THE ITALIANS IN THE SECOND PUNIC WAR: LOCAL CONDITIONS AND THE FAILURE OF THE HANNIBALIC STRATEGY IN ITALY

DISSERTATION

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By

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ABSTRACT

Rome’s victory in the Second Punic War paved the way for its conquest of the Mediterranean. Yet that victory is bound up with Hannibal's failure in Italy, even though he brought Rome to its knees in the early stages of the war. Previous explanations for the failure of Hannibal's strategy have tended to stress either the hopelessness of this strategy, because of the loyalty of Rome's Italian allies and their willingness to be integrated into the Roman system, or the success of Rome's counter-strategy of attrition, aimed at limiting allied revolts while wearing down Hannibal's forces. Previous scholarship, however, neglects an important dimension of the question of the failure of Hannibal’s strategy; that is, Hannibal’s failure as a diplomat to win over large numbers of Rome’s Italian allies and thus overcome Rome’s long-term strategic advantages. This dissertation looks at the Second Punic War from the perspective of the Italian states in order to explain why Hannibal did not gain more Italian allies. The dissertation is divided into four regional case studies and brings to bear literary, archaeological, numismatic, epigraphic, and topographic evidence. Thus, local political, diplomatic, and economic conditions that shaped the decision faced by Rome’s Italian allies to revolt or to remain loyal to Rome are brought into focus. Aristocrats in various Italian states were motivated more by local and immediate impulses rather than by an ideological attachment to Hannibal or Rome. Therefore, Hannibal was forced to practice ad hoc
diplomacy – at times threatening Italian cities, at times promising freedom, territory, or power – to gain allies. In particular, when Hannibal won over a number of powerful Italian cities, such as Capua or Arpi, he did so in part by promising to extend those cities’ local hegemonic interests. However, this tended to drive cities that were traditional rivals to his new allies more firmly into the Roman camp. In effect, Hannibal’s success in winning over some cities in a given region actually precluded his chances to win over other cities in the same region. Overall, therefore, local conditions contributed greatly to Hannibal’s strategic failure in Italy.
Dedicated to J.B.
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The following abbreviations are employed in this dissertation. Full references are included in the Bibliography.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Azzi</td>
<td>Azzi, G., Nuovi Annali dell’ Agricoltura (1922)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAH¹</td>
<td>The Cambridge Ancient History, 1st ed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAH²</td>
<td>The Cambridge Ancient History, 2nd ed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>Oakley, S.P., A Commentary on Livy Books VI-X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCP</td>
<td>Walbank, F.W., A Historical Commentary on Polybius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRR</td>
<td>Broughton, T.R.S., Magistrates of the Roman Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCD³</td>
<td>The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 3rd ed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RE</td>
<td>Wissowa, Real-Encyclopädie der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft</td>
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INTRODUCTION

The Problem

The Second Punic War was pivotal in the history of the Roman Republic, and it remains one of the most studied events in all ancient history. Nearly every aspect of the war has received scholarly scrutiny. Military historians have poured over the strategies, tactics, armaments, logistical dispositions, and quality of commanders of the two combatants.¹ Both the outbreak of the Second Punic War and the treaty concluded by Scipio provide valuable information for the motivations for and nature of Roman imperialism.² The relatively rich source material has proved fertile ground for the study

¹ “In the history of the art of warfare the Second Punic War is epochal,” concludes Delbrück, History of the Art of War 311; for analysis of the Second Punic War primarily from the perspective of military history, see for example Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars 143-328; Peddie, Hannibal’s War; Bagnall, The Punic Wars 155-299; Caven, The Punic Wars 85-258; Lazenby, Hannibal’s War; Montgomery of Alamein, A History of Warfare 89-98; Thiel, Studies on the History of Roman Sea-Power in Republican Times 32-199; Delbrück, History of the Art of War 311-390; Dodge, Hannibal; for a recent treatment of logistics in ancient warfare, with a specific analysis of the Second Punic War, see Erdkamp, Hunger and the Sword; for the mechanics of battle in the Second Punic War, see Daly, Cannae: The experience of battle in the Second Punic War; Sabin, “The mechanics of battle in the second Punic War,” in Cornell, et al., The Second Punic War: A reappraisal.

of Roman aristocratic politics. Scholars have debated the social, demographic, and economic effects on the Italian population of the war, a nearly two-decade contest on Italian soil the reverberations of which may have been felt at least as late as the social struggles of the republic’s last century. Finally, Rome’s ultimate victory in the war, after Hannibal nearly brought the Romans to their knees in the early stages of the conflict, paved the way for its conquest of the Mediterranean. Indeed, Rome entered the Second Punic War as the dominant city in Italy but still a regional hegemonic power, and it emerged as a “world power” whose influence would be felt far beyond the Italian peninsula. However, despite the importance of the war, the closeness of the contest for much of its course, and the lengthy historiography on the subject, a satisfactory explanation for why Hannibal lost the war has yet to be articulated fully.

Historiography

The starting point for any discussion of why Hannibal lost the Second Punic War is the great advantage Rome enjoyed in manpower. It is generally agreed that Rome’s great manpower reserves and its ability to field army after army profoundly shaped the

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4 The classic formulation of the problem remains Toynbee, Hannibal’s Legacy, arguing that the effects of the Second Punic War were felt in southern Italy as late as the 19th century; Toynbee has been opposed by Brunt, Italian Manpower; for a recent summary of the debate, see Cornell, “Hannibal’s Legacy: the effects of the Hannibalic War on Italy,” in Cornell, et al., The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal 97-117. A wealth of archaeological evidence has contributed to the study of Hannibal’s legacy, at times calling into question the image presented in the literary evidence that the Second Punic War caused profound and long-term damage to agricultural production and a large-scale decline in population in southern Italy; for example, see Lomas, Rome and the Western Greeks 115-23.

5 For a summary of Rome’s rise from hegemon of Italy to Mediterranean power, see Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars 316-21; Crawford, The Roman Republic 43-57; see also Errington, Dawn of Empire 119-28,
course of the Second Punic War, and some scholars have cited Roman manpower as the
critical factor in determining the outcome of the war.⁶ In fact, the Romans did enjoy a
significant advantage in manpower relative to the forces under Hannibal’s command at
the outbreak of the war, and maintained that advantage through the course of the conflict.
According to Polybius (2.24), the total number of Roman and allied men capable of
bearing arms exceeded 700,000 infantry and 70,000 cavalry. Brunt adjusted Polybius’
figures and estimated that the population Italy in 225 BC, not including Greeks and
Bruttians, exceeded 875,000 free adult males, from whom the Romans could levy troops.
Not only did Rome have the potential to levy vast numbers of troops, but she in fact
fielded large armies in the opening stages of the war. Brunt estimates that Rome
mobilized 108,000 men for service in the legions between 218 BC and 215 BC, while at
the height of the war effort (214 BC to 212 BC) Rome was able to mobilize
approximately 230,000 men. Moreover, Rome’s manpower reserves allowed it to absorb
staggering losses, yet still field large armies. For example, according to Brunt, as many
as 50,000 men were lost between 218 BC and 215 BC, but Rome continued to place
between 14 and 25 legions in the field for the duration of the war.⁷ Against these mighty
resources Hannibal led from Spain an army of approximately 50,000 infantry and 9,000

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⁷ Brunt, *Italian Manpower* 44-54, 416-22; Brunt also estimated the potential manpower at over 940,000 if
the Greeks and Bruttians were included. However, for a somewhat lower estimate of potential Roman-
allied manpower, around 540,000 infantry and 57,500 cavalry, see Baronowski, “Roman military forces in
225 BC (Polybius 2.23-4),” *Historia* 42 (1993) 181-202. In either case Rome would have enjoyed a vast
advantage in manpower over Hannibal’s invading army.
cavalry. By the time Hannibal reached the Rhone his force had dwindled to about 38,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry, and when Hannibal descended into the Po Valley, he commander perhaps 20,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry. Even the addition of 14,000 Gallic troops (if Polybius’ figures are to believed) left Hannibal outnumbered at the battle of Trebia.8

It is within the context of Rome’s great manpower advantage that Hannibal devised his Italian strategy. Hannibal probably never envisioned marching on the city of Rome itself, or at least not until he had an overwhelming military advantage that would have allowed him either to storm the city or prosecute a prolonged siege. Rather, as discussed in the Conclusion, Hannibal figured that the war would end through diplomacy, with the Romans accepting terms dictated by himself. He hoped to achieve his objective of bringing the Roman senate to terms by overawing the Romans and their allies with his military prowess, while at the same time breaking up the so-called Italian confederacy by weakening the resolve of Rome’s Italian allies. The latter would be achieved in two ways: first, by defeating Roman armies Hannibal would undermine Roman credibility and shake the image of Rome as the dominant city in Italy; second, Hannibal would attempt to convince the allies that siding with him would prove more beneficial than remaining loyal to Rome. Goldsworthy has argued that Hannibal’s Italian strategy was not unique, but rather conformed to military-diplomatic practice typical for the Hellenistic age.9 While this may be true, it should be recognized that Hannibal’s Italian

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8 For estimates of the troop strength of Hannibal’s army at various stages during his march from Spain to the Po valley, see Lazenby, Hannibal’s War 34-48, 50-1; see also Walbank, HCP 1.361-7; De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 3.2; 281-2.

9 Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars 155-6
strategy had the potential to counteract Rome’s manpower advantage. Hannibal may have figured that rebellious allies, dissatisfied with Roman rule, would provide reinforcements for his army; in fact, as noted above, he quickly acquired thousands of Gallic troops. Even if disaffected allies did not furnish troops for his army, the rebellious states would have deprived the Romans of potential soldiers for the legions. Thus, the Hannibalic strategy, if successful, would have at least leveled the playing field in terms of manpower, and at best, Hannibal were extremely successful and vast numbers of Italian allies revolted, Rome would have been essentially isolated, while Hannibal’s forces would have been greatly augmented by the addition of Italian reinforcements.

From the time Hannibal made his now famous march into Italy through the Alps\(^{10}\) in 218 BC to his crushing victory at the battle of Cannae in 216 BC, Hannibal appeared unchallenged in Italy, winning a series of stunning victories over Roman armies and, after the battle of Cannae, inspiring a number of Rome’s Italian allies to defect. From 216 BC to 211 BC, the war hung in the balance, though the Romans slowly began to turn the tide against their Carthaginian foe. From 211 BC to 207 BC, although the fortunes of war had clearly turned against him, Hannibal was still capable of exacting painful defeats on opposing armies. However, he was forced to operate in an increasingly restricted corner of the Italian peninsula. The Romans would eventually force him from Italy, and they would also capture Carthaginian possessions in Spain and invade North Africa.\(^{11}\)

\(^{10}\) The route of Hannibal’s march also remains a constant topic of debate; for a comprehensive treatment, see Proctor, *Hannibal’s March in History* for a more recent analysis, see Lancel, *Hannibal* 57-80.

\(^{11}\) The most thorough narrative account of the Second Punic War remains De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* 3^2^, originally published in 1916. The best accounts in English are Goldsworthy, *The Punic Wars* 143-328 and Lazenby, *Hannibal’s War.*
Although he had repeated battlefield successes, he never brought Rome to the bargaining table, nor did he bring about the disintegration of the Italian confederacy. Rome’s ultimate victory in the war, therefore, is bound up with Hannibal’s failure to achieve his strategic objective in the Italian theatre – that is, with the failure of the Hannibalic strategy. While Roman manpower undoubtedly shaped the Second Punic War, further analysis is required to explain the failure of the Hannibalic strategy, especially the question of why Roman *socii* did not all decide to revolt. There have been many attempts to explain why Hannibal failed to achieve his military objective even though his strategy appears to have worked to perfection through his victory at the battle of Cannae. In the face of this volume of scholarship, it is best to consider various explanations for the failure of Hannibal’s Italian strategy as falling into three categories, rather than treat each scholar in turn. However, the reader should keep in mind that these three categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

The first explanation emphasizes the effectiveness of the Roman military and diplomatic response after Cannae as the critical factor in Hannibal’s defeat. Adherents to this thesis vary in the degree to which they praise individual Roman commanders and politicians for the decision to prosecute a war of attrition or credit structures in Roman society that allowed it to endure a war of attrition and the presence of a foreign army on its shores for nearly two decades. In either case, scholars have correctly recognized that after its initial failure in the Second Punic War, Rome adopted counterstrategies that played to its strength in manpower, while limiting Hannibal’s opportunities to take
advantage of his apparent tactical superiority. De Sanctis perhaps best articulated this position, arguing that strict adherence to the so-called Fabian strategy ultimately saved the Roman cause and led to Hannibal’s defeat. Fabius Maximus advised that Rome should not meet Hannibal in the open field, unless the Romans clearly held the advantage. Meanwhile, the Romans would be able to field many armies and not only wear down Hannibal’s forces, but also punish allied states that had rebelled from Rome. Caven argued that Hannibal’s incomplete success in encouraging allied revolts had the ironic effect of contributing to the success of the Fabian strategy, since Hannibal’s new allies were potential targets for Roman reprisals. Thus, Hannibal faced the dilemma of having to divide his army in order to protect his allies or be shown incapable of protecting them. Pursuance of the Fabian strategy produced subsidiary benefits for the Roman cause. Goldsworthy has argued that the stalemate in the Italian theatre allowed Rome’s legions and their commanders to become more experienced and skilled at facing Hannibal in Italy, mitigating Hannibal’s initial advantage, while Roman armies

12 Errington, *The Dawn of Empire* 77 credits at least in part the unusual patience of competence of the important Roman commanders Fabius Maximus, Marcellus, and Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus with the defeat of Hannibal’s strategy. Goldsworthy, *The Punic Wars* 227, 314-5 suggests that there was “far more continuity in the Roman command,” and that Roman commanders were generally superior to Carthaginian commanders except Hannibal. Goldsworthy also praises the Roman senate for committing troops to distant theatres while enduring a war of attrition in Italy, and lauds the willingness of all classes of Romans to endure difficult campaigning. Caven, *The Punic Wars* 156-7 calls attention to the senate for its willingness to prosecute the Fabian strategy. Bagnall, *The Punic Wars* 201-3 also praises the senate for strategic farsightedness, based, however, on the highly questionable argument that the crisis of Cannae was a “national catharsis” that cleared Rome of “political lumber,” and that Roman military commanders after 216 BC were no longer to be chosen because of politics. Dorey and Dudly, *Rome Against Carthage* 68-70 credit the senate for following the appropriate strategy after Cannae. Cottrell, *Hannibal: Enemy of Rome* 146-53 commends the senate both for squelching talk of surrender and for “developing in full the harrying tactics of Fabius.” According to Cottrell (p. 147), “The factor which, in the end, defeated the invader was not the ability of Rome’s generals, but the strength and vitality of its political institutions.”

13 De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* 32.2.209-14

14 Caven, *The Punic Wars* 148-9; see also Goldsworthy, *The Punic Wars* 313; De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* 32.2.214
demonstrated increasing superiority over other Carthaginian armies and commanders.\textsuperscript{15}

Finally, Peddie suggested that as the war dragged on, Hannibal faced not only the loss of manpower, but also the loss of “junior command,” which crippled the battlefield effectiveness of his army.\textsuperscript{16}

Roman strategic response certainly played a part in Hannibal’s defeat in Italy; however, this alone does not account for Rome’s victory in the Second Punic War. The Romans decided to pursue a war of attrition in Italy only after a string of crushing victories by Hannibal that shook the image of Rome’s invincibility and brought about numerous allied defections. In fact, perhaps the most important result of the Fabian strategy was that it deprived Hannibal the opportunity to follow up the battle of Cannae with another stunning victory in a pitched battle, which may have yielded even more defections if not capitulation by the Roman senate. It is appropriate, therefore, to praise Rome’s long-term strategy and its decision to pursue a war of attrition. However, the decision to pursue the Fabian strategy was made possible only through Hannibal’s failure to elicit massive allied defections. Had Hannibal succeeded in bringing about the defection of an overwhelming number of Roman allies in the wake of his stunning victories, it is more likely Rome would have sought terms. Even if Rome did not surrender immediately, the loss of most of its allies may have convinced the senate of the need to face Hannibal in the open field in order to save face, rather than to allow him to march freely through southern Italy. Indeed, there would have been little point in

\textsuperscript{15} Goldsworthy, \textit{The Punic Wars} 314-5

\textsuperscript{16} Peddie, \textit{Hannibal’s War} 110
pursuing the Fabian strategy because there would have been few allies left to defect. Even if the Romans decided to fight a war of attrition in the face of massive allied revolts, the loss of allied manpower and the possibility Hannibal could re-supply his army with Italian defectors would have left the Romans less capable to do so. The question remains, therefore, why more allies did not revolt immediately after the Cannae.

A second group of scholars accepts the fundamental soundness of the Hannibalic strategy, and assumes that Hannibal could have won the war within the context of that strategy. According to these scholars, critical errors in executing the Hannibalic strategy, either on the part of Hannibal, other Carthaginian commanders, or the Carthaginian senate, contributed to Hannibal’s ultimate defeat. For example, it has been argued that Hannibal failed to capitalize on his battlefield victory at Cannae – this echoes Livy’s sentiment, placed in the mouth of Maharbal, that Hannibal knew how to win battles but did not know how to use those victories to win the war.\(^\text{17}\) Thus, Montgomery argued that Hannibal should have marched on Rome in the wake of Cannae.\(^\text{18}\) Most scholars agree that a march on Rome would have been impractical, both because of the distance between Hannibal’s camp near Cannae and Rome, and because Hannibal was unprepared to engage in what likely would have been a lengthy siege of the city.\(^\text{19}\) However, there is some merit to the notion that Hannibal failed to capitalize as much as he could on his victory at Cannae. Goldsworthy has recently suggested that Hannibal should have

\(^{17}\) Liv. 22.51.1-4


marched on Rome, not so much with the hope of capturing the city by storm or by means of a long siege, but with the possibility that such a move may have encouraged the Romans to seek terms.²⁰ Even had Rome not surrendered, Hannibal may have further eroded Rome’s credibility and encouraged more allied defections by marching into Latium. However, it is possible that Hannibal should have remained in southern Italy, rather than have marched to Campania. For example, Peddie faults Hannibal for losing the military initiative, in particular chastising him for not pursuing more actively the remnants of the defeated Cannae legions in Canusium.²¹ It may also have proven better to march toward Tarentum and attempt to gain the support of the Greek cities along the southern coast of Lucania, instead of focusing on the cities of Campania, because, as discussed in Chapter 4, Hannibal should have found both the Lucanians and the Greek coastal cities receptive to his overtures. If Hannibal had secured southeast Italy in 216 BC, he presumably would still have been able to encourage revolts in Samnium, Campania, and Bruttium. In any case, the critical issue for Hannibal was his failure to elicit more allied defections, in light of Rome’s refusal to surrender after Cannae.

Another source of criticism is the failure either on the part of Hannibal or the Carthaginian senate to have provided for the re-supply of Hannibal’s army in the critical years following Cannae.²² Thus, a number of scholars have emphasized Roman naval superiority during the Second Punic War and its ability to prevent Carthaginian reinforcements to arrive by sea to Italy. For example, Montgomery blamed Hannibal in

²⁰ Goldsworthy, *The Punic Wars* 216

²¹ Peddie, *Hannibal’s War* 198-9
particular for not recognizing the importance of sea power, though Lazenby observed that
Hannibal’s actions during the Second Punic War – his repeated attempts to capture ports – show that he had a keen awareness of the importance of sea-power. Thiel questioned
why there was not vigorous naval support for Hannibal’s offensive, and he argued, “the maritime failure of Carthage decisively contributed to Roman victory.” However, Delbrück asserted that it would have been foolhardy for Hannibal or Carthage to waste money building up a fleet since they could never outstrip Roman naval superiority. More recently, Rankov has suggested that “naval superiority” must be understood within the context of ancient naval warfare. Ancient fleets could spend only short periods of time at sea, and were forced to hug the coastline during operations. For Rankov, Roman naval superiority during the Second Punic War resulted from Rome’s control of Italian coastline communities, thus limiting the opportunities for any Carthaginian fleet to land. Moreover, even when Hannibal gained a number of ports in southern Italy, a Carthaginian fleet would have had difficulty sailing from Africa to Italy without making an intermediate stop in Sicily, which Rome controlled for much of the war. The explanations for Carthaginian maritime failure are not entirely convincing; however, it

22 Caven, The Punic Wars 149-52; Dodge, Hannibal 382, 403-4, 632

23 Montgomery, History of Warfare 97; Lazenby, “Was Maharbal Right?” in Cornell, et al., The Second Punic War: A reappraisal 46, see also Hannibal’s War 235.

24 Thiel, Studies on the History of Roman Sea-Power 192-193; De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 3.2.2.112 also emphasized Roman control of the sea.

25 Delbrück, History of the Art of War 312


27 Failure to obtain a port cannot be the sole reason for Carthaginian maritime failure, since Hannibal did, in fact, gain a port early in the war – Locri in 215 BC – and received reinforcements via that port (see Chapter
does appear clear that the Carthaginian navy rarely played a significant role in the re-supply of Hannibal’s army. Still, the issue of re-supply became important only as the war dragged on and Rome pursued a policy of attrition. Had Hannibal been able to force the Romans to seek terms after Cannae or bring about an utter collapse of the Italian confederacy, the naval failure of the Carthaginians would have been rendered moot.

Rankov’s observations bring us to a related modern criticism of the Carthaginian war effort. A number of scholars see Hannibal’s defeat in Italy rooted in military failures in other theatres of the war – in other words, the war was not lost in Italy, but rather in Spain, Sicily, or Sardinia. However, scholars are often at odds over how events in other theatres related to Hannibal’s defeat in Italy. For example, Peddie blamed Hannibal for failing to secure Spain adequately before marching on Italy; therefore, the Romans were able to make gains in Spain and prevent Hannibal from using Spain as a source of re-supply.28 However, Caven argued that the Carthaginian senate was too concerned with Spain and Sardinia and thus wasted time and resources on campaigns there rather than making a concerted effort to re-supply Hannibal until it was too late.29 Similarly, De Beer argued that the Carthaginians wasted their efforts in Sicily and should have focused on

3). One must also question if an ancient fleet needed a port in which to land, since the Romans were able to pick up sailors around Croton and Thurii after those cities had fallen to Hannibal (Livy 26.39.7; see Chapter 4), and the Romans were able to beach their ships near a hostile city during First Punic War (Pol. 1.29.1-3). Despite the fact that Rome recaptured Syracuse, and therefore essentially controlled Sicily, a Carthaginian fleet was able to cruise the waters off of Tarentum as late as 209 BC (Liv. 27.15.7; see Chapter 4). Finally, one must question the “superiority” of the Roman navy. It is not clear how effectively the Romans could prevent opposing ships from landing or raiding towns along the coast. Nor, in naval combat, did Roman fleets necessarily prove effective – consider the defeat of a Roman fleet at the hands of the Tarentines (Liv. 26.39).

28 Peddie, Hannibal’s War 198. The importance of the Spanish theatre is a common theme; for example, see Barceló, Hannibal 73-83; Lancel, Hannibal 102, 133-51; Briscoe, CAH 8.56-61; Errington, The Dawn of Empire 80-92; Dorey and Dudley, Rome against Carthage 96-118.

29 Caven, The Punic Wars 155-6, 256-7
sending supplies and reinforcements to Italy. However, according to Rankov, the turning point in the war was Rome’s victory at Syracuse, which gave Rome control of Sicily and essentially cut off the routes of re-supply by sea from Italy to Africa. Lazenby’s analysis is perhaps the most forgiving to Hannibal. According to Lazenby, Hannibal fought the best strategy he could and came very close to victory. In fact, a Carthaginian victory would have been possible had Hannibal been able to receive reinforcements. For Lazenby, like Rankov, the critical blow was the defeat of Carthaginian forces in Syracuse, which cost Hannibal control of Sicily. However, Lazenby emphasizes that the Roman victory at Syracuse came about “largely by accident,” so presumably the Carthaginians were just as likely as the Romans to control the city. Had the Carthaginians controlled Syracuse, they would have been able to subdue all of Sicily and form a bridge between North Africa and rebellious southern Italy. This in turn would have facilitated the re-supply of Hannibal’s army and allowed the Carthaginians to open a “second front” against Rome. Lazenby was correct when he

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30 De Beer, Hannibal 233, 240

31 Rankov, “The Second Punic War at Sea,” in Cornell, et al., The Second Punic War: A reappraisal 55; see also Peddie, Hannibal’s War 199, who criticizes Hannibal for not changing “his command structure when the fighting spread to Sicily.” According to Peddie, Hannibal should have taken direct command in Sicily, since its importance outweighed that of his dwindling holdings on the Italian peninsula.

32 Lazenby, The Second Punic War: A reappraisal 115: “It is probably not going too far to say that the threat to Capua was not so important to Hannibal’s chances of success in Italy as the threat to Syracuse: the while of the Greek south of Italy was now [212 BC] in his hands, except for Rhegium, as well as Bruttium and much of Lucania, and, if Sicily could have been won, he might have been able to establish secure communications with Carthage and to open a “second front” in Italy. One only has to reflect what this might have meant, to realise that a Carthaginian success in Sicily, even if it had brought ultimate victory to Carthage, could have greatly prolonged the war, particularly since the Scipios were defeated in Spain in 211, and could have left Rome as she was in the 270s, before its conquest of southern Italy. Success for Rome at Syracuse, moreover, came largely by accident, as we shall see, and only after Carthage, for the first time in the war, had begun to make a real effort at sea. In many ways, then, the fall of Syracuse was the turning point in the war.”
observed that the Romans had a good grasp of long-term strategy and were willing to commit great resources to the Sicilian, Sardinian, and Spanish theatres of the war despite the fact Hannibal remained unbeaten in Italy. Carthaginian failure in these other theatres certainly contributed to Rome’s ultimate victory in the Second Punic War, but the importance of the other theatres must remain secondary to the Italian theatre. If Hannibal had elicited massive allied defections in Italy and the Romans had to rely on only their own citizens to man the legions, then there would have been few troops to spare for overseas military actions. Thus, had Hannibal’s Italian strategy been effective, and had Rome either surrendered or had she been essentially isolated by the defection of most or all of its allies, the Sicilian and Spanish theatres would have been of little consequence.

Finally, explanations of the third category argue that Hannibal miscalculated so profoundly when formulating his Italian strategy that a victory in the Second Punic War within the context of the Hannibalic strategy was essentially impossible. Scholars who promote this position stress the futility of Hannibal’s Italian campaign. For example, it has been argued that the Roman senate would never surrender, thus dooming from the start Hannibal’s strategic goal of forcing the Romans to seek terms. The reasons cited for extreme Roman resolve vary from such nebulous concepts as Roman character to the far more plausible assertion that the confidence of the Roman senate was bolstered by its knowledge of its great manpower resources. It does appear that Hannibal miscalculated

33 Lazenby, The Second Punic War: A reappraisal 106
34 For the intransigence of the Romans, see Crawford, The Roman Republic: “The war was settled by Roman persistence, a characteristic which had already helped defeat Pyrrhus and which was about to defeat Hannibal…” (p. 50) and “It was clear in the aftermath of Cannae that Rome had no intention of ever
the Roman response to his march into Italy and his subsequent victories. Hannibal would have based his calculations on his family’s experience in Spain, records of the First Punic War, the subsequent Carthaginian campaigns to re-subjugate North Africa, and precedents from the Hellenistic world, especially Pyrrhus’s war with Rome. Hannibal probably assumed, based on this experience, that Rome would respond as would other contemporary states, which tended to seek terms after suffering one or a series of grave military defeats. Thus, even though Rome did not surrender after Cannae, Hannibal’s initial calculation was certainly reasonable. Moreover, it is hard to believe the Romans could never have been forced into a situation in which they would surrender, while there is evidence to suggest that the Romans could be brought to the bargaining table. Indeed, if Hannibal had elicited massive defections and thus mitigated Rome’s manpower superiority, he is likely to have shaken the senate’s confidence and wherewithal to continue the war. In any case, even had Rome never surrendered, she would have been completely isolated if Hannibal convinced most or all of its allies to revolt.

Finally, and related to the last point, it has been argued that Hannibal completely misunderstood the nature of Roman rule in Italy and was foolish to believe he could bring about the utter collapse of the Italian confederacy. Various reasons are cited for Italian loyalty to Rome, though the most popular explanation is that there was a “community of surrendering…” (p. 52); Caven, *The Punic Wars* 256-7: “Hannibal either did not consider, or ignored, that Rome would not surrender after shattering defeat;” Baker, *Hannibal* 150-151 argues that Rome adopted a “victory or death” posture after Cannae. See also Briscoe, *CAH* 8.53: “the firmness with which the crisis was met prompted Polybius to devote the whole of book VI [extolling Roman virtues].” For the more sophisticated explanation that Rome’s stubbornness after Cannae was based on the knowledge of its manpower advantage, see Goldsworthy, *The Punic Wars* 315.

35 For a discussion of the development of Hannibal’s strategy and the Roman response he should have expected, see Conclusion.
interest” between Rome and its allies and that many of Rome’s allies perceived benefits and shared rewards from Roman rule. A related argument suggests that, although there may have been some disaffection on the part of Rome’s allies, they would have felt closer cultural and ethnic bonds to Rome than to Hannibal, whose army was composed of Carthaginians, Iberians, and Gauls. However, the evidence suggests that Rome’s allies did not necessarily enjoy living under Roman dominion, nor felt any strong bonds of common unity. For example, as result of Roman conquest, the Bruttii lost half of their territory, while the revolt of Capua and the terms of the subsequent Hannibalic-Capuan treaty indicate that even allies who shared a degree of political integration did not appreciate the benefits of Roman rule. Moreover, the Bruttii and coastal Greeks were bitter enemies, the Samnites and the Apuli were enemies, and a number of nearby cities maintained longstanding rivalries for regional hegemony (for example, Tarentum and Thurii, Rhegium and Croton, Canusium and Arpi). It is not clear that many cities in Italy would feel the Romans were any less foreign, or more palatable, than the Carthaginians.

36 See for example Goldsworthy, *The Punic Wars* 222-4, who correctly observed that the communities to join Hannibal did not have a common identity or purpose; David, *The Roman Conquest of Italy* 57; Salmon, *The Making of Roman Italy* 80-82 while more cautious – suggesting that the allies acted out of self-interest rather than the love of Rome – still emphasizes the foreignness of Hannibal; Crawford, *The Roman Republic* 52-53; Lazenby, *Hannibal’s War* 87-88; Dorey and Dudley, *Rome against Carthage* xvi, with the particularly anachronistic suggestion that, by attacking Rome, Hannibal was not challenging a city-state but a nation-state; Toynbee, *Hannibal’s Legacy* 272-80, suggesting that Rome’s overall generous enfranchisement of the conquered helped its unite Italy in a “Roman commonwealth;” Badian, *Foreign Clientelae* 143-5; Halward, “Hannibal’s Invasion of Italy,” *CAH* 8.56.

37 See now Mouritsen, *Italian Unification: a study in ancient and modern historiography*, who critiques the idea that there was a growing sense Roman and Italian closeness during the second century BC, and thus a priori against the idea of growing closeness in the third century BC.

38 For a discussion of the Bruttii, see Chapter 3; for a discussion of Capua, see Chapter 1.

39 Lazenby, “Was Maharbal Right?” in Cornell, et al., *The Second Punic War: A reappraisal* 42 observed that various Italian communities did not necessarily share common bonds, but argues from this point that the lack of unity would have undermined Hannibal’s strategy because there was no feeling of “us or them” on the part of the Italians against the Romans. This appears to me to miss a fundamental point, that if the
A more cynical argument emphasizes fear of Roman reprisal as a chief reason for Hannibal’s failure to elicit more allied revolts.⁴⁰ This position has some merit, though Hannibal also treated intransigent states poorly, and it is hard to believe that the ruling class of a city was always significantly more concerned with Rome’s response down the road than with Hannibal’s army outside their city’s wall. Some scholars have questioned whether Hannibal’s pose as a Hellenistic liberator could ever have appeared credible to his audience (Rome’s allies in Italy), either because his brutal punishment of intransigent Italian communities contradicted his promise of “freedom” or because many Italian communities would not have understood this fundamentally Hellenistic propaganda.⁴¹ By the late third century much of the Italian peninsula may have been hellenized, or at least exposed to Greek culture,⁴² and is implausible that the Italian states would have been confused by Hannibal’s promise that they would be free from Roman rule. Also Hannibal probably expected some difficulty in convincing the allies to revolt.⁴³ It will be shown that Hannibal would have adopted a more sophisticated diplomatic approach, not only promising “freedom” but also certainly promising power to cities that revolted, and

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⁴⁰ For example, see Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars 226; David, The Roman Conquest of Italy 57; Briscoe, CAH 8.75-8.

⁴¹ Erskine, “Hannibal and the freedom of the Italians,” Hermes 121 (1993) 58-62 suggested that either Hannibal posed as a Hellenistic liberator but the Italians were confused by the propaganda, or ancient authors – especially Polybius – hellenized Hannibal and portrayed his actions in terms of Hellenistic diplomacy. Errington, Dawn of Empire 69-71, 76-77 argued that the release of prisoners after the battle of Trebia, Trasimene, and Cannae probably had little effect in convincing the Italians that Hannibal was a legitimate liberator, while his treatment of intransigent communities completely undermined his promise of freedom.

⁴² See Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome 86-92; Lomas, Rome and the Western Greeks 46-8
favoring local aristocrats who promoted Hannibal’s cause.44 Hannibal did not fail in Italy because he appeared completely foreign or unattractive to Rome’s allies, but rather because he did not elicit enough revolts soon enough to isolate Rome and bring its to its knees.

Subject of the Present Work

Although previous explanations for Hannibal’s failure to elicit massive defections among Rome’s allies have not been entirely persuasive, the focus on the Italian confederacy is appropriate. The question of why Hannibal failed to elicit massive allied rebellions is of fundamental importance because, as this brief historiographic survey has shown, if Hannibal been able to elicit massive defections from among Rome’s Italian allies, then he could have either forced Rome to surrender or rendered its impotent without allies. Hannibal could have marched into central Italy with less fear of protecting his possessions from Roman reprisal, and he possible could have compelled the Romans to fight him once again in the open field. Even if he could not elicit another battle or an immediate Roman surrender, without allies Rome would have been more vulnerable to a prolonged siege. However, not enough of Rome’s allies revolted soon enough. This allowed Rome to pursue a war of attrition, take advantage of its manpower reserves to check Hannibal in Italy, while slowly re-conquering territory in Italy and making inroads into Carthaginian possessions in Spain. Therefore, an analysis of Italian loyalty in the Second Punic War, especially the loyalty of allies in the wake of Cannae when the war


44 Hannibal’s propaganda and his expectations for the Italian response to it will be discussed in detail in the Conclusion.
hung in the balance, is critical for understanding Hannibal’s failure in the Italian theatre and ultimately in the war.

However, there has yet to emerge an adequate scholarly explanation for the decisive loyalty of the Italian allies. Despite the fact that scholars frequently make reference to the loyalty of the Italian confederacy, there has been no comprehensive study aimed specifically at the question of why some allies revolted but many remained loyal during the Second Punic War since J. S. Reid’s lengthy article, itself not without weaknesses.\textsuperscript{45} When scholars do discuss Italian loyalty, they tend to fall back on blanket explanations for Hannibal’s failure to elicit quickly large-scale revolts, and Reid ultimately concludes that Roman beneficence toward its allies limited the effectiveness of the Hannibalic strategy. It is necessary, therefore, to study closely why many allied states remained loyal to Rome even after Hannibal’s awesome victories and his promise of freedom, for this loyalty resulted in the war lasting perhaps longer than Hannibal had anticipated, and once the conflict became a war of attrition, other factors undermining Hannibal’s chances for success came into play. The purpose of this work is to provide such a study.

The following analysis will show, through a series of regional case studies, that individual communities in Italy acted out of self-interest, and responded to immediate pressures and a changing military-diplomatic landscape when calculating their response to Hannibal’s overtures. Most importantly, however, what generally shaped these responses was the fact that Hannibal’s arrival in Italy temporarily allowed local tensions,

\textsuperscript{45} Reid, “Problems of the Second Punic War III: Rome and its Italian allies,” \textit{JRS} 5 (1915) 87-124; in addition to the bibliography cited in n. 36, analysis of allied motivations can be found in Sanctis, \textit{Storia dei Romani} 3\textsuperscript{2}.2 passim.
political divisions, and especially regional inter-city rivalries, which had been suppressed by the Roman domination of Italy, to rise to the surface. Overall, Hannibal’s difficulty in eliciting allied rebellions arose not so much because of the strong loyalty or cultural closeness Italian communities felt toward Rome or because of the foreignness of Hannibal, but because each community made the decision to revolt or not based on a unique history of relations with its local rivals and the specific ways in which the larger events of the war affected these local rivalries. As such, no single diplomatic strategy or single promise by Hannibal would work for all Italian communities. In many cases, it was only when Hannibal promised a city power and played on local rivalries that Hannibal was able to convince important Italian cities to revolt. However, the acceptance of Hannibal by one city often had the effect of limiting his success among communities rival to that city. Thus, age-old intra-regional competition – in some cases long predating Roman conquest – undermined the effectiveness of the Hannibalic strategy. In other cases, larger events gave free rein to political rivalries within cities, again long held in check by Roman hegemony. Thus, Hannibal was often able to gain control of a city by playing on local political rivalries and by backing members of the city’s aristocracy who supported him against the current ruling class, presumably backed by Rome. However, such support proved difficult to maintain, for when Hannibal’s fortunes appeared to waver, pro-Hannibalic aristocrats lost credibility, or even sought reconciliation with Rome. That is, local aristocrats generally backed Hannibal if they perceived a political benefit, not because they were tied ideologically to the Carthaginian cause. When Hannibal appeared unable to deliver on his promise of political power, he quickly lost
support of these aristocrats, and their cities. Moreover, taking control of cites in this way left in place a built-in opposition – those who had formerly held power with the blessing of Rome and around whom resistance to Hannibal could crystallize.

Hannibal did, in fact, miscalculate Rome’s response to his entry into Italy and his initial military success. His miscalculation, however, should not be taken as a sign of a failure in command. Rather, Hannibal based his calculation on his experience in Spain and his understanding of military-diplomatic patterns exhibited in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy during the third century, especially during the Pyrrhic War and the First Punic War. However, Rome simply did not respond to Hannibal as would a typical Hellenistic state, and instead refused to surrender after Cannae. Hannibal’s initial miscalculation may have been exacerbated strategic blunders after Cannae. However, the fundamental reason for Hannibal’s defeat in Italy was his failure to elicit allied revolts in significant numbers. There was not a complete lack of success on Hannibal’s part, but rather success came slower than was necessary for Hannibal to overcome Rome’s manpower advantages. Because of Hannibal’s logistical problems, Hannibal had only a limited window of opportunity in which to defeat Rome. It is not clear when Hannibal realized the war in Italy was lost, but it is clear to the modern observer that when not enough allies came over after Cannae, and the Romans refused to offer Hannibal another chance to wipe out another Roman army and overawe the Italians with his military prowess, Hannibal’s Italian campaign was doomed.

Organization of the Present Work

The following analysis may be divided into two sections. The first makes up the bulk of the work, and comprises a series of four lengthy regional case studies: Campania
(Chapter 1), Apulia (Chapter 2), Western Magna Graecia and the Bruttii (Chapter 3), and Eastern Magna Graecia and the Lucanians (Chapter 4). In each of these regions the success of the Hannibalic strategy was incomplete. In Campania, Apulia, and Western Magna Graecia, Hannibal was unable to control all of cities in a given region at any single time. In Eastern Magna Graecia, Hannibal was able to achieve nearly total success, but success was belated; he never controlled the citadel of the region’s most important city (Tarentum), and his strategy only began to bear fruit after the war in Italy had stalemated. Since these regions each witnessed only partial success of the Hannibalic strategy, they provide excellent evidence for the failure of Hannibal’s strategy.

Instead of falling back on blanket statements for the attitude of Rome’s Italian allies, the decision of each individual community in the four designated regions either to remain loyal to Rome or to revolt to Hannibal is examined in detail. My analysis places particular emphasis on the local political, economic, and diplomatic concerns that shaped a city’s stance during the Second Punic War. My analysis often focuses as much as possible on the history of each city in a given region and that city’s relationship with surrounding communities. Archaeological evidence is also integrated into the analysis and sheds more light on potential demographic and economic factors that shaped the Italian response to Hannibal’s strategy on the local level. Much of the archaeological research has been conducted in the past thirty years, and provides evidence either neglected by or unavailable to scholars who previously studied the Second Punic War. What emerges from the case studies is a picture of Italy more localized than unified under Roman rule. In many cases, Italian cities were as concerned with the policies of their neighbors as they were with Rome. The analysis suggests that local economic, political,
and diplomatic factors – including local political factionalism and intercity rivalries – shaped a city’s decision to revolt or remain loyal more than global issues such as the “attractions of Roman rule” or the promise of “freedom from Rome.”

Despite the emphasis on local and immediate decisions, other long-term reasons for the failure of Hannibal’s strategy cannot be rejected. Thus, the present analysis is perfectly consistent with the thesis that the Romans won by pursuing, more or less, the Fabian strategy of attrition. Nor does this analysis contradict previous scholars who emphasize that Hannibal lost the war because he could not adequately reinforce his army, either from Spain, by sea, or from the Italians themselves. Rather, this study compliments these theories. It explains what factors compelled specific, individual cities to revolt or stay loyal, and it explains, therefore, why Hannibal did not bring about the massive defections after Cannae that were key to his strategy’s success. Once Rome withstood the defeat at Cannae, with enough allies still faithful, she was free to pursue the brilliant Fabian strategy and slowly wear down Hannibal’s army. Rome also had the manpower to contain the struggle in Spain, fight in Sicily, and wage war in Greece. The critical moment in the failure of the Hanniballic strategy thus was in the wake of Cannae, when local pressures drove enough of Rome’s Italian allies to remain loyal and to give Rome the chance to recover from the shock of Cannae and continue the fight. The present work will allow the reader to see the Second Punic War from the perspective of Rome’s Italian allies, rather than from the perspective of Rome or Carthage. By shifting the focus of the war from Rome or Hannibal to local conditions, the Second Punic War, with its significant corpus of ancient evidence, can be used as a window for exploring local municipal concerns generally overshadowed in the sources.
The first section is followed by a Conclusion that discusses the sources for Hannibal’s expectations before embarking on his Italian campaign. While it is impossible to know for sure on what knowledge and experience Hannibal formulated his Italian strategy, it is likely that Hannibal would have looked to a number of sources. First, Hannibal certainly considered his family’s experience in Spain. Second, Hannibal would likely have knowledge of Carthaginian wars the third century BC, including the First Punic War and the re-subjugation of North Africa, especially those campaigns led by his father. Third, Hannibal probably studied in particular the Italian campaign of Pyrrhus, since Hannibal certainly had access to information about the Pyrrhic War and since Pyrrhus’ invasion of Italy would have provided the most appropriate precedent for his own invasion. Fourth, Hannibal had probably been exposed to the typical tactics and terminology of Hellenistic diplomacy. This Conclusion will demonstrate that Hannibal would have expected, based on the sources mentioned above, the combination of battlefield success and diplomacy – including promises of freedom from Roman rule and the extension of local hegemony – to bring about the defection of large numbers of Rome’s allied states. Moreover, Hannibal also would not have expected a protracted war, but would have expected the combination of battlefield success and allied revolts to bring Rome to the bargaining table in a relatively short time. Ultimately, I will conclude that although Hannibal was an excellent battlefield general, he was unremarkable as a strategist and at best adequate as a diplomat.
CHAPTER 1

CAMPANIA

1.1 Introduction

Campania, from the revolt of Capua in 216 BC to its surrender to the Romans in 211 BC, was the decisive theatre of the war. For Hannibal, the region would showcase his Italian strategy.¹ He was able to win over the most important city in Campania, Capua, as well as a number of smaller towns; moreover, the Capua was a civitas sine suffragio, so Hannibal did not just win over mere Roman allies, but (at least partial) Roman citizens. Hannibal also captured an important stronghold where the Via Appia crossed the Volturnus River (at Casilinum), setting up the potential for Hannibal to march north to Latium. However, even at the height of his power, Hannibal achieved only partial success, and a number of Campanian cities (including Naples, Cumae, and Nola) remained loyal to Rome. Also, opposing Hannibal, the Romans committed vast resources in order to hold the line in Campania. In five out of six years between 216 BC and 211 BC, Rome stationed between four and six legions in Campania, both to prevent further Hannibalic success and to wear down and eventually recapture Capua and other

¹ Hannibal invaded the ager Falernus in northern Campania in order to awe the Italian allies (Pol. 3.90.10-4). Livy (26.5.1-2) states explicitly that all Italy was focused on the struggle in Campania between Rome and Hannibal.
rebellious cities.² Hannibal’s failure to defend the Capuans revealed to his other Italian allies Rome’s resilience and marked a major turning point in the conflict.³ Because of the importance of the Campanian theatre ancient authors have left a rather thorough record of events, and we are relatively well informed about the region during at least the first half of the Second Punic War. Hannibal’s partial success in the region combined with the fact that it is the best-documented region in Italy with regard to the events of the Second Punic War make Campania the ideal case study to evaluate why Hannibal was not more successful in eliciting allied revolts and thus why he failed to achieve his military objective in Italy.

Hannibal’s ultimate failure in Campania has been explained variously, and we have touched on most of them in the general historiographic discussion of the failure of the Hannibalic strategy in Italy.⁴ However, a few explanations specific to Campania are worth mentioning here. Reid has suggested that Hannibal’s “ravaging of the Campanian plain” in 217 BC probably delayed his success in eliciting allied rebellions in Campania, especially the revolt of Capua.⁵ Presumably Reid meant the *ager Falernus*, which was the object of Hannibal’s campaign after Trasimene in the summer of 217. However, the *ager Falernus* was Roman territory and had been mulcted from the Capuans over a century earlier, so one may question whether the devastation of this land would have

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³ Liv. 26.16.12-3 emphasizes that Hannibal appeared powerless to defend his allies after Rome’s capture of Capua.

⁴ See Introduction, pp. 2-18.

⁵ Reid, *JRŠ* 5 (1915) 93
angered the Capuans. Even if Reid is correct, however, it does not explain why, once Hannibal did begin to achieve success, only some Campanian cities revolted while others remained loyal.

Rome’s military response – its yearly commitment of multiple legions to Campania and the strategic placement of garrisons in key Campanian cities – has also been cited as the reason why Hannibal was unable to build on his partial success in the region. It would be foolish to think that the Roman military response did nothing to limit Hannibal’s success in winning allies. However, it should be noted that Rome failed to provide military support for some cities that did not revolt in the face of Hannibalic pressure. For example, both Nuceria and Acerrae chose to be sacked rather than submit to Hannibal, and neither city received military assistance from Rome. Thus, Rome’s military response does not appear to be the only factor that encouraged the loyalty of some Italian cities and cannot therefore be the only reason that Hannibal achieved only partial success in Campania.

Moreover, there remains the fundamental question of Hannibal’s initial success, that is, why some Campanian cities revolted to begin with. General dissatisfaction with Roman rule is assumed to be the source of most allied revolts. In particular, the dissatisfaction with the status of *civitas sine suffragio* has been cited as an important factor in revolt of Capua. But some *civitates sine suffragio* did not revolt, for example Cumae and Acerrae. The latter is striking, since the Acerrans, as mentioned above,

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7 Liv. 23.15.3-6, 17.1-7
allowed Hannibal to sack their city rather than submit. Therefore, the question remains why the ruling classes of Campanian cities did not all make the same calculation when deciding whether to revolt or remain loyal.

As this brief historiographic survey suggests, the problem facing most explanations for failure of Hannibal’s strategy in Campania is that they attempt to generalize too broadly the motivations of the ruling classes in the various Campanian cities. This chapter will look closely at the reasons why individual cities chose to remain loyal to Rome or to revolt. Ultimately, it will show that local political factionalism and inter-city rivalries limited the effectiveness of Hannibal’s strategy and contributed to his long-term military failure. Particular attention will be given to the case of Capua, the most important Campanian city and the one whose revolt to great degree shaped policy decisions in neighboring cities. Specifically, this chapter will argue that the ruling class of Capua was politically divided, as were the aristocracies in most Campanian cities. One aristocratic faction perceived that an alliance with Hannibal would restore Capuan hegemony; since Capua had a long history as a regional hegemonic power, this idea was persuasive and the Capuan aristocracy voted to revolt from Rome. Once Capua revolted, smaller surrounding communities that had traditional bonds with Capua also revolted. However, the threat of an expansionist Capua allied with Hannibal played a part in the decision of Capua’s traditional regional rivals to remain loyal. In effect, Hannibal’s success with Capua contributed to his long-term failure in Campania. Some scholars have noted that that inter-city hostility helped confirm the loyalty of Capua’s traditional rivals, such as Cumae and Naples; however, they mention the idea only briefly and with

8 De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 3.2 205-207; Toynbee, Hannibal’s Legacy 200-209
superficial consideration of the impact of local rivalries on the outcome of the war.\(^9\) In this chapter the argument is explored in detail and it forms a critical component of my analysis. Moreover, since Campania is the best-documented case study, the analysis in this chapter serves as a comparative model for interpreting regional, inter-city diplomacy in the subsequent case studies.

Before beginning the present case study, a brief note on terminology is required. First, it is necessary to define the geographic limits of the case study. Augustus incorporated Campania along with parts of Latium into the \textit{Regio I}. However, as Frederiksen pointed out, this was an artificial, administrative boundary that did not necessarily reflect historic or topographic considerations. Before Augustus’ time, Campania was generally defined by more or less natural topographical barriers: to north by the Mons Massicus and the modern day Monte Roccamonfina, to the east by the foothills of the Apennines, to the south by the rugged Sorentine peninsula, and to the west by the sea.\(^10\) It is a little more challenging to determine what cities should be considered Campanian, and lists provided by ancient authors vary.\(^11\) A number of settlements, such as Teanum Sidicinum and Abella, straddled the border between Samnium and Campania, and Salmon devotes considerable space to defining which cities were Campanian versus Samnite;\(^12\) indeed even Strabo expresses confusion over the

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\(^9\) Reid, \textit{JRS} 5 (1915) 117; David, \textit{Roman Conquest of Italy} 58-59

\(^10\) Frederiksen, \textit{Campania} 1-3

\(^11\) See Pol. 3.91; Strab. 5.4.3-11; Plin. \textit{N.H.} 3.60-70.

\(^12\) Salmon, \textit{Samnium and the Samnites} 23-27
region to which various cities belonged.\textsuperscript{13} For the purposes of this chapter, I will consider Campania to have included: Sinuessa, Teanum Sidicinum, Cales, Volturnus, Casilinum, Capua, Atella, Abella, Calatia, Sabata, Suessula, Acerrae, Nola, Nuceria, Surrentum, Pompeii, Herculaneaum, Naples, Puteoli, and Cumae.

The second consideration is the definition of the terms Campania, Campanian, Capua, Capuan, and Campani. Confusion arises because [1] ancient authors refer to the inhabitants of the city of Capua (Capua, Kapuva) as “Campani” (Campani, Kampavnoi), often translated as “Campanians;” [2] “Campani” also often refers to citizens of the member cities of the Capuan league, comprised of Capua and a number of subordinate settlements; and [3] because “Campania” is often meant in ancient sources to mean the territory of Capua, the traditional \textit{ager Campanus}.\textsuperscript{14} For the purposes of this chapter, I will assume that ancient references to the Campani refer only to the people of Capua, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. Also, I will employ the following conventions: [1] “Campania” will refer to the geographic region defined above; [2] “Campanian” will refer to any city or people located within the geographic region of Campania, including Capua, Naples, Nola, etc; [3] “Capua” will refer specifically to the city of Capua, but not to other cities in the Capuan league; [4] “Capuan” will refer to the people and territory of the city of Capua, but not to the other people and cities of the Capuan league; and [5] “Campani” will be used occasionally to refer to the people of

\textsuperscript{13} Strab. 5.3.11

\textsuperscript{14} For the etymology, see Heurgon, \textit{Capoue préromaine} 136-53; see also Frederiksen, \textit{Campania} 2, 137-9; Brunt, \textit{Italian Manpower} 19 n. 4.
Capua and of the other cities of the Capuan league, including Atella, Calatia, Sabata, and Casilinum.

1.2 Hannibal’s success and the revolt of Capua (216-215 BC)

Hannibal had marched into Campania in 217 BC, after the battle of Trasimene, in order to devastate the fertile *ager Falernus*, a tract of land north of the Voltunus river occupied by Roman citizens. Hannibal hoped that he would either compel the Romans to fight another pitched battle or that he would encourage the Italian allies to throw off their allegiance at the sight of Roman impotence. He achieved neither goal in 217 BC. However, the battle of Cannae in 216 BC was a serious loss for the Romans that gave Hannibal the credibility he needed to incite revolts among Rome’s allies. Hannibal returned to Campania in 216 BC, this time with an eye toward capturing a port. Hannibal attacked Naples, but the Neapolitans resisted him fiercely and after a few days Hannibal quit the coast and marched to Capua. Hannibal was successful in his negotiations with the Capuans and they revolted from Rome. Capua would prove to be the most important city Hannibal gained during the war. This section will discuss in detail the factors that promoted Capuan loyalty to Rome and that encouraged Capua’s revolt. Livy’s account of Capuan politics and of the negotiations between the Capuans and Hannibal is relatively detailed, thus allowing the opportunity to evaluate the local conditions that affected the success of Hannibal’s strategy in Campania. The reasons for Hannibal’s success in Capua and for his subsequent repeated failure to win over other Campanian cities such as Naples and Nola will provide the strongest evidence for the importance of

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15 See Appendix A.
local conditions, especially local inter-city rivalries, in shaping the course of the Second Punic War.

Hannibal emerged from winter quarters in Apulia in time to gather food from the surrounding countryside. Polybius states that Hannibal began to move from winter quarters when the grain crop had advanced enough to begin harvesting, suggesting a date around the middle of June. In fact, Polybius also states that Hannibal seized Cannae because the Romans had converted it into a supply depot for grain already collected, suggesting that the spring harvest was already underway. The Roman army sent numerous messengers to Rome asking what should be done, and were told that the consuls were on their way. The battle of Cannae was fought within a couple weeks of the dispatch of the consuls from Rome, placing the date of the battle in early July. This would appear to conflict with a reference by Gellius, recording that the battle of Cannae was fought on August 2, 216 BC. However, the Roman calendar was running early even though the Romans likely intercalated in even years during the Second Punic War. According to Derow’s estimation, the Roman calendar was about four weeks early in 216 BC, and he calculates that August 2 (Roman) would have fallen on about July 1 (solar). Overall, therefore, we should conclude that the battle of Cannae did occur in early July.

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16 Pol. 3.107.1-5; Azzi, 544 notes that the grain harvest at Cerignola, which is nearby Canosa, falls around June 15.

17 Pol. 3.107.6-7, 113.1; Derow, Phoenix 30 (1976) 278 n. 39; HCP 1.443

18 Gell. 5.17.5; Macrobr. Sat. 1.16.26

19 Derow, Phoenix 30 (1976) 277-8; see also HCP 1.438-9, who assumes the calendar was running on time and rejects an early date for the battle of Cannae. Derow’s assumption that intercalation was regular in this period has been challenged by Warrior, Latomus 50 (1991) 80-87.
After Cannae, Hannibal marched to Samnium at the request of Statius Trebius, a member of the elite from Compsa. Apparently there was a political division within the city. The Romans ruled through the loyalty of an elite family, the Mopsii, who had gained in prestige through Roman patronage. It is likely that this arrangement created tensions within the ranks of the elite, and Statius and his allies saw Hannibal as a means to further their own power locally. Hannibal successfully exploited this local political rivalry, and the city revolted from Rome. However, in return for gaining Compsa, Hannibal was compelled to leave a garrison to protect his allies.\textsuperscript{20} Hannibal next marched into Campania and tried unsuccessfully to invest the city of Naples.\textsuperscript{21} From Naples, Hannibal turned to Capua. We can estimate that Hannibal’s peregrinations from the battlefield at Cannae to the gates of Capua took several weeks and that his negotiations with Capuans, which are recorded in some detail by Livy, occurred by early August.

Livy attempts to paint a picture of stasis, with the poorer classes of Capua in support of Hannibal because of hostility to Rome.\textsuperscript{22} The leader of Livy’s “people’s party” was Pacuvius Calavius, whom Livy blames for bringing the Capuan state ultimately to the side of the Carthaginians.\textsuperscript{23} However, Livy is clearly oversimplifying his description of Capuan politics to fit his general, and demonstrably false, statement that Hannibal garnered support from the lower classes in all Italian cities.\textsuperscript{24} Instead, Livy’s narrative

\textsuperscript{20} Liv. 23.1.1-4

\textsuperscript{21} Liv. 23.1.5-10

\textsuperscript{22} Liv. 23.2.1-4.8

\textsuperscript{23} Liv. 23.2.2, 23.8.2

\textsuperscript{24} For example, see Liv. 23.14.7.
reveals a complex struggle of interests between various members of the Capuan elite in which the Capuan aristocracy was deeply divided both politically and in terms of their loyalty to Rome. Indeed, Pacuvius Calavius was certainly a member of the Capuan aristocracy rather than a member of the lower classes. His family had marriage connections to prominent Roman families, and he held the highest office in Capua (medix tuticus) in 217. Pacuvius appears to have favored Roman rule at the beginning of the war since he initially opposed siding with Hannibal. Nor was Pacuvius alone in supporting the Roman cause, at least until 216 BC. Pacuvius’ son remained loyal to the Roman cause even after the Capuan treaty with Hannibal, and a certain Decius Magius also supported the Romans. Although Livy mentions only these few men by name, presumably Roman rule rested on the loyalty of a core “party” of pro-Roman aristocrats.

The case of Pacuvius in particular suggests a couple of reasons why at least some Capuan aristocrats would have promoted Roman rule. First, Capua enjoyed the privileged status of civitas sine suffragio, granted to the Capuans in the fourth century. As such, all Capuans had the right of conubium, the right to intermarry with Roman citizens. Pacuvius had married into a prominent Roman aristocratic family, and Livy states explicitly that Romano-Capuan aristocratic intermarriage was widespread. Thus, Roman rule offered the Capuan elite the opportunity for more thorough political

25 Liv. 23.2.3, 23.2.6. Pacuvius had children by a daughter of Appius Claudius and his daughter was married to Marcus Livius. The former is perhaps to be identified as Appius Claudius Pulcher cos. 212, the latter Marcus Livius Salinator cos. 219; see Lazenby, Hannibal’s War 89.

26 Liv. 23.2.5, 23.7.2-4

27 Liv. 8.14.10-11

28 Liv. 23.4.7
integration. Second, we can surmise that men like Pacuvius Calavius achieved local political prominence at least in part through Roman backing. At the very least Pacuvius’ marriage ties to wealthy Roman aristocrats may have provided him with greater financial backing, which he could have used in enhancing his own local political prominence. Overall, if any group should have been attracted to the benefits of Roman rule, it would have been the Capuan aristocracy, and we might, therefore, expect the Capuan ruling class to have remained loyal throughout the Second Punic War.

However, despite the supposed attractions of Roman rule, the Romans lacked complete loyalty from the Capuan nobility. According to Livy, Capua showed signs of rebelling as early as 217 BC, when Capuan knights approached Hannibal and told him that Capua would revolt if only he marched to the city. However, this anecdote may be Livian foreshadowing of the Capuan revolt that did occur in 216 BC. There is more compelling evidence of the attitude of the Capuan elite toward Rome. According to Livy, after the battle of Cannae, the Capuans no longer respected Roman military prowess, and one of the factors preventing immediate secession was the fact that many Capuans and Romans had intermarried. Livy then states explicitly that the single most important factor preventing the Capuans from siding with Hannibal was that 300 Capuan knights serving with the Roman army were stationed in Sicily. The Capuans understood that these young men were in effect hostages, and their families were so concerned that they convinced the Capuan senate to send a delegation to the consul Varro in order to have the

29 Liv. 22.13.2-4
30 Liv. 23.4.8
knights restored from Sicily.\textsuperscript{31} It is striking that the benefits of Roman rule did not guarantee Capuan aristocratic loyalty, but rather native sons whom the Capuans recognized as potential hostages when they contemplated revolt.\textsuperscript{32}

After Varro rebuffed the embassy seeking the restoration of the 300 hostages, Capuan frustration with Roman rule came to the surface. An anti-Roman party emerged under the leadership of a certain Vibius Virrius who argued openly that the Capuans should seek an alliance with Hannibal. Indeed, Capuan aristocratic dissatisfaction with Roman rule appears to have been widespread, since when Capua fell to the Romans in 211 BC, over seventy Capuan senators were arrested for their part in the revolt or killed themselves in order to avoid Roman reprisal.\textsuperscript{33} According to Livy, even Pacuvius Calavius, who had cautioned against allying with Hannibal, appears to have come over to the anti-Roman position.\textsuperscript{34} The \textit{medix tuticus} for 216 BC, Marius Blossius, was instrumental in arranging a public meeting between the Capuan citizenry and Hannibal.\textsuperscript{35} Since Blossius held Capua’s highest office, it is likely that he received Roman backing, and he probably promoted the Roman cause at the beginning of the war. His appearance in 216 BC in the Hannibalic camp shows that he had switched sides. Finally, by the time the Capuans agreed to terms with Hannibal, there appear to have been only a few

\textsuperscript{31} Liv. 23.5.1

\textsuperscript{32} The importance of the hostages is further underscored by one of the terms in the eventual treaty between Hannibal and the Capuans. In the treaty Hannibal agrees to give the Capuans 300 Roman prisoners with which the Capuans could bargain for the return of their own citizens (Liv. 23.7.2).

\textsuperscript{33} Liv. 26.14.3-9

\textsuperscript{34} See Liv. 23.7.1-2; Livy names Pacuvius as the leader of the party that brought Capua over to Hannibal’s side and he also states that Pacuvius dined with Hannibal at the house of Sthenius and Pacuvius Ninni Celeres, who were presumable pro-Hannibalic Capuan aristocrats.

\textsuperscript{35} Liv. 23.7.8-9
aristocrats who remained openly pro-Roman (or at least anti-Hannibalic). Decius Magius remained committed to Rome, but Livy’s account suggests that he took this stance because he heard the Carthaginians were going to place a garrison in Capua.\textsuperscript{36} Thus, Decius Magius appears to have been more concerned with Capuan autonomy than with the attractions of Roman rule. Livy also reports that Pacuvius Calavius’ son was in Decius Magius’ party, but that Pacavius was able to convince his son to silence his pro-Roman rhetoric.\textsuperscript{37}

To summarize: despite Livy’s statement that Capua suffered from stasis, his narrative reveals a complex political milieu in which the aristocratic ruling class was greatly divided in its loyalty to Rome. Some aristocrats remained loyal despite the appearance of Hannibal, and they even cautioned against siding with the Carthaginians after Hannibal and the Capuan senate signed a treaty. Some aristocrats were more frustrated with Roman rule and were willing to break with Rome more readily. There appears also to have been a swing group of aristocrats, such as Pacuvius Calavius and Marius Blossius, who switched their allegiance from to Rome to Hannibal as events developed. Some Capuan aristocrats were motivated more by personal concerns and family connections than by an ideological attachment to either the Roman or Carthaginian cause. When the military landscape had changed dramatically after Cannae, the factors that contributed to Capuan frustration with Roman rule began to outweigh the factors that cautioned against rebellion; enough of the “swing” aristocrats changed from

\textsuperscript{36} Liv. 23.7.4-6

\textsuperscript{37} Liv. 27.8.2-9.13
the “pro-Roman” to the “pro-Hannibal” position, and Rome lost the support of enough of the Ruling class to lose control of the city.

This does not, however, explain why Capua revolted and other cities in Campania did not. In other words, the fact that the Romans had been utterly routed at Cannae should have undermined Roman military credibility not only in the eyes of the Capuans, but also in the eyes of the citizens of other Campanian cities. Also, while Hannibal successfully took advantage of political divisions within the Capuan senate, certainly Capua was not the only Campanian city the ruling class of which displayed varying degrees of loyalty to Rome. We do not have detailed evidence for the internal politics of most Campanian cities, but the evidence that does exist suggests that such political divisions were not specific to the Capuans. For example, in the same summer that he secured the treaty with Capua, Hannibal marched to Nola, where some Nolani wanted to revolt from Rome. Livy claims that the ruling class remained steadfast in its loyalty and that the seditious elements came from the lower classes. However, in the same passage, Livy also states that the leading members of the Nolani senate were especially loyal to Rome (maxime primores eius [senatus] in societate Romana cum fide praestare). This statement may suggest that the most powerful members of the aristocracy saw their own power as linked to Roman rule. Perhaps these local aristocrats derived their power, at least in part, through Roman backing. The statement also suggests that the Nolani senate was not unified in the degree to which it supported the Roman cause. This is

38 Liv. 23.14.7

39 We have already seen that this was the case in Compsa, where members of the Mopsii family dominated local politics through Roman support; see Liv. 23.1.1-3.
consistent with Livy’s later claim that Nola remained loyal more because of the strength of a Roman garrison under Marcellus than because of the will of the leading men (voluptate principium).\textsuperscript{40} suggesting that Nolani elite loyalty was neither steadfast nor undivided. Livy also states explicitly that the leader of the movement to revolt, Lucius Bantius, was a member of the Nolani equites.\textsuperscript{41} Finally, we hear that Marcellus conducted trials and executed over seventy Nolani for conspiring to revolt; presumably these men included members of the ruling class.\textsuperscript{42} Therefore, a careful reading Livy reveals that the ruling class of Nola was also divided in its loyalty toward Rome. Moreover, Nola’s ultimate loyalty was not solely the result of Roman military presence in the form of a Marcellus’ garrison, since members of the Nolani aristocracy requested the Roman garrison when they learned of possible sedition.

Therefore, political divisions among the ruling aristocracy combined with Hannibal’s victory at Cannae are not enough to explain why Capua revolted and other cities did not. Presumably all Campanian cites were impressed with Hannibal’s military success, and presumably all cities harbored some aristocrats more willing to support open rebellion. It is necessary to isolate conditions specific to Capua that explain why enough Capuan aristocrats either immediately or eventually concluded that it was better to side with Hannibal than remain loyal to Rome, while enough aristocrats in other Campanian cities, faced with same choice, opted to remain loyal so that their cities did not revolt from the Roman alliance system.

\textsuperscript{40} Liv. 23.15.7

\textsuperscript{41} Liv. 23.15.7-9

\textsuperscript{42} Liv. 23.17.1-2
When the Capuans revolted, they made a treaty with Hannibal the terms of which Livy preserves. These terms presumably reveal the issues uppermost in the Capuans’ minds. The Capua-Hannibalic treaty suggests that considerations of sovereignty weighed heavily in the Capuan decision to revolt. Relevant terms of the treaty guaranteed that the Capuans would be governed by their own laws and magistrates, and that they would not be liable for military service against their will.\textsuperscript{43} Let us now consider the first condition, which might have been aimed at protecting the Capuans from Roman civil magistrates. Fredericksen dismissed any idea that the condition was serious, arguing that Capuan resentment against foreign magistrates was not very strong, at least with regard to magistrates with civil authority, because Rome never interfered seriously in Capuan judicial affairs. Fredericksen claimed the treaty terms are formulaic, but he did not elaborate or provide much evidence.\textsuperscript{44} Analysis of the level of Roman interference in Capuan internal politics and judicial affairs usually hinges on a passage in Livy for the year 318 BC.\textsuperscript{45} On the surface, the passage implies that the Romans regularly sent prefects to Capua, presumably annually. However, the function of the magistrates is unclear. If these were annual \textit{praefecti iure dicundo}, then Rome appears to have been interfering with Capuan judicial practice at a very early date, and this interference would have been ongoing for around a century when Hannibal treated with the Capuans. Sherwin-White argued, however, that these prefects were not annual \textit{praefecti iure}

\textsuperscript{43} Liv. 23.7.1-2

\textsuperscript{44} Frederiksen, \textit{Campania} 240-1

\textsuperscript{45} Liv. 9.20.5: \textit{Eodem anno primum praefecti Capuam creari coepti legibus ab L. Furio praetore datis} (“in that same year for the first time prefects for Capua began to be elected, with the laws having been given by the praetor L. Furius”).
dicundo but rather arbitrators requested by the Capuans themselves to settle an internal political dispute. Sherwin-White further concluded that Rome only infrequently sent such prefects to Capua, so Roman interference with Capuan internal judicial affairs was limited.⁴⁶ Toynbee rejected altogether Livy’s reference to prefects sent to Capua in 318 BC, since no such magistrates are mentioned in Livy’s account of the Capuan revolt and since Livy later states that prefects began to be sent annually to Capua in 211 BC, after Rome recaptured the city.⁴⁷ More recently, however, Humbert has argued that Livy’s reference for 318 BC is not spurious and that Rome did send annual praefecti to Capua beginning in the late fourth century.⁴⁸

However, even if Rome did send annual civic magistrates to Capua, there is little evidence that these magistrates interfered to any great extent with Capuan affairs. There is only one explicit reference to Rome interfering with Capuan politics after 318 BC: Livy records that the Romans elected a dictator in 316 BC amid rumors that the Capuans were going to revolt who was to carry out investigations in Capua.⁴⁹ This event shows Rome reacting to a specific crisis, and the whole affair tells us nothing about the role of the praefecti iure dicundo.⁵⁰ When the Capuans revolted in 216 BC, they committed acts of violence against private Roman citizens and against the Roman military magistrates

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⁴⁶ Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship* 43-5
⁴⁷ Toynbee, *Hannibal’s Legacy* 1.244-5; Liv. 26.16.7-10; see Cic. *Lex Agr.* 2.84, 88.
⁴⁸ Humbert, *Municipium et Civitas sine Suffragio* 355-80
⁴⁹ Liv. 9.25.2-3, 26.5-8
⁵⁰ Humbert, *Municipium et Civitas sine Suffragio* 390-2 suggested that the praefecti iure dicundo performed a solely juridical role and would not have interfered otherwise in local administration. However, there is no evidence for their specific role in the third century.
(praefecti socium) in the city, but nothing is said of any civil magistrates.\textsuperscript{51} Moreover, the Capuans continued to elect and be ruled by their own chief magistrate, the medix tuticus. This annual office was an Oscan institution, and its survival into the third century suggests that Roman rule did not impact greatly Capuan political autonomy.\textsuperscript{52} Second, even if the interference of Roman magistrates did generate local resentment, there is still little evidence to suggest that this was a decisive factor in convincing the Capuans to revolt. It is likely that other Campanian cities, also civitates sine suffragio, fell under the authority if praefecti iure dicundo in the fourth century at the same time as Capua.\textsuperscript{53} However, not all of these cities revolted during the Second Punic War.\textsuperscript{54} Therefore, it appears that Roman interference in local judicial proceedings was not the critical factor compelling Capua to rebel while other Campanian cities remained loyal. Thus, while the Capuans certainly preferred no interference from Roman magistrates and in fact struck a treaty guaranteeing this condition, they would have been unwilling to risk Roman

\textsuperscript{51} Liv. 23.7.3; Toynbee, \textit{Hannibal’s Legacy} 1.245

\textsuperscript{52} Salmon, \textit{Samnium and the Samnites} 77-93; Humbert, \textit{Municipium et Civitas sine Suffragio} 369-70; Frederiksen, \textit{Campania}; Toynbee, \textit{Hannibal’s Legacy} 1.214-5; De Sanctis, \textit{Storia dei Romani} 3.2.206 n. 17

\textsuperscript{53} According to Festus (p. 262 L), Capua, Cumae, Casilinum, Volturnum, Literum, Puteoli, Acerrae, Suessula, Atella, and Calatia were all under the authority of a Roman prefect, though it is not clear when these cities comprised a praefectura. While many of these cities are listed as falling under the authority of Roman prefect in 211 BC (see Liv. 26.16.7-10), there is evidence that at least some of them were part of a praefectura at an earlier date. Not all of the cities listed by Livy for 211 BC revolted during the Second Punic War. It is unlikely that the Romans would have punished loyal cities by putting them under the authority of a prefect. Therefore, it is likely that Livy’s reference for 211 BC is anachronistic – while all of these cities may have eventually comprised the praefectura Capuam Cumas, individual cities probably fell under the prefect’s authority at different times. Indeed, Cumae and Suessula were made civitates sine suffragio in the fourth century, as were the Campani (Liv. 8.14.10-1). The most probable solution is that Rome had been sending praefecti to Cumae, Suessula, and the cities of the Campani before the beginning of the Second Punic War. Therefore, these cities faced a similar violation of sovereignty at the hands of Roman authorities.

\textsuperscript{54} For example, Cumae and Suessula remained loyal.
reprisals over the issue. Thus, there must have been other factors that convinced the Capuans to revolt.

The second condition of the Capuo-Hannibalic treaty, that the Capuans would not be liable for military service against their will, does appear to reflect a real grievance on the part of the Capuans. Although it is difficult to determine their exact contribution, the military burden of the Capuans seems to have been particularly heavy.\textsuperscript{55} Baronowski estimates that the Campani contributed about 28\% of the infantry available to them to the Roman legions serving in 225 BC. Meanwhile, Roman allies besides those who were \textit{civitates sine suffragio} contributed a somewhat smaller percentage (about 24\% of their available infantry).\textsuperscript{56} Therefore, the Campani appear to have endured a greater burden of military obligation in 225 BC than did other Italian allied cities. Moreover, Baronowski asserts that some \textit{civitates sine suffragio} did not supply troops in 225 BC.\textsuperscript{57} All this suggests that the Capuans may indeed have suffered a disproportionate military burden, which may have contributed to greater dissatisfaction with Roman rule. The fact that Capuan citizens attacked Roman military magistrates is consistent with this suggestion. However, one should not push this point too far. Polybius’ use of the term Campani referred not only to the Capuans but also to other member cities of the so-called Capuan

\textsuperscript{55} In his account of potential Roman military strength in 225 BC, Polybius lists the Campani together with full Roman citizens; Polybius states that there were 250,000 men available for service in the infantry from among the Romans and the Campani, out of a total potential infantry of about 540,000 men. Polybius also states that the Romans and Campani could supply as many as 18,000 cavalry out of a total potential cavalry of about 58,000 men. Baronowski estimated that out of the 250,000 potential Roman and Campanian infantry and out of the 18,000 potential Roman and Campanian cavalry, the Campani comprised 30,000 potential infantry and about 4,000 potential cavalry. See Pol. 2.23-4, with figures adjusted by Baronowski, \textit{Historia} (1993) 181-202.

\textsuperscript{56} Baronowski, \textit{Historia} (1993) 201

\textsuperscript{57} Baronowski, \textit{Historia} (1993) 199-200
league, so the military obligation calculated by Baronowski would have spread among a
number of cities.\textsuperscript{58} Also, Baronowski asserts that the figures for troop contributions
would have varied from year to year.\textsuperscript{59} It is not clear, then, if the Capuans always
contributed a disproportionate number of young men to the Roman military. Perhaps
more importantly, any Roman demand for soldiers no matter how large was a serious
infringement of Capuan sovereignty, which, as mentioned above, weighed heavily on the
minds of the Capuans. However, all of Rome’s allies would have suffered the same sort
of infringement. So while the military obligation certainly caused discontent, this
discontent was not specific to the Capuans and cannot explain why the Capuans revolted
and other Campanian allies did not.

However, it has been suggested that Capuan discontent was rooted not so much in
Capua’s unusually heavy military burden, as in Capua’s ambiguous political status. As
stated before, Capua enjoyed the rights of \textit{civitas sine suffragio}, so the Capuans were
only partially integrated into the Roman political system, although they endured similar
military obligations to those of full Roman citizens. Some scholars have argued that the
Capuans desired full political integration and when the Romans refused, they grew
frustrated by their “half citizenship.” According to this theory, Capuan frustration with
partial Roman citizenship contributed directly to Capua’s revolt in 216 BC.\textsuperscript{60} There are,
however, a number of objections to this line of reasoning. First, there is little evidence
that Rome’s allies, regardless their technical political status, actually desired greater

\textsuperscript{58} Baronowski, \textit{Historia} (1993) 200; Toynbee, \textit{Hannibal’s Legacy} 1.214-6; Brunt, \textit{Italian Manpower} 19 n.4

\textsuperscript{59} Baronowski, \textit{Historia} (1993) 201
political integration. In fact, Mouritsen has argued that even as late as the Social War the Italians were not drawn to the so-called benefits of Roman citizenship. Second, we have already discussed the widespread intermarriage between Roman and Capuan aristocrats and at least in some cases Capuan aristocrats could promote their local political standing by marrying into prominent Roman families. Such intermarriage was possible only because Capua was a *civitas sine suffragio*, which suggests that the Capuan ruling class may not have been upset by their citizenship. Third, and perhaps most importantly, other *civitates sine suffragio* in Campania did not revolt during the Second Punic War. This suggests that the political status of a city is not a good predictor of that city’s loyalty during the Second Punic War.

Ciaceri observed that Hannibal’s success in eliciting allied revolts was linked to the proximity of his army to the seditious cities. In other words, Hannibal only found success in detaching Italian cities from the Roman alliance system when he posed an immediate military threat to allied cities. There is certainly some truth to this generalization, as no city spontaneously revolted to Hannibal unless his army was nearby, at least initially, to offer support for anti-Roman elements within the city and to guarantee continued protection from Roman reprisal. However, the proximity of Hannibal’s army was not enough in itself to encourage allied rebellions. Events in Campania provide clear evidence, since Hannibal’s entry into Campania in 216 BC yielded only partial success.

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60 De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* 3.2.205-7; Toynbee, *Hannibal’s Legacy* 1. 200-9; Capuan desire for political integration was implied by Frederiksen, *Campania* 238-41.

61 Mouritsen, *Italian Unification* 87-108

62 As stated above, Suessula and Cumae were *civitates sine suffragio* but did not revolt; see n. 54.

Moreover, of the Campanian cities that rejected Hannibal’s overtures, not all possessed the military strength to withstand being stormed or besieged. In Campania, Acerrae and Nuceria chose to be sacked by Hannibal’s army rather than throw off their allegiance with Rome.\textsuperscript{64} This suggests that the decision of a city to revolt or remain loyal was not based solely on the immediate military context.

Frederiksen suggested that Capua was particularly susceptible to Hannibal’s devastation techniques, which made the city more likely to revolt.\textsuperscript{65} The sources do not report that Hannibal’s army devastated Capuan territory when it approached the city in 216 BC. However, the question remains whether Capua was in fact more susceptible to devastation and therefore would have been more willing to revolt than to face the threat of devastation. While there is evidence for a close relationship between town and country in Capua, this same relationship existed in other Campanian cities. Indeed, the cities of Campania comprised a regional trade network, so the destruction of one city’s territory may have affected all cities in the region.

Campania was renowned for its wealth and capacity for agricultural production. There are numerous references both to productivity of the Ager Campanus with respect to grain and for its production of fine wine. The \textit{ager Falernus}, which lay north of the Volturnus River and south of the Mons Massicus lay, was most famous for particularly

\textsuperscript{64} Liv. 23.15.2-6, 17.1, 17.4-7, 43.13-4; Sil. Ital. 12.424; Val. Max. 9.6 ext. 2; Zon. 9.2. It is striking that both cities succumbed to Hannibal after Capua had revolted. Therefore, the Acerrans and the Nucerians chose to remain loyal despite the fact that Rome’s military strength in Campania had been further weakened. De Sanctis, \textit{Storia dei Romani} 3\textsuperscript{2}.2.226 suggested that the cities surrendered more-or-less freely; however, Liv. 27.3.6-7 shows that the citizens of Acerrae and Nuceria still held favor with the Roman senate in 211 BC. It is unlikely the senate would have granted their requests had the Nucerians and Acerrans not displayed loyalty in 216 BC.

\textsuperscript{65} Frederiksen, \textit{Campania} 241
fine wine. According to Livy, there was also fruit cultivation in the *ager Falernus*.\(^{66}\) One may object that most of the literary references to agricultural production in Campania come from a much later period than the Second Punic War and that these sources project a later villa economy onto Campania of the third century BC. However, ancient depictions of Campanian fertility are consistent with modern studies of soil types in the region. For example, Spurr notes that the Campania has soil and climate conditions ideal for the production of the varieties of wheat most important to the Roman farm.\(^{67}\) Soil conditions would have remained relatively consistent, so it is safe to conclude that Campania was a fertile region in third century BC.

While it is difficult to reconstruct patterns of land tenure in the ancient world with a high degree of certainty, a few passages from the ancient sources may shed light on the nature of land organization in Campania. It is likely that for many Campanian cities, inhabitants lived in town and walked to their farms. Livy records that after the fall of Capua in 211 BC, the citizens lost their rights and their land was to be leased.\(^{68}\) Livy later notes that, in 210 BC, Roman soldiers quartered in the city were ordered to construct huts along the city walls. The soldiers had previously been living in houses inside Capua. However, the senate wished to lease parcels of Campanian territory along with houses inside the city, so the soldiers were forced to find new quarters.\(^{69}\) The passage is striking

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\(^{66}\) Liv. 22.14.1, 22.15.2, 23.2.1, 26.16.7; Pol. 3.91; Plin. *NH* 3.60; Strab. 5.4.3; Var. 5.1.2.3-6; Cic. *De Leg. Agr.* 2.76-91; M. Frederiksen, *Campania* 31-53

\(^{67}\) Spurr, *Arable Cultivation in Roman Italy* 7-8.

\(^{68}\) Liv. 26.16.6-11, 26.34.4-11, 27.3.1; Cic. *Leg. Agr.* 2.88-90

\(^{69}\) Liv. 27.3.1-3
because Livy states explicitly that the senate planned to lease the houses together with the plots of land, implying that farmers were expected to live within the walls and farm the land outside the walls. Livy also states that after the Romans had captured Capua in 211 BC, the senate debated the fate of the city. The senate decided that the Capua should be kept intact rather than destroyed, so that when the territory was leased, the farmers would have a place to live. This reference also shows the expectation that farmers would live in the city. While these references pertain to Capua, there is indirect evidence that there was much communication between town and country in Roman Campania. De Ligt noted the average distance between urban centers in Campania was only about 11km, the smallest ratio in Italy. Essentially 100% of the population of Campania would have been within walking distance of an urban center, a condition that would have encouraged intense communication between town and country. For example, rural denizens would have been more likely to attend periodic markets in the city.

With relatively high interaction between town and country, we should expect the tactic of devastation to have been particularly successful in Campania as a whole. That is, any disruption of agricultural patterns, such as burning farms or interrupting sowing and harvest, would result in political agitation within the urban centers by urban-dwelling landowners and by those involved in trade with the rural population. In fact, Livy does record some evidence that suggests Capua was particularly susceptible to devastation. After Hannibal won over the Capuans, he marched to Naples and thence to Nola. Although Hannibal did not devastate Nolani territory – Livy states explicitly that

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70 Liv. 26.16.7

Hannibal hoped to win over the Nolani voluntarily – the mere threat of devastation caused some of the Nolani to propose openly siding with Hannibal. Hannibal again attacked Nola in 215 BC; this time the Nolani were protected by a Roman garrison under the command of Marcellus. After failing to capture Nola through treachery and after a few days of skirmishing with the Romans, Hannibal ordered his men to plunder Nolani territory. When Marcellus recognized that Hannibal was plundering Nolani territory, he immediately ordered his troops out of the city. It is possible that Marcellus feared the political consequences of Hannibal’s plundering, so he chose to face Hannibal in a pitched battle rather than risk losing the confidence of the Nolani. Both episodes suggest that Capua was not unusual in the degree to which she may have been susceptible to devastation tactics.

Even Campanian cities that were involved in trade, and therefore presumably less reliant on agriculture, would not have been immune to the effects of devastation. A number of Campanian cities did, in fact, have economic interests besides agriculture. Coastal cities benefited from sea-borne trade and fishing. Polybius attests the high quality of ports in Campania, and Livy repeatedly mentions that Hannibal desired to capture Naples because it was a port. Naples also had a thriving fishing industry.

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72 Liv. 23.14.5-7
73 Liv. 23.44.3-8. There is some doubt as to the historicity of the battle; in any case Livy has probably exaggerated the magnitude of Marcellus’ victory. However, Plutarch (Marc. 12.2-3) and Zonaras (9.3) report that Marcellus attacked Hannibal’s forces when they were dispersed for foraging. In either case, Marcellus still responded to Hannibal’s devastation tactics rather than simply staying behind the city walls. See Lazenby, Hannibal’s War 96-97.
74 Pol. 3.91.1-2; Liv. 23.1.5, 15.1
75 Liv. 23.1.6-10. Hannibal routed troops from Naples, and the defeated Neapolitans escaped by swimming to fishing boats in the bay. The passage implies that there were numerous boats.
most important port in Campania during the third century was Puteoli. The Romans used Puteoli as a port to import grain during the siege of Capua and as a point of departure for a fleet transporting troops to Spain.\textsuperscript{76} Livy refers to Puteoli specifically as an “emporium” that grew in importance during the war.\textsuperscript{77} Archaeological evidence supports the idea that there was significant trade among Campanian coastal cities. Reugg argued that Minturnae was a center for iron and ceramic production and that it was involved in a flourishing wine trade as early as the third century BC.\textsuperscript{78} One might expect that trade and production centers and cities that exploited the sea would have been less reliant on exploiting their territories and would have been less likely to succumb to an enemy devastating the fields. However, they would not have been completely immune to the tactic, since all ancient cities would have been reliant, at least to some degree, on the agricultural exploitation of the territory. The example of Naples during the Second Punic War confirms this. In 216 BC Hannibal tried to capture Naples. Hannibal ordered his men to plunder Neapolitan farms and display the booty before the walls of the city; the sight encourage the Neapolitans to sally out of their city walls into an ambush that Hannibal had prepared.\textsuperscript{79} Two relevant observations can be made: 1] the existence of farms shows that the Neapolitans were involved in agricultural production, and 2] the tactic of devastation was successful in generating discontent among the Neapolitans.

\textsuperscript{76} Liv. 25.20.2, 22.5; 26.17.2
\textsuperscript{77} Liv. 24.7.10
\textsuperscript{78} Reugg, “Minturnae,” in \textit{Archaeology of Coastal Changes} 209-228
\textsuperscript{79} Liv. 23.1.5-8
Moreover, there probably was not a great divide between inland “farming cities” and coastal “trading cities,” but rather both inland and coastal cities were likely linked by lines of trade and communication. A city such as Minturnae, whose trade may have centered on goods produced rurally, must have felt the affects of rural devastation. Rivers also would have allowed inland cities to take part in the import and export of goods and thus linked inland and coastal communities. For example, the port of Minturnae was actually located upriver on the Garigliano. Also, the Volturnus may have been navigable far upriver, thus allowing Capua access to sea-borne trade. This suggestion is supported by events during the Second Punic War. In 212 BC the Romans prepared to invest Capua; the preparations included fortifying a camp at the mouth of the Volturnus, establishing Casilinum as a granary, and shipping grain from Etruria and Sardinia to Campania to supply the Roman army. At least some of the grain was to be transported by sea, presumably to the mouth of the Volturnus, then by boats upstream to Casilinum. In fact, Laurence argues that Campania contained a regional trade network and the center of the network was the port of Puteoli. The existence of regional economic network in Campania greatly affects our understanding of the potential effectiveness of Hannibal’s devastation techniques. Since coastal cities were connected economically to inland agricultural production, all cities in Campania would have felt the effects of agricultural devastation.

80 That the third century port of Minturnae was upriver, see Reugg, in *Archaeology of Coastal Change* 213ff.


82 Liv. 25.20.1-3, 22.5-6

83 Laurence, *Roman Pompeii* 321-325
To summarize: Campania in the third century BC was a very fertile region exploited by its denizens for the production of wheat and probably grapes and other fruits. All Campanian cities appear to have been reliant on their territories for agricultural production and there appears to have been intense communication between town and country. Coastal cities undoubtedly were involved in sea-borne trade, but this did not render them immune to devastation. Finally, the cities of Campania – both inland and coastal – shared economic links. Overall, therefore, there is little to support Frederiksen’s argument that Capua was more susceptible to the threat of devastation by Hannibal’s army; instead, all Campanian cities appear to have been more-or-less equally vulnerable to devastation tactics. The decisive factor in Capua’s decision to revolt must be found elsewhere. A close reading of Livy’s account, especially his description of the sequence of negotiations between the Capuans and Hannibal, provides the solution to the problem of the Capuan revolt.

There is little doubt that a number of factors, including the military burdens imposed upon civitates sine suffragio and possible Roman interference in local judicial affairs by means of praefecti iure dicundo, contributed to the Capuan dissatisfaction with Roman rule. Roman rule may also have exacerbated local political rivalries – presumably if some Capuan aristocrats such as Pacuvius Calavius benefited politically from Roman backing, then other aristocrats may have felt that their own political careers were hindered. Rome’s recent losses, especially the devastating rout at Cannae, and the immediate threat posed by Hannibal’s army would certainly have undermined Roman military credibility, promoted anti-Roman sentiment, and compelled more Capuans to
question their loyalty to the Roman cause. It is in this context that the Capuans voted to send a delegation to the Roman consul Varro in 216 BC in order to seek the restoration of the 300 aristocratic hostages. The consul at Venusia rejected the Capuan request to restore the hostages, which in turn engendered more hostility.

At this point one member of the legation, the Capuan aristocrat named Vibius Virrius, talked openly about allying with Hannibal. Vibius argued that if the Capuans allied with Hannibal, they would be able to recover land they lost since becoming Roman allies and the city of Capua would be able to assert hegemony over the rest of Italy. Vibius convinced the Capuan senate, after some debate, to send legates to Hannibal in order to seek terms. Vibius’ argument, that siding with Hannibal would yield an extension of Capuan territory and power, must have resonated with the Capuan ruling class because a majority of the senate voted to send the legation despite the fact the Romans still held Capuan hostages. In fact, Vibius’ appears even to have persuaded Pacuvius Calavius, who had previously cautioned against revolt, to switch sides and join Hannibal’s cause. Thus, according to Livy, an appeal to power was decisive in the Capuan decision to revolt.

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84 Liv. 23.4.6-5.1. Livy and Cicero also preserve a tradition that the Capuans sent a delegation to Rome demanding that one of Rome’s consuls be Campanian, though the tradition is dubious; Livy himself questioned the veracity of the story. See Liv. 23.6.6-8; Cic. *Leg. Agr.* 2.95.

85 Liv. 23.5.2-3

86 Liv. 23.6.1-2

87 Liv. 23.6.3-5

88 Liv. 23.6.5

89 Liv. 23.2.1-6, 8.1-2
There is strong evidence that Livy’s account is plausible and that the Capuans were motivated by the desire to increase Capua’s hegemony.\textsuperscript{90} Ancient literary sources agree that Capua had long been a wealthy and powerful city. Livy, describing Capua of the fourth century BC, calls the city the \textit{urbs maxima opulentissimaque Italiae}.\textsuperscript{91} Livy later reports a speech made during the Second Punic War in which Capua is named as the most powerful city after Rome.\textsuperscript{92} Zonaras also records that Capua was a great city in the late third century BC.\textsuperscript{93} Florus calls Capua the \textit{caput urbi\ae} and claims that she was once considered one of the three greatest cities in the world.\textsuperscript{94} Most scholars agree that Capua was the hegemonic power in Campania and that she dominated a league of subordinate cities.\textsuperscript{95} Ancient evidence does suggest that Capua was a hegemonic power in Campania: Livy refers to Capua as the capital city of Campania (\textit{caput Campaniae}),\textsuperscript{96}

\textsuperscript{90} See also Zon. 9.2; Val. Max. 3.8.1. While some scholars have conceded that the desire for hegemony may have motivated the Capuans, it has not been central to their explanations of the Capuan revolt; see for example, Frederiksen, \textit{Campania} 240; Goldsworthy, \textit{The Punic Wars} 224; David, \textit{Roman Conquest of Italy} 57-8; Reid, \textit{JRS} 5 (1915) 113 emphasized Capuan desire to regain land taken by the Romans, but downplayed the appeal to hegemony (that Capua would be master of Italy).

\textsuperscript{91} Liv. 7.31.1

\textsuperscript{92} Liv. 23.11.11. According to Livy, Mago made a report to the Carthaginian senate in 216 BC, after the battle of Cannae and the revolt of Capua. Mago argued that since Rome had lost so many battles, Capua was now the most powerful state in Italy, implying that Capua had been the second most powerful city in Italy. While the speech is certainly fictitious, it is probably accurate enough in its general description of the power of Capua.

\textsuperscript{93} Zon. 8.25: th\n povlin th\n Kapuvh\n n megivsth

\textsuperscript{94} Flor. 1.11.6

\textsuperscript{95} The so-called Capuan league; for scholars who assume the existence of the Capuan league, see for example Toynbee, \textit{Hannibal’s Legacy} 138-9; Salmon, \textit{Samnium and the Samnites} 195 n. 5; Frederiksen, \textit{Campania} 140-1; De Sanctis, \textit{Storia dei Romani} 3\textsuperscript{2}.2.206 n. 17; Cornell, \textit{Beginnings of Rome} 346-7.

\textsuperscript{96} Liv. 23.11.11
and both Pausanias and Strabo refer to Capua in the same manner. However, it is rather more difficult to determine what cities comprised the Capuan league. Strabo states explicitly that when Etruscans settled in the plain of Campania, they made Capua the capital of a twelve-city league. However, Etruscan influence in Campania should probably be dated to the seventh through fifth centuries BC, before Oscan migrations fundamentally changed any political structures which may have formed under the Etruscans. Moreover, Strabo’s twelve-city league looks suspiciously like the Etruscan league itself. Therefore, we should not place too much importance on the specifics of the reference, but instead recognize that Strabo at best confirms the general picture of Capua as a longtime powerful city in the region of Campania. Since most cities in Campania succumbed to Oscan invaders during the fifth century BC and since Capua remained Oscan-speaking at least until the Second Punic War, we should look instead to the Oscan period for evidence of the so-called Capuan league. Livy mentions a number of Campanian cities that received Roman citizenship _sine suffragio_ in 338 BC, including Suessula, Cumae, and the “Campani.” The term “Campani” in general does not refer to all inhabitants of the region of Campania, but rather to citizens of Capua and

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97 Paus. 5.12.3: ἡ ἡμιτροπόλεις ἦσστιν ἡ Καπουsimilar; Strab. 5.4.10: ἐν οἷς ἡ μεγαίθρα Καπού
98 Strab. 5.4.3
99 For a brief reconstruction of the Etruscan period, see Frederiksen, _Campania_ 117-33.
100 Frederiksen, _Campania_ 126
101 Diodorus Siculus (12.31.1) states that Campanian nation formed in 438/7 BC, though the exact meaning of this reference is unclear. Livy (4.37.1) claims that Capua fell to Oscan invaders in 423 BC; Cumae fell a few years later (see Liv. 4.44.12; Diod. Sic. 12.76.4). For a more complete discussion, see Frederiksen, _Campania_ 134-57; see also Lomas, _Rome and the Western Greeks_ 30-7.
102 Liv. 8.14.10-2
its subordinate cities, and the reference suggests the Capuan league existed in the fourth century BC. After the fall of Capua in 211 BC, the Roman senate reorganized Atella, Calatia, Sabata, and Casilinum along with Capua. Indeed, Livy specifically equates the Campani with the people of Capua, Atella, Calatia, and Sabata. Livy also says that after capturing Casilinum Hannibal restored the town to the Campani (Casilinum oppidum redditum Campanis est), suggesting that Casilinum had previously been under the authority of the Capuan league. There is further evidence that links various members of the Capuan league. First, the Capuan meddix tuticus in 214 BC was a certain Cn. Magius Atellanus, suggesting that the man’s family was from Atella and had gained Capuan citizenship, or that the member states of the Capuan league fell under the authority of a single meddix who could be elected from any of the cities. Also, from about 250 BC Atella, Calatia and Capua minted very similar bronze coinage, and Capua and its satellite cities issued nearly identical bronze and silver coins during the years Capua was in revolt (216-211 BC). Overall, the evidence indicates that Capua, Casilinum, Atella, Sabata, and Calatia were members of the Capuan league.

However, there is little to support Salmon’s contention that Cumae, Suessula, and Acerra were members of the Capuan league. Salmon cites no evidence, though he

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103 Salmon, Samnium and the Samnites 33 n. 3
104 Liv. 26.16.5, 26.33.12
105 Liv. 24.19.2; see also Frederiksen, Campania 141.
106 De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 3.2.206 n. 17; Frederiksen, Campania 242; Crawford, Coinage and Money under the Roman Republic 62-4, Roman Republican Coinage 144
107 Salmon, Making of Roman Italy 12 n. 52
may have based his assertion at least in part on Livy’s testimony that Cumae and Suessula received citizenship without the vote in 338 BC (the same year the Campani received the same rights) and Acerrae became a *civitas sine suffragio* in 332 BC. However, a close inspection of Livy’s account suggests nothing about Cumaean or Suessulan participation in the Capuan league. Livy lists in order 1] rights to all the Campani because of the goodwill of the *equites* of the Campani; 2] rights to the Fundani and Formiani for providing safe passage; and 3] the same terms to people of Cumae and Suessula as awarded the Campani. Livy clearly separates the Campanians and the people of Cumae and Suessula. Cumae in particular appears to have been more closely tied to Naples – Naples was a colony of Cumae, and many Cumaeans who fled the Oscans and sought refuge in Naples were granted citizenship there. Moreover, while it is true that Cumae fell to Oscan expansion, it long remained an enclave of Greek culture, whereas Capua became heavily Oscanized. Cumae and Suessula may have been allied with the Capuan league during the Latin Revolt, but Livy’s reference to the three receiving the same rights in 338 BC does not imply that they were all league members. Likewise, Acerrae’s status as *civitas sine suffragio* does not imply was a member of the Capuan league; indeed, there is little to suggest that Acerrae was even allied with Capua or the

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109 Liv. 8.22.5; Vell. Pat. 1.4.2; Plin. *N.H.* 3.62; Dion. Hal.15.6.1-5; see Lomas, *Rome and the Western Greeks* 30-1.

110 Strab. 5.4.4; Diod. Sic. 12.76.4; Dion. Hal. 16.6.4-5; Liv. 4.44.12.

111 CL 2.569 suggested that Cumae and Capua were allied in 340 BC and that Rome confiscated land from defeated Cumae for the *ager publicus* (mentioned by Cic. *Leg. Agr.* 2.66). This does not mean that Cumae was a league member, and the fact that Cumae was loyal during the Second Punic War confirms that she definitely was not part of the Capuan league in 216 BC. Suessula also remained loyal during the second Punic War.
Capuan league.\textsuperscript{112} Finally, there is no evidence that Cales was in the Capuan league, at least after 334 BC. According to Livy, Rome placed Latin colony in Cales after the Latin War. If Cales had been a member of the Capuan league, and there is little direct evidence to support this, she certainly ceased to be a league member when Rome placed a colony there.\textsuperscript{113} To conclude: it is likely that Capua was the chief city of a league that included Atella, Calatia, Sabata, and Casilinum. Acerrae and Suessula do not appear to have been members of the Capuan league. Cumae and Cales may have been allied with Capua in the fourth century BC, but there is no evidence they were under the sway of Capua, at least after the 330s BC.\textsuperscript{114}

It is not clear whether the Capuan league was still functioning as a formal institution at the time of the Second Punic War. However, long-standing though less formal ties still connected the cities, probably including economic links and almost certainly personal connection among the elite of the various cities.\textsuperscript{115} During the period of the Capuan revolt, 216-211 BC, Capua, Calatia, and Atella minted similar coinage,

\textsuperscript{112} CL 2.593

\textsuperscript{113} See Liv. 8.16.1-14. Cales was an Ausonian settlement that allied with the Sidicini and warred with Rome. The reason for war is unclear, and Livy’s silence may indicate Roman aggression. The Sidicini along with the Capuans had previously sought Roman protection against the Samnites. It is possible, therefore, that Cales was part of the Capua league; at least Cales and Cpaua appear to have been allied. After the Romans defeated the Sidicini-Ausonian alliance, the senate decreed that a colony of 2,500 settlers be led out to Cales in 334 BC. Archaeological evidence confirms this early colony – there are the remains of strigation that covered about 19000 iugera; see Choquer, et al, Structures Agraire en Italie Centro-Méridionale 191-5.

\textsuperscript{114} Consider also Pol. 3.91.1-6, which lists the various cities of Campania, and the author includes Capua, Sinuessa, Cumae, Dicaearchea, Nuceria, Nola, Cales, Caudium, and Teanum. The implication of the passage is that these were the chief cities in the region. By listing Cumae and Cales separately from Capua, Polybius implies they were independent from the Capuan league.

\textsuperscript{115} For example, the meddix tuticus in 214 BC was Cnaeus Magius Atellanus. The name may indicate that he emigrated from Atella to Capua; it is less likely that the cities were so linked that an Atellan could hold Capua’s highest office.
suggesting the cities maintained close ties well into the third century and that these close bonds surfaced when Hannibal temporarily suspended Roman rule. Indeed, since Capua remained a powerful city, it would be surprising if the smaller cities that used to be in Capuan league did not tend to gravitate toward its. Presumably, however, the Capuans would have had little opportunity to exert their influence in Campania, so long as Rome dominated Italy. Indeed, the Capuans appear to have lost power since they became Roman allies. Livy states explicitly that the Romans had mulcted the Capuans of the productive *ager Falernus*, because the Capuans took part in the Latin Revolt. Vibius Virius argued that the Capuans would recover territory they had lost since allying with Rome, presumably referring to the *ager Falernus*. Vibius’ arguments appear to have been persuasive to the Capuan aristocracy, since Livy states that the anti-Roman party was able, after some debate, to secure the majority opinion in the Capuan senate. Since Capua had long been a hegemonic city, and since Roman domination of Campania certainly limited the opportunities for Capua to exert greater influence over neighboring cities, it is plausible that an appeal to Capuan power would have resonated with Capua’s increasingly discontented ruling class. Thus, Vibius’ suggestion that an alliance with Hannibal would further Capuan power appears to have been the decisive factor that convinced enough of the Cauan ruling class to side with Hannibal.

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116 Frederiksen, *Campania* 242-243; Crawford, *Coinage and Money under the Roman Republic* 62-64, *Roman Republican Coinage* 144; De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* 3.2.206 n. 17

117 Liv. 8.11.12-3

118 Liv. 23.6.1

119 Liv. 23.6.4-6
Three events subsequent to Vibius’ initial appeal and the decision by the Capuan senate to send legates to Hannibal further support the assertion that the Capuans were moved to revolt, at least in part, by the desire to extend Capuan territory and hegemonic power. The first event was Hannibal’s personal address to Capuan senate. Although Hannibal had come to terms with the Capuans and a number of previously pro-Roman aristocrats were convinced by Vibius’ arguments, support was not universal for the Carthaginian among the Capuan aristocracy. Livy mentions in particular that Decius Magius and a party of aristocratic backers – including Pacuvius Calavius’ son – argued strongly in favor of rejecting Hannibal and maintaining the treaty with Rome. The meddix tuticus for 216, Marius Blossius, contacted Hannibal to inform him that there was still some resistance his entry into the city. Hannibal was in an awkward spot. He was unwilling to have Decius killed immediately for fear that he would appear to trample Capuan sovereignty and would thus encourage an outbreak of violence. Hannibal had Marius Blossius arrange for the Capuan citizenry to witness Hannibal’s entry into Capua, in order to generate enthusiasm for the Carthaginian; Hannibal next called for a meeting of the Capuan senate. When Hannibal spoke before the senate he reiterated the promise that Capua would rule Italy. Hannibal now sensed that support for himself was strong

120 Liv. 23.10.1-5
121 Liv. 23.8.2-9.13, 23.10.1-6. Magius was concerned that Hannibal was planning to leave a garrison in Capua, further suggesting that for some aristocrats, sovereignty issues weighed heavily in the calculation to revolt or remain loyal.
122 Liv. 23.7.7-12
123 Liv. 23.7.8
124 Liv. 23.7.8-11
125 Liv. 23.10.2
enough and, since Pacuvius was able to quiet the objections of his son, he proposed that Decius should be arrested. According to Livy, only after this speech did the senate vote to support Hannibal’s proposals. The salient point in the account is that only Hannibal’s guarantee of Capuan supremacy finally quieted any significant opposition to revolt that remained among the Capuan aristocracy.

The second suggestive event was Hannibal’s capture of Casilinum, the strategic stronghold that overlooked the crossing of the Volturnus River at the juncture of the Via Latina and Via Appia. After Hannibal secured Capua, he tried unsuccessfully to win over the cities of Nuceria, Nola, and Acerrae. While Hannibal and his army were near Acerrae, the Carthaginian heard from Casilinum that the Roman dictator M. Iunius Pera had levied new troops and was on the way. Livy reports that word of the dictator’s levies came from Casilinum, though it is more plausible that the Capuans informed him. Hannibal was concerned that if the Romans were able to march across the Volturnus and camp near Capua, he would lose support from among the Capuans and the city might revolt back to the Romans. This suggests that Hannibal still did not have the undivided loyalty of the Capuans. Thus, Hannibal marched to Casilinum and tried to convince the townsmen to

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126 Liv. 23.9.1-13. Livy’s account is suspiciously dramatic, but likely at least reflects political wrangling that must have gone on with the arrival of Hannibal.

127 Liv. 23.10.3-6.

128 Liv. 23.10.1-4. After guaranteeing Capuan hegemony, “all Capua” voted to support Hannibal. While Livy surely exaggerates, the sense of the episode is that Hannibal focused on the promises of power in his speech to the Capuans and that this promise finally swayed the audience.

129 Liv. 23.17.7; see also Liv. 22.57.9-12, 23.14.2-4. Pera had conducted an emergency levy of very young men. There is some confusion in the sources as to the total number of troops raised, though Lazenby suggests plausibly that Pera raised two new legions; see Lazenby, Hannibal’s War 90-91.

130 Liv. 23.17.7 states explicitly that Hannibal was concerned about a possible revolt in Capua.
open their gates and admit a Carthaginian garrison; when this failed, Hannibal prepared
to attack the town, which was garrisoned by small force of Roman allies.\footnote{Liv. 23.17.10 states that the allied garrison had already massacred part of the town’s populace when they heard that Hannibal was treating with Capua, because the garrison feared sedition on the part of the Casilini. After the massacre the garrison occupied the part of the town north of the Volturnus River.} Attempts to
take the town by storm also failed, so Hannibal left a small garrison near Casilinum,
prepared to starve out the Roman allied garrison, and retired with the bulk of his army to winter quarters near Capua.\footnote{Liv. 23.17.8-18.9} That Hannibal decided to stay around Capua during the winter instead of returning to Apulia, where he had already set up a supply base, suggests the strategic importance of the Casilinum crossing. According to Livy, as soon as the weather grew mild, Hannibal’s first act was to resume the siege in full force.\footnote{Liv. 23.19.1-20.1; Front., Strat. 3.14.2-15.3; Strabo 5.4.10 describe the siege at Casilinum. Livy’s account does present some chronological problems. According to his narrative, Ti. Sempronius Gracchus was still master of the horse and had yet to take office as consul when the siege of Casilinum was resumed, making a \textit{terminus ante quem} of March 15 according to the Roman calendar. However, we have assumed throughout that the calendar was running early; Derow, \textit{Phoenix} 30 (1976) 272 has suggested that March 15, 215 BC (Roman) would have fallen around February 5 (Solar). The siege probably would have been resumed a little earlier than this, to allow for Gracchus to return to Rome for the elections (Liv. 23.24.1-5), perhaps late January or the first of February (allowing for a rather swift return trip). This would appear to be at odds with Livy’s claim (23.19.1) that the siege resumed when winter was growing mild (\textit{mitescente iam hieme}). However, Livy’s terminology is sufficiently vague; moreover, Livy also states (23.19.11) that when Gracchus tried to relieve the besieged garrison, the Volturnus was running swiftly because of heavy rains, suggesting that events occurred during Campania’s rainy winter months.} Despite Roman attempts to deliver food to the allies, Hannibal starved out the garrison, captured Casilinum, and garrisoned the stronghold with 700 of his own men. More important to the present argument is Livy’s statement that, after Hannibal captured Casilinum, he restored the city to the Campani (\textit{Casilinum oppidum redditum Campanis est}).\footnote{Liv. 23.20.1} Hannibal’s decision to sacrifice seven hundred troops for the purpose of garrisoning
Casilinum suggests the strategic importance of the town. However, we have already argued that Casilinum was, or at least had once been, a member of the Capuan league. Hannibal’s decision to turn the town over to the Campani may show that he was trying to make good on his promise to restore Capuan hegemony. Whatever Hannibal’s motivation, the Capuans may have interpreted this move as a sign that Hannibal’s promise of Capuan power was to be taken seriously.

The third event may provide the most compelling evidence that the Capuans saw an alliance with Hannibal as an opportunity to extend their hegemony. Early in 215 BC the Capuans decided to subjugate the nearby city of Cumae. According to Livy, the Capuans first tried to convince the Cumaeans to revolt from Rome. When this attempt failed, the Capuans arranged to ambush the Cumaeans at a pan-Campanian religious festival at Hamae. The Cumaeans suspected some sort of trap and sent word to the Roman consul, Ti. Sempronius Grachus, who commanded the Roman army at Sinuessa. Gracchus used this Cumaean intelligence to ambush the Capuan army and inflicted heavy losses on the Campanians. Livy provides another important detail about this episode: the Capuans decided on their own to capture Cumae without assistance from Hannibal. Thus, the Capuans appear to have been carrying out independent foreign policy and not to have been acting at Hannibal’s request. In fact, events after the Capuan defeat at the hands of Gracchus further suggest that the Capuans were not following Hannibal’s orders

135 Liv. 23.35.1-4
136 Liv. 23.35.4-19
137 Liv. 23.35.2
Hannibal was still camped in winter quarters on the Mons Tifata, near Capua.\textsuperscript{138} When Hannibal heard that his allies had been routed, he hastily marched from camp in order to catch Gracchus off guard and to convey the wounded Capuans back home. Hannibal’s troops only brought arms without supplies, so they were unable to attack Cumae – this suggests Hannibal’s decision to march out of camp was spontaneous and reactive, not planned ahead of time.\textsuperscript{139} Hannibal returned to winter quarters, but the Capuans compelled him to march out again and attack Cumae.\textsuperscript{140} Ultimately Gracchus was able to defend Cumae against Hannibal’s siege, so the Carthaginian again returned to winter quarters.\textsuperscript{141} During the entire affair Hannibal was reluctant to leave winter quarters, while the Capuans were clearly highly motivated to capture Cumae. The Capuans would not have been able to attack Cumae as long as Rome dominated Italy and all Italian cities were allied with its. The Capuans’ repeated attempts to subjugate Cumae are strong evidence that the Capuans did, in fact, see Hannibal as a means to restoring and extending Capuan hegemony.

To summarize: the decisive factor in the Capuan decision to revolt was the calculation, argued by Vibius Virrius, that allying with Hannibal would allow Capua to restore lost territory and assert its own hegemony. The narrative of the Capuo-Hannibalic negotiations confirms this assertion, for Hannibal did not secure Capuan loyalty when he signed a treaty with the Capuans guaranteeing Capuan sovereignty but rather after he

\textsuperscript{138} Liv. 23.36.1

\textsuperscript{139} Liv. 23.36.2-5

\textsuperscript{140} Liv. 23.36.6-7. It is clear that the Capuans were behind the attack on Cumae: \textit{[Hannibal] fatigatus Campanorum precibus sequenti die cum omni apparatus oppugnandae urbis Cumas reedit.}

\textsuperscript{141} Liv. 23.36.8, 37.1-10
addressed the Capuan senate in person and reiterated the promise that the Capuans would be masters of Italy. That hegemonic aspirations motivated the Capuans is consistent with Campanian history from the fifth through third centuries BC, during which time Capua was a wealthy and powerful city and dominated a league of subordinate cities, the so-called Capuan league. Finally, events after Hannibal made his promise to the Capuan senate suggest strongly that the Capuans were, in fact, motivated by the desire to assert Capuan hegemony. After Hannibal captured Casilinum, he turned the city over to the Capuans. Thus, the Capuans benefited from their alliance with Hannibal, since Hannibal restored to the Capuans a town the Romans had garrisoned that had traditionally fallen under Capuan domination. Also, the Capuans took it upon themselves to attack the city of Cumae; when their attack failed, they compelled Hannibal to besiege the Cumaeans. These acts of independent foreign policy show clearly the Capuans using their alliance with Hannibal to assert hegemony over a neighboring state.

1.3 The Revolt of Capua’s Allies (216-215 BC)

After Capua revolted the subordinate members of the Capuan league\textsuperscript{142} followed suit and at the height of his success Hannibal controlled Atella, Sabata, Calatia, and Casilinum. The following analysis will show that local conditions, namely their traditional diplomatic ties to Capua, encouraged these smaller Campanian settlements to break from their alliance with Rome.

\textsuperscript{142} As discussed above, it is not clear of the Capuan league still functioned as a formal institution in 216 BC (see pp 54-59), nor is it clear if the league was reinstated during the period of Capua’s revolt. However, for sake of convenience I will continue to employ the term “Capuan league” to refer to Capua and he subordinate allies, all of whom constituted the formal Capuan league in the fourth century.
It is not exactly clear when Calatia, Atella, and Sabata decided to throw off their alliance with Rome. For example, Livy lists the Calatini, the Atellani, and the Campani (Capuans) among the peoples who rebelled from Rome in the wake of Cannae, but the list also includes cities that revolted years later (for example, Tarentum), and it cannot be used to determine the chronology of the various allied revolts.\textsuperscript{143} However, there is evidence that suggests the once subordinate cities of the Capuan league revolted soon after their former league hegemon decided to side with Hannibal. Zonaras states that the revolt of Capua encouraged dissent among the other cities in Campania.\textsuperscript{144} This is plausible, since the revolt of an important ally would have further weakened the Romans and thus may have made an alliance with Hannibal appear more attractive to some Campanian denizens. Also, Livy lists Calatia, Atella, and Sabata as surrendering to Rome in 211 BC, soon after the Romans received the Capuans’ surrender, and the citizens of all three smaller cities were punished along with those of Capua.\textsuperscript{145} Zonaras preserves a somewhat different tradition, that after the fall of Capua all the surrounding pro-Hannibalic strongholds surrendered except for Atella. According to Zonaras, the Atellani instead abandoned their city and joined in a body with Hannibal.\textsuperscript{146} Both versions show that status of Capua influenced the actions of the subordinate cities. It is

\textsuperscript{143} Liv. 22.56.11-3

\textsuperscript{144} Zon. 9.2

\textsuperscript{145} Liv. 26.16.5-6, 33.12, 34.6-13; see also Liv. 27.3.6-7. Livy does not mention the surrender of Sabata, but he does specify Sabata was one of the states punished along with Capua. Presumably the Sabatini also surrendered in 211 BC.

\textsuperscript{146} Zon. 9.6
likely, therefore, that Calatia, Atella, and Sabata all revolted soon after they saw that the Capuans had sided with Hannibal.\textsuperscript{147}

The only Capuan league member not to revolt immediately was the fortress-town of Casilinum. However, closer scrutiny of the sources reveals that Casilinum fits the general pattern of former Capuan league members following closely Capua’s lead. First, the Romans had garrisoned the town in 217 BC\textsuperscript{148} and again in 216 BC,\textsuperscript{149} making an open revolt on the part of the Casilini more difficult. According to Livy, the garrison grew suspicious that the Casilini were leaning toward sedition. Finally, when the garrison heard that the Capuans had treated with Hannibal, the garrison massacred the inhabitants of the city and seized the part of the town that lay north of the Volturnus.\textsuperscript{150} Livy’s narrative is greatly compressed. It is plausible that news of the Capuan revolt encouraged seditious behavior on the part of the Casilini, which in turn frightened the Roman allied garrison. If so, then Livy’s account suggests that the Casilini would have revolted soon after and in response to the Capuan revolt, had the allied garrison not prevented them from doing so.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{147} After Capua revolted, Hannibal tried to win over Nola and Acerrae, besieging the latter city. Livy (23.17.5-6) states that some of the men of Acerrae fled while Hannibal prepared to invest their city, and sought refuge in other cities in Campania that had not changed sides (\textit{in urbes Campaniae, quas satis certum erat non mutasse fidem perfugerunt}). The statement may imply that some cities had changed sides, suggesting that cities besides Capua had already revolted.

\textsuperscript{148} Liv. 22.15.3; see also Pol. 3.92; \textit{HCP} 1.427-9.

\textsuperscript{149} Liv. 23.17.8-12. According to Livy, the Romans held the town initially with a small garrison of 500 troops from Praeneste who were late in joining the Roman army destined for Cannae. When news of Cannae reached the company, they decided to return to Casilinum. This may have been at the command of the Romans, since Livy mentions a few Romans and Latins had joined the Praenestines, perhaps including Roman military magistrates. The garrison was eventually joined by a contingent from Perusia, bringing the total garrison to nearly 1000 men.

\textsuperscript{150} Liv. 23.17.10
\end{footnotesize}
Indeed, the smaller cities of Atella, Sabata, Calatia, and Casilinum had a long history of following Capua’s lead in foreign policy, regardless of Rome’s position. For example, before the First Samnite War (343-1 BC), the Capuans placed themselves under Roman protection against increasing military pressure from the neighboring Samnites. Capua and Rome remained allied during the First Samnite War; indeed, the Roman-Capuan alliance appears to have been the reason that the Romans and Samnites were drawn into conflict with each other. In his account Livy uses forms of both Capua and Campanus, so it is difficult to determine whether Capua alone was involved in the First Samnite War or whether other members of Capuan league sided with Rome. However, Salmon assumed that Casilinum, Calatia, and Atella should be included in references to the Campani. Livy mentions that in 342 BC the Capuans requested a Roman garrison as protection against the Samnites; later we hear that this garrison was distributed during winter quarters among “all the cities of Campania” (praesidia hibernatura divisa enim erant per Campaniae urbes). This implies that more cities than just Capua had sought Roman assistance against the Capuans, and supports Salmon’s assertion. Therefore, Capua and probably other members of the Capuan league placed themselves under Roman protection in 343 BC.

151 Liv. 7.29.6-31.12, especially 29.6-7. CL 2.284-9 accepted the basic structure of Livy’s narrative, arguing that Capua’s deditio should not be compared to the typical surrender of Rome’s conquered enemies, but rather to numerous examples in both Greek and Roman history of one state placing itself under the protection of another. The historicity of the deditio, and by implication the historicity of the First Samnite War has been accepted, for example, by Frederiksen, Campania 181-5 and Salmon, Samnium and the Samnites 194-206; Toynbee, Hannibal’s Legacy 400-2 rejects the deditio.

152 Salmon, Samnium and the Samnites 195 n. 5

153 Liv. 7.38.4, 9-10
However, during the Latin War, Capua and presumably members of the Capuan league sided with the Latins against Rome. Again, the evidence is meager. Livy’s exact description of the chain of events leading to the outbreak of the Latin War and the decision of Capua to join the Latins is probably, on the whole, not historical. However, from Livy’s narrative one can reconstruct a basic sequence of events: the end of the First Samnite War resulted in the restoration of a Romano-Samnite alliance and to combat this alliance, the Sidicini and Campani joined with the Latins, who had revolted from Rome. Livy does preserve one detail that is worth noting, that the Capuans were motivated more out of hostility toward the Samnites than out of concern for the Romans. It is certainly plausible that the Capuans would have feared further Samnite aggression once the Samnites and Romans had reconfirmed their alliance, and this points to the importance of immediate and local factors in shaping the policies of Italian cities. Once again, there is no explicit evidence to determine if the Capuans alone took part in the Latin War or if they were joined by other Capuan league members. However, after defeating the Campani, Rome mulcted them of the *ager Falernus* and imposed the citizenship without the vote. We have already discussed whether the *civitates sine suffragio* in Campania fell within the jurisdiction of a Roman prefect and whether the Romans began to send *praefecti* to those cities in the forth century. Festus states that

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154 Liv. 8.1.1-3.2

155 See *CL* 2.393-5

156 Liv. 8.2.7

157 Liv. 8.11.12-4, 15.10

158 See pp. 40-43.
Casilinum, Atella, and Calatia were under the authority of same prefect who was sent yearly to Capua and Cumae.\textsuperscript{159} It is likely that Casilinum, Atella, and Calatia received the citizenship without the vote at the same as Capua, implying that these cities had all allied with the Latins.

The Second Samnite War provides more and clearer evidence. At the beginning of the war Rome had the support of the Capuan league. For example, the Romans used Calatia as a base for their operations for the Caudine campaign,\textsuperscript{160} and after the disaster at the Caudine Forks the Capuans provided the defeated Roman army with much needed provisions.\textsuperscript{161} Atella also appears to have started the war on the side of the Romans.\textsuperscript{162} We do not hear anything about Casilinum or Sabata, but the references to other subordinate members of the Capuan league (Atella and Calatia) suggest that all league members started the war allied with Rome. However, at least some members of the Capuan league switched sides in the middle of the war. In 318 BC the Romans created the \textit{tribus falernus}, presumably in which to enroll settlers living on the \textit{ager Falernus}.\textsuperscript{163} Rome had mulcted the Campani of the \textit{ager Falernus} over two decades before, and the decision to create the new tribe may indicate that large numbers of settlers had only

\textsuperscript{159} Fest. 262 L; the territory of this prefect is the so-called \textit{praefectura Capuam Cumas}.

\textsuperscript{160} Liv. 9.2.2

\textsuperscript{161} Liv. 9.6.5-10

\textsuperscript{162} Liv. 9.28.6 reports that the Romans recovered Calatia and Atella, which had switched sides in the middle of the war. This implies that Atella had started the war on the side of the Romans. The interpretation rests on the plausible emendation of \textit{Atinam} to \textit{Atellam}; see Frederiksen, \textit{Campania} 213 n. 59; Salmon, \textit{Samnium and the Samnites} 238-9 and 239 n. 1.

\textsuperscript{163} Liv. 9.20.5-6
recently begun to claim the viritine allotments. Moreover, in 315 BC the Romans suffered a defeat at the battle of Lautulae. The growing Roman presence on previously Campanian territory and the recent Roman defeat probably encouraged members of the Capuan league to revolt. According to Livy, Calatia and Atella actually switched sides, while Rome investigated a conspiracy by members of the Capuan elite to throw off Roman rule. The Samnites tried to capitalize on the dissent and may also have urged on their sedition. According to Diodorus Siculus, the Capuans actually joined in the revolt. In either case, the various members of the Capuan league clearly experienced similar conditions during the Second Samnite War and tended to make similar policy decisions in light of those conditions.

Finally, this pattern of alliances repeated itself during the Second Punic War. Capua revolted, followed soon thereafter by Atella, Calatia, and Sabata. The people of Casilinum probably would have revolted immediately after the Capuans treated with Hannibal, but the garrison of Roman allies squelched any possible revolt. However, Hannibal successfully besieged the town, after which he turned Casilinum over to the Campani. Thus, the events of the Second Punic War suggest that Capua, Atella, Sabata, Calatia, and Casilinum tended to align together, regardless the conflict or Rome’s stance in that conflict.

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164 See Arthur, *Romans in Northern Campania* 35ff.

165 Liv. 9.22, 25.2-5; Diod. Sic. 19.72.7-8

166 Liv. 9.25.1-3, 26.5-12, 27.1-3

167 Diod. Sic. 19.76.1-4. See also Diod. Sic.19.101.3, which mentions specifically that Calatia revolted (reading Kalativan for Kai; leivan; Frederiksen, *Campania* 213 n. 59).
The previous discussion can be summarized in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st S.W. Rome</th>
<th>1st S.W. Samnite</th>
<th>2nd S.W. L.W. Rome</th>
<th>2nd S.W. L.W. Latin</th>
<th>2nd S.W. S.W. 326-315 BC</th>
<th>2nd S.W. Samnite post 315 BC</th>
<th>2nd S.W. Rome Hannibal</th>
<th>2nd P.W. Rome Hannibal</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capua</td>
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<td>X*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Calatia</td>
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<td>Atella</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sabata</td>
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<td>?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casilinum</td>
<td>[X]</td>
<td>[X]</td>
<td>[X]</td>
<td></td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

S.W. = Samnite War  
L.W. = Latin War  
P.W. = Punic War

* = Romans may have prevented Capua from revolting in 2 S.W.  
** = Romans prevented revolt, Hannibal captured  
X = strong evidence for alignment  
[X] = probable alignment  
? = no evidence for alignment, though suspected

Table 1: Capuan League alliance patterns, 4th-3rd centuries BC

The previous discussion of alliance patterns, shown graphically in Table 1, has important implications for our understanding of the decisions of Campanian cities to revolt or stay loyal to Rome during the Second Punic War. The ruling classes of the cities in the Capuan league had to calculate whether to revolt or not when approached by Hannibal. We have already seen that the Capuans decided to revolt, at least in part, because they expected their hegemony to increase as a result. It is likely that aristocrats in Atella, Sabata, Casilinum, and Salatia were not unified in their desire to revolt; in fact, Livy’s account suggests otherwise.\(^{168}\) There is no evidence that Hannibal promised

\(^{168}\) Liv. 26.15.5 shows that the Romans punished more harshly aristocrats who were the leaders of revolt, suggesting that not all aristocrats supported Hannibal as enthusiastically.
increased power or territory to the other members of the Capuan league, so what factor, then, convinced the aristocrats in these cities ultimately to side with Hannibal rather than withstand Hannibal’s overtures as did Nola, Naples, Cumae, Acerrae, and Nuceria? The answer may be found in the existence of the Capuan league itself and the historical tendency for members of the league to align with each other. Capua was clearly the league hegemon and she tended to shape league policy. That is, there appears to have been a tradition that the lesser cities in the Capuan league follow Capua’s lead in terms of foreign policy. When Hannibal’s presence in Campania temporarily suspended Roman rule, the members of the Capuan league were more or less free to choose their own foreign policies. Literary evidence clearly suggests that the smaller cities in the Capuan league were encouraged to revolt because the Capuans revolted. Once Capua treated with Hannibal and began to assert independent foreign policy, the lesser members of the Capuan league were in effect now offered the choice between Rome and Capua as hegemon. In this landscape old bonds proved stronger, and the members of the Capuan league broke their alliances with Rome.

1.4 Hannibal’s Limited Success: the failure to win more allies (216-214 BC)

Hannibal enjoyed great success in 216/5 BC – he won a staggering victory in the field at Cannae, he convinced Capua, the most powerful city in Campania, along with its smaller neighbors and former subordinate allies to throw off their allegiance to Rome, and he dislodged Roman forces from the strategic fortress town of Casilinum. However, Hannibal was never able to win over any more Campanian cities despite persistent efforts to do so. It is difficult to understand why many Campanian cities did not revolt. The various loyal Campanian cities endured many of the same burdens of Roman rule that the
Capuans and their allies did. Moreover, the military landscape had changed dramatically in 216 BC. Not only would Rome have appeared less of a military threat after Cannae, she would have appeared even weaker locally after the revolt of Capua. Indeed, one might expect the Capuan revolt to have encouraged other cities to revolt – that is, the actions of the Capuan elite could have served as an example to the ruling aristocracies in other cities that revolt was possible. Overall, therefore, it is striking that the ruling classes in the remaining Campanian cities, when weighing their options and deciding if Hannibal or Rome presented them with the better deal, did not simply make the same calculation that the Capuans did. I argue that local inter-city rivalry and traditional hostilities, especially the fear a number of Campanian cities felt toward traditional local hegemon Capua, weighed heavily in the decision of the other Campanian cities – namely Naples, Cumae, Nola, Acerra, and Nuceria – to remain loyal to Rome.

Naples was the first Campanian city that Hannibal tried to secure after the battle of Cannae. In fact, Hannibal greatly desired access to a port in order to receive reinforcements by sea, and he tried repeatedly to win over the Neapolitans between 216 BC and 214 BC. Despite Hannibal’s persistence, the Neapolitans remained staunchly loyal to the Roman cause. Hannibal’s incursion into the nearby ager Falernus in the summer of 217 BC, which was meant to overawe Rome’s allies and to show the Roman incapable of protecting their own territory, apparently had no effect on the Neapolitans. Indeed, over the winter of 217/6 BC the people of Naples sent ambassadors to Rome to

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169 For Hannibal’s desire for a port, see Liv. 23.1.5, 15.1-2, 36.6. De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 3.2.224 n. 44 has suggested the Livy’s account of Hannibal’s many attempts to capture Naples, especially the three attempts in 216 BC alone, may indicate some duplication resulting from Livy’s reliance on annalistic sources, but he did admit that multiple attempts to capture Naples was not implausible.
offer forty gold bowls as a sign of thanks and friendship to the Romans. This appears to have been a spontaneous act on the part of the Neapolitans, underscoring their strong loyalty. More important to the present argument, the Neapolitans continued to display strong loyalty after the battle of Cannae. For example, when Hannibal entered Campania in the summer of 216 BC, he first marched to Naples. The city’s impressive defenses made Naples a daunting target for a siege, so Hannibal instead harassed the Neapolitans by plundering their farms and parading the booty before the gates of the city. The tactic was meant to elicit an attack from those within the city, and according to Livy, Hannibal successfully lured out the Neapolitan cavalry. However, Hannibal was not able to compel the Neapolitans to surrender despite capturing a number of Neapolitan aristocrats whom he could have used as leverage in negotiations. Late in the summer of 216 BC, after the revolt of Capua, Naples withstood at least one more Hannibalic incursion. According to Livy, Hannibal quickly conceded this attempt to capture Naples when he learned that a Roman prefect, M. Junius Silanus, now protected the city. Silanus probably commanded a Roman garrison; in any case, Livy makes it clear that the Neapolitans requested assistance from the Romans and that they did so after Capua had revolted. Therefore, in 216 BC the Neapolitans remained loyal to Rome even in the face

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170 See Appendix A for the date.

171 Liv. 22.32.4-9

172 Liv. 23.1.5-10, for the first attempt on Naples.

173 Liv. 23.14.5, 15.1-2; Livy records two attempts to capture Naples: the first immediately after the revolt of Capua and the second a little later after Hannibal failed to capture Nola. Livy may be reduplicating events here.

174 Liv. 23.15.2
of increasing Hannibal’s success. Finally, Naples’ loyalty did not evaporate as the war in Campania dragged on and Rome’s allies faced repeated attacks by Hannibal and his Campanian allies. Thus, Naples withstood the final Hannibal’s attack in 214 BC, when the Carthaginian made a last sweep against the Campanian coastal cities of Naples, Cumae, and Puteoli.  

The loyalty of Naples was, indeed, remarkable. Livy’s account does not indicate any dissent among the Neapolitan aristocracy. Plutarch calls attention to Neapolitan loyalty stating explicitly that Marcellus had to do little to encourage Naples’ loyalty because the Neapolitans were steadfast on their own accord. Naples’ resolve appears all the more striking if we consider the pressures that urged its to revolt. For example, we have already seen that Hannibal’s devastation tactics successfully elicited a Neapolitan counterstrike. Moreover, Hannibal not only defeated the Neapolitan cavalry, he captured a number of cavalry troopers. Members of the cavalry would have been aristocrats and it is surprising that Hannibal could not generate a significant amount of discontent among the Neapolitan aristocracy despite the fact that he had captured members of their rank. Finally, one might suspect that Hannibal’s pose as a Hellenistic liberator would have

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175 Liv. 24.13.6-7

176 Plut. Marc. 10.1. Plutarch contrast the steadfast loyalty of Naples with the wavering loyalty of Nola, which Marcellus maintained only with some difficulty.

177 Especially considering the Capuans’ concerns over their own cavalry troopers; see above, pp. 35-36.
been particularly attractive to the Neapolitans,\(^{178}\) since Naples remained a bastion of Greek culture into the imperial period.\(^ {179}\)

Naples’ steadfast loyalty has been explained by the supposed lenient terms of its alliance with Rome and by the fact that Roman rule had given the Neapolitans a long period of peace and prosperity.\(^ {180}\) The Neapolitans hesitated to accept the rights granted by the *Lex Iulia* of 90 BC;\(^ {181}\) presumably the Neapolitans debated accepting the status of municipium because the treaty between Rome and Naples, dating to 326 BC, guaranteed very favorable conditions for Naples. However, it is not clear what made the conditions of the treaty so attractive to the Neapolitans. One might suggest that Naples’ military obligation was relatively light, but there is little evidence to calculate the exact contribution Naples made to the Roman military, nor to evaluate the Neapolitan attitude toward their military obligation. Naples appears to have been one of Rome’s so-called socii navales – she is one of the few cities listed specifically as supplying vessels for Rome during the First Punic War, and it is likely that the Neapolitans contributed regularly to the Roman navy.\(^ {182}\) There is no reason to believe that the military obligation of a socius navalis was necessarily lighter than the obligation of a state that provided only infantry and cavalry. It is likely that some socii navales were obligated to supply both

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\(^{178}\) Lomas, *Rome and the Western Greeks* 63

\(^{179}\) Strab. 5.4.7 comments on the persistence of Greek customs and culture in Naples despite the Oscan conquest of many of the Greek cities in Campania; see Lomas, “Urban elites and cultural definition: Romanization in southern Italy,” in Cornell and Lomas (eds), *Urban Society in Roman Italy* 107-120, especially pp. 111-112.

\(^{180}\) De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani*\(^ {2}\) 3.2.224; Toynbee, *Hannibal’s Legacy* 1.261; Salmon, *Samnium and the Samnites* 219

\(^{181}\) Cic. *Balb.* 21

\(^{182}\) Pol. 1.20.14; see also Toynbee, *Hannibal’s Legacy* 1.261
naval forces and land forces,\textsuperscript{183} and it was certainly common for socii navales to have supplied not only ships, but also crews and rowers.\textsuperscript{184} Therefore, one cannot deduce that Naples’ military obligation was light simply from the fact that she was a socius navalis. We also cannot tell how the Neapolitans felt about their military obligation in the summer of 216 BC, regardless of whether it was relatively light or heavy. The best evidence for the Neapolitans’ opinion of their state’s status is its hesitance to exchange that status for municipium status in 90 BC. However, Naples’ hesitance to exchange its status in the first century BC may have little relevance to the Neapolitans’ calculation in the late third century BC of whether Hannibal offered a better deal than the Romans. Overall, Naples may have enjoyed relatively favorable conditions under its treaty with Rome, but there must be another, decisive reason why the Neapolitan aristocracy remained steadfast in support of Rome. I suggest that Neapolitan resolve can only be understood in the context of the loyalty of Cumae and Nola, the relationship between these three cities, and their traditional mistrust of the Capuans.

Hannibal also tried repeatedly and unsuccessfully to win over the ruling classes of Cumae and Nola, even though in both cities at least some aristocrats were sympathetic to Hannibal. According to Livy, during the summer of 215 BC the Capuans tried to convince the Cumaeans to revolt but their efforts failed. The Capuans then contrived to

\textsuperscript{183} Ilari, \textit{Gli Italici nelle strutture militari romane} 112-114; Toynbee, \textit{Hannibal’s Legacy} 1.491-2; Livy (24.13.1, 25.10.8) mentions that Hannibal captured troops from Tarentum at the battle of Trasimene, supporting the idea that \textit{socius navalis} and an ally under the \textit{formula togatorum} were not necessarily mutually exclusive categories.

\textsuperscript{184} Brunt, \textit{Italian Manpower} 50
ambush the Cumaeans at a nearby religious sanctuary, Hamae.\textsuperscript{185} The Cumaeans recognized the trap and sent word to the Roman consul Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, who was stationed near Liternum. Gracchus ordered the Cumaeans to bring in their goods from their farms and to stay within the city walls.\textsuperscript{186} Meanwhile he moved his camp to outside the walls of Cumae and placed guards at the gate to prevent news of his plans from getting out.\textsuperscript{187} Gracchus’ order to bring in goods from the farms suggests that Cumaeans would have susceptible to devastation tactics, or at least that Gracchus was concerned about the potential repercussions if Cumaean farms were destroyed. That Gracchus needed to prevent his plans from getting out of Cumae suggests that the Cumaean loyalty was suspect.

With these precautions in place, Gracchus managed to ambush the Campanians at Hamae, three miles from Cumae.\textsuperscript{188} News of the defeat was reported to Hannibal at his camp on Mt. Tifata, and he quickly mobilized his men and marched to meet Gracchus.\textsuperscript{189} Since Hannibal found the battlefield empty (Gracchus had already withdrawn to Cumae) he escorted the wounded Campanians back to Capua. Hannibal decided next to attack Cumae directly;\textsuperscript{190} he briefly besieged Cumae, but after few days gave up and retreated to Tifata.\textsuperscript{191} At this point Gracchus probably garrisoned Cumae,\textsuperscript{192} which no doubt helped

\textsuperscript{185} Liv. 23.35.1-4
\textsuperscript{186} Liv. 23.35.10-12
\textsuperscript{187} Liv. 23.35.16-17
\textsuperscript{188} Liv. 23.35.16-19
\textsuperscript{189} Liv. 23.36.2
\textsuperscript{190} Liv. 23.36.3, 5-7
\textsuperscript{191} Liv. 23.37.1-9
the Cumaeans withstand Hannibal’s last attempt to capture the city. In 214 BC Hannibal marched the bulk of his army from his camp at Tifata to Cumae, lingered for some time while he devastated much of the Cumaean *chora*, and they withdrew to attack Puteoli and Naples. The attacks on these coastal towns were unsuccessful so Hannibal marched for Nola after hearing that there was a chance he could secure the loyalty of the leading citizens there.

The rather detailed ancient evidence also allows us to reconstruct more clearly the events surrounding Nola from 216 BC to 214 BC. Hannibal first approached Nola soon after he had secured the loyalty of Capua and after his second unsuccessful attempt to capture Naples, in the summer of 216 BC. According to Livy, although Hannibal was prepared to force Nola to surrender, he held out hope that he could win over the city peacefully. He probably hoped to capitalize on political divisions at Nola as he had in Capua and Compsa. If so, he reasoned well because Nola appears to have been a politically divided city. Livy reports stasis at Nola, with the senate supporting Rome and the common people in favor of Hannibal. However, Livy’s account is certainly oversimplified and there is evidence to suggest that at least some of the Nolani aristocracy were prepared to join Hannibal. Although Livy states that the Nolani senate

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192 After breaking Hannibal’s siege, Gracchus marched from Cumae to Luceria (Liv. 23.48.3). We have already suggested that Naples was garrisoned under the command of Silanus, and Livy (24.7.10, 13.6-7) states explicitly that Fabius garrisoned Puteoli at the end of the year with six thousand. It appears that the Romans were securing coastal towns, and it is likely that they also garrisoned Cumae.

193 Liv. 24.13.6-7

194 Liv. 23.14.5

195 Liv. 23.14.7-8
leaned toward Rome, he specifies that the leading members of the senate (senatus ac maxime primores eius) were especially loyal. Members of the Nolani senate informed Marcellus that Hannibal had conducted negotiations with the Nolani, and they requested Marcellus to bring a garrison to Nola in order to prevent open revolt.\textsuperscript{196} Finally, Livy states that even after Marcellus arrived at Nola, he held the city more by the goodwill of the aristocracy than by the force of his garrison.\textsuperscript{197} This makes sense since Roman rule relied on the loyalty of local aristocracies, and the Romans likely supported the current ruling regime in order to guarantee their fidelity. Finally, Marcellus trusted Nola’s senate to run affairs, at least to a point, even after he had carried out investigations and executed a number of Nolani citizens for sedition.\textsuperscript{198} This underscores the Roman reliance on local aristocratic loyalty.

However, it is clear that not all aristocrats supported Rome. Livy reports that a Nolan knight named Lucius Bantius was fostering rebellion.\textsuperscript{199} Bantius was not the only aristocrat looking to Hannibal, for Marcellus later executed over seventy Nolani and confiscated their lands for seditious behavior. At least some were likely men of standing who stood to gain from handing over the city to Hannibal.\textsuperscript{200} Finally, Livy states that the Nolani senate carried out negotiations with Hannibal in order to buy time until they could

\textsuperscript{196} Liv. 23.14.8-12
\textsuperscript{197} Liv. 23.15.7
\textsuperscript{198} Marcellus did, however, maintain his troops at the castra Claudiana, nearby neighboring Suessula.
\textsuperscript{199} Liv. 23.15.7-10
\textsuperscript{200} Liv. 23.17.1-3
send for help from Marcellus. Livy’s account is implausible; it is likely that at least some Nolai aristocrats had conducted legitimate negotiations with Hannibal, and that pro-Roman aristocrats were able to contact Marcellus because the Nolani and Hannibal were unable to come to terms.

Overall, a careful reading of the evidence suggests that Nolan political divisions resembled those in Capua. The current regime supported the Romans while other aristocrats, perhaps hoping to displace the current regime and promote their own political power, expressed dissatisfaction with Roman rule and the desire to seek an alliance with Hannibal. In particular, Lucius Bantius promoted the pro-Hannibalic position, likely hoping that he would profit politically when Nola revolted. The immediate threat of Hannibal put a further strain on Nolan loyalty and generated debate in the local senate. Fears that Hannibal would devastate farms or besiege the city weakened the pro-Roman position. The fact that some negotiations took place between Hannibal and the Nolani indicates that the pro-Hannibal position won out, at least for the moment. Marcellus was forced to treat the situation very carefully. For example, when he arrived in Nola after being informed of the near revolt, Marcellus had to act quickly. However, he hesitated to execute Bantius because the man was very popular politically. In fact, Livy states explicitly he preferred to have a popular figure as Bantius as an ally. Therefore,

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201 Liv. 23.14.8-10

202 In fact, Livy (23.14.7) states that there were men willing to propose revolt (neque auctores defectionis deerant); these certainly would have been aristocrats.

203 Liv. 23.15.7-9

204 Liv. 23.14.7

205 Liv. 23.15.8, 10-11
Marcellus promised Bantius honors and political advancement if he remained loyal to the Roman cause; the tactic worked and Bantius began to promote the pro-Roman position.\textsuperscript{206} The episode points to the degree that local aristocrats were motivated by personal political power, rather than an ideological attachment to Rome or Hannibal.

In the meanwhile, Hannibal drew his army to the gates of Nola and tried to elicit a pitched battle from Marcellus and the Roman troops who now garrisoned the city. Marcellus initially avoided battle but received information from loyal aristocrats that some Nolani were again plotting to betray the city to Hannibal. This compelled Marcellus to march out of the city and face Hannibal. Marcellus managed to catch Hannibal’s troops off-guard by ordering his own soldiers to make a rapid sally out of the gates against the enemy position. The Romans won the engagement, and for the moment Hannibal gave up trying to win over the Nolani, instead withdrawing to Acerrae. Marcellus then conducted trials, condemned over seventy Nolani as traitors, executed them, and confiscated their property.\textsuperscript{207}

Marcellus’ decisive actions helped prevent Nola from revolting, but the Romans did not completely trust the Nolani, and they used Roman troops to encourage Nolani

\textsuperscript{206} Liv. 23.15.14-16.1. According to Livy Marcellus also bribed Bantius with a horse and 500 denarii.

\textsuperscript{207} Liv. 23.16.2-17.1. According to Livy’s narrative, this battle occurred after Hannibal had already retreated from Nola once, after Marcellus first arrived there. Marcellus’ arrival compelled Hannibal to look elsewhere for allies – he attacked Naples and reduced Nuceria (Liv. 23.15.1-6), then finally returned to Nola. However, Livy’s account of the two rounds of negotiations between Hannibal and Nola are very similar and may indicate Livy has duplicated events. Also, the magnitude of Marcellus’ victory over Hannibal has certainly has been exaggerated; indeed, it is possible the battle is account is merely anticipating Marcellus’ later victory over Hannibal at Nola. See Plut. Hann. 10; De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 32.2.225 n. 47; Lazenby, Hannibal’s Legacy 92. In any case, the evidence clearly shows that the Nolani elite was divided politically and that Marcellus’ actions (garrisoning the town, carrying trials, winning over key aristocrats, and (possibly) defeating Hannibal in battle) helped prevent the city from rebellion.
loyalty. For example, although Marcellus removed his troops from Nola and left the local senate in charge, he also pitched camp at nearby Suessula.\footnote{Liv. 23.17.3} Marcellus was at least partly motivated by his desire to keep an eye on Nola. The troops remained in Suessula during the winter of 216/5 BC; in fact, Marcellus refused to help relieve Hannibal’s siege of Casilinum because of entreaties from the Nolani that he not remove troops from the area.\footnote{Liv. 23.19.4} In 215 BC Marcellus was sent with two legions to replace the Cannae legions at Suessula, and Livy tells us that he was sent specifically to guard Nola.\footnote{Liv. 23.32.2} Indeed, Marcellus was performing a duel job – guarding Nola from Hannibal and guarding the Nolani themselves – for despite Marcellus’ efforts the previous year, there was still dissent in Nola. That same year, the consul Fabius stationed his army at Suessula, thus cutting off Hannibal from Nola. Once Fabius was camped in Suessula, he sent Marcellus with his army to garrison Nola. These actions were taken specifically to squelch a potential revolt.\footnote{Liv. 23.39.5-8.}

During the late summer of 215 BC Marcellus marched out of Nola, leaving a garrison, and raided towns in Samnium.\footnote{Liv. 23.41.13-14} The Samnites sent envoys to Hannibal seeking relief, and Hannibal responded by leading most of his army to Nola to devastate the territory.\footnote{Liv. 23.42.1-13, 23.43.5} He figured he would both satisfy his troops and lure Marcellus away from
Marcellus heard of Hannibal’s approach and returned to Nola to prepare for a possible siege. Hannibal first tried to win the city over peacefully by sending Hanno to negotiate terms. Despite Hanno’s promise that an alliance with Hannibal offered the Nolani better terms than an alliance with the Romans, the entreaty was rejected. Hannibal next began to invest the city, surrounding the walls on all sides. According to Livy, Hannibal’s siege compelled Marcellus to make a sally from the city gates but neither side could claim a decisive victory in the subsequent skirmish. Three days after the first clash Hannibal sent troops out to plunder the surrounding farms. Marcellus saw Hannibal’s troops plundering and immediately prepared his troops and attacked. Marcellus proved victorious in the close-fought battle, and the Carthaginians retreated. It is striking that it only took a few days of devastating farms to compel Marcellus to come out of the city walls. When Hannibal paraded booty from local farms, landowners in the city must have agitated and put pressure on the ruling elite to act. In turn, the ruling elite must have appealed to Marcellus to protect their interests.

The Romans continued to garrison Nola through the remainder of 215 BC and throughout 214 BC. When Hannibal left Campania (215 BC) in order to winter in Apulia, Fabius ordered grain collected from Naples and Nola and brought to the Roman army

214 Liv. 23.43.3
215 Liv. 23.43.9-44.3
216 Liv.23.44.3-6
217 Liv. 23.44.6
218 Liv. 23.44.7-9, 46.1-9; Plut. Marc. 12.2-3; Zon. 9.3. Livy probably exaggerates Marcellus’ victory. Plutarch and Zonaras both record that Marcellus attacked when Hannibal’s troops had dispersed to forage. This is plausible, though in either case 1] Marcellus responded to Hannibal’s devastation, and 2] Hannibal withdrew from Nola after the battle; see Lazenby, Hannibal’s War 97. See also De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 3².2.244 n. 44, doubting completely the historicity of the battle.
wintering at Suessula. Fabius later ordered Marcellus to leave as small a garrison as necessary in Nola and to send the remaining soldiers home to Rome. Livy tells us specifically this was done so as not to burden the allies. However, the presence of the Roman garrison in the city and the Roman requisition of grain seem to have weakened the loyalty of some Nolans. In the following year (214 BC), a legation from Nola met with Hannibal while he attacked Naples. Loyal Nolan aristocrats sent word of the dissatisfaction to Marcellus in Cales, who marched quickly to Suessula and then sent 6000 infantry and 300 infantry to protect Rome’s Nolan allies. When Hannibal moved his camp from Naples to Nola, Marcellus was already prepared. With one army at Nola and another near Suessula Marcellus was able to stymie Hannibal’s attempt to take Nola. Finally, even when Marcellus marched his troops north in support of the Romans’ siege of Casilinum, he left a garrison of 2000 soldiers in Nola. When the siege ended, Marcellus returned with his army to Nola.

This brief narrative of events pertaining to Nola shows clearly that Roman military response, namely the deployment and maintenance of a garrison either in or near Nola at nearly all times from 216 BC to 214 BC, limited Hannibal’s opportunities to

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219 Liv. 23.45.8, 46.9
220 Liv. 23.48.2
221 Liv. 24.13.8
222 Liv. 24.13.9-11
223 Liv. 24.17.1-8
224 Liv. 24.19.5
225 Liv. 24.20.1-5
capture Nola through either force or seduction. Indeed, the strategic placement of Roman garrisons in Puteoli, Naples, and (probably) Cumae certainly went a long way in preventing the spread of revolts among Campanian cities in the wake of Cannae. However, Rome’s military response does not explain why the Campanian cities of Naples, Cumae, and especially Nola did not revolt immediately after Cannae or at least after Hannibal entered Campania in the summer of 216 BC and convinced the Capuans to revolt. The ruling class in each city had the chance to revolt before they were garrisoned by Roman troops. In other words, had these cities revolted in 216 BC, either in the wake of Cannae or soon after Capua revolted, Rome would not have been able to garrison the towns, and Hannibal would have moved much closer to achieving his military objective.

The decision of Naples, Cumae, and especially Nola not to submit to Hannibalic overtures appears even more striking if we review the factors that would have compelled these cities to revolt. We have already seen that both Cumae and Nola were politically divided over the decision to remain loyal to Rome or to side with Hannibal, and in Nola in particular the pro-Hannibalic position gained significant aristocratic support. Neither Cumae, Naples, nor Nola were immune to the threat of devastation: Hannibal elicited a battle from the Neapolitans by devastating their territory; fears of devastation weighed heavily in the debate in the Nolani senate, and Marcellus was compelled to meet Hannibal in the open field because Hannibal began to plunder the city’s territory; and Gracchus took specific precautions to protect the Cumaeans from potential devastation on the part of Hannibal and its allies. Presumably the cities were burdened by similar military obligations to those of the Campanian cities that revolted: Cumae was a civitas sine suffragio, just like Capua and its subordinate allies; we have already argued that
Naples was not free from military obligations; Nola was also bound to supply troops, and there is no reason to assume the burden was unusually light. Finally, all three cities had witnessed the successful revolt of Capua in 216 BC, and all three had the opportunity to revolt before they invited Roman military assistance. In particular, both Nola and Cumae were even given the chance to negotiate terms and come over to Hannibal’s side peacefully.

Why did the aristocracies in these cities not make the same calculation as the Capuan aristocracy, when faced with the same decision and very similar pressures? Looking specifically at Nola, why did the pro-Hannibalic party fail to secure power and carry out successful negotiations with Hannibal, since they appear briefly to have gained the upper hand? We can begin to answer these questions by considering the historical relationship between Cumae, Naples, and Nola.

Naples and Nola seem to have enjoyed a longstanding alliance, dating to the fourth century BC. It is difficult to disentangle from the confusing ancient accounts the early interaction between the two cities. The fifth and fourth centuries BC witnessed the conquest of most of the Greek cities in Campania at the hands of Oscan-speaking invaders. Nola herself had become an Oscan-speaking city by the fourth century if not earlier. However, Naples maintained a strong Greek identity in the face of Oscan pressure. The persistence of Naples’ Greek culture was the result of accommodation and

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226 The Nolani are probably to be included among the Samnites’ contribution in Polybius’ (2.24) estimation of Rome’s manpower resources; see Brunt, *Roman Manpower* 47-8. Nola held out against the Romans during the Second Samnite War far longer than its ally Naples did (Liv. 9.28.3-6; Diod. Sic. 19.101.3). There is no reason, therefore, to assume the Nolani were granted an exceptional treaty after they surrendered.

227 Frederiksen, *Campania* 134-157; CL 2.654-655; Lomas, *Rome and the Western Greeks* 33-34

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compromise between the Greek Neapolitans and its would-be Oscan conquerors.\footnote{Strab. 5.4.7; Lomas, in Cornell and Lomas, \textit{Urban Society in Roman Italy} 107-120; Lomas, \textit{Rome and the Western Greeks} 34; Frederiksen, \textit{Campania} 139.} Therefore, it is not surprising that Naples would have allied herself with an Oscan city. Also, during the fourth century, Nola was growing more powerful, and its territory abutted that of Naples.\footnote{Dion. Hal. 15.5.2-3}

Before the outbreak of the Second Samnite War, in 328/7 BC, the people of Naples engaged in raiding the territory of Capua and the \textit{ager Falernus}. The Neapolitans probably were motivated by hostility against the Capuans, but the act brought Naples into conflict with Rome.\footnote{Liv. 8.22.5-9. The Neapolitans wanted to restore the territory of Cumae to the descendants of the Greek inhabitants who were driven from Cumae by Oscan-speakers nearly a century before and who had taken up residence in Naples. The ancient sources agree that Cumae was conquered by the “Campani,” presumably related in some way to the Capuans. See Dion. Hal. 15.6.4; Liv. 4.44.12, 52.6; \textit{CL} 2.640-2. Naples may also have felt threatened by the apparent growing integration of Capua and Rome. Livy refers to Naples as Paleopolis; this is the result of confusion in the annalistic sources concerning the fact that Naples occupied two sites that had synoecized as the Neapolitans. Paleopolis was probably the site of Pizzafalcone. See \textit{CL} 1.633-6, 640-45.} Rome sent ambassadors to Naples, but ambassadors from Nola, Tarentum, and the Samnites encouraged the Neapolitans to maintain their alliance with the Samnites and to make war with the Romans. In particular, the Samnites promised to help the Neapolitans restore Cumae to the Greeks once Rome had been defeated.\footnote{Dion. Hal. 15.6.4} The Samnite argument proved persuasive, and Naples allied herself with the Samnites; apparently the Nolani were also allies. This local conflict between Naples (allied with the Nolani and the Samnites) and the Romans (allied with the Capuans) should be seen as independent from the Second Samnite War.\footnote{Dion. Hal. 15.6.4} By the outbreak of the Second Samnite
War (326 BC) Nola and Naples were allies against the Romans, and Naples had invited a large contingent of Nolani and Samnite troops within its walls to protect against a Roman attack. Rome concentrated its military effort in 326 BC on fighting around Naples. The Neapolitans did not hold out for very long but rather negotiated a relatively quick surrender. The fact that the Romans guaranteed certain privileges to the Neapolitans may indicate that the surrender was voluntary. According to Livy, the Nolani garrison retreated from Naples, and Nola held out until it was stormed by the Roman dictator Gaius Poetelius in 313 BC. From this point Naples and Nola remained loyal allies of Rome and, as we have seen, both cities repeatedly rebuked overtures from Hannibal. Moreover, Nola and Naples appear to have been remained closely associated. For example, when Hannibal sacked Nuceria, remnants of the citizenry sought safe haven in neighboring cities, but especially in Naples and Nola, according to Livy.

Both Nola and Naples, especially the latter, tended to have close relations with the city of Cumae. First, ancient evidence is in nearly complete agreement that Naples was a colony of Cumae, which was a colony of Chalcis. Cumae fell to Oscan-speakers,

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233 Liv. 8.23.1-2. Livy’s depiction of abusive treatment on the part of the Samnites and Nolani against the Neapolitans (8.23.2, 25.5-6), and his statement that Naples desperately wanted reinforcements from Tarentum as much against the Samnites as against the Romans (8.25.7-8) are both improbable and should be rejected. See CL 2.644.

234 Liv. 8.23.10-12, 26.1-7

235 Liv. 8.26.4, 9.28.4-6; Diod. 19.101.3

236 Liv. 23.15.5

237 Liv. 8.22.5-6; Vell. Pat. 1.4.1; Ps.-Scymn. 242-3; however, Strab. 5.4.7 states that Naples was refounded by Chalcis and other Greek cities. See CL 2.633-6.
identified as the Campani, in the fifth century. Cumae did ally with the Capuans during the Latin War, but after the war she was mulcted of land and became a *civitas sine suffragio*. From this point, she seems to have fallen out of the Capuan sphere, since we do not hear of its allying with Capua in the Second Samnite War. Some Greek Cumaeans escaped the Oscan conquest and sought refuge in Naples. Nearly a century later descendants of these exiles still lived in Naples, and the Neapolitans were motivated to ally with the Samnites and the Nolani in order to restore Cumae to the descendants of the Greek Cumaean exiles. Despite the fact that Cumae was more Oscanized than Naples, Cumae appears to have retained some vestiges of Greek culture, and this may have further linked the two cities. Finally, like Naples-Nola, Cumae remained loyal to Rome in the face of Hannibal’s invasion and repeated attempts by Hannibal and his allies to win over the city.

Moreover, Nola-Naples (and to a lesser degree Cumae) tended not only to ally with each other, but also they tended to align against the Capuan league regardless of the conflict and Rome’s stance in that conflict. During the Neapolitan War, Nola and Naples allied against Capua and presumably the Capuan league. In the same conflict Rome allied with the Capuans. During the Second Samnite War both Nola and Naples began the war allied with the Samnites, while the Capuan league fought alongside Rome. However,

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238 Liv. 4.44.12, 7.29.4, 10.38.6; Diod. Sic. 12.76.4; Dion. Hal. 15.6.4; Strab. 5.4.4

239 Liv. 8.14.11; Cic. *Leg. Agr.* 2.66; *CL* 2.569

240 Diod. Sic. 15.6.4

241 Strabo (5.4.4) comments on the persistence of Greek culture in Cumae. Lomas, in Cornell and Lomas, *Urban Society in Roman Italy* 109-11 argued that Cumae was “considerably Oscanized by the time of Roman conquest,” but noted that Greek still survived as an epigraphical language; Frederiksen, *Campania* 139 argued on the basis of numismatic evidence that Greek customs endured at Cumae.
Naples conceded within the first year of the Second Samnite War and Nola was conquered in 313 BC, after which both remained loyal to Rome. Meanwhile, in 315 BC members of the Capuan league revolted from their alliance with Rome, and Capua herself would have revolted had the Romans not taken steps to prevent sedition. During the Second Punic War, Cumae, Naples, and Nola remained staunchly loyal to Rome, while Capua and its subordinate allies revolted and sided with Hannibal.

This can summarized in the following table:

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N.W. = Neapolitan War  
S.W. = Samnite War  
P.W. = Punic War  

* = Romans may have prevented Capua from revolting in 2 S.W.  
** = Romans prevented revolt, Hannibal captured  
X = strong evidence for alignment  
[X] = probable alignment  
? = no evidence for alignment, though suspected

Table 2: Campanian alliance patterns, 4th-3rd centuries BC
The chart shows graphically that Naples-Nola (and sometimes Cumae) tended to align together but against the Capuan league. The pattern suggests there was a longstanding rivalry or hostility between the Capuan league and the cities of Cumae, Naples, and Nola. Literary evidence confirms that there existed ancient hostilities between Capua and several of the neighboring cities in Campania. For example, Livy and especially Dionysius of Halicarnassus record that there was an ongoing territorial feud between the Capuans and the Neapolitans at the outbreak of the Neapolitan War. More striking is Livy’s account of the failure of the Romans to relieve the siege of Casilinum. Marcellus wanted to aid the small garrison at Casilinum but could not because the citizens of Nola and Acerrae requested that he keep his army near Suessula. Livy states explicitly that the Nolani and Acerrani made their request because they feared the Capuans, with no reference to Hannibal. Finally, Cumaean actions during the Second Punic War are consistent with the suggestion that rivalries between Capua and other Campanian cities persisted into the third century. In 215 BC, the Capuans tried to convince the Cumaeans to revolt; when their entreaty failed, the Capuans planned to ambush the Cumaeans by luring them to a pan-Campanian religious sanctuary on the pretext of holding some sort of general Campanian conference. The Cumaeans

242 Dion. Hal. 15.5.1: the Capuans made repeated complaints to the Roman senate about Neapolitan wrongdoing; 15.6.4: the Neapolitans figured not only to restore the Cumaeans, but also to capture Capuan territory; Liv. 8.22.7: the Romans were angry because the Neapolitans had committed hostile acts against Romans in the ager Falernus and the ager Campanus.

243 See Liv. 22.57.7-8, 23.14.5

244 Liv. 23.19.4: Nolanorum Acerranorumque...Campanos timentium si praesidium Romanum abscessisset. It is likely that Campanos is used here to mean the Capuans. However, even if Livy means the Campani, there is little impact on my overall thesis. All that would show is that the Nolani and Acerrani feared the Capuan league (headed by Capua), and this would still show the persistence of longstanding local hostility.

245 Liv. 23.35.1-3
suspected a ruse but did not simply ignore the offer. Rather, the Cumaeans led the Capuans on while they informed the nearby Roman consul so that he might ambush the Capuans.\textsuperscript{246} The episode shows that the Cumaeans, in choosing to stay loyal, did not act with ambivalence toward the Capuans but instead worked to damage Capuan interests. Overall, historical trends, events during the Second Punic War, and specific literary references all point to the persistence of longstanding animosity between Capua and the neighboring cities in Campania.

This conclusion has profound implications for the question of the failure of the Hannibalic strategy in Campania. When Hannibal invaded Campania, he temporarily suspended Roman domination and offered the Campanians the chance to pursue a relatively independent foreign policy. Hannibal also allowed traditional bonds and hostilities, suppressed by Roman rule, to rise to the surface. The most important and immediate policy decision that each city faced was the choice over whether to support Rome or Hannibal. As discussed, all the cities of Campania experienced similar pressures, both push and pull factors compelling either loyalty to Rome or revolt. The influence of traditional inter-city bonds and hostilities would prove to be the decisive factor in determining which pressures prevailed and consequently the effectiveness of the Hannibalic strategy.\textsuperscript{247} When Hannibal won over the Capuans, he also won over the cities that traditionally allied with Capua. However, Hannibal’s very success in gaining an alliance with Capua ultimately undermined his efforts to win other Campanian allies.

\textsuperscript{246} Liv. 23.35.4, 10-11

\textsuperscript{247} See David, Roman Conquest of Italy 58-59.
Campanian cities that traditionally opposed the Capuans would have been leary of the Capuo-Hannibalic treaty and the threat it posed to their own interests. Thus, Capua’s revolt and its treaty with Hannibal probably encouraged the loyalty of at least some members of the aristocracy in cities such as Cumae and Nola. Indeed, the very terms of the negotiations between Capua and Hannibal – that Hannibal promised Capuan hegemony in return for their allegiance – would have provoked resistance in neighboring Campanian cities and so their loyalty to Rome. Even if the exact nature of the Capuo-Hannibalic negotiations remained secret, Capua’s subsequent acts of aggression would have made its neighbors suspicious. Therefore, it makes sense that Nola, Naples, and Cumae sought Roman military assistance only after the Capuans treated with Hannibal; the aristocracies in these cities decided that Rome was a preferable counterweight against their traditional rival, an expansionist Capua.

This process is best seen in Hannibal’s failed attempts to win over the Nolani. The city of Nola came very close to revolting during the Second Punic War. A pro-Hannibalic party crystallized around the popular aristocrat Lucius Bantius. The pro-Hannibalic position appeared to have gained the upper hand, and the Nolan senate began to conduct negotiations with Hannibal. This situation parallels the political debates in Capua on the eve of its revolt. However, negotiations between Hannibal and Nola fell through, allowing the pro-Roman aristocracy to regroup and send word to Marcellus. In light of the present discussion, it is likely that Nolani fear of Capua made it more

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248 Liv. 23.14.5-9, 15.7-9; Plut. Marc. 10.1-3

249 Liv.23.14.9-10. Livy states that the aristocracy treated with Hannibal only to buy time to contact Marcellus, but this seems unlikely. Livy is trying to force events to fit his picture of *stasis*, with the
difficult for the Nolani to believe that a treaty with Hannibal was a better deal. Indeed, if the Nolani were aware of Hannibal’s negotiations with the Capuans and his promise to extend Capuan power, it would have been challenging for Hannibal to convince the Nolani that he was acting in their best interests. Thus, Hannibal did not win over enough Nolani aristocrats to secure the city. When the city did not revolt immediately, the Romans and the pro-Roman Nolani had the time to bolster the city’s loyalty. Marcellus was able to garrison the city, conduct trials and punish seditious aristocrats, and perhaps most importantly make counter-offers to win back the loyalty of Hannibal’s most influential aristocratic ally, Lucius Bantius. Although Nola’s loyalty would continue to waver, the Romans and their local aristocratic allies would never relinquish control of the city.

Recognizing the importance of local rivalries helps explain the loyalty of Campanian cities for which there is less documentation because the decision-making process of the Nolani probably replayed itself to some degree in the other cities that were traditionally hostile to Capua, such as Naples and Cumae. Hostility toward Capua also helps explain the remarkable loyalty of Acerrae. This city was a *civitas sine suffragio*, like Capua. However, unlike Capua, Acerrae was not a particularly important city.

250 Liv. 8.17.12

251 The territory of Acerrae was sandwiched approximately equidistant between Capua, Naples, and Nola. In his description of Campania, Polybius (3.91.1-7) fails to mention Acerrae; Strabo (5.4.11) states that there are other settlements “even smaller” than Acerrae, implying Acerrae was relatively small (of course, however, Strabo wrote much well after the destruction of Acerrae in the Second Punic War and his description may not reflect the realities of the third century BC); Pliny (*N.H.* 3.63) calls the town an *oppidum*, though of course this is also a much later source. See *CL* 2.592-3.
Hannibal at first approached the Acerrani, in 216 BC, intending to win them over peaceably. However, the Acerrani remained steadfastly loyal to Rome, so Hannibal blockaded the city. Even this threat did not compel the Acerani to surrender; instead, Hannibal stormed the town, plundered it, and left it at least partially destroyed.\textsuperscript{252} It is worth noting that the sources mention no Roman garrison in Acerrae, so the Acerrani were not compelled at Roman spearpoint to remain loyal. Acerrae appears to have had cordial relations with Nola and possibly with Nuceria. Livy states that the Acerrani who fled their city sought refuge in cities that were known to have remained loyal.\textsuperscript{253} Livy does not specify, but it is likely that at least some made their way to Nola. We later hear that the Nolani and Acerrani sought military assistance from Marcellus.\textsuperscript{254} This suggests Acerrae was not entirely destroyed and that the refugees had returned home; however, the reference may also indicate that the Acerrani were living in Nola.\textsuperscript{255} In either case, the Acerrani and the Nolani seem to have acted together. Finally, Acerrae may have had close trade links with Nola and Nuceria.\textsuperscript{256} Meanwhile, as we have already seen, the Acerrani feared the Capuans, and this fear compelled them to ask for Roman military assistance.\textsuperscript{257} It is clear that hostility between Capua and Acerrae on the one hand, and close bonds between Acerrae and Nola (and perhaps Nuceria) encouraged the Acerrani to

\textsuperscript{252} Liv. 23.17.1, 4-7

\textsuperscript{253} Liv. 23.17.6

\textsuperscript{254} Liv. 23.19.4

\textsuperscript{255} Liv. 27.3.7: The Romans allowed the Acerrani to rebuild their town only in 210 BC.

\textsuperscript{256} Nola, Nuceria, and Acerrae traded along the Sarno River and shared the same port town, Pompeii; see Strab. 5.4.8.

\textsuperscript{257} Liv. 23.19.4: The men of Nola and Acerrae sought military assistance from Marcellus because they feared an attack by the Capuans.
remain loyal to Rome. That the Acerrani chose to allow their city to be destroyed rather than submit to Hannibal underscores the importance of traditional local bonds and hostilities.

Finally, the importance of local rivalries may also help us understand the loyalty of Nuceria. In 216 BC, Hannibal also marched to Nuceria in southern Campania, where he tried to play on political divisions within the city. When Hannibal could not win over the city peacefully, he starved the inhabitants into submission. According to the terms of the surrender, Hannibal let the Nucerians leave with one garment after which he sacked and burned the city. Once again, no Roman garrison is mentioned. Meanwhile, the Nucerians sought refuge wherever they wanted, and most ended up in Cumae, Naples, and Nola. We are given little detail concerning Hannibal’s negotiations with Nuceria, but the limited evidence is consistent with the suggestion that local rivalries and ties shaped the Nucerian decision to reject Hannibal’s offers. Nuceria had been the hegemonic power of a league of southern Campanian cities, including Stabiae, Pompeii, Sorentum, and Herculaneum. It is not clear if the Nucerian league existed as a formal confederation

258 Liv. 23.15.2-6. Livy records that the Nucerian aristocracy was unified in rejecting Hannibal’s terms. However, after the city fell, the populace dispersed to Naples and Nola, except for 300 men from the wealthier class – they tried to go to Capua but were refused entry. That members of the aristocracy first sought sanctuary from Hannibal’s ally indicates that some senators were probably sympathetic to Hannibal.

259 Polybius (3.91.4) mentions Nuceria when listing the cities on the southern coast of Campania. In fact, he states that Nucerian territory reached the coast despite the fact that Nuceria was, according to Pliny (N.H. 3.62) nine Roman miles from the sea. Polybius does not mention Herculaneum or Pompeii. Livy (9.38.2) states that, during the Second Samnite War, P. Cornelius led a raid on the territory of Nuceria by landing a fleet at Pompeii. These three passages suggest that the coastal towns of Pompeii and Herculaneum were included in the territory of Nuceria. Nuceria also seems to have coined money for all cities in the league, and the chief Nucerian magistrate may have had some authority in subordinate cities; see Frederiksen, Campania 141-2 n. 77. For the Nucerian league, see also Salmon, Samnium and the Samnites 99-100, 233 n. 4; Toynbee, Hannibal’s Legacy 1.111; Afzelius, Die römische Eroberung Italiens (340-264 B.C.) 161.
after Nuceria entered into a Roman alliance in the late fourth century, but it is likely that Nuceria, Pompeii, Stabiae, Sorrentum, and Herculaneum continued to share mutual bonds of affinity. Nuceria also apparently had economic links to Nola and Acerrae, since all three cities shared a common port, Pompeii, and they traded along the Sarno River. Hannibal approached Nuceria after Capua had revolted, but before Acerrae had been destroyed. Therefore, the Nucerians decided to remain loyal when they knew that Capua had allied with Hannibal and while Acerrae and Nola remained loyal. It is plausible that the Nucerians figured that an alliance between Hannibal and Capua threatened their own prominence as the chief city among the southern Campanian cities. Therefore, like the cities with which they were close – Nola and Acerrae – the Nucerians chose to remain loyal to Rome.

To summarize: After the revolt of Capua and its subordinate allies in the summer of 216 BC, many of the remaining Campanian cities were compelled to choose between Rome and Hannibal, either because Hannibal approached the cities directly or because the Capuans tried to convince them to revolt. However, no other Campanian city rebelled, despite in some cases repeated overtures by Hannibal, both seductive and threatening, between 216 BC and 214 BC. In fact, the local aristocracies of Nuceria and Acerra preferred to see their cities sacked than to side with Hannibal. The stark contrast between Hannibal’s success vis-à-vis the Capuan league and his total failure to elicit revolts from the remaining Campanian cities is all the more striking when we consider that all the cities in Campania were pressured by essentially the same factors to revolt. However, Hannibal’s arrival in Campania allowed local inter-city rivalries and

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260 Strab. 5.4.8
allegiances that had been suppressed under Roman hegemony to come to the fore. A number of Campanian communities, including for example Naples and Nola, had long felt hostility toward the powerful city of Capua. When Hannibal won the allegiance of Capua and its subordinate cities by promising to extend Capuan hegemony, local rival cities to Capua became more confirmed in their loyalty to Rome – the ruling aristocracies in these cities calculated that Capuan hegemony threatened their interests more than Roman rule. Therefore, Hannibal’s greatest success, winning over wealthy and powerful Capua, had the ironic effect of limiting the effectiveness of his strategy.

That is not to say that the remaining cities in Campanian were completely firm in their loyalty. Rather, the aristocracies in these cities tended to be divided, with at least some aristocrats promoting a pro-Hannibalic position. In some cases, especially Nola, the loyalty of the aristocracy continued to waver, and the threat of revolt lasted for years. However, initial suspicion of the Capuo-Hannibalic alliance, rooted in traditional hostility toward the Capuans, delayed potential revolts. This allowed pro-Roman aristocrats to consolidate their power, usually with the help of a Roman garrison. When Hannibal did not win over all or most Campanian cities in 216 BC, Rome had time to recover – to encourage local aristocracies and win back the loyalty of important aristocrats (e.g. in Nola), to punish aristocrats who promoted sedition (e.g. in Nola), and to place garrisons to protect cities against potential attacks by Hannibal or his allies (e.g. Nola, Naples, Cumae, and Puteoli).

With the remaining Campanian cities more secure against revolt, both through the loyalty of the local elite and through the strategic placement and maintenance of
garrisons, Rome weathered the storm of the first few years of the Second Punic War. In the years to follow, when Hannibal was forced to protect the allies he had won over lest he lose credibility, Rome’s long-term strategic advantages would increasingly come into play.

1.5 Longterm Failure of Hannibal’s Strategy in Campania (215-211 BC)

After Hannibal captured Casilinum early in 215 BC the battle lines in Campania were drawn – Hannibal had secured the loyalty of Capua and of its subordinate allies while Rome held the remaining cities in Campania. This exact situation played into Rome’s long-term strategic advantages. First of all, Rome could draw on its great manpower reserves, which were still formidable even after Cannae and the revolt of many allied states, in order to hold strategic positions and check Hannibal’s movement, to garrison at least some allied states, and to begin to carry out reprisals against disloyal Italian cities. Corollary to this, Hannibal’s relative lack of manpower resulted in his inability over the long haul to protect his allies against Roman counterattacks. Instead, Hannibal relied on the loyalty of local aristocracies to show resolve in the face of Roman reprisals. However, local aristocracies were riven by political rivalries and factionalism; indeed, the very decision to side with Hannibal was a decisive issue for most of Rome’s allies. Therefore, Rome was able to exploit the political divisions among Hannibal’s Italian allies as Hannibal himself had done when he first won them over. Moreover, as Hannibal’s power in Italy began to wane, his popularity among local aristocrats diminished. Ultimately, through both military and political means, Rome captured all of Hannibal’s allies in Campania. Thus, Hannibal’s incomplete success in eliciting allied
revolts, his failure to win over more cities in 216 BC, lay the groundwork for Rome’s successful counterstrategy of attrition.

Rome’s advantage in terms of manpower was fundamental to its recovery after Cannae and its ultimate reconquest of Campania. Rome was able to station six legions in Campania in four out of the six years – 216, 215, 212, and 211 BC – between Cannae and the Roman capture of Capua. Four legions were station in Campania in 214 BC, when the Romans moved the two legions of volones to the Apulian theatre, perhaps anticipating the emphasis Rome placed on the Apulian theatre in 213 BC. In 213 BC Rome only stationed two legions in Campania. However, by this point the tide of the war had clearly turned, Hannibal was far off in the vicinity of Tarentum, and Rome focused its war efforts on southeast Italy. ²⁶¹ Rome’s manpower advantage was visible almost immediately after Cannae. In the critical months after the battle, M. Iunius Pera raised two new legions of volones, conscripted troops from the ager Picenus et Gallicus, added the two legions urbanae, and marched toward Casilinum with, according to Livy, a total of around 25,000 troops. ²⁶² Meanwhile the consul Varro gathered the survivors from the Cannae legions, approximately 14,500 men, in Canusium. ²⁶³ The praeter Marcellus took command of the so-called legions Cannenses and led them to Campania, in the vicinity of Nola and Suessula. ²⁶⁴ Thus, even in the wake of Cannae the Romans had enough

²⁶¹ For Roman the distribution of Roman legions, see Toynbee, Hannibal’s Legacy 2.647-51; De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 3:2.614-9; for the Roman war effort Apulia, see Chapter 2: Apulia; for the Roman war effort around Tarentum, see Chapter 4: Eastern Magna Gracia and the Lucanians.

²⁶² Liv. 22.57.9-12, 23.14.2-4, 17.7

²⁶³ For the estimated number of survivors, see Liv.22.49.13-8, 50.11, 52.4, 54.1-4, 60.9-19; Pol. 3.117.2; HCP 1.440; Lazenby, Hannibal’s War 90-91.

²⁶⁴ Liv. 23.14.10, 23.31.4
manpower to hold line in northern Campania and to control two of the main routes out of southern Campania.\(^{265}\) Even after Casilinum had fallen, the Romans stationed an army near Sinuessa, which controlled the Via Appia at the coastal pass near the Mons Massicus.\(^{266}\) Rome also had enough manpower to garrison allied cities in Campania, including Cumae and Naples.\(^{267}\) Fabius fortified Puteolil late in 215/4 BC, and we hear later that the city was protected by a garrison of 6,000 Roman troops.\(^{268}\) By the time of the siege of Capua (212 BC), Rome was able to bring to bear three armies against its rebellious ally.\(^{269}\) Thus, Rome took advantage of its manpower reserves to recover after Cannae – to raise new troops, to hold strategic points in Campania and limit Hannibal’s movements, to protect its own allies, and to take the offensive against Hannibal’s allies.

Not only was Hannibal threatened by Rome’s manpower advantage and its military response in the wake of Cannae, but also his position in Campania was vulnerable to political divisions and wavering aristocratic loyalty among the cities he had won over in 216 BC, especially Capua. Hannibal had won over the Capuan aristocracy, at least in part, by promising to extend Capuan power. However, he convinced the Capuans only after difficult negotiations, and even then there remained some aristocratic

\(^{265}\) The Romans still held Casilinum, which overlooked the crossing of the Voltunus at the juncture of the Via Appia and Via Latina. Marcellus established himself at the so-called *castra Claudiana* on modern-day Monte Cancelllo; the poition overlooked Suessula on the route between Capua and Nola, and also overlooked the Via Appia on the route to Beneventum through the pass at Arienzo. See Lazenby, *Hannibal’s War* 93.

\(^{266}\) Liv. 23.35.5

\(^{267}\) Liv. 23.15.2; see pp. 49-53.

\(^{268}\) Liv. 24.7.10, 12.4, 13.7

\(^{269}\) Liv. 25.22.7-9
opposition. While some aristocrats, such as Vibius Virrius, were rather vocal in their support for Hannibal, many Capuans were less enthusiastic. If Hannibal failed to back up his promises, his credibility would suffer, and he risked losing the support of this “swing group” of aristocrats. Thus, Hannibal was at times coerced to pursue policies in order to bolster Capuan loyalty. In 215 BC, for example, Hannibal was compelled to leave winter quarters early in order to assist the Capuans after Gracchus routed them at Hamae, and later he himself attacked Cumae at the request of the Capuans.\textsuperscript{270} Indeed, as early as 216 BC in the months following Capuan revolt, Hannibal was already concerned about the wavering loyalty of his new allies.\textsuperscript{271} Thus, Hannibal’s options were constrained, at least in part, by the necessity to bolster the loyalty of his allies.

Just as Hannibal was compelled to reinforce the allegiance of his allies, the Romans were able to exploit political divisions and the varying degrees of pro-Hannibalic sentiment among the aristocracies in Campanian cities that had revolted from Rome. For example, early in 215 BC the Roman senate voted to bring the 300 Capuan knights back from Sicily and to give them Roman citizenship. It was also decided that they should obtain the municipal rights of Cumae.\textsuperscript{272} This act was certainly designed to weaken the resolve of Capuan aristocrats loyal to Hannibal by emphasizing the potential rewards

\textsuperscript{270} Liv. 23.36.1-7

\textsuperscript{271} Liv. 23.17.7: Hannibal marched to Casilinum after he received word that the Romans were bringing newly conscripted legions to Casilinum. While strategic considerations certainly motivated Hannibal, Livy also states explicitly that he feared that Capua would waver if the Romans drew their camp nearby (\textit{ne quid tam propinquius hostium castris Capuae quoque moveretur, exercitum ad Casilinum ducit}). Moreover, by beginning a siege in fall Hannibal sacrificed an opportunity to winter his troops in Apulia, where he had set up a supply base.

\textsuperscript{272} Liv. 23.31.10-1
granted to faithful allies. Such rewards were, of course, juxtaposed with Roman reprisals against the faithless. For example, the Romans between 215 BC and 213 BC repeatedly devastated Capuan territory or otherwise interfered with their agricultural production. While it is impossible to know how much damage was caused by Roman devastation, the tactic worked well enough to compel the Capuans to respond by sending troops from within the city walls in order to protect farms and territory. Roman devastation certainly exacerbated Capuan political divisions and may have convinced some aristocrats that siding with Hannibal had been a poor choice. Indeed, Livy states that 112 Capuan nobles presented themselves to the praetor Cn. Fulvius, in command of the Roman camp at Suessula. The Capuans surrendered on the stipulation that when Capua fell, their property would be restored. This episode points to the sorts of personal motivations on the part of local aristocracies that the Romans could exploit in order to wear down the resolve of Hannibal’s allies. Perhaps the clearest example of Rome’s attempt to undermine Capuan resolve by contrasting the price of disloyalty with the benefits of rejecting Hannibal occurred in 212 BC. As the Romans prepared to surround Capua with siege walls, the senate sent word to the consuls that any Capuans who left their city before March 15 would have their property restored, while those who remained would be considered enemies. The consuls published this edict to the Capuans, showing that this was meant to elicit Capuan desertions.

273 Liv. 23.46.9-11, 48.1-3, 25.13.1
274 Liv. 23.46.10
275 Liv. 24.47.12-3
276 Liv. 25.22.11-3; Diod. Sic. 26.17
Hannibal lacked the resources to protect all of his allies once they joined him. He had probably counted on gaining reinforcements by convincing the Campanians to join him, and there is evidence that some Campanians served in Hannibal’s army.\textsuperscript{277} However, his failure to elicit massive allied revolts limited the potential manpower from which he could draw reinforcements. Also, the patchwork nature of the revolts combined with Rome’s military response forced Hannibal to fritter away troops by garrisoning the towns that had joined him. Even with garrisons, it was difficult for allied states – especially the smaller cities – to withstand Roman reprisals. Moreover, Hannibal generally did not have the manpower to carry out campaigns in more than one theatre. Therefore, he was often forced to choose between eliciting revolts in one region of Italy or defending his allies in another.

Consequently, Hannibal often found himself torn between protecting Capuan interests and pursuing prosecuting the war in southeastern Italy. At the same time, the Capuans soon realized not only that allying with Hannibal failed to yield an extension of their hegemony but also that they were worse off than before the war. Thus, Hannibal had failed to secure Cumae for the Capuans; meanwhile the Capuans suffered from Roman devastation of their territory. Livy states explicitly that Quintus Fabius devastated the Capuan territory in 215 BC only after he knew Hannibal had departed Campania for Apulia, underscoring the ramifications of Rome’s manpower advantage.\textsuperscript{278} Similarly, the Romans took advantage of Hannibal’s absence to besiege and capture

\textsuperscript{277} Livy (26.34.6-7) states that some Capuans, Atellani, Calatini, and Sabataini were with Hannibal, presumably in the ary, after the cities had surrendered. Livy also mentions (23.39.5, 24.19) Capuans (or Campani) among the garrisons at Casilinum and a few Samnite towns.

\textsuperscript{278} Liv. 23.46.9, 48.1-3
Casilinum in 214 BC; any Capuan captives were imprisoned in Rome. The people of Campania also witnessed Hannibal’s inability to protect his allies outside of Campania. For example, in 214 BC while Hannibal was near Tarentum, Fabius marched into Samnium, devastated Samnite territory, and captured a number of towns by force, including Combulteria/Conpulteria, Trebula, Auristicula, Telesia, and Compsa. Livy states that Fabius was campaigning in the vicinity of Capua, and both epigraphical and archaeological evidence confirms that Trebula and Combulteria/Conpulteria were situated close to Campania. More importantly, Livy also states that Campanians who were garrisoning the towns were captured in large numbers. Hannibal was forced to respond to entreaties from his new allies lest he appear to have abandoned them, and this restricted his actions. For example, the large number of legions levied in 214 BC frightened the Capuans, who suspected a Roman siege. The Capuans sent legates to Hannibal, who was wintering in Apulia, to beg him for protection. Hannibal quickly led his army to Campania, where he tried unsuccessfully to capture coastal towns there.

279 Liv. 24.19. It is worth noting that when the Romans began to draw up siege weapons, a number of the Capuans who were garrisoning the city lost their will to fight and begged Fabius for permission to abandon Casilinum for home; apparently Fabius granted the request to some (23.19.8-9).

280 Liv. 23.39.5-6, 24.19.3-5. Livy records two separate campaigns, one each in 215 BC and 214 BC. However, there is good reason to think that both references are to events in 214 BC. His repetition of Combulteria/Conpulteria but with different spellings suggest he drew on different sources and did not recognize they referred to the same events. See Salmon, Samnium and the Samnites 300-1; De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 3:2.203 n. 9, 245.

281 Liv. 23.39.5; H. Solin, Le iscrizioni antiche di Trebula, Caiatia, e Cubulteria 13-24 (Trebula = modern Treglia, in the heart of the Monti Trebulani), 145-53 (Combulteria = near modern Alvagnano)

282 Liv. 23.39.5

283 Liv. 24.12.1-4
Hannibal was repeatedly torn between trying to secure Tarentum and trying to protect and ameliorate the Capuans. Later in the summer of 214 BC Hannibal was informed that he could easily capture Tarentum if only he drew his army near. The Carthaginian was clearly growing impatient with his inability to capture more cities in Campania, so late in the summer he withdrew to Tarentum and spent the next year in the vicinity of Calabria. While Hannibal was near Tarentum, the Romans captured Casilinum and continued to ravage Capuan territory. Hannibal’s inability to protect his allies, essentially because he could not be in two places at once, damaged his credibility and further strained the loyalty of his allies.

Patterns established in the first few years of the war continued and the combination of long-term strategic problems that Hannibal faced came to a head in Campania in 212-211 BC, when the Romans began to besiege Capua. According to Livy, in 212 BC the Capuans were suffering from deprivation and sent legates to Hannibal in Tarentum in order to request food. Hannibal was busy trying to capture the citadel of Tarentum, so he could not deal with the request personally. However, he did not want to look like he was abandoning the Capuans so he ordered Hanno to quit Bruttium, march to Campania, and supply the Capuans. Hanno marched via Samnium, gathered grain that had been collected during the summer from Hannibal’s allies, collected wagons and pack animals from surrounding farms, and set up a day to meet the Capuans with the

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284 Liv. 24.13.1-2

285 Liv. 24.17.8; for Hannibal’s campaign around Tarentum, 214-3 BC, see Chapter 4, especially pp. 292-294.

286 Liv. 25.13.1-2
supplies. Loyal colonists at Beneventum informed the consuls of Hanno’s actions and the Romans ambushed the camp in which the new supplies were being distributed. According to Livy thousands of Capuans and Carthaginians were killed or captured, all the grain, pack animals, and plunder collected by Hanno was captured, and Hanno fled to Bruttium. The mission was an utter failure, and Hannnibal lost precious men and materiel because he was forced to respond to local initiatives.

Hannibal continued to be torn between his desire to secure the citadel of Tarentum and the necessity of protecting Capua in order to avoid losing credibility in the Italians. The Capuans sent another legation to Hannibal, reporting the disaster that befell Hanno and their concern that the Romans would soon take the city. Hannibal replied with the appropriate niceties – promising that he would not abandon Capua – and he sent 2000 cavalry to protect Capuan farms from Roman devastation. Hannibal himself marched his army to Beneventum and thence to Capua. Hannibal fought a successful pitched battle against the Roman armies outside Capua, but, according to Livy, quit Capua in pursuit of Appius Claudius’ legions. Livy claims that Hannibal fell for a clever ruse, in which the Roman consuls marched in opposite directions. After choosing to pursue Appius Claudius, the consul led Hannibal on a wild goose chase into Lucania, then doubled back to Capua. We later hear that Hannibal broke off his pursuit of Appius

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287 Liv. 25.13.3-8
289 Liv. 25.15.1-3. This must be the cavalry under the command of Mago, which successfully thwarted Roman efforts at devastation (see Liv. 25.18.1-3).
290 Liv. 25.19.4.
291 Liv. 25.19.4-8.
and crushed a small Roman force in Lucania.\textsuperscript{292} Then Hannibal marched to Apulia at the request of legates from his Apulian allies that he protect their cities from the Roman praetor Cn. Fulvius.\textsuperscript{293} While Hannibal campaigned in Apulia, Appius Claudius and Fulvius Flaccus renewed their attack on Capua. The two consuls took measures to guarantee enough grain to feed their armies over winter. The Romans fortified a camp at the mouth of the Volturnus, converted Casilinum into a granary, and placed a garrison in Puteoli. These preparations allowed the Romans to ship grain from Etruria and Sardinia to Campania.\textsuperscript{294} The praetor C. Claudius Nero left a token garrison at Suessula and marched the bulk of his army to Capua. By the end of the summer, the Romans had surrounded Capua with three camps, and encircled the city with a ditch and rampart.\textsuperscript{295} The Romans were able to carry out these preparations unhindered, because Hannibal was compelled to respond to allied interests in Apulia. Also, as mentioned, the Romans tried to undermine Capuan resolve by promising to restore the property of any man who abandoned Capua before March 15.

The Capuans again sent legates to Hannibal asking the general to relieve the Roman siege, but Hannibal was busy first with his attempt to secure Tarentum and later with the hope of gaining an alliance with Brundisium.\textsuperscript{296} Clearly Hannibal desired a seaport and could not be bothered for the moment, and he instead sent the legates home.

\textsuperscript{292} Liv. 25.19.8-17
\textsuperscript{293} Liv. 25.20.6-7
\textsuperscript{294} Liv. 25.20.1-3, 22.5-6
\textsuperscript{295} Liv. 25.22.7-9
\textsuperscript{296} Liv. 25.22.14-5
with vague promises that he would return. The following year (211 BC) Hannibal again was torn between operations in Tarentum and Capua. Hannibal ultimately chose to relieve the Capuans because it was the most prominent city to side with him. He feared that he would look impotent in the eyes of his allies, his promises of liberation empty, if he could not protect Capua from Roman reprisal. Thus, Hannibal marched to Capua, managed to get word through to his besieged allies, and coordinated an assault on the Roman camps. According to Livy, what followed was a battle of some magnitude in which the Romans were trapped between the onrushing Carthaginians and a Capuan sally from within the walls. Polybius describes a much less significant encounter. In any case, Hannibal was unable to break the siege, and retired unsuccessfully from Capua. In frustration Hannibal tried one last tactic to break the siege of Capua. He figured he could lure the Roman army from Campania if he marched on Rome. However, the famous march on Rome failed to elicit the desired response, and the Roman siege continued. At this point Hannibal seems to have given up on Capua, and instead he marched to Bruttium.

297 Liv. 25.22.15-6. Apparently this was late in the campaign season, since Livy synchronizes the building of siege works around Capua with the fall of Syracuses, which he places near the end of the consular year (Liv. 25.23.1, 41.7-8). The coincidence of events smacks of literary license, but the construction of siege works is the last event listed for the year. Hannibal seems to have wintered near Tarentum (Liv. 26.5.1).

298 Liv. 26.4.1-3

299 Liv. 26.4.3-6, 26.5.1-13; Pol. 9.3.1-4.6

300 Liv. 26.7.1-2; Pol. 9.4.7—8

301 Pol. 9.4.7-8; Liv. 26.7.1-5

The final stages of the Capuan show clearly that there was a great deal of political
dissent among the Capuan elite. In fact, Hannibal seems to have recognized this, since he
made a point to send messengers to the Capuans before he marched on Rome, telling them
of his plans and promising them that he had not abandoned their cause.  
Earlier in the
summer, the *medix tuticus* Seppius Loesius complained that the Capuan elite had
betrayed the city by siding with Hannibal, suggesting that high-ranking aristocrats were
beginning to switch sides. The Capuans were probably suffering from deprivations,
even if we allow for Livy’s exaggerated statement that the Capuans were starving, which
would have further weakened Capuan resolve. Even the Carthaginian garrison began to
feel abandoned by Hannibal. The garrison commander Hanno sent a final appeal to
Hannibal by disguising 70 Numidians as deserters. The Romans exploited this to break
the Capuans’ will: they scourged the messengers, cut off their hands, and sent the severed
hands back to Capua.

The terror tactic was the final straw; the combination of Hannibal’s inability to
protect Capuan interests, the deprivations caused by Roman devastation and the siege, the
loss of Capuan citizens who had been captured in battle over the previous years, and the
growing sense that Hannibal was unwilling or unable to protect Capua, let alone ensure
the growth of Capuan hegemony, yielded open dissent among the Capuan elite. Seppius
Loesius called a meeting of the Capuan senate. Some senators argued that legates should

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303 Liv.26.7.5-8; Pol. 9.5.1-6
304 Liv. 26.6.13-17
305 Liv. 26.6.16

112
be sent to the Roman camp, while others argued that they should hold out longer. The leader of the latter group was Vibbius Virrius, who was foremost in engineering the revolt.\textsuperscript{307} In the end, sentiment among the remaining elite had swung against Hannibal. Twenty-eight senators killed themselves rather than face surrender to Rome, the rest voted to send an embassy to propose to surrender, and the on next day the gates of Capua opened.\textsuperscript{308} The fact that some Capuans still vigorously opposed surrender shows that the aristocracy was still not uniform in its loyalty. However, it is clear that the large group of “swing voters” in the senate, the aristocrats who had been convinced by Vibius Virrius’ arguments and Hannibal’s promises, had swung back and now favored seeking terms with Rome.\textsuperscript{309}

The subordinate towns of the Capuan league appear to have surrendered soon after Capua fell to the Romans. Livy states that over fifty surviving Capaun senators who had been guilty of fostering rebellion were sent to Cales and Teanum to await punishment.\textsuperscript{310} The senators were executed, after which Appius Claudius and Fulvius Flaccus returned to Capua and received the surrender of Atella and Calatia.\textsuperscript{311} Livy does not mention Sabata in this passage, but later lists the Sabatini along with the Capuans, Atellani, and Calatini as having surrendered to the Romans, so we may presume that Sabata

\textsuperscript{307} Liv. 26.13.1-19


\textsuperscript{309} Over fifty senators who had voted to revolt did not commit suicide along with Vibius and his followers. These men may represent, at least in part, some the aristocrats who been convinced by Vibius in the first place.

\textsuperscript{310} Liv. 26.14.9

\textsuperscript{311} Liv. 26.16.5
surrendered around the same as the other Capuan league members. \(^{312}\) Appian and Zonaras preserve another tradition, that the Atellani abandoned their city and joined Hannibal’s army in one body, possibly to be settled in Thurii. \(^{313}\) The two accounts can be reconciled: Livy refers to certain Capuans, Atellani, Sabatini, and Calatini who themselves or whose parents “were among the enemy” after the Capuan league had surrendered (\textit{qui eorum autipsi aut parentes eorum apud hostis essent}). \(^{314}\) It is clear that some Capuans, etc. had joined Hannibal’s army or simply fled to Hannibal when Rome attacked their cities, and Zonaras/Appian may refer to those men. In any case, Rome occupied all previously rebellious Campanian cities. Livy also states that the Romans carried out similar trials among the Atellani and Calatini (and presumably the Sabatini) – the leading citizens most responsible for revolt were executed. \(^{315}\) The senators whom the Romans executed likely represent the core of the pro-Hannibalic party, who probably argued against surrender (and in fact may have suspected that they would be punished severely if they did surrender, since they would likely have known about the executions at Cales and Teanum). It is likely that aristocrats in the subordinate states felt the same pressures that their Capuan counterparts did, and by 211 BC many of these aristocrats had lost faith in Hannibal’s ability to protect them. Moreover, Capua was the most powerful city in Campania and the Capuan league hegemon, and the smaller league members tended to follow its lead in policy. Therefore, Capua’s surrender would have further encouraged

\(^{312}\) Liv. 23.36.12, 34.6-7

\(^{313}\) App. Hann. 49; Zon. 9.6

\(^{314}\) Liv. 26.34.6-7

\(^{315}\) Liv. 26.16.5-6
the elite in Sabata, Atella, and Calatia to surrender. When Capua fell, its subordinate allies followed suit, and Hannibal no longer possessed any allies in Campania.

To conclude: in 211 BC the Second Punic War in Campania was essentially over. Rome’s ability year after year to place as many as six legions in Campania allowed its to keep its own allies in check while placing pressure on Hannibal’s allies, Capua and its league of subordinate cities. Hannibal could not match Rome’s manpower resources and therefore could not adequately protect all of his allies and at the same time take the offensive against the Romans. He often found himself in the awkward position of choosing between allies. Rome was able to take advantage of this situation by ravaging the territories of, besieging, or storming Hannibal’s allies in one theatre while Hannibal and his army were absent in another. This made his allies lose faith and led to increasing dissent among the aristocracies in the cities allied with Hannibal. In turn, Rome exploited political dissent through a combination of threats and acts of brutality against intransigent disloyalty and offers of rewards for those who would throw of their allegiance to Hannibal. Hannibal had won over enough Capuan elite to gain control of the city, at least in part, by promising to extend Capuan hegemony. However, even in the first years after the Capuans voted to ally with Hannibal, the Capuan elite was not uniformly loyal. As Hannibal appeared less capable of fulfilling his promise, he lost the loyalty of the critical mass of aristocrats and the Capuans voted to surrender to Rome. Capua’s subordinate allies, as we would suspect, followed suit.

Rome’s long-term strategic advantages and Hannibal’s long-term weaknesses emerged in Campania between 216 BC and 211 BC. However, these long-term strategic considerations only came into play because Hannibal did not secure most or all of the
Campanian cities as allies. In other words, it was Hannibal’s incomplete strategic success that created the very conditions for his defeat in a war of attrition. This chapter has argued that Hannibal’s failure to elicit a significant number of allied revolts in Campania was rooted local conditions and pressures, especially local inter-city rivalries, more than in global considerations such as the “benefits of Roman rule” or the desire for political integration. Even where Hannibal was successful in eliciting allied revolts, the aristocracies were motivated by local concerns. For example, the Capuans were convinced to revolt because they wanted to assert local hegemony, and their subordinate allies followed suit because of traditional bonds to Capua that predated Roman conquest.

Campania provides the best evidence for the sorts of local concerns that had been suppressed by Rome, that emerged when Hannibal temporarily suspended Roman rule, and that proved too strong for Hannibal to overcome. We are fortunate to have relatively detailed accounts of the internal politics in Capua and Nola and of Hannibal’s negotiations with those cities, which opens a window into the processes of decision making among local aristocracies. Moreover, we can reconstruct the historical relationships between the various cities because local Campanian events, especially in the fourth century BC, happened to intersect with events pertaining to Rome. Although the ancient sources tend to place Rome at the center of events, this chapter brought local issues into sharper focus and shown the impact local considerations had on the course and ultimately the outcome of the Second Punic War. In particular, this chapter has paid close attention to the importance of local, inter-city ties and rivalries to the failure of Hannibal’s strategy. In addition, the arguments presented in this chapter make it possible to analyze similar processes other, less well-documented regions.
CHAPTER 2

APULIA

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will examine the application of the Hannibalic strategy in Apulia, its relative success in the summer of 216 BC, and Hannibal’s ultimate strategic failure in the region. Apulia in the Second Punic War is an interesting case study because Hannibal did in fact enjoy a great deal of success there. He successfully won over the most powerful city in the region, Arpi, as well as many smaller communities including Salapia, Herdonia, Aecae, and probably Ausculum. Moreover, it was in Apulia that Hannibal’s strategy first began to produce results, as these revolts occurred immediately after the battle of Cannae and before Hannibal departed for Samnium and Campania. However, Hannibal was not completely successful in eliciting allied revolts in Apulia even though the battle of Cannae took place in Apulia and should therefore have had the most dramatic effect in undermining Rome’s reputation among nearby communities. Two Latin colonies remained Roman strongholds, Luceria and Venusia. More interestingly, a few Apulian communities remained loyal to Rome, including Canusium and Teanum Apulum. Ultimately, of course, Hannibal failed to hold Apulia; in fact, Arpi fell after only a few years as a Carthaginian ally, in 213 BC, making it the first of Hannibal’s important allies
to be re-captured by the Romans.¹ Since Rome had maintained control of Luceria, Venusia, Teanum, and Canusium, Hannibal’s Apulian allies were essentially isolated, and since Hannibal was unable to protect them, the Romans slowly but surely re-conquered all of the rebellious cities. Thus, Hannibal failed in Apulia because of Rome’s long-term strategic advantages. However, the more fundamental question remains why Hannibal did not convince more Apulian cities, especially Canusium and Teanum, to revolt after the battle of Cannae.

Even though the Apulian affairs during the Second Punic War are intriguing – the Apulians supplied Hannibal with his first Italian allies and provided the Romans with their first major re-conquest in the war of attrition – there has been very little attempt to analyze why some Apulian cities allied with Hannibal while others remained loyal to Rome. The revolts of Arpi, Salapia, Herdonia, and Aecae are often mentioned only in passing as evidence that the Hannibalic strategy began to work after the battle of Cannae, but such references do not explain particular local conditions shaped the decisions of Apulian cities to revolt or not.²

Even prior attempts to focus on specific local factors that shaped the course of the war in Apulia have proven insufficient. Some scholars have argued that fear was the decisive factor compelling Apulian revolts, that the combination of Hannibal’s victory at Cannae and, perhaps as significant, the proximity of his army persuaded many

¹ Compared, for example, to Capua (recaptured 211 BC), Syracuse (211 BC), Tarentum (209 BC), and Locri (205 BC).

² For a typical example, see Lazenby, Hannibal’s War 89; Lazenby states: “But in other respects, his strategy at last began to bear fruit: some of the Apulian communities, including Arpi, Salapia, Aecae and Herdonia, seem to have gone over to him immediately after Cannae…” but provides no further analysis.
communities to defect. While there is certainly some truth to this assertion, it cannot account entirely for the revolts of Apulian cities. For example, the people of Gereonium rejected Hannibal’s overtures and ultimately chose to be massacred rather than surrender, suggesting that Carthaginian threats were not necessarily enough to convince a community to revolt. More importantly, this assertion only explains why a city would revolt, but does not explain why other cities such Canusium, having witnessed the battle of Cannae and with Hannibal’s army nearby, did not make the same calculation to revolt. In fact, Canusium is a particularly striking example because, as this chapter will show, the battle of Cannae occurred in the territory of Canusium, yet the Canusians remained loyal Roman allies.

Others explanations emphasize ethnic tensions in limiting the success of the Hannibalic strategy in Apulia. For example, Reid argued that there was little sympathy for Hannibal in Apulia because there had been strong Greek influence in the region and the Apulians would have been, therefore, leery of his “barbarian” army. This argument is fundamentally flawed because it assumes that there would have been a general Greek sentiment that was antithetical to allying with a foreign invader. Yet there is no evidence to support the idea that the Greeks in Italy held this opinion. For example, the Greek city of Locri allied with Hannibal in 215 BC and remained his ally until 205 BC, while the neighboring Greek city of Rhegium remained a staunch Roman ally. In fact, there is strong evidence to suggest that Rhegium and Locri were bitter rivals and that the

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4 Reid, *JRS* 5 (1915) 108
Locrians saw Hannibal as a means to assert hegemony over neighboring Greek cities.\(^5\) Also, the people of Tarentum had a long history of allying with various Italic peoples in order to assert their hegemony, in some cases over neighboring Greek cities.\(^6\) Livy states that Thurii did not share a strong sense of kinship with Metapontum, both Greek cities.\(^7\) Overall, these examples show that there was not a strong feeling of unity among the Greek communities in Italy and that the Greeks were not inherently opposed to allying with “barbarians” to further their own interests. Therefore, even if the Apulians were highly Hellenized, it is not likely this would have contributed significantly to Hannibal’s failure in Apulia.

A more plausible explanation calls attention to the longstanding hostility between the Apulians and the Samnites. According to this theory some Apulian communities including Arpi had allied with Rome out of resentment against the Samnites, but since the Samnites had been subjugated by the time of the Second Punic War and ceased to pose a threat to the Apulians, resentment against Roman domination emerged among the Apulians.\(^8\) This chapter will argue that there were in fact significant feelings of hostility between the Apulians and the Oscan Samnites, and that these hostilities influenced the effectiveness of the Hannibalic strategy. Indeed, this chapter will also argue that Apulian-Samnite rivalry helps explain why Teanum, an Oscanized city, remained loyal while Arpi, an Apulian city, revolted. However, this does not explain why Canusium, an

\(^5\) For Locri and Rhegium, see Chapter 3, especially pp. 216-223, 240-242.

\(^6\) See Chapter 4, pp. 257-264.

\(^7\) Liv. 25.15.7

\(^8\) De Sanetis, *Storia dei Romani* 3\(^3\).2.201; Caven, *Punic Wars* 141
Apulian city that was not Oscanized, remained loyal during the Second Punic War. Therefore, we need to examine more closely the conditions that contributed to Hannibal’s defeat in the Apulian theatre.

I suggest that a better understanding of the failure of Hannibal’s strategy in Apulia is gained by focusing on the local level, analyzing the specific economic, political, and diplomatic factors – many of them independent of the conflict between Rome and Carthage – confronting Apulian cities that had to choose whether or not to revolt. In this chapter, I will argue that the decision of an individual city to revolt or remain loyal was rooted in a complex matrix of political rivalries, economic tensions, and diplomatic interests. The critical moment was immediately after the battle of Cannae, when Hannibal was unable to over all the Apulian cities precisely because of these local factors. The city of Arpi chose to side with Hannibal probably because the Arpini wanted to extend their local hegemony and knew their opportunities for expansion were limited while Rome dominated Italy. When Arpi revolted a number of less powerful cities that shared traditional ties and economic links followed suit, thus gravitating toward Arpi’s hegemony. However, Canusium and Teanum were also powerful cities, and both maintained rivalries with Arpi. The Canusians and the Teanenses would have perceived an Arpini-Hannibalic alliance as an immediate threat to their interests. Therefore, the revolt of Arpi probably strengthened the resolve of the Canusians and the Teanenses to remain loyal to Rome.

The analysis in this chapter follows the same approach as the analysis in Chapter 1. Thus I will appeal to the history of the various Apulian communities in order to show the relationships that existed between the cities and to understand the Second Punic War
from the local Apulian perspective. However, the literary record preserves less evidence for Apulia than for other regions in Italy, especially Campania. Therefore, I will utilize archaeological and topographical evidence to complement the scattered literary references to Apulian communities. I will also use comparisons to Hannibal’s experience in Campania to shed light on the Second Punic War in Apulia. Although the evidence for Apulia is less explicit, many of the same features of Hannibal’s experience in Campania are also visible in Apulia, and this suggests that similar processes shaped the Hannibalic strategy in Apulia, especially local political factionalism and inter-city rivalry.

Before proceeding to the main analysis of this chapter, it is necessary to define the topographic and political boundaries Apulia. The region was bounded to south by the Ofanto River basin, including the territory of Canusium to the south of the river. The northern limit is the Fortore River basin, inland to the Lago di Occhito, including the ancient city of Teanum Apulum. The eastern limit is obviously the Adriatic littoral between the mouths of the aforementioned rivers. The boundary to the west and southwest is less clearly defined. The western limit of the region is the base of the Apennines of Samnium, thus including Aecae (modern Tróia) and Ausculum (modern Àscoli), and following roughly the modern western limit of the provincia di Foggia. To the southwest I am including ancient Venusia (Venosa) in the so-called Melfese, as far south as ancient Bantia (Banzia). To some degree the limits are arbitrary, though they correspond roughly to ancient Daunia. Geographic boundaries, however, such as the division between Daunia and Messapia, or even the administrative division between Samnium and Apulia, changed over time, and were difficult even for the ancients

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9 Volpe, La Daunia 13-14
themselves to disentangle.\textsuperscript{10} I feel justified, therefore, making references to cities outside the arbitrary limits I have defined – such as to Larinum to the north, and even as far as Brundisium to the south – when such references are relevant.

This chapter will focus on a number of cities in the northern section of Apulia, as defined above, because much of the action in the Apulian theatre of the war occurred around these cities. Throughout the fourth and third centuries BC there was a radical change in settlement patterns in northern Apulia, approximately ancient Daunia, as the less nucleated settlements typical of late Iron Age Daunia gave way to emerging urban centers. Apulian urban centers increasingly took on the form of Hellenized cities and shared a number of important characteristics. First, one can observe the rise of an oligarchic, landed elite, mentioned both in the literary sources and the archaeological record.\textsuperscript{11} Second, Apulian centers took on urban structures associated with Hellenized or Romanized cities. For example, many Apulian cities erected stone walls around their urban centers,\textsuperscript{12} replacing earlier defensive works that enclosed much wider areas.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{10} See for example the confusion of Strab. 6.3.5; for a modern example, see Salmon, \textit{Samnium and the Samnites} 23-27 for an attempt to define the boundary between Samnium and Apulia.

\textsuperscript{11} See Mazzei and Lippolis in Mazzei, \textit{La Daunia Antica} 185-210; Volpe, \textit{La Daunia} 35-45; Grelle in Uggeri, \textit{L’età annibilica e la Puglia} 29-42; Bottini in Giardina and Schiavone, \textit{Società romana e produzione schivistica} I 151-54; Mertens in Mertens, \textit{Herdonia} 135. Archaeological evidence, from tombs – different burial techniques and differentiation of grave goods – and from excavations of settlements, indicate increased social stratification in the fourth and third centuries.

\textsuperscript{12} Liv. 24.46.1-6; 27.28.9-12 describes the walls and gates of Arpi and Salapia. There are archaeological remains for the defenses of Salapia, see Tinè and Tinè in \textit{ArchStorPugl} 16 (1973) 221-248. A series of walls have been excavated at Herdonia, which clearly show the earthen wall replaced by a brick wall at the beginning of the third century. For a detailed discussion of the walls and gates of Herdonia, see Mertens, \textit{Le mure e la rete viari urbana} in Mertens, \textit{Herdonia} 139-149.

\textsuperscript{13} For example, the earth works around Arpi ran 13km; see Volpe, \textit{La Daunia} 30
Apulian urban centers also contained planned, paved streets. Finally, many Apulian cities began to mint coins, indicating both urbanization and the assertion of political autonomy. By the start of the Second Punic War, therefore, a number of northern Apulian cities emerge as politically independent. These cities are identified both by their “urban form,” the coining of money, and any references to them treating diplomatically. These cities include Arpi, Herdonia, Salapia, Aecae, Teanum Apulum, Canusium, Ausculum, and Bantia, and the colonies of Venusia, Luceria.

2.2 The Revolt of Arpi (216 BC)

Arpi was the most important city in Apulia. The Arpini had a long history of loyalty to Rome that stretched back to the fourth century BC. However, during the Second Punic War, the city went over to Hannibal. Indeed, as this section will argue, Arpi probably invited Hannibal into an alliance relatively willingly and was also likely one of the first communities to reject its allegiance to Rome. The revolt of Arpi was significant because the event encouraged other Apulian cities revolt, a process similar to the revolt of Capua followed by a number of the surrounding communities. This section will analyze the reasons for the Arpini revolt and will conclude that local hegemonic interests were an important consideration in the Arpini decision to revolt.

14 Liv. 24.46.3, 24.47.3 mentions the streets of Arpi; Liv. 26.38.8 implies a forum in Salapia. See Volpe, La Daunia 36-40.

15 By the Second Punic War, the following cities had minted coins: Canusium, Arpi, Teanum Apulum, Ausculum, Hyrium, Luceria, Salapia, and Venusia. See Volpe, La Daunia 36; Stazio, ArchStorPugl 25 (1972) 39-47; Grelle, “La daunia fra le guerre samnitiche e la guerra annibalica” in Uggeri, L’età annibalica e la Puglia 39-40; Crawford, Coinage and Money 52-74.


17 See Volpe, La Daunia 35-40 for summary and bibliography.
There is some debate as to the chronology of the Arpini revolt. For example, De Sanctis argues that Arpi was one of the first cities to revolt, soon after Cannae, but Reid posits that the Arpini did not revolt until the following year.\(^\text{18}\) The ancient evidence would suggest the earlier date is the more probable. Polybius states specifically that the Arpini invited Hannibal soon after his victory at Cannae, while Livy reports more generically that some of the Apulians, presumably including Arpi, came over to Hannibal in the wake of Cannae.\(^\text{19}\) However, both references contain anachronisms, so more analysis is required before we can conclude that Arpi did in fact revolt in 216 BC.\(^\text{20}\) In the same passage Polybius also emphasizes that Arpi did not surrender, but that its citizens invited Hannibal to come to them. The wording suggests that that Hannibal and the Arpini reached some sort of agreement, and this likely occurred while Hannibal was still in the area. This conclusion is consistent with accounts of the Roman re-conquest of Arpi. According to Livy and Appian, a local aristocrat named Dasius Altinius led Arpi into revolt soon after the battle of Cannae.\(^\text{21}\) There is also comparative evidence – Livy claims that Herdonia, a nearby Apulian city, also revolted right after Cannae.\(^\text{22}\) It is most likely that Arpi revolted in 216 BC while Hannibal lingered in Apulia for a number of

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\(^\text{18}\) De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* 3.2.201; Reid, *JRS* 5 (1915) 106

\(^\text{19}\) Pol. 3.118.3; Liv. 22.61.10-2, see also 23.11.11.

\(^\text{20}\) For perhaps the most obvious anachronism, both Livy and Polybius state that Tarentum revolted soon after Cannae; in fact Polybius claims that the Tarentines “immediately surrendered” (Taranti noiv te ga;r eujqevwß ejneceivrizon auJtouvß). However, Tarentum did not revolt until the winter of 213/2 BC; see Chapter 4.

\(^\text{21}\) Liv. 24.45.2; App. *Hann.* 31

\(^\text{22}\) Liv. 27.1.4; however, see Lomas, “Herdonia,” *OCD*, who places the revolt of Herdonia in 214 BC with no explanation; Sirago, “Lacerazioni politiche in puglia,” in Uggeri, *L’età annibalica e la puglia* 70-74 assumes the cities of Apulia revolted in 216 BC, but allows for the possibility that Herdonia revolted later. Agan, no explanation is given.
days after his spectacular victory at Cannae, and before he marched through Samnium to Campania.

Now that we have established a chronology of events, we can discuss how Hannibal managed to win over Arpi. As stated above, Hannibal gained Arpi through negotiations. We do not have detailed account of the negotiations, but we can reconstruct events from the ancient accounts of Rome’s recapture of Arpi and by using comparisons with our analysis of Campanian affairs. It appears that Hannibal won over the loyalty of a party of local aristocrats who saw Hannibal as opportunity for political advancement.

Livy attempts to paint a picture of Arpi beset by political stasis, with the lower classes in support of Rome and the aristocrats in favor of Hannibal. Thus, when Roman troops besieged and stormed Arpi in 213 BC, they found a Carthaginian garrison of 5,000 troops alongside 3,000 Arpini; the local troops quickly turned on the Carthaginians, blaming their own government for selling them out to the Carthaginians. However, the political situation must have been more complex than Livy presents, and the Arpini elite was probably not uniform in its support for Hannibal. The ancient sources do suggest that Hannibal had the support of a party of aristocrats. For example, a certain Dasius Altinius had helped lead Arpi to revolt to Hannibal in 216 BC and the man was clearly a local princeps. Dasius is the only supporter of Hannibal mentioned by name. However, when Hannibal suspected that the Arpini were going to submit to Rome and he

23 It is worth noting that this is the opposite of Livy’s usual portrayal, with the principes in support of Rome and the mob loyal to Hannibal.

24 Liv. 24.47.3-6

25 Liv. 24.45.11-4; App. Hann. 31. Livy specifically refers to Dasius as “principe” and mentions his great wealth.
investigated charges of sedition, he executed members of Dasius’ family. Livy also mentions that while the Romans and Arpini parlayed, the local citizenry compelled the city’s chief magistrate to discuss terms with the consul; this unnamed praeter appears to have supported Hannibal. Finally, the Arpini complained that their city was betrayed by a few leading men (principibus...paucis). Thus, a closer analysis of the episode reveals that Hannibal had support of a small party of the local aristocracy, at least some of whom were probably related to Dasius Altinius.

It is not surprising that Hannibal gained Arpi by winning over the loyalty of a critical mass of the local aristocracy. Indeed, Roman rule relied to a great degree on cooperation from the local elite, and we have already seen in Chapter 1 that both Rome and Hannibal vied for the loyalty or aristocrats in the cities of Campania. Also, it is clear that pro-Hannibalic (or anti-Roman) aristocrats were instrumental to Hannibal’s success in eliciting revolts from other Apulian cities, for example Herdonia and Salapia. Once again, we do not possess detailed accounts of the internal politics in Herdonia and Salapia at the time the two cities revolted, but we can reconstruct the political context by looking at the relatively detailed ancient accounts of their recapture by Rome.

In his account of Herdonia, Livy presents the political situation as one of stasis, with the lower classes in favor of Hannibal and the leading men leaning toward the Roman cause. When Hannibal learned in 210 BC that the Herdonian nobility had been plotting with Cn. Fulvius Centumalus to betray the city, he executed the ringleaders,
burned the town to the ground, and transferred the remaining population to Thurii and Metapontum.\textsuperscript{29} However, it is doubtful that the entire local aristocracy was unified in its loyalty to Rome. In fact, Livy states that some Herdonian aristocrats were courting Fulvius while at the same time others informed Hannibal of the plot.\textsuperscript{30} Moreover, Livy’s statement that Hannibal put to death only the leading men who had carried out negotiations with Romans implies that not all of the local aristocracy was involved in the plot to restore Roman rule. Therefore, it is clear that the Herdonian aristocracy was divided in 210 BC, and we can surmise that aristocratic loyalty was also divided at the time the city rebelled in 216 BC. Herdonia switched sides in the wake of the Roman defeat at Cannae,\textsuperscript{31} when Hannibal successfully won over the loyalty of enough of the Herdonian elite.

The most striking picture of local political division is seen in the case of Salapia. Both Livy\textsuperscript{32} and Appian\textsuperscript{33} record the names of two leading citizens of Salapia, Blattius and Dasius, who were bitter political rivals. Their political rivalry extended to their loyalties during the Second Punic War, with Blattius remaining loyal to Rome and Dasius siding with Hannibal. While the accounts of the rivalry between the two differ in detail, the general situation is described consistently. In 210 BC Salapia was under Carthaginian

\textsuperscript{28} Liv. 24.47.6

\textsuperscript{29} Liv. 27.1.3-15

\textsuperscript{30} Liv. 27.1.6

\textsuperscript{31} Liv. 27.1.4

\textsuperscript{32} Liv. 26.38.6-14

\textsuperscript{33} App. Hann. 45-47
control and garrisoned by 500 Numidian cavalry. Blattius hoped to betray the city to Rome, but figured his plan could not succeed without Dasius’ help. After sending messengers to Marcellus, Blattius approached sought help from Dasius. Both Livy and Appian state that Dasius initially rebuked Blattius’ offer. In fact, Livy states explicitly that Dasius refused Blattius primarily because they were rivals for high political honors. Although the sources only preserve the names of the two men specifically, the fact that both came from old, powerful families and the fact that Blattius needed Dasius’ help both imply that the two men had political allies. It is clear, therefore, that this episode involved more than just the two men whose names we know. It is also clear that the political rivalry between Blattius and Dasius predated Rome’s recapture of the city, and indeed it appears to have been a longstanding rivalry that predated the Second Punic War. Once again, Hannibal was able to win over Salapia by winning over a party of local aristocrats – in this case the party of Dasius.

To summarize: Arpi sided with Hannibal peaceably through negotiations in 216 BC. It is likely that the Arpini aristocracy was politically divided at the time their city revolted, and Hannibal successfully won the loyalty of a party of aristocrats, which allowed him to control the city. Although not described explicitly in the sources, we can reconstruct this process from Livy’s account of Rome’s recapture of Arpi, accounts of Hannibal’s acquisition of aristocratic loyalty in other Apulian cities, and comparisons of similar and better-documented processes in Campanian cities. It is not surprising that Hannibal relied on the cooperation of local elite to secure the loyalty of Arpi, nor is it

34 Liv. 26.38.11; App. Hann. 47

35 Liv. 26.38.6-8; App. Hann. 45
surprising that the Arpini aristocracy was politically divided. However, this does raise
the question why a party of aristocrats would choose to side with Hannibal – in other
words, how did Hannibal win over the anti-Roman party in Arpi? I suggest that the
political rivalries in Arpi as well as in other Apulian cities were often long-standing
feuds. It was likely the case that the ruling party would have tended to be pro-Roman
because the Romans may have supported them, or at least because they benefited from
the status quo. However, aristocrats who were closed out would have been dissatisfied
with the status quo and would have been more likely to find an alliance with Hannibal an
attractive option. Indeed, a rival faction may even have seen Hannibal as a means to
further its own interests or to seize power.

It is very likely that all of the cities in Apulia experienced aristocratic feuds and
political competition that long predated the Second Punic War. As stated before, a class
of local landed elite emerged in Apulia in the fourth and third centuries BC as Apulian
cities became increasingly urbanized and Hellenize. Ancient literary sources preserve the
names of a number of elite families, including the Dasii (in Arpi, Salapia, and
Brundisium), the Blatii (in Salapia), and the family of Busa (in Canusium), who lived
during the Second Punic War. We do not know when these families achieved elite status,
but at least some of them must have possessed elite status for generations, perhaps even
predating the Roman conquest of Apulia. The survival of native elite is implied in the
Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ account of the foundation of the Latin colony of Venusia, in
291 BC. Dionysus records that the colony was founded by 20,000 settlers for the
colony, a figure rejected by many scholars as improbably high. However, other scholars have argued that the figure represents the total number of inhabitants, a fusion of settlers and the native population. It is likely that native aristocratic elements survived the colonial foundation and were still visible in the late third century BC. Canusium is an example of a city that had not been colonized by the Romans and had an aristocracy of mixed ethnic origins at the time of the Second Punic War. Canusium was a Daunian city, but Livy mentions that a noble woman named Busa aided the defeated Romans after Cannae. The name is Oscan and shows that Oscan elite lived in Daunian cities. Finally, comparative evidence from Campania suggests that aristocratic families probably held power locally for generations, possibly even before Roman conquest. For example, Livy mentions a Capuan aristocrat who made a speech before the Romans after the Caudine Forks (321 BC), named Aulus Calavius; Livy says that the man was very old in

36 Dion. Hal. 17/18.5.2; see also Vell. 1.14.6.
37 The figure is far higher than the typical number of colonists sent to a Latin colony, usually between 2,500 and 6,000 colonists; see Gargola, Lands, Laws, and Gods 56; for attempts to emend the figure, see for example Salmon, Roman Colonization 60-2 n. 80, who amends the figure to 6,000; Bernardi, Paideia 1 (1946) PAGES lowers the number to 2,000.
38 For example, Bottini, “L’ area melfese fino alla conquista romana,” in Giardina and Schiavone, Società romana e produzione schiavistica I 153; Marchi and Sabbatini, Venusia 19; Torelli, “Il quadro materiale e ideale della romanizzazione” in Cassano, Canosa (Venice 1992) 608-619; though first proposed by Pais, MAL 4 (1924) 329ff. For a brief summary of the debate, see Torelli, Atti del convegno di studi Etruschi e Italici 325-36.
39 This theory is given support by references to Dasius of Brundisium, who commanded the garrison Clastidium and betrayed it to Hannibal in 218 BC; see Pol. 3.69.1-4; Liv. 21.48.8-9. Brundisium had been refounded as a Latin colony in 244 BC, and the fact that Dasius was placed in charge of a garrison shows that native aristocratic families could survive a colonial foundation and could achieve high political honors.
40 Liv. 22.52.7; see also Val. Max. 4.8.2.
41 See “Busa,” RE 5.1072-3.
321 BC and that he was the son of Ovius Calavius. Ovius certainly would have been an adult before Rome made Capua a *civitas sine suffragio* in 338 BC. Members of the Calavius family were accused of heading an aristocratic conspiracy in 314 BC. Pacuvius Calavius held the office of *meddix tuticus* in 216 BC, while an unspecified number of Calavii were accused of arson in 210 BC, after Rome had recaptured Capua. The evidence suggests that local aristocratic families remained powerful for generations.

Presumably some local aristocrats benefited from Roman conquest, and furthered their own local standing through their relationship with Rome. Once again we can look at the striking example of Dasius of Brundisium. The name Dasius was of local Iapygian origins; indeed, its ubiquity throughout a number of Apulian cities may indicate more a function or status than a personal name. According to both Polybius and Livy, Dasius had been entrusted to command the city’s garrison. Brundisium had been a Latin colony since 244 BC, and Dasius’ position as *praefectus praesidii* indicates not only the survival of indigenous elite, but also the achievement of high office by indigenous aristocrats within a Roman framework. It is also worth noting the case of Busa of

42 Liv. 9.7.1-3

43 Liv. 9.26.5-7

44 Liv. 23.2-4

45 Liv. 26.27.7

46 Volpe, *La Daunia* 35-7; Sirago, “Lacerazione politiche in Puglia durante la presenza di Annibale” in Uggeri, *L’età annibalica e la Puglia* 75


48 Pol. 3.69.1-4; Liv. 21.48.8-9
Canusium. After she provided at personal expense food and shelter for the survivors of Cannae, she was bestowed honors by the Roman senate, showing that Rome rewarded loyal local aristocrats.\textsuperscript{50} Finally, we can look at comparative cases. For example, Marcellus promised political honors and money to secure the loyalty of the important Nolan aristocrat Lucius Bantius.\textsuperscript{51} Also, Livy states explicitly that the Mopsii, an aristocratic family in Compsa in Samnium, were powerful thanks to the Romans.\textsuperscript{52}

While some elite families survived and profited from Roman rule, others may have lost out or perceived that Roman rule restricted their own political power and advancement. For example, the Romans likely punished local aristocrats who resisted initial Roman conquest. The clearest evidence for this is the capture of Venusia. Under the consul L. Postumius, the Romans took the city and killed thousands of the native population.\textsuperscript{53} In Luceria the native population betrayed a Roman garrison to the Samnites,\textsuperscript{54} and the Roman re-conquest was particularly harsh. Some members of the senate voted to destroy Luceria, but it was decided to found a Latin colony there instead. However, Livy states specifically that the Romans punished the treacherous Lucerians;\textsuperscript{55} it is likely that those punished included aristocratic ringleaders. This can be compared to Roman actions in Campania. For example, Marcellus investigated rumors of sedition in

\textsuperscript{49}Cic. \textit{Att.} 4.1.4; Salmon, \textit{Roman Colonization} 64
\textsuperscript{50}Liv. 22.52.7
\textsuperscript{51}Liv. 23.15.7-15, especially 14-15
\textsuperscript{52}Liv. 23.1.2: \textit{Mopsiorum factio, familiae per gratiam Romanorum potentis}
\textsuperscript{53}Dion. Hal. 17/8.5.1
\textsuperscript{54}Liv. 9.261
\textsuperscript{55}Liv. 9.26.2-5
Nola and executed a number of suspected Nolani. Also, in 211 BC, the Romans executed Campanian aristocrats who had been the most vocal supporters of Hannibal, and they imprisoned another 300 Campanian aristocrats. In some cases, the Romans took hostages, undoubtedly from aristocratic families, in order to ensure the loyalty of defeated Apulian cities. The ancient sources mention hostages after the initial conquest of Teanum, Canusium, and Forentum, and hostages may have been taken in other cities. In any case, the Romans certainly would not have given honors to resistant or disloyal aristocrats, while they clearly would have worked to maintain the friendship and support of loyal aristocrats. Thus, Roman rule undoubtedly shaped the political environment in Apulian cities.

To summarize: as Roman power in Apulia increased, some local aristocratic families benefited from Roman rule and received rewards while others were punished or at least found their potential for political power limited. Some aristocratic families were probably entrenched in power and dominated local affairs for generations, leaving rival families closed out. Roman rule may have created some political rivalry; however, it is more likely that the imposition of Roman hegemony merely contributed to and was another factor in ongoing local political competition.

Hannibal’s invasion of Italy introduced a new factor into the ongoing political competition within Apulian cities and opened up new possibilities. For aristocratic rivalries were probably ongoing, but as long as Rome’s power was unchallenged, no

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56 Liv. 23.17.1-2 (execution of the Nolani), 26.16.5-6 (punishment of the Campanians)
57 Liv. 9.16.1, 9.20.4; Diod. Sic. 19.10.2
aristocrat would have figured to further his own power by proposing revolt from Rome. However, after the battle of Cannae, with Rome’s army routed and Hannibal’s army camped nearby, Apulian aristocrats could foresee the possibility of a successful revolt from Rome. Aristocrats who received Roman support or who at least perceived that their own interests were tied to the status quo would have been less likely to seek an alliance with Hannibal, but more likely to promote remaining loyal to Rome. However, rival aristocratic factions may have seen an alliance with Hannibal as a means to promote their own political power, while probably figuring that loyalty to Rome meant a continuation of the current political order. The clearest evidence of this process occurring in Apulia is provided by accounts of politics in Salapia. As argued above, two Salapian aristocrats Blattius and Dasius were bitter political rivals, and their rivalry manifest itself during the Second Punic War when Blattius remained loyal to Rome and Dasius sided with Hannibal. Livy states explicitly that the two men opposed each other because of competition for political honors, not because of an ideological attachment to Rome or the Carthaginian cause.\textsuperscript{58} Blattius, and presumably his family and political allies, probably had enjoyed Roman backing.\textsuperscript{59} If true, their aristocratic rivals, such as Dasius’ family, would have suffered politically under Roman domination. Hannibal’s invasion and especially his victory at Cannae gave Dasius the opportunity he needed. Thus, Dasius probably promoted revolt from Rome and alliance with Hannibal because he figured to further his political standing in Salapia. In any case, there were clearly longstanding

\textsuperscript{58} Liv. 26.38.6-8; see above, pp. 128-129.

\textsuperscript{59} See App. \textit{Hann. 46}, in which Blattius claims to have been closely acquainted with the Romans.
political rivalries in Salapia, and Hannibal introduced a new factor in the competition for power.

Finally, the situation in Salapia recalls the political dynamic in Compsa. According to Livy, a Compsan aristocrat named Statius Trebius invited Hannibal to his city and promised to turn it over to him. Trebius was opposed by the Mopsii, a family that enjoyed power because of the Romans. The situation clearly suggests that Trebius (and presumably his supporters) and the Mopsii had been rivals for power before Hannibal came to Italy, and that Trebius saw Hannibal as a way to overthrow the Mopsii. In fact, Livy also says that after Cannae Trebius advertised Hannibal’s coming to the Compsan citizenry, suggesting that Trebius was confident that a pro-Hannibalic platform would prove popular since Rome had been discredited by its crushing defeat at Cannae. The Mopsii fled the city, indicating that they figured they would suffer under Hannibalic domination – especially if their political rivals were placed in power.

The analysis of the politics of Salapia and of Samnite Compsa provides useful comparative material for understanding Arpini politics and the emergence there of an anti-Roman party. I argue that Hannibal successfully exploited political competition in Arpi by winning over aristocrats, the party of Dasius Altinius, who were rival to the current ruling families. Dasius’ party would have Hannibal as an opportunity to further their own standing at the expense of their political opponents who likely drew support from Rome. Although we have few details concerning Arpini politics, accounts of Dasius’ offer to restore Roman rule support my argument. Dasius sided with Hannibal

60 Liv. 23.1.1-2
61 Liv. 23.1.3
immediately after the battle of Cannae and sought to reestablish relations with Rome only after he perceived the Romans were recovering and Hannibal’s power was waning. Moreover, Livy explicitly states that Rome’s recovery went against Dasius’ hopes and expectations. This statement clearly indicates that Dasius’ decision to side with Hannibal was calculated for his own gain. Livy also states that Dasius hoped to get a reward for restoring Arpi to Rome, suggesting further that Dasius was motivated by personal gain rather than by ideological attachment to Rome or Hannibal. Finally, both the Romans and Hannibal appear to have recognized that Dasius Altinius was a political opportunist. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the assertion that the Arpini elite was politically divided and that a group of aristocrats, led by Dasius Altinius, formed an anti-Roman party. This party saw its own interests tied to the rejection of Roman rule and the subsequent overthrow of the current ruling party, and Hannibal enjoyed this party’s support, at least as long as his own fortunes were good.

However, although the evidence supports the assertion that Hannibal exploited political factionalism and gained the support of Apulian aristocrats who perceived that throwing off Roman rule benefited their own political careers, this does not explain why the pro-Hannibalic party held sway in some Apulian cities, such as Arpi and Salapia, but not in other cities. For example, there is evidence that the aristocracy of Canusium was

62 Liv. 24.45.1-3; App. Hann. 31
63 *quoniam res Romana contra spem votaque eius velut resurgere ab stirpibus videatur*
64 *venit promittens, si sibi praemio foret, se Arpos proditurum esse*
65 The Romans did not trust Dasius, so they arrested him (Liv. 24.45.8-9); Hannibal had long suspected Dasius (24.45.12).
similarly divided. However, maintained its loyalty to Rome throughout war. After the disastrous defeat at Cannae, remnants of the Roman army gathered at Canusium and the Roman colony of Venusia. In Canusium the survivors – numbering as many as 10,000 men – received food, clothing, and money from an aristocratic woman named Busa. Livy calls attention to the munificence of Busa in contrast to the otherwise chilly reception the Romans received in Canusium. Even if Livy has exaggerated for dramatic purposes and the Romans received aid from other aristocratic families (or at least other members of Busa’s family), the episode implies that loyalty to Rome was neither uniform nor particularly strong among the elite of Canusium. As noted above, Busa was an Oscan name; Oscan aristocratic families probably faced political challenges in Daunian Canusium. Busa’s extraordinary act of generosity may have been an attempt to curry favor with the Romans and advance its family’s standing, or it may reflect strong pre-existing loyalty because Busa’s family had received support from or forged bonds of friendship with Rome. Either explanation suggests that Canusian politics were consistent with the general picture of local Apulian politics, with elite families of varying loyalty and political rivalries shaped by contact with Rome. More importantly, Canusium did not revolt despite the existence of local political rivalries, indicating that the mere existence

66 Liv. 22.50.11-12, 52.4-7; Pol. 3.117.2-3; Val. Max. 4.8.2.

67 The Canusians, according to Livy (22.52.7), afforded the Romans only shelter and protection from Hannibal, while Busa gave the men food, clothing, and money for their journey home.

68 See above, p. 131 n. 41.

69 There was a history of hostility between Oscan Samnites and Daunian Apulians; see Liv. 9.2.3-5, 13.6; see also De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* 3:2.201; Caven, *Punic Wars* 141.

70 In fact, Livy (22.52.7) says that the senate voted high honors for Busa as a reward for its genosity.
political divisions, which Hannibal successfully exploited to win over Arpi among other Apulian cities, was not enough by itself to guarantee the emergence and ascendancy of an anti-Roman (or pro-Hannibalic) party.

Therefore, it is necessary to ask why – what particular factors – encouraged anti-Roman sentiment to win out in Arpi. One should imagine the Arpini ruling class debating the relative merits of revolt; there was probably a vocal group of aristocrats who argued strongly for revolt – likely the party of Dasius Altinius – while a core group of aristocrats cautioned against revolt and called for staunch loyalty to Rome. Many aristocrats would have fallen somewhere in the middle, a swing group whose support was necessary for the success of either the pro-Roman or pro-Hannibalic parties. There is no direct evidence for this sort of debate among the Arpini elite in 216 BC, though the situation is comparable to affairs in Capua and Nola. What factors, then, were decisive in urging the swing group to support the pro-Hannibalic position (as occurred in Capua) rather than the pro-Roman position (as occurred in Nola)?

Certainly Hannibal’s victory at Cannae discredited the Romans as well as any local aristocrats who voiced strong pro-Roman sentiment. The battle occurred right in the Apulia and it is possible that local soldiers were killed serving in Rome’s legions. This would have fostered feelings of resentment on the part of the Apulians. Moreover, the result of the battle and the presence of Hannibal’s army nearby made revolt a real possibility. Indeed, one might argue that the very proximity of the battle and of Hannibal’s victorious army stunned the Arpini into siding with Hannibal, with the aristocratic swing group falling quickly in line with the more vocal aristocrats calling for

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revolt. However, Polybius’ statement that the Arpini invited Hannibal implies that the move was relatively calculated and that Arpi was not simply cowed into surrendering to Hannibal.\textsuperscript{72} A stronger objection is bound up with the political status of Cannae, the settlement after which the famous was named. Volpe suggests the territory of Canusium straddled the Ofanto River, from the coast inland to the territory of Venusia. This is consistent with Strabo, who records that Canusium maintained an emporium on the Ofanto.\textsuperscript{73} To the northeast of Canusium lay Cannae (modern Canne). There is debate as to the status of Cannae in the third century, but archaeological evidence suggests the site was a hilltop village and a \textit{vicus} of Canusium, not a politically independent \textit{civitas/polis}.\textsuperscript{74} Therefore, the battle of Cannae took place in the “backyard” of Canusium. If the proximity of both the battle of Cannae and of Hannibal’s army were the decisive factor encouraging revolt, then we would expect Canusium to have revolted. The fact that Canusium remained loyal suggests that the proximity of Cannae was not the decisive factor that secured enough aristocrat support for Hannibal to win Arpi.

Erdkamp suggests that during the Second Punic War Apulia suffered from
depopulation, loss of crops, and destruction of farms on a scale at least as severe as the

\textsuperscript{72} Pol. 3.118.3; in fact, the suggestion that Arpi made a calculated invitation to Hannibal supports the assertion that the decision to revolt followed a debate similar to those observed among the Capuan and Nolani elite.

\textsuperscript{73} Strab. 6.3.9

\textsuperscript{74} Liv. 22.43.10, 22.49.13; Flor. 2.6.15 ; App. Hann. 3 imply or refer specifically to Cannae as a \textit{vicus}. Pol. 3.107.2 refers to Cannae as a polis. For the archaeological evidence, see De Juliis, \textit{Bibliografia topografica della colonizzazione greca in Italia} 4 (1985) 135ff; De Paolo and Labellarte, \textit{Profili della Daunia antica I} (Foggia 1985) 101-31; for a summary of the debate, Grelle, “La Daunia fra la guerre samnitiche e la guerra annibalica,” in Uggeri, \textit{L’età annibalica e la Puglia} 40-41; Ashby and Gardner, \textit{PBSR} 8 (1912) 156 suggest that modern-day Canne is the emporium of Canusium to which Strabo refers, though this seems unlikely.
most devastated areas of Campania. Erdkamp discusses the effects of the whole war on Apulia. However, it is worth considering that in the critical early years of the war, as Italian communities witnessed Hannibal’s invasion and calculated whether or not to revolt, Apulia repeatedly endured Hannibal’s devastation tactics at the same time the Romans also exacted supplies from Apulian communities. In particular, as we will discuss below, Hannibal devastated the territory of Arpi. One might argue, therefore, that the relative thoroughness of Hannibal’s devastation tactics, Rome’s inability to defend its allies from Hannibal’s devastation, and the added burden of Roman consumption of local grain encouraged the Arpini elite to side with Hannibal. However, the following paragraphs will show that although repeated devastation may have undermined Roman credibility in the eyes of the Arpini, it was not likely the decisive consideration in the Arpini decision to revolt.

As we should expect, the regional economy of Apulia in the third century was based primarily on agricultural production, most importantly the cultivation of cereal crops. The broad plain of the Tavoliere, with its series of hydration basins, was conducive to agricultural production, and Apulia was famed for its fertility. A few

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75 Erdkamp, *Hunger and the Sword* 286-87

76 Concerning Roman collection of local supplies, Polybius (3.107.1-4) states that the Romans had collected supplies from around Canusium and stored them at Cannae.

77 There is much less evidence for the cultivation and the production of wine, oil, and other non-cereal crops. Amphorae from Greece, found in wealthy graves, indicate at least the ceremonial use of wine in Apulia before the second century BC, though there was no large-scale production of wine or oil until after the Second Punic War. Instead, local production of wine and oil from the fifth through third centuries was on a very small scale. Each city would have produced only enough grapes and olives for its own use, probably cultivated close to the urban center, and would not have produced enough surplus for trade; see Volpe, *La Daunia* 30-33, 60; Mertens, “Sulla tracce di Annibale negli scavi di Ordana,” in Uggeri, *L’ età annibalica e la Puglia* 95-6; Mazzei, “Indigeni e Romani nella Daunia settentrionale,” in Mertens and Lembrechts, *Communità indigene* 111.
ancient sources show clearly the production of surplus grain in Apulia in the fourth and third centuries. Livy mentions that the Arpini supplied grain for the Roman army besieging Luceria. During the Second Punic War, Hannibal captured large amounts of grain in Gereonium and Cannae. Strabo mentions the fertility of the Daunian plain, and comments on the transport of grain from Sipontum to Salapia. Though this last reference is much later than the Second Punic War, it is unlikely that the overall fertility of Apulia had changed much by Strabo’s day, and his observation should reflect at least in general upon conditions in the third century. Indeed, Spurr notes that the soil of Apulia remains among the most fertile in Italy for cereal production. Therefore, it is not surprising that Hannibal not only devastated Apulia but also wintered his army there in three out of four years beginning in the winter of 217/6 BC.

However, despite the fertility of the region, Apulia did not boast a high urban density. In fact, de Ligt calculates that the average distance between cities in northern Apulia was over 23 km, well beyond the normal distance a rural inhabitant would be willing to travel on a regular basis. While de Ligt is discussing Italian settlement for a later period, the density of urban centers in northern Apulia – that is, the number of cities – had not changed much from the third century BC. Northern Apulia was dotted by

78 Liv. 9.13.9-12

79 Pol. 3.100.1-8, 3.101.1-4, 8-10, 3.102.1-4, 3.107.1-4; Liv. 22.52.7, 22.43.5-6. Strabo’s reference (6.3.9) to the shipment of grain also implies surplus production, though he wrote long after the third century BC, so his observations on Apulian trade may not be relevant for the period we are examining.

80 Strab. 6.3.9

81 Spurr, *Arable Cultivation* 7-8, citing Varro, *RR* 1.2.6, 1.57.3, 2.6.5; Col. 3.8.4, et al.


cities in general more than 20 km from each other, with each city possessing a relatively large territory. Within the territories of individual Apulian cities the population appears to have clustered either in the urban center, or in rural villages or *vici*. By the third century BC a number of villages appear to have been abandoned, presumably because the inhabitant moved to a growing urban center. The remaining rural population lived almost exclusively in scattered *vici*. Archaeological research has identified very few isolated rural settlements, and the majority of these lay along major rivers or roads – that is, lines of communication to urban centers. Unfortunately, the exact relationship between Apulian urban centers and rural *vici* is unclear, though this settlement pattern may suggest that there was less communication between the urban center and the outlying rural population. Such a pattern may have rendered Hannibal’s devastation tactics less effective, since the destruction of outlying farmlands would not have brought as much political pressure on the urban elite. This suggestion is consistent with the literary evidence.

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84 Compared to the territories of Campanian cities; see Chapter 1, especially pp. 47-49.

85 Volpe, *La Daunia* 35-49, 101-8. 428 rural sites have been identified from Roman age of Daunia, from the fourth century BC to late antiquity. Of these, only 24 can be dated to fourth to third centuries. 20 of these sites are located along the Ofanto and Fortore rivers.

86 There was a somewhat different settlement pattern around the two colonies in northern Apulia, Luceria and Venusia. In the territories surrounding the two colonies there was the almost complete abandonment of older rural settlements and *vici*; however, there was an increase in the number of small settlements immediately surrounding the urban centers of the colonies. There are also clear traces of Roman land divisions around Venusia and Luceria. The colonies may have had a different agricultural economy. For example evidence that olives and grapes were cultivated on a somewhat larger scale and at an earlier date in the territory of Luceria that in Apulian cities that were not colonized. It is likely that similar agricultural patterns existed at Venusia. This underscores the dramatic effect colonies could have on local settlement and economic patterns. See Marchi and Sabbatini, *Venusia* 19, 111-5; Bottini, “L’area Melfese fino alla conquista romana,” in Giardina and Schiavone, *Società romana e produzione schiavistica I* 151-54; Torelli, “Historical and Archaeological Aspects of the Romanization of Daunia,” in Torelli, *Studies in the Romanization of Italy* 141-54; Volpe, *La Daunia* 46-49.

87 Compared to a region in which farmers lived in the city and walked to their farms, as we observed for Campania; see Chapter 1, pp. 47-49.
evidence. Ancient sources report no reaction by the Apulians to Hannibal’s devastation tactics, unlike the cities of Campania, where either actual or threatened Hannibalic devastation prompted response from the local population. This is not to say that the interests of the urban elite were not bound at all to rural condition such as the devastation of outlying farms or the destruction of rural vici, but there is nothing relatively leisurely pace toward northern Apulia, devastating along the way, until he reached to suggest that the Apulian cities in general, and Arpi in particular, were more susceptible to Hannibal’s devastation tactics.

Moreover, Hannibal appears to have devastated the territories of cities that both revolted and remained loyal to Rome. For example, both Livy and Polybius state explicitly that in 217 BC Hannibal devastated Arpi, which of course would later revolt. However, Hannibal also repeatedly devastated the territory of the Latin colony Luceria, both before and after his march into the ager Falernus. Luceria did not revolt, though one may object that it is unfair to compare Arpi to Luceria, since the latter was a Latin colony and would have been bound more closely to Rome.

More striking is the fact that Hannibal also devastated Teanum Apulum (Teate), which remained loyal throughout the war. Thus, after the battle of Trasimene, Hannibal marched from Etruria, through Umbria and Picenum, until he reached the Adriatic

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88 For example, the Neapolitans sent a cavalry contingent to prevent Hannibal from plundering farms, while the Nolani talked openly of negotiating with Hannibal at the mere threat of devastation; see Chapter 1, pp. 48-51.

89 Pol. 3.88.6; Liv. 22.9.5

90 Pol. 3.88.5, 100.1; Liv. 22.9.5

91 On the loyalty of Teanum, see discussion below pp. 172-174.
Hannibal’s route would have taken him through the territory of Teanum, which he presumably also devastated. Later in the same year Hannibal gathered grain from around Gereonium after he destroyed the settlement. At first Hannibal tried to seduce the inhabitants of the town into forging an alliance by promising them unspecified advantages. The Gereonians rejected Hannibal’s overtures, so the Carthaginian general besieged the town and quickly took it, massacring the inhabitants. The ancient site of Gereonium has been located near the Masseria Finocchito, near Caselnuovo della Daunia. Despite references in the ancient sources to walls around Gereonium, the settlement was almost certainly a vicus and not an independent civitas. It is difficult to determine whether Gereonium was a vicus of Teanum or Luceria. De Sanctis’ discussion, while not explicit on the matter, implies Gereonium was in the territory of Luceria, interpreting Pol. 3.100.1-3 to mean that Hannibal planned to forage in the territory of Luceria. However, the exact text of Pol. 3.100.1 indicates the territory of

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92 Pol. 3.86.8-10; Liv. 22.9.1-4; Zon. 8.25
93 Pol. 3.88.1-6; Liv. 22.9.5
94 Pol. 3.100.1-8; Liv. 22.18.7; App. Hann. 15. Livy’s statement that the town was already abandoned must be rejected.
95 For the identification of Gereonium-Masseria Finocchito, see Russi, Teanum Apulum 208-209; Russi, Taras 2 (1982) 181-84; Volpe, La Daunia 133; contra De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 3.2.123-5 with a discussion of the confusion in the literary sources for the location of Gereonium. De Sanctis places the city near the Castle Dragonara and Casalnuovo Monterotaro.
96 For walls, see Pol. 3.100.4; Liv. 22.18.7, 22.23.9; For the identification of Gereonium as a vicus, see Volpe, La Daunia 40; Grelle, “La Daunia fra la guerre samnitiche e la guerra annibalica,” in Uggeri, L’età annibalica e la Puglia 40.
Gereonium was separate from that of Luceria. A. Russi cites two inscriptions found near the Mass. Fimocchito as his main evidence to place Gereonium in the territory of Luceria. Both inscriptions are badly preserved, but may contain the references to the *gens Claudia* and the *legio prima*, both associated with the colony of Luceria. However, both inscriptions date to the last half of the first century BC at the earliest, and should not be used to determine the status of Gereonium in the third century. Topography should provide the answer. Accepting the identity of Gereonium-Masseria Finocchito places Gereonium about equidistant between Teanum and Luceria, but clearly in the Fortore River basin. The territories of the various Apulian cities tended to correspond to rivers and main drainage basins. From a topographical perspective, it is more plausible to place Gereonium in the territory of Teanum. Therefore, Hannibal not only devastated the territory of Teanum, he also destroyed one of its rural *vici*, yet the aristocracy of Teanum was not cowed into submitting to Hannibal.

Finally, Hannibal also devastated the territory of Canusium. Hannibal wintered in Apulia in 217/6 BC, and he remained in winter quarters throughout much of the spring. When he broke camp, he then decided to march from Gereonium to the Roman supply base in Cannae. Cannae was a strategically important *vicus* of Canusium. Polybius states explicitly that Cannae occupied a strategic location. In fact, the *vicus* was a

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97 Ejn th' peri; th;n Loukarivan kai; to; kalouvmenon Gerouvnion cwvra/

98 Volpe, *La Daunia* 14-15, 28-29; see Map 4 and Map 5.

99 For these and following events, see Pol. 3.107.1-6; Liv. 22.43.5-10

100 For the identification of Cannae as a *vicus* of Canusium, see p. 140 n. 74

101 Pol. 3.107.5
hilltop settlement that commanded Canusium’s access to sea along the Ofanto. Cannae also lay near the littoral route that stretched from Sipontum, through Salapia, south along the coast. According to Polybius, Hannibal’s primary goal was to elicit another pitched battle with Rome, and he figured capturing Cannae would achieve that objective. However, Hannibal also must have hoped to overawe Rome’s Apulian allies, who remained to this point loyal. Hannibal would have marched through the heart of northern Apulia on his way to Cannae, passing a number of cities while unmolested by the Romans. The sight of his army only a few miles from Canusium, consuming Roman supplies collected from the surrounding countryside, would have made the Romans look powerless. However, we hear of no reaction on the part of Canusium, and the city remained loyal after the battle of Cannae.

To summarize: Despite consistent ravaging by Hannibal’s forces, no Apulian city rebelled until after the battle of Cannae. Moreover, it appears that Hannibal failed even to elicit much of a response from the cities whose territories he ravaged. The pattern of settlements and the relatively low density of urban centers may have made Apulia less

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102 There is evidence suggesting that Canusium conducted trade along the Ofanto River. Strabo (6.3.9) states that Canusium maintained an emporium on the Ofanto. Of course, Strabo wrote much later than the Second Punic War. However, commercial amphorae from Greece, datable to the fourth through third centuries, have been found in Canusium, and the Ofanto was navigable in antiquity as far as Canusium; see Volpe, La Daunia 60-62, 93-94. It is likely that imports from Greece would have been conveyed by ship, first to the coastal ports of Apulia, then upriver to inland cities – in the case of Canusium, to the otherwise unidentified emporium, then along the Ofanto.

103 For a discussion of the overland routes in Apulia, see Volpe, La Daunia 86-90; Strabo (6.3.10) mentions the coastal road, which may have been the same route taken by the Roman army during the Second Samnite War (see Liv. 9.2.6); see Map 6.

104 Pol. 3.107.2

105 According to Pol. 3.107.6, Roman commanders in Apulia kept sending messengers to the senate asking what to do, because they were greatly bothered by Hannibal’s maneuver and the loyalty of the allies was uncertain.
susceptible to devastation tactics. In any case, Hannibal appears to have ravaged the territories of cities that both remained loyal to Rome and that rebelled. In fact, Hannibal’s devastation of Teanum appears to have been particularly painful, since he not only gathered supplies from the city’s territory but also massacred the inhabitants of Teanum’s rural vicus Gereonium. Yet Teanum did not revolt after the battle of Cannae. Therefore, Hannibal’s relatively destructive devastation of Apulia cannot be invoked to explain why anti-Roman sentiment prevailed in Arpi.

It was probably the case that Roman rule in Apulia, especially the foundation of Latin colonies at Luceria and Venusia, disrupted local economic patterns. In particular, growing Roman influence in Apulia from the later fourth through third centuries BC may have impacted local systems of breeding and transhumance. However, there is no evidence that long-term, structural economic tensions brought about by Roman rule can explain why some Apulian cities revolted and others did not.

Animal breeding composed an important part of the Apulian regional economy, from at least the fifth century BC. Strabo mentions the breeding of sheep and the production of fine wool in Apulia. This reference is supported by archaeological research in the area of Herdonia, where survey and excavation have revealed strong evidence for the raising of sheep for the production of wool. Cattle and pigs were also grazed on the Tavoliere. Finally, Apulia, as well as the Sallentine peninsula, was

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106 Strab. 6.3.9

107 For example, see Iker, “L’Epoca Daunia,” in Mertens, Herdonia 45; Volpe and Mertens, “Il territorio, la viabilita, la produzione agraria,” in Mertens, Herdonia 318-19.

108 Volpe, La Daunia 30-31
famed for the rearing of horses. Arpi and Canusium were said to have been founded by Diomedes, and the cult of Diomedes – associated with horses – was widespread in the region. Arpi supplied 4,000 cavalry to the Roman cause against Pyrrhus, and Polybius’ description of Roman manpower in 225 BC shows the Apulii supplying a disproportionate number of horses.

Transhumance appears to have been practiced in Apulia during the third century BC, though the extent of the practice has been debated. Some scholars suggest that transhumance was not practiced in Apulia until the middle of the second century BC, while others argue that transhumance was practiced by the middle of the third century BC if not earlier. Volpe offers a sensible compromise. Large scale and long distance transhumance was probably not feasible until after the Second Punic War, when the Roman state could take an active part in regulating the practice. However, this does not preclude the existence of small-scale transhumance at a much earlier date. We should picture transhumance on a local, small scale, with the movement of herds between

109 Iker, “L’Epoca Daunia,” in Mertens, Herdonia 45; Volpe, La Daunia 30-31, 71-72
110 Strab. 6.3.9 comments on the horse breeding of Apulia, and the founding of Canusium and Arpi by Diomedes. Torelli, “Historical and Archaeological Aspects of the Romanization of Daunia,” in Torelli, Studies in the Romanization of Italy 142-3, discusses the cult of Diomedes in Canusium, Aecae, Arpi, Salapia, Sipontum, Venusia, and Luceria, and the persistence of the cult despite the Oscanization of some of these cities. See also Volpe, La Daunia 30-4 for the importance of the horse to the formation of the Daunian elite in the pre-Roman period.
111 Dion. Hal. 20.3.2
112 Pol. 2.24.12, following the interpretation of also Volpe, La Daunia 71-72; Lepore, “Società indigena e influenze esterne con particolare riguardo all’ influenze greca,” in Modona, La civiltà dei Dauni 321; Mazzei and Lippolis, “Dall’ ellenizzazione all’ età tardo-repubblicana,” in Mazzei, La Daunia antica 229.
113 For example, see Grenier, Mèlanges d’arch. Et d’hist. 25 (1905) 293-328
114 Toynbee, Hannibal’s Legacy 2.286
115 Salmon, Samnium and the Samnites 68-70
highlands of the Frentani and the foothills of the Samnite Appenines and the plains of the Tavoliere.\textsuperscript{116} It is not clear whether the dominant practice was \textit{transhumance normale}, the driving of herds from the lowlands to the highlands to graze in the summer, or \textit{transhumance inverse}, in which highland farmers drive their herds into the plains to winter. Livy implies that it was the unsettled highlanders who encroached upon the territory of the settled plains-dwellers,\textsuperscript{117} but the description seems oversimplified and both forms of transhumance probably took place side by side.\textsuperscript{118} The practice of transhumance is likely to have been a source of tension between farmers and passing herders, and even between cities or tribes competing for control of drove roads.\textsuperscript{119}

The imposition of colonies by Rome may have exacerbated these tensions. There were three important overland routes through Apulia.\textsuperscript{120} We have already discussed one, the coastal route.\textsuperscript{121} The second was the Via Traiana, which followed the Calone river valley to Aecae, then bent south connecting to Herdonia, Canusium, and Brundisium.\textsuperscript{122} The third route was the Via Appia, which by the middle of the third century BC ran from Beneventum to Tarantum and Brundisium. The Roman colony of Venusia was located on

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\begin{enumerate}
\item Volpe, \textit{La Daunia} 72-73
\item Liv. 9.8.6-7
\item See J. Skydsgaard, \textit{Analecta Romana Instituti Danici} 7(1974) 7-36.
\item Skydsgaard, \textit{Analecta Romana Instituti Danici} 7(1974) 11-12; Salmon, \textit{Samnium and the Samnites} 68-69. The Livy passages cited above (see p. 148 n. 117) perhaps implies this sort of conflict.
\item For a discussion of overland routes in Apulia, see Volpe, \textit{La Daunia} 86-90; see also Map 6.
\item See above, pp. 146-147.
\item The road was built during the imperial period, though it probably followed a pre-existing route. In fact, Strabo mentions the existence in his day of a “mule road” that connected Canusium and Herdonia. The
\end{enumerate}
this major line of communication. Indeed, any Roman confiscation of land may have blocked local transhumance routes and interfered with grazing patterns.\textsuperscript{123} Therefore, not only the colonial foundations of both Luceria and Venusia but also any mulcting of land from conquered Apulian cities had the potential to disrupt this element of the Apulian economy.

However, the evidence for Roman interference in local stockbreeding and transhumance is scant. More importantly, there little evidence that the Arpini economy suffered disproportionately by Rome’s disruption of local grazing and transhumance patterns. If anything, Livy’s statement that the Arpini in particular resented Samnite encroachment may indicate that Arpi would have welcomed Roman interference in this specific practice. In any case, there is not enough evidence to conclude that the foundation of Latin colonies, the mulcting of land, and the resulting Roman interference in regional transhumance would have made the Arpini more inclined to revolt. Therefore, this cannot explain why Arpi revolted and other Apulian cities did not.

Indeed, the revolt of Arpi is all the more puzzling in light of the fact that the Arpini had come willingly into an alliance with Rome and had shown particular loyal to Rome in previous conflicts.\textsuperscript{124} I suggest that the solution to the question of why Arpi revolted – why the anti-Roman party won out over their political opposition – may be

\textsuperscript{123} Salmon, \textit{Samnium and the Samnites} 70

\textsuperscript{124} The Arpini invited the Romans into alliance to counter Samnite aggression (Liv. 9.13.6). Later, Arpi helped provision the Romans during their siege of Luceria (Liv. 9.13.9-12), and the Arpini are the only Apulians named specifically in the sources as supplying troops, a very large cavalry contingent, for the Romans against Pyrrhus (Dion. Hal. 20.3.2; Plut. \textit{Pyrrh.} 21.9).
found by comparing the revolt of Arpi with the revolt of Capua. The comparison is appropriate because each city was the largest and most powerful in its region. Arpi’s history and its relationships with neighboring communities suggest that Arpi revolted, at least in part, because the Arpini recognized that Rome’s domination of the peninsula limited their ability to assert hegemony over neighboring communities and calculated that an alliance with Hannibal as a means to restore their city’s power.

Both literary and archaeological evidence attests Arpi was the most powerful city in Apulia. Strabo states that Arpi and Canusium were once the two largest cities in Apulia, and he claims that the city still had formidable walls.\textsuperscript{125} Livy indicates that stone defensive works were in place at the time of the Second Punic War.\textsuperscript{126} Many Apulian cities erected stone walls around their urban cores during the fourth and third centuries BC, usually replacing extensive earthen ramparts that enclosed much wider areas. Aerial photography has revealed that the circuit of Arpi’s earthen rampart ran approximately 13 km, the longest in Apulia.\textsuperscript{127} Arpi also controlled a broad territory. Livy records that it included the coast of Sipontum until the Romans confiscated the town and planted a colony there.\textsuperscript{128} Modern scholars suggest that the territory of Arpi stretched from the Sipontine coast inland perhaps as far as Aecae, south to the Cervaro River basin, and north along the Candelaro basin as far as Casone, including settlements along the

\textsuperscript{125} Strab. 6.3.9

\textsuperscript{126} Liv. 24.46.1-6

\textsuperscript{127} Volpe, \textit{La Daunia} 27-30

\textsuperscript{128} Liv. 34.45.3
The exact relationship between Aecae and Arpi is unclear. Aecae seems to have been an independent city by the Second Punic War, but may have acted in the previous century as an outpost for Arpi against the Samnites. In any case, the territory of Arpi stretched to the foothills of the Apennines. During the Pyrrhic war, the Arpini aided the Romans at the battle of Asculum with a very large military contingent, also suggesting that the city was a powerful local hegemon. Finally, Livy portrays the Roman recapture of the city in 213 as a major victory, on par with the capture of Capua and Syracuse.

Arpi sought an alliance with Rome initially to protect their hegemonic interests. At least since the fourth century BC there existed clear Apulian-Samnite hostility that shaped the foreign policy of Apulian cities. The Samnites had long raided the plains in Apulia, which was good for grazing. In fact, the process of urbanization that many Apulian cities underwent, especially the building of defensive walls, may have been hastened as a response to Samnite encroachment. Livy paints an explicit picture of conflict between village-dwelling hill people and the Apulians who cultivated the plains.

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130 Grelle, “La daunia fra le guerre samnitiche e la guerra annibalica” in Uggeri, *L’ età annibalica e la Puglia* 35-36

131 Dion. Hal. 20.3.2; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 21.9; Mazzei and Lippolis, “Dall’ ellenizzazione all’ età tardorepubblicana,” in Mazzei, *La Daunia Antica* 185

132 Liv. 26.41.15 ascribes to Scipio a speech in 210 to veteran troops, in which Scipio compares the victory over Arpi to the capture of Capua and Syracuse.

133 So Salmon, *Samnium and the Samnites* 231; citing Strab. 6.3.9; Varro *R.R.* 2.1.16, 2.2.9. See also Diod. Sic. 20.35.2 for further Samnite raiding.
the description may be overly schematized, but does indicate conflict between the Samnites and Apulians. Apulo-Samnitic hostility led Arpi to form an alliance with the Romans – the Arpini probably considered Rome the farther away of two evils, while the Romans saw the opportunity to surround Samnium. Indeed, Livy clearly states that Arpi and unnamed surrounding Apulian settlements treated with the Romans more because of their hatred toward the Samnites than because of any beneficia afforded the allies of the Roman people. Samnite-Apulian hostility influenced events surrounding Rome’s conquest of Luceria. At the time of the Romano-Arpin, Luceria bordered Arpi and was dominated by the Samnites. Immediately after forging the alliance, according to Livy, the Arpini help provision the Roman siege of Luceria. When Luceria fell, the Romans took a great deal of plunder. For the moment Luceria must have been weakened, and the Arpini probably figured to exert influence over the city when the Romans left. In any case, Arpini assistance for the Roman siege was very likely inspired by their hostility toward the Samnites.

However, the Romans never did leave Luceria. Rather, they garrisoned the city and probably used it as base for raiding Samnium. Luceria remained a problem for the

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134 Liv. 9.13.7

135 See Salmon, Samnium and the Samnites 228-233

136 Liv. 9.13.6

137 Liv. 9.13.9-12

138 Liv. 9.15.7

139 Arpi already controlled the Cervore and the Calone, as far as Aecae, to the foothills of the Apennines. The Arpini may have desired to further their control of the Triolo valley.

140 Liv. 9.26.1; Diod. Sic. 19.72.8-9 for its garrison and subsequent use as a base for raiding.
Romans until it was finally stormed and captured in 314 BC. At that time it was converted to a Latin colony, with 2,500 colonists settled there to ensure future loyalty. Some of the native Samnite population of Luceria probably survived the colonial foundation and continued to inhabit the city. It is likely, therefore, that the Arpini continued to feel some hostility toward the Lucerians.

Even if the Arpini did not consider Luceria a Samnite city after its colonial re-foundation, they probably still resented Roman control of Lucerian territory. First, the Roman presence should have lessened Samnite raiding, though the ancient sources record Samnite attacks on Apulia after the deduction of Luceria. Second, the Arpini gained nothing – at least in terms of territory – from siding with the Romans, since the very city and territory over which the Arpini and Samnites had been fighting fell under the control of the Romans. In fact, the Arpini may have felt that they actually lost territory when Rome sent colonists to Luceria. Survey archaeology and aerial photography have uncovered a series of centuriation patterns around Luceria. Land to the east of Luceria retains traces of strigatio et scamnatio, the oldest Roman land division pattern, and therefore securely datable to the deduction period of the colony. This land lies directly between the urban centers of Luceria and Arpi, and it is possible that colonial lots encroached upon Arpini territorial claims. Third, even if the colonists did not encroach

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141 Liv. 9.26.1-5; Diod. Sic. 19.72.8; for the date, see MRR 1.157.

142 There is good evidence supporting the assertion that at least some natives composed the population of Latin colonies. For example, we hear of a certain Dasius of Brundisium who commanded a Roman garrison in Clastidium during the Second Punic War. Brundisium had been a colony since 244 BC; Darius was a Daunian/Iapygian name. See above, pp. 130-133.

143 Diod. Sic. 20.35.2

144 See Volpe, La Daunia 209-213; see also Map 7.
upon Arpini claims – and presumably the colonists did not make raids into the territory of Arpi – the placement of the colonial lots would have blocked potential Arpini territorial expansion. Fourth, the Arpini probably grew to resent the colony of Luceria as a sign of growing Roman hegemony at the expense of their own power. In fact, Diodorus Siculus states that the Romans used Luceria as much to control Apulia as to raid Samnium. Therefore, even after Luceria became a colony, tension between Luceria and Arpi probably continued through the third century BC, and this tension also likely encouraged Arpini resentment toward Rome.

Both Arpi’s status as a local hegemonic power and the limits placed on the exercise and expansion of that power by Rome’s domination of Italy ultimately drew the Arpini to Hannibal. The Arpini did not revolt during the Pyrrhic War, perhaps because the Samnites had sided with Pyrrhus and Arpini hostility toward the Samnites outweighed any disaffection with Rome, but in any case suggesting that in the early third century the Arpini considered their alliance with Rome as a good enough deal not to risk siding with Pyrrhus. However, by the late third century the Arpini made a different calculation. The ruling elite of Arpi may have felt that the status of their city as a hegemonic power was slipping. The deduction of the Latin colony at Luceria limited Arpi’s ability to extend its power locally, since the Latin colonists of Luceria, some of whom may have been drawn from the native Samnite population, occupied land that abutted Arpini territory. At the same time, the Latin colonists enjoyed more legal privileges vis-à-vis Rome, including the right of *conubium*, which was a means for local aristocrats to forge close ties with the

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145 Diod. Sic. 19.72.9: ajlla; kai; kata; tou’ß meta; tau`ta genomenvouß ejVwß tw`n kaq j hJma`ß crobw’v dietevlesan oJrmhthrivw/ crwvmenoi kata; tw’n plhsivon ejqpw’n.
Roman aristocracy. Hannibal may have offered Arpi the chance to expand its territory by rejecting its alliance with Rome and the imposed peaceful relations with Luceria. We do not have exact negotiations between Hannibal and the Arpini, so it is impossible to know if Hannibal made such a promise outright. However, we have already seen that the desire for power lured the Capuans to revolt, and Hannibal did promise after Trasimene that he would restore land to the Italians. In any case, an appeal to hegemony certainly would have been attractive to the Arpini. Therefore, it is plausible that Hannibal promised the power to the Arpini in return for their loyalty. Even if Hannibal did not make this promise openly, it is very likely that the Arpini figured an alliance with Hannibal was an opportunity to expand Arpi’s power. Also, although there is no direct literary evidence that Arpi acted on its hegemonic designs after revolting, numismatic suggests that the issue of hegemony weighed heavily in Arpi’s decision to revolt. During the Second Punic War, both Arpi and the much smaller city of Salapia minted coins containing the legend of each city, but otherwise identical. That Arpi and Salapia minted the same coins recalls the emission of nearly identical coins by Capua and its subordinate allies during the years of the Capuan revolt (216-211 BC) and indicates the hegemonic aspirations of the Arpini.

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146 Widespread aristocratic intermarriage linked the Capuan and Roman elite; see Liv. 23.4.7.

147 Crawford, Coinage and Money 64 and fig 19. The coins have Zeus on the obverse, a thunderbolt and boar on the reverse, legends are in Greek. Crawford remarks that the two cities are “closely linked.”

148 Afzelius, Die römische Eroberung Italians 163-4 also suggests that Salapia acted under the sway of a local hegemon but does not conclude whether the hegemon was Arpi or Canusium. The numismatic evidence makes Arpi the far more plausible choice. For Capuan coinage during the Second Punic War, see Chapter 1, pp. 58-59.
To summarize: as discussed above, it is likely that the Arpini aristocracy was divided in its loyalty to Rome. It was probably also the case that although some Arpini aristocrats were either staunchly pro-Roman or very resentful of Roman rule, many aristocrats fell in the somewhere in middle. Hannibal’s victory at Cannae gave the anti-Roman party under the leadership of Dasius Altinius the opportunity to call openly for the Arpini to overturn the current political status quo, reject their alliance with Rome, and side with Hannibal. However, Dasius still needed the support of critical mass of the Arpini aristocracy in order to secure the city for Hannibal (and presumably secure greater political power for himself). There was probably aristocratic discontent with Roman that Hannibal could exploit. However, as this section has demonstrated, neither the proximity of the battle of Cannae and Hannibal’s army, nor Hannibal’s devastation of Apulia and Rome’s inability to prevent it, nor Rome’s long-term disruption of the regional economy by founding two Latin colonies in Apulia were the decisive factors that convinced enough Arpini aristocrats to follow Dasius. Rather, the argument that probably clinched Dasius’ success was that siding with Hannibal would restore Arpi’s regional hegemony; this convinced enough Arpini aristocrats that Hannibal offered a better deal than loyalty to Rome, so that Dasius Altinius’ suggestion won out, the Arpini invited Hannibal to their city, and Arpi revolted and became Hannibal’s most powerful ally in Apulia.

2.3 The revolt of the smaller Apulian cities (216 BC)

The last section showed that Arpi revolted in 216 BC, at least in part, because the Arpini wanted to restore the regional hegemony of their city. Arpi’s revolt set off a domino effect, and many smaller cities that surrounded it, including Salapia, Herdonia, Aecae, and Ausculum, now also chose to throw off their alliances with Rome. This
section will discuss what factors were critical in convincing these smaller Apulian cities to revolt. Section 2.2 relied heavily on comparisons to Capuan politics, the negotiations between Capua and Hannibal, and the eventual Capuan revolt to shed light on the factors motivating the Arpini aristocracy to ally with Hannibal. Likewise, this section will take into account Campanian events in order to understand better why the smaller Apulian cities revolted. In particular, this section will look at the evidence for Apulia during the Second Samnites War, which suggests that there was a tendency for Arpi, Aecae, Ausculum, Salapia, and Herdonia to ally with each other. Arpi was the most powerful city in Apulia and when it sided with Hannibal the local balance of power shifted greatly against Rome. Therefore, when Arpi revolted old ties – probably ethnic and economic links as well as the reality that Arpi was closer and more powerful – emerged, and these bonds compelled the smaller Apulian cities to revolt.

Before moving on to the main analysis of this section, we must first consider two questions. First, what smaller Apulian cities in fact revolted during the Second Punic War? It is clear that Salapia, Herdonia, and Aecae revolted since the ancient sources show that they were at some point during the Second Punic War in Hannibal’s possession. The primary literary accounts are not explicit about Ausculum’s status during the Second Punic War. However, the Liber Coloniarum mentions Ausculum together with Arpi, Salapia, Herdonia, and Sipontum, stating that the territories of all four

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149 The Romans stormed Aecae in 214 BC (Liv. 24.20.8); Salapia was still under Carthaginian control, including a garrison of 500 Numidian cavalry, in 210 BC (Liv. 26.38.6-14; App. Hann. 45-47); Hannibal controlled Herdonia as late as 210 BC, when he executed a number of aristocrats for plotting to surrender to Rome and transferred the population to Metapontum and Thurii (Liv. 27.1.3-15).
cities had been divided by the same law into 200 *iugera* centuries.\(^{150}\) Moreover, Livy states that Rome confiscated Sipontum from the territory of the Arpini and founded a Roman citizen colony there in 194 BC, presumably as punishment for revolting in the Second Punic War.\(^ {151}\) It is plausible that the centuriation of Ausculum, Arpi, Salapia, Herdonia, and Sipontum mentioned in the *Liber Coloniarum* relates to confiscations after the Second Punic War, suggesting that Ausculum also revolted. Second, when did these cities revolt? The chronology is difficult to establish because the sources only discuss in detail the re-capture of these Apulian cities by the Romans, with no reference in most cases to when the cities revolted in the first place. However, we have already argued that Arpi revolted soon after the battle of Cannae, in the summer of 216 BC.\(^ {152}\) Also, Livy indicates that Herdonia also revolted soon after Hannibal’s victory at Cannae.\(^ {153}\) It is likely that all the cities in Apulia that revolted did so at around the same time in the summer of 216 BC. Now that we have established what cities revolted and when, we can consider why they chose to side with Hannibal rather than remain loyal to Rome.

The patterns of alliances in Apulia during the Second Punic War – Arpi, Salapia, Herdonia, Aecae, and (probably) Ausculum siding with Hannibal but (as will be discussed later) Canusium and Teanum Apulum siding with Rome – bear a striking resemblance to alliance patterns during the Second Samnite Wars. A significant amount


\(^{151}\) Liv. 34.45.1-3

\(^{152}\) See above, pp. 125-126.

\(^{153}\) Liv. 27.1.4
of the Second Samnite War involved Apulia since Rome attempted to encircle Samnium by making alliances with various Apulian communities. At this time Arpi welcomed an alliance with Rome as a counterbalance against Samnite aggression, and Salapia and Herdonia also concluded alliances at the same time.\textsuperscript{154} Livy states explicitly that not only Arpi but in fact “all [in the area] were friendly [to Rome], more because of injuries and their hatred of the Samnites than because of any good will of Roman people.”\textsuperscript{155} There is no direct evidence for the alignment of Aecae. However, Aecae probably did not emerge as a politically independent city until the third century, before which it functioned as an outpost of the Arpini against the Samnites. This suggests that Aecae was politically subordinate to Arpi during the fourth century and therefore probably allied with Rome along with the Arpini.\textsuperscript{156} The sources are silent concerning Ausculum during the Samnite Wars. Arpi supported the Romans during the Pyrrhic War, and though the sources do not mention the other Apulian cities specifically during this conflict, we may conjecture that Arpi’s allies also fought for Rome.\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{154} Toynbee, \textit{Hannibal’s Legacy} 1.146; Afzelius, \textit{Die römische Eroberung Italians} 163-4

\textsuperscript{155} Liv. 9.13.6: \textit{omnia pacata Samnitium magis iniuriis et odio quam beneficio ullo populi Romani.}

\textsuperscript{156} Grelle, “La daunia fra le guerre samnitarie e la guerra annibalica” in Uggeri, \textit{L’ età annibalica e la Puglia} 35-36; see also above, pp. 152-153.

\textsuperscript{157} Plut. \textit{Pyrrh.} 21.9; Dion. Hal. 20.3.2
The previous discussion can be summarized in the following chart:

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<tr>
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<td>?</td>
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<td>Ausculum</td>
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S.W. = Samnite War  
Py. W. = Pyrrhic War  
P.W. = Punic War  
X = strong evidence for alignment  
[X] = probable alignment  
* = See Toynbee, Afzelius  
? = no evidence for alignment, though suspected

Table 3: Arpi and its allies, 4th-3rd centuries BC

Table 3 calls to mind the alliance patterns of Campania (see Chapter 1, Table 1), in which members of the Capuan league tended to align together regardless of the conflict or Rome’s position in that conflict. While there is not enough evidence to support the existence of specific “leagues” in Apulia, we can demonstrate that the cities of Arpi, Salapia, Ausculum, Herdonia, and Aeae shared common bonds. Arpi and Salapia appear to have been particularly closely linked. During the Second Punic War, both Arpi and Salapia minted coins containing the legend of the respective city but otherwise identical, suggesting perhaps some sort of political association. Also, Strabo states that Salapia was the port of Arpi and that many goods, including grain, were traded between

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158 Crawford, *Coinage and Money* 64 and fig 19. Crawford remarks that the two cities were “closely linked.”
Salapia and Sipontum.\textsuperscript{159} Although the sites of ancient Salapia and Sipontum are now landlocked, modern coastline studies prove that they did have access to the sea in Roman times.\textsuperscript{160} Strabo wrote long after the Second Punic War, so his statement that Salapia was Arpi’s port may be anachronistic. However, Sipontum appears to have been in Arpini territory during the Second Punic War.\textsuperscript{161} Also, it is likely that Apulian trade in Strabo’s time continued to be conducted along similar routes and lines of communication as it had for generations. In fact, amphorae imported from Greece and datable to the fourth and third centuries BC have been found in Arpi, Salapia, and Sipontum (among other locations in Apulia), suggesting strongly that Arpi and Salapia did share economic ties by the time of the Second Punic War.\textsuperscript{162} Herdonia also may have shared economic ties to Arpi and Salapia. Most of the third century coins found in Herdonia came from Arpi, Salapia, and Teanum, with the majority minted in Arpi. Of coins found at Herdonia datable to specifically to the Hannibalic era, the greatest proportion, more than 60\%, were emissions of Arpi and Salapia.\textsuperscript{163} We have already mentioned that Aecae was probably once an Arpini outpost in the fourth century, so the city may still have maintained close

\textsuperscript{159} Strab. 6.3.9

\textsuperscript{160} For example, see Delano-Smith, “Coastal sedimentation, lagoons, and the ports of Italy,” in Blake, \textit{Papers in Italian Archaeology} I 25-33.

\textsuperscript{161} Liv. 34.45.3

\textsuperscript{162} Volpe, \textit{La Daunia} 60-62

\textsuperscript{163} Scheers, “La circolazione monetaria,” in Mertens, \textit{Herdonia} 327-28
ties with Arpi through the third century. Finally, Ausculum, Aecae, Salapia, and Arpi may have been bound together by their hostility toward the Samnites.

Even though Arpi’s allies were politically independent – that is, they do not appear to have synoecized or sacrificed local political autonomy as members of a formal league – they were almost certainly weaker than Arpi. The territory of the Salapia stretched along the coast from the border of Canusium to the location of Sipontum, originally in the territory of Arpi. It is not clear how far inland its territory ran, though it clearly straddled the Carapelle River, between the territories of Canusium and Arpi, until abutting the territory of Herdonia in the central Tavoliere. A recent study of ancient Herdonia argues that Herdonia and Salapia controlled territory of approximately the same size, with neither as extensive as Arpi or Canusium. Therefore, and both Salapia and Herdonia were probably less powerful than their neighbor Arpi. Numismatic evidence further suggests that Herdonia and Salapia were weaker than Arpi. First, as mentioned above, Arpi and Salapia minted nearly identical coins during the Second Punic War, symbolizing the close relationship between the two cities but also underscoring Arpi’s hegemony. Herdonia did not mint its own coinage in the third century, also suggesting its subordinate status. Both the small size of their territories and their relative anonymity in the sources indicate that Ausculum and Aecae were weaker states than Arpi.

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164 See above, pp. 150-151.

165 Liv. 9.13.6. Livy mentions that all in the area of Arpi were pecably disposed toward Rome because of their hostility toward the Samnites, though he does not mention other cities by name. We may conjecture that Arpi’s allies felt the same way about the Samnites.

166 Volpe, *La Daunia* 14-15 n. 17

The status of Ausculum, Salapia, Aecae, and Herdonia – subordinate allies of Arpi, bound to the Arpini by economic ties, mutual hatred of the Samnites, and perhaps even the simple fact that Arpi was close and powerful – helps explain why these cities rebelled during the Second Punic War. It is likely that Arpi took the lead among these cities in the area of foreign policy. In fact, the ancient sources imply as much since only Arpi is mentioned by name forging an alliance with Rome during the Second Samnite War and supplying troops to Rome during the Pyrrhic War. In turn, the smaller cities would tend to fall in line with the Arpini. Perhaps Ausculum, Salapia, Herdonia, and Aecae gravitated to Arpini hegemony out of self-interest, for example, as protection against the hated Samnites or because of strong economic ties, or perhaps the Arpini asserted hegemony and imposed their influence on the weaker states. In either case, when Arpi revolted during the Second Punic War, it is not surprising that its smaller allies were inclined also to revolt.

However, the decision by these cities to revolt after the battle of Cannae should not be seen as a simple round of follow-the-leader. Rather, the limited evidence we have for the internal politics of Arpi’s allies suggest the desire to revolt would not have been shared by the entire aristocracy. In fact, as we have argued earlier, even the smaller Apulian cities would have been riven by aristocratic factionalism and political rivalry. The arrival of Hannibal in Apulia, his victory over Rome, and the revolt of Arpi would have opened up new opportunities for rival aristocrats. In Salapia, for example, two aristocrats named Dasius and Blattius opposed each other not on ideological grounds but because they competed for high political honors; Blattius was loyal to Rome and was

168 Liv. 9.13.6; Plut. Pyrrh. 21.9; Dion. Hal. 20.3.2
presumably a member of the ruling elite, the political status quo, while Dasius sided with Hannibal. As long as Rome’s domination of Italy remained unchallenged, there would have been no chance for Blattius and his party to pose a political challenge to Dasius by promoting a platform of revolt from Rome. However, Hannibal’s victory at Cannae suspended Roman hegemony and Blattius the opportunity to challenge the political status quo by calling for a Salapian alliance with Hannibal. In this way, Blattius tied his own political advancement to Hannibal’s military success. Thus, after Arpi revolted Blattius probably called to mind the traditional bonds between the Salapians and the Arpini, while Hannibal’s victory and Arpi’s secession would have undermined the credibility of pro-Roman aristocrats such as Dasius. The Salapian aristocracy probably calculated that siding with Hannibal and Arpi was preferable to remaining loyal to Rome, a critical mass of aristocrats began to favor Blattius’ party over Dasius’, and Salapia threw off their allegiance to Rome. There is evidence for political factionalism in Herdonia, and we may presume that a similar process occurred there as well as in Aecae and Ausculum, for which the sources are silent.

To summarize: there is strong evidence that Ausculum, Aecae, Herdonia, and especially Salapia tended to ally together under Arpi’s hegemony because of traditional if informal mutual bonds such as economic ties, hatred and fear of the Samnites, and the fact that Arpi was powerful. Roman rule had suppressed these ties. However, Hannibal’s victory at Cannae allowed such traditional links to rise to the surface. When

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169 For Dasius and Blattius in Salapia, see Liv. 26.38; App. Hann. 45-47; see also above, pp. 128-129, 134-136.

170 For Herdonian politics, see Liv. 27.1.3-15; see also above pp. 127-128.
Arpi revolted, these cities were inclined also to revolt from Rome. We must imagine that
the aristocracies of these cities were divided in their loyalty to Rome and that strongly
anti-Roman aristocrats openly challenged the current ruling elite, presumably pro-
Roman. Hannibal’s victory and perhaps as importantly Arpi’s revolt gave the anti-
Roman movements the credibility they needed to win over enough aristocrats to further
their own power and to secure their city for Hannibal. Ultimately, the aristocracies of
Aecae, Salapia, Ausculum, and Herdonia felt a stronger allegiance to the local hegemonic
power Arpi than to Rome, or at least they were cowed by Arpi because it was powerful,
nearer than Rome, and allied with Hannibal. In either case, powerful local factors proved
decisive in compelling these cities to revolt.

2.4 Hannibal’s failure to elicit further rebellions

Arpi revolted during the Second Punic War, at least in part, because the Arpini
sought to restore their city’s regional hegemony. The smaller Apulian cities of Salapia,
Herdonia, Aecae, and Ausculum followed the lead of Arpi, their powerful ally with
whom they traditionally tended to align. This process recalls the actions of Capua and its
subordinate allies during the second Punic War, discussed in Chapter 1. However, not all
Apulian cities revolted in the summer of 216 BC; this section will discuss why these
cities remained loyal to Rome. The cities in Apulia to remain loyal to Rome fell into two
categories, Latin colonies (Luceria and Venusia) and allied Apulian cities (Canusium and
Teanum). It is not surprising that the two Latin colonies did not revolt. However, it is
harder to explain why Canusium and Teanum remained loyal, especially considering that
these cities probably faced essentially same conditions that Arpi faced. Moreover,
whereas Arpi had allied willingly with the Romans and had a history of loyalty to Rome before the Second Punic War, Canusium and Teanum were forced into the Italian confederacy. Chapter 1 demonstrated that local inter-city rivalries limited the success of the Hannibalic strategy. The Capuans joined Hannibal partly in order to extend their own power, but this strengthened the resolve of Capua’s local rivals to remain loyal to Rome.

This section will argue that Hannibal’s strategy in Apulia suffered in a similar fashion, namely that Canusium and Teanum were long-time rivals of Arpi, and when the Arpini allied with Hannibal, the people of Canusium and Teanum were more inclined to side with Rome.

Venusia and Luceria were situated at the edge of Roman Apulia and both had been Latin colonies since at least the early third century BC. Luceria straddled the boundary of Samnium and Apulia, and according to Diodorus Siculus, was one of the most noteworthy cities in Apulia. Rome’s early relationship with Luceria is difficult to disentangle, but according to Livy Rome planted a colony there soon after 314 BC. By the Third Samnite War the Romans used Luceria as a base for raiding Samnium, a precursor to Roman strategy in the Second Punic War, and the colony remained loyal throughout the third century. Venusia was situated at the intersection of the Bradano

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171 Diod. Sic. 19.72.8

Livy (9.2.1-8) records that the Lucerii were socii of the Romans as early as 321 BC; in fact, he claims it was the Roman desire to relieve a Samnite siege of Luceria that brought the legions to the Caudine Forks. Salmon, *Samnium and the Samnites* 223 doubts this account. In any case, according to Livy (9.12.9) Luceria was under, or fell under Samnite control, with the Samnites possibly even holding Roman hostages. The Romans successfully besieged Luceria with help from Arpi (Liv. 9.12.9-11, 9.13.9-12, 9.15.2-7. See also Diod. Sic. 18.44.1; Dio frag 36; Zon. 7.26). The Romans garrisoned Luceria, but the Lucerians betrayed the garrison and the Samnites recaptured the city. Finally, The Romans retook the city, and after some debate, it was decided to settle 2,500 colonists there (Liv. 9.20.1-5).

173 Liv. 10.11.13
trench and the upper Ofanto River valley, in an area known as the Melfese, on the border of Apulia, Lucania, and Samnium. Like Luceria, Venusia was a sizeable city,\(^{174}\) had been controlled by the Samnites, and was used as a bastion for Samnite raids into Apulia.\(^{175}\) Rome finally conquered and colonized it only in 291 BC.\(^{176}\) Also like Luceria, Venusia remained loyal throughout the rest of the third century BC.

It is not surprising that the two colonies remained loyal during the Second Punic War. The Latin colonists were probably comprised mostly of Roman citizens, and they enjoyed the right of *conubium*, so presumably some Lucerians and Venusians had married into Roman families. Both factors would have bound the colonists more closely to Rome. However, we have already argued in this chapter that a significant number of the colonists would have been drawn from the native population. However, it is likely that Rome punished ringleaders of the native aristocracy when the cities were finally conquered. More importantly, Rome would have worked to ensure the loyalty of any remaining native (Oscan Samnite) aristocrats who now lived alongside the other Latin colonists. In any case, the two colonies displayed remarkable loyalty despite Hannibal’s success in Apulia. For example, Livy comments on Venusia’s handsome treatment of the defeated Cannae legions.\(^{177}\) Also, in 209 BC neither Luceria nor Venusia were listed

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\(^{174}\) Dion. Hal. 17/8.5.1 records that 10,000 Venusii were killed and over 6,000 were captured in the final Roman assault, though the numbers are likely to be exaggerated; Strab. 6.1.3 comments on Venusia as a noteworthy city.

\(^{175}\) Salmon, *Samnium and the Samnites* 246-47; Marchi and Sabbatini, *Venusia* 99-100; however, Bottini, “L’area Melfese fino alla conquista romana,” in Giardina and Schiavone, *Società romana e produzione schiavistica I* 151 argues Oscan pressure stopped at the limits of Apulia in the Melfese.

\(^{176}\) See Vell. 1.14.6 for the date.

\(^{177}\) Liv. 22.14.1-3
among the twelve Latin colonies that refused to fulfil their manpower obligations, but rather were commended by the senate for their service to Rome. As we will discuss in section 5.5, Venusia and Luceria would be instrumental in Rome’s reconquest of Apulia.

It is more difficult to explain why Canusium and Teanum, two important Apulian cities, did not revolt in the wake of Cannae. Unlike Arpi and (probably) its allies, both Canusium and Teanum were forced unwilling into alliance with Rome. Indeed, both cities enter the historical record as Rome’s enemies during the Second Samnite war. According to Livy, after the disaster at the Caudine Forks, the Romans carried out military operations in Apulia, including the capture of Canusium, Teanum, and Forentum. Diodorus Siculus confirms the general picture of events, albeit with some differences in the details.

However, Salmon rejects the Roman brute subjugation of these towns as fanciful and argues that Rome’s relationship with them was instead diplomatic. Salmon’s objection is based mainly on three arguments. First, references to Roman operations in Forentum and Lucanian Nerulum should be considered implausible because Salmon placed those towns south of Venusia beyond Rome’s reach c. 320 BC. These objections do not stand up. First, recent epigraphic evidence places Forentum north of Venusia, and thus a very plausible target for a campaign around Canusium. The location is also

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178 Liv. 27.9.7, 10.7-10

179 Liv. 9.20.4-10

180 Diod. Sic. 19.10.2, 19.65.7

181 Salmon, Samnium and the Samnites 230-2

182 For the identification of Forentum-Lavello based on epigraphical evidence, see Bottini and Tagliente, Bolletino storico della Basilicata 2 (1986) 65-76.
consistent with Diodorus’ reference to Roman operations around “Ferentum,” and should be identified as the same city. Salmon did not recognize this reference and he did not have access to the archaeological evidence that places Forentum north of Venusia. Salmon’s second objection is that the obvious repetition of the conquest of Teanum in Livy’s narrative results from Livy’s failure to recognize that Teanum and Teate were the same city and calls into question Livy’s entire account of Rome’s military operations there. Various attempts have been made to explain Livy’s duplication of the conquest of Teanum, though a simple explanation may be that the author confused accounts of the same conquest from two different sources. In any case, Salmon’s argument, that the existence of two versions of Rome’s conquest of Teanum implies that there was no conquest of the city, appears strained. Salmon’s third remaining is that references to Roman military operations around Nerulum in the late fourth century BC are implausible. This is easily explained if Livy has conflated M. Iunius Brutus (cos 317) who campaigned in Apulia with C. Iunius Brutus (cos 277) who campaigned in Lucania. We may therefore reject Livy’s reference to the Roman conquest of Nerulum in the fourth century, but that need not mean also rejecting his references to the conquests of Canusium and Teanum. Indeed, both Diodorus and Livy say the Romans took hostages

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183 Diod. Sic. 19.65.7

184 For example, Russi, Miscellanea Greca e Romana 12 (1987) 93-114 thinks that one reference is to the actual foedus, and the other is to the deditio.

185 Russi, Miscellanea Greca e Romana 12 (1987) 93-114; see also Grelle, “La Daunia fra la guerre samnitiache e la guerra annibalica,” in Uggeri, L’età annibalica e la Puglia 33-5.

186 See MRR 1.155, 1.194; Salmon actually proposes this very mistake, except he, placing Forentum south of Venusia, assumes the latter Iunius Brutus was responsible also for the campaign against Forentum in 277BC.
after defeating the Teanenses and the Canusians, an act consistent with the suggestion that these cities had been subdued violently rather than through diplomacy.\textsuperscript{187} Overall, we can conclude both Teanum and Canusium (and Forentum) were initially hostile to Rome during the Second Samnite War, even if the sources exaggerate the magnitude of the Roman conquest of these two cities.

However, both Canusium and Teanum were loyal to Rome in the wake of Cannae and remained loyal throughout the Second Punic War, while Arpi, with a history of closer relations to Rome, revolted. Livy records explicitly the loyalty of Canusium, which helped shelter – albeit grudgingly – the remnants of the Roman army after Cannae. Hannibal failed to get the city to revolt in 209 BC\textsuperscript{188} and marched there in 207 BC, again with little effect, immediately preceding the Roman victory at the Metaurus.\textsuperscript{189} The disposition of Teanum is harder to evaluate since there is essentially no historical record of the city during the Second Punic War. Some scholars posit that Teanum rebelled during the war,\textsuperscript{190} based on an ambiguous passage from the \textit{Liber Coloniarum}.\textsuperscript{191} However, the narrative sources do not mention either the defection of Teanum or its recapture. Teanum was one of the most powerful cities in Apulia: the pre-urban defenses of Teanum were extensive on a scale similar to those of Arpi, with a circuit of about

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Diod. Sic. 19.10.2; Liv. 9.20.4
\item Liv. 27.12.7-8
\item Liv. 27.42.16; see also Liv. 27.47.1.
\item For example, see Grelle, “La Daunia fra la guerre samnitiche e la guerra annibalica,” in Uggeri, \textit{L’età annibalica e la Puglia} 42; Volpe, \textit{La Daunia} 40.
\item Lib. Col. 1.210.14 L: \textit{Item et Teanus Apulunus iter populo non debetur.}
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
suggesting that Teanum like Arpi had been a powerful Iron Age settlement; Teanum maintained a large territory in the third century BC, which stretched from the middle of Fortore River basin north to the border of Larinum, east to the coastline near the Lago di Lesino and the Lago di Vesano, and along the Gargano, south along the Candelaro to the border of Arpi and the Triolo, and west to the foothills of the Apennines; in fact, Teanum controlled directly the rural vicus of Gereonium, located near the modern-day Masseria Finocchito. It is unlikely that the revolt and recapture of such an important city would go unnoticed in the sources. Moreover, Strabo states that the territory of Teanum had been devastated by Hannibal. While the confusing description of Apulian geography presented by Strabo renders this passage problematic, the geographer implies Teanum remained loyal to Rome. The ambiguity of Liber Coloniarum passage does not allow any conclusions about the loyalty of Teanum. In

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192 Greco, Magna Grecia 192, 259

193 Volpe, La Daunia 14 n. 17; Russi, Teanum Apulum 197-214.

194 For Gereonium as a vicus of Teanum, see above, pp. 144-146.

195 Strab. 6.3.11

196 However, this may refer to devastation before the battle of Canne and therefore tell us nothing about Teanum’s disposition after the Italian allies began to break away from Rome.

197 The exact text is as follows: Item et Teanum Apulus. Iter populo non debetur. It is likely that Item refers to land divisions mentioned in the previous passage, Lib. Col. 1.210.10-13: Item et Herdonia, Ausculinus, Arpanus, Salapinus, et quae circa montem Garganum sunt, centurii quadratis in iugera n. CC., lege Sempronia et Iulia. Kardo in meridianum, decumanus in orientem. Therefore, the territory of Teanum was divided into 200 iugera centuries. However, contra Volpe, La Daunia 220-221, et al., the passage does not necessarily imply that Teanum was centuriated at the same time or under the same law as Arpi and the other Apulian cities. In fact, the fact that Teanum was mentioned in a separate passage may suggest that the city was not mulcted of territory at the same time Arpi and the other cities were. This raises the question of when the Romans did mulct Teanum of territory. However, we have already shown (see above, pp. 53-55 ) that the Romans conquered Teanum in the late the fourth century. It is likely that any Roman confiscations took place then. Ultimately, the Liber Coloniarum alone cannot provide enough evidence to justify the inclusion of Tenaum in the ranks of the rebellious cities during the Second Punic War.
light of the lack of positive evidence that Teanum revolted, it is more plausible to conclude Teanum remained loyal to Rome during the Second Punic War.

Gereonium, a vicus of Teanum, also remained loyal. Hannibal tempted the village to switch sides, then besieged it, and finally massacred the population. Gereonium remained loyal in face of Hannibal’s army apparently with no Roman garrison present. The remarkable loyalty of Gereonium may also reflect upon the loyalty of the Teanenses, though this suggestion is certainly not conclusive.

According to the preceding discussion, the alignment of Apulian cities during the Second Punic War is very similar to alliance patterns during the Second Samnite Wars, which can be summarized in the following table:

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<tr>
<td>Gereonium</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>X*</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canusium</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Forentum**</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cannae</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>X*</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venusia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>LC</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luceria</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>LC</td>
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</table>

S.W. = Samnite War      P.W. = Punic War
X = strong evidence for alignment
[X] = probable alignment
? = no evidence for alignment, though suspected
LC = Latin Colony
* = destroyed before Cannae ** = see discussion below, pp 178-179

Table 4: Apulian Alliance Patterns, 4th-3rd centuries BC

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198 Pol. 3.100.1-5; Liv. 22.23.9; App. Hann. 15; contra Liv. 22.18.7, which should be rejected.
The consistency of the alliance in patterns among Apulian cities in both the Second Samnite War and the Second Punic War is reminiscent of the alliance patterns in Campania in the fourth and third centuries BC and suggests that there may have been inter-city rivalries and hostilities between the local hegemonic power Arpi and a number of the neighboring Apulian communities. In fact, we argued in the last section that there was probably some sort of tension between the Arpini and the Lucerians that was rooted in Samnite-Apulian hostility and that survived into the third century. As we suggested above, while it is not surprising that the Latin colonies of Venusia and Luceria did not revolt during the Second Punic War, it is more difficult to account for the loyalty of Teanum and Canusium. I suggest that local inter-city rivalries – Arpi v. Teanum and Arpi v. Canusium – influenced the policies of the Teanenses and the Canusians and ultimately contributed to their decision not to revolt in the Second Punic War.

The rivalry between Teanum and Arpi may have been rooted in traditional Samnite-Apulian hostilities combined with the fact that both Teanum and Arpi were powerful cities whose territorial interests would have come into conflict. Volpe argues that Teanum Apulum was a regional hegemonic power, and a strong case can be made that it was a powerful city. As noted above, Teanum had massive defensive works in the late Iron Age the extent of which rivaled Arpi’s defenses and in the third century controlled a broad territory. The territory of Teanum abutted that of the Arpini. It is likely that the Teanum-Arpi relationship was similar to the Luceria-Arpi rivalry, with the Arpini frustrated by their inability to extend their territory in the direction of the

199 Volpe, La Daunia 40
Teanenses. There is another similarity between the Teanum-Arpi relationship and the Luceria-Arpi relationship. Although Teanum originally was of Daunian/Iapygian foundation, it became Oscanized by the fourth century BC. It is likely that Teanum succumbed to Samnite pressure, and this is consistent with the fact that Oscanized Teanum entered the Second Samnite War on the side of the Samnites, against Rome and its Apulian allies (including Arpi). It is not surprising, therefore, in light of the traditional hostility between the Samnites and Apulians, that Teanum and Arpi would have shared mutual hostility.

After Rome conquered Teanum during the Second Samnite War, the Romans punished the Teanenses aristocracy. We know that the Teanenses were forced to give hostages, and it is possible the Romans also tried or executed staunchly anti-Roman aristocrats. However, Rome probably also installed in power aristocratic families loyal to the Romans, or at least worked to forge bonds of loyalty and obligation between the Teanenses elite and Rome. Finally, perhaps the Teanenses recognized that their alliance with Rome protected them from Arpini aggression. In any case, Rome relied on the loyalty of the local elite to maintain hegemony over Teanum. Hannibal’s victories in the early stages of the Second Punic War and Rome’s inability to prevent Hannibal from devastating Teanenses territory and destroying their vicus Gereonium must have put a strain on Teanum’s loyalty. However, as discussed above, Teanum and Arpi probably

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200 Russi, Teanum Apulum: Le inscrizioni e la storia del municipio 2-3. Russi suggests that the double name, Teate-Teanum, reflects the oscanization process. Teate was the Iapygian name, while Teanum (Oscan Teianud) is the Samnite name.

201 See above, pp. 152-155 for Apulian-Samnite hostilities.

202 Diod. Sic. 19.10.2; Liv. 9.20.4
shared mutual hostility. When Arpi and its allies sided with Hannibal, the Teanenses may have suspected that the alliance posed an immediate threat to their interests, and they would have been more inclined to remain loyal to Rome. This is comparable to the disposition of cities in Campania, in which the Capuo-Hannibalic alliance drove a number of Capua’s rivals more firmly into the Roman camp. Despite the lack of direct evidence for the Teanenses’ decision-making, the historical tendency for Teanum and Arpi to oppose each other, the evidence for Samnite-Apulian hostility, and comparisons to Campania suggest that the Arpi-Teanum rivalry influenced the Teanenses’ decision to remain loyal to Rome.

Canusium is perhaps a more interesting case because there is more ancient evidence with regards to the Canusians attitudes in the summer of 216 BC. In fact, the evidence suggests that Canusium was not uniformly pro-Roman in the days following the battle of Cannae. After their stunning defeat the remnants from the Roman army, numbering in the thousands, began to gather in Venusia and Canusium. The defeated Romans were treated quite differently depending on the city. Varro and four thousand survivors were treated with great hospitality in Venusia. They received clothes and food, presumably from aristocratic families. However, according to Livy, at least as many survivors arrived in Canusium yet received a chilly reception from the locals. Had it not been for the generosity of a local aristocratic woman named Busa, the Romans would not have received food at Canusium. Livy’s account is likely to be over-dramatic but still

\[203\] See Chapter 1, especially pp. 86-95.

\[204\] Pol. 3.116.13; Liv.22.49.13-4, 22.52.4-7, 22.54.1-6; see HCP 1.440.
reveals certain reluctance on the part of the Canusian elite in welcoming the Roman survivors. Like Teanum, Canusium did not enter into alliance with Rome willingly in the fourth century, and the Romans certainly punished the Canusian elite after initial conquest. Presumably the Romans also forged bonds of loyalty and obligation with the Canusian elite who ruled after Roman conquest. Finally, Roman rule in Canusium relied at least in part on cooperation on the part of the local elite. It is not surprising that some discontent on the part of the Canusians emerged after the battle of Cannae and Hannibal’s devastation undermined Roman credibility. Rather, the obvious question is why discontent and anti-Roman feelings did not become manifest in a full-blown revolt.

In part, the Roman response in the weeks after Cannae may have been crucial in suppressing any potential Canusian revolt. First, the Roman decision to gather the remnants of the Cannae legions at Canusium may have had the effect of bolstering the local pro-Roman aristocracy. Despite Varro’s handsome treatment in Venusia, the consul decided to unite the Cannae legions at Canusium. Later, M. Claudius Marcellus was hurried to Canusium to take over command of those troops. Canusium was a very large city with impressive defensive walls that could more easily withstand a siege, and fear of a follow-up attack by Hannibal certainly influenced the Roman decision to regroup at Canusium. However, Varro’s decision to muster in Canusium may also

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205 Liv. 22.50.11-12, 52.4-7; see also above, pp. 137-139.

206 The Romans took hostages from Canusium, as they did from Teanum; see Liv. 9.20.4; Diod. Sic. 19.10.2.

207 Liv. 22.52.7, 22.54.1-6, 22.57.7-8

208 Strab. 6.3.9 for the walls of Canusium. Hannibal was still nearby as the Romans regrouped, and Varro could have expected a follow-up attack by the Carthaginians.
have been designed to check any faltering loyalty in the closest allied city to the battle.\textsuperscript{209} Whatever the reason for the decision to move the troops to Canusium, their effect was probably the suppression of any potential revolt. Second, the Romans may have promised honors or other rewards to the Canusian elite in order to maintain their loyalty.\textsuperscript{210} This is consistent with Roman actions in Nola, in Campania. Although the Nolani ultimately sided with Rome, their loyalty wavered and they actually carried out negotiations with Hannibal. In response the Romans maintained a garrison either in or near Nola, and they promised money and political honors to members of the Nolani elite in order to guarantee their loyalty.\textsuperscript{211}

However, if the comparison between Nola and Canusium is appropriate then another question presents itself – why did the Canusians allow Rome the chance to bolster their loyalty? That is, as we argued in Chapter 1, Rome would not have had the chance to place a garrison in Nola or to bribe the Nolani aristocracy if they had revolted immediately after Cannae (or at least after immediately after Hannibal entered Campania and before Rome responded). Only Nola’s hesitance to revolt gave Rome the chance to shore up its position vis-à-vis the Nolani elite.\textsuperscript{212} Similarly, the remnants of the Cannae legions and any promises of honors and rewards made by Roman commanders to the Canusian aristocracy could have suppressed potential revolt only once the Canusians

\textsuperscript{209} De Sanctis, \textit{Storia dei Romani} 3.2.202 also suggests that the decision of Varro helped secure the loyalty of Canusium.

\textsuperscript{210} In fact, after the war the Roman senate voted honors for Busa (Liv. 22.52.7); is is likely that the Roman magistrates in command in Canusium made public promises of the sorts of rewards local aristocrats could expect in return for their loyalty to Rome.

\textsuperscript{211} See Chapter 1, pp. 80-86.

\textsuperscript{212} See Chapter 1, pp. 86-87.
allowed the Romans to enter their city. Indeed, as noted above, Canusium was well defended by strong defensive works, and the defeated Cannae legions were certainly in no position to besiege Canusium.\textsuperscript{213} Therefore, we must ask why Canusium did not revolt immediately after Cannae, as had Arpi and its allies, and closed its gates to the Cannae legions.

If we refer once more to Table 4 and the associated discussion and consider the historical alignment of Apulian cities, we will observe that Canusium tended to oppose Arpi, suggested that Canusium (like Teanum) maintained a long-standing rivalry with Arpi. The basis of the Canusium-Arpi rivalry does not appear to have been rooted in the traditional mutual hostility between Samnites and Apulians. Despite the fact that at least one of the prominent Canusian families may have been Oscan,\textsuperscript{214} indicating some Samnite influence in Canusium, archaeological evidence suggests that Canusium was of Daunian foundation and that the city resisted Oscanization.\textsuperscript{215} Even if Samnite-Apulian hostility was a consideration, certainly other factors contributed to the Canusium-Arpi rivalry.

Most importantly, Canusium was also a powerful city and probably a rival for local hegemony with Arpi. By the third century BC Canusium was probably the second most important city in Apulia. In fact, Strabo states that Canusium and Arpi were once

\textsuperscript{213} See above, p. 176 n. 208.

\textsuperscript{214} Busa was an Oscan name; see Liv. 22.52.7; Val. Max. 4.8.2; see also “Busa,” \textit{RE} 5.1072-73.

\textsuperscript{215} That Canusium was originally a Daunian settlement, see Plin. \textit{N.H.} 3.104; for the suggestion that the city remained Daunian and therefore did not succumb to Oscan-Samnite pressure, see Bottini, “L’area malfese fino alla conquista romana, “ in Giardina and Sciavone, \textit{Società romana e produzione schiavistica I} 151; Torelli, “Historical and archaeological aspects of the Romanization of Daunia,” in \textit{Studies in the Romanization of Italy} 141-43; see also Greco, \textit{Magna Grecia} 249-264.
the largest cities in Apulia.\textsuperscript{216} The territory of Canusium was sizeable, though not as extensive as Arpi’s. To the northeast Canusium controlled the *vicus* of Cannae.\textsuperscript{217} It is more difficult to determine is the western limit of the territory. Volpe suggests the territory of Canusium straddled the Ofanto River, from the coast inland to the territory of Venusia. This is consistent with Strabo’s statement that that Canusium maintained an emporium on the Ofanto. Volpe also argues that the small settlement at Lavello, only a few kilometers from Venusia, declined after the Roman foundation of that same colony, and probably came under the direct control of Canusium during the third century.\textsuperscript{218} Recently the site of Lavello has been identified as the ancient site of Forentum, conquered by the Romans after 320 BC.\textsuperscript{219} Thus, by the Second Punic War Canusium would have dominated as far as Forentum as a local hegemonic power. Overall, there is general agreement that Arpi and Canusium were the most dominant cities in northern Apulia.\textsuperscript{220}

I suggest that Canusium’s status as a powerful city contributed to its rivalry with Arpi, and this rivalry limited the effectiveness of the Hannibalic strategy in Apulia. The

\textsuperscript{216} Strab. 6.3.9

\textsuperscript{217} Strab. 6.3.9; Liv. 22.43.10, 22.49.13; Flor. 2.6.15 ; App. Hann. 3 imply or refer specifically to Cannae as a *vicus*. Pol. 3.107.2 refers to Cannae as a polis. For the archaeological evidence, see De Juliiis, *Bibliografia topografica della colonizzazione greca in Italia* 4 (1985) 135ff; De Paolo and Labellarte, *Profili della Daunia antica* I 101-31; for a summary of the debate, Grelle, “La Daunia fra la guerre samnitiche e la guerra annibalica,” in Uggeri, *L’età annibilica e la Puglia* 40-41; Ashby and Gardner, *PBSR* 8 (1912) 156.

\textsuperscript{218} Volpe, *La Daunia* 29; Strab. 6.3.9

\textsuperscript{219} For the identification of Forentum-Lavello, based on epigraphical evidence, see Bottini and Tagliente, *Bolletino storico della Basilicata* 2 (1986) 65-76; for the Roman conquest of Forentum, see Liv. 9.20.9; Diod. Sic. 19.65.7.

\textsuperscript{220} For example, see Grelle, *Canosa Romana* 22-24; Volpe, *La Daunia* 28-29.
two cities probably competed for regional hegemony in northern Apulia. Arpi was the more powerful of the two cities, and the alliance of Arpi and its allies with Hannibal must have frightened the Canusians. That is, the people of Canusium may have figured that the Arpini-Hannibalic alliance threatened to their own territorial interests; this is consistent with the concerns of Capua’s local rivals after the Capuans allied with Hannibal.\textsuperscript{221} Moreover, unlike Arpi, Canusium seems to have benefited from Rome’s increased presence in Apulia, since the settlement of Forentum came under the dominion of Canusium after the deduction of a Roman colony of Venusia.\textsuperscript{222} These two factors, Canusian mistrust of Arpi and the fact that Canusium probably gained territory under Roman hegemony, probably made the Canusian elite more inclined to remain loyal to Rome and thus limited the degree of aristocratic discontent in the wake of Cannae. As a result, pro-Roman aristocrats maintained control of Canusium and allowed the remnants of the Roman army to enter the city. From this point, Canusium remained securely in the Roman camp.

To conclude: by the end of 216 BC, northern Apulia was divided in its loyalties. Hannibal’s strategy had been relatively successful. After smashing the Romans at Cannae, he quickly gained Arpi, the most powerful city in Apulia, as well as a number of Arpi’s less powerful allies, including Herdonia, Salapia, Aecae, and probably Ausculum. Hannibal controlled central Daunia, and could hope to have use of the port of Salapia. However, the combination of local factors combined with Rome’s military response in

\textsuperscript{221} See Chapter 1, especially pp. 88-95.
\textsuperscript{222} See above, pp. 180-181.
defeat ultimately limited the effectiveness of the Hannibalic strategy. Most importantly, allying with Arpi, the local hegemonic power, likely compelled its rivals Teanum and Canusium to remain loyal. In the case of Teanum, traditional Apulian-Samnite hostility probably contributed to the Teanenses mistrust of the Arpini. Meanwhile, Arpi and Canusium were probably rivals for local hegemony. Moreover, the placement of a Roman garrison in Canusium shored up local support and guaranteed loyalty. Finally, two Latin colonies, Luceria and Venusia, remained steadfast in their loyalty to Rome. Thus, Arpi and its satellites were more or less surrounded by Roman allies, and Rome still controlled most of the major lines of communication to Arpi. As we will see in the next section, this allowed Rome to slowly reconquer the cities of Apulia.

2.5 Long-term failure of the Hannibalic strategy in Apulia

It was not the case that Hannibal’s strategy – to defeat the Romans in pitched battles, and shatter the Roman alliance system in the guise of a Hellenistic liberator – was unsuccessful in Apulia. Rather it was simply not successful enough; Hannibal was not able to secure the loyalty of all Roman allies in northern Apulia. Since the Romans were able to control strategic cities and Latin colonies, Hannibal was forced to defend his new allies. For the next two years Rome consolidated its power in Apulia and began to take back smaller Apulian cities that had revolted. The Romans also used their base in Luceria to raid into Samnium. By 213 BC, the Romans managed to re-conquer Arpi, and it was proved that Hannibal could not defend even his most powerful ally in Apulia. This section will trace Rome’s reconquest of Apulia from 215 to 210 BC, during which time long-term Roman strategic advantages came to the fore. Also, the following analysis will show clearly that local aristocrats were not drawn to Hannibal for ideological reasons but
rather were bound to him only as long as he was successful and they perceived that associating with him furthered their own interests. Thus, when Hannibal’s fortunes began to decline, the loyalty of aristocrats in Apulian cities allied with him began to crumble.

The Romans kept a large number of troops stationed in Apulia between 216 and 214 BC; they were able to pressure Hannibal’s allies in both Samnium and Apulia and show that Hannibal could not defend the cities that sided with him. It is difficult to disentangle the exact location of Roman forces at the end of 216 BC, but for the following year (215 BC) Rome appears to have been more confident in the loyalty of Canusium. Livy reveals that the Cannae legions had been led out of Apulia to the Claudian camp near Suesulla and were then sent to Sicily for the remainder of the war. The two legions in Sicily were conveyed to Italy, and thence to Apulia under the praeter M. Valerius Laevinus. This army replaced C. Merentius Varro’s army, perhaps the legion of marines stationed in Ostia at the beginning of 216 BC, which was sent to Tarentum. Varro was commissioned to levy troops in Picenum. Livy later reports that Laevinus made his camp near Luceria. Laevinus appears to have avoided campaigning in Apulia, though one may speculate that he foraged in Hannibal’s allies’ territory. But the praeter did not remain dormant the entire summer. Livy states that he raided into Samnium, storming a few small Samnite villages. Undoubtedly Livy exaggerates the magnitude of the raids, recording that 5000 captives and a great amount of plunder were

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223 Liv. 23.31.1-6, 23.32.1-2, 23.32.16-8; see De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* 32.2.238-9; Lazenby, *Hannibal’s War* 92-3

224 Liv. 23.33.5
carried back to Luceria. However, Livy’s statement that Samnite ringleaders were beheaded is plausible.

The following spring (214 BC) brought to light the difficulty Hannibal would face in protecting his various allies. When the Romans took up winter quarters the previous fall, they sent two legions under Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus to Luceria, and moved the two legions under Laevinus to Brundisium.226 The Romans, therefore, began slowly to encircle Apulia with armies. Meanwhile, Hannibal could not defend his Apulian allies because he was compelled to break winter quarters and return to Capua at the request of Campanian envoys.227 But Hannibal did not leave the Apulians unguarded. Over the winter Gracchus’ troops had skirmished with Hannibal’s.228 These were probably clashes between foraging parties; with Hannibal gone, the Romans would have been able to devastate and pillage unchecked, especially the territory of the Arpini. Therefore, Hannibal left large garrisons to protect his allies. For example, Livy reports that the Carthaginian garrison in Arpi was 5000 strong in 213 BC.229 With Arpi strongly garrisoned, the Romans focused on retaking its satellite allies. Q. Fabius Maximus (the younger), operating again out of Luceria, took Aecae by storm. He also seems to have

225 Liv. 23.37.12-3

226 Liv. 23.48.3

227 Liv. 24.12.1-3. The Romans had levied an extraordinary number of legions for the year, and the Campani feared a siege of Capua. Indeed, Livy states explicitly that Hannibal hastened from Arpi to Capua.227

228 Liv. 24.3.16-7

229 Liv. 24.46.1-2. Hannibal spent the campaign season away from Apulia, then returned and wintered in Salapia in 214/213 BC. It is most plausible, therefore, that Hannibal left the garrison in Arpi in 214 BC. Perhaps his decision to winter in Salapia in indicates Hannibal’s concern that he would overburden an ally which had already supported a large garrison for the year.

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campaigned near Herdonia.\textsuperscript{230} Livy states that he fortified a permanent camp near Herdonia,\textsuperscript{231} but does not say if Fabius (younger) attacked the city. Herdonia was still under Hannibal’s control in 210 BC, so Fabius probably did not capture the city. The Romans certainly succeeded, however, in pillaging the territory of Herdonia. Also, while the sources are silent on Ausculum, it has already been shown that Ausculum probably sided with Hannibal. If Fabius (younger) had retaken Aecae and campaigned in the vicinity of Herdonia, it seems probable that Ausculum had fallen by this date as well.

Hannibal returned to Apulia late in 214 BC after concluding a disappointing campaign season. Livy’s account of Hannibal’s exact route is rather confused, but a few important details are worth noting. Hannibal had spent at least part of 214 BC trying to gain access to the important port of Tarentum, but failed.\textsuperscript{232} Either before he wintered, or perhaps on the way to Salapia, he sent his cavalry to round up horses and cattle from Apulia and the Sallentine peninsula.\textsuperscript{233} Finally, he decided to winter in Salapia. According to Livy the area afforded him good forage,\textsuperscript{234} though he may have wanted to make a show of strength to the Apulians who, to this point, had only witnessed Roman success in the area.

\textsuperscript{230} Liv. 24.20.8, 24.19.5. Livy states that Fabius Maximus (senior) advanced into Samnium and captured a number towns, and proceeded to take Blanda in Lucania and Aecae in Apulia by storm. He also states that Fabius (younger) captured Acuca. At the very least it would appear Livy has conflated the two Fabii, and that the conquest of Aecae belongs to the son, nearer whose camp the city lay. Acuca may or may not be a mistake for Aecae, otherwise nothing is known about Acuca.

\textsuperscript{231} Liv. 24.20.8

\textsuperscript{232} Liv. 24.17.8, 24.20.9-15

\textsuperscript{233} Liv. 24.20.15-6

\textsuperscript{234} Liv. 24.25.15
In fact, the following year (213 BC) the Romans stepped up their war effort in Apulia by assigning four legions to the region, and the combination of Rome’s military strength and Hannibal’s failure to protect his allies wore down the resolve of his most important ally, Arpi. Two legions, under M. Aemilius Lepidus, were stationed at the Roman camp in Luceria. Livy vaguely reports that another two legions under Q. Fabius Maximus (younger) were sent to “Apulia,” probably to be stationed at the permanent camp “near Herdonia.” Before Fabius reached his camp and while Hannibal was still stationed in Salapia, the Romans were approached by an aristocrat from Arpi, Dasius Altinius, with an offer to betray the city. After the Roman command council debated, it was decided to arrest Dasius and deport him to Cales.

The Dasius episode illuminates the difficulties Hannibal faced in maintaining allied loyalty and the local conditions that undermined his overall strategy. Both ancient accounts agree that Dasius Altinius was from an old, aristocratic family, the sort of family that likely exercised power since the first contact between Arpi and Rome. After Cannae it had been Dasius who had convinced the Arpini elite to side with Hannibal; Dasius likely did not act alone but represented a party of aristocrats who saw personal advantage and the chance for political power in siding with Hannibal. So long as Hannibal had the loyalty of the elite, or at least enough of them, he could control the city.

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235 Liv. 24.44.1-2. However, Liv. 24.46.1 states that Fabius left from Suessula to press the siege of Arpi. Since his province was Apulia, it is clear that he had not yet reached his province, and was still making his way to his camp in Apulia when confronted by Dasius.

236 For events to follow, see Liv. 24.45.1-47.11; App. Hann. 31. According to Appian, Dasius approached the Roman senate and was driven from the city to become a wander. This version is less plausible. However, Dasius may have been on the way to Rome, when he approached the Roman camp in Suessula. That he approached Fabius in Suessula is consistent with his deportation to Cales.

237 See above, pp. 133-137.
But Hannibal’s inability to protect his allies in Apulia clearly lowered his credibility in the eyes the local aristocracy. Both Appian and Livy state explicitly that Carthaginian reverses and the apparent revitalization of Rome led Dasius to consider a second betrayal. The arrival of a second Roman army permanently camp nearby would have underscored Roman power. We may also guess that Hannibal’s garrison, although meant to hold the city and probably to bolster his aristocratic allies, may have generated resentment among the Arpini citizenry.

If there was resentment toward the Carthaginians, Hannibal worsened it in his handling the Dasius affair. The disappearance of Dasius caused a stir among the Arpini, and after a search failed to turn up the leading citizen, messengers were sent to inform Hannibal. It is not clear who warned Hannibal, but Livy’s account implies it was the Arpini themselves. Livy is explicit in stating that they warned Hannibal because they feared a rebellion. Clearly the aristocracy was still divided, with at least some local elite still in support of Hannibal. Other pro-Carthaginians, such as Dasius, were losing their resolve, while there must have been some pro-Roman elite in the city. Hannibal investigated the matter personally, then ordered members of Dasius’ immediate family to be burnt alive. Livy claims the executions were a ruse to obscure Hannibal’s designs to confiscate Dasius’ property. This is clearly hostility in the Roman source; the act was

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238 Liv. 24.45.3, App. Hann. 31

239 Indeed, when Fabius later entered Arpi, the citizenry turned on the garrison; see Liv. 24.47.7.

240 Liv. 24.45.11

241 Liv. 24.45.12-4; App. Hann. 31
meant to deter other aristocrats from rebellion. One suspects, however, that the executions further undermined the Carthaginian position.242

In the mean time, Fabius struck out for Apulia, moved his camp close to Arpi, and began to invest the city.243 Dasius’ defection gave the Romans hope they could avoid a prolonged siege, and instead gain access to the city through betrayal. Instead, the Romans were able to penetrate one of the city gates at night. The next day the Romans entered the city in force, confronted by the Arpini, and behind them the Carthaginian garrison. The Carthaginians had arranged the forces as such because they further suspected rebellion.244 By this point, though, the Carthaginians were completely discredited. After the Romans and Arpini parlayed, the citizens brought out the chief magistrate of the city – presumably he had been a supporter of Hannibal – and after further negotiations, the Arpini turned on Carthaginians. Perhaps more shocking is the fact that the Spanish contingent of the garrison also came over to the Romans.245 Thus, the failure of Hannibal to defend his allies undermined his credibility in the eyes of not only the Italians, but even of some of his own troops. The fate of the Carthaginian troops is less clear. Livy claims they were allowed to return to Hannibal in Salapia, while Appian reports they were massacred.246 Although Livy downplays any Roman violence,247 it must have been

242 De Sanctis Storia dei Romani 3.2.262-63
243 Liv. 24.46.1-2
244 Liv. 24.47.2
245 Liv. 24.47.4-9
246 Liv. 24.47.9-11, App. Hann. 31
247 Liv. 24.47.10
the case that the most prominent supporters among the Arpini aristocracy were punished, and Appian records that a Roman garrison was stationed in the city.\textsuperscript{248}

To summarize: the fall of Arpi, and the precious details it preserves regarding local politics, shows clearly that the local elite was motivated by personal gain, and not by abstract notions of loyalty to Rome or promises of “freedom” from Hannibal. Their loyalty to either Rome or Hannibal shifted based on the immediate circumstances of war. Hannibal constantly needed to bolster the loyalty of the local elite, either by the carrot or the stick, because their loyalty was not tied to any greater ideology. When Hannibal failed to show that he could offer the Arpini elite a better deal, his standing in the city crumbled.

The capture of Arpi of was a major victory for the Romans,\textsuperscript{249} and it essentially broke Carthaginian power in Apulia. Hannibal still had control of Salapia and Herdonia, both in the Carapelle valley. But Hannibal would spend little time in Apulia for the remainder of the war, focusing his attention instead on Tarentum, Capua, and other theatres of the war. The Romans, however, continued to station troops in Apulia, and by 210 BC Hannibal held no city in northern Apulia.

Subsequently Hannibal made only brief appearances in Apulia. Hannibal may have entered Apulia in 212 BC. According to Livy, Hannibal pursued one of the Roman consuls from Capua into Lucania, defeated another Roman force there, then swept into

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{248} App. \textit{Hann.} 31

\textsuperscript{249} Liv. 26.41.15 ascribes to Scipio a speech in 210 to veteran troops, in which Scipio compares the victory over Arpi to the capture of Capua and Syracuse.
\end{footnotesize}
Apulia and crushed a Roman force operating near Herdonia. The historicity of the so-called First Battle of Herdonia is questionable because 1] the details of the battle are very similar to second battle near Herdonia reported by Livy; 2] the similarity of the commanders’ names; and 3] the silence of sources corroborating Livy’s account of the first battle. For the present purpose, it does not matter whether the episode was historical or not. If the battle did not occur, then Hannibal did not show himself in Apulia during the 212 BC campaign season. Even if the first battle is historical, Hannibal’s decision to enter Lucania and Apulia was clearly meant to relieve the siege of Capua. The following year, Hannibal was again compelled to relieve the siege of Capua, this time by marching on Rome. After surprise attack in the vicinity of Rome failed to elicit the appropriate response, Hannibal retreated through Samnium, then marched rapidly through Apulia, Lucania, and Bruttium to Rhegium. Once again, he made a brief appearance in Apulia, and his purpose was not to bolster his allies there.

250 Liv. 25.19.6-17, 25.20.5-7, 26.25.1-10

251 For the second battle, see Liv. 27.1.3-15; App. Hann. 48. De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 3.2.444-7 and n.28 argues that the episode has been duplicated; MRR 1.271 n. 2 and Lazenby, Hannibal’s Legacy114 argue both battles are historical. All are in agreement that at least the second battle of Herdonia is historical.

252 Liv. 25.19.1-8, 25.20.1, 25.20.5. Hannibal probably felt that he could not relieve the siege directly, but lure the Romans away from Capua if he attacked elsewhere. For this interpretation, see Lazenby, Hannibal’s Legacy 114.

253 See Chapter 1, pp. 110-111.

254 Pol. 9.7.9-10; Liv. 26.12.1-2. Hannibal was avoiding the Roman forces concentrated in Campania. See De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 3.2.329: De Sanctis doubts that Hannibal could have made such a long circuit, and instead proposes that he marched not to Apulia/Daunia, but through Lucania to Rhegium. This would still support my point that Hannibal was essentially invisible in Apulia.
Only in 210 BC did Hannibal return to Apulia for any length of time. De Sanctis suggests that Hannibal was concerned with holding the Carapelle-Sele line and protecting his allies south of that line, and therefore moved his army toward Apulia. But Hannibal must also have suspected that his neglect had weakened the resolve of his allies, and his visit was a show of strength. However, in the only remaining two pro-Carthaginian cities (Salapia and Herdonia), Hannibal had already begun to lose the support of the aristocracy. In Salapia, Hannibal had capitalized on a political rivalry to gain the allegiance of a party of the local elite through which he controlled the city. But Hannibal’s absence from Apulia and the string of Roman victories weakened the position of the pro-Carthaginian elite, and provided an opportunity for their political opponents to seek out Roman assistance. Dasius, the head of the pro-Carthaginian party, warned Hannibal that another aristocrat, Blattius, sought to betray the city from Rome. Hannibal investigated the matter, but assumed the allegations were the product of personal political hostility, and lacked substance. Hannibal’s inaction further discredited Dasius and the pro-Carthaginian elite, and Blattius’ party was able to betray the city to Marcellus.

255 Liv. 26.28.5-13, 26.29.1-10, 27.1.1. It is not clear where Hannibal had wintered in 211/210 BC, though, as we have seen, he operated in Bruttium late in 211 BC. By summer 210 BC, Hannibal had probably worked his way back at least as far as Lucania. The consul Marcellus was assigned the war with Hannibal as his province, and was later active in Samnium. The Romans also maintained two legions in Apulia. The disposition of troops, especially Marcellus’, suggest that Hannibal was either in Lucania or Apulia.

256 De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 3.2.443

257 Liv. 26.38.1-2; Pol. 9.26.2 Livy states that Hannibal feared the fall of Capua had greatly discredited him in the eyes of his Italian allies, and that he could not afford to leave garrisons in every city.

258 Liv. 26.38; App. Hann. 45-47; also see above, pp. 128-129, 134-136, 165-166.
The situation was similar in Herdonia. Messengers informed Hannibal that loyalty in the city was wavering because of the loss of Salapia and reports that Hannibal had quit Apulia and abandoned his allies there. The Carthaginian cause was further challenged when the Roman praetor Fulvius moved his camp close Herdonia, in order to win the city by betrayal. Fulvius himself had received reports that the loyalty of the city was in doubt, presumably from pro-Roman factions within the walls. Hannibal made a forced march to Herdonia and caught Fulvius off guard, destroying the Roman army. After the battle, Hannibal conducted investigations, and executed the ringleaders of the potential revolt. But Hannibal still doubted he could maintain the loyalty of the city, so he took the extreme step of destroying Herdonia and removing the population to Metapontum and Thurii.

In both cases, Hannibal held the cities through the loyalty of a party of the elite. These local aristocrats, however, sided with Hannibal more because of personal interest than because of abstract notions such as “loyalty to Hannibal” or the desire for “Italian freedom.” The sources show clearly that in the case of Salapia, the arrival of Hannibal was an opportunity for a personal political rivalry to play out. When Hannibal no longer appeared a profitable option, the loyalty of his aristocratic allies weakened, and the scales tipped in favor of Rome.

By the end of 210 BC, Hannibal had to admit defeat in Apulia. Hannibal did march into Apulia a few more times, and even tested the resolve of the Apulian cities. In spring 209 BC Hannibal tried to tempt Canusium to revolt, but retreated quickly when

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259 For events surrounding Herdonia in 210 BC, see Liv. 27.1.1-15; App. Hann. 48. For the historicity of the multiple accounts of the battle of Herdonia, see above, pp. 190-191.
Marcellus emerged from winter quarters and marched into the vicinity. In 208 BC Hannibal retreated into Apulia, where he ambushed and killed Marcellus. Hannibal tried to use Marcellus ring to gain access to Salapia. However, the townsmen knew of the ruse, and trapped a number of Hannibal’s men within the gates. Hannibal retreated in defeat. Finally, Hannibal marched again into Apulia in 207 BC, in the vicinity of Canusium. He was probably on his way to join forces with his brother, but when news of the battle of the Metaurus River reached Hannibal, the Carthaginian retreated from Apulia for good. Thus, after the fall of Salapia and destruction of Herdonia in 210 BC the Apulian cities remained firmly in the Roman camp.

The preceding analysis has shown that local conditions undermined the effectiveness of the Hannibalic strategy in Apulia in the wake of the battle of Cannae. That is not to say that Hannibal was not successful. Indeed, after Cannae Hannibal was able to play of allied disaffection, local political rivalries, and regional hegemonic interests to convince most of the northern Apulian cities to revolt. However, in the critical days after Cannae, it was these same local forces that prevented Hannibal from taking Teanum Apulum and Canusium. That is, although their loyalty at times may have

260 Liv. 27.12.7-8. Marcellus may have been wintered near Venusia, and he would be in 208 (Liv. 27.22.2). The proximity of the Roman army should have squelched any possible chance of revolt, though at this stage it seems unlikely Hannibal seriously threatened the loyalty of the town.

261 Liv. 27.28.1-13; App. Hann. 51. In both accounts there is no mention of a Roman garrison. Thus, Hannibal was discredited in the eyes of the Salapians. As the ancient accounts indicate, the Salapians probably feared retribution from Hannibal for betraying him. But even if that was not the case, the townsmen had no reason to believe that Hannibal could protect them if they went over to him a second time.

262 Liv. 27.41.1-42.17, 27.51.12-3. For an attempt to make sense of Hannibal’s movements before the battle of the Metaurus, see Lazenby, Hannibal’s War 184-86.
wavered, these two cities remained loyal to Rome in part because of their traditional rivalry with and fear of Arpi.

Hannibal’s incomplete success in the days after Cannae gave Rome the chance to utilize its long-term strategic advantages, especially its manpower reservoir that let the Romans fight keep the pressure on Hannibal’s allies in more than one theatre. Meanwhile, Hannibal could not defend all of his allies in multiple theatres. Thus, after the initial shock of Cannae, the Romans began to pick off the cities that revolted to Hannibal. Although Aecae (and probably Ausculum) was stormed, the other cities were betrayed when the local elite grew dissatisfied with Hannibal. This dissatisfaction should not be confused with the notion that local aristocrats were particularly loyal to Rome, or felt an ethnic bond with the Romans over the Carthaginians. It was simply that Hannibal failed to provide the local aristocrats with the better deal they perceived that he had offered in the first place.

Finally, the conclusions drawn in this chapter are consistent with the analysis and conclusions presented in Chapter 1; in fact, the better-documented case study of Campania has been used comparatively to shed light on Apulia during the Second Punic War.
CHAPTER 3

WESTERN MAGNA GRAECIA AND THE BRUTTII

3.1 Introduction

Hannibal should have expected to find widespread support in southern Italy. Ancient Bruttium as well as the cities of western Magna Graecia\(^1\) were among Rome’s most recent conquests and they had yet to be fully pacified. Moreover, there was precedent for successfully fostering rebellion in southern Italy: Pyrrhus was able to win over the southern Italic tribes and most of the Greek cities along the Ionian coast after inflicting military defeat upon Roman armies in the field. The campaign of Pyrrhus provides a suggestive parallel to Hannibal’s campaign, since Hannibal did, in fact, manage to bring most of the Mezzogiorno over to his side. This chapter will examine the implementation and relative success of Hannibal’s strategy in Bruttium and among the Greek cities of western Magna Graecia, including Locri, Croton, and Rhegium. In the wake of Cannae many of the Bruttii revolted, and by 215 BC Hannibal had secured most of the Greek cities in Bruttium – Rhegium remained the only city in Magna Graecia loyal to Rome.

\(^1\) For the purposes of this chapter, western Magna Graecia corresponds roughly to the Greek cities on the coast of the region of ancient Bruttium (modern Calabria, the “toe” of Italy), stretching approximately from the boundary of Laös (but not including Laös) to the boundary of Thurii (but not including Thurii); see Strab. 6.1.5-12.
However, despite this early success, Hannibal’s strategy ultimately failed in Magna Graecia. Lomas suggests that the failure of Hannibal in Magna Graecia was not in taking cities, but in his inability to hold territory that he had captured. While this is true, it verges on tautology and does not really explain Hannibal’s failure in the south – that is, why Hannibal even needed to defend conquered territory for an extended period of time. Instead, a better explanation is that Hannibal was never able to gain enough allies at one time – to pry enough cities from alliance with Rome – to bring Rome to its knees. In the immediate aftermath of Cannae no Italiote Greek city came over to Hannibal’s side, and as late as 214 BC, Hannibal had secured the loyalty of only the Greek cities on the coast of Bruttium, except for Rhegium. By the time Hannibal made significant inroads in eastern Magna Graecia and captured Tarentum – though not its citadel – the tide of the war was already turning against him. Moreover, Hannibal never secured Rhegium and this city would contribute to his long-term strategic failure in Bruttium. Therefore, Hannibal’s failure in western Magna Graecia is not only a question of what drove Rome’s allies in the south to rebel but also what factors slowed and limited his success.

The hesitance of the Greeks to revolt must have been, in part, because of their mistrust of and hostility toward the neighboring Italic peoples who quickly allied with Hannibal. However, as this chapter will demonstrate, although all of the Italiote cities in

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2 Lomas, *Rome and the Western Greeks* 63-4

3 I will use “Italiote” to refer to the Greek cities in southern Italy, “Italiotes” to the Greeks who inhabited southern Italy.

4 For eastern Magna Graecia, see Chapter 4.

western Magna Graecia felt hostility toward the Bruttii and Lucanians, some ultimately revolted and sided with Hannibal. This suggests that other factors were at work in limiting the effectiveness of the Hannibalic strategy in this region. Ciaceri argued that most of the defections after Cannae occurred in areas nearest Hannibal’s armies, while the Italiotes remained well disposed toward Rome because Roman rule was mild. Thus, according to Ciaceri, Hannibal only made headway when he brought force directly against cities and when the Romans failed to respond with adequate garrison protection. However, the Petelians held out for eleven months and endured legendary deprivation, despite lack of a Roman garrison and word from the senate that no Roman aid would arrive. De Sanctis asserted that Greek discontent lay in a sense of Hellenism: the Italiotes desired liberty and a return to past glory. The Italiotes also recognized that Roman domination in Italy was built on the Italian alliance system, in which Greek cities did not fully take part. Thus, according to De Sanctis, the Italiotes felt they did not benefit from Roman victory as did the Italian allies. This position presupposes that the Greeks wanted to be more integrated into the Roman-Italian system, a problematic position.

More recently, Lomas has suggested that the decisions of Italiote cities to stay loyal to Rome or to revolt, and thus the failure of Hannibal in southern Italy, were bound

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7 Pol. 7.1.3; Liv. 23.20.4-10, 23.30.1-5; App. Hann. 29; Front. Strat. 4.5.18; Val. Max. 6.6.2; Sil. Ital. 12.431-2; see also Walbank 2.30-1, De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* 3.2.264-6.

8 De Sanctis, *Storia Dei Romani* 3.2.264-6

9 Indeed, Toynbee suggests that in some cases, with the so-called *socii navales*, it was better not to be more integrated in the Roman system; that is, the military burden of a *socius navaalis* was less than the burden of a state under a full *foedus*. See Toynbee, *Hannibal’s Legacy* 1.261. More recently, Mouritsen, *Italian Unification* 39-58 has questioned the notion that any Italian state was driven to be integrated into the Roman system.
up local issues rather than global concerns.\textsuperscript{10} The suggestion is attractive, but Lomas undermined its position by then arguing that the Italiote league\textsuperscript{11} was at the core of the revolt of the Greek cities.\textsuperscript{12} Thus, Lomas essentially sees the revolt of Greek cities in Magna Graecia as a pan-Italiote decision. The chronology of events argues against this position – Tarentum was the hegemon of the league and did not revolt until 213 BC,\textsuperscript{13} by that point the Italiote cities in Bruttium had already sided with Hannibal. However, Lomas’ initial idea has merit, and local conditions did play an important role in shaping the course of the Second Punic War in Magna Graecia. Internal political divisions and longstanding rivalries and mistrust – both Greek-Italic and Greek-Greek – undermined Hannibal’s strategy and delayed the acquisition of allies in southern Italy after his victory at Cannae.

This chapter will examine in detail the local rivalries that shaped the course of the Second Punic War in western Magna Graecia and Bruttium. Hostility between coastal

\textsuperscript{10} Lomas, \textit{Rome and the Western Greeks} 59-76 for a general discussion of Magna Graecia in the Second Punic War.

\textsuperscript{11} The Italiote league was a league of Greek cities in Italy, formed in the sixth century BC and modeled after the Achean league. The league had a central treasury, a central meeting place, and regular meetings by the member states. The league was originally under the hegemony of Croton, however in the fourth century league hegemony passed to Tarentum. It is not clear how many Italian cities belonged to the league, and league membership varied over time. However most Italian Greek cities probably belonged to league; see, Lomas, \textit{Rome and the Western Greeks} 32-7. Its relevance to the present argument is that the league was a pan-Italiote institution.

\textsuperscript{12} Lomas, \textit{Rome and the Western Greeks} (London 1993) 61: “It is notable that the cities which defected most readily to Hannibal, and which supported him the longest, included Tarentum, Thurii, Croton, Locri, and Metapontum, all of which were leading members of the Italiote League in the fourth century. With the exception of Rhegium, the cities which remained loyal to Rome were those of Campania and northern Lucania, which were less involved with the Italiote League, as far as is known. This may imply that the core of the revolt centred on the League.”

\textsuperscript{13} That Tarentum was the hegemon of the Italiote league from the fourth century, see Brauer, \textit{Taras} 53-6; Lomas, \textit{Rome and the Western Greeks} 35; Wuilleumier, \textit{Tarente} 62-71. A more detailed discussion is presented in Chapter 4, pp. 258-259.
Greeks and inland Italic peoples including the Bruttii and Lucanians limited the effectiveness of the Hannibalic strategy. Thus, even after Cannae Hannibal did not immediately win over any western Italiote cities in part because he had allied with many of the Bruttian communities. This chapter will also demonstrate that Hannibal’s strategy was undermined by rivalries within ethnic groups. For example, although he gained the support of most of the Bruttii soon after his victory at Cannae, he was forced to divert resources in order to capture the recalcitrant Bruttian cities Petelia and Consentia, whose hesitance to join Hannibal was rooted in their hostility toward the less urbanized Bruttians. A more problematic rivalry existed between Rhegium and Locri. Hannibal would eventually win over Locri, in part because the Locrians recognized that Hannibal offered them a means to extend local hegemony. However, Locri and Rhegium had a longstanding rivalry, and the Locrian-Hannibalic treaty further confirmed the loyalty of the people of Rhegium to Rome. Rhegium would provide the Romans a base for both land and sea operations and would be instrumental in Rome’s reconquest of Bruttium and the western Italiote cities.

3.2 Hannibalic Success among the Bruttii (216-215 BC)

Soon after Hannibal’s victory at the battle of Cannae, most of the Bruttii revolted and joined forces with the Carthaginians. However, some Bruttian communities – in fact, the two most important cities, Petelia and Consentia – remained loyal to Rome. Hannibal sent a large portion of his army under the command of Hanno into Bruttium in order to secure the remaining Bruttian communities and to win over the coastal Greek communities. However, it would take another year to capture Petelia and Consentia.
This section will outline the capture of Petelia and Consentia, focusing on the reasons why these communities held out longer.

After Cannae, Hannibal waited a few days in Apulia and then proceeded to Samnium; there he gained the loyalty of Compsa as the pro-Roman aristocracy fled the city. At this point, Hannibal divided his forces and marched into Campania, sending part of his army with Mago to secure the loyalty of any remaining pro-Roman settlements in among the Samnites.\(^{14}\) Thence Mago marched into Bruttium to encourage rebellion there, and finally he returned to Carthage and reported Hannibal’s victories to the Carthaginian senate. In the meantime, Hanno took over operations in Bruttium.\(^{15}\) Cannae was fought on August 2, 216 BC according to the Roman calendar, which likely equates to about July 1 according to the solar year.\(^{16}\) Therefore, Carthaginian forces are not likely to have reached Bruttium until August. Their first order of business was to capture the two Bruttian towns remaining in the Roman camp, Consentia and Petelia. The steadfast loyalty of the two cities reveals the inaccuracy of Livy’s claim that all the Bruttii revolted immediately after Cannae\(^{17}\) and raises the question why they had not revolted. Petelia and Consentia were the two most important Bruttian population centers. According to Strabo, Consentia was the chief city of the Bruttian league, which had

\(^{14}\) Liv. 23.1.1-5

\(^{15}\) Liv. 23.11.7, 23.43.6, 23.46.8, 24.1.1, 23.30.1 (where Livy mistakes Himilco for Hanno); App. Hann.29. See De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* 3.2.204 n. 13, suggesting that Himilco was a lieutenant of Hanno.

\(^{16}\) For arguments that the Roman calendar was running ahead of the solar calendar, see Appendix A.

\(^{17}\) Liv. 22.61.11-2
formed in the middle of the fourth century BC. Strabo also mentions that Petelia was an important city, even down to his own time. The Bruttian league sided with Pyrrhus, was defeated by Rome, and appears to have entered into an alliance with Rome by about 270 BC. The terms of the Roman peace were harsh, and this must have generated disaffection among the Bruttii.

It is likely that the Roman senate would have carried out diplomacy in Bruttium by seeking recognizable political forms. That is, Rome would have been most comfortable treating with urbanized population centers, equivalent in Roman eyes to the *polis/civitas*. Consentia and Petelia were the most urbanized population centers in Bruttium. It has already been noted that Strabo considered Consentia and Petelia important cities. Both Livy and Appian mention walls surrounding Petelia, and the city was surrounded by farms, implying the importance of cereal-culture. Bruttian towns began to mint coins during the third century BC, and Petelia in particular minted a large

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18 Strab. 6.1.5; Diod. Sic. 16.15.1-2; Just. 23.1.3-5; Liv. 24.4.4 implies the existence of a Bruttian League and the importance of Consentia; Lomas, *Rome and the Western Greeks* 56-7 assumes the Bruttian League survived until the Hannibalic War. See Guzzo, in Tagliente, *Italici in Magna Grecia: Lingua* 87-92 and in Hackens, Holloway, and Holloway, *Crossroads of the Mediterranean* 191-246, both articles downplaying the level of organization of the Bruttian League and suggesting that the Bruttii remained in general un-urbanized; see also Arslan, *Monetazione aurea ed argentea dei Brettii*.

19 Strab. 6.1.3

20 De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* 22.399-400; see also MRR 1.189-199, recording Roman campaigns in Bruttium in 282, 278, 277, 276, 273, 272, and 269 BC, with the last triumph over the Bruttii recorded for 272 BC.

21 Dion. Hal. 20.15.1 states that the Bruttii were compelled to give half of their land to the Romans. The passage not only indicates the severity of the settlement, but also implies that the existence of a Bruttian league.

22 Liv. 23.20.10, 23.30.4; App. *Hann.* 29
number of coins datable to the Second Punic War.\textsuperscript{23} In general, the Bruttii remained relatively un-urbanized;\textsuperscript{24} however, the building of city wall, the reliance on cereal-culture, and the minting of coinage indicate that Petelia (certainly) and Consentia (very likely) adopted characteristics of Hellenized cities, and this may have engendered hostility among less urbanized Bruttii.\textsuperscript{25} This is consistent with the literary evidence: Livy records that Petelia was besieged not only by the Carthaginians, but also by other Bruttii angry with the Petelini for siding with Rome.\textsuperscript{26}

If one follows Livy, after Rome rebuffed the Petelinian appeal for a Roman garrison, the ruling class of Petelia splintered into a number of factions, as some proposed to flee, some proposed to side with Hannibal, and some argued for remaining loyal to Rome. The depiction is probably overly schematized – indeed, Livy’s description of the pro-Roman group as \textit{optimates} who did not make decisions \textit{raptim} or \textit{timere} smacks of literary embellishment. Still, it is plausible that Petelini aristocracy was greatly divided, with varying levels of support for Rome, and that the arrival of Carthaginian troops in the area brought to the surface long-standing political divisions. After defeating Bruttium during the Pyrrhic War, Rome presumably placed pro-Roman aristocratic families in

\textsuperscript{23} Crawford, \textit{Coinage and Money under the Roman Republic} 66-9; Guzzo, “Lucanians, Brettians, in Hackens, Holloway, and Holloway, \textit{Crossroads of the Mediterranean} 226-28; Arslan, \textit{Monetazione aurea ed argentea dei Brettii} 41-9; some scholars would push back the dates of Bruttian emissions, for example see Caltabiano, \textit{Una città del sud tra Roma e Annibale}; Head, \textit{Historia Numorum} 90-114.

\textsuperscript{24} See above, p. 202 n. 18.

\textsuperscript{25} So De Sanctis, \textit{Storia dei Romanii} 3\textsuperscript{2}.2.204, 204 n. 12, arguing that Petelia’s proximity to Croton was one factor in its Hellenization. Bruttian coins bearing either tribal or city names had legends in Greek, and Greek inscriptions – including one listing Italic names from Petelia – discovered in Bruttian settlements support the idea that, by the outbreak of the Second Punic War, some Bruttian communities were becoming increasingly Hellenized. See Guzzo, in Hackens, Holloway, and Holloway, \textit{Crossroads of the Mediterranean} 227-9.

\textsuperscript{26} Liv. 23.20.4
charge of Consentia and Petelia, possibly executing or exiling members of the local elite who sided with Pyrrhus. Pro-Roman factions in Consentia and Petelia would have benefited from Roman rule, and the decision by the pro-Roman Petelini to endure an eleven-month siege may indicate the degree to which their power derived from collusion with Rome.

After the fall of Petelia, in the early summer or late spring 215 BC, the Carthaginians advanced to Consentia, which fell in a few days, according to Livy. There are no detailed accounts of the internal politics of Consentia, but we may surmise the context was similar to that of Petelia, with loyalties among the elite divided. However, Consentia appears to have switched sides a couple of times in during the Second Punic War, perhaps indicating that the resolve of the local elite was never as strong as it was at Petelia. By the summer of 215 BC, the people of Consentia had witnessed the results of the siege of Petelia and knew what fate awaited those who resisted the Carthaginians. There had yet been no significant Roman victory in Italy, and the Roman senate had abandoned its Bruttian allies while garrisoning at least one of the

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27 The earliest date for the fall of Petelia would be mid-May, counting inclusively eleven months plus allowing two weeks from the battle of Cannae [August 2, 216 BC (Roman) = c. July 1, 216 BC (solar)] for Hanno to march to Petelia and conduct any negotiations before the siege. Consentia fell in a few days, or sometime in late May at the earliest. We will approximate that Petelia fell about June 1 and Consentia fell sometime in early June, to allow for any delays Hanno might have encountered. See the chronological discussion below for a more detailed analysis.

28 Liv. 23.30.5

29 Restored to Rome in 214 or 213 BC (Liv. 25.1.2), under Carthaginian control in 206 BC (Liv. 28.11.12-13), and recaptured by Rome in 204 or 203 BC (Liv. 29.38.1, 30.19.10; App. Hann. 56). De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 3\(^2\).2.263 n. 133 accepts that Consentia was captured briefly by Rome in the middle years of the war.
Greek cities in Bruttium.30 From this perspective a pro-Roman stance in the face of a Carthaginian siege would have proven less popular; there was no protracted siege, as Consentia fell to the Carthaginians with relative ease.

To summarize: siding with Hannibal was an attractive option for many Bruttii because of the harshness of the settlement that followed Roman conquest. There also appears to have been rivalries among the various Bruttian communities. From 270 BC onward Rome probably favored the urban centers of Petelia and Consentia: Rome probably carried out any diplomacy through the ruling classes in these cities, and Petelian and Consentian aristocrats may have perceived that their power and influence had been enhanced by collusion with Rome. This situation created, or at least exacerbated, hostility between the less urbanized Bruttians and those who inhabited Petelia and Consentia. This made the less urbanized Bruttii all the more willing to side with Hannibal. However, since the aristocrats of Petelia and Consentia to some degree saw their power tied to Rome, they were more steadfast in their loyalty. Thus, Hanno was compelled to force Petelia to join Hannibal. The fall of Petelia in turn convinced Consentia to join Hannibal.

3.3 The revolt of Locri and its subordinate allies (215 BC)

After securing the last of the Bruttian settlements, the Carthaginians were able to turn their sights on the Greek cities of Bruttium. By the end of the year every Greek city in Bruttium except Rhegium had fallen to the Carthaginians. It is difficult to establish the

30 Locri (Liv. 24.1.9) seems to have contained a Roman garrison from the earliest stages of the war; Rhegium (Liv. 24.1.10-13) may have had a garrison from the outbreak of the war, though Livy’s narrative shows the Roman garrison arriving after the fall of Locri. There is no direct evidence that Croton was garrisoned, though Lomas, Rome and the Western Greeks 65 assumes all three cities were garrisoned at the same time.
chronology of these campaigns from surviving literary accounts – Polybius is fragmentary, Livy appears to have repeated certain episodes, and Appian glosses over many events. However, the Carthaginian attack on Croton and Locri and subsequent Greek-Carthaginian-Bruttian negotiations are described in relative detail. The events reveal clearly the problems Hannibal faced in trying to navigate the complex matrix of local alliances and rivalries.

Immediately following the capture of Consentia and Petelia, Carthaginian forces moved against the Greek cities of Bruttium, attacking first Rhegium then Locri. Polybius records that the siege of Petelia lasted eleven months, and this date is followed by Frontinus; Livy mentions an unspecified number of months. Walbank argues that the siege would have ended the summer of 215 BC, perhaps in September. But Walbank’s suggestion would be difficult to reconcile with Livy’s claim that Carthaginian forces landed at Locri, which fell after Petelia, then marched to Hannibal in Campania, and finally returned to Bruttium by the end of the campaign season. In fact, Livy claims the reinforcements landed at Locri before the fall of the city and compelled the Locrians to close their city to the Romans and side with Hannibal; he then claims the same

31 Pol. 7.1.3; Liv. 23.14, 23.20, 23.30, 24.1; Front. Strat. 4.5.18; see also Val. Max. 6.6; Sil. Ital. 12.431-2.

32 Walbank 2.30-1. Walbank assumes that a couple of months passed from the battle at Cannae until the investment on Petelia and that the Roman calendar was in line with the solar calendar.

33 If the siege ended in September it would be difficult to fit all events subsequent into the campaign season. If Locri fell a few weeks after Petelia, then the reinforcements could not have arrived until late September or early October. Hanno would not have reached Hannibal with the reinforcements until mid or late October, and he would not have returned to Bruttium until November (?). It is not likely that the Carthaginians would have been conducting operations this late in the year. However, the battle of Trebia was fought in mid-January. Also, the climate in southern Italy was relatively mild, which would have allowed the Carthaginians to operate later in the season. Still, even if we allow that the Roman calendar was running early, it is difficult to fit all events into the campaign season.
reinforcements returned to Bruttium and were used to help capture Locri. Moreover, in Book 23, the fall of Croton precedes the surrender of Locri, while in Book 24 the order is reversed. This account as it stands makes no sense, and it is clear that Livy has duplicated some events and anticipated in Book 23 the rebellion of Locri in Book 24.

There is a plausible reconstruction of events. If we accept the eleven-month reference as correct, then the earliest Petelia could have fallen counting inclusively is May 215 BC (if the calendar were running off, as we have argued) or June 215 BC (if Cannae occurred on August 2 of the solar year). Petelia preceded Locri, and if events followed in short order, then we may estimate that Locri fell at the earliest in June (or July, if the calendar was accurate). Next, the Carthaginian reinforcements arrived after the fall of the Locri, perhaps also June or early July (July or early August). Marcellus’ attacked on Samnium in the summer of 215 BC drew complaints from Hannibal’s Samnite allies. This would have occurred about the same time Locri fell and the

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34 Liv. 23.41.10-12, 23.43.5-6, 23.46.8, 24.1.1-10

35 Liv. 23.30.6-8, 24.2.1-3.15

36 Since we are forced to estimate the date for most of these events, whether or not the calendar was running early will not make a great deal of difference.

37 Livy’s account (24.1.2) of the Locrians hastily bringing in grain and other goods into the city from the fields also better fits an early date for the city’s capture. If Hanno attacked the city in late summer or early fall, then we would have to suppose that the Locrians knew that Carthaginian forces had been operating in the area and yet took no steps to prepare for a siege until much later.

38 This is consistent with the terms of the Carthaginian-Locrian treaty, which guaranteed the Carthaginians access to the city but left the port under the control of the Locrians (Liv. 24.1.13). The Carthaginians may have known the fleet with reinforcements was on the way, and informed the Locrians of their desire to land at Locri. Since the Carthaginians did not yet possess a major port, the Locrians were in a possession to bargain. By controlling the port, the Locrians guaranteed that the Carthaginians would not maintain a permanent naval presence that could potentially strain Locrian resources, as later happened in Tarentum (Liv. 26.20.7-11).

39 Liv. 23.41.13-23.42.1
Carthaginian reinforcements arrived in Italy. Hanno marched to Campania in mid- or late-summer to help Hannibal with the assault of Nola. After the assault failed, as Hannibal moved to winter quarters in Apulia,⁴⁰ Hanno returned to Bruttium with the reinforcements, perhaps in the fall of 215 BC. Livy also records that first Rhegium then Locri were attacked by Hanno upon his return to Bruttium.⁴¹ Of course Locri had already fallen, but it is possible that the attack on Rhegium did occur late in 215 BC.⁴² Finally, Croton surrendered to the Carthaginians some time after Locri capitulated. It is possible that Croton did not fall until Hanno returned to Bruttium in the fall – in fact, this fits the details of the Livy’s narrative in Book 24.2-3, as the Bruttii attacked Croton on their own and were forced to ask for Hanno’s assistance when they could not capture the formidable citadel.⁴³

⁴⁰ Liv. 23.45.8

⁴¹ Liv. 24.1.1

⁴² It is also possible that the attack on Locri belongs before the fall of Locri, during the summer. In either case Liv. 24.1.1 must be modified.

⁴³ Liv. 24.3.9-11. See below, especially pp. 229-230, for a more complete discussion.
This can be summarized in the following chart:\textsuperscript{44}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 1 (August 2), 216</td>
<td>Cannae</td>
<td>App. Hann. 29, Pol. 7.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-June (June-July), 215</td>
<td>Petelia falls after 11-month siege</td>
<td>App. Hann. 29, Pol. 7.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer 215</td>
<td>Locri surrenders</td>
<td>Liv. 24.1.1-13, 23.30.8, 23.41.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reinforcements land</td>
<td>Liv. 23.41.10-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marcellus attacks Samnium</td>
<td>Liv. 23.41.13-23.42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late Summer 215</td>
<td>Hannibal attacks Nola with</td>
<td>Liv. 23.43.5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reinforcements from Locri</td>
<td>Liv. 23.43.5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bruttii attack Croton (?)</td>
<td>Liv. 24.2.1-11, 24.3.9-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fall 215</td>
<td>Hannibal to winter quarters (Arpi)</td>
<td>Liv. 23.46.8, 24.1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fall-Winter 215/214</td>
<td>Hanno returns to Bruttium</td>
<td>Liv. 24.3.10-15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dates in parenthesis assume the Roman calendar was synchronized with the Solar calendar.

Table 5: Chronology of 215 BC

With the chronology established, it is possible to discuss the implementation of the Hannibalic strategy in Bruttium and the local factors that limited its success. After Cannae, Locri did not immediately break its alliance with Rome, and as late as the summer of 215 BC the city remained loyal to Rome. In part the loyalty of Locri resulted from Carthaginian-Bruttian diplomatic relations. Livy states explicitly that the Greeks in Bruttium remained loyal to Rome because they knew that the Bruttii, toward whom they long felt animosity, had sided with Hannibal.\textsuperscript{45} Later the Locrians refused to treat with the

\textsuperscript{44} Compare to the chronology in De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 3\textsuperscript{2}.2.665, placing the fall of Croton, Locri, and Caulonia early in the summer of 215 and before the arrival of the reinforcements.

\textsuperscript{45} Liv. 24.1.1
Bruttii out of mistrust and entered negotiations only when the Carthaginians appeared.⁴⁶ Ultimately, the Locrians struck a treaty with the Carthaginians, and Livy’s account makes it clear that the Bruttii were excluded from the final deal.⁴⁷ Longstanding hostility and mistrust between the Greeks and the Bruttii is well attested in the literary evidence: for example, the Bruttii attacked Sybaris,⁴⁸ captured the Locrian colony of Hipponium,⁴⁹ and overran the Greek settlement of Laös and Tempsa/Temesa,⁵⁰ all fitting a general pattern of expansion by Oscan-Italic peoples into Magna Graecia from the fifth through third centuries.⁵¹ Locrian fear in 216-5 BC appears to have been well founded, as Hannibal’s Bruttian allies expressed disappointment at not having sacked Rhegium or Locri and initiated the attack on Croton.⁵² Livy’s description of events implies that the Bruttii expected to gain plunder or territory by siding with Hannibal, and it is possible that Hannibal made such promises in order to secure Bruttian loyalty.

Anti-Bruttian sentiment was not the sole factor contributing to Locrian reluctance to side with Hannibal. First, there was also a Roman garrison quartered in the city.⁵³ Second, the Carthaginians had already attacked coastal territories that either were Locrian

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⁴⁶ Liv. 24.1.5-6
⁴⁷ Liv. 24.1.13-24.2.1
⁴⁸ Diod. 12.22.1
⁴⁹ Diod. 21.8.1; Strab. 6.1.5
⁵⁰ Strab. 6.1.5
⁵¹ For example, see Lomas, Rome and the Western Greeks 30-49; Frederiksen, Campania 134-40; Toynbee, Hannibal’s Legacy 93-100; Salmon, The Making of Roman Italy 6-16; Adamesteanu, in Descoeudres, Greek Colonists and Native Populations 143-150; Guzzo, in Carratelli, The Greek World 559-62; Small and Buck, The Excavations of San Giovanni di Ruoti 1. 23-26.
⁵² Liv. 24.2.1-3
possessions, or were closely associated with Locri. This certainly would have made the Locrians suspicious of Carthaginians motives and confirmed their loyalty to Rome. Finally, the loyalty of the local elite, or at least the loyalty of enough of them, was critical to Rome’s control of Locri. At one point Livy states that when Locri rebelled, it was betrayed by the leading citizens (a principibus), but later details reveal a far more complex scenario. During negotiations with the Carthaginians, three main groups appear: those who wished to remain loyal, those who wanted to ally with Hannibal, and a third swing group, whose opinions were swayed by the capture of their relatives. After Locri’s ultimate surrender to Rome in 205 BC, Scipio ordered those who had been guilty of sedition to be killed, and their property confiscated and turned over to the loyal Locrians. When Locri first fell to Carthaginian forces, a number of Locrians fled to loyal Rhegium, and the Roman garrison was able to negotiate an escape before capture by Hanno. It is clear that Locrian loyalty to Rome was mixed, that some Locrian aristocrats remained loyal to Rome, and that Rome relied on the loyalty of Locrian aristocrats to keep the city within Roman hegemony.

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53 Liv. 24.1.9

54 Liv. 21.51.3-6. According to Strabo (6.1.5), the Locrians founded Hipponium; the city fell to the Bruttii in the mid-fourth century, but it may have remained under Locrian influence. See discussion below, pp. 216-219.

55 Liv. 23.30.8

56 Liv. 24.1.7-8. The picture is also certainly oversimplified, but likely reflects the range of opinions as to the best response to Carthaginian overtures.

57 Liv. 29.8.2

58 Liv. 24.1.9-10, 29.6.5-6
It is likely that political rivalry among the Locrian elite predated its expression in the Hannibalic War, going back to the time of the Pyrrhus’s incursion into Italy if not earlier. At that time, a Roman garrison was quartered in Locri, and Toynbee suggests that the garrison came at the invitation of the Locrians.\(^59\) Locri betrayed the Roman garrison and allied with Pyrrhus only to betray the Pyrrhic garrison to the Romans.\(^60\) Finally, Pyrrhus retook the city briefly and executed any Locrians who had opposed his plans.\(^61\) The wavering nature of Locrian loyalty, at different times inviting garrisons both from Pyrrhus and also Rome into the city, and the fact that Pyrrhus singled out individuals for punishment near the end of the war suggest that the Locrian aristocracy was divided politically. Presumably some aristocrats sought to further their own power through Roman backing, while others figured Pyrrhus to be a means to political advantage. Pyrrhus killed Locrians who opposed him, and we can surmise that Rome likewise punished aristocratic families who supported alliance with Pyrrhus and subsequently either promoted surviving loyal aristocratic families or installed new pro-Roman aristocrats, into positions of power.\(^62\)

This is consistent with Livy’s description of Locrian politics during the Hannibalic War. Consider again Livy’s account of tripartite division of the Locrian

\(^{59}\)Just. 18.1.9; Toynbee, *Hannibal’s Legacy* 1.260; see also Beloch, *Römische Geschichte* 461

\(^{60}\) App. *Sann*. 12.1; Just. 18.1.9, 18.2.12; Zon. 8.6. Appian claims the Locrians massacred the Pyrrhic garrison because they committed abuses.

\(^{61}\) Zon. 8.6; App. *Sann*. 12.1. Appian claims that Pyrrhus retook the city violently and sacked it, in response to the massacre of his garrison.

\(^{62}\) At the very least, those aristocrats in power after Rome captured Locri would have known enough to remain loyal, lest they suffer the consequences of disloyalty.
Livy refers to the pro-Hannibalic party with scorn, calling them fickle and claiming that they sought not only a new alliance but also revolution (*laevissimus quisque novas res novamque societatem mallent*). Looking beyond the obvious invective, it is clear that the pro-Hannibal party in the assembly tied a foreign policy decision (siding with Hannibal) to political change. Livy again describes the decision to side with Hannibal in terms of political rivalry in his description of the Locrian exiles in Rhegium. Livy records that at least some of the exiles were aristocrats (*ab Locrensium principibus*) and that a rival faction drove them out of Locri and allied with Hannibal (*pulsi ab adversa factione, quae Hannibali Locros tradiderat*). The whole account suggests that some Locrians saw their political fortunes linked to an alliance with Hannibal, presumably at the expense of aristocrats supported by Rome who sought to remain loyal. Scipio’s settlement in Locri – with the ringleaders of Locrian sedition executed, and their property given to pro-Roman aristocrats – would have been similar to the post-Pyrrhic settlement imposed by Rome.

It was critical for Hannibal to play on those political divisions in order to gain possession of Locri. While anti-Roman sentiment existed in Locri when Hannibal invaded Italy, the fact that Locri did not immediately rebel shows that pro-Roman sentiment held sway. Indeed, the Locrians had supported Rome since the post-Pyrrhic settlement. For example the city was one of the few specifically mentioned supplying

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63 Liv. 24.1.7-8; the situation recalls the political divisions in Capua, which entailed a vocal pro-Roman party cautioning against rebellion, a vocal anti-Roman party promoting rebellion, and a large group of “swing voters;” see Chapter 1, pp. 33-38, 52-53, 112-113.

64 Liv. 29.6.5-6
ships for the Roman navy. The question, then, is how Hannibal was able to undermine the control of the pro-Roman aristocracy. Hannibal’s promise of freedom was probably attractive propaganda, and the Locrian-Carthaginian treaty preserved by Livy guaranteed Locri the right to govern herself by its own laws. Hannibal’s military success and the presence of Carthaginian forces in Bruttium certainly discredited Rome and would have undermined the authority of local pro-Roman aristocrats. However, these factors were not enough to detach Locri from its alliance with Rome. When a combined Bruttian-Carthaginian force began to attack the Greek cities in Bruttium, Locri immediately braced for a siege and its citizens scattered to their farms in order to bring food and valuables within the city walls. The Locrians should have been relatively confident that they could resist a siege. The city maintained an extensive system of defensive walls extending for about seven kilometers around the site of ancient Locri Epizefiri. More recent archaeological research has revealed that city defenses were reinforced from the fourth to the beginning of the third centuries BC. The reinforcement included the construction of a number of towers along the original wall circuit and a reconstruction of the stretch of wall along the coastline that had previously offered little protection. The new fortifications appear to correspond to inscriptions preserved from the local Temple of Olympian Zeus that record funds allocated for thirty-six years for the pyrgopoia, or

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65 Pol. 1.20.14

66 Liv. 24.1.13. Of course, it is not clear if the guarantee that they would live under their own laws afforded the Locrians any more than the terms of Roman rule. At the very least, Hannibal was promising that the Locrians would be no worse off, at least with regards to political autonomy, allied with him than they were allied with Rome.

67 Liv. 24.1.2-3
“tower building.” Moreover, the walls of Locri may not have been breeched during the Pyrrhic war – Zonaras records that Locri was betrayed to the Romans in 275 BC but later the Locrians massacred the Roman garrison and invited Pyrrhus back into the city. In either case Locri did not fall to a siege and a failure of the defensive works. Ultimately, therefore, the appearance of hostile forces could not have been the deciding factor that compelled the Locrians to break with Rome, and, in fact, Livy’s account indicates that the appearance of enemy troops, at least in the short term, strengthened Locrian resolve.

The proximate event that brought the Locrians to the bargaining table was the capture of a number of Locrian citizens by the Carthaginian cavalry under the command of a certain Hamilcar. According to Livy, while some Locrians repaired the city’s defensive works and the majority of Locrians went out to their farms in order to bring food and valuables into the city, Hamilcar sent the cavalry to cut off the citizens from the city. He then surrounded Locri and sent some Bruttian allies to seek surrender from the few citizens remaining in the city. While Livy may exaggerate the total number of Locrians captured, he states explicitly that the captured were composed of all classes (permixtam omnium aetatium ordinumque multitudinem) and therefore included some aristocrats. The capture of even a few aristocrats as hostages would have had a powerful effect on the ruling class of Locri. For example, Rome had maintained the loyalty of Capua because of marriage ties between Capuan and Roman elite and because some

68 For a brief discussion of the defenses around Locri, see Costamagna and Sabbione, *Una città in Magna Grecia* 49-53

69 Zon. 8.6; however Appian (*Samn.* 12.1) records that the Locrians had massacred the Pyrrhic garrison, so Pyrrhus retook the city and sacked it, perhaps implying that Pyrrhus retook Locri violently.

70 Liv. 24.1.2-5
Capuan nobles were serving as cavalry in Sicily, effectively held as hostages. Rome also demanded hostages from Tarentum and Thurii, presumably from the aristocracy, in order to secure the loyalty of those cities; in fact, the maltreatment of the Tarentine hostages encouraged the city to revolt from Rome. However, even the capture of the Locrians did not result in the immediate surrender of the city but rather compelled the remaining aristocrats to negotiate terms with the Carthaginians. The Carthaginians offered the “friendship of Hannibal” (amicitiam Hannibalis) in return for the city’s surrender; the Locrian aristocracy responded by calling an assembly. The debate in the assembly, while probably stylized by Livy, provides a glimpse at the complexities of local politics. Some aristocrats wanted to remain loyal to Rome, while other sought alliance with Hannibal. According to Livy, those who had relatives captured by Hamilcar made up the “swing vote,” choosing to side with Carthage and restore their family members over loyalty to Rome. The debate is similar to that which occurred in the Capuan senate before that city revolted. In both cases it was local and immediate concerns that shifted the balance from pro-Roman to pro-Carthaginian.

There may be further similarities between the negotiations in Locri and the negotiations in Capua. It was the promise of local hegemony that ultimately drew the

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71 Liv. 23.2.6, 23.4.7-8; see Chapter 1, pp. 35-36.
72 Liv. 25.7.10-8.1; see Chapter 4, pp. 295-296.
73 Liv. 24.1.7-8
74 See Chapter 1, pp. 52-53, 58-61.
Capuans into alliance with Hannibal,\textsuperscript{75} and a similar appeal likely made Hannibal attractive to the Locrians. The ancient evidence clearly shows that Locri had longstanding hegemonic aspirations in Bruttium. The \textit{chora} of Locri was bounded to the south by the river Halex, perhaps the modern-day Fiume Galati, which separated Locri from Regium.\textsuperscript{76} To the north the Greek settlement of Caulonia/Aulonia abutted the \textit{chora} of Locri; the exact boundary was probably the Fiume Allaro or the Fiume Torbido, with one or the other to be identified with the ancient Sagra.\textsuperscript{77} Since Locri was unable to expand to the north and south, she founded sub-colonies and acquired territory across the Bruttian peninsula, presupposing that she came to control the mountainous interior of Bruttium or that she had the naval capacity to maintain communications by sea.\textsuperscript{78} Locri founded Hipponium (modern Vibo Valentia) and Medma (modern Rosarno), and conquered the area known as Metaurus (Gioa Tauro).\textsuperscript{79} Strabo also records that the Locrians captured a Bruttian settlement called Temesa, later the Roman colony of Tempsa.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{75} Liv. 23.10.1-4. After guaranteeing Capuan hegemony, “all Capua” voted to support Hannibal. While Livy surely exaggerates, the sense of the episode is that Hannibal focused on promises of power in his speech to the Capuans and that this promise finally swayed the audience. See Chapter 1, pp. 60-61.

\textsuperscript{76} Strab. 6.1.9; Osanna, \textit{Chorai Coloniali} 214; Costamagna and Sabbione, \textit{Una città in magna Grecia} 160; see Map 10.

\textsuperscript{77} Strab. 6.1.10; the identity of the Sagra remains, however, uncertain. See Osanna, \textit{Chorai Coloniali} 214; Costamagna and Sabbione, \textit{Una città in magna Grecia} 160

\textsuperscript{78} Osanna, \textit{Chorai Coloniali} 220; Costamagna and Sabbione, \textit{Una città in magna Grecia} 35-37

\textsuperscript{79} Strab. 6.1.5; Osanna, \textit{Chorai Coloniali} 220; Costamagna and Sabbione, \textit{Una città in magna Grecia} 36; De Franciscis, \textit{Atti M Grecia} 4 (1960) 21-67.

\textsuperscript{80} Strab. 6.1.5; the site has not been identified, though Strabo’s account places the town north of Hipponium. Strabo also indicates that Temesa was controlled by the Bruttii by the outbreak of Hannibal’s War.
While Medma and Hipponium appear to have become politically independent from Locri, they also seem to have, in general, remained under Locrian influence. An inscription at Olympia, perhaps commemorating the Battle of Sagra at which Locri crushed the Crotoniates, lists Hipponium and Medma independently, but also as victors alongside Locri. Diodorus reports that Dionysius I of Syracuse recruited both Locrians and Medmaeans to resettle Messene. During this period Hipponium seems to have asserted its independence, but Dionysius I and the Locrians forged a marriage alliance, and the tyrant re-conquered Hipponium, giving its territory to the Locrians. The Carthaginians later restored Hipponiate exiles, perhaps to encourage anti-Dionysian sentiment in Italy. Hipponium was overrun by the Bruttii during the fourth century BC, but was recaptured and used as a base of operations against the Bruttii by Agathocles. The sources do not state explicitly that Agathocles was allied with the Locrians. However Locri often maintained friendly relations with Syracuse and its tyrants. Moreover, Agathocles appears not only to have attacked the Bruttii but also to

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81 Costamagna and Sabbione, *Una città in magna Grecia* 36

82 Diod. Sic. 14.78.5


84 Diod. Sic. 15.24.1

85 Diod. Sic. 16.15.1-2

86 Diod. Sic. 21.8.1; Strab. 6.1.5; Just. 23.2.1

87 We have already mentioned the alliance between Dionysius I and Locri. Dionysius II was born of a Locrian mother (Diod. Sic. 16.6.1-2). After being defeated by Dion, Dionysius II found refuge in Locri (Diod. Sic. 16.17.1-2, 16.18.1; Just. 21.2.8-9), where he stayed until his abuses compelled the Locrians to drive him from their city (Just. 21.2.10-3.9). Justin’s account of Dionysius’ cruelty seems exaggerated – Dionysius stayed in Locri for six years and likely helped the Locrians defend themselves against Italic pressure (implied in Just. 21.3.3). The relevant point is that Locri started out on good terms with Dionysius and may even have invited him to stay there (possibly implied by Just. 21.2.9). His long stay in Locri suggests his rule was at least initially welcome and that it took some time for relations to deteriorate.
have been planning to capture Croton. Locri previously had tried to expand control of territory in the direction of Croton – according to Strabo, Dionysius I captured Scylletium/Scylacium and incorporated it into Locrian territory, and Diodorus records that Dionysius I captured Caulonia and gave it to the Locrians. This pattern suggests that Locri would have allied with Agathocles in order to reassert control over Hipponium and perhaps extend its control north along the Ionian coast. Finally, consider the patterns of revolt during the Hannibalic War – Locri, Hipponium, and Temesa all sided with the Carthaginians. It is plausible that Hipponium, Temesa, and probably Medma remained subordinate settlements that were strongly influenced by Locrian policy.

A similar conclusion may be drawn concerning Caulonia. According to Strabo the city was originally a colony of the Achaeans, though it may have been a Crotoniate colony. In any case, the city fell under the domination of Croton, but was later captured by Dionysius I, the population exiled, and its territory given to the Locrians. The city seems to have been re-founded by Dionysius II, though in light of his alliance with Locri Caulonia probably remained under Locrian hegemony. While the city suffered from

88 Diod. Sic. 19.4.1
89 Strab. 6.1.10; Diod. Sic. 14.106.3. The territory of Scylletium (modern Squillace) bordered Croton (Strab. 6.1.11).
90 Locri probably was the base of operations for Agathocles’ campaign in Italy, see Costamagna and Sabbione, Una città in magna Grecia 40.
91 Strab. 6.1.10; Paus. 6.3.12 consider Caulonia an Achaean colony. Ciaceri, Storia della Magna Grecia 1.173-83 argues Caulonia was a colony of Croton, established to check Locrian expansion. See also Lomas, Rome and the Western Greeks 19-25.
92 Diod. 14.106.3
93 Diod. Sic. 16.10.2, 16.11.3, Plut. Dion 26.4
Bruttian attacks, it appears to have been occupied continuously from its re-founding to the outbreak of the Hannibalic War and does not appear to have been totally Oscanized.\textsuperscript{94} In other words, Caulonia remained a small yet vital Greek community until the outbreak of the Hannibalic War.\textsuperscript{95} Then the city rebelled,\textsuperscript{96} which would be expected if the city remained under Locrian hegemony. Thus, we can conclude that Locri was a local hegemonic power asserting control over a number of satellite cities, including most likely Hipponium, Temesa, Medma, and Caulonia.

The similarity between Carthaginian-Capuan negotiations and Carthaginian-Locrian negotiations, noted above, suggests that Hannibal or his lieutenants would have appealed to Locrian hegemonic interests, perhaps promising that an alliance with the Carthaginians would yield an expansion of Locrian power. While the negotiations in Locri are not preserved in as much detail as are the negotiations with Capua, a few details in the literary record are consistent with the idea that Hannibal appealed to Locrian designs on hegemony. First, we should note that the capture of the Locrian citizens by Hamilcar’s cavalry did not result in immediate, unconditional surrender by the remaining

\textsuperscript{94} Strab. 6.1.10 says that the city was abandoned because of attacks by otherwise unnamed barbarians; Paus. 6.3.12 records that the city was utterly destroyed by Rome’s Campanian allies during the Pyrrhic War, implying that its existence during the Hannibalic War would have been the result of non-Greek occupation. However, Tréziny, Kaulonia I 155-7 concludes, based on archaeological evidence, that there was a hiatus during the fourth century of human occupation at the cite, perhaps corresponding to Dionysius I’s destruction of Caulonia; however, there was continuous occupation from later in the fourth century (Dionysius II’s refounding ?) through the Hannibalic War, contradicting Pausanias’ account. Finally, Tréziny concludes that the archaeological evidence (such as tiles, stamped bricks, and Bruttian coinage) indicates increased interaction with Oscans, but retained Hellenistic elements.

\textsuperscript{95} For the inclusion of Caulonia among Greek cities in Magna Graecia at the outbreak of the Hannibalic War, see Toynbee, Hannibal’s Legacy 1.490-2; De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 2\textsuperscript{2}.250; Afzelius, Die römische Kriegsmacht 89. Afzelius suggests that Caulonia was bound by treaty to supply warships for the Roman navy.

\textsuperscript{96} Liv. 27.12.6, 27.15.8, 27.16.9
Locrians but rather compelled the Locrian assembly to meet. Second, the terms of the eventual treaty between the Carthaginians and the Locrians are in part unexpected, considering Livy’s preceding narrative. The guarantee that the Locrians should live in freedom under their own laws is clearly in keeping with Hellenistic rhetoric and Hannibal’s early war propaganda. However, there is no mention of the restoration of the hostages and there is the strange clause concerning Locrian control of the port. This suggests that Livy’s account is compressed, and that complex negotiations between the Locrians and the Carthaginians took place before the city was secured for Hannibal. The most plausible explanation of the events is that Carthaginian possession of hostages brought the Locrians to the table, but that both the Carthaginians and the Locrians were forced to grant further concessions before the Locrians came over to Hannibal’s side.

One of the concessions that the Carthaginians probably made consisted of a promise that joining Hannibal would further Locri’s local hegemonic interests. While the treaty guaranteed “freedom” for the Locrians to live under their own laws it also allowed the Carthaginians access to the city. This suggests that the Locrians were not particularly concerned with the possibility of a Carthaginian garrison stationed within the city walls. However, the final clause of the treaty guarantees that Hannibal and the

97 Liv. 24.1.13

98 For the promise of freedom in Hellenistic diplomacy, see Gruen, Hellenistic World 132-42.

99 This again would be similar to Hannibal’s dealings with Capua. The Capuans treated with Hannibal and the two parties agreed to a treaty. However, there was still opposition to Hannibal, so he came to Capua, dined with prominent aristocrats, and addressed the Capuan senate in person. Only after Hannibal made another promise that Capua would be the master of Italy did he finally secure the loyalty of the Capuans. Thus, Hannibal and the Capuans conducted multi-stage negotiations. See Chapter 1, pp. 52-53, 59-60.

100 Indeed, in Hellenistic diplomacy the promise of freedom often meant the installation of a garrison to “protect” those who had been “freed;” see Gruen, Hellenistic World 136.
Locrians would help each other in war and peace. This is the form of Hellenistic *symmachia* and is similar to the treaty between Hannibal and Philip V of Macedon. The Hannibalic-Macedonian treaty appears to preserve the expectation on the part of Philip that Hannibal will help Philip gain territory in return for Philip’s aid against Rome. We have already discussed that Hannibal secured the loyalty of the Capuans with the promise of power. It is likely that the Locrian-Carthaginian treaty, similar in form to the Hannibalic-Macedonian treaty and struck in the context of similar negotiations as those in Capua, carried the expectation on the part of the Locrians that their local hegemony would be extended as a result of siding with Hannibal. Subsequent events confirm this supposition. Soon after the fall of Locri, the Bruttii unsuccessfully attacked Croton and were forced to call on the Carthaginians for help. The Crotoniates refused to surrender out of hatred for the Bruttii, and the standoff was broken only when Locrian ambassadors appeared on the scene to broker the surrender of Croton to the Bruttians in return for the transplant of a number of Crotoniates to Locri. The narrative implies that the Locrians acted on their own initiative and clearly shows the Locrians in the role of arbiters. By

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102 Pol. 7.9.1-17. The key passage is Pol. 7.9.12-4, in which the Hannibal promises that even if the Romans seek terms to end the war, Hannibal would not grant terms unless they guaranteed the Romans would give up Corecyra, Apollonia, Epidamnus, Pharos, Dimale, Parthini, and Atitania, of which Philip hoped to gain control; see Walbank 2.56. However, the terms may only have meant that both sides would stay out of each other’s way as each expanded his own hegemony, and the Locrian-Carthaginian treaty may reflect that understanding. In any case, the treaty shows the Locrians treating as an independent state with the potential to extend its own hegemony, which was not possible under Roman rule.

103 Liv. 24.2.1-5. Notice that the Bruttii expected to have gained territory by attacking Locri and Rhegium, and were angry this had not come about. They decided, therefore, to attack Croton, and when the attack failed, sent delegates to the Carthaginians to guarantee that the Bruttii would profit territorially from the capture of Croton. It is clear that Hannibal promised power to all his allies, or at least that was the common expectation on the part of his allies.

104 Liv. 24.3.9-15
offering arbitration the Locrians were acting in the tradition of Hellenistic monarchs and powerful hegemons.\textsuperscript{105} Thus, the first act by the Locrians after allying with Hannibal was an act traditional associated with a Hellenistic hegemon.\textsuperscript{106}

To summarize: At the outbreak of the Hannibalic War, Rome was able to maintain the loyalty of Locri not only by placing a garrison in the city, but also through the support of a local elite friendly to the Romans. Hannibal’s military success in the first few years of the war discredited the Roman position and presumably also undermined the power of the pro-Roman Locrian elite. The capture of Locrian citizens, including members of aristocratic families, provided an opportunity for anti-Roman members of the elite, motivated in part by their own political aspirations, to voice dissent over Roman rule. Finally, the combination of concern on the part of relatives for the hostages held by the Carthaginians and the lure of the potential for the Locrians to conduct independent foreign policy and to expand local hegemony swung the opinion of enough Locrian elite from support for Rome to support for Hannibal. The revolt of Locri likely also encouraged he revolt of the smaller Greek cities with which she had ties and over whom she had traditionally exerted hegemony – the subordinate cities that revolted include Hipponium, Temesa and Caulonia (and possibly Medma). The negotiations between the Carthaginians and Locri and the tendency for weaker states to follow the

\textsuperscript{105} see Gruen, \textit{The Hellenistic World} 96-9. There was also a tradition of smaller independent states acting as arbiters. It is important to recognize that the Locrians were acting as an independent third party and were not standing for (and therefore subordinate to) the Carthaginians. Once again, this sort of independent action would have been limited under Roman rule.

\textsuperscript{106} This is similar to the actions of Capua, which at first opportunity after allying with Hannibal attacked its traditional rivals; see Chapter 1, pp. 63-64, 87-94.
decision of the local hegemonic city to revolt both reflect patterns observed in other regions of Italy, especially Campania.

3.4 The revolt of Croton (215/214 BC)

Croton was the next city to revolt and join Hannibal’s side. The following analysis of Croton’s revolt will show clearly the sorts of complex local conditions and pressures, some mutually contradictory, that shaped a city’s decision to remain loyal or revolt in the face of Hannibalic overtures. I will show that immediate conditions, namely the revolt of Locri, proved the strongest arguments in convincing the Crotoniates to revolt. That is, the Crotoniates had been hesitant to revolt because of their longstanding hostility toward the Bruttii, and even increased military pressure – their city was seized and the citadel besieged by Bruttian forces – could not convince the remaining Crotoniates to submit. Only when Locri had revolted and the Locrians took part in negotiations between Croton, the Brutii, and the Carthaginians did Croton finally revolt.

The political and diplomatic context of Croton conforms to general patterns already observed. It is clear that the Crotoniate ruling elite was politically divided and that Rome controlled Croton through the loyalty of local aristocrats. Livy states that Croton exhibited the stasis that beset all cities in Italy, with the upper class supporting Rome and the lower class yearning to side with Hannibal.\textsuperscript{107} However, Livy’s narrative of the fall of Croton contradicts this generalization. In the same passage just cited, Livy notes that in Croton there was no single plan or desire among the general population (\textit{Crotone nec consilium unum inter populares nec voluntas erat}), implying a situation more complex than simple class stasis. The “leader of the plebeians” (\textit{principem plebis},

\textsuperscript{107} Liv. 24.2.8
Aristomachus, was probably an aristocrat. For example, Livy associates him with the Crotiante elite: he took refuge with the *optimates* in the citadel while the *plebs* supposedly welcomed the Bruttii within the city walls. Livy’s description of the *optimates* defending the citadel with the *plebs* welcoming the Bruttii within the city walls is clearly over-schematized, but the important point is that Aristomachus appears in the narrative to be an aristocrat. Moreover, Aristomachus is described as instrumental in negotiations between the Crotoniates and the Carthaginians, and it is unlikely that a non-aristocrat could have functioned in this capacity. Finally, Aristomachus’ name implies his elite status. Livy preserves only the name of Aristomachus, but it is likely that he was the leader of a group of aristocrats. Overall, it appears that the Crotoniate aristocracy was divided among itself. Moreover, the Crotoniate aristocracy was further fragmented by the appearance of a hostile Bruttian army outside the city walls. Some Crotoniates went over immediately to the Bruttii; for example, Livy calls attention an unnamed deserter who gave the Bruttii vital intelligence for storming the city. Aristomachus (and presumably his party) advised that Croton should surrender, but only to the

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108 Liv. 24.2.11

109 In fact, see Liv. 23.30.6-7, which states that the Crotoniates who held the citadel were those who escaped the initial Bruttian attack, with no reference to social class. The passage implies, therefore, that a cross-section of the population fled to the citadel.

110 Liv. 24.2.10-1, 24.3.11-3

111 Livy’s tendency to reduce opposition to Rome to infamous, named individuals has already been observed. See the discussion of Salapia in Chapter 2, pp. 128-129.

112 Liv. 24.2.9
Carthaginians. Some aristocrats remained defiantly loyal even though they were trapped in the citadel. In the end, some aristocrats went over to the Carthaginians, some chose to live with the Bruttii, and still others sought refuge in Locri. Overall, we must image that the Crotoniate aristocracy was greatly divided in the face of an immediate external threat, with some arguing to remain loyal to Rome, some for accommodation with the Bruttii, and still others for looking to the Carthaginians for help.

Political divisions in Croton long predated the Hannibalic War. Diodorus records political instability in Croton from the late fourth to early third centuries. The Crotoniates adopted a democratic government and exiled supporters of the previous government, presumably an oligarchy. The subsequent civil war between the oligarchic supporters and supporters of the democracy, including the elected generals Paron and Menedemus, resulted in the massacre of the exiles; Menedemus later established himself as tyrant of the city. During the Pyrrhic War one group, presumably the aristocrats who were described as “friends” of the Roman commander Rufinus, conspired to betray Croton, which had revolted from Rome; an opposing group invited a Pyrrhic garrison into the city to prevent the conspiracy. It is clear that rival factions played out their rivalry during the Pyrrhic War, and it is likely that members each faction sought to

113 Liv. 24.2.9: Aistomachus advised that Croton should surrender, but to whom is unclear; Liv. 24.2.11: when the Bruttii stormed the city, Aristomachus fled as if he had advocated that the city be handed over to the Carthaginians, not to the Bruttii (*tamquam Poenis, non Bruttiiis auctor urbis tradendae fuisset*).

114 See below pp. 229-233.

115 Once again, this situation recalls the political divisions in Capua and Nola; see Chapter 1.


117 Diod. Sic. 21.4

118 Zon. 8.6
further their own political standing through the patronage either of Rome or of Pyrrhus. The sources agree that by the outbreak of the Hannibalic War, Croton had suffered from repeated occupations, most recently during the Pyrrhic War. After the war Rome certainly punished leading pro-Pyrrhic aristocrats while backing pro-Roman aristocrats. Rome would have relied on the loyalty of the Crotoniate aristocracy to keep Croton under Roman hegemony.

However, it is likely that some aristocratic families “lost out” if other families either received Roman backing or at least benefited from the status quo of Roman rule. Aristomachus and his party were more willing to throw off Roman rule and submit to the Carthaginians when Croton was faced by a Bruttian attack. This suggests that Aristomachus’ party was less loyal to Rome or at least perceived less benefit from the status quo. It is possible that Arsitomachus’ party consisted of aristocrats whose families either were punished by Rome after the Pyrrhic War or failed to receive Roman backing and therefore lost out politically. Perhaps Aristomachus and his followers saw an opportunity to advance their own political careers by seeking an alliance with the Carthaginians and thus overturn the current political status quo. In any case, two important points emerge. First, the Crotoniate aristocracy was clearly divided, and the Carthaginians could hope to exploit these political divisions. Second, Arsistomachus’s party could not generate enough support, at least at first, to secure an alliance between Croton and the Carthaginians because other factors, namely Crotoniate-Bruttian hostility,

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119 For example, Liv. 23.30.6, 24.3.1, 8; Diod. Sic. 19.3.1, 19.4.1, 21.4.
weighed more heavily in the minds of the aristocracy. Therefore, the Crotoniate aristocracy remained for the moment loyal to Rome.

It is clear that Greek-Bruttian hostility bolstered the loyalty of the Crotoniates, since Croton had a history of conflict with neighboring Italic peoples. Diodorus reports that a Bruttian siege of Croton resulted in Syracusan military support for the Crotoniates,\textsuperscript{120} while Polybius speaks in general terms of hostility between Italiote League and the surrounding “barbarians.”\textsuperscript{121} Livy states that the Greek cities of Bruttium remained loyal to Rome because they saw their enemies the Bruttii had gone over to Hannibal’s side,\textsuperscript{122} and he later records that the besieged Crotoniates refused to surrender on the condition that a colony of Bruttii cohabit the city.\textsuperscript{123} The Crotoniates chose to evacuate their city rather than mix with the Bruttii. However, there is no mention of a Roman garrison or of Crotoniate hostages held in Rome.\textsuperscript{124} Despite the presence of Carthaginian forces in Bruttium and repeated Roman military failure, Croton remained loyal to Rome until late 215 BC (or early 214 BC).\textsuperscript{125} Therefore, the support of pro-Roman aristocrats coupled with the fear of Bruttian aggression was enough initially to maintain Crotoniate loyalty and to counteract the effects of such factors as Rome’s military failure and Hannibal’s liberation propaganda.

\textsuperscript{120} Diod. 19.3.3, 19.10.3
\textsuperscript{121} Pol. 2.39.6-7
\textsuperscript{122} Liv. 24.4.1
\textsuperscript{123} Liv. 24.3.10-5
\textsuperscript{124} Lomas, Rome and the western Greeks 64-5 states that Croton was garrisoned but cites no evidence.
\textsuperscript{125} For the chronology, see Table 5 and related discussion.
However, Croton did revolt. Before analyzing the factors that contributed to the surrender of Croton, it is necessary to make clearer sense out of the narrative presented in two separate passages of Livy. It is not clear whether the Bruttii sent a legation to Hannibal before attacking Croton, seeking assurance that the city would be theirs if captured. It is more likely that the Bruttii treated with Hanno, since the latter was the Carthaginian commander in Bruttium and later played a role in negotiations at Croton. Indeed, it is possible that the Bruttii attacked Croton on their own and only sought Carthaginian help when they failed to capture the citadel. A plausible sequence is that the Bruttii attacked Croton while some Crotoniates fled the city and deserted to the Bruttii. Aristomachus advised that the Crotoniates should surrender but only to the Carthaginians, while presumably other aristocrats argued the city should stand firm. The Bruttii were able to storm the city walls, at which point the optimates, including Aristomachus' party, fled to the citadel. This shows that Aristomachus wanted some sort of negotiated settlement and was unwilling to surrender to hostile Bruttians. The Bruttii were unable to capture the citadel and were forced to call on the Carthaginians for

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126 Liv. 23.30.6-7, 24.2.1-3.15. Livy’s account in Book 23 is greatly compressed and lacks details about Bruttian-Carthaginian diplomacy that are contained in the account in Book 24.

127 Liv. 24.2.5

128 Liv. 24.2.6-7, 24.3.10-5

129 Liv. 23.30.6-7 makes no mention of the various diplomatic missions by the Bruttii to Hannibal/Hanno, as Livy elaborates in his later account.

130 Liv. 24.2.9-11, see also 23.30.6-7. Livy reports that a single deserter helped the Bruttii attack Croton, though we must image other individuals deserted. According to the deserter, Croton was unoccupied (vasta urbe). This is surely an exaggeration, but may point to the fact that many citizens fled upon the approach of the Bruttii. However, the city had been in decline for many years and the statement may reflect its generally small population; see pp. 230-232.
military assistance.\textsuperscript{131} This ushered in a period of Bruttian-Carthaginian-Crotoniate negotiations, during which Aristomachus again emerged as a proponent of Crotoniate submission to the Carthaginians.\textsuperscript{132} However, the ruling class still remained loyal to Rome. When Aristomachus was unable to convince the Crotoniate aristocracy to submit to the Carthaginians, he forged a separate peace with Hanno and the Carthaginians. Livy claims that Aristomachus acted alone, but it is more plausible that he was joined by his aristocratic supporters.\textsuperscript{133} Negotiations between the Crotoniates, the Bruttii, and the Carthaginians broke down until the arrival of Locrian ambassadors, either at the urging of the Carthaginians or (as argued earlier) because the Locrians recognized the standoff as a chance to exert local hegemony. The Crotoniates, faced with a siege, finally opted to evacuate their city and move to Locri.\textsuperscript{134} Now that we have established the narrative, we can analyze more carefully the factors that contributed to the Crotoniate surrender.

First, Croton was not powerful in the late third century BC; indeed, the surrender of Croton in 215 BC (or 214 BC) in many ways marks the end of the long decline of the once mighty city. Croton had once been one of the most powerful cities in Magna Graecia and had been the hegemon of the Italiote League. However, Dionysius I defeated the league and dismantled it, occupied Croton for twelve years, and turned over Crotoniate territory to the Locrians.\textsuperscript{135} When the Italiote League re-emerged in the

\textsuperscript{131} Liv. 24.3.9-11
\textsuperscript{132} Liv. 24.3.11-13
\textsuperscript{133} Liv. 24.3.13
\textsuperscript{134} Liv. 24.2.14-5
\textsuperscript{135} Pol. 2.39.1-7; Diod. Sic. 14.91.1, 14.101.1, 14.102.1-3, 14.103.3-106.3; Strab. 6.1.10; Just. 20.5.1-3; Liv. 24.3.8; Dion. Hal. 20.7.2-3; see Caven, \textit{Dionysius I} 124-53.
middle of the fourth century, league hegemony had passed to Tarantum. According to Diodorus, the city suffered at the hands of Agathocles. Livy states that only 2000 citizens inhabited Croton, the population having been greatly reduced as a result of the Pyrrhic War. Croton also endured attacks from the Bruttii and Lucani. Archaeological evidence in general supports the picture of Croton as a city in decline through the fourth and third centuries. Results from field surveys conducted in the Crotoniate chora indicate that the number of rural sites, presumably farmhouses, declined between about 400 BC and 250 BC, correlating to a gradual decline in the economy of Croton over the same period. Osanna argues that, despite the difficulty in identifying archaeological sites in Magna Graecia as either “Greek” or “native Italic,” there is clear evidence that the territory controlled by Croton contracted greatly from the fifth to the third centuries. The Carthaginians exploited Croton’s declining fortunes, promising that a union with the Bruttii would restore the population and glory of the city.

136 Strab. 6.3.4; Lomas, Rome and the Western Greeks 35; Caven, Dionysius I 139; for a more complete discussion, see Chapter 4.

137 Diod. Sic. 21.4

138 Liv. 23.30.6, 24.3.1-2; see also Zon. 8.6, suggesting that Croton was completely destroyed during the Pyrrhic War, though this is clearly an exaggeration.

139 Diod. Sic. 19.3.3, 19.10.3; see also n. 121 for references to the Italiote League, which was formed in part as a response to Italic pressure. By about 280 BC, the Crotoniates, as well as other Greek cities, turned to Rome as protection against Italic incursions: see Lomas, Rome and the Western Greeks 50-52.

140 Carter and D’Annibale, “Il territorio di Crotone. Ricognizione topigraphiche 1983-1986,” in Crotone 93-9, although the results also indicate that the decline of Croton was less dramatic than indicated in the literary sources.

141 Osanna, Chorai coloniali 167-87. At one point, the territory of Croton stretched between the Fiume Nicà and the Fiume Tacina. However, by the end of the fourth century it had contracted to the area between the Fiume Neto and the Fiume Tacina. See Map 11.

142 Liv. 24.3.11
However, the Crotoniates rejected this offer, indicating that appeals to power carried less weight in Croton than did their enmity toward the Brutii.

It is clear that Croton was not a local hegemonic power. One should expect, therefore, the Crotoniates to have sought the protection of a more powerful state.\textsuperscript{143} In fact, when notified of the Bruttian siege, the Carthaginians figured the Crotoniates would seek aid from themselves.\textsuperscript{144} While the siege initially strengthened Crotoniate resolve,\textsuperscript{145} the sudden change in the military landscape exacerbated local political divisions. Not only had the Romans suffered repeated defeat in the opening stages of the war, but also no Roman garrison was present to protect Croton, and a hostile force had captured much of the city and killed many of its inhabitants. The situation certainly undermined the position of pro-Roman aristocrats and provided an opportunity for dissenting groups to emerge. As noted above, Aristomachus may have represented a cadre of aristocrats who used dissatisfaction with Roman rule as a means to further their own political standing or at least who were dissatisfied with status quo in 215 BC. Political divisions among the aristocracy continued even when the city fell but the citadel held out. Indeed, Aristomachus and presumably his party forged a separate peace and surrendered directly to the Carthaginians. The citadel, however, remained in Crotoniate hands, indicating that while discredited Roman authority opened the door for dissent, many of the Crotoniates

\textsuperscript{143} The tendency for weaker cities to subordinate themselves to more powerful states has been observed elsewhere in this section, and in both Campania (Chapter 1) and Apulia (Chapter 2).

\textsuperscript{144} Liv. 24.2.6-7

\textsuperscript{145} Indicated by the defiant Crotoniate statements (Liv. 24.3.12).
holed up in the citadel still remained loyal to Rome. It was only the arrival of the Locrian delegation that finally swung the remaining Crotoniates against Rome. The Locrians provided a more acceptable option than surrendering either to Carthage or the Bruttii or even to remaining loyal to Rome. While Livy claims that the whole remaining population transferred to themselves to Locri, it is more likely that only the most staunch anti-Bruttian Crotoniates, especially aristocrats, left their city. Presumably some Crotoniates stayed behind and cohabited with the new Bruttian colonists. Therefore, Croton did ultimately submit to a more powerful state, but that state was a local hegemonic power rather than Rome or Carthage.

To summarize: the surrender of Croton clearly shows the importance of local conditions in shaping the foreign policies of cities in Italy. Hannibal’s victory at Cannae and the presence of Carthaginian troops in Bruttium were not enough to compel Croton to surrender, nor does there appear to have been an overriding enmity toward Rome that drove the Crotoniates to the Carthaginian cause. However, Croton was also not motivated by an ideological closeness to Rome. Croton’s policy instead was shaped more by local hostilities and the promise of immediate protection by local hegemon Locri (a Greek city with which Croton shared cultural links). The surrender of Croton also reveals a number of Carthaginian miscalculations: the Carthaginian command figured the Bruttians would compel Croton to seek Carthaginian help and they later assumed the appeal of renewed Crotoniate power outweighed hostile feelings toward the Bruttii. Finally, these events point to the sorts of conflicts of interest created by Hannibal’s

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146 Liv. 24.3.13

147 Liv. 24.3.15; Lomas, Rome and the Western Greeks 65
strategy. It is clear that the Bruttii took it upon themselves to attack Croton, since they were angry they had not yet profited from their alliance with Hannibal. Livy’s narrative implies clearly that the Bruttii expected to profit, and it has already been shown that Hannibal dangled the promise of local hegemony to attract allies in Italy. Meanwhile, the Carthaginians preferred the Bruttii not sack Croton but were forced to promote a compromise so as not to further anger their Bruttian allies. Lastly, the failure of the Bruttian allies to capture Croton compelled the Carthaginians to provide military assistance, lest Hannibal appear incapable of following through as an ally. Hannibal could ill afford to divert manpower either to protect his new allies from Roman reprisal or to bail them out from their own failed military initiatives.

3.5 Hannibal’s limited success: the failure to win over Rhegium (215 BC)

Hannibal’s string of relative successes in Bruttium ended with Carthaginian attempts to capture Rhegium, for Hannibal and his allies were never able to capture Rhegium or lure the city into alliance with Carthage. Rhegium had a long history of loyalty to Rome, so it may not seem surprising that it remained loyal throughout the Hannibalic War. However, the failure of the Hannibalic strategy in Rhegium is interesting because Rhegium faced many of the same conditions that confronted the other Greek cities in Bruttium. This section will argue that the ultimate failure of Hannibal to capture Rhegium lies to a great degree in the network of local rivalries and hostilities that

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148 Liv. 24.2.1-4
149 Liv. Liv. 24.3.7
150 Compare Hannibal’s assistance to the Capuans, after their botched attempt to ambush the Cumaeans; see Chapter 1, pp. 63-64.
predated Hannibal’s arrival and the conflicts created when Hannibal attempted to apply his strategy to this local diplomatic matrix.

The same factors that promoted loyalty in other cities in Bruttium operated as well in Rhegium. First, Rome managed to secure the loyalty of at least some of the local elite. Although a detailed description of Rhegine politics during or immediately preceding the Hannibalic War is lacking, the situation can be inferred from the events in the first thirty years of the third century BC. In 282 BC The Rhegines requested a Roman garrison as protection against neighboring Italic Lucanians and Bruttii and also the Tarentines. The Romans responded by garrisoning the city with Campanian mercenaries under the command of Decius Vibellius (the so-called legio Campana) who proceeded to take over the city and massacre its inhabitants. Dio and Livy state specifically that this was not a general massacre but instead aimed at the leading citizens. There is some evidence that local aristocrats were planning to turn the city over to Pyrrhus when Decius ordered the massacre, though any pro-Pyrrhic movement

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151 Pol. 1.7.6; Diod. Sic. 22.1.2-3; Dion. Hal. 20.4.1-3; Liv. 31.31.6, Per. 12; Dio 9.40.7; App. Samn. 9.1; Strab. 6.1.6. It is difficult to establish the date of the garrison’s installation because of the contradictory nature of the sources. The ancient sources agree that the garrison seized the city when Pyrrhus was in Italy. Most of the ancient sources state that the garrison was installed because the Rhegines wanted protection against Pyrrhus. However, Dionysius states that the garrison was installed in 282 BC to protect the Rhegines against the Lucanians, Bruttii, and the Tarantines. This is plausible, since Thurii had requested a Roman garrison for the same reason (App. Samn. 7.1-2; Liv. Ep. 12). The statement is also consistent with Tarentum’s history of employing Italic allies to exert hegemony over Italiote cities (see Chapter 4). The best reconciliation of the sources is to accept Dionysius’ reference and place the installation of the garrison in 282 BC (the date is arrived at because Dionysius mentions the consul’s name as C. Fabricius; see Fasti Cap.; MRR 1.189). The garrison then seized Rhegium after Pyrrhus had arrived in Italy and the Romans were preoccupied (perhaps after the battle of Heraclea). For this reconstruction, see HCP 1.52-3; Toynbee, Hannibal’s Legacy 1.100-102; Beloch, Römische Geschichte 461; De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 2.379.

152 The massacre probably occurred after Pyrrhus came to Italy, approximately 280 BC; see Pol. 1.7.6-8; Diod. Sic. 22.1.2-3; Dion. Hal. 20.4.2-8; App. Samn. 9.1; Liv. 28.28.1-3, 31.31.6, Per. 12; Dio 9.40.7-11; see also above, n. 151.

153 Dio 9.40.7; Liv. 28.28.2; see also Dion. Hal. 20.4.3
may have arisen after the legio Campana seized the city.\(^{154}\) In any case, literary accounts agree that when Rome recaptured Rhegium, the Campanian garrison was executed, and the city was restored to the surviving Rhegines.\(^{155}\) It is likely that this “restoration” involved placing pro-Roman families in charge of the city or re-establishing previously loyal families, while if any pro-Pyrrhic families had not been executed by Decius Vibellius, the Romans would likely have punished them. Moreover, Roman restoration may have created a strong sense of obligation on the part of the Rhegine elite, which would have contributed to Rhegine loyalty in the Second Punic War.

Second, hostility toward the Bruttii would also have bolstered the loyalty of the Rhegines, most importantly the loyalty among the pro-Roman elite. As we have seen in the discussions of Locri and Croton, anti-Italic sentiment long predated Hannibal’s invasion of Italy. Diodorus records that, during the fifth century, a contingent of Iapygians defeated the Rhegines in a pitched battle near Tarentum, then pursued the fleeing Greeks to Rhegium and captured the city.\(^{156}\) More relevant chronologically, Rhegium requested a Roman garrison in 282 BC specifically out of fear of the Bruttii and Lucanians.\(^{157}\) The revolt of the Campanic garrison may also be seen, at least in part, as

\(^{154}\) Dio 9.40.9-10; Dion. Hal. 20.4.4-6; both Dio and Dionysius claim that Decius had forged documents to show that the Rhegines were promising to turn over the city to Pyrrhus. However, this may reflect pro-Roman bias, and there may have been a movement by the Rhegines to ally with Pyrrhus. Lomas, *Rome and the Western Greeks* 52-3 argues that the Campanian garrison was trying to forestall a Rhegine alliance with Pyrrhus, which triggered the garrison’s seizure of Rhegium. However, Polybius (1.7.6) states that it was the example of the Mammertines that triggered the revolt of the legio Campana, not dissent among the Rhegines. Therefore, even if there were pro-Pyrrhic aristocrats, it is likely they surfaced after the Campanians seized the city.

\(^{155}\) Pol. 1.7.9-13; Dion. Hal. 20.5.1-5; App. Samn. 9.3; Liv. 28.28.3, 31.31.6-7

\(^{156}\) Diod. Sic. 21.52.1-5; see Lomas, *Rome and the Western Greeks* 30-2; Ciaceri, *Storia della Magna Grecia* 2.280-4.

\(^{157}\) Dion. Hal. 20.4.1-2
an example of Greek-Italic hostility in Rhegium. Campanian and Sidicinian mercenaries comprised the garrison, and Decius Vibellius was Oscan.\textsuperscript{158} The quartering of Oscan-Italic troops in the city, especially considering the threat posed by the Bruttii, may have encouraged the plot to reject the garrison and seek the assistance of Pyrhhus, a fellow Greek. At any rate, the Rhegine experience with the Campanian garrison was far from positive, and the Oscan occupation and massacre or Rhegine citizens must have contributed to anti-Italic feelings. There is clear evidence for Rhegine-Bruttian hostility during the Second Punic War. Livy states explicitly that Greek fear and hatred of the Bruttii encouraged loyalty to Rome and discouraged the Greeks in Bruttium, including the Rhegines, from allying with Hannibal.\textsuperscript{159} Rhegine-Bruttian hostility emerged later in the Hannibalic War, when the Rhegines requested Roman troops both as protection against the Bruttii and so that they could plunder Bruttian territory.\textsuperscript{160} By gaining the Bruttii as allies, Hannibal certainly strengthened the loyalty of the Rhegines, especially of the pro-Roman aristocracy.

Third, Rome was able to strengthen Rhegine resolve further by placing a garrison in the city. However, it is worth noting that, according to Livy’s narrative, a Roman garrison did not arrive in Rhegium until 215 BC, and then only after the Rhegines repelled an initial assault by Hannibalic forces.\textsuperscript{161} Livy synchronizes the arrival of the

\textsuperscript{158} Dion. Hal. 20.4.6 states explicitly he was a Campanian (that is, from Capua), and Capua had been Oscanized by the time of the Pyrrhic War; see Frederiksen, \textit{Campania} 137-40.

\textsuperscript{159} Liv. 24.1.1-2

\textsuperscript{160} Liv. 26.50.18, 27.12.4-6

\textsuperscript{161} Liv. 23.51.10-2, 24.1.2, 9-13, 24.2.1
Roman garrison with the fall of Locri, and the narrative implies that these troops, sent from Sicily by the praetor Appius Claudius, were initially to relieve the Roman garrison at Locri.\textsuperscript{162} Therefore, their use as a garrison in Rhegium was a secondary mission. The fact that Rome neither felt the need to garrison Rhegium at the outbreak of hostilities nor apparently to hold Rhegine hostages and the fact that the Rhegines withstood Hannibalic forces despite Roman failure in the early stages of the war both underscore the degree to which Rhegine loyalty was the result of factors such as anti-Bruttian hostility rather than direct Roman military intervention.\textsuperscript{163} In any case, Roman military strategy in 215 BC surely helped secure the loyalty of Rhegium. Livy explicitly links the arrival of Roman troops with the abandonment of the Carthaginian attack on Rhegium.\textsuperscript{164} It is not clear if the Romans maintained the Rhegium garrison throughout the war, though events later in the Hannibalic War suggest they did not. After his failed march on Rome in 211 BC, Hannibal marched swiftly to Rhegium and nearly took the city by surprise,\textsuperscript{165} yet there is no mention of a Roman garrison protecting the city. Moreover, references to the mercenaries sent by Laevinus to Rhegium (210-209 BC), apparently at the request of the Rhegines, imply that this was the only Roman garrison quartered in the city.\textsuperscript{166} Its proximity to Hannibal’s march on Rhegium suggests that at least part of the reason

\textsuperscript{162} However, Lomas, \textit{Rome and the Western Greeks} 65, claims that Locri, Croton, and Rhegium were all garrisoned by the time of the events described in Liv. 24.13.

\textsuperscript{163} Rhegine resistance is all the more striking since it occurred after the battle of Cannae. Without a Roman garrison present, the Rhegines appear to have had every reason to revolt. Thus, traditional enmity toward the Bruttii was important in convincing the Rhegines to remain loyal to Rome.

\textsuperscript{164} Liv. 24.1.12-3

\textsuperscript{165} Pol. 9.7.10; Liv. 26.12.1-2

\textsuperscript{166} Liv. 26.40.16-17, 27.12.4-6
Laevinus sent a garrison to Rhegium was as a response to the lack of a Roman presence the previous year. Thus, it may have been the case that Rhegium only housed a Roman garrison intermittently and only from 215 BC. In any case, the evidence clearly shows there was no Roman garrison in Rhegium before 215 BC and that Reginian loyalty was not compelled by an overt Roman military presence within the city walls.

That is not to say that support for Rome would have been universal, and presumably there were factors at play undermining Reginian loyalty. First, it is unlikely that Reginian ruling elite was undivided in its loyalty. While there are no detailed descriptions of Reginian politics during the late third century, we have already noted that there is some evidence that the Reginian aristocracy was politically divided during the Pyrrhic War. Lomas argues that the outstanding loyalty of Rhegium during the Second Punic War should be explained by Rhegium’s unusual misfortune a half-century earlier, because the Campanian occupation of Rhegium, the massacre of pro-Pyrrhic aristocrats by Decius Vibellius, and the subsequent recapture of the city by Rome in 270 BC offered Rome the chance to establish a firmly pro-Roman government in Rhegium. This is possible, and indeed I have argued that Rome’s restoration of the Reginian aristocracy would have engendered loyalty on the part of the Reginians. However, it is hard to imagine that the Campanian occupation did not yield some anti-Roman sentiment, especially since the Roman senate was responsible for sending the garrison to Rhegium.

Moreover, we can observe political rivalry in every allied city for which there remains an

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167 It is possible, however, that after the arrival of the initial Roman garrison, Rome maintained a small force in Rhegium, and that the force sent by Laevinus bolstered the Roman military presence both in response to Hannibal’s attack and to Reginian requests for troops to attack the Bruttii. However, no Roman forces are mentioned in addition to the mercenaries.
account of its internal politics.\textsuperscript{169} It is very likely, therefore, that there were some aristocrats in Rhegium who were less enamored with the status quo of Roman rule, perhaps because their families were punished by Rome in 270 BC or simply because they were not in power. Second, Roman military credibility would have been greatly undermined in the eyes of the Rhegines. Not only had Rome suffered tremendous defeats in the field, closer to home the Rhegines witnessed Rome’s inability to maintain control of other Greek cities, especially Roman-garrisoned Locri. Finally, Hannibal’s posture as a Hellenistic liberator and his promises of freedom would have been particularly enticing to the Rhegines. Rhegium maintained a distinctly Hellenistic character long after the Hannibalic War; Strabo remarked that even in his own day, Rhegium was the only Greek city remaining in Bruttium.\textsuperscript{170} Therefore, it is surprising that we do not hear about any anti-Roman agitation in Rhegium, suggesting that on the whole the aristocracy was strongly pro-Roman even if there were some aristocrats who felt less attachment to Rome.

The remarkable resolve of the Rhegines, considering the fact that all other Greek cities in Bruttium rebelled, suggests circumstances specific to Rhegium promoted its loyalty. The deciding factor in Rhegium’s loyalty may have local diplomatic rivalries and animosities in addition to the traditional Greek-Bruttian hostility that we have already discussed. For example, Rhegium and Locri maintained a longstanding rivalry over local

\textsuperscript{168} Lomas, \textit{Rome and the Western Greeks} 67-68

\textsuperscript{169} For example, consider Capua and Nola (Chapter 1), Arpi and Salapia (Chapter 2), Locri and Croton (this chapter), and Tarentum and Thurii (Chapter 4).

\textsuperscript{170} Strab. 6.1.2; for the persistence of Hellenistic culture in Magna Graecia preserved in epigraphic sources, see Lomas, in Cornell and Lomas, \textit{Urban Society in Roman Italy} 107-120.
hegemony.\textsuperscript{171} The territories of the two cities abutted along the Halex River, so attempts at territorial expansion by Locri, at least to the south and west, would have come at the expense of Rhegium.\textsuperscript{172} As rivals, the two cities tended to fall on opposite sides of a number of conflicts dating to the fifth century BC. In 427-6 BC, Syracuse and Leontini were at war, and the Locrians sided with Syracuse while the Rhegines sided with the Leontini.\textsuperscript{173} Dionysius I of Syracuse appears to have manipulated the Locri-Rhegium rivalry. Dionysius I initially sought an alliance with the Rhegines, fearing that the Carthaginians could use both Rhegium’s military and its strategic location against his interests in Sicily. In his embassy to Rhegium, Dionysius I offered a marriage alliance and specifically promised that the alliance would furnish Rhegium with territorial expansion.\textsuperscript{174} When the Rhegines refused his alliance, Dionysius I immediately sought and gained an alliance with Locri.\textsuperscript{175} Dionysius used Locri as a base of operations against the Rhegines, ultimately capturing Rhegium, ruling it for twelve years, and giving portions of the territory he captured in Bruttium to the Locrians.\textsuperscript{176} The campaign suggests that Dionysius made promises of territory to the Locrians similar to those he had

\textsuperscript{171} Costamagna and Sabbione, \textit{Una città in Magna Grecia} 37

\textsuperscript{172} Strab. 6.1.9. The Halex has been identified with the modern rivers Amendolea, Melito, or Galati, see Osanna, \textit{Chorai coloniali} 214, Osanna prefers the Galati because its geography conforms to Strabo’s description and on toponymic grounds (the site was called Alica in the Middle Ages). That the nature of the Rhegine-Locrian rivalry was territorial and that the two cities struggled for control of Hipponium and Medma is argued by Ciaceri, \textit{Storia della Magna Grecia} 2.190-4. The loss of territory is implied in Strab. 6.1.6, which states that Rhegium was once a powerful city with many dependencies in the area.

\textsuperscript{173} Thuc. 3.86; there may have been a cultural factor as well, since Rhegium and Leontini were both Chalcidian colonies.

\textsuperscript{174} Diod. Sic. 14.44.3-4

\textsuperscript{175} Diod. Sic. 14.44.6-7, 14.106.1, 14.107.2-5

\textsuperscript{176} Diod. Sic. 14.100.1-2, 14.106.3, 14.107.2-5, 14.11.1-113.1; Dion. Hal. 20.7.3

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made to the Rhegines. Moreover, Dionysius of Halicarnassus records that the Locrians invited Dionysius I into Italy because of their local squabble with the Rhegines.\textsuperscript{177} Dionysius II maintained a garrison in Reginium. After Dionysius II was driven from Syracuse, he sought refuge in Locri. Eventually, anti-Dionysian forces drove the garrison from Rhegium and restored Rhegine independence;\textsuperscript{178} once again, Locri and Rhegium were in opposing camps.\textsuperscript{179} The rivalry likely played a role in the Pyrrhic War. The Rhegines began the Pyrrhic War on the side of the Romans. There may have been an aristocratic plot to turn the city over to Pyrrhus, but as noted above, this plot probably would have been formed only after the legio Campana seized control.\textsuperscript{180} In any case, Pyrrhus never controlled Rhegium.\textsuperscript{181} Meanwhile, Locri welcomed Pyrrhus, at least at the beginning of the war.\textsuperscript{182} These events show a consistent pattern, suggesting that there was a longstanding rivalry between Locri and Rhegium and that the two cities tended to oppose each other regardless the conflict.

Locri was not the only Greek city with which Rhegium maintained a longstanding rivalry. Rhegium was strategically located overlooking the Messinian Straits and lay only a few miles away from Sicily. Rhegium was often deeply involved in Sicilian affairs. From the fifth century on, Rhegium and Syracuse, the most powerful Siciliote

\textsuperscript{177} Dion. Hal. 20.7.2-3

\textsuperscript{178} Diod. Sic. 16.17.1-2, 16.18.1, 16.45.9; Just. 21.2.1-9

\textsuperscript{179} Dionysius ultimately was driven from Locri; however, the important point is that he was initially welcome in Locri.

\textsuperscript{180} See above pp. 235-236.

\textsuperscript{181} There is some evidence Pyrrhus tried to capture Rhegium but failed; see App. Samn. 12.1; Zon. 8.6.

\textsuperscript{182} Just. 18.1.9
city, were more often than not on opposing sides in various conflicts. As mentioned above, Rhegium sided with Leontini in the Syracuse-Leontini war recorded in Thucydides. There was a drawn out struggle between Dionysius I and Rhegium that resulted in the destruction of Rhegium and the establishment of a “Syracusan empire” on the Italian peninsula. Dionysius II re-founded Rhegium in honor of his father, but garrisoned the city. Rhegium undoubtedly sided with Dion in his struggle with Dionysius II, and it was two Syracusans, Leptines and Callippus who finally liberated Rhegium by ejecting Dionysius II’s garrison. This should not be seen as a softening of Rhegium’s relationship with Sicily so much as Sicilian domination of Rhegine affairs and the Rhegines preference for any Sicilian leadership over Dionysus II. Around 317 BC, Syracuse under the oligarchic rule of the Six Hundred besieged Rhegium, but the Rhegines called in Agathocles, who successfully relieved the siege and helped topple the Syracusan oligarchy.

The Rhegium-Locri and Rhegium-Syracuse rivalries helped maintain Rhegine loyalty during the Hannibalic War. By the time Carthaginian forces besieged Rhegium,

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183 Lomas, *Rome and the Western Greeks* 68: “[Rhegium] had enjoyed a closer diplomatic relationship with Sicily, owing to its geographical situation, than with most other areas of Magna Graecia.” Lomas’ wording is ambiguous, and the following discussion will show that Rhegium’ diplomatic relationships with Sicilian cities were not always pleasant.

184 Thuc. 3.86

185 Diod. Sic. 14.100.1-2, 14.106.3, 14.107.2-5, 14.11.1-113.1; Dion. Hal. 20.7.3; see Caven, *Dionysius I* 127-146, for a reconstruction of the diplomatic maneuvering and warfare between Rhegium and Dionysius, c. 395-386 BC.

186 Diod. Sic. 16.17.1-2, 16.18.1, 16.45.9; Just. 21.2.1-9; see Caven, *Dionysius I* 213-21, for a reconstruction of Dionysius II’s reign.

187 Diod. Sic. 19.4.2-3
Locri had already gone over to Hannibal’s side, and as has already been discussed, the Locrians likely were promised local hegemony in return for allying with Hannibal.\textsuperscript{188} The Locrians had long struggled with Rhegium for territory in the toe of Bruttium, and the Rhegines certainly saw that an effective Bruttian-Locrian bloc posed a serious threat to Rhegine independence, particularly in light of Rhegium’s conflict with the Bruttii. Also, by the fall of 215 BC, Syracuse either had switched allegiances or was leaning in that direction under Hieronymus.\textsuperscript{189} Both accounts of the revolt of Syracuse indicate clearly that Hieronymus expected territorial gain in return for an alliance with Hannibal.\textsuperscript{190} By late 215 BC, all Bruttium had sided with Hannibal, and also the two most powerful local Greek hegemonic powers, both of which were long-time rivals to Rhegium, had sided with Hannibal. These new allies of Hannibal saw the Carthaginian cause as a means to territorial expansion, which clearly threatened Rhegine interests. Therefore, the ruling aristocracy of Rhegium calculated that remaining loyal to Rome held out better prospects than submission to the Carthaginians.

\textsuperscript{188} See above pp. 216-223.

\textsuperscript{189} Pol. 7.2.1-8.9 and Liv. 24.4.1-7.9 provide the narrative for the death Hiero, the accession of Hieronymus, and the treaty between Hannibal and Syracuse, but there is little detail to confirm during what months these events occurred. De Sanctis, \textit{Storia dei Romani} 3.2.317-22 has worked out the chronology such that Hiero died in the spring or summer of 215 BC, and Hieronymus was assassinated in the summer of 214 BC. Polybius (7.2.1-2) implies that Hieronymous sent envoys to Hannibal soon after the death of Hiero. The Romans sent envoys to renew their previous treaty with Syracuse. According to Polybius (7.3.1-4), Hieronymus had yet to sign a treaty with Hannibal, but there were already Carthaginian ambassadors in Syracuse who had informed Hieronymus of recent Roman military defeats; according to Livy (24.6.1-7), Syracuse and Hannibal had already agreed to terms by the time the Roman envoys arrived on the scene. In either case, both narratives suggest that Hieronymus had been advised to treat with Hannibal relatively early in his short reign. If we assume an early death for Hiero (spring 215 BC), it possible that Syracuse had sided with Hannibal around the same time or soon after Locri had surrendered.

\textsuperscript{190} Pol. 7.4.1-9; Liv. 24.6.7-9
To summarize: Rhegium was not immune to political rivalries and divided loyalty. However, Rome was able to maintain the loyalty of enough of the local elite to prevent Rhegium from revolting. When Hannibal gained the Bruttii as allies, he initially strengthened the resolve of the Greek cities in Bruttium to stay loyal to Rome. Hannibal was able to overcome the anti-Bruttian sentiment in Croton, Locri, and other dependent communities in Bruttium. However, Hannibals’ strategy could entirely neutralize the effects of local rivalries on the decision-making of local aristocracies. In particular, the Rhegines preferred an alliance to Rome as a counterweight against Bruttian, Syracusan, or Locrian aggression. The hesitance of Rhegium to revolt when Locri, Syracuse, and Croton revolted bought Rome time to garrison (or further garrison) the city. The combination of long-term conditions (local rivalries) and short-term factors (Rome’s military response) proved too much for Hannibal’s strategy to overcome – Rhegium would remain staunchly loyal to Rome.

3.6 The longterm failure of Hannibal in western Magna Graecia and Bruttium

By the end of 215 BC in Bruttium, Hannibal had been very successful in prosecuting the war but not successful enough. Hannibal’s incomplete success in Bruttium and western Magna Graecia, especially his failure to capture Rhegium, contributed to his long-term strategic failure. Proximately, Rhegium offered a refuge for the pro-Roman exiles from Locri who would later orchestrate the Roman recapture of their home city. Rhegium would also serve as a base for future raids by Roman and allied forces against the territories of Hannibal’s allies. In response, Hannibal was compelled to leave garrisons to protect his allies, lest Roman reprisals discredit Hannibal’s promises that he would liberate Rome’s Italian allies. However, these garrisons used up troops that
Hannibal could have used elsewhere. In fact, because Rome still controlled Rhegium, Bruttium became a rear front that could distract Hannibal while he was engaged in the critical campaign in Campania and in operations around Tarentum. Finally, Rome was able to secure a major port in southern Italy and use Rhegium as a staging area for the war in Sicily, while Rhegium continued to supply ships to outfit the Roman navy. This section will trace briefly the long-term effects of Rhegium’s loyalty on the outcome of the Second Punic War.

Rhegium made contributions to Rome’s naval operations during the Second Punic War. First, Rhegium was the best natural port between Naples and Tarentum, and far superior in this regard to Locri.\textsuperscript{191} Since Rhegium, Naples, Brundisium, and Tarentum (until 213/2 BC) remained loyal, Hannibal deprived of the better ports in Italy through which he could hope to receive reinforcements. Perhaps more important, however, is the fact that Rhegium was strategically located, controlling the straits of Messina and the easiest access between Italy to Sicily.\textsuperscript{192} Second, Rhegium was a \textit{socius navalis} and therefore supplied the Roman navy with ships and presumably crews.\textsuperscript{193} Rhegium’s exact military obligation is not clear, but we can estimate that the Rhegines were bound by treaty to supply at most about four ships.\textsuperscript{194} In at least one instance during the Second

\textsuperscript{191} Thiel, \textit{History of Roman Sea-Power} 61-62.

\textsuperscript{192} For example, see Liv. 26.39.1-3: The garrison commander in the citadel of Tarentum expected that Rome could convey supplies by ship from Sicily to Tarentum. In order to protect the fleet, the Romans had a fleet of twenty ships stationed at Rhegium. The passage shows clearly that Rhegium controlled the shipping lanes along the coast of Italy and Sicily.

\textsuperscript{193} For Rhegium as a \textit{socius navalis}, see Afzelius, \textit{Die römische Kriegsmachte} 89; Toynbee, \textit{Hannibal’s Legacy} 1.491 n. 8.

\textsuperscript{194} During the war with Antiochus (191 BC), the Rhegines supplied unspecified number of ships (Liv. 35.16.3, 36.42.1-3). During the war with Perseus (171 BC), Rhegium supplied a single trireme (Liv. 42.48.7). During the Second Punic War (210 BC) the Romans had a fleet of twenty ships in Rhegium: five
Punic War, the Romans used the port facilities of Rhegium as a base for naval operations, to which the Rhegines also supplied ships: Rome tried to convey supplies to the besieged Roman garrison in the citadel of Tarentum. Although the mission ultimately failed, the episode indicates that Rome could put pressure on Hannibal’s allies because Hannibal had failed to secure universal support among the cities in southern Italy. Livy also reports that in 208 BC the Romans tried to capture Locri through a combined assault by land (from troops stationed in Tarentum) and by sea (from a fleet in Sicily under the command of Lucius Cincius). Although Livy is not explicit, the fleet likely would have crossed the straits of Messina and passed by Rhegium, possibly stopping along the way. Once again, Rome’s control of this strategic port city allowed its to put military pressure on Hannibal’s allies.

The Romans also attacked Bruttian communities, sometimes using Rhegium as a base for these operations. By devastating Bruttian territory and storming settlements, the Romans were able to show that Hannibal was incapable of protecting his allies and thus undermine the loyalty of Hanibal’s remaining allies. In 210 BC, the consul M. Valerius Laevinus led a band of mercenaries, 4,000 strong according to Livy, to Rhegium where they were employed by the Rhegines to plunder Bruttium. The following year the same group of mercenaries were employed to plunder Bruttium and attack the city of

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196 Liv. 27.26.3-6
197 Liv. 26.40.16-18
In 206 BC the Romans plundered the territory of Consentia and apparently collected a great deal of plunder, after which they marched into Lucania. Many Bruttian communities remained loyal to Hannibal until the waning years of the war. For example, the Romans were still storming Bruttian towns, including the urbanized center of Consentia, as late as 204 BC. However, Roman reprisals did take their toll on Bruttian loyalty. For example, the loyalty of Consentia appears to have wavered, and the city may have switched sides several times in the war. More striking is Livy’s account of the second plundering campaign by the mercenaries stationed in Rhegium. Livy states that the mercenary ranks swelled between 210 BC and 209 BC from Bruttian deserters. Finally, the successful campaign around Consentia in 206 BC appears to have convinced some Lucanian communities to surrender.

Hannibal was forced to defend his allies in Bruttium and western Magna Graecia in order to avoid the appearance that he had abandoned his allies. Therefore, Hannibal placed garrisons in a number of Bruttian towns. However, these garrisons had the potential to engender resentment on the part of the people they were supposed to protect. For example, in 210 BC, some Bruttian aristocrats agreed to betray their city, Tisia, to the

198 Liv. 27.12.4-6; App. Hann. 49
199 Liv. 28.11.12-15
200 Liv. 29.38.1-2, 30.19.10; App. Hann. 56
201 Liv. 23.30.5, 25.1.2
202 Liv. 27.12.4-6
203 Liv. 28.11.15
Romans because they resented the Carthaginian garrison.\textsuperscript{204} Moreover, if we are to believe Appian, the relationship between Hannibal and the Bruttii became more strained after the battle of the Metaurus (207 BC), when Hannibal retreated to Bruttium. Hannibal’s presence was a burden to the Bruttians and Hannibal began to suspect numerous plots by the local aristocrats to hand over their cities.\textsuperscript{205} Perhaps most importantly, Hannibal was often trapped between protecting allies in two different theatres of the Italian war because he could not match Rome’s manpower advantage. For example, Hannibal successfully defended Caulonia from the Roman siege of 209 BC. However, Fabius Maximus had planned to attack Hannibal’s allies in multiple theatres; thus he commanded the attack on Caulonia and ordered Marcellus to keep Hannibal busy in Apulia.\textsuperscript{206} When Hannibal heard that Caulonia was under attack, he hastened to protect the city. Fabius took advantage of Hannibal’s absence to capture Tarentum.\textsuperscript{207}

Finally, Hannibal’s failure to capture Rhegium led directly to Rome’s re-conquest of Locri. Locri had remained a staunch ally of Hannibal throughout most of the war, and Hannibal took advantage of the city’s port in its early stages. For example, Carthage sent a fleet with reinforcements that put in at Locri.\textsuperscript{208} The city also resisted Roman attempts

\textsuperscript{204} App. \textit{Hann}. 44. Hannibal recaptured the city, but the Roman forces escaped to Rhegium showing the importance of Rhegium as pro-Roman safe haven in Bruttium. Hannibal executed the aristocrats who were responsible and placed another garrison in the city.

\textsuperscript{205} App. \textit{Hann}. 54, 57, though one may suspect the details.

\textsuperscript{206} Liv. 27.12.1-6, which also shows that seizing Tarentum was Fabius’ strategic goal in ordering these coordinated attacks.

\textsuperscript{207} Liv. 27.15.8, 16.9-11

\textsuperscript{208} Liv. 23.41.10-12
to capture it, albeit with Hannibal’s assistance.\textsuperscript{209} Finally, the city remained pro-Hannibalic as late as 205 BC, when the war had clearly turned against Hannibal. However, Rome was able finally to capture this longtime Hannibalic bastion because Rhegium remained pro-Roman. According to Livy, when Locri first sided with the Carthaginians a number of Locrian aristocrats fled the city and sought refuge in Rhegium.\textsuperscript{210} In 205 BC, after Roman and Rhegine raiding of the territory of Locri, a number of Locrian citizens were captured.\textsuperscript{211} The Locrian exiles recognized the opportunity to take back control of their city, so they promised to ransom the Locrian captives on the promise that they would betray the city. Livy’s account emphasizes that the Locrian aristocrats were motivated by personal enmity toward their rival aristocrats (\textit{cupiditate inimicos ulciscendi arderent}). The Romans were involved in the planning and Scipio sent 3,000 soldiers to assist in the capture of the city.\textsuperscript{212} The ransomed Locrians helped the Roman force enter the city, but the Romans met stiff resistance from the Carthaginian garrison. However, according to Livy, the Locrians turned on the Carthaginian garrison and allowed the Romans to seize the city.\textsuperscript{213} The Carthaginians still held the citadel and Hannibal tried to relieve his troops, but Scipio reinforced the Roman

\textsuperscript{209} Liv. 27.25.11-26.6

\textsuperscript{210} Liv. 29.6.5. Livy’s account underscores the how local political rivalries played out during the Second Punic War. Livy states explicitly that when Locri joined Hannibal, the leading party was driven out by an opposing faction (\textit{Locrensium principibus qui pulsi ab advera factione}).

\textsuperscript{211} Liv. 29.6.2-4

\textsuperscript{212} Liv. 29.5.6-9

\textsuperscript{213} Liv. 29.6.17. Livy states that the Locrians had grown to resent the Carthaginian garrison, which shows again the long-term problems Hannibal faced when he was forced to fight a war of attrition and leave garrisons in allied cities in order to protect the cities from Roman reprisals and to bolster the pro-Hannibalic aristocrats in those cities.
garrison now holding the city. When Hannibal reached Locri his assault was rebuffed, so he withdrew and ordered the Carthaginians holding the citadel to withdraw as well.\textsuperscript{214}

To conclude: by 204 BC Hannibal controlled only a small corner of southern Italy, and the Second Punic War in Italy had all but ended. The Hanniballic strategy was perhaps most effective in Bruttium, for Hannibal won over all of the Bruttii and nearly all of the Greek cities on the coast of Bruttium. However, even where his strategy worked very well, it was not a total success. Local rivalries and political divisions delayed the acquisition of two important Bruttian cities, Petelia and Consentia. Also, traditional hostility between the Bruttii and the coastal Greeks made the Greeks hesitant to join Hannibal. The Carthaginians finally won over the powerful city of Locri, in part because they had captured a number of Locrian citizens whom they used as leverage in negotiations and in part because the Locrians saw Hannibal has a means to further their own hegemonic interests. The revolt of Locri encouraged other Greek cities to revolt. For example, the smaller cities that tended to follow Locri’s lead soon revolted from Rome. Locri’s revolt also led to the revolt of Croton. The Crotoniates were very hesitant to revolt because they feared the Bruttii. However, the Locrians allowed many of the Crotoniates, presumably those who most resisted submission to the Bruttii, to settle in Locri. This allowed these Crotoniates to choose the “lesser of two evils,” submission to a fellow Greek state rather than submission to or destruction by the Bruttii. Any Crotoiates who were less concerned about the Bruttii presumably stayed in Croton and cohabited with them. But Hannibal was not completely successful in winning over all the Greek cities. Rhegium was a longtime rival of Syracuse and Locri and shared the general Greek

\textsuperscript{214} Liv. 29.7.1-10
mistrust of the Bruttii. When the Carthaginians gained alliances with Syracuse, Locri, and the Bruttii, the Rhegines became more confirmed in their loyalty to Rome. Also, the Carthaginians did not secure Croton until late 215 BC or early 214 BC, and by this time Rome was able to station a garrison in Rhegium and prevent the city from being taken by storm. Rhegium would remain loyal for the rest of the war.

As we argued in the chapters concerning Campania and in Apulia, the incomplete success of the Hannibalic strategy allowed long-term Roman strategic advantages to come into play. In particular in Bruttium, Rome was able to use Rhegium as base both for raids against the Bruttii and for naval operations. Rhegium commanded the straits of Messina and access to Syracuse, and the Rhegines supplied ships to the Roman navy. Hannibal was forced to garrison allied communities in Bruttium so that he would not appear to have abandoned his allies to Roman reprisals. However, these garrisons not only consumed valuable manpower, but also they tended over time to engender resentment from the inhabitants of the garrisoned cities. This further eroded Hannibal’s position and made the return to Roman rule more attractive. Finally, Hannibal did not have the resources to defend all of allies, and Rome was able to exploit this. In particular, the Romans used an attack on Caulonia to distract Hannibal while Fabius Maximus captured Tarentum.

This chapter has shown that the failure of the Hannibalic strategy in Bruttium is consistent with its failure in Campanian and Apulia. Hannibal’s failure to achieve his objective was rooted in local conditions, including intra-city political rivalries and inter-city hostilities, that allowed Rome to recover after Cannae and let long-term Roman strategic advantages to overcome Hannibal’s short-term military success.
CHAPTER 4

EASTERN MAGNA GRAECIA AND THE LUCANIANS

4.1 Introduction

Tarentum should be numbered among the most important cities to ally with Hannibal during the Second Punic War. Tarentum was a powerful city with a tradition of hegemonic aspirations, and its revolt in the winter of 213/212 BC set off a domino effect that left every city along the Gulf of Taranto in Hannibal’s hands. Scholars have tended to view the Tarentine revolt as an expression of Italian Hellenism and a general desire by proud western Greeks to recapture their past glory.¹ However, revolts of Tarentum, Thurii, Metapontum, and Heraclea occurred at least two years after the revolts of Locri and Croton, while neither Rhegium nor Naples ever revolted during the Second Punic War. Moreover, it has already been demonstrated that Locri and Rhegium were bitter rivals; Tarentum and Thurii were also longtime rivals for hegemony.² These facts undermine efforts to explain the revolts in terms of general Greek sentiment. Ancient literary evidence also contradicts the notion that the revolts were rooted in a sense of

¹ For example, see De Sancis, Storia dei Romani 3:2. 264-266; Halward, CAH 8.76-7; Caven, The Punic Wars 165-6.

² For Locri and Rhegium, see Chapter 3, pp. 240-242; for Thurii and Tarentum, see below pp. 266-269.

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Greek brotherhood. Katherine Lomas suggests that the revolt of southern was centered on the Italiote league, a confederation comprised of many of the Greek cities in southern Italy under the hegemony of Tarentum. Since the revolt of league hegemon Tarentum occurred after the revolt of league members Locri and Croton, this explanation seems inadequate.

This chapter will argue that the Tarentines revolted because of conditions specific to Tarentum rather than general to the Greeks of Southern Italy. Tarentum traditionally exercised hegemony over neighboring Greek cities and Italic peoples, but Roman domination in southern Italy curtailed Tarentum’s local hegemony. Moreover, Roman rule generated disaffection among the Tarentines, and by the middle of the Second Punic War a group of Tarentine aristocrats coalesced into an anti-Roman party. Hannibal’s battlefield success combined with the prospect that a Tarentine-Hanniballic would restore Tarentum to its position of local hegemon lent credibility to the anti-Roman party while at the same time undermining the position of the aristocrats promoting the pro-Roman position. Finally, when Hannibal marched near Tarentum and gave direct support to the anti-Roman party, they seized power and joined Tarentum to Hannibal.

It is not surprising that the Tarentines preferred Hannibal to Rome; indeed, this chapter will also argue that at the outbreak of the Second Punic War the city would have been a likely candidate for revolt. Instead, the noteworthy feature of the Tarentine revolt is its lateness. By the time the Tarentines revolted, the Roman had begun to recover

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3 Liv. 25.15.7 states explicitly that the Thurii revolted not out of common cause with the Tarentines or because of cultural ties with the Metapontines, but rather because of anger against Rome. App. Hann. 35 states that Heraclea revolted out of fear, and the passage implies that it was at least in part fear of Tarentum and Metapontum.
some lost ground from Hannibal, and within two years of the Tarentine revolt, Capua fell to the Romans and the tide of the war had turned clearly against Hannibal. Moreover, Hannibal never gained control of Tarentum’s citadel and therefore never fully benefited from holding the city. Rather Hannibal was forced to station a garrison in the city, and his concern to protect the Tarentines from the Roman-controlled citadel forced him to divide his attention between Tarentum and other Italian theatres of the war. Hannibal’s ultimate strategic failure in southeastern Italy stemmed, therefore, from Hannibal’s failure to capitalize soon enough on Tarentum’s inclination to revolt from Rome.

Finally, as mentioned above, the revolt of Tarentum set off a domino effect in which all the Greek cities on the coast of Lucania also revolted. This chapter will further examine the local conditions that compelled the cities of Metapontum and Heraclea to revolt in the wake of Tarentum’s alliance with Hannibal. In particular, Heraclea and Metapontum had traditional ties to Tarentum and tended to put themselves, with varying degrees of willingness, under Tarentum’s power. Tarentum’s alliance with Hannibal helped convince the aristocracies of Heraclea and Metapontum also to join Hannibal. Thurii was a longtime rival of Tarentum, and we should expect the revolt of Tarentum to have confirmed the loyalty of the Thurian aristocracy. However, Thurii also allied with Hannibal in the wake of the Tarentine revolt. This chapter will argue that short term and immediate factors convinced the Thurians to revolt. In particular, Roman abuses against Thurian citizens made an alliance with Hannibal look more attractive. This points to the limits of the influence of local rivalries in shaping foreign policy decisions.

4 Lomas, Rome and the Western Greeks 60-61.
4.2 The failure to elicit Tarentum’s revolt (216-213 BC)

Even after Hannibal’s crushing victory at Cannae, rebellions failed to materialize among the Greek cities of the eastern Ionian coast, which included Tarentum, Metapontum, Thurii, and Heraclea. Ultimately, the important city of Tarentum did revolt, and this event led to Hannibal’s control of the entire Ionian coast except for the territory of Rhegium. However, the revolt of Tarentum did not occur until the winter of 213/212 BC, though there had been previous rumblings of sedition. The delay of the Tarentine revolt was critical in Hannibal’s ultimate strategic failure in southeast Italy. Previous attempts to explain Tarentum’s hesitance to revolt in the wake of Cannae have tended to focus on one or a combination benefits that Roman rule supposedly afforded the Tarentines. For example, it has been suggested that Roman domination of southern Italy actually encouraged Tarentine trade while at the same time protecting the Tarentines from incursions by inland Italic peoples. However, we will see that the Tarentines would

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5 The sources for the revolt of Tarentum generate a certain amount of confusion. Statements that Tarentum revolted immediately after Cannae are clearly anachronistic (Pol. 3.118.3; Liv. 22.61.12). Polybius’ full narrative of events (8.24-34) is from a fragmentary book and lacks reference to specific dates. Livy’s account (25.7.10-11.20) places the revolt after the beginning of consular year 212 BC (25.3.1) and possibly before April 26, 212 BC (25.12.1). However, Livy also states that while most of his sources dated the event to 212 BC, some placed it in 213 BC (25.11.20). Livy later records a debate in which the Roman garrison commander in Tarentum is said to have held the citadel for five years (27.35.4); since Tarentum was recaptured in 209 BC (27.12.1-3, 15.4-16.9), the reference suggests Tarentum revolted in 213 BC. Appian (Hann. 35) records that Tarentum revolted in the year before the death of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, which occurred in 212 BC (Liv. 25.16). The best solution relies on the assumption that Polybius’ Book 8 covered Olympic years 141.1-141.4, corresponding to the consular years 214/3-213/212 BC. Hannibal besieged the citadel of Tarentum during the winter (Pol. 8.33.13), so it is likely that he captured Tarentum in the winter of 213/212 BC, before the beginning of consular year 212/211 BC. The confusion in Livy’s sources (25.11.20) reflects the overlap of Olympic years and consular years, and Roman annalists placed the revolt of Tarentum in either 213 or 212 BC. For this reconstruction, see De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 3.2.322-4; HCP 2.5,100-111; however, Lazenby, Hannibal’s War 110 places events between March 15 and April 26, 212 BC. If we assume the Roman calendar was running about four weeks ahead of the solar calendar in 212 BC and March 15 = c. February 15 (solar) and April 26 = c. March 26, then the fall of Tarentum may have occurred in late winter and still fallen after March 15 on the Roman calendar; see Derow, Phoenix 30 (1976) 272-3.
not have perceived any “benefits” from Roman domination, but rather that Roman rule brought a number of burdens that should have promoted disaffection and encouraged the Tarentines to revolt when Hannibal entered Italy.

Tarentum’s stature as a powerful city with a long history of exerting local hegemony should have made the Tarentines inclined to side with Hannibal. Indeed, the Tarentines probably would have seen Hannibal as a means to re-assert their regional hegemony, which they had lost when the Romans conquered them. Tarentum was the most powerful Greek city in southern Italy. It had a history of allying with Hellenistic condottieri to further its hegemonic interests and had previously allowed its hegemonic aspirations bring its into conflict with Rome.

According to ancient literary evidence, Tarentum was the most powerful Greek city along the central coast of the Gulf of Taranto, corresponding roughly to the southern border of ancient Lucania. Livy writes that Tarentum and Thurii were two of the nobilissarum Graecarum civitatium in Italy. Strabo comments on Tarentum’s large harbor, formidable acropolis, and extensive defensive walls that stretched 100 stades in circumference. Indeed, Strabo emphasizes that although the city had declined greatly after its fall in the Second Punic War to his own day, the city remained worthy in size.

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6 Strabo (6.1.4, 15. 3.1) states that Thurii to the west and Metapontum to the east bounded the southern coast of Lucania, while Tarentum (Taras) lay in Messapia. Bruttium and Lucania together formed Augustus’ Regio III, the eastern boundary of which was Metapontum, and Tarentum lay in Regio II (Plin. N.H. 97-9). This chapter will include Tarentum in the southern coast of Lucania, since the city straddled Lucania and Messapia, and was intimately involved with the other Greek cities in western Magna Graecia (Metapontum, Heraclea, and Thurii).

7 Liv. 25.8.1

8 Strab. 6.3.1

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Modern scholars estimate that the enclosed area of Tarentum exceeded 500 ha. The Tarentini expanded the territory of the colony from a core area around the Mare Piccolo, until the Tarentine *chora* extended from the Bradano River and the border with Metapontum along the coast as far south as modern-day Campomarino and inland to the Murge perhaps as far as Crispiano. In terms of territory, Tarentum was certainly the largest Greek city in southern Italy by the fourth century BC.

Literary evidence paints a clear picture of Tarentum as a regional hegemon that, from the middle of the fourth century BC, tried to extend its territory and assert control over neighboring Greek settlements. First of all, Tarentum assumed the position of hegemon of the so-called Italiote League. The league had been formed under the dominance of Croton in the fifth century, along the lines of the Achaean league. The league was disbanded by Dionysius I of Syracuse after the tyrant defeated it in the early fourth century BC. It is unclear when the league was revived, but it would appear that by the middle of the fourth century hegemony of the Italiote League had passed to Tarentum. We do not know what states composed the revived league, and the status of the league after the Roman defeat of Pyrrhus and its conquest of Magna Graecia is

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9 Lomas, *Rome and the Western Greeks* 21

10 Osanna, *Chorai coloniali* 19. The settlement of Magna Graecia after Rome defeated Pyrrhus was probably not very severe, and it is safe to assume that there was little or no territory taken from the cites of Magna Graecia after their defeat; see Lomas, *Rome and the Western Greeks* 56-57.

11 Pol. 2.39.1-7; Diod. Sic. 14.91.1, 14.101.1; Walbank 1.225-6; E. Ciaceri, *Storia della Magna Grecia* 2.408ff; Ehrenberg, *AJP* (1948) 149-70. The chronology of the league foundation, its initial purpose, and its membership are all subject to debate. However, the existence of some sort of defensive league of Greek cities in Southern Italy by the early fourth century BC is certain.

12 Strab. 6.3.4 records the only direct evidence that Tarentum was hegemon of the Italiote League, placing Tarentine hegemony sometime before the arrival of Alexander of Epirus in the 340s BC. Lomas, *Rome and the Western Greeks* 35 suggests that Tarentum assumed league hegemony in soon after the capture of Croton by Dionyus I in 390 BC.
equally unclear. However, Lomas argues persuasively that the Roman settlement after the Pyrrhic War was not particularly harsh toward the Italiote Greeks and that it is likely the league continued to function in some form, with Tarentum as hegemon, down to the outbreak of the Second Punic War.\textsuperscript{13}

Regardless of the status of the Italiote League, Tarentum emerged as a hegemonic power in Southern Italy by the middle of the fourth century, and its hegemonic interests came into conflict with Rome’s during the Second Samnite War. The Tarentines promised to reinforce Naples against Roman aggression, and they probably appealed to ethnic fellowship in order to prevent the Neapolitans from surrendering to Roman forces.\textsuperscript{14} It is unclear whether Tarentine support failed to materialize because of logistics or because, as Livy claims, the Tarentines never really intended to send troops.\textsuperscript{15} In either case, Livy is explicit that the Tarentines were angered by the surrender of Naples to Rome and saw the event as a threat to Tarentine hegemonic interests.\textsuperscript{16} In 326 BC, Tarentum tried to destabilize the Roman alliance with the Lucanians by bribing various members of the Lucanian elite to take up arms along side the Samnites against Rome.\textsuperscript{17} Tarentum must have seen the Roman alliance with the Lucanians as an immediate threat

\textsuperscript{13} Lomas, \textit{Rome and the Western Greeks} 56-57, 61

\textsuperscript{14} Liv. 8.25.7-8, 8.27.2

\textsuperscript{15} The latter explanation should imply the Tarentine expectation of loyalty by fellow Greeks rather than duplicity of the part the Tarantines. See Lomas, \textit{Rome and the Western Greeks} 13-7 for a general discussion on the hostility of Roman sources toward the Italiotes, especially Tarentum.

\textsuperscript{16} Liv. 8.27.2-5; see CL 2.685-6.

\textsuperscript{17} Liv. 8.25.6-11, 8.29.1; see CL 2.680-2.
to its local hegemony and acted accordingly.\(^\text{18}\) It is also worth noting that Tarentum attempted to assert hegemony by securing the loyalty of the Lucanian elite and playing off local rival factions, the same method used by Rome to control its allies. Finally, the Tarentines tried unsuccessfully to arbitrate between Rome and the Samnites before their battle near Luceria in 320 BC.\(^\text{19}\) Arbitration was a common in Hellenistic diplomacy, and a hegemonic state often assumed the role of arbitrator.\(^\text{20}\)

Tarentum had a long tradition of employing various Hellenistic *condottieri* to protect the city from hostile Italic peoples and to further its hegemonic interests against other Greek cities. In the 340s BC, the Tarentines appealed to Archidamus of Sparta to help them against the Messapians who had previously overrun nearby Metapontum and Heraclea. Unfortunately for the Tarentines, Archidamus died in battle at Manduria.\(^\text{21}\) From 333 to 330 BC Alexander of Epirus fought with great success against a number of Italic peoples, until his death at Pandosia. Two relevant points to Alexander’s campaign should be emphasized. First, he drove the Messapians from Heraclea and Metapontum, and second, he came to Italy at the request of the Tarentines.\(^\text{22}\) Therefore, the recapture

\(^\text{18}\) *Contra* Lomas, *Rome and the Western Greeks* 47-48, who argues that the events of 326 BC were driven by anti-Roman Lucanian aristocrats rather than by the Tarentines, and that the anti-Roman sentiment of the Tarentines is the product of Livy’s hostility. Lomas does argue, however, that the Lucanian elite would have been encouraged by the Tarentines and that Tarentum saw a Roman-Lucanian alliance as a threat to its power.

\(^\text{19}\) Liv. 9.14.1-16

\(^\text{20}\) Gruen, *The Hellenistic World* 96-101

\(^\text{21}\) Diod. Sic. 16.15.1-2, 16.62.4, 16.63.2; Plut. Agis.3.2; Plin. *NH* 3.98; Lomas, *Rome and the Western Greeks* 41-42

\(^\text{22}\) Liv. 8.3.6, 8.17.9-10, 8.24.1-6, 16; Strab. 6.3.4; Just. *Ep.* 12.2.1-15; Lomas, *Rome and the Western Greeks* 42-43. Justin lists three specific treaties forged by Alexander: with the Romans, the Poediculi, and the Metapontines. The inclusion of Metapontum in this list is curious, and implies that Alexander’s capture of Metapontum was more an act of conquest than liberation. Since he was acting, at least in part, at the
of Heraclea and Metapontum came as a result of Tarentine initiative, and it is safe to conclude that Tarentum had employed Alexander not only to drive off hostile Italic tribes but also to assert hegemony over Metapontum and Heraclea. The strained relations between Alexander and Tarentum support this conclusion. Strabo records that Alexander transferred a Panhellenic festival – likely related to the Italiote League – from Heraclea to Thurii out of enmity toward the Tarentines. The reference shows that Tarantum was concerned with its hegemonic status relative to the neighboring Greek settlements.

Tarantum continued to employ condottieri later in the fourth century BC. In 315/4 BC the Tarentines enrolled Acrotatos of Sparta as protection against Agathocles, the tyrant of Syracuse. According to Diodorus Siculus, Agathocles had made a number of forays into Italy with little success and was driven from Tarentum on suspicion of seditious behavior. The Tarentines received Acrotatos and outfitted him with a fleet so that he could overthrow Agathocles. Acrotatus sailed to Acragas and assumed the office of general; in the meantime the Tarentines sent their fleet to rendezvous with Acrotatos in Acragas. However, when it appeared that Acrotatus was more interested in establishing himself as tyrant of Acragas, the Tarentines withdrew their support and recalled the fleet. In 303/2 BC Tarentum employed Acrotatos’ brother – Cleonymus of Sparta – against a request of the Tarantines, it is possible that Tarentum encouraged the capture of Metapontum as a way to extend its authority along the coast of the Gulf of Taranto.

23 Strabo 6.3.4
24 For the following events surrounding Acrotaos, see Diod. Sic. 19.70.4-71.7
25 Diod. Sic. 19.4.1-2
coalition of Lucanians and, possibly, Romans. While the exact course of events is difficult to disentangle from the sources, the basic outline of the campaign is clear. The Tarentines invited Cleonymus to Italy and supplied him with ships and money. Cleonymus then forged a coalition of Greeks and Messapians, defeated the Lucanians, and possibly conquered some of the cities on the Sallantine peninsula. Diodorus states that Cleonymus forced the Lucanians to accept an alliance with Tarentum. Moreover, Diodorus states specifically that the Metapontines did not come to terms with Cleonymus, so the general attacked and conquered the city using his new Lucanian allies. Cleonymus may have captured Thurii as well before his relationship with Tarentum soured, and he departed Italy. Despite the problematic nature of the sources, it is clear that the Tarentines employed Cleonymus to further their hegemonic interests. Through Cleonymus, Tarentum asserted control over the Lucanians and perhaps the Sallentini as well as control over the Greek city of Metapontum and perhaps Thurii. The campaign also shows Tarentum’s willingness to employ non-Greek allies – Messapians and later Lucanians – to secure hegemony over other Italiote cities.

The most famous Hellenistic condottiere was Pyrrhus, and it is the Pyrrhic War that reveals most clearly Tarentum’s hegemonic tactics. Accounts of the outbreak of the war vary but can be reconciled. According to Appian, the Tarentines had sunk a Roman fleet because it had violated a treaty prohibiting the Romans from sailing beyond the

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26 For the events surrounding Cleonymus, see Diod. Sic. 20.104.1-105.3; Liv. 10.2.1-14; Strab. 6.3.4; MRR 1.169-71.

27 See MRR 1.169, reading of Thurii instead of Thuriae at Liv. 10.2.2.

28 The Lucanians made an alliance with Tarentum, presumably on terms favorable to the Tarentines. It is probable that all of Cleonymus’ conquests, including over Metapontum, took the form of treaties in the name of Tarentum.
Lacinium promontory. He also records that the Tarentines then attacked Thurii, which had allied with Rome; a Roman garrison surrendered and pro-Roman aristocrats were expelled from Thurii.\textsuperscript{29} Other literary references indicate that the Romans had aided the Thurians against attacks by the Lucanians and Bruttians.\textsuperscript{30} Both the appearance of Roman fleets off the Sallentine peninsula and a Roman garrison protecting a neighboring city would have jeopardized Tarentine regional hegemony and must have been viewed as a threat by the Tarentines. Dionysius of Halycarnassus records that Rhegium also sought Roman protection against barbarians.\textsuperscript{31} Dionysius also claims the Rhegians feared the Tarentines, and the passage implies that the barbarian attacks on Thurii may have been prompted by Tarentum. Plutarch states that the invitation of Pyrrhus was an Italiote action under Tarentine leadership.\textsuperscript{32} However, among the peoples furnishing contingents to Pyrrhus’ army – Messapians, Lucanians, and Samnites – Plutarch lists Tarentum as the only Greek city to provide troops and he implies that other Greek cities joined Tarentum only after Pyrrhus’ initial success.\textsuperscript{33} The pattern is consistent with the campaign of

\textsuperscript{29} App. Samn. 7.1-2; Liv. Ep. 12

\textsuperscript{30} Dion. Hal. 19.13.1, 19.16.3, 20.4.2; Liv. Ep. 11, 12; Val. Max. 1.8.6; see also MRR 1.189.

\textsuperscript{31} Dion. Hal. 20.4.1-2. Unfortunately for the Rhegians, the request resulted in the sack of Rhegium by the Mammertines; see Pol. 1.7.6-8; Diod. 22.1.2-3; App. Samn. 9.1.

\textsuperscript{32} Plut. Pyrrh. 13.5

\textsuperscript{33} Plut. Pyrrh. 13.6, 17.5, 18.4. See App. Samn. 10.1; D.H. 19.9.2; Pyrrhus offers to arbitrate between the Romans and Tarentum and, perhaps, the other Italiotes, depending on the source. However, in both accounts Tarentum and various barbarian peoples are mention by name, implying that Pyrrhus was operating on behalf of a coalition of Tarentines and Italic peoples. Plutarch states explicitly (Pyrrh. 18.4) that the Roman senate considered suing for peace because they had been defeated at Heraclea and now faced an even larger army since the Italiote Greeks had joined Pyrrhus: de~loiv ge me;n h;~san ejvndidovnteß oiJ polloi; pro;ß th; n eijhvnhn, hJtthmevnoi te megavlh/ mavch/ kai; prosdokw~nteß eJtevran ajpo; meivzonoß dunavmewß, tw~n Ijalikw~n tw~/ Puvrrw/ prosgegonotwn. However, we
Cleonymus, in which Tarentum tried to employ a combination of Italic allies and a Hellenistic mercenary general to extend its own regional hegemony. The sources clearly agree that Tarentum was the prime mover behind inviting Pyrrhus to Italy, that Tarentum was concerned with Rome undermining its local hegemony, and that Tarentum hoped to use local barbarian tribes and Pyrrhus’ army both as a counterweight against Rome and a means to assert its own power over other Italiotes. Tarentum’s frequent employment of condottieri would have made its a prime candidate for allying with Hannibal, especially since the Carthaginian general adopted the guise of Hellenistic liberator.

As the local hegemonic power in Greek Lucania, Tarentum had controlled a number of satellite cities, a pattern consistent with other local hegemonic powers such as Arpi and Capua. It has already been shown that Tarentum controlled directly a large chora. By the outbreak of the Second Punic War, the Tarentines had come to control the port of Callipolis, far down the southeast coast of the Sallentine peninsula. Through the course of the fourth century BC, Metapontum fell under the domination of Tarentum. Tarentum had invited both Archidamus and Alexander of Epirus to Italy in order to drive the Messapians from Metapontum. In a last grasp at independence, the Metapontines rejected another Tarentine ally, Cleonymus of Sparta. Cleonymus attacked and captured the city with Lucanian reinforcements, took hostages from elite families, and demanded a huge indemnity of 600 talents of silver – approximately one year’s production of wheat.

know that the Tarentines had already supplied Pyrrhus with troops(17.5); therefore, the remaining Italiote Greeks joined Pyrrhus only after he enjoyed initial battlefield success.

34 Dion. Hal. 19.3.1-2; the site was also known as Anxa, modern-day Gallipoli in the Provincia di Lecce. See Lamboley, Recherches sur les Messapiens 243-5; Pomponius Mela 2.66; Plin. H.N. 3.99-100.
according to modern estimates. Archaeological evidence indicates that the city went into rapid decline over the next half century (c. 300-250 BC). It is likely that Metapontum followed Tarentum and allied with Pyrrhus. Overall, it is safe to conclude that Metapontum was a subordinate city to Tarentum by the middle of third century BC. Tarentum also controlled Heraclea, which bordered both Metapontum and Thurii. Heraclea was founded in 433 BC near the site of Siris and according to Strabo was originally a colony of both Thurii and Tarentum. However, the colony was soon considered of Tarentine foundation, and the name was changed to Heraclea. Diodorus preserves a slightly different tradition, that Heracleia was founded with colonists from Tarentum and the remnants of Siris. In either case, Heraclea clearly came to be dominated by Tarentum. Tarentum employed both Archidamus and Alexander of Epirus to drive the Messapians from Heraclea. Moreover, Strabo states explicitly that Heraclea

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35 Diod. Sic. 20.104.1-3; Carter, in Descoeudres, *Greek Colonists and Native Populations* 423-5.

36 Carter, in Descoeudres, *Greek Colonists and Native Populations* 405-41. Carter estimates that at its height in the fourth century BC, the *chora* of Metapontum was bounded by the Bradano and Cavone rivers, and stretched inland over 10 km, for a total area of over 18,000 ha. Carter also estimates a total population of about 20,000 individuals for the last half of the fourth century BC. From 300 BC to 250 BC, the number of occupied rural farm sites observed in archaeological survey fell by half, and by the end of the third century the rural population had nearly vanished.

37 De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* 2.366, 400 n. 87. De Sanctis suggests that Liv. 25.15, which mentions Roman garrisons in Metapontum and Thurii during the Hannibalic War, is evidence that these cities had allied with Tarentum-Pyrrhus, then accepted Roman garrisons after surrendering in or before 270 BC. This is plausible, though it should be noted that Thurii was compelled by Tarentum to receive Pyrrhus and had invited a Roman garrison as protection. However, Metapontum may have been one of the unnamed Greek cites that sent ambassadors along with Tarentum to Pyrrhus (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 13.5). It is not surprising that a weak and subordinate city such as Metapontum would not be mentioned by name supplying troops for Pyrrhus’ cause.

38 Ancient Heraclea was a part and lay a few kilometers from modern Policoro; See Quilici, *Siris-Heraclea* 157-8; Osanna, *Chorai coloniali* 97.

39 Strab. 6.1.14, citing Antiochus. The original colony of Siris had been destroyed.

40 Diod. 12.36.4; see also Strab. 6.1.14, preserving a variant tradition that the Tarentines colonized Heraclea. See Quilici, *Siris-Heraclea* 155-6

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was in Tarentine territory when Alexander moved a Panhellenic festival from there to Thurii, and Heraclea also joined Tarentum and Metapontum in allying with Pyrrhus.

Tarentum and its subordinate cities Metapontum and Heraclea maintained a longstanding rivalry with Thurii. Both Tarentum and Thurii should be considered local hegemonic powers. Livy lists Thurii along side Tarentum as the greatest Greek cities in Italy, and at its height, the Thurians controlled an extensive *chora*. Thurii dominated a territory that stretched north to around present day Trebisacce and the Fiume Saraceno, south beyond Rossano di Calabria to the Fiume Trionto, and inland as far as Spezzano and the confluence of the Coscile and Esaro. The city also controlled the major inland communication routes of the Crati and Coscile rivers. Because of the surrounding topography, Thurii tended to look to the north in the direction of Tarentum. That is, at the Capo Trionto the coastal plain narrows greatly, and the terrain is more rugged and mountainous. However, to the north, while the coastal plain narrows some, the flat land stretches unbroken around the Gulf of Taranto. Any expansion of the Thurian *chora* would naturally be to the north, into the territory of Heraclea and in conflict with Tarentine hegemony.

Despite the importance of Thurii in the literary tradition and its extensive *chora*, archaeological evidence indicates that Thurii was threatened in the late fourth and early third centuries BC. Osanna argues that a number of small sites along the Thurian frontier

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41 Strab. 6.3.4

42 Cic. *Balb.* 22.50; De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* 2.366, 391

43 Liv. 25.8.1

44 For a discussion of the topography, see Osanna, *Chorai coloniali* 146-8, and Map 9 and Map 11.
were abandoned or had been replaced by non-Greek settlements. This is consistent with
the literary references to attacks on Thurii by the Lucanians and Bruttians, and it is also
consistent with a general phenomenon, documented archaeologically, of the contraction
of Greek settlements in Calabria and their reoccupation by “Bruttians.” The combined
threat of Italic tribes and Tarentine aggression led Thurii to seek the protection of the
Romans in the 280s BC. The arrival of a Roman garrison in Thurii, Tarentum’s main
rival in Magna Graecia, further threatened Tarentine hegemony. The Tarentines once
again attacked their rival, throwing out the Roman garrison at Thurii as well as any pro-
Roman Thurian aristocrats.

Indeed, Thurii and Tarentum consistently opposed each other almost from the
foundation of Thurii in 444/3 BC near the site of Sybaris, which Croton had destroyed.
Thurii was technically a pan-Hellenic colony, but a large number of colonists from
Athens dominated the new city. The new colony acted as a counterweight to Spartan
interests in Magna Graecia, since Tarentum was a colony of Sparta. The imposition of
the new colony brought the Thurians into immediate conflict with Tarentum. Both cities
fought for control of the territory between Metapontum and Thurii, occupied previously

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45 Dion. Hal. 19.13.1, 19.16.3, 20.4.2; Liv. Ep. 11, 12; Val. Max. 1.8.6; see also MRR 1.189.
46 For the contraction of Thurian settlement, see Osanna, Chorai coloniali 146.
47 App. Sann. 7.1-2; Liv. Ep. 12
48 Dion. Hal. Lys. 1; Strab. 6.1.13; Diod. Sic. 11.90.3, 12.9.1-12.11.3; Hdt. 5.44-5. The site of Thurii is
between the present day Crati and Coscile rivers, near the town of Sibarí. The urban structures and planning
can be reconstructed with the help of archaeological remains and Diodorus’ unusually detailed account of
the city foundation. See Greco, in Greco (ed.), La città greca antica 413-30; Ehrenberg, AJP 69 (1948)
149-70; Osanna, Chorai coloniali 138-42; Lomas, Rome and the Western Greeks 23-5.
49 In fact, Tarentum (Taras) was Sparta’s only overseas colony. For its foundation, see Brauer, Taras3-10.
Ultimately, Tarentum gained control of Siritide through the colony of Heraclea. An inscription on a trophy erected at Olympia by the Tarentines in commemoration of victory over Thurii, possibly for possession of Siris, indicates the rivalry between the two cities. The rivalry between the cities continued after initial hostilities had subsided. During the Sicilian expedition, the Athenian fleet under Alcibiades was not aided by Tarentum, Metapontum, or Heraclea, but it was received by Thurii. The end of the Alexander of Epirus’s campaign in Italy is clear evidence of a Thurii-Tarentum rivalry. As mentioned above, Alexander transferred a Panhellenic festival – likely related to the Italiote League – from Heraclea to Thurii, out of enmity toward the Tarentines. Tarentum may have employed Cleonymus the Spartan to attack Thurii. By the outbreak of the Second Punic War, Thurii and Tarentum were the most powerful Greek cities along the Gulf of Taranto. The two had a long history of local rivalry that often broke out in open hostility. Tarentum was the more powerful city and exercised hegemony over Metapontum and Heraclea, threatening the territory of Siris.

50 Strab. 6.1.14; Diod. Sic. 12.36.4; see also Strab. 6.1.15, which describes efforts by the “Sybarites” to prevent Tarentum from seizing control of the territory of Siris, and thus effectively control most of the Gulf of Taranto. Tarentine designs to control the Siritide, therefore, predated the foundation of Thurii.

51 Meiggs and Lewis, A Selections of Greek Historical Inscriptions #57; the text of the inscription reads: sku’la ajpo; Qourivon Taranti’ noi ajenqekan Dii; Ojlumpivoi dekavtan.

52 Diod. Sic. 13.3.3-4. However, Thucydides (7.33.4-5, 7.57.11) twice lists the Metapontines, along with the Thurians, as helping Athens. He also states (7.57.11) that Metapontum joined Athens during a period of political instability, perhaps implying that a pro-Athenian party had come to power, while he records (7.33.4-5) that Metapontum had a treaty with Athens. Gomme, HCT 4. 413-4, 439 accepts that Metapontum aided Athens, and does not cite Diod. Sic. 13.3.3-4. If Thucydides is mistaken, then Diodorus’ account indicates that the tendency for Tarentum, Heraclea, and Metapontum to align with each other against Thurii stretches back to the fifth century. If Thucydides’ account is correct, then Metapontum had not yet fallen under Tarentine domination. In either case, Tarentum and Thurii took opposite sides on Athens Sicilian expedition, implying the antiquity of the Tarentum-Thurii rivalry.

53 Strab. 6.3.4

54 Liv. 10.2.1; MRR 1.169
Thurii. By the beginning of the third century the power of Thurii was diminishing, and
the Thurians sought the aid of Rome against both Tarentine and native aggression. This
move, however, only exacerbated the rivalry between the two cities as well as brought
Rome and Tarentum into direct conflict.

Tarentum may also have maintained a rivalry with Brundisium for hegemony of
the Sallentine peninsula, also known variously as Messapia, Calabria, and Iapygia.\(^{55}\)
About a dozen cities occupied the Sallento, and by the third century BC these likely were
organized in a league similar to the Bruttian league. Aletium, Basta, Neretum, Uzentum,
Veretum, Manduria, and Brundisium were the most important cities in the Sallentine
league, and ancient literary evidence suggests that Brundisium was the league hegemon,
or at least the dominant city in the league.\(^{56}\) Florus, referring to the Roman conquest of
the Sallento in the 260s BC, calls Brundisium the capital of the region (\textit{caput regionis}).\(^{57}\)
Zonaras also describes the Roman conquest of the Sallentine peninsula, emphasizing
Bruttium as the focus of the Roman campaign.\(^{58}\) The latter reference implies Brundisium
was the most important city in the Sallentine league.\(^{59}\) We have already noted that
Tarentum employed Archidamus and Alexander of Epirus against the Messapians and
that this probably brought Tarentum into conflict with Brundisium. We have also already

\(^{55}\) Strab. 6.3.1, 5; Plin. \textit{N.H.} 3.99

\(^{56}\) La Bua, in Uggeri, \textit{L’età annibalica e la Puglia} 44-8. An exact list of Sallentine cities is difficult to
produce, since ancient sources record various lists. See Plin. \textit{N.H.} 3.99-100, 105; Strab. 6.3.5-6; see also
Liv. 22.61.12, 27.15.4.

\(^{57}\) Flor. 1.20

\(^{58}\) Zon. 8.7

\(^{59}\) Although Zonaras also points out that Brundisium had a fine harbor. The Romans may have been more
concerned with capturing a valuable harbor than bringing to heel the league hegemon.
noted that Tarentum employed Pyrrhus not only as a counterweight against Rome but also to extend its local hegemony. Messapians composed part of Pyrrhus’ army, suggesting that Tarentum had been able temporarily to assert its dominance over the peninsula. Roman generals celebrated triumphs over the Sallentini in both 267 and 266 BC.\(^6\) Presumably the cities of the Sallentine peninsula were placed under a *foedus* at this time, though the league may have continued to function.\(^6^1\) In fact, La Bua suggests that the deduction of a Latin colony to Brundisium in 244 BC was meant to place the Sallentine league under more strict control, perhaps in response to potential Sallentine rebellion.\(^6^2\) The Latin colony at Brundisium would have been used not only as means to subdue the Sallentini and as a naval base allowing access to Illyria but also as a forward position from which to control Tarentum.\(^6^3\)

To summarize: by the outbreak of the Second Punic War, Roman expansion into and domination of southern Italy limited the opportunities for Tarentine exercise of local hegemony. Rome had colonized Brundisium, one of Tarentum’s regional rivals, and presumably placed the remaining Sallentine communities under a treaty, making Tarentine expansion into the peninsula impossible. Rome also had allied with Thurii, Tarentum’s primary rival for hegemony along the coast of the Gulf of Taranto. Finally,

\(^{6^0}\) *MRR* 1.200-201

\(^{6^1}\) La Bua, in Uggeri, *L’età annibalica e la Puglia* 48-51

\(^{6^2}\) La Bua, in Uggeri, *L’età annibalica e la Puglia* 50-1. For the deduction of Latin Brundisium, see Liv. *ep.* 19; Vell Pat. 1.14.8; *MRR* 1.217; Salmon, *Roman Colonization* 64.

\(^{6^3}\) Sirago, *Puglia Antica* 157. Roman ships stationed in Brundisium afterwards were charged with policing the coast between Tarentum and Brundisium and certainly paid close attention to the Tarentines. See Liv. 23.32.17, 24.11. 3-6.
Roman domination of Magna Graecia also weakened Tarentum’s hold over cities subordinate to its. For example, a Roman garrison was quartered in Metapontum during the Second Punic War, and it had likely been there since the beginning of the war or earlier. Metapontum would have been compelled to fall in line with Roman policy rather than subordinate herself to Tarentine hegemony. According to Cicero, Rome offered Heraclea a very favorable treaty in 278 BC, which the Heracleans enjoyed until the Social War. Since Heraclea was a Roman ally, Tarentum would have had little chance to assert influence over the city. Therefore, Roman rule undercut Tarentine hegemony and must have contributed to anti-Roman sentiment. Throughout the fourth and third centuries BC Tarentum had been the most powerful Italiote city. The Tarentines exercised local hegemonic influence over neighboring Italic tribes as well as other Greek cities. The Tarentines were adept at using non-Greek allies against other Italiote cities and were unafraid to invite various Hellenistic condottieri both to protect Tarentum and to further its local hegemony. Finally, Tarentum’s growing power led its into conflict with Rome and at times led other Italiote cities to seek their own counterweights to Tarentine hegemony. Tarentum would certainly have seen Hannibal as means to reassert its hegemony in southern Italy.

Moreover, Roman domination certainly contributed to political divisions within Tarentum, and we may ask why Hannibal did not successfully exploit those division as he had done in Capua. Plutarch records political debate among the Tarentines over

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64 Pol. 8.34.1; Liv. 25.11.10; App. Hann. 33
65 Cic. Arch. 6, Balb. 21-2; see also Quilici, Siris-Heraclea 162.
whether to invite Pyrrhus to Italy to fight against Rome. Plutarch’s depiction of three parties – the old and sensible who opposed war, the impetuous who sought war, and a third party who remained silent – is clearly over-schematic. However, the account likely reflects the variety of opinions expressed in the Tarentine senate at the point of a momentous foreign policy decision. After Rome defeated Tarentum in 272 BC, vocal anti-Roman aristocrats were likely executed, exiled, or at least removed from power, while Rome probably installed pro-Roman families in power. While no detailed accounts of the capture of Tarentum and the subsequent settlement remain, the fragmentary literary record is consistent with this suggestion. According to Zonaras, a party of Tarentines under the leadership of a certain Nico, grew dissatisfied with Pyrrhus’ commander Milo, who commanded the Pyrrhic garrison in Tarentum. The party set up in a nearby fortress and sent envoys to Rome seeking an alliance. Later, more Tarentines came to oppose Milo, though it is unlikely that Tarentum was uniform in rejecting the Pyrrhic garrison. The account indicates political divisions in Tarentum at the time of Pyrrhus’ control of the city. After Roman conquest in 272 BC, it is likely Rome backed members of the anti-Pyrrhus party while punishing staunch supporters of Pyrrhus. Thus, some Tarentine aristocrats benefited from Roman domination while others suffered. Aristocrats whose families had lost out as a result of Roman rule would have seen Hannibal as an opportunity to promote their own political careers and would have

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66 Lomas, *Rome and the Western Greeks* 70-1 argues that events during the Second Punic War suggest Tarentum was trying to re-assert its hegemony in southeastern Italy.

67 Plut. *Pyrrh.* 13

68 Lomas, *Rome and the Western Greeks* 56.

69 Zon. 8.6
provided Hannibal another lever with which to pry Tarentum from the Roman alliance system. Events during the Second Punic War confirm that Tarentine aristocrats did remain divided in their loyalty to the Roman cause. A number of aristocrats had been held hostage in Rome to insure the Tarentum’s loyalty. The hostages were likely taken in the early stages of the war, presumably from families in whose loyalty the Romans lacked confidence. A cabal of young aristocrats related to the hostages formed the core of the anti-Roman party that helped turn Tarentum over to Hannibal. Polybius’ account indicates these anti-Roman aristocrats curried political favor with their fellow Tarentines before allowing Hannibal to enter the city. The account is consistent with the suggestion that there were Tarentine aristocrats out of favor with Rome who sought Hannibal as a means to promote their political power.

Overall, there was strong impetus for at least some members of the Tarentine aristocracy to revolt. The Tarentine aristocracy was politically divided, and this division should have provided Hannibal with political allies within the city walls. In particular, we should expect that aristocrats whose families had fallen out of favor during the period of Roman domination would have seen Hannibal as a means to further their own political careers. We should also expect that disaffected aristocrats would have appealed to

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70 Liv. 25.7.11-8.1

71 Livy says that the revolt was “long suspected,” suggesting that the Romans may have also held the hostages for some time. It is likely, therefore, that Rome removed the Tarentine hostages to Rome before the battle of Canae, or shortly thereafter, in order to safeguard Tarentum’s loyalty. The hostages would have been in Rome at least three years before the city rebelled in 213/212 BC.

72 Liv. 25.8.2-3

73 Pol. 8.24.11-13
Tarentum’s history as a regional hegemon. That is, anti-Roman politicians should have been able to garner political support by promoting an alliance with Hannibal on the grounds that such an alliance would restore Tarentine power, just as Vibius Virrius had argued in Capua. Indeed, the Tarentines had a long history of employing *condottieri* for the very purpose of extending their hegemony. However, despite the strong impetus for the Tarentines to revolt, the city remained loyal in the wake of the Battle of Cannae and did not rebel until the winter of 213/212 BC. The obvious question is why it did not revolt sooner.

On one level, the answer to the question is relatively simple: the Rome had the loyalty of enough Tarentine aristocrats so that the anti-Roman movement could not seize power. The political influence of anti-Roman aristocrats was limited through the early stages of the war for a variety of reasons. First, some aristocratic families certainly benefited politically from Roman rule, and Rome relied on their loyalty to prevent sedition. Evidence for the Second Punic War suggests at least part of the Tarentine elite remained pro-Roman. When the city fell to Hannibal, some Tarentines chose to retreat to citadel with the Roman garrison rather than remain in the Carthaginian-occupied city. Polybius’ refers to this group as those who “held goodwill toward the Romans” and states explicitly that the pro-Roman Tarentines retreated to the citadel after they understood Hannibal and the anti-Roman party had seized power.\(^7\) That is, the pro-Romans did not retreat to citadel in the confusion, but chose to quit the city rather than submit to Hannibal’s (or pro-Hannibal) rule. Presumably the “supporters of Rome” included pro-

\(^7\) Pol. 8.31.3: οιντσοι μεν ουν των Ταραντινων προκειεσθαι τον προς τον Ρωμαϊκον ειμινοια, γνοντες απεκεφωνον ειδη την αυτοκρατορια; see also Liv. 25.10.7; App. *Hann.* 33.
Roman aristocrats. Livy also records that in 208 BC, after Rome had recovered Tarentum, the senate voted to restore any Tarentine citizens who had been banished by Hannibal. Since Hannibal likely would have concerned himself only with the Tarentine elite, the passage shows that some aristocrats who did not flee to the citadel remained pro-Roman even after Hannibal occupied the city and were forced into exile as a consequence. Staunch pro-Roman aristocrats need not, and likely did not, comprise a majority of the Tarentine ruling class. The successful canvassing of Philomenus and his fellow conspirators suggests many Tarentines could be swayed to either the pro-Roman or the anti-Roman position. Therefore, Rome only needed the pro-Roman bloc to impose more political influence than strongly anti-Roman aristocrats, and Rome likely encouraged pro-Roman aristocratic families. As discussed above, literary evidence for the Roman capture of Tarentum in 272 BC implies the city was politically divided, and it is likely the Romans rewarded the anti-Pyrrhus aristocrats who aided in Rome’s capture of the city. Events from the Second Punic War also suggests that Pro-Roman elite held political sway in Tarentum until 213/212 BC, at least in part, because of Roman backing. Finally, Rome took strong steps to suppress potential anti-Roman aristocrats

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75 Liv. 27.35.3-4

76 This is similar to the political atmosphere in Capua, in which the anti-Roman party was able to win over members of the aristocracy who had pro-Roman leanings (such as Pacuvius Calavius, who was related to prominent Romans by marriage), and thus tip the political balance against the pro-Roman aristocrats. See Liv. 23.6.1-5, 8.1-2; see also Chapter 1, p. 60.

77 There is no explicit evidence that the Romans promoted the political ambitions of local aristocrats in Tarentum, as can be seen in the Capua, with the marriage alliance between Pacuvius Calavius and both Appius Claudius and Marcus Livius (Liv. 23.2.2-6). However, some details in the account of the revolt of Tarentum imply Roman magistrates could act as patrons for Tarentine aristocrats. First, Philemenus apparently made a habit of presenting wild game to the Roman garrison commander. The act was an attempt to win over the confidence and favor of the garrison commander but also reveals a certain intimacy between the magistrate and the local aristocracy (Pol. 8.25.7-8; Liv. 25.8.10). Polybius also records that Livius and his officers enjoyed drunken jests with some of the conspirators, also suggesting amicable
from influencing Tarentine foreign policy. Specifically, Rome held a number of Tarentine aristocrats hostages in Rome, and it has been shown that that taking hostages could bring to heel a city’s ruling elite.  

Once again, however, many of the factors that bolstered the power or the pro-Roman aristocracy and limited the influence of potential anti-Roman aristocratic dissent were visible in other cities in Italy that revolted, with the most obvious example being Capua. We must consider what conditions specific to Tarentum prevented anti-Roman aristocrats from seizing power.

De Sanctis emphasized Tarentum’s role as a center of commerce as an important reason for Tarentine loyalty between 216 BC and 213/212 BC. According to De Sanctis, Roman rule afforded protection for Tarentine ships and therefore fostered trade. However, the evidence suggests that if anything, Tarentum’s economy would have suffered in the years she was under Roman rule. For example, the deduction of Brundisium certainly undermined Tarentine trade. Literary evidence attests that Brundisium was a superior port to Tarentum and that the city was well situated for the interaction between the magistrate and the local aristocracy was not uncommon (Pol. 8.27.4-6). More importantly, Livius had become drunk at an unspecified public celebration. Such events would have provided excellent forums for public displays of loyalty by the local elite and patronage by the Roman magistrate (Pol. 8.25.11, 27.1-7)

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78 Rome held aristocratic hostages from Capua, and this was a critical factor preventing a prior Capuan revolt (Liv. 23.4.8). The Carthaginian capture of Locrian hostages was instrumental in the revolt of Locri (Liv. 24.1.4-5). When the Romans attempted to recapture Arpi, they held a certain aristocrat named Altinius hostage. Meanwhile, Hannibal executed members of Alitius’ family in order to discourage the Arpiani from changing sides (Liv. 24.45.8-14). Hannibal captured a number of Neapolitan aristocrats, though he was unable to bring the city to his side (Liv. 23.1.9-10). Both Rome and Hannibal employed the threat of punishment to aristocrats and their families as a means to control a city.

79 De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* 3.2.265

80 Strab. 6.3.6; see also Plin. *N.H.* 3.101; Ennius. *Ann.* 488.
exchange of trade with southern Balkans and Asia Minor.\textsuperscript{81} Dio records that that Illyrian pirates were harassing ships sailing from Brundisium, suggesting the port functioned as a link between Italy and the east.\textsuperscript{82} In 244 BC, Rome had likely extended the Via Appia from Beneventum, through Venusia and Tarentum, to Brundisium. The extension of the road would have strengthened the lines of communication between Rome and Brundisium and further enabled Brundisium to dominate trade with the east. Strabo also mentions a second road that connected Brundisium to Beneventum by way of Canusium – the so-called “mule road.”\textsuperscript{83} The mule road probably followed the same course as the later Via Traiana\textsuperscript{84} and the route likely existed long before Strabo’s time. Strabo reports that taking the mule road from Beneventum to Brundisium saved the traveler a day’s journey, though the Via Appia was better for travel by carriage.\textsuperscript{85} Certainly traders moving goods from central Italy to southern Italy, less concerned with comfort and more concerned with profit, would have used the mule road instead of the Via Appia and circumvented Tarentum altogether.\textsuperscript{86} Polybius indicates that the deduction of Brundisium

\textsuperscript{81} Strab. 6.3.7

\textsuperscript{82} Dio. 12.49.2

\textsuperscript{83} Strab. 6.3.7

\textsuperscript{84} See Ashby and Gardner, \textit{PBSR} 8 (1912) 104-71

\textsuperscript{85} Strab. 6.3.7

\textsuperscript{86} App. \textit{B.C.} 1.79 reports that Sulla granted Brundisium exemption from all port taxes, a status the city enjoyed to Appian’s day. However, Lomas, \textit{Rome and the Western Greeks} 91-2 argues that the exact date of the exemption is unknown. If the tax exemption predated Sulla, it is possible that Brundisium’s political status gave its a further competitive advantage over Tarentum. Even if the exemption post-dates the third century BC, it is indicative of the long-term ascendancy of Brundisium at the expense of Tarentum.
directly undercut Tarentine trade.\textsuperscript{87} The Tarentines appear to have recognized the commercial threat posed by Brundisium and founded a competing port on the Adriatic coast at Fratuertium (perhaps identified with the modern site of Torre dell’Orso), but it remained unimportant.\textsuperscript{88} Archaeological evidence suggests that the Tarentine economy was in decline during the third century BC. Guzzo notes a drastic decline from the fourth to the third century BC in the number of datable Tarentine graves.\textsuperscript{89} Sirago argues that there was a consistent drop in the quality and quantity of Tarentine coinage in the third century, noting especially that didrachmae from 228 BC were minted at a lesser weight.\textsuperscript{90} The foundation of the Roman colony at Brundisium appears, therefore, to have shifted patterns of commerce and certainly struck a blow against the Tarentine economy.\textsuperscript{91}

Roman rule brought more direct burdens to Tarentum besides the limitation to Tarentine hegemony. As a Greek city, Tarentum was expected to help outfit the Roman navy.\textsuperscript{92} Although Tarentum’s exact naval obligation to Rome is unclear, Polybius does

\textsuperscript{87} Pol. 10.1. According to Polybius, everyone coming from the opposite coast (of the Adriatic) used to land Tarentum and use the town as an emporium to exchange goods because \textit{the town of Brundisium had not yet been founded}: \textit{ajpo;} \textit{gac} \textit{ajvkra}β \textit{Ijapugiva}β \textit{e}β\textit{Si}po-\textit{nta pa-}β \textit{oJ prosferovmeno}β \textit{ejk} \textit{tw-}n \textit{ajntipevra}β \textit{kai;} \textit{kaqormisqi}β \textit{B pro;B th;n Ijtalivan eij}β \textit{Tavrant}Δ \textit{ejpoie}i to \textit{th;n ulperbolhvn, kai;} \textit{tauvt/ su}necp\' to \textit{th/ povlei pro;B ta;B ajllaga;}β \textit{kai;} \textit{metaqevsei}β \textit{oij}on \textit{eij ejmporivw/}, oujdevpw \textit{ga;r sunevbaine tovte th;n tw-}n \textit{Brentesivnwn ejktivsqai povlin. The passage clearly implies that once Brundisium was founded it supplanted Tarentum as the most important port in southeast Italy.}

\textsuperscript{88} Plin. \textit{N.H.} 3.101; Sirago, \textit{La Puglia antica} 157-158

\textsuperscript{89} Guzzo, in Mertens and Lambrechts, \textit{Comunità indigine e problemi della romanizzazione nell’ Italia centro-meridionale} 79-81

\textsuperscript{90} Sirago, \textit{La Puglia antica} 158

\textsuperscript{91} Sirago, \textit{La Puglia antica} 157-9; Lomas, \textit{Rome and the Western Greeks} 91-92

\textsuperscript{92} For the obligations of the \textit{socii navales}, see Ilari, \textit{Gli Italici nelle strutture militari romane} 105-117.
record that Tarentum supplied an unknown number ships during the First Punic War.93 Tarentum could outfit a fleet of at least twenty vessels, and she repeatedly defeated Roman naval forces.94 Livy records that Rhegium, Paestum, and Velia supplied by treaty a total of twelve vessels to the Roman navy. 95 Since Tarentum was the largest Greek city in Italy, she may well have been required to furnish more vessels than these cities, perhaps six to eight vessels. Livy’s reference to Tarentine prisoners captured and freed by Hannibal at Cannae and Trasimene indicates Tarentum was also obligated to supply either infantry of cavalry for the legions.96 Polybius does not mention any Greek cities among those allies obligated to provide Rome with infantry and cavalry, and Walbank rejects Livy’s remarks.97 However, Ilari argues that Polybius’ omission is inconclusive, and that the socii navales need not have been a mutually exclusive category from the allies under the formula togatorum. Rather, it is likely that in some cases, allied cities supplying ships and marines for the Roman navy would also have been obligated to supply ground troops, at least in reduced proportion.98 It is plausible, therefore, that Tarentum was bound to supply ground troops. In any case, the Tarentines likely resented their military burden, and this may be reflected in the terms of the Hannibalic-Tarentine

93 Pol. 1.20.14


95 Liv. 26.39.2-5

96 Liv. 24.13.1, 25.10.8

97 Pol. 2.24.1-17; Walbank HCP 2.107. However, accepted by Sirago, in Uggeri, L’età annibalica e la Puglia 78.

98 Ilari, Gli Italici nelle strutture militari romane 112-4; so too Brunt, Italian Manpower 50; Toynbee, Hannibal’s Legacy 1.491-492.
treaty, which relieved the Tarentines of unspecified “burdens” if they sided with Hannibal.99

Roman rule also certainly posed a financial burden on the Tarentines. Polybius states explicitly that Rome maintained a permanent garrison in Tarentum at the time of the Gallic War in 225 BC, and the garrison may still have been in place at the outbreak of the Second Punic War.100 It is likely that the Tarentines absorbed at least part of the cost of maintaining the garrison, perhaps supplying the garrison with food at fixed prices if not underwriting altogether the legion’s stipend.101 Supporting the Roman garrison should have proved costly; the arrival of a Carthaginian fleet in 211 BC, sent to protect the Tarentines from a Roman blockade, reveals the strain a foreign garrison could impose on the local population.102 The Carthaginian marines quickly consumed Tarentine food stores,103 and the fleet’s departure made the Tarentines happier than its arrival. The terms of the Polybian version of the Hannibalic-Tarentine treaty protect Tarentum from unspecified burdens.104 It is possible that the terms of the treaty were meant also to

99 Pol. 8.25.2

100 Pol. 2.24.13, 8.25.7; Liv. 25.8.13; App. Hann. 32; for Roman troops in place in Tarentum at the outbreak of the Second Punic War, see below, pp. 288-289.

101 For evidence that the local population suffered, at least in part, the expense of maintaining Roman garrison: the Romans fed the garrisoned at the Claudian camp above Suessula, near Nola, by bringing in grain from Nola and Naples (Liv. 23.46.8-9); Marcellus was ordered to leave the smallest possible garrison in Nola over the winter of 215/4 BC so that the soldiers did not burden the allies (Liv. 23.48.2): M. Claudio proconsuli imperavit ut, retento Nolae necessario ad tuendam urbem praesidio, ceteros milies dimitteret Romam, ne oneri sociis et sumptui rei publicae essent. The quote also suggests, however that Rome picked up most of the cost of the troops.

102 Liv. 26.20.7-11; Pol. 9.9.11

103 Food stored might already have been depleted, since the town had been blockaded. Still, the episode indicates the costs to the local population associated with maintaining a foreign garrison, be it welcome or not.

104 Pol. 8.25.2
protect the Tarentines from the financial burden they endured in supporting the Roman occupation. Both the Livian and Polybian versions of the Hannibalic-Tarentine treaty also preserve a clause protecting the Tarentines from tribute and may indicate that the Tarentines paid yearly the tribute first imposed after Rome captured the city in 272 BC.\textsuperscript{105}

Economic disaffection may have been exacerbated by the presence of wealthy Romans within the walls of Tarentum. Both Livy and Polybius record that the Hannibalic-Tarentine treaty guaranteed the Carthaginians the right to plunder Roman houses once Tarentum was secured for Hannibal. When the city fell into Hannibal’s hands, the Carthaginians did in fact pillage Roman property, and ancient accounts state that the Carthaginians carried off a significant amount of booty.\textsuperscript{106} The loss of trade to Brundisium, Tarentine tribute to Rome, possibly the cost of maintaining a foreign garrison, and wealthy Romans living in Tarentum all must have contributed to anti-Roman sentiment among the Tarentines.

To summarize: all evidence suggests that not only that Roman rule placed immediate financial burdens on the Tarentines, but also that the period of Roman domination saw a general decline in Tarentum’s economic vitality. Moreover, this decline corresponded to the emergence of Brundisium, one of Tarentum’s local rivals, as an important economic center. It is likely, in fact, that the Tarentines recognized a link

\textsuperscript{105} Pol. 8.25.2; Liv. 25.8.8; Zon. 8.6. See also Liv. 35.16.3, which indicates Tarentum paid tribute in 193 BC.

\textsuperscript{106} For the clause guaranteeing the right to plunder Roman homes: Pol. 8.25.2; Liv. 25.8.8; for the amount of plunder taken from the Romans living in Tarentum: Pol. 8.32.1; Pollw`n de; kai; pantodapw`n katakeuasmavtwn aJqroisqevntwn ejk th`ß diarpagh`ß, kai; genomevnhß wjfeleivaß toi`ß Karchdonivoiß ajxivaß tw`n prosdokwmevnwn ejlpivdwn – “a quantity of objects of various kinds were collected by the spoilers, the booty coming quite up to the expectation of the Carthaginians” [trans. Paton]); Liv. 10.10 (\textit{et fuit praedae aliquantum} – “and there was not a small amount of booty”).
between Roman rule and their own declining economic fortunes. This may have further encouraged the aristocracy to throw off the yoke of Roman rule. In any case, there is no evidence to suggest that the Tarentines would have perceived any economic benefit from having submitted to Rome, and it is unlikely, therefore, that economic factors contributed to Tarentine loyalty between 216 BC and 213/212 BC.

De Sanctis also argued that the Roman pacification of Italy protected the Tarentines from their traditional enemies, the Lucanians and Messapians. This assertion implies that one of the factors contributing to Tarentine loyalty in the early stages of the Second Punic War was traditional hostility between coastal Greek communities and inland Italic populations, since the Lucanians and Messpians allied with Hannibal. However, despite the fact that there had been conflicts between the coastal Greeks and inland Italic peoples in Lucania, there was also a tradition of accommodation between the Italic peoples and the Greeks, especially Tarentum.

It is true that there had been conflicts between the eastern Ionian Greeks and the Lucanians and Messapians. According to Livy, Rome recaptured Tarentum when the Bruttian contingent of the Carthaginian garrison betrayed the city to Fabius. The episode may reflect lingering hostility between Italic tribes and the Greeks. However, Tarentine mistrust of the Lucanians and Messapians was far less pronounced than the clear hostility between the Bruttii and the Greeks of Bruttium. In fact, Tarentum had been willing to ally with its Italic neighbors at times in order to assert hegemony over

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107 De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* 3:2.265

108 For example, see Liv. 8.25.6-11, 8.29.1; Diod. Sic. 16.15.1-2, 16.62.4, 16.63.2; 19.4.1-2
other Greek cities.\textsuperscript{109} Moreover, Hannibal did not garner uniform support among the Lucanians and Messapians in the early stages of the war. Livy records that the Lucanians revolted in the aftermath of Hannibal’s victory at Cannae, as did the Uzentini in the Sallentine peninsula; Polybius makes no mention of either.\textsuperscript{111} Livy’s claim is anachronistic, for he later reports that the Romans enrolled Lucanian troops in either 214 or 213 BC.\textsuperscript{112} In fact, some Lucanians remained loyal to Rome until 212 BC, after the revolt of Tarentum.\textsuperscript{113} The Uzentini probably did not revolt in 216 BC but rather came over to Hannibal with the rest of the Sallentine peninsula in the summer of 213 BC.\textsuperscript{114} If De Sanctis is correct and the Tarentines were bitterly hostile toward the Lucanians and Messapians, then the fact that at least some of the Lucanians and the Messapians remained loyal to Rome should have compelled the Tarentines to seek an alliance with Hannibal sooner.

One might object, however, that since Lucania was a large region and encompassed many communities, only the stance of those Lucanians geographically closest to Tarentum would have been relevant to the question of Tarentine loyalty. That

\textsuperscript{109} Liv. 27.15.9-19

\textsuperscript{110} Liv. 8.29.1; Diod. Sic. 20.104.2-4; Plut. Pyrrh. 13.6, 17.5, 18.4; App. Samn. 10.1; Dion. Hal. 19.9.2. For Tarentum’s employment of non-Greeks against neighboring Greek cities, see above, pp. 258-261.

\textsuperscript{111} Liv. 22.61.11-2; Pol. 3.118.3

\textsuperscript{112} Liv. 24.20.1-2, 25.1.3-5, 25.3.9. The details of the two battles are so similar as to suggest Livy has duplicated the account. If there was only one battle, it is unclear whether to place it in 213 or 214. The confusion between Bruttium and Lucania suggests the campaign took place along the border of the two regions. See De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 3\textsuperscript{2}.2.263-4 and n. 135. The Lucanians could raise 30,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry, according to Pol. 2.24.12.

\textsuperscript{113} Liv. 25.16.5-24; App. Hann. 35; see also Pol. 8.35.

\textsuperscript{114} Liv. 25.1.1, 27.15.4; see La Bua in Uggeri, L’età annibalica e la Puglia 60-61; De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 3\textsuperscript{2}.2.263-264.
is, if De Sanctis is correct and a Hannibalic alliance with the Lucanians would have confirmed the loyalty of Tarentum, we need only consider if those peoples who inhabited territories closest to Tarentum were among the Lucanians who revolted first. However, while the evidence is incomplete, it appears that the Lucanians who revolted first and resisted re-conquest the longest were those who inhabited the northern and western regions of Lucania, that is, farthest from Tarentum.

De Sanctis argued that most of the Tyrrhenian coast of Lucania remained loyal, but his assertion does not stand up in light of both literary and archaeological evidence. For example, the Romans stormed Blanda in 214 BC, indicating the town had rebelled. The coastal city of Laös appears to have been abandoned during the Second Punic War. The city was once a Greek colony but had fallen to the Lucanians, and the timing of its abandonment suggests it rebelled and was destroyed by the Romans. The colony of Buxentum (near modern Policastro) was deducted in 194 BC, presumably to keep an eye on coastal Lucania and so perhaps in response to Lucanian sedition during the Second Punic War. Further inland, the important city of Grumentum almost certainly revolted, as did the town of Volceii (modern Buccino). The main historical accounts do not

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115 De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* 3.2.251

116 Liv. 25.20.5. For the identification of modern Palecastro di Torora as Blanda, see La Torre, *Bolletino d’Archeologia* 8 (1991) 133-155; Greco and La Torre, *Blanda, Laos, Cerillae* 7-8, 31-36.


118 Liv. 23.37.10-1 records Roman military activity near Grumentum in 215 BC, though De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* 3.2.444 doubts the historicity of Livy’s account. Liv. 27.41.1-42.17 records that Hannibal returned to Grumentum in 207 BC in order to recover nearby Lucanian towns that had gone over to Rome. Grumentum’s loyalty in 207 is unclear; De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* 3.2.472 believes the city was still loyal to Hannibal, though he may have been trying to recover the city. In either case, Grumentum would

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mention Potentia’s status during the Second Punic War; however, Potentia is listed along with Grumentum and Volceii in the Liber Coloniarum as praefecturae, and Brunt accepts this as evidence much of the nearby country side was confiscated by 200 BC. This evidence suggests Potentia revolted during the Hannibalic War. Numistro (modern Muro Lucano) appears also to have revolted. Finally, most Roman military action in Lucania took place in the western and northern sections of the region. For example, in 213 BC, the Roman consul campaigned in both Lucania and Bruttium, probably along the border of the two regions. The following year the proconsul Ti. Sempronius Gracchus was ambushed and killed along a certain river Calore, near the Bruttian-Lucanian frontier. Finally, in 209 BC the consul Q. Fulvius Flaccus was assigned the province in Lucanis ac Bruttias, and restored a number of Lucanian and possibly Bruttian towns. It is not surprising that the western and northern Lucanians would have been both more resistant to Roman rule and more likely to revolt. The history of western Lucania is characterized by Lucanian encroachment on coastal Greek settlements, such as

have revolted at some point during the war. For the revolt Volceii and possibly other unnamed Lucanian towns, see Liv. 27.15.2-3; for the identification of Volceii with Buccino, see Russi, La lucania romana 14.

119 Lib. Col. 209L; Brunt, Italian Manpower 280-281

120 Liv. 27.2.4-10; Plut. Marc. 24; Front. Strat. 2.2.6; Plin. N.H. 3.98; see also De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 3:2.246-7. Plutarch’s account implies Hannibal held the city, while Livy’s version is more ambiguous. However, in Livy’s version, after the inconclusive combat and Hannibal’s retreat from Lucania, Marcellus left a garrison in Numistro. This may suggest Roman occupation of the city was unwelcome by the Numistrini.

121 Liv. 25.1.3-5, 25.3.9; De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 3:2.263-264

122 Liv. 25.15.10-16.7; App. Hann. 35; see also Pol. 8.35; for the location of the river, see De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 3:2.281 n. 149.

123 Liv. 27.7.7, 27.15.2-3
Poseidonia (later Paestum) and Laös. Roman domination of Italy prevented Lucanian expansion along the Tyrrhenian coast. Roman conquest of Greek cities ultimately shielded those cities from Lucanian aggression, albeit at the cost of their freedom and the imposition of military obligations; this appears to have been the case with Velia. Rome also directly conquered Lucanian-controlled cities, and in the case of oscanized Paestum, Rome planted a colony there in 273 BC. The foundation of a Roman colony not only strengthened Roman control while checking potential Lucanian incursions, it also could have had a profound impact on the surrounding settlement patterns. The western Lucanians likely suffered under Roman domination, as did other inland Italic peoples such as the Bruttii and Sammnites, who also revolted during the Second Punic War. Indeed, western and northern Lucanians may have been encouraged to revolt by the actions of their seditious neighbors. It is no coincidence, then, that Rome concentrated its military efforts in Lucania on areas bordering both Bruttium and Samnium.

The previous analysis has important implications with regard to the posture of Tarentum in the early stages of Second Punic War. Contrary to the De Sanctis’ suggestion, the Tarentines were not inclined to remain loyal to Rome because nearby and hostile Lucanians allied with Hannibal. Tarentum was situated in the far southeast of

124 Strab. 5.4.13, 6.1.1-2; Diod. Sic. 14.101.3-4; Lomas, *Rome and the Western Greeks* 33-34

125 Velia may have been conquered in 293 BC, during the Third Samnite War, if the Livy’s (10.14.9, 15.9) “Velia” is to be identified with Greek city in question; see Lomas, *Rome and the Western Greeks* 47. In any case, Velia (also Elea) supplied ships for the Roman navy during both the First Punic War (Pol. 1.20.14) and the Second Punic War (Liv. 26.39.5).


127 This is seen most clearly with the later foundation of Buxentum, which seems to have resulted in the abandonment of the inland Lucanian settlements around Roccagloriosa; see Lomas, *Rome and the Western Greeks* 89; De Polignac and Gualtieri, in Barker and Lloyd, *Roman Landscapes* 196-198.
Lucania, on the border of Messapia, and far from Hannibal’s earliest and most robust support among the Lucanians. Meanwhile, the Lucanians who inhabited lands closest to Tarentum appear to have remained loyal to Rome longer than did their kinsmen to the northwest. Therefore, it is not likely that the revolt of the northwestern Lucanians and their alliance with Hannibal had much impact on the Tarentine decision to remain loyal until 213/212 BC.

In fact, Livy’s account of Hannibal’s earliest negotiations with the Tarentines suggests the opposite may have the case, that the Tarentines were disinclined to revolt sooner not because they feared a Lucanian-Messapian-Hannibal alliance, but because Hannibal failed to win over nearby Lucanians and Messapians before 213 BC. According to Livy, in 214 BC when Hannibal was engaged in operations in Campania, a small party of Tarentines approached him and guaranteed that Tarentum would revolt if only he would move his camp closer to the city.\textsuperscript{128} This reference suggests that even though Tarentum certainly chaffed under Roman rule, the Tarentines needed Hannibal to “show the goods” before they would seriously entertain rebellion. The passage also shows that Hannibal did not decide to pursue seriously the capture of Tarentum until the Tarentine envoys arrived in 214 BC. This may have been a strategic blunder on Hannibal’s part since, as we have argued above, Tarentum in particular was a promising candidate for revolt because of its history as a local hegemonic power and its history of conflict with Rome. Instead of focusing first on southeast Italy, the Campanian theatre of

\textsuperscript{128} Liv. 24.13.1-5
the Second Punic War drew most of Hannibal’s attention from 216 BC to 213 BC.\footnote{Hannibal spent the summers of 216 BC and 215 BC in Campania, and wintered there in 216/5 BC; he wintered in Apulia in 215/4 BC, but was compelled to return to Campania the following spring because of appeals by the Capuans. Hannibal began to lose patience with Campania in 214 BC after he met with a legation from Tarentum (Liv. 24.13.1-5), and in 213 BC spent much of the year near Tarentum. However, complaints from his Capuan allies while he was trying to secure Tarentum in 213 BC and 212 BC (see Liv. 25.13.1-2, 15.1-3) underscore the difficult position he faced. Hannibal was unable to devote full attention to other theatres of the war so long as he was required to defend Capua.} With Hannibal often occupied elsewhere, and without revolts by nearby Roman allies, Hannibal’s early military success remained nearly invisible to the Tarentines (except for the testimony of a few survivors from Trasimene and Cannae). Without a strong pro-Hannibalic presence in southern Lucania, Hannibal was unable to undermine Rome’s military stranglehold on Tarentum, even after his victory at Cannae. By not marching sooner into such fertile ground for rebellion, Hannibal may ultimately have cost himself the chance to control southern Lucania earlier in the war.

Hannibal needed to exert more direct pressure on Tarentum at least in part because the Roman military presence in the vicinity of Tarentum at the time of Cannae was relatively strong, compared to other regions in Italy, and Rome’s strong military presence in the region undoubtedly helped suppress potential Tarentine sedition. According to Polybius, Rome garrisoned Tarentum at the time of the Gallic revolt in 225 BC with one legion of approximately 4000 troops.\footnote{Pol. 2.24.13} Polybius later reports that after the battle of Trebbia, in the winter of 218/7 BC, the Roman senate sent garrisons to Tarentum and other “suitable places.”\footnote{Pol. 3.75.4} It is possible that the two references refer to the same body of troops. However, in the same passage, Polybius draws a distinction between legions...
sent to Sicily and Sardinia (pevmponteß eijß Σαρδονα kai; Sikelian stratovpeda), and the aforementioned garrisons (eijß Ταυραντα profulakaß). Polybius uses the term stratovpeda in reference to Roman forces in Tarentum at the start of the war. It is likely that Rome already had a garrison in Tarentum before the Second Punic War and reinforced it soon after the war began. The Roman force occupying Tarentum by 213/212 BC was at least 2,500 troops and probably exceeded in size the reserve legion of 4,000 troops stationed in Tarentum in 225 BC.\textsuperscript{132} Roman garrisons were also stationed in Metapontum and Thurii, though none is attested for Heraclea.\textsuperscript{133} It is impossible to tell if these garrisons were in place before the Second Punic War or if they are to be included in the garrisons sent to “other places.” In either case, Roman military presence had been visible to the Greeks along the Ionian coastal least since the battle of Trebbia and before the battle of Cannae.

In particular, the garrison in Metapontum, the chora of which bordered Tarentum,\textsuperscript{134} may have further impressed the Tarentines. First, as noted above, Metapontum had been under Tarentine hegemony, and Roman occupation of the nearby city would have underscored Roman military dominance in the area. Second, the Tarentines may also have realized that Rome could quickly use the Metapontum garrison

\textsuperscript{132} Appian (\textit{Hann.} 33) claims the garrison was about 5,000 troops. Livy (26.29.21-2) provides the minimum figure reporting that the Romans sent a force of 2,500 men to harass Tarentine foragers. It is unlikely the Romans would have sent all or nearly all their garrison to attack foragers while the citadel itself was under siege, so Livy’s figure points to a larger garrison. Livy’s reference is to events after the garrison was reinforced with troops from Metapontum. Appian’s number may include the reinforcements as well.

\textsuperscript{133} Pol. 8.34; Liv. 25.11, 25.15, App. \textit{Hann.} 33-34

\textsuperscript{134} At the time of the Second Punic War, the chora of Metaponto stretched between the Bradano river and either the Bassento or Cavone river, from the Ionian coast inland around five miles. See Carter, in
to reinforce the force occupying Tarentum. Third, Tarentum lay between the Latin colonies of Brundisium and Venusia, from which the Roman could quickly move troops along the Via Appia. Rome’s ability to reinforce the Tarentine garrison may have contributed to Tarentum’s loyalty after Cannae. Finally, Rome’s active defense of the Sallentine peninsula also limited the opportunities for a successful Tarentine rebellion. Rome coordinated land and naval forces to protect the Sallentine peninsula. In 216 BC after the Battle of Cannae, C. Terrentius Varro returned to Apulia with an unnamed army, perhaps the legio classica that had been sent previously to Teanum Sidicinum. The force was relocated in 215 BC to Tarentum, and the senate ordered twenty–five ships to guard the coast between Brundisium and Tarentum; the fleet was later increased to fifty vessels. The following year a fleet and the same legion were again stationed near Brundisium for the protection Tarentum and the Sallento. If Livy is to be believed, the combined Roman land and sea forces effectively prevented hostile forces from landing in the Sallentine peninsula. Visible Roman military strength also would have helped prevent coastal cities on the Sallento, included Tarentum, from rebelling after the Roman defeat at Cannae.

Descoeudres, *Greek Colonists and Native Populations* 405-6; Osanna, *Chorai coloniali* 19-20; see also Giardno and De Siena, in Greco, *La città greca antica.*

135 Which the Romans in fact did after Hannibal captured Tarentum but Rome still held the citadel; see Pol. 8.34.1; Liv. 25.15.5-6, 11.10; App. *Hann.* 35.

136 Liv. 22.57.7-8, 23.32.16-7; Brunt. *Italian Manpower* 648-9; Lazenby, *Hannibal’s War* 91

137 Liv. 23.38.8-10

138 Liv. 24.11.3-5; 24.20.12-3; Brunt, *Italian Manpower* 649-50.

139 Liv. 23.33.1-4
To conclude: Tarentum was a likely candidate for revolt at the outbreak of the Second Punic War because of its history as a local hegemonic power, internal political unrest and significant anti-Roman sentiment among the aristocracy, and the negative economic impact of Roman rule. However, even after Hannibal’s stunning victory at Cannae significantly undermined Roman credibility and brought about the fragmentation of the Italian confederacy, the Tarentines remained loyal. Unique circumstances prevented Hannibal from winning over the critical mass of Tarentine aristocrats to wrest Tarentum from Rome’s control. Rome had stationed garrisons in Tarentum and in nearby Greek coastal cities before the battle of Cannae, and it is possible that Tarentum was already garrisoned at the outbreak of the Second Punic War. Tarentum also lay along a military road between two Latin colonies along which Rome could quickly convey troops. Therefore, even though the battle of Cannae greatly changed the military landscape, Rome’s military presence in southeast Italy remained strong. In the wake of Cannae, Rome combined land and sea forces to control Tarentum and the rest of the Sallentine peninsula. Rome’s unusually strong military presence must have bolstered the loyalty of the pro-Roman Tarentine aristocracy; at the very least it had the effect of suppressing open aristocratic dissent. Opposition was also squelched because Rome took Tarentine aristocratic hostages. For all these reasons, Hannibal needed to influence more directly affairs in southeast Italy if he hoped to exploit anti-Roman sentiment and win over enough Tarentine aristocrats to secure the city. However, Hannibal chose to fight in Campania for much of the time between 216 BC and 213/212 BC, and he therefore failed to impress the inhabitants of southeast Italy; Tarentum and the other coastal Greek cities,
the Messapians, and (likely) the nearby Lucanians all hesitated to revolt in the wake of Cannae.

4.3 The Revolt of Tarentum (213/212 BC)

From 214 BC to the winter of 213/212 BC, local military, political, diplomatic, and economic factors influencing Tarentum’s loyalty changed, and the balance began to shift in favor of Hannibal. Hannibal campaigned in the vicinity of Tarentum, and he actively influenced the internal politics of Tarentum. Hannibal may have promised Tarentine hegemony in return for the city’s loyalty, just as he had offered Capua in 216 BC, and his successful campaigns in the nearby Lucania and the Sallento lent credibility to the promise. Ultimately, a party of pro-Hannibal Tarentine aristocrats seized power, in part through Hannibal’s backing and in part because immediate and local conditions undermined the position of the pro-Roman regime. We will now consider what factors influenced the Tarentine aristocracy to bring the city to Hannibal’s side after remaining loyal for several years after the battle of Cannae.

First, Hannibal grew frustrated with his limited success in Campania, and especially his inability to capture a port city, and for the first time he appeared to consider seriously detaching from Rome the cities along the eastern Ionian coast. In the summer of 214 BC, an embassy of Tarentine aristocrats approached Hannibal in Campania with the promise that Tarentum was ready to revolt if only Hannibal would march to the city. Although Hannibal had spent the winter of 215/214 BC in Apulia, Livy’s account

140 For Hannibal’s strained patience concerning affairs in Campania, see Liv. 24.13.11. Besides his frustration, Hannibal perhaps also desired a port in southeast Italy in order to link with Philip V, with whom he had recently concluded a treaty; see Liv. 24.13.5.

141 Liv. 24.13.1-5
implies that Hannibal decided to campaign around Tarentum only after he met with the Tarentine delegation. Hannibal set out for Tarentum, “devastating” along the way until he entered Tarentine territory. Hannibal gave his troops orders to cease devastating when he entered Tarentum’s *chora* in order to win over the Tarentines peaceably. Hannibal pitched camp near Tarentum for an unspecified number of days, hoping the show of strength would encourage the city to revolt. However, the Roman commander in Brundisium had heard of Hannibal’s approach and secured the city’s defenses. It was already autumn, so Hannibal left Tarentum with the grain he had collected around Metapontum and Heraclea and moved to winter quarters in Salapia, from which he began to raid the Sallentine peninsula.

Hannibal spent the next campaign year in Sallentine peninsula, and it is at this time that he likely brought over most of the cities in the Messapian league. Although Livy downplays Hannibal’s achievements for the year, his acquisitions included Uzentum and Manduria. Only after capturing the Sallento did Hannibal again march toward

142 Liv. 24.13.5-6
143 Liv. 24.17.8, 20.9-10
144 Liv. 24.20.11-3
145 Liv. 24.20.13-6. For the time of year, see Lazenby *Hannibal’s War* 110. The grain from Metapontum and Heraclea may have been collected during Hannibal’s march, while he devastated the countryside; see De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* 3\(^2\).2.250. The cities along the Ionian coast could supplied Hannibal with significant grain stores, as the broad plains and coastal terraces of the Metapontino provide great agricultural potential; see Carter, in Descoeudres, ed, *Greek Colonists and Native Populations* 423-5; Giardno and De Siena, in Greco, *La città greca antica* 335-6. However, the reference to the collection of grain may pose a chronological problem, since the grain harvest in that part of Italy should have occurred in early June, long before Hannibal’s arrival in the area; see Azzi, 544ff (the date can be found by comparing to harvest at Lecce, occurring around June 5). It may have been the case that Hannibal collected grain stored in rural silos – this is not unprecedented, since the Romans had converted Cannae into a granary earlier in the war, and Hannibal raided the site, see Chapter 3, pp. 146-147.

146 Liv. 22.61.11, 25.1.1, 27.15.4; La Bua, in Uggeri, *L’età annibalica e la Puglia* 61-62.
Tarentum. In late in 213 BC (either autumn or early winter) another delegation met Hannibal and proposed to turn over the city to the Carthaginians.\textsuperscript{147} By marching through Lucania and the Sallento, Hannibal had altered the military landscape. The appearance of his army and his success among the Messapians was an appropriate show of strength for the Tarentines. Manduria controlled the lines of communication between Tarentum and Brundisium and was the key to holding the Sallentine peninsula.\textsuperscript{148} When he captured Manduria, Hannibal effectively shielded Tarentum from Roman forces in Brundisium. Finally, Rome had been unwilling or unable to stop Hannibal from pillaging around Metapontum, Heraclea, and the Sallento. Overall, Hannibal had revealed weakness in Rome’s regional military network and in so doing encouraged disgruntled Tarentine aristocrats to come forward and seek a treaty with him.

Second, anti-Roman sentiment within Tarentum is also likely to have increased since the outbreak of the war. Both the economic and military burden of the Roman occupation may have increased in the previous year. There was already a garrison of at least 4,000 Roman soldiers stationed in the citadel.\textsuperscript{149} The previous autumn, the Roman commander at Brundisium sent a certain Marcus Livius to Tarentum in order to prevent Hannibal from capturing the city. According to Livy, Marcus Valerius conscripted more troops and posted guards along the city walls.\textsuperscript{150} Livy’s account implies that the men were conscripted from the local population, and the Tarentines certainly had to help fund

\textsuperscript{147} Pol. 8.24.4-8; Liv. 25.8.3-6

\textsuperscript{148} La Bua, in Uggeri, L’està annibalica e la Puglia 59-64

\textsuperscript{149} See above, pp. 287-288.

\textsuperscript{150} Liv. 24.20.13
the increased manpower. Perhaps more costly would have been maintenance of the Roman fleet protecting the shores between Brundisium and Tarentum. The fleet had been increased to fifty vessels and spent at least some time harbored in Tarentum. In any case, the financial and military burden on the Tarentines would not have lessened between 216 BC and 213 BC.

The greatest contributor to anti-Roman sentiment, however, was the execution of the Tarentine hostages held in Rome, probably in the months preceding autumn, 213 BC. The executions had three effects counter to Roman interests. First, it angered the Tarentine citizen body in general and lent more credence to Hannibal’s liberation propaganda. Hannibal played on Tarentine anger, first signing a treaty guaranteeing that the Tarentines would live under their own laws, then inveighing against Roman high-handedness in a speech to the general citizen assembly. According to Polybius, Hannibal’s speech was enthusiastically received. Second, the executions angered in particular the aristocratic relatives of the hostages who formed the core of an anti-Roman

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151 Liv. 23.38.8-11. At the very least the crews had to eat and would probably have requisitioned food and supplies locally. The Romans requisitioned grain from neighboring communities to supply the army at the Claudian Camp near Suessula, and they were concerned that the army was a burden on their allies (Liv.23.48.2). Also, in 211 BC, the Tarentines requested a Carthaginian fleet for protection but later asked that it leave because the sailors consumed too many supplies (Liv. 26.20.7-11; Pol. 9.9.11). Both episodes suggest that a foreign garrison would have gathered supplies locally and that this could put a strain on the local community.

152 Liv. 25.7.10-3: The Romans held the hostages under light guard because they did not want appear heavy-handed in their treatment of the hostages. A Tarentine aristocrat named Phileas, under the guise of an ambassador, bribed the guards and convinced the hostages to escape. They were captured the next day near Terracina and executed. Lomas, *Rome and the Western Greeks* 70 argues that the hostages were executed in 215 BC; De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* 3:2.264 argues the executions took place nearer to the time of the revolt. In any case, the executions appear to have been critical in turning Tarentine public opinion against the Romans.

153 Liv. 25.8.1

154 Pol. 8.25.1-2, 31.1-4; Liv. 25.8.8, 10.6-9
Relatives of the hostages may have acted primarily out of revenge. However, it is also clear that this bloc of aristocrats saw Hannibal as a means for political advancement. For example, Livy states that the five aristocrats who met Hannibal in Campania claimed to have convinced other Tarentines to prefer an alliance with Hannibal. These aristocrats appear to have increased their political standing by associating themselves with Hannibal’s cause. Polybius records the conspirators in 213/212 BC parroting Hannibal’s liberation propaganda after they had curried favor with the Tarentine citizenry by selling food and putting on entertainment, presumably at their own expense. The evidence suggests that the revolt of Tarentum was part of a political coup. Third, by executing the hostages, Rome lost any leverage she had over potential anti-Roman aristocrats.

Finally, Hannibal may have offered Tarentum the opportunity to reassert local hegemony, and aristocrats who argued for the rejection of Roman rule probably promoted the position that an alliance with Hannibal would restore Tarentine power. While there is no direct evidence that Hannibal promised power in return for Tarentine loyalty or that

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155 There may already have been an anti-Roman movement, since Livy mentions five aristocrats who met with Hannibal in 214 (24.13.1). The execution of the hostages, therefore, may have convinced the relatives of the hostages to join the anti-Roman party. Livy states that thirteen Tarentine aristocrats conspired to betray Tarentum to Hannibal in BC (25.8.3). Later we hear of unspecified leaders of Tarentum (principibus Tarentinis) with whom Hannibal conferred concerning the blockade of the citadel (Liv. 25.11.12). Literary sources preserve the names of at most six of the anti-Roman aristocrats. According to Polybius and Livy, Nico and Philomenus were the leaders of the party (Pol. 8.24.4, Liv. 25.8.3). Tragiscus (Pol. 8.27.7) and Democrats (Liv. 26.39.6) are also to be numbered among the conspirators. Livy (26.39.15) also names a certain Nico Perco as member of the party that betrayed Tarentum; it is not clear if he is different from the Nico who led the conspiracy. Finally, Appian (Hann. 32) names a certain Cononeus, but Appian appears to have confused Cononeus with Philomenus.

156 Liv. 24.13.1-3

157 Pol. 8.24.12-3, 31.2
members of the Tarentine ruling class recognized this possibility, such a formula would be consistent with Hannibal’s diplomacy with regional hegemonic powers Capua, Arpi, and Locri, and there is a wealth of evidence consistent with the proposition. Livy states that Hannibal made unspecified “promises” to the conspirators in 214 BC and again in 213/212 BC.\footnote{Lomas, Rome and the Western Greeks 70} The references echo Hannibal’s negotiations with Capua, when Hannibal promised that the Capuans would be masters of Italy if they allied with him.\footnote{Liv. 24.13.4, 25.8.6} It is plausible Hannibal promised Tarentum would be restored to its previous greatness if she rebelled from Rome.

Events subsequent to Tarentum’s revolt are consistent with the suggestion that Hannibal promised Tarentum power in return for loyalty. Both Metapontum and Heraclea revolted in the wake of the Tarentine revolt.\footnote{Liv. 23.10.2; for a complete discussion, see Chapter 1, pp. 53ff.} The internal politics of the two cities are not recorded, but Appian says Heraclea rebelled out of fear, and the context of the passage suggests the Heracleans feared Tarentum and Metapontum. Heraclea and Metapontum had traditionally fallen under Tarentine hegemony, and it is likely Heraclea’s rebellion was a response to the immediate threat of a Tarentum-Hannibal alliance and Tarentine re-assertion of local hegemony. Tarentum also tried to assert hegemony over longtime rival Thurii. According to Livy, the Thurians revolted because of the execution of the Thurian hostages held in Rome. The hostages were executed after a failed attempt to escape, mentioned above, and the initiative to escape came from a
Tarentine aristocrat named Phileas. According to Appian, on the other hand, the Thurians were compelled by the Tarentines to rebel after some Thurians were captured and held hostage by Hannibal and Tarentum. The two versions need not be mutually exclusive; indeed, both versions show that Tarentum exerted pressure on Thurii to revolt and suggest Tarentum was attempting to extend its influence over the neighboring Greek cities on the Ionian coast. Finally, the actions of the Lucanians in 212 BC may reflect Tarentine hegemonic influence. In the spring of 212 BC, soon after the rebellion of Tarentum, Metapontum, Heraclea, and Thurii, previously pro-Roman Lucanian aristocrats came to the Carthaginian commander Mago with a plan to ambush Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus. The ambush was successful, Gracchus was killed, and the “remaining Lucanians” came into alliance with Hannibal. The rebellion of the Ionian coastal cities may have convinced the Lucanians to throw in their lot with Hannibal, but the Tarentines may have actively encouraged the Lucanian aristocrats to revolt. In any case, it is clear that an alliance with Hannibal offered Tarentum a chance to throw off the yoke of Roman rule, to restore Tarentine hegemony over subordinate cities Metapontum and Heraclea, and to assert increased influence on its traditional rival Thurii and, possibly, on the neighboring the Lucanians. It is likely that Hannibal promised as much when he negotiated with the Tarentines.

162 Liv. 25.8.1, 15.7-8; App. Hann. 34

163 Lomas, Rome and the Western Greeks 71

164 Liv. 25.16.5-17.7; App. Hann. 35

165 The Tarentines had in the past tried to influence Lucanian elite in order to destabilize Lucanian-Roman relations and to secure Tarentum’s local hegemony; see Liv. 8.25.6-11, 8.29.1.
The revolt of Tarentum provides clear evidence for the interplay between Hannibal’s strategy and the dynamics of local politics. As noted, there were divisions among the Tarentine ruling elite, and at least some Tarentine aristocrats were dissatisfied with Rome’s domination of their city. Hannibal’s entry into Italy, and more importantly his early success, offered some aristocrats the chance to further their own political careers by challenging Roman authority. By 213/212 BC, at least thirteen Tarentine aristocrats led by Nico and Philomenus comprised an anti-Roman party. It does not matter whether these aristocrats were merely political opportunists playing on growing anti-Roman sentiment or whether they themselves harbored personal enmity toward Rome, though the sources suggest they were motivated more by the latter. In either case, the group likely used anti-Roman rhetoric, calls for an alliance with Hannibal, and appeals to Tarentine freedom in order to effect the overthrow of the current regime. Anti-Roman Tarentine aristocrats would have linked their own political success with Hannibal’s military and diplomatic success. When Hannibal drew near to Tarentum in 213 BC, the anti-Roman party negotiated with him, and after several meetings worked out a plot by which the aristocrats would allow Hannibal to enter Tarentum, while Hannibal promised Tarentine freedom.\footnote{Pol. 8.25.1-2, 28.1-13; Liv. 25.8.8, 9.9-16; App. Hann. 32} Presumably Hannibal also guaranteed that the anti-Roman party would rule in the place of the current ruling elite, who had been hitherto loyal to Rome. In the meantime, the anti-Roman party canvassed for political support by performing acts of public largess.\footnote{Pol. 1.24.11-2} At the same time, Nico, Philomenus, and their supporters may have begun to criticize the current ruling elite, though there is no direct evidence for this. In
any case, the sources do suggest that the anti-Roman party had gained political support by the time they allowed Hannibal to enter Tarentum. It appears that even after Hannibal had entered Tarentum and seized the agora and the initial confusion died down, Hannibal and the anti-Roman party still needed to squelch lingering loyalty to Rome. At this point, Philomenus, Nico, and the other conspirators openly appealed to the Tarentine aspirations of freedom, while Hannibal also addressed the Tarentine assembly and inveighed against Roman rule. Though not stated explicitly, it is likely that Hannibal promised that an alliance with him would restore the power and greatness of Tarentum. Hannibal’s speech was received warmly, and the anti-Roman party undoubtedly associated themselves with Hannibal and assumed power.\(^{168}\) The sources record little resistance to the new party in power, and any remaining pro-Roman (or anti-Hannibalic) Tarentines were either quieted or left the city. Thus, anti-Roman aristocrats were able to assert enough political influence to secure Tarentum for Hannibal.

To summarize: between 216 BC and the winter of 213/212 BC anti-Roman sentiment among the Tarentines appears to have grown. The anti-Roman sentiment was likely rooted in part in the financial burden that Rome’s military efforts placed on Tarentum. More importantly, the execution of Tarentine hostages in Rome angered the Tarentines and gave anti-Roman aristocrats the opportunity to promote their position. This underscores the degree to which local and immediate factors shaped the course of the Second Punic War. Hannibal was also more willing and able to exploit growing anti-Roman feelings and political divisions. Hannibal campaigned successfully near

\(^{168}\) Liv. 27.16 indicates that Nico, Philomenus, and Democrats were still in power three years later when Tarentum fell to Rome.
Tarentum in the Sallentine peninsula, and as a result he made a show of his military strength, cut off Tarentum from potential Roman reinforcements in Brundisium, and ultimately called into question Rome’s military dominance. Finally, Hannibal allied himself with the anti-Roman party in Tarentum, who with Hannibal’s financial backing were able to win over most of the populace, seize political power, and quiet most remaining pro-Roman opposition.

4.4 The Aftermath of the Tarentine Revolt

4.4.1 Metapontum and Heraclea

Hannibal’s capture of Tarentum yielded more success because the remaining Greek cities on the Ionian coast – Metapontum, Heraclea, and Thurii – rebelled from Rome soon after Tarentum fell to the Carthaginians. This section will detail the revolts of Metapontum and Heraclea. Both of these cities were traditionally linked to Tarentum and had tended to fall under Tarentine hegemony, and we should not be surprised that they fell in line when Tarentum revolted. This section will also argue that the revolt of Heraclea was not entirely voluntary. Thus, the revolt of Heraclea provides valuable evidence to suggest that the relationship between a local hegemonic power and its subordinate allies was likely complex and that subordinate cities tended to follow the lead of their local hegemon not only because of bonds of kinship, loyalty, economic ties, etc, but also because of compulsion. In any case, though, the actions of Metapontum and Heraclea show smaller states were concerned more with and reacting to the local hegemonic power than to Rome or Hannibal.
The exact chronology of events from the fall of Tarentum to the fall of Thurii is difficult to establish from surviving literary references. However, it is most likely that Metapontum was the first city to rebel after Tarentum, since both Livy and Appian link the two rebellions closely.\(^{169}\) Although Hannibal had captured the city of Tarentum, the Roman garrison, its commander, and an unknown number of pro-Roman Tarentines retired to the city’s formidable citadel.\(^{170}\) The citadel was the reinforced with troops from the garrison at Metapontum – either the whole garrison (implied by Livy), or half of the garrison (stated by Appian).\(^{171}\) Hannibal constructed a palisade, a moat, and then a second palisade along the wall that separated the citadel from the city of Tarentum. Hannibal then ordered the construction of another stone wall separating the Tarentines from the Romans camped in the citadel while he retired to a camp a few miles from Tarentum. Hannibal then returned to inspect his work and prepare to take the citadel by storm. Polybius and Livy agree that the reinforcements arrived from Metapontum after Hannibal completed his siege works around the citadel but before he retired to his camp for the remainder of winter.\(^{172}\) One may estimate, therefore, that the troops left Metapontum a few weeks after Tarentum fell, sometime in the winter of 213/212 BC.

The arrival of Roman troops from Metapontum and the stiff resistance offered by the reinforced garrison in the citadel of Tarentum convinced Hannibal that he could not storm the citadel but rather that he should starve out the Roman garrison. The quick

\(^{169}\) Liv. 25.15.5-6; App. Hann. 35; see also Pol. 8.34.1  

\(^{170}\) Pol. 8.30.8; Liv. 25.10.6; App. Hann. 32  

\(^{171}\) Liv. 25.15.4-6; App. Hann. 33, 35  

\(^{172}\) Pol. 8.33.1-34.1; Liv. 25.11.2-11
Roman military response ultimately may be responsible for Hannibal’s failure to capture Tarentum’s citadel; in the short-term, the removal of some or all the Metapontum garrison resulted in that city’s almost immediate revolt from Roman rule. The sources preserve little detail about the conditions the Metapontines faced. Appian claims that the Metapontines massacred the remaining Roman garrison, while Livy reports that the city revolted immediately once the fear of the garrison had been removed.\textsuperscript{173} Both accounts suggest that Rome held the city more through military force than through the loyalty of the local elite. In fact, by the time of the Second Punic War, Metapontum had ceased to be an important city.\textsuperscript{174} It is unlikely, therefore, that Rome would have stationed a garrison in the city unless she suspected the Metapontines would otherwise have revolted. Metapontum had long been under Tarentum hegemony, and it is consistent with the present analysis that a subordinate city would have followed the local hegemonic power in revolt. Once Tarentum allied with Hannibal, the Metapontine elite would have been inclined to place themselves under its hegemony. When the Roman garrison was removed, or weakened, the Metapontines had the opportunity to revolt and took advantage of the opportunity.

Heraclea likely revolted after Metapontum. Unfortunately, neither Polybius nor Livy records the city’s revolt, and Appian’s account presents some difficulties. Appian erroneously places Heraclea between Metapontum and Tarentum, when in fact the city lay to the west of Metapontum; Appian also places the revolts of both Heraclea and

\textsuperscript{173} App. Hann. 35; Liv. 25.15.5-6

\textsuperscript{174} See above, pp. 264-266.
Metapontum after the revolt of Thurii. Livy’s account appears more reliable with regard to chronology, and this places the revolt of Metapontum before the revolt of Thurii. Livy clearly has omitted the revolt of Heraclea, and since the Heraclea’s revolt is bound closely to the revolt of Metapontum and Tarentum, it is best to place events at Heraclea soon after the fall of Metapontum. Appian records almost no detail for the fall of Heraclea, but two important observations can be gleaned from his account. First, there is no mention of a Roman garrison protecting the city or ensuring its loyalty. Second, Appian claims that Heraclea revoluted more out of fear than out of a desire to rebel, and the context of the passage makes it clear that the Heracleans feared Tarentum and Metapontum. While Appian is certainly promoting an oversimplified, pro-Roman version of the story, there may be some plausibility in his account. Heraclea was not a powerful city, and she long remained under Tarentine hegemony. However, in 278 BC Heraclea received a favorable treaty from Rome the terms of which she enjoyed until the Social War. Heraclea appears, therefore, to have enjoyed a degree of political autonomy under Roman domination, and the lack of a Roman garrison suggests that Rome did not fear Heraclea’s revolt. When Tarentum revolted and the neighboring city of Metapontum followed suit, the Heracleans were forced to decide between loyalty to a distant Rome or to the regional hegemonic power Tarentum. If the Tarentum saw an alliance with Hannibal as a chance to reassert local hegemony, as discussed above, then it

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175 App. Hann. 35. For the identification of modern-day Policoro with the site of ancient Heraclea, see Quilici, Siris-eraclea 159ff.

176 Liv. 25.15.7

177 Quilici, Siris-eraclea 162

178 Cic. Arch. 6, Balb. 21-2; Quilici, Siris-eraclea 162
is plausible that the Tarentines would have threatened Heraclea if she hesitated in throwing off Roman rule and accepting Tarentine hegemony. Roman power appeared to be waning,\textsuperscript{179} and faced with a more immediate threat of a Tarrentine-Hannibalic alliance, Heraclea revolted.\textsuperscript{180}

To summarize: Heraclea and Metapontum traditionally placed themselves under Tarentine hegemony, and both revolted soon after Tarentum revolted, repeating a pattern observed in both Campania (Capua and its subordinate allies) and Apulia (Arpi and its subordinate allies). The details of the revolts of the two cities reveal varying degrees of attraction between subordinate city and local hegemonic power. Metapontum appears to have been relatively more amenable to Tarentine hegemony. Only the presence of a Roman garrison prevented revolt, and the combination of Tarentum’s revolt and the weakening of the garrison brought about rebellion in short order. Heraclea, meanwhile, appears to have been more hesitant to revolt. However, she crumbled under Tarentine pressure, suggesting that the bonds between local hegemon and subordinate ally were at times based on compulsion.

4.4.2 The revolt of Thurii and the limits of local rivalry

The last Greek city along the Ionian coast to revolt was Thurii, in the spring of 212 BC. It is striking that this city sided with Hannibal. Thurii in the past had sought

\textsuperscript{179} Rome had been unable to stop Hannibal from collecting grain from around Heraclea; see Liv. 24.20.15.

\textsuperscript{180} The decision of Heraclea to revolt is consistent with its history of shaping its foreign policy to meet changing external pressures. As discussed already, Heraclea was a colony of Tarentum and traditionally allied with the metropolis. However, she also sided with Rome in 278 BC. Moreover, Lomas has observed that many of the magistrates listed on the “Heraclea Tables” have Messapian names, suggesting that the Heracleans reached some sort of accommodation with the neighboring Italic peoples who threatened coastal Greek settlements; see Lomas, \textit{Rome and the Western Greeks}111.
Roman military assistance against incursions by inland Italic peoples including the Lucanians and Bruttii; Thurii also had a longstanding rivalry with Tarentum. Since Hannibal had allied with Tarentum, the Bruttii, and most of the Lucanians by the spring of 212 BC, we would expect the Thurians to be confirmed in their loyalty to Rome. However, a number of factors, especially the execution of Thurian citizens in Rome, compelled the Thurians to ally with Hannibal. It is clear that there were limits to the effects of intercity rivalries in shaping diplomatic events, and the case of the Thurian revolt helps reveal what those limits were and what issues outweighed considerations of local rivalry.

Appian and Livy record two very different accounts of the rebellion of Thurii, and the chronology of the city’s revolt is problematic. Appian places the Thurian revolt immediately after the Tarentine revolt but before the revolts of Metapontum and Heraclea.\(^{181}\) However, Livy lists the Thurian revolt after that of Metapontum,\(^{182}\) and this order of events makes more sense. Both historians state that Thurii surrendered to Hanno, who was in command of Carthaginian forces in Bruttium. Livy’s full narrative of the Thurian revolt is placed after the consuls and praetors took office in 212 BC and were delayed in Rome until April 26, 212 BC, providing a tentative *terminus post quem*\(^{183}\). Livy also records that while Hannibal was still near Tarentum, presumably in winter quarters, the Capuans were afraid that the consuls were planning to invest their city and

\(^{181}\) App. *Hann.* 34-35

\(^{182}\) Liv. 25.15.7-17

\(^{183}\) However, one should not press this point to far, since Livy tends to organize events by region rather than narrate them in strict chronological order. Also, if the Roman calendar were running early, then April 26, 212 BC would correspond to early April or late March by the solar year.
sent legates to Hannibal and requested food. Hannibal commanded Hanno to march out of Bruttium and collect supplies for the Capuans; Hanno pitched camp near Beneventum and collected grain from allied peoples who had stored grain the previous year, suggesting that the current grain crop was not yet ready for harvest. This suggests a terminus ante quem of around mid-June or earlier. The Roman consuls defeated Hanno and captured the grain supplies he had collected. Hanno retreated into Bruttium, and the consuls marched into Campania as soon as the crops were still young (in herbis), probably in early May. The Thurians probably treated with Hanno after he returned to Bruttium. Therefore, the fall of Thurii probably occurred in early or mid-May.

We have already shown that Tarentum revolted sometime in the winter of 213/212 BC, so Thurii revolted after Tarentum revolted. Now that the chronology has been established, we must reconcile the two versions of the Thurian revolt. Livy states that the primary reason the Thurians rebelled was because Thurian hostages were involved in the attempt by Tarentine hostages to escape from Rome and were executed along with the Tarentines. Friends and relatives of the executed hostages then formed a conspiracy to betray the city to Mago and Hanno. Appian clearly preserves a different tradition: the Thurians sent ships laden with supplies to help relieve the pro-Roman forces besieged in the citadel of Tarentum. However, the Tarentines learned of the plan and with the help of the Carthaginians captured all the Thurian vessels and held the crews

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184 Liv. 25.12.1, 13.1-2
185 Liv. 23.13.3-5; Azzi, 544-545
186 Liv. 25.14.11-14, 15.18; Consules a Benevento in Campanum agrum legions ducunt non ad frumenta modo, quae iam in herbis erant; see Azzi, 544-545.
187 Liv. 25.8.1, 15.7-8
hostage. This compelled the Thurians to send envoys to Tarentum in order to negotiate
the release of the hostages. The Thurians envoys were apparently convinced to trade the
loyalty of their city for the freedom of the hostages; after negotiations were concluded, all
Thurian hostages were released, and both the envoys and former hostages convinced
Thruii to open the gates for Hanno.\textsuperscript{188} Although the two accounts appear contradictory, it
is not impossible to reconcile them. The Romans may have executed some Thurian
hostages, likely in the months preceding the Tarentine revolt, but Thruii did not revolt
immediately after this event. Then, Thruii sent supply ships to relieve the citadel, after
Tarentum. Metapontum and Heraclea had revolted and Hannibal had begun to besiege the
Tarentine citadel. It is impossible to secure an exact date for their capture, but it is
plausible that the episode occurred before the Roman senate commissioned a special
purchase of grain from Etruria for the pro-Roman forces besieged in Tarentum.\textsuperscript{189} Livy
synchronizes the commission with Hanno’s mission to bring food to Campania, in the
spring of 212 BC.\textsuperscript{190}

A careful analysis of the Thurian revolt is in order, because the evidence suggests
that Thruii was perhaps the least likely Greek city to revolt, especially considering that
Tarentum had already revolted. First, the Thurians had previously sought Roman

\textsuperscript{188} App. Hann. 34

\textsuperscript{189} Liv. 25.15.4-5

\textsuperscript{190} While it is dangerous to establish a chronology from Livy’s synchronizing, the timeline makes sense.
The Thurian and Tarentine hostages were executed, perhaps in autumn of 213 BC. Tarentum revolted in
the winter of 213/212 BC, followed closely by Metapontum and Heraclea. In early spring, perhaps, the
Romans requisitioned ships from Thruii to carry supplies to Tarentum; the mission failed, and Thruians
were captured by Tarentum. By spring 212, Thruii revolted, and the Romans tried to purchase food in
Etruria to provision Tarentum garrison.
protection from both hostile neighboring Italic peoples and from Tarentine hegemony. Thurii and Tarentum maintained a longstanding rivalry that is apparent in Appian’s account.\textsuperscript{191} It is likely that Thurii would have seen an alliance between Tarentum and Hannibal, who already had the support of the Bruttii and some Lucanians, as a certain threat to Thurian interests, and this should have strengthened Thurian loyalty to Rome. Second, both the Livian and Appianic accounts suggest that Rome had the support of at least some of the Thurian ruling elite.\textsuperscript{192} The fact that the Roman garrison was particularly small implies Rome was not remarkably concerned about a Thurian revolt.\textsuperscript{193} In fact, according to Livy, the Roman garrison commander Marcus Atinius was overly confident in anticipation of battle with the Carthaginians not because of the strength of his troops, but because of the training and presumed loyalty of the Thurians themselves.\textsuperscript{194} Finally, if Livy’s account is correct that the execution of Thurian hostages did contribute to Thurii’s revolt, it is striking that she did not revolt until May 212 BC, probably at least a couple of months after Tarentum revolted, assuming the chronology proposed above is correct. Thrurii’s hesitation to revolt may suggest its closer attachment

\textsuperscript{191} See above, pp. 266-269.

\textsuperscript{192} Livy (25.15-7) states that the Romans were shut out of Thurii by the anti-Roman faction after a failed engagement by a combined Roman and Thurian force against a Carthaginian army. Livy later states that the garrison commander Atinius and a few of his men were admitted, and these men were allowed to escape the city by sea before the Thurnians allowed the Carthaginians to enter the city. Appian (\textit{Hann.} 34) states that the Roman garrison escaped by sea to Brundisium. It is clear from both accounts that some, if not all, of the Roman garrison was allowed to enter Thurii after the garrison was defeated, and this suggests that there was still support for Rome until soon before Thurii fell to the Carthaginians. More importantly, Livy also reports that only after some debate did the anti-Roman party prevail and allow the Carthaginians to secure Thurii. This implies that some aristocrats argued for remaining loyal to Rome.

\textsuperscript{193} Of course, the Romans were not completely confident in Thurian loyalty, hence they took aristocratic hostages. The garrison also may imply that the Romans did not entirely trust the Thurians, though Rome may have stationed the garrison more for strategic purposes than for policing their ally.

\textsuperscript{194} Liv. 25.15.9
to Rome. Indeed, the fact that she tried to send grain to the garrison in Tarentum, that the Thurians fought alongside Marcus Atinius’ troops, and that the Thurians allowed the Roman garrison and its commander escape all suggest at least ambiguous feelings toward Rome on the eve of Thurii’s revolt. 195

A number of local conditions factored into Thurii’s decision to revolt. The accounts of both Livy and Appian show that Thurii was politically divided: Livy refers explicitly to an anti-Roman party comprised of the friends and relatives of the executed Thurian hostages, while Appian mentions that the hostages released by Hannibal and the hostages’ relatives conspired to turn the city over the Hannibal. 196 Both accounts imply that the anti-Roman conspiracies formed only in response to recent events. Clearly Rome’s execution of the Thurian hostages either generated anti-Roman sentiment or contributed to any low-lying resentment of Rome that already existed in the city. 197 The act of violence on the part of Rome would have strengthened the position of aristocrats who preferred to ally with Hannibal while undermining the credibility of any Thurian aristocrats who promoted loyalty to Rome. Both accounts also underscore the personal nature of local politics – the Thurians were motivated by personal and family connection, not by an ideological attachment to Rome or Hannibal. Moreover, Hannibal ordered the

195 See Lomas, Rome and the Western Greeks 70-71

196 Liv. 25.15.8; App. Hann. 34

197 The evidence is ambiguous as to the level of Thurian hostility toward Rome that existed before the hostages were executed. The fact that Rome held Thurian hostages suggests she suspected Thurii’s loyalty, and the hostages may have been taken from aristocratic families whose loyalty in particular Rome mistrusted. However, it is also possible that there was little strong anti-Roman feeling, but the execution of the hostages angered Thurian aristocrats, especially the friends and relatives of the hostages, and convinced them that Hannibal offered them a better deal to protect their own interests.
release of the Thurian hostages whom the Tarentines had captured. His order came after Rome had executed the Thurian hostages, and he certainly knew of the events that had taken place in Rome.\textsuperscript{198} By releasing the hostages, Hannibal would have improved his standing with the Thurians while drawing attention to Rome’s heavy-handed rule.

The Thurians may have been receptive to this message since the evidence also suggest that the burdens of Roman rule increased in 213/212BC. For example, the Thurians sent a fleet with supplies to relieve the citadel of Tarentum. It is likely that the act was not entirely voluntary on the part of the Thurians but rather came at the request of Rome. Also, Marcus Atinius appears to have conscripted Thurian citizens and trained them for the defense of their city; this may represent an increased military obligation.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, both accounts suggest that the immediate influence if not threat of Tarentum compelled Thurii to ally with Hannibal. According to Livy, both the Thurian and Tarentine hostages who were quartered in Rome escaped because of the influence of a Tarentine aristocrat named Phileas.\textsuperscript{199} Appian’s account shows more clearly the effects of Tarentine pressure of Thurian policy, since in this version the Tarentines arranged the ambush that captured the Thurian crews. Moreover, the Tarentines met with the Thurian envoys sent to negotiate the release of the hostages – therefore, either the Tarentines held the hostages, or they were acting as arbiters between Thurii and Hannibal. Tarentum and Thurii were longtime rivals, and Tarentum had threatened Thurian autonomy in the past. It is likely that the new ruling elite of Tarentum

\textsuperscript{198} The anti-Roman conspiracy in Tarentum centered on relatives of the executed Tarentine hostages. Philomenus and Nico certainly would have told Hannibal about the executions, and Hannibal would have emphasized the affair in his speech to the Tarentines.\textsuperscript{199} Liv. 25.7.11-13
saw the hostages both as a means to show their loyalty to Hannibal and to assert hegemonic influence over Thurii. Thurii’s final decision to revolt was made out of expediency rather than out of a sense of Greek brotherhood or an ideological attachment to Hannibal’s cause.\textsuperscript{30} There was growing anti-Roman sentiment among the Thurian ruling class, and after the anti-Roman conspiracy invited Carthaginian troops to the city walls and these defeated the Roman garrison, Rome must have appeared increasingly incapable of protecting Thurian interests. However, there was still support for maintaining the alliance with Rome, and many of the Thurians must have chaffed at the notion of submitting to Tarentine domination.\textsuperscript{30}\textsuperscript{1} By allying with the Carthaginians and allowing Hanno to enter the city, the Thurians were able to protect themselves from any Tarentine threat, perhaps figuring that Hannibal would not allow Tarentum to attack another of his allies. The Thurian ruling class, therefore, calculated that the Carthaginians were more capable of protecting Thurian interests than was Rome.

The previous discussion has demonstrated that there were limits to the impact of intercity rivalries on shaping policy decisions by a local aristocracy. We should expect that Thurii would have been confirmed in its loyalty to Rome since its longtime rivals the Lucanians, the Brutii, and especially Tarentum had sided with Hannibal. Indeed, we have seen throughout the present work that regional rivals tended to align against each other during the Second Punic War. However, in the case of Thurii, other considerations outweighed the importance of local rivalries, and therefore Thurii went against the

\textsuperscript{30} Liv. 25.15.7, which states specifically that Thurii did not revolt because of blood ties to Metapontum or because of the example of Tarentum.

\textsuperscript{30}\textsuperscript{1} It is striking that the Thurians preferred to surrender to Hanno rather than to the Tarentines.
general trend. The increased military and economic burden of Roman rule and especially the Roman execution of Thurian aristocrats convinced the local elite that siding with Hannibal was a better deal than remaining under Roman rule, despite the fact that Hannibal was aligned with Tarentum. Therefore, Thurii was compelled to revolt by a changing and increasingly unfavorable military and diplomatic landscape.

Lomas argues, however, that Thurii’s continued support for Hannibal suggests that the city was not compelled to change alliance against its will.\textsuperscript{202} Livy reports that in 210 BC the Thurians and Metapontines either killed or captured survivors from a Roman fleet defeated in an engagement with Tarentum.\textsuperscript{203} The Thurians were instrumental in helping Hannibal ambush Roman troops near Petelia, preventing Rome from recapturing Locri in 208 BC.\textsuperscript{204} According to Appian, Thurii remained loyal to Hannibal until 204 BC, when he resettled 3500 Thurian citizens in Croton.\textsuperscript{205} However, Lomas fails to account for other details in Hannibal’s relationship with Thurii. First, Thurii was not uniform in desiring to negotiate with Hanno, and there was apparently a debate over what course to pursue after Hanno and Mago had defeated Marcus Atinius’ garrison. The Thurians decided ultimately to allow Atinius and the remaining Romans to escape rather than surrendering them to the Carthaginians, and it is likely that some pro-Roman local

\begin{footnotes}
\item[202] Lomas, \textit{Rome and the Western Greeks}\textsuperscript{70-71}
\item[203] Liv. 26.39.18
\item[204] Liv. 27.26.3-6
\item[205] App. \textit{Hann.} 57
\end{footnotes}
aristocrats fled along side the Roman forces, as they had in Locri and Tarentum.\textsuperscript{206} Furthermore, in 210 BC, Hannibal resettled the entire population of Herdonea to Thurii and Metapontum after executing Herdonean aristocrats whom he suspected of plotting with Rome.\textsuperscript{207} Therefore, Thurii was increasingly populated by inhabitants who were particularly loyal to Hannibal. Even so, there is evidence that not all remaining Thurians were steadfast in their loyalty to Hannibal. For example, Livy records that before the aforementioned naval battle between the Tarentine and Roman fleets, the Roman commander Decimus Quinctius enrolled rowers from around Thurii and Croton.\textsuperscript{208} When Hannibal evacuated Thurii (204 BC), he did not move the entire population but rather selected 3000 citizens from the city and 500 rural inhabitants who were particularly friendly to the Carthaginians and moved them to Croton.\textsuperscript{209} Both references suggest that the population of Thurii was not uniformly in support of Hannibal. Finally, by 210 BC Rome had recaptured Capua and Syracuse, treating both conquered cities harshly, and Hannibal destroyed Herdonea; in 209 BC Roman troops massacred the population of Tarentum.\textsuperscript{210} The Thurians probably figured they had little choice but to stay the course once they had sided with Hannibal since both Hannibal and Rome set examples for the

\textsuperscript{206} For Locri: Liv. 29.6.5-6; for Tarentum: Pol. 8.31.3; Liv. 25.10.7; App. Hann. 33; see also Liv. 27.35.4, for Tarentine citizens banished by Hannibal, presumably because they were loyal to Rome.

\textsuperscript{207} Liv. 27.1.14-5

\textsuperscript{208} Liv. 26.39.7

\textsuperscript{209} App. Hann. 57

\textsuperscript{210} Capua: Liv. 26.15-6; App. Hann. 43; Tarentum: Liv. 27.16; Plut. Fab. 22; Syracuse: Liv. 25.31; Plut. Marc. 19; Herdonea: Liv. 27.1.3-15
severe punishment of disloyalty. In any case, the subsequent actions of Thurii do not shed light on its initial decision to revolt.

4.4.3 The revolt of the Lucanians

The revolt of Tarentum encouraged the revolts of Metapontum and Heraclea and was linked to the revolt of Thurii. Hannibal’s capture of Tarentum was also soon followed by the revolt of the rest of the Lucanians who had remained loyal to Rome. This would mark the high point of Hannibal’s success in Lucania and Eastern Magna Graecia. This short section will outline the events surrounding the revolt of the Lucanians and will argue that the Lucanians revolted not because of any ideological attachment to Hannibal but rather because the military landscape had changed since the revolt of Tarentum and because some Lucanian aristocrats decided that it was politically advantageous to side with Hannibal.

The rebellion of the Greek cities of eastern Magna Graecia was followed by the ambush and death of the proconsul Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus. An exact chronology is difficult to establish, but Livy states that Gracchus’ death occurred as he planned to return from Lucania to Beneventum, probably in the spring or early summer. Some Lucanian aristocrats who were still loyal to Rome, under the leadership of a certain Flavus (Flavius, according to Appian), decided to seek the favor of the Carthaginians. The Lucanians met with Mago and negotiated a treaty by which the Lucanians promised to deliver Gracchus in return for the promise of freedom. Flavus and

211 Liv. 25.15.10-16.7; Pol. 8.35; App. Hann. 35; see also Walbank HCP 2.109-110.

212 Liv. 25.15.18-16.1; the consuls had marched from Beneventum to Capua as the crops were ripening in Campania, perhaps early May. De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 3:2.322-324 suggests Gracchus was killed in the spring, after the revolt of Metapontum, Heraclea, and Thurii.
his party lured Gracchus into an ambush with the promise that they could secure the surrender of all the Lucanians who had previously sided with Hannibal. The whole episode again underscores the personal nature of politics and, at times, diplomacy during the Second Punic War. According to Livy, Flavus was a guest-friend (hospes) of Gracchus, and the proconsul so trusted the Lucanian that he met Flavus with only a token bodyguard.\(^{213}\) More interesting is Livy’s statement that Flavus suddenly decided to switch allegiance, even though he had achieved political prominence by associating with the Romans.\(^{214}\) Flavus and his party may have felt that, with Hannibal’s recent success in Lucania, the pro-Hannibalic Lucanian elite would gain political influence while their own power was undermined. Flavus and the other previously pro-Roman aristocrats may also have been influenced by the Tarentines to revolt, as Tarentum re-asserted its own hegemonic influence.\(^{215}\) In either case, the episode emphasizes that Hannibal’s allies in Italy were not attached ideologically to the Carthaginian cause but based their decisions more on the immediate political and military landscape. Hannibal’s success in Tarentum brought him more success among the Greek cities on the Ionian coast and among the inland Lucanians.

By the spring of 212 BC Hannibal had finally achieved nearly complete success in Lucania and eastern Magna Graecia. However, he had been unable to capture the citadel of Tarentum, and he would never enjoy Tarentum’s port facilities. More importantly, Hannibal’s success came more than three years after the battle of Cannae; by

\(^{213}\) Liv. 25.16.6, 15, 23

\(^{214}\) Liv. 25.16.5
the time he gained control of the Greek cities along the southern coast of Italy, Rome had already begun to reclaim lost ground. Holding Tarentum would prove, at least to some degree, more a burden than a benefit. Rome would recapture Tarentum by 209 BC, and ultimately Hannibal’s success in Magna Graecia would be short-lived.

4.5 The Roman Re-conquest of eastern Magna Graecia (212-207BC)

By 212 BC Hannibal controlled all of the Greek cities on the Ionian coast, he had won over the cities of Sallentine peninsula, and he was allied with most or all of the Lucanians. However, he did not enjoy total success in eastern Magna Graecia and Lucania, and his incomplete success allowed long-term Roman advantages to take effect. Hannibal’s success was incomplete in two ways. First, success in these areas came only years after Cannae, so that the Romans had already begun to recover. Second, and more immediate, Hannibal was never able to control the citadel of Tarentum because Rome took decisive steps to secure the fortress. Roman troops in the citadel threatened pro-Hannibalic aristocrats in Tarentum, so Hannibal was compelled to divide his forces further in order to protect his allies. Furthermore, at about the same time Hannibal captured Tarentum the Romans began to put increased pressure on Capua, and Hannibal once again found himself caught between protecting two important allies. Ultimately Rome would take advantage of Hannibal’s absence from Tarentum – he was defending another ally from Roman reprisal – to capture the city, and once Tarentum fell, Rome quickly re-captured much of eastern Margan Graecia, Lucania, and Messapia. This section will outline Hannibal’s long-term strategic failure in this region.

215 See above, pp. 296-298.
Although negligence on the part of Caius Livius may have contributed to Hannibal’s capture of Tarentum, a swift Roman military response and a diligent policy of resupply prevented Hannibal from capturing the citadel. Troops from the garrison stationed in Metapontum were quickly sent to reinforce the Tarentine garrison. While this move allowed the Metapontines to revolt, the additional troops convinced Hannibal that he could not take the Tarentine citadel by storm. Instead, Hannibal ordered the blockade of the citadel completed, left a garrison to protect the Tarentines, and marched to winter quarters in the hope that the Roman garrison and their Tarentine supporters would be starved out. However, it would be the pro-Hannibalic Tarentines in the city who would face greater deprivation. First, the Romans made an effort to support the garrison by sea. Some time before the spring of 212 BC, Thurii sent ships laden with supplies to relieve the Roman troops in Metapontum, though the fleet was captured by the Tarentines. In the spring of 212 BC the Roman senate commissioned the special purchase of grain from Etruria to support the Tarentum garrison, and at least some of these supplies later reached their destination. The sources do not state explicitly that Rome sent supplies in 211 BC, but an episode late in the summer of 211 BC suggests supplies had continued to reach the garrison. The Tarentines requested a Carthaginian fleet to shore up the blockade of the citadel by preventing supplies from reaching the

216 Liv. 25.11.10, 15.5-6; App. Hann. 35; Pol. 8.34.1

217 Pol. 8.34.2; Liv. 25.11.10-3

218 Pol. 8.34.2-13; Liv. 25.11.12-20

219 App. Hann. 34

220 Liv. 25.15.4-6
Roman forces and also to allow the Tarentines to ship grain into the city for themselves. However, the Carthaginian sailors consumed more supplies than their protection allowed the Tarentines to gather, so the Tarentines requested the fleet leave. It is possible that the Carthaginian fleet did successfully prevent the Romans from receiving supplies, but it is clear the Tarentines also suffered from lack of food. In any case, the Tarentines faced at least as severe a food shortage as the Romans. In 210 BC the Romans sent another fleet under Decimus Quinctius to bring food to the garrison, but the Tarentines successfully defeated the fleet in a naval engagement and prevented the supplies from reaching the Roman garrison. However, Caius Livius ordered 2,500 troops under the command of a certain Caius Perseus to attack a large body of Tarentine citizens who were foraging in the surrounding countryside. Livy reports that the Romans killed many of the foragers and drove the rest back within the city walls. Livy claims that on the balance, both the Tarentines and the Romans had failed to acquire grain, though he does admit the Tarentines captured a few of the Roman supply ships, and it is likely the Romans were able to forage after defeating the Tarentines. Also, later in 210 BC, the Roman senate again authorized the purchase of grain in Etruria, and shipped it to Tarentum with additional troops. Finally, in 209 BC, proconsul Marcus Valerius sent grain supplies for the Roman army under the command of the consul Fabius Maximus near Tarentum; Fabius was also assigned one hundred pounds of gold to convey to the

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221 Liv. 26.20.7-11; Pol. 9.9.11.

222 Liv. 26.39.1-23

223 Liv. 27.3.8-9
Tarentum citadel. Presumably Fabius was able to convey both money and food to the garrison on the citadel. Overall, therefore, despite Hannibal’s promise that the Roman garrison would succumb to hunger, by 209 BC the Roman garrison may have been at least as well fed as the Tarentines and the Carthaginian garrison in the city.

The survival of the Roman garrison was critical for Rome’s reconquest of Tarentum and ultimately for the failure of Hannibal’s strategy in eastern Magna Graecia. Despite securing all the neighboring cities along the Ionian coast, Hannibal was forced to defend the Tarentines against Roman counter-attacks from the city’s citadel. Therefore, Hannibal left a garrison of both infantry and cavalry to protect the Tarentines. Leaving a garrison, however, may have produced ambiguous results. First, Hannibal could ill-afford to sacrifice troops, especially as he faced pressure from the Romans in Apulia and Campania. Second, the terms of their treaty with Hannibal suggest the Tarentines were sensitive to issues of sovereignty; a prolonged stay by a foreign garrison may have engendered more feelings of hostility than of gratitude. Third, and related to the last point, since at least part of the garrison was composed of Bruttian troops, the quartering of the garrison with the city walls may have stirred up traditional, ethnic hostility. Fourth, the garrison must have strained the Tarentine food supply. Finally, the Carthaginians did not prove to be particularly effective in protecting their Tarentine

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224 Liv. 27.8.13.19, 10.18
225 Pol. 8.33.7-8; Liv. 25.11.8
226 Pol. 8.25.2; Liv. 25.8.8. Livy’s version of the treaty specifically stipulates there was to be no Carthaginian garrison against the will of the Tarentines and certainly reflects Tarentine suspicion of a foreign garrison.
227 For the Bruttian contingent, see Liv. 27. 15.9; App. Hann. 49
allies. For example, Roman troops were able to harass Tarentine foragers with no recorded Carthaginian response. The Carthaginian fleet sent to protect Tarentum in 211 BC did more harm than good, while the Tarentines bore the brunt of naval defense in 210 BC. Indeed, when the city fell to Fabius in 209 BC, the Tarentine anti-Roman party, the Bruttians soldiers, and the Carthaginian soldiers appeared to have conflicting interests – the Bruttian troops betrayed Tarentum, the Carthaginians tried to surrender, while the Tarentines put up some defense. Overall, by 209 BC, the garrison probably had done little to help Hannibal’s credibility among the Tarentine citizenry.

Other factors between 212 BC and 209 BC certainly undermined Hannibal’s credibility in the eyes of the Tarentines. Hannibal had gained the loyalty of Tarentum at least in part by playing on Tarentine hegemonic aspirations, and Tarentum had been hesitant to revolt until Hannibal made an appropriate show of strength in southeast Italy. At first Hannibal delivered on his promise, as Metapontum and Heraclea revolted, Tarentum asserted influence over longtime rival Thurii, and most of the Lucanians who had remained loyal to Rome came over to Hannibal, perhaps under Tarentine influence. After his initial success, however, it became clear that Hannibal would be unable to author a resurrection of Tarentine hegemony. Hannibal tried to take the Tarentine citadel by storm one last time in 212 BC; after his attempt failed, he marched to Brundisium where he mistakenly believed the port would be betrayed to him. Strategic considerations undoubtedly influenced Hannibal’s move against Brundisium. However, Hannibal may also have been attempting to fulfill his promise to Tarentines by capturing

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228 Liv. 27.15.17-16.6

229 Liv. 25.22.14-5
a city that Rome used to control the Sallentine peninsula and which challenged Tarentine commercial interests. His failure would have undermined Tarentine confidence in his ability to promote Tarentine power. An event in Apulia in 210 BC also may have hurt Hannibal’s reputation: Hannibal resettled many of the inhabitants of Herdonea in Thurii and Metapontum, then razed Herdonea. Tarentum must have received word of these events from Metapontum, and although Hannibal had soundly defeated a Roman army near Herdonea before he resettled the town, the message he may have sent to the cities of eastern Magna Graecia was that he could not defend his allies without destroying their city. Finally, before Rome recaptured Tarentum in 209 BC, Fabius recaptured Manduria and Fulvius Flaccus received the surrender of some Lucanian towns. From a strategic perspective, the Romans were tightening the noose around Tarentum, and the strategy also must have demoralized the Tarentitines.

Hannibal was incapable either of following through with his promise of Tarentine power, capturing the Tarentine citadel by force, or adequately defending Tarentum because he had not brought Rome to its knees soon after Cannae. By the time Hannibal was involved in Tarentum, his resources and attention were divided among a number of military theatres. In the most striking case, Hannibal was often forced to choose between defending either Capua or Tarentum – the two most powerful cities in Italy to ally with him. In 212 BC, Hannibal tried to storm the citadel of Tarentum and next attempted to capture Brundisium; both actions were meant to shore up his position in southeast Italy.

280 Liv. 27.1.14
281 Liv. 27.15.2-4
However, by staying in the neighborhood of Tarentum, Hannibal gave the impression he had abandoned Capua, which the Romans began to besiege in 212 BC.\textsuperscript{232} The following year Hannibal was compelled to choose Capua over Tarentum in order to relieve the siege of Capua.\textsuperscript{233} Livy suggests that Hannibal recognized that not only could he not defend all of the cities that had allied with him, but also his failure to defend his allies from Roman reprisal cost him credibility.\textsuperscript{234} By 209 BC, Hannibal had already lost a number of powerful allies, including Capua, Arpi, and Syracuse, as well as numerous less important cities. Rome’s reconquest of Hannibal’s allies must have contributed to Tarentine doubt and weakened Tarentum’s resolve to remain loyal to Hannibal.

Meanwhile, the Romans exploited Hannibal’s dilemma with a coordinated military effort in 209 BC. The consul Fabius Maximus was assigned Tarentum as his province, but marched first into the Sallentine peninsula and captured the strategic city of Manduria.\textsuperscript{235} The other consul, Fulvius Flacchus, was assigned Lucania and Bruttium as his province; Flaccus operated in northern Lucania and received into surrender some Lucanian communities including Volceii and also the Samnite tribe of the Hirpini, probably by guaranteeing mild terms for surrender.\textsuperscript{236} Fabius encouraged Marcellus to

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{232}{Liv. 25.22.14-6}
\footnotetext{233}{Liv. 25.5.1-2}
\footnotetext{234}{Liv. 26.38.1-2}
\footnotetext{235}{Liv. 27.15.4}
\footnotetext{236}{Liv. 27.15.2-3. The passage is confusing because Livy does not recognize that the Volceii were Lucanian. The Hirpini inhabited the most southern reaches of Samnuim, bordering Lucania, while Volceii lay in northern Lucania. Therefore, it is likely that Flaccus was operating in the northern part of Lucania. For the geography of the Hirpini, see Salmon, \textit{Samnium and the Samnites} 46-8. Livy also mentions two members of the Bruttian elite who sought the same mild terms that the Lucanians had received. Livy states that the Bruttians came to Flaccus, so he may still have been in Lucania; it is not clear if the Bruttians would still be in Lucania.}
\end{footnotes}
keep Hannibal busy in Apulia so that he would be able to besiege Tarentum.\textsuperscript{237} According to Livy, Marcellus twice engaged Hannibal near Canusium, and both battles were costly for Romans.\textsuperscript{238} Fabius also commanded the Roman garrison commander at Rhegium to raid into Bruttium and besiege the city of Caulonia.\textsuperscript{239} Livy’s account clearly suggests that recapturing Tarentum was Rome’s strategic goal for 209 BC.\textsuperscript{240} The wide-ranging military actions in Italy must have been designed to distract Hannibal and lure him away from Tarentum. The distractions worked – after the two battles near Canusium Hannibal marched into Bruttium to relieve the siege of Caulonia.\textsuperscript{241} Hannibal either did not recognize that Rome was going to attack Tarentum, or he felt he the Tarentines could defend themselves long enough for him to relieve Caulonia.\textsuperscript{242} In either case, Hannibal compromised the defense of Tarentum by leaving southeast Italy. The defense of Tarentum was further compromised because the Punic fleet had crossed to Corcyra to seeking surrender were communities still allied with Hannibal, or those that had surrendered previously (see Liv. 25.1.2) and sought milder terms.

\textsuperscript{237} Liv. 27.12.1-2

\textsuperscript{238} Liv. 27.12.7-14.14. Livy claims Hannibal won the first battle, and the Romans won the second. It is likely, however, that Hannibal came out the better in both; see Lazenby, \textit{Hannibal’s War} 175

\textsuperscript{239} Liv. 27.12.4-6

\textsuperscript{240} According to Livy (27.12.3), Fabius believed that if Rome recaptured Tarentum, Hannibal would retreat from Italy. A fleet was prepared to assist in the siege of Tarentum (Liv. 27.7.15), and extra supplies were conveyed from Sicily to Tarentum (27.8.18-9). It is clear that the Romans had planned to besiege Tarentum by the beginning of the campaign season.

\textsuperscript{241} Liv. 27.15.1, 15.8, 16.10

\textsuperscript{242} Hannibal heard of the attack on Tarentum while he was near Caulonia (Liv. 27.16.9-10), suggesting that he did not know of the Roman attack sooner. However, it is unlikely that Hannibal would not have suspected a Roman attempt on Tarentum. If Plutarch (\textit{Fab.} 22) is to be believed, the siege of Tarentum took only about week; Hannibal may have figured that even if Tarentum were attacked, it would hold out longer than a week, so that he could relieve the siege of Caulonia and return to defend Tarentum. As it was, he almost managed to get back to Tarentum in time.
help Philip attack the Aetolians. The military dispositions in early 209 BC reveal the extent of Hannibal’s conundrum – Hannibal could not defend all of his allies, and he could only assist one ally by weakening the defense of another.

Fabius captured Tarentum after only a brief siege; had the Tarentines been able to hold out longer, Hannibal might have been able to return to Tarentum and relieve the siege. A number of factors contributed to the brevity of the Tarentum’s resistance. First, Hannibal’s absence and the fact that the Romans still controlled the citadel allowed Fabius to station troops very near Tarentum and surround the city completely. Fabius himself pitched camp near the entrance of the harbor, while ships laden with siege weapons were drawn up to city walls. Second, the Romans were able to storm the walls on the eastern side of the city because some of the Bruttians who comprised part of the garrison left by Hannibal betrayed the city to Fabius. According to Livy, the commander of the Bruttian contingent betrayed the city because he was in love with a Tarentine woman whose brother served in the Roman army and who helped sway the loyalty of the Bruttian commander. While the story is not impossible, it only accounts for the acts of the Bruttian commander, and Livy records that many Bruttians were involved in the plot to allow Fabius’ troops into the city. Bruttian willingness to betray

243 Liv. 27.15.7. Livy seems to mean that the Carthaginian ships were stationed in Tarentum, then moved to Corcyra; for this interpretation, see Lazenby, Hannibal’s War 175. However, Livy may mean that more generally there was no threat of a Carthaginian fleet appearing and disrupting Roman plans to besiege Tarentum by land and sea. If the Punic fleet had been in Tarentum, it probably was only putting in for a short time on its way to help Philip. It is not likely any Carthaginian fleet would have stayed long in Tarentum, after the unpopularity of the previous Carthaginian fleet.

244 Liv. 27.15.4-6

245 Liv. 27.15.9-12; App. Hann. 49; Plut. Fab. 21

246 Liv. 27.15.18
Tarentum may reflect lingering hostility between the Bruttians and the Greeks. There is also a good chance that the Hannibalic garrison was demoralized and was unwilling risk their own safety for the defense of Tarentum, since after Fabius’ troops entered the city both the Bruttian and Carthaginian contingents appear to have surrendered without a fight.\textsuperscript{247} Finally, most of the Tarentines themselves put up very little resistance. Livy does note that the leaders of the anti-Roman party fought bravely, while the Tarentines initiated combat when they met Romans in the \textit{agora}. It is not surprising that the leaders who had urged alliance with Hannibal were more willing to fight. However, it is more telling that the rest of the Tarentines fought only half-heartedly before retreating and hiding in private homes.\textsuperscript{248} Moreover, when Livy describes the massacre that ensued, he states that the Romans killed Carthaginians, Bruttians, and Tarentines, whether armed or unarmed.\textsuperscript{249} The passage implies that not all Tarentines put up armed resistance. Overall, Livy’s account suggests that by 209 BC, Hannibal and his allies among the local aristocracy had lost credibility with many of the Tarentines who had supported revolt in 213/212 BC, and it is likely that most Tarentines would have surrendered peaceably had the Roman troops been more disciplined.

Tarentum was the lynchpin to controlling southern Lucania and the Sallentine peninsula, and Hannibal did not immediately concede the city after it fell to Fabius. After spending a few days in the vicinity, he retreated to Metapontum and devised a plan to ambush Fabius: an envoy of Metapontines was sent to Fabius promising that the ruling

\textsuperscript{247} Liv. 27.16.5-6

\textsuperscript{248} Liv. 27.16.2

\textsuperscript{249} Liv. 27.16.6
aristocracy wished to betray the city and its Carthaginian garrison to the Romans. Hannibal probably figured if he could decisively defeat the consul, he could recapture Tarentum. Fabius did not take the bait – according to Livy, Fabius was warned by omens to be suspicious, though he also employed torture to extract the plot from the Metapontines. It is not clear how long Hannibal lingered in Metapontum, though he may have wintered in the vicinity. Rome still appears to have been concerned that Tarentum was vulnerable, but by this point its great manpower advantage permitted the senate to guard the area around Tarentum while taking the offensive against Hannibal’s remaining Italian allies. In 208 BC the praetor Quintus Claudius was assigned to command the two legions near Tarentum, in the province of “Tarentum and the Sallentini.” This army wintered in the Sallentine peninsula, and in 207 BC Claudius was prorogued to command the same army with the same province. It is probably during these two years that Rome subjugated any Messapian communities that did not surrender with Manduria to Fabius Maximus. Meanwhile, Hannibal was unable to recapture Tarentum or protect the Sallentine peninsula, despite killing the consul Marcellus and mortally wounding the consul Quinctius Crispinus in an ambush near Venusia in 208 BC. This is because the Romans twice attacked Locri, Hannibal’s principle Greek ally in Bruttium, and drew

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250 Liv. 27.16.11-2

251 Liv. 27.16.13-6, 25.12-4; Russi, *La Lucania romana* 14. The exact location of Hannibal’s winter quarters in 209/8 BC is unclear, and Livy may imply that he wintered in Apulia. In any case, Hannibal stayed in the neighborhood of Tarentum, and did not winter in Bruttium.

252 Liv. 27.22.2-3

253 Liv. 27.36.13, 38.8, 40.11-4

254 La Bua, in Uggeri, *L’età annibalica e la Puglia* 68-9
Hannibal away from southeast Italy.\textsuperscript{255} Once again, Hannibal was compelled to sacrifice the offensive in order to defend his allies.

The following year, 207 BC, saw Hannibal essentially abandon southeast Italy. The narrative of events is difficult to establish, because Livy’s account is particularly garbled. However, it appears that Hannibal had spent the winter of 208/7 BC in Bruttium, then gathered his troops in the spring of 207 BC and marched near Grumentum in Lucania. Livy claims that the reason for his movements was to recapture Lucanian towns that had submitted to Rome; this may be true in part, but Hannibal was certainly also planning to meet with his brother Hasdrubal, who had descended the Alps and reached the Po valley the same spring.\textsuperscript{256} Hannibal may have engaged a Roman army near Grumentum and then again in Apulia – according to Livy both battles were smashing Roman victories, though this is undoubtedly the exaggeration of Livy’s Roman sources.\textsuperscript{257} Livy then states that Hannibal doubled back to Metapontum where he reinforced his army with troops from Metapontum and Bruttium.\textsuperscript{258} DeSanctis doubts this part of Hannibal’s march, but Lazenby suggests the march to Metapontum is plausible.\textsuperscript{259} In any case, Hannibal either continued north or turned north from Metapontum and may have reached Larinum when he learned of the Roman victory at the

\textsuperscript{255} Liv. 27.25.11-4, 26.3-6, 28.13-7

\textsuperscript{256} Liv. 27.41.1-2; for the purpose of Hannibal’s march to Grumentum, see Lazenby, \textit{Hannibal’s War} 185; De Sanctis, \textit{Storia dei Romani} 3\textsuperscript{2}.2.553-4.

\textsuperscript{257} Liv. 27.41.3-42.8, 42.14-5; see Lazenby, \textit{Hannibal’s War} 185-6; De Sanctis, \textit{Storia dei Romani} 3\textsuperscript{2}.2.553-4.

\textsuperscript{258} Liv. 27.42.15-6

\textsuperscript{259} Lazenby, \textit{Hannibal’s War} 185-6; De Sanctis, \textit{Storia dei Romani} 3\textsuperscript{2}.2.554.
Metaurus River and his brother’s death. The battle of Metaurus marks the end of a legitimate Hannibalic threat in southeast Italy. After learning of the outcome of the battle, Hannibal retreated to Bruttium, perhaps first turning toward Tarentum and the Sallentine peninsula. Hannibal also appears to have conceded Messapia and most of Lucania, since he resettled to Bruttium the population of Metapontum, Heraclea, and the remaining Lucanians loyal to him.

To conclude: Hannibal’s strategy failed in eastern Magna Graecia because Hannibal did not convince the key city of Tarentum to revolt until the winter of 213/212 BC, by which time Rome had already begun to turn the tide of war. In the short term, Rome was able to hold the citadel of Tarentum in part through support of the pro-Roman Tarentines and in part because of a strategic policy to reinforce and re-supply Roman forces besieged in the citadel. Therefore, the Romans were able to hold out for the critical few years during which the Second Punic War still lay in the balance. After 211 BC, when Capua was recaptured, Rome was able to put increasing pressure on Hannibal’s allies in southeastern Italy. Having Tarentum as an ally became more a burden than a benefit for Hannibal since he was compelled to divert resources to defend the city, and the Romans adeptly forced Hannibal to choose between his allies, all of whom he could not actively defend at the same time. Hannibal was unusually successful

260 Liv. 27.40.10; see Lazenby, *Hannibal’s War* 185, 190.

261 Lucanians returned to alliance in 206 BC (Liv. 28.11.15); Thurii held out until 204 BC (Liv. 27.51.12-3); for a discussion of Thurii from 212 BC to 204 BC, see above pp. 61-63. Heraclea is not mentioned in the sources. It may have been evacuated with Heraclea. However, Heraclea continued to enjoy a favorable treaty until the Social War (Cic. *Arch. 6, Balb.* 21-2) and does not appear to have been colonized after the war. The city was visited by Delphic *theoroi* in 198 BC or 194 BC and is mentioned in the list of *theorodokoi* of Delphi. This all suggests that Heraclea maintained a degree of political autonomy that was denied other Greek cities such as Metapontum, Thurii, Croton, and Caulonia and may indicate that
in eastern Magna Graecia in that he was able – for a brief period of time – to elicit rebellion in all of the Greek cities on the Ionian coast, most or all of the inland Lucanians, and probably all of the Sallentine communities. However, he was not able to elicit rebellion among these communities soon enough for his overall strategy to succeed. That is, by the time his strategy bore full fruit in southeast Italy, Rome had already begun to re-conquer Hannibal’s Italian allies. Ultimately, his success in eastern Magna Graecia was not able to compel the Roman senate to seek terms.

When analyzing why Hannibal failed to achieve military and diplomatic success in southeast Italy earlier in the Second Punic War, thus failing to capitalize fully on his string of victories early in the war, it becomes apparent that local conditions contributed to his strategic failure. Hannibal miscalculated the degree to which dissatisfaction with Roman rule and the promise of freedom would attract allies among the cities in southeast Italy. While the communities of southern Italy were not particularly enamored with the so-called attractions of Roman rule, neither were they drawn ideologically to the Carthaginian cause. For the communities of eastern Magna Graecia and southern Lucania, local political rivalries and inter-municipal tensions greatly influenced a city’s decision to revolt or stay loyal. In all of this, the diplomatic stance of Tarentum dominated the policy decisions of its neighbors. Thurii had long sought protection from Rome against Tarentum’s hegemonic encroachment. The cities of Metapontum and Heraclea tended to follow Tarentum’s lead in matters of diplomacy. Tarentum herself was a likely candidate to ally with Hannibal, but she hesitated to revolt because of the military reality of the day – Rome maintained overwhelming military supremacy in the

Heraclea returned to its alliance with Rome willingly; see Quilici, *Siris-Heraclea* 162; Manganaro, *Historia* 330
region. Hannibal was able to win over the Tarentines, at least in part, by promising that an alliance with him would restore Tarentum’s hegemony. However, the mere promise of “freedom” and the release of a few prisoners after Trasimene and Cannae had not been enough to encourage Tarentum to revolt in the wake of Cannae. Rather, it was not until Hannibal’s presence was felt more directly that he convinced them he could deliver them from Roman rule and help usher in a new age of Tarentine imperialism. Thus, Hannibal failed to take advantage of Tarentum’s inclination to revolt until the tide of the war had begun to turn against him, and this delay cost Hannibal the war in the southeast Italian theatre.
CONCLUSION

The previous four case studies have brought the Second Punic War into focus from the perspective of the Italian states and suggest that Hannibal’s lack of success as a diplomat was an important component of his overall defeat in the Italian theatre of the war. Because Rome enjoyed a significant manpower advantage, Hannibal needed to elicit massive allied revolts in a short period of time. Rome’s Italian allies were willing to come over to Hannibal’s side, but only on their own terms, and Hannibal found it difficult to get all the communities in any given region to revolt at the same time. Moreover, it was difficult for Hannibal to maintain the loyalty of the Italian communities that did revolt. The arguments presented in this dissertation reveal that local conditions and motivations significantly influenced the decisions of various Italian states to remain loyal to Rome, thus shaping the course and ultimately the outcome of the Second Punic War. In short, Hannibal’s failure resulted from military disadvantage that he could not overcome through diplomatic means because of local, circumstantial factors. This analysis raises a number of wideranging questions both specific to the Second Punic War and with more far-reaching ramifications that I will discuss in this conclusion.

First, we must consider why Hannibal was unable to unify the Italians against Rome, or even to keep his new Italian allies unified in the eventual war of attrition.
Goldsworthy has stated that the communities that did join Hannibal lacked a sense of common identity or purpose.\(^1\) It is more accurate to say that there were too many mutually exclusive identities and purposes. Hannibal’s invasion of Italy and his initial military success over the Roman army temporarily suspended cohesive structures of Roman rule, and brought to the fore local tensions that had been suppressed beneath the surface of Roman hegemony. In some cases these local tensions far pre-dated Roman conquest. The Italian communities were little motivated by global ideological impulses, such as “loyalty to Rome” or the cause of the Carthaginians. Instead, local conditions and factors had greater impact in shaping the decision-making in individual communities, and it was difficult for Hannibal to appear attractive in all conditions. Local rivalries introduced further difficulties. Some Italian cities were more concerned with pressure from a local expansionist hegemonic power than with the imposition of Roman rule. When Hannibal gained a powerful city as his ally, such as Capua, Arpi, Locri, and Tarentum, he pushed that ally’s rival cities more firmly into the Roman camp. Even playing on political factionalism proved tricky. If Hannibal backed the rule of one group of a city’s aristocrats in return for their loyalty, there was likely to be a rival faction of aristocrats who would be prone to seek the restoration of Roman rule in return for political backing. Moreover, some local aristocrats tied their political power to Hannibal’s success, and when Hannibal’s fortunes declined their resolve was easily broken. Overall, the variety of local contexts made it difficult for Hannibal to accommodate the desires of every Italian community, despite the flexibility of Hannibal’s diplomacy. In the short-term, therefore, local conditions limited the effectiveness of

\(^1\) Goldsworthy, *The Punic Wars* 223
Hannibal’s Italian strategy, and as the war dragged on long-term Roman advantages came increasingly into play. Thus, Hannibal could not elicit the defection of enough of Rome’s allies quickly enough to overcome Rome’s manpower advantage and achieve his strategic objective.

Hannibal has been widely considered one of the great military geniuses in the ancient world, yet, as the previous summary suggests, he was not able to overcome the local conditions that undermined the effectiveness of his Italian strategy. This raises the important question of where did Hannibal’s strategic planning go wrong? In other words, should Hannibal have foreseen that Rome would hold out despite major losses on the battlefield and the defection of some of its allies, or did Hannibal envision a protracted war with a series of campaigns, with the slow accumulation of Italian allies? If the latter is the case, then Hannibal failed to account adequately for Rome’s long-term advantages. Or, did Hannibal expect a short war and for more Italian allies to revolt in a short time, thus depriving Rome of its manpower advantage? If this is the case, then Hannibal greatly miscalculated the latent tensions within and between the Italian cities. Indeed, the answers to these questions, which are suggested by the analysis presented in the four regional case studies, will help us evaluate Hannibal’s generalship.

Hannibal’s failure to defeat Rome despite his ability to win victories on the battlefield has led some scholars to question Hannibal’s competence as a strategist. In fact, Peddie has criticized Hannibal for having no clear objective when invading Italy. According to Peddie, the lack of a clear strategic goal made it difficult for Hannibal to
formulate of any effective, coherent strategy in Italy. However, Peddie fails to notice evidence from the Second Punic War that suggests Hannibal did, in fact, have a strategic objective and that he formulated a strategy to achieve that objective. He probably never planned to reduce the city of Rome, but rather envisioned winning pitched battles and eliciting allied revolts in order to force the Romans to offer peace terms. This conclusion is consistent with evidence from the Second Punic War and conforms to general patterns of Hellenistic era warfare.

As Goldsworthy observed, it was difficult in the Hellenistic period for one large state to destroy another large state utterly in war. Therefore, the strategic objective of warfare usually was to compel an enemy to surrender or seek peace terms. Hannibal’s strategic objective conformed to this tendency, as his strategic objective was not to reduce the city of Rome but rather to compel the Roman senate to seek peace terms acceptable to himself or Carthage. A treaty between Hannibal and Philip V, dated to 215 BC and preserved in a fragment of Polybius, supports this conclusion. The terms of the treaty assume that the war between Hannibal and Rome would end with the Romans offering peace terms and contain provisions for a future war with Rome, which indicates that Hannibal did not envision the destruction of Rome as the likely outcome of his invasion of Italy. According to Livy, Hannibal told his Roman captives after Cannae that

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2 Peddie, Hannibal’s War 5-6, 199-200

3 Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars 155-6

4 Pol. 7.9; see also Liv. 23.33.5, 10-2, 34.4; App. Mac. 1; Zon. 9.4.2-3; Walbank 2.42-56; for the authenticity of the document, see Bickerman, “Hannibal’s Covenant,” AJP 73 (1952) 1-23, “An Oath of Hannibal,” TAPA 75 (1944) 87-102; Barré, The God-List in the Treaty between Hannibal and Philip V.

5 Pol. 7.9.12-5; see Walbank 2.43-4, 55-6.
he was not fighting a war for the death of the Romans (non internecivum sibi esse cum Romanis bellum), but rather for dignity and empire (de dignitate atque imperio). After the speech Hannibal sent ten captured Roman equites to the Roman senate in order to discuss the ransom of Roman prisoners. More importantly, he also sent a Carthaginian representative named Carthalo to discuss peace terms with the Romans. The wording of the passage suggests Hannibal suspected the Romans would have desired peace after suffering such a significant defeat at Cannae. As Lazenby noted, the only time Hannibal did march on Rome, in 211 BC, was to draw the Romans from their siege of Capua; it was not a legitimate attempt to seize the city by storm. Overall, it is clear that Hannibal expected the war to end with the Romans agreeing to terms, not with the capture or destruction of Rome herself.

Hannibal expected to achieve this strategic objective by winning victories on the battlefield and eliciting allied revolts. Again, this is in keeping with the typical order of events on Hellenistic warfare. Wars in the Hellenistic period were not, in general, protracted affairs, so the winning side could hope to force the losing side to seek terms in a relatively short time. The conclusion to such a short war was usually reached through a number of methods, usually in combination. A state could compel its enemy to seek terms by marching into its homeland and defeating its army in one or a few pitched

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6 Liv. 22.58.3
7 Liv. 22.58.6-7
8 Carthalo was commissioned to offer terms si forte ad pacem inclinare cerneret animos (if by chance he that their [the Romans’] minds were inclined toward peace). Hannibal of course could not be certain the Romans would surrender, but he suspected his victory at Cannae had broken the senate’s will.
9 Lazenby, Was Maharbal Right?” in Cornell, et al (eds), The Second Punic War: A reappraisal 41
battles. A state could also break its enemy’s will to continue fighting by capturing enemy
cities or ravaging their land. A powerful state usually controlled a number of smaller
subordinate or “allied” states that felt varying degrees of loyalty toward the dominant
power. By defeating its enemy in a pitched battle, or ravaging its enemy’s territory with
impunity, a state would reveal its enemy’s weakness and elicit defections from among the
enemy’s subordinate states. The combination of battlefield defeat and the rebellion of
subordinate “allied” states could place further pressure on a Hellenistic state to seek to
terms quickly.  

The meager evidence from the Second Punic War suggests that Hannibal planned
for a campaign essentially along Hellenistic lines. According to Livy, Hannibal
recognized that the key to defeating Rome was to march into Italy and disturb its alliance
system, and he appears to have expected his invasion to yield a quick victory rather than
a war of attrition. In 217 BC, Hannibal marched into northern Campania and laid waste
to the Ager Falernus in order either to elicit a pitched battle with the Roman army under
Fabius Maximus or to reveal to the Italians Rome’s inability to defend its own territory.
Polybius implies that Hannibal decided to march into the Ager Falernus at least in part
out of frustration that his victories at Trebia and Trasimene had yet to yield allied revolts,
suggesting that Hannibal figured that only couple of victories would have been needed to

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10 Goldsworthy, *The Punic Wars* 155-156

11 Liv. 34.60.3; see also Pol. 3.34.1-5.

12 The Ager Falernus had been assumed into the Ager Romanus. For a complete discussion of the
campaign, see Appendix A.
bring the war to a conclusion.\textsuperscript{13} Carthalo’s embassy to Rome after Cannae also suggests that Hannibal figured the senate would capitulate after he exacted that crushing defeat. It is striking that only after Cannae did Hannibal both send a legate to Rome and address Roman prisoners in congenial terms.\textsuperscript{14} Previously, after both Trebbia and Trasimene, Hannibal had freed non-Roman prisoners, but had treated Roman prisoners badly.\textsuperscript{15} The change in his tactics may indicate Hannibal’s frustration at Rome’s refusal to have sought terms sooner. Therefore, it is likely that Hannibal expected to conclude the war with Rome relatively quickly, typical of contemporary military-diplomatic practice.

Overall, therefore, Peddie’s criticism that Hannibal did not have a strategic objective and as a result did not develop a coherent strategy does stand up to the evidence. Hannibal’s strategic objective was to force the Romans to seek terms; this would be achieved through a strategy of winning victories and eliciting allied revolts – as Goldsworthy puts it, Hannibal invaded Italy to win the war. From the modern perspective this may appear to be rather amorphous planning, yet it is consistent with the military science of the day. What is striking is not that Hannibal lacked a strategic objective or failed to formulate a coherent strategy, but rather how unremarkable his objective and strategy were relative to contemporary standards.

\textsuperscript{13} Pol. 3.90.10-13. According to Polybius, Hannibal was frustrated that Fabius would not offer battle, and his decision to invade the Ager Falernus was made in response; it had not been planned long in advance. Polybius states explicitly that Hannibal hoped if the Romans would not defend the Ager Falernus, their allies would revolt (3.90.11-2). Polybius further explains that although the Romans had been defeated in two battles, the allies had yet to revolt (3.90.13), and he links this fact to Hannibal’s decision to invade the Ager Falernus.

\textsuperscript{14} Liv. 22.58.1-7

\textsuperscript{15} Pol. 3.77.3-7, 85.1-4
Lazenby has argued that Hannibal would not have been so naïve as to expect the Romans to give in easily, but that he would have anticipated a lengthy war of attrition in which he would slowly wear down the resolve of Rome and its allies. Lazenby’s conclusion rests to a great degree on the argument that Hannibal would have learned from the example of the First Punic War that Rome was resilient and could withstand war for decades.\(^{16}\) We have just argued that Hannibal probably did not anticipate a long war of attrition. However, Lazenby does raise a relevant question: was Hannibal a poor student of history and thus did he fail to learn from Carthage’s first war with Rome that the Romans could only be defeated in a long war?

I suggest that the lessons of the First Punic War were not unambiguous. Admittedly, the war was a protected struggle in which Rome suffered a number of major setbacks yet refused to surrender. However, the First Punic War ended with the Carthaginians seeking terms rather than with the Romans capturing the city. More telling are the events surrounding Regulus’ invasion of Africa.\(^{17}\) After defeating a Carthaginian fleet off Ecnomus in 256 BC, the Romans sailed to Africa and landed an army under the command of the consul Manlius and the suffect consul Regulus at Cape Hermiae. After seizing nearby Aspis, the Romans marched towards Tunis, plundering widely and capturing a large number of cattle and slaves. Manlius then sailed back to Rome, leaving Regulus in command of an army of about 15,000 troops.\(^{18}\) Regulus marched to and prepared to besiege a town named Adys, about 15 miles from Tunis though the exact

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\(^{17}\) For modern analysis of the Roman invasion of Africa, 256-5 BC, see Goldsworthy, _The Punic Wars_ 84-92; Lazenby, _The First Punic War_ 97-110; Walbank 1.89-92.
location of which is unknown. The Carthaginians camped nearby in the hope of relieving Adys, but the Romans made a daring attack on the Carthaginians, defeated them, stormed the Carthaginian camp, then seized Tunis in the wake of the Carthaginian retreat.\textsuperscript{19} After seizing Tunis Regulus entered into negotiations with the Carthaginians. Although accounts differ with regards to the specifics of the negotiations, all sources agree that the Carthaginians were inclined to accept terms, but refused to surrender because Regulus’ terms were too harsh.\textsuperscript{20} The next year the Carthaginians regrouped under the Spartan mercenary Xanthippos and defeated Regulus’ army in a pitched battle, probably near Tunis; the Roman survivors withdrew from Africa that year.\textsuperscript{21} The salient point is that the Roman invasion of the enemy’s homeland coupled with victory in pitched battle nearly brought the Carthaginians to the bargaining table in less than a year. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the war was fought for the most part in Sicily, not in Italy, and therefore the Romans never had to face a hostile army in their own territory. Hannibal may have paid particular attention to this fact. When Hamilcar Barca, his father, took over command of the Carthaginian war effort in 247 BC, his first operation was a raid on Bruttium and the territory of Locri.\textsuperscript{22} Over the next few years Hamilcar continued to raid the Italian coast, reportedly as far north as Cumae.\textsuperscript{23} Though he lacked the resources for

\textsuperscript{18} Pol. 1.25-9; Eutrop. 2.21; Oros. 4.8.6-9; Zon. 8.12; Diod. Sic. 23.11; Liv. \textit{Per.} 17

\textsuperscript{19} Pol. 1.30; Zon. 8.13; Flor. 1.18.21; Eutrop. 2.21; Liv. \textit{Per.} 18

\textsuperscript{20} Pol. 31; Zon. 8.13; Dio 11.22-3; Diod. Sic. 23.12; Liv. \textit{Per.} 18

\textsuperscript{21} Pol. 1.32-6; Diod. Sic. 23.13-5; Liv. \textit{Per} 18; Flor. 1.18.22-4

\textsuperscript{22} Pol. 1.56.2-3

\textsuperscript{23} Pol. 1.56.10-11
a full-scale invasion of Italy, Hamilcar may have recognized that Italy was the key to defeating Rome. At the least, he may have recognized that Rome’s ability to continue the struggle depended heavily on the contributions of the naval allies and, therefore, tried to deprive Rome of those allies by attacking the coast. In either case, the lesson that Hannibal would have taken from the First Punic War, especially from his father’s command, was that the key to victory over Rome lay taking the war to Italy and Rome’s allies.

It is also not reasonable to fault Hannibal for failing to learn from the example of Pyrrhus that Rome could not be compelled to seek terms in a short a short war.\(^{24}\) It is not clear that Hannibal would have known about or placed much stock in the events of a war that took place around half a century before he invaded Italy, but let us assume that Hannibal did study Pyrrhus’ campaign in Italy, since there is some evidence he could have done so.\(^{25}\) If Hannibal did, in fact, study Pyrrhus’ Italian campaign, he likely would

\(^{24}\) Dorey and Dudley, *Rome against Carthage* xv-xvi

\(^{25}\) First, there is the anecdote of a famous meeting in 193 BC between Scipio and Hannibal, at which the latter expressed great admiration for Pyrrhus’ generalship (Liv. 35.14.5-12; App. Syr. 9-10; Plut. Flam. 21). The account is almost certainly spurious (Lancel, *Hannibal* 195; Holleaux, *Rome et la conquête de l’Orient* 184-207), but may reflect a tradition that Hannibal did have knowledge of Pyrrhus’ campaigns. Second, Polybius’ record of the treaties between Carthage and Rome provides stronger evidence. According to Polybius, Rome and Carthage signed five treaties between 509 BC and the so-called Ebro Treaty, probably in 226 or 225 BC. The third treaty was an extension of the first two with specific clauses added with regards to Pyrrhus (Pol. 3.22-27, the third treaty is recorded in 3.25; see also Diod. Sic. 22.7.5-6; Liv. Per. 13). It should be dated to 279/8 BC, after Pyrrhus’ victories at Heraclea and Ausculum, but before he invaded Sicily (Walbank 1.349). Hannibal’s brother-in-law Hasdrubal orchestrated the fifth treaty, the Ebro treaty (Pol. 2.13.7, 3.27.9). Presumably Hasdrubal was aware of any pre-existing agreements between Rome and Carthage, so that his activities in Spain would not contravene the previous treaties. It is likely that Hannibal also knew about earlier Romano-Carthaginian treaties, including the third treaty, and perhaps had knowledge of the events that surrounded its signing. Finally, and most obviously, Pyrrhus engaged Carthaginian forces in Sicily, and Hannibal probably had access to any Carthaginian records and accounts of this conflict. Overall, it is likely that Hannibal would have had some familiarity with the campaigns of Pyrrhus, and may have looked to the Pyrrhic example when formulating his own Italian strategy. The Ebro treaty has generated great deal of scholarly debate concerning the actual terms of the treaty, the responsibilities the treaty placed on both Rome and Carthage, whether the treaty was ratified by the Carthaginian senate, the relationship between the treaty and Saguntum, and the relationship between
have reached the conclusion that Rome could be compelled to seek terms without a lengthy war. It is important to understand the Pyrrhic War from the Carthaginian perspective. After he defeated the Romans in a single pitched battle, near Heraclea, Pyrrhus sent Cinneas to Rome, who carried out extensive negotiations with the Roman senate. Despite the fact that the senate turned down the terms offered by Cineas, the majority of senators were anxious for peace after noting the defection of much of southern Italy. Later, the Romans took the initiative and sent an embassy to Pyrrhus in order to negotiate the ransom of Roman captives. There may have been another round of negotiations after Pyrrhus again defeated the Romans at the battle of Ausculum, with Cinneas making a second trip to Rome, though this account may be a reduplication of the negotiations after the battle of Heraclea. In either case, the Romans were brought to the bargaining table and to the brink of accepting terms after one or two pitched battles and the defection of a number of its allies. It is in the context of Rome’s battlefield defeats and its negotiations with Pyrrhus that the third Carthaginian-Roman treaty was signed. Both the Romans and the Carthaginians agreed to help the other in the case Pyrrhus attacked their homeland, and the Carthaginians promised to provide the Romans naval assistance, if either the Romans or the Carthaginians made a summacivan pro;β

the treaty and the outbreak of the Second Punic War, most of which is of little relevance to the present discussion. The important fact is that Hasdrubal negotiated the Ebro Treaty and was probably aware of previous treaties between Rome and Carthage, and that Hannibal also probably knew about previous Romano-Carthaginian treaties. For brief analysis and bibliography of the Ebro Treaty, see for example Walbank 1.168-72; Richardson, Hispaniae 20-28.

26 Diod. Sic. 20.6.3; App. Samn. 1-2; Plut. Pyrrh.18; Dion. Hal. 19.13-5; Liv. Per. 13; Zon.8.4

27 Plut. Pyr. 20.1; App. Samn.10.4; Zon. 8.4; Dio 9.40.29 Liv. Per. 13

28 Plut. Pyrrh.21.1-4; see Lefkowitz, HSCP 64 (1959) 147-77; see also MRR 1.193.
Some scholars have translated summacivan pro;ß Puvrron as “an alliance against Pyrrhus.” However, Walbank argues convincingly that the phrase should read “an alliance with Pyrrhus.” This translation makes better sense semantically and in the immediate historical context. The Carthaginians feared that the Romans were about to cave in to Pyrrhus and that they would make an alliance with him, leaving Pyrrhus free to invade Sicily against the Carthaginians. This was a very real threat to Carthage; soon after the battle of Ausculum the important Siciliote cities of Syracuse, Agrigentum, and Leontini sent an embassy to Pyrrhus requesting military assistance against the Carthaginians. The treaty was meant, therefore, to encourage the Romans to keep the war against Pyrrhus going in Italy. While hindsight shows that the Romans did not offer terms to Pyrrhus, the third Carthaginian-Roman treaty suggests the Carthaginians figured the Romans would have surrendered. Also, from the Carthaginian perspective, their military assistance proved instrumental in Rome’s final victory over Pyrrhus. While Pyrrhus campaigned on behalf of the Greek cities of Sicily, the Romans were able to recapture cities that had rebelled to Pyrrhus, including Locri. When Pyrrhus returned to Italy, because he had lost popularity in Sicily and also possibly because of appeals by the Samnites and Tarentines, the Carthaginians destroyed his fleet. Rome’s victory in the pitched battle at Beneventum (275 BC) ultimately convinced Pyrrhus to abandon Italy.

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29 Pol. 3.25.3-5

30 For the analysis and bibliography, see Walbank 1. 350-1. Walbank argued based on comparanda that the formula summacivan pro;ß tina normally meant “alliance with someone.”

31 Plut. Pyrrh. 23.4-6, 24.3-4; Zon. 8.5-6; Dion. Hal. 20.8.1-9.2; App. Samn. 12.1
However, the Carthaginians may have perceived that it took the combined efforts of the Carthaginians and the Romans to drive Pyrrhus from the western Mediterranean.

To summarize the “lessons” of the campaigns of Pyrrhus upon which Hannibal may have formed his expectations of a war with Rome, it is not certain that Hannibal would not have learned from the Pyrrhic War that Rome would not surrender quickly. Rather, if Hannibal studied the example of Pyrrhus at all, he may have drawn the opposite conclusion. Pyrrhus quickly elicited large-scale allied revolts and brought Rome to the brink of surrender after only two pitched battles. Moreover, Pyrrhus’ Italian campaign was incomplete – instead of following up his victories against Rome, he departed Italy for Sicily. Hannibal clearly did not plan to abandon Italy if he perceived he was close to victory. Hannibal may also have calculated that it was only the promise of military assistance from Carthage that kept Rome from conceding after Ausculum. Finally, Hannibal may have figured that without Carthaginian help, the Romans would not have defeated Pyrrhus. Overall, Pyrrhus’ Italian campaign should have suggested to Hannibal that Rome could be brought to terms relatively quickly by a successful invasion of Italy.

It is possible, however, that Hannibal did not look to distant precedents when devising his Italian strategy, but that he calculated Rome’s response based on his family’s and his own personal experience in Spain. While the evidence for Barcid Spain is rather limited, the extant accounts campaigns of the campaigns of Hamilcar Barca, Hasdrubal, and especially Hannibal suggest that Hannibal probably figured that he would compel Rome to seek terms relatively soon after he invaded Italy.
Hamilcar Barca landed near Cades in 237 BC, after he had engineered the recovery of Carthaginian possessions in Africa during the Libyan War, and he remained in Spain until his death in 229 BC. According to Polybius, Hamilcar brought over many tribes by means of both arms and diplomacy; Appian says that he plundered the natives and distributed the booty to tribal elements loyal to him. Diodorus Siculus records the most detail: Hamilcar fought against Celtic, Iberian, and Tautessian tribes, he tortured and killed the leaders of defeated tribes and enrolled the conquered in his own army, and won over many cities by diplomacy and force. The overall picture, even if one assumes that hostile authors have exaggerated Hamilcar’s brutality, is a lengthy campaign of pacification during which Hamilcar conquered as far as Turdetania (the Baetis valley). Despite his success, Hamilcar failed to bring to heel the Oretani, the most powerful tribe in the region. A number of tribes unified under the leadership of the Oretani faced Hamilcar in battle near Helike (modern Elche) and killed him. On the surface, it might appear that a nine-year campaign ending in the death of his father should have cautioned Hannibal against expecting a quick victory in war. However, until his death Hamilcar was successful at bringing over various Spanish tribes through only a few pitched battles. In fact, Diodorus Siculus’ statement that Hamilcar won over many cities by arms and diplomacy is placed immediately after his account of two pitched battles, the first against


33 Pol. 2.1.5-9; App. *Iber*. 5; see also Liv. 21.2.1-2

34 Diod. Sic. 25.10.1-4; Hamilcar also founded the colony of Akra Leuke.

35 For the geography, see Strab. 3.2.14; Richardson, *Hispaniae* 19.

36 App. *Iber*.5; Diod. 25.10.3-4; Strab. 3.3.2; Pol. 2.1.8

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the tribes under Istolatius’ command and the second against those commanded by Indortes. The passage as a whole suggests that the loyalty of Spanish communities wavered and that they would fall in easily with whoever seemed more powerful.

Hasdrubal took over command in Spain upon Hamilcar’s death. He too is credited with extending Carthaginian dominion by winning over Spanish tribes through diplomacy. Hasdrubal appears to have been particularly adept at maintaining strong relations with the native elite.\(^{37}\) According to Diodorus Siculus he married a woman from an elite Iberian family, an act certainly aimed at securing his position vis-à-vis the powerful local families.\(^{38}\) Although the sources emphasize his record of diplomacy, Hasdrubal also resorted to military force. Hasrubal immediately attacked the Oretani as soon as he learned of Hamilcar’s death. According to Diodorus Siculus, after he defeated the Oretani in battle and punished those responsible for Hamilcar’s death – presumably he executed tribal leaders – the twelve cities of the Oretani and all the cities of Iberia came under Carthaginian control.\(^{39}\) While this is certainly an exaggeration, the account clearly indicates that the loyalty of the Spanish communities could be gained by a strong show of military strength. Indeed, it is possible that Hasdrubal’s campaign had stronger influence on Hannibal’s generalship than his father’s. After all, Hannibal was only a young boy when he accompanied Hamilcar to Spain, but he was a young man and probably had experience commanding troops during Hasdrubal’s tenure. Moreover, Hasdrubal’s campaign against the Oretani is more analogous to Hannibal’s Italian

\(^{37}\) Pol. 2.36.1-3, Polybius claims he extended Carthaginian power more through his relationship with tribal chiefs than through military prowess; see also Liv. 21.2.5-6; App. Iber. 6-8.

\(^{38}\) Diod. Sic. 25.12.1
campaign than were the campaigns of Hamilcar, at least as far as goes the evidence that the sources preserve. Hasdrubal marched into the territory of the Oretani and defeated them in battle, many tribes – presumably less powerful – came over to the Carthaginians, and the Oretani ceased to threaten Carthaginian hegemony. Hannibal may have figured that the defeat of the Romans in pitched battle would yield similar results in Italy.

Finally, one may consider Hannibal’s own brief career in Spain, about which the sources contain a little more detail. Hannibal was acclaimed general after Hasdrubal was assassinated by his Celtic servant in 221 BC, and like Hasdrubal he married an Iberian princess. He immediately attacked the Olcades, a tribe that probably inhabited the region of the upper Guadiana River. According to both Polybius and Livy, he captured the Olcades’ chief city, though the two sources differ on the name of the city. Hannibal’s capture of the Olcades capital overawed the surrounding settlements, which immediately submitted to Carthaginian hegemony. The following summer (220 BC) Hannibal marched against the Vaccaei and captured two of their large settlements. He next attacked the Carpetani, reportedly one of the strongest tribes in the area and who had allied with survivors from Hannibal’s campaign against the Vaccaei. Hannibal defeated the Carpetani coalition near the Tagus River, then proceeded to ravage the Carpetani territory. Within a few days the Carpetani surrendered, and Hannibal secured Carthaginian hegemony over all tribes south of the Ebro. Finally, after Hannibal set out

39 Diod. Sic. 25.12.1

40 Pol. 2.36.1-4, 3.13.1-4; Liv. 21.2.6, 3.1-4.2, 24.41.7; Diod. Sic. 25.12.1; App. Iber. 8; Zon. 8.21; Just. 44.5.5; Val. Max. 3.3; Sil. Ital. 3.97-107

41 Pol. 3.13.5-6; Liv. 21.5.3-4; for the geography, see Walbank 1.316-7.

42 Pol. 3.14; Liv. 21.5.5-17; Walbank 1.317-9
to invade Italy, he crossed the Ebro and quickly subdued a number of tribes around the Pyrenees. Overall, the Barcid experience in Spain, especially the campaigns of Hannibal, must have influenced the development of Hannibal’s Italian strategy and shaped his expectations for a war with Rome. After only one or two defeats in pitched battles, even the most powerful Spanish tribes submitted to the Barcid generals. Also, by defeating a powerful tribe, the Barcids were able to overawe subordinate communities and neighboring tribes. Hannibal was particularly successful, nearly doubling Carthaginian holdings in Spain in only a couple of years. Thus, Hannibal’s personal experience of military conquest may have led him to expect that a war with Rome would be relatively short, and could be concluded with one or a few successful pitched battles.

To summarize the previous discussion: it is more plausible that Hannibal expected a short war with Rome rather than a war of attrition, and he probably calculated that one or a few significant victories on the battlefield would compel the Romans to seek peace terms. It is unfair to criticize Hannibal for failing to learn the appropriate lessons from Rome’s war with Pyrrhus or the First Punic War. Rather, from the Carthaginian perspective these wars would not have suggested that Rome was more resilient than Carthage or that she would never surrender in the face of a foreign invader on Italian soil. Instead, Hannibal probably made the reasonable calculation that if he invaded Italy, defeated Rome in one or a few pitched battles, and stayed and continued to apply pressure on the Romans by remaining in Italy, he would bring Rome to its knees. Moreover, the experience of the Barcid family in Spain would only have reinforced these

43 Pol. 3.35.1-4; Liv. 21.19.7, 23.2
suspicions. Overall, it appears that Hannibal did not make any error that was avoidable given what he knew about how hegemonic powers tended to respond in the face of a successful invading army. The fact that Rome did not surrender does not imply that Hannibal’s strategic objective was unrealistic or that his strategy was under-planned. It is simply not fair to criticize Hannibal for not anticipating Rome’s response after the battle of Cannae.

However, the fact that Rome did not surrender after suffering three staggering defeats should not by itself have doomed Hannibal’s Italian strategy, since Hannibal may still have counted on massive allied defections. In other words, if we assume that Hannibal understood the resources Rome could bring to bear, especially in a long war of attrition, and if we also assume that he expected a short war (as we have just argued), then Hannibal must have counted on widespread allied defections to level the playing field in terms of manpower and to put further pressure on the Romans to seek terms.

In general, Hannibal has been criticized for not recognizing that strong bonds linked the Italian allies to Rome, so therefore hoping to elicit massive allied revolts in a short time was a fool’s game. However, there is no reason that Hannibal should have expected a high degree of loyalty on the part of the Italian allies. The Pyrrhic War would have been Hannibal’s best source of evidence for the relationship between Rome and its allies. If he in fact studied Pyrrhus’ campaigns, the example should not have suggested to Hannibal that Rome’s Italian allies would have displayed particular loyalty. The people of Tarentum clearly resented growing Roman hegemony, and they invited Pyrrhus

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44 Indeed, Lazenby is almost apologetic on the point, suggesting that Hannibal realized that the confederacy was strong and that a long war was necessary to win over the Italians.
to Italy at least in part as a counterweight against Roman power. Pyrrhus’ entry into Italy quickly shook the Roman network of alliances. After Pyrrhus defeated the consul Valerius Laevinus at the battle of Heraclea, Locri and Croton threw out their Roman garrisons and joined Pyrrhus. The Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians also allied with Tarentum and Pyrrhus. Pyrrhus was able to elicit similar revolts in Sicily. In 278 BC, he received an embassy from a number of cities in Sicily promising that they would submit to his rule. Pyrrhus responded to the embassies by sailing to Sicily, whereupon cities came over to him either immediately or after minimum effort on his part. Thus, either a major victory by Pyrrhus in a pitched battle or even the appearance of his army was enough to compel cities in both Italy and Sicily to submit to his rule.

Carthage’s tenuous relationship with its own subject allies in Africa also probably shaped Hannibal’s expectation that Italian loyalty to Rome would quickly waver. The willingness of Carthaginian allies to revolt was apparent during the Libyan War. The

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45 Rome and Tarentum had come into diplomatic contact as early as the fourth century, and tensions between the two cities had been rising by the time Tarentum sought protection from Pyrrhus. During the Second Samnite War the Tarentines promised to reinforce Naples against Roman aggression. Livy is explicit that the Tarentines were angered by the eventual surrender of Naples to Rome and saw the event as a threat to Tarentine hegemonic interests (Liv. 8.25.2-5,7-8, 27.2) In 326 BC the Tarentines tried to destabilize a Roman-Lucanian alliance by bribing Lucanian aristocrats to take up arms with the Samnites against Rome (Liv. 8.25.6-11, 29.1). Tarentum attempted to arbitrate in a dispute between Rome and the Samnites in 320 BC, but the Romans ignored the offer (Liv. 9.14.1-9). The Tarentines may have sought the aid of Cleonymus of Sparta against the Romans and Lucanians (Diod. Sic, 20.104.1). The Tarentines later sank a Roman fleet that had passed the Lacinium promontory in violation of a treaty. Finally, Tarentine hegemony was threatened when Thurii sought Roman protection against attacks from Italic tribes, rather than seeking protection from Tarentum (App. Samn. 7.1-2). It is clear that the Tarentines were responsible for inviting Pyrrhus to Italy (Pol. 1.6.1-6; Plut. Pyrrh. 13.5; App. Samn. 7.3; Liv. Per. 12; for a more complete discussion, see Chapter 4, pp. 262-264.

46 Plut. 17.4-5, 18.5 indicate that the Lucanians, Samnites, and other Italian Greeks joined the Tarentum-Pyrrhus alliance after the battle of Heraclea. For a complete list of Italian communities to join Pyrrhus, see Plut. Pyrrh. 13.6, 17.5, 18.4; App. Samn. 10.1, 12.2; Dion. Hal. 19.9.2; Zon. 8.6; see also Lomas, Rome and the Western Greeks 53-55.

47 Plut. Pyr. 22
Libyan War was started by unpaid mercenary troops employed by Carthage for service in the First Punic War. After negotiations failed between the unpaid mercenaries and the Carthaginian senate, the mercenaries mutinied; thereupon one of the leaders of the mutiny, Matho, sent embassies to the Libyan towns under Carthaginian domination and proclaimed their freedom. Immediately nearly all subject Libyan towns revolted and supplied the mutineers with men and supplies, with only Hippou Acra and Utica remaining loyal to Carthage. The mercenaries besieged both cities while the revolt spread to the Numidian tribes. Hamilcar Barca raised the mercenaries’ siege of Utica with a stunning victory over the mercenaries. After this victory Hamilcar was able to win over a series of rebellious towns both by assault and by diplomatic means. Hamilcar next defeated a mercenary army near Hippou Acra, with the help of 2,000 Numidian reinforcements. The reinforcements were under the command of a Numidian nobleman named Naravas, to whom Hamilcar gave his daughter in marriage to seal the new alliance. However, Carthaginian fortunes had again changed, as the island of Sardinia revolted and the Carthaginians lost a fleet conveying supplies from Emporiae. Thereafter, the cities of Utica and Hippo Acra suddenly revolted. The revolts of Utica

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48 Pol. 1.70.6

49 Pol. 1.70.8-9; the size of the mutineer army swelled to 70,000 men, according to Polybius (1.73.3); see also Diod. Sic. 25.2.2.

50 Pol. 1.70.9, 73.3-5, 77.1-3, 6-7

51 Pol. 1.75.1-3, 76.9-10, though Walbank 1.143 argued that Hamilcar was not successful in raising the siege of Utica.

52 Pol. 1.78.1-12. The actions of Naravas show the fluid loyalty of Carthage’s neighbors. Hamilcar pardoned the prisoners captured in battle, and he allowed that they might join his army or go free (Pol. 1.78.13-5). The rhetoric recalls Hannibal’s offers to the Italians early in the Second Punic War.

53 Pol. 1.82.6-8
and Hippo Acra are particularly striking considering the two cities had displayed remarkable loyalty in the face of both Regulus’ and Agathocles’ invasion of Africa.\textsuperscript{54} With the tide turned in their favor, the mercenaries undertook a siege of Carthage.\textsuperscript{55} However, the Carthaginians were able to withstand the siege, the mutineers began to lose the will to fight on, and a few leaders of the mutiny approached Hamilcar to seek terms for surrender; after treating with the leaders, Hamilcar massacred their troops.\textsuperscript{56} He next began to raid Libyan territory, compelling a number of Libyan towns to give in.\textsuperscript{57} Finally, Hamilcar defeated the forces remaining under the command of Matho in a decisive battle, after which all rebel cities except Utica and Hippacritae submitted again to Carthaginian hegemony. The latter two cities fell after being placed under siege, and surrendered after accepting terms dictated by the Carthaginians.\textsuperscript{58} This brief narrative shows that loyalty of the Carthage’s subject allies as well as that of the neighboring Numidian tribes wavered frequently in accordance with the fortunes of the principal combatants. Moreover, the subject allies appear to have long resented Carthage’s hegemony, and their pattern of wavering loyalty can be traced back to the fourth century. According to Diodorus Siculus, when Agathocles invaded Africa in 311 BC, he figured that if he took the field against the Carthaginians their allies would take the opportunity to revolt and he would

\textsuperscript{54} Pol. 1.79.1-6, 82.4-9; Diod. Sic. 25.3.2

\textsuperscript{55} Pol. 1.82.11

\textsuperscript{56} Pol. 1.84.1-2, 85.1-5; however, after the mutinous leaders surrendered, Hamilcar massacred many Libyan soldiers who had revolted (Pol. 1.85.6-7).

\textsuperscript{57} Pol. 1.86.1-2

\textsuperscript{58} Pol. 1.87.7-88.4; Diod. Sic. 25.5.3
bring Carthage to its knees. The strategy paid off initially – Agathocles defeated the Carthaginians in a pitched battle after which a large number of Carthaginian subjects came over to him. Some allied towns were taken by storm, while others surrendered voluntarily because they resented Carthaginian rule or were overawed by Agathocles’ show of military strength. Therefore, if Hannibal expected Rome’s Italian allies to have the same degree of loyalty as Carthage’s allies historically had displayed, then he probably expected to easily detach the Italian cities from Rome.

The loyalty of the Greek cities in Sicily also proved malleable, as shown by Carthage’s difficulty in holding allies during the First Punic War. In general, Sicilian cities were often willing to treat after one of the principal combatants won an important victory, a pattern seen most clearly after Roman victories. For example, after initial Roman success by the consul Appius Caludius, the senate sent reinforcements to Sicily. According to Polybius, Roman and military success and the arrival of new troops compelled most of the cities in Sicily to revolt from Syracuse and Carthage. In turn, Hiero of Syracuse broke his alliance with Carthage and signed a treaty with Rome. Polybius later reports that after a Roman victory at Agrigentum, more inland cities came over to the Roman cause. In 254 BC the consuls Aulus Aetilius and Gnaeus Cornelius

59 Diod. Sic. 20.3.1-3, 17.1
60 Diod. Sic. 20.13.1-3, 17.1-6
61 Pol. 1.16.1-2
62 Pol. 1.16.3-10; Diod. Sic. 23.4.1; Liv. Per. 13
63 Pol. 1.20.6-7. Agrigentum was allied with Carthage. Polybius claims that the coastal cities feared the Carthaginian navy, and did not revolt, while the inland cities revolted because they feared Roman prowess on land.
successfully besieged and captured Panormus, the most important Carthaginian-held city after the destruction of Agrigentum. After Panormus fell the cities of Tyndaris, Ieta, Petra, and Imachara expelled their Carthaginian garrisons and submitted to the Romans. If Hannibal considered the First Punic War when devising his Italian strategy, he must have recognized that Rome was able to get many of the Sicilian cities to break with Carthage after only a few substantial victories.

Finally, the experience of Barcid Spain should have suggested to Hannibal that he could expect to win the loyalty of smaller, less powerful, or subordinate communities if he invaded Italy. Although most of the details of Hamilcar Barca’s policies are lost, a couple of general tendencies emerge from the sources. Ancient authors agree that while Hamilcar may have been brutal, he won over the southern Spanish tribes both through diplomacy and force. Diodorus records that although he executed tribal leaders who resisted him, he released large numbers of Spanish war captives. Appian reports that Hamilcar distributed plunder to local chiefs, presumably to gain their support. The admittedly incomplete account of his activities suggest that he was adept at securing the loyalty of at least some tribes through non-violent means, and it is likely that Hamilcar did not reduce every community he encountered in Spain. More to the present point, the accounts suggest that Hamilcar did not need to reduce all native Spanish communities because at least some submitted willingly to Carthaginian rule. The sources also agree that Hasdrubal furthered Carthaginian interests in Spain by means of diplomacy: Polybius

64 Pol. 1.38.6-10; Diod. 23.18.3-5; HCP 1.98-99
65 Diod. Sic. 25.10.1-4
66 App. Iber. 5
claims that his success resulted more from his congenial dealings with the native tribal aristocracies than from military success, while Diodorus states that Hasdrubal married into an Iberian elite family to secure his control. Hannibal continued in the same vein after the assassination of Hasdrubal. Finally, Hannibal’s Spanish campaign provides the clearest evidence that subordinate Spanish communities could relatively easily be overawed or seduced to accept Carthaginian rule. For example, when Hannibal attacked the Olcades he captured their most important town, after which many neighboring communities immediately submitted to Carthaginian hegemony. When Hannibal attacked the Vaccaei he captured two of their important cities, Hermondica and Arbocala. Polybius does not record any more detail about the campaign, but his account implies that the capture of the two cities was enough to compel most of the Vaccaei to submit. However, the powerful tribe of the Carpetani rose against him. The Carpetani had been able to incite weaker neighboring tribes, including some of the Olcades and survivors from Hermandica, to join in their attack on Hannibal. Hannibal defeated the coalition in a single pitched battle, after which all tribes south of the Ebro submitted to Carthaginian

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67 Pol. 2.36.1-3; Diod. Sic. 25.12.1; see also Liv. 21.2.5-6; App. Iber. 6

68 Hannibal married an Iberian princess: Liv. 24.41.7; Sil. Ital. 3.97-107

69 Pol. 3.13.5-7; Liv. 21.5.3-4

70 Pol. 3.14.1-2. Polybius only mentions that he captured the important city after some difficulty, then he reports that Hannibal was returning to his base in New Carthage when attacked by the Carpetani. Hannibal would only have returned if his campaign had been concluded. Since Polybius mentions no other actions against the Vaccaei, and only fugitives from Hermandica took part in the Carpetani coalition (1.14.3), then it is likely that Hannibal’s capture of Arbacal cowed the remaining communities of the Vaccaei. See also Liv. 21.5.5-8.
rule without further incident.⁷¹ Weaker or subordinate Spanish communities appear to have switched their allegiance to the side that looked stronger.

Therefore, Hannibal’s experience in Spain was consistent with the Carthaginian understanding of the relationship between a strong state and its subordinate allies, a relationship in which the weaker or subordinate communities could be expected to submit more or less voluntarily to a foreign threat, rather than to remain loyal and face conquest through military defeat. The Carthaginian perspective on this relationship was undoubtedly shaped by the long history of restive behavior by their African subject allies. Carthage’s allies resented its hegemony, and they were easily convinced to revolt from Carthaginian rule when presented with an opportunity. Hannibal probably figured Rome’s allies would react in similar fashion to an invasion of Italy, and that a combination of military strength and diplomacy would convince the Italian allies to revolt from Roman rule. Hannibal’s expectations would only have been reinforced if he studied the diplomatic patterns of cities in Sicily and Italy during the First Punic War and the Pyrrhic War. In particular, the cities of Sicily and southern Italy appeared to break alliances easily when confronted by an invading army. Finally, Hannibal’s experience in Spain would also have suggested that weaker states would not remain intransigent when threatened by a winning army, but rather would be more likely to submit voluntarily. It is likely, therefore, that Hannibal expected to elicit large-scale allied revolts if he marched into Italy, and he expected he could break the resolve of a significant number of Rome’s allies without a lengthy campaign.

⁷¹ Pol. 3.14.3-9; Liv. 21.5.5-17
It is appropriate, then, to consider why the actions of the Italian allies did not meet Hannibal’s expectations, and this question sheds light on Hannibal’s ability as a diplomat. The question of the diplomatic component of Hannibal’s strategic failure is bound up in our understanding of his pose as a Hellenistic liberator. According to the ancient sources, Hannibal adapted Hellenistic liberation propaganda: he promised to fight on behalf of the Italians and, especially in the early stages of the war, he freed prisoners from Italian communities and promised of “freedom” from Rome in order to gain the goodwill of the Italian communities and to weaken the bonds between Rome and its allies. It is commonly held that Hannibal’s diplomatic approach was doomed from the start because he failed to understand the nature of Roman rule in Italy, and that the promise of freedom would hold little appeal for Rome’s allies because they in general welcomed the benefits of Roman rule.\textsuperscript{72} Errington has suggested that Hannibal’s strategy was hampered by a lack of credibility. Hannibal promised freedom yet ravaged territory and destroyed intransigent cities, while tokens of goodwill such as releasing Italian prisoners were not enough counteract his contradictory actions.\textsuperscript{73} Erskine has argued that Hannibal either posed as a Hellenistic liberator only to be met with confusion by the Italians, who were unfamiliar with Hellenistic diplomatic terminology, or he never posed as a liberator at

\textsuperscript{72} See for example Salmon, \textit{The Making of Roman Italy} 78-83, who argued that the Italians were acting out of self-interest, but still fell back on the notion that the Italians generally profited from Roman hegemony; Errington, \textit{Dawn of Empire} 76-77: the Italian allies were essentially satisfied with Roman rule; Badian, \textit{Foreign Clientelae} 141-153, who stressed the evolutionary nature of the Roman confederacy, that Rome’s allies slowly became accustomed to Roman rule and eventually were voluntarily submissive because of the “habit for obedience and the desire for protection;” Reid, \textit{JRS} 5 (1915) 124 concludes that the Roman confederacy was impregnable to Hannibalic overtures because Rome had long pursued the policy of making its hegemony as un-intrusive as possible on the allied states.

\textsuperscript{73} Errington, \textit{Dawn of Empire} 76-77
These objections are not warranted, because they are based on an oversimplified understanding of the diplomatic tactics Hannibal applied to Rome’s Italian allies.

The promise of “freedom” was a common feature of Hellenistic diplomacy. Hellenistic hegemons frequently posed as “liberators,” offering Greek states freedom or autonomy and promising to fight on behalf of the Greek states in order to win their goodwill. From the fourth century BC the Carthaginians were exposed to Hellenistic liberation propaganda in their dealings with the Greeks on Sicily. For example, the city of Agrigentum tried to capitalize on the war between Agathocles and Carthage, and assert hegemony over all Sicily. To achieve hegemony the Agrigentines appealed to the ejleuqeriva and ajuutonomiva of the Greek cities of Sicily. Deinocrates of Syracuse challenged Agathocles’ domination of Sicily by declaring himself “champion of the common freedom” of the Sicilian cities. Agathocles himself expected to Carthage’s subject allies to revolt when he invaded Africa, and he won over a number of cities by diplomacy. It is possible that liberation propaganda formed part of Agathocles’ diplomacy, though the sources are not explicit. Timoleon of Syracuse signed a treaty with the Carthaginians guaranteeing the freedom of the Greek cities of Sicily. Pyrrhus tried to negotiate for the freedom and autonomy of the Greek cities in southern Italy, and

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75 Gruen, *Hellenistic World* 132-142


77 Diod. Sic. 20.31.2-5

78 Diod. Sic. 20.56.3

79 Diod. Sic. 20.3.1-3

80 Diod. Sic. 26.82.3
he later claimed that he would liberate the Greek cities from the rule of Antigonus Gonatas;\textsuperscript{81} it is very likely that he employed such propaganda during his struggle with the Carthaginians in Sicily. Considering their exposure to Hellenistic propaganda and treaty making, it is likely that Carthaginians were comfortable with the language of Hellenistic diplomacy.

It is no surprise, therefore, that Hannibal appears to have understood Hellenistic diplomacy. Indeed, he was able forge an elaborate treaty with Philip V of Macedon.\textsuperscript{82} The ancient evidence also suggests that the use of Hellenistic liberation propaganda comprised a significant component of Hannibal’s diplomacy with the Italians. For example, Polybius reports that Hannibal addressed Italian, but not Roman, prisoners, claiming that he was fighting on their behalf, offering them friendship, and promising that he had come to restore the freedom of all Italy.\textsuperscript{83} Hannibal made a similar speech after the battle of Trasimene, in which he claimed not to be fighting against the Italians, but against Rome for their freedom.\textsuperscript{84} The treaties between Hannibal and Capua, Locri, and Tarentum each contain language that recalls liberation propaganda. Thus, according to Polybius, Hannibal promised to free the Tarentines; according to Livy he agreed that

\textsuperscript{81} Plut. Pyrrh. 26.10; see Gruen, Hellenistic World 140.

\textsuperscript{82} Pol. 7.9. The agreement appears to conform more to a Near Eastern tradition than to the Hellenistic treaty model. The treaty may be equivalent to the Hebrew \textit{berit}, and the lack of a time duration on the alliance between Hannibal and Philip is decidedly non-Greek. However, some Hellenistic elements are visible in the text. For example, the clause allowing the treaty to be amended (7.9.17) is a typical Greek provision. This suggests that Hannibal was capable of reconciling Punic and Hellenistic diplomatic language. See Bickerman, \textit{AJP} 73 (1952) 1-23, \textit{TAPA} 75 (1944) 87-102; Walbank 2. 42-56; see also Barré, \textit{The God-List in the Treaty between Hannibal and Philip V}.

\textsuperscript{83} Pol. 3.77.6-6

\textsuperscript{84} Pol. 3.85.4
the Tarentines would be free and have their own laws and possessions.\textsuperscript{85} He promised that Capua would have its own laws and that the people of Locri would live free under their own laws.\textsuperscript{86} Hannibal may also have employed liberation propaganda in Spain, when he met with Roman legates in New Carthage and claimed to be acting on behalf of the Saguntines,\textsuperscript{87} and such slogans continued to be used late in the Second Punic War, when Mago claimed to be fighting for the freedom of the Gauls and Ligurians in order to win their support.\textsuperscript{88}

Despite the apparent overwhelming ancient evidence, Erskine has proposed that Hannibal probably did not pose as a Hellenistic liberator and that references to his liberation propaganda are likely projections by Polybius, who interpreted Hannibal’s war through a Greek lens.\textsuperscript{89} Erskine’s key evidence is the fact that in Livy’s Books 21 and 22, which rely less upon Polybius as a source, there are no explicit references to liberation propaganda in key passages parallel to Polybius’ version – Livy does not mention Hannibal’s promise of freedom to the Italians after the battles of Trebia and Trasimene. However, despite the lack of explicit freedom propaganda, Books 21-22 of Livy are not devoid of Hannibal engaging in typical Hellenistic diplomatic practices. For example, third-party arbitration was a common feature of Hellenistic diplomacy,\textsuperscript{90} and Livy states

\textsuperscript{85} Pol. 8.25.1-2; Liv. 25.8.8  
\textsuperscript{86} Liv. 23.7.2, 24.1.13  
\textsuperscript{87} Pol. 3.15.7  
\textsuperscript{88} Liv. 29.5.3-4  
\textsuperscript{89} Erskine, \textit{Hermes} 121 (1993) 60-62  
\textsuperscript{90} Gruen, \textit{Hellenistic World} 96-9
that Hannibal acted as an arbiter, settling a dynastic quarrel between two elite Gallic brothers.\footnote{Liv. 21.31.6-8; see also Pol. 3.49.8-13. It is interesting that Livy uses the term “arbiter” while Polybius is less explicit; see Walbank 1.388. By Erskine’s logic Livy would appear to be projecting a Hellenism on Polybius’ account.} Also, even if one accepts that Books 21-22 can be used as an independent check on Polybius’ version, it is not clear which account is more accurate. The lack of liberation propaganda in Livy’s account may reflect the suppression of the Carthaginian perspective in Livy’s sources, rather than the intrusion of the Greek perspective in Polybius’ account. Overall, it is more plausible that Hannibal attempted, at least at times, to win the goodwill of Italian communities through liberation propaganda.

Assuming he did employ liberation slogans, it is not likely that Hannibal seriously undermined his own diplomatic efforts, either because of the “lack of any Italian tradition which emphasized autonomy and freedom as concepts of inter-state relations,”\footnote{Erskine, Hermes 121 (1993) 59-60} or because his sometimes brutal treatment of intransigent Italian cities contradicted his promise of freedom.\footnote{Errington, Dawn of Empire 76-77} First, there is evidence that the Italians had at least some exposure to the language of Hellenistic diplomacy. Pyrrhus offered the Romans peace if they in return promised to leave the Greeks in Italy free under there own laws and to restore to the Lucanians, Bruttii, Samnites, and Daunii what the Romans had taken from them. Although the sources do not preserve an explicit promise of freedom to non-Greeks, it is clear that Pyrrhus portrayed himself as fighting on their behalf.\footnote{App. Samn. 10.1} Pyrrhus also offered to
arbitrate between the Romans and the Tarentines, Samnites, and Lucanians. 95 During the late fourth century the city of Tarentum offered to arbitrate between Rome and the Samnites before their battle near Luceria. 96 It is striking that although the Romans ignored the offer, the Samnites willingly accepted the Tarentine offer, suggesting that the Samnites were not confused by this application of Hellenistic diplomacy. According to Polybius, the Romans arbitrated a political dispute in Saguntum. 97 During the Second Punic War the city of Locri arbitrated between Hannibal, the Bruttii, and the Crotoniates. 98 By the late third century there had been extensive contact between Greeks and non-Greeks in Italy, especially the southern part of the peninsula. It is implausible, therefore, that the terminology of Hellenistic diplomacy would have been completely foreign to non-Greek communities in Italy. Second, even if Hellenistic diplomatic terminology was greatly foreign to the Italian audience and typical Italian interstate diplomacy did not entail the use of liberation propaganda, it is unlikely that Hannibal’s promise of freedom would have been met with total confusion on the part of the Italians. After all, the complaints of the Capuans suggests that there was dissatisfaction with Roman hegemony among the Italians; 99 at the very least the Italians would have

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95 Plut. Pyrrh. 16.3-4; Dion. Hal. 19.9.1-2; Plutarch only mentions Pyrrhus as arbiter between the Romans and the Greeks, but Dionysius includes the Samnites and Lucanians. See Gruen, Hellenistic World 100.

96 Liv. 9.14.1-16

97 Pol. 3.15.7

98 Liv. 24.3.14-5

99 See Liv. 23.7.1-3, the Capua-Hannibal treaty, which by implication reveals Capuan grievances against Roman rule.
understood that Hannibal was offering to end Roman rule. Finally, liberation propaganda must be understood in its Hellenistic context. The promise of freedom and autonomy were merely tools to elicit the goodwill of potential allies, and it was common for such promises to lack substance. It is likely the Italians would have been less bothered by the apparent contradictions between Hannibal’s words and his actions than are some modern scholars.

In any case, even if Hannibal’s promise of freedom did confuse his Italian audience, the application of liberation propaganda would not necessarily have critically damaged Hannibal’s chances for diplomatic success. This is because the promise of freedom and the Italian response to that promise have both been overemphasized in analyses of Hannibal’s Italian strategy. A closer look at Hannibal’s diplomacy in Italy suggests that the promise of freedom was never its only component. Returning to Hannibal’s speech to the Italian prisoners of Trebia, the first explicit reference to his liberation propaganda and its most detailed formulation, Hannibal not only offered the Italians friendship and freedom, he also promised to restore the cites and the land the Romans had taken from them. The promise of land was also an important element of

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100 Once again, the example of Capua suggests that the Italians would at least recognize Hannibal’s offer meant freedom from Rome. After allying with Hannibal, the Capuans attacked the neighboring city of Cumae on their own initiative (Liv. 23.35.1-2) – this would have been impossible under the Roman rule, since both states were allied to Rome. Hannibal, by effectively suspending Roman rule, offered the Italian communities the opportunity to pursue foreign policy with a degree of autonomy not possible under the Romans. Thus, Hannibal did deliver freedom, and at least some of the Italian states must have understood this.

101 Gruen, Hellenistic World 135-136: “Few rational men would have regarded this move [Antigonus’ promise of freedom to Greek cities everywhere] as betokening genuine independence for the smaller states of Greece.”

102 Pol. 3.77.6
Hannibal’s negotiations with the people of Capua. Hannibal appears to have been informed about some aspects of Roman rule, since this presumably refers to the land Rome mulcted from defeated allied communities. The rhetoric after Trebia recalls Pyrrhus’ negotiations with Rome, in which he bargained to restore to the Daunii, Bruttii, Lucanians, and Samnites whatever the Romans had taken from them in war. The evidence suggests that even in its earliest formulation Hannibal’s Italian diplomacy was multifaceted rather than monolithic. Moreover, Hannibal’s diplomacy probably was not comprised even of a single consistent set of promises. Rather, since local political, diplomatic, military, and economic conditions varied from city to city and each Italian community existed in its own unique context, Hannibal likely reacted to the immediate conditions and his negotiations changed accordingly. If the promise of freedom did not work, Hannibal would have offered something else to which the community would respond.

To summarize briefly, the question of Hannibal’s use of Hellenistic liberation propaganda and its compatibility in the context of late third century Italy is a red herring in any analysis of the factors that contributed to the failure of the Hannibalic strategy. First, the Italians, especially those communities in southern Italy, probably had experience with and understood the terminology of Hellenistic diplomacy. Second, even if some Italian communities were not well versed in Hellenistic diplomatic language, they certainly would have understood that Hannibal offered them freedom from Roman rule. Third, the importance of liberation propaganda to Hannibal’s Italian diplomacy has in

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103 Liv. 23.6.1-2; for a complete discussion of negotiations with Capua, see Chapter 1.

104 App. Samn. 10.1
any case been overstated. Hannibal promised not only freedom, but also land and in some cases power, which certainly would not have been baffling concepts to the Italian communities with which Hannibal was negotiating.

In fact, Hannibal’s diplomacy was also probably not static, but a series of ad hoc decisions and promises meant to garner especially the immediate support of nearby cities, and any definition of Hannibal’s overall diplomatic stance should put in the most general terms. Hannibal wanted to convince potential allies that allying with him was a better deal than remaining loyal to Rome, and he readily used a variety of tactics to prove this point. As shown already, he tried to seduce the Italian communities with the promise of freedom and the restoration of their land, and by tokens of goodwill such as releasing Italian prisoners of war. In at least one instance he resorted to simple bribery. Hannibal might also choose to punish a stubborn community, in order to show neighboring cities the cost of resistance while revealing Rome’s inability to defend its allies. Hannibal also appears to have been adept at playing off local rivalries. If a city’s ruling elite were divided politically, Hannibal could hope to win the loyalty of one faction by promising to support their local rule. Perhaps the best example comes from Salapia, in which Dasius led the anti-Roman party while Dasius’ bitter political rival

105 Hannibal successfully bribed a certain Dasius, a native of Brundisium in command of the town of Clastidium in order to captured the town, its garrison, and its grain stores. According to Polybius, Hannibal rewarded Dasius with lofty titles. According to Livy, he paid Dasius forty gold coins, and he released the captured garrison as a sign of his clemency. See Pol. 3.69.1-4; Liv. 21.48.9.

106 For example, he sacked Acerra after negotiations to win the city voluntarily failed; see Liv. 22.17.4-7.
Blattius remained loyal to Rome.\textsuperscript{107} Hannibal furnished support for the campaign of Philemenus and Nico to seize political power in Tarentum, in return for allowing Hannibal to enter the city.\textsuperscript{108} Hannibal also played on longstanding rivalries between Italian communities. In some cases this meant manipulating ethnic tensions; for example, Hannibal appears to have won the support of the Bruttii in part because they figured an alliance with Hannibal was an opportunity to plunder coastal Greek communities protected by the Romans.\textsuperscript{109} In other cases, he used to his own advantage rivalries between Italian cities, promising regional hegemony to a powerful city in return for that city’s loyalty. The clearest example is found in the negotiations with Capua. Hannibal addressed directly the Capuan senate and he secured the loyalty of Capua only after promising that the Capuans would be masters of Italy after he defeated Rome.\textsuperscript{110} Soon after allying with Hannibal the Capuans decided to subjugate the neighboring city of Cumae, suggesting that the Capuans seriously believed Hannibal’s arrival in Italy had afforded them the chance to extend their local hegemony.\textsuperscript{111} Hannibal also appealed to the local hegemonic aspirations of the people of Locri, Tarentum, and Arpi.\textsuperscript{112} In fact, although it has been argued that he had no clear, long-term vision of a post-war

\textsuperscript{107} Liv. 26.38.6-14; App. Hann. 45-47; for a complete discussion of Hannibal’s manipulation of Salapian political rivalry, see Chapter 2, pp. 128-129. Control of the local aristocracy was a main objective, according to Polybius (3.69.4).

\textsuperscript{108} Pol. 8.24-28, especially 24.11-3; Liv. 25.8-9. For a complete discussion, see Chapter 4, pp. 299-300.

\textsuperscript{109} Liv. 24.2.1-4

\textsuperscript{110} Liv. 23.10.1-2, see also 23.6.1-2

\textsuperscript{111} Liv. 23.35.1-2. For a complete discussion, see Chapter 1, pp. 53ff.

\textsuperscript{112} See Chapter 2, pp. 156ff; Chapter 3, pp. 216ff; Chapter 4, pp. 296ff.
settlement in Italy,\textsuperscript{113} it is possible that Hannibal figured on greatly reducing Roman power and rendering Italy a series of mini-hegemonies subordinate to Carthaginian rule.\textsuperscript{114}

Hannibal’s opportunistic negotiations in Italy reflect the flexible diplomacy of Barcid Spain. Indeed, for all the diplomatic tactics Hannibal employed in Italy there can be found at least rough precedents in Spain. Thus, the Barcids committed occasional acts of brutality to caution against future resistance to Carthaginian rule. Hamilcar is said to have tortured and executed various Spanish tribal elite.\textsuperscript{115} Hannibal stormed the chief town of the Olcades and sacked it, after which the remaining tribe capitulated.\textsuperscript{116} He later captured Hermandica, a town of the Vaccaei; when another town of the Vaccaei named Arbocala refused to submit, Hannibal reduced it by siege.\textsuperscript{117} Livy claims that Hannibal also ravaged the territory of the Carptani.\textsuperscript{118} However, brutality was also tempered with acts of goodwill. For example, although Hamilcar executed native leaders, he appears to have maintained a policy of freeing captured survivors,\textsuperscript{119} which is echoed by Hannibal’s treatment of captured Italian soldiers. There are no specific

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{113} Briscoe, \textit{CAH}\textsuperscript{2} 8.46
\textsuperscript{114} The idea is not without precedent. In the First Punic War, Hiero of Syracuse began the war as Rome’s enemy. However, he soon negotiated a settlement with the Romans in which he was allowed to rule the subordinate cities of Acrae, Leontini, Megara, Helorus, Naestum, Tauromenium, Erbessus, and possibly Centuripa. See Diod. Sic. 23.4.1; Liv. 24.30.10; \textit{HCP} 1.68-69.
\textsuperscript{115} Diod. Sic. 25.10.1-4
\textsuperscript{116} Pol. 3.13.5-6; Liv. 21.5.3-4
\textsuperscript{117} Pol. 3.14.1; Liv. 21.5.5-7
\textsuperscript{118} Liv. 21.5.16
\textsuperscript{119} Diod. Sic. 25.10.2
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references to the Barcids employing liberation propaganda in Spain, though Hannibal claimed to the Roman envoys at New Carthage that he was acting on behalf of the Saguntines.\footnote{Pol. 3.15.6-7} The Barcas manipulated local politics and tried to win the loyalty of local aristocrats. According to Appian, Hamilcar distributed plunder to Spanish chiefs who supported him.\footnote{App. Iber. 5} Hasdrubal maintained good relations with the Spanish elite, in part by marrying an Iberian princess.\footnote{Pol. 2.36.1-3; Liv. 21.2.5-6; App. Iber. 6; Diod. Sic. 25.12.1} Hannibal may have been playing on political infighting in Saguntum,\footnote{Polybius (3.15.5-7) reports that the Romans had arbitrated a political dispute in Saguntum, and the arbitration resulted in the execution of Saguntine aristocrats. Hannibal claimed to be acting on behalf of the Saguntines and cited the Roman arbitration as evidence of their mistreatment of Saguntum. It is possible that Hannibal was trying to manipulate the event in order to win favor with at least some of the Saguntine aristocracy.} and he undoubtedly took advantage of a Celtic dynastic struggle to gain support before he crossed the Alps.\footnote{Pol. 3.49.8-13; Liv. 21.31.6-8. The episode of course does not belong to Barcid Spain. However, it does fit as an antecedent to Hannibal’s flexibility diplomacy in Italy.} Finally, there is clear evidence of the manipulation of local rivalries in Barcid Spain. According to both Appian and Livy, Hannibal stirred up trouble between local tribes and Saguntum as part of an elaborate ruse to justify attacking the city.\footnote{App. Sp. 10, Liv. 21.6-7} Polybius records that Hannibal sent word to Carthage that the Saguntines were attacking local tribes while hiding behind its alliance with Rome.\footnote{App. Iber. 5} The consistent element in all three versions is that there was tension between Saguntum and the surrounding Iberian tribes. It does not matter whether Hannibal’s allies were encroaching upon Saguntine territory, or the Iberians appealed to Hannibal because
Saguntum was expanding into their territory. In either case Hannibal would have secured the loyalty of his Spanish allies by furthering their territorial interests. Overall, Hannibal seems to have treated the Italian campaign as another war of conquest and not as a campaign worthy of special consideration.

Where does that leave us in our evaluation of Hannibal as general and diplomat? There is little doubt that Hannibal should be commended as a great tactician, a master of winning battles. However, Hannibal appears to have been unremarkable as a strategist. His strategy of invading Italy, winning battles, and eliciting allied revolts in order to achieve his strategic objective (compelling Rome to seek terms) was fairly typical of contemporary military practice and was certainly based at least in part on the Carthaginian experience in the First Punic War, the Pyrrhic War, and Barcid Spain. On the one hand, Hannibal should not be criticized for failing to recognize Rome’s unique resilience, given the evidence at his disposal. On the other hand, Hannibal should not be praised for coming up with an unusual or innovative strategy for defeating the Romans. Hannibal also appears to have been at best indifferent as a diplomat. Once again, his diplomacy vis-à-vis the Italians – at times posing as a Hellenistic liberator and promising Italian freedom, at other times promising territory in return for a city’s loyalty, playing on local intra- and inter-city rivalries, and punishing stubborn communities – does not seem to have been particularly inspired or innovative. Instead, Hannibal seems to have assumed that Rome’s subordinate allies would react in the same way as had the smaller states and weaker tribes in Barcid Spain, Sicily, North Africa, and also, of course, as had many of the Italian states during the Pyrrhic War. To his credit, Hannibal’s diplomacy

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126 Pol. 3.15
was flexible and changed in response to immediate conditions. That is, Hannibal would make specific offers to individual communities in order to make an alliance with him seem attractive. However, it was difficult for Hannibal to respond to all local conditions, especially when he manipulated a local rivalry to win the loyalty of an Italian community. Indeed, the case studies in the previous four chapters may give ground for criticizing Hannibal as a poor diplomat, because he failed to recognize that the promises he used to win over certain powerful allies essentially precluded his chances to win the allegiance of other cities.

To summarize: Hannibal’s Italian diplomacy was not particularly noteworthy – Hannibal was not unusually perceptive in recognizing the best path to victory nor was he unsophisticated or failed to understand the unique nature of Roman rule. His Italian strategy was not hamstrung by inherent incompatibilities between his diplomatic approach and the fundamental structures of Roman Italy. Rather, Hannibal’s failure resulted from military disadvantage exacerbated by local factors that he could not overcome through diplomatic means. Indeed, Hannibal appears to have been doomed by his own experience, since he probably based his Italian strategy and the corresponding diplomacy on his understanding of the campaigns of Pyrrhus and, perhaps more importantly, on his own and his family’s campaigns in Spain. As we have stated before, Hannibal probably treated the Italian campaign as another war of conquest, no different in kind from the wars he fought very successfully in Spain. But Italy did not function in the same way as Spain, for the Italian communities did not bend to Hannibal’s will as easily as the Spanish tribes had, and Hannibal did not have the time to pacify Italy.
This last point and indeed the conclusions of this dissertation as a whole raises a very important question – why did the Italian communities react differently to Hannibal than did the peoples of Spain? The answer to this question has very broad implications that reach beyond the topic of the Second Punic War, because it is bound up with issues of ethnicity, community, urbanization, and the very loci of identity in the ancient world. Although this is topic certainly requires more exhaustive analysis than is appropriate in this concluding chapter, I will offer at least tentative arguments that suggest further avenues of study.

The previous four chapters have shown that local conditions, especially intra-city political rivalries and inter-city tensions and hostilities limited the effectiveness of Hannibal’s strategy. We have also argued throughout this dissertation that the communities of the Italian peninsula were little influenced by broader or global factors. In other words, ideology, ethnic ties, or cultural affinity did not strongly bind the Italians to Rome, nor were these ideas around which Hannibal could unify the Italians in opposition to Rome. Rather, for the ruling classes of many Italian communities, all politics were to a great degree local politics. Local aristocrats desired primarily to maintain or further their own political standing while undermining the influence of rival aristocratic families. In many cases aristocratic family rivalry certainly predated Hannibal’s invasion of Italy, and the decision to support a revolt or to remain loyal to Rome was merely an opportunity for these local political rivalries to emerge and play out. Hannibal did provide the Italians with the opportunity to pursue foreign policy without Roman domination, but when deciding on foreign policy, many Italian communities were more concerned about the threat posed by nearby rival towns than by the global struggle.
of Rome versus Carthage. That is, for many communities the “world” of their foreign diplomacy was also highly localized and comprised of a matrix of regional or sub-regional inter-city alliances and rivalries.

But would not Hannibal have noticed this and taken steps – adopting a different diplomatic approach – to compensate for the localism of third century Italy? As stated above, Hannibal was probably trapped by his experience in Spain and by his understanding of the Pyrrhic campaigns. Broadly speaking, in the third century BC the Iberian peninsula was far less urbanized than Italy and most of the Spanish peoples were organized in tribal structures rather than in city-states – *poleis/civitates*. As the Romans would discover in Spain, as well as among the Gauls and the Germans, tribes were flexible and amorphous entities that lacked many abstract state structures and institutions. Therefore, identity in tribal society was also more flexible and more malleable, and various peoples could and would often coalesce around a strong individual rather than around abstract loci of identity. This, in part, helps account for Hannibal’s rapid success in conquering much of northern Iberia in only a few years and after only a few battles – the various tribes were accustomed to falling into line behind whoever appeared strongest. This is also consistent with Rome’s varied experience in Spain during the Second Punic War. Indeed, the very personal nature of Scipio Africanus’ diplomacy and the fact that Iberian elite called honored him as a king underscores how the Spanish tribes could crystallize around a strong war leader. ¹²⁷ This is not to say that areas organized into tribes were easy to conquer and govern in the long run; in fact, Rome’s long and brutal pacification of the Iberian peninsula suggests the opposite. Rather, the amorphous nature
of tribes encouraged relatively rapid initial conquest by strong and successful generals, and the limited evidence for Barcid Spain suggests that Hannibal was particularly adept at this sort of warfare. This is consistent with the fact that Hannibal achieved his earliest and best success among the more tribal (that is, less urbanized) areas of Italy, winning over many of the Gauls, Samnites and Bruttii.

However, by the late third century BC other parts of Italy were highly urbanized. For example, the Greeks, Etruscans, Latins, and Campanians had long urban traditions; the settlements of the Apulians increasingly took on the characteristics of poleis/civitates (as argued in Chapter 2); and even the Samnites and Bruttii (for example, Consentia and Petelia in Bruttium, discussed in Chapter 3) began to settle in communities that would have been recognizably urban to the Roman observer. I suggest that urbanization contributed to the strong sense of localism and local identity displayed by many Italian communities. Inhabitants of an Italian city-state were citizens of a polis/civitas, and each polis/civitas had a strong sense of its own laws, institutions, customs, traditions, political structures, and history. Therefore, one the most important if not primary locus of identity for an Italian was the shared community of his city-state/polis/civitas. This is not to say that individual Italians did not recognize other bonds of kinship beyond the city-state. Indeed, we have seen that some cities were bound together in traditional alliance patterns, such as the Capuan League. We have also seen that “ethnicity” contributed to identity; for example, the Greeks must have felt some mutual fraternity against their traditional enemies the Bruttii. However, the case studies presented in this dissertation show clearly that “race” or “ethnicity” or “cultural fraternity” were subordinate to the city-state as a

127 See especially Liv. 27.19.1-7
locus of identity. Moreover, this strong sense of urban identity may have encouraged the sort of inter-city rivalries that greatly undermined Hannibal’s efforts in Italy, because just as the *polis/civitas* forged a sense of community among fellow citizens, it also created a sense of separation from other neighboring city-states with different institutions. Indeed, feelings of enmity between cities may actually have contributed to the formation of the identity of the cities. Finally, even without inter-city rivalry, communities with a strong sense of their own identity may have been more likely to resist overtures from an outside force such as Hannibal. If this is true, Hannibal faced a difficult time trying to win over and unify these highly individual and at times mutually hostile cities before longterm Roman advantages came into play.

But this raises the obvious question of what bound the allies to Rome. In other words, it is easy to see how the pervasive localism of third century Italy was divisive and thus prevented Hannibal from unifying the Italian communities against Rome, but what allowed Rome overcome the same factors? How did Rome essentially unify the Italian peninsula and forge strong enough bonds to prevent Hannibal from totally splintering the Italian confederacy? As we have argued throughout this dissertation, the Italian allies were not strongly bound to Rome by ethnic ties, a sense of cultural fraternity, or any feeling of ideological unity. Nor were the Italians attracted to the benefits of incorporation in the Roman system. In fact, I have argued that the inhabitants of the various Italian cities – or at least the ruling classes who dominated policy-making in those cities – were more concerned with local motivations than with the global struggle between Rome and Carthage. However, despite the fact that Roman rule certainly generated discontent among many Italian aristocrats, the Romans were able to forge
bonds of loyalty and obligation with local aristocracies. In some cases, the Romans used similar tactics as did Hannibal, such as bribing local aristocrats. In other cases the Romans doled out titles and honors in order to win local aristocratic loyalty. In some cases, for example the Mopsii in Compsa, the ruling class of a city was in power because they enjoyed a close relationship with the Roman aristocracy. The nature of the Roman confederacy also protected weaker Italian states, not from foreign invaders such as Hannibal, but from local aggressors. For example, the Neapolitans certainly recognized that their alliance with Rome protected them from their long-time enemies the Capuans.

It should be emphasized that the existence of these bonds does not contradict the general observation that Italian communities were localistic. Rather, the links that held the confederacy together were bilateral between Rome and the local elite of individual Italian cities, aristocrats who in many cases saw their own political standing and the welfare of their city linked to alliance with Rome. These sorts of bonds could only be forged over time, and Hannibal had only a short time to elicit massive allied revolts before Rome’s long-term advantages made his victory essentially impossible. Perhaps Rome’s greatest advantage over Hannibal was time. Rome had essentially secured hegemony over Italy for fifty years before Hannibal invaded the peninsula, during which time the bilateral links between Rome and the Italian cities, such as intermarriage between Roman and Capuan aristocrats, could grow more pronounced. It is perhaps here that Hannibal’s use of the Pyrrhus \textit{exemplum} undermined his own war effort in Italy. Pyrrhus achieved great success in eliciting revolts in southern Italy – indeed he united the southern Greeks against Rome more quickly that Hannibal did – and he brought Rome to the bargaining table. But the Romans were slowly able to secure tighter control of the peninsula in the
generations after the Pyrrhic invasion. Simply put, Italy in the late third century BC was not the same diplomatic environment as Italy in the early third century BC. For over fifty years in southern Italy and longer in other regions of the peninsula, there had been for the Italian cities no alternative to accommodation and subordination to Rome, a situation that further encouraged the establishment of links between the Romans and local aristocrats. This is not to say that the abuses of Roman rule did not sow the seeds of some allied rebellions during the Second Punic War, but Hannibal simply could not replace in only a few years the mechanisms of control that developed over the previous generations when Rome was in effect unchallenged in Italy.

Finally, it appropriate to call attention to the methodology employed in this dissertation. The four case studies have focused on the Second Punic War on the local level and emphasized the regional, sub-regional, and local political, diplomatic, military, and economic conditions that shaped the course and the outcome of the war. In order to bring these conditions to light, I have presented in essence a series of micro-histories culled from occasional tantalizing episodes and passing references to local communities in the Romanocentric ancient texts. The approach has allowed the Italian perspective of the Second Punic War to emerge, which is generally obscured in the narrative sources and overshadowed in modern historical analyses. The four case studies show that there was an important diplomatic component to Hannibal’s defeat – his inability to elicit massive Italian revolts – in addition to other contributing factors that have been emphasized in the past, such as Rome’s manpower advantage, the effectiveness of Rome’s counter-strategy, and strategic blunders on the part of Hannibal and the Carthaginian senate. Thus, this dissertation does not so much overturn previous studies
as provide a necessary and complementary treatment of the question of the failure of Hannibal’s strategy in the Italian theatre. Moreover, the case studies have allowed us to re-evaluate Hannibal’s competence as a general, suggesting that while he was a brilliant tactician, he was rather unremarkable as a strategist and as a diplomat.

More importantly, this methodology points to broader conclusions about how less powerful states functioned and interacted within the context of Roman hegemony. The case studies have shown repeatedly the importance of local politics and diplomatic relationships in shaping the actions and decisions of local aristocrats, and we have been able at least to speculate – though clearly there is need for more study – that the primary locus of identity for an individual Italian in third century BC remained his city-state/polis/civitas, rather than any growing sense of Italian community. This bears directly on our understanding of the nature of Roman imperialism, the mechanisms of Roman rule, and the process of assimilation into the Roman system – that is, Romanization. Finally, and perhaps most important of all, the approach used in this dissertation is not limited to the study of the Second Punic War. Tacitus records that as the Julio-Claudian dynasty collapsed and Rome plunged into civil war, open hostility broke out between two neighboring cities in Gaul, Lyon and Vienne. According to Tacitus (Hist. 1.65, Trans. By Church and Brodribb): “The old feud between Lyon and Vienne had been kindled afresh by the late war. They had inflicted so many losses on each other so continuously and so savagely that they could not have been fighting only for Nero or Galba. . . Thence came rivalry and dislike, and the two states, separated only by a river, were linked by perpetual feud.” This example suggests that the kind of local inter-city ties and rivalries pervasive in third century BC Italy also persisted and are
observable in other times and areas of Roman conquest. Again, local or provincial motivation and perspective are often overshadowed in the ancient sources. However, Rome fought many wars, and since ancient accounts of war often give our only glimpse at local/provincial concerns, they provide relatively rich source material with which to understand the local perspective. Indeed, the wars that strained and fissured Roman hegemony, such as the Samnite Wars, the Pyrrhic War, and the Second Punic War, are particularly valuable. For to study what tore apart or threatened to tear apart the Roman empire is by definition to study the very bonds that held it together. Thus, this dissertation not only explains how Rome defeated Hannibal, but also contributes to our understanding of the resilience and endurance of the *Imperium Romanorum*. 
Map 1: Campania: Topography and Cities (from Frederiksen, *Campania*)
Map 2: Campania: Fabius’ and Hannibal’s camps, summer 217 BC
(from Walbank, *HCP*)
Map 3: Campania: Capua and Northern Campania
(from De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* 3.2)
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Map 10: Western Magna Graecia: Locri and Rhegium (from Osanna, *Chorai Coloniali*)
Map 11: Western Magna Graecia: Croton and Thurii (from Osanna, *Chorai Coloniali*)
Map 12: Eastern Magna Graecia: Tarentum, Metapontum, and Heraclea
(from Osanna, *Chorai Coloniali*)
APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGY AND THE AGER FALERNUS

Hannibal’s first entry into Campania was his curious incursion into the *ager Falernus*. Sometime in 217 BC Hannibal made a difficult crossing of the Apennines, attacked Beneventum, then descended into the *ager Falernus*. He eventually camped along the Volturnus River and “devastated” the region while Fabius shadowed his movements. Finally, Hannibal retreated from the *ager Falernus* to winter quarters in Apulia after he escaped the clutches of Fabius with the “ruse of the cattle.”¹ A great deal of controversy surrounds the exact chronology not only of the *ager Falernus* episode, but also of all the events of 217 BC; therefore, the first order of business must be to establish a firm chronology.

The *ager Falernus* episode can be dated only relative to the date of the battle of Trasimene and to the founding of the colonies of Cremona and Placentia. According to Ovid,² the Romans celebrated the anniversary of the battle of Trasimene on June 21. However, it is likely that the Roman calendar was running approximately six weeks ahead of the solar year in 217 BC. Therefore, if Ovid’s date is correct, then the battle of

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¹ Pol. 3.90-93; Liv. 22.13-17
² Ov. Fast. 6.767-8
Trasimene occurred approximately May 9 according to the solar year. An earlier date for the battle is consistent with other references in the ancient sources. Both Polybius and Livy state explicitly that Hannibal broke camp very early in the spring: Polybius records that Hannibal began to march across the marshes of Etruria and to surprise the consul Flaminius at the time the season changed, while Livy reports that Hannibal broke winter quarters when “spring was drawing near.” Walbank used Polybius’ statement, that news of Trasimene reaching Philip V of Macedon while he attended the Nemean games, to defend dating the battle of late June, because (according to Walbank) the Nemean games were held in July. However, Derow has demonstrated that the Nemean games for 217 BC cannot be dated securely since we have an incomplete understanding of the Argive

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3 Derow, Phoenix 30 (1976) 268-281, especially 272-6; however, Derow’s dating of the battle of Cirta in 203 BC, on which to a great degree his conclusion rests, has been challenged. See Briscoe, Commentary on Livy 34-37, 19-20; see also Marchetti, Ant. Class. 42 (1973) 478-80.

4 Pol. 3.78.6: The phrase suggests the vernal equinox, perhaps some time in late March. See Derow, “The Roman Calendar,” Phoenix 30 (1976) 275; HCP 1.412.

5 Liv. 22.2.1, suggesting a date sometime in March. Livy also relates Hannibal’s departure from winter quarters to the Idea of March when the consuls C. Flaminius and Cn. Servilius took office (Liv. 22.1.5). The Ides of March would have fallen around the beginning of February (solar) if the Roman calendar were running six weeks early. After the consuls took care of state matters in Rome, Flamininus left for Arretium. Hannibal knew that Flamininus was already at Arretium and planned to surprise, so he left winter quarters (see also Pol. 3.77.1, 80.1). If we allow at least a few weeks for the consuls to take care of affairs in Rome and to move troops to Arretium, and perhaps another week for Hannibal to learn about the consul’s movements and to make plans to surprise him, then Hannibal would have left winter quarters sometime in March.

6 HCP 1.412-3. Walbank did not accept that the Roman calendar may have been running ahead of the solar calendar. In order to keep Ovid’s date, Walbank was forced to downplay evidence suggesting that Hannibal broke winter camp in March or early April while asserting that Hannibal broke camp in May (following De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 3 2.115-7). Thus, Walbank also argues that Hannibal would not march before late May because the mountain passes would have be frozen. However, Hannibal showed such daring in crossing the Alps, and since he was trying to surprise a consul, he may have been more willing to take such a gamble. Moreover, Livy says that Hannibal’s troops suffered from the deprivations of marching through the marshes of Etruria, indicating that Hannibal was not above marching his soldiers through less than ideal conditions. The need to leave Hannibal in winter quarters is obviated by adjusting Ovid’s date for Trasimene to early May of the solar year.
Moreover, Polybius states explicitly that Hannibal defeated the Romans at Trasimene while Philip was besieging Thebes, and the historian roughly synchronizes the siege of Thebes with the grain harvest – probably some time in May. An earlier date for Trasimene is also consistent with Livy’s evidence concerning the dictatorship of Fabius Maximus. Livy tells us that Fabius’ six-month term, which began a few days after the Battle of Trasimene, ended in autumn. If Fabius were appointed by about May 20 (solar), his term would have ended in October (counting inclusively) or November.

May 9 also fits the evidence for Hannibal’s march to Gerunium to establish winter quarters. According to Polybius, Hannibal retreated from the ager Falernus into northern Apulia in time to forage a large amount of grain; presumably he foraged for many days. Polybius specifies that Hannibal had sent scouts who ascertained that there was significant grain to collect in the area between Gerunium and Luceria. This evidence suggests that Hannibal moved his troops to the area of Luceria in time for the grain harvest, which should have occurred around early- or mid-July (solar). We will estimate that he arrived at Gerunium about July 10, 217 BC (solar).

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7 Derow, Phoenix 30 (1976) 276 n.36
8 Pol.5.95.5, 96.1, 97.1-99.2. It has been suggested that Polybius’ synchronization of events in his narrative cannot is at best a vague indicator of chronology, and cannot be used to reconstruct with any detail the dates of the events he mentions (including the date of Trasimenne); see Desy, La Parola del Passato 44 (1989) 112-5; Derow, Phoenix 30 (1976) 276 n.36.
9 Liv. 22.31.7. However, Livy may have calculated from the Roman calendar, and not the solar calendar. This is still possible, since a six-month term beginning in late June would still have ended in November, counting inclusively.
10 Pol. 3.100.1-2, 6-8
11 Azzi, 545 places the grain harvest around Luceria at about July 5. Gerunium was situated about 25km northwest of Luceria, at about the same elevation. The grain harvest there would probably have been almost exactly the same time as the harvest around Luceria – certainly no later. Polybius says that the scouts informed Hannibal that there was already grain for collection in northern Apulia, so Hannibal may
total period between the battle of Trasimene and Hannibal’s arrival near Gerunium was about 65-70 days. The estimate is at best guesswork, though it appears plausible enough. If Hannibal reached the Adriatic coast about 14 days after Trasimene (a few days spent in Etruria after the battle + ten days march), then Hannibal would have reached the Adriatic coast by about May 23 (solar). Hannibal rested his troops there and plundered the territories of Arpi and Luceria; this all took perhaps for about 25 days, until about June 18 (solar). Hannibal thence marched through Samnium on the way to Campania, plundering along the way. Polybius reports that Hannibal descended into Samnium and the territory of Beneventum in time to collect significant provisions and plunder. By my estimate, Hannibal would have been in Beneventum around June 20 have just missed the beginning of the harvest. However, in a pre-modern society, it probably took a few weeks to harvest all grain in an area. This allows us to place Hannibal in northern Apulia a few days after Azzi’s date for the harvest around Luceria. For the location of Gereonium (at modern Masseria Finocchito), see Russi, Teanum Apulum (Rome 1976) 208-9; V. Russi, “Mass. Finocchito (Castelnuovo della Daunia),” Taras 2 (1982) 181-4; Volpe, La Daunia 133; contra De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 3.2 123-125 with a discussion of the confusion in the literary sources for the location of Gereonium. De Sanctis places the city near the Castle Dragonara and Casalnuovo Monterotaro.

12 HCP 1.421-2, 430. According to Walbank, Hannibal stayed in Etruria for a few days after the battle of Trasimene, then reached the Adriatic coast in ten days (Pol.3.86.9), and spent about one month in Apulia before marching to the ager Falernus. (The attack on Spoletium (Liv. 22.9.1, Zon. 8.25) is an annalistic creation.) Walbank figures Hannibal would have reached the ager Falernus around August 7, bringing the time between the battle of Trasimene and Hannibal’s arrival in the ager Falernus to about six weeks. Finally, he figured that Hannibal remained in the ager Falernus a short time, because he “will hardly have stayed long in this dangerous situation,” and that Hannibal would have reached the area of Gerunium by the beginning of September. See also De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 3.2.2.116-117

13 By comparison, Derow, Phoenix 30 (1976) 275-6 makes the total about 85 days.

14 Pol. 3.85.1-6, 86.8-10, 87.1-3, 88.1-6. Polybius account does not specify that Hannibal was foraging. Since Hannibal was encamped near Arpi before the grain harvest there, his devastation probably amounted to destroying farmsteads and plundering livestock. Hannibal may have planned to wait for the grain to ripen, but the arrival of the dictator Fabius provided him with the opportunity to elicit another pitched battle (see Pol. 3.89.1).

15 Pol. 3.90.7-8
(solar), just in time for the grain harvest in that part of Italy.\textsuperscript{16} Hannibal then marched to the \textit{ager Falernus}, probably arriving there by about June 25.\textsuperscript{17} Thus, Hannibal would have been able to plunder the \textit{ager Falernus} for about a week before returning to Gerunium by about July 10 (solar). The grain harvest in the \textit{ager Falernus} probably occurred a little before the harvest around Beneventum, so Hannibal and his troops would have missed at least some of the harvest when they descended into Campania. This is consistent with Polybius’ account, which states that although Hannibal was able to collect enough food for the present, he was worried about running low on provisions in the future and began to think about winter quarters.\textsuperscript{18} Overall, then, the events of 217 BC can be worked into a plausible chronology if we both accept Ovid’s date of June 21 for the battle of Trasimene and assume the Roman calendar for 218 BC was running about six weeks ahead of the solar calendar.

There is one remaining objection: it is difficult to fit the founding of Cremona and Placentia into the chronology of 218 BC if we assume the Roman calendar was running ahead of the solar calendar. According to Asconius (with Madvig’s emendation), the Romans founded the colonies of Cremona and Placentia on May 31, 218 BC.\textsuperscript{19} Derow argues that the Romans intercalated in even years during the Second Punic War and that the calendar was running only about four weeks early in 218 BC, so the colonies would

\textsuperscript{16} Azzi, 544

\textsuperscript{17} For the march to the \textit{ager Falernus}, see Pol. 3.90.7-11; Liv. 22.13.5-10.

\textsuperscript{18} Pol. 3.92.8-9

\textsuperscript{19} Asc. \textit{In Pis.} P. 3 (Clark); for a discussion of the emendation, see Eckstein, \textit{Rhein Mus.} 126 (1982) 257-68.
have been founded about April 28 (solar). Both Polybius and Livy state that the double-foundation predated a revolt by the Boii and that the Boii were encouraged to revolt not only out of anger at the colonial settlements, but also because they knew Hannibal was marching to Italy. Hannibal began his march from Cartagena at the earliest in the middle of May (solar), probably around the middle of June (solar). He would have crossed the Ebro between about the middle of June and the middle of July. Therefore, the Boii could not have known Hannibal was on the way when they revolted unless the colonies were founded on May 31, the Roman calendar was running close to the solar calendar, and Hannibal started his march at the earliest possible date. If one accepts this, then one must reject any chronology of 217 BC based on the assumption the Roman calendar was running off of solar calendar. This objection is, however, more apparent than real, since there are at least two plausible explanations to reconcile the sources with the assumption that the Roman calendar was running early in 218 BC.

We must recognize that although there may have been a link between the march of Hannibal and the revolt of the Boii and a link between the foundations of the colonies and the revolt of the Boii, there was not necessarily a link between Hannibal’s march and the foundation of the colonies. Only Polybius’ account implies the date of colonial foundations were tied to Roman knowledge of Hannibal’s march. According to Polybius, the Romans already had received word that Hannibal had crossed the Ebro and they were busy enrolling legions to send to Spain and Africa when at the same time they hastened

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20 Derow, *Phoenix* 30 (1976) 266-74, 274 n. 30

21 Pol. 3.40.3-8; Liv. 21.25.1-3

22 Proctor, *Hannibal’s March* 13-35
the foundation of Cremona and Placentia. Polybius thus implies that the Romans stepped up efforts to complete the foundations, at least in part, because they knew Hannibal was on the way. However, there are problems with Polybius’ narrative. For example, Polybius states that the six thousand colonists for each colony were to meet at the respective foundation cites, but Gargola pointed out that Polybius must be mistaken. Poybius also states the colonies’ actual foundations – sunw/kismevnwn – occur at least thirty days after the Romans heard Hannibal was coming. The earliest date Hannibal could have begun his march was in May, and the earliest the Romans could have learned about the march would probably have been a week or two later. If colonists assembled thirty days from that point, then Asconius’ (emended) date of May 31 for the founding of Cremona-Placentia is impossible. Finally, Polybius does not state explicitly that news of Hannibal’s march and the hurried colonial foundations were connected; it is possible that the two events occurred in coincidence.

Livy’s account is more ambiguous about the relative timing of the colonial foundations and the revolt of the Boii. Livy states only that the Boii were angry at the foundations, which occurred scarcely before (aegre), but does not say that the Romans knew about Hannibal’s march before the foundations. According to Livy, the Romans knew Hannibal had crossed the Ebro by the time the Boii revolted, which would have

23 Pol. 3.40.1-3
25 Polybius states that the colonist were given thirty days to meet at the sites of the colonies; the command was part of the effort to complete the foundations, after the Romans heard about Hannibal’s march. He also states (3.40.6) that the colonies had been recently founded (hjvdh de; touvtwn sunw/kismevnwn).
26 Liv. 21.25.2
been late June to late July (following Proctor). Livy includes one important detail not mentioned by Polybius: the Boii revolted while colonial commissions were still surveying and allotting land.\textsuperscript{27} The foundation date of a colony was the day that the colonial commission first marked the sacred boundary of the colony during a solemn ceremony; it was the first step in a series of procedures that took place at the site.\textsuperscript{28} Land survey and the distribution of parcels to the colonists would likely have taken months to complete after the foundation date.\textsuperscript{29} Even if the Roman calendar was running early and the Cremona-Placentia foundation date was the equivalent of about April 28 (solar), it is possible that the colonial commissions were still surveying land in June or July when news of Hannibal’s march reached Italy. The upshot is that we should prefer Livy’s account to Polybius’, at least with regards to the relative timing of the Cremona-Placentia foundation and news of Hannibal’s march in Rome. If the foundations of Cremona and Placentia did not occur after the Romans learned about Hannibal’s march, then there could have been no causal link between the two events. The reason the Romans founded Cremona and Placentia was as a safeguard against the recently conquered Boii. The Romans probably voted to establish the colonies in 219 BC.\textsuperscript{30} Polybius may well be accurate in recording Roman frustration with the slow pace of the double foundation; however, the Romans were probably urged on by the restive nature of Boii rather than by fear Hannibal would invade Italy. Meanwhile, the Boii were incited to rebellion by the

\textsuperscript{27} Liv. 21.25.3

\textsuperscript{28} Eckstein, \textit{Calif. St. in Class. Ant.} 12 (1979) 85-97

\textsuperscript{29} Gargola, \textit{Land, Laws, and Gods} 71-101

\textsuperscript{30} Liv. \textit{Ep.} 20; Gargola, \textit{Athenaeum} 78 (1990) 456-73; \textit{HCP} 1.374
arrival of colonists and the actual parceling of confiscated land, combined with their encouraging negotiations with Hannibal. Overall, by rejecting Polybius’ chronology, which places the foundations of Cremona and Placentia after news of Hannibal’s march reached Italy, it is easy to reconcile Asconius’ foundation date with the assumption that the Roman calendar was running early.

Gargola has suggested a second possible solution to the apparent conflict between the date of the foundations of Cremona and Placentia and Derow’s assumption about the Roman calendar. Gargola made four observations concerning Asconius’ reference to the colonial foundations in question: 1] Asconius only mentions Placentia, not Cremona; 2] he preserves different names for the colonial commission than do Polybius and Livy; 3] he lists the colonists of Placentia as novi coloni; and 4] the date of May 31, 218 BC is arrived at by following Madvig’s emendation – the manuscript says December 31, 218 BC. Gargola also emphasized that the double foundation was first mentioned in Livy’s Book 20 (preserved in ep. 20), which described events mostly from 219 BC. Using this evidence, Gargola claimed that the two colonies were founded – the marking of the sacred boundaries – in 219 BC or very early in 218 BC. The Boii revolted and prevented the completion of the foundation process at Placentia, but did not prevent the foundation of Cremona. Asconius preserves information concerning a second colonization of Placentia later in 218 BC, complete with a new colonial commission and novi coloni.

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31 Pol. 3.40.6-7; Liv. 21.29.6
32 Gargola, Athenaeum 78 (1990) 456-73
Either solution successfully reconciles the assumption that the Roman calendar was running early in 218 BC and the reference to the foundation of Placentia in Asconius.

To summarize: Ovid’s date of the battle of Trasimene (June 21, 217 BC according to the Roman calendar) can be accepted if we also accept Derow’s suggestion that the Roman calendar was running from four to six weeks ahead of the solar calendar during the early years of the Second Punic War. This yields the following approximate chronology for the solar calendar of 217 BC:

- c. March 21: Hannibal leaves winter quarters in Etruria
- May 9: Battle of Trasimene
- c. May 20: Fabius appointed dictator
- May 23: Hannibal reaches the Adriatic coast
- c. June 20: Hannibal reaches Beneventum
- c. June 25: Hannibal reaches ager Falernus
- c. July 3: Hannibal departs ager Falernus
- c. July 10: Hannibal reaches Gerunium
- c. October 20: Fabius’ term ends (counting 6 mo. inclusively)

Table 6: Chronology of 217 BC

We may now discuss in detail Hannibal’s march on the ager Falernus and its implications with regards to the Hannibalic strategy in Campania. In late June Hannibal marched from Beneventum to the ager Falernus. He appears to have followed the Calor River west and north from Beneventum, turned north and followed the course of the Volturnus River, and entered the northeast corner of Campania near Monto Maggiore or
Monte Croce, in the vicinity of Teanum or Cales. Hannibal set up camp in the plains of the Ager Stellas and proceeded to lay waste to the surrounding area. According to Livy, Hannibal was able to plunder unopposed as far as the Roman colony of Sinuessa, though Polybius is less specific about the geography of Hannibal’s devastation. Both Livy and Polybius say that Hannibal plundered the *ager Falernus*, the fertile plain that ran along the north bank of the lower Volturnus. The *ager Falernus* had been confiscated from the Capuans in the fourth century and had been parceled in viritine allotments, probably by about 318 BC. Therefore, since entering Beneventum, Hannibal had targeted for devastation the territory of Beneventum, and probably the territory of Cales, the *ager Falernus*, and the territory of Sinuessa, all populated by either Latin right colonists or Roman citizens.

Polybius states explicitly that Hannibal foresaw two outcomes to his entry into Campania – either the Romans would be compelled to fight a decisive pitched battle or Roman allies would throw off their alliances at the sign of Roman impotence. Eliciting another pitched battle appears to have been a goal of Hannibal throughout the campaign. For example, after Hannibal learned of the arrival in Apulia of the dictator Fabius Maximus, the Carthaginian general led his army out of camp and offered the Romans battle. Polybius states explicitly that Hannibal hoped another victory would bring the

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33 Pol. 3.91.8-10, 92.1; Liv. 22.13.4-8. For a summary of the route and bibliography, see HCP 1.92-3.

34 Liv. 23.13.9-10

35 Pol. 3.92.5-7; Liv. 22.13.9

36 Liv. 8.11.13-5, 9.20.6. Livy states that a new tribe, the *tribus Falerna*, was created in 318 BC, implying that Roman citizens were living on *ager Falernus*, which had been mulcted from the Capuans.

37 Pol. 3.90.10-4
Romans to their knees.38 Even though Fabius had refused this previous opportunity to fight a pitched battle, Hannibal had good reason to expect his march to the *ager Falernus* would bring about another battle. Although Hannibal probably missed at least some of the Campanian harvest season when he descended into the territory of Cales, his army should still have been able to disrupt the lives of nearby denizens. Hannibal may have been able to prevent some of the locals from harvesting their crops while his own army plundered the fields for forage. The *ager Falernus* was also renowned for its grape production, and Livy notes that the area was full of vineyards and orchards at the time Hannibal was devastating the region.39 Even if Hannibal and his men had missed the grain harvest, they still would have been able to do at least some damage to vines and trees. Polybius claims that Hannibal laid waste to the entire area, collecting a great amount of booty in the process.40 Also, the flat lands would have been ideal to graze the large number of cattle he plundered, as well as any pack animals and cavalry.41 At the very least, Hannibal’s men could have destroyed farmsteads if not the farmers’ crops. To this point, Livy records that Hannibal sent out cavalry detachments to strike terror throughout the entire *ager Falernus*, and that he burned farms from Cales to Sinuessa.42

38 Pol. 3.89.1

39 For the wealth of Campania in general, and the *ager Falernus* in particular, see Pol. 3.91.2; Liv. 22.14.1, 15.2, 23.2.1, 26.16.7; Plin. *NH* 3.60; Strab. 5.4.3; Var. 5.1.2.3-6; Cic. *De Lex Agr.* 2.76-91; Frederiksen *Campania* 31-53; Spurr, *Arable Cultivation* 7-8.

40 Pol. 3.92.8-9

41 Pol. 3.86.4-5, 9-10, 3.88.6, 3.92.8-9, 3.93.5; Liv. 22.8.1, 22.8.1-2, 22.16.6-8: we know that Hannibal had at least 2000 cattle with him. Presumably grazing cattle on the crops that he prevented the Romans from reaping would have done significant short-term damage.

42 Liv. 22.13.9-10
Indeed, the plains probably allowed his cavalry to range more effectively. Therefore, despite the difficulty ancient armies faced in “devastating” territory, Hannibal appears to have done at least significant short-term damage to Roman holdings.

Perhaps more important than the physical damage caused by Hannibal’s incursion into the ager Falernus was the political effects of such a campaign of devastation. The appearance of Hannibal’s army must have driven rural farmers to seek shelter within the walls of nearby towns. The combination of rural denizens and urban dwellers, some of whom may have owned rural farmland outside, huddled inside a city’s walls while their farms were burned by a hostile army had the potential for explosive political agitation. These angry farmers could put political pressure on the ruling elite. One can look to the Athenian experience during the Peloponnesian War for an instructive comparison. Despite the fact that Athenian citizens were well defended by Athens’ strong walls, by the second year of the Peloponnesian War public opinion began to turn against Pericles. According to Thucydides, after two seasons of watching their farms devastated by the Peloponnesian army, Athenian citizens began to blame Pericles for their situation, to question Pericles’ policies, and to call for peace with the Spartans.\textsuperscript{43} Since Hannibal was devastating the property of either Latin colonists or Roman citizens, one would expect the political pressure on the Roman military commanders to have been particularly acute. Literary evidence bears out this assumption. Livy reports an angry speech made by Minucius rebuking Fabius for allowing Hannibal to devastate unhindered.\textsuperscript{44} The exact words of the speech are likely to be Livy’s invention, but the speech probably reflects the

\textsuperscript{43} Thuc. 2.59

\textsuperscript{44} Liv. 22.14.1-15
general sentiment toward the Fabian strategy. Both Livy and Polybius report that Fabius was forced to return to Rome, allowing his Master of the Horse Minudius to take over command of the army.\textsuperscript{45} Fabius was compelled to return to Rome, at least in part, because of the public outcry over his strategy of allowing Hannibal to plunder territory unopposed.\textsuperscript{46}

Therefore, it appears that Hannibal did succeed in putting the sort of political pressure on the Roman military command necessary to elicit the pitched battle he desired. Hannibal’s failure to elicit that pitched battle resulted not from a failure in the execution of his strategy, but because of Fabius’ stubbornness in pursuing his own strategy of avoiding pitched battles with Hannibal. Thus, while Hannibal descended into the ager Falernus and proceeded to plunder the country, Fabius fortified a camp on the high ground and placed garrisons around the ager Falernus in order to limit Hannibal’s potential movement. Both Livy and Polybius agree that Fabius fortified his main camp on a ridge overlooking the pass by which Hannibal first entered Campania and by which Fabius suspected Hannibal would ultimately retreat from the area. Livy further specifies that Fabius encamped on the Mons Callicula, and sent a garrison to Casilinum in order to prevent Hannibal from crossing the Volturnus River into main plain of the Campania.\textsuperscript{47} Fabius also sent Minucius with a garrison to guard the pass at Terracina, which protected against Hannibal marching along the Via Appia north toward Rome.\textsuperscript{48} The exact location

\textsuperscript{45} Pol. 3.94.8-10; Liv. 22.23.1-24.2

\textsuperscript{46} HCP 1.430; De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 3\textsuperscript{2}.2.50-251

\textsuperscript{47} Pol. 3.92.11; Liv. 22.15.1-4; see also, HCP 1.428-9.

\textsuperscript{48} Liv. 25.15.11
of Fabius’ main camp is a matter of debate, though Kromayer suggests that he held the hill south of modern Vairano, thus protecting both the pass to the east through which the Via Latina ran and the pass to the west through which Hannibal had entered Campania.\textsuperscript{49} As Walbank suggests, Fabius had placed Hannibal in a precarious military situation;\textsuperscript{50} moreover, Hannibal may have had some concerns that he would run out of supplies.\textsuperscript{51} Indeed, Hannibal was able to escape Fabius’ encirclement through a spectacular ruse: at night Hannibal ordered his men to affix torches to the horns of cattle that the Carthaginians had captured, and then to set fire to the torches. The Carthaginians urged the cattle toward the Roman position; the sight of lights advancing toward their camp sent the Romans into confusion, and Hannibal and his army were able to slip through pass by which they had come.\textsuperscript{52} Hannibal was able to retire to winter quarters in Apulia, but he had been unable to elicit another, potentially decisive, pitched battle.

However, as stated above, Hannibal foresaw a second outcome to marching into the \textit{ager Falernus} – he thought that he would encourage Rome’s allies to revolt. Even though he had not compelled the Romans to fight another pitched battle, Hannibal had called attention to Roman impotence and their inability (or at least unwillingness) to protect the territory of their citizens and of their Latin allies. He must have figured that his recent victory at Trasimene, his arrival in Campania, and his unopposed devastation

\textsuperscript{49} Kromayer, \textit{AS} 3.1.225ff

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{HCP} 1.430

\textsuperscript{51} Pol. 3.92.8-9. Polybius’ states that although Hannibal was able to collect enough food for the present, he was worried about running low on provisions in the future and began to think about winter quarters.

\textsuperscript{52} Pol. 3.93.3-94.6; Liv. 22.16-18; App. \textit{Hann.} 14-15; Zon. 8.26; Plut. \textit{Fab.} 6-7
of both Latin and Roman colonies would undermine the credibility of the Romans in the eyes of their Italian allies. If the Romans appeared essentially powerless against Hannibal, the Italians may have been less fearful of Roman reprisals; thus, Hannibal may have figured his campaign in 217 would have exacerbated pre-existing dissatisfaction with Roman hegemony.

However, despite the fact that there was certainly at least some dissatisfaction with Roman rule, Hannibal was still unable to elicit allied revolts. Roman rule relied on the loyalty of the local aristocracies in the various allied cities. Despite Roman setbacks, the Romans maintained this loyalty in Campania through 217 BC, or at least the loyalty of enough of each Campanian city’s aristocracy to prevent open sedition. For example, the people of Naples sent forty golden bowls to Rome during the winter after Trasimene and ager Falernus campaign. This opulent gift was certainly sent by the Neapolitan aristocracy as a sign of their loyalty to the Roman cause.

To some degree Fabius’ tactics in the ager Falernus may have limited Hannibal’s potential diplomatic success with Rome’s allies. Whatever the reasons, local

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53 Liv. 22.13.2-3 states that Hannibal received word of wavering Capuan loyalty from Capuan knights that he had captured at and released after Trasimene. However, Livy may be foreshadowing the Capuan revolt of 216 BC; Polybius does not mention the episode.

54 The most explicit example of this sort of control may be the Samnite city of Compsa. Livy (23.1.1-4) states explicitly that the Romans ruled through the loyalty of an elite family, the Mopsii, who had gained in prestige through Roman patronage. After the Roman defeat at Cannae, other aristocrats sought an alliance with Hannibal. When the Mopsii fled the Compsa, the city went over to Hannibal.

55 Liv. 22.32.4-9

56 Polybius (3.92.5-7) states explicitly that Fabius shadowed Hannibal’s army, following him from along the highground, in order that he not appear to be abandoning the allies. This shows that Fabius was concerned with allied loyalty. Also, by establishing his camp at Callicula and placing garrisons at Casilinum and Tarracina, Fabius prevented Hannibal from marching out of the ager Falernus where he could have made direct contact with Rome’s non-Latin allies. Thus, even though the Romans did not
aristocracies had yet to calculate that an alliance with Hannibal offered a better deal than did loyalty to Rome. However, Hannibal’s victory at Cannae would change the equation.

prevent Hannibal from devastating the *ager Falernus*, they did prevent him from appearing at the gates of Campanian cities that may have been growing unhappy with Roman rule.


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