ABSOLUTISM AND EMPIRE:
GOVERNANCE ON RUSSIA’S EARLY-MODERN FRONTIER

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the
Graduate School of The Ohio State University

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ABSTRACT

The conquest of the Khanate of Kazan’ was a pivotal event in the development of Muscovy. Moscow gained possession over a previously independent political entity with a multiethnic and multiconfessional populace. The Muscovite political system adapted to the unique circumstances of its expanding frontier and prepared for the continuing expansion to its east through Siberia and to the south down to the Caspian port city of Astrakhan.

Muscovy’s government attempted to incorporate quickly its new land and peoples within the preexisting structures of the state. Though Muscovy had been multiethnic from its origins, the Middle Volga Region introduced a sizeable Muslim population for the first time, an event of great import following the Muslim conquest of Constantinople in the previous century. Kazan’s social composition paralleled Moscow’s; the city and its environs contained elites, peasants, and slaves. While the Muslim elite quickly converted to Russian Orthodoxy to preserve their social status, much of the local population did not, leaving Moscow’s frontier populated with animists and Muslims, who had stronger cultural connections to their nomadic neighbors than their Orthodox rulers.

The state had two major goals for the Middle Volga Region. First, the region needed to be pacified and secured against internal and external threats. Second, the region needed to produce revenue for the state. This dissertation will examine the ways
in which the Muscovite government attempted to achieve its goals. Rather than following the concerns of earlier studies on why the tsar conquered Kazan’, this study will explore the mechanisms of the Muscovite government in the century and a half following the conquest of Kazan’, as the structures of the state were slowly and successfully implanted. By the time Peter the Great succeeded to the Russian throne, the borders of the Muscovite empire had expanded far beyond the Middle Volga Region, but the processes employed in the region became the groundwork for later territorial expansion.

Muscovite governing strategies in the Middle Volga Region were able to adapt to frontier conditions. Muscovy was developing as an absolute monarchy; Moscow was an imperial capital at the center of an ever-growing empire. Many previous historians have approached Muscovite history as unique when contrasted to its European counterparts, stressing the lack of the common experiences as in the West. However, Muscovy was an early-modern empire, and therefore the institutions and features of other early-modern empires exerted as great an influence over the process of state-building in Muscovy as in England, France, or Spain.
Dedicated to my parents
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank my advisor, Eve Levin, for her constant support, inspiration, and sage editorial advice. Her insightful comments have guided this project at all stages, and several times have forced me to reevaluate and focus my argument. I must also thank the other members of my dissertation committee, Geoffrey Parker, David Hoffmann, and Nicholas Breyfogle, for their assistance throughout my graduate career as well as during its final stages. Additionally I must also thank Joseph Lynch and Leila Rupp for their support and enthusiasm for my work in its earliest stages.

I do not think I could have completed my graduate education without constant support and friendship of my colleagues in the OSU History Department. I would especially like to thank Paul Hibbeln, as well as the other members of our dissertation-writing group: Aaron Retish, Jennifer Waldron, and Matt Masur. Also, I must acknowledge the collegial support of my fellow Russian and East European History students: Lorraine Abrahams, Jennifer Anderson, Basia Nowak, Kate Heilman, Sean Martin, Bill Risch, and Tricia Starks. Finally, my thanks to the revolving cast of characters that have populated Dulles 239 and made graduate student life a bit more pleasant.

I owe a great debt to the librarians and archivists who provided assistance at all stages of this project. First and foremost, Predrag Matejic and the staff of the Hilandar
Research Library at the Ohio State University always has provided a welcoming environment to all scholars. During my time in Russia the help of the staffs of the Russian State Library, the Public Historical Library in Moscow, and the Russian State Archives of Ancient Acts was invaluable. My shorter research trips to the Public Records Office in Kew and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign’s Library were made profitable by the extraordinary efforts of their staffs. Also, none of my research trips would have been possible without the financial assistance of the Ohio State Graduate School, its History Department, Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, and Office of International Studies.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my family for their ongoing support.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

And with God’s grace, and because of the great faith of the Orthodox Tsar Ivan Vasil’evich, and on account of his heartfelt desire, God turned over to him the godless Tatars of Kazan’, and on account of his faith, desiring the love of God, our pious sovereign destroyed their Muslim faith, and he ruined and demolished their mosques … and established there an archbishopric and many clergymen in the churches.¹

Muscovite’s conquest of the Middle Volga Region was the result of centuries of slow territorial advances. The Muscovite government first advanced into the Middle Volga Region with the establishment of Nizhnii Novgorod in the thirteenth century. However, the Mongol conquest, and subsequent political domination of Muscovite territory, retarded Muscovite expansion from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries. As the Mongol Empire fragmented, its successor states, such as the Khanate of Kazan’, continued to resist Muscovite incursions. The Muscovite government exerted varying amounts of influence within the Khanate of Kazan’ before Tsar Ivan IV began his active attacks and territorial acquisitions in the 1540s. Ivan IV’s conquest of Kazan’ in 1552 was Muscovy’s first victory against the former Mongol Empire. With the Khanate of Kazan’ defeated, the path to Muscovite settlement of the Middle Volga Region was opened.

The conquest of the Khanate of Kazan’ was a pivotal event in the development of the Muscovite state. Moscow gained possession over a previously independent political entity with a multiethnic and multiconfessional populace. The Muscovite political system adapted to the unique circumstances of its expanding frontier and prepared for the continuing expansion to its east through Siberia and to the south down to the Caspian port city of Astrakhan.

Control over the territory of the Khanate of Kazan’ provided Muscovy immediate economic and strategic benefits along the Volga River. With the conquest of Kazan’, Muscovy began a process that ultimately would lead to total possession of the entire Volga, positioning itself as an intermediary between West European trading countries, such as England and the Netherlands, and those in East, primarily Persia, India, and China. In addition, the land of the Khanate of Kazan’ was a historically-profitable agricultural region. As early as the eleventh century, grain exports from the Middle Volga Region had been sold to Slavs. Muscovy’s conquest finally succeeded in bringing this valuable resource into Slavic hands.

Muscovy gained more than land and people with the conquest of Kazan’. As a legitimate successor to the Mongol Empire, the political leader of Kazan’ was a khan, a title which was translated into Russian as “tsar.” With the conquest of the city of a tsar, Ivan IV legitimated his own claim to the title of tsar. While historians still debate the origins of Muscovite claim to the title, contemporary sources utilized the conquest of

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2 For a discussion of the international trade along the Volga River, see chapter 3.

3 The agricultural production of the region before the conquest is discussed in Jaroslaw Pelenski, Russia and Kazan: Conquest and Imperial Ideology (148-1560s), (The Hague: Mouton, 1974), pp. 58-61.
Kazan’ to justify it.⁴ In Moscow, Ivan commemorated his conquest with the building of the Church of the Ascension on Red Square, popularly called St. Basil’s Cathedral. St. Basil’s served as a visible symbol of the glory and prestige gained from Kazan’ for residents of Moscow. In the 1550s, Ivan IV employed his conquest of Kazan’ to justify the title of tsar to the Polish King and the Patriarch of Constantinople.⁵ Muscovite subjects in the seventeenth century believed that the Muscovite Grand Prince became a tsar with the conquest of Kazan’ as well, as discussed on the first page of G. K. Kotoshikhin’s description of the Muscovite government.⁶

The Khanate of Kazan’ had its own political and religious structures, but the Muscovite government treated the territory as a tabula rasa, establishing entirely new structures to control the region. The central authorities planned to incorporate its new land and peoples within the preexisting structures of the state in order to pacify the local population, protect the region from outside threats, and realize its potential profitability. Though Muscovy had been multiethnic from its origins, the Middle Volga Region introduced a sizeable Muslim population for the first time. Kazan’s social composition paralleled Moscow’s; the city and its environs contained elites, peasants, and slaves. While the Muslim elite quickly converted to Russian Orthodoxy to preserve their social

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⁵ These documents are discussed in Donald Ostrowski, Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier, 1304-1589, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 176.

status, much of the local population did not, leaving Moscow’s frontier populated with animists and Muslims, who had stronger cultural connections to their nomadic neighbors than their Orthodox rulers.

The state had two major goals for the Middle Volga Region. First, the region needed to be pacified and secured against internal and external threats. Second, the region needed to produce revenue for the state. This dissertation will examine the ways in which the Muscovite government attempted to achieve its goals. Rather than following the concerns of earlier studies on why the tsar conquered Kazan’, this study will explore the mechanisms of the Muscovite government in the century and a half following the conquest of Kazan’, as the structures of the state were slowly and successfully implanted. By the time Peter the Great succeeded to the Russian throne, the border of the Muscovite empire had expanded far beyond the Middle Volga Region, but the processes employed in the region became the groundwork for later territorial expansion.

MUSCOVITE COLONIALISM

Muscovite colonial expansion was greatly influenced by each region’s climate, population, and, in some cases, religious and political institutions. Kazan’ was both a trading center and an Islamic capital, and the incorporation of the city and its environs was necessarily different than Muscovy’s progress against steppe nomads. Muscovy’s expansion southward into Orthodox Ukraine, westward against Catholic Poland or

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Lutheran Sweden, and eastward into Siberia posed unique challenges and required different adjustments of Muscovite strategy for conquest and expansion. Therefore, it is not possible to discuss a single Muscovite frontier or one pattern of Muscovite expansion. Muscovy’s conquest of the Middle Volga Region was the first to incorporate a Muslim state. Though each period and direction of Muscovite expansion was distinct, the Middle Volga Region’s challenges conditioned later encounters with Muslims, a recurring situation as the state expanded toward the southwest.

As a study of the earliest period of Muscovite expansion, this dissertation extends our knowledge of the patterns of Muscovite imperialism by focusing on the growth of the state behind the expanding frontier rather than upon expansion itself. The earliest studies of Muscovy’s growth presented its expanding frontier as the natural extension of the state, reducing the newly-formed empire’s multiethnic and multiconfessional composition to the natural subjects of the tsar. This approach ignored the role of non-Russian participation in the Muscovite Empire, depicting ethnic Russians as the primary settlers on an open, unsettled frontier. Recent studies have included Muscovy’s

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relationship with its subject nationalities, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. However, for the early modern period, previous studies have focused more
on Muscovy’s contacts with the nomadic peoples than its settled populations, as was true
for the Middle Volga Region. Muscovy’s conquest and occupation of the Volga was
more characteristic of the Russian Empire’s later relationship with its multiethnic
population than the early-modern experience of conquering nomads.

There are several fine studies of the conquest of the Khanate of Kazan. However, these studies have almost invariably focused upon the relationship between
Moscow and Kazan’ and generally end with the conquest itself. Some Soviet scholars
briefly discuss the ongoing resistance to Muscovite rule that followed the conquest of the
Khanate, but have ended with the appearance of the success of Muscovite rule.

Following this pattern, the Middle Volga appears in historical narratives during periods
of major unrest, particularly the Bolonitkov Rebellion during the Time of Troubles and
the Stepan Razin Revolt of 1670. Soviet scholarship especially focused on these

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*Borderlands upon the Course of Early Russian History*, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976).


12 The best work in English on the conquest of Kazan’ remains Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan*. A notable exception to the focus on the conquest is Andreas Kappeler, *Russlands erste Nationalitäten: Das Zarenreich und die Völker der Mittleren Wolga vom 16. Bis 19. Jahrhundert*, (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1982). By spanning such a great length of time, however, Kappeler de-emphasizes developments in the Middle Volga Region in seventeenth century for the eighteenth.
events, classifying Bolotnikov and Razin as the first and second “peasant rebellions” of Russian history. This approach to the study of Muscovite governance in the Middle Volga Region places all of its emphasis on the violent nature of Muscovite conquest and control in the region, without much attention to the extended periods of peace or to Muscovite policies in the Middle Volga Region.

The Middle Volga Region itself has been gaining in historical prominence throughout the twentieth century. Part of this interest was fueled by Soviet-era support for kraevedenie (local history), particularly among the newly-established ethnic republics of the Soviet Union. One part of the Middle Volga Region became the Mordvin Autonomous Region, and the Chuvash, Mari, Tatar, and Udmurt Autonomous Regions included sections of the Middle Volga. In the post-Soviet era, all of these former autonomous regions still exist and, one, Tatarstan, continues to pressure Moscow for greater political and cultural independence. However, the local studies produced by

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Soviet and post-Soviet scholars narrowly focused on individual cities, *volost* (districts), or *uezdy* (regions) of the Middle Volga Region. Past scholarship has rarely examined the common features or experiences of Muscovite governance within the entire Middle Volga Region.

Recent studies by I. P. Ermolaev and E. L. Dubman approached the Middle Volga in new ways. Ermolaev studied the growth of law in the province of Kazan’, which reveals the role of the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa, the region’s governing chancellery, upon the frontier. While Ermolaev failed to extend his geographic view, his study lays the groundwork for any study of governance in the Middle Volga. Dubman studied land usage by monasteries in Samara (Soviet Kuibyshev) and Simbirsk (Soviet Ul’ianovsk) provinces; his remains the only study to date of land-holdings in more than one province of the Middle Volga Region. Unsurprisingly, Dubman discovered many common features in these neighboring provinces, but his approach has yet to produce similar comparative studies of the Middle Volga Region. This dissertation will attempt to follow the work of Ermolaev and Dubman by examining the common features of Muscovite governance throughout the Middle Volga Region.

This study not only concerns the Middle Volga Region but also focuses upon its relationship with Moscow. While the idea of examining the connections between the center and the periphery is not new, it has only recently gained the attention of historians of Russia. Though most studies of Muscovite governance have only focused upon the

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central provinces, there are several good studies of regional governance and its influence on the relationship between central and local authorities.\textsuperscript{17} This dissertation will add to this developing literature; the relationship between the center and its multiethnic periphery was not similar to the Russian-only portions of Muscovy. In fact, the needs and concerns of the non-Russian population generated numerous changes to central policy.

As the Middle Volga remained religiously diverse throughout the early modern period, the dissertation will closely examine the role of the Russian Orthodox Church as a part of Muscovite governance over its frontier. Earlier studies of the Middle Volga Region have overemphasized the importance of conversion to Russian Orthodoxy as an ingredient of Muscovite imperial control.\textsuperscript{18} While strong rhetoric accompanied, and


perhaps drove, the conquest of Muslim Kazan’, the reality of the everyday relationship of Muslim and animist populations with the Russian Orthodox Church was one of accommodation rather than conversion. The Russian Orthodox Church did fulfill an important role on the frontier, but this role has not yet been accurately portrayed in the historiography. This study will explore the political and economic position of the Church in the Middle Volga as well as its religious role to more accurately reflect the unique circumstances of this institution.

This dissertation is also an examination of the growth of Muscovite autocracy. During the seventeenth century, the Muscovite government gained many features of a Western, absolutist monarchy. In particular, the ongoing process of bureaucratization witnessed by a tremendous growth and reorganization of the prikazy (chancelleries), the steady and progressive implementation of mercantilistic policies to control the state’s economy, and the development of an imperial ideology had a tremendous impact on Muscovite governance in the Middle Volga Region. Part of the bureaucratization process was a response to the necessity of governing the expanding Muscovite state. This study will discuss a number of bureaucratic reforms and their impact on the governance of the Middle Volga.19 The Volga River became a prominent trade artery for Muscovy, connecting Western trading nations with those of the East, including Persia and India.

However, in a similar manner to Western mercantile companies, the Muscovite state controlled the trade with monopolies and tariffs, and exploited foreign experts to develop domestic industries to further promote economic growth. Also, the conquest of the Khanate of Kazan’ had been an important part of the development of an imperial ideology for the tsar. Therefore, the history of the Middle Volga Region reveals the features of the Muscovite state that resemble other absolutist states of early-modern Europe. This dissertation adds to the growing literature on bureaucratization and mercantilism in Russia, and further promotes the idea of the establishment of Russian absolutism before Peter the Great.

In this manner, this study explores the common feature of early-modern empires and governments. The sixteenth and seventeenth century witnessed a worldwide transformation brought about by the initial period of European expansion. Russia’s land-based empire was similar to other European overseas empires. For example, a plantation economy was a common feature of most early-modern empires. The plantation economy allowed a small group of elites to assume primary responsibility for large amounts of land and populace, therefore its utility in any early-modern empire should not be surprising.


In colonial Latin America, the hacienda developed over time to become the basic unit of provincial administration in both north and south Mexico, even if it adapted to local circumstances. In Oaxaca, indigenous elites continued to play an important role in the hacienda economy while in northern Mexico they did not.\textsuperscript{22} The English experimented with plantation settlements in Ireland as an attempt to exploit a small English settler population’s influence over the Catholic Irish.\textsuperscript{23} In the Ottoman Empire, sipahis (cavalry) received timars (land and villages) to support their military service for the state.\textsuperscript{24} Russian organization of the countryside in the Middle Volga similarly involved large tracts of land being granted to monasteries and Russian and non-Russian military servitors (pomeshchiki) who had responsibility for realizing profit and monitoring the local peasant populations.

Furthermore, the Muscovite experience in the Middle Volga Region has even more common features with European settlements of “internal frontiers” – contiguous land-based empires. While no other country in early-modern Europe claimed as much territory as Russia, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed French expansion into Roussillon, the Spanish conquest and occupation of Muslim Granada, and the entrance of the Swedish into the Baltic Region.\textsuperscript{25} In these other cases, European states


\textsuperscript{24} Daniel Goffman, \textit{The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe}, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 77-83.

claimed territories divided by ethnic and cultural differences from the political center. As the Spanish conquered and occupied a former Muslim political power, so did the Russians in their conquest of the Khanate of Kazan’. Catholic Spanish settlers were an integral part of the Spanish conquest and Orthodox Russian settlers served a similar goal in the Middle Volga. Whereas the Russians experimented to a great degree with accommodation with its non-Orthodox population, Spain forced the conversion of its Muslim population. In both cases, a rebellion was the result of these imperial policies. By contrasting the Middle Volga with other European empires, this dissertation will explore the common features and contrasts of Muscovite imperialism with other European countries to develop a clearer idea of the nature of early-modern expansion.

MUSCOVY’S MIDDLE VOLGA REGION

For the purposes of this dissertation, the Middle Volga Region is the land contained by the Volga River between Nizhnii Novgorod and Saratov. It encompassed approximately 61,000 square miles, slightly larger than the state of Georgia or twice the size of Ireland. While not the geographic center of the region, Kazan’ was its primary administrative and religious center both for the Khanate of Kazan’ and for Muscovy. Until the sixteenth century, Muscovy’s influence in the region ended at Nizhnii Novgorod. In order to secure Nizhnii Novgorod, Moscow founded outposts outside of its borders, such as the city of Kurmysh, established in 1372, specifically to defend the

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southern border of Nizhegorod uezd. All of the territory of the region was under the control of the Khanate of Kazan’, which had been an independent state since its separation from the Mongol Golden Horde in the first half of the fifteenth century.

From fragments of the disintegrating Mongol Golden Horde, the Khanate of Kazan’ emerged as one of several smaller successor states, alongside the Khanates of Astrakhan, Sibir’, and Crimea. The relative weakness of Kazan’ when compared to the Horde provided Muscovy an opportunity to make territorial gains in the region, but not until 1523, with the establishment of Vasil’grad (later Vasil’sursk) at the juncture of the Sura River and the Volga, was there any evidence of Muscovite success. Muscovy generally relied upon political and financial influence in Kazan’ to succeed where might could not, though that policy had only produced inconsistent results for Muscovy. By the 1540s, Muscovy finally possessed a sufficient military advantage over the Khanate, and pressed its territorial claims with force. Tsar Ivan Vasil’evich began a series of campaigns against the Khanate, culminating with the establishment of the fortress of Sviiazhsk, only 30 versts from Kazan’, in 1551. The major thrust against the city of Kazan’ followed the next summer, when Ivan IV arrived with 150,000 men and 150 cannons at the city walls. On 2 October 1552, the Muscovite army entered and sacked Kazan’, ending the political independence of the Khanate.27 Uprisings inside the region


27 This is an abbreviated account of the extensive description of Muscovite-Kazan’ relations in Pelenski, Russia and Kazan’, pp. 23-61.
arose throughout the remainder of the sixteenth century, but Muscovy had replaced the Khanate as the ruler of the Middle Volga Region.

Illustration 1.1: Map of the Muscovy in 1551

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Muscovite expansion into the Middle Volga Region following the conquest of Kazan’ faced a series of environmental and demographic challenges, in addition to the need to replace a preexisting Tatar Muslim political structure with a Russian Orthodox

Illustration 1.2: The Volga Region; Detail of a map of Russia from Paris (1706)

29 Public Records Office, WO 78, Miscellenea: Maps and Plans, 2498, Detail of a map produced in Paris in 1706. This French map is a more detailed version of an earlier map of Russia, from Joan Blaeu and William Janzoon Blaeu’s Nieuwe Atlas (1635). The description of the Mordvins and Maris (Cheremises) in
one. The northern end of the Middle Volga Region, stretching between Nizhnii Novgorod in the west and Kazan’ in the east and bound in the north by the Volga River, was composed of mixed coniferous and deciduous forests. The territory closely resembled the environment of the traditional Muscovite heartland. As such, Russian migration into the northern Volga Region encountered few environmental difficulties in terms of adapting to a new climate, and, as a result, Muscovite control over the Middle Volga Region was at first focused upon the northern Middle Volga. The entire Middle Volga had slow-moving rivers, however, which limited Muscovy’s ability to utilize water mills. Even with the familiar climate of the region, agriculture was problematic.

The environment of the southern extent of the Middle Volga Region had a changing composition. It was a transitional forest-steppe belt running roughly east-west through the region just south of the city of Samara along the Volga; this belt was a combination of open grasslands and mixed forest regions. The soil of the grasslands was too hard for contemporary Russian plows, though the forested areas suited traditional slash-and-burn methods. Adding to the challenge of a new climate, the likelihood of drought conditions increased on the steppe areas when compared with the forested regions of the north. Because of the environmental challenges, Russian migration into this southern region was more difficult for peasants, and Russian settlement moved southward into the forest-steppe region only during the seventeenth century.30

Combined with the environmental challenge of moving the border southward, the Muscovite government was acquiring lands with a large, multiethnic population of varied socioeconomic status and religious affiliations. The dominant ethnic group of the Khanate of Kazan’ were Tatars, who retained their social prominence after conquest, particularly the elite Tatars—the *murza*—called Murzii by the Russians. Chuvashes, another group of Turkic peoples, also were settled inside the Middle Volga. Several Finno-Ugric groups resided alongside the Turkic peoples, including Mordvins, Maris (then known as Cheremisses), and Udmurts (then Votiaks). Other than the Murzii, the Muscovite government classified the non-Russians either as peasants or *iasachnye liudi* (people who paid tribute), a term covering any non-Russian settled in the region who did not belong to a monastic or servitor estate. Muscovite control over the region opened the way to large-scale Russian settlement within the region, adding to the complex ethnic mix. However, even after Russian migration began, the non-Russian groups remained in large numbers and became an integral part of Muscovy.

The Tatars were the dominant political and cultural ethnic group during the Khanate of Kazan’ and some continued to serve in important positions under Muscovite control during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Murzii Tatars were largely an urban population living in Kazan’ before conquest, but there were numerous villages of Tatar peasants throughout the countryside. The Tatars had their own written language, using Arabic script by the sixteenth century, unlike the surrounding ethnic groups in the region. The Tatars were Muslim, but after Muscovite conquest some did convert to Russian Orthodoxy. Conversion was most common among Murzii Tatars, who adopted
the religion in order to maintain their social prominence. In addition to a social
distinction between Murzii and Tatar peasants, the Tatars of Kazan’ accepted an inherited
political separation from other Tatars later incorporated into Muscovy, including the
Tatars of Astrakhan, Siberia, and Crimea, all of whom had been affiliated with separate
Khanates.

The Chuvashes were another Turkic group that lived within the Khanate of
Kazan’ before Muscovite conquest. The Chuvashes were primarily settled around the
Volga River at the northern end of the Middle Volga Region, though one large group was
settled toward the east near the city of Samara. Almost all Chuvashes lived in small
agrarian communities. The Chuvashes were either Muslim or animist before Muscovite
control. Their religious affiliation was partly a result of geography, with those in contact
with the Tatars usually becoming Muslim, and those without remaining animist.

31 Several recent books and articles relate the history of the Tatars under Muscovite and Russian rule.
These include: Azade-Ayse Rorlich, The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National Resilience, (Stanford: Hoover
Institution Press, 1986); Yahya G. Abdullin, “Islam in the History of the Volga Kama Bulghars and
of Personal Ties between Émigré Tatar Dynasts and the Muscovite Grand Princes in the Fifteenth and
Sixteenth Centuries,” (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation: Harvard University, 1994); Allen J. Frank, Islamic
Historiography and ‘Bulghar’ Identity among the Tatars and Bashkirs of Russia, (Leiden: Brill, 1998);
Damir Iskhakov, Ot srednevekovykh tatar k tataram novogo vremeni, (Kazan’: Institut istorii AN
Tatarstana, 1998); F. M. Sultanov, Islam i Tatarskoe natsional’noe dvizhenie v Rossiiskom i mirovom
Musul’manskom kontekste: Istoriia i sovremennost’, (Kazan’: Akademiia nauk Respubliki Tatarstan Institut
istorii, 1999); Janet Martin, “Multiethnicity in Muscovy: A Consideration of Christian and Muslim Tatars
Muscovite Army during the Livonian War,” The Military and Society in Russia, 1450-1917, (Leiden: Brill,

32 I. D. Kuznetsov, ed., Istoriia Chuvashskoi ASSR: Tom I, S drevneishikh vremen do velikoi oktiabr’skoi
sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii, (Cheboksary: Chuvash ASSR keneke izdatel’stvo shupashkar, 1966); V. A.
Prokhorova, et al., eds., Materialy po etnografii i antropologii Chuvashiei, (Cheboksary: Chuvashkii
gosudarstvennyi institut gumanitarnykh nauk, 1997); Uyama Tomohiko, “From ‘Bulgarism’ through
‘Marrism’ to Nationalist Myths: Discourses on the Tata, Chuvash and the Bashkir Ethnogenesis,” Acta
Interspersed among the Turkic villages of Tatars and Chuvashes were Finno-Ugric groups, particularly the Maris and Udmurts. Both the Maris and Udmurts were settled toward the northern and eastern end of the Middle Volga Region, in a territory extending north of the Volga Region. Unlike the Tatars and the Chuvashes, both the Maris and Udmurts lived in villages within the forested portions of the region. Their livelihood depended primarily upon products of the forest, either from hunting and trapping, or by gathering natural resources such as honey and wax, and not upon agriculture. Both of these groups maintained their animist beliefs before and after Muscovite control over the region.33

Another large population of Finno-Ugric origins were the Mordvins, who were also settled in the forests of the Middle Volga Region, but primarily in the northwest, south of Nizhnii Novgorod. As a result, the Mordvins had a longer period of contact with the Muscovite government before the conquest of the Khanate of Kazan’. Mordvin villages in this region relied upon forest products for their livelihood. During the seventeenth century, the Muscovite state relocated a sizeable percentage of the Mordvins to the southern Volga Region near Penza, forcing a change to steppe agriculture. The Mordvins, like the Maris and Udmurts, were animist before Muscovite conquest, but some did convert to Russian Orthodoxy during the seventeenth century.34

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The final ethnic group to settle the Middle Volga Region were the Russians. Russian slaves had been part of the Khanate’s populace before the conquest, but the entrance of Muscovy into the region facilitated wider settlement throughout the territory. Unlike in other portions of the expanding Muscovite empire, the Russian population in the Middle Volga Region remained smaller than the combined non-Russian population into the seventeenth century. After conquest, Russians, especially soldiers, moved in large numbers into the preexisting and newly-founded urban centers. Over the course of the seventeenth century, Russian peasants arrived and settled in agricultural communities throughout the countryside. They did not adopt the forestry lifestyles of the Finno-Ugric communities, preferring to employ slash-and-burn agriculture. With the combination of Russian Orthodoxy and the infringement upon the region’s traditional agricultural practices, the arrival of Russians throughout the region constituted a persistent attack upon the region’s indigenous populations and cultural traditions.

For Muscovy to establish effective control over the Middle Volga Region, it had to make its presence felt not only in the urban centers but also in the countryside in order to enable its control over the non-Russian populations. Therefore, the state had to establish institutions and structures to allow the full utilization of the territory under its control, and to defend this new territory against military aggression from its neighbors.

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Table 1.1: Middle Volga Towns and Outposts established before 1700

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Year of Foundation</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Year of Foundation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sviiazhsk</td>
<td>1551</td>
<td>Saratov</td>
<td>1590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alatyr'</td>
<td>1552</td>
<td>Iadrin</td>
<td>1600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheboksary</td>
<td>1555</td>
<td>Nizhnii Lomov</td>
<td>1636</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laishev</td>
<td>1557</td>
<td>Verkhnii Lomov</td>
<td>1636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temnikov</td>
<td>1557</td>
<td>Atemar</td>
<td>Before 1641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tetiushii</td>
<td>1571</td>
<td>Saransk</td>
<td>1641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kokshaik</td>
<td>1574</td>
<td>Insar</td>
<td>1648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arsk</td>
<td>1576</td>
<td>Simbirsk</td>
<td>1648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arzamas</td>
<td>1578</td>
<td>Kerenesk</td>
<td>1658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koz'modem'iansk</td>
<td>1583</td>
<td>Penza</td>
<td>1663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsivil'sk</td>
<td>1584</td>
<td>Syzran</td>
<td>1683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samara</td>
<td>1586</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to occupy the land, Muscovy established new cities throughout the region to support and protect it, creating a strong urban presence outside of the city of Kazan’.

Illinois University Press, 1995); M. K. Liubavskii, Obzor istorii russko polyanizatsii s drevneiskikh vremen i do XX veka, (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1996); David Moon, “Peasant Migration.”


In describing Spanish settlement and occupation of colonial Mexico, Eric Van Young argued that “colonial cities sat like spiders at the center of administrative, political, and commercial networks with identifiable regional boundaries. Cities were not only supplied by their regions with food, primary
The Russian Orthodox Church followed suit with strong support from the central
government for the establishment of its physical institutions, especially monasteries and
convents, which were prevalent features of Muscovite settlement inside and outside of
the new cities. With the physical structures of Muscovite occupation established within
the Middle Volga Region, Muscovy achieved an essential first step to claim and
transform this frontier region.

Once Ivan IV’s army seized the city of Kazan’ in 1552, Muscovy founded new
cities and military outposts throughout the northern end of the former Khanate to
consolidate its territorial gains. Within a few decades of the conquest of the Khanate,
Muscovite cities were an established presence throughout the frontier. Most of the cities
situated along the Volga secured Muscovite control over the profitable river trade route.
Others defended the inland trade route, and provided a Muscovite barrier against nomads
raiding the Volga. As Table 1.1 demonstrates, the Muscovite government expended
tremendous resources to settle and control the land and people of the Middle Volga
Region, with the state engaged in easily one of the greatest periods of town formation in
Russia’s history.

Many of the new settlements began only as military outposts. Tsarevokokshaisk
was built in response to the Mari Uprising of the early 1570s, and Samara was built to
defend the region against the Nogai Tatars. As the frontier grew more secure, those

\[^{38}\] A. A. Andreianov, *Gorod Tsarevokokshaisk: Stranitsy istorii (Konets XVI-nachalo XVIII veka)*, (Ioshkar-

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initial outposts developed into towns and cities serving a variety of economic and administrative functions. Moscow’s frontier was protected by organizing the military outposts and new towns as a series of defensive military lines. In order to fortify the lines, the state established new cities both along the Volga and throughout the interior of the Middle Volga Region. The central government organized the first defensive line in 1571, stretching from Tetiushii along the Volga to Alaty’ along the Sura River. With the extension of the line to Arzamas and Temnikov in the west, Moscow created a protective line of forts guarding the Volga River between Kazan’ and Nizhnii Novgorod. While the cost of financing the construction of the Middle Volga’s defensive lines is not known, its expense was undoubtedly great, demonstrating the commitment of the central authorities to protecting the region.

By the middle of the seventeenth century, Moscow gained enough control in the region to push its expansion southward, beginning work on a second military defensive line. This line began along the Volga at the new city of Simbirsk, established in 1648, and went westward, including Saransk and Insar both founded in the 1640s. Insar developed into a city with the settlement of Tatars in Muscovite service, who constructed the fortress. Intriguingly, Muscovite authorities willingly settled Tatars inside a city

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established to protect the region against incursions from the nomadic and independent Nogai and Crimean Tatars. Using non-Russians inside these new cities was common; Mordvins in Muscovite service settled Kerensk, whose language also provided the name for the city.43

The purpose of the defensive lines was not only for defense against nomadic raiders but also was a visible sign to the indigenous population of the presence of the

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42 The map is reproduced from Voronin, Saransk.
Muscovite state. Under the Khanate of Kazan’, the boundaries of the Khanate were fluid outside of the city walls of Kazan’, allowing the local populations limited freedom of movement. With the construction of the defensive lines, Muscovy demarcated a massive boundary line, strongly indicating the current possession by the state of both land and people. This process was similar to the construction of large defensive lines in the early medieval period, where Western monarchs were less concerned with the defense benefits of these constructions but instead on visibly marking their possession over the land.44

Similarly to the dual purposes of the defensive lines, the newly established cities and fortresses also served more than one role for the region. These new settlements also served economic roles in developing the frontier under the direction of the central chancelleries, which considered the financial benefits as important as the security concerns. Simbirsk, benefiting from a position along the Volga River and the defensive line, became an important commercial center. Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich personally assigned Boiar Bogdan Matveevich Khitrovo to transform the former fortress into an entrepot. As Simbirsk developed into a stop along the Middle Volga’s overland trade


route as well, it fulfilled the tsar’s expectations. By the end of the seventeenth century, Simbirsk was an influential trade center, complete with its own factories.45

Muscovy’s defensive lines, however, interfered with urban development in the region, altering preexisting structures for the state’s purposes. Saransk, for example, was built to support a streltsy (musketeers) outpost as part of the new, southernmost defensive line against nomadic raiders. The state used the Saransk to replace an older, nearby city, Atemar, which occupied a less strategic position on the defensive line. With state support behind Saransk, it grew rapidly, reaching a population of more than 600 households within ten years of its foundation. Reinforcing the preeminence of Saransk, the state supported Saransk’s newer monasteries over Atemar’s, transferring the fishing rights of Atemar’s Voskresenskii Monastery over the river Inzera to Saransk’s Bogoroditsii Monastery. By 1651, Saransk became the administrative center of the region, with responsibility for Atemar and Temnikov, and two years later the voevoda of Saransk was also the voevoda of Atemar.46 Similarly, the Stepan Razin Revolt in the fall of 1670 resulted in the building of Syzran, along the Volga near Simbirsk, to add further fortifications to a city that had been endangered in recent events. From its position amidst established cities, Syzran never threatened the administrative or commercial influence of Simbirsk unlike Saransk’s over Atemar.47

45 Romashin, Ocherki ekonomiki Simbirskoi gubernii, p. 5; M. F. Superanskii, Simbirsk i ego proshloe (1648-1898 gg.): Istoricheskii ocherk, (Simbirsk: Tipo-litografiia A. T. Tokareva, 1898), pp. 3-7.


In the northern end of the Middle Volga Region, the situation was different, primarily because the region was more secure from raiding nomads. However, new town foundations affected preexisting cities, just as Saransk caused Atemar’s decline. Kurmysh, established in 1372, suffered from the encroachment of Muscovy into the Middle Volga Region. When the tsar founded Alatyr’ in 1552, following the conquest, the city and its monasteries received extensive rights over the Sura River, which previously served Kurmysh. Shortly after, the state established the town of Iadrin, only 12 versts north of Kurmysh. With support taken for Alatyr’ and Iadrin instead of Kurmysh, there were no new villages established in Kurmysh’s uezd from 1552 until the late seventeenth century despite the influx of population into the region. In other words, state intervention caused the development of new cities and retarded the growth of older ones.

The two defensive lines reinforced the environmental division within the Middle Volga Region. The northern region was forested, while the southern region comprised the transitional forest-steppe belt. The northern region was populated and settled by the region’s indigenous populations, while the south was sparsely populated. Therefore, while Muscovite authorities could exploit the native populations in the north, occupation of the southern territory required a new strategy. Encouraging the settlement of non-Russians into the new fortresses in the south, such as the Tatars in Insar, was part of this movement. Similar to the regional variations of Muscovite expansion, even within the

contained area of the Volga Region there were various policies pursued to guarantee the safety of Muscovy’s borders.

Combined with the state-directed program of urban expansion into the Middle Volga Region, both the central government and the Russian Orthodox Church established numerous monasteries throughout the frontier. Many of these monasteries were founded inside the new cities, creating a strong Russian Orthodox presence on the frontier. Table 1.2 lists the foundations of monasteries throughout the Volga Region following the conquest of Kazan’. The pattern for establishing monasteries was similar to that of founding new cities; these institutions generally accompanied the creation of new cities, though certain important cities, especially Kazan’, continued to have new monasteries established inside and outside of its city walls. Monasteries founded outside of city walls created an important connection between city and countryside, extending Muscovite influence, governance practices, and religious traditions further into the territory. Urban monasteries also received villages in the countryside, as well as economic rights over certain fields or rivers, as part of their foundation, further connecting these new cities to their hinterland. Many of these monasteries possessed extensive lands in largely non-Russian territory, bringing the Russian Orthodox Church

\[49\] In an examination of Catholic Church landholding in Oaxaca, William Taylor demonstrates monasteries’ ability to manage the land of the frontier. When monasteries’ estates began too large to effectively manage, monasteries rented out small tracts of land to local landholders. Monastic landholding was an integral part of the development and utilization of colonial Oaxaca. William Taylor, *Landlord and Peasant in Colonial Oaxaca*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), pp. 165-194.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Foundation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zilantov-Uspenskii</td>
<td>3 versts from Kazan’</td>
<td>1552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uspenskii Bogoroditskii</td>
<td>In Sviiazhsk</td>
<td>1555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spasskii-Arzamaszkii</td>
<td>In Arzamas</td>
<td>1555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spaso-Preobrazhenskii</td>
<td>In Kazan’</td>
<td>1557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troitskii Chuvashskii</td>
<td>In Cheboksary</td>
<td>1566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spaso-Preobrazhenskii</td>
<td>In Samara</td>
<td>1585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ioanno-Predechenskii</td>
<td>In Kazan’</td>
<td>1595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sedmiozernyi Bogoroditskii</td>
<td>17 versts from Kazan’</td>
<td>1613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sviiazh-Troitskii</td>
<td>In Alatyr’</td>
<td>1613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raiimskii Bogoroditskii</td>
<td>30 versts west of Kazan’</td>
<td>1st Quarter of 17th Century</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spaso-Preobrazhenskii</td>
<td>In Arzamas</td>
<td>Before 1619</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maloivingskii</td>
<td>Kozi’ modern’iansk</td>
<td>1627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troits-Sergeevskii</td>
<td>In Arzamas</td>
<td>Before 1628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pokrovskii</td>
<td>In Tetiushii</td>
<td>Before 1631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mironositskii</td>
<td>15 versts from Tsarevokokshaik</td>
<td>1647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazanskii Bogoroditskii</td>
<td>2 versts from Kerensk</td>
<td>1648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voskresenskii</td>
<td>In Atemar</td>
<td>Before 1650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazanskii Bogoroditskii</td>
<td>In Saransk</td>
<td>Before 1650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spaso-Prichysty Bogoroditskii</td>
<td>In Atemar</td>
<td>Before 1652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podrogodnii Makar’evskii</td>
<td>2 versts from Sviiazhsk</td>
<td>Before 1661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spaso-Preobrazhenskii</td>
<td>In Penza</td>
<td>1667–1689</td>
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<td>Troits-Sergeevskii</td>
<td>In Sviiazhsk</td>
<td>Before 1669</td>
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<tr>
<td>Savvo-Storozhevska</td>
<td>In Kazan’ uezd</td>
<td>1673/74</td>
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<td>Spaso-Preobrazhenskii</td>
<td>In Saratov</td>
<td>1680</td>
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<td>Voznesenskii</td>
<td>In Syzran</td>
<td>1683</td>
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<td>Petrovavlovskii</td>
<td>In Saransk</td>
<td>1684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kizicheskie-Vvedenskii</td>
<td>2 versts north of Kazan’</td>
<td>1691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeiv Makar’evskii Zheltovodskii</td>
<td>In Arzamas</td>
<td>Before 1694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pokrovskii</td>
<td>In Simbirsk</td>
<td>1698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V’iasskii Vladimirskii</td>
<td>40 versts from Saransk</td>
<td>17th Century</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.2: Middle Volga Monasteries established before 1700\(^{51}\)

into close contact with non-Orthodox populations. Thus, the Church became an important institution for the Muscovite state to reach out, monitor, and encourage close connections with the new subjects of the tsar.

Monasteries’ massive buildings would also serve as large-scale defenses for the newly-founded cities. Monasteries had served defensive purposes for Muscovy and the southern frontier before the conquest of the Khanate of Kazan, therefore it was logical to use monasteries along the newest frontier. Monasteries in the Volga Region tended to supervise the construction and repair of their own stone walls, as was the case for the Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery of Arzamas, which hired local peasants for the masonry work. However, if the monastery possessed additional defensive structures, such as turrets, then Muscovite authorities provided both the impetus and the financial support for the structure. Kazan’s two oldest monasteries, the Zilantov Uspenskii and the Spaso-Preobrazhenskii, both had several turrets, constructed over two decades in the 1570s and

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52 In one study of monastic landholding in Simbirsk and Samara uezdy, E. L. Dubman claims that all land granted to monasteries in those regions was settled with Tatars and Mordvins peasants, E. L. Dubman, *Khoziastvennoe osvoenie srednego Povol'zia v XVII veke: Po materialam tserkovnoe-monastyrskikh vladeni**, (Kuibyshev: Kuibyshevskii gosudarstvenny universitet, 1991), p. 13.


54 RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 260, 24 March 1630.
1580s. Successive metropolitans of Kazan’ received instructions from Moscow to construct these defenses for the protection of the city.\textsuperscript{55}

The creation of convents for women accompanied the endowment of monasteries in the Middle Volga Region. As seen in Table 1.3, there were less than half as many convents founded in the territory as monasteries. This, however, does not indicate anything concerning the numbers of monks or nuns in religious institutions.\textsuperscript{56} It is likely that more nuns lived in each convent than monks in each monastery, because convents served the needs of the frontier as safe residences for women.\textsuperscript{57} In general, the establishment of convents falls into a similar pattern as that of monasteries, starting in the north, and then shifting to the south as new cities were established. Unlike monasteries, convents were almost entirely founded in cities, because Muscovite authorities feared for the nuns’ safety. While monasteries might supplement the defense of a city, or protect the city’s hinterland, convents did not.

\textsuperscript{55} These arrangements were reviewed in a document sent to Metropolitan Germogen later in the sixteenth century, RGADA, f. 281, op. 4, d. 6432, 25 January 1595.

\textsuperscript{56} In the nineteenth century, at least, there were more nuns than monks in the Volga Region monasteries. Contrasting monasteries and convents with similar foundation dates in the same towns reveals a large discrepancy among monks and nuns housed in the institutions according to Denisov’s nineteenth-century survey. The Kiev-Nikolaevskii Convent in Alatyr’ housed 37 nuns and 237 postulants and the Krestovozdvizhenskii Convent in Saratov housed 66 nuns and 329 postulants. Whereas the Troitskii Monastery in Alatyr’ housed 14 monks and 26 postulants, and the Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery in Saratov housed 8 monks and 18 postulants. Denisov, \textit{Pravoslavnye monastyri Rossiiskoi imperii}.

\textsuperscript{57} In Colonial Peru, convents served the colonizers’ agenda of instilling Catholic values on the mixed-ethnic children of early settlers. The convents’ abbesses would “take the place of the children’s Andean mothers and keep the girls in the cloisters until they were old enough either to profess or to leave the monastery and assume a role (\textit{estado}) in the Christian society their fathers planned to erect in the city,” Kathryn Burns, \textit{Colonial Habits: Convents and the Spiritual Economy of Cuzco, Peru}, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), p. 16. Whether the convents of the Volga Region were designed for a similar purpose is hard to discern. There is no evidence of widespread intermarriage between Russian colonists and non-Russian women, and there is also no evidence of the composition or size of the convents in the early modern period.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Foundation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bogoroditskii</td>
<td>In Kazan</td>
<td>1579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikolaevskii</td>
<td>In Arzamas</td>
<td>1580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ioan-Predtechenskii</td>
<td>In Sviiazhsk</td>
<td>End of 16th Century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troitskii Feodorovskii</td>
<td>In Kazan</td>
<td>1595-1607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikolaevskii</td>
<td>In Cheboksary</td>
<td>1601</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spaso-Preobrazhenskii</td>
<td>In Arzamas</td>
<td>Before 1626/27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novodevichii Alekseevskii</td>
<td>In Arzamas</td>
<td>1634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kievo-Nikolaevskii</td>
<td>In Alatyr’</td>
<td>1639</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spaso-Preobrazhenskii</td>
<td>In Simbirsk</td>
<td>Before 1640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spasskii</td>
<td>In Samara</td>
<td>First Half of 17th Century</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vladimirskaia</td>
<td>In Cheboksary</td>
<td>First Half of 17th Century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spaso-Zelenogorskii</td>
<td>35 Versts from Arzamas</td>
<td>First Half of 17th Century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tikhvinskii</td>
<td>In Tsivil’sk</td>
<td>1671-1675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krestovozdzhenskii</td>
<td>In Saratov</td>
<td>1680</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tikhvinskii Bogoroditskii</td>
<td>In Kerensk</td>
<td>1683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troitskii</td>
<td>In Penza</td>
<td>1691</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.3: Middle Volga Convents established before 1700

Both convents and monasteries, however, served Muscovite settlement on the frontier as spiritual defenses, bolstering the strength of Russian Orthodoxy in a territory largely settled with Muslim and pagan populations. To grant these monasteries and convents an immediate holy aura they were associated with religious objects, important

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Church officials, or sacred locations. The first monastic foundation in the region, the Zilantov Uspenskii Monastery received Smolensk’s miraculous Mother of God icon as a gift from Ivan IV in 1552. The icon had survived the Moscow fire of 1547, and Ivan IV placed it in the All Saints’ Cathedral within the monastery to make it a sacred space.\(^5\)

Similarly, Ivan IV ordered the foundation of Kazan’ Bogoroditskii Devichii Convent in 1579 to house Kazan’s Mother of God icon, as well as an abbess and forty nuns.\(^6\)

Archmandrite Jeremiia of Kazan’s Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery brought the icon from Moscow upon his arrival from Moscow in 1568. According to the convent’s official history, the icon appeared in a vision to a girl in the city during a fire in Kazan’ on 8 June 1579, instructing her to bring people to the Church of Nikolai Tul’skii, which would be saved from the fire.\(^6\)

The convent was built to commemorate the miracle. Later tsars added more financial support to both the Bogoroditskii Devichii Convent and the Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery for the benefit of the icon, demonstrating the important connection between these institutions and this symbol of Orthodox power.\(^6\)

Kazan’s Mother of God icon became an important feature of future monastic foundations in the Volga Region. The Sviiaito-Troitskii Monastery, built in Alatyr’ in 1613, became a residence for the icon on occasion throughout the seventeenth century.\(^6\)

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60 Malov, *Kazanskii Bogoroditskii devich’ monastyr’*, p. 3.


62 Mikhail Fedorovich gave four courtyards in Kazan’ to the Bogoroditskii Devichii Convent in 1623 for a new building to house the Mother of God icon, RGADA, f. 281, op. 4, d. 6456, 29 October 1623. The Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery received new land as *pomest’e* in 1638 to provide for another new church to house the icon, RGADA, f. 281, op. 4, d. 6470, 16 April 1638.
The Novodevichii Alekseevskii Convent of Arzamas, established as a companion convent for Arzamas’s older Spasskii Monastery, received funds to construct a new cathedral on its grounds in 1686 dedicated to the icon.\(^64\) The convent already enjoyed strong support from the tsars, who gave funds to rebuild the convent after a fire in 1667.\(^65\) The cathedral dedicated to the icon was a step to establish a strong sacred aura to match the tsar’s strong financial support, providing spiritual protection for Moscow’s exposed frontier.

Many monasteries and convents established in the Middle Volga Region survived without the support of miraculous icons, but still benefited from a holy aura. The Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery in Samara, opened in 1585, was built between the two existing churches in Samara, the Uspenskii and the Preobrazhenskii, which were incorporated in the monastery.\(^66\) The Kizicheskii Vvedenskii Monastery in Kazan’, built in 1691, was similarly founded on the site of two already established cathedrals.\(^67\)

Another option to create a sacred aura for the monasteries was an important or holy benefactor, a role the Metropolitans of Kazan’ happily fulfilled. Metropolitan Germogen founded the Ioanno-Predtechenskii Monastery in 1595 in Kazan’ to commemorate an earlier archbishop of Kazan’, German. After the monastery suffered damage from fire in 1649, it was rebuilt and rededicated to Kornilii, another Metropolitan.

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\(^{63}\) Tokmakov, *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie Sviato-Troitskago monastyria*, pp. 10-16.


\(^{66}\) Nevostruev, *Istoricheskoe opisanie byvshikh v gorode Samare*, p. 3.

\(^{67}\) E. N., *Kizicheskii Kazanskii monastyr’,* p. 7.
of Kazan’.

The monasteries and convents established in the territory had both financial and spiritual support, serving the frontier as the forerunners of Russian Orthodoxy and providing spiritual and physical defenses for the new borders of Muscovy.

While the Muscovite state succeeded in establishing the physical presence of administrative and Russian Orthodox ecclesiastical centers in the Middle Volga Region, the process of governing the region’s non-Russian populations through those structures was more difficult. It was not possible for Moscow to supervise its subjects with the same ease it could build a new monastery. In order for Muscovy to succeed in controlling its growing empire, the state had to accommodate local conditions along its frontier. Muscovy was not merely extending its borders, but instead was replacing the religious and political system of the Khanate of Kazan’ with systems of its own.

GOVERNING THE RUSSIAN FRONTIER

The expanding territory presented the Muscovite state with a difficult challenge: developing new methods of governance. The political system of the central territories could not be directly implemented, since it was not designed to accommodate local interests extensively. The Middle Volga Region, composed of a multiethnic, socioeconomic-, and religiously-diverse population, was the first great test of the preexisting political structures. The history of Muscovite governance of its frontier centered around resolving the conflict between preexisting structures and new innovations. As will be seen in the subsequent chapters, the Muscovite government’s first step to resolve this situation was the establishment of a specific chancellery to

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68 Azletskii, *Opisanie Ioanno-Predtechensoi muzhskogo monastyria*, pp. 4-7.
supervise the frontier. At the same time, however, many institutions and officials were
implanted into the Middle Volga Region possessing the exact same influence and
authority as those for the central provinces.

The Muscovite state wanted to accomplish two primary goals in the Middle Volga
Region: profitability and security. Profitability included both the region’s self-
sufficiency and the production of usable goods for the interior. The large-scale
importation of wax and honey from the Middle Volga proved immediately valuable.
Central authorities expected the region to support the use of the Volga River as an
important international trade route. In order for profit to be realized, the region had to be
stable and secure, both from outside invading nomads and internal rebellion. The
occasional rebellions against Muscovite rule during the 1550s, 60s, and 70s proved how
difficult that goal could be. The solution adopted by the state was not conversion of the
non-Orthodox population but support for ongoing enlistment and military service. With a
large number of military servitors throughout the Middle Volga Region, both internal and
external security could be achieved.

To support the goals of profit and security, effective governance of the
countryside was a necessity. The primary officials of the state in the region were its
voevody (governors), who had both political and military responsibilities. Coexisting
with the voevody in the frontier were the officials of the Russian Orthodox Church,
especially the archbishop (later metropolitan) of Kazan’ and numerous monastic abbots.
As the voevody received instructions from the state’s chancelleries in the name of the
tsar, religious officials received instructions from the metropolitan (later patriarch) of the
Russian Orthodox Church. These various officials worked in combination to influence
and control the Middle Volga Region’s Russian and non-Russian populations. Frontier governance originated in the center, but local circumstances and personal interests could upset or alter the intentions of stated policies.

Frontier governance had one further complication. In 1552, the Middle Volga Region had one urban center: Kazan’. By 1600, there were more than ten new towns, and the number continued to escalate during the seventeenth century. Development of the Middle Volga included the establishment and support for urban growth. Cities and towns were necessary for effective governance, because they became administrative centers with their own voevoda, court, and military forces. With smaller distances between administrative centers, the movement of information, goods, and troops was facilitated more readily.

The methods of Muscovite governance in the Middle Volga Region have several distinctive features, generating different solutions for the political, religious, economic, social, and military difficulties of the frontier. In each case, the ultimate purpose of the state was to contribute to the overall profitability and security of the region, but each aspect of the state’s governing policies assumed distinctive forms. Individuals both in Moscow and on the frontier shaped state policies, creating a unique system that balanced state goals against the necessities of controlling a region at a distance from the political center.

As this governing system developed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the state displayed many of the attributes of an early-modern absolutist government. Recently Donald Ostrowski has attacked the applicability of the concept of “absolutism” for Muscovy or Europe, following the work of Nicholas Henshall in *The Myth of*
Absolutism. However, Ostrowski has reduced the concept of absolutism down merely to the relationship between the king and his nobility, rejecting the idea that the centralization of the government is “absolutist.” However, absolutism remains the only term sufficient to describe the multiple processes of bureaucratization, mercantilism, and the formation of new ideologies of kingship that were exhibited by Muscovite governance in the Middle Volga Region, I have continued to employ the term throughout this dissertation.  

Bureaucratization included several simultaneous processes: the growth of central chancelleries, increasing refinement of the responsibilities of the chancelleries, and the expansion of a trained bureaucratic staff both in the interior and along the frontier. All of these processes were part of the story of governance in the Middle Volga Region. In replacing all of the Muslim governing structures of the Khanate of Kazan’, the Muscovite government created new institutions (such as the region’s governing chancellery—the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa) and new regional officials to enact policy on the frontier. While these Muscovite institutions were based on preexisting positions inside the state, the government responded to frontier conditions by granting supervisory powers to other institutions and restricting the authority of the regional officials in favor of the central authorities.

Mercantilism required state-sponsored development of domestic industries, use of tariffs and customs to increase state revenues, and control over foreign merchants, especially with the establishment of specific import and export monopolies. In the

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Middle Volga Region, the central chancelleries implemented all three of these methods. As a major trade artery connecting Western trading companies with the luxury goods of the East, access to the Volga River acted as a bargaining tool in Muscovy’s relationship with other trading nations. Muscovy also encouraged domestic production in the Middle Volga Region, and the region’s voevody were instructed to carefully monitor all trade activities in their provinces.

Though historians have focused primarily upon the issue of conversion in the Middle Volga Region, the most important feature of religious policy in the territory was its contribution to the creation of new ideology of the “tsar.” Kazan’ was a tsar’s city, with its conquest, the Muscovite leader legitimated his claim to the conquest. Local religious figures and icons from the Middle Volga Region proclaimed the holy aura of this frontier city and bolstered the contemporary conceptions of the Muscovite tsar as a holy figure.

Furthermore, while the form of governance in the Middle Volga was absolutist, individuals could still influence state policy for their personal benefit. There is no better example of the policy of local accommodation than in the relationship between servitors and the state, since the need for military servitors to be physically present in the region far outweighed concerns about their ethnic or religious background. In addition, because of the state’s needs for the servitors, Russian and non-Russian pomeschchiki (military servitors) could negotiate with the state in order to serve and protect the needs of their
families. As was true for European absolute monarchies, local conditions demonstrate that the ruler’s “arbitrary power” could be altered, at least on a small scale.\(^{70}\)

Muscovite governance over the Middle Volga Region was adaptive, able to meet the changing circumstances and needs of local administrators. Muscovy was developing as an absolute monarchy; Moscow was an imperial capital at the center of an ever-growing empire. Many previous historians have approached Muscovite history as exceptional when compared to its European neighbors, stressing the lack of the common experiences as in the West. Russia lacked Catholicism and a classical heritage, and subsequently avoided the Renaissance and the Reformation. However, as an early-modern empire, Muscovy possessed institutions and features common to early-modern empires: bureaucratization, mercantilism, and an imperial ideology. The Muscovite government’s transformation to accommodate its empire exerted as great an influence over the process of state-building in Muscovy as in England, France, or Spain.\(^{71}\)

\(^{70}\) Historians of other early-modern countries have made greater strides in demonstrating local accommodations within an absolutist state. For example, Ruth McKay, *The Limits of Royal Authority: Resistance and Obedience in Seventeenth-Century Castile*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

\(^{71}\) Historians of Western Europe have argued that bureaucratization and mercantilism were logical results of the pressure of establishing an early modern empire. J. H. Elliot discusses the expansion of the bureaucracy to govern an empire in his “Spain and Its Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” *Spain and Its World 1500-1700: Selected Essays*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 7-26. J. N. Ball discusses the connection between empires and mercantilism in his *Merchants and Merchandise: The Expansion of Trade in Europe 1500-1630*, (London: Croom Helm, 1977), p. 45.
After the conquest of the Khanate of Kazan’ in 1552, Moscow attempted to pacify and stabilize the new territory and to make it economically profitable. The Muscovite government treated the new territory and peoples as an extension of the Muscovite state rather than a unique region with different needs for effective governance. The central government implanted the preexisting Muscovite provincial administrative style, led by voevody (governors), into a frontier region settled with a recently conquered, ethnically-, and religiously-diverse population.¹ This region, however, was also far from the center of the state, and difficulties in communications between the center and the frontier became apparent immediately. If the voevody were to serve the state in the Middle Volga Region as effectively as they did in the central provinces, they had to be more independent than their brethren closer to Moscow and its chancelleries. Therefore, the central government adapted its administrative system to the new circumstances on the frontier, even while retaining the preexisting system of governance.

¹ There is a historical debate concerning whether the governing structures of Kazan’ were an experiment later repeated elsewhere in Muscovy or an adaptation of the preexisting rural governing structure. This chapter focuses primarily upon the seventeenth century when the voevoda, and his role in provincial governance, was firmly established throughout the country. This approach bypasses the sixteenth century, when provincial governing structures were being changed. For a discussion of the changing aspects of provincial administration, see Brian L. Davies, “The Town Governors in the Reign of Ivan IV,” Russian History, 14 (1987): 77-143. For the argument that the Volga Region led provincial government reform, rather than relied upon models elsewhere, see I. P. Ermolaev, Srednee Povolzh’e vo vtoroi polovine XVI—XVII vv. (Upravlenie Kazanskim kraem), (Kazan’: Izdatel’stvo Kazanskogo universiteta, 1982).
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Muscovy’s administrative system was reforming and expanding. A part of this process was the growth of an increasingly professional group of administrators of various ranks. Governing Muscovy’s expanding empire was part of the cause for these reforms. While the administration adapted to the changing needs of Muscovy, professionalization and bureaucratic expansion were common features of early modern governments throughout Europe. Though the relative influence of the bureaucracy in the functioning of the Muscovite state is still being debated, the tsars’ political authority only could function with the bureaucracy’s ability to legislate and enforce that authority outside of Moscow.


3 For example, the Spanish Empire under Philip II (1555/56-1598) witnessed the rapid expansion of a chancellery government and, as a result, the massive increase in government correspondence. Philip ruled absolutely, but found himself running an increasingly complex bureaucracy. See, Geoffrey Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 13-45.

4 Historians have expanded the portrayal of the tsarist government in several ways. This includes the influence of the most elite nobles, the boiars, who had a role in developing policy. These studies include: Gustave Alef, “The Crisis of the Muscovite Aristocracy: A Factor in the Growth of Monarchical Power,” Forschungen zur osteuropaischen Geschichte, 15 (1970): 16-58; Robert O. Crummey, Aristocrats and Boyars: The Boyar Elite in Russia, 1613-1689, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). Recently,
Despite the ongoing reforms of the bureaucracy throughout the early modern period, Muscovy’s chancelleries had conflicting lines of authority. While the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa (Chancellery of the Kazan’ Palace) was established specifically for governing the Middle Volga Region, it was not the only chancellery with responsibilities in the area. Muscovy’s chancelleries dispatched a multitude of instructions all issued in the name of the tsar, and the local voevody faced a challenge in resolving their contradictions.

Moreover, while the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa appointed the voevody, the voevody as frequently frustrated its designs as fulfilled them. When they received conflicting orders, voevody had a space for making independent decisions. For the


voevody, ignoring orders from Moscow was frequently the easiest solution to a frontier problem from the central chancelleries. Similar situations were common throughout early modern Europe; Spanish administrators expressed this same principle with “Obedezco pero no cumplo” (I obey but do nothing). Voevody also served short terms, limiting their ability to enact and sustain policies from the center. Therefore, despite the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa’s power over the voevody’s appointments, it had to depend upon their cooperation of the successful implementation of its plans.

Adding to the complexity of frontier governance was the integral role of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Russian Orthodox hierarchy had encouraged the conquest of the Muslim Khanate of Kazan’, and the Metropolitan of Moscow used his close connection with the tsar to move Orthodox churchmen into the forefront of Muscovite colonization plans in the Middle Volga Region. As with other early modern empires, the goal of religious uniformity could create tension, but the Russian Orthodox Church was as much as part of the Muscovite administrative apparatus as other provincial officials. Frontier administration, therefore, was both central and regional, religious and


8 For a discussion of the rhetorical attacks of the Russian Orthodox Church against the Tatars before the conquest, see Jaroslaw Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan: Conquest and Imperial Ideology (1438-1560s)*, (The Hague: Mouton, 1974), pp. 177-196.

secular, functioning with a plurality of voices rather than a single plan for the integration of the new territory.

MUSCOVITE CHANCELLRIES

The central chancelleries generated the policies governing the Middle Volga Region. Initially, the Stol Kazanskogo dvorets (Desk of the Kazan’ Palace) was a department within the Posol’skii Prikaz (Foreign Chancellery), and had primary responsibility for the Middle Volga Region following the conquest of Kazan’. Due to the strategic and economic importance of the Volga River for Muscovy’s progressing expansion, by the 1570s the original office had been upgraded into its own, separate chancellery, the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa (Chancellery of the Kazan’ Palace). The responsibilities of the Kazanskii dvorets included managing the region’s voevody and their d’iaki (secretaries), monitoring the economic development of the region and its trade routes, protecting the region from external and internal threats, and administering the service requirements of pomeshchiki (military servitors).

The creation of a new chancellery was part of the broader bureaucratization process during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which witnessed a tremendous growth of Muscovite chancelleries. Muscovy created new institutions to address the needs of its growing frontier, and at the same time attempted to reform the existing

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10 By the 1570s, the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa controlled the entire eastern frontier, including the lands of the former Khanates of Kazan’, Astrakhan, and Sibir’. Siberia became a separate administrative unit with the creation of an independent Sibirskii Prikaz in 1639, though it continued to have close ties with the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa, sharing, among other things, its staff through portions of the seventeenth century. See, Rywkin, “Russian Central Colonial Administration,” pp. 15-17.

institutions to create a more efficient government. In the late sixteenth century, one
contemporary observer commented on the importance of four chancelleries in Moscow:
Posol’skii (Foreign Office), Razriadnyi (Military), Pomestnyi (Service-Land), and
Kazanskii dvorets.\textsuperscript{12} Later visitors to Moscow numbered the \textit{prikazy} at thirty-three in
1647, and forty-two by 1667.\textsuperscript{13} However, contemporary historians of the chancellery
system number the \textit{prikazy} between sixty to seventy throughout the seventeenth
century.\textsuperscript{14} One of the reasons for the discrepancy was that bureaucratic growth was not
linear; new \textit{prikazy} would come into existence, be removed, and responsibilities shifted
to other offices.\textsuperscript{15} Therefore, while the Kazanskii dvorets had only a small number of
competitors for jurisdiction over its region in the sixteenth century, it shared
responsibilities with several chancelleries throughout the seventeenth century. Since the
\textit{prikazy} operated independently of one another, the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa had
limited control over the region’s population, transactions, and institutions.

At the same time, the design of the Muscovite governmental system prevented
any chancellery such as the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa from functioning independently
from the others. The Kazanskii dvorets did not even have exclusive rights to supervise

\textsuperscript{12} This is how the government is explained, for example, by Giles Fletcher, “Of the Russe
Commonwealth,” pp. 146-153, after his visit to Moscow in 1588-89. This view has been accepted by

\textsuperscript{13} The estimate of the chancelleries in 1647 comes from Olearius, \textit{Travels of Olearius}, pp. 218-232; and the
number in 1667 was given by Kotoshikhin before his death in Sweden, \textit{O Rossii}, pp. 107-147.

\textsuperscript{14} For a brief discussion of the fluctuating number of chancelleries, see Peter B. Brown, “Muscovite

\textsuperscript{15} For example, the Monastyrskii prikaz, created in 1649 to supervise all monasteries, and monastic land
and peoples, was abolished in 1677. During its existence, its jurisdiction over all monasteries included
those in the Middle Volga Region. After its dissolution, some authority over monasteries in the region was
all of the newly-founded cities of the Middle Volga Region. The easternmost portion of the territory remained under the control of the Novgorodskaiia chetvert’, a chancellery such as the Kazanskii dvorets with all-encompassing responsibilities over its territory, including management of the voevody, tax collection, monitoring of service, and trade regulation. Most of the territory of the Novgorodskaiia chetvert’ contained well-established cities, including Novgorod, Pskov, Arkangel’sk, Perm, and Nizhnii Novgorod, but it was given Arzamas in 1578 upon its foundation. Arzamas developed into an important city for the Middle Volga Region, and served as the gateway to the trade route that ran through the region, stopping at Alatyr’, Simbirsk, and Samara, all cities under the control of the Kazanskii dvorets. Therefore, the Kazanskii dvorets’s supervisory role in the Middle Volga for defense and trade regulation was conditioned by its continual negotiations with the Novgorodskaiia chetvert’ over every issue involving Arzamas.

Struggles among the chancelleries over a wide variety of disputes were common throughout the early modern period, and the conflicts troubled the Volga Region, far from the chancelleries themselves. A chancellery system with carefully delineated powers sometimes impeded easy solutions for the tsar’s subjects. A non-Russian in Muscovite service, Matvei Stepanov syn Pushkin, had been taken hostage by the Bashkirs. Since hostage-ransoms were paid by the Posol’skii prikaz, the Kazanskii dvorets sent a note on 25 September 1675 to remind the Posol’skii prikaz to pay the ransom in order to release Pushkin back to the service of the Kazanskii dvorets. On 21

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returned to the Kazanskii dvorets, which had enjoyed those privileges before 1649. The Monastyrskii prikaz was recreated in 1701, reclaiming its lost authority from 1677, and lasted until 1725.
December 1676, the Kazanskii dvorets wrote again to the Posol’skii prikaz, to remind them of the situation, since more than one year later the ransom had still not been paid.\textsuperscript{16} The Posol’skii prikaz’s authority to manage all affairs with the Bashkirs prevented the Kazanskii dvorets from resolving a situation involving one of its own people.

Economic development, nominally under the control of the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa for the Middle Volga Region, frequently led to a wide variety of intra-chancellery conflicts. In 1645, for example, the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa sent a reminder to the Aptekarskii prikaz (Pharmaceutical Chancellery) concerning the recent activities of Elizarii Rolant, a non-Russian, who was selling medicine to the Kalmyks. However, since Rolant was one of the subjects of the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa, these two chancelleries were forced to coordinate their regulation of Rolant’s activities.\textsuperscript{17} In 1676, for example, the Kazanskii dvorets sent a reminder to the officials of the Posol’skii prikaz concerning the factory-owner Mamatitudei Zamanov. In March the Prikaz Tainykh del (Chancellery of Privy Affairs) had instructed Zamanov, a Tatar, to travel to Simbirsk to establish a new factory for the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa. Since this had not happened, the Posol’skii prikaz was required to enforce these instructions.\textsuperscript{18} It is possible that the Posol’skii prikaz’s involvement was necessary because Zamanov was not currently in Russia, and the Prikaz’s regulatory powers over foreign travel would be required to recall him. Another possibility was that this new factory was intended as a joint project

\textsuperscript{16} RGADA, f. 159, Prikaznye dela novoi razborki, op. 2, Posol’skii prikaz, d. 1490, ll. 9-10.

\textsuperscript{17} Akty istoricheskie, sobrannye i izdannye, Vol. 3, (St. Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo arkheograficheskoi komissii, 1842), #240, 13 March 1645, pp. 398-399.

\textsuperscript{18} RGADA, f. 159, op. 2, d. 1490, l. 13, 11 May 1676.
between Zamanov and a foreigner, not an uncommon occurrence, even among factories built in the Volga Region.\(^{19}\) Both situations demonstrate the difficulties of the Kazanskii dvorets in developing its region, and the limits on its ability to enforce chosen policies. Conflicts among the Muscovite chancelleries affected many other areas of development for the region. Land disputes were another frequent source of struggles among chancelleries. For example, a dispute arose over the division of land between two Mordvin villages in Utishnii stan in Arzamas uezd, Old and New Cherevatovo. On 29 January 1684, Arzamas Voevoda Ivan Leont’evich Mistrev received word from Moscow that possession of these villages would be resolved by the Sudnyi prikaz (Judicial Chancellery). In this case, the authority of both the Novgorodskaiia chetvert’, based on its authority over Arzamas, and the Pomestnyi prikaz, with its control over pomest’e grants, were excluded from making decisions about either land divisions or grants.

Muscovite officials were aware of the problems of conflicting authority. In fact, the chancellery system expanded to address the combined problems of overlapping authority and of long delays needed to resolve contradictory commands. The authority of individual chancelleries was bolstered in face of other chancelleries’ interference. For example, in 1660, the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa received a reminder of its responsibilities for adjudicating over all matters among people of all ranks in the region. The Kazanskii dvorets apparently passed too many judicial cases to other central

\(^{19}\) For example, when the Dutch merchant Konrad Nordermann, along with his partners Andrei Andreev syn Vinibsov and Iakov Galaktimov syn Galkin, wanted to sell his iron-works near the confluence of the Volga and Kama Rivers, to another Dutch merchant, Peter Muller, it was necessary to receive the permission of the Posol’skii prikaz and not the Kazanskii dvorets, in whose territory the factory was located. RGADA, f. 159, op. 2, d. 1361, 9 May 1675
chancelleries. Similarly, in 1693 the tsar granted the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa judicial rights over dishonor cases involving boiars and Murzii in the Volga Region, removing that right from the Sudnyi prikaz. In both cases instance, the Kazanskii dvorets received more authority, limiting the influence of the other chancelleries involved in the region. When the Monastyrskii prikaz was eliminated in 1678, the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa gained control over monasteries in the Volga Region, further simplifying lines of authority in the territory. In each of these examples, the Kazanskii dvorets’s authority grew by specific steps to improve its control of the over the region, with grants of privileges that had not been made explicit previously.

However, some of the reforms affecting the distribution of power in the Volga Region weakened the Kazanskii dvorets. A major conflict between the chancelleries arose when a gramota (charter) sent to the Kazanskii dvorets on 12 November 1680 notified it that all troops and military service owed from land grants in the region would be controlled thenceforth by the Razriadnyi prikaz. The Kazanskii dvorets resisted implementing any part of this instruction for a year, because it was unwilling to abandon control over its own troops. Following another gramota on 14 November 1681, the

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20 Polnoe sobranie zakonov Russiskoi Imperii, Series 1, Vol. 1, (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia i otdelenie sobstvennoi ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva Kontseliariia, 1830), #282, p. 499, 12 September 1660. Hereafter, PSZ.

21 PSZ 3, #1460, pp. 149-151, 10 January 1693.

22 Though the Monastyrskii prikaz gave its Volga monasteries to the Kazanskii dvorets, in the remainder of Muscovy monastic authority was assumed by the Prikaz Bol’shogo dvortsa. PSZ 2, #711, p. 784, 19 December 1678.

23 This change was part of a broader reform process. This ruling also places troops from Smolensk province under the authority of the Razriadnyi prikaz rather than local authorities. S. I. Porfir’ev, “Kazanski stol Razriadnyi prikaza,” Izvestiia obshchestva arkeologii, istorii i etnografii pri Imperatorskom Kazanskom universitete, 28: 6 (1913), pp. 535-553.
Kazanskii dvorets began the process of turning over its local militias. The Inozemskii prikaz (Foreigners’ Service Chancellery), however, gained control of all Tatar soldiers from the Middle Volga Region by the same *gramota*. The Inozemskii Prikaz came into existence specifically to regulate the military service of all non-Russians, including foreign mercenaries and commanders hired to train the army. Military service provided in the Volga Region remained split between two chancelleries (the Razriadnyi and Inozemskii), leaving the Volga *voevody* to make appeals to those chancelleries rather than to the Kazanskii dvorets concerning local security issues. The military reform of the early 1680s only added two chancelleries with responsibilities in the frontier, rather than simplifying lines of authority.

The Muscovite government at the end of the seventeenth century was dramatically larger than its late sixteenth-century incarnation, but whether it had improved its ability to govern the Middle Volga Region is questionable. The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa both gained and lost specific powers over time, modifying its position as the primary authority over the frontier. The Kazanskii dvorets appointed the *voevody*, but it needed the *voevody* to enforce its decisions rather than the ones of other chancelleries. Regardless of any attempted reforms of the chancellery government, local officials in the region would still work for a system of multiple institutions all with specific responsibilities, limiting the impact of any central reforms on the frontier.

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VOEVODY, D’IAKI, AND BAILIFFS

The men who filled administrative positions within the Middle Volga Region largely belonged to the same boiar families as those in service within the Muscovite chancelleries in Moscow, especially as voevody. Younger brothers of members of the boiar council were commonly placed into positions of authority. The men on their staffs, both d’iaki (secretaries) and bailiffs, were selected from the lower ranks of the nobility or even from local servitors.25 Even with the close relations between chancellery officials and regional governors, the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa monitored the actions of its regional officials as much as possible, and tended to keep their terms in office short to limit their influence and prevent the voevody from developing local power bases.

The voevody’s authority over their individual cities and regions was comparable to the tsar’s over the country; missives from the Kazanskii dvorets frequently referred to a voevoda as a “sovereign” just like the tsar.26 D’iaki were trained secretaries, responsible for the voevody’s daily correspondence, and filing reports on current events with the Prikaz. Both the voevody and d’iaki worked in an office in the individual cities, called the prikaznaia izba (chancellery office) in larger cities, or prikaznyi stol (chancellery desk) in smaller ones. Carrying out the directives of the voevody and d’iaki,

25 In the Middle Volga Region, non-Russians did not occupy prominent positions in the provincial administration, unlike in some early modern empires. In Oaxaca, cacicazgos, or native chieftains, maintained prominent positions within the Spanish colonial administration as a stabilizing presence, Taylor, Landlord and Peasant, pp. 35-65. Similarly, in Portuguese India, service to the crown was rewarded with high status as well as positions, Glenn J. Ames, “Fama e reputação: The Provincial Portuguese Nobility, the Challenges of the Restoration Era, and Imperial Service in the Estado da India, ca. 1661-1683,” Journal of Early Modern History, 6 (2002): 1-23.

26 For example, in a gramota from 2 November 1682 to the voevoda of Saransk, “…to Saransk stolnik our Voevoda Ivan Pavlovich Iazykov, we bow our head to you, the great sovereign of Saransk city…,” RGADA, f. 1156, Saranskaia prikaznaia izba, op. 1, d. 9, ll. 7-9.
or serving in local court systems were various ranks of bailiffs, with individual titles usually linked to terms of service, such as *nedelshik* (week-officer).

Despite the distance between the Middle Volga Region and Moscow, and the length of travel between the two, the terms of office of local officials tended to be short, particularly in the region’s most important cities, where the appointment held greater political prestige.\(^27\) In the most politically and economically important city of the region, Kazan’, one- to three-year terms were standard.\(^28\) Because of the prestige of Kazan’, its *voevoda* was in almost all cases a boiar. It was not uncommon that more than one member of a single family served as Kazan’s *voevoda*, as was the case for the Golitsyns, who had four *voevody* from their family in Kazan’.

The length in office in the region’s smaller cities was generally longer than in its majors cities like Kazan’. Arsk, Laishev, and Tetiushii even lost their own *voevody* by 1651, once they were placed under the authority of nearby, more prominent cities. No boiar held the position of *voevoda* for any length of time in these cities, a marked contrast to Kazan’. Frequently, the Middle Volga’s gentry served in these cities, residents of Alatyrr’ and Kazan’ in Arsk, of Sviiazhsk and Kazan’ in Laishev, and of Atemar in Tetiushii. While two- and three-year terms occurred, terms as long as twelve or fourteen years also did. For example, Arsk, Laishev, and Tetiushii each had long-term *voevody*

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\(^27\) For a discussion on the evolution of the office of *voevoda* in the sixteenth century, see Davies, “The Town Governors of Ivan IV,” especially pp. 107-119.

\(^28\) Porfir’ev, “Spiski voevodi i d’iakov po Kazani i Sviiazhsku.”

\(^29\) The four are: Ivan Ivanovich Golitsyn (1602); Ivan Andreivich Golitsyn (1639-41); Aleksei Andreivich Golitsyn (1670-73); and Andrei Ivanovich Golitsyn (1682). V. D. Korsakov, comp., “Spisok nachal’stuiushchikh lits v gorodakh tepereshnei Kazanskoi gubernii: S 1553 g. do obrazovaniia Kazanskoi gubernii v 1708 g.,” *Izvestiia obshchestva arkheologii, istorii i etnografii pri Imperatorskom Kazanskom universitet*, 24 (1908): Prilozhenie, p. 4.
during the Time of Troubles: Andrei Aleksandrovich Nagovo in Arsk (1602-1614), Andrei Vasil’evich Levashov in Laishev (1601-1614), and Danil Ziushin in Tetiushii (1602-1614). In that same time period, Kazan’ had five different voevody. The long terms were not necessarily linked to the disruptions of the Time of Troubles; the 1630s and 1640s also witnessed long tenures in those cities.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Years when appointed</th>
<th>Number of voevody appointed</th>
<th>Average term in office (in years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arsk</td>
<td>1576-1651</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheboksary</td>
<td>1552-1694</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iadrin</td>
<td>1602-1683</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazan’</td>
<td>1553-1699</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerensk</td>
<td>1658-1700</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koz’modem’iansk</td>
<td>1583-1700</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kokshaisk</td>
<td>1574-1681</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laishev</td>
<td>1575-1651</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sviiazhsk</td>
<td>1551-1697</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tetiushii</td>
<td>1571-1651</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsarevokokshaisk</td>
<td>1601-1695</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsivil’sk</td>
<td>1601-1697</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1: Terms in Office of the Middle Volga’s voevody

For the newly-founded cities during the seventeenth century, longer terms in office were usual for the early voevoda, but two- to three-year terms became common

Korsakov, “Spisko nachal’stuishchikh lits.”

All data taken from V. D. Korsakov, comp., “Spisok nachal’stuishchikh lits v gorodakh tepereshnei Kazanskoj gubernii: S 1553 g. do obrazovanii Kazanskoj gubernii v 1708 g.” Izvestiia obshchestva arkeologii, istorii i etnografii pri Imperatorskom Kazanskom universitete, 24 (1908): Prilozhenie 1-18; except Kerensk from G. P. Peterson, Istoricheskii ocherk Kerenskogo kraia, p. 78. It should be noted,
once the city was established. For Kerensk, Avtamon Semenovich Bezobrazov served as *voevoda* from the foundation of the city in 1658 until 14 December 1671, when he was removed in office for having failed to respond effectively to local uprisings. His replacement, Dmitrii Kharlamovich Soimonov, remained in the office of *voevoda* until 1681, but following him two- to three-year terms became standard.32

The relationship between the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa and the *voevody* in the countryside was defined by *nakazy* (instructions). Each term of office began with one set of *nakazy* to outline all of the *voevody*’s responsibilities in the Middle Volga Region. In the sixteenth century, the Prikaz instructed its *voevody* orally in Moscow, but by the beginning of the seventeenth century the Prikaz wrote the first set of instructions so that the *voevody* these instructions to the region. Shorter *gramoty* (charters) followed on a regular basis concerning individual matters, but the *nakaz* was the basis for all later directions. While each *voevoda* arrived in his city with a new *nakaz* for his time in office, very few *nakazy* still survive. The best collection extant is for Kazan’, with copies from 16 April 1613, 16 May 1649, 22 March 1677, 21 July 1686, and 31 March 1697. A comparison of these *nakazy* reveals the major trends of governance and the responsibilities of the *voevody*, as well as demonstrate the standardization of the Muscovite bureaucracy. Bureaucratization was not limited to the growth of the chancellery system but also included increased communication between Moscow and its periphery.

however, that it is possible that officials could have been appointed and served without being recorded in the extant documents.

The nakazy addressed the common problems facing the voevody in his term in office: security issues, tax collection and trade regulation, and justice. Across the seventeenth century there was a steady increase in the complexity of each nakaz, more closely attempting to regulate the authority of the voevody. For example, the nakaz of 1613 to Kazan’s voevoda comprised seven clauses, 1649 had twenty-six, both 1677 and 1686 were thirty-three, and 1697 was forty-seven articles. The growth of the nakazy reflected improved awareness of the difficulties of frontier governance; most of the new articles specifically addressed recent problems that needed to be resolved.

The first clause of each nakaz was a specific directive for the incoming voevoda and d’iaki to claim the keys to the city from the previous officials, and for all residents of all ranks in the region to respect the authority of the new officials. Usually this article was followed by one reminding the voevoda that he owed his personal loyalty to the tsar first and then to the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa. Both of these clauses addressed specific problems within the Muscovite governance system. It was not impossible for a voevoda to attempt to ignore the arrival of his replacement. This was the case on 28 May 1600, when the Kazanskii dvorets instructed Kazan’s Voevoda Merkur’ë Aleksandrovich.

33 With the exception of different names in the first clause concerning the arrival of the new voevody, these two nakazy are comprised of the exact same articles. RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, copy from 1720, ll. 36-111 is from 1677, ll. 115ob-181 is from 1687.

34 Both topics were included in all of the nakazy to Kazan’, except for the one from 1613, which did not include an article reminding the voevoda of his loyalty to the Prikaz. In 1613, power was given to Voevoda Iurii Petrovich Ushaty and d’iak Stepan Dichkov; RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, copy from 1720, l. 3a. In the nakaz for 1649, the first article (f. 16, ll. 6-6ob) is the direction for turning over the keys to the new voevoda; the second article (f. 16, ll. 6ob-8) is the article directing all residents to give their loyalty to the new voevoda; and the third article (f. 16, ll. 8-8ob) reminds the new voevoda that his loyalty belongs to the tsar and the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa. For 1677, the first three clauses cover the same instructions as 1649, f. 16, ll. 36ob-38. 1697 covers the same issues, with the first article containing directives for turning over the keys to the city, but articles two and three outline who must loyally follow the orders of the voevoda, PSZ, vol. 3, #1579, pp. 284-285.
Shcherbatov and d’iak Aleksei Shapilov to turn over the key to the city to the new Voevoda Toma Onuchin and his d’iak Ivashka Gliadkov. This was the second notice sent by the Prikaz. Included in this gramota was an order that if Shcherbatov did not obey the Prikaz, he would be imprisoned, along with any Kazan’-resident who listened to him.\textsuperscript{35} The article reminding the voevody of their loyalty to the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa was a necessity considering the ongoing conflict and competing interests among the Muscovite chancelleries. After the promulgation of the Ulozhenie of 1649, subsequent nakazy instructed the voevody they were responsible for following its clauses, as well as all previous nakazy and gramoty sent to Kazan’.\textsuperscript{36}

The clauses about security concerned two major issues: internal threats from rebellion and external threats from nomads. During the seventeenth century, domestic rebellions received greater attention, especially in the wake of the Stepan Razin revolt, in which the non-Russian populations of the Middle Volga Region widely participated. The numerous instructions contained methods of preventing future uprisings. The voevody were to conduct investigations and interrogations of the inozemtsy to uncover any plots against the state.\textsuperscript{37} Furthermore, the voevody was also ordered to take hostages from inozemtsy families to ensure the loyalty of those families, and should forbid the sale of

\textsuperscript{35} Dokumenty po istorii Kazanskogo kraia, #19, pp. 54-55.

\textsuperscript{36} In 1677, RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 38ob-39ob.

\textsuperscript{37} The nakazy discussed problems in general terms, at least by 1649. The final article of the nakaz of 1613 was a specific directive to locate Nikanor Shulgin who had returned from military service in Sviiazhsk to Kazan’ on 25 March. Visitors returning to Moscow from Kazan’ had reported the presence of Shulgin; the Kazanskii dvorets was concerned about what he was doing once he had abandoned his duty, RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 4ob-5.
military commodities (such as muskets, swords, or helmets) in certain districts, especially those that contained Maris, Udmurts, or Chuvashes.\footnote{The seventeenth century was marked by a rapid increase in the number of specific clauses to address the problem of rebellions. The nakaz from 1613 included only one such clause, which instructed the voevoda to investigate Tatars, Udmurts, Bashkirs, Chuvash, and Maris, especially if they had contact with Russians. If there was any evidence of instabilities (shatosti) or troubles (smuty), the voevoda should write to Moscow for advice, RGADA, f. 16, l. 3v. In 1649, there was an article to interrogate anyone coming into town (f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 9-10), one to take hostages from Tatars, Chuvash, Maris, and Udmurts (f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, l. 10), one about investigations of the inozemtsy (f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 10-11), and banning the sale of helmets, sabers, rifles, or anything produced by blacksmiths or silversmiths in Chuvash and Mari volosti and villages (f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 11-12). The same articles were included in the nakaz from 1677, (f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 39ob-42ob, 57ob-61), but added several more restrictions discussed below.}

Other instructions about domestic security issues involved protecting Kazan’ itself against both revolts and natural disasters. The growth of security clauses reflected the benefit of experience from frontier administrators. An ongoing danger throughout the Middle Volga Region was fire, which devastated almost all of its cities at some point. The nakaz of 1613 did not mention any specific actions for fire prevention. Following in a large fire in early 1649 in Kazan’, which destroyed the Ioanno-Predtechenskii Monastery, the nakaz from later that year instructed the voevoda to keep water at all of the city’s churches.\footnote{RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 27ob-28. An account of the fire and its destruction of the monastery can be found in the monastery’s official history, \textit{Opisanie Ioanno-Predtechenskogo nuzhskogo monastyria}, pp. 4-7.} Similarly, after the experience of the Stepan Razin Revolt, numerous clauses were added to the nakazy addressing specific issues that had exacerbated the rebellion. The nakaz of 1677 included specific warnings to appoint only “trustworthy” people to watch the gates of the city, to take responsibility for paying and feeding the streltsy (musketeers) in the city, and to watch the lieutenant of the streltsy to make sure that he was not disobeying his orders from Moscow.\footnote{RGADA, f. 16, l. 3v. In 1677, the nakaz included several more restrictions discussed below.} Though Kazan’ had not
fallen during the rebellion, several other Volga cities had been betrayed by their
gatekeepers, and the loyalty of the cities’ troops became a greater concern, especially
since the streltsy had been instrumental in breaking the siege of Simbirsk.41

In addition to specific security measures, the nakazy throughout the seventeenth
century promoted greater monitoring of the population. All people entering the region
had to be registered by the voevody; anyone without valid reason for being in Kazan’ was
to be returned to their point of departure.42 Monitoring population movements through
the region served several purposes simultaneously. The region’s non-Russians were
mentioned for fear of either plotting against Muscovite rule, or of communicating with
nearby nomads, especially the Nogai or Crimean Tatars. The Volga River was a major
trade route, and as such, one of the responsibilities of Kazan’s voevoda was to prevent
smuggling along the trade route. Finally, after the final enserfment of the peasantry in
1649, the voevoda were instructed to find and return any runaway peasants who might be
residing inside the region.

Tax collection and trade regulation comprised an equal if not greater portion of
the instructions to the voevody. By the end of the seventeenth century, the number of
trade matters covered in the nakazy was vast, and the specific details of the trade
discussed indicate the growing knowledge in the central chancelleries of the Volga trade

40 RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 49-51, 62-64, and 64ob-69. Incidents had occurred when the local
streltsy had disobeyed Moscow, in 1662/63, 1671/72, 1672/73. The nakaz of 1697 included a very long
specifically about controlling the streltsy, PSZ 3, pp. 288-89.

41 The Stepan Razin Revolt, and Muscovite security policies in the Volga Region, will be discussed in
greater detail in Chapter 6.

42 This article had the benefit of not only stopping raiding nomads, but also providing a mechanism for
finding and capturing runaway peasants. This clause first appeared in 1649’s nakaz, and then in the
remainder of the nakazy, RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, l. 30.
route. The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa included longer and more specific trade regulations in the larger nakazy. The voevody monitored grain reserves, and ensured the collection of tax from the fish trade in the city. By 1649, they collected taxes from servitors and iasachnye liudi and monitored the activities of traders. They also prevented the sale of commodities that the nonRussians might use for rebellions. The nakazy also demanded controls on bootlegged liquor to eliminate smuggling and tax-dodging, especially among the region’s non-Russian populations. The nakaz of 1697 expanded this to include tobacco, at that point still an illegal commodity but increasingly available from smuggled Chinese and Ukrainian supplies.

When compared to the level of specific instructions addressing security, tax collection, and trade regulation, only a small number of articles in the nakazy concerned judicial prerogatives. The nakaz of 1613 had only one clause, which informed the voevoda that he had the right to dispense justice to all people in Kazan’ region, and to

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43 The nakaz of 1697 included details about recent trading years with Tsaritsyn (PSZ 3, p. 290), with Astrakhan (PSZ 3, pp. 290-91), specific rights possessed by the Armenian Company to trade along the Volga (PSZ 3, p. 291), regulations affecting a local mining company (PSZ 3, p. 291), regulations on the honey trade (PSZ 3, p. 293), and that of salt peter (PSZ 3, p. 293), among others.

44 The nakazy of 1613 only had one clause on tax or trade, and it included these specific instructions, RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 4-4ob. By 1649, the number or articles concerned with financial matters had increased to nine. Tax instructions were broken down by rank, with separate articles on the iasachnye liudi (f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 12-13ob), Muslims (f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 130b-14ob), and all servitors (f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 35-35ob). Trade regulation was divided into types of activity, with one article one regulating the movement of traders on the Volga (f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 14ob-16), one for regulating horse trade (f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 27ob-28), one about the gosti (highest rank of Russian merchant, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 32ob-35), and the longest clause of the entire nakaz, specifically about the fish market, which tracked recent returns from taxes gathered from fish (f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 16ob-21).

45 Interestingly, though non-Russian subjects should not possess arms, Moscow was willing to arm non-subject nomads to suppress non-Russian rebellions, a potentially short-sighted solution to a serious problem. For example, Aiuki Khan and his Kalmyks were provided ten puds of gunpowder, lead, and some muskets as payment for suppressing a rebellion in Simbirsk. RGADA, f. 159, op. 2, d. 1349, 15 June 1675.

46 Anyone caught selling such liquor was to be jailed, RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, l. 14ob.
collect the appropriate duties from his judgments. During the seventeenth century, this wide latitude decreased, as the central chancelleries progressively claimed greater legal authority in the countryside. Some of the powers claimed by the central chancellery were simply too important to rest in the provinces, such as the voevody’s ability to settle boundary disputes, which was lost in a 1649 law. Also in the nakaz of 1649, the Kazanskii dvorets added specific details about the types of judicial matters that should be reported in Moscow, even if they were settled locally. For example, debt slavery was only a local matter and did not need to be reported. If someone claimed the tsar’s land for his own, however, the voevody was required to report the individual to the Prikaz, and collect the appropriate taxes and service due for that land. As the voevody’s power to adjudicate was transferred to Moscow, longer delays for judgments became more common.

One reason why judicial powers may have received less attention in the nakazy was the nature of the Muscovite judicial system. The expanding bureaucracy of the seventeenth century was dependent upon local participation in the legal system in order to extend its authority into the countryside, especially on the frontier. Neither the central government nor the voevody regularly investigated and prosecuted crimes. Instead, individuals petitioned the government for justice. Residents of the countryside frequently

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47 PSZ 3, p. 287.

48 RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, l. 3a ob.

49 The nakaz claimed the ability to settle boundary disputes for the tsar, but, in actuality, the “tsar” would mean either the Sudnyi prikaz, the Pomestnyi prikaz, or the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa, depending on their specific claims of authority against one another, RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, l. 24.

50 Also, if a person claimed land from a monastery, that was for the monastery to settle and the voevoda should not be involved. RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 30-32 ob.
contacted their local government officials for justice. For example, on 10 August 1681, A. I. Mukhanov notified Arzamas d’iaki Timofei Isaakovich Kuz’min and Bet’iand Pelageno Grigor’ev that Efrem Issev, from his own village of Khorkov, had attacked Mukhanov with a sword.\textsuperscript{51} Without Mukhanov’s petition, neither the regional or central authorities would have investigated this attack. Though the central government could create the institutions of judicial authority, only voluntary individual participation made the system effective.

The \textit{nakazy}, intended to guide the \textit{voevody} during their terms of office, were increasingly specific about the parameters of the \textit{voevody}'s activities in the countryside during the seventeenth century. While expansion of the bureaucracy was part of a reform process designed to specifically address problems of inefficiency in the Muscovite government, directions from the political center of Moscow slowly intruded into the power of the local \textit{voevody}. However, the increase in documents and regulations created by the Muscovite chancelleries did not necessarily result in decreased independence for regional officials in Muscovy. The power of the Muscovite state felt in the countryside became a combination of the instructions of the central chancelleries and the local authority of the \textit{voevody}.

In addition to the growth of the power of the central chancelleries in the countryside, the \textit{voevody} shared their personal authority over their cities with their staffs. \textit{D’iaki}, in particular, were a prominent presence throughout the countryside. While the position of \textit{voevoda} was a political position frequently occupied by boiars, \textit{d’iaki} were professional bureaucrats. \textit{D’iaki} generally had extensive administrative experience,

\textsuperscript{51} RGADA, f. 1455, op. 1, d. 2294.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>D’iak</strong></th>
<th><strong>Years served in Kazan’</strong></th>
<th><strong>Other provincial posts as d’iak</strong></th>
<th><strong>Moscow prikazy posts as d’iak</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mikhail Bitiagovskii</td>
<td>1578-79; 30 November 1581-22 July 1585</td>
<td>Vladimir; Uglich</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aleksei Zakhar’evich Shapilov</td>
<td>1596-1602; 1610-11</td>
<td>Beloozero; <em>voevoda</em> of Murom</td>
<td>Kazanskii dvorets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fedor Fedorovich Likhachev</td>
<td>1613-15; 1617/8-1619/20</td>
<td>Streletski; Pomestnyi; Posol’ski; Razriadny</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrei Romanovich Podlesov</td>
<td>1615-17</td>
<td>Kostroma; Astrakhan</td>
<td>Iamskii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivan Vasil’ev</td>
<td>1618-22</td>
<td>Pskov; Vladimir</td>
<td>Kazanskii dvorets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrei Stepanov</td>
<td>1620-21</td>
<td>Kostroma</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potap Ivanovich Vnukov</td>
<td>1622-27</td>
<td>Vaga; Tula; Vologda; Dvina</td>
<td>Kazach’ii; Razboinii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivan Ivanovich Borniakov</td>
<td>1626-1627/8</td>
<td>Beloozero</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grigorii Ivanovich Borniakov</td>
<td>1630-1632/3</td>
<td><em>Voevoda</em> of Temnikov and Atemar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stepan Ugotskoi</td>
<td>1632-34</td>
<td>Tobolsk; Astrakhan</td>
<td>Pushkarskii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stepan Borisovich Kuriavtsev</td>
<td>1639-41</td>
<td>Kazennyi; Bol’shoi kazny; Kazach’ii; Novgorodskaiia chet’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grigorii Mikhailovich Volkov</td>
<td>1641-43</td>
<td>Novgorod</td>
<td>Bol’shoi dvorets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalistrat Petrovich Akinfiev</td>
<td>1641-43</td>
<td>Astrakhan</td>
<td>Chelobitnyi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mikhail Naumovich Kluucharev</td>
<td>1642/3-1646/7</td>
<td>Cheboksary; Tomsk</td>
<td>Reitarskii; Galitskaia chet’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivan Larionov</td>
<td>1642/3-1647/8</td>
<td>Dvina; Pskov</td>
<td>Pomestnyi; Streletski; Zemskii dvor; Kholop’ii sud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vasilii Nefedev</td>
<td>1648/9-1650/1</td>
<td>Novoi cheti; Bol’shoi kazny</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boris Stepanovich Korelkin</td>
<td>1677-79</td>
<td>Pskov</td>
<td>Prikaznyi stol; Sudnyi; Reitarskii; Inozemskii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivan Stepanovich Rodion</td>
<td>1677-79</td>
<td>Simbirsk</td>
<td>Kazanskii dvorets; Pechatnyi; Khelbnyi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artemii Volkov</td>
<td>1682/3-1685/6</td>
<td>Reitarskii; Inozemskii; Pusharskii; Kazanskii dvorets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikita Patrikeevich Nasonov</td>
<td>1686-87</td>
<td>(Census-taker for Shatsk and Alatyr’)</td>
<td>Khelbnyi; Chelobitnyi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danil Dement’evich Nebogatov</td>
<td>1686-87</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bol’shoi dvorets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.2: Selected D’iaki of Kazan’**

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52 All information on these d’iaki is taken from S. V. Veselovskii, *D’iaki i pod’iachie XV-XVII vv.*, (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo “Nauka,” 1975), pp. 12-13, 52, 65-66, 82, 100, 102-104, 243, 261, 272-273, 287-288, 296-297; 354, 356, 364, 415-416; 490; 530-531, 572. While some d’iaki who served in Kazan’ are
working both in the central chancelleries in Moscow, and also at other provincial administrative posts alongside a voevoda. As Table 2.2 demonstrates, the careers of both sixteenth- and seventeenth-century d’iaki were remarkably similar. This table includes those d’iaki who served in Kazan’ and were included by S. V. Veselovskii in his index of early-modern administrators, D’iaki i pod’iachie XV-XVII vv. (Moscow, 1975).

Historians have debated the relative qualifications of the d’iaki’s service, an analysis of the d’iaki of Kazan’ from the conquest of the Khanate until Peter the Great’s reign indicates consistent administrative experience among the ranks. During the seventeenth century, the d’iaki became a largely closed caste of officials, ending an earlier meritocracy among their ranks. Two d’iaki of Kazan’ ended their administrative careers as voevody, but after 1640 such a rise to prominence no longer occurred. By the second half of the seventeenth century, d’iaki remained d’iaki throughout their careers, which at least one historian has suggested led to a decrease in the competence of the d’iaki.53 The careers of later d’iaki indicate that their training and experience remained comparable to earlier ones, therefore there no evidence that later d’iaki were less capable of fulfilling their duties. It should also be noted that earlier d’iaki sometimes had important political connections, such as serving in the Patriarch of Moscow’s office, or prominent rank (as was the case for syn boiarskii Grigorii Volkov), which was highly

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missing from Veselovskii’s compilation, these twenty-one men span the entire period under study and are representative of the careers of the officials serving in Kazan’.

53 George Weickhardt pointed to a decree of 1640 that prohibited the merchants, townsmen, or the sons of clergy as clerks, preventing their entrance into the ranks of the bureaucracy. Weickhardt extended this suggestion to imply that once the ranks of bureaucracy were closed, talent was lost. Weickhardt, “Bureaucrats and Boiars.”
unusual for the later ones. If there was a change in the careers of the d’iaki, it was that personal connections became less important once the ranks were closed.

When examining the overall careers of the d’iaki, it is clear that these were professionally trained and experienced bureaucrats groomed for the challenges of administering Muscovy’s expanding frontier. Most of the d’iaki serving in Kazan’ had extensive preparations working in a provincial city. Several of the d’iaki moved to Kazan’ after working in Siberian cities, and others followed their work in Kazan’ with service in Astrakhan. Most of the d’iaki who served in chancelleries in Moscow did so in prikazy that played an important role in the frontier, primarily in the offices concerned with finance, military matters, judicial offices. Those working for the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa had close connections with the Middle Volga. Anyone of the d’iaki in the Streletskii, Pushkarskii, Inozemskii, and Khlebnyi prikazy would be well-prepared for assisting the voevoda in managing local troops.

Because of their qualifications, d’iaki acted as a check on the power of the voevoda. Frequently d’iaki served longer in a city than any one voevoda, providing them more opportunity for adapting to local conditions. For example, Aleksei Shapilov, d’iak of Kazan’ at the end of the sixteenth century, was in office between 1596 and 1602, outlasting four voevody in that same period, and A. D. Unkovskii served for three voevody in Saratov between 1666 and 1670. Several d’iaki worked in the various military chancelleries in Moscow before assuming a provincial post, preparing them to make necessary decisions about regional defenses when voevody were hesitant to act. This was in fact the reason for the dismissal of Kerensk’s voevoda, Avtamon Semenovich
Bezobrazov in 1671. Upon receiving the news of the spreading rebellion from the city of Simbirsk, Bezobrazov could not decide how to respond. His d’iak, Iakov Timofeev syn Khitrov, independently ordered 1000 men to stop the rebels from reaching Kerensk. When Moscow was notified of the situation in Kerensk, the Kazanskii dvorets removed Bezobrazov for his incompetence, and kept Khitrov in place under a new voevoda.55

Unsurprisingly, even with long careers as administrators, not all d’iaki were as capable, or as willing to serve, as Khitrov. Some d’iaki resented the extended residences in one city, which was beneficial to provincial rule. Ivan Aristov had to petition the tsar in 1679/80 to be allowed to return to his home in Murom, having been in service in Kazan’ for at least ten years.56 More troubling for the effectiveness of the local governments of the Middle Volga Region was that not all cities enjoyed a well-trained staff as did Kazan’. For example, some of the d’iaki were pensioners from the army. This was the case in 1680 when the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa ordered Dmitrii Grigorev syn Azter’ev to become a d’iak in Saransk because his recent injury prevented further military service. In order for Azter’ev to keep his pomest’e (service lands), the career change was necessary.57 However, the varied responsibilities of the populous trade and military center of Kazan’ required professional d’iaki; in a small outpost such as Saransk,


56 RGADA, f. 1455, op. 1, d. 136. The d’iaki generally retired to their pomest’e, as Andrei Podlesov did in the 1630s in Kostroma. However, it is interesting to note that the d’iaki’s land grant for their service tended to be in a city where they had served, as Podlesov had done in Kostroma before he worked in Kazan’. Veselovskii, D’iaki i podiachii, pp. 415-416.

57 On 27 June 1680 the Prikaz notified the current voevoda of Saransk, Pavl Petrovich Iazykov, to expect Azter’ev’s immediate arrival. RGADA, f. 1156, op. 1, d. 9, ll. 4-5.
the military training of Azter’ev would have provided him training in the most important responsibility of Saransk, to wit, monitoring its defenses.

The lowest rank of provincial bureaucrat was the bailiff, who served fluid terms of service when compared to d’iaki or voevody, varying between as little as a week up to several years.\(^{58}\) In general, the numbers of bailiffs serving at any one time could be flexible, from only two or three to as many as fifteen, as was the case in Kazan’ during 1622/23.\(^ {59}\) From the extant documents, bailiffs were more vocal in their discontent with their length of service or even the town in which they served than the other officials in the frontier, though bailiffs were more numerous. For example, the Kazanskii dvorets granted the bailiff Nedai Salamykov’s request to leave service in Kokshaisk on 22 May 1585, but instructed him to remain one full year before leaving.\(^ {60}\) In that same year, Kazan’-residents Fedor Gurev and Istomka Khvostov received instructions to extend their service for another six months as they had in the previous year.\(^ {61}\) Unsurprisingly, disputes between bailiffs and the Kazanskii dvorets continued throughout the next century, such as a plea from Savva Vasil’ev syn Dulov who desired a move to service in Saransk in 1689. Having already failed to win his case with the Kazanskii dvorets, he

\(^{58}\) The role that bailiffs fulfilled in the community is still hard to discern. Many acted as court officials, though whether they acted in any other forms of community peace-keeping is unknown. By contrast, in England sub-keepers and constables, locally appointed court officials, worked within the communities fulfilling an essential need to mitigate dictates from the center with the needs of the local community. A. J. Mussom, “Sub-keepers and Constables: The Role of Local Officials in Keeping the Peace in Fourteenth-Century England,” *English Historical Review*, 118 (2002): 1-24.

\(^{59}\) *Dokumenty po istorii Kazanskogo kraia*, #60, no earlier than September 1641, pp. 135-136.

\(^{60}\) *Dokumenty po istorii Kazanskogo kraia*, #10, p. 44.

\(^{61}\) *Dokumenty po istorii Kazanskogo kraia*, #11, 25 August 1585, p. 45. 1585 proved to be an unfortunate year for Istomka Khvostov, who was informed that his request for *pomest’e* was denied on 13 September,
attempted to achieve better results with a petition to the Posol’skii prikaz in July of that year, reminding them of the century of his family’s loyal service for the tsars.\textsuperscript{62}

In addition to the d’iaki and bailiffs serving in the voevody’s office were translators, a necessity in a multiethnic region, and military servitors, a necessity for defense against internal and external threats.\textsuperscript{63} Disputes between the Kazanski dvorets, voevody, and translators or military servitors concerning service were similar to the complaints from the d’iaki or bailiffs. For example, a group of streltsy petitioned the tsar from a Nizhegorod prison, after having been imprisoned by the voevoda of Nizhnii Novgorod as the result of a debate over service. Having served for 47 days for that voevoda, the streltsy believed their responsibilities had been fulfilled. The voevoda demanded a longer period of service. When the streltsy refused, they were incarcerated, where they remained when they petitioned Moscow for their release.\textsuperscript{64} On occasion, the weight of the central chancelleries supported the rights of military servitors to be taken into service. This was the case when the Kazanski dvorets ordered Saransk’s Voevoda

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{tabular}{l}
\textsuperscript{62} RGADA, f. 159, op. 2, d. 3852.  \\
\textsuperscript{63} I have encountered little evidence of the presence of translators in the Middle Volga during this period, though they would have been a necessity for a Russian-speaking voevoda communicating with his non-Russian subjects. For a discussion of translators further south of the Middle Volga Region, see Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), pp. 69-74.  \\
\textsuperscript{64} S. I. Arkhangel’skii and N. I. Privalova, comps. Nizhnii Novgorod v XVII veke: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov k istorii Nizhnogo Novgoroda i ego okruga, (Gor’kii: Gorkovskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1961), #36, 9 July 1627, pp. 71-72.
\end{tabular}
\end{footnotesize}
Ivan Pavlovich Iazykov to take the Cossack, Tatar, and Mordvin cavalry under Mevtsapin Kutsiazkov syn Eushev into service on 2 November 1682.\textsuperscript{65}

The bureaucratization of the Muscovite government did not happen only in Moscow but also along the frontier. Throughout the seventeenth century, voevody, d’iaki, and bailiffs acted in conjunction to administer the Middle Volga Region. Overall, the provincial administrative system was increasingly prepared for its responsibilities, and the administration gathered information to inform later decisions and instructions. Though voevody were generally political appointees from the top ranks of Muscovite society, the use of nakazy to outline their tenures in office created a better trained and knowledgeable rank of governors throughout the region. D’iaki generally were the beneficiaries of long administrative positions in Moscow’s central chancelleries and in the countryside, provided expertise to supplement the voevody’s potential lack of experience. Provincial administrators learned from their experiences and improved their abilities to govern the countryside.

PRIESTS, ABBOTS, AND MONASTIC PRIVILEGES

Supplementing the actions of secular officials in the countryside were the representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church: monks, nuns, and priests. In addition, the Metropolitan of Kazan’ created another pole of authority in the region, recreating Kazan’ as a religious center as it had been for Muslims during the Khanate. While the ultimate supervisory power over both priests and monastics resided in Moscow with the Patriarch, the Orthodox men and women in the Middle Volga Region frequently acted

\textsuperscript{65} RGADA, f. 1156, op. 1, d. 9, ll. 7-9.
independently of Moscow. With limited independence from the central authorities, the actions of ecclesiastics on the frontier exerted as much influence on the development and integration of the territory as secular officials.66

Unfortunately, uncovering the activities of the numerous priests and ecclesiastics in the Middle Volga Region is more difficult than that of provincial administrators, since they rarely corresponded with the central authorities. Though abbots and bishops would have communicated with the Patriarch, the archive of Patriarchs of Moscow has been lost. The Metropolitans of Kazan’, however, were closely involved with central political developments, and follow in a later chapter.

The abbots were not under the supervision of central chancelleries, but certain patterns of service can be discerned. In general, abbots served lengthy terms in office, with the notable exception of the territory’s most prominent institutions. Kazan’s Ioanno-Predtechenskii Monastery had eight abbots between its foundation in 1595 and 1736. The shortest term of office was Makarii’s from 1613 to 1615, but he was the only abbot in office for less than six years. The longest serving abbot was Filaret, in office from 1664 until 1702.67 Alatyr’s Sviato-Troitskii Monastery had twelve abbots between its foundation in 1612 and 1720. While the longest term in office was Abbot Nifont Kabylan from 1650 until 1692, there was tremendous turnover in the early years of the monastery. The first abbot, Evfimii, served only from February 1612 until April 1613,

66 The integral role of clergy in a colonial context is certainly not unique to Muscovy; clergy were equally essential to supporting the interests of the secular government in colonial Mexico. While the state supported the clergy’s conversion efforts, the clergy reinforced the authority of the government. N. M. Farriss, *Crown and Clergy in Colonial Mexico 1759-1821: The Crisis of Ecclesiastical Privilege*, (London: The Athlone Press, 1968).

67 Azletskii, *Opisanie Ioanno-Predtechenskogo mužskogo monastyr’ia*, p.46.
and several other abbots for two years, including Iosif Pestrikov from 1618 to 1619, Sevirian from 1627 to 1628, and Vassian from 1697 to 1698. There is no correlation between political or social upheavals in the region and the short terms in office, nor are there indications that these abbots transferred to another institution. Most abbots served until their death.

In the most prominent monasteries of the Middle Volga Region, the abbots served short terms in office, as they frequently transferred to other monasteries or into positions within the Church hierarchy. Sviiazhsk’s Uspenskii Bogoroditskii Monastery, established in 1555, was one of the region’s oldest institutions. In the period between 1555 and 1724, the monastery had twenty-three abbots. Abbot Semen had the longest term in office from 1698 to 1724, but before him there were only two abbots with ten-year, or longer, terms. Its first abbot, German, served a nine-year term before becoming the second archbishop of Kazan’ in 1564, which at that time was the third most important position within the Russian Orthodox hierarchy. Several of the abbots after German left the monastery for other positions within the Orthodox hierarchy. Abbot Kornilii became Archbishop of Vologda in 1620 after his seven-year term in office. Abbot Iosif and Abbot Varfolomei entered the Solovetskii Monastery after the Uspenskii Bogoroditskii Monastery in 1667 and 1669 respectively. Iosif returned to the Volga Region in 1673 to become the abbot of the Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery in Kazan’ in 1673, which was the most important monastery of the region. With the departure of so many abbots for other institutions, the prestige of this monastery was clear. However, even these abbots

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were a far more stable presence in the region than the voevody with only two to three year residences in the Middle Volga Region.

Strong financial support for the metropolitans, priests, and monasteries added to the stability of the Russian Orthodox Church’s officials on the frontier. While the state granted extensive landholdings to the Church, it also provided cash frequently.

Archbishop Gurii, the first head of the Orthodox Church in the region, received a stipend of 865 rubles from the tsar, and also 155 rubles, and 1800 cheti of rye, 1000 cheti of other grains, and 50 puds of butter from tariffs from Kazan’, Sviiazhsk, and Cheboksary during his tenure in office, in addition to revenues from the lands the archbishopric of Kazan’ possessed. Later archbishops (titled metropolitans during the 1590s), accepted more privileges, including more land, endowing the position with even more assets. While not matching the enormous financial support for the archbishops, monasteries also received land grants, and some benefited from revenue generated by the transport of goods along the Volga, tariffs on fishing rights in the region’s rivers, or profits from use of designated mills. Convents obtained similar privileges, though usually with a priest to oversee the financial arrangements for the nuns.

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69 Iablokov, Pervoklassnyi muzhskii Uspensko-Bogorodskii monastyr, pp. 157-158.

70 S. Nurminskii, Vliianie monastyrei na raselenie narodnoe v Kazanskom krae, p. 184.

71 Metropolitan Mafeia received land in Kazan’ uezd along the coast of the Volga River during his tenure in office in 1618, RGADA, f. 281, op. 4, d. 6452.

72 These grants are discussed extensively in the subsequent chapters. Land grants are discussed in chapter three, and commercial privileges are covered in chapter four.

73 When Arzamas’s Nikolaevskii Convent was supported with the funds generated by a mill in the village of Kichazanskii in Arzamas uezd, but the mill was overseen by a priest. In 1688 when Voevoda Boris Maksimovich Kvashnin denied the convent’s petition for land in addition to the mill, he notified the convent’s cellarer, a Priest Ivan. RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 317. In Western Europe, it was common for a
Priests also received financial privileges to support themselves in the Middle Volga Region, albeit on a smaller scale than ecclesiastical hierarchs or institutions. Generally, Muscovite authorities granted land for the support of priests, although some priests, like monasteries, profited from local mills. The Archpriest Petr in Arzamas uezd received fields along the road to Arzamas to support himself and his church, while the Archpriest Afonasii accepted 19 cheti of land in Arzamas uezd and village of Obinii in Zasabakii stan to support the Voskresenskii Cathedral in Arzamas.74 An urban priest in Simbirsk, Vasilii Torstov, received 30 cheti of agricultural fields in Sviiazhskii stan on 27 August 1685.75 Requests for subsequent financial assistance could be denied, as was the case when Patriarch Nikon denied the petition of Archpriest Trofim of the Voskresenskii Khrista Church in the village Osinovka in Arzamas uezd. Nikon told Trofim to be content with the profits from the Church’s nearby mill, which was enough to support Trofim and his church.76

While financial grants established the economic footing of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Volga Region, the role that the Church played in the development of the frontier is still unclear. Monasteries and their abbots became important judicial figures over both the Russian and non-Russian populations of the Volga Region, though local priests did not fulfill an equal administrative role. When monasteries assumed control of

74 RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 288, 16 April 1641; and RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 308, 10 June 1685.

75 In 1687, the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa upheld Kuzma Fateev’s right to land against the interest of podiatj Maksim Ivanov. Fateev was the current priest of Simbirsk’s cathedral, and Torstov’s successor. RGADA, f. 281, op. 8, d. 11563.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monastery</th>
<th>Number of Villages</th>
<th>Number of Households/People in Villages</th>
<th>Households/People in City</th>
<th>Monastery’s Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazan’s Troitse-Sergeevskii</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>111/422</td>
<td>8/50</td>
<td>472 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazan’s Zilantov Uspenskii</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>159/557</td>
<td>3/5</td>
<td>562 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sviiazhsk’s Bogoroditskii</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>228/872</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>872 people</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3: Monasteries’ Villages, Households, and People in 1646

Their land grants, they also received the right to hear legal disputes and court cases for their subjects. Sviiazhsk’s Uspenskii Bogoroditskii Monastery had the right to judge all of its people in both the city of Sviiazhsk and in the countryside. Kazan’s Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery also received exclusive legal privileges over its people in Kazan’ and all of its villages upon its foundation that same year. As seen in Table 2.3, monasteries possessed legal privileges for large populations, creating numerous oases of villages free from the control of the local voevody.

Throughout the seventeenth century, monasteries continued to gain legal authority over peasants on their lands, as was the case for the Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery in

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76 RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 296, 23 September 1657.

77 Information taken from I. Pokrovskii, “K istorii Kazanskikh monastyrei do 1764 goda,” Izvestiia obshchestva arkheologii, istorii etnografii pri Imperatorskom Kazanskom universitet, 18 (1902): 16-22. Pokrovskii gathered the information from the census of 1646 in Kazan’ uezd. He did not include complete information from the census. For Kazan’s Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery, he only included the names of the monastery’s 29 villages, but did include the 17 households the monastery owned in the city. Similar data does not exist for most of the region’s monasteries, from the inconsistent information kept in the census records.

78 Dokumenty Kazanskogo kraia, #1, 16 May 1555, pp. 28-29.

79 Episkop Nikaron, ed., “Vladennyia gramaty Kazanskago Spasopreobrazhenskago monastyria,” Izvestiia obshchestva arkheologii, istorii i etnografii, 11 (1893): 357. The villages were Pleteni, Podmonastyrskoe Ozera, Safarova, Borisova, Novoselka, Beldiakova, Tanleva, Mertnyi Pochinok, Voznesenskoe,
Arzamas in 1627. At that time, Patriarch Filaret notified the current voevoda of Arzamas, Vasilii Petrovich Mororzov of his loss of legal rights over the villages under the control of the monastery.\textsuperscript{80} Even monasteries that did not begin with legal control over their peasants could gain that right, which benefited Novospasskii Monastery of Saratov on 24 May 1652. The abbot of that monastery received judicial responsibilities for all of his people inside and outside of Saratov, a loss of authority for the city’s voevoda, Aleksei Panteleevich Chirikov.\textsuperscript{81}

By granting legal authority to monasteries and removing it from the hands of the voevody, the central chancelleries confused the workings of the legal system within the Volga Region. Villages outside of the voevoda’s control divided the voevoda’s territory and potentially undermined his influence. However, abbots shared judicial power with the voevody over cases of murder or robbery “caught red-handed,” allowing local voevody to oversee at least some legal matters on monastic estates, and acting as one check on the abbots’ authority over their lands.\textsuperscript{82}

Despite the confusion created by monastic legal authority, the policy had some positive aspects, because of the monasteries’ possession of land settled by non-Russians. Sviiazhsk’s Uspenskii Bogoroditsii Monastery received the Tatar village of Khoziasheva Kabachishchi, Salmach’, Balrydinka, Cheremukhina, Samosyrovo, Bol’shie Klyki, Reshetinkov Pochinok, Chernopen’, Dertiuli, Polianka, Kuiuki, Kuiuki v Zarechnoi storone, Egor’evskoe, Bimy, Kaipy, Chertyk’.

\textsuperscript{80} RGADA, f. 281, op. 4, d. 6457, 5 March 1627.

\textsuperscript{81} RGADA, f. 281, op. 7, d. 10797.

\textsuperscript{82} This was the specific condition of the legal authority of the Kazanskii Zilantov-Uspenskii Monastery over its village of Kinder, from a gramota granting its legal privileges on 28 February 1585. G. Z. Kuntsevich, comp., “Gramoty Kazanskogo Zilantova monastyrja,” Izvestiia obshchestva arkeologii, istorii i etnografii pri Imperatorskom Kazanskom universitete, 17 (1901): 272-274.
in 1621, in addition to an earlier grant of the Tatar village of Isakov in Sviiazhsk uezd.\textsuperscript{83} With legal authority over those villages, the monastery could attempt to inculcate Russian Orthodox values among Muslim villagers.\textsuperscript{84} When the Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery of Arzamas received legal rights over its peasants in 1627, it gained supervision over several villages of non-Christian Mordvins.\textsuperscript{85} Therefore, monastic legal privileges may have served the state’s need for a pacified and converted populace on the frontier, even if the voevody lost some control over the frontier’s residents.

The voevody ignored this potential benefit in an attempt to claim sole legal rights over the tsar’s subjects in their uezdy. Ultimately, extant documents reveal several monasteries defending their legal rights over their villages against petition filed by local voevody, as was the case in the above example of Saratov’s Novospasskii Monastery. Several voevody of Kazan’ challenged their local monasteries’ legal claims throughout the seventeenth century, on occasion seeking the right to the same village time and again. The Zilantov Uspenskii Monastery defended its power over its village of Kinder twice within ten years against the claim of the local voevody. Each time the monastery was victorious in the dispute.\textsuperscript{86} Sviiazhsk’s Uspenskii Bogoroditsii Monastery faced at least three challenges to its legal authority by 1650; it was also successful against the

\textsuperscript{83} Dokumenty Kazanskogo kraia, # 38, 24 February 1621, pp. 84-92.

\textsuperscript{84} Six Tatar households lived in Khoziasheva, only one of which was Christian when the monastery received the village, Dokumenty Kazanskogo kraia, # 38, 24 February 1621, pp. 84-92.

\textsuperscript{85} See note 117 above concerning the monasteries legal rights. As for the Mordvin composition of the monasteries villages, RGADA, op. 1, d. 277, recounts a long series of disputes between the monastery and the local voevody over the Mordvins.

\textsuperscript{86} The monastery was notified of its victory on 3 August 1613 and 26 February 1621. Kuntsevich, “Gramoty Kazanskogo Zilantova monastyria,” pp. 281-290.

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The monasteries’ success in maintaining their privileges indicates that these legal rights fulfilled a goal of the central government: either conversion or just the close supervision of individual villages that resulted. While a voevoda oversaw an entire uezd, monasteries usually only possessed four or five villages.

Because of the monastery’s role as an institution of Muscovy in the countryside, peasants and priests might petition it rather than the local voevoda or the central authorities for advice or assistance. The exchanges between Arzamas’s Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery and its villages covered a wide field. In 1629, the Priest Markel Konstantinovich wrote to the monastery to ask for an explanation of the recent decision of the Council of Elders (sobor startsa) about the number of days a woman must be secluded after giving birth. The monastery received a petition from one of its villages, sent by the village elder Semen, who asked for assistance during the current famine year (god goloda). The monastery denied the petition, asserting that the village had plenty of food. The monastery wrote and validated a contract for a land exchange between the Mordvin Egchaik Kozhilanov and the local streltsy. An entire Mordvin village, Chiarchursh, petitioned the abbot in 1688 for his protection against some recent policies of the central government. While the abbot could answer the religious question and

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87 Dokumenty Kazanskogo kraia, #3, no later than August 1567, pp. 32-36; #38, 24 February 1621, pp. 84-92; #74, 31 May 1649, pp. 161-162.

88 RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 262, September 1629.

89 RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 264, 19 April 1630.

90 RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 276, 27 February 1633.

91 The matter at hand was the state’s plan to relocate Mordvins to the southern border and grant the former Mordvin village to Russian settlers. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 277, 16 February 1688, ll. 1-5.5.
write the land contract, he did not have the power to address all petitions. Abbots were
expected to refer some matters, such as the problem of village of Chiarchush, to the
central government for a response, and could act only as intermediaries rather than as
governors.

As a result, abbots and abbesses frequently petitioned the central government on
behalf of their peasants and even for themselves. Many of these petitions were the result
of challenges from the local voevody to the monasteries’ privileges. Even without
questioning monastic privileges, however, local secular officials could hinder monastic
success in the countryside. The abbot of Kazan’s Zilantov Uspenskii Monastery
protested local bailiffs seizing the carts of the monastery’s peasants in 1598. The abbot
informed the central government this would prevent the harvesting of the peasants’ crops
and, subsequently, the monastery’s ability to pay the year’s taxes. Unsurprisingly the
government sided with the monastery to ensure the tax payment.\footnote{Kuntsevich, “Gramoty Kazanskogo Zilantova monastyria,” pp. 279-281.} Abbess Elisaveta of
the Nikolaevskii Novodevichii Convent in Alatyr’ petitioned the tsar on 1 February 1639,
claiming that the roof of the convent was leaking. The water damage had rotted the cells,
and no one would help them in Alatyr’. Furthermore, Elisaveta claimed that when
pilgrims saw the convent they had “great wails and tears” but were unable to offer the
convent any assistance. In response, the central government advised the abbess to build a
mill and charge for its services, which could finance the repairs, but did not offer the
funds for construction of the mill.\footnote{Notariusa, Arkhiv Kievo-Nikolaevskago Novodevich’iago Monastyr’ia, p. 9-11} When seeking the assistance of the central

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\footnote{Kuntsevich, “Gramoty Kazanskogo Zilantova monastyria,” pp. 279-281.}

\footnote{Notariusa, Arkhiv Kievo-Nikolaevskago Novodevich’iago Monastyr’ia, p. 9-11}
government for some matters, abbots and abbesses had no greater chance of success than petitions from voevody or d’iaki, who received rejections as often as advice.

Russian Orthodox priests, monks, and nuns, were as essential to the structures of the Muscovite state in the Middle Volga Region as their secular counterparts in the government. Rather than acting as individuals serving the Patriarch of Moscow as provincial officials served the tsar, abbots, abbesses, and priests held both secular and religious responsibilities. Both voevody and abbots received financial support in return for providing governmental functions, such as legal adjudication. While the voevody oversaw local military defenses, abbots and priests created an atmosphere of spiritual defense against the nomadic infidels. An abbot’s authority over his villages was no different than a voevoda’s over his uezd. Abbots, however, had longer terms of office than the voevody, leaving them longer in the countryside to utilize their authority. Also, the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa did not send the abbots nakazy, giving abbots greater de facto autonomy over their villages than the voevody had over their uezdy. Abbots operated in the frontier with independence, making their role essential for both Muscovite and Russian Orthodox control over newly-conquered territory and peoples.

CONCLUSION

Frontier governance in the Middle Volga Region reflected the Muscovite government’s bureaucratization process during the seventeenth century. The chancellery system was in a state of experimentation and growth. While prikazy could be removed as easily as created, the ones that fulfilled an administrative need, such as the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa, became an integral part of the government. Using its regional
officials as recorders of events on the frontier, the Prikaz used its *nakazy* to improve the effectiveness of the *voevody* for greater control and stability over the frontier. Though intra-chancellery conflicts could create difficulties of enforcement in the Middle Volga Region, there was generally consensus among the chancelleries of the need to increase profits and stability along the frontier. The bureaucratic reforms of Peter the Great after 1700 relied upon the gained wisdom and increased effectiveness of the *prikazy*. If Peter’s type of absolute rule relied upon the bureaucratization of the government, it was not his innovation but part of the inherited legacy of Muscovy.

Simultaneously occurring with the experimentation of the chancelleries was the growth of a professional bureaucratic class. Though *voevody* held the most considerable power in the countryside, *d’iaki* were trained and experienced administrators capable of circumventing the authority of *voevody* if necessary. Not only did they add a guaranteed level of competence to the provincial administration but also a check against poor decisions of the *voevody*. The combination of levels of influence and ability more effectively served the Middle Volga Region than a *voevoda* would have with absolute authority over his populace.

While bureaucratization and professionalization improved the effectiveness of Muscovite administrators, the distance between Moscow and the Middle Volga challenged the ability of the central administration to govern its frontier. The conflicting nature of the central chancelleries, the semi-independent status of the *voevody*, and the ambiguous governing role of abbots created a significant liminal space of contested authority. Some of the overlapping authority can be classified as a system of checks-and-balances to protect the government against any one individual with too much autonomous
power, but the result was a political system that moved more in fits and starts rather than one with the ability to consistently advance its policies. While the d’iaki could act as a “on the spot” check on the voevody, only persistent orders from Moscow could guarantee the enforcement of directives from the center. The growth of the nakazy, therefore, was simultaneously a sign of the increased exchange of information between the countryside and the center and a sign of more control over the freedom of provincial administrators.

Adding another tension to the ongoing balance between center and periphery was the Russian Orthodox Church. Religion played a role in most early-modern conquests, such as the Spanish expansion into Muslim Granada or the English into Catholic Ireland, but the prominence and political authority of the Orthodox hierarchs was unique. Rather than supplementing the power of Muscovy in the countryside, abbots challenged the authority of the voevody for dominance over the newly-conquered subjects of the tsar. With the active role of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Middle Volga, frontier governance was destined for conflict, because too many forces had too much power, leaving no one with the ability to rule unchallenged.
CHAPTER 3

TRADE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

One of the most powerful motivations for the conquest of Kazan’ and the Middle Volga Region was the economic benefit of controlling the Volga River trade route connecting Muscovy to Persia, India, and the East.¹ In the wake of incorporation, Muscovy established new cities and military outposts along the river, attempting to defend it against bandits and raiding nomadic tribes. This protected its economic interests, aided the Muscovite goal of making the region secure from outside interference, and promoted Muscovy’s importance to the early-modern global economy.

To profit fully from possession of the Volga trade route, Muscovy began a program of mercantilistic economic development, a combination of controlling foreign trade and exploiting domestic resources. Though the Muscovite government lacked an abstract theory of mercantilism as existed in Western Europe, the economic policies enacted in the Middle Volga Region would have been familiar to any Western economic

The central chancelleries’ activities in the Volga Region encouraged a favorable balance of international trade. For instance, the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa fostered self-sufficiency by creating local industries and improving agricultural production, and regulated trade through chartered monopolies and a toll system. However, domestic disruptions to trade, such as the Time of Troubles and the Stepan Razin revolt, and ongoing natural disasters, such as an outbreak of plague in 1654, limited the success of these policies. In addition, international concerns, such as Muscovy’s competition with the Ottoman Empire for dominance over East-West trade, created further challenges.

Nevertheless, since both central and regional authorities benefited financially from the economic development of the region, they demonstrated consistent support for mercantilistic policies. Muscovy’s chancelleries invested in the region’s infrastructure to

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2 Recently scholars have identified mercantilistic trends in early-modern states before a well-developed theory of mercantilism arose. J. N. Ball wrote “The sixteenth-century state largely took its decisions relating to ‘economic’ matters in a condition of innocence of what we regard as commonplaces of economic theory. It was superficially aware of changes which affected its interests, and took measures to protect them as it saw them, without the benefit of abstract theory. It was not necessary that a government should have a sophisticated understanding of the quantity theory of money in order to see that its revenues were losing in purchasing power as prices rose, even if it could not always restore the position without difficulty,” J. N. Ball, Merchants and Merchandise: The Expansion of Trade in Europe 1500-1630, (London: Croom Helm, 1977), p. 45. Rudi Matthee described the Muscovite economic system as “mercantilistic” in the seventeenth century, based on its regulations controlling foreign traders. Rudi Matthee, “Anti-Ottoman Politics and Transit Rights: The Seventeenth-Century Trade in Silk between Safavid Iran and Muscovy,” Cahiers du monde russe, 35 (1994): 739-762. Samuel H. Baron investigated the possible origins of Russian mercantilism in his article, “Was Krizhanich a Mercantilist?,” Explorations in Muscovite History, (Hampshire: Variorum, 1991), pp. 67-86.

nurture and solidify trade. Officials in Moscow directed the establishment of warehouses, local markets, mills, and other businesses. Both local administrators and churchmen supported the imposition of tolls on all regional trade and river traffic, producing steady tax revenues for religious and secular authorities in the Volga Region and in Moscow. The region’s voevody were especially vigilant in this regard, monitoring all river traffic and producing the data needed for Moscow to tax domestic and international trade more effectively.

Muscovite officials expected these measures to support a larger long-distance trade on the Volga River, allowing more Persian and Indian goods to reach as far as England or the Netherlands. In the end, however, Muscovy limited the growth of international trade by creating a group of transportation monopolies for state-designated merchant companies. These monopolies maximized Muscovy’s ability to collect customs from tariffs and controlled the movement of all foreign traders through the country. Though the monopolies limited the total number of merchants travelling along the Volga, they completed the package of mercantilist reforms enacted during the seventeenth century. The combination of monopolies, tariffs, and state interference in local business

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produced a system identifiable as mercantilist, presaging the more extensive commercial reforms of Peter the Great.

DEVELOPING INFRASTRUCTURE

The development of the economic infrastructure was one of the most important projects of the Muscovite government after the conquest of Kazan’. The city of Kazan’ already fulfilled a role in a trade network as an entrepot, but was the only developed part of Volga trade route that predated Muscovite conquest. Muscovite authorities needed the infrastructure to support trade along the entire Volga River; this included storage facilities for goods moved along the river, mechanisms for exploiting the region’s natural resources, marketplaces to sell those goods, and administrative structures for monitoring the developing trade system. The government used all possible tools to realize their economic goals as quickly as possible, displaying a rare feat of cooperation to manage to promote trade and to control merchants along the frontier. The central chancelleries, especially the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa, actively directed the economic development of the Middle Volga Region, planning and implementing the necessary structures throughout the territory.

Control of the Volga River trade route was one of the primary goals of the conquest of Kazan’, but, following the conquest, new trade routes developed in addition to the Volga River itself. The primary route remained the Volga River, with merchants travelling west and south from Nizhnii Novgorod, through Vasil’gorod,
Koz’modem’iansk, Cheboksary, Kokshaishk, Kazan’, Tetiushii, Samara, Saratov, Tsaritsyn, and ending at Astrakhan. Some merchants opted instead for a partially overland route. The first of these ran from Arzamas through Alatyr’ to Tetiushii, following the first military defensive line in the region, where it reached the Volga River, and then merchants traveled downstream through Saratov. When Simbirsk was constructed in 1649 as part of the new, more southerly defensive line running through Saransk, the overland trade route crossed south from Alatyr’ to Simbirsk, which likely was a better port than Tetiushii. Merchants likely opted for the overland route to escape river tolls along the Volga, though trade on this route still supplemented the Volga River trade.

The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa concerned itself with the security of the trade routes. Beginning with the first nakaz in 1613, it instructed its voevody to observe all merchants travelling on the Volga River. In Kazan’, for example, when merchant caravans prepared to travel downriver to Astrakhan, a herald announced the date of departure allowing other merchants to join the party. The Prikaz also instructed the

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5 For a discussion of the economic motivations in conquest, and their relationship to the religious and political motivations, see Jaroslav Pelenski, Russia and Kazan: Conquest and Imperial Ideology (1438-1560s), (The Hague: Mouton, 1974), pp. 23-61;

6 The state knew and treated these cities as a functioning trade route. Shortly after the conquests of Kazan’ and Astrakhan, charters referenced these cities as the trade route. One from 8 July 1578 to the Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery in Astrakhan referred to goods travelling upriver to Kazan’, Sviiazhsk, Cheboskary, Kokshaisk, Vasil-gorod, and Nizhnii Novgorod. Kashtanov, “K istorii Volzhskogo torgovogo sudokhodstva,” p. 49. A later example can be found in a gramota sent by the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa to all of the voevody of those cities about Sviiazhsk’s Bogoroditsii Monastery’s trade practices. The monastery was given the right to move goods along the Volga without tariffs within set limits. The monastery could buy at most 2451 cheti of rye and 787 cheti of oats in Cheboksary, for example, and transport that grain to Astrakhan to buy salt and fish. S. I. Arkhangel’skii and N. I. Privalova, eds., Nizhnii Novgorod v XVII veke: Sbornik godumentov i materialov k istorii Nizhnogo Novgoroda i ego okrugi, (Gor’kii: Gor’kovskoe knizhni izdatel’stvo, 1961), #35, 18 March 1627, pp. 68-70.
voevody in charge of cities along the Volga to make efforts to guarantee the safety of merchants; several petitions had reached Moscow complaining of raided caravans and stolen goods.⁸

The increased protection of traders over the course of the seventeenth century also enabled more effective customs collection. All caravans travelling upriver from Astrakhan were stopped and examined in the cities along the Volga River. If the merchants lacked proper permission for trade, or were carrying any banned items, the caravans were seized.⁹ Further instructions from the Prikaz required the voevody to be wary of merchants who might have fished in the Volga as well as moved goods, and instructed each voevoda to watch the customs official in the city to ensure proper taxes were being paid for the goods.¹⁰

The revenue raised from the customs collection from river trade was considerable. For example, Simbirsk’s customs official collected 129 rubles from tariffs in May 1666 alone, and averaged approximately 100 rubles per month throughout the following summer. During the winter, customs duties dropped to little as 10 rubles per month from the decreased traffic, but trade duties over the course of one year were more than the money produced from fines in the voevoda’s court in that same period.¹¹ Also, these

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⁷ Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnykh arkhivov (RGADA), f. 16, Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv, r. XVI, Vnutrennee upravlenie, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 52-53ob.
⁸ RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 71-75ob. The protests of merchants moving goods along the Volga River are discussed in Kaufmann-Rochard, *Origines d’une bourgeoisie Russe*, pp. 100-102.
⁹ RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 14ob-16.
¹⁰ RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 32ob-35.
figures omit taxes collected from salt sales or fishing privileges, which would produce a much higher figure for the total revenue produced from commercial activities.

The regulation of the trade routes extended outside of city walls as well. The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa employed monasteries to monitor trade travelling either over their own land or over designated areas. Kazan’s Zilantov Uspenskii Monastery charged fees based on the size of boats travelling along the Volga River near the city of Tetiushii. A trading boat (tovarnii lodok) paid one grivna, while fishing boats in the Volga River paid less for fishing privileges in the same waters. These figures are from 1662, when the Prikaz informed the monastery of the cost of the most recent tolls for travel along the river. Other monasteries had the rights to tax land-based trade, such as Saransk’s Spasskii Monastery, which collected tolls for commodities transported from Kazan’ to Saransk. The monastery then turned a portion of its profits over to the government as tax revenue.

The combination of monasteries and voevody monitoring merchant activities and taxing goods through the region functioned as a state-managed toll system. This toll system also regulated all fishing rights throughout the region, since fishing the region’s rivers and moving goods over those rivers were linked by central authorities. With numerous fishable rivers throughout the territory, the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa closely

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12 This information was included in a gramota sent to Kazan’s voevoda. A ocean-going boat (plavnyi lodok) paid two dengi, while a small fishing boat (botik) paid only one dengi. N. L. Rubinshtein, ed., Istoriia Tatarskoi v dokumentakh i materialakh, (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoe izdatel’stvo, 1937), 26 February 1662, p. 156. These rights had been granted as early as 1585, when Kazan’s voevoda instructed the Zilantov Monastery of its responsibilities for merchants transporting salt and fish from Astrakhan to the north. Arkhiv P. M. Stroeva, Tom I, Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka, Tom 32, (Petrograd: Arkheograficheskaia komissiia, 1915), #323, 22 July 1585, pp. 626-629.
watched sales of fish. The Prikaz instructed the voevoda of Kazan’, for example, to maintain records on the volume and price of fish being sold in Kazan’, compare that information to previous years, and report any irregularities to the Prikaz. This allowed the Prikaz to gather accurate data on the growth of the fish market and utilize that information to adjust taxes upon the fish trade.

On occasion, rather than merely observing fish sales in their cities, voevody controlled all the fishing rights to nearby rivers, potentially limiting the fish market. This was the case for Simbirsk, which forced residents of the city to petition the tsar for access to the rivers outside of the city. In 1669, urban residents protested Voevoda Ivan Ivanovich Dashkov’s control, which prevented them from fishing in the Volga River. The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa agreed with the petition, leaving Dashkov with 450 desiatina of land along the river and fishing rights to those areas, but granting 1310 desiatina of riverbank for the city’s streltsy and service people. The central authorities decided against the voevoda in this case because greater revenue from the fishing privileges were generated by broader access to the river.

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13 Ovam Voroblevskii wrote to Archimandrite Avram of the monastery after paying the toll for transportation of salt. He told the archmandrite that he was only paying the toll because it was the tsar’s command. RGADA, f. 281, Gramoty kollegii ekonomii, op. 7, d. 10828, 1686.

14 RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 16ob-21.

15 P. Martynov, Seleniia Simbirskogo uezda (Materiały dliia istorii Simbirskogo dvorianstvo i chastnogo zemlevladeniia v Simbirskom uezde), (Simbirsk: Tipo-litografiia A. T. Tokareva, 1903), #30, 28 February 1669, pp. 30-31.

16 Similar petitions were produced from other cities, but without clear success for the petitioners. For example, when merchants in Saratov petitioned the Posol’skii prikaz for access to local fishing waters, the Posol’skii prikaz only turned the petition to the Prikaz Bol’shogo dvortsa for a decision. Since the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa had ultimate authority for fishing rights in the region, the merchants would have had more success directly petitioning them. RGADA, f. 159, Prikaznye dela novoi razborki, op. 2, Posol’skii prikaz, d. 1161, September 1670.
Monasteries were equally involved in the fish trade and had primary responsibility for regulating fishing rights outside of the cities. The Zilantov Uspenskii Monastery charged fees to fishing boats on the Volga River near Tetiushii (south of the monastery’s own lands), which were representative of the rights of most Volga Region monasteries. Kazan’s Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery possessed fishing privileges for a section of the Volga River, but charged fees for access in advance of the actual fishing. One group of *iasachnye* Tatars from Sviiazhsk *uezd* petitioned for the right to access the river and the monastery’s woods. The abbot granted this petition, but first required the *iasachnye* Tatars to pay 200 rubles as a guarantee against later taxes due.\(^\text{17}\) Some monasteries had narrowly defined taxation powers over fishing rights. Arzamas’s Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery received taxes from Russian peasants settled in its villages for its rights to the local rivers Meil’ and Avn’, but not from its non-Russian residents.\(^\text{18}\) At a minimum, all monasteries in the Volga Region were guaranteed access to the Volga waters to fish for themselves.\(^\text{19}\)

As the seventeenth century progressed, the *voevody* attempted to restrict monastic fishing privileges, as well as their rights to collect taxes from fishermen. Sviiazhsk’s


\(^{18}\) During the Time of Troubles, a confirmation of fishing rights were given to the monastery over its villages for those rivers, RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 243, 21 March 1608. Another confirmation followed because the villages’ refusal to pay followed, RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 244, 6 May 1608. However, after the Time of Troubles the monastery’s fishing rights were restricted to only Russian peasants living in its villages, RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 245, 27 March 1614.

\(^{19}\) In case of misunderstanding, Kazan’s *Voevoda*, Semen Vasil’evich Golovin, received a tsarist *gramota* in 1624, which explicitly stated that all monasteries in Kazan’ and Sviiazhsk must be allowed access to the Volga waters for fishing. *Arkhiv P. M. Stroeva*, Tom II, *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka*, Tom 35, (Petrograd: Arkheograficheskaia kommiissiia, 1917), #337, 8 May 1624, pp. 638-639.
Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery had the right to fish in Volga River in Kazan’ uezd, and received taxes from people fishing on that section of the River. Shortly after the initial grant in 1616, Kazan’s Voevoda Volodimer Timof’evich Dolgorukov changed those privileges to the Volga River near Samara, claiming the original privileges for himself. Kazan’s Savvo-Storozhevskii Monastery received the right to fish in the Volga River near Simbirsk and Samara in 1679, but had to petition the government to guarantee its tax-free privileges against the wishes of the local voevody several times during the 1680s. Saratov’s Novospasskii Monastery received the right to tax fishing boats travelling in Saratov uezd on the Volga River, but this grant was conditional. If the monastery received sufficient revenue without the fishing tariff, then the right would be removed.

20 The initial grant, RGADA, f. 281, op. 4, 4 March 1616. The change of their rights, RGADA, f. 281, op. 4, d. 6449, 26 March 1616. Later that same year, the privileges for the Volga River outside of Samara were extended until 1621, warning the monastery that their privileges might not be renewed after that point, RGADA, f. 281, op. 4, d. 6450, 5 August 1616.

21 The initial grant was made on 20 June 1679, RGADA, f. 281, op. 8, d. 11546. Acting on instructions from the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa, Samara’s voevoda notified the monastery that its fishing privileges were without tariffs, RGADA, f. 281, op. 8, d. 11551, 23 January 1684. Petitions from the monastery kept its duty-free fishing rights in place. The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa notified Samara’s new voevoda, Grigor Afonasevich Kozlovsckii, of the monastery’s privileges, RGADA, f. 281, op. 8, d. 11554, 28 August 1684. Similarly, the Prikaz notified Voevoda Ivan Osipovich Shcherbatov, RGADA, f. 281, op. 8, d. 11571, 9 January 1690.

22 RGADA, f. 281, op. 7, d. 10794, 26 December 1631. A constant stream of petitions from the monastery during the seventeenth century maintained its right to tax Volga fisherman. In response to their petition, Voevoda Grigor Ivanovich Fefilaev agreed to leave the privileges intact, RGADA, f. 281, op. 7, d. 10795, 22 March 1635. A longer letter to the monastery one year later reiterated the history of its fishing privileges, allowing it to keep them for another year, RGADA, f. 281, op. 7, d. 10796, 22 March 1636. Voevoda Aleksei Panteleevich Chirikov extended the monastery’s privileges again in 1653, RGADA, f. 281, op. 7, d. 10798, 6 April 1653. In 1659, Voevoda Aleksei Mikhailovich Khitrov reiterated the monastery’s fishing rights, though with new tariffs, a portion of which were turned over to the tsar, RGADA, f. 281, op. 7, d. 10799, 3 March 1659. Voevoda Mikhail Ivanovich Glebov left those tariffs in place, but also required the monastery to regulate the local fish market in Saratov, RGADA, f. 281, op. 7, d. 10800, 2 June 1674. A later petition from the monastery was again positively answered, leaving its privileges in place, RGADA, f. 281, op. 7, d. 10801, 1 June 1684.
Despite the beginnings of local restrictions against monasteries’ fishing privileges, the central chancelleries continued to grant such privileges, even to monasteries far removed from the Volga Region. Moscow’s Chudov Monastery first received privileges for the Volga River in 1606, when the tsar granted the monastery the customs-duties from fishing boats (rybnye lodi) in Samara’s fishing waters. Later explications of the monastery’s privileges specified that only boats gathering more than 100 fish would be taxed for the monastery’s benefit. Unlike some of the local Volga Region monasteries, several reminders were sent to the Chudov Monastery about its failure to turn a portion of the fishing taxes over to the voevody of Samara, which could result in the removal of those privileges. Despite the tension between the voevody and the monastery, the fish trade also provided revenue for Moscow’s Novodevichii Convent, which received tariffs from fishing in Simbirsk’s waters in 1683. The fish trade, at least, provided sufficient revenue for all parties in the Muscovite government to benefit.

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23 RGADA, f. 281, op. 8, d. 11525, 5 February 1606.

24 RGADA, f. 281, op. 8, d. 11529, 15 July 1653; identical copy d. 11530. After the establishment of Simbirsk in 1649 its voevoda gained responsibility for collecting the Chudov’s revenue, since the fishing waters were closer to Simbirsk than Samara. The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa notified Simbirsk’s voevoda on his responsibilities for the monastery, RGADA, f. 281, op. 8, d. 11532, 27 August 1653. Another confirmation of the monastery’s privileges was sent to the monastery by a later voevoda of Simbirsk, RGADA, f. 281, op. 8, d. 11536, 22 June 1661.

25 Voevoda Ivan Ivanovich Dashkov wrote to the monastery in 1667, threatening to remove the monastery’s privileges, RGADA, f. 281, op. 8, d. 11537, 2 April 1667. A similar letter was sent soon after, though it notified the monastery that only because of the memory of Holy Iov would the monastery maintain its privileges, RGADA, f. 281, op. 8, d. 11538, 14 March 1670. Simbirsk’s voevoda, Afonasii Denisovich Favisin, similarly threatened the monastery for its failure to pay taxes, RGADA, f. 281, op. 8, d. 11539, 20 May 1673. The monastery maintained its privileges despite the attempts to remove them. Samara’s Voevoda Aleksandr Vasilevich Shchel confirmed the monastery’s rights without restrictions after the threats, RGADA, f. 281, op. 8, d. 11545, 20 June 1678. The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa similarly upheld the rights, RGADA, f. 281, op. 8, d. 11528, 1 April 1682. A later charter, from 10 April 1700, extended the monastery’s fishing rights to include parts of the Volga between Samara and Saratov, and the monastery’s role in establishing a fishing industry (rybnyi promysl’); V. A. Osipova, et al., eds., Istoriia Saratovskogo kraia 1590-1917, (Saratov: Izdatel’stvo Saratovskogo universiteta, 1983), #4, pp. 16-18.
Regulating commerce along the river was a part of the economic structure of the Volga Region. To encourage more trade along the Volga, central authorities sent directives to the frontier with specific instructions for infrastructure development.

Arzamas’s Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery, for example, received a gramota (charter) in 1614 instructing the abbot to construct granaries in two places on its land, one in town and one outside of it, in order to provide a place for merchants to store their goods. The monastery’s village of Strakhov in Arzamas uezd would provide the revenue for construction, and the money generated from the rent of the silos would be turned over to the government. Similarly, the Zilantov Uspenskii Monastery in Kazan’ built ten granaries and two small huts inside the monastery to provide for traders along the Volga River on instructions from Moscow during the 1620s. The gramota stated that these buildings would encourage traders to travel down river.

The central chancelleries were closely involved in the construction and of new businesses throughout the region as well. For example, Mamatagei Zamanov, a silk (shelkovii) factory-owner in Kazan’, received orders from the Posol’skii Prikaz (Foreign Chancellery) in 1676 to obey earlier directives from the Prikaz Tainykh del (Privy Chancellery), which had instructed him to establish a factory in Simbirsk to generate

26 RGADA, f. 281, op. 8, d. 11550, 25 March 1683.

27 RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 246, 12 April 1614.


revenue for the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa.\textsuperscript{30} Intra-chancellery rivalries were not unknown in Muscovy, but the success of the development of the Volga Region outweighed other concerns. Furthermore, once the businesses were established, the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa extended its influence to monitor these new businesses. This was the case in 1697 when the Prikaz instructed the voevoda of Kazan’ to supervise Stepan Vladychin’s mine in Rutkinyi Mountain, as well as its workers and its production, in order to assure the mine’s success.\textsuperscript{31}

In addition to factories, the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa attempted to regulate all local mills throughout the Middle Volga Region. With the slow moving rivers of the region, working water mills were a precious commodity, and accordingly received significant attention from the central authorities. Generally religious institutions owned the mill, but the Prikaz instructed monks, nuns, and priests how much the services’ would cost and who was allowed to use those services. Arzamas’s Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery received a mill inside Arzamas for its own uses, but a gramota in 1632 ordered the monastery to allow townspeople to use the mill.\textsuperscript{32} Protests against the central authorities’ decisions were summarily dismissed. The Prikaz granted the Kievo-Nikolaevskii Convent in Alatyr’ a mill in the village of Kichazanskii in Alatyr’ uezd as early as 1606/7. The villagers and the voevody of Alatyr’ contested the convent’s ownership numerous times, but the Prikaz kept the mill in the convent’s hands.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{30} RGADA, f. 159, op. 2, d. 1490, l. 13, 11 May 1676.

\textsuperscript{31} Polnoe sobranie zakonov Russiskoi Imperii, (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia i otdelenie sobstvennoi ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva Kontseliariia, 1830), Vol. 3, p. 291. Hereafter, PSZ.

\textsuperscript{32} RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 268, 23 January 1632.
The establishment and regulation of mills was similar to other businesses of local interest. Ferries and taverns, for example, received the attention of the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa. Ivashko Semenov syn Karakashev, a converted Tatar in Muscovite service, petitioned the tsar with his wish to open a tavern on his land along the Ara River outside of Sviiazhsk. He received permission to run a tavern and sell beer. Emei Khoziashev, a Muslim Tatar in service, had an established tavern and ferry along the Kama River outside of Kazan’, but received instructions from Moscow that he must move his businesses further up the river and away from town. According to the central chancelleries, the ferry was intended to serve Russian, Tatar, Chuvash, and Mari traders, and in its current location it did not. An unspoken reason might have been distancing unconverted non-Russians from Kazan’, but the stated justification demonstrates the central government’s concern with the development of infrastructure for trading.

Not all of the policies enacted by the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa produced the intended results. Iakov Vasil’ev syn Asanov, another Tatar in service, contested the seizure of his mill in Kazan’ uezd by Kazan’s Prechistii Bogoroditsii Monastery. The Monastery claimed the mill to support its rebuilding following a fire in 1632; the Prikaz

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33 The challenges were summarized in the *gramota* to the convent in 1688, once again upholding the convent’s right to the mill. The challenges were made in 1606/7, 1608/9, 1614/5, 1615/6, and 1632/3. RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 317, 13 January 1688. Similarly, the Voskresenskii Khrista Church in Arzamas survived with the revenue from its mill in the village of Osinovka in Arzamas uezd, preventing its priest’s attempt to receive more funding from the central government in 1657. Patriarch Nikon notified Archpriest Trofim that the mill provided sufficient revenue to support the church, RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 296, 23 September 1657.


sided with Asanov following his petition. However, this decision created greater problems when the Prikaz also supported the claim of Emei Khoziashev for that same mill two years later. When Asanov contested that decision in court, the final verdict over Asanov’s mill declared that Khoziashev and Asanov would split the profits from the mill in half from then on. Khoziashev presented two gramoty in court which gave him claim to the land that the mill was on. He claimed that Asanov had abandoned the mill and therefore his ownership of the land gave him right to the mill. Asanov presented two gramoty with his own claim for the mill; he added that just because the river that the mill was on was low, did not mean that the mill had been abandoned. The mill still operated, but the legal difficulties raised questions about the Prikaz’s ability to follow its own plans.

The hand of the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa guided economic development inside the Volga Region. The overland trade route followed the government’s military defenses; commands for the construction of various buildings enabled more trade along the Volga River itself. Voevody, monasteries, and the Prikaz benefited from the toll system, and the combination of their collective interests guaranteed the enforcement of those policies. The voevody not only enacted centrally-created policies but also provided thorough information to the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa to help maintain and regulate the trade system. Based on earlier records, the subsequent nakazy to the region’s governors established tax rates for commodities such as fish, as well as the nature and volume of

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37 Dokumenty Kazanskogo kraia, 51, No earlier than 1636, pp. 113-114.
Volga River trade. The result of this information was an increasingly regulated trade system during the seventeenth century, which generated revenue for the state, proving the worth of mercantilistic control over economic development.

REGIONAL TRADE

The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa developed and expanded the regional economy. Local markets arose in all of the new cities, frequently centered inside urban monasteries courtyards. Local merchants and abbots bought and sold a variety of regional commodities, especially grain, fish, and salt. Economic exchange was not limited to the new marketplaces but was just as vital to the regional economy. In particular, there was an active land market throughout the Volga Region. While the state regulated the physical structures and monitored all transaction of the frontier economy, merchants had some independence in choosing their own economic destiny.

In most parts of the Middle Volga Region, the courtyard of a prosperous urban monastery was the central marketplace in its town, especially in the early years of a new town. These monastic marketplaces fostered the development of a regional economy.

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38 This information is contained in several clauses in the *nakaz* of 1697, *PSZ* 3, pp. 290-291.


40 The discussion of trade in this chapter is built upon extant records, which were used by merchants to record transactions. Because of this, if peasants were involved in trade, favors merchants’ commercial activities over peasants, since the former kept records. For a discussion of peasant traders in Muscovy during the seventeenth century, see: V. R. Tarlovskaia, *Torgovlia Rossii perioda pozdnego feodalizma*
For example, Arzamas’s Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery was the primary market of Arzamas, Simbirsk’s market was located in its Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery, and Kazan’s Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery served Kazan’. The *tamozhennaia izba* (customs house) in Kazan’, in fact, sat just outside the monastery’s walls, to register merchants travelling to and from the market. Descriptions of these monastic courtyards depict them as bustling markets, complete with numerous merchants and a variety of commodities. While the cities along the Volga benefited from steady river traffic, even inland cities such as Saransk had a diverse market visited by merchants from Arzamas, Atemar, Insar, Nizhnii Novgorod, Penza, Temnikov, and even Ark’angelsk.

Both the monasteries and the local government benefited from the development of these local marketplaces. Monasteries charged rents to merchants for space in their courtyards, turning over a portion of the rents to the government. Competition over space in the monastic courtyards was strong. Traders frequently petitioned abbots in

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41 Contracts signed by these monasteries and merchants prove the importance of these courtyards. For example, the merchants Fedor Lukochnov syn Sibiriak signed a contract with the elder of Simbirsk’s Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery for space in its courtyard, RGADA, f. 281, op. 8, d. 11534, 9 June 1656.

42 This location was described in the *pistsovaia kniga* of 1565-68. Rubinshtein, ed., *Istoriia Tatarii v dokumentakh i materialakh*, p. 234.

43 In the records of Nikita Vasil’evich Borisov and Dmitrii Andreevich Kikin, written between 1565 and 1568, described Kazan’s Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery’s courtyard with numerous secular and ecclesiastical merchants. *Materialy po istorii Tatarskoi ASSR: Pilstsovye knigi goroda Kazani 1565-68 gg. i 1640 g.*, (Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo akademii nauk, 1932), pp. 14, 32.

44 The arrival of merchants to the city is recorded in one of its customs books, A. I. Iakovlev, *Saranskaia tamozhennaia kniga za 1692 g.*, (Saransk: Mordovskoe gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1951).

45 On occasion, the central government reminded the monastery of its tax obligations. RGADA, f. 281, op. 4, d. 6436, 18 May 1596.
order to receive space within the courtyard, even offering land instead of money if necessary.\textsuperscript{46}

As the regional marketplaces grew, most expanded into the city centers beyond the confined monastic courtyards. In 1686 in Kazan’, Archmandrite Evfimii of Moscow’s Chudov Monastery petitioned Kazan’s 
\textit{voevoda}, Matvei Aleksevich Golovin, to claim 30 \textit{sazhen} of land in the city’s new marketplace, then under the \textit{voevoda}’s control.\textsuperscript{47} With the rise of an urban market under the control of the city’s \textit{voevoda}, monasteries became petitioners for space, but the revenue from rents was now completely controlled by the local government. Though monasteries lost revenue from the loss of their marketplaces, the new markets testify to the success of economic growth in the Middle Volga Region.

The commodities sold in Volga marketplaces consisted primarily of the region’s natural resources. Grain and fish were common, as was salt, which several monasteries and later businesses produced. Beekeeping, a traditional occupation among the non-Russian populations of the region, produced honey and beeswax, valuable early-modern goods. There was a trade in horses as well, since many of the nearby nomadic tribes, particularly the Nogai Tatars, raised horses. Some of these commodities were sold

\textsuperscript{46} Examples of land for space are common. One trader (\textit{torgovok chelovek}), Andronik Elizarov, petitioned Arzamas’s Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery’s abbot for permission to sell goods in the monastery, and offered some land in the city as an exchange, RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 249, 1618/19. This land exchange was frequent enough to curb cash rents. In a letter from the Arzamas’s Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery’s cellarer to Archmandrite Deonisii in 1632, the cellarer informed the abbot that instead of the expected 30 rubles from this year’s rent, there would instead be 16 rubles this year and another 16 rubles in two years, RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 270, 16 March 1632.

\textsuperscript{47} RGADA, f. 281, op. 8, d. 11560, 14 August 1686.
throughout Muscovy, especially honey, wax, and horses, while the region itself consumed most of its grain and fish.\textsuperscript{48}

Honey was one of the region’s first natural resources to be exploited by Muscovite authorities. As early as 1555, for example, local beekeepers paid tribute to the new Muscovite government with their honey production. In a \textit{gramota} of that year, Archbishop Gurii, Archimandrite German of Sviiazhsk’s Bogoroditsii Monastery, and Archimandrite Varsonofii of the Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery in Kazan’ were to receive yearly allocations of 500 puds (18,050 lbs.), 200 puds, and 6 puds of honey, respectively. According to the land cadaster of 1623-1624, there were 2,330 Tatar beekeepers in Kazan’ 
\textit{uezd} alone.\textsuperscript{49}

The importance of beekeeping continued throughout the seventeenth century. In 1682, local beekeepers in Arzamas of Mordvin, Tatar, Chuvash, Mari, and Udmurt descent successfully petitioned the tsar to be free from any tax obligation to the local 
\textit{voevoda}, his 
\textit{prikazaia izba} (governor’s office), or the city, as long as they produced the appropriate amount of honey for their tribute. In other words, they would remain 
\textit{iasachnye liudi}—tributaries, rather than becoming subject tax-payers. This privilege would extend to all beekeepers regardless of religion.\textsuperscript{50} The state’s decision to keep all

\textsuperscript{48} Volga merchants infrequently appear selling grain or fish outside of the Volga Region, while there was a large market for these goods inside the Volga Region. For example, in Saransk in December 1691, local merchants sold 1,227 seti of rye and oats (176.7 tons), \textit{Saranskaia tamozhennaia kniga}, pp. 16-19.


\textsuperscript{50} To ensure this policy, the Prikaz also notified the current 
\textit{voevoda} of the change in policy, RGADA, f. 1103, Arzamasskaia priazsnaia izba, op. 1, d. 25a, 1682. This policy is a change from the desires of local beekeepers in Nizhegorod, Koz’modem’iansk, and Kurmysy 
\textit{uezdy} during the 1660s. Then those apiarists petitioned their landlord, the Makar’evskii Zheltovodskii Monastery in Nizhnnii Novgorod, asking for that
beekeepers as *iasachnye liudi* maintained honey production, as well as its direct delivery into state coffers.\(^5^1\) When the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa instructed Kazan’s *voevoda* to monitor all honey sales in his city in 1698, honey production assumed the relative importance of fish, which had previously been the only commodity to receive such special attention.\(^5^2\)

Both honey and wax were expensive commodities throughout the seventeenth century; honey generally sold for 1 ruble per pud while beeswax could be as much as 9 rubles per pud.\(^5^3\) Numerous examples exist of Volga merchants selling both wax and honey outside of the Volga Region. Fedot Anikeev, for example, a resident of Kazan’, arrived in Vologda on 24 September 1634 with three carts of honey and beeswax to sell, and on 26 March 1636 he arrived in Velikii Ustiug with 20 puds of wax and 32 puds of honey.\(^5^4\) Koz’modem’iansk resident Nikita Terent’ev frequently sold honey in the north, their privilege to pay their tribute in cash rather than honey. They wanted to sell their honey directly to merchants, rather than allowing the monastery to profit as the middleman. *Akty iuridicheskie, ili sobranie form starinnago deloproizvodstva*, (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia otdeleniia sobstvennoi E. I. V. Kantseliarii, 1838), #202, 211-214, 23 June 1663 (Nizhegorod), 23 June 1663 (Koz’modem’iansk), and 20 June 1664 (Kurmysh).

\(^5^1\) The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa also meddled with servitor status in November 1685, when it notified the *voevoda* of Kazan’ that any Tatars in business (*promysl*) were exempted from all military service. *PSZ* 2, #1143, pp. 701-702.

\(^5^2\) The *nakaz* of 1697 instructed the *voevoda* to insure the delivery of the tsar’s honey to Moscow, *PSZ* 3, p. 293.


\(^5^4\) *Tamozhennaya kniga goroda Vologdy 1634-1635 gg.*, (Moscow: Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1983), entry for 24 September 1634, p. 45. In Velikii Ustiug, Anikeev also carried some silk and leather with him. The honey, wax, silk, and leather were sold for a combined 171 rubles. A. I. Iakovleva, ed., *Tamozhennye knigi*
selling 169 puds of honey in Velikii Ustiug on 28 January 1651 and then honey worth 17 rubles, 16 altyns, and 4 dengi in that same city on 15 October 1651. The Volga Region’s peasants also participated in the honey and wax sales, including the Udmurt Biia Chiunekov from Kazan’ uezd who sold 25 puds of wax for 100 rubles in Velikii Ustiug in 1679.

Salt also assumed special importance in the Middle Volga Region, though it was not initially produced in the region. Sviiazhsk’s Bogoroditsii Monastery became one of the earliest large-scale salt merchants. The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa instructed the monastery to import 10,000 puds (361,000 lbs.) of salt from Astrakhan. The importation of the salt was not taxed, greatly facilitating the importation. The salt could be sold in Kazan’, Sviiazhsk, or Nizhnii Novgorod for whatever commodities were needed by the monks, including bread, honey, butter, hemp-seed oil, sheepskin, or cloth. In 1613, the Prikaz raised the amount of salt imported by the monastery to 20,000 puds, making the monastery an early center for salt-trading in the Middle Volga Region.

Later records reveal that the monastery imported 33, 250 puds of salt in 1621, an increase from the 21,
687 puds bought in 1610/11, which had sold for 3, 376 rubles. Salt prices varied in the region throughout the seventeenth century, between 1 pud for .01556 rubles in 1610 to 1 pud for .03125 rubles by the 1665, but the volume of salt steadily increased.

Later in the seventeenth century local businesses established salt refineries, producing salt to supplement the earlier imports from the south. In the 1660s, an official tsarist gramota instructed the Savva-Storozhevskii Monastery in Kazan’ uezd to establish a salt refinery (solianyi promysl’) on their lands in Samara uezd along the Volga River. The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa granted the monastery the right of hiring outside workers for the salt refinery in the 1670s. While the refinery was a benefit for the local economy and supported by the central authorities, the various authorities competed for control. The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa maintained its control over the monastery’s fishing rights, but the Prikaz Bol’shogo dvortsa (Great Chancellery) was responsible for the salt refinery. This division of supervisory responsibilities was in accordance with the chancelleries’ traditional interests. The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa always regulated

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58 Dokumenty Kazanskogo kraia, #39, 11 March 1621, pp. 92-95.

59 The merchant Iakov Ilantov syn Lukoshkov bought 320 puds of salt for 100 rubles from the Zilantov Uspenskii Monastery, RGADA, f. 1455, Gosudarstvennye i chastnye akty pomestno-votchinnykh arkhivov XVI-XIX vv., op. 5, d. 223, January 1665. Richard Hellie demonstrated in his study of the Russian economy that salt prices were seasonally variable. Therefore, the increased price for salt sold in January of 1665 versus an average salt price over a year might only reflect that seasonal transition. Hellie, The Economy and Material Culture of Russia, pp. 157-160.

60 For other studies of the regional salt trade, see: N. V. Ustiugov, Solevarennaia promyshlennost’ soli kamskoi v XVII veke: K voprosy o geneze kapitalisticheskikh otoshenii v Russkoi promyshlennosti, (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Rossiiskoi akademii nauk 1957); and A. I. Razdorskii, Torgovliia Kurska v XVII veke (Po materialam tamozhennykh i obrochnykh knig goroda), (St. Petersburg: Rossiiskaia akademii nauk, 2001), pp. 150-158.

61 RGADA, f. 281, op. 8, d. 11548, 21 March 1682.

62 This split of supervising responsibilities was relayed to Samara’s voevoda in a gramota, RGADA, f. 281, op. 8, d. 11552, 23 January 1684.
fishing rights in the region, while the Prikaz Bol’shogo dvortsa usually monitored factories. This division, however, represents a growing trend in the seventeenth centuries of more involvement by chancelleries in the frontier.

Horses were another closely regulated commodity because of their military, rather than financial, importance. In fact, the horse trade was sufficiently important to central authorities that establishing the trade in Kazan’ was among the first tasks after the conquest. In February of 1555, Kazan’s voevoda received a gramota instructing him to welcome Nogai horse merchants into the marketplace at the Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery. As rent for space in the monastery’s courtyard, the monastery received five horses. By the end of the seventeenth century, a domestic horse trade subsidized Nogai horses in the region. The central authorities continued to monitor all sales, even by individual merchants outside of the cities. The Tatar Izamnet Tokhmagulov, for example, sold a horse out of his pen to Nester Nefed’ev in the village of Oshniaka in Kazan’ volost’, but needed the approval of the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa for the sale. The growth of the domestic horse trade was partially the result of Muscovy’s expanding frontier, which claimed the Nogai Tatars as Muscovite subjects, as well as a necessity produced by horses continuing military importance.

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63 Some pomest’e grants included a horse as well as land, with the estate claiming the expense of the horse to guarantee military service. For example, Vasilii Asavinovskii received a horse from the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa along with his pomest’e in Kurmysh uezd. RGADA, f. 1209, Pomestnyi prikaz, op. 78, d. 1475, no later than 1678.

64 Akty, sobrannye v bibliotekakh i arkhivakh Rossiiskoi imperii arkheograficheskoiu ekspeditseiu imperatorskoi akademii nauk, Vol. 1, (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia i otdeleniiia sobstvennoi E. I. B. Kantselarii, 1836), #235, p. 239.

65 RGADA, f. 1455, op. 3, d. 825, 25 May 1692.
Building upon the horse trade in Kazan’, numerous residents of the region sold horses in other parts of Muscovy. In Kursk, for example, horse traders from a variety of cities in a variety of years during the seventeenth century. Specifically, the cities of origin were Alatyr’ (1677/78), Arzamas (1647/48), Atemar (1660/61), Kazan’ (1677/78), Kurmysh (1628/29), Simbirsk (1677/78), and Cheboksary (1677/78). During a horse fair in Velikii Ustiug between 14 February and 19 February 1634, nine residents of Kazan’ sold a total of eight geldings and two mares to residents of Ustiug. The mares both sold for three rubles, while the average price for the geldings was 3.7 rubles. Two years later, another eleven residents of Kazan’ each sold a gelding in Ustiug, which included five of those merchants were peasants from the estates of Kazan’s Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery, one was from Sviiazhsk’s Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery, and two were peasants from the estates of Kazan’s Metropolitan.

Ultimately, the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa attempted to regulate all commodities with military applications. Horse traders needed permission from the Prikaz for a sale. As early as the nakaz (instruction) of 1649, the Prikaz banned all sales of Volga Region horses to Nogai Tatars and Bashkirs unless they had demonstrated their loyalty to

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66 For a study of the horse trade in another frontier town during the seventeenth century, see Razdorskii, Torgovliia Kurska, pp. 241-257.

67 Razdorskii, Torgovliia Kurska, pp. 246-249.

68 Tamozhennye knigi Moskovskogo gosudarstva, I, Velikii Ustiug, 14-19 February 1634, pp. 134-135. Hellie’s median price for geldings (meriny) was 4 rubles, and for mares (kobyly) was 2.3. Hellie, The Economy and Material Culture, pp. 39-45. Between 17 March and 30 March 1634, eleven residents of Kazan’ sold 9 geldings for an average of 3.17 rubles and 2 mares for 2.5 rubles, Tamozhennye knigi Moskovskogo gosudarstva, I, Velikii Ustiug, 17-30 March 1634, pp. 136-137.

69 Tamozhennye knigi Moskovskogo gosudarstva, I, Velikii Ustiug, 6-7 March 1636, pp. 265-266.
Further regulations against arming non-Russians inside or outside of Muscovy increased throughout the rest of the century, corresponding to continuing non-Russian resistance to the state’s authority. The Prikaz banned the sale of helmets, sabers, rifles, or anything produced by blacksmiths or silversmiths in the Chuvash and Mari volosti and villages under the control of the voevoda of Kazan. As military technology advanced, so did the restrictions, necessitating a ban on selling saltpeter anywhere in the region by 1697.

Local authorities in the Middle Volga Region perceived the sale of any banned commodities as a potential danger to domestic security as well as to profits. In 1649, the voevoda of Kazan’ received instructions to investigate and arrest any Russians or non-Russians possessing bootlegged liquor, an ongoing concern since vodka was a state monopoly. By 1677, the Prikaz forbade taverns from selling alcohol in Kazan’ uezd, because of recent problems in Simbirsk the previous year. Only taverns licensed by the voevoda’s office could retain their rights. In the nakaz of 1697, the Prikaz instructed the voevoda of Kazan’ to search and seize any tobacco found in his region, with a special warning to scrutinize Tatar, Chuvash, and Udmurt villages. Part of the vigilance on these commodities concerned lost revenues for the state from smuggling, however, all of

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70 RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 27ob-28.
71 RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 11-12. These restrictions continued through the seventeenth century in later nakazy. The prohibitions in the nakaz of 1677, for example, are reproduced in f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 39ob-42ob, 57ob-61.
72 PSZ 3, p. 293.
73 RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, l. 14ob.
74 RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 51ob-52.
the restrictions were targeted at the region’s non-Russian populations. In the
chancelleries’ perception, alcohol, tobacco, and weapons all presented potential dangers
to frontier stability.

Local merchants extended the economic influence of the Middle Volga Region by
buying and selling varied commodities throughout Muscovy. These merchants not only
sold the region’s fish, honey, wax, salt, and horses but also silk, caviar, leather,
horseshoes, nuts, and numerous pelts, among other goods. Prokopei Andreev from
Kazan’ was a typical merchant of the seventeenth century, buying sable, fox, and bear
pelts in Siberia for sales in Velikii Ustiug, Vologda, and Iaroslavl’, but also buying
imported Persian silk in Kazan’ for sale in those same places during the 1630s.76

While many of the commercial exchanges on the frontier received the attention of
the central government, there was a limit to its power to control the economy. This is
especially true for the active land market in the Middle Volga Region, which operated
mostly independently of Moscow. While the majority of landowning in the territory was
in the form of *pomest’e* (service land), which was closely regulated by the state, land
inside cities and *votchina* (hereditary land) in the countryside were both sold with

75 *PSZ* 3, p. 287.

76 *Tamozhennye knigi Moskovskogo gosudarstva*, I, Velikii Ustiug, 4 October 1633, p. 20, recorded his
arrival from Siberia with pelts in Velikii Ustiug on his way to Vologda. Early the next year he arrived in
Velikii Ustiug on his was to Iaroslavl’ with Andrei Antipin and a shipment of silk, *Tamozhennye knigi
Moskovskogo gosudarstva*, I, Velikii Ustiug, 2 January 1634, p. 30. A year later, his arrival in Vologda
with 150 rubles worth of silk was entered in its customs book, *Tamozhennaia kniga Vologda*, entry for 22
February 1635, p. 420. In April of 1635, Andreev arrived in Velikii Ustiug with several furs, and later that
year sold 9 beaver pelts and 13 red fox for 30 rubles in town, *Tamozhennye knigi Moskovskogo
gosudarstva*, I, Velikii Ustiug, 8 April 1635, p. 158; *Tamozhennye knigi Moskovskogo gosudarstva*, I,
Velikii Ustiug, 9 October 1635, p. 166. His final appearance in the customs books was in February 1636
when he sold 100 rubles worth of silk in Ustiug on his way from Iaroslavl’, *Tamozhennye knigi
regularity, usually for cash.\textsuperscript{77} Frequently, urban residents desired land in the countryside, as was the case for the \textit{posadskii chelovek} (city resident) Obolenskii, who purchased land along the Volga River from Kuz’ma Fomin syn Nikonov in 1650.\textsuperscript{78} A resident of Sviiazhsk, Iakov Ivanov syn Lukoshkov, bought fields in the countryside outside of the city from Gavril Fedorov syn Krasnikov in 1671.\textsuperscript{79} Land-sellers even attempted to encourage reluctant purchasers. Ivan Semenov syn Balabanov warned Mikhail Sidariv syn Mesoedov in 1686 that Mesoedov should accept the deal for Balabanov’s land in Kurmysh before he lost his chance.\textsuperscript{80}

Non-Russians and Russian women also participated in the region’s land market. Egchaik Kozhilanov, a Mordvin, bought land from the Russian \textit{streltsy} of Arzamas. However, to guarantee the land purchase, Kozhilanov took the preventative measure of using the Elder Iosif of Arzamas’s Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery as a witness for his contract.\textsuperscript{81} Women could legally own and sell their own \textit{votchina} (hereditary land), but also \textit{votchina} belonging to their family, if they were acting on behalf of their minor children.\textsuperscript{82} Anna Fedorov doch Noskova sold a village of her \textit{votchina} (hereditary land)

\begin{itemize}
\item[77] For example, Kir’iak Ivanov syn Vshivskov bought Gregor Fedorov syn Vatukov’s fields along the Volga River in Iurev’skii \textit{uezd} for cash, RGADA, f. 1455, op. 3, d. 234, 26 February 1643. Samson Ignat’ev syn Miaenikov sold his \textit{votchina} along the Volga to Ivan Fedorov syn Berdov for some amount of cash, RGADA, f. 1455, op. 3, d. 496, 1675. Ivan Petrov syn Samoilov paid cash for land along the upper part of the Lemzha River in the \textit{storona} of Piagdiach from Ivan Pavlov syn Pravoselkov, RGADA, f. 1455, op. 2, d. 6508, 13 March 1688.
\item[78] This contract was witnessed by the villagers and the village priest from the land Obolenskii purchased, RGADA, f. 1455, op. 3, d. 278, 31 December 1650.
\item[79] RGADA, f. 1455, op. 3, d. 438, 19 September 1671.
\item[80] RGADA, f. 1455, op. 1, d. 2861, 8 May 1686.
\item[81] RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 276, 27 February 1633.
\end{itemize}
to posadskii chelovek (townsperson) Iakim Semenov syn Koniaev for the benefit of her sons Grigorii and Miuda. \(^{83}\) Some lands were not sold for cash, but were instead exchanged for other lands. Andrei Fedorov syn Ziuzin sold his votchina, a village in Kazan’ uezd, to Ivan Fedorov syn Zmeev, and received land in the city of Kazan’. \(^{84}\) Ilev Mustovan sold 46 cheti of land with pine forests in Arzamas uezd in exchange for Mikhail Maksimov’s house and courtyard in Arzamas. \(^{85}\)

The Russian Orthodox Church also actively participated in the land market in the Middle Volga Region. Church institutions made both cash transactions and land exchanges in and out of the countryside. Orthodox monasteries used their position of controlling urban markets to gain more land in the countryside. Arzamas’s Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery accepted Ignatkii Letilov’s fields in the countryside in exchange for a small piece of land near the monastery and its marketplace. Letilov explained that he needed space near the city’s trading district (torgovnaia storona). \(^{86}\) Monasteries also received cash for their urban land, as was the case when a priest, Markel Konstantinovich, purchased a small plot of land inside Arzamas from the monastery. \(^{87}\)

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\(^{83}\) RGADA, f. 1455, op. 3, d. 369, 18 January 1664.

\(^{84}\) RGADA, f. 1455, op. 1, d. 1897, 7 April 1698.

\(^{85}\) Mustovan hoped to purchase a field near Arzamas as well, but would pay 100 rubles in cash for that deal. RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 267, 26 January 1632.

\(^{86}\) RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 265, 15 November 1630.

\(^{87}\) RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 273, 1631/2.
While many of the land transactions would have required official approval on some level, only a few such documents remain for the Middle Volga Region. Vasilii Dmitriev syn Kniazhikhin wrote to Sviiazhsk’s prikaznaia izba asking for approval for his purchase of Praskovia Elagina’s land in Sviiazhsk uezd.\textsuperscript{88} Church officials might also seek official permission for their land transactions. The Archpriest Afonasii of Arzamas’s Voskresenskii Cathedral bought 19 cheti of land, including Obinii village in Zasabakii stan in Arzamas uezd from stolnik Iur’e Fedorov syn Shishkin. The archpriest notified Arzamas’s voevoda, Volodimir Danil’evich Vorobin, of the purchase.\textsuperscript{89}

Land transactions of votchina were an unusual form of exchange for the region because the central authorities, especially the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa, were rarely involved. The central Muscovite chancelleries assumed supervisory control over most aspects of the regional economy, at least in terms of its production and supply, if not necessarily its sales. The goods produced from the natural resources in the Middle Volga Region were important for the Muscovite economy, and therefore it is unsurprising that these commodities received close attention from the center. The growth of marketplaces outside the bounds of the monastic courtyard during the seventeenth century testifies to the economic growth within the territory.

By the end of the seventeenth century, the Volga Region was a valuable center of production in its own right, and an entrepôt for numerous trade goods. By harnessing the region’s natural resources, the economy of the frontier provided needed commodities for Muscovy, proving the economic value of the conquest of the Khanate of Kazan’.

\textsuperscript{88} RGADA, f. 1455, op. 2, d. 5022, l. 1, 9 July 1686.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE

With control over trade on Volga River, Muscovy transformed its importance in the early-modern global economy by functioning as a conduit for east-west and north-south trade. The direct involvement of Muscovite authorities created a regulated economic system in the region, and these regulations channeled revenues from international trade to the state as well. The historiography of the region emphasizes the importance of control over the Volga trade route for the Muscovite government, though most early accounts have not explored the international aspects of the Volga trade. While Moscow was the primary beneficiary of its tolls and regulations, English, Dutch, Sweidsh, Persian, Indian, and Armenian traders all had vested interests in the smooth functioning of the trade route. The section will be based primarily upon the records of the English merchants, who established the first foreign trade company in Moscow, and remained an integral part of the international trade of Muscovy throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The Volga River trade route induced foreign trade contacts with Muscovy. For example, when the English established trade contacts with Muscovy in the middle of the sixteenth century, the potential access to eastern goods was one of their interests. As the English East Indies Company established itself in Persia, it considered the Volga River a secure route for export of Persian silks, moving goods up the Volga to Moscow, then to the English trade entrepôt in Arkangel’sk, where the goods could be transported on English ships. This trade route required concessions from Muscovite officials for

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89 RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 308, 10 June 1685.
transport along the Volga, an issue first raised by Queen Elizabeth I. The English enticed Muscovite support with the promise of the lucrative trade travelling through Muscovy.\textsuperscript{90} After a few years of negotiations, the English received a guarantee of access to all Persian, Chinese, and East Indian goods transported through Muscovy.\textsuperscript{91}

The Time of Troubles prevented the English from taking advantage of this trade concession.\textsuperscript{92} Once the Time of Troubles ended with the election of Mikhail Fedorovich, the English pursued another guarantee of access from the new tsar. King Charles I promised Mikhail Fedorovich that he desired that “this Trade of Silk should be settled in your Majesties Dominions rather than in any other Kingdome,” producing tariff revenue for Muscovy.\textsuperscript{93} This time, however, the English attempts were not successful, and the Volga trade remained closed.

Despite the reversal of Muscovite policy, English merchants petitioned the tsar to regain the earlier concessions. Several factors motivated the English desire. The first was a belief in the superior speed and safety of transportation along the Volga River when compared with Ottoman Turkey, where the English faced restrictions against their movement. In fact, at one point Charles I sought permission for his ambassador to Persia

\textsuperscript{90} In writing to Tsar Boris Fedorovich, Queen Elizabeth reported that her ambassador, Francis Cherry, would soon raise the issue of Persian trade with the tsar at his convenience, Public Records Office (PRO), PRO 22/60, English Royal Letters in the Soviet Central State Archive of Ancient Records, 1557-1655, #17, 30 May 1600.
\textsuperscript{91} PRO, SP 91/1, Secretaries of State: State Papers Foreign, Russia , ff. 209r.-210r., [c. 1605].
\textsuperscript{93} PRO, PRO 22/60, #33, 1 February 1626.
to travel through Muscovy to Arkangel’sk for “his speedier returne.”

The second, and perhaps more pressing, factor was England’s developing competition with the Dutch over access to the East. Following the English merchants’ loss of privileges during the Time of Troubles, the Dutch petitioned the tsar for the right to export Persian silk through Muscovy, guaranteed by a thirty-year monopoly for the Company of Filippo. While that plan was not successful, Dutch merchants succeeded in signing an advantageous treaty with the Persian Shah in 1619, which the English hoped to match if not surpass. Throughout the seventeenth century, Dutch merchants gained several exclusive export contracts to Russian goods, including important naval commodities such as tar and timber. The English attempts to break the Dutch export monopolies increased the

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94 PRO, PRO 22/60, #38, 27 April 1629. The tsar did give his permission, though the Persian Ambassador did not use this route to England due to his untimely death in Persia, PRO, PRO 22/60, #49, 5 January 1631.


97 The East Indies Company petitioned Charles I after the Dutch Treaty of 1619, asking for an English ambassador to Persia in order to equalize the Dutch advantage, PRO, CO 77/4, East Indies Original Correspondence, 1570-1856, ff. 135r.-136r., April 1629.
The English applied a steady pressure on the Muscovite government throughout the seventeenth century for access to the Volga River and a potential Persian silk monopoly. John Hebdon, the English envoy in Moscow during the 1660s, recorded his attempts to persuade the tsar’s authorities for an English concession, which would enable a transfer of English trade from Ottoman Turkey to Muscovy. Hebdon explained his negotiating tactics in a memo to the Foreign Office, telling the tsar’s officials that the Ottoman sultan attempted to “enriche himselfe and with a great many violencyes and injuries by laying upon then heavy impositions let them passe from himselfe unto Christian Countryes.” If English trade traveled along the Volga through Moscow onto Arkangel’sk, both English and Armenian traders would be safer, and the tsar would receive the thanks of Persia’s Shah Abbas.\(^9^9\)

Muscovite control over the Volga River gave its authorities the ability to negotiate advantageously with early-modern trading countries. In spite of English attempts to wring concessions from Moscow, the Muscovite government increasingly regulated and controlled Volga trade throughout the seventeenth century, and denied the English most of their demands. These policies followed a generally mercantilistic pattern, using state monopolies and high taxes on foreigners for Muscovy’s financial benefit.

\(^9^8\) One of the first Dutch monopolies in Muscovy was for the export of tar, establishing the pattern for later Dutch monopolies in the seventeenth century. An English merchant in Moscow, Thomas Wyche, petitioned King Charles I for redress against the Dutch tar monopoly, PRO, SP 91/2, f. 244r., 1633.

\(^9^9\) PRO, SP 91/3, Part 1, ff. 117r.-117v, 6 December 1666. For a discussion of the tsar and Shah Abbas’s relationship from a Russian perspective, see P. P. Bushev, Istoriia posol’stv i diplomaticheskikh otnoshenii
From the middle of the sixteenth century, the state proscribed the activities of foreign merchants. The initial agreement with the English Muscovy Company granted those merchants freedom from local tariffs, the merchants were only allowed to reside in the northern territories of Muscovy, specifically Arkangel’sk, Kholmogory, Iaroslavl’, Vologda, and Moscow. While Muscovy expanded to the east and south during the seventeenth century, the English trade did not, even with the short-lived tsarist guarantee of access to eastern goods. The trading relationship therefore heavily favored Moscow by the middle of the seventeenth century, once the Muscovy Company’s free trade agreements were revoked during the English Civil War. John Hebdon petitioned the tsar several times for the return of the Company’s “ancient privileges” in the 1670s, but the Muscovite government refused to reinstate them, prospering from its tax revenues on English trade.

Other foreign traders suffered from the increased trade regulations in Muscovy. Following the denial of one of Hebdon’s request for the restoration of privileges in 1676, the Posol’skii prikaz notified him that all foreign merchants in Muscovy “shall come upon their borders no further then such and such places.” The English and Dutch remained limited to trading in the north, only using the port at Arkangel’sk, but in addition the Persians could only trade in Astrakhan, and the Swedes only in Pskov and


PRO, SP 91/1, ff. 55r.-58r., February 1587.

PRO, SP 104/119, f. 11v, 29 November 1681.
Novgorod. These new regulations are a clear statement of the state’s mercantilistic policies, enforcing increasing restrictions against foreign merchants and providing the state greater control over all exports.

Regulating the movement of foreign merchants was part of the central chancelleries’ plan to create a regulated zone of trade within the interior of Moscow. If English or Dutch merchants intended to utilize the Volga River as a major trade route during the second half of the seventeenth century, only the Russian gosti, a closed group of elite Russian merchants, or the Armenian Company, a state-controlled monopoly, were permitted to transport the goods. The Armenian Company was unusual, since it was the only group of foreigners allowed to transport goods along the Volga after these restrictions. The monopoly was established by 1677, and received special attention in the nakaz to the voevoda of Kazan’ that year. The nakaz instructed the voevoda not to interfere in the business of the Armenian Company, and their transport of goods between Astrakhan and Moscow. The Armenians received these privileges from both the Posol’skii Prikaz and the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa, prohibiting any local intervention against the merchants. The Dutch were the beneficiaries of the Armenian monopoly,

PRO, SP 91/3, Part 2, f. 222r., 4 December 1676. These “New Trade Restrictions” are also discussed in Dale, Indian Merchants, p. 96.


RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 100-101. By 1697, the article containing the rights of the Armenian Company had been significantly shortened, only notifying the Kazan’s voevoda the rights possessed by the Company were those received in 1667/8 and 1673/4. PSZ 3, p. 291. For a survey of the scope of Armenian-Persian trade, see R. W. Ferrier, “The Armenians and the East India Company in Persia in the Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries,” The Economic History Review, 26 (1973): 38-62; and Vartan

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since the Armenians exclusively transferred Persian silk from Astrakhan to Moscow for them.\(^\text{105}\) The English attempted to break this monopoly, but failed, partially because of a history of economic cooperation between the Dutch and Armenians.\(^\text{106}\)

The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa though the nakazy also gave voevody the responsibility to monitor all foreign trade, in the same manner as their regulation of domestic trade. The nakaz of 1649 was the first one to contain extensive instructions for the regulation of long-distance trading. The voevody were required to inspect all possessions carried by the gosti travelling between Kazan’ and Astrakhan, making sure that the head of customs (tamozhennaia golova) in the city received the appropriate amount for the commodities. After the inspection, the voevoda and head of customs were to send a record of the trade goods to the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa.\(^\text{107}\)

Later nakazy instituted greater restrictions. The nakaz of 1677 informed the voevoda of Kazan’ he needed to secure certain commodities within traders’ caravans to prevent the sale of military goods to the Kazaks along the Volga. In addition, the voevoda was to provide guards for caravans to protect the goods being transported from

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\(^{106}\) Though the northern European merchants had lost their travel rights through the Volga by 1649, both Armenian and Indian merchants were permitted to transport goods through the region as long as they had been residents of Moscow for “many years.” *Russko-Indiiskie otnosheniia v XVII v.*, #76, III, June 1665, p. 152.

\(^{107}\) The English Ambassador to the Netherlands reported on the presence of an Armenian enclave in Holland as early as 1630, when the Armenians established their own churches in Schoonhoven and Leland. PRO, SP 84/142, State Paper Office: State Papers Foreign, Holland, ff. 120r.-122r., 2/12 October 1630. For a study of Dutch-Armenian relations late in the seventeenth century, see Kéram Kévonian, “Marchands Arméniens au XVIIe siècle: A propos d’un livre arménien publié à Amsterdam en 1699,” *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, 16 (1975): 199-244.

\(^{107}\) RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 30ob-35, from 1649.
nomadic raiders.\textsuperscript{108} Furthermore, one article in the \textit{nakaz} of 1677 warned Kazan’s current \textit{voevoda} about a recent complaint of the \textit{voevoda} of Astrakhan, who petitioned Moscow about difficulties of merchants travelling from Kazan’. The merchants protested unfair treatment in Kazan’, where they had been charged high fees for their goods. Kazan’s \textit{voevoda} was to fulfill his duties but not impede the current trade.\textsuperscript{109}

The exchange of information enabled the increased regulation of the seventeenth century. Kazan’s \textit{voevoda} sent reports to the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa about trade travelling through the city. The information concerning that trade was included in subsequent \textit{nakazy}, in order to provide the most current information about trade for more accurate customs’ collection. Other \textit{voevody} along the Volga kept similar records, providing the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa a complete record of all caravans along the river and where and when goods were sold.\textsuperscript{110} The \textit{voevody} followed expected reports with occasional letters reporting incidental developments about Volga River trade. For example, in 1638 Kazan’s \textit{voevoda} petitioned the tsar concerning the arrival of Persian and Indian merchants in his city from Astrakhan. The merchants carried gifts for the Posol’skii Prikaz in order to persuade Muscovite authorities to allow them to travel to Moscow with their trade goods. For the moment, they remained in Kazan’\textsuperscript{111}.

\textsuperscript{108} RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 52-53ob.

\textsuperscript{109} RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 71-76.

\textsuperscript{110} For example, Saratov’s \textit{voevoda} also tracked customs owed in his city, in a similar manner to Kazan’s \textit{voevoda}. Two of these records are published in: T. D. Lavrentsova, et al., comp., \textit{Russko-Indiiskie otnoshenii v XVII v.: Sbornik dokumentov}, (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo vostochnoi literatury, 1958), #42, 7 December 1649, pp. 93-94; #43, 7 December 1649, p. 94.

\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Russko-Indiiskie otnoshenii v XVII v.}, #12, No earlier than 23 August 1638, pp. 38-39.
Gathering information about trade along the Volga, collecting expected taxes, and utilizing monopolies, such as the Armenian Company’s, created a mercantilistic economy for Muscovy’s benefit. However, the economic development of the Volga Region was not unchallenged. English merchants were banned from moving south or east from Moscow, but at least one Englishman resided in Kazan’. The Posol’skii Prikaz awarded John White, a member of the Muscovy Company, the houses of his Russian debtors in Arzamas, creating an English property owner in a city he could not enter. Dutch merchants were also banned from the Volga Region, but in 1675 the Posol’skii Prikaz recorded the sale of an iron-works between Andrei Andreev syn Vinibsov, Vologda-resident Iakov Galaktimov syn Galkin, and Dutch merchant Konrad Filipov syn Nordermann to Peter Meller, who was also Dutch.

While the Armenian merchants and the Russian gosti had exclusive privileges to trade along the Volga River, other merchants continued to trade within the region. Bukharan merchants, having established a large trade network throughout Eurasia, carried on their own trade along the Volga with permission from the central government. Bukharan caravans traveled overland to both Astrakhan and Kazan’, though they could then proceed along the Volga to Nizhnii Novgorod and onto

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112 In 1622, James I petitioned Mikhail Fedorovich for the release of Dr. John Scroop from service in Kazan’. While Scroop was not a merchant, his presence in a city forbidden to the English displays the limitation of Muscovite prohibition. PRO, PRO 22/60, #28, 1622.


114 RGADA, f. 159, op. 2, d. 1361, 9 May 1675. Many of the iron-works in Muscovy were established by the Dutch, so this transaction is not unusual in that regard. Lubimenko, “The Struggle of the Dutch,” pp. 45-46.
Therefore, while the Armenians possessed a monopoly over Persian trade, other eastern commodities could be transported by Bukharans.

Other merchants attempted to circumvent the restrictions on foreign merchants by protesting the increasing regulations imposed by the central government. Persian and Indian merchants arriving or living in Astrakhan frequently petitioned Muscovite authorities for permission after travel to Kazan’ was restricted. A nephew of the Persian Shah Mamandu Selbek, Oalarbek, protested the refusal of permission to travel to Kazan’ from Astrakhan to deliver his goods. In previous years, Oalarbek had traveled to Kazan’ without hindrance; he protested paying a middleman for that same transportation. In that same year, an Indian merchant living in Astrakhan, Banda Mingaev, petitioned the voevoda of Astrakhan to receive permission to transport his goods to Kazan’. The voevoda of Astrakhan wrote to the current voevoda of Kazan’ about Mingaev, arguing that Mingaev had this permission in the past and only wanted his rights restored.

Other complaints arrived in Moscow, especially concerning the high expense of the tariffs. The merchant Klima Kalmykov petitioned the tsar for freedom to move salt along the Volga between Saratov and Astrakhan. The local voevody were collecting tolls,

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116 Several documents recording the transit of the Bukharan merchants through Nizhnii Novgorod are published in, *Nizhnii Novgorod v XVII veke*, #46-48, 4 December 1633-11 March 1634, pp. 82-84.

117 RGADA, f. 159, op. 2, d. 328, 29 March 1677.

118 *Russko-Indiiskie otnosheniia v XVII v.*, #172, 29 September 1677 and 8 October 1677, pp. 276-277. Petitions from Indian and Persian merchants to the authorities in Astrakhan continued throughout the rest of the century. A combined group of Persian and Indian merchants sought approval for to transport to Kazan’ an itemized caravan of goods, *Russko-Indiiskie otnosheniia v XVII v.*, #244, 3 October 1690, p. 350.
which Kalmykov believed should not have been charged.\textsuperscript{119} Similarly, Petr Gudumov and Terchanin and Semen Gruzin complained in a petition that they were being stopped on the overland trade route between Arzamas and Simbirsk, and being held until they paid tolls, even though they were “people without trade” (\textit{liudi bezomeny}). Gudumov and the Gruzins sent their complaint to the Posol’skii Prikaz, who were responsible for monitoring foreign trade, suggesting that despite their disclaimers they were transporting commodities through the region.\textsuperscript{120} The English agent in Moscow, Thomas Meverall, complained to Tsar Feodor Aleksevich about taxes charged for Englishmen bought out of Turkish slavery and transported along the Volga and then north to Arkangel’sk.\textsuperscript{121} None of these attempts, however, were successful, since profits from tariffs were an important source of revenue for the state.

The lack of success of petitions and complaints against Muscovite trade regulations did not dissuade English merchants from seeking access to Persian goods through the Volga Region. In the second half of the seventeenth century, a series of English agents in Moscow reminded English authorities of the potential windfall from Volga River trade. John Hebdon wrote to the Foreign Office in 1677 with word of Persian luxuries recently arrived in Moscow. Persian merchants were selling “several sorts of Rarities, as Carpets, Severall sorts of Silks, Diamonds, and delicate Horses.” Knowing the Foreign Office had stopped seeking access to Persia through Muscovy, Hebdon suggested a change of policy: “I could wish I might be thought worthy to serve

\textsuperscript{119} RGADA, f. 159, op. 2, d. 4356, After 1692.

\textsuperscript{120} RGADA, f. 159, op. 2, d. 3924, l.1, 17 August 1689.

\textsuperscript{121} PRO, SP 104/118, ff. 32r.-34v., 22 April 1682.
your Honour not alone in procuring any of the aforesaid Commodityes…” Hebdon’s suggestion followed the complete disruption of Volga trade during the Stepan Razin Revolt, which would make any trader wary of relying upon the Volga.

In fact, English merchants in Moscow did not pursue establishing Persian trade through the Volga Region again until Peter the Great was on the throne. In 1707, Charles Whitworth, the current English envoy to Muscovy, wrote to the Foreign Office of the possible gain for the English trading position with an alternate route to Persia.

The English Trade would still increase considerably if any expedient could be found to reconcile the interests of the Muscovite and East India Company’s about introducing raw Silk from a Province of Persia called Chilan, which lies on the Caspian Sea: This Traffick is now in the hands of some Armenians, who have a permission from the King of Persia, and bring yearly great quantitieys hither by Astracan up the river Wolga, Six hundred Bales being either come or expected this Winter, From hence it was usually sent to Holland, but now the Armenians will load two ships for Copenhagen, where they are endeavouring to Settle a Trade and Manufacture…”

Whitworth’s primary argument was not only the benefit of the Persian silk trade, but the continuing problem of the Dutch-Armenian trade relationship that forced the English out of the silk trade. Despite the disruption of trade along the Volga from domestic uprisings, the Volga trade route still attracted international interest.

While the English never succeeded in utilizing this resource, Muscovy prospered from its established monopolies. The Armenian transport monopoly was part of a series of Muscovite mercantilistic reforms to maximize its profits from the Volga River trade. The toll system, the information gathering by the voevody, and restrictions on foreign

122 PRO, SP 91/3, Part 2, ff. 235r.-236v., 27 February 1677.
123 PRO, SP 91/5, Part 1, ff. 34r.-37v., 31 January 1707.
merchants created strong state control over the economic interactions within the Volga Region. Petitions, complaints, and internal disruptions limited the potential growth, but the Volga River remained a vital international trade artery for Muscovy.

CONCLUSION

Without question, economic motivations influenced the Muscovite role in the Middle Volga Region after the conquest of Kazan’. However, the economic benefits were not only limited to international trade along the Volga River but also included the natural resources of the region, which produced important commodities for Muscovy. The central Muscovite chancelleries, especially the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa, took an active role in the regulation of the frontier economy and international trade. The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa developed infrastructure and businesses, and used its voevody to gather and regulate both domestic and international trade. Based on its increased knowledge of trade throughout the territory, instructions to later voevody became more explicit and empowered increased control over trade and traders.

Muscovite authorities employed mercantilist reforms to guide the economic development of the Middle Volga Region. Domestic industries were established and their functioning closely monitored. Foreign merchants had limited access to Muscovite markets and accepted state-granted monopolies for specific commodities or privileges. All economic activity was supervised at both the regional and central level. Despite the active involvement of the state authorities, protests from merchants and temporary disruptions to trade, such as the Stepan Razin Revolt in the fall of 1670, tempered the
success of the economic reforms. Limited success, however, should not be mistaken for
an absence of coordinated economic development plans.

Traditionally, historians have suggested that mercantilism was introduced to
Muscovy as a part of Peter the Great’s reforms. Peter invested heavily in domestic
industries, granted export monopolies to foreign merchants, and instituted a series of
“protectionist” reforms to support the domestic economy. Peter’s lack of an explicated
mercantile doctrine, which was present in most Western monarchies, has led historians of
Petrine Russia to debate whether Peter’s reforms are best described as mercantilist, proto-
mercantilist, or perhaps not mercantilistic at all. This debate has neglected the pre-
Petrine, Muscovite origins of all of Peter’s economic “reforms.” Peter did not create a
mercantilistic economy ex nihilo, but extended and enforced policies used by the
Muscovite chancelleries beginning in the previous century. While Muscovy lacked a
Colbert, the development of the Middle Volga Region suggests that none of Colbert’s
reforms of the French economy would have been surprising to Tsar Aleksei
Mikhailovich, Louis XIV’s contemporary and Peter’s father.

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124 This debate is present in all recent works on Peter the Great, for example: Evgenii V. Anisimov, *The
70-86; Lindsey Hughes, *Russia in the Age of Peter the Great*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998),
especially pp. 157-158. Anisimov critiques earlier Soviet historiography by classifying Peter as mercantile,
while Hughes suggests Peter is best described as “proto-mercantilist,” since he lacked the ideology of
mercantilism in his policy formation.
CHAPTER 4

RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY ON THE FRONTIER

The formation of a new imperial ideology for Muscovy accompanied the ongoing bureaucratization of the Muscovite administration and the implementation of mercantilistic reforms. The conquest of the Khanate of Kazan’ provided Ivan IV and the Metropolitan of Moscow an opportunity to transform the image of ruler of Muscovy from Great Prince to Tsar. The victory raised the tsar’s international profile as the first Orthodox victory against Islam since the fall of Constantinople. Furthermore, since Kazan’ was a tsar’s city, Ivan IV legitimated his claim to the title both to his own subjects and the steppe nomads along his borders. By the seventeenth century, Muscovite subjects understood that Ivan IV became a tsar, and Muscovy an empire, with the conquest of Kazan’.

While the conquest of Kazan’ brought glory to the tsar as a religious victory, it also created an opportunity to shape a new civic identity for the city of Kazan’. Russian Orthodox rituals transformed the conception of the physical, legal, and social space of Kazan’ as part of a religious identity for the city. This new identity for Kazan’ could appeal to both Orthodox and Muslim residents in the Middle Volga Region, accommodating the needs of the new Muscovite rulers and the Church itself on the

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1 This idea appears in the first paragraph of Kotoshikhin’s description of the Muscovite government. G. K. Kotoshikhin, O Rossii v tsarstvovnanie Aleksei Mikhailovicha, Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2000), p. 22.
frontier creating a common image of the city for its inhabitants.\(^2\) The Russian Orthodox Church, and its creation of new public rituals for Kazan’, became an integral part of Muscovite presence on the frontier.

As religious rituals refashioned the cultural identity of the region, Russian Orthodox churchmen, especially its hierarchs, led the path toward this reinvention. With the arrival of the first Archbishop of Kazan’ in 1556, the local hierarchy became the driving force behind the creation of a popular image of the Russian Orthodox Church on the frontier. At the end of the sixteenth century, the first Metropolitan of Kazan’ elevated popular local rituals and miracle cults into traditions of national importance. In this way, frontier innovations entered the landscape of Orthodox believers throughout Muscovy, and became genuinely popular.

The Middle Volga’s contribution to early modern Russian Orthodoxy did not guarantee its success at the local level. Conversion efforts among the non-Russian populations, Muslims and animists alike, produced only intermittent successes.\(^3\) The


willingness of the local secular officials to support the enlistment of non-Orthodox military servitors, and provide them land grants, removed one reason for conversion to Orthodoxy.\textsuperscript{4} Much of the current historiography stresses the role of financial conversion incentives, primarily in the form of tax exemptions to recent converts for a set number of years, as the major cause for non-Russian conversions.\textsuperscript{5} More recent work has demonstrated that rank was the most important criteria, demonstrated by conversion of the elite Murzii Tatars and the lack of conversion from Tatar peasants.\textsuperscript{6} In either case, non-Russian conversion to Russian Orthodoxy was not actively pursued in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries in the Middle Volga. Further problems developed with the spread of the Russian Church’s schism throughout the region in the second half of the seventeenth century, as more people joined the protest against the religious reforms of Patriarch Nikon. The schismatics, or Old Believers, were a more serious threat to the Russian Orthodox Church than Muslims or animists; however, the increased attention toward religious issues affected the Orthodox treatment of non-Russians as well.


\textsuperscript{6} For a study of the Murzis, see Craig Gayen Kennedy, “The Juchids of Muscovy: A Study of Personal Ties between Émigré Tatar Dynasts and the Muscovite Grand Princes in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries,” (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation: Harvard University, 1994).
Previous historians have focused on the Russian Orthodox Church’s interest in conversion, obscuring the developments of a unique Orthodox identity on the frontier. But Church authorities in the region never stressed conversion, and there was no attempt to induce the conversion of the non-Orthodox populations on the frontier until the Russian Church schism threatened the unity of the Church. The greatest contribution of the Church in the Middle Volga was the creation of important miracle cults, but their success throughout the country should not obscure the fact that Orthodoxy made limited inroads into the Muslim and animist populations of the region.

AN ORTHODOX CONQUEST

Russian Orthodox rhetoric dominated the call for the conquest of the Khanate of Kazan’. Metropolitan Makarii of Moscow, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, joined ongoing debates in the early 1550s about the potential conquest. When Makarii had been the archbishop of Novgorod and Pskov earlier in his career, he dedicated himself toward the conversion of all non-Orthodox residents in the surrounding territories.⁷ As metropolitan, Makarii demanded the conquest and conversion of the Khanate of Kazan’, a nearby Muslim rival for Muscovy’s authority. According to contemporary religious chronicles, Makarii blessed Ivan IV’s decision to attack the

⁷ Makarii’s call to missionaries to convert local heathens is printed in Dopoleniia k aktam istoricheskim, sobranntia i izdaniia Arkheograficheskoiu kommissieiu, Vol. 1, (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia i otdelenia Sobstsennoi E. I. V. Kantseliariia, 1846), #28, 25 March 1534, pp. 27-30. Hereafter, Dopoleniia. For a discussion of the rhetorical attacks of the Russian Orthodox Church against the Tatars before the conquest, see Jaroslaw Pelenski, Russia and Kazan: Conquest and Imperial Ideology (1438-1560s), (The Hague: Mouton, 1974), pp. 177-196.
Khanate for “the holy churches and for Orthodox Christianity.” If Muscovy conquered the Khanate, then the Church could convert the heathens to the true faith.

Under Makarii’s influence, the war against the Khanate was fought as a religious struggle. Once the military maneuvers began, he exhorted more virtuous behavior of Ivan’s army stationed in Sviiazhsk, the Muscovite fort near Kazan’. Makarii admonished the army to fight for “the holy churches and our holy Orthodox faith against the godless sons of Hagar.” His warning demonstrated his belief that Orthodox virtue would produce an Orthodox victory.

To further connect a military conquest with religious imperatives, Makarii employed Russian Orthodox rituals to support Ivan IV’s campaign against Kazan’ in 1552. He blessed the tsar before his departure in a public ceremony in Moscow. Ivan IV highlighted the connection between Orthodox ritual and conquest by stopping in Vladimir and Murom for blessings at their cathedrals. When Ivan arrived in Sviiazhsk, the Muscovite fort near Kazan’, he proceeded immediately to the church for a local blessing. The culmination of the connection between tsar and Church occurred in 1552, when Ivan took Kazan’ and commanded that a church be built on the spot where his banner stood during battle. The church foundation in the city was supported by the

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8 PSRL, Vol. 29, p. 58.

9 Akty istoricheskie, sobrannye i izdannye Arkheograficheskoiu komissieiu, Vol. 1, (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Ekspeditsiia zagotovleniiia gosudarstvennykh bumag, 1841), #159, 25 May 1552, pp. 257-290. A second epistle from Makarii, written between 13 to 20 July 1552, exhorted Ivan IV in with similar religious rhetoric, Akty istoricheskie, #160, pp. 290-296. These letters are thoroughly examined in Pelenski, Russia and Kazan, pp. 197-207. Other religious figures supported the campaign, including Archbishop Feodosii of Novgorod, who had called for Ivan IV’s campaign against the godless Tatars as early as 1545/46, Dopolneniia, Vol. 1, #37, pp. 38-40.

10 All of these events are recounted in Nancy Shields Kollmann, “Pilgrimage, Procession and Symbolic Space in Sixteenth-Century Russian Politics,” Medieval Russian Culture: Volume II, Eds. Michael S. Flier
establishment of the region’s first monastery, the Zilantov Uspenskii Monastery, located outside of the city.\footnote{For an account of the foundations of Middle Volga monasteries, see L. I. Denisov, Pravoslavnye monastyri Rossiiskoi imperii, (Moscow: A. D. Stupina, 1908), pp. 232-258.}

Even with the rhetoric demanding conversion of the new subjects of the tsar, the Russian Orthodox hierarchy was not officially present until the arrival of Archbishop Gurii on 28 July 1555. The most complete accounts of Gurii’s arrival survive only in religious sources, particularly chronicles and the vitae of Gurii and Archimandrite Varsonofii written in the 1590s.\footnote{The discussion of Gurii’s life both in the chronicle accounts and in his vitae is slight. These religious sources stress the selection of Gurii and his procession, but mention very little after his arrival in Kazan’. Beginning with Kliuchevskii, historians have questioned the accuracy of these sources because of the lack of details, rather than examining those aspects of his life that have been documented. For a critical} Though Metropolitan Makarii’s plans always included a strong Orthodox presence in the region, the religious sources indicate that the impetus for Gurii’s arrival came from Kazan’, not Moscow. These accounts begin with the request from the voevoda of Kazan’ in 1555 for assistance from Moscow in converting the native populations of the region. This version of events emphasized the local community’s interest in conversion, shifting responsibility for conversion away from Moscow and its metropolitan.

In response to the voevoda’s request, a Russian Orthodox Church council convened to decide the best way to convert the populace. Secular figures present at the council included Ivan IV, his brother Prince Iur’ii Vasil’evich and the boiars of the

\footnote{Kollmann’s narrative is based upon a compilation of chronicle accounts from Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei, 37 vols., (St. Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo arkheograficheskoi kommissii, 1862-1928); hereafter, PSRL. These events are also discussed in George V. Lantzeff and Richard A. Pierce, Eastward to Empire: Exploration and Conquest on the Russian Open Frontier to 1750, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1973), pp. 64-67.}
Muscovite court. The religious figures included Metropolitan Makarii, the Archbishop of Novgorod and Pskov, as well as the local bishops from Rostov, Suzdal, Smolensk, Riazan, Tver’, Kolomna, and many important abbots from local monasteries. This council decided to create an archbishopric in Kazan’ and selected important churchmen to fill the positions that would be created. The selected group included Gurii, onetime Father Superior of the Iosifo-Volokolamskii Monastery, who became the new archbishop of Kazan’; German, another onetime Father Superior of the Iosifo-Volokolamskii Monastery who founded a monastery in Sviiazhsk; and Varsonofii, a former Father Superior of the Pesnoshskii Monastery, who founded an urban monastery in Kazan’.

Both the Russian Orthodox Church and the Muscovite state valued the establishment of Orthodoxy in Kazan’. The new archbishopric would oversee Kazan’, Sviiazhsk, and their environs; soon it also gained authority over the lower Volga, including Astrakhan. The new archbishopric ranked third in the hierarchy of archbishoprics, after Moscow, Novgorod and Pskov, and just before Rostov. Surprisingly, this ranking placed Kazan’ ahead of the remaining central Russian bishoprics. The Church hierarchy on the frontier remained closely connected to events in the center of Muscovy from its prominence.

discussion of the texts, see V. O. Kliuchevskii, Drevnerusskii zhitiia sviiatykh kak istoricheskii istochnik, (Moscow: Tipografiia Gracheva, 1871), p. 305.

13 PSRL, vol. 29, pp. 234-5.

14 PSRL, vol. 20, pp. 481-2; PSRL, vol. 21, part 2, pp. 650-651; PSRL, vol. 31, p. 133; and PSRL, vol. 34, p 189. The level of detail in these volumes varies widely, but all refer to the presence of Ivan IV in the selection process. Vol. 34 does not refer to the selections of Varsonofii and German along with Gurii’s. Also recounted in Mozharovskii, “Izlozhenie khoda,” p. 11. Mozharovskii’s narrative closely resembles the chronicle account, with occasional references to the appropriate Saint’s life.

Later in 1555, Gurii prepared an entourage to travel to his new see. He traveled down the Volga with a large procession, including German and Varsonofii who had important roles to fulfill in the Middle Volga Region. Gurii’s procession began inside the Kremlin in Moscow. At a church service in the Uspenskii Cathedral, Metropolitan Makarii, Ivan IV, and the entire assembled church council gathered together to bless Gurii. Before the liturgy, Makarii blessed some holy water for Gurii to take with him on his procession, and which was needed for blessings in the new see. This entire group proceeded to the Frolovskii gates, carrying church banners and holy icons, while all the bells of the Kremlin were rung. Ivan IV received a blessing from Gurii, and then departed. Makarii then blessed the entire procession and returned to the Kremlin as well. The rest of the assembled Church council proceeded with Gurii for a distance outside the city to help Gurii prepare for his journey. These activities closely resembled Ivan IV’s departure from Moscow on his way to conquer Kazan’, thus associating the ideas of military and religious conquest. This blessing ritual was repeated at each step of the four-month procession down the Volga.

Archbishop Gurii’s procession arrived in Kazan’ on 28 July 1555, culminating with a ritual blessing of the local Kremlin, the residence of the voevoda and former center of the Muslim Khanate’s power. Gurii led a procession around the Kremlin, sprinkling the walls with holy water; in front of each gate he read a prayer for the preservation of the Orthodox tsar, his Christian army, and the entire Orthodox community. While circling

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the Kremlin, he made the sign of the cross in all four directions of his new bishopric.\textsuperscript{17}

Through this ritual, Gurii made the Kremlin a blessed, Orthodox place—the spiritual home of the new bishopric. These actions also invoked the earlier blessing by the Metropolitan of Moscow and the blessing of local churchmen all along the Volga. It was also a sign of possession over this territory. For the non-Orthodox of Kazan’, Gurii’s arrival marked the beginning of the imposition of a new belief system, and the intrusion of a new cultural system into their daily lives.\textsuperscript{18}

The tsar, metropolitan of Moscow, and \textit{voevoda} of Kazan’ all provided financial support for Gurii and the Russian Orthodox Church in the Middle Volga Region, supplementing the spiritual support of Gurii’s ritualized departure from Moscow. The tsar was the first to grant large tracts of land to the new bishopric, and included fishing privileges in the nearby Volga River.\textsuperscript{19} Financial support for the bishop of Kazan’ and the later metropolitans continued throughout the early modern period, though the \textit{voevody} of Kazan’ became the primary providers. For example, when the lands initially provided by the tsar for the archbishopric were “worn out” by the early seventeenth century, Kazan’s \textit{voevoda} Volodimir Timof’evich Dolgorukov granted new lands to the current


\textsuperscript{18} Gurii’s procession around Kazan’ to mark Muscovy’s new territory resembles varied rituals practiced by West European countries in the New World. For a discussion of other European models, see: Patricia Seed, \textit{Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640}, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

\textsuperscript{19} 13 August 1555, the tsar granted Gurii 2,000 \textit{cheti} of land, fishing rights, and the villages of Kadysh, Karaish, and Karadulat for the financial security of the bishopric, \textit{Akty istoricheskie}, Vol. 1, #162, pp. 298-299.
Metropolitan Matfei with land inside the city, fields outside of Kazan’, and water rights to the Volga.  

Based on the religious rhetoric that accompanied the conquest of Kazan’, historians have persistently argued that the hierarchy in the Middle Volga Region was dedicated to converting the Muslims and animists of the Volga Region. In the nineteenth century, for example, K. Nevostruev, argued that Samara’s Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery was founded in 1585 for the purpose of converting the Nogai Tatars, who were still enemies of Muscovy at that time. Soviet scholars drew similar conclusions from the ongoing financial support for monastic foundations and the hierarchy. D. M. Makarov argued the foundation of the Troitskii Monastery in Cheboksary in 1566 was evidence of state-driven conversion attempts of the local Chuvashes. However, there are no extant confessional records, missionary reports, sermons, or lists of novices from the monasteries to prove the connection between financial commitment and actual conversion attempts.

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20 RGADA, f. 281, op. 4, d. 6451, August 1616, and RGADA, f. 281, op. 4, d. 6452, 10 May 1618. However, both the tsar and the Patriarch in Moscow did occasionally provide financial support for the Metropolitans of Kazan’. Metropolitan Matfei received four courtyards in Kazan’ to house the Kazan’ Mother of God icon in 1623 from the tsar, RGADA, f. 281, op. 4, d. 6456, 29 October 1623. Even later, Metropolitan Markel received 300 rubles from Patriarch Adrian for repairs to the Archbishop’s house in Kazan’, I. M. Pokrovskii, “O naspedstvennom prave tserkovnykh uchrezhdenii, v chastnosti Kazanskago Arkhiereiskago doma, v kontse XVII veka,” Izvestiia obshchestva arkheologii, istorii i etnografii pri Imperatorskom Kazanskom universitete, 18 (1902): 4-5.

21 K. Nevostruev, Istoricheskoe opisanie byvshikh v gorode Samare muzheskogo Spaso-Preobrazhenskago i zhenskogo Spasskogo monasteryei, (Moscow: Sinodal’naia tipografiia, 1867), p. 3; D. M. Makarov, Samoderzhavie i khristianizatsiia narodov povolzh’ia v vtoroi polovine XVI-XVII vv.: Uchebnoe posobie, (Cheboksary: Chuvashskii gosudarstvennyi universitet im I. N. Ul’ianova, 1981), pp. 21-53. Also, E. L. Dubman also connected the strong financial support for monastic foundations with state-support for conversion efforts, though Dubman argues not for the success of conversion but more for the punitive nature of the “feudal” landholding system, which destroyed the traditional lifestyle and independence of the Volga Region’s native populations. Dubman, Khoziaistvennoe osvoenie srednego Povolzh’ia.
Whether or not Gurii’s arrival announced the beginning of a committed conversion process, his procession and ritualized arrival in Kazan’ were integral parts of the formation of a new civic identity for the city of Kazan’. Kazan’ was the religious and political center of a Muslim state. Gurii publicly announced Muscovy’s spiritual and political possession of Kazan’ and the territory of the Khanate. In addition, Gurii’s procession transformed the Islamic city of Kazan’ into a holy city for Russian Orthodoxy. Rather than denying the religious importance of the city, Gurii transformed it from a Muslim capital to an Orthodox one. The new civic identity of Kazan’ was suitable for its new position inside Muscovy, and the physical presence of the archbishop and the new monasteries would continually reinforce the image of Kazan’ as a holy Orthodox center.

THE METROPOLITANS OF KAZAN’

By the end of the sixteenth century, the archbishops of Kazan’ had been elevated to the rank of metropolitan and achieved new levels of national prominence. Germogen, the first Metropolitan of Kazan’, was also its most famous. Metropolitan Germogen was an important hagiographical author, producing the texts of the first two miracle cults for Kazan’. He later became Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church early in the seventeenth century, solidifying not only his position in the Church’s history but also Kazan’s.22 While no other metropolitan in the seventeenth century attained Germogen’s

22 Several books were published on Germogen to commemorate the 200th anniversary of his death. These include: E. Cherkashin, Patriarkh Germogen: K 300 letiiu so dnia smerti 1612-1912, (Moscow: Tipografiia Pochaevskoi Lavry, 1912); and Vasilii Borin, Sviatieishii Patriarkh Germogen i mesto ego zakliucheniiia, (Moscow: Izdanie tserkovno-arkheograficheskago otdeia pri Obshchestve Liubitelei Dukhovnago Prosveshcheniia, 1913).
national stature, his career influenced the subsequent actions of the metropolitanate and consolidated Kazan’s aura of Orthodox holiness.

Germogen’s most lasting legacy on Russian Orthodoxy in the Middle Volga Region was the “Life of Gurii and Varsonofii” and the “Tale of the Appearance of Kazan’ Icon of the Mother of God.” Germogen wrote “Gurii and Varsonofii” either in 1596 or 1597. Germogen might have written the original version of the “Icon of the Mother of God” after its discovery in 1579, but definitely edited the final version of the tale in 1594 or 1595. Gurii and Varsonofii first appeared in a national Ustav for commemoration in 1610, and the Mother of God icon acquired a national festival on 8 July in 1633 in commemoration of its first appearance. These two miracle tales transformed Kazan’s image throughout Muscovy as one of the country’s spiritual centers. This reinforced Kazan’s position as the third city in the Russian Orthodox hierarchy, and made the city an important pilgrimage site.23

The “Life of Gurii and Varsonofii” focused upon the selection of the men for their positions in Kazan’ and Gurii’s procession, but briefly summarized their careers after their first arrival. According to their vita, Gurii dedicated himself to establishing the Russian Orthodox Church in Kazan’. Varsonofii founded the Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery in Kazan’, and German, another member of the procession, established the Bogoroditsii Monastery in Sviiazhsk. Germogen wrote that once Varsonofii and German built their monasteries, they devoted themselves to the conversion of their non-Orthodox

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neighbors. 24 “Gurii and Varsonofii” recounts how Varsonofii, the son of a Russian clergyman, was captured by the Crimean Tatars and spent three years as a Crimean slave. During his enslavement, Varsonofii learned Tatar, providing him the skill to lead conversion efforts. 25

Gurii died on 5 December 1563, and German succeeded him as the second archbishop. Varsonofii became Bishop of Tver from 1567 to 1570, but returned to the Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery where he died on 11 April 1576. Germogen revealed their relics in 1595 by opening their tombs, and subsequently wrote the “Life of Gurii and Varsonofii” as the miracle cult was being established. 26 By the early-seventeenth century, sixty-six miraculous cures were recorded. Most of those cured by the relics were clergy, townspeople, and servants. Most of the sixty-six were from Kazan’ uezd, with the furthest arriving from Arzamas, Vologda, Viatka, and Rostov, all towns with trade connections to Kazan’. While the “Life of Gurii and Varsonofii” accounts that local Muslims were “awed” by the miracles, the vita did not include a single example of a non-Christian experiencing a miracle. 27

The development of a miracle cult of the Kazan’ Mother of God Icon was similar to the one surrounding “Gurii and Varsonofii.” During a fire in Kazan’ on 23 June 1579,

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24 For German’s history in Sviiazhsk’s Bogoroditsii Monastery, see: A. Iablokov, Pervoklassnyi muzhskii Uspensko-Bogoroditsii monastyr v gorode Sviiavhe, Kazanskoi gubernii, (Kazan’: Tipo-litografiia Imperatorskogo universisteta, 1907), pp. 3-31.


26 “Life of Gurii and Varsonofii,” ff. 170r.-171v. Also see E. Golubinskii, Istoriia kanonizatsii sviatykh v Russkoi tserkvi, (Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1903), pp. 118-119. Golubinskii adds that the relics of both Gurii and Varsonofii were moved from the monastery to a new stone cathedral in Kazan’ on 4 October 1595.

27 “Life of Gurii and Varsonofii,” ff. 175v.-197r.
the icon appeared in a vision of a young girl, instructing her to take shelter in Church of Nikolai Tulskii the Miracle-worker. According to the tale, the appearance of the icon during the fire was a reward from God for the Orthodox faithful in Kazan’ for their ongoing battle against non-believers (*inovernye*). The subsequent sixteen miraculous cures recorded were similar to those of “Gurii and Varsonofii” in terms of geographical origins and social rank of those cured. Most of those cured were local townspeople and clergy, but there was one noble, the wife of *syn boiarskii* Ivan Kuz’minskii.

Both miracle cults became prominent pieces of Kazan’s image as a holy city. As metropolitan, Germogen used his position to popularize these local cults, recording the appearance of the relics and icon and their miraculous cures. Pilgrims traveled to Kazan’ specifically to pray at these holy sites. Germogen sponsored a new chapel in the Bogoroditsii Convent in Kazan’ specifically to house the Kazan’ Mother of God Icon. Germogen supplemented the new miracle cults with new ecclesiastical foundations, including the Ioanno-Predtechenskii Monastery in Kazan’.

National importance followed upon the heels of local success. As mentioned above, Gurii and Varsonofii were commemorated throughout Muscovy by 1610. The

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30. During Germogen’s metropolitanate, the Bogoroditsii Convent received two new stone churches, and new icons, books, and vestments for services. Germogen’s later embellishments to the Convent helped establish it as an important pilgrimage site. E. A. Malov, *Kazanskii Bogoroditskii devich’ monastyr’*: *Istorii i sovremennoe ego sostoianie*, (Kazan’: Tipografiia Imperatorskogo universiteta, 1879), pp. 3-4.

31. The foundation of the Ioanno-Predtechenskii is discussed in its official history, P. Azletskii, comp., *Opisanie Ioanno-Predtechenskogo muchshogo monastyrja v gorode Kazani*, (Kazan’: Tipt-litografiia Imperatorskogo universiteta, 1898), pp. 4-5.
Mother of God icon received national attention shortly after, when an early copy of the icon was carried into battle against the Poles in 1612. The icon’s role in the Muscovite military advance was commemorated in a short tale, “About the Advance of the Kazan’ Icon of the Mother of God toward Moscow,” which recorded several new miracles affecting the Russian troops. With the spread of local miracle cults into Muscovite ones, the influence of Russian Orthodoxy in the Middle Volga Region became important for the entire country. While Ivan IV’s conquest of Kazan’ had been celebrated as a holy conquest with the building of St. Basil’s cathedral in Moscow, these later miracle cults further connected Kazan’ to the public conception of Muscovy as a blessed, holy kingdom.

During his entire career in the Church, Germogen encouraged the perception of Kazan’ as an Orthodox city. He maintained a correspondence with the tsar during his time in Kazan’, reminding the tsar of his important connections within the Church, the icons and religious books possessed by the metropolitanate, and the contributions to local defense provided by the region’s monasteries. Germogen’s contacts and influence in Moscow, particularly with Vasilii Shuiskii, was the main element in his rise through the hierarchy, becoming Patriarch of Moscow when Shuiskii became tsar. Germogen’s primary responsibility as patriarch was to gather support for Shuiskii, but he continued to promote Kazan’ and its local cults. It was at this time that Gurii and Varsonofii

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32 The tale is published in PSRL 14, pp. 132-133. The tale is briefly discussed in Pelenski, Russia and Kazan, p. 273.

33 RGADA, f. 281, Gramoty kollegii ekonomii, op. 4, d. 6432, 25 January 1595, Letter from Germogen to Tsar Feodor Ivanovich; and RGADA, f. 281, op. 4, d. 6432, 25 January 1595. Germogen also received updates from Patriarch Iova concerning current political developments in Moscow, RGADA, f. 156, Istoricheskie i tseremonial’nye dela, d. 76, 1598, Letter from Patriarch Iova to Germogen.
transitioned from local saints into national ones.\textsuperscript{34} The Mother of God Icon’s role in supporting the Muscovite army against the Poles, in addition to Germogen’s martyrdom at the hands of the Poles, reinforced the contribution of Kazan’ and its local Orthodox faithful in supporting a true Russian tsar against foreign invaders. Germogen’s actions expanded local cults targeted at the conversion of local Muslims into national cults empowering Russian Orthodoxy against all other faiths, including Catholicism.

None of the metropolitans of the seventeenth century matched Germogen’s prominence in Muscovite society. Germogen’s actions as metropolitan, however, established the general policies pursued by all later metropolitans. The Metropolitans of Kazan’ continued to promote the miracle cults of Gurii and Varsonofii and of the Mother of God icon. The icon processed to many of the region’s monasteries to remind the public of its power. For example, local churchmen regularly transferred the icon to Alatyr’s Sviato-Troitskii Monastery, and in 1686 a new church was built inside the Novodevichii Alekseevskii Convent in Arzamas to house the icon there.\textsuperscript{35} New attention was brought to the miracle cult of Gurii and Varsonofii with the addition of German, the second archbishop of Kazan’, to their \textit{vita}e in the 1670s.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{34} Gurii and Varsonofii were not included in the \textit{Ustav} of 1602 but were included in 1610 after Germogen’s tenure as Patriarch. Bushkovitch suggests it that the inclusion was to bolster support in the Middle Volga Region during the Bolotnikov Revolt, but Germogen’s inclusion of local Saints he created should also be considered a factor. See Bushkovitch, \textit{Religion and Society}, pp. 87-88.


\textsuperscript{36} While the date of German’s addition to the miracle cult of Gurii and Varsonofii is uncertain, it was completed by 1678. In a letter to Metropolitan Ioasaf of Kazan’ in 1678 concerning the construction of a new cathedral for the Kazan’ Mother of God Icon, thanks are given to “Gurii and Varsonofii and German Kazan’ miracle-workers,” \textit{Akty iuridicheskie, ili sobranie form starinnago deloproizvozstva}, (St. Petersburg, 1838), #380, pp. 400-401, 12 August 1678. For a discussion of German’s career before and
In addition, Germogen’s connection to the cults became increasingly important after his martyrdom. Illustration 4.1 is reproduction of a late-seventeenth century icon, which commemorated Germogen’s discovery of the miraculous powers of the Mother of God icon. In this icon, Germogen’s stature was sufficient for him to be almost level with the icon being brought to Kazan’ by two angels. Illustration 4.2 is a reproduction of another late-seventeenth century icon commemorating Germogen’s opening of the

during his time as archbishop until his death during the oprichnina, see: A. A. Zimin, Oprichnina, (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo “Territoriia,” 2001), pp. 157-159.

37 Illustration reproduced from Borin, Sviatieishii Patriarkh Germogen.
Illustration 4.2: Icon of Germogen opening the caskets of Gurii and Varsonofii

Illustration reproduced from Borin, Sviatieishii Patriarkh Germogen.

caskets of Gurii and Varsonofii to reveal their uncorrupted bodies. In both cases, later Church authorities elevated Germogen’s spiritual importance by sacralizing his role in the creation of these two miracle cults. As the heirs to Germogen, later Metropolitans of

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38 Illustration reproduced from Borin, Sviatieishii Patriarkh Germogen.
Kazan’ benefited from the growing portrayal of Germogen as a holy figure throughout his time in the office.

Germogen and the later metropolitans of Kazan’ enhanced the reputation of Kazan’ as a holy Russian Orthodox city. Not only did the local miracle cults gain national recognition but these cults also became a part of the Muscovite resistance to foreign invaders early in the seventeenth century. The conquest of the Khanate of Kazan’ created an image for Ivan IV as the promoter of Orthodoxy against Islam, which was expanded by later hierarchs into an image of the Muscovite tsar against all infidels.

CHALLENGING RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY

While the Russian Orthodox hierarchy successfully established Kazan’s reputation as an Orthodox city of national importance, there were local challenges to this portrayal. Makarii’s call for Orthodoxy’s defeat of Kazan’ was fulfilled, but military success did not translate into the conversion of the region’s Muslim and animist populations. In the traditional rhetorical style, the miracle tales suggested that the Muslims were awed by the power of the Christian God, but in reality their awe did not translate into numerous conversions to Russian Orthodoxy. The Russian Orthodox Church schism of the 1660s further complicated conversion by creating a challenge to Orthodoxy from within.39 The Russian Orthodox Church regarded the competing

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versions of Orthodoxy to be a much more serious threat than the alternative faiths of the indigenous populations of the region. While the local hierarchy achieved a level of accommodation with Muslims and animists throughout the region out of necessity, they could not tolerate the Old Belief. In fact, even converts from Islam received increased attention after the schism for fear that the tsar’s new Orthodox subjects could become Old Believers.

Throughout most of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, local Russian Orthodox churchmen accommodated the religious diversity of the territory under their control. They received tacit support for this approach from the Church hierarchy in Moscow and state officials both in the region and in the center. Despite this reality, conversion policies in the Middle Volga Region received consistent attention from historians since the nineteenth century. Makarii’s rhetorical attack on Islam was accepted as proof of the Russian Orthodoxy’s active conversion program. Many historians further argued that the financial incentives offered by the Muscovite government drove successful conversions where exhortations to convert failed. However, financial incentives were first enacted in the 1680s, but some non-Russians converted to Russian Orthodoxy as early as the 1550s. Furthermore, the incentives begun in the 1680s failed


41 When the first financial incentives were set in place for conversions to Russian Orthodoxy, they were not universally applied. Murzii Tatars, most of whom had converted to Russian Orthodoxy in the sixteenth century, had several opportunities to receiving incentives if they were still Muslim in 1680. PSZ 2, #823, p. 267, 21 May 1680; PSZ 2, #867, pp. 312-313, 16 May 1681; and PSZ 2, #870, p. 315, 24 May 1681.
to match the state’s persistent conversion efforts in the middle of the eighteenth century.  As a result of the thrust of historiography of the region, the policies of religious accommodation have remained unstudied.

The issue of conversion is an example of the disconnect between the constructed history of the Volga Region and the reality. Though the *vita* of “Gurii and Varsonofii” stresses that Varsonofii’s position as abbot of the Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery in Kazan’ provided him the opportunity to convert local Muslims and animists, there is little evidence later abbots throughout the region followed his example. As their landlord, later monasteries and convents had the closest contact of any Orthodox institution to the region’s non-Russian peasants. By 1621, Sviiazhsk’s Bogoroditsii Monastery possessed at least two Tatar villages, Khoziasheva and Isakov, and Saransk’s Kazanskii Bogoroditsii Monastery received the Mordvin village of Bogoslovskoe in 1686. However, there is no demographic evidence to suggest that close contact with the monasteries produced conversions in these villages.

The only other group in the Middle Volga to be offered a financial incentive were Mordvin peasants, see A. Mozharovskii, "Po istorii provshcheniia Nizhegorodskikh Mordvy," *Nizhegorodskie eparkhal’nye vedomosti*, 16 (1890): 664-674.

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43 *Dokumenty Kazanskogo kraia*, #38, pp. 84-92; and RGADA, f. 281, Gramoty kollegii ekonomii, op. 7, d. 10826. Other monasteries possessing non-Russian villages include the Troitse-Sergeivskii Monastery in Alatyr’ with the Tatar village of Ivanovka by 1641/2, S. A. Shumakov, ed., *Obzor “Gramot kollegii ekonomii”*, vyp. 1, (Moscow, 1899), pp. 79-80; and all of the monasteries in Arzamas, including its Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery, which controlled a local Mordvin village, identified by its complaint of high taxes on 14 January 1695, RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 321. In fact, in one study of monastic landholding in Simbirsk and Samara *uezdy*, E. L. Dubman claims that all land granted to monasteries in those regions was settled with Tatars and Mordvins peasants, E. L. Dubman, *Khoziastvennoe osvoenie srednego Povolzh’ia*, p. 13.
Monasteries had both amicable and hostile relationships with their peasants, but religious affiliation was not the deciding factor. Financial and jurisdictional issues were the most common factors influencing the connection between peasants and landlords. For example, the Muslim Mordvin Gerasim Onanin reported to his landlord, Abbot Kornilii of Arzamas’s Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery, that his fellow villagers, the Muslim Tatars of Cherny Khrety, had fled the area and were not returning. Onanin hoped to avoid responsibility for fulfilling the Tatars’ obligations in addition to his own.\textsuperscript{44} The peasants of Chernukha, a Mordvin village, petitioned Tsar Feodor Aleksevich to be returned to the Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Convent of Arzamas, who had been granted the village more than fifty years earlier, in 1626/27. The villagers preferred the convent as a landlord to their current one, a Russian servitor.\textsuperscript{45} Conversely, the Savvo-Storozhevskii Monastery of Simbirsk faced defiance from one of its Tatar villages, Voznesenskoe, which had petitioned the tsar in 1686 to be freed from its monastic landlord.\textsuperscript{46} Religion could have been a factor in this last case, but according to the petition, the primary motive was financial and not religious: to be freed from financial obligation to the monastery.

If monasteries and convents did not concern themselves with the religious affiliation of their peasants, neither did the Russian Orthodox hierarchy in Moscow.

\textsuperscript{44} RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 293, 23 February 1648.

\textsuperscript{45} The response from the tsar’s government was to return the petition without answering their plea. RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 303, 30 March 1679.

\textsuperscript{46} The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa’s response to the Tatars was a flat denial of their petition, reminding them they had been bequeathed in 1674/5, ten years before the petition, in memory of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich. The response concluded with a reiteration of all of the various responsibilities the village had toward the monastery. RGADA, f. 281, op. 8, d. 11557, 26 July 1686.
particularly in the seventeenth century. Filaret, for example, not renowned for his religiosity, never mentioned conversion issues in his correspondence with the churchmen of the Volga Region. Filaret did send letters concerning his own authority over church institutions, as well as advice on property rights and monastic legal privileges. Later patriarchs, such as Nikon, did not vary from the relationship established between the patriarchs and Volga Region, focusing largely on financial matters when communicating with Orthodox hierarchs. Even after the Stepan Razin Revolt, widely supported by the non-Russian populations of the Volga Region, the patriarchs never instructed the metropolitans of Kazan’ to focus upon conversion attempts. For example, in 1690 the current Patriarch sent a long list of instructions for the administration of the Metropolitanate of Kazan’ and Sviiazhsk. It contained numerous instructions for the clergy’s role in the region, but no reference to conversions or the non-Orthodox living in the territory.

The Russian Orthodox Church’s lack of conversion attempts among the Middle Volga Region’s non-Russian populations was reinforced by the state’s failure to discriminate on the grounds of religion in its relationship with those same populations.

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47 Filaret was the father of Tsar Mikhail Romanov, and had been forced to become a monk during the Time of Troubles. Filaret used his authority as patriarch to reinforce Mikhail’s rule as tsar. There are numerous examples of these sorts of letters from Filaret. For example, in a series of letters to the Arzamas Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery, Filaret covered land grants (RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 268, 23 January 1632), his importance and ability to settle intra-monastic disputes (RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 269 13 March 1632), and tax disputes (RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 278, 21 August 1633). Filaret sent one letter concerning Kazan’s Troitse-Sergeivskii Monastery’s legal right over its peasants on 5 March 1627, explicitly warning them to not let the local voevoda, Vasilii Petrovich Morozov, claim legal authority, RGADA, f. 281, op. 4, d. 6457.

48 In one such letter from Patriarch Nikon, he lectured Archpriest Trofim of the Arzamas Voskresenskii Monastery to stop petitioning the patriarchate for financial support since the monastery had already been provided a mill to support themselves. RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 296, 23 September 1657.

49 PSZ, vol. 3, 22 August 1690, pp. 70-80.
Conversion to Orthodoxy was not a prerequisite for use of the Muscovite legal system. This idea was enshrined in the *Ulozhenie of 1649*, a codification of Muscovite law to standardize certain legal practices, which allowed everyone in Muscovy equal access to the courts, though procedures and penalties differed according to social rank. For example, before testimony in all court cases, a Russian was required to kiss a cross, while the non-Russians were required to “take an oath … according to their creed.” Also, Muslims and animists entered Muscovite service and received *pomest’e* (service land) to support their military obligations just as ethnic Russians could, and did so in large numbers during the sixteenth and seventeenth century.

The treatment of the region’s non-Orthodox residents contrasts sharply with that of Old Believers after the schism. While Old Believers developed a variety of different theological positions, they were all united in their rejection of the reforms of Patriarch Nikon. As early as the 1660s, Muscovite authorities identified such dissenters as schismatics (*raskol’niki*). Since the Old Belief was a powerful force in the Middle Volga in the eighteenth century, some historians have assumed a similar influence in the seventeenth century, but without evidence to support this assertion. The first hint of the

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50 Several other clauses of the *Ulozhenie* further demonstrate the equal access to the legal system for Orthodox and non-Orthodox subjects. For example, the fees for judicial cases was the same for both groups, as was the amount to be paid when filing a petition to the state. Richard Hellie, trans. and ed., *The Muscovite Law Code (Ulozhenie) of 1649*: Part 1, *Text and Translation*, The Law of Russia: Series 1: Volume 3, (Irvine, CA: Charles Schlacks, Jr., Publisher, 1988), p. 44, 98, 148. Hereafter, *Ulozhenie*.

51 Tatars Iangil’d Enandarov and Bakrach Ianchurin were provided *pomest’e* in order to provide for their military service on 18 July 1595. Enandarov, who had already served the tsar for three years, was awarded 50 *cheti* of land in Sviiazhsk *uezd*, while Ianchurin, who just entered service, was only awarded 20 *cheti* of land in the same *uezd*. I. P. Ermolaev and D. A. Mustafina, eds., *Dokumenty po istorii Kazanskogo kraia: Iz arkhivokhranilits Tatarskogo ASSR (vtoraja polovina XVI-seredina XVII): Teksty i komment*, (Kazan’: Izdatel’stvo Kazanskogo universiteta, 1990), #16, pp. 49-51.
Old Belief appeared by 1670, but not until later in the 1670s was the first report of the schism among the local Orthodox peasantry received. The earliest groups of Old Believers were found in the northwest portion of the Middle Volga, surrounding Nizhni Novgorod, and in the southern portion, near Penza. Accordingly, by the eighteenth century, the northeastern Volga Region and the southern portion, particularly Penza, Saratov, and Samara uezdy, had widespread, though still numerically small, Old Believer communities.53

As was true throughout Muscovy, the first proponents of the schism were ecclesiastical men and women who were the first to learn of Nikon’s reforms of Church practices. There is one report of a sermon given in 1670 at a cathedral in Kazan’ where the priest recalled the “old times,” but there is no other evidence of anyone supporting the Old Belief until 1675.54 By 1675, the situation had changed, and Archimandrite Antonii of Sviiazhsk’s Bogoroditsii Monastery was accused of maintaining a correspondence

52 For example, Zenkovskii connects the appearance of any Old Believers as evidence they participated in the Razin Revolt of 1670, but it is highly unlikely since the Old Belief in 1670 had not yet reached outside of ecclesiastical institutions, and there are no monks or priests who participated in the Razin Revolt. Sergei Zenkovskii, Russkoe staroobriadchestvo: Dukhovnye dvizheniia semnadtsatogo veka, (Munich: Wilhem Fink Verlag, 1970), pp. 322-331.

53 The earliest evidence places the Old Believers in the Middle Volga by 1670, but as a population a fraction of the size later identified in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in those same places. I. Peretrukhin, “ Staroobiadtsy v Kniaigininskom uezd, Nizhegerodskoi guber.,” Staroobiadiets, 3 (1907): 323-331; I. G. V., “Bratskoe slovo k beglopopovtsam, skazannoe v sele Kamenke, Penzenskoi guber. pri staroob. molit. dome.,” Staroobiadiets, 8-9 (1908): 723-727; V. C. Rumiantseva, Narodnoe antitserkovnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v XVII veke, (Moscow: “Nauka,” 1986), pp. 180-188; S. V. Sirotkin, “ Raskol’nich’ia prelest’ v Arzamasskom uezde v 70-e gg. XVII v.,” Staroobiadichestvo v Rossii (XVII-XX veka), Ed. E. M. Iukhimenko, (Moscow: Iazyki Russkoi kul’tury, 1999), pp. 261-268. In the census from 1858, great numbers of Old Believers were registered living throughout the Middle Volga Region. Kazanskaia guberniia had 8,954, Nizhegerodskovaia had 20,246, Penzenskaia had 7,793, Samarskaia had 28,750, Saratovskaia had 25,843, and Simbirskovaia had 8,645, which equaled approximately 15% of the total Old Believer population in European Russia. I. A. Kirillov, Statistika staroobriadchestva, (Moscow: Tipolitografiia I. M. Mashistova, 1913), pp. 13-14.
with a community of Old Believers in the Blagoveshchenskii Monastery in Viaz’ma, and then again in 1676 of communicating with the Vvedenskii Devichii Convent.\textsuperscript{55} The Bogoroditsii Monastery was the region’s third oldest monastery and among its wealthiest from its salt refining; the discovery of its abbot as an Old Believer was a serious problem for the local Church hierarchy.

At approximately the same time, the first reports of Old Believer peasants were being sent to Moscow by the voevoda of Arzamas. From its proximity to Nizhegorod uezd, a developing Old Believer center, the presence of these schismatics was predictable but still disconcerting for local authorities who witnessed the southward spread of the schism. In the first report, the Old Belief had led to the death of Aleksandr Vasil’ev and his family. According to gramota sent to Moscow, one peasant of Vasil’ev’s village in Arzamas uezd, Mamon Sergeev, burned Vasil’ev, his wife, and their children to stop the spread of their “fascination” (prelest’) with the Old Belief.\textsuperscript{56} In response to this report, the Novgorodskiaia chetvert’ instructed the local voevoda that if any other schismatics or fascinated people (raskolniki i prelesnye liudi) were uncovered doing “an evil thing” (zloi del), then they should be imprisoned in an isolated cell.\textsuperscript{57} By the spring of 1676, Arzamas’s voevoda reported with alarm the arrival, or at least discovery of, more Old


\textsuperscript{56} RGADA, f. 159, Prikaznye dela novoi razborki, op. 3, Novgorodskii prikaz, d. 448, ll. 25-28, no later than 12 October 1675.
Believers in his *uezd*, which was leading toward more violence among the local peasantry.58

The correspondence from Arzamas explains the state authorities’ greater concern with the spreading schism than the ongoing presence of unconverted non-Russians. The presence of Muslims and animists in the Middle Volga Region was the result of Muscovy’s conquest of the Khanate of Kazan; their religious differences had been accepted, perhaps grudgingly, since the middle of the sixteenth century. The Russian Orthodox schism, however, created a new religious divide that resulted in escalating violence among the region’s Russian peasantry. Though the Middle Volga’s non-Russian populations had rebelled, they had been relatively peaceful for most of the time under Muscovite rule. Therefore, for both religious and secular authorities, the schism created a real danger on the frontier.59

The Russian Orthodox hierarchs extended their concern over the spread of the Old Belief to include those recently converted to Russian Orthodoxy. Either from a belief that those most recently converted to Russian Orthodoxy were the most vulnerable to the appeal of the schism, or that non-Russians who had once been animist or Muslim were untrustworthy, the *novokreshchane* (recently-baptized) found themselves singled out for special attention from local Church authorities. For example, in 1687 Metropolitan

57 RGADA, f. 159, op. 3, d. 448, ll. 29-30, 13 October 1675.

58 RGADA, f. 159, d. 563, ll. 93-97, 12 May 1676.

Adrian of Kazan’ warned Archimandrite Misail of the Maloiunginskii Monastery in Koz’momed’iansk to watch all of the novokreshchanye peasants on the monastery’s estates for proper Christian observances. At the same time, the Muscovite government began to extend legal privileges to the same novokreshchaneoe community that was being closely supervised by the local Church. In 1681, the chancelleries promulgated a law requiring the return of any votchina or pomest’e land had been taken away from baptized Tatars. Furthermore, in 1682 another law allowed land to be seized from Muslim Tatars and granted instead to novokreshchanye Tatars. In a period when recently-baptized non-Russians received close scrutiny over their religious practices for fear of their conversion to the Old Belief, secular officials began to legalize incentives for conversion, allowing the converted populace to benefit at the expense of their unconverted brethren.

There can be no doubt that the greatest religious challenge to Russian Orthodoxy in the Middle Volga Region was one of its own making: the schism. The spread of the Old Belief also spread local violence among Orthodox believers. It was only in this period of religious division that non-Russians gained the greatest advantage for converting to Russian Orthodoxy. Perhaps the Russian Orthodox Church hoped to

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60 B. D. Grekov, et al., eds., Dokumenty i materialy po istorii Mordovskoi ASSR, Tom II, (Saransk: Mordovskoi nauchno-issledovatel’skii institut iazyka, literatury i istorii pri SNK MASSR, 1940), #208, 16 November 1687, p. 72. Hereafter, Dokumenty po Mordovskoi ASSR.


63 While no laws exist demonstrating clear incentives for conversion in the Middle Volga, incentives became common in other parts of Muscovy under Peter the Great. For example, in Siberia Ostiaks and Tatars who converted to Orthodoxy were to be provided a new shirt, some iasak, and select privileges from the regional governors, PSZ, vol. 5, p. 133, 6 December 1711.
replace parishioners lost to the schism from Muscovy’s non-Russian population, or the Church valued religious uniformity on a level that had not yet existed in a period of great upheaval. In either case, Metropolitan Makarii’s plea for the conversion of the region’s Muslim populations gestated for more than a century before it began to take root.

CONCLUSION

The religious history of the Middle Volga is most clearly defined by two pivotal events—the conquest of Kazan’ in 1552 and the schism of the 1660s—which were not only important for the frontier but also for the central provinces. Metropolitan Makarii’s exhortations of the Tsar Ivan Vasilievich were justified by the first successful conquest of an Islamic state by an Orthodox one. When Archbishop Gurii spiritually claimed Kazan’s kremlin with his procession in 1556, Makarii’s hopes achieved fruition. However, the actual conversion of the Middle Volga’s non-Orthodox population never became a priority for the churchmen within the region.

Instead, the local miracle cults of Metropolitan Germogen became cults of national importance, which became driving forces against Catholicism in the form of the Poles rather than Muslims or animists in the Volga Region itself. In Muscovy, alternative forms of Christianity were always more threatening than the religions of non-Christians; this explains the importance placed upon the conversion of West European mercenaries in the tsar’s army who served arm-in-arm with Middle Volga’s non-Russians who served without conversion pressures.64 It was in fact the challenge of the Russian Orthodox

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64 For a discussion of the pressures to convert upon Western mercenaries, see W. M. Reger, “Baptizing Mars: The Conversion to Russian Orthodoxy of European Mercenaries during the Mid-Seventeenth Century,” The Military and Society in Russia, 1450-1917, (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 390-391.
The schism was not only a challenge inside the Volga Region but also throughout Muscovy, especially for the tsar. Ivan Vasilievich’s victory over Kazan’ demonstrated that the tsar was Orthodoxy’s most important defender. Once alternative Orthodoxies existed, however, the image of Muscovy’s tsar as a holy figure was tarnished. When Peter the Great assumed the throne, the schismatics portrayed Peter as the antichrist – Orthodoxy’s greatest opponent. The opposition of the Old Believers was a factor in Peter the Great’s recreation of the symbolic representations of the tsar’s power, relying upon Roman classical models of procession and rituals rather than Russian Orthodox ones. Historians have connected Peter’s use of classic rituals as a part of Peter’s Western-styled absolutist reforms of the Muscovite government. Peter’s borrowing of these classical models, however, was not an absolutist innovation but instead a refashioning of the tsar’s holy aura to accommodate changed cultural circumstances in the wake of the schism.

The Russian Orthodox Church schism ultimately diminished the importance of Kazan’ at the national level. The miracle cults of Gurii and Varsonofii lost their national prominence by the end of the seventeenth century, not even surviving the Nikonian

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reforms when they were removed from the national liturgical calendar. Kazan’s Mother of God icon was physically disconnected from the city of Kazan’ when it was transferred to a cathedral in St. Petersburg constructed for its storage.\textsuperscript{67} Under Muscovite rule, Kazan’ slowly descended from the city of a tsar to one city of the new Russian Empire.


CHAPTER 5

LANDHOLDING AND MUSCOVITE SERVICE

Muscovy’s possession of the Middle Volga Region was endangered by its new subjects and nearby nomads during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Muscovite government had to invent a method of providing armed forces on its exposed frontier, preferably without great expense. As with all early modern monarchies, raising a new army was a considerable challenge. Using monasteries and *pomeshchiki* (military servitors), the Muscovite government attempted to ensure its security along the frontier with an enhanced defensive position, supplementing the Volga Region’s urban garrisons of *streltsy* with a military presence in the countryside. Monasteries and *pomeshchiki* already existed within Muscovy, but their transplant to the Middle Volga Region changed their functions. Though neither monasteries nor *pomeshchiki* produced the instantaneous results announced with the triumphant rhetoric of religious conquest, the steady incursion of Muscovite presence into the Middle Volga slowly pacified Muscovy’s new territory.

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Muscovite expansion into the Middle Volga Region was a unique moment in the history of Russian colonialism. Since the Middle Volga was populated with settled, agrarian non-Russian peasants, Russian peasant settlement was not required to establish defensive lines for security, because the local populations could fulfill that role, unlike the situation along Muscovy’s steppe frontier in the south. The Middle Volga’s peasants could be readily placed under the supervision of monastic or pomeshchiki landlords to toil in the fields, unlike in Siberia where the native populations tended to live a nomadic lifestyle. Therefore, the Muscovite government supported only the presence of Russian 


monks and *pomeshchiki* in the Middle Volga Region, because there was no immediate need for Russian peasants to occupy the state’s new territory.

Granting land to monasteries and *pomeshchiki* was the first step of expanding Muscovite control of the Middle Volga Region outside Kazan’s walls. Monasteries were the first and easiest solution for managing vast tracts of land and large numbers of people with the smallest expense for the state. Monasteries had strong walls, which created physical defenses for the region as well. To provide troops for the region’s defenses, the state granted *pomest’e* (service land)—a temporary grant of land and the people on it—to provide the revenue to support the *pomeshchik’s* military service. Unlike elsewhere in Muscovy, the authorities required the residence of the *pomeshchiki* inside the Middle Volga Region if not on their actual *pomest’e*. Not only would the *pomeshchiki* be present to provide their military service and enhance the region’s defenses but also they would monitor the activities of their non-Russian peasants, as the monasteries did.

5 The *pomest’e* system and its ability to provide for *pomeshchiki* closely resembles the contemporaneous system operating in the Ottoman Empire, where *sipahis* (cavalrymen) were provided for by *timars* (villages), which were temporary grants to prevent families from developing close ties with the local community. This similarity is evidence of the practicality of providing for military servitors with land grants for all early modern empires. See Daniel Goffman’s work for a more extensive discussion of service in the Ottoman Empire, *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), especially pp. 77-83.

Though granting land was a relatively straightforward process for the state, ensuring the fulfillment of its wishes was considerably more complex. Both the monasteries and the *pomeshchiki* attempted to manipulate the Muscovite government’s actions for their own betterment, though the reasons they resisted governmental decrees were dramatically different. Monasteries witnessed a steady decrease in the amount of land under their control during the seventeenth century, as the state supported an increase in the number of military servitors for greater security. In contrast, *pomeshchiki* continually protested the *pomest’e* system itself, which was a recent innovation.

Traditionally in Muscovy, landholding took the form of *votchina* (hereditary land), which then belonged to the servitor’s family in perpetuity. Since *pomest’e* was a temporary grant, after a servitor’s death or disability it would be granted to another servitor, potentially dispossessing the original *pomeshchik’s* heirs, if there was no one in the family of age to provide military service. Moreover, the Muscovite government also willingly included the local non-Russian populations among the potential pool of candidates for *pomest’e*, a further complication to any set of principles guiding land grants because Russians and non-Russians comprised different ranks under Muscovite law.

Frontier conditions forced the Muscovite government to modify its policies in the Middle Volga Region. Security was the primary concern of state authorities, and the government granted its frontier land to the institutions and people most capable of providing military service and enhancing frontier defenses. Following the grants, the...
central chancelleries attempted to enforce compliance over the objection of monks and *pomeshchiki*. The tension between the state’s and the individuals’ desires produced a series of small compromises, producing a land utilization system unique to the Middle Volga Region. With a relatively small commitment of Russian monks and *pomeshchiki* inside the Middle Volga Region, the region itself became an important gateway to the continual expansion of the Russian state.

THE POMEST’E SYSTEM

1. Land Grants for *Pomeshchiki*

   The central chancelleries’ control over land grants empowered Moscow’s control over the Middle Volga Region. Land grants of *pomest’e* to monasteries and *pomeshchiki* provided a solution to the state’s security concerns for its frontier: the twin dangers of nomadic invaders and possible uprisings by the region’s non-Russian populations. In addition, the state had to ascertain that the region could produce the revenue necessary to support its defense, which required the monks and *pomeshchiki* to guarantee the labor of the peasants on their land. If any recipient of a land grant failed to provide the needed product—military service, supervision of the local community, or revenue—then the state could seize that land and award it to other servitors more willing to fulfill their responsibilities.

   Grants of *pomest’e* in the Middle Volga Region varied tremendously. *Pomest’e* was a land grant, frequently including a populated village. If the *pomest’e* was unpopulated, then the *pomeshchik* had to develop the resources of his land in order to support his military service and tax obligations. The basic unit of *pomest’e* was a
chetvert’ (pl. cheti), which was the equivalent of 1.35 acres. Some pomest’ia were quite extensive. Torka Ianziaitov, a Murzii Tatar, possessed the village of Iashovo in Sviiazhsk uezd with 250 cheti surrounding the village, and Kliuch Begeneev received Botaev in Sviiazhsk uezd with 170 cheti.⁷ These relatively large grants contrast sharply with Nikifor Lavrentev syn Sobakin’s pomest’e of only 15 cheti in Arzamas or Ivan Volodimer syn Volyskov’s 11 cheti in Alatyr’.⁸ Overall, about half of the pomeshchiki in the Middle Volga Region had land with a village. If the pomest’e did not include a village, it was generally between 20 to 60 cheti, with few as small as Sobakin’s or Volyskov’s. All of the information here is based upon an examination of reports from 1670, but there is no indication that these grants were unusually large or small when compared with earlier periods.

The revenue generated by a pomest’e grant varied as well, because of these variations in the amount of land granted and the size of its population. Having a village was not necessarily an advantage, as most villages had to turn part of their harvest over to local authorities to provide for the region’s streltsy, and more of it as iasak to the regional voevody, before they paid their financial responsibilities for their new landlords.⁹ Furthermore, pomeshchiki and monasteries who received pomest’e gained the responsibility of assuring the payment of this tax revenue. In addition, the type of goods

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⁷ RGADA, f. 210, Razriadnyi prikaz, op. 21, d. 228, l. 3, no earlier than 1669.

⁸ RGADA, f. 210, op. 21, d. 245, ll. 2-3, 22 June 1670.

⁹ For example, the village Turgakova, along the Picheniia River in Alatyr’ uezd contained 9 households that paid 2 rubles in iasak to Alatyr’s voevoda and 7 chetverti of rye and oats for the streltsy before providing for its pomeshchiki. A. V. Kleiankin, ed., Perеписная книга мордовских селений Алатырского уезда 1671 года, (Saransk: Mordovskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1979), pp. 72-73. All of the villages including in this perеписная книга paid similar amounts to the local authorities.
produced from the land was as important as the size of the grant in determining the eventual revenue. Taking advantage of the natural resources in the region, some pomeshchiki preferred the region’s traditional products rather than raising crops or livestock. In particular, some pomest’ia remained forested to support the work of bortniki (beekeepers), especially for those pomeshchiki who were granted Mordvin or Tatar villages.¹⁰

In order to receive pomest’e in the Middle Volga Region, servitors had to demonstrate loyalty to the tsar, particularly through earlier military service. When Leontii Luk’ianov syn Chufarov received 70 cheti in Simbirsk uezd in 1675 as his pomest’e, the grant specifically stated that it was a reward for his service in the tsar’s army.¹¹ For a non-Russian hoping to become a pomeshchik, service in the tsar’s army was the primary criteria for receiving land. When Iangil’d Enandarov and Bakrach Ianchurin, Tatars in service, received pomest’e in 1595, Enandarov received 50 cheti of land in Sviiazhsk uezd for his three years in service, while Ianchurin received only 20 cheti of land in the same uezd because he had just entered service.¹² Generations of a single family in service received greater rewards, as seen in the case of Nuramet Nurkeev, who received the village of Egingereva with 70 cheti of fields as votchina in

¹⁰ For example, Fedor Ivanovich Sychov and Isak Parfen’ev kept their Mordvin villages in Arzamas uezd as bortniki, an effective use of pomest’e considering the high value of honey and wax. B. D. Grekov, et al., eds., Dokumenty i materialy po istorii Mordovskoi ASSR, Vol. 1, (Saransk: Mordovskoi nauchno-issledovatel’skii institut iazyka, literatury i istorii pri SNK MASSR, 1940), #44, 18 September 1619, pp. 250-257. For further discussion of beekeeping in the Middle Volga, see chapter 3.

¹¹ P. Martynov, comp., Seleniiia Simbirskogo uezda (Materialy dla istorii Simbirskogo dvorianstva i chastnogo zemlevladeniia v Simbirskom uezde), (Simbirsk: Tipo-litografiia A. T. Tokareva, 1903), p. 120. Hereafter, Seleniiia Simbirskogo uezda.
addition to his current *pomest’*e, in honor of the ten years of service his father provided the tsar.\(^3\)

Local authorities in the Middle Volga Region also valued loyalty, but with the caveat of current residence in the region. The number of men available for military service was an ongoing concern, especially for the local authorities, because of the fear of both nomadic raiders and local rebellions. In order to guarantee the continuing presence of a part of his staff, one *voevoda* of Kazan’ even turned over part of his own *pomest’*e in Kazan’ *uezd* to provide land for his staff in 1581.\(^4\) A similar situation arose late in the seventeenth century when the *voevoda* of Saransk supported the petition of the local *streltsy*, who asked the tsar for 300 *cheti* of land to provide for their continuing presence in the city.\(^5\)

It is probable that maintaining, or perhaps increasing, the number of military servitors on the frontier influenced the government’s decision to enlist the Middle Volga’s non-Russian population into the local armed forces. The percentage of non-Russian servitors in each town was highly variable, though the region’s oldest cities tended to have a higher percentage of non-Russians in service than in the newest ones. In 1669 in Sviiazhsk, for example, 79.1% of the 149 servitors were non-Russian, comprising


\(^3\) *Dokumenty Kazanskogo kraia*, #31, pp. 72-74, 13 April 1622.

\(^4\) *Dokumenty Kazanskogo kraia*, #5, pp. 38-39, 28 February 1581.

\(^5\) RGADA, f. 1455, Gosudarstvennye i chastnye akty pomestno-votchinnykh arkhivov XVI-XIX vv., op. 2, d. 6493, ll. 4-6, August 1685.
82 Muslim Tatars and 28 other non-Russians (*inozemtsy*). In 1677 in Penza, however, out of the 468 servitors recorded by the *voevoda*, there were only 109 Mordvins and 33 Tatars in servitors, or a total of 30.3% of the servitors. Even accounting for the variable percentages of non-Russians serving the tsar, the Middle Volga Region was unique in Muscovy for the considerable multiethnic and religiously diverse composition of its *pomeshchiki*.

The Middle Volga’s *pomest’e* system differed in other significant ways from the system in the interior. A grant of *pomest’e* in the Middle Volga carried an expectation of frontier settlement for the *pomeshchiki*, whereas this was not required in Muscovy’s central provinces. This change conformed to the wishes of local officials, who valued current residence for all potential *pomeshchiki*. A *d’iak* of Atemar, Petr Samoilov, accepted *pomest’e* in nearby Saransk *uezd* on 30 May 1677. Samoilov remained in town rather than settle on his land, leaving the land unused. Moscow sent him a rather sternly-worded *gramota* in 1679, commanding him to travel to his land in Saransk and provide the service for which it had been granted.

Without current residence in the Middle Volga Region, there was little guarantee that the servitor would provide his expected service or his tax obligations. Since this was a regional peculiarity, the government frequently reminded the region’s *pomeshchiki* of

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16 RGADA, f. 210, op. 21, d. 228, ll.1-7ob. In nearby Kokshaisk, 75% of the 12 servitors were non-Russians, though 8 out of 9 of them were Orthodox converts. RGADA, f. 210, op. 21, d. 228, l. 13, 1669.

17 Aleksandr Barsukov, ed., *Desiatni Penzenskago kraia (1669-1696)*, (St. Petersburg, Sinodal’naia tipografiia, 1897), pp. 1-87.

18 RGADA, f. 1455, op. 2, d. 6497, 13 September 1679.
their duty. This was the case for Vasilii Elatin in 1654, when the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa warned him to start fulfilling his duties, and his failure was not uncommon.\footnote{For example, on 16 April 1654 Vasilii Elatin was reminded by the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa that he owed them both taxes and service, which he had failed to provide the previous year RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 2753. The Kazanskii dvoret reminded Savin Fedorov syn Aukin and Petr Painravevich Nechaev in 1688 to fulfill their duties in Saransk uezd, RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 2749; Aukin’s is l. 1, Nechaev’s is l. 2. The Pomestnyi Prikaz reminded Boris Skaskev in Saransk on 20 May 1694 or his failure to fulfill his obligations, RGADA, f. 1209, Pomestnyi Prikaz, op. 78, d. 2750.}

In the central provinces, \textit{pomest’e} always carried military service obligations, but it did not in the Middle Volga. Some of the region’s non-Russians received \textit{pomest’e} to support their tribute payments only. One \textit{voevoda} of Svitazhsk granted \textit{pomest’e} to the \textit{iasachnyi} Tatar Aladiachek Bivaev syn Isheev for his use as well as for the villagers of Nirkov-Amachev in 1625.\footnote{\textit{Seleniia Simbirskogo uezda}, 21 March 1625, pp. 127.} In exchange for legally recognizing the \textit{iasachnye} Tatars’ right to the land of their “fathers and grandfathers,” the \textit{voevoda} guaranteed continuing payments of fish and beaver pelts as tribute from Isheev and his fellow villagers. This grant was an early example of a later law, which officially enshrined this practical solution for generating revenue as a legal principle for the Volga Region. In November 1685, it was decreed that if Murzii, Tatars, or other service \textit{novokreshchane} were involved in trade which provided “needed stores” for the army, then they were “liberated” from land taxes and duties.\footnote{\textit{In order to promote fulfillment of a servitor’s responsibilities, the central government followed a set of procedures to control the \textit{pomeshchiki} as much as possible.}} Revenue was expected from \textit{pomeshchiki}, but the \textit{pomest’e} system adapted to local conditions sufficiently to create a special category of \textit{pomeshchiki} who did not provide service but still contributed to Muscovy’s coffers.
If a servitor received more than one land grant, all of this land was located on the frontier, to avoid military servitors abandoning frontier land for the safety of the central provinces. For those multiple-grant pomeshchiki, their land was either in more than one uezd of the Middle Volga Region or a combination of land inside the region and some in the northern region defined by Vologda, Vladimir, and Nizhnii Novgorod, to ensure their proximity to the region. Iakov Matiunin, for example, possessed land in Nizhegorod, Alatyı’, Kurmysh, and Arzamas uezdy. Kazan’-resident Andrei Vasilev syn Elagin accepted land in Arzamas in addition to his possessions in Kazan’ in 1676. Andrei Vel’iamov, already possessed of lands in Vologda and Galich, both out of the Volga Region, when he received land in Alatyı’ in July 1687.

These isolated examples are representative of a widespread phenomenon in the Middle Volga Region. The muster records of the voevoda of Saransk on 22 June 1670 recorded military servitors from a wide section of the Volga, specifically those in Alatyı’, Arzamas, Kadom, Kurmysh, Murom, Nizhnii Novgorod, Saransk, Shuia, and Temnikov. This report only covers those pomeshchiki responsible for providing some service to the voevoda of Saransk, but provides a general overview of the situation. The report covered a total of 66 pomeshchiki with land in those uezdy; those 66 pomeshchiki controlled approximately 3450 cheti of land, including the pomest’e they had been

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22 RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 33, no earlier than 1686/87.

23 RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 147, ll. 2-4, 25 September 1676.

24 RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 35.

25 RGADA, f. 210, op. 21, d. 245.
granted outside of the Volga Region. Of the 66 pomeshchiki, 40 possessed land in more than one _uezd_, and 27 of those possessed land outside of eight _uezdy_ covered in the report. The land granted outside of the original eight _uezdy_ of the report were all located within a triangular region defined by Vladimir and Nizhni Novgorod in the south and Vologda to the north. No one in the Saransk report possessed land in any other place than the original eight _uezdy_ and the northern region; however, the previous examples include one person with land in Arzamas and Kazan’.

By clustering the land of the Middle Volga’s pomeshchiki on the frontier to keep them there, the Muscovite government changed its traditional patterns in granting _pomest’e_. Military servitors with _pomest’e_ in the central provinces frequently found themselves with several small grants distributed among a geographically-diverse area. That pattern of land grants prevented pomeshchiki from developing close connections in one particular _uezdy_, whereas in the Middle Volga Region the servitors’ continuing presence on their lands was highly desirable.

If military servitors resisted the state’s plans for keeping them on the frontier by failing to provide their required military service or tax obligations, the central chancelleries resorted to more coercive measures in order to achieve their goal. The best weapon against pomeshchiki was a threat of seizure of the land grant. The land seized would be regranted to another servitor, though only to one of similar ethnic

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26 In the Saransk muster roll for 1670, 39.4% of the servitors had single- _uezd_ _pomest’e_, and the remainder had possessions in nearby _uezdy_. Ia. E. Vodarskii argued that single- _uezd_ landholdings were a rare exception by 1700, and A. A. Novosel’skii concluded that by the second-half of the seventeenth century single- _uezd_ landholdings had disappeared. However, single- _uezd_ landholdings, such as in Saransk, corresponds with Valerie Kivelson’s study of provincial landholding. For a complete historiographic discussion as well as Kivelson’s findings, see her *Autocracy in the Provinces*, pp. 84-92.
One example of this was the case of Savva Fedorovich Lukin in Simbirsk uezd. In 1671, the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa reminded Lukin to pay taxes for his 300 cheti of land outside of Simbirsk. Having continued to fail in his obligations, the Prikaz removed the pomest’e from his control in March 1675, when it granted it to two brothers from Simbirsk, Zomin and Petr Popov. The service-Tatar Tolubaik Tonashev received the village of Beteman as his pomest’e in Kazan’ uezd in April 1622 under such circumstances. Another service Tatar, Isennaleevskii, had been granted the land, but upon his death his children departed from the pomest’e, losing their claim for it. On occasion the state authorities preferred a more benevolent solution after protests from the pomeshchik, allowing the servitor to retain his land and letting the near loss of his pomest’e serve as a reminder of his obligation to fulfill his duties.

2. Land Grants for Monasteries

The Middle Volga Region’s monasteries and convents supplemented the military service and tax revenue produced by pomeshchiki from their pomest’e. These institutions became a common feature on the frontier, since they could defend the territory and

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28 RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 2782.

29 For example, Voevoda Gleb Ivanovich Morozov of Kazan’ attempted to seize the pomest’e of the Iaushev family of service-Tatars in Kazan’ uezd in 1650. After the Iaushevs protested, the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa allowed them to keep their land, though the voevoda reminded the Iaushevs that they must pay their taxes and provide required service in order to keep the pomest’e in the future. Dokumenty Kazanskogo kraia, #76, 9 April 1650, pp. 163-167.
manage the population, generally with more extensive lands than servitors. Monasteries and convents generated revenue for the state in multiple ways, by supporting the region’s economic development and also paying taxes.\textsuperscript{31} Between 1552 and 1700, thirty-one monasteries and sixteen convents were founded within the Volga Region, both inside and outside of cities.\textsuperscript{32}

Monastic buildings served as large-scale defenses for the newly-founded cities. Monasteries had served defensive purposes for Muscovy and the southern frontier before the conquest of the Khanate of Kazan’; therefore it was logical to use monasteries along the newest frontier.\textsuperscript{33} Monasteries in the Volga Region tended to supervise the construction and repair of their own stone walls, as was the case for the Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery of Arzamas, which hired local peasants for the masonry work.\textsuperscript{34} Monasteries that possessed additional defensive structures, such as turrets, did so at the express direction of the central chancelleries, who also financed the construction. Kazan’s two oldest monasteries, the Zilantov Uspenskii and the Spaso-Preobrazhenskii, both had several turrets, constructed in the 1570s and 1580s. Successive metropolitans of Kazan’ received instructions from Moscow to construct these defenses for the protection of the city.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{31} The economic functions of monasteries is discussed in chapter 3.

\textsuperscript{32} See chapter 1 for a discussion of monastic foundations.


\textsuperscript{34} RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 260, 24 March 1630.
Monasteries founded outside of city walls created an important connection between city and countryside, extending Muscovite influence, governance practices, and religious traditions further into the territory. Urban monasteries also received villages in the countryside, as well as economic rights over certain fields or rivers, as part of their foundation, further connecting these new cities to their hinterland. The Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery in Kazan’, for example, possessed at least three villages in Kazan’ uezd—Iakovlevskoe, Tolseka, and Sukhaia. Many of these monasteries and convents possessed extensive lands in largely non-Russian territory, bringing the Russian Orthodox Church into close contact with non-Orthodox populations. The Bogoroditsii Monastery in Sviiazhsk, founded in 1555, possessed at least two Tatar villages, Khoziashcheva and Isakov, by 1621.

Land controlled by the monasteries provided a series of important services to the government, but not without the same difficulties created by pomeshchiki. Abbots

35 These arrangements were reviewed in a document sent to Metropolitan Germogen later in the sixteenth century, RGADA, f. 281, op. 4, d. 6432, 25 January 1595.


37 Episkop Nikaron, “Vladeniia gramaty Kazanskogo Spasopreobrazhenskogo monastyria,” Izvestiia obshchestva arkheologii, istorii i etnografii pri Imperatorskom Kazanskom universitete, 11 (1893). Iakovlevskoe is attested in a gramota from 15 June 1506 (pp. 272-4), Polseka in a gramota from 5 November 1595 (pp. 361-2), and Sukhaia on 29 January 1601 (pp. 362-3).
received reminders as often as servitors, indicating a widespread problem with the fulfillment of their obligations along the frontier. Monasteries sometimes failed to pay taxes or financially support local military units, and attempted to claim greater privileges throughout the region. For example, the central chancelleries granted Arzamas’s Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery several villages to support the streltsy of Arzamas, but then the monastery failed to do so, resulting in several reminders to fulfill their obligations.

A similar situation arose in 1647 when the Osinskii-Preobrazhenskii Monastery in Kazan’ was reminded of its responsibility for paying the previous years’ obrok in order to support local streltsy.

The Muscovite government remained committed to pomeshchiki and monasteries as the solution to frontier security concerns throughout the early modern period. In order to achieve this goal, the central government pressured servitors and monasteries to fulfill their obligations with numerous reminders or even threats of seizing land grants. At the

38 Dokumenty Kazanskogo kraia, #38, pp. 84-92. Other monasteries possessing non-Russian villages include the Troitse-Sergeiiskii Monastery in Alaty’ with the Tatar village of Ivanovka by 1641/2, S. A. Shumakov, ed., Obzor “Gramot kollegii ekonomii”, vyp. 1, (Moscow, 1899), pp. 79-80; the Kazanskii Monastery in Saransk with the Mordvin village of Bogoslovske in 1686, shortly after the founding of the city itself, RGADA, f. 281, Gramoty kollegii ekonomii, op. 7, d. 10826; and all of the monasteries in Arzamas, including its Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery, which controlled a local Mordvin village, identified by its complaint of high taxes on 14 January 1695, RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 321. In fact, in one study of monastic landholding in Simbirsk and Samara uezdy, E. L. Dubman claims that all land granted to monasteries in those regions was settled with Tatars and Mordvins peasants, E. L. Dubman, Khozistvennoe osvoenie srednego Povolzh’ia, p. 13.

39 Numerous examples exist of reminders sent to abbots. The Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery in Kazan’ failed to pay its taxes in 1639, when it was reminded of the kindness of the tsar in providing them with land and fishing rights to the Volga, for which it owed taxes, RGADA, f. 281, op. 4, d. 6471. The Savvo-Storozhevkii Monastery in Saransk followed the pattern of several of its pomeshchiki when it was reminded of their tax obligations on 20 May 1683. The monastery had earlier petitioned to have its taxes reduced since it could not pay as much as had been expected; the amount had been reduced, but they still had not paid, RGADA, f. 281, op. 7, d. 10825.

40 RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 248, 2 June 1619; RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 251, 25 February 1621.

41 RGADA, f. 281, op. 4, d. 6477.
same time, other actions to accomplish the state’s goals, such as keeping servitors’ land clustered together in a small geographic area on the frontier, changed the *pomest’e* system from its origins in the center of Muscovy. Frontier conditions altered the state’s policies in the Middle Volga Region, but without compromising their effectiveness.

**GROUND FOR NEGOTIATIONS**

While the central chancelleries employed varied strategies to force *pomeshchiki* and monasteries to fulfill their military and tax responsibilities, *pomeshchiki* and monasteries employed their own strategies for reducing their responsibilities or enlarging their land grants. Servitors and monks had three major approaches for achieving their personal goals: rejecting a land grant, claiming the land was of poor quality, or using petitions to alter their land, its boundaries, or their obligations. In each case, central or local authorities had to respond either by acceding to or rejecting the claims of the plaintiff. The state’s plan for servitors and monks to fulfill its goals for regional security created a space for individuals to negotiate with the state for personal gains.

In addition, these negotiations between individuals and the Muscovite government created tension between local and regional authorities. The immediate concern of the officials on the frontier was the complete utilization of available land—once all available was claimed, then the greatest number of troops and tax revenue would be produced. With the distance between the Middle Volga Region and Moscow, central authorities were not as willing to agree to each demand of local servitors or monks. The ensuing conflict between the interests of local and state officials frequently resulted in local
voevody interfering in the land grant process to ensure the immediate resolution of claims rather than drawn-out disputes.

_Pomeshchiki_ rejected land grants in the Middle Volga Region, but it is hard to determine when this was from lack of need or when it was rejected from legitimate concerns about the quality of the land. However, whether the land was of sufficient quality to provide for a _pomeshchik_, local authorities attempted to grant the land to any willing servitor. Bogdan Matveevich Khitrovo and Petr Shapilov rejected some land in Nizhegorod _uezd_ in 1677, because they believed the land to be of poor quality. The current _voevoda_ of Nizhni Novgorod, Boris Vasil’evich Gorchakov, petitioned the Pomestnyi Prikaz for the right to regrant the land to other servitors. The Prikaz agreed, believing in the validity of _Voevoda_ Gorchakov’s claim that Khitrovo and Shapilov already had “too much land,” and the opinion of the local village elders, who assured Gorchakov that the land was good.  

Khitrovo, as one of Muscovy’s most prominent boiars, did not have a pressing need for claiming land with greater obligations than _pomest’e_ in the center, but granting the land was a necessity for frontier authorities. The _voevoda’s_ interference with this rejected land grant was a fairly typical occurrence. If a Russian servitor could not be found for _pomest’e_, the rejected lands could be offered by a _voevoda_ to a non-Russian servitor. This was the case in 1613 when the state granted the Chuvash Men’shii syn Andreianov a _pomest’e_ that Ivan and Kalin Esipov had rejected in Kazan’ _uezd_.  

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42 RGADA, f. 1455, op. 2, d. 7118, 18 September 1677. Another regrant of rejected land was made by the _voevoda_ of Alatyry, when he offered land rejected by Grigor Nekliudov to Kozan Pushchenikov, arguing that Pushchenikov’s _pomest’e_ laid alongside the rejected land, therefore Pushchenikov would want the rejected land “for his family.” RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 4, no earlier than 1622/23.
seventeenth century, which is how Elbno Fedorovshii, a non-Russian who had converted to Orthodoxy, received his land in Kazan’ uezd in 1690. The land in question had been in the possession of the recently deceased Fedor Stilenev. First the voevoda offered this land to the Russian Lov Zhukov; Zhukov examined the land and rejected it, informing the voevoda that the land was “untrustworthy.” The voevoda of Kazan’, Danil Adonaevich Boriatsinskii, included Zhukov’s rejection of the land in his offer to Fedorovshii, who accepted this grant.

The process of granting pomest’e created a demand for land among non-Russians that resulted in a non-Russian accepting land when a Russian servitor would not. However, non-Russians needed to demonstrate loyalty to the state with military service for the tsar, if they were to have their petitions for land approved. Non-Russians who served in a tsar’s administration as bailiffs or translators, for example, did not meet that qualification despite their service. Ivashka Khvotsov and Granushka Machekhin, two Tatar bailiffs of Kazan’ in the 1580s, were both denied land in spite of several years of service in the voevoda’s office. Denying the requests of non-Russians in administrative service created a pool of potential recipients for the land that was rejected by Russian pomeshchiki. The quality or location of the land was less important to this group because it was the only possibility for receiving land. In this way, rejecting the petitions of non-Russian servitors became a long-term asset for local administrators, who ultimately kept all of their frontier land under the supervision of a pomeshchik or monastery.

43 This land comprised 65 cheti of land and Benete, a village, Dokumenty Kazanskogo kraia, #28, pp. 66-67, 26 June 1613.

44 RGADA, f. 1455, op. 1, d. 1330, 23 September 1690.
For Russian servitors, rejecting one offer of *pomest’e* in the Middle Volga Region functioned as a bargaining position in order to receive lands in a different *uezd* or perhaps lowered tax obligations. The central chancelleries, knowingly or unknowingly, supported this tactic by responding to one rejection with an offer for other lands. Boris Matveev and Fedor Sychov first rejected land in Arzamas, and then later in Alatyr’, as the Pomestnyi Prikaz attempted to find land suitable for them in this new frontier.\(^46\) Even non-Russians who had converted to Orthodoxy might receive the same negotiating advantage for rejecting land. Mikhail Petrov and Ivan Semenov deti Beklemeshev, converted Tatars, first rejected land in Alatyr’ and then again in Nizhegorod *uezd* in 1687/88.\(^47\)

The negotiating process over rejected *pomest’e* extended even beyond the original parties involved. Potential Russian servitors frequently petitioned for the right to receive *pomest’e* rejected by other servitors just as non-Russian servitors did. Davyd and Mikhail Zherebtsovykh petitioned Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich for the right to receive the *pomest’e* that had been rejected by Nikita Kudrin in Arzamas and Nizhegorod *uezdy*.\(^48\) Boris Morozov petitioned for land in Alagorenskii *stan* in Alatyr’ *uezd* on 1660. Artemii Ivanov syn Agibalov rejected this land the previous year; Morozov hoped to add this *pomest’e* in Alatyr’ to his *votchina* in Arzamas.\(^49\)

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\(^{45}\) *Dokumenty Kazanskogo kraia*, #12, 13 September 1585, p. 46.

\(^{46}\) RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 18, 1672/73.

\(^{47}\) RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 36, 1687/88.

\(^{48}\) RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 98, [1613-1645].

\(^{49}\) RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 10, 2 June 1660.
While outright rejections of land grants were possible before a servitor received land, after accepting a land grant it was not an option. However, claiming that the land was of poor quality and needed to be exchanged, or perhaps even sold, was a valid justification for those with or without land. Some of the claims that the land had deteriorated and was no longer arable would have been truthful. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, most peasant farming used the slash-and-burn method, which was common in the densely forested Volga Region. While initially the soil would have been rich, after several years, yields would have dropped considerably. Metropolitan Mafeia of Kazan’, for example, successfully petitioned the tsar in 1616 for new land, because the metropolitanate’s lands were “used up.”

With the depletion of the quality of the soil a genuine concern in the region, it frequently appeared as the cause for both land exchanges or the receipt of new land. The priest Markel Konstantinovich made three separate attempts to buy land from Arzamas’s Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery. In his second attempt, he claimed that his family’s votochina “had served long enough” and that his children “had fallen out over it,” and for their “future happiness” he wanted to acquire some land from the monastery. Neither his first attempt nor his last had any reference to problems with his children or the quality of his land, suggesting that his land was not exhausted. Similarly, when Ivan Romadinovskii of Atemar petitioned the tsar in 1652 for permission to sell his pomest’e

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50 RGADA, f. 281, op. 4, d. 6451, August 1616. At least one local resident attempted to claim the metropolitanate’s new lands, leading to another declaration of the metropolitanate’s ownership just two years later. RGADA, f. 281, op. 4, d. 6452, 10 May 1618.

51 RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 261, 3 September 1628.

52 RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 273.
to the local monastery, the Spaso-Prichistaia Bogoroditsaia, he begged the tsar to allow the sale, because “nothing grows on” the pomest’e, and “there is certain death from hunger.” While it is possible that the monastery would pay for depleted land, it is equally possible that Romadinovskii was using this trope to escape the tsar’s service.

Both the rejection of land grants and claims of the soil’s depletion were possible strategies to receive different or better quality lands, but the most common approach to changing the size or quality of the land under a pomeshchik’s control was to challenge the current boundaries of his pomest’e. Many servitors petitioned the tsar to have the records of the boundaries of their pomest’e adjusted, which could reduce their tax obligation if successful. Kondratei Filimonov, for example, managed to lower his yearly tax payments for his fields in Simbirsk uezd in December 1682. Nikita Semenov syn Bolkovskii wrote several petitions in the 1690s to persuade the central authorities that he should keep his pomest’e in Arzamas without fulfilling his military service obligations.

Petitions from servitors frequently sought to improve their land by acquiring a portion of their neighbors’ land. Boundary disputes of this type occurred among servitors and between local ecclesiastical institutions and servitors throughout the early modern period. In most cases involving only servitors, the current pomeshchik of the land in question was victorious against claims for his land. However, infrequent successes by those attempting to dispossess the current pomeshchik likely encouraged more petitions and litigation. In 1691, for example, Lev Dmitrev syn Ermolaev lost control over his

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53 RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 176, March 1652.
54 Seleniia Simbirskogo uezda, p. 168.
pomest’e in Nizhegorod uezd to Stepan Romanov syn Kolitsov. Ermolaev possessed 12 cheti of pomest’e adjacent to Kolitsov’s 30 cheti of votchina. When Kolitsov petitioned the tsar for more land, he received Ermolaev’s.\textsuperscript{56} In this case, Ermolaev was given land as compensation along the Kama River, much further to the east than his original land.

Not all land disputes between servitors were resolved by a state agency. On rare occasions, one of the servitors involved opted to use force rather than litigation for a resolution. In 1685, the voevoda of Saransk investigated the accusations of Simbirsk-resident Timofei Iachont’ev syn Karazulov against Matvei Erlov, who resided on his pomest’e in Saransk uezd.\textsuperscript{57} Karazulov accused Erlov of arriving on Karazulov’s 60 cheti of pomest’e in Murom uezd, “breaking him,” and seizing his land, forcing Karazulov to live on 20 cheti of land in Simbirsk. Erlov offered an alternative version of events to Saransk’s voevoda, but the Pomestnyi Prikaz rejected it, fining Erlov for the attack.\textsuperscript{58} Interestingly, while Erlov was found at fault and fined, he was allowed to keep possession of the land he had seized.

In disputes involving monasteries during the sixteenth century, the legal owner of the land usually was victorious in maintaining possession. Before 1560, the voevoda of Kazan’ unsuccessfully attempted to seize some of the Zilantov Uspenskii Monastery’s

\textsuperscript{55} Bolkovskii petitioned the voevoda of Arzamas in 1690/91 without success. In 1692, he petitioned the tsar. RGADA, f. 210, op. 20, November 1692.

\textsuperscript{56} RGADA, f. 1455, op. 1, d. 1163, after April 1691.

\textsuperscript{57} RGADA, f. 1156, Saranskaia prikaznaia izba, op. 1, d. 6, 15 October 1685, ll. 1-3.

\textsuperscript{58} Erlov explained to Saransk’s voevoda that there had not been any violence, and that Karazulov willingly made this land deal. According to Erlov, Karazulov’s desire was to be summoned to Moscow to the Pomestnyi Prikaz to meet with the tsar, which could happen if he made a poor land deal. It is probable that Saransk’s voevoda was a friend of Erlov, since the voevoda petitioned the tsar for Erlov’s fine to be
lands in Kazan’ uezd, perhaps hoping to support military servitors with it.\textsuperscript{59} Another such
collision was resolved in favor Kazan’s Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery of 1595, when
the abbot there gratefully received news from the government that he had been successful
in keeping his land against the claims of local streltsy.\textsuperscript{60}

When monasteries tried to seize land that had been granted to servitors, they were
generally unsuccessful. Sviiazhsk’s voevoda, Petr Ivanovich Rostovskii, warned
Sviiazhsk’s Bogoroditsii Monastery to stop claiming the village of Beshbotman in
Sviiazhsk uezd in 1583. The monastery’s lands entirely surrounded the village, rightfully
the pomest’e of Nikita Fedorov syn Ol’gov, and it recently had attempted to rule Ol’gov’s
peasants as their own.\textsuperscript{61} Similarly, the Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery of Sviiazhsk lost
its battle in a dispute over a village of “tsarist peasants” against the voevoda of Kazan’ in
1669. While the voevoda’s office received the rights to the village in 1618, the
monastery had claimed it in 1652. After each side presented its claims, the Prikaz
Kazanskogo dvortsa decided in favor of the voevoda, but the crops from the current
year’s harvest would be turned over to the monastery first.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{59} The monastery won this case against the voevoda on 19 June 1560, G. Z. Kuntsevich, comp. “Gramoty
Kazan’skogo Zilantova monastyria,” Izvestiia obshchestva arheologii, istorii i etnografii pri

\textsuperscript{60} The streltsy’s pomest’e abutted the monastery’s land in Gorotskaia storona along the river Ichkika. The
streltsy attempted to seize a portion of the monastery’s land; an examination of the most recent land
cadaster from 1566/67 proved the monastery correct. RGADA, f. 281, op. 4, d. 6435, 14 March 1595.
Similarly, an attempt by the voevoda of Arzamas in 1614 to seize the village of Strakhov from its Spaso-
Preobrazhenskii Monastery was unsuccessful, RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 246, 12 April 1614.

\textsuperscript{61} Dokumenty Kazanskogo kraia, #6, 22 June 1583, pp. 39-41.

\textsuperscript{62} RGADA, f. 1455, op. 5, d. 859, 29 September 1669.
During the seventeenth century, however, monasteries began to lose control over lands in their legal possession. By then, the Middle Volga Region had a larger pomeshchik population, and the state preferred a pomeshchik’s ability to manage land and people and provide military service to a monastery’s ability only to manage land and people. Monasteries consistently resisted any administrative decrees removing their privileges, but without much success, especially if a military servitor needed land and the monastery possessed more than was necessary for its survival. A longstanding dispute began between Simbirsk’s Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Convent and the voevody of Arzamas when Voevoda Mikhail Brevich Tagishchev won his claim to the village of Cherukha, a former possession of the monastery in 1672.\textsuperscript{63} The voevoda wanted the village to provide more land for more streltsy. Over the next two decades the monastery attempted unsuccessfully to reclaim its lost village, using different justifications as its appeals failed.\textsuperscript{64} The loss for the convent was not atypical, since Arzamas’s Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery lost its village of Slotnik to the local voevoda in 1686, and Arzamas’s Makar’evskii Zheltovodskii Monastery lost Kolovek in Zapesnoi stan to Mikhail Andreev syn Shaimotov in 1694.\textsuperscript{65}

\textsuperscript{63} RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 299, ll. 2-4ob., 3 May 1672.

\textsuperscript{64} On 28 April 1677, the monastery petitioned the tsar claiming the peasants of Cherukha had asked to be returned to their possession, RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 302. This produced a response from the voevoda to the villagers of Cherukha, informing the peasants any further petitions to return to the monastery would be rejected, RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 303, 30 March 1679. The monastery received a further rejection on 11 July 1683, when the voevoda of Arzamas informed them that claiming the village should remain in their possession because they converted the peasants was not valid, RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 305. The monastery persisted at least until 13 January 1688, when the current voevoda notified them that they must stop petitioning, RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 312.

\textsuperscript{65} Slotnik had been granted to the Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery in 1628/29, RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 310, 30 November 1686. RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 319, 25 May 1694.
However, in the portions of the Middle Volga where the land was still sparsely settled, the central authorities still supported monastic landowning. In particular, as more cities were established in the second half of the seventeenth century, monasteries remained an integral part of the new fortresses. For example, the Voznesenskii Monastery was founded in Syzran in 1684, and the Kazanskii Monastery was founded in Saransk in 1686, and both were given lands in the surrounding territory. Both Syzran and Saransk were established in the middle of seventeenth century, and these new monasteries were part of their defenses. In addition, while many of the claims of local authorities over monastic lands were successful, on occasion, monasteries maintained control over their land. For example, Solovetskii hermitage in Nizhegorod uezd defeated a claim from Nizhnii Novgorod’s voevoda in 1675, though the monastery’s success may have been a result from the small size of its landholdings.66

In addition to accepting the reassignment of monastic lands to lay servitors, both central and provincial authorities tried to limit the rights of monasteries to receive donations of land, because they shifted land from the possession of servitors, who provided military service, to a monastery, who might support military service with goods but not men and frequently with neither. Monasteries, however, mounted successful defenses for their donated lands. The Zaipaskii Monastery of Arzamas defended its claims to all of the lands that were donated to it in a lengthy document from 1676.67 Arzamas’s Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery received tsarist approval for its control of the village of Malakhov donated by brothers Petr and Ivan Stepanov deti Polocheninov in

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66 RGADA, f. 1455, op. 5, d. 822, 28 October 1675.
That said, it is possible that a monastery that successfully retained a donation may have then lost some of its older land grants in order to prevent the potential pool of *pomest’e* from diminishing.

The state’s security concerns of providing sufficient military servitors guided frontier policy. *Pomeshchiki*, however, not only accepted *pomest’e* but also attempted to improve their position on the frontier by limiting service and tax obligations or increasing the amount of the grant. Rejecting land grants or demonstrating land quality was poor developed into bargaining tools for achieving personal goals. By the end of the seventeenth century, increased numbers of servitors in the region created pressure for land, resulting in losses for monasteries as their ability to manage expansive estates became less important.

**FAMILY AFFAIRS**

A *pomeshchik*’s family placed one great limitation upon his ability to negotiate with the central government. While servitors employed various strategies to increase the amount of land under their control, providing for their families created an ongoing concern about the temporary nature of their land grant. Unlike *votchina*, retaining *pomest’e* was dependent upon the *pomeshchik*’s military service; upon his death, his family was dispossessed. Fortunately for the *pomeshchiki* and their families, their concerns and those of the state paralleled one another in this instance. If the servitor was survived by a son of age to provide military service, then keeping his father’s land

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67 RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 301, 10 May 1676. There is no verdict for this dispute.

68 RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, 313, 27 January 1688.
guaranteed the steady supply of military service and tax revenue from that land. There was less agreement over a servitor’s ability to use his land as a dowry for his daughter. If the daughter was an only child, then her husband could fulfill the service requirements for the pomest’e. If there were several children including a daughter, then splitting the pomest’e into portions for each child could diminish the size of the land until it was insufficient to provide for a military servitor. Because of this, pomeschchiki with small holdings found dowries more difficult to arrange than their wealthier neighbors. Personal connections with the authorities, not surprisingly, also played a role in determining the success or failure using pomest’e as a dowry.

When arranging the inheritance of pomest’e from a servitor to his son, there was widespread agreement at all levels. The servitor provided for his family, and the local and central authorities benefited from continual military service from the pomest’e. Many of the Middle Volga’s servitors received land that had been in their family for at least one generation. In 1646, the Pomestnyi Prikaz granted Aleksei Bogdanov syn Dubrovskii the land in Arzamas uezd that his father had been given in 1626/27, and Bogdan Iakovlev syn Solovtsov became the third generation of his family to receive their pomest’e in Arzamas in 1674.69

The commitment to maintaining the connections of single families to their pomest’e even extended to awarding the land to minors. Minors keeping the pomest’e of their departed fathers was not uncommon in the sixteenth century, but had become rare in the seventeenth century, at least in the central provinces.70 For example, Ivan

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69 RGADA, f. 1455, op. 3, d. 251, 27 October 1646; RGADA, f. 1455, op. 3, d. 482, 21 September 1674.
Alekseevich Alenin, a minor, received the land of his recently deceased father in Saransk uezd on 18 April 1654, because “it was necessary” for the city to keep its residents. The youngest children in the Alferov family, pomeshchiki of Saransk and Penza uezdy, received all of the family’s pomest’ia despite the claims of their elder cousins, Dmitrii and Vasilii, who had left the Middle Volga Region. This grant kept the land with the members of the family with the greatest commitment to residence in the frontier, and more importantly guaranteed frontier settlement.

Non-Russian pomeshchiki also retained land within families, though converted non-Russian families enjoyed more extensive grants than the unconverted. The Asanov family, Tatars from Kazan’ uezd, converted to Russian Orthodoxy during the sixteenth century and possessed extensive lands throughout Kazan’ and Samara uezdy by the early seventeenth century. While Iakov Vasil’ev syn Asanov (alive until sometime in the 1620s) received many of these grants for the first time, his children continued to manage his possessions after his death, in the pattern typical for the region.

Partible inheritance among all the heirs was common in Muscovy, but exceptions were possible. If there was only one heir, inheritance followed a direct line. However,

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70 Ann Kleimola suggests that in the seventeenth century the state’s goal was to keep all land in active service, a policy not served by awarding land to minors. However, on the frontier where there was a preexisting problem forcing pomeshchiki onto their land, any residents on the land may have been valuable to the interests of the state. Ann Kleimola, “‘In accordance with canons of the Holy Apostles’: Muscovite Dowries and Women’s Property Rights,” *Russian Review*, 51 (1992): 215, 226.

71 RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 2746.

72 RGADA, f. 1455, op. 3, d. 493, 22 June 1675

73 Many of these lands are detailed in *Dokumenty Kazanskogo kraia*, #s 17, 21, 23, 32, 33, 36, 47, 51, 59, 66.

if multiple heirs succeeded their father, there was no single pattern for inheritance. For example, the eldest of three Kozlov brothers, Nikita, had inherited all the *pomest’e* of his father in 1666, which included several villages in both Nizhegorod and Alatyr’ *uezdy*. His brothers attempted unsuccessfully to claim a portion of land for themselves.\(^5\)

Conversely, the next year in Kerensk, one family’s estate was divided into three to provide for two brothers, Bekbulat and Uraz Makmametev, and their cousin, Shmamet Lasaev syn Shukinchev.\(^6\)

The most important factor in determining who inherited the land was the proximity of the potential recipient to the land in question. Family members who remained in the Middle Volga Region always had an advantage over family members who left. If no family members remained in the region, then a non-related servitor from the region would become the beneficiary. This principle was in accordance with the central chancelleries’ support for the current resident of *pomest’e* against other claims. Liubim Besson syn Mekishin, a resident of Simbirsk, had to petition for his father’s land in Arzamas in 1677, because he had lost the grant to his cousin Ivan Mekishin, a resident of Arzamas.\(^7\) Semen Ivanov syn Bogtachevskii lost the village of Kamenii Brod in Simbirsk *uezd* to Savva Timofeev syn Voronkov, currently living in Simbirsk, even though the village had been the *pomest’e* of Bogtachevskii’s family for two previous

\(^{5}\) RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 13, no earlier than 1666, includes an account of all of the family’s property and upholds the exclusive grant to Nikita, denying any land to his brothers, Ivan and Petr.

\(^{6}\) RGADA, f. 1455, op. 3, d. 393, 28 January 1667.

\(^{7}\) RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 150, 12 February 1677. Many petitions exist from sons trying to reclaim their father’s *pomest’e*. For another example, see N. I. Zagoskin, *Materialy istoricheskie i iuridicheskie raiona byvshago Prikaza Kazanskogo dvortsia*, Tom I, *Arkhiv Kniazja V. I. Baiusheva*, (Kazan’: Tipografiia universiteta 1882), #8, pp. 9-10, and #10, pp. 11-12.
generations. Bogtachevskii, however, had left Simbirsk.\footnote{Bogtachevskii’s grandfather had been the original pomeshchik. Though his father had inherited the village from his grandfather, Bogtachevskii had left Simbirsk while his father was alive. The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa had given the village to Voronko upon Bogtachevskii’s father’s death, on 2 July 1685. Bogtachevskii petitioned the tsar to be given the land, but his petition was rejected on 20 March 1686. Seleniia Simbirskogo uezda, pp. 94-95.} The central chancelleries also supported keeping the lands within the family of the original pomeshchik, even if some of those family members decided not to accept the land. Konstantin Miakin, for example, received all the land awarded to his uncle (split among Arzamas, Alatyr’, and Kurmysh uezdy) after it was rejected by his cousins in 1686.\footnote{Konstantin originally had inherited half of his uncle’s land—they were split between him and one other cousin, Iakov. When Iakov died in 1686, his children rejected his lands, allowing Konstantin inherit all of them. RGADA, f. 1455, op. 2, d. 6207.}

If there was a dispute among potential recipients for pomest’e, the claimant with both familial connections to the land and current residence in the region usually defeated unrelated petitioners. In July 1681, Mikhail Ruzhevskii and one of his neighbors, Aleksei Stepanovich Khlopov, both filed claims for Ruzhevskii’s father’s pomest’e of 300 cheti in Simbirsk uezd. Khlopov failed to prevent Ruzhevskii from receiving his father’s land.\footnote{Ruzhevskii sent the voevoda a long letter explaining his father’s service to the tsar; on the basis on this service, he asked to keep his father’s land. Khlopov sent a petition to the voevoda as well, acknowledging that the land had been granted to Ruzhevskii but the land of that pomest’e was better than the pomest’e he already possessed. Both are contained in RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 2783. Ruzhevskii’s letter is ll.1-4; Khlopov’s petition is l. 5.} In 1692, Kazan’s voevoda Dmitrii Vasil’evich Urakov tried to seize the pomest’e of Stepan and Fedia Levashev for himself.\footnote{RGADA, f. 1455, op. 3, d. 831.} The Levashevs presented eight gramota to demonstrate their claim to their estate, beginning with the original grant from 1646. With this evidence and proof they had paid their taxes, the Levashevs defeated the voevoda.
On the rare occasions when familial connections failed to win these inheritance disputes, the social rank of the unrelated petitioner had to be much higher than that of the family’s. In 1676, Kazan’-resident Andrei Vasilev syn Elagin granted his father’s land in Arzamas to his nephew, Fedor Petrov of Sviiazhsk. Petrov was a relative and lived within the Volga Region. In most cases, this was sufficient for support from the central authorities for receiving the *pomest’e*. However, when the *voevoda* of Arzamas was asked to approve this exchange, he notified Elagin and Petrov that Boiar Iakov Nikitich Odoevskii already had rights for the land. Odoevskii’s rank in Muscovite society trumped the Elagin family’s connection to their *pomest’e*, bypassing the standard criteria for land inheritance in the Middle Volga Region. Since the highest rank in Muscovite society was a small group, this result was quite unusual.

The *pomest’e* system in the Middle Volga Region evolved from its origins in the central provinces. For the *pomeshchiki* who served the tsar in the Volga Region, as long as they fulfilled their service obligations and resided in the region, inheritance from one generation to the next was nearly guaranteed. Unlike in the center of Muscovy where minors were dispossessed of their father’s land because they could not fulfill the expected service, in the Middle Volga Region minors inherited the land as long as the family remained on the frontier.

One problem that followed *pomeshchiki* from the center was their daughter’s dowries. Legally, *pomest’e* was not the possession of the *pomeshchik*, and therefore it could not be divided to provide any land as a dowry. Sons, or at least male family

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82 RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 147, ll. 2-4, 25 September 1676. Elagin and Petrov protested the loss of their family’s land, but were denied.
members, tended to inherit the land under a new grant for military service, creating a bond between a family and specific lands that resembled patrilineal inheritance. With few options, *pomeshchiki* did use *pomest’e* as dowries. This created a new reason for negotiations with the central authorities as a *pomeshchik* attempted to win approval for his illegal action.\(^8\)

It is not possible to estimate how often *pomeshchiki* utilized land as the dowry for their daughters’ marriages, however, it was not uncommon. A son-in-law’s ability to provide military service made a dowry of *pomest’e* desirable for central authorities, if there was not a male heir to claim a *pomeshchik*’s land. Rank also affected dowries; servitors with social prestige in Muscovite society could have connections in Moscow to ease the land exchange. A *syn boiarskii*, Smirnoi Petrov syn Andreianov, gave his daughter Marfa an extensive dowry including bolts of cloth, various dresses, and the village of Voskresenskova in Kazan’ *uezd* upon her marriage to Mikita Ivanov syn Brekhov in 1636.\(^4\)

Gentry of the lower ranks also gave land for their daughter’s marriages. Fedor Prokof’ev Derevii gave the village Zhrikhinoi in Elnattskaia *volost’* along the Volga to Vasilii Nikoforov syn Kokorin as a dowry for his daughter’s marriage in 1654, and Boris Gavrilov syn Ostrovskii’s daughter received the village of Levasheva

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\(^8\) For a discussion of *pomeshchiki*’s dowries, see Kivelson, *Autocracy in the Provinces*, pp. 101-128.

\(^4\) *Dokumenty Kazanskogo kraia*, #50, pp. 112-113, 9 July 1636. For the country’s wealthiest and most powerful residents, outright land purchases prevented the need for arranging the transfer of *pomest’e*. Boiar Boris Ivanovich Morozov, for example, bought the village of Seriatinoe in Arzamas *uezd* for his daughter’s dowry from Arzamas’s Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery in May 1640, RGADA, f.281, op. 1, d. 286.
in Arzamas *uezd* and peasants from his estates in Vologda to marry Leontii Aleksov syn Kopnin in 1683.\(^8^5\)

These land transfers were not binding without the permission of the central chancelleries. Fortunately for *pomeshchiki*, there was support throughout the chancellery system for dowries and the exchange of *pomest’e*, because dowries reinforced the residence of *pomeshchiki* families on the frontier. Several different chancelleries had the authority to approve dowries of *pomest’e*. The most frequent chancellery to grant permission was the Pomestnyi Prikaz, which had primary responsibility for *pomest’e* throughout Muscovy. The Pomestnyi Prikaz, for example, endorsed Petr Gavrilov syn Domozhirov’s petition to the tsar to give a portion of his *pomest’e* in Zaiudemskii *stan* in Nizhegorod *uezd* to Ivan Rodinov syn Zheriskii, his current son-in-law, and resident of Alatyr’.\(^8^6\) However, the Prikaz Bol’shogo dvortsa approved the petition of *stolnik* Petr Grigor’evich Ramodanovskii for a dowry in Arzamas, and the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa approved the petition of Fedor Maksimov syn Dement’ev for using his *pomest’e* as a dowry in Alatyr’ *uezd*.\(^8^7\) When Grigor Petrov syn Evlashchev in Kurmysh obtained permission for the land transfer of his daughter’s dowry, he received it from “the tsar,” not a particular chancellery.\(^8^8\)

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\(^{8^5}\) RGADA, f. 1455, op. 3, d. 296, 6 July 1654; RGADA, f. 1455, op. 2, d. 6450, 18 March 1683.

\(^{8^6}\) RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 39, l. 1, 1685/86. Other petitions include one from Mikhail Alekseev syn Vosukii asking for permission to give land to Iakov Ivanovich Shakhov in Arzamas as a dowry for his daughter Duria in 1689/90, RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 156, ll. 6-10.

\(^{8^7}\) RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 39, ll. 2-4, 1685/86; RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 290, 1646/47; and RGADA, f. 1455, op. 3, d. 309, 9 March 1657. The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa allowed Fedor Maksimov syn Dement’ev to turn 130 *cheti* of his land in Alatyr’ *uezd* (out of 360 *cheti* combined in Alatyr’ and Arzamas) over to Bogdan Volokitich Nesterov as a dowry.

\(^{8^8}\) RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 1474, 1671/72.
However, servitors’ petitions were sometimes denied, as in the unfortunate case of Mikhail Mikhailov syn Oshcherin in 1675/76. Oshcherin had already given his son-in-law, Vania Netesev, 12 *cheti* in Arzamas *uezd*. The Pomestnyi Prikaz rejected the petition to approve the dowry, and instructed the *voevoda* of Arzamas to seize the land. The reasons for rejecting a petition are difficult to uncover, but the land seizure was clearly a punishment for Oshcherin’s actions. Oshcherin’s request might have been denied because he had already given the land to Netesev, having only sought permission after the actual exchange. For the *pomeshchiki* who did receive approval, their requests generally occurred before the land transfer.

Servitors not only concerned themselves with the marriage arrangements of their own children but also of their peasants. Some of the arranged peasant marriages involved great distances, while others were simple arrangements among family members or neighbors. The central chancelleries did not interfere with arranged peasant marriages unlike with *pomest’e* exchanges for dowries. Peasants were treated as a *pomeshchik*’s movable property, while *pomest’e* was the ultimately the tsar’s property. Praskovia Firsovna Elagina sent a peasant from her estates in Kazan’, Petr Bochkard, to her son, Gavril Kan’dret’evich Elagin. Bochkar was to marry Elagin’s peasant, Mirona Telitsina, and settle in Elagin’s village of Morkvasha in nearby Sviiazhsk *uezd*. By comparison, Dmitrii Ivanov syn Aristov had Ivan Petrovich Chaplygin’s peasant Anna travel from

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89 RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 144, l. 1.

90 RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 144, l. 2, 1675/76.

91 For another discussion of arrangements for peasant marriages among the *pomeshchiki*, see Kivelson, *Autocracy in the Provinces*, pp. 45-47.
Kurmysh to Mozhaisk uezd to marry one of Aristov’s peasants.\textsuperscript{93} Both of these arrangements occurred in the 1690s, decades after the enserfment of the peasantry in Muscovy. Though it was illegal for runaway peasants to enter the Middle Volga Region, pomeshchiki had the ability to move their own peasants into and out of the region as they required.

While a servitor’s dowry of land required the central government’s approval, peasant marriages were freely arranged because they did not involve an exchange of pomest’e. The inheritance of pomest’e, like a dowry of pomest’e, was only legal if the central authorities agreed to the transfer. Pomeshchiki treated their pomest’e as if it was still votchina, disposing of land as if they had the right to determine its ownership. The central chancelleries’ security plans for the Middle Volga Region depended upon a large pomeshchik population on the frontier. Therefore, the servitors’ interest in providing for their families coincided with the state’s interest in keeping those families in the region, facilitating the success of the servitors’ petitions in defense of their families’ rights to their pomest’e.

CONCLUSION

The use of pomest’e as the primary mechanism to divide the land of the Middle Volga Region was a unique moment in Russia’s expansion. Because the region was already settled with numerous non-Russians, the Muscovite government did not allow, or require, large-scale Russian settlement in the region. Monasteries and pomeshchiki

\textsuperscript{92} RGADA, f. 1455, op. 2, d. 5023, 10 January 1693.

\textsuperscript{93} RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 1481, January 1696.
created a strong military presence in the region for the defense of a vulnerable frontier, with minimal commitment of resources from Moscow. Without the population gained from the Khanate of Kazan’, grants of *pomest’e* to monks and *pomeshchiki* could not have been possible.

The *pomest’e* system functioned differently on the frontier than in the center of Muscovy. Grants of *pomest’e* in the Middle Volga Region carried an expectation of residence in the region, preferably on the land. This requirement influenced all of negotiations the occurred between *pomeshchiki* in the Middle Volga Region and the central chancelleries. As long as the continuing presence of the families settled in the Middle Volga Region was privileged, the *pomeshchiki* had a slight advantage when attempting to redraw boundary lines, receive better land, or even provide dowries for their daughters. For the central authorities, the goals of the *pomeshchiki*’s negotiations were minor, but these small victories created significant improvements for individual servitors, allowing them to provide for their families.

Accompanying the expansion of the Muscovite bureaucracy, the installment of mercantile reforms, and the formation of an imperial ideology, the use of the *pomest’e* system was an essential transformation of the Muscovite government to accommodate the needs of its growing empire. *Pomest’e* provided an integral component of the military presence required to serve the frontier, which reinforced Muscovite control. Though *pomest’e* created a liminal space for negotiations between the *pomeshchiki* and the central chancelleries, these negotiations and small gains never challenged Muscovite authority.
Such negotiations for individual gain were part of the absolutist system; small concessions ultimately enabled the state’s plan for military enlistment.\textsuperscript{94}

\textsuperscript{94} Similar concessions became part of Spain’s governing style, see Ruth McKay, \textit{The Limits of Royal Authority: Resistance and Obedience in Seventeenth-Century Castile}, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
CHAPTER 6

REBELLION AND RESPONSE

From the time of the conquest of the Khanate of Kazan', the Muscovite government had concerns about the security of the Middle Volga Region. Some Tatars of the Khanate continued to resist conquest throughout the 1550s, and outbreaks of violence from the non-Russian populations in the region remained an ongoing problem, including the Mari Revolt of 1573-1577 and a rebellion from 1582-1584 supported by Chuvashes, Mordvins, Maris, Tatars, and Udmurts. The Time of Troubles, the widespread Muscovite civil war, added to the difficulties of settling the frontier by engulfing the region in a national and international dispute. Following the ascension of the Romanovs to the throne in 1613 and the stabilization of Muscovy’s center, the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa began a concerted effort to pacify the Middle Volga Region and prevent future rebellions, of which keeping pomeshchiki settled on the frontier was only a part.

The rebellions in the Middle Volga Region influenced state policy because the knowledge gained by local authorities in suppressing one rebellion was incorporated into new prophylactic measures against future rebellions. Many of these measures were practical, such as limiting the sale of arms in the region. Others had widespread impact upon the entire populace of the region, such as monitoring all population movements into and out of the region. The central authorities’ policies produced mixed results, maintaining
peace for much of the seventeenth century but with a violent punctuation in 1670—the Stepan Razin Revolt.

Both urban and rural rebellions were endemic throughout the early-modern world. Unfortunately, information about the Volga rebellions is scarce, especially for the sixteenth century. Seventeenth-century records are prevalent only for the Razin Revolt, which creates difficulties in studying either the rebellions of 1606 or 1615. With the limitations of the sources, the best approach to understanding the rebellions of the Middle Volga Region is to study the resultant changes to state policies that followed in the wake of these events. Though this is a not a commonly employed approach for the study of early-modern rebellions, it should not be assumed that the causes of the rebellions in the Middle Volga Region were different than those occurring Europe. In fact, the information that does exist concerning the origins of Volga rebellions suggests common causes with those in Western Europe, such as protests against new taxes and the growing authority of the state. For example, tax riots were endemic throughout Europe. Therefore, a rebellion in Montpellier in 1645 against the implementation of a new tax, the *joyeaux avènement à la couronne*, enacted to support France’s commitment to the Thirty Years’ War has a common cause with a Middle Volga rebellion in 1615 against recent grain requisitions to provide for Muscovy’s campaign against the Crimean Tatars.¹

The Middle Volga Region’s rebellions were the greatest test of Muscovy’s ability to govern its expanding frontier. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the

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Muscovite government expanded and instituted new policies to exploit the resources of the region and the benefits of controlling an important East-West trade route. *Pomeshchiki* and monasteries were the centerpiece the region’s defenses; however, their mere presence in the region did not assure peace or potential profits. By responding to frontier rebellions, the Muscovite government demonstrated its ability to adapt to local conditions, and, as a result, Moscow’s ability to control the population of its growing empire.

**REBELLION AND RESPONSE BEFORE RAZIN**

Most of the Muscovite policies enacted in the Middle Volga Region were adopted from governing strategies employed in the center. The appointment of *voevody* and the supervision of the region by a central chancellery were as typical in Novgorod or Arkangel’sk as in Kazan’. However, the incursion of Muscovite authority into the Middle Volga Region engendered resistance among the conquered population of non-Russian peasants and elites. Rebellions remained a chronic problem during the sixty years following Ivan IV’s conquest until the Romanov ascension to the throne in 1613. While the region remained peaceful during the seventeenth century, unrest was common in the nearby Ural region and in Astrakhan, and the nomadic Kalmyks, Bashkirs, and the Nogai and Crimean Tatars continued to pressure defenses. Even when it was peaceful, the authorities never considered the region secure.

The state’s response to the danger of the frontier was to take steps to deter future rebellions. In order to maintain peace within the region and defend it from outside destabilizing forces, administrative policies required constant vigilance and military preparedness. *Voevody* closely scrutinized the local non-Russian populations for fear of
potential rebellions. The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa instructed the voevody to monitor all people moving through the region, in expectation of the arrival of runaway peasants. Free from the supervision of their state-designated landlord, runaways were a potential destabilizing force among the local peasants. While the Muscovite government recognized the value of the region and its populations, its central and regional officials feared loss of control over it.

For the first fifty years of Muscovite control of the Middle Volga Region, extant documents record neither the state’s policies nor the resulting rebellions. Other than the dates of these rebellions, little is certain. While the conquest of Kazan’ is traditionally dated to 1552, the local Tatar, Mari, Mordvin, and Chuvash populations continued to resist Muscovite conquest of Kazan’ until 1557. The best information on the ongoing resistance after conquest is in a contemporary Russian Orthodox chronicle from the period, which recorded the months when troops were sent from Kazan’ or Sviiazhsk to pacify the hinterlands. This account lacks any details about the numbers of people involved on either side, but it does substantiate that support for the Russian voevody of Kazan’ came from his streltsy, local Cossacks, and newly-converted Tatars. Contemporaneous chronicles record this resistance as a struggle between converts to Russian Orthodoxy and their pagan and Islamic neighbors, which may or may not have had basis in fact, but certainly reflected the Church’s opinion of the success of conversion.

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Another rebellion disrupted Muscovite rule in the northern end of the Volga Region from 1572 to 1574. For this revolt, documents are sufficiently rare that even the ethnic or social composition of the rebels is not certain. Some scholars have labeled this revolt the “Mari War,” though Tatar scholars note a more ethnically diverse composition of the rebels. The following decade witnessed a more widespread revolt, supported by the Tatars, Maris, Chuvashes, Mordvins, and Udmurts from 1582-1584. The extant chronicle account of this rebellion focused on the hope that more Christian conversions among the non-Russian population in the future would pacify the region, but fails to provide any details. Despite evidence that these revolts occurred, the causes, participants, and sequence of events remain in the arena of speculation.

The first comparatively well-documented rebellion in the region occurred in 1606, during the Time of Troubles, historically included in the Bolotnikov Revolt. Isaac Massa, contemporaneously recording in Moscow rumors of Bolotnikov, classified the events within the Middle Volga Region as further evidence of the decay of stability in Muscovy. He reported that fleeing merchants from Samara and Saratov escaped a general rebellion and Nogai Tatar raids. In Soviet historiography, the Middle Volga revolt was part of a widespread peasant rebellion nominally led by Ivan Bolotnikov, against the sovereignty of


5. PSRL, vol. 14, p. 34.
Tsar Vasilii Shuiskii and the ongoing enserfment process. Recently, both Maureen Perrie and Chester Dunning have challenged the traditional Soviet interpretation, arguing that the Volga rebellion included varied social ranks and that it began before Bolotnikov’s retreat through the region.\(^7\) Both the Soviet and non-Soviet historiography expands Massa’s original sketch into an urban and rural revolt of non-Russian and Russian peasants in the Middle Volga affecting Kurmysh, Arzamas, Alatyr’, Iadrin, Cheboksary, and Sviiazhsk.

Despite the differences of interpretation, the dimensions of this uprising were large enough to concern tsarist authorities, as the rebellion spread to include Mordvins, Maris, Tatars, and Russians. Though much of the fighting began as separate, disconnected revolts, the leadership of two sons of the former voevoda of Arzamas (who had been ousted by Shuiskii), as well as the recently-converted Murzii Tatar Andrei Kazakov from Kurmysh, united many of the insurrectionists. This rebellion did not spread to the north past the Volga River or connect with rebels in the south. However, the rebels killed officials loyal to Shuiskii, including the voevoda of Cheboksary. The combined army marched on Nizhnii Novgorod in 1607, and laid siege to the city but did not take it. Ultimately the capability of


the voevody of Kazan’ and Nizhnii Novgorod and their military forces succeeded in suppressing the revolt.\(^8\)

The confusion accompanying the Bolotnikov revolt can be seen in an unusual source from the times: the records of a Carmelite mission travelling to Persia. Ironically, the Volga route to Persia had been selected because it was considered to be the safest of possible options. Having been promised safe passage by the First False Dmitrii, the Carmelite monks reached Kazan’ on 2 April 1606, where they were notified of Dmitrii’s death and the ascension of Shuiskii to the throne. Held in Kazan’ until permission arrived from Shuiskii to permit their continuing travel, the monks encountered more problems in September in Tsaritsyn, where they were held until the spring. In Tsaritsyn, local officials sought approval of both Shuiskii and the Second False Dmitrii allowing the monks to depart for Astrakhan.\(^9\) The Carmelites’ travel corresponded with the beginning of the Bolotnikov Revolt, but their account highlighted the central problem in the Volga Region in 1606 as one of Shuiskii’s weak authority rather than the success of the rebels.

The Soviet interpretation of the Bolotnikov Revolt as a peasant war against enserfment fails to correspond with the evidence from the revolt. Though the social implications of the Soviet interpretation seem unfounded, undoubtedly this was a struggle against the current Muscovite government. It is likely, but not certain, that this revolt

\(^8\) Dunning, *Russia’s First Civil War*, pp. 287-291. For a contemporary report of the effort needed to reclaim Cheboksary from Tatar and Mari rebels, see *Istoriiia Tatarii v dokumentakh i materialakh*, (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoе izdatel’stvo, 1937), 1 January 1609, p. 367.

influenced the beginning of the state’s restrictive policies against the population of the Volga after the Time of Troubles.

From the state’s perspective, the Bolotnikov Revolt was one of a long series of rebellions against Muscovite authority fought in the Volga Region. However, the Middle Volga demonstrated its support for the Muscovite government by joining the military resistance to the Poles and Swedes toward the end of the Time of Troubles. Kazan’s Mother of God icon became a symbol for the Middle Volga’s forces’ commitment to resisting all foreign invaders. Participants from all of the Middle Volga’s social ranks—Russians and non-Russians, and urban and rural residents—were part of the successful campaign that succeeded in placing the Romanov dynasty on the Muscovite throne. ¹⁰

Even with the demonstrated support of the Middle Volga for a Russian tsar at the end of the Time of Troubles, the region maintained its reputation as an area subject to violent uprisings that threatened Muscovy’s authority. Both Russian and non-Russians in the region had rebelled during the previous sixty years, and the Nogai Tatars added to the confusion of the revolt during 1606-7 by raiding Muscovy’s still endangered southern frontier.

The central chancelleries’ response to these events guided the enactment of a series of restrictive policies against the region’s populace. Two of the seven articles in the instruction (nakaz) to the first voevoda of Kazan’ appointed by Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich in 1613 demanded careful control of the local community. Voevoda Iurii Petrovich Ushatii was to investigate all Russian, Murzii, Tatar, Udmurt, Bashkir, Chuvash, and Mari residents

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¹⁰ zametki, (St. Petersburg: Izdanie A. S. Suvorina, 1902), pp. 64-6; Perrie, Pretenders and Popular Monarchism, pp. 132, 144-149.
in his *uezd* to uncover any “instability” (*shatosti*) or “troubles” (*smuty*). If anyone was plotting against Muscovite rule, the *voevoda* should bring them to court, interrogate them, and search for any further evidence. Finally, “according to the investigation, if they cannot control those events (*dela*), they [the *voevoda* and his officials] should write to the sovereign in Moscow.”

Added to this careful supervision of all local residents, the *voevoda* was to observe and communicate with the *voevody* of the lower Volga cities to monitor all population movements in the region, with special attention to any activities of the Nogai and Crimean Tatars. Both of these clauses were attempts to suppress any further disruptions of Muscovite rule in the Volga Region.

The combination of local population’s acceptance of Muscovite authority in the Middle Volga Region and the success of the *voevoda*’s new security measures produced a period of relative peace and prosperity. The *nakaz* did not guarantee immediate peace within the Middle Volga Region. As early as 1615, a short revolt broke out in the northern Volga Region, supported by the Tatars, Chuvashes, Maris, Udmurts, and Bashkirs. It was probable that recent grain requisitions spurred the revolt. In 1614 the Muscovite army, on campaign against the Crimean Tatars, passed through the region requiring large quantities of food. The rebels seem to have been objecting to the loss of their grain, but not the Muscovite government, which they had supported in the years immediately preceding.

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11 RGADA, f. 16, Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 3ob-3v, 16 April 1613, copy from 1720.

12 RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 3v. ob-4.
This was the last revolt in the Volga Region until Stepan Razin, a period of stability of more than fifty-years.

During this period of stability, the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvorsta attempted to protect against future insurrections by increasing control over the local populace. It used two approaches: delegating responsibilities to local officials, and more closely supervising these officials from the Prikaz. The next extant nakaz to the voevody of Kazan’ in 1649 reflected a growth in the state’s awareness of the necessary steps to control its populace on the frontier. Some of this knowledge may have been gained as a result of the numerous rebellions throughout Muscovy in 1648, engulfing Moscow, Kursk, and Tomsk as well as other cities. The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvorsta responded to the rebellion in Astrakhan in 1648, and also maintained close connections with Sibirskii Prikaz, which administered Tomsk. As a warning of the continuing potential danger of rebellions, the events of 1648 provided a forceful warning to the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvorsta about potential unrest among the population of the Middle Volga.


\[15\] Though the rebellion in Astrakhan has not been studied, the Swedish envoy in Moscow recorded the departure of troops for Astrakhan, indicated the scope of the rebellion was more than local authorities could handle. K. Iakubov, “Rossiia i Shvetsiya v pervoi polovine XVII vv., VI: 1647-1650 gg. Doneseniia korolev Khristine i pis’ma k korolevskomu sekretariu shvedskogo rezidenta v Moskve Karla Pommereninga,” Chtenia v imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete, 1 (1898), #13, 14 November 1648, p. 430.
Influenced by both recent events and an increase of regulation of local administration, the *nakaz* sent to Kazan’s *voevoda* in 1649 contained nine clauses to regulate security and local populations. Some of these instructions extended the previous directions, though several of them were entirely new, reflecting the growth of administrative practices and responsiveness to the changing conditions of the frontier.

First, the *nakaz* of 1649 repeated the earlier instructions to monitor the populace in order to learn of any possible insurrections. It also provided instructions for responding to any attacks from nomad raiders. However, these decrees had evolved from earlier models. The instruction focused on Tatars, Chuvashes, Maris, and Udmurts, specifically omitting the possibility of Russians plotting against the state. The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa added a further check on the populace by requiring the *voevoda* to monitor all people arriving or leaving from Kazan’, including Russians. Any runaway peasants discovered entering the region were to be returned to their places of origin. A third clause reminded the *voevoda* to watch closely all non-Russians, since their “treachery” could spread to the rest of the populace.

Concerning the threat of nomads attacking Kazan’, the earlier decree mandated that the *voevoda* of Kazan’ remain in contact with the region’s other *voevody*. The 1649 instructions included a specific list of actions the *voevoda* should take to defend Kazan’, focusing on keeping the Volga navigable to maintain communication within the region.

Other new provisions were present in the *nakaz* of 1649. Three separate articles regulated the military service of the region’s *pomeshchiki*. All people arriving in the city

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16 RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 10-11, 16 May 1649, copy from 1720.

17 RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 9-10.
owing military service were required to report to the sotnik (lieutenant) of Kazan’s streltsy. The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa also delineated which servitors served the voevoda and which served the sotnik, suggesting that these regional officials had previous jurisdictional conflicts. An additional clause instructed the voevoda to examine all non-Russian pomeshchiki, verifying their origins and the location of their current pomest’e. Anyone who claimed they had been recruited but whose origins could not be verified should not be let into town.19

Other instructions continued the prophylactic measures by regulating the flow of arms to the countryside. Helmets, sabers, rifles, or anything made by a blacksmith or silversmith were banned from all Chuvash and Mari volosti (districts). The voevoda also regulated the horse trade, monitoring all purchases as well as forbidding any sales to Nogai Tatars or Bashkirs.20 Once again, primary suspicion of future rebellions fell upon the non-Russian populations, based on the authorities’ perceptions of the rebellious history of the region. This suspicion reached its peak with the requirement that the voevoda take hostages from the families of Tatars, Chuvashes, Maris, and Udmurts to guarantee their good behavior.21

The restrictive policies targeting the local populace were not limited to those specifically stated in the nakazy. Throughout the seventeenth century, central and regional officials attempted to regulate all population movement on the frontier for fear of its

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18 RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 22-24.
19 RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 21-21ob, 24ob-26, 30.
20 RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 11-12, 27ob-28.
potentially destabilizing effects. The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa, for example, viewed runaway peasants as a serious problem, because of the possibility that they might participate in a rebellion against local authorities.\(^2\) Thus, restrictions on non-Russians were not the state’s only tool for suppressing dissent before 1670. Not only did the events of 1648-49 bypass the Volga Region but the ongoing struggles in the Urals between the Bashkirs and their voevody similarly failed to affect the stability of the Volga Region. However, between 1617 and 1670, the reclamation of runaway peasants provided both servitors and the runaways themselves many opportunities to resist the state. Even in a period without open rebellion against the government, the region’s populace was not stable.

1. The Problem of Runaway Peasants

The issue of runaway peasants received significant administrative attention during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.\(^3\) The steady progress of increasing restrictions against the movement of peasants, ultimately produced a series of laws enabling landlords to reclaim peasants who had fled. In 1597, the government legalized a five-year time limit for the recovery of runaway peasants; this was extended to ten years in 1642.\(^4\) While the tsar’s

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\(^2\) RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 10.

\(^3\) Grigorii Semenovich Kurakin, a voevoda of Kazan’, reported to the Razriadnyi Prikaz the participation of Kazan’s runaway peasants in a small revolt in his uezd, proving the validity of their fears. S. I. Arkhangel’skii and N. I. Privalova, eds., *Nizhniy Novgorod v XVII veke: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov k istorii Nizhnogo Novgoroda i ego okrugi*, (Gor’kii: Gor’kovskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1961), #104, 7 March 1665, pp. 155-156.


government produced these laws, petitions from the gentry asking for the unrestricted right to reclaim runaway peasants influenced the government’s decision.\textsuperscript{25}

The *Ulozhenie of 1649* eliminated the statute of limitations on reclaiming runaways, essentially giving landlords the unrestricted right to retrieve them.\textsuperscript{26} It also outlined the formal process of reclamation: the landlord petitioned the Pomestnyi Prikaz, which turned the petition to the Razriadnyi Prikaz for enforcement. The Razriadnyi Prikaz notified the local *voevody*, who then claimed and returned the peasant to their original landlord. In practice, the process for the Volga Region was more complicated. With the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvorts’s exclusive control over the region’s *voevody*, both the Razriadnyi and Pomestnyi Prikaz needed to contact the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvorts first. In general, after a landlord petitioned the Pomestnyi Prikaz for the return of his peasant, that Prikaz instructed the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvorts and its *voevody* to investigate, bypassing the involvement of the Razriadnyi Prikaz.

Reclaiming peasants from the Volga Region, therefore, never strictly followed the legal process. The number of peasants who fled to the Volga Region is also uncertain, though the Muscovite government considered it to be large, and focused much of its reclamation efforts in the region.\textsuperscript{27} Many landlords petitioned the chancelleries for the


\textsuperscript{26} Also, for the first time, the entire family of the runaway peasant would be returned. Blum, *Lord and Peasant*, pp. 261-266; Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change*, pp. 141-145.

\textsuperscript{27} There are many studies of the attempts and successes of the government in reclaiming runaway peasants, both inside and outside of the Volga Region. These include: A. A. Novosel’skii, “K voprosy ob ekonomicheskom sostoianin beglykh krest’ian na iuge Moskovskogo gosudarstva v pervoi polovine XVII veka,” *Istoricheskie zapiski*, 16 (1945): 58-64; I. A. Bulygin, “Beglye krest’iane Riazanskogo uezda v 60-e
return of their peasants; both Russian and non-Russian pomeshchiki filed petitions from the Middle Volga Region asking the government to return their peasants, most of whom had fled further out on the frontier. For example, in 1642 Ivan Semen syn Karachev, a newly-baptized servitor, petitioned the Pomestnyi Prikaz for the return of his runaway peasants, Sten’ka Titov and his sister, from Kazan’ uezd.28 Vasilii Mikhailovich Lunevskii, a pomeshchik in Kurmysh uezd, petitioned the Pomestnyi Prikaz in 1659/60, asking for the return of his peasants from the village of Sasuyonka in Saransk uezd who was then residing on the pomest’e of Grigor Mikhailovich Ziminiskii.29 In 1669, Voevoda Ivan Danilov syn Myshchetskii of Alatyr’ petitioned at least twice for the return of his peasant Feodor Ivanov, who had fled his village of Borzhoto in Alatyr’ uezd.30

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29 RGADA, f. 1455, op. 1, d. 2296, l. 2. Unsuccessful with his first petition, Lunevskii petitioned again later that same year to ask the tsar for compensation for his lost peasants in the amount of 267 rubles, 8 altyn, and 2 dengi, f. 1455, op. 1, d. 2296, l. 3.

30 The voevoda included the location of his peasant in both of his petitions to the tsar, RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 17, l. 1 and l. 2, both before 24 June 1669. The tsar replied to the petitions on 24 June 1669, but
Though the majority of petitions involving the Middle Volga Region were sent from it, landlords outside of the region also lost peasants to the frontier. For example, in 1626, Archimandrite Iosif of the Murom’s Troitse-Sergeivskii Monastery attempted to reclaim one of his peasants who fled to the village of Selitsa in Arzamas uezd, asking for the peasant to be returned. Following the rhetoric of such petitions, the abbot claimed the monastery suffered great hardship from the loss of its peasants; only the tsar could rectify the situation.\textsuperscript{31}

After the petitions were filed, then the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa or the Pomestnyi Prikaz instructed the region’s voevody to investigate. For example, Nizhnii Novgorod’s voevoda notified the Pomestnyi Prikaz in 1661 about the successful return of Marfa, a peasant woman who had fled from Ivan Ivanovich syn Chemodanov’s village of Vodovstoe in Arzamas uezd to the pomest’e of Silvian Vorontsov in Nizhegorod uezd.\textsuperscript{32} Not all petitions were successful, especially if the original petition had not specified the current whereabouts of the runaway peasant. One of Sviiazhsk’s bailiffs spent most of 1666 trying to locate a runaway peasant of Iakov Nikitich Odoevskii. The bailiff reported his numerous searches of all of the villages in Sviiazhsk uezd, but could not find any evidence of him. The voevoda of Kazan’ then began to search in his own uezd.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{31}RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 126, 16 December 1626.

\textsuperscript{32}RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 1885, 13 December 1661.

\textsuperscript{33}RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 2752, ll. 1-2, 16 December 1666.
Filing petitions remained the best option for a landlord to reclaim his lost peasant. However, after 1649 it was not the only option. The Pomestnyi Prikaz began sending commissions into the Middle Volga Region, which systematically examined the entire peasant population to uncover runaways. This process did not involve landlords petitioning specifically, and generally had a high rate of success. All peasants who could not establish that they belonged to the region were returned to their original owner. The first such commission in all of Muscovy arrived in Kazan’ in 1658, and several more followed in the 1660s, searching Arzamas, Alatyr’, Penza, Sviiazhsk, Simbirsk, and Saransk.\textsuperscript{34}

In general, the commissions uncovered more runaway peasants in the southern Middle Volga Region than in the more densely populated north. The investigation in Penza uezd in 1664/65 found 1183 runaway peasants in the district, and 77.6\% were returned to their original land.\textsuperscript{35} These 1183 peasants comprised as much as 10\% of the total peasant population in Penza uezd.\textsuperscript{36} By comparison, the commissions sent to Arzamas and Alatyr’ uezdy in 1665-66 uncovered 283 runaway peasant households, which comprised at most 1\% of the total peasant population.\textsuperscript{37} In both cases, however, the peasant commissions proved

\textsuperscript{34} Specifically, the commissions arrived in Alatyr’ in 1661/2, and 1662-69, Arzamas in 1661-3, Sviiazhsk in 1662, and Saransk and Simbirsk in 1661-1663, and 1668. These commissions are discussed in A. P. Gudzinskaia, “Dokumenty sysknykh komissii vtoroi poloviny XVII v. kak istoricheskii istochnik,” Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 1967 god (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo “Nauka,” 1969), pp. 107-118.

\textsuperscript{35} Dolzhenkov, “Beglye krest’iane, pp. 31-36.

\textsuperscript{36} In 1678, the total peasant population (both serfs and \textit{iasachnye liudi}) in Penza uezd was 10,500. Had the runaways remained, the population could have been as much as 11,683. Ia. E. Vodarskii, \textit{Naselenie Rossii v kontse XVII-nachale XVIII veka (Chislennost’, soslovo-klassovyi sostav, razmeshchenie)}, (Moskva: Izdatel’stvo “Nauka,” “1977), pp. 110, 229.

\textsuperscript{37} In 1678, Arzamas and Alatyr collectively had 26,442 households, producing a population of just more than 90,000. The results of the commissions are taken from Puskhov and Promakhina, “Sem’ia i sisteme,” p. 27; the population statistics are from Vodarskii, \textit{Naselenie Rossii}, pp. 110, 221, 228.
highly successful in reclaiming runaway peasants when compared with the individual attempts made by local voevody.

The commissions were also important for generating demographic data about the origins of runaway peasants, with whom they traveled, and the length of their residence in their new homes. In Penza for example, 42.9% of the peasants arrived with their families. Runaway peasants in Penza had arrived from Arzamas, Alatyr’, Riazan, Kasimov, and Kadom.\(^{38}\) It was typical for the region that many of the peasants arriving had only traveled short distances. Many of the runaway peasants in the Middle Volga had been settled for long periods on the frontier. 111 of the 283 runaway peasant households in Arzamas and Alatyr (approximately 40%) had been settled in the uezdy for more than ten years, and 12 of those households had in fact been settled there for more than 40 years.\(^{39}\)

The knowledge gained from the commissions did nothing to alter the state’s policies during the 1660s. The commitment of state resources to reclaiming runaway peasants from the interior indicates the chancelleries’ belief in the seriousness of the problem. The state dispatched four commissions to Alatyr’ in the 1660s, which produced minimal returns despite the ongoing interrogations of all of the peasant population. The runaways uncovered by the commissions were not a restless population endangering the countryside, but established families contributing to the settlement of the frontier, especially in the sparsely populated south, but the reality failed to influence the state’s attitude toward runaway

\(^{38}\) Dolzhenkov, “Beglye krest’iane, pp. 31-36.

\(^{39}\) Pushkov and Promakhina, “Sem’ia i sisteme,” p. 27.
peasants. The state was as successful as it could be in reclaiming runaways, but this success came at the potential expense of weakening Muscovite presence along its exposed frontier.

2. The Problem of Non-Russian Peasants

The recovery of runaway peasants in the region fulfilled the central chancelleries’ goal of controlling the population of the Middle Volga Region. Control over runaway peasants was supplemented by restrictive policies targeted at the non-Russian peasant population in the region. The *nakazy* established the guidelines for supervision of the non-Russian populations, however, in some parts of the Middle Volga, the *nakazy* were not sufficient to achieve the state’s security goal. In particular, the central chancelleries exploited the Mordvin population residing in Arzamas and Alatyr’ uezdy. Many of these Mordvins were relocated to the southern frontier, particularly in Saransk and Penza uezdy, in order to consolidate the Muscovite defenses along its southern defensive line by increasing the area’s population.

Arzamas’s Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery, which possessed several Mordvin villages, began to lose its peasants in the 1640s. The monastery’s village of Bazkov in Temykovskii stan petitioned the tsar in 1645 to complain that Russian peasants were moving into the area and seizing their land. On that same day, another of the village’s residents, Chumas Komiatev, complained to the *voevoda* of Arzamas, Grigor Semenovich Vodorov, about Russian peasants claiming Mordvin territory outside the village. Despite the appeals, nothing stopped the Russian peasant arrivals from claiming the ancestral lands of

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40 Included in the petition were maps drawn by the Mordvins to explain where the Russian peasants established their new houses. RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 291, 5 January 1645.
the Mordvins. Left without their own village, the Mordvins moved to the southern frontier, assisting in settling that region and further securing the northern region by decreasing the non-Russian population.\(^{42}\)

Although the relocation of the Mordvins and the recapture of Russian runaway peasants caused much upheaval for the individuals involved, the Middle Volga Region as a whole remained peaceful and stable. From the perspective of the government, the policy worked. However, underneath, tensions built up throughout the region by the 1660s. The runaway peasant commissions systematically examined the entire population of the region and disrupted the settled population with the arrests and removals of some of the area’s residents. The relocated Mordvins deeply resented the state’s policies and attempted to circumvent their relocation with petitions, which proved ineffective. The frontier itself was extending further south with the completion of the second major defensive line in 1649, running through Saransk and ending at Simbirsk on the Volga. Though the intention of the security policies and population supervision was to further secure the region, the state settled its southern frontier with non-Russians, the population it most suspected of potential rebellion. When these ongoing tensions transformed into violence during the Razin Revolt of 1670, the state had to react not only to a rebellion but also the failure of its long-term policies. Therefore, a reevaluation of all policies and procedures was necessary, immediately inspiring changes in Muscovite administrative practices.

\(^{41}\) RGADA, f. 281, op.1, d. 292.

\(^{42}\) See discussion below.
THE RAZIN REVOLT

Between 1615 and 1670, the Middle Volga Region was free from a major rebellion, a dramatic change from the first sixty years of Muscovite rule. This peace was destroyed by one quick explosion of violence in the fall of 1670, inspired by Stepan Razin and his cossacks. The revolt engulfed the entire the region, but it was short-lived, beginning in September and completely suppressed by January of 1671. The damage, however, was extensive. Rebels destroyed Alatyr’ and killed several voevody, numerous local officials, and one priest. This violence forced a reevaluation of security policies and Muscovy’s treatment of the region’s populace, prompting the acceleration of some procedures and the abandonment of others.

Russian historiography has followed two approaches to understanding the Stepan Razin Revolt. Early accounts treat Razin as the key figure of the revolt, an invader from the steppe who brought a rebellion with him, while Soviet historians portray it as a “peasant revolt,” with the region’s population striking back against state authorities against the injustice of enserfment. The few non-Russian studies of the revolt have not distanced

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themselves from the Russian accounts, either by accepting or repudiating them. The Middle Volga Region’s rebellions in the time of Razin were both urban and rural, and sometimes were influenced by Razin and other times not. The region’s revolts in 1670, therefore, should be studied independently from either of these strands of historiographical interpretation. Fortunately, several contemporary accounts exist, as well as much of the communication among the voevody in the Volga Region, allowing a reinterpretation of these events without the influence of Soviet ideological frameworks.

The residents of the Volga Region heard of Stepan Razin no later than 1667, when Razin and his troops first entered the region. Though no lasting damage was done then, the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa worried about Razin’s potential destabilizing influence on the region. Three years later widespread violence erupted throughout the region confirming the Prikaz’s worst fears. The historiography of the revolt has treated Razin similarly to Bolotnikov, conflating separate, disconnected rebellions and Razin’s army as one large


The major primary published source is the comprehensive five-volume document collection, A. A. Novosel’skii, ed., Krest’ianskaia voina pod predvoditel’stvom Stepana Razina: Sbornik dokumentov, (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo akademii nauk SSSR, 1955-1976). A typical foreigner’s study is that of Ludvig Fabritius, a Dutch soldier serving the tsar’s army and later taken hostage by Stepan Razin. Fabritius adds unique observations about the siege Chernyi Iar, for example, but says nothing concerning the Middle Volga Region, S. Konovalov, “Ludvig Fabritius’s Account of the Razin Revolt,” Oxford Slavonic Papers, 6 (1955): 72-101.

uprising. In contrast, Stephen Hart demonstrated that even if Razin inspired the Middle Volga Region’s rebellion in 1670-71, it began before his siege of Simbirsk in 1670 and other small uprisings continued after his failure to take that city and his subsequent retreat from the region. Therefore, any study of the origins, scope, and effects of the Razin Revolt in the Middle Volga Region must include more than the activities of Stepan Razin.

Stepan Razin began raiding merchant caravans along the lower Volga as early as 1667, and made a reputation for himself after successes against Persian shipping in the Caspian Sea. Razin’s brigandage devastated Volga trade, but did not produce any corresponding unrest among the population of the region. The situation changed when Razin led a force of as many as ten thousand men to lay siege to Simbirsk, which sat on the Volga as part of the southernmost defensive line in the Middle Volga Region. Razin encircled the city on 4 September 1670, beginning a long siege. Simbirsk’s voevoda, Ivan Bogdanovich Miloslavskii, had prepared for Razin’s arrival by gathering between three to four thousand men under his command, including some streletsy, pomeshchiki, and local infantry. With preparations in place before Razin’s arrival, Miloslavskii held the city until Muscovite forces arrived from Kazan’ on 1 October. The combined pressure of the forces from Kazan’ and Simbirsk’s garrison successfully broke Razin’s siege on 5 October. Razin himself was injured during the fighting and retreated with his forces down the Volga.

The period of Razin’s siege of Simbirsk largely defines the period of rebellions throughout the Middle Volga Region. Revolts in Alatyr’ and Penza occurred early in

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September, while those in Tsivil’sk and Koz’modem’iansk arose in late September and early October. As is typical for the events of the Razin Revolt in the region, Razin’s forces guided only some of these rebellions, indicating that the prolonged tensions of the Volga Region were more of a factor than Razin himself. However, the timing of these rebellions suggests that word of the Razin’s ongoing siege of Simbirsk inspired the events along the frontier. Furthermore, the Muscovite government considered all of these events to be linked, which conditioned policy changes after the revolt was suppressed.

The primary targets of all of the rebellions were the state’s officials, while the hierarchs, monks, and priests of the Russian Orthodox Church remained virtually free from attack. Rebels killed several voevody during the revolt, and on occasion replaced the state-appointed governor with a peasant commission to rule their uezd. There is not a corresponding record of attacks on priests, churches, or monasteries. One church was burned in Alatyr’, but that town’s voevoda had sought sanctuary in the building. Though all of the rebellions share the common trait of an attack on the sovereignty of Muscovy in the Volga Region, specific targets, participants in the rebellions, and process of escalation in the various uezdy all differ. A discussion of events in Alatyr’, Arzamas, Tsivil’sk, Koz’modem’iansk, and Penza will provide a general portrait of the rebellion in the Middle Volga Region in the fall of 1670.

The news of the siege of Simbirsk spread rapidly throughout the Middle Volga Region. On 6 September, Voevoda Akinfii Buturlin of Alatyr’ listened to the report of a member of his prikaznaiia izba, Iakov Lukin syn Panov, about the spread of Razin’s revolt into the countryside. Panov had sent a trusted man, Lar’ka Khrenov, south to Simbirsk to
discover what was happening to the city. After ten days of travel, Khrenov returned to Alatyr’ having failed to reach Simbirsk. Panov had ended his trip thirty versts from the Simbirsk at the Tatar village of Gorenko. Gorenko had already been visited by five cossacks from Razin’s army. These cossacks told the Tatars that once Razin took the city, he would move into the countryside with the support of military servitors, streltsy, and the peasantry.49

By 10 September, Voevoda Buturlin decided to write to Moscow for assistance, because the scope of the rebellion had already exceeded expectations. He informed the tsar that city-residents, deti boiarskii, Murzii, and Tatars had fled to Alatyr’ from the surrounding regions for protection from Razin.50 Buturlin did not gather local military forces to defend Alatyr’, believing that the nearby state military forces under the command of Fedor Ivanovich Leon’tev would protect the city. However, when Leon’tev received word of the size of Razin’s army, he removed his troops from Alatyr’ uezd and departed for Arzamas. Buturlin decided to retreat to the center of town to await his fate, lacking enough men to protect his city.51

Rebels attacked Alatyr’ on 16 September. With state forces already departed, the voevoda and his city garrison were unable to prevent a portion of Razin’s army along with local Mordvins, Maris, and Chuvashes from burning the city’s walls and towers. The next


50 *Krest’ianskaia voina*, II, ch. 1, #48, 10 and 16 September 1670, pp. 60-62.

51 *Krest’ianskaia voina*, II, ch. 1, #58, 21 September 1670, pp. 69-71
day the rebels proceeded into the town, discovered the voevoda, his family, and his officials seeking refuge in the town’s cathedral, and burned it to the ground. After burning the city, the rebels abandoned it shortly thereafter. One group of the rebels departed in the direction of Arzamas, inspiring a nervous report from its voevoda, Lev Shaisupov, who clearly believed he would share his fellow voevoda’s fate. Some of the rebels moved northward toward Kurmysh, participating in that city’s rebellion against its own voevoda, which resulted in his death. The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa became increasingly alarmed when a former resident of Alatyr’, currently in Kurmysh, predicted the rebels’ success in the Volga presaged the fall of Moscow.

Neither Razin nor his troops supported the rebellion in Penza, but it was as successful in deposing Muscovite control. The exact date of the rebellion is unknown, but, when some of Razin’s agents arrived in the city on 30 September with Razin’s call for revolt, they discovered the city was under control of local rebels. Voevoda Elisei Lachinov, his d’iak Aleksandr Telepov, and a priest, Luka, already had been beaten to death (pobili do smerti). Furthermore, the rebellion had proceeded eastward ahead of Razin’s agents. The voevody of Nizhnii and Verkhnii Lomov were dead, and the local rebels were on the march to Kerensk. Razin’s troops only followed the path of the rebels, and failed to influence events as they had in Alatyr’.

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52 Krest’ianskaia voina, II, ch. 1, #66, 23 September 1670, pp. 76-78; #79, Between 30 September and 2 October 1670, pp. 92-93.

53 Krest’ianskaia voina, II, ch. 1, #60, 22 and 29 September 1670, pp. 71-72.

54 Krest’ianskaia voina, II, ch. 1, #88, 2 October 1670, pp. 104-105.
Other rebellions relied on the organization of Razin’s troops for their success. On 1 or 2 October, between 20 to 30 rebels under the leadership of two of Razin’s cossacks arrived at the gates of Koz’modem’iansk. According to later reports of the rebellion, the rebels were local Maris and Chuvashes. Residents of the city willingly opened the gates to the rebels, and then assisted the outsiders in killing their voevoda, Ivan Pobedinskii, and Vasilii Bogdanov, one of his prikaznaia izba officials. After the execution of the voevoda, two of the city’s residents, Ivashka Shust and Zamiatenka Laptev, one of its streltsy, Mit’ka Kholelev, and two cossacks, Ivashka Soroka and Ivashka Pronek, claimed the city the for Stepan Razin and established themselves as the new town council.56

Compared to other cities in the Middle Volga Region’s northern end, Koz’modem’iansk is unusual, because it is the only one of those cities in which urban residents collaborated with outsiders, rather than assisting the voevoda in protecting their city. More typical of the northern region is the city of Tsivil’sk. On 30 September, a Tatar from Sviiazhsk, Almakaiko, led local Tatar and Chuvash peasants against Tsivil’sk. In the city, its Russian Orthodox residents combined with its Murzii and Tatars to resist the efforts of the rebels. On 2 October, the peasant rebels had managed to encircle the city. But when relief troops from Kazan’ arrived on 23 October, the rebels were defeated.57

While local forces broke the siege of both Simbirsk and Tsivil’sk, the central government’s forces broke the momentum of the larger rebellion. Ironically, the state’s


56 Krest’ianskaia voina, II, ch. 1, #186, 30 October 1670, pp. 220-221; #205, No earlier than 6 November 1670, pp. 248-251; #234, No later than 17 November 1670, pp. 282-283.
forces that abandoned Alatyr’ to its fate proved capable of defending Arzamas and defeating
a large army of rebels with additional support from the center. The defense of Arzamas
prevented the spread of the revolt into the central regions of Muscovy.

Leon’tev believed that his small forces in Alatyr’ uezd were not sufficient for
meeting any of the rebel forces. A new army from the center under the command of Iurii
Dolgorukov arrived on 26 September in Arzamas. When Dolgorukov updated the central
government on that day about the current situation, he reported that Saransk, Kurmysh,
Tsivil’sk, and Temnikov were all occupied by rebel forces. To protect Arzamas and the
central provinces, Dolgorukov established his camp with 800 men to the east of Arzamas on
27 September.58

Fortunately for Dolgorukov and the Muscovite government, the state’s forces never
faced a coordinated attack within Arzamas uezd. By the beginning of October, there were
three separate groups of rebels operating around Arzamas. The first of these was defeated
on 6 November to the south of Arzamas.59 The northernmost group, under the command of
the cossacks Vas’ka Tikhonov and Vas’ka Petrov, led a group of peasants from the votchina
of the Pecherskii Monastery against the Makarev Zheltovodskii Monastery outside of
Nizhnii Novgorod on 7 October. While that rebel group bombarded the monastery with
cannons, the Monastery withstood the assault and refused to open its gates. A portion of
Dolgorukov’s army arrived and easily broke the siege.60 After brief battles on 20 October

57 *Krest’ianskaia voina*, II, ch. 1, #78, No later than 30 September 1670, p. 91; #177, 28 October 1670, p. 212.
58 *Krest’ianskaia voina*, II, ch. 1, #70, 27 September 1670, pp. 82-84.
59 *Krest’ianskaia voina*, II, ch. 1, #100, 7 October 1670, pp. 115-118.
and on 22 October, Dolgorukov’s forces defeated all remaining rebels along the western frontier of the Volga Region, securing Arzamas and Nizhnii Novgorod.\textsuperscript{61}

While some rebels continued to vex Muscovite authorities until January 1671, the rebellion was largely defeated by the beginning of November 1670. Yet despite the short duration of the rebellion, it had a strong impact on Muscovite governance in the Middle Volga Region. In 1660, Muscovite security policies had appeared completely successful, but the quick spread of the rebellion throughout the region indicated that control was illusory.

James Hart has suggested that the contrast between the resistance of the northern Volga cities in face of rural rebels and the support of southern cities for the rebellion was explained by the ethnic difference of the northern and southern cities. In the north, he argued, the cities were largely ethnically Russian and were situated in opposition to a non-Russian countryside. In the south, however, the populations were mixed.\textsuperscript{62} This distinction fails to account for the most dramatic difference between the cities, specifically that the northern cities were all established before 1600, whereas many of the new cities of the south had existed for twenty years or less by the time of the Razin Revolt. Subsequently, the northern cities were well fortified and the southern ones much less so. This resulted in a divide greater than an ethnic one between the established urban and rural populations of the north which the cities in the south lacked.

\textsuperscript{60} Krest’ianskaia voina, II, ch. 1, #407, Earlier than 16 January 1671, pp. 526-527.

\textsuperscript{61} Krest’ianskaia voina, II, ch. 1, #162, 25 October 1670, pp. 192-194; Hart, “Urban and Rural Protest.” pp. 113-128

During the short-lived insurrection, Muscovite authorities witnessed the destruction of Alatyr’, the loss of parts of the southern defensive line, as well as the death of several of its voevody and other local officials. Interestingly, monasteries, an important part of frontier land management, were almost completely unaffected by any of the rebels. The exception was the Makarev Monastery outside of Nizhnii Novgorod, but it was not attacked by the peasants from its own land. This fact does challenge the Soviet interpretation of the Razin Revolt as a peasant war, since one of the region’s largest landowners was unaffected. As with the Bolotnikov Revolt, the Razin Revolt in the Middle Volga appears to be directed against Muscovite political authority.

RESPONDING TO RAZIN

In response to the Razin Revolt, the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa left intact the Middle Volga’s governing structures: the voevoda, pomeshchiki, and supervision by central chancelleries remained. However, several of the policies enacted by those agencies were altered or even abandoned. Some aspects of the central administration adapted to accommodate a more efficient response to future threats in the region, and instructions to the local voevody continued to require more control over the local populations.

The most serious transformation of policy affected runaway peasants, as the peasant commissions to investigate the countryside were abandoned. As the state’s chancelleries evaluated its relationship with the peasants in the Middle Volga Region, they decided that runaway peasants did not create the destabilizing force on the frontier as had been feared. During the Razin Revolt, runaway peasants might have participated but certainly were not
the ringleaders or instigators of the rebellion. Townspeople and local non-Russians were, and those populations subsequently received greater administrative attention.

The primary response from the state to the Razin Revolt was an increase in the number of security measures from the previous decades. It modified its policies based on the weaknesses Razin had revealed. The nakaz to the voevoda of Kazan’ in 1677, for example, contained thirteen clauses related to security, an increase from the nine of 1649. There was considerable overlap between 1649 and 1677, including a ban on selling arms to local non-Russians, constant supervision and checks on anyone arriving in or leaving from the uezd, and the necessity of taking hostages from non-Russian families. However, all of the new clauses were reflections of the state’s experiences during the revolt. Two clauses demanded the immediate fulfillment of all instructions from the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa: one was targeted at voevody who had failed their directives, the other instructed the voevoda to keep the sotnik of the streltsy under constant supervision to guarantee that he acted upon all his instructions.\(^6\) There were warnings to only use “good and trustworthy people” at the city gates and during fires.\(^6\) This had been one failing during the revolts of 1670. Similarly, another clause warned the voevoda to watch alcohol consumption in the city’s taverns, because this had created post-Razin problems in Simbirsk according to recent information gathered by the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa.\(^6\) Another clause reiterated an early warning about the danger of fires, but specifically instructed Kazan’s voevoda to keep

\(^6\) RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, copy from 1720, 22 March 1677, ll. 38, 64ob-69.
\(^6\) RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 49-51.
\(^6\) RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 51-52.
the grain silos in the city away from its cathedrals, because the cathedral in Alatyr’ had been the main target during the revolt.66

A broader response to the region’s difficulties came in the form of a reorganization of the responsibilities of the central chancelleries. Specifically, in 1680 the state transferred supervision of the region’s pomeshchiki’s military service to the Razriadnyi Prikaz, who already oversaw the local infantry and the streltsy. The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa thus lost its ability to control part of the military defenses with the transfer of the pomeshchiki. However, all non-Russian pomeshchiki, and the Volga Region had many of them, came under the regulation of the newly-formed Inozemskii Prikaz.67 While the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa attempted to delay the change of command and the loss of its troops, by the end of 1681, the majority of its pomeshchiki had been placed under the command of the Razriadnyi Prikaz, and the rest followed shortly thereafter. Although leaving the region’s numerous non-Russian pomeshchiki under the authority of the Inozemtsy Prikaz prevented a completely united military command structure, the Inozemtsy Prikaz fulfilled the state’s general goal of greater supervision of non-Russians.

The most dramatic administrative change in Muscovite policy was the abandonment of the runaway peasant commissions into the Middle Volga Region, despite their high rate of success. Only one commission arrived between 1670 and 1700, in Arzamas in 1692/93, though at least eight had arrived in the 1660s.68 Nevertheless, the voevody of the region

66 RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 77ob.

67 The law was promulgated on 12 November 1680. S. I. Por’firev, “Kazanskii stol Razriadnyi prikaz,” Izvestia obshchestva arkheologicheskii, istorii i etnografii pri Imperatorskom Kazanskom universitete, 28: 6 (1913): 535-553.
continued to pursue individual runaways based on petitions for the remainder of the century. It is probable that the commissions caused serious disruptions in the countryside, which were undesirable in the wake of a widespread revolt. It is also possible that the runaway peasants became a desirable population in the region, perhaps considered more loyal than the non-Russians throughout the region. In either case, even with occasional investigations from voevody, runaways continued to settle in the Volga Region. For example, in the records of the estates of the Samara’s Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery in 1723, 60% of the peasant households were comprised of runaway families from Alatyr’ and Kasimov uezdy.69

At the same time as the state removed its best control on the migration of runaway Russian peasants, it accelerated its relocation of the Mordvins from the northern end of the Middle Volga Region. While Arzamas’s Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery’s Mordvin village of Bazkov had been repopulated with Russian peasants before the Razin Revolt, after the revolt the monastery lost several more of its Mordvin villages. Chiarchush, one of its villages in Arzamas uezd, was occupied by Russian peasants in the 1680s. Despite several petitions to the Archimandrite of the monastery from the Mordvin villagers, nothing was done to stop their forced departure.70 In the 1690s, the monastery’s Mordvin villages of Sergievsko and Kimishkira were also seized by Russian peasants. Though at first the

68 Gudzinskaia, “Dokumenty sysknykh komissii.”

69 The Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Monastery may not have been typical. A similar examination of the land of the Novodevichii Convent along the banks of the Volga in 1705 also found peasants originating from outside the region, but all of those 796 peasant households began on the Convent’s own estates in the central provinces. Dubman, “Beglye krest’iane,” pp. 15-17.

70 The Mordvin villagers of Chiarchush petitioned Archimandrite Deonisii of the monastery on 16 February 1688, appealing for his support based on the close and loyal connections between the monastery and the Mordvins, RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 277, ll. 1-5.5. This first petition was followed by another from two
Mordvins resisted the incursion and remained in their villages, a single petition from the voevoda of Penza was sufficient to receive the support of the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa for the process.\footnote{RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 277, ll. 32-34.5, 16 November 1693. The voevoda tried once again to win his Mordvins with another petition to the monastery on 3 February 1694, indicating that his earlier request had not been successful, RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 277, ll. 36-37.5.}

The state intended to settle Russian peasants onto Mordvin lands in the northern Volga Region, and the displaced Mordvins would settle the southern frontier. Once located in the south, the Mordvins would provide military service to the local voevody and still fulfill their earlier financial obligations to their original, northern landlords.\footnote{The Mordvin villagers of Chiarchush, a group of the Troitse-Sergeevskii’s peasants, were informed explicitly of their dual burden, while witnessing the Russian settlers arrive who would belong to a new pomestnik, the Russian Ivan Moibev syn Chekhov. RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 291, 5 January 1645.} The experience of the Troitse-Sergeevskii Monastery is representative of the state’s treatment of Mordvins throughout Arzamas and Alatyr’ uezdy. The Mordvins of the village of Maloe Moresevo in Alatyr’ petitioned the tsar in 1680 about losing their land to Russians. The state’s reply informed the Mordvins that they had no reason to complain because they were supposed to claim their new land in the village of Mokshalev in Saransk uezd.\footnote{RGADA, f. 1103, op. 1, d. 24, January 1681. Other Mordvin villages, such as the one of Rozan Siavashev and friends, a group of Mordvins living in Arzamas uezd, received instructions detailing their move from the interior of the Volga Region to their new home along a river outside of the city of Saransk, RGADA, f. 281, op. 7, d. 10824, February 1683.} The extant demographic evidence substantiates the Mordvin deportations. From the census records, there was a 33% decline in Mordvin households in three representative stany of Alatyr’ uezd (Nizsurskii, Verkhalatyrskii, and Verkhosurskii) between 1624-26 and 1721.\footnote{villagers in Chiarchush, Kamii Nadezhii and Andrei Enoumasho, appealing to the archimandrite based on their long connection, RGADA, f. 281, op. 1, d. 277, ll. 6-9, 2 August 1686.}
It seems likely that the Mordvins’ lack of support for the rebels in Alatyr’ and Arzamas had demonstrated their loyalty to the state, especially when compared to the nearby Chuvashes, Maris, and Tatars who supported the rebellion in large numbers. As the one trustworthy non-Russian population in the Middle Volga Region, the chancelleries exploited the Mordvins to reinforce its strategic position along the southern defensive line—the site of the worst rebellions during the Razin Revolt.

State authorities, however, had not realized that relocating the Mordvins to the south might in fact cause widespread resistance among them against Muscovite authorities. Local authorities in the Middle Volga were more savvy in their evaluation of the Mordvins, since problems with those relocated Mordvins began shortly after their arrival in the south. In 1676, the voevoda of Kerensk notified the government that some of the local Mordvins were fleeing south to join the Don Cossacks, both reducing the labor supply and reinforcing the rebellious Cossacks.  

State authorities responded to the problem they created. The central authorities promulgated new laws during the late seventeenth century warning the voevody about the danger of Tatar and Mordvins hiding fugitives, frequently Mordvins fleeing from the southern frontier. The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa instructed the voevoda of Kazan’ to specifically investigate Tatar and Mordvin villages in 1682, 1688, and 1697, demonstrating the continuing problem.


However, the ongoing problems with Mordvin relocations to the south did not alter the state’s commitment to the abandonment of the runaway peasant commissions. The loss of the commissions created difficulties for landlords both in and out of the Middle Volga Region, but this failed to motivate a reversal of this policy. Left without alternatives, the gentry continued to petition the tsar begging for the return of their runaway peasants. Some of these individual petitions produced successful results, even if the state’s commitment to reclaiming runaways had waned. In 1672/73, Moisei Matveevich Shchukin received word of this imminent return of his peasant Aleksei from Arzamas uezd where he had been residing on the pomest’e of Petlin Selaminulin. In 1680, the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvoritsa notified okol’nik Ivan Ivanovich Chaadaev to expect the return of all of his peasants from Kazan’ and Simbirsk uezdy, where they had been found living among the Maris.

If a petition to reclaim a peasant had been unsuccessful, servitors could conduct their own investigation to uncover the location of their missing peasants. Family members might get involved in such attempts, questioning neighbors in their area for the origins of newly-arrived peasants. This was case for Ivan Ivanovich and Nikofor Ivanovich Aristov in 1685, who wrote to their brother Feodor Ivanovich Aristov, currently residing in Kazan’, to ask him to find two runaway peasants, Ioshka Mikhailov and Iosof Pietrov who might be living

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76 PSZ 2, #980, 1682, p. 488; PSZ 2, #1688, 7 March 1688, p. 914; PSZ 3, #1582, 22 April 1697, pp. 303-304.

77 For example, Ivan Andreev Aristov, who family possessed extensive lands in Kazan’ province, petitioned in 1699/1700 for the return of his runaway peasant from the estate of Grigor Fedorovich Griboedov in Saransk province. RGADA, f. 1455, op. 1, d. 144, l. 1.

78 RGADA, f. 1455, op. 3, d. 477, l. 2.

79 RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 958, 10 September 1680.
in Kazan’ province. However, the most common solution for a failed petition was more petitions. Kazan’-residents Petr and Naum Narmukimov filed numerous petitions in the early 1690s to reclaim their runaway debt-slave, Petrushka Zakharin syn Aprov and his wife, from Saransk. The first investigation in Saransk had not discovered the debt-slave; after more petitions, the Aprovs were found on the estate of the current voevoda of Saransk. The Narmukimovs did not regain their lost debt-slave, but instead the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa paid compensation to them and let the voevoda of Saransk keep Aprov and his wife.

Though some petitions failed from a lack of state support, others failed because of counter-petitions or even lawsuits. Aleksei Durov from Penza petitioned the Pomestnyi Prikaz for the return of his peasant from the pomest’e of Grigor Timov. Timov responded by bringing Durov to court in Nizhnii Novgorod for slander (klevet), which he won, perhaps because Timov was a bailiff of that court. Also, runaway peasants could respond to a petition to return them with a petition for remaining in their new homes. For example, Grigor Ivanovich Zakharov was notified in 1672 that the petition from Simai Semenov for his family had been granted, and they were not to return to Zakharov in Arzamas. While not common, these counter-petitions could prove successful.

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80 RGADA, f. 1455, op. 1, d. 140, 28 June 1685.

81 All of these petitions and reports are contained in RGADA, f. 1455, op. 1, d. 941, ll. 2-10. On 25 May 1692, the Narmukov’s petitioned the voevoda of Kazan’ to intervene with the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa to force another investigation, l. 2. The Prikaz’s notification of the presence of Aprov on the estate of the voevoda of Saransk follows on l. 5; ll. 9-10 contains the details of the compensation payments to be made by the Prikaz.

82 RGADA, f. 1209, op. 78, d. 2269, l. 1, 1692/3.

83 RGADA, f. 1103, op. 1, d. 12, l. 1, 3 May 1672.
Though the laws for the reclamation of runaway peasants had not changed following the Razin Revolt, there was a clear difference on the part of the state at all levels in enforcing those laws in the Middle Volga Region. No more commissions arrived to investigate the peasant population of the region, unofficially condoning runaway peasant settlement in the region. The nakazy sent to the region focused the voevody’s attention onto the supervision of all of the activities of the region’s non-Russian populations. The attempt to rely upon the loyalty of the Mordvins by relocating them to the southern frontier produced mixed results. While many Mordvins moved, this created new problems with resistance against the state’s authority from the Mordvins.

While the security policies pursued after the Razin Revolt produced inconsistent results, an alteration of preexisting policies was unavoidable because of the scale of the revolt throughout the Middle Volga. Non-Russians joined the rebellion in great numbers, and with sieges of Alatyr’ and Arzamas, those provinces were particularly in danger from non-Russians. Though the loss of a peasant might cause hardship for a single gentry servitor, the loss of Alatyr’ was a much greater concern for the state. The changing status of runaways peasants in the Middle Volga Region demonstrates the disconnect between laws generated in Moscow and administrative policy on the frontier. While the needs of the center were served by enserfment, the security of the Volga Region necessitated settling peasants from the center on the frontier. Frontier conditions successfully altered established policy, though not necessarily for the better.

While the rebellions in the Middle Volga demonstrated that Muscovy’s control over its frontier was not absolute, Muscovite forces on the frontier were capable of suppressing
these rebellions. Policies may have been adjusted or even abandoned, but Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa’s control over its territory was not imperiled. Increased communication with the local voevody throughout the seventeenth century increased the Prikaz’s ability to adjust its policies accordingly. By the time of Peter the Great’s ascension to the throne, Muscovite control over the Middle Volga Region was firmly entrenched.
CHAPTER 7

ABSOLUTISM AND EMPIRE

“And Metropolitan Germogen wrote to us about the Tatars’ mosques, that the Tatars’ began to place many mosques in their district, but it was according to the ukaz of our father that no mosques of the Tatars remain in Kazan’ … we disapprove of your improvidence and negligence, and because you have not written to us about it.”
-Tsar Fedor Ivanovich writing to Kazan’s Voevoda Ivan Mikhailovich Vorotynskii, 1595

“Tatarstan has been seen as a test case of presidential power: Could the strong hand of the new tsar in Moscow rein in the Tatars? … Tatarstan’s wily survivor of a president, Mintimer Shaimiyev, has wheeled and dealt with federal authorities, making his republic not an exhibit in Putin’s trophy case but an example of just how hard it is for even an aspiring authoritarian to impose order on Russia while sitting in Moscow.” - The Washington Post, 2001

The contemporary difficulties of the government in Moscow in its attempt to govern Tatarstan and the other Volga Region republics closely resembles Moscow’s attempt to govern the Middle Volga Region after the conquest of Kazan’. Enforcing central policies in the provinces is difficult in any era, especially in the Middle Volga Region with its multifaith and multiethnic population that still differs from Moscow’s ruling elite. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Muscovite authorities employed a series of policies to

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1 Akty, sobrannye v bibliotekakh i arkhivakh Rossiiskoi imperii arkheograficheskoio ekspeditsieiu imperatorskoi akademii nauk, Vol. 1, (St. Petersburg: Tipografia i otdeleniia sobstvennoi E. I. V. Kantseliariii, 1856), no. 358, 18 July 1595, pp. 436-439, Gramota from Fedor Ivanovich to Voevoda Ivan Mikhailovich Vorotynskii.

regulate their non-Russian subjects. In particular, they altered policies and practices in the center to better suit the local conditions in the Middle Volga Region in order to achieve the state’s primary concern of security and profitability. When Vladimir Putin agreed to allow primary education in Tatar instead of in Russian in Tatarstan’s schools in exchange for a higher percentage of tax revenue, he was following a centuries-old pattern of agreeing to allow concessions to the provinces in exchange for consistent delivery of revenue.

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Muscovite government was expanding its influence over all of Muscovite society, including the Middle Volga Region. The bureaucracy was growing and becoming more professional, new mercantilist economic reforms were implemented, the Russian Orthodox Church supported the tsar’s position with religious imagery, and the government developed new strategies for supporting its military forces on its exposed frontiers. All of these processes were part of the creation of the structures of an absolutist government, similar to the political reforms being enacted concurrently in England, France, and Spain. In Muscovy, the development of an absolutist government occurred without an elucidated theory of government or statecraft such as present in Western Europe, but the tsar in Moscow had as much influence over his country as the king in Versailles.

Current historiography emphasizes that absolutism—here defined as bureaucratization, mercantilism, and imperial ideologies—was introduced to Muscovy as a part of Peter the Great’s reforms. As seen in earlier chapters, all of these policies were implemented in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries both in the Middle Volga and in the
center of Muscovy. Peter’s “reforms” were the culmination of more than a century of a developing governing structure rather than a sharp break with the past.

The Petrine reliance on earlier developments was not limited to just the forms of an absolutist government. Security policies in enacted in the Middle Volga Region under Peter the Great followed the security guidelines established over the course of the previous century. All of the clauses of the nakaz of 1697 to the voevoda of Kazan’ were based on the earlier nakazy and frontier policies. The voevoda was told to investigate the local non-Russians to uncover any evidence of instability or troubles, to appoint trustworthy people at the city gates, and to restrict sales of weapons to non-Russian volosti.\(^3\) The voevoda received extensive instructions about monitoring the activities of Kazan’s streltsy, evidence of the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa’s fears of a potential rebellion of the streltsy on the frontier as had already occurred in the center.\(^4\) Any weakening of the frontier’s military forces would jeopardize Muscovite control in the Middle Volga. Another clause continued to warn the voevoda to investigate, uncover, and return runaway peasants.\(^5\)

However, even with the strong continuity in the instructions, small changes were evident by 1697. The restrictions against arms sales were extended to include the Udmurts in addition to the Chuvashes and the Maris. A more serious change arose in the clause about the dispensation of justice in Kazan’, informing the voevoda and his officials of the tsar’s expectation that Tatars, Chuvashes, Maris, Udmurts, and Russians would be treated with

\(^3\) PSZ 3, #1579, 31 March 1697, pp. 286-288.

\(^4\) PSZ 3, p. 288.

\(^5\) PSZ 3, p. 289-90.
justness and without strict penalties.\(^6\) Never before had the *nakaz* concerned itself with the methods of justice employed by the *voevoda*; the expectations of fairness for the non-Russians suggests a changing attitude toward Muscovy’s non-Russian populace. After a century of population surveillance and investigations, fairness under the law was a moderate improvement. There was no evidence of any increased restrictions against non-Russians in the last decade of the seventeenth century.

Other changes followed. Whereas the early *nakazy* warned the *voevody* to observe nomads and be ready to respond to their threats, after Razin the state began to use those same nomadic populations against its own settled populations. The Kalmyks, for example, became a common feature of Muscovite military maneuvers throughout the Volga. In 1675, for example, the tsar sent ten puds of gunpowder and lead as a reward for loyal service in a recent campaign against Simbirsk.\(^7\) The Kalmyks continued to be employed by the tsar, and became an integral feature of frontier governance under Peter the Great, including their suppression of the rebellion in Astrakhan in 1705-06.\(^8\)

Over the course of the seventeenth century, Muscovy switched from protecting the Volga Region from the destabilizing presence of nomads and runaways to exploiting those populations for stability. Whether the impetus for this shift was generated by local conditions, rebellions inside and outside of the Volga Region, the expanding frontier, or a combination of all of those factors is unknowable, but the results are clear. Increased

\(^6\) PSZ 3, p. 286.

\(^7\) RGADA, f. 159, op. 2, d. 1349, 15 June 1675.

supervision of the local populace, combined with population management of runaways and non-Russians, generated an extended period of peace spanning the seventeenth century punctuated by one violent outburst. That outburst, the Razin Revolt, targeted the region’s voevody, the representatives of the state. The Russian Orthodox Church, a similarly pervasive presence in the region, was bypassed. Mordvins facing relocation southward in fact turned to local monasteries for support against the voevody and the state. Similarly, there are no reports of widespread violence against the region’s pomeshchiki, and some pomeshchiki even joined the rebellion. The popular response to the security policies employed in the Volga Region understood that these were state-driven policies, and the violence was directed accordingly.

Examining the changes in security policies demonstrates the nature of the Petrine reforms. The Petrine government continued adjusting their policies in response to specific events on the frontier, relying upon the knowledge gained after a hundred years of experience in controlling the region’s populace. Therefore, rather than a revolution in the nature of governance, Peter’s government continued to refine the preexisting absolutist state in order to more effectively achieve the state’s continuing concerns of stability and profitability.

Security policies further demonstrate that an absolutist state failed to guarantee absolute authority over its provinces. Local conditions in the Middle Volga Region mitigated the implementation of central policies throughout the entire period under study. While the state succeeded in forcing pomeshchiki to reside in the region, it also created a liminal space for pomeshchik’s negotiations to improve their individual status on the
frontier. Placing troops in the region failed to guarantee security against rebellions. The mercantilist reforms were enacted, but the rebellions prevented the Volga trade route from developing to its full capacity. The *Ulozhenie* enserfed the peasantry, but the central authorities’ complicity allowed the settlement of runaway peasants in the region following the Stepan Razin Revolt.

However, these limitations on the absolutist government were not unique to Muscovy. Recent scholarship has critiqued the concept of absolutism by demonstrating the challenge of center-periphery relations in an absolutist state. Local governments attempted to resist the interference of the central authorities. Local resistance required the central authorities to adopt varied techniques to enforce its policies outside of the political center. While France employed the *intendant* to supervise its regional governments, Muscovy kept its *voevody* on a short leash with a brief term in office. In both cases, the central governments employed new methods to extend its influence and control outside of the central provinces.

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9 Accepting Muscovite service and the subsequent negotiations there had much in common with the impact of enlistment in Castile. See, Ruth McKay, *The Limits of Royal Authority: Resistance and Obedience in Seventeenth-Century Castile*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). For a discussion of *pomeshchiki* in the Middle Volga, see chapter 5.


At the same time, the absolute authority of the center could be resisted. The short
term of office of the regional voevody generated an opportunity for a powerful form of
passive resistance: inaction. Spanish officials embraced inaction in a similar manner,
proclaiming “Obedezco pero no cumplo” (I obey but do nothing). Similarly, enlistment
practices for the army created a liminal space for military servitors to gain individual
advantages against the interests of the central authorities. The negotiations between
servitors in early-modern Castile and the Spanish crown were as common as negotiations
between pomeshchiki and the central chancelleries in Muscovy.\textsuperscript{12}

Simultaneously with the growth of absolutist reforms, Muscovy was an expanding
empire, of which the conquest of Kazan’ was a large part. Many of the absolutist reforms of
the government were necessary for managing an empire. The conquest of Kazan’
incorporated a tsar’s city within Muscovy, legitimating Moscow’s Grand Prince’s claim to
an empire. The Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa was a colonial chancellery, and the overall
growth of the bureaucracy was required to administer Muscovy’s internal colonies.\textsuperscript{13} The
mercantilistic reforms enacted in the Volga Region were necessary for the management of
Muscovy’s new international trade route along the Volga. Developing new security policies
was a reaction to the dangers posed by Muscovy’s new non-Russian subjects. Therefore, the
adjustments to Muscovy’s governing policies were responses to the changing demographic
and geographic realities of Muscovy.

\\textsuperscript{12} See McKay, The Limits of Royal Authority.

\textsuperscript{13} Michael Rwykin was the described the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa as Russia’s first “colonial office” in his
article, “Russian Central Colonial Administration: From the prikaz of Kazan to the XIX Century. A Survey,”
The primary differences between Muscovite absolutism and the comparable developments in Western Europe were based in cultural differences between the countries. Patricia Seed in her *Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640* contrasted Spanish, French, Portuguese, Dutch, and English patterns in visible proclaiming their rights of ownership over colonial territories. Christopher Columbus planted the royal banner of the Spanish king and queen in 1492, whereas Sir Humphrey Gilbert planted a small twig and soil from England upon his arrival in St. John’s Harbor in 1583. When the Portuguese arrived in Brazil, their expedition’s astronomer measured the height of the sun and the position of the stars, Cornelius Henricxson of the Netherlands began extensive cartographic surveys of the shore upon his arrival in New York in the beginning of the seventeenth century. Seed argues that each culture relied upon those signs and symbols from their own culture to mark a similar process – their colonization of the New World.\(^\text{14}\) Archbishop Germogen’s ceremonial procession down the Volga River, culminating the ritual blessing of the kremlin of Kazan’, was a uniquely Muscovite version of the same event: the symbolic possession of a foreign land and people.

Furthermore, cultural differences affected the management of these colonial empires as well. While many of the features of colonial rule are comparable across a broad spectrum of countries, Muscovy’s integration of the non-Russian population of the Middle Volga without restriction based on language or religion was unique. Spain, for example, upheld the supremacy of Catholicism to the persistent detriment of its subjects. This included the

expulsion of the *moriscos* from Granada in 1569 and ultimately from all of Spain in the seventeenth century). ¹⁵ England’s colonial empire supported the supremacy of its white settlers throughout the world and closer to home, privileging the position of Welsh and Scottish settlers inside the Irish Pale. ¹⁶

While differences among the early-modern empires existed, these differences were culturally-defined attempts to resolve one common set of problems created by governing a tremendous amount of territory and ethnically diverse populations. Expanding borders became the impetus for centralizing state control. The results of centralization consolidated the hold of the political center, but without destroying the political autonomy of the frontier. It is not surprising that the relationship between Moscow and Tatarstan today encounters many of the same problems as Moscow and the Middle Volga Region in the seventeenth century. The empowered central authorities can dictate, but only the participation of the frontier guarantees success.


A NOTE ON THE SOURCES

A study of the early-modern Middle Volga Region faces several unique challenges. Because of the lack of administrative centers in the earliest period of Muscovite control over the Middle Volga Region, documentation of the region for that period is scarce. In fact, there is an exponential growth of evidence for the seventeenth century when compared to the sixteenth. In addition to the problem of little administrative presence in the earliest period, recurrent fires had further detrimental effects. In Moscow, the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa, the region’s supervisory chancellery, burned twice, destroying the best source for evidence from the region. The chancellery would have followed the standard administrative practice in response to the destruction of its records by recalling the copies of all of its missives from the countryside. Therefore, many of the documents that could have been preserved in the countryside were subsequently destroyed in the second fire. Fires in the Middle Volga Region also took a toll, whether they were natural or the result of a rebellion, as was the case when Alatyr’ was completely destroyed during the Razin Revolt.

Fortunately, numerous documents from the region still exist, though they do create a bias in favor of the latest period covered in the study. While the sixteenth century is not neglected, this dissertation is primarily a study of Muscovite governance of the Middle Volga Region in the seventeenth century, after the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa was already
established to meet the needs of Muscovy’s frontier. What specific events or people proved pivotal in the establishment of that chancellery remain a mystery for the ages.

This dissertation employs all types of extant documents involving the Middle Volga Region. The greatest number of these are gramoty (charters). Gramoty served a wide variety of purposes, but primarily they include all intra-chancellery communications and instructions sent to the countryside. Other gramoty were grants from the tsar, patriarch, or central chanceries to abbots, parish priests, or anyone in Muscovite service. Supplementing the gramoty are petitions from abbots, priests, and servitors requesting various adjustments to the relationship between the individuals in the Middle Volga Region and the Muscovite chancelleries.

While gramoty and petitions relate specific events and requests, a broader scale of activity in the Middle Volga Region is revealed from numerous knigi (books), including land cadasters, census records, tax rolls, muster records, and customs books. While no single city or region in the Middle Volga Region had a consistent run of these knigi over the course of the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries, enough remain to complement the specific events and requests revealed from the gramoty.

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