ETHNIC NATIONALIST ACTORS: PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN ETHNIC NATIONALIST HOMELAND STATES AND DIASPORA

DISSERTATION

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By

Rachel J. Sorrentino, M.A.

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Dissertation Committee:

Professor Richard K. Herrmann, Advisor
Professor Brian M. Pollins
Professor Marilynn B. Brewer

Approved by

Advisor
Political Science Graduate Program
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ABSTRACT

The signature of ethnic nationalist communities is often assumed to be a combination of shared ancestry, culture, and values (for example see Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983; Smith 1986). Although these features reflect a common thread among ethnic nationalist communities, the question of what motivates the activities within these communities is far more complex. In this dissertation, I develop a model to clarify various elements of the complex nature of transnational ethnic nationalist communities. I explore the issue of how identity, homeland/diaspora/and adoptive state relationships, and homeland/diaspora/and adoptive state power affect cooperation between homelands and their diaspora communities.

The dependent variable discussed in this thesis is “cooperation” between ethnic nationalist homelands and their diaspora. I gathered data from Lexis-Nexis news stories and coded all appropriate data using the Text Analysis By Augmenting Replacement Instructions (TABARI) coding program; cooperative events were coded according to a modified World Event Interaction Study (WEIS) scale. In addition to measuring “cooperation”, I compiled a data set that includes demographic information for all states and ethnic groups included in the Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook (1999). I also gathered information regarding shared ethnic nationalist identity, cultural
similarity, and issues that directly relate to homelands, diaspora groups, and adoptive states’ relationships and power.

In order to explore homeland/diaspora cooperation from cultural similarity, homeland relationship or power perspective, I collected descriptive data for 42 homeland states that are included in this study. For those homelands that did interact with a diaspora group in 1998, I modeled how cultural similarity, homeland relationships and power prospects affected homeland/diaspora cooperation.

I found that homelands were more likely to interact with their diaspora when other international actors, particularly international institutions, targeted their diaspora. Furthermore, I found that cultural similarity, homeland relationships and power do affect homeland/diaspora cooperation, however the impact of variables associated with each of these concepts is dependent on whether one controls for shared identity between homeland and diaspora groups.
Dedicated to Wilbert H. Walters, who sparked my interest in International Politics
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VITA

May 12, 1972 .........................Born-Iowa City, Iowa

1994 .................................B.A. Political Science, University of Chicago

1994 .................................Dean’s Fellow, The Ohio State University

1995-1997 .............................Research Associate and Graduate Teaching,
                           The Ohio State University

1997 .................................M.A. Political Science, The Ohio State University

1998-2000 .............................Data Manager, University of Chicago

2000 .................................Lecturer, The Ohio State University

2000-2001 .............................Lecturer, Hunter College (CUNY)

FIELD OF STUDY

Major Field:  Political Science
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview

The signature of ethnic nationalist communities is often assumed to be a combination of shared ancestry, culture, and values (for example see Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983; Smith 1986). Although these features (shared ancestry, culture, and values) reflect a common thread among ethnic nationalist communities, the question of what motivates the activities within these communities is far more complex. In this dissertation, I develop a model that can be used to clarify various elements of the complex nature of transnational ethnic nationalist communities (Figure 1.1). I explore the issue of how identity, homeland/diaspora/and adoptive state relationships, and homeland/diaspora/and adoptive state power affect cooperation between homelands and their diaspora communities.
Sheffer writes that the existence of a diaspora group in an adoptive state “will result in the formation of either conflictual or cooperative triadic networks involving homeland, diaspora and host country” (Sheffer 1986, p. 10). However, the literature supporting Sheffer’s triadic network is scanty. It must be noted that although there is qualitative literature on diaspora communities, quantitative analysis of diaspora communities is limited. The focus of the diaspora literature is on defining and describing diaspora communities with anecdotal and journalistic evidence that reference specific cases. For example, a great deal of descriptive literature exists about the African American, Armenian, and Jewish diaspora, but no literature addresses how the foreign policies of associated homelands are likely to be affected by the existence of these groups (Elazer 1986; Sheffer 1986; Pattie 1994).
Authors that specifically discuss diaspora groups focus on the internal organization of diaspora groups (Armstrong 1976), labor and immigration issues (Kenny 1999; Weiner 1986, 1993), cultural assimilation (Landau 1986; Laitin 1998) and the impact of diaspora on their adoptive states (Sheffer 1993; Chapin 1996). There are also several sources that address the economic implications of diaspora transnational networks; the focus of this work is on economic resources available to several diaspora communities (Lever-Tracy 1996; Bolt 1997). However, this literature has more to do with the impact of specific diaspora communities on their adoptive states than on homeland response to their diaspora’s needs.

I believe that the most comprehensive source on the role of diaspora in the field of international relations is the edited volume compiled by Gabriel Sheffer (1986). This book includes articles that address transnational diaspora networks and their impact on the field of international politics. Although this book includes chapters that address diaspora groups and their potential affect on international politics, none of the studies included in this book identifies, describes, or quantifies any information for diaspora groups on a global basis. Instead, most of the articles presented in this book focus on descriptions of the institutions and corporations affiliated with transnational diaspora networks rather than on the nature or characteristics of the diaspora groups or homelands associated with these networks. Other than noting the existence of diaspora communities and the assumption that these communities will continue to exist as distinct organizations within their adoptive states, there is very little comparison of the characteristics of diaspora groups or how these characteristics may affect diaspora group relationships with their homelands.
Although the descriptive literature on diaspora is useful for those interested in the organizations and institutions that support diaspora communities, very little applies to the affect of diaspora groups on international politics. I believe that the research presented in this project closes the empirical gap in the literature about diaspora characteristics as well as the potential relationship between homelands and their own diaspora.

I believe that two major issues have yet to be addressed within the international politics literature that refers to ethnic nationalist communities and the triadic network that Sheffer discusses. First, I believe that before assuming that the nature of homeland/diaspora/adoptive state relations is either cooperative or conflictual, we must use empirical evidence to determine how homelands and diaspora interact rather than looking at the relationship in theoretical terms. Second, I believe that in order to understand the underlying features of ethnic nationalist community interactions we must establish the impact of shared identity, the homeland/diaspora and adoptive state relationship, and power related issues for each of these three actors on the interactions of members within a single ethnic nationalist community.

In addition to addressing the traditional assumption that ethnic nationalism is a reflection of shared ancestry, culture, and values; I evaluate the association between homeland/diaspora cooperation and the relationship maintained by the homeland with its diaspora and the adoptive state in which the homeland’s diaspora live. Furthermore, I evaluate how the balance of power between the homeland and adoptive state affects homeland/diaspora prospects for cooperation. In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, I discuss the theoretical issues associated with the study of ethnicity and international politics. In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I outline the research design I have constructed for this
study; Chapter 3 presents a survey of the collected data as well as some of the characteristics related to the selected homeland and diaspora cases. I discuss the logic of my expectations in Chapter 4. I follow this discussion with analysis of the individual impact of identity, relationships, and power and I measure how combined identity, relationships, and power explain homeland/diaspora cooperation in Chapter 5. Finally, I present my conclusions of the research conducted for this project in Chapter 6. The focus of Chapter 6 is my discussion of the research and theoretical implications of the work done in this project for future studies of ethnic nationalism and international politics.

1.2 Divergent Homeland and Diaspora Interests: Two Examples

Many cases exist in which homeland states and diaspora work together to improve the welfare of their common ethnic nationalist communities. However, one can also find many cases in which homelands and diaspora do not support the other’s efforts, despite membership in the same ethnic nationalist community. Regardless of which example of homeland/diaspora interaction one chooses to cite, I believe that the underlying feature of all homeland and diaspora interactions is inconsistent support for each other.

China’s relationship with its diaspora clearly illustrates this point. During 1911, the Chinese government actively supported its Southeast Asian diaspora communities by enacting a “nationality” law that stated that any individual of Chinese ethnic origin would be considered a citizen of China and, as such, would be protected by the Chinese state (Esman 1986). According to Esman, at this time, many of the adopted states in which Chinese diaspora lived supported China’s “nationality” law. By supporting China’s “nationality” law, adoptive states were able to minimize the participation of Chinese
diaspora in their own domestic affairs. Chinese diasporas’ continued dependence on China for support enabled the adoptive states to minimize incorporation of the Chinese diaspora into political and economic domestic affairs.

Esman notes that following the Chinese revolution, China’s support for its diaspora communities began to wane. Once the outcome of the revolution became apparent and China reviewed its diaspora-related policy, tension between China and adoptive states increased. As China’s power became more apparent to its regional neighbors, tension and concern among Southeast Asian states arose. In addition to uncertainty about China’s regional goals, adopted states feared that Chinese diaspora would respond to the absence of direct Chinese support by interfering with domestic politics.

China responded to the concerns of adoptive states by clarifying its relationship with Chinese diaspora. China and Indonesia, one of the Southeast Asian states concerned with Chinese diaspora, agreed to sign the Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty of 1955. This treaty represented a reversal of the previous “Nationality” policy promoted by China. The 1955 treaty provided that Chinese diaspora would no longer be automatic citizens of China, and consequently that China would no longer be responsible for Chinese diasporas’ protection. Based on this example, Chinese support of its diaspora has been inconsistent at best. Even though Chinese diaspora expected to suffer economic discrimination because of the Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty, China refused to extend support to its diaspora.¹ For more on current Chinese nationalist interactions see Strecker Downs and Saunders 1998/1999.

¹ For more on the Chinese case, see Esman 1986
China’s support for its diaspora can be characterized as not being driven by concern for the welfare of the ethnic nationalist community as a whole, but rather “when Peking’s foreign policy interests clashed with the defense of overseas Chinese, the former would have to prevail” (Esman 1986, p. 136). In my opinion the Chinese case, outlined above, clearly raises the question of whether or not one can assume that homelands consistently support their diaspora. In this dissertation, I suggest that an examination of shared identity, homeland/diaspora, and adoptive state relationships, and power issues related to all three actors will help to explain inconsistent homeland/diaspora cooperation. The first part of my examination will address how often homelands support their diaspora; the second part will address the influence of shared identity, relationships, and power have on homeland/diaspora cooperation.

Although this dissertation focuses on homeland support of their diaspora (not diaspora support of homelands) I believe that the activities of Macedonian diaspora in relation to their homeland further illustrates the complexity of relations within a single transnational ethnic nationalist community.

In 1990, Macedonian ethnic nationalist diaspora groups from Bulgaria, Greece, Canada, and Australia worked together at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to lobby for the recognition of an independent Macedonian state (Danforth 1994). These Macedonian diaspora groups also worked together in an effort to improve the human rights of Macedonians living in Greek dominated areas (Danforth 1994). However, after the Macedonian diaspora successfully demonstrated to the CSCE their unified support for an independent Macedonian state, and recognition of the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was achieved, unified efforts to support human rights for Macedonians living in Greek regions evaporated.

Following the recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Pan-Macedonian Association of Ontario began to insist that the only Macedonians were of Greek origin rather than supporting a unified approach to improving conditions for Macedonians everywhere. At the same time, the Association of Macedonian Societies in Bulgaria argued that true Macedonians were of Slavic origin and should be considered Bulgarian, not Macedonian. Both the Ontario and Bulgarian Macedonian diaspora considered themselves representatives of all Macedonians and subsequently claimed Macedonia as their homeland. However, neither diaspora group could agree on a consistent definition of who ought to be considered Macedonian. This example not only highlights the fractious nature of the Macedonian diaspora community, but also demonstrates the diverging interests of each diaspora group. Once their homeland achieved sovereignty in 1991, the Macedonian diaspora shifted the focus of their efforts. Some diaspora communities argued that the Macedonian community should concentrate on reclaiming territory occupied by Bulgaria and Greece while other diaspora communities argued that the focus of their efforts should be on improving human rights for those Macedonians living in Bulgaria and Greece.

In the Macedonian example, issues other than identity seem to have informed the behavior of the diaspora toward their common homeland. Even when each Macedonian diaspora group claimed membership to the same ethnic nationalist community, factions within the group emerged. While all Macedonians could have been categorized as members of the same ethnic nationalist community, the goals and support of each specific
diaspora group varied. At one point the resources of each group were combined to improve the welfare of the group as a whole while later, these resources were withdrawn in favor of supporting each diaspora groups’ independent interests.

I suggest that we must consider the independent motivation of homeland and diaspora in order to explain when and why transnational ethnic nationalist communities behave as a single group. The Chinese case was an example of a homeland that had a variety of interests including some that competed with Chinese interests in the welfare of its own diaspora. In this case, homeland support of its diaspora was inconsistent due to China’s concern for how its diaspora-policy affected the attitudes of its neighboring states. China’s concern for Indonesia’s reaction to the Chinese diaspora policy outweighed China’s concern for the welfare of its own Chinese diaspora.

The Macedonian case shows that multiple interests exist within a single ethnic nationalist community. Different and competing values within the Macedonian ethnic nationalist diaspora community regarding who ought to be considered a member of the diaspora community and the specific location of the homeland territory, show that there is less than one unified position within the same transnational ethnic nationalist community. This dissertation will explore several reasons why actors within a transnational ethnic nationalist group may appear to share a common interest in the welfare of the group as a whole but may not act to support that interest. I will identify specific characteristics that may distinguish cases in which homelands cooperated with their diaspora by focusing on shared identity, homeland/diaspora and adoptive state relationships, and power issues.
1.3 Framework of the Problem

In the previous section of this chapter, I described two cases in which homelands and diaspora were inconsistent in their support for each other. I believe that in order to explain when and why ethnic nationalist homelands and their diaspora cooperate, we must consider how cooperation relates to each of the following points:

- The notion that shared identity leads to shared goals for members of ethnic nationalist communities
- The implications of the transnational nature of ethnic nationalist communities
- The influence of diverging homeland and diaspora interest upon prospects for cooperation

By considering the implications of these three points, one can better conceptualize problems of cooperation between homelands and diaspora.

I define ethnic nationalism as a group with members that may or may not exist within the boundaries of a single state, yet whose members can be categorized as a group of individuals that share a common ethnic nationalist identity. These ethnic nationalist groups may also consider themselves to share an interest in the welfare of their transnational community as a whole. According to my definition, concern for the existence of a sovereign homeland does not necessarily represent the primary interest of all members of the community: this definition contradicts the fundamental assumptions of others’ definitions of nationalism. In particular, the definition I rely on in this study contradicts those outlined by both Cottam and Van Evera who argue that the primary interest of all nationalists is the sovereignty of their national territory (Cottam 1984; Van Evera 1994). My definition of ethnic nationalist communities allows homelands and diaspora to recognize a common ethnic nationalist identity, maintain an interest in the
sovereignty of their homeland, and maintain an interest in the issues unique to the homeland and/or diaspora. For example, according to my definition, it is possible for ethnic nationalist diaspora to maintain support for their unique community living within the borders of an adoptive state as well as support the interest of the homeland.

In this study, I do not rely on self-identification by members of ethnic nationalist communities. Instead, I assume that individuals could identify themselves, or could be identified and acted on by others as if they are members of an ethnic nationalist community. In other words, regardless of whether or not individuals choose to participate in the ethnic nationalist community, the potential to be categorized by themselves or others as members of an ethnic nationalist community is recognized. My conception of identity and my methods for homeland and diaspora identification are outlined in the research design chapter (Chapter 2). Stated briefly for the purposes of this study, homelands and diaspora that share the same ethnic nationalist name are considered members of the same ethnic nationalist community. For example, Turkish individuals living in Germany and Turkish individuals living in Cyprus are both considered members of the same ethnic nationalist community.

1.4 Does Shared Identity Imply Shared Goals?

There are many examples of theoretical arguments in which authors assume that the resources of ethnic nationalist communities benefit the ethnic nationalist community as a whole (Fearon 1998; Gagnon 1994/1995; Moore and Davis 1998). As I see it, the fundamental basis of this assumption is that identity is inextricably linked to ethnic nationalist group behavior in such a way that those who share ethnic nationalist identity
are likely to share policy preferences. Although shared identity may influence homeland/diaspora cooperation, identity alone cannot be used to explain why homelands and diaspora policy preferences coincide to create an environment in which homeland/diaspora cooperation can occur. Instead, I expect that the distinct conditions under which homelands and diaspora exist ultimately inform diverging policy preferences of both homelands and their diaspora. Since we must incorporate the role of identity into our explanation to understand prospects for cooperation between homelands and diaspora, my goal is to do this, while simultaneously evaluating the benefit of relationships and power within a framework that addresses why some homelands cooperate with their diaspora and others do not.

Nationalist behavior is defined as “a set of behavioral patterns associated with an intense identification with a community that has achieved or seeks independent statehood” (Cottam 1984, p. 29). For Cottam, only those groups whose primary goal is sovereignty can be considered members of the nationalist community. As a result, any community members who do not consider sovereignty for their homeland to be their first priority cannot be considered nationalistic. Although what I consider the “purist” approach offered by Cottam simplifies the often-ambiguous term, “nationalism”, Cottam’s definition is limited because it cannot account for members in the community who share a sovereignty goal but do not maintain this goal as their primary interest. Homeland and diaspora interests which extend beyond the borders of a single state are excluded from Cottam’s analysis unless both the homeland and diaspora focus their efforts on homeland sovereignty above all else.
Although homeland sovereignty may be the focus of the homeland state, such a focus may not necessarily apply to the homeland’s diaspora. Diaspora, as residents of an adoptive state, may have an interest in their homeland, but there is little reason to believe that such interests do not motivate diaspora behavior. For example, diaspora who voluntarily left their homeland may have done so to advance their personal economic interests. In such cases, although they may have an interest in the well-being of their homeland (which is based on shared identity), diaspora may also have a stake in the political or economic stability, and sovereignty of their adoptive state (motivated by personal gain). Moreover, just as diaspora interests may deviate from those of the homeland, homeland interests may deviate from those of their diaspora or ethnic nationalist community as a whole. I believe (and examine in this dissertation) that the primary interest of homelands is their concern for maintaining sovereignty, which in turn is a concern that does not directly relate to the day-to-day life of diaspora communities.

Moore and Davis (1998) argue that ethnic groups form alliances similar to those that exist between states. Although these authors do not measure policy preference, they assume that similar preferences exist between transnational ethnic groups simply because they are members of the same ethnic nationalist identity group. Moore and Davis’ reliance on what I call the “shared identity implies shared goals” assumption leads them to conclude that ethnic alliances are related to greater hostility between states with competing ethnic populations. However, as demonstrated by the Chinese and Macedonian examples, there are cases in which shared identity does not imply shared goals. Thus, the extent to which community members can rely upon ethnic alliances is more limited than Moore and Davis imply.
Van Evera’s (1994) contribution to the ethnic nationalism literature creates a framework for investigating ethnic nationalist communities that extends beyond state boundaries by including state relations with diaspora as one potential cause of ethnic nationalist conflict. Although his approach goes beyond the domestic political focus taken by those who consider ethnicity and conflict, Van Evera fails to articulate why a state would choose to maintain a relationship with those who share their ethnic nationalist identity but live outside the borders of their homeland state.

Similar to Cottam (1984), Van Evera assumes that members of the ethnic nationalist group extend primary loyalty to their own group, above all else. Van Evera’s definition assumes that group members share common goals, which, I believe, is an oversimplification, given the wide range of political, social, and economic environments in which an ethnic groups’ members may reside. In addition, Van Evera’s definition implies that group formation for ethnic nationalist groups, and the events that result, are in some way contingent on the existence of shared identity and cultural values. Although I believe Van Evera’s work represents a valuable approach to the relationship between ethnicity and conflict, the assumptions upon which his theories are based are, in my opinion, unsubstantiated.

The research done by King and Melvin (1999/2000) supports my hypotheses regarding the likelihood of inconsistent support among transnational ethnic nationalist communities. King and Melvin claim that, “Politics, not identity, has been the major determinant of when and how successfully foreign policy has reflected existing ethnic linkages” (King and Melvin 1999/2000, p. 118). While I support this statement, I feel that additional research is required before one can truly explain the extent to which
foreign policy and ethnicity are linked. I argue that in addition to focusing our research efforts on the type of conflict that results from ethnic identification, we must explore the limits of ethnic nationalist identification in conjunction with the influence of relationships and power, to explain cooperation within an ethnic nationalist community.

While I support the inclusion of identity as a factor in ethnic nationalist communities, this dissertation attempts to identify additional variables that, along with identity, explain homeland/diaspora interactions. Identity may play a key role in motivating ethnic nationalist communities, however a measure of this variable’s influence ought to be clarified in order to establish guidelines to demonstrate when identity is or is not likely to affect homeland/diaspora interactions and cooperative activities. While identity may be important in explaining shared goals within an ethnic nationalist community, we should not overlook other factors such as homeland relationships within the adoptive state in which the homeland’s diaspora live or how a difference in power resources between homeland and adoptive state impact the goals of actors within the ethnic nationalist community.

1.5 Characteristics of Transnational Ethnic Nationalist Communities

Many scholars limit their theories regarding the behavior of ethnic nationalists to reflect those contained within a single state’s borders (Breuilly 1982, Gagnon 1994, Gellner 1983, Horowitz 1985, Posen 1993). While this approach may be appropriate in certain cases, it cannot be used to explain cases in which the ethnic nationalist community includes members from more than one state. As will be demonstrated in
Chapter 3 of this dissertation, 31% of the ethnic nationalist groups surveyed, exist in more than one state (see Chapter 3 for more information).

Breuilly (1993) discusses nationalism in terms of the domestic politics of a single state. Breuilly argues that nationalism is a process by which a link between the political elite and the mass population is developed. According to Breuilly, this link allows elites to gain political power to change the dynamics of a political system within a state. Although this logic can be used to explain mobilization of the masses within a single state, the logic fails when it is applied to a transnational community with more than one political system. The issue not addressed by Breuilly is how and when the political elite of one state mobilize its community members living in another state. In other words, Breuilly fails to consider the question of homelands that are likely to utilize the support of their diaspora in order to consolidate the ethnic nationalist groups’ political power within the homeland.

Theories related to ethnic nationalist communities imply that such mobilization is possible; however, neither the way in which such cooperation would occur nor the outcome of such cooperation is taken into consideration. For example, Brubaker (1996) discusses nationalism in terms of what he calls a “relational nexus” between newly nationalizing states, external national homelands, and national minorities. Although Brubaker takes into consideration the influence of trans-border ethnic nationalist groups, he fails to demonstrate how and why homelands would extend their support to minorities living outside their state borders. Brubaker also fails to discuss why minorities living abroad would request homeland support or why ethnic minorities may refuse assimilation into their adoptive states. As is true with many other scholars who attempt to explain
trans-border ethnic group behavior, Brubaker fails to cite empirical evidence that supports his assumptions regarding the relationship between groups within the ethnic nationalist community. My dissertation represents an effort to test the applicability of identity related assumptions to the interactions that occur between homelands and diaspora.

Gagnon (1994/1995) also highlights one of the ways in which members of the ethnic nationalist community could use nationalism to promote their political status. Although his account is limited to the domestic implications of nationalism, it is valuable in that it highlights how the political elite within a homeland may utilize their position within the overall ethnic community to benefit the homeland. Gagnon identifies ethnic nationalism as a tool used by the political elite when economic or political shifts within the domestic arena occur. He claims, “violent conflict along ethnic cleavages is provoked by the elite in order to create a domestic political context where ethnicity is the only politically relevant identity” (Gagnon 1994, p. 131). He goes on to argue that creating a basis upon which identity is politically relevant can help establish political power for some of the political elite within a state.

In Gagnon’s article, political rhetoric is used to maintain control of a central government, media, and propaganda by emphasizing the existence of an external threat. In these cases, ethnic identity is used to bolster the domestic political environment so that political elite can secure their own position within the domestic political system. Although I do not dispute Gagnon’s claim that nationalism is a powerful tool that can be utilized by political elites, I do take issue with his omission of any discussion regarding
how members of the same ethnic nationalist community outside the homeland state respond to their newly politicized elite living in the homeland.

The response to newly consolidated power based on ethnic identity from the diaspora community has vast implications for homelands. It is possible that not only could the political elite within the homeland use the existence of diaspora as justification for their own increased political leverage, but the political elite within a homeland could also gain additional resources from the diaspora itself, in the form of either economic or political support. In my opinion, the implications of homeland and diaspora cooperation put an interesting twist on what is currently understood about the relationship between ethnic nationalism and conflict.

1.6 Potential Effects of Homeland Interest and Capability on the Ethnic Nationalist Community

If ethnic nationalist communities function as a group with common policy preferences, one could expect all members of the community to share a common perspective regarding the interests and capabilities of the homeland. However, the reality of the extremely diverse environments in which members of the same ethnic nationalist community exist, particularly those who reside outside the homeland, may lead us to find something other than that which is expected regarding the behavior of homelands and their diaspora.

Cooperation between homelands and their diaspora is likely to be, in some part, related to the potential gains expected by each group. This assumption relates directly to the literature on collective action and international cooperation. For more on the collective action debate see Hardin 1995 or Olson 1971. For more on international
homeland do not necessarily result in equal gains for the diaspora, one ought not to assume that cooperation will be equally supported by both homelands and their associated diaspora groups. For example, gains in political freedom or greater political leverage for the ethnic nationalist community living in the homeland do not necessarily carry over to diaspora communities. In fact, *newfound* sovereignty for an ethnic nationalist community, a gain for homeland members, may result in a loss of political freedom for diaspora in their adoptive state. It is possible that the diaspora’s adoptive state, fearing increased interaction and influence of a homeland, may respond to homeland sovereignty or increased political leverage by limiting diaspora’s political, economic, or social activities. In this case, the gain for the homeland would clearly represent a loss for the diaspora.

Because gains for one part of the transnational ethnic nationalist community do not necessarily represent a gain for all members, the application of theories typically used to explain international cooperation must be altered when applied to transnational ethnic nationalist communities. Not only are recipients of gains and losses dependent on distinct situations, but incentives to cooperate with the overall goals of the ethnic nationalist community are not necessarily as easily identified and calculated as current cooperation and collective action theories would have us believe. I argue that for members of a transnational ethnic nationalist group, maximizing gains from cooperation and distributing resources required for cooperation is dependent, in large part, on the calculations of state and non-state actors, each with different interests and capabilities. For example, homeland and diaspora interests could diverge in the following ways:

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Interests of homeland states could focus on the security and welfare of their own states in terms of its interests relative to other states, international organizations, or its own domestic population. Homeland states may also maintain an interest in the welfare of the ethnic nationalist community as a whole.

Interests of diaspora could focus on the security and welfare of its community in its adoptive state, security and welfare of the adoptive state itself, its relationship with its homeland, its relationship with diaspora living in other states, and its relationship with international organizations. Diaspora, like homelands, may also maintain an interest in the welfare of the ethnic nationalist community as a whole.

In short, I believe that the existence of divergent interests and capability within the transnational ethnic nationalist community necessitates the examination of variables linked to homeland/diaspora and adoptive state relations and power differentials as well as the existence of shared identity.

Cooperative and Collective Action and Homeland/Diaspora Interests

For those who study collective action, what I refer to as “cooperation” occurs when individuals expect to receive benefits commensurate with sacrifices made for participation in a group effort. Individuals within an organization have two sets of interests; 1) interests shared with the group, and 2) self-interest (Olson 1971). For Olson, groups benefit from acting collectively, however an individual’s decision to contribute to the group is based on how much the contribution will cost in relation to the benefit received by the individual. I hypothesize that because homelands and diaspora exist in unique political, economic, and social environments, the cost and benefits of cooperation are likely to be defined in terms of what is best for each independently. Consequently, homelands and diaspora could view the value of cooperation not only in terms of benefits to the shared identity group, as well as recognizing that their own interests could diverge.
Hardin’s (1995) explanation of collective action is in many ways an extension of that offered by Olson; however, his argument focuses on how collective action specifically affects identity group formation. Much like Olson, Hardin argues that group identity formation and cooperation reflects a balance of self and group-interest. For Hardin, identity group formation is a form of collective action, albeit one that is based on both interest and group identification. Hardin urges us to consider how identity and interests combine to promote cooperation, but not to simply accept that shared interests imply shared identity.

Hardin assumes that the main problem of identity group formation (and I extend this problem to include ethnic nationalist group cooperation) is the same problem that affects all types of group behavior. He writes, “Whether or not we coordinate might turn in part on whether there is someone urging us to recognize our identity and coordinate on it” (Hardin 1995, p. 52). Ultimately, according to Hardin’s logic, whoever wields leadership power and provides an adequate number of co-participants is capable of prompting cooperation within an identity group. Although I believe the logic behind Hardin’s argument is sound, I do find it to be somewhat problematic when applied to transnational ethnic nationalist communities because it assumes one primary source of leadership. Homelands and diaspora have the potential to have multiple sources of leadership. Ethnic nationalist community leadership, for homelands and diaspora, could originate within a homeland, but it could also originate within one or more diaspora communities in one or more adoptive states. The ethnic nationalist community in which homelands and diaspora exist could be influenced by at least two separate political systems, that of the homeland and that of an adoptive state. Consequently, more than one
source of leadership exists yet such a situation is not addressed by Hardin’s approach. “Interests” of homelands evaluated in this project focus on those related to homeland interests in cooperation with its diaspora. Homeland interest in this study will be understood as a function of the homeland relationship with diaspora and the homeland relationship with the adoptive state in which its diaspora reside.

Homeland/Diaspora Cooperation and Capability

When discussing cooperation, it may seem that capability to cooperate is an obvious factor to consider, yet as an explanatory variable, capability is often overlooked. Homelands may not have the necessary resources to cooperate with diaspora, or, diaspora may live in an adoptive state in which they lack the freedom or resources needed to cooperate with their homelands. In such scenarios, limited capability directly affects prospects for cooperation.

For example, Gallagher (1997) writes that Croat émigrés had little opportunity to aid Croats living in Croatia until the late 1980s. However, once the opportunity arose for the Croatian diaspora in the early 1990s to interact with their homeland, they demonstrated support for their homeland by sending money to Croatia and building political support for Croatian issues.

McAdam (1986) is more explicit in his discussion of capability. McAdam writes that “structural availability is more important than attitudinal affinity in accounting for differential involvement in movement activity” (McAdam 1986, p. 65). He continues: “Ideological disposition toward participation matters little if the individual lacks the structural contact to ‘pull’ him or her into protest activity” (McAdam 1986, p. 65).
Esman (1986) makes a similar statement regarding capability and diaspora activities. Esman argues that diaspora activities are enabled by three different issues: a) the availability of resources, b) opportunity structures in adopted states, and c) motivation to maintain solidarity (Esman 1986). The arguments of Gallagher, Esman, and McAdam demonstrate that capability is a crucial factor that influences group activities. It is with this in mind that I suggest that our understanding of homeland/diaspora cooperation ought to be linked to the capability or resources of each actor.

1.7 The Solution

The dependent variable discussed in this thesis is “cooperation” between ethnic nationalist homelands and their diaspora. I measure cooperative events according to a modified World Event Interaction Study (WEIS) scale. In an effort to expand our knowledge about cooperation within transnational ethnic nationalist communities, as outlined earlier in this chapter, I explore how much homeland/diaspora cooperation shared identity, homeland/diaspora and adoptive state relationships, and issues of power explain. I explore how each of these three factors functions independently and combine to promote or hinder homeland/diaspora cooperation.

In order to address this issue I have compiled a data set that includes demographic information for all states and ethnic groups included in the Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook (1999). I have also gathered information regarding shared ethnic nationalist identity, cultural similarity (measured in terms of shared language and shared religion), and issues that directly relate to homelands, diaspora groups, and adoptive

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3 For further elaboration on my use of this scale please consult the research design portion of this thesis, Chapter 2
states’ relationships and power. Although the measures I use to test the homeland/diaspora relationship are quite broad, I strongly believe that my empirical efforts to test the relationship contribute to what we now know about ethnic group behavior in theoretical terms.

I believe that there are three basic approaches one can take in explaining homeland/diaspora cooperation. The first approach to explaining the nature of homeland/diaspora cooperation is based on the idea that identity affects homeland/diaspora cooperation. According to this scenario homelands and diaspora share a unique relationship based on common identity. In this case, the existence of shared identity creates an opportunity for homelands to influence the domestic environment within the adoptive state via the diaspora group. The utility of shared identity as a tool of leverage that motivates homelands to cooperate with their diaspora is important if one supports the idea that an identity-related study is best for explaining homeland/diaspora cooperation.

The logic of an identity-based approach to homeland/diaspora cooperation relies on four primary assumptions:

1) Homelands and diaspora interests are linked to one another because they share a common identity.
2) Diaspora groups are a viable tool that can be leveraged by homelands against adoptive states.
3) The homeland/diaspora tie is exclusive and cannot be accessed by the adoptive state in which diaspora live.
4) Homelands have an incentive to use their diaspora as a tool of leverage when dealing with adoptive states.
The concept that shared homeland/diaspora identity is a key condition of homeland/diaspora cooperation is the basis of two hypotheses discussed in this thesis.

**Hypothesis 1**
More homeland/diaspora cooperation is likely to occur between homelands associated diaspora (by identity) than occurs between homelands and non-associated diaspora groups.

**Hypothesis 2**
Homelands and diaspora that share similar cultural values, such as a common language or religion, are more likely to cooperate with one another than homelands and diaspora who do not share similar cultural values.

The second approach to explaining homeland/diaspora cooperation is based on the relationship established between homelands and their diaspora, as well as the relationship that exists between homelands and the adoptive states in which their diaspora live. One could argue that the nature of the relationship between any of the three actors, the homeland, its diaspora, or adoptive state determines whether homeland/diaspora cooperation is likely to occur. In this scenario, a history of cooperation between the homeland and an adoptive state may make homeland/diaspora cooperation more feasible. It is also possible, according to this perspective, that politically organized diaspora are less likely to receive support from their homeland because these diaspora can address their concerns within their adoptive state’s political system. The following four hypotheses address the issue of homeland, diaspora, and adoptive state relationship.

**Hypothesis 3**
Homelands that have a history of cooperation between themselves and the adoptive state in which their diaspora live are more likely to cooperate with diaspora than are homelands that have no history of cooperation between themselves and the adoptive state.
Hypothesis 4
Homelands and adoptive states with reciprocal relationships are home to each other’s diaspora groups. Homelands that have a reciprocal relationship with the adoptive state in which their diaspora live are more likely to cooperate with their diaspora than are homelands that have no reciprocal relationship with the adoptive state in which their diaspora live.

Hypothesis 5
Homelands that share a border with their diaspora are more likely to cooperate than are homelands that do not share a border with their diaspora.

Hypothesis 6
Homelands are less likely to cooperate with diaspora groups that are politically organized within their adoptive states.

The third approach is based on a realist perspective in which homelands, like any other state in the international system, are assumed to pursue power and security above all else. In this scenario, homeland/diaspora cooperation would occur only when homelands have already satisfied their power and security requirements. Because a realist approach assumes that homelands focus on power/security, shared identity is not expected to motivate homeland behavior toward its diaspora. In this case, diaspora groups are no different from any other political organization that may make request the homeland’s support.

The logic of the realist approach to homeland/diaspora cooperation relies on three primary assumptions:

1) Homelands, like any other sovereign state, are self-interested international actors.
2) The realist approach understands homeland interest in terms of a homeland’s pursuit of power.
3) Homeland interest in its own diaspora, with whom the homeland shares a common identity, will not supersede a homeland’s interest in power.
The idea that homelands value a stable power relationship with surrounding international actors more than homelands value the welfare of the transnational ethnic nationalist community as a whole leads to four power-related hypotheses examined in this thesis.

**Hypothesis 7**
Homelands whose total power exceeds that of the adoptive state in which their diaspora live are more likely to cooperate with their own diaspora group than are homelands whose total power is less than that of the adoptive state in which the homeland’s diaspora lives.

**Hypothesis 8**
The size of a diaspora population, relative to the population of their adoptive state, affects homeland/diaspora cooperation. Homelands are less likely to cooperate with a diaspora population that is relatively large, compared to the total population of the adoptive state in which it lives.

**Hypothesis 9**
The number of diaspora groups associated with homelands affects homeland/diaspora cooperation. Homelands are less likely to cooperate with any of their diaspora if there are a large number of diaspora groups associated with the homeland.

**Hypothesis 10**
When power and identity are both taken into consideration, total power, not identity, is expected to explain trends in homeland/diaspora cooperation.
Further analysis and theoretical implications of all three of these perspectives is included in Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation.

In Chapter 2, entitled Research Design, I discuss the case selection and data analysis techniques I used in this study. In addition to outlining the parameters for case selection, I describe the manner in which I collected data. The Research Design chapter also includes a discussion of how I have defined, identified, and measured the dependent and independent variables included in this study.

In Chapter 3, I offer a survey of the cases discussed in this dissertation. As noted above, I believe a key factor in determining homeland and diaspora interests is the unique environment in which each exists. Within Chapter 3, I detail categories of cases and discuss characteristics that are unique to the homelands and diaspora I selected for review in this study.

In Chapter 4, I explore in depth how identity, relationships, and power affect homeland/diaspora cooperation. I employ a logistic analytical model to determine whether homelands interact with their diaspora any differently than they do with any other international actors because of shared identity, relationships, and power in Chapter 5. I also combine shared identity, relationships, and power as a single model to explain homeland/diaspora cooperation in Chapter 5 using a logistic analytical model.

I present the conclusions of this dissertation in the final chapter, Chapter 6. In addition to summarizing my findings, I discuss the implications of my research, as well as the possibility of extending this research to define additional conditions for homeland/diaspora cooperation.
2.1 Introduction

The focus of this chapter is research design and includes a discussion of the methods used for data collection, case selection and verification. All substantive discussions regarding theoretical basis and implications of the data detailed in this chapter follow in Chapters 4 and 5.

2.2 Data Collection

This data set was created by combining information gathered from the CIA World Factbook (1999) and news events that were coded using the Text Analysis By Augmenting Replacement Instructions (TABARI) coding program. TABARI is the successor to the Kansas Events Data System (KEDS) coding system. TABARI codes news stories in much the same way as the KEDS system, utilizing the same actor and verb related dictionaries with a few technological improvements. For more information on the TABARI and KEDS event coding systems see the KEDS project website, located at http://www.ukans.edu/~keds/tabari.html.
To generate data related to the independent variables, I collected information for 259 territories included in the 1999 CIA World Factbook. Information gathered included:

- Country Name
- Dependency Status (which I refer to as sovereignty status)
- Ethnic Groups
- Government Type
- Independence (refers to the date of independence)
- Languages
- Location (geographic region)
- Nationality
- Political Pressure Groups and Leaders
- Population
- Religion
- GDP-Per Capita
- GDP-Real Growth Rate
- Inflation Rate (comparison of consumer prices)
- Unemployment Rate
- Military Expenditures (as a percent of GDP)
- Military Manpower (number fit for service)

**Territories**

The World Factbook (1999) identifies each territorial entity in the international system with a specific country name; I refer to these entities as “territories”. This category specifies each country’s name as it has been approved by the United States Board on Geographic Names. Each name used in this database is presented in its conventional short form. For example, I refer to the Italian territory as “Italy” rather than relying on the conventional long form, “Italian Republic”. These territory names are used to refer to both homeland and adoptive states.
Sovereignty Status

I use the term “sovereignty status” to indicate whether each territory is an independent entity. The information reported in this category refers to whether or not a particular territory is sovereign and on what date sovereignty was recognized (according to sources used for the World Factbook). If sovereignty was achieved, I noted the sovereignty status for such a territory as “sovereign”. If the territory had not achieved sovereignty, I noted the specific status of that territory.

Nationality

Nationality is another variable included in this data set. I define nationality as the name associated with each state’s citizens, as it is defined in the World Factbook. For example, the adjective used to describe citizens of Poland is “Polish”. This will be the term used to describe the polish national population living within each territory.

Also included in this study is information regarding “core ethnic groups”. After gathering information about the proportion of ethnic groups existing in each territory, I have indicated which territories have a core ethnic group. I define a core ethnic group as one in which a single ethnic group consists of more than 50 percent of the total population in a given territory. For example, the ethnic groups within Fiji are Fijian (49%), Indian (46%), and other (5%). Because none of these ethnic groups exceeds 50% of the entire population, according to this criterion, Fiji does not have a core ethnic group. In contrast, Albania is a state that does have a core ethnic group according to this criterion. Albania’s ethnic population is composed of Albanian (95%), Greek (3%), and other (2%). Because the Albanian population exceeds 50% of the total population in
Albania, it is considered a state in which a core ethnic group exists. This information was compiled for all territories and states in this study.

I define “ethnic diaspora” as an ethnic community that lives outside the borders of its homeland state. For example, Abkhaz is an ethnic group (again, ethnicity is indicated according to the criteria outlined in the World Factbook) living in Georgia. However, because this group lives only in Georgia, for the purposes of this study, Abkhaz is not considered an ethnic nationalist diaspora group. Referring again to the Albanian example, Albanians live in three different territories including Albania, Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and Macedonia. Because Albanians live outside their homeland state of Albania, this group is one example of an ethnic group that also qualifies as a diaspora community.

“Ethnic nationalist diaspora” are defined as those diaspora groups whose identification also corresponds to a nationality name. For example, although the members of the Afar ethnic group live in three separate states, the term “Afar” does not correspond to a nationality as defined in this study; therefore, Afar is not considered an ethnic nationalist diaspora group. Albania, on the other hand, meets my definition of an ethnic nationalist diaspora group, because in addition to existing in more than one state, its ethnic group corresponds to a nationality phrase (Albanian).
Excluded Ethnic, Nationalist, and Diaspora Groups

This study excludes several groups from the ethnic nationalist diaspora category because either they lack an associated nationality or they are defined in terms of race. The excluded groups are: Aborigine, Afar, African, Amerindian, Arab, Asian, Baloch, Bantu, Basque, Berber, Black, Caucasian, Chamorro, Creole (Creole Mulatto), Descendants of Bounty Mutineers, Dravidian, East Indies, European, Fulani, Gypsy, Hausa, Hutu, Khmer, Kurd, Lapp, Malinke, Mande, Mediterranean, Mestiso, Mestizo, Mixed, Moor, Mulatto, Muslim, Pacific Islander, Scandinavian, Sinhalese, Tatar, Togas, Tuareg, Tutsi, Twa, and White.

The exclusion of these ethnic and racial groups does mean that several territories cannot be considered candidates for homeland states. For example, the World Factbook lists Argentina’s population as 85% White. Because “white” is a racial category for which no national identity can be assigned, Argentina cannot be considered a homeland state. I excluded several other groups from this study because the ethnic category assigned was too broad to assign a national categorization. For example, the World Factbook refers to Spain and Portugal’s ethnic populations as Mediterranean ethnic groups. Norway’s ethnic population is listed as Nordic, Alpine, and Baltic. Because no national association can be made for the Mediterranean, Nordic, Alpine, or Baltic ethnic groups, Spain, Portugal, and Norway must not be considered candidates for homeland states.
Methodology for Collecting “Events” Data

The information coded using TABARI originated with the Lexis-Nexis World News service. In order to collect news stories I searched for and downloaded all news stories that referenced any of the 42 homeland states and their corresponding diaspora groups addressed in this study. For example, I used the Lexis-Nexis search engine to identify all news items regarding Albania or Albanians living in Macedonia. My search for homeland and diaspora related news items was restricted to the January 1, 1998 to December 31, 1998 period. All stories were downloaded as HTML files in full format; complete stories were downloaded, opposed to only the lead sentences or headlines.

It is important for me to highlight the fact that full stories were downloaded from Lexis-Nexis. Lexis-Nexis offers several options for capturing news events. For example, one could choose to download only the “lead” sentences for each news story in which an event may have occurred. Choosing a “lead” sentence format prompts a download that contains only the first two sentences of each news story. I did not choose the “lead” story option; instead, I downloaded “full text” of stories that included the complete news story for each of my searches. Although using TABARI with the “full” story format is known to produce a large number of duplicate coded events, this methodology of download enabled me to hand check each story’s text to verify the accuracy of the automatically (TABARI) coded events.

In order to gain a wide perspective and a large sample set of related news stories I searched the Lexis-Nexis database for news stories from all Non-US and US news sources available in the Lexis-Nexis World News source. The Non-US news available from Lexis-Nexis contained English language news sources that were published outside
the United States. US news sources included news stories from all newspapers published within the United States. A list of news agencies included in both the Non-US and US news sources can be found at http://www.nexis.com/research.

After downloading all related news stories and before processing downloaded HTML files with the TABARI system, I used a filtering program to reformat the HTML file so that it could be read by the TABARI program. The filtering program I used is entitled “nxdnlldformat.pl” and can be found on the KEDS web site. I modified the filter program so that all non-political stories (i.e. sports, leisure, arts, etc.) would be excluded from the final document coded by TABARI.

**Actor and Verb Dictionaries**

TABARI requires actor and verb dictionaries to code news stories as events. In order to ensure complete and accurate verb and actor dictionaries I updated the dictionaries that were established by previous users of KEDS and TABARI. As noted, TABARI requires an actor dictionary in order to identify the source and target of each event. In order to ensure that all the appropriate actors related to each of my 42 cases and associated diaspora groups were represented in the dictionary and would be properly coded by TABARI, I revised the TABARI Balkans actor dictionary. My revisions of the TABARI Balkans dictionary enabled me to properly account for and code activities associated with all identified homelands, diaspora communities, and adoptive states, as well as all relevant political and ethnic group actors associated with all cases included in my study. In short, by adding actors to the Balkans actor dictionary I was able to use
TABARI to code all events that involved states, ethnic groups, diaspora communities, and political representatives of interest for this study.

*Actor Dictionary*

For example, because the Balkans actor dictionary was limited to actors within the Balkan region of the world, I added the names of political officials, ethnic groups, political parties, and states that interact within Asia, Europe, the Americas, and the Middle East, etc. In order to capture all active political figures and international actors during the 1998 period to reflect the global nature of this study, I relied on the KEDS ActorFilter.

The KEDS ActorFilter is designed to filter downloaded story text for relevant actors by isolating all instances in which two or more capitalized words appear adjacent to one another. In addition to listing all capitalized phrases, the ActorFilter includes a short text excerpt so that the capitalized phrases can be put into context and relevant actors can be identified. By using the ActorFilter on all downloaded text for each of the 42 homeland cases and related diaspora, I was able to identify the names of all political leaders and representatives that would be referenced in the complete set of downloaded news stories. I reviewed the capitalized words and context that were generated by the KEDS ActorFilter so that I could identify and add relevant names to TABARI. By comparing the lists of actors generated through the ActorFilter program to those already included in the Balkans actor dictionary, I was able to include all political elite who represent homelands, adoptive states, ethnic groups, and diaspora of interest for this study.
After building the dictionary to include all appropriate actors, I assigned a specific TABARI code to identify each actor. For example, using the ActorFilter I identified Slobodan Milosevic, the Serb leader in Yugoslavia who was associated with the Serb homeland. Based on this information, I assigned to Milosevic a unique identification code that would be used by TABARI when coding Lexis-Nexis news stories. Both the name “Slobodan Milosevic” and the code for the Serbian homeland were added to the TABARI actor dictionary.

**Verb Dictionary**

The verb dictionary is used by TABARI to code events in the same way actors are coded. Verbs of interest are identified from news articles and assigned a specific code. Each time TABARI identifies a verb from its dictionary, a code is assigned to reflect level of conflict or cooperation between actors. The verbs and associated codes in the TABARI dictionary correspond to the conflict and cooperation scale established by the World Event Interaction Study (WEIS), these codes are often referred to as WEIS codes (McClelland 1978). In order to maintain consistent use of the WEIS coding system, I utilized the verb dictionary that has been established by TABARI users to create previous KEDS and TABARI data sets. Unlike the actor dictionary, the verb dictionary rarely changes according to geographic region; therefore, I did not modify the verb dictionary.

The information gathered from the World Factbook and TABARI coded events were merged to create a single data set. The unification of the two data sources, along with all the data analysis, was performed using the SAS 8.2 statistical package.
Data Verification

In order to verify that TABARI produced valid and reliable coded events for all homeland/diaspora interactions, I took several steps. First, I checked for events that could have been missed by TABARI. Second, I eliminated all duplicate events. Third, I reviewed the text that accompanied all coded events to ensure that each event correctly reflected the actors and nature of each event.

Under Coded Events

In order to identify homelands for which events were omitted by TABARI (what I refer to as “under-coding”), I reviewed the distribution of events for each homeland. For example, I found that although there is a Byelorussian diaspora living in Russia, and Belarus and Russia have close political ties, there were no events coded that referred to the Byelorussian diaspora living in Russia. I reviewed all homeland cases for under-coding issues and identified several homelands, like the Byelorussian case, for which I expected more TABARI coded events. These cases include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, India, Lebanon, Malaysia, Malta, Mongolia, New Zealand, Poland, Samoa, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Tajikistan, Tonga, Turkmenistan, and the Ukraine.

Of the 21 cases that I identified as potentially under-coded, I chose several for manual coding to ensure that TABARI did not fail to code an event. Candidates for manual coding were selected according to three criteria: 1) the number of associated diaspora, 2) the location of homeland’s associated diaspora community, and 3) homeland
interaction with non-associated diaspora, but not between the homelands and their
associated diaspora groups.

I assumed that homelands with very few associated diaspora groups would have
fewer coded events, simply because there are very few homeland/diaspora relationships
to consider. The following homelands had both very few coded events, and two or less
diaspora groups, and thus were excluded from my manual check for under-coding:
Bulgaria, Finland, Malta, Mongolia, New Zealand, and Samoa, Slovenia, Somalia,
Turkmenistan.

I chose to manually code events for some homelands that had several diaspora
groups located geographically close to one another and/or geographically close to the
homeland, yet did not have a large number of associated events coded. Homelands that
satisfied these criteria include Belarus, Hungary, Malaysia, Poland, Slovakia, Tajikistan,
Tonga, and the Ukraine. In order to satisfy the third criteria for manually coding cases
that were suspected of being under-coded, I manually coded events for homelands that
did not interact with their own diaspora, but did interact with diaspora with whom they
shared no ethnic nationalist identity association. These cases included Armenia,
Azerbaijan, India, and Lebanon.

In summary, I manually coded the text associated with the following homelands:
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Hungary, India, Lebanon, Malaysia, Poland, Tajikistan,
Tonga, Slovakia, and the Ukraine. In order to manually code events for each of these
homeland cases I searched the downloaded news story text for each of these 12 cases for
all terms that referenced “ethnic” or the name of the homeland’s associated diaspora
group. I read each of these news stories and manually coded all events. All relevant
verbs were compared to the TABARI verb dictionary (used for all other cases in this study), and events were coded according to the WEIS scale. I found a total of four events that were not included in the automated coding done by TABARI, which represents an under-coding error rate of 1.3% (N total events coded=305).

I determined that these four events were under-coded by TABARI because a) the text of the news story contained a complex sentence in which the subject and verb were unclear or b) the actor referenced in the text was not included in the actor dictionary used by TABARI for event coding.

**Duplicate Events**

I found that the automated coding of events done by TABARI included many duplicate codes for single events. In part, duplicate codes could be attributed to multiple versions of a single event, which were reported by more than one news agency. For example, a meeting between Serb and Albanian diaspora officials was often reported by more than one news agency, therefore each time the event was reported it was coded by TABARI as a unique event. Because I choose to consider “full text” downloads rather than “lead” sentences as discussed earlier in this chapter, quotes from political officials that occurred during important meetings were often referred to several times in the same news story. For example, President Slobodan Milosevic’s comments about his impression of meetings with Albanian diaspora official Ibrahim Rugova were referenced after the two officials met, as well as several months later, as part of a historical background on the interactions that had occurred between the two officials in the past. There were also several instances in which the same story was downloaded more than
one time. In this case, the same story appeared on the Lexis-Nexis search engine during different search sessions.

In order to discard duplicate events I undertook two steps. First, I sorted all coded events by date, homeland, and targeted diaspora. Any event that was repeated between the same actors during the same day was excluded from the data set. The second step was to compile all questionable duplicate events into a single file in order to review the text associated with the TABARI code. After compiling a list of potentially duplicated events, I sorted the text for each coded event by date and actor so that I could establish whether content included in the text had already been coded and included in the final data set. I discarded all coded events that referred to the same homeland/diaspora interaction.

Of the 5,712 homeland/diaspora interactions originally assembled, 4,813 (84.3%) were duplicate codes for a single event. The number of unique homeland/diaspora events after this phase of my data verification process was 899.

*Verify Accuracy of TABARI Coding for Remaining Events*

Finally, in order to verify the accuracy of the remaining 899 events I read the text associated with each event to verify that the appropriate subject, verb, and code were assigned to text. The purpose of this exercise was to verify that the code assigned by TABARI would have also been assigned if the text had been coded manually. Based on manual coding, I determined that many of the 899 events were not legitimately coded because of technical errors related to the TABARI program. I found that TABARI incorrectly assigned an actor code to many of the news stories that included a dateline. For example, if Belgrade was included as the location on the dateline of a news story,
TABARI coded an event in which Serbia was a relevant actor. Improper coding involving the dateline was responsible for nearly all incorrectly coded events. Other automated coding errors could be attributed to incorrect identification of actors and verbs within complex sentences.

I found that of the 899 unique events coded by TABARI, 305 (33%) corresponded to the manually coded events. For the purposes of this study, I included only those events that satisfied manual and automated coding verification. For an example of the text and associated coding that was assigned by TABARI, refer to appendix A.

2.3 Case Selection

Territories and Sovereign States

Specifically, homelands are defined according to two criteria: a) the territory is sovereign, and b) territories have a core ethnic nationalist population. Sovereign territories are those in which the population is politically organized and those which have internationally recognized borders. All sovereign territories are referred to as “states”.

For example, Australia is considered a “state” while the Ashmore and Cartier Islands (which are dependencies of Australia) are considered “territories”. Of the entire sample (N=259 entities) 191 entities are sovereign (74%).

All 191 sovereign states are valid candidates for consideration as either a homeland or an adoptive state. Territories that are not considered are those that are not sovereign themselves and are under the authority of a sovereign state like Australia, United Kingdom, China, Denmark, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, or the United States. Additionally, there are three territories excluded because control and/or
sovereignty are disputed, including Paracel Island (disputed by Taiwan and China), Spratly Islands (disputed by Taiwan, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines), and Western Sahara (occupied by Morocco).

**National and Ethnic Groups**

As noted above, this study examines several types of national and ethnic groups. National groups are those in which the group is identified according to its state nationality. A total of 222 nationalist groups are identified in this study. In a few cases, the same nationalist groups exist in more than one state, (this occurred in the cases of Channel Islanders (living in Guernsey and Jersey), Chinese (living in China and Hong Kong), Congolese/Congo (living in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Congo), Dominicans (living in Dominica and the Dominican Republic), French (living in France and Saint Pierre and Miquelon), Guinean (living in Guinea and Guinea-Bissau), Koreans (living in North and South Korea), and those that fell into the “Not Applicable” (N/A) category. The N/A category refers to those territories for which there is no recorded nationality. Typically, these territories are uninhabited, are lacking an indigenous population, or are inhabited only by seasonal caretakers or research teams. One example of an uninhabited territory is the Ashmore and Cartier Islands.

I identified 311 separate ethnic groups in my study. In order to make the number of these groups manageable, I organized ethnic groups according to the size of the group as related to the size of the territory population. Ethnic groups that represent greater than 50% of the population in their territories are described as core ethnic groups. I found that 173 (67%) of territories had a core ethnic group, while 59 (23%) of the territories did not
have a core ethnic group. For example, because Canada’s population is composed of individuals of 40% British Isles origin, Canada does not qualify as a state with a core ethnic nationalist group.

The composition of the ethnic population was ambiguous in 27 (10%) territories. Examples of ambiguous ethnic populations have unknown territorial origin, ethnicity that is primarily religious in nature, a percentage of the ethnic population is unknown according to the data source, or indigenous groups or tribes compose the majority of the population. One example of an ambiguous ethnic population is the Descendants of the Bounty mutineers located on Norfolk Island.

_Ethnic Nationalists and Diaspora Groups_

Ethnic nationalist groups satisfy both the ethnic and nationalist criteria. Of 311 ethnic groups, 92 (30%) could also be considered nationalist. Ethnic nationalist _diaspora_ groups are ethnic nationalist groups that reside in more than one state. I found that 50 of the 92 (54%) ethnic nationalist groups could also be considered _diaspora_ groups. I counted North and South Koreans as members of the same ethnic nationalist group, therefore the number of ethnic nationalist diaspora totals 49.

According to Sheffer, diaspora communities are an “ethnic minority of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries by maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin-their homelands” (Sheffer 1986, p. 3). Contrary to Sheffer’s definition, my definition of diaspora communities does not require diaspora to be minorities in their adoptive state or to maintain material links with their homeland. I have chosen to drop these requirements so that a) I do not limit my study to
diaspora who are minority groups and b) I can explain the cases in which material links between diaspora and homeland are either present or absent. I define diaspora as an identifiable ethnic nationalist group that resides outside the borders of its homeland state.

To identify potential diaspora groups, I created an index of all ethnic populations as they are listed in the “ethnicity” portion of the World Factbook. I began by noting the percentage of the ethnic population associated with all 259 territorial entities. For example, the ethnic category for Albania includes the following values: Albanian 95%, Greek 3%, and Other 2%. I generated a similar index of nationality names. After comparing my index of ethnic group populations to the index of nationality names, I was able to identify all ethnic groups that corresponded to a national identity and their associated territories. I define ethnic nationalist groups that exist in their homelands and at least one other state as diaspora groups. All of the territories in which the ethnic nationalist diaspora reside are considered either homelands or adoptive states.

One important exclusion to note at this point relates to the United States exclusion from the list of homelands. Because the United States does not gather census data that reflects ethnic or nationalist identification categories and because the World Factbook population statistics are based on census information, no specific data on ethnic or nationalist individuals residing in the United States was available for inclusion in the Factbook related data I gathered. The only ethnic groups listed as residents of the United States are White 83.4%, Black 12.4%, Asian 3.3%, and Amerindian 0.8% (1992). The United States did not satisfy the criteria of a state with a core ethnic nationalist group, so I excluded the United States as a potential homeland.
In total, 43 homelands have ethnic nationalist diaspora groups. Because I consider North and South Korea a single homeland state the actual number of homelands included in this study is 42. A table containing all homelands and associated diaspora included in this study is shown in Appendix B.

2.4 Dependent and Independent Variables

Dependent Variables

The dependent variable discussed in this thesis is “cooperation” between ethnic nationalist homelands and their diaspora. The WEIS codes categorize interaction between two actors (source and target) according to the cooperative or hostile nature of the interaction. I identified and coded cooperative events in this study according to a modified WEIS scale. Although the WEIS scale can include up to 63 separate categories, I have combined the categories to reflect 22 types of interactions (Table 2.1).

---

4 Seven ethnic nationalist diaspora (Micronesia, Moldova, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, and Kazakhstan) were excluded from this study because the population of their “home” states was not indicated; thus, the ethnic composition of the population within these states could not be said to have a core ethnic group and could not be considered true homelands.

5 For a full scale of variables offered in WEIS scale see McClelland 1978.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Code</th>
<th>Type of Event</th>
<th>Description of Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>COOPERATIVE EVENTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yield</td>
<td>surrender, yield or order, yield position, admit wrongdoing, retract statements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Comment</td>
<td>decline comment statement issued, pessimistic, neutral, optimistic comments on current or future situations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Consult</td>
<td>meet at a neutral site, visit, receive visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>praise, hail, endorse another’s policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Promise</td>
<td>promise own policy support, material support, future support or action, assure/reassure earlier pledges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>express regret/apologize, give state invitation, grant asylum, grant privilege, suspend negative sanctions, release property or persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Reward</td>
<td>extend economic aid, military assistance, other assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NEUTRAL EVENTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>make substantive agreement, agree to future action, meeting, negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Request</td>
<td>ask for information, policy assistance, material assistance, request action, appeal for help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Propose</td>
<td>offer proposal, urge or suggest action or policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2.1: Event Codes Used to Categorize Cooperative Events*

6 This table summarizes information found in the WEIS codebook.
Table 2.1 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Code</th>
<th>Type of Event</th>
<th>Description of Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HOSTILE EVENTS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Reject</td>
<td>turn down proposal, refuse, oppose, refuse to allow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Accuse</td>
<td>charge, criticize, denounce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Protest</td>
<td>make formal or informal complaint or protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Deny</td>
<td>deny an accusation, policy, action or position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Demand</td>
<td>issue an order or command, insist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Warn</td>
<td>give warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Threaten</td>
<td>threats with and without specific negative sanctions, threaten with force, ultimatum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Demonstration</td>
<td>non-military demonstration, walk out of meeting in protest, armed force mobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Reduce Relations</td>
<td>cancel or postpone a planned event, reduce routine international activity, reduce/halt aid and or negotiations, break diplomatic relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Expel</td>
<td>order personnel out of country, expel organization or group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Seize</td>
<td>seize possessions or position, detain or arrest person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Force</td>
<td>non-military physical destruction, military engagement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cooperative events are those in which the homeland activities fell into the “yield”, “comment”, “consult,” “approve,” “promise,” “grant,” or “reward” categories. If an event was cooperative in nature (i.e. coded within the range of one to seven on the
WEIS scale), the dependent variable “cooperation” was equal to one. If not, “cooperation” was coded as zero.

Over all, I find that homelands cooperate with diaspora more often than not. Specifically, of the events that occur between homelands and diaspora, 54.1% of the events observed were cooperative. Although this statistic does not reflect how often homelands cooperate with their own diaspora (opposed to diaspora with which homelands have no ethnic nationalist identity in common), this statistic does indicate that in general, homeland interactions with any diaspora group is likely to be cooperative more often than it is likely to be non-cooperative (Table 2.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Homeland/Diaspora Cooperation</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homeland/Diaspora Cooperation Does Not Exist</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Cooperation=0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland/Diaspora Cooperation Does Exist</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>54.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Cooperation=1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Events</td>
<td>305</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2: Frequency of Homeland/Diaspora Cooperation
Independent Variables

I discuss three approaches to homeland/diaspora cooperation in this thesis: 1) cultural similarity between homelands and their diaspora, 2) relationships between homelands, diaspora, and the adoptive states in which diaspora live, and 3) issues related to the balance of power between homelands and adoptive states.

Cultural Similarity

It is possible that cultural similarity between homelands and diaspora affects prospects for homeland/diaspora cooperation. If this is true, we could expect that the homelands and diaspora that share some cultural similarity may cooperate with one another more often than homelands and diaspora that have no cultural similarity between them. If cultural similarity is positively associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation, cultural similarity could be considered one condition for homeland/diaspora cooperation.

I measure cultural similarity between homelands and diaspora in terms of three binomial independent variables:

- shared identity ($SID_{hd}$)
- shared language ($L_{hd}$)
- shared religion ($R_{hd}$)

For the purposes of this dissertation, “shared identity” applies to homelands and diaspora groups that share a common ethnic nationalist group name. For example, in this study, Serbs (or Serbian political representatives) living in Serbia share identity with Serbs living in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Albania and Albanians living in Serbia are also members of the same ethnic nationalist categorization and therefore satisfy my criteria for
“shared identity.” However, Serbian interaction with Albanians living in Serbia does not qualify as an identity sharing homeland/diaspora pair.  

I believe that for the purposes of this empirical study, ethnic nationalist categories are a reasonable way to proceed. Categorizing ethnic nationalist populations into identity related groups based on the existence of a common ethnic nationalist name could be criticized as an overly simplistic way of approaching a very complex issue. In fact, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) reject their hypothesis that the existence of ethnic categorization is significantly correlated to peace building success.

My response to such criticism is directly related to the overall goal of this study. The primary focus of this thesis is on explaining homeland behavior to those, outside its borders, who may be associated in some way with the homeland. Whether the association is understood in terms of shared name/identity, shared religion, or shared language merely reflects the impact of how cultural similarity categorizations affect homeland/diaspora cooperation.

Although the origins or intensity of identity may or may not be associated with a common name, I assume that because identity could be associated with an ethnic nationalist name it is possible that shared identity, (understood in terms of a common ethnic nationalist name), could motivate a homeland to cooperate with one particular diaspora group instead of another. It is conceivable that, like any other issue of cultural similarity, a common name and any lingering identity associated with that name, could

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7 The term “homeland/diaspora pair” is used here to reference any interaction that occurs between one homeland and one diaspora group. For example, a Serb interaction with Serbs living in Bosnia would be considered one homeland/diaspora pair.
affect how a homeland state interacts with culturally similar groups residing outside its borders.

Individuals within or outside an ethnic nationalist group may assume that others identify with the ethnic nationalist community even if an individual explicitly rejects his/her ethnic nationalist identification. Others may assume such an identity exists for an individual and may therefore interact with the individual as if ethnic identity had been established, regardless of whether the individual has self-categorized him/herself as a member of an ethnic nationalist group. Furthermore, activities undertaken by the individual could be assumed by others to correspond to the cultural values of his/her ethnic group, regardless of whether or not that was the individual’s intent. Although my measure of identity is limited, I believe it may be useful for evaluating how cultural similarity affects homeland/diaspora cooperation.

Shared language exists when the language spoken in the homeland is also spoken in the adoptive state in which diaspora live. I observe shared language only when the name of the language referred to in the “language” portion of the World Factbook for a homeland corresponds to the “language” used in the adoptive state. For example, French is spoken in France and in Monaco where French diaspora live, therefore France and its Monaco diaspora group satisfy the criteria for a shared language. Shared religion, like shared language, is observed when the “religion” portion of the World Factbook indicates the same religious group exists in both the homeland and the adoptive state.

Shared identity, shared language, and shared religion are all expressed as dichotomous variables. A “1” is assigned to homelands/diaspora that share identity, language, or religion and a “0” is assigned to homelands/diaspora that do not share
identity, language, or religion. According to my logic, homelands that interact with members of their own ethnic nationalist categorization share identity thus, SID\textsubscript{hd} = 1. Homelands that do not interact with their own diaspora groups do not share identity with their targeted diaspora, in these cases SID\textsubscript{hd} = 0. For example, SID\textsubscript{hd} = 1 when events involve Albania (homeland) and Albanians in Macedonia or Albanians in Serbia. However, if Albania participates in an event with Croats living in Bosnia-Herzegovina SID\textsubscript{hd} = 0.

I use the same type of measure to evaluate the existence of shared language. If Albania interacts with its diaspora who live in Serbia, shared language and the value of L\textsubscript{hd} = 1 because Albanian is spoken in Albania and in Serbia. However, if Hungary interacts with Hungarians living in the Czech Republic the value of L\textsubscript{hd} = 0, because Hungarian is not spoken in both Hungary and in the Czech Republic.

**Relationships**

The relationship between homelands, diaspora, and the adoptive states in which diaspora live could be associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation. If this is the case, we could use information we have about homeland relationships with diaspora and adoptive states to evaluate homeland/diaspora cooperation. The four variables I use to measure homeland relationships with diaspora and adoptive states are:

- A history of cooperation between homelands and adoptive states
- Reciprocal relationships between homelands and adoptive states
- Diaspora related political organizations within their adoptive states
- Shared borders between homelands and diaspora
If relationships were associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation, I would expect to find that homelands that have a history of cooperation with the adoptive state in which diaspora live are more likely to cooperate with diaspora than those homelands who do not have a history of cooperation with adoptive states. I would also expect to find that homelands that have a reciprocal relationship with adoptive states are more likely to cooperate with diaspora than homelands that do not have such a relationship. Should diaspora have access to a political organization within their adoptive state, I would expect homelands to cooperate with those diaspora groups less often. If homeland and diaspora share a border, I would expect more homeland/diaspora cooperation to occur than if homelands and diaspora did not share a border.

The HIST_COOPha variable describes circumstances in which homelands and adoptive states have a history of cooperation with one another. I define history of cooperation between homelands and adoptive states as any previous official alliance between the two actors. For example, Russia and Serbia have a history of cooperating with one another because they allied with each other to combat Turkish forces in 1877, and then supported one another through both World Wars. The relationship between Russia and Serbia satisfies my criteria for a history of cooperation.

If a homeland has at one time cooperated with an adoptive state and at others been involved in conflict with that state, I coded the relationship as one in which a history of cooperation exists between the two actors. In this case, one could find issues in which the two states disagreed as well as circumstances under which the two states could coordinate their efforts to achieve the same goal. For example, although Bosnia took the opportunity to raid Serbian villages after Turkey gained control of the region in the early
19th century, Bosnia and Serbia worked together to oppose Turkish forces in the late 19th century. I assume that an inconsistent history of cooperation must not be discounted as a factor that could affect a homeland’s decision to cooperate with a diaspora group. Even though Bosnia and Serbia have not always supported one another, they have been known to cooperate if ideal circumstances occur. Thus, I code cases like the Bosnian and Serb case as one in which a history of cooperation does exist.

To establish whether a homeland and adoptive state have a history of cooperation, I relied on two data sources. First, I consulted the Correlates of War data (Singer and Small, 1990) to establish all conflicts in which homelands and adoptive states had participated as allies. If homelands and adoptive states were on the same side of a particular coalition, (i.e. winning side of World War I) I coded this relationship as having a history of cooperation, HIST_COOP\textsubscript{ha}= 1. If the homelands and adoptive state were on opposite sides of a conflict, or if the homeland and adoptive state did not interact with one another, I coded the relationship as having no history of cooperation, HIST_COOP\textsubscript{ha} =0. In order to verify that homelands and adoptive states supported one another in each of these conflicts, I reviewed the activities of each event as it was cited on www.onwar.com (2003). This web site indexes conflict information for all sovereign states from 1800 to 1999.

The reciprocal relationship variable RECIP\textsubscript{ha} indicates whether homelands and adoptive states have a reciprocal relationship (see figure 2.1 below). Including the RECIP\textsubscript{ha} variable acknowledges that it is possible for unique relationships like the one illustrated below, to affect prospects for homeland/diaspora cooperation.
Figure 2.1: Pattern of Interaction – Homeland and Adoptive States with Reciprocal Relationship

For example, diaspora group “A” resides in the adoptive state “B.” However, because adoptive state “B” is a homeland as well as an adoptive state, and because the diaspora associated with state “B” reside within the borders of state “A”, states “A” and “B” have a reciprocal relationship. In this example, \( \text{RECIP}_{A} \) is coded as having a value of 1, in all other cases, the coded value of \( \text{RECIP}_{A} \) equals zero.

The \( \text{POLITICAL}_{d} \) variable refers to whether an ethnic nationalist political organization is associated with a specific diaspora group exists within the diaspora’s adoptive state. This variable measures whether homelands cooperate with diaspora who have access to the political system within their adoptive state. If a diaspora political organization did exist during the 1998 period, the coded response was “1”, if no organization existed during 1998; the coded response was “0”.

56
The BORDERING_{hd} variable refers to homelands that border diaspora groups. BORDERING_{hd} is a binomial variable for which a positive response (homelands border diaspora) is coded as “1” and a negative response (homelands do not share a border with diaspora) is coded as “0”.

**Power**

It is possible that the conditions for homeland/diaspora cooperation reflect the balance of power that exists between homelands and the adoptive state in which diaspora live. If so, we could use information about homeland power as compared to adoptive state power to evaluate homeland/diaspora cooperation. The three variables that measure homeland power issues are:

- Total Homeland Power Compared to Adoptive State Total Power
- Diaspora Population Represents an Ethnic Majority in their Adoptive State
- Number of Diaspora Associated with Homeland

In short, I expect to find that the total power of homelands is associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation. If homelands’ power exceeds the total power of adoptive states, homeland/diaspora cooperation is likely to occur. However, if homeland power is relatively weak as compared to adoptive states, one could expect to find less homeland/diaspora cooperation. It is possible that homelands with a large number of associated diaspora are less likely to cooperate with diaspora than homelands with only a few diaspora groups that could request homeland resources. Finally, I expect to find that homeland/diaspora cooperation is associated with the size of the diaspora population that exists in adoptive states. In this thesis, I examine the possibility that diaspora groups that
represent a majority of the population within their adoptive state receive less support from their homeland than diaspora groups that are a minority in their adoptive state.

$T_{\text{POWER}_{\text{ha}}}$ is a variable that reflects whether homeland power resources exceed those of adoptive states. If a homeland’s $T_{\text{POWER}_{\text{ha}}}$ is greater than the $T_{\text{POWER}_{\text{ha}}}$ of the adoptive state, I coded a response of $T_{\text{POWER}_{\text{ha}}} = 1$. However, if the $T_{\text{POWER}_{\text{ha}}}$ of an adoptive state exceeds that of a homeland the coded response is $T_{\text{POWER}_{\text{ha}}} = 0$.

In order to establish $T_{\text{POWER}_{\text{ha}}}$ I compared several homeland and adoptive state economic and military sources of power. For example, Serbia interacts with Serbs living in Croatia. In order to measure $T_{\text{POWER}_{\text{ha}}}$ for Serbia I compared economic and military statistics for Serbia and Croatia. By measuring $T_{\text{POWER}_{\text{ha}}}$ this way, I was able to observe how the relative power of Serbia and Croatia affects prospects for cooperation between Serbia and its Serb diaspora who live in Croatia.

To measure $T_{\text{POWER}_{\text{ha}}}$ I compared World Factbook statistics for four economic factors as well as two military factors that reflect power resources. The economic factors included each state’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, inflation rate, unemployment rate, and economic growth. The military factors included the percent of each state’s military expenditures as a percent of their total GDP and the number of individuals within each state that were fit to serve in the military service for the 1998 period. In order to aggregate the value of each of the economic and military factors to reflect one value for $T_{\text{POWER}_{\text{ha}}}$, I gave a score to each homeland based on aggregate economic and military factors. The scoring system I used to calculate $T_{\text{POWER}_{\text{ha}}}$ is illustrated below (Table 2.2).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Homeland Power Factor</th>
<th>&gt; or &lt;</th>
<th>Adoptive State Power Factor</th>
<th>Homeland Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homeland GDP Per Capita</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>Adoptive GDP Per Capita</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland GDP Per Capita</td>
<td>&lt;</td>
<td>Adoptive GDP Per Capita</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Inflation Rate</td>
<td>&lt;</td>
<td>Adoptive Inflation Rate</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Inflation Rate</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>Adoptive Inflation Rate</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Unemployment</td>
<td>&lt;</td>
<td>Adoptive Unemployment</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Unemployment</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>Adoptive Unemployment</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Econ. Growth</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>Adoptive Econ. Growth</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Econ. Growth</td>
<td>&lt;</td>
<td>Adoptive Econ. Growth</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Mil. Exps.</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>Adoptive Mil. Exps.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Mil. Exps.</td>
<td>&lt;</td>
<td>Adoptive Mil. Exps.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Mil. Personnel</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>Adoptive Mil. Personnel</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Mil. Personnel</td>
<td>&lt;</td>
<td>Adoptive Mil. Personnel</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Homeland Power Score</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: If no information was available for a specific power factor, the points associated with that factor were excluded from the total possible power score. Therefore, if there was no information on a homeland or adoptive state’s military expenditure the total possible power score was lowered from a value of 8 to a value of 6. Calculations of total power score were done on the lower of the two values.

Table 2.3: $T_{POWER\_ha}$ Coding Scheme

Once a total power score was generated for each homeland, I divided the total power score for each homeland by the total points possible. This calculation gave me a final percentage of the relative power to be allocated to each homeland/adoptive state dyad. If the homeland’s percentage of the total power score exceeded 50%, homelands received a $T_{POWER\_ha}$ value of “1.” If the homeland’s percentage of the total power score was less than 50%, homelands received a $T_{POWER\_ha}$ value of “0.”

I measured the number of diaspora associated with each homeland state $NUMBER_{h}$ by counting the number of diaspora groups that were associated with each of...
the 42 homeland states. For example, I identified 18 Russian diaspora groups (Russians living in 18 different states, outside their homeland) associated with Russia. By definition, all homelands must have at least one diaspora in order to fit within the criteria for being a homeland, so the range of NUMBERh is between one diaspora group and 31 diaspora groups (see Table 2.4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Diaspora Groups Associated with Homelands</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19.04%</td>
<td>19.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16.66%</td>
<td>35.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14.28%</td>
<td>49.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11.90%</td>
<td>61.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9.52%</td>
<td>71.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9.52%</td>
<td>80.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.38%</td>
<td>83.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.76%</td>
<td>88.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.38%</td>
<td>90.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.38%</td>
<td>92.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.38%</td>
<td>95.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.38%</td>
<td>97.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.38%</td>
<td>99.96%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.4 Number of Diaspora Associated With Homelands

Because I used logistic analysis to evaluate prospects for homeland/diaspora cooperation, I reclassified the NUMBERh variable so that it was a binomial variable. If NUMBERh was less than three diaspora groups, the response for NUMBERh was reclassified to equal “1” to indicate that the number of diaspora associated with homelands was three or less.
One can see from table 2.3, that 49.98% of the homelands had three or less associated diaspora groups. If the response for NUMBER_h was originally in the range of 4-31 diaspora groups, (as was true for 50% of the homelands) the response for NUMBER_h was reclassified to equal “0” to indicate that the number of diaspora groups associated with the homeland was four or more.

I originally measured the size of the diaspora population in terms of the numeric value of the diaspora population relative to that of the general population in each diaspora’s adoptive state. For example, Albanians living in Macedonia represent 22 percent of Macedonia’s total population. However, as I did with NUMBER_h, I coded the diaspora population size so that it could be used as a binomial variable. Rather than considering the numeric percent of each diaspora population within the adoptive states, I chose to consider whether each diaspora group represented a minority or majority of the ethnic population within their adoptive states. If the diaspora population percent was equal to or less than 49%, I coded the variable MAJORITY_d to equal a value of “0” to indicate the diaspora population does not represent a majority of the population in its adoptive state. If the diaspora population percent was equal to or greater than 50%, I coded MAJORITY_d to equal a value of “1” to indicate the diaspora population does represent a majority of the population in its adoptive state.
CHAPTER 3

HOMELAND AND DIASPORA CHARACTERISTICS: A SURVEY OF DATA

3.1 Overview

In Chapter 1, I discuss two examples of cases in which homelands and diaspora demonstrate diverging interests. In the Chinese case, China’s interest in its diaspora waxed and waned depending on the status of China’s foreign policy. The Macedonian example demonstrated diverging interest among diaspora groups within the larger Macedonian ethnic nationalist community.

Variations in homeland and diaspora social, political, and economic environments could explain why homeland and diaspora interests do not always coincide. In this sense, if we understand the unique environments in which homelands and diaspora exist, we may be able to improve our conception of conditions that promote homeland/diaspora cooperation. I believe it is critical to establish how certain characteristics differentiate one homeland from another and develop a consistent explanation of why some homelands cooperate with their diaspora and others do not. At best, establishing definitive homeland and diaspora characteristics may be helpful for determining which characteristics are common among homelands that do not cooperate with their diaspora. At worst, providing a survey of information I have gathered about homeland/diaspora
actors will provide a better understanding of who these actors are, so that we know more about them for future research.

This chapter focuses on identifying and distinguishing actors that exist within transnational ethnic nationalist communities. The data presented in this chapter is a survey of homeland and diaspora communities, as they existed in 1998. In addition to a survey in which actors are classified as homelands and diaspora for this study, I describe several characteristics that I believe influence homeland/diaspora interactions.

3.2 Environmental Characteristics: Homelands and Diaspora

I devote the following portion of this chapter to a discussion of the variation within homeland/diaspora environments. Although many different factors affect homeland and diaspora environments, my focus is on the following characteristics:

- Shared language and shared religion between homelands and diaspora
- Political organizations that can be utilized by diaspora within their adoptive states
- Proximity between homelands and diaspora
- The number of diaspora groups associated with homelands
- The percentage of diaspora group population relative to that of their adoptive states

My discussion of the environmental factors included in this chapter is brief and will focuses mainly on descriptive statistics as they apply to homelands and diaspora. In Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation, I discuss, in depth, the implications of these environmental factors and their use as independent variables.
Distribution of Homeland and Diaspora Interactions/Events

Events analyzed in this study are those for which the homeland is the source and the diaspora group is the target of interaction. Homeland interaction with common identity associated diaspora was inconsistent. Some homelands consistently interacted with their own diaspora, while other states interacted only with non-associated diaspora groups. For example, Ireland consistently interacted with Irish living in Northern Ireland during 1998 while Armenia did not interact with any of its diaspora groups but rather interacted only with Greeks living in Cyprus. Regardless of which diaspora groups were targeted, those associated by identity or not, data was collected for all 42 homelands and all diaspora groups that were targeted by a homeland.

Homelands

It must be noted here that although all potential interactions among 42 homelands and diaspora were surveyed for this study, not all homelands participated in events with diaspora groups during 1998. Of the 42 homelands, 23 (54.8%) interacted with a diaspora group (see Table 3.1). Of these 23 homelands, 16 (69.6%) interacted with diaspora groups with whom they shared identity (see Table 3.1).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Homeland Name</th>
<th>Event Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interactions with Own Diaspora</td>
<td>Interactions with Other Diaspora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia &amp; Montenegro</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Events</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: Frequency of Homelands that Interact with Diaspora Groups
Because identity is a key condition investigated in this study, I have chosen to include homeland interaction with identity-associated diaspora and non-identity-associated diaspora groups. I believe that when evaluating the influence of shared identity overall, it is important to take into consideration those cases in which the effect of shared identity is at issue. In these cases, I have included all homeland/diaspora interactions, regardless of whether shared identity \((\text{SID}_{\text{hd}})\) is equal to “1” or “0”. For example, when determining how shared identity is related to Croatia’s propensity to cooperate with diaspora, it is necessary to include those events that occurred between Croatia and Croats living in Bosnia for whom the value of \(\text{SID}_{\text{hd}}=1\) to Croatia’s interactions with Serbs living in Bosnia, for whom the value of \(\text{SID}_{\text{hd}}=0\). The analysis that includes those cases in which \(\text{SID}_{\text{hd}}=1\) and \(\text{SID}_{\text{hd}}=0\) is discussed in Chapter 4.

Serbia and the United Kingdom were both involved in conflict negotiations with non-associated diaspora groups during 1998. Given the intensity of negotiations related to the Kosovo crisis and the UK negotiations in Northern Ireland during this time period, one should not be surprised to find that Serbia/Albanian and UK/Irish related events dominated the \(\text{SID}_{\text{hd}}=0\) events.\(^8\) Serbian events with Albanians living in Kosovo represent 20.7% of the total number of events and UK events with Irish living in Northern Ireland account for 21.7% of the total number of events in this study. These cases represent homeland interaction with diaspora that are not their own, yet are living within the bounds of the adoptive state. Although the Serb/Albanian and UK/Irish cases

\(^8\) Several issues must be noted; first, all conclusions drawn in this study must be understood in terms of how Serbia and the UK affect the results of the models, analysis, generalizations related to this study. In one sense, it is clear that the findings of this study are strongly associated with the activities of Serbia and the UK. However, rather than viewing the data as inherently skewed, I argue that the dominance the Serb and UK homelands reflects the intensity of the issues each homeland addressed. Serbia and the UK were central actors in two major international cooperation issues during 1998.
are interesting, I have chosen to exclude the Serbia/Albanian and UK/Irish cases in the analysis (presented in Chapter 5). My decision to exclude these cases was due to the non-transnational nature of these interactions. For example, Serbia/Albanians in Kosovo interactions involve homeland/diaspora events; however, these interactions occur between an adoptive state (that also happens to qualify as another diaspora’s homeland) and a non-associated diaspora living within the homeland’s boundaries. In this case, interactions are internal between two actors, not transnational between a homeland and its associated diaspora group.

**Diaspora Groups**

I observed 22 diaspora groups that were involved in homeland/diaspora interactions during 1998. As was true of the frequency of homeland initiated events, (Table 3.1) Albanians living in Serbia, Irish living in the UK, and Serbs living in Bosnia combined, account for nearly 67% of all homeland/diaspora interactions.

It is also important to note, that although Albanian, Irish, and Serbian diaspora were the target of homeland interactions far more often than any other diaspora groups, they were not necessarily the targets of their own homelands. For example, although Albanians living in the Serbia were involved in 27.5% of the events included in this study, Albania, China, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Iran, Macedonia, Russia, and Serbia all interacted with this diaspora group.
Shared Language and Shared Religion between Homelands and Diaspora

Both shared language and religion are often considered relevant indicators of cultural similarity.\(^9\) Although not all scholars agree on the utility of language and religion, I believe that these variables are valuable for establishing a basis for cultural characteristics that distinguish certain diaspora communities from others.

The data in this study shows that a majority of the diaspora have the opportunity to communicate with their homeland in a language used in both the homeland and the diaspora’s adoptive state. Of the homeland and diaspora considered in this study, over half of the 213 (67.9\%) diaspora communities live in adoptive states in which their homeland’s language is used. As I state in Chapter 4, I assume that if a homeland’s language exists within the diaspora’s adoptive state, diaspora are assumed to have the opportunity to use the language of their homeland. For example, three of the five Hungarian diaspora lived in adoptive states in which Hungarian was spoken.

The statistics regarding shared religion are even more striking than those of shared language. I find that the religions commonly encountered in the homeland are also available in 92.0\% of diaspora’s adoptive states. The existence of a common religion does not necessarily imply that all homeland and diaspora populations practice the same religion, however this statistic shows that both homelands and diaspora have the opportunity to practice a common religion should they choose.

\(^9\) For a detailed discussion of the implications of language on ethnic identity, see Laitin 1998.
Political Organizations for Diaspora Groups

Although not all diaspora participate in the political organization associated with their ethnic nationalist group, the existence of political organizations could allow diaspora groups to access to the domestic political environment in their adoptive states. I find that 13 (30.1%) of all homelands are associated with diaspora that have political parties or pressure groups in their adoptive states.

In general, there are many potential explanations for the absence of political organizations associated with diaspora groups. One explanation is that governments of adoptive states could disallow the formation of political parties, regardless of whether or not the party represents ethnic nationalist groups. Alternatively, ethnic nationalist diaspora populations could assimilate to life outside their homeland as long as there is no desire within the ethnic nationalist diaspora to form a political organization associated with their diaspora population.

Homeland Proximity to its Diaspora

Regardless of whether or not a true network of support exists between homelands and their bordering diaspora groups, the perception of such a relationship may affect the environment in which bordering groups exist. In comparison to those homeland and diaspora groups that do not border one another. It is possible that homelands are more likely to cooperate with those diaspora who are geographically proximate, rather than those diaspora groups that are located at a distance from the homeland. Furthermore, as I discuss in Chapter 4, homelands that border a diaspora’s adoptive states may have a more precarious security situation to consider, when interacting with bordering diaspora
groups, than they do when diaspora are not nearby. In this sample, 69.1% homelands share a border with at least one diaspora group.

*Number of Diaspora Groups*

The number of actors participating in cooperative activities has long been discussed as one of the most important features determining the success of collective action (Olson 1971). Olson argues that as the number of actors in a group increases, it becomes less likely that individuals within the group will be able to sustain collective action.

Regardless of whether or not cooperation actually occurs, it is possible that as the number of diaspora groups increases, the frequency of homeland/diaspora interactions that are disruptive to diplomatic relations could increase between a homeland and its surrounding states. I found that just under half (49%) of the homelands had three or less associated diaspora groups (see Chapter 2, Table 2.3).

*Majority Ethnic Nationalist Diaspora Groups*

It is possible that a diaspora group that represents a majority of the ethnic population of its adoptive state significantly influences the diaspora’s social, economic, or political environments. In fact, Horowitz (1985) links the size of an ethnic group’s population to the likelihood that these groups will suffer from disadvantages or lack of representation in their adoptive states. I argue in Chapter 4 that homelands may choose to avoid cooperation with diaspora groups who represent a majority of the population in their adoptive states. It is possible that homelands assume that large diaspora groups can
“help themselves” or that homeland assistance could increase tension between the homeland and the adoptive states in which majority diaspora populations reside. I found that 9.2% of diaspora groups represent a majority of the adoptive state’s population.

3.3 Conclusion

The data presented here clarifies many characteristics that distinguish the homeland/diaspora cases selected for this study as well as demonstrates the wide range of environments in which homelands and diaspora exist. In the overview section of this chapter, I suggest that identification of characteristics that are unique to homelands and diaspora may clarify characteristics that are common to homelands that choose to cooperate with their diaspora groups. These characteristics may also be common among homelands that choose not to cooperate with their diaspora. I believe that by pursuing an effort to improve our understanding of the environments in which homelands and diaspora interact, we can begin to outline the factors that are likely to shape the interests of homelands and diaspora.
CHAPTER 4

CULTURAL SIMILARITY, HOMELAND RELATIONSHIPS, AND POWER FACTORS

4.1 Overview

In this chapter, I focus on how cultural similarity, homeland relationships, and homeland power factors, influence homeland/diaspora cooperation. The question is whether homeland/diaspora cooperation is more likely to occur when a) the homeland and diaspora are culturally similar, b) the homeland has a relationship with diaspora/adoptive state that promotes cooperation, or c) homeland power exceeds that of adoptive states with which homelands interact. I also explore the idea that power and relationships, not identity, are associated with prospects for homeland/diaspora cooperation.

First, I discuss the association between cultural similarity and homeland/diaspora cooperation when homeland/diaspora cooperation is defined in terms of shared identity, shared language, or shared religion, between homelands and the diaspora with whom homelands interact. Second, I explore whether the relationship that these homelands maintain with diaspora and adoptive states can be considered a condition for homeland/diaspora cooperation. I consider the value of four conditions: a) homeland/adoptive state history of cooperation, b) whether homelands and adoptive
states have a reciprocal relationship, c) the political organization of diaspora groups, and
d) the proximity of homelands to diaspora with whom they interact. I relate these four
conditions to homeland diaspora cooperation. Finally, I evaluate how the balance of
power between homelands and adoptive states affects homeland/diaspora cooperation. I
compare the total power of a homeland to that of an adoptive state, the size of a diaspora
group, and the number of diaspora groups that are associated with homelands.

4.2 Logic of the Argument

The main assumption behind the logic of my argument stems from the dual role of
a homeland as a sovereign state functioning within the international system and as a
member of a transnational ethnic nationalist community. Homelands are subject to
competing interests; they must balance their interest in maintaining the sovereignty of the
homeland state with the welfare of their ethnic community. Clearly, cultural values play
a key role in defining the character of a homeland state, but it is also possible that a
homeland’s interest in developing resources (e.g. economic or military) interferes with a
homeland’s interest or capability to directly support their diaspora. Keeping this in mind,
it is possible that issues connected to homeland relationships or power concerns could
divert the influence of cultural similarity on homeland/diaspora cooperation. I argue, that
once we understand the effect of cultural similarity, homeland relationships, and power
issues, independently, we can begin to address the more complex issue of how the three
approaches may work together to promote or dissuade homeland/diaspora cooperation
(Figure 4.1).
I believe that before we can use any of the three concepts to explain the dynamics of the international system, we must first establish how each of these concepts affect the behavior of specific states facing transnational ethnic nationalist issues. We must take a step back and explain how they apply to the current complexity of states within the international system, particularly those in the not so unique situation of homelands dealing with transnational ethnic nationalist communities. Once we establish the potential influence of cultural similarity, homeland relationships, and power issues on homeland/diaspora cooperation we will have found the missing link that can applied to dynamics among transnational ethnic nationalist groups in the international system as a whole.
In this section, I concentrate on cultural similarity. First, I address how cultural similarity has been treated in previous literature, and then I present my views. Finally, I outline the measures of cultural similarity used in this thesis. One key issue addressed in this chapter is whether shared identity clarifies our understanding of how likely homelands are to cooperate with their diaspora. I take issue with those who assume that shared identity influences the behavior within ethnic nationalist communities without empirical testing. The purpose of this thesis is two-fold. One purpose is to operationalize a cultural similarity concept by measuring shared identity, shared
language, and shared religion. The other purpose is to apply these measures along with homelands relationships and power to the question of homeland/diaspora cooperation.

The debate of the role of ethnic identity in international politics is ongoing. Some argue that ethnic nationalism plays a significant role in the foreign policy of states, while others argue that state interaction, regardless of whether or not identity exists, is motivated by state pursuit of power. For example, Saideman (1997) argues that ethnic identity influences the foreign policy preferences of states. He suggests that ethnic ties motivate the political elite within a state to respond in favor of those who share their ethnic identity when coping with secessionist issues. He writes that the existence of ethnic identity creates a special bond between members of ethnic groups, a bond that could extend beyond the borders of a single state. Specifically Saideman writes, “the ethnic ties (or enmities) between a politician’s supporters and the combatants in ethnic conflicts in other states help to explain the policies of states toward secessionist crises” (Saideman 1997, p. 722). Such a statement, if true, would lead us to expect homeland support of diaspora communities, especially when diaspora have specific demands related to secessionism. However, this argument also requires that we ignore the implications of such behavior for states’ abilities to maintain their position as sovereign entities in the international system. In other words, Saideman’s assumption suggests that if homelands have an ethnic identity tie with their diaspora, we ought to expect the homeland to support their diaspora’s goals, even though the homeland could suffer a blow to its domestic economic or political stability resulting from this support for its diaspora. I believe this is a flaw in Saideman’s research.
Suny describes how “conceptualizations of interest can change rapidly in politically fluid moments” (Suny 1999/2000, p. 141). He discusses how policymakers shift their presentation of national identities to reflect their current interests. I agree with Suny’s comments and suggest that given the difficult task of reconciling multiple interests within an ethnic nationalist community, and the challenges states face to maintain their position in the international arena, one must not assume that identity-based cooperation is assured for homelands and their diaspora. My research is designed to empirically test how shared identity, among other characteristics, affects homeland/diaspora cooperation.

Homeland commitment to ethnic identity may be clear within the boundaries of the homeland’s territories. Gorenburg writes, “The extent to which members of social subgroups within the ethnic group come to support nationalism is predicable and is based on a particular sequence of mobilization” (Gorenburg 2000, p. 115). Although Gorenburg’s assessment of how to mobilize an ethnic nationalist population may apply to actions that occur within the boundaries of a homeland, I do not believe that Gorenburg’s analysis can be extended to explain transnational homeland/diaspora interactions.

Gorenburg’s argument relies on state institutions (e.g. academic institutions, political parties, youth organizations etc.) that are able to promote social networks and collective identity. Although it is plausible that state institutions are a key factor for establishing a concept of collective identity, there is no evidence that homelands are either capable of, or have an interest in, “exporting” collective identity to the regions in which their diaspora reside. In cases where homelands demonstrate no interest in
supporting their diaspora, I believe that homeland behavior is better explained by either relationships or power factors.

As noted in Chapter 1, Charles King and Neil Melvin (1999/2000) take a very different approach to the influence of identity on foreign policy. These authors suggest that identity has very little to do with the activities of diaspora in international politics. King and Melvin compare the interactions of three states (Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan) with their diaspora. The authors conclude that the pursuit of political power explains why these three states have crafted foreign policies that support the goals of their diaspora far better than the existence of common identity. King and Melvin conclude that:

Nation-states may label a variety of different groups “diasporas”—whether produced by forced migration or by alterations in state borders—but the ability of kin states to make the label meaningful and to craft foreign policy accordingly is determined by a set of concrete political factors. Most of these factors are more straightforward than explanations that focus on the vagaries of identity politics would allow (King and Melvin 1999/2000, p. 131).

I believe that the logic outlined by King and Melvin is accurate, but that it requires more evidence to support their arguments. If homeland foreign policy is really about politics as King and Melvin suggest, we ought to find that power, not identity offers the best explanation of those situations in which homelands are more or less likely to cooperate with their diaspora.

My view is that although cultural similarity is a key factor needed to begin to understand homeland behavior, it is not the whole story. I propose that when adoptive states feel that either diaspora or homelands exert too much influence over their domestic
activities, homelands respond by avoiding cooperation with their diaspora. In these cases, it is plausible that homelands choose not to support diaspora rather than to compromise their own security. In later sections, I examine the explanatory value of interest (understood in terms of previous relationships) and capability (understood in terms of power) for homeland/diaspora cooperation. In the following section, I test the influence of cultural similarity in relation to homeland relationships and power. I operationalize cultural similarity in terms of shared identity, shared language, and shared religion.

Operationalizing Cultural Similarity

*Shared Names*

As noted in Chapter 2, shared name does not always reflect shared identity. However, as a categorizing measure I believe shared names are an appropriate way to indicate identity groups. Names establish collective personality and lead to a sense of community among members of ethnic groups (Smith 1986). Thus, the name that applies to an ethnic nationalist community could identify groups that share a common ethnic nationalist category. For example, “Albanian”, is a name that describes individuals of Albanian origin who could be identified as members of a common identity group, either by their own members or by others.

Smith suggests that three processes enable ethnic communities to engage in some sort of collective action. Among the three processes discussed, Smith includes
“vernacular mobilization” (Smith 1986, p. 35)\textsuperscript{10}. Vernacular mobilization refers to a community’s discovery of things that make it different, including common history and traditions. One factor that clearly contributes to the distinction of ethnic communities is the name used to describe the community. Smith writes, “collective names are a sure sign and emblem of ethnic communities” (Smith 1986, 23). Such distinctions, in my opinion, can be used to categorize ethnic nationalist populations. Based on this reasoning, I suggest that those who share a common ethnic nationalist name also share a common ethnic nationalist identity.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{10} The two additional processes that are thought to promote mobilization are cultural politicization and ethnic purification. For more on each of these concepts see Smith 1986.

\textsuperscript{11} Of course, individuals within a group may not choose to associate with others who share the same ethnic nationalist “name”. However, regardless of whether or not individuals accept a specific name it is possible that others will assume that the name applies and act based on this fact, even if individuals oppose such categorization.
Shared Language and Religion

Common language, religion, and national traditions, are all issues upon which cultural similarity could be based.\textsuperscript{12} These issues are believed by some, to enhance ethnic nationalist identity and to improve support among ethnic nationalist members for collective activities (Gorenburg 2000). Although common language and religion contribute to a community’s sense of shared culture, the utility of applying these concepts to homeland/diaspora cooperation is debatable (see Gurr 1993; Horowitz 1985; Laitin 1998). It is possible that because language and religion can be changed or disavowed, these characteristics cannot be relied upon to distinguish one ethnic nationalist group from another.

Regardless of which side of the debate one supports, I believe that including issues that have been shown to be useful for establishing cultural similarity by some theorists is a valuable endeavor and adds depth to my operational concept. I have chosen to include shared language and religion in this chapter in much the same way I included shared identity. Just as the question of whether shared identity is a foundation on which cooperation within an ethnic nationalist community is built, shared language and/or religion could also motivate homelands to support their diaspora.

\textsuperscript{12} For discussion regarding the importance of cultural similarities, see Anderson 1991; Gurr 1993; Horowitz 1985; or Smith 1986.
Homeland Relationships

In international politics literature, inter-state cooperation is often explained in terms of state interests. What is not addressed in this literature is the type of interests that may motivate homeland/diaspora cooperation. My solution for this oversight is to operationalize homeland interest in terms of homeland relationship with adoptive state and diaspora groups. I assume relationships are for homeland/diaspora cooperation what interest is for explaining interstate cooperation in the international system.

The discussion of interstate cooperation is inherently linked to a discussion of interest. The centrality of interest within the international cooperation literature is demonstrated particularly well in Milner (1992). She suggests that an international actor will recognize its interest and gauge responses to other actors accordingly. Milner writes that international cooperation is observed, “when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination” (Milner
1992, 467). In other words, actors adjust their behavior in favor of cooperation when it is in their interest to do so. One key element to Milner’s argument is the assumption that all actors are motivated by goal-oriented behavior and that all actors have an interest in achieving some type of gain or reward.

Rather than directly measuring homeland interest, I have chosen to evaluate interest in terms of the homeland/adoptive state relationship and homeland/diaspora relationship. Although interest is a complex issue that is difficult to quantify, the study of interest in this project will be limited to relationships that could threaten homeland security. Homeland/adoptive state or homeland/diaspora relationships could threaten a homeland’s sense of security; therefore, homeland relationships with either of these actors could spark homeland interest in security.

I assume that the interests of homelands are no different from those of other states and that the security concerns faced by homelands as sovereign states are no different from those of other sovereign states. In other words, homelands may become embroiled in a security dilemma with an adoptive state just as could any other state in the international system. Moreover, because cooperation with diaspora could create resources that are uniquely available to homelands, it is possible that cooperation between homelands and associated diaspora could increase security anxieties for adoptive states. Because increased security anxiety for adoptive states could result in increased anxiety for homelands, I believe that the influence of homeland/diaspora and homeland/adoptive state interests/relationships must be considered.
Operationalizing Homeland Relationships

*History of Cooperation*

One hypothesis promoted in this dissertation is that a history of cooperation between homelands and the adoptive state is likely to affect homeland/diaspora prospects for cooperation. For example, if homelands and adoptive states have a history of a contentious relationship, it is likely that homelands will avoid contact with their diaspora in an effort to minimize accelerating tension between the homeland and adoptive state. In this case, given that there is no history of cooperation between homelands and adoptive states, it is possible that adoptive states will consider homeland interaction with diaspora to be “intrusive” or “unacceptable”. Specifically, the hypothesis advanced here is that if there is a history of cooperation between homelands and adoptive states, it is more likely that homelands will be able to cooperate with diaspora without suffering negative affects on the homeland/adoptive state relations.

If homeland cooperation with diaspora is explained by the existence of a previous cooperative relationship between homelands and adoptive states, any example of cooperation between homelands and adoptive states in the past ought to establish a basis for a relationship between homeland and adoptive state that allows homelands to cooperate with diaspora.
Reciprocity

Because both the homeland and adoptive state have access to the other’s diaspora communities, homelands could pressure an adoptive state’s diaspora as a way to exercise leverage over the adoptive state. Put simply, a homeland’s ability to pressure an adoptive state, via diaspora living within the homeland, could enable homelands more latitude for cooperating with its own diaspora. If an adoptive state were to react negatively to the homeland’s efforts to cooperate with its own diaspora, homelands could respond by placing pressure on the adoptive state’s diaspora group that exist within the homelands borders. In this case, one could find that homelands are capable of cooperating with their own diaspora, and do not need to take into consideration the adoptive state’s concerns because the homelands have their own avenues through which they can pressure disapproving adoptive states. For example, one could expect Hungary to interact with its diaspora in Romania, without fear of Romanian repercussions because Hungary could act against the Romanian population living in Hungary, should Romania adversely treat Hungarians within its borders.

Political Organizations

I hypothesize that the existence of political organizations in diasporas’ adoptive territories negatively influences the relationship that exists between homeland states and diaspora. As I later suggest of large diaspora groups, it is also possible that organized diaspora (or those that have the opportunity to organize) will be perceived as a threat by adoptive states, thus increasing tensions between homelands and adoptive states (see Figure 4.3). Homelands may minimize relations with politically organized diaspora as a
means to ease tension and threats to the stability of homeland/adoptive state relations. In addition to the security dilemma implications of political organizations, it is also possible that if diaspora have access to organized political groups within their adoptive state, homelands can more easily “pass the buck” of ethnic nationalist community responsibility to the political organizations that represents diaspora in their adoptive state.

Figure 4.3: Homeland Cooperation Based on Existence of Diaspora Political Organizations

“Structural availability” could explain why some actors within a group participate in collective action, while others do not (McAdam 1986). According to McAdam, an individual that “lacks the structural contact to ‘pull’ him or her into protest activity” is unlikely to participate in collective action (McAdam 1986, p. 65). I believe that the same idea applies to homeland/diaspora relations. In the context of ethnic nationalist groups, structural availability could refer to diasporas’ access to political organizations within their adoptive states. It is possible that homelands are more capable of cooperating with
their diaspora if ethnic nationalist diaspora can access political organizations in their own country.

At first glance, this logic may seem to support the hypothesis that homeland capability to cooperate can be associated with politically organized diaspora. However, I believe that the existence of political organizations actually has a negative effect on homeland capability to cooperate with diaspora. Although this contradicts intuitive logic, (that homelands interact with their diaspora) interactions via diaspora political organizations intensifies tension that may exist between homelands and adoptive states. If homelands use the diasporas’ political organizations to facilitate support, it is possible that adoptive states could interpret such actions as homeland interference in the adoptive state’s domestic political environment. Following this logic, I believe that rather than improving prospects for cooperation, the existence of diaspora political organizations within the adoptive state work to inhibit homeland/diaspora cooperation.

**Proximity/Shared Borders**

As discussed in Chapter 1, the transnational nature of ethnic nationalist communities is often excluded from explanations about how ethnic nationalism affects international politics. Although many authors are willing to accept that divisions exist within an ethnic nationalist community, very few take into consideration the impact of homeland/adoptive state proximity on the cohesiveness and behavior of ethnic nationalist communities (notable exceptions include work done by Esman 1986; Sheffer 1995; and Weiner 1995).
In my view, it is possible that although an international border may cut across what would otherwise be a contiguous ethnic nationalist community, the border may not significantly affect how members of an ethnic nationalist community interact with one another (Figure 4.4). Furthermore, it is reasonable to believe that homelands that do share a border with their diaspora are close enough to one another to easily communicate and coordinate their support. However, I believe that homelands that are geographically close to one another are less likely to cooperate because close diaspora implies closer potential threats to homelands from adoptive states.
The primary basis for my suggestion is that homelands are more sensitive to the perception of threat by bordering adoptive states. In part, homelands are more sensitive to a perceived threat by adoptive states with which they share a border because they are more likely to interact with bordering adoptive states regarding a wide range of issues. For example, the separation offered by an international border does not coincide with the distribution of natural resources. I suggest that, just as states must negotiate with one another over natural resources such as water and fuel, homelands and adoptive states must negotiate over ethnic populations with which both states have an interest. It is possible that homelands choose to accept agreements with adoptive states that are less than beneficial for the homeland’s diaspora in exchange for favorable terms regarding economic, environmental, or military development between homelands and adoptive states. As a result, I expect to find that homelands are less likely to cooperate with diaspora when they share a border.
Power Issues

Ultimately, I believe that a homeland may be generally concerned with the welfare of its diaspora community. However, when faced with a threat to itself, I expect homelands to act in their own self-interest without regard to their diaspora. I believe that homeland behavior toward diaspora reflects the difficulty that homelands could face when their support for diaspora would compromise the homeland’s own security interests. Furthermore, even if security is not at issue, the deciding factor for homelands to support diaspora may be an issue of resource allocation to achieve both diaspora and homeland goals. Regardless of whether a threat actually exists, homeland/diaspora interactions could intensify a perceived threat by the adoptive state, which could in turn ultimately jeopardize the stability of the relationship that exists between the homeland and the adoptive state. Put simply, threats to the adoptive state, real or perceived, could initiate a security dilemma between the homeland and adoptive states.

Arguments that relate the security dilemma to ethnic nationalism are well-documented (Kaufman 1996; Posen 1993). However, those who discuss the security dilemma in terms of ethnic nationalist actors ignore the potential role of diaspora. A classical realist explanation of homeland/diaspora cooperation relies on a basis of power as a factor that explains inter-state behavior. If one were to apply realist logic to homeland/diaspora cooperation, which is outside the bounds of classical realist concerns, one would have to rely on the status of the homeland/adoptive state balance of power as a basis for any explanation of homeland/diaspora cooperation.

Jervis gives a classic international relations perspective that relates state interest to issues of security and cooperation in his 1978 article “Cooperation under the Security
Dilemma”. In this article, Jervis suggests that the security dilemma is one of the most important barriers to cooperation among states. According to Jervis, improved access to resources alters the balance of security in favor of those with more access to power-related resources. According to this logic, any increase in one state’s security, or security-related resources, will necessarily cause others to experience less security. Thus, any security advantage for one state will result in a ripple effect of security concerns for all other states. Therefore, if cooperation is expected to improve the relative resources of one state, or is perceived to do so, cooperation may fail. Although Jervis’ argument is a systemic, state-based discussion, I believe that the basic elements of his argument apply to homelands, adoptive states, and diaspora groups. The potential for a security dilemma resulting from intensifying diplomatic relations between homelands and adoptive states is not highlighted in the current literature; my research addresses this gap.

For example, although additional resources supplied by diaspora could increase homeland resources available, homeland support to diaspora could be interpreted by the adoptive state as an effort by the homeland to upset the balance of power that has been established between homelands and adoptive states. In this case, homelands could benefit from a stronger diaspora community that could increase its contributions to the homeland. However, by contributing to a strengthened diaspora (that could begin to challenge the stability within their adoptive state); homelands could upset the balance in the distribution of resources between homelands and adoptive states. For adoptive states, homeland support of their diaspora could be a “double-whammy” because homeland assistance of their diaspora could increase instability within the adoptive state, as well as work to distribute resources generated in the adoptive state back to the homeland.
As outlined in Chapter 2, there are three measures of power that I expect to affect homeland/diaspora cooperation. These measures include total power, size of diaspora populations, and the number of diaspora associated with homelands.

**Power**

Total power is a measure of homeland economic and military power relative to that of the adoptive state. I assume that homelands anticipate balancing behavior from adoptive states because of homeland interaction with diaspora groups. When homelands are more powerful than adoptive states, it is possible that homelands perceive less threat from adoptive states. Therefore, homelands have less fear of adoptive state retaliation against the homeland for homeland/diaspora cooperation. The opposite would be true if power favored *adoptive states*. In this case, I expect that there would be very few opportunities for a relatively weak homeland to cooperate with its diaspora without concern for the adoptive state’s retaliation.

*Size of Diaspora Community Populations Relative to that of their Adoptive States*

It is possible that if a diaspora community represents a large percentage of the population in its adoptive state, the diaspora may threaten the stability of the adoptive state (see Figure 4.5). For example, if the diaspora represents a majority of the ethnic group population within the adoptive state, the diaspora could dominate the adoptive state’s political system. Assuming diaspora support their homeland policies, such domination could promote an opportunity for homelands to influence the policies addressed within the adoptive state.
By destabilizing the political balance within an adoptive state, relatively large diaspora groups could compromise the security of the adoptive state to the advantage of homelands. According to this logic, I expect less homeland/diaspora cooperation to occur for those homelands that are associated with majority diaspora populations in their adoptive states. In these cases, homelands are expected to opt to avoid destabilizing (via interaction with their diaspora) the domestic environments of adoptive states in order to maintain a balance of power between homelands and the adoptive states. To investigate the potential influence diaspora majorities have on homeland/diaspora cooperation, I test the likelihood that majority diaspora populations minimize prospects for homeland/diaspora cooperation.
Number of Diaspora Associated with Homelands

In addition to the balance of total power between homelands and adoptive states and diaspora population size, I believe that the number of diaspora groups is also relevant to the homeland’s capability to interact with diaspora. Put simply, if homelands have a large number of diaspora groups, it is less likely that homelands will choose to devote their resources to any one of its many associated diaspora groups.

In part, Olson outlines the relevance of diaspora number in homeland/diaspora interaction. If we assume diaspora group behavior within transnational ethnic nationalist communities is analogous to individual behavior in the collective group, then the following logic described by Olson can be applied here. Individuals within an organization have two sets of interests; interests shared with the group and self-interest (Olson 1971). Although homeland and diaspora groups could benefit from acting collectively, an individual’s decision (or in this case a homeland’s decision) to contribute to the group is based on how much the contribution will cost, relative to the benefits received. Olson writes:

The total gain to the group will depend upon the rate or level at which the collective good is obtained (T), and the “size” of the group (Sg), which depends not only upon the number of individuals in the group, but also the value of a unit of the collective good to each individual in the group. (Olson 1971, 23)

Applying this logic, homelands with many diaspora are less likely to extend support than those with relatively few associated diaspora groups.

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13 Olson’s theory related to group size and collective action is disputed in Esteban and Ray’s article “Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox” (Esteban and Ray 2001). However, because Esteban and
The number of groups within an ethnic nationalist community will determine how much benefit each actor within a community receives (Olson 1971). Additionally, prospects for collective behavior will be influenced by how much each actor within the ethnic nationalist community expects to receive from engaging in collective activities. According to Olson, the more participants in a group, the smaller the benefit provided to those who participate in collective activities, and as a result, the less likely it will be that group members may contribute to collective action. Olson writes:

...the more individuals in the group, the more serious the suboptimality will be. Clearly then groups with larger numbers of members will generally perform less efficiently than groups with smaller numbers of members. (Olson 1971, p. 28)

Thus, we are more likely to see support from homelands with fewer diaspora than support from homelands with a large number of associated diaspora groups.

Not only are relatively large groups subject to problems of benefit distribution, but they also have a problem of properly enforcing the participation of all members within the collective group. Specifically, large groups are prone to a “free-rider” phenomenon in which members do not contribute to the “cost” of cooperation, yet receive full benefits. For ethnic nationalist communities in which there are many diaspora groups, it is possible that homelands could “free ride” or “pass the buck” on to another diaspora group. Therefore, as the number of diaspora associated with homelands increases, it becomes less likely that the homeland will be capable of cooperating with its diaspora (see Figure 4.6).

Ray base their argument on the issue of public vs. private benefits, the points raised by these authors are beyond the scope of this project, and therefore are excluded from this discussion.
I test the influence of the number of diaspora associated with homelands on homeland/diaspora cooperation by simply counting all diaspora groups for each homeland state.

Figure 4.6: Homeland Cooperation Based on Number of Associated Diaspora
CHAPTER 5

DATA ANALYSIS

5.1 Overview

As noted in Chapter 3, not all homelands interact with their diaspora. In order to address the absence of events for some of the homelands/diaspora, I provide two analyses in this chapter. The first analysis addresses why some homelands choose to interact with their diaspora and others do not. I do this by evaluating the influence of other international actors on the presence or absence of homeland/diaspora events. The second analysis directly relates to those homelands that do interact with diaspora; the data for the second analysis applies only to those cases in which homeland/diaspora interactions were observed (number of homelands=23, number of events=170). For a list of homelands that did or did not interact with a diaspora group, see Chapter 3, Table 3.1.

The first analysis addresses the issue of why some homelands interact with their own diaspora and others do not. In order to do this I evaluated which diaspora groups were targeted by homelands and other international actors, including adoptive states, other territories, diaspora groups, and international institutions. In short, I wanted to establish whether homeland/diaspora interaction was in any way related to the activities of other international actors. For example, it is possible that Armenia’s lack of
interaction with its Armenian diaspora reflects the fact that no other international actors chose to interact with any of the Armenian diaspora groups. Along similar lines, Serbia’s interaction with its diaspora in Bosnia could be related to international interest in Serbs living in Bosnia. The purpose of the first analysis is to probe this issue by evaluating the association of homeland/diaspora interaction with events initiated by other international actors.

I begin the second analysis by describing basic distribution for all homeland/diaspora data. I then examine relationships between variables by cross-tabulating the dependent and independent variables to determine a general expectation of which independent variables are associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation. Next, I perform a logistic model analysis to determine if there are statistically significant relationships between all independent and dependent variables.

5.2 Homeland/Diaspora Interactions

In order to establish whether any homeland/diaspora interaction is linked to the presence of interaction by other international actors, I cross-tabulated homeland/diaspora interaction with several other international actors. The interactions of all 42 homelands were included in this cross-tabulation, including those for which no homeland/diaspora interactions occurred. Note, the interaction variable is not related to the cooperation/non-cooperation variable. Interaction is simply a measure of whether an event occurred.
Interaction Variables

I created a variable named “INTERACTION” that indicates whether each homeland (N=42) did or did not interact with its own identity-associated diaspora. If a homeland did interact with its diaspora, as was true for Albania, the “INTERACTION” response was coded as “1.” If a homeland did not interact with any of its diaspora groups, as was true for France, “INTERACTION was coded as a “0”. The variable “INTERACTION” is the dependent variable for this analysis.

The independent variables for this analysis are other international actors that could have interacted with a homeland’s diaspora during 1998. For example, if there was an observed event between a specific diaspora group (ex. Albanians living in Kosovo) and an international institution, such as the United Nations, the independent variable “INSTITUTION” was given a response of “1.” If no interaction occurred between a diaspora group and an international institution, I assigned “INSTITUTION” a response of “0”. I applied the same coding system to several other international actors as listed below. Each international actor is a separate independent variable.

- OTHERS – is the variable name given to the general category of other international actors. This is a “catch-all” category that refers to any one of the international actors listed below. In other words, if any international actor, other than its own homeland, targeted a diaspora, then the response to this variable was given a value of “1”. All examples of diaspora that did not interact with any international actor received a value of “0” for this variable.

- STATE – is the variable name given to all interactions that occurred between a diaspora and a non-identity associated homeland, adoptive state, or territory. If any type of state, other than its own homeland, targeted a diaspora the response to this variable was “1”; otherwise the response to this variable was “0”.


DIASPORA – is the variable name given to all interactions that occurred between a homeland’s diaspora and any other diaspora group. For example, if a diaspora were targeted by a diaspora group, its own or otherwise, the value for “DIASPORA” was “1”; if a particular diaspora were ignored by all other diaspora groups “DIASPORA” was coded as “0”.

INSTITUTION – is the variable name given to all interactions that occurred between a diaspora group and any international institution. If an institution had interacted with a homeland’s diaspora, the value of “INSTITUTION” was coded as “1”. If a diaspora had not been targeted by any international institution the value of “INSTITUTION” was coded as “0”.

Interaction Findings

In order to establish whether homeland/diaspora interactions (with identity-associated diaspora) were associated with the activities of other international actors I cross-tabulated “INTERACTION” with the independent variable “OTHER”. I found that when cross-tabulated with “OTHER” there is an association between homeland/own diaspora interaction and the activities of other international actors (once again, “OTHER” is a general “catch-all” category). Of the homelands that interacted with their own diaspora, 81.3% (P<.0001) had one or more diaspora groups that had been targeted by some sort of international actor, other than the homeland itself.

In addition to the general category “OTHER”, I cross-tabulated the type of international actor that interacted with a homeland's diaspora to determine if one type of actor was likely to be linked to homeland/diaspora events. I found that of the homelands whose diaspora were targeted by “STATE”, homeland/own diaspora interactions occurred in 50.0% of the cases (P<.0001). Similar findings were true of homelands whose diaspora had been targeted by an international institution. For these cases, 62.5%
(P=.0005) of the homeland/diaspora interactions were for those homelands whose diaspora had been targeted by an international institution. See the listings below, which indicate which diaspora were targeted by “STATE” and “INSTITUTION”.

**Diaspora Groups Targeted by “STATE”**

- Albanian living in Macedonia and Serbia
- United Kingdomers living in the United States
- Croat living in Bosnia
- Greek living in Cyprus
- Irish living in the United Kingdom
- Serbian living in Bosnia and Croatia
- Turkish living in Cyprus
- Uzbek living in Afghanistan

**Diaspora Groups Targeted by “INSTITUTION”**

- Albanian living in Macedonia and Serbia
- United Kingdomers living in the United States
- Chinese living in the United States
- Croat living in Bosnia
- Greek living in Cyprus
- Hungarian living in Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia
- Irish living in the United Kingdom
- Korean living in the United States
- Russian living in Estonia and Latvia
I also found that the activities of diaspora groups were less frequently linked with the likelihood of homeland/diaspora interaction. It seems that diaspora activities with one another (ex. Albanians in Macedonia targeting Albanians in Kosovo) is linked with homeland/diaspora interaction, but that this occurs far less often than for other international actors. I found that 25.0% (P=.0074) of the homeland/diaspora interactions were associated with diaspora groups that had also been targeted by another diaspora group.

**Diaspora Groups Targeted by “DIASPORA”**

- Albanian living in Macedonia and Serbia
- Greek living in Cyprus
- Hungarian living in Slovakia
- Serb living in Bosnia and Croatia
- Turkish living in Cyprus

The information gathered from the cross-tabulations clearly indicates that homelands are more likely to interact with their own diaspora if other international actors are also interested in that diaspora group. Based on this information, one could suggest that one reason why some homelands interact with their own diaspora and others do not is related to the interest of other international actors. In other words, one could suggest
that France ignored its French diaspora in part because there was no interest in French
diaspora among other international actors. This is not to say that France would only
interact with its diaspora if others also did, but that events sparking an international
actor’s interest in French diaspora may coincide with France’s activities with its diaspora.

This data shows that it is also possible that several adoptive states were “Hot
Spots” for international actor/diaspora events. The diaspora in four adoptive states in
particular were particularly “popular” among homelands, states, institutions and diaspora.
Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia each had diaspora that were targeted by all types
of international actors. This could lead one to conclude that homelands associated with
diaspora living in each of these four states are more likely to interact with their own
diaspora.

Based on the cross-tabulation findings one could also suggest that there is no
issue faced by French diaspora that is pressing enough to warrant any international actor's
attention, including that of France. However, for the Albanian diaspora the opposite
seems to be true. Albanians in Kosovo were the subject of a great deal of interest by all
international actors during 1998. This is not surprising given the events that occurred
during 1998 between Serbs and Albanians living in Kosovo who were engaged in active
conflict during this period. In this case, one could conclude that the “high profile” of
Albanian diaspora during 1998 inspired all international actors, including Albania, to
initiate some sort of interaction with Kosovar Albanians. These basic findings suggest
that in order to explain why one homeland ignores its diaspora and others do not, one ought to consider the interest of actors other than the homeland state\textsuperscript{14}.

5.3 Analysis 2-Basic Frequencies \textsuperscript{15}

I begin this chapter by reviewing the frequencies of the dependent variable (cooperation) and all relevant independent variables. As noted in the overview section of this chapter, the total number of observed events is 170, which includes all transnational homeland interactions with any diaspora group, their own or otherwise. For example, this data includes Serbia’s interaction with Greeks living in Cyprus, as well as Serbia’s interaction with Serbs living in the Bosnia and Croatia.

Of all 170 homeland/diaspora interactions observed, I found that 101 of the 170 events (59.4\%) were cooperative. This statistic demonstrates that when interacting with diaspora, their own or otherwise, homelands are more likely to cooperate than not (Table 5.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of Homeland/Diaspora Events</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation=0</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation=1</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>59.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{Table 5.1: Homeland/Diaspora Cooperation}

\textsuperscript{14} Of course, one could ask whether the homeland is interested in the diaspora before or after the interest of other international actors is displayed, however, this is a question that is outside the scope of this study. With additional data this issue could be pursued in future studies.

\textsuperscript{15} Definition and measures for all independent variables can be found in Chapter 2.
Cultural Similarity Frequencies

Frequency of cultural similarity between homelands and diaspora indicates that although most homelands share the same religion (98.2%) and language (81.8%) as their diaspora, relatively few homelands interact with their diaspora associated by shared identity. The two homeland/diaspora pairs that did not share a religion or identity but did interact with one another were Armenia interactions with Greeks living in Cyprus, and Japan interactions with Serbs living in Bosnia. Twelve homelands interacted with diaspora with whom no shared language exists. These homelands include Armenia, China, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Iran, Israel, Japan, Russia, Serbia, and the United Kingdom. I find that of the 170 homeland/diaspora events, 114 (67.1%) occurred between homelands and diaspora with shared identity. Homelands that did interact with identity-associated diaspora include, Albania, the United Kingdom, China, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Korea, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

Homeland Relationship Frequencies

Homeland relationships are measured in terms of history of cooperation between homeland and adoptive states, a reciprocal relationship between homelands and adoptive states, the existence of political organizations that could be accessed by diaspora groups, and the proximity of homelands to diaspora groups. I find that more than half (62.4%) of the homeland/diaspora interactions occurred between homelands and adoptive states that have a history of cooperation. The frequency of the reciprocity variable is similar to the findings of homeland and diaspora that share identity. I find that 20.6% of the events in
these data, involved a homeland that had a reciprocal relationship with the adoptive state in which targeted diaspora lived. This is not surprising because common identity is a prerequisite for reciprocal relationships. In other words, in order observe events for a reciprocal relationship between an adoptive and homeland state, shared identity must exist for both actors. In this sense, shared identity and reciprocity is a redundant variable.

The frequency distribution of homeland/diaspora events reveals that just over half (51.8%) of the observed events involved a diaspora with access to political organizations in the adoptive state. Which is to say, politically organized diaspora were the targets of 51.8% of the 170 observed events. Finally, I found that just over half of the events observed involved a homeland/diaspora pair that shared a border. This means that given an interaction between a homeland and diaspora, the interaction is likely to involve a homeland/diaspora pair that shares a border at least 52.9% of the time.

*Homeland Power Issues*

The distribution of homeland power issues indicates that 70.6% of the observed events occurred between a homeland whose total power exceeded that of the adoptive state in which the targeted diaspora lives. This means that homelands are more likely to target diaspora groups that live in an adoptive state that is relatively less powerful than the homeland itself. I found that only one diaspora group, Greeks living in Cyprus, represents a majority of the population in their adoptive state. Given the rarity of majority diaspora groups, it is not surprising to find that very few of the events (2.4%) involved a diaspora group that represents a majority of the population in their adoptive state. The final power issue evaluated is related to the number of diaspora groups associated with
homelands. I found that most homeland/diaspora events involved homelands that had relatively few associated diaspora groups; 59.4% of the events involved homelands with three or less associated diaspora groups.

5.4 Analysis 2-Cross Tabulation Distribution

In order to assess the basic association between cooperation and the independent variables, I cross-tabulated cooperation with each of the independent variables related to the cultural similarity, relationships and power concepts. Based on this finding, one could say that only one independent variable (the number of diaspora groups associated with homelands) is a statistically significant condition for homeland/diaspora cooperation (see Table 5.3). However, although none of the cultural similarity variables prove to be associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation in these cross-tabulations, I will discuss my findings for shared identity because it is a key variable included in this study.
Cultural Similarity Cross-Tabulations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperation</th>
<th>Shared Identity</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>26 (15.3%)</td>
<td>69 (40.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>30 (17.7%)</td>
<td>101 (59.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>56 (32.9%)</td>
<td>170 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DF=1
$\chi^2=1.2$
Prob=0.277

Table 5.2: Homeland/Diaspora Cooperation by SID$_{hd}$

The data presented in Table 5.2 indicates that although there is no association between homeland/diaspora cooperation and shared identity, most of the observed events in this study occurred between identity associated homelands and diaspora. For those homelands and diaspora that did share identity cooperation occurred more often (41.7%) than did non-cooperative events (25.3%). This data also shows that 17.7% of the events were cooperative and occurred between non-identity associated homeland/diaspora pairs.

Although shared identity is not associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation, it could be seen as a sufficient condition for cooperation in the following cases.
Albania with Albanians living in Serbia
China with Chinese living in the United States
Croatia with Croats living in Bosnia
Greece with Greeks living in Cyprus
Hungarian with Hungarians living in Slovakia, Romania, and Serbia
Ireland with Irish living in the United Kingdom
Israel with Israelis living in the United States
Korea with Koreans living in the United States
Romania with Romanians living in Hungary
Russia with Russians living in Estonia and Latvia
Serbia with Serbs living in Bosnia and Croatia
Slovakia with Slovaks living in Hungary
Turkey with Turkish living in Cyprus
United Kingdom with British living in the United States
Uzbekistan with Uzbeks living in Afghanistan
Vietnam with Vietnamese living in Cambodia

The 114 events associated with the sixteen homeland/diaspora pairs listed above represent 67.1% of all observed homeland/diaspora interactions included in this study. For future reference, note that all analysis of data for which shared identity is controlled (SIDhd=1) refers to the 114 events associated with the 16 homeland/diaspora pairs listed above.

The fact that 17.6% of cooperative events occurred between homelands and diaspora with no shared identity demonstrates that although shared identity is more frequent, there are cases in which homelands cooperate with diaspora groups that are not associated to them by shared identity. In other words, one could interpret the shared identity and cooperation cross-tabulation to mean that shared identity could coincide with cooperation, but for those homelands and diaspora that do not share identity, cooperation is still possible. In total, 12 homelands cooperated with non-associated diaspora groups. Homelands that did cooperate with non-associated diaspora include:
• China with Albanians in Serbia
• Croatia with Serbs in Bosnia
• France with Turks in Cyprus
• Germany with Albanians in Serbia and Serbs in Bosnia
• Greece with Turkish in Cyprus
• Iran with Albanians in Serbia
• Japan with Serbs in Bosnia
• Russia with Albanians in Serbia, Greeks in Cyprus, Serbs in Bosnia, and Uzbeks in Afghanistan
• Serbia with Turks in Cyprus
• Slovakia with Hungarians in the Czech Republic
• Turkey with Greeks in Cyprus
• United Kingdom with Albanians in Serbia, Greeks in Cyprus, Serbs in Bosnia, and Turks in Cyprus

Several of the cases listed above are interesting because they involve cooperation between unexpected homeland/diaspora pairs. The United Kingdom cooperated with diaspora in the Balkans and in Cyprus. In these cases, United Kingdom efforts were encouraged by the international community, specifically, NATO. One could also argue that German and French cooperation with non-associated diaspora occurred because members of NATO encouraged both Germany and France to cooperate with non-associated diaspora. Cooperation between Croatia and Serbs in Bosnia and Serbs in Croatia as well as with Turkish cooperation with Greeks in Cyprus with Albanians was clearly a result of international pressure.

Finally, it is possible that the events associated with Slovakia and the Czech Republic support a suggestion that homeland/diaspora cooperation is a function of international diplomatic strategy. Both of these homelands were interested in negotiating with the European Union (EU) during 1998. At the time, EU required very specific, cooperative, behavior of each homeland toward non-associated diaspora groups in the
region. Thus, one could argue that in these cases, homelands cooperated with non-associated diaspora in order to advance their goals with the EU.

I expect to find that neither shared language nor shared religion are associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation, I base these expectations on the logic that although homeland capability to cooperate with diaspora groups would improve if there were a shared language, homelands may choose not to cooperate. This lack of cooperation may result because adoptive states may view improved homeland communication capability as an increased threat to the adoptive state’s security.

These findings suggest that although homelands may have improved sense of cultural similarity with their diaspora, due to shared language or shared religion, prospects for homeland/diaspora cooperation do not necessarily improve. I find that shared language is not associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation, in fact, the probability of these variables having any association is insignificant (P=0.52). Results for findings of shared religion and homeland/diaspora cooperation are similar to those of shared language. I therefore find no significant association between shared religion and homeland/diaspora cooperation (P=0.79).

Homeland Relationships Cross-Tabulations

None of the homeland relationship variables seems to affect homeland/diaspora cooperation. However, the cross-tabulations show that of homeland/diaspora pairs that cooperate, 62.4% have a history of cooperation between the homeland and the adoptive state in which diaspora live (P=0.99). Furthermore, the data indicates that of homelands that cooperate with their diaspora, very few (17.8%) have a reciprocal relationship with
the adoptive state in which their diaspora live (P=0.28). I also found that the balance between those diaspora with and without political organizations was fairly even for cooperative homeland/diaspora pairs. 49.5% of the cooperative homeland/diaspora pairs have diaspora that are associated with political organizations in their adoptive states (P=0.60). Similar findings were true for the shared border independent variable. I found that 50.5% of homeland/diaspora pairs that cooperated also shared a border (P=0.44).

Power Issues Cross-Tabulations

Homeland/diaspora cooperation is associated with the number of diaspora groups (Table 5.3). This finding seems to support my expectation that homelands are likely to cooperate with diaspora groups based on the number of diaspora associated with homelands. However, more analysis is required because the cross-tabulation is not designed to indicate direction of association and therefore it is difficult to tell whether the number of diaspora associated with homelands favors or limits prospects for homeland/diaspora cooperation.
Number of Diaspora Groups and Homeland/Diaspora Cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperation</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>32 (18.8%)</td>
<td>37 (21.8%)</td>
<td>69 (40.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>69 (40.6%)</td>
<td>32 (18.8%)</td>
<td>101 (59.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>101 (59.4%)</td>
<td>69 (40.6%)</td>
<td>170 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DF=1
\(\chi^2=8.2\)
Prob=0.0042

Table 5.3: Homeland/Diaspora Cooperation by Number

Remarkably, total homeland power is not associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation. Homelands that have more power than adoptive states are neither more nor less likely to cooperate with diaspora residing in that adoptive state. In this case, one could interpret the findings to indicate that homeland power that exceeds that of adoptive states is not associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation (P=0.20). To establish whether diaspora that represent a majority of the population in their adoptive states affect homeland/diaspora cooperation, I cross-tabulated diaspora population size with homeland/diaspora cooperation. The analysis indicates that no significant association exists between majority diaspora groups and cooperation (P=0.40). This finding implies that it is not likely that homelands will interact with large diaspora groups. Therefore, these findings could indicate that homelands are not likely to attempt to destabilize the
domestic political environment of the adoptive state by cooperating with large diaspora groups.

Although the distribution of basic frequencies and cross-tabulations can give a general idea of what homeland/diaspora cooperation, cultural similarity, relationships, and power issue variables look like; neither of these types of statistics can tell us whether we ought to expect more or less cooperation with the presence of the independent variables related to each of these concepts. For this, I turn to logistic analysis.

5.5 Logistic Analysis

The logistic model analysis is performed on two different groups of homeland/diaspora actors.

- Only transnational homeland/diaspora interactions for homelands that do and do not share identity with the targeted diaspora group ($SID_{hd}=0$ and $SID_{hd}=1$, $N=170$). For example, Serbia’s interactions with Serbs in Croatia are included and Serbia’s interaction with Albanians living in Serbia is excluded from this analysis.

- Only interactions between homelands and diaspora that share identity are included in this analysis ($SID_{hd}=1$, $N=114$). For example, only Serbian interactions with Serbs living in Croatia are considered for this analysis.

The Homeland/Diaspora Model evaluates the impact of the three concepts in terms of each independent variable separately; this contains nine independent variables (shared identity, shared language, shared religion, history of cooperation, reciprocal relationships, political organizations, total power, and the number of diaspora groups.

It is important for me to note that due to a skewed distribution in the number of events associated with “majority” diaspora populations I have chosen to drop the
“Majority” independent variable from Model A and Model B. I found that only one
diaspora group, Greeks living in Cyprus, represent a majority of the population in their
adoptive state. A majority of all the other diaspora groups (51.1%) represent four percent
or less of the population in their adoptive states. Therefore, because they represent such
small populations relative to that of their adoptive states, I believe it is unlikely that
diaspora groups included in this study are likely to present a threat to either their adoptive
state or to their homeland\textsuperscript{16}.

\textit{Homeland/Diaspora Cooperation Model}

\[
C_{hd}=SID_{hd}+L_{hd}+R_{hd}+HIST\text{-}_\text{COOP}_{ha}+RECIP_{ha}+PROXIMITY_{hd}+POLITICAL_{hd} \\
+T\_\text{POWER}_{ha}+\text{NUMBER}_{d}
\]

Where: $C_{hd}$=Homeland cooperation with diaspora  
$SID_{hd}$=Shared identity between homeland and associated diaspora  
$L_{hd}$=Shared language between homeland and associated diaspora  
$R_{hd}$=Shared religion between homeland and associated diaspora  
$HIST\text{-}_\text{COOP}_{ha}$=History of cooperation between homeland and the adoptive state in which diaspora live  
$RECIP_{ha}$=Homeland and adoptive state are each home to each other’s diaspora groups  
$PROXIMITY_{hd}$=Homeland border diaspora group  
$POLITICAL_{d}$=Political organization exist for diaspora  
$T\_\text{POWER}_{ha}$=Total power (economic and military combined) of homeland is greater than the total power of the adoptive state in which the homeland’s diaspora live  
$\text{NUMBER}_{d}$=Number of Diaspora Associated with Homeland

\textit{Homeland/Diaspora Cooperation Model-SID}_{hd}=1 \text{ or } SID_{hd}=0 \text{ (N=170)}

\textsuperscript{16} One could argue that small diaspora groups with access to a significant amount of resources could present a threat to either their adoptive states or to their own homelands. However, data related to the resources available to diaspora was not generated for this study. This could be a subject for future research.
In the Homeland/Diaspora Cooperation Model both shared identity and the number of diaspora associated with homelands are significantly associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation (Table 5.4). The observation that shared identity is important, when considered in conjunction with homeland relationships and power issues is striking. This implies that when transnational homeland/diaspora interactions are considered, in conjunction with homeland relationships and power, cooperative events are more likely to occur when homelands and diaspora share identity. The model observations also indicate that given an interaction that occurs between a homeland and a diaspora group, a cooperative event is less likely to occur when homelands have three or less associated diaspora groups. This finding contradicts my original expectations regarding the implication of a large number of diaspora associated with homelands.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>Point Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Identity (SID\textsubscript{hd})</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.10**</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>3.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Language (L\textsubscript{hd})</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Religion (R\textsubscript{hd})</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of Cooperation (HIST_COOP\textsubscript{ha})</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocity (RECIP\textsubscript{ha})</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Organizations (POLITICAL\textsubscript{a})</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Borders (PROXIMITY\textsubscript{hd})</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Power (T_POWER\textsubscript{ha})</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Diaspora (NUMBER\textsubscript{a})</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.84**</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=170

P≤.01 level ***
P≤.05 level **
P≤.10 level *

Table 5.4 Logistic Analysis for Homeland/Diaspora Cooperation Model:
\[ C_{hd} = \text{SID}_{hd} + \text{L}_{hd} + \text{R}_{hd} + \text{HIST\_COOP}_{ha} + \text{RECIP}_{ha} + \text{PROXIMITY}_{hd} + \text{POLITICAL}_{hd} + \text{T\_POWER}_{ha} + \text{NUMBER}_{d} \]

\[ \text{SID}_{hd} = 0 \text{ or } \text{SID}_{hd} = 1 \]

The findings of this model also show that homeland relationships are in no way associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation. Neither a previous history of cooperation between homelands and adoptive states nor a reciprocal relationship between the two actors affects homeland/diaspora cooperation. Furthermore, neither diaspora political organization nor shared borders with homelands have an impact on homeland/diaspora cooperation.
The findings from the model in which shared identity is controlled indicate that cultural similarity, (as measured in terms of shared language) does promote homeland/diaspora cooperation. In addition, this model shows that relationship, measured in terms of a history of cooperation and homeland/diaspora proximity are negatively associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation (Table 5.5).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>Point Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Identity (SID&lt;sub&gt;hd&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Language (L&lt;sub&gt;hd&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.44***</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Religion (R&lt;sub&gt;hd&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of Cooperation (HIST_COOP&lt;sub&gt;ha&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-2.08***</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocity (RECIP&lt;sub&gt;ha&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Organizations (POLITICAL&lt;sub&gt;hd&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.81</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Borders (PROXIMITY&lt;sub&gt;hd&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1.41**</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Power (T_POWER&lt;sub&gt;ha&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Diaspora (NUMBER&lt;sub&gt;d&lt;/sub&gt;)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=114

P ≤ .01 level ***
P ≤ .05 level **
P ≤ .10 level *

Table 5.5: Logistic Analysis for Homeland/Diaspora Cooperation Model:

\[ C_{hd} = SID_{hd} + L_{hd} + R_{hd} + HIST\_COOP_{ha} + RECIP_{ha} + PROXIMITY_{hd} + POLITICAL_{hd} + T\_POWER_{ha} + NUMBER_{d} \]

Comparisons of the two versions of the Homeland/Diaspora Cooperation model suggest that the type of actors included in a model must be considered.

When controlling for shared identity, it appears common language promotes cooperation for only those homelands that also share identity. For homelands that do not necessarily share identity with the diaspora with whom they interact, shared language has no significant impact on homeland/diaspora cooperation. It seems, based on these
findings that for those who do share identity, shared language could ease the process of cooperation by improving homeland/diaspora capability to cooperate (Table 5.5).

One hypothesis promoted in this dissertation is that the relationship that exists between homelands and the adoptive state affects homeland/diaspora cooperation. For example, if homelands and adoptive states have a history of a contentious relationship, it is likely that homelands will avoid contact with their diaspora. It is plausible that a homeland avoids diaspora cooperation in an effort to minimize accelerating tension between itself and the adoptive state, which may find homeland interaction with its diaspora “intrusive” and “unacceptable”. I expected to find that if homelands have a good relationship with adoptive states; it is more likely that they will be free to cooperate with their diaspora without increasing tension between themselves and their adoptive states. Therefore, when homelands have positive relationships with adoptive states it would be less likely that adoptive states would perceive homeland/diaspora cooperation to be an attempt to destabilize the balance of power.

Based on the data presented, it is clear that the relationship independent variables have no impact on homeland/diaspora cooperation for those that may or may not share identity. However, I find that when considering only those homeland/diaspora events that occur between homelands and their own diaspora (SIDmd=1), history of cooperation and shared borders are both associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation, but the association is negative (Table 5.5). The finding about the influence of history of cooperation contradicts my expectations, and the finding that shared borders are negatively associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation supports my expectations.
One could explain the negative association between history of cooperation and homeland/diaspora cooperation for those homelands and diaspora that do share identity by noting the correlation ($r=0.29$, $P\leq 0.001$) between the shared border and history of cooperation variables. Both the history of cooperation and the border variables are negatively associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation. Therefore, the history of cooperation variable could be measuring something associated with shared borders rather than the true history of cooperation between homelands and adoptive states.

Again, for those that share identity, my findings regarding shared borders confirm my expectation that homelands bordering diaspora groups are less likely to initiate cooperative events. Given that an interaction occurs between a homeland and a diaspora group, a cooperative event is less likely to occur when homelands and diaspora share a border. As suggested earlier, the negative association between bordering homeland/diaspora and cooperation could reflect homeland concerns for extending resources to geographically proximate groups (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2).

I also suggested that asymmetric power that favors homelands over adoptive states is likely to lead to cooperation. Homelands that are relatively strong, compared to the adoptive states in which their diaspora live, are more likely to cooperate with their own diaspora than are homelands that are weak in comparison to the adoptive state in which their diaspora live. I base this idea on the realist assumption that homelands with a power advantage will be able to interact with their diaspora without being concerned about whether they will suffer retribution from adoptive states.

Although the $\text{NUMBER}_{4}$ variable finding contradicts my original expectations about the influence of the number of diaspora associated with homelands and
homeland/diaspora cooperation, it is possible that this reflects that homelands are less concerned about the initial expenditure of resources to diaspora, than they are about the total benefits they could receive from cooperation.

For example, Albania’s cooperation with Albanians in Serbia or Macedonia is likely to result in very few additional resources to be utilized. However, Russian cooperation with its diaspora, who exist in 18 adoptive states, could benefit from a variety of diaspora (e.g. contributions from diaspora residing in various economic environments) contributions to the homelands in return for homeland support of diaspora concerns.

I find that when shared identity was held constant (SID_{hd}=1) none of the power relationships were significant (Table 5.5). This is interesting because it suggests that power issues and the associated threats faced by homelands do not matter for interactions between members of a common ethnic nationalist identity group. These findings suggest that a realist model is not an applicable explanation for homeland/diaspora cooperation when SID_{hd}=1.

To summarize the findings for the two versions of the Homeland/Diaspora Cooperation model, one could write that for those homelands who do not necessarily share identity with their targeted diaspora, identity related cultural similarity is likely to promote cooperation and the number of diaspora groups for which homelands are responsible, is the only power issue that lessens prospects for cooperation. For those who do share identity, shared language promotes cooperation, but a history of homeland/adoptive state cooperation and/or a shared border appears to inhibit homeland/diaspora cooperation.
Although the number of diaspora is important to explain limited homeland/diaspora cooperation when identity is not controlled, this statistical significance is not valid for a group for which SID_{hd}=1. Power issues seem to be important for those homelands and diaspora that do not necessarily share identity, however, power issues are not important for those who do share identity. Therefore, one could conclude that those who share identity are more concerned with the welfare of the ethnic nationalist community as a whole than they are concerned with maximizing their own power related resources.
6.1 Introduction-The Question

In this dissertation, I present research that addresses whether traditional approaches to international cooperation, such as those based on the idea that cultural similarity, homeland interest (understood here in terms of relationships) and/or capability (understood in terms of power), apply to the issue of homeland/diaspora cooperation. This project has posed the question of which perspective best explains homeland/diaspora cooperation: cultural similarity, homeland relationships or power issues. In developing this research project, I explored whether the debate regarding when and why we ought to expect homelands to cooperate with their diaspora reflects the tensions common to past international cooperation analyses. I discussed that although there are several issues that are unique to the study of homeland/diaspora cooperation, such as the issue of shared identity and the transnational nature of these communities, the same fundamental features of international cooperation literature that apply to explanations of why states cooperate with one another may apply to homelands and their diaspora.
Summary of Hypotheses and Findings

In order to explore whether one can explain homeland/diaspora cooperation from a cultural similarity, homeland relationship or power perspective, I collected descriptive data for all 42 homeland states included in this study. For those homelands that did interact with a diaspora group in 1998, I modeled how cultural similarity, homeland relationships and power prospects affected homeland/diaspora cooperation.

I found that homelands were more likely to interact with their diaspora when other international actors, particularly international institutions, targeted their diaspora. Furthermore, I found that cultural similarity, homeland relationships and power do affect homeland/diaspora cooperation. However, the influence of these concept measures on homeland/diaspora cooperation depends on the way homeland/diaspora events are categorized. The following is a list of the basic hypotheses presented in Chapter 1, along with my findings.

Hypothesis 1
More homeland/diaspora cooperation is likely to occur between homelands and associated diaspora (by identity) than occurs between homelands and non-associated diaspora groups.

I found that more events occurred between homelands and identity-associated diaspora (67.1% of total events, N=170) than occurred for homelands with non-identity associated diaspora (32.9%). However, events among identity-sharing homeland/diaspora pairs were more likely to be cooperative (62.3%) than non-cooperative (37.7%).
**Hypothesis 2**
Homelands and diaspora that share similar cultural values, such as a common language or religion, are more likely to cooperate with one another than homelands and diaspora who do not share similar cultural values.

I found that cultural similarity, measured in terms of shared language or religion, has limited influence on homeland/diaspora cooperation. I found that for all cases where shared identity is not controlled, or is not held constant (SID$_{hd}$=1 or SID$_{hd}$=0), neither shared language nor shared religion is associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation. However, for homelands and diaspora that do share identity, I found that shared language improves prospects for homeland/diaspora cooperation. For these cases, shared language was positively associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation (Chapter 5, Section 5.5).

**Hypothesis 3**
Homelands that have a history of cooperation between themselves and the adoptive state in which their diaspora live are more likely to cooperate with diaspora than are homelands that have no history of cooperation between themselves and the adoptive state.

I found that a history of cooperation is only important for those homelands that share identity with their targeted diaspora. I found that for homeland/diaspora pairs that share identity, a history of cooperation is negatively associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation. Therefore, less cooperation ought to be expected from homeland/diaspora pairs that share identity and a history of cooperation. However, for homeland/diaspora pairs where identity was not controlled, a history of cooperation did not influence homeland/diaspora cooperation in any way (Chapter 5, Section 5.5).
Hypothesis 4
Homelands and adoptive states with reciprocal relationships are home to each other’s diaspora groups. Homelands that have a reciprocal relationship with the adoptive state in which their diaspora live are more likely to cooperate with their diaspora than are homelands that have no reciprocal relationship with the adoptive state in which their diaspora live.

I found that homeland relations with the adoptive state in which targeted diaspora live, measured in terms of reciprocal relationships, do not affect whether homelands are more or less likely to cooperate with their diaspora. The findings from my research indicate that reciprocal relationships have no explanatory value for any homeland diaspora events (Chapter 5, Section 5.5).

Hypothesis 5
Homelands that share a border with their diaspora are more likely to cooperate than are homelands that do not share a border with their diaspora.

The research presented in this project indicates that geographically proximate homelands and diaspora, those who share borders, are generally less likely to cooperate with one another. For those events that occurred between homelands and diaspora that share identity, shared borders were negatively associated with fewer cooperative events (Chapter 5, Section 5.5). For those homeland/diaspora events for which identity was not controlled, shared borders had no impact on homeland/diaspora cooperation.

Hypothesis 6
Homelands are less likely to cooperate with diaspora groups that are politically organized within their adoptive states.

Contrary to my expectations, I found that the existence of politically organized diaspora groups were not associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation for any of the groups on which the model was run (Chapter 5, Section 5.5).
Hypothesis 7
Homelands whose total power exceeds that of the adoptive state in which their diaspora live are more likely to cooperate with their own diaspora group than are homelands whose total power is less than that of the adoptive state in which the homeland’s diaspora lives.

I found that the total power of homelands when compared to that of the adoptive state in which targeted diaspora lives has no influence on prospects for homeland/diaspora cooperation. I found that total power was not statistically significant for any of the groups on which the model was run; therefore, total power does not improve prospects for homeland/diaspora cooperation for homelands that interact with any diaspora group, including those who share identity (see Chapter 5, Section 5.5).

Hypothesis 8
The size of a diaspora population, relative to the population of their adoptive state, affects homeland/diaspora cooperation. Homelands are less likely to cooperate with a diaspora population that is relatively large, compared to the total population of the adoptive state in which it lives.

Due to a lack of variation in this variable as well as a skewed data distribution, this variable was dropped from the logistic analysis. See Chapter 5 for more on my decision to exclude this variable from the logistic models.

Hypothesis 9
The number of diaspora groups associated with homelands affects homeland/diaspora cooperation. Homelands are less likely to cooperate with any of their diaspora if there are a large number of diaspora groups associated with the homeland.

I found that the number of diaspora associated with homelands is related to homeland/diaspora cooperation. Although the number of diaspora associated with homelands is not associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation where SID\textsubscript{hd}=1, the number of diaspora associated with homelands is negatively associated with the
homelands that interact with diaspora groups where $\text{SID}_{\text{hd}}=1$ or $\text{SID}_{\text{hd}}=0$ (Chapter 5 Section 5.5).

**Hypothesis 10**
When power and identity are both taken into consideration, total power, not identity is expected to explain trends in homeland/diaspora cooperation.

Contrary to the expectation of this hypothesis, I found that when both power and identity were taken into consideration, power had no affect on prospects for homeland/diaspora cooperation. As noted in Chapter 5, Section 5.5, I found that identity, not total power, explains homeland/diaspora cooperation. Even when controlling for shared identity, I found that power issues played no significant role in explaining homeland/diaspora cooperation.

### 6.2 Compare and Contrast-Prior Studies with Findings of this Study

Doyle and Sambanis find that ethnic heterogeneity does not affect peace-building successes (2000). One would expect, based on these authors’ findings, that those groups with a common ethnic nationalist name or shared identity (according to my measure), would not be a good measure for establishing homeland/diaspora cooperation trends. However, I found that common name, as a measure of cultural similarity, is a valid way to consider whether homelands are likely to cooperate with their own diaspora. By measuring *homogeneity*, in terms of common ethnic nationalist category, rather than focusing on the diversity of ethnic nationalist category (heterogeneity), I found that identity is significantly and positively associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation.
Shared identity is important when including homeland trans-border events. For this group of events, shared identity, measured in terms of a common name, is associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation. So, although ethnic heterogeneity is not a valid measure for Doyle and Sambanis’ model for peace building, it can indicate likelihood that some homeland/diaspora cooperative events are linked with shared identity, as understood in terms of shared name.

Doyle and Sambanis also find that ethnolinguistic fractionalization (Mauro 1995) was insignificant. My model reflects that, as an indicator of cultural similarity, common language, a measure that is similar to ethnolinguistic fractionalization, is not significant for transnational activities for which shared identity is not controlled. These results mimic those found in the Doyle and Sambanis study. However, for those who do share identity, a group not considered in the Doyle and Sambanis study, shared language is significant and positively associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation. Although my measure of shared language could reflect the importance of shared identity, taken as a whole this finding shows that cultural similarity, as a concept, is related to homeland/diaspora cooperation. Doyle and Sambanis conclude that “the mere presence of ethnic diversity does not mean that populations will resume the fight” (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, p. 789), but I find that the presence of cultural similarities among members of a trans-border ethnic nationalist group does promote cooperation among homelands and diaspora.

One major contribution of my research is my finding that homeland interaction with common ethnic groups outside their borders is, at least to some extent, motivated by shared identity. This finding confirms the work done by Saideman (1997), in which he
argues that ethnic identity is likely to affect a state’s foreign policy preferences. Although I do not address the issue of secessionism, the focus of Saideman’s work, my work presents an empirical basis on which one could argue that ethnic ties may motivate state behavior. As discussed later in this chapter, this issue has potential for future study.

Brubaker discusses newly nationalizing states, external national homelands, and national minorities. Brubaker suggests that external national homelands are likely to interact with ethnic kin across state borders and that this event is likely to result in a “single relational nexus” (Brubaker 1996). My research identifies a group of states that behave as if homeland responsibilities extend beyond the borders of their state so that homeland activity could be conceived of in terms of regional political activity as Brubaker suggests. Again, my research provides an empirical basis on which one could begin to test the claims made by Brubaker.

From the findings presented in this project, one could conclude that it is plausible that the political elite within a homeland manipulate ethnic identity within their community as a tactic to establish or maintain their own political power. Because homelands do cooperate with their diaspora, it is possible that by emphasizing their support for diaspora, political elite could generate additional support from ethnic nationalists within the homeland. In such cases, one would expect to see homeland/diaspora cooperation. As Breuilly 1982; Gagnon 1994; Gellner 1983 suggest, the political elite within a homeland could support their diaspora in order to maintain gains at home by emphasizing common ethnic nationalist identity, or by highlighting the needs of those who share the same ethnic nationalist identity but live in a different state.
Based on data presented in this thesis, one could not predict whether political elites would continue to support diaspora if there were a shift in political authority or regime in the homeland. If homelands continued to support their diaspora, even after a shift in the domestic political environment, this could be seen as a demonstration of continued homeland commitment to the welfare of the ethnic nationalist community as a whole. In order to provide a basis for this prediction, one would have to extend the time period of observed events beyond a single year (1998) that is included in my study and look at a long range of events that include changes in political regimes within homeland states. Again, I discuss this potential for future study in later sections of this chapter.

6.3 Compare and Contrast-Prior Studies of Transnational Ethnic Nationalist Group Behavior with Findings of this Study

The findings of my research indicate that cooperation among trans-border ethnic nationalist communities is a reality, especially when outside international actors show some sort of interest in a homeland’s diaspora group. Furthermore, the data presented in this thesis suggests that some trans-border cooperation can be attributed to the presence of shared identity.

King and Melvin suggest that political issues, not issues related to identity, are likely to “trump” any sense of duty homelands may have toward their diaspora. Given this idea, these authors lead us to believe that when compared to power issues, identity is not likely to affect homeland/diaspora behavior (King and Melvin 1999/2000).

King and Melvin write, “Even if political elites look nostalgically across a state’s frontiers, stressing the duty to protect the interests of their co-ethnics in another host
state, there is no reason to believe that such an identity will necessarily find expression in foreign policy” (King and Melvin 2000, 109). My data shows that the theoretical proposition advanced by King and Melvin is not necessarily true for those who do share identity.

I pursued the idea that homeland/diaspora cooperation is more a reflection of a homeland’s assessment of its diplomatic relationship with the adoptive state in which its diaspora reside than a reflection of the homeland’s desire to maintain ties with members of its ethnic nationalist community. My findings regarding transnational events among homeland/diaspora pairs for which shared identity was not controlled indicate that identity, not homeland relationships, indicate whether one should expect homeland/diaspora cooperation. This directly contradicts King and Melvin’s main argument. However, King and Melvin specifically address homeland/diaspora interaction for those that do share identity. I found that for this group, as King and Melvin suggest, homeland relationships are a valuable indicator for explaining homeland/diaspora interaction, but that the association is negative. King and Melvin’s findings, based on domestic politics, do not apply to the transnational relationship of homelands and diaspora groups.

Like King and Melvin, my original expectation was that homeland/diaspora interactions reflect a complex relationship in the international political environment and that homelands and adoptive states are integral features that determine prospects for homeland/diaspora interactions. Specifically, I anticipated that the relationship that exists between homelands and adoptive states would explain homeland/diaspora cooperative events far better than issues related to cultural similarity. I believed that
King and Melvin’s findings about the domestic features of identity and politics would apply to international features of identity and politics.

I suggested that although homeland/diaspora cooperation could benefit the homeland as well as members of its ethnic nationalist community, homeland interaction with its diaspora might have negative repercussions for the homeland’s relations with other international actors, particularly the adoptive states in which their diaspora live. In this regard, homeland cooperation with diaspora could be a double-edged sword, providing both benefits and costs to the homelands and members of their ethnic nationalist community. I expected that homelands would only cooperate with their diaspora if the costs of doing so would be limited. I anticipated that homelands that had a history of cooperation with the adoptive states in which their diaspora live would be more likely to cooperate with diaspora because the cost (in terms of the homeland/adoptive state relationship) would be limited. However, I found the opposite to be true. I found that for those homelands that did interact with their diaspora, cooperation was less likely to occur if homelands and adoptive states had a history of cooperation.

King and Melvin suggest that the ability of states to make foreign policy based on identity is negated by state constraints such as domestic interest groups, resource scarcity, and competing policy preferences. However, I found that given the fact that these barriers do exist, homelands still manage to find a way to cooperate with their diaspora in some way. Based on my research that homelands are able to overcome these barriers, the challenge for future research becomes how homelands manage multiple views on ethnic communities to achieve homeland/diaspora cooperation.
6.4 Compare and Contrast-Prior Studies of Power with Findings of this Study

Although homelands could benefit from supporting their diaspora, the premise of this paper is that there are costs involved in homeland/diaspora cooperation as well as benefits. The cost of homeland/diaspora cooperation can be associated with the negative implications of homeland/diaspora cooperation initiated by the adoptive state where diaspora live, or by the diaspora itself.

Throughout this project, I have argued that asymmetric homeland power (favoring adoptive states), diaspora group size and the number of diaspora groups associated with homelands are likely to limit homeland support of their diaspora because each of these issues could increase an adoptive state’s perception of threat from homelands and their diaspora. Only one of these three indicators (number of diaspora groups) proved to be useful for explaining homeland support for their diaspora.

Jervis’ 1978 discussion of the security dilemma has been a cornerstone in the study of systemic, state-based cooperation. Jervis suggests that the most important barriers to state cooperation are state fears regarding availability of future resources and the security dilemma. According to Jervis, fear of future events may cause states to avoid cooperation with one another, even when doing so could result in increased resources. In large part, this is because increasing one’s own resources is believed to decrease security of others, thereby causing other states to respond by increasing their own security assets. Here, cooperation with another state would ultimately jeopardize a state’s own security position. Applying this idea to homeland/diaspora interaction could lead one to believe that homeland interaction with their diaspora, and resulting fears for implications for
security dilemma and relations with neighboring states, could affect homeland/diaspora cooperation.

**Total Power**

When formulating the hypotheses, I believed that one way to establish the impact of the security dilemma on homeland/diaspora cooperation would be to measure the affect of homeland/adoptive state power asymmetries on homeland/diaspora cooperation. However, I find that total homeland power, when compared to that of adoptive states, has no significant association with homeland/diaspora cooperation. One could conclude based on this finding that Jervis’s argument, while important for understanding limitations of cooperation on a systemic level, has little relevance to this study. However, I believe that before asserting the relevance of the security dilemma for homeland/diaspora cooperation, further research that relies on different measures of homeland/adoptive state power is warranted. The data I present in this study suggest that power asymmetry between homelands and adoptive states does not influence homeland/diaspora cooperation. However, it is possible that circumstances other than total power between homelands and adoptive states reflect how the security dilemma impacts homeland/diaspora cooperation.

Given the finding that shared identity is an important feature of homeland/diaspora cooperation, one could extend research to include specific motivation for homeland/diaspora support. Although my data shows that total power does not explain homeland/diaspora cooperation, it is possible that shared identity itself is an asset that could be used by homelands to increase their influence over adoptive states. In this
sense, the unique relationship that exists between homelands and diaspora could be considered a non-traditional power source that homelands could use against adoptive states. In this case, one would see that total power, as measured in terms of economic and military characteristics, is less important for some homelands than is the existence of shared identity.

In addition to the increased domestic support, the political elite within a homeland may support their diaspora as a way to increase their access to economic, social or military resources (Esman 1986; Helweg 1986). Although these homeland activities with their diaspora are not affected by traditional sources of power, homeland/diaspora interactions could be, in part, based on the security dilemma that exists between homelands and adoptive states. Further research could indicate whether the intention of homeland cooperation with its own diaspora is to improve the homeland economic status by encouraging economically successful diaspora to contribute to their homeland.

It is also possible that homeland/diaspora cooperation represents an effort by the homeland to increase its relative power by indirectly influencing the domestic political structure of the adoptive state. By supporting diaspora, homelands could indirectly promote their own foreign policies by encouraging diaspora to bring these policies to the attention of their adoptive states. Ultimately, homelands could greatly benefit if they were to maintain an indirect route to the political system in the adoptive state; such benefits could affect the security dilemma, even though benefits to homelands cannot be measured according to traditional approaches to power.

On the other hand, homeland influence on diaspora could be perceived as a threat to the adoptive state. Further study including military and economic measures that were
not available in my data set would be helpful to understand the role of power on homeland/diaspora cooperation in future studies.

**Size of Diaspora Population**

In this study, I proposed that the size of a diaspora population is one threat to adoptive states. I argued in this study that adoptive states are likely to perceive large diaspora as a threat to the adoptive states’ domestic and international security. Thus, I hypothesized that those homelands that have large diaspora populations, relative to the population of the adoptive state, are not likely to cooperate with their diaspora. I found that the relative population of diaspora in their adoptive states could not be used as an explanatory variable due to the lack of large diaspora populations relative to that of their adoptive states. On the one hand, one could argue that additional data is needed to verify that diaspora population is not significantly associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation. However, it is possible that the findings presented in this study are representative of all diaspora groups given the fact that only one diaspora group observed represented a majority of the population in their adoptive state.

**Number of Diaspora Groups**

I proposed that the more diaspora groups that were associated with homelands, the less likely any one of the diaspora would be to receive assistance from homelands. Thus, for homelands with many associated diaspora groups, no diaspora could expect substantial assistance from the homeland because homelands have a finite amount of resources available to devote to assistance of ethnic nationalists living outside their state.
borders. Furthermore, according to the logic outlined by Olson, the distribution of benefits to individuals within groups becomes less effective as the size of the group increases (Olson 1971). Thus, one ought to expect that homelands with a small number of associated diaspora could distribute benefits to diaspora more effectively than homelands with a large number of associated diaspora. Therefore, homelands with fewer diaspora could cooperate with their diaspora more often.

For Olson and much of the international politics literature that followed, smaller collective groups were thought to enable individuals within the group to receive sufficient benefits from collective action so that they would be willing to pay the associated costs of cooperation. Large groups were thought to require more resources to ensure that the cost of establishing collective action would be beneficial (Olson 1971). Thus, it is possible that homelands with many diaspora are simply unwilling to expend the resources to establish cooperation with several, if not all, of their diaspora. It is also possible that larger groups are also much more likely to be subject to the problem of free riders. Recall that the free rider phenomenon occurs when individuals within the collective group are able to receive the benefits of cooperation without paying any associated costs (Olson 1971).

I expected to find that collective action theories regarding the impact of group size also applied to homeland/diaspora prospects for cooperation and that as the number of diaspora groups associated with the homelands increased, cooperation between

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17 Hardin (1995) has done a great deal of work on collective action logic and the formation and interaction of ethnic identity groups. Because the main focus of Hardin’s work is on explaining why individuals choose to associate with a specific identity group, not the interaction between groups once identities have formed, I believe that the findings of Hardin’s work are outside the scope of this study.
homelands and their diaspora was less likely to occur. I found that my expectations regarding group size were incorrect; rather than large numbers of diaspora groups limiting prospects for cooperation, my data shows that those with fewer associated diaspora are less likely to cooperate with diaspora.

My findings regarding the number of diaspora groups are similar to Doyle and Sambanis’ faction findings (2002). Using a measure of the number of factions, Doyle and Sambanis expected to find that as the number of factions increases, success of peace building will decline because there are too many divergent interests. I expected to find a similar trend within the number of diaspora associated with homelands. I expected that diaspora groups would behave as factions, and that as the number of diaspora groups associated with homelands increased, just as preferences diverge, so would homeland preferences for what it can gain with many different diaspora groups. I expected that homelands with three or less diaspora would be more likely to cooperate than those that had four or more associated diaspora groups. Note that only 10% have ten or more diaspora. Because so few homelands were associated with substantially large numbers of diaspora, I was unable to determine the true impact of substantially large numbers of diaspora. It could be that a threshold of some number demarcates the place where cooperation changes. It would be useful to address in future work. I found that, like the number of factions finding for Doyle and Sambanis, the number of diaspora associated with homelands is significant and negatively associated with homeland/diaspora cooperation.

As discussed in Chapter 5, it is possible that the number of diaspora associated with homelands is not a liability, but a resource. I suggest in Chapter 5 that homelands
with many diaspora groups may have indirect access to the resources available to the
diaspora group. In this sense, homelands with many diaspora are more likely to receive
many different resources when compared to those available to homelands with very few
diaspora groups. Of course, access to a larger pool of resources does make
homeland/diaspora cooperation more threatening to a large number of adoptive states,
which may ultimately affect the security dilemma within the international system. To
establish a clearer idea of how the number of diaspora associated with homelands affects
homeland power, one would have to evaluate the resources returned to homelands by
diaspora. In order to accomplish this, one would need to look more closely at
diaspora/homeland interactions, which is outside the scope of this study.

The negative association of the number of diaspora associated with homelands
highlights the difficulty of applying Olson’s logic to state/non-state transnational
activities. The failure of Olson’s theory to explain cooperation among these groups could
be a result of the fact that Olson’s theory was intended to apply to individuals, not
subgroups within a larger ethnic nationalist community. Alternatively, the failure of the
applicability of Olson’s theory could be due to unequal size of actors within the ethnic
nationalist community. Olson notes that if the individuals within a group are of unequal
size, prospects for cooperation improve (Olson 1971, p. 34). In order to apply collective
action theories to homelands and diaspora, it is necessary to examine the interaction of
individuals, not subgroups. This is a pursuit better suited for a case study approach.
Political Organization

Homeland interaction with diaspora could be facilitated if a political organization exists for diaspora in their adoptive state. In this case, diaspora political organizations could embody an organized structure through which homelands can direct their assistance to diaspora. However, although these political organizations could improve homelands’ capability to interact with their diaspora from an organizational perspective, I believe the picture is much more complex.

Although homelands may see diaspora political organizations as a good way to influence their diaspora, such assistance may be rejected by diaspora. Although diaspora could benefit to some extent by accepting homeland support, there are several reasons why diaspora would not accept such support. The most obvious consequence of homeland support for diaspora political organizations is that it could jeopardize the political organization established by diaspora in their adoptive states. If homeland support for diaspora political organization threatens the political elite of the adoptive state, such threats could result in negative sanctions against the diaspora. In cases like these, one would expect homelands to deny support for diaspora as a means to “assist” them over the long term.

In Chapter 4, I discussed the possibility that homelands are not likely to cooperate with diaspora that have political organizations within their adoptive state. The logic of my argument rests on the assumption that politically organized diaspora could represent a threat to the domestic political stability of the adoptive state in which they live. Because diaspora political organizations could be viewed by adoptive states as destabilizing, it is plausible that homelands avoid interaction with diaspora political organizations in order
to minimize adoptive state fears that homelands are interfering with the political system and groups within the adoptive state.

My research on the role of politically organized diaspora for explaining homeland/diaspora cooperation is not directly associated with increased homeland/diaspora cooperation because my findings show no statistical significance between homeland/diaspora cooperation and the existence of politically organized diaspora. However, further research with measures that reflect the political activities of diaspora groups, as well as diaspora support of homeland goals, could tell us more about how homelands use their diaspora to promote their own goals.

A closer look at the role of political organizations for homeland/diaspora cooperation could reveal whether it is possible that homelands choose not to interact with their diaspora political organizations or whether politically organized diaspora choose not to interact with homelands. Homelands may refrain from cooperating with politically organized diaspora if diaspora organizations make it known that such support is not needed. Blalock writes that the more resources one possesses, the less subject to control of others one is likely to be (Blalock 1967, p. 139). Applying this logic to homeland/diaspora cooperation, if the diaspora’s political organization is capable of achieving its goals without the homeland’s assistance, then homeland support is less likely to occur. In such cases, it is possible that either diaspora do not ask for assistance because they want to stay “free” of homeland control or it is possible that homelands see no need to assist diaspora who have already worked out a way to gain political representation within their adoptive states. If homelands believed that diaspora could take care of themselves, there would be little incentive for homelands to extend their
resources outside their state borders, potentially jeopardizing both the resources available to the population within the homeland as well as the homeland’s reputation in the international community.

It is also possible that homelands and politically organized diaspora do not share the same goals. As noted by Weiner (1986), political representation for diaspora does not necessarily promote the interests of homelands. Weiner suggests that for diaspora “the goal is not necessarily to influence the foreign policies of their hosts toward their home governments, but to have a direct involvement in the internal politics of their homeland” (Weiner 1986, p. 66). In this case, politically mobilized diaspora could help or hinder homeland foreign policies.

Ultimately, I believe that diaspora unpredictability is responsible for why homeland support of politically organized diaspora is inconsistent, and thus insignificant as an explanatory variable. Although I believe there is theoretical validity to the existence of diaspora political organizations for explaining prospects for homeland/diaspora cooperation, the analysis of my data shows that the existence of diaspora political organizations does not significantly affect homeland/diaspora cooperation.

Shared Borders

I expected homelands that were geographically close to their diaspora to limit homeland/diaspora cooperation more than those homelands that were not geographically close to their diaspora. As Jervis notes, “In order to protect themselves, states seek to control, or at least to neutralize, areas in their borders” (Jervis 1978, p. 169). I proposed
that homelands that were relatively proximate to their diaspora would be more sensitive
to the security threat they posed to surrounding adoptive states. Thus, I suggested that
homelands are likely to avoid engaging in unnecessary activities with groups that exist
within the borders of adoptive states in order to neutralize or protect themselves from
potentially volatile situations.

Geographic proximity and perception of threat are two concepts that are often
associated with one another (Walt 1987). According to Walt, we ought to expect those
states that are closer in proximity to one another to project power, and therefore threat,
better than states that are geographically distant from one another (Walt 1987).
According to this logic, state ability to project power declines with distance. Therefore,
homelands that share a border with their diasporas ought to be able to project greater
power than those homelands that do not share borders with their diasporas. Carrying this
logic forward, one would expect that if Walt’s theory applies to homeland/diaspora
relations, adoptive states perceive a greater threat from homelands that are contiguous to
their diasporas. Thus, it is plausible that in an effort to minimize effects of the security
dilemma, one ought to expect homelands to minimize their support for their diaspora.

In this study, homeland/diaspora proximity was measured in terms of shared or
contiguous borders between homelands and their diaspora. In some sense, borders are
important because they separate an ethnic nationalist community superficially. Without a
border, one would expect those who belong to the same ethnic nationalist community to
establish themselves as one cohesive community. However, the existence of an
international border between homelands and diaspora creates a unique condition for those
homelands and diaspora that are all residents of the same geographic region, and
members of the same ethnic nationalist community, yet live within the borders of two separate sources of political authority. Rather than existing as a cohesive ethnic nationalist community in which interactions occur as a contained unit, interactions that may have been inconsequential because they occurred within the bounds of a single cohesive unit could take on particular significance because an international boundary cuts across the unit. In this case, international boundaries separate not only the ethnic nationalist community, but also introduce the adoptive state as an additional actor to interactions, an actor that has significant implications on the activities of the homeland state.

I found that my hypothesis about shared borders was correct. The negative association of shared borders for homeland/diaspora pairs that do share identity indicates that homeland/diaspora relations are affected by the geographic proximity of homelands to their diaspora.

One way to evaluate the influence of the proximity variable further would be to examine the frequency and type of interactions that occurred for those homelands that were relatively close to their diaspora compared to those that are relatively distant from their diaspora. Taking into consideration the frequency with which homeland/diaspora events occur could clarify the impact of proximity, while taking into consideration the type of homeland/diaspora event that occurs could indicate whether homelands that are close to their diaspora are more or less cooperative with diaspora than homelands which are relatively distant from their diaspora.
6.5 Contributions and Implications for Future Study

My finding that a homeland/diaspora identity based relationship exists demonstrates that it is possible that the existence of ethnic nationalist kin outside the state could either promote or effectively short-circuit homeland efforts to maintain a stable relationship with adoptive states.

My study is an important beginning to understanding the identity relationships. Future work that includes economic measures in addition to the evaluation of diaspora/homeland interactions I provide would be valuable to understanding adoptive state/homeland interactions. It is possible that adoptive states respond to homeland/diaspora cooperation by levying economic sanctions against homelands or limiting trade that occurs between the adoptive states and the homeland. Either scenario could create an economic burden for the homeland, which could deter homeland support for its diaspora. This type of response by the adoptive state could be especially costly for homelands if economic development is unstable or particularly dependent on trade with the adoptive state. My study shows that asymmetric power does not influence homeland/diaspora cooperation. However, I believe that future research ought to evaluate specific adoptive state/homeland events to clarify the role of specific types of events and which types hinder or enhance cooperation.

In addition to evaluating adoptive state/homeland events, one could extend my research to evaluate how diaspora communities benefit adoptive states. It is possible that homeland power issues are not relevant for homeland/diaspora cooperation because power advantages from interaction with diaspora are not unique to homelands. In other
words, one perspective not addressed in this study is whether diaspora could benefit adoptive states as well as homelands. In this case, it is possible that power, as a measure to indicate homeland/diaspora cooperation, is limited because diaspora-related power can be utilized by either the homeland or the adoptive states where diaspora live.

Adoptive states, like homelands, could support groups that oppose the policies of another state. Homelands cannot exert legitimate authority over their diaspora groups that oppose their policies, or influence diaspora who choose to shelter themselves from the authority of the homeland by living in another state. However, adoptive states could be well positioned to support homeland opposition within the diaspora community, thus working against the efforts of homelands. Furthermore, if the homeland’s domestic political environment is dependent on support from its diaspora, or if the political success of political elite within the homeland is largely dependent on its campaign on behalf of its diaspora, an adoptive state’s ability to effectively suppress the diaspora community could result in a backlash against the homeland’s domestic political establishment. Should adoptive states respond to increased homeland influence in their state by punishing diaspora, the political elite within the homeland could be painted by the adoptive state as a government that is unable to protect its diaspora interests abroad. As a consequence, the homeland could lose popular support at home in addition to diaspora loyalty. Further research of this possibility could help us to understand more fully the role of power in explaining homeland/diaspora cooperation.

Finally, future research could specifically address the relative economic or social status of homelands and diaspora. It would be useful to devise measures of relative economic status similar to the measures I devised to test cultural similarity, relationship
and power. These measures could provide an enhanced explanation of the relationship between homeland and diaspora. Esman writes that diasporas’ interests are best defined in terms of their status in their adopted states (Esman 1986). He writes, “the higher the cost to their [diaspora communities’] status and security in their adopted country, or to their ideological commitments, the greater the prospect that the community will split, fail to support the home government or even turn against it” (Esman 1986, p. 347). The relative social status of diaspora could significantly affect how homelands and diaspora interact. It is also possible that homelands that are economically or socially superior see very little potential benefit to interacting with their diaspora. There has been a great deal of work done on the influence of status on ethnic group interactions; it may be useful to apply some of the findings and/or indicators of these studies to the homeland/diaspora cooperation question addressed in this project.

Finally, the last extension of this research relates to how the presence of security threats to diaspora groups affects homeland willingness to cooperate with diaspora. The issue of threats on alliance formation has been well developed within the international politics alliance literature (Walt 1987). However, the extent of this work has focused on the impact of threat on interstate alliance, not on alliances made by state/non-state actors (Moore and Davis 1998). It is possible that homelands, just as they would with established state allies, support their diaspora if it appears that diaspora are threatened. However, the way in which homelands define or perceive threat to their diaspora is not easily measured. The difficulty of measuring threat is not only in the potential threats to which adoptive states could subject homelands but also that threats for a homeland are perceived in a very different way than are threats to diaspora.
For example, a homeland state’s security may be threatened by the military or economic strength of neighboring states. Even when security of the homeland is a concern of the diaspora community, it is unlikely that the diaspora will be directly affected by a breach in their homeland’s security. Put simply, threat for a homeland state may involve a risk to its sovereignty; however, threat to the sovereignty of a homeland could have minimal impact on diaspora living in an adopted state. I do not intend to imply that diaspora do not express concern about such issues. However, as individuals living in a different state, the sovereignty of diasporas’ homelands is not expected to affect the day-to-day life of diaspora communities.

Furthermore, just as threats to homelands may not affect diaspora, threats to diaspora may not affect homelands. A militarily and economically strong adopted state can threaten the organizational capabilities and security of the diaspora community. Although diaspora may not wish to assimilate with the society of their adopted state, there are benefits to not alienating themselves from this society. Alienating themselves from the population of their adopted state could thwart efforts to improve economic, political or social status in the adoptive state.

One caveat should be applied to this statement. In a scenario in which cooperation can alleviate threat for both groups, both the homeland and diaspora would be expected to support cooperation. In other words, if both actors can reduce the threats they face by cooperating with each other, it is likely that cooperation will occur.
6.6 Final Conclusions

I consider the issue of intra-group cooperation as one that is the key to further advancing our understanding of ethnicity and international politics. In my opinion, as scholars, we have skipped over the step of demonstrating whether cooperation exists within an ethnic community. That is, current literature does a fair job of describing interstate cooperation, but attempts to extend this understanding to transnational ethnic nationalist community behavior cannot be accurately understood without first understanding homeland/diaspora coordination better. My study identifies this as a missing link and makes the beginning efforts to describe these relationships and implications for state to ethnic nationalist diaspora behaviors.

The notion that members of ethnic nationalist communities may not always cooperate with one another is particularly important to consider if one is interested in the question of whether or not ethnic nationalism is related to conflict between state (or non-state) actors. Put simply, ethnic groups cannot effectively initiate or maintain conflict with other actors if they are unable or unwilling to organize their resources and efforts as a group. I suggest that in order to truly understand the relationship between ethnicity and conflict we must re-conceptualize our studies of ethnic conflict. Instead of defining the relationship between ethnicity and conflict by contrasting the values and goals of competing ethnic nationalist groups, we ought to consider the cooperative mechanisms that exist within a single ethnic nationalist community.

The results of this study could help us form expectations regarding when and why China is likely to cooperate with its diaspora. A brief example of China’s cooperation with its own diaspora was discussed in Chapter 1. As noted in this discussion, China’s
cooperation with its own diaspora was often inconsistent and seemed to mimic its foreign policy goals. However, the findings of this study would suggest that China’s cooperation with diaspora is better explained in terms of shared language, history of cooperation and shared borders than it would be by relying on a power-related explanation.

The findings presented here suggest that China is more likely to cooperate with identity-associated diaspora than it is with any other diaspora group. Therefore, the findings of this study would lead us to believe that when dealing with its own diaspora, China is more likely to cooperate with identity sharing diaspora that share a common language, but less likely to cooperate with identity sharing diaspora that border China or whose adoptive states China had cooperated with in the past.

In this case, Chinese foreign policy does influence homeland/diaspora cooperation, but previous cooperative relations with adoptive states in which Chinese diaspora live do not seem to enhance prospects for homeland/diaspora cooperation. Still, as noted in Chapter 5, it could be that history of cooperation and shared borders, both of which are conditions that are likely to limit homeland/diaspora cooperation according to the results of the study, could be correlated with one another. Therefore, it could be that shared borders, not a previous history of cooperation, are responsible for less expected homeland/diaspora cooperation. Specifically, one could expect to find that when it interacts with its diaspora, China is more likely to cooperate with diaspora that share the Chinese language. Should China interact with its diaspora at all, the event is less likely to be cooperative for those diaspora residing in adoptive states with which China has a history of cooperation.
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_____.


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APPENDIX A

SAMPLES OF TABARI CODED LEXIS-NEXIS TEXT

Date: 08 Jan 98  Record:  NEXI-0014-01
Belgrade, 6th January: Croat member in the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina Kresimir Zubak said that Bosnian Croats were dissatisfied with the fact of being in a federation with Muslims as partners, Croatian media reported Tuesday [6th January].

Coded events:
980108  H119  D119A  023

Date: 09 Jan 98  Record:  NEXI-0001-32
The government of the Republic of Ireland freed nine IRA prisoners last month, while the British government has transferred several in recent months from English to Irish prisons, longtime demand of the IRA-allied Sinn Fein party.

Coded events:
980109  H211  D211A  066

Date: 11 Jan 98  Record:  NEXI-0001-05
The HDZ is the ruling party of neighboring Croatia, which supported Bosnia's Croats in their 1993-1994 war against the Bosnian Moslems.

Coded events:
980111  H119  D119A  073

Date: 15 Jan 98  Record:  NEXI-0001-27
Britain reportedly plans to transfer seven long-term IRA prisoners to Irish jails as part of continuing efforts to advance the Northern Ireland peace process.

Coded events:
980115  H075  D211A  025

Date: 19 Jan 98  Record:  NEXI-0008-01
BELGRADE, Jan 19 (AFP) - The regime of Yugoslav strongman Slobodan Milosevic publicly withdrew its support for Bosnian Serb hardliners on Monday by recognizing the new government elected by supporters of pro-Western Bosnian Serb President Biljana Plavsic.

Coded events:
980119  H410  D410A  195
### APPENDIX B

**HOMELAND AND DIASPORA CASES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Homeland</th>
<th>Diaspora</th>
<th>Adopted States of Residence (% of pop)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Albania (Albanian 95%, Greek 3%, Other 2%)</strong></td>
<td>Albanian</td>
<td>Macedonia 22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Serbia &amp; Montenegro 14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armenia (Armenian 93%, Azeri 3%, Russian 2%, Other 2%)</strong></td>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>Azerbaijan 2.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bulgaria 0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Georgia 8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Syria (exact population not indicated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Azerbaijan (Azeri 90%, Dagestani Peoples 3.2%, Russian 2.5%, Armenian 2.3%, Other 2%)</strong></td>
<td>Azeri</td>
<td>Armenia 3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Georgia 5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iran 24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Belarus (Byelorussian 77.9%, Russian 13.2%, Polish 4.1%, Ukrainian 2.9%, Other 1.9%)</strong></td>
<td>Byelorussian</td>
<td>Estonia 1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Latvia 4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lithuania 1.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Poland 0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Russia 0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bulgaria (Bulgarian 85.3 %, Turkish 8.5%, Gypsy 2.6%, Macedonian 2.5%, Armenian 0.3% Russian 0.2%, Other 0.6%)</strong></td>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td>Moldova 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (Han Chinese 91.9%, Other 8.1%)</td>
<td>Chinese Brunei 20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burma 3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cambodia 1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Christmas Islands 61%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Costa Rica 1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cuba 1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fiji &lt; 5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French Guiana &lt; 12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French Polynesia 12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guadeloupe &lt; 5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guam &lt; 18%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guyana &lt; 1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jamaica 0.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Laos &lt; 1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Macau 95%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malaysia 26%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Martinique &lt; 5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mongolia 2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nauru 8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Northern Mariana Islands (exact population not indicated)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peru &lt; 3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines 1.5%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reunion (exact population not indicated)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Singapore 76.4%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solomon Islands 0.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suriname 1.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Taiwan 14%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand 14%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago 1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vanuatu (exact population not indicated)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vietnam 3%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia (Croat 78%, Serbian 12%, Other 8.1%, Muslim 0.9%, Hungarian 0.5%, Slovenian 0.5%)</td>
<td>Croat Austria 0.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina 22%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romania &lt; 1.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slovenia 3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Czech 94.4%, Slovak 3%, Polish 0.6%, German 0.5%, Gypsy 0.3%, Hungarian 0.2%, Other 1%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Finn 93%, Swede 6%, Lapp 0.11%, Gypsy 0.12%, Tatar 0.02%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Celtic &amp; Latin with Teutonic, Slavic, North African, Indochinese, Basque Minorities</td>
<td>French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>German 91.5%, Other 4.6%, Turkish 2.4%, Italian 0.7%, Greek 0.4%, Polish 0.4%</td>
<td>German</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Greece | Greek 98%, Other 2% | Greek | Albania 3%
Cyprus 78%
Germany 0.4% |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Ethnicity Description</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Hungary (Hungarian 89.9%, Gypsy 4%, German 2.6%, Serb 2%, Slovak 0.8%, Romanian 0.7%)</td>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>Croatia 0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Czech Republic 0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Romania 8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Slovakia 10.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India (Indo-Aryan 72%, Dravidian 25%, Mongoloid &amp; Other 3%)</td>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>Burma 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fiji 46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Malaysia 7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mozambique 0.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nepal (exact population not indicated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Qatar 18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reunion (exact population not indicated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Singapore 6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>South Africa 2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>United Kingdom &lt; 2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran (Persian 51%, Azerbaijani 24%, Gilaki &amp; Mazandarani 8%, Kurd 7%, Arab 3%, Lur 2%, Baloch 2%, Turkmen 2%, Other 1%)</td>
<td>Iranian</td>
<td>Bahrain 8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kuwait 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Qatar 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>United Arab Emirates 23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish (Celtic, English)</td>
<td>Irish/Celtic</td>
<td>France (exact population not indicated)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Luxembourg (exact population not indicated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>United Kingdom 2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel (Jewish 82%, Non-Jewish 18% (mostly Arab))</td>
<td>Israeli</td>
<td>Moldova 1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Morocco 0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tunisia &lt; 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ukraine 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Population Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Italy (Italian) | Italian | Djibouti < 5%  
|  |  | Germany 0.7%  
|  |  | Gibraltar (exact population not indicated)  
|  |  | Holy See, Vatican City (exact population not indicated)  
|  |  | Liechtenstein < 12.5%  
|  |  | Luxembourg (exact population not indicated)  
|  |  | Monaco 16%  
|  |  | San Marino (exact population not indicated)  
|  |  | Switzerland 10% |
| Japan (Japanese 99.4%, Other 0.6% (mostly Korean)) | Japanese | Brazil < 1%  
|  |  | Guam < 18%  
|  |  | Northern Mariana Islands (exact population not indicated)  
|  |  | Peru < 3% |
| Korea, North and South (Korean) | Korean | Guam < 18%  
|  |  | Japan < 0.06%  
|  |  | Northern Mariana Islands (exact population not indicated) |
| Lebanon (Arab 95%, Armenian 4%, Other 1%) | Lebanese | Antigua/Barbuda (exact population not indicated)  
|  |  | Guadeloupe < 5%  
|  |  | Martinique < 5%  
<p>|  |  | Senegal &lt; 1% |
| Macedonia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of (Macedonian 65%, Albanian 22%, Turkish 4%, Gypsies 3%, Serbian 2%, Other 4%) | Macedonian | Bulgaria 2.5% |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Population Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia (&lt;58% Malay, Chinese 26%, Other 9%, Indian 7%)</td>
<td>Malay</td>
<td>Brunei 64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Christmas Island 25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cocos (Keeling) Islands (population not indicated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesia 7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines 100% (Christian/Muslim)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Singapore 14.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sri Lanka &lt; 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta (Maltese)</td>
<td>Maltese</td>
<td>Gibraltar (exact population not indicated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia (Mongol 90%, Kazakh 4%, Chinese 2%, Russian 2%, Other 2%)</td>
<td>Mongolian</td>
<td>India &lt; 3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand (New Zealand European 74.5%, Maori 9.7%, Asian &amp; Others 7.4%, Other European 4.6%, Pacific Islander 3.8%)</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Norfolk Islands (exact population not indicated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland (Polish 97.6%, German 1.3%, Ukrainian 0.6%, Byelorussian 0.5%)</td>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>Belarus 4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Czech Republic 0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Germany 0.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Latvia 2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lithuania 7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Slovakia 0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania (Romanian 89.1%, Hungarian 8.9%, Ukrainian, Serb, Croat, Russian, Turk, and Gypsy 1.6%, German 0.4%)</td>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>Hungary 0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Moldova &lt; 64.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Population</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Armenia 2%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td></td>
<td>28.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td></td>
<td>34.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td></td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td></td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td></td>
<td>&lt; 1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent &amp; the Grenadines</td>
<td></td>
<td>&lt; 62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(declining because of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>emigration)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia &amp; Montenegro</td>
<td>Serbian</td>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina 40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td></td>
<td>12%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td></td>
<td>&lt; 1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>Samoan</td>
<td>American Samoa 89%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Slovakian</td>
<td>Czech Republic 3%</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hungary 0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Language</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Slovene 91%, Croat 3%, Other 3%, Serb 2%, Muslim 1%</td>
<td>Slovenian</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Somali 85%, Bantu, Arabs 30,000</td>
<td>Somali</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Tajik 64.9%, Uzbek 25%, Other 6.6%, Russian 3.5% (declining because of emigration)</td>
<td>Tajik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>Polynesian, Europeans about 300</td>
<td>Tongan</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Turkish 80%, Kurdish 20%</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Turkmen 77%, Uzbek 9.2%, Russian 6.7%, Other 5.1%, Kazakh 2%</td>
<td>Turkmen</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Ukrainian 73%, Russian 22%, Other 4%, Jewish 1%</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Identity</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>English 81.5%, Scottish 9.6%, West Indian, Indian, Pakistani, and Other 2.8%, Irish 2.4%, Welsh 1.9%, Ulster 1.8%</td>
<td>British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Uzbek 80%, Russian 5.5%, Tajik 5%, Kazakh 3%, Karakalpak 2.5%, Other 2.5% (1996 est.), Tatar 1.5%</td>
<td>Uzbek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Vietnamese 85%-90%, Chinese 3%, Muong, Tai, Meo, Khmer, Man, Cham</td>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Canada 40%
Falkland Islands (exact population not indicated)
Gibraltar (exact population not indicated)
Guernsey (exact population not indicated)
Ireland (exact population not indicated)
Jersey (exact population not indicated)

Kazakhstan 2.3%
Kyrgyzstan 12.9%
Tajikistan 25%
Turkmenistan 9.2%

Laos < 1%
New Caledonia 1.6%
Vanuatu (exact population not indicated)