Just Coverage and the Path to Peace: Reporting Operation Protective Edge in Haaretz, BBC Online, and The New York Times

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This thesis titled
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ABSTRACT

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Just Coverage and the Path to Peace: Reporting Operation Protective Edge in Haaretz, BBC Online, and The New York Times

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The following thesis pertains to media coverage of Israel/Palestine, with emphasis on The New York Times, Israeli publication Haaretz, and BBC Online’s coverage of the conflict in Gaza during the Summer of 2014. The thesis will quantitatively delve into the material being studied, utilizing measures of bias, as well as indicators of peace journalism to accomplish the objective of thoroughly analyzing the 351 news stories sampled from the three publications at hand. The study will employ eleven variables, six pertaining to news bias and five operationalized indicators of peace journalism.

The thesis will argue that peace journalism is a partial yet powerful remedy for biased coverage. Although it is considered to be a form of advocacy journalism, it can, when translated onto the pages of conventional news outlets, shed objective light on even the direst and most intractable shades of conflict.

The study found that The New York Times and BBC Online favored Palestinians in headlines and photographs, likely due to the dramatic devastation wrought upon Gaza. Haaretz was found to be more evenhanded, likely due to its market of Israelis and Jews throughout the world. BBC Online and Haaretz both relied heavily on official (military and government sources), while The New York Times relied on experts. Measures of peace journalism were varied among the variables being analyzed.
DEDICATION

To Mickey Mouse, Donald Duck, Pluto and Uranus;

Also to Cassidy, who put me up to this.

Oh yeah, and my family:

Mom, Dad, Brett, Doug, and Papa Fred
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In both Islam and Judaism, there is an adage concerning the sanctity of life that rings with equivalency between the two faiths: “Whoever destroys a soul, it is considered as if he destroyed an entire world. And whoever saves a life, it is considered as if he saved an entire world.”\(^1\) If such a sentiment exists in both faiths, why does so much tension surround that small strip of land in the Levant known as Israel-Palestine? For reasons both political and religious, one tract of land has come to define intractable conflict in the popular imagination. In spite of shared kinship, no solutions seem to be available, and the causes of the conflict are misted by collective memory. While the modern state of Israel came of age in the era of mass communication, there is little to suggest that its media outlets have had a hand in mitigating the conflict (Soffer, 2015). Given that media is such a central part of life in the 21st century, it must be explored as a tool in resolving conflict. This research employs quantitative methods to consider the 2014 war in the Gaza Strip as covered by BBC Online, The New York Times, and Haaretz—British, American, and Israeli publications, respectively. [In the interest of clarification, Haaretz is a left-leaning Israeli publication with about 90,000 print subscribers, primarily elite members of Israeli society (Korn, 2004).] In so doing, I hope to consider the role of nationality in determining news bias and the extent to which nations’ news outlets mimic, or are reflective of, the foreign policy of the nations from which they operate.

\(^1\) Quotation can be found in different forms in Mishna Sanhedrin in the Jewish Talmud, and in the Quran, 5:32.
Background on the Most Recent Round of Fighting

When I first visited Israel, on the very first day of my Birthright trip, three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped while hitchhiking near their home in the West Bank. Eighteen days later, on the day I left Israel, they were found dead. The rest of the summer, I witnessed—via the American and Israeli news media—a war that caused me to question the values of a country that had provided me with nothing short of a spiritual awakening. As an American Jew, I found that I supported a Jewish state; as a global citizen, I found that I had difficulty stomaching the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. By the end of the summer, the petals had fallen off the roses. What had started as an extraordinary trip to the Holy Land had become nothing short of a persistent source of confusion.

It was through the filter of the media that I acquired information about the conflict as it unfolded—hundreds of arrests in the days after the kidnappings, the revenge killing (via immolation) of a teenage Palestinian boy, rockets firing daily from Gaza and, finally, Israeli military action. The incursion began with air-strikes, but within weeks the Israel Defense Force staged a full-scale ground invasion of Gaza. The death toll was remarkably lopsided, with about 2,100 Palestinians losing their lives while 73 Israelis lost theirs (BBC Online, 2014).

The three Israeli boys were kidnapped on June 12, 2014 while hitchhiking to their homes in Hebron, in the West Bank (CBS News, 2014). Eighteen days later, their bodies were found (Rudoren & Kershner, 2014). In the period between June 12 and June 30, Israel carried out a police action it called Operation Brother’s Keeper, during which between 350 and 500 Palestinian men were arrested in the West Bank because of their alleged affiliation
with Hamas, the militant entity that controls the Gaza Strip (Ahren, 2014). Israel blamed Hamas for the kidnappings, and had every intention of bringing those responsible for them to justice (Goldman & Aegerter, 2014). Meanwhile, in Gaza, members of Hamas’s military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, began firing rockets into Israel (Issacharoff, 2014). Israel responded with air strikes of its own, and on July 1—the day after the bodies of the three boys who had been kidnapped were found—Jewish extremists burned a Palestinian boy alive, in a revenge kidnapping designed to send a message of intimidation to the Palestinian community (Sterman, 2014). In response, Hamas increased its rocket fire, and Israel increased its air strikes. On July 7, Israel began Operation Protective Edge, which had the expressed intent of ending rocket fire and restoring peace to Israel (Haaretz, 2014). Rocket fire did not cease, so Israel sent in ground troops on July 17 (The Jerusalem Post, 2014).

The goals of the operation, besides ending rocket fire, were not entirely clear. On July 28—three weeks into the conflict—an article in Haaretz quoted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaking of demilitarizing Gaza as a potential goal (Haaretz, 2014). Furthermore, Avigdor Lieberman, Israeli minister of foreign affairs, listed defeat of Hamas as being among the goals of the operation (Keinon, 2014). Yet another goal Israel had was to destroy Hamas’s complex network of tunnels, which pervaded the Gaza-Israel border and were believed by Israel to pose a threat. Hamas’s goals included putting an end to the blockade of Gaza, negotiating the release of prisoners (as was done in 2011 when 1,027 prisoners were exchanged for captive Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit), and, according to CNN, destroying Israel (Castillo, 2014). The results of these competing ends—Israel the purported protection of its home front, and Hamas the rebellion against what it viewed as
Israeli hegemony—were catastrophic, particularly for the people of Gaza, of whom between 2,125 and 2,310 lost their lives, and well over 10,000 were injured (Ma’an, 2015; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). Furthermore, a great deal of property was damaged as a result of Israeli air strikes, with the estimated cost of rebuilding Gaza between $4 billion and $6 billion, according to CNN (Asher, 2014). It was through the filter of the media that Americans, Israelis, and Britons acquired information about the conflict as it unfolded.

What is the role of transnational news outlets in light of such bloodshed? What is the role of Israeli outlets? Is there a need for both to strike a balance? What does balance entail in this case? What is the truth—or at least, what is factually accurate—behind the numbers? Was it true, as the IDF reported, that members of Hamas deliberately stationed themselves in populated urban areas to “enhance” the death toll? Or are Palestinians simply victims of an atrocious apartheid regime bent on subjugating them into submission? Can members of the media be expected—as they are often thought to—to take a stance in conflict inside or outside of their borders? One study by Matt Viser (2003) proclaimed that Haaretz, an Israeli publication, was less favorable toward its own nation than The New York Times (though this study finds differently), a claim that has significant implications for those who might consider the role of U.S. policy in influencing the Times’s coverage. Such considerations beg profound questions of journalistic independence. As Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel (2014) wrote, “Journalism’s first loyalty is to citizens” (p. 72). This thesis project expands this definition to consider journalism’s loyalty to global citizens. As the filter through which multitudes decode events beyond their borders, news organizations play a vital role in the process of globalization. As the printing press spurred the growth of
nationalism (Anderson, 1991), so have the mass media assisted in defining modern-day conceptions of the nation, with the Internet facilitating the spread of ideas worldwide.

In the global marketplace of ideas, the truth is like a flame: powerful, dangerous, and at risk of being snuffed out. How can journalists credibly contend with misinformation, and steer clear of bias in the form of cultural stereotyping (such as the portrayal of Palestinians as an inherently violent people) and overly simplistic analyses (such as the reduction of conflict to mere competition—a “zero-sum” game)? The most important facet of conflict coverage is that it be just—though not necessarily even-handed—in its treatment of opposing sides.

Overview

*Causes and Context*

In light of the destruction in Gaza in the heat of summer 2014, it is natural to wonder: “What caused this?” A corollary question is: to what extent can the goals of each side be viewed as causes? Arguably, they can be so viewed to the utmost. Journalism ideally provides a platform in which various stakeholders in a given issue can find their voices heard, with their competing ends matched against one another for public display. The motives of two or more competing sides can thus be viewed as causes, as well as context—necessary for the establishment of dialogue within the confines of a given news article. Providing the causes of a given conflict—both immediate and historical—is a necessary component of context, which must be provided if a news article is not to be divorced from the tides of meaning that lend it shape. To effectively negotiate meaning
derived from news stories, it is the duty of reporters to provide the necessary context in a majority of articles written about intractable conflict, with the conflict being discussed here as no exception. Cause is an inseparable, but distinct corollary to context (Menzies, 2009, 354). For the purposes of this study, causes were divided into “Immediate Causes” and “Historical Causes,” with immediate causes exemplified by the kidnapping of the three Israeli youths and the Palestinian youth, as well as rocket fire from Gaza and the arrests of hundreds of Palestinians before the outbreak of the conflict. Historical causes include the 1967 partition plan, the Palestinian unity government of more recent years, the formation of Hamas, any of the wars fought between Israelis and Palestinians/Arabs, and many more.

**Solutions to the Conflict**

While we have already discussed the immediate causes, and to some extent, the outcomes of the most recent round of fighting in Israel-Palestine, we must now turn to the solutions to the conflict. What is the duty of journalists regarding the question of advocacy for peaceful outcomes to conflicts? Some would argue that this is the territory of the opinion pages, while others would argue that it can and ought to be a central facet of effective conflict coverage (McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000). Solutions can be provided in at least two ways: one way is through sources, and the other is from the journalists themselves. For the purposes of this study, one variable dealt exclusively with solutions as presented by journalists, excluding ceasefires. Another variable dealt with solutions presented by both sources and journalists that included ceasefires. Such solutions included: the two-state solution, any form of peace treaty, cease-fires, or any form of innovative, transformative outcome that may transpire from the conflict. Of course, the major
limitation of this variable is that intractable conflict, by its nature, generally does not resolve, but rather transforms (Shinar, 2009). Still, it is important that publications at least mention preferred and/or ideal outcomes to the Israeli-Palestinian problem.

**Articles Written in a Competitive (Zero-Sum) Tone**

In covering conflict, it is important to take care with regard to sensitivities of tone. Often, coverage of war finds every sentence fraught with actions taken by either side, going back and forth, with ill prospects for any form of resolution. Thus, any form of writing that implies competitiveness between or among stakeholders in a conflict may have a negative impact on the conflict at hand. Peaceable writings in the news media ought to be divorced from any notion of competitiveness in the context of conflict, as styling void of a zero-sum tone is a key component of peace journalism and journalism that is helpful in negotiating conflicts.

**Victims and Aggressors**

This study considers victimhood and aggression in the context of headlines and photographs in the three publications at hand, with the stated aim of uncovering any biases in coverage of the most recent conflict between Israel and Hamas. In an unbiased, neutral portrayal, significantly more photographs and headlines should depict Palestinian victimhood and Israeli aggression, given the lopsided death toll. Forms of victimhood included loss of life, news of the wounded, and property damage, while depictions of aggressors included photographs of soldiers, and instances in which a depiction of an
aggressor or victim role was implied by the victimhood or aggression being depicted of one side or the other.

**Expectations**

While it is difficult to predict, prima facie, which of these publications will exhibit peace journalism, predicting bias is slightly easier. The likelihood is that *BBC Online* and *New York Times* coverage will favor the Palestinians in light of the sheer drama of the destruction. *Haaretz*, on the other hand, will likely publish more articles pertaining to the Israeli perspective, simply by virtue of the fact that it is an Israeli publication. Sources are likely to be predominantly militaristic and governmental, with reporters relying on military officials, politicians, or government officials. The proportion of civilians interviewed is likely to be moderate, though smaller than official sources. Concerning the peace journalism variables, the likelihood is that *Haaretz* is less liable to cite causes to the conflict due to the persistency with which Israelis follow the news, and the extent to which they are informed about the issues facing their society. Immediate and historical causes are more likely to appear in *The New York Times* and *BBC Online*. While it is difficult to predict the extent to which solutions will be named in the articles sampled in this study, it is the prediction of the researcher that *Haaretz* will offer fewer solutions than the other publications, by virtue of the Israeli public’s belief in the hopelessness of the conflict. Finally, it is the researcher’s contention that zero-sum reporting is likelier to take place on the pages of *Haaretz* than the other two publications, by virtue of the publication’s nationality. Despite its widely viewed left-wing stance, *Haaretz* remains a publication, ideally, serving Israeli citizens. Thus, it is possible that entrenched views will take
precedence over fair reporting, or that perceptions of the modus operandi of Hamas will take precedence over what may or may not be considered “fairness.”
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

A review of the pertinent literature concerning conflict coverage points to eight key frameworks. Framing theory provides the underlying foundation for this work, as it connects to all of the other components of the literature pertaining to this study. Means by which to frame intractable conflict include peace journalism, war journalism, press nationalism, press patriotism, and cosmopolitan conflict coverage. A section on international journalism ethics will underscore ideal ways in which to frame conflict. The mechanics of conflict coverage will be examined in a section on the dynamic between Reporters and Officials (Sigal, 1973)—which addresses the importance of source types—and on the hierarchy of influences model of journalism, which addresses the layers of influences that shape final news products. The segments of the literature review culminate in a section on bias, which transpires as a result of the aforementioned frameworks underlying this study.

Framing Theory

The diverse perspectives available on framing theory are, in themselves, both emblematic of the many-layered problems posed by the study of communication, and likewise representative of the apparently “fractured” nature of the framing paradigm. Whether one chooses to view framing as a monolithic body of socio-scientific thought that can be appropriately standardized, or as a broken body of research with as many ways of using it as there are perspectives on it, is far more than a matter of taste. One’s understanding of the nature of framing theory is, itself, a commentary on the way an individual might wish to employ the existing framework, with its simultaneously diverse
practices and common understandings of what frames are and how they operate within the largest existing frame: the so-called “media landscape”.

By some metrics, anything rendered salient in a text or media presentation can be considered to have been framed. According to Robert M. Entman (1993, p. 52),

Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.

Thus, framing theory becomes especially relevant in studies of conflict coverage, in that communicating texts may focus more on “problem definition” and “moral evaluation” than on “causal interpretation” or “treatment recommendation.” The latter components of Entman’s definition of framing are critical components of peace journalism. The former are examples of war journalism, where problems are presented, sides are morally evaluated, and no attempt to delineate causation or prospects for peace are offered. “Causal interpretation” and “treatment recommendation” are the two key facets of peace journalism used by this study.

The limitations of “problem definition” and “moral evaluation,” as they pertain to bias, are thoroughly illustrated in Robert M. Entman’s (1991) article “Framing U.S. Coverage of International News: Contrasts in Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incidents.” The article depicts the difference in coverage between two similar events: A Soviet downing of a South Korean passenger plane and a U.S. downing of an Iranian passenger plane. First and foremost, the amount of coverage was substantially different, with Time, for instance, devoting 51 pages of coverage to the South Korean plane, and 20 pages to the Iranian plane (Entman, 1991, p. 10). The publication also lists the headlines
devoted to each event: “Murder in the Air” for the Soviet incident, and “Why It Happened” for the U.S. incident (Entman, 1991, p. 12). Both headlines contain moral evaluations, the former being highly damning, and the latter being passive, not eliciting fault. Often, in conflict situations, (particularly in intractable conflict) problem definitions and moral evaluations are simply inadequate means of addressing problems. According to the standards of American journalism, since the 1920s, problems should not be defined by journalists in hard news stories, but rather presented, while moral evaluations ought to be left to the reader to determine (Schudson, 1978). If “frames are principles of selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters (Gitlin, 1980, p. 6),” then this process should be done carefully, with regard for causes and solutions, which are more apparent than the innate problem being addressed and a journalist’s moral evaluation. In the same light, however, all four of these components can lend themselves to judgments and exaggerations, such as the extreme case of defining a cause of conflict as the “other’s” evil motivations, and defining a solution as the total annihilation of the “other.” By the same token, a problem may be defined with nuance and care and a moral evaluation may be undertaken subtly.

After all, writes Claes deVreese (2005, p. 51), “communication is not static, but rather a dynamic process that involves frame-building (how frames emerge) and frame-setting (the interplay between media frames and audience predispositions).” DeVreese goes on to define frame-building as “the factors that influence the structural qualities of news frames. Factors internal to journalism determine how journalists and news organizations frame issues (deVreese, 2005, p. 52; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996), and frame-setting as “the interaction between media frames and individuals’ prior knowledge and
predispositions” (deVreese, 2005, p. 52). Frame-building, in deVreese’s eyes, is innately tied to the hierarchy of influences model (to be explained later). Frame-setting, on the other hand, is critical to this study, as individuals bear all manner of biases in their interpretations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Furthermore, one’s interpretation of media coverage of the conflict says far more about one’s perception of the conflict than it does about the coverage itself.

This is where the importance of empirical research on media coverage is paramount. Without numerical data it is difficult to determine bias, a nebulous concept in and of itself. There are a multitude of content analyses grounded in framing theory that serve not only to strengthen the sometimes poorly defined framework, but to improve upon the numerical means by which to gather and interpret data from news sources. Framing studies are, by their nature, a hybrid of quantitative and qualitative research, although this project portends to be more of a quantitative review than a thorough qualitative undertaking. Scholar Stephen D. Reese writes on framing theory as “a Bridging Model for Media Research,”

Framing’s value . . . does not hinge on its potential as a unified research domain but . . . as a provocative model that bridges parts of the field that need to be in touch with each other: quantitative and qualitative, empirical and interpretive, psychological and sociological, and academic and professional. If the most interesting happens at the edges of disciplines—and in the center of policy debates—then framing certainly has the potential to bring disciplinary perspectives together in interesting ways.

Though this study is largely quantitative, there is no escaping the use of qualitative elements, namely the use of strong examples from the 351 articles being studied.

That those who employ framing theory in media research cannot escape qualitative means of argumentation is a product of the subjective nature guiding thought leaders who
frame, as well as academics who study (and frame) frames. Ultimately the importance of framing lies in its ability to influence the thinking of media consumers, through “modes of presentation that...resonate with existing underlying schemas among their audience” (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 12). Framing theorists such as Scheufele, and Tewksbury (2007, p. 11) hold that “different presentations of essentially identical decision-making scenarios influence people’s choices and their evaluation of the various options presented to them.” This follows in presentation of war. If war is framed in such a way that it is deemed hopeless by both writers and readers, then the hopelessness of the situation will reinforce itself. In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, representations of war that are devoid of context and outcomes beyond body counts and property damage can further reinforce the sense of hopelessness that is associated with intractable conflict.

Peace Journalism versus War Journalism

Peace journalism stands as an effective means of framing conflict in order to change the way in which it is perceived. According to Annabel McGoldrick and Jake Lynch (2000, p. 5), “Peace Journalism uses conflict analysis and transformation to update the concept of balance, fairness and accuracy in reporting.” In this sense, it is a form of advocacy journalism that must be implemented by news outlets as they cover conflicts. The framework holds that conflict coverage as it currently manifests itself is problematic as it overly emphasizes war rather than peace. As Jake Lynch and Johan Galtung (2010, p. 5) write,

Imagine now that “conflict” is conceptualised, reductively, as war and violence, and that a war is reported much like a sports game, a soccer or a boxing match. What happens to our understanding? First, the reader will not know the goals of the
parties. . . .Second, if the conflict/violence is reported like a sports game, then conflict, like a sports game, has not only an arena, but also a clear beginning and end.

Four measures were chosen for this study based on this depiction of “zero-sum” reporting, as well as on past indicators used by scholars such as Dov Shinar (2009) and Fahmy and Eakin (2014). Shinar maintains that peace journalism both holds an “emphasis on longer term processes and wider aspects” of conflict (the basis for our current consideration of conflict causes and solutions), as well as a “win-win orientation,” which is diametrically opposed to the competitive, zero-sum, framing being searched for in this content analysis. These are but two of ten indicators Shinar used to code his study, “Can Peace Journalism Make Progress? The Coverage of the 2006 Lebanon War in Canadian and Israeli Media.” Several of Johan Galtung’s (1998) “Concepts of Peace Journalism” hold that peace journalism is solutions-oriented, including the requirement that journalists operating in the service of peace “see conflict/war as [a] problem, [and] focus on conflict creativity.” In earlier writings, Shinar (2003) puts forth the notion that there are two views on conflict resolution: one is reconciliatory and the other is transformative. While the reconciliatory approach implies an end to conflict, the transformative approach is far more descriptive of the actual state of things, which is that conflicts like the one in Israel-Palestine (intractable conflicts) never end, but are merely transformed. What he advocates for is a model of coverage whereby the complexities and cultural nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are taken into account, rather than mere reconciliation. This argument against reductive definitions of conflict solutions may be counterintuitive, as the belief that there is no concrete solution to the conflict may be regarded as a self-fulfilling prophecy. That is why
this study focuses explicitly on basic solutions that have been offered, such as the two-state solution, or land for peace.

As far as causes are concerned, Fahmy and Eakin (2014, p. 90-1) note “that war journalism has been criticized for the lack of historical context in covering conflicts and wars. . . . Studies, for example, have found that in the case of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, context is often missing from how events within this conflict are framed and reported.” If causes constitute a key form of context, then it should come as no surprise that mentions thereof are extremely lacking as will be displayed in the results section of this study.

Standards of peace journalism provide a key benchmark for ethical conflict coverage, regardless of whether a given journalist is covering the conflict from a foreign or domestic perspective. Several key elements distinguish “peace journalism” from “war journalism.” For instance, according to Galtung’s (1998 found in Shinar, 2009) framework, peace journalism is (1) “peace/conflict oriented,” in the sense that it is committed to fostering “win-win” scenarios, by “making conflicts transparent,” and “giving voice to all parties.” Peace journalism is (2) “truth-oriented,” because it must “expose untruths on all sides” of a conflict situation; it is (3) “people-oriented,” for its tendency to “focus on suffering all over,” because it gives “name to all evil-doers” and focuses “on…peacemakers.” Finally, peace journalism is (4) “solution-oriented” in the sense that it “highlights peace initiatives,” focuses “on structure, culture, the peaceful society,” and is concerned with conflict’s “Aftermath: resolution, reconstruction, reconciliation” (Shinar, 2009, p. 453; Galtung, 1998). Peace journalism strives to avoid “zero-sum” considerations of war, where the winner takes all, as well as applications of sports
analogies, where counts of dead and wounded become like the score of a game in which only one party can claim victory.

This is a key marker of “war journalism,” which is (1) “war/violence-oriented,” meaning it has a tendency to facilitate the opacity of war, operate from an “us-them” perspective, dehumanize the ‘enemy,’ operate from a reactive standpoint (meaning “waiting for violence before reporting,”) and “focus only on visible effects of violence (killed, wounded and material damage),” rather than such invisible effects as post-traumatic stress disorder. War journalism is also (2) “propaganda-oriented” meaning it tends to “expose ‘their’ untruths/help ‘our’ cover-ups/lies.” It is (3) “elite-oriented,” in that it focuses “on ‘our’ suffering,” and “on elite peacemakers.” Finally, war journalism is (4) “victory-oriented,” in that it attempts to “conceal peace initiatives before peace is at hand. War journalism is the respite of nationalists, while peace journalism is the respite of global citizens.

Ethical Issues Surrounding Conflict Coverage

The literature concerning the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict further points to writings on existing problems in global media ethics, notably problems of entrenched nationalistic norms competing with what should be idealized as a cosmopolitan media ethic. Guiding the endeavor of normalizing the embrace of cosmopolitanism in news coverage is termed by Hanitzsch et al (2013) as “The Quest for Ethical Universals” (p. 31). Journalism—mediator of culture—must, in turn, be mediated by principles that bespeak such universal goods as human dignity, truth, equality, assurance that one’s voice will be heard, and nonviolence. What these tenets, as well as the inalienable claims outlined in the United
Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, amount to is a cosmopolitan ethic that should be ideally suited with coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.

Currently, a tension exists between what is termed press nationalism and the right of readers to consume truly cosmopolitan news stories. Offered in this study is the prescription of peace journalism and a form of press patriotism that centers on a global patriotism—a patriotism for all humanity.

Cosmopolitan Conflict Coverage

Critical to an understanding of peaceable conflict coverage is an understanding of the role of cosmopolitanism and global citizenship in shaping the media sphere’s coverage of foreign affairs. Cosmopolitanism as a sociopolitical concept has both its etymological and conceptual roots in ancient times, when Diogenes Laertius (one of the founders of the Cynicist branch of Greek philosophy) proudly proclaimed, “I am a citizen of the world” (Laertius, 1972). In Kant’s essay, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” the philosopher sets forth a series of contractual agreements regarding the rights of nations to be self-governing, beside the restrictions that must be put into place against the potential for impingement of one nation unto another that invariably occurs in the course of international affairs. Kant offers three categories under which all laws fall.

Every juridical constitution which concerns the person who stands under it is one of the following: (1) The constitution conforming to the civil law of men in a nation (ius civitatis). (2) The constitution conforming to the law of nations in their relation to one another (ius gentium). (3) The constitution conforming to the law of world citizenship, so far as men and states are considered as citizens of a universal state of men, in their external mutual relationships (ius cosmopoliticum) (Kant, 1795).
For Kant, cosmopolitanism was a logical conclusion of his categorical imperative, that an individual must “act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law” (Kant, 1993/1785, p. 30). Cosmopolitanism offers a framework for social justice beyond borders. According to scholar Pauline Kleingeld, “Cosmopolitan law is concerned not with the interaction between states, but with the status of individuals in their dealings with states of which they are not citizens” (Kleingeld, 1998, p. 72). In a sense, Kant’s assertions provided the justification for modern-day institutions such as the League of Nations or the United Nations. “While on the one hand, cosmopolitan law safeguards a state’s sovereignty vis-à-vis other states, on the other it is an innovation which allows the international community to monitor the internal affairs of its members” (Archibugi, 1995, p. 429). The interpretations of Kantian cosmopolitanism rendered by both Archibugi and Kleingeld can best be employed in consideration of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, and coverage thereof.

Of course, Kantian universalism must be updated for the global era in which we find ourselves. Media ethicist Clifford G. Christians (2010) offers a critique of rationalism and relativism, both of which, he views, have plagued the modern period. “Enlightenment rationalism contending for absolutes across time and space has been exposed as imperialistic, oppressive of non-Western perspectives, and exclusively male” (Christians, 2010, p. 7). What replaced rationalism was relativism, in the form of Nietzsche’s philosophy that “moral values had become useless” (Christians, 2010, p. 8). What Christians puts forth is a revised form of universalism that can serve as guides for journalists’ consciences. Three fundamental principles take root: “a universal ethics of human dignity, truth, and nonviolence,” fundamental principles that are “themselves
grounded in the sacredness of life” (Christians, 2010, p. 6). Are these tenets of ethical
global journalism truly universal?

In a video released by Hamas (the militant group that holds power over the Gaza
Strip) to intimidate Israelis, a narrator utters the maxim: “We love death more than you
love life” (Gabbay, 2012). In struggling to develop a universal set of principles to guide
coverage of interactions among nations, such an utterance poses a challenge to the notion
that cultures unanimously value the sanctity of life. Does Hamas represent a majority of
Palestinians? It was democratically elected by a wide margin. Is it true that Israelis value
life more than Palestinians? While such questions are outside the reach of the mainstream
media, anyone who has witnessed an image of a Palestinian mother in mourning would
doubt that Hamas’s claim holds true for all Palestinians (Han, 2014). Palestinians do value
life, and it is the responsibility of mainstream media to honestly report Israeli human rights
abuses with respect for human dignity.

In light of mutual fault in intractable conflict, journalists covering such struggles
should take into account scholar Ward’s (2010, p. 160) “three cosmopolitan imperatives,”
that global journalists must “act as global agents,” serving the world as a holistic
community; “serve the citizens of the world,” and “promote non-parochial understandings”
of global issues, avoiding oversimplification and entrenched norms in favor of more
nuanced approaches such as peace journalism. In operating towards this end, global
journalism can help provide “the goods that all citizens must have to pursue other good,”
to employ the parlance of general ethical theory (Ward, 2010, p. 169). According to Ward,
ethical global journalism ought to “[p]rovide information on (and an analysis of) world
events and trends. . . . Monitor basic levels of physical, individual, and social dignity,” and
“investigate inequality” Ward, 2010, p. 169-70). While these three tenets are applicable wholesale to domestic coverage, they take on additional significance within the realm of global coverage, due to transnational outlets’ duty to shed light on the darkest corners of the globe.

One way in which global journalists can promote these goods, according to Ward, is to “use global comparisons” of measures such as quality of life, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, education, and others. This means by which to display inequality is important when such inequality is taken to a logical extreme in such an instance as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The most readily apparent inequality in the 2014 war in the Gaza Strip was the sheer disparity in the number of injured, the number of dead, and the amount of property damage between the two states as a result of the conflict. While there is much to be said for Israel’s right to defend itself, such disparities cannot be overlooked.

Press Nationalism and Press Patriotism

A great source of cognitive dissonance (and headache) plaguing Israeli journalists in particular is the dynamic between national allegiance and the poorer actions of their nation’s government. It should go without saying that journalists must avoid being overly patriotic when covering news beyond the borders of the nation into which they were born. Ward (2010) outlines a set of criteria by which journalists can observe “moderate patriotism” in their coverage of issues both global and domestic. Such a modus operando—that a journalist of a given nation operates with respect to the best of his or her country’s moral philosophy—is not only accepted, but encouraged, as is an embrace on the part of journalists of a form of “global patriotism” (Ward, 2010).
Ethical journalists can be patriotic only under strict conditions—if patriotism is defined along moderate, democratic lines. Journalists can be patriots only if they are moderate, rationally constrained patriots serving their country and humanity by fulfilling their distinctive social role as critical informers of democratic citizens. (Ward, 2010, 43).

Such an embrace of one’s national identity is, arguably, the most natural course of action, as biases stemming from ingrained worldviews are very nearly inevitable, even for the most conscientious of reporters. For instance, one article in the *New York Times* was headlined “As Israel Hits Mosque and Clinic, Air Campaign’s Risks Come Home,” highlighting the difficulties posed to the successful completion of Israel’s mission in Gaza (Erlanger, 2014). The lead paragraph read: “As Israel’s air war against Hamas and Islamic Jihad fighters in Gaza entered its sixth day on Saturday, a pair of bombings threw the campaign into difficult relief” (Erlanger, 2014). While the photo published with the article—a Palestinian mother crying with her child—may have highlighted the Palestinian side of the event, and the event being depicted may have been a war crime, the article was still portrayed in terms of the Israeli perspective, underscoring the challenges Israel faced in waging their campaign in such a heavily populated area. These are the sorts of instances in which publications strive to strike a “balance,” a journalistic tenet that has been derided by scholars such as Kovach and Rosenstiel (2014), who favor such principles as truth-telling and objectivity instead. In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—however impossible balance is to strike in light of clear advantages held by the Israeli side—balance may be a virtue worth pursuing, particularly in light of those banal platitudes (“there’s blame to go around,” or “both sides are at fault”) so hopelessly attached to the conflict. Such banal platitudes are highly illustrative of the heart-wrenching nature of the conflict—that so much aggression results in such devastation for so many people. In truthfully reporting events related to the conflict,
journalists must fulfill their duty to global citizens by exercising their conscience, and exposing injustices wrought by both sides.

This task must be undertaken regardless of national affiliation. Many Israeli publications refrain from reporting casualties from the other side, and they are far more likely to use terms such as “terrorist” or “militant.” For example: according to Alina Korn (2004, p. 251), scholar Daniel Dor (2001), in his article titled “Newspapers Under the Influence,”

argued that the two major Israeli daily tabloids *Ma’ariv* and *Yediot Achronot* systematically ignored facts indicating that the “restraint policy”, proclaimed by Prime Minister Ehud Barak in the first week of the intifada, did not reflect the IDF’s real mode of conduct in the territories, and provided readers with fragmented and highly censored reports regarding the severe consequences of the use of military force in the territories.

To Korn, this represents the degree of complicity on the part of the Israeli press to reflect the views and aims of the Israeli nation, a byproduct of national pride and overt patriotism on the part of reporters who blind themselves to the sins of their homelands. Rather than emphasizing the provocation that sparked the Intifada (the arrival of Ariel Sharon and hundreds of Israeli troops and police to the Temple Mount, a holy site for Muslims), the emphasis—as was true of all Western outlets—was on the wave of suicide bombings that followed. From the standpoint of the American and European press, the suicide bombings were far more dramatic than Sharon’s provocation, but in Israel, the emphasis on terror was an outgrowth of press nationalism. Only *Haaretz* provided routine statistics on Palestinian casualties, indicating a far more cosmopolitan modus operandi than its fellow Israeli publications.
“Reporters and Officials”

The complicity of Israeli publications in the propagandistic intentions of their nation’s government is both reflective of their dependence upon official sources, and vice versa. The willingness of such publications to fall in line with national messages is as much a cause of overreliance on official sources as it is a result. Herman and Chomsky (1988) argue that the United States government plays a significant role in shaping press output. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that the press’s increasing reliance on government sources (Sigal, 1973; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Schlesinger, 1991; Korn, 2004; Richardson & Barkho, 2009) skews coverage in favor of government policies—what, then, can be made of a correlation between Israeli policy concerning the conflict and the resultant press coverage?

According to Dor (2001), Israeli publication Ma’ariv scarcely mentioned Palestinian casualties throughout the Intifada, and Yediot Ahronot only published information about Palestinian casualties only during the first week of the years-long uprising. Korn (2004) cites numerous sources that claim that consensus on the part of the press only occurs when there is consensus within the government on a given issue (Schlesinger et al., 1991; Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994). When consensus breaks down, as seen in the U.S. response to the Tet offensive in the Vietnam War (Korn, 2004, 250), the press follows suit. While, on the one hand, this can be seen as evidence that the press does not always act in agreement with government positions, on the other it is further evidence that the press often falls in alignment with the views of the officials on which it depends for information. While Haaretz routinely reported Palestinian casualties, the publication was also guilty of utilizing “vague generalizations about Palestinians ‘killed in
clashes,” for example (Korn, 2004, p. 258). Furthermore, Korn (2004, p. 259) continues: “During the period surveyed, *Haaretz* reported Palestinian casualties, yet tended to link their deaths to the escalation of Palestinian violence and, in its headlines, highlighted that they were killed during confrontations and exchanges of fire.” Such is the inescapability of press nationalism and publications’ alignment with official sources’ intentions.

Leon V. Sigal (1974), author of *Reporters and Officials: The Organization and Politics of Newsaking*, discusses the bargain that invariably occurs between journalists and sources. On the one hand, sources need to get their message across to a mass audience. On the other hand, a journalist’s incentive dictates that he or she must maintain a more or less amicable relationship with sources in order to sustain a steady stream of information.

On the beat, bargaining enters the relationships among reporters and between the reporter and his sources of information. In these relationships, motives are mixed; overt competition coexists with tacit cooperation. Among his sources, too, bargaining affects what information they pass along. Inside the government, for instance, men struggle to shape the outcomes of public policy. The ability to get information into the news and to prevent rivals from doing so is at once a tactic and a stake in that fight (Sigal, 1974, p. 5).

In light of the lack of literature on the subject, one can only assume that this relationship between press and officials transcends borders, particularly in the context of the globalized media environment, which would have been well beyond the imagination of Sigal, writing in 1974. Politicians, government officials, and military officials in Israel (as well as in the U.S., the U.K., and around the world) are all stakeholders in the conflict, and their statements to the press, and the information they provide reporters with, will invariably reflect that. Even a critical, widely respected publication such as *Haaretz* is not immune.
Hierarchy of Influences Model

A range of forces shape the final products put out by news outlets, outlined in Stephen D. Reese’s (2001) essay “Understanding the Global Journalist: A Hierarchy-of-Influences Approach.” The attitudes of the individual reporter, the professional habits and routines of a publication’s staff, the newsroom culture maintained by a given outlet, extra-media influences such as advertising and the public relations endeavors of the government, non-governmental organizations, and industry, and finally the ideological climate in which all other levels of this hierarchy operate all shape news as it is produced on a daily basis. Ideologically, the outlets being considered here (The New York Times, Haaretz, and the BBC Online) fall under the “Anglo-American” model of press coverage, a key feature of which “is the diminishing role of the state as an owner and regulator primarily due to the liberalisation, deregulation and the growth of corporatism in the media system” (Kasmani, 2014, p. 595; Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p. 291).

Media Bias as a Mutation of Media Framing

For one to claim that all reporters are biased is true, but the sentiment, and its relativistic outlook, neglects the whole picture. Bias not only lies on a spectrum with verifiable degrees, but can be defined, in the researcher’s eyes, in two concrete elements. The first element of bias—to return to the discussion on media framing—lies in emphasis, namely the choice of subject matter deemed newsworthy and the aspects and details of a given story lent greater importance. Matthew A. Baum and Yuri M. Zhukov (2015) go as far as to define “reporting bias” as “the media’s tendency to systematically underreport or overreport certain types of events” (p. 384). Emphasis is largely driven by economic factors
that guide news outlets toward reporting stories that will attract a greater number of viewers. Baum and Zhukov go on to state that “the scope of reporting should reflect conventional media preferences toward novel, large-scale, dramatic developments that challenge the conventional wisdom and highlight the unsustainability of the status quo” (Baum & Zhukov, 2015, p. 384). In this sense, the media’s preference for dramatic developments is a bias in and of itself, and its tendency to report in a partial manner is driven by economic incentives as well, as different outlets vie for the respective market segments toward which their content is geared. This phenomenon is stated most succinctly by scholar of media economics, Cagdas Agirdas:

The basic idea is that, if media bias is demand-driven, then a surviving newspaper could expand its reader base by moderating its bias to reach out to the former readers of the closed rival newspaper in the same media market. On the other hand, if supply-side factors were driving media bias, then a surviving newspaper would not change its bias, as editors or owners of the newspaper did not change after closure of the rival newspaper (Agirdas, 2015, p. 123).

This leads to the second element of bias: spin, or the way in which selected subject matter is presented. Examples of spin include the terminology employed to depict frames (e.g. terrorists vs. militants), or routine definitions of people or places (e.g. definitions of one side in conflict as “good” and the other side as “evil”). Spin, or partiality, is the element of bias people most commonly associate with the term.

Media historian William David Sloan lists partiality as one of eight characteristics of bias, including: “‘one-sidedness’ ‘unbalanced selection or presentation’ ‘tendency or inclination that prevents a fair or balanced approach’ ‘temperamental or emotional leaning to one side’ ‘favoritism that distorts reality’ ‘personalized, unreasoned judgment’ ‘predisposition or preference’” (Sloan, 2007, p. 6). These characteristics of bias can be
distinguished from the elements of bias as they are manifestations of bias, not overarching classifications.

Just as important as the elements and manifestations of bias are the sources of bias. Listed above are the economic drivers of bias with respect to market segmentation and consumer satisfaction. Equally important are the supply-side factors introducing bias into the information market, namely newsroom culture and demographics. The standards set by a given newsroom, as well as any deliberate political stance taken by a given editorial staff can all become sources of bias, even insofar as this culture is resistant to the consumption demands of the public at large (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). Another significant source of bias are the preconceptions of reporters, sometimes driven by demographic tendencies within the group’s population. According to Gillian B. White (2015) of The Atlantic, minorities account for only 22.4 percent of television journalists, 13 percent of radio journalists, and 13.34 percent of journalists at daily newspapers. Yet another survey, “The American Journalist in the Digital Age” reports the number of minority journalists has gone down from 9.5% to 8.5% between 2002 and 2013. The same study reports that the median age of journalists has grown from 32 in 1982 to 47 in 2013. Though there has been a slight uptick in the percentage of female reporters (to 37.5%), the fact remains that they are in the minority. A majority of journalists—92.1%—are college educated, up from nearly 60% in 1971. Finally, nearly four times as many journalists identify as liberal than conservative, at 28.1% vs. 7.1%. What bodes well for those who fear bias, however, is that over half (50.2%) of journalists identify as politically independent. All of these factors, most notably the final one, will factor into how journalists perceive events and report the news. Such
factors as ethnicity of reporters, gender, socioeconomic class, nationality, or political leanings can all bear weight in assessing the bias of a given reporter.

The final factor, however, fuels the perception that the media have a liberal bias, which is countered by those who believe that the media—with its corporate ownership models—have a conservative or neoliberal bias (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). Sloan writes, “Such reactions are natural for us humans. We tend to see bias in media content that disagrees with our views and fairness in content that supports them. And that is one of the reasons it is so difficult to determine whether the media are biased and, if they are, exactly in what direction.” (2007, p. 4). Those who believe that the Anglo-American model of news reporting is biased in a conservative fashion point not only to corporate ownership, but to the extent to which such outlets are a reflection of the ideology of the Western countries from which they hail. Those who believe the media are liberal point to the ideological leanings of reporters and what they view as overwhelmingly liberal-leaning editorial pages of many American flagship newspapers. Furthermore, overreliance on official sources on the part of publications such as The New York Times and The Washington Post may belie purported liberal leanings to the extent that the American public becomes imbued with a neoliberal agenda that may claim to espouse liberal values such as human rights, but also supports capitalism and the free market.

On Bias in Reporting Israel-Palestine

Generally speaking, one’s assessment of coverage of the Israeli Palestinian conflict is a litmus test about one’s opinion concerning the conflict. Rather than favoring one side or the other, media outlets in the West tend to emphasize the most dramatic elements of
the longstanding conflict, and most coverage concerns itself with instances in which tensions flare up. For instance, the predominant, and most dramatic, story of the Second Intifada was the suicide bombings that occurred in Israel—a seemingly pro-Israel frame in light of the significant disparity in casualties suffered by Palestinians in comparison to Israelis. In contrast, the more dramatic narrative of the 2014 war in the Gaza Strip was the devastation wrought in Gaza, a narrative that would seem to favor Palestinian interests. Framing tended to follow the predominant story in both cases.

Yet, despite the media’s preference for drama, the fact remains that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, more specifically since the Six-Day War in 1967, has changed the way violent conflict is covered. That is to say: violent conflict coverage evolved from interest in conventional warfare to what scholar Giora Goodman (2016) described as “low-intensity conflict” (p. 441). Of Reuters coverage of Israel-Palestine following the Six-Day War of 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973, Goodman wrote: “Deeply influencing the coverage was the post-war low-intensity conflict on Israel’s cease-fire borders and in the territories it ruled. This generated regular media interest which was previously reserved for intensive conventional warfare.” (Goodman, 2016, p. 441). In the text *Media Bias: Finding It, Fixing It*, edited by William David Sloan and Jenn Burleson Mackay (2007), the very first essay in the collection concerns itself with biased coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The essay’s author, Bruce J. Evensen (2007), writes the following on the subject of the media’s economic incentive to provide coverage that will appeal to a wide audience: “We must balance our goals of being authoritative and credible,” [Washington Post managing editor Phil] Bennett observes, with our recognition that there is news in news.” (Evensen, 2007, p. 12).
Evensen (2007) also subscribes to the “litmus test” notion of Israeli-Palestinian conflict coverage, writing that, “competing claims that the American media tilt toward Israel or have a bias in behalf of the Palestinians are often rooted in the critic’s view of who has the right to live in a land the size of Connecticut that both sides claim to be their own” (p. 11). As a result of this phenomenon there is a sizable list of media watchdog groups favoring one side or the other that the author lists in his writing. The most prominent media watchdog group operating on behalf of the Palestinians is Palestine Media Watch, a group that measures the number of times terms such as “terrorists” are used in lieu of “freedom fighters,” or the percentage of articles from major news outlets sourcing Palestinian casualty lists, or human rights reports (Evenson, 2007, p. 14). Palestinian Media Watch (or pmwatch.org) works in tandem with likeminded groups such as Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), If Americans Knew, Arab Media Watch, and the Institute for Public Accuracy; as well as media outlets such as the Palestine Chronicle or the Electronic Intifada (Evenson, 2007, p. 15). On the Israeli side is a group called Honest Reporting, which scrutinizes reporting in a similar fashion to pmwatch, claiming to be “a Website dedicated to promoting greater ‘objectivity in reporting on the Middle East and less ‘pro-Palestinian bias’” (Evenson, 2007, p. 15).

Such dissension has filtered into the academic realm as well. Evenson quotes David Nes, “a veteran observer of U.S. policy-making and the press,” who “observed that ‘America’s strongly emotional pro-Israel bias’ was the ‘understandable aftermath of public revulsion over the Holocaust’ and ‘American admiration for the Israeli success story.’” Evenson further quotes Nes as saying that “Israel’s victories in the 1948 and 1967 wars seemed to clarify the image of ‘a people who are hard-working, technologically skilled,
and militarily tough’ . . . ‘a people Americans can easily admire and identify with” (Evenson, 2007, p. 14-15). Evenson describes the perspective of noted Israel critic Edward Said as being less sympathetic. Said believed that Western anti-Muslim sentiments were rooted in the crusades. Evenson quotes and paraphrases the scholar: “‘Zionism and its supporters . . . have rationalized the eradication of the present reality in Palestine’ and its majority Arab population.’ Said and critics after him would argue that the ‘uncritical support of Israel and Zionism’ by the press had been critical in advancing Israel’s standing in the first generation after its establishment.” (Evenson, 2007, p. 13).

There is even disagreement on whether the U.S. government supports or neglects Israel. Former U.S. Ambassador to Israel Dennis Ross (2015) wrote a fairly comprehensive tome on the United States’ relationship with Israel beginning in 1948, when the latter nation declared its independence. In it, he categorizes U.S. presidents from Truman to Obama in terms of their willingness to assist Israel despite their inclination to not alienate Arab allies. He makes the case that what most Americans view as the United States’ unwavering and perpetual devotion to Israel has neither always been so, nor always been a given. For instance, when the State of Israel was being built, President Harry Truman provided government assistance, but Dwight Eisenhower saw U.S. help to the nascent state as a risk to relations with the Arab world—concluding that Truman had gone too far. As a result, Eisenhower was not as generous during his administration, refusing, for instance, to supply military aid to Israel during the Suez crisis of 1956. Scholars John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt differ from Ross’ view. They write about efforts in recent decades on the part of the preeminently successful Israel lobby, which has ensured that Israel has been able to acquire nearly $154 billion in U.S. aid money since 1948, “the bulk of it comprising
direct grants rather than loans” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007, p. 24). As a result of lobbying, as well as efforts in Israeli public diplomacy (a form of propaganda termed “Hasbara” or “explanation”), a drastic shift in sentiment has taken place; it has become something of a taboo for public figures, namely politicians, to criticize Israel.

This fact is reflective not only in policy, but in media coverage. A host of books and journal articles is available referencing a pro-Israel bias in the news media. Among them is *Pens and Swords* by Marda Dunsky (2007). In the book, she makes the case that because advertising time/space is the real product news outlets are selling, “the product of the media, what appears, what doesn’t appear, the way it is slanted, will reflect the interest of the buyers and sellers, the institutions and the power systems that are around them” (Dunsky, 2007; Chomsky, 2007, Lecture). This assertion is critical in establishing the core argument of her book—that coverage of Israel-Palestine is biased in favor of Israel. Dunsky cites a study by Zelizer, Park and Gudelunas (2002) called “How Bias Shapes the News: Challenging The New York Times’ Status as a Newspaper of Record on the Middle East,” which found that “the [New York] Times tended to portray the Israelis as victims and the Palestinians as aggressors in its headlines” (Dunsky, 2008, p. 289; Zelizer et al, 2002, p. 295-96). As far as the visual element of coverage was concerned, “the *Times* ‘more often displayed photos suggesting Palestinian culpability than Israeli. . . . Aggression on the part of the Israelis was not depicted by the *Times*’” (Dunsky, 2007, p. 289; Zelizer et al, 2002, p. 299-300). The conflict being analyzed by this study was, of course, somewhat different from the 2014 conflict in Gaza. While the Israeli-Palestinian conflict of the early 2000s was defined in terms of the Second Palestinian Intifada (“shaking off”), the 2014 conflict was defined largely in terms of the Israeli “incursion” into Gaza. This incursion, or
invasion, was a response to Palestinian rocket fire—a response to the spate of arrests in the West Bank after the kidnapping of three Israeli boys. One study that analyzed the conflict in question here constituted a scathing critique of *New York Times* coverage. In the critique, titled “Banal Balance, Selective Identification and Factual Omissions: The *New York Times* coverage of the 2014 war in the Gaza Strip,” scholar Lee Artz (2014) argues that the pursuit of balance in the case of covering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is foolish in light of the lopsided nature of the conflict.

The banality of recognizing that there are opposing antagonists in any fight is decidedly insufficient for accurately describing consequences. Simply noting “both sides” have a stake in the conduct and outcome of a confrontation does little to contextualize or even present existing events as they unfold. The *New York Times* coverage of the 2014 Gaza war epitomizes this banality of balance, obscuring conditions and actions surrounding the war behind a false objectivity of a simplistic “both sides” frame (Artz, 2014, p. 99).

The author goes on to state that of the 31 articles surveyed for his study, “22 (70%) framed the Gaza war as consequence of ‘both sides’ acting and suffering, as ‘both sides’ choosing to confront the other, as ‘both sides’ responsible for the violence and outcomes’” (Artz, 2014, p. 99-100). Such emotive language, and such a small sampling of articles renders Artz’s argument subject to greater scrutiny than it would be otherwise. Given the reality of mutual culpability in matters concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, balance may be a necessary—if impossible to achieve—element of news coverage.

Of course, a variety of structural aspects can hinder this process. In Richardson and Barkho’s (2009) paper “Reporting Israel/Palestine: Ethnographic insights into the verbal and visual rhetoric of BBC journalism,” the authors interviewed a variety of BBC in various levels of the agency’s management hierarchy, including Senior Editorial Adviser Malcolm Balen, the BBC’s “top man” on the Middle East, who said the following:
Israel has a far more technically sophisticated media infrastructure. It has democracy, though it is a Jewish democracy. . . . and I think that can have an effect. And Israel clearly has more power to do things, because it is a bigger country, more money, more support from America, more technological developments, more weaponry, all the rest of it, has more power to do things say than the seven-square miles of the Gaza strip. (p. 614)

Balen, who issued the 20,000-word Balen Report on behalf of the BBC, in response to accusations of anti-Israel bias, is astute in observing that Israel, and the West at large, have a greater degree of power than most Middle Easterners, particularly those who dwell in the Gaza strip. With such power comes responsibility that is too often abused in violent ways. Furthermore, the shared values of Israelis and those in the West should be no excuse for coverage that fails to meet standards of objectivity. Viser cites Galtung and Ruge who suggested that readers are less interested about countries that they are physically distant from, but their interest level increases if the countries are tied culturally. . . . Although Israel is physically distant from the United States, the two countries are tied culturally, perhaps allowing American readers, as well as journalists, to relate more with Israelis than with Palestinians.

In this sense, the media are hardly exempt from responsibilities concerning coverage that is reflective more of international or cosmopolitan norms than of policies espoused by the countries outlets may represent as a corollary of ownership. For instance, simply because the BBC is owned by the British people, or the New York Times’ ownership is a group of private American citizens, that ownership should in no way mean that the papers should publish from an American or British policy perspective.
Research Questions

The research questions grounding this study will provide a jumping off point for the exploration to be undertaken. As mentioned before, the research questions pertain to peace journalism and bias. They are as follows:

RQ1: Was the coverage provided by The New York Times, BBC, and Haaretz proportionate relative to the damage wrought upon Gaza? What trends can be derived from presentations of victimhood and aggression in headlines and photographs?

RQ2: What was the valence of headlines, if any, relative to the difference between portrayals of Israelis and Palestinians as victims in the conflict?

RQ3: What was the valence of headlines, if any, relative to the difference between portrayals of Israelis and Palestinians as aggressors in the conflict?

RQ4: What was the valence of photographs, if any, relative to the difference between portrayals of Israelis and Palestinians as victims?

RQ5: What was the valence of photographs, if any, relative to the difference between portrayals of Israelis and Palestinians as aggressors?

RQ6: What are the differences between the publications at hand in the number of the first three paragraphs of each article devoted to either Israelis, Palestinians, or both? What is the significance of such differences?

Moreover, the goals of this study are as follows:

- First of all, it will be necessary to ascertain the extent to which the articles published by the three publications at hand conformed to the selected standards of peace journalism utilized here, namely the elicitation of immediate and historical causes of the conflict, the proffering (by reporters and sources) of solutions to the conflict, and avoidance of the use of competitive (zero-sum) tones in coverage.
- Furthermore, this research will attempt to understand the distinctions that can be drawn among the publications at hand pertaining to their employment of such standards.
- Additionally, this study seeks to determine the range of nationalities and occupations used as sources by each of the publications at hand, in order to determine how such usage pertains to press nationalism and/or problematic overreliance on official sources (government, military, etc.)?
- Finally, this study will survey the various solutions to the conflict at hand and, more broadly, the Israeli Palestinian Conflict, as offered by either sources or reporters.
CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

The roles of press nationalism, peace journalism, bias, and ethical conflict coverage will be surveyed by monitoring differences among the three publications at hand (one British, one American, and one Israeli) through tendencies to portray one side or the other as either victims or aggressors in photographs and headlines. Also to be surveyed toward that end are the first three paragraphs of each article, to determine whether each paragraph mentioned Israelis, Palestinians, or both, as well as observing the various sources quoted in the first fifteen paragraphs of each article surveyed. Additionally, the indicators of peace journalism used for this survey will include whether or not the causes of the conflict (historical and immediate) were given by reporters, whether reporters, in particular, offered solutions to the conflict, and whether articles employed a zero-sum (winner-take-all) tone.

The publications being surveyed were Haaretz, The New York Times and BBC Online. The justification for the selection of the three publications at hand, Haaretz, BBC Online, and The New York Times, is as follows: Haaretz was selected to test the potential additional hypothesis that its standing in Israel might lend itself to comparison with the two other outlets surveyed here, which stand as examples of “prestige media,” or media widely consumed by elites. The New York Times was chosen because it is generally considered to be a standard bearer of American journalism, with a nexus to American foreign policy, while BBC Online, despite its purported independence, is hinged to its government as a publicly owned corporation. Haaretz is the only publication that differs from the other in terms of its political positionality relative to its nation’s foreign policy, but this will be taken into account, as the potential hypothesis of whether it falls in line with foreign biases will be tested by the first five variables in this study. Also crucial to the selection of these
three publications is their prima facie emphasis on humanitarian issues, a crucial justification in light of this thesis’ emphasis on peace journalism.

All articles were searched for and accessed via each publication’s respective websites (www.haaretz.com, www.bbc.com/news, and www.nytimes.com). The articles used for this study were published between June 12 and August 26, 2014. The keywords used to search for the articles were “Israel,” “Gaza,” “West Bank,” “Hamas,” “IDF,” “Operation Protective Edge,” “rockets,” “airstrikes,” and “ground invasion.” The sampling method employed was probability sampling, with 50% of n=700 articles selected by flipping a coin and alternating articles, one by one, to be used for this study. Articles from Haaretz numbered n=264, while BBC Online stood at n=37, and The New York Times at n=51.

Reliability testing for this study was acceptable. Reliability for all but the “Sources,” “Paragraphs,” and “Photos” variables were calculated using Krippendorff’s Alpha (Freelon, 2016). The other variables were calculated using intraclass correlation coefficient. Nine of the eleven variables employed in this study were coded by three coders: a 28-year-old Midwestern white male, a 22-year-old white Midwestern female, and a 25-year-old Midwestern male. The remaining two variables were tested by a 25-year-old Midwestern male and a 25-year-old white male from Colorado. Reliability was tested at 5 percent of n=350, or n=18. As far as the actual results of reliability were concerned, the variables pertaining to headlines stood at .886 and .784 for “ Victim” and “ Aggressor,” respectively. The “Number of Paragraphs,” measured using Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (SPSS, 2016), stood at .833 for “Israeli,” .739 for “Palestinian,” and .856 for “Both.” For the “Photographs,” reliability was as follows: “Israeli Victims” at .877,
“Palestinian Victims” at .946, “Israeli Aggressors” at .947, and “Palestinian Aggressors” at .834.

Sources variables were all acceptably reliable, and calculated using Intraclass Correlation Coefficient. Results reading “Undefined” indicate that all of the values entered for each article by each coder were 0. Israeli Politicians: .934; Israeli Military Officials: .689; Israeli Government Officials: .860; Israeli Healthcare Workers “Undefined”; Israeli Civilians: “Undefined”; Israeli Journalists: .957; Israeli Experts: “Undefined”; Other Israeli Sources: .957; Palestinian Politicians: .790; Palestinian Military Officials: .940; Palestinian Government Officials: .699; Palestinian Healthcare Workers: .845; Palestinian Civilians: “Undefined”; Palestinian Journalists: “Undefined”; Palestinian Experts: “Undefined”; Other Palestinian Sources .957; All US sources were “Undefined”; UK Politicians: .957; UK Military Officials: “Undefined”; UK Government Officials: .957; UK Healthcare Workers “Undefined”; UK Civilians “Undefined”; UK Journalists: .762; UK Experts: .957; Other UK Sources: “Undefined” UN Officials: “Undefined”; all “Other/International Sources were “Undefined” except for “Other,” which was .957.

The final four variables—relating to peace journalism—were also acceptable. Agreement on whether “Immediate Causes of the Conflict Were Mentioned” was .672, “Historical Causes of Conflict Mentioned” .798, “Solutions Offered by Journalists alone,” .824, and “Article Written in a Competitive (Zero-Sum) Tone” .725.

The justifications for the variables chosen are as follows: It was determined, based on Galtung’s (1998) lecture on peace journalism, that the best indicators of context were whether the “Immediate Causes” of the conflict at hand or the “Historical Causes” of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general were mentioned in each given article. Furthermore,
inquiry was necessary into whether the authors of any given article interjected potential “Solutions” into the substance of the article. Finally, it was necessary to determine whether each article was written in a “Zero-Sum or Competitive Tone,” so as to establish in the data the extent to which peaceable language was employed in articles. The other five variables were intended to measure bias with respect to the publications at hand. The first two inquired into the extent to which “Headlines” portrayed Israelis, Palestinians, or both as victim or aggressor. The third variable took account of the first three paragraphs of each article, asking whether Israelis or Palestinians alone were mentioned in the paragraph or if both were. The fourth and fifth variable considered photographs, and whether victimhood or aggression on the part of Palestinians or Israelis was portrayed visually. The findings will be cross-tabulated with each of the publications at hand and, by extension, the nationalities of each publication.
CHAPTER 5: RESULTS

It should first be noted that the best point of comparison for all results presented in this chapter are the proportions. The frequencies are offered as a reference point, so that the scope of the results can be understood. This chapter will be divided into two sections: one pertaining to bias, and the other to measures of peace journalism. Though this chapter deals with verifiable facts, it will be additionally necessary to point out significant data points. For example: 26 percent of sources quoted by BBC Online in coverage of Operation Protective Edge were Israeli military officials. The results of this study tell a story, which will be elaborated upon in the discussion chapter of this work.

Variables Pertaining to Bias

The first variables pertaining to bias involved depiction of victimhood and aggression in headlines of the articles sampled. According to Table 1 in appendix C, in 18% of headlines, BBC Online portrayed Israelis as victims versus 46% Palestinian and 27% both. For The New York Times, 22% of headlines depicted Israelis as victims versus 54% Palestinians and 8% both. Haaretz was more even-handed, portraying Israelis as victims 35% of the time, Palestinians 28% and both 9%. A separate, but corollary variable was depiction of aggression in headlines, displayed by Table 2. For this variable, BBC Online portrayed Israelis as aggressors 38% of the time, Palestinians 22% of the time, and both 32% of the time. The New York Times portrayed Israelis as aggressors an equal percentage of times as BBC Online—38%—and Palestinians 18%. “Both” was also at 38%. Haaretz depicted Israelis, Palestinians and both as aggressors 31%, 29%, and 20% of the time, respectively.
The third variable offered by this study involved the first three paragraphs of each article. If only Israelis were mentioned, a mark would be made in the appropriate box on the codesheet. Likewise, with Palestinians and “both.” The majority of paragraphs featured both Israelis and Palestinians, with measurements of 68%, 67%, and 59% for each publication (BBC Online, Haaretz, and The New York Times), respectively. BBC Online and The New York Times featured more Palestinians than Israelis in the first three paragraphs at 23% versus 5% and 19% versus 11%, respectively. Haaretz, on the other hand had more Israelis solely in the first three paragraphs than Palestinian, at 28% versus 11%.

The variables pertaining to photographs fell along the same lines as the variables pertaining to headlines: victimhood and aggression. These results can be seen in Tables 4 and 5. A similar pattern arose, with BBC Online and The New York Times both portraying Palestinians as victims more than Israelis—18% versus 43% and 12% versus 58%, respectively. Haaretz was, again, more balanced, with 33% of photographs portraying Israelis as victims versus 28% Palestinians. One caveat: A Haaretz article titled “Operation Protective Edge: The IDF’s Fallen” contained 33 photographs of Israeli soldiers who had been killed in action (Haaretz, 2014). This skewed the victim figure. With those photographs, the figure was 33% Israeli, 28% Palestinians. Without it, it was 25% versus 32%.

Both publications portrayed Israelis more than Palestinians as aggressors in photographs (23% versus 16% and 22% versus 8%, respectively). Haaretz followed suit, with 26% versus 13% (Israeli and Palestinian, respectively) including the photos of the
“fallen” Israeli soldiers and 29% versus 15% without. Table 5 displays the data associated with this variable.

There were multiple different ways of analyzing the sub-variables pertaining to sources studied here. A good starting point was to consider the percentage of each source type the three publications at hand relied on the most. Across all publications, Politicians/Leaders, Military Officials and Government Officials were commonly cited. *BBC Online* relied on these three varieties the most. *The New York Times* relied on Civilians and Experts more than the three aforementioned categories, and *Haaretz* relied on Civilians more than Politicians/Leaders. Twenty percent of *BBC Online* sources were Politicians/Leaders and Government Officials, respectively, while Military Officials, the most oft cited category, stood at 33%. *The New York Times* had a much more balanced set of sources, with six of the 10 source types between 11% and 20%, inclusively. Politicians/Leaders, Military Officials, and Journalists all stood at 11%. Experts were the most frequently cited source at 20%, five times more than *Haaretz*’s 4%. *BBC Online* had zero. Most notable was *The New York Times*’s comparably minimal reliance on military officials, which stood at 11% beside *BBC Online* and *Haaretz*’s 33% and 27%, respectively—their most oft-cited source type.

The next step in analyzing the source data was to consider Israeli sources quoted, namely Politicians, Military Officials, Government Officials, Healthcare Workers, Civilians, Journalists, Experts, and “Other.” Most notably, 60% of *BBC Online*’s Israeli sources were from the military, with *Haaretz* not far behind, at 43%. *The New York Times*’ second most quoted source was Military Officials, and the proportion was less—24%. Table 7 illustrates the data for Israeli sources in all three publications: *The New York Times*’
most cited Israeli Sources were experts (29%, greater than the other two). All three publications relied on Politicians and Government Officials to similar extents between the two source types, with *BBC Online* relying on each 19% and 18% of the time, respectively, *Haaretz* 14% and 12%, respectively, and *The New York Times* 15% and 12% respectively. Based on the aforementioned numbers, it should be noted that *BBC Online* relied on these source types more than *Haaretz* and *The New York Times*. Also of note: *Haaretz*’s second most quoted sources were Israeli civilians, who were quoted 21% of the time. Meanwhile, *BBC Online* quoted no Israeli civilians, and *The New York Times* only quoted only seven, or 9% of the total Israeli sources.

Next, it is necessary to analyze the proportions of Palestinian source types utilized relative to the total number of Palestinian sources quoted and referred to by each publication. Politicians were not heavily quoted, but lower-level government officials were, and far more than military sources. The publications at hand seldom specified whether Palestinian sources were from the government or the military sources, however, so, unless specified, all Palestinian official sources were assumed to be governmental. This may be viewed as an object of contention to those who view Hamas as less a governing entity than a militant group, but a distinction must be drawn. Forty percent of sources from *BBC Online* were government officials, and *Haaretz* had an equal percentage—their most quoted sources. Government Officials were *The New York Times*’s second most quoted Palestinian source, with civilians higher—49% of sources. Healthcare Workers were *BBC Online*’s second most quoted source, at 30%, nearly four times more than *Haaretz*’s 8%, and more than twice as much as *The New York Times*’ 14%. Civilians were the third most cited Palestinian sources in *Haaretz*, and the fourth most in *BBC Online*. The third most
quoted Palestinian source category in *BBC Online* was Military Officials at 15%. *BBC Online* and *Haaretz*’s reliance on Government Officials, and *The New York Times* use of civilians will be held up for analysis in the Discussion chapter of this study. The data pertaining to Palestinian sources in the three publications at hand are enumerated in Table 8.

Later in this chapter, we will analyze the percentage of sources devoted to each nationality. For now, it will be necessary to look at British and American sources in a comparative fashion among the three publications being studied. Of the two U.S. sources quoted in *BBC Online*, one was a Journalist and the other was a Politician. Most U.S. sources quoted or referred to in *Haaretz* and *The New York Times* were Government Officials. Of note, 29% of U.S. sources used by *The New York Times* were Experts. The data for this category of sources is presented in Table 9. Very few British sources were cited.

A small but important category in this dataset is “Other Sources.” This category includes UN Officials, Non-Governmental Organization Officials, International Leaders, International Military Officials, Journalists from countries outside of Israel-Palestine, the U.S., and the U.K., and “Other.” The most cited source types by each publication were UN Officials (*BBC Online*: 50%; *The New York Times*: 33%) and NGO Officials (*Haaretz*: 39%). International Leaders were the second most commonly cited sources used by *Haaretz* and *BBC Online* (28% and 22%, respectively), but *The New York Times* did not rely as much on this category as it did on International Journalists (21%). The data for this category can be found in Table 11.
Table 12 contains a plethora of data proportionate to the total number of sources cited by each publication throughout the 2014 war in the Gaza Strip. Of the 31 source types surveyed in this study, only several are worth mentioning, most notably the one involving Israeli military officials. Twenty-six percent of BBC Online sources were Israeli Military, and 25% of Haaretz. Meanwhile, Palestinian Military and Government Officials were 17% and 15% combined for both publications. In fact, upon a casual gleaning of the information provided on this table, it can be ascertained that a majority of the total number of sources used were Israeli. Of note, The New York Times’ distribution appears far more even than the other two publications, with its reliance on Israeli Military Officials at 105—2 percentage points larger than the proportion of Israeli experts cited. Also of note, the largest proportion of sources used by The New York Times was Palestinian Civilians, at 14%. This is larger than the proportion used by BBC Online and Haaretz—4% and 6%, respectively. BBC Online used more than twice the percentage of Healthcare Workers as The New York Times (9% and 4%), but used nearly as many British Politicians—an equal percentage as the number of UN Officials. Across the board, UN Officials were not quoted often, with 7%, 2%, and 6% for BBC Online, Haaretz, and The New York Times, respectively. A similar number of Israeli Politicians was used by the publications, though more than the number of Palestinian politicians. While Israeli Military Officials was the most frequently cited source type between Haaretz and BBC Online, Palestinian Military Officials were but a fraction of that, at 3% and 5%, respectively.

Clear distinctions can be made among the total numbers of sources counted by nationality (see Table 13). Overall, a greater percentage of sources were Israeli than Palestinian. For BBC Online, the total was 44% versus 31%. For Haaretz, the disparity was
much greater, with the publication using nearly twice as many Israeli sources as Palestinian sources (57% versus 29%). The New York Times was more even handed, as the disparity was only 41% versus 29%. Behind Israeli and Palestinian sources, “Other” sources were also cited, though not nearly as heavily. The New York Times used more “Other” sources than the rest—twice as many as Haaretz, and slightly more than BBC Online. The key disparity, however, is the one between Israeli and Palestinian sources used.

Variables Pertaining to Peace Journalism

Causes and solutions were the key variables pertaining to peace journalism, as well as a consideration of whether the articles in the sample were written in a “zero-sum” tone. The frequency with which Immediate Causes (Table 14) of the conflict were mentioned tapered downward with each publication, with BBC Online mentioning causes the most (49% of articles), The New York Times mentioning them less (40%), and Haaretz mentioning them the least (28%). Historical Causes (Table 15) were mentioned far less by each publication, with The New York Times mentioning them the most (26% of articles), then BBC Online (22%), and, finally, Haaretz (11%).

Solutions to the Conflict (Tables 16 and 17) were scarcer than Causes, with journalists from BBC Online mentioning solutions (excluding ceasefires) 8% of the time, The New York Times 4% of the time, and Haaretz 14% of the time. Solutions offered by both journalists and sources (including ceasefires) were more common, as 44% of BBC Online articles mentioned ceasefires, and 30% of articles published by The New York Times. Haaretz only mentioned ceasefires in 14% of articles. Of all the articles surveyed, only one mentioned the two-state solution. “Other” solutions were relatively common, with
15% of BBC Online articles employing such solutions, 9% of Haaretz articles, and 13% of articles published by The New York Times. Of note is the percentage of articles that made no mention of solutions: 41% for BBC Online, 77% for Haaretz, and 57% for The New York Times. The information on solutions offered by both sources and journalists (excluding ceasefires) can be found in Table 17. Land for peace was not mentioned in any article surveyed. The value “Land for Peace” would have included cessation and dismantlement of settlements.

Finally, articles that were written in a zero-sum tone were not very common. BBC Online employed zero-sum language in 22% of articles, with Haaretz employing an equal percentage. The New York Times, on the other hand, utilized zero-sum language in 0% of articles.
CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION

The data surveyed here included variables pertaining to bias and peace journalism. The importance of the values in the above tables will be elaborated upon and interpreted in the present chapter of this study. This chapter will be divided, like the one before it, into sections on bias and peace journalism. The final section of the chapter will enumerate some of the limitations of the study.

Variables Pertaining to Bias

Both BBC Online and The New York Times published a greater number of headlines depicting Israelis as aggressors than Palestinians (See Tables 1 and 2). On the other hand, a greater number of headlines published by both publications portrayed Palestinians as victims than Israelis. Haaretz, on the other hand, published a fairly even number of headlines portraying Palestinians and Israelis as victims and aggressors, respectively. A similar trend held true for photographic depictions of victimhood and aggression among the three publications, with a greater number of photographs in BBC Online and The New York Times portraying Palestinians as victims and Israelis as aggressors, and Haaretz having an even number of both sides.

There are at least three possible reasons for these trends: The first is that there is an implicit bias against Israel in The New York Times and BBC Online, and greater support for Israel in Haaretz. Many casual readers of this data would presume this to be the case. In the case of Haaretz, there is some truth to this: Given the wisdom of press nationalism—the concept that details implicit biases held by publications toward their own nations—there is some weight to this presumption. For instance, one article stands out as notably
sympathetic to Israel over Palestine. Titled “Palestinians Celebrate Hamas Claim of IDF Soldier’s Capture,” the article could be found in any of Israel’s more nationalistic tabloids (Haaretz, 2014). Yet another article, titled “Dear Hamas, Psychological Warfare – You’re Doing It Wrong” poked fun at a video made by Hamas to attempt to intimidate Israelis (Schechter, 2014). On the other hand, the vast majority of articles were written from an anti-war stance, even ones that favored Israel. For example, one titled “American Birthright Graduate Among IDF’s Gaza Fallen” underscored the tragedy of war in its ability to rob society of its youth (Smith, 2014). Many articles written in a peace frame went as far as to criticize Israel. One article, headlined “Israeli Military Playing a Lethal Game of Cat-and-Mouse in Gaza” detailed the finer points of the operation from the standpoint of the devastation being exercised upon Gaza (Pfeffer, 2014). An article headlined “Gaza Conflict Reportedly Costing Israel $32 Million a Day” seems to prove that Haaretz tends to write articles from an anti-war stance—even those articles that seem to favor Israel in terms of national sympathies (Arlosoroff et al, 2014). Meanwhile, many articles written by The New York Times reflected the chaos in Gaza, and thus—by default—did not portray Israeli actions in a positive light. One article, headlined “Israeli Troops Kill Palestinian Teenager Protesting Arrests in the West Bank,” detailed Israeli action in the prelude to the war both in depth and by using the example in the article’s headline (Rudoren, 2014). Of note, since the days of Adolph Ochs, The New York Times has been owned by Jews since its 1897, and Jodi Rudoren—the publication’s Jerusalem bureau chief—is Jewish (Pier, 2012). This may mean that the publication deliberately goes out of its way to avoid perceptions of pro-Israel bias.
The second possible reason for the discrepancy between victim and aggressor portrayals between Israelis and Palestinians on the part of BBC Online and The New York Times is the likelihood that the publications offered coverage of the conflict that reflected the story at hand—namely, the highly lopsided devastation that was wrought upon the Gaza Strip. In one article published by The New York Times, titled “Loss of Shelter and Electricity Worsens a Crisis for Fleeing Gazans,” the first paragraph reads “When artillery shattered their home near the Israeli border, Ibrahim Hillis, a grandfather, rushed his extended family to the city to seek shelter, but the schools were full and relatives’ houses were already packed with others displaced by war” (Hubbard, 2014). The photo with the article portrays Palestinian emergency workers standing before a blaze of fire, and the article details life amid the ruin and devastation taking place in the heat of the conflict. Despite the statistics rendered here, Haaretz has historically been far more likely than other publications to list Palestinian casualties (Korn, 2004), and this conflict was no exception. The sheer drama of the chaos in Gaza led Haaretz, and its correspondent in the exclave region, Amira Hass, to portray the Palestinians there with deft sympathy and from a non-nationalistic stance.

Press nationalism is yet a third factor to consider, although its role in bias in this conflict seems minimal, particularly in the case of BBC Online and The New York Times. There does exist, however, a possibility that press nationalism may, in fact, play a role in The New York Times’s portrayal of the conflict. While the Obama administration provided more aid to Israel than any administration before it, President Obama has been far more critical of Israel and its prime minister—Benjamin Netanyahu—than his recent predecessors, leading to a notoriously contentious relationship. Whether this is a factor in
The New York Times’ sympathetic portrayal of the Palestinians is a matter of mere speculation, and nothing more. In the case of Haaretz, on the other hand, press nationalism appears evident in certain areas and less so in others. As mentioned before, the greater number of portrayals of Israelis as victims and Palestinians as aggressors is likely motivated by the need to appeal to a primary readership of Israelis and Jews living in the diaspora—primarily in the United States. On the other hand, the anti-war framing of such victimhood and aggression, as well as the apparently consistent, unflinching illustration of the course of events in Gaza, can be held as evidence that nationalism was hardly the driving factor behind Haaretz’s coverage of the 2014 war in the Gaza Strip.

The fifth variable pertaining to bias involved references to either side within the first three paragraphs of each article. Both BBC Online and The New York Times mentioned Palestinians alone a greater percentage of times than Israelis (23% to 5% for BBC Online and 19% to 11% for The New York Times). Haaretz, on the other hand, mentioned Israelis 28% of paragraphs versus 11% of paragraphs referring to Palestinians. It should be noted that BBC Online, Haaretz, and The New York Times referenced both in all paragraphs counted 68%, 59%, and 67%, respectively. The potential reasons for these discrepancies closely resemble the reasons listed above—namely the presence and absence of peace journalism and the reality of the situation at hand; that the predominant story was the crisis in Gaza. There is one confounding factor, however, and that is the reality that not all paragraphs portrayed one party or the other in a positive light. For example, one article published by BBC Online began: “Israel has resumed its air strikes on Hamas controlled Gaza, after Israel’s brief truce was met with continuing rocket fire” (BBC Online, 2014). There were, however, many paragraphs that mentioned either side favorably, but finding
paragraphs referring to Palestinians as such was particularly more difficult. The aforementioned paragraph mentions that “Israel’s brief truce was met with continuing rocket fire” (BBC Online, 2014). The two paragraphs following the lead paragraph are also unfavorable to Palestinians: “Israel had earlier accepted an Egyptian ceasefire proposal and halted operations on Tuesday morning,” reads the first paragraph, which represents Israelis as desiring peace. The following paragraph—“But the armed wing of Hamas rejected the initiative as a ‘surrender’”—may be factually accurate, but the detail is framed (or selected) in such a way as to be featured prominently. These three paragraphs reference Palestinians as the aggressors and Israelis as the peaceful party. Furthermore—a fact that confounds the statistics—while Palestinians are the sole party mentioned in one of these paragraphs, it is not a positive representation.

Source variables required a range of angles from which to interpretatively attack the data. The first step in this process involved a consideration of the overall patterns of source types used, as displayed in Table 6. It was necessary to figure out which source types—indepen-dent of nationality—were relied upon most to craft news articles. For BBC Online and Haaretz, Military Leaders were sourced the most (33% and 27%, respectively). The New York Times quoted Military Leaders less, relying on Government Officials more, and Experts the most. This is a stark stylistic difference. Though it would seem that in covering conflict it would be necessary to use military sources more than others, considering the framework of peace journalism, the fact is that this tendency is a hallmark of war journalism. Though it may be that other publications use a higher proportion of military sources relative to other sources, remaining is the fact that Haaretz is supposedly a bastion of left-wing sentiment, and BBC Online is generally considered as such by those
in the United States and Great Britain (though to a lesser extent among other countries in the developed world). Of course, in the case of Haaretz, a reliance on Military Leaders is additionally a likely outgrowth of the overwhelmingly knowledgeable Israeli public toward which its communications are directed. Israelis are generally known as highly educated and well-versed in the history of the conflict (Torstrick, 2004), so a need to rely on experts may be reduced (4% of sources versus The New York Times’s 20%—its highest proportion of sources). Of course, BBC Online cites zero Expert sources, which is unfortunate given the high proportion of non-Israeli readers who might have assumptions about the conflict that would otherwise be dispelled by knowledgeable individuals. To its credit, however, BBC Online did make the highest use of Healthcare Workers as sources, though this fact may indicate that the publication dwelled excessively on things like body count, number of wounded, and using war as a spectacle of human suffering intended to promote the consumption of information provided by a given organization—even a publication that borders on what might be considered a newswire, namely, BBC Online. Furthermore, the publication made, by far, the least use of Civilian sources (4% to Haaretz’s 19% and The New York Times’s 17%). In fact, Civilians was The New York Times’s second most used source. Use of civilian sources is a key marker of peace journalism, and with its cold and detached style of reporting war, BBC Online struggled to humanize the horror of the 2014 war in the Gaza Strip.

The next step in analyzing the source variables is to take a look at each nationality surveyed individually. Israeli sources, portrayed in Table 7 were distributed accordingly: Military Officials were used the most by BBC Online and Haaretz (60% and 43%, respectively), while Military Officials were the second most used Israeli source by The
New York Times behind Experts, which accounted for 29% of sources (far greater than BBC Online and Haaretz’s 0% and 3% respective proportions). These sources included “The IDF,” “Lt. Colonel Peter Lerner,” and “Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon,” as well as accounts from Israeli soldiers. Haaretz made the most use of Civilian sources at 21% to The New York Times’ 9% and BBC Online’s 0%. While BBC Online’s value in this case may simply be a product of the publications general lack of civilian sourcing, the discrepancy between The New York Times and Haaretz here may be a mere matter of difference between each publication’s access to civilian sources (Haaretz having the upper hand), and the number of reporters available who speak the local language and are available to interview civilians. Furthermore, there is likely a far greater interest among Israelis in human interest stories revolving around Israeli civilians than there is among individuals elsewhere around the world. Politicians and Government Officials were relatively close percentage-wise among the three publications. For example, 19% of sources used by BBC Online were Politicians compared with 18% Government Officials. This was interesting if only for the reason that the most powerful were considered on par or even more important than others in government by each publication, such as to warrant a similar proportion of sources from both categories.

Palestinian sources followed different trends, if only for the reason that, consistently, the distinction between Military Officials and Government Officials was rarely drawn. Though Hamas is widely considered to be a militant group, it is also a governing body. Therefore, Hamas officials were counted only as Military Officials in instances in which they were specified as such. In BBC Online and Haaretz, Military Officials accounted for 15% and 9% of sources, respectively. The New York Times, on the
other hand, employed Military Officials as sources 2% of times and Government Officials 24% of times. This falls in line with the standards of peace journalism, as it implies an approach to reporting that transcends militaristic means of information dissemination. Both BBC Online and Haaretz employed Government Officials 40% of times, which also falls in line with the standards of peace journalism. The smaller use of Politicians is likely a product of the lack of elected officials in the Palestinian body politic than Israeli. Other major discrepancies included the higher proportion of Palestinian Healthcare Workers sourced by BBC Online (30% to Haaretz’s 8% and The New York Times’s 14%)—again a likely product of war reporting, rather than peace reporting. The largest discrepancy, however, was the higher proportion of Civilian sources employed by The New York Times than the other two publications (49% to BBC Online’s 12% and Haaretz’s 21%). This proportion is a credit to The New York Times, given the essentiality of focusing on civilian stories in times of war, particularly within the context of peace journalism.

While the proportions of sources devoted to each nationality will be enumerated below, it bears mentioning at present because BBC Online used only two US Sources, and Haaretz and The New York Times each used only four UK Sources. For that reason, for the US Sources table (Table 9), it is only necessary to compare Haaretz and The New York Times. Both publications used US government officials about 50% of the time (Haaretz 52% and The New York Times 47%). Generally, these sources were individuals in the U.S. State Department. There were, additionally, two instances of US politicians being sourced, and two of US journalists. The politician in question was President Barack Obama. This result—the lack of employment of the US president as a quoted source—and the emphasis on the State Department as the chief means of information from the US was important for
the demonstration of a lack of press nationalism or press patriotism. *The New York Times*, again, used the greatest number of Expert sources (compared to the other publications’ 0%), at 29%. *BBC Online* used the greatest number of UK sources, unsurprisingly, to the extent that it is not necessary to mention the proportions of this nationality’s sources used by *Haaretz* and *The New York Times*. The majority of British sources used by *BBC Online* were Politicians (75%), and there were several instances in which British Journalists were sourced.

“Other Sources” contained variety among the three publications and sub-variables at hand. UN Officials were the most oft-cited sources for *BBC Online* and *The New York Times*. NGO Officials were sourced most for *Haaretz* and second most for *The New York Times*. In contrast, *BBC Online* cited NGO Officials 0% of times. This is problematic, given the fact that Non-governmental organizations (while not always benign) are often repositories of expertise or charitable entities—engines propelling the common good. Examples include Amnesty International, B’tselem, and Human Rights Watch. The most frequently sourced UN Official was Ban Ki-Moon, but others were cited as well, including officials in the International Criminal Court, and United Nations Aid Workers. *Haaretz* cited International Leaders the most by far (28% of times compared with 12% of times by *The New York Times*). Leaders sourced included Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, King Abdullah of Jordan, and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada. *The New York Times* only cited a single international expert source, or 3% of Other Sources cited. With the exception of *Haaretz* and *The New York Times*’ reliance on NGO Officials, there is an expected usage of Government Official sources, namely UN Officials and International Leaders.
When all source types of all nationalities are considered in the same table (Table 12), the trends become apparent. Twenty-six percent and 25% of BBC and Haaretz sources were Israeli Military Officials, or one-quarter of total sources for each respective publication. The New York Times had no such statistic that stood out like this, though its most cited sources were Palestinian Civilians (14%) and Israeli Experts (12%). This even distribution is a credit to the publication, as it means that a strong variety of sources both official and unofficial were used, though its third most used source type was “Military Officials” (10%). It is difficult to discern a reason for the differences between the publications’ use of Palestinian Civilian sources. Why did The New York Times use more than twice the proportion of Palestinian Civilian Sources than Haaretz, and more than three times that of BBC Online? While the reason is difficult to tell, this fact can be perceived in multiple ways. Looking at BBC Online, there may have been less access to Gaza, or perhaps the organization had fewer individuals stationed there. Or, the organization views itself as more of a newswire service, without the need for “color,” or a sympathetic human element. If these assumptions are true, they are justifications for this modus operandi. Still, the frameworks of peace journalism, and conflict coverage grounded in cosmopolitan ethics, dictate that diverse sources ought to be used, even by newswire services. Haaretz’s lack of civilian sourcing is likely an outgrowth of its status as an Israeli newspaper to which Palestinians would be less willing to speak than The New York Times, even though Haaretz correspondent Amira Hass resides in Gaza is widely considered to be critical of Israel. Haaretz used twice as many Israeli civilians as sources than Palestinian civilians, again a likely outgrowth of access, and less of press nationalism, though press patriotism likely plays a role to the extent that human interest stories regarding Israelis are of generally
greater interest to Israelis than Palestinian human interest stories, even in light of such devastation as transpired in Gaza in 2014.

On the subject of press nationalism, the proportion of sources used from each nationality by publication are on display in Table 13. Of course, across the board, the most sourced nationality is Israel, followed by Palestinian Sources. In keeping with our discussion of press patriotism, *Haaretz* cites Israeli sources 28 percentage points more of the time than Palestinians (57% to 29%), while that figure is 13% for *BBC Online* and 12% for *The New York Times*. This is a major discrepancy and supports the notion of press nationalism—however critical *Haaretz* may be of the sources it cited, or however anti-war *Haaretz* framed the crisis. On the other hand, these facts—that *Haaretz* has a record of criticizing Israel, and that the overarching frame of the coverage was from an anti-war standpoint—are notable, and should not be overlooked in consideration of whether the publication’s coverage was biased toward its own nationality. If one were to base the conclusion on this statistic alone, however, it would be readily apparent that, yes, *Haaretz* is biased toward Israel. Also of note, *The New York Times* cited US sources more than the other publications, and *BBC Online* did the same for British sources.

**Variables Pertaining to Peace Journalism**

As mentioned before, one of the key elements of peace journalism is context. In the case of conflict, one of the most important elements of context is causes. As far as providing the immediate context—in the form of causes—to the conflict at hand, two of the three publications surveyed successfully offered the various impetuses that spurred the 2014 war in the Gaza Strip. Perhaps the chief cause mentioned was the kidnapping of the three Israeli
teenagers. This is because a sizable portion of the articles surveyed directly pertained to the kidnapping. Though the number of articles that primarily addressed the kidnapping was uncounted, this element cannot be discounted in considering the extent to which causes were elicited by the three publications at hand. For instance: BBC Online and The New York Times both published fewer articles on the conflict. Thus, a higher proportion of articles would have had to do with the kidnapping. Haaretz, which published 264 articles, had a smaller proportion of articles devoted to the kidnapping, as well as Operation Brother’s Keeper (the spate of arrests that followed the kidnapping), or the rocket fire from Gaza that precipitated the Israeli incursion. This disparity is reflected in the numbers. BBC Online elicited immediate causes to the conflict in roughly half (49%) of articles), while The New York Times did so in 40% of articles. Haaretz, on the other hand, mentioned causes in 28% of articles. This is not only a reflection of the proportion of articles devoted solely to the kidnapping of the three boys; this is also a likely outgrowth of the knowledge base Israelis have regarding news developments in their own countries. Israelis are avid consumers of news. It should, therefore, come as no surprise that Israeli publications view the provision of context as being less important than other publications.

The same holds true for providing historical context to the overall scope of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Haaretz mentioned historical causes to both the conflict at hand and the conflict of which it was a part in only 11% of articles. BBC Online and The New York Times did so in more articles (22% and 26%, respectively). These statistics indicate that both publications mention causes in a number of articles. One example of a historical cause is the “occupation” of the West Bank and Gaza, or the “siege” of Gaza. One civilian was interviewed in an article titled “In Gaza, Airstrikes and Economic Stress Make for an
Anxious Ramadan” in The New York Times: “It’s been more than eight years of siege [Dr. Ayman al-Sahbani] said, noting shortages ‘of gasoline, of electricity, of medical supplies and building materials,’ let alone the nearly sealed borders” (Erlanger, 2014). This heartwrenching account underscores the aggravation among Palestinians that would drive many of them to violence. Mentions of past conflicts were additionally listed as historical causes, even ones as recent as “Operation Returning Echo” in 2012 or “Operation Cast Lead” in 2008-2009. The rationale behind this lies in the assumption that these conflicts are cumulative—that every time Israel “mows the lawn” (to borrow from the Israeli military term for the routine carpet-bombing of Gaza) the rage of Gazan civilians worsens, leading to greater resistance and yet another round of fighting, as was seen in 2014. One example of an article containing multiple causes was published by BBC Online on July 4, 2014. Titled “Hamas ‘Ready for Gaza Ceasefire’ if Israeli Raids Stop,” the final segment of the article contains ten bullet points outlining critical moments leading up to the present conflict (BBC Online, 2014). Among them are the evacuation of Israeli settlers from Gaza in 2005, the ouster of Fatah (Hamas’ rival in the split Palestinian governing body), the 2006 kidnapping of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit (who was released in 2011 in exchange for hundreds of prisoners), and the intensification of Israeli restrictions of goods entering and leaving Gaza—the “blockade.”

Solutions, excluding ceasefires, presented by journalists, were harder to find. BBC Online featured such solutions in 8% of articles, and The New York Times in 4% of articles. Reporters with Haaretz—a publication that, as an element of its style is more prone to editorializing in hard news stories—mentioned solutions in 14% of articles. Perhaps the simplest suggested solution is that Israel and Hamas conduct a dialogue. This solution was
offered on several occasions in *Haaretz*, including in one article titled “Israel and Hamas: Enemies that Depend on Each Other” (Bar’el, 2014). Another article titled “The Technical Failure of Israel’s Divine Intelligence” seems to suggest a radically different end that Israel’s intelligence apparatus should pursue. This was primarily done by listing the offenses that present themselves as elements of the Shin Bet’s modus operandi at present. Reporter Amira Hass writes:

> It is the job of the security organizations to ensure the well-being of the Jews in every outpost and settlement so they can continue enjoying the view and the tax breaks . . . Another supreme objective—as the 66 years of the [Israeli] state’s existence show—is to grind down the Palestinian people until they cannot or will not demand their right to self-determination . . . So what is the knowledge and understanding that the Shin Bet—and all Israelis—are required, trained and commanded not to extract from all the information in their possession? . . . The answer is so obvious, it’s there in all the wisdom of the sages and the history. What about, say, “‘Do unto others as you would have them do unto you?’ (Hass, 2014).

Yet another *Haaretz* article—presented as hard news—was titled “The Undisputed Truth about Israeli Occupation.” This article, written by Palestinian reporter Munib Al-Masri, suggested that Israel ought to be tried for war crimes—that

> there will be no peace so long as [the fact that the term “disputed land” is a misleading euphemism] is not told—that since 1967 we Palestinians have been occupied by the Israel Defense forces, controlled by Israeli government planners and watched over by the shin Bet security service. We do not need an “honest broker” refereeing our “dispute.” We need an honest judge to deliver justice.

One instance in which the researcher took the liberty of violating the parameter that solutions in this variable not be ceasefires was in an article titled “Israel’s International Credit to Pound Gaza Is Running Out.” The final sentence—“If Israel wants the ceasefire to include diplomatic achievements and not just six months of calm, it must initiate an effort of its own volition” (Ravid, 2014). The justification for this exception lay in the reasoning behind excluding ceasefires from the category of solutions within this particular
variable—that they are mere Band-Aids that simply stave off the next conflict. In this instance, the solution presented is that Israel initiate the ceasefire process, which, in the reporter’s view, would allow for a more lasting peace.

Among the root problems of war journalism is zero-sum reporting, which was present in the context of this study to some extent in BBC Online and Haaretz, and virtually nonexistent in The New York Times. One major feature of zero-sum reporting is that it is rooted in the present moment and provides no context for the stakes held by the sides in a given conflict. One such article, published by BBC Online. The first sentence is problematic by virtue of its depiction of competition in conflict: “Israel has carried out more air strikes on the Gaza Strip, following dozens of rockets fired by the Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas” (BBC Online, 2014). The third paragraph goes on: “Hamas said it fired rockets to respond to ‘Zionist aggression’, after accusing Israel of killing five of its fighters” (BBC Online, 2014). The paragraph that follows continues in the trend of back-and-forth depiction of the warring sides as follows: “Israel denied the claim. It says it has now begun an open-ended aerial operation to end rocket fire” (BBC Online, 2014). There is a major tonal gulf between this opening and the opening of a New York Times article depicting the same early period of the conflict, though the article at issue (“Covering the Israeli-Palestinian Battle”) is a meta-analysis of The New York Times’ coverage of the conflict. It begins as follows: “When the American-led peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians collapsed, [Times Israel correspondent] Jodi Rudoren was there to document the falling and tell us what it meant going forward. When Hamas and the Palestinian Authority agreed to a unity government, and Israel complained, Jodi was there again” (Slackman, 2014). The following paragraph continues: “In each case, Jodi was focused not
on the singular event, but on how it all fit together and how the fallout from one incident would inevitably drive another” (Slackman, 2014). The article goes on to depict the kidnapping of the three boys that followed the peace talks and the new Palestinian unity government, and the revenge killing of the Palestinian teenager. There is back and forth, but the depiction is not one of pure animosity, but of tragedy. The back-and-forth is present to provide context to the war—not to jolt the senses. *Haaretz* was guilty of such sensory assaults on numerous occasions, but the most apparent were the “Live Updates” put out every day by the publication. “Live Updates” was a service provided by *Haaretz* to inform Israelis, on a minute-by-minute basis, of Israeli and Palestinian actions in war. One paragraph from Live Updates: Operation Protective Edge, day 10 exemplifies the competitive presentation:

> The infiltration near Kibbutz Sufa was followed by massive rocket fire at the Sharon region, north of Tel Aviv, as well as at southern Israel. Like most of the Hamas rockets so far, they left behind mainly a number of people who were treated for shock and mild injuries as a result of falling while running to shelters. At 3 P.M., when the six-hour humanitarian cease-fire ended, Hamas resumed firing rockets into Israel, and the Israel Air force resumed its bombing sorties in the Strip (*Haaretz*, 2014).

These “Live Updates” are veritable artifacts of the war. They detail, in depth, the actions taken by both sides. Their main virtue is how revealing they are about the mechanics of war, but it is easy to understand how they could do no more than stoke fear and present the conflict in a hopeless fashion, which—as we have discussed before—is not an ideal route to pursue when presenting conflict in such a fashion as to help remediate and move war toward less tragic outcomes.

Solutions offered by both reporters and sources including ceasefires were more common. Though the two-state solution was mentioned once (by *Haaretz*), and land-for-
peace (which would have included mention of the dismantlement of settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem) wasn’t mentioned at all, ceasefires were mentioned 44% of times in BBC Online and 32% of times in The New York Times. A degree of cynicism regarding solutions may have led to fewer mentions as such in Haaretz, which mentioned ceasefires in 14% of articles, and zero solutions in 77% of articles (compared to 41% in BBC Online and 58% in The New York Times). It may have been that the knowledge base among Haaretz reporters led to a greater range of issues covered than those involving solutions, or that a knowledge of—or belief in—the hopeless intractability of the conflict led reporters to shy away from any mention of solutions. Perhaps the most fertile ground for analysis lies in solutions other than the ones specified in the survey. One such solution was the petition on the part of Palestine to join the International Criminal Court (ICC). Yet another involved trying Israel in the ICC. Solutions were as simple as preventing an Israeli ground operation, avoiding further escalation. Others had a punitive bent, such as one that involved disrupting funding from European countries or another that involved an arms embargo. Perhaps the most common solutions offered (besides ceasefires) were mention of Hamas’s demands—often phrased, by Haaretz in particular, in such a fashion as to recommend them. Several articles published by Haaretz mentioned multiple solutions, including one titled “Israel looks to Lebanon Model for Gaza Endgame.” It suggests that

[a] UN resolution to end the hostilities should include the following principles: a) A declaration that the lawful government in Gaza is that of the Palestinian Authority. . . . b) A redeployment of Palestinian Authority forces along Gaza’s borders and at border crossings into Israel and Egypt. C) Erection of a mechanism that will ensure demilitarization of the Gaza Strip from rockets, tunnels and heavy weapons. . . . d) A meaningful change in Israel’s policies with regard to border crossings, particularly concerning the passage of people and goods between Gaza and the West Bank. e) A lifting of the naval siege and the construction of a deep water harbor under the supervision of the Palestinian Authority and a strong
international force. f) The rehabilitation of Gaza’s economy and infrastructure under international supervision that will prevent the diversion of building materials to the construction of bunkers and tunnels by terrorist organizations (Ravid, 2014).

This article presents an exemplar of peace journalism. It offers innovative and creative solutions, it provides context (namely its use of the 2006 Lebanon War as its backdrop), and contains a complete absence, no less the opposite, of zero-sum reporting. These sentiments were echoed on the final day of fighting by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon who warned that “the blockade of Gaza must end; Israel’s legitimate security concerns must be addressed. . . . Any peace effort that does not tackle the root causes of the crisis will do little more than set the stage for the next cycle of violence” (Rudoren, 2016 Ceasefire Extended, but not on Hamas’ terms)

Limitations

This study’s limitations mainly involve a lack of specificity. For instance, the paragraphs variable does not allow for any understanding of whether each paragraph surveyed is a positive or negative depiction of either side. Furthermore, there is no means by which to statistically prove that Haaretz—despite its even-handed approach to victimhood and aggression in photographs and headlines—operated from an anti-war frame. Additionally, specific language was not a focus of this research. Use of terms like “terrorist,” “militant,” or “extremist”—all loaded with significance ripe for analysis concerning bias—were not surveyed here. Furthermore, there was no attempt to look at frames that favored one side or another, such as an “occupation” frame, or the IDF’s frames involving tunnel warfare or claims that Hamas used human shields to bolster casualty numbers. One further limitation is a general limitation of content analysis, which is that the
method employed can only measure “manifest content,” and not opinions rendered by reporters. Thus, a caveat: the meaning of content interpreted in this study is strictly inference, though grounded in the facts presented in the results chapter.

Yet another limitation is the usage of descriptive statistics, rather than inferential statistics, which are generally considered more sophisticated. The reasoning behind this is, quite simply, an outgrowth of ability. As I continue to grow as a scholar, I will be able to make better use of advanced techniques such as the successful interpretation of chi-square values. Two more quantitative limitations both involve sample size. First is the fact that some of the frequencies in the tables become quite small, rendering their viability somewhat suspect. Fortunately, the overall sample size is large enough that this does not become a major issue, but there are many values, particularly in the sources sub-variables, that are simply not worth mentioning in the results section. The other limitation regarding sampling is the time frame from which articles were sampled. Since one cannot sample an infinite number of articles, it became necessary to be selective with regard to the articles sampled. The sensible timeframe seemed to be the duration of the war, including the kidnapping and Operation Brother’s Keeper. Because this thesis was about reporting conflict in the heat of battle, it was necessary to select articles that took place during the contested period, rather than articles that may have been reflective of Operation Protective Edge.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect presented by the findings of this study is the consistency among the bias variables pertaining to headlines, photographs, and paragraphs. In *Haaretz*, portrayals of victims and aggressors in photographs and headlines were around even between Israelis and Palestinians. The paragraphs variable followed suit, with a greater number of paragraphs published by *BBC Online* and *The New York Times* mentioning Palestinians alone, while the numbers for *Haaretz* were closer to even. In the Discussion, I alluded to three potential reasons for the three publications’ relative sympathy toward the Gazan perspective. One was an implicit bias against Israel; another was press nationalism; and a third was that the coverage was a reflection of the damage wrought upon Gaza. Press nationalism is an unlikely reason, as the governments of all three countries from which the publications report are supportive of Israel (most apparently *Haaretz*). Implicit bias is possible, but only to some extent. In *Buried By the Times*, Laurel Leff’s (2005) academic lament of *The New York Times*’ faltering coverage of the Holocaust, the author points out that the publication’s Jewish ownership may have had a hand in the hesitation. “After much thought about ‘why a story like this did not get played by the establishment press,’ liberal journalist Max Lerner concluded that ‘one answer . . . is the hypersensitivity of *The New York Times* because of its Jewish ownership’” (Leff, 2005 12). The same might be said to the *Times*’ treatment of Israel: in order to avoid the perception of favoritism, reporters for *The New York Times* may be required to adhere to a newsroom culture that demands they be harder on Israel than other outlets.

On the other hand, there are convincing studies that find the press to favor Israel, such as Viser’s (2003) study of the *Times*’ coverage of Israel, which found that the
publication favors the state. Zelizer, Park, and Gudelunas’ (2002) study attested to pro-Israel bias in *Times* coverage, as did Marda Dunsky in her (2008) text *Pens and Swords*. The evidence in this study, however, indicates that *The New York Times* (along with *BBC Online* and to a lesser extent *Haaretz*) were fair in their treatment of both parties, with far greater coverage of Palestinians as victims than Israelis. The likely reason for the disparities rendered by *The New York Times* and *BBC Online* was that their coverage was relative to the damage wrought upon Gaza. As mentioned before, *Haaretz* has a history of reporting the Palestinian perspective to a greater extent than other Israeli publications; additionally, more so than other Israeli publications, it tends to frame news in such a way that is harshly critical of the Israeli government and military (Korn, 2004). The reason for the publication’s even-handed results corresponding to the five bias variables is likely a product of the fact that it is an Israeli publication serving a market of Israelis and Jews around the world. It is a manifestation of press patriotism—if only in the strict sense that the publication identifies as Israeli—but lacking the jingoism typical press nationalism, or of other Israeli publications.

The sources used by two of these publications (*BBC Online* and *Haaretz*) were largely militaristic and governmental (25% and 26% of these publications’ sources were Israeli military), with a decisive majority of all three publications’ sources coming from Israel. *The New York Times* was the exception, with a majority of its sources being experts on the conflict and the region, rather than military. This approach, taken in lieu of overreliance on military officials, was the most effective as it minimized war journalism framing and the transference of a military or political agenda onto the pages of the “Grey Lady.” *The New York Times* also relied on Palestinian civilians three times more often than
Haaretz, and BBC Online did not interview a single Palestinian civilian. While BBC Online’s headlines and photographs were in line with the damage wrought upon Gaza, its distribution of sources was not.

Relatively speaking, BBC Online’s language was rife with the tone of conflict, and devoid of context and pathways to resolutions other than ceasefires—mere gauze upon the gunshot wound of war. The New York Times, on the other hand, employed a softer hand, reflecting the tragedy of the conflict, while employing a more narrativistic style that stood in stark contrast with BBC Online’s language, which was thoroughly rooted in the present and knew neither past nor future. Haaretz was similar in this regard, but for different reasons. Haaretz provided little context nor sense of futurity in articles pertaining to the 2014 war in Gaza. This is a likely outgrowth of the stored cultural knowledge regarding the conflict, which may lead Israeli journalists to believe that the Israeli public need not be “filled in” as to the causes of the conflict. The opposite is likely true—Israelis need to be filled in on the causes of the conflict, given the entrenched sense of hopelessness that demands of publications that they reframe the conflict in such a way as to promote peace.

A consideration of future studies is imperative to the continuation of this vein of research. One potential avenue would be to consider the same parameters measured here with respect to articles written retrospectively about the 2014 war in the Gaza Strip. How does the tone change? What differences are there in terms of sources used to compose articles? Furthermore, how frequently are causes and solutions listed in articles written in the days, months, and years following Summer 2014? Yet another route of inquiry may be to engage with specific language used to describe the conflict. How often are Palestinians referred to as militants? Terrorists? How often is the conflict referred to as a war, or how
often is it referred to by its formal name, “Operation Protective Edge”? One other way to go about looking at media coverage of this conflict is to take into account Palestinian or other Arabic news sources, either comparatively—beside the three nationalities’ news sources surveyed here—or individually. Two questions applicable to such a route is: what variables would be used to study such news sources? Would they be the same, or different? Finally, another way to go would be to survey bias and peace journalism as two separate frameworks, rather than synthesizing them into one. While peace journalism ought to be considered a means by which to achieve “fairer” coverage, it stands alone as a conceptual framework, as does bias. But the two are different. Bias holds a negative connotation—it deals with coverage that is slanted. Analysis of media coverage through the lens of peace journalism holds a positive connotation that deals, in part, with causes and solutions, but, holistically, from the standpoint of promoting peaceable outcomes to conflict scenarios.

Beyond ceasefires, creative solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are available. The best place to start in conflict resolution is the recognition of the stakes and goals held by either side of a conflict. Israel’s demands of Hamas included the cessation of rocket fire (by whatever means necessary) and the destruction of tunnels; Hamas’s demands of Israel included an end to the blockade of the port and borders, and freedom for all Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. The tragedy of both sides’ demands is that Hamas believes itself to be justified in its aggression against Israel, and Israel, during this particular war, felt justified to do whatever it took to end rocket fire. Furthermore, opening seaports and border crossings may lead to the shipment of materials to build more tunnels into Israel, thus undermining Israeli security. This reality had been demonstrated by past
Palestinian action—that after Israel’s prior incursion into the Gaza Strip, the aid money that flowed into the exclave region was directed toward the construction of tunnels.

Though Hamas is an elected governing body, the reality is that most Palestinians are not violent, nor are most Israelis, many of whom voted for the right-wing coalition that dominated the Israeli parliament (Knesset) during the time of the 2014 war. The path to peace involves recognizing the humanity of the other. This can be done successfully on the pages of publications the world over—that even an Israeli publication such as Haaretz can resist popular opinion about a war that caused carnage and destruction in an open-air prison, which is, in part, a self-inflicted wound borne of years of aggression against a Jewish state. It could be argued that transnational publications such as The New York Times have an obligation to both nationalists and global citizens to mediate conflicts within their columns, and actively promote peace in the process. Such action was taken by Haaretz in an article titled “Humans of Gaza, Humans of Tel Aviv,” which was published as hard news. In it, Israeli journalist Josi Glauslusz writes:

I want to remember that people in Gaza are human, just like me and my family. If I forget that, then I’ve lost part of my own humanity. I also know that the military solution is no solution, and that it will only lead to more bloodshed and hatred and war; that the only way of ending this conflict is through a negotiated peace settlement with the Palestinians. . . . In my mind’s eye, I keep seeing myself running through the street with my children, the siren wailing, the children laughing, the crash, the children screaming. I know there are mothers in Gaza doing the same, and they are not so different from me, and they probably have nowhere to go for shelter. I want to believe in the words of that Nurit Hirsch song, that “children on vacation will play tag between the house and the fields” and that there can be peace and equality and human rights and respect for both Israelis and Palestinians wherever they are. Because I do not want my children to grow up to kill or be killed in a senseless war that has no end (Glauslusz, 2014).

This is peace journalism at its most potent, recognizing humanity despite bloodshed and animosity. There is hope and, though neither solutions nor causes are offered, it extends
beyond the present to offer a future that readers can do their best to believe in. To do anything less than work toward the best of all possible futures is to succumb to the forces of evil. Publications, with their wide reach and broad power to mold the marketplace of ideas can play a vital role in establishing new modes of thinking about violent conflict the world over. To do so is to operate in the service of global citizens and, perhaps, to bring new ones into the fold.
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### APPENDIX A: TABLES

#### Table 1
Headlines depicting victimhood in coverage of the 2014 war in the Gaza Strip
(Frequency | Proportion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Israeli</th>
<th>Palestinian</th>
<th>Both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BBC Online</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New York Times</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Haaretz</strong></td>
<td>92</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 2
Headlines depicting aggression in coverage of the 2014 war in the Gaza Strip
(Frequency | Proportion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Israeli</th>
<th>Palestinian</th>
<th>Both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BBC Online</strong></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New York Times</strong></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Haaretz</strong></td>
<td>82</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 3
Paragraphs depicting Israelis and/or Palestinians in coverage of the 2014 war in the Gaza Strip
(Frequency | Proportion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Israeli</th>
<th>Palestinian</th>
<th>Both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BBC Online</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New York Times</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Haaretz</strong></td>
<td>223</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4  
Photographs depicting victimhood in coverage of the 2014 war in the Gaza Strip  
(Frequency | Proportion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Israeli</th>
<th>Palestinian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BBC Online</strong></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New York Times</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Haaretz</strong></td>
<td>103/70</td>
<td>33%/25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5  
Photographs depicting aggression in coverage of the 2014 war in the Gaza Strip  
(Frequency | Proportion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Israeli</th>
<th>Palestinian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BBC Online</strong></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New York Times</strong></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Haaretz</strong></td>
<td>81</td>
<td>26%/29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6  
Sources quoted in each category across nationalities by *BBC Online*, *Haaretz*, and *The New York Times* as a proportion of the total number of sources quoted by each publication during the 2014 War in the Gaza Strip  
(Frequency | Proportion)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>BBC Online</th>
<th>Haaretz</th>
<th>New York Times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politicians/Leaders</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. Officials</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare Workers</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Officials</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7
Israeli sources quoted in *Haaretz, The New York Times*, and *BBC Online* in articles about the 2014 war in the Gaza Strip as proportion of totals
(Frequency | Proportion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BBC Online</th>
<th>Haaretz</th>
<th>New York Times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military officials</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov’t officials</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare workers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8
Palestinian sources quoted in *Haaretz*, *The New York Times*, and *BBC Online* in articles about the 2014 war in the Gaza Strip as proportions of totals (Frequency | Proportion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BBC Online</th>
<th>Haaretz</th>
<th>New York Times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military officials</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov’t officials</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare workers</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9  
U.S. sources quoted in *Haaretz*, *The New York Times*, and *BBC Online* in articles about the 2014 war in the Gaza Strip as proportions of totals  
(Frequency | Proportion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BBC Online</th>
<th>Haaretz</th>
<th>New York Times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov’t officials</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare workers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10
British sources quoted in *Haaretz, The New York Times*, and *BBC Online* in articles about the 2014 war in the Gaza Strip as proportions of totals (Frequency | Proportion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BBC Online</th>
<th>Haaretz</th>
<th>New York Times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military officials</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare workers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 11
Non-Israeli/Palestinian/American/British sources quoted in *Haaretz*, *The New York Times*, and *BBC Online* in articles about the 2014 war in the Gaza Strip, as proportion of totals
(Frequency | Proportion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BBC Online</th>
<th>Haaretz</th>
<th>New York Times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Officials</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Officials</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officials</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 12  
All source types quoted in *BBC Online, The New York Times*, and *Haaretz*  
(Frequency | Proportion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Type</th>
<th>BBC</th>
<th>Haaretz</th>
<th>New York Times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IL Politicians</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL Military Officials</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL Gov’t Officials</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL Healthcare workers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL Civilians</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL Journalists</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL Experts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pal Politicians</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pal Military Officials</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pal Gov’t Officials</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pal Healthcare workers</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pal Civilians</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pal Journalists</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pal Experts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Politicians</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Gov’t Officials</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCivilians</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Journalists</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USExerts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Politicians</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Military Officials</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Healthcare workers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Journalists</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Experts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Officials</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Officials</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int’l Leaders</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int’l Fighters</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 13
Nationalities of quoted sources as a proportion of total number of quoted sources counted from n=351 articles from *BBC Online, Haaretz* and *The New York Times* on the 2014 war in the Gaza Strip
(Frequency | Proportion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>BBC (Frequency</th>
<th>Proportion)</th>
<th>Haaretz (Frequency</th>
<th>Proportion)</th>
<th>New York Times (Frequency</th>
<th>Proportion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Sources</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Sources</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Sources</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Sources</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Sources</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14
Frequency with which Immediate Causes of Conflict Were Mentioned in 2014 war in the Gaza Strip
(Frequency | Proportion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Mentioned (Frequency</th>
<th>Proportion)</th>
<th>Not Mentioned (Frequency</th>
<th>Proportion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>BBC Online</em></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.49%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>New York Times</em></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>.40%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Haaretz</em></td>
<td>75</td>
<td>.28%</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 15
Frequency with which historical causes of Israeli-Palestinian conflict are mentioned in coverage of the 2014 war in the Gaza Strip
(Frequency | Proportion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mentioned</th>
<th>Not Mentioned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>BBC Online</em></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>New York Times</em></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Haaretz</em></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16
Solutions to Immediate Conflict or Israeli-Palestinian Conflict as a whole by Journalists in Coverage of the 2014 war in the Gaza Strip
(Frequency | Proportion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>BBC Online</em></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>New York Times</em></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Haaretz</em></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 17
Solutions offered by both sources and journalists including ceasefires in coverage of the 2014 war in the Gaza Strip
(Frequency | Proportion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BBC</th>
<th>Haaretz</th>
<th>New York Times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceasefire</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-State Solution</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 18
Articles about 2014 war in the Gaza Strip written in zero-sum tone
(Frequency | Proportion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BBC Online</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New York Times</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Haaretz</strong></td>
<td>57</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B: CODESHEET

Chad Weisman / Bias & Peace Journalism in Coverage of 2014 Israeli Invasion of Gaza Thesis

Case Number

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>1 = BBC</th>
<th>2 = Haaretz</th>
<th>3 = New York Times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Article Title/Headline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>m</th>
<th>d</th>
<th>d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Victim Headline

| 1 = Israeli | 2 = Palestinian | 3 = Both |

Aggressor Headline

| 1 = Israeli | 2 = Palestinians | 3 = Both |

Number of Paragraphs

| Israelis | Palestinian | Both |

Photograph/s of Victims

| Israeli | Palestinian |

Photograph/s of Aggressors

| Israeli | Palestinian |

Immediate Causes of Conflict mentioned

| 0 = Not mentioned | 1 = Mentioned |

Historical Causes of Conflict mentioned

| 0 = Not mentioned | 1 = Mentioned |

Solutions Offered

| 0 = No | 1 = Yes |

Article Written in a competitive (zero-sum) tone

| 0 = No | 1 = Yes |
**Israeli Sources**
Politicians
Military Officials
Government Officials
Healthcare Workers
Civilians
Journalists
Experts/think tanks
Other

**Palestinian Sources**
Politicians
Military Officials
Government Officials
Healthcare Workers
Civilians
Journalists
Experts/think tanks
Other

**US Sources**
Politicians
Military Officials
Government Officials
Healthcare Workers
Civilians
Journalists
Experts/think tanks
Other

**UK Sources**
Politicians
Military Officials
Government Officials
Healthcare Workers
Civilians
Journalists
Experts/think tanks
Other

**Other Sources**
United Nations Officials
NonGovernmental Organization Officials
NonPalestinian/Israeli Leaders
NonPalestinian/Israeli Fighters
International or Regional Politicians (Not Israeli, Palestinian, US, or UK)
International or Regional Experts/Researchers/Think Tanks
Journalists

**Solutions**
0 = None
1 = Ceasefire
2 = land for peace
3 = Two-state solution
4 = Other
APPENDIX C: CODEBOOK

INTRODUCTION:
This study aims to discern bias among three newspapers in coverage of Israel’s 2014 war in the Gaza Strip. The publications to be analyzed for the purposes of this study are: The New York Times, Haaretz, and BBC Online. Any and all articles in these publications concerning the 2014 war in the Gaza Strip are eligible for coding. The following Codebook should be used in conjunction with the Codesheet to comprise a coding instrument that can be used to derive data from the articles at hand.

VARIABLES:

1. Case number:
   This element should be used, along with the headline, to discern the individual article to be coded. For the purposes of inter-coder reliability, case numbers will be pre-assigned, however, during the process of coding the articles, the case number will be applied to each article a posteriori of coding.

2. Article Title/Headline:
   This is where the article’s title/headline (including sub-head if there is room on the sheet) should be written.

3. Date:
   This is where the date on which the article was published (or the date associated with the article on the publication’s respective website) should be written.

4. Victim Headline:
   a. Israeli
   b. Palestinian
   c. Both
   Who is the victim in the headline? Are both sides the victim? Who is the recipient of aggression from the other side?

5. Aggressor Headline:
   a. Israeli
   b. Palestinian
   c. Both
   Who is the aggressor in a given headline? Are both sides depicted acting belligerently? Who is responsible for an attack being depicted?
6. **Number of Paragraphs:**
   a. Israeli
   b. Palestinian
   c. Both

   How many paragraphs are devoted to each side (Israeli and Palestinian)? Does the paragraph mention both sides? If so, there is an available space to put the number of paragraphs that mention both sides.

7. **Number of Photograph/s of Victim/s**
   a. Israeli
   b. Palestinian

   How many photographs does the publication run with a given article that render one side or the other (Israelis or Palestinians) as victims of the conflict at hand? Representations of victimhood may include, but are not limited to, pictures of people crying/mourning, images of destruction in Gaza, images of maimed or wounded, or pictures of the Israeli boys kidnapped prior to the conflict’s beginnings.

8. **Number of Photograph/s of Aggressor/s**
   a. Israelis
   b. Palestinians

   How many photographs does the publication run with a given article that render one side or the other (Israelis or Palestinians) as aggressors in the conflict at hand? This category should include photographs of individuals involved in acts of war. Acceptable counts in this regard include pictures of Israeli soldiers, pictures of militants in Hamas’ Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades fighting, or even children throwing stones, so long as the image represents them as aggressors. Pictures of politicians should not be included as aggressors.

9. **Sources**
   a. Any sources of all respective nationalities found in the first fifteen paragraphs of the article should be marked here.
      i. Politicians – Any elected government official (prime minister, minister of Knesset [Israeli Parliament], etc.)
      ii. Military Officials – Sources are Officials who work for the military, e.g. Minister of defense, soldiers, etc.
iii. Government Officials – Sources are non-elected officials working for the government.

iv. Healthcare workers – Hospital employees, red cross employees, doctors, etc.

v. Civilians – innocent bystanders, unaffiliated individuals, victims, etc.

vi. Journalists – individuals affiliated with a news organization.

vii. Experts/Think Tanks – professors, those associated with nongovernmental organizations.

viii. Other – If the source does not fall into any of the other categories, mark this one and fill in the blank space with the nature of the source.

ix. Other Sources (Sources from countries other than the United States, Israel, Palestine, or the United Kingdom).


2. Non-governmental Organization Officials – individuals working for NGO’s in countries other than Israel, Palestine, The United States, and the United Kingdom.

3. NonPalestinian/Israeli leaders – public figures from countries other than the ones listed above

4. NonPalestinian/Israeli Fighters – individuals associated with the military, but not from any of the countries listed above.

5. International or Regional Politicians – elected public figures from countries other than the ones listed above

6. International or regional experts/researchers/ think tanks – professors/researchers from countries other than the ones listed above.

7. Journalists – individuals working for publications in countries other than the ones listed above.

8. Other – If source does not fall into any of the above categories, list in this one and fill in the blank.
10. Immediate Causes of Conflict Examined/Mentioned:

Does the article discuss the events leading up to the conflict as it unfolded? For instance, does it mention the kidnapping of three Israeli boys that led to the tension that broke out into violence? Does it mention the arrests of hundreds of Palestinians in the West Bank following the kidnapping that led to Hamas’ use of rockets against Israel? Are such causes mentioned in passing, or does the author take the time to delve deeper into the subject matter? A degree of familiarity with the conflict may not be required here, but close reading of the articles certainly is.

11. Historical Causes of Conflict Examined/Mentioned:

Does the article mention the overarching conditions that begat the violence at hand? Are the historical causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict—e.g. the desire for land, cultural differences, occupation—mentioned or examined? Again, familiarity with the conflict may not be as important as a thorough reading of each article.

12. Solutions Offered:

a. By Author excluding ceasefires.
   i. Does the author of the article offer any solutions for peace? This may be an overextension into advocacy journalism, or it may be a requirement of journalists to provide creative ideas that can be thrust into the public discourse, and facilitate the negotiation of peaceful outcomes to the violence that, at this point, has become routine. Does the article being analyzed delve into such solutions like the “two-state solution,” “land for peace,” “demilitarization of Gaza,” or “dismantlement of settlements”? Does the article offer other solutions?

b. Solutions by author including (non-humanitarian) ceasefires
   i. If any sort of solution to the conflict is listed, whether by the author or by a source, take note. This includes, ceasefires, the two-state solution, land for peace, and others. Ceasefires will undoubtedly be most common, though humanitarian and temporary ceasefires are not to be counted. Important: Look for solutions throughout the whole article, not just the first fifteen paragraphs.
13. **Article written in a Competitive (zero-sum) tone:**

Is the article framed in competitive terms? Does it seem like casualty counts are framed in terms of keeping score? Does the article treat the conflict as a winner-takes-all occurrence, rather than a participatory process? If so, take note.