^9\)

Lynn’s investigation of army growth naturally led him to study army style. During the course of his research, he began to explore the nature of armies based on their institutional characteristics. For Lynn, three elements contributed to a particular army style. First, army style is directly related to the state from which it is derived. This is of course, not surprising. Most historians would agree that armies are shaped by the state that governs them. But Lynn adds to this two other important variables. The first of these is technology and the second success in war. It is the last of them — military success — which leads armies to imitate the most successful military institutions. The fact that successful armies are imitated while the unsuccessful ones are ignored has led Lynn to propose that during particular historical periods, the

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"winningest" armies have become paradigm institutions, models for other armies to imitate and follow. One good example of this phenomenon is the revolution brought on by Napoleon’s French army. Military leaders in Prussia and Austria imitated the paradigm French army such that by the end of the Napoleonic Wars, both had created institutions which, while uniquely Prussian and Austrian, bore many of the trademarks of the French Napoleonic model, a sure sign of the influence of a paradigm army on those in the periphery.20 Lynn’s examination of army style measured military institutions on an evolutionary scale. There are seven stages of military development on this scale, each one represented by a paradigm army type: feudal, medieval-stipendiary, aggregate-contract, state-commission, popular-conscription, mass-reserve, and volunteer-technical. Each of these styles was represented by a “paradigm army,” an army that was essentially the core model in a core-periphery system. According to Lynn, it was sometimes possible to have more than one model army in a particular period; thus two armies might serve as core models for the periphery armies. In his analysis of army styles, Lynn suggested that in the second half of the 17th century, the French model served as the paradigm for the rest of Europe’s militaries. According to Lynn, during much of the early modern period, armies fell into one of two categories: “Aggregate Contract Armies” whereby units were contracted by the sovereign — often times from foreign sources — to serve on his (and the State’s) behalf; and “State Commission Armies” in which the State raised and commissioned armies from its own citizenry to be controlled by the government. Lynn maintains that the French were the first to introduce the State Commission Army in the latter 17th century under Louis XIV and it was this particular type that became the model for the rest.21

While this makes sense if one assumes that such an army was the “goal” of early modern states and if one, furthermore, assumes that none of them, save the “paradigm army,” could ever really attain such a goal, his argument is less convincing if one examines the nature and composition of Louis XIV’s rivals. With the exception of Russia, none of Europe’s states possessed the manpower to build “State Commission Armies” on the French model. The Austrian Habsburgs, while perhaps possessing the

20 Lynn, “Army Style in the Modern West,” 505-545.
21 Ibid.
requisite manpower, supplemented their own forces with those of the German Kreise, the defensive alliances concluded among princes in the northern and western Holy Roman Empire.\textsuperscript{22} Louis’ other rivals — the Dutch Republic, England, Spain, Savoy, and numerous smaller German states — enjoyed neither the manpower nor the political leverage to demand the public concessions necessary to construct a state-commission army on the French model. The only states able to construct French-style state-commission armies would have been Spain and the hodgepodge of small German states that made up the Holy Roman Empire. Yet, in the second-half of the seventeenth century, it was impossible for Spain to imitate the French model. Not only did it lack the necessary resources for an army based on its own subjects but it lacked the strong, centralized government needed to raise the requisite funds to subsidize it.\textsuperscript{23}

The German states in the Holy Roman Empire and the Baltic powers, on the other hand, more closely mimicked the French model. States like Brandenburg-Prussia, Hesse-Kassel, Saxony, and others generally began creating armies that closely mirrored the French model but on a much smaller scale. Under the guidance of the Great Elector Frederick William I, Brandenburg-Prussia’s army expanded from a small force of roughly 18,000 men in 1660 to 29,908 men at the time of his death in 1688.\textsuperscript{24} Most German states could not muster these kinds of numbers, however. Bavaria, Saxony, and the Palatinate each fielded armies of between 3,000 and 5,000 men, or 6,000 to 10,000 men in times of war.\textsuperscript{25} There is no question that France influenced the growth of large standing armies in Germany and elsewhere. King Christian V of Denmark, a great admirer of Louis XIV, raised a 31,000-man army; huge when one considers the

\textsuperscript{22} For a discussion of the German Kreise and their relationship with the Habsburg Empire, see Wilson, German Armies, 17-22.


\textsuperscript{25} Wilson, German Armies, 29.
meager population of the region.26 According to one contemporary, the reason for Denmark’s large military was France:

France has told this king that soldiers are the only true riches of princes, and this has made him raise more than he knows what to do with unless he disturbs his neighbours.... Denmark resembles in this point a monster that is all head and no body, all soldiers and no subjects.27

Such a description no doubt held true for other Scandinavian and German states during the latter 17th and 18th centuries. And yet it is difficult to know whether or not France alone was the inspiration for these smaller states or if it was something else that influenced German and Baltic princes to raise forces practically beyond their means. What is certain is that although France might have been a model for many of Europe’s armies, it was by no means the model for all of them.

Neither England, the Dutch Republic, nor Savoy adopted the French model during the age of the state commission army. Unlike France, the Dutch Republic did not enjoy the same resources of manpower. A country of 1.9 million inhabitants, it could not possibly compete with France militarily, a land with ten times as many people.28 During the course of its rise to preeminence as a military power, the Dutch Republic learned to use its wealth as means of securing the necessary manpower. During most of the early modern period, the Dutch army fielded at least as many foreign regiments as domestic ones, and even the Republic’s own national regiments

26 The Danish army was composed of 5,500 horse, 1,500 dragoons, and 15,000 foot. An additional 9,000 foot made up the Norwegian army, a distinct but component part of the forces at Christian V’s disposal. For more, see Danaher and Simms, ed., The Danish Force in Ireland, 1690-1691, 12.

27 Robert Molesworth, An Account of Denmark as it was in the Year 1692, 224, as cited in Danaher and Simms, The Danish Force in Ireland, 1690-1691, 12.

28 According to Jonathan Israel, the total population of the Dutch Republic reached its zenith on the eve of the Nine Years’ War with 1,950,000 inhabitants. By the war’s conclusion, the population of the Republic “was about the same or slightly lower.” Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude concur placing the population of the Dutch Republic circa 1650–1700 between 1,850,000 and 1,950,000 inhabitants. During the same period, France numbered between eighteen and twenty million people; Alfred Cobban notes, however, that the famines of the late 17th century might have brought the population down to 16 or 17 million by 1715. For more, see Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1995), 619-620; Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, Nederland, 1500-1815: De eerste ronde van moderne economische groei (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Balans, 1995), 71; Robin Briggs, Early Modern France, 1560-1715 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 35; and Alfred Cobban, A History of Modern France, Volume I: Old Regime and Revolution, 1715-1799 (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 48.
had considerable numbers of foreigners filling their ranks. Of particular importance was the Republic’s early use of and participation in the German soldier market. As with other areas of the Dutch economy requiring manpower — in particular the merchant marine, navy, VOC and WIC — the army relied upon foreigners, especially northern Europeans, to fill its ranks.\textsuperscript{29} In addition, the States-General used the Republic’s financial wealth to hire complete regiments from various German and Scandinavian princes, and later the Swiss Republic whenever the need arose. The use of hired regiments, while common enough in the 16\textsuperscript{th} and early 17\textsuperscript{th} centuries, became even more popular among larger European states in 18\textsuperscript{th} century. It was, furthermore, the only way the Dutch could compete with larger continental powers. In many ways, the Dutch model — which called for the hiring of “off the shelf” German and Scandinavian regiments in times of war — provided a more realistic model for some European armies to follow than the French paradigm.

William III the Dutch military system to the British Army, particularly the use of foreign troops to augment its national establishments. Like the Republic, England was a maritime power with a relatively small population base from which to draw its military manpower. Although almost three times as large as the Republic, its population of just over 5 million people was still less than one-third the size of its military rival, France. Like the Republic, Britain too had the financial resources to enable it to hire expensive foreign troops. Consequently, the British army came to follow the Dutch rather than the French paradigm in terms of how it expanded its armed forces. Of the 90,000 men on the English Establishment during the Nine Years’ War, more than one-third were foreign and all were raised during the war’s course. Thus, while the French army relied on its own indigenous sources of manpower, Britain, following the Dutch model, relied upon foreign mercenaries, turning cash into soldiers in the service of the Crown.

Savoy, Spain, and others also relied upon the German “soldier trade” to augment their forces. During the both the Nine Years’ War and the War of the Spanish Succession, Savoy was forced by necessity to make use of foreign hirelings to augment

its armed forces. Even more than the Dutch Republic and England, Savoy lacked the manpower resources to field anything resembling a French-style army. During the Nine Years’ War, the Savoyard army increased from 8,500 men in 1690 to 24,000 men by 1696 at the war’s peak. Of this figure, no less than 9,000 were foreign troops. These included not only hired regiments from Germany but Swiss and Huguenot regiments as well. Spain, too relied upon foreign troops hired from outside of its domains. The Spanish army in the Low Countries employed a significant number of foreign regiments and independent companies to augment its domestic forces, though the bulk were recruited from Habsburg lands. The deteriorating financial position of Spain during the Nine Years’ War, however, led many of these German troops to be let go where they were later hired by the Dutch and English.

That so many of Europe’s militaries hired significant numbers of foreigners to augment their own domestic forces suggests that perhaps there was more than one paradigm army in late 17th and 18th century Europe. While it is true that the French army was emulated by many of Europe’s armed forces, it was not the only force deemed worthy of imitation. The French army was admired for its professionalism, military competency, and tactical ability but it was also feared for its size. It was the greatness of Louis XIV’s army that forced its foes to look to each other to provide a counterweight to the French giant.

The allied answer to the Sun King’s massive military build-up was to assemble coalition armies. These multi-national armies were composed of contingents from several national military establishments. In the Spanish Netherlands, the “Confederate army” during the Nine Years’ War was comprised of forces from William’s Dutch and English armies, their hired German and Scandinavian auxiliaries, as well as Carlos II’s

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31 Although Etienne Rooms notes that the vast majority of the Spanish army of Flanders was comprised of “native” troops recruited from Habsburg domains, at the outbreak of the Nine Years’ War, the Spanish government did hire a number of “off the shelf” regiments from German princes to augment their forces in that theater. In 1690, Brunswick-Luneburg provided the Spanish with a sizable contingent. The deterioration of state finances in the Spanish Netherlands, however, made it impossible for that government to honor its contracts with Duke George William of Brunswick-Luneburg. On 19 January 1691, the Dutch Republic took over the Spanish contract for the two regiments of cavalry, two independent companies of dragoons, and two regiments of infantry — together 3,119 men — and they remained in Dutch service for the duration of the war. For details see Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, deel VII, 339-340; Wilson, German Armies, 93; and Rooms, “De Materiele Organisatie van de Troepen,” II, 166-167.
army of the Spanish Netherlands. The Dutch army, which made up a largest part of that force, was widely considered among the best armies in Europe. John Lynn noted that armies learn from one another when they fight along side each other. When one army is recognized as superior to the others, it tends to be copied. Writing only ten years after the conclusion of the War of the Spanish Succession, Englishman Humphrey Bland attributed much of what the British army learned during the Wars of the Grand Alliance to their association with the Dutch army. Within the allied army in the Spanish Netherlands, Dutch practices were widely emulated and eventually adopted by many of the states whose forces were part of that army. As we shall see in later chapters, the Dutch army introduced numerous military innovations to the allied contingents of the Confederate army. These practices, in turn, were later adopted by the national militaries from which they came. Such innovations were often simply given the sobriquet “the Dutch manner” or “the Dutch way.” “Platoon-Fire,” the firing system for which the British and Prussian armies became famous, was known in French circles as “feu d’Hollandois.” British military manuals make numerous references to firing or forming square “the Dutch way.” And for all the criticism the Dutch received in the English political pamphlets of the period, English officers had nothing but praise for the Republic’s army.


33 Humphrey Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline; In which is Laid down and Explained The Duty of the Officer and Soldier, Thro’ the several Branches of the Service. (London: Sam. Buckley, 1727ed.), passim.

34 The best known of these was Humphrey Bland but others admired the Dutch army as well. Richard Kane, author of Campaigns of King William and Queen Anne as well as a manual on camp discipline noted that the Dutch were extremely cool under fire. At Fleurus, their infantry was able to hold off mounted attacks without the help of their own cavalry. For details, see Richard Kane, Campaigns of King William and Queen Anne; from 1689-1712, also a new system of military discipline, for a battalion of foot in action; with the most essential exercise of cavalry...(London, 1745), passim.

35 M. Le Blond, Elemens de Tactique, Ouvrage dans lequel on traite de l’arrangement & de la formation des troupes...(Paris, 1758), 405-406.

36 Humphrey Bland, Robert Parker, and Richard Kane all refer to the Dutch army’s military skill, particularly its infantry. Following the Glorious Revolution, it seems England adopted numerous Dutch military practices, especially drill and tactics. Not surprisingly, English soldiers referred to their new drill as “Dutch” or “the Dutch Exercise” or the “Dutch Way.” For details, see Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline, 147; and Chapter 7 below.
The Dutch were not the only influential members of William’s coalition. As we shall see in Chapter 7, the army was a place where military ideas and weapons technology was exchanged. The introduction of flintlocks and bayonets to European infantry began in earnest during the Nine Years’ War and many of the leading innovators were neither the British nor the Dutch but rather were German.\textsuperscript{37} The confederate army was, without doubt, a melting pot of organizations and military ideas. Out of it sprang two of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century’s most important military organizations, the British and Prussian armies. The Prussians would later become Lynn’s paradigm army for the second half of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, in large part for the steadiness of their discipline which they learned while part of William’s confederate army.\textsuperscript{38} The British army, on the other hand, took to the Dutch practice of hiring German and Scandinavian subsidy troops. Prior to the Nine Years’ War, the English army rarely resorted to hiring troops beyond the shores of the British Isles. After 1688, it became a regular client of Germany’s soldatenhandel such that by the mid-18\textsuperscript{th} century, England was probably its largest.\textsuperscript{39}

The influence of the Dutch army on two of Europe’s most important militaries both in terms of their composition (in the case of England) and/or their doctrine (in the case of both), suggests that there was more than one paradigm army in Lynn’s age of the “state commission army.” The same period also witnessed a series of coalition wars with France (and sometimes one or two allies) on one side, and the rest of Europe on the other. This polarization among European militaries naturally led to the creation of an opposing paradigm. Although the French army may have been the European paradigm in terms of its composition, administration, organization, and success, the fact that it was so large made it impossible for most European states to emulate. The creation of coalitions opposing it, furthermore, made it more likely that one of the leading members would become the competing paradigm. The Dutch army was at the

\textsuperscript{37} The regiments from Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel and Lünenberg in Dutch pay were among the first to adopt flintlocks and bayonets in the allied army before both the Dutch and the British. For details, see Jeremy Black, European Warfare, 1660-1815 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 38-39; and Chapter 7 below.

\textsuperscript{38} Chapter 7 below.

\textsuperscript{39} Peter H. Wilson, “The German ‘Soldier Trade’ of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: A Reassessment,” in The International History Review, Volume XVIII No. 4 (November 1996), 757-792; and Wilson, German Armies, passim.
center of the forces aligned against Louis XIV. The waning success of the French army after 1693, coupled with the increased success of the confederate army in the Spanish Netherlands led the Dutch army to, if not displace, then certainly compete with the French as the European paradigm. It was an army style more easily copied than the French one and as we shall see, it was widely respected in terms of its military prowess.

In terms of army style, the Dutch paradigm (and the British army that followed its example) differed significantly from the French style “state commission army.” Unlike the French army, which raised domestic regiments loyal to the crown or government, a Dutch paradigm army was composed of domestic regiments, and foreign regiments hired in times of war to augment the land’s domestic forces. These “mercenary” forces were bound by contract or treaty to act in the best interests of their employer. Although technically a part of the army of their employer, they acted more the role of coalition troops. With so many foreign troops in its pay in wartime, the Dutch might be seen less as a paradigm and more an aberration. But the fact that so many other states utilized the same German soldier market in the 18th century suggests that the Dutch army was indeed the model. Dutch military expansion during the later 17th century, particularly during the Nine Years’ War, followed a pattern typical of armies dependent upon foreign hirelings for their military manpower. However, in order to better understand the Dutch paradigm, it is first necessary to examine the nature of that institution — the army of the States-General — and how it expanded during the course of the 17th century.

_Het Staatsche Leger and the Growth of Armies, 1650-1700_

Although most historians maintain that the army of the Dutch Republic had its origins in 1572 in forces raised in the north against Spain, some argue that _Het Staatsche Leger_ — the army of the States-General — had its origins slightly later. Comprising Sea Beggars, foreign volunteers, and local militia, the army of the rebels was administered by the provinces of Holland and Zeeland.40 While historians acknowledge that these troops constituted the Dutch Republic’s first military forces, the Army of the States-General — the Dutch Republic’s standing army — traces its roots to the Southern Netherlands and the forces raised there by the States-General in 1576, and Wijn has even gone so far to

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say that from 1572 to 1576, the north had no troops worthy of mention.\textsuperscript{41} While this is certainly an exaggeration, their point is clear.\textsuperscript{42} Many 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} century Dutch historians have tended to emphasize the importance of Holland’s and Zeeland’s militias in the early history of the army at the expense of those raised by the States-General in the south. According to Pieter Geyl, this style of historiography — whereby both Dutch and Belgian historians describe this important period of their countries’ respective histories in isolation from the other — was quite commonplace until after the Second World War.\textsuperscript{43} After the Pacification of Ghent (1576), both the northern provinces of Holland and Zeeland, the States-General in Brussels granted officers commissions (albeit those granted by the States-General were mostly given to officers in the southern Provinces). The fact that until the split between north and south, the States-General in Brussels (and after the battle of Gembloux, Antwerp) controlled the forerunner of the Dutch Republic’s army is often overlooked.\textsuperscript{44} It was only after the States-General moved to The Hague in 1585 that the forces employed by Holland and Zeeland and those of the States-General that established itself in the north finally combined.

Regardless of its origins, by the mid-1580s the States-General had an army in being, albeit a modest one. In 1589 after the Earl of Leicester’s departure, the army numbered only 19 \textit{vanen} or companies of horse, and 150 companies of foot, altogether

\textsuperscript{41} Zwitzer, \textit{‘De militie van den Staat’}, 15.

\textsuperscript{42} According to Geoffrey Parker, the Holland and Zeeland had at least 12,000 men in their employ. For details, see Parker, \textit{The Dutch Revolt}, 191-192.

\textsuperscript{43} In describing the historiography of the Dutch Revolt, Geyl notes: “Much excellent work was done by Dutch nineteenth-century historians, like Bakhuizen van den Brink, Fruin (especially Fruin), Van Vloten, P.L. Muller, Bussemaker. All these writers, it is true viewed the events from a strictly Protestant and North Netherlandish standpoint. Unconsciously they projected the “Belgium” which seemed so alien to them in their own day back into the sixteenth century, when it was, in fact still far to seek. The mental attitude of Belgian historians was the compliment to that of their Northern neighbours. M. Pirenne gives in the third and fourth volumes of his \textit{Histoire de Belgique} a striking and brilliant version of the story but he ignores practically the work of his Dutch predecessors while proceeding, like them on the tacit assumption that the severance of Flanders and Brabant from the rest of the Dutch-speaking area was a perfectly natural consummation.” For more, see Pieter Geyl, \textit{The Revolt of the Netherlands, 1555-1609} (London: Cassell Publishers, Ltd., 1988 ed.), 297-298.

\textsuperscript{44} Zwitzer, \textit{‘De militie van den Staat’}, 14.
approximately 30,000 officers and men, the bulk of whom were mercenaries. During the eighty-year course of the Dutch Revolt however, this fledgling force became the large, well-organized and led army historians of the seventeenth century would come to recognize. At its peak during the war against Spain, the Dutch army numbered 92,505 men in eighty companies of horse (11,780) and five-hundred-eighty-two companies of foot (80,725), of which at least 32,000 were foreigners. It would reach these levels only two other times in its history: during the Rampjaar Oorlog or “War of the Disaster-Year” which was concluded with the Peace of Nijmegen in 1678 and during the Wars of the Grand Alliance. During these conflicts, the Dutch army again expanded to more than 90,000 officers and men.

**Early Organization and Army Growth, 1585-1678**

The Dutch army of the early modern period appears, *prima-facie*, to be more a collection of small provincial armies or corps’ rather than one national army. The Union of Utrecht, the defensive treaty that bound the seven provinces together, required that each province provide forces for the defense of the collective provinces or “Union.” Based on what would come to be called the “quota system,” each province would bear a pre-determined portion of the Union’s military needs. Likewise, each province would provide a similar percentage of military forces for the army. Not surprisingly, Holland supplied the largest part of the quota as well as the largest contingent of the army.

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45 F.J.G. Ten Raa and F. de Bas, *Het Staatsche Leger, 1568-1795, Deel I: Van het begin van den opstand tegen Spanje tot het vertrek van den graaf van Leicester (1568-1588)* (Breda: De Koninklijke Militaire Academie, 1911), 109-110, 126.


47 This war, which began with the French invasion of the United Provinces in 1672, is commonly referred to in English historiography as the “Dutch War” or the “Third Anglo-Dutch War.”

48 The Wars of the Grand Alliance is another way of describing Nine Years’ War and the War of the Spanish Succession, the two wars fought against Louis XIV’s France by the so-called “Grand Alliance.” The Grand Alliance was composed of Britain, the Dutch Republic, the Holy Roman Empire, Brandenburg-Prussia, and Savoy. Spain was a signatory of the “Grand Alliance” in 1689, but was in the French camp during the War of the Spanish Succession.

49 For a detailed description of the “Quota System,” see Chapter 4 below.
Prior to 1651, individual provinces paid their contingent’s officers, its troops, and administered its regiments. Unfortunately for some of the provinces — particularly Holland — administration did not insure loyalty. The position of the Stadholder had become very strong by 1650 such that control of the Republic’s army was firmly in his hands. Soldiers swore oaths of loyalty their Stadholder of the province rather than to the provincial states, States-General, and the Raad van State in whose name they fought. Consequently, the Stadholder enjoyed the patronage of the officer corps since he was directly responsible for their appointments. With a military more loyal to the princes of Orange and Nassau than the governing bodies that employed it, the risk of military intervention in domestic affairs loomed large. When cuts in the military budget following the Peace of Munster threatened Stadholder Willem II’s position, he decided to act. On 30 July 1650, Willem used the army to crush Holland’s opposition to his anti-Spanish position. Although he botched the attempt to seize Amsterdam, Willem, with the army’s support, overturned Amsterdam’s domination over the Republic’s domestic and foreign affairs and for a short time brought the Republic to the brink of war with Spain. Only the unexpected death of the Stadholder from smallpox on 6 November 1650 averted renewed conflict.

50 Prior to 1651, the Stadholder named all military appointments giving him considerable power in terms of the Republic’s army. Since his patronage was needed by any that aspired to high military post, the Stadholder’s political influence was significant, particularly in the Republic’s inland provinces. This patronage allowed him, furthermore, the use of the army as a political instrument. This threat was demonstrated by Oldenbarnevelt’s fall prior to the resumption of hostilities in 1621, and again in 1650 with Willem II’s coup. For details on the impact of Willem II’s coup on the Stadholder’ship, see Robert Fruin and H.T. Collenbrander, Geschiedenis der Staatsinstellingen in Nederland, 221-226; Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic, 702-709; and F.J.G. Ten Raa, and F. de Bas, Het Staatsche Leger, 1568-1795, Deel V, Van het sluiten van den vrede te Munster tot de verheffing van Prins Willem III van Oranje tot kapitein- en admiraal-generaal der Vereenigde Nederlanden (Breda: De Koninklijke Militaire Academie, 1921), 24-32.

51 Indeed, Prince Maurits’ coup against Oldenbarnevelt in 1618 demonstrated how the Stadholder might use the army to influence the domestic affairs. Acting in the name of the States-General, Mauritis used military force to arrest Oldenbarnevelt when he raised waardgelders (local militia) to preserve order in Holland’s cities without consulting either the Stadholder or the States-General. Mauritis then marched through Holland’s cities at the head of his troops, removing those officials politically opposed to him. For a detailed examination of the coup, see Israel, The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 62-63; and Parker, The Dutch Revolt, 248-249.

52 The circumstances surrounding Willem II’s short-lived coup and attempted march on Amsterdam is beyond the scope of this work. Essentially, it was the result of a power struggle between those groups in support of the Munster peace settlement, led by Amsterdam, and those against the settlement, led by commercial interests, particularly Holland’s leading manufacturing towns (such as Leiden, Haarlem, and Rotterdam), Zeeland, and some of the
Willem II’s coup had important repercussions for the Dutch army. Shortly after the Stadholder’s death, the States-General organized a meeting of all of the provinces to discuss what should be done in the wake of his death. On 16 April 1651, this “Great Assembly” met at The Hague and revolved around both the Stadholder and the armed forces. Central to the discussions was control over the army. That Willem was able to use military force against the civil authority was alarming to the representatives, particularly those from the States of Holland. The most important decision the assembly made was not to choose a new Stadholder. The States-General and Raad van State would appoint a Commander-in-Chief of the Republic’s armed forces in times of war but the Stadholderate would remain vacant. But arguably more pertinent to the military was the new formula for giving oaths by the officers and men in the army to the government. Instead of swearing an oath to the Stadholder, officers would swear their oaths on the governing authority — both provincial and the Union — based on a particular formula. Usually, this included swearing oaths to local magistrates and to the Generality, in other words, the States-General and the Raad van State. Not surprisingly, this change was accompanied by a reduction in the Republic’s land forces.

In the years that followed, the Dutch army remained modest in size, a reflection of the lack of land threats between 1650 and 1672. From 1650 until 1661, the Dutch army numbered just under 30,000 officers and men. The financial administration of the eastern provinces. Although to say that Willem’s coup against Amsterdam and the States of Holland did not enjoy significant popular support would be incorrect, it was nevertheless alarming even to those who supported the Stadholder’s position. For a good summary of the circumstances surrounding Willem’s coup, see Jonathan I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606-1661* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986 ed.), 375-391. For a more ‘anti-Orangist’ interpretation, see Geyl, *The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, Part II, 1648-1715*, 13-19.

53 Dutch diplomacy following Willem II’s coup all but assured a resumption of hostilities with Spain. Not only did the Republic demand an end to Spanish inroads in France but offered to broker a settlement between the two. Failure to accept Dutch offers would result in the Dutch intervening in the Low Countries on the side of France. Bearing this in mind, there is little question that Israel’s contention that Willem II’s death in November averted war between the Republic and Spain. See Jonathan I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 390-392.

54 This new formula, adopted by the States of Holland required that captains and commanders swear oaths first to the magistrates of voting cities when in garrison there, as well as for soldiers not on Holland’s repartition but in garrison in Holland’s cities. For those soldiers on Holland’s repartition but not in garrison in the province itself, they were to swear oaths to their deputies. In addition, all officers above the rank of captain were to swear oaths to the States-General in the name of the Generality; thus all officers were required to travel to The Hague to swear their oaths. For details, see Ten Raa and de Bas, *Het Staasche Leger*, V.,27-29.
army makes an examination of its peacetime or baseline strength and its wartime strength relatively easy to determine. The military costs of the army were contained in a document prepared by the States-General in conjunction with the Raad van State called the *Staat van Oorlog* or “Budget for War.” The Staat van Oorlog lists all of the companies of the army by province and by arm and the costs associated with their upkeep. Also included is the cost of fortifications, officers’ commissions, ammunition, and anything else associated with the land defense of the Republic. When the army went on a war-footing, the States-General prepared an *Extraordinaris* or “Extraordinary” *Staat van Oorlog*. The Extraordinaris *Staat van Oorlog* listed all troops and regiments added to the army in wartime. Any augmentation of infantry, cavalry, and artillery companies would be included in the Extraordinaris *Staat van Oorlog* as would any foreign regiments hired by the Republic to supplement its national troops. By tracing the strength of the ordinary budget from peacetime to peacetime, one can trace the “baseline” growth of the Dutch army during the later 17th century. Figure 3.1 shows the growth of the army from 1660 to 1700 on the eve of the Spanish Succession War.\(^{55}\) During the course of this forty-year period, the baseline strength of *Het Staatsche Leger* grew from 29,315 officers and men to just under 48,000 in 1698, a sixty-one percent increase in army size. Following a pattern similar to the one Lynn has shown for the French army during the same period, the Dutch army saw its most significant base-line growth in the period spanning from 1665 to 1678. During this period, the peacetime strength grew from 28,395 officers and men in 1665 on the eve of the Second Anglo-Dutch War to 40,064 men where it would remain unchanged from the conclusion of the war with France in 1678 to 1687, one year before the resumption of hostilities.\(^{56}\)

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\(^{55}\) The figures in this chart are based on “Staet van’s Lands militie met en sedert 1595” from *Collectie Bogaers*, doos 3 as presented by Zwitter in “De Militie van den Staat,” 175-176; and ARA Archief Staten Generaal (St. Gen.) (1.01.05), “Staten van Oorlog,” nrs. 8100-8122 which correspond to the years 1687-1698. It is important to note that the numbers that I derived from the actual Staten van Oorlog for the years of the Nine Years’ War do not correspond to the figures summarized by Bogaers for the same period. Indeed for some years, the difference between the two sources is great, particularly in transitional periods when the army was significantly augmented. Because the Staten van Oorlog was the document prepared by the States-General to determine the cost of the army for a given year, I believe it to be a more accurate account of the army than the document in Collectie Bogaers.

\(^{56}\) ARA. *Collectie Bogaers*, “Staet van ’s Lands militie met en sedert 1595,” doos 3, as cited in Zwitter, ‘De Militie van den Staat,’ 175.
The war with France, called in Dutch literature the *Rampjaar Oorlog* or the “War of the Disaster Year” witnessed a period of significant army growth, a growth that would continue until the conclusion of the last of the Republic’s wars with Louis XIV in 1712. In 1670, two years before the French invasion, the Dutch army mustered 28,240 officers and men on the ordinary *Staat van Oorlog* and an additional 4,340 infantry on the extraordinary *Staat van Oorlog* for a total of 32,580 officers and men. With war clouds looming on the horizon, the Dutch army rapidly expanded. In 1671, it more than doubled in size, growing to 64,715 officers and men, its paper strength at the time of the French invasion in 1672. In 1673, with the bulk of its forces bottled up in Holland, the Dutch army was comprised of 159 companies of cavalry and 865 companies of infantry, together 91,288 officers and men.\(^5\) As the war progressed, the

army saw minor growth, but eventually leveled-out and even decreased in size as the French invader was gradually driven from Dutch territory. After reaching a wartime peak of 93,456 officers and men in 1674, the army saw a period of slow decline in strength as more allies joined the war against Louis XIV. For the remainder of the war, the Dutch *Staat van Oorlog* registered 88,588 officers and men, a decrease of over 5,000 troops from its high point in 1674.

*Dutch Army Organization, 1668-1698*

Although regiments were the standard tactical and administrative units in early modern armies, the company was its building block. During the period prior to the Dutch invasion in 1672, there was very little uniformity amongst Dutch infantry and cavalry companies. Prior to 1668, cavalry companies could number anywhere between 40 and 150 men depending upon when the company was raised and on whose repartition it appeared. Cavalry regiments were more or less ad-hoc organizations prior to the Dutch War and there was no uniformity among its component companies. One regiment might include companies of 80, 88, and 92 men. In 1667, the States-General resolved to make the army’s cavalry more uniform. Companies were reformed so that they mustered 79 or 86 troopers, while the regiments themselves were to be comprised of six companies. Together, the cavalry corps consisted of eight regiments plus a number of independent guard companies. When the war began, the cavalry was further rationalized so that companies numbered 80 men each with each regiment generally comprising six companies. When the war ended, cavalry companies were reduced further. In 1678, regular cavalry companies were reduced to a standardized strength of 72 men per company. The next year, the regular companies were reduced

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58 According to Ten Raa, in mid-1672 the Dutch army numbered over 100,000 on paper. See *Het Staatsche Leger*, Deel V.


60 According to Ten Raa, the strength of cavalry companies was completely non-uniform. So-called “Old Companies” could be comprised of units 45, 50, 55, 100, or 150 men-strong. “New Companies” raised in 1665 numbered 80, 88, or 92 men. From 1666 through 1667, the States-General embarked upon a plan to create more uniformity within the corps. After 1667, cavalry companies were generally either 79 or 86 men strong, though there were a few exceptions. For details, see Ten Raa and de Bas, *Het Staatsche Leger*, deel V., 410-415.

again to 50 men, and then to 47 men per company in 1685. Guards carried an establishment of 80 men per company, even in peacetime. Like the cavalry, Dutch infantry companies were far from uniform; the typical company in the 1660s might muster anywhere from 50 to 200 soldiers, but usually they comprised 60, 80, or 96 man units, depending upon the company. To add to the army’s organizational heterogeneity, the number of companies per regiment was equally irregular with some regiments numbering 13 companies and others 8. Suffice it to say, it was difficult to create regiments of uniform strength when their basic building blocks varied so much in size. In order provide its infantry with a semblance of uniformity, in 1671 the States of Holland decided to standardize the basic composition of regiments on its establishment. Every infantry regiment, with the exception of the Guards and the Marines, would now be comprised of 12 companies; Guards Regiments would be made up of 10 companies and the Marines, due to the nature of their service, an unspecified number. Each company would number 100 officers and men with the exception of the several of the specialist companies. Most of the other provinces made similar adjustments to the companies on their respective establishments. During the course of the war however, the strength of both companies and regiments changed yet again. Although when the war broke out, most infantry companies were supposed to muster 100 officers and men on paper, by 1673 the States-General reduced the number of soldiers in Dutch infantry companies to 89 officers and men. The only exceptions to this were amongst the Guards, Marines, Grenadiers, and several independent garrison companies, all of which mustered 100 or more officers and men. Following the

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62 Ten Raa, *Het Staatsche Leger*, VI., 185-188; ARA. St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8100, (SvO, 1687).

63 The only exceptions to this were the “Stadholder’s Company of Guards” which numbered 197 officers and men, and the Friesian Stadholder’s Company of Guards which numbered 52 officers and men. All dragoon companies numbered 86 men in wartime and 55 when demobilized. See ARA. St. Gen. (1.01.05), 1800, (SvO, 1687); and Ten Raa, *Het Staatsche Leger*, VI., 188, 202-203.


65 Guards companies were 100 men strong; Marine companies were 150 men strong; Grenadier companies were 100 men strong. In addition, the permanent garrison companies stationed in Emden were 110 men strong. F.J.G. Ten Raa, *Het Staatsche Leger* 1568-1795, Deel VI., Van de verheffing van Prins Willem III van Oranje tot Kapitein- en Admiraal-generaal der Vereenigde Nederlanden tot het begin van den Negenjaarigen Oorlog (1672-1688) (‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1940), 213-214.
conclusion of the war, infantry companies were reduced first from 89 to 78 in September 1678 and then to 55 officers and men per company by January 1679. Guards companies continued at their wartime strength of 100 officers and men while the garrison companies in Emden maintained 110 officers and men. Dutch infantry companies would maintain these strengths until 1688 when the threat of renewed war with Louis XIV’s France again loomed on the horizon.

Although the Republic’s domestic forces grew considerably during the later 17th century, that growth was mirrored, or even exceeded by the number of foreign regiments hired to supplement its domestic forces. During most of its history, the army of the States-General hired or raised significant numbers of foreign or subsidy troops in times of war. During the Dutch War, all the regiments raised in foreign lands for the service of the States-General were on the regular military establishment. Of the 68 infantry regiments on the four remaining provincial establishments, six were English or Scottish, five were French, and an untold number of German origin.66

Foreigners were equally well represented in the Republic’s mounted arm. The conclusion of the Dutch War in 1678 again saw most of the Republic’s foreign regiments disbanded leaving a core of experienced Dutch troops organized into regiments more or less of a standard strength. Most cavalry regiments mustered three companies in peacetime while infantry regiments mustered 10 to 12 companies. In 1687, the Dutch army comprised twenty-six regiments of horse, two of dragoons, and forty-nine of foot for a total of 39,173 officers and men.67 Of these, six one-battalion regiments — 3,000 men all told — comprised the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, a force of three English and three Scottish

66 It is difficult to determine the exact origin of the recruits in some Dutch regiments, particularly those with foreign connections. Some had definite foreign origins (i.e. Schleswig-Holstein, Holstein-Norburg, Graaf van Königsmark, etc.) and thus recruited heavily abroad, while others did not making the origins of their rank-and-file unclear. This was also true of its national regiments. According to Zwitzer, 55% of recruits for Dutch national regiments were born within the United Provinces while 45% were recruited from outside of the Netherlands. Of those recruited beyond the borders of the United Provinces, the vast majority came from the hereditary lands of the Stadholders. For example, of the 159 recruits for the Lijfregiment Oranje-Friesland in 1780-81, 23 were Dutchmen and 136 foreigners. However, of the 136 foreigners recruited for the regiment, 81 were born in the Stadholder’s landholdings in Nassau (Germany). This is also true for the late 17th century. For details, see Zwitzer, ‘De militie van den Staat,’ 51-52; and Ten Raa, and de Bas, Het Staatsche Leger, V., 489-495.

67 This figure is derived from ARA St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8100, (SvO, 1687).
regiments in pay of the States-General but loyal to the English monarch. There was also one regiment of horse guards, one regiment of guard dragoons, and one three-battalion regiment of foot guards, together just over 4,000 household troops. The regular regiments of horse and foot were divided by province, each province being required to sustain the regiments in its quota. In the years immediately preceding the Nine Years’ War, Holland alone paid for 17 regiments of horse, 2 of dragoons, and 23 regiments of foot, all told 20,016 men or 51% of the army’s total strength in peacetime. Friesland, the second largest province in terms of the land forces it provided, paid for 2 regiments of horse and 6 of foot, less than a quarter of that supplied by Holland. [Appendix] shows the Dutch army in 1687 on the eve of the Nine Years’ War and the breakdown of the provincial quotas. A quick examination of the table illustrates just how important Holland was to the army as a whole.

When the States-General decided to support William’s expedition to England and provide him with the necessary troops, they took on a significant foreign contingent to make up for the shortfall of men, and to protect the Republic’s eastern frontier in case Louis XIV’s forces should attack. Unlike the Dutch War when the Republic added foreign regiments directly to the regular military establishment, in 1688 the States-General concluded agreements with German and Scandinavian princes to hire regular, established regiments for Dutch service. To insure the security of the eastern approaches to the Netherlands — France’s traditional invasion route into the Netherlands — the Dutch Stadholder met with several German princes and arranged to

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68 The regiments of the Anglo-Dutch brigade were part of the Dutch standing army but could be summoned by the English monarch to assist him in times of military emergency. Upon the conclusion of any such crisis, it was understood that the regiments should return to the service of the States-General. For details, see John Childs, The Army, James II, and the Glorious Revolution (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), 119-137.

69 In addition to the guards of the “Stadhouder en Captain-Generaal van de Unie,” the Friesian Stadholder possessed one regiment of horse guards and two of foot guards in the pay of Friesland and Groningen. The foot guards were made up of two regiments, the one in Friesian pay (Nassau-Friesland) comprised two battalions while that in the pay of Groningen (Nassau-Groningen) mustered one battalion. The cavalry was in the pay of Friesland. For details, see Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VII., 264-265, 316-320.

70 Included among these formations was the three-battalion foot guards regiment.

71 Friesland provided eight companies of horse in two regiments, and six regiments of foot in seven battalions and seven independent, or otherwise attached, companies. All told, Friesland’s quota amounted to 5,621 officers and men. See ARA. St. Gen. (1.01.05) 1800, (SvO, 1687).
hire 13,000 men to augment the Dutch forces remaining in the Republic. From Brandenburg-Prussia, Elector Frederick III agreed to provide 700 horse and 5,200 infantry; Duke Ernst August of Hanover (Celle) would provide 715 cavalry and 3,200 infantry; Landgraaf Karl of Hessen-Kassel agreed to supply 1,200 cavalry and 1,200 infantry; and Duke Frederick-Karl of Württemberg promised 1,000 horse. In November of 1688, these forces, together with six squadrons of Dutch horse and nine battalions of foot assembled at Nijmegen under the command of the Prince of Waldeck. Waldeck’s army at the Nijmegen camp, which numbered just over 18,000 men, was the first Dutch-led confederate army assembled in what would come to be called the Nine Years’ War. The augmentations in late 1688 mark the beginning of a period of dramatic army growth, a growth that would only end with the conclusion of peace in 1712.

The Growth of the Dutch Army, 1688-97

The “Glorious Revolution” and William’s succession to the English crown had important repercussions for the Dutch army. In 1688, with the addition of the German and Scandinavian subsidy troops, the army of the States-General numbered 64,327 officers and men, an increase of more than 20,000 troops. Of that figure, 50,075 officers and men were in “national” regiments (see Figure 3.2). The impending war with France convinced the States-General to bring the army to a war footing. In 1688, all cavalry companies were augmented by an additional 22 men and all infantry companies by an additional 16 men, thus bringing the establishments of Dutch cavalry and infantry companies up to their wartime strengths of 69 and 71 men respectively. The French declaration of war in the fall of 1688 provided impetus to complete the army’s mobilization. During the course of 1689, the States-General ordered all of its infantry regiments to muster 12 companies and its cavalry regiments six. Infantry colonels with less than 12 companies were required to raise however many additional companies as

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72 ARA Archief Raad van Staat (RvS) (1.01.19) 109, “Resoluties”, 8, 11 October 1688; St. Gen. (1.01.03), 4592, “Secreet Resoluties”, 20, 25, 28 September, and 2, 4, 9 October; and Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, 1568-1795, deel VI, 118-119.

was necessary to bring their regiments up to full strength. Cavalry and dragoon formations were similarly commissioned to raise additional full-strength companies or bring their regiments up to wartime levels. At the same time, the States-General authorized recruiting several new regiments. To insure the security of Maastricht, eighty-two 56-man infantry companies were raised to bolster the garrison there. Extra recruits not needed by the formations then in garrison would form the cadres for three new infantry regiments. The Republic also resolved to add a regiment of Karabiniers to the Republic’s existing cavalry establishment.

Figure 3.2 The Army of the States-General showing national and subsidy troops, 1687-1698.

74 ARA S.G. (1.01.05) 8103 (Svo, 1689), and 8104 “Extraordinaris Staten van Oorlog (extr.SvO) 1689”, Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VII., 243-246, 270, 279-281.

75 Based on the Staten van Oorlog for 1689, Regiments Torsay, Zobel, Rijngaaf, van der Gracht, Amelisweerd, du Theil, and Luneburg-Osnabruck, each received ten “Maastricht” companies to augment their numbers while Regiment Bulow received 12. In 1690, the extra recruits formed the cadres for new regiments Dedem, Clau bergen, and Brauw. See ARA. S.G. (1.01.05), 8104 (extr.SVO, 1689) and 8106 (extr.SvO, 1690). See also Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VII., 279, 324-325.

76 The Karabiniers were raised by resolution on 23 November 1688 and were commanded by Frederick Adolf, Count van der Lippe. Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VII., 243-44, 267-68.
In addition to augmenting its standing army, the States-General also opened negotiations with a number of northern European princes to hire additional forces. In September 1688, it concluded an agreement to hire six regiments of infantry from Sweden, each comprising twelve 84-man companies. Altogether, the Swedish contingent numbered 6,048 officers and men.\(^77\) In early August, the Republic took on three regiments of cavalry from the Duke of Württemberg. By November, the first regiment had arrived in Waldeck’s camp near Nijmegen, and in 1689, the second had arrived with a third to follow in 1690. These regiments were organized on lines similar to Dutch cavalry regiments, each comprising six companies of 72 men each. In the early spring of 1689, Dutch diplomats negotiated with Elector Frederick I of Saxony to hire a single regiment of horse organized on the Dutch model. By the end of 1689, there were ten regiments of subsidy cavalry, two regiments of subsidy dragoons, and twenty-three battalions of foot, together 20,744 men.\(^78\)

At the same time, the Republic lost a number of regiments. Following William’s expedition, most of the formations that had accompanied him were hired into English service. This included not only the English regiments raised from William’s supporters but the six regiments of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade as well. In addition, William’s own Dutch guards, including his horse-guards, dragoon-guards and his three-battalion regiment of foot guards went into English pay as well, as did 9 regiments of Dutch cavalry and three of infantry that had accompanied him.\(^79\) Altogether, the forces formerly in Dutch pay but in the employ of the new King of England numbered 14,788

\(^77\) ARA. St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8104 (Extr. SvO, 1689), St. Gen. (1.01.03), 4594 (Secret Resolutions, 1689) 6, 30 February 1689; and Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VI., 272-273, VII., 343-345.

\(^78\) ARA. St. Gen. (1.01.05) 1804 (Extr. SvO, 1689), and 1806 (Extr. SvO, 1690).

\(^79\) William’s 1688 expeditionary force comprised 47 companies of horse, 18 companies of dragoons, and 17 battalions of foot for a total of 15,269 officers and men not including artillerists. In addition, Jonathan Israel and Geoffrey Parker note that perhaps as many as 5,000 English, Scottish, and Huguenot followers accompanied the force, beefing-up the expedition’s strength to 21,000 men. Of these, roughly 15,000 went into English pay, including William’s Blue Guards (1 regiment of horse, 1 regiment of dragoons, and 3 battalions of foot), nine regular Dutch regiments of horse, three regular regiments of foot, and all six battalions of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade. For details, see BL. Add. MSS. 63,629, The Albermarle Papers, ff. 1-5 “Lyste van de Gardes van Syne Hoogheyt”; PRO SP 8/5 ff. 306; Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VI., 126-128; and Israel and Parker, “Of Providence and Protestant Winds,” 337-338.
officers and men. If one considers the departure of these men, net increase of the Dutch army in 1689 was closer to 5,000 than 21,000 officers and men.80

This confusion with regards to the strength of the forces in Dutch pay is reflected in both Dutch and English sources. On the Dutch side, the Staten van Oorlog are unclear as to the actual strength of the Dutch army in 1689 because they include the expeditionary force, while English records include the same Dutch troops on the English Establishment.81 According to the Staten van Oorlog, the army’s strength including the soldiers on the extraordinary ledgers is 84,568 officers and men. But if one considers the departure of regiments into English service, that figure should probably be closer to 70,000 officers and men.82 Likewise, English lists which include the Dutch forces calculate a strength of 58,914 men and 44,126 without the former Dutch units.83

By 1690, the Dutch army reached a strength it would more or less maintain for the next three years. The national army now comprised 18 regiments of horse, 2 regiments of dragoons, and 45 regiments of foot along with several independent companies, together 52,510 officers and men. In addition, the States-General had taken on 21,520 subsidy troops. The largest contingent was from Brandenburg. Numbering 7,044 men, the Brandenburg corps was made up of two cavalry regiments and nine infantry battalions. Swedes made up the second largest group. In 1690, there were six 1000-man strong infantry regiments in Dutch pay. Brunswick-Lünenburg and Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel provided 4,234 men in two cavalry regiments, one dragoon regiment, and six infantry regiments. The remainder of the subsidy troops in Dutch pay came from Hessen-Cassel and Saxe-Gotha providing the services of 2,370 and 468 troops respectively. During the course of the next three years, the number of subsidy troops in Dutch pay would gradually increase to 23,297 men. For the most part, the

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80 Since 15,000 men on the Staten van Oorlog remained in England (they are mentioned in SP 8/5 ff. 306), the army only increased by between 5,000 and 6,000 men. Compare PRO SP 8/5, ff. 306 and ARA. St. Gen.(1.01.05), 8105, (SvO, 1690).

81 The regiments are first mentioned in English sources in April 1689 in BL Add. MSS. 15897, ff. 88-90.

82 This figure came from tallying all of the companies listed on the Ordinary and Extraordinary Staten van Oorlog and subtracting from it the strength of the troops that went into English pay.

83 Add. MSS. 15,897, ff. 88-90; SP 8/8 ff. 306.
increase represented augmentations to current formations in Dutch pay. In 1692, Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel hired two more cavalry regiments and another infantry regiment to the States-General. All told, from 1690 through 1693, the troops in pay of the States-General including both national and subsidy troops increased from 74,280 in 1690 to 75,395 in 1693.\textsuperscript{84}

The largest increase in the Dutch army came in 1694. This is not surprising, especially when one considers allied fortunes prior to that year. From 1690 through 1693, the allies suffered setback after setback as the Duke of Luxemboug’s French army chipped away at the allied coalition’s crumbling barrier of protective fortresses in the Low Countries. In 1690, Luxembourg inflicted a serious defeat on the Prince of Waldeck’s allied army at Fleurus which threatened to open-up the region to French deprivations. The next year, Luxembourg’s success continued as Mons fell, punching the first hole in the region’s barrier of fortresses. In 1692, Luxembourg’s forces knocked another chink in the Low Countries’ protective armor when Namur fell after a month-long siege. Luxembourg’s Pyrrhic victory over William’s forces at Steenkerk only served to confirm the fact that the fortunes of war were with the Sun King. With the allies reeling, Louis planned to deliver William’s confederate army a knock-out blow in 1693. Mustering the largest French army in the region to date, Luxembourg attacked again, threatening the Pays d’ Liège. After capturing Huy, the French marshal turned his attention to the main allied army. The bloody battle of Neerwinden was an allied defeat but damaged Luxembourg’s forces enough to save Liège and Brussels from attack. In spite of William’s determined defense, he could not save Charleroi. After more than a months siege, Charleroi fell to Vauban, completing the destruction of the thin barrier of fortresses protecting the Spanish Netherlands’ frontier in Brabant.

The inability to stave off the French attack year after year coupled with the serious losses suffered by its forces at Neerwinden led the States-General to take drastic steps to defend its southern neighbor, and thus insure its own security. The first problem facing the States-General was to replace the losses suffered by its regiments. After resolving to make good its losses, the Raad van State proposed to give their captains money to raise an additional eight men — thus increasing the paper strength of Dutch infantry companies from 71 to 79 men — not simply to increase the strength of

\textsuperscript{84} ARA. St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8106 (Extr. SvO, 1690), 8108 (Extr. SvO, 1691), 8110 (Extr. SvO, 1692), 8112 (Extr. SvO, 1693); Ten Raa, \textit{Het Staatsche Leger}, VII., 337-351; and Wilson, \textit{German Armies}, 93 (Table 3.4).
the companies but to enable the captains to use the money to maintain the companies’ actual wartime strength of 71 men. Cavalry companies were similarly augmented from 69 to 76 men. The same expedient was proposed for the foreign subsidy regiments in Dutch pay as well. Thus, while on paper the strength of the Dutch standing army increased from 52,098 to 58,276 men, in reality its strength was closer to the former than the latter figure. Likewise, the real strength of the subsidy corps already in Dutch pay changed only on paper.\footnote{ARA. RvS. (1.01.19), 119 (Jun.-Dec. 1693) Res. 20 Oct. 1693, 120 (Jan.-Jun. 1694) Res. 8 April 1694; ARA St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8114 (Extr. SvO, 1694), 8115 (Supp. Extr. SvO, 1694); and Ten Raa, *Het Staatsche Leger*, VII, 75-76.}

At the same time, the States-General resolved to hire additional subsidy troops. The “General Petition” of 15 October 1693 proposed that an additional 15,000 troops be raised. In 1693, the States-General had already concluded a contract with the Swiss cantons for 6,400 men in eight battalions. Five regiments of cavalry, each comprising six companies of 76 men each would be hired from the Elector of Saxony, the Elector of Cologne, the Duke of Saxe-Meiningen, and the King of Sweden. A new regiment of dragoons commanded by the Duke of Holstein-Ploen comprising eight 86-man companies would supplement the army’s dragoon contingent, and additional companies would be added to bring the regiments currently on the establishment up to full strength. In addition, four regiments of infantry, each organized along Dutch lines, were to be hired from Hesse-Kassel, Schlippenbach, and Sweden. Finally, the States-General hired the two regiments of cavalry, one of dragoons, and three of infantry from Celle, formerly in Spanish pay. The addition of more than 15,000 subsidy troops to the Dutch army coupled with the resolution to augment the size of the company establishments increased the number of foreign troops in the pay of the States-General from 23,297 in 1693 to 43,885 officers and men in 1694.\footnote{ARA St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8114 (Extr. SvO, 1694), 8115 (Supp. Extr. SvO, 1694); Ten Raa, *Het Staatsche Leger*, VII, 72-77.}

Although this figure probably represents an “actual” paper strength of approximately 40,000 officers and men if one considers the augmentation, it still represents a total increase of no less than 17,000 men, almost doubling in size the number of subsidy troops in Dutch pay.

The increase in the size of the Republic’s subsidy corps in 1694 combined with the augmentations made to its national contingent resulted in the army reaching its greatest strength during the war. According to figures presented in the ordinary and
extraordinary Staten van Oorlog for 1694, the Dutch army now numbered 102,161 officers and men on paper making Het Staatsche Leger the largest of the allied coalition’s armies. In the remaining three years of war, the Dutch army would hover between 101,000 and 103,000 men. During these years, the number of national and subsidy troops changed only slightly. In 1695, there were 58,783 officers and men in the national regiments. In 1696, this figure had increased slightly to 58,903 officers and men, and increased again in the last year of the war to 58,982 officers and men. The subsidy corps in Dutch pay saw similar slight changes to its composition and numbers. The Republic’s subsidy corps reached its greatest strength in 1695 numbering 44,092 officers and men. After 1695, the numbers of foreign troops in Dutch pay saw steady decline. In 1696, the number decreased by almost 500 men, totaling 43,678 according to the extraordinary Staat van Oorlog for that year. The next year, the subsidy corps shrank even further, albeit slightly. The Staat van Oorlog for 1697 lists 47,790 foreign troops in the States-General’s pay for the last year of the war.87

The Peace of Rijswijk and the Reduction of the Army

The conclusion of the conflict saw significant changes to the size and composition of the States-General’s army. At the end of 1697, virtually all the foreign regiments in Dutch pay were released from service. The only foreign units to remain were the 6,000 men in the six Swiss regiments and the two infantry regiments formed from former Brandenburg and Swedish subsidy troops.88 Upon the conclusion of peace, Dutch domestic forces returned to their pre-war levels. In 1698, Dutch cavalry companies were reduced from 76 to 47 men per company. There remained eighty-five cavalry companies in 24 regiments on the peacetime establishment for a total of 4,081 officers and men. Dutch infantry companies were likewise reduced from 79 to 55 men. After the war’s conclusion, the Republic mustered fifty-three infantry regiments comprising 10 or 12 companies each, together 28,899 officers and men. Two of three Dutch dragoon regiments remained at their wartime footing, both maintaining their eight 96-man companies, while one regiment was reduced to eight 55-man companies. The total

87 See Figure 3.2.

88 ARA St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8122, (SvO. 1698); Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VII, 324-328 (these were regiments Oxenstierna and Crown Prince). For the Swiss, see Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VII. 331-334. Swiss companies were reduced to 150 men per coy upon the conclusion of the war.
strength of the Dutch army following the Peace of Rijswijk including the Swiss contingent was thus 40,956 officers and men.  

During the inter-war years, the Dutch army experienced further growth, however. The debates in Parliament over the appropriate size for the British army led William III to transfer a number of English and Dutch regiments to the pay of the States-General. After Rijswijk, the Dutch infantry and cavalry regiments of the 1688 expedition taken into English pay returned to the Republic to take their place on the Dutch peacetime establishment. William’s Dutch guard regiments, however, remained in the British Isles in English pay for the time being, as did the former regiments of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade. During the course of 1698, with the standing army controversy raging in England, new English and Scottish regiments returned to the Republic to take the place of the old Anglo-Dutch Brigade. In an effort to save some of the British army’s more experienced regiments from the Parliamentary chopping block, William transferred six new regiments — Regiments Lauder, Murray, Colyear, Strathnaver, Hamilton, and Ferguson — to the Republic to replace the former Anglo-Dutch Brigade. By the middle of 1698, all had appeared on the Staat van Oorlog. Each of the units was organized on Dutch lines, comprising twelve 55-man companies. Although the old Anglo-Dutch Brigade went into English service at the outbreak of the Nine Years’ War, only three of the six new regiments would do so when the Spanish Succession War broke out in 1702.

As the standing army debate wound down and it became clear that William had lost his bid to retain a strong peacetime army in England, Parliament ordered that the Koning-Stadhouder’s Dutch Guards be removed from the English Establishment. In 1699, the three battalions of the “Blue Guards,” the Stadholder’s regiment of Guard Cavalry and Eppinger’s regiment of Guard Dragoons returned to Dutch service. This household force, numbering 2,622 infantry, 677 cavalry, and 860 dragoons, added over 4,000 men to the Republic’s peacetime forces. By 1700, with the War of the Spanish

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89 See Figure 3.2.

90 With the exception of Hamilton’s which received a company of grenadiers in 1701. ARA St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8122 (SvO, 1698); Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VII, 330; and Dalton, English Army Lists and Commission Registers, 6 vols. (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1892-1904; repr. ed., Francis Edwards, Ltd., 1960), Vol. III., 379, IV., 189.

91 Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VII., 328-331.
Succession only twelve months away, the Dutch army numbered 49,075 officers and men.92

**Army Growth and the British Army, 1661-1700**

Unlike the Dutch army, which had continuously maintained close to 30,000 officers and men in peacetime, the British army in the later 17th century began as a small household force of little over 18,000 men divided into three establishments, the English, Scottish and Irish Establishments. The English Establishment, the most important of the three, numbered only 8,000 men for almost the entire late-Stuart period. Only in times of war did it see significant growth, but this was only temporary. The English regiments raised in wartime prior to 1688 remained on the establishment only for the duration of hostilities; upon the conclusion of peace, the new regiments would be disbanded and the army would return to its pre-war levels. The Irish and Scottish Establishments generally saw little growth during the later 17th century and were essentially used for garrison and police duties; only under rare circumstances did they ever experience measurable growth. As we shall see, the Glorious Revolution brought significant changes to all three establishments. Not only did all three establishments see dramatic growth, but the ways in which the army expanded and contracted in times of war and peace changed as well. Although the standing army controversy following the conclusion of the Nine Years’ War seriously limited the size of the force maintained by the Crown in peacetime, the nature of that force differed markedly from the force that emerged following the Peace of Nijmegen only twenty years before.

**The Growth of the Late-Stuart Army, 1661-1688**

During the Restoration period, the British army was puny by continental standards. Although under Cromwell it may have numbered as many as 60,000 men, following Charles II’s restoration in 1661, the army was relegated to being little more than the

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king’s personal guard. During the first four years of Charles’s reign, the “English” standing army comprised but three troops of horse, five regiments of foot, and a number of independent garrison companies, all told approximately 8,000 officers and men. During the same period, the Irish army numbered 7,500 and the Scottish 2,700 men. Thus, together Charles II had approximately 18,500 men at his disposal. Parliament authorized the raising of additional regiments in times of war but these forces were not kept on permanently. During the Third Anglo-Dutch War, the Crown raised six new regiments of horse, five of dragoons, and twenty-six of foot — all told almost 25,000 men — but following the Peace of Nijmegen the army returned to its pre-war levels. In 1680, only two years following the conclusion of hostilities, the English Establishment numbered only 8,700 men. At the time of James II’s succession to the throne in 1685, the English army numbered only slightly more than this figure but Argyll’s and Monmouth’s invasions that year began a period of rapid augmentations. Following the defeat of Monmouth’s Rebellion in the summer of 1685, James’ English forces numbered nearly 16,000 rankers, and by the end of December, they were augmented still further to 19,778 men. For the next two years, James’ English forces hovered at roughly 20,000 men until March 1688 when the Anglo-Dutch brigade was recalled, adding another 2,100 men to his forces. The last large-scale augmentation of Stuart forces occurred in the fall of 1688. In late September as the threat of war with the Dutch Republic grew, James ordered every cavalry troop and infantry company augmented by ten men, and commissioned the raising of five new regiments of horse and seven of


97 According to John Childs, the English Establishment numbered 8,865 men in February 1685, while the Irish and Scottish Establishments mustered 7,500 and 2,199 men respectively. At the time of the battle of Sedgemoor, the English Establishment mustered 15,710 men. For details, see Childs, The Army, James II and the Glorious Revolution, 1-2.
foot. This expansion gave James’s English army a paper strength of 34,320 men, with an additional 8,938 men on the Irish and 3,000 men on the Scottish Establishments — altogether approximately 45,000 men.\(^9\) In the tumultuous days and weeks that followed William III’s landing at Torbay, the army lost considerable numbers not by death in battle or illness but through desertion brought on by the change of regime. In December 1688, the army’s Commander-in-Chief, the Earl of Feversham, disbanded the army. Thousands of men, unsure of whether they should remain with the colors or go home, milled around southern and central England awaiting orders. During the confusing months that followed, perhaps as many as 10,000 of them deserted while thousands of others were expelled as political undesirables in the purge that followed.\(^9\)

When a new list was finally prepared on 1 April 1689 for William’s review, the English army numbered 30,866 men, of which 10,864 were in England, 10,972 were in the Low Countries, and 9,030 were in Ireland.\(^1\) The Scottish Establishment, which had numbered 3,000 men, is not mentioned, and the bulk of the Irish Establishment had virtually ceased to be as many flocked to the deposed James or were shipped abroad.\(^1\)

*The British Army during the Nine Years’ War, 1689-97*

The British Army grew tremendously during the first year of the war. From just over 30,000 men in early April 1689, the army more than doubled in size, expanding to over 60,672 men by the end of that year, a massive expansion in military manpower by any measure. How did Britain achieve such growth in her armed forces so rapidly? Part of

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\(^9\) Childs, *The Army, James II, and the Glorious Revolution*, 3-5; Walton, *History of the British Standing Army*, 496-497. Childs’ figures are significantly lower that Walton’s for the same period. Walton gives the English Establishment a strength of 34,592 men, and the Irish and Scottish Establishments a combined strength of 16,482 men, thus giving James II’s army a strength of 51,074 men. According to Childs, the English Establishment carried a paper strength of 34,320 men on the eve of William of Orange’s invasion, while the Scottish and Irish Establishments numbered 2,946 and 8,238 men respectively, or 11,184 men on the two establishments together. Childs estimates the British army numbered roughly 45,000 men together. Although his figures are 5,000 less than Walton’s, the detailed nature of his research make Childs’ numbers the more credible of the two.


\(^1\) PRO SP 8/5, ff. 25 (“The English Army, the first of April last, consisted as followeth…”).

\(^1\) Many of those in Irish regiments were shipped to the Holy Roman Empire to fight against the Turk. For details, see Childs, *The British Army of William III*, 10-13.
the expansion came through hiring large numbers of foreign troops, and part came through raising regiments locally. To some degree, the expansion of the first year is misleading. The first foreign troops added to the British army in 1689 were already present in the kingdom, namely William’s Dutch expeditionary force. By mid-1689, the force went into the king’s pay, adding approximately 15,000 foreign troops to the English Establishment. According to one source, on 1 April 1689 the English army numbered 30,866 plus the 14,788 of the Dutch force and “seventeen new Regts.” which amounted to another 13,260 men. All told, according to list, the English army numbered 58,914 men. It is more likely, however, that the strength of the English army was closer to 46,000 men, since it is unlikely that all seventeen new regiments had been completed by 1 April and only the Dutch forces were actually present. There is no doubt that William intended to raise the additional seventeen regiments, however. On 3 March 1689 (OS), the House of Lords minutes note that 14 regiments were to be raised for Ireland and list the colonels given commissions for that purpose. Indeed, by 20 September 1689, the English Establishment, including those regiments raised for Ireland

102 It is unclear when exactly the force went over to English pay. Although one of the states of the English army for 1 April list no Dutch regiments, another includes the entire expeditionary force. The Staten van Oorlog for 1689 still includes the forces in the expedition in its pages. In 1690, the regiments were removed from Staten van Oorlog to be reinstated only in 1698. For details, see PRO SP 8/5, ff.25 (“English Army the first of April last consisted as followeth”); to be compared with BL Add. MSS. 15,897, ff. 88-90 (“Accompt of the English Army as it was 1st April 1689.”) also cited in Dalton, vol. 3, 10-11. The second source mentions the Dutch force but does not list its regiments. They are first shown on PRO SP8/5, ff. 306 (“The Present Disposition of all Their Matys. Forces” dated 20 September 1689). For the Dutch side, see ARA St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8103, (SvO, 1689), 8104 (Extr. SvO, 1689), 8105 (SvO, 1690), 8106 (Extr. SvO, 1690), and 8122 (SvO, 1698).

103 William’s expeditionary force was composed of eleven regiments of horse, one of dragoons, and 10 regiments of foot, if one considers the Anglo-Dutch Brigade “foreign” (or 3 regiments of foot if one considers Anglo-Dutch Brigade British). In the charts that follow, I have included the six regiments of the Brigade among the foreign troops, namely because they were part of the Dutch army prior to 1688, and returned to Dutch service upon the conclusion of hostilities. They were no doubt considered as such by William III. In a list compiled by Joost van Keppel, the future Duke of Albermarle, the regiments of the Anglo-Dutch brigade are included among “His Highness’s Foot Guards.” For the composition of William’s expeditionary force, see BL: Add. MSS. 63,629 Albermarle Papers, ff. 1-5 “Lyste van de Gardes te voet van Syne Hoogheyt,” and Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, 1568-1795, VI, 126-128.

104 BL Add. MSS. 15,897, ff. 88-90, “Accompt of the English Army as it was 1st April 1689.”

as well as the Dutch troops, numbered 60,672 men. To reach this figure, England had raised an additional regiment of horse and nineteen of foot, most of which were for service in Ireland.\textsuperscript{106}

In 1690, the British army expanded further to 76,506 men. Although the bulk of the new forces were raised in England, Ireland, and Scotland, approximately 6,500 of them were foreign troops. On 15 August 1689, the King of Denmark was contracted to provide 7,000 Danish troops for service in Ireland. After some minor modifications to the treaty, it was ratified by King Christian V of Denmark on 30 September 1689 and the regiments were shipped to Ireland via England and Scotland. Although the strength of the force upon embarkation was three regiments of horse and nine of foot, the loss of several infantry companies during the voyage forced the consolidation of two of the regiments into one.\textsuperscript{107} Although the first of the troops arrived in Hull in November, it was not until mid-March of 1690 that the entire force finally arrived in Ireland.\textsuperscript{108} The addition of the Danish corps brought the number of foreign troops in English pay up to 20,398 men.

The expansion of Britain’s armed forces in the first years of the war was impressive, yet fraught with difficulties. In 1689, no less than two regiments of horse, three of dragoons, and thirty-five regiments of foot had been, or were in the process of, being raised for the war.\textsuperscript{109} Unfortunately, because of the time it took to complete

\textsuperscript{106} Among the nineteen new regiments were four regiments of foot raised from Londonderry militia during the siege of that place, three infantry regiments composed of French Huguenot refugees, and twelve English foot regiments. PRO SP 8/5, ff. 306 (“The present disposition of Their Matys. Forces.”).

\textsuperscript{107} Two of the transports carrying Danish troops to Ireland were captured en-route. Four companies from the Queen’s Regiment on one transport were captured by French privateers and taken to France where they were incorporated into the Royal Danois Regiment in French service. Another transport carrying a further 130 men from the Queen’s Regiment was captured by the French, but the plucky Danes managed to overpower the prize-crew, and sailed to the coast of Holland where they wrecked the ship. They were then transported from Holland to Portsmouth and from there, made their way to the Danish corps in Ireland. The loss of the four companies from the Queen’s Regiment, however, caused the amalgamation of the Oldenburg Regiment with the remnants of the former. For more on the Danes in English service, see K. Danaher and J.G. Simms, ed., \textit{The Danish Force in Ireland, 1690-91} (Dublin: Stationery Office For the Irish Manuscripts Commission, 1962), 11-13.

\textsuperscript{108} Danaher and Simms, ed., \textit{The Danish Force in Ireland}, 13-14.

\textsuperscript{109} See Dalton, \textit{English Army Lists and Commission Registers}, Vol. III, 1-9 (“Succession of regimental colonels from the date of raising of each regiment to Dec. 31, 1694.”)
them, only the regiments of horse, dragoons, and nineteen of the thirty-five new regiments of foot were completed in 1689. During the course of 1690, the remaining sixteen regiments of foot were ready, but four were disbanded early in the year due to losses sustained in Ireland, and another seven infantry regiments raised in Scotland in 1689 were reduced to two regiments of foot by the end of 1690. When one considers the units disbanded, the British army enjoyed a net gain of two regiments of horse, four of dragoons, and eleven of foot, or together 10,224 men.

In the years 1691 through 1694, there appears to have been a drop in the strength of the British army from 79,968 in 1690 to 71,502 in 1691. During the next three years, the British army fluctuates between 67,000 and 73,000 men. The reason for the decrease in the size of the army in 1691 and its subsequent inconsistency through 1694 has as much to do with irregularities in accounting and the sources themselves than with actual strength fluctuations. Certainly, the conclusion of the war in Ireland in late 1691 led to the demobilization of some units on the Irish Establishment and the transfer of others to the English Establishment. In addition, seven regiments raised for the Jacobite rebellion in the Scottish Highlands were disbanded in late 1690, thus reducing the Scottish Establishment from 9,490 to 5,098 men, a decrease of more than 4,000 troops. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 best illustrate the impact the conclusion of the wars in Ireland and Scotland had on the British army and its three establishments. In 1691, there were 35 regiments on the Irish Establishment and 32 on the English

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110 All of the regiments disbanded in Ireland in 1690 suffered from the epidemic that swept through the Duke of Schomberg’s camp at Dundalk in the winter of 1689-90. These included the infantry regiments of the Earl of Drogheda, Earl of Roscommon, Lord Lovelace, and Sir Henry Ingoldsby. For details, see Dalton, English Army Lists and Commission Registers, Vol. III, 73-78.

111 The Lord Bargeny’s, Lord Blantyre’s, and the Earl of Mar’s Regiments of Foot were consolidated into Colonel Richard Cunningham’s Regiment of Foot, while the Laird of Grant’s, Earl of Glencairn’s, and Viscount Kenmure’s together became Colonel John Hill’s Regiment of Foot. Lord Strathnaver’s Regiment of Foot was disbanded in November of 1690. For more, see Dalton, English Army Lists and Commission Registers, Vol. III, 90-97.

112 In 1689, thirty-five colonels were granted commissions to raise new infantry regiments for service of the Crown. When included with those already on the establishments, the three establishments numbered sixty-three regiments of foot. Of those, at least twelve were disbanded or consolidated into other regiments, and one was never raised. By 1691, the British army had fifty infantry regiments on the three establishments, and would remain at that level until 1694 when another eleven regiments were added bringing the number of infantry regiments up to 61. See Charles Dalton, English Army Lists and Commission Registers, Vol. III, 6-9.
Establishment, excluding foreign troops.\textsuperscript{113} The next year, with the war in Ireland concluded, the Irish Establishment comprised 18 regiments and the English Establishment 46, a net decrease of one regiment between the two years, and clearly demonstrates the British system in practice.\textsuperscript{114} The loss of one regiment cannot explain a more than 3,000 man strength difference between the two years, however. This is explained by the decrease in the ordered strength of infantry regiments on the Irish Establishment. In 1692, the mandated strength of infantry companies on that establishment dropped from 60 to 50 men, which resulted in 2,700 men less than would have been mustered had the units been kept at 1691 levels. The balance of the difference comes from the Scottish Establishment, which decreased by five regiments of foot. The lack of significant change in the size of the British Army from 1691 through 1694 is shown by Figure 3.4, which illustrates the number of regiments in British pay. This should be compared with Figure 3.3, which shows the number of men in British pay during the Nine Years’ War. A brief examination of this table will reveal that 1690 reaches a wartime peak in terms of manpower not equaled again until 1695. This growth spurt is misleading, especially considering the number of regiments disbanded that year. It is more likely that the “actual paper-strength” for 1690 was closer to 75,000 than the almost 80,000 depicted in the table for that year.

\textsuperscript{113} This is further broken down as follows: the English Establishment was comprised of 7 regiments of horse, 2 of dragons, and 23 of foot; the Irish Establishment consisted of 9 regiments of horse, 4 of dragoons, and 22 of foot. The Scottish Establishment remained more or less constant from 1691 onwards, being made up of 1 regiment of horse, three of dragoons, and 6 of foot. For details, see Figure 3.4.

\textsuperscript{114} The unit in question is Colonel Langston’s Regiment of Horse, which due to heavy casualties suffered at Steenkerk, was struck off the English Establishment in mid-1692. Dalton, \textit{English Army Lists and Commission Registers}, Vol. II, 124, Vol. III, 295.
Figure 3.3 The Forces of the English Crown showing the three establishments, 1688-1698.

The most significant growth in the British army during the Nine Years’ War came in 1695. In 1694 and 1695, the Crown issued commissions to raise an additional 3 regiments of horse, 5 of dragoons, and 12 of foot. As was often the case, regiments almost never appeared on the books the year they were to be raised. Indeed, one list for 1694 anticipates eight new regiments of horse, four regiments of dragoons, and twenty-five new regiments of foot for that year! Subsequent lists, however, confirm that only half of the regiments projected in 1694 were ever mustered. The list for 1695 shows three new regiments of horse, four of dragoons, and eleven of foot; in 1696, one more regiment of dragoons, and one of foot regiment are listed.

115 SP 8/15, ff. 158 (“A List of the Land Forces which his Matie. thinks necessary, to be maintained in England, Scotland, and beyond Seas, for the Service of the yeare 1694”).

116 SP 8/15, ff. 230 (“A List of the Land Forces his Majty. has now in pay & which he thinks necessary to be continued and maintained in England & beyond Seas for ye Service of the year 1695”); and “A list of the General Officers and of the Colonels and Commanding Officers of his Majesty’s Land Forces, with the numbers” in Historical Manuscripts Commission, The Manuscripts of the House of Lords, 1695-97, Vol. II- New Series (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1903), 131-135. Marquis de Miremont’s dragoons do not appear on the list from King William’s
this additional force suggests that Britain was beginning to tap the limits of its domestic manpower pool.

Figure 3.4 Regiments in the pay of the English Crown showing the three establishments, 1688-1698.

As we have seen, as early as 1689, Britain had begun hiring foreign troops to supplement their own domestic forces. In 1694-95 with the Nine Years’ War reaching its climax, Britain utilized manpower sources traditionally used by the Dutch Republic to augment their own forces. In 1695, William hired four regiments of horse and four of foot from the Elector of Hanover — a total of 3,712 men — and another 1,200 men in 2 infantry regiments from the Prince of Brunswick.\textsuperscript{117} The addition of 5,000 Germans to Chest but do appear on the House of Lords list, confirming that Miremont’s regiment was embodied in 1695. For 1696, compare the lists for 1695 with Dalton, English Army Lists, Vol. IV, 1-10.

\textsuperscript{117} According to Peter Wilson, the initial treaty between Hanover and England was arranged on 20 June 1692. The treaty, or rather joint treaty, between England, the Dutch Republic, and the Elector of Hanover required the latter to provide the Maritime Powers with 7,949 officers and men. From 1692-94, these forces were entirely in Dutch pay, but in 1695, England took over four regiments of horse and four of foot, or roughly half of the force. These Hanoverian troops continued in English pay for the remainder of the war. See Wilson, German Armies.
the English Establishment proved to be a watershed the army’s history in that it ushered in Britain’s active participation in the German soldier market.\textsuperscript{118} Although one might argue William’s invasion of 1688 had already brought 15,000 “foreign” soldiers onto the English Establishment, these were all part of the Stadtholder-King’s personal entourage. Most of the regiments brought over were either Dutch guards units or part of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade — thus native Englishmen and Scotsmen.\textsuperscript{119} When the Crown hired the Danish corps for Ireland in 1689, however, it marked a significant departure from normal English practice. Prior to 1689, Britain rarely if ever hired foreign troops (unless one considers Irish and Scottish troops foreign) to supplement its own domestic forces.\textsuperscript{120} However, from 1689 onwards, England became an active participant in the mercenary soldier market, and would become its most active client during the eighteenth century, only ending its involvement at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars. Following the precedent set by the Danish contract, in 1692 William hired another 1,400 men from Saxe-Gotha. Losses sustained during the Steenkirk campaign that year, however, led them to leave British pay at the end of year.\textsuperscript{121} The addition of contingents from Hanover and Brunswick in 1695 would prove to be more long lasting. The 1695 hires increased the number of foreign troops in English pay from 18,098 in 1694 to 23,042 in 1695. All told, foreign troops made up 31\% of all soldiers in British pay. And of all foreign

\textsuperscript{118} For the historiography surrounding the German soldier market, see Peter H. Wilson, “The German ‘Soldier Trade’ of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: A Reassessment,” in \textit{The International History Review}, Vol. XVIII, No. 4, November 1996, 757-792.

\textsuperscript{119} Although only three of William’s regiments The perception that William’s accompanying troops were “guards” is confirmed by a muster in the Albermarle Papers which describes them so. See BL. Add. MSS. 63,629 \textit{Albermarle Papers}, ff. 1-5 “Lyste van de Gardes te voet van Syne Hoogheyt.”

\textsuperscript{120} During the Second Anglo-Dutch War, Charles II negotiated an agreement with Prince-Bishop Christopher Bernhard von Galen of Munster to open a second front against the Republic. Concluded on 13 June 1665, von Galen was to provide 20,000 men in exchange for £500,000. The arrangement proved short-lived, however. For details, see Wilson, \textit{German Armies}, 34.

\textsuperscript{121} In the “memorandum” of the 1693 list of his Majesty’s Land Forces is a note regarding the Saxe-Gotha regiments formerly in pay of the Crown. It notes that £46,558 is to be paid “For the Pay of a Regiment of Horse, a Regiment of Dragoons, and a Regiment of Foote, which his Matie. is to have, from the Duke of Saxony, in lieu of the Three Regiments of Saxe Goth, which were under his Matie’s Pay, this last Campagne; An which are now sent home; being in a very ill condition.” For details, see PRO SP 8/14, ff. 310, “ A List of the Land Forces, which his Majestie thinks necessary to be maintained, in...the yeare 1693.”
troops in pay of the Crown, German (and Danish) subsidy troops made up 50% of its horse, and 67% of its cavalry.\(^{122}\) Although these figures are by no means on par with the number of foreign units taken on by the States-General during the same period, they do, nevertheless illustrate the increasing degree in which the British army was dependent upon foreign troops.

![Graph showing the number of British and foreign troops from 1688 to 1698](image)

**Figure 3.5 The English Establishment, 1688-1698.**

The British army reached its peak strength during the Nine Years’ War in 1696 when it numbered 88,087 men or 102,784 if one includes officers. Indeed, a document listing the English Establishment alone that year gave it a strength of 87,440 officers and men, an impressive figure when one considers that at the beginning of the war, the

\(^{122}\) In calculating these figures, I *did not* include the six regiments of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade among the foreign troops, though they were part of the Dutch contingent taken on by Parliament in 1689. Without the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, the number of Dutch foot in English pay was 4,433 men excluding officers while together they numbered 9,113. For the 1695 totals, see PRO SP 8/15 ff. 230; and HMC *House of Lords*, II, 131-135.
English Establishment mustered less than 25,000 officers and men.\textsuperscript{123} The next year, the army mustered a comparable number of men. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show the growth of the English Establishment during the course of the Nine Years’ War. Figure 3.5 depicts army growth in terms of number of soldiers on the establishment while Figure 3.6 illustrates the number of regiment in the pay of the kingdom. As the largest of the three establishments, the English Establishment was the only one that could send troops overseas. Thus, among the men and regiments on this establishment were those sent overseas as part of William III’s coalition army. It is noteworthy that the English Establishment expanded from 60% of the total British army in 1690 at the height of the war in Ireland to 88% of the Crown’s total forces following the Irish war’s conclusion. As we shall see in the next chapter, the growth of the English Establishment mirrored Britain’s growing commitment to the war in the Spanish Netherlands.\textsuperscript{124}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure3.6.png}
\caption{Regiments on the English Establishment, 1688-1698.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{123} SP 8/16 ff. 53 as cited in David G. Chandler, “Fluctuations in the Strength of Forces in English Pay sent to Flanders during the Nine Years’ War, 1688-1697,” in War and Society, vol. 1, No.2 (1983), 17.

\textsuperscript{124} These percentages are derived from Figures 3.3 and 3.5.
The Demobilization of the Army, 1697-99

The conclusion of peace at Rijswijk in September 1697 marked the end of the Nine Years’ War as well as the British army’s expansion. During the war, it had grown to 88,087 men — 102,784 if one includes officers — a level the British army would not reach again until the mid-eighteenth century. In the eighteen months following the Peace of Rijswijk however, the British army’s rapid growth was matched by even more meteoric plunge from its nearly 103,000-man war-time high to perhaps as many as 24,000 officers and men on all three establishments.125 Anti-standing army sentiment in Parliament — the product of tradition coupled with the desire to flex its political muscles against Dutch William — and the costs associated with nine years of war, led politicians to order the English Establishment reduced to 10,000 men in 1697, and then to 7,000 “natural-born subjects” in 1698, and finally to discharge William’s Dutch guards in 1699. Although it is beyond the scope of this study to examine the anti-standing army debate in detail here,126 it is instructive to compare British demobilization between the Nine Years’ War and the War of the Spanish Succession to Dutch demobilization during the same period, as well as the nature of their respective military reductions.

As John Childs points out, the standing army debate in England was not about the existence of a standing army. There was no question that England and Britain was to have a standing army to protect its territories and pursue its policies. Rather, the debate “was about numbers, troop levels, and what the country was prepared to afford.”127 In this, Parliament and the king were in disagreement. William, perhaps more than anyone else in England, recognized the instability of the Rijswijk peace.

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125 In 1699, Parliament reduced the English Establishment to 7,000 officers and men. The same year, the Scottish Establishment maintained 4,769 officers and men, while the Irish Establishment numbered 11,855 officers and men, leaving a grand total of 23,624 to protect the interests of the Crown. These figures are derived from the following sources. For the English Establishment: Childs, The British Army of William III, 200-202; and Walton, History of the British Standing Army, 1660-1700, 497. For the Scottish Establishment: M. Trenchard, A Short History of Standing Armies in England (London, 1698), 37. For the Irish Establishment: Charles Dalton, English Army Lists and Commission Registers, Vol. IV, 216 (“List and Numbers of the Forces comprized in the Proclamation declaring the Regiments to be kept up in Ireland, 1” May 1699”).


127 Childs, The British Army of William III, 190.
Having an eye toward Europe, the Koning-Stadhouder was determined to be in a position to deter any further French ambitions, particularly as they pertained to the security of the Low Countries. With the Spanish Succession still in doubt, William felt that England needed to maintain an army of no less than 35,000 men so that in case of war, the army could be quickly re-mobilized.\(^{128}\) Parliament, on the other hand, saw the standing army debate less as a question of threatening the freedom and liberties of English subjects — though they certainly couched their position in such rhetoric — but rather as a means of asserting its power over a king whose interests appeared more continental than English. They resented William, a foreigner who confided more in his Dutch favorites than in Englishmen, and wished to see “his” army reduced. Unfortunately for Britain — and arguably Europe as a whole — William’s attempts to maintain a strong peacetime force by “hiding” regiments in Ireland coupled with Parliament’s suspicion of Dutch William and “The New Country Party’s” determination to see the army’s foreign influences purged led to the wholesale reduction of Britain’s armed forces.\(^{129}\)

In spite of the reduction of the English Establishment to a mere 7,000 men, William and his military officials took great care that the cadres of the most experienced formations survive the disbandment. This was done in a number of ways. First, as mentioned above, a number of battle-seasoned regiments were shipped from Flanders to Ireland to replace the garrison troops there, while the young and inexperienced depot battalions in garrison were disbanded. A list from Dalton’s *English Army Lists and Commission Registers* dated 1 May 1699 shows two regiments of horse, three regiments of dragoons, and 21 regiments of foot on the Irish Establishment — in total 11,855 officers and men — all of whom had attained significant combat experience serving in the Low Countries. A close examination of the list illustrates an important change in English military practices that reflect William’s concern for the future. Unlike the disbandment following the Peace of Nijmegen that saw complete regiments disbanded, the 1699 Irish list shows that William wanted to preserve cadres around which to build in case of war. Companies of horse were reduced from 59 men to 36 per company but the number of officers and NCOs per regiment was reduced only


\(^{129}\) Ibid.
marginally, from 59 to 38 men. The same was true of the dragoon and infantry regiments placed on the Irish Establishment. Like the cavalry, both dragoon and infantry companies were reduced to 36 men while the bulk of the regimental officers and NCOs were retained. Consequently, the total strength of dragoon regiments went from 444 to 288 officers and men, while the strength of most infantry regiments dropped from 928 officers and men to 488 following the reduction.\(^{130}\)

The reduction of the English and Scottish Establishments followed similar lines. An examination of Dalton’s English Army Lists shows four regiments of horse, five of dragoons, and thirty-six of foot (plus a number of independent companies) went to the chopping block. Although these reductions appear — and were — drastic, the manner in which William and the army conducted the disbandment left an army better prepared for war than earlier English peacetime forces had been in spite of Parliament. First, it is noteworthy that while the number of soldiers on the three establishments was sharply reduced, the number of regiments remaining in England, Ireland, and Scotland, was reduced less drastically. At the Nine Years’ War’s peak, the British army mustered 15 regiments of horse, 14 of dragoons, and 67 of foot not counting marines and foreign troops.\(^{131}\) By the end of 1699, 11 regiments of horse, 9 of dragoons, and 31 of foot remained. Although most of the regiments lost were disbanded, some were sent elsewhere and thus retained for future service. Six infantry regiments went back to the Dutch Republic to reconstitute the Anglo-Dutch Brigade. Thus, it is likely that closer to 40 former British regiments remained.\(^{132}\) Of the remaining forces, 2 cavalry regiments, 3 of dragoons, and 21 of foot were retained on the Irish Establishment, leaving remaining 9 regiments of horse, 6 of dragoons and 10 of foot on the English and Scottish establishments. Although it is difficult to determine with any certainty the composition of the English Establishment at this time, the number of surviving regiments suggests

\(^{130}\) Dalton, *English Army Lists and Commission Registers*, Vol. IV, 216 (“List and Numbers of the Forces comprised in the Proclamation declaring the Regiments to be kept up in Ireland, 1st May 1699”).

\(^{131}\) All “hired” foreign troops were discharged from British service upon the conclusion of hostilities in 1697. Most of the Dutch regiments left English for Dutch service in 1698, while William’s Dutch Guards returned in 1699. For details, see Ten Raa, *Het Staatsche Leger*, VII, 142-143.

\(^{132}\) For the dates regiments were disbanded, see Dalton, *English Army Lists and Commission Registers*, Vol. IV, 301-303
these too retained most of their officers and a small cadre of seasoned soldiers to build upon in case of war.

The great disbandment of the British army, while serious in terms of its consequences for Britain’s diplomacy and foreign policy in the inter-war years, had less impact on the army than the numbers involved might suggest. In large part, this was due to the way in which the reductions were carried out. Much like the Dutch army, which had maintained peacetime cadres of veteran troops around which to build, the British army retained most of its seasoned regiments, and those regiments too, kept their cadres of veterans and officers. Although the British army did not retain all of its regiments as the Dutch army had done, it did keep almost all of its regiments raised before 1685 and many of the regiments raised in 1689 or before. Consequently, like the Dutch army, the British army was able expand rapidly when war broke out again in 1702. The manner of the British army’s reduction in 1698-99 also demonstrates the beginnings of military professionalism in that organization. The vast majority of the regiments that survived the great disbandment were the very regiments that would gain such notoriety in the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries. Thus, in a sense, one can trace the origins of what would become the British army, to William III.

**The Spanish Army of Flanders and the Growth of Armies, 1660-1700**

Unlike the Dutch and British armies which saw significant growth during the later 17\textsuperscript{th} century, the Spanish army, particularly the Army of Flanders, had reached the apex of its strength well before the British and the Dutch armies. During the Dutch Revolt, the Army of Flanders reached its greatest strength in 1640 when it mustered 88,280 men. During the later 17\textsuperscript{th} century, however, the Spanish Army of Flanders entered a period of gradual decline culminating in the complete wastage of the army in the last years of the Nine Years’ War. Figure 3.7 illustrates the gradual decline of the Army of Flanders in the later 17\textsuperscript{th} century. In 1677, at the peak of the first coalition war with France, the Army of Flanders mustered 59,853 officers and men. After that conflict, the army embarked upon a course of steady decline. Twenty years later, in the last years of the

133 John Childs suggests that the great disbandment affected William III’s talks with Louis XIV regarding the partition treaties. For details see Childs, *The British Army of William III*, 193.

Nine Years’ War, the Army of Flanders had shrunk to 16,594 officers and men on paper, though in reality, contemporaries related that less than half of that number were actually with the colors.  

The decline of the Army of Flanders at the same time as the rapid expansion of the Dutch and British armies says much about the nature of the growth and decline of armies in early modern Europe. Unlike the Dutch Republic and Britain, the Spanish Netherlands had neither the financial nor the manpower resources to expand — let alone maintain — its military forces. Since the Brussels government was responsible for paying for its own military forces, any damages sustained in the Spanish Netherlands that affected the regions financial resources had a direct impact on the army. An examination of the gradual decline of the Army of Flanders during the Nine Years’ War illustrates not only the importance financial wealth played in maintaining 17th century armies but how the absence of the same wealth affected a state’s ability to field adequate military forces. The bulk of the operations in which the Army of Flanders took part were conducted on its own territories. French parties levied contributions from lands in the Spanish Netherlands, while the needs (and privations) of both the French and allied armies had a direct impact on the region’s economy, and thus the Brussels government’s ability to pay for its armed forces. Consequently, the Spanish Netherlands was forced to rely on the armies of the Anglo-Dutch alliance for its security during the Nine Years’ War, particularly after 1690.

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136 For the financial losses sustained by the Spanish Netherlands due to the French, see in particular Reginald de Schryver, Jan van Brouchoven, Graaf van Bergeyck, 96-98.
Like the Dutch and British armies who relied heavily upon foreign or “non-native” personnel to fill their ranks, the Spanish army of Flanders comprised troops mostly from outside of the Spanish Netherlands. During most of the later 17th century, Spaniards made up the largest part of the army of Flanders (See Figure 3.8). In 1688, on the eve of the Nine Years’ War, the Army of Flanders numbered 25,539 officers and men on paper. Of these, 6,831 of them were cavalry troopers and dragoons, and the remaining 18,708 infantrymen. 2,871 of the army’s cavalry and dragoons, and 6,264 of the army’s infantry were in Spanish regiments, all told 9,154 officers and men or 36% of the army’s total manpower.\textsuperscript{137} The next largest contributor to the Army of Flanders was the Spanish Netherlands itself. 1,909 cavalry and dragoons and 5,574 infantrymen were Walloons, roughly 29% of the army’s total strength in 1688. Germans made up the next highest percentage of troops in the Spanish army in the Low Countries. German

princes fielded five cavalry and dragoon regiments and seven infantry regiments in 1688 numbering 1,365 horsemen and 4,035 infantry respectively. All told, Germans made up 21% of the army’s total strength. The last group comprising a significant part of the Spanish army in the Low Countries were the Italians. There were 2,589 Italians in the army of Flanders in 1688, the bulk of them with the infantry. In addition to Italians, there were several small contingents of English, Irish, and Scots serving in foot companies.

Figure 3.8 The Spanish Army of Flanders showing the three combat arms, 1688-1697.

In addition to troops raised locally or in other Habsburg lands, the Governor of the Spanish Netherlands often hired subsidy troops, much in the same way as the Dutch Republic and England did, to supplement soldiers on the “national” establishment. During the Nine Years’ War, the Brussels government and Carlos II concluded agreements with Hannover, Celle-Wolfenbüttel and Brandenburg, to provide troops for the defense of the Spanish Netherlands and the Meuse valley regions. In some cases, the Spanish government in Brussels paid only a portion of the units’ subsistence money while the Dutch and English paid the balance (as well as their
soldiers’ salaries). In other instances, governor of the Spanish Netherlands hired true subsidy troops into Spanish service. In 1689, for instance, the Marquis de Gastañaga hired a Hanoverian contingent of 7,949 men, and the next year took on 3,119 men from Celle-Wolfenbüttel. Unfortunately for Gastañaga, Brussels’ rapidly dwindling coffers meant that these troops were the first to be dismissed from Spanish service. At the conclusion of the 1691 campaign, all of Spain’s subsidy troops in the Spanish Netherlands were dismissed from service for lack of pay, but in the end, all of them would be rehired by the Maritime Powers.

The Army of Flanders mirrored the fate suffered by the subsidy troops hired by the government in Brussels. A dearth of adequate funds caused by the inability to defend the wealthiest regions in the Spanish Netherlands — namely Flanders and Brabant — led to the shrinkage of the Army of Flanders as the fortunes of war turned against the alliance. As we have seen, on the eve of the conflict, the Army of Flanders mustered 25,539 officers and men. In 1689 during the first year of the war, the Army of Flanders numbered 31,741 officers and men on paper. It was the peak of the army’s wartime strength. After 1689, the army went into a steady decline. In 1690 and 1691, the army mustered 11,979 horsemen and 16,297 infantry for a total of 28,276 men. If one considers the subsidy troops in Spanish pay, the army numbered close to 39,000 officers and men. But this is misleading. Already in 1690, the Hanoverian corps had left the theater for lack of pay; only a loan from the States-General enabled the government in Brussels to meet some of its financial obligations including paying its subsidy troops. Unfortunately for Spain, the situation was not to improve. In 1692, the army shrank further due to the critical financial situation. Although the Elector of Bavaria had replaced the inept Marquis de Gastañaga as the governor of the Spanish Netherlands,

138 ARA Archief Fagel Supplementaire (1.10.94), 662 “Generalen Index op de Registers der Resolutien van den Raad van State...1675-1699,” “Brandenburg” and “Hannover”.

139 Although Rooms makes no mention of the subsidy troops hired by the government of the Spanish Netherlands, Ten Raa points out that at the end of the 1690 campaign, Spain’s Hanoverian corps marched home for lack of pay. The next year, the States-General loaned the Brussels government f1,575,000 but quickly realized it was not enough to bring the region into a state of adequate defense. It is likely that much of it went to pay for its subsidy troops. It can be no coincidence that Britain and England hired a 7,949-man Hanoverian corps for service in the Spanish Netherlands in 1692, one year after it left Spanish service. For details, see Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VII, 350-351; and Wilson, German Armies, 93.

140 ARA St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8111 (SvO, 1693), 8112 (Ext.SvO, 1693); Wilson, German Armies, 93; and Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VII, 339-340, 350-351.
the fortunes of the army continued to wane. All of its subsidy troops were forced to leave Spanish service for lack of pay while its own forces shrank by more than 7,000 men. In that year, Spain could muster only 8,061 cavalry and 13,529 foot soldiers on paper. The allied defeat at Fleurus in 1690 coupled with the loss of Mons and Namur in 1691 and 1692 opened the door to more French raiding parties. As their activities intensified, the government in Brussels had less and less money with which to finance the region’s defense. Although the addition of the small Bavarian corps that had accompanied the Elector somewhat bolstered the Wittelsbach governor’s forces, the army as a whole continued to dwindle in size. In 1693, the Spanish army lost an additional 3,000 men as the army’s forces shrank to 17,029 officers and men. The next year, the army numbered 16,777 as more and more of the army’s soldiers deserted the colors for lack of pay. In 1695, the Army of Flanders appears to have expanded slightly, numbering 18,267 officers and men on paper. The next year however, the army shrank still further. In 1696, the Spanish army of Flanders mustered only 6,430 cavalry and 10,164 infantry for a total of 16,594 officers and men, a level it would maintain for the balance of the conflict.

The decline of the Army of Flanders during the Nine Years’ War is indicative of the importance of adequate financial resources. All told, the army lost 15,147 men, the result of the Brussels government’s inability to pay its forces or raise new ones. And yet there is evidence that the reality was much worse than that. In a letter written to the Spanish Court in Madrid, the Thesaurier-Generaal in Brussels, Jan van Brouchoven, Count van Bergeyck, listed the strength of the Army of Flanders in 1696 at 15,000 officers and men but added that the true strength of the army was closer to 7,000! The dramatic difference between paper strength and actual strength suggests that the figures presented above are likely significantly greater than the actual numbers of troops present with the colors. This in and of itself is not surprising, since historians recognize early modern armies frequently engaged in “false musters,” a practice whereby colonels reported the strengths of their regiments to be far stronger than they

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141 The Bavarian corps which accompanied Max Emmanuel to the Spanish Netherlands is not mentioned in Rooms dissertation. In 1694, it comprised fifteen squadrons of horse and five battalions of foot with a strength of approximately 5,000 officers and men. For details, see Edward d’Auvergne, The History of the Campagne in the Spanish Netherlands, Anno. Dom., 1694 with The Journal of the Siege of Huy (London, 1694), 35-36.

142 Reginald de Schryver, Jan van Brouchoven, Graaf van Bergeyck, 1644-1725, 84.
actually were in order to pocket the surplus funds. The difference between the paper strengths and the actual strengths of the Army of Flanders and the armies of their British and Dutch allies was significantly different, however. As we shall see in the next chapter, British and Dutch regiments on campaign usually mustered between 15% and 25% less than their paper strengths reported.\textsuperscript{143} If we are to believe Count van Bergeyck and the Count de Mérode-Westerloo however, the reported strength of the Spanish army of Flanders' reflected not 15% to 20% less but a whopping 50% to 60% less than the paper strengths declared!\textsuperscript{144} Although it is difficult to confirm the real difference between paper and actual strengths of the Spanish army from two anecdotes alone, their testimonies, together with the documentary evidence of the financial distress faced by the Brussels government, suggests that the Spanish army was much weaker in reality than its musters suggest. It is perhaps noteworthy that after the war's conclusion, the Army of Flanders shrank still further numbering just over 15,363 officers and men on paper, evidence of the Spanish government's financial exhaustion.\textsuperscript{145}

\textbf{Coalition Warfare and the Growth of Armies: Some Conclusions}

The cases of the Dutch, British and Spanish armies illustrates the various ways army size changed during the course of the later 17\textsuperscript{th} century. For the Dutch Republic — and for the other armies examined here for that matter — the true measure of growth or contraction was the size of the army before and after a given conflict. During the Nine Years’ War, the Dutch Republic’s army saw dramatic growth, more than doubling in size.

\textsuperscript{143}See Chapter 4 below.

\textsuperscript{144} According to Count de Mérode-Westerloo, when he arrived in Oostende in 1700 to take command of his regiment then in garrison in the city, it numbered but 160 officers and men when it should have numbered at least 600! Rooms states that official documents record its strength to be 459 men. Although Rooms is correct to note that it is possible (or even likely) Mérode-Westerloo exaggerated the shortfall of his new command, it is probable that the number of missing men was greater than that recorded in official documents. Regardless of the exact number of men missing, it was certainly noteworthy enough for him to remember that the difference was quite significant. For more, see M. le Comte de Mérode-Westerloo, Mémoires de Feld-Maréchal Comte de Mérode-Westerloo, Chevalier de la Toison d'Or, Captaine des Truband de l'Empereur Charles VI, etc. etc., in two volumes (Brussels: Société Typographique Belge, 1840), II 147. For Rooms’ argument, see Rooms, “De Materiele Organisatie van de Troepen,” Vol. II.194.

\textsuperscript{145} Rooms, “De Materiele Organisatie van de Troepen,” Vol. II, 194; Bijlagen Deel III, 487.
size. That growth was based on fleshing out peacetime regiments to their wartime strengths, raising a several new national ones, and hiring large numbers of subsidy troops. In Britain, army growth followed a slightly different pattern. Because Britain’s peacetime establishment was smaller than the Dutch one, it was necessary to raise completely new domestic regiments from scratch. Consequently, Britain’s mobilization took more time and was fraught with difficulties. Lacking seasoned cadres around which to build, Britain’s inexperienced levies died in droves during their first exposure to campaign life in Ireland in 1689-90. By 1695, Britain had raised an impressive army indeed, overshadowing the Dutch army in terms of the number of national troops it raised during the war. Like the Dutch, Britain supplemented its domestic forces with foreign troops, most of which were hired from the Dutch Republic, Germany and Scandinavia. When the war ended, the British army, like the Dutch one, maintained a large number of small, peacetime regiments around which to build in case of war. In spite of the large-scale disbandment of its armed forces, the maintenance of formations manned by seasoned cadres made it easier to mobilize in 1701-02 when war again erupted in Europe.

![Figure 3.9 Forces deployed in the Low Countries Theater by Army, 1689-1697.](image-url)
The Spanish army was similar to the Dutch and British militaries in that it too relied on a cadre around which to build, supplemented by subsidy troops. But this is where the similarities ended. After bringing its regiments up to full-strength in 1689, the Spanish army of Flanders endured a gradual decline in its numbers until by the end of the war, its peacetime establishment was smaller than it had been in 1688. The shattering effect of the war on Spain’s finances coupled with the threat to Spain itself in the latter years of the war made it impossible to maintain a sizable force in the Spanish Netherlands. Thus, while the Dutch and British armies grew to meet the French threat to the Spanish Netherlands, the Spanish army of Flanders shrank, devastated by that same threat.

This examination of relative army size among the most important contributors to the “Confederate Army” in the Low Countries is closely related to the composition of that army itself. As we shall see in Chapter 4, the growth of the British and Dutch armies is directly related to the decline of the Spanish army of Flanders. In the very years when the Dutch and British armies saw the most growth, the army of Flanders experienced its greatest decline. Figures 3.9 and 3.10 illustrate the contributions of the
three principals in the Low Countries Theater. The growth of the Dutch army, particularly the hiring of subsidy troops, is directly related to Spanish decline because many of those regiments taken on were formerly in Spanish service. The growth of the British and Dutch armies in 1694-95 reflects their perception of the French threat to the Spanish Netherlands in the wake of Neerwinden and the necessity of hiring or raising additional troops to meet that threat. At the same time, that same French threat — a threat that resulted in the pillaging of Spain’s wealthiest Netherlandic provinces — insured that the army of Flanders would be ill-equipped to face it.

Central to the growth (and maintenance) of early modern armies was financial wealth. If these case studies illustrate anything, it is the necessity of strong finances to facilitate army growth. British and particularly Dutch military expansion rested upon strong financial underpinnings. In Britain and the Dutch Republic, armies rapidly expanded when need arose. Although the relationship between the hiring of subsidy troops and financial wealth is clear, wealth was also necessary to support the growth of large domestic forces as well. Military expansion requires an element of financial stability and strength since early modern armies were expensive even when most of the troops were raised domestically. The British army was able to grow largely because the government possessed the financial institutions to support its growth; the States-General’s army also enjoyed the financial strength to support a military whose size was far out of proportion with the state’s population. In the Spanish Netherlands, however, a lack of that same financial stability insured not only the inability to expand its forces when the need arose but the actual degradation of the force as well.

The cases of the Dutch Republic, Britain, and Spain also illustrate the different ways in which army growth (or contraction in the case of Spain) manifested itself in late 17th century Europe. Although Lynn may argue that the French case was the European paradigm, it is clear from the cases examined here that the French model was of little consequence to the growth of the armies comprising the “Confederate Army” except in the way that any state would react to its enemy. The French army was not the model followed by any of the countries examined here, except perhaps indirectly. One could argue that all of the armies examined here were various forms of Lynn’s “State Commission Army.” However, the nature of British and Dutch expansion shows a marked difference from the growth of the French army during the same period. Both relied heavily on foreign subsidy troops to augment their numbers rather than just domestic levies. The fact that all of the armies examined here contributed elements to
the allied “Confederate Army” in the Spanish Netherlands not only explain the difference between allied army growth and the French case but also explains to a large extent why the armies examined here grew or shrank. Army growth, as Professor Lynn has pointed out, reflected the military needs of the country in question. But in the case of coalition armies, this is only part of the equation. Armies contributed to the various coalition forces arrayed against France not merely out of military necessity. Some lands were inhibited in their contribution to the coalition by other threats — both foreign and domestic, domestic needs, or even political necessity. On the other hand, states like the Dutch Republic might provide more forces for the same reasons given above, or smaller states my provide contingents merely to gain international prestige, or for political gain. Conversely, countries might be hampered by financial shortcomings or manpower shortage. With the factors affecting a given land’s contribution to a coalition army so varied, it is useful to examine the allied army in the Spanish Netherlands to understand the nature of the coalition partners contribution to that organization, and it is to this that we shall turn our attention now.
CHAPTER 4
THE SINEWS OF COALITION WARFARE

INTRODUCTION
The growth of western European armies in the latter 17th century was directly related to the political and military challenges facing European leaders in the face of Louis XIV’s apparent hegemonic designs. Because few of the princes arrayed against the Sun King could field an army large enough to challenge the French “giant” alone, the allies relied upon coalition armies to meet his forces on more equal terms. The foundation for what would become the Grand Alliance was laid in 1686 with the League of Augsburg. Based on the old Laxenburg Alliance — the agreement between the Habsburg Emperor and the princes of the territories of the Rhine committed to the region’s defense in case of French attack — the new League of Augsburg was further extended to include not only the Empire’s larger territories but its smaller ones as well. The League eventually came to include Carlos II of Spain, Charles XI of Sweden, and the Elector of Bavaria, each representing their German possessions threatened by French expansion toward the Rhine.1 Although the Dutch Republic and England were never a part of the League of Augsburg, the existence of that coalition aided in the allied effort to mobilize forces against Louis XIV. By 1689, the “Grand Alliance” had been concluded aligning the forces of Britain, the Dutch Republic, the Empire, Spain, Brandenburg-Prussia, Savoy-Piedmont (in 1690), and princes of the Augsburg League against Louis XIV.2

The creation of coalition armies to face Louis XIV’s forces in large part determined the way in which armies of the member states expanded in the later 17th

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1 Baxter, William III, 213-124; Rule, “France caught between two balances,”38-42; Symcox, “Louis XIV and the Outbreak of the Nine Years’ War,” 186-186; and Wilson, German Armies, 76, 87.

2 Sweden, one of the League’s original members, never declared war against France. Savoy did not join the Grand Alliance until 1690. See Storrs, War, Diplomacy, and the Rise of Savoy, 126-127.
century. Although the creation of military coalitions demanded that every member contribute forces to one of the several armies fighting against France, it did not necessarily place the same kinds of manpower and monetary demands on each contributing member. Wealth, of course, was important in allowing an army to expand but it was not the only factor affecting army growth. Manpower resources often limited the ability of an army to expand; only those states with the financial means to hire subsidy troops were able to expand beyond the capability of their own domestic manpower sources. More often than not, political necessity played the crucial role in determining the degree in which a state would — or could — mobilize for war. Without the political will, finding the requisite resources, both in terms of manpower and money, was impossible. The Dutch Republic for example, expanded its forces for defensive reasons. Fearing a repeat of 1672, the States General raised the largest force possible to insure the security of its frontiers. Consequently, the Dutch Republic, at the behest of its Stadhouder William III, mustered an army very nearly exceeding its financial means and far beyond its manpower ones, of which more than 85% was committed to the allied army in the Low Countries. Although the financial burden adversely affected the Dutch economy, for most of the war both Amsterdam and the provinces supported the Dutch army’s expansion.\(^3\)

In Britain, on the other hand, Parliament’s position changed during the course of the conflict. Although initially motivated to expand its forces for domestic reasons, after the pacification of Ireland Parliament was at first ill-disposed to beef-up Britain’s land forces to the degree William maintained was necessary. Parliament had seen the presence of James II’s forces in Ireland as a direct threat to the English crown, the Protestant faith, and British liberty. With the conclusion of the Irish War in late 1691, however, some MPs felt that an expanded British presence in the Low Countries along the lines suggested by William as excessive and counter to English interests. “Blue Water” strategy proponents maintained Britain’s military role on the continent should be should be a supporting one.\(^4\) Instead of a full-scale continental commitment, it

\(^3\) See Chapter 3.

\(^4\) “Blue Water” strategy, according to Daniel Baugh, is defined thus: blue water warfare was a form of technically advanced warfare emphasizing economic pressure. The military weight of the Continental powers was to be opposed by naval skills, superiority of equipment, and abundance of money and resources, as well as access to resources. All of these were chiefly derived from domestic industry and seaborne commerce. (Daniel Baugh, “British Strategy
should attack French trade through focusing on the war at sea. It would take the allied defeat at Neerwinden in 1693 coupled with the failure of the raid on Brest the following year to convince Parliament to support William’s war in Flanders and his proposals for Britain’s land forces. Consequently, from 1693 through 1696, the British army saw massive growth such that by 1696, it had a national army comparable in size to the Dutch one, and had virtually matched the States General’s commitment to the land war in the Low Countries.5

Other states were less willing to actively participate in the coalition army, or did so only for the political kudos such participation might bring them. In 1695 for example, the Prince of Hessen-Kassel brought his much-needed forces into the field only in late-August, just in time to participate in the final days of the exhaustive two-month siege of Namur, much to the disgust of William III and his generals.6 Spain, on the other hand, had willingly played a central role in the Confederate Army in the Low Countries in the early years of the war. The reduction of its forces due to its weakening financial position had a like effect on its influence on the conduct of the war. By 1695, while possessing a significant force on paper, the Spanish army of Flanders was but a shadow of its former self. Only a few of its cavalry regiments were deemed fit for active campaigning while its infantry regiments — reduced in some cases to 40% or less of their established strength — were relegated to garrison duty.7 And while both Prince Vaudemont and the Elector of Bavaria — the most important Spanish commanders in

during the First World War in the context of four centuries: blue water versus continental commitment,” in Daniel M. Masterson (ed.), Naval History: The Sixth Symposium of the US Naval Academy (Wilmington, Delaware, 1987), pp.87-88). In using this definition, Brewer continues: “this strategy does not preclude the use of alliances and subsidies to fight in Europe. But it does assume that European hostilities will primarily be conducted by the troops of allies rather than by the British army.” Cited in John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 257n.


7 According to de Schrijver, the Spanish army in the Netherlands suffered a manpower crisis brought on by the fiscal drain of warfare, particularly French incursions into Flanders. For details, see de Schrijver, Jan van Brouchoven, Graaf van Bergeyk, 96-98,103-104.
the theater — continued to command allied forces in spite of Spain’s dwindling forces, their influence, not surprisingly was dependent upon the Koning-Stadhouder’s goodwill.8

Along the frontiers of France, allied armies comprising the various members of the Grand Alliance assembled in each of the different theaters of operations ringing the French border. By 1690 there were five armies fighting against the Sun King’s forces not including the one in Ireland in support of the deposed James II. In the Low Countries, an Anglo-Dutch army commanded by the Dutch Field-Marshal George Frederick Prince von Waldeck and supported by the Marquis de Gastañaga’s Spanish Army of Flanders, operated in the area bordered by the Meuse River in the east and the English Channel in the west. In the region between the Meuse and Moselle Rivers covering the area between the two most important theaters, the Elector of Brandenburg commanded his own Prussian army. To the southeast of the Elector’s forces in the Palatinate, Duke Charles V of Lorraine led an allied army comprising Imperial, German, and Kreise troops. His army operated in an area stretching roughly from Trier on the Moselle to Frankfurt on the Rhine, then south to Philippsburg and Freiburg, and was arguably the second most important allied theater of operations in terms of manpower. A fourth theater of operations, bounded by the Alps in the north and the Mediterranean Sea in the south, saw Victor Amadeus II of Savoy-Piedmont command a Savoyard-centered allied army which campaigned in northern Italy, Savoy, and southern France. Finally, in the Pyrenees along the Franco-Spanish border, a fifth allied army, commanded by the Spanish General Villahermosa and comprised primarily of Spanish national troops defended Catalonia from French incursions.

Although every theater played an important part in the overall allied war effort, the Flanders theater, comprising the Spanish Netherlands and Pays d’ Liège was arguably the most important one in the eyes of both the allies and Louis XIV. The region was the most heavily populated of the five principal theaters of war and could support armies larger than those in other theaters. The allied army in Flanders, dubbed by contemporaries the “Confederate Army”, comprised Dutch, British, Spanish, and various German contingents and was commanded for much of the war by the Koning-Stadhouder himself. Of all the armies ringing Louis XIV’s France, William’s “Confederate Army” was certainly the largest of them. Having begun the war with a

8 For William’s relationships with Prince de Vaudemont and Max Emmanuel, see Chapter 6 below.
modest 65,000 to 70,000 men in the first few years of the war while under Waldeck’s care, under William it expanded so much so that by 1695, the year of its peak strength, it numbered over 150,000 officers and men.\(^9\)

The composition and expansion of the Confederate Army in the Low Countries during the Nine Years’ War provides us with an interesting case study for examining coalition army growth. Since the bulk of its forces were drawn from the British and Dutch armies, an examination of those militaries and the nature of their commitment to the Confederate Army will tell us much about the nature of late 17\(^{th}\) century coalition armies. An investigation of both the British and Dutch participation in the allied coalition, and the nature of that participation, can afford us a greater understanding of what these coalition armies were, how they were organized, and how they were administered. In the next three chapters, we will examine the Confederate Army as a military organization. In this chapter, we will look at its composition. During the course of this investigation, we will explore questions central to understanding not only coalition warfare in the 17\(^{th}\) century but in the present day as well. Questions like which states became members and contributed troops? Which states were most influential to the alliance and why? What determined a state’s degree of contribution to the alliance? In terms of manpower? In terms of resources? And finally, how did that contribution affect a given state’s influence within the coalition? In answering these questions, this chapter will provide the foundation for an in depth study of the Confederate Army in the Low Countries.

**War Finance and the Growth of Armies**

Wars cannot be conducted without money. As we saw in the preceding chapter, the Spanish army of Flanders was unable to meet foreign threats due not to lack of will but to lack of money. If government administration and available manpower provide the sinews of war and the muscles to wage it, then money is war’s lifeblood. Handicapped by a limited pool of available manpower, the Dutch Republic depended upon its wealth to empower it not only to attract foreigners to serve in the well-paid Dutch army but to

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\(^9\) Knoop notes that the army numbered 126,000 but these figures do not include formations in garrison. D’Auvergne estimates allied strength at 124,700 “effective men” again, not including garrisons. My estimation would place total allied strength in the theater at closer to 160,000 men which would leave roughly 35,000 men in garrisons. Figures on the allied army’s strength come from Knoop, *Kriegs Geschiedkundige Beschouwingen van Willem den Derde*, III., 269-270; d’Auvergne, *The History of the Campagne in Flanders, For the Year*, 1695, 18; and [Chapter 5] below.
allow the States General to hire troops from foreign princes to supplement their domestic forces.

Britain too relied on its economic wealth to support a national army of unprecedented size. John Brewer has called Britain “the military Wunderkind of the age” and there is much evidence to support his claim. Under the later Stuarts, Britain was a peripheral world power waiting to take center stage; it took the Glorious Revolution and the shift in policy the Koning-Stadhouder’s invasion brought with it for Britain to emerge as a military power of the first order. The infusion of financial capital into the Crown’s coffers, in large part due to the introduction of Dutch banking methods, made it possible for Britain to raise a huge national army, and to supplement those forces with foreign troops, thus ushering what has come to be called Britain’s “Continental” strategy. Prior to the Nine Years’ War, it seldom hired foreign troops to defend its continental interests. After the war’s conclusion, however, the island nation wavered between William’s “Continental” strategy and the “Blue-Water” strategy of the past strongly advocated by both Tory MPs and the Country interest. In keeping with its desire to limit its commitment on the continent, Parliament turned to foreign “mercenaries”, particularly during the wars of Austrian Succession and the Seven Years’ War. Even during the Napoleonic Wars, Britain engaged in what could be called a Blue Water policy in prosecuting its war against France, including both the hiring of subsidy or mercenary troops and the payment of subsidies to its continental allies. Nevertheless, the policy Britain would follow for at least the next 100 years had its start in 1689. And central to pursuing its new policy was a strong economy and financial base with the requisite bureaucracy both to raise and manage money, and administer its armed forces. If William III and his followers did not implement the structures and financial practices used by the English government during the Nine Years’ War, he was unquestionably the first English monarch to enjoy their fruits.10

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10 James Scott Wheeler contends that England’s “Financial Revolution” took place in the years immediately following the English Revolution, more than 50 years prior to William’s landing at Torbay in 1688. William III’s continental-looking policy was merely the first to enjoy the fruits of the developments ushered in by that Financial Revolution. For details, see Wheeler, The Making of a World Power, 91-93, 197-215.
The Dutch Republic, State Finances, and the Growth of Armies

The Dutch had long depended upon their economy and strong financial institutions to provide a foundation for their military power. Michiel de Jong, a specialist in the relationship between public finance and war notes that the rise of the Dutch economy went hand-in-hand with its army’s military reforms and its subsequent emergence diplomatically on the European stage. During the Nine Years’ War and the War of the Spanish Succession that followed it, the Dutch Republic became the most heavily taxed state in early modern Europe. In order to sustain its war effort, Dutch citizens were taxed annually as much as 3.08 pounds sterling per person at the war’s peak, an amount far exceeding the burden on the citizens of its most important ally, England. In his book describing England’s economic effort during the same period, D.W. Jones states: “from comparative figures of war spending, the number of troops paid for, and the size of navies it can be seen that no one else surpassed England’s military mobilization, let alone her total mobilization of the naval and military arms together.” (italics mine) Jones’ figures are misleading, however. While it is true that in terms of the actual numbers of men and ships paid for, Britain’s war-effort outstripped the Dutch one, in terms of military and economic potential the Dutch Republic stretched its resources — both human and economic — to their very limits.

As we saw in the preceding chapter, the Dutch army saw significant growth during the Nine Years’ War. In 1687 on the eve of the war with France, the Dutch Army numbered just under 40,000 officers and men. Following the Glorious Revolution, the army began a period of rapid expansion. From 1688 to 1697, the number of Dutch national troops under arms expanded from just over 50,000 to almost 60,000 officers and men. Even more significantly, the States General hired huge numbers of foreign troops in various agreements with German and Scandinavian princes. In 1688 to cover the United Provinces in the absence of Dutch troops in England, the States General

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12 This figure comes from D. W. Jones Table 2.1 “The war efforts of England and other European powers compared” in Jones, War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough, 29.

13 Jones, War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough, 28.
hired just over 14,000 foreign troops. During the course of the war, the number of foreign troops in the pay of the States General tripled in size increasing to almost 21,000 men in 1689, to 23,000 in 1693 to a wartime high of just over 44,000 officers and men in 1695. All told, the Republic paid for just over 102,000 officers and men in 1695-96 at the climax of the war.\footnote{See Chapter 3.}

In addition to land forces, the Republic provided the alliance with an impressive fleet. Although beyond the scope of this study, it is noteworthy to add that the Republic maintained the third largest fleet in Europe during this period. In 1696, the Dutch navy had more ships in active service than ever before, including sixty-one ships-of-the-line, thirty-three frigates, and twenty-one smaller ships — all told 115 naval vessels — manned by 24,369 sailors and armed with 5,026 cannon.\footnote{Jaap R. Bruijn, \textit{Varend Verleden: De Nederlandse Oorlogsloot in de Zeventiende en Achtste Eeuw} (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Balans, 1998), 125; the above is a more extensive and detailed version of Professor Bruijn’s earlier English-language study \textit{The Dutch Navy of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century} (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1990).} The Dutch naval building program, begun in 1682 to upgrade and expand the navy, was still underway during the later years of the Nine Years’ War. From 1682 to 1700, the Dutch admiralities built 112 ships-of-the-line — of which 18 were first or second rates — and 64 frigates. During the same period, the Royal Navy built 82 ships-of-the-line and 63 frigates. It is noteworthy that in spite of the massive building program, the Dutch admiralities had only 83 ships-of-the-line available for active service while the Royal Navy could boast of 127 like ships, an indication of the comparative obsolescence of Dutch navy in the early years of the war.\footnote{Bruijn, \textit{Varend Verleden}, 125; See also Glete, \textit{Navies and nations}, 208-211 and 220-227; and John Ehrman, \textit{The Navy in the War of William III, 1689-97: Its State and Direction} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953) 429-31.}

To support Republic’s military expansion on both land and sea required a massive infusion of capital and the bureaucracy both to collect it and distribute it to the appropriate service. As a state comprising seven independently governed yet united provinces,\footnote{There were actually eight provinces though only seven were represented: Gelderland, Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Friesland, Overijssel, Groningen, and Drenthe. However, Drenthe, due to its small population, geographic area, and relative poverty, had no seats in the States General.} the administration that coordinated the Dutch war effort reflected the
independent, decentralized nature of the Dutch State. The government of the Dutch Republic was divided essentially into three levels of administration, each corresponding to a different level of government: the “Generality” or federal level, the provincial level, and finally the town level, which represented the lowest level of government administration. Obviously in terms of military spending, the Generality was most important. However, because each province raised the required funds independently of the others, an examination of provincial finances is not without merit. Regardless of the level of government under scrutiny, each was dependent upon the levels beneath it to fulfill the financial burdens the state required of it.¹⁸

Financial affairs at the federal level were coordinated by the Raad van State or “Council of State.” The Raad van State was responsible for managing both the Republic’s financial and military affairs, and thus played a crucial role in coordinating the Republic’s war effort. As part of its responsibilities, the Raad van State prepared two separate but closely related documents for review — and ultimately for approval — in the States General: the Generale Petitie or “General Petition,” and the Staat van Oorlog. The general petition was essentially a petition or plea to the provinces describing the current military and financial circumstances and the costs demanded by them, while the Staat van Oorlog was the estimated military budget for the coming year. Prepared in the fall and/or winter months, the general petition was closely tied to the Staat van Oorlog. In the petition, the Raad van State outlined the expected costs to be borne by the Union for the Generality in the coming year as summed up in the Staat van Oorlog. Along with this, the Raad van State requested a continuation of the means needed to support the costs required of the Generality. Once the Staat van Oorlog and the general petition were sent to the States General for approval, the body mulled-over their contents, and in some cases, modified them. Once the States General agreed to the petition and Staat van Oorlog, representatives from each of the provinces would return to their respective provincial assemblies to present the approved budget. Once

approved by the provinces, they were obliged to pay for the expenditures outlined in the Staat van Oorlog.\(^{19}\)

Although the Raad van State, with the approval of the States General and provincial states, determined the Republic’s budget, the amount each province was required to pay was based on a more or less fixed percentage of the total costs called “the quota.” The “Quota System” could trace its roots to the very beginning of the Republic when the lack of a uniform system to pay the Republic’s soldiery threatened to result in mutiny. In response to this problem, the provinces created a system whereby each would pay a fixed percentage of the total costs. These percentages were based on the respective wealth of the provinces in question as well as their ability to pay.\(^{20}\) The quota during the period under investigation here, based on a one-hundred guilder scale, is shown thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>guilders</th>
<th>stuivers</th>
<th>penningen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gelderland</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2 1/4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zeeland</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utrecht</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7 1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friesland</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2 3/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overijssel</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stad en Lande (Groningen)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7 1/2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1 The Quota System (Source: R. Fruin and H. T. Collenbrander, ed., Geschiedenis der Staatsinstellingen in Nederland, 193.).

The table above shows the distribution of state costs based on the quota. As is evident from the data, Holland was responsible for by far the largest percentage of the Generality’s costs contributing ƒ58-6-2 1/4 per ƒ100.00, almost 60% of the quota. The next closest contributor — Friesland — provided but a quarter of Holland’s total quota. This difference between Holland and the Union’s next most important contributor illustrates the importance of Holland not only financially but politically as well. Without Holland’s political backing, no endeavor requiring significant financial


\(^{20}\) Discuss the origins of the Quota System as described in Zwitzer, ‘De militie van den staat’, 62-68.
support could succeed. Likewise, the disparity between Holland’s and the rest of the provinces’ contributions is a vivid illustration of the political power wielded by the Dutch Republic’s wealthiest province.

All of the Republic’s financial documents including the *Staat van Oorlog* and the extra-ordinary military petitions were divided, more or less, along the same lines as the quota. Consequently, the military commitment made by each province — in other words the companies and regiments each province provided and paid for — was comparable to the established quota. In terms of manpower, Holland provided approximately 50% of the standing army’s forces in peacetime. Friesland provided the next largest percentage with 14% of the total forces. The remaining provinces paid for the balance of the Republic’s standing forces. Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1 illustrate the breakdown of the Dutch army by province. Table 4.2 shows the number of companies paid for by each province as part of its quota. As is illustrated below, Holland supplied the vast majority of the Republic’s horse, dragoons, and infantry maintaining well over half of the cavalry, all of the dragoons and over 40% of the army’s infantry. Figure 4.1 depicts the quota showing each province’s contribution to the Dutch standing army as a
percentage of the whole. Based on this figure, the relationship between the financial quota and the number of troops supported by each province is obvious. Although Holland’s 50% does not exactly correspond to its 59% contribution to the quota, it is close enough to see a relationship between the province’s contribution to the Republic’s finances and its military contribution. Furthermore, Holland’s contribution to the army does not take into consideration its material and financial contribution to the war at sea, nor does it consider the province’s contribution to extraordinary Staten van Oorlog prepared in times of war. In 1696 when the Dutch war effort reached its peak, Holland paid for 53,944 of 102,581 men on the Republic’s payroll or 53% of all the forces in Dutch pay.\footnote{See Figure 3.2.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Horse</th>
<th>Dragoons</th>
<th>Foot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gelderland</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeeland</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utrecht</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friesland</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overijssel</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groningen</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drenthe</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>592</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2 Companies comprising the Dutch standing army in 1687 divided by province and branch of service\textit{(Source: ARA St. Gen. 1.01.05, nr. 8100 “Staat van Oorlog, 1687.”)}. In times of war, the Raad van State prepared a number of extraordinary petitions as well as augmentations to the Staten van Oorlog. These augmentations reflected the costs associated with bringing the army to wartime strength: fleshing-out established companies, raising new ones to bring the army’s regiments to their wartime establishments, and the hiring of foreign “subsidy” troops to supplement the Republic’s standing forces. All of these additions to the Republic’s military forces were recorded on a supplementary or “extraordinary” Staat van Oorlog. Together, the ordinary and extraordinary Staten van Oorlog recorded the costs associated with the army. Both documents divide the costs according to the quota among the seven provinces and Drente, and both documents provide a rough picture of the total costs associated with

\footnote{See Figure 3.2.}
the Republic’s army. Figure 4.2 illustrates the Staten van Oorlog’s costs — both ordinary and extraordinary — by province during the period under investigation here. It gives a good indication of the base military costs accrued by the Republic during the Nine Years’ War. What it does not show how much was actually paid by each province; it merely shows how much ought to have been paid.

![Figure 4.2 The Staten van Oorlog, 1687-1698.](image)

In addition to the general petition and the Staten van Oorlog, the Raad van State prepared a number of additional wartime petitions. There were usually three such petitions: *Legerlasten*, Forage, and *Extraordinaris Equipagien*. The Extraordinaris Equipagien petition or “extraordinary equipage” does not concern us directly as it was a naval rather than military cost. The other two petitions, however, were directly associated with the army. The first of these, the petition for *Legerlasten* or “army expenses,” outlined the costs associated with an army on campaign including the costs of wagons and train personnel, the cost of bread and other foodstuffs for the army as
well as its transport, and the cost of additional munitions.\textsuperscript{22} The most expensive element of the petition for Legerlasten, the cost associated with the provision of bread, was reserved for Holland who usually directly concluded and paid the contract with the bread purveyors for the army. The remaining elements of the Legerlasten petition were divided among the various provinces. In Groningen, their portion of the petition for Legerlasten — called \textit{veldlegerlasten} in its financial records — divided the costs between “army wagons,” “government horses,” and “unspecified.” In 1694, \textsterling 27,460.20 of Groningen’s \textit{veldlegerlasten} were earmarked for wagons, \textsterling 325 were for horses, and \textsterling 10,000 were listed as unspecified.\textsuperscript{23} Since each province’s administration was different, their bookkeeping methods pertaining to the petitions were different as well. In Zeeland, for example, Legerlasten was included in the category “Extraordinary Consents.” In 1694, Zeeland paid \textsterling 148,148 \textit{Vlaams}\textsuperscript{24} in Extraordinary Consents of which only \textsterling 147,961 or \textsterling 24,660 \textit{Vlaams} was for its Legerlasten obligations.\textsuperscript{25}

Figure 4.3 illustrates the difference between the quota and the actual amount paid by each province for Legerlasten. According to this diagram, Holland’s average contribution was 71\% of the total, significantly higher than its quota of the Republic’s finances. This difference perhaps explains the discrepancy between Holland’s contribution to the Staten van Oorlog, which amounted to approximately 50\%, and the quota, which called for a contribution of 59\% of the Republic’s costs. As we shall see, Holland made up for this difference through its contribution to the extraordinary petitions. The total costs of the petitions for Legerlasten are shown in Figure 4.4. As is clear from an examination of this chart, Holland contributed an average of \textsterling 1,587,362

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} For details see Olaf van Nimwegen, \textit{De subsistentie van het leger: Logistiek en strategie van het Geallieerde en met name het Staatse leger tijdens de Spaanse Successieoorlog in de Nederlanden en het Heilige Roomse Rijk}, 22-23.

\item \textsuperscript{23} Rijksarchief in Groningen [RAGr.], Archief Staten en Lande (1), \textit{Stukken betreffende de administratie van de ontvanger-generaal, “Rekeningen, 1694,” #1917.}

\item \textsuperscript{24} Zeeland computed its finances in Flemish Pounds. One Flemish Pound or \textit{Pond Vlaams} (\textsterling) was equal to six Dutch guilders (f).

\item \textsuperscript{25} Zeeland’s Legerlasten quota is illustrated in a document in \textit{Collectie van der Hoop} showing each province’s obligations by year. I have compared this figure with Zeeland’s Extraordinary Consents for the same year in that province’s financial records. For details see ARA. CvdH. (1.10.42), 93 “Staten van Oorlog en Finantien” unfoliated (“Staat van de betalingen gedaan door de Seven provincies en het Landschap Drenthe tot de laatste maart 1699 toe op de consenten tot de Legerlasten van de laatste oorlog...”); and Rijksarchief in Zeeland (RAZ) Rekenkamer C, #1790 25e rekening over 1694.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
per year. In terms of money contributed, it was a drop in the bucket compared to the more than ten million guilders it paid annually for its share of the ordinary and extraordinary Staten van Oorlog. Indeed, an examination of Holland’s contribution to the other extraordinary petition — the petition for forage — illustrates the importance of Holland’s financial contribution to the Dutch war effort and how the Republic distributed its military costs.

![Pie chart showing average contribution by province.](image)

**Figure 4.3 Petition for Legerlasten showing average contribution by province.**

During the early years of the war when the bulk of the Republic’s cavalry was quartered in the Generality lands and the border provinces, *fourage* — fodder for the army’s horses — was a small percentage of the army’s total maintenance costs. In 1689-90, the Dutch cavalry corps was a relatively small force and did not demand significant sums for its upkeep, particularly when it was quartered within the Republic’s own territories. Initially, the cost of fodder — roughly £700,000 total — was included in the petition for Legerlasten.²⁶ The Spanish government’s inability to live up to its promise

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²⁶ The difference in the cost of the Legerlasten petition in 1689 and 1690 probably reflects the cost of the winter upkeep of the Republic’s cavalry. In 1689, the petition for Legerlasten amounted to £2,865,531 but the next year it dropped to £2,159,213, a difference of £706,318. Although the sources consulted here do not explicitly state that the difference was cost of the cavalry’s winter upkeep, we do know that the Spanish government in Brussels agreed to maintain allied cavalry quartered in the Spanish Netherlands in the winter of 1689-90. We also know that there were numerous complaints from Dutch cavalry commanders regarding the state of their mounts and the inability to find adequate feed for them. Consequently, in March 1690 a special commission
to supply Dutch cavalry quartered in the Spanish Netherlands led the Republic to take steps to insure its cavalry mounts were adequately fed. The Spanish cavalry’s inability to defend against French forays during the winter months led Dutch and allied commanders to quarter more and more of their cavalry in the Spanish Netherlands. In order to support the increased allied cavalry presence, the Dutch established large magazines for its mounted forces. The costs involved led the Raad van State to create a separate extraordinary petition, which it presented to the States General for the first time in 1691. This petition pertained entirely to the subsistence of Dutch and subsidy cavalry during the winter months — and on campaign when necessary — while quartered in the Spanish Netherlands and the Pays d’ Liège.

was formed from members of the States General and Raad van State, probably from the Secret Committee for Military Affairs, to discuss the creation of magazines to support 6,000 cavalry in the Spanish Netherlands. In September 1690, the Raad van State concluded a contract with the army’s Provediteurs-generaal, Machado and Pereira to form two magazines, one in Brussels and one in Maastricht to support Dutch cavalry during the winter months. During the course of the fall and early winter of 1690-91, additional contracts were concluded to establish magazines in Mechelen for the artillery horses and for additional amounts to be delivered to Brussels. The costs associated with these magazines led the States General and Raad van State to draft a separate petition for forage. This petition was drafted by the Raad van State and presented to the States General for the first time in 1691 and became a regular part of the Republic’s military expenses through the conclusion of the Spanish Succession War. For details see ARA RvS. (1.01.19), Resolution, 1 October, 7, 17 December 1689; 14, 16 March, 21 September, 11 October, 31 October, 8 December 1690; ARA RvS. (1.01.19) Acteboeken, 1545, ff. 105, ff.119, ff.120, ff.123, ff. 133; and O. van Nimwegen, ‘De subsistentie van het leger’, 21-22.
Figure 4.4 Annual petitions for Legerlasten illustrating the contribution by province, 1688-1697.

Like the petition for Legerlasten, Holland paid for the lion’s share of the costs. As is illustrated by Figure 4.5, Holland again supplied 71% of the funds for the petition for forage while the remaining provinces supplied the balance. The gradual increase in the forage petitions’ costs reflects a comparable growth in the Dutch (and allied) cavalry arm quartered in Spanish Flanders and Brabant. Figure 4.6 illustrates the gradual increase in the sum for the forage petition reaching a peak in 1693 when it amounted to almost £2,000,000.

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27 The Anglo-Dutch cavalry corps presence in the Spanish Netherlands increased significantly after 1689 as it became obvious that Spain would be unable to defend its territories on their own during the winter months. Consequently, the Dutch established magazines in the Spanish Netherlands to support their increased presence in the theater. This is reflected in the Legerlasten and Forage petition’s numbers after 1690. For a discussion surrounding the establishment of magazines in the Spanish Netherlands, see Ten Raa, *Het Staatsche Leger*, VII, 41-42, and note 27 above.
Figure 4.5 Petition for Forage showing percentage contribution by province.

The ordinary and extraordinary Staten van Oorlog combined with the petitions for Legerlasten and forage give a good indication of the total military costs borne by the Dutch Republic. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 illustrate both the costs and the distribution of the military costs among the provinces. Figure 4.8 traces the total military costs accrued by the Dutch Republic during the Nine Years’ War. In 1687 on the eve of the war, Dutch military costs amounted to f9,339,924. As the war escalated and the Republic increased the size of its land forces, the Republic’s military costs grew reaching its peak in 1694 when the combined cost of the ordinary and extraordinary Staten van Oorlog and the extraordinary petitions reached f27,687,009. The military budget would hover between 26 and 27 million guilders during the last four years of the war. Of that amount, Holland paid close to what was demanded of it by the quota. As is shown in Figure 4.7, when the Republic’s total military costs are added together and divided by the totals contributed by each province, Holland’s contribution amounted to 59% of the total, virtually the exact amount established by the quota.
Figure 4.6 Annual petitions for Forage by province, 1688-1697.

It should be added however that these figures are only estimates of the Republic’s military expenditures. Although the figures given for the petitions of forage and Legerlasten where taken from sources showing actual amounts paid by each province, the numbers from the Staten van Oorlog were intended as estimates.\textsuperscript{28} As was mentioned earlier, the Staten van Oorlog was a \textit{projected} budget; it did not necessarily reflect the actual amount paid by the respective provinces.

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{28} The figures for the petitions come from a document found in \textit{Collectie van der Hoop} entitled “Staten van Oorlog en Finantien.” In the unfoliated papers in this folder are tallies of the costs of the various petitions by province. They show not only how much was to be paid, but how much was actually paid during the Nine Years’ War and when each province completed its payments. For details, see ARA. CvdH (1.10.42), 93 “Staten van Oorlog en Finantien.”
To show the actual costs borne by the provinces would require extensive research in the archives of each of the Republic’s provincial Rekenkamers. An indication of the veracity of the Staten van Oorlog’s numbers, however, can be derived from a comparison of the budget proposed by the Staten van Oorlog and the actual costs borne by the individual provinces themselves. Although an examination of each provinces’ military contribution to the war effort would require independent studies of each provinces’ finances — a colossal project still underway in the Netherlands today— a comparison of projected and actual expenditures of a few select provinces will give an indication of the veracity of the Staten van Oorlog’s figures. Having said that, the most important province in terms of military expenses, Holland, is difficult — if not impossible — to determine since the province’s financial records are largely incomplete for this period.  

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29 The Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis has undertaken this project and is sponsoring studies of the finances of most of the Republic’s seven provinces and Drenthe. Thus far, three of these studies are complete: the finances of Groningen, Overijssel and Drenthe. Dr. W. Fritschy, author of the volumes on Overijssel and Drenthe, is currently working on a study of Holland’s finances as part of the same series. For more, see Gewestelijke financiëlen ten tijd van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden, Part I, Overijssel by W. Fritschy; Part II, Drenthe, by W. Fritschy; and Part III, Groningen, by L. van der Ent and V. Enthoven.

30 One of the difficulties in reconstructing Holland’s finances during the Nine Years’ War is the fragmentary nature of the surviving records. The best work on Holland’s finances during the Nine Years’ War period is E.H.M. Dormans, Het Tekort (in English “The Deficit”) which explores the growth of the Dutch Republic’s debt. Wantje Fritchy is currently working on the volume on Holland’s finances for the Instituut van Nederlandse Geschiedenis. A preview of her work can
Figure 4.8 Total Military Costs Accrued by the Dutch Republic, 1687-1698.

Nevertheless, an examination of the other provinces’ financial records suggest that most paid close to the figures outlined by the Staten van Oorlog.

Arguably, the most complete financial records come from the Provincial Rekenkamers of Zeeland, Groningen, Drenthe and to a lesser degree Overijssel. Figure 4.9 compares Zeeland’s total income and total expenditures with the sum of its military expenses as prescribed by its Staat van Oorlog. As can be seen by this figure, for much of the Nine Years’ War, Zeeland’s military expenditures outpaced its prescribed Staten van Oorlog. Although in 1688 and 1689, the sum of the Staten van Oorlog exceeded the amount actually contributed by the province for war, from 1690 through 1692, actual and projected costs are similar enough to suggest that the Staten van Oorlog is indeed an accurate way to measure Zeeland’s military commitment. From 1692 through 1695, be seen in her article “The Poor, the Rich, and the Taxes in Heinsius’ Times,” in Jan A.F. de Jongste and Augustus J. Veenendaal, Jr., Anthonie Heinsius and the Dutch Republic, 1688-1720: Politics, War, and Finance (The Hague: Institute of Netherlands History, 2002), 242-258.

31 Note that the provinces of Overijssel, Groningen, Drenthe in the RGP series Gewestelijke financiën ten tijde van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden are complete. Zeeland’s financial records are among the most complete of the seven provinces (and Drenthe), but the volume on Zeeland is not yet complete.
actual expenditures seem to exceed the amount prescribed by the Staten van Oorlog. Although in 1692, the difference is trivial, the next one is close to ƒ800,000, which suggests an additional cost not included in the Staten van Oorlog. That additional expenditure is no doubt in part due to the petitions for Legerlasten and Fourage. According to one source, Zeeland’s contribution to the extraordinary petitions in 1692, 1693, and 1694, the years of the most significant variance between the two sources, amounted to ƒ94,170, ƒ159,076, and ƒ147,961 respectively. Thus, while a part of the difference rests with these petitions it does not completely explain the disparity between the figures.\footnote{The discrepancy may have to do with the fact that the amount required by the Staten van Oorlog exceeded actual military expenditures in 1688 but it does not explain the difference entirely. Much of the difference may be due to the sizable petition for Equipagien which was a naval expense, or perhaps they are expenses accrued by the provinces apart from the Staten van Oorlog, like the upkeep of the provinces fortifications for example. In any case, I have not yet discovered the reason for the discrepancy. For Zeeland’s military expenditures and total income, see RAZ, Archief Rekenkamer C, #508 “Johan van der Stringe, 1667-1703,” rrs. 1660-1860 (19e-29e Rekeningen), 1688-98. For Zeeland’s extraordinary petitions, see ARA CvdH, (1.10.42), 93 “Staten van Oorlog en Finantien.” And for Zeeland’s Staten van Oorlog, see ARA St. Gen.(1.01.05), 8100-8122 (SvO, 1688-98).}

![Graph showing the relationship between actual expenditures and Staten van Oorlog expenditures for Zeeland, 1687-1698.]

\textit{Figure 4.9} Staten van Oorlog vs. actual military expenditures for the province of Zeeland, 1687-1698.
A comparison of Groningen’s Staten van Oorlog with its actual military expenditures reveals the difficulties some provinces had in meeting their financial obligations. Unlike Zeeland, whose military expenditures generally equaled or exceeded the amount required by the Staten van Oorlog, Groningen’s military expenditures were much less than the Staten van Oorlog required. With the exception of 1687 and 1698, the years before and after the war, Groningen’s expenditures never came close to what the States General demanded of it, largely because the province’s total income was never more than the quota itself. Figure 4.10 illustrates the disparity between the Staten van Oorlog and Groningen’s actual military expenditures as well as its total income. Unlike Zeeland, which was a wealthy province, Groningen was comparatively poor.\(^3\) Zeeland’s income was two to three times that of Groningen.

\[\text{Figure 4.10 Staten van Oorlog vs. actual military expenditures for the province of Groningen, 1687-1698.}\]

\(^3\) According to Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, Groningen made up roughly 7% of the Republic’s population in 1795 and was responsible for 5.8% of the quota as compared with Utrecht, Zeeland and Friesland who possessed a similar percentage of the population but were responsible for over 8% of the quota. For details, see Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, Nederland 1500-1815, 126 (Table 4.4) 129 (Table 4.5).
As is shown in the table below, for much of the war Groningen’s expenditures were £400,000 to £500,000 less than the Staten van Oorlog demanded of the province. The reason for this discrepancy is not hard to find and is obvious from the table below. Simply put, the strain of war was too much for Groningen to bear. From the first year of the war until its conclusion, the sum demanded by the Staten van Oorlog was roughly equal to the total income of the province. To meet the amount the war demanded of it would have required all of its income and no doubt would have led to serious difficulties, both political and economic. Not surprisingly, Groningen was also unable to pay its share of the extraordinary petitions. By the war’s end, Groningen’s total share of the petition for Legerlasten was £333,264 but had only managed to pay £22,825 by its conclusion. This left more than £300,000 unpaid not to mention the interest accrued on the unpaid amount. Of the £778,471 of its quota for the petition for Fourage, Groningen had been able to pay £131,907 during the course of the war, a grim indication of the financial cost of the war in the provinces.

Other provinces found it less difficult to meet their financial obligations. Overijssel, while smaller than Groningen, appears to have had less difficulty meeting its quota. Although the data contained in the provincial archives in Overijssel is incomplete, a comparison of the Staten van Oorlog with the province’s surviving data on its income and actual military expenditures seems to follow the same pattern as Zeeland.

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34 The figures for Groningen are derived from RAGr, Archief Staten en Lande (1), Stukken betreffende de administratie van de ontvanger-generaal, “Rekeningen, 1687-98” [inv. nrs. 1909-1921]; and dr. L. van der Ent en dr. V. Enthoven, Gewestelijke financiën ten tijde van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden: Deel III, Groningen (1594-1795) (Den Haag: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 2001), 114-115 (Tabel III.2 Verzamelpost voor de middelen), 296-297 (Tabel IV.2.1 Groningen generale lasten — verzamelposten). Groningen’s Staten van Oorlog figures were compiled from ARA. St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8100-8122 (SvO 1687-98). My figures for military costs differ from van der Ent’s and dr. Enthoven’s published figures because I culled sub-categories within the category military expenses that were not directly related to the war on land and included others, like officers commissions. I thank Dr. Enthoven for his assistance in compiling these figures.

35 ARA CvdH. (1.01.42), 93 “Staten van Oorlog en Finantiën.”
Figure 4.11 Staten van Oorlog vs. actual military expenditures for the province of Overijssel, 1697-1698.

Figure 4.11 illustrates Overijssel’s contribution to the Republic’s war effort. For the years we have complete data, namely 1689, 1694, 1695, 1697 and 1698, the surviving data suggests that Overijssel’s Staten van Oorlog is a good indication of that province’s military expenditures, the estimate closely mirroring the province’s actual expenditures. In comparing those figures with the surviving data on Overijssel’s total income, it seems that this province at least had little difficulty in meeting its obligations. In examining its quota of the extraordinary petitions, Overijssel was one of the few provinces that paid close to all of its obligations before the conclusion of hostilities. As of 20 October 1697, Overijssel had paid f873,156 of the f1,049,831 required by the quota for Legerlasten, an indication of both the financial health of the province and the impact of the war (or lack thereof) on Overijssel’s economy.

The data for Overijssel is from W. Fritschy, Gewestelijke financiën ten tijde van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden, Deel I: Overijssel (1604-1795) (Den Haag: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 1996), 92-93, 226-227; and ARA Archief Staten Generaal (1.01.05), 8100-8122 (SvO 1687-1698).
Although the Staten van Oorlog’s figures, based on the evidence above, appear a good yardstick for determining the military costs of the Dutch Republic, it does not show directly the difficulties each province had in meeting their quota obligations. To do that would require an examination not only of the amounts actually paid at the time but the province’s total income and the percentage of that income represented by loans. During the period of the Republic’s wars with France, the Republic’s debt, like that of France and England, sky-rocketed. Much of its debt was due to falling interest rates and the erosion of the Republic’s credit, in large part the due to its inability to repay its loans. One way to examine the war’s impact on the provinces, albeit in a limited way, is to investigate each one’s fulfillment of its extraordinary petitions’ quotas. The same document held in Archief van der Hoop showing each province’s portion of the petitions also suggest the difficulties some provinces had in fulfilling their obligations. Based on the papers held in this archive, it is clear that some provinces came closer to meeting their obligations than did others. In one document highlighting the provinces’ payments of the petition for Legerlasten, it is clear that Gelderland, Holland, Utrecht, Overijssel, and Drenthe enjoyed economies strong enough to withstand the strain of the nine years of sustained warfare. Each had paid no less than 72% of their respective shares of the costs of the petition at the war’s conclusion. Holland’s economy seemed particularly resilient, not only bearing the lion’s share the petition’s cost, but paying all but £1,036,235 of its £16,533,047 quota before the war’s end, a whopping 94% of the total. Zeeland, Friesland, Groningen were either unwilling or unable to meet their respective financial obligations. None paid more than 49% of their quotas and Groningen paid no more than half of that before the war ended. The petitions for Fourage showed a similar trend.

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37Dormans, Het Tekort, 75-81, 142-149,213-216; De Vries and van der Woude, Nederland, 1500-1800, 781-782.

38 According to one unfoliated document dated 5 January 1700 and entitled “Sommen Staat van het geen de Seven Provintien en het Landschap Drenthe betaeld hebben en nog schuldig zijn volgens de boecken van den Ontvanger Generael, en de Registers van de belastingen op alle de pettien geduyrende den laatsten Oorlog gedaan tot de Legerlasten...”, Gelderland had paid 73% of its quota, Utrecht 77%, Overijssel 85% and Drenthe 72% of their respective quotas by the conclusion of peace in September 1697. Zeeland, Friesland, and Groningen had paid but 25%, 49%, and 21% respectively. Indeed as late as 1699, some of the provinces still had not completed their payments. For details see ARA CvdH (1.01.42), 93 “Staten van Oorlog en Finantiën.”

39 The percentage paid by each province for the petitions for Fourage is shown in ARA CvdH (1.01.42), 93 “Staten van Oorlog en Finantiën.”
The inability of some provinces to meet their financial — and thus military — obligations forced both the Generality and the provinces themselves to borrow money to sustain the war effort. Although almost 3 million of the f5,055,713 borrowed by the Generaliteits Rekenkamer pertained to the petitions for Extraordinaris Equipagien, the fact that the Generality was forced to borrow money because the provinces were unable to meet their financial obligations to the war effort would contribute to the Republic’s growing debt and worsening credit. By the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, the Generality’s debt had increased to almost f25 million.40 Holland’s ability to pay the bulk of its expenses on time had as much to do with its ability to borrow money on short notice and at reasonable rates as anything else. During the course of the Nine Years’ War, its debt too rose sharply. Prior to the war, Holland’s debt hovered around the f160 million mark. By the end of the Nine Years’ War, Holland’s debt had grown by f30 million. But because the States of Holland had also raised additional taxes during the war affecting various sectors of its economy, the actual growth in the province’s debt was significantly greater.41

In return for these expenditures, the States General was able to raise the largest army in the allied camp. In his book War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough, D. W. Jones notes that only the Dutch “had to attempt a substantial forward commitment of both naval and military arms,” but that “no one else surpassed England’s military mobilization, let alone her total mobilization of the naval and military arms together.”42 Although by the Spanish Succession War, the British military commitment had outpaced that of its continental ally, during the Nine Years’ War, not even Britain matched the Dutch commitment to the “common cause.” Year after year, the Dutch Republic provided the most troops of any of the coalition’s members. Only in 1696 did the British army raise an army comparable in size to the States General’s, with both lands fielding armies of 102,000 officers and men. Even then, as shall be illustrated below, the Dutch provided more troops in the main theater of operations than its ally ever did. And while the Dutch navy never put to sea the same number of

40 f2,983,368 of the f5,055,713 was for additional naval or maritime expenses. The remainder was for shortfalls in the provinces’ payments for Legerlasten, Fourage, and other extraordinary expenses. For details, see Dormans, Het Tekort, 142-149 but especially Table 4.4 (p. 146).

41 Dormans, Het Tekort, 78-79.

42 D. W. Jones, War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough, 28.
ships as its maritime partner, the Dutch nevertheless completed an expensive building program during the war. By 1700, the Dutch navy possessed 83 ships-of-the-line to Britain’s 127, 44 less than its partner, but impressive nevertheless.

In implementing its own “Double Commitment” furthermore, the Republic sowed the seeds of “strategic over-stretch.” The Republic’s annual military costs alone exceeded 27 million guilders per year during the last four years of the war. These do not include the cost for the navy, usually the most expensive service. In addition, the Republic guaranteed more than f11 million for foreign powers fighting with the alliance. The impact these efforts had on the Dutch economy was severe indeed. Although the Republic’s debt after the Nine Years’ War was not as debilitating as it would later become, it had barely recovered from the financial strain of almost a decade of exhausting warfare when the War of the Spanish Succession erupted in 1701. Holland’s and the Generality’s debt had grown significantly due to the Republic’s war effort, an effort that would be overshadowed in the colossal struggle yet to come. By the time representatives met in Utrecht to negotiate the end to the Spanish Succession War, the Republic’s finances were permanently damaged and the economy strained beyond recovery. The Republic’s decision to take the leading role in the struggle against Louis XIV began during the Nine Years’ War. Its determination to continue on that course, however, would leave the economy of Europe’s financial center damaged, forcing the Republic to retreat from the European center stage. Although the Dutch would play a prominent part in War of Austrian Succession only twenty years later, its days as a great power were over, as their performance in this conflict would confirm. Thus, the Republic’s decision to take the leading role in the crusade against Louis XIV in 1688 would cause its ultimate demise as a great power. However, in order to truly appreciate the United Provinces’ role in the allied war effort during the Nine Years’ War, it is first necessary to examine Britain’s contribution to that same effort, the

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43 This term was first used by Paul Kennedy in describing the rise and fall of nation-states. For details, see Paul Kennedy’s Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), passim.

44 See Figure 4.8.

45 Dormans, Het Tekort, 142.

46 De Vries and van der Woude, Nederland, 1500-1800, 782-790.

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Republic’s most important ally. Only a comparison of both countries’ efforts will enable an accurate evaluation of their respective contributions to the allied cause.

**Britain’s War Effort and the Grand Alliance**

Britain’s emergence as a great power following the War of the Spanish Succession has been the focus of numerous studies in recent years.47 According to this historiography Britain owed its appearance on the European stage not so much to the military prowess of its generals and admirals — though this was important — but to the development of government bodies for the purposes of organizing and deploying Britain’s financial wealth. This revolution in state finance, a hallmark of the ‘military revolution’ in early modern Europe, took place in England during the period spanning roughly from the English Civil War to the Glorious Revolution. In the words of James Scott Wheeler, “had England not already passed through the Military Revolution, she would have failed her first test as a world power.”48 The key to military expansion and reform was a country’s ability to tap its financial resources. Without these resources, an army could not be expanded, foreign troops could not be hired, equipment could not be manufactured or purchased, and the soldiers and their beasts could not be fed and sustained in the field. Indeed, one of the factors influencing William III’s decision to embark upon his descent on England was his conviction that the Dutch Republic needed England — and its financial resources — in its corner in any struggle against Louis XIV’s France.49

As we saw in the previous chapter, Britain’s armed forces were relatively small on the eve of the Glorious Revolution and the Nine Years’ War. Prior to William III’s landing in Southern England, James II’s English army numbered just under 35,000 men, or perhaps as many as 45,000 if one counts the Scottish and Irish Establishments. In the fallout of the Glorious Revolution, the standing army crumbled. The Irish

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Establishment virtually ceased to be as those soldiers loyal to James II fled to France or awaited their monarch’s return, while those loyal to the new government were shipped overseas to serve in the Holy Roman Emperor’s army then fighting the Turk.\textsuperscript{50} The English Establishment — the core of the British army — lost close to 4,000 men in the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution and the Earl of Feversham’s subsequent disbandment order. When a muster was taken of the remaining forces on the English Establishment in April 1689, it numbered 31,000 officers and men. As we saw in Chapter Three, almost immediately, all three establishments of the British army saw significant growth. By mid-1689, the Scottish Establishment had been augmented to just under 10,000 men, almost 25,000 men had been raised for service against James II’s forces in Ireland, and some 14,000 Dutch, English, and Scotsmen, formerly in the pay of the States General, were hired by Parliament to augment the English Establishment. By the end of the year, the British army numbered just over 70,000 officers and men on paper, a more than 100% increase in the Crown’s forces.

During the first five years of the war, the forces of the British Crown fluctuated between 67,000 and 80,000 officers and men on paper. The army reached its greatest strength during this period in 1690 when the Crown’s forces numbered almost 97,000 officers and men on all establishments. Following the conclusion of the war in Ireland, Crown forces hovered around 80,000 officers and men. During much of this period, there were roughly 20,000 foreign troops on the British payroll. It was only in 1695 when the British army again experienced renewed growth. That year, the British army expanded from 80,000 in 1694 to 100,000 officers and men the next year, and then to 102,800 in 1696 and 1697. While the bulk of Britain’s armed forces continued to be drawn from domestic sources, more than 25,000 of the 89,000 men on the English Establishment during the last three years of the war were foreign troops. The vast majority of these hirelings comprised the Dutch forces that had participated in the William’s invasion of 1688. These were soon augmented by a 6,000-man Danish force hired during the war in Ireland, and by a Hanoverian corps hired 1695. When the war ended in September of 1697, the more than 102,000 men under arms were quickly demobilized. In spite of William’s efforts to husband his forces in preparation for the war he was convinced would soon follow, Parliament pushed through its plans. By 1698, the English Establishment numbered but 15,000 men, while the other two

\textsuperscript{50} Childs, \textit{The British Army of William III}, 11.
establishments together numbered perhaps another 15,000. By 1700 however, Parliament reduced the English Establishment still further to a mere 8,000 men while the Irish Establishment maintained just under 12,000 men. Parliament had demonstrated its control over the state’s finances and its armed forces. In spite of the king’s pleas for maintaining a larger force, Parliament pushed through its demobilization plans. Unfortunately for Britain, Parliament had not demonstrated its foresight; less than two short years later, Britain again found itself at war as its Dutch king feared it would.51

Like the Dutch Republic, Britain relied upon its financial strength to rapidly augment its forces in wartime. During much of the latter 17th century, Britain maintained small peacetime establishments. As we saw in Chapter 3, these small peacetime forces were then supplemented by new regiments raised in times of war. Fortunately for Britain, it never had to put this practice to the ultimate test. During both the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars, wartime levies did little more than take the place of regular regiments sent overseas. In both of these conflicts, Britain sent but a token corps in support of its continental allies.52 Thus, the mobilizations of these wars against the Dutch never really tested Britain’s ability to mobilize both manpower and money. The Nine Years‘ War provided the first real test of Britain’s financial and military bureaucracies. During the latter conflict, Britain, for the first time, was forced to implement a “Double Forward Commitment” — in other words, a fully mobilized army and navy.

Britain’s ability to raise both a large army and navy during the Nine Years‘ War was directly related to its strength as an economic power coupled the danger the war represented to Britain and its constitution. Parliament’s fear of absolutism led to its “invitation” for the Prince of Orange to intervene in Britain’s domestic affairs. But William was no pawn of Parliament’s plan to unseat James II. The prince saw the war-clouds looming on the horizon and determined to use Britain’s resources — both monetary and military — in the war that he believed would soon erupt on the Continent over Louis’ ambitions in Germany. When William and Mary were crowned King and Queen of England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland in February of 1689, the

51 See Chapter 3.

52 For details, see Childs, The Army of Charles II, passim.
Prince of Orange had little understanding of the details of parliamentary politics. Having enjoyed success in dealing with the States General, William expected that the same strategies that had worked for him in the Netherlands would provide him with the formula for success in England. Unfortunately for William, he was to be mistaken; indeed some have argued that he never truly grasped the intricacies of parliamentary politics. Consequently, while both parliament and William had been working more or less towards the same end, parliament’s own political goals coupled with its misperception of William’s true intentions (or its disagreement with his policies) led both oftentimes to work at cross purposes.

As in the Dutch Republic, a committee comprising the King’s leading military advisors, in consultation with the Privy Council, formulated the estimates of the forces deemed necessary for the pursuit of England’s military policy. Unlike in the former country where military affairs were formally discussed and planned in the Raad van State, in William III’s England the king himself and his closest military advisors determined what forces were necessary to satisfy the State’s military commitments. Once William and his advisors — no doubt in cooperation with the Lord High Treasurer — determined the size and cost of the force to be raised, it was reviewed in the Privy Council for their advice and/or support. Included among its members were the Secretaries of State, the Captain-General of the Army, the Lord High Admiral, the Lord Treasurer, Lord Chancellor, as well as several officials from the King’s Household. Once they determined the cost of the forces to be raised, the King would send his proposal to Parliament. After much negotiation, Parliament would then vote on the king’s proposal — or often a modified form of it — for approval. Once they agreed on the amount necessary to support the Kingdom’s war effort, Parliament would then decide upon the means of raising the appropriate funds.


54 The king would have included among his military advisors the Secretary of State at War, the head of the Board of Ordnance, the Captain-General of the Armed Forces (when it was not William himself) and his leading Dutch advisors including Willem Bentinck, First Duke of Portland, Count Solms, the army’s highest ranking General, and Nassau-Ouwerkerk. For details see Baxter, William III, 249-251; Horwitz, Parliament, policy and politics, 88-94; and Cox, King William’s European Joint Venture, 59-62.
As in the Dutch Republic where the Stadholder required the support of the provinces in conducting the war, the king was dependent upon Parliament’s support and goodwill in prosecuting the war against France. For most of the Nine Years’ War, William’s military requests were accepted. At times however, there were conditions or caveats added, or modifications made to his proposals. In 1689, the presence of James II’s forces in Ireland required the mobilization of additional English forces to meet this new threat. In that year, the House of Commons reviewed estimates made for the Crown’s extraordinary expenses and agreed upon most of them. These expenses came to over £2,500,000 and were divided thus: £600,000 to be repaid to the States General for the expenses related to William’s expedition, and £714,000 for the reduction of Ireland; another £1,199,000 was earmarked for the fleet, and for guards and garrisons. The £714,000 for Ireland supported the creation of a force of just over 30,000 officers and men. In addition to these, 10,000 men would be earmarked for service in Flanders with the allies. By the end of the year, 78,000 officers and men would be in the service of the British Crown.

Unfortunately, the confusion following the change of rulers in 1689, coupled with Britain’s use of the “Old Style” calendar makes a truly accurate assessment of the Kingdoms’ military costs during William and Mary’s first three years of rule somewhat problematic. According to the House of Lords papers, £3,478,585 was paid to the Earl of Ranelagh to cover the costs of the English Establishment during the period 5 November 1688 to 29 September 1691. This represents an approximate annual cost of just under £1,160,000. During this same period, the English Establishment expanded from just over 34,000 officers and men at the time of the invasion in 1688, to 50,000

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55 The members of the King’s Household in the Privy Council were the Lord President (of the Privy Council), the Lord of the Privy Seal, and the Lord Steward.
56 Horwitz, Parliament, Policy and Politics, 27.
57 English fiscal years measured from Michaelmas to Michaelmas. (September 30 to September 29).
58 Historical Manuscripts Commission (HMC), The Manuscripts of the House of Lords, 1690-1691 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1892), 357 (Accounts Commissioners—Book entitled A brief STATE of the INCOMES and ISSUES of their MAJESTIES’ PUBLIC REVENUE from the 5th day of November 1688, to the 29th of September 1691, with MEMORANDUMS made by the COMMISSIONERS constituted by one ACT OF PARLIAMENT made in the second year of their MAJESTIES’ reign, entitled An Act for appointing and enabling COMMISSIONERS to examine, take and state the PUBLIC ACCOUNTS of the KINGDOM.)
officers and men in 1691, an increase of approximately 15,000 men. This amount more or less correlates to the Dutch and English troops taken on by the Crown formerly in the pay of the States General. However, in addition to the cost of the English Establishment, the Exchequer also disbursed £1,102,057 to William Harbord, paymaster of the Irish Army in 1689 and an additional £1,347,160 to Charles Fox and Thomas Coningsby as paymasters of the Irish army in 1690-91. Taken together, the cost of the Irish Establishment amounted to £2,449,214 from 1688-91, or £816,405 per year. In addition to the expenses accrued by the English and Irish Establishments, the cost of forces overseas, and the accounts of the paymaster of Dutch forces in English pay together amounted to an additional £21,100. All told, British military expenses during the first three years of the war amounted to 5,948,903 — an average of approximately £2,000,000 per year. Not included in these costs are the accounts of the Board of Ordnance — which provided the army with its weapons, munitions, and cannon — and the small Scottish military establishment.60

The financial costs associated with Britain’s military establishments mirrored somewhat the spikes and dips of their gradual expansion during the war’s course. In the first four years of the war, more than one-third of the British Crown’s military expenditures were committed to sustaining the army in Ireland. The costs associated the English Establishment’s upkeep during this same period amounted to just under £1,200,000 per year, while the Irish Establishment’s costs averaged just under £800,000 per year. Figure 4.12 illustrates the Crown’s fluctuating military expenses during the course of the Nine Years’ War. During the war’s first four years, military costs hovered between 1.8 and 2 million pounds-sterling annually. During the same years, the army saw wild fluctuations, fluctuations that do not seem to mirror expenditures. For example, 1688-89 the army experienced massive growth, expanding from 30,000 in April of 1689 to over 78,000 men by September of that same year.61 Admittedly, these

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59 This figure was derived by dividing the total expenditures by three.

60 The account of the Board of Ordnance, which provided weapons and ammunition to both the army and the fleet, amounted to £661,206 for this same period. The Scottish Establishment, paid for by Scottish funds, numbered less than 10,000 officers and men at its peak strength in 1689-90. Because its size was relatively small and the costs involved were not significant, their omission from the totals here do not significantly affect the army’s totals. For the costs accrued by the Board of Ordnance during this period, see HMC, House of Lords, 1690-91, 359.

61 This figure represents the post-Glorious Revolution army. The list in Appendix shows the British army essentially as it was under James II in 1688.
represent paper figures and it is possible — even likely — that the actual musters never reached the levels claimed in the September report. Regardless of this, there was unquestionably a certain degree of actual growth since the number of new regiments on the books increased as well.\textsuperscript{62} The next year, the paper strength of all Britain’s forces approached 97,000 officers and men.\textsuperscript{63}

![Figure 4.12 British Military Expenditures, 1688-1699.](image)

The contrast between the financial expenditures, which on the surface seem relatively constant, and the army’s expansion, which during this same period increased dramatically, upon closer examination appear sharp or even contradictory. This image, however, has more to do with the sources themselves, and what they mean, than with differences between trends in financial and manpower data. The House of Lords manuscripts, the source for the financial data presented here, provides only a lump sum

\textsuperscript{62} See Figure 3.3.

\textsuperscript{63} See Figure 3.3.
for Britain’s military costs for the first thirty-four months of William’s reign.\textsuperscript{64} Although the data suggests that after 1688-89, the cost of Britain’s armed forces averaged £2,000,000 per year, other sources demonstrate that initially at least, costs closely mirrored the growth of the army. In his book \textit{Parliament, policy and politics in the reign of William III}, Henry Horwitz notes that Parliament had agreed to provide £1,200,000 in military expenses for the 1689-90 campaign season, and that the next year, it had agreed on an army of 69,000 men, and an even greater budget of £2,300,000 to pay for it, an increase of more than £1,000,000. Taken together, these figures equal the sum provided by the House of Lords records for the same period.\textsuperscript{65} This increase likewise mirrored the growth of the British army. Although the army appears to dip in strength from 1690 to 1691, the difference is more likely due to some units having never been raised while others were disbanded after having suffered serious casualties in Ireland.\textsuperscript{66} Even if one considers 1690 an aberration, the army experienced growth during all of the first four years of the war as can be seen in Figure 3.3 in the previous chapter. In the next financial period, spanning from 30 September 1691 to 29 September 1692, the cost of the army dropped to £2,148,854, including the Ordnance Board’s

\textsuperscript{64} These financial figures are from the period spanning from 5 November 1688 to 29 September 1691.

\textsuperscript{65} It is likely that this figure represented men only. Together with officers, the army would have numbered in the area of 72,000 men, a sum comparable to that shown on SP 8/8 ff.6 which lists the total strength of the English army on 9 October 1690 at 70,746, including foreign hirelings. The difference between these figures and the total for the British army is that the 35,000 men then on the Irish Establishment are not shown. It is likely, however, that the Irish figure is an inflated one, especially considering the date of this list and the loss of so many men in 1689-90. Another difficulty in confirming the strength is the confusion surrounding the Irish Establishment, which had virtually ceased to exist in November 1688. Many of those regiments included as part of the English army were in reality on the Irish Establishment, since they were serving there, thus rendering it difficult if not impossible to differentiate between English units serving in Ireland and those on the Irish Establishment. For Horwitz’s figures, see Horwitz, \textit{Parliament, policy and politics in the reign of William III}, 53-54, 62-63. For the House of Lords’ numbers, see HMC, \textit{The Manuscripts of the House of Lords, 1690-91}, 356-361. The House of Lords’ figures are also cited in John Childs, \textit{The British Army of William III}, 1689-1702, 269 (Appendix C.).

\textsuperscript{66} A number of relatively new regiments were disbanded after suffering serious losses during the first campaign in Ireland. It is possible the high figure for 1690 reflects both regiments newly raised in 1690 and damaged regiments before their disbandment appearing on the books at the same time. For more, see Charles Dalton, \textit{English Army Lists and Commission Registers, 1661-1714}, Vol. III., 1689-1694, 1-9, 65-98.
Likewise, the army during this same period experienced a decrease in size. Based on numbers presented in Figure 3.3, the British army shrank from just over 81,000 officers and men to 76,000 in 1692.68

For the remainder of the war, expenditures only loosely mirror the growth of the army during the same period. From the 1691-92 through 1693-94 fiscal years, the army’s expenses experienced steady growth. In 1691-92, the cost of the army’s pay and contingencies was just under 1.9 million pounds-sterling. From there, the costs associated with the army’s upkeep increased to 2.3 million in 1692-93, and to 2.8 million in 1693-94. After 1694, the army’s costs dipped slightly to 2.5 million in 1694-95, but then rose to 2.7 million pounds during the last two years of the war. At the same time, the army saw sporadic but consistent growth, somewhat mirroring the monies devoted to its upkeep. The army plummeted to its lowest point in 1692 when it mustered 76,043 officers and men on all three establishments. It then grew steadily until 1695 when it reached 100,000 officers and men and reached its peak the next year topping 102,000 on all establishments including officers. Why does the growth of the army seem not to mirror precisely the growth of the funds disbursed to support it? How can we explain the dip in army costs in 1694-95 as opposed to the previous year’s budget when the exact opposite occurred in terms of actual growth? One possibility is that the costs themselves changed; costs separate from those devoted to paying the troops. Indeed, it is noteworthy that in 1694, the military budget includes 25 regiments that were never fully completed. Only a close examination of the proposed 1694 budget, appearing in King William’s Chest for that year, would show that only 15 of the proposed 25 regiments were actually raised (and appear on the list for 1695). At the same time, the document shows an estimated cost for the 1694-95 fiscal year of £2,705,102 — £200,000 more than was actually disbursed by the Lord High Treasurer, but £100,000 less than the previous budget.69 Although it is premature to draw conclusions based on one example, the sources cited above do suggest that while the costs surrounding the army

67 The sum of the annual costs of the army’s pay and contingencies for 1691-92 shown in Figure 4.12 was £1,895,942. The cost accrued by the Board of Ordnance during this period was £252,912. Together they, more or less, equal the figure of £2,101,000 cited by Horwitz. See HMC, The Manuscripts of the House of Lords, 1690-91, 356-361; and Horwitz, Parliament, policy and politics in the reign of William III, 72.

68 See Chapter 3.

did roughly correspond to the army’s growth, they are by no means an exact measure of that expansion. At the same time, they also suggest a degree of record keeping inferior to that practiced by the Dutch. This example of the rather slipshod financial administration practiced by parliamentary and military bureaucrats also hints at the relative inexperience of the British Crown in administering large armies. Such fiscal sloppiness suggests that the Dutch indeed got more bang for their buck than did their less frugal British allies, a point we will return to later in this chapter.

Their apparent lack of frugality, nevertheless, does not mean that the war was any less exhausting for Britain and its economy. On the contrary, in spite of the establishment of the Bank of England in 1694 to help finance its effort on the continent, government finances were hard hit by the rocketing costs of the expanding Continental war. Although the Parliament raised numerous taxes to support the much-expanded British war effort — such that the cost of that effort per head amounted to £1.56 — much of that effort was financed through long-term borrowing.\(^{70}\) The first three years of the war saw the government borrow only £1,703,000. That amount was increased by one-third for 1693 alone — some £2,269,000 all told — to support Britain’s expanding war effort in the Low Countries and on the high seas. And while Britain’s long-term obligations subsided the following year, in 1695 government borrowing exceeded £2.3 millions and increased by another million pounds to £3,298,000 for 1696. By the last year of the war, government long-term borrowing had reached £4,767,000, the highest of the entire war, reflecting degree of strain on the Britain’s finances.\(^{71}\) By the time the war had ended, Britain’s national debt had grown from nil at the war’s onset, to £16,700,000 at its conclusion.\(^{72}\) During the war’s course, England suffered from a Recoinage Crisis, triggered in part by difficulties with the new national bank, which severely hurt the economy and hampered the war effort in that year. When peace was concluded at Rijswijk in September 1697, England was just as ready as both its Dutch allies and France to end the war.

Britain’s financial commitment to the alliance was impressive. By 1696, Britain was paying for army of 102,000 officers and men and a fleet of over 300 vessels, a good

\(^{70}\) D.W. Jones, War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough, 29 (Table 2.1).

\(^{71}\) D.W. Jones, War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough, 70-71 (Table 3.1).

\(^{72}\) John Brewer, The Sinews of Power, 30 (Table 2.1).
indication of the island nation’s “Double Forward Commitment.” During the war, Britain’s average annual government expenditure was over £5 million with defense costs accounting for the lion’s share. Although beyond the scope of this study, it is noteworthy that the costs associated with the Royal Navy’s upkeep were actually less than the army’s for much of the war, particularly during its earlier stages. This is particularly ironic considering the importance of the naval side of the war during its early years, years when the maritime war was dominated by fleet actions.\(^{73}\) And yet during the first six years of the war, naval costs exceeded military ones. According to the House of Lords Manuscripts, during the period spanning from November 1688 to 29 September 1691, the Exchequer disbursed £3,126,037 to cover the Royal Navy’s expenses. Even at this early date when maritime action played a prominent part in the war, costs for the land forces exceeded naval costs by more than £2 million!\(^{74}\) During the next fiscal period, from Michaelmas of 1691 to Michaelmas of 1692, army costs exceeded those of the navy by £648,518.\(^{75}\) During the 1692-93 fiscal year, army expenses exceeded naval ones by between £200,000 and £400,000, depending upon the source.\(^{76}\) From 1694 to 1697, naval expenses began to approach military ones such that by 1696, they had exceeded them by £55,436, a level they would maintain until the conclusion of the conflict in the fall of 1697.\(^{77}\)

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\(^{75}\) Total naval costs were £1,247,424 as opposed to those for the army, which amounted to £1,895,942. See HMC, *House of Lords Manuscripts*, 1692-93, 163.

\(^{76}\) HMC, *House of Lords Manuscripts*, 1693-95, 67. According to naval historian John Ehrman, naval costs for 1693 amounted to £2,077,216. The House of Lords Manuscripts, however, notes that for the same period, £1,925,327 was paid to “the Right Hon. Edward Russell, Esq., Treasurer for the Navy.” Army costs, according to the House of Lords Manuscripts and cited by John Childs, amounted to £2,345,548. One explanation for the discrepancy between naval figures may be that the one provided by Lords was a fiscal year number while Ehrman’s was for a calendar year. It is also possible (and more likely) that Ehrman’s numbers include additional costs not included in the House of Lords’ figure. For details, see John Ehrman, *The Navy in the War of William III*, 569. For John Childs’ figures, see John Childs, *The British Army of William III*, 267.

\(^{77}\) Based on figures from John Childs, *The British army of William III*, “Appendix B” and John Ehrman, *The Navy in the War of William III*. The military and naval costs during last four years of the war were: in 1694, £2,881,194 for the army vs. £2,346,032 for the navy; in 1695, £2,558,924 (army) vs. £2,603,492 (navy); and in 1696 and 1697, £2,709,713 (army) vs. £2,765,149 (navy). According to Ehrman, grants voted to meet the naval estimates the last three years of the war
The fact that army expenses exceeded naval costs during the greater part of the war does not by itself demonstrate a greater commitment to the land war. It is conceivable that military costs surpassed naval ones for other reasons. The increase in naval expenses in the latter years of the war, however, is more difficult to explain. According to John Ehrman, fleet warfare is expensive. The costs of maintaining the fleets, their stores and provisions, and their maintenance facilities was a constant financial burden. Facilities had to be kept constantly ready to receive ships in the event of a major action, even when such actions were unlikely or improbable. As Ehrman points out, “until an action had been fought, and probably until a decisive victory had been won, the war at sea seemed likely to persist on a large scale. Apart from a major defeat, the only end to such a process that could be contemplated was the financial or material collapse of one of the protagonists.”78 And yet from 1689 through 1693 — years when France was committed to fleet action — British army costs exceeded those of the fleet by significant amounts. Naval expenses did experience constant growth, such that by the war’s end they had exceeded the army’s expenses. Nevertheless, at a time when many would have expected naval costs to dwarf military expenses, the army devoured the greater part of the state’s financial obligations.79

A better indication of Britain’s commitment to the allied coalition would be to compare it to the commitments of its allies. The Dutch Republic was Britain’s most important ally both at sea and on the Continent. A comparison of their respective war efforts and commitments to the Confederate Army in the Spanish Netherlands would provide arguably the best indication of each nation’s commitment to the common cause and the efforts their commitment’s required. Likewise, a comparison with the other major contributor to the Confederate Army — Spain — will provide an exceptional case of a land whose interests demanded a maximum effort but whose finances prohibited it.

came to £2,382,712; £2,516,927 and £2,372,197 respectively. For details, see J. Childs, The British army of William III, 268; and John Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William III, 569.


The Decline of the Spanish Netherlands and the Allied War Effort

Whereas Britain and the Dutch Republic saw their expenditures and armies increase in size, the Spanish army in the Low Countries withered along with its economy. As was shown in Chapter 3, the Spanish army in the Low Countries attained its peak strength in 1690, the second full year of the war. From 1690 onwards, the Spanish army declined until by the war’s conclusion, it was just over half of its pre-war strength on paper, and undoubtedly far weaker in reality. Spanish military decline went hand in hand with the declining health of its finances. The Spanish Netherlands’ wealthiest provinces, Flanders and Brabant, were almost immediately subject to French contribution raids severely limiting the Brussels government’s ability to levy taxes. In October 1689, the French occupied the towns of Veurne, Diksmuiden, and Courtrai in southern Flanders. From these forward positions, France was able to place much of Flanders under contribution. Worse still, in 1691 Mons fell to Louis XIV’s forces which likewise opened Brabant to French chevauchées.80 Added to the region’s financial woes was the prohibition of trade with France, one of its most important trading partners. Consequently, the government in Brussels found itself remarkably short on funds, which naturally led to reliance on loans to finance the war effort, which only further aggravated the financial situation in the Spanish Netherlands.

The result on the government in Brussels and its armed forces was acute. In 1696, Councilor of Finance Michel Servati prepared a report showing the profits and losses suffered by the Spanish Netherlands between 1689 and 1695. Based on that report, the Spanish Netherlands’ income was calculated at 61,898,179 fl. while its losses amounted to a staggering 139,208,169 fl. During the same period. Flanders alone suffered losses in excess of 60,000,000 fl. — virtually the whole of the Brussels government’s income — while Brabant accounted for 43,500,000 fl. of the losses. Together, the two provinces accounted for 75% of Brussels’ total losses during the war.81 It can be no coincidence that these provinces suffered the most from the war since it was here where the bulk of the war’s campaigns took place. Although the evidence is less complete than that for the Dutch and the English, it is, nevertheless, equally compelling. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that the Spanish army

80 De Schrijver, Jan van Brouchoven Graaf van Bergeyck, 71-72.
81 De Schrijver, Jan van Brouchoven Graaf van Bergeyck, 97.
in Flanders underwent a significant decline. Lacking adequate funds, Brussels found it harder to pay its troops. This situation led not only to the shrinkage of the Spanish army in the Low Countries but it also forced the Dutch and English to shoulder a greater share of the allied war effort in the theater.\(^\text{82}\)

**Conclusion**

As we have seen above, both Britain and the Dutch Republic taxed their national economies to the utmost in order to stop the French onslaught in the Spanish Netherlands. Together they were the most important contributors to the allied army in the Low Countries, providing not only the most troops from their respective national establishments but the most “hired” subsidy troops. But what did this effort entail? How can we compare the war efforts of the Dutch Republic, England, and Spain in an equitable way?

One way is to determine the correlation between military expenditures and forces raised. During the Nine Years’ War, Britain’s army grew from 39,000 officers and men in early 1689, to almost 103,000 officers and men the last year of the war. Likewise, the army of the States General saw a similar, albeit less dramatic expansion, from 64,000 officers and men in 1688, to a wartime peak of 102,875 officers and men in 1695, the year of the Republic’s greatest military effort. Figure 4.13 compares the British and Dutch military mobilizations. Both include hired foreign troops; the British numbers include all three of the Crown’s military establishments. As is clear from the table, both governments raised or paid for similar numbers of troops, so superficially at least, both Britain and the Dutch Republic raised comparable armies to meet the French threat. How do their respective expenditures compare? If we use English pounds sterling as our standard and convert Dutch Guilders to pounds using contemporary exchange rates, we can directly compare Dutch and British expenditures. Figure 4.14 (yet to be completed) shows British and Dutch military expenditures side-by-side.

\(^{82}\) Ibid, 80-96.
But arguably more important than the size and cost of Britain’s and the Dutch Republic’s armies were their actual commitments to the Grand Alliance in general, and the Confederate Army in Flanders\textsuperscript{83} in particular. It meant nothing to the alliance if the troops were not deployed effectively. If soldiers of any nation were held back for domestic reasons, or committed to another theater, they affected the overall strength of the forces in the theater of operations under scrutiny here, Flanders. British historians have often claimed that Britain embarked on the most impressive war effort of all of the allied coalition’s members. The purpose of this section is to examine if this impressive effort was equally well deployed. Central to answering this question is an examination of which power bore the greatest part in the allied war effort in the Low Countries: Britain or the Dutch Republic? In order to answer this question, we will first look at the

\textsuperscript{83} Although Flanders was only a province in the Spanish Netherlands, because contemporaries so often used it to describe the region as a whole, we will do the same. Thus, whenever reference is made to the Flanders theater of operations, it is to be understood that it encompasses the entire region from the Meuse River to the English Channel.
commitment of the Dutch army. Then, we will examine where Britain deployed its troops and why. Through an examination of both armies’ deployments, we will see not only the military and diplomatic concerns of the states under scrutiny here but the role hired troops and domestic troops played in their respective efforts beyond their borders.
CHAPTER 5
ASSEMBLING THE CONFEDERATE ARMY

INTRODUCTION
The early modern state’s ability to wage war depended upon the effective mobilization of its military resources. The growth of its army, while important was not the only measure of its military power. In Chapter 3, we examined the patterns of army growth amongst European powers, particularly the members of the Grand Alliance, during the wars of Louis XIV. While important, army growth alone measured neither how a state employed its forces for war nor the factors influencing both its expansion and employment. In a period dominated by coalition armies, an examination of a given state’s army growth alone sheds little light on why its forces expanded. Even more significantly, it says nothing about whether that growth was based on fear of enemy attack, internal unrest, treaty obligation, or political opportunism. A better way to measure these factors is to examine army growth within the context of how the state’s forces were actually mobilized for war. One way to explore these factors is to examine the composition of the various coalition armies facing Louis XIV’s forces. In 1690, there were three principal theaters of war containing coalition armies: the Rhineland Theater, which contained forces from Habsburg Austria, various German princes, and southern German Kreisen; the Lower Rhine theater, which was built around the forces of the Elector of Brandenburg, the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, and the Duke of Hanover; and the Low Countries Theater which commanded the forces of the Dutch Republic, England, and Spain.1

1 Although the remaining theaters surrounding France — Northern Italy/Savoy, and Catalonia contained armies, these were not coalition armies per se. In Northern Italy/Savoy, the Duke of Savoy did hire subsidy troops to supplement those from own lands but all of them fell under his command. The same was true for Spanish forces in Catalonia, which with a few notable exceptions, were commanded by the Spanish Crown. Likewise, the Irish Theater is important
The Low Countries Theater was the focus of the allied war effort against Louis XIV. Although in the war’s early years, both the Rhineland and Low Countries Theaters attracted equal attention from both Louis XIV and the allies, by 1691 the Low Countries had emerged as the most important theater of war in spite of a French offensive in Germany in 1693. The reason for its growing importance was two fold: first, the fortress-dotted landscape of the Spanish Netherlands and Pays d’Liège and the manpower needs demanded by positional warfare required large armies both to garrison the territories’ numerous fortresses and provide adequate forces for field operations; and second, it was where the leader of the Grand Alliance, King William III of England, could deploy his resources to the maximum effect. But there was a third reason that in many ways overshadowed the others: the security of the Dutch Republic depended upon the integrity of the Republic’s southern buffer, the Spanish Netherlands, with its belts of fortifications. If the Spanish Netherlands and the Pays d’Liège were to fall into French hands, the Republic would be at the mercy of France. Thus, the driving factor explaining the expansion of forces in the Low Countries was the threat Louis XIV posed to Dutch security. Indeed, as K.H.D. Haley convincingly argues, William’s plan to unseat James II and bring England into the allied camp grew directly from the danger Louis XIV’s machinations in Germany posed for the Republic. The succession of a Francophilic candidate to the Archbishopric of Cologne would bring not only that strategically important territory into the Sun King’s camp but Liège and Münster as well, the very staging areas used for his attack on the Dutch Republic in 1672. The situation would pose a grave danger both to Dutch security and Dutch trade. Only with these security issues in mind can one fully understand William’s decision to invade England, the States General’s support of that plan, and the importance of the Low Countries Theater.

Strategic concerns also determined the make-up of the Confederate Army. The seriousness of the threat demanded that the Dutch Republic contribute the bulk of its forces to its defense. From the beginning, Dutch forces dominated the allied army in

more for its role in helping to shape William III’s coalition forces in the Spanish Netherlands than as a battleground for coalition forces. In fact, although William’s army in Ireland was a multi-national one, all of its formations were in the pay of the English Crown, and thus technically did not constitute a proper coalition army.

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2 Haley, “The Dutch, the invasion of England, and the alliance of 1689,” 21-34; and Israel, “The Dutch role in the Glorious Revolution,” 112-120.
the Low Countries. Although forces from Spain, Brandenburg-Prussia, and Hesse-Cassel would play a significant role in the operations there, only the Dutch Republic and the Spanish Army of Flanders provided more than 90% of their total forces to prosecuting the war in the Low Countries. Even England’s participation in the war in the Spanish Netherlands was shaped by Dutch strategic concerns. When Raadpensionaris Gaspar Fagel outlined the Prince of Orange’s scheme to invade England to the States of Holland, its underlying purpose was clear: to mobilize English military resources in support of the Dutch Republic in the coming war with France. The success of William’s expedition and his subsequent determination to use English forces in support of Dutch interests in the Low Countries was not lost on his new countrymen. Commenting on William III’s reason for intervening in what many in England viewed as English domestic affairs, the Marquis of Halifax noticed that the Stadholder-King “hath such a mind to France, that it would incline one to think, hee tooke England onely in his way.” His determination to expand the British army reflects not the needs of Britain but those of his homeland, the United Provinces. Thus the expansion of the British Army, in a sense, reflected William III’s and the Dutch Republic’s determination to defend its interests at all costs, even if those interests were not shared by all in Britain. As Sir Thomas Clarges, spokesman for the Commission of Accounts and opponent of William’s decision to send British troops to Flanders, made clear, “I cannot help but take notice that though we were drawn into this war by the Dutch — they being the principals — yet we must bear a greater share of the burden. These things, I am afraid, are occasioned by having one of the Dutch [E]states in your council.” Although Clarges accusation that the British commitment was greater than the Dutch one, his observation that Britain was drawn into the war in Flanders and that the Dutch were its “principals” captures the reality of the situation. Whether or not fighting the war in Flanders was in the British interest does not change the fact that it was unquestionably in the Dutch interest; no amount of debate in parliament could refute the fact that British soldiers were fighting “King William’s War.”

3 Jonathan I. Israel, “The Dutch Role in the Glorious Revolution,” 120.

4 Cited in Craig Rose, England in the 1690s: Revolution, Religion, and War, 105.

5 Henry Horwitz, ed., The Parliamentary Diary of Narcissus Luttrell, 1691-1693, 304.
The composition of the “Confederate Army” during the Nine Years’ War reflects the dominant role both William III and the Dutch Republic played in the conduct of the war in the Low Countries. The preponderance of Dutch, and later, English forces in the Confederate Army reflects the priority William III gave the security of the region. For the Stadholder-King, the Spanish Netherlands was the dueling ground. Success or failure depended upon exhausting the French juggernaut and maintaining the buffer between France and the Republic. To do that required devoting the militaries of both the Dutch and English states to wearing down French military might in Flanders. Only through a maximum mobilization of the “Maritime Powers” military resources could France be turned back and Louis XIV brought to the negotiating table.

Indeed, the multitude of Dutch forces within the Confederate Army reflects not only the Republic’s commitment to the security of the Spanish Netherlands, but also suggests the important influence the Republic’s forces had on the allied forces in the theater as a whole. Indeed, William’s presence in the theater as the Confederate Army’s commander from 1691 onward undoubtedly had a profound influence on allied forces under his command. Nevertheless, as we shall see below and in the chapters to follow, the fact that the Dutch Republic and England provided the Confederate Army with the bulk of its forces not only allowed William to exercise greater operational control over what began as a very disunited and strategically uncoordinated force, but the preponderance of Anglo-Dutch forces helped to forge an effective coalition army, as well.

Allocating Resources: The Allied War Effort and the Creation of the Confederate Army

As the events of 1688 plunged Europe into war, the states comprising what would become the Grand Alliance began mobilizing their forces. Through a combination of alliances and defensive arrangements, coupled with the direction of the French threat in 1689, collections of armies mobilized and began moving toward the threatened areas, the Palatinate and the Bishopric of Cologne. The various combinations of national armies, German Kreisen, and princely alliances helped create the main coalition armies

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6 Kreisen or “Circles” were the ten regions of the Holy Roman Empire. Established in the early 16th century, the Kreisen represented an intermediate level organization between the institutions of the Empire and its member states. An early institution of collective security within the Empire, each Kreise comprised a number of states that sent representatives to the Kreise.
facing France, and consequently, helped to define the main theaters of operations. By 1689, there were three main theaters of operations surrounding France: the Spanish Netherlands, the Lower Rhine, and the Rhineland or Palatinate. By 1690, two more theaters, Spain and Savoy/Northern Italy had been added to these. Each theater was different and each had different military requirements. To prosecute the war in so many theaters demanded coordination. Each theater required the right number of troops to do the job. Not all theaters could support large numbers of troops and, perhaps most importantly, not all theaters had the same strategic importance. In 1689 however, the creation of the initial three theaters — and thus the first three coalition armies — was more the result of geography and the position of the major alliance members and their military potentials than any, well thought-out strategic plan.

![Diagram of Allied forces in the Low Countries and Germany arrayed against France, 1690.](image)

**Figure 5.1 Allied forces in the Low Countries and Germany arrayed against France, 1690.**

Prior to the French invasion of the Palatinate, little had been concluded in terms of military commitment between the states that would comprise the Grand Alliance. Although the League of Augsburg bound the Emperor, Spain, Sweden, and a number of German states together in case of French aggression, not all of the members were at assembly. Each of the ten Kreise had their own armies with limited autonomy, and were responsible for the defense of its member states. For details see Wilson, *German Armies*, 17-22.
war with France in 1688, nor were all the states at war members of the League.\textsuperscript{7} Even more significantly, the alliance members seem not to have established any formalized war plans. Consequently, when Louis' forces marched into the Palatinate on 24 September 1688, very few states were prepared for war. The French easily brushed aside the armies of the Palatinate and Cologne and quickly marched on Philippsburg, investing it by 3 October 1688. After a siege just over a month, the formidable fortress fell to Vauban.\textsuperscript{8} Even as cannon still played against the fort’s walls, the allies made plans to oppose the French aggression. On 22 October 1688 Elector Friedrich III of Brandenburg, Elector Johann Georg III of Saxony, Duke Ernst August of Hannover, and Landgraf Karl of Hessen-Cassel met in Magdeburg with the goal of assembling an army to counter the French invasion. The “Magdeburg Concert” as it came to be called, resolved to form an army of just over 20,000 men under the command of the Elector of Saxony himself to operate in the middle Rhine to oppose the French attack.\textsuperscript{9} Although the concert could not assemble the forces quickly enough to save Philippsburg, by the end of the year it had mustered enough men to prevent further cavalry incursions across the Rhine. With Frankfurt covered, the army quickly advanced on Heidelberg forcing the French back to the Rhine. In the months that followed, this force would augmented by Imperial troops, and would become the cadre for the Emperor’s own Reichsarmee, the coalition army that operated in the Rhineland Theater for the rest of the war.\textsuperscript{10}

As the various allied armies marched to the front in response to the French attack, the foundations of the war’s main theaters began to take shape. To the south of the Magdeburg Concert’s forces, the Max-Emmanuel von Wittelsbach, Elector of Bavaria led a 20,000-man force comprising Bavarian and Schwabian Kreistruppen on the

\textsuperscript{7} Sweden never formally declared war against France though it did provide troops to the allies, most of which were in the pay of the Dutch Republic. Spain was neutral until Louis XIV declared war on that kingdom on 14 April 1689. The Dutch Republic was never a signatory of the League of Augsburg. William’s landing at Torbay in 1688, however, was treated as an act of war and brought with it a formal French declaration shortly thereafter. The States General reciprocated with its own declaration of war against France in March 1689.

\textsuperscript{8} Lynn, \textit{Wars of Louis XIV}, 194; and Wilson, \textit{German Armies}, 89.

\textsuperscript{9} The composition of the allied army according to the Concert of Magdeburg was as follows: Saxony 10,000; Hannover 7,400; Hessen-Cassel 2,000; and Brandenburg 1,200 for a total of 20,600 men. For details, see Jany, \textit{Geschichte der Preußischen Armee}, I. 364.

\textsuperscript{10} Wilson, \textit{German Armies}, 89-95.
Upper Rhine. At the same time, the Elector of Brandenburg began to assemble his own forces on the Lower Rhine in Cleves. Relying on forces already present there, Brandenburg’s local commander, Field-Marshal Schöning, assembled an army in and around Wesel. Schöning’s 8,383-man force, along with the Prince von Waldeck’s Dutch Army forming at Nijmegen, was responsible force for defending the Lower Rhine, and thus the Dutch Republic, from possible attack in William III’s absence. While Schöning protected the Rhine, Brandenburg threw a Prussian garrison into Cologne, thus denying the French the Bishopric’s capital. By January 1689, the Prussian corps in Cleves had grown to 10,520 and was poised to clear the French occupied forces along the Rhine in the Bishop’s lands. By the time the campaign began, the Elector’s army had doubled in strength numbering just under 27,000 officers and men, and a 40-gun artillery train.

The Origins of the Confederate Army: 1688-1690

The Dutch Army’s mobilization in the fall of 1688 reflected the States General’s concern for Louis XIV’s intentions. In 1688, the Dutch Army numbered 64,327 officers and men, up from just under 40,000 officers and men in 1687. Most of the increase resulted from bringing regiments up to wartime strength and the hiring of 14,252 “subsidy troops” to make up for the loss of a like number of Dutch troops participating in William’s “English Campaign.” In the late spring of that year, the States General had begun negotiations to acquire forces from various German states to augment the Dutch Army entrusted with defending the frontier. When William’s forces embarked on their great adventure, 43 squadrons of horse, 5 squadrons of dragoons, and 53

11 Jany, Geschiedenis der Preußischen Armee, I. 363-364; Wilson, German Armies, 89-95.

12 Schöning’s Corps was made up of 3,357 cavalry and dragoons drawn from six regiments and 8 battalions of foot numbering 5,036 men. For details see P. L. Müller, Wilhelm on Oranien und Georg Friedrich von Waldeck, Pt. II, 226 (“Kur-Brandenburgische Armee. Feldmarschall Lt. Schöning.”); and Jany, Geschichte der Preußischen Armee, I., 364-365.


15 ARA St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8100 (SvO, 1687), 8101 (SvO, 1688), and 8102 (Ext. SvO, 1688).

16 Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, Part VI, 118-121; and Part VII, 5-7.
battalions of foot — roughly 45,000 officers and men in all including the new subsidy troops — remained to protect the United Provinces from attack.\(^{17}\)

In the fall of 1688, the Dutch had assembled a field army to cover the traditional invasion route between the Rhine and Meuse rivers. Commanded by William’s deputy, Georg Friederich, Prince von Waldeck, this 23,270 strong covering force assembled in the outskirts of Nijmegen on the Mookerheide.\(^{18}\) According to a list entitled “Die verbundeten Armeen am Rhein”, Waldeck’s command contained more German subsidy troops than Dutch national forces. Of the 27 infantry battalions, 28 cavalry squadrons, and 5 squadrons of dragoons Waldeck had assembled, only nine battalions and four squadrons were native Dutch formations. A breakdown of the army at Mookerheide reveals the composition of Waldeck’s army, thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATIONALITY</th>
<th>Cavalry Squadrons</th>
<th>Dragoon Squadrons</th>
<th>Infantry Battalions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandenburg-Prussian(^{19})</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunswickers (-Lüneberg)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hessian (Hesse-Kassel)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Württembergers</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1: Waldeck’s army at Nijmegen, November 1688.\(^{20}\)

\(^{17}\) This figure was derived by subtracting William’s expeditionary force from the Dutch Army’s total strength as it is expressed in the *Staten van Oorlog* for 1688. For details see ARA. St.Gen. (1.01.05), 8101 (SvO, 1688), and 8102 (Extr. SvO, 1688). For the composition of William’s expeditionary force, see Ten Raa, *Het Staatsche Leger*, Part VI, 126-129.

\(^{18}\) The force mustered at the Mookerheide numbered only 27 infantry battalions and 28 cavalry squadrons for a total strength of 23,270. In total, the Dutch army numbered just under 70,000 not including the 1688 expeditionary force, which suggests that over 46,000 Dutch troops were in garrison. For details, see ARA. St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8105 (SvO, 1690) and 8106 (Extr. SvO, 1691); Müller, *Wilhem III von Oranien und Georg Friedrich von Waldeck*, Part II, 225-226 (“Die verbundeten Armeen am Rhein. November 1688.”); and Ten Raa, *Het Staatsche Leger*, VII., 6, 244-246, 280-282.

\(^{19}\) Only six of ten Prussian infantry battalions were on the Dutch establishment. The other four had been detached from Field Marshal Schöning’s corps in Cleves. These were *Churprince, Churfurst, Spaein, Zielen, Jongh Holstein*, and *Essers*, Jany, *Geschichte der Preußischen Armee*, I, 364-370; and ARA. St.Gen. (1.01.05), 8102 (Extr. SvO, 1688), for the Prussian formations hired that year.

Not all of the Republic’s forces were with Waldeck, however. Indeed, sixteen squadrons of horse and thirty-six infantry battalions — just over half of the army — were divided between the garrisons in Maastricht, the Dutch barrier fortresses, and in Zeeuws Flanderen. Schöning’s 8,000 Brandenburgers just over the border in Wesel supported Waldeck’s force. During the winter of 1688-89, the Dutch army expanded significantly as regiments completed their musters, new formations were raised, and others returned from England.21 By June 1689, the Dutch Army numbered 89 squadrons of horse, 14 of squadrons of dragoons, and 68 battalions of foot, of which most was fit for service in time for the start of the campaign.22

The Spanish Netherlands provided the other major allied force in the Flanders Theater in 1688-89. When France marched into the Palatinate, Spain — and thus the Spanish Netherlands — was still neutral. William’s expedition to England and the French declaration of war against the States General on 26 November made open conflict in the Low Countries more likely than ever, regardless of Spain’s position. On 15 April 1689, Spanish talks with France collapsed, and Louis XIV declared war on Carlos II. Within a week of the declaration, the Governor of the Spanish Netherlands, Francisco Antonio d’Agurto, Marquis de Gastañaga, requested military support from the States General. A month later, Waldeck and the Spanish General of Artillery, Isidoro de la Cueba Y Benavides, Marquis de Bedmar, met to discuss arrangements for Spanish and Dutch collaboration.23 They decided upon assembling two armies: one to operate in Flanders to protect the wealthy towns there from French incursions and another to operate in Brabant to support the barrier fortresses along the Sambre and Meuse Rivers.

In 1688, Gastañaga’s Army numbered 25,5390 officers and men divided into 18 regiments of horse, 5 of dragoons, and 30 battalions of foot, of which the bulk were confined to garrison duty. As war became more of a likelihood, Gastañaga

21 On 1 March, the Dutch forces not destined to enter the English Establishment returned to the Dutch Republic. These formations included 13 companies of cavalry, one regiment of dragoons, and five regiments of foot. Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, Part VII., 12-13, 428.

22 These figures include subsidy troops.

23 For details on this meeting, see Chapter 7 below.
supplemented his forces by an additional 6,000 men bringing the total strength of his army to 31,743 men by the end 1689, the peak strength of the “Army of Flanders” for all of the Nine Years’ War. Gastañaga was particularly concerned for the security of Flanders, the wealthiest of the Spanish provinces in the region and focused his defensive efforts there. To defend the region, he assembled roughly one-third of his forces in a field force comprising 34 squadrons of cavalry, 12 squadrons of dragoons, and five battalions of infantry; together 9,131 officers and men.24 Supplementing Gastañaga’s forces were eleven battalions of Dutch foot, and five companies of detached grenadiers under the command of Lieutenant-General Count Willem Adrian de Hornes. All told, Gastañaga’s allied army in Flanders numbered somewhere between 18,000 and 20,000 officers and men.25 An additional ten squadrons of Spanish horse were attached to Waldeck’s army forming at Hasselt near Maastricht. Gastañaga’s committed his remaining forces — some 26 squadrons of horse, ten of dragoons, and 25 infantry battalions or roughly 20,000 men — to garrisons throughout the Spanish Netherlands.26

Waldeck’s Dutch Army provided bulk of the allied forces available for the first campaign in the Low Countries theater. In 1689, Waldeck’s forces numbered just over 74,000 officers and men on paper divided into 89 squadrons of horse, 14 squadrons of dragoons, and 65 infantry battalions. The confusion of the first year and the lack of a

24 Figures here are based on Etienne Rooms, “De Materiele Organisatie van de Troepen,” Bijlagen Deel I, 120; Bijlagen Deel II, 313; Bijlagen Deel III, 487; and ARA. St. Gen. (1.01.06), Secrete Kast Lopende, 12579.121, “Lyste van het Leger van den Marquis de Guastanaga,” (recd. 30 August 1689).

25 According to the 30 August 1689 list of Gastañaga’s army in Flanders, the regiments Hornes-Kessel, Hornes-Boxtel, Manmaecker, Schimmelpenninck, Scheltinga, and Essen were assigned to his corps in Flanders, while the regiments Percival, Schotte, Haersolte, and Burmania, all of which were assigned to garrisons in the region, contributed their grenadier companies. In addition to these formations, the Dutch regiments Noyelles, Stirum, Beyma, and the Swedish regiments Putbus and Tiesenhausen, all of which were originally part of Waldeck’s army and appear on his 16 May list, were later assigned to Gastañaga. For details, see ARA. St. Gen. (1.01.06), Secrete Kast Lopende, 12579.121, “Lyste van het Leger van den Marquis de Guastanaga,” (recd. 30 August 1689); RV. (1.01.19), 626, Ingekomen Missieven, Jan.-Juni 1689, “Lyste van de Regimenten te Voet, Maestricht den 16 Mey 1689.”

26 This is a rough figure. If one subtracts 9,131 from the total strength in 1688, 25,539 — probably closer to the paper strength the 1689 figure of 31,743 — one arrives at 16,408. Since the army expanded in 1689 to over 31,000 men, it is likely that some of this expansion had taken place by the campaign season giving Gastañaga between 18,000 and 20,000 men for garrisons in the rest of the Spanish Netherlands. Etienne Rooms, “De Materiele Organisatie van de Troepen,” Bijlagen Deel I, 120; Bijlagen, Deel II, 313; Bijlagen Deel III, 487.
clear campaign objective led much of Waldeck’s force to be split between Gastañaga’s forces in Flanders and the Elector of Brandenburg’s on the Lower Rhine. During the winter months, nine battalions of foot and a regiment of dragoons were attached to Field-Marshal Schöning’s forces on the Lower Rhine.27 At the start of the campaign, another eleven battalions had been detached to support Gastañaga’s army in Flanders while 14 squadrons of horse had left his army to support the Elector of Brandenburg’s siege of Bonn.28 The remaining forces — 69 squadrons of horse, 8 of dragoons, and 48 infantry battalions — formed the basis for Waldeck’s field forces.29 Although no musters of this force exist, an estimate based on an average squadron strength of 150 troopers and a battalion strength of 700 men yields a figure of 49,900 men including Gastañaga’s 1,500 cavalry troopers.30 Of this figure, perhaps as many as 15,000 were committed to garrisons in the Spanish Netherlands and the Dutch Republic. The addition of the Earl of Marlborough’s English corps, comprising four squadrons of horse and 14 battalions of foot,31 added another 6,000 men to Waldeck’s army, giving his field army a strength of between 40,000 and 45,000 officers and men. Together with Gastañaga’s Spanish forces, the allies had 90,000 men available between them, with


29 ARA. RvS. 1.01.19, 626 (Incoming Missives, Jan.-June 1689), unfoliated “Lyste van de Regimenen te Voet die ten deele al gamarcheert syn ende ten deele ordere hebben sigh gestelt te houden, Maestricht den 16 Mey 1689”; and Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, Pt. VII., 13, 429 (Aanteekening No. 8).

30 F. J. G. Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VII., 14-15; Rooms, De Materiele Organisatie van de Troepen..., Bijlagen Deel II, 313. Based on Rooms’ figures, Spanish cavalry regiments averaged 300 men in 1689, thus suggesting that at least five Spanish regiments would have accompanied Waldeck’s army.

31 According to English sources, Marlborough’s corps should have numbered 10,972 men or 12,907 with its officers. At the time of its arrival with the army, however, the English corps mustered no more than 6,000 men. For details, see PRO SP 8/5, King William’s Chest, 1689, ff. 25, 46; ARA. RvS. (1.01.19), 626, Ingekomen Missieven, Jan.-Juni 1689, “Memoire waer de Nieuwe Engelsche Regimenten logiren sullen (Zanten, den 16 April 1689), “Waldeck to the Raad van State, Breda den 25 April 1689”; CSPD, 1689-90, 130-131 (“Waldeck to William III, Maestricht, 1 June 1689”); and John Childs, The Nine Years’ War and the British Army 1688 – 1697, 114.
perhaps 70,000 men available for duty in Flanders and Brabant during the 1689 campaign season.\textsuperscript{32}

Rolls of Waldeck’s and Gastañaga’s corps’ in their winter quarters in 1689-90 provides a clearer indication of the allied forces present in the Low Countries and Hispano-Dutch force commitments. Although the Dutch Army had not yet reached its wartime peak strength, troops in the pay of the States General nevertheless represented the majority of allied forces in the theater, even during the war’s first years when Spain’s contribution was still significant. The Dutch Army in 1690 comprised a total of 43 infantry battalions, 37 squadrons of cavalry, and five squadrons of dragoons (66 infantry battalions, 57 squadrons of cavalry, and 13 squadrons of dragoons if one includes subsidy troops) with a total strength of 74,280 officers and men on paper. Gastañaga’s army included 52 squadrons of cavalry, 29 of dragoons, and 32 battalions of infantry plus an 8,000 man Hanoverian corps for a total strength of 39,700 officers and men.\textsuperscript{33} Although the numbers for Gastañaga’s force appear to be real strength

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{32} This estimate is based on adding together the strengths of the allied forces available in the in the Theater. The Dutch army could muster between 50,000 and 60,000 men. The Staten van Oorlog for 1688 likely was a more accurate reflection of the army’s strength in 1689 than in the year for which it was intended. In 1688, the Dutch army numbered 64,327 officers and men including the 15,269 men accompanying William to England. Subtracting that from the total strength in 1688, the Dutch army would have numbered 55,580 officers and men on paper. In 1689, an additional 6,522 subsidy troops went into Dutch pay. It is conceivable that some of these would have been mustered in time to augment the army. Under the circumstances, an estimated paper strength of between 55,000 and 60,000 officers and men seems realistic. The Spanish army, likewise, could muster between 25,539 and 31,743 in 1689. Since the latter figure represents the number of men paid for in 1689 — men who may not have been present with the army until after the campaign season — an average between the two figures seems a realistic estimate of Spanish paper strength. The English expeditionary force numbered 12,907 on paper though it is clear that this figure was quite inflated. Adding together the median strengths of the three armies in the theater, one arrives at a figure of 92,000 officers and men. Thus, it is likely that the allies could muster around 90,000 officers and men on paper in the theater of operations including garrisons. For the Dutch army, see ARA. St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8101 (SvO, 1688); 8102 (extr.SvO, 1688); 8103 (SvO, 1689); 8104 (extr.SvO, 1689). For the Spanish, see Rooms, “De Materieel Organisatie van de Troepen,” Bijlagen Deel III, 487. And for the English, see PRO SP 8/5, King William’s Chest, 1689, ff. 25, 46.

\textsuperscript{33} According to a list found among Waldeck’s papers, the Spanish Army in the Low Countries numbered 24 regiments of horse, 9 of dragoons, and 30 regiments of foot. In addition to these, Waldeck’s list notes that 8,000 Hanoverian troops — predominantly cavalry — were in Spanish pay with their forces. Etienne Rooms, author of an exhaustive study of the Spanish Army in the Low Countries gives the army a strength of 25 regiments of cavalry, 8 of dragoons, and 32 of infantry and provides a strength figure of 31,743 but makes no mention of the Hanoverian troops. As Rooms’ work draws from a multitude of sources but focuses on domestic forces, I have relied on his figures for the Spanish army but added Müller’s for the Hanoverian subsidy troops to arrive at a figure of 40,000 men. For details, see Etienne Rooms, “De Materieel Organisatie van de Troepen,” Bijlagen Deel I, 120-121; Bijlagen Deel II, 313-314; and Müller,
figures, those for Waldeck’s force are based on the *Staten van Oorlog* which are paper-strength figures. Consequently, its is likely that the actual strength of Waldeck’s force was significantly less. Based on discounted figures for the Dutch Army, it is likely that the Republic’s forces possessed a “real” strength of 52,330 officers and men. The same muster of allied forces in the Low Countries lists ten English infantry battalions and four squadrons of horse or 6,600 officers and men based on discounted strength figures. Taken together, it is likely that actual number of allied forces wintering in the Low Countries in 1689-90 numbered somewhere between 90,000 and 100,000 officers and men. The breakdown of allied formations based on their winter quarters in the Low Countries Theater is shown in Table 5.2 below:

![Table 5.2: The Confederate Army in the Low Countries, 1688-1689.](image)

- Dutch Republic: 43 infantry battalions, 37 cavalry squadrons, 8 dragoon squadrons
- Dutch Subsidy Troops: 23 infantry battalions, 20 cavalry squadrons, 5 dragoon squadrons
- England: 10 infantry battalions, 4 cavalry squadrons, 0 dragoon squadrons
- Spain: 32 infantry battalions, 51 cavalry squadrons, 29 dragoon squadrons
- Hanover (in Spanish Pay): (10) infantry battalions, (16) cavalry squadrons, 0 dragoon squadrons

**Total Forces:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATIONALITY</th>
<th>Infantry Battalions</th>
<th>Cavalry Squadrons</th>
<th>Dragoon Squadrons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Republic</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Subsidy Troops</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanover (in Spanish Pay)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Forces:</strong></td>
<td><strong>118</strong></td>
<td><strong>128</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2: The Confederate Army in the Low Countries, 1688-1689.


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34 These discounted figures are based on the following average strengths: squadron of horse = 150; squadron of dragoons = 120; battalion of foot = 650. Knoop uses these figures for his estimates and these seem good ballpark figures to use to estimate field strengths, particularly for the mounted units. I have used 650 as an average strength for infantry battalions because it was early in the war and the battalions were probably close to full strength. Actual musters of infantry battalions in the field in 1692 and 1694 yield averages of 600 and 630 for Dutch and Dutch subsidy formations, however. For those lists, see PRO SP 8/13, ff. 179-199; and ARA. RAZH, *Familie van Wassenaer* (3.20.63), 4 (Willem van Wassenaer-Duvenvoorde) unfoliated, “Trouppes daer over den Coninck van Groot Bretaigne, Monsteringe, ende Reveue heeft gedaen, ende daer uyt d’Armée inde Spaense Nederlanden, onder desselfs commande is gecomposeert 1694.”


Based on number of formations in the figure above, and using discounted figures to compute their strengths, the allied forces wintering in the Low Countries would have numbered 94,440 — close to the 98,630 men the strengths of each of the contingents would have yielded if computed separately. Taking median of these figures — 96,000 officers and men — provides a good ballpark figure of the real allied strength in the Low Countries Theater in the winter of 1689-90.37

The 1690 season saw an even larger allied force assembled in the Spanish Netherlands, in spite of decreases in both the Spanish and English contingents. The Spanish and Dutch presence in the theater remained more or less the same in terms of formations employed, though the Spanish Army seems to have decreased in size somewhat. According to Etienne Rooms’ figures, the Spanish Army in Flanders shrank from almost 32,000 men in 1689 to just over 28,000 in 1690, largely due to wastage in its infantry formations.38 The Dutch Army, on the other hand, continued to commit the bulk of its forces to the Spanish Netherlands. As had been the case in 1689, between four and seven infantry battalions were posted above the Maas in the United Provinces proper as garrisons leaving at least 59 battalions for service in the Spanish Netherlands as well as all of its cavalry and dragoons. The English force in Flanders, which had numbered some 9,970 men on paper in the fall of 1689, was drastically reduced as William redeployed more than half of it back to the British Isles the following spring.39 Consequently, only five English battalions were in the Low Countries for the 1690

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37 The first figure is based on adding up the strengths of the Dutch, Spanish, and British contingents as shown on page [000] while the second is based on using average strengths for the grand total of squadrons and battalions as shown in Table 5.2. It is interesting to note that the estimates here are not very different from the estimates based on the paper strengths described in note 33 above.

38 According to observers in 1690, the Spanish government in Brussels’ fiscal difficulties had an adverse effect on the army and contributed directly to its rapid wastage during the course of the war. Almost from the war’s first year, the treasury in Brussels fell in arrears. By January 1692, the troops’ salaries were already fourteen months in arrears. For details, see de Schrijver, Jan van Brouchoven, Graaf van Bergeyck, 82-83.

39 The paper strength of the British force in Flanders is provided in SP 8/5 ff. 306 “The Present Disposition of all Their Majesties Forces” dated 20 September 1689. Based on this document, there were two regiments of horse (together four squadrons) and thirteen battalions of infantry that went into winter quarters. The paper strength of this force was 9,970 men, excluding officers, though the actual field strength with officers and men together would have been slightly less than this.
campaign. Its loss was largely offset by the addition of the army of the Prince Bishop of Liège, which added 6,000 men to the allied forces in the Low Countries.

But the most significant change was the addition of the Elector of Brandenburg’s army to the Low Countries Theater. In the winter of 1690, a planning congress met for the first time in The Hague to coordinate the coalition’s military efforts. Although it did not produce coordinated plan of action for the coming campaign, it did lay down the strengths of allied armies and where they would be deployed for that season. For the 1690 campaign, the Prince of Waldeck would command his Dutch force of 32,000 men concentrating in Brabant, while in Flanders the Marquis de Gastañaga would command a joint Spanish, English, and Hanoverian force in Flanders numbering between 20,000 and 25,000 men. On the Lower Rhine concentrating in the vicinity of Wesel was the Elector of Brandenburg’s Prussian Army. The Elector’s army consisted of 17 squadrons of horse, 6 of dragoons, and 20 battalions of foot, together 21,347 men. The Brandenburg-Prussian Corps area of responsibility was between the Meuse and the Mosel but his force would play an important role in the campaign in the Low Countries.

The total forces available to the allies in the Low Countries had increased with the presence of the Elector of Brandenburg’s forces. Furthermore, the addition of forces from Liège helped to offset the departure of more than half of the British force to Ireland. The total remaining is shown in Table 5.3 below:

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40 The composition of the British contingent is shown in PRO SP 8/13 ff. 323 entitled “A List of their Majesties Forces now in Flanders, And those ordered Thither.” Mistakenly labeled “1693?”, the list shows the composition of the English force before and after the departure of seven battalions and all of the cavalry for the British Isles in the early spring of 1690.

41 John Childs, *Nine Years’ War and the British Army*, 137.

Table 5.3: Allied forces available for service in the Low Countries in 1690.

Although the allies possessed a sizable force in the Low Countries, the lack of coordination between the coalition members led to the ultimate failure of the campaign. Waldeck’s field force of 71 squadrons of horse, 13 squadrons of dragoons, and 30 battalions of foot, roughly 32,000 officers and men in all, suddenly found itself outnumbered when the Marquis de Gastañaga failed to prevent the union of d’Humieres corps with the Duke of Luxembourg’s main army. Outnumbered by more than 10,000 men and unable to retreat in the face of the Duke of Luxembourg’s superior force, Waldeck was forced to give battle, unsupported, at Fleurus. The defeat at Fleurus on 1 July 1690 was a serious blow to the allies. Waldeck lost over 11,000 men in the battle, roughly one-third of his total force. French losses were heavy but not as severe. The arrival of the Brandenburg Army from the Meuse following the battle immediately redressed the balance, but the damage had been done.

Despite the apparent strength of allied forces in the Low Countries, the inability of the three forces to cooperate led to the decisive defeat of Waldeck’s Army. The irony of the 1690 campaign is that the allies most likely outnumbered French forces in the theater. Although we do not know the strength of French garrisons in the region, the total forces mobilized for field service in the Low Countries theater was 155 squadrons of horse and dragoons and 61 battalions of foot. Luxembourg’s own force numbered 37 battalions and 91 squadrons of horse and dragoons. Before the battle, Luxembourg had detached 14 battalions and 36 squadrons to observe Gastañaga and pin him in Flanders. To make up the difference, Marshal Boufflers marched to the Low Countries from the Mosel adding 24 battalions and 64 squadrons to Luxembourg’s force. Thus on the eve of the battle, Luxembourg had at his disposal perhaps as many as 47 battalions and 119
squadrons though other sources give his army a strength of 40 battalions and 80 squadrons. Nevertheless, the arrival of either Gastañaga’s 15,000 men and Brandenburg’s 21,000 men would have redressed the imbalance of forces. It is also interesting to note that only half of Waldeck’s infantry was at the battle. Although one would expect the allies to keep sizable garrisons, the fact that 36 of 66 Dutch infantry battalions were in garrison is indicative of the manpower demands of the theater and its fortresses.\footnote{For a description of the 1690 campaign and the battle of Fleurus, see especially W. Sawle, An Impartial Relation of All the Transactions Between the Army of the Confederates, And That of the French King, in their Last Summers Campaign in Flanders With a more particular Respect to the Battle of Fleury (London, 1691), passim; de Beaurain, Histoire Militaire de Flandre Depuis l’année 1690. jusqu’en 1694 inclusivement; Qui Comprend Le Détail Des Marches, Campemens, Batailles, Sièges & Mouvements des Armées du Roi & celles des Alliés pendant ces cinq Campagnes. Campagne de 1690 (Paris, 1755), passim; ARA St. Gen. (1.01.06), Secrete Kast Lopende, 12579.122 “Slag bij Fleury”; and Childs, The Nine Years’ War and the British Army, 133-155.}

\textbf{1691-93:} \\
\textit{The Dutch Commitment to the Low Countries and the Decline of Spain}

The inability of Gastañaga and Waldeck to work together defeated any advantage the allies might have enjoyed in manpower during the first years of the war. This too would change, however. Although Spain commanded the second largest of the allied contingents in the theater at the start of the war, Gastañaga and Spain were destined to play an ever-diminishing role in the struggle for the Spanish Netherlands. The decline of Spanish influence within the coalition was due to that state’s inability to maintain sizable field forces as the fighting wore on. As Etienne Rooms and Reginald de Schrijver have shown, while the Spanish mustered considerable forces in the Low Countries for the first four years of the war, a dearth of government funds — in part brought on by French raids into the Spanish Netherlands’ most wealthy provinces — meant that Brussels lacked the financial means to maintain its forces.\footnote{See Chapter 4.} At the end of the 1690 campaign season, arguments erupted between allied commanders largely because Spain could pay neither for its Hanoverian subsidy troops, nor for its share of the Brandenburg corps’ sustenance as agreed, thus leaving Flanders and Brabant exposed to further French raids. But not only could Brussels no longer pay its subsidy troops but its own troops also fell further and further into arrears, leading to the
degradation of its formations. As we have already seen, the Spanish Army of Flanders continued to wither on the vine so that it had fallen from just over 31,000 in 1689 to 17,029 officers and men in 1693, a 45% drop in its strength in only three years! Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that Brussels would play an ever diminishing role in the defense of its territories.

That left the burden of defending the region on William III and the States General. From the beginning, the Dutch Republic had devoted nearly all of its forces to its southern neighbor’s defense. The first year of the war, the Dutch Republic deployed 90% or more of its forces to the allied army in the Spanish Netherlands as it increased the size of its armed forces. In 1688, the Dutch Republic fielded 31 squadrons of horse, 5 of dragoons, and 52 battalions of infantry while William was in England marching on London.\footnote{ARA St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8101 (SvO, 1688), and 8102 (extr. SvO, 1688).} When William intervened in English domestic politics, he determined to take no chances. His expeditionary force comprised 15,269 regular Dutch troops plus several thousand English and Huguenot followers. Based on recent scholarship, historians estimate William’s army numbered around 21,000 officers and men, including artillery personnel.\footnote{Israel and Parker, “Of Providence and Protestant Winds,”337-338 (note11); Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VI., 127-128.} In terms of the Dutch standing army however, it removed some of the best regiments from Dutch service for the balance of the war. Included among the regiments participating in the expedition were the Prince of Orange’s 27 companies of “Blue Guards” under the command of Hendrik Trajectinus, Count van Solms, one of the prince’s cousins and the Dutch army’s General of Infantry. The Blue Guards were the cream of the Dutch army, numbering 2,522 officers and men at the time of the expedition. Eight regiments of regular infantry — each numbering between 550 and 660 officers and men — also accompanied the expedition.\footnote{These infantry regiments were as follows: from Gelderland Regiment \textit{van Wijnbergen}; from Holland Regiments Birkenfeld, Holstein-Norberg, Fagel, and Brandenburg; from Zeeland, Regiment \textit{Nassau-Saarbrucken}; from Utrecht Regiment \textit{Hagedoorn}; and from Overijssel Regiment \textit{Carlson}. For details, see Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VI, 126-128.} In addition to the Dutch guards and regular infantry, the six infantry regiments of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade — three English and three Scottish Regiments paid for by the States General but jointly commanded by the English Crown and Stadholder — accompanied the expedition. These 600-man-strong regiments were considered among
the very best in the Dutch army, and would later provide officer cadres for other English and Scottish regiments. In addition to the 11,000 infantry, William amassed 47 companies of horse and 18 companies of dragoons; together just over 4,000 mounted troops. Although the dragoons comprised two complete regiments, the horse were organized largely into ad-hoc regiments, each comprised of three companies. Following the successful expedition in 1688, and William and Mary's acceptance of the throne in February 1689, most of the accompanying Dutch regiments were retained in English service. According to both English and Dutch sources, these regiments included the Dutch Horse-Guards and nine regiments of horse (34 companies total), the Dutch Guard-Dragoons (10 companies), the Stadholder's "Blue Guards" (27 companies of foot), the infantry Regiments Brandenburg, Nassau-Saarbrücken, Carlson, and the six infantry regiments of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade. Those units that were not taken into English service — 13 companies of horse, 8 of dragoons, and 5 infantry battalions all told — returned to the Republic in the summer of 1689.

The 1688 operation had committed more than half of the Republic's cavalry, all of its dragoons, and about one-quarter of its infantry to an operation outside of the continent, leaving between 25,000 and 30,000 Dutch troops, plus an additional 14,000

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48 The exception to this was William's Regiment of Horse Guards. The Guards comprised one company of Gardes du Corps numbering 197 troopers and six companies of horse each numbering 80 troopers. They maintained this strength level in English service as well. For details, see ARA St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8103 (SvO, 1689); 8104 (extr. SvO, 1689); BL Add. MSS. 15,897, ff. 88-90; and Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VI., 126-128; and VII., 427-428.

49 The nine regiments of horse numbered 213 troopers each divided into three 71-man companies. At the time of the invasion, the companies mustered only 52 men each but were brought up to full strength before they went over into English pay. Each regiment in English pay seems to have approximated only a half regiment when in the pay of the States General. For details, see ARA St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8103 (SvO, 1689); 8104 (extr. SvO, 1689); BL Add. MSS. 15,897, ff. 88-90; and Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VI., 126-128; and VII., 427-428.

50 Each infantry regiment numbered 852 men broken down into 12 companies of 71 men each. Prior to the invasion, the regiments' companies numbered 55 men each. These were brought up to full strength before going into British service, thus giving the impression that the entire expeditionary force had gone into British service, when in fact only ten regiments of horse, one of dragoons, and four of foot (including the three-battalion strong guards regiment) in the end were retained by William III. For details, see ARA St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8103 (SvO, 1689); 8104 (extr. SvO, 1689); BL Add. MSS. 15,897, ff. 88-90; and Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VI., 126-128; and VII., 427-428.

51 The regiments that returned to the Republic in March 1689 were Marwitz's Dragoons, and the infantry regiments Wijnbergen, Birkenfeld, Holstein-Norberg, Fagel, and Hagedoorn. For details, see Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VII., 427-428.
subsidy troops, to defend the Republic’s borders. During the autumn months, Prince Georg-Friedrich von Waldeck, the commander of the Dutch army in William’s absence, concentrated the allied field army near Nijmegen. According to a roll taken in November 1688, the army numbered 16,302 men. Included among its numbers were 12 companies of Dutch cavalry and 7 battalions of infantry, together 540 horsemen, and 4,200 infantrymen. The balance of the army comprised troops from Brandenburg, Brunswick-Lünenburg, Hesse-Cassel, and Württemberg, all recent additions to the States General’s forces. Another two Dutch battalions were detached from the main field army in Grave and ’s Hertogenbosch. Thus, between the expedition to England and the field army massing on the outskirts of Nijmegen, all but 15 companies of horse, all the dragoons, and half of the army’s 52 infantry battalions had been committed to one of the two “field armies.” The remaining troops were either in garrisons in Zeeland, in the barrier fortresses in Brabant and Limburg, or in one of the other fortress towns in the Republic.

During the course of 1689, the States General and the Raad van State brought the existing Dutch regiments up to wartime strength and raised new ones. Before the end of the year, the Republic was fielding 63 infantry battalions, while the 23 regiments of horse and 4 of dragoons now fielded 77 and 13 squadrons respectively. By the end of the 1689 campaign season, 90% of the Republic’s forces were committed to the Confederate Army in the Spanish Netherlands. It is also noteworthy that virtually all of the subsidy troops were with the confederate army; ten of twelve cavalry regiments, all of the dragoons, and 22 of 23 infantry battalions went into winter quarters in the Spanish Netherlands. In terms of Dutch national troops, 11 of 14 cavalry regiments, all

52 In 1688, the Dutch Republic hired 47 companies of horse (2,896 troopers) in eight regiments, 10 of dragoons (740 troopers) in two regiments, and 86 companies of foot (10,616 men) in seventeen battalions. The subsidy troops, hired from Brandenbrug-Prussia, Celle-Wolfenbüttel, Hesse-Kassel, and Württemburg replaced the soldiers in William’s expedition to England. For details of the subsidy corps composition, see ARA St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8102 (Extr.SvO, 1688); and Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VI., 118-119.


54 These two field armies were the one in Nijmegen and the other in England accompanying the Prince of Orange.
the dragoons, and 34 of 40 infantry battalions were deployed in the Spanish Netherlands or Zeeuws Vlaanderen.\(^{55}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(includes subsidy troops)</th>
<th>Total Units</th>
<th>With the Confederate Army</th>
<th>Percentage of the Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Squadrons of Horse</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squadrons of Dragoons</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalions of Foot</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.4: Dutch forces committed to the Confederate Army, 1689-90.**\(^{56}\)

The pattern begun in 1689 would be repeated throughout the war. In 1690, the States General authorized raising additional forces to offset the loss of those units that had gone into British service, and to supplement the army’s regiments further. The army increased the number of “national” cavalry companies by 76 bringing the total to 112 companies or approximately 56 squadrons. The States General could now field 14 cavalry regiments of between six and nine companies each. There remained two dragoon regiments on the national establishment, each of eight companies. And to replace the infantry battalions lost, the States General ordered six new battalions be raised and authorized bringing the others up to a uniform strength of twelve companies each.\(^{57}\) This growth translated into stronger forces in the theater of operations. Table 5.5 illustrates the growth of the Dutch Army during the war’s first five years:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Infantry Battalions</th>
<th>Cavalry Squadrons</th>
<th>Dragoon Squadrons</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1688</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1689</td>
<td>63</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1692</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.5: Increase of forces in Dutch pay, 1688-1692.**

\(^{55}\) See note 103 below.

\(^{56}\) Figure 5.4 is derived from the Staten van Oorlog for 1689 and the list of the Dutch army’s winter quarters in 1689-90. For details, see ARA St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8103 (SvO, 1689); 8104 (extr.SvO, 1689); and “Die niederländische Armee unter Waldecks Oberbefehl im Winter 1689—90” in Müller, *Wilhelm von Oranien und Georg Friedrich von Waldeck*, II., 227-230.

\(^{57}\) ARA St.Gen. (1.01.05), 8106 (extr. SvO, 1690).
Indeed, roughly half of the forces raised during this period were new Dutch formations rather than hired regiments. Of the thirteen new battalions added to the Dutch Army during this period, for example, six were newly raised Dutch regiments. The same was true of dragoon regiments. The established cavalry regiments saw the most significant growth in the Republic’s armed forces.

At the same time, the Dutch Republic continued to send almost all of its forces to the Spanish Netherlands. A document prepared in the winter of 1691-92 confirms the high degree of Dutch commitment to the Confederate Army. According to a muster taken of the allied army in winter quarters that year, more than 80% of all Dutch forces were committed to the war in the Spanish Netherlands. Table 5.6 illustrates the degree of the States General’s commitment to the allied cause:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Troops</th>
<th>Number of Units</th>
<th>With the Confederate Army</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Horse (regts.)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragoons (regts.)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot (btns.)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsidy Troops</th>
<th>Number of Units</th>
<th>With the Confederate Army</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Horse (regts.)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragoons (regts.)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot (btns.)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.6: Dutch forces committed to the Confederate Army, 1692.**

As is illustrated by the table above, the Dutch army was committing 92% of all its forces — both national and subsidy — to the war in the Spanish Netherlands. That is not to say that all of these formations were assigned to the field army. On the contrary, probably no more than half, at most two-thirds, of the forces in the theater went into the field, often contingent upon the strength of the unit in question, the availability of adequate transport, and the necessity to garrison exposed or threatened towns in the

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58 This information was derived from PRO SP 8/13 “King William’s Chest, 1691-92,” ff. 170-171 (Lyste van de troupen welche in de aenstaende Campagne deses Jaers 1692 de Arméen souden komen fomeren.), 179-193 (Regimenten te voet), 194-199 (Regimenten te peerdt), which provides the list of garrisons occupied by the allied army in the Spanish Netherlands, Dutch Brabant and the Pays d’ Liège. This list was then compared with the Dutch Staten van Oorlog, for 1692 to determine which regiments were not listed. For the Dutch army in 1691-92, see ARA St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8109 (SvO, 1692); 8110 (extr. SvO, 1692).
Nevertheless, the fact that only eight of the Republic’s 70 infantry battalions were deployed north of the Maas demonstrates the degree in which the States General was committed to supporting the Stadholder-King and the Confederate Army. In spite of the increase in the size of the forces in Dutch pay, the decrease of the in numbers of Spanish forces demanded more allied troops to meet the increasing French threat. Those forces would come from Britain.

**Britain’s Troop Commitments and the Confederate Army**

During the first three years of the war, Britain’s commitment to the war in Flanders was more or less limited to its treaty obligations with the States General. In April 1689, the British expeditionary force comprised eleven regiments of foot and two of horse, together 10,972 men. But England had other military commitments. The same document that showed the composition of the English force committed to Flanders also noted that 10,864 men were in England while another 9,030 soldiers had been deployed to Ireland. Table 5.7 shows the deployment of the English Establishment as of April 1689 and the division of its forces in light of the military situation. As illustrated below,

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59 A comparison of Wagondienst list for 1692 in Collectie van der Hoop and the army muster in PRO SP 8/13, ff.179-199 give a good indication of both available forces and forces in the field army. On the average, no more than 1/2 to 2/3 of Dutch national regiments were sent to accompany the Confederate Field Army. Since the States General did not arrange for the subsidy troops wagons, these lists give no insight as to which subsidy regiments were assigned to the field army. For details, see ARA. CvdH (1.10.42), 109 (Employ van wagens en karren), (unfoliated) “Extract uit het Register der Resolutien van de Ed. Mo. Heeren Raaden van Staate der Vereenigde Nederlanden, Saturdag den 3 Mey 1692.”

60 The list of the Dutch army’s winter quarters in 1689-90 suggests likely postings for the eight regiments not in the Spanish Netherlands in 1691-92. Based on that earlier list, nine regiments of infantry and three of horse were assigned as garrisons in The Hague in Holland, Arnhem, Nijmegen and Zutphen in Gelderland, Deventer and Zwolle, in Overijssel, Middleburg in Zeeland, and in unspecified posts in Friesland. Based on this list, it is likely that the eight regiments not in Flanders were posted, one each, in the cities above. For the 1689-90 list, see Müller, Wilhelm III von Oranien und Georg Friedrich von Waldeck, II., 227-230.

61 The Anglo-Dutch Mutual Defense Treaty required that if one country were attacked, the other would come to its aid. The French declaration of war against the Republic in 1688 and the Dutch response to France in January 1689 enabled the States General to activate that treaty two months before the House of Commons permitted William and Mary to declare war on France in May 1689. For details, see John Childs, The Nine Years’ War and the British Army, 1688-1697: The operations in the Low Countries, 100-101; and Henry Horwitz, Parliament, policy and politics in the reign of William III, 28.

62 PRO SP 8/5 “King William’s Chest, 1689,” ff. 12.
the army was more or less divided into thirds, with one third remaining in England, one third being shipped abroad to Flanders, and the last third being posted to Ireland. By this time, most of the deposed James II’s Irish Establishment had been shipped abroad or had escaped to France, and had to be completely reconstituted with loyal troops. The Scottish Establishment, having never numbered much more than 2,000 men, is not included in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No. Regts./Bns.</th>
<th>In England</th>
<th>In Ireland</th>
<th>In Low Countries</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Horse</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragoons</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.7: Dispositions of the English Establishment, 1 April 1689.

In addition to the 10,000 English troops at home, another 15,000 troops formerly in Dutch pay that had accompanied William III also remained in England. These would later be added to the English Establishment as the first foreign troops hired by William as king of England. At the same time, recruiters were hard at work raising troops for the war in Ireland. By September of 1689, the English Establishment numbered just under 58,000 officers and men. Many of these newly raised formations were shipped to Ireland as part of the Duke of Schomberg’s Expedition. Indeed, by September some 56% of the establishment’s English horse, 50% of its dragoons, and 38% of its foot were committed to the war in Ireland. Nevertheless, if one includes both the army’s foreign and national forces, there remained 15 regiments of horse, 3 of dragoons, and 42

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63 John Childs, The British Army of William III, 10-12.

64 This table is derived from PRO SP 8/5, “King William’s Chest, 1689,” ff. 12 (“The English Army the first of April last, consisted as followeth”); and BL. Add. MSS. 15,897, ff. 88-90 (“Accompt of the English Army as it was 1st April 1689”) as cited in Charles Dalton, English Army Lists and Commission Registers, 1661-1714, Vol. III., 10-11.

65 Warrants were issued to raise fourteen regiments of foot for Ireland on 18 March 1689. Additional warrants were issued on 10 April to raise three regiments of Huguenot infantry, and on 29 April, a regiment of horse. When the force was finally assembled at Dundalk Camp, it mustered 54 companies of horse, 18 of dragoons, and 24 battalions of infantry. For details, see Charles Dalton, English Army Lists and Commission Registers, 1661-1714, Volume III, 1689-1694 (London: Francis Edwards, Ltd., 1960 ed.), 1-9; J. G. Simms, “Schomberg at Dunkalk, 1689,” chap. in J. G. Simms, War and Politics in Ireland, 1649-1730, edited by D.W. Hayton and Gerard O’Brien (London: The Hambledon Press, 1986), 91-104; Simms, Jacobite Ireland, 62, 121-122; and Clifford Walton, History of the British Standing Army, 77-78.
battalions of foot still posted in England and Scotland. Figure 4.8 shows that Britain’s commitment to the Confederate Army in the Low Countries did not change as a result of the army’s expansion. Indeed, in terms of total forces available to William — both English and foreign subsidy troops — only 8% of the establishment’s horse, none of its dragoons, and 16% of its infantry battalions were stationed in the Low Countries.

In 1690, Ireland was the focal point of Britain’s war effort. In the spring of 1690, all of the cavalry and seven of the corps’ 12 infantry battalions were withdrawn from the Netherlands for service in Ireland. Table 5.8 illustrates the British Army’s dispositions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No. Regts./Bns.</th>
<th>In England(^66)</th>
<th>In Ireland</th>
<th>In Low Countries</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>British</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragoons</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragoons</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.8: Dispositions of the British Army, 20 September 1689.\(^67\)

At the same time, the British army in Ireland experienced significant growth, including the 7,000 men of the Danish corps and the greater part of the Dutch corps in English pay. A muster of the British army in Ireland lists eleven regiments of horse, three regiments of dragoons, and thirty-one infantry battalions, and these figures include

\(^{66}\) Includes Scotland.

\(^{67}\) This table is based on data derived from PRO SP 8/5, “King William’s Chest, 1689,” ff. 306 and Charles Dalton, *English Army Lists and Commission Registers, 1661-1714*, Vol. III., 1-9. Included among the units in England were those in Scotland or on the Scottish Establishment. In 1689, the Scottish Establishment reached its greatest strength when it numbered 13,080 officers and men divided in approximately two regiments of horse, three of dragoons, and 15 battalions of foot.
only native English and Irish troops. In addition, during the 1690 campaign, all of the new Danish Corps and almost all of the Dutch Corps were dispatched to Ireland. An order-of-battle showing William’s army in Ireland records that the entire Danish Corps was attached to the field army as was all of William’s former Dutch troops, with the exception of a few regiments of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade. Table 5.9 illustrates the deployment of the British army for the 1690 campaign season. As we saw in the last chapter, the British army mustered around 65,000 officers and men on paper in this year. Based on both English and Dutch sources, the British army in Flanders mustered just over 5,000 officers and men, while the war in Ireland occupied 25 regiments of British horse, four of dragoons, and 46 battalions of foot — between 35,000 and 40,000 officers and men all told — or fully 59% of all forces in British pay. The deployment of the British army in 1690 is not surprising. Indeed, the greatest threat to William’s reign was James II and his followers. Not only was the elimination of the Jacobite threat crucial to the security of the Stadholder-King’s government in England, but to the allied war effort as a whole. Britain’s military priorities in 1690 are clear: without William’s position in Britain secured, there could be no British war effort on the Continent.

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68 “An Account of the Particular Establishment of the Horse, Foot, and Dragoons Appointed For Ireland, with the Number of the Same, 1689/90,” cited in Dalton, English Army Lists and Commission Registers, Vol. III., 127-128.

69 ARA. Rijksarchief in Zuid Holland, 3.20.63 “Archief Familie van Wassenaer,” #4 Willem van Wassenaer-Duvenvoirde., stukken 2-10 (unfoliated) (“Ordre de Bataille de L armée du Roi Guillaume en Irlande 1690”).

70 The exact strength of the Williamite force in Ireland is difficult to determine with certainty. We do know that there were 25 regiments of horse, 4 of dragoons, and 46 infantry battalions with the army that summer, but the respective strengths of the formations are difficult if not impossible to determine. It is noteworthy that fully 40% of the British forces deployed to Ireland for the 1690 campaign were foreign: Danes, Dutch, or English formations formerly in Dutch pay (ie. the Anglo-Dutch Brigade). For more on the composition of William III’s British army in Ireland, see Walton, History of the British Standing Army, 92-93; and Chapter 7 below.
Table 5.9: Dispositions of the British Army in 1690.

The British army’s dispositions in 1691 reflect the continuation of the war in Ireland and its central place in Britain’s military policy. Nevertheless, William’s personal command of the Confederate Army that season insured an increased British presence in the Low Countries. During William’s first campaign in the Low Countries, the British contingent numbered 11,343 officers and men in 1 squadron of cavalry and 16 infantry battalions. But because the war in Ireland had not yet been concluded, the bulk of the army was still posted there. In 1691, the British army’s dispositions were as follows:

Table 5.10: Dispositions of the British Army in 1691.\(^7\)

\(^7\) This table is based on PRO SP 8/8, “King William’s Chest, 1690-91,” ff. 121 (“The Present Disposition of all Their Maj. Land-Forces, 29 January 1690/91”), and Charles Dalton, *English Army Lists and Commission Registers, Vol. III*, 1-9, 171-218, and Figure (Chapter 3). According to “The Present Disposition” there were a total of 24 regiments of horse, 71 battalions of foot, and 9 regiments of dragoons.
According to one source, more than 35,000 men — of a total strength of almost 65,000 men — were stationed in Ireland. In terms of formations, fully 52% of all forces in British pay were in Ireland, while only 15% of them were committed to the Confederate Army.

This situation began to change in 1692 after the conclusion of the Irish War. From the end of the war in Ireland to the last year of the Nine Years’ War, the British contingent in the Low Countries experienced steady growth. At the beginning of the campaign season the national contingent numbered eleven regiments of horse, one of dragoons, and 22 battalions of infantry, a 162% increase in the size of the English contribution. Even more significant is the increase in the foreign contingent, which grew from 3.5 regiments total to 10 regiments of horse, two of dragoons and eleven infantry battalions, plus the six battalions of the former Anglo-Dutch Brigade which by this time had been re-integrated into the British army. Table 5.11 below illustrates the shift in the dispositions of Britain’s forces from Ireland to Flanders thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No. Regts./Btns.</th>
<th>In England</th>
<th>In Ireland</th>
<th>In Low Countries</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>British</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragoons</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragoons</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*included among the 20 foreign infantry battalions in Flanders are the six of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade.*

Table 5.11: Dispositions of the British Army, Summer 1692.

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72 The figures cited here do not match those previously presented in Chapter 3. According to the 29 January 1690/91 document, there were 35,289 men in Ireland of a total of 64,614 men in the service of the Crown. These figures, based on SP 8/8 ff. 121, listed only the men in their regimental strength figures. Because in 1694, both officers and men were included on the lists, and because it compares the growth of both the British and Dutch armies, an estimate based on both officers and men was used in that chapter and in its pertinent charts (Figure 3.3). According to that figure and based on a comparison of later figures which included strengths with and without officers, the estimated strength of the British army in 1691 is 81,231 with officers.

73 Figure 5.11 is based on PRO SP 8/13, ff. 12 “The Disposition of all their Majesty’s Land Forces”; and “List of Their Majesties’ British Forces in Flanders in 1692,” cited in Charles Dalton, English Army Lists, Vol. III, 221.
As can be seen from the table above, the majority of Britain’s armed forces — both national and foreign — were committed to the war in the Low Countries. All told, 61% of Britain’s armed forces were now committed to the Confederate Army including virtually 100% of all foreign troops in British pay.\(^4\) If broken down by nationality, 47% of British national troops were in the Low Countries, while 92% of foreign units in British pay were deployed to that theater. 1693 saw no significant change to the British Army’s commitment to the Low Countries.

**The Confederate Army and the Germans 1689-1693**

During the war’s first five years, Dutch, English, and Spanish forces relied heavily on corps’ of local German princes to bolster allied numbers in the Low Countries Theater. Brandenburg-Prussia, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, and Münster all provided subsidy troops to the allied armies in the theater, while their rulers led their own “independent” contingents to participate in the allied war effort. For the most part, these forces limited their activities to the region between Flanders and the Rhineland theaters, an area roughly bounded by the Meuse River in the West and the juncture of the Rhine and Mosel Rivers in the East. Nevertheless, these forces contributed to the allied war effort in important ways, particularly during the war’s early years. In an age when numbers played a pivotal role in warfare, these German princes helped to even the odds between the forces of the alliance and Louis XIV’s France. The active participation of German princes in the allied war effort in the Low Countries Theater instead of in the Rhineland, furthermore, provided them with a degree of autonomy that they could not have enjoyed while serving the Emperor.\(^5\) For some Princes with territories near the theater, like Brandenburg-Prussia, participation in the allied war effort west of the Rhine was driven by both strategic and political motives. For other princes less directly affected by French aggression, participation in the war in the Low Countries was driven more by political motives. The lack of reliability of these princes in carrying out William III’s strategic goals and the increase of French forces in the region led their role

\(^4\) The only foreign units not serving in Flanders were two regiments of Dutch horse (Rechteren and Riedesel) and one battalion of the Stadholder’s own “Blue Guards,” William’s personal guard. For details, see PRO SP 8/13, ff. 12 (“The Disposition of all Their Majestys Land Forces”).

\(^5\) Wilson, *German Armies*, 91-98.
within the “Confederate Army” to diminish as more Dutch and English forces were sent to the theater.

Almost from the beginning of the war, Northern German princes contributed their own forces in the Lower Rhine and Low Countries Theaters, often leading them in person. Both the Elector of Hanover and the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel led their own contingents in the Spanish Netherlands throughout the war. In 1691, Karl Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel led a combined Brandenburg–Hessian–Liégeois force comprising 19 squadrons of horse, 17 squadrons of dragoons, and three infantry battalions — together approximately 6,500 officers and men — to the Spanish Netherlands to work in conjunction with William III’s army. Most of these forces received significant subsidies from either the States General or Parliament, which helped foster German princes’ participation. From 1691 through the end of the war, Hesse-Cassel sent troops to the Low Countries on an irregular basis; during some campaign seasons, the Landgrave’s troops augmented those Brandenbrug forces in the region between the Meuse and Mosel rivers. In others, particularly in 1695 and 1696, the Landgrave himself led forces in the Low Countries Theater proper. The size of the Landgrave’s forces fluctuated significantly. Early in the war, his armies numbered under 7,000 officers and men but by 1696, he was commanding armies of over 15,000 officers and men.

Like Hesse-Cassel, Hanover too played an important role in the war in the Low Countries. From the first year of the war, the Ernst August, Duke of Hanover had provided Spain with a significant subsidy force. In the winter of 1689-90, approximately 8,000 Hanoverian troops were in Spanish pay. By 1692, that force seems to have declined in size somewhat. A list of Hanoverian forces in the allied camp at Lembeek on 13 August 1692 lists 6,561 officers and men in three squadrons of household troops, six regiments of horse, one of dragoons, and three battalions of

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76 Edward d’Auvergne, The History of the Campagne in Flanders for the Year 1691, 92.

77 In 1695, the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel led a force of Hanoverian, Hessian, and Cellisch troops from the Middle Rhine Theater comprised of 13 squadrons of horse, 9 of dragoons and 10 of foot for a total of 9,300 men. In 1696, the Landgrave’s forces were even more considerable including forces from Münster as well. Together, the Landgrave’s army numbered 13 squadrons of horse, 29 of dragoons, and 10 battalions of foot for a grand total of 15,650 officers and men. For details, see Edward d’Auvergne, The History of the Campagne in Flanders For the Year, 1695, 185; and Edward d’ Auvergne, The History of the Campagne in Flanders, For the Year 1696, 55-56.
foot. By 1692, Spain could no longer support its Hanoverian subsidy corps and the Maritime Powers began paying for its upkeep from the end of 1692 until the end of the war.79

Brandenburg-Prussia and its elector, Friedrich III, in particular played a crucial if ancillary role in the war in the Low Countries, especially during those early years. Friedrich III, sun of the “Great Elector”, possessed a considerable army for a land of slightly over 1.5 million inhabitants. In April 1687, he could call on 31,000 men, but his army would expand to 42,982 men by the end of 1693 as his military commitments grew (or 42,566 — see Table 5.12 below).80 From the beginning, he showed his support for the alliance by sending the bulk of his army to support the allies in the west. In 1688, he loaned 6,000 of his troops to William III to help make-up for the absence of Dutch troops participating in the English Expedition.81 When war erupted in September of 1689, Brandenburg was pivotal in organizing the defense not only of the Lower Rhine region — an area critical to the security of the Dutch Republic — but of the defense of the Palatinate as well. His participation in the Magdeburg Concert in the fall of 1688, with the contribution of 18,400 Brandenburg troops for the Lower Rhine and an additional 1,500 men for the Middle Rhine Theater in the war’s opening months

78 Some of the Hanoverian formations were probably committed to garrison. This likely explains the discrepancy between the strength of the Hanoverian force in 1689-90 and in 1692. P.L. Müller, Wilhelm III von Oranien und Georg Friedrich von Waldeck, II. 227-231 (“Die niederländische Armee unter Waldecks Oberbefehl im Winter 1689–90”); PRO SP 8/12 (ff. 000). “Lyste de Troupen van Hanover gedaen door Syne Majestite in het Camp tot Limbeek op den 13 Augt. 1692.”

79 Wilson, German Armies, 93 (Table 3.4 “German auxiliaries in Anglo-Dutch service, 1688-97.”)

80 Curt Jany, Geschichte der Preußischen Armee, I. 300-305, 364-369, 410; Hans Delbruck, The Dawn of Modern Warfare, 267 (note 43: According to Delbruck, the strength of the army in January 1705 was 47,031 officers and men; Jany’s work, which does indirectly trace the expansion of the Prussian army during the Nine Years’ War, suggests the growth of the Prussian Army suggested by Delbruck’s figures. In 1690, the army expanded from 31,000 to approximately 38,000 officers and men. Most of this growth came from expanding established one-battalion infantry regiments to two battalion formations and by fleshing out cavalry and dragoon regiments to their full war-time strength. By 1694, the Brandenburg had 24,477 men in the Elector’s own field forces with an additional 7,192 in Dutch Pay).

81 In 1688, the States General hired a 5,900 strong corps from Brandenburg-Prussia. It comprised two regiments of horse, each of six companies, and nine battalions of infantry, each of between 4 and 6 companies. Each cavalry company numbered 56 troopers while the infantry companies were 110 men strong (excluding officers). All told, the corps numbered 5,900 men including officers. ARA St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8102 (extr.SvO, 1688); Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VI, 118-119; VII, 337-339; and Jany, Geschichte der Preußischen Armee, 360-362.
demonstrated his support for the allied cause.\(^{82}\) By the spring of 1689, Friedrich was committing just under 27,000 officers and men to the allied war effort in the Lower Rhine and Low Countries Theaters, not including the over 6,000 officers and men in Dutch service.\(^{83}\) By 1690, Brandenburg had become a member of the Grand Alliance with the Dutch Republic, the Holy Roman Empire, and England.

For virtually the whole war, Brandenburg troops were largely responsible for defending the allied left flank in the Low Countries. In 1689, the bulk of the Elector’s 27,000 men were committed to the Lower Rhine Theater. The conquest of Kaiserswerth and Bonn and the re-conquest of the Prince-Bishop of Cologne’s territories, however, freed up more of the Elector’s forces for duty in the Spanish Netherlands Theater. Indeed, their presence was needed. In 1690, the defeat of Waldeck’s Dutch Army at Fleurus required the intervention of the Elector’s forces to insure the security of the Spanish Netherlands. In July, the Elector led the main Brandenburg Army numbering 21,346 men to the Spanish Netherlands proper where he concentrated with Waldeck’s remaining 20,000 men. To make-up for the absence of the Elector’s forces in the region between the Maas and Mosel, an allied army comprised of forces from Liège, Münster, the Rhineland, and Brandenburg numbering 17,300 men moved into the Lower Rhine Theater to take its place and observe the French.\(^{84}\) Growing French pressure and the apparent inability of the government in Brussels to defend its many fortresses led to an increase in the number of Prussian forces in the theater. On 7 September 1690, the Elector of Brandenburg concluded an agreement with Gastañaga and Waldeck to maintain 20,000 Brandenburg troops in the region between the Maas and Rhine during the winter months. Based on that agreement, Spain would pay 20,000 Thalers per month, the Dutch 10,000, and England 10,000 to sustain them in winter quarters there, thus helping to prevent French winter raids in the vulnerable gap between the two main theaters and strengthening the allied position during the winter months.\(^{85}\) The government in Brussels concluded a similar agreement with the Elector on 13 October.

\(^{82}\) Wilson, *German Armies*, 183 (Table 5.5).


\(^{84}\) Ibid., 377-378.

to add seven Brandenburg battalions to the Spanish garrisons in Brabant in the coming winter. Based on the agreement, Brussels would pay 14,455 Thalers for the regiments’ sustenance in return for their wintering in the region. The Dutch followed suit by making a similar arrangement with the Great Elector for the fortresses in the Meuse valley region. Based on an earlier agreement concluded at Maastricht, the States General paid for an additional 6,468 Brandenburg troops to winter in key fortresses on the Meuse and in the towns of Meuse Valley, thus buttressing the allied garrisons already there.

From 1691 to 1693, Brandenburg forces were crucial to the allied war effort in the Spanish Netherlands Theater. Following the allied congress in The Hague in February 1691, the Elector agreed to maintain 21,000 officers and men in the west not including those in the pay of the Dutch Republic or Spain. In 1691, there were no less than 8 regiments of horse, 4 of dragoons, and 20 battalions committed to the war in the Low Countries and between the Meuse and Rhine rivers, not including the forces in Dutch or Spanish pay in Flanders. These numbers fluctuated by year and circumstance; generally speaking, the bulk of the Brandenburg commitment was directed to the Low Countries and Lower Rhine but often detachments were directed to other theaters. At the end of 1693 for instance, the bulk of the Elector’s forces were with the main Brandenburg Army of which no less than two-thirds was committed in the Low Countries. The principal difficulty (and also advantage) with the main Brandenburg force was the distance of its winter quarters from the Low Countries Theater, coupled the difficulties Brandenburg troops seemed to cause everywhere they went. In 1691, the main Brandenburg force under the command of Field Marshal Flemming, as always, wintered in the Elector’s own western territories in the vicinity of Aachen and Cleves which were a considerable distance from the main allied armies in the Low Countries. Consequently, the Prussians — with the exception of those forces that had wintered in the theater — were often in the field late. Added to this was Brandenburg troops’ reputation for plundering the surrounding countryside even if


89 Ibid., 380, 387-393.
billeted in allied territory when their pay was late in coming or in arrears. Local civilians did not like soldiers but they had a particular dislike for Brandenburg troops and their lack of discipline while in winter quarters. Their reputation within the coalition was equally poor. For example, disputes between Brandenburg and Liégeois troops became so serious that commanders would not deploy them near each other in the order-of-battle for fear of fights, duels, or worse erupting between the two contingents.\footnote{90}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & Field Army & Dutch Pay & In Hungary & Savoyard Pay & Home Garrisons & Total \\
\hline
Horse & 4920 & 840 & 409 & 0 & 0 & 6169 \\
Dragoons & 2595 & 0 & 421 & 0 & 0 & 3016 \\
Foot & 16962 & 6345 & 4830 & 700 & 4544 & 33381 \\
\hline
Total & 24477 & 7185\footnote{91} & 5660 & 700 & 4544 & 42566 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{The Elector of Brandenburg’s Military Commitments, 1693-94.\footnote{92}}
\end{table}

Nevertheless, the Elector’s forces were necessary for defending the theater’s numerous fortresses — particularly along the Meuse — and to add valuable numbers to the allied field army. In 1693, France made its maximum effort in the war in the Low Countries. Determined to coerce the allies to the peace table though force of arms, Louis XIV had mustered no less than 126 battalions of infantry and 285 squadrons of horse and dragoons, all told more than 120,000 men with the field army alone. These numbers include neither the corps’ operating in Flanders and east of the Meuse, nor

\footnote{90} There were numerous quarrels between Liégeois and Brandenburg troops when they were quartered in the same towns together. Such problems often led to quarrels, duels, or worse. Writing to Hendrik Casimir, Colonel Amama noted that Liégeois commander Count Tilly was concerned that Brandenburg Troops under his command would not follow his orders because Liège was a lesser state then the Electorate of Brandenburg-Prussia. See KHA A26, Afd. VIIc. 3, “1695,” ff. 302 (S. van Amama to Hendrik Casimir II, Liège, 4/14 June 1695).

\footnote{91} These numbers are from the Staten van Oorlog for 1693 (ARA St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8112 (extr.SvO, 1693.) which provides a slightly lower number for the Brandenburg troops in Dutch pay.

\footnote{92} Table 5.12 “Brandenburg Forces in the Low Countries Theater” based on Jany, Geschichte der Preußischen Armee, 388-390.
garrisons in the region’s most important fortresses. To meet this overwhelming force required all available allied forces, and even they would not be enough. Table 5.13 illustrates the allied mobilization in the Low Countries to meet the French threat, thus:

Table 5.13: Allied forces in the Low Countries Theater by contributing state, 1693.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Horse (squadrons)</th>
<th>Dragoons (squadrons)</th>
<th>Foot (battalions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Dutch Pay</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Spanish Pay</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In English Pay</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandenburg</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanover</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total in Theater</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Field Army</td>
<td>(93% of total)</td>
<td>(49% of total)</td>
<td>(57% of total)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the German princes played an important role in defending the region, the Maritime Powers provided far and away the lion’s share of the alliances’ forces. Together, England and the Dutch Republic supplied the Confederate Army with 69% of its horse, 45% of its dragoons, and 74% of its infantry. Nevertheless, the Maritime

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93 Beaurain notes that Louis’ field forces in the Low Countries numbered 276 squadrons and 130 battalions, while d’Auvergne estimates French field strength at 126 battalions and 285 squadrons. Together, Beaurain estimates the French strength in the Low Countries to be between 115,000 and 120,000 men. In addition, Boufflers commanded an army on the east bank of the Meuse that numbered 60 squadrons and 16 battalions, while in Flanders, de Maulevrier commanded a flying corps in Flanders to defend the French Lines numbering 26 squadrons and three battalions. According to Knoop’s estimates, France had no less than 140,000 officers and men in the Low Countries in 1693. For details, see Beaurain, Histoire Militaire de Flandre Depuis l’année 1690. jusqu’en 1694 inclusivement...Campagne de 1693, passim; and Knoop.

94 These figures are based on a comparison of base figures to field numbers. The base figures for the Dutch are based on musters of the army in 1689-90 (Müller, Wilhelm III von Oranien und Georg Friedrich von Waldeck, II., 227-230) and 1691-92 (PRO SP 8/13, ff.179-199). For the Spanish, I have relied upon Rooms, “De Materieele Organisatie van de Troueuen,” Bijlagen I., 122; and Bijlagen II, 315. For the English, I have relied upon PRO SP 8/13, ff. 179-199, and Edward d’Auvergne, The History of the Last Campagne in the Spanish Netherlands, Anno Dom. 1693. With An Exact Draught of the several Attacks of the French Line by the Duke of Württemburg, with the Detachment under his Command. (London, 1693), 18-24. Brandenburg troop strengths are shown in Jany, Geschichte der Preußischen Arme, I., 401-410. The composition of the Hanoverian Corps is shown in PRO SP 8/13 (“Lyste Der Troueuen van Hanover gedae door Syne Hoogheit in het Camp tot Limbeck op den 13 Aug. 1692”); and Beaurain, Histoire Militaire de Flandre Depuis l’année 1690. jusqu’en 1694 inclusivement...Campagne de 1693.
Powers, together with Spain, could only field 160 squadrons of horse, 35 squadrons of dragoons, and 133 infantry battalions, together approximately 108,000 officers and men both for defending the territory’s fortresses and for service against Louis’ 120,000-man field army. The weakness of the allied fortresses, particularly Liège and Huy in the east, and Ghent and Bruges in the west, demanded large garrisons — literally small armies — for their defense, thus depriving even more men from field duty. For example, Liège alone possessed a garrison of 29 infantry battalions supported by several squadrons of cavalry and dragoons, a good indication of the weakness of its defensive works. This need to devote so many men to garrison duty — in all, no less than 66 battalions — meant there were fewer men available for the field force. Allied leaders tried to redress this imbalance by committing both the Brandenburg and the Hanoverian contingents to the theater, but neither force possessed enough troops to offset the Sun King’s massive army. In addition, the deployment of so many French troops in the Rhine theater at the same time pinned down much of the Brandenburg force in the Lower Rhine and Middle Rhine regions. Consequently, only about two-thirds of the Brandenburg field force was available for the Low Countries. Together, the Brandenburg and Hanoverian corps’ added 17 infantry battalions, 27 squadrons of horse and 14 squadrons of dragoons. Nevertheless, these forces were too small to make up for both the allied weakness in numbers and the needs of the region’s forts. The allied defeat at Neerwinden signaled the necessity for more troops in the Low Countries Theater. The fact that William was able to save Liège and Maastricht from attack, and the success of the Duke of Württemburg’s raid in French Flanders meant that the 1693 campaign had been an overall success in spite of the defeat at Neerwinden. Just the same, it was also clear to William that without additional troops, it was likely that Liège and Maastricht were vulnerable. If they were to fall, then the Republic itself might be open to attack.

95 Liège’s poor defenses required an army to defend it. Under the supervision of the great Dutch engineer, Baron Menno van Coehoorn, the Liège garrison eventually numbered forty infantry battalions and twenty-two squadrons of cavalry, all told between 20,000 and 24,000 men not including artillerists. For details, see ARA RvS (1.01.19), Resolutions 8 January, 20 January, 9 February, 5 June 1693 and 16 March 1694. Although in August, it appears that four battalions left to join the field army, the garrison picked up 22 squadrons of cavalry. For the order of battle, see attachment to Jean de Meijer’s 17 August letter to Hendrik Casimir in J. W. Sypesteyn, Geschiedkundige Bijdragen. Derde aflevering. Eenige Gebeurtenissen Gedeurende het leven van Prins Hendrik Casimir II van Nassau, (1664-1696) (’s Gravenhage: De Gebroeders van Cleef, 1865), 108-111. W.J. Knoop, Krigs-en Geschiedkundige Beschouwingen III, 257.
William III and the Expansion of the Army, 1694-1697

The various contingents of Brandenburgers, Hanoverians, Liégeois, Hessians, and Münsterites, while important in providing the Confederate Army the needed manpower, were too disparate as armies — being more or less independent corps’ — to contribute effectively to the allied war effort. Only those wintering in the region — particularly the Liégeois corps, and the Hanoverian and Brandenburg subsidy troops in Spanish pay — were actually in the theater itself for the whole year. Not only were they available for defending the region’s fortresses from winter (and early spring) attack, but they were available for field operations earlier than those forces that had to travel to the theater. Unfortunately for William III and the allies, neither the main Brandenburg Army, nor the Hanoverian Corps, nor the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel’s forces wintered close enough to the theater to facilitate an early start to the campaign season. Consequently, as long as William III and the allies were dependent upon the arrival of these forces to kick-off the campaign season, they would be at a disadvantage against Louis XIV’s forces. Adding to this difficult situation was the obvious problem of both defending the region’s fortresses and fielding an army large enough to prevent Louis from besieging further towns and even allow the allies to go over to the offensive.

An additional problem was control of the army itself. Although William commanded forces in the Spanish Netherlands, the German contingents were more independent. William might ask that their commanders insure that they arrive in the theater in time for the opening of the campaign season but if they were late, there was little he could do about it. Consequently, William was forced to operate with fewer troops early in the campaign season and thus had to surrender the initiative to the French commander, particularly if allied forces were outnumbered in the theater, as they often were during the war’s first five years.

This realization led William to try to improve this dangerous situation. Central to solving the problem was increasing the size of both the English and Dutch armies, the two military organizations over which he had the most control. In 1694, Dutch diplomats arranged additional subsidy agreements with Celle, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Sweden, Switzerland, and Wolfenbüttel. During that year, the States General hired eight new cavalry regiments, two new regiments of dragoons, and seventeen infantry regiments. As a result, the number of cavalry squadrons in Dutch pay increased from 84 to 112, the number of dragoons from 13 to 23 squadrons, and the number of
battalions from 70 to 87. In terms of numbers, the Dutch army had grown from 75,395 to 102,161 men on paper — of which 19,000 were subsidy troops — an increase of more than 26%. 

The increase of Dutch forces transformed allied forces in the Low Countries Theater. In spite of the dearth of material pertaining to Dutch force commitments during the Nine Years’ War, what does survive strongly suggests that for the remainder of the war, the States General continued to commit 90% of its forces to the region, leaving but a skeleton force behind to garrison the Republic’s most important fortresses and cities north of the rivers. If we assume such a deployment at home for the remainder of the war — by no means a certainty but a logical assumption nonetheless — then the Republic would have deployed well over 90% of its forces in or near the theater of operations. This means that over 98,000 Dutch or Dutch-paid troops were in the Spanish Netherlands with the field army or in garrisons, or were stationed in Dutch barrier fortresses along the Maas River within easy marching distance of the theater of operations.

This increase in the number of Dutch forces in the Low Countries is misleading, however. Although the Dutch Army had taken on new formations, much of its growth did little to change the real balance of power in the Low Countries. Fully two regiments of horse, one of dragoons, and three battalions of foot were taken over from the Cellisch corps formerly in Spanish Pay. In addition, the States General hired on one regiment of horse and two of foot from the Duke of Hanover, also regiments formerly in Spanish pay. The fact that the Republic was merely exchanged with Spain as the paymasters for

96 ARA St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8113 (SvO, 1694); 8114 (Extr.SvO, 1694); 8115 (Spec.Extr.SvO, 1694).

97 In 1693, the Staten van Oorlog listed 10 regiments of subsidy cavalry, two of dragoons, and 25 battalions of infantry, a total strength of 23,297 officers and men. The next year, the Republic hired an additional 11 regiments of horse, two of dragoons, and 15 of foot. All told, the States General paid for 43,885 foreign troops. If we assume that all of these troops were in the theater and the same number of troops were in garrison in the north (8 regts.), then the Dutch contribution to the war in Flanders amounted to 96% of their forces. If we assume, furthermore, the same number of regiments in garrison as in 1689-90 (13 regts.), then the Dutch commitment was 89% percent of their total forces. Either way, it is likely that no less than 85% of the Republic’s forces were in the theater from 1692 to the war’s conclusion, an impressive commitment and a good indication of the Republic’s military priorities. For details, see ARA St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8111 (SvO, 1693); 8112 (extr.SvO, 1693); 8113 (SvO, 1694); 8114 (extr.SvO, 1694); 8115 (spec.extr.SvO, 1694).

98 ARA St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8113 (SvO, 1694); 8114 (extr.SvO, 1694); 8115 (extr. SvO, 1694, “Nieuwe geworven militie”); and Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VII., 339-340.
these formations obviously did little to affect the actual allied strength in the theater. Nevertheless, the addition of a Saxon corps, seven battalions of Swiss infantry, and several other new formations added significantly to allied strength in the theater. In all, the efforts of the Dutch diplomatic corps probably netted an additional 10,000 men for the allied war effort in the Low Countries.

England was the other source for additional troops. At first, William faced opposition from parliament both for his deployment of increasing numbers of Englishmen to the Low Countries and his insistence that Parliament vote for a larger military. Indeed, the Tories’ failure to provide the forces William knew were necessary for the Low Countries contributed to his decision to back the Whigs in 1694. With Whig support, William was able to increase the army as he felt necessary. Real growth did not begin until after the 1694 campaign, however. Indeed, from 1693 to the end of the war, the deployment of Britain’s land forces more or less followed the pattern already established in 1692. As the war dragged on, more and more English troops were committed to the Confederate Army; virtually all the foreign troops in British pay were a part of that force and the number of British national troops increased year by year. In 1694 the British Army experienced modest growth, a growth in line with Parliament’s support for an increase in the military budget. In that year, the number of British national troops increased by 4 regiments of dragoons, but the overall commitment to the Confederate Army remained more or less the same, as is illustrated by Table 5.1499:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No. Regts./Bns.</th>
<th>In England</th>
<th>In Ireland</th>
<th>In Low Countries</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>British</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragoons</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragoons</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*included among the 18 foreign infantry battalions in Flanders are four from the Anglo-Dutch Brigade.*

Table 5.14: Dispositions of the British Army, 1694.

99 Figure 5.14 is derived from the allied order-of-battle presented in Edward d’Auvergne, The History of the Campagne in the Spanish Netherlands, Anno Dom. 1694 with The Journal of the Siege of Huy (London, 1694); and ARA RAZH 3.20,63, Familie van Wassenaer, #4 “Willem van Wassenaer-Duvenoirde,” 2-10 (“Troupes daer over den Coninck van Groot Bretaigne, Monsteringe, ende Reveue heeft gedaen, ende daer uyt d’Armée inde Spaensche Nederlanden, onder desselvs commande is gecomposeert 1694”).
From 1692 through 1694 Britain committed 61% of its land forces to the war in the Low Countries, on the average. What did this mean in terms of real numbers? Based on contemporary estimates, during these three years, the British contingent in Flanders fluctuated between 35,000 and 40,000 men or roughly 39,000 to 44,000 if one includes officers.\(^{100}\)

The size of the British contingent reached its peak in 1695. In that year, Britain’s land forces increased significantly both in terms of new national regiments raised to allow experienced units to join the Confederates, and new subsidy regiments, and is reflected in the increased size of the British force. In 1695, the British army added four new regiments of horse and 10 of foot to its national forces, and hired four regiments of Hanoverian horse and four of foot, and two regiments of foot from Brunswick-Wolfebuttel. The British commitment to the war in the Low Countries increased as well as is reflected by Table 5.15\(^ {101}\) below. It shows that fully 54% of Britain’s national troops and 93% of its foreign troops were committed to the Confederate Army. In terms of numbers, roughly 32,000 officers and men from the national establishments,

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100 These figures are based on four documents, each of which provide strength figures for the British contingent of the Confederate Army. Two documents from “King William’s Chest,” SP 8/12, ff. 147, and SP 8/13, ff. 12 (“The Disposition of Their Majesties Land-Forces” and “The Disposition of all Their Majesty’s Land-Forces” respectively) illustrate the strength of the British Contingent in 1692 at various times during the campaign. Edward d’Auvergne’s The History of the Last Campagne in the Spanish Netherlands Anno Dom. 1693 (London, 1693), 18-23, provides a list that can be corroborated with the years before and after 1693 to determine the contingent’s strength. The last document comes from ARA RAZH 3.20.63, Familie van Wassenaer, #4 “Willem van Wassenaer-Duvenoirde,” items 2-10, which include various orders of battle for the Confederate Army. One in particular, entitled “Trouppes daer over den Coninck van Groot Breaigne, Monsteringe, ende Reveue heeft gedaen, ende daer uyt d’Armée inde Spaensche Nederlanden, onder desselffs comande is gecomposeert 1694” provides a muster of the troops under William’s command in the Low Countries. The first two documents provide figures of 40,254 and 34,127 respectively. D’Auvergne’s list for 1693 matches the latter for 1692 which suggests the strength of the force in 1693 was close to 34,000 without officers. The muster for 1694 gives the British contingent a strength of 36,008 men. This is the most accurate of the four since it is based on an actual muster of the force rather than the paper figures the others relied upon. The first two figures no not include officers while the 1694 muster does not state if officers are included in its figures.

101 Figure 5.15 is based on paper strengths established in SP 8/15, ff. 230, and Edward d’Auvergne’s order-of-battle for the 1695 campaign season. See in particular Edward d’Auvergne, The History of the Campagne in Flanders, For the Year 1695. With An Account of the Siege of Namur (London, 1696), 11-18.
and 22,000 foreign troops were committed to the war in the Low Countries, together around 55,000 officers and men.\footnote{102}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. Regts./Bns.</th>
<th>In England</th>
<th>In Ireland</th>
<th>In Low Countries</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragoons</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragoons</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*included among the 26 foreign infantry battalions in Flanders are the six of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade.*

Table 5.15: Dispositions of the British Army, 1695.

The 1695 campaign marks the high point of British contribution to the war in Flanders. For the last two years of the war, the British contingent in the Low Countries hovered close to the level established in 1695. In 1696, the British contribution remained more or less the same while in 1697, the last year of the war, the contingent shrunk slightly from 33 to 28 battalions of British infantry while the level of foreign troops remained the same. Perhaps more significantly, as Figure 5.2 illustrates, the Low Countries Theater demanded the bulk of the coalition’s manpower.

\footnote{102 This is a rough estimate based on the percentage of British units deployed in the Low Countries and the army strength figures for 1697 provided in Chapter 3 above.}
Even with the increased English commitment to the war in the Low Countries Theater, the Dutch Republic still provided the bulk of the forces committed there. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 trace the growth of Spanish, Dutch, and English forces in the Low Countries Theater and the percentage each state contributed to the whole. The charts are based on actual strengths of the forces in the theater. Figure 5.3 follows the expansion of the army in the Low Countries using average strengths of formations as a basis. As the graph illustrates, the Dutch Republic bore the brunt of the military burden for the entire war. For virtually the entire conflict, the Dutch were providing between 50,000 and 70,000 officers and men in the theater based on discounted field strengths. At the same time, the Spanish commitment declined during the course of the war so that by the war’s last five years, Brussels was providing between 12,000 and 15,000 officers and men per year. The English Army’s commitment to the theater saw steady growth but experienced two spurs; one in 1692 when the war in Ireland allowed a greater deployment of English troops to the theater and in 1695, the year following

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103 Wilson, German Armies, 92.

104 Description of basis for average strengths.
Parliament’s approval to raise additional regiments and hire more subsidy troops. Nevertheless, in spite of the expansion of English forces, as Figure 5.4 clearly shows, the English commitment to the war never exceeded 35% of all forces in the theater.

![Figure 5.3: Approximate strengths of British, Dutch, and Spanish forces in the Low Countries Theater, 1689-1697.](image)

The Dutch Republic, on the other hand, consistently provided between 50% and 60% of all forces in the theater. Clearly, this had little bearing on the composition of the field army as the 1693 campaign season above shows, and additional examples in Chapter 7 will confirm. Indeed, despite the discrepancy between the English and Dutch commitments, as many English formations were posted to the field armies as the Dutch, and perhaps even more in certain years. At the same time, the Spanish commitment to the allied forces in the theater declined both in number and percentage of the whole. Admittedly, not included in the Spanish figures or in the tables are the percentages of Brandenburg, Hannoverian, Hessian, and Cellische formations either subsidized by the Spanish Crown or under independent command but operating in the theater on an
irregular basis. However, if such figures were added to the tables in Figures 5.3 and 5.4, it would most likely show a more dramatic decline in the Spanish military commitment in the theater.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 5.4** Troops in the Low Countries Theater by army as percentage of total.

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105 At most, the Spanish had hired between 8,000 and 15,000 troops from German princes respectively. At the beginning of the war, Spain seems to have had a Hanoverian corps of close to 10,000 men in its pay. In 1690, the government in Brussels took on 7 battalions of Brandenburg infantry to help garrison its fortresses. In addition to these troops, there seems to have been a corps of 3,000 men from Brunswick-Lünenburg in Spanish pay. Most of these seem to have left Spanish pay by 1693. Unfortunately, the most comprehensive work on the Spanish Army in the Netherlands says little about the subsidy troops it hired so I have had to rely upon sources that indicate the foreign troops in Spanish pay indirectly. Together with the Brandenburg and other German princely forces in the theater, I would estimate the “independent” German presence to be between 10,000 and 15,000 men, plus the Spanish formations. For details on the German subsidy troops in Spanish pay, see Jany, Geschichte der Preußischen Armee, I., 380; Ten Raa, *Het Staatsche Leger*, VII., 339-340; Wilson, *German Armies*, 93.
Conclusion

The financial exertions of England and the Dutch Republic were crucial to the allied war effort in the Spanish Netherlands. The defense of the region fell to the Dutch Republic when Spanish finances began to fail in 1692. From that point on, the Dutch Republic took on more and more of the responsibility of defending the Spanish Netherlands, even hiring on the better part of its Spanish ally’s former subsidy troops. The expansion of the Dutch Army in 1689-90 and 1693-94 was directly related to the Dutch government’s ability to muster the financial resources needed to hire forces from foreign states participating in the soldier market. That determination, at the same time, was related to the perceived threat France posed to the Republic’s security. With 1672 still in the minds of most Dutchmen including the Stadholder-King himself, defense of the Spanish Netherlands and the Pays d’ Liège were seen as crucial to the Republic’s own security. That perception drove the States General to ask more from the provinces’ coffers to support the growing Dutch war effort. Although for many provinces the needs of the Generality taxed their economies severely, the threat was considered great enough to warrant the exertion. The expansion of England’s military commitment — both in terms of finances and manpower — to the Low Countries Theater, likewise, was directly related to both William III’s determination to defend the Spanish Netherlands. Although at first Parliament voted him the funds he deemed necessary to prosecute the war, its opposition to increased English commitment on the Continent led to clashes between tory party then in power and the Crown. The loss of Namur in 1692 followed by the defeat at Neerwinden was evidence of the numerical inferiority of the allies and their inability to effectively prevent the loss of the more important of the Spanish barrier fortresses. The Tory party’s opposition to increased military spending in England ran counter to what William perceived to be the real threat, the loss of the Spanish Netherlands. Consequently, his decision to throw his lot in with the Whigs resulted from the knowledge that they would support his plan to expand the military, and while they did not truly support his emphasis on the Low Countries strategy, they would not stand in his way. As a result, the English army saw significant growth both in terms of its national forces and the subsidy troops it hired. By 1695, England was providing over 35% of all forces in the Spanish Netherlands, more than it would ever do during the War of the Spanish Succession with Marlborough directing the war there.

As we have seen in the last two chapters, the growth of armies in the latter 17th century was directly related to the military demands of the early modern state. These
demands were based on a combination of foreign threats and military commitments to allies. For many of the Grand Alliance’s members, the expansion of their militaries was based on the danger those threats posed coupled with the seriousness of their commitments. The importance of either of these factors often depended upon how direct the danger was to each individual state and the earnestness of their military commitments. For Louis XIV — diplomatically isolated and surrounded by enemies — the choice was simple. The difficulty for France was to produce an army large enough to meet the various foreign threats and to deploy those forces to the greatest advantage. During the Nine Years’ War, the French army expanded to between 340,000 and 420,000 men at the war’s peak largely because it was ringed by hostile neighbors. How Louis XIV deployed those men was based on his and his ministers’ perception of the enemy threat in each of the theaters of war. Those perceptions were nuanced by his strategic intentions in each theater coupled with the French state’s ability to muster the resources requisite to the demands of those intentions. These factors would, in turn, be influenced by the nature of each of the theaters of war. The presence of large numbers of fortresses — and thus the dominance of positional warfare — in the Low Countries demanded large forces for the conduct of either offensive or defensive operations. Other theaters, like the Catalonian Theater or Northern Italian/Savoy, required far fewer forces for operations to be effective. France also had the advantage of interior lines of communication, and thus the ability to transfer forces

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107 This is the crux of the debate between John Lynn and Geoffrey Parker pertaining to the role the trace italienne played in the growth of early modern armies. For Lynn’s argument, see “The trace italienne and the Growth of Armies: The French Case,” in *The Journal of Military History*, 55 (July 1991): 297-330. For Parker’s argument, see *The Military Revolution: Military innovation and the rise of the West*, 1500-1800.


109 Average size of armies in the southern European theaters was considerably less than in the Low Countries or Lower Rhine Theaters. Field armies in the north frequently numbered between 50,000 and 100,000 men while in the south, they fluctuated between 15,000 and 40,000 men. For example, Marshal Catinat’s army in Northern Italy and Savoy hovered between 12,000 and 16,000 men during the first years of the war, but jumped to 40,000 men in 1693 at the battle of Marsaglia. Likewise in Spain, Noailles commanded a French army of 26,000 officers and men at the peak of the fighting. For details, See Lynn, *The Wars of Louis XIV*, 191-265.
from one theater to another relatively quickly if need arose. These conditions undoubtedly influenced the size of the French commitment to the various theaters.

For the members of the Grand Alliance, the problem of resource mobilization and troop deployment was far more complex. Operating without the benefit of interior lines, the principals of the Grand Alliance — the Dutch Republic, England, and Austria — were separated by significant distances, which in turn affected the allied conduct of the war. Each theater’s base of operations, not to mention the courts of the alliance’s leading heads of state, was separated from that of the adjoining theater in such a way as to make each one virtually independent from the others. Consequently, with the possible exception of the Lower Rhine Theater, which could divert troops to either the Middle/Upper Rhine Theater or the Low Countries relatively easily, each theater represented essentially its own virtually self-contained war. Early attempts to coordinate the war effort in the different theaters was ultimately unsuccessful; by 1694 the leading contributor to the theater coordinated its own war effort from its capitol, and from there negotiated the level of commitment of its own forces as well as those of its allies. The deployment of forces to a given theater of operations was as much a function of geography as it was military necessity. Consequently, the war in the Low Countries would command the armed forces of two of the Grand Alliance’s strongest member-states, Britain and the Dutch Republic, as well as those forces in the theater itself, the Spanish Army of Flanders, and the army of the Prince-Bishop of Liège. Though corps’ from Brandenburg-Prussia, Hessen-Cassel, and Hannover would contribute significantly to the allied war effort in the Low Countries, the Dutch, British, and Spanish armies would shoulder the majority of its demands in the theater.

For the Dutch Republic and the Government of the Spanish Netherlands, the war in the Low Countries was seen as a danger to the security of their respective states, and thus called for their maximum effort. The powerful Dutch economic base enabled the Dutch Republic to triple the size of its army during the course of the war to meet the French threat. Following the costly defeat at Neerwinden in 1693, William III and Heinsius were convinced that the only way to turn the tide in the Low Countries Theater was an infusion of more troops.\textsuperscript{110} Prior to that defeat, Spain, Brandenburg-

\textsuperscript{110} The correspondence between William III and Heinsius prior to and following the battle of Neerwinden reflect their concerns that only an infusion of more troops would change the allies’ fortunes in the theater. Much of their letters involve plans to hire additional forces and Parliament’s unwillingness to provide the requisite funds. On 14/24 February 1693, William
Prussia, Hesse-Cassel and other states, contributed significant forces to the allied army in the region, forces either independent of, or only in part subsidized by, William III and the Maritime Powers. By 1694, the year of the Dutch Army’s peak strength, between 75,000 and 90,000 soldiers in the States General’s pay were being committed to the Low Countries Theater alone including their new subsidy troops.

Britain’s commitment to the war, like that of the Dutch Republic, was also driven by the danger to the Spanish Netherlands, and its military expanded largely as a result of that threat. In the early years of the war however, domestic unrest — particularly the war in Ireland — was the driving force behind the British Army’s expansion. Thus, the growth of the British Army from 1689 to 1691 — an expansion from just over 30,000 at the beginning of the war to 77,000 in 1692 was largely based on England’s strategic commitments as put down by Parliament and the King. The increasing threat to the Spanish Netherlands — and thus the Dutch Republic — led William III to demand an expansion of both the army in general and its foreign commitments, especially in the Low Countries. Although to attain this end, William was forced to give the Whigs more influence in government, he was able to get what he wanted; a expanded British Army with a like increase in military expenditures and increased commitment to the war in the Low Countries. By 1695, the British Army had grown from just under 80,000 men to 100,000 officers and men. Of that number, roughly 50,000 were in the Low Countries or between 35% and 40% of all troops in the theater. For Britain, the war in the Low Countries became a strategic interest because William believed it was, and that belief stemmed from his commitment to Dutch security and to the Grand Alliance’s war with Louis XIV, a war driven by the needs of the war on the Continent rather than at sea.

The massive injection of new troops into the Confederate Army changed both the allies’ fortunes in the theater. It can be no coincidence that the next three campaign seasons saw the William and the confederate army on the offensive. The commitment

wrote to Heinsius that he “would be in no position to be able to contribute to the raising and maintenance of a corps of Swiss because the Parliament has given me are so little that I would not be able to get enough credit and consequently I do not know how I will be able to pay for the ordinary upkeep of my troops and complete the outfitting [of ships] for sea...” Following the campaign, the States General agreed to take on an additional 20,588 men including a 8,000 man Swiss corps. For details, see H.J. van der Heim, Het Archief van den Raadpensionaris Antonie Heinsius, II., 68 (“William to A. Heinsius, Kensington, 14/24 February 1693), ARA St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8113 (SvO, 1694); 8114 (extr. SvO, 1694); and 8115 (Spec. extr. SvO, 1694).
of the Dutch and British Armies to the war in the Low Countries could not help but affect the character of the coalition army that fought in that theater. The presence of so many formations in the pay of the Dutch Republic and England in the “Confederate Army” gave it a more Anglo-Dutch character as the war wore on. By committing so many of his own forces to the war in the Low Countries, William was able to exercise greater control over the “Confederate Army.” But that control came not only through the weight of numbers committed to the theater. As we shall see in the next chapter, the deployment of so many of his own troops enabled him to forge the most effective military instrument possible given the difficulties of allied cooperation.
CHAPTER 6

WILLIAM III, THE DUTCH OFFICER CORPS,
AND THE CONFEDERATE ARMY

INTRODUCTION
William III was one of the few truly effective coalition commanders of the early modern period. During both the Franco-Dutch War and the Nine Years’ War, he commanded large, multi-national forces under difficult circumstances with relative success. Despite reverses and defeats, in the end he proved a successful commander as his campaigns in Ireland and in the Low Countries attest. In an age where officers often clashed over the most petty matters of social rank and personal rivalry, William was able to unify them, even if temporarily, in pursuit of a common goal, the defeat of France. His ability to command the Confederate Army so effectively was largely due to his position as both Stadholder and King and through his extensive experience in commanding armies in the field. As Stadholder of Holland and Kaptiein-Generaal of the Union he learned the intricacies of military administration in the Dutch Army which was, in and of it self, an exercise in diplomacy. He acquired his knowledge of practical military affairs and his leadership skills, furthermore, through on-the-job experience. During his tenure as Stadholder, William reformed the Dutch Army and made it one of the most effective and professional organizations in 17th century Europe. When he was crowned King of England in 1689, he became commander-in-chief of a new military organization, or organizations. His position as Captain-General of the Dutch Army and Commander-in-Chief of British forces, placed him atop two separate military organizations. Indeed, William commanded the two largest military organizations in the Grand Alliance. Although William was King of England, his experience as Captain-General made him
one of the few true soldier-kings of the early modern period and the obvious choice to command the Confederate Army, in spite of the misgivings of Parliament.

William’s understanding of the nature of coalition armies made him the best possible soldier to command the Confederate Army. His experience in coalition warfare gave him a greater understanding of the difficulties of coordinating allies’, as well as a familiarity with his brothers-in-arms. His experience fighting in cooperation with the Spanish and Prussian forces during the Franco-Dutch War provided him knowledge of his counterparts in those militaries and they with knowledge of his own abilities. His close friendship with the Prince de Vaudémont, for example, made for a good working relationship between he and his Spanish allies.¹ Likewise, William’s acquaintances with his fellow princes gave him political advantages — and leverage — that other allied commanders did not possess. William’s connections, in combination with his reputation as a capable commander led him to be highly regarded by his contemporaries and earned him respect. His determination to see the power of France diminished at all costs made him the emotional heart of the coalition arrayed against Louis XIV as was demonstrated by the welcome he received upon his return to the continent in the winter of 1691. As a result, William’s opinions carried considerable weight in matters of both military strategy and protocol. His social status as King of England, furthermore, gave him the requisite leverage to resolve conflicts between the coalition’s heterogeneous — and often quarrelsome — collection of officers; officers very much aware of their position within Europe’s military and social hierarchies.

¹ Charles-Henri de Lorraine, Prince de Vaudémont (1649-1704) was commander of Spanish Cavalry from 1689 to 1691 and commander of the Spanish forces in the field from 1692 until the war’s conclusion in 1697. The illegitimate son of Duke Charles V of Lorraine and Beatrix de Cusance and brother of Duke Charles V of Lorraine, Vaudémont went into the service of the Spanish government in Brussels. He fought in the Dutch War, first with Spanish forces in the Franche-Comté and then in the Spanish Netherlands where he took part in the battle of Seneffe (1674), and was lightly wounded at the siege of Trier (1675) while serving with his father. In October of that year, Vaudémont served in the Prince of Orange’s army and in 1677 was given command of his army’s left wing. He also participated in the expedition to Charleroi (1677). During the Nine Years’ War, Vaudémont became one of William’s most capable subordinates and was one of the few commanders William entrusted with independent commands. In 1691 with William’s help, Vaudémont was named “Général des armes” in the Spanish Netherlands. Under Elector MaxEmmanuel of Bavaria, Vaudémont served as commander of Spanish field forces. Vaudémont was a good commander. His greatest feat of arms was his masterly defense of Flanders in 1695. For details, see Childs, The Nine Years’ War and the British Army, 356; Hora-Siccama, Aanteekeningen en Verbeteringen, 421-422; and Linda Frey and Marsha Frey, ed., The Treaties of the War of the Spanish Succession: An Historical and Critical Dictionary (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995), 460-462.
But William’s knowledge of military affairs and coalition warfare alone was not enough to insure the creation of an effective military force in the Low Countries. To be effective, the allied army had to be every bit as centralized as its French opponents — a difficult task when one considers the diversity of the allied force assembled in the theater. In 1689, allied forces in the Low Countries were organized in three separate forces: a Dutch Army, a Spanish Army, and a Prussian Army. The inability of the three corps’ to work together led directly to the allied defeat at Fleurus in 1690 and helped precipitate William’s speedy return to the Continent to command the coalition forces in the theater. The first two campaigns demonstrated that the army required a commander who could hold the disparate elements of the coalition army together. William was arguably the only leader in the allied camp that could mold the allied forces in the Low Countries into an army. To do this, he relied upon the one organization with which he was most familiar: the Dutch army.

William III, the Stadholderate, and the Dutch Army
The Dutch army, specifically its officer corps, was the foundation of William’s influence in European military circles. His involvement in Dutch military affairs began at an early age though in the 1660s no one could have envisioned how important he would become in both Dutch and European affairs. In part, this had to do with the nature of Dutch domestic politics during the reign of Jan de Witt during the “First Stadholderless Period.”

In the years following William II’s attempted coup, the States of Holland and its Raadpensionaris, Jan de Witt, had wanted to eliminate the Stadholderate in an effort to limit the House of Orange’s power, and thus the threat of military coup. As part of de Witt’s policy, he hoped to limit the young Prince of Orange’s power through what was called the Perpetual Edict. According to de Witt’s plan, the prince would be excluded from the Stadholderate, thus limiting his authority over the army and his political influence in the Republic. The Captain-Generalship, in turn, would be a post controlled by the States General and the States of Holland rather than the House of Orange. Thus, de Witt intended to make the Captain-Generalship more of a military appointment determined on an annual basis, much like a Field-Marshal or Commander-in-Chief, rather than in perpetuity as the old Stadholderate had been. According to the Edict, William would be given a seat in the Raad van State in preparation for his being named Kapitein-Generaal, but his influence would be curtailed by giving his seat a merely
advocacy function. But the Prince’s position in the Republic strengthened in the face of the growing French antagonism. On the eve of war with France, de Witt conceded to grant him a voting seat in the Raad van State in May 1670. When William was named Kaptiein-General 24 February 1672 on the eve of the French invasion, his power and influence was still limited, though he had begun to learn the intricacies of military administration, and — more importantly — Dutch politics.²

War with France, however, transformed the Prince of Orange’s position with regards to both the army and the state. William’s elevation to the Stadholderate following the French invasion, coupled with the fall of the de Witt government, however changed the young Prince of Orange’s fortunes and his political position within the Republic. On 2 July 1672 Zeeland, bowing to the demands of an angry and fearful populace, appointed William Stadholder of that province, dismantling the ideas behind de Witt’s perpetual edict. A few days later, the province of Holland followed suit as the de Witt regime plummeted toward collapse.³ In an effort to quell the unrest, William was granted extraordinary powers in an effort to “persuade, dispose, and if necessary, oblige” whatever changes he deemed necessary to restore public order.⁴ In the days and weeks that followed, new stadholder purged his political opponents from government, thus solidifying his position. As Jonathan Israel shows, of 460 regents in Holland, 130 were replaced as politically undesirable.⁵ After 1672 the Prince of Orange enjoyed a more dominant position in the Dutch Republic than any Stadholder since Maurits. His power base was further reinforced by the recommendation that the Prince of Orange’s Stadholderate be made both hereditary and permanent in the Nassau-Orange male line. On 23 January 1674, under the recommendation of Haarlem’s representatives, the States of Holland approved of the proposal. Shortly thereafter, Zeeland followed suit. This development gave William greater influence over Dutch


³ De Witt stepped down as Raadpensionaris on 5 August 1672.

⁴ Israel, The Dutch Republic, 804.

⁵ Ibid., 804-810.
politics than any of his predecessors, and had important repercussions for the army’s direction.\textsuperscript{6}

William’s position as Stadholder gave him tremendous influence over military matters. Unlike the Captain-Generalship, which was strictly limited to command of the army in the field, the Stadholderate’s authority extended well beyond mere military command authority. The Stadholder, by definition, was the leading government figure in the province, not unlike a sort of king. Although it was up to the province to appoint him Stadholder, once named the prince enjoyed more rights and privileges than any political figure in the province. As Stadholder of Holland, however, he became the most important figure in the Republic. First, the Stadholder of Holland was essentially chairman of the States of Holland. Although he could not exercise direct power over the daily colleges — the Gecommitteerde Raden in Holland (or the Gecommitteerde Staten in other provinces where he was Stadholder) — he could influence their deliberations. Simon van Slingelandt summed up the five primary responsibilities of the Stadholder of Holland thus: first, to preserve the state religion; second, to maintain Justice; third, to replace vacated magisterial posts; four, to nominate government officials, and finally; five, to grant pardons and remit sentences.\textsuperscript{7} In addition to these responsibilities, the Stadholder sat as chair of the Raad van State and President of the Court of Justice. In Holland, the Stadholderate generally went hand in hand with the Captain-General’s and Admiral-General’s post. As such, the Stadholder served as commander-in-chief of the province’s armed forces. Although this included the admiralties, William left naval affairs to the admirals while he concentrated on the army.\textsuperscript{8} He enjoyed similar rights and privileges in every province where he carried the title Stadholder.\textsuperscript{9}

As Stadholder of Holland, (and later of Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland and Overijssel) William wielded considerable control over the Dutch military, as well. Even

\textsuperscript{6} Baxter, William III, 76-85; Israel, The Dutch Republic, 810; and Japikse, Prins Willem III, I, 205-220, 258-263; and D. J. Roorda, Rond Prins en PatriciAant: Verspreide opstellen door D.J. Roorda (Weesp: Fibula-Van Dishoeck, 1984), 125-130.

\textsuperscript{7} Robert Fruin, Gescheidenis der Staatsinstellingen in Nederland tot den val der Republiek, prepared by Dr. H. T. Colenbrander (‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), 222.

\textsuperscript{8} Fruin, Gescheidenis der Staatsinstellingen in Nederland, 294-299; Fockema Andrae, De Nederlandse Staat onder de Republiek, 6-11;

\textsuperscript{9} Fruin, Gescheidenis der Staatsinstellingen in Nederland, 218-227.
before receiving the appointment, William had been named Kapitein-Generaal van de Unie or “Captain-General of the Union” — overall commander of the Dutch armed forces. This appointment gave him control over the employment of the army on campaign, subject to the approval of the States General. His position as Stadholder of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland, and Overijssel however, increased his influence even more. Not only did he have the right to nominate army officers on all the respective provinces’ military establishments, but after the purge of government officials and magistrates in those provinces, his decisions, particularly those regarding military affairs, went virtually unopposed, as well. When he was first made Kapitein-Generaal in 1672, it was intended that the Generality’s Field Deputies supervise his actions.\textsuperscript{10} William’s success in defending the country in 1672-73 and his nomination to the Stadholderate, however, allowed him to dispense with the Field Deputies from the provincial assemblies, thus giving him virtual carte blanche over the army’s employment.\textsuperscript{11} His position in the Raad van State changed significantly as well. Rather than being but one of twelve members of that college, he became its presiding member. Taken together, William’s control over the Republic’s military affairs was greater than it had been under any of his predecessors. If one considers the extent of his rights and privileges at the peak of his power — he controlled the nomination of commissioned officers above the rank of captain in 85% of the army’s establishment, presided over the army’s administration, and commanded all Dutch forces in the field — his control of the military bordered on the absolute. Indeed, his influence over officer appointments led him into conflict with Hendrik Casimir II, his counterpart in Friesland, Groningen, and Drenthe.\textsuperscript{12} Nevertheless, the French invasion and the rout of the Dutch army called

\textsuperscript{10} The Provincial Estates sent Field Deputies to insure that their military establishments were being utilized properly. In addition to deputies from each of the provinces, an eighth deputy from the Raad van State accompanied the army on campaign. For details, see Chapter 8 below.

\textsuperscript{11} William was still accompanies by the Field Deputies from the States of Holland and from the Raad van State, the two deputies most responsible for making the army’s logistics arrangements. For details, see Chapter 8 below.

\textsuperscript{12} William had a rather shaky relationship with Hendrik Casimir II of Nassau-Dietz (1657-1696), the Stadholder of Friesland, Groningen, and Drenthe. Much of their differences had to do with rivalry over their respective positions within the Republic. Seven years younger than William III, Hendrik Casimir II was always in the shadow of his older cousin. William took advantage of Hendrik Casimir’s youth to exert his own influence over areas that were traditionally within the Friesian Stadholder’s sphere of influence, particularly in the area of officer appointments. Although Hendrik Casimir had participated in the Dutch War, having campaigned as a teen in 1674, 1675, and 1676, he was not a particularly good a soldier, another source of irritation
for a strong military leader and the young Prince of Orange was the obvious (and hereditary) choice.

**William III, Het Staatsche Leger, and the Dutch officer corps**
The virtual disintegration of the Dutch army following the French invasion in 1672 required that the army be rebuilt, and the Prince’s increased power and prestige allowed him a free hand in reforming it. As part of his reforms, William hired Georg-Friedrich von Waldeck. Waldeck entered Dutch service as Field Marshal in September 1672, and proved invaluable in educating the young Prince in the art of war. Waldeck’s principal task was to serve as council and advisor to the 22 year old Captain-General. Although the definitive study of the Dutch Army’s reform is yet to be written, William, with Waldeck’s sound advice, appears to be the man largely responsible for rebuilding the shattered Dutch force. Using Holland as their sanctuary and the Waterline as their defensive cordon, William and Waldeck began the difficult process of sacking incompetent officers and replacing them with capable men, and rebuilding the army’s shattered regiments. William demonstrated his uncompromising toughness between the two men. The two Stadholders clashed publicly for the first time over William’s proposed augmentation of the Dutch Army in 1683, Hendrik Casimir siding with Amsterdam. The situation improved somewhat when William relinquished his right to make officer appointments in Hendrik Casimir’s provinces a few years later. Hendrik Casimir was the Dutch Republic’s third Field-Marshal when war erupted again in 1688 and participated in the battles of Fleurus, Steenkerk, and Neerwinden. Relations between the two princes worsened again in 1693 when, following Waldeck’s death, William chose not to promote Hendrik Casimir to first Field-Marshal, instead nominating Johan-Adolf Duke of Holstein-Plön as Waldeck’s replacement. In response, Hendrik Casimir left the army and even began clandestine peace negotiations with Louis XIV without William’s approval. Hendrik Casimir died in 1696 of unspecified causes but left behind a son, Johan-Willem Friso, as heir. For details of Hendrik Casimir’s life, see J. W. Sypesteyn, *Geschiedkundige Bijdragen Derde Aflevering: Enige Gebeurtenissen Gedurende Het Leven van Prins Hendrik Casimir II van Nassau* (1664-1696) (’s-Gravenhage: De Gebroeders van Cleef, 1865), 2-39; Hora-Siccama, *Aantekeningen en Verbeteringen*, 256-258; and Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 831-837.

13 According to Ringoir, Waldeck received his commission as Field-Marshal on 16 September 1672 though Müller notes that Waldeck came to the Republic in August. For details, see H. Ringoir, *Nederlandse Generaals van 1568 tot 1940*, 1; and Müller, *Wilhelm III von Oranien und Georg Friedrich von Waldeck*, I, 32.

14 Dr. Olaf van Nimwegen is currently working on such a project.

as a commander through his court-martials of garrison commanders who fled their posts, many of whom would suffer the death penalty for their actions.16

The army that survived the French onslaught was shaped by William and Waldeck’s reforms. As had been the case since its inception, the Republic relied upon both its own population and foreign “adventurers” to fill its ranks, and those ranks were rapidly filled following the “year of disaster.” Under William, with Waldeck’s supervision, young officers of promise were promoted, old or incapable officers sacked, experienced officers recruited from abroad, and the rank-and-file disciplined and trained. Particular attention was paid to the technical services like the artillery and medical service. A stickler for details, Waldeck busied himself with every aspect of military efficiency, from exercise, to organization. Even the details of the soldier’s personal arms and equipment fell under Waldeck’s attention.17 Indeed, it is likely that Waldeck introduced “Platoon Fire” to the Republic’s infantry, a firing discipline for which it would later become famous.18 The result of William’s and Waldeck’s reforms was arguably one of the best disciplined militaries in Europe. Not only was the Dutch army well trained; it was also experienced. Although the army rapidly demobilized following the Peace of Nijmegen, the core of soldiers that remained was one educated

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16 Colonel Pain-et-Vin was executed for abandoning his post during the initial French onslaught in 1672. Found guilty of cowardice, the court-martial twice recommended leniency but William insisted he receive the death penalty for his actions. For details, see W.J. Knoop, Krijgs-en Geschiedkundige Beschouwingen over Willem den Derde, I., 12-13, 211-212; and Ten Raa en de Bas, Het Staatsche Leger, V., 355-356: and VI, 235.

17 Müller, Wilhem III von Oranien und Georg Friedrich von Waldeck, I., 32-34; and Gerhard Menk, Georg Friedrich von Waldeck (1620-1692): Eine biographische Skizze (Arolsen: Waldeckischer Geschichtsverein, 1992), 43-44; and Robb, William of Orange, 263. In describing Waldeck, Robb notes that “Waldeck was something of a stage colonel, choleric and grumpy, a brave but mediocre commander in the field; but if he was neither a great strategist nor an agile tactician he understood the mechanics of his job. He was a good organiser and an expert on military training and discipline, an invaluable assistant in the task of bringing order out of chaos.”

18 The origins of “Platoon-Fire” — the discipline adopted by most of the Confederate Army’s contingents, was introduced to the allies by the Dutch. Its origins in Dutch service likely go back to the Dutch War when Waldeck and William instituted reforms. The first Dutch drill manual illustrating the discipline appears to be Louis Paan’s Den korter weg tot de Nederlandsche Militaire Exercitie (1681), which suggests that the discipline was in widespread use during the Dutch War. For details, see Louis Paan, Vervolg Ofte Tweede Volumen Van Den korter weg tot de Nederlandsche Militaire Exercitie, Inhoudende verscheide extraordinaire Evolution ende Bataillons, Mitsgaders de formen der Batailles, so als de selve tijden van hare Hoogheden de Princken van Orangen Mauritius ende Frederic Hendric hooglooffelijker Memorie sijn gepractiseert (Leeuwaarden, 1681); and Chapter 7 below.
in the school of war. It was also very cosmopolitan. Like every virtually all segments of the work force in the Dutch Republic, *Het Staatsche Leger* was drawn from many lands. Although the army numbered 40,000 officers and men in 77 regiments of “national troops” on the eve of the Nine Years’ War, many of them came from lands beyond the frontiers of the Republic.

With the possible exception of France, virtually every military in Europe relied on “foreigners” to help fill its ranks. In Sweden, Germans, Poles, Scots, and the eastern Baltic states provided the army with its soldiery.\(^{19}\) In Savoy, soldiers from its own territories, France, various German states — even Irishmen — filled the Duke’s ranks.\(^{20}\) The Dutch Army was no exception to this practice. In his study of the 18\(^{th}\) century Dutch Army, H.L. Zwitzer notes that the army was not unlike any other large employer in the Dutch Republic during the early modern period. Because the Republic’s population numbered but 1.8 million inhabitants during much of the 17\(^{th}\) and 18\(^{th}\) centuries, it was impossible for the army — and many other large employers in the Republic — to meet all of its personnel needs domestically.\(^{21}\) As was the case with the VOC and the Dutch West India Company, the army recruited much of its manpower abroad.\(^{22}\) Not only the army’s ‘Subsidy Regiments’ were comprised of foreigners; even the ‘National Regiments’ recruited at least part of their manpower beyond the borders

\(^{19}\) The Swedish army seems to have been as cosmopolitan as its Dutch counterparts. One of the surviving muster-rolls of a Swedish subsidy regiment in Dutch pay illustrates its cosmopolitan soldiery. According to a muster of Captain Treiden’s company of Colonel Magnus Willem Baron van Nieroth, only 30% of the troops were born in Sweden. The remaining 70% were born in Baltic lands like Latvia, Estonia, and Poland, or from the Holy Roman Empire. Other Swedish companies seem to have a similar composition. For details, see RAZ, 508 “Rekenkamer C, 1690,” 1714 (“Rollo Van den Herren Collonel Baron de Niroths Regement en van de Companie Heer Capitein Treiden...,” and “Muster Rolla: Von Henrik Obristen Baron Magnus Wilhem Niroths Regiment, Conrad von Rephen’s Compagnie eingegeben in ’sHartogenbosch 12 juni 1690).


\(^{21}\) Zwitzer, ‘*De militie van den staat,*’ 41-43.

\(^{22}\) In his work of the maritime labor market in the Dutch Republic, Jan Lucassen notes that the Republic drew much of its work force from foreign sources. “Artisans and common labourers, as well as most servants... were recruited from an area within a radius of 500 kilometers. Soldiers, often earning as much as the most poorly-paid sailors...were recruited from as far away as Scotland and Switzerland.” For details, see Jan Lucassen, “The International Maritime Labour Market (Sixteenth-Nineteenth Centuries),” in Paul van Royen, Jaap Bruijn and Jan Lucassen, ed., “*Those Emblems of Hell?’ European Sailors and the Maritime Labour Market, 1570-1870*, 17-19; See also H.L. Zwitzer, ‘*De militie van den staat,*’ 41-43.
of the United Provinces. According to Zwitzer’s recruit lists from the 1780s, 55% of the army’s manpower came from the Dutch Republic itself while the remainder was recruited abroad. Admittedly, his sample is problematic for judging William’s army. First, it is small: 2,599 men from the army’s main services. Secondly, and more problematic for us here, is the date it was taken. Zwitzer’s 2,500-man sample pertains to the late 18th century army, not the late 17th century one. While it is likely that the recruiting pool in the earlier period was similar, it was probably not exactly the same, as the sample below illustrates.

Zacharias Cramer’s company was part of Joachim Willem van Claubergen’s regiment of infantry. One of three new “national” regiments raised in 1689, Regiment Claubergen was in the pay of Zeeland and was officially established on 19 January 1689 when van Claubergen received his colonel’s commission. The muster roll for Cramer’s company is one of the few surviving musters that show where its soldiers came from. The table below, based on the roll taken on 21 March 1689, shows that the vast majority of the new company’s manpower was recruited within the Dutch Republic itself.

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23 Among the foreign regiments on the regular establishment were those of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade. For details of their service, see Childs, The Army, James II, and the Glorious Revolution, 119-137; and James Ferguson, Papers Illustrating the History of the Scots Brigade in the Service of the Netherlands, 1572-1782, Vol.I (1572-1697) (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1899), passim.

24 These were the infantry, cavalry, artillery, dragoons, and engineers. For details see Zwitzer, ‘De militie van den staat,’ 39-61, 180-186.

25 ARA St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8103 (SvO, 1689), 8104 (extr. SvO, 1689), 8105 (SvO, 1690), 8106 (extr. SvO, 1690); and Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VII., 324-325.

Table 6.1: Muster of Zacharias Cramer’s Company, 21 March 1689.\textsuperscript{27}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHERE RECRUITED</th>
<th>NUMBER OF RECRUITS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gelderland</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeeland</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utrecht</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friesland</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overijssel</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groningen</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drenthe</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generality Lands</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside of the United Provinces</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL RECRUITS:</strong></td>
<td><strong>64</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Figure 6.1 shows, 46 of 64 total recruits came from within the Republic itself or 72\% of the total. Of the 18 recruits who came from outside of the Dutch Republic, four came from the Spanish Netherlands or Liège, one from Austria, and the remaining thirteen from Germany. Although Cramer’s Company is by no means large enough to be representative of the whole army let alone its parent regiment, it does no doubt suggest that the later 17\textsuperscript{th} century Dutch Army may have relied more heavily on its own population for its manpower than it would do almost 100 years later.\textsuperscript{28}

Like all armies in the late 17\textsuperscript{th} century, the Dutch Army recruited heavily in Germany. Based on the same muster roll, thirteen or 78\% of those recruited abroad were from German territories, and the majority those came from lands near to the frontier of the United Provinces itself. Of the thirteen German recruits, eight were from lands immediately across the border from the United Provinces.\textsuperscript{29} The remaining five came from towns in the Rhineland, Brunswick, and Bremen. The other foreign recruits

\textsuperscript{27} The total does not include the company’s three officers, whose home is not listed on the muster roll.

\textsuperscript{28} Writing to Hendrik Casimir in 1695, Lieutenant-Colonel van Molenschot of the Regiment Nassau-Friesland (the Frisian Stadholder’s Guards) notes that a recruiting sergeant had been sent to the “Nassause” region in order to “recruit as many people as possible.” The Frisian regiments seem to have recruited heavily in Germany, particularly in the Prince’s hereditary lands. See KHA A-26 VII C., 3 (“Stukken Betreffende Militaire Zaken, 1672-1695”), unfoliated letter #260, “J. van Molenschott to Hendrik Casimir II (date unknown, 1695);” and Zwitzer, ‘De militie van den Staat,’ 39-61, 180-186.

\textsuperscript{29} This included five recruits from East Frisia (Emden, Leer, and Munsterzijl), one from Munster, and two from Cleves (Neuss and Rhineberg).
came from the Spanish Netherlands and the Bishopric of Liège.\textsuperscript{30} Only one soldier traveled from far distant lands to serve in the army of the States General: one Adam Janse came from Steiermark in Habsburg Austria! Zwitzer’s own research on the Dutch Army a century later supports the findings here. Based on the 1,158 foreign soldiers in his sample, 837 or 72\% came from Germany, 78 or just under 7\% from the Bishopric of Liege, and 86 or just over 7\% from the Spanish Netherlands.\textsuperscript{31} Zwitzer’s numbers match-up comparably with the percentages of foreigners found in Cramer’s company.

Reform and strict discipline forged this diverse collection of soldiers into a cohesive military organization. Waldeck and William’s reforms following the French invasion made the rank-and-file better, more disciplined soldiers. But it was their attention to the Dutch officer corps where the Stadholder and his advisor had the greatest influence, and arguably the greatest success. The virtual collapse of the army in 1672 had a tremendous impact on the army’s officers and made plain their shortcomings. The twenty-five years of peace marking the first “Stadholderless Period” adversely affected the army’s discipline, and much of its shortcomings were due to corrupt, inefficient, or incompetent officers, particularly at the company and regimental levels. Many formations had gone without pay or were in arrears; captains and colonels used \textit{passe volants} and other deceptive practices to profit from their commissions at the expense of their men. Still others were either elderly or incompetent. Many officers left their commands unattended for long periods while their soldiers suffered in garrison while others abandoned their posts at the critical moment allowing the French to pass unmolested. Under the conditions, it is not surprising that the army was unable to stop the French invasion.\textsuperscript{32}

As the Dutch Army crumbled in the face of the French onslaught, William began the process of reforming it, especially the officer corps. In order to fight administrative abuse, William first set out to reform the financial administration of the army’s regiments and companies. With the support of the States of Holland, a new system of administration was introduced which placed the financial responsibilities firmly in the

\textsuperscript{30} Two recruits came from the Bishopric of Liège (Hasselt and Loon), while two came from Flanders (Ghent and Zandvoort).

\textsuperscript{31} Zwitzer, ‘\textit{De militie van den staat,}’ 46-55 (especially Tables 3.3a., 3.3b., and 3.3c.).

\textsuperscript{32} For the poor state of the Dutch army on the eve of the Dutch War, see in particular, Ten Raa and de Bas, \textit{Het Staatsche Leger,} V, 228-243; and Knoop, \textit{Krijgs- en Geschiedkundige Beschouwingen over Willem Den Derde,} I., 83-87.
hands of the provinces and their officials rather than in the hand of captains. Officers would no longer able to name their own solliciteurs for the financial administration of their companies and regiments. Rather, according to the new plan new solicitors under the direction of the provinces, called “Directors For Paying the Lands Military” would now entrusted with insuring the proper and timely payment of the troops, thus eliminating the opportunity for graft amongst the officer corps. To prevent officers from profiting from passe volants or false musters, the States of Holland passed an edict on 19 April 1673 forbidding officers from such practices under penalty of death. To give the threat teeth, the Prince of Orange made an example of one such corrupt officer. On 13 November 1673, a court-martial sentenced Colonel Louis-François de Grijspierre to death by sword for using false-musters and numerous other financial abuses to the detriment of his men.33 Although the new plan was never fully implemented, reforms in the appointment of solliciteurs insured that the worst of the abuses were eliminated. The other provinces, following Holland’s example, adopted similar financial measures.34

William was equally uncompromising with cowardly or incompetent officers. Commanders who surrendered their garrisons without a fight were cashiered or worse. Captain Alexander d’Hinyossa was beheaded for “deserting his post, great faintheartedness, creating uneasiness, and being mutinous and rousing the same in others” after the fall of Wesel. During the same trial, the garrison’s colonel, Johan van Santen was cashiered; the lieutenant colonel, Willem Copes, was also cashiered but was later restored to his rank.35 When Rhinberg surrendered, Colonel Daniel d’Ossory and six of the garrison’s captains were sentenced to death while subaltern officers were given lesser sentences. Although three months later, the captains’ death sentences were commuted, d’Ossory sentence was carried out.36 Later Colonel Moijse Pain et Vin was sentenced to life imprisonment for ordering the abandonment of Nieuwerbrug and

33 Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VI, 8-9.

34 Zwitzer, ‘De militie van den staat,’ 92-94.


allowing French troops, cut off by the thawing ice and Dutch troops, to escape capture. The Prince of Orange was so incensed over the laxity of the sentence that he ordered Pain et Vin re-tried. A second court-martial sentenced the unfortunate colonel to death for his poor judgement.37

Although harsh, William’s iron discipline had a positive affect on the Dutch officer corps and the army as a whole. In the wake of court-martials and executions emerged a hard, well-disciplined, and professional group of officers and men. Those officers that experienced the disaster of 1672 and continued their careers in the Dutch Army became part of what contemporaries would recognize as one of the most experienced and professional officer corps’ of the later 17th century. Even outsiders recognized the excellence of the Dutch officer corps after William’s reforms. Humphrey Bland, an English officer who served during both the Nine Years’ War and the War of the Spanish Succession and author of A Treatise of Military Discipline,38 noted that Dutch officers “are generally promoted by their service; by which the majority of them are men of Experience....”39 Most of William’s officers in the Nine Years’ War learned their trade as captains or colonels during the Dutch War; many of them went on to become his most trusted generals. The disaster of 1672 demonstrated the importance of discipline. After the army was re-built and trained, Dutch soldiers gained a reputation for their coolness under fire. Central to the improvement of their reputation was the discipline instilled upon them by their officers. In describing the quality of the Dutch soldier, Humphrey Bland rightfully identifies the real reason for his excellence:

We have a common notion, that this sang froid, or Obedient Quality in the Dutch, is owing chiefly to their Nature, by their having a greater Proportion of Phlegm in their constitution than the English, by which their minds are not so soon as agitated as ours. But I look upon this way of reasoning, to be a rather plausible

37 Ten Raa and de Bas, Het Staatsche Leger, V., 355-356, 576-577 (Antekening No. 48).

38 Bland’s early career is obscure. He first appears in Dalton’s, English Army Lists and Commission Registers in 1709 as a major in Frederick Sibourg’s French regiment of foot. In his book A Treatise of Military Discipline, Bland notes that he entered service just after pikes had been phased out of the English army. Since England did not officially eliminate pikes from its infantry until 1704, it is likely that Bland entered service sometime between 1704 and 1709, and it is possible that his appointment to Frederick Sibourg’s regiment was his first assignment. For details, see Humphrey Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline, 82; Dalton, English Army Lists and Commission Registers, VI., 176 and 176n; and R.E. Scouller, The Armies of Queen Anne, 193-195.

39 Humphrey Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline, 146-147.
excuse for our own neglect, in not bringing our men to the same perfection of discipline, than the product of any natural cause in the Dutch. But, allowing that nature does contribute something towards it, yet, it is evident, Art has the greatest share, since their troops are generally composed of different nations.\(^{40}\) In other words, Dutch soldiers were superior through their “perfection of discipline” and their mastery of the military “Art” rather than through any inherently “Dutch” quality. As Bland notes, Dutch troops were composed of men from many different lands. Consequently, discipline rather than nationality was the determining factor.

The backbone of the Dutch officer corps was, not-surprisingly, largely made up of Dutchmen. Historians like the late Pieter Geyl, and more recently Simon Schama, have suggested that the army was alien, more foreign, than the navy. According to Schama “collectively, and institutionally, the navy was seen as less intimidating and more vaderlandse than the army.”\(^{41}\) But for many Dutchmen, particularly of the elite regent class and the ever-diminishing group of Dutch nobility, it made for an attractive career. In Zwitzer’s study of the Dutch officer corps on the eve of the French Revolutionary Wars, he discovered fully 74% were naturalized Dutchmen. Although Zwitzer’s figures may not be representative of the late 17th century army, there is no question that a majority of the army’s officers came from Dutch families.\(^ {42}\) Unlike other armies, however, the bulk of the Dutch officer corps was not drawn from the noble class. Although it is true that nobles dominated the army’s highest ranks, the subaltern ranks were largely filled by men from regent backgrounds.\(^ {43}\) Apart from the house of Orange-Nassau which was one of the last vestiges of the Dutch nobility and provided five of the army’s general officers, most of the officers of noble background were noble in little more than name.\(^ {44}\) Thus, while men from noble families like Aylva, Burmania, 


\(^{41}\) Simon Schama, *Embarrassment of Riches*, 246.

\(^{42}\) Zwitzer, ‘De militie van den staat,’ 194.


\(^{44}\) These were Field-Marshals Walrad, Prince van Nassau-Saarbrücken and Hendrik Casimir II, Prince van Nassau(-Dietz), Lieutenant-General of Cavalry Hendrik van Nassau-Ouwerkerck (also known as Auverquerq or Overkirk), Major-General of Infantry Walrad, Graaf van Nassau-Usingen, and Major-General of Cavalry Willem van Nassau-Zuylenstein, First Earl of Rochford.
Dedem, Heyden, Keppel, van Plettenberg, Reede van Ginkel, Wassenaer, Welderen, could be found throughout the lists of the army’s officers during the early modern period, it was a class that was rapidly dying out.\footnote{Zwitzer, ‘De militie van den staat’, 228-231.}

Most officers came from regent families with a tradition of state service. For example, the Hollandse family \textit{Wassenaer-Duyvenvoorde} had a long tradition of both civil and military service. Jacob, Baron van Wassenaer-Duyvenvoorde, Voorschoten and Veur was a member of Holland’s \textit{ridderschap} — Holland’s nobility. The elder Wassenaer-Duyvenvoorde was a representative in the States of Holland and sat in that college’s \textit{Gecommitteerde Raden} until his death in 1707. His younger brother, Frederik Willem, Baron van Wassenaer-Duyvenvoorde, Heer van Rosande, received his commission in 1686 as a lieutenant in the Dutch Blue Guards. In 1689 he was promoted to lieutenant of His Majesty’s Life Company and then to Captain of the Foot Guards in 1690. He attained the rank of Colonel in 1695 and Brigadier in 1704. In 1709, he was made Major-General of Infantry and Sergeant-Major of the Regiment of Foot Guards. At the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, Willem was appointed Governor of Bergen-op-Zoom and Lieutenant-Colonel of the Foot Guards, a position he would hold until 1716.\footnote{For details, see H. Ringoir, \textit{Nederlandse Generaals van 1568 tot 1940} (’s-Gravenhage: Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis van de Landmachtstaf, 1981), passim; Ten Raa, \textit{Het Staatsche Leger}, VII., 234-237; and Hora Siccama, \textit{Aanteekeningen en Verbeteringen}, 486-491, 518-519, 789-792.} Frederik Willem’s son, Carel Lodewijk followed a military career as well. Entering the cavalry, Carel Loedewijk rose steadily through the ranks attaining the rank of major of cavalry in Baron ’s-Gravemoer’s Regiment of Horse in 1708 and Colonel of de Matha’s Regiment of Dragoons in 1711. By the time he left the service in 1737, he had attained the rank of Brigadier of Horse.\footnote{For details on the life of Willem van Wassenaer-Duyvenvoorde, see ARA RAZH \textit{Inventaris van het Huisarchief der Familie van Wassenaer} (3.20.63), “Willem van Wassenaer Duyvenvoorde” (nr.3: Ambten en bedieningen); J.H. Hora Siccema, \textit{Aanteekeningen en Verbeteringen}... 746-747; H. Ringoir, \textit{Hoofdofficieren der Infanterie van 1568 tot 1813} (’s-Gravenhage: Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis van de Landmachtstaf, 1981), 6-8.}

The example of the Wassenaer-Duyvenvoorde family is in many ways typical of the Dutch officers who served in the army. Most came from the same group of military
families, some of whose members served in the army for several generations. Adolf Hendrik van Recheren, heer van Almelo had a similar family background. Born to an Overijssel family of noble origin, Adolf Hendrik is best known as the diplomat who organized the logistical support for Marlborough’s famous march to the Danube in 1704, and for his service as Field Deputy for Overijssel during the War of the Spanish Succession. He was one of eight sons, all of whom embarked upon military careers. Only Adolf Hendrik himself chose for a career in government. Like many military families in the later 17th century Dutch Republic, van Recheren-Almelo and Wassenaer-Duyvenvoirtde were from nobility. But the officer corps was by no means limited to nobles, in fact far from it. Although a breakdown of noble versus non-noble officers of Dutch origin would be difficult to compile, it is safe to say that most junior officers and many ranking officers were either of non-noble or of indeterminate origins. Such officers included men like Johan Wijnand van Goor, a Dutch artillery officer who later commanded the English train in Flanders, Remt ten Ham van Holtzappel, Hendrik Losecaat, Johan de Rhoo, and Johan de Vassy, all of whom commanded regiments under William III. Although the Dutch Army was not unlike other military

48 For his service during the War of the Spanish Succession, see in particular van Nimwegen, De Subsistentie van het Leger, passim (especially 132-156).


50 Johan Wijnand Goor received his commission as a captain in the infantry company of Colonel Prince Maurits van Nassau on 9 November 1676 but would make his name as an artillerist. In the 1680s he moved through the ranks of the Dutch army and at the time of the war’s outbreak in 1689, Goor was a lieutenant-colonel and commandant of Grave. He accompanied the Dutch contingent on the Lower Rhine in 1689 and participated in the sieges of Rhineberg, Kaiserswerth, and Bonn as Quartermaster-General of the Dutch force. In 1690, Goor went into English service where he was given command of the English train in Ireland. Goor commanded the train until the end of the war in Ireland, and then was given command of the English train in Flanders, an appointment he would hold until the end of the war. After Rijswijk, he returned to Dutch service. He was promoted to Major-General of Infantry in 1701 and then Lieutenant-General in 1704. He gained fame commanding the Dutch corps under the Duke of Marlborough during his campaign on the Danube where he was killed during the storming of the Schellenberg. For Goor’s career, see BL Stowe MSS., 444, ff. 10-12; RAU, Huis Amerongen, 3108 (“Brieven afkomstig van Johan Wijnand Goor, met journaal en kaart van het beleg van Kaiserswerth, 1698 [1689]?); Hora-Sicema, Aantekeningen en Verbeteringen, 276-277; and Ten Raa, Het Staatse Leger, VII., 236, 402, 422,428, 430, 435, 440.

51 Holtzappel, Losecaat, and de Rhoo all commanded infantry regiments; Johan de Vassy was Lieutenant-Colonel of an infantry regiment and governor of Sas van Gent in Zeeuws Flanders. For details, see Ringoir, Hoofl-officieren der Infanterie, 28,27,34; Hora-Sicema, Aantekeningen en Verbeteringen, 715; and Ten Raa, Het Staatse Leger, VII., 235,239,262, 313, 322, 404, 407.
organizations in that it provided better opportunities for men from the nobility, its high number of men from the regent and non-noble elements of Dutch society made it unique. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that very few general officers came from non-noble families.

The diversity of the Dutch officer corps undoubtedly contributed to the army’s professionalism. Since its inception, the Dutch army opened its doors to officers of many backgrounds and nationalities, many bringing with them special expertise. Although it had long attracted candidates from its own territories, its reputation for expertise and regular pay made it attractive to foreigners as well. During the Dutch Revolt, soldiers from across Europe came to the Netherlands to gain experience. The “Dutch Exercise”, devised by Count Johan van Nassau and spread throughout Europe by Jacob de Gheyn’s illustrated drill manual during the early 17th century attracted soldiers to serve in the Republic’s army. The Republic was recognized as a nexus for the exchange of military ideas. Henry Hexham, an Englishman who served in the Dutch Army during the war with Spain described it as “the nurserie of soulderie.” In many ways the Army of the States General’s officer corps epitomized the cosmopolitan nature of the European officers’ fraternity. During the course of the Dutch Revolt, officers from England, France, Germany, Scotland, Sweden, and numerous other states made their careers serving the States General and many would continue to do so long after the Peace of Munster.

Foreigners and the Dutch Officer Corps
The Dutch Army had always contained a relatively high proportion of foreign officers. As was the case with its soldiery, the Republic’s relatively modest population forced it to look abroad for at least part of its manpower, and the officer corps was no exception to this. But just as the Republic needed officers from beyond its borders to serve in its regiments, foreign officers likewise wanted to serve in the Dutch army. Not only was

52 For the development of volley fire and the Dutch influence on the art of war, see Parker, The Military Revolution, 19-24.


54 Geoffrey Parker, “Foreword,” in Marco van der Hoeven, ed., Exercise of Arms, ix-xi.
the Republic on the cutting-edge of the military art, but service in the States General’s army made for an attractive career for many a German, Flemish, or French nobleman, particularly those younger brothers of nobles who, through accident of birth, were forced to make their own way in the world. Although in times of war, whole regiments and their officers often served as subsidy formations in the pay of the States General, many individual foreign officers found a place in one of the regiments on the national establishment. This was particularly true in the wake of the French invasion in 1672 and the expansion of the army that followed.

The rapid expansion of the army and the need for qualified officers provided many opportunities for foreigners. Among the more prominent foreign officers who entered Dutch service during the Franco-Dutch War were several who became generals in the 1680s and 90s. Johan Karel, Paltzegraaf van Birkenfeld entered Dutch service in 1673 when he became colonel of a new regiment created from the rump of regiments Degenfeld and Jorman. Born in 1638, Birkenfeld had served in Germany before entering Dutch service. After serving as colonel of his own regiment for four years, he was promoted to the rank of Major-General of Infantry, a rank he would hold until 1689 when he was promoted Lieutenant-General of Infantry. Numerous foreign officers, like Birkenfeld, entered Dutch service during the Dutch War and became prominent generals under the Stadholder-King during the Nine Years War. Tilly, Dopff, Noyelles, Tettau, Schlippenbach and Salisch are but a few of the officers of foreign birth who made their careers in Dutch service and became general officers under William III. Indeed, roughly half of the Dutch Army’s generals were of foreign origin. Figure 5.2 below illustrates the breakdown of Dutch-born to foreign-born general officers thus:

55 For Birkenfeld’s background, see Hora-Siccama, Aantekeningen en Verbeteringen, 85; Ringoir, Nederlandse Generaals, 4, 14; Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VI., 179, 233; VII., 236,304,401.
Many foreign officers entered Dutch service as junior officers in Dutch regiments. Jacques Louis Count de Noyelles began his career as an ensign in the Blue Guards. In 1674 he was promoted to the rank of Captain in the same regiment and eventually became Colonel in 1681. Noyelles was typical of a large group of foreign officers who began and ended their careers in Dutch service.\(^5^7\) Other foreigners entered Dutch service through commanding their own native formations as Dutch “subsidy” regiments. Carel Willem, Baron von Sparre served as a Lieutenant-Colonel in the Swedish subsidy regiment of Baron von Putbus. In 1691, he was promoted to colonel of the regiment, but was still a Swedish officer albeit in Dutch pay. However, when he was promoted to Major-General in 1702 during the first year of the Spanish Succession War, he officially entered Dutch service where he would stay until severely wounded at Malplaat.\(^5^8\) Baron Sparre’s experience was a common one; a number of officers who

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Field Marshals</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generals</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-Generals</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major-Generals</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadiers(^5^6)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2: Origin of Dutch General Officers by Rank, 1688-1697.

\(^5^6\) “Brigadier” was an informal, ad-hoc rank in the Dutch Army until 1701 when the first Brigadiers were appointed, and like the other ranks, they were divided between infantry and cavalry. The first brigadiers formally appointed to the post were: for the cavalry, Zeno Diederik van Tengnagel, Frederik Christiaan van Reede Baron of Aughrim, Johan Reinhard van Hoornbergh, and Frederik Jacob Prince von Hessen-Homberg; and for the infantry, Willem Frederik van Schratenbach, Johan van Beynheym, Johan Werner van Pallandt, and Johan Frederik van Dohna Baron van Ferassières. Of these officers, three were Dutch (Aughrim, Beynheym, and Pallandt), three were foreign (Hessen-Homberg, Schratenbach and Dohna-Ferassières), and two (van Tengnagel and Hoornbergh) were of indeterminate origin but likely Dutch. Based on the first appointments, the national breakdown of brigadiers is consistent with other general officers shown in Table 6.2. For details, see F.J.G. Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VII, 234-237; and Zwitzer, ‘De militie van den staat,’ 228-239 (Bijlage 22b).

\(^5^7\) Hora-Siccama, Aanteekening en Verbeteringen, 501; Ringoir, Hooftofficieren der Infanterie, 64; and Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VII, 236-429.

\(^5^8\) For details of Carel Willem, Baron von Sparre’s service, see J. H. Hora-Siccama, Aanteekeningen en Verbeteringen, 660; Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VII, 236, 313, 368-370, 403; and Ringoir, Hooftofficiern der Infanterie, 68.
entered Dutch service at the head of subsidy regiments ended up with Dutch commissions through their good service.

Other officers served only temporarily in Dutch service or gained their training in the Republic but went on to serve other masters. Julius Ernst van Tettau, a Danish officer born in East Prussia, epitomizes the cosmopolitan nature of the Dutch officer corps under William III. Tettau was no stranger to Dutch service; in 1657, at the age of thirteen, Tettau entered the Dutch Army as a cadet. Three years later, he left the Republic to continue his military education in France. Tettau studied military engineering and siegcraft under the tutelage of Turenne and even attracted the attention of the Sun King himself. After six years in French service, he joined the Elector of Brandenburg’s army as an engineer. Tettau fought in both the Franco-Dutch War on the side of the Allies, and in the war between Sweden and Denmark where he led a Brandenburg subsidy regiment in Danish service and earned the respect of his Danish peers. His experience there led him to enter Danish service. While there, he rose through the ranks advancing from colonel to major-general in 1684, eventually finding his way to the Duke of Württemberg’s staff. In 1689, he accompanied Württemberg to British Isles as part of the Danish subsidy corps hired by William III for service in Ireland. He served with distinction in Ireland, not only fighting with great courage in several engagements, but also showed his technical expertise through his able direction of several sieges. Upon the close of the Irish Campaign, William asked him to enter Dutch service and in 1691, was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General of Infantry in the Dutch Army, and in 1694 general of artillery, a rank he would hold until the end of the Nine Years’ War.59

The Dutch army was a haven for Protestant officers, particularly French Huguenots. Even before the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the Dutch army offered an attractive alternative to Protestant officers whose future in Louis XIV’s service seemed uncertain. During the Franco-Dutch War, numerous French Huguenots entered Dutch service, some of whom raised regiments for the States General.60


60 These include Regiments Villaumaire, Thouars, Hauerive, Torsay, and Perponcher-Maisonneuve. The bulk of the French infantry regiments in Dutch service were disbanded in 1674 and their personnel absorbed by Dutch regiments. See Ten Raa and De Bas, Het Staatsche Leger, V., 484-487; VI., 234, 257, 262, 265; and Ringoir, Hooftofficieren der Infanterie, 144-160.

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their regiments were disbanded at the end of the war, many officers stayed on and made careers in the Dutch army. Another wave of French soldiers joined the forces of the States General following the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. It is interesting to note that many of those who fled France for the Dutch Republic ended up in English service, a good indication of William III’s influence over officer appointments in England as well. Fredéric Armand van Schomberg is probably the outstanding example of this. After the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, Schomberg left France for service in the Brandenburg army and shortly thereafter entered Dutch service. He accompanied William III to England in 1688 and was later made Master of the Board of Ordnance and General of His Majesty’s (English) Forces, posts which he held until his death at the Boyne in 1690. His youngest son, Count Meinhard van Schomberg, followed his father into English service and later received the title Earl of Leiceste.61 Many French officers, however, stayed in Dutch service where their sons became naturalized Dutch citizens and continued in the footsteps of their fathers.62

As these examples show, service in the Dutch Army served different purposes for different officers. For many, it was an integral part of their education. Men like Tettau joined to learn the basics and then went on to serve other masters. Still others entered Dutch service because there were more opportunities for them in the Republic than in their native land and greater religious freedom. Another group comprised “mercenary commanders.” Prince von Waldeck, and later the Duke of Holstein-Plön and the Duke of Württemberg were hired directly to the top of the chain-of-command either as field marshals or generals. Their entrance into Dutch service came through the bidding of William III himself with the specific purpose of commanding large contingents of Dutch (or allied) troops. Later in this chapter, we shall explore the significance of this type of officer to both the Dutch and Confederate armies. Regardless of the reason for entering Dutch service and their influence on the corps, foreigners did not represent the majority of Dutch officers. According to Zwitzer’s study of the 18th century Dutch officer corps, only 26% of officers on the national

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62 The families Noyelles, Saint Amant, and Perponcher are a few examples of French families who eventually made careers in the Dutch army and became naturalized with time. See especially, Ringoir, Hooffofficieren der Infanterie, passim; Hooffofficieren der Cavalerie, passim.
establishment were born outside of the Dutch Republic, far fewer than the percentage for foreigners amongst the general officers would suggest. Although there was no doubt a difference between William’s army and the army examined by Zwitzer, the disproportionate number of foreign-born officers who reached the staff level was arguably a reflection of William’s determination to field the best group of commanders possible rather than the result of mere patronage allegiances.

The character of the Dutch army’s officer corps provided the Confederate army with a cohesiveness that it otherwise might not have had. Although on the surface the cosmopolitan nature of the Dutch army’s officer corps would seem to have created disunity, the opposite more likely was true. Although the officers in Dutch service came from many lands, Dutchmen comprised the heart of corps. In much the same way that Dutch national regiments were supplemented by foreign regiments hired in times of war, the Dutch officer corps was likewise supplemented by foreign officers. The fact that so many made their careers in the Dutch army gave the organization a character not unlike that of the Confederate Army itself. Both foreign and Dutch officers in service of the States General owed their loyalty to the States General and to William III. In many ways, however, these officers were really clients of the Stadholder-King. In return for a commission in the States General’s army, both foreign and native officers owed the Prince of Orange their allegiance. Indeed, their career advancement depended on the support of William III. That is not to say that William only promoted officers for political reasons. But some officers likely received commissions for the sake of creating unity with the Confederate Army. But more often than not, William tended promote officers for their ability rather than for their loyalty. Consequently, the Dutch officer corps enjoyed not only a cohesiveness that it had not enjoyed since the end of the Eighty Years’ War, but a sense of military “professionalism” unsurpassed in its history. This group of officers would provide the core of capable leaders around which the Confederate Army would be built.

As the late Dutch historian W. J. Knoop points out, William is one of the few captains who can lay claim to a “school” of officers who learned their trade under him. Men like Athlone, Ouwerkerk, Slangenburg, Coehoorn, Tilly, and Fagel and many

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64 See Chapter 3 above.
others learned their trade as junior officers serving the Prince of Orange during the Franco-Dutch War, but would make their reputations as general officers serving in the Confederate Army during the Nine Years’ War. Indeed, many of them later proved to be the Duke of Marlborough’s most trusted and capable subordinates during the War of the Spanish Succession. Even Marlborough himself, one might argue, gained his most important military experience serving with William’s armies in both the Spanish Netherlands and Ireland. Although others, like Waldeck, Montpouillan, Weijbom, Delwich, and Solms provided the Dutch Army with a cadre of experienced officers when it needed it most, they were nearing the end of their careers during the Nine Years’ War. Those officers who served in William’s army during his tenure as Stadholder and Captain-General nevertheless had an important influence on the Confederate Army during the Wars of the Grand Alliance in particular and warfare in general during 17th and 18th centuries. It was they, along with the William himself, which gave the army its character.

William III, the British Army, and the Legitimacy of Command
In a world where prestige and social position was every bit as important as military rank, William’s level of control over the Dutch military provided him with the requisite leverage to command general officers and gain the respect of hereditary princes alike. Arguably, the centerpiece of his political power within the coalition was his legal position as commander-in-chief of the Dutch Republic’s armed forces. As commander of the most proficient and — at the time of the Nine Years’ War — largest of the allied contingents arrayed against Louis XIV’s forces, this carried tremendous political weight. The Prince of Orange was recognized as a military commander of some talent through his exploits during the Franco-Dutch War, an important factor in gaining the respect of his fellow princes. Many of his colleagues had worked with him either as commanders of independent contingents allied to Republic, or as colonels of subsidy regiments in Dutch service. His charisma made him popular among both his fellow

65 W.J. Knoop, Krijgs-en Geschiedkundige Beschouwingen over Willem den Derde, I., 14.

66 Marlborough’s most important military biographer, David Chandler, describes him as “William’s General” during the early years of the Stadholder-King’s reign. For details, see David Chandler, Marlborough as Military Commander, 26-44; W.J. Knoop, Krijgs-en Geschiedkundige Beschouwingen over Willem den Derde, I., 14.
princes as well as with his own officer corps. His succession to the English throne, furthermore, strengthened his position within Europe’s military-noble circles. Consequently, William could command respect of foreign princes in a way that none of his subordinates could, a critical factor in creating unity within a multi-national coalition army.  

But where possible, William relied upon legal control to create a centralized chain-of-command within the Confederate Army. When William became King of England in February 1689, William became Commander-in-Chief of England’s armed forces. As commander of the Confederate Army’s two largest contingents, William personally commanded the bulk of the forces facing Louis XIV. William used the Dutch army, particularly its administrative structures and its corps of seasoned officers, to create a similarly efficient British force to augment the Dutch one in Flanders. By promoting English officers familiar with the Dutch military practices supplemented by foreign officers of experience, William was able to create a English army that could be deployed to the Low Countries and serve within the same administrative and organizational umbrella as the Dutch Army. In an age where field armies by their very nature were ad-hoc affairs, William used his power and influence to focus military authority in his own hands. Through a complicated mix of patron-client relationships, social position, and legal authority, William created a military organization that was almost as centralized as the forces he faced. By utilizing his legal authority as commander of both the Dutch and English armies he was able to fashion an allied army that he could control.

William III, the Dutch Officer Corps, and the British Army

When war broke out in 1688-89, the Prince of Orange was faced with two problems. The first was to secure the English throne from external threats and the second, to

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67 William’s character as a military commander is still somewhat difficult to gauge. On the one hand, William had been involved with military affairs for virtually his entire adult life. He reformed the Dutch army and led the army in the field during every campaign of the Dutch War and eight of nine campaign seasons during the Nine Years’ War, yet he won very few victories. John Childs describes William as “unlucky” and this seems to describe him quite well. He was always faced with the problem of commanding coalition armies and this, according to Knoop, was a serious disadvantage for William. Both Knoop, Childs, and others agree that William was an excellent organizer and diplomat, skills essential in waging coalition warfare. For details, see Childs, The British Army of William III, 211-212; Knoop, Krijgs- en Geschiedkundige Beschouwingen, I., 5-17; and Baxter, William III, 281-287.
establish an adequate force in the Low Countries to defend against French incursions. To defend against potential French attacks in the Low Countries, he left Waldeck with a Dutch/German force to defend the Republic’s traditional invasion routes while William consolidated his own position in England accompanied by the cream of the Dutch Army. 65 companies of horse and 17 infantry battalions in all including both the Guard and the Anglo-Dutch Brigade had accompanied William in 1688 and most of these formations remained in England with Orange. Although his expedition to England had been a smashing success, almost immediately he was faced with threats that required his attention and, more importantly, his absence from the Low Countries Theater. Jacobite rebellion in the Scottish highlands and even more dangerously, James II’s return to Ireland a little more than a month after William and Mary were crowned, forced him to intervene before he was fully prepared to do so.68

It was not that the Prince of Orange did not want to commit England’s forces to the allied cause. Indeed, one of his primary reasons for embarking on his “Grand Design” was to bring England into the war on the side of the alliance. Unfortunately, the circumstances of the Glorious Revolution made the British army ill-prepared to embark upon a full-scale war in 1689. The British army’s defeat at the hands of William, and James II’s subsequent flight severely affected its morale. Most of the army’s rank-and-file maintained their loyalty to the Stuart king. Although the conspiracy of the army had undermined James ability to act, it was not as widespread as the Prince of Orange had hoped, much to his dismay. Instead of whole units defecting to William’s army intact, only a few, mostly high-ranking, officers came over in dribs and drabs, along with the remnants of their companies. Even more seriously, before William could get to London and take control of the reigns of government, the Earl of Feversham — the British army’s Commander-in-Chief — had disbanded the army on the mistaken orders of James. The result was chaos. The Prince of Orange had invaded not only to bring Britain into the camp of the Grand Alliance but to use its army in his war against Louis XIV as well.69 The confused state of the army in the wake of the revolution required that it be completely reorganized and retrained. Now,

68 Israel, “The Dutch Role in the Glorious Revolution,” 105-110.

69 Childs, The British Army of William III, 4-7; and Israel, “The Dutch Role in the Glorious Revolution,” 105-110.
circumstances demanded that the army be patched together as quickly as possible and
thrown into full-scale war without the restructuring it so desperately needed.70

William’s reforms focused, first and foremost, on making the army a politically
reliable force. His first act was to re-organize its central administration. When Orange
first arrived in London, he put the army’s administration into the hands of Constantijn
Huygens, his personal secretary, until the political situation stabilized. Only in late
January did control of the military administration pass back to William Blathwayt, the
previous Secretary-at-War.71 In order to bring some order out of the chaos, William
ordered the disbandment order rescinded and the regiments to report to their assigned
garrisons and await further instructions. Meanwhile, William initiated a purge of both
the officer corps and the enlisted ranks. Beginning the first week of January 1689,
William cashiered all English and Irish Catholic officers, regardless of experience and
loyalty, thereby leaving the army composed of only Protestants. Then, the rank-and-file
of the Irish regiments were mustered together, disarmed, and marched to the south of
England. After pledging their allegiance to the new sovereign, they were moved to
"internment" camps in Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight and shipped off to serve the
Holy Roman Emperor.72 Needless to say, a good number of these troops resented their
less than civil treatment and managed to make their way to France where they could
take up arms against England.

Among the remaining Protestant rank-and-file, the weeding out process was
more difficult, however. First, to remove the threat of a military revolt in London, all of
the Household regiments were marched to distant quarters away from the capital,
where they could do little to interfere with events at the capital.73 Once the regiments
were in their quarters, William III and his advisers began to purge the officer corps by
replacing suspect officers — most notably the regimental colonels — with politically


71 Huygens acted as Secretary-at-War from 14 December to 31 December 1688. For details see
Childs, The British army of William III, 9; and Scouller, The Armies of Queen Anne, 14.

72 William John Hardy, ed., "Letter from the Earl of Shrewsbury to the Duke of Schomburg
dated 28 March 1689," in Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of William and Mary.
13th Feb. 1689—April 1690 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode for Her Majesties Stationary Office,
1895), 44.

73 Childs, The British Army of William III, 10-12.
Many of William’s appointments came from among the English officers of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, whose military ability and political leanings he found acceptable. Other officer appointments were strictly political, designed to insure the loyalty of a particular corps. Of the remaining former officers, roughly one-third left the army voluntarily, either unable to give up their vows of allegiance to James, or unwilling to take up arms against England. Another other third of the officer corps was purged under William’s reforms, thus leaving about one-third of James’ former officers to serve in William’s “reformed” English army. Even these officers were hardly trusted by William. While William might have endowed men like Marlborough with titles and rewards for their assistance in the Glorious Revolution, he believed such men could never be fully trusted. Not surprisingly, very few English officers were entrusted with important commands in the years immediately following the revolution. To fill the roughly two-thirds of the vacant officer spots in the army, William turned to the two sources of officers he felt he could trust, the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, and the Huguenots.

The Anglo-Dutch brigade was William’s most important source for trustworthy and professional British officers. British soldiers had served in the forces of the States General since the end of the 16th century when the Holland Regiment of Foot went into Dutch service in 1572. Almost from the beginning of its existence, the Dutch army included English and Scottish regiments. Many of these during the course of the 17th century became Dutch national regiments and thus lost their “Britishness” with time. Still others were disbanded while their men either entered service in Dutch national regiments or returned home. Like other foreign officers in the Dutch Army, many English and Scots had actually become naturalized Dutch citizens; their sons often continued to serve in the States General’s forces. After generations of service, such men were English in little more than name. Nevertheless, there were also British regiments in the pay of the Dutch Republic manned and officered by British soldiers. Following


75 For example, Patrick Balfour — a naturalized Scot — was a lieutenant-colonel in Karel Manmaecker’s regiment. His family had served in the Dutch army since the early seventeenth century. Patrick Balfour wrote his correspondence in Dutch, an illustration that his family had completely naturalized. Like the Balfour family, there were numerous other Scots who became naturalized Dutch citizens. Hugh MacKay was probably the most famous. He became a Major-General of Dutch Infantry in 1686 and commanded William’s forces in Scotland. For details, see Ringoir, Hooftofficieren der Infanterie, passim, and Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VII., 236-237, 304.
the Peace of Nijmegen, a new Anglo-Dutch Brigade was formed. Raised in England and Scotland but paid by the Dutch Republic, the Anglo-Dutch Brigade comprised six regiments: three English and three Scottish regiments of foot. Many of the officers who served in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade became generals in the British army, while others continued in Dutch service. Consequently, the Dutch officer corps always included English and Scottish officers.

The Anglo-Dutch Brigade formed one of the more important pools of replacement officers for the vacancies created by the turmoil of 1688. Although at first William chose “political colonels” — officers appointed purely for their political loyalty — as replacements for the vacancies created by the great purge, as regiments neared deployment such officers were generally replaced by men of experience. William preferred to appoint officers of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade; not only did he know them personally but he was satisfied with their professional ability. Unlike most native English officers, Anglo-Dutch Brigade members were familiar with continental practices. Perhaps even more importantly, they had seen and understood the Dutch army. Indeed, the vast number of new colonels to receive regiments in 1689 — and when the army expanded again in 1693 — had done service in the brigade. Virtually all of the colonels of the brigade’s six regiments went on to become general officers. Those who held mere captaincies in 1688 moved rapidly through the ranks such that roughly half of the captains in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade commanded English regiments before the Nine Years’ War had ended.

In his three-part study of the late-Stuart British Army, John Childs calls the Anglo-Dutch Brigade “one of the cornerstones of the operation of the conspiracy in the army and in the mechanics of the invasion.” William was able to use it as a refuge for English officers in opposition to James and as a base of support for him. Childs notes:

76 The commanders of the six regiments of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade on the eve of the Glorious Revolution were Thomas Tollemache, Philip Babington, John Cutts, George Lauder, Hugh MacKay, and George Ramsay. Sir Henry Belasyse had been commander of Babington’s regiment of foot until April 1688. It is noteworthy that all of these colonels save Babington became generals in English service during the Nine Years’ War. For details, see Dalton, ed., English Army Lists and Commission Registers, III., 4-5; and Childs, The Army, James II, and the Glorious Revolution, 119-137.

The numerous personal and official contacts between the officers of the armies in England, Scotland, Ireland, and the United Provinces allowed the conspiracy within the English officer corps to function smoothly and without causing undue suspicion. More than any other institution, the Anglo-Dutch Brigade was the instrument by which William was able to prepare the way for his descent on England in November 1688.\textsuperscript{78}

That same network, however, helped create unity both within the British Army, and within the Anglo-Dutch officer corps as a whole. The Anglo-Dutch Brigade was one of the means by which William, either intentionally or unintentionally, created a bond between the British and allied armies. The officers of the Brigade provided a professional “bridge” between the English and the more cosmopolitan European officers. Indeed, the British general officers who served in the Confederate Army almost reads like a who’s who of the Brigade: Hugh Mackay, Sir John Cutts, Sir Thomas Tolmache, Sir Henry Bellasize, George Lauder and Philip Colyear all served in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, and all would go on to command brigade-size or larger formations while serving in the Confederate Army under William.\textsuperscript{79}

But the Anglo-Dutch Brigade could not fill all the vacant posts. Although six infantry regiments produced a number of qualified officers, there were simply not enough of them to meet the demand brought on by the purge followed by the army’s rapid expansion. To fill the remaining vacancies, William had to look abroad for qualified candidates. During the Nine Years’ War, France provided the English officer corps with the bulk of its foreign manpower. When Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes in 1685, fully 3,000 officers left the Sun King’s service.\textsuperscript{80} Many went into Dutch or German service; still others offered their services to the Duke of Savoy. The rest crossed the channel to England. A number entered British service prior to the Glorious Revolution. In 1688, Henri Armand de Bourbon-Malause, Marquis de Miremont raised a regiment of horse for service in James II’s army. Although Miremont had entered the army in James’ service, he had no difficulty in shifting his loyalties following the events

\textsuperscript{78} Childs, \textit{The Army, James II, and the Glorious Revolution}, 135.

\textsuperscript{79} Childs, \textit{The Nine Years’ War and the British Army}, 343-357; and Chapter 7 below.

of 1688. After his regiment was disbanded in January 1689, he raised a new regiment of dragoons for King William in 1691 for service in Savoy, and later served as one of his Aides-de-Camp in Flanders.  

Miremont one of many Huguenot officers who went into James II service in the late 1680s following Louis’ clamp-down. Louis de Duras, Earl of Feversham — James II’s Commander-in-Chief — was a Huguenot as were many others. Although some of James’ Huguenots left the service after 1688, most stayed on.

The Glorious Revolution brought even more Huguenot officers into English service. Many of the expelled Protestants entered English service by way of William III. The Dutch army had long been a haven for French Huguenots and Louis’ policy in the 1680s brought an influx of French to the Dutch Republic to join William’s entourage. The Duke of Schomberg had been one of Louis’ finest officers but left France for the Republic in 1685. As we saw above, both Schomberg and his sons followed William to England and began careers in English service. Other, less prominent, French officers raised regiments or simply served in one of the Huguenot regiments on the English establishment. Issaac de Monceau de la Melonière was typical of many Huguenots that accompanied William’s expedition in 1688. La Melonière entered Dutch service after escaping his confinement in the Bastille in 1686. After serving as one of William’s aids-de-camp, he raised a regiment of Huguenot infantry for English service. By the end of the Nine Years’ War, there were five regiments of Huguenots on the English establishment: a regiment of horse, one of dragoons, and three regiments of foot. Of the between 8,000 and 10,000 British officer commissions granted during Nine Years’ War, John Childs estimates that roughly 1,000 were men of Huguenot birth. According

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81 From 1691-1695, Miremont’s Regiment of Dragoons was in the pay of the United Provinces after which it went into English pay. For much of its existence, it fought in the south for the Duke of Savoy. For details on the Marquis de Miremont’s career, see F.J.G. Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VII, 466-465; Charles Dalton, English Army Lists and Commission Registers, II., 165. For Huguenot’s in the pay of the Duke of Savoy, see especially Christopher Storrs, War, Diplomacy and the Rise of Savoy, 1690-1720 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 43, 52-54.

82 Childs, The British Army of William III, 132.

83 Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VII, 474; Childs, The British Army of William III, 50.

to Childs, Huguenot officers comprised as many as 15% of the British officer corps during the war years.85

**The British Officer Corps, and the Problem of Dutch Commanders**

Dutchmen were the last group of foreign officers granted commissions in the British Army by the Stadholder. They were also the one group that received the most criticism from Englishmen, particularly amongst MPs and some British officers. Dutch officers were particularly disliked because they represented not only a hated enemy in three wars, but they also William’s favoritism for his fellow Dutchmen. Unlike Huguenot officers who filled vacancies throughout the British army both in the subaltern ranks and at the heads of regiments, most Dutch officers were to be found amongst the British Army’s generals. With the exception of junior officers serving in the regiments of horse, foot, and dragoons that had gone over to English pay in 1689, and those in the technical services (ie. the artillery and train)86 Dutch officers who received English commissions were usually amongst William’s inner circle. In part, this stemmed from William’s low opinion of the English officers’ professional skills but even more serious was their loyalty. The mutiny of the Royal Scots Regiment in early 1689, while not the fault of its officers, no doubt affected William’s opinion of the British Army’s reliability and by association, the officer corps’s reliability. Even those officers who did side with William — officers like the Earl of Marlborough — were understandably viewed with suspicion. While their loyalty to William was welcome, desired, and rewarded, it was equally true that they had turned their backs on their king. What assurances did William have that such men would stand by him if faced with similar circumstances? Understandably, William tended to treat such officers very carefully, which does much to explain why English officers were kept from high military posts, particularly during the war’s early years.


86 Sixty-six of 295 men with the “Flanders Train” in 1692 were of Dutch or foreign origin including ten of the train’s thirteen ranking officers! These include the Colonel (Johan Wynant Goor), the Comptroller (Willem Meesters), the Major (John Symon Schlundt), Captain-Lieutenant (Albertus Briellus), the Battery-Master (Abraham Cock), the Battery-Master’s Assistant (John Geensoon), the Adjutant (Daniel Cattin), the Quartermaster (John van Scanternell), and the Master Surgeon (John de Quavere). For details, see HMC The Manuscripts of the House of Lords, 1692-1693, 191-192, 197-198.
The English officers’ lack of professionalism did little help to his opinion of them, however. William believed the majority of English officers did not know their business, and even commented to the Marquis of Halifax that “The humor and character of a peer of England do not agree very well with the discipline to which a colonel must be subject.” And unfortunately there was much to his less than positive opinion of their abilities, particularly during the war’s early years. Although British officers with foreign experience either in France, Holland, or Germany demonstrated their ability as soldiers and usually advanced to posts of responsibility if they elected to serve William, many of those who survived the purge or who entered the service early in William’s reign lacked such experience. The most basic skills seem to have been beyond the abilities of some of these men. Even the establishment of camps while on the march had to be supervised by Dutch officers. In 1689, while en-route to Ireland, Adam van der Duyn, heer van ‘s-Gravemoer, Quartermaster of Dutch Horse felt compelled to inspect each of the regiments’ campsites before allowing them to bivouac. His concerns seem warranted. Only months later during the same campaign, English soldiers died in droves at the Dundalk Camp due in part to the lack of care taken by the officers for their soldiers’ billets. More than 5,000 English soldiers — one third of the entire force — lost their lives in the winter of 1689-90. Conversely, only a handful of Dutch and Huguenot soldiers died at the same camp faced with the same weather conditions — a harsh testimony to the experience and care foreign officers applied to their duties contrasted by the indifference and incompetence the British officers seem to have applied to theirs. These examples, and numerous others,


88 Childs, The British Army of William III, 52.

89 Robert Parker, a soldier present with the army in the Dundalk Camp, explained that English casualties were due to illness was caused by their inexperience and their officers’ incompetence: “[The] English being raw soldiers neglected the duke’s [Schomberg’s] orders [to build huts] till it was too late to provide either timber or straw.” The Dutch and French, by comparison, built “good, warm barracks” for themselves and thus were able to endure the harsh conditions. As a result of their officers’ lack of care, the English regiments suffered 5,674 dead — roughly one-third of the entire force — for the period from September 1689, when they first encamped at Dunkalk, until February the next year. For details, see Robert Parker, Memoirs of the military transactions...from 1683 to 1718, 16; Dalton, English Army Lists and Commission Registers, III, 105-123; Simms, “Schomberg at Dundalk,” 91-104; Richard Doherty, The Williamite War in Ireland, 1688-1691(Dublin: Four Courts Press, Ltd., 1998), 90-91.
only served to reinforce William’s low opinion of his English officers’ martial abilities. Colonel John Hales seemed to confirm the William’s worst opinion of British officers when he complained to Blathwayt on 12 July 1692, “I am not fond of fighting.” Not surprisingly, William showed him the door. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that William looked to foreign officers, or Englishmen whose martial abilities were known personally to him, for generalships rather than entrust command to someone ill-equipped for such responsibilities. An examination of the “British” order of battle in Ireland in 1690 vividly illustrates the preponderance of foreigners in positions of high command:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Brigadiers</th>
<th>General Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Foreign</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.3: English vs. foreign general officers with the British Army in Ireland, 1690.

William’s apparent preference for foreign officers had little to do with favoritism or patronage, however. Indeed, as Table 6.3 above shows, there were as many

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91 The English general officers were: Major-General Percy Kirke, Lieutanant-General William Douglas (Commander of English Foot in Ireland), Lord Henry Sidney, and Lieutenant-General Sir John Lanier.

92 The Dutch general officers were: Hendrik Trajectinus, Count von Solms (General of English Foot); Goddart van Reede-Ginckel (Lieutenant-General of Horse); Adam van der Duyn van ’s-Gravemoer (Major-General of Horse and Quartermaster-General of the Dutch and English Armies); Hans Willem Bentinck, First Earl of Portland (Major-General of Horse); Willem van Nassau-Zuylenstein (Major-General of Horse); and Hendrik van Nassau-Ouwerkerk (Major-General of Horse).

93 The Danish generals were: von Tettau, the Duke of Würtemberg, and La Forest, while the brigadiers were Ellenberg and Hanmore. The Huguenot generals were the Duke of Schomberg while the brigadiers were Villers, La Melonniere, and de Maine.

Huguenot and Danish general officers as there were Dutchmen, and as he would demonstrate later in the war, he was just quick to sack incompetent general officers and promote foreigners of ability in the Dutch Army, than retain someone simply because he was Dutch. His chief concern was his officers’ martial abilities. Promotion in the Dutch Army came through merit and seniority, in that order. Indeed, one of the few cases when William felt obliged to promote someone who did not fulfill these requirements was when the Earl of Portland pushed for his own promotion to the rank of Lieutenant-General of Horse, a move that left the William with reservations. But this was the exception. In general, William promoted men for their abilities. Indeed, for the first time since Charles I reign, the purchase system was abolished from the English Army, William electing to fill vacancies with his own candidates.

That is not to say that influence or patronage played no role in his appointments. Even among native Dutchmen, promotion to the general ranks was mostly reserved to those of noble lineage. While this may appear elitist, it was also practical. In an international setting where social rank was as important as military rank — in some cases even more so — it was essential that William’s general officers be considered equals both in rank and in social status to their counterparts on the continent. But from 1688 until the conclusion of the war in Ireland, William relied upon Dutchmen and foreigners to lead his English forces. Fredéric Armand, First Duke of Schomberg, a former marshal of France became a naturalized Englishman and was given both command of the British Army and made Master of the Ordnance. His two sons both served in the British army but only his youngest son, Count Meinhard von Schomberg naturalized, becoming General of Horse and later receiving the title Duke of Leinster. Like Schomberg and his sons, Willem-Frederik van Nassau-Zuylenstein, a Major-General of Horse in Dutch service, naturalized and was promoted to Lieutenant-General of Horse in English service. He too eventually received an English title, Earl of

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95 According to David Onnekink of the University of Utrecht, William III only promoted Bentinck after the latter’s constant complaints. In spite of the promotion, Bentinck was never given commands equal to his rank. I thank Mr. Onnekink for sharing this information with me.

96 Louis M. Waddell, The Administration of the English Army in Flanders, 302.

98 For Leinster’s background, see Hora-Siccama, Aantekeningen en Verbeteringen, 627; Childs, The Nine Years’ War, 350.
Rochford. Hendrik van Nassau-Ouwerkerk also became a naturalized Englishman. He arrived as Major-General of Horse and was later promoted to Lieutenant-General of Horse and then General though he never took an English title. The last important foreigner to receive an English commission and command British forces was Hendrik-Trajectinus, Count von Solms. Solms was a Major-General of Foot and Colonel of William’s Blue Guards. In 1691, he was promoted to Lieutenant-General of Foot and given charge of the British corps in Flanders. Goddart van Reede-Ginckel, another of William’s favorites, commanded British forces in Ireland after William’s departure in the fall of 1690 until its conquest the following year, but never held an English commission.

If the majority of Dutchmen to reach the generals’ ranks were of noble parentage, so too were many of William’s English generals. In 1689, Sir John Churchill, First Earl of Marlborough was made commander of British Forces in Flanders. Churchill had received the title “Earl of Marlborough” for his participation in the Glorious Revolution, a title that put him on a comparable level with continental officers of the same rank. Many English officers to attain generals’ ranks held titles; most were of noble parentage. In 1692, the British Army’s “English” Lieutenant-Generals Aubrey de Vere, Earl of Oxford and Sir Thomas Tollmache were both of noble parentage. Likewise the army’s English Major-Generals, Sir Henry Bellasis, Sir Richard Lumley, Earl of Scarborough and Sir James Butler, Duke of Ormond were mostly of noble origin. Although William promoted officers based on their ability, particularly to higher ranks, it is also true that most were either of noble parentage or were endowed with titles that ennobled them. This was also true of Dutch officers who also were endowed with English titles.

99 For Nassau-Zuylenstein’s background, see Hora-Siccama, *Aantekeningen en Verbeteringen*, 789-791.


101 For Count Solms’ background, see Hora-Siccama, *Aantekeningen en Verbeteringen*, 653.


Nevertheless, William’s apparent preference for foreign officers, particularly Dutchmen, for the British Army’s highest command functions led to friction between he and some of his British officers. A breakdown of the origins of Britain’s general officers in 1692, shown in Figure 5.4, illustrates the large number of foreigners amongst them:

![Table 6.4: British general officers in 1692 by country of origin.](image)

Marlborough’s quarrel with William is well known; he, like many of his English colleagues, was angry that British troops were commanded by foreign troops instead of Englishmen. One of William’s most promising English officers, Sir John Churchill, First Earl of Marlborough was one of the few Englishmen to receive independent commands during the early years of the war. In 1689, he commanded the English contingent in Flanders as Waldeck’s subordinate. Then in 1690, he led the successful expedition to capture Cork and Kinsale in southern Ireland. Unfortunately, Marlborough would not be satisfied to be a mere subordinate. In 1691, he accompanied William III on his staff to Flanders but already he began to grumble about his appointment. Perhaps jealous that he had not been given command of British Forces in Ireland, a post that instead went to William’s most capable Dutch officers, Goddard van Reede-Ginckel, (soon to be First Earl of Athlone) Marlborough criticized his king openly, something that wise officers did not do. Marlborough’s refusal to serve in Flanders 1692 except as commander of all English troops there led to his being sacked by William on 20 January 1692.105

In the end, Marlborough’s dismissal was due to his own insubordination, though many Englishmen viewed it otherwise. William did not tolerate

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105 Chandler, *Marlborough as Military Commander*, 43-46;
insubordination from his Dutch officers and would not do so from Marlborough. Although Marlborough’s anger that the most important commands in the British Army were held by Dutchmen or foreigners might have been justified, it was also true that he was an ambitious man who used this situation to provide support for his own claims. In the end, William was as uncompromising as always and Marlborough was “benched” for the remainder of the war. And the acts of the Stadholder-King were justified: Marlborough’s demand that he be made commander of English forces in Flanders was not his to make, and suffered the consequences for making such a bold demand of the king.106

Nevertheless, many Englishmen were angered by the number of foreign generals in positions of authority in the British army. The fallout from the Marlborough affair coupled with opposition to William’s decision to commit greater British forces to the Low Countries led to a series of quarrels between Parliament and the king over the army’s budget and the general direction of the war. The blow-up first occurred shortly after Marlborough’s dismissal. In early 1692 when the Earl of Ranelagh made his usual request for supply for the coming campaign season, he sent Commons a list of general officers which for the first time included their names, ranks, and pay scales. It also revealed their nationalities. Alarmed at the number of foreign officers on the books, Commons acted. To force the removal of the foreign officers and at the same time attack the king’s seeming anti-English attitude and his direction of the war, Commons limited army’s budget significantly to its detriment, and the detriment of the allied war effort. Many of the foreign officers were later deleted from the list when budget was released. Danish generals hired on for Ireland were, furthermore, placed on a separate establishment so that Parliament could keep track of them. William’s response was to ignore this jab for the time being and find money for to make up for the shortfall from his own purse.107

The climax came in the fall of 1692 when Count Solms, the Dutch commander of the British Expeditionary force, was made the target of parliamentary attack. Although

106 Chandler, Marlborough as Military Commander, 43-46; Horwitz, Parliament, Policy, and Politics in the Reign of William III, 76; Childs, The British Army of William III, 74; and Rose, England in the 1690s, 49.

107 For the list of foreigners in English service, see HMC, House of Lords MSS., 1692-1693,187-198. See also Waddell, “The Administration of the English Army in Flanders,” 181-183; Rose, England in the 1690s, Horwitz, Parliament, Policy and Politics in the Reign of William III, 104-108;
the attack on Solms was sparked by the severe casualties suffered in English regiments at the battle of Steenkerk the previous summer, it really marked the confluence of several disputes Parliament had with the king. Marlborough’s dismissal the previous January coupled with William’s increasing demands for resources to prosecute the war in Flanders — a strategy at odds with the Tory parliament’s ‘blue water’ adherents — and that strategy’s apparent lack of success exploded into a concerted parliamentary attack on Solms’ conduct at Steenkerk. According to rumor, English regiments had been slaughtered there because Solms had failed to send reinforcements to support their assault. Indeed, Solms appeared to be the scapegoat for the allied defeat as Robert Harley wrote to Sir Edward Harley: “The blame for the miscarriage of the late action in Flanders is now charged to Count Solms.” Pamphlets attacking Solms attributed his actions to his hatred for the English. According to one such pamphlet, he remarked “Let us see what sport these English bull-dogs will afford us”, and “Damn the English, if they are so fond of fighting, let them have a belly full!” Such attacks demonstrated Parliament’s anger at pursuing a policy that seemed against “English interests”. To many Englishmen, English soldiers were simply being used by William to fight a Dutch war. Commenting on the increased number of English soldiers fighting on the continent, one pamphleteer stated accusingly that “some Body’s heart is as Foreign as his Birth.” In response to the “evidence,” MPs moved to eliminate foreigners from the ranks of the English officer corps. Sir Peter Colleton moved that “None but natives should command Englishmen.” Others were critical of the Dutch war effort and even maintained that the English contribution exceeded that of its continental allies. Such accusations in view of the reality demonstrate how politically charged the war, and England’s role in it, had become.

Parliament’s attacks on Solms could scarcely hide their political roots and the general ignorance of most MPs with regards to military affairs. Sir Thomas Clarges, Colonel John Granville, and others pressed home their attacks against foreigners in the

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109 Cited in van Alphen, De Stemming van de Engelschen, 115.

110 Ibid.

111 Cited in Childs, British Army of William III, 76.
British Army and William’s continental strategy in general. Interestingly enough, English officers, particularly those with military experience, agreed with William’s appointments. Most maintained that at the time there was a lack of qualified English-born officers to lead the contingent in war. The Tory Sir Edward Seymour asked those attacking William’s appointments “...will you think to discharge and send away foreigners till you have generals of your own?” but added “I’m not for Foreigners, for Foreigners sake”, as if to show his lack of sympathy for the Williamite cause. Veteran English officers confirmed Seymour’s position on foreign officers. One such officer, Thomas Erle, colonel of a regiment of infantry, highlighted the lack of substance behind the attacks when he confessed that his own four years of military experience had hardly prepared him for serving as a colonel let alone as a general.

Captain Henry Mordaunt, another veteran of William’s army, told Commons that he had “served under foreigners who did very well.” Regardless of their opposition to the war in Flanders, the simple truth was that the army did not possess enough general officers of experience to command the greatly expanded British Army. Nevertheless, the attacks and counter-attacks in the Commons continued until they came to focus on Solms and his competency to command English troops where they ended with little really concluded.

Meanwhile, the House of Lords began its own series of assaults against the King’s foreign appointments with far more at stake. On the 28th of November 1692, the House of Lords moved to present to the King with the advice that “in the future, his Majesty’s native subjects may be preferred in the Army before all others. That the Chief Commander of the English Foot (then Count Solms) shall be a subject born in England....[and] that the Chief Governor of the English forces under the King shall be a subject born in their Majesties’ dominions.” The Duke of Macclesfield, one of the most outspoken and vehement of the Whigs, maintained the preponderance of

112 Van Alphen, De Stemming van de Engelschen, 120.

113 Childs, The British Army of William III, 76

114 Ibid.

115 Van Alphen, De Stemming van de Engelschen, 120-122;

Dutchmen in the army was just the tip of the iceberg: “[W]e may soon have not only Dutch bishops, Dutch presbyters, and Dutch commanders, but Dutch Lords, Dutch Commons and Dutch everything.”117 Among those Lords protesting against foreign influence was Marlborough himself, an indication of his personal interest in this matter. When the Lords presented William with their requests, his response was “I will consider it.” In the end, William did nothing, though when Commons approved an expansion of the army for 1694, they made sure to add that the new regiments should be officered by English officers. As van Alphen points in his work on Anglo-Dutch relations during the Nine Years’ War, if foreign officers could not be eliminated from the army, then at least Parliament could insure that no more entered English service.118

Conclusion
The presence of Dutch and Huguenot officers in the British Army, particularly among the ranks of general officers, was directly related to William’s determination to add its weight to the war with France as quickly as possible. As had been the case with the Dutch Army following the Rampjaar, William set out to make the British Army a militarily useful force as quickly as possible. Although the British Army never received the kinds of reforms it needed to make it a truly professional force, William did what was necessary to enable it to fight the war with France. His reliance on foreigners — particularly Dutchmen or foreigners with Dutch experience — was more due to William’s tendency to entrust important commands to those he knew and was confident were qualified for the task than to any inherent dislike for Englishmen. Indeed, as English officers gained more and more experience and proved themselves, they advanced to high ranks such that by the last years of the war, the British forces in Flanders were commanded, with a few exceptions, by Englishmen. The political commentator Daniel Defoe best captures the rationale behind William’s penchant for appointing foreigners to posts within the British Army in his book An Essay Upon Projects, thus:

...when the present King took possession of this kingdom, and, seeing himself entering upon the bloodiest war this age has known, began to regulate his army, he found but very few among the whole martial part of the nation fit to make

117 Cited in van Alphen, De Stemming van de Engelschen, 123.

118 Van Alphen, 123-124.
use of for general officers, and was forced to employ strangers, and make them
Englishmen (as the Counts Schomberg, Ginkel, Solms, Ruvigny, and others); and yet it is to be observed also that all the encouragement imaginable was
given to English gentlemen to qualify themselves, by giving no less than sixteen
regiments to gentlemen of good families who had never been in any service and
knew very little how to command them. Of these, several are now in the army,
and have the rewards suitable to their merit, being major-generals, brigadiers
and the like.  

William firmly believed in appointing men of ability. By the end of the war, English
officers proved that they could be as militarily competent as any of William’s
Dutchmen.

William’s appointment of foreigners to high posts within Britain’s military was
also related to the role the British Army was to play in the struggle with France. As
Jacobite pamphleteers were right to point out, William’s intention had been to use
British resources in the war against France. To that end, the British forces that deployed
to Flanders became essentially the same as other Dutch subsidy troops. Both were
merely integrated into the Dutch organizational structure. The fact that William’s
reforms focused on merely putting regiments in the field and not on administrative
reforms is evidence of this. Although historians have criticized William for not
reforming the British Army in the same way as he did the Dutch Army in the wake of
1672, there was no need to do so given the presence of a flexible Dutch structure in the
Low Countries. Indeed, during the first three years of the war, the British Corps in
Flanders was more or less fully integrated into the Dutch administrative structure.
British regiments were supplied by Dutch provisioners, British soldiers received their
pay from Dutch paymasters, arms from Dutch arsenals, and British colonels and
brigadiers received their orders from Dutch generals. Under the circumstances, it was
only necessary to insure that the regiments be well led; the rest was superfluous.
Although Parliament might complain about the preponderance of foreign generals in
British service, such complaints assumed that the British corps in Flanders was an
independent corps. William’s response to the House of Lords demands with regards to
command — “I’ll think about it” — in a sense illustrates his understanding of the true
situation and MPs ignorance of the same. Regardless of what Parliament demanded,

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British forces would be commanded by whom ever William saw fit. There was no immediate need to reform the British Army’s since such reform was irrelevant to William’s needs, the creation of a large allied army in the Low Countries, an army commanded by him in person.

The William’s purge of the British officer corps insured that at least his officers would be on more or less on the same footing as his own Dutch officers. In this way, William did hope to create a British officer corps not unlike his Dutch one. Indeed, as Louis Waddell points out, for the only time in its history from the reign of Charles I to Victoria, the sale of commissions was significantly curbed in the British Army. When regiments went to Flanders, each of its colonels were chosen by William personally, first for their political reliability, and second for their military expertise. As more officers gained experience, those criteria were reversed. In that way, the men who led Britain’s regiments in the Low Countries were just like the Dutch ones; all of the colonels were William’s men and in this way, he created one of the key the foundations of the Anglo-Dutch force in the Low Countries and thus the Confederate Army as a whole.

William III’s control of both the Dutch and British armies, his selection of their colonels, his appointment of senior commanders, and his use of the Dutch administrative organization to support the British expeditionary force in the Low Countries illustrates the lengths to which William tried to create a unified, Anglo-Dutch army. His success in creating such a force and the impact it had on the Confederate Army’s is the topic of the next chapter.

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CHAPTER 7
WILLIAM III AND THE COMMAND
OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY

INTRODUCTION
The allied army that fought in the Spanish Netherlands during the Nine Years’ War was the largest and most important of the forces facing Louis XIV. In 1696 at the war’s peak, out of an allied mobilization of approximately 360,000 men,\(^1\) the alliance fielded between 130,000 and 150,000 men in the Spanish Netherlands alone, just under half of all forces arrayed against the Sun King in that year.\(^2\) Like most of the armies facing Louis XIV’s forces, the allied army in the Spanish Netherlands — the “Confederate Army” of contemporary English literature — comprised forces from many states. The Dutch Republic and England provided the lion’s share of its manpower. Nevertheless, Spain, Brandenburg-Prussia, Hesse-Cassel, Münster and a host of smaller states contributed significant forces to the Confederate Army as well. Its composition, arguably, was as much the result of geography as it was planning, since it drew most of its forces from neighboring states. Still, the mere assemblage of soldiers in the theater

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\(^1\) This figure comes from Wilson, *German Armies*, 92. Although from the 1695 campaign season, allied strengths did not significantly change in 1696, and thus these numbers seem a good estimate of the total allied strength facing Louis XIV’s forces.

\(^2\) Edward d’Auvergne, *The History of the Campagne in Flanders For the Year 1696* (London: John Newton, 1696), 65; Knoop, *Krijgs-en Geschiedkundige Beschouwingen over Willem den Derde*, III, 364-365; D’Auvergne gives a figure of 130,000 while Knoop maintains it was closer to 120,000. These figures do not include garrisons, which would have numbered between 10,000 and 20,000 men. Of the two sources, I believe d’Auvergne’s figures to be the more trustworthy, particularly because Knoop relies upon de Quincy, a French author writing significantly after the fact while d’Auvergne’s account was written immediately following the campaign itself.
of operations did not insure an effective army by itself; the army had to be well organized, commanded, and deployed as well.

William III provided the Confederate Army with its leadership; he also gave it its unique character. All military organizations require effective command-and-control. Although the allied war effort was marginally coordinated in the annual planning conferences in The Hague prior to each campaign, the local theater commanders really determined how each coalition force was organized and led. For most of the Nine Years’ War, William was responsible for planning the campaigns and leading the allied army in the Low Countries Theater. Having led coalition forces during the Dutch War, William recognized the need for a uniform chain-of-command. The difficulties his deputy commander, the Prince von Waldeck, faced during his absence in Ireland during the war’s first two years highlighted that necessity. Unable to coordinate the efforts of the army’s several contingents, Waldeck and the other commanders could not effectively counter the French moves. Although he did manage a minor victory at Walcourt the first year of the war, Waldeck’s inability to muster the support of his fellow allies undermined the first campaign in the Low Countries and limited the coalition’s offensive ability. The following year, this lack of cooperation led to Waldeck’s costly defeat at Fleurus in 1690. Although in total manpower the allies had outnumbered the French in the Low Countries, the inability of the various contingents to operate in concert led to the isolation and defeat of Waldeck’s predominantly Dutch army at the hands of the Duke of Luxembourg. Recognizing that the aging field marshal possessed neither the requisite power nor prestige necessary to command the

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3 See Chapter 4 above.

4 William was in England during the 1689 campaign and in Ireland during the 1690 campaign. Consequently, Waldeck was left in charge of the Dutch army in the Low Countries. He received his patent for commanding the Dutch army in his absence on 22 October 1688. For details, see Müller, Wilhelm von Oranien und Georg Friedrich von Waldeck, II., 42-43; and Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VI., 122-123.

5 See in particular Knoop, Krijgs- en Geschiedkundige Beschouwingen, III., 77-78; and Childs, Nine Years’ War, 147-152; and Jany, Geschichte der Preußischen Armee, 375-381. This superiority was due to the presence of the Prussian Corps in the theater. Had the Prussian Corps arrived sooner in the theater and had Waldeck tried to coordinate his moves with theirs, Luxembourg probably would not have attacked the allied force.
allied forces in the Low Countries effectively, William determined to return to the Continent as quickly as possible to take personal command of allied forces there.\(^6\)

William took command of allied forces in the Spanish Netherlands in 1691, after having defeated James II at the Boyne the year before. Just as he had done in Ireland on a smaller scale, William began to create an integrated coalition army in the Low Countries with himself as its head. Using his own Dutch Army as the cadre around which to build, he assembled an organization more unified than its component parts would suggest was possible for an early modern army. Like the army upon which it drew, the Confederate Army comprised a cadre of formations owing their allegiance directly to William himself — the forces of the States General and England — supplemented by forces from other members of the alliance. A soldier experienced in coalition warfare, William understood the complexities that such warfare entailed as well as the importance of unity of command. In an effort to create this unity, he utilized his legal positions as Kapitein-Generaal van de Unie and Commander-in-Chief of English Forces to build an organization that owed its principal loyalty to him. By using the power and prestige his position as King of England and Stadhouder of the Dutch Republic to his advantage, William crafted a military organization that eventually could face Louis XIV’s forces on more or less equal terms. Indeed by 1694, the allied army had gone over to the offensive and by 1696 had managed to recapture many of the French army’s most important conquests. Although the last year of the war saw the allies return to the defensive in the Low Countries, William’s creation of the first “modern” coalition army enabled it to survive and served as a model for future coalition armies. One could argue that Marlborough’s success during the War of the Spanish Succession was as much due to William’s ability to organize a successful and efficient allied military organization with the requisite administrative, logistical, organizational structures as it was to his military genius.

Through an examination of the Confederate Army’s composition, organization, administration, and military practices, this chapter seeks to uncover the elements that held the army together in spite of its diversity and provided the foundation for future coalition armies. The central figure in this story is the Stadholder-King himself. William was at the head of a vast network of military men and government officials who led the army in the field and held it together. Through this group of men — all of

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\(^6\) Waldeck’s ability as a commander is discussed in Chapter 6 above.
whom owed their allegiance to him through either officers oaths of loyalty or less formal ties — was built a highly centralized and effective military organization. Although technically an ad hoc force, the Confederate Army possessed many elements that might be found in more permanent military organizations; a headquarters staff, logistics administration, and even a semi-permanent organizational structure. The permanence of this organization — if any such army can be considered “permanent” — is suggested not only by the dissemination and utilization of standardized tactical practices amongst its units, but its subsequent successes during the War of the Spanish Succession, as well. If Marlborough was one of military history’s great captains, the army won him his fame was not his creation.

The Dutch and British armies provided the Confederate Army with its fundamental building blocks and organizational structure. The Stadholder-King’s position with regards to those organizations in large part helps to explain his legitimacy as the Confederate Army’s commander. But the Prince of Orange’s relationship to the Anglo-Dutch forces provide only part, albeit an important part, of the story, however. His ability to control those elements not under the Anglo-Dutch umbrella was also crucial in creating the Confederate Army’s centralized structure and chain-of-command. Thus, we shall also explore the significance of the King’s social status as well as his patronage networks beyond his Anglo-Dutch forces in an effort to understand both how and why William succeeded in assembling a centralized coalition army while Waldeck and his Spanish counterpart Castaño failed. The degree in which William succeeded is demonstrated by those characteristics shared by all of the army’s various contingents. The dissemination of military ideas, exemplified by the spread of the “platoon-fire” discipline among others, illustrates the degree with which the Confederate Army had become an army greater than the mere sum of its parts. Thus, in concluding, we shall explore the degree in which ideas were exchanged. By studying how military practices were transmitted within the Confederate Army, we shall better understand the uniformity of that organization and the degree with which it shared information with its diverse elements. But before exploring the Confederate Army and the dissemination of ideas, it is first necessary to understand the nature of the army’s building blocks, and their relationship to the Stadhouder-Koning himself.

At the heart of the Confederate Army was William’s Dutch forces. As we saw in Chapter 5, virtually the entire Dutch army was committed to the war in the Spanish Netherlands. With the exception of the regiments that remained in British service and
the few that were retained at home, between 90% and 95% of the Republic’s land forces were deployed in the theater of operations itself. As the war went on, William’s British forces joined the Dutch forces in the theater in increasing numbers, such that Britain’s commitment to the war in the Low Countries overshadowed everyone else’s, save the Republic’s. The expansion of the Anglo-Dutch force in 1692 coupled with the gradual integration of allied forces in the theater into a larger “Confederate Army” increased Stadhouder-Koning’s control over the allied forces in the Low Countries as that organization came to be dominated by his general officers.

William’s domination of the conduct of operations in the Low Countries came largely due to an increasingly impotent Brussels government coupled with the recognition that William III was the Grand Alliance’s true leader. Although both Spain and Brandenburg-Prussia commanded significant contingents in the theater, the integration of those forces into the larger Confederate Army commanded by William himself lessened their influence with regards to the conduct of operations. Though some Spanish generals, like the Prince de Vaudemont and the Marquis de Bedmar, came to play important roles within the larger allied organization, the Brussels government was gradually pushed out of the strategic decision-making process as William took greater personal control over the conduct of the war. It can be no coincidence that William’s arrival in the Low Countries in 1691 corresponded with the Marquis de Gastañaga’s removal as governor of the Spanish Netherlands the next year. His replacement by Maximillan-Emanuel von Wittlesbach, Elector of Bavaria in 1692 was as much due to William’s desire replace the inept Gastañaga as it was to Max-Emanuel’s own political ambitions.\(^7\) The Spaniard’s replacement by a German Prince supported by the King of England suggests the extent to which William himself — and the Dutch Republic — came to dominate the prosecution of the war in the Low Countries. Nowhere is that domination more evident than in the organization of the Confederate Army itself.

\(^7\) According to Hora-Sicca, Gastañaga was accused of correspondence with the enemy. William also held him responsible for the fall of Mons and the poor state of its garrison. Shortly thereafter, William complained to the Spanish Crown and requested that he be replaced with Max Emmanuel, Elector of Bavaria. The Elector of Bavaria was known as a capable soldier having fought against the Turks in the east. He was also ambitious. It is likely that William’s role in getting Max Emmanuel appointed Governor of the Spanish Netherlands gave him leverage over the Elector and thus greater control over Spanish troops in the region. For details, see Hora-Sicca, Aantekeningen en Verbeteringen, 263; Rooms, “De Materiele Organisatie van de Troepen, I, 77; and Childs, Nine Years’ War, 180-181.
Command and Control at the Strategic and Operational Levels

The prosecution of war in the latter seventeenth century was conducted on several levels, each of which influenced the Confederate Army in different ways, and each of which demonstrated William III’s influence. Just as like today, warfare in the seventeenth century can be divided into four principal areas or levels of activity: the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels. William III exercised influence in all four of these areas, albeit in different ways and with a differing degrees of authority. At the political level, William insured that both the States General and Parliament fully mobilized their respective states for war. As both Stadholder and King, William had the authority to do this, provided he could convince both Parliament and the States General of the wisdom of his strategy. Most decisions at the political level concerned resource mobilization: assembling the money and manpower to fulfill the goals of the conflict. As has been shown, in both the Dutch and English case, William was able to do this. Not only did England and the Dutch Republic field the largest land armies in their respective histories up to that point, but they also mobilized large navies as well.

How forces were deployed and in pursuit of the government’s (or coalition’s) policy comprise a state’s strategy. Strategic effectiveness, according to historians Williamson Murray and Allan Millett, concerns how a nation’s armed forces are employed in pursuit of its strategic goals. In William’s case, both the Dutch Republic’s and England’s resources were employed in pursuit of the Grand Alliance’s goals, namely returning France to its 1648 frontiers. William believed that to do this required maintaining allied control of the Spanish Netherlands, and if possible, reconquer those fortresses taken by Louis XIV since the Peace of Westphalia. The

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8 According to historians Williamson Murray and Allan Millett, these four levels: the political or policy level, the strategic level, the operational level, and the tactical level. All of these are as pertinent to 17th century warfare as they are today. The taxonomy of war is based on the discussion in Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman’s essay “The Effectiveness of Military Organizations,” in Allan R. Millet and Williamson Murray, ed., Military Effectiveness, Volume I: The First World War (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989 ed.), 1-30. For a more recent description of this taxonomy, see Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 583-589.

9 See Chapters 3 and 4 above.

10 Murray and Millett, Military Effectiveness, I., 6-7.
deployment of William’s Anglo-Dutch forces — both on land and on sea —
demonstrate William’s adherence to this strategy. For William, the Low Countries was
the most important theater of operations, and his strategic decisions reflected this
conviction. William’s belief in the Low Countries’ importance led him to take personal
command of allied forces in the theater. But because the war in the Low Countries
involved the resources not only of William’s Anglo-Dutch forces but of other allied
forces as well, the process of achieving his strategic ends fell beyond mere national
goals. The Grand Alliance Treaty had bound all of its signatories together to that end.
Thus, the pursuit of strategy was not only a goal of each state independently, but a goal
of the collective members of the alliance. Each state had, of course, goals that fell
outside of those stated in the Grand Alliance. For William (and England), French
recognition of his and his wife’s claims to the English throne was central and this
essentially fell outside the provisions of the treaty and the goals of the alliance.11

Operations are the manner in which military forces are used to achieve a state’s
(or coalition’s) strategic goals. According to Millett and Murray, operational military
activity includes “the analysis, selection, and development of institutional concepts or
doctrines for employing major forces to achieve strategic objectives within a theater of
war.”12 The Confederate Army, and the allied contingents that comprised it, was the
force entrusted with pursuing William’s strategic aims in the Spanish Netherlands.
While it would be anachronistic to describe the Confederate Army as an “institution” in
the modern sense, it did develop certain institutional characteristics that set it apart
from its French and even allied counterparts. Its administrative apparatus,
organization, and composition — even its tactical doctrines — made it a unique military
force in the 17th century. The Dutch Army and its institutions played a central role in
creating the Confederate Army’s institutional personality. As the Confederate Army’s
commander and architect, William III put his unique stamp on it. His own familiarity
with Dutch military institutions, his reliance on officers with whom he was personally
acquainted, and his own military experience meant that the Confederate Army owed
much of what it was to the Dutch Army. Although Spanish, English, and German

11 For an examination of these negotiations, see Mark A. Thomson, “Louis XIV and William III,
1689-97,” in Hatton, ed., William III and Louis XIV, 24-48; and van der Heim, Het Archief van den
Raadpensionaris Antonie Heinsius, III., vii-lxxx.

12 Millett and Murray, Military Effectiveness, I., 12.
officers also held important posts, the Dutch Army provided the Confederate Army with its administration, organization, and “doctrine.” The Dutch Army’s influence on the Confederate Army is clear not only from the predominance of Dutch officers at the highest levels but the degree in which experience in the Dutch Army provided a common bond between the Confederate Army’s officers. Even more telling is the dissemination of military practices among the states that contributed forces to the confederate army. Prior to the Nine Years’ War, only the Dutch Army utilized the “platoon-fire” discipline. By its conclusion, the army of Brandenburg-Prussia, Britain, and perhaps Spain had all adopted the so-called “Dutch Discipline,” a clear illustration of the Dutch Army’s role in creating the Confederate Army’s institutional personality.

Although the Dutch Army was central in the Confederate Army’s creation, geography, coupled with the Grand Alliance Treaty was largely responsible for the forces that would eventually comprise it. “Strategic” concerns at the highest levels influenced the deployment of allied forces and directly influenced the Confederate Army’s composition and, to a lesser extent, its chain-of-command. Monarchs, Parliaments, and their ministers determined national strategy at the highest level. The Grand Alliance Treaty — the foundation of allied strategy — in large part represented the coalition’s strategic goals and thus contributed to the army’s creation. The pursuit of a common strategy demanded the creation of coalition forces. Based on the fourth article of that treaty, the goal of the allied coalition was to push France back to the boundaries established at Westphalia and the Pyrenees. Only when these treaties have “been vindicated” through the use of “common force” would the allies be satisfied. Thus, allied strategy focused on this straightforward goal. William’s central role in formulating these aims is demonstrated by his own unique position within the alliance, having agreed to the document as King of England while at the same time authoring it as Stadholder of the Dutch Republic. Although the Dutch signatories of the agreement — Anthonie Heinsius of the States of Holland and Jacob Hop of the States General — signed the treaty independent of William, they were his clients, or were at least sympathetic to his policies. The third signatory, Emperor Leopold, was the only one of the original three signatory states not directly influenced by William III.\(^\text{13}\) Under the

\(^{13}\) For an English translation of “The Great Alliance of 1689,” see B. Cox, King William’s European Joint Venture, 118-119.
circumstances, it is not surprising that William was the central figure in allied decision making at the strategic level.

Although the treaty laid-down the goals of the alliance, it did not describe, or even suggest, an allied strategy to achieve them. During the war’s first year, the allies simply threw forces into the field with little or no consultation with each other. Admittedly, much of this was due to the fact that during the first year there was no “Grand Alliance” in a formal sense. The Grand Alliance only became a reality on 20 December 1689 after almost a year of negotiation.14 The poor coordination between the coalition members during the war’s first campaign season led William to suggest erecting a central planning congress to coordinate the campaigns of the various theaters of war. In late August 1689, William wrote to Heinsius of his plan thus:

The continuous discord between the allies is a sad and pernicious business....

[I]n order to prevent it as much as possible in the future, it would be useful that sometime in October or November a congress be held in The Hague including all the ministers of the allies. I have spoken about it with the Count von Mansfelt...[and] he expressed his inclination [for it] and did not doubt that the Emperor would support it as well, not to mention rest of the German princes. Don Pedro Ronquillo is of the same sentiment, just as is Count von Oxenstirna.... Soon [we] work to inform the ministers in The Hague that they may come at the end of October.15

Although the Emperor and other German princes suggested that the allies meet in Augsburg,16 by the end of 1689 they had agreed on The Hague, and met for the first time there that winter.

Command and The Hague Congress

In the winters of 1690 and 1691, the congress in The Hague was the nerve center for the allied coalition. Correspondence between Heinsius and William III, particularly during the 1690 planning session, demonstrates the hopes that they had for the Congress’s success. But assembling the deputies and actually formulating a uniform strategy were

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14 See Chapter 2 above.

15 “William III to Heinsius, Hampton Court, 20/30 August 1689,” in Krämer, Archives, I., 33.

16 “William III to Heinsius, Hampton Court, 24 September/4 October 1689,” in Krämer, Archives, I., 37.
entirely different matters. Even more than in the present day, strict adherence to diplomatic protocol was central to the Congress running effectively. Even communication between delegates was an issue. In a letter to the Duke of Nottingham, England’s representative to the congress Charles Lord Dursley noted that French would be the language spoken and written in the Congress. At the same time, the limited power given the delegates is illustrated by the following discussion Dursley had with his Dutch counterparts:

The Deputys desired to know of me whether I had any order for the ratification of the trea[t]ys made by their Ambassadors in England whether the exchanges must bee made here or there. I told them that I had no command about it and therefore did suppose that all things were to bee done by their ministers in England however they desired me to write concerning that matter that they will so one bee ready for it whether it bee transacted by their ministers in England or by me in this place, therefore I begg your [Lordship] commands concerning these treatys which they mentiond....

Dursley’s letter to Nottingham underscores one of the Congress’s principal shortcomings; namely, that Dursley, like the other delegates, had no authority to treat with the other deputies, and certainly no authority to decide anything. All proposals had to go back to London, in the case of Dursley, and then once the government there made a decision, they communicated it to him where he, in turn, could pass it on to his counterparts at the congress. Considering that all of the deputies save the Dutch had to send home for advice, speedy decision making — crucial for the effective prosecution of war — was impossible. At the same time, the problems of diplomatic protocol and

17 Charles Berkeley, Viscount Dursley (1689-1710) was a career diplomat. After serving as Chamberlain to Cosimo III, Grand Duke of Tuscany (1667-1675), Dursley was made a member of the Levant Company’s steering committee (1678-1679). He later went on to become MP for Glostershire (1679-1681), and Envoy to Spain (1689). Dursley was sent to the Dutch Republic as extraordinary envoy to the States General in late 1689 and received his first audience on 14 December. Dursley remained in the Republic until 14 November 1692 when he went back to England. He returned to the Republic in 1693. He left the Republic on October 1693 and became first Lord Steward and then High Steward of Gloucester. During his tenure as extraordinary envoy, Dursley regularly attended the allied congress at The Hague and is one of the few people who seems to have written about their proceedings. For details, see Schutte, Repertorium Der Buitenlandse Vertegenwoordigers Residerende in Nederland, 1584-1810, 81.

national prestige further constrained the freedom of the delegates. In a letter to Nottingham, Dursley writes:

...I am affrayde there will be some difficulties about the preliminarys of the Congresse, there is already a dispute about the place where we should meet. Count Berka is new ernest to have it in his house and the States on the contrary would have it in theire conference chamber in the rome where of custome the Envoyes breake with the deputys of the States, I have by way of discours nam’d a third place the old Hoff or Prince Maurice his House but this proposition is not much liked by Count Berka neither doe I believe the States will approve of it, but if the dispute lasts till I can heare out of England, which I think it is my duty to present as much is possibly I can that there may bee noe loss of time for a trifle, I say if it does last I am of opinion that all partys will acquiesse in what soever the King likes best when your [Lordship] has signifeyd his Majestys pleasure to me.19

Given the deputies’ limited authority and questions of precedence they seemed determined to dispute, it is not surprising that the congress’s utility as a true forum for military decision making was limited. Although the congress was capable of agreeing on the number and dispositions of the coalition’s forces for a given campaign season, it could not coordinate the war in the different theaters of operations effectively.20 Discussions of strategy were limited and seem to have revolved around and the general plan each of the allied armies had for their respective theaters of operations. The congress did address specific operational concerns, especially in the Low Countries theater where Dutch, English, Spanish and Prussian forces had to coordinate their efforts but generally the real discussions were left to the commanders in the field. More significant was that the congress demonstrated the divisiveness of coalition warfare and the divergent aims of the coalition’s members. Lord Dursley’s correspondence is replete with examples of disagreements between the allies, from minor quibbles to major blow-ups. In one letter written to Nottingham in 1690, Dursley describes one of many disputes aired in the allied congress:


20 See in particular Dursley’s 11/21 March 1690 letter to the Earl of Nottingham, which lists the size and disposition of the armies arrayed against France. PRO SP 84/222 Pt. I, ff. 56-57, “Charles Lord Dursley to Nottingham, The Hague, 11/21 March 1690.”
There has happend a dispute betwixt the Elector of Brandenbourgh and the Bishop of Liege concerning certaine sums of money I send Your [Lordship] The Bishops petition to the Emperor, this quarrell may be of very ill consequence to the Allys and therefore Count Berka by order from his [Imperial Majesty] has desired me that the King may bee aquainted with it and desires that the King would make use of His [Majesty’s] Interest with the Elector of Brandenbourgh for the preventing of mischeife...21

When William suggested the erection of an allied congress, he no doubt envisioned a body that would make the decision-making process speedy. But given the diplomatic culture of the time, and the petty differences between the delegates and the member states, it is not surprising that timely decision-making was difficult if not impossible, particularly when compared to France with its more centralized bureaucracy and singular strategic vision.

William’s arrival at the congress in February 1691 marked its high point but it also signaled its decline, as well. His triumphal arrival coupled with the attendance of so many of the coalition’s military leaders demonstrated its potential as a military planning forum.22 The Prince of Orange, now King of England, endowed the congress with the legitimacy to forge a true “allied” strategy. Indeed, the Elector of Bavaria, the Elector of Brandenburg, the Duke of Luneburg-Celle, the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, the Duke of Würtemberg, and the Governor of the Spanish Netherlands were all present at the 1691 meeting, largely to honor William and his achievement.23 But William’s return as both Stadholder and King also signaled the emergence of his own dominant “Anglo-Dutch” military power, particularly when compared to his “princely” allies. In addition to showing his determination to take control of the Dutch Republic’s conduct of the war, William’s return signified the full-scale commitment of English resources to the war on the Continent as well. Consequently, just as William’s presence gave the congress direction, it also pointed to its future irrelevance as England gradually replaced Spain, and to a lesser degree Brandenburg-Prussia, as the principal


22 For a description of the 1691 Congress, see The Congress At The Hague, passim.

23 For a full list of the dignitaries present at the 1691 congress, see The Congress At The Hague, 22-25.
combatants in the war’s chief theater, the Spanish Netherlands. Altogether, William controlled not only the combined armies of the Dutch Republic and England — together over 200,000 men at the war’s peak — but their combined fleets, as well. This amounted to perhaps 80% of the coalition’s naval power and over 50% of its total military power. As his Anglo-Dutch forces came to shoulder an increasingly larger share of the war’s burden, William became the true arbiter of allied strategy, especially in the Low Countries. Although the Lower Rhine, Northern Italy, and Spain continued to be important theaters, the crux of the allied effort would be in the Low Countries where the bulk of England’s and the Dutch Republic’s forces could be most effectively brought to bear. Even when William deployed Anglo-Dutch seapower to the Mediterranean, he did so with the idea of diverting French resources from the Spanish Netherlands. If Anglo-Dutch seapower enabled Savoy and Spain to engage in offensive operations, it could only help the situation in the Low Countries. Thus for William, the other theaters contributed to the allied war effort only in so far as they helped to break the deadlock in the Spanish Netherlands. William’s ability to project Anglo-Dutch power from the North Sea to the Mediterranean demonstrates not only the dominant role Anglo-Dutch resources played in the war against France but William’s dominant place in the formulation of allied strategy.

Although the allied congress in The Hague continued to be important for political reasons, its military usefulness was limited. Even when it occupied center

24 According to Peter Wilson, the allies mustered 362,000 men against France in 1695. Although the Dutch and English armies numbered 205,000 officers and men total, approximately 125,000 of William’s forces were committed to the field army in the Low Countries, or 34% of all forces fighting against France. All told, Britain and the Dutch Republic fielded 205,000 officers and men, of which perhaps another 30,000 to 50,000 were in the Low Countries or the Dutch Republic as garrisons. The Emperor and the German princes provided the balance of allied field forces or roughly 66% of the total. Austria alone fielded an army of 93,000 officers and men. Thus while it appears that William’s Anglo-Dutch forced provided only 1/3 of allied forces against France, the addition of another 30,000 would have increased their participation to at least half of allied strength. The Emperor and the German princes provided the balance of the allies’ 362,000 men. In terms of naval strength, only Spain contributed forces to the Grand Alliance in addition to the Anglo-Dutch Combined Fleet. It is likely that William contributed at least 80% of allied naval strength plus 50% to 60% of allied military strength. For details, see Wilson, German Armies, 92 (Table 3.3); Jones, War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough, 29; and Chapters 3, 4, and 5 above.

25 For details on the utility of the allied congress, see Childs, The Nine Years’ War and the British Army, 43, 138-139; and Baxter, William III, 288.


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stage, its delegates limited authority naturally diminished its effectiveness as a forum for the conduct of strategy. This is suggested by the business discussed in the meetings and how that business bore on the actual campaigns. By its nature, coalition warfare required constant negotiation. Not surprisingly, the talks revolved less around strategy and more about keeping the alliance together. Perhaps the most important task concluded by the congress each year related to strategy was determining troop dispositions before each campaign season. On the surface, this suggests that strategy was rudimentary; success was merely a question of putting more troops in a given theater of operations than the opposition. On 11/21 March 1690, Dursley wrote to Nottingham that after much negotiation, the ministers decided how many troops each would “bee rely’d on of what forces theire respective Masters would bee willing to furnish.” Dusley exchanged William’s list and then sent Nottingham an account of all the allied forces available for the coming campaign.  

Although one might conclude that this emphasis on force distribution demonstrates either the allies’ limited strategic vision or, more likely, the limited scope of the congress’ authority, in reality, it show the real challenges facing this first modern military coalition. The most difficult of tasks was insuring that all the forces went into the field as complete armies before their French counterparts, and to do this required endless diplomacy. Of course, other items were discussed as well: the state of allied magazines, garrisons, and siege artillery, to name just a few. But beyond these concerns, it was the difficulty of getting troops in the field that was the crucial concern. As Dursley communicated to Nottingham in the same letter, “nothing is more effectuall for the carring on the warr agaist the common enemy...then quick dispatch.”

Dursley’s letters to Nottingham provide one of the few windows into the workings of the allied congress. Although Heinsius and Portland both discuss the

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27 According to Dursley’s letter, the allies were prepared to provide the following: the Elector of Bavaria would lead 38,000 men on the Upper Rhine; the Duke of Lorraine would lead 54,000 men between the Moselle and the Meuse; and Spain, including troops hired from the Elector of Hanover, would provide 25,000 men for the Spanish Netherlands, while the Dutch, under Waldeck, would provide 38,000 men for the field. Because the Dutch had close to twice the number of men listed in this letter, it is likely that the forces agreed to were field forces, and thus did not include garrisons. PRO SP 8/222, ff. 56-57, Dursley to Nottingham, The Hague, 11/21 March 1690.

28 Ibid. [PRO SP 8/222, ff. 56-57, Dursley to Nottingham, The Hague, 11/21 March 1690].

29 Ibid. [PRO SP 8/222, ff. 56-57, Dursley to Nottingham, The Hague, 11/21 March 1690].
congress in their correspondence to William, Dursley’s letters written to Nottingham describe what happened in the congress proceedings themselves, in large part because it was his job to report to Nottingham and the king. One of the reasons why both Heinsius and Portland write so little about the congress, particularly after 1691, was because both of them had the king’s ear and both of them, but particularly Heinsius, was more directly involved in formulating strategy. Although Heinsius too attended the congress regularly, it is clear that it was much more a place of diplomacy than of decision-making. After 1691, William seems to have attended the congress only rarely. Much of the deliberations over troop dispositions and the military needs of the various princes would have already been discussed by the time William arrived on the Continent in the late spring in any case. Count Dursley’s later letters suggest the congresses changing, or rather, evolving role. By 1692, the year after William’s attendance, it seemed more a place to complain or express concern rather than forge allied strategy. On 3/13 June 1692, Dursley wrote that in the last day’s meeting Heinsius “complained very much of the slow and unactive proceedings of the Imperialists both upon the [Rhine], and in Savoy, and was seconded in that complaint by me, and Monsr. Schmettau; Count Windisgrats replyd that wee had a greate deal of reason, and that he himself had made the same complaints to the Imperiall court...”

Each year, the ministers still deliberated over troop commitments, but it was clear that real decision-making took place in the courts of their respective masters. It had become perhaps what it had always been intended to be — a place where ideas might be exchanged, a place where the war effort might be orchestrated, but not where strategy was truly decided. This of course begs the question, where was strategy formulated if not in the congress?

The Mechanics of Operational Planning: Waldeck and the Confederate Army, 1689-90

Although at first William hoped that the congress might facilitate ease in coordination between both allies and theaters of operations, after 1691, it became increasingly clear


31 By 1694, most of the correspondence between William and Heinsius concerned peace negotiations. Although this is no proof that the Congress no longer met, its absence in their correspondence suggests that by 1694 it seems to have lost its political importance. See in particular Archives I, 219-269 (1692), 299-318 (1693); and Childs, Nine Years’ War and the British Army, 43.
that the congress would be little more than a forum to discuss concerns rather than a place to formulate strategy. In any case, the details of operational planning were generally left to officials in each of the theaters of operations. There were a number of important reasons for this, not the least of which being that Congress was not a good place to keep secrets. Indeed, most important operational decisions were communicated orally rather than by letter.\textsuperscript{32} For this reason, historians of this period only rarely find correspondence which discusses concrete operational plans. For example, writing to Heinsius in 1695, William scarcely mentioned his intention to besiege Namur in spite of the fact that he probably discussed the possibility with him in person.\textsuperscript{33} Correspondence between William and Heinsius, as well as minutes of meetings in the States General, do shed light on how Anglo-Dutch strategy was formulated, particularly at the theater level. While such correspondence does not explain the rationale behind the strategy, it does show how they approached each campaign season and their preparations. Not surprisingly, William played a crucial role in this process.

Operational planning or theater-level strategy took place on several political and military levels. At the top was William himself. As Stadholder, William decided — in cooperation with the Raad van State’s deputies and his generals — the Dutch Army’s deployments. William and his field commanders decided which units would be assigned to garrisons and which would be assigned to the field army. When William went to England in 1688, he left command of the field army in the hands of Prince von Waldeck, the Dutch Army’s First Field-Marshal. Waldeck was responsible for commanding the Dutch army in the Spanish Netherlands in 1689 and 1690. But because his authority extended only to the Dutch troops, diplomacy was required to negotiate the plan of cooperation between allies, not to mention the operational goals, for each campaign. Generally speaking, plans for each campaign were made during the winter

\textsuperscript{32} G. de Bruin, \textit{Geheimhouding en verraad: De geheimhouding van staatszaken ten tijde van de Republiek (1600-1750)} (’s-Gravenhage: SDU Uitgeverij, 1991), 110-111.

\textsuperscript{33} William’s correspondence surrounding the siege of Namur suggests much about the ad-hoc nature of operational planning. On 9 June, 1695, William writes to Heinsius of his intention to undertake “something of importance” but says little else. It is only on 27 June 1695 with allied armies in the process of surrounding Namur when William finally tells Heinsius of his plans. The nature of the correspondence suggests that there was no set plan for the campaign until William arrived at the army. For details, see van der Heim, \textit{Het Archief van den Raadpensionaris Anthoenie Heinsius}, II., 97 (William III to Heinsius, with the army at Ersele, 9 June 1695; and William III to Heinsius, with the army at Beselaer, 27 June 1695).
months, usually in consultation with William and Anthonie Heinsius. The details of operational planning during the war’s first two years were formulated by the generals of the various contingents destined for each respective theater of operations. In the Low Countries, Waldeck consulted with his Spanish and Brandenburg counterparts to formulate plans for each campaign. These plans were always reviewed by William; some even might have been prepared by him though it is impossible to confirm this. In any case, preparing the first campaigns was an “allied” effort and demonstrated the difficulty in coordinating the actions of several armies in the same theater, particularly when they did not enjoy anything resembling a uniform command structure.

Allied preparations for the 1689 campaign in the Spanish Netherlands illustrates the difficulties Waldeck faced in formulating a campaign plan that satisfied both the States General, and the other allies in the theater. In the late winter and early spring of that year, talks began between the Dutch diplomats and their Brandenburg and Spanish counterparts. In February the Governor of Breda, Lieutenant General Weibnom, went to Brussels to coordinate the military forces of the Dutch Republic and Spain in the event of war.\textsuperscript{34} Although they did not make any firm plans for the coming campaign season, they did discuss plans for defending Mons and Namur. Then on 12 March 1689, the Brandenburg \textit{chargé d’affairs} in The Hague, Henrich von Diest\textsuperscript{35} met with “the heer van Heeckeren and the deputies of foreign affairs” to coordinate their efforts in the coming campaign.\textsuperscript{36} The meeting produced a list of thirteen points to be addressed in planning the campaign. Interestingly enough, the first consideration was not how

\textsuperscript{34} Johan Thibault Weibnom was Governor of Breda since 1678 and was charged by the States General to make arrangements with the Governor of the Spanish Netherlands. On 18 February, Weibnom wrote to William III to describe what had taken place. Both Weibnom and Gasta\~naga were concerned about the security of Mons as well as Namur but they were convinced that they could stop any French incursion. For details, see Japikse, \textit{Correspondentie van Willem III en van Hans Willem Bentinck}, Pt. II, iii., 98-99 (Johan Thibaut van Weibnum to William III, The Hague, 18 February 1689); and Childs, \textit{The Nine Years’ War and the British Army}, 103.

\textsuperscript{35} The 12 March 1689 secret resolution mentions “d’ heer affgesante van Diest” as the Brandenburg representative. This was most likely Henrich von Diest. For details, see Schutte, \textit{Repertorium Der Buitenlandse Vertegenwoordigers Residerende in Nederland, 1584-1810}, 344; and ARA St. Gen. (1.01.03), 4594, (Secret Resolutions, 1689), 12 March 1689.

\textsuperscript{36} “Heer van Heeckeren” or Walraven van Heeckeren was a seasoned Dutch diplomat who worked primarily in the Empire. In 1689, he seems to have been consulted as an expert on German affairs. Only weeks after the conclusion of the 12 March resolution, he became extraordinary envoy to Brunswick-Luneburg and Hessen-Kassel. For details, see Hora Siccama, Aantekening en Verbeteringen, 311-312; ARA St. Gen. (1.01.03), 4594 (Secret Resolutions, 1689), 9 March and 12 March 1689.
command would be organized (that was number 11!) but rather the number of troops to be contributed by each side in the theater of operations, a fact that says much about strategy in the latter 17th century. The other points pertained to the defense of certain key cities or regions, how both states should act together, and which allies could be expected to work with the Dutch and Brandenburgers.

Spain and the Dutch had not made firm campaign plans because Spain had not been at war with France when Weibnom visited Brussels. However, with the French declaration came renewed Dutch discussions with Spanish officials. On 14 April 1689 (OS), Waldeck sent William several letters describing events on the continent including the first discussions pertaining to the coming campaign and allied preparations in the Spanish Netherlands. The Marquis de Gastañaga, Governor of the Spanish Netherlands, demanded assistance from the Dutch but then proceeded to tell Waldeck how his own forces should be disposed. Although he was William’s military representative, from the beginning of the 1689 campaign, Waldeck constantly demonstrated his lack of authority and his reliance on word from him before making any plans. His inability to coordinate his Dutch forces adequately with those of Spain and Brandenburg stemmed from his social rank, placed him beneath both the Elector of Brandenburg’s and Gastañaga’s socially while at the same time conferring upon him equal status militarily. Consequently, Waldeck was put in the difficult position of organizing the Dutch Republic’s war effort without the Prince of Orange’s leverage. Much of his difficulties stemmed also from his advanced age, which made it more

37 The thirteen points were as follows: 1.) How many troops from each side will act in unison; 2.) how should they be established; 3) How Gulich and Cologne will be succored from the enemy; 4) How Dusseldorf and Gulich will be secured; 5) When the campaign/operations will begin; 6) Against which place will the Elector’s and the States General’s troops act (together); 7) Will any other allies take part in these operations? 8) Regarding the army’s field artillery; 9) Regarding the heavy cannon and mortars in the event of siege; 10) Regarding ammunition of war, powder, lead, and other such things; 11) Regarding command; 12) Regarding the defense of both sides fortresses; 13) Regarding the army’s fodder and wagons, to transport provisions. For details, see St. Gen. 1.01.03, #4594, Secret Resolution, 12 March 1689.

38 CSPD, William and Mary 1689-90, 62-64.

39 Waldeck's 26 April 1689 letter to William III illustrates his difficult relationship with Gastañaga. He writes: "Mr. le Marq. de Gastanaga me demande de l’Infanterie alleguent assurance de V.M. qu’Elle me l’avait commande, j’ay envoye deus regimens a Brugge, mais n’en puis envoyer d’avantage si je dois operer su le Rhin et couvrir nos frontieres dans le pays de Liege. Il semble que ce marquis agit en forme de commandement avec moy, je ne le feray pas paroistre que dans la derniere extremité." For details, see Müller, Wilhelm von Oranien und Georg Friedrich von Waldeck II., 154-155.
difficult for him to be as active. On 16 May 1689, Waldeck explained his problems to William thus:

I am much embarrassed by the people at The Hague, and my age and infirmities make me unequal to the campaign. Certain of the generals are also insubordinate. The behaviour of the Count of Nassau is excellent.... If two English regiments were given to the Marquis de Gastanaga, who wishes to form a corps of 16,000 men, I could then put a stop to the daily complaints; and if there were need, this corps could be united to that under my command.  

Two days later, Waldeck wrote to the States General what had been decided in Maastricht between himself and Bedmar. A corps of 15,000 men, including 6,000 Dutch infantry would be formed to defend Flanders commanded by Gastanaga. In addition, Dutch troops would be sent to reinforce Namur. Another 6,000 Dutch troops would be detached to assist the Brandenburgers on the Lower Rhine. The remaining Dutch forces, augmented by 1,500 Spanish horse, would defend Brabant and the Pays de Liege. Although the Elector of Brandenburg’s forces, assisted by the Dutch corps, were successful in besieging Kaiserswerth and Bonn, Waldeck could not convince Brandenburg to coordinate his actions with his own in the Spanish Netherlands.

Adding to Waldeck’s difficulties were the stormy relations between he and Gastañaga, relations that only deteriorated as the campaign went on. From the beginning, Gastañaga and Waldeck’s could not agree on how best to proceed; both had different goals for the campaign and both wanted to command the other. Gastañaga was intent on defending Flanders and insisted on creating two more or less equal armies, one under himself and the other under Waldeck. Waldeck was not prepared to surrender control to Gastañaga. Although he agreed to send significant Dutch forces to support Gastañaga in Flanders, he continued to control the largest force, which seems to have soured relations between the two men. Unhappy at accepting a subordinate role to Waldeck, Gastañaga acted more or less independent of Waldeck, sometimes against his explicit orders. Indeed, in early June, Gastañaga disobeyed Waldeck by

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40 CSPD, William and Mary 1689-90, 90-91.

41 ARA St. Gen. (1.01.03), 4594 (Secret Resolutions, 1689), 18 May 1689.

42 CSPD William and Mary, 1689-90, 91-92 [SP 8/5, ff. 21 (v)] (“Memorandum of conference at Maastricht, 15 May 1689”).
sending his field force into Mons, rendering Flanders vulnerable to French incursions.\(^{43}\) At the same time, Gastañaga constantly questioned Waldeck’s strategy wanting the Dutch Field-Marshal to protect Flanders rather than push into Brabant and Hainault. Although Gastañaga and Waldeck did coordinate fairly well at times, they were not on the best of relations when the campaign concluded.\(^{44}\) In spite of the fact that Waldeck had managed a minor victory over the French at Walcourt, the lack of coordination between the allies during this first campaign season pointed to difficulty in the future.

Waldeck’s principal problem was his inability to exercise authority within the coalition. Although acting on William’s orders, he had difficulty orchestrating his campaign plans with the allied commanders. Both the Elector of Brandenburg and the Marquis de Gastañaga demanded the spotlight, and neither was willing to allow Waldeck to command. Not surprisingly, William’s general found it increasingly difficult to work with his Brandenburg and Spanish allies and almost impossible to coordinate their respective campaign strategies. Against the mediocre generalship of d’Humieres, this lack of unity resulted in a limited allied victory at Walcourt. In 1690 against the more formidable Duke of Luxembourg however, the result was the decisive defeat of Waldeck’s Dutch Army. Just as had happened the previous year, each of the theater commanders had their own campaign plans, in spite of the creation of The Hague planning conference designed to overcome such obstacles. Gastañaga, tasked with covering Flanders, either through ignorance or ineptitude, allowed the French to concentrate all of their forces against Waldeck, which in turn led to his severe defeat at Fleurus.\(^{45}\)

Waldeck’s defeat led to further quarrels between the three theater commanders. To reinforce Waldeck’s army’s depleted ranks and cover the now exposed Brussels, Gastañaga requested that the Elector of Brandenburg move his corps from its positions in the Meuse valley to Brabant where it could better screen the capital and protect the

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\(^{43}\) CSPD William and Mary, 1689-90, 220 [SP 8/5, ff. 89]; and Childs, The Nine Years’ War and the British Army, 110.

\(^{44}\) For a good description of the 1689 campaign, see Childs, The Nine Years’ War and the British Army, 110-128.

\(^{45}\) W. Sawle, An Impartial Relation of All the Transactions Between the Army of the Confederates And That of the French King, In their Last Summers Campaign in Flanders With a more particular Respect to the Battle of Fleur (London, 1691), 3-5; De Beaurain, Histoire Militaire de Flandre Depuis l’année 1690. jusqu’en 1694 inclusivement, Campagne de 1690; Childs, Nine Years’ War, 138-140.
province from French incursions. Gastañaga had promised to pay the Elector the cost of his army’s subsistence but Brussels’ empty coffers made that impossible. Not surprisingly, quarrels erupted again, this time over who would pay for the Elector’s forces. Spain’s dire financial situation threatened to undermine allied defense of the region. Writing to Heinsius at the end of September, William worried that Spain’s financial difficulties would only lead to military ones:

The greatest fear that I have now, is how it will be possible for the allied troops to subsist [in the Spanish Netherlands] this winter, especially those of Brandenburg and Lüneburg, because if the aforementioned do not stay in the Spanish Netherlands, the country cannot be defended, and I question very strongly if it will be within the means of the Marquis de Gastañaga to be able to continue the contract with the troops from Hannover, let alone furnish the Brandenburg troops the promised 40,000 Rijksdaalders.\(^4\)

Unwilling to allow the Spanish Netherlands to become indefensible, William was forced to find money for Brandenburg’s corps’ subsistence.\(^5\) As the fall turned to winter, both William and Heinsius worried about the state of defense in the Low Countries. Indeed, William believed that preparing for the winter and the next campaign season “was the greatest and most important work that one must do” and that they “must work with diligence, seriousness, [but] without worry...”\(^6\)

But Spanish ill-preparedness was not the only problem. A lack of concert between the allies in the theater threatened their ability to defend against further incursions. Writing to Heinsius, Major-General Jacob van Wassenaer-Obdam, shared his perceptions of the relationship between Waldeck, Gastañaga, and the Elector of Brandenburg and thus:

There have been many disagreements between the commanders of our three armies, but they appear to have subsided. This is because the two others [Brandenburg and Gastañaga] want to establish their advantage by blabbering to the world that their reputation depends upon Waldeck and our army, and

\(^4\) Krämer, Archives, I., 90-91 (William III to Heinsius, Kensington, 19/29 September 1690).


\(^6\) Krämer, Archives, I., 90-91.
thus propose designs impossible to execute with the knowledge that the Prince von Waldeck would oppose them on logical grounds.... This furnished them with the pretext for stating and writing everywhere, at which they are quite deaf, about their wanting to conduct important operations, but [that] the Prince von Waldeck finds problems with them.... I am sure that if the Prince von Waldeck had resolved to comply with their propositions, that they would be the first to retract them, because not to do so would come at the expense of establishing the Elector’s reputation for his ardor and his great valor for the cause at the court of the Emperor and of the Empire, [rather than his reputation as] one with a nose for good winter quarters. As for the Marquis de Gastañaga, he has continued the masquerades made for the benefit of his court and Spain, and made a great display of his good intentions and charged (on account of his rushing off) the others of every iniquity, so that they keep him in the government, which is a unique practice.

Obdam concludes with what must have already been obvious to Heinsius as well as to William: “Finally, sir, as long as we are obliged to act with the combined armies, we will not do anything valiant, no matter how I try to persuade you with a thousand other reasons, but you have probably heard enough.”49 Others shared Obdam’s opinion. Writing to Johan Pesters50 from the allied camp at Wambeek only a few days earlier, Johan Ham51 echoed his sentiments. In describing the allied army, Ham explains:

I guess it is not really true that allied troops are always unified troops. We have seen a fatal preview of this truth many times this campaign. God grant that the next one will be conducted with more diligence and harmony and thus might go

49 Van der Heim, Het Archief van den Raadvonkant Antje Heinsius, II., 20-21, “(Lieutenant-General) Jacob van Wassenaer Obdam to Antionie Heinsius, From the Camp at St. Quintin Humeque, 17 September 1690.”

50 Officially, Johan Pesters was Paymaster and Pensionary of Maastricht, but he was also involved in espionage. Much of his correspondence to the Raad van State concerns the collection of contributions. For details, see Hora Sicama, Aantekeningen en Verbeteringen, 535-536.

51 Dr. Johan Ham was a veteran diplomat in Prussia. In 1680, he received his commission as secretary and commissioner to Prussia. Shortly after the outbreak of war, Ham was named resident in Prussia for the Dutch Republic. In 1693, he would be promoted to extraordinary envoy to the Elector of Brandenburg. For details, see Schutte, Repertorium der Nederlandse vertegenwoordigers, residerende in het buitenland, 207.
better. To this end, it is crucial that His Majesty, through his high presence, in time will redress and unify everyone.

In Ham’s opinion, only William himself could pull together the allied war effort in the Spanish Netherlands: “...the King’s person and presence are absolutely necessary [my italics], without which we must certainly fear for the [allied cause].”52

Jacob Ham was not alone in his belief that only William could hold the coalition together. William too believed that his presence at the head of the army was crucial. In Ireland, the Duke of Schomberg proved incapable of commanding William’s Anglo-Dutch forces forcing William to take personal command of the army. Now Waldeck’s inability to command in the face of opposition both from Brandenburg and Gastañaga, not to mention his own officers, compelled William to act. Most likely he had always intended to command allied forces in the Low Countries personally; his victory at the Boyne and Marlborough’s successful Munster expedition meant that the war in Ireland would likely be over in 1691. Thus, with the situation in Ireland seemingly in hand, he undoubtedly felt he could take his leave from the British Isles to command allied forces on the Continent without too much worry for the situation in England.

William III, and the Confederate Army’s “High Command”

From the beginning, William was the central figure in allied strategic planning. As Stadholder and Captain-General of the Dutch Republic, it was William’s prerogative to decide how its resources would be used against Louis XIV’s forces. When William and Mary were crowned king and queen of England in February 1689, he became the principal figure behind the conduct of English strategy as well. That is not to say that there were no checks on William’s power. Although as Stadholder, William did possess almost unbridled control over Dutch strategy, his military budgets or Staten van Oorlog were still subject to the States General’s approval, and if the war did go poorly, the provinces could demonstrate their displeasure by withholding their financial support. The same was true to an even larger extent in England, where William was wholly dependent upon Parliament to approve his military budgets. Without Parliamentary support, William could not have pursued a continental war. That he could do was as

52 “J. Ham to J. Pesters, Wanbeek, 13 September 1690,” in van der Heim, Het Archief van den Raadpensionaris Antonie Heinsius, I, 67-68.
much due to his ability to muster support for his policies, as it was his ability to compromise enough to get them pushed through.

If William formulated the Dutch Republic’s and England’s military policies, an ability that has led several historians to refer to him as a “Dual Monarch,” he required allies in both states to insure that they were carried out effectively. At the policy level, William insured that the Dutch Republic and England remained opposed to France until the conditions laid down in the Grand Alliance Treaty were satisfied or conditions were favorable for peace. Strategically, William could do little more than determine where Dutch and English military (and naval) assets were deployed to that end. From the beginning, William was convinced that the Low Countries Theater was the fulcrum of the Grand Alliance. He believed it was where the war would be won or lost. That the Spanish Netherlands should be the focus of the Dutch Republic’s war was never in doubt in The Hague and Amsterdam. After all, France had attacked the Dutch in 1672 and it was in the Republic’s best interest to defend its buffer to the south to prevent the French from directly threatening them.

But for Britain, full-scale continental commitment was a more difficult sell, particularly in the war’s first years when Ireland rather than Flanders seemed the more direct threat. In order to see England’s resources directed against the Low Countries effectively, William determined that he had to direct the allied army’s operations personally. During the war’s first two years, direct control was impossible. In 1689, William was too busy learning to control the reins of government to risk absenting himself to lead armies in the field. The next year however, following Schomberg’s ineffective invasion of Ireland, William was convinced that his personal attention was necessary to bring the war there to a speedy conclusion and thus effect his original strategy of seeing England fully committed on the continent. It was only in 1691, with the situation in Ireland no longer a threat, when William determined that he must lead the allied armies in person. Thus from 1691 through 1697, William decided not only Anglo-Dutch policy and strategy but he directed the Confederate Army’s operations as well.

William’s decision to lead armies in the field required that he often “hand-off” certain responsibilities while he busied himself with other important ones. From the beginning of the Nine Years’ War, Raadpensionaris Anthonie Heinsius served as the

Stadholder-King’s willing accomplice, doing William’s bidding in the Dutch Republic and in the Low Countries while William mustered support in Parliament. Indeed, William would not have been as successful a coalition leader without the willing support of Heinsius. In addition to insuring that his military initiatives pass through the States of Holland and the States General without difficulty, Heinsius acted as William’s voice on the continent during his absences in England and Ireland.

Heinsius was particularly important during the war’s first three years when William’s attentions were focused less on the war in the Low Countries and more on consolidating his position in England and eliminating the threat in Ireland. From the time Heinsius first became Raadpensionaris, he played a central role in the orchestrating the Dutch war effort and the campaigns in the Spanish Netherlands. Mostly Heinsius was simply kept in the loop. In his letter congratulating Heinsius on his acceptance of the Grand Pensioner’s post in April 1689, William notes “with regards to the military operations, I have written my feelings to the Prince von Waldeck” which demonstrates William’s dominance over military affairs. But in the same letter, William tells Heinsius to assist Waldeck “particularly, in that which will be required for the service of the state. You are familiar with the difficulties he faces and what assistance he requires...”\(^5\) Thus, Heinsius was to assist Waldeck in insuring that his plans not be impeded. Much of Heinsius’ activities focused on diplomacy. He maintained a regular correspondence with the army’s generals, and while he left the details of grand strategy to William, he nevertheless became at times heavily involved in theater-level strategic planning, particularly when the situation demanded it.\(^5\)

Heinsius’ usually served as William’s voice on the continent, particularly when a stronger voice was needed to push through the Stadholder-King’s plans. Heinsius also served as William’s sounding board for both his ideas and his worries. Much of William’s correspondence to Heinsius involved his concerns about the strategic situation. At times however, William required Heinsius’ direct assistance in operational planning. During the winter of 1690-91 before William arrived to chair the planning congress in The Hague, Heinsius busied himself with working out the logistical arrangements to insure that enough troops could winter in the Spanish

\(^{54}\) Krämer, *Archives*, I., 1-2.

\(^{55}\) See in particular Stapleton, “Grand Pensionary at War,” 206.
Netherlands to make it defensible. Then after William had returned to England at the end of the 1691 campaign, Heinsius coordinated plans for defending the Spanish Netherlands and for establishing magazines so support an expanded English expeditionary force.\(^{56}\) Heinsius’ most direct involvement in formulating theater strategy came in the winter of 1692-93 when he was directly involved in planning the Spanish Netherlands’ defense, a clear indication of the situation’s gravity.

**Waldeck and the Allied Army, 1689-90**

Before William took personal command of allied forces in the Low Countries, allied forces were less integrated than they would later be under William III, in larger part due to the general confusion that accompanied the outbreak of war. The first attempt at forming “allied” armies in the Low Countries came about during the initial meetings between Dutch, Brandenburg, and Spanish officers at Maastricht and elsewhere to formulate plans for the 1689 campaign. While both Waldeck and Gastañaga’s forces contained contingents from their allied counterparts, their armies’ command structures were not integrated. In both 1689 and 1690, Prince von Waldeck’s Anglo-Dutch army, contained regiments from Gastañaga’s Spanish army; in 1689, 1,500 Spanish horse were attached to Waldeck’s force to make up for the 3,000 horse and dragoons sent to the Rhine in support of the Elector of Brandenburg’s operations, while 1,200 foot reinforced Waldeck’s Anglo-Dutch infantry.\(^{57}\)

In Flanders, Gastañaga commanded a Spanish force numbering 18,000 men. He was assisted by a Dutch contingent, under the command of Count Willem Adrian van Hornes, Master-General of Dutch Artillery and Governor of Sluis.\(^{58}\) Of this number, roughly one-third comprised troops from the Spanish army while the rest were provided by the Dutch Republic. Gastañaga’s army in Flanders in 1689, for example, included eleven Dutch and Dutch-subsidy battalions plus several companies of detached grenadiers in addition to his own Spanish troops. Although I have not been

\(^{56}\)Stapleton, “Grand Pensionary at War,” 208-209.

\(^{57}\)The identity of these Spanish forces is unclear. For details, see Ten Raa, *Het Staatsche Leger*, VII., 14-15; Childs, *Nine Years’ War*, 113; and Rooms, “De Materiele Organisatie van de Troepen,” I., 66.

\(^{58}\)The Master-General of Artillery was always named Governor of Sluis. For details, see Ten Raa, *Het Staatsche Leger*, VII., 405.
able to uncover that army’s order-of-battle, the incoming missives of the Raad van State include a list of the forces that comprised it.\textsuperscript{59}

The other army in the Low Countries was Waldeck’s Anglo-Dutch force. In 1689 and 1690, the size of the army varied but most accounts give it a strength of somewhere between 35,000 and 40,000 men.\textsuperscript{60} In 1689 and 1690 the Dutch army and British Corps in the Low Countries operated together as one field force. Included within Waldeck’s army was a small force of Spanish infantry and a larger force of Spanish cavalry to make up for the weakness of his own mounted forces. From the beginning, the English Corps in the Low Countries, first under Marlborough and later under Talmash, were fully integrated into the Dutch chain-of-command and administrative structures. Not only were English forces integrated into the Dutch Army’s command structure, but the troops were even paid by Dutch paymasters.\textsuperscript{61} The same could not be said for Spain’s or Brandenburg-Prussia’s troops. Although Waldeck’s allied army did include a small Spanish contingent, the fact that Gastañaga commanded independently in Flanders and that the Elector of Brandenburg and his generals commanded the same way along the Meuse made unity of action virtually impossible. This situation no doubt contributed to Waldeck’s difficulties in terms of coordination with the other allies in the theater.

\textit{William III and the Confederate Army, 1691-1697}

When William decided to command allied forces in the Low Countries in person, it was necessary to create a system that not only allowed him to command the army in the field, but also enabled him to exercise the duties his office required of him. Heinsius served as his representative on the continent while he was attending to business in England. Heinsius not only insured that his policies were carried out, but he also acted as his surrogate to oversee military planning, or when act needed pushing through.

\textsuperscript{59} ARA. RvS. (1.01.19), 627 (\textit{Incoming Missives, June-December 1689}), “Lyste van het Leger van den Marquis de Guastanaga (Rec. 30 Aug. 1689)”.

\textsuperscript{60} According to John Childs, Waldeck’s army numbered 34,000 on 9 July 1689. This included ten battalions from the British Corps under the command of the Earl of Marlborough. For details, see Childs \textit{The Nine Years’ War and the British Army}, 113;

\textsuperscript{61} Louis Waddell examines the way in which English troops were integrated into the Dutch payment scheme. For details, see Waddell, “The Administration of the English Army in Flanders,” 86-102.
But, when William was on the continent, he needed to be able to conduct state business, particularly diplomacy, while on campaign. As King of England, and Commander-in-Chief of the army, it was essential that two of his most important officials, the secretary-of-state and the secretary-at-war either accompany him in the field, or that some expedient be developed so that their presence was not necessary. For William the latter option was preferable since he was inclined to serve as his own secretary-of-state, and more importantly, did not want to be burdened by the presence of a politically powerful secretary-of-state who might overshadow his Dutch favorites, especially his confidant, Hans Willem Bentinck, Duke of Portland.62

William laid the groundwork for how he would solve these problems in the Low Countries when he took personal command of his forces in Ireland in 1690. To serve as his secretary of state, William revived the office of Secretary of State for Ireland and appointed Sir Robert Southwell, a man well versed in Irish affairs, and to serve as surrogate secretary-at-war, William turned to George Clarke a man eager to succeed William Blathwayt.63 William had hoped that his Secretary-at-War, William Blathwayt, would accompany him to Ireland, but Blathwayt flatly refused to do so. Consequently, William was forced to ask the less experienced but enthusiastic Clarke. While he was away, Mary held the reigns of state assisted by an advisory council chosen by William himself.64

Militarily, William was influenced by his experience with the Dutch Army. In both Ireland and later in the Spanish Netherlands, William constructed organizations staffed largely, but not exclusively, by Dutch officers and administrators or by men with considerable military experience. In spite of the fact that the majority of his army’s rank-and-file were natives of the British Isles, his general officers tended to be foreigners. Most were veterans of the Dutch Army; many had accompanied him to England in 1688. His commander-in-chief in Ireland, the Duke of Schomberg, was a French Huguenot former in Brandenburg service. He had accompanied William in


64 Included on this advisory council were the Lords Carmarthen, Devonshire, Dorset, Marlborough, Monmouth, Nottingham, Pembroke, Sir John Lowther, and Admiral Russell. For details, see Horwitz, Parliament, Policy, and Politics in the Reign of William III, 59-60.
1688 and was appointed commander of English forces and Master-General of the Board of Ordnance based on his military reputation and experience. When William arrived in Ireland to assume command, Schomberg became his second-in-command, and served in that capacity until he was killed at the Boyne. Schomberg was replaced by another of William’s favorites, Hendrik-Trajectinus, Count von Solms. A Lieutenant-General in the Dutch Army, Solms commanded Dutch Forces in English service. In Ireland, he became second-in-command to William, and Commander-in-Chief in his absence. Because William’s army in Ireland was never as large as the armies on the continent, it was divided into what amounted to brigade-size commands rather than wings, each one commanded by a Lieutenant- or Major-General. Of the thirteen most senior officers in the order-of-battle, nine were foreigners of which five were generals in the Dutch Army; the remaining four were either recently hired Danes or Huguenots who had accompanied William in 1688.65

This group of general officers, particularly the foreigners, would become the inner circle of William’s officer corps in the Confederate Army. Among its members were Lieutenant-Generals Goddard van Reede-Ginckel, and Ferdinand Willem, Duke of Württemberg-Teck, and Major-Generals Ernst van Tettau, Hans Willem Bentinck, Karel von Schomberg, Adam van der Duyn van ’s-Gravenmoer, Hendrik van Nassau-Ouwerkerk, and Marquis de la Forest-Suzannet. All of these men would go on to hold major posts in the Confederate Army. Likewise, the army’s headquarters personnel were destined for important posts in the Confederate Army. William’s personal secretary, Constantijn Huygens, accompanied William both to Ireland and to the continent. He would continue to fulfil his job as his military secretary until his death in 1696.66 Both William’s Adjutant-General, Willem van Nassau-Zuylenstein, and Quartermaster-General, the aforementioned Major-General van ’s-Gravenmoer, continued in their same posts within the Confederate Army. Likewise, the commander

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66 For an excellent inside view of William’s headquarters during the Nine Years’ War, see Journaal van Constantijn Huygens, den zoon, van 21 October 1688 tot 2 September 1696, 2 Volumes (Utrecht: Kemink en Zoon, 1877), passim. Huygens is particularly good for William’s first four campaigns. His diary is less good in 1695 and 1696 when it seems worsening health led Huygens to make fewer entries in those years.
of William’s artillery at the Boyne, Colonel Johan Wynand Goor, commanded the English artillery train in Flanders from 1692 until the war’s conclusion.

Unlike William’s Dutch officers, few of his English officers were destined to reach high posts within the Confederate Army. Although Sir John Churchill, First Earl of Marlborough seemed the likely candidate to command the English contingent in the Low Countries, his incessant criticism of his king coupled with his endless ambition damaged their relationship and led to Marlborough’s dismissal in 1692. Of those officers that served under William in Ireland, none of those who held high post there were destined for further advancement on the continent. Major-General Percy Kirke died of illness in the fall of 1691 after one campaign in the Low Countries, while Lieutenant-General William Douglas’ record in Ireland likely prevented him from being transferred to the Continent. Although Lord Henry Sidney went on to serve in the Low Countries, he left William’s headquarters in 1692 to become Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. Only Sir John Lanier seemed likely to reach a high rank in the Confederate Army only to be killed at Steenkirk in 1692. British officers who served as colonels or brigadiers in Ireland, however, were more likely to attain a high rank. Among those who served in Ireland who reached the command level in the Low Countries were Sir Henry Bellesise and Charles Trelawney.

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67 Huygens sheds some light on why Marlborough was sacked in 1692. In a 7 July 1691 entry in his diary, he notes that Marlborough countermanded an order given by William himself. According to Huygens, Marlborough had told Colonel Ramsay that the orders for English Regiments in the Low Countries must be issued by Henry Sidney (Secretary-at-War) rather than by Huygens himself as per the king’s orders. However, when William was later asked if this was the case, he said he never issued such an order, and that all orders were to come through Huygens. This discovery annoyed William, but the next day when he lunched with Marlborough, Huygens only notes that “the table was well appointed.” The fact that Marlborough seemed to be assuming command of the English Corps by telling its colonels to go to Sidney for orders rather than Huygens demonstrates the friction between the two men during the 1691 campaign. For details, see Journal van Constantijn Huygens, den zoon, I, 456.

68 For Percy Kirke’s background, see Hora-Siccema, Aantekeningen en Verbeteringen, 388.

69 For William Douglas’ background, see Hora-Siccema, Aantekeningen en Verbeteringen, 208.

70 Sir Henry Sidney became Lord Lieutenant of Ireland after serving as Secretary-at-War in the Low Countries in 1691.

71 Bellasise eventually commanded all English infantry in the Low Countries. Charles Trelawney attained the rank of Major-General in late 1690 but never reached the rank of Lieutenant-General. For details, see Hora-Siccema, Aantekeningen en Verbeteringen, 700; and Childs, The Nine Years’ War, 344.
When William decided to command in the Low Countries in 1691, he was faced with the same difficulties as in Ireland and sought to solve them in the same way. Just as in Ireland, William needed to create conduits between his headquarters in the field and both the war office and the foreign office. In Ireland, William utilized existing positions to do this. In the Low Countries, Lord Henry Sidney served as William’s military secretary in 1691. Unfortunately, although Sidney was a good military man, he was no secretary. Consequently, William turned to William Blathwayt. Blathwayt already served as Secretary-at-War and had much experience in the war office. Blathwayt’s position was unique in that its responsibilities included those of Secretary-at-War, Secretary-of-State, and personal (military) secretary. Much of its broad nature had to do with the unique organization of William’s government. In 1692, there was no Secretary of State for the north, the Secretary of State usually responsible for the army and the northern territories. As Secretary-at-War, Blathwayt was responsible for every element of military administration, from the transportation of troops, to subsistence, to subsidy payments. While on campaign, Blathwayt’s activities resembled less those of a Secretary-at-War than of a military secretary. Indeed, in many ways Blathwayt’s military duties seem to mirror those of William’s Dutch secretary, Constantijn Huygens, particularly since both were responsible for preparing their respective army lists. But Blathwayt’s duties also resembled those of a Dutch field deputy in that he was responsible for arranging the English contingent’s logistical arrangements just as his Dutch counterpart did. To assist in his duties, Blathwayt enjoyed the assistance of a number of clerks. It seems as many as seventeen clerks and assistants attended to Blathwayt and his office while on campaign, thus Blathwayt would have been at the heart of William’s headquarters.72

In addition to Blathwayt, William was attended by a number of what one might call “staff officers”, though this term seems a bit anachronistic in reference to early modern armies. In both Ireland and in the Low Countries, Willem van Nassau-Zuylenstein served as his Adjutant-General until 1694 when he was replaced by the Joost van Keppel, First Duke of Albermarle. The duties of the Adjutant-General in late seventeenth century armies were somewhat different from today. Just as in modern armies, the Adjutant-General was responsible for the general’s — or in this case William’s, military correspondence — particularly his orders. He was responsible for

72 Jacobsen, William Blathwayt, 410; and Chapter 8 below.
writing down the orders of the day, keeping a detailed roster of the army’s regiments, and arranging duty rosters for the various contingents within the army. Finally, the Adjutant-General was responsible for both inspecting and laying down the troops’ discipline.\textsuperscript{73} This last point is particularly important since theoretically, the Adjutant-General of an \textit{allied} army would be responsible for establishing the exercise practiced by all of the army, and thus the Adjutant-General provided the army with a degree doctrinal uniformity.

The Quartermaster-General was another of William’s staff officers. For the war’s first five years, Adam van der Duyn van ‘s-Gravenmoer, served in that capacity until he succumbed to wounds suffered at Neerwinden. Just as the Adjutant-General of the 1690s was different from his modern day counterpart, so too was the Quartermaster-General of the late-seventeenth century different from quartermasters today. Indeed, the duties of the original Quartermaster-Generals were more like a modern-day pathfinder than logistician or administrator. The Quartermaster-General commanded the army’s eyes and ears. In the seventeenth century, he was essentially a cross between an intelligence officer and a scout. His duties included scouting suitable camp sites, reconnoitering areas beyond the camp for enemy activity and passage ways, scouting and marking march routes, providing guides for the army on the march, as well as finding and harvesting forage for the army.\textsuperscript{74} Not surprisingly, a good Quartermaster-General had to have an almost photographic knowledge for the region’s military geography. He had to know where the best camp-sites were located, their strengths and weaknesses, the best routes of march, and so on. When ’s-Gravenmoer died, he was succeeded by the very capable Major-General Daniel Wolf von Dopff. A client of Waldeck, von Dopff was a very experienced soldier who served both in the Dutch War and the Nine Years’ War and was purported to know the geography of the Spanish Netherlands and Pays d Liège better than anyone else in the allied army. His career would go on well into the Spanish Succession War.\textsuperscript{75}

When William took command of allied forces in the Spanish Netherlands in 1691, much of Waldeck’s chain-of-command remained intact. William assumed

\textsuperscript{73} Bland, \textit{A Treatise of Military Discipline}, 283-284.

\textsuperscript{74} Bland, \textit{A Treatise of Military Discipline}, 254-255; Ten Raa, \textit{Het Staatsche Leger}, VII., 239.

\textsuperscript{75} Hora-Siccama, \textit{Aantekeningen en Verbeteringen}, 201-202.
command of the army and Waldeck moved to his second-in-command. Beneath Waldeck were the Dutch Army’s two field-marshals and the general of Spanish forces. During the Nine Years’ War, the Dutch Army had three field-marshals numbered in order of seniority. The First Field-marshal was Waldeck; the second was Walrad van Nassau-Saarbrücken, while the third was Hendrik-Casimir II, Prince of Nassau-Dietz and Stadholder of Friesland, Groningen, and Drenthe. As was customary, William left these men in place and merely plugged in those who had accompanied him from Flanders. Commanding the center was Prince Hendrik-Casimir II. Beneath him was Count Solms-Braunfels commander of Dutch Infantry, and reporting to him were Lieutenant-Generals Marlborough and the Prince von Birkenfelt. Leading the army’s left wing was Nassau-Saarbrücken who commanded Lieutenant-Generals Nassau-Ouwerkerk and Wassenaer-Obdam. The army’s right wing was commanded by Prince de Vaudemont, General of Spanish forces in the Netherlands. Inter-allied cooperation had been particularly poor during the preceding campaign season, and much of the difficulty stemmed from sour relations between Waldeck and Gastañaga. Althgough Gastañaga continued to command the Spanish-Dutch Force in Flanders proper, William was anxious to see him gone. The Prince of Orange’s relations with Vaudemont, on the other hand, were very good. The two had been friends since the Dutch War. In many ways Vaudemont represented a bridge between William’s Anglo-Dutch forces and those of Spain. Their friendship facilitated inter-allied cooperation, and as the war went on, Vaudemont would become William’s most trusted subordinate. In 1691, Vaudemont served as part of William’s force leaving Gastañaga to command the Spanish-Dutch force in Flanders on his own.\textsuperscript{76}

1692 was a watershed year in the organization of the Confederate Army. With the conclusion of the war in Ireland, the army in the Low Countries underwent a significant expansion as a much larger English contingent joined the Confederate Army’s ranks. Likewise, the Confederate Army’s command group seemed to reflect William’s original group in Ireland more and more. Waldeck continued in his capacity as William’s ADC as did Nassau-Saarbrücken and Hendrik-Casimir II as his army’s

\textsuperscript{76} For the allied order-of-battle in 1691, see d’Auvergne, The History of the Campagne in Flanders For the Year 1691. Being the First of his late Majesty King William the Third, Compleating the History of the Seven Campagnes of his said Majesty to the Treaty of Ryswick (London, 1735), 88-92; ARA RAZH Familie van Wassenaer (3.20.63), 4 (“Willem van Wassenaer-Duivenvoorde”), “Camp de Gerpines, 1691” (unfoliated); and “Ordre de Bataille de l armée hollandoise Commandée par le Roi Guillaume au Pays Bas 1691” (unfoliated).
field-marshal. But the increase in numbers enabled William to employ both a General of Infantry and a General of Cavalry. Count Solms-Braunfels was promoted to General of Infantry in 1692, and as such, all the allied infantry fell under his command. This is reflected by the cosmopolitan nature of the Lieutenant-Generals who fell under his command: the Duke of Württemberg (Danish), Hugh MacKay (Scottish/Dutch), Sir John Lanier (English), Thomas Talmash (English), Julius Ernst von Tettau (Danish), and the Prince von Birkenfeld (Dutch). Commanding Anglo-Dutch horse was Goddard van Reede-Ginckel, recently given the title Earl of Athlone for his service in Ireland. Athlone commanded a less-cosmopolitan group of Lieutenant-Generals including Hendrik van Nassau-Ouwerkerk (Dutch in English Service), the Earl of Portland (Dutch in English Service), and Jacob van Wassenaer-Obdam (Dutch). In addition to forces, England sent over a sizable field artillery train to join the Dutch one already present in the theater. In 1691, the Dutch Republic’s artillery fell under the command of its Master-General, the Count van Hornes. In order to unify Dutch and English artillery under one overarching allied structure however, William appointed Johan Wynand Goor commander of the English Flanders train, while the Dutch train continued to be commanded by Colonel Verscheur, thus placing both trains under Hornes. The new “allied” artillery train was really little more than an expanded version of the Dutch train since so many of the English train’s personnel were drawn from the Dutch Army, a fact that raised more than a few eyebrows in Whitehall when it was discovered.77

Maximillian Emmanuel von Wittlesbach, Elector of Bavaria and Governor of the Spanish Netherlands assumed command of Spanish forces in the Low Countries in 1692, replacing the detested Marquis de Gastañaga. Because William was in large part responsible for his nomination, Max Emmanuel contributed to creating unity among the coalition forces in the Spanish Netherlands. In 1693, William took his own steps at breaking down inter-allied rivalry while at the same time strengthening his own hold over coalition forces when he detached the Duke of Württemberg with a force of 12,000 men to operate in Flanders while at the same time drawing the Elector of Bavaria’s Spanish-paid forces into his own Anglo-Dutch Army. This move proved a watershed in the history of the Confederate Army because it not only eliminated the possibility

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77 The English train comprised eight 12 pounders, ten 6 pounders, and twenty 3 pounders. The Dutch train comprised fifty 24 pounders, twenty 12 pounders, twelve 50lb. “stone” mortars, and twelve howitzers. For details, see HMC, The Manuscripts of the House of Lords, 1692-1693, 197-198; and BL Stowe MSS, 444, ff. 10-12. For the Dutch train, see Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VII, 386.

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that Spanish forces might operate independently of William’s Anglo-Dutch forces, but by making the Elector of Bavaria William’s military subordinate, he eliminated the difficulties Waldeck faced when dealing with the Marquis de Gastañaga. No longer would Spanish forces defend Flanders; that would be the job of an Anglo-Dutch corps commanded by an officers of William’s own choosing. Meanwhile, the main coalition army, with its numerous European princes — men overly concerned with protocol and “honor” — would be commanded by William in person, his superior social rank as King of England neutralizing their princely pretensions. Thus, while Max Emmanuel’s Spanish forces technically fell outside of William’s military control being forces of another sovereign king, their inclusion into William’s coalition army placed them under his control. For the remainder of the Nine Years’ War when William and his generals organized the theater’s forces, they would arrange that the army in Flanders would be comprised almost exclusively of English and Dutch troops. The main Confederate Army in Brabant, commanded by William in person, comprised Dutch, Spanish, and German forces, thus effectively placing all the forces in the theater under his command.

The 1693 campaign marked an important turning point in the composition of the Confederate Army. Prior to the opening of the campaign, the venerable Prince von Waldeck succumbed to a lengthy illness in November 1692, only a few months after the conclusion of the 1692 campaign’s conclusion. It was one of the bloodiest battles fought by coalition forces during the Nine Years’ War. The battle claimed the lives of a number of important officers, the most noteworthy being Count Solms who had his right leg shot off in one of the battle’s artillery volleys. Among the allied dead was Prince Barbanzon of the Spanish army, Baron d’Offener, a Lieutenant-General of the Hanoverian Corps, Major-General Bouche, also of Hanover, and a number of seasoned colonels, lieutenant-colonels and majors. Illness also claimed some of the army’s senior staff. Lieutenant-General ‘s-Gravenmoer, the army’s Quartermaster-General,

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78 Interestingly, William often chose Vaudemont, an officer in Spanish service, to command his own Anglo-Dutch forces in Flanders. Vaudemont enjoyed independent commands in 1693, 1695, 1696 and 1697. For details, see d’Auvergne, The History of the Last Campagne in the Spanish Netherlands, Anno Dom. 1693, 89-83;

79 Compare Allied order-of-battle in 1693 with those of 1695 and 1696. See especially Edward d’Auvergne, Last Campaign in the Spanish Netherlands for those years.

80 D’Auvergne, The History of the Last Campagne in the Spanish Netherlands, Anno Dom. 1693, 89-93;
was captured at Neerwinden only to die of illness after his return from captivity in late 1693. Others, like Major-General Nassau-Zuylenstein, survived French captivity but suffered from its effects. In 1694, he left behind his post as Adjutant-General because his constitution was no longer strong enough for campaigning. After 1694, Zuylenstein was no longer present with the Confederate Army, likely due to his deteriorating health.\footnote{Zuylenstein died in 1708 in Utrecht. For details of his life, see Hora-Siccama, Aantekeningen en Verbeteringen, 789-790.}

The death of some of William’s most important generals led to a reorganization of the Confederate Army’s chain-of-command. To replace the loss of Waldeck, William nominated Johan Adolf, Duke of Holstein Plön First Field-Marshal over the heads of Walrad von Nassau-Saarbrücken and Hendrik-Casimir. Both Nassau-Saarbrücken and Hendrik-Casimir were outraged that they had been passed over and showed their ire by leaving the army. Count Solms, likewise was replaced by the Duke of Württemberg who now became General of Dutch Infantry. Solms had been the focus of controversy, due in part to his apparent mishandling of English troops at the battle of Steenkolk. Solms’ death at Neerwinden left command of the English corps in Flanders open and suggested that he might be replaced by an Englishman. Instead, William chose to streamline the army’s organization. Rather than give command of the English corps to Thomas Tollmache or another Englishman — a move that might cause political problems for him in Parliament — William chose to leave the post vacant. Sir Henry Bellasise — Major-General of Foot — was promoted to Lieutenant-General and command of English infantry while Lieutenant-General Hendrik van Nassau-Ouwerkerk commanded the corps’ mounted troops. Without a commanding officer of the corps, the respective commanders of infantry and cavalry would report to the Dutch generals of the same arms, thus streamlining the Confederate Army’s chain-of-command. In addition to these changes, ‘s-Gravenmoer was succeeded by the very able van Dopff. William was able to integrate the English corps into the larger Dutch structure. Although the Spanish (and Brandenburg) corps fell outside of the Anglo-Dutch structure, the fact that Vaudemont commanded the allied right where the
Spanish were positioned in the order-of-battle suggests that William would have enjoyed considerable control all of the army’s forces, both Spanish and Anglo-Dutch.\(^{82}\)

**Forging a Coalition Army:**

**the Confederate Army on Campaign**

European field armies during the early modern period shared many similar characteristics. During the later 17th century, armies were organized in what contemporaries referred to as the *order-of-battle*. The order-of-battle was a guide to the army’s organization; it showed where the regiments, battalions, and squadrons were located within the army’s battle-line. The order-of-battle was how the army would be deployed on the day of battle, but it was also the way in which the army bivouacked, and it also showed the chain-of-command. Orders-of-battle were often published in newspapers of the day, though the actual order-of-battle of a given army on campaign changed during the course of a campaign season. Most *authentic* orders-of-battle were hand drawn. Every one differed with each camp the army occupied, and the forces that joined or left the army. And most probably were circulated only amongst the army’s general officers and staff.\(^{83}\)

Usually comprising several battle-lines or bodies, the army’s order-of-battle was influenced by size of the army, terrain it occupied, circumstances of the campaign, and strategy of the commander. Most field armies were arrayed in three bodies, the first line sometimes being referred to as the *Vanguard*, the second the *Center* or *Main-body*, and the third the *Rear* or *Corps de Réserve*.\(^{84}\) In most orders-of-battle, cavalry was deployed on the flanks with each brigade following the traditional protocols of honor and seniority. Likewise, each brigade was deployed in the battle line following these same criteria, the formations of the most senior contingent occupying the right of the battle line and the most junior the left, and so on toward the center of the line. A third line, usually called the reserve, was arrayed in the rear following the same guidelines as the first two. In addition to the lines of the order-of-battle, the army’s dragoons and its

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\(^{82}\) Figure 7.3 shows the nationalities of the chief commanders of the Confederate Army based on the order-of-battle in Figure 7.2. I have also consulted, d’Auvergne, *The History of the Campagne in the Spanish Netherlands...1694*, 35-43.

\(^{83}\) The orders found among the papers of Willem van Wassenaer-Duvenvoirde ARA RAZH, *Familie van Wassenaer* (3.20.63), 4 (“Willem van Wassenaer-Duvenvoirde”)

\(^{84}\) Anon., *The Accomplished Officer; A Treatise Containing The Most Essential and Necessary Accomplishments of An Officer* (London, 1708), 204-205; Bland, *A Treatise of Military Discipline.*

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artillery were deployed in support of the battle line. Dragoons were the most versatile soldiers in any early modern army. Capable of fighting both on horseback or on foot, dragoons were usually the army’s vanguard while on the march and the flank guard for the army in camp. Depending upon the situation, the army’s dragoons could be deployed to defend the flanks, kept in the rear as a reserve, or posted on advantageous ground in front of the army to provide it an early warning system. On the day of battle, the army’s dragoons usually occupied the flanks. Meanwhile, the artillery was posted to the front of the army on the day of battle, and was generally deployed to make best use of its firepower. While in camp, however, the artillery train was generally set up in the rear of the army with the reserve.

In addition to illustrating how the army camped and lined-up for battle, it showed its chain of command, and suggested which contingents were most important both within the coalition and within the field army. In outlining the chain-of-command, it showed the officers that occupied the most important links of that chain. Their nationality or paymaster gives clues into the state or states that exercised the most influence amongst the coalition partners. Early in the war, no single army dominated the war in the Low Countries. Although the Dutch provided more troops than the other coalition partners in the theater, the Spanish, and Brandenburg armies contributed large contingents. Consequently, during the war’s first two campaign seasons, three separate field armies were organized in the theater. In Flanders, a Spanish army under the command of the Marquis de Gastañaga defended the region while a larger Dutch Army — supported by Marlborough’s British Corps — commanded by the Prince von Waldeck operated in Brabant. Later in the war after William had taken personal command of the allied forces in the Spanish Netherlands and England superceded Spain as the second most important contributor to the Confederate Army, the command of the various armies in the theater fell to William and his appointees. Although there continued to be two, and sometimes three, separate field armies in the theater of operations, the vast majority of those forces fell under the Stadholder-King’s direct military control since the overwhelming majority of those forces were in Dutch or English pay. Not surprisingly, the command of those forces devolved to those either closely associated with William or of his personal choosing. By the end of the war, the Confederate Army’s chain-of-command was more integrated.

than it had been early in the war. Although it would be an exaggeration to say that the army had a “modern” integrated command structure, it was more integrated than most early modern coalition forces insofar as William and the Dutch Army was at the center of the allied army’s organizational and administrative structure.

The Army’s Building Blocks: The Regiment and the Organization of the Confederate Army

The regiment was the smallest independent administrative and tactical organization in early modern European armies, and the Confederate Army was no exception to this. It was the only administrative organization common to all combat arms: infantry, cavalry, and dragoons. Regiments were composed of companies, the number of which usually depended upon the regiment, its nationality, and combat arm. Regiments were commanded by colonels, though if the colonel had other responsibilities (i.e. if he were a general or brigadier) it might be commanded by a “colonel-commandant”, usually the regiment’s lieutenant-colonel or major. Regiments differed in size depending upon the army and branch of service. For example, most Dutch infantry regiments mustered twelve 71-man strong companies, while cavalry regiments numbered between six and nine 76-man companies. In the Prussian Army however, infantry regiments boasted ten 125-man companies, while cavalry regiments numbered between six and nine companies of 88 troopers each.

The inconsistent size of regiments, both between military organizations and by combat arm, demanded the creation of smaller, more uniform, tactical units. During the course of the 17th century, the battalion became the preferred tactical formation for the infantry. Battalions numbered between 500 and 800 officers and men. Its development was largely in response to the disconnect between the organization of its administrative sub-unit — the company — and the arms infantrymen carried. During the 17th century, foot-soldiers carried two different types of weapons, the pike and the musket. The pike was the oldest infantry weapon, and still the most prestigious.

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86 Although artillery was considered one of the most important combat arms on the battlefield, it was not organized along the same lines as the infantry, cavalry, and dragoons. For details, see page [000] below.

87 Dutch infantry companies increased from 55 to 71 men. For details, see ARA St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8100 (SvO, 1687), 8105 (SvO, 1690), and 8106 (Extr. SvO, 1690).

88 Curt Jany, Prussian Army, I. 335-336.
Carried by up to one-third of all infantrymen, the pike provided infantry formations with protection against cavalry attack until the bayonet-tipped musket superceded it at the end of the century, a process well underway during the Nine Years’ War. Although between one-third and one-quarter of a battalion’s infantry were armed with the pike during this period, most foot soldiers were equipped with firearms of various types. Though the vintage matchlock could still be found in most armies, the more effective flintlock was well on the way to replacing it.\textsuperscript{89}

The Nine Years’ War coincided with what some historians might argue was one of the most important developments in warfare, the “Military Revolution.” Part of this revolution in warfare was the increase of infantry firepower that resulted from the change in the infantryman’s personal arms.\textsuperscript{90} During the last quarter of the seventeenth century, the foot-soldier’s standard firearm, the matchlock musket, was slowly being replaced by the safer and more reliable flintlock. At the same time, the centuries old pike was finally being retired as various forms of the bayonet — either stuck into the weapon’s barrel or later fastened to it so that it might still be fired — were introduced to keep enemy cavalry at bay. Since much of this transformation took place during the Nine Years’ War, it is particularly useful to examine how it affected William’s Anglo-Dutch and allied forces. Indeed, the confederate army in the Spanish Netherlands provides an excellent case study in how this important transition took place within various militaries in Europe.

\textit{New technology and Allied Infantry Organization}

When the Nine Years’ War erupted in the fall of 1688, the Dutch army, like most of Europe’s armies in the late 17\textsuperscript{th} century, was still armed primarily with matchlock muskets and pikes. Although the more effective flintlock musket had become commonplace by the late 17\textsuperscript{th} century, it was still not deployed in the numbers necessary to take advantage of the increased rate of fire such weapons could produce. As in other armies, the Dutch infantry at the outbreak of the Nine Years’ War bore a closer resemblance to the massive pike and matchlock armed tercios of the Thirty Years’

\textsuperscript{89} The list of the Dutch army after the battle of Fleurus suggests that some formations were still armed with older matchlocks. For details see ARA St. Gen. (1.01.06), 12579 (\textit{De Loketkast en de Secretekas}), 122 (“Slag bij Fleury”).

\textsuperscript{90} See especially Parker, \textit{The Military Revolution}, 18-24.
War than to the linear flintlock and bayonet armed regiments of the eighteenth century. Although Dutch battalions had become more linear, being arranged in three ranks rather than the six or more of its Eighty Years’ War predecessors, as late as 1689 up to one-third of the battalion’s manpower was still equipped with the out-dated pike. In fact, pikes would continue to play an important role in the battalion’s organization well into the War of the Spanish Succession. However, by the time the Nine Years’ War had ended in 1697, both allied and French armies had begun the process of rearmament so often associated with the “Military Revolution” in early modern Europe. By that time, the bulk of the Dutch army’s infantry had been re-equipped with flintlock muskets of one sort or another, while the replacement of the ancient pike by the bayonet was well underway if not complete.

The Snaphaan\(^{91}\) or flintlock musket made its debut in the second half of the seventeenth century.\(^{92}\) The first versions of the weapon were introduced in special fusilier regiments — regiments tasked with defending the artillery train — grenadier companies, and marines. The Dutch army, like most military establishments in Europe, began to introduce the new weapon in the 1670s. In 1673, the army’s three grenadier companies were equipped with flintlocks and plug bayonets. The next year, Gelderland raised the first regiment of fusiliers\(^{93}\) and shortly thereafter, the Stadhouder’s Regiment of (Blue) Guards was completely re-equipped with the new weapon.\(^{94}\) Although in other armies, separate flintlock-armed grenadier companies were added to existing infantry regiments, in the Dutch army every captain was tasked with providing a number of flintlock-armed grenadiers as part of his company’s establishment. On 22 December 1674, William III ordered that each captain equip 20 men per company as

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\(^{91}\) The Snaphaan — Dutch for “pecking hen” — was a particular type of trigger mechanism found on early flintlock muskets. Its name was derived from the lock’s action.

\(^{92}\) Although units of flintlock-armed fusiliers had appeared in the French army as early as 1640, the large-scale introduction of the flintlock in French service only began in 1670. For details see John A. Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, 461-462.

\(^{93}\) According to Ten Raa, Regiment Wijnbergen was the first regiment to be completely equipped with flintlock muskets. Raised in 1674, Regiment Wijnbergen was on the establishment of Gelderland and was initially designated “The Regiment of Fusiliers or Snaphanen,” though it seems it was no longer referred to by this title during the Nine Years’ War. For details see Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VI., 226, 229.

\(^{94}\) Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VI., 218; and VII., 286. According to Ten Raa, the Guards were armed with snaphaan muskets with a caliber of 12 balls to the pound.
grenadiers, each armed with “Snaphanen-Sloten” or snaphaan-lock muskets. To re-equip so many men per company was probably impossible; between 1675 and 1678, Ten Raa notes that this number had already decreased to ten men per company instead of the original 20 ordered in 1674. Following the conclusion of peace in 1678, the number of flintlock-armed grenadiers was further reduced to six per company.\footnote{Ten Raa, \textit{Het Staatsche Leger}, VI, 217-218; and VII., 286-287.}

The Dutch were among the first European armies to adopt the new weapon, albeit in limited numbers. By comparison, the French army introduced its first flintlock armed infantry in 1670 when Louis XIV granted permission to equip four men per company with flintlock 	extit{fusils}. The next year, Marshal Vauban ordered the establishment of \textit{le Régiment de Fusiliers}, an infantry battalion attached to the artillery train armed exclusively with fusils and bayonets, significantly safer than matchlocks when operating near open powder kegs. When Louis XIV’s forces marched into the Palatinate in September 1688, it is likely that his infantry, like its Dutch counterparts, were still primarily armed with the older matchlocks and pikes.\footnote{John A. Lynn, \textit{Giant of the Grand Siècle}, 461-463.} Other armies were equally slow in adopting the new weapon, however. The English army, for example, began adding “Granadeer” companies to the “eight oldest regiments of Foot” only in 1678, eight years after the French and four after the Dutch. As in other armies, these units were equipped with flintlocks, plug-bayonets, and hand-grenades instead of matchlock muskets and pikes.\footnote{War Office Records, Royal Warrant — Granadeers (13 April 1678 O.S.), as cited in Clifford Walton, \textit{History of the British Standing Army, 1660-1700} (London: Harrison and Sons, 1894), 788.} But it was only in the 1680s that British forces began to re-equip whole infantry regiments with the new weapon. In 1680, \textit{Rew’s Fusiliers} — later known as the \textit{North British Fusiliers} — were raised on the Scottish establishment of Britain’s armed forces. Like their Dutch and French counterparts, they were armed with flintlocks and plug-bayonets and were intended to defend the army’s artillery train. Three years later, the \textit{First Regiment of Foot Guards} and the \textit{Coldstream Guards} exchanged their matchlock muskets for flintlocks, though they kept their pikes.\footnote{Walton, \textit{History of the British Standing Army}, 44; and War Office Records, Royal Warrant—Armament, 28 June 1683, and War Office Records—Armament, 26 January 1683-4 O.S. as cited in Daniel MacKinnon, \textit{Origins and Services of the Coldstream Guards}, (London: 1833), I: 167, 167n-168n.} The
bulk of Britain’s armed forces, however, retained their matchlocks and pikes well after 1688.\footnote{For example, of the 444 musketeers in the \textit{Holland Regiment of Foot} (Third Regiment of Foot or “Buffs”), 144 were armed with “Snaphance Musquets” while the rest were equipped with matchlocks. Based on the number of companies in this regiment (13) and the total number of men under arms (689), it would appear that either one or two companies, in addition to the grenadiers, were armed with the weapon or that they were equally distributed among the remaining 12 companies. For details, see \textit{H. R. Knight, Historical Records of the Buffs, East Kent Regiment, 3rd Foot, Formerly Designated the Holland Regiment and Prince George of Denmark’s Regiment, Vol.I} (London, 1905), 244; see also \textit{His Majesties’ Orders For Regulation of the Musters} (London, 1686-87), 3.}

As is so often the case with advances in military technology, the outbreak of war served as a catalyst for change as commanders experimented with various combinations of musket, pike, and bayonet. During the first years of the war allied formations, for the most part, continued to employ the pike until an adequate bayonet could be developed and produced in sufficient numbers. In Dutch military circles in particular, the pike was still seen as an essential weapon for defense against cavalry. In printed muster rolls from the period, Dutch infantry companies were to be comprised of 71 men, of which no less than 24 were to be pikemen, 33 musketeers, and the rest officers, NCOs, and drummer-boys.\footnote{Examples of muster rolls from the Zeeuws Archief confirm this.} It is likely however, that actual practice placed more emphasis on firepower, and thus differed from what was mandated on printed muster-roll sheets. One example, Captain Alexander Lodewyck de Mauregnault’s company of \textit{Noyelle’s Regiment}, illustrates the how administrative practice differed from military reality. According to a printed muster-roll dated 11 February 1689, de Mauregnault’s company — like every company in \textit{Noyelle’s Regiment} — mustered 33 musketeers, 24 pikemen, 11 officers, and 3 drummer-boys. A \textit{hand-written} muster-roll taken on 18 February of the same year however, notes that de Mauregnault’s company mustered 37 musketeers, 17 pikemen, 7 officers, and 3 drummers, for a total strength of 64 officers and men instead of the 71 normally called for.\footnote{Rijksarchief in Zeeland, Archief van Rekenkamer C (Inv. #508), #C 1692—1e grossa, 1e somma I, 1689: “Regiment van Noyelle, Compagnie van den Captiteyn Alexander Lodewyck de Mauregnault.”} Other examples from Zeeuwse companies and regiments during the Nine Years’ War show that real, hand-written, muster-rolls always differed from their printed “official” counterparts, not only in the strength of the company in question but in its numbers of musketeers and
pikemen as well. This is interesting because it shows the difference between paper and “real” establishments. But, it is particularly pertinent here because it shows the real breakdown of weapons within a given company, and the recognition that the musket’s firepower was more valued than whatever defensive capability the pike might have offered.

Another document found in the archive of the States-General confirms this ratio of musketeers to pikemen. In the wake of Waldeck’s defeat at the battle of Fleurus, Heinsius, and deputies Dijkveld and Schurman from the States-General, prepared a report regarding the state of the army and what was needed to bring it back up to strength.102 Entitled “Verbael gehouden by de heeren Heinsius, van Dyckvelt, ende Schurman Haer Ho: Mo: Gedeput. naar het Leger onder den Heere Prince van Waldeck kort naer de bataille van Fleury ter vergaderinge overgelevert den 15 July 1690,”* the report describes what happened to Waldeck’s forces leading up to and during the battle. Although one would think that such reports were commonplace — and in fact they probably were — very few have survived to the present day. What makes it a particularly interesting and unique document, however, is that it provides the strengths of the army’s battalions before and after the battle, as well as showing how many muskets and pikes were still present with the army’s battalions and companies following the battle. Although several were so decimated that it is impossible to provide and accurate estimate of the ratio of muskets to pikes, nine of the regiments listed mustered more than 50% of their original number.

By 1690, many countries had already completed replacing their old matchlocks with flintlocks; some German states had even begun equipping their infantry exclusively with firearms, exchanging their antiquated pole arms for flintlocks tipped with rudimentary bayonets, though this was still exceptional. In most infantry formations where the pike was still carried, the pikemen took up position in the center of the formation while the musketeers positioned themselves on the flanks. Because

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102 ARA, St.Gen. (1.01.06), De Loketkast en de Secrete Kast van de Staten-Generaal, 12579.122 (Verbael gehouden by de heeren Heinsius, van Dyckvelt, ende Schurman Haer Ho: Mo: Gedeput. naar het Leger onder den Heere Prince van Waldeck kort naer de bataille van Fleury, ter vergaderinge overgelevert den 15 July 1690).

* Interview held by Heinsius, Dijkvelt, and Schurman, their High Mightiness’ Deputy, at the army under the Prince van Waldeck shortly after the battle of Fleury presented at the 15 July 1695 meeting.
each company contained both pikes and muskets, and because these arms were most effective when grouped together, the company structure — one that mirrored the battalion’s order-of-battle only in miniature — became increasingly irrelevant as a tactical unit. On the day of battle, each of the company’s elements were separated from each other and then deployed into one of the three divisions in the battalion’s battle line. The two divisions of musketeers on the wings gave the battalion its firepower, and came to make up more and more of its manpower as the number of pikemen in the center declined. Because each company’s musketeers moved to its assigned division in the flanks, while its pikemen moved to the division of pike in the center of the battalion, the company organization was a tactical irrelevancy on the day of battle. It also meant that the number of companies that comprised a battalion was unimportant since the division was the principal tactical sub-unit of the battalion. Consequently, Prussian battalions, for example, could number five companies and Dutch battalions twelve, but both would be organized in exactly the same way for combat. Both numbered roughly 600 men, both had pikes arrayed in the center and musketeers in the flanks of their formations, and both likely were arrayed in three ranks. As we shall see later in this chapter, the ad-hoc nature of the battalion’s organization helped ease the dissemination of military practices between the various contingents that made up the Confederate Army.

Battalions often comprised entire infantry regiments and for that reason, became virtually synonymous with them in many military organizations. In the Dutch Republic, in most instances the battalion was the regiment, and vice versa. The same was true of British infantry regiments, which were also generally one-battalion formations. The main exception to this were Guards or other elite infantry regiments, which usually could boast of two or even three battalions per regiment. In other

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103 It would only be after the Seven Years’ War when companies would become tactically relevant again, largely the result of the standardization of an infantry company’s weaponry and changes in a battalion’s organization. For infantry organization in the eighteenth century, see Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1988 ed.); passim (especially 110-115, 207-214); and Brent Nosworthy, The Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics 1689-1763 (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1990), passim.

104 The Dutch “Blue Guards” comprised one three-battalion regiment plus one Life Company and one company of Grenadiers. Altogether, the Stadholder’s Guards numbered 2,622 men on paper. In the British army, there were three guards regiments. The First Regiment of Foot Guards (later to become the Grenadier Guards), the Second or Coldstream Guards, and the Third or Scots Regiment of Guards. The total paper strength of the British guards corps was
military organizations, the regiment regularly comprised two or three battalions. This was the case in most German infantry regiments. Such formations tended to have the same number of companies as their British or Dutch counterparts but their companies were often twice the size, as the Prussian example above illustrates. Consequently, the number of battalions an army mustered was a more precise gauge of its infantry strength than the number of regiments. Contemporaries generally estimated an infantry battalion’s strength to be 600 men at the start of a campaign and 500 at its conclusion to account for wastage, and these figures are pretty close to the average strength of Allied battalions in the Confederate Army.105

*The Tactical Organization of Cavalry*

Mounted troops also utilized a tactical unit that had no real administrative function. The *squadron*, like the battalion, was the smallest tactical formation in cavalry and dragoon regiments. Squadrons usually mustered between 120 and 150 troopers while on campaign and like the battalion, were the standard measure of an army’s mounted forces. Squadrons usually comprised between two and three companies, depending upon the strength of a company, and a cavalry regiment two to three squadrons, though it was not uncommon for one strong company to be the same as a squadron, and likewise, a very strong regiment might possess four squadrons. Unlike infantry companies that only rarely operated independently of its parent battalion, cavalry companies were often deployed apart from their regiment, particularly as part of a garrison to give it some mounted capability. And also unlike the infantry battalion which was developed largely in response to technological changes to the foot soldier’s weaponry, the cavalry squadron seems not to have arisen out of any change in the mounted soldier’s arms. Rather, the squadron seems to have been a unit born on the battlefield out of the necessity to create an ad hoc tactical unit that would transcend national organization practices. A Spanish squadron was the same size as an English squadron or Prussian squadron, though each of them might be comprised of a different

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4,706 officers and men. Most of the guards regiments were one-battalion formations though the First Regiment of guards mustered two. For details of these units strengths, see ARA St. Gen. (1.01.05), 8101 (SvO, 1688); and PRO SP 8/5, ff. 25.

105 These averages are based on Knoop’s average, which conforms to averages derived from actual army musters from 1692 and 1694. For a discussion of these averages, see page [000] in Chapter 5.
number of companies. Indeed, by the end of the war, a Spanish cavalry squadron might comprise more than one horse regiment due to the weakness of their mounted formations at that stage of the war. Squadrons also usually were posted with other squadrons from the same regiment, a practice that was not as common among infantry battalions.

**Artillery Organization**

Unlike infantry and cavalry that were organized into administrative regiments and tactical battalions or squadrons, the artillery was always organized in an ad-hoc formation on campaign referred to as “the train.” Although technically there was a regiment of artillery in most armies, the formation never served as such on campaign, the gunners being spread among a given state’s military expeditions. For example, in 1692 England had two separate artillery trains: one for Flanders, and one for descent on the French coast. Each included its own staff, artillery personnel, gunners, and equipment, and each fell under the command of the army to which it was attached. The Dutch Republic’s artillery was organized along lines similar lines. Like England’s artillery, the Dutch Republic’s train was organized separately from the army’s infantry, cavalry, and dragoons. Whereas in the Dutch army, these formations were divided among the provinces in terms of pay and administration, the artillery came under the direct control of the Raad van State and in that way, resembled England’s Board of Ordnance. Artillery was commanded by the Master-General of Artillery, but the Raad van State’s Field-Deputy was responsible for administrative matters.

On campaign artillery trains were commanded by colonels or lieutenant-colonels. For much of the war, Dutch and English personnel were intermixed creating a truly Anglo-Dutch artillery train. During the Nine Years’ War, the Dutch train was commanded by Colonel Otto Christoffel Verschuer. Although in English pay, Verschuer commanded the train from 1692 onward. Assisting him was Lieutenant-Colonel Adriaan van der Mijl, though for the war’s early years van der Mijl assumed command of the train in the absence of Charles de Goullon who was in England with Dutch forces there. The Controller-General of the States artillery was inventor and innovator Willem Meesters. Meesters served in the same capacity in the English Board of Ordnance which suggests William hoped to attain a certain degree of uniformity

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106 HMC *House of Lords, 1692-93*, 197-198.
between the Dutch and English artillery trains. Indeed, when England sent its first train to the Low Countries in 1692, it was commanded by a Dutch artillerist, Johan Wynand Goor. He was assisted in his duties by the same Meesters as the trains Comptroller, Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob Richards, and Major Johan Symon Schlundt. The fact that the leading personnel were Dutchmen (Goor and Meesters) suggests that William hoped to create uniformity between Dutch and English artillery arms. But it also suggests a certain pragmatism on William’s part. With Goor and Meesters heading up the English train and with their knowledge of Dutch administration, they could more easily draw supplies from Dutch arsenals when necessary. Indeed, Colonel Richards diary finds Goor in Delft arranging for supplies, a good indication of William’s rationale for appointing Goor commander of the English train.\footnote{BL Stowe MSS., 444, “Diary of Lieutenant Colonel Richards,” ff. [000]; HMC House of Lords, 1692-93, 189-191; and Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, VII., 381-338.}

In terms of weapons, the Dutch provided the lion’s share of the army’s guns. For the first three years of the war, the Dutch supplied the army with its field train as well as its siege train. The Dutch train comprised six long 12 pounders, thirty long 6 pounders, thirty-eight 3 pound regimental pieces, and six howitzers.\footnote{ARA CvdH (1.10.42), 120 (Stukken betreffende de artillerey trein), unfoliated MSS. “Lyste vande Velt Artillerie...voor den Jare 1695...”} When England sent its first field train to Flanders in 1692, it comprised eight 8 pounders, ten, 6 pounders, and twenty 3 pound regimental pieces. In 1694, the English field train was expanded to virtually mirror the Dutch train. According to a list among Colonel Richards papers, the English train comprised ten 8 pounders, thirty-six 6 pounders, twenty 3 pounders, and four howitzers.\footnote{BL Stowe MSS., 444, ff. 10-12, 16-22.} All of the army’s heavy guns were supplied by the Dutch army. In 1690, the paper establishment of the Dutch siege train called for fifty 24 pounders, fourteen long 12 pounders, six 24 pounder kamerstukken (breach-loaders), six 12 pounder kamerstukken, six 75 pound stone mortars, six 50 pound stone mortars, and twelve howitzers.\footnote{ARA CvdH (1.10.42), 120 (“Stukken betreffende de artillerey trein”), unfoliated MSS., “Lyste van’t geen Inden Jare 1690 tot de Groote Artillerye te velde is geordonneert...”} The bulk of the Dutch heavy artillery was housed in Maastricht. In time of need, more heavy weapons could be obtained from Dutch central arsenals in Delft, Dordrecht and Schiedam. During the siege of Namur, the Dutch
Republic managed to assemble more 312 guns, howitzers, and mortars, a good indication of the army ability to assemble tremendous firepower when needed.\footnote{ARA CvdH (1.10.42), 138 (“Mémoires et dispositions touchant le Siége de Namur”).}

**The Organization of the Confederate Army and Institutional Personality:**

**The Brigade and the Allied Order-of-Battle**

Regiments — and their component battalions and squadrons — were the largest permanent military units in early modern European armies. On the battlefield and on campaign, however, infantry battalions and cavalry squadrons were organized into brigades. Brigades were ad-hoc formations comprised of several battalions or squadrons. Brigades seem to have first been introduced to European armies during the Nine Years’ War, and not unlike what the division and corps would do seventy-five years later, helped make the expanded field armies more manageable. Numbering anywhere from two to ten infantry battalions, or four to sixteen squadrons of horse, the brigade was the army’s fundamental building block and the only real “national” organizational entity larger than the regiment in the Confederate Army.\footnote{According to Humphrey Bland, a brigade of foot was to be four battalions and a brigade of horse six squadrons. For details see Humphrey Bland, *A Treatise of Military Discipline*, 251.} Like the battalion and squadron organizations, the brigade was strictly an ad hoc unit, though there were prescribed rules commanders usually followed in forming them. Indeed, an examination of Confederate Army orders-of-battle indicates that while many of the same officers served as brigadiers, the regiments that comprised them changed on an annual basis with a few minor exceptions.\footnote{Based on an examination of allied orders-of-battle derived from d’Auvergne’s and other histories of the campaigns in the Low Countries, brigades seem to have been completely ad-hoc organizations. After gleaning through the composition of several allied brigades, it seems that they were almost never comprised of the same formations from campaign to campaign. For details, see Anon., *A Journal of the Late Motions and Actions of the Confederate Forces Against the French in the United Provinces and the Spanish Netherlands* (London, 1690), 25-32; W. Sawle, *An Impartial Relation of All the Transactions Between the Army of the Confederates and That of the French King In their Last Summers Campaign in Flanders With a more particular Respect to the Battle of Fleury* (London, 1691), passim; d’Auvergne, *The History of the Campagne in Flanders For the Year 1691* (London, 1735), 43-44, 88-92; d’Auvergne, *A Relation of the Most Remarkable Transactions Of the Last Campagne in the Confederate Army, Under the Command of His Majesty of Great Britain; and After Of the Elector of Bavaria in the Spanish Netherlands, Anno Dom. 1692* (London, 1693), passim; d’Auvergne, *The History of the Last Campagne in the Spanish Netherlands, Anno Dom. 1693* (London, 1693), 18-24; d’Auvergne, *The History of the Campagne in the Spanish Netherlands, Anno Dom. 1694 with a journal of the Siege of Huy* (London, 1694), 35-43; d’Auvergne, *The History of the Campagne in Flanders, For the Year, 1695. With An Account of the Siege of Namur* (London, 1696), 11-18, 183-185; d’Auvergne, *The History of the Campagne in Flanders For the Year 1696* (London, 1696), 42-44, 55-56.} Nevertheless, the brigade was the smallest
maneuver element on the battlefield and the smallest part of the army entrusted with independent tasks. Although ad hoc formations, brigades had rudimentary staffs which were associated with the brigadier and his entourage. Brigadiers were issued separate orders for marching both with the army and separately.\textsuperscript{114} They also had an important role in the army’s logistics administration; the army’s bread and forage purveyors delivered their supplies to the head of the army’s brigades and the brigadier was responsible for distributing that food to their men and horses.\textsuperscript{115}

In terms of organization, the brigade, like the army as a whole, was driven by principles of seniority and honor. In his \textit{A Treatise of Military Discipline}, Humphrey Bland notes that battalions or squadrons within the brigade were first divided into four divisions based on the seniority of the formations within the brigade. The most senior battalions (or squadrons) were placed in the first division, the next oldest in the second division, and so on until all of the formations in the brigade were assigned. Just as was the case with regiments deployed for review, brigades placed their eldest battalion or squadron on the right flank, which contemporaries considered the “post of honor.” After the senior battalion was deployed, the next most senior battalion took up its position on the opposite flank and so on towards the center of the brigade until all of the battalions or squadrons had taken up positions in the line of battle. Brigades were the largest formation with a national identity, and were generally comprised of regiments from the same country, though there were exceptions to this.\textsuperscript{116}

Although the command of the brigade is usually associated with the rank \textit{brigadier}, brigadiers were not universal to all armies. During most of the period under examination here, \textit{brigadier} was not a rank per se but rather an \textit{appointment}. In most instances, brigades were commanded by senior colonels, but sometimes major-generals or even lieutenant-generals commanded brigades, depending upon the size of the formation and the number of generals with the army. Thus, all of these commanders, regardless of rank, might be considered a “brigadier” because they commanded a

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{62-64; and d’Auvergne, \textit{The History of the Campagne in Flanders, For the Year 1697, Together with a Journal of the Siege of Ath and a Summary Account of the Negotiations of the General Peace at Ryswick} (London, 1698), 52-58.}

\footnote{114 \textit{SP 8/8} shows typical brigade-level orders.}

\footnote{115 See Olaf van Nimwegen, ‘\textit{De Subsistentie van het Leger}’ for a discussion of this.}

\footnote{116 Bland, \textit{A Treatise of Military Discipline}, 253; Childs, \textit{Nine Years’ War and the British Army}.}
\end{footnotesize}
brigade. As the war progressed and the army expanded, the rank brigadier became more than a mere appointment, but was instead gradually recognized as an official rank falling between major-general and colonel in the chain-of-command. The first of the allies in the Low Countries Theater use the rank brigadier was the British Army, and it was a common rank among its general officers even before the Glorious Revolution. In the Dutch Army, it remained an appointment until the latter years of the war when the rank was introduced into the mounted arm. It was only during the War of the Spanish Succession that “brigadier” became an official rank in the infantry. Among the German allies, most considered it an ad hoc appointment, and like the Dutch, they began to introduce it officially during the eighteenth century.

The brigade was the building block of the field army. Field armies were little more than collections of brigades, and like the brigade, it too was informed by early modern notions of honor and prestige. Most of the armies that fought for the alliance in the Low Countries during the Nine Years’ War were multi-national. In other words, the field armies comprised regiments and brigades from many nationalities falling under the command of one, or several, allied commanders. This complicated the issue of prestige and honor, particularly in determining which contingent would occupy the right of the army, the post of honor. Much of this was decided through practical considerations, i.e. which contingent could field enough troops to occupy the army’s right flank and so on. For most of the war, when all of the principal allies in the Low Countries were part of a given field army, the forces of Spain and those in their pay constituted the army’s right wing while William’s Dutch and English forces took up positions on the left. In armies where only William’s British and Dutch forces were present, the British were given the right while the forces of the States-General were positioned on the army’s left. Although the question of which state’s forces would occupy the left or right flank might seem trivial, it was of vital importance in maintaining the unity within the Confederate Army, and William no doubt used it as a means of cementing the various elements of the coalition together.

Towards an Institutional Doctrine:
Military Discipline and the Confederate Army

One of the indications that the Confederate Army achieved an institutional identity of sorts was the dissemination of uniform doctrines. With one commander leading the Confederate Army — particularly one with constitutional rights over its two largest
contingents — it should come as no surprise that the army came to adopt some of the same military practices. In A Treatise of Military Discipline, Humphrey Bland notes that the Adjutant-General was responsible for seeing to the army’s discipline. During the course of the Nine Years’ War, it appears that those lands that contributed troops to the Confederate Army were among the first to adopt Platoon-Fire. Platoon-Fire enabled infantry battalions to fire continuous volleys without endangering the ranks that had already fired.\(^{117}\) In addition to allowing continuous fire, the Platoon-Fire discipline required a different tactical organization that enabled all battalions to use it regardless of the number of companies that comprised them.

Platoon-Fire seems to have originated in the Dutch Republic during their first war with France. The first manual to describe the discipline seems to be Louis Paan’s, Den Korten Weg, Tot de Nederlandsche Militaire Exercitie published in 1681.\(^{118}\) Although the history of its development in Dutch service is obscure, the way in which it was disseminated among the Confederate Army’s members is better recorded. According to Kurt Jany, the Prussian army learned the discipline from the Dutch through the subsidy units that went into Dutch pay. He notes that platoon-fire’s dissemination into Prussian use can be traced to Waldeck’s army encamped on the Mookerheide in the autumn of 1688.\(^{119}\) Its adoption by English troops is better known. In his book Fit For Service, J.A. Houlding explores how English troops learned the discipline. In the case of the English corps in the Low Countries, it seems Marlborough first asked what discipline his troops should use. Writing to Blathwayt, he inquired

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\(^{119}\) Jany, Geschichte der Preußischen Armee, I., 336-337. Jany gives 11 October 1688 as the date when Brandenburg troops officially adopted the “Holländische Salve.”
I desire that you will know the King’s pleasure whether he will have the Regiments of Foot to learn the Duch [sic] exercise, or else to continue with the English for if he will I must have it translated into English.\textsuperscript{120} Although we do not know with certainty whether the “Dutch Exercise” was translated or not, there is ample evidence to prove that it was, or at least the English troops were learning it. Perhaps the very document that served as the English infantry’s guide is held in the British Library. Entitled “Rules of Order observed by the Body of his Majesties Infantry encountering with the Enemy on the Day of Battle,” the “Rules” describe how infantry should deploy into platoons to give fire. Although it is undated, the fact that it mentions pikes in the infantry’s organization strongly suggests that it was written during the Nine Years’ War. The fact that it was not printed suggest the way in which such information was disseminated within the Confederate Army.\textsuperscript{121}

Although the spread of Platoon fire alone does not prove that the army’s practices were uniform, it does suggest uniformity. Additional evidence supports the important role Dutch influence had on the Confederate Army’s military practices. In his \textit{Treatise of Military Discipline}, Bland notes that the English army practiced several different methods for forming square in the event of cavalry attack. One of them, called “Forming Square by Grand Divisions” was the maneuver taught to British forces in England. However, he notes, the best way to form square was called forming square in “The Dutch Manner.” The Dutch Manner is the simpler of the two. Bland notes that the mere name — the fact that it was Dutch — made it a superior discipline: “The manner of forming square, as describ’d is the Dutch way of performing it; the bare mention of which, will recommend it infinitely more than all I am capable of saying [about] it.”\textsuperscript{122} Although Bland’s endorsement alone is not evidence of tactical usage, the fact that so many of the British army’s practices carried the sobriquet “the Dutch way”

\textsuperscript{120} BL Add. MSS. 21,506, ff. 98.

\textsuperscript{121} BL Stowe MSS.,143, ff. 80-89 (“Rules of Order observed by the Body of his Majesties Infantry encountering with the Enemy on the Day of Battle.” For Platoon-Fire’s transmission through the British Army, see especially, J. A. Houlding, \textit{Fit For Service}, 174-178.

\textsuperscript{122} Bland, \textit{A Treatise of Military Discipline}, 100.
suggests a degree of uniformity within the Confederate Army, which in turn, suggests a certain institutional personality, one influenced by William III and the Dutch Army.  

**Conclusion**

Like all military organizations, the Confederate Army’s command structure evolved through a complex variety of intervening factors: the personality of its leader, William III, and of his subordinates; the organizational characters of the armies that contributed forces; the military tasks demanded of the Confederate Army; and even the character of the theater of war itself; all of these factors contributed to forging the coalition army that fought in the Low Countries during the Nine Years’ War. Arguably, the single most important influence on the army’s command structure, however, was William himself. All the alliance members realized that he was the only one who could command the coalition in the Low Countries effectively. His importance to the Grand Alliance was demonstrated by the reception he received upon his return to the Dutch Republic in January 1691. As Stadholder of Holland and King of England, William’s forces comprised the bulk of the Confederate Army. With between eighty and ninety percent of the Dutch Army present in the Spanish Netherlands or Liège, it is not surprising that it would have an influence on the rest of the coalition. William’s influence over the British Army, and his appointment of Dutch officers to high posts in that organization, and the expansion of the British contingent in the Low Countries in 1692, furthermore, gave William even more influence over the coalition’s forces in the theater. But there were other factors that contributed to William’s position atop the Confederate Army chain-of-command and the unmistakable Dutch influence that army would assume.

William and his generals integrated formations into the larger Dutch military organization where it was possible. When Marlborough’s corps arrived in the Low Countries in the spring of 1689, it was immediately integrated into the larger Dutch administrative/command organization. Although it was an English force, it was treated much like any other force within the Dutch administrative umbrella. Defective weapons were replaced with new Dutch ones drawn from local magazines. Marlborough’s troops were trained in Dutch military practices, and subject to musters

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123 Bland makes many references to Dutch practices or practices used while in the Confederate Army. For details, see Bland, *A Treatise of Military Discipline*, 206-227, and 238-255.
by Dutch muster-masters. They were even paid in Dutch — as opposed to English — coin, thanks to a funding arrangement whereby the contingent would be paid in Dutch and Flemish coins that had accumulated in England. Indeed, the contingent’s financial arrangements were supervised by William Schulyburgh, a Dutch paymaster who had accompanied William to England in 1688.\textsuperscript{124}

But what worked for the British Army would not work for the other contributors to the Confederate Army. For the Spanish, Brandenburgers, Bavarian, and other allied forces, William used his position as King of England to more closely integrate non Anglo-Dutch contingents into the larger Dutch-influenced Confederate Army. Through a combination of organizational tricks as well as the manipulation of his social position, William was able to exercise greater control over the allied coalition forces than any other commander before him. With time, the Confederate Army would be able to meet the French Army toe-to-toe. By the time his organizational practices were firmly established, the allies began to reap rewards from the more centralized structure, eventually even beating the more uniform French Army into the field. William’s command style and his organizational reforms played an important role in making the Confederate Army an effective fighting force.

\textsuperscript{124} Waddell, “The Administration of the English Army in Flanders,” 94-96.
INTRODUCTION
Logistics has always been one of the principal concerns of military captains during the early modern period. The famous comment frequently attributed to Frederick the Great, “an army marches on its stomach,” bore more than a kernel of truth in the early modern period. A brief survey of the principal works on the art of war in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries graphically demonstrates this point. In virtually every one, particularly those written by veterans of the Nine Years’ and Spanish Succession wars, hundreds of pages are taken up with the problems of military logistics. This should not be surprising. It was one of the most important factors determining military strategy in the early modern period. Soldiers and horses needed food to function; muskets and cannon required ammunition and powder. Without these basic needs met, commanders faced the prospects of seeing their armies weakened through sickness, desertion, and even mutiny, let alone being capable of facing the enemy. “Mars must be fed,” as John Lynn most poignantly states in his survey of military logistics through the ages, and during the early modern period Mars was a most rapacious god indeed.1 The staggering logistical requirements of early modern armies turned wars in the age of Louis XIV into financial slugging matches, the result of the dramatic increase in the size of early modern militaries without a like increase in the administrative organizations needed to supply them. Early modern states did possess administrative structures tasked supplying their respective military

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1 John A. Lynn, Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present (Boulder, CO: Greenhill Press, 1993), vii.
organizations, but these were little more than embryonic bodies hardly capable of fulfilling the administrative needs of the massive armies fielded by the end of the seventeenth century. With the exception of a soldier’s personal equipment, which was a regimental matter seen to by either the soldier’s captain or colonel, the logistical needs of an army at large were handled by a combination of military, governmental, and civilian officials and contractors.

During the Nine Years’ War, the allied army in the Spanish Netherlands was strongly influenced by Dutch logistical and administrative practices. Like the organization of the allied army, its logistical administration was, with a few minor exceptions, an expanded version of the Dutch one. Although every major contingent within the allied army had its own government and/or military officials tasked with arranging the supplies for its expeditionary force, they also used, with minor exceptions, the same group of civilian contractors to provide bread for its soldiers and fodder for its horses. Transport too was locally arranged; the Dutch, British, and Spanish contingents employed the same contractors to provide their armies with wagons for their equipment and supplies, while heavy equipment and raw materials were shipped to allied magazines in Dutch ships. Perhaps the only area where this uniformity began to break down was in the supply of the army’s weapons and ammunition, which no doubt reflected the importance of the early modern state’s monopoly over organized violence. Yet even here, all of the allies’ drew arms and ammunition from the Dutch Republic’s well-stocked arsenals at one time or another, while the Republic kept the allied army well supplied with the bulk of its heavy ordnance, powder, and shot. The administration of the allied army in the Spanish Netherlands most clearly demonstrates the important influence of William III and the Dutch Republic on the army of the Grand Alliance in the Spanish Netherlands. Through an examination of both the Dutch and allied administrative bodies responsible for the logistical support of William’s army, this chapter will illustrate the degree in which the Dutch Republic contributed to the logistical and administrative support of the allied army in the Spanish Netherlands.

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The Raad van State and the Army

In order to understand the degree in which the allied army in the Spanish Netherlands relied upon the Dutch logistics system, it is useful first to look at the government bodies that directed the administration of States’ army. The Raad van State or “Council of State” handled the day to day administration of the army. Originally intended as a governing council to supersede the States-General, the Raad van State’s principal tasks were limited to the meting out of justice, the management of the Generality lands, the financial administration of the Union, and the direction of the Republic’s armed forces. During the Nine Years’ War, the Raad van State was a rather modest government organ. Made up of fourteen members and perhaps as many as twenty secretaries, clerks, and administrators, the Raad van State was overshadowed in size and importance by the States-General, the principal governing body in the United Provinces. Unlike the States-General, which was a decision- and policy-making body, the Raad was essentially an advisory council. Its members concerned themselves principally with drafting petitions and sending advice to the States General, particularly with regards to the Union.

In spite of its small size, the Raad van State was, along with the States General, the most influential government body in terms of the foreign affairs in the Republic, particularly during the Nine Years’ War. While the States-General made and implemented policy, that policy was frequently discussed and decided upon in the Raad van State, or in committees with members of that body, before being accepted, usually without change, by the States-General. The Raad van State was composed of twelve representatives, with each province providing between one and three members, with the exception of Drenthe which was not represented. The seats were distributed thus: three from Holland, two from Zeeland, Friesland and Groningen, and one from Gelderland, Overijssel, and Utrecht. The tenure of the members of the Raad van State varied from province to province. Some members, like those from Zeeland or Holland’s Ridderschaap, were appointed for life; others had more limited terms of service or rotated regularly with other officials from their home province. In terms of resolutions decided by the Raad van State, each member was allowed one vote, thus the

distribution of seats more or less represented the financial importance of the province in question with regards to policy.

In addition to the representatives from the provinces, both of the Republic’s Stadhouders were considered members of the Raad. As the Republic’s military leaders, the Stadhouders had more than a passing interest in the administration of the army. Both the stadhouder of Friesland and Groningen and the stadhouder of the Union were allowed voting rights within the council. Their presence within the council as voting members underlined the Raad van State’s importance, both in terms of military affairs as well as foreign policy. As Captain-General of the Union and King of England, William III brought the Raad van State tremendous prestige and influence. Although during the Nine Years’ War William only infrequently sat in the meetings of the Raad van State, he was — with the exception of his first two years when he was directing affairs in England and Ireland — present there every autumn.  Hendrik Casimir II van Nassau-Dietz, the Stadhouder of Freisland and Groningen as well as a Field Marshal in the Dutch army, also sat in the Raad van State. Following his exit from military affairs in 1693 after the Duke of Holstein-Plön’s appointment as First Field Marshal of the States’ army, Hendrik Casimir no longer attended the meetings of the Raad van State. Consequently only for the first five years of the war were both Stadhouders active in the Raad van State.

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4 According to W. A. ridder van Rappard, William III attended the Raad van State following his becoming King of England every autumn from 1691 until 1699, two years after the peace was concluded ending the Nine Years’ War. This practice is confirmed by a letter written by Heinsius now held in the Public Record Office entitled “Memoire van Eenige Pointen, By Syne Majt.van Groot Bretagne Goedgevonden.” In the “Memoire,” Heinsius lists as his seventh point that “the staet van oorloogh should first be formulated, and to that end to discuss with Secretary van Slingelandt its contents and once instructed of everything, to go to Loo, to communicate it to His Majesty for his approval.” See W. A. van Rappard, “Welke generale pettien schreef Simon van Slingelandt?,” *Nedererlands Archiveenblad: Tijdschrift van de Vereniging van Archivarissen in Nederland* (Groningen: N.V. Erven B. van der Kamp, 1969): 36; N. Japikse, *Correspondentie van Willem III en Hans Willem Bentinck*, II, iii: 233-254.

5 The Friesian Stadhounder stopped attending the meetings of the Raad van State when he was passed over for the position of First Field-Marshal of the army in favor of Johan-Adolph, the Duke of Holstein-Plön following the death of the former First Field-Marshal, the Prince van Waldebeck. From 7 September 1693 when the appointment was announced until his death in 1696, Hendrik-Casimir retreated to Leeuwaarden no longer taking any part in either the meetings of the Raad van State or the direction of the army. For details see J.W. Van Sypesteyn, *Geschiedkundige Bijdragen. Derde aflevering. Eenige Gebeurtenissen Gedurende het Leven van Prins Hendrik Casimir II van Nassau* (1664-1696) (’s Gravenhage: De Gebroeders van Cleef, 1865), 21-23.
Two of the most important government officials in the Republic, the Thesaurier-Generaal and the Secretaris of the Raad van State, directed the council’s business. Their responsibilities within the Raad van State only partially explain their importance within the Republic’s administrative apparatus, however. The Thesaurier-Generaal or “Treasurer-General” was essentially the Republic’s minister of finance. Presiding over the meetings of the council, the Treasurer-General was responsible for drafting the financial petitions sent to the States-General for approval. The most important of these, the generale petitie and the staat van oorlog, were particularly important for the military affairs of the Republic in that they anticipated the expected costs of the army and its upkeep in the coming fiscal year. The Secretary on the other hand, was primarily responsible for keeping the minutes of the Raad van State’s meetings, though he also helped the Treasurer-General with the drafting of the staat van oorlog and generale petitie. Both men — but particularly the Secretary — were present at every meeting. The resolutions passed and the petitions drafted in the Raad van State bore both of their signatures.6 Professor van Deursen, an historian of the Raad van State, notes that when the States-General began printing its resolutions for distribution, three copies were sent to the Raad van State: one went to the Raad van State’s archive, one to the Treasurer-General, and one to the Secretary. Van Deursen explains why the States-General sent them personal copies of the resolutions thus: “apparently these two officials alone had to be as well informed as the Raad van State was as a whole.”7 This example demonstrates, perhaps better than any other could, the importance of these two officials within the Dutch Republic’s bureaucratic apparatus. Their intimate knowledge of all the inner-workings of the Raad van State and its business made them very powerful men indeed.

While the members of the Raad van State changed, the Treasurer-General and Secretary usually served very lengthy terms of office. Furthermore, the Treasurer-General and Secretary sat in the most important committees outside of the Raad van State, particularly foreign affairs, military affairs, and finance. Much of the policies

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7 A. TH. van Deursen, “De Raad van State onder de Republiek 1588-1795,” 56.
eventually adopted by the States-General were discussed in these special committees or *besoignes*. In this way, the Treasurer-General and Secretary exercised power and influence beyond the preserve of the Raad van State. It is for this reason that the Treasurer-General and Secretary of the Raad van State are considered, after the *Raadpensionaris* of Holland and the *Griffier* (clerk) of the States-General, among the four “ministers” of the Dutch Republic. Indeed if one could speak of a “Cabinet” government in the Dutch Republic, it would have been made up the men in these four offices.\(^8\)

The Raad van State also included a number of other officials, secretaries, and clerks tasked with the day to day administration of the college. The most important of these was the *Ontvanger-Generaal* or “Receiver-General” of the Union. During the Nine Years’ War, this post was held by Cornelis de Jonge van Ellemee. Unlike the Treasurer-General who was considered a policy advisor, de Jonge van Ellemee was a specialist. His principal duties revolved around the finances of the Union, especially the funds raised for and by the Generality for its expenses. These included ordinary and extraordinary consents from the provinces, the collection of taxes and duties within Generality lands, and the collection of contributions in times of war.\(^9\) The Receiver-General’s political influence was strictly limited by the position of the Treasurer-General within the council. This is probably just as well since he was much more of a technician than a politician. He was, furthermore in charge of the clerks and bureaucrats involved in the financial side of the council’s responsibilities thus leaving him little time for politics. According to Van Deursen, in 1669 there were seven *commiezen* or administrators of finance, five clerks of the Raad van State, and one clerk of finance. Thus, the bulk of the Raad van State’s employees were occupied with the financial side of its duties.\(^10\)

The Raad van State’s influence as government body in relation to the States-General was largely dependent on the personalities of its two chief officers. From 1690 onwards, Simon van Slingelandt served the as the Raad van State’s secretary while

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\(^8\) Van Deursen, “De Raad van State onder de Republiek,” 56-57;


\(^10\) Van Deursen, “De Raad van State onder de Republiek,” 60-61.
Coenraad Burgh, heer van Kortenhof was its Treasurer-General. With the Raadpensionaris of Holland Anthonie Heinsius, and the Griffier of the States-General François Fagel, Burgh, and especially Slingelandt, were the Dutch Republic’s chief ministers. During the Nine Years’ War, the Secretary overshadowed the Treasurer-General in political influence. Burgh has been described by one authority on the workings of the Raad van State as a “notorious weakling.” We know that during Burgh’s tenure, the Treasurer-General enjoyed no voting rights within the Raad. Jacob Hop, Burgh’s successor following the later’s death in 1699, colorfully describes the waning power of the Treasurer-General in a meeting of the Raad van Staat thus: “in the time of the last treasurer, Mr. Burch [sic.], the treasurer-generalship was trampled underfoot and sufficiently reformulated to but a mere name. Both the material and reason of that charge have been diverted by the life of the aforementioned Mr. Burch.”

When van Slingelandt began his tenure as Secretary in August 1690, Burgh was already 67 years old having served as the Raad van State’s Treasurer-General since 1666. Following his 70th birthday, Burgh was increasingly absent from the meetings of the Raad due to the onset of illness. Van Slingelandt, who would in the end would serve as the Raad’s secretary for some thirty-five years, was but a young man of twenty-six with limited administrative experience when he succeeded to his father’s post upon his death on 3 July 1690. That van Slingelandt had a dramatic influence on the Raad van State, even early on in his career, is now clear, since as early as 1693 it seems he had gradually begun taking over the responsibilities of the ailing Burgh. Indeed at the time of Burgh’s death in 1699, Slingelandt hoped he would be chosen as his successor since he essentially already had taken over his post, if not in name than in practice.

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11 Hora Sicama, Aanteekeninge en verbeteringen, 125

12 This is especially true if one compares Burgh to his successor, the influential and energetic Jacob Hop. Hop served the Raad van State during the War of the Spanish Succession and would, with van Slingelandt, become one of the Republic’s most important ministers. Van Deursen, “De Raad van State onder de Republiek 1588-1795,” 62.


But during the Nine Years’ War, Slingelandt was not yet the influential figure in Dutch foreign affairs that he was later to become. The fact that William III recommended Jacob Hop as the Raad van State’s new thesaurier-generaal perhaps says as much about the Raad van State’s influence as an instrument of policy during this period as it does the abilities of its two chief ministers. Slingelandt was young, inexperienced, and most importantly, owed his appointment to the Stadhouder-King.\footnote{According to van Ditzhuyzen, Simon’s father, Govert van Slingelandt, requested that William III recommend his son as his successor several months before his death in July 1690. For details see van Ditzhuyzen, “Simon van Slingelandt: Secretaris van de Raad van State,” 96.} With Burgh a sick and elderly man and Slingelandt a young client of William III, the Raad van State was much more William’s administrative tool during the Nine Years’ War than an independent policy-making body. What policies it did help implement were no doubt strongly influenced by the Stadhouder-King.

The Stadhouder-King’s influence over the Raad van State and military affairs extended beyond his role in appointing its Secretary. It also included the drafting of one of the most important financial documents in the Republic, the staat van oorlog or “state of war.” As was mentioned above, the Raad van State was responsible for drafting the staat van oorlog and the generale petitie. Written by the Treasurer-General and signed by the Secretary, the “general petition” and the staat van oorlog were estimates of the financial costs to be incurred by the Generality in the coming fiscal year.\footnote{H.L. Zwitzer, “De Militie van den Staat:” Het leger van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden (Amsterdam: Van Soeren and Co., 1991), 73.} The principal difference between the two lay in the purpose of the documents. The general petition was a request by the Raad van State for money from the provinces to pay for all of the costs associated with the Generality. In other words, the Raad sought the permission or “consent” from the provinces for the budget they had drafted and presented to the States-General. It was a not a detailed document; rather it was a broad-stroked one intended to give the provinces an idea as to what costs to expect in the coming year.

The staat van oorlog, on the other hand, was an itemized budget of the costs associated with the Republic’s defense. It too was an estimate since it projected the expected costs of all the items it listed. Yet, it differed from the general petition in that it was a highly detailed document. On it was listed everything required for the defense...
of the Republic down to the pay of individual captains and their companies. The staat van oorlog listed only those costs associated with the army. It is also unique in that it listed the anticipated costs by province; in other words, it showed which costs were to be born as part of each province’s quota. In times of war, the Raad van State usually drafted one or more extraordinary staten van oorlog for specific additional items anticipated for, but not normally a part of, the regular staat van oorlog. For example, the extraordinary staat van oorlog would contain new regiments raised during wartime, foreign regiments hired on the Dutch establishments, the augmentation of regular regiments, and the purchase of additional weapons and tools of war.

The Raad van State also submitted a number of additional petitions to the States-General for approval. These petitions, like the extraordinary staat van oorlog, were usually only submitted in times of war and like the other petitions, were drafted by the Treasurer and Secretary of the Raad van State. The two most important of these, the petition for legerlasten and the petition for forage magazines, were concerned with the additional costs of the army’s upkeep in wartime. Both were important in terms of the logistical support of the Dutch army. The first — the petition for legerlasten or “army costs” — was a multi-part petition which included among its articles the cost associated with the hiring of the army’s wagons and horses, and the provision the army’s bread magazines and its transport to the army. Each of these additional costs was divided by provincial quota. Some provinces, like Groningen, were only responsible for paying for its province’s share of the army’s wagon costs, while others, like Holland, were responsible for paying for significantly more, like for example the army’s bread contracts.\textsuperscript{18} The cost for the army’s forage magazines, as well as the army’s horses, fell under a different petition, and was also divided among the provinces by the prearranged quota.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{18} Olaf van Nimwegen, \textit{De subsistentie van het leger}, 23; Rijksarchief in Groningen (RAGR) 1, #1917 Rekening, 1694. The accounts in the provincial archives in Groningen break out three separate categories within the legerlasten paid for by the province: wagons, the state’s horses, and unspecified.

\textsuperscript{19} At first, forage contracts were put on Holland’s quota, but as the war progressed, the costs were divided among the provinces. Supplemental contracts concluded before and after a given campaign season were placed on the quotas of the provinces as well. Overijssel, for example, had to pay for part of the upkeep of magazines in the Spanish Netherlands from 1694 until the end of the war. For details see W. Fritschy, \textit{Gewestelijke financiën ten tijde van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden, Deel I, Overijssel (1604-1795)} (Den Haag: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 1996), 270, 276.
Although the staat van oorlog, and the general and supplementary petitions were prepared by the Treasurer-General and Secretary of the Raad van State, during the Nine Years’ War it seems the final word on the composition of these documents before they were finally submitted to the States-General for approval rested with the Stadhouder-King. Evidence of this is contained in a memoir, written by Heinsius on 19 September 1691, of twenty-three items to be reviewed by William before he departed for England. Of particular importance with regards to the Raad van State is number seven of his memoir which notes that

“The staet van oorlogh must first be composed and to that end the contents discussed with the Secretaris van Slingelandt, and after having been instructed of everything, [he] must go to [Het] Loo to communicate it to His Majesty and await his approval.”

And indeed, it seems Slingelandt did follow Heinsius’ instructions. From 27 September to 7 October 1691, Slingelandt was absent from the meetings of the Raad van State. On the 8th, Slingelandt reported that he had met with William at Dieren to get his instructions with regards to the staat van oorlog. Ten days later, Slingelandt presented his petition for the state of the legerlasten, to the Raad van State, and on the 20th he wrote in the resolutions of the Raad that he and Treasurer Burgh “have done a report on the forming of the ordinary and extraordinary staaten van oorlog for the coming year 1692...” This in and of itself is not particularly surprising. After all, William was Captain-General of the Republic’s army and, of course, would have wanted to voice his opinion with regards to the needs and composition of the army that he was tasked with leading. What is noteworthy is that he continued to take part in the Raad van State’s deliberations while he was King of England. Although the following year, a similar meeting took place in Breda between the Stadhouder-King and Slingelandt to discuss military matters, after 1692 following the conclusion of every summer campaign season William attended the meetings of the Raad van State personally. From 1693 through 1699, William went to the meetings of the Raad van State, as Stadhouder-King, to negotiate the staat van oorlog both during and after the war. His presence there

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20 N. Japikse, Correspondentie II, iii: 253 (“Memoire van eenige pointen, by Syne Majt. van Groot Bretagne Goetgevonden.”). According to Japikse, the original, drafted in Heinsius’ hand, is contained in PRO SP 8/10 “King William’s Chest.”

hearkened back to the days of the Earl of Leicester, when an English official regularly attended the meetings of one of the Dutch Republic’s most important policy-making bodies.  

*The Raad van State and “gedeputeerden te velde”*

In addition to the preparation of petitions and the staat van oorlog, the Raad van State was responsible for the day to day administration of the army and the defense of the Republic. The preparation of the petitions represented the planning side of the council’s responsibilities. The other part of its duties, as far as the army was concerned, was to insure that the army was properly provided for, and that those tasked with supplying it with arms, ammunition, food and fodder fulfilled their responsibilities. It was also tasked with insuring that the Republic’s garrisons and magazines were adequate and that its fortresses were in a full state of defense. To fulfill these tasks, the Raad van State sent its own members or deputies to inspect not only the frontiers of the Republic but the army itself to insure that its resolutions were being carried out and that they were being properly administered. In the spring and fall, the council held four more or less permanent commissions to inspect the state of the Republic’s defenses. These were divided into four regions: Dutch Flanders, the Maas region, Maastricht, and Wedde and Westwoldingerland.  

The duties of deputies assigned to make these tours were comprehensive indeed. They inspected the fortifications of all the towns in the region, insured that the land’s magazines were properly stocked, and if the cities were within the Generality, reported on the state their revenues. These findings were then announced to the Raad van State so that appropriate action could be taken if necessary.

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23 This included present day Drente, Gelderland, and Overijssel.

24 F. B. van Blockland describes two such trips conducted in 1691 based on a diary kept by Mathijs Beelaerts, the son of one of the deputies. The first trip, conducted by Pieter Beelaerts and Martinius Scheltinga which toured the Republic’s fortresses in Dutch Flanders, began on 3 March and ended on 13 April. During that time, the deputies inspected every fortress and garrison from Steenbergen in Brabant to Sas van Gent in Flanders. For details see F. B. van Blockland, “Met Gecommitteerden uit den Raad van Staat op Reis in 1691,” *Bijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap*, 55 (1934), 177-178 and passim.
The administration of the army on campaign was directed by the Raad van State’s gedeputeerde te velde or “field-deputy.” Not unlike the Raad van State’s other deputies, the field-deputy was sent to the army to insure that the Raad’s resolutions were carried out. Like deputies sent on inspection tours, field-deputies were sitting members of the Raad van State and were appointed by that college each year to accompany the army on campaign.\(^\text{25}\) They were experts in military matters; most of them regularly sat on the besoigne for military affairs and many had been members for a number of years. During the course of the Nine Years’ War, the Raad van State sent three deputies. Jacob Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Heer van der Cloese, deputy from Gelderland, accompanied the army during the first three years of the war. In 1692, the Raad sent Burchard Joost van Welvelde tot Buchhorst, heer van Zallick, member from Overijssel, to the army.\(^\text{26}\) Finally, in 1693 it appointed Adriaan van Borssele, Heer van Geldermalsen, one of the Raad’s deputies from Zeeland, to accompany the army and would serve in that capacity until the end of the war.\(^\text{27}\) Although Geldermalsen would later gain a reputation for being one of the most knowledgeable of the Raad’s field deputies, he was relatively inexperienced when first appointed by the college in 1693. In the end, not only would the very capable Geldermalsen serve as the Raad van State’s field deputy for the last five years of the

\(^{25}\) Not all field deputies were members of the Raad van State. All of the provinces had the right to send their own deputies to accompany the army as well. Their importance in terms of army administration, with the significant exception of the deputy from Holland, was limited. During the Nine Years’ War, the States General usually only sent one deputy to accompany the army. During the Nine Years’ War, this was Everard van Weede, Heer van Dijkveld. Thus during most of the Nine Years’ War there were only three field deputies with the allied army: one from the Raad van State, one from the States of Holland, and one from the States General. For details see below.

\(^{26}\) Hora Sickema, Aantekeningen en Verbeteringen, 181-182.

\(^{27}\) During the course of the Nine Years’ War, the Raad van State commissioned three field deputies to accompany the army on campaign. Jacob Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Heer van der Cloese, deputy from Gelderland, accompanied the army from 1689 to 1691. In 1692, the Heer van Sallick served as the Raad’s field deputy, and in 1693, Adriaan van Borssele, Heer van Geldermalsen, deputy from Zeeland, became the Raad van State’s field deputy. Geldermalsen served in that capacity until the end of the war. For details see ARA RvS. 110, Resolutiën 1689, I: 24 March; RvS. 112, Resolutiën 1690, I: 15 March; RvS. 114, Resolutiën 1691, I: 26 March; RvS. 116, Resolutiën 1692, I: 10 May; RvS. 118, Resolutiën 1693, I: 17 April; RvS. 120, Resolutiën 1694, I: 18 May; RvS. 122, Resolutiën 1695, I: 2 May; RvS. 124, Resolutiën 1696, I: 7 May; and RvS. 126, Resolutiën 1697, I: 6 April.
Nine Years’ War, but he would be regularly assigned to accompany the army during the War of the Spanish Succession as well.28

At the time of the Nine Years’ War, the Raad van State’s field deputy resembled, on the one hand, a modern day Inspector-General, since he was entrusted with insuring that the army in the field was the same as that represented in the staat van oorlog. But on the other, the deputy resembled a Quartermaster-General or chief logistician, since he was directly responsible for the army’s logistics administration and all that that entailed. The particulars of the Raad van State field deputy’s responsibilities are laid down in two documents. The first, drafted by Slingelandt for Geldermalsen before he departed for the army in 1693, contains twelve articles outlining his responsibilities as field deputy. The second document, also attributed to Slingelandt and probably written at the same time as the first, lists the same twelve articles accompanied by his own “Remarques op de Instructie.” These “remarks” illustrate the nature and extent of the field deputy’s responsibilities as outlined by Slingelandt.29 Together, these two documents give us a clear picture of what was expected of the Raad van State’s field deputy when he accompanied the army on campaign during the Nine Years’ War.

The instructions focus on four main areas of responsibility: regiment’s officers and men, the army’s weapons and ammunition, its transport, and the provision of the army’s subsistence. The extent of the field deputy’s responsibilities in each of these areas varied and, not surprisingly, reflected the extent of the Raad van State’s administrative responsibilities in each of them. Some articles are more important than others; for example, article one dictates that the “deputy shall foster in everything the most service to the land, and further he shall assist the general who exercises the command of the expedition with advice and assistance in every occasion and occurrence.”30 Slingelandt points out that the wording for this first article is necessarily very general. He notes: “this general article is necessary in the event that something is forgotten in the following [articles] that actually should be concluded here [...].” Later

28 Van Nimwegen, De subsistentie van het leger, 24.

29 The recognized authority on the Dutch army during this period, Dr. Olaf van Nimwegen, attributes this document to Simon van Slingelandt. For details see Van Nimwegen, De subsistentie van het leger, 23-24, 48.

on, he explains that its intention is to “prevent hazard” by creating a blanket article to
cover unforeseen circumstances.\footnote{ARA CvdH. 137, “Instructie voor den Heer Gedeputeerde te Velde Weegens den Raad van
State.”} In one sense however, the first article defines the
very nature of the field deputy’s job: to give the field commander advice.

The specific areas wherein he was to give that advice is explained in the second
and third articles. The second notes that the field deputy is to offer advice regarding
“the infantry and cavalrymen employed in the expedition” but that advice was to be
limited to the soldiers’ “mounts and armament.” According to Slingelandt, this meant
that the deputy should have an exact knowledge not only of which companies and
regiments comprised the expedition but the state of their pay and equipment as well.
The purpose of this was to insure that the commander of the expedition knew which
companies were complete and which were below strength:

The supervision that the deputy can take over the infantry as well as the cavalry
consist (in my opinion) in the keeping an exact knowledge, of on what footing
the army is paid by the provinces in which they are distributed, and to inform
the General commanding the army, and the Generals of Cavalry and Infantry, of
that, so that the generals can regulate them and that the Generals can be
informed whether or not the officers keep complete the proportion of their
companies.\footnote{ARA CvdH. 137, “Instructie voor den Heer Gedeputeerde te Velde Weegens den Raad van
State,” Article 2.}

In other words, he was to keep informed with regards to the financial state of the
various companies and regiments of the army. Slingelandt’s advice goes further. The
deputy should also be aware of other costs that the companies are subject to, apart from
the interest payments owed to the Solliciteurs Militaire, as well as the costs borne by the
companies in the provinces, particularly the costs of recruiting. Furthermore, he was to
be aware of any complaints levied by the company officers regarding pay. This was
particularly important since if the regiments went unpaid they could not pay for their
own subsistence. In case of such abuse, the deputy was to inform the Raad van State so
it could take action. He was also to be aware of each company’s equipment and insure
that it followed the prescribed instructions. Thus, the field deputy served as a check
against the provinces to insure that the army in the field was adequately equipped and paid.

Where the second article demonstrates the deputy’s role as a kind of inspector general, the third article describes his duties as logistician. It states that he is to offer the commander advice “on the subject of artillery, ammunition of war, food, forage, assisting ships, pontoon bridges, wagons and draft horses and everything on which they depend.” It was here where the deputy exercised not only the most influence but carried the most responsibility. Unlike the regiments and companies of the army which were administered by the provinces, the artillery, ammunition, train, and all of their personnel, not to mention the subsistence of the army fell under the administrative jurisdiction of the Raad van State and its field deputy. With regards to the artillery train and ordnance personnel, the field deputy was to keep detailed lists of all artillery, ammunition, equipment, and personnel. In the event that something was missing, he was to arrange for it to be delivered to the army, whether it was cannon, gunpowder, or additional artillerists. He was also to insure that the artillery and its staff were properly proportioned in the event that the army should be broken down into corps’ or wings. The deputy’s responsibilities with regards to the army’s ships and wagons were similar. He was to keep detailed lists of all wagons, ships, and their personnel. He was to insure that they too were properly distributed within the army, and he was even required to check how wagons and ships were loaded to insure that they were being properly utilized. Slingelandt notes that all the ships were to be loaded “each with one-thousand pounds of weight” and that the wagons were to be loaded “as agreed to by the contract.”

With regards to the subsistence of the army, field deputies had several important jobs. First they were to take care that the army was well supplied, particularly with sufficient sutlers, since the soldiers depended upon them for all of their butter, cheese, bacon, beer and other foodstuffs apart from their daily bread while in the field. He was to inspect the grain magazines for bread to see that they are well provided for. In addition, the deputy was to check in each designated town where bread magazines were to be erected to insure that there were enough ovens and mills to support the baking of large numbers of loaves. The transport of bread too fell under his administrative umbrella. Like the rest of the army’s transportation, he was to take care

33 ARA CvdH. 137, “Instructie voor den Heer Adr. Van Borssele van Geldermalsen...”
that the army’s bread wagons and grain boats were sufficient and that they were appropriately divided between the army’s contingents. Finally, he was tasked with making sure that those towns garrisoned by the allies and threatened with siege had sufficient bread and grain supplies.

Advice with regards to the provision of forage to the army’s horses fell into his bailiwick as well. Not unlike his responsibilities for the soldiers’ food supplies, the field deputy was tasked with keeping an inventory of the army’s forage magazines. He was to keep the commander of the field army appraised of the state of the forage magazines at all times, and to inform him which needed to be re-stocked. If the army required provisioning from magazines, then the deputy was to inform the commander which magazines possessed sufficient supplies of fodder. When drawing rations from magazines either in winter quarters or during the campaign season, the deputy was responsible for keeping a record of the quantities of rations drawn from each magazine; if required, he was tasked with supplementing the magazines. Finally, at the conclusion of the campaign season, it was the deputy’s responsibility to present a list of the winter quarters to the commander and see that each quarter be adequately supplied with hay and oats.

The remaining nine articles of the deputy’s instructions pertain to the specific administrative tasks of the field deputy rather than the advice he was required to provide. Most, but not all, illustrate his important role in the army’s logistical/administrative hierarchy. Article Four, concerns the army’s administrative hierarchy and the artillery; Article Five the administration of the army’s subsistence; Article Six the army’s wagons and ships; Article Seven the army’s courts-martial; Article Eight sutlers; Article Nine the collection of contributions; Article Ten the quartering of general officers; Article Eleven the mustering the army; and Article Twelve the army’s general welfare.34 Slingelandt’s “Remarques” concerning these articles indirectly illustrate which areas fell under the field deputy’s direct jurisdiction — and thus received his most attention — and which did not. Those remarks with extensive descriptions generally were an important part of the deputy’s responsibilities; those without such comments were either of less importance or not under the deputy’s direct administrative control.

34 ARA CvdH. 137, “Instructie voor den Heer Gedeputeerde te Velde Weegens den Raad van State.”
For example, articles Four and Six describe the field deputy’s responsibilities with regards to the army’s administration, artillery, and transport, and are accompanied by extensive comments. Article Four notes that it is the field deputy’s duty to regulate all of the army’s, commissaries, controllers, artillerists, engineers, miners, bridging personnel, guides, and all other associated personnel “according to commissions and instructions.” Slingelandt notes that the field deputy is to regulate all of the army’s commissaries and controllers, which include bureaucrats in the artillery, train, riverine transport, subsistence — even the commissaries of mustering — which Slingelandt notes “are of little use in the army.” Appendix [1] illustrating the organization of the army’s administration and the field deputy’s responsibilities show the degree of decentralization present and the varied nature of the deputy’s tasks. In some instances, his responsibilities are limited to the keeping of muster-rolls; in others he is responsible for much more.

Article Four also describes the field deputy’s responsibilities with regards to the artillery arm. Administratively, these were probably the field deputy’s most important tasks, not because they were more important in terms of the army but because the Raad van State was directly responsible for the administration of the army’s artillery and all associated personnel. Like the army’s regiments and companies, which were administered and paid by the provinces and their solliciteurs, the States’ artillery train was administered and paid by the Raad van State. The field deputy’s responsibilities within the artillery’s organization combined elements of both administrative control and advice. Most of them had to do with general administration; the mustering of the army’s administrative personnel and their distribution within the army. But it also included the mustering of regular military personnel within the artillery and train. Since the field deputy did not hold a military rank, he could not issue orders to the artillery’s military personnel; he could only offer them advice. Militarily, the command of the Dutch artillery train fell under the control of the Meester-generaal der artillerie.35 Administratively, however, it fell under the control of the contrerolleur-general and the Raad van State’s field deputy. Although this post was held by the artillerist and noted inventor Willem Meester, during most of the Nine Years’ War Lieutenant-Colonel

35From the beginning of the war until his death in In 1695, Julius Ernst van Tettau served as Meester-gerneraal of artillery F.J.G. Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, Vol. VII, 381-382.
Adriaan van der Mijl cared for the administration of the artillery train.\(^{36}\) It was here where the decentralized nature of the Dutch system is most obvious. In terms of logistics, the field deputy exercised considerable control and worked closely with the controller-general of the artillery. In fact, he received instructions from controller-general regarding present day artillery practices. Thus while the field deputy was tasked with some administrative tasks, more often than not he followed the advice of the controller-general since he was the expert on the artillery’s inner workings rather than the other way around. In terms of logistics, however, the field deputy more or less ran the show. While on campaign, he issued orders to the artillery’s two *commissen te velde* or “field-clerks” and the *commis stapelier* or clerk-of-stores at the Generality’s arsenal in Dordrecht.\(^{37}\)

The artillery’s clerks were responsible for the artillery train’s equipment and supplies. The Raad van State laid down their responsibilities in a printed document entitled “Instructions for the clerks of the artillery and ammunition of war in the army.” The “clerk of field artillery” and the “clerk of field munitions” were “responsible for all [of the army’s] cannon, equipment, munitions of war, instruments, and materials that are to be taken in the field [...].”\(^{38}\) Their supply responsibilities were divided along lines suggested by their titles. The “clerk of the field-artillery” was responsible for

- all siege cannon and their carriages, wheels, *block-wagens* [wagons used to transport mortars and their bases], limbers, livery bridals, cord, gunpowder, cannon-balls, and all other tools necessary for the servicing of the cannon...

The “clerk of the ammunition of war” was primarily concerned with state of the train’s small-arms and small-arms ammunition as well as “shovels, spades, woodwork, and woodwork, gunpowder, cannon-balls, and all other tools necessary for the servicing of the cannon...

\(^{36}\) During most of the Nine Years’ War, both the colonel, Charles le Goullon, and the Contrrolleur-Generaal Willem Meesters, were absent from the States’ artillery train, Goullon having taken up service in Britain and later in the Empire, while Meesters served as “Commandant of the Tower” and Controller-General of the British artillery train during the entire period. In their absence, Adriaan van der Mijl, Lieutenant-Colonel of the artillery train, served both as the train’s Colonel and Contrrolleur-Generaal until Otto Chrtoffel van Verschuer was named Colonel of the artillery on 29 August 1693. F.J.G. Ten Raa, *Het Staatsche Leger*, VII: 381-382.


ironwork, storm-bridges, and all other like instruments and materials.” All of the cannon, equipment, ammunition, and other supplies were provided to the field train from stocks stored in one of the Republic’s main arsenals. It was the clerk’s responsibility to keep a detailed list of the supplies and equipment in the train. He was also responsible for the distribution of goods and was tasked with keeping a detailed list of which items were given out and which were returned. If equipment was destroyed, damaged or lost, or supplies were wanting, one of the field clerks would request additional goods or replacements from one of the arsenals.

The field deputy’s responsibilities included the personnel responsible for the care of the Republic’s weapons and munitions. The Dutch Republic possessed numerous arsenals but three were of particular importance to the maintenance of the artillery train: the Generality’s arsenal in Dordrecht, the province of Holland’s arsenal in Delft, and the forward most Dutch military arsenal in Maastricht. In terms of supplying the artillery in the field, each of these played an important role. Arsenals were under the command of the city’s governor but were administered by commissen who supervised the shipment and inventorizing of supplies. Most of the ammunition and supplies for the army were stored in Dordrecht under the supervision of the clerk of the stores there, Matthijs Beelaerts. Beelaerts was one of the most important people in the army’s administrative chain since he was responsible for supervising the shipment of guns, ammunition, and equipment to the army. Dordrecht’s location allowed Beelaerts to send guns and ammunition to army’s operating in Flanders, Brabant, or along the Rhine. Usually artillery was sent by way of Maastricht — the Republic’s most forward magazine — and then by boat or horse to the army itself. George Frederick Wueston

39 The “clerk of the artillery” during the 1695 campaign was Adriaan Koen and the “clerk of the ammunition of war” was Gysbertus Pallas. Interestingly, Adriaan Koen was also clerk of the “company of stores” in the British train in Flanders. See ARA. RvS. 1912 IV, “Instructie voor de Commissien van Artillerie”, article 1; ARA. CvdH. 120 “Stukken betreffende de artillerie trein”, “Lyste vande Officieren en verdeire Bediende vande Artillery, waer de selve in de respective garnisoenen verdeelt zyn voor de Winter 1694,” and BL. Stowe MSS., 444, ff. 16-17.

40 ARA RvS. 1912 IV, “Instructie voor de Commissien van Artillerie.”

41 Beelaerts was a twenty-one year old graduate of the University of Leiden when the Raad van State appointed him commies stapelier der Generaliteits magazijnen te Dordrecht, upon the death of Pompeius Berck, vrijheer of Goidschalxoord, on 25 August 1691. Beelaerts served in this capacity for the rest of the Nine Years’ War and for the entirety of the War of the Spanish Succession. He continued to hold the office until his death on 11 December 1743. F. Beelaerts van Blockland, “Met Gecommitteerden uit den Raad van State op Reis in 1691,” 231-232.
was clerk of the arsenal in Maastricht. As *Commies te Maastricht*, Wueston played an important part in insuring that any siege in the Meuse region or Brabant was properly supplied.

Another important link in the Republic’s ordnance supply chain was the “commissioner of stores” in Holland’s arsenal in Delft. Holland possessed the largest and best-stocked arsenal in the Dutch Republic. In addition to supplying its own troops and the fleet with munitions and artillery, the arsenal in Delft often loaned guns and supplies not only to other arsenals in the Republic but to foreign powers as well. If the goods were wanting in Dordrecht as sometimes occurred, they could be loaned from Holland, but this usually required the intervention of the Raad van State and the States-General. During much of the Nine Years’ War, Delft served as a reserve arsenal for the Republic. In 1693 following the allied defeat at Neerwinden, the Raad van State requested that Holland send replacement arms and equipment to William III’s army. On 31 July, only one day after the battle, the *Gecommitteerde Raden* of Holland ordered Francq van den Bergh, clerk of the Magazines of Delft and Schiedam, to send 3000 matchlock muskets, 1000 snaphaenen, 4000 bandoliers, 2000 pikes, 25,000 lbs. of musket lead, 50,000 lbs. of gunpowder, and 25,000 lbs. of match to rearm soldiers who had lost their arms in the retreat. 42 Later as the allied army raced to invest Namur in 1695, Delft supplied the Generality with 30 heavy cannon to augment the siege train. During the course of the siege, Holland’s arsenals in Delft and Schiedam would send 500,000 lbs. of gunpowder, 100,000 lbs. of match, 30,000 rounds of 24 pdr. ammunition, 5,000 mortar bombs, 30,000 hand-grenades, 100,000 musket rounds, and 50,000 flints to the army before its walls. 43 Then following the loss of numerous siege guns due to wear and tear, Holland was also called upon to replace them. 44

The field deputy supervised this complex and largely decentralized network of officers, artillerists, and logisticians, and insured that when there were difficulties they were quickly resolved. He provided an element of centralization in what was otherwise a somewhat confusing and decentralized system. During the siege of

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43 ARA. RvS. 1546 Acteboek, 1695-1699, ff 20-24;

Namur, the largest and most complicated logistical effort conducted by William’s army during the Nine Years’ War, deputy Geldermalsen was directly involved with organizing shipping the heavy siege guns from Maastricht to the army before Namur. During the siege, he worked hand-in-hand with van der Mijl, and the clerk of the field artillery at the time, Adriaan Koen, to insure that the required guns were present and properly loaded for the journey up the Maas.45 Slingelandt notes that it was the duty of the field deputy was to insure that the commisen of artillery shall be kept to their duties and it appears that Geldermalsen did just that during the siege. Slingelandt writes that the deputy was to be kept informed by the artillery clerks with regards to when, how much and what types of equipment were needed before they were actually shipped. He notes furthermore, that “in times of siege, the same [commies] shall every day precisely report to the deputy what they have distributed and what is still [in supply], since he must judge, what can be missed first[...]” In the event that the deputy notes that certain supplies will be exhausted, it is his responsibility to “discuss it with the generals, and give them his opinions as to how they can avoid the problem.”46

Article Six of Geldermalsen’s instructions describes the other half of the field deputy’s administrative responsibilities. The wagon-train fell under the military and administrative control of the artillery, thus as with the artillery, the Raad’s field deputy was directly involved not only with the train’s supervision, but the normal administration of the army’s train and all of its personnel. At the top of the wagon train’s chain of command was the wagenmeester-generaal. Maertens Kip served as the wagon-master general of the army during both the Nine Years’ and Spanish Succession Wars. He was assisted by one — and later three — subordinates. The first, Huybert Foyert, served as luitenant-wagenmeester-general. He was joined in early 1694 by two additional wagonmeesters; Nicolas Broun, who served as luitenant-wagenmeester voor de infanterie, and Jan van Beeck who became the luitenant-wagenmeester voor de cavalerie.47 As Slingelandt’s describes the field deputy’s responsibilities thus:

45Geldermalsen traveled first to Maastricht and then to Liège. From there he supervised the shipment of artillery, ammunition, and supplies to Namur. ARA. RvS. 634, Ingekomen Missieven, 1695, (unfoliated)


47 F.J.G. Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger VII, 382.
With regards to the *Wagenmeester-Generaal*, he shall muster the same *conducteurs* [as in the artillery] and shall note whether or not the same are being paid according to the list of the country; Whenever two army’s are formed, [the deputy is] to discuss with the general the best way to organized the aforementioned conductors equally between all detachments. In addition he shall see that the company of the *Wagenmeester-Generaal*, &c, are organized the same.48

The wagon-master was chiefly responsible for the organization of the army’s train, which included all of its wheeled transport. The vast majority of the train’s personnel were civilians; with the exception of the artillery’s caissons and the bridging train, civilian contractors provided the vast majority of the army’s wheeled transport.

The use of boats to transport artillery and heavy goods was critical to the Dutch army. One of the most important responsibilities of the Raad van State’s field deputy, as well as the commissaries of artillery, was to arrange for the transport of the ordnance and heavy supplies by boat, either to Maastricht and further afield, or to the army in Flanders via Sas van Gent and/or Sluis in *Zeeuws Vlaanderen*. Due to the heavy weight of the cannon and the volume of supplies required to be shipped, the commissioner of stores in Dordrecht or Delft would either contract or press the needed ships into service rather than rely on cumbersome wagons and limbers.49 The Raad van State’s deputy was entrusted with supervising the boats and ships used for that purpose. Article Six of Slingelandt’s “Instructions” notes that the field deputy did not need to concern himself with the duties of the *commissaris van schepen* since his responsibilities were already highlighted in his own *instructies*. Rather, he was to insure “that no more ships than is necessary be kept through the campaign.” Much of the deputy’s duties concerned the loads carried by the ships. Slingelandt notes that the deputy should insure that “no ships lay half empty” and that “the servants of the artillery do not use

48 ARA CvdH. 137, “Instructie voor den Heer Gedepudeerde,” *Remarques op de Instructie, Art. 6.*

49 Due to the sheer weight of cannon in the late seventeenth century, the number of horses needed to pull artillery was enormous; boats were much more practical and used as often as possible. One 24 lb. siege gun alone weighed 4,775 pounds and required 21 horses to pull it and its limber, thus to move even a modest siege train of 35 siege guns would have required no less than 735 horses. See ARA. CvdH. 120, “Lyste van de swaarte van al de soorten van metaal kanon so nu word gegoote, alsmeede van mortiers en houwitsen”; ARA. RvS. 1912 IV., “Lyste van yder soorte van Canon, soo als deselve met Peerden behooren ingespannt te werden...”
the same [half empty ships] for their own baggage, provisions, equipment, etc.\textsuperscript{50} The Raad van State empowered its field deputies and artillery commissioners to issue licences to the Maas boat captains (\textit{Maas schippers}) so that they could transport the necessary guns and munitions without having to pay the usual tolls required of commercial river traffic.\textsuperscript{51} The deputy was to make sure that ships were constantly under orders; they were not to be kept inactive either waiting for instructions or for their payment. It was the deputy’s job to see that the ships-captains were paid, and was to keep an updated list of those ships in the service of the state. During the course of the campaign season and in the early fall, there was an almost constant stream of boats travelling back and forth between forward magazines in the Republic and the Spanish Netherlands and their supply sources either in Rotterdam or Amsterdam. The bulk of the allied supplies were carried to Maastricht where the officials there could decide where it was to go. In the case of the artillery — and grain for bread and fodder magazines, as we shall later see — the boats were usually mustered in Dordrecht and then shipped up-river.\textsuperscript{52}

Articles four and six of Slingelandt’s “Instructions” described above pertain to the two areas which fell directly under the Raad’s administrative control, artillery and transportation, and as we have seen, both contain extensive instructions with regards to them. The remaining articles, however, touched on areas where the field deputy had little real jurisdiction. Rather, they were areas where was to be kept informed and offer his help if needed, but were not among his most important responsibilities. For example, on the topic of contributions, the deputy was to work closely with the Raad’s officials concerned with their collection; Slingelandt comments that he has little further to add. In Article Seven which concerned courts martial, Slingelandt offers some advice

\textsuperscript{50} ARA CvdH 137, “Instructie voor den Heer Gedeputteerde te velde weegens den Raad van State,” Art. 6.

\textsuperscript{51} See especially Res. RvS. 22 March 1691, 17 January 1693, 30 March and 2 April 1695 for examples of boat-captains being contracted by the Raad van State and the \textit{commies stapelier te Dordrecht} to ship artillery and ammunition to Maastricht and Liége.

\textsuperscript{52} In 1695, the Maas-schippers were three years in arrears in their pay and resolved that they “would rather abandon their ships than serve in this way, let alone put themselves in danger.” Only William III’s encouragement kept them at their posts until they were finally paid in September. See Ten Raa and de Bas, \textit{Het Staatsche Leger, Vol. VII}, 95; and ARA RvS 634iv. \textit{Ingekomen Missieven}, M. Beelaerts to the Raad van State, “Dordrecht desen 4 September [1695].”
to the field deputy but also notes that with regards to the court proceedings, “the concern of the deputy is not necessary[...].”

It is particularly noteworthy that Slingelandt had little comment with regards to the army’s provisioning since this was one of the deputy’s most important responsibilities. According to his remarks, “this [article] (in my opinion) requires no comment and the same can be determined from the contracts, that change every year.” The reason for the Slingelandt’s lack of commentary however had little to do with the deputy’s responsibilities. He was responsible still for supervising both the supply of bread to army both while it was in winter quarters and during campaign season, as well fodder for its horses while in winter quarters. But his responsibilities were strictly supervisory; he did not conduct the administration of these jobs himself. Rather, the state contracted with civilian entrepreneurs well-versed in the business of army provisioning. These firms were essentially independent, logistical/administrative bureaucracies concerned with every aspect of the purchase, storage, production, and shipment of rations to the army’s men and horses. Such civilian-run administrations within the military bureaucracy were unique to early modern armies, particularly those of the late seventeenth century. These administrations, became the common link between the many allied contingents in the Spanish Netherlands and it is to these entrepreneurs where we shall now turn our attention.

**Civilian Contractors and the Dutch Army**

In his book *War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough*, D. W. Jones describes in detail the supply options available to early modern armies, particularly the British army, during the Nine Years’ and Spanish Succession Wars. According to Jones, there were only two methods for financing and supplying armies while campaigning beyond their own borders. The first method, which Jones calls “direct supply,” required the state to purchase all of the army’s goods at home with cash or credit and ship these goods directly to the army in the field. The second method, “indirect supply,” required goods to be purchased locally with cash and credit provided by the

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53 ARA CvdH. 137, “Instructie voor de Heer Gedeputeerde.”

54 ARA CvdH. 137, “Instructie voor de Heer Gedeputeerde.”
home government. Although according to Jones, direct supply would have been the best method for the British army — not to mention the British economy — since “all spending would then have taken place at home,” the British army in Flanders utilized indirect supply. The main reasons he cites are first, the lack of “the required commissarial structure” to supply the army directly; second the vulnerability of sea supply; third the prohibitive costs and the tonnages involved with shipping which made it unrealistic; and lastly, the advantages of indirect supply — not the least of which being the presence of numerous “local entrepreneurs...who were well versed in the business of supplying armies.” He notes, furthermore, that indirect supply was the most common method of supply in Europe since only two lands, the Habsburg Empire and Russia, utilized direct supply practices.

Jones’ explanation is plausible if one considers the British contingent in Flanders an independent force. His analysis regarding the reasoning behind why the British eventually adopted indirect supply is accurate. However, Jones’ emphasis on the possibilities open to Britain is misplaced. He notes that the expenses involved with direct supply made it unrealistic, and that the presence of numerous local supply contractors made it unlikely that the British army would have utilized another form of supply. Unfortunately, Jones’ detailed analysis overlooks the most important reason why the British army adopted indirect supply; namely because the Dutch army — which made up the bulk of the forces in the Spanish Netherlands — utilized such a system. The system in use by the Dutch army in 1689 had been in use since the Republic’s war with France in 1672. During that war, civilian contractors provided William’s army with its transport, food, and fodder. When in March 1673, the Prince of Orange concluded a contract with Anthony Àlveraz Machado to provide bread and cheese for 8 months to the 3,000 man garrison in s’ Hertogenbosch, as well as the requisite wagons to transport the foodstuffs there, he began a practice that would to contribute greatly to expansion of allied armies facing Louis XIV’s France: the reliance on civilian — particularly Jewish — military entrepreneurs for the supply of the army’s subsistence.

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56 Ibid., 32-34.

57 F.J.G. Ten Raa, *Het Staatsche Leger*, VI, [000].
Dutch Army Administration and Jewish Entrepreneurs

In much of western and central Europe, but especially in Germany, Austria, Holland and Spain, military provisioning was handled by contractors and financiers from the local Jewish community. Through their dominant position in the precious metals market and banking — and thus accessibility to large sums of ready cash — as well as their connections with their fellow co-religionists in the Polish grain trade, the Jewish community was advantageously placed to handle army provisioning. Jewish military purveying began in the 1630s when several Portuguese New Christians in service of the King of Spain expanded their services from the mere handling of payments to Spanish troops to the wholesale provisioning of armies. But it was not until the period from 1650s and 60s — the beginning of the period dubbed by Jonathan Israel as “the age of the Court Jew” — where Jewish army contracting came into its own.58 The most prominent of these contractors were Samuel Oppenheimer of Heidelberg — who provisioned the Austrian Habsburg armies from 1673 until his death in 1703 — and the Dutch provisioners Machado and Pereira who supplied bread to the allies in the Spanish Netherlands.59

Peace of Munster in 1648 had brought with it a renewal of the economic relationship between Spain and the Dutch Republic and with it the strengthening of the relationship between the two land’s Jewish communities. The origin of this new relationship dates back to the 1660s and the Spanish slave trade. Spanish contractors in Spain tasked with providing slaves to its American colonies began obtaining most of them from the Dutch merchants in Curaçao. Consequently, an informal triangular trade between Holland, Curaçao, and the Spanish colonies developed in the wake of the slave trade that proved advantageous to the Saphardi communities in both lands. The new trade relationship grew rapidly, particularly in the wake of Louis XIV’s invasion of the Republic in 1672.60 Sephardi Jews had been involved in Spanish military


provisioning for much of the 17th century, and with the Spanish and Dutch allies, many of those formerly associated with that business began offering their services to the Dutch. Abraham Pereira, father of Jacob Pereira, had taken part in the Spanish military payments system, which no doubt influenced his son’s decision to follow in his footsteps. This connection between Spain and the Dutch Republic in large part explains the emergence of the army-provisioning firm of Machado and Pereira.61

The men behind the firm Machado and Pereira were two Sephardi Jews from Amsterdam, Antonio Álvares Machado and his associate Jacob Pereira. Their appointment as the Dutch army’s Provediteurs-Generaal van den Staat was the direct result of the Jewish community’s close relationship with William III. During the course of his tenure as Stadhouder of Holland, William III developed friendships with some of Amsterdam’s most influential Jewish financiers. This relationship was mutually advantageous; William III provided Jewish leaders with political support and protection while they provided him with the community’s financial backing. Some in the community, like Antonio Lopes Suasso, would later play a crucial role in financing William III’s expedition to England in 1688. Initial Jewish involvement in Dutch army contracting was modest, however.62

The Jewish involvement in Dutch military provisioning began in March 1673 when the Prince of Orange concluded a contract with Machado to provide bread and cheese for the garrison in s’Hertogenbosch. The Stadhouder-King must have been reasonably satisfied with him because from that point onwards, Machado, and his business partner Jacob Pereira, came to accept a larger and larger share of the responsibility for supplying the army. In 1674, they had 100 wagons in their employ to transport bread. On 23 January 1675, the Raad van State concluded their first contract with Machado, his partner Pereira providing his financial backing. According to this first contract, Machado and Pereira were to provide bread to the entire Dutch army as well as the necessary transport to deliver it. By 1 May of that year, the enterprising Machado had established five magazines and a wagon train of 150 cars to keep the

61 Jonathan I. Israel, European Jewry in the Age of Mercantilism, 127-128.

army supplied with its bread. As their business concern grew, Machado and Pereira began to sub-contract with other Portuguese Jews in the Spanish Netherlands and the Dutch Republic to handle other aspects of the business like the hiring of grain ships and riverboats, horses, bread wagons, and the distribution of supplies. By the time the Nine Years’ War broke out in September 1688, Machado and Pereira were so firmly established as part of the Dutch military-logistical infrastructure that they became known as ‘Provediteurs-generaal van den Staat.’

Machado and Pereira, along with many in Amsterdam’s Jewish community, played a crucial role in William III’s expedition to England. Contemporaries noted the speed with which William’s expedition to England was outfitted and equipped. Much of this was due to the community’s support for William III and his endeavors against their mutual enemy, Louis XIV. Machado and Pereira were appointed the official provisioners of William III’s expedition and fulfilled their duties with speed and efficiency. In addition, to providing food for the expedition, the firm also supplied the newly raised (or more correctly, hired) Dutch, German, and Swedish Regiments under the command of Prince van Waldeck defending the eastern frontier with their subsistence. During the early years of the war, Machado and Pereira were involved in virtually every aspect of army provisioning from supplying grain to the army’s magazines, to hiring the army its wagons, even to the hiring of water transport for carrying the army’s heavy goods. But by 1691, the firm had focused its efforts on what was arguably their most important task, supplying the troops with their daily bread.

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64 For the Raad van State’s resolutions to employ Machado and Pereira during the Nine Years’ War, see ARA. RvS. 110, 16 January 1689 [1689 campaign]; RvS. 113, 14 December 1690 [1691 campaign]; RvS. 117, 10 November 1692 [1693 campaign]; RvS. 119, 22 October 1693 [1694 campaign]; RvS. 121, 2 November 1694 and RvS. 122, 22 February 1695 [1695 campaign]; RvS. 123, 7 October 1695 [1696 campaign]; and RvS. 125, 16 December 1696 [1697 campaign]. See also Olaf van Nimwegen, Subsistentie, 26-27; and F.J.G. Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, Vol. VII, 11.

65 See note 64 above.

66 For Machado and Pereira’s activities in the first two years of the war, see ARA RvS 1545, Acteboek, 1685-1699, ff. 35-36, 105-107; ARA RvS., Resolutiën, 16 January 1689; 16 March 1690.


**Bread Contractors and Contracts**

Bread was the staple of the early modern soldier’s diet. The French Marshal Villars once stated “We can go some time without money, but without bread it is impossible.”\(^67\) In general, soldiers required between one and two pounds of bread per day; in the allied army soldiers were generally issued a three pound bread ration every two days. Machado and Pereira were responsible for insuring that every soldier received his bread ration and they oversaw every step of that process: from the purchase of the grain and stocking of the army’s magazines in Brabant and Flanders, to the baking of the bread and its delivery to the troops. An examination of a standard bread contract illustrates the extent of their responsibilities.

During the Nine Years’ War, the bread contracts concluded between the Raad van State and Machado and Pereira usually comprised twenty-two separate articles, each one pertaining to a different aspect of the bread contractor’s responsibilities. The wording of the contracts demonstrate the degree in which Machado and Pereira’s service had become almost institutionalized. Virtually every bread contract concluded between Machado and Pereira and the Raad van State was worded the same way with only trivial differences between them. The main differences lay in the sums of money to be provided by the States of Holland for the purchase of grain, and the cost of the rations themselves; both of which represent fluctuations in the price of grain and the size of the army being supplied. The rest of the articles’ wording changed relatively little over the course of nine years. The first three articles, for example, usually described the duration of the contract and amount of bread to be provided. The bread contractor was to deliver bread from the conclusion of the contract — usually in the late fall or early winter — through the end of the campaign season. Contracts always stipulated that the contractor was required to provide bread “to the whole army of the State, infantry as well as cavalry, as well as the train of artillery with all of the same consequences and conditions.”\(^68\)

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\(^68\) ARA CvdH. 122, *Aantekening over de aanemen van broot*, unfoliated printed contract dated 18 October 1695. The passage reads “Desgelijx zal den Contractant geduyrende de Veldtogt van’t aenstaende Jaar Brood leveren aan’t gehee Leger van den Staat, so Voetvolck als Ruyterye, nevens den train van de Artillerye met alle desselfs gevolgh en aenkleven.”
The remaining articles describe the various responsibilities associated with the provision of bread. Much of what is described in the contract is vague, most likely to allow for changes in the cost in grain or the strategic situation facing the commander of the army. The third article, for instance, notes that the contractor was to establish “five or six” magazines in places ordered by the commanding general, but the contracts never stated where these magazines were to be established (with one or two exceptions).\(^6\) This was done, no doubt, to allow the commander a degree of strategic flexibility. In spite of this, by 1691, the allies had established the most important bread magazines in the larger cities of the Spanish Netherlands. In the east, Maastricht and Liège supplied allied armies during operations in the Meuse region. In Brabant, Leuven and especially Brussels, formed the principal bread magazines, while in Flanders, magazines were established in Ghent and Bruges. The most important provisions of the contracts, and the ones that changed the most over the course of the war, were those pertaining to the sum of money provided by the States of Holland for the purchase of the requisite grain. The contracts for the 1689 and 1693 campaign seasons, for example, called for the States of Holland to furnish £100,000 as a down payment. By 1695 that amount had increased to £200,000, where it would remain for the rest of the war. These fluctuations — which were, more often than not, increases — most likely were related to the growth in the Dutch army between 1689 and 1696, the year of its final wartime peak. The change in cost of bread for the soldiers changed over time as well, probably reflecting fluctuations in the price of Baltic grain as much as army growth. In 1689, infantry companies were charged £50.00 and cavalry £42.00 per month for their daily ration. By 1693, this too had increased to £150.00 and £100.00 for infantry and cavalry respectively. The cost for individual loaves — usually noted in the last article of the contract — was probably most closely related to the cost of bread on the market since the other prices no doubt contained service charges. In 1692-93, the cost of one three pound loaf was 3 Stuivers

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\(^6\) The wording of the third article is quite clear (and vague) with regards to the placement of magazines: “In order to be able to carry out the delivery, the Contractor shall now or during the Winter assemble the necessary supply from good Prussian Rye, together before the start of the Campaign, and at the latest before the first of____ ordered to make five or six Magazines in the places commanded by the General of the Army, or where ever is authorized... For details, see ARA Rv5 (1.01.19), 1545 (Acteboek, 1686-1694), ff. 276-283.
Hollands; in 1695-96, the price per loaf had fallen slightly to 2 St. 6 dt. 2/7; the last year of the war, this had again increased to 2 St. 9 Penningen per loaf.70

The contracts concluded between Machado and Pereira and the Raad van State included every provision pertinent to the supply of bread, from the transport of the grain to the designated magazines, to the baking of the said grain into edible loaves, to their final transport to the regiments in the army and the mouths they were intended to feed. The ninth article of Machado and Pereira’s standard contract concerned the transport of bread from the ovens and magazines to the army. For most of the war, their contracts stipulated that in the winter 100 wagons and during the campaign season 250 wagons were to be mustered for the transportation of bread to the troops either in the field or in garrison. The 250 four-horse wagons were intended to supply an army of 35,000 men. In the event that the field army mustered more than 35,000 men, then “the Contractor shall acquire the necessary wagons in proportion with the increased number of the army outside of his own costs, or otherwise the payment of the Wagon services to the same proportion shall be increased.” Based on the size of the Dutch army mustered by the States General and William III, it is likely that closer to 500 wagons accompanied it rather than the 250 agreed to by contract.

In addition to wagons, Machado and Pereira had to assemble large numbers of boats in order to transport the Prussian Rye from Amsterdam to the allied magazines in Flanders, Brabant, and along the Maas river. Although the bread contracts make no mention of the numbers of boats required to keep the five or six Dutch magazines filled with adequate wheat, it is clear from the contracts that the numbers were sizable enough to require a large portion of their ships’ cargoes to be exempted from Dutch duties and tolls. In every contract there was a provision regarding the use of ships as transport for grain. Article 18 of the 1695-96 contract notes “it shall be seen to that the Contractor shall be provided with the requisite Ships, outside his own cost, for the transport of Rye from one place to the other in Brabant and elsewhere should it be required.” Because the theatre of war fell within the jurisdiction of no less than four sovereign lands, the contracts also contained articles with regards to tolls and other taxes. Article 19 of the same 1695-96 contract notes that the States-General and Raad van State would do “as much as is possible” to insure that a large quantity of the


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contracted wheat for bread be exempted from tolls and licenses along the Maas river. The amount of wheat fluctuated with the size of the said contract. In the early years of the war when the Dutch army was still modest in size, the contract exempted a smaller portion of wheat from river tolls. In the 1692-93 contract, “five- or six-hundred lasts of wheat” were exempted from tolls. By 1696, it exempted 1,000 lasts. Clearly, the differences between the two contracts reflects the increased quantities of grain expected to be transported to the Republic’s magazines in the Spanish Netherlands and the Country of Liège in the later years of the war. These changes also illustrate the larger forces mustered by the Dutch Republic as well as the increasing burden it shouldered as the war dragged on.

**Providateurs Generaal van den Staat and the Provision of Forage**

Machado and Pereira also played an important role in supplying the army with the other of its staples: dry feed for the army’s horses. Unlike the men, who required bread provisions the whole year round, horses required dry forage only while they were in winter quarters or when inadequate green fodder was available in the theater of operations. Although some historians have argued that dry forage was necessary to feed the army’s horses and draught animals during the campaign season, this was only rarely the case in the Low Countries. A region rich in grains, grasses, and other grazing crops, armies usually relied on fresh fodder to feed their horses during the summer months. Only when areas were exhausted through over-grazing, or when farmers quit planting crops in the more contested regions did the armies in the Low Countries turn to dry forage to supplement the more limited supplies of fresh grass. While in winter quarters and the beginning of the campaign season, however, both allied and French armies relied on dry forage to sustain their horses. Dry forage was necessary to allow armies to take the field in the spring months before sufficient fresh grasses were available.

Just as with bread provisioning, Machado and Pereira supplied the Dutch army with its dry forage in the first years of the war. During most of the Franco-Dutch war of 1672, Machado and Pereira had supplied William’s forces with fodder for its draught animals and cavalry mounts. When war broke out again in the fall of 1688, the Raad van State concluded a contract with Machado and Pereira to establish forage magazines for the 2,000 cavalry garrisoned in the towns of s’Hertogenbosch and Arnhem that
winter.\textsuperscript{71} The 1689 campaign season was relatively uneventful but it was clear to Dutch authorities that the size and number of magazines would have to be increased to support a larger Dutch cavalry force. In October 1689, the Raad van State, States-General and the Raad’s field deputy, Schimmelpennink van der Oye, began discussions on the placement of forage magazines for the 1690 campaign season. According to the 1 October resolution of the Raad, the representatives were to determine the composition of the magazines, the quantities necessary to feed a cavalry force of 6,000 troopers for five to six months, and the sources of necessary forage. The Raad had already decided that the cost per ration could not exceed 9 stuivers per day. The Raad van State also hoped to determine if the land could support the expense if it provided 5 stuivers per ration to help the troopers defray the costs. Discussions went on during the winter and into the early spring. On 14 March, Goddard van Reede Ginkel, Lieutenant-General of Cavalry, issued a report to the States-General with regards to the feeding of the States’ mounted force. In the wake of the meeting, Ginkel was instructed to contact Machado and Pereira to request their advice. Two days later, the Raad van State concluded a contract with the Provediteurs-Generaal to deliver 1,260,000 pounds of hay\textsuperscript{1} and oats to establish a magazine in Brussels. For the cost of 4 Stuivers per 14 pound ration and a down payment of f7,500.00 to be paid by the States of Holland, this magazine — or rather magazines — would be sufficient to feed the Republic’s 6,000 cavalry in the Spanish Netherlands that season.\textsuperscript{72}

Although Machado and Pereira supplied Dutch armies for the first three years of the war, after the 1691 campaign season, the contract for supplying much of the dry fodder for the Dutch army was farmed out to several other contractors. When the contracts were concluded for the 1691 campaign season, Machado and Pereira were still responsible for providing the bulk of the Dutch army’s horse rations. In that same year however, a number of competing contractors provided supplemental magazines, and expanded on established ones. As the war went on, these new contractors came to

\textsuperscript{71} ARA. RvS. 112, Resolutiën, Jan.-Jun. 1689, Res. 5 and 16 January 1689; and RvS. 1545, Acteboek, 1686-1694, ff. 34-35.

\textsuperscript{1} This quantity was the equivalent of 9,000 rations or roughly a one-day supply for the whole force. Thus, the contractors were to provide this amount or its equivalent on a more or less daily basis.

\textsuperscript{72} ARA. RvS. 113, Resolutiën, Jul.-Dec. 1689, Res. 1, 14, 17 October 1689; RvS. 114, Resolutiën, Jan.-Jun. 1690, Res. 9, 14, 16 March 1690; and RvS. 1545, Acteboek 1686-1694, ff. 105-107.
accept a greater share of what had been Machado and Pereira’s monopoly over the forage business. In 1693, for example, François Castaigne accepted the contract for supplying the Dutch troops in Maastricht, Tongeren and Bergloo, amounting to just under 1,000,000 rations, while Machado and Pereira managed Dutch magazines in Brabant and Flanders. In 1695 however, Machado and Pereira provided neither the Dutch nor allied armies with their dry forage. Then in 1696, they furnished grain to Dutch magazines in both Brabant and along the Maas. The last year of the war, however, the contracts to provision the Dutch magazines went to Guillaume Moreau and Pieter van den Pangaert along the Maas and in Brabant respectively. Why Machado and Pereira did not handle the Dutch army’s forage contracts the entire war one can only guess. Perhaps they had their hands full providing bread to the entire allied army. Or it is possible that they were simply unable to provide the Dutch armies with rations cheaper than their competitors. It is also possible that they were simply farming the work out to sub-contractors of their choice. In any case, Machado and Pereira continued to play an important role in feeding both Dutch and later allied soldiers and their animals during the whole of the Nine Years’ War and well into the Spanish Succession War.

The fall of 1691 was an important period for the administration of the allied armies in the Low Countries. With the conclusion of the war in Ireland immanent, allied administrators had to lay the logistical framework to support a large British corps and an increased Dutch one. To support the larger Dutch army, the Raad van State introduced a separate petition to pay for the cost their of forage magazines. According to Dr. van Nimwegen, the Raad van State considered five points in determining the amount of money to be petitioned. The first was the quantity of rations to be delivered and the cost of those rations in excess of the 5 or 6 stuivers to be borne by the troops. The difference between the asking price per ration and the five or six guilder ceiling established by the government was usually paid to the contractor as an advance to enable him to set up the magazines in the said contract. The second factor the Raad van State had to consider was the cost associated with feeding the horses in the baggage train kept on during the winter months. The third was the estimated cost of expanding or moving magazines; the fourth was the payment for any damage done to the
contractor’s magazines due to enemy action; and finally the fifth consideration was the cost of forage to subsidy troops, which was provided to them at the State’s expense.\textsuperscript{73}

The monies involved in paying for the Republic’s forage magazines were considerable. In 1692-93, Machado and Pereira required an advance of ƒ905,330 to stock their assigned magazines in Brabant while François Castaigne requested by comparison a modest ƒ98,000 guilders to stock those in and around Maastricht. As forage became scarcer, the costs involved with stocking the Dutch army’s magazines grew. During the 1694 campaign season, scarcity of forage in the theater forced the allied cavalry to subsist from dry forage drawn from Dutch magazines in Brabant and in the Maas region. Added to the crop failures of 1692 and 1693, the draining of allied magazines in 1694 meant that substantial funds would be needed to fill the empty or near empty magazines. Consequently, in 1695 William estimated that it would cost no less than 2 million guilders to replenish Dutch magazines in Brabant and along the Maas in preparation for the coming campaign. Although 1695 was an exception, the Raad van State’s petitions for forage represented the payment of significant funds. On the average, the money involved in the forage petitions usually figured in the hundreds of thousands — if not the millions — of guilders per year.\textsuperscript{74}

Forage contracts, like bread contracts, described in detail the contractor’s responsibilities with regards to provisioning an agreed quantity of rations. Unlike bread contracts which rarely if ever noted where the contractors were to establish their magazines, forage contracts gave a detailed account of where and how many rations were to be delivered. The contract concluded between Pierre Castaigne, the Raad’s deputy van Zallick, and Dijkveld from the States-General in the late summer of 1692 provides a good example of the typical forage contract. Its wording demonstrates the degree in which forage provisioning had become standardized in the Dutch army. The contract is divided into fifteen separate articles. Unlike bread contracts, which tended to be somewhat more complicated in terms of the services rendered by the contractor, forage contracts focused almost exclusively on the transport and distribution of rations. The first article noted the quantity and locations of the magazines to be completed,

\textsuperscript{73} O. van Nimwegen, \textit{Subsistentie van het leger}, 51.

\textsuperscript{74} Olaf van Nimwegen lists the petitions for forage magazines presented to the States-General by the Raad van State during the Spanish Succession War. For details see Olaf van Nimwegen, \textit{Subsistentie van het leger}, (pp. 52 tabel 3.1)
while the second the size of the individual rations. Early contracts focused more on the
total quantity of feed to be delivered rather than the number of rations. For example,
Machado and Pereira’s 1690 contract required they provide 1,260,000 pounds of hay as
fodder. After 1691 however, contracts speak of numbers of rations. At that time, one
horse ration comprised fifteen pounds of hay and three “picotins” — the rough
equivalent of 8 liters today — of oats;\(^75\) thus the quantities required by later contracts
were large indeed. In the late summer of 1691, Machado and Pereira were contracted to
supply 2,000,000 such rations to Dutch cavalry garrisoned in Brussels, and 1,000,000 to
Leuven at a cost of 9 stuivers per ration. Similar contracts — with similar quantities of
rations — were concluded between forage contractors and allied administrations for
magazines in the other two regions.

The contractors’ jurisdictions were divided into three regions: Flanders, Brabant,
and “along the Meuse.” Within these regions, the allies had established more or less
permanent magazines to store their supplies of rations that corresponded to the
locations of the allies’ winter cavalry billets. In Flanders — which for most of the war
provided the British corps with its winter quarters — the allies established their main
forage magazines in and around Bruges, Ghent, and Dendermonde. For most of the
war, but especially after 1691, British officers, commissaries, and contractors
administered these magazines, about which more will be said later. Dutch purveyors
supplied the magazines in the remaining two regions. The main magazines in Brabant
were at Brussels, Leuven, and Mechelen. The fifth article pertains to the physical
storage of the forage. The other important region comprised the area between
Maastricht and Liège, the so-called region “along the Meuse.” The allies established the
largest magazines at Maastricht and Liège, but as in Brabant, the Dutch set-up smaller
ones in the villages around these two towns, particularly the villages along the river
itself. Castaigne’s 10 September 1692 contract required that he administer the
magazines at Maastricht, Tongeren, and Bergloo, but by 1695 there were additional

\(^75\) A picotin is defined in Cornélis De Witt Willcox’s French-English Military Technical Dictionary as
“a peck, feed of oats, feed measure.” The word picotin came from the Spanish word pico
meaning “a tiny bit.” It was a unit of measure equivalent to 10\(^{-12}\) of a pound, which is the
modern-day equivalent of 8 quarts or 8.810 liters. See J.M. Verhoeff, De oude Nederlandse maten
en gewichten (Amsterdam: P.J. Meertens-Instituut, 1982), 118; Cornélis De Witt Willcox, A French-
and Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, MS: Merriam-Webster, Inc., 1983),
1338.
magazines established in Maeseyst, Stockhem, Hasselt, Bilsen, Lovet, Bekom, Beringen, Course, Peer, Bree, Hammont, and Vogelsangh. More often than not, forage was stored in the empty attics of buildings or in large vacant ones. In 1688-89, Machado and Pereira even requisitioned Arnhem’s cathedral for use as a forage magazine.76 The sheer volume of space needed to store the massive quantities of rations needed to feed the allies’ horses in the winter required that magazines be established not only within the cities assigned but in smaller magazines all across the surrounding countryside. Since much of the Dutch and Prussian cavalry were billeted in the villages along the Demer river, contractors stored smaller quantities of forage in the villages between Mechelin and Deist dotting its banks.

The importance of forage to the Dutch and allied war effort is reflected by the third and fourth articles of the contract which allows the contractor to press the necessary ships to transport the rations to the magazines and to exempt his cargo from tolls. Even ships destined for “British” magazines in Flanders were exempted from such tolls and their contractors were permitted to press the necessary ships to transport horse rations to their magazines. Johan Huycoop, purveyor for British magazines in Flanders in 1693, was permitted to press the requisite Dutch ships to transport rations to his magazines, while in 1695, the Raad van State permitted Christiaan Crayenest to transport 700,000 rations of hay and oats to British magazines in Bruges, Ghent and Dendermonde. The fourteenth article of Castaigne’s 1692-93 contract best exemplifies this inter-allied relationship with regards to the army’s logistics. Based on the wording in his contract, rations are to be distributed to soldiers of the Dutch Republic and His Majesty the King of England. In virtually every forage contract concluded between civilian contractors and the Raad van State, provision was made to supply both armies if need arose. Foreign troops were to be supplied for free. Thus, if allies were operating near Dutch magazines or British troops were garrisoned in Brabant or near Maasticht, they were permitted to draw from Dutch magazines. The same was true of Dutch units operating in Flanders.77

Article 9 of the typical forage contract established the cost and duration of the said contract, and the distribution of rations. As can be seen by an examination of Appendix [2], the price of rations fluctuated significantly not only from year to year but by

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76 ARA. RvS. Res. 16 January 1689.
77 Childs, The Nine Years’ War and the British Army, 56-58.
contract as well. By 1691, with the size of rations standardized, contracts talked more of
numbers of rations to be delivered rather than pounds of hay and oats. Article 9 of
François Castaigne’s 1692-93 contract, for example, charged 10 stuivers per ration, of
which the State paid 4 stuivers and the troopers the remaining 6 stuivers per ration. In
1695, Castaigne charged 9.50 Stuivers per ration for troopers garrisoned along the
Meuse while Zeger Goris, tasked with providing rations to garrisons in Brabant,
charged 9.00 Stuivers per ration.

In addition to payment for the individual rations, the forage contractor would
receive a down payment to enable him to fill the magazines assigned to him. Most
often, this was discussed in Article 15. The amounts involved were large indeed and
illustrate the scale of allied logistics expenditures. The first petitions for forage
magazines called for the States-General to raise f1,800,000 to pay for the army’s
magazines. The contract concluded with Machado and Pereira to establish magazines
in Brabant in 1692 alone cost more than f900,000.00 to stock thus it is not surprising that
the total cost might be twice as much. In 1694, the funds petitioned by the Raad van
State increased to f2,000,000, which reflects a combination of higher grain prices and
the growth of the Dutch cavalry arm following the 1693 campaign season. For the
remainder of the war, the cost of maintaining Dutch forage magazines would hover at
this level.\textsuperscript{78}

The remaining articles pertain to the distribution of forage. Article Eleven
describes how the contractors were to distribute the rations; Articles Twelve and
Thirteen explain how contractors and government officials were to keep their accounts;
and finally article Fourteen notes to whom rations were to be distributed. It is
noteworthy that soldiers of both the Dutch Republic and Britain were included among
this number. It is also noteworthy that if foreign regiments were to draw from the same
magazines, than the State (ie. the Dutch Republic) was to cover the expenses. This last
point is important. Both Dutch and British troops were required to pay a portion of the
cost of feeding their horses. While this was a modest sum (no more than 5 stuivers), it
meant that the cost for feeding the subsidy cavalry hired on by the Republic was
totally borne by the State itself.

\textsuperscript{78}ARA. RvS. Res. 17 July 1692, petition for f1,800,000; RvS. Res. 27 June 1693, petition for
f1,800,000; RvS. Res. 8 July 1694, petition for f2,000,000; RvS. Res. 22 July 1695, petition for
f2,000,000; RvS. Res. 4 July 1696, petition for f2,000,000.
The details of forage distribution are fairly straightforward. During the first years of the war, distribution was relatively easy since the size of the Dutch and allied cavalry force was small. Generally speaking, rations were handed out by company, with each trooper on the muster roll receiving his assigned ration. Unfortunately, the early system used by the Dutch administrators and forage contractors was uneconomical because it relied on a fixed muster rather than on the actual number of troopers present. While this proved not to be a problem when the force was small and rations plentiful, with the failure of harvests in 1693 and 1694, and the increase of the Dutch cavalry force in 1690 and 1693, lax distribution practices began to have serious effects not only on the contractors’ credit but on state finances as well. In many instances, more rations were distributed than there were cavalry, which when added to the growing exhaustion of the surrounding countryside during the campaign season, increased the expenses borne by the forage contractors and the government. In an effort to combat this, Geldermalsen reported to the Raad van State that he had appointed commissaries to insure that “close regard be taken and attention be paid to the Hay and Oats, which is put into and taken out of the magazines.” These commissaries were to receive 30 guilders per month and were assigned by region. During the winter of 1693-94, Geldermalsen and the Raad van State appointed four such commissaries. Later in January 1694, the Raad van State resolved that these commissaries hold “exact reviews” of the horses so that the proper amount of rations could be delivered to the companies. According to the resolution, Commis de Greve would hold reviews of the regiments garrisoned in Brussels and Mechelen, G. Otto would hold reviews in Leuven, N. Smits would hold reviews of the regiments quartered along the Demer and J. Blomhert would review regiments quartered in the Meuse region. To insure that the lists were accurate, the captains and Ritmeesters would have to countersign the muster rolls following the commissary’s review of the regiment. Therefore, from 1693-94 onwards, additional commissaries insured that the forage contractors delivered the proper quantities of rations to Dutch and allied regiments.

79 ARA. RvS. Ing. Miss. 23 Sept. 1693; Res. Same; Res. 3 October 1693; Ing. Miss. 2 Nov. 1693; Res. 11 January 1694.
Civilian Contractors and Transport

The last important area within the Dutch army’s logistics administration where civilian contractors played a crucial role was in the realm of transportation. All armies in the late 17th century required horse drawn transport of some kind to move its supplies, equipment, and provisions. And like the provision of bread and forage, civilian contractors handled the supply of horse-drawn wagons and crewed sailing vessels to transport the army’s goods. Even duties normally considered strictly military — like the transport of cannon to and from the battlefield — was in the hands of civilians.

Like forage and bread, Machado and Pereira initially provided much of the States army’s transport during the 1672-78 Franco-Dutch War. In 1674, Machado provided 100 “sturdy Brabantsche wagons” each capable of transporting 1,500 pounds of grain, bread, or other supplies for William’s army. The next year, Machado and Pereira, provided 150 wagons to transport bread, grain, and biscuit both to and from magazines and the army. For the remainder of the Dutch War, Machado and Pereira provided transport to enable their bread to reach the troops in the field. During the Nine Years’ War, as we have seen, Machado and Pereira continued to supply their own wagons to transport their loaves to the soldiers either in garrison or on campaign. By 1691, bread wagons were included as part of the standard contract for bread. Every campaign, Machado and Pereira provided 250 wagons, each drawn by three horses, to transport bread to the troops in the field. In the winter months, 100 wagons were kept on, each drawn by four horses instead of three, to keep Dutch garrisons in winter quarters well fed. When William’s forces expanded beyond the capabilities of the firm’s standard 250-wagon contract, additional wagons were negotiated to supplement them. In 1693-94, Machado concluded a supplemental contract for 250 wagons, bringing the total number of bread wagons in the States’ army to 500. This change reflects the significant growth of the army between 1690 and 1693. Normal contracts required 250 wagons for every 35,000 men. The increase in the number of bread wagons in Machado

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80 F.J.G. Ten Raa, Het Staatsche Leger, 1588-1795, Deel VI, 28, 42, 54, 62.

81 For the increase in the size of the bread wagon train, see ARA RvS. 1545 Acteboek, 1686-94, 21 October 1693 bread contract with Machado and Pereira (ff. 377-383) which includes 250 wagons. On the same date, Machado concluded an additional contract with the Raad van State for 250 wagons in addition to the 250 in the bread contract for the 1694 campaign season (ff. 383-389). Thus the Dutch employed 500 bread wagons in 1694.
and Pereira’s train follows the growth of the Dutch field force, which by 1694 had grown to more than 70,000 men including auxiliaries.

Although Machado and Pereira continued to provide bread wagons for the whole of the Nine Years’ War, their share of the transportation burden was relatively small when compared to the overall needs of the Dutch army. In addition to bread wagons, the army required ammunition-wagons, horses for the pontoon and artillery trains, ambulances, and supply-wagons. Generals, senior officers, and the even the regiments themselves required wagons for transporting their baggage and heavy equipment while on the march. The vast majority of the army’s vehicles and all of the horses needed to draw them were hired from civilian contractors. Because of the sheer numbers of wagons and horses involved, the Raad van State and the States-General, together with the provinces, were forced to conclude agreements with numerous contractors to provide different elements of the Dutch train with its wagons and horsepower. As with the rest of the army, the responsibility for transport rested with the governing administrative structure. Generally speaking, the provinces were responsible for providing wagons for officers and regiments on their respective establishments, while the Raad van State hired the army’s ammunition wagons, artillery and pontoon horses, and hospital wagons. The wagons costs were included in the petition for “legerlasten” prepared by the Raad van State and presented to the States-General each year. For example, in 1694, £27,460 out of a total cost of £37,785 from Groningen’s legerlasten was allocated to pay for wagons. Since Groningen only had 4 infantry regiments on its establishment, the costs borne for hiring these wagons by the provinces with a larger share of the army on its bankroll would have been considerable.\textsuperscript{82}

The Raad van State hired directly those wagons attached to the artillery train or associated with administrations paid for by the Generality. Usually different types of wagons or transport were hired from different contractors. In 1694, the Raad van State concluded one contract with Christiaan Verzyl for 170 ammunition wagons for the coming campaign season, and another for an additional 170 ammunition wagons with H. Hardenbergh. To draw the Republic’s artillery, Geldermalsen and Slingelandt

\textsuperscript{82} Rijksarchief in Groningen (RAG), Archief Stad en Lande, 1 #1917, Rekening 1694. Overijssel, by comparison, paid £144,172 for its cost of legerlasten, 2/3 of which was probably allocated for the cost of wagons. This is interesting because only one regular infantry regiment was on Overijssel’s establishment. The high cost probably was due to the number of foreign regiments put on the province’s payroll during the course of the war. See W. Fritschy, Gewestelijke Financiën ten Tijde van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden, Deel I, Overijssel (1604-1795), 276.
concluded a contract with Govert Verploeg to provide 578 draught horses, each one at least five years of age and 15 hands tall, and Reynout van Weli contracted with the Raad van State to provide 224 draught horses for the pontoon train. In addition, the Raad van State hired on contractor to provide “12 Brabants Wagons each with three horses” to serve the army’s field hospitals. Including the bread wagons, the Raad van State hired directly 500 bread wagons, 340 ammunition wagons, 12 hospital wagons — all told 852 wagons and 2,556 horses — and 802 draught horses to pull the artillery train’s assorted wagons, limbers, pontoons, and guns.83

Wagon contracts were quite rigid in what they required of the contractor; they were also very straightforward. Every contract for wagons — whether it was for ammunition-, bread-, or hospital-wagons — required that they be “good strong Brabantsche Wagons like those usually used by the Spanish for their artillery and supplies.” The tradition for using wagons of this type dated back to the Dutch War when contractors with earlier experience serving the Spanish army began providing their services to William III’s forces after 1672. From that point forward, the Dutch army preferred to use this type of wagon. Wagons were required to have iron fittings and be capable of transporting up to 1,200 pounds of goods, equipment, or supplies. They were to be equipped with a “tanned tarpaulin” to prevent the good carried within being damaged by weather and rain. Contracts provided that each wagon be supplied with its own driver “older than 25 years old, experienced in driving wagons” and “three strong well trained horses, at least five years old.” In the event of loss or damage, it was the contractor’s responsibility to replace either horses wagons or both. In addition, the contractor was tasked with insuring that enough staff were employed to control his wagons while on campaign. To command his wagons, the contractor was to provide a Lieutenant and for every 25 wagons provided, a “good conductor with a horse” as well as a smith, bridal-maker, and wheelwright. The contract notes that the conductors “must be able to read and write, and have to keep a double list, and to note the numbers of the Wagons, and of the names of the same drivers.”84


84 The wording for these contracts was virtually identical for each one. I have used the printed contract concluded between the Raad van State and Cornelis Draak for 170 Ammunition Wagons on 28 December 1694. See ARA RvS. 1545, Acteboek, 1686-1694, unfoliated and inserted at the end of the aforementioned Acteboek.
the war, the Raad van State’s deputies utilized the same group of local contractors throughout. Because of the numbers involved, each contractor was usually asked to provide only a portion of the train. Appendix [3] notes the contractors and the numbers of horses and wagons hired by the Raad van State between 1689 and 1697.

The numbers presented above represent only half of the horses normally employed by the Dutch army while in the field. In addition to these, senior and staff officers as well as field deputies and other administrative personnel were allowed to hire additional wagons at the cost of the state. Unlike the wagons arranged by the Raad van State, these additional wagons were intended for individual officers and regiments. The number of wagons permitted to officers usually depended upon the rank of the individual in question. For example, in 1694, the Duke of Holstein-Plön, first field marshal of the Dutch army, was permitted 16 wagons; the Earl of Athlone and Duke of Wurtemburg, the generals of cavalry and infantry respectively, were permitted 12 wagons each, and so on. Based on a list from William III presented to the Raad van State, the army’s staff required 236 wagons. This number does not include wagons for the engineers and miscellaneous government officials, nor does it include the wagons the regiments hired to transport their supplies. Each regiment, furthermore, was allowed 17 or 12 wagons depending upon whether it was an infantry or dragoon regiment. The number of wagons permitted to cavalry regiments is unclear but was probably closer to 12. If one considers the number of regiments fielded by the Dutch in 1693 (44 infantry regiments and 4 regiments of dragoons), then the regiments would have possessed no less than 796 wagons. This does not include wagons for the

85 ARA CvdH. 109, Employ van wagens en karren, “Lyst van... het jaar 1694”;

86 O. van Nimwegen, De Subsistentie van het Leger, 70- 71.

87 Neither the work of Dr. van Nimwegen nor my own has discovered how many wagons were allocated to the cavalry regiments. It is possible that none were provided, or that cavalry officers were simply required to supply their own to the regiments. The first I find difficult to believe since the cavalry too would have needed wagons to transport its regiments’ tents, cooking supplies, extra saddles, and so on. It is likely that the cavalry regiments possessed a number of wagons similar to what was allotted to dragoon regiments. Unfortunately, I have found no evidence to suggest either possibility.

88 ARA CvdH. 109, Employ van wagens en karren, (unfoliated) “Extract uit het Register der Resolutien...Raaden van Staa...Woensdag den 17 Juny 1693;” “Wagen Ordonnantien...voor de naar volgende Regimenten Dragonders...14 Juny 1693;” “Extract uit het Register der Resolutien...Raaden van Staa...Woensdag den 15 July 1693;” and “Saturday den 18 July 1693...”
cavalry regiments, which would have brought the figure to well over 800 wagons. Thus, if one considers the 852 wagons in the artillery train and the 850 or so wagons in the regiments’ train, the Dutch army alone would have fielded 1,702 wagons drawn by at least 6,000 horses.89 All of these would have been provided by civilian contractors.

In addition to wagons, civilian contractors supplied the army with its waterborne transport. Ships played an important role not only in transporting unwieldy goods like grain, ammunition, or artillery pieces but personal baggage as well. Like other contracts, contracts with ship’s captains to transport goods were concluded for a particular period of time and for a particular purpose. Every campaign season, ships were hired to transport ammunition and guns up the Maas from the Republic’s main magazines in Holland to Maastricht or one of the cities in the Pays de Liège. For example, on 6 April 1691, Martyn van Leeuwen concluded a contract with the Raad van State to transport artillery and ammunition to Maastricht and Liège for the whole of the campaign season. Unlike wagon contracts, which noted in exact terms the type of wagon to be used, contracts with ship’s captains merely stipulated that the good must be shipped in “Maas ponten” or ferrys typically found in the region. Contracts did not stipulate the number of ships needed to transport the goods. Rather, they noted how much would be paid for a given poundage of goods shipped. Van Leeuwen’s contract stipulated that he be paid £17.00 10 st. for every last of 4,000 pounds transported. Half of the sum was to be paid in Dordrecht before the ships departed up-river and the other half was to be paid upon arrival in Maastricht.90 When boats were required to sail further up-river than Maastricht, the captains’ received an additional sum, usually much less than the £17.00 per last charged for the trip to Maastricht. In addition, the Raad van State often contracted with local entrepreneurs to provide draught horses to pull the boats up-river when there was not enough wind to do so. These “toght

89 This number is based on the contracts we have for the Raad van State for 1694, the number of infantry and dragoon regiments which took the field in 1693, and the numbers presented by van Nimwegen in Subsistentie van het leger. The numbers of wagons and horses contracted by the Raad van State are confirmed by sources while those of the regiments receiving “wagengeld” (wagon money) are estimates, since we don’t know precisely how many wagons were present with the regiments. The figures for the general officers, however, are firm ones. Thus, the only figures we do not know with certainty are the numbers of wagons present with the regiments. With that in mind, I believe my estimate to be an accurate one.

90 ARA RvS. 1545, ff. 160v-163v.
paarden” were sometimes drawn from the pool of artillery horses but more often than not were hired separately.91

The ships hired directly by the Raad van State were utilized for shipping artillery, ammunition, and other equipment of war. Forage and bread contractors also hired captains to ship their goods but these were considered part of the contract; thus such contracts were concluded between bread or forage purveyors and Maas captains and not Raad van State officials. The government played little role in the conclusion of these contracts. As we have seen, both bread contracts and forage contracts included wording relieving the contractor from paying local tolls. Thus while the State might exempt a captain transporting grain destined for magazines in the Spanish Netherlands from tolls, it was the contractor’s responsibility to hire whatever boats were necessary to transport the grain to his magazines. In addition to shipping grain, boats were often used to supplement the army’s baggage train. During much of the Nine Years’ War, officers were allowed one or more barges, in addition to wagons, to enable them to use water transport to move their personal goods from one place to another. Such contracts, much like those with wagon contractors, stipulated a particular period of service — usually the campaign season — rather than a particular cost per boat. However, in the case of personal boats, officers were only permitted a limited number depending upon their rank.

The widespread utilization of civilian contractors to provision the Dutch army was not unique. Most, if not all, early modern armies relied on civilian contractors to some degree. What was unique was the size and efficiency of the Dutch system. In large part, this stemmed from the proximity of Amsterdam to the theater of operations. The center of the Baltic grain trade and grain entrepôt for much of northern Europe, it is not surprising that Dutch bread and forage purveyors would be tied to this market in one way or another. Entrepreneurs like Machado and Pereira eased the administrative burden of the State by providing not only an important service but a ready-made bureaucracy to administer that service as well. Clearly, the original decision to utilize their services had to do with their personal relationship with the Stadhouder-King. But William’s continued use of their services demonstrates their efficiency as purveyors of

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91 ARA RvS. 1545.
subsistence. Obviously related to the efficiency of the Dutch system was the presence of large navigable rivers, heavily populated urban centers, and highly developed business networks. This infrastructure enabled civilian contractors to move heavy goods and supplies from Amsterdam — and to a lesser degree Antwerp — to armies campaigning in the field. Dutch armies would never want for food, forage, ammunition, or other tools of war. With such an effective system already in place, it should not be surprising that the allies’ other main contributor to the war effort in the Spanish Netherlands, England, would come to utilize William III’s “Dutch” logistics administration.

Dutch Logistics Administration and the Allied Army

When war broke out in 1688, the only major contributors to the allied armies in the Spanish Netherlands were, not surprisingly, the Spanish and the Dutch. The next year, English and Prussian forces joined them. During the course of the war, William’s diplomatic efforts brought a number of smaller German powers into the war, most of whom contributing forces in either the Low Countries or Rhine theaters of operations. Clearly the largest of William’s coalition forces were the Dutch, but by 1694 Britain was contributing almost as many men as the States-General. At the same time, Spain’s presence in the Low Countries waned as France threatened that country directly. As the war continued, small independent German contingents came to play and increasingly important role in the operations in the Low Countries and the Rhine theaters. At the time of the war’s zenith in 1695-96, Liège, Munster, and Hesse-Cassel had joined William’s original British, Dutch, and Spanish forces. Before the war would end, all of these corps would come under the umbrella of the Dutch Republic’s civilian-military logistics administration. Some contingents, like the Spanish, had their own well-established network which used some but not all of the same purveyors and administrators. Others, like the British, fully adopted the system used by William III’s Dutch troops.

The Administration of the British Army, 1689-91

When Britain entered the war against Louis XIV’s France in May 1689, its army was still recovering from the political and administrative disarray that followed the Glorious Revolution, and was unprepared for the scale of the land war that was to follow. As
with the British army in general, its logistics administration suffered from a combination of inexperience and incompetence — the result of its lack of any significant wartime experience since the English Civil War — coupled with the uncertainty that followed William’s decent on England. Describing James II’s British army, historian Sir George Clark noted:

The standing army of James II had many experienced officers. In all the arms, infantry, cavalry, artillery, and the still civilian engineers, it could easily be made ready to meet European troops. The weakest part of the military machine was the administration. This was inefficient and corrupt, and during the war, when the army expanded but the finances were always inadequate, it went from bad to worse, so that transport, supply, and pay were always badly managed.\footnote{Sir George Clark, \textit{The Later Stuarts, 1660-1714}, The Oxford History of England, vol. X (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1985 ed), 168-169.}

Prior to the Glorious Revolution, the British army’s logistics administration — like the army itself — was a small organization administered by several competing bureaucracies. Not surprisingly, this led to inefficiency with regards to the army’s supply, particularly in Ireland. Although William recognized the problem, he chose not to reform the army’s administration, though he no doubt would have liked to. Instead, the Stadhouder-King modified the administration only for the army in the Spanish Netherlands, utilizing the useful elements while circumventing those he deemed inefficient, corrupt, or extraneous.

When William accepted the English crown in February 1689, he inherited a British army whose administration was shared by a host of bureaucratic bodies. During the reigns of Charles II and James II, the army’s deployment was in the hands of either the Northern or Southern Secretary of State, depending upon where the army was deployed. The Lord High Treasurer had a hand in the army’s administration as well since he controlled the army’s finances. The disbursement of funds for both the soldiers’ pay and supplies came from the office of the Paymaster-General, a treasury official. The provision of the army’s cannon, ammunition, and field transport was controlled by the Board of Ordnance with its Master-General. And of course, Parliament itself could lay claim to one or more aspects of the army’s administration, since it, in the end, voted on how much money was to be allocated to the land’s defense. The army’s day-to-day administration, however, was in the hands of the Secretary-at-
War, and during the reigns of both James II and William III, William Blathwayt held this important post.

William Blathwayt became Secretary-at-War when he purchased the office from the Irishman Mathew Lock in 1683, and served in that capacity during James II’s reign, through the turbulent years of the Glorious Revolution, and William III’s reign until stepping down in 1704. During the course of Blathwayt’s twenty-one year tenure, the nature and prestige of the Secretary-at-War changed significantly. Before the Glorious Revolution, and William and Mary’s succession to the English throne, the post had been one subservient to the Secretary-of-State. William’s desire to free himself of the Secretary of State’s influence subsequently brought more prestige to the office of the Secretary-at-War, since he came to take over more and more of the formers duties.93 Under Blathwayt, the office increased in importance, more due to circumstances beyond his control than to any particular talent Blathwayt possessed. Parliament’s growing interest in the army — the result of its financial control of that arm concluded during the revolution settlement — coupled with the rapid growth of army during the reigns of James II and especially William III led that body to work more closely with the Secretary at War. Parliament came to rely on both him and the Paymaster-General of the army, the Earl of Ranlagh, for their army strength estimates, while William came to depend on him as a combination military secretary, Secretary of State, and Secretary at War while he was with the army on campaign.94

Blathwayt’s responsibilities as Secretary at War, and after 1692, as ad hoc Secretary of State and Secretary at War, placed him at the top of the British army’s administrative hierarchy, in some ways not unlike the Dutch Raad van State. The scope of his duties during the course of his tenure remained more or less constant until William III’s accession to the throne. Then from 1692 until the end of the war, Blathwayt came to accept more and more responsibilities since he performed the duties of two posts rather than one. However, when Blathwayt first accepted the post during

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93 In Britain, the two Secretaries of State divided responsibilities of foreign policy and military affairs. The Secretary of State for the North, who handled diplomatic activities in lands north of England, was responsible for the army, while the Secretary of State for the South, who was similarly involved with diplomatic affairs in southern Europe and the Mediterranean, was responsible for the Royal Navy.

Charles II’s reign, the office of Secretary-at-War was a less important one. Its close relationship to the office of the Northern Secretary of State in particular caused him at times to be referred to as one of his staff members. When Blathwayt began as Secretary-at-War, the official responsibilities of his post were unclear; indeed there were never specific instructions written for him. The only description we have of the Secretary-at-War's duties date from 1657 when he was authorized to

draw up, form, prepare, and present unto us for our royal signature all such commissions, warrants, letters orders, and other institutions fit and proper for the government of our army and forces according to such commands as you shall receive from ourselves for the same or from any of our principal secretaries of state signifying our pleasure. We do likewise will and authorize you to be present at our councils of war to take the results thereof, and to cause all such directions as you shall receive thereupon to be duly executed and from time to time to give us an account of the performance and to keep registers thereof.\(^5\)

The patent issued to Blathwayt in 1683 only mentions that he was to serve as the King’s Secretary-at-War, saying nothing of his duties. In spite of the vagueness of his patent, we can still piece together his responsibilities by examining his daily activities. Prior to 1688, Blathwayt was entrusted with the levying, disbanding, and quartering of troops as well as issuing them with their transportation and marching orders. He was also tasked with preparing the military establishments for signature by the Secretary of State. Payment of the troops fell under his care as well, though this only involved signing the pay warrants; the actual disbursement of funds was the responsibility of the Paymaster-General.\(^6\)

As part of his responsibilities, Blathwayt was entrusted with coordinating the army’s logistics administration. This included among other things arranging for the soldiers’ provisions, clothing, and food, as well as the horses’ fodder. Unfortunately for Blathwayt, the actual administration of each of these needs fell under separate bureaucracies over which Blathwayt had at best only partial control and at worst no control at all. Feeding the army was the responsibility of both the Commissariat and the Commissioners of Transport and Vicutalling, civilian organizations under the


control of the High Treasurer. The supply of provisions in the field was administered by the Commissariat with its Commissary-General who supervised the various civilian subcontractors, purveyors and sutlers tasked with providing the army with its food. The Commissioners of Transport and Vicutalling, on the other hand, was responsible for feeding the troops aboard ship or on limited expeditions. Finally, the Board of Ordnance administered the supply of the soldiers’ arms and ammunition, as well as their land transport. To insure that the field army was adequately supplied with food, munitions, and transport, Blathwayt had to work in close cooperation with the Lord High Treasurer and Master-General of Ordnance which often times resulted in the untimely delivery of provisions, money, and equipment to the soldiers in the field. The Board of Ordnance was particularly difficult because it was a completely separate organization from the army and took its orders from the King and his Cabinet. The inefficiency of this system would in the end lead William to modify it so that much of this unnecessary bureaucracy was circumvented, particularly with regards to the army in the Spanish Netherlands. Indeed, one of the principal reasons why Blathwayt would come to play such a pivotal role in the logistics administration of the British army was due to William’s dissatisfaction with the system in place in 1688.

During James II’s reign and during the first few years of William’s, the Commissariat was directly responsible for providing Britain’s soldiers with food, provisions, transport, as well as forage for its horses.97 At the head of this body was the Commissary-General, who during much of James II’s reign was Mr. John Shales. Shales was not a particularly good administrator and would play a key role in convincing William III to have the British expedition in the Spanish Netherlands utilize the Dutch network of civilian contractors as opposed to its own supply system. Shales had had a lackluster career as purveyor to James II’s forces before aligning with William III. He had supplied James’ army with its provisions during its summer exercises at the Hounslow Camps, but even then, there was some question as to his competence.98 Although it might have been clear to some that Shales was incompetent, the overall confusion following the Revolution coupled with William’s inexperience with James’ former bureaucrats led Shales to be entrusted with the job of supplying the Duke of Schomberg’s expedition to Ireland in the late-summer of 1689.

97 Scouller, The Armies of Queen Anne, 216-218.

Almost from the start, Schomberg complained of Shales’ inability to fulfill his administrative responsibilities. The Duke received his orders to begin preparing his expedition in mid-July. When he arrived one month later to check the expedition’s progress, Schomberg found the preparations painfully incomplete and behind schedule. Writing to William III, he explained “Your Majesty will be informed by the Earl of Portland, of the state in which we found things here; we have since used all diligence in embarking the troops. Mr. Sheills [Shales] excuses the delay that has occurred.”

Scarcity of funds, a shortage of provisions, and inadequate arms and ammunition slowed the preparations. Schomberg noted that he was forced to issue 500 muskets to almost every regiment because the ones originally provided them were so badly made. He added that he suspected Shales of taking bribes to pass the wholly inadequate weapons. Schomberg’s complaints became more severe as the preparations for the expedition neared its jump-off date. Schomberg’s 11/21 August letter to the King from Hoylake is particularly damning:

I spent yesterday in visiting the ships; Shales has not sent in them all the provisions that he promised; he has failed particularly as to water and beer, which he was desired to furnish. The arrangements made about embarking the soldiers are bad; Shales has deceived us in several ways and generally mismanaged things. Unless things are managed better in the future, the same accident will happen that occurred at the departure of the regiments destined by your Majesty for the relief of Londonderry. I think those who suspected Shales of not acting in good faith have reasons for their suspicions: he is said to have been a papist not long since.

Schomberg’s observations clearly did not bode well for his expedition. In spite of his suspicions, the force departed for Ireland the next day, and arrived off the coast on 13/23 August.

In spite of assurances from Shales that he would correct the supply problems, they did not improve. Almost every aspect of the expedition’s equipage seems to have been deficient. Following the fall of Carrickfergus on 27 August/7 September, Schomberg complained to William of the poor quality of the artillery and ammunition;

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100 CSPD, 1689-90, 219-220.
this he noted “is [largely] due to Mr. Henry Shales.” On 2/12 September, Schomberg’s army left the vicinity of Belfast and made camp at Dundalk on 7/17 September to await supplies. Already the lack of bread had begun to cause problems as the soldiers tried to live off the land. From 7 September until Schomberg’s decision to retire from the Dundalk Camp in mid-October, Schomberg’s troops suffered more and more from sickness, in part due to the poor logistical arrangements. In virtually every letter Schomberg wrote to William from Dundalk, the general either complained of Shales’ incompetence or begged that he be sent provisions. On 15/25 September for example, Schomberg complains: “I do not know how Shales can answer your Majesty with respect to his conduct about the provisions; he has sent over but two or three incapable men to dispense them. He ought, himself, to come over to Ireland, if he does not difficulties must arise.” Initially Schomberg believed Shales presence in Ireland would help matters. Indeed, with Shales still in England, the supply situation continued to degenerate. The lack of adequate wagons and horses to transport supplies to the army from magazines in and near Belfast was particularly pressing. “Pray hasten away Mr. Shales with the wagons and horses” wrote William Harbroad, Schomberg’s secretary, on 18/28 September.

Shales’ arrival in Ireland nine days later did little to help matters, however. On 3/13 October, Schomberg noted that Shales had finally arrived in camp but he had “only seen him once and cannot learn from him the condition of affairs with regards to provisions and their carriage.” By this time, the army had begun to suffer serious casualties due to hunger and sickness. On 3/13 October, Schomberg commented with regards to Shales “I do not know what opinion to form of this man, nor can I believe his

101 Shales was not the only one to blame for the poor quality of the army’s artillery though his incompetence with regards to its provision is clear as Schomberg’s letter illustrates: “The artillery officers are ignorant, lazy, and cowardly. There has been a great deal of trickery in the artillery: the bombs are badly charged, the cannon badly cast, and the arms badly constructed. Much of this is due to Mr. Henry Shales.” See CSPD, 1689-90, 231.

102 The lack of a supply train brought Schomberg’s forces into difficulties almost immediately. One eyewitness noted that he was “forced to dig potatoes, which made the greatest part of a dinner to better men than myself; and if it was so with us it may be easily supposed the poor soldiers had harder times of it.” The lack of bread and beer forced many soldiers to slaughter the local sheep for food. Eaten with nothing but water, the meat “cast a great many into fluxes.” For details see J.G. Simms, Jacobite Ireland, 126.

103 CSPD, 1689-90, 256.

104 CSPD, 1689-90, 261.
intentions to be sincere.”105 Two weeks later with the situation worsening daily, Schomberg’s fears of the Commissary-General’s incompetence was confirmed. Writing to William III on 16/26 October, William Harbroard raved

I desire to tell you what I will not write to the Committee, which is that we are in a most unhappy condition; that Mr. Shales studies more to ruin the army than Tyrconnell, that he had devoured all the oats bought by Mr. Fielding as the reserve, that of a 100 carts for the provisions, and the 400 horses, he cannot give an account of half, and that he has bought over 4,000 busshels of salt at 9d. per busshel and sells it here for almost four shillings, that—to be short—it is no fault of his if the army is not destroyed.

Harbroard concludes his letter exclaiming “God, in His mercy, preserve us!” — a clear illustration of the army’s desperate situation. After the loss of no less than 7,000 men due to illness caused by the rainy, cold weather coupled with the unsanitary conditions in the allied camp, Schomberg decided to withdraw from his position at Dundalk north to Lisburn.106

Although the death of so many soldiers at Dundalk Camp was not the fault of the army’s poor logistic arrangements alone, it no doubt contributed to weakening the soldiers’ resistance to illness. Not only Schomberg was convinced that Shales had played a key role in thinning his army’s ranks; Parliament too wanted a scapegoat for the disaster at Dundalk. On 26 November/6 December the House of Commons asked the King that Shales be taken into custody and his papers seized. Shortly thereafter, Schomberg arrested him. He was replaced temporarily by Bartholomew van Homrigh,107 whom Blathwayt “sent...off in great haste.” In the wake of the disaster, Parliament investigated Shales for the mismanagement of the army’s logistics administration. Although it is difficult to determine if he was ever formally punished

105 CSPD, 1689-90, 288.

106 Simms, Jacobite Ireland, 130.

107 According to Simms, Homrigh was a Dutch merchant who had settled in Dublin. He offered his services to William III following his arrival in England in 1688. For details see J.G. Simms, Jacobite Ireland, 35, 136-137.

The failure of the British commissary to adequately supply the Schomberg’s army in Ireland had an important influence on the British army’s logistics administration during the remainder of the Nine Years’ War. William was already skeptical of the capabilities of the British army, and the failure of its commissariat to supply Schomberg’s largely British corps in Ireland only served to confirm his opinion. As was the case with the British army as a whole, William had neither the time nor the patience to reform an organization that was needed immediately. Consequently, he sought his own solutions — solutions often intended to circumvent Britain’s more ineffective bureaucrats — to enable the army to take an active part in the war against France on a footing comparable with his own Dutch troops. In the case of the British army, the catastrophe at Dundalk convinced him that the British commissariat was simply not up to the task of supplying its forces. It seems that as early as mid-January 1690, William had begun preliminary discussions with the Dutch \textit{Provediteurs-Generaal} to provide the same services to the King’s British troops. In a 19 January letter to the Stadhouder-King, Schomberg commented that he hoped “arrangements may be made with Pereyra or with others here for the carrying provisions for 25,000 men for 20 days.” By early February 1690, it appears the Stadhouder-King had concluded an arrangement with Machado and Pereira’s purveying firm. On 10 February 1690, Schomberg wrote William that he was glad Pereira was chosen as the new Commissariat of the army “having always had a good opinion of his capacity.”\footnote{Not everyone was pleased with William’s appointment of Machado and Pereira. Schomberg apparently argued with Lord Halifax of the Committee for Irish Affairs with regards to the King’s appointment of the Dutch purveyors, arguing that Schomberg desired “favoriser ceux de ma nation; surquoj je le repliquay que je le croyois autant de sa nation que de le mienne.” For details see CSPD, 1689-90, 436-437.} In late March 1690, Issac Pereira, the brother of the \textit{Provediteur}, arrived in Ireland to take control of the army’s bread provisioning. For the remainder of the war in Ireland, two commissaries-general would serve William III’s forces there: William Robinson and
Bartholomew van Homrigh, while Isaac Pereira provided the army with its daily bread as well as the requisite transport to deliver it to the troops.\textsuperscript{110}

The British corps deployed to the Spanish Netherlands in the spring of 1689, on the other hand, fell under the logistical administration of Waldeck’s the allied army. From the beginning of its involvement in the fighting in the Spanish Netherlands, the British army — like its confederate allies — utilized local purveyors. In 1689 when the British corps under lieutenant-general John Churchill, First Earl of Marlborough arrived in the Spanish Netherlands, it quickly adopted the system then utilized by William’s Dutch forces. To facilitate this, the Earl of Ranelagh arranged for Willem Schuylemburgh, one of Holland’s paymasters, to pay the British troops in the Low Countries their subsistence money. Schuylemburgh drew funds from the British Paymaster’s account in The Hague so that the British troops could be paid in Dutch coin.\textsuperscript{111} Machado and Pereira concluded a contract to provide bread to the 10,000 man British corps at a rate of 5 sols per man per day, which was deducted from their pay like the Dutch and other Dutch subsidy troops.\textsuperscript{112} The presence of only two cavalry regiments the first year of the war made it impractical for the British corps in the Low Countries to conclude a separate contract for forage; furthermore, the withdrawal of the British cavalry to England during the winter months made this unnecessary. From 1689 through 1691, the British corps in the Low Countries hovered between 5,000 and 12,000

\textsuperscript{110} Simms, Jacobite Ireland, 136-137.

\textsuperscript{111} According to Louis Waddell, on 30 March 1689, the Earl of Ranelagh made an arrangement with Schuylemburgh to pay for the soldiers’ subsistence. The Exchequer released £2,814 in coin to the Schuylemburgh in exchange for a bill drawn on one George Clifford, a wealthy Amsterdam financier, payable to Roger Sizer, the English Deputy Paymaster in the Low Countries. After the initial release of coin, Schuylembugh was to draw funds from Ranelagh’s account in The Hague on the credit of Clifford. Schuylemburgh would then give the (Dutch) cash to Sizer to distribute to the troops. In this way, the British contingent was able to operate along the same lines as the Dutch, since as we have seen, the Dutch troops were required to purchase their food with exception of their bread which was deducted from their pay. Interestingly, Schuylymburgh had a hand in the Brandenburgh subsidy troops financial arrangements as well, though it is unclear whether or not he set up the same subsistence arrangement. Although Waddell describes Schuylemburgh as “the King’s servant,” Schuylemburgh was most likely a solliciteur militaire in the province of Holland. For details, see Louis M. Waddell, “The Administration of the English Army in Flanders and Brabant from 1689 to 1697” (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of North Carolina, 1971), 94-96, and ARA RvS. 109, Resolutien, 1688, 11, 16 October 1688.

\textsuperscript{112} Childs, The Nine Years’ War and the British Army, 52-53.
officers and men. For the first year of the war, Marlborough supervised the British corps’ logistics administration and supplies; but in practice it was administered by the same organization as Waldeck’s Dutch forces. In 1690, invasion scares and the poor condition of the British corps — now under the command of Major-General Thomas Talmash — led a number of regiments to be withdrawn to England, leaving only six battalions in Flanders during the winter of 1690-91. William’s victory at the Boyne in July 1690 freed up additional British forces for service in the Spanish Netherlands. Eight infantry battalions and two cavalry regiments joined Talmash six battalions bringing the paper strength of the British corps in the Low Countries to 11,144 officers and men in the spring of 1691, still but a small part of Waldeck’s forces. During the course of the year, additional British formations were transferred from Ireland to the Low Countries theater. Following the conclusion of the campaign season, the British force retired to its winter quarters in Flanders and the Republic. During this entire period, the British corps remained under the Dutch army’s logistical/administrative umbrella.

**British Logistics Administration and the Allied Army, 1692-97**

The conclusion of the war in Ireland coupled with the expansion of the British force in the Spanish Netherlands in 1692 saw additional changes in the British army’s logistics administration. When Marlborough arrived in the Low Countries in 1689, he was accompanied by few administrators since the size of the English force did not require a large support network, especially considering the presence of a large and efficient Dutch administration with its civilian purveyors. The expansion of the British force in the Low Countries in 1692, however, saw an increase in the number of British bureaucrats present with the army. That year saw the British force expanded from 14 battalions of infantry and 2 regiments of cavalry to 44 infantry battalions, 20 cavalry

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114 Waddell, *The Administration of the English Army in Flanders*, 83-86; Childs, Nine Years’ War, 162-163.

115 Marlborough was accompanied by Adam Cardonnel and Paymaster Roger Sizer.
regiments, and 4 regiments of dragoons, or just over 40,000 officers and men.\textsuperscript{116} The
expansion of the British contingent required that a larger administration be established
in the Low Countries to insure that it be properly fed, paid, and equipped.

Like the Dutch army’s administration in the Low Countries, the government
bureaucracy that accompanied the expanded British expeditionary force was but a
skeletal structure with civilian contractors carrying out the bulk of the force’s logistics
administration. At the top of the hierarchy was William Blathwayt. Blathwayt
accompanied William to the Low Countries in 1692 serving him not only as Secretary at
War but as his military secretary. His duties resembled those of both Geldermalsen (or
other Field Deputies from Raad van State), and Huygens, William’s Dutch secretary.\textsuperscript{117}
In her biography of Blathwayt, Gertrude Jacobsen notes that Blathwayt’s primary
administrative responsibilities while serving as William’s Secretary at War in the Low
Countries were the transportation of troops, contracts for the soldiers’ supplies (food,
clothing, and horses), and the distribution of subsidies to Britain’s allies. His duties
placed him under close supervision of William; thus Blathwayt was more a bureaucrat
rather than a policy maker. As with the Dutch army — where William directed not
only its employment but its administration as well — the British army was directly
controlled by the Stadhouder-King. As the King’s English secretary, Blathwayt, notes
Jacobsen, “was simply transmitting the royal orders...”\textsuperscript{118} To help him execute them,
Blathwayt employed a staff that included two personal secretaries. The most important
of these, Adam Cardonnel, accompanied him every campaign to the Low Countries.
Cardonnel, who had previously served as Marlborough’s secretary in 1689 and the

\textsuperscript{116} This figure includes 19,000 Danish and German auxiliaries. For details see David G.
Chandler, “Fluctuations in the strength of the forces in English pay sent to Flanders during the
Nine Years’ War, 1688-1697,” in War and Society, Vol. 1, No. 2 (September, 1983), 10-11; Childs,

\textsuperscript{117} Although Huygens is described as William III’s personal secretary, his duties while
accompanying the Stadhouder-King are not unlike those of Blathwayt who served as his
“Military Secretary.” For example, Huygens was responsible for preparing lists of regiments in
the Dutch army and their respective strengths as well as their marching orders. Huygen’s diary
notes that Blathwayt did the same for the King’s British forces. The duties he performs for
William on campaign closely resembles those performed by Blathwayt as the King’s “Military
Secretary.” For details see Het Journaal van Constantijn Huygens, den Zoon, van 21 October 1688 tot
2 Sept. 1696, tweede deel (Utrecht: Kemink & Zoon, 1877), passim; Jacobsen, William Blathwayt,
207-210, 242-250; and Scouller, The Armies of Queen Anne, 13-14, 67-68.

\textsuperscript{118} G.A. Jacobsen, William Blathwayt, 288-289.
Duke of Schomberg’s in 1690, did much of the clerical work for Blathwayt, which included compiling lists of regiments and calculating financial matters. Cardonnel would go on to become Marlborough’s military secretary during the War of the Spanish Succession.\(^{119}\)

Blathwayt was accompanied to the Spanish Netherlands in 1692 by Richard Hill, Paymaster for the British forces in the Low Countries. Although Hill received his orders from the Earl of Ranelagh, Paymaster-General of British forces, Hill worked closely with Blathwayt since the latter carried the power of the King’s signature and was responsible, together with Hill, for paying the troops. Hill also played an important part in the British army’s logistics administration. Because Hill had the power to disburse funds, he had direct dealings with the civilian purveyors — particularly Machado and Pereira — hired to supply the men and animals with their subsistence. As part of his responsibilities, Hill was tasked with deducting “bread money” from the soldiers’ salaries to pay for their bread rations. Not surprisingly, Hill also took part in the annual negotiations for bread and forage contracts to feed the British corps.\(^{120}\)

The British army, like their Dutch allies, drew their supplies directly from local military entrepreneurs. Although the British army possessed a commissariat, the Dundalk Camp fiasco convinced William that the British government was incapable of feeding its men on a scale required of a large army. From the beginning of the war, the British corps in the Low Countries had received its bread from Machado and Pereira, while the army in Ireland received its bread rations from Isaac Pereira since 1690. Being familiar with their firm’s capabilities, William did not intend to try to resuscitate a post that was little more than a redundancy in the Low Countries. Blathwayt’s presence in the Low Countries, furthermore, made the British commissariat administration superfluous, and Machado and Pereria were firmly established when the expanded corps arrived in 1692. With their network of administrators, magazines, and subcontractors, the Provediteurs-Generaal possessed an administration no existing


English bureaucracy could equal. Although written in 1694, Richard Hill’s letter to William Blathwayt illustrates the extent of the Provediteurs operation thus:

Pereyra...has alreadly his provision of corn, of ovens & of bakers at Gand[Ghent] as providor to ye Danes whom he has fed these 2 years & Ffonseca has ye same at Bruxelles, Louvain, as providor to all ye Spanish troops. Ffonseca has ye use of a 100 waggons as providor & a great many boats to transport his provision. They have a comis [commissioner] and serv’t in every town allready as they furnish ye troops every [where] with bread and for ye same reason have credit everywhere, they have provision of corn excise free in all towns, they have waggons to bring’em in straw and wood as forrage. ...Ffonseca has his own grounds and farms near Bruxelles where he designed to keep a stock of cattle and bring his provision as he had occasion, he has his own magazines and graneryes at Bruxelles & every town to lay up his provisions...\(^{121}\)

With such a network already in place, it made little sense to try to feed the British corps by means of an alternate system. Furthermore, Machado and Pereira’s services lent a degree of uniformity to the allied army’s administration. All of William’s soldiers — Dutch, English, and otherwise — received the same three pound ration of Prussian Rye bread at roughly the same price from the same magazines, baked in the same ovens, and delivered by the same wagons.\(^{122}\)

The arrival of an expanded British corps in the Low Countries required that the number and size of the army’s forage magazines be expanded, however. As we have seen, prior to 1692, the British army did not require separate forage magazines for its cavalry since none of it stayed in the Low Countries during the winter months. The expansion of the British presence in the Low Countries required the establishment of additional fodder magazines in Flanders to support the contingent’s horse during the winter months. In 1692, British officials concluded a contract with Gysbert van den Biesheuvel to provide 375 lasts of oats and 2,500,000 pounds of hay to establish

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\(^{122}\) Childs, *The Nine Years’ War and the British Army*, 54-55. It seems that there were slight variations between British and Dutch bread Contracts: Dutch contracts required 250 bread wagons while British contracts stipulated 200 wagons. For details see Waddell, *The Administration of the English Army in Flanders*, 407.
magazines in Ghent and Dendermonde. For the remainder of the war, the bulk of the British cavalry would winter in Flanders between Brussels and the coast. Like the Dutch, who utilized local entrepreneurs to provide their mounts with feed during the winter months, the British utilized the same pool of local forage purveyors. Although Machado and Pereira enjoyed a monopoly in the bread business, the contracts for forage went to a number of local entrepreneurs. After 1692, Machado and Pereira, Johan Heykoop, and Christiaan Craysnest all vied for contracts to provide the British horse with its winter forage.

The supply of ammunition, arms, and equipment to the British corps, on the other hand, was the responsibility of the Ordnance Office. As was the case with the Dutch army, individual regiments were generally responsible for providing its men with their own arms and equipment. However, the poor state of the King’s British forces required many regiments to be rearmed from English or preferably Dutch stores as this Board of Ordnance report states:

The firelocks received from Holland and those parts do far exceed ours here the stocks being very rotten; if the locks chance to take wett (which cannot always be avoided) they are no more fitt for service.”

Marlborough’s corps was equipped with weapons supplied to them in England when it embarked for the Low Countries in the early spring of 1689, but the poor quality of their arms forced him to procure new arms locally. On 25 May 1689, Waldeck permitted British troops to draw new weapons from the Republic’s arsenal in Delft in exchange for cash payment. Due to the proximity of the Republic’s well-stocked magazines and the small size of the British corps, this must have been a fairly common

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123 ARA RvS, 1545, Acteboek, 1686-1694, ff. 226. It is more than likely that the British simply took over responsibility for the Spanish forage magazines in Flanders in 1692 when the British force was expanded. For the first three years of the war, Spanish forces — particularly the cavalry — were quartered between Brussels and Ostend and as the war dragged on, they played an increasingly diminished role in the war. Though I have no direct evidence to support this, it is likely that the British corps, being significantly larger than their Spanish counterparts, gradually took over the Spanish cavalry’s role in Flanders while the Spanish pulled their steadily shrinking cavalry forces back to Brussels. See Chapters 3 and 5.

124 “A list of what forces his Ma’tie thinks necessary...dated 1690,” PRO SP 8/8, King William’s Chest, ff.6.

practice. Indeed, it is probable that during the first three years of the war, the British corps purchased more of its weapons from Dutch stocks rather than have them shipped from the Ordnance Office. The expansion of the British corps in the Spanish Netherlands however, saw the shipment of a train of field artillery from England that also required a supply of powder and shot. According to one document, in 1692 Ordnance shipped 11,200 rounds of ammunition to supply its 38-gun train.\textsuperscript{126} Although much of this would have been stored in the artillery train’s ammunition wagons, some of it would have had to be stored in magazines. From 1692 until the end of the war, the British artillery train wintered in Ghent, and it is likely that Ordnance would have established a magazine there to keep the British train equipped with ammunition and powder. But even after 1692, it is likely that the British continued to draw a portion of its ammunition from Dutch magazines. The staff of the British train, for example, included two prominent Dutch artillerists; Colonel Johan Wynant Goor, a client of the Earl of Athlone, commanded the train from 1692 until the war’s conclusion; and Lieutenant-Colonel and comptroller-general Willem Meesters, a noted innovator and inventor of weapons of war administered it. Lieutenant-Colonel Richards notes on more than one occasion that Goor travelled to Delft to arrange for supplies.\textsuperscript{127} Perhaps even more telling is the presence of Adriaan Koen as the British train’s “commissary of stores,” the same Adriaan Koen who would later serve in the same capacity in the

\textsuperscript{126} BL Stowe MSS. 444, ff. 10-12, “An Acct. of Brass Ordnance, Stores, and other Habillements of Warr Received from the Office of the Ordnance for the Service of their Maj. in Flanders. vis (1692).” According to the account, the Board of Ordnance shipped 3,200 rounds of solid shot and 160 “tinned cases filled with musketsloot” for the train’s 8 “demi-culverins” (long 12-pounders); 4,000 rounds of solid shot and 200 rounds of case shot for the 10 “sakers” (6-pounders); and 4,000 rounds of solid shot and 200 rounds of case for the train’s 20 3-pounder light pieces.

\textsuperscript{127} BL Stowe MSS. 444, ff. 16-22, “List of the Ordnance Train for 1694 through 1697.” (The last six folios of “Col. J. Richards Campaign of 1692-1693.”) Lieutenant-colonel Jacob Richards records numerous instances of Colonel Goor being absent to arrange for supplies in Delft or elsewhere, and it was commonplace for British artillery troops to go the Dutch arsenals to do the same. In his diary of the 1693 campaign, Richards reports on 22 April “I arrived at Rotterdam at 8 in the morning, where not finding any ordrs. either for the disposition the stores with me, or for the sending back the 8 mortars. &c. from Ghent with the Traine horses, I sent away a Conducotr. to Delft to one of the Commissrs. to know we. ord. Coll. Gore had left w. him or where it was Coll. Gore was to be found.” The next day, Richards reports “Commissary Smalbeen came to me & tho he had from Colle. Goor a Coppie of our bills of loading, yett had no directions for shipping, for their transportation, wherefore I dispatched and Express to Mr. Blaithwaite.” Smalbeen was a commissary in Dutch service. Such entries demonstrate the degree of integration between the British and Dutch artillery and supply personnel. For more, see BL Stowe MSS. 458, \textit{Diary of Jacob Richards, 1693, 1695}, ff. 1-2.
Dutch train in 1695.128 By appointing men familiar with the Dutch army’s own administration, William no doubt hoped that they would be able to work in close cooperation with their “Dutch” colleagues, perhaps even work within its administration if need arose. Therefore, while the board of Ordnance did provide the British expedition with much of its ammunition and supplies, it must have been common for it to procure supplies from Dutch sources.

The Ordnance Office was also technically responsible for arranging the army’s transport. However, as with food and fodder, the British corps relied mostly on local contractors for its transport. Unlike the Dutch army that utilized a pool of contractors to satisfy its transportation needs, the British army tended to rely almost exclusively on Machado and Pereira for its supply of wagons. According to John Childs, the British army employed 310 wagons to transport is supplies, while an additional 200 artillery cars were contracted by the Board of Ordnance to transport the train’s ammunition and tools.129 According to the list contained as part of lieutenant colonel Richard’s diary however, the artillery train alone required 230 vehicles. Of these, 61 were for the cannons (one per gun), 8 for the train’s mortars (again one per gun), one for the signal cannon, 80 for the infantry regiments, 20 for the horse and dragoon regiments, and 60 to carry the army’s ammunition supply.130 In addition to these, Machado and Pereira hired between 200 and 250 wagons to transport the British contingent’s bread. All told, the British possessed a train of between 700 and 800 wagons and cars, roughly half the size of the Dutch army’s train. Like the Dutch, the British train was supervised by a “Waggon-Master-General” who was also attached to the artillery arm. For most of the war, Robert Barker held this post while one Bill Pickett commanded the army’s baggage.131

William Blathwayt played the key role in insuring that the British system in the Low Countries worked. This came largely through his unique position as the King’s military secretary, Secretary-at-War, and ad hoc Secretary of State. Although his position as Secretary-at-War alone did not allow him to issue orders to bureaucrats in

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128 BL Stowe MSS. 444, ff. 16-22, “List of the Ordnance Train for 1694 through 1697.”

129 John Childs, The Nine Years’ War and the British Army, 59-60.

130 BL Stowe MSS. 444, ff. 16-22, “List of the Ordnance Train for 1694 through 1697.”

131 John Childs, The Nine Years’ War and the British Army, 60.
the Treasury or Ordnance, as military secretary Blathwayt enjoyed the power of the King’s signature. This was critical if Blathwayt was to circumvent the cumbersome London bureaucracy. Blathwayt could order Ordnance supplies shipped to the Low Countries in the King’s name. He could, furthermore, conclude contracts for bread and forage in Flanders with local entrepreneurs, thus circumventing the ineffective and superfluous Commissariat. The only time British troops were supplied by their own administration was aboard ship en-route to Flanders. Once soldiers disembarked in Flanders or Holland, they immediately fell under the administration Stadhouder-King’s confederate army. As Secretary-of-State, Blathwayt insured, furthermore, that the Secretaries of State in England’s influence was strictly limited. By appointing Blathwayt as temporary Secretary of State, William insured that he alone controlled the army’s employment and thus suffered a minimum of interference from politicians in London. In this way, the King exercised absolute control over the British contingent in the Low Countries, at least in terms of its employment and administration.

**Logistics Administration and the Allies**

Although the bulk of the forces in the Low Countries were in the pay of either England or the United Provinces, there were other contingents attached to the confederate army in the Spanish Netherlands which technically fell outside of the Dutch administrative umbrella. The most noteworthy of these forces were the allied contingents of the King of Spain, the Elector of Brandenburg, the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, and the Prince-Bishop of Liège. Yet in spite of this, they too at one time or another drew supplies from the civilian administration serving William III’s Anglo-Dutch forces.

During the entirety of the Nine Years’ War, the Elector of Brandenburg supplied a corps of 21,000 men to defend the lower Rhine, a region spanning roughly from Maastricht in the west to Bonn in the east. Although this army served independently for much of the war, the Dutch frequently supplied it with cannon and munitions, and when it was operating within the Low Countries, its subsistence. In 1689, the Republic

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133 Ibid, 166-167.

134 For details on the Brandenburg force, see Peter H. Wilson, *German Armies: War and German Politics, 1648-1806* (London: UCL Press, 1998), 89-95 and Table 3.3.
sent the Elector’s forces part of the Dutch heavy battering train to support them in the sieges of Kaiserswerth and Bonn as well as the requisite logistical support.\textsuperscript{135} It was usually preferable to supply Brandenburg troops directly than to allow them to see to their own logistical arrangements, especially if they were operating in or near the Low Countries theater. At the close of the 1689 campaign, Brandenburg soldiers plundered the cloister Koenigsdorf near Aachen, and extorted 2,000 rations of oats, hay, and straw from the village of Gronsveld, practically under the guns of Maastricht.\textsuperscript{136} Perhaps to prevent a recurrence of such counterproductive activities, whenever the Brandenburg army operated near Dutch magazines, the Republic saw to their provisions.

German subsidy troops in the pay of the Republic and Britain were supplied by the same system as the rest of the allied troops. During the first three years of the war, the Republic paid for the subsistence of their subsidy troops as part of the hiring agreement. Thus from 1689 through 1692, Brandenburg regiments in Dutch pay received their bread rations and horse feed for free. However, as more and more foreign troops joined the Grand Alliance forces in the Spanish Netherlands, the subsidy regiments’ provisions were merely paid for in part by the Maritime Powers, the regiments being responsible for half of the cost and the Maritime Powers the other half. As was the case with the Dutch and British forces, Machado and Pereira provided the allied subsidy troops with their bread, while local forage contractors supplied feed for their horses, depending upon the locations of the subsidy regiments’ winter quarters. On 6 November 1693, the States General resolved that the 6,000 Brandenburg subsidy troops pay for half of the cost of their rations while William paid one-third and the Republic one-sixth.\textsuperscript{137} Other subsidy troops were subject to a similar arrangement. On 1 June 1696, the Raad van State resolved that Hannovarian, Cellish, and Holsteinish, regiments pay for their bread in the same way, with the Crown subsidizing $1/3$rd of the cost and the States General $1/6$th. On 15\textsuperscript{th} and 25\textsuperscript{th} of June, troops from Munster and Cologne became part of the same payment scheme.\textsuperscript{138} Interestingly, the Republic


\textsuperscript{137} ARA Archief Staten Generaal, Res. 5 November 1693; ARA RvS. \textit{Resolutiën}, July-Dec. 1693, 6 November 1693.

continued to pay for the bread of the Prince-Bishop of Liège’s troops throughout the war, undoubtedly a reflection of the strategic importance of that land to the allies, particularly the States General.\textsuperscript{139}

On the other hand, the Spanish army in the Low Countries, while working closely with William III’s Anglo-Dutch forces, utilized a separate administration with its own network of purveyors. When war broke out in 1688-89, the governor of the Spanish Netherlands, Francisco Antonio Agurto, marquis of Gastañaga, was entrusted with commanding the army there. Its administration, however, was in the hands of Jan van Brouchoven, Count van Bergeyck. As Thesaurier-Generaal and Raadsheer van State, Bergeyck sat atop the government bureaucracy in Brussels. Of particular importance to the army were his responsibilities as Treasurer-General, which gave him charge over the Council of Finance, and thus the financial administration of the army.\textsuperscript{140} When the war broke out, the Spanish forces in the Low Countries numbered approximately 25,000 officers and men on paper, the bulk of whom being garrison troops.\textsuperscript{141} Because regiments in the Spanish Netherlands were for the most part garrison troops, their logistical arrangements were probably made locally, with each garrison making its own arrangements with contractors in town. For much of the first half of the war, however, the Spanish mustered a field force, first under the command of Gastañaga, but after 1691, under Max Emmanuel, Elector of Bavaria and Governor of the Spanish Netherlands. This force would have had to have been provided with adequate transport.

\textsuperscript{139} The first mention of the decision to pay for the Prince-Bishop of Liège’s troops out of the pockets of the States General appears in the States General’s resolution of 2 November 1693 and the Raad van State’s resolution of 5 November of the same year. The main difference in the agreement with the Prince-Bishop of Liège and the other subsidy troops is that the normal portion to be split by the English Crown and the Republic was paid by the States-General. The remaining half, normally paid for by the regiments themselves, was made part of the Dutch subsidy agreement, and thus came out of the Republic’s coffers. For details, see ARA RvS. 119, Resolutiën, july-dec. 1693, 5 November 1693; ARA Archief Fagel Supplementaire, (1.10.94), #662-663, “Generale Index op de Resolutien van der Raad van Staate der Verenigde Nederlanden, 1675-1699,” (5 November 1693 entry under “Brood, Magazynen van Rogge, Meel, Biscuit”).

\textsuperscript{140} Reginald de Schryver, Jan van Brouchoven Graaf van Bergeyck, 1644-1725: Een halve eeuw staatkunde in de Spaanse Nederlanden en in Europa (Brussels: Paleis der Academiën, 1965), 66-70, 80-81.

and provisions. According to Richard Hill’s 1694 letter to Blathwayt cited above, the supply of bread and forage to the Spanish army was in the hands of Manuel de Fonseca. Fonseca too was probably either Jewish or a Spanish “new Christian.” He was also a colleague of Jacob Pereira and most likely had numerous dealings with the Dutch firm Machado and Pereira. Fonseca, like Machado and Pereira, had established ovens and magazines in Brussels and Leuven to supply Spanish troops with their bread. Also like the Provediteurs-Generaal, Fonseca possessed a train of 100 bread wagons to transport the rations from the bakeries to the Spanish troops, both in the field and in garrison. Although it is difficult to determine if Fonseca provided Spanish troops with their forage, it is more likely that they too drew from the same group of local purveyors as the rest of the coalition forces.

**Conclusion**

Much scholarship devoted to the study of early modern military institutions, particularly the British army, has tended to examine them exclusively on the national level rather than how they were actually organized and used — as part of multinational coalition armies. Only on rare occasions was the army’s national, peace time, administration used without modification when troops were actually committed to war, especially in a period dominated by coalition warfare. As John Childs notes in his work on the British army in the late 17th century, “British troops rarely fought together as a separate, national corps. Only at the level of the brigade...did British soldiers fight along side one another.” The same could also be said of the Dutch, Danish, Prussian, and various German subsidy troops. As we have seen, the Confederate army in the Low Countries was an army organized and directed by the Stadhouder-King, not the governments whose armies formed part of that entity. Its administration, while drawing much from the Dutch, was also different and utilized government bureaucrats

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142 Shortly after the Peace of Rijswijk, Fonseca sought investors for the creation of a new East India Company using the Spanish Netherlands and Antwerp as its headquarters. One of these investors was Jacob Pereira from the Dutch provisioning firm. Most likely, they became acquainted with one another during the Nine Years’ War as bread purveyors for allied troops. For details on their post-war business dealings, see de Schryver, Graaf van Bergeyck, 157-165.

143 Bodl MS Eng. Hist. d 146 (1) , fo. 7 (Hill to Blathwayt, 22/12 Feb. 1694 as cited in Jones, War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough, 34-35.

144 Childs, The Nine Years’ War and the British army, 69-70.

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and staff officers from all of the contributors and was an administration unique to the wars of the Grand Alliance. Works like D.W. Jones’, *War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough*, and R. E. Scoullers’, *The Armies of Queen Anne*, while excellent in many ways, are fundamentally flawed in that they attempt to understand, in their cases, the British military bureaucracy without reference to Dutch administration which played the principal role in supplying the allied army. In describing Britain’s utilization of foreign purveyors and administrations, Jones’ contends that early modern states had but two ways available to them for supplying their armies: Direct Supply, by which army’s brought their supplies with them, or Indirect Supply which required the army to purchase its supplies abroad using money or credit. Jones’ notes that “of these two possibilities...that of Direct Supply would at least have possessed the merit of simplicity.” While on the surface, such a statement might appear to be true, it also assumes that early modern armies were indeed national entities, and more importantly, that they operated as such. As we have seen, that was not the case in William’s Confederate army. While multi-national, it possessed an administration remarkably centralized for one made up of so many nationalities.

The nature of the administration of the allied army in the Spanish Netherlands illustrates the important influence *het staatsche leger* — and William III — had on the coalition army’s logistics administration. Every contingent within the William’s confederate army, as we have seen, had a different administrative hierarchy governing it. The Republic had the States General and Raad van State; England had the Secretaries of State, Lord High Treasurer, Board of Ordnance and so on. Lesser states too had their own military administrations that provided their troops with their pay, clothing, and basic weaponry. But in the Spanish Netherlands, the government bureaucracies normally entrusted with the administration of the army as an entity, particularly those tasked with large-scale logistics administration, lost much of their power and influence to an ad hoc bureaucracy organized and run by Stadhouder-King William III and his staff. Not surprisingly, the coalition army’s administration bore many resemblances to the one used by the Dutch Republic. In part, this was due to William’s own experience and knowledge. As Stadhouder of the Republic, William had more experience with the Dutch system; he understood how it worked and knew the key officials, having appointed or nominated many himself. But part of the decision to adapt the Dutch system to the confederate army was due to the nature of the system itself. The Dutch army was a decentralized organization; its logistics administration was suited to
supplying an army of many contingents. Its reliance on civilian contractors, furthermore, centralized control of the administration under the Captain-General, the commander of Dutch forces in the field. It was a system well-suited to both supporting a multi-national army, and satisfying the tastes of William III.

Central to the Dutch system was the use of civilian food and forage contractors. In Amsterdam’s Jewish community, William found willing allies in his war against Louis XIV. The proven purveying firm Machado and Pereira handled the lion’s share of the allied army’s logistics administration, particularly the provision of bread, and to a lesser extent, forage. These Safardi businessmen had demonstrated their competence during the Republic’s first war with France and continued to do so during the Nine Years’ War. Supplying allied troops both in Flanders and Ireland, the Dutch Republic’s Provideteurs-Generaal possessed not only the expertise but the requisite administration to supply armies of 100,000 men or more, something none of the allied governments were able to do, as Schomberg’s Irish expedition demonstrates. By 1693, Machado and Pereira were supplying bread to all of William’s forces in the Low Countries with the exception of the Spanish which, by this time, made up but a small fraction of the allied army. William’s decision to employ Machado and Pereira was due not to the fact that they were Dutch purveyors, but rather because he knew their capabilities and had developed a long working relationship with them. Although the provision of forage for much of the war fell outside the control of these entrepreneurs, William’s decision to use the same pool of local contractors the for the entire war demonstrates the unifying and centralizing effect such a system had on the allies. By utilizing a system controlled by William and his staff, he insured that all of his soldiers, regardless of nationality, were provided for equally.

William did not, and could not, control every aspect of his army’s supply. The provision of weapons and ammunition, for example, was in the hands of the various governments providing men for his army. But in the end, the Republic bore most of the burden of supplying the army not only with ammunition but with most of its cannon as well. Although William would have liked to have standardized the army’s weaponry — and did so, to some degree — the supply of the soldiers’ personal arms and equipment was in the hands of the regiments’ colonels and captains. In times of need, the Republic could and did, however, fulfill the role as magazine for William’s coalition forces. The Stadhouder-King could rely on the Republic’s arsenals in Delft, Dordrecht, and Schiedam to provide his men, regardless of nationality, with weapons and
ammunition if need arose. This capability, perhaps more than any other, demonstrates the role of the Dutch Republic played within the allied coalition, particularly with regards to the war on land. While Britain would come to accept a larger and larger responsibility in the land war as is demonstrated by the expansion of its expeditionary force in 1692, it was still primarily a war fought for Dutch — and William’s — interests. The vast majority of the regiments were Dutch; and the allies’ were supported by Dutch artillery firing Dutch ammunition paid for out of Dutch coffers. And to insure that his forces were well supplied, William relied upon what was essentially a Dutch administrative system.

To describe the administration of the William’s Confederate army as “Dutch” would be an overstatement. However, there can be no question that William’s Confederate army owed more of its administrative direction to bureaucrats in The Hague than to their counterparts in Whitehall.
CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

On 1 September 1695, William III’s Confederate Army recaptured the impregnable fortress of Namur from the French. It was the first important allied victory in the Low Countries during the Nine Years’ War, and seemed to demonstrate like nothing else could that the tide of the war had turned in the allies’ favor. During the previous campaign season, the allies had had their first taste of victory since Walcourt. In 1694, the Duke of Holstein-Plön had captured Huy, opening the way for William’s siege of Namur. After two successful campaigns, it appeared that the allies would finally turn the tide of the war. Unfortunately for William, the Maritime Powers, and the Elector of Bavaria, the Duke of Savoy’s exit from the war in 1696 put the allies on the defensive the last year of the war, threatening to undo all that the allies had managed to accomplish. Everything that Britain and the Dutch Republic had done to redress French military power in the Low Countries seemed to indicate that the French were on the verge of collapse. And yet in 1697, Louis XIV’s forces managed to capture Ath, demonstrating that the French were still capable of defeating the much improved Confederate Army. After all of William’s work to create a military organization capable of wrestling control of the Spanish Netherlands away from France, it seemed that Louis XIV’s forces could not be beaten, and that the theater would remain a quagmire. But the French victory in 1697 obscured the fact that the Sun King’s forces were perhaps closer to exhaustion than the allies were themselves. Much like the German Army’s last offensive during the First World War, the French victory in 1697 obscured both French weakness and allied strength. During the War of the Spanish Succession, the same coalition army, this time commanded by the Duke of Marlborough, would drive Louis’
armies back and eventually invade France itself, something that would have seemed impossible to William during the Nine Years’ War.

The contrast between William’s marginal success during the Nine Years’ War and Marlborough’s great victories during the Spanish Succession War suggest that William’s efforts mattered little in the outcome of the war. But in many ways, William’s apparently less successful war in the Low Countries had significance beyond the Nine Years’ War’s outcome. William’s efforts provided not only a foundation for Marlborough’s victories but for the Anglo-Dutch relationship in the eighteenth century as well. In many ways, the Confederate Army symbolizes this Anglo-Dutch relationship, as well as both states’ role within the Grand Alliance. At the same time, it also highlights William’s ability as a general and as an organizer. His determination to protect the Dutch Republic from France — coupled with the Dutch Republic’s fear of invasion — ushered in an Anglo-Dutch relationship that would be the centerpiece of their respective foreign policies until the conclusion of the War of Austrian Succession. Although at first the Dutch Republic played the dominant role in that relationship, England’s emergence as a Great Power in the early 18th century saw that relationship reverse. The history of the Confederate Army, and both states’ role within that structure, in many ways mirrors the relationship between England and the Dutch Republic themselves.

The Glorious Revolution, the Anglo-Dutch Alliance, and the European Balance of Power

The creation of the Confederate Army was due directly to the Glorious Revolution and the circumstances that triggered it. The Dutch Republic’s fear of French attack and William III’s determination to stop Louis XIV’s hegemonic designs, were the principal reasons why the Prince of Orange and the States General were willing to overthrow the Stuart monarchy. The Dutch Republic’s experience in its war with France demonstrated that the current constellation of states opposed to Louis XIV were simply not strong enough to insure the security of the Republic in the event of further French attacks. The Dutch Republic needed England; but England was unlikely to throw its lot in with the Sun King’s opponents, in spite of the growing number of states that opposed him. The diplomatic situation of the 1680s created an increasing number of states willing to oppose Louis XIV’s seemingly insatiable desire for territory. James’ determination to steer a middle course between Louis XIV’s hegemony and those
opposed to him on the continent might have seemed an intelligent course to James but to the Dutch Republic, desperate for support, a dangerous gamble. In the wake of Louis’ Reunions policy and his revocation of the Edict of Nantes, William III and the Dutch came to the conclusion that only an armed overthrow of James II could secure English military support in the event of war with France. Thus, the Dutch Republic’s motivation for invading in 1688 was to see England’s resources mobilized against France. The fact that they would be mobilized in support of Dutch diplomatic and military objectives demonstrates the central role the Dutch played in the Glorious Revolution. The success of William’s “Grand Design,” symbolized his being crowned King of England and his subsequent return to the Dutch Republic in February 1691, was demonstrated when William first took command of Anglo-Dutch forces in the Spanish Netherlands that same year. From that point on, England would be an active participant in Europe’s wars on the continent, a major departure from its previously isolationist policies.

The creation of the Confederate Army in many ways marked the ultimate realization of William III’s and the States General’s objective in ousting James II. Before William and Mary were crowned king and queen, they had promised the States General that they would bring England into the growing coalition against France as quickly as possible. James’ return to Ireland in March of 1689 provided them with the support they needed to push Parliament toward that end. By the summer of 1689, England had joined the Dutch Republic and the Empire in alliance against Louis XIV. It was a watershed moment in English history because it marked the beginning not only of England’s active participation in continental politics but of their role as the guarantor of the European balance. In supporting the Dutch and the coalition, England shifted to an isolated island nation to one concerned with the balance of power. William III’s role in setting England on this path is crucial since it was his policy they adopted. As leader of the anti-French coalition, William pushed England to embark upon a continental rather than a Blue-Water strategy, England’s traditional strategy in times of war. Their reluctant acceptance of William’s assessment of this strategic reality led England on a path toward great power status. To pursue a continental strategy required England to mobilize its financial and military resources on a scale never seen before in its history. In a few years, England’s financial might enabled William to assemble the largest army and navy in English history up to that point. This achievement demonstrated not only England’s latent military power but the ultimate significance of the Glorious Revolution.
forces during the Republic, operations. Geography The First Modern Coalition Army? intervention in English affairs. have tried within England's creation Glorious military War, England's inadvertent commitment. pursuit to England. Although William succeeded in mobilizing English resources in support of the Dutch, he inadvertently ushered in the end of the Dutch Republic's golden age. By unleashing England's military might, the Dutch Republic saved itself from French aggression only to be overpowered by an awakened England. During the course of the Nine Years' War, the Dutch Republic continued to field the largest army of the allied coalition and the second largest navy but by the war's end, England had matched the Republic's military mobilization on the ground and far surpassed it at sea. Thus, while the Glorious Revolution might have been undertaken with Dutch interests in mind, the creation of the maritime alliance exposed the Dutch Republic's growing weakness. England suddenly was central to Dutch security, a situation that posed no problem while William was on the throne but one fraught with dangers should England pursue a policy more in line with its interests than the Dutch Republic's. Although this was less obvious to contemporaries than it is to historians today, England's growing role within the coalition and William's gradual shift from Stadholder to King paralleled the two states' changing relationship within the alliance. Although the Dutch Republic had tried to act as a balance to France, only England was sufficiently placed, both financially and militarily, to do this. Indeed, England's steadily expanding role within the Confederate Army highlights its changing position. Nevertheless, England might not have emerged a great power in the eighteenth century without the Dutch Republic's intervention in English affairs.

The Confederate Army: The First Modern Coalition Army? The problem of fighting Louis XIV by necessity required assembling coalition armies. Geography in large part determined who would contribute to what theater of operations. The Low Countries theater attracted the armies of the Spain, the Dutch Republic, England, and to a lesser extent Brandenburg-Prussia. The allied experience during the war's first two years demonstrated that it was not enough simply to send forces to the Low Countries, however; there had to be a command structure capable of
directing coalition armies and an administrative structure able to supply it. In many ways, Spain’s inability to defend its territories served as the catalyst for creating an administrative structure for supporting a large military organization. Originally, the Dutch Republic established magazines in the Spanish Netherlands in order to support its own forces while wintering in the region. Later, this network of administrators, contractors, and magazines would support the Dutch and English armies and their subsidy troops.

But the need for an organization to supply the armies in the Spanish Netherlands was not the only factor that led to the creation of the Confederate Army. The first two years of the war demonstrated that it was impossible to orchestrate the campaign in the Spanish Netherlands effectively. Although the members of the Grand Alliance attempted to alleviate the problem through the creation of a planning conferences, only a strong leader could hold the various elements of the coalition together on campaign. William III’s decision to command in person was crucial in creating the Confederate Army as an organizational entity. During the course of William’s tenure as commander in the Low Countries, the Confederate Army went from a collection of contingents to a military organization with a defined structure and chain-of-command.

William’s “reform” of the Confederate Army in 1692 had as much to do with the Dutch Republic’s and England’s growing military burden — and the English contingent’s growing presence — as it was his desire to create an international military organization. Indeed much of what William did organizationally was typical for the early modern period. The principal difference was that William had both the militaries of England and the Dutch Republic at his disposal, giving him an immense army over which to command. As he had always done, he relied upon “favorites” to fill the army’s most important posts, and most of these were Dutchmen or veterans of the Dutch army. In fact, it was his reliance on the Dutch army — not surprising given William’s military experience and position — that in the end gave the Confederate Army its “Dutch” character.

Also crucial was the Dutch Republic’s ability to mobilize administrative resources to support not only a much-expanded Dutch army, but a much-expanded British Army as well. Indeed, the Glorious Revolution’s impact on the British Army led William to use the Dutch Army’s administration to support his British troops in the Low Countries. With both of his armies in the Low Countries under one administrative
Likewise, fully of course relied manpower strength mercantile and The more than just a collection of armies but a military organization shaped by William III. several particularly doctrine Brandenburgers, which uniform one. comprised suggests command where his predecessors had failed. Furthermore, in independent the his main control over his opportunity to act against his plans. By integrating the Spanish into the main order-of-battle, as opposed to letting them operate their own independent corps in Flanders their forces fell under his command and watchful eye. Furthermore, his close relationships with men like Vaudemont and Bedmar coupled with his own reputation as a military commander helped William exercise effective command where his predecessors had failed.

William’s influence on the organizations that comprised the Confederate Army suggests it might have had an institutional identity much like the national armies that comprised it. Not surprisingly, the Dutch Army’s personality was the predominant one. Although it would be too much to suggest that the Confederate Army had a uniform doctrine, the dissemination of “platoon fire” among the military organizations which participated in the confederate army — particularly the English, Brandenburgers, and those of minor German states — suggests a uniform fighting doctrine of sorts. The fact that it was the responsibility of William and his staff officers, particularly the Adjutant-General for directing the army’s discipline, the fact that several of the participating armies adopted it suggests that the Confederate Army was more than just a collection of armies but a military organization shaped by William III.

Coalition Warfare and Modern War
The creation of the Confederate Army and the way in which it was organized, supplied, and led, suggests much about the states who provided it with its resources. As mercantile powers, both the Dutch Republic and England relied upon their economic strength and financial wealth to raise armies of unprecedented size. Lacking the manpower to raise large standing armies from its own population, the Dutch Republic relied upon the German soldier market to supplement its standing forces. During the course of the Nine Years’ War, the Dutch Army expanded from 45,000 men on the eve of the Glorious Revolution to 102,000 men in 1694 at the peak of the army’s strength, fully half being hired soldiers from Germany, Scandinavia, and the Swiss Cantons. Likewise, the Dutch Republic’s position as Europe’s entrepôt enabled it to support not
only the Dutch Army’s expanded numbers but the English and Spanish Armies as well. The Dutch Army’s Jewish military purveyors were capable of supplying large numbers of men and horses. Their access to the Baltic grain trade was crucial in the allies’ ability to continue fighting. In addition, the Dutch were able to provide the army with munitions, weapons, heavy cannon, and transport — everything an early modern army needed to conduct a war of sieges.

Even more important was the Confederate Army’s ability to replace lost men and equipment. The Dutch Republic’s reliance on the German soldier market enabled them to keep large forces in the field even after serious losses. After the battle of Neerwinden, a battle where the allies lost close to 15,000 men, the Dutch were able to make good their losses in men and materiel within days. Indeed, their reliance on the German soldier trade enabled them to hire additional troops such that the year after one of the Confederate Army’s greatest defeats, it had one-third more men than it had the year before. England too was perfectly placed to wage this sort of “mercantilistic” war. Having not yet realized its full potential as a European power prior to 1688, by the war’s middle years England was able to not only raise an army of equal size as the Dutch but an immense navy as well. England made use of the German soldier market for the first — but not the last — time in its history; indeed the Nine Years’ War was the first war in which the Crown hired significant numbers of foreign troops. By 1695, the year of the British army’s peak strength, fully one-third of the army was foreign, a clear indication not only of the Dutch Republic’s influence on Britain, but of Britain’s emergence as a fiscal-military powerhouse.

William III clearly played the central role in not only creating the Confederate Army, but in seeing England transformed from a second-tier, largely isolationist, European power, to a Great Power with the balance of Europe in its hands. In fact, one need only follow William in tracing the rise of one great power, England, and the fall of another, the Dutch Republic. When William arrived in England in 1688, his goals were Dutch — to bring England in alliance with the Republic. But once this had been accomplished, William’s power base shifted from the Dutch Republic to England. Even as commander of the Confederate Army, William derived his greatest power not from the Stadholderate but from the English Crown. Consequently, his base of power slowly shifted from the Dutch Republic to England. At the same time, England slowly but surely began to surpass the Dutch Republic as the real muscle behind the Grand Alliance. Although the Confederate Army was clearly a “Dutch” organization, by the
war’s end England was contributing as many troops as were the Dutch. Even more important, William was King of England. While he would return to the Dutch Republic as part of his duties as Stadholder, William would never really return. Spending his summers on campaign, his falls at Het Loo, and his winters at Kensington Palace, William was the center of power wherever he was. When he was with the Confederate Army, it was the most powerful instrument of the Grand Alliance. When the war ended in 1697, the power behind the Dutch Republic had shifted to England. With William on the English throne, England emerged the dominant power in the allied camp. Rather than calling the tune as it had done in 1688, the Dutch Republic now followed England’s lead. When war erupted again, William emerged as the Grand Alliance’s leader once more, but he was no longer “Dutch William” but King of England. His death in 1702 not only deprived the Grand Alliance of a great military organizer but it also deprived the Dutch Republic of the insurance that Britain would work not only in its own interests but in the Dutch Republic’s as well.

The War of the Spanish Succession demonstrated the importance of the Nine Years’ War to Britain’s emergence as a Great Power. Pursuing a continental policy first implemented by William III, Britain assumed leadership of the Grand Alliance, supplanting the Dutch Republic in that role. On the continent, the Duke of Marlborough skillfully wielded the Confederate Army in the Low Countries and Germany. Just as during the Nine Years’ War, allied success in the Spanish Netherlands was as much due to the Dutch Republic’s ability to raise still larger armies as it was Marlborough’s ability to wield the Confederate Army effectively. Again, the Dutch would raise a large army — over 120,000 men at the war’s peak. The combination of Marlborough’s brilliant leadership, Spain’s shift to the French camp, and the Dutch Republic’s military commitment would lead to allied success in the Spanish Netherlands. Marlborough’s victory at Ramillies enabled the allies to conquer much of the Spanish Netherlands while at the same time demonstrating the weakness of Spanish fortresses in the region. The ease with which Marlborough was able to conquer the Spanish fortresses in Flanders perhaps says more about the state of their defenses than it does his generalship. Once his forces reached Vauban’s pré carré, Marlborough’s pursuit came to a screeching halt and war returned to one dominated by sieges.

Although the nature of the war in the Low Countries had not changed, the roles of its principals had. Whereas the Nine Years’ War saw Britain being driven by Dutch
strategic goals, the Spanish Succession saw their roles reversed. Britain was now the arbiter of Anglo-Dutch strategy with Marlborough at the helm. Although England still provided 40,000 men for the Low Countries, the Dutch Republic’s burden grew, illustrating the continuing importance of the Low Countries and the barrier to Dutch interests. Indeed, the Dutch had grown more dependent on Britain than the other way around, a clear indication of the reversal of roles. Britain’s emergence as a Great Power and the Dutch Republic’s decline is perhaps best illustrated by the withdrawal of the British army in 1712 followed by the Confederate Army’s defeat at Denain. The defeat at Denain demonstrated how much the Dutch needed Britain. At the same time, it also showed that Britain had emerged a Great Power that would pursue its own interests.

In some ways, one might say that William III left two legacies; one a coalition army, founded on the Maritime Powers’ great economic strength, capable of meeting the French on equal terms, and the Dutch Republic without a guarantor, without a strong figure to guide it through its next war. Although the Dutch Republic would continue to bear the lion’s share of the land war’s burden, the absence of someone in England to guarantee that Dutch interests would be served, more than the financial cost of war, contributed to the Dutch Republic’s decline as a great power and England emergence on the world stage. Likewise, Britain’s emergence as a great power on the European stage would not have been possible without William III. The Confederate Army was William’s legacy but it — and other armies like it — would become Britain’s hallmark.
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